\ ~-rv‘.\~:~~.~sa.. Noam-“QM EMPLSCATIONS or THREE SELECTED SQGEQLGGICAL THECRIES or EMILE DURKHEIM I FC‘R TI—IE GOALS 0F CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION Thesis for the Degree of PhD. MICHEGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Donnie! Frank Gerdy 1%? .. a w: Illlicicililslll Ill"lHllHllIWIUUlIHlllllmll LIBRIRE t1 3 1293 1063 < Michigan Otatc ‘ Universnty This is to certify that the thesis entitled IMPLICATIONS OF THREE SELECTED SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMILE DURKHEIM FOR THE GOALS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION presented by Donald Frank Gerdy has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for PHD degree in Education fez/156417.1— Major professor Deg/M69 I 0-169 tions Durkh educa- man a: the di Enile Ehlle i PUblic concept of labc' H 1SSues ABSTRACT IMPLICATIONS OF THREE SELECTED SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMILE DURKHEIM FOR THE GOALS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION by Donald Frank Gerdy The purpose of this study is to examine the implica- tions of three selected sociological theories of Emile Durkheim for the goals of contemporary American public education. The three theories used in this study are: man and society, moral and ethical considerations, and the division of labor. The body of this study is divided as follows: 1. Selected theories from the sociological works of Emile Durkheim. 2. An analysis of contemporary American society. 3. Implications of the sociological theories of Emile Durkheim for the goals of contemporary American public education. The first segment deals with an emplanation of the concepts of man and society, morality, and the division of labor as presented in the works of Emile Durkheim. The second segment is a study of several crucial issues facing contemporary American society examined using the concepts deve10ped in the first segment. and char: cati seve: founc Donald Frank Gerdy The third segment is a synthesis of the first two, and presents a series of twenty-five recommendations for changes in the goals of contemporary American public edu- cation. A final aspect of the study is a discussion of several areas of the theories examined which have been found to be of no value in a study of this type. IMPLICATIONS OF THREE SELECTED SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMILE DURKREIM FOR THE GOALS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION By Donald Frank Gerdy A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Secondary Education and Curriculum 1968 572773 In 6379.90 1"}- If? Cha] *4 III IV BIBLIO’. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Purpose of the Study . . . . Importance of the Study . . Procedure . . . Questions To Be Investigated II. SELECTED CONCEPTS FROM THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMILE DURKHEIM . . . . . . Man and Society . . . . . . . . . . . Moral and Ethical Considerations . . . Division of Labor . . . . . . . . . . III. AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY O O O O O C O O O O O O O O 0 Man and Society . . . . . . . . . . . Moral and Ethical Considerations . . . Division of Labor . . . . . . . . . . IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THREE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMILE DURKHEIM FOR THE GOALS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION . . . . . . . . . . . Man and Society . . . . . . . Moral and Ethical Considerations The Division of Labor . . . . . School Environment . . . . . . . V 0 SUMMARY 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O The Ideal School . . . . . . . . . . Criticisms of Durkheim's Theories . . Recommendations for Further Study . . BIBLI WRAPHY O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O I O O O 0 APPENDIX C O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 11 Page \lO‘xUtUi 14 24 43 54 55 78 84 86 99 113 122 130 133 l 122 144 147 APPENDICES Appendix Page A. The Life of Emile Durkheim . . . . . . . . . . 1&8 B. BibliOgraphy of the Works of Durkheim . . . . 152 C. Summary of Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . 155 ill many ized dismi touch if th or mi found 80010 of th bas1c the Wr "any 1 educat founda mentioz early t dominan CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Social theorists and philosophers have formulated many proposals concerning the way society should be organ- ized. Pe0ple have often looked at these suggestions and dismissed them as the ideas of radicals who were out of touch with reality. Others have taken these writings as if they were handed down from God. Regardless of the use or misuse of their ideas these theorists have had a pro- found effect on society. One such individual was Emile Durkheim, the French sociologist. Durkheim is considered by many as the father of the science of Sociology. His works are still read as basic sources in many areas of Sociology. In addition, the writings of Durkheim are used as a basic source for many ideas which deal with contemporary American public education. One has but to skim books dealing with social foundations of education to find the name of Emile Durkheim mentioned again and again. Emile Durkheim wrote during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and was influenced by the pre- dominant philosophies of that period. indiI that in Sc ment Z.— Arnrnannmr‘if‘hl—‘mOdmo Only by constant reminder of the profoundly, Ialmost obsessively, individualistic age in which Durkheim wrote, and of the deep strains of biologism in the social thought of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, can we keep fresh the true magnitude of his contribution and the reason for the relentlessness of his insistence upon social explanations of social behavior even when this in- curred, as it frequently did, the risk of hypo- statization.1 Writers of the late nineteenth century who accepted individualism as the key for the analysis of society held that reality was to be found in the individual rather than in social groups or institutions. Man was the basic ele- ment of society and society was formed entirely by man. One begins, Durkheim insisted, not with man, not with the individua1--either in the abstract or in any of his historical guises--but with society. And society is not reducible to a vast aggregate of indi- viduals in tenuous and shifting assortment by social class or economic category. Neither is society, or any of its components--community, work, religion, law--the consequence of an alienation of what had formerly been vested in man's nature. These, for Durkheim, are primordially, lastingly, and unalter- ably manifestations of the social. The root is not man, but society. This contrast between Marx's con- ception of alienation and Durkheim's is itself suf- ficiently eXpressive of the gulf between their con- ceptions of the nature of man. Unlike Durkheim's sociological thought, Marx's image of man must be seen as but a variant form of the same individualism 2 that had activated the works of Rousseau and Bentham. Durkheim was among the first to contend that society was more significant than the individual men who composed it. His theory was opposed to those held by the lRobert A. Nisbet, Emile Durkheim (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1955), p. v. 2Ibid., p. 13. .3), as m maj< ism biol from of d expl fact only impo: that divis It d1 Again feren two W} philos 1n the consel p°Slt1 rounds t° the 3 maiority of writers of his time in the area of individual- ‘ism as well as in the area of biologism. Herbert Spencer and others who proposed the idea of biologism, or social evolution, held that society evolves from simple to complex based upon an increasing complexity of division of labor. Durkheim did not feel that such an explanation was sufficient. He recognized that it was a factor in the development of society but it was not the only factor. Durkheim also felt that such a theory imposed one notion of a given society as best and said that all other notions were worse. Durkheim felt that while society did evolve the division of labor was only one factor in its development. It did not Just grow but had to be guided and developed. Again, as with individualism, Durkheim's ideas were dif- ferent from those of the majority of writers of his time. The theories of individualism and biologism were two which Durkheim opposed. There were, however, two philosophical currents from which Durkheim drew directly in the fashioning of his social theory: positivism and conservatism. The positivism which Durkheim accepted was positivism in its large sense, that of a methodology founded on the rigorous application of scientific values to the study of human nature and society.1 1Ibid., p. 23. )4 Although this discussion cannot deal in detail with all the contributions of philosophical conservatism to Durkheim's sociology, it is important to identify several of the main pr0positions that originated in the polemical contexts of conservatism and were to culminate as vital persPectives in Durkheim's study of man and society. The first is the conservative idea of the nature of society. . . . According to this theory, society is not an emanation of presocial forces within the indi- vidual; on the contrary, man is creature of society, and his ideas, language, morality, and relationships are but reflections of the anterior reality of society. The second idea, flowing logically from the first, is the moral and psychological dependence of man on society. The individual-~far from being the self- sustaining, self-stabilizing, and self-directed being that the philosophers had promised in their psycholo- gies and reform proposals--is unalterably dependent upon society and its codes. The separation of man from tradition and community, argued the conserva- tives, 1ed--not to freedom--but to intolerable isolation and anguish. Third, the conservatives insisted upon the neces- sity of authority, not only in the state, but in each and all of the nonpolitical relationships which com- prise society. The fourth conservative idea involves a deep con- cern with religion and with the whole concept of sacred values. Throughout the writings of Emile Durkheim the influence of these two phiIOSOphical currents may be seen as well as the influences of those philosophies with which he dis- agreed. While Durkheim is not considered a social theorist, in that he did not prOpose an ideal society, a Specific conception of society appears throughout his works which 11bid., pp. 25-26. rang Sim: mari be t? Durk} educs that reSea. the t educa heimI theor ideas Prima. it W1 thOug the r Dubli Chang and d 5 range from a commentary on the works of his teacher Saint Simoneeto his widely read study of suicides. It is pri- marily upon his conception of society that this study will be based. Purpose of the Study The purpose of this study is to examine the impli- cations of three selected sociological theories of Emile Durkheim for the goals of contemporary American public education. Importance of the Study The importance of this study resides in the fact that little, if anything, in the way of definitive research has been done in the area of the implications of the theories of Durkheim for contemporary American public education. Several individuals have touched upon Durk- heim's educational ideas as parts of works on his theories, but they have not attempted to deal with these ideas as they pertain to contemporary education. The primary value of this study lies in the contribution which it will make to the expansion of knowledge and educational thought. These contributions will arise primarily from the recommendations for the goals of contemporary American public education and the suggestions for organizational changes needed to attain them. Durkheim wrote much about the concept of society and described his conception of the relationship of man to soc soc is pos soc: man 513: educ Oper was I role tions ceptf Durkh 6 sooiety in these writings. One of the foundations of any sOOIety is the form of education provided its people. It is significant that very few social theorists have pro- posed an educational system which will aid in improving society and bring about a social order which will allow man and society to function more effectively. It is also significant that many of these men do not even discuss education as anything more than a minor variable in the Operation of society. Durkheim was not such a man. He was concerned with education and had much to say about the role which it should play within society. This study will attempt to derive general sugges- tions for our educational system, framed within the con- ception of society today as well as the conception held by Durkheim. It is here that the value of the study lies. Procedure The body of this study will be divided as follows: 1. A discussion of three selected theories of Emile Durkheim: ' A. Man and Society B. Moral and Ethical Considerations C. The Division of Labor 2. An examination of contemporary American society. This will be based upon the three areas presented above and will deal with some of the basic issues facing contemporary American public education. Hhat : What 1 the ex catior °f div 7 3. ‘The implications of the theories of Emile Durkheim for the goals of contemporary American public education. This will be primarily a synthesis of the materials from the other two segments leading to the development of general suggestions for American public education. 4. An example of an ideal school using the recommenda- tions developed as well as a discussion of weaknesses in portions of Durkheim's theories as they pertain to contem- porary American public education. Questions To Be Investigated The first item to be investigated is, What does Durkheim say about the relationship of man and society? What is the nature of society? What is a moral society, and what effect does the division of labor have upon society? The second item arises from the preceding one. What is the role of education in forming a moral society? What type of educational system is needed to best serve the ends of such a society? What is the role of the edu- cational system in developing a society with a high degree of division of labor? Third, using the concepts developed in the first item, what can we say about contemporary American society? Is contemporary American society moral? Is it one society or a group of societies? What roles do the various sub- cultures play? dev Ame ti o I'— 8 Fourth, what are the implications of the concepts developed by Emile Durkheim for the goals of contemporary American public education? What changes in organization programs and goals might be brought about by an examina- tion of these concepts? vid has and to e prOp theo purp. Paths cepts tions Durkh CHAPTER TWO SELECTED CONCEPTS FROM THE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF EMILE DURKHEIM When attempting to discuss the theories of any indi- vidual it is necessary to start from that individual's basic assumptions. It is also necessary that his place and time in history be recognized. This allows the reader to examine the various aspects of his theories from the proper perspective. In examining the sociological theories of Emile Durkheim it is also necessary, for the purposes of this work, to examine certain key concepts rather than the entire scope of his ideas. These key con- cepts are: man and society, moral and ethical considera- tions, and the division of labor. (A biography of Emile Durkheim appears in the appendices of this study.) Many contemporary sociologists recognize the con- tributions Emile Durkheim made to American thought and to the development of American sociology. Many of the con- cepts and techniques which he developed are still useful today. This is most clearly eXpressed by Robert Nisbet in his book, Emile Durkheim. Durkheim's special contribution to American Sociology lies in the fact that, like the Americans, his own sociology began with a conscious recognition of such social problems as crime, suicide, family 9 10 instability, and social strife. This made for common ground. But what Durkheim added to this recognition of problems was a perspective both theoretical and historical--a perSpective that rescued social prob- lems from the empirical atomism, the aimless individ- ualism, that had so dominated the American sociologi- cal scene. Durkheim's momentous contrast between mechanical and organic solidarity: his concepts of anomie, altruism, and egoism: his matchless demon- strations of the social elements in personality, religion, and law; and his typology of social inte- gration and disintegration—-all of this was, so to Speak, manna for American sociology.l Durkheim's conception of the role of sociology is also a guide to understanding the contributions which he made to the development of the field. Durkheim, along with Max Weber, is credited by many writers as being the founder of the science of sociology. Durkheim and Weber were the first to make use of the processes of science in studying social phenomena and social problems. Durkheim conceived the science of sociology as having three major functions: 1. The objective and theoretical pursuit of the truth regarding the laws and the facts of social life. 2. The reexamination, reevaluation, and recasting of the principles and theories of philosophy so that they may be made consistent with the data and findings of the new science. 3. The establishment of a basis for the guidance of social action and practice.2 1Ibid.. p. 5. ZHarry Alpert, Emile Durkheim and His Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 19395, p. 31. 11 He saw the science of sociology as being divided into the following areas: I. Social Morphology 1. 2. II 1. 2. 3 u, 5. 6 III. General Sociology Study of the geographical base of peoples in its relation to social organization. Study of population; its volume, density, the way it is disposed over the soil. Social Physiology 7 Religious sociology Moral sociology Juridical sociology Economic sociology Linguistic sociology Esthetic sociology 1 Before proceeding with a discussion of the major concepts upon which this study is based, several key con- cepts which Durkheim used throughout his works will be defined. The first, and possibly most important, is that concept which he called a social fact. To Durkheim a social fact: is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of acting which is general Ibid., p. 51. SI ME throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its own right independent of its indi- vidual manifestations. 12 Social facts are the bases of sociology in Durkheim's methodology. sociology are built. It is upon social facts that society and Viewing sociology as a natural science implies accepting the following principles: (1) Social facts are in nature, i.e. have distinc- tive empirical prOperties and form real systems. (2) (3) (4) (5) They are linked by necessary general relations deriving from their very nature; they are, in subject to the same principle of determanism that has been so fruitfully postu- ” other words, h‘ V- (\I‘ lated by all the sciences. We can therefore uncover invariant relations, i.e. laws, which express the necessary bonds between social phenomena, or between social facts and other forces which act upon them. Moreover, we can establish between certain of these phenomena relations of causation and of interdependence. And, in discovering the nature of social phenomena, the laws of their behavior, and the patterns of their development and changes, we must use the methods of accurate observation that are approach. gharacteristic of the scientific As can be seen, the social fact was the basic unit of analysis for Durkheim. It is something which is universal throughout the society and is, therefore, one of the defin- ing and identifying characteristics of that society. l Emile Durkheim (edited by George E. G. Catlin, translated by Sarah A. Solovay & John H. Mueller), The Rules 2; Sociological Method (New York: The Free Press, 19355, p. 13. ‘ 2Alpert, 22. cit., p. 80. th ce; of que tin exié mammL..- had 0: uset‘u: and w} the re the Cc Placed ”t in dry to 13 A second concept which will be found throughout Durkheim's writings deals with the questions surrounding the notion of social solidarity. Durkheim found the con- cept of social solidarity to be crucial in any discussion of society and its problems. Durkheim dealt with this question in Th3 Division 21 L529; in Society where he dis- tinguished between two types of social solidarity; mechan- ical and organic. Mechanical solidarity is that type which had existed during most of human history. Based on moral and social homogeneity, it is rein- forced by the discipline of the small community. Within such a framework, tradition dominates, indi- vidualism is totally lacking, and justice is over- whelmingly directed toward the subordination of the individual to the collective conscience. Property is communal, religion is indistinguishable from cult and ritual, and all questions of individual thought and conduct are determined by the will of the com- munity. And the ties of kinship, localism, and the sacred give substance to the whole. Durkheim recognized that this type of solidarity had once been practical; but he did not feel that it was useful in a society which had developed technologically and which allowed for the emergence of individuality from the restraints of the past. He felt that repression by the collective was no longer necessary and could be re- placed by the organic articulation of free men carrying out individual functions, but united by their complement- ary roles. This type of solidarity was not based on lNleet, 92c 2L2.) PP. 34-35. lI ori wou ind: basi lems ing 1 PIOb] theor; or hi throng or a E tIVe. it is and an 14 repressive laws, but rather was based on division of labor. Within the framework of organic solidarity there can be a general disengagement of man from the tradi- tional restraints of kinship, class, localism, and the generalizad social conscience. Justice will be restitutive, rather than penal; law will lose its repressive character, and there will be a diminish- ing need for punishment. Heterogeneity and indi- vidualism will replace homogeneity and communalism, and division of labor will provide all that is necessary to unity and order.1 Durkheim felt that as society became more technologically oriented a new social order was needed. This social order would be more in line with the times and would allow the individual to find self-expression and self-fulfillment. Since the question of social solidarity was so basic to Durkheim, many of his works were based upon prob- lems which he considered capable of destroying or enhanc- ing this solidarity. The role played by some of these problems will be discussed as this work proceeds. Man and Society - Any study of the sociological theories of Emile Durkheim must begin with an examination of his related concepts of man and society. It is only through an understanding of these concepts that the works of a social theorist may be put in their proper perspec- tive. Since the sociologist claims to be studying society, it is imperative that his conception of society be defined and understood. lIbid. tit he: tha ideI COVG SOCL exPre patter 8Octet 15 Durkheim felt that man is by nature a social animal. He is not able to live or function according to his poten- tial outside of the framework of society. His identity and being are formed by relationships with others. He is both a creator and a product of society. In order to know man one must know his society. The importance of this relationship is evident throughout the works of Emile Durkheim. Society is more than a group of individuals, it transcends those composing it at any given time. If Durk- heim were living today he would probably feel comfortable with the Modern Liberal school of philosophy which holds that man is a product of society, man finds his self identity in his social identity, and who man is is dis- covered in the relations in which he engages. The question is then, what is society? To Durkheim society was unity, regulation and a source of life and expression. Society is a unity. It is neither a mere plurality of individuals, nor a simple mechanical juxtaposition of human beings, although, of course, it could be nothing if it were not at least this. Society is an organization, a more or less definite, and more or less permanent system of relationships. It is an association, interaction, and communication, but of a sort that permits us to conceive of it as system, and hence as organization and unity. Society is regulation in that there are certain patterns of relationships which are set for all within the society. This is what brings about social solidarity. A lAlpert, gp. gig” pp. 174-175. he 16 simple society is regulated by mechanical solidarity with its repressive laws and strict system of penalties. Society in this instance is regulated to a great extent by tradition, with the individual subordinated to the col- lective conscience. The concept of collective conscience as proposed by Durkheim is one which must be understood if many of Durk- heim's theories are to be studied. Common or collective consciousness is a name that Durkheim gives to the sum total of social similitudes, that is, to the complex whole of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling which, on the whole, are char- acteristic of the members of a group. It is a system of values which is held by all members of the society. This value system is made up of the accepted patterns of behavior which are found within the society. It is a rather constant set of rules which apply to the behavior of all individuals within the society. The indi- vidual in a society with mechanical solidarity is sub- serviant to this value system. He is not an individual, but rather, is like a cog in a gear. He turns with the rest and does not rise above the gear. In this simple society, kinship. localism, and religion are the prime factors in the formation of the personality of the individual. Because of the signifi- cance of tradition in the Operation of the society the kinship patterns were regulated by the past as were the 1Ibid., p. 180. JI rel tho and pan: l7 religlous patterns . Individuals who attempt to be individuals in their thoughts and actions are considered harmful to the society and to all the members of the society and are, therefore, punished severely. This is the type of system which was in Operation during much of the history of man until the rise of tech- nology. With the industrial and technological revolution came a breaking down of this form of society. Kinship and religious patterns began to suffer because of the in- creased pOpulation and contact between people. Durkheim saw this breakdown and called for social solidarity based upon organic solidarity. This form of solidarity was to be based upon the increasing technology and its accompanying divisions of labor. Under organic solidarity man could become a true individual. He could find his own identity primarily in his function. He was, however, dependent upon others to provide him with that which he could not provide for himself. As a result, society was strengthened. It was made more solid. People worked together because they needed one another in order to survive. More will be said about this aSpect of Durk- heim's thought in the section of this chapter dealing with the division of labor. The importance which Durkheim placed upon society is probably best reflected in the following quotation from The Elementary Forms 23 the Religious Life: whi ele Of: the crea He 1: tut1( It tr by so I'hich not 0] actior V1 in So be E/é” l—_ 18 A society is the most powerful combination of ‘physical and moral forces of which nature offers us an example. Nowhere else is an equal richness of differ- ent materials, carried to such a degree of concentra- tion to be found. Then, it is not surprising that a higher life disengages itself which, by reacting upon the elements of which it is the product, raises them to a higher plane of existence and transforms them.1 Durkheim felt that society was a natural thing which, because of its ability to synthesize its diverse elements, could cause man to be raised to a higher plane of existence than he could be without it. Man is a producer of society because he is one of the materials which makes up society. He also helps to create it since it is through man that society operates. He is the essential element. His relationships and insti- tutions are the prime elements in society. At the same time, however, society is more than man. It transcends each individual. The individual is shaped by society through the relationships and institutions which form the society. As a result, man is also a prod- uct of society. A major variable in the Operation of the society is action. Society cannot make its influence felt unless it is in action, and it is not in action unless the indi- viduals who compose it are assembled together to act in common. It is by common action that it takes con- sciousness Of itself and realizes its position: it is before all else an active cooperation. 1Emile Durkheim (translated by Joseph Ward Swain), The Elementary Forms 2; the Religious Life (London: George Allen a Unwin, 1915), p.-EFO. 2Ib1d. ’ p. “18. is I; 1 19 The inactive society ceases to exist. Society, to Durk- heim, is like an idea, it is Of no value if it cannot be put into action. A society which has become stagnant, or inactive, has no reason for existing and will, in a rela- tively short period of time, cease to exist. Solidarity will break down and the society will disintegrate. As Nisbet points out, from the above description of society it follows that for Durkheim society comes from the Greek word communitas rather than from societas. For Durkheim society is a community, a close knit group which is brought together in order to act. In Durkheim . . . it is community that has prior reality, and it is from community that the essential elements Of reason flow. It is instructive to note that in Durkheim the tables of individualism are turned. Where the indi- vidualist perSpective had reduced all that was tradi- tional and corporate in society to the hard and unchanging atoms Of individual mind and sentiment, Durkheim, in diametrically Opposite fashion, makes the latter manifestations Of the former. We have thus a kind of reverse reductionism, one that takes some of the deepest states of individuality . . . and explains them in terms of what lies outside the individual: in community and moral tradition.1 Community, for Durkheim, became a framework for analyzing questions of morality, law, religion, and other problems facing society. Durkheim felt that community and society had a reality prior to the individual. Community exists and the Jmoped-1: A. Nisbet, The Sociolo ical Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 33. i I'm-CW III; - . 20 human being becomes an individual as he partakes of the relationships which exist in the community. Durkheim's view of the individual is thus as radi- cally social as his view of morality. Man is unknow- able, at least to the social scientist, except as a manifestation, a mode, of community. The discipline of mind and character is but the personalization of the discipline of the forming group. Normal person- ality is a reflection Of normal integration with com- munity. Abnormal personality is a reflection of the breakdown Of this group integration.l Here we see the close relationship between man and society. In Suicide Durkheim spent much time discussing this rela- tionship. He explains one important service which society provides man when he points out that, It has been sometimes said that because of his psychological constitution, man cannot live without attachment to some object which transcends and sur- vives him, and that the reason for this necessity is a need we must have not to perish entirely. Life is said to be intolerable unless some reason for existing is involved, some purpose justifying life's trials. The individual alone is not a sufficient end for his activity. He is too little. He is not only hemmed in spatially; he is also strictly limited temporally. When, therefore, we have no other object than our- selves we cannot avoid the thought that our efforts will finally end in nothingness, since we ourselves disappear. But annihilation terrifies us. Under these conditions one would lose courage to live, that is, to act and struggle, since nothing will remain of our exertions. The state Of egoism, in other words, is supposed to be contradictory to human nature and, consequently, too uncertain to have chances of permanence. Durkheim then carries this further by pointing out that, 1Ibid., p. 96. 2Emile Durkheim (ed. George Simpson, translated by John A. Spaulding & George Simpson), Suicide (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 210. 21 Indeed, a whole range of functions concern only the individual; these are the ones indispensable for physical life. Since they are made for this purpose only, they are perfected by its attainment. In every- thing concerning them. therefore, man can act reason- ably without thought Of transcendental purposes. These functions serve by merely serving him. In so far as he has no other needs, he is therefore self- sufficient and can live happily with no other objec- tive than living. This is not the case, however, with the civiliZed adult. He has many ideas, feelings and practices unrelated to organic needs. The roles of art, morality, religion, political faith, science itself are not to repair organic exhaustion nor to provide sound functioning of the organs. All this supra-physical life is built and expanded not because of the demands of the cosmic environment but because of the demands of the social environment. The influ- ence of society is what has aroused in us the senti- ments of sympathy and solidarity drawing us toward others; it is society which, fashioning us in its image, fills us with religious, political and moral beliefs that control our actions. To play our social role we have striven to extend our intelligence and it is still society that has supplied us with tools for this developmint by transmitting to us its trust fund of knowledge. It is clear that to Durkheim man is composed of two selves, the social and the biological. The biological, or physical, man can survive outside of society. He can live without others, and according to Durkheim, be happy. How- ever, once he begins tO live with other men and to engage in relationships with them this changes. He begins to develop art, morality and law and become involved with religious beliefs and practices. He becomes a social animal. If, in other words, as has often been said, man is double, that is because social man superimposes him- self upon physical man. Social man necessarily pre- supposes a society which he expresses and serves. lIbid. , pp. 211-212. not SOC OI‘I 1° 5’ C: s/a ¥ 22 If this dissolves, if we no longer feel it is exist- ence and action about and above us, whatever is social in us is deprived of all Objective foundation. All that remains is an artificial combination of illusory images, a phantasmagoria vanishing at the least re- flection; that is, nothing which can be a goal for our action. Yet this social man is the essence of civi- lized man: he is the masterpiece Of existence. Thus we are bereft of reasons for existence: for the only life to which we could cling no longer corresponds to anything actual: the only existence still based upon reality no longer meets our needs. Since man is born a biological man and not a social man, he must learn to be social. Social man is developed not born. The child does not know how to act within the social setting. Thus we come to Emile Durkheim's formula, or definition, of education. Education is the influence exercised by adult gener- ations on those that are not yet ready for social life. Its object is to arouse and to develop in the child a certain number of physical, intellectual and moral states which are demanded of him by both the political society as a whole and the Specific milieu for which he is Specifically destined. Many writers of Durkheim's time were critical of this position. This group, whose philosophy has been labeled Classical Liberal, felt that this was an imposition of the will of the group upon the individual and was, therefore, immoral. It would seem that Durkheim's answer to this criticism would be that the individual and society are able to develop only at the expense of each other. He ll'bid., p. 213. 2Emile Durkheim (translated by Sherwood D. Fox), Education and Sociology (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 71. so. tic was soc um and lear the 1 It a] tIVe 23 felt, that rather than being in Opposition they imply each other, The individual, in willing society, wills himself. The influence that it exerts on him, notably through education, does not at all have as its object and its effect to repress him, to diminish him, to denature him, but, on the contrary, to make him grow and to make of him a truly human being. No doubt, he can grow thus only by making an effort. But this is pre- cisely because this power to put forth voluntary effort 8 one of the most essential characteristics of man. In summary, it is evident that Durkheim considered society as the basic unit Of life. It is upon this assump- tion that many of his ideas and observations are based. As was previously stated, he considered man a product of society as well as a creator. He proposed that every indi- vidual was a two-fold being: a physical, or biologic, man and a social man. The physical was natural and the social learned, but both were important. Education, he held, was the key which allowed man to take his place in society. It allowed him to form his social self which was impera- tive if he were to survive. Man had to learn to be moral, lawful, artistic, religious. It was the task of society to teach man so that he could rise above his animal status. The next section of this chapter will deal with the moral and ethical considerations of society and education which were of much concern to Emile Durkheim. lIbid., p. 78. mo; itj rea 24 Moral and Ethical Considerations - Emile Durkheim considered the question Of morality as one of the most central concepts which confronted society and sociologists. As Everett K. Wilson points out in the Editor's Intro- duction to Moral Education: For Durkheim, however, morality was crucial from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. Theoretically, any enduring system Of human relation- ships must be seen as intrinsically moral, involving obligatory elements that coerce conduct and that, since they represent shared conceptions of the good, provide the basis for social unity. From a practical standpoint, a sound secular morality was for Durkheim the condition of national health--or even survival.l It is significant that Durkheim stressed a secular morality rather than a strictly religious oriented moral- ity. Secular morality, to Durkheim, was founded upon reason rather than revealed religion. It was not tied to a system of static religious beliefs, but rather could be changed as reason dictated. The conveyor of secular morality was the public school. In Moral Education Durkheim discussed the three main elements of morality: the spirit of discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy or self-determination. In discussing the concept of morality in general Durkheim stated that: 1Emile Durkheim (ed. Eyerett K. Wilson, translated by Everett K. Wilson & Hermann Schnurer), Moral Education (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. ix. “w TV r’“"' whie They 25 We can say that morality consists of a system Of rules of action that predetermine conduct. They state how one must act in given situations: and to behave properly is to obey conscientiously.i If we see morality as it is, we see that it con- sists in an infinity of special rules, fixed and Specific, which order man's conduct in those different situations in which he finds himself most frequently.2 Thus, in fact and in practice, it is not according to theoretical insights or general formulae that we guide our conduct, but according to specific rules applying uniquely to the Special situation that they govern. In all significant life situations, we do not refer back to the so-called general principle of morality to discover how it applies in a particular case and thus learn what we should do. Instead there areBOlear-cut and Specific ways of acting required of us. Morality is basically a constant thing, and so long as we are not considering an excessively long time span, it remains ever the same. A moral act ought to be the same tomorrow as today, whatever the personal prediSpositions of the actor. Morality thus presup- poses a certain capacity for behaving similarly under like circumstances, and consequently it implies a certain abi ity to develop habits, a certain need for regularity. Morality, however, constitutes a category of rules where the idea of authority plays an absolutely pre- ponderant role.5 Morality is then a group of basically constant rules which govern the conduct of most aSpects of a man's life. They are determined by rational rather than by religious Ibid.. p. 24. Ipid,, p. 25. 3;2i§., p. 26. Ibid.. p. 27. 5;2id,, p. 29. f5 in ct] the 11m not kind “H53 26 bel‘lefs. They are also Specific rather than imparting a general.notion of moral behavior. For Durkheim, the spirit of discipline was the fun- damental element of morality. Discipline, as used by Durkheim, has a rather Special meaning: Discipline is only a means of Specifying and impos- ing the required behavior, so it derives its raison d'etre from the behavior. But if the preceding analysis is correct we must say that discipline derives its raison d'etre from itself; it is good that man is disciplined, independent of the acts to which he thus finds himself constrained.l Many writers of his time argued that discipline was a violation of man's natural constitution. They held, in fact, that this was an immoral act: that man should not be impeded in his natural development. Durkheim, on the other hand, argued that discipline was natural. He argued that an inability to restrict one's self within determinate limits was a sign of disease. He held that this was true not only with reSpect to human conduct but also for all kinds of biological behavior. In order to have a full sense of self-realization, man, far from needing to see limitless horizons unroll- ing before him, in reality finds nothing as unhappy as the indeterminate reach of such a prOSpect. Far from needing to feel that he confronts a career without any definite terminus, he can only be happy when involved in definite and Specific tasks. This limitation by no means implies, however, that man must arrive at some fixed position where ultimately he finds tranquility. In intermittent steps one can pass from one special task to others equally Specific, without drowning in lIbid., p. 32. 811 in; 2? ‘the dissolving sense of limitlessness. The important thing is that behavior have a clear-cut objective, 'Yhiph may be grasped and which limits and determines Durkheim felt that moral discipline was necessary in order to teach the child to curb his desires, set limits on his appetites of all kinds, and to help him define the goals of this activity. Only with such limita- r tions could the individual find happiness and moral health. Without such limitations the individual would lack purpose and, therefore, would find unhappiness and would be im- moral. Moral discipline extends further than just buttres- sing moral life. It, according to Durkheim, performs an important function in forming character and personality in general. In fact, the most essential element of character is this capacity for restraint or--as they say--Of inhi- bition, which allows us to contain our passions, our desires, our habits, and subject them to law.2 Throughout the discussion of the role of discipline in morality a group context is implied. According to the definition Of morality prOposed by Durkheim the individual cannot carry out such action if he is not part of a group. This leads to the second element of morality, attachment to social groups. llbido 9 p. 40. 21bid., p. 46. _ 'rz'.»~' , .~'_~ . w 8“ an vi is tw: I‘eE se; the dis attai there sOlel been to ,h s°Cie 28 While Durkheim separated the spirit of discipline and attachment to social groups and discussed them indi- vidually, he did so only for purposes of examination. It is impossible, according to Durkheim, to separate these two, since discipline and attachment to social groups are really integral parts of the same whole. They cannot be separated in real life, since it is through attachment to the group that discipline comes about, and it is through discipline that the group survives. Before discussing the role of attachment to social groups as an element of morality it is necessary that we examine the related concepts of personal and impersonal goals as they relate to the issue of morality. Human behavior can be distinguished in terms of the ends toward which it is directed. Now, all the objectives sought by men may be classified into the following two categories. First, there are those con- cerning only the individual himself who pursues them; we shall therefore call them personal. Second, there are those acts concerning something other than the individual who is acting: in this case, we shall call them impersonal.l Durkheim held that personal ends and the means of attaining them do not have moral value. He held that there has never been a society where behavior directed solely to the interest of the person performing it has been considered moral. In fact, there is some question as to whether such a situation could even be considered a society. It would appear, from an examination of 11b1d.. pp. 55—56. th to on him: 1118 only reco behav /Orffl.’3‘l~k 29 Durkheim's concept of society, that a condition where 'behavior directed solely to the interest of the actor would not be a society. As a result, Durkheim held that behavior prescribed by the rules of morality is always behavior concerned with achieving impersonal ends. Moral action pursues impersonal objectives. But the impersonal goals of moral action cannot be either those of a person other than the actor, or those of many others. Hence, it follows that they must neces- sarily involve something other than individuals. They are supra-individual. Outside or beyond individuals there is nothing other than groups formed by the union of individuals, that is to say, societies. Moral goals, then, are those the object of which is society. To act morally is to act in terms of the collective interest.l Again, we see Durkheim's position that society supercedes the individuals who comprise it. Society is again shown to be more important than the individual. In order for society to produce the desired effect on the individual, he must have an interest in linking himself with society. Man must realize, and act, accord- ing to the idea that he may achieve his fullest potential only within the context of society. He must learn to recognize the necessity of living within the limits of behavior imposed by the society. Must we then acknowledge the antagonism between the individual and society, which so many theoreticians have cavalierly asserted? Quite to the contrary, there is in us a host of states which something other than ourselves--that is to say, society--exPresses in, or through us. Such states constitute society itself, 1Ibid.. p. 59. 8V0: ASa one I 30 living and acting in us. Certainly society is greater than, and goes beyond us, for it is infinitely more ‘vast than our individual being; but at the same time it enters into every part of us. It is outside us and envelops us, but it is also in us and is everywhere an aspect of our nature. We are fused with it. Just as our physical organism gets its nourishment outside itself, so our mental organism feeds itself on ideas, sentiments, and practices that come to us from society. It is society which promotes individualism and indi- vidualism which carries out the actions of society. There- fore, the question of morality is completely tied to the notion Of attachment to a social group. 2 It must be recognized that man belongs to many groups, which causes the problem for the individual of choosing the group or groups to which he shall be commit- ted. Should the individual commit himself to family, nation, or humanity to the exclusion of the others? This question, Of course, is rather ridiculous. Each of the three represents a different phase of our social and moral evolution. They prepare for, and build upon, each other. As a result, they may be superimposed without excluding one another. To Durkheim, man is morally complete only when governed by the threefold force which they exert on him. If these three groups can and should coexist con- currently, if each Of them constitutes a moral objective worthy of our effort, it does not follow that these different goals have the same value. They constitute a hierarchy. The evidence suggests that familial goals are and should be subordinated to lIbid., p. 71. 31 Inational objectives, if for no other reason than that the nation is a social group at a higher level. Because the family is closer to the individual, it provides less impersonal--and hence, less lofty-- goals. The question of the hierarchical relationship between nation and humanity is somewhat more difficult than the family-nation relationship because of the nationalistic pressures brought upon individuals in many countries. The individuals are taught to place nation before all else. If an ideal situation could exist, nations would all be working together to achieve the goals of humanity, thus bringing about a cessation of national rivalry. The third element of morality, autonomy or self- determination, is the keystone of those who criticized Durkheim's conception of morality. They argued that autonomy was the only condition which was moral, and that the imposition of collective behavioral expectations was immoral. Durkheim, in his discussion of the role of autonomy in moral behavior, is not agreeing with this posi- tion. Durkheim felt that in no society was completely autonomous behavior practiced or allowed. There is also much evidence to Show that he did not consider such behavior possible. To understand the world and to order our conduct as it should be in relationship to it, we only have to take careful thought, to be fully aware of that which is in ourselves. This constitutes a first degree of auton- omy. Moreover, because we then understand the laws Of 1Ibid., p. 74. This “as Very 32 everything, we also understand the reasons for every- thing. We can then understand the reason for the universal order.1 If we understand the reasons we are able to act rationally, and it is here that we have autonomy. Our autonomy comes from science. It, according to Durkheim, liberates us because it helps to develop understanding. This is not autonomy in the old sense, but rather is an autonomy based upon science and reason. This autonomy is ours in the sense that we internalize its bases, science and reason, and make them the bases for our actions. Thus, we have ascertained a third element of moral- ity. To act morally, it is not enough--above all, it is no longer enough-~to respect discipline and to be committed to a group. Beyond this, and whether out of deference to a rule or devotion to a collective ideal, we must have knowledge, as clear and complete an awareness as possible of the reasons for our conduct. This consciousness confers on our behavior the auton- omy that the public conscience from now on requires of every genuinely and completely moral being. Hence, we can say that the third element Of morality is the understanding Of it. Morality no longer consists merely in behaving, even intentionally behaving, in certain required ways. Beyond this, the rule prescrib- ing such behavior must be freely desired, that is to say, freely accepted; and this willing acceptance is nothing less than an enlightened assent.2 This is the role, and type, Of autonomy to which Durkheim was referring in making it an element of morality. This is very different from that discussed by his critics. To his critics the definition of autonomy proposed by Durkheim does have limits. Autonomy for Durkheim lIbid., p. 115. 21bid., p. 120. rl 33 Upemated within the context of given rules of behavior and under the guidance of science. For his critics, autonomy meant the right to act any way that the individual felt acceptable with no necessary regard for others. This type of autonomy is that which differentiates secular morality from religious, or sacred, morality. Such autonomy, as Durkheim prOposed, could have no place in religious morality, especially in the religious morality of Durkheim's time. This autonomy, according to Durkheim, implies that there is a human science of morality, and consequently that moral facts are natural phenomena that l emerge through reason alone. Durkheim was convinced that public education was the key factor in the development of the moral society and moral individuals. This is brought about by the fact that it is in the public schools that the majority Of children are being formed. While Durkheim was concerned with the role of public education, it must be remembered that he was discussing elementary school systems of France when referring to public education. His comments, however, would also appear to be applicable to more general public education such as that Operating in the contemporary United States. The role of the public schools is to help the child understand the need for curbing his desires and appetites. It is imperative that the child be brought to the 34 realization Of the demands, and the need for demands, which are made upon him. Education must help the child understand at an early point that, beyond certain contrived boundaries that constitute the historical framework of justice, there are limits based on the nature Of things, that is to say, in the nature of each of us. This has nothing to do with insidiously inculcating a spirit of resignation in the child; or curbing his legitimate ambitions; or preventing him from seeing the condi- tions existing around him. Such proposals would contradict the very principles of our social system. But he must be made to understand that the way to be happy is to set proximate and realizable goals, cor- responding to the nature of each person and not to attempt to reach Objectives by straining neurotically and unhappily toward infinitely distant and conse- quently inaccessible goals. Without trying to hide the injustices of the world--injustices that always exist--we must make the child appreciate that he can- not rely for happiness upon unlimited power, knowledge, or wealth; but that it can be found in very diverse situations, that each Of us has his sorrows as well as his joys, that the important thing is to discover a goal compatible with one's abilities, one which allows him to realize his nature without seeking to surpass it in some manner, thrusting it violently and arti- ficially beyond its natural limits. There is a whole cluster of mental attitudes that the school should help the child acquire, not because they are in the interest of this or that regime, but because they are sound and will have the most fortunate influence on the general welfare.1 Public education has a responsibility to assist the child in learning the expected patterns Of behavior which society holds as acceptable. By doing so the school is assisting the child in realizing that the only way in which he can reach his fullest potential is through soci- ety and the limits it places upon his personal goals. Only if the child realiZes the necessity of Operating 1... 1. _d-. pp. 49-50- II de 1nd ing, does forc form: 03‘ la sanct that theor tfike W t: key e] 35 Within the limits set by society does Durkheim feel that he will be able to reach his potential. It would appear, that at this point, Durkheim is operating on the basis of Split grounds; social expecta- tions and the autonomy Of science. He has said that the individual must learn the expected patterns of behavior while also saying that the individual may take autonomous action on the basis of science and reason. It should be noted that, for Durkheim, social eXpectations and the autonomy of science are not mutually exclusive. They are related in that the limits set by society upon action are determined, at least in part, by the use Of science and reason. The limits which Durkheim held are placed upon the individual are somewhat unclear. At no point in his writ- ings does he go into detail concerning these limits. He does not describe the way that they are determined or en- forced. It must be assumed that these limits take two forms: formal and informal. Formal limits take the form of laws while the informal limits may take the form of sanctions against certain forms Of behavior. The fact that such limits do exist was a major aSpect of Durkheim's theories and it would appear that he desired that others take them on the same basis. It is in the school that a child learns the need for the spirit of discipline which Durkheim considered the Ikey element of morality. The spirit of discipline was the g4. 1e th pul 8c: the llljhgdllrlkt 36 'Drimary, or key, element of morality for Durkheim for without it moral behavior was impossible. It is also in the school that the child learns the value of attachment to social groups. It is here that he is introduced to other aSpects of society with which he did not interact before this time. It is here that he is introduced to social groups of larger scope than the family. It is also in the public school that the child learns about the third element of morality, autonomy. It is here that the child learns to use science, to develOp the reason and rational thought and action necessary for autonomy. It is in the public school that he also learns the limits which must, according to Durkheim, be placed upon the individual for the good of society. If man is to be a moral being, he must be devoted to something other than himself: he must feel at one with a society, however lowly it may be. This is why the first task of moral education is to reunite the child with the society immediately surrounding him, that is to say, with the family. In a general sense, morality begins where and when social life begins, but there are nonetheless different degrees of morality, if for no other reason than that all human societies are not of equal moral value. Now there is one that enjoys a real primacy over all the others--the political society, the nation. However, it can enjoy moral primacy only on the condition that it is not con- ceived of as an unscrupulously self-centered being, solely preoccupied with eXpansion and self- aggrandizement to the detriment Of similar entities; but as one of many agencies that must collaborate for the progressive realization of the conception of man- kind. The school has, above all, the function of linking the child to this society. As for the family, it itself suffices to arouse and sustain in the hearts of its members those sentiments necessary for its existence. On the contrary, as for the nation--as here understood--the school is the only moral agent through which the child is able systematically to so Sh. be) whi Vid in Wha‘ in 37 learn to know and love his country. It is precisely this fact that lends pre-eminent significance to the part played by the school today in the shaping of national morality.l What Durkheim is saying, in effect, is that the prime function of public education is socialization. This is the process which changes the human being into a person. It takes the raw animal and changes him into a member Of society. This process links the child with his society by showing him what the society considers as apprOpriate behavior. By exposing him to the standards and mores by which society is governed, education develOps the indi- vidual personality and aids the child in finding his place in society. The logical Question which arises at this point is: What place shall be accorded to the teaching of morality in public schools? Durkheim foresaw this question and answered it in Moral Pnucation: Morality, which originally was completely a function of the act, the content of the behavior that consti- tuted the act, now depends more and more upon knowl- edge. For a long time now we have imputed social value only to an act that was intentional, that is to say when the actor pictured ahead Of time what the act involved and what bearing it had on the rule. But now, beyond this first level Of awareness, we require another, which goes deeper into the nature of things-- the symbolic explanation of the rule itself, its causes and reasons for being. This explains the place we accord the teaching of morality in our schools. For to teach morality is neither to preach nor to in- doctrinate; it is to explain. If we refuse the child all explanation of this sort, if we do not try to help him understand the reasons for the rules he should lIbid.. p. 79. tr. 0P Spe for in I 0PM hem 38 abide by, we would be condemning him to an incomplete and inferior morality. Such teaching, far from harm- ing the public morality--as has sometimes been 1 alleged-~1s henceforth its necessary condition. The teacher answers questions: he explains; he does not indoctrinate; he does not provide set answers. His main task is to provide guidance. He assists the child in finding the reasons behind various limitations which Mu society has set upon him. He assists the child in dis- covering the reasons for the need of a Spirit of disci- pline, attachment to social groups, and autonomous actions. He assists the student in developing a questioning atti- tude, based upon the use of science, which leads to reason and rational action. It may be useful, at this point, to examine some of the Specific recommendations which Durkheim made for devel- oping the elements of morality in the child. These are Specific recommendations which present, in somewhat clearer form, the tasks which have just been discussed. These are, in effect, the means to the end, the end being the devel- opment of a moral society. In order for the teacher to achieve what he desires, he must bring the child under his influence. There are at least two basic prediSpositions, two built-in characteristics of the child's nature, which expose him to our influence: first, his character as a creature of habit: and second, his suggestibilityé especially his Openness to imperative suggestion. lIbid., pp. 120-121. 21bid., p. 134. hei 39 Keeping this in mind, the teacher would be able to assist the student in seeking the explanations for the rules and restrictions of society. After exposing the child to his influence, the teacher will then work on developing habits and accustom- ing the child to regularity. This, according to Durkheim, will give the child his first feeling for the moral forces which surround him and upon which he depends. Since the development of habit involves a great deal of emulation of the teacher by the student, Durkheim felt that this could lead to subservience, which he felt was not in the best interest of the pupil. The only way of preventing this kind of servitude, of insuring that education does not make of the child a carbon copy Of the teacher's shortcomings, is to multiply the teachers in order that they may comple- ment one another, and so that the various influences prevent any one from becoming too exclusively pre- ponderant. In discussing the topic of school discipline, Durk- heim stated: In reality, however, the nature and function of school discipline is something altogether different. It is not a simple device for securing superficial peace in the c1assroom--a device allowing the work to roll on tranquily. It is the morality of the class- room, just as the discipline Of the social body is morality properly speaking. Each social group, each type of society, has and could not fail to have its own morality, which expresses its own make-up. lIbid. . p. 143. ha 171 ¢ and 1 s 1 fun a 40 Now, the class is a small society. It is therefore both natural and necessary that it have its own moral- ity correSponding to its size, the character of its elements, and its functions. Discipline is this morality.1 By initiating the student in the development of habits of self control and restraint simply because he should control and restrain himself, the teacher is devel- oping the understanding which the child will need when he leaves the school and enters the larger society. He will be developing the habit of living the moral life which he will need for survival. The use of punishment in bringing about school disci- pline is also of importance in the writings of Durkheim. The purpose of punishment is not to make the guilty party pay for his crime through suffering, nor to intimidate others. It is to bolster those consciences which viola- tions of the rule can and do disturb. If the children have adopted the rules of the classroom society, the viola- tion of such rules will have the effect of bothering them, and punishment will usually not be necessary. Punishment is not forgotten, but plays an important role in the functioning of the morality of the school. The same, of course, is true within the context of the larger society. Punishment is a portion of what Durkheim referred to as education through direct experience. 11b1d.. pp. 148-149. ‘1'; vux . Du Se' is way have S.Yst 41 Furthermore, this education through direct experi- ence with things is prolonged well beyond childhood and.adolescence. It lasts throughout life. .For learning is continuous, and the adult has no teachers except life itself; and the only sanctions for his behaviors are most often simply the consequences of these acts. It is through this tentative, groping procedure, by trying and failing and beginning again, and correcting little by little our ways of doing things, that we learn the techniques of our trades and everything we possess of the practical wisdom that we significantly term "experience."1 The teacher acts as a guide for his students in order that they may have the experiences which will allow them to grow toward their fullest potentiality and degree of morality. This idea, of course, is not unique to Durk- heim, as others such as Rousseau and Dewey have discussed the same theory of education. In discussing the area of discipline and punishment Durkheim pointed out that education is necessarily more severe among civilized than among primitive peoples. This is caused by the difference in complexity in their various ways of life. Primitive systems, according to Durkheim, have no need of an organized or systematic discipline or system of formal education. True education begins only when the moral and intel- lectual culture acquired by man has become complex and plays too important a role in the whole of the common life to leave its transmission from one eneration to the next to the hazards of circumstance. 11bid., p. 177. 21bid., p. 189. 8} ca la ea. ca: env rel: Dora SChC will the Prim, made Even during Durkheim's time school environment was considered as having a significant influence on learning. It is important that the child be aided in making the transition from his home environment to the school environ- ment. Since the individual takes part in many groups dur- ing his lifetime it is important that he be able to make the necessary adjustments which come with each group and each environment. To Durkheim, the school environment should be one which allows students to eXperience the types of relation— ships which exist in the larger society. This environment ; cannot be shaped or fashioned at will. It depends, to a large extent, upon the composition of the class. With each group there is a Spontaneous collective life which cannot be created nor replaced by any individual. Durkheim's position on the importance of school environment in the shaping of the individual is extremely relevant today. One of the major problems facing contem- porary American society, racial integration of public schools, is closely tied to the question. This subject will be explored in more depth in the next chapter during the examination of contemporary American society. This brings us to what Durkheim considered the role of the teacher. While it has been pointed out that the primary role of the teacher is that of a guide, Durkheim made this even more Specific. 001 3P! cus Hum mem rep] torn Side 43 The role of the teacher, although thus limited, is 'Very important: he directs the class. His task is above all to multiply the circumstances in which a free elaboration of common ideas and sentiments can take place, to bring out the positive results, to co- ordinate them, and give them stable shape. Preventing the spread of destructive sentiments; discouraging their expression; re-enforcing wholesome ones with the full weight of his authority, by taking advantage of all the incidents of school life: awakening them in such a manner that they become crystallized and durable-~these are the procedures he may use. In a word, he must lie in wait for everything that causes the children of a giIen class to sense their unity in a common enterprise. Nothing really needs to be added to this, so we shall turn to the question of the division of labor in society. Division 9; Labor - In The Division 9; Labor in Society Durkheim was concerned with social solidarity as a key moral issue. One of the major functions of the divi— sion of labor is to promote solidarity within society. Since Durkheim made much use of the previously mentioned concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity it would appear valuable to devote some time to a more precise dis- cussion of each of these. Mechanical solidarity comes about when a certain number of states of conscience are common to all the members of the society. This is represented primarily by repressive law. Bepressive law is basically that which causes people to conform to the common conscience. This form of solidarity is more common in what Durkheim con- sidered primitive societies. These are usually small 1mm. , p. 242. eve for Per: the Societies with little division of labor. In this form of society the individual is bound directly to society with- out any intermediary. Man is a part of society, he is not an individual entity. Individuality is possessed by the society; therefore, personal rights and real rights are the same. As society develOps and the division of labor be- I comes more prominent, organic solidarity comes to the fore. In this form of solidarity the individual depends upon society, because he depends upon the parts which consti- tute society. Society is larger and more complex, which F leads to the division of labor. Rather than being a soci- ety of common beliefs and sentiments this society is char- acterized as a system of different special functions which are united by definite relations. The man in this society is an individual. He is not expected to be the same as every other person. Man is an individual because he per- forms a Specialized function: therefore, he has a unique personality. Man's personality comes from the society and the relationships in which he participates. It is necessary, then, that the collective con- science leave open a part of the individual conscience in order that Special functions may be established there, functions which it cannot regulate. The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity. In effect, on the one hand, each one depends as much more strictly on society as labor is more divided; and, on the other ta 10 hi: coo pen the dew are Bet} 8001. 45 hand, activity of each is as much more personal as it 1 S more specialized. 1 Since man is no longer self-sufficient, he comes to depend upon others for many of the things which he needs in order to survive. In most cases this develOps a co- hesion within the society since people are put in the posi- tion of depending upon others. As shall be pointed out later in this chapter, such psychological cohesion does not F always occur. When this happens the individuals involved tend to suffer from anomy. As the individual's work becomes more specialized the individual can take more pride in his portion of the tasks to be carried out for the good of society. He no longer is in the position of having to do many things, but is able to concentrate on a Specific task which becomes his task, and hence, more personal. The laws which characterize organic solidarity are cooperative, rather than being repressive. Repressive, or penal, laws characterize primitive societies because of the necessity of keeping everyone the same. In a more developed society these laws are not needed since people are to be individuals. It is necessary that they work to- gether for the good of the total society. In primitive societies even domestic and religious life had to be 1Emile Durkheim (translated by George Simpson), The Division 3: Labor ;n_Societz (New York: The Free Press, 19557. p. 131. In Th1 aPP clo imp: the lab on ‘v 11031: #6 regulated by penal laws. Formerly all aSpects of family life were governed by law, but as society advanced there were few laws concerning the family except for adultery and bigamy. Durkheim made the following statement in summariz- ing his arguments on this subject: If, moreover, one recalls that even where it is most resistant, mechanical solidarity does not link men with the same forces as the division of labor, and that, moreover, it leaves outside its scope the major part of phenomena actually social, it will become still more evident that social solidarity tends to become exclusively organic. It is the division of labor which, more and more, fills the role that was formerly filled by the common conscience. It is the principal bond of social aggregates of higher types. This is a function of the division of labor a good deal more important than that ordinarily assigned to it by economists.1 In connection with this the question arises as to whether this is caused by the division of labor or the marketplace. This question is not as difficult to answer as it may appear, as the division of labor and the marketplace are closely tied. To say which is more important is almost impossible. However, it would appear, that for Durkheim the division of labor is more significant. Having discussed the functions of the division of labor, Durkheim then turned to the causes and conditions on which it is dependent. Durkheim took exception to the most widely accepted theory of the time, that the division lIbid., p. 172. of 1*? of labor had its origin in man's unceasing desire to in- crease his happiness. His main reason for rejecting this theory was his idea that if the function of the division of labor was just to increase happiness it would have arrived at its extreme limit long before his time. In addition, civilization which results from the division of labor would have also st0pped. Since Durkheim did not feel that either had reached its limit he could not accept the idea that the division of labor was solely caused by a desire to increase happiness. He also stressed the idea that as a society becomes more complex (more Specialized) the rate of suicide increases. Therefore, specialization (the division of labor) could not be a cure-all for the unhap- piness of men. In attempting to explain the cause of the division of labor Durkheim presented the following prOposition: The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and, if it pro- gresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development, it is because societies become regularly denser and generally more voluminous.l Durkheim was arguing that as societies grow, both in size and density, it becomes necessary for them to divide the functions which must be carried on in order for the society to continue in existence. It should be stressed here, as it is by Durkheim, that society does not permit the divi- sion of labor, it necessitates a greater division. This 1Ibid.. p. 262. 4 J #8 is caused not by external circumstances which react upon society, but rather by the increased struggle for existence which the society wages. The need for the division of labor, therefore, comes from within the society and is one of the keys for survival as the society expands. In this discussion Durkheim made a point which again shows his evolutionary leanings when he stated "that W the division of labor can be effectuated only among members of an already constituted society."l Society must deve10p from a primitively, mechanically solidary, society into an organically solidary position. This provision h prevented Durkheim from proposing a utOpia which could be set up, full-blown, on earth to prove the superiority of an organically solidary form of society. Civilization does not cause the division of labor as many other theorists had stated. To Durkheim, civiliz- ation is a consequence of the division of labor. Civiliz- ation develops as a result of the division of labor, not because of any intentional action, but rather, because it must develop. The third portion of The Division 22 Lager in_ Society deals with three abnormal forms of the division of labor; anomic division of labor, the forced division of labor, and a third form which is characterized by the fact that the functional activity of each worker is insufficient. lIbid., p. 275. 1: 1: The lab 0001 of _] aris Seco ’49 In each of these cases the division of labor does not pro-