

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THE AESTHETIC THEORIES OF ROGER FRY:

A RE-EVALUATION

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Leslie Cavell Garelick

has been accepted towards fulfillment
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Linda O. Stanford

Major professor

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Linda Stanford

THE AESTHETIC THEORIES OF ROGER FRY:

A RE-EVALUATION

By

Leslie Cavell Garelick

A THESIS

Submitted to
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ABSTRACT

THE AESTHETIC THEORIES OF ROGER FRY:
A RE-EVALUATION

By

Leslie Cavell Garelick

Roger Fry is considered one of the foremost formalists of the twentieth century. But for most of his life, Fry was not a formalist, as this thesis attempts to prove. I survey Fry's aesthetic theories from 1900 to 1934. In the early theory (1900-1914), the criterion for artistic success is whether a painting adequately conveys the artist's emotion: thus truth to the imaginative demands of the artist replaces truth to nature. The distinction between the "actual" and "imaginative" life is sharpened during his formalist years (1915-1924); the aesthetic emotion must be a response to form alone. I surveyed important unpublished essays of the twenties and thirties in which Fry rejects the formalist aesthetic. This late aesthetic defines painting's "double nature": plastic design combined with psychological insight. A re-evaluation of Fry's theories may be useful for postmodernist criticism.

Illustration 1. Roger Fry seated in an Omega chair. Photograph taken by Robert Tatlock, c. 1920.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

King's College, Cambridge, holds a number of unpublished manuscripts and personal papers of Roger Fry, the Fry Papers. The late manuscripts have proved essential in establishing Fry's thorough rejection of the formalist aesthetic in the late twenties. I wish to thank Michael Halls, modern archivist at King's, who was entirely accommodating in allowing me to study the Fry Papers during the summer of 1984. Through him and Pamela Diamand (Fry's daughter), I was given permission to quote from the papers. Mrs. Diamand was kind enough to discuss her father with me on a number of occasions in 1984, and to show me her large collection of his paintings, for which I thank her. I also thank Mr. and Mrs. Igor Anrep and the staff at the Tate Gallery Archive in London, for allowing me to inspect their respective collections of papers related to Fry.

I wish to express gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor Linda Stanford, especially for her editorial suggestions. I also thank my committee, Professors Molly Teasdale Smith and Eldon Van Liere for their good advice.

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The Fry Problem

Kenneth Clark has said that "in so far as taste can be changed by one man, it was changed by Roger Fry."[1] This refers to Fry's sponsorship of Post-Impressionism in England. Fry organized the first large-scale London exhibition of the paintings of Gauguin, Van Gogh, and Cezanne, and such artists as learned from them in the years preceding 1910--such as Rouault, Derain, and Matisse.[2] Fry coined the term "Post-Impressionism" in titling this first exhibition Manet and the Post-Impressionists.

Although the art was fiercely derided by many, it immediately influenced progressive British artists, including Wyndham Lewis, Duncan Grant, and Fry himself. The artists were also influenced by Fry's explanation of Post-Impressionist form. The forms had beauty and significance, said Fry, apart from any associations they might have with the actual world. Fry became so interested in formal design that he rarely analyzed a work of art with anything else in mind. This included works by old masters such as Fra Angelico and Rembrandt.

Because of the importance of his work in formal analysis, Fry is best known for the formalist aesthetic which dominated his writings between the years 1915 and 1924. It is widely assumed that Fry was a formalist throughout his mature career, or at least that if he held

any other view, his expression of it was haphazard and subordinate to his interest in pure form. These assumptions are not only problematic; my thesis is that they are clearly false.

Others have contributed to a new understanding of Fry's aesthetics. Frances Spalding's 1980 biography of Fry is helpful as a starting point. Spalding's rigorous presentation of facts, dates, and events in Fry's life first brought to my attention the late aesthetic theory of Fry, propounded between 1926 and his death in 1934. This theory recognizes that apart from purely formal design in the pictorial arts, there exist designs in which representational elements enter into the aesthetic experience proper. Fry refers to these representational elements interchangeably as psychological, emotional, or literary; I follow him in this.

Spalding also discusses the aesthetic theory held by Fry before his introduction to Post-Impressionism, a theory given its fullest expression in his 1909, "An Essay in Aesthetics." Fry was forty-three in 1909, and well into his mature career. Spalding interprets this essay as a failed attempt at a formalist theory; this is not the case, I would argue, since Fry did not seriously take up formalism for another six years. Rather, the essay is a fully formulated explanation of art and of the aesthetic experience, and provides the basis for both his middle and late theories.[3]

In his two-volume Letters of Roger Fry, published in 1972, Denys Sutton mentions Fry's change of mind in the late twenties; he says it is only in 1934 that Fry fully accepts nonformal elements in painting.[4] Sutton, in his introduction, briefly discusses Fry's early

theory and notes, correctly, that it affects Fry's analysis of Post-Impressionism until 1914.[5]

Sutton and Spalding were both concerned with a great many facts about Fry's life, and so do not expand on their opinions regarding his aesthetics. Virginia Woolf, in her biography of Fry, is far more interested in Fry's character and in his influence as a formalist critic to discuss the significance of any theory of his other than formalism. Her discussion of major early and late essays by Fry illuminate Fry's character, rather than his aesthetic predispositions.[6]

I believe the most recent book to deal with Fry's aesthetics at any length is Jacqueline Falkenheim's Roger Fry and the Beginnings of Formalist Art Criticism (dissertation, Yale, 1973, published 1980). Her primary interest is Fry's formalist criticism in its relation to artistic concerns in England during his lifetime.[7] She highlights Fry's formalist writings: "the beginnings of formalist criticism--that language descriptive of the relationship among areas of color, the extension of space, and other structural elements, which avoids making reference to subject matter or to associations with the external world beyond the picture plane."[8] Her interest is typical of general interest in Fry; she only briefly reviews Fry's interest in representational elements in painting from 1909 to 1933. Yet Fry's late theory, she suggests, "may be considered the one most consistent with his feelings about art throughout his life."[9]

Aside from the vast number of articles in which Fry's aesthetic theories are given passing attention, two particular articles discuss at some length the nature of Fry's aesthetics. Both find an interplay

of formal and emotional concerns at the center of Fry's discussions of the pictorial arts. "The Aesthetic Theories of Roger Fry Reconsidered," David Taylor's 1977 work on Fry, acknowledges the interest of most people in Fry's formalist years, which Taylor puts at 1913 to 1925, remarking, however, that "evidence is clearly available that Fry, in his final decade, was motivated by ideas and attitudes quite different from those of his close theoretical association with Clive Bell."[10] Taylor's re-evaluation of Fry is based on "Some Questions in Esthetics," written by Fry in 1926 for his collection of essays entitled Transformations. This fairly late essay shows Fry's abandonment of formalism for a more inclusive theory.

In a 1962 essay, Berel Lang addresses the question to what extent Fry can be considered a formalist. Lang finds "an essential ambivalence in Fry's attitude concerning the degree of 'purity' which he finds in the art work and in the extent to which he actually carries out his formalist program."[11] Rather than being ambivalent, there were long periods in his life when Fry clearly has no interest in a formalist program. Because Lang's essay does not attempt to treat Fry's work with any chronological precision, it fails to clarify the real direction of Fry's thinking on the issue of form and representation.[12] The essay documents enough remarks by Fry to make clear, however, that he was not simply a formalist.

I, too, argue that Roger Fry was not simply a formalist. Proceeding chronologically, I identify three periods in Fry's aesthetic theory, and argue for my interpretation of these periods by presenting quotations from Fry's writings during these periods. Only in his

middle period can Fry be considered a formalist, and even then, the evaluation should be made with reservations. I have attempted merely to present the outlines of Fry's theories, and many considerations have been necessarily left aside.

My analysis of Fry's thought revolves around several essays which most authors have relied on in interpreting Fry's aesthetic: "An Essay in Aesthetics" (1909), "Post-Impressionism" (1911), "The Artist and Psycho-Analysis" (1924), "Some Questions in Esthetics" (1926), and "The Double Nature of Painting" (1933). I have also used certain unpublished essays from the Fry Papers at King's College, Cambridge. I show that in each period of Fry's thought the theories propounded in these essays are applied in other essays which are primarily critical, not aesthetic. All these works reveal what I believe to be a central organizing concept, running through Fry's thought.

For Fry, the work of art is a medium of expression of the artist's emotion. The work is successful if the artist succeeds in communicating, through a unified formal composition, the emotions he or she feels. Fry's understanding of what emotions properly belong to a work of art changes throughout his life. Finally, Fry's constant re-evaluation of his theories, his interest in helping the public to see works of art, and his sensitivity to the artist's purpose lead him to a theory which encompasses and refines his former theories and which, in particular, rejects formalism as inadequate to explain the whole of art and the aesthetic experience.

NOTES--INTRODUCTION

1. Kenneth Clark, introduction to Roger Fry, Last Lectures, Boston, 1962, first published 1939, ix.

2. For information on a smaller exhibition of Post-Impressionist work at Brighton in June of 1910, see Frances Spalding, Roger Fry: Art and Life, London, Toronto, Sydney, New York, 1980, 130.

3. Ibid., 121.

4. Denys Sutton, introduction to Roger Fry, Letters of Roger Fry, 2 vol., London, 1972, 89.

5. Ibid., 40.

6. See her discussions of "Some Questions in Esthetics" and the Last Lectures for proof of Woolf's relative indifference to Fry's nonformalist predispositions in Virginia Woolf, Roger Fry, a Biography, London, 1940, 258-259, 280.

7. Jacqueline V. Falkenheim, Roger Fry and the Beginnings of Formalist Art Criticism, Studies in the Fine Arts: Criticism, No. 8, edited by Donald B. Kuspit, Ann Arbor, 1980, xv, xviii-xix.

8. Ibid., 29.

9. Ibid., 90.

10. David Taylor, "The Aesthetic Theories of Roger Fry Reconsidered," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 36, pt. 1, 1977, 63.

11. Berel Lang, "Significance of Form: The Dilemma of Roger Fry's Aesthetic," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 20, pt. 1, 1962, 171.

12. Ibid., 169, 171. In discussions on both these pages, Lang neglects to clearly separate the various periods of Fry's thought.

CHAPTER I

THE EARLY THEORY, 1902-1909: ART AS EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION

In his unpublished essay "Expressive Representation in the Graphic Arts," written in 1908, Fry states his attitude toward aesthetic theorizing:

> I am myself obliged from time to time to sum up my results in a theory of aesthetics, which I always regard as provisional and as of the nature of a scientific hypothesis, to be held valid until some new phenomenon arises which demands that the terms of the theory shall be revised so as to include it. . . .[1]

This insistence on constant re-examination is admirable in Fry. He maintained this attitude throughout his life and it allowed him to explore widely divergent theories and experiences of art at a time when the representational theory of art was being questioned.[2] The theories which Fry held at one time or another were never fully reasoned; he borrowed ideas from a variety of sources and developed them, at any given time, as a loose system of explanation for his own understanding and feelings about art. As an artist Fry always had in mind a use for his aesthetic theories; the theorizing of Sir Joshua Reynolds was an early ideal of Fry, who in his introduction to an edition of Reynolds' Discourses (1905) writes:[3]

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> The artist can make as little use of the pure aesthetics of professed philosophers as the practical engineer can of the higher mathematics; what he requires is an applied aesthetics,

> and it is rarely indeed that a writer has at once the practical knowledge and the power of generalization requisite to produce any valuable work in this difficult and uncertain science. Reynolds was one of the first, and he remains one of the best, who have attempted it. He keeps, as a rule, close to the point at which the artist must attack the problems of aesthetics, and he succeeds in proportion as he does so. When he endeavours to find support in abstract philosophical principles he is less happy, though he never fails to be ingenious and suggestive. It results from this--from his approaching the subject with the artist rather than the philosopher--that his methods will be found of real value.

This evaluation of Reynolds may will serve as a description of Fry's own work in the area of aesthetics.

The aesthetic theory Fry held throughout the first decade of the century had developed during the time Fry was establishing a reputation as a connoisseur of the old masters (he was curator of paintings and European buyer for the Metropolitan Museum of Art from 1906-1910). He supplemented his living by writing regularly for such journals as the Nation, the Atheneum, the Pilot, and the Burlington Magazine. Fry wrote reviews of contemporary exhibitions, explaining the art of his peers, as well as the art of the masters. Fry was familiar with Impressionist work and had seen and reviewed works by Cezanne and other Post-Impressionists, but had not as yet taken them to heart, when he wrote, in 1909, "An Essay in Aesthetics."

This essay summarizes the direction of Fry's first aesthetic; what I shall refer to as Fry's early theory of the nature of art is a criticism of the theory of the pictorial arts as essentially representational. He believed that the theory of representation in which imitation was the central explanatory concept was inadequate for a complete and fruitful understanding of the graphic arts. In particular,

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such an explanation, Fry felt, must corrupt or leave aside the creative act.[4] Fry continued to hold this particular view throughout his life.

Fry's alternative to the theory of imitation was based on the idea that art is an expression of the artist's emotion. Beauty in art is different from beauty in nature because of the artist's role. "In our reaction to a work of art there is . . . a consciousness of a peculiar sympathy with the man who made this thing in order to arouse precisely the sensation we experience."[5] Following Fry's method of attacking the problems of aesthetics--"close to the point at which the artist must"--this statement emphasizes first, that a work of art is an expression of emotion (loosely equated here with sensation); second, that the artist's expression results in an object with its own force of reality; and third, that the viewer experiences the emotion expressed by the artist.

Fry acknowledges a debt to Tolstoy's 1896 What is Art?, from which Fry takes the notion of "the essential importance in art of the expression of emotions."[6] In explaining his attraction to this idea, Fry wrote in 1920 that Tolstoy had laid aside previous theories of art which centered around the concept of beauty in favor of more useful speculation, wherein one might ask (among other things), "of what kind of emotions is art the expression?"[7] Tolstoy himself allows art to express a great many emotions: humor, courage, voluptuousness, a feeling of quietness or of admiration. Tolstoy:[8]

> To evoke in oneself a feeling one has experienced, and having evoked it in oneself, then, by means of movements, lines, colors, sounds, or forms expressed in words, so to transmit

> that feeling that others may experience the same feeling--
> this is the activity of art.

Throughout the rest of his book, Tolstoy attempts to show that the feelings that good art transmits are those "highest and best" feelings, which morally elevate. Fry rejects this stricture on art, as he had rejected it in Ruskin.

While Tolstoy was clearly a direct influence on Fry regarding emotional expression in the arts, other writers of whom Fry was aware and who represented views commonly held at this time made it possible for Fry to adopt this position. As Frances Spalding has noted, Fry again turns to Reynolds for precedent. Fry, in his introduction to the Discourses, says of Reynolds that his "contention was that art was not a mechanical trick of imitation, but a mode of expression of human experience."[9] Two Americans, George Santayana and Denman Ross, with whose writings Fry was familiar, included the idea of art as an essentially expressive activity in their works. The idea is central to Santayana's The Sense of Beauty, which Fry mentions in his introduction to Reynold's discourses. And in The Theory of Pure Design, published in 1907, Denman Ross states: "The arts are different forms or modes of expression: modes of feeling, modes of thought, modes of action."[10] This basic view of the essence of art is not argued in Ross's book. But that it is firmly stated, seemingly without need of defense, is evidence of its widespread acceptance at the turn of the century; this helps us to understand in what intellectual context Fry was working.

In order to apply this general concept of art as expression to particular works of art, Fry introduces six "elements of design,"

which are the forms in a work of pictorial art: rhythm of line, mass, space, light and shade, color, and the inclined plane. While Fry might have included other elements for consideration in looking at a work of art, his program of dividing up these particular elements for further discussion and perception, is complete.

As we might by now expect, Fry does not introduce these elements of design as sufficient in themselves. Rather, they affect us in certain ways, they arouse certain emotions in us because they stand in relation to certain natural phenomena which arouse similar emotions in us during the course of actual life. Rhythm of line, for example, appeals to sensations of muscular activity, or space to profound judgments surrounding our very physical movement. The "emotional elements of design," says Fry "have this great advantage over poetry, that they can appeal more directly and immediately to the emotional accompaniments of our bare physical existence."[11] He remarks that only with the "presentation of natural appearances" can these elements affect us strongly.[12]

But what begins to look like an admission that art is representation after all is forestalled by Fry. He emphasizes that form in a work of art is ordered according to the demands of the imaginative life of the artist, not according to nature's demands. The artist chooses which aspects of natural form to borrow in constructing a work which conveys an emotional idea of the artist's own invention. No longer is truth to nature the criterion for artistic success, but the adequate expression of the artist's emotional idea. It is crucial to note that Fry doesn't set limits on what is an emotional idea.

And this freedom is what allows him, five years later, to sympathize with Bell's notion that discrete aesthetic emotions are the sole appropriate emotions to be felt in front of a work of art.

By basing his early replacement for the theory of imitation on the distinction between the imaginative life and actual life, Fry provides a partial explanation for why we call only certain objects works of art, and further, why certain emotional reactions are aesthetic while others are not. Noting that unlike our responses to visual phenomena in actual life, when confronted with an art object, which we do not have to react to physically "we <u>see</u> the event much more clearly; see a number of quite interesting but irrelevant things, which in real life could not struggle into our consciousness, bent, as it would be, entirely upon the problem of our appropriate reaction."[13] Thus our instinctive response to run away from a charging bull is completely unnecessary and beside the point if the bull is a painted one.

Fry calls art "the chief organ of the imaginative life."[14] The imaginative life, for Fry, is distinguished not only by a greater clarity of perception, but also by a "greater purity and freedom of its emotion": together with the idea that art is the medium of expressive emotion, this concept of the imaginative life is the vehicle through which Fry identifies the subject matter of aesthetics in this early phase of his development.[15] Kenneth Clark has suggested that the dichotomy between the imaginative and the active life was to remain the foundation of Fry's aesthetic theory throughout his life.[16]

Fry's doctrine of the "emotional elements of design" allows him to make general evaluations of an artist's work within a consistent framework. A work could now be judged according to how successfully its elements evoked the specific feelings the artist had in mind. In a 1902 Athenaeum review of Auguste Breal's Rembrandt: a Critical Essay, Fry applies his doctrine:[17]

> M. Breal hardly allows for the part played in the resulting beauty by those elements of design which he calls factitious. He insists on Rembrandt's study of nature, on his feeling for life, on the intensity of his vision, but he scarcely points out how much in the total result of Rembrandt's rendering of Biblical scenes is due to the deliberate invention and the artful composition of his scenes--composition which, where it is successful, where it really furthers the dramatic idea, is based on the same principles of balance and intentional design as were employed by the Italians whom Rembrandt studied and copied, even though he never imitated them.

Fry, throughout the years in which he held this early theory of the nature of art, organized his comments about pictures around the principle of emotional or expressive design. Not only could he make general evaluations of artists, but also detailed comments on particular parts of their pictures. In what is otherwise a rather vague and ill-written essay, "Art and Religion," (1902) Fry draws our attention to a particularly fine passage in one of Fra Angelico's Annunciations; his reaction to the passage is particularly sensitive and even poetic, making it clear that at this time in his life Fry had no qualms about the value of "non-aesthetic" emotions.[18]

> At once the artist sees in his two figures the opportunity for a subtle balance of line, for that polarity which enters more or less into all beautiful design, while anything like a too rigid symmetry is avoided by the contrast of mood, and therefore gesture, and so of line, between the angel whose rapid flight is brought to its gentle close, and the sudden

> movement of surprise, the start of awakening from reverie to a reality of incredible significance, which characterizes the Virgin's movement.

I have noted that Fry's formulation of Tolstoy's idea emphasizes that the work of art, as an expression of emotion, has its own force of reality. This is to be understood in the sense that it is the art object itself which moves the spectator to a particular emotion, by its particular arrangement of forms. Whether or not the forms themselves are representational, it is their arrangement which determines a particular situation and a particular response. This kind of reality, peculiar to works of art (as Fry will maintain throughout his life) is very close to that which Bernard Berenson ascribes to the work of Giotto and others. In his 1896 Florentine Painters, Berenson describes Giotto's work as "life-enhancing," that is as appealing to our whole being, our senses, nerves, feeling for weightiness and space. Thus we identify with the thing or scene represented, according to Berenson, more completely than we would in real life, yet the appeal is not made to evoke action on our parts but rather to produce in us a feeling of ecstacy, which is the desired result of a work of art.[19]

Life-enhancement is a quality of a work of art, and correspondingly, the viewer who appreciates this quality does so by having what Berenson calls "ideated sensations."[20]

> Ideated sensations . . . are those that exist only in the imagination, and are produced by the capacity of the object to make us realize its entity and live its life. In the visual arts this capacity is manifested primarily and fundamentally through varieties of imagined sensations of contact and their multiple implications; and through the equally

> imagined sensations of barometric, thermometric, visceral, and above all muscular alterations, supposed to be taking place in the objects represented.

When an artist makes use of his material this way, he has created "form" in the Berensonian sense.[21] Although, as Spalding has pointed out, Fry in 1908 wrote to Berenson that he was looking at art "more psychologically, less physiologically" than was Berenson, yet the basic understanding of the relation of expressive artistic form to the natural world is shared by Fry and Berenson and it seems that Fry borrowed from Berenson the idea that specific forms evoke specific reactions because of this relation.

Fry was a close friend of Berenson at this time, and knew his writings intimately.[22] Some of the most interesting of Berenson's ideas, for Fry's purposes, were his concepts of material and spiritual significance. It is by grasping the significant in an object and expressing that significance in form that an artist produces a work that is life-enhancing. In discussing Giotto's Arena chapel frescoes, Berenson remarks:[23]

> "What are the significant traits," he seems to have asked himself, "in the appearance and action of a person under the specific domination of one of these vices? Let me paint the person with these traits, and I shall have a figure that perforce must call up the vice in question." So he paints "Inconstancy" as a woman with a blank face, her arms held out aimlessly, her torso falling backwards, her feet on the side of the wheel. It makes one giddy to look at her.

In choosing to portray just those character traits, as they manifest themselves visibly, those which most clearly define a certain sort of individual, Giotto has, in Berenson's terms, isolated the spiritually significant.

This notion is closely related to Berenson's notion of the "materially significant." What is conveyed in this case is not the spiritual aspect of things, but their material aspect. According to Berenson, an "exemplification of his (Giotto's) sense for the significant is furnished by his treatment of action and movement. The grouping, the gestures never fail to be just as will most rapidly convey the meaning. So with the significant line, the significant light and shade, the significant look up or down, and the significant gesture . . . Giotto conveys a complete sense of motion."[24] Later in the text Berenson elaborates his notion of significance, in explaining what the artist achieves in his attempt to render movement;[25]

> making us realize it as we never can actually, he gives us a heightened sense of capacity, and whatever is in the actuality enjoyable, he allows us to enjoy at our leisure. In words already familiar to us, he extracts the significance of movements, just as, in rendering tactile values, the artist extracts the corporeal significance of objects."

Thus Berenson suggests that Giotto knows what is significant insofar as he knows what will most appropriately convey the idea he wishes to express. Giotto's forms are chosen because they are significant--in the everyday sense of the word.

Berenson's definition of significance, while maintaining the link with meaning external to (though evoked by) the forms themselves, nevertheless directs one to the notion of a kind of reality in art which is in an important sense more vivid than actual reality. It also directs one to the artist's choice of form to serve an end and gives precedent for the use of a notion of significance which centers itself on form.

While Fry rarely uses the word "significant" before 1910, his early theory of art makes constant reference to the Berensonian sense of the word in insisting that the artist chooses his elements of design for a particular purpose, to create a particular effect. I suggest that Fry continues to use this idea throughout his aesthetic writings; during the period between 1915 and 1920 Fry develops his "middle" theory of the nature of art, in which Berenson's idea is transformed into the idea of "significant form." Fry develops "significant form" with Clive Bell, as will be discussed in Chapters II and III.

While Fry introduces particular emotional elements of design to be found in the graphic arts, he considers it essential that his aesthetic cover all the arts. He will maintain this concern through his career, but it is especially clear in his early theory. Fry gave a series of (unpublished) lectures in New York and London during his tenure at the Metropolitan. Based on the ideas in "An Essay in Aesthetics," the purpose of these lectures is to divide all of art into four categories: Epic, Comedic, Lyric, and Dramatic. Fry's explanation of these categories, discussed briefly by Spalding from her perusal of the Fry Papers at Cambridge, indicates how firmly established was his belief that art is an expression of emotion. Fry developed these categories to explain the various kinds of emotions produced by various paintings. "The epic artist," he writes, "watches the procession and recalls it for the wonder, amazement and delight of his kindred."[26] The comedic artist conveys the emotions of mundane experience with satire, irony, and wit; the lyric conveys

confessions of the soul, and finally, a dramatic artist conveys emotions related to the most personal experience of the individual (see Illustration 2).[27]

Acknowledging that his scheme is derived directly from an analogy with poetry, Fry defends himself, noting that "the emotions which are expressed by poetry, by music and by painting are of the same nature and that therefore these modes hold good for all the arts."[28] For Fry, the example of poetry is particularly helpful "because there the direction of the emotional condition is much more definite than in the other arts and, therefore, in that art much greater progress has been made in classification."[29]

In his 1964 essay on Fry, Quentin Bell remarked that the New English Art Club, with which Fry was affiliated between 1891 and 1908, was "very much devoted to the idea of impersonality" in art.[30] A stance taken from Whistler, this refusal to accept deeper emotional significance in painting was unacceptable to Fry. Fry's own interpretation of Velasquez' work, at this time, was equally unacceptable to the club:[31]

> I advance this with great diffidence--I know that it is rank heresy to attribute any conscious literary idea to any work of Velasquez. It is a blow upon the reputation of the one old master who is supposed to be free from the taint of thought and innocent of the crime of poetical imagination.

Spalding considers it a weakness in Fry's argument, in "An Essay in Aesthetics," that "while stressing that one should appreciate a work first for its formal qualities, he as yet refuses to adopt a purely formalist stance: he cannot deny either the need to be aware of the artist's purpose, nor the psychological appeal of subject



Illustration 2. Roger Fry: The Pool, Exh. 1899. Oil on canvas, 42 x 68.5 cm. Private Collection.

matter."[32] The implication that Fry intends his essay to be an argument for formalism is, I maintain, wrong-headed.

Fry's introduction of "emotional elements of design" as an organizing concept was part of a continuous task throughout his life to provide a vocabulary for discussion of the visual arts. Fry had been introduced to such an attempt by Ross, whose discussion of formal aspects of the graphic arts is particularly exact. Fry's later contributions to this effort will be discussed in Chapters III and IV.

The work of Ross is also important in the context of Roger Fry's understanding of form.[33] In The Theory of Pure Design Ross discusses painting and drawing, distinguishing in their expression two modes: "the mode of Pure Design and the mode of Representation." Ross:[34]

> By Pure Design I mean simply Order, that is to say, Harmony, Balance, and Rhythm, in lines and spots of paint, in tones, measures, and shapes. . . . In Representation we are no longer dealing, as in Pure Design, with meaningless terms. . . . The attention must be directed to what is important, away from what is unimportant. Objects, people, and things represented must be brought out and emphasized or suppressed and subordinated, according to the Idea or Truth which the artist wishes to express.

Although Ross's book focuses on Pure Design, he claims that Pure Design and Representation can be effectively combined.[35] The book includes diagrams, simple line drawings, which illustrate his remarks on Harmony, Balance, and Symmetry. Ross seems to admit in more than one example that our appreciation of Design is "facilitated by an association of ideas."[36] It is unclear in these cases whether the

Design is automatically Representational rather than Pure, since the author mentions such associations as asides.

Another, more well-known writer on art at the turn of the century, with whose writings Fry was also familiar, was James Abbott McNeill Whistler. That Fry was wholly aware of Whistler's interest in form for its own sake is evident (together with Fry's reaction to this idea) in a 1903 Athenaeum obituary written by Fry on "Mr. Whistler." I quote Fry at length to show his understanding of Whistler and his attitude toward the question of form and content at this date.[37]

> Along with sentimentality, which he rightly saw was the bane of our age and country, he denounced all sentiment, all expression of mood in art, until he arrived at the astounding theory, enunciated in his 'Ten o'Clock,' that pictorial art consists in the making of agreeable patterns, without taking account of the meaning for the imagination of the objects represented by them--that, indeed, the recognition of the objects was not part of the game. The forms presented were to have no meaning beyond their pure sensual quality, and each patch of colour was to be like a single musical note, by grouping which a symphony, as he himself called it could be made. The fallacy of the theory lay in its overlooking the vast difference in their effects on the imagination and feelings beween groups of meaningless colour-patches and rhythmical groups of inarticulate sounds. As a protest it was, or might have been valuable, since it emphasized that side of art which, when once realistic representation is attainable, tends to be lost sight of; but as a working theory for an artist of extraordinary gifts it was unfortunate, since it cut away at a blow all those methods of appeal which depend on our complex relations to human beings and nature; it destroyed the humanity of art. What Mr. Whistler could not believe is yet a truth which the history of art impresses, namely, that sight is rendered keener and more discriminating by passionate feeling--that the coldly abstract sensual vision which he inculcated is, in the long run, damaging to the vision itself, while the poetical vision increases the mere power of sight.

Fry's early aesthetic theory replaces a long standing theory that the criterion for success in the pictorial arts is accuracy of representation. Fry objected to this theory because it ignored the artist's activity as a creator of expressive emotional designs, and because it relegated pictorial art to the statue of a reflection of reality.

For Fry, a work of art has a reality of its own, independent of the whims of nature and human instinct. It is independent in the sense that the artist orders the forms in a work of art according to his or her own imaginative demands. These forms, which Fry calls "emotional elements of design," arouse emotions in the viewer which, although related to the emotions of actual life, are distinct from those emotions, since the "aesthetic emotions" are appreciated in and for themselves. In contrast, the emotions of actual life are appreciated "by the standard of resultant action."[38] Tolstoy, Berenson, and Reynolds are important influences on Fry in his first attempt to establish an aesthetic theory, and many of the ideas that Fry garners from these authors remain important in his later work.

NOTES--CHAPTER I

1. Roger Fry, Fry Papers, King's College Cambridge, manuscript "Expressive Representation in the Graphic Arts."

2. See Roger Fry, "Retrospect," in Vision and Design, 1st American ed., London and New York, 1924, 284.

3. Sir Joshua Reynolds, Kr., Discourses Delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy, with introduction and notes by Roger Fry, London, 1905, x, xi.

4. Roger Fry, "An Essay in Aesthetics," in Vision and Design, 17, 21-22.

5. Ibid., 30.

6. Leo Tolstoy, What is Art?, translated by Almyer Maude, Indianapolis, New York, 1960, 27. 1st ed. 1896.

7. Fry, "Retrospect," 293.

8. Tolstoy, What is Art?, 51.

9. Frances Spalding, Roger Fry: Art and Life, London, Toronto, Sydney, New York, 1980, 87. From the Introduction to Discourses, x.

10. Denman Ross, The Theory of Pure Design: Harmony, Balance, Rhythm, with illustrations and diagrams. New York, 1933, 4. First published 1907.

11. Fry, "An Essay in Aesthetics," 35.

12. Ibid.

13. Fry, "Essay in Aesthetics," 15.

14. Ibid., 24.

15. Ibid.

16. Kenneth Clark, Last Lectures, xiv.

17. Roger Fry, "Fine Arts," Anthenaeum, 16 Aug. 1902, 229.

18. Roger Fry, "Art and Religion," Living Age, 14 June 1902, 654.

19. Bernard Berenson, Aesthetics and History, 1948, 67-68.

20. Ibid., 74.

21. Ibid., 71.

22. Spalding, Art and Life, 67-69, 109; Sutton, Letters, 293, 303.

23. Bernard Berenson, Florentine Painters, in The Italian Painters of the Renaissance, New York, 1907, 45-46. First ed. 1896.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., Berenson's emphasis, 59.

26. Roger Fry, Art and Life, 110, from Fry Papers.

27. Ibid.

28. Roger Fry, "New York Lectures," Fry Papers, conclusion.

29. Ibid.

30. Quentin Bell, Vision and Design--The Life, Work and Influence of Roger Fry,London, 1966, 7. Philip Troutman also contributes an essay to this catalog. See also Spalding, Art and Life, 46, 11.

31. Bell, The Life, Work and Influence, 7.

32. Spalding, Art and Life, 121.

33. Ibid., 85.

34. Ross, Pure Design, 5 and 7.

35. Ibid., 8.

36. Ibid., 60-61, 110.

37. Fry, "Mr. Whistler," Athenaeum, July 25, 1903, 133.

38. Fry, "Essay in Aesthetics," 27.

CHAPTER II

THE EARLY THEORY APPLIED, 1910-1914: POST-IMPRESSIONISM

We have seen that during the first decade of the century, the content of Fry's aesthetic theory was influenced by philosophers and connoisseurs of art. Fry's theory was to be practical. It allowed Fry to explain the emotions he felt in looking at works of art and to categorize the kinds of pictures which produced these emotions. He emphasized the imaginative, communicative effort of the artist in creating "expressive form." Between 1910 and 1915 Fry was to continue interpreting art in terms of expressive form. And between 1915 and 1920 he turned his attention more directly to the forms themselves and to those emotions which are aroused solely through the relations of form, and not through psychological or literary associations.

Throughout this decade, 1910-20, the major influence on Fry's aesthetic theory does not come from literature, but from a new acknowledged movement in the visual arts, which Fry called "Post-Impressionism." Fry also turned, at various times, to remarks by the artists themselves.

As Fry would argue in several articles written between 1910 and 1934, art critics and aestheticians have, traditionally, been intellectuals who discuss visual art as an offshoot of their literary interest, attempting to define the visual arts on the model of

literature. Fry attempts, increasingly during the years 1910-1920, to bring to art theory the consciousness of the artist, whose model is visual. That artists should have an important say in how art should be defined lent itself to analysis which emphasized the visual and the technical, an approach which set a standard for modernist criticism. This visual approach allows Fry to emphasize the individuality of the artist's intentions or purposes, particularly the Post-Impressionist's, and confirms the practical direction of his theory, directed as it is toward careful looking.

One of the artists to whom Fry listened was Maurice Denis. Fry benefited from Denis' understanding of the art of Cézanne, in particular as expressed in a two-part article which Fry himself translated for publication in the Burlington Magazine, January and February, 1910. For Denis, as for Fry, the art object is a result of the artist's response to his environment; meaning is expressed through form, according to Denis' symbolist interpretation.[1] But what will become particularly important for Fry later in the decade is the idea that an artist must pay the closest attention to his or her medium's "intrinsic properties." Denis states that, "just as the writer determined to owe the whole expression of his poem to what is, except for idea and subject, the pure domain of literature--sonority of words, rhythm of phrase, elasticity of syntax--the painter (Cézanne) has been a painter before everything."[2] Denis' interpretation of Cézanne's work, which is not purely formalist but which does emphasize form, did not at first dominate Fry's conception of Cezanne or the Post-Impressionists in general.

Fry's practical aesthetic, in this decade between 1910 and 1920, cannot be separated from his attempt to gain acceptance for Post-Impressionism in England. Fry was at all times during his life more interested in bringing a clear understanding of art to the general public than in discovering sophisticated truths which could only interest those whose profession it is to think about art.

The first full-scale Post-Impressionist exhibition to be held in England, called Manet and the Post-Impressionists, was organized by Fry and ran from November 8, 1910, to January 15, 1911, at the Grafton Gallery in London. In her biography of Fry, Spalding says that Fry at first liked the term "Expressionists" for these painters, because of the strong expressive design which characterized their work.[3] For one reason or another, this label was finally rejected. The show centered on works of Cézanne, Van Gogh, and Gauguin, and included such works as Manet's Un Bar aux Folies-Bergères, Matisse's Femme aux Yeux Verts, Cézanne's La Vieille au Chapelet, and Van Gogh's Dr. Gachet.[4]

Of the exhibition, Clive Bell was to recall: "I do not suppose there were fifty people in England who had looked at pictures by Matisse or Picasso, but all true lovers of art knew instinctively that they hated them."[5] One indignant citizen expressed in the Nation his "infinite sadness that Art should be dragged so low. I venture to think," he adds, "that neither painters nor the public will listen to the cobwebs of words which may be put together in praise of the product of diseased minds, for, let us hope, the great mass of the

people are as yet sane."[6] Virginia Woolf, in her biography of Fry, mentions a great number of prominent Britains who expressed a similar outraged reaction, including Sir William Richmond, D. S. MacCall, Henry Holiday, Wilfrid Blunt, and Henry Tonks.[7] Fry, himself, wrote in a number of places that the same people to whom he had been lecturing on Greek and Renaissance art--the "cultured" upper middle class in England--who had seemed to have an appreciation for art--now rejected the great works of Post-Impressionism. Fry understood this rejection as based on snobbery--there had been a great many things to know about, for instance, Italian art which could be resorted to if one had failed to see the works. This was not the case with a still life by Cézanne. "One could feel fairly sure," wrote Fry, "that one's maid could not rival one in the former case, but might by a mere haphazard gift of Providence surpass one in the second."[8] The upper classes could not tolerate an art as accessible to their servants as it was to themselves. While Fry did not have a sympathetic audience in the upper classes, his remarks on the nature of the new art were enthusiastically accepted by young English artists; Fry had a regular following in this quarter.[9] Artists had a use for Fry's critical theory, his applied aesthetic; it gave them the freedom to explore their mediums' "intrinsic properties." And it was in the assessment of Post-Impressionist art that Fry's gift for getting people to look carefully was most strongly challenged.

In applying his aesthetic theory to Post-Impressionist art, Fry acted as a true critic. H. Gene Blocker in his 1975 article, "The Oilcan Theory of Criticism," argues, following Sibley, Isenberg,

Hungerford, and Hampshire, that a critic's task is not to prove the truth of something. Rather, she or he attempts "to get us to see the work of art in a certain way, to get us into position to see for ourselves what is being claimed for it."[10] Blocker suggests that Fry did just this in his remarks to the British public on Post-Impressionism. Fry's strategy, according to Blocker, was two-fold. First, Fry separated art from life, defining art by its essentially formal qualities and defining life by its moral and representational interests. This, Blocker says, amounted to giving the public "a simple and value-laden choice between art and non-art."[11] Then, Fry explained the new art as a return to the strong design tradition of past art (particularly that of the Italian Quattrocento), thus giving the new art its place in tradition and, with that, a claim to respectibility and comprehensibility.[12]

Blocker's interpretation better fits Fry's more formalist writings. These do not appear until after 1914. In 1910, at the beginning of the ten-year period in which Fry had the most to say about Post-Impressionism, Fry's remarks revolve around the same point he wished to make clear in his early theory--that creative, expressive design was the primary activity of the artist. Cézanne is the great master of the new movement. Fry writes in the December 3, 1910, Nation that it was Cezanne "who discovered by some mysterious process the way out of the cul-de-sac into which the pursuit of naturalism à outrance had led art."[13] His assessment of artists, such as Matisse and Van Gogh, by the emotional qualities of their work shows

Fry's interest at this time in a nonformal analysis. And Fry's analysis of Çezanne is largely nonformal.[14]

> When Cezanne turns to the human form he becomes, being of a supremely classical temperament, not indeed a deeply psychological painter, but one who seizes individual character in its broad, static outlines. His portrait of his wife has, to my mind, the great monumental quality of early art, of Piero della Francesca or Mantegna. It has the self-contained inner life, that resistance and assurance that belong to a real image, not to a mere reflection of some more insistent reality.

Fry's continued interest in finding a way to replace the theory of imitation becomes especially clear in an answer to the critics of the exhibition, when he replies to Henry Holiday's criticism of one of Cézanne's Bathers. Holiday had objected that beyond the bare recognizability as human figures, Cézanne's bathers "were as nearly formless as possible--feeble and flabby. . . . I have sometimes seen bathers," he says, "but not being a Post-Impressionist, I failed to see thick black lines round their limbs."[15] Fry replies by pointing out "unnatural linear conventions" in a drawing of the Virgin and Child by Raphael, noting that Holiday "forgets that Art uses the representation of nature as a means to expression, but that representation is not its end and cannot be made a canon of criticism."[16] Fry ends the defense with a similarly strong statement as to the "main achievement" of the Post-Impressionists: "they have recognized that the forms which are most impressive to the imagination are not necessarily those which recall objects of actual life most clearly to the mind."[17] Fry makes a bolder statement in an interview in a few years later, iterating this theme: "Art," he says, "is significant deformity."[18]

Fry's writing in this period is beautifully and insightfully done and his passion for this new art is profound. A lecture given by Fry at the end of the first Post-Impressionist exhibition, published in the Fortnightly Review, is particularly eloquent. Fry makes two main points: first, that a certain amount of distortion of natural appearances is necessary in order that the picture conform to the imaginative demands of the artist. But secondly, "a certain amount of naturalism, of likeness to the actual appearance of things is necessary, in order to evoke in the spectator's mind the appropriate associated ideas."[19] The degree of distortion depends entirely on what the artist wishes to express. Fry applies this idea further in categorizing types of subjects in the graphic arts.[20]

> And I think we may say this, that those sentiments and emotions which centre around the trivialities of ordinary life --that kind of art which corresponds to the comedy of manners in literature--will require a larger dose of actuality, will have to be very precise and detailed in its naturalism: but those feelings which belong to the deepest and most universal parts of our nature are likely to be actually disturbed or put off by anything like literal exactitude to actual appearance.

As an example of the hazards of literal exactness, Fry cites William Blake as an example of an artist whose deeper feelings are unsuccessfully expressed when he makes his greatest efforts at skillful representation. It becomes clear that the "deepest and most universal" emotions Fry is referring to are spiritual rather than merely formal. Fry believes, at this time in his life, that "their fitness to appeal to the imaginative and contemplative life" can be a proper canon of criticism.

It is also in this article that Fry makes one of his first "formalist" statements of the sort which, taken out of context and made to be representative of Fry's thought as a whole, has misled later critics and historians. "There is no immediately obvious reason why the artist should represent actual things at all, why he should not have a music of line and colour. Such a music he undoubtedly has, and it forms the most essential part of his appeal."[21] Note that Fry hasn't called formal qualities the only essential part of the appeal of art. Moreover, in this same paragraph, Fry goes on to say that the artist has "a second string to his bow," his ability to call up images of the visible world. For example, Fry has no qualms about discussing Leonardo's use of line alongside that of Matisse, remarking on the importance of line in Leonardo's work as an indicator of character and mood. Thus it is clear that Fry is not committing himself to a pure formalism. Rather, formal and emotional demands must be balanced so that a work of art contains elements which are there to satisfy the imaginative expression of the artist.

Admitting the difficulty, if not impossibility, of finding laws to govern this balance, Fry, nevertheless, attempts to point out the direction in which to look by reiterating his notion of the independent reality of a work of art. Art and its counterpart, the imaginative life, have a "reality" which must be distinguished from the "actuality" of the external world. The latter must not be allowed to interfere with the former, according to Fry.[22] Thus not all emotional expression is acceptable; this is what gives Fry's theory

direction, narrowing it down so that not everything can be called a work of art. The test of this theory, that formal and emotional elements are balanced to produce a work of art with its own reality, rests on the viewer's ability to detect the balance. And, of course, it is Fry's intention at all times to sharpen the viewer's sensibility. To do so, Fry uses his own sensibility. As Virginia Woolf writes:

> Undoubtedly he wakes the eyes; and then begins what is in its way as exciting as the analysis by a master novelist of the human passions--the analysis of our sensations. It is as if a great magnifying-glass were laid over the picture. He elucidates, he defines. And as the colours emerge and the structure, learning begins easily and unconsciously releases its stores. He recalls other pictures--one in Rome, another in Pekin; he is reminded of a Matisse or a Picasso seen the other day in Paris. So the tradition, the submerged but underlying connection is revealed.[23]

Fry considers Post-Impressionism itself a broad enough movement to allow total abstraction on the one hand and on the other the expression of "what is most poignant and moving in contemporary life."[24] He states this in his essay "The French Group," written for the catalog of the Second Post-Impressionist Exhibition, held from October 5 to December 31, 1912. Here again Fry makes a statement which, taken out of context, might suggest a strict formalism: ". . . In so far as the artist relies on the associated ideas of the objects which he represents, his work is not completely free and pure, since romantic associations imply at least an imagined practical activity."[25] The remark seems to imply that art really should be free and pure and not allow the influence of "associated ideas." However, what Fry objects to again is that a work of art <u>rely on</u> associated ideas, rather than rely on a balance of form and associated ideas.

"Classical" art, as Fry defines it (following Maurice Denis), maintains such a balance, where "Romantic" art does not.[26] The latter, Fry suggests, loses its appeal more quickly, since it adds no new, imaginative, or contemplative factor to our experience. Classical art, on the other hand, "communicates a new and otherwise unattainable experience."[27]

An example of such a "classical" artist, for Fry, is Henri Matisse. In a late 1912 article, Fry points out that on the one hand, Matisse's art is "aloof, singularly withdrawn from the immediate issues and passions of life," while on the other hand producing a mood of serenity and repose.[28] Fry recognizes that Matisse hasn't the same need of representational or specific emotional meaning as do so many works of Giotto, Caravaggio, David, or any number of history painters. Matisse is more interested in distorting visual appearances, but in recognizing this, Fry does not, even by late 1912, deprive Matisse's work of a definite emotional element, a mood dependent on his use of line and color.

In describing Matisse's 1909 Dance (see Illustration 3), Fry associates the term "significance" with form:[29]

> In order that each form may have its full significance in the whole, may hold its own in the equilibrium of all forms, it must be as ample and as simple as possible. It is because he (Matisse) has followed out this scheme so fearlessly that his designs have their singular compelling power.

Fry's analysis of Matisse is not a formalist one. How then are we to understand his use of the notion of "significant" form at this time? This is best answered by comparing what Fry says with what Clive Bell says about significant form.



Illustration 3. Henry Matisse: The Dance (First Version), early 1909. Oil on canvas, 260 x 390 cm. New York, Museum of Modern Art, Gift of Nelson A. Rockefeller in honour of Alfred H. Barr, Jr.

The friendship and mutual intellectual influence of Fry and Bell is well known. Arnold Isenberg has remarked that "if we were asked who the leading formalists were, some would say Bell and Fry while others would say Fry and Bell."[30] It has been widely assumed that Roger Fry was a strict formalist, sharing with Clive Bell the theory that the essence of art is "significant form." We have seen that in his early theory and at the beginning of his middle theory, such an estimation of Fry is inaccurate. Bell intended the theory of significant form, as he wrote in 1913, to "explain the whole of my aesthetic experience and suggest a solution of every problem."[31] Bell attempts such an explanation in Art, first published in 1914. In his introduction Bell remarks that after innumerable conversations with Fry, the two differ profoundly about aesthetics; Fry, says Bell, was habitually challenging Bell's generalizations with particular examples of works of art which seemed not to fit Bell's thesis.[32] Later, writing of Fry in his 1956 Old Friends: Personal Recollections, Bell says, "He never quite swallowed my impetuous doctrine--Significant Form first and last, alone and all the time; he knew too much, and such raw morsels stuck in his scientific throat. He came near swallowing it once; but always he was trying to extend his theory to cover new difficulties. . . ."[33] The theory, which explained the whole of Bell's aesthetic experience, could not explain the whole of Fry's.

Although several authors have suggested that Fry was not the strict formalist he is popularly taken to be, none that I know of his carefully documented this claim. I hope to show that Fry at no point thought that significant form alone could account for what is essential

in art. Berel Lang, in the 1964 article "Significance or Form: The Dilemma of Roger Fry's Aesthetic" says, ". . . even accepting formalism as the dominant tendency of Fry's position, we must be continually brought up short by the knowledge that he never commits himself to its unequivocally."[34] But, against Lang, who suggests that the closest Fry comes to strict formalism is in his 1926 publication Transformations, I argue that it is between the years 1915 and 1920 that Fry's formalism is strongest.

In 1914 Fry still had qualms about formalism--in particular about the power of significant form to explain the whole of art. Before clarifying Fry's qualms, one might discuss what it was that Fry and Bell meant by this term. I would note that Bell is not defining the word "significant," rather one is to understand "significant" in the ordinary sense: the "important, interesting or appropriate quality of a thing." I suggest that Fry, as well as Bell, expects us to understand the term "significant" in the normal, mundane way. The term "significant form" was, after all, not meant to mystify, but to clarify.

The word "significant" suggests an effect of form, of some forms, which sets them apart from others. I suggest an interpretation of Fry's use of "significant" which keeps to the general sense of the word and which one might note has a clear connection with Berenson's use of the word. Fry offers a definition of significant form in his 1914 review of Clive Bell's Art, in discussing what is common and peculiar to all art: ". . . significant form, that is to say, forms related to one another in a particular manner, which is

always the outcome of their relation to x (where x is anything that is not of itself form)."[35] This statement in itself suggests how far Fry was in 1914 from being a strict formalist. Again: ". . . in all art there is a fusion of something with form in order that form may become significant."[36] Fry confesses that he cannot say what this "something" is which fuses with form--Bell, himself, suggests that certain forms are significant because they express emotions (he means formal emotions) felt by the artist.[37] As an example of this, Bell suggests that a copy of a great work of art, however exact, has not the beauty or the significant form of the original because what was in the mind of the creator was not shared by the copyist. Fry does not, in this review, address such a possibility, though it is hinted at in other writings of the period. Here, he leaves the "other ingredient," "x" in a work of art totally unspecified, except to required that x "is not of itself form."

Lang argues that Fry, himself, considers the artist's expression of an idea essential to significance of form, following Fry's remarks in "An Essay in Aesthetics": "I conceived early the form of the work of art to be its most essential quality, but I believed this form to be the direct outcome of an apprehension of some emotion of actual life by the artist."[38] "Significant form on that account," writes Lang,

> was significant because it conveyed to the perceiver the emotions of the artist who, if the art work was successful, both had felt deeply and had found a suitable vehicle in which to embody his feelings.[39]

Lang is not correct in attributing to Fry a concept of significant form in his 1909 "Essay in Aesthetics." Before the discussions between Fry and Bell in 1910, there simple was not a notion of significant form. Fry had earlier taken for granted the necessity, for the artist, of working with form, on the one hand, and a governing nonformal idea on the other. He had not formulated a term to denote this. Yet it may be correct to say that in 1914 Fry understood significant form in the way Lang suggests. Moreover, as early as 1911, Fry ties "significant form" to his theory of imaginative expression.[40] Fry is writing of the importance of Cézanne:[41]

> Working along the lines of Impressionist investigation with unexampled fervour and intensity, he seems, as it were, to have touched a hidden spring whereby the whole structure of Impressionist design broke down, and a new world of significant and expressive form became apparent. It is that discovery of Cézanne's that has recovered for modern art a whole lost language of form and colour. Again and again attempts have been made by artists to regain this freedom of imaginative appeal, but the attempts have been hitherto tainted by archaism. Now at last artists can use with perfect sincerity means of expression which have been denied them ever since the Renaissance. And this is not isolated phenomenon confined to the little world of professional painters; it is one of many expressions of a great change in our attitude to life. We have passed in our generation through what looks like the crest of a long progression in human thought, one in which the scientific or mechanical view of the universe was exploited for all its possibilities. How vast, and on the whole how desirable those possibilities are is undeniable, but this effort has tended to blind our eyes to other realities; the realities of our spiritual nature and the justice of our demand for its gratification. Art has suffered in this process, since art, like religion, appeals to the non-mechanical parts of our nature, to what in us is rhythmic and vital. It seems to me, therefore, impossible to exaggerate the importance of this movement in art, which is destined to make the sculptor's and painter's endeavour once more conterminous with the whole range of human inspiration and desire.

This is Fry's aspiration for Post-Impressionism in 1911--far from the Modernist understanding of the movement, which centers around the use of form for its own sake.

NOTES--CHAPTER II

1. Fry acknowledges a debt to Denis and other artists in "The Double Nature of Painting," Apollo, 89, 1969, 365; for Denis' views, see Maurice Denis, "Cézanne," Burlington Magazine, 16, 1910, 275. The article first appeared in L'Occident, September, 1907.

2. Ibid., 214.

3. Spalding, Art and Life, 133.

4. Ibid.; Clive Bell, "How England Met Modern Art," Art News, October, 1950, 24-27, 61, describes this exhibition and later ones.

5. Ibid., 24.

6. Robert Morley, Letter to the Editor, Nation, December 3, 1910, 406.

7. Woolf, Roger Fry, 155-157, 168, 186.

8. Fry, "Retrospect," 291.

9. Howard Hannay, Roger Fry and Other Essays, London, 1937, 15-16; Woolf, Roger Fry, 167.

10. H. Gene Blocker, "The Oilcan Theory of Criticism," Journal of Aesthetic Education, 9, pt. 4, 1975, 22.

11. Ibid., 25.

12. Ibid., 26.

13. Roger Fry, "The Post-Impressionists--II," Nation, December 3, 1910, 402.

14. Ibid.

15. Henry Holiday, letter to the Editor, Nation, December 24, 1910, 539.

16. Roger Fry, "A Postscript on Post-Impressionism," Nation, December 24, 1910, 536.

17. Ibid., 537.

18. In Virginia Woolf, Roger Fry, 195.

19. Roger Fry, "Post Impressionism," Fortnightly Review, 95, 1911, 860.

20. Ibid., 861.

21. Ibid., 862.

22. Ibid., 864.

23. Woolf, Roger Fry, 227.

24. Roger Fry, "The French Group," Catalogue of the Second Post-Impressionist Exhibition, London, 1912, 16.

25. Ibid.

26. Denis, "Cézanne," 208, 213.

27. Fry, "The French Group," 17.

28. Roger Fry, "The Grafton Gallery: An Apologia," Nation, November 9, 1912, 250-251.

29. Ibid., 250.

30. Arnold Isenberg, "Formalism," Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism, edit. by William Callaghan, et al., Chicago, London, 1973, 23.

31. Clive Bell, Art, New York, 1981, 6. First published in 1914.

32. Ibid., 8-9.

33. Clive Bell, Old Friends: Personal Recollections, New York, 1957, 73. First published 1956.

34. Lang, "Significance or Form," 173.

35. Roger Fry, "A New Theory of Art," Nation, March 7, 1914, 938.

36. Ibid.

37. Bell, Art, 19, 22, 28.

38. Fry, "Retrospect," 294.

39. Lang, "Significance or Form," 173.

40. Fry, "Post Impressionism," 867.

41. Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE MIDDLE THEORY, 1915-1924: FORMALISM

Fry had, as early as 1886, written of the "value of pure aesthetics as apart from the emotional" end of art.[1] Even at that time formalist theories were taking shape on the continent, particularly in Germany. Johann Friedrich Herbart, Robert Zimmerman, Conrad Fiedler, and Adolf von Hildebrand had all developed theories which distinguished between form and content. According to Peyton Richter, these theories encouraged

> "pure visibility," according to which feelings and associations must be completely banished from the mind of the aesthetic contemplator if he is to really "see" the work of art, pictured as though "at a distance."[2]

This kind of vision was of growing interest to Fry between 1915 and 1920; he produced a great number of his own "Post-Impressionist" paintings during these years, and his writing was mainly in the form of reviews in which he applied his aesthetic theories, but did not discuss them explicitly.[3] Fry said of his writing that these "analyses of form-lines, sequences, rhythms, etc. are merely aids for the uninitiated to attain to the contemplation of form--they do not explain."[4] He would later claim that his emphasis on formalism was for the benefit of public consciousness--an attempt at public education. We may best understand this period of formal analysis, first

as a sustained, in-depth concentration on formal concerns in order to raise public consciousness of form, and second, as a concentration on form in his own paintings. Rather than reject his theory of expressive form, Fry narrows down the range of emotions which he considers properly aesthetic, to include only emotions aroused by pure form. After 1920, Fry more frequently discusses nonformal elements in particular paintings. Moreover, the 1924 essay "The Artist and Psycho-Analysis," perhaps Fry's strongest explicit defense of formalism, is a deliberate simplification of his position. After this point, his belief in the efficacy of the formalist aesthetic diminishes rapidly.

Fry's later remark that he had once tried to "explain everything" in terms of form refers to his attempt to isolate a particular, purely aesthetic or "formal" emotion.[5] Fry does not deny the existence of nonformal elements in art, but suggests that emotional elements and our response to them can be separated from purely formal elements and our response to those. Furthermore, these formal elements--line, color, shape, and volume--are necessary elements of a work of pictorial art, whereas the emotional elements are not. Therefore, form alone is the essential quality of works of art and emotions other than the formal emotion are not properly aesthetic.[6] I have come across no essay in which Fry explicitly argues for a formalist aesthetic, during these years or any others. Yet his analysis of art is overwhelmingly formal during this period, from 1915 to 1920, and these should be considered his strongest formalist years.

Post-Impressionism again proved important for Fry's theory. Its defiance of representation lead to a greater consciousness of the picture surface. Fry noted in 1917 that "in general the effect of the movement has been to render the artist intensely conscious of the aesthetic unity of the work of art."[7] This evaluation of the goals of Post-Impressionism leads Fry, during these years, to discuss it largely in terms of its use of form. This was inevitable, since the artists did not create their works in order to direct our attention to things represented.

Fry speaks, in "Art and Life" of contemporary art turning its vision inward, "to work upon the fundamental necessities of man's aesthetic functions."[8] These aesthetic functions are part of the imaginative life, and as they cease to require accurate representation, they rely more fully on the reality of the work of art alone. This is a new element in Fry's evaluation of Post-Impressionism, not central to his 1910-1914 evaluation of that movement. Fry states more than once that most people are unable to appreciate art of this sort--that they are increasingly stimulated by and interested in being carried away from the work of art--to God, glory, or actual memories of their past.[9] Fry attempts to bring them back to reality--to what's in front of them, to the work of art they seem to be looking at. He has to talk about form because whatever it is that is conveyed by a work of art is conveyed through lines, colors, volumes and shapes--through form.

This most obvious of observations about a work of art was behind Fry's long-lived urge to isolate form as the "most essential"

element in art. It is the most essential because it is the very material of art; there can be art without associations with life, but without form, art is obviously impossible.

The emotions aroused by form are difficult to understand and to talk about. Fry suggests they are:[10]

> much vaguer than ordinary emotions although as we know from music they are extremely powerful. . . . They seem to me to go below our conscious life and to stir the unplumbed depths of our subconscious nature. . . . They may affect . . . instincts more fundamental [to] aspects of our being than those which rise to consciousness in our everyday life. At all events they do not flow along recognizable channels toward familiar ends but seem to flood and permeate our whole being. They seem to gain by their massive quality what they lose in precision and those who experience them feel also that they are of very profound significance.

This description of "formal emotions" is essentially denotative, so that one who has not felt such emotions is, perhaps, not brought any closer to them by this passage. It is a decidedly vague description, especially for Fry. Because Fry is fully aware of the absence of an adequate vocabulary with which to discuss the emotions aroused by form, and because he believes that discussion of this sort should properly be left to psychologists, Fry's formal analyses are directed toward the forms themselves, rather than to the emotions forms arouse.

Fry felt the profound significance of forms most strongly in the Post-Impressionist works of Cézanne. In his 1917 review of Vollard's Paul Cézanne, republished in Vision and Design (1920), Fry discusses the evolution of the artist's work in terms of line and plasticity. Fry uses the terms "plastic" and "plasticity" regularly during these years to describe certain formal elements in

painting. For Fry, the construction of an illusory three-dimensional space is an important ingredient in an effective two-dimensional composition. (Illusory) three-dimensional shapes are plastic shapes for Fry, and a plastic idea is "such a construction of three-dimensional shapes as satisfies the contemplation of their relations to one another and to the whole combination."[11] (See Illustration 4.) Fry writes:[12]

> That Cézanne became a supreme master of formal design every one would nowadays admit, but there is some excuse for those contemporaries who complained of his want of drawing. He was not a master of line in the sense in which Ingres was, "The contour escapes me," as he said. That is to say he arrived at the contour by a study of the interior planes; he was always plastic before he was linear. . . . In later works, such as the portrait of "Mme. Cézanne in a green-house," the plasticity has become all-important, there is no longer any suggestion of a romantic decor; all is reduced to the purest terms of structural design.

Fry treats a number of modern artists with this strong formalist emphasis, among them Renoir, about whose treatment of the human figure Fry writes in 1919:[13]

> The figure presents itself to his eye as an arrangement of more or less hemispherical bosses and cylinders, and he appears generally to arrange the light so that the most prominent part of each boss receives the highest light. From this the planes recede by insensible gradations toward the contour, which generally remains the vaguest, least ascertained part of the modelling. Whatever lies immediately behind the contour tends to become drawn into its sphere of influence, to form an undefined recession enveloping and receiving the receding planes. As the eye passes away from the contour, new but less marked bosses form themselves and fill the background with repetitions of the general theme. The picture tends thus to take the form of a bas-relief in which the recessions are not into the profound distances of pictorial space, but only back, as it were to the block out of which the bossed reliefs emerge, though, of course, by means of atmospheric colour the eye may interpret these recessions as distance.

Illustration 4. Still-life with a basket by Paul Cézanne (1839-1906). Oil on canvas, 65 x 81 cm. Musée du Louvre, Paris.

It was not in only modern art that Fry wished the public to see form; in this period Fry analyzes the art of the museums formally. While he had given Fra Angelico a poetic interpretation in 1902, in 1919 Fry writes:[14]

> The fact is Fra Angelico was, for all the fervour of his religious emotion, a fiercely intellectual artist, one whose immense sensibility was always under the control of an almost mathematically precise mind. He seems almost to have had a horror of mixing or modifying in any way the several colours of his palette. Ultramarine, scarlet, warm ochre, black, white, terra verte, raw umber, a few greys made probably by the simplest mixtures as of black and white or umber and white,--he uses these almost as a musician uses the notes of the scale, dreading the complications and impurities of intermediate tones, and relying entirely upon his rare sense of disposition and quantities to build up not so much a harmony as a melody of colour.

Fry does not go on to explain Angelico's use of color in terms of his religious motives. Nor does he discuss at any length the emotional content of any other of the Florentine works he is reviewing, then on view at the Burlington Arts Club. He does, however, note at one point Pesellino's intense interest in depicting psychological states.[15]

During this time Fry was fervently interested in formal concerns in his own painting. He wrote to Vanessa Bell from Paris in 1919:

> I spend most of my time over the Poussins in the Louvre and am trying to hammer out some notions very vague at present about the different kinds of fullness and emptiness of picture space. Poussin fascinates me more than ever. His composition seems to me more full of new and unanalysable discoveries than anyone. I want to find what principle there is that governs the relations of a convex volume to the space that occupies and fills it.[16]

This is a typical remark for Fry during the late teens and early twenties (see Illustration 5).

One of Fry's strongest formalist remarks during this period was also made in a latter to Vanessa Bell in which Fry defines the subject of any painting as "a thing with a definite point . . . [calling on] purely formal sensibility."[17]

We can conclude that during the period from about 1915 to 1920 Fry attempted to analyze all art primarily through its formal qualities. Expressive form, for a time, was limited to "significant form." He paid some attention to nonformal emotion, but very little, since Fry considered it extra-aesthetic. While Fry wrote a number of insightful formal analyses during this period, this posture prevents him from appreciating important emotional aspects of the art he seeks to understand.

In the years between 1920 and 1926 Fry, for the most part, continues to emphasize the formal analysis of works of art. As in the previous five years, Fry maintains such notions as the distinction between the imaginative life and the actual life which renders the work of art an independent reality, the separation of emotional from formal aspects in a work of art, and that art is the means of expression of the artist's emotion. During these years, however, Fry is more willing to discuss emotional aspects of an artist's work, along with the formal aspects. At the end of this period, Fry writes an extensive essay "Some Questions in Esthetics," in which he firmly rejects formalism. The resulting aesthetic, as might be



Illustration 5. Roger Fry: South Downs, 1914. Oil on panel, 43 x 59 cm. Private Collection.

expected, is a refinement of various aspects of his early (and his middle) theory.

In a 1921 lecture, "Architectural Heresies of a Painter," Fry reiterates his view that imitation is in no way the end of art. He is replying specifically to the suggestion that one might produce "wonderful art" by copying the work of a master. "Now this view of art," Fry says, is "fatal to creative effort. It implies an idea that beauty is something material, absolute, fixed, and determined . . . whereas in fact beauty is a relative quality which inheres in the forms of the object of art only in so far as it is an evident sign of an inward spiritual state on the part of the artist."[18]

In a related statement, Fry had ended his 1920 essay "Retrospect" as follows.[19]

> As to the aesthetic emotion--it is clearly infinitely removed from those ethical values to which Tolstoy would have confined it. It seems to be as remote from actual life and its practical utilities as the most useless mathematical theory. One can only say that those who experience it feel it to have a peculiar quality of "reality" which makes it a matter of infinite importance in their lives. Any attempt I might make to explain this would probably land me in the depths of mysticism. On the edge of that gulf I stop.

In both these passages, Fry expresses himself in the same terms as he had used since 1909 in talking about art.

The particular use of the words "spiritual" and "reality" in these two passages introduces an aspect of Fry's thought which I have not emphasized. The imaginative life of human beings, including the creative effort of the artist and the receptive vision of the viewer, has a special status, above the ordinary field of physical existence.

Art and the imagination have a different quality than does ordinary existence--the action of the mind can transform the physical into a spiritual reality.

In a latter to Fry in early 1921, Goldsworthy Dickinson replies to this last paragraph of "Retrospect." In regard to Fry's remarks on the aesthetic emotion, Dickinson writes:[20]

> I suppose you have cleared away a lot of confusion and got down to a root perception, the meaning of which still remains to you mysterious to judge from your concluding sentence. Your use of the word Reality already postulates a kind of mystic theory. I feel critical about that. What you have got, in fact, is an emotion. Why should there be any reality corresponding to it, other than the real work of art, which arouses it?

None of Fry's other writings, as far as I know, support the claim that Fry "postulates a mystic reality." I suggest that his remark in "Retrospect" is an allusion to the reality of the spirit, about which it is so difficult to speak. Fry would later claim that a fair amount of that about which it is so difficult to speak in art is a result of the workings of the human unconscious.[21] I believe that for Fry the spiritual reality of a work of art was mystifying and awesome, but not transcendental.

During the early twenties, Fry continues to speak of the artist's task in the same language as we have seen him use throughout his career in aesthetics. Thus it is Rembrandt's "imaginative comprehension and construction of forms" which Fry finds of interest in a 1921 article on the master's work.[22] Even in articles devoted to formal analyses, form is presented in the context of his notion that the artist's emotion determines the form of a work of art. Fry

revises this notion only peripherally in admitting only formal emotions into his aesthetic. In this same article on Rembrandt, Fry suggests that out of this construction of forms "emerges even for those who miss this discovery of formal sequences a spirit which brings conviction not so much of its ever having been actual as of its being necessary or eternally real."[23] The necessity of which Fry speaks is the necessity, inevitability, or propriety of a particular artistic composition. Its "eternal reality" is a function of the success of the artist in creating a composition which does not rely on associations outside the work itself. That is, given the general context of human life, Rembrandt's pictures carry significance in their own unique "world" revealing a spirit which retains its completeness across time.

Desmond MacCarthy, in his introduction to a 1952 Arts Council exhibition of Fry's paintings and drawings, acknowledges that Fry seems to have held different views on the degree to which the content of a work of art might enter into the aesthetic experience.[24] During the years 1920 to 1926 Fry wavers on this matter. In a June, 1921, article, Fry extolls Rembrandt's formal design. A month earlier, he had written an article on portraits by Rembrandt in the collection of Prince Yussupoff in Petrograd; here Fry reveals a sensitivity to Rembrandt's handling of emotional elements, reminiscent of his early theory:[25]

> Rembrandt had so miraculous an instinct for the characteristic that he could, one imagines, have discovered an expressive design from any conceivable material. . . . Something of the thickness and phlegm of the Dutch character is there, but they

> have the poise and balance of well-bred people. In response to this, Rembrandt has here developed a more sweeping silhouette, a more flowing rhythm in the lines and a general sense of amplitude and ease that give to these two pictures so singular a charm.

Fry's 1924 essay "The Artist and Psycho-Analysis" has been cited in defense of claims that Roger Fry was a pure formalist. The passage chosen by Arnold Isenberg, and used by him as an introductory quotation, is a baldly formalist remark when read in isolation.[26]

> Now I venture to say that no one who has a real understanding of the art of painting attaches any importance to what we call the subject of a picture--what is represented. To one who feels the language of pictorial form all depends on how it is presented, nothing on what. Rembrandt expressed his profoundest feelings just as well when he painted a carcass hanging up in a butcher's shop as when he painted the Crucifixion or his mistress. Cézanne whom most of us believe to be the greatest artist of modern times expressed some of his grandest conceptions in pictures of fruit and crockery on a common kitchen table.

I would argue that the context of the article out of which this quotation is taken requires one to hesitate in accepting this as an accurate measure of Fry's views. The essay was originally read to the British Psychological Society and Fry's argument is that art is not merely an attempt at wish-fulfillment.

Such a characterization of art had been offered by Freud, Jung, and Pfister. Fry quotes Freud:[27]

> The artist has also an introverted disposition and has not far to go to become neurotic. He is one who is urged on by instictive needs which are too clamorous; he longs to attain to honour, power, riches, fame, and the love of women; but he lacks the means of achieving these gratifications. So, like any other with an unsatisfied longing, he turns away from reality and transfers all his interest, and all this Libido too, on to the creation of his wishes in life.

Fry rightly rejects this characterization of art and the artist. Of course, Fry had long held that art was an activity separate from, and transcending the instinctive life. The imagination of the artist, in Fry's view, is contemplative and does not concern itself with the immediate cares of actual life. Thus, art is not a veiled call to action.[28]

Although he expressed this view in his 1909 essay on aesthetics, it would not have served the purpose of Fry's argument against the psycho-analysts to introduce an aesthetic which allowed the artist to express nonformal emotions in a work of art. A more clear-cut distinction between art and instinct was needed, if Fry was to succeed in casting doubt on the psycho-analysts' characterization of art. And so Fry says, "for the moment I must be dogmatic and declare that the esthetic emotion is an emotion about form."[29]

In distinguishing between true art and art as wish-fulfillment, Fry uses terms which he had never before and would never again use to describe art that is not purely formal.[30]

> I believe that two distinct aims and activities have got classed together under the wond "art," and that the word "artist" is used of two distinct groups of men. One of these groups into which I would divide artists is mainly preoccupied with creating a fantasy-world in which the fulfillment of wishes is realized. The other is concerned with the contemplation of form.

Even in his most formal analyses, Fry does not see fit to characterize dramatic artists such as Giotto or Rembrandt as "creating a fantasy-world in which the fulfillment of wishes is realized." In attempting to remove art from the domain of psycho-analysis, Fry presents an agrgument in terms understandable to the scientists, and he allows

some kinds of pictures to be fair game for their inspection. Such a picture is described by Pfister:[31]

> A youth is about to leap away from a female corpse on to a bridge in a sea of fog, in the midst of which Death is standing. Behind him the sun rises in blood-red splendour. On the right margin two pairs of hands are trying to recall or hold back the hurrying youth.

The distortion of the category of nonformal art which Fry allows for the sake of argument must be taken into account in understanding just how straightforward is Fry's assertion of the preeminence of form in true art. Because Fry does not leave room between these two extremes, one concludes that his distinction is designedly not a precise expression of his views.

Fry had adopted a formalist position for much of the period between 1915 and 1924, and had analyzed art from all ages and places in formalist terms. He had stated in 1921 that form alone was the essential quality in all of art, and that emotions other than those aroused by form were not property aesthetic. Yet there is no straightforward, prolonged argument for a formalist aesthetic in any of Fry's writings of these years, and in the early twenties Fry turns more frequently to emotional elements in art. To whatever extent we may judge Fry to be a formalist in 1924, soon afterwards he would begin to very clearly turn away from its strict demands.

NOTES--CHAPTER III

1. Sutton, Letters, 110.

2. Peyton E. Richter, editor, Perspectives in Aesthetics: Plato to Camus, New York, 1967, 381.

3. Spalding, Art and Life, 221. Woolf, Roger Fry, 202-212; Donald A. Laing, Roger Fry: An Annotated Bibliography of the Published Writings, New York, 1979, 170-181.

4. See Virginia Woolf, Roger Fry, 230.

5. See Roger Fry, "Literary in Painting," Fry Papers; Fry in "Double Nature," does not say he was, simple, a formalist.

6. See Roger Fry, letter to Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, Fry Papers.

7. Roger Fry, "Art and Life," Vision and Design, 12.

8. Ibid., 14.

9. Ibid., 2; Fry, "Retrospect," 297.

10. Fry, "Literary in Painting," Fry Papers.

11. Roger Fry, "Architectural Heresies of a Painter," Fry Papers.

12. Roger Fry, "Paul Cézanne," Vision and Design, 264-265.

13. Roger Fry, "Renoir," Vision and Design, 269-270.

14. Roger Fry, "Florentine Painting," Burlington Magazine, 35, 1919, 4.

15. Ibid., 11.

16. See Woolf, Roger Fry, 220.

17. See Sutton, Letters, 438.

18. Fry, "Heresies."

19. Fry, "Retrospect," 302.

20. Letters of Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson, King's College, Cambridge, January 3, 1921.

21. Fry, Last Lectures, 13.

22. Roger Fry, "Self Portrait by Rembrandt," Burlington Magazine, 38, 1921, 262-263.

23. Ibid., 263.

24. Sir Desmond MacCarthy, Introduction to Paintings and Drawings, an exhibition catalog, London, 1952.

25. Roger Fry, "Two Rembrandt Portraits," Burlington Magazine, 38, 1921, 210.

26. Isenberg, "Formalism," 22.

27. Roger Fry, "The Artist and Psycho-Analysis," The New Criticism. Edwin Berry Burgum, ed., New York, 1930, 202-203.

28. See Chapter 1, Note 16: Fry, "Essay in Aesthetics," 17-21.

29. Fry, "Psycho-Analysis," 198.

30. Ibid., 194.

31. Ibid., 207-208.

CHAPTER IV

THE LATE THEORY, 1926-1934: PAINTING'S DOUBLE NATURE

In an unpublished essay on Giotto in the Fry Papers, dated between 1919 and 1926, Fry implies that the relations among Giotto's forms are the most important part of his work, while admitting that it is impossible to overlook "what is desirable" in Giotto's dramatic content.[1] Fry remarks that his own "problem" is that of relating Giotto's dramatic content to its form--acute here since Giotto's dramatic imagination is in forms "of such amplitude and such originality." Fry recognizes that form and content "play into one another's hands . . . to raise each other to a higher power." This last remark is perhaps the first articulation of what will becaome one of two central ideas in Fry's late theory, and which appeared in published form in Fry's lead essay in the book Transformations, in 1926. Fry is hesitant to allow full cooperation between form and dramatic content in "Some Questions in Aesthetics." Yet he clearly allows it. At any rate, the essay on Giotto may be placed within at most a year or so from this 1926 date.

The second central idea of Fry's late theory is also discussed in the Giotto essay. This is the idea that

> in all cases our reaction to works of art is a reaction to a relation and not to senstations or objects or persons or events. This, if I am right, affords a distinguishing

mark of what I call esthetic experience, esthetic reactions, or esthetic states of mind."[2] This distinction grows out of a long-standing notion in Fry's theorizing that an art object is distinguished from other objects because of its organization according to the imaginative demands of the artist. The organization of forms, in other words, the ordered relation of forms one to another is the subject of aesthetics, and thus, the source of the aesthetic emotion.

In his discussion of "Some Questions in Aesthetics," David Taylor points out that the claim that an aesthetic experience involves "the recognition of a relation among visual elements" is not necessarily a formalist hypothesis, since we might as well relate trees, buses, and socks as volumes, lines, and colors.[3]

Taylor then discusses what is the main thesis of Fry's essay, that aspects of realism may legitimately enter into a work of art if they are part of the necessary group of relations which make up the work of art.[4] We can understand this thesis as an elaboration of Fry's belief that a work of art has its own "reality," separate from --that is, not an imitation of--the actual world. Although Taylor does not acknowledge this continuity of Fry's thought, he is, nevertheless, correct in characterizing this idea as transitional, from Fry's emphasis on form and formal emotions (as aesthetic reality), to an emphasis on the varieties of aesthetic reality which can be created by various artists. Taylor calls this a theory of "aesthetic personality."[5]

Taylor focuses the rest of his essay on the ramifications of this aspect of Fry's newly iterated aesthetic, outlining what he

understands to be the main features of the theory of artistic personality. I agree with Taylor that this becomes a focus of Fry's later aesthetic theory and mark especially his claim that

> for Fry, from 1926 onward, aesthetic content would appear to be the whole emotional import of the artist's unique sensibility, transmitting, by means of its deep familiarity with the expressive resources of its medium, the familiar into the revelatory: a content accessible only within the context of the work of art.[6]

While Fry admits, in this essay, the importance of representation in painting, he still resists the idea that a painting might be successful when it leads one to contemplation of something outside the painting itself. Thus, in his analysis of Rembrandt's Titus at his desk (Illustation 6), Fry suggests that the contemplative mood of the work is so well established by the forms on the canvas that it is those forms that one contemplates and is not immediately led to questions such as what Titus, Rembrandt's son, was really like, and what was his relationship to his father--did it make him moody or unhappy. Rather, one observes the softened light as it falls across the right grain of the desk, as it shapes the boy's face out of the darkness behind him. One notices the solidity of the desk in opposition to Titus' small body. The thoughtful expression on his (painted) face is compelling in itself, quite apart from what it might represent in the real world. This is how, in his late theory, Fry brings one back to what is in front of one's face: by pointing out the unique context into which associations with the actual world are called. As an artist, Rembrandt isolates certain characteristics

Illustration 6. Rembrandt van Rijn: Titus at his Desk, 1655. Oil on canvas, 77 x 63 cm. Rotterdam, Museum Boymans-van Beuningen.

of his son and through his use of paint, creates a spiritualized image, with its own "revelatory" content, its own reality.

Taylor points out Fry's use of the word "spiritual" in describing such a work of art. His explanation of this, though somewhat high-flown, points out clearly Fry's concept of the unique quality of the creation of works of art:[7]

> Fry's use of the word spiritual in regard to this process would seem peculiarly appropriate since what is involved is essentially the operation of transmutative mind in the manifestations of sight, the bestowing upon these the connotation of a distinct "spirituality," or sense of heightened visual and psychic activity."

This concept of art, of its spirituality, is not new in Fry, dating back as it does at least to the first decade of the century.

I would emphasize, what Taylor does not, that in this 1926 essay, Fry is somewhat hesitant about the ways in which form and emotional content interact in a work of art with an independent reality. Fry's stated thesis in the essay is to show the falsity of I. A. Richards' claim that aesthetic experience is not separate from other experiences. He does this by introducing three works of art --Brueghel's Carrying of the Cross, Daumier's Gare St. Lazare, and Poussin's Ulysses discovering Achilles among the daughters of Lycomedon. In these works, as Fry analyses them, psychological and formal content do little, if anything, to complement one another. He suggests that this is the rule in European art.[8] "Co-operation, then, between the two experiences derived from the psychological aspects of a picture does not appear to be inevitable. I have not sought to prove that it is impossible or that it never occurs."[9] This

clearly separates Fry from Bell's formalism, but also shows how little Fry is willing to claim here.

Fry will come to believe that such cooperation occurs in artists other than Rembrandt. He sets up the apparatus for those later evaluations by distinguishing between two sorts of talents an artist may possess and which, in 1926, he is already willing to state are possessed by Rembrandt.[10]

> Rembrandt is certainly rare, if not unique, among artists in having possessed two separate gifts in the highest degree. His psychological imagination was so sublime that, had he expressed himself in words, he would, one cannot help believing, have been one of the greatest dramatists or novelists that has ever been, whilst his plastic constructions are equally supreme.

Fry believes that in most of Rembrandt's works, one or another of his gifts predominate. And in what he says is one of the best examples of perfect cooperation between the two, Christ Before Pilate in London's National Gallery, Fry's analysis of these elements falls into their two corresponding parts. He admits to not being able to reconcile them, suggesting that one's vision must switch from one aspect to the other in beholding the work. It is worthwhile to quote Fry's analysis at length.[11]

> As Rembrandt has seen it, Christ Himself falls into the background. This in itself is a striking indication of how fresh and original Rembrandt's dramatic imagination was. As he reconstrcuted from the Gospel text the whole scene before his inner vision he saw that such a moment as he has chosen must have arisen. It is the moment of greatest dramatic tension, where the protagonists are no longer Pilate and Christ, but Pilate and the Rabbis. And he has given this moment with astonishing perception of exactly the kind of characters involved and the inevitable effect of their clash. . . . Certainly as drama this seems to me a supreme example of what the art of illustration can accomplish. And as a

> plastic construction it is also full of interest and strange unexpected inventions. The main group piles up into a richly varied but closely knit plastic whole which leads on by the long upward curve of Pilate's robe and turban to the less clearly modelled volume of the soldiers around Christ. Around these Rembrandt has created first of all the concavity of shade beneath the overhanging baldachin of the judge's seat, and this opens out into the vaster concavity of the public place through which a diagonal movement, hinted at by the inpouring crowds, leads us away under the arched entrance.
>
> Personally I feel that the great, uprising pillar surmounted by the bust of Caesar, admirable as it is in its dramatic suggestiveness, is a little detrimental to the spatial harmony. Still, one cannot deny the plastic beauty of the whole conception, although it is somewhat too crowded and overlaid with detail to be considered one of Rembrandt's great discoveries. This may, perhaps, be placed to the psychological account, since the general agitation and bustle of every detail increases the idea of the whole mad turbulence of the scene.

In summing up the importance of "Some Questions in Aesthetics" one would note Fry's clear departure from the formalist aesthetic, which ignores the artist's intentions and the kind of meaning his work will carry. Although he does not explicitly address this difficulty, Fry meets it squarely in suggesting that it is each artist's unqiue vision and understanding of his subject and material which determines his or her work's aesthetic content. Further, Fry distinguishes two aspects of the artist's capacity--a formal and an emotional one. The major difference in this 1926 formulation from what has been a consistent dichotomy in Fry's aesthetic is its admission that formal and emotional elements may enter equally in the aesthetic experience.

Fry wrote to Charles Mauron July 10, 1926, I have "begun to think one must admit the possibility of psychological volumes in the

visual arts."[12] From this point in 1926 until his death in 1934 Fry's aesthetic theory is less and less formalist. As he writes to Helen Anrep in 1928:[13]

> I am at last getting under way with my lecture. I propounded a few of its heresies at Vanessa's last night. She, poor dear, is deeply shocked but I believe I'm on a tack that will make things a little clearer and relieve the strain which I have felt of late on the other orthodoxy. One runs a theory as long as one can and then too many difficulties in its application--too many strained explanations accumulate and you have to break the mould and start afresh. I'm going to divide pictures into Opera pictures and Symphony pictures and then we can begin to analyse them according to these ideas instead of trying to pretend that all pictures produce similar effects by similar means.

The lecture to which Fry refers, "Representation in Art," written in late 1928 and early 1929 and as yet unpublished, lays out some basic themes of Fry's late theory. Many of these themes: the understanding of the visual arts as a means of expression, and not as mere imitation; the importance of the independent reality of a work of art; and the helpfulness of analyzing our reactions to art as a means of comprehending its significance, have been constant in the various different phases of Fry's aesthetic theory. While Fry continues to maintain that purely formal ("symphonic") works can be separated and appreciated in a different way than works of art which combine the formal and emotional ("operatic" works), he now explicitly refused to maintain that operatic works are less aesthetically successful. And he improves on his early theory by discussing more fully the relation between form and emotion and by broadening the range of forms and emotions for which the theory can provide help in seeing and understanding.

Both Spalding and Pamela Diamand (Fry's daughter) suggest that part of the reason Fry changes his mind about the efficacy of formalism is that Fry's companion during these years, Helen Anrep, was not sympathetic to the formal analysis of the whole of art history.[14] Of a late letter from Fry to Anrep, Spalding remarks that Fry

> noted in Correggio's Adoration of the Magi how much of its content he had prevously missed due to his emphasis on form. "I see I'm in danger of getting shockingly 'literary' under your influence," he reported back to Helen. "But I see that the pictures that 'count' most generally have some quite new and personal conception of the situation." In this case, it was the reluctance and tenderness expressed in the figure of the Virgin that had caught his attention.[15]

As has been noted, Fry's close friend Dickinson had criticized his formalism as early as 1921. Dickinson remarks that Fry's attempt to "isolate a special element," the purely aesthetic element, weakens Fry's theory as regards its application to literature. "I believe," writes Dickinson, "that element, isolated, would be very thin indeed, perhaps like a note without overtones."[16] This was also Virginia Woolf's objection to the universality of Fry's theory. Woolf writes to Fry on September 22, 1924,

> I'm puzzling, in my weak witted way, over some of your problems: about "form" in literature. . . . I say it is emotion put into the right relations; and has nothing to do with form as used in painting. But this you must tidy up for me when we meet. . . ."[17]

I suggest that the most important factor in Fry's decision to reject pure formalism was that it had begun to deprive him of seeing what was in front of him, and he felt this in 1926 just as he had felt it in 1903 in objecting to Whistler's theory: "the coldly abstract sensual vision which he inculcated is, in the long run, damaging to

the vision itself, while the poetical vision increases the mere power of sight."[18]

In "Representation in Art," Fry compares music and architecture to painting, sculpture, and literature, noting the relatively large part played by representation in the latter group. "In consequence," Fry says, "truth to nature is often put forward as the highest incentive to creation and the certain test of achievement."[19] This turns out, consistent with all phases of Fry's aesthetic theory, to be an inappropriate demand on these arts. His argument here is that such a demand is not universal, since no one thinks of making it in regard to music and architecture. And because it is not universal, it is inadequate as a basis for aesthetic theory.

He argues further that our reactions to music, to literature, and to pictures are fundamentally alike, implying that in this reaction we may find the appropriate basis for aesthetics. Fry finds, as he had stated in "Some Questions in Aesthetics," that in all cases we react to relations. Fry uses the drama as an example: "the aesthetic idea of a drama is not in the emotions themselves but in the pattern which the artist has made out of them." Thus since in the case of all the arts an analysis of our reactions leads us to a series of relations, these relations are the real content of the work of art.

In upholding his idea that the work of art must have its own reality, Fry introduces a difficulty for the art of painting. He suggests that anything merely representational--which does not play a necessary part in the unity of the whole--tends to destroy the work

of art, by introducing elements unconnected with the work itself. This is clearly related to the ideas espoused in "Some Questions in Aesthetics," and to other aspects of his late theory.

In a lecture on the "Literary in Painting," given in 1931 (also unpublished), Fry presents a fairly complete aesthetic theory.[20] He denies that emotions aroused by form must necessarily be isolated from other ("literary") emotions; there are some pictures, he now claims, in which the two elements interact in something like a chemical combination. He concedes to having gone too far in stressing form, saying that it was for the benefit of the public sensibility, adding that he "was thinking of making amends by writing a book on Rembrandt as a dramatist."[21]

I suggest that the most important statement made by Fry in the 1931 essay, which marks his later theory as a kind of evolutionary advance over his previous two theories, is the following.[22]

> Aesthetic satisfaction which comes from psychological elements included in a work will depend on the form given to that psychological material--just as it is in a work of literary art . . . with this will be compounded our aesthetic satisfaction in the form given to the visual construction. We have an apprehension of both forms at once but it is from form in both cases that our aesthetic satisfaction is derived.

The aesthetic which Fry then presents is precisely that which is found in his 1933 lecture "The Double Nature of Painting."

If his formal theory made the public aware of a responsibility to look closely at visual art, to draw not only literary, but more importantly formal delight from it, he now asks more. He asks one to consider how the forms, which move us at a level so subtle that it is

difficult to talk about, enhance the story, the psychological content. This requires one to enter more fully into the artist's intentions, to see the work as a whole. In 1894 Fry had suggested that "to look at pictures the right way, to understand them critically" involved an "appreciation of the painter's intention and of the emotional equivalent of the picture."[24] His late aesthetic theory suggests a way to do this. It requires ridding one's mind of generalizations about lyric or comedic art, about the supremacy of pure form or of ingenuity of representation in favor of a close visual analysis of particular works of art.

The visual analysis will reveal emotional elements which it will be important to react to. These emotional elements may be of two sorts: in "symphonic" pictures they will be purely formal, in "operatic" pictures the emotions will be literary, or psychological, and may make reference to things outside the painting. This outside reference will not interfere with the independent "reality" of the painting if the form which makes this reference is an essential part of the scheme of the painting as a whole. This is the case because such a reference will have the meaning it does only in reference to its particular presentation in the work of art. Thus the reference to the plight of Paolo and Francesca in Delacroix's painting means something somewaht different than does the same reference in Dante's Inferno. The difference lies in the form of presentation.

Fry was in Vienna (perhaps during his May 1928 visit there) looking at Giorgione's Three Philosophers, when he writes, "for the first time I became sharply aware of how much it is necessary to invoke

the double function of art in order to explain all that I experienced."[25] Fry explained this double function as requiring the cooperation of two distinct arts. First, the art of producing a system of forms which presents us with certain delights, surprises, and puzzles which cna be worked out wholly by looking at the picture with reference to nothing outside it. Second, the art of producing significant dramatic or poetic content, which necessarily relies on the artist's psychological imagination and on references to a world outside the picture frame. He gives examples of paintings which rely on only one of these arts: that is, examples of "pure painting," which are wholly formal, and of "literary painting" which employ form solely to represent a literary or psychological situation. He then discusses paintings which employ both; these he calls "true painting."

Fry mentions one literary painting, Poynter's Faithful unto Death; the same artist's Israel in Egypt is a second example of a literary painting. Earlier in his career Fry would have called it epic, and during his middle period would have mourned its lack of formal concerns. Painted for the educated middle class, it is decorative in a way similar to that of a modern day movie poster. The forms are solid and arranged only to draw our attention to the mass of Jewish slaves laboring for the Egyptians. Various symbols of Egyptian power are placed throughout the picture space to reinforce the theme. While a few interesting shadows are cast on the pylon temple at the right, the play of light is not generally exploited for

its own visual effects. The perspective is skillfully done but with no surprises and not consistent rhythm of volumes in space enlivens the illusory picture space. We are given a clear depiction of an historical event and it is the historical event which remains the point of the work.

We might look briefly at an example of what Fry would have called "pure painting"--and he is careful to say that pure painting is not to be considered better or worse than operatic painting--Picasso's Le verre d'absinthe.[26] Representation drops out as an essential element of this painting, replaced by a rhythm of shaded planes across the canvas. PIcasso makes no attempt to render physical reality, says Fry; instead, he draws our attention to the flat surface by various devices. The complex relationship of lines and tones felt by Picasso are recorded and shared by the viewer.

An oddly delightful example of failure to unite the double function is discussed by Fry in his Brussels lecture: Correggio's Martyrdom of St. Placid and St. Flavia. Fry marks the double aspect of the work: first, its representation of the extremely violent and brutal martyrdom of these two saints and second, the formal composition, which as he notes is not only melodious, but voluptuous. "It is as if one were to play Othello to the music of Cosi fan tutte. What an admirable ballet scene; you would think the executioners have just come on stage performing a gay and elegant pas de deux."[27] Correggio cannot adapt his typical elegant rhythm to such a brutal theme, and the double aspect of the work pulls in two directions.

Illustration 7. Martyrdom of Saint Flavia and Saint Placid by Antonio Correggio (1489/94-1534). Oil on canvas, 160 x 185 cm. Pinacoteca, Parma.

Giorgione's Three Philosophers exemplifies true operatic painting. Fry is first struck by the formal qualities of the work, in particular the volumes of the three figures which he finds intriguingly placed in Giorgione's strange pictorial space. He finds their placements both unexpected and inevitable. Yet Fry confesses that it is not only a pleasing formal emotion which he experiences in front of Giorgione's masterpiece . . . he says, "I feel that I am in the presence of a great poet as well as a great plastic artist."[28] The "unexpected and inevitable" disposition of volumes, Fry claims, heightens our capacity to feel the strange quietude of the three figures, their otherworldliness, their understanding of a hidden truth. Thus the formal and psychological complement one another here. Fry notes that Rembrandt is another painter of great dramatic poetic skill and suggests that there are certainly others.

Fry admits that this theory of the double nature of painting, which does not aim at a metaphysical basis or at ultimate principles but hopes to "stimulate the growth and direct the attention of the sensibility," does not give one the intellectual satisfaction of a theory which lends to all painting the unity of explanation offered by the earlier formalist theory.[29] The late theory is "less tidy," he writes, "but there it is . . . ."; Fry does not like "straining facts at all."[30] He gives up unity of explanation for a theory which better accounts for all the facts. Emotional content, crucial to art throughout history, is given a place in Fry's late aesthetic and finally, the individual aims of the painter are given due attention.

Illustration 8. The Three Philosophers by Giorgione (c. 1476-1510). Oil on canvas, 123.8 x 144.5 cm. Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna. Fry acknowledges Giorgionne as "a great master of plastic harmonies and a great romantic poet."

NOTES--CHAPTER IV

1. Roger Fry, "Giotto," Fry Papers. Other quotes in this paragraph are from the same essay.

2. See Roger Fry, "Art and Science," Athenaeum, June, 1919, 434-435.

3. Taylor, "Aesthetic Theories," 64.

4. Ibid., 66. Taylor quotes Fry as saying "the moment anything . . . ceases to serve towards the edification of the whole plastic volume . . . (or) depends on reference to something outside the picture, it becomes descriptive of some other reality."

5. Ibid., 64.

6. Ibid., 68.

7. Ibid.

8. Fry, "Some Questions," 26.

9. Ibid., 27.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 28-30.

12. Sutton, Letters, 594.

13. Spalding, Art and Life, 268.

14. Ibid., 268-269; Pamela Diamand, Fry's daughter, suggested this in a conversation with me in August, 1984.

15. Spalding, Art and Life, 269.

16. Dickinson Papers, January 3, 1921.

17. Virginia Woolf, The Letters of Virginia Woolf, Vol. 3, 1923-1928, Edited by Nigel Nicolsen and Joanne Trautmann, New York, 1978, 133.

18. Fry, "Whistler," 133.

19. Roger Fry, "Representation in Art," Fry Papers. Other quotations in this and the next paragraph are also from this manuscript.

20. Roger Fry, "The Literary in Painting," Fry Papers.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Sutton, Letters, 162. Fry repeats the idea in "Idioms in Painting," Fry Papers. The precise date of this essay is unknown, it is listed as 1924-1935.

25. Fry, "Double Nature," 371.

26. Fry, "Literary in Painting."

27. Fry, "Double Nature," 369.

28. Fry, "Literary in Painting."

29. Ibid.

30. Roger Fry, "Representation in Painting," Fry Papers. Now dated 1928-1929.

CONCLUSION

The oversimplification of Fry's views came early. In a 1923 review of Fry's paintings a writer for the Westminister Gazette says that a "serious indiscretion has to be recorded of the portrait of The Honorable Bertrand Russell,in which Mr. Fry has been, I believe, betrayed into something dangerously like psychological interest." Indeed, it seems the most common error made by writers on art has been to overlook the evolutionary quality of Fry's thought, and to ignore altogether his interest in emotional expression in favor of ill-documented claims that Fry was simply a formalist.

In his 1933 Critical History of Modern Aesthetics, the Earl of Listowel states, without qualification, that for Fry "dramatic representation in painting is the unwarranted intrusion of an alien art, the art of literature; for painting itself is an art of plastic volumes and pure design,"[1] and that Fry endorses Bell's notion of significant form. We have seen that this second claim is blatantly false. Listowel's other claim is made in reference to Fry's opinion as expressed in "Some Questions in Esthetics" (1926), and in "An Essay in Aesthetics," (1909). Listowel implies that the two works are entirely compatible and that together they offer a formalist view of art. A review of the two essays reveals that although somewhat compatible, the two essays are by no means formalist. Instead, they

support Fry's belief that art is an activity of the imaginative life and that the art object is a means of transmitting the artist's emotion--whatever it may be--to the viewer. At the early date at 1933, then, Fry's views are already being distorted through simplification.

Morris Weitz makes a similar error in his 1956 article "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," where he calls Fry a formalist, referring to the "Bell-Fry theory" of significant form.[2] Moreover, as distinguished an aesthetician as Arnold Isenberg falls into the same oversimplification. In his essay "Formalism," published posthumously in 1973 from a lecture outline, Isenberg quotes Fry at length, without citing a source. His use of this passage, in which the strongest formalist remark is that "Rembrandt expressed his profoundest feelings just as well when he painted a carcass hanging up in a butcher's shop as when he painted the Crucifixion or his mistress," lends an explanation for why such misrepresentations of Fry abound.[3] Isenberg is interested in the theory of formalism--that Fry may (or may not) have held this theory is for him, incidental. In the course of discussing what he considers weak arguments for a formalist position and possible reasons for holding it, Isenberg never mentions Fry's reservations about Bell's statement of significant form, and never admits that Fry ever held any other theory. The quote Isenberg depends on is from the 1924 essay, "The Artist and Psycho-Analysis," in which Fry comes closest to arguing explicitly for a formalist aesthetic; by ignoring the context of these remarks Isenberg further propogates the myth of Fry's formalism.

The instances of this sort of simplification, made with inadequate documentation and for purposes which distort Fry's own, can be recorded without end. I will only name a few aestheticians who have followed this course, aside from those already mentioned: Harold Osborne, Stephan Pepper, and F. E. Sparshott.[4] I do not discuss misrepresentations of Fry in the writings of modern art critics, but note that lately critics have themselves found formalism wanting, and might do well to understand the whole of Fry's thought. His constant interest in emotional expression in art, and his late concern with the transmutative power of the artist may be of particular interest to the "postmodernist" critic.

NOTES--CONCLUSION

1. Earl of Listowel, Critical History of Modern Aesthetics, London, 1933, 148.

2. Morris Weitz, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 15, No. 1, 1956, 35.

3. Isenberg, "Formalism," 22.

4. Harold Osborne, Aesthetics and Criticism, New York, 1955, 85-86 and 131. The author allows for some nonformalist sentiments in Fry's wiritng, but leaves this in doubt when he writes, 224-225: "Roger Fry became firmly convinced of the absolute value of abstract form-properties independent of sentiment, feeling or representation. . . ."; Stephen C. Pepper, The Basis of Criticism in the Arts, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, 91-92; F. E. Sparshott, The Structure of Aesthetics, Toronto, 1965, 328, 348-49.

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