ABSTRACT

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
AND MANAGEMENT THEORY
AND PRACTICE: AN EXPLORATORY
ANALYSIS

by Gary R. Gemmill

The investigation was an attempt to discover what is
involved in determining if knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences is useful to managers in solving their problems. The
investigation consisted of four major parts.

The first part of the investigation consisted of
establishing a criterion of usefulness for assessing the use-
fulness of knowledge in the behavioral sciences to management
theory and practice. The criterion selected stated that
knowledge contained in the behavioral sciences in order to be
useful to managers must enable them to resolve their behavioral
problems more efficiently and effectively. It was further
premised that only control knowledge can be used to solve such
problems.

The second part of the investigation consisted of
establishing a framework for assessing behavioral science
literature in terms of control knowledge. The framework con-
sisted of a construct of a behavioral change model and an

operationalizing process.

Gary R. Gemmill
2

The third part of the investigation consisted of
applying the framework to three areas of the behavioral sciences
to determine if they constituted control knowledge. The three
areas selected were psychotherapy, group dynamics, and need—
satisfaction psychology. The specific areas examined in psy—
chotherapy included Freud's psychoanalytic model, Ellis'
rational-emotive model, and Wolpe's conditioning therapy model.
The specific areas examined in group dynamics included Lewin's
group decision model, Likert's supervisory model, and
Roethlishberger's and Dickson's counselor model. The specific
areas examined in need—satisfaction psychology included
McClelland's need for achievement model and Argyris' inter-
personal competence model. Each of these models was described
in terms of the constructd a behavioral change model and
appraised in terms of whether they constituted control knowledge.
It was concluded that presently none of the models could be
said to be useful since they did not constitute control knowledge.

The fourth part of the investigation consisted of a study
of behavioral change models used by ten managers in an industrial
firm to handle inadequate performance. Open-ended interviews
were used to gather the data. An analysis of the data gathered
indicated that the ten managers utilized three types of change
models in coping with inadequate performance. The models they

used were extensions of their over-all administrative control

Gary R. Gemmill
3

patterns. The three control patterns were labeled freedom-

centered, authority-centered and development—centered. The
patterns were differentiated in terms of the predominant inter-
personal tool used by the manager to control and change behavior,

the manager's conception of his role, the extent of subordinate

role structuring by the manager, the extent of impersonality
between the manager and subordinate, and the handling of
inadequate performance. The managers did not attempt to sys-
tematically measure variables they manipulated to improve per-
formance or verify propositions on which manipulation was based.

They did not experiment with different alternatives to determine
if the control pattern they used was the most efficient and

effective alternative for improving performance. The control

patterns they used were not directly acquired from the behav-
ioral sciences. They were acquired from their experience as

subordinates to other managers. They tended to retain features

of control patterns they found satisfying and to change features

they found frustrating. A conceptual comparison revealed that
the models used by the managers were different from the models

examined in part three of the investigation.

On the basis of the data gathered it was not possible
to determine if the managers could increase the performance
level of subordinates by using the model analyzed in part three
rather than the models they used. It was concluded that the
models in part three and the models used by the managers have
to be made operational before a comparative experiment can be

conducted to ascertain which are more efficient and effective

in solving the behavioral problems of managers.

I. ‘45

 

 

 

 

 

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
AND MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE:

AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION

BY

Gary Robert Gemmill

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Management

1966

“uh,

an.-

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge indebtedness for the
many stimulating ideas provided by the members of
my thesis guidance committee: Dr. Eugene E.
Jennings, Chairman, Dr. Dalton McFarland, and Dr.
Darab Unwalla. A special note of thanks is due
the chairman, Dr. Eugene E. Jennings. In a few
words it would be impossible to describe the
significant influence he has had on my intellectual
growth and development during the past six years.
I hope that some day I will be able to match the
model of excellence he portrays in exploring the

psychological problems faced by managers.

ii

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

LIST OF
LIST OF
LIST OF
Chapter
I.

II.

TABLES .
ILLUSTRATIONS
APPENDICES

INTRODUCTION

Purpose . .
Premises and Propositions
Research Design . .
Organization of the Thesis

A CRITERION OF USEFULNESS FOR EVALUATING
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
TO MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Need for a Criterion for Assessing
the Contribution of the Behavioral
Sciences to Management Theory and
Practice .

The Importance of Goals for

the Behavioral Sciences

The Control Position. .

The Non-Control Position . .
The Relationship Between Prediction
and Control . . . . . . .

The Motives of Social Scientists
Empirical Determination Versus Control
The Applied Social Scientist and

the Problem of Values . . .

The Applied Areas of the Behavioral
Sciences

Summary .

iii

Page
ii
vii
viii

ix

F‘G‘k1P‘ H

23

23

25

3O
37

4O
42
45

49

52
54

Chapter Page

III. A CONVERSION FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSLATING
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE INTO

ADMINISTRATIVE TOOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
The Need for a Conversion Framework
from a Managerial Point of View . . . . . 55
The Need for a Conversion Framework
from an Applied Science Point of View . . 61
A Conversion Framework: The Construct
of a Behavioral Change Model . . . . . . 69
The Operationalizing Process . . . . . . 82

The Simple Human Relations Model:
An Illustration of the Operationalizing

Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Analysis of Propositions B.3 and B.4 . . 89
IV. PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC MODELS FOR CHANGING
BEHAVIOR: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION C:1A . 92
Analysis of Proposition C:1A . . . . . . 92
The Freudian Psychoanalytic Model . . . . 93
The Rational—Emotive Model... . . . . . . 114
The Conditioning Model . . . . . . . . . 137
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
V. ENVIRONMENTALISTIC MODELS FOR CHANGING
BEHAVIOR: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION C:1B . 155
The Group Decision Model . . . . . . . . 156
The Supervisory Model . . . . . . . . . . 165
The Counselor Model . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
VI. NEED-SATISFACTION MODELS FOR CHANGING
BEHAVIOR: AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION C:lC . 186
Need—Satisfaction Models . . . . . . . . 186
The Need for Achievement Model . . . . . 187
The Interpersonal Competence Model . . . 202
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
VII. THE FRAMEWORK UTILIZED TO ANALYZE THE
IMPLICIT BEHAVIORAL CHANGE MODELS OF THE
TEN MANAGERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
D PROPOSITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
The Need for an Empirical Study . . . . . 246

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Chapter Page

Implicit Behavioral Change Models:

An Analysis of Proposition D.2 . . . . . 247
Control Patterns: The Unit of Analysis . 248
Limitations of the Control Pattern
as a Unit of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 249
Control Pattern Variables . . . . . . . 250
A Summary Comparison of the Three
Control Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
VIII. ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM-CENTERED

CONTROL PATTERN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
The Manager's Rationale for the Pattern . 257
The Manager's Conception of His Role . . 258
Extent of Role Structuring . . . . . . . 259

The Experiencing of a Low Degree of
Role Structuring by Subordinate Managers. 260

Impersonality . . . . . . . . 261
The Experiencing of Impersonality

by Subordinate Managers . . . . . 261
The Handling of Inadequate Performance . 263
The Experiencing of Ambiguity in

Evaluation by the Subordinate Managers . 265
The Experiencing of Pressure by

the Subordinate Managers . . . . . . . . 267
The Problem of Self- Motivation . . . . 269
The Ideationally Obsolete: A Special

Case of Inadequate Performance . . . . . 270
Modeling as a Mechanism for

Self-Motivating . . . . . . . . . . . 273

The Psychodynamics of the Freedom-

Centered Control Pattern from the

Point of View of the Manager . . . . . . 274
The Psychodynamics of the Freedom-

Centered Control Pattern from the

Point of View of Subordinates . . . . 278
The Relationship of the Freedom—Centered
Control Pattern to Existing Theory

and Research . . . . . . . . . 281
Summary and Analysis of D Propositions . 291

Chapter Page

IX. ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORITY-CENTERED

CONTROL PATTERN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
The Manager's Conception of His Role . . 294
Extent of Role Structuring . . . . . . . 296
Impersonality . . . . . . . . . . 298
The Handling of Inadequate Performance . 300
The Changing of Behavior Through
Authority: An Illustration . . . . . . . 304
Money as an Incentive . . . . . . . . 307
Changing the Behavior of Peers . . . . . 309
The Psychodynamics of the Authority—

Centered Control Pattern . . . . . . 310

The Relationship of the Authority-
Centered Control Pattern to Existing

Theory and Research . . . . . . . . . . 312
Summary and Analysis of D Propositions . 319
x. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT-CENTERED

CONTROL PATTERN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
The Manager's Conception of His Role . . 321
Extent of Role Structuring . . . . . . . 322
Impersonality . . . . . . . . . . . 324
The Handling of Inadequate Performance . 325
Changing Performance Criteria as a
Mechanism for Changing Behavior . . . . . 332
Changing the Behavior of Peers . . . . . 333
Recognition as an Incentive . . . . . . . 334
Psychodynamics of the Development-
Centered Pattern . . . . . . 336

The Relationship of the Development-
Centered Pattern to Existing Theory

and Research . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Summary and Analysis of D Propositions . 341
XI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 343
A Criterion of Usefulness . . . . . . . . 343
A Conversion Framework . . . . . . . 344
Examination of Existing Knowledge
in the Behavioral Sciences . . . . . . 349
Empirical Determination of Control
Knowledge Possessed by Managers . . . . . 356
Experimental Comparison . . . . . . . . . 369
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table Page

5.1 Changes in Consumption Behavior of
New Mothers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

6.1 Suggested Solution to Emotional Outburst . . 231

6.2 Perceived Importance of Interpersonal
Abilities by the Eighteen Executives . . . . 237

11.1 A Comparison of Possible Determinants of
Inadequate Performance . . . . . . . . . . . 362

vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

The Didactic Technique

Comparison of the Two Experimental Techniques
for Changing Behavior

Subordinates' Perception of the Supervisor's
Behavior

Scoring Mechanism for the Need for
Achievement .

The Interpersonal Competence Model--
Behavior Pattern U.

The Interpersonal Competence Model——
Behavior Pattern D. . .

A Comparison of the Three Control Patterns

viii

Page

129

157

167

189

218

219

256

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix Page
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVIEW . . . . . . . . 372
B. THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT . . . . . . . . . . 375

ix

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer the
question: can knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences help managers solve their behavioral problems
more efficiently and effectively? The thesis is that
this question can only be answered through:

1. developing a criterion of usefulness
for knowledge contained in the

behavioral sciences.

2. developing a framework for converting
such knowledge into a form which

managers can use .

3. examining the existing knowledge in
the behavioral sciences using the
aforementioned criterion and frame—

work.

4. determining the range of behavioral
problems managers encounter and how

they presently cope with them.

5. experimentally comparing items 3 and

4 in terms of item 1.

This thesis is defended through establishing a set of
premises and prOpositions about the relationship between
the behavioral sciences and the management of an organ-
ization. The premises are statements assumed to be

true for the sake of studying the consequences that
follow from them. The propositions are statements that

can be said to be true or false.
Premises and Propositions

The premises and propositions to be analyzed

are grouped under the following five areas.

Criterion Qf Usefulness:
The A Premises

Premise A.1:

To determine if knowledge contained in
the behavioral sciences is useful to
managers in handling their behavioral
problems, a criterion of usefulness

must be constructed.
Premise A.2:

Knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences is useful to managers if it
helps them solve their behavioral

problems more efficiently and

 

effectively than they could solve them

without using such knowledge.
Premise A.3:

Knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences can only help managers solve
their behavioral problems more
efficiently and effectively if it is
control knowledge that is superior

to the knowledge the managers already

possess.

Conversion Framework:
The B Propositions

Proposition B.1:

Management theory and practice and the
behavioral sciences have not identified
the problems managers face in converting
knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences into a tool they can use for

changing behavior.
Proposition 3.2:

Knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences cannot be used by managers

or by applied social scientists without
it being converted into a different

form.

Proposition B.3:

The construct of a behavioral change model
is capable of converting behavioral
science knowledge into a form in which
managers can use it for solving their

behavioral problems.
Proposition B.4:

For a behavioral change model to be useful
it must meet the following necessary and

sufficient conditions:

a) it must contain variables that a

change agent can control.

b) it must possess an objective
system for measuring the values

of the variables.

c) it must state valid relationships

between the variables.

[Examination.g§ Existing
Behavioral Science Knowledge:
The‘gugropositions

Proposition C.1:

Attempts to change behavior in the
applied areas of the behavioral sciences
do not presently meet the necessary and
sufficient conditions of a useful

behavioral change model.

Proposition C.2:

Attempts to change behavior in the applied
areas of the behavioral sciences consist
of the manipulation of the values of
individual variables, environmental

variables, or both.

Empirical Determination of Managers'
Approaches £9 Behavioral Change:
The Q Propositions

Proposition D.1:

To determine the usefulness of knowledge
contained in the behavioral sciences to
managers, the behavioral problems managers
face and how they cope with them must be

determined.
Proposition D.2:

Managers implicitly use behavioral change
models in handling inadequate performance

on the part of their subordinates.
Proposition D.3:

The implicit behavioral change models
managers use in handling inadequate

performance:

a) are not based on knowledge they

acquire from the behavioral sciences.

b) lack dbjective measurement systems.

Experimental Comparison:
The E Proposition

Proposition B.1:

If the behavioral change models managers
use are different from those present in
the applied areas of the behavioral
sciences, an experiment must be conducted
to determine which ones are most
efficient and effective in helping them

resolve their behavioral change problems.

Research Design

 

The research design for analyzing these premises

and propositions is as follows.

Criterion of Usefulness
Premises

 

Since the A premises are premises, they are not
to be analyzed. Chapter II, however, provides a rationale
for them and demonstrates the consequences that follows

from them.

Conversion Framework
Propositions

Propositions 8.1 and 8.2 are analyzed in Chapter

III through applying the A premises to selected

 

 

literature dealing with the application of behavioral
science knowledge to management theory and practice.

The analysis attempts to answer the following questions.
Can managers directly apply knowledge contained in

the behavioral sciences? What is involved in applying
such knowledge? Propositions B.3 and B.4 are analyzed
through the use of deductive logic. They represent a
conversion framework for assessing the behavioral

sciences in terms of control knowledge.

Examination-Q: Existing
Knowledge Propositions

The C propositions are analyzed by applying
the A premises and the B prOpositions to selected
literature in the applied areas of the behavioral
sciences. The literature selected represents three
applied areas: psychotherapeutics, group dynamics, and
need-satisfaction psychology. The general rationale
for the selection of these three areas is that on an
.a priori basis they seem to represent attempts to
change behavior through changing individual variables,
environmental variables, and both. The specific
literature selected and the rationale for its selection

is as follows.

Psychotherapeutic Models

The three psychotherapeutic models analyzed are
Freud's psychoanalytic model, Albert Ellis' rational-
emotive model, and I ‘Wolpe's conditioning model. There
were two major reasons for selecting these three forms
of therapy for analysis of the C propositions. First,
on an.g priori basis it seemed that they would deal
exclusively with changing the behavior of an individual
by changing the values of individual variables.
Second, they represent verbal models in which words
are used to change behavior.

The specific proposition analyzed in Chapter IV
is:

Proposition C:1A

In terms of the A premisesand proposition
B.4, these three psychotherapeutic models

are not presently useful to managers.
The proposition is analyzed by describing each model and
then appraising it in terms of the A premisesand

proposition B.4.

Environmentalistic Models

The three environmentalistic models analyzed
are Kurt Lewin's group decision model, Rensis Likert's
supervisory model, and Roethlishberger's and Dickson's
counselor model. The reason for selecting these three
models for the analysis of the C proposition is that
on anlg priori basis they seemed to deal exclusively
with changing the behavior of an individual by changing
the values of environmental variables.

The specific proposition analyzed in Chapter

Proposition C:1B:

In terms of the A premises and prOposition B.4,
these three environmentalistic models are not

presently useful to managers.
The proposition is analyzed by describing each model and
then appraising it in terms of the A premises and

proposition B.4.
Need-Satisfaction Models

The two need-satisfaction models analyzed are
David McClelland's need for achievement model and Chris

Argyris' interpersonal competence model. The reason

10

for selecting these two models for the analysis of the
C propositions is that on an §_priori basis they seemed
to deal with changing the behavior of an individual
by changing the values of both individual and
environmental variables.

The specific proposition analyzed in Chapter
VI is:

Proposition C:1C:

In terms oftheiA.premises and proposition B.4,
these two need-satisfaction models are not

presently useful to managers.
The proposition is analyzed by describing each model
and then appraising it in terms of the A premises and

proposition B.4.

‘Empirical Determination 9; Managers'
Approaches £9 Behavioral Change
Propositions

The D propositions are analyzed by means of an
exploratory study of ten managers from one company.
The purpose of the study was threefold. First, to
determine the general types of problems the managers
perceive themselves as having with other participants

in their organizations which require them to somehow

11

change their behavior. Second, to determine how they

go about making changes in the behavior of the participants
‘they perceive as causing the problems. Third, to deter-
mine how they go about handling inadequate performance

on the part of subordinates. In short, the study was an
attempt to discover and describe the variables the ten
managers use in defining behavioral problems and developing

techniques to cope with them.

The Research Instrument

 

The research instrument used in the study was an
open-ended interview format. The choice of this format
as an information gathering instrument was based on two
factors. First, the study was designed to identify some
of the variables managers used to conceptualize their
behavioral problems and coping techniques. Because of
this it was felt that an open-ended interview format
would be the most appropriate research instrument since
it allows respondents to reveal their natural frame of
reference and hence give more true-to—life replies.
Secondly, the open-ended interview format is the most

appropriate research instrument for exploring areas

12
where there is little basis for knowing either what
questions to ask or how to formulate them.1

Once deciding on the use of the open-ended
interview format, the next step was to decide on what
kinds of questions to ask the managers. A direct
approach to questioning the managers was ruled out on
an.§ priori basis. If managers were asked: ”What
types of problems do you have which involve behavioral
change?", chances are they would not asSign a specific
meaning to the question. It is outside their frame of
reference and too technical to elicit the information
sought. Consequently it was decided to use indirect
questions which seemed on ania priori basis to be capable
of revealing the managers' notions about behavioral
problems and change techniques.

The specific questions used and the information
each question was designed to provide are reported in
Appendix B. The general research strategy underlying
their choice is all that will be mentioned here. First,
it was decided that the questions used should serve as
relatively ambiguous stimuli to get the managers to

1R. L. Kahn and C. F. Cannel, The Dynamics 9f

Interviewing: Theory, Techniques, and Cases (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

 

1 n.1h5i1fl1lllg
—wI-l!...-. #

l3
discuss certain areas that were thought on an.§ priori
basis to involve behavioral problems and change
techniques. Therefore, "yes" and "no" types of questions
were minimized. When they were used, additional probes
were designed to discover the reasons behind the "yes"
or "no."

Secondly, it was decided that the questions
should be arranged in sets based on the funneling process.
In the funneling process sets of questions dealing with a
certain area are arranged in an order which starts from
very general questions and proceeds to very specific
questions. An example of the funneling process used is
as follows:

We recently conducted a study in which we found
that some managers felt that one of the most
important aspects of their job was to search for

areas which need changing, as well as to formulate
new objectives to be achieved.

In connection with this, they felt that one of
the most difficult problems they faced was
trying to get other people in their organization
to see the need for the change and to go along
with them in making the needed changes. They
thought that one of the key abilities a manager
must have is the ability to get other people to
change their behavior.

 

1The funneling process is discussed in F. N.
Kerlinger, Foundations pf Behavioral Research (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), pp. 471-73.

1911... h

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I.

14

In terms of your experience, what do you think
about this?

Why do you think some people resist change?

How do you think managers can go about getting
people to change their behavior or ways of
doing things?

Can you recall anytime in the past when you
were faced with a problem like this?

What did you do about it?
In the sequence of questions following the initial state-
ments the questions move from very general ones to very
_specific ones.

The rationale for using this funneling process is
twofold. First, because the general questions are ambiguous
in scope they permit the manager to structure his response
in the way he thinks is appropriate or meaningful to him.
Hence, he can reveal his natural frame of reference.
Secondly, the specific questions which follow the general
questions provide a measure of the possible gap between
how the manager says he behaves and how he actually behaves.
For example, if he were asked how he generally handles
mistakes that his subordinates make, he might state how
he ideally thinks they should be handled rather than how
he actually handles them. By moving from this general

question area to a more specific one some measure of how

15
he actually handles mistakes is possible. For example,
after asking him how he generally handles mistakes, he
might be asked for a recent example involving his
handling of a mistake. This would provide information

on how he actually handles mistakes.

The Interview Procedure

Each manager at the beginning of the interview
was to be informed about the general purpose of the
study and the reason he was selected to participate in
it. A Verbatim transcript of the introduction to the
interviews is reported in appendix A. The introduction
was designed to put the manager at ease and to c0pe
with any uncertainty he might have about what was going
to be done with the information he provided. He was
also to be told how the interview would proceed and
that he could answer all the questions on the basis of
his experience.

The interview was to begin with those questions
that the researcher assumed to be the least threatening
to the manager (see appendix B). In general, the inter-
view was to proceed from questions about his

subordinates to, questions about the managers he had

l6
worked under to, questions about the nature of his
role as manager. However, it was decided not to
always maintain the exact order of questioning reported
in appendix B. Whenever possible the manager was to
be allowed to lead the interview. If he mentioned
other areas in the interview format while responding
to a question, it was decided that the researcher
should step out of the question order of the format
in order to take advantage of the manager's natural
frame of reference.

The researcher in conducting the interview
was to refrain from making any type of evaluative
comment to avoid putting the manager on the defensive,
as well as, to avoid putting words into his mouth.

The researcher was to minimize all his comments to
prevent leading the manager's thoughts.

It was decided to record the interview with a
tape recorder. The reason for this decision was that
it was thought that if notes were taken, or the
researcher attempted to memorize the interview content,
his perception would be selective resulting in the loss

of information that might later on prove to have been

l7
meaningful. A survey of the research literature failed
to uncover experiments done on the relative effective—
ness of notetaking, memorization, or recording in
producing accurate information. One researcher
suggested that recorders were effective with high level
executives but not with supervisors since they tend to
freeze in the presence of a recorder.1 Because of
inconclusive evidence that recorders are not as
effective as note-taking or memorization it was decided
to record the interviews.

Each manager was to be given a choice as to
whether he wanted the interview recorded (see appendix
B). To reduce any possible feelings of discomfort a
manager might experience in having his conversation
recorded he was to be told why the researcher wanted
to use the recorder. The recorder was to be a small
transistorized unit that could be placed outside his
line of vision. It was assumed that these conditions
would decrease any discomfort he might experience and
that in his conversation he would not hesitate to express

his real opinion.

 

C. Argyris, Understanding Qgganizational
Behavior (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press, 1960), p. 55.

18

Selection 9; the Managers
1:2 _IE Studied

To carry out the study it was decided to inter—
view ten managers from one company. The reasons for
selecting this type of sample were threefold. First,
intensive interviews were to be conducted, so in the
interest of economy the sample had to be small.

Second, the study was to be exploratory, hence the
size of the sample and its representativeness was not
of immediate importance. Third, the study was
designed to find out if the types of behavioral
problems and techniques used by managers varied within

one company.
Thelgample.§elected

The company selected for study was engaged in
the manufacturer of agricultural and industrial equip—
ment and was a division of a larger national corporation.
In 1965, the gross sales of the division ran into the
millions and it employed 750 people in its plant and
administrative offices. Division profits had been
declining over the past two years and in an effort to

improve performance many technological and organizational

19
changes were taking place. For example, a computer
system Was being installed and value analysis teams
were being instituted.

Access to the company was gained through an
acquaintance who was an assistant to the general
manager of the division. He secured permission to
conduct the study.

After permission was granted, ten managers out
of a possible fifteen from the top two authority levels
of the division were selected to be interviewed. The
criterion used to select the ten managers was that
in total they represent as many diverse functional
areas within the division as possible. The reason for
using this criterion was to find out if the types of
behavioral problems and techniques used by the managers
were unique to their functional areas.

The ten managers selected included the general
manager of the division and nine other managers who
reported directly to him. The functional areas
represented by these nine subordinate managers and the

number selected from each area is as follows:

20

 

 

Number of

Functional Areas Managers
Accounting 1
Personnel 1
Research & Development 1
Production Control 1
Manufacturing 1
Product Management 4
Total Number of Subordinate Managers 9

The ten managers ranged in age from thirty-nine to sixty—
two with the average age being fifty. In terms of the
number of years spent working for the corporation, the
range was from ten years to thirty-five years with the
average being twenty years. Five of the managers had
college degrees and five of them had only high school
diplomas.

Once the ten managers to be interviewed were
selected they were contacted and informed about the
general nature of the study. They were asked whether
they would be willing to participate. All ten of them
were willing to participate and were asked to select

a one or two hour block of time for the interview.

21

Experimental Comparison
Proposition

The E proposition is analyzed in Chapter XI
through comparing the analysis of the C propositions

with the analysis of the D propositions.

Organization 9f the Thesis

 

Chapter II consists of an analysis of the A
premises and the rationale on which they are based.
Chapter III consists of an analysis of the B pro—
positions. The analysis is based on an appraisal of
selected literature dealing with the relationship
between management theory and practice and the
behavioral sciences. Chapter IV consists of an analysis
of proposition C:lA. The analysis is accomplished
through describing the psychotherapeutic models of
Freud, Ellis and Wolpe and evaluating them in terms of
the A premises and proposition B.4. Chapter V consists
of an analysis of proposition C:lB. The analysis is
accomplished through describing the environmentalistic
models of Lewin, Likert, Roethlishberger and Dickson
and evaluating them in terms of the A premises and

prOposition B.4. Chapter VI consists of an analysis

22
of proposition CtLB. The analysis is accomplished through
describing the need-satisfaction models of McClelland and
Argyris and evaluating them in terms of the A premises
and proposition B.4. Chapter VII consists of an
analysis of the D propositions. The analysis is
accomplished through evaluating the information
provided by the exploratory study of the ten managers.
Chapters VIII, IX and X consist of a description and
evaluation of the techniques the ten managers used to
change the behavior of other participants in their
organization. Chapter XI consists of a summary and
comparison of the analysis of the C propositions with
the analysis of the D propositions. The E proposition

is analyzed and areas for future research are delineated.

CHAPTER II
A CRITERION OF USEFULNESS FOR EVALUATING
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES TO MANAGEMENT THEORY
AND PRACTICE

The Need for §_Criterion for Assessing the
Contribution 9f_the Behavioral Sciences
£9_Management Theory and Practice

To determine if the applied areas of the behavioral

SCiences have made, or are capable of making, a contribu-

ticmn to management theory and practice a criterion of what

CCulstitutes a contribution must be developed. Obviously,

without such a criterion it would be impossible to

ascertain if the behavioral sciences make a contribution
t£> management theory and practice. For this reason
Premise A.1 is necessary.

Premises A.2 and A.3 represent a twofold criterion
for assessing the contribution of the behavioral sciences
to management theory and practice. Premise A.2
delineates a pragmatic criterion. It states that knowl—

edge contained in the behavioral sciences is useful to

23

24

managers if it helps them solve their behavioral problems

more efficiently and effectively than they could solve

them without using such knowledge. The implication of

this premise for the ensuing analysis is that it leads
to a fourfold examination of the relationship between

behavioral knowledge contained in the behavioral sciences

and management theory and practice.
First, it leads to an analysis of the existing

knowledge contained in the behavioral sciences. Second,

it: requires an analysis and description of the behavioral

Problems that confront managers. Third, it leads to an

analysis and description of the behavioral knowledge

managers possess. And lastly, if the behavioral know-

ledge possessed by managers is different from that
ZPIKesent in the behavioral sciences an experiment must
.bEE conducted to determine which knowledge is the most
efficient and effective in resolving the managers
}3ehaviora1 problems. Hence, premise A.2 leads to an

analysis of the existing behavioral science literature,

the behavioral problems managers confront, the behavioral

knowledge they possess, and a comparison of behavioral

knowledge contained in the behavioral sciences with

 

25
that which managers possess. In accordance with premise
A.2, if the knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences is more efficient and effective in solving
the behavioral problems of managers it is useful to
them.

Premise A.3 states that knowledge contained in
the behavioral sciences can only help managers solve
their behavioral problems more efficiently and effectively
if it is control knowledge which is superior to the
knowledge the managers already possess. The questions
of importance in providing a rationale for this
premise are: What is control knowledge? Why is it
only useful to managers? The remainder of this chapter

will attempt to answer these questions.

The Importance of Goals for the Behavioral Sciences

Among social scientists there exists two pre-
dominant positions about the ultimate goal of the
behavioral sciences. One position contends that the
ultimate goal is to control human behavior. This will
be referred to as the control position. The other
position contends that the ultimate goal is to predict

human behavior. This will be referred to as the

26
non—control position. An examination of each of these
positions is necessary in order to determine if they
make any difference for develOping a criterion for
assessing the usefulness of the behavioral sciences
to management theory and practice.

The ensuing discussion of the control and non-
control positions regarding the goals of the
behavioral sciences may in some respects appear
anthropomorphic. It may give the impression that
"behavioral sciences" are independent objects which
have the human attribute of being goal seeking mechanisms.
Of course nothing could be further from the truth. The
goals of the behavioral sciences, or more generally
science,are set by men. Therefore, when one speaks
of the goals of the behavioral sciences one is referring
to how certain men have formulated them.

It is only possible to examine how different men
articulate the goals since there is no way of "proving"
that science has goals, or what its goals should be.

The crucial issue is if different definitions of goals
result in different behavior on the part of social

scientists. In discussing the non—control and control

27
positions it will be suggested that each position will
result in different behavior on the part of social
scientists.

For example, a social scientist who articulates
goals for the behavioral sciences of description,
prediction and control of some social phenomenon
focuses his attention and efforts on trying to achieve
these goals. To the degree he can describe, predict
and control the phenomenon he investigates, he has
achieved the goals. Hence goals serve as a reference
point for measuring how well he is achieving the goals,
and provide a way of rechanneling his efforts if the
goals are not being achieved.

It is possible, of course, to take issue with
the specific goals postulated by different social
scientists. This will be done in discussing the control
and non—control position. It is not possible, however,
to dispense with the statement that there must be some
type of goal toward which social scientists expend their
efforts. A social scientist, for example, by postu-
lating goals of description, prediction and control

channels his behavior into achieving these goals.

28

If they failed to direct his behavior, they would be
empty goals and an examination of the goals he actually
uses to channel his efforts would have to be made.

People within and without a given discipline
appraise its progress by the goals they attribute to it.
They may, for example, assess the achievement of the
behavioral sciences in terms of the amount of control
knowledge it accumulates. Laymen and some social
scientist who have used this goals for appraisal have
been disillusioned with the achievements of the behavioral
sciences. They look around them and see all kinds of
indicators which suggest that the behavioral sciences
contain no useful knowledge. Crime, war, hatred,
poverty and mental illness abounds. People still
continue to smoke cigarettes even though they are
allegedly pathogenic for them. Surely, they reason,
if there were any substantive knowledge in the behavioral
sciences it would be possible to ameliorate these
social "sicknesses."

Although this assessment may be "true" it
certainly does not refute the goals or mean that they

can never be realized. It simply suggests that the

29
proper means for achieving the control goals have not
yet been discovered. Perhaps, the "causes" of these
sicknesses have not yet been found. In sum, these
people seem to be dealing primarily with what the state
of the behavioral sciences is now, not what it can be
in the future. And as Skinner has so aptly stated:

Certainly no one is prepared to say now
what a science of behavior can or cannot
accomplish eventually. Advance estimates
of the limits of soience have generally

proved inaccurate. The issue is in the

long run pragmatic: we cannot tell until
we have tried.

Moreover, these people are appraising the
behavioral sciences in terms of an important value.
Namely, the behavioral sciences should produce know-
ledge which is "useful" for solving contemporary
social problems. As Bierstedt puts it:

Indeed, I should assert with some

enthusiasm that the ultimate test of all

knowledge is its social use and
consequences.2

 

1B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior

(New YOrk: Macmillan, 1953), p. 20.

R. Bierstedt, "Social Science and Public
Service," in Applied Sociology: Opportunities and
Problems, ed. A. W. Gouldner and S. M. Milier
(New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 419.

30
Hence, these people judge the behavioral sciences as
not useful because they do not provide control know-
ledge which would help solve contemporary social

problems.

The Control Position

 

B. F. Skinner is a representative of the control
position. He articulates the goals of science in the
following manner:

Science is more than the mere description
of events as they occur. It is an attempt to
discover order, to show that certain events
stand in lawful relations to other events.

No practical technology can be based upon
science until such relations have been
discovered. But order is not only a possible
end product, it is a working assumption
which must be accepted at the very start.

We cannot apply the methods of science to a
subject matter which is assumed to move
about capriciously. Science not only
describes, it predicts. It deals not only
with the past but also with the future. Nor
is prediction the last work: To the extent
that relevant conditions can be altered, or
otherwise controlled, the future can be
controlled. If we are to use the methods

of science in the field of human affairs,

we must assume that behavior is lawful and
determined. We must expect to discover that
what a man does is the result of specifiable
conditions and that once these conditions
have been discovered, we can anticipate and
to some extent determine his actions.

 

1Skinner,2p. cit., p. 6.

31
The three goals postulated by Skinner are sequential in
nature. Science moves from description to prediction

to control.
Descriptive Knowledge

The description goal that Skinner assigns to the
behavioral sciences is concerned with the accumulation of
descriptive knowledge pertaining to human behavior.
Descriptive knowledge defines a variable and describes
its frequency in the real world. A social scientist,
for example, might be concerned with acquiring descriptive
knowledge of the amount of job satisfaction present in a
particular occupational group. To acquire this knowe
ledge, he must define job satisfaction in measurable
terms and then apply the Operational definition to the
occupational group to determine its actual incident.

He might define job satisfaction as statements
made by members of the occupational group that indicate
they like their job. To measure satisfaction, he would,
perhaps, ask the members: "Do you like your job?"

If they answer yes, by definition they would be classified
as being satisfied with their jobs. Descriptive knowl—

edge of job satisfaction would state, in accordance

32
with the measurement device used, the frequency with
which members of the occupational group say they are

satisfied with their jobs.

Predictive Knowledge

The predictive goal is concerned with the
accumulation of predictive knowledge. Predictive knowl-
edge. constitutes a statement of how two variables are
related in time so that given the value of one variable,
the value of the other variable can be determined. A
social scientist, for example, might want to acquire
predictive knowledge about the relationship between job
satisfaction and employee turnover. Predictive knowlr
_edge: of the relationship would tell him.how changes
in job satisfaction affect employee turnover.

When investigating the relationship between rate
of employee turnover and degree of job satisfaction, the
social scientist would be interested in both the direction
of the relationship and the magnitudes of each variable.
Direction deals with whether they are negatively, or
positively, or neutrally related to each other. If turn-
over was positively related to job satisfaction, it

would be possible to state that a high turnover rate

33
is associated with a high degree of job satisfaction.
If the relationship was negative, a high turnover rate
would be associated with a low degree of job satis-
faction. If the relationship was neutral, there would
be no discernible association between the two variables.

To make predictive statements, a time dimension
is added to the association so that the statement of
association changes form and the possibility of a
curvalinear relationship transpires. If the relation-
ship is positive the predictive statement is: if the
degree of job satisfaction increases over time, then the
rate of turnover will increase. If the relationship is
negative the statement is: if the degree of job satis—
faction increases over time, then the rate of turnover
will decrease. If the relationship is curvalinear the
statement is: if the degree of job satisfaction
increases over time, then the rate of turnover will
first decrease and then increase. These predictive
statements represent the possible relationships between
two variables in terms of the direction in which they

move in regards to each other.

34

It is often possible to predict the relationship
of variables without predicting their relative magnitudes.
Magnitude deals with how the amount, or degree, of each
variable is related to other variables. A social
scientist is not only interested in predicting that
when the value of one variable increases, the value of
the other variable will decrease. He is also interested
in how much each will increase or decrease. If magnitude
Could be predicted the predictive statement might read:
If job satisfaction increases from a value of one to a
Value of two, then the rate of turnover will decrease
from a value of ten to a value of five. Very few
Predictive statements in the behavioral sciences are of
this form. Most of them are simply predictive statements
of the direction in which the variables move in relation-

ship to each other.

‘Control Knowledge

Some social scientists feel that when the pre—
dicztion goal is achieved their role is over. MacIver,

fOr example, states that:

1.: ‘4‘1

} I Inn I.“

 

35

All our investigating is a search for
relationships and all our science is the
knowledge of systems of relations. The
more we know, the more widely and more
fully do we apprehend things as related
to others and things as themselves systems
of relations.

IBut other social scientists such as Skinner contend
tihat this is only an intermediary step in achieving
tihe ultimate goal: control over the relationships

being investigated.

Brown and Ghiselli define the control goal in

the following manner:

As an aim of science, control refers to
the manipulation of the conditions determining
a phenomenon in order to achieve some desired

end.

Hence, a control goal for the behavioral sciences deals
withacquiring knowledge that indicates how relationships
1Pe-tween variables can be altered to achieve some desired
State of behavior. To state that a social scientist

1Has acquired control knowledge is to imply that he has

‘

1R. M. MacIver, Social Causation (New York:
Ginn and Company, 1942), pp. 97-98.

2c. w. Brown and E. E. Ghiselli, Scientific
.Methodiig Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955),
p. 41.

 

36
diascovered the determinants of some behavioral phenomenon
.arufl that they are amenable to his control.

There is an important difference between
prediction and control in the behavioral sciences.
Prediction does not always lead to the possibility of
cxantrol. For example, a predictive statement such as
a. high degree of job satisfaction leads to low employee
turnover is simply a relating of the description of the
'tvwo variables. By itself the statement is of little
use to someone interested in developing a high degree
cxf job satisfaction. It does not indicate, as a
CHDritrol statement would, how a high degree of job
Satisfaction could be developed.

A control statement not only indicates the
r‘elationship between variables but also its determinants
Mflnich are subject to control by man. It describes a
Irreferred pattern of behavior and how the pattern can
13e achieved. For example, if low employee turnover

was a preferred pattern of behavior and was known to
be a function of job satisfaction, the control statement

might read:

37

To decrease employee turnover, increase
job satisfaction. To increase job satis-
faction the following conditions must be
established. . . . These conditions can
be established through. . . .
TWTUS, control statements are different from predictive

stuatements. They specify an end to which predictive

knowledge is to be applied and how it is to be applied.
The Non—Control Position

There is disagreement among social scientists
over whether the goal of the behavioral sciences should
.EEEJ or is in fact, control of human behavior. An example
CDf’ a social scientist who adheres to a non-control
Position is Chinoy. He claims that:

The goal of science is the building of

theory, a body of logically interrelated
propositions that assert determinate
relations amont the phenomena being studied.1
bhowhere in the statement is there an implication that
"Theory" is to be used for controlling human behavior.
‘Also it does not indicate if there is any purpose behind
"the building of theory."

Stated differently, Chinoy's statement does not

answer the question of why the social scientist should

g

 

1E. Chinoy, Society: 'AQ Introduction 59 Sociology
(New York: Random House, 1961), p. 17.

 

1h. "‘4 .

 

38
build a theory. Is it only because there is some
intrinsic satisfaction accuring to him for doing it?

Or is it intended to be used by someone to solve some
problems? Or is it for both of these reasons? In
short, of what utility is the theory once it is
constructed?

Premises A.2 and A.3 state that a theory only
has utility to the extent that it can be applied to the
real world and allow mankind to achieve improvements.
Improvement is the meaning and significance of postu-
lating a control goal for the behavioral sciences.

Kerlinger has a non—control View which is
similar to Chinoy's. He states that:

If we said that the aim of science is

the betterment of mankind, most readers would
quickly read the words and accept them. But

the basic aim of science is not the better-
ment of mankind. It is theory.

A theory is a set of interrelated
constructs (concepts), definitions, and
propositions that present a systematic View
of phenomena by specifying relations among
variables, with the purpose of explaining
and predicting the phenomena.

He goes on to state that theory implies prediction and

that prediction implies control.

 

1F. N. Kerlinger, Foundations 9; Behavioral

Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964),
p. 11.

 

39

A number of questions are raised by Kerlinger's
point of view. First, is the goal of control to better
mankind as Skinner claims and Kerlinger denies?
Second,can, as Kerlinger claims, theory be a goal in
itself with no other purpose? Third, why cannot the
betterment of mankind be the basic aim of the behavioral
sciences? What difference would it make if the better—
ment of mankind was or was not the ultimate goal of the
behavioral sciences?

Kerlinger seems to forget that the aim, or goal,
of the behavioral sciences is what one defines it to be.
Readers who quickly read the words “the aim of science
is the betterment of mankind" and accepts them, have
defined this as the aim. Subsequently for them it is
the aim while for Kerlinger it is not. The important
question is whether it makes any difference if it is
or is not the ultimate aim. If it does not, then
attempts to define the aim are meaningless. Kerlinger
does not, however, mention why the basic aim of science
can not be the betterment of mankind, and hence sheds
no light on what difference it makes as to how the aim

is viewed.

40

The Relationship Between Prediction and Control

Kerlinger's assertion that control is implied by
prediction is somewhat erroneous simply because prediction
does not always imply control. A doctor, for example,
may be able to predict that a patient with a certain
magnitude of illness will die in six months, and yet
this knowledge may not allow him to prevent (control)
the occurrence. Prevention, or control, only comes
after he has isolated the determinants of the illness
and can exert control over their magnitude and direction.
Thus prediction does not necessarily imply control.

Prediction simply means that if one variable
has such and such a value, the other variable will have
such and such a value. It does not mean that someone
can exert control over the values of either variable,
nor does it necessarily explain why they have their
respective values. So in this sense, postulating a
control goal for the behavioral sciences can make a
difference in the behavior of a social scientist. If
he adheres to a non-control goal, his task may terminate
when he describes an association between variables.

He may not go on to investigate how the values of the

41
variables can be manipulated to attain some preferred
end, or how the predictive knowledge can be utilized.

The crucial issue, then, is whether it is
possible to have a theory in the behavioral sciences
which is not capable of leading to human betterment.
Certainly, applied areas of the behavioral sciences
like psychiatry seek to better mankind through
contructing theories of diseases that will permit its
practitioners to control their magnitude and direction.
What, then, would be an example of a theory which does
not lead to the betterment of mankind? An example
would be a theory which imparts no new knowledge of
relationships, or one which contains variables that are
not controllable by mankind.

An example of the latter is the illustration
dealing with illness. It simply predicted the outcome
of an illness without providing control knowledge.

But even this predictive knowledge may potentially lead

to the betterment of mankind. Having isolated the disease
the medical scientist would be in a position to search

for its determinants. If he discovered the determinants

and could somehow control their magnitude and direction,

:k.‘ w.-

‘n‘l GSA

 

42
he would ultimately provide medical practitioners with
control knowledge which they could use to betteriman—
kind, provided the absence of illness is defined as
bettering mankind. Thus regardless of the inner motives
of the medical scientist, be they the betterment of
mankind or simply curiosity, the ultimate effect of
his work may be to provide knowledge that can be used

to control the disease.

The Motives pf Social Scientists

 

Perhaps, what Kerlinger means to suggest is that
a given social scientist exploring social phenomena
does not have in mind an immediate knowledge of how
his research may lead to the betterment of mankind. In
a sense he can not know either of these things until
after he conducts his investigation. However, prior to
an investigation of some social phenomena a social
scientist often sets forth a social or behavioral
problem he would like to study. For example, why do
some people become dOpe addicts while other do not?
Why do some workers in a factory restrict their output
while others(do not? Why do some people react to

frustration with aggression while others do not?

43

In these instances, the social scientist may
obtain his problems to study from those which are
thought to exist in his society. He may believe that
if he can uncover the determinants of these problems
and if they are amenable to control, he can provide
knowledge which is capable of bettering mankind,
provided he defines betterment as amelioration of
these problems.

Of course he does not always obtain problems
to study in such a manner. Often he simply postulates
questions to which he would like to find answers. For
example, what is it that holds a society or organization
together? A social scientist raising this type of
question will look for variables which affect an
organization or society "holding together." In his
search he will construct some scheme of variables, some
method of relating them, and some method for measuring
their values. The search process he uses is the same
one he would have used had he taken his problem from an
array of existing social problems. The important
difference is that in this case he has not set out to

find a way of lessening existing social problems. But

44
if he should discover the determinants of "holding
together" and they are subject to control by man, he
would nevertheless provide knowledge which is
potentially useful. It would become actually useful
when someone defines an organization as "splitting
up" and, assuming it to be undesirable, uses the know—
ledge to pull it back "together." Hence, it is
conceivable that even a social scientist who attempts
to answer theoretical questions may ultimately produce
control knowledge.

It is only when a social scientist has know-
ledge of the relationship between variables and can
change their magnitudes that he can achieve a better—
ment goal he has established. Knowledge henceforth
only becomes actually useful when it helps him resolve,
or lessen, a problem he confronts better than he could
do so without it. Knowledge, on the other hand, is
potentially useful if it holds the possibility of a
solution and the occurrence of the problem is probable
without some intervention on his part. These statements
tie together the rationale behind premises A.2 and

A.3. They state that knowledge is useful if it can

l‘wIIIEuL,rtufl.-u. .bl.‘

firui—Jlalli I .

45
help solve problems (premise A.2) and that it can only
be useful if it is control knowledge (premise A.3).

Problems after all are essentially betterment
variables. They are statements depicting values of
variables someone would like to increase, or decrease;
for example, low productivity, low return on investment,
low job satisfaction, or a high degree of role conflict.
Solutions to these perceived problems consist of
changing the values (high or low) to a desired level
through finding variables that produce these values

and manipulating their values.
Empirical Determination Versus Control

The non—control position which contends that
the social scientist's job stops with the construction
of theory is frequently based on a view that its
application involves value judgments that are non-

. . . . l . .
SC1ent1f1c 1n scope. It is asserted that the soc1al

 

1Examples of authors who express an Opinion that
"values" have no place in science are: P. M. Hauser,
"Social Science and Social Engineering," Philosophy 9;
Science, XVI (1949), 209-18: G. A. Lundberg, Social
Research (New York: Longman and Green, 1942) and,
H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavio; (New York: Macmillan,
1957).

46
scientist is no more competent to make value judgments
than anyone else and, therefore, should not determine
how theory is to or could be used.

Social scientists who adhere to such a viewpoint
sometimes uphold a point of view called empirical
determinism. Empirical determinism occurs when a
social scientist succeeds in describing and predicting
some phenomenon in the real world and accepts the
relationships as immutable. He, in effect, states that
this is the way the world is, not the way it can be or
should be. An example of empirical determinism is
provided by an article written by Robert McMurry
entitled, ”The Case for Benevolent Autocracy." He
summarizes the article by saying:

Since so many members of lower, middle

and even top management in the typical large
business enterprises of today are dependent,
insecure, and ineffective—-productive only
because they are bossed by one or two hard-
driving strong autocrats——the outlook for
the wide spread introduction of a genuine
humanistic, democratic-participative
philosophy of leadership in the near future
locks dim indeed. But benevolent autocracy,
while it is neither idealistic nor inspiring,
is practical. It accepts people as they are
and recognizes particularly that most pe0p1e

prefer to be led. It also faces the fact
that there is a dearth of leaders in industry

47

now and in the foreseeable future. It is,
the final analysis, simply a technique for
making the best of the worst! What benevolent
autocracy offers is not a beautiful vision of
a world to come. Instead, it simply accepts
reality with all of its limitations. While
hardly a noble philosophy of management, it

does have one invaluable attribute: where i;
has been trieg, .i__t; works.

in

The "accepts things as they are" theme that runs

through these statements is what is meant by empirical

determinism. The possibility that man could be different,

as well as the search for "causes" as to why he is the way
he

is, are absent. The possibility of changing the

behavior of man (the real meaning of the control goal

eSpoused by Skinner) is not entertained.

When McMurry states that most people are
"dependent, insecure, and ineffective," he accepts each

Of these characteristics as being immutable. Conse-

ql-Iently, he is not concerned with why or how they acquired
the se characteristics and why the one or two "strong

antocrats " are different .

It is interesting to note, in this vein, that

Chris Argyris suggests that the reason for people in

lower levels of an organization being “dependent,
1R. N. McMurry, "The Case for Benevolent Autocracy,"
Harvard Business Review, XXXVI (January-February, 1958).

48
insecure and ineffective" is because of the one or two
"strong autocrats" controlling the organization.

TArgyris, thus, entertains the possibility that although

scam-me people may be this way now in the future they can

be different if certain conditions are changed. More
Specifically, if the one or two "strong autocrats" are

Somehow replaced, people in the lower levels of an

Organization might become "independent, secure and

e ffective. " In terms of values, McMurry places a high

priority on the way people are while Argyris places a

high priority on the way people can be and, perhaps,

Should be if an organization desires to maximize its

I. .
e ffectiveness. "

It is evident from this illustration that a
SOcial scientist who adheres to an empirical deterministic

POsition is mistaken if he believes he does not exert

a value judgment. Certainly to state that things should

be the way they are is a form of value judgment. But

Ihost importantly, a social scientist who adheres to a

Position of empirical determinism will not pursue a

control goal. He will not be concerned with changing

-C. Argyris, Personality and Organization
(New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).

_....__,_,,

 

in“? 1. !- _

49
the nature of the world through the application of

control knowledge.

The Applied Social Scientist and
the Problem 2; Values

 

Social scientists in the applied areas of the
behavioral sciences use a general form of premises A.2
and A.3. By virtue of being applied social scientists,
they believe that control knowledge can be developed
and that it should be used to better mankind. Thus,
they are not empirical determinists.

Applied social scientists can not escape making
value judgments since they are engaged in changing
behavior.1 As change agents, they must make a judgment
that one pattern of behavior is more desirable than
another.

To clarify the nature of value-judgments

exercised by applied social scientists, it is necessary

 

1For a discussion of the role of values in the

behavioral sciences see: K. D. Benne and G. E. Swanson,
"The Problem of Values and the Social Scientist,"

Journal 9; Social Issues, VI (October, 1950), 2—7;

L. Gross, "Values and Theory of Social Problems," in

A. W. Gouldner and Miller, gp. cit., pp. 383-97;

R. S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton

Univers1t Press, 1945); R. Ross, "Moral Obligations of
the Scien ist," in A. W. Gouldner and Miller, 9p. cit.,
p. 429-38, and C. R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, "Some
ssues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior: A
Symposium," Science, CXXIV (1958), 1057-66.

 

50

to define the terms "value" and "value-judgment." A
value is a statement of a desired pattern of behavior.
The statement describes the behavior pattern and asserts
that it is desirable. One example of a value would be
a statement that people should be mentally healthy.
Mental health may be defined as the presence of behaviors
X and Y.1 By itself the description of the pattern
"mental health" is value—free. It is only a description
of behaviors associated with the term "mentally healthy."
By adding to it the assertion, "people should be, " it
becomes a value.

A value-judgment is the application of a value
to a given situation. A psychotherapist, for example,
would exercise a value-judgment if he applied the value
"mehtally healthy" to a particular patient and classified
him as "mentally unhealthy." The value-judgment would
be his decision that the patient should be made "mentally

healthy" through the application of control knowledge.

\

1For an interesting discussion of the value
Problems inherent in the concept of mental health see:
M' Jahoda, Current Concepts g: Positive Mental Health
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1958).

51

The control knowledge a psychotherapist might
apply to make the patient "mentally healthy" would
constitute a descriptive statement of how the values
of certain variables could be manipulated to produce
behaviors X and Y. It might state, for example, that:

To achieve behaviors X and Y, decrease

the value of A. The value of A can be

decreased through performing operations

1, 2, and 3.
Thus, control knowledge itself constitutes a value—free
descriptive statement. It does not specify an end for
its use. The end is determined by the applied social
scientist.

The applied social scientist often converts the
value he accepts as a change goal into a premise. By
converting it into a premise, he is able to concentrate
on developing knowledge which will permit him to change
the behavior of pe0ple that deviates from the value.

A psychotherapist, for example, may accept as a premise
the value, "mentally healthy." Since the value describes
the desired behavior pattern, he can focus his attention
on acquiring knowledge that will permit him to change

the behavior patterns of patients that do not conform

to the desired pattern.

“"1

I.»

 

52

The Applied Areas_gf the Behavioral Sciences

 

 

For purposes of the analysis that follows the
applied areas of the behavior sciences are considered
as those areas that share in common the desire to
change the behavior of some object, be it a person,
group, organization, or society, through instrumenting
knowledge contained in the basic disciplines of the
behavioral sciences. Examples of applied areas are
psychotherapy, group dynamics, social work and
educational psychology. These have all emerged from
the basic disciplines of the behavioral sciences in
order to c0pe with specific behavioral problems. They
are all based on the contention that it is possible to
change the behavior of people who have problems.

A more precise definition of the applied areas
is provided by Greenwood. He defines them as areas
within the basic disciplines that are:

. . . designed to achieve controlled

changes in natural relationships by means

of procedures which are scientifically
based.

 

E. Greenwood, "The Practice of Science and the
Science of Practice," in The Planning 9f Change:
Readings jg the Applied Behavioral Sciences, ed. W. G.
Bennis g; al. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston),
p. 74.

53
He also states that theory in the basic disciplines
"consist of laws describing and explaining nature" while
theory in the applied areas “consists of principles
prescribing ways of controlling nature."l Thus, the
applied areas are characterized by theiry concentration
on developing techniques for applying knowledge accumu—
lated by the basic disciplines to achieve changes in
the behavior of people. The psychotherapist, for example,
attempts to apply knowledge contained in the discipline

of psychology to cure his patients' mental afflictions.

The universe of the applied areas of the behav—
ioral sciences in the analysis that follows will be
considered to be: psychotherapy, group dynamics, and
need-satisfaction psychology. Management theory and
practice will not be considered an applied area of the
behavioral sciences because its relationship to the
behavioral sciences is to be analyzed. Expressed in terms
of set theory, the intersection of management theory

and practice and the applied areas of the behavioral

sciences equals an empty set. The intersection

 

1Ibid.

54
of the two areas is considered problematic and, hence,

is to be analyzed in the ensuing chapters.

Serum

In this chapter the rationale behind the A
premises was presented. Without premise A.1 it would
be impossible to determine if knowledge contained in
the behavioral sciences is useful to management theory
and practice. Subsequently some form of criterion of
usefulness must be established. Premises A.2 and A.3
provide a possible criterion. Taken together they
state that knowledge in the behavioral sciences is
useful to management theory and practice if it helps
managers solve their problems more efficiently and
effectively. It can only do this if it is control
knowledge since only with control knowledge could
managers manipulate the values of variables to attain

a desired end.

CHAPTER III

A CONVERSION FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSLATING

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE KNOWLEDGE INTO

ADMINISTRATIVE TOOLS

In this chapter the need for a conversion frame-
work is analyzed from both a managerial and an applied
science point of View. After the analysis, a conversion

framework is constructed.

The Need for 2 Conversion Framework
from g Managerial Point 9; View

 

 

 

Recently there has been much attention given
to the relationship of the behavioral sciences to the
operation of industrial firms. Much of the literature
bearing on this subject reveals the opinion that know-
ledge derived from the behavioral sciences can increase
the efficiency and effectiveness of industrial firms.
Attempts to support the opinion usually results in the

listing of concepts and subject matter contained in the

55

56
behavioral sciences in terms of managerial decision
1 .
areas. Somet1mes such endeavors are centered on
developing either general propositions about human
behavior or general frameworks for analyzing the human

problems of industrial firms.2 Rarely, however, does

 

1Examples of such articles are: C. Y. Glock
35 al., Case Studies 1g Bringing Behavioral Science into
UseHTStanford, Calif.: Institute for Communication
Research, Stanford University, 1961); W. Lazer and E. J.
Kelley, "Interdisciplinary Horizons in Marketing,"
Journal 9; Marketing (October, 1960); F. J. Roethlisberger,
"Contr1butions of the Behavioral Sciences to A General
Theory of Management," Readings ig Managerial Psychology,
ed. H. J. Leavitt and R. J. Pondy (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 518—41; and L. X. Tarpey,
"Marketing Research and the Behavioral Science," Bus1ness
TOpics, XIII (Winter, 1965), 61-67.

Some examples of such articles are: D. W. Belcher,
"Toward A BehaV1oral Sc1ence Theory of Wages," Journal 9f
the Aggggmy 9; Management, V (August, 196 ), 1 - . In
tH1s art1c e Belcher adVances propositions about the
relationship between certain concepts in the behavioral
sciences and industrial wage practices. For example, he

 

 

 

hypothesizes that: "The internal wage structure (of a
f1rm) will be more redictable and stable: (1) The more
the f1rm is a close , isolated bureaucracy. . . (5) The

more social norms and tradition correlate with organizational
values, (6) The weaker the pressures of groups within the
organization" (p. 116). It seems clear that such pro-
positions do not provide managers with administrative tools
they can use in designing wage systems for their organization.
Pro ably after reading t is article the would wonder, among
other things, how they could go about f1nding out what
"social norms" and "organizational values" are prevalent

in their firms. Belcher's article, however, does not
attempt to answer these types of questions; and M. H.
Mescon, "Sociodrama and Sociometry: Tools for a Modern
Approach to Leadershi ," Journal 9; the Academy 9; Manage-
ment, II (April, 1959 , 21—28. Of interest in this article
18 Mescon's statement on page 27 that: "Industry might
advantageously investigate more fully the potentialities

of these interesting tools of modern leadership." This
conclusion is fairly typical of articles which purport

to relate the behav1ora sciences to management. The
questions that remain unanswered in such articles is:

How does one measure the "potentialities" of "interesting”
concepts develo ed in the behavioral sciences for the

theory and prac ice of management?

57
anyone attempt to specifically indicate how the concepts,
propositions, or frameworks can be applied by managers
in their day-to—day Operations. Neither, for that matter,
do they mention how managers can determine whether the
use of such concepts, propositions, or frameworks will
improve the performance Of their firms more than not
using them.

Even less frequent in the literature are examples
of behavioral concepts which have been applied by managers,
or efforts aimed at converting such concepts into an
Operational framework which managers can incorporate in
their everyday Operations. In light of these deficiencies,
it is no wonder that some of them are bewildered by the
literature and question whether it is really possible
to apply the behavioral sciences to the process of
running a going concern.

Lawrence Ferguson, manager Of General Electric's
Behavioral Research Service, for example, claims that:

. . . several years ago (prior to 1959) when
we sought to apply available social science
findings to solve specific personnel problems,
we consistently found that the social science

information available then was of little help
to us.1
1 C. Ferguson, "Social Scientists in th

L. e
Plant," Harvard Bus1ness Review, XLIII (Mabeune, 1964),
135.

 

58

It is not surprising then that today, as Leeds and
Smith phrase it:

. . . the businessman wants tO know

precisely what social science can offer

him, and how its contribution can best

be applied. Moreover, he wants to know

with a fair amount of precision what

difference the application of social

science knowledge will make in the

operation Of his company.
But authors typically do not discuss the potential for
application. They leave managers to work out their own
problem of direct application and conversion.

Developing a formal conversion framework is a
formidable task that managers have not attempted to
carry out. Just how formidable this task can be is
revealed in the following illustration.

A manager call him Smith, is reading an article
on the relationship of learning theory to management
development. The author of the article expresses the
opinion that all developmental programs should rest on
"known laws Of learning." His purpose in writing the

article is to make these laws known to managers so that

they can use them in building their own programs. One

 

1R. Leeds and T. Smith, Using Social Sgience
Knowledge lg Business and Industry (Homewood, Ill.:
Irwin, 1963), p. 2.

 

59
of the laws described is the so-called law Of effect.
The author presents the law in terms Of a quote from
McGeogh, namely:

Acts followed by a state of affairs which

the individual does not avoid, and which he

often tries to preserve or attain, are selected

and fixated, while acts followed by states Of

affairs which the individual avoids or attempts

to change are eliminated. . . Acts (resulting

in) satisfying . . . motivating conditions

are selected and strengthened, while those

leading to consequences which do not satisfy

a motivating condition are eliminated.
Upon reading this rather precise statement, Smith
scratches his head in bewilderment. "How in the world
can I go about applying this law to my company's develop-
ment program?" he asks.

The author of the article, however, has anti-
cipated that some readers would find the passage
difficult to comprehend so he advances what he feels is
a less complex statement of the law:

A satisfying outcome strengthens, and

an annoying outcome weakens, a modifiable

connection between a stimulus and a response.2

 

1J. A. McGeogh, The Psychology 9; Human Learning

(New York: Longmans and Green, 1942), p. 574.

2P. L. Harriman, Handbook 9: Psychological Terms

(Paterson, N.Y.: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1961),
p. 89.

60
After reading this passage, Smith's bewilderment is
somewhat lessened.. However to him it seems that the
law simply means people will do things they find
gratifying and not do things they find non-gratifying.

Smith's interpretation is, in a sense, correct,
because the law deals with the effect of reinforcement
on behavior. It holds that behavioral responses which
yield satisfaction will be repeated again while those
which yield dissatisfaction will not. If a person
receives a reward for acting in one fashion and is
punished for acting in another fashion, he will repeat
the reWarding acts but not the punished acts. According
to this hedonistically based law, people supposedly do
not repeat behavioral responses to stimuli found, by
experience to be non-rewarding.

But now that Smith has a vague idea of what the
law means, how is he to apply it to his firm's development
program? To be able to apply it he would need to
operationalize the law by stating in measurable terms
what stimuli, subject to his control, are rewarding and
non—rewarding to the proposed participants of the program.

He would also need to know in measurable terms what types

61
of behavioral responses, which:are presently absent, he
wants the program to produce. Only if he had this
knowledge could he manipulate the stimuli to get the
response he desires. Furthermore, only if he has this
knowledge would he possess control knowledge that
would be useful in helping him establish a development
program.

A search of selected management literature Offers
support for proposition B. I. Management theory and
practice has not identified the problems managers face
in converting behavioral change knowledge contained in
the applied areas of the behavioral sciences into a

tool they can use for changing behavior.

The Need for g Conversion Framework
from an Applied Science Point pf View

 

Some social scientists, particularly those in
the non-applied areas, assume there is no conversion
problem in using knowledge provided by the basis
disciplines of the behavioral sciences. According to
Gouldner:

In the standard View of the relation-

ship between applied and pure social

science there is the tacit assumption that
the development of the applied social

4
'1J‘L'

 

62

sciences requires no special planning and
theoretical analysis. It is assumed they
possess no distinctive problems and what
will be required is to transfer their
development. . . . The thought is scarcely
entertained, however, that the applied and
pure discipline may have differences in
their basic interests and thus in their
very conceptual roots.

Ford and Urban exemplify those who profess a
non-conversion assumption when they state:
It is quite clear that the practice of
psychotherapy is an applied field. A
therapist primary purpose is not to
establish principles Of behavior, but
rather to apply established principles
to achieve behavioral changes. His
primary purposes is to "cure" patients
rather than to build theory.2
They assume that an applied social scientist is one who
takes knowledge from a basic discipline and directly
applies it to a given situation. A therapist supposedly
takes principles of behavior contained in the basic

discipline of psychology and applies them to a given

case in order to make changes in his patient's behavior.

 

1
A. W. Gouldner, "Theoretical Requirements of

the Applied Social Science," in Marketing and the
Behavioral Scippces, ed. P. Bliss (Boston: Allyn and
Bacon, 1963), p. 7.

2D. H. Ford and H. B. Urban, Systems g: Psycho-

therapy: .A Comparative Stugy (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1963), p. 9.

63

While the non-conversion assumption appears
plausible many social scientists in the applied areas
take issue with it. In terms of psychotherapy, for
example, they believe that at the present time there
are no "established principles to achieve behavioral
changes." Berelson and Steiner, for example, contend
that:

There is no conclusive evidence that

psychotherapy is more effective than

general medical counseling or advice in

treating neurosis or psychosis. Strictly

speaking, it cannot even be considered

that psychotherapy. on the average,

improves a patient's chances of recovery

beyond what they would be without any

formal therapy whatsoever.l
If this statement is valid, Obviously the psychotherapist
has no "established principles to achieve behavioral
changes." He cannot take knowledge from the basic
discipline of psychology and directly apply it.

An illustration of the conversion problem con-

fronted by applied social scientists is provided by

examining Berelson's and Steiner's recent effort to

 

B. Berelson and G. A. Steiner, Human Behavior:
.Ap Inventory pf Scientific Findings (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), p. 287.

64
compile an inventory Of scientific findings on human
behavior. Only a cursory examination of their books
reveals that many of the findings are not directly
applicable, or even useful, in the sense of solving
problems or bettering mankind.

One finding, for example, states: "The larger
the organization becomes, the more ranks of personnel
there will tend to be within it."1 It seems Obvious
that this type Of proposition is not particularly useful
for someone in an applied area. In terms of premise
A.2, it does not specify a problem which it might help
solve. In terms of premise A.3, it is not a control
statement because it does not specify what applied
social scientists could do to change the value Of the
independent variable (organization size) nor indicate
the determinants of the relationship. Without knowledge
of the determinants the value of the independent variable
is uncontrollable.

The finding also does not specify the context
of "larger"; whether it means larger in terms of assets,

sales, or number of personnel. Similarly it does not

 

Ibid., p. 368.

 

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65
j_rudicate how "rank" is to be measured. Without a
technique for measuring these variables the validity
of the relationship can not be confirmed and the
finding can not be applied, even if it were useful.

Another of the findings states that:

The efficiency of a large formal

organization is sizably enhanced when

its own chain of command or decision

or communication is tied into the informal

network of groups within the organization,

so that the network can be used to

support the organization's goals.
In terms of the A premises this finding is not useful
by itself.

It does not, in accordance with premise A.2,
specify a particular behavioral change problem to which
it might be applied. It alludes to the possibility of
an "efficiency" problem but it does not specify the
parameters of the problem. Every time an organization
is labeled inefficient, is the inefficiency due to
improper communication?

The finding, in accordance with premise A.3,

does not constitute a control statement. It does not

indicate how, "the network can be used to support the

 

Ibid., p. 370.

 

Md”; mk _.

 

66
organization's goals." Hence, it does not tell the
social scientist or manager how they can make the
network support the organization's goals. Moreover,
the statement does not refer to Operational definitions
or measurement devices for the key variables. How,
for example, are "efficiency," "sizably enhanced,"
"chain of command," "informal network of groups," and
"support the organization's goals” to be measured?
Without a system for measuring the values Of these
variables the finding cannot be applied and the
empirical validity Of the proposition can not be
determined.

Another illustration of the difficulty of
applying the findings is the finding that: "The
leader's style Of leadership tends to be influenced by
the style in which he himself is led."1 Once again,
in terms of the A premises this finding is not useful.
It does not indicate the significance Of the finding
for solving problems. Furthermore, it does not
specify the determinants Of "leadership style" or how

it can be measured. If a social scientist or manager

 

Ibid., p. 376.

 

67
is to use this finding to discover if changes in leader-
ship styles in an organization are necessary, he needs
to have a way Of measuring them. Given that some change
is necessary, he also needs to know the determinants of
the styles and how their values can be altered in order
to implement the changes. The finding, of course, does
not furnish this information.

The intention has not been to deprecate
Berelson's and Steiner's efforts to classify findings
since they may be only reporting the existing state of
the behavioral sciences. The purpose of analyzing some
of their findings has been to evaluate proposition 8.2,
which states that knowledge contained in the basic
disciplines can not always be directly applied by a
social scientist who is trying to better mankind.

Some form of conversion framework is necessary.

It is not surprising that some social scientists
in the applied areas Of the behavioral sciences perceive
the need for a conversion framework. They believe, on
the basis of their experience, that knowledge existing
in the basic disciplines can not be directly applied to

specific problem situations.

68
Goulder, for example, states that:

It seems evident that the needs of an
applied social science, which must above
all cope with social change, are not met
by all models of present-day pure theory.
An applied social science cannot, there—
fore, be regarded as entailing the simple
transfer of either the established pro-
positions or the concepts Of pure science
to practical purposes.

Elaborating on this point he hypothesizes that:

. . .(a) Applied social scientist are more
likely to use the concepts than the
generalized propositions of their basic
disciplines.

(b) Not all concepts or theoretical
models of pure social science are equally
useful to applied social scientists.

(c) Applied social scientists will
more likely borrow from their basic
disciplines those concepts and theoretical
models which aid them in understanding or
producing changes.

(d) When the basic discipline does
not provide theoretical systems or concepts
aiding the applied social scientist to
deal with change, the latter will develOp
these himself.

(e) These new concepts will, in turn,
exert pressures to produce modifications
in the theories of the basic disciplines.

Apparently Gouldner believes that social

scientists in the basic disciplines have not been

 

lGouldner,.9_p. cit., p. 7.

2Ibid., p. 9.

69
interested in developing an applied theory of behavioral
knowledge. Traditionally, they have been interested in
the description and prediction of human behavior rather
than control. Subsequently, the applied social scientist
has been left to develop an applied theory of his own
making. Implicitly or explicitly he has had to
develop concepts and theories he could utilize in carry-
ing out his role as a change agent. His efforts, how-
ever, have not yet resulted in the construction of a
formal conversion framework that could be utilized by

all persons who act as change agents.

.5 Conversion Framework: The Construct
.pf a Behavioral Change Model

A conversion framework to be useful to managers
and applied social scientists must enable them to trans-
form knowledge contained in the behavioral sciences
into a set of Operational directives. A conversion
framework can only do this if it meets the following
conditions:

1. Provides a technique for describing
different forms of desirable and
undesirable behavior. This is

necessary for determining if change

70

occurs and the direction of change.

2. Specifies the variables that produce
changes in behavior and provides a
technique for measuring them. This
is necessary for establishing the

validity of relationships.

3. Specifies how the values of change
producing variables can be manipulated
by a change agent. This is necessary

for producing change.

When these conditions are met a manager will possess
control knowledge. A desired end will be specified, he
will have knowledge Of its determinants, and know how
to manipulate them.

The proposed conversion framework is twofold.
First, it consists of a construct of a behavioral change
model. As a construct it is deliberately designed to
facilitate the scientific investigation of behavioral
change. It does this by delineating a set of conceptual
variables that can be used to analyze specific attempts
to change behavior. Secondly, the framework consists
Of an operational process that permits specific

behavioral change attempts to be analyzed and evaluated

71
in terms of premises A.2 and A.3. It demonstrates that
managers have useful knowledge when they in fact can
change behavior.

The construct of a behavioral change model
consists of:

l. A change agent's statement of an
undesirable behavior pattern
possessed by an Object of change.
This statement represents a
behavior pattern that the change
agent attempts to move the Object
of change away from. For purposes
of analysis it is labelled,

behavior pattern U.

2. A change agent's statement of a
desired behavior pattern for an
object of change. This statement
represents a behavior pattern that
the change agent attempts to move
the Object of change toward. For
purposes of analysis it is labelled,

behavior pattern D.

3. A change agent's description of a
mechanism for moving the object of
change from the undesired behavior
pattern (U) to the desired behavior
pattern (D).

 

 

72
A simple illustration will clarify the meaning of the
construct.

First, suppose a manager believes one of his
subordinates is restricting his output. He will
define the problem as one of getting the subordinate
to change from behavior pattern U, where he is
restricting output, to behavior pattern D, where he
is producing at a level which the manager considers
acceptable. The mechanism the manager prescribes for
the transition between the two patterns may take many
forms. Each form reflects his assumptions about what
will cause his subordinate to change his behavior. He
may, for example, hypothesize that if he increases the
subordinate's wages, the subordinate will reciprocate
by increasing his output. He may generalize this
hypothesis and state that output will always increase
with increases in pay. As long as this relationship
appears valid, he assumes that it is effective for
producing changes in the output behavior of his sub-
ordinates.

It is possible that the manager may implement

different mechanisms such as persuasion, coercion, or

73

a promise of promotion, or some combination Of them,

if money does not appear to be a sufficient condition

for achieving the changes he desires in his subordinate's
behavior. However, these are also subject to the test
of whether they lead to the desired response of

increased productivity.

Definitions p§_Behaviora1, Change, and Model

Before proceeding it is necessary to examine
the meaning assigned to the key terms in the construct:
"behavioral," "change," and "model."

The term "behavioral" refers to actions and
motives Of the Object of change. Actions are those
portions of behavior, verbal and physical gestures,
which are capable of being directly observed by others.
Motives, on the other hand, are not capable Of being
directly observed by others. They can only be
assessed by questioning and probing the Object Of
change or by inferring the nature of these motives
and making predictions about how these will affect
his actions. In the latter instance, the accuracy Of
the inference is partially determined by the ability

to predict actions. But in either case it is motives

74
which provide the explanation for actions. Motives
form the definition of situations from which actions
ensue.

The significance of the term "behavioral" in
the construct is that it implies that the change
models have consequences in the real world. What
the change models are trying to change is actions
and motives which are summed together under the term
behavioral. Change models have consequences for the
real world because they are concerned with moving
the behavior pattern of the Object of change from
behavior pattern U, to behavior pattern D.

The term "change" means to move an Object of
change from behavior pattern U, to behavior pattern D.
When D is reached the Object of change has by definition
been changed.

The term "model" refers to a set Of propositions
that relate variables involved in making a transition
from behavior pattern U to behavior pattern D. The
set Of propositions constitutes a transition-producing
mechanism that a change agent utilizes to change the

behavior pattern of an object Of change.

“Hi. 5.6 .w .1 |MII| ‘3'1—

75

The Change Agent and the
Object pf Change

A change agent is a person whose purpose is the
changing of behavior. This definition is universal in
scope since it can be applied to all persons involved
in changing behavior, be they social scientist or
manager.

The construct describes the activities a change
agent performs in carrying out his purpose. He
identifies behavior patterns U and D, and constructs a
mechanism for making a transition between them.

An Object Of change constitutes the unit of
behavior the change agent is interested in changing.

It can be a person, group, organization, or society.
It also constitutes a universal definition that can be
applied to all social units that are to be changed by

a change agent.

Behavior Patterns U and 2

Behavior patterns U and D are statements of
variables and their values. They can be classified on
the basis of common variables with differences in the

values of variables differentiating each pattern.

76

Behavior pattern U, for example, may be described in terms
of behavioral labels such as: high alienation, high
mental depression, high anxiety, low productivity, low
morale, and low return on investment. Each of these
behavioral labels are variables with values (high or
low). Behavior pattern D may be described in terms of
these variables taking on different values. For example,
if U is described as low productivity, D may be described
as high productivity.

These behavioral labels simply identify
desirable and undesirable behavior patterns. By them—
selves, they neither explain how the pattern became
undesirable nor what can be done to make it desirable.
They are only indicative of a behavior pattern being
something other than what the change agent considers
desirable. They, so to speak, describe an incidence Of
a negatively valued social phenomena without suggesting
methods Of treatment or prevention.

When a change agent uses the descriptions of
the two patterns as a change goal for an Object Of
change he exercises a value judgment. He states that

behavior pattern D is preferable tO behavior pattern U.

77
The descriptions of the two patterns makes his value
criterion explicit by specifying the specific behaviors
he values. By making behavior pattern D a premise,
he is able to construct a transition-producing
mechanism for attaining what he has defined as a more
preferable behavior pattern.

Every behavioral change model contains a
diagnostic scheme for identifying behavior pattern U.
The scheme describes the variables to be Observed and
provides a means for measuring the degree of undesir-
ability present in a given situation.

Diagnostic schemes in the medical sciences are
based on highly elaborate classification schemes Of
symptoms of diseases along with very precise diagnostic
tools for assessing the incidence and magnitude of
disease. The diagnostic tools available to medical
practitioners include such things as thermometers,
x-ray machines, blood pressure gauges, and stethoscopes.
Such tools are used to uncover diseases and their level
of severity.

Within the behavioral sciences diagnostic tools

are not as precise. Those that are available include

78
such things as personality scales, attitude surveys,
interviews, and return of investment. These tools are
designed to uncover the presence Of certain undesirable
patterns of behavior and their magnitude in given
situations. They are not designed to change the

patterns or explain why they occur.

The Transitioneppoducipg Mechanism

The process of developing a transition-producing
mechanism for moving from behavior pattern U to behavior
D is called "theranosis." It is distinct from diagnosis
in that diagnosis establishes the presence of an
undesirable behavior pattern while theranosis prescribes
a mechanism for changing it into a desired behavior
pattern. Examples of transition-producing mechanisms
include: hallucinatory drugs, hypnosis, operant
conditioning, reciprocal inhibition, conceptual insights,
acting out, incentive payment plans, participation in
decision making, and decentralization.

There are two major categories of variables on
which transition-producing mechanism may be constructed:

environmental variables and change Object variables.

79

Environment variables are those which lie outside the
change Object and, hence, are not a property of the
change Object itself. Examples of environmental
variables are: the behavior of other organization
participants, leadership styles, incentive plans,
drugs, and group norms. Often times, a change agent
attempts to alter or modify the values Of these kinds
of variables in order to produce the change he desires
in the object of change.

Change Object variables are those which lie
within the change Object itself. These variables are
usually of two types: perceptual variables and response
variables.

Perceptual variables are those through which
the change Object assigns meaning to different environ—
mental variables. Sometimes it is assumed that
modification of this meaning will lead to the desired
changes in behavior. For example, a change agent might
be concerned with changing the behavior Of someone who
he belfeves is restricting output. He wants to increase
this person's output. In searching for the reason

output is restricted he notes that the person perceives

IJIlOIl .1»! its F! p. I
.

1}.»
v

 

80
his boss as a tyrant. Taking note of this the change
agent assumes this is the reason the person is restrict-
ing output. He hypothesizes that if he can change
the person's perception of his boss as a tyrant, he
will succeed in changing his output response. If the
person no longer perceives his boss as a tyrant, his
productivity will supposedly increase.

Once the change agent establishes the basic
hypothesis he focuses attention on finding a way of
changing the person's perception Of his boss. He
constructs a mechanism for moving from behavior pattern
U, in which the person's productivity is considered low
and he sees his boss as a tyrant, to behavior pattern
D, in which his productivity is greater and he no longer
seahis boss as a tyrant.

Response variables consist. of those which make
up an individual's behavioral pattern for relating
to environmental variables. They deal with how he
responds to environmental variables ratherthan how he
perceives them. Sometimes change agents assume that a
person's behavior can be changed by directly altering

or modifying the way he characteristically responds to

81

environmental variables. For example, a change agent
may be confronted with a person who experiences an
inhibitory anxiety when he is in the presence of his
boss. His goal may be to eliminate or reduce this
anxiety. He may observe that a person cannot
simultaneously be relaxed :and , anxious in responding
to some element in his environment. He may, therefore,
advance a hypothesis that getting the person to respond
with relaxation in the presence Of his boss will
inhibit his responding in terms Of anxiety. His
problem then becomes one of finding a mechanism for
moving from behavior pattern U, in which the person
responds with anxiety when in the presence of his boss,
to behavior pattern D, in which the person responds
with relaxation. He does not, however, directly
attempt to change perceptual variables in constructing
a mechanism. He is not concerned with why the person
sees the situation in such a way that he responds with
anxiety. Instead, he attempts to directly alter and
modify the person's response to the situation. A
change in the percepticui of the person may occur as

a result Of altering his responses but it occurs after

82

the change and, hence, is not partioned into the mechanism.
In sum a transition-producing mechanism consists

of a set of propositions that state how an undesirable

behavior pattern can be transformed into a more desirable

pattern. Its utilization by a change agent represents

the application Of control knowledge to achieve a

desired change in the behavior of an object of change.
The Operationalizing Process

The process of operationalizing behavioral change
models consists of converting them from a conceptual
form to a form in which they can be applied in a given
case to change the behavior of some object. It is a
fourfold process.

First, behavior patterns and transition-producing
variables contained in the model must be identified
and defined. The number of variables constitutes the
parameter of the model.

Second, propositions relating behavior pattern
variables to transition-producing variables must be
developed. Without such propositions there would by
definition, be no model but only a set of variables.

Only if a change agent has such propositions can he

83
determine what variables to manipulate in order to
reach behavior pattern D.

Third, an objective system for measuring the
values of the behavior patterns and transition-producing
variables must be developed. Without such a system,

a change agent could not determine the validity Of
the propositions, the magnitude of change, or the
effectiveness of the change model he uses.

Fourth, statements indicating how the values
of transition-producing variables can be changed must
be developed. Without these statements a change agent
would not know how to change the values of transition-
producing variables and, hence, would not be able to
apply the model in a given situation. It is only after
these processes have been completed that a model can
be said to be Operational from an application point of

view.

The Simple Human Relations Model: .Ap Illustration
2; the Operationalizing Process

The simple human relations model is drawn from

Dale Carnegie's book entitled, How pp Win Friends and

 

1For an excellent discussion.of problems involved
in operationalizing knowledge from the behavioral sciences
see: H. Guetzkow, "Conversion Barriers in Using the
Soc1al Sc1ences," Adm1n1strat1ve Sc1ence Quarterly, IV
(1959), 68-81.

84

Influence People.1 It is intended to serve as an
illustration of the process of Operationalizing
behavioral change models.2

The variables comprising the simple human
relations model are: individual A, individual B, A's
lack of influence over B's behavior pattern, A's
desire to influence B's behavior in some manner, a
state of nonfriendship between A and B, A's giving of
compliments and favors to B, B's acceptance of A as a
friend, A's attempt to influence B's behavior pattern,
B's acceptance of A's influence attempts, A's threat
to terminate his relationship with B, and A's emotional
detachment from B.

As the title of Carnegie's book suggests, the
basic proposition relating these variables is that if
A can get B to accept him as a friend, he can influence
B's behavior. The model does not specify the specific

variables in B's behavior pattern that A desires to

 

1 . . .
D. Carnegie, How pg Win Fr1ends and Ipfluence
People (New York: Pocket Books, 1958).

2In constructing the simple Human Relations
Model for changing behavior, I have drawn from.H. J.
Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (2d ed.; Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 181-88.

  

1E1. . IE- 1» 9.10
u
o

t a

85

change through achieving influence. A's general goal
is to move from a situation in which he has no
influence over B's behavior pattern to a situation

in which he has influence over it.

The major transition-producing mechanism for
achieving influence is A's attempts to secure B's
friendship through doing him favors and giving him
compliments. The basic proposition is that B will
respond to A's compliments and favors by becoming his
friend. If B becomes A's friend, A's attempts at
influencing his behavior will be successful. He will
have moved from a situation of non-influence over B's
behavior to a situation of influence over it.

This is the basic model for winning friends
in order to influence them. There are, however, a
few other aspects of it which require explanations.
The first aspect is its explanation Of why friend-
ship allows one to influence the behavior of others.
The rationale appears to be that "friendship" evinces
a social Obligation between the parties involved. If
A does favors for B and gives him compliments, B owes

A something in return. Because of this assumed norm

86

of reciprocity A can ask B, once they are friends, to
do something he wants him to do.1 If B has accepted
A as a friend, he will do it since non—performance
would signify that he did not consider A to be his
friend.

There is also a mediating factor that increases
the probability of B accepting A's influence attempts.
If he has accepted A as a friend and values their
friendship, he will experience guilt or anxiety in
violating the social Obligation of friendship. Hence,
it seems that the model assumes there is some type of
norm prohibiting violation Of these Obligations and
that peOple who do so will experience guilt or anxiety.

Another important aspect of the model is the
need for A's emotional detachment from B. A has an
instrumental purpose for establishing a friendship with
B. He values their relationship simply for its
contributions in allowing him to influence B's behavior.
The rationale for A's needing tO be emotionally detached
from B is that if he valued the relationship intrinsi-

cally, he would not enter into the relationship with

 

iFog an interesting discussion on the norm of
reciprocity see: A. W. Gouldner, "The Norm of
Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," American Socio—
logical Revigy, XXV (1960), 161-78.

87
the specific intention Of changing B's behavior. If he
were to become emotionally attached to B, it could
seemingly erect a barrier against effecting changes
in B's behavior.

From an operational point of view, one of the
most difficult problems with the modeljis determining
when "friendship" is established. How can a person
determine when another person becomes his friend?

The resolution Of this problem requires the
development of a definition of "friendship" in terms
of a set of observable characteristics. Only with a
definition of this type is it possible to empirically
determine the presence or absence of friendship in a
given situation.

One approach to providing such a definition
might consist of a statement that "friendship” has
occurred when A asks B to do something he would not
otherwise do, and he does it. If A asks B to change
his behavior from X to Z and B does it, but would not
do it without A's influence, then, by definition, they
are friends. B changes to behavior Z because, it is

inferred, that he values his relationship with A.

88

For purposes of analysis B's valuation of the friend—
ship is labeled F.

Using this symbolic set of notations, A wants
Z from B and has F to offer in exchange while B wants
F from A and has Z to Offer in exchange. If B is
hesitant about changing his behavior, A can threaten
to terminate F in order to increase the probability
that B will succumb to his influence. When A Obtains
Z and B obtains F by definition a friendship exists.

Using this definition Of friendship, A could
not really tell if B was his friend until after he
attempted to influence B's behavior. Hence, it is
an ad hpg conceptualization in which "friendship" is
viewed as simply being a dichotomous variable. A
person is either your friend or not your friend. With
this definition one only looks at the behavioral
result Of friendship and, if it is in line with the
foregoing definition, infers that a friendship relation-
ship exists between A and B.

Simple as this definition is there are
innumerable problems in trying to apply it to a

specific situation. To apply it a technique for

89
determining if B would have changed his behavior with-
out these attempts would also be required since
changes in his behavior might occur but not be due
to A's attempts.

In order to fully Operationalize the model,
terms such as "favors," "compliments," "influence,"
and "emotional detachment" would have to be defined
in terms of observable phenomena so that their presence
in a given situation could be ascertained; that is,
what behavioral actions constitute or signify "favors,"
"compliments," "influence," and "emotional detachment"?
It is only after these terms are defined in observable
sets that procedures for measuring their values in a
given situation can be developed, and the model to be

fully operational requires a system for measuring the

values of variables contained within it.

Analysis 9: Propositions B.3 and B.4

The construct of a behavioral change model
makes it possible to assess behavioral knowledge
contained in the applied areas of the behavioral
sciences in terms of control knowledge. In accordance

with proposition B.4, the construct can only lead

90

to control knowledge when:

1. It contains variables that a change

agent can control;

2. It offers an Objective system for

measuring the values of the variables;

3. There are valid relationships

between the variables.

The first condition is necessary because if a
change agent cannot exert control over the values of
the variables in the model he cannot use it to change
behavior. The second condition is necessary because
if a change agent cannot measure the values of the
variables in the model he cannot determine either
the direction of change or its magnitude. The third
condition is necessary because if the relationships in
the model are not valid the change that occurs may be
due to exogenous variables. Hence, the model would
not be based on control knowledge.

The construct of a behavioral change model
coupled with the operationalizing process constitutes
a conversion framework. The utility of a specific
behavioral change model built through use of the frame-

work can only be determined pg hoc. If a change agent

91
can utilize it to change behavior, by definition, it
is useful and proposition B.3 would be supported. The
construct of a behavioral change model would be capable
of converting behavioral science knowledge into a form
in which managers could use it for solving their

behavioral problems.

Jul:- :1

. ?.!’lyr.xe .§H§\A

CHAPTER IV
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC MODELS FOR CHANGING
BEHAVIOR: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSITION C: 1A

Analysis 2; Proposition C:lA

 

In this chapter proposition C:lA will be analyzed
through applying the conversion framework to three
psychotherapeutic models: Psychoanalysis, Rational-
Emotive Therapy and Conditioning Therapy. Each of these
models will be described in terms of the construct of
a behavioral change model and evaluated in terms of the
A premises and prOposition B.4.

The three models have two major sources of vari-
ables: patient variables and therapist variables.
Patient variables are a therapist's statements and
observations about the patient's behavior. They constitute
a description of behavior patterns U and D when the
patient is considered the object of change. Therapist
variables, on the other hand, refer to the therapist's

behavior and rules for moving the patient from behavior

92

93

pattern U to behavior pattern D. They constitute the
therapist's transition-producing mechanism when the

therapist is considered a change agent.

The Freudian P§ychoanalytic Model
Analysis pf Behavior Pattern g

In the Freudian psychoanalytic model, behavior
pattern U is described in terms of:

1. Symptoms exhibited by P.

2. The determinant of the symptoms.

Symptoms are the observable characteristics
of the patient's behavior that indicate the presence
of a psychological disorder. Since they are only a

manifestation of a disorder, treating them will not

 

1This presentation of Freud's psychoanalytic
model is based on the following sources: S. Freud,
A General Iptroduction pp_Psychoanalysis, trans. J.
Riviere (New York: Permabooks, 1953): S. Freud, Moses
and Monotheism (New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1957);
S. Freud, N y Iptroductory Lectures pp_Psychoanalysis
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1933); S. Freud,
Egg Question p£_pgy.Ana1ysis, trans. J. Strachey
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1959); S. Freud, Therapy
gpg Technigue, ed. P. Rieff (New York: Collier Books,
1963); P. J. Stern, Egg Abnormal Person and His WOrld:
Ag Iptroductigp_pp Psychopathology (Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 196-211; N. walker, A.
Short History pp Psychotherapy 1p Theory gpg Practice
(New York: The Noonday Press, 1959).

j. P 15.. ha

94

eliminate the disorder. The disorder can only be

eliminated by changing the determinant of the symptoms.

The Relationship Between Symptoms
ang their Determinants

Freud maintained that at one level of abstraction
the cause of the patient's symptoms was a repressed
sexual conflict between his id and ego that occurred
during his childhood. The conflict alledgedly arose
from a situation in which gratification of the id's
urges was foregone by the infantile ego because it
perceived a danger that would accrue if it permitted
gratification. The perceived danger, according to
Freud, was "irrational" but the infantile ego was too
weak to see it.

For example, a child was believed to desire
at one time or another, at the urging of his id,
intercourse with his mother. But at the same time it
was believed that he feared his father would cut off
his penis if he attempted to do it. Becoming casterated
was alledgedly the danger the child perceived if he

sought gratification of the urgings of his id. His

95
fear was held to be "irrational" since "objectively"
no such danger existed and logically he should have seen
that the desire was incestual and needed to be
rechanneled into more socially acceptable mediums.

He could not however see these things because his
ego was weak. Hence, since he was incapable of
handling this "irrational" conflict Freud postulated
he would repress it.

Repressing it simply meant that he put it out
of his consciousness which allowed him to momentarily
reduce the "unpleasure" he felt over the conflict.

But in repressing it the conflict did not go out of
existence, it simply seeped to his unconscious to
come back and haunt him later on in the form of symptoms.

Symptoms when they appeared were supposed to
be an indication of and substitute for the patient's
unachieved instinctual gratification. Indeed, the
formation of symptoms was called "the return of the
repressed." The symptoms that emerged were distorted
from the original conflict and appeared on the surface

to have no relationship to it. They were in disguised

96

form an "acting out" of the unresolved and unconscious
conflict. To eliminate the symptoms, the therapist
had to eliminate the repressed conflict since it was

held to be the determinant of them.

The Relationshipretween
the pg and Ego

According to Freud, the id and the ego were
not rigid and well-defined components of an individual's
personality. At infancy, personality was supposedly
composed entirely of the id. The id represented
unconscious instincts and passions. It was the source
of energy for behavior since it pressed for immediate
satisfaction of instincts and passions.

In pressing for satisfaction, the id operated
under what Freud called the "pleasure principle." This
principle states that as energy in the id accumulates
it is felt as "unpleasure" by the individual and impels
him to reduce the feeling by obtaining immediate
gratification of the urgings of his id.

The source of gratification lies in the environ-

ment in which an individual is immersed. Some of the

97

sources in the environment he might utilize to attain
gratification could result in the destruction of his
self. The id, however, does not discriminate between
sources and seeks immediate gratification without regard
to self-preservation.

The ego emerges to help the individual discrim-
inate sources in his environment in his pursuit of
gratification of his instincts and passions. Its
function is to preserve the self while securing grati-
fication. It performs this function by analyzing the
degree of danger present in utilizing different sources
and channeling the individual's behavior to avoid
dangerous sources. The egt> mediates between the demands
of the environment and the urgings of the id. It decides
how, when, and where the urgings of the id will be
gratified in such a way that the self is preserved.

The ego may decide to forego immediate gratifi-
cation if it would endanger the self and search for
substitute sources that are not so dangerous. While
the id seeks only pleasure, the ego seeks pleasure and

the avoidance of unpleasure. It takes into account

98

objects in the environment which if pursued for their
immediate pleasure would result in "self-destruction."

The principle under which the ego Operates is
what Freud called the "reality-principle." This principle
states that individuals tend to seek and utilize Objects
in the environment to achieve gratification of urgings
of the id without incurring other difficulties which
will be felt as unpleasure. In short, the ego delays
gratification when the probability of danger is high
and seeks substitute sources to avoid unpleasure. It,
in effect, substitutes thoughtful behavior for completely
impulsive behavior.

Since the ego emerged from the id, Freud
contended that in a "healthy" person there was no
division between them. The person's behavior was under
the control of his ego rather than his id. He was aware
of his instincts and passions and the dangers which
immediate gratification might bring if he followed

certain socially unapproved channels.

Analysis 9; Sphavior Pattern 2

Behavior pattern D is described in terms of

99

the absence of symptoms and their cause. The therapist
removes the patient‘s symptoms by bringing the repressed
conflict into his consciousness so that his adult ego
can analyze it and see that it is "irrational." As
Freud described this goal: "Where id was, there shall
ego be." Under behavior pattern D, the patient is to
be aware of his repressed conflict. He is to recognize
his instinctual desires, the demands of reality, and

be able to apply reason to the choice of an effective
source of action for gaining gratification. In short,
his id is to become subject to the influence of his

ego O
The T;ansition~—Producing Mechanism

The transition-producing question faced in the
psychoanalytic model is: How can the patient's repressed
conflict be made conscious so that it can be put under
the control of his ego rather than his id? Freud
constructed four major transition-producing techniques:
dream analysis, free association, transference, and the

fee-setting process.

100

pream Analysis

One of Freud's earliest techniques for bringing
the unconscious conflict into the Open was dream analysis.
He believed that dreams were a projection of the conflict
as well as a dnguised gratification of the repressed
desire comprising it. He believed the therapist could
discover the nature of the conflict by analyzing the
content of the patient's dreams. The therapist was
to analyze dream content by means of "interpretation."
Interpretation was defined as a process of "discovering
a hidden meaning."

Freud assumed that a dream was a disguised
acting out of the patient's conflict in which his id
obtained its desires. The dream was postulated to be
a valid representation of his unresolved conflict because
in sleep supposedly the repressing and censoring part
of the conscious mind relaxed its vigilance. When
this occurred, the content of the dream was more directly

determined by the content of the unconscious.

 

lFreud, A_General Introduction pg Psychoanalysis,
p. 91.

101

Freud thought the therapist could determine
the nature of the patient's repressed conflict by
interpreting the dream ideas in terms of a sexual
conflict between the id and the ego. Dream ideas
had to be interpreted because they were assumed to
undergo a censorship by the unconscious. The censor-
ship process was called dream-work. It was defined
as a process in which the meaning of a dream was
disguised in order to reduce the unpleasure that might
arise if the repressed conflict came to the surface
inaidream. Through dream-work the sexual properties
of the conflict were translated into symbols which
were more acceptable to the individual's consciousness.
Consequently, the manifest content of a dream was a
distortion of the actual repressed conflict. A dream,
so to speak, was not as it appeared to be.

Interpretation of the latent meaning of a dream
was based on an assumption that almost all dream content
was sexual. The assumption was necessary because
interpretation consisted of associating non-sexual

dream ideas with sexual prOperties of individuals.

102
The interpretative framework for dream analysis
consisted of a set of sex symbols for ideas manifested
in the dream content. Freud postulated that the number
of sex symbols represented in dreams was not great.
They consisted of the human body, parents, children,
brothers and sisters, birth, death, nakedness, genitals,
sexual processes, and intercourse.
Using these sexual properties of human beings,
Freud attempted to apply them to non-sexual Objects and
processes which he believed served as symbols for them.
For example, a tree symbolized a penis while climbing
represented intercourse. How did Freud establish
these symbolic equations?
Freud was not clear in stating how one equated
a sexual property with a seemingly non—sexual object
or process. He in fact stated that:
The symbolic relation is a comparison
of a quite peculiar kind, the nature of which
is as yet not fully clear to us. Perhaps
some indication will be found later which

will throw some light upon this unknown
quantity.l

 

1Ibid., p. 160.

103

He did, however, indicate how he arrived at some of his
associations.

He thought that one could derive the association
from widely different sources which included fairy tales,
myths, songs and the colloquial usage of a language.

An example of such a derivation is as follows:
We may at first find it surprising that parents
appear in our dreams as kings and emperors and
their consorts, but we have a parallel to this
in fairy tales. Does it not begin to dawn upon
us that the many fairy tales which begin with
the words 'Once upon a time there were a king
and queen' simply means 'Once upon a time there
were a father and mother'? In the family life
the children are sometimes spoken of jestingly
as princes and the eldest son as the crown
prince. The king himself is called the father
of his people.1

Freud's contention that an individual learns
from myths and fairy tales to equate sexual prOperties
with non-sexual objects and processes is certainly Open
to question. It suggests that human beings unconsciously
equate the two. For example, they unconsciously equate

trees with penises. Furthermore, it assumes that they

unconsciously translate their repressed sexual conflict

 

l;p;g,, p. 168.

104

into non-sexual terms. Without this assumption the
therapist would not be able to use Freud's "theory" of
the neurosis to "cure" his patient. Why is this so?

The primary reason is that the assumption is
predicated on another assumption that the “cause" of
the patient's symptoms is a repressed sexual conflict.
Only by granting the validity of this assumption can
the therapist proceed to discover by means of interpre-
tation how the patient expresses the sexual conflict
in non-sexual terms. Only if the assumption is valid
can he take sexual properties and equate them with the
patient's non-sexual expression of objects and processes.
Sgp equatingthem does not "prove" that the patient's
sygptoms are "caused" py.g_represseg_sexual conflict.
To understand the meaning of this statement the self-
validating bias of the psychoanalytic model must be
examined.

The patient's equation of sexual properties
with non-sexual objects and processes is unconscious
as is his sexual conflict. He does not consciously

know about either of them. Hence he does not consciously

105

know what his dream really means. As Freud put it:

. . . the dreamer really does know the meaning

of his dreams: only he does not know that he

knows, and therefore thinks that he does not.1
If the dreamer does not know that he knows, how can
he know that he knows? Freud's answer is that he can
know if the analyst demonstrates to him that the manifest
content of his dreams is not what it appears to be.
Rather, it represents certain sexual properties and
relationships between them which he has repressed.

If the patient accepts the symbolic equation
and interpretation of the determinant of his symptoms
he is pronounced "cured." If he does not, he is
resisting and, hence, is still ill.

The crucial question is if the patient's
acceptance of the interpretation means that his symptoms
were actually caused by a repressed sexual conflict.
This would not appear to be the case because he has
been told what the determinant is by the analyst, who
only assumed it. Since the conflict was alledgedly
in the patient's unconscious, he can only take the

1Ibid., p. 106.

106

therapist's word for it that such is the case. The
therapist does not admit any other determinant and

by "teaching" the patient how to "interpret" his
illness, he sets in motion a self-validating bias.

In short, the patient is taught to accept without
evidence the validity of Freud's "theory" of the
neurosis. If he does not accept it, he is considered

to be ill.

Free Association

Out of his work on dream-analysis Freud evoked

a similar technique which he called "free association.‘
It consisted of a rule that the patient would tell the
therapist everything that came into his mind. Freud
used to tell his patients:

Your talk with me must differ in one respect
from an ordinary conversation. Whereas usually
you rightly try to keep the threads of your
story together and to exclude all intruding
associations and side-issues, so as not to
wander too far from the point, here you must
proceed differently. You will not1ce that

as you relate things various ideas will occur
to you which you feel inclined to put aside
with certain criticisms and Objections. You
will be tempted to say to yourself: This or

107

that has no connection here, or it is quite
unimportant, or it is nonsensical, so it
cannot be necessary to mention it. Never
give in to these objections, but mention

it even if you feel a disinclination
against it, or indeed just because of this.
Later on you will perceive and understand
the reason for this injunction, which is
really the only one you have to follow. So
say whatever goes through your mind. Act
as if you were sitting at the window of a
railway train and describing to someone
behind you the changing views you see out-
side. Finally, never forget that you have
promised absolute honesty, and never leave
anything unsaid because for any reason it
is unpleasant to say it.1

One reason Freud developed the technique of
free association was that he £31: if one could
"interpret" the repressed conflict from dreams he
could also do it from conscious thoughts based on
free association since free association reduced
censoring by the conscious mind. Hence, non-sexual
ideas which an individual usually censors out of his
talks with other people could be subjected to symbolic
interpretation. The therapist could equate sexual
properties with non-sexual Objects and processes
revealed by the patient's free association.

lFreud, Therapy and Technigue, p. 147.

108

Transference

Transference was another way of finding out
what was repressed. Transference, according to Freud
was a process in which the patient acteg_out his repressed
sexual conflict in the therapy situation. Because the
therapist maintained a "neutral" attitude toward the
patient any emotional behavior directed by him toward
the therapist could only be symbolic of his unconscious
conflict. In the analytic situation there was
"objectively" no way for the patient to become emotionally
involved with the therapist. Consequently emotional
behavior by the patient toward the therapist must stem
from somewhere else. This somewhere else was the ;
patient's repressed conflict which he acted out in the
therapy sessions.

Freud described the concept of transference
in the following manner:

The neurotic sets himself to the work because
he believes in the analyst, and he believes in
him because he begins to entertain certain
feelings towards him. The attitude is, in
fact--to put it bluntly--a kind of falling

in love. The patient repeats, in the form
of falling in love with the analyst,

 

1‘11". nahafi...

109

psychical attitudes which lay ready within

him, and which were intimately linked with

the inception of his neurosis. . . . What

he is showing is the very core of his most

private life; pp_;§_pa1pab1y reproducing i3,

pp.though ;p_were all happenings pp the

present, instead g§_remembering;p, With

this the riddle of transference--love is

solved. . .1
The technique like the other two is designed to elicit
material for the therapist to interpret. It also rests
on the symbolic equation of ”interpretation." When the
patient accepts the "interpretation” and can apply the
symbolic equation by himself he is pronounced "cured."

As has been demonstrated, this process of "interpretation"

is highly conjectural.

The See-Setting Process

Freud regarded the therapist's fee as having a
direct relationship to the patient's cure. As he put it:
It is well known that the value of the

treatment is not enhanced in the patient's
eyes if a very low fee is asked.

Later while discussing the role of the fee in

the therapeutic process he states:

 

lFreud, The Qgestion p£_Lay Anglysis, p. 266.
2Freud, Therapy and Technigue, p. 144.

110

Gratuitous treatment enormously increases
many neurotic resistances, such as the
temptations of the transference-relationship
for young women, or the Opposition to the
Obligatory gratitude in young men arising
from the father-complex, which is one of
the most troublesome obstacles to the
treatment. The absence of the corrective
influence in payment of the professional
fee is felt as a serious handicap; the
whole relationship recedes into an unreal
world; and the patient is deprived of a
useful incentive to exert himself to bring
the cure to an end.1

According to this passage, the fee was to serve as an
incentive for the patient to want to be cured and to do
what the therapist told him.

Freud, however, did not experiment with the
effect of fees on the rate of ”cure." For example,
did patients recover faster the greater the relative
cost to them of the treatment? Did the increasing
total cost of therapy have an influence on the rate
at which they accepted Freud's interpretation of the
"determinant" of their illness? Did they, in fact,
tend to agree with the therapist to stop depleting
their financial resources?

1Ibid., p. 145.

111
Freud considered money and the process of
setting fees and collecting them a vital part of the
therapy process. He felt that money was a sex symbol
and that the patient sometimes revealed his repressed
conflict when he and the therapist would discuss
financial matters. As he put it:

The analyst does not dispute that money is
to be regarded first and foremost as the
-means by which life is supported and power
is obtained, but he maintains that, besides
this, powerful sexual factors are involved
in the value set upon it: he may expect,
therefore, that money questions will be
treated by cultured people in the same
manner as sexual matters, with the same
inconsistency, prudishness and hypocrisy.

He is therefore determined beforehand not

to concur in this attitude, and in his deal-
ings.with patients to treat money matters
with the same matter-of-course frankness
that he wishes to induce in them towards
matters relating to sexual life. By volun-
tarily introducing the subject of fees and
stating the price for which he gives his time,
he shows the patient that he himself has
cast aside false shame in these matters.

Of interest in the passage is the therapist's use of
himself as a model. Because Freud thought money

represented sexual matters, he felt that the therapist

 

1Ibid., pp. 143-44.

 

112

could show the patient how to "rationally" look at them
by showing him how "rational" he was in discussing
money matters. The therapist, in effect, put himself

out as a model that the patient was to emulate.
Evaluation 9; the Psychoanalytic Model

One problem with the model is that many of the
propositions comprising it have not been experimentally
validated. Freud's attempt to validate the model was
twofold.

First, he claimed that if the patients symptoms
appeared to be removed, the model must be valid. However,
he did not establish through controlled experimentation
that the rate of symptom removal from using his model
was significantly greater than it would have been had
the model not been used. Thus, symptom removal could
have been due to variables over which the therapist had
no control. The patient could have lost his symptoms
without the therapist's influence.

Even if Freud could have experimentally determined
the symptom removal effectiveness of his model, he would

not have known why it was effective. He could have only

 

III... I...
no .

 

113

stated that for some reason the use of the model resulted
in a faster rate of symptom removal than not using it.

In order to determine why the model worked more
effectively, he would have needed to empirically test
the propositions comprising the model. For example,
all symptoms are caused by a repressed sexual conflict,
or transference is an acting out of the repressed
conflict.

Instead of experimentation, Freud used a self-
validating check to test the internal validity of the
model. If patients accepted the model's interpretation
of the cause of their symptoms, it was valid. To be
considered "cured," they had to accept the interpretation.
If they did not accept the interpretation they were
considered to be resisting.l Hence, the model has a
self-validating bias because patients must accept the
interpretation to be pronounced cured.

Thus, in terms of proposition B.4, the

psychoanalytic model does not provide control knowledge.

 

1A similar criticism is advanced by: C. H.
Campbell, Induced Delusions: The Psychopathy 9;,
Freudism (Chicago: Regent House, 1957).

114

The empirical validity of the prOpositions comprising
the model have not been determined. Moreover, there
is no objective measurement system for defining and
measuring variables within the model. Therefore, in

accordance with premise A.3, the model is not useful.

The Rational-Emotive Modell

 

Analysis p§_Behavior Pattern g.

The description of behavior pattern U consists

of:

1. The patientksdissatisfaction with some
aspect of his behavior. For example,
he feels depressed, anxiety-ridden,
angry, or guilty. These are considered
as symptoms.

2. The patient's lack of control over his
emotions. This is considered the
determinant of his symptoms.

IIrithe rational-emotive model, the therapist attempts to

Eilter the determinant (2) to remove the symptoms (1).

1This presentation of Ellis's rational-emotive
therapy is based on: A. Ellis, Reason and Emotion _i_p
~PSychotherapy (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1963).

,w—

 

115

The Nature p§_Emotions

The patient's emotional control is defined as
his ability to influence the experiencing of dissatis—
faction. To understand the definition it is necessary
to examine Ellis' usage of the term "emotion" and
"reason.“

Emotions are defined as both a form of thought
and physical sensations. Ellis defines them in terms
of the behavior they represent. He states that
'individuals:

feel good because (a) they receive

pleasant physical sensations (such as good
odors, tastes, sounds, sights, and caresses)
and (b) they think or believe that some
person or thing is delightful or charming.
And they feel bad because they encounter
unpleasant physical stimuli and they think
or believe that some person or thing is
horrible, frightful, or terrible.l

It is contended that evaluative thoughts are subject to

control while physical sensations are not.

Emotional control refers to an individual's

influence over his own experiencing of discomfort

through controlling his evaluative thoughts about

 

1Ibid., p. 333.

116

himself. His control over them is held to be a function
of what is called "reflective appraisal." In behavior
pattern U, the therapist maintains that the patient's
evaluative thoughts are accepted and internalized without
a "reflective" appraisal. The patient thinks, for example,
that a given situation is "horrible" and "feels bad"

about it because he has been taught to do so. He has

not asked himself why it is "terrible" and if "rationally"
it is "terrible." He has accepted and internalized
evaluative thoughts blindly and without the use of

reason. He thinks something is "terrible" because that

is what he has been taught to think.

Since the patient accepts the evaluative thoughts
he has been taught without "rationally" examining them,
the therapist contends he has no control over them. His
experiencing of discomfort is sustained by his continuous
application of unreflectively induced evaluative thoughts.
In applying them, he continues to allow his behavior to
be directed by the party who taught them to him.

In sum, the patient perceives Objects in his

environment, evaluates them as "good" or "bad," and

117
responds to them on the basis of his evaluation. However,
his evaluations differ in the degree to which they are
the product of "reflective appraisals." Responses of
discomfort by him are viewed as not caused by external
factors in his environment but by his interpretation
of them as being "good" or "bad" for him. His inter-
pretation of them is colored by his earlier conditioning.
He is taught how to appraise objects as being “good" or
"bad" without the use of reason. When his appraisal of
objects is "unreflective," he lacks control over his
evaluative thoughts, and if they are negative, he
experiences discomfort. His thinking has been condi-
tioned, so to speak, to make him Epipk_he is sick. How
and why do the evaluative thoughts he accepts and

internalizes make him sick?
The Nature 9; Reason

The reason for the patient having no control
over his emotions, is supposedly because he has accepted
and internalized certain "irrational" beliefs deve10ped

and taught to him by his parents and society. He has

118

not only accepted these beliefs but uses them, since
they are evaluative in nature, to regulate his behavior.
And this is held by the rational-emotive therapist to
be the heart of his problem.
The "irrational" beliefs he accepts and
internalizes are norms developed by his society or
his parents to control and regulate his behavior.
Being norms they are evaluative statements that indicate
what is "good" and "bad" for one to do and feel. For
example, it is ”good'' for one to seek the approval of
others. This norm is designed to channel and direct
an individual's attention and behavior in trying to
earn the approval of others and avoid their disapproval.
But norms if they are to in: control devices must
be backed by some form of sanction for non-compliance.
There must be a penalty that will increase the
probability of compliance. In the case of the foregoing
norm, the sanction is that one should feel "worthless"
or "bad," if he does not strive to attain the approval

of others. If others express disapproval with him, he

119

should feel guilty and ashamed as well as 'worthless'
because of his failing.

The patient is taught to punish and blame himself
for not living up to the norut through saying to himself:
"I am worthless because other disapprove of me. This is
terrible and I must be punished by my feelings of guilt."

When he violates the norm he experiences guilt,
because he has been taught that one should be approved
by others; and it is "terrible" if he is not. Hence,
the evaluative thoughts (emotions) he has accepted
without question has resulted in his dissatisfaction.

The foregoing suggests that society is partly
responsible for the patient's emotional plight since
it has implanted the 'irrational' norms by which he
evaluates his behavior. It has taught him to blame
himself when he violates its norms.

The patient, however, is partly responsible
because he has accepted these norms without 'reflective
appraisal' and keeps reindoctrinating himself with them.
He continues to blame himself for not living up to the

norm. And blame, Ellis claims, is the essence of all

120

states of emotional dissatisfaction because it is an

"irrational" concept.

According to Ellis, blame is an “irrational"
concept because it is the Opposite of a "rational"
concept. The term rational is defined as:

. . . showing reason; not foolish or silly;
sensible; leading to efficient results

for human happiness; producing desired
effects with a minimum of expense, waste,
unnecessary effort, or unpleasant side
effects.1

The concept of blame is irrational because:

1. It is not based on "reason" and,

hence, is foolish or silly.

2. It leads to inefficient results

for human happiness.
According to the definition, an individual's behavior
in regards to blame is irrational because:

1. He does not use "reason"in

accepting and internalizing it.

2. Accepting and internalizing it
results in his unhappiness.

Ellis says that the concept of blame is not

based on "reason" because it implies an individual is

 

1Ibid., p. 343.

121
"worthless" when he violates some norm. "WOrthlessness,"
or “personal worth," is a concept that is strictly
definitional. It is not capable of being "scientifically
proven" since there is no empirical evidence to which it
can be referred.
Ellis tells patients:

Granting that I cannot prove that you are

worthwhile because you exist, by the same

token you cannot prove that you are worthless

because you do not succeed in life, or do not

attain your potential, or cannot win the love

of significant others. Because your concept

of worthlessness, like my definition of worth,

is also a definition. And how can you prove

a definition?1
He tells patients that man is "worthwhile" simply because
he exists, not because of his extrinsic achievements that
others may value. The term "worthwhile" is definitional
because by his definition human existence equals personal
worth. Because the concept of blame is definitional it
is not based on “reason.“

The second reason the concept is "irrational"

is that it allegedly results in human unhappiness.
Unhappiness occurs because the individual is taught
that he should like himself when he succeeds and hate

1Ibid., p. 148.

 

122

himself when he fails. As Ellis phrased it:
. . . he is taught that because others dislike
or disapprove of him when he fails to master
something, he should accept their evaluation
of himself and make it his own.
The acceptance of the evaluation of others results in
human unhappiness and the patient's current plight.

Thus, the concept of blame, by Ellis' definition, is

"irrational" and results in "irrational" behavior.

Analysis p§_Behavior Pattern Q

 

Behavior pattern D is characterized by the
patient's control over his emotions. He is capable
of "rationally” analyzing the evaluative thoughts he
has unreflectively accepted and internalized.
Furthermore, he believes that he does not need the
approval of others. Hence, society's control over
his emotions decreases while self control over them
increases.

Ellis describes behavior pattern D as follows:

The patient of RT is never considered 'cured'

or minimally disturbed until he has learned
to truly and consistently challenge his

 

1Ibid., p. 150.

123

underlying irrational assumptions, to think

in a fairly straight manner about himself

and his intimate associates as well as about

external things and events, and to stand

on his own two feet without any dire need

for support from the therapist or anyone else.1
Idle therapist attempts to demonstrate to the patient
that the norms he has accepted and internalized are
the cause of his unhappiness and that they are
"irrational." By this he hOpes to give the patient
control over his emotions. In the process, he attempts
to change the patient's perception and interpretation
of external occurrences. The patient is cured when
he sees and realizes that the norms he has accepted
and internalized are "irrational" and that he can
control his own emotions through "rationally" analyzing
them.

The therapist does not attempt to adjust the

patient to societal norms but neither does he attempt
the reverse. He helps the patient to rationally analyze

them and to remain undisturbed when he is placed in a

position where non-compliance in an overt sense with

 

1Ibid., p. 362.

124
the norms would place him in a disadvantageous position.
According to Ellis:

Patients . . . normally acquire the philosophy

that it is wise to accept unpleasant people

and circumstances when (a) it is of practical

advantage to do so, or (b) there is really no

other choice. 'Thus, they learn to accept

unanxiously and unhostilely an unfair

supervisor or boss when (a) their job has

usual advantages aside from their contact

with this overseer, or (b) it is presently

impossible for them to get a better position

with a less unfair boss.
Ellis implies that the patient should not attempt to
change his supervisor's treatment of him. Perhaps,
the supervisor is unaware that the patient resents
the way he treats him and would change his behavior
if informed. Ellis however does not indicate why the
patient should not seek changes in the supervisor's

behavior. He is only interested in the patient not

feeling disturbed by the situation.

The Transition-Producing Mechanism

The transition-producing mechanism consists

of teaching the patient how to control his emotions.

 

1Ibid., p. 362.

125

Ellis describes the therapist's role in a summary
form by stating:

. . . the effective therapist should continually
keep unmasking his patient's past and, especially,
his present illogical thinking, or self—defeating
verbalizations by (a) bringing them forcefully

to his attention or consciousness; (b) showing
him how they are causing and maintaining his
disturbance and unhappiness; (c) demonstrating
exactly what the illogical links in his
internalized sentences are, and (d) teaching

him how to re-think, challenge, contradict,

and re-verbalize these (and other similar
sentences) so that his internalized thoughts
become more logical and efficient.1

How does the therapist teach the patient "to think
straight and act effectively?" There are three aspects
to this mechanism: the patient's self-analysis of his
emotions; the therapist's demonstration that the emotions

are irrational; and the therapist's use of modeling.

Selp-analysis pg Emotions

 

The therapist's first step is to ascertain the
patient's current emotions. He does this through having
the patient do "homework." The Phomework" requires the
patient to keep a record of what he tells himself when

1Ibid.. pp. 58-59.

 

126

he faces situations in which he experiences dissatis-
faction. This "homework" provides the raw data for

the therapy.

HI

Demonstration p_ the

Irrationality _§_Emotions

 

 

The therapist demonstrates the irrational basis
of the patient's reported emotions. As Ellis puts it:

. . . he is shown how he concretely and
literally creates most of his self-
destructive emotions by consciously or
(more usually) unconsciously telling
himself certain exclamatory and
evaluative sentences. Thus, when he
feels hurt by being rejected, he is
shown that his feeling is created by

(a) the fairly same internalized
sentence, "I don't like being rejected,"
and by (b) the decidedly insane sentence,
"It is terrible being rejected, and
because I don't like it, I can't stand
to be rejected in this fashion.1

The technique used in showing the patient the
irrationality of his emotions is called the didactic
method. Under the didactic method the patient tells
the therapist he (a) feels unhappy because he thinks
(c) his boss disapproves of him and thinks he is

"worthless." The therapist tells him, in turn, that

 

11bid., p. 332.

127

he has forgotten about (b) which is his internalized
evaluative statement to himself that it is "terrible"
not to be approved by his boss, or to be considered
"worthy" by him. More precisely, (b) is his statement
to himself that: "Because the boss thinks I am
'worthless', therefore, I am 'worthless'. It is
'terrible' to be 'worthless' and not be approved by

my boss."

The therapist tries to demonstrate to the
patient that it is his acceptance and internalization
of the norm, that one should seek the approval of his
boss and feel "terrible" if he does not attain it,
that is making him unhappy. It is not his boss's
behavior, or expressed disapproval of him that makes
him unhappy. He is making himself unhappy by accepting
his bosses evaluations of him as his own and telling
himself it is "terrible" that the boss's negative
evaluation of him is true. Hence it is not outside
events or objects which are causing the patient's
unhappiness but rather his internalized sentences about

them which he has learned from others.

128

Figure 4.1 presents the patient's emotions chain
under behavior patterns U and D.

The crucial variable in the transition-producing
mechanism is demonstrating to the patient that his
internalized beliefs in behavior pattern U are irrational.
The patient says to himself: "I am worthless because
my boss does not think I am competent." The therapist,
in response, tells him: "You are worthless only because
you consider yourself worthless. Incompetence only makes
you valueless because you think it does. If you continue
to believe this you will only continue to make yourself
unhappy."

Ellis attempts to demonstrate the irrationality
of the belief by stating:

Let us face it; I tell him. 'Assuming that
you do measure your intrinsic and extrinsic
value by the same kind of scales, and therefore
arrive at the conclusion that you are worthless,
you must, once this conclusion is reached,
thereafter be prey to everlasting feelings of
anxiety, guilt depression, and other kinds of
emotional upset. On the other hand, if you do
not conclude that you are worthless (because,

at bottom, your definition of worth is human,

personal perfection), you may live with a
minimum of anxiety and hostility. Obviously,

129

BehaviopiPattern‘g

 

 

 

 

 

 

(a)< Patient's Chain of Causation >(c)
Patient's Statement Patient's Feelings
of problem about (a)
"Boss thinks I'm 'T'm unhappy."
worthless.“ za

\\‘ Actual chain ’/’
\\\ of ///'//
\
causation
$(b)/

Patient's Internalized
Belief

 

1. “One should be considered
worthy by his boss."

2. "It is 'terrible' if he
isn't."
Behavior Pattern Q
(C)

Patient's Feelings
2‘ about (a)

(a)

Patient's Statement
of problem \\

”Boss thinks IHn\\ "I'm therefore not
worthless.“ Patient's and Actual unhappy."
\ Chain of Causation /

N .4.

Patient's Internali
Belief

 

1. "One is worthy whether
others think so or not."

2. "It is 'annoying' to be
considered worthless but
not 'terrible.'“

Fig. 4.1. The Didactic Technique.

130

then, the only pragmatic course to follow
is to assume that you are not valueless.l

Ellis claims that with this argument he "proves" to
the patient that he is "rationally" only worthless by
his own arbitrary definition and if he continues to
accept this definition, he will inevitably bring on
his feelings of discomfort--particularly anxiety,

quilt, and depression--that are not necessary.

Modeling

The therapist serves as a model of "rationality.'
In his role as a model, he teaches the patient to "check
assumptions, generalize more accurately, and deduce
more logically" by showing him how it is done. He is
very active in his relationship with the patient and
continuously questions his beliefs and the propositions
on which they are based. The process of questioning
is meant to show the patient how to think ”clearly"
and "scientifically" about himself and his associates.
An interesting illustration of the modeling

process is what Ellis tells a patient when he fails

 

1Ibid., p. 155.

131

to do the "homework" (check on what he tells himself
when he experiences discomfort). He tells him:

'SO you didn't feel like doing the assignment.
Tough! Well you're goddam well going to have
to do it if you want to overcome the nonsense
you keep telling yourself. And you didn't
like me for giving you the assignment. Well,
I don't give a shit whether you like me or
not. We're here not to have a lovey-dovey
relationship--and thereby to gratify you for
the moment so that you don't have to work to
get better--but to convince you that unless
you get off your ass you're going to keep
stewing in your own neurotic juices forever.
Now when are you going to cut out the crap
and gp_something to help yourself?‘1

Through this series of statements Ellis shows the
patient a number of behaviors he wants him to emulate.
First, that he does not need to be "liked" by other
peOple. Second, that he is the only one who can
"rationally" control his emotions. Thirdly, because
he is the only one who can control his emotions, he

is the only one who can "cure" himself. Fourthly,

he can only "cure" himself by rationally analyzing

his evaluative thoughts.

 

1.132141- . P- 198-

132

Evaluation p§_the Rational-Emotive Model

 

In terms of prOposition B.4, the model does
not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions of
a useful behavioral change model. It lacks an
objective measurement system, control statements

and empirically validated prOpositions.

The Lack p§_pp Objective
Measurement System

 

 

 

The model does not contain an objective
measurement system. For example, it does not specify
how "rational behavior can be measured objectively.
"Rational" behavior is defined as a set of behavior
categories including "showing reason," "not foolish
or silly," and "human unhappiness." An objective
basis for classifying behavior in terms of these
categories is not provided.

The technique for classifying beliefs as rational
or irrational lacks empirical referents. A belief is
held to be irrational if it is not based on "reason”
and it results in "unhappiness." There is no objective

technique for measuring these variables. The measurement

133

is based on the therapist's subjective estimate of
their value.

Ellis, for example, contends that the belief,
"it is a dire necessity for an adult human being to
be loved or approved by virtually every significant
other person in his community," is irrational because
it is definitional.l One cannot empirically demonstrate
that it is a "dire necessity." Why this cannot be
accomplished is not indicated.

The second reason the belief is irrational is
that its acceptances results in human unhappiness.
Ellis claims it results in human unhappiness for two
reasons; it sets an unattainable goal and it creates
a constant anxiety. The reason it sets an unattainable
goal is "because even if 99 peOple accept or love you,
there will always be the hundredth, the hundred-and-
first, and so on, who do not."2 Why someone would
always dislike a person is not indicated. Ellis simply
contends that since the goal can never be attained, the

person must always feel frustrated and unhappy.

 

1Ibid., p. 61.
2Ibid., p. 61

134

Ellis claims that even if a person could achieve
such approval, it would result in constant anxiety over
how much he is accepted and approved. Moreover,
attempting to maintain the approval of others, would
result in the person becoming obsequesious to them.

He would become less self-directing. He would do what
they wanted regardless of whether or not he liked it.
He would,tmerefore, experience "unhappiness" as a
result of his self-defined "dire need" for the approval
of all significant others.

Ellis has not been interested in the empirical
validity of this proposition. He, in fact, considers
it untestable because no person could ever win such

approval. Thus these effects could never occur.

Lack p£_Smpirically
Validated Propositions

Because of the lack of an objective measurement
technique, propositions contained in the model have not
been empirically validated. For example, the proposition
that irrational beliefs are learned from society has

not been empirically tested. Moreover, there is no

135

prOposition indicating where society acquires the
beliefs.

The validity of the model has not been
established through a controlled experiment. The
possibility exists that changes in the behavior are
due to exogenous variables rather than those manipulated

in the model.
The Self-Validating Bias

The model has a self-validating bias. The
patient is told by the therapist that to remove his
symptoms he must change the nature of his evaluative
thoughts. The therapist also tells the patient what
his evaluative thoughts should be like. For example,
if the patient states he wants the approval and love
of all significant others, the therapist indicates
how he should change the statement. He should say
to himself: "What difference does it really make if
I am not approved and loved by all? After all it is
what I think of myself which is important. If I say

to myself that I don't need their love and approval,

136

when they express disapproval with me I won't feel
"bad" because I know it isn't "terrible” that they

do so. In short, why should I care whether they
approve of me or not? If they disapprove and restrict
me from getting something I desire, it makes me
annoyed but there is no "reason" why I should feel
"terrible about it."

It the patient accepts the therapist's state-
ments, he is pronounced cured. Acceptance is considered
to be a measure of validity for the model. However,
it is not an objective or independent measure of

validity.
The Lack g£_Control Statements

The mOdel does not provide control statements
for changing the patient's internalized beliefs. For
example, it does not specify the behaviors the therapist
should exhibit in "forcefully bringing the patient's illogical
thinking to his attention."

A control statement might be that:

If the patient's internalized belief is x, the

therapist should use behavior A and statements B.

137

The model, however, does not contain such statements.
. . . l
The Cond1t1on1ng Model

Analypis 2; Behavior Pattern g

The description of behavior pattern U is

twofold. It comprises:

1. The patient's reported symptoms such
as a feeling of discomfort, low
productiveness, unsatisfactory sex
adjustment, and dissatisfaction

with interpersonal relationships.

2. The patient's inappropriate
conditioning. This is the determinant

of the symptoms.
The therapist views the symptoms reported by the patient
as arising from his having learned unadaptive responses
to situations and objects that are not objectively

dangerous. In behavior pattern U, the patient is afraid

 

This presentation of Wolpe's conditioning
therapy is based on the following sources: J. Wolpe,
ngchotherapy py Reciprocal Inhibition (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1958); J. Wolpe, A. Salter,
and L. Reyna (eds.), TQQIConditionipg Therapies: Egg

Challenge pp gsychotherapy (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1965).

138
of something that cannot cause him any actual harm.
He has learned to respond to it unadaptively.
A response is "unadaptive" if it results in

unnecessary, unpleasant and non-beneficial feelings
on the part of the patient and it leads to "objectively
wasteful" expenditure of energy. Wolpe says "fear,"
for example, meets this criteria and, hence, is
"unadaptive.“ As he put it:

The very feeling of fear when no real danger

is present (for example, when going up in an

elevator) is unpleasant and non-beneficial.

The fear may also lead to objectively wasteful

expenditure of energy in the avoiding of feared

situations (such as climbing stairs in the case

of the elevator phobia).1

Wolpe states that there are two major inappropriate

responses that are interconnected; anxiety and avoidance.
The Anxiety Response

Anxiety is the primary inappropriate response.
Wolpe claims that:

All human neuroses are produced, as
animal neuroses are, by situations which
evoke high intensities of anxiety.2

 

lW01pe, pp, git., p.33.
2Ibid., p. 78.

139

He does not explain how or why high anxiety situations
produce neuroses. Such explanations are superfluous
to him. For therapy purposes he believes one does not
need to know why anxiety is evoked in certain situations
but only that it does occur. Stated differently, he
believes that if one can simply identify the presence
of anxiety, he can change it without knowing why it is
evoked.
According to Wolpe anxiety is:

. . . the automatic response pattern or

patterns that are characteristically part

of the organism's response to noxious

stimulation. A noxious stimuli is one

that causes tissue disturbance of a kind
that tends to lead to avoidance responses.1

The autonomic response pattern is characterized by
neurological changes. Examples of neurological changes
associated with anxiety include increased muscle tension,

tremor, headaches, and decreased mental concentration.

The Avoidance Regponse

When anxiety occurs it leads to the avoidance

of the noxious stimuli. Avoidance reinforces and

 

1Ibid., p. 34.

140

perpetrates the anxiety response. As long as the
noxious stimuli is avoided, the individual will
continue to respond with anxiety when confronted
with it. But by the same token, he can reduce the
probability of anxiety through avoiding as much as
possible the noxious stimuli. An executive, for
example, who responds with anxiety to the presence
of his boss, can reduce the incident of anxiety

through avoiding him as much as possible.

Identification pp
Noxious Stimuli

Behavior pattern U is described in terms of
the patient's anxiety response to certain noxious
stimuli that lead to avoidance behavior.

Noxious stimuli are classified into four
categories: interpersonal, sexual, non-human object,
and free-floating. The therapist tries to identify
the specific noxious stimuli to which the patient
reSponds unadaptively. If, for example, his symptoms
indicate difficulties with inter-personal relationships,

the therapist would attempt to identify the Specific

141
anxiety~evoking features of them. The therapist may do
this by using the Willoughby Scale of Neurotism. The
scale consists of 25 questions pertaining to how an
individual feels about certain interpersonal situations.
An example of the type of questions on the scale is:

Are you self-conscious before superiors? The stimuli
here is "superiors.“ If an individual answers yes to
the question, it is deemed an anxiety—evoking or noxious
stimuli.

The therapist may attempt to identify other
anxiety-evoking stimuli by presenting the patient with
different interpersonal situations and asking him how
he would react to each. For example, what would you do
if after leaving a shop you notice that you have been
short changed? If the patient says he would not go
back, his response is deemed inappropriate because the

therapist infers it is an anxiety—evoking situation.

Analysis 9; Behavior Pgttern Q

Behavior pattern D is described in terms of the

absence of symptoms, anxiety responses, and avoidance

142

responses. The patient no longer responds unadaptively

to specific non-objectively dangerous stimuli.
The Transition-Producing Mechanism

The transition-producing mechanism consists
of: prescribing inhibitory responses, developing

set, and implementing inhibitory responses.
Prescribipg Inhibitory Responses

The general mechanism for moving from behavior
pattern U to behavior pattern D is the principle of
rec1procal inhibition. The principle states that:

. . . if a response inhibitory to anxiety can
be made to occur in the presence of anxiety-
evoking stimuli it will weaken the bond between
the stimuli and the anxiety.1
The implementation of the principle requires the
therapist to provide the patient with stimuli that is
incompatible with the anxiety and avoidance responses
he currently makes. Two responses are held to be

incompatible, or reciprocally inhibit each other, if

the patient can be trained to make an adaptive response

 

lWolpe, §p_§;,, pp, cit., p. 10.

143

to noxious stimuli that prevents his making his current
unadaptive response. According to Wolpe, an example
of a response that will inhibit the anxiety response
is a "relaxation“ response. He claims that the two
responses are incompatible because one cannot feel
anxious and relaxed at the same time.

Wolpe has delineated four basic types of
inhibitory responses:

1. Assertive - used against anxiety produced
by interpersonal situations.

2. Sexual - used against anxiety produced
by sexual relationships.

3. Relaxation - used against anxiety produced
by non-human objects.

used against "free-floating"
anxiety where stimuli cannot
be uncovered.

4. Respiratory

For purposes of analysis emphasis will be placed on the
assertive response. It will be assumed that behavior
pattern D is where the patient substitutes an assertive
response for an anxiety and avoidance response.

Wolpe defines the assertive response as follows:

It refers not only to more or less aggressive
behavior, but also to the outward expression
of friendly, nonanxious feelings.l

 

144

Wolpe claims the assertive response is an
inhibitory response because each act of assertion by
a patient will, to some degree, reciprocally inhibit
his anxiety and avoidance responses. A patient cannot
avoid and be assertive simultaneously in anxiety-
evoking interpersonal situations. Since avoidance
maintains his anxiety, it will be reduced by his being
assertive. In short, the assertive response is used
to overcome neurotic (non-Objective) anxiety in
interpersonal relationships and the avoidance of them

when possible.
Developing Set

The therapist explains the principle of
reciprocal inhibition to the patient and shows him
how it relates to his symptoms. He, then, creates
a suggestibility set in the patient by indicating how
his symptoms can be eliminated. Wolpe does this by
telling the patient:

These fears can be overcome if they are opposed

by another, stronger emotion. I shall demonstrate
this to you by means of an example or two.

145

Suppose a university student goes to a meet-
ing of a society that he has joined because

of real interest in its field. A professor
has been invited to lecture at this meeting,
and afterward, at discussion time, the student
wishes to get up and ask a question or make

a criticism. Although he has no doubt about
the good sense of what he has to say, at the
very thought of saying it his heart thumps,
his knees tremble, and his hands sweat.

This fear is clearly unadaptive as, objec-
tiVely, no dire consequences could reasonably
be expected to ensue from his speaking.

There are two possible outcomes—-he may get
up and speak in spite of his fear, or he may
remain in his seat. He will in fact speak
only if the motivation to speak is stronger
than the fear. Just as fear tends to suppress
the impulse to speak, this impulse, whenever
it can be expressed, suppresses the fear to
some extent and, through so doing, slightly
weakens the habit of reacting with fear to
this particular kind of situation. If the
student should repeatedly speak on such
occasions, this fear will be progressively
weakened and eventually disappear. By con-
trast, another fearful student who at the same
meeting has been frozen to his seat will not
have improved at all.1

Having given the patient a general description
of his problems and what must be done to correct them,
the therapist shows him in detail how to apply the

"lesson“ to his own situation. Wolpe, for example,

 

lWolpe, loc. cit.

146

told one of his patients:

The main source of your anxieties (is) other
people. You become anxious when they
disapprove of you, or even if there is a
possibility that they may, in all sorts of
circumstances in which their opinions cannot
make any real difference to you. Suppose,

for example, that while out visiting, you want
to expressaapolitical viewpoint but do not

do so because Mr. X may think less of you.

In reality you could not be harmed by his low
Opinion. In failing to express your View,
however, you are expressing anxiety, and so
keeping up the strength of your anxiety habit.
If, on the contrary, you were to express it,
the feeling behind it would force down the
anxiety to some extent, weakening the anxiety
habit.1

Wolpe has communicated a number of things to the patient
in this passage. First, he has told him what his
”problem" is by indicating the noxious stimuli (other
people) to which he responds with anxiety (fear of

being disapproved) and avoidance (suppresses Opinion).
Second, he has told him that his response is inappro-
priate because the noxious stimuli is not objectively-
dangerous to him since their low opinion could not
"actually" harm him. Third, he has told him how to
resolve his problem (express his opinion). Fourth,

lIbid., p. 123.

147

he has told him that following his advice will result

in a "cure" (the development of set).

Implementing pp Inhibitopy Response

The last step the therapist takes in the therapy
process is to let the patient try the assertive response
and, then, analyze the result- Usually where the
patient does not try the new response, the therapist
exerts pressure on him to adopt it. A glimpse of this
process is revealed by Wolpe when he says:

As much pressure as seems necessary is applied
to motivate the actual performance of the
requisite behavior in appropriate circumstances.
NOt only is he told that it will result in his
feeling better, but his attention is focused

on the enormity of any injustices being
perpetrated on him, and in addition he is

shown how undignified and unattractive to Others
it is for him to behave in his accustomed
spineless way. These pressures lead to the
desired behavior in most cases, though not
always immediately. In subsequent interviews

he will be asked to recount his experiences

in relevant situations, and his handling of
them will be discussed and corrected.

The therapist then, pressures the patient into changing
his behavior. Only when he tells the therapist he has

tried does he become “cured."

 

lIbid., p. 117.

148
Evaluation p£_the Conditioning Model

In terms of proposition B.4 and premise A.3,
the model is not useful. It lacks an objective
measurement technique, empirically validated proposi-

tions, and control statements.

Lack pj_gp Objective
Measurement Techniqge

One of the key variables in the model is
classifying behavior as adaptive or non-adaptive.
Wolpes states that ”behavior is adaptive to the extent
that it is 'worthwhile'."1 He states that behavior
is worthwhile if it does not result in unnecessary
feelings and "objectively wasteful expenditure of
energy." However, he does not indicate how the
therapist can determine that feelings are unnecessary
and that energy is being objectively wasted.

In regards to the fear of elevators example,
climbing stairs does not necessarily lead to an

"objectively wasteful expenditure of energy." It may

 

1Ibid., p. 32.

149

”objectively" be beneficial to the person when viewed
from the standpoint of his physical health.

Another example of the problem of determining
the adaptiveness of a response is prescribing an
assertive response. Under what conditions 18 an
assertive response adaptive? WOlpe states that discretion
must be used in prescribing it. The criterion of
discretion he suggests is that ”no unpleasant reper—
cussions can be reasonably expected from his behavior.”

He states, for example, that if the patient "resents
(his) boss's surly manner, it would in most cases be
foolhardy to give frank expression to this resentment."

In such cases, he maintains that anxiety is
functional since it prevents the patient from encountering
an "objective danger," the boss discharging him.
Logically, the possibility exists that by expre551ng
his feelings the patient might alleviate the anxiety-
provoking situation. The boss may be unaware of his

feelings and when informed change his ”surly" manner.

 

1Ibid., p. 118.

150

Hence, the assumption that the boss would resent the
expression and penalize the patient is open to question.

Similarly, even if he were discharged he might
be better off since the situation would be eliminated
and he would have to look elsewhere for a job. There
is a chance that he might find a new boss without a
"surly" manner. Thus, the possibility exists that the
need for assertiveness could be eliminated through
changing the anxiety-evoking features of the patient's
environment.

Changes in the values of symptomatic variables
are measured subjectively. The therapist evaluates
changes in their values on the basis of what the patient
reports to him and his own subjective estimate of changes
in the patient's behavior. The possibility exists that
the patient could report changes without actually making
changes in his behavior. Thus, the model does not contain

an objective system for measuring changes in behavior.

151

The Lack pi Empirically
Validated Propositions

The model has a self-validating bias. The
therapist tells the patient that his problem consists
of making an unadaptive response to noxious stimuli.
He also tells the patient he can only eliminate the
response through using an adaptive response in place of
the unadaptive response. He is told that if he tries
the new response, his unadaptive response will
automatically disappear. If he reports that he is
using the new response, the therapist concludes the
model must be valid. He does not experimentally
determine if the patient would have recovered without
his intervention, or if some other technique had been

used.
The Lack p§_Control Statements

The model does not provide control statements.
For example, it does not specify under what conditions
an assertive response would be adaptive other than to
say that no undesirable consequences should accrue to

the individual. Moreover, it does not specify in

 

"7

152
measurable terms the behaviors that comprise the
assertive response. For example, it does not indicate
what specific behavior is associated with an "outward

expression of friendly, nonanxious feelings."

Summary

PrOposition B.4 states that a behavioral change
model is useful if it contains variables a change agent
can control, possesses an objective system for measuring
the values of variables and states empirically validated
relationships between the variables. The three
psychotherapeutic models examined do not presently
meet these conditions. Thus in accordance with premise
C:lA they presently cannot be considered as useful to
managers. fro the extent that they are representative
of other psychotherapeutic models, proposition C.l is
supported. Attempts to change behavior in the applied
areas of the behavioral sciences would not presently
meet the necessary and sufficient conditions of a useful

behavioral change model.

153

In terms of premise A.2 none of the three models
can be considered as presently useful to managers in
solving their behavioral change problems. It is not
yet possible to determine if they could help managers
solve their behavioral problems more efficiently and
effectively than they could solve them without using
them. The reason for this is twofold. First, the
behavioral change problems managers confront and the
models they use have not been identified. Thus it is
not known if the use of the three models would help
them solve their behavioral problems more efficiently
and effectively. Secondly, the three models do not
specify behavioral problems confronted by managers.

It is not yet known if the range of behavioral problems
dealt with in the models are conceptually similar to

the range of behavioral problems confronted by managers.
Therefore it is not yet possible to ascertain if the
models would be useful to managers.

In terms of premise A.3, there are two reasons
the models can not be considered as presently helpful

to managers in solving their behavioral problems more

 

154

effeciently and effectively. First, they do not as

yet constitute control knowledge. Secondly, the control
knowledge possessed by managers has not been identified.
Therefore it is not possible to determine if the knowledge
provided by the models is superior to that possessed by

managers.

 

if

CHAPTER V

ENVIRONMENTALISTIC MODELS FOR CHANGING

BEHAVIOR: AN ANALYSIS OF

PROPOSITION C:lB

In this chapter proposition Cl:B will be
analyzed through applying the conversion framework to
three environmentalistic models: the group decision
model, the supervisory model, and the counselor model.
Each of these models will be described in terms of the
construct of a behavioral change model and evaluated
in terms of the A premises and proposition B.4.

Unlike the psychotherapeutic models that focus
on changing the individual himself to change his behavior,
the environmentalistic models focus on changing environ-
mental elements to change behavior. The central proposition
is that a change agent can change behavior through

manipulating environmental variables.

155

)i’l

I
J

 

 

156

. . l
The Group Dec1s1on Model

Behavior Patterns U and~D

In Lewin's group decision model, behavior
pattern U consisted of certain food habits of
housewives. They did not use certain food items such
as beef hearts, canned milk, cod liver oil, or orange
juice. Behavior pattern D was described as one in

which they used these items.
The Transition-producing Mechanism

Lewin and his colleagues devised a series of
experiments to determine the relative effectiveness
of two different transition-producing mechanisms. The
two mechanisms are portrayed in figure 5.1. Mechanism

A consisted of lecturing the housewives on the need

 

lLewin reports on and analyzes these experiments
in the following sources: K. Lewin, "Group Decision and
Social Change," in G. Swanson, T. Newcomb and E. Hartley
(eds.), Readipgp ip_Social Psychology (Rev. Ed.: New YOrk:
Henry Holt & Co., 1952); K. Lewin, "Frontiers in Group
Dynamics: Concepts, Method and Reality in Social Science;
Social Equilibria and Social Change," Human Relations,
vo1. 1, #1 (1947). pp. 5-42.

 

 

 

 

 

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158

to change. As Lewin described the mechanism in one
experiment:

In three of the groups attractive lectures
were given which linked the problem of
nutrition with the war effort, emphasized

the vitamin and mineral value of the three
meats, giving detailed explanations with

the aids of charts. Both the health and
economic aspects were stressed. The
preparation of these meats were discussed

in detail as well as techniques for avoiding
these characteristics to which aversions were
oriented (odor, texture, appearaaqg, etc.).
Mimeographed recipes were distributed. The
lecturer was able to arouse the interest of
the groups by giving hints of her own methods
for preparing these "delicious dishes," and
her success with her own family.1

Mechanism B consisted of lecturing the housewives
on the need for change, holding a group discussion,
asking members to indicate if they would change, and
telling them that a check would be made to see if they
change. As Lewin described it:

Again the problem of nutrition was linked with
that of the war effort and general health.
After a few minutes, a discussion was started
to see whether housewives could be induced to
participate in a program of change without

attempting any high-pressure salesmanship.
The group discussion about 'housewives like

 

 

lK. Lewin, "Group Decision and Social Change,"
p. 202.

159

themselves' led to an elaboration of the
obstacles which a change in general and
particularly change toward sweetbreads, beef
hearts, and kidneys would encounter, such as
the dislike of the husband, the smell during
cooking, etc. The nutrition expert offered
the same remedies and recipes for preparation
which were presented in the lectures to the
other groups. But in these groups preparation
techniques were Offered after the groups had
become sufficiently involved to be interested
in knowing whether certain Obstacles could be
removed. In the earlier part of the meeting,
the women were asked by a showing of hands
who was willing to try one of these meats
within the next week.1

 

The outcome of the experiments was that mechanism

B seemed to lead to more changes in behavior than

. 2 . .
mechan1sm A. HouseW1ves exposed to mechan1sm B had

a higher incidence of change. The results of one

experiment are presented in Table 5.1. The results

indicated that more new mothers exposed to mechanism

B incorporated orange juice and cod liver oil in their

babies diet than those exposed to mechanism A.

 

lIbid.
2&4... p. 205.

160

TABLE 5.1

CHANGES IN CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR OF NEW MOTHERS

“5
Percentage of Mothers Who Used Orange Juice
as Prescribed

 

Two weeks after Four weeks after
experiment experiment
Mechanism A 36 55
Mechanism B 85 100

 

Percentage of Mothers Who Used Cod Liver Oil
as Prescribed

 

 

Two weeks after Four weeks after
experiment experiment
Mechanism A 18 52
Mechanism B 46 88

 

The experiments did not indicate why mechanism
B was more effective in changing behavior. All that
could be concluded was that for some reason or other
mechanism B tended to result in a greater incidence of

change in the food habits of the housewives.

Evaluation

In terms of proposition B.4, the model does
not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions of

a useful behavior change model. It lacks empirically

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161

validated propositions, an Objective measurement system,
and control statements.

Lewin was uncertain as to whether the greater
incidence of change was due to: l) the group discussion,
2) asking individuals to make a decision as to whether
they would change, 3) telling the individuals a check
would be made to see if they followed through with their
decisions, and 4) some combination of these factors.

He did not conduct any further experiments to isolate
the effects of these factors. Based on the data from
the experiment it could not be determined if one factor
was more important in producing the change.

One of the reasons Lewin advanced for the greater
effectiveness of mechanism B was simply its "group
setting." He felt that this setting performed three
major functions necessary for changing behavior. First,
he thought the group discussion "unfroze" the individuals'
behavior from their previous pattern of behavior. It

supposedly did this by permitting them to express their

anxieties about the change as well as by showing them

 

what other people felt. Second, he thought the lecture

 

.—
i _ L

provided the movement necessary for the change by
indicating how it was to take place. Lastly, he
thought the decisions made by the individuals in the
group "refroze" their changed behavior so that it
became persistent. Individuals through making the
decision to change committed themselves to the new
behavior.

But for some reason or other this explanation
seemed insufficient to Lewin. He suggested that
mechanism B was more effective because of group
processes operating on the individuals. He contended
that the "group" set norms which it expected its
members to carry out. If certain members violated
the norms, the other members applied pressure to
bring their behavior back under the influence of the
norm. Lewin assumed, however, that most people desire
to support group norms. He concluded that the reason
it is harder to change an individual's behavior under
mechanism A is because the individual does not want
to depart from group standards. Given this assumption,

he postulated that the easiest way to change the

162

2"

"Fr

 

163

individual's behavior is to change the group norms.
As he stated the "principle”:

. . . experience in leadership training, in
changing of food habits, work production,
criminality, alcoholism, prejudices, all
indicate that it is usually easier to change
individuals formed into a group than to
change any one of them separately. As long
as group standards are unchanged, the
individual will resist changes more strongly
the further he is to depart from group
standards. If the group standard itself is
changed, the resistance which is due to the
relation between individual and group
standard is eliminated.1

In stating this principle Lewin went beyond the data
obtained in the Iowa studies.

First, in the experiments conducted at Iowa
the groups were simply, as far as can be ascertained
from the data, aggregates of individuals since it was
not known if they shared a common norm. There was in
fact no attempt to determine whether they shared a
common.xemup which differentiated them from other groups.
In one of the experiments the experimental group was

made up of Red Cross club members who met regularly.

In another experiment the group was made up of new

 

 

1Ibid., p. 208.

164
mothers who neither knew each other, nor lived close
to each other. Lewin, on noting these differences,
claimed that groups of individuals need not be a
permanent organization for mechanism B to work more
effectively. Yet, he suggests that the reason for
their greater incidence of change was due to the
changing of a group norm. A group norm that was not
identified in the experiments.

Even more surprising is that he clearly states
that the decision in the experiment did not involve a
group goal or norm but was a decision about individual
goals in a "group setting." The individuals in the
group did not develop a consensus as to whether they
should change; it was strictly a personal choice.
Since some of the groups were non—permanent it seems
dubious that even if a consensus had ensued, that an
individual would, if he disagreed, go along with it
because of the lack of sanction power. The test of a
group is its ability to control deviants through sanction
power. Lewin's reasoning that the change was due to

the threat of group pressures for deviation seems erroneous

 

165

on the basis of the data gathered in the experiments.
There is no evidence to suggest that his assumption
that peOple desire to live up to group norms is valid.
One simply cannot, on the basis of the experiment,
conclude that the "group" serves as an important
determinator of behavior in the process of change.
Without knowledge of the reason for the
greater incidence of change under mechanism B it is
not possible to ascertain the general applicability
of the model. Does it work only for changing food
habits or can it be generalized to other forms of
behavior? In short, what range of behavior could it

be used to change?
. l
The Superv1sory Mpdel
Analysis g§_Behavior Pattern g

The description of behavior pattern U consists
of:

1. An observation that the productivity

of subordinates is lower than desired.

 

lThe supervisory model is drawn from R. Likert,
New Patterns pg Management (New YOrk: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

 

 

166

2. An observation that subordinates
have unfavorable attitudes toward
their supervisor, organization

goals, and each other.

3. A ten statement questionnaire indi—
cating portions of the supervisor's
behavior that subordinates perceive

as undesirable.

The subordinates‘perception of the supervisors
behavior is ascertained through the use of a ten item
questionnaire.1 The ten items are listed in Figure 5.2.
Subordinates of a given supervisor are asked to indicate
if they strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
disagree with the statements. In behavior pattern U
subordinates strongly disagree with the statements while

in behavior pattern D they strongly agree with them.
Behavior Pattern Q

The description of behavior pattern D consists of:

1. An observation that the productivity
of subordinates is higher than it was

in behavior pattern U.

 

lD. Katz, "Human Interrelationships and Organi-

zational Behavior," in S. Mailick and E. H. van Ness,

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice—Hall, 1962), p. 183.

167

 

 

 

=~ _
Behav1or Behavior
The Ten Statements Pattern U Pattern D
1. He thinks of employees as human
beings not just as people to get Strongly Strongly
the work done. disagree agree
2. He will go to bat or stand up Strongly Strongly
up for me. disagree agree
3. He deals fairly with peOple Strongly Strongly
I work with. disagree agree
4. He knows the job well and can Strongly Strongly
give right answers. disagree agree
5. He gives help when I really Strongly Strongly
need it. disagree agree
6. He likes to get our ideas and Strongly Strongly
tries to do something about them. disagree agree
7. He is quick to praise people Strongly Strongly
rather than to criticize. disagree agree
8. He keeps me well informed. Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
9. He keeps men posted on how Strongly Strongly
well they are doing. disagree agree
10. He hears complaints and Strongly Strongly
grievances. disagree agree
Fig. 5.2. Subordinates' perception of the supervisor's

behavior.

168

2. An observation that subordinate have
favorable attitudes toward their
superior, organization goals, and

each other.

3. A ten statement questionnaire
indicating portions of the supervisor's
behavior that subordinates perceive

as desirable.
The subordinates perception of the supervisor's behavior
in behavior pattern D is shown in figure 5.2. They
strongly agree with the ten statements about their

supervisor's behavior.
The Transition-ppoducing Mechanism

The transition-producing mechanism attempts to
change the subordinates' perception of their supervisor's
behavior to that described in behavior pattern D. If
their perception changes, it is hypothesized that their
attitudes and productivity will change. The supervisor
is to change their perception by changing those portions
of behavior specified in the ten statements. For example,
he is to try to obtain their ideas and do something about

them. If he incorporates this behavior, it is assumed

 

169

subordinates will perceive the change and change their
attitudes and productivity.

The supervisory model assumes that subordinates
expect their supervisor to exhibit the behavior specified
in the ten statements. It is inferred that subordinates
agreeing strongly with the ten statements expect these
behaviors. Because they perceive them as being present
they have more favorable attitudes and are more
productive. Subordinates disagreeing strongly with
the statements are inferred to have the same exceptations.
However, since they do not perceive their supervisor's
behaVior as being consistent with the expectations,
they have unfavorable attitudes and lower productivity.

In short, it is hypothesized that subordinates
enter the organization with certain expectations about
the behavior of the peOple they work under. When the
behavior of their supervisor is not in accord with
their expectations, they develop negative attitudes
that lead to low productivity. Their experience in

the organization is not consistent with their expectations.

170

To change their attitudes and productivity the supervisor

must change his behavior toward them.
Evaluation

In terms of proposition B.4, the model does not
meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
useful behavioral change model. It does not provide
adequate control statements and an Objective measurement

system for all the variables contained in the model.

Lack f pp Objective Measurement System

 

Likert has developed a "principle" for super-
visors to use in designing administrative style that
will make their subordinates' experience consistent
with their expectations. The principle is called the
"principle of supportive relationships." It states
that:

The leadership and other processes of the
organization must be such as to ensure a
maximum probability that in all interactions
and all relationships with the organization
each member will, in the light of his back-

ground, values, and expectations, view the
experience sis supportive and one which builds

T; “V
1.. H'
.

f“ "”
"”31.

(n
(‘7

) (I) 4* h-o

"UOL;

The q:

H

171

and maintains his sense of personal worth
and importance.1

The principle asserts that the supervisor should
consider the "expectations" of subordinates and arrange
their "experiences" in the organization in such a way
as to produce "favorable attitudes."

Likert does not indicate how the supervisor
is to measure such things as subordinates' "sense of
personal worth and importance." He claims that if
subordinates perceive their environment as supportive
they will maintain their "sense of personal worth."
"Supportive relationships" appears to equal "personal
worth and importance." This tautology is revealed in
the following passage:

Experiences, relationships, etc., are considered
to be supportive when the individual involved
sees the experience (in term of his values,
goals, expectations, and aspirations) as
contributing to or maintaining his sense of
personal worth and importance.2

The question of course is how the supervisor is to

determine if his subordinates view their experience

 

1Ibid., p.103.
21bid.

172

as supportive. Moreover, if they fail to view it as
supportive what can he do to change their perception?
In regards to the first question, Likert states:

To apply this general principle, a superior
must take into consideration the experience

and expectations of each of his subordinates.
In determining what these expectations are,

he cannot rely solely on his observations and
impressions. It helps the superior to try to
put himself in his subordinate's shoes and
endeavor to see things as the subordinates

see them but this is not enough. Too often,
the superior's estimates are wrong. He needs
direct evidence if he is to know how the sub-
ordinate views things and to estimate the kinds
of behavior and interaction which will be seen
by the subordinate as supportive. The superior
needs accurate information as to how his behavior
is actually seen by the subordinate. Does the
subordinate, in fact, perceive the superior's
behavior as supportive?1

He suggests that such information can be gathered from

a survey using the ten statements or a facsimile. He

also suggests that the supervisor might get such infor-
mation by creating an atmosphere in which his subordinates
give candid expression of their perceptions and reactions
to him and each other. He does not indicate how the

supervisor can create such an environment. As shall

 

lIbid., pp. 103-104.

173
be demonstrated in the next section, the ten statements
do not constitute an adequate basis for the supervisor

to change his behavior.

Lack p£_Adeguate Control Statements

 

The generality of the behaviors specified in
the ten statements raises application problems. For
example, what specific behaviors on the part of the
supervisor indicate to subordinates that he "thinks
of them as human beings?" Does he say to them: "Look
I don't think of you just as people to get work done
but rather as 'human beings.'" If not, what specific
behaviors does a supervisor use to indicate to his
subordinates that he thinks of them as "human beings?"
An answer would necessitate a definition of a "human
being." The studies do not provide such a definition.

It might be contended that if the supervisor
incorporated the behaviors specified in the other nine
statements he would be treating subordinates as "human
beings." By engaging in these behaviors he would

automatically receive a favorable evaluation on the

174

first statement. Granting that this possibility exists,
the supervisor may still not know what Specific items

to change in his actual behavior toward his subordinates.
For example, in terms of the second statement what
specific behaviors constitute. "batting" or “standing
up" for subordinates? Under what condition and with
whom does he "stand up?" For him to receive a favorable
evaluation, must subordinates directly observe him
"standing up?" Or can he simply tell them he has done
so? In short, how does he determine when and how to
"bat" and "stand up" for subordinates so that they will
endorse his behavior?

Another example of the difficulty in using the
ten statements as a basis for changing behavior is the
fifthxstatement. How can a supervisor determine when
subordinates "really need help?" Does he wait for them
to ask for it? What if it is not possible for him to
"help?" The ten statements do not constitute adequate
control statements. They do not indicate how the

behavior specified in the statements can be implemented.

175

Likert also does not indicate why the supervisor cannot
change the expectations of subordinates so that their
experience would be supportive. He seems to assume
that expectations are rigid and incapable of change.
Hence, the need for the supervisor to change the

experience of subordinates.

The Counselor Modell

Behavior Patterns g_and Q

In the counselor model behavior pattern U is
described in terms of the presence of felt personal
and work problems by a lower participant in an
organization. Behavior pattern D is described in
terms of the participant no longer experiencing these

problems.
The Trangition—producing Mechanism

The transition—producing mechanism developed

by Roethlishberger and Dickson consisted of a counselor

 

lThe counselor model is drawn from F. J.

Roethishberger and W. J. Dickson, Management and the
WOrker: Sp Account p£_g Research Program Conducted

py_the Western Electric Compapy Hawthorne Works, Chicago
’(New YOrk: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Science Edition, 1964).

176
who used a non-directive interviewing to change the
behavior of low level participants. The counselor
was to be an impartial third party in the relationship
between the lower level participants and the higher
level participants. Lower level participants were to
be able to come to him and discuss their problems
without the fear of it adversely affecting their jobs
or relationships with higher level participants. The
counselor was to play a non-directive role in his
discussion with the participants. He was not to advise
them on how to solve their problems. He was only to
help them clarify their problems.

In helping participants clarify their problems,
the counselor was to make use of non—evaluative and
non-directive questions. For example, if a low level
participant told him: “I can't stand this place anymore.
My boss is such a bastard and he is always on my back,"
lthe counselor was to respond to this series of statements
by saying: "You say your boss is always riding you?“
This was supposed to be the first step in helping the

employee clarify his feelings and the reasons for them.

177

Such questioning was to continue until the employee
had found a way out of his problems.
In handling personal problems the counselor
was to listen and not to advise the employee. He was
not to directly attempt to change the employee's
behavior. The counselor's role was casted in the
following terms:
The counselor's sole object is to lead the
employee to a clear understanding of her
problem such that she herself comes to
realize what action to take and then
assumes responsibility for taking it.1

This assumed that the employee wanted to solve her

problem and could do it herself.if the counselor could

show her the way.
Evaluation

In terms of proposition B.4 the model does not
meet the necessary and sufficient conditions of a useful
behavioral change model. It lacks an objective measure—
ment system, empirically validated propositions, and

control statements.

 

1Ibid., p. 600.

178

Lack f pp Objective Measurement System

 

It is not possible to determine the efficiency
and effectiveness of the model because the range of
behavior it attempts to change is not identified in
measurable terms. Personal and work problems of
participants who came to the counselor are defined on
an individual basis. What constitutes a problem and
how the counselor is to define it are unclear.
Apparently, participants define their problems in
behavior pattern U.and reports they no longer have
these problems in behavior pattern D. This is strictly
a subjectivelneasurement of the effectiveness of the

model in changing behavior.

Lack p§_Empirically Validated Propositions

 

The proposition on which the model is based is
a facsimile of the catharsis hypothesis that emerged
from Freud's early work in psychotherapy. The cathersis
hypothesis states that the level of hostility felt by
an individual is inversely related to the opportunity

he has for verbalizing it. The greater the opportunity

179

for him to verbalize his hostility, the lower his felt
level of hostility. The hypothesis is based on an
emotidnal constipation postulate. If individuals can
not discharge their hositility it will accumulate.

In the counselor model the problems presented
by participants are held to be hostility bearing. By
verbalizing their problems to the counselor, their
hostility dissipates and they no longer.perceive a
problem. The model is, hence, a perceptual model aimed
at changing the participants’perception of their
environment. The counselor and his use of a non-
directive interviewing technique constitute environmental
variables for changing the perceptions of participants.

There is no evidence in the Hawthorne studies
that indicates that the counselor is effective in
changing perceptions. Furthermore, the studies do not
specify if changing perceptions is sufficient to dissipate
the problems felt by participants. The model seem to
suggest that there is no objective basis for their
problems and that their environment does not have to

change but only their perception of it. There is some

evidence that suggests that change in perceptions is
not adequate.1 Strauss and Sayles claim that:

Although counseling might help an individual
make a better adjustment to a poor environment
(say to an inept supervisor) it didn't improve
the environment itself. Employees often began
to feel that they were wasting their time
talking to a counselor who could do nothing
for them, and ended up almost as frustrated as
before.

Lack 9; Control Statements

180

The model while it is intended to be non—directive

is actually directive. The directive function performed

by the counselor is clearly revealed in Roethlishberger's

and Dickson's description of how the counselor was to

handle work problems of participants. A participant

named Mary comes to a counselor and expresses dissatis-

faction with her present job. The counselor in response:

might ask her if she has ever discussed
the problem with her supervisor. Mary replies
that she has thought about discussing it with
her supervisor but has never done so. The
counselor asks her why. Mary answers that she
really doesn't know why but guesses that he
might misunderstand her. Now at this stage of

1See for example R. Likert, New Patterns 9;

lfiflfifififlfiflflb
2
G. Strauss and L. R. Sayles, Personnel: The

Human Problems p£_panagement (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.
Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 219.

181

the interview the counselor is focusing Mary's
attention upon a possible source of remedying
her problem. She is directing her attention
toward the supervisor. After some discussion,
Mary concludes that many of her fears are
groundless and decides that she will see her
supervisor.1
In this illustration it can be very clearly seen that
the counselor directs Mary's attention to her expressed
"problem.“

The counselor by asking Mary if she had
discussed the problem with her supervisor is directing
her attention. He presents her with an alternative
course of action that she may not have perceived before
as being feasible. About the only sense in which the
counselor is non-directive in this situation is not
directly telling Mary how to solve her problem. It
is a subtle form of masterminding by the counselor.

He hOpes that through asking Mary questions he can
make her believe she is solving her problems. But the

use of questions forces Mary to arrive at the "solution"

the counselor wants her to consider.

 

lRoethlishberger and Dickson, pp, cit., p. 600.

 

182

Further evidence of masterminding is revealed
by the description of the counselor's next move after
talking to Mary:

The next day the counselor is in the department
and is called over by the supervisor. He says
he wants to talk to her about Mary Jones. Mary,
he says, came to him yesterday and said she
wanted a transfer to a different kind of work.
He is perplexed as to why she is dissatisfied
with her present job and what he should do
about her request. The counselor at this stage
may ask the supervisor a number of questions
such as: Did Mary tell you why she is dis-
satisfied with her work? Do you see any
possibilities for advancement within your own
department which would obviate the necessity
for a transfer? Do you think that Mary
understands these possibilities? Questions

of this kind, as will be readily seen, may

give the supervisor a number of ideas.1

The questions the counselor asks the supervisor certainly
provides direction for the supervisor's behavior. Indeed,
it "may give the supervisor a number of ideas." Ideas
the counselor wants the supervisor to implement.

With the coming of these ideas to the supervisor,
he and Mary achieve a state of harmony. As described

by Roethlisberger and Dickson:
He may very likely say that he has always thought
Of Mary as a good worker and had planned to

1Ibid.

 

183

advance her to other work as rapidly as possible.
Following this discussion with the counselor,

he then calls Mary up to his desk and gives her
a more adequate understanding of the Situation.
As a result of this process, she goes back to
her work in better spirits. She is restored to
her normal effectiveness and her efficiency may
rise.1

What would have happened if the supervisor could not h
.i
have promised Mary a promotion? Would her problem

have been dissipated?

 

These are very crucial questions because Mary's
adjustment may have resulted from changes in her
environment rather than simply changes in her perception
of it. The change may have been a result of changes in
her supervisor's behavior. He called her in and attempted
to find out what was troubling her. He also promised
her a promotion. It would seem possible that her
adjustment could be due to these factors rather than

her interview with the counselor.

 

WY

Proposition B.4 states that a behavioral change

model is useful if it contains variables a change agent

lIbid.

 

 

184
can control, possesses an objective system for measuring
the values of variables and states empirically validated
relationships between the variables. The three environ—
mentalistic models examined do not meet these conditions.
Thus in accordance with proposition C:lB they presently
cannot be considered as useful to managers. To the
extent that they are representative of other environ—
mentalistic models, proposition C.1 is supported.
Attempts to change behavior in the applied areas of the
behavioral sciences would not presently meet the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions of a useful behavioral
change model.

In terms of premise A.2 none of the three models
can be considered as presently useful to managers in
solving their behavioral problems. It is not yet possible
to determine if they could help managers solve their
behavioral problems more efficiently and effectively
since the models used by managers have not been identi—
fied. Thus it is not known if the use of the three
models would help them solve their behavioral problems

more efficiently and effectively.

In terms of premise A.3,

185

there are two reasons

lodels cannot be con51dered as presently helpful

inagers in solv1ng their behavioral problems more

siently and effectively. First, they do

:itute control knowledge Secondly, the

edge
:fore
.edge

wssed

possessed by managers has not been
it 18 not p0831b1e to determine if
provided by the models 18 superior

by managers.

not yet

control

1dentif1ed.

the

to that

 

 

CHAPTER VI

BED-SATISFACTION MODELS FOR CHANGING BEHAVIOR

AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION C:lC

Need-Satisfagpipn,flpdg15

In this chapter proposition C:lC will be analyzed
h applying the conversion framework to two types of
atisfaction models; the need for achievement model
e interpersonal competence model. Each of these
will be described in terms of the construct of a
oral change model and evaluated in terms of the A
as and proposition B.4.

The need for achievement model concentrates on
ng behavior by changing need structure. It is
on the premise that increasing the need for achieve-
ill result in increases in actual achievement, if
nmental conditions permit satisfaction of the need.
terpersonal competence model takes the need for
rowth as a given and attempts to manipulate environ-

conditions to permit satisfaction of the need. The
delineates the type of organization environment that

llow satisfaction of the need for "self-growth."

186

 

 

«gym-w"

 

 

187

The Need for Achievement Modell

sis of Behavior

r p

 

Behavior pattern U is described in terms of a

eed for achievement and low actual achievement.

The Need for Achievement

Conceptually need for achievement refers to the
e to which an individual is concerned with attaining
goal. In operational terms, the definition repre-
a score on an achievement test. The achievement
usually consists of showing an individual a series
ur pictures depicting possible achievement situatipns
sking him to write a story about it. A description

ch a picture follows:

 

1This presentation of McClelland's need for
vement model is drawn from the following sources:
own, Social Psychology, New York: The Free Press,
Chapter 9; D. McClelland, "Business Drive and
nal Achievement," Readings ;p_Managerial Psychology,
. J. Leavitt and L. R. Pondy (Chicago: University
icago Press, 1964), pp. 122-46; D. C. McClelland,
evement Motivation Can Be Developed," Harvard
ess Review, XLIII (November-December 1965), 6ifor D.
lland.p;,§l., The Achievement Motpyp (New York:
ton-Century-Crafts, 1953); D. C. McClelland, The
ving Society (Princeton; D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc.,

 

 

 

188
scription of the picture: A man with a white

irt and tie sitting at what looks like a draft—
; board. In front of him on the board is a

all family photograph which he is gazing at
ther pensively.l

After the individual is shown the picture he is
to write a short story about what is happening in
at events have led up to it, what is being thought

person in it, and what will happen next. The
is then scored for the degree of need for achieve-
xpressed in it.

The scoring mechanism is presented in Figure 6.1.
ghest possible score, or degree to which the achieve-
eed is expressed, is 11 points per story. To attain

score each of the items listed in the scoring mecha-
auld have to be expressed in the story. The story
have to contain statements indicating AI, N, I

or ?), Ga+, Ga-, Bp, Bw, Nup, G+, G-, and Ach th.

f these items are given a value of 1 so that the

n score possible per picture is 11.

Defining a person as having a high need for

ement is somewhat arbitrary since there are many

1McClelland, "Business Drive and National
ement."

 

P-

h—If-‘nlsh
I
‘l

'(

 

 

.-
IX
_ , ,
‘ . '__' _.
., w: _—

 

 

189

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Canaan on mcflhuu CH uoommm O>Huamom
wouMOHocH SOH£3.>Houm CH ucoEoumpm

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pouomufiplamom was Apa3 omennmmfiwm

no Hmom was onm3ou EH: mam: mma moo
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mounoach noanz mnoum onu Ge ucoaoumum

.ANHV oEoouso samuumocs cm
o>m3 Ho .AIHV Hammmooosmss .A+Hv Hummmoo
loom Honuao mum SOH£3 Hmom mo ucoacampum

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Ho A+mwv Hmom mo unmeoflmuum moaummHOHucm
ma Hospa>apce msflzonm mnoum ca ucoEoumum

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A
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H
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snow as pommma mo mumum

mmonm ucmusuoz

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MnH>Huo¢ HmncoEoHDmGH

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ucmEm>mH£O¢ How pmmz

190
3 scores (1 to 11) indicating the degree of
nent need revealed by the test. In light of this,
be said that a person with a score of 5 has a high
r achievement? Yes and no. It is high in compari—
h others who score below 5 and lower than those who
bout 5. Hence, when one talks about a high need
.ievement operationally he must specify the com-
'e base he is using.

What the achievement test score represents is the
icy with which the individual tends to think spon-
sly in achievement terms when that is not clearly
2d of him. It indicates how closely he approxi—
:he complete achievement sequence. Did he define a
u, want to solve it, think of means of solving it,
of difficulties that get in the way of solving it
r in one's self or in the environment), think of

who might help in solving it, and anticipate the
hood of success or failure? If he only presented

these items in writing his story, he will receive
r score than if he presents more than two items in
,quence.

To illustrate how the need for achievement is

[two stories that were written in response to the

 

 

191

titni of the picture previously presented will be

d.

Story S_

engineer is at work on Saturday When it is
et and.he has taken time to do a little day-
:aming; He is the father of the two children
‘the pdcture--the husband of the woman shown
'has a happy home life and is dreaming about
1e pleasant outing they have had. He is also
>king forward to a repeat of the incident which
now giving him pleasure to think about. He
Ins on the following day, Sunday, to use the
:ernoon to take his family for a short trip.1

Story'S

a man is an engineer at a drafting board. The
:ture is of his family. He has a problem and
concentrating on it. It is merely an everyday
currence--a problem which requires thought. How
n he get that bridge to take the stress of pos-
ble high winds? He wants to arrive at a good
lution of the problem by himself. He will dis-
ss the problem with a few other engineers and

ke a decision Which will be a correct one--he

s the earmarks of competence.2

Without going into the scoring mechanism in
, the person who wrote the first story would receive
m need for achievement score than would the person

romathe second story. According to McClelland, the

 

1Ibid., pp. 124-25.

2Ibid., p. 125

 

 

192
writing story A would receive a score of (-1)
;he story is completely unrelated to achievement.
fson writing story B would receive a score of
-mately (+6) because there are six ideas in his
:hat are scorable as related to the achievement
:e (AI, Ach Th, N, Ga+, Bw, and Nup). In his
1e has defined a problem, indicated he wants to
Lt, thought of difficulties that get in the way of
3 it, thought of people who might help him solve it,
:icipated the likelihood of success. This is, in
a, how the variable, need for achievement, is

ad.

Actual Achievement

Actual achievement is more difficult to measure
he need for achievement. Having such a measure is
ary for finding out if a high need for achievement
3 in high actual achievement. Stated differently,
hinking in achievement terms on a fantasy test pre—
hat a person will actually achieve things in the
orld, or non-test situation?

McClelland advances the proposition that:

 

 

 

193

ople who spend a lot of their time thinking
out getting ahead, inventing new gadgets,
fining problems that need to be solved, con—
dering alternative means of solving them, and
lling in experts for help should also be people
0 in real life pp_a lot of these things or at
e very best are readier to do them when the
casion arises.1
t the validity of this proposition a measure of
chievement need and actual achievement is necessary.

For measures of actual achievement McClelland has
used proxy variables such as salaries, grade point
[es, and rate of promotion. He has found, for
.e, that men in corporations earning less than
)0 a year have the lowest average need for achieve-
icores while those making between $20,000 to $25,000

2 But men in the bracket

:he highest average scores.
$25,000 have a somewhat lower average achievement
than those in the $20,000 to $25,000 bracket.
ding to McClelland, the reason achievement need

5 of managers declines somewhat after the $25,000
y bracket is that managers in higher brackets are

g well enough to relax a little."3

 

 

I—

1Ibid., p. 126.

2Ibid., pp. 128—29.

3Ibid., p. 129.

 

194

a

is pp Behavior
2r D

 

 

Behavior pattern D is described in terms of
flu need for achievement and a high rate of actual
evement. The object of change has moved from a
ation in which his achievement need and actual
evement were low to a situation in which they

relatively higher.

Egansition-producing
anism

Originally it was thought that to increase
magnitude of the achievement need and the actual
evement rate of people one had to uncover the
ial determinates of the need for achievement.1
ed differently, what "causes" some people to have
.gh need for achievement and others to have a low
[for achievement?

At first, McClelland traced the determinates
:he achievement need to early independence and
:ery training of children by their parents. The

ans, in turn, were viewed as deriving these

Ad‘—

1McClelland, The Achieving Socipty.

 

 

 

195

‘inging practices from the Protestant Ethic that
ssed hard work and self—reliance. After uncov-
.g these determinates, McClelland suggested that
.ges in the magnitude of the achievement need of
ters of a nation, as well as changes in the mag-
.de of their actual achievement, would require
.ges in the nation's child rearing practices. One
.he most significant variables in child-rearing
:tices was believed to be father dominance. Father
.nance was hypothesized to result in the child
iming dependent on others for direction and to dis-
'age him from trying to gain mastery over his
.ronment. Hence it prevented him from becoming
spendent and mastery—oriented. The presence of
:e two characteristics was postulated to be the
.ical determinant of the achievement need. If they
2 absent, the child would not develop a high need for
.evement or a high level of actual achievement.
McClelland, has recently hit upon a way to
rt-circuit this long and involved cultural process

increasing the magnitude of the achievement need.

 

1McClelland, "Achievement Motivation Can Be
aloped."

 

1.. ..

 

 

196

txagun to experiment with teaching people with a
Ci for achievement how to behave like people with
tweed for achievement. He is teaching them the
system used for measuring the achievement need
training them to write stories that will earn
'high score. As he putSit, he teaches them:

r to think, talk, act, and perceive the world
;e a person with a high need for achievement.

:ulates that such training will increase their need
iievement. He believes that if they learn to attend
.evement dimensions for the purpose of writing

5, they will begin to do this when they are not

; such stories. They will begin to think in

ament terms in their everyday life so that their

f actual achievement will increase.
Evaluation p; the Achievement Model

In terms of proposition B.4, the model does not
he necessary and sufficient conditions of a useful
cnal change model. It lacks objective measures for
riables contained in the model, empirically vali-

pmopositions and control statements.

 

1Ibid., p. 10.

 

 

 

197

pj_pp Objective Measure
gtu§l_Achievement and
gigpi Validipy pp
asitions

At the present time there is little information
-able that deals with the effectiveness of the pro-
for increasing the magnitude of the achievement need. Ft

>usly, the effectiveness of the program can only be

.‘qi-

fmined by observing whether the incidence of actual

 

“FT-1 2...
‘hip-

evement among individuals exposed to the program sig-
:antly increases after the program is completed.

:ases in the magnitude of the achievement need does
:onstitute a measure of the effectiveness of the pro—
because the measurement of the need for achievement

intaminated by the program. Stated differently,

 

'iduals exposed to the program are taught how to

ase their scores on the achievement test. One would,
fore, expect their scores to increase after exposure
e program.

Determining the effectiveness of the program in
ing behavior requires the measurement of the indi-
l's rate of actual achievement before and after the
ing. At the present time, McClelland has some crude

ators of the changes in behavior that follow from

 

198

: tc> the program. In one training program, for
:aixteen executives in one company were taught
3e lrigh achievers while a matched control group I

asexi to the company's usual type of development
. Two years after the program a follow-up
d that executives exposed to the achievement pro-

d been promoted faster than those in the control

But there appeared to be an unanticipated conse-
with the control group. The company's usual train-
>gram seemed to have a negative affect on their pro-
rate. As McClelland put it:

part this appeared to be due to the fact that
ase men who had attended the regular company
irse had slowed down somewhat; that is, they
re advancing somewhat less rapidly after the
irse than they had before, whereas our par-
:ipants had continued to forge ahead. So far
we could tell, the reason the regular group
awed down was that the company course had
ressed the importance of 'not rocking the boat,‘
representing the company image as it was out-
ned for them in the course.

Ixmlly possible to tell from the study if the achieve-
raining resulted in the executives significantly'

simgtheir incidence of actual achievement?

 

1McClelland, loc. cit.

 

 

 

199

The answer, in large part, is negative. The use
:e of promotion for a measure of actual achievement
: best, a proxy variable. The study provided no
: measure of the executives' actual achievement
: before or after their exposure to the program. It
ierefore, possible that their higher rate of promo-
Ls not attributable to greater actual achievement
air part but on other factors which were not
ited for in the follow up studyu IPut differently1the
:ion mayormay nothave been solely a function Of their
1 achievement.

Along similar lines, it is questionable whether
y is a good proxy variable for measuring actual
vement. Just because a manager receives a higher
y than people below him does it necessarily follow
his actual achievement is greater?

In another training program, fifty-two men from
participated in a ten day seminar. Among the fifty-
en there were bicycle shop owners, fiber exporting
s, lawyers, bankers, and politicians. How effective
he program? McClelland says that it is still a
e too early to tell exactly how effective it was.

er, as he put it:

 

 

 

200

it is too soon to know what the long-range
'esults will be, but between six and ten

lonths after training, two-thirds of the men
Lad become unusually active in business in
:ome readily observable way: e.g., they had
:tarted a new business, expanded their old
>usiness, greatly increased profits, or taken
:ctive steps to investigate a new product line.
inly one-third of these men had been unusually
ctive in similar ways in the two years prior
0 taking the course. In short, the course
rould appear to have doubled the natural rate
if unusual entrepreneurial activity in this
roup.1

McClelland furnishes the following illustrations
ople who appeared "to have doubled the natural rate
usual entrepreneurial activity:"

. One man who owned a small radio shop
decided to start a paint and varnish

factory. It has succeeded, and he has
opened another radio shop.

. One has decided to go to work daily instead
of leaving his shop to his assistant.

. A wealthy family has started a new sugar
mill.2

trations 2 and 3 seem to indicate a decision to try
hing different. They do not really indicate if the
e actually achieved something in terms of the
vement sequence. Similarly, just because "the

e would appear to have doubled the natural rate of

Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid., pp. 20, 22.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

201

ual entrepreneurial activity," does it necessarily
ow that their actual achievement will increase?
t not increases in actual achievement require not
a desire, or need to achieve, but also an ability
:hieve?

On an.p priori basis it would seem that just
(ing in achievement terms would not necessarily
Lt in a greater incidence of actual achievement. It
i seem necessary for an individual to have the ability
:ansform his achievement desires into specific behav-
that will result in actual achievement. It is
ear if McClelland's program actually increases a

.cipant‘s ability to achieve.

pp Control Knowledge

McClelland does not indicate how he arrived at
:Onclusion that participants in the India program
_pd their rate of entrepreneurial activity. He does
Lention how he determined their existing level of
'ity or how he measured changes in it. Similarly,
»es explicate the unit of comparison: entrepren-

1 activity.

 

 

 

202

The possibility exists that the changes observed
articipants were due to exogenous variables. Thus,
5 not possible to state that the transition-produc-

mechanism leads to changes in actual achievement.
1
The Interpersonal Competence Model

sis of Behavior
ern‘g

 

The description of behavior Pattern U is a high
for self-growth coupled with a low interpersonal
etence which is a function of certain environmental

itions.
The Need for Self-Growth

According to Argyris, the self is an inter-
onal phenomena. As he defines it:

The self is the individual's needs, values,
abilities, and defenses integrated into an
organized whole or entity that has some mean-
ing to the individual.2

onsiders the self to be an interpersonal phenomena

'—

1This presentation of Argyris' interpersonal
etence model is drawn from: C. Argyris, InteppersonaL
etence and Organizationap Effectiveness (Homewood,
: Richard D. Irwin, 1962).

2Argyris, pp, cit., p. 17.

 

 

 

203

lse the certain needs, values, abilities, and defenses
liCh it is composed are acquired and learned from
>ns external to the individual.

The interpersonal competence model is a need—sat—
:tion model since it postulates that an individual
I need for "self-growth" that can be satisfied or
Jited by his environment. "Self-growth" is held to
function of experimentation with new values, ideas,
In awareness Of one's impact on others and their
:t on him. If an individual's environment is such
he can not experiment with new values, or ideas,
:annot gain feedback on his impact on others, his
for self—growth will be frustrated. In such
nnces, his self will become a static entity in that
:ehavior will be of a reoccurring nature and hence

predictable.
Interpersonal Feedback

From Argyris' conceptualization of self-growth
In be seen that “feedback" from an individual's
'onment plays an important part in his self-growth.
lSt receive information about his impact on others,

10W changes in his values and ideas affect their

 

 

 

204

ption of him in order to grow.

Argyris believes that only "descriptive
valuative" feedback will facilitate the process of
growth. Descriptive non-evaluative feedback is
rack that describes a relationship without placing
ue judgment on it. As he puts it:

. . descriptive non-evaluative feedback . . .
.ttempts to describe and not evaluate. For
example, there is a significant difference
>etween saying 'you shouldn't behave in x
manner' and 'I experience the following feel-

.ngs when you behave in x manner.‘l

>es not explicitly indicate ppy there is a "signi-
1t difference" between the two statements he cites
118 example. He simply seems to suggest that the
: statement explicitly espouses a value judgment.
Ly, one should not behave in x manner.

Why should descriptive evaluative feedback be
ied if the self is to grow? Argyris answers this
pstplating that descriptive evaluative feedback
3 to "defensive behavior" in individuals that inhib-

their self-growth. Defensive behavior supposedly

bits self-growth because it maintains the existing

 

1Ibid . p 18

 

 

 

205

It defends the self from change. As Argyris
it:
'he individual will tend to accept those
experiences consonant with his self; and he
rill tend to distort, deny, and reject that
>ehavior that is different from, and is not
.mmediately integratable with, his self.1
:es not indicate how an individual determines if
riences are consonant or dissonant with his self,
1y he should become defensive when he receives
:iptive evaluative feedback. He assumes the indi—
al will become defensive with such feedback.

If interpersonal feedback is to facilitate self

:h it must not put an individual on the defense.
:15 suggests that such feedback occurs when an
Jidual "accepts" his own, or someone elsés behavior
: is without evaluating it. As he expresses it:
Acceptance may be defined as perceiving one's
awn or others' behavior as the self or others
intended it to be perceived. Acceptance implies
nothing as to whether one likes or agrees with
vhat one sees. It simply means that the individ—
ial is willing to see it, to accept it as existing
in the way the person who manifests it wants it
perceived. The Operational criteria for whether

an individual A is accepting of his (or someone
else's) behavior are as follows:

Argyris, loc. cit.

 

 

 

206

a) In the case where x is A's own behavior,
does A permit feedback about x from others
without becoming defensive or making them
defensive for giving such feedback?

b) In the case where x is someone else's behav-
ior, does A provide feedback to B about x
without being defensive or inducing B to be
defensive?l

rding to the definition, acceptance means that an
Iidual gives and receives non-evaluative feedback

>ut becoming defensive. When this occurs, the

ssary condition for high interpersonal competence and
-growth is met. The individual is open to new values
ideas and is aware of his impact upon others.

use of this openness, ‘he has a potential for

E—growth.'
Interpersonap Competence

Argyris defines "interpersonal competence" as a
component of "administrative competence." "Admin-
ative competence" is defined as an "organization's
.ities to achieve its objectives, maintain itself
arnally, and adapt to its external environment."

>rding to.Argyris, administrative competence breaks

 

1Ibid., p. 19.

2Ibid., p. 15.

 

 

 

207

1 into two analytically separable components: 1) tech-
il, rational, and intellectual competence which
agedly deals with things and ideas necessary for
anization effectiveness; and 2) interpersonal com-
ance which allegedly deals with interpersonal relation-
>s necessary for organization effectiveness. Inter—
:onal competence is defined as the degree to which
;icipants of an organization are aware of their
lCt upon others and others' impact upon them, and
degree to which interpersonal problems are handled
uch a way that the problems do not reoccur. Inter-
onal competence is considered to be low when these
ables assume low values, and vice-versa.

As Argyris puts it:

Interpersonal competence increases as individuals:

a) Are aware of their impact upon others
and others' impact upon them.

b) Solve problems in such a way that the
same (or similar) problems remain
resolved.1

Organizational Effectiveness

Argyris postulates that increases in interpersonal

etence may result in increases in organization

L

1Ibid., p. 26.

 

 

 

 

208

iziveness. "Organization effectiveness" appears to
‘Ehe degree to which an organization achieves its
'tives, maintains itself internally, and adapts to
xternal environment. He does not indicate how one
» measure the values of these variables. For

>1e, how can the degree to which an organization

:ains itself internally be measured?
The Determinant p§_Low IpterpersonaL Competence

The determinant: of low interpersonal competence
astulated to be a function of an inappropriate set
rganizational values. In behavior pattern U, the
nization values "rational" behavior and devalues
tional" behavior. It, so to speak, operates on an
mption that efficiency and effectiveness decrease as
ession of feelings and emotions increase. It assumes

"emotional" and "rational" behavior can be separated
segmented by participants. Participants are to inter—
strictly on the basis of their formal roles. They
to be impersonal in their orientation toward each

er and interact on a task related basis.1

 

1For an interesting discussion on the role of
arsonality in organizations see: P. Selznick,
indations of the Theory of Organization, " American
Lological Review, XII (1948), 25-35.

 

(PH—h—

i1- ..

 

 

209

Argyris asserts that as participants commit
elves to the organization's value of rationality,
will emphasize the rational, intellectual aspects
teractions and suppress the emotional aspects. For
1e, they will say such things as "Let's keep feel-
Out of the discussion." When the emotional aspects
eir behavior is suppressed, interpersonal difficul-
will either be suppressed or disguised and brought

rational, technical, intellectual problems. Due

e lack of interpersonal feedback, participants will
it difficult to develop competence in dealing with
' emotions and feelings in their interpersonal rela-
hips. Their interpersonal competence will be low
use they are not aware of their impact on others and
's' impact on them, and interpersonal problems will

>e resolved in such a way that they do not reoccur.
The Effects pg Low Lpterpersona; Competence

Argyris goes on to postulate that because the
ession of emotions and feelings is not permitted, the
Lcipants will establish personal and organizational
1ses to help them suppress their own feelings or

ait others in their attempts to express their emotions

 

_A"

 

 

210
feelings. As he states it:
If feelings are suppressed, the tendency will be
for the individual not to permit himself or
others to own their feelings. For example, the
individual may say about himself, 'No, I didn't
nean that,’ or 'Let me start over again. I'm
confusing the facts.‘ Equally possible is for one
individual to say to another; 'No, you shouldn't
feel that way,‘ or 'That's not effective executive
behavior,‘ or 'Let's act like mature people and
keep feelings out of this.'1
aking statements like, "No, you shouldn't feel that
" participants are allegedly transmitting evaluative
back that lowers interpersonal competence and hence
-growth.

Argyris hypothesizes that another way to prevent
icipants from violating the organization's value
ationality is to block out, or refuse to consider,

3 and values which, if discussed, could reveal sup-
sed feelings and emotions. He believes that such a
nsive reaction may lead to a-barrier to intellectual
s as well as values. Participants will tend to limit
selves to those ideas and values that do not violate
organization norms or values. This, in effect, fur—

decreases interpersonal competence and self-growth.

rgyris states it:

lArgyris,pp.cit., p. 41.

 

‘1..-

IF. a.»
I
1.

 

 

211

he iJniividuals in the organization will tend

o decrease its capacity to be open to new ideas
rui values. As the degree of openness decreases,
the capacity to experiment will tend to decrease,
rui the fear to take risks will tend to increase.
s the fear to take risks increases, the proba-
ility of experimentation is decreased and the
ange or scope of openness is decreased, which
.ecreases risks. We'have a closed circuit that
rould be an important cause for the loss of
ritality in an organization.1

[dividuals cannot achieve self-growth, the organiza—
cannot either. If individuals will not experiment
new values and ideas, neither will the organization.
iet effect is that the organization's achievement of
objectives and adaptability to its environment is
than it would be if such conditions were not present.
As openness to new values and experimentation
eases, interpersonal competence decreases. As
rpersonal competence decreases, it has a number of
equences for the behavior of the individual and the
[vior of the organization. As Argyris describes it:
If individuals are in social systems where they
are unable to predict accurately their inter-
personal impact upon others, and others' impact
upon themselves they may begin to feel confused.

'Why are people behaving that way toward me?‘
'Why do they interpret me incorrectly?‘2

'—

lArgyris, loc. cit.

21bid., pp. 142.,

 

1|

km.m.

 

 

212

rding to the passage, since participants receive no

rpersonal feedback about how they "emotionally"

ct each other they become suspicious of each others

ves. Supposedly, because they do not really know

they think of each other, they mistrust each other.
Mistrust is postulated as leading to defensive

vior on the part of the participants. In this

rd, Argyris says:

Since such questions (e.g. 'Why are people behav—
ing that way toward me?') are not sanctioned in a
rationally dominated system, much less answered,
the confusion will tend to turn to frustration and
feelings of failure regarding interpersonal rela-
tions. In an attempt to maintain their sense of
esteem, the members may react by questioning the
nonesty, and genuineness of the interpersonal
oehavior of their fellow workers. Simultaneously,
they may place an even greater emphasis upon the
rational, technical interactions, in which they are
probably experiencing a greater degree of success.
The increased emphasis upon rationality will act

to suppress the feelings even more, which in turn,
will decrease the probability that the questions of
confusion and the mistrust (of self and others) will
3e explored.1

passage suggests that when mistrust becomes prevalent
1 organization participants will react by emphasiz—
:he "rationality” value. They will stress inter-

an on an impersonal and taskfrelated basis. This

 

1Ibid., p. 44.

 

17‘
V

 

 

213

reaction, in turn, will increase the suppression of

emotions and mistrust.

There is another consequence for the participant's

behavior that supposedly transpires when emotions are
suppressed and mistrust emerges. Argyris states the con-

sequence in the following manner:

As interpersonal mistrust increases, and as the
capacity (individual and organizational) to cope
with this mistrust decreases, then the members
may tend to adapt by 'playing it safe.‘1

The important question is why should participants react
to "mistrust" with an increased tendency to "play it
safe?" Argyris believes that since they cannot gain
interpersonal feedback they will tend to avoid new
behavior patterns because the patterns may be negatively
evaluated by other participants. To “play it safe" they
will simply repeat patterns that they have used in the
past without eliciting negative feedback. He equates
"playing it safe“ with defensive conformity.

Defensive conformity apparently means that

participants will adhere to traditional methods and

 

1Ibid., p. 41.

 

(

 

214MW
/

techniques that reflect the "rationality" value of the
organization. It assumes that participants desire to
maintain, or improve upon, their present position and
that they perceive that this can only be done by "playing
it safe."

The increasing incidence of mistrust and con—
formity supposedly has another consequence for the

participants' behavior. As they increase, the partici-

 

pants' commitment to their roles in the organization
becomes external in nature. They gain their primary
satisfaction from increases in their salaries and

status and gain little satisfaction from their role per-
formance itself. The reason this occurs is obscure.
Apparently, it is attributed to the value the organiza-
tion places on “rational" behavior. Since participants
comprise the organization and it values "rationality,"
they will also value it highly. Internal commitment to

a role is an "emotional" process and hence is something

 

to be avoided.

216

The organization consequence of mistrust, con-
formity, and external commitment is that decision—making
by participants becomes rigid. Since they want to take
no chances with new ideas, or experiment with them, they

simply apply decision rules and techniques they have

learned in the past. The net effect on the organization ”XL

is that in decision—making there is no self-growth or

organizational growth. If the organization's environ—

 

ment is changing and requires new decision rules and
techniques, organization effectiveness may be decreased.
Another organization consequence of the partici—
pants' behavior under low interpersonal competence is
that they began to engage in certain non-productive
behaviors which further decreases organizational effec—
tiveness. Because of the prevalence of mistrust among
participants, Argyris postulates that they will engage
in non-productive activities whose aim is to provide
them with a rationale for their actions in case any one
should question their judgment or actions. They also
gather data and keep a record of mistakes that other
participants make in order to give them some control if
these people cite them for mistakes. According to

Argyris, they often build "JIC" files, which stand for

 

217

just in case, to protect themselves from absurd questions
their boss might ask them. For example, the boss might
ask them how many parking spaces there are in the com—
pany's parking lot.

A summary of the total description of behavior

pattern U is presented in Figure 6.2.

Analysis pp Behavior Pattern p

Figure 6.3 portrays behavior Pattern D. The
pattern primarily differs from behavior U in that the
organization's values have been changed. Communication
of emotions, "authentic relationships," interpersonal
competence, and internal commitment are valued. These
new values are associated with reverse changes in the
values of other variables used to describe behavior
pattern D.

Under the organization values in behavior pattern
D, the expression of "emotional" aspects of interpersonal
relationships is encouraged. The encouragement changes
the characteristics of interpersonal relationships.
Non-evaluative feedback is transmitted and received by
participants and they are open to new values and ideas

and willing to experiment with them. With the increase

f'f—h-r-‘t.

 

218

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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219

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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220

in non-evaluative feedback and Openness to change, inter-

personal competence increases. Participants become
aware of their interpersonal impact on each other and
attempt to solve interpersonal difficulties in such a
way that they do not recur. As interpersonal competence
increases; mistrust, external commitment, and defensive

conformity decreases. As they decrease, rigidity

in decision—making and non-productive behavior decreases.

As they decrease, organizational effectiveness increases.

The Transition-producing Mechanism

The transition—producing mechanism is directed
at changing the organization's values from those present
in behavior pattern U to those present in behavior pat-
tern D. The mechanism consists of communicating the
diagnosis, establishing a T-group, non-cognitive inter-

action, and modeling.

Communicating the Diagnosis

The change agent diagnoses the behavior pattern
present in the organization using the interpersonal

competence model. He shows the participants the values

 

 

221

they are operating under and the behaviors to which they
lead. However, he does not evaluate the values and
behaviors. He describes what pp_pppp is going on and
has the participants decide if they would like to change
their behavior. If they choose to do so, the change
agent's next step is to establish a T—group in which
they can analyze their impact on each other and question

their current values and feelings.

The geGroup

A T-group according to Argyris:
Is most difficult to describe in a few words.
Basically it is a group experience designed to
provide maximum possible opportunity for the indi—
viduals to expose their behavior, give and receive
feedback, experiment with new behavior, and develop
everlasting awareness and acceptance of self and
others.
How does the change agent design a "group experience" that
"provide maximum possible opportunity for individuals to
expose their behavior?"
According to Argyris, the change agent is not to
enact a directive role. The only expressed goals he

Offers to participants is to study their own interaction

as a group. As he states it:

 

Ibid., p. 156.

 

M

 

 

222

The T—group experience begins with the educator
making explicit that it is designed to help human
beings 1) to explore their values and their impact
upon others, 2) to determine if they wish to modify
the old values and develop new ones, and 3) to
develop awareness of how groups can inhibit as well
as facilitate human growth and decision-making.1

Exactly how these changes are to take place is not indi~
cated. For example, how the T-group experience is to
"develop awareness of how groups can inhibit as well as
facilitate human growth and decision-making" is not
indicated.

The change agent is not to perform a directive
function or provide a power structure for the T-group.
He is to provide no rules for the interaction of parti-
cipants. Moreover, he is not to delineate tasks, topics,
or agenda for discussion. As Argyris states:

To begin . . . the educator states that he has
no specific goals in mind for them. Moreover,
he offers no specific agenda, no regulations,
rules, and norms by which they should act. This
'vacuum' of leadership, goals, and so on, is

created so the members can fill it with their own
leadership, goals, rules.2

 

1Ibid., p. 145.

2Ibid., p. 157.

 

3

 

223

Modeling

The change agent is to assume the role of a model
T-group member. As a model member, he is not to give
advice but to provide feedbacks to other participants
about how they affect him. He is to encourage them to FR
talk about how he affects them. He is to receive feed-
back from them without becoming defensive.

Argyris describes the initial actions of the

 

change agent as follows:

The educator pp the outset would tend to focus
on those interpersonal interventions that tend
to help the members 1) to become aware of their
present (usually) low potential for establishing
authentic relationships 2) to become more skill-
ful in providing and receiving non—evaluative
descriptive feedbacks 3) to minimize their own
and others' defensiveness, and 4) to become
increasingly able to experience and own their
feelings.

He is to do these things by serving as a model member.
Argyris does not precisely indicate how the

change agent is to "focus on interpersonal interventions"

that result in the accomplishment of T-group objectives.

What he does is indicated in the following passage:

 

Ibid., p. 169.

 

224

One way that I have found to be helpful during the
early stages of a T-group is to tell the group that
I understand how they could feel dependent upon me.
But I believe that learning can take place more
effectively if they first develop an increasing
sense of trust of one another and a feeling that
they can learn from one another. I freely admit
that silence is not typical of me and that I need
to talk, to be active, to participate. In fact,

I may even feel a mild hostility that I am in a FA
situation in which I cannot participate in the way *-
that I desire. Thus, anything they (members) can
do to help me "unfreeze" by decreasing their 1
dependence upon me would be deeply appreciated. I

add that I realize that this is not easy, and that

I will do my share to help decrease the dependence 1
upon me.l 5"

”ll-

 

This passage illustrates the change agent's use of himself
as a model member of the T—group. He exhibits the behav-
iors that he wishes the others participants to exhibit.
For example, he discourages "dependence" upon him for
direction because he wants to avoid the "traditional
educational approach“ to training.

In the passage, Argyris, in effect, tells the
participants that he will share his problems with them

and would like, in turn, for them to share their problems

 

with him and each other. This action supposedly shows
the participants that he wants them to provide feedback
on his behavior as well as feedback on their behavior

toward each other.

 

Ibid., p. 158.

225

Non-cognitive Interaction

While the change agent shares his problems and
gives feedback to the other participants, he does not
attempt to share his "skills" in psychology with them.
He does not strive to provide participants with psycho—
logical tools for analyzing each others'behavior in
"depth." This restriction on the change agent's behav-
ior arises from Argyris' contention that T-groups are
fundamentally different from therapy groups.

A T—group in contrast to a therapy group:

. . . emphasizes the constructive, healthy,

positive aspects of life. It has to, if for

no other reason than that the educator is not

there to lend his skilled professional advice

to analyze the pathological aspects of their

behavior. The group, if it is to succeed,

must rely primarily upon its member resources

with minimum depth interpretation from the

educator.
Apparently, the change agent is not to give participants
advice or evaluate their behavior in "depth" terms. But
if this is so, exactly what is it that the change agent
is to do? Why, for that matter, does a T-group require

a change agent? How does it emphasize the "constructive,

healthy, positive aspects of life?" What are ”the con-

structive, healthy, positive aspects of life?" Why, in

11bid., p. 174.

 

 

 

226

short, does not the change agent "lend his skilled pro—
fessional advice to analyze the pathological aspects of
their behavior?" And what "member resources" must the
T-group rely on?

Argyris' reason for not providing professional

advice or sharing professional skills with participants
is:

Without conceptual tools to get at pathology or
their deeper motives, the members must discover
what Bettelheim calls the "good experiences" of
life, those that are the heart of sane living.

If they are unable to do so (even with the help

of the educator) then the group will be left at

the mercy of the destructive forces and eventually
fail. Here is a crucial reason why T-groups need
to have as their goals the increased effectiveness
of all members and of the group as a whole. These
goals act to coerce (responsible) members to behave
constructively. Otherwise, since they lack the
clinical concepts to cope with destructive pathology,
they will tend to fail. This also illustrates why
T-groups need to be composed of relatively healthy
individuals, that is, individuals who have avail-
able to them and are able to help others express
constructive, caring behavior that can overcome

the destructive tendencies.l

This reason assumes that the behavior the change agent is
trying to change is not pathological in nature. The
change agent is to help members to discover "what

Bettelheim cans the "good experiences" of life, those

 

1Loc. cit.

 

 

227

that are the heart of sane living." However, Argyris
does not explicate the "good experiences of life."
One might begin to think that interaction in a

T—group is the same type of interaction that the parti-
cipants engage in every day. Argyris claims that such
is not the case. As he puts it:

One difference between a T-group and everyday

relationships is that eventually everyone

receives the feedback (nonevaluative) presum—

ably in a climate of support and openness with

a minimal distortion or evaluation on the part

of the sender.
This difference assumes that "a climate of support and
openness with minimal distortion or evaluation on the
part of the sender" can not occur in everyday relation-

ships. Argyris does not indicate why they can not occur

in everyday relationships.
Changing Values: §p_Illustration

Argyris says that one of the problems that
emerges in the early stages of a T-group:

. . . is the apparent need on the part of members
to appoint a leader or a chairman. Typically,
this need is rationalized as a group need because
'without an appointed leader a group cannot be
effective.‘ For example, one member said, 'Look,
I think the first thing we need is to elect a

 

1Ibid., p. 175.

 

 

228

leader. Without a leader we are going to get
nowhere fast.‘ Another added, 'Brother, you
are right. Without leadership there is chaos.
People hate to take responsibility and without
a leader, they will goof off.‘1

This "apparent need" for leadership arises because of
the ambiguity of the situation and the participants'
past educational experience. Somewhere or other they
have been taught that without leadership chaos occurs.
Argyris handles this "problem" by starting a dis—

cussion with the participants in order:

. . . to help the group members explore the

underlying assumptions expressed by those

individuals who wanted to appoint leaders.

For example, in the case illustrated above,

both men began to realize that they were

assuming that people 'need' appointed

leadership because, if left alone, they will

not tend to accept responsibility. This implies

a lack of confidence in and trust of the people

around the table. These men are suggesting that

without an appointed leader the group will

flounder and become chaotic.2
It is not clear why the preposition that without leader—
ship, chaos would ensue, is invalid. To simply "psych—

ologize" the possible implications of the proposition is

not to invalidate it.

 

1Ibid., p. 170.

2Loc. cit.

 

 

229

The empirical validity of the proposition depends

both on one's conception of leadership and a statement
of the conditions under which such a proposition would
be "true." For example, if one defines "leadership" as
a goal setting and means arranging function, and defines
chaos as the absence of goals and means, the proposition
would be true on the basis of definition. Assuming this
was the case, it would not necessarily follow that such
a proposition implies a "lack of confidence in and trust
of people." The expression of the proposition by execu-
tives might simply reflect their conditioning. It may
be that they have been "taught" that a group situation
in which someone does not exercise the leadership func-
tion cannot accomplish anything. This certainly would
not imply that they "mistrust" each other as Argyris
claims.

What Argyris seems to be suggesting in the fore-
going passage is that the goal of the T-group is to
increase the participants' awareness of their impact on
each other. They are to accomplish this by providing
feedback to each other. If this is the case, Argyris

himself performs the leadership function because he set

 

 

230

forth the goal of the T—group and articulates the means

for accomplishing it.

Evaluation of the Interpersonal
Competence Model

In terms of proposition B.4, the model does not
meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for a useful
behavioral change model. It lacks an objective measure-
ment system, empirically validated proposition, and con—

trol statements.

The Lack pf §g_0bjective
Measurement System

 

Argyris attempted to measure the variables in
the model and their relationship through interviewing
and observing the behavior of eighteen executives from
one company. In the study he set forth the following
question and hypothesis:

In another question, the executives were asked

how they would handle an emotional outburst in

the meeting. The hypothesis is that the execu-
tives would tend to cope with feelings by reject-

ing them or by transforming them into intellectual,
rational problems. The data confirms the hypothesis.

The reasoning behind the hypothesis was that if the

organization valued "rationality" and devalued the

.i‘.‘

 

 

1Ibid., pp. 59, 60

 

231

expression of "emotions," participants should react to
"emotional outbursts" by suppressing them, or trans—
forming them into "rational" problems. He predicted
that when participants were asked about how they would
handle "emotional outbursts," they would respond in
ways which suggest they would suppress, or transform,
the outbursts.

The data he claims "confirms the hypothesis" is

reproduced in Table 6.1. According to Argyris, the

TABLE 6.1

SUGGESTED SOLUTION TO EMOTIONAL OUTBURST
(Per Cent)

 

18

2
II

a) If possible, stop the meeting. Calm the
people down by saying that they are not
prepared to discuss the subject. More
groundwork is needed. Call off the meeting . ... .89

b) Let the feelings be expressed. You might
learn something about the individuals ... ... . . . 6

Total solutions of 'leaving the fieldf. . . ...95
Solutions of dealing with feelings... . ... ... O

 

"data" demonstrated that the executives did not attempt
to cope with "emotional outbursts" by "handling the feel-

ings." Supposedly, it, indirectly, meant that the

 

fl—KF—

 

232

executives adhered to the organization's value of
"rationality" and devaluing of "emotions." Because
they did not mention that they would directly cope with
the outburst, Argyris assumed they had internalized
these values. The internalization of these values, in
turn, supposedly decreased their interpersonal compet—
ence so that they did not have the "ability to handle"
the outbursts.

The Pdata" would seem to raise some questions
that Argyris does not answer. First of all, were the
executives who answered his question reacting to their
actual experience, or were they expressing "ideal"
opinions? Had they ever encountered such situations?
If so, what did they do? What consequences did they
see as arising from their action?

Answers to such questions might enable one to
determine if these problems are common and how execu-
tives actually cope with them. It is important to have
such knowledge since it is possible that if they rarely
encounter such problems they lack an opportunity to

develop a skill in coping with them.

 

 

233

Assuming the executives actually experienced such
problems, why did they fail to learn how to handle them?
Is their failure to mention the possibility of "dealing
with the feelings" primarily due to the organization's
value system, or an inability on their part to handle
such situations? Stated differently, if they do not Exp
cope with emotional outbursts by "dealing with the feel-

ings" is it primarily because of the strict "rationality"

 

“I!“

value, or because they do not know how to do so, or is
it some combination of these two reasons?

To illustrate the importance of these questions,
assume that their failure to "deal with such feelings"
is a result of the organization's values. Also assume
that the executives internalize these values and as a
result fail to develop "interpersonal competence." The
importance issue becomes one of explaining where the
organization obtained its value of "rationality” and the
suppression of emotions. Obviously, since the organiza-

tion acquires its values from people within it, the

 

values must originally come from certain people within
it. The question, then, becomes: where do these certain
people acquire these valuesi’ Did they, for example,

learn these values while in college?

234

While it cannot be determined from the data
Argyris presents, it would seem possible that the
organization's value creators, as well as the eighteen
executives, learned the values of "rationality" and
suppression of emotions outside of the organization.
Some of them might have learned them in certain business
schools which, perhaps, inculcate these values through
stressing the use of rational and impersonal techniques
and procedures for running organizations. Perhaps, by
teaching so-called traditional "principles of management"
they indoctrinate the students in "rationality."

Argyris in his works certainly alludes to this
possibility. He has claimed that such principles as
span of control, and unity of command lead to harmful
psychological consequences. One of these consequences
is a lowering of interpersonal competence which alleg-
edly decreases organization effectiveness. This would
suggest that such principles are dysfunctional because
they detract from their expressed purpose of increas-
ing organizational effectiveness.

According to this thesis, the executives and

value creators of the organization do not receive

 

 

235
training in college, or from their educational experience
in general, that develops their "interpersonal abilities."
Since they do not receive such training, T—group train—
ing is needed to develop these abilities. If this thesis
were valid, it might be possible to prevent low inter-
personal competence of executives through restructuring
their educational exposure in college. The “proper"
values could be inculcated so that there would be no
need for T-group training later in their careers.

Argyris has nothing to say about this possibility.
Another set of data Argyris interprets as a
measure of a rationality value held by an organization
is also open to other interpretations. This particu-
lar measure consisted of asking the eighteen executives:
1) what characteristics make one an effective leader;
2) what characteristics influence promotions; and
3) what types of assignments are the most effective for
developing executives. The executives responses are
described in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2, according to Argyris, indicates that
the eighteen executives think "interpersonal abilities"

are unimportant in determining effective role performance.

 

 

236

It should be pointed out that the executives did not
explicitly state that "interpersonal abilities" were
unimportant. Simply because they failed to mention it
at all is the reason it received a zero value in Table
6.2.

Once again, one of the pertinent questions the
data raises but does not answer is why the executive did
not mention interpersonal abilities as an important
factor in "effective" leadership, getting ahead, and
developing their subordinates? Is it because they were
taught in college and by society at large that such
abilities are not important? Are they taught that tech-
nical competence and hard work should be the important
factors rather than a "pleasing personality?" Unfor-
tunately we cannot answer these questions from the data
Argyris accumulated. Moreover, to provide answers we
would need to know exactly what he means by "interper-
sonal abilities." Since its meaning is not well articu-
lated, it is not surprising that the executives did not
mention it. Assuming it refers to transmitting and
receiving descriptive feedback, the reason for not men-
tioning it may, once again, be attributed to inappropri-

ate conditioning.

 

 

a)

b)

237

TABLE 6.2

PERCEIVED IMPORTANCE OF INTERPERSONAL ABILITIES
BY THE EIGHTEEN EXECUTIVES

+

Characteristics of Effective Leadership
(Per cent)

Ability to articulate one's ideas. . . . . . . . 89
Ability to direct, to be aggressive . . . . . . 72
Ability to think quickly; high intelligence . . 50
Interpersonal abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

Leadership Factors That Influence Promotions

(Per cent) N 18

Technical, professional competence . . . . . . . 89
Persuasive, "seller of ideas". . . . . . . . . . 72
High intellectual capacity . . . . . . . . . . . 6l
Interpersonal abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 0

Characteristics of Effective Executive Development
(Per cent)

N = 18
Give individual a job that challenges his
rational, technical competence . . . . . . . . . 72
Give individual a job that provides challenging,
interpersonal as well as the intellectual
rational experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 

 

 

238

The Lack of Empirically
Validated Propositions

Argyris has attempted to indirectly validate the
model through gathering data on changes that occur in the
behavior of T-group participants. The intended purpose
of the training was to change the values held by partici-
pants in order to achieve high interpersonal competence.
However, Argyris has not tried to find out if the train-
ing actually changes values held by the participants. In
the validation study, he examined certain changes in
their behavior and inferred that changes in values had
produced them.

What behavior of participants changed after
T-group training? To answer the question, the tech—
nique used to measure changes in behavior must be exam-
ined. The measure used was a modified form of Kelly's
Role Reportory. The modified form was called the Person
Description Instrument. The instrument required execu-
tives to describe eleven persons besides themselves
within their organization. They were asked to compare
the persons in sets of three and asked to give an

important way in which one of the three persons differed

 

nu

I
"a

 

239
from the other two. They were then asked to state the
logical opposite of this characteristic.

Examples of characteristics mentioned by the

executives are as follows:

 

 

Differentiating Characteristic Logical Opposite

l. Mentally alert 1. Mentally dull

2. warm in personal relation— 2. Cool in rela-
ships. tionships with

each other.
The first characteristic mentioned is postulated to be a
description of the person based on his technical abilities
The second characteristic, on the other hand, is held to
be a description of a person based on his interpersonal
abilities.

The validation study by Argyris indicated that
executives exposed to T-group training increased the use
of interpersonal terms (such as characteristic 2) in
describing themselves and others. Participants in the
T-group when compared with executives in a control group
increased the use of interpersonal terms in describing
themselves and other people. This might well be expected
since the T-group training stresses interpersonal factors.
However, such evidence does not "validate" the interper-

sonal competence model.

 

 

240

Just because participants change their descrip—

tions of other people does not mean that they experiment

more with new ideas, give more descriptive feedback,

become less rigid in making decisions, and engage in

Inore productive behavior. Moreover, it does not indicate

.if organizational effectiveness actually increases with

cflmanges in the participants' descriptions of other ,
i

People. Lastly, it does not indicate if the participants

 

acztually changed their values or behavior toward others.

Argyris summed up the "validation study" by

stating :

These findings are interpreted as further evidence
of the effectiveness of the laboratory training in
increasing the desire and ability to perceive and
respond to interpersonal and emotional aspects of

behavior.

Evenif it is granted that the interpretation is correct,
:it: cannot be determined if "the desire and ability to
E3€31Tceive and respond to interpersonal.and emotional
asPects of behavior" actually results in changes in the

lbeallavdor predicted by the interpersonal competence model.

Irt: cannot be, in sum, determined if they have been taught

11c)“, to handle interpersonal problems and how to make

t: . . .
1“Gilrown behaVior more effective.

\

 

lIbid., p. 220.

241

The Lack of Control Statements

One of the key assumptions on which the model is
based is that changes in values will result in changes
in behavior. Argyris expresses this assumption in the
following manner:

Re-education in human relations should focus
more on a change in basic values than on
acquiring skills. The development of valid
values will tend to lead automatically to the
development of proper skills. On the other
hand, the skills without appropriate changes

in values becomes, at best, an alteration Whose
lack of depth and manipulative character will
become easily evident to others. Skills follow
values; values rarely follow skills. Skills
can be used to illustrate values. But they ought
not to develop human relationships.

 

'L I __~-

The assumption states that changes in values will result
in changes in behavior, rather than the reverse.

Argyris does not explain how and why the "development of
valid values will tend to lead automatically to the
development of proper skills." Moreover, he does not
explain what he means by "valid values" and "proper
skills." Hence there is no way to measure the empirical

validity of this assumption.

 

1Ibid., p. 135.

242

According to Argyris, changing values is a diffi-
cult process for two reasons. The first reason is that:

. . . changing the values of individuals
effectively requires that the educational
processes used should not violate the very
values that the executives (in this case) are
being asked to consider. Most lecture and dis-
cussion teaching is typically based upon values
similar to those that the executives presently
hold (for example, the teacher is in control;
he directs; he focuses on the objectives; and
he emphasizes rationality). Consequently, there
is a need for a significantly different process
2g education.l

 

This reason is actually an assumption that values cannot
be changed if the process of change is itself based on
the same values. Since he assumes the values on which
"most lecture and discussion teaching is typically based
upon" are "similar to those that the executives presently
hold," he postulates the only way to change their values
is to change the form of teaching. The change agent, so
to speak, is not to control, direct, focus on objectives,
and emphasize rationality.

Apparently, Argyris believeSathat the change agent
can change his behavior without changing his values.
Through refraining from using the traditional education

techniques, he can change the values of participants in

___

1
Ibid., p. 154.

"' gin”. . ’
i
l

 

VT—f.

 

243

the T-group. But where did the change agent learn the
"appropriate values?" Was his college education, in
terms of professional techniques, different from that of
most people? If so, how exactly did it differ? Argyris
does not provide answers to these questions-
The second reason changing values are difficult

is that:

. . . values are not on the same order as skills

to influence people in order 'to keep them happy.‘

Values are the emotionally rooted, intellectually

expressed 'personal directives' that individuals

hold that serve to compel their behavior in a

particular direction. They cannot be ‘taught,'

'issued,' 'sold' or 'plugged into' people (who

have an opportunity to choose freely) regardless

of the oratorical, persuasive and pedagogical

skill of the teacher.1
This reason is questionable. What does it mean to say
values are "emotionally rooted?" Does it mean that they
are innate rather than acquired? Obviously they cannot
be innate from Argyris' viewpoint since he hopes to
somehow change them.

Argyris is rather unclear about how and where

values are acquired. It is only an assumption that

values cannot be taught or "plugged into" people. He

presents no empirical evidence that would suggest the

Loc. cit.

 

 

244

assumption is valid. Without uncovering the determinants
of values it is doubtful if a transition-producing mech-
anism for changing them could be based on control know—
ledge. To state that they are a function of "emotions"

ad& nothing in the way,.of control knowledge.

Summary

Proposition B.4 states that a behavioral change i

model is useful if it contains variables a change agent

 

can control, possesses an objective system for measur—
ing the values of variables and states empirically
validated relationships between the variables. The two
need—satisfaction models examined do not meet these con-
ditions. Thus in accordance with proposition C:lC they
presently can not be considered as useful to managers.
To the extent that they are representative of other
need-satisfaction models, proposition C.1 is supported.
Attempts to change behavior in the applied areas of the
behavioral sciences would not presently meet the neces—

sary and sufficient conditions of a useful behavioral

 

change model.

245

In terms of premise A.2 neither of the models
can be considered as presently useful to managers in
solving their behavioral problems. It is not yet pos—
sible to determine if they could help managers solve
their behavioral problems more efficiently and effect-
ively since the models used by managers have not been
identified. Thus it is not known if the use of the two
models would help them solve their behavioral problems
more efficiently and effectively.

In terms of premise A.3, there are two reasons
the models can not be considered as presently helpful
to managers in solving their behavioral problems more
efficiently and effectively. First, they do not yet
constitute control knowledge. Secondly, the control
knowledge possessed by managers has not been identified.
Therefore it is not possible to determine if the know-
ledge provided by the models is superior to that posses-

sed by managers.

 

 

CHAPTER VII

THE FRAMEWORK UTILIZED TO ANALYZE THE

IMPLICIT BEHAVIORAL CHANGE MODELS OF

THE TEN MANAGERS: AN ANALYSIS

OF THE D PROPOSITIONS

The Need for an Empirical Study

Premise A.2 states that knowledge contained in
the behavioral sciences is useful to managers if it
helps them solve their behavioral problems more
efficiently and effectively than they could solve them
without using such knowledge. This premise leads to
proposition D.l. To determine the usefulness of know-
ledge contained in the behavioral sciences to managers,
the behavioral problems managers face and how they cope
with them must be determined. Without this analysis
the usefulness of knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences can not be ascertained.

Stated differently, without knowing the types
of behavioral problems managers face and how they c0pe

with them, it is not possible to determine what types

246

 

 

247

of behavioral change models will be useful to them in
solving these problems. Moreover, it is possible that
the implicit model they presently use is as effective
or even more effective than the ones available to them
in the behavioral sciences. The models analyzed in
Chapters IV, V, and VI may or may not be as effective
in changing behavior as the models managers typically
use. This is an empirical issue that can only be
resolved through experimentation. One of the first
steps in resolving the issue is determining the

types of change models managers use and if they differ
from those in the behavioral sciences. This was the
scope of the present study. The study did not go beyond
this stage and experimentally compare the models
analyzed in Chapters IV, V and VI with those managers

were discovered to use.

Implicit Behavioral Change Models:
‘Ag Analysis 9; Proposition D.2

The study was designed to provide data on which
to analyze proposition D.2. This proposition states
that managers implicitly use behavioral change models

in handling inadequate performance on the part of their

 

 

248

subordinates. On an g_priori basis it was reasoned that
inadequate performance represents a U type behavior
pattern. It was assumed that managers implicitly
formulate propositions about the determinants of inade-
quate performance and how changes in their values will
lead to adequate performance. These propositions con-
stitute a transition-producing mechanism. The study

was designed to reveal the particular mechanism the

ten managers used to c0pe with inadequate performance.

Control Patterns: The Unit 9; Analysis

The first step in analyzing the data was to
search for variables managers mentioned in discussing
how they coped with inadequate performance. As
variables were extracted from the interviews, patterns
were discovered. Certain managers would mention and
describe similar ways of coping with inadequate
Performance.

It became apparent that to understand the
implicit behavioral change models the managers used,
the control environment they established had to be

examined. The control environment dictated the type of

249
implicit change model utilized.

In total, three basic control patterns were dis-
covered. The patterns were labeled freedom-centered,
authority-centered, and development—centered. The
freedom-centered pattern was constructed from the inter-
view with the general manager. His control pattern
was different from the patterns used by the nine managers
who worked under him. The authority-centered pattern
was constructed from interviews with four managers
engaged in roles that dealt with highly repetitive activi—
ties such as accounting and manufacturing. The develop-
ment—centered pattern was constructed from interviews
with five managers who were engaged in roles that dealt
with highly non-repetitive activities such as research

and development and product management.

Limitatigns g; the Control Pattern
as a Unit _g_f_ Analysis

 

 

The managers did not explicitly articulate the
three patterns. The patterns were constructed through
interpreting what the managers articulated and how their

statements fit together to form a pattern. Thus, because

250

of the exploratory nature of the study, the patterns are
heuristic devices. As such, they represent an interpre-
tative framework that was impossed on the data. They
provide in terms of a pattern a descriptive insight into
the implicit behavioral change models the ten managers
utilized.

Because of the small sample on which the study
was based, it is not possible to generalize on the
prevalence of the three patterns. Moreover, it is not
possible to say that these patterns are exhaustive.

No attempt was made to determine which pattern was
the most efficient and effective in controlling and

changing the behavior of subordinates.

Control Pattern Variables

 

The variables extracted from the interviews that

were used to differentiate the patterns are as follows.

Conception 2f the
Managerial Role

The three control patterns delineated stemed in
large part from the managers'conception of their role.
Differences in role conception resulted in differences in

control patterns and, therefore, implicit change models.

251

Extent 9; Role
§tructuring

Extent of role structuring by managers was two-
fold. First, there were differences in the extent to
which they defined the role content of their subordinates.
Second, there were differences in the extent to which
they defined role performance techniques for their
subordinates. The values assigned to these variables
in the three patterns were a function of the managers'
role conception.

The extent of role structuring was estimated
from statements made by the managers. On the basis of
an inter-pattern comparison, it was assigned a low,
medium, or high value. An assignment of a high value
meant that in comparison with the other two patterns

the extent of role structuring was greater.
Extent.9§.;mpersonality

Extent of impersonality in the relationship
between the manager and subordinate was twofold. First,
there were differences in the extent to which managers
took individual differences into account in designing

a control environment. A manager who did not take

252

individual differences into account used the same control
pattern for all his subordinates. He implicitly
assumed that they would all respond to the same control
pattern with similar responses He also attributed
homogeneous work motives to his subordinates. Hence,
impersonality deals with the universalism of a given
control pattern.

Second, there were differences in the extent
to which managers considered the expression of emotions
and feelings by their subordinates as relevant to their
relationship. A manager who considered them non-relevant
emphasized rational and role—oriented behavior. He
viewed his subordinates personal life as being isolated
from his role in the organization.

Extent of impersonality was considered a present
or absent variable. A relationship was either classified

as impersonal or not impersonal.

The Handling g; Inadequate
Performance

The ten managers differed in the mechanisms they
used to cope with inadequate performance. There were

six variables that differentiated the mechanism used in

253

the three control patterns; role performance criteria,
amount of feedback on role performance, extent of
collaboration, extent of participation in correcting
inadequate performance, and motives attributed to

subordinates.

Role Performance Criteria

The criteria the managers used for evaluating
the role performance of subordinates differed. They
differed in the emphasis they placed on technical and
non-technical criteria. Technical criteria refers to
such items as percentage increase in sales. Non-technical
criteria refers to such items as attitude toward work.

The criteria they used was their basis for
establishing the need for change. Deviations from them
are descriptions of behavior pattern U while the criteria

itself describes behavior D.

Amount of Feedback 9g
Role Performance

 

The amount of role performance feedback the
managers gave their subordinates differed. They differed
in how often they discussed role performance and when

they initiated a discussion.

254

The division had no formal procedure for
appraising role performance. Thus, each manager was

able to develop his own procedure.

Extent pf Collaboration

The managers differed in the extent to which
they asked subordinates for their views on the reason

for inadequate performance.

Extent of Participation in Correcting
Inadequate Performance

The managers differed in the extent to which
they participated in helping subordinates develop a
program for improving their performance. Since it was
not possible to determine the degree of help given in
patterns where it was found present, it was considered
a present or absent variable. The extent of participation
was a function of the managers' view on the determinants

of inadequate performance.

The Psychodynamics of
the Patterns

An attempt was made to discover where the managers

acquired the control patterns they used. This analysis

255

focused on proposition D.3. Namely, the implicit change

model managers use are not directly acquired from the
behavioral sciences.

.5 Summary Comparison of the
Three Control Patterns

Figure 7.1 compares in summary form the three

control patterns.

256

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CHAPTER VIII

ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOMrCENTERED

CONTROL PATTERN

The Manager's Rationale for the Pattern

The general manager's perception of a competitive
threat constituted the rationale for the control pattern
he developed. He believed the threat could be handled
by improved performance of his division. He described
the threat in the following manner:

We must produce things that are new and
better. A man can say that we've improved
our product as much as we can improve them
but maybe a competitor comes along and
brings in a brand new idea. This happens
repeatedly in our business.

We'll be on top for awhile, have the best
product, the furtherest advanced one. We'll
build this product for awhile, and be very
well satisfied with it and then somebody will
come along and make something a little bit
better.

Well up until the time the competitor makes
something a little bit better, the engineerng
department doesn't really have much incentive
to try and improve this thing. It might be
that the engineers will say this is the best
I can do, so what can I do about it? But
then he sees somebody else outsmart him and,
then, he realizes he wasn't so smart.

257

258

This happens to us just over and over and

over again in every single line we produce.

There is somebody just a little smarter

than we are. Sometimes we get ahead of

them and then they get ahead of us.
According to the manager, the division could not afford
to wait for competitors to spur its people to innovate.
He felt that he had to get in front of his competition
rather than merely meet it.

His answer was the development of a freedom-

centered control pattern. The pattern was intended to

establish an environment capable of generating "things

that are new and better."

The Manager's Conception 9§_His Role

 

 

The manager considered his role to consist of
creating a control environment for generating new ideas
and improvements. He believed that the appropriate
environment was related to the freedom of his subordinates
to define their roles and role techniques. His function
after providing them with freedom was to evaluate their
results. The results he expected were new ideas and

improvements.

259

Extent 2; Role Structuring

The freedom the manager provided subordinates
consisted of an Opportunity to define their roles and
to develOp role performance techniques. He did not tell
them of what their role consisted, on what activities
to work, or how to go about carrying out their roles.
The role situation confronting his subordinates was
ambiguous. They were left to define and structure
their roles.

The low extent of role structuring was reflected
in the manager's statement that:

The objective here is to have each
department head run his own department

as much as he can within the bounds

of the corporation objectives which I

am here to direct. Now I think in

some areas we will have people who are
much more self-motivated than others.

In cases where they lack self-motivation
it is, of course, my job to try and check
and recheck, and to encourage them either
by continuously questioning, or by praise,
or by proding to do the best possible

job they can and to keep on improving.

Later on he stated:

Now my department managers will come to me
and say: 'what do you think we should work
on. You tell us what to work on.‘ Well,
I tell them, I'm paying them to run their
departments. They should find the things
to work on.

260

The Experiencing pf.a Low Degree pf Role
Structuring by Subordinate Managers

The nine subordinate managers experiencing of
the low degree of role structuring by the general
manager provided a measure of validity for the
description of his control pattern. All of them
indicated that he rarely told them what to do, what
problems to work on, and what techniques to use in
performing their role assignments.

One of the managers experienced the ambiguity
in the following manner:

I have been very unclear about my assignment.
I am hesitant, however, about having it
clarified probably because the reaction
generally is that it's clear enough and you
should take it from there. It has particuiarly
galled me over the years that the direction
has been so broad that it leaves me without
any program. A typical example is that he
tells me we need something new. Well you
can't Operate just on the basis of telling
the boys to think up something new. And yet
he pounds the table and tells us we have to
bring something new to the sales department.
In what area, what problems need to be solved,
where is the sales potential, where shall we
direct our efforts, he doesn't indicate. I
get nowhere except he needs something new,

and you've got to get these boys to produce
more.

261

Impersonalipy

Because the manager granted freedom to all
subordinates, his control pattern was universalistic.
He did not account for individual differences in
establishing his control pattern. Moreover, his
notion of self-motivation precluded personalized inter-
actions with subordinates. A self—motivated subordinate
was defined as one who did not need to ask the manager
what to do and how to do it.

The manager did not consider expression of
emotions and feeling by subordinates as appr0priate
role behavior. His interaction with subordinates was
very infrequent and always task oriented. He expected

them to independently carry out their role assignments.

The Experiencing pf Impersonality
.py Subordinate Managers

It was thought that in response to the ambiguity
in role structuring and evaluation that the subordinate
managers might band together in order to cope with it.
Such, however, was not the case. They did not interact
with each other socially and only rarely within the

organization. When they did interact with each other it

262

was strictly on the basis of their formal roles.

Seldom, if ever, did they discuss their problems
with each other, or indicate that they desired this form
of interaction. Two of the nine, however, seemed to
desire it. As one of them phrased it:

I often thought that it might be well if
our top manager had his department heads
meet at the country club for a breakfast
meeting. On completion of the breakfast
spend about 4 hours completely relaxed
in a conversation about anything you
wanted to talk about without any pressure.
Discuss your problems and what you think
is needed to do a better over-all job
for the division. Then, perhaps, have
lunch and in the afternoon play golf,
swim or anything you want to, but get
acquainted.

The statements indicated a plea for a more personalized
form of interaction within the division. Apparently,
this manager felt that he should be able to discuss his
problems with the general manager and other subordinate
managers and be personally acquainted with them.
Another manager reacted to the impersonality of

the freedom-centered pattern by stating:

I would like to have an operation on a more

personal basis. I am perhaps, somewhat at

fault in this regard. I am not a particularly

extroverted person. But I still enjoy having

someone indicate to me that he would like to
talk to me on a personal basis. I perhaps

263

don't take the initiative and am not aggressive
enough in establishing that manner of contact,
but I still enjoy it.

I like to feel that I can go into my supervisor
and talk to him about my problems in the
department and have him curtiously listen if
nothing more, rather than get off that subject
and squelch immediately my discussion. My
experience has been that tendency.
The statements indicated that this manager would have
liked a more personalized form of interaction with the
general manager but was confused as to whom should
initiate it. He blamed himself in part for the lack
of it rather than the general manager. However, he
believed that the general manager's duty was to talk
to him about his problem and disliked his not doing so.
This type of reaction to the freedomrcentered
control pattern might be expected because the general
manager is simply refusing to help this manager
structure his role. Hence, it is consistent with his

conception of his role. It is the subordinate's duty

to structure his role and performance techniques.

The Handling pf Inadequate Performance

The manager used technical criteria to appraise

the performance of subordinates. Engineering managers,

264

for example, were evaluated on the number of product
improvements they achieved. Product managers were
evaluated on the basis of increased profits.

When the manager evaluated a subordinate's per-
formance as being inadequate, he attributed it to a
lack of self-motivation. To correct the deficiency,
he pressured the subordinate to do something different
or to come up with something new. However, he never
indicated the nature of this "something." It was the
task of the subordinate to decide what specific changes
to make in his behavior in order to improve performance.
Hence, the manager did not participate in helping
subordinates improve their performance. The manager
described his apporach in the following manner:

I think in the majority of cases I try to
impress upon them the need for improvement.
We will see a sales trend where the product
line may be dropping and our competitor is
coming in and getting the buSiness. I point
this out to the people and try to indicate
to them how serious it is for them (they're
payed on bonuses) and the company to allow
this condition to continue. (The external
threat once again. Note how he uses it to
justify the need for improvement.) That

sometimes works.

And if improvements did not occur, he stated:

265
As a last resort I tell them they either
got to do something or it means their jobs.
In some cases, it's as serious as that.
Usually we have never resorted to firing

people because we couldn't get them to
react. Maybe that time will come.

The manager never told subordinates how well they
were doing in a positive sense. He believed that their
performance could always be improved. He also felt that

if he were to compliment them they would become content

with their current performance.

The Experiencing pf Ambiguity
ip Evaluation p1 the
Subordinate Managers

All nine subordinate managers experienced
ambiguity in the evaluation of their role performance.
They reported that the general manager never told them
how satisfied he was with their performance. The only
evaluative cue they received was his increased pressure
to get improved performance.

One manager described his experiencing of the
evaluative ambiguity in the following manner:

I don't know if the present manager and
the one which preceeded him feel that I,
or as far as I know, anyone else who is
a department head isn't doing the job

that is expected of a manager. Just
how well he regards what I am doing, I

266

don't know. I am sure it must be passible

or I wouldn't be here. I have got some

increases in salary and that is also a

means of recognition. We have had very

few personal discussions about my work.
The statements indicated that the subordinate experienced
ambiguity in evaluation. They also offered support for
the validity of the general manager's statements about
how he evaluated the role performance of subordinates.

Because of the ambiguity in evaluation, some
subordinates established their own indicators. The
indicators they established allowed them to determine
when to make changes in their behavior.

One manager, previously mentioned, said that the
fact he still had his job and had received salary
increases indicated to him that the general manager
must have considered his performance "passable." Another
indicator that he thought important was stated as follows:

I handle all the patent matters for the
department and I know he respects my ability
in this regard. He doesn't review patent
matters which are quite important, he
depends on my judgements about them. So
indirectly he does respect that ability.
Later in the interview this subordinate mentioned

that he thought it was his knowledge of patent matters

that accounted for the rise to his present position.

267

This suggested that subordinates in the presence of
ambiguity in evaluation may develop self—indicators
on the basis of what they considered their greatest
ability or interest. This subordinate, for example,
had defined his key function as the handling of

patents and used the manager's lack of interference
in this area as an indicator of successful role

performance. This indicator conflicted with the

general manager's desire to generate new ideas. He
thought the subordinates most important function was

to generate new ideas.

The Experiencing pf Pressure py
the Subordinate Managepg

The only direction the subordinate managers
experienced was generalized pressure to constantly
improve. One manager described his experience in the
following manner:

He expects too much from everybody in too
little time. It creates an atmosphere of
frustration where you just know damn well
you can't please him regardless of how hard
you try so what the hell do you want to bat
your head against the wall for. So you

go about todays work and get todays work
done and that's about it. Your not pleasing
the boss, you know that. He's never
satisfied.

268

The statements indicated that this manager experienced
ambiguity in the general manager's evaluation of his
role performance. He, also, experienced the generalized
pressure to constantly improve and found it somewhat
annoying.

Another manager described his experience in
the following manner:

I don't feel that he's aware of the amount
we are producing because he has no way of
knowing the amount of work that is required
to turn out a particular piece of final
development work. But he still has the
feeling that with the over-all direction
we've got to produce more. We got to get
our subordinates to work more.

Now that is a little too broad. There is

no way I can help. I know that any department
can be improved, so what good does it do to
have him tell me that we have got to do better.
Particularly, when I know he's telling all

the department the same thing.

The statements indicated that the subordinate found both
the ambiguity in evaluation and the generalized pressure
frustrating.

What was particularly interesting was his state-
ments about how he responded to them. If he actually

decreased, or minimized, his performance because he felt

the general manager was never satisfied, he would be

269

engaging in a form of self-defeating behavior. The more
he minimized his role performance, the more the general
manager might be dissatisfied with his performance, and
the greater might be the pressure he would exert on the
subordinate to improve. If such were the case, the
subordinate's frustration might increase over time.

The possibility exists that the subordinate might
build up a resistance to the pressure so that he would
not find increased pressure as frustrating. This seemed
to be the case with this subordinate since he expected

the pressure.

The Problem.p£ Self-Motivation

 

The manager saw the lack of self-motivation as
a perplexing problem. As he phrased it:

We have different types of individuals in
the various department heads. Some of them
are very much inclined to push things as
fast as they can to go ahead, while we'll
have another maybe that drags along.

With the different department heads we've
got various degrees of self-motivations.

I think I've got more trouble getting
department heads to carry their responsi-
bilities farther and to motivate themselves,
than I do with department heads I have to
hold back. Even though, if I had my
preference, I would much rather prefer to
hold back a subordinate than I would to try
to motivate him.

270

This problem of motivating people is a

problem with me. I don't know whether it

is with other people or not.
These statements indicated his concern with self—
motivation. Also he was bewildered about the lack
of self-motivation.

Apparently, he assumed that his subordinates
would be eager to accept and use the freedom he
provided them. Furthermore, he assumed that they had
the ability to be self—motivated and generate new

ideas. Without self-motivation, he believe they could

not productively use the freedom he provided.

The ldeationally Obsolete: ,A Special
Case 9; Inadequate Performance

When subordinates did not respond to increased
pressure for improvement, the manager thought that, per-
haps, they had run out of ideas. His strategy in such
cases was to provide them with sources of new ideas.

In this connection, he said:

We have and are sending people to seminars.
We have and are sending people to other
plants. We hope that they will see what
other peOple are doing and, then, come
back and say this is what I should do
because someone else has been successful
doing it.

271

I've got a real problem with one department
head who we are sending to school for a
month trying to jar him out of a complacent
feeling and a desire to stay status quo.

I don't know if this fellow is so complacent
but I think he's fearful of making a move
that could be wrong, that might bring
criticism.

Hopefully he will be put in contact with
other people who will indicate what they've
been doing and their problems will probably
be similar. They're being thrown together
with a group of people who are having these
same kinds of problems. Maybe some of them
will be doing something and if they're not
then, hopefully, the course presented by the
instructor will be such that these fellows
will have a broader outlook and a more, say,
futuristic viewpoint of the things that go
on around the factory. This is a problem
that is not easy.

The manager sent the subordinate to an external
environment where it was hoped that through exposure to
other people‘s problems and approaches he would come
back with new ideas. But he hOped for more than this.
He hOped that whatever it is that makes people self-
motivated would be initiated by the training program.
If the training did not accomplish this, he would have
to send the subordinate back every time he depleted the
ideas he acquired from associates in the seminar.

It seemed odd that the general manager did not

feel that anyone in the division, including himself,

272

could help the department head generate new ideas.

A partial answer was that he believed there was no one
else in the division that had experience in the
department head's functional area, or role. He
believed the department head had to be sent out to
interact with other people in similar functional

areas and roles.

The general manager was unclear about what
the department head needed to generate new ideas and
improvements. However, he knew there had been few
changes in the department's operations over the past
five years. Also costs had been increasing. Since
his use of increased pressure failed to improve the
department's performance, he assumed that the depart-
ment head had run out of ideas. He thought the way
to correct the impoverishment was to expose the
department head to people in similar roles who, hope-
fully, would have new ideas.

Deficiency of new ideas was viewed by the
manager as a consequence of a lack of self—motivation.
He thought that if the department head had been self-

motivated he would not have run out of ideas. The

273

manager hoped that by exposing the department head to

new ideas he would become self—motivated.

Modeling as a Mechanism
for Self—Motivating

 

 

About six months prior to the study, the
manager hired a young Ph.D. candidate in the field of
communications. Previous to his employment the young
Ph.D. candidate had contacted the general manager to
find out if he could use the division as a source of
data for his dissertation. The manager consented with
a provision that he would reveal some of the problem
areas he found to the manager. The Ph.D. candidate
agreed and within a month he provided the manager with
a twenty page list of problem areas he had uncovered.
The manager was so impressed with the report that
he asked him if he would be willing to work on these
problems and join the company as his assistant. The
young Ph.D. candidate accepted the position.

The manager felt that his new assistant was a
prime example of a self-motivated person. He did not
need to be told what to do, or how to do it. He was

a man with new ideas that he was not afraid to try out.

274

The manager gave him authority to make decisions
in many of the functional areas of the division and
left him to define his own role. He hOped that the
assistant would serve as a model to his other sub-
ordinates Of a self-motivated person so that they would
become like him. He felt that the assistant would
keep them from being content with thestatus quo since
he was constantly suggesting changes in their Operations.

Thus the manager tried to self—motivate sub-
ordinates by providing them with a model of a self-
motivated person. In doing so, he assumed that sub-
ordinateswho are not self—motivated can become so by
Observing a person who is and emulating him. The model
also exerted pressure on them to try and match up with

the model.

The Psychodynamics pf the Freedom—
centered Control PattErn fme~
the Point pf View pf
the Manager

 

Insight into why the general manager used a
freedomrcentered control pattern was gained through
exploring his experience with people he had worked

under in the past. In the past, he thought he had

275

been exposed to a freedom—centered control pattern in
which he was not told what to do or how to do it.
As he described it:

I was never told really how to go about

performing my job. There was no such

thing as job descriptions when I started.

You might say a lot of it was self-

motivating. I don't believe my superior,

at the time I was a product manager had

any idea of what was the best thing to

work on.
The statements indicated that he perceived himself as
being given an ambiguous role assignment. However, he
felt that it had to be that way because the superior
did not have the capacity to structure his role. He
believed that the superior had properly performed the
managerial role and did not find the experience
frustrating. Thus, it is not surprising that he has
incorporated the pattern for controlling his own
subordinates.

He felt that his subordinates expected him to
tell them what to do and how to do it. This, of course,
was in conflict with his conception of the manager as
a provider of freedom. Because of their demands for

role structuring, he assumed they lacked self-motivation.

If they were self—motivated, they would not ask him what

276

and how to work. After all, he did not make such demands

on his superior. As he described it:

Now there is a change in philiosopy right

or wrong. Now my department manager will

come to me and say what do you think we

should work on? You tell us what to work

on. Well, I tell them I am paying them

to run their department. They should find

the things to work on.
The statements indicated that he expected subordinates to
structure their roles.

Insight into the meaning the general manager
assigned to self-motivation was, also, gained from
examining his past experience. He felt that a self-
motivated subordinate was one who could define his
own role content and, appraise his own performance. He
does not have to be told what to do or how he is doing.

The manager considered himself to be a self—
motivated person. This was revealed in a discussion of
his early work experience. As a salesman he said:

I was a salesman and I knew what I was
doing. A sales job is very gratifying
because you know what you've done when

you get the order. You know what you've
done at the end of the year. SO you

don't need somebody to tell you how you're

doing.

As an engineer he stated:

277

I knew I was bringing products to them,
brand new ideas, patents that were very
valuable to them. I need not need to
be told how I was doing.

Later as a product manager he stated:

As a product manager of a section here

our group in the division was making a

higher percentage of profits. So once

again no one had to tell me how I was

doing.
This series of statements indicated that he felt it was
appropriate that none of his superiors structured his
role. It is not difficult to see why he did not inform
his subordinates on the adequacy of their performance.

The manager considered a self-motivated subor-

dinate to be one who was capable of generating new
ideas. In terms of his own experience, he felt that
the generation of new ideas had been responsible for
his rise to general manager. This was revealed in his
statements that:

I've always been able to do something different.

As a salesman, I designed so to speak. If I

saw something I thoughtneeded a better way of

doing, I would send suggestions to the company.

Few of the salesman I was with ever did that.

They sold. They did better selling and I was

never the best salesman but I was down 3rd or

4th or 5th. But I was making the company more

money because I was contributing something
beyond sales.

278

The statements indicated the importance he assigned to
his ability to generate new ideas as an important factor
of his success. This was the "something beyond sales"
that he provided the company.

Apparently, the general manager believed the
freedomrcentered control pattern under which he operated
and his self-motivation were responsible for the new
ideas he generated. He realized, of course, that it
was necessary for the company to value these ideas. In
this connection, he said:

I think these ideas brought my name to the
attention of everybody up the line because
they would say, here is an idea Worthington
sent us. I know this is true because I had
to get patents on them.

Applying for patents indicated to him that his performance

was adequate.

The Psychodynamics pf the Freedom-Centered
Control Pattern From the Point 9:
View pf Subordinates

None of the nine subordinates of the general
manager copied his control pattern in managing their
subordinates. They developed two different control
patterns, the authority-centered and the development?

centered.

279

The general manager seemed to have set in motion
with his control pattern a set of dysfunctions if he
believed the pattern to be the best one for generating
new ideas. Subordinates did not copy his pattern in
managing their own subordinates.

The lack of emulation suggested that the manager
through granting freedom to his subordinates did not
guarantee that they, in turn, would grant it to their
subordinates. Due to his refraining from participation
in structuring their roles he presented them with role
Options. They were free to select the type of control
pattern they would use with their subordinates.

It was presenting them with role options which
constituted the freedom of the general manager's control
pattern. But it was an anxiety—ridden freedom for
subordinates. Somehow or other they had to structure
their roles and develop control patterns of their own.

What accounted for the control patterns the
subordinates developed in this ambiguous situation?

The subordinates did not COpy the control pattern the
general manager used even though it was an alternative

they might have chosen. There appeared to be two major

280

factors that accounted for the patterns they used with
their own subordinates. The first factor was the
control pattern they had worked under in the past. If
they had found the pattern satisfying, they tend to
emulate it. If they found it dissatisfying, they
developed a control pattern of their own in which they
attempted to eliminate the elements they found dis-
satisfying. “é

The second factor that may have accounted for
the control patterns the subordinates used was
personality attributes. They were free to design their
roles and develop a pattern that meshed with their
personality. This opportunity for personalization may
have lowered their experienced frustration in the ‘
ambiguous environment under which they were expected
to perform.

The general manager had given his subordinateS‘
the impression that they were sources of ideas and
improvements while he was the receiver of them. He had
told them they were the boss in their role area. Under

the authority—centered pattern subordinates reversed

the manager-subordinate relationship used by the general

281

manager. They saw themselves as sources of ideas and
improvements and their subordinates as receivers of
them. They told their subordinates, so to speak, "I
am boss and a source of ideas and improvements, you
are here to carry them out."

Under the development—centered pattern, subor-
dinates reacted by defining themselves and their subor—
dinates as both receivers and sources of new ideas and
improvements. They told their subordinates, "I am a
source of ideas and improvements but so are you. We

are here to help each other develop."

The Relationship pf the Freedom—
Centered Control Pattern pp
Existing Theory
and Research

The Prevalence
‘gf Ambiguity

According to recent studies, ambiguity appears
to be a very prevalent phenomena in contemporary
organizations.1 The studies indicate that many people

I
in organizations are not clear about their role

 

For an excellent study on ambiguity see:
R. L. Kahn, D. M. Wolfe, R. P. Quinn, and J. D. Snoek,
Qggapizational Stress: Studies ip_Role Copglict and
Ambiguity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964).

282

assignments, how other participants evaluate their
performance, and the scope of their authority.

A study by Dill suggested that managers often
Operate in environments where they are given role
assignments without any indication of their content
or how to perform them.1 The environment he described
was similar to the general manager's freedom-centered

control pattern.

The Function
p§_Ambiguipy

Dill's study suggested a dominant reason managers
who make ambiguous role assignments and evaluations can
not always make them explicit. The roles they assign
might be innovative in nature. When such is the case a
manager may only know that the purpose of the role is
to come up woth something new. He may not be able to
define what this something new is to be, or how it can
be accomplished. Obviously, if he could do this on an
ex ante basis the role, by definition, would not be an

innovative one.

1

 

W. R. Dill, T. L. Hilton and W. R. Reitman,
The Ngw Managers: Patterns pf Behavig; and Development
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962).

283

Because of an inability to specify actual output

requirements of innovative roles and the techniques for
performing them, it is difficult to establish specific
performance standards for evaluating the role efficiency
and effectiveness of incumbents. About the only
performance standard a manager can use is an ad hoc one.
Did the incumbent come up with something new and was it
useful? At best, this would only be a relative measure
of performance since the manager cannot know for certain
if output would have been greater if another subordinate
had been placed in the role, or if the present subordinate
had been more efficient and effective in his behavior.

The difficulties of determining what is to be
done, how it is to be done, and how performance can be
appraised reflects the difficulty the manager faces in
trying to change the behavior of subordinates assigned
innovative roles. The use of ambiguity as a control
technique is one alternative he may resort to in per-
forming his duties as a manager. Since he cannot build
"do-lOOps" for the roles Of his subordinates, he may
use a ratchet principle by which he continuously pressures

them to change. His only directive to them may be that

284

they must do better without specifying the meaning of
"better," or what techniques subordinates should use.
Another condition that makes it difficult for
a manager to structure the roles of subordinates is
where he lacks knowledge in their specialities. Thus,
objectively he may not be able to tell some of his
subordinates what to do and what to work on. If he
lacks knowledge of the different role areas under his
jurisdiction, he may only be able to appraise performance
on the results achieved. His lack of knowledge may lead
him to conclude that he cannot structure their role.
Through pressuring them with vagueness and telling them
to improve, he may focus their attention on improving
and coming up with something new. Hence, ambiguity in
structuring their roles may result in changes in their

behavior.

The,§ffectsupf
Ambiguity

The study by Dill sheds additional light on how
managers cope with ambiguous environment. When faced
with ambiguous environments, they seem to develop a

system of "cues" that indicates how well they are doing

285

and when they smuld make changes in their behavior. One
of the "new managers," Olin Larson, for example, used

the number of changes his boss had to make in the reports
he submitted to him to determine how "successful" his
actions were. The fewer the number of changes the boss
made, the more successful Larson believed his actions were,
and the less the need for him to make changes in his
behavior. Hence, the number of changes made in the
reports was an indicator of whether he should or should
not attempt to make changes in his behavior.

Another of the "new managers," Tony Rodwell,
received an unanticipated but very definite cue that
other peOple in his organization expected him to change
his behavior. He was unexpectedly shifted from a high
power potential position in his organization to a lower
power potential position without an explanation as to
why he was being shifted.

When Rodwell started working for the company he
was made assistant to the factory manager who thought
Rodwell had a great potential as a manager. The factory
manager in order to develop Rodwell's potential as a

manager asked him to become an assistant to the chief

286

scheduler of the company. The position of chief scheduler
was an important position within the company.

The current incumbent of the chief scheduler
position was about 45 years old and had received no
formal college education. He had worked his way up to
the position in about 20 years with the company. The
factory manager respected him for his experience and
technical competence but thought that he was somewhat
deficient as a manager.

When discussing this new assignment with Rodwell,
the factory manager suggested that Rodwell might move
into the position of chief scheduler within a few months,
if all went well. If this happened, he planned to give
the chief scheduler Rodwell's current job as his personal
assistant.

After six months in the position of assistant to
the chief scheduler Rodwell was rather abruptly shifted
to a position of lesser importance by the factory manager
who did not explain to Rodwell why he was being trans-
ferred. One of the crucial factors responsible for the
shift seemed to be that the factory manager perceived

Rodwell as violating certain organization norms.

287
One of the norms the factory manager thought
Rodwell violated dealt with not discussing your immediate
boss's deficiencies with people at the same or a higher
organizational level than your boss. The factory manager
alluded to this norm and Rodwell's violations of it when
he said:
One night, Tony dropped in after work. He

sat down right where you are sitting and
began to castigate his boss. That was real

bad taste . . . . There is only one person
you have to satisfy, and that is your immedi-
ate boss.

There was, however, a condition under which complaining
was perceived by the factory manager to be legitimate.
As he put it:

You've got to accept what he says until you've

proved by analysis and evaluation that he's

wrong. Now if you've proved that something

is wrong and your boss won't listen to you,

then it's Okay to come and complain to me.

But with Tony, it was all opinions and

speculation. I saw right away it was very

wrong.2
It seems that the factory manager thinks it is legitimate
to complain about the behavior of one's boss if he can

"prove by analysis and evaluation that he's wrong." He.

of course, felt that Rodwell did not do this. It was

 

1
Ibid., p. 75.
21bid., p. 76.

288

shortly after this encounter with Rodwell that the
manager decided to transfer him to a lower ranking
position. His expressed reason for transferring
Rodwell was to place him in a test situation to find
out if Rodwell could change his "inappropriate"
behavior. He did not give Rodwell an explanation for
the transfer.

Another factor which seems to be responsible
for Rodwell's transfer was his orientation to the role
assignment the factory manager gave him. He thought
the factory manager expected him to be aggressive and
innovative in carrying out the assignment. Consequently,
when he started working for the chief scheduler he was
very aggressive in trying to get him to make many
changes in the operations of the department. The chief
scheduler thought that many of the changes Rodwell
suggested were based on inadequate analysis and he
refused to implement them. Rodwell, in response, became
frustrated and eventually, as we have seen, poured out
his frustration to the factory manager.

As previously indicated, the factory manager never

told Rodwell the reason he was being transferred. At

289

first Rodwell attributed his transfer to organizational
"politics." He thought that some important friends of
the chief scheduler were worried that the chief
scheduler was being "squeezed" out and intervened by
making the factory manager transfer Rodwell. But later
Rodwell began to discount this reason and to analyze
his own behavior in his role as assistant to the chief
scheduler. He thought on the basis of his analysis that
he had been too aggressive toward the chief scheduler
and realized he should not have poured out his
frustrations to the factory manager. As he put it:

I just didn't pay too much attention to

him and started reorganizing the

department. It wasn't good human

relations.1
He went on to say:

I probably didn't make any conscious effort

to gain the confidence and liking of the

chief scheduler . . . but I was just so

damn sure that I wouldn't have to live

with him too long that I guess I just sort

of fumbled into the situation.

The important point of this discussion about

Rodwell is that it clearly illustrates the managerial

use of ambiguity to change behavior. Rodwell was never

 

1Ibid., p. 71.

290

told by the factory manager why he was being transferred.
The factory manager expected Rodwell to diagnose his
own behavior and to make appropriate changes in it.
Rodwell, as we have seen, did this rather than asking
the manager why he had been transferred. Similarly,
Rodwell's role asSignment as an assistant to the chief
scheduler was ambiguous from the start. The factory
manager did not tell Rodwell what he was to do and how
he was to do it. He did not tell him that he was not
to try and make many changes, or that he should not
complain about the chief scheduler's behavior. If the
factory manager had told Rodwell these things, Rodwell
might not have made the mistakes he did.

One might say that such action on the part of
the manager would have been "better." Such a judgment
would imply that the factory manager did not intentionally
create an ambiguous situation for Rodwell. He had no
rationale for not clearing up the ambiguities Rodwell
confronted. But if the ambiguity was an oversight, why
did he not tell Rodwell the reason for the transfer.

Unfortunately, on the basis of the data gathered

in Dill's study, the question cannot be answered. On an

291

intutitive basis the possibility exists that the manager
was using ambiguity as a tool for developing Rodwell's
"managerial talents." He intended the transfer to be

a "test" for Rodwell. But a "test" of what?

Apparently, he wanted to see how Rodwell could
diagnose his own behavior and make appropriate changes.
Perhaps, he also wanted to see if Rodwell could become
"self-reliant" in carrying out role assignments. If
this was what he intended, his use of ambiguity was
effective. Rodwell did diagnose his own behavior and

make changes in it.

Summary and Analysis
pimp Proppgitions

Under the freedomrcentered control pattern,
behavioral change on the part of subordinates was a built
in expectation of the manager. In accordance with the
ratchet principle, the manager expected subordinates to
continuously make changes in their behavior so that their
performance constantly improved. The manager did not
explicitly state what behaviors the subordinates were to
change to meet this expectation. Regardless, of their

level of performance, he told them they had to improve

292

without specifying what should be improved or how they
should attempt to improve it. He only examined global
response variables, such as sales or cost trends, and
pressured them to change their behavior through instru-
menting a generalized ambiguity. In short, he did not
discuss reasons for inadequate performance and did not
help establish programs for improving their performance.

The locus of change under the freedom—centered
pattern was the subordinates. They were expected to
define the appropriate behavior that would result in
improvement and to make changes in their behavior that
they considered necessary for improvement.

Support was offered for proposition D.2 since
the manager used an implicit behavioral change model
for improving the performance Of subordinates. Support
was Offered for proposition D.3 since the manager's
implicit behavioral change model was not directly based
on knowledge he acquired from the behavioral sciences.
It was based on knowledge he gained from experience as
a subordinate to other managers. Furthermore, it lacked

an objective measurement system and was not derived

293

from a controlled experiment. NO attempt was made to
empirically test the proposition that subordinates
will generate new ideas if they are left alone.
Similarly, no attempt was made to experiment with

alternative control patterns.

CHAPTER IX

ANALYSIS OF THE AUTHORITY-

CENTERED CONTROL PATTERN

The Manager's Conceptlpn f His Role

 

 

Under the authority—centered control pattern,
the manager conceived his role to be one of determining
and controlling the work behavior of subordinates. He
determined both their role content and performance
techniques and communicated it to them. He, then,
observed their performance to make sure they performed
properly. He assumed that if he told subordinates what
to do and how to do it he would have few problems with
them.

The manager used authority as a mechanism for
changing behavior. He believed that because he was in
a higher position in the division than his subordinates,
ht had the right and duty to order their behavior. If
they failed to perform in terms of his expectations, he
believed he simply needed to order them to change their

behavior.

294

295

One manager described the process of correcting
subordinates deviations from his definition of their
role in the following manner:

Of course in some cases they don't do
things the way you tell them to. So
you simply go back and check it and
find out what's going on. When you
find out you simply tell them to shape
up. You can get them started on
things and they'll work on it for a
month or two and everything will be
going fine. But unless you watch it,
it will drift back into a problem.
This is normal in industry.

He elaborated by stating:

Most of these things happen if you lose

touch with your people and given them

too free a hand. In other words, you

lose control and they wander Off and

if you don't bring them back to conform

to standard procedures, then you've got

real problems on your hands.
These statements indicated that the manager felt it
necessary to observe the behavior of subordinates
closely to see that they carried out his definition Of
their roles.

Moreover, the manager seemed to think that

changing subordinates was not a problem. He was the

boss and, by virtue of his position, had the right to

order their behavior. If subordinates balked at his

296

orders, he simply had to demand compliance. As one
manager put it:

As a general rule, when you talk to a
subordinate you request them to do a job.
You usually don't have a problem. Now
and then they don't agree with the method
you want done a d sometimes they get a
little ornery agout it. But as a general
rule, when you say this is the way I want
it done, then they say well your the boss.

Extent pf Role Structuring

There was a high extent of role structuring in
the authority-centered pattern since the manager believed
it was an important component of his role. One manager
alluded to the importance of role structuring when he
stated:

You issue instructions to them on some of
the things that really have to be done,
covering all the fine points. Then you
expect that they carry it out.

Another manager expressed the importancelhe attached to
role structuring this way:

Ultimately I'm telling them how I want
them to function in the department. If
this conflicts with their basic interest
they really have no other alternative but
to be wrong. You have to find out how
the man you work for wants you to work.
If your not in agreement or have a basic
conflict in this area, the best thing you
can do is find a man you can work for.

297

These statements were taken as being indicative of the
manager's concept of his role in terms of being a role
structurer. He felt it was his duty to define subor-
dinates' role content and techniques. It was their duty
to accept the role structure the managers designed.
Initially the manager had to spend a great deal
of time with subordinates telling them what to do and
how to do it. After initial role structuring, the
manager believed there was less need to interact with
subordinates. He felt he needed to occasionaliy observe
their performance to insure that it was consistent with
his role definition. If it was not, he thought that he
had only to order them to change.
One manager put it this way:

If a man is performing real well, I very

seldom give him a work assignment. He

knows what he has to do and he does not

require a dictorial situation at all.

The more he works for you, the more he

knows how far he can and should go. If

he moves a little too far you have to

bring him back.
This statement indicated that once the roles of subor—
dinates were structured the manager felt interaction

with them could be at a minimum. Subordinates knew

what activities they were expected to perform and how

298

they were expected to perform them. All he needed was
an observational system to spot deviations.

Besides conserving time, the authority-centered
control pattern had the appearance of precision. As one
manager said:

Sure their human and make errors. Sometimes
you have to tell them something twice and
next time you speak a little louder. But

I think this is normal. I've had to almost
say this is an order to supervisors but I
only had to do it once to correct the
situation.

Impersonality

The manager was impersonal in his relationship
with subordinates. His control pattern did not account
for individual differences, or the feelings and emotions
of subordinates. The stress placed on suppressing
feelings and emotions was revealed by one manager who
said:

I recall a case where a young foreman would
openly show anger in front of his work
force. He would slamebang things around.
This cannot be done. You can't display

this type of thing. And I had a hell of

a time over a period of 2 to 4 years with
him. After I initially talked to him you
could see he was striving to improve but
this habit perhaps was hereditaryh-who knows?
I had to bite him in the tail once in awhile
when he'd break away but eventually he came
around.

299

The manager felt that expression of the emotion
Of anger by the foreman was not role relevant. His
approach to correcting it was to assert his right of
authority and order the foreman to stop it. The fore-
man eventually learned to suppress his anger and, hence,
changed his behavior in front of his men. It is doubtful,
however, if it stopped him from becoming angry. It
seems likely that he only learned not to show his
anger to other people.

The manager emphasized rationality and authority
in his relationship with subordinates. One manager
displayed this orientation when he said:

I think the most important thing is that

a subordinate respects his boss. I've

worked for many people I didn't like

but I did respect their judgement. From

a social or personal standpoint we were

not compatible. But as long as I can

respect a man, I can work for him and do

an efficient job. The same thing holds

for my people. They don't have to like

me but they have to respect me.
The statements indicated that the manager thought that
"respect" belonged to the world of rationality while
"liking" belonged to the world of emotions. A manager,

he believed, did not have to be.liked because it is an

emotional form Of behavior. Respect, on the other hand,

300

was thought to be a rational form of behavior.
According to the manager, a superior attains
the "respect" of his subordinate through the exercise
of authority and through displaying his intelligence.
Indeed, he believed that he had demonstrated
intelligence by advancing to a superior position.
Since he had greater intelligence, he felt it was only
right that he told subordinates what to do. He felt
that a manager should not ask subordinates for
suggestions because they might feel he does not know
anything. He would appear unintelligent and lose their

respect.
The Handling pf Inadequate Performance

The manager believed that correcting inadequate
performance required him to point out deficiencies in
the behavior of subordinates and threaten them directly,
or indirectly, with the exercise Of authority. One
manager described the process of handling inadequate
performance in the following manner:

In most cases you have to sit right down
with the individual and point out exactly

what is happening and what you think is
wrong with him. Sometimes you get down

301

to the very fact that he has good knowledge

and does a good job but he doesn't have the

push or drive which is needed for that

particular job. So you talk to him about

it. You tell him he has got to shape up.

Generally, they'll improve quite a bit

in that area.
These statements indicated that the manager used authority
as a technique for correcting inadequate performance.
Through "talking" to subordinates, he explicated his
performance expectations. He, then, threatened to
exercise his right to sanction their behavior if
compliance did not ensue. In short, he simply pointed
out what he considered inadequate performance and ordered
subordinates to change.

Another manager exemplified this approach when

he stated:

I almost always in discussions with my people

point out their weaknesses rather than their

strong points. You may cover them lightly

but the main thing you cover is his weaknesses.

It's the improvement in the weaknesses which

is going to bring him along. It's my

responsibility to point them out.
The statements were taken as evidence that the manager
felt it was part of his role to order the behavior of
subordinates. He believed that he had to point out their

"weaknesses" so that they would function in terms of his

definition of their roles.

302

The manager seemed to believe that it was
unnecessary to point out the "strong points" of
subordinates because it was their duty to perform to
the best of their ability in the role structure he
designed. Complimenting them on their "strong points"
would have meant that they were not expected to perform
with maximum exertion in the role structure provided.
It would have suggested that they had done him a
personal favor.

One manager described the manner in which he
handled discussions about inadequate performance with
his subordinates in the following terms:

This is almost by now a canned speech to
them. You've got some weaknesses and if
you improve them it's going to help you a
great deal.

The question then is whether they're
willing to discipline themselves to attempt
to make this progress or improvement.
Sometimes they do and sometimes they don't.

Most of the people this approach works
on are the eager ones, ambitious, the good
producers. While they don't care to be
criticized, even objectively, they do
accept it for what it's worth and in general
they go out and make a sincere effort.

You may have to, if it's a glaring weakness,
repeat this to them a number of times
providing you see progress is.being made.

303

The statements revealed the manager's machine—like
approach to control. The use of a "canned speech"
levels out individual differences. Furthermore, by
stating that his criticisms are "objective," he implies
that only "rational" behavior is relevant in their
relationship. These two factors emphasize, once again,
the impersonal nature of the control pattern.

The manager believed his approach was effective
with what he called "eager" subordinates. He expanded
his notion of an "eager" subordinate by stating:

I'm not really interested in anyone who

isn't eager. If he desires, he will let

you know. He's the one coming in about

money, whether he should do this or that,

what will help him.
The statements suggested that an "eager" subordinate was
one whom acknowledged the manager's role as a designer
of his activities.

By asking the manager what he should do and how
Ineshould do it, the subordinate validates the manager's
conception of his role. If an "eager" subordinate has
promotion aspirations, it would be expected that he would

be willing to comply with the manager's definition of

his role and suggestions for improving performance.

304

The Changing pf Behavior Through
Authority: ‘Ap Illustration

 

One manager described a problem he was having
‘with one of his subordinates in the following manner:

We've had a problem with one of our older
people not a particularly good one. He
was somewhat of a renegade because he'd
improvise his own systems and procedures
and nobody could work with him because of
his personality traits. One of the cardinal
sins was he was not keeping his programs
up—to—date so engineering changes were not
being taken into account. This was
costing us money. The worst single thing
was you couldn't get anybody to work with
him because he wouldn't accept any outside
help. This was his area and he wanted
nobody else in there.

It was primarily a personality problem.
He'd been around here a long time and couldn't
get along with any of the foreman. He was
really a problem child and yet he's been in
our organization 20 years.
The statements indicated that he believed the problem
occurred because the subordinate refused to operate under
the role structure provided. The subordinate improvised
his own systems and procedures for performing his role.
Hence, the manager branded him a "renegade."
The manager believed that part of the subordinate's

difficulties resulted from his relationship to the

previous manager. As he described it:

305

He had been given a lot of freedom, perhaps

a little favoritism in a manner of speaking

in that he could come in at night when he

wanted and felt like it. SO it was not a

tight ship he was operating under. When

I came in so did law and order. He was

fighting law and order and that's why we

were having a problem.
According to the manager, the previous manager of the
subordinate did not prOperly perform the managerial role.
He did not properly use his position of authority to
structure the subordinate's role. Instead, he provided

the subordinate with "a lot of freedom" to structure
his role.

In short, the previous manager did not run a
"tight ship." He allowed emotions to enter the relation-
ships in the form of favoritism and failed to structure

the subordinate's role.

The manager's approach to correcting the performance
of the subordinate was to assert his right to order the
behavior Of the subordinate. As he destribed it:

So we had a couple of meetings which were
very straight forward, it was an either/or
situation. We went in and spent most of
my time on his defects and that these
defects had to be corrected or I would
have to look for another man for his job.

306

The choice was left to him. 'It's up
to you, you make the decision. I told you
what our department requires and if you
want to conform to it alright.‘ It was
an either/or situation. He either had
to conform or he was going to be removed.
He decided to conform.
The statements revealed his use of authority as a threat
to attain changes in the behavior of the subordinate.
In effect, he told the subordinate to either change his
behavior, or leave the division. If the subordinate
decided to stay, the manager made it very clear that he
was to structure his role and order his behavior.
When questioned about how effective the change
had been, the manager replied:
Some of these things are almost miraculous.
The transition of these people happen
almost overnight. By 10 O'clock the next
morning people came up to his superior
and said: "What happened to him?" The
change was this obvious and apparent.
Certainly, the change was not "miraculous." The subor-
dinate had no other choice if he wanted to keep his job.
The subordinate's reported new "willingness to
let others help him" and to "follow law and order" was
a change imposed upon him by the manager. The manager

did not consider the emotional reactions of the

subordinate to the change he proposed because he

307

considered it irrelevant. Moreover, he did not collaborate
with the subordinate to find out his reasons for not
performing in the fashion the manager thought he should
perform.

The manager did not consider the possibility
that the subordinate might disguise his behavior and
minimize his productive behavior. The subordinate may
have decided to "change" his behavior for the moment in
order to search for a new job. Another possibility could
have been that he had so much time invested in the
division that he did not want to lose senority rights
and pension benefits. In either case, his compliance
with the order to change his behavior would only be
apparent at the overt level. The manager did not
consider the effects of his directive on the subordinates
covert behavior. He was not concerned with whether the

subordinate resented the directive.

Money 5 n Incentive

Money was viewed as the chief work-motive of
subordinates. The manager believed that when subordinates
contracted to work for the division they exchanged the

right of ordering their own behavior for wages. The

308

organization assigned the right to managers in various
positions. The manager could use the right to structure
the roles of their subordinates.

One manager described the nature of this per-
ceived contract by stating:

When you go to work for a company you get
paid for letting them tell you what to
do. You agree to let them tell you what
to do so long as its moral.

One manager stressed the importance of money in
the following manner:

There are many things important in a job.
It's nice to have pleasant surroundings,
washrooms, a title, and an office and so
forth but the paycheck, this may go against
many human relations, is the thing that
motivates people more. It will unless
situations are completely intolerable and
unbearable overcome many sins and most

of the people who work for me respond best
to this.

The statements indicate the importance the manager assigned
to money as an incentive.

According to this manager the productivity of
subordinates varied directly with the rate of their
compensation. As he put it:

I still think basically man is lazy and
very few of us want to do anymore than we

have to. I feel that an incentive system
of whatever type your talking about is

309

the greatest thing there is. In unions, of
course, this is taboo in general. But still
your profit motive, I'm talking about take
home pay, is what they say made America
great and I think this is what inspires

and motivates people.

Sure they want to advance positionewise
and so forth but if they advance position
and don't derive some monetary benefits it
doesn't amount to much. I realize that
your textbooks bring out so many factors
and that wages may be the 3rd or 4th or
6th item mentioned. This is a lot of

poppy cock.

He seemed to believe that subordinates could only be
forced out of their "inherent laziness" through
compensating them. Even though he was aware of other
possible motives he discounted their importance. He
believed that people work to earn a living and will
only surrender the right to order their own behavior
(to be lazy) for compensation of some form. It was
not surprising to find that he used salary increases

to reward those subordinate who met his expectations.
Changing the Behavior pf Pgers

Due to the manager's emphasis on the use Of
authority as a tool for changing behavior, he felt
frustrated in dealing with people in the division over

whom he had no formal authority. Since he had no formal

310
authority over them, he felt he could not effectively
change their behavior. The only way he thought he
could influence their behavior was to appeal to a
higher authority. As one manager described this
process:

I can walk into a meeting with other
department heads. They have no control
over me and I've none over them so your
completely dependent on yourself. If
they're not interested in buying any-
thing at the moment you don't get the
job done. The alternative, if you feel
it is a critical matter, is to discuss
it with the general manager. He either
backs you or does not, but we do have
problems in this area.

Thus, his solution to the problem of influencing peers

was to appeal to a higher authority.

The Psychodynamics p§_the Authority-
Centered gontrol Pattern

None of the managers classified as Operating
under the authority-centered pattern perceived themselves
as having worked under a manager who used a similar
pattern. One of them described his experience in this
way:

I've never been watched or supervised
closely. I prefer this method. I don't

want someone to lay out in the morning
when I walk in that this is the job

311

you'll do today, or this is what your

going to do tomorrow. As far as I can

remember no one I've worked for has

done this to me. Maybe once in awhile

they would call you in and say this

has to be done at such and such a date.

But that was about it. They never

really told me how to do my job.
Why, then, did the manager use an authority—centered
administrative pattern if he disliked its use with him?

One likely reason seemed to be that he believed
that he was different in an important way from most
people. He felt that he had greater ability and know-
ledge and that it was, therefore, only right for him
to order their behavior. While he believed most people
were inherently lazy, he felt he was an exception.
These characteristics were revealed when he

said:

I think number one you have to be endowed

with a certain degree of intelligence.

You have to have things given to you over

which you have no controlw Once

it's been decided whether you've been

given this gift then you havthO be

willing to use it. There's blood, sweat

and tears. You have to be willing to

give of yourself.
From the statements it can be seen that he thinks "intelli-
gence“ is not equally distributed among people. Conse-

quently, only a few have the knowledge to direct the

behavior of others.

312

This manager also felt that people who have a
high degree of intelligence should be willing to use
their superior knowledge to direct the behavior of
people who have a lower degree of intelligence. Since
he assumed "intelligence" was innate, it seemed only
natural that he did not concern himself with developing
those who have a low degree of intelligence. It is
not at all surprising that he did not consider develop-
ment of subordinates to be a vital component Of the
managerial role. Instead, he felt the most important
component was "giving" subordinates his greater knows

ledge through structuring their roles for them.

The Relationship pf The Authority-Centered
Control Pattern pp Existing
Theory and Research

 

Allegedly, the authority model has been present
in the Americanrculture for sometime. Its survival seems
to rest on it simplicity as a technique for controlling
and changing behavior and its apparent effectiveness in
certain situations.

If a manager can specify the exact changes he
'wants in the overt behavior Of his subordinates, and

they are willing to accept and implement his orders, the

313

model would hawaalugh probability of being effective.
The two possible conditions that would impair the

effectiveness are:

l. The manager cannot specify the behavior
changes he wants in concrete terms.

2. The subordinates of the manager are
not willing to accept and implement
his orders.

 

The Problem pf Specifying the
Behavior £2 be Changed

The effectiveness of the authority model depends
in part on the manager's ability to specify in concrete
terms the behavior he wants subordinates to exhibit.

To clarify the meaning of specifying behavior in

concrete terms, consider the following illustration. A
manager tells a subordinate that he wants him to become
more of a "leader" without specifying what he means

by the term. He expects the subordinate to move from
behavior pattern U in which he is not a "leader" to
behavior pattern D in which he is a "leader." Obviously,
this is an ambiguous change goal since the manager does
not specify the overt behavior he is referring to when

he uses the term "leader." Consequently, the subordinate
does not know what aspects of his behavior he should change

in order to be labelled a "leader."

314

If the manager were to define the term "leader"

as giving orders to subordinates rather than asking
them to do things, the change goal would become more
concrete. He would be telling the subordinate that

in behavior pattern U, he is not giving his subordinates
direct orders but is asking them to do things. In
behavior pattern D, he would expect the subordinate

to do the reverse. The subordinate would now have a
more explicit basis for making changes in his behavior.
Moreover, the manager would have defined the behavior
to be changed in observable terms. He could easily
see if the subordinate made the appropriate changes.

If the subordinate did not, he could evoke his right
to sanction the behavior of the subordinate.

In sum, the manager who uses the authority model
must be careful to specify the behavior he wants changed
in observable sets. The managers classified in the
study as operating under an authority-centered pattern
did this. One manager, for example, said he had a
problem with a subordinate who exhibited anger in front
of his own subordinates through "slamrbanging things

around and cursing." The manager, because this was an

315

emotional outburst, told the subordinate to stop "slams
banging things arOund and cursing" in front of his men.
The manager assumed this would stop him from "showing
anger."

A manager's ability to specify the desired
changes in behavior in concrete terms is, in part, a
function of the nature of the situation in which his
subordinates operate. If his subordinates operate
under situations that are highly repetitive and where
output is easily measured, the ability to specify in
concrete terms the behavior desired would be greater
than if the reverse were true. In such situations he

can determine a priorily what is to be done, and the

 

behavior that will accomplish it. He can, so to speak,
determine the "best" behavioral alternative for
accomplishing the task since he deals with a "deter—
ministic" situation. The managers in the study who
were classified as using an authority—centered control
pattern were in functional areas where roles were of a
highly repetitive nature.

When a manager's subordinates hold innovative.

roles in which the situation they confront are unique

316

and their output, on both an a_priori and ad hes basis,
is difficult to measure it is difficult to specify

overt behaviors for subordinates. Under such conditions
the situations are not "deterministic" and the manager
cannot apply "do-loop" logic to delineate the roles of
subordinates. In such situations ambiguity might be

used as a control technique.

The Problem pf Subordinates'
Acceptance p§_Orders

The authority model has been attacked by social
scientists on two grounds. The first attack is based on
a proposition that people in general resent being given
orders by incumbents of higher authority positions.
Supposedly, this resentment is a function of an equali-
tarian norm Operating in the American culture. The norm
states that everyone is "equal" and, hence, prohibits
the existent of authority differential.

Because authority differentials are present in
many organizations, it is postulated that participants

in low level authority positions will resent the issuing

 

For examples of such attacks see: C. Argyris,
Personalipy and Organization (New York: Harper and Bros.,
1957); D. McGregor, The Human Side pf Enterprise (New York:
McGraw—Hill Co., Inc., 1960), Chapter 2.

317

of orders to change their behavior by participants in
'higher positions. The resentment is hypothesized to
result in the lower level participants exerting a
Ininimum of effort in carrying out the orders they
receive.

This line of attack has not resulted in direct
evidence that would support the resentment proposition.
There have been few attempts to measure "resentment,"
"performance at a minimum level," and the incidence of
an "equalitarian norm."

The second attack on the authority model focuses
on a generalized "need for participation" by individuals
in decisions that affect them.1 When the need is
frustrated by the issuing of orders without an opportunity
for participating in formulating them, it is hypothesized
that the person will resent it. The resentment causes

him to exert as little effort as possible in carrying

 

For examples of this attack: R. Likert, N23
Patterns pf Management (New York: McGraweHill, 1961),
pp. 1-4: J. G. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 95;
R. Tannenbaum and F. Massarik, "Participation by
Subordinates in the Managerial Decision-Making Process,"
Canadian Journal pf_Economics and Political Science,
XVI (1950), 408-418.

318

out the order. Sometimes the resentment is referred to
as "resistance" to change.

While there have been empirical studies on
participation, the results are inconclusive. Some
studies indicate that the lack of participation does
not necessarily lead to lower productivity. The
conditions under which it does are not clear.

It was not within the scope of the present study
to determine the effects of the authority-centered
control pattern on the behavior of subordinates. Hence,
it is not known how the productivity and job satisfaction
of subordinates was affected by the pattern.

An alternative interpretation Of why subordinates
might resent the exercise of authority is that they
consider the manager's orders unreasonable, or view him
as being incompetent. If they feel the order is
unreasonable and they have no respect for the manager
issuing it, they may resent the order and do as little
as they have to in carrying it out.

This assumes that the individual desires to
stay in the organization and thinks this would be

impossible if he questioned the order itself, or the

319

competence of the manager issuing it. Without this
assumption the possibility would exist that he could
question such things and, perhaps, overcome his
resentment.

Why this possibility is not mentioned by those
who attack the authority model is unclear. They
simply seem to discount such a possibility by assuming
the individual will incur some sort of penalty if he

does it.
Summary and Analysis pf Q Pgoppsitions

The manager used authority to change the
behavior of subordinates. When trey deviated from his
expectations, he specified the behavior they were to
change.

Support was offered for proposition D.2 since
the manager used an implicit behavioral change model
for improving the performance of subordinates. Support
was Offered for proposition D.3 since the manager's
implicit behavioral change model was not directly based
on knowledge he acquired from the behavioral sciences.

It was based on knowledge he gained from experience

320

as a subordinate to other managers. Furthermore, the
change model lacked an Objective measurement system

and was not derived from a controlled experiment.

CHAPTER X

AN ANALYSISCW‘THE DEVELOPMENT-

CENTERED CONTROL PATTERN

The Manager's Conception pf His Role

 

The manager conceived his role to be one of
develOping subordinates. He believed that interaction
with them was a key element in their development. As
one manager stated:

My relationship with my subordinates has
been to give them as much freedom as I can
by helping them outline a work program, having
overall general supervision, and being avail—
able as a consultant whenever they wanted to
talk. Even in areas where I'm satisfied they
know more about the subject than I do, I
still like them to come to me for discussion.
I think they can clarify their thinking by
talking about it.

He believed that to carry out his role he had to serve
as a source of development by acting as a consultant.
Another manager revealed the importance he
assigned to development in the following passage:
Some managers surround themselves with
peOple who make them look good. The thought
being if this guy down here is any good

he might end up getting my job so to avoid
that I'm going to hire some safe people.

321

322

This is a ridiculous thing.

If a man's ambitious, as most of us

are, and surrounds himself with sub-par

people, the company can't afford to let

him leave that job because they have

nobody to put in it, except sub-par

people. They probably won't do this

so they'll let him set. If he surrounds

himself with strong peOple, just their

strength make him stronger and his

performance better. And when he moves

up, they'll move up with him.
To this manager the measure of role success was how well
he developed subordinates. Promotion was a function of

developing subordinates.

Extent pf Role Structuring

Similar to the manager in the freedom-centered
pattern, the managers stressed freedom as an important
component of his control pattern. However, he utilized
a bounded freedom. Freedom was bounded in the sense
that he participated in helping subordinates structure
their role content and performance techniques. In
contrast to the manager in the authority—centered pattern,
he encouraged his subordinates to participate in the
role structuring process. He did not define their

roles himself.

323

One manager described the role structuring
process in the following manner:

I don't like to give a man a job and
run right out and tell him how to do it.
Telling him, 'this is step one and when
you get through with it this is step two.
I give our peOple a lot of freedom in doing
the task they're assigned. I don't box
them in so they have a chance to express
themselves in their job.

If I have a particular task I want
a fellow to do, I'll have him come in
and explain what I want him to do and
when I want him to do it. I always ask
for his suggestions how we ought to go
about it.

These statements were taken as an indicator of a medium
extent of role structuring. The extent of role structur—
ing by the manager was greater than it was under the
freedomrcentered pattern but less than it was under the
authority-centered pattern.

Another example of a medium extent of role
structuring was furnished by another manager who stated:

The type of people I deal with must be
individuals and must be independent,
originating types of thinkers or they're
of no value. We need creative peOple.

Creative people are bound to be
independent, they want to do things the
way they think they should be done.
Frequently its a balance between having
them follow specific directions and
not liking it, or going along with his

324

way of doing it and perhaps following up
on it if it doesn't work with what I
think should be done. Sometimes we do
it both ways simultaneously.

Here's an example. (Points to a
drawing for a new part) I thought it
might well be done one way, and the
product engineer thought another. He
drew it up both ways and we are going
to try both of them.
The statements indicated that the manager attempted to

provide subordinates with some structuring but allowed

them role options.
Impersonality

Impersonality was low in the sense fln¢.expression
of feelings and emotions by subordinates was viewed as
a legitimate form of interchange. As one manager put it:
I think it is important in a relation—
ship between a manager and his people that
they feel free to come in and discuss their
particular problems and feelings about
other departments, relationships, salaries
and even home affairs.
The rationale he offered for his View was that these
factors influenced the performance of subordinates.
Therefore, they had to be dealt with in developing them.

Although the pattern was universal in application,

individual differences were taken into account because

325

development was considered an individual process. Sub-
ordinates were considered to be unique in their
deficiencies. Consequently the manager believed he

had to hold individual discussions with them.

The Handling 9: Inadequate Performance

 

The manager appraised the performance of sub—
ordinates on the basis of both technical and non-technical
criteria. An example of non-technical criteria was
provided by a manager who stated:

I think more of a feeling of the attitude
of the individual gives me a clue as to
whether he is producing to the best of his
ability. If the fellow is interested in his
job I find that he will come to me for
discussions, will attempt to outline his
own programs ahead of what is scheduled for
him to do, and will bring to my attention
some of the competitOrs'products which
have features he thinks are better than
ours. He will tend to put in some extra
time, evenings or Saturdays.

You get a feeling of just how much he's
producing within his capacity limitations,
by his attitude toward his work more than
anything else.
This manager seemed to use predominately non-technical
criteria for determining the adequacy of the performance

of subordinates. One of the criteria he used was their

expressed desire to gain new knowledge through going

326

to the manager for consultation on their problems.
Such action signified their acceptance of his role
as being a developmental one. Similarly, if they
finished their role assignments early and sought
out the chance to learn something new, they
demonstrated interest in being developed.

The subordinate was expected to reciprocate in
kind for knowledge gained from the manager. One
example was the subordinate providing the manager
with knowledge about competitor's products. The
sharing of knowledge expectation followed from the
manager's View that development was a two-way process
in which he and subordinates exchanged knowledge and,
in doing so, grew together. He believed that the
exchange of knowledge gave subordinates experience in
playing the role of develOper. Thus, when they moved
into a managerial role they supposedly would be able
to play it properly.

It was not surprising that this manager stressed
developing a better "attitude" toward work in attempting
to help subordinates improve performance. As he put

it:

327

Of course there's a time for a discussion

as to what's expected from him and what he's

actually doing. I simply try to create a

better attitude toward his work. I try to

find out if there is anything about his

particular assignment he doesn't like,

whether he'd prefer work in another area,

or work with someone else. We just,have

to find out what the basic problem is and

then, maybe together we can find a solution

to it.
The statements indicated that the manager collaborated
with subordinates on the reasons for inadequate performance.
He saw improving performance as a two—way process in
which he and subordinates searched together for the
problems and solutions to it.

The manager viewed inadequate performance as

a result of deficiencies in knowledge or dissatisfaction
with the work role. If he believed the determinant was
dissatisfaction with the work role, he attempted to
change it. If he believed the determinant was inadequate
knowledge, he attempted to provide the necessary knows
ledge. He assumed that given new knowledge the
subordinates would use it so that their performance would
improve.

One manager described the process of providing

new knowledge in the following manner:

328

You might run into a problem where a man
isn't doing what you would like him to do
with a specialty range of products. A man
has a hesitancy to try to sell a segment of
the line he doesn't understand very well.

The statement clearly indicated the critical role the

manager assigned to a deficiency in knowledge as the

 

cause of inadequate performance.

‘O$.lh,w.nl'._l :
*0
- I.»

To improve performance the manager stressed

increasing the subordinate's knowledge. As he put it:

 

It takes a little doing sometimes to
get him receptive to the point where you
can train him in this area. The only way
I know to go about this is to sell him on
the idea that this is something that can
be beneficial to him as well as the company,
as though he were a customer.

a
".
.

It's awfully difficult to order a man

to learn something. You have to stimulate

or motivate him to do this.
This manager felt subordinates had to be sold on using
the knowledge he provided them. Selling, in the sense
he used the word, was providing subordinates with know-
ledge and showing them why they should use it. He
assumed that subordinates had to understand what they

could gain from its use before they would change their

behavior in the desired direction.

329

The manager elaborated on his sales approach by
saying:

You've got to remember I'm sales oriented.
I figure the job of a salesman is to get.
other peOple to do what it is you want them to
do, whether its buy a pnOduct or pay for it.
As far as I'm concerned this is no different
than selling a product.

Your selling an idea, its an intangible
instead of a piece of machinery but I think
if you approach almost anyone properly and
explain why things should be done you can
do it. You explain why it needs to be done
for the betterment of the company and why
it needs to be done for the betterment of
the particular individual. If what your
selling is a sound product, I think you can
get the job done.

He went on to say:

This is the approach you have to use
with people. Call it selling or public
relations or whatever you want to but its
trying to get someone to seriously consider
what your talking about and, then, present
it in such a way that when he considers it,
he thinks it's a good idea. It's got be
not just from thexcompany's standpoint but
in some measure from his standpoint. 'The
company will prosper, get bigger, he'll
be recognized as an integral part of the
accomplishment.‘

The statements clearly revealed the emphasis the manager
gave to increasing subordinates' knowledge through
Selling them on what its implementation will do for

‘them. His concern for their motives in changing their

330

behavior was very apparent.

The manager actively participated in helping
his subordinates improve their inadequate performance.
He helped them develop specific ways of changing their
behavior rather than ordering them to change, or
pressuring them with ambiguity into changing it. One
manager described this process of participation in
the following manner:

I think everybody from year to year

have one or two salesman who might be

turning in unsatisfactory performance.

The thing we do when this occurs, one of

us in the office either myself or Mr. X

(in the past I've handled it but Mr. X

has progressed to the point where I think

he can handle it as well as I can) plans

two or three selling trips with this man.

We go with him when he calls on his

customers, knocks on doors, and cold

canvassing to his actual meetings to

observe him in his operations to see

what he's doing which might adversely

affect his sales performance.
The manager attempted to diagnose the role performance
difficulties of subordinates by observing them while
they were actually engaged in role behavior. Apparently,
he felt that each situation was unique and, therefore,

each subordinate's behavior had to be observed individually

‘to find the reason for inadequate performance.

331

After the diagnosis, the manager attempted to
aid subordinates in developing new techniques for
performing their roles. As this manager described it:

Then, when we do find it, we try to

point out to him what's happening and sit

down with him and work out with him,

perhaps, a new and more interesting

presentation.
Thus, he actively participated in helping subordinates
improve performance. Such action on his part was
congruent with the view that development was a two—way
process and that inadequate performance occurred
because of deficiencies in knowledge.

Coupled with participation in increasing the
knowledge of subordinates was the offering Of emotional
support when they were uncertain that they could apply
their knowledge effectively. One manager described the
process of emotional support as follows:

When my people get a little bit shakey

and call me and want to know if there's any
particular method they should use, I
generally try to get them calmed down by
saying; 'Don't forget you've been in this
business for six years. Now even if you.
were at it one day, you'd know a little

bit more about it than these people do.
They don't know anything about it so it's

up to you to tell them about it. Don't
get shakey about it because everything you

332

say is information they need and want and
will have to use in their evaluation Of the
requirements.‘ This generally gets them
calmed down.

It is interesting to note that the manager casted the
role of salesman as imparting knowledge to customers.

A salesman, so to speak, was to develop customers.

Changing Performance Criteria é§.A
Mechanism for Changing Behavior

The manager sometime used changes in performance
criteria as a basis for changing the role behavior of
subordinates. An illustration of this was provided by
a manager who stated:

He (a previous boss) had only one criticism
and this I thought extremely unusual because
I have lots more criticism of my people. He
didn't think I got out enough and contacted
people who were active in our sales area. In
other words, our dealers, customers, research
people in universities, and that type of
thing.

Well, as a result of his criticism, I
joined several organizations and became an
Officer in many of them. I make some very
close contacts with a number of research
people. I felt it helped a lot. I enjoyed it
andwanted to do it Before but didn't think
I should spend that much time.

When the supervisor criticized his role behavior, the

subordinate responded by changing his role behavior.

333

He thought the superior was trying to help him develop.
Later the subordinate said:

Well, it wasn't long after that, that
I was, indirectly at least, criticized for
spending too much time. I was questioned
about whether these activities were paying
Off; whether we got enough out Of the
meetings to warrant attending them. SO I
curtailed it.

The superior changed the criteria and the subordinate
corresponding changed his behavior. He simply curtailed

the activities that the superior now evaluated negatively.

Changing the Behavior 9; Peers

When the manager was faced with a problem that
required changing the behavior of peers, he stressed
"selling" them on the need for change. Like the manager
in the authority-centered pattern, he saw the alternative
of having a mutual superior intervene. As one manager
described it:

Now if your dealing with someone whose
on the same level of responsibility and
authority and you can't sell him, then you've
got some real problems. Then you have three
alternatives: (1) forget the idea, (2)
continue to try to sell him on the idea, and
(3) ultimately discuss it with people who
are the superior of both of us and let them
decide whether its worth doing.

334

His first reaction to changing the behavior of peers is
to try and "sell" them on his idea. He is, so to speak,
to help them increase their knowledge. Only as a last
resort does he believe the issue should be resolved

by a person in a higher position.
Recognition §§.§fl Incentive

The manager assumed subordinates had an intrinsic
desire to develop and were motivated to do so by recogni—
tion. As one manager put it:

The biggest thing is recognition of
the work they've done which is a thing which
is too frequently overlooked. We're inclined
to expect them to produce and when they do we
take it as a matter of course without any
compliments in their direction, or a pat on
the back, or public recognition of any kind.
I think this causes them to fall into more
routine activities then if they're rewarded,
not necessarily through salary increases
although that is one way. I think, however,
recognition on the personal basis is just as
important as salary increases, if not more
so. It encourages them to do more and better
work.

Recognition was not the important motivating factor.
Its function was to provide subordinates with feedback
on how well they were developing. The desire for
development seemed to be the most important motivating

factor.

1' lat
l

 

335

Money was not considered a prime incentive of
subordinates. As one manager said:

I suppose most peOple would tell you
money is the reason why people work hard.
I don't feel that's true. Money is a
necessity, of course, you've got to live
but I don't think you can motivate people
as such with money. I think most people
just enjoy doing a good job even when
someone else doesn't know about it. SO
I think you've got something going for
you right there.

This manager discounted the importance of money as an
incentive and stressed an "inner motive" for wanting
to do a good job.
He elaborated on this "inner motive” by stating:
Almost everybody enjoys doing a good job
if he's recognized for it. I think recognition
does a pretty good job of motivating people.
Ambition is certainly a strong motivating force.
If he does a good job and is recognized for it,
you give him a little more to do, a little more
responsibility and give him the right to do it.
Hence, he favored recognition, Opportunities for develop-
ment and special assignment as incentives.
The manager attempted to establish an environment
in which subordinates could gain a personal sense of

accomplishment through controlling the results of their

role performance. As one manager described it:

 

It :i- ‘

 

336

One of the ways we have been motivating
our people is to truly make our fellows
managers of their respective territories.
We don't make any decisions regarding their
territories without their recommendations
and advice. We'll even let them make a
mistake if we think they're genuine and
sincere in their efforts. We don't like
them to make any bad ones but sometimes a
man can learn more rapidly by doing what he
thinks he has to do and stubing his toe can
wake him up into doing it right. They fee1~
they are a part of a decision making team
and not just having a bunch of edits handed
down to them.

This manager attempted to motivate subordinates through
providing them with an opportunity for development. He
felt that they could often acquire new knowledge through

making mistakes.

Psychodynamics pf the Development-
Centered Pattern

 

Some of the managers who were classified as using
the development—centered control pattern had previously
worked under what they called "autocratic" managers.
Without exception they found working under such managers
a dissatisfying experience. They felt that the managers
did not allow them to develOp. The "autocratic"
managers,so to speak, over—determined their roles and

they found it dissatisfying.

 

 

 

337

The development-centered managers were sometimes
aware that they were modelling their pattern after
control patterns they found satisfying in the past.

In discussing how he would try to get a subordinate to
do a task he did not like, one manager said:

The only way anyone can do a job that's “R.
disagreeable to them is through full under—
standing of why it needs to be done. As I
think back this approach was always used

with me and is probably why I use it with
my subordinates.

 

 

If a man understands the need for some-
thing being done, you usually don't have
to push him to get it done. It's when he
either doesn't understand the need, or
doesn't believe it that he drags his feet.

Most of the managers had, also worked for
managers who used a development—centered control pattern.
They found such a control pattern satisfying. One
manager described his experience with it in the follow-
ing manner:

The second manager I worked under Operated
more in the manner I personally like to
operate in. He was nowhere near the authori-
tarian the first man was. He had just as much
authority and everybody recognized it but
he didn't wear it on his sleeve all the time.
This man got you to do the things he wanted
you to do through discussion, guidance, and
suggestions. He'd say: 'would you like to
handle this for me?‘ And maybe he'd give a

 

338

suggestion on how he'd think you might want to
handle it. This was a reverse of the first one.
It was a very pleasant experience.

It is not difficult to see why this manager simulated
the development—centered pattern. He found it, by
experience to be satisfying.

Another manager described his experience along
similar lines. He said:

The fact he generally allowed me to make
my own decisions was one reason I liked
working for him. When he questioned why I
had done something, I'd explain in detail
why I'd done it that way, and I usually got
his support. At that time he'd advise you
on experiences he'd run across and you
hadn't yet experienced which indicated he
was trying to develop you more. He
continuously gave me more responsibility
than I had previously.

No matter how much background you've got
there's always an awful lot you can learn
otherwise. Often times he would take time
out to explain in detail some of the things
which certainly ungraded your knowledge of
things and of the procedures he desired.

Thus, the experience he found most satisfying was one in
which the manager concentrated on expanding the know—

ledge Of subordinates.

 

 

 

339

The Relationship pf the Development-
Centered Pattern pg Existing
Theory and Research

The development-centered control pattern appears
to be consistent with performance appraisal theories
directed at developing subordinates. Maier, for
example, uses a problem-solving appraisal interview as
a prototype of excellence.1 In the problem-solving
interview, the manager views his role as one of stimu-
lating growth and development of subordinates. He
assumes that discussing work problems will lead to
improved performance and that increased responsibility
will serve as an incentive to grow. Moreover, he believes
that both the subordinates and manager can learn and
develop from sharing their experience and views.

The process of handling inadequate performance
in the development-centered control pattern is similar to
using what Leavitt calls a "collaborative model."2 The
collaborative model consists of the following interchanges

between the manager (M) and subordinate (S):

1N. R. F. Maier, "Three Types of Appraisal Inter-

view," Personnel (March-April, 1958), pp. 27—40 and The
Apggaisal Interview (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
1958).

2H. J. Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964), second edition,
pp. 189-205.

 

 

 

340
1. Both (M) and (S) diagnose the
inadequate performance of (S).

2. Both (M) and (S) suggest
alternative ways (S) can improve

his performance.

3. Both (M) and (S) communicate the
implication of alternatives to

each other.

4. (S) selects alternative (M) can

accept.

5. (S) attempts to change and (M)

supports.
Leavitt claims that in this model (S) controls the changes
in his behavior.

When the collaborative model is generalized to
the develOpment—centered pattern it rests on an implicit
authority threat. The manager maintains his right to
order the behavior of subordinates. TO help subordinates
develop, he may refrain from completely exercising the
right, but the right to order their behavior is always
present. Thus, it is possible that Changes in the
behavior of subordinates are due to an implicit authority
threat rather than his development-centered control

pattern.

 

~ ‘l.r-.!l.

 

I}.

 

341

Summary and Analysis gfug Propositions

The manager attempted to correct the inadequate
performance of subordinates by uncovering deficiencies
in knowledge, offering a rationale for change, giving
an opportunity to counter the rationale, and helping
develop new behaviors. His first step in determining
the need for change was to establish performance standards,
such as increases or decreases in sales volume. When a
need for change was indicated the manager looked for
reasons actual performance was below expected performance.
He examined the subordinate's behavior pattern to find
out what he was doing "wrong." When he uncovered what
he thought was the "cause," he delineated waysfor
correcting the behavior.

The manager's next step was to give the subordinate
a reason for the change and his suggestions for the
change. In the process, he allowed the subordinate to
question the need for change and the proposed changes.
After they arrived at the types of changes the subordinate
was to make, the manager helped the subordinate to
develop and implement the new behaviors. When the

subordinate attempted changes, the manager encouraged

him

and

the

for

was

342

and gave him support when he encountered difficulties
recognition when he succeeded.

Support was Offered for proposition D.2 since
manager used an implicit behavioral change model
improving the performance of subordinates. Support

offered for proposition D.3 since the manager's

implicit behavioral change model was not directly based

on knowledge he acquired from the behavioral sciences.

It was based on knowledge he gained from experience as

a subordinate to other managers. Furthermore, the model

lacked an Objective measurement system and was not

derived from a controlled experiment.

CHAPTER XI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A Criterion g: Usefulness

 

One cannot rule out on an g_priori basis any
of the areas of the behavioral sciences as potentially
capable of contributing to management theory and practice.
The usefulness criterion must be applied to all areas
to determine their contribution. The A premises
established a criterion for determining if knowledge
contained in the behavioral sciences is useful to managers.
Premise A.2 stated that such knowledge is useful if it
enables managers to solve their behavioral problems.
Premise A.3 stated that such knowledge can lead to more
efficient solutions if it constitutes control knowledge.
Premise A.2 led to an examination of the behavioral
problems faced by managers and the behavioral problems
dealt with in the behavioral sciences. Premise A.3
led to an examination of the control knowledge possessed
by managers and control knowledge contained in the

behavioral sciences.

343

 

 

344

The Conversion Framework

In Chapter III it was demonstrated that both
applied social scientists and managers experience a
conversion problem in trying to apply existing knowledge
from the basic disciplines of the behavioral sciences.
The problem exists because not all existing knowledge
in the basic disciplines has been accumulated to solve
behavioral problems. It has not been intended to pro—
vide control knowledge. Moreover, in accordance with
proposition B.l, neither management theory and practice
nor the behavioral sciences hawaidentified the problems
faced by managers in converting knowledge contained in
the behavioral sciences into a tool they can use for
changing behavior.

An analysis of Berelson's and Steiner's findings
on human behavior revealed that, in accordance with
proposition 3.2, not all knowledge in the behavioral
sciences can be used in its present form to solve
specific behavioral problems. To solve specific
behavioral problems it must be control knowledge. Control
knowledge permits a change agent to manipulate conditions

determining a phenomenon in order to achieve a desired end.

345

The finding pertaining to leadership styles
was cited as an example of knowledge that could not
be used to solve a specific behavioral problem. It
did not specify a desired end or the determinants of
the phenomena "leadership styles." Hence, by definition 2
it did not constitute control knowledge. {11‘
The construct of a behavioral change model I

coupled with the operationalizing process wasznopoax1as a

 

conversion framework. Proposition B.3 stated that the

iii

framework permits knowledge in the behavioral sciences
to be appraised in terms of control knowledge. Behavior
pattern U identifies a behavioral problem and behavior
pattern D describesea"desired end." The transition-
producing mechanism describes how the "conditions
determining a phenomenon" can be manipulated to achieve
the "desired end." Proposition B.4 stated that a
behavioral change model built through use Of the
conversion framework constitutes control knowledge if

it contains variables that can be manipulated by a

 

change agent, possesses an objective system for measuring

the values of variables and states empirically valid

 

relationships between the variables.

346
The analysis Of the relationship between the

behavioral sciences and management theory and practice
presented in Chapters II and III suggested that a gap
currently exists between those who develop behavioral
knowledge and those who try to make use of it for
solving specific problems. Many social scientists
in the basic disciplines of the behavioral sciences
have not been concerned with the practical use Of
their research by applied social scientists and
managers. Commenting on the gap, Leeds and Smith
suggest that:

Some social scientists feel that they are

not responsible for determining the practical

uses of their research. Other social scientists

feel that they do not know how to implement

their findings; they lack the skills needed to

translate research findings into action programs.

Very little training in social engineering is

given to social scientists, and only a few

have had practical experience in ;implementing

their knowledge.1
Apparently, some social scientists, particularly those
in the basic disciplines, have not been interested in
the application of their research to change behavior.
.Moreover, their training and role conception have not

lR. Leeds and T. Smith, Using Social Science

Knowledge ip Business and Industry (Homewood, Ill.:
Irwin, 1963), p. 122.

 

In ’JIL“

 

‘ . _
I
1

 

347

prepared them to translate research findings into
action programs. While they have been trained to
describe and predict behavior they have not been
trained in how to control it. They have been
conditioned to be descriptive rather than prescriptive.
Contrariwise managers and applied social
scientists have been conditioned to be prescriptive
as well as descriptive and operate in a world where
they serve as agents of change. They are expected
to change behavior and control its direction. Research
findings from the basic disciplines of the behavioral
sciences are considered useful if they help them
perform their change agent role more efficiently and
effectively. The analysis presented in chapter III
suggested that they experience a conversion problem
in trying to use such findings because the researcher,
in many cases, does not explore how the findings can
be used to achieve behavioral change. Stated differ-
ently, the researcher does not attempt to translate
the findings into action programs for changing

behavior. Thus change agents who want to make use of

 

 

 

348

the findings for changing behavior must convert them
into action programs.

According to Leeds and Smith, the chasm between
the developers and users of behavioral knowledge has
resulted in a proposal for a new Speciality that does
applied research. As they state it:

Some social scientists argue that the person

who is talented in analyzing situations and

conducting research may not have the talent

to implement findings or translate them into

an action program. One solution which has

been suggested is to have a Specially

trained person, a third party, who takes

the research findings of the social scientist

and ascertains how they can be utilized by

the manager in the organization.1
The necessity for a middleman between the developers
and users of behavioral knowledge is a moot issue.
The important factor is that a conversion function
must be performed. The conversion framework presented
in chapter III was designed to facilitate research on

the conversion function and to serve as a model of the

conversion process.

 

lLoc. cit.

349

Examination 9; Existipg_Know1edge
ig the Behavioral Sciences ‘

 

The conversion framework developed in chapter
III was applied to a selected body of knowledge in the
applied areas of the behavioral sciences: psycho-
therapy, group dynamics and need-satisfaction
psychology. In terms of proposition B.4, presently
none of the models analyzed in chapters IV, V, and VI
constituted control knowledge. They lacked either
objective measurement systems, empirically validated
relationships between variables, statements indicating
how to manipulate the value of transition-producing
variables, or some combination of these factors. Thus
in terms of prOposition C.1 the models did not presently
meet the necessary and sufficient conditions of a useful
behavioral change model. In terms of proposition C.2,
the models attempted to change behavior by changing
the values of individual variables, environmental
variables, or both.

While presently the behavioral change models
examined in chaptersIV, V and VI do not meet the

necessary and sufficient conditions of a useful behavioral

350

change model it is possible that in the future they
could be transformed into useful models. The analysis
of the models demonstrated that in terms of proposition
B.4 they did not yet meet the necessary and sufficient
conditions. However, it is possible that in the
future they could be made to conform with these
conditions. Hence it7can not be concluded that the
models are not actually useful. It can only be
concluded that at the present time they do not meet
the necessary and sufficient conditions of a useful
behavioral change model.

In the future,attempts must be made to determine
if models derived from the behavioral sciences can be
translated into control knowledge if, in their present
form, they do not constitute control knowledge.

Stated differently, if in their present form they do

not meet the necessary and sufficient conditions for

a useful behavioral change model can they be made to
conform to these conditions in the future? Can objective
measurement systems be established for variables used

to describe behavior patternsU and D as well as the

transition-producing mechanism? Can the relationships

351
between the behavior pattern variables and the transition—
producing variables be empirically validated? Can
statements be developed that indicate how a change
agent can manipulate the values of transition-producing
variables? In accordance with proposition B.4, if the
answer to the questions is affirmative the models would
be useful since they would constitute control knowledge.
Acquiring answers to the questions is an experimental
issue that must be resolved in the future.

Another area for future research consists of
applying the conversion framework to other literature
of the behavioral sciences. The universe of literature
examined in the present study represented only a fragment
of behavioral science knowledge. It is possible that
presently there exists behavioral knowledge that meets
the necessary and sufficient conditions of a useful
behavioral change model. Only through applying the
conversion framework to other literature in the
behavioral sciences can this possibility be explored.

The general applicability of the models examined

in Chapters IV, V and VI, as well as other models, to

352

behavioral problems of managers represents another
area for research. In short, can behavioral change
models that are not explicitly designed for use by
managers be made useful to them through use of the
conversion framework? To answer this question a
systematic study of the range of behavioral problems
dealt with in the behavioral science literature as
well as those dealt with by managers would have to
be conducted. Such a study would permit a conceptual
comparison of behavioral problems dealt with in the
behavioral sciences with those confronted by managers.
It would make it possible to determine if they share
in common a particular range of behavioral problems.
A twofold problem exists in trying to compare
behavioral problems dealt with in the behavioral
sciences with those managers experience in carrying
out their organizational role. First, some of the
behavioral problems described in the behavioral
science literature have Specific reference to industrial
settings (e.g..Likert's Supervisory Model), while

others do not (e.g.,Ellis' Rational-Emotive Therapy).

353

While seemingly irrelevant, the range of behavioral
problems described in a non—industrial setting cannot
be discounted on an g_priori basis. Conceptually they
may be similar to some of the behavioral problems
confronted by managers. If some of the problems are
conceptually similar, models built by social scientists
to resolve~the shared range of problems may prove on
further analysis to be useful to managers. For example,
if a set of irrational beliefs influences the adequacy
of a man's performance, use of the rational-emotive
model, assuming it was made Operational, might improve
performance. Thus while the rational-emotive model
was not develOped in an industrial setting and was not
designed to help managers with their behavioral problems
it may prove to be useful to managers in coping with
some of their behavioral problems.

The second problem in conceptually comparing
ranges of behavioral problems, centers on develOping
a definition of a behavioral problem. In terms of the
conversion framework, behavior pattern U is a behavioral
problem in the sense that the change agent wants to

move the object of change away from it. However, the

354

description of the pattern does not indicate why the
change agent considers the behavior pattern a problem
or undesirable. It Simply describes the behavior
pattern he considers a problem and attempts to change.

Sometimes in the behavioral science literature
a range of behavioral problems thought to exist in an
industrial setting are simply described. No prescriptive
mechanism is proposed to resolve the problems. The
social scientist describes the incidence of problems
(e.g. high alienation) without indicating how to
ameliorate them. In such cases, further research is
necessary to determine how the values of the variables
describing the problems can be changed (e.g. from high
alienation to low alienation). In effect, transition-
producing mechanisms for resolving the problems have
to be constructed and tested.

Sometimes the description of a behavioral
problem by a social scientist represents an invention
on his part and is not perceived as a problem by managers.
For example, in one of the Hawthorne experiments the

researchers labelled a range of employee behavior:

 

355

restriction of output.1 Restriction of output meant

that the employees worked at a lower output level than

they were actually capable of achieving. At the time

of the study the management of the company, considered

the employees output to be adequate. The issue, then,

is did restriction of output constitute a behavioral EHIAI;

problem for managers?

 

If it is assumed the managers were informed i
on restriction and came to consider it a problem, the E?
problem of how to change the behavior emerges. The
Hawthonxaexperiments, however, did not provide a
transition-producing mechanism for dealing with
restriction of output. Experiments on how to change

this behavior were not conducted. Thus, in this

 

instance, even though managers may have been made
aware of a problem the social scientists did not
provide a mechanism for resolving it. It is possible
then that the behavioral sciences may share a range
of behavioral problems with management theory and
practice but not possess mechanisms for resolving the
Problems.

1F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson,

Management and the Worker (Science Editions; New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964), pp. 531-537.

356

Empirical Determination 9; Control
Knowledge Possessed pthanagers

PrOposition D.l stated that to determine the
useful of knowledge contained in the behavioral
sciences to managers the behavioral problems they
face and how they cope with them must be determined.

An exploratory study was designed to identify and

describe behavioral change models used by ten managers

to handle inadequate performance. In terms of the
conversion framework, inadequate performance and

improved performance constituted descriptions of

behavior patterns U and D. The managers' attempt to
correct inadequate performance constituted the transition-
producing mechanism.

In accordance with proposition D.2, the study
revealed that the ten managers implicitly used behavioral
change models in handling inadequate performance. They
used three types of transition-producing mechanisms in
correcting inadequate performance of subordinates. The
transition-producing mechanisms they used stemmed from
the control patterns they implemented and represented

attempts to correct deviations from them.

'1

 

 

 

357

In accordance with proposition B.4, the
transition-producing mechanisms used by the ten managers
did not presently meet the necessary and sufficient
conditions of a useful behavioral change model. The
managers made no attempt to systematically measure F‘
variables they manipulated to improve performance or ‘1

verify propositions on which manipulation was based.

I3. I All“

The general manager, for example, did not empirically

 

IIP‘ "
. y e .2

test the prOposition that an ambiguous directive will
result in improvements. He did not attempt to measure
its psychological effects on subordinates or discover
the conditions under which it might be effective.

The range of alternatives the managers considered
in devising mechanisms for handling inadequate perform-
ance-was small. They did not experiment with different
alternatives to determine if the particular model they
used was the most efficient and effective alternative
for improving inadequate performance. From the data
gathered it was not possible to state if they could
increaSe the efficiency and effectiveness of improving
inadequate performance by using knowledge from the

behavioral sciences.

 

 

358

In accordance with proposition D.3, the control
patterns used by the ten managers were not based on
knowledge directly acquired from the behavior sciences.
The control patterns were acquired from their experience
as subordinates to other managers. The major reason
they did not use knowledge from the behavioral yfitq

sciences was that they were not exposed to it. However,

 

theqppssibility exists that even though they did not

 

directly acquire their control patterns from the
behavioral sciences the patterns could be identical

by coincidence. In terms of the behavioral change models
examined in chapters IV, V and VI, the managers' models
appeared to be conceptually different.

There are a number of areas for future research
on behavioral change models used by managers. One area
is determining if there are other types of control
patterns. It is likely that the present study did not
exhaust all of them. In connection with such an extended
analysis an effort could be made to determine under what
conditions a homogeneous pattern prevails in an organi-

zation. For example, if the general manager had used an

 

359

authority-centered pattern would his subordinates have
used other patterns?

Another area of research is assessing the
impact of different control patterns on subordinates.
Are the psychological effects of the pattern different?
What is the effect of each pattern on productivity?

Are there conditions under which one pattern is more
effective than others and vice-versa?

A systematic study of the range of behavioral
problems faced by managers is another area for research.
What types of behavioral problems do they have with
subordinates, superiors, peers and themselves?‘ The
present study was restricted to problems of inadequate
performance.

Finding managers who have been exposed to some
of the findings of the behavioral sciences and deter-
mining how the exposure has affected their role
performance is another area for research. Have they
tried to use the findings? If so, how have they tried
to use them? What changes in their practices have
followed from the exposure? Do they perceive a conversion

problem? If so, how have they reacted tO the problem?

 

 

360

A Conceptual Comparsion gf_the Bphavioral
Change Models Useg_py_the Ten Managers
with Those Examined ip_Chapters
.131. Yasdfl

The models examined in chaptersIV, V, and VI
were not explicitly designed to help managers handle
problems of inadequate performance. However, it is
possible to conceptually compare them with the models
used by the ten managers. In short, were the models
used by the ten managers for handling problems of
inadequate performance conceptually similar to the
psychotherapeutic, environmentalistic and need-

satisfaction models examined?

- w-“

Psychological Determinants g§_
Inadequate Performance

The managers classified as using freedom-
centered or authority-centered control patterns
appeared to rule out psychological determinants of
inadequate performance by usingimpersonality as a
basis for relating to subordinates. Impersonality
resulted in their not taking individuals differences
into account and considering "emotional behavior" to

be administratively irrelevant. Hence on an g_priori

 

 

361

basis they excluded psychological problems of subordinates
as potential determinants of inadequate performance. For
example, they did not consider the possibility that
inadequate performance may be influenced by a negative
emotional state based on a set or irrational beliefs,

or by the frustration of certain needs. )

Environmental Determinants of :
Inadequate Performance :

 

The managers in the study appeared to rule out get
the possibility that inadequate performance may be
influenced by environmental factors. For example, they
did not consider the possibility that their own behavior
may influence the performance of their subordinates.
In fact, they did not attempt to discover systematically
or precisely what behavior their subordinates expected

from them.

A Summary Comparison gf_Determinants
g§_Inadeguate Perfopgance

Generalizing the models analyzed in chapters
IV, V and VI to the problem of inadequate performance
there are many possible determinants of inadequate

performance. Figure 11.1 indicates the range of possible

FIGURE 11.1

362

A COMPARISON OF POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF
INADEQUATE PERFORMANCE

 

 

Determinants from the
Behavioral Sciences

1. Repressed sexual conflict
2. Irrational beliefs
3. InapprOprate conditioning

4. Low need for achievement

5. Low interpersonal competence

6. Lack of group decision

7. InapprOpriate supervisory
behavior

8. Lack of Opportunity for
discussing problems

Determinants used by
the Ten Managers

1. Laziness
2. Low intelligence
3. Low wages

4. Lack of self-
motivation

5. Inadequate knowledge

6. Dissatisfaction with
role activities

 

363

determinants. The figure also indicates the determinants
attributed to inadequate performance by the ten managers.

From the standpoint of improving actual role
performance it is important to uncover the actual
determinants of inadequate performance. The determinants
inferred by a manager dictates the type Of transition-
producing mechanism he uses for improving performance.
For example, in the authority-centered pattern the
manager attributed inadequate performance to either
laziness, or low intelligence, or low wages. If he
believed the determinant was laziness, he ordered
the subordinate to change and threaten him to ensure
compliance. If he believed the determinant was low
intelligence, he made his ordering of the subordinate's
behavior more explicit. If he believed the determinant
was low compensation, he raised the compensation.

In the development-centered pattern the manager
attributed inadequate performance to deficiencies in
knowledge or dissatisfaction with work activities. If
he believed the determinant was deficiencies in knowledge,
he attempted to improve performance through correcting

the deficiencies. If he believed the determinant was

364

dissatisfaction with work activities, he tried to make
them more satisfying.

In the freedom-centered control pattern the
manager attributed inadequate performance to the lack
of self-motivation. He attempted to improve performance
through ambiguously pressuring subordinates to change
their behavior.

If the managers had used the models examined
in chapters IV, V and VI, they would have broadened
the sc0pe of determinants they assigned to inadequate
performance and the techniques they used to improve
it. For example, if a set of irrational beliefs
contributed to a subordinate's inadequate performance,
they may have used the rational-emotive model to
improve it. The important question is if the determinants
of behavior pattern U described in the models can be
generalized to inadequate performance. If they can be
generalized, under what conditions would the use of the
various models by the managers increase the performance
of subordinates? These two questions reveal an area

for additional research.

_' I’JM . .h"

 

365

Determining the Conceptual Similarities
g; Behavioral Change Models

Determining the conceptual similarities of
behavioral change models is an area for future research.
Is it possible for behavioral change models to be
conceptually similar even though the variables contained
in them are labelled differently and the range of
behavioral problems they are designed to deal with are
different? If some of the models are conceptually
similar it would be possible to reduce the number of
models.

The process of conceptually comparing can be
illustrated by examining the psychotherapeutic models
analyzed in chapter IV. The three models analyzed
shared in common a general range of behavioral problems;
a patient's reported unhappiness and anxiety. However,
each model assigned different determinants to these
problems which led to the use of different transition-
producing mechanisms for resolving them. All three
model builders claimed their model was effective in
dissipating the shared problems. Given the apparent
differences can they all be right in claiming effectiveness

for their model?

 

366

At a broad conceptual level the models appear
similar. In each model the patient is taught the
therapist's theory of why he is "sick" and how he
can be cured. When he accepts the theory and implements
it he is considered "cure." Conceptually, the
transition-producing mechanism seems to consist of
providing a patient with an authoritative interpretation
of his symptoms and convincing him that he will be
cured if he accepts and implements the interpretation.
In this reSpect the three models seem to be conceptually
similar. Determining the validity of this conceptual
ccamparison is ultimately an experimental issue. For
example, if a controlled experiment was conducted on
the three psychotherapeutic models and it was found
that they were equally effective in changing the patient's
behavior, it might suggest that they were conceptually

Similar.
Eclecticism and Model Building

An important issue raised by the foregoing
analysis is whether the contributions of the behavioral

sciences to management theory and practice will be

 

.1

 

367

eclectic in nature. The models examined in chapters
IV, V and VI tended to emphasize different determinants
of similar problems and prescribed different mechanisms
for coping with them. For example, the rational—
emotive model attributed a patient's symptoms to a

set of irrational beliefs. The prescriptive mechanism CIA;
entailed substituting rational beliefs for irrational

beliefs. On the other hand, the psychoanalytic model ,

 

attributed a patients symptoms to a repressed sexual iwf'
conflict. The prescriptive mechanism entailed bringing
the repressed conflict to the surface.

From an eclectic point of view the important
question is if, in terms of application, behavioral
change models are mutually exclusive. If they are not
mutually exclusive would combining them result in a
"better" model? If changes in both individual and
environmental variables can produce changes in behavior,
under what conditions would a model that combined both
sets of variables be more effective?

Pure individual models and pure environmental
models limit the transition-producing mechanism. The

pure individual model holdsthe environment constant

368

and attempts to adjust the individual to it. It assumes
the problem is with the individual who should be made

to fit into his existing environment. On the other
hand, the pure environmental model holds the individual
constant and attempts to adjust the environment to him.
It assumes the environment should be adjusted to the
individual.

It would seem that if changes in both individual
and environmental variables can produce changes in
behavior a model that combines both might be more
effective under certain conditions. For example,
increasing the need for achievement which is an individual
variable may not always result in changes in actual
achievement. The environment in which the individual
Operates may not present an opportunity for achievement.
Thus to instrument changes in the actual achievement
level of an individual both individual and environmental
variables may have to be manipulated.

Ultimately the possibility of building eclectic
behavioral change models is an experimental issue. The

gxbssibility of combining models can only be determined

369
by attempting to combine them and testing their relative

effectiveness.
Experimental Comparison

In accordance with proposition E.l, since the
behavioral change models examined in Chapters IV, V and “A

VI were different from those used by the ten managers

 

an experiment must be conducted to determine which ones

are most efficient and effective in helping them handle

 

inadequate performance. An experiment is necessary
because it is possible that the change mechanisms used
by the managers may be more efficient and effective

in improving inadequate performance than the change
mechanism analyzed in Chapters IV, V and VI. Experi-
mentation would involve exposing managers to the
behavioral change models contained in the behavioral
sciences. If the models were made Operational and the
managers implemented them, their relative efficiency and
effectiveness in improving inadequate performance could
be compared with the mechanism the managers customarily
used. The models that were most efficient and effective

vuould be the most useful.

370

The general sequence of events in ascertaining
the relationship between the behavioral sciences and
management must begin with the empirical identification
of the range of behavioral problems confronted by
managers. After identifying the range of problems a!

and how the managers cope with them, the behavioral

 

sciences may be examined to see if the knowledge

contained within them might be useful to managers in

I!” u 2 1

Solving their problems. If the knowledge contained

in the behavioral science is different from that
possessed by managers, or was not designed to solve
their behavioral problems, it must be converted and
experimentally compared with the existing practices

of the managers. If experimentally it is demonstrated
that the knowledge is superior to that held by the

managers, it would be useful to the managers.

A PPENDICES

 

APPENDIX A

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVIEW

 

373

This interview is a part of a study I am doing for my
dissertation at the Graduate School of Business at
Michigan State University.

The purpose of the study is essentially threefold

First: To find out the kinds of problems successful
managers have with people they work with and'
how they deal with these sorts of problems.

Second: TO find out how they go about getting the
people they work with to do things for them.

Third: To find out how they go about making changes in
their job and their organization in general.

The reason I am interviewing you is that your position
indicates to me that you are a successful manager.
Because of this I am very much interested in your
Opinions and experience in regards to the things we
will be discussing today. What I will do in our
discussion is ask you some questions bearing on the
three areas I have just mentioned.

Before we begin, I want to stress to you that any
information or Opinions you give me will be treated
as privileged communication. NO one besides us will
ever know what your views and Opinions are. SO I
hope you won't be afraid to tell me what you really
think and feel about the things we will be discussing.
I am sure you realize how important it is for me to
get accurate information about how you really think
and feel about the matters to be discussed.

This (tape recorder) is my traveling secretary. Because
it may be rather distracting for me to take written notes
and, more importantly, because I want to get down what
you have to say as accurately as possible, I would very
much like to record our conversation. I aSsure you that
no one besides me will ever hear this tape. Do you have
any objections to using it?

374

Before we go on, do you have any questions about what
has been said so far?

If you should have any questions as we proceed, please
feel free to ask them.

 

APPENDIX B

THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT

376

I would like to begin by asking you a few questions
about your relationship with the people who work
under you.

1.

What type of work climate have you tried to
maintain with your subordinates?

Information sought: The types of variables
managers considered important in their relation-
ship with their subordinates.

In general, what type of treatment do you think
subordinates expect from their boss?

Information sought: The types of variables
managers consider important in their relationship
with their subordinates.

What is the most frequent problem, if any, that
you have with your subordinates? (If they answer
they do not have any problems with their subordin-
ates, they are to be asked why).

Information sought: The variables managers used to
describe problems with their subordinates.

Do you recall any time in the recent past when you
wanted a subordinate to do something and. you had
difficulty getting him to do it? (If the answer is
affirmative, they are to be asked to describe the
situation and what they did about it).

Information sought: The variables managers use in
describing difficulties with their subordinates and
how they handle such difficulties.

Suppose you wanted a subordinate to do something and
he refused to do it. What might you do about it?

What could you do about it? Have you ever experienced
a situation in the past like this? (If the answer is
affirmative, they are to be asked about what they did).

377

Information sought: The managers' approach to a

(situation that requires them to change the behavior

of the subordinate and how much they stress the use
of authority in such Situations.

Have any of your subordinates ever disagreed with you
about what to do in a given situation? (If the answer
is affirmative, they are to be asked for examples of
disagreements and what they did about them).

Information sought: The managers' approach to
dissagreements with their subordinates.

How do you go about determining whether your subordin-
ates' performance is satisfactory? That is, whether
they are doing their job as well as they can or
whether they are just doing enough to get by?

Information sought: The variables they use for
assessing their subordinates' role performance.

Assuming you found a subordinate whose performance
was not satisfactory, what would you do about it?
Can you remember a recent example? (If the answer
is affirmative, they are to be asked to describe
the example and indicate what they did about it).

Information sought: The variables they use to
change their subordinates' role performance.

In general, what do you think motivates peOple to
perform up to their full capacity rather than to
just do enough to get by?

NOw I would like to change direction and ask you some
questions about your relationship with peOple you have
‘worked under.

1.

In general, how would you describe the type of
relationship you have had with bosses you have
worked for in the past?

378

Information sought: The variables they stress in
their relationship with people in higher authority
positions.

How free were you to carry out your assignments?

Information sought: Their perceived degree of
freedom in their relationship with their superiors.

If you made mistakes were you sometimes afraid to
tell your boss about them? Why, or why not?

Information sought: If they attempted to conceal
mistakes from their superiors and their rationale
for doing so.

If you were unclear about what your boss wanted
you to do, were you sometimes hesitant to ask
him to clarify it? Why, or why not?

Information sought: Their preception of role
ambiguity and how they experienced it.

Have you usually felt that you knew how satisfied
your boss' has. been with your performance?

Information sought: Their perception of ambiguity
in evaluation of their role performance and how
they experienced it.

What thing indicated to you that your boss was
either satisfied or dissatisfied with your work?

Information sought: The variables they use to
determine how well they are performing their role
and whether they should make changes in their
behavior.

10.

379

We have found that at some time or other many
people have had some type of problems with their
bosses and we are interested in the particular
kinds you might have had. WOuld you mind telling
us about a couple of them? How did you handle
them?

Information sought: The problems they encountered
that they though were important and how they dealt
with them.

Did you ever disagree with your bosses? Could you
give me an example? How was the disagreement
handled?

Information sought: How they handled disagreements
with superiors and if, and how, they attempted to
change their behavior.

Did your bosses ever try to get you to do things
differently than you usually did them? Could you
give me some examples? What did they usually do
to get you to do these things?

Information sought: Their perception of whether
and how their superiors attempted to change their
behavior.

We have found that many peOple would like to see
their boss change their behavior in some way. Is
there anything you would like your boss to change?
Are you doing anything to facilitate these changes?
If yes, what? If no, why not?

Information sought: The types of change they would
like to see their superiors make and whether, and
how, they have attempted to facilitate these changes.

Now I would like to change direction again and ask you
some questions about your job.

1.

Would you briefly tell me what your job consists of
as you see it?

380

Information sought: Their conception of their role.

If you could redesign your job so that it would be
most satisfying to you, what would you like to have
changed about it? Have you attempted these changes?
Why or why not?

Information sought: Their perceived dissatisfaction
with their role and how they have attempted to
change it.

Since you have been in your current job have you
made many changes? Which one do you think was
the most significant? Why?

Information sought: Their conception of important
change variables and how they attempted to make
changes.

Let's assume now that you were made president of
this company tomorrow, would there by any changes
you would like to make? If yes, what are some of
them? Do you foresee any problems in getting them
accomplished? Have you ever suggested these changes
to anyone? If no, why not? If yes, to whom? What
was their reactions?

Information sought: Their conception of change,
dissatisfaction with the organization, and the
problems they perceive in making changes.

We recently conducted a study in which we found
that some managers felt that one of the most
important aspects of their job was to search for
areas which need changing, as well as to formulate
new objectives to be achieved.

381

In connection with this, they felt that one

of the most difficult problems they faced was
trying to get other people in their organization
to see the need for the change and to go along
with them in making the needed changes. They
thought that one of the key abilities a manager
must have is the ability to get other people

to change their behavior.

In terms of your experience, what do you think r1.
about this? 4

Why do you think some people resist change?

How do you think managers can go about getting
people to change the ways of doing things?

 

V1

Can you recall any time in the past when you
were faced with a problem like this? What did
you do about it?

Information sought: How important they think
change is in their roles, why they think people
resist it, and how they attempt to COpe with it.

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