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
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POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE URBAN INDIAN

presented by

Michael LeRoy Indergaard

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URBAN RENEWAL AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN
MOVEMENT IN MINNEAPOLIS: A CASE
STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND THE URBAN INDIAN

By

Michael LeRoy Indergaard

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ABSTRACT

URBAN RENEWAL AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT IN MINNEAPOLIS: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE URBAN INDIAN

By

Michael LeRoy Indergaard

This study examines the founding of the American Indian Movement (AIM) in Minneapolis during 1968. AIM represents the continuation of an old struggle in a new social context. Large migrations in the 1950's and 1960's introduced Indians to new forms of social inequality and domination. At the same time Indians were exposed to new models of political resistance provided by the urban rebellions of the 1960's. This study is an attempt to understand the relationship between the immersion of Indians in the urban class structure and the emergence of a radical Indian political organization. A political economy framework is used to sketch the Indian's place in the class system. Within this context a specific focus is the impact of urban renewal on Indian housing. The study finds that the Indian housing situation along with police relations, were the key factors in the evolution of AIM.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study examines a milestone in the continuing struggle of American Indians--the formation of the American Indian Movement. The most significant aspect of this chapter of an old conflict, was its new social context. Large migrations had introduced Indians to the cities and to new forms of social inequality and domination.

Indian migration to cities built up gradually in the 1950's and increased steadily in the 1960's. Migration was stimulated by chronic poverty on the government managed reservations in combination with the enticement and pressure of Bureau of Indian Affairs relocation programs. There have been large established Indian populations in a number of cities since the mid-1960's.¹ By 1970, it was estimated that at least half of the Indian population of one million was urban.² A large proportion of these Indians are amongst the most impoverished segments of the urban population.

In a sense, this episode served to update the American Indian struggle. Previously, Indians resisted white domination on reservations through a relatively passive, cultural strategy. This cultural strategy³ centered around maintaining the kinship relations and social norms of tribal society. When Indians migrated to the city many of them used the same

strategy to face a new situation of domination. This strategy was somewhat successful in terms of preserving Indian identity in the city. In fact, the migration of Indians to cities resulted in a revitalization of Indian ethnicity. Unfortunately, another matter requires equal consideration. Many urban Indians have found themselves subjected to unbearable material hardship and various forms of domination.

In relocating to the city, Indians have come face to face with the forces, which in another form, subjugate the reservation from afar. Although both city and reservation are within the U.S. political economy, they occupy quite different positions. The urban social structure has its own relations of domination. Urban Indians shared the subordinate position of the "urban poor" with other groups.

Some urban Indians have recognized both the similarity and uniqueness of their own position. An important manifestation of this perception was the American Indian Movement (AIM) which appeared in Minneapolis in 1968. In AIM we see the development of a new resistance whose focus expands to include many forms of domination. AIM adapted new principles and tactics from the political struggles of other subjugated urban groups, particularly blacks.

Indian resistance as expressed in AIM was of an assertive rather than passive nature. At the same time, Indian identity remained as the core organizing principle of AIM. Thus, AIM represented a delicate blend of tradition and innovation.

AIM was a result of the choice of urban Indians to remain Indian. The organization was based on the recognition and acceptance of struggle as the necessary means to pursue this choice. It is important to understand how Indian experiences in Minneapolis led to this political consciousness. Such an understanding is the general goal of this study. A political economy framework will be used in this undertaking.

Other studies of urban political movements have influenced the specific focus on this study. John Mollenkopf's attempt⁴ to link grass roots political activism and rebellion of the 1960's to urban renewal programs has proved very helpful and relevant for the case of Minneapolis Indians. Mollenkopf argued that these political challenges were direct responses to the adverse consequences of urban renewal programs. The most important of these negative effects were deteriorating housing conditions and political domination.

Mollenkopf's argument influenced the specific question this study examined, "the relationship between urban renewal and the emergence of the American Indian Movement in Minneapolis."

It is fair to say that the urban renewal program was a significant factor in AIM's development, but it is one of several important factors. This study suggests that an entire political economy context must be drawn for urban political rebellions. Unequal relations of power characterize many points of the Indian's contact with urban society. It seems

that Indian activism developed along these points of power as paralleling points of resistance. No other issue mobilized Minneapolis Indians as did the open exercise of police power. The perception of police harassment was probably the single most important factor in the actual origin of AIM.

The material conditions that inner city Indians shared seemed an important part of their sense of community. The housing crisis was probably the most important aspect of their material deprivation. Urban renewal was a key factor in creating an unbearable housing situation for Minneapolis Indians. What is important to note is that relations of domination were also involved in the actual implementation of urban renewal programs such as Model Cities. The struggle of AIM in Model Cities was similar to its struggles to get involved in other government programs. It seems that it was because Model Cities raised expectations about the redevelopment of local territory that AIM's struggle here, led to its crystalization as a radical political organization.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The urbanization of American Indians provides material that is highly relevant for the study of race and class. Unfortunately, the theoretical implications of their urban experiences have not drawn much attention from social theorists.

This examination of the American Indian Movement has several interrelated theoretical tasks. The first is to demonstrate the usefulness of a political economy framework in a case study of urban Indian political activism. The second is to explore the concept of ethnicity in the analysis of racial inequality and domination. The third and final task is to consider the significance of Indian experiences for understanding the relationship between race and class.

The empirical question through which these theoretical goals will be pursued is "What was the relationship between urban renewal and the origin of the American Indian Movement in Minneapolis?"

The central theme of this study is that the Indian migrating to the city, enters a new set of social relations - the urban class structure. The complexity of the urban Indian situation requires an intricate research operation. First we will examine the reservation background of Minneapolis Indians so as to understand the circumstances which led to urban migration. Then the focus will shift to a political economy

sketch of the urban class system. Because this area has been largely neglected in previous urban Indian studies, it will be outlined in some depth. Once the urban context of class relations has been established, the case of urban renewal will be used to highlight the social forces which have shaped urban Indian experiences. We are then prepared to consider the American Indian Movement as an important response of Indians to their experiences in the urban class structure.

A. The Assimilation Model and Urban Indians

Most empirical research on urban Indians has not contributed much to our understanding of either general theoretical issues or of the group itself. The few studies that have focused on urban Indians generally have been theoretically handicapped by their reliance on the acculturation-assimilation model. This model is largely derived from an analysis of the "ethnic" European immigrants who came to the U.S. in large migrations between 1840 and 1920.

One of the most influential articulations of this model appears in Milton Gordon's work, Assimilation in American Life (1964). It is worthwhile to examine Gordon's presentation of this model in some depth, and to use it occasionally as a point of reference throughout our theoretical discussion. Its influence in urban Indian studies reflects its popularity as an attempt to interrelate the concepts of ethnicity, race and class. It is still significant because of the responsive chord it has struck within mainstream American sociology for the study of inequality.⁵ As Joan Moore notes, "the ethnic-assimilationist model fits extremely well with the

neoconservative emphasis on 'free' market factors as an explanation of status mobility, and on cultural factors as an explanation of failure" (Moore, 1981:278).

Milton Gordon's project has been to develop a model of the adaptation of "ethnic" European immigrants to the dominant white, Anglo Saxon Protestant (WASP) society in nineteenth century America. In designing this model he intended that it also serve as a framework for analyzing contemporary majority-minority relations.

His model is largely concerned with the process by which a minority group assimilates into the dominant American society. Although he conceives of several variables in this process, the "acculturation" and "structural assimilation" variables stand out as the two most basic steps in the assimilation process. Acculturation, usually the first step of assimilation for the minority group, entails a "change of cultural patterns to those of the host society" (Gordon, 1964:71). Structural assimilation represents the large scale entrance of the minority group "into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society, on a primary group level."⁶ Once the group is structurally assimilated, it is on the verge of full assimilation as "all of the other types of assimilation will naturally follow" (Gordon, 1964:81).

For our purposes, it is useful to try to determine the assumptions about ethnicity, race and class that underly Gordon's assimilation model. (1) In the context of majority-minority relations, the most useful indication of ethnicity is social group endogamy. Ethnic groups are those which "permit

and encourage" their members "to remain within the confines of the group for all of their primary relationships and some of their secondary relationships throughout all the stages of the life cycle" (Gordon, 1964:34). (2) Because they are characterized by endogamy, racial, religious and cultural minorities are all ethnic groups. For religious, cultural and cultural-racial (Indians) minorities, "ethnic closure" originated as an attempt to preserve the group's values and identity. For racial groups, especially Blacks, prolonged segregation from whites, has led to the same practical results--endogamy. (3) The condition of social group endogamy, "structural pluralism," "sets up the conditions under which ethnic prejudice will grow and flourish" (Gordon, 1964:237). The most significant contemporary consequence of social group endogamy is racial discrimination and inequality. (4) Racial discrimination is dysfunctional in the urban, industrial class system. The very existence of ethnic groups in modern class society is a fundamental source of tension and injustice.

The major problem, then is to keep ethnic separation from spilling over into the civic areas of secondary relations to impinge on housing, jobs, politics, education, and other areas of functional activity where universalistic criteria of judgment and assignment are necessary and where the question of ethnic considerations can only be disruptive and even disastrous (Gordon, 1964:264).

Thus one of Gordon's fundamental assumptions is that the American class system functions to stratify people on the basis of criteria which are universalistic instead of particularistic.

There are three major conclusions that Gordon draws from his examination of majority-minority relations that deserve our consideration. The first is that acculturation is

inevitable for non-WASP peoples in America. The second is that acculturation is a necessary pre-condition for minority groups to achieve a higher position in American society. The third point is that the other steps in the assimilation process, most importantly structural assimilation, do not inevitably follow acculturation.

The success of the acculturation process has by no means guaranteed entry of each minority into the primary groups and institutions . . . nor has such acculturation success eliminated prejudice and discrimination or in many cases led to large-scale intermarriage within the core society (Gordon, 1964:78).

The WASP group, or "core society," itself an ethnic group, will naturally resist the intrusion of other ethnics into its realm of primary relationships. As a result, prejudice and discrimination are likely to remain a feature of American society for some time. These will tend to be racial in nature as neither whites nor blacks are particularly interested in racial intermarriage.

A most important implication of the assimilation model is made salient in this last point. The assimilation model concedes a dominant structural position for WASPs in the American class structure. What unspoken assumption about majority-minority relations underlies Gordon's project and ultimately holds such a model together? The absence of conflict in his discussion suggests that minority groups do not question either white supremacy or the class hierarchy because they accept the superiority of WASP cultural values. Now we are prepared to consider the assimilation model as it has been applied to urban Indian research.

As Hoy Steele notes, most urban Indian studies take the approach that (1) "once Indians move to the cities, the process of acculturation/assimilation inevitably occurs" and that (2) "Indians must acculturate/assimilate if their adaptation to urban life is to be successful" (Steele, 1982:283).

The main consequence of this emphasis is that the urban Indian is examined with an intense but narrow focus while little attention is directed to the urban social structure itself. One study which typifies this approach consists of a sophisticated statistical analysis of the "relationship between self-conception and several factors previously identified as correlates of assimilation" (White & Chadwick, 1972: 239). The whole endeavor centers on the expectation that the only possible direction for changes in Indian identity is toward that of white society.

Another common exercise has been to attempt to determine if a sample of urban Indians possess attitudinal traits and values that are assumed to be prerequisites to successful urban adjustment. These measures are usually compared to indicators of successful urban adaptation such as length of urban residence, occupational status and income. The results of such a study in Denver show that factors outside the assimilation model have to be considered.

The Indians were rated poorer than Anglos in the areas of psychological characteristics, which usually are associated with the ideal white, middle-class, working personality which exhibits assertiveness (offers suggestions), ambition, flexibility, and ability to plan ahead. But unfortunately, these characteristics did not produce a differential reward even if they were present.

For those Navajos who did have desirable personality characteristics, as measured by various personality attributes, wages were not higher (Weppner, 1972:309-310).

This study suggested that employer discrimination serves as a barrier to upward mobility for Indians whether they are acculturated or not. However, the limitations of the study's framework prevent Weppner from examining the larger context of this discrimination. "Were these Indians being hired because they were relegated to a category of 'cheap labor' in the minds of employers? It is difficult to say, but the data did not tap such information."⁷

Likewise, a study of discrimination in Seattle which provides implications about the Indians' relationships with urban institutions, retreats into attitudinal explanations. A survey of Indians found widespread complaints about poor treatment or discrimination with regard to "access to adequate housing, opportunities for employment, availability of welfare services, police-Indian relations, and delivery of medical and dental services" (Bahr, Chadwick & Stauss, 1971: 4). Rather than raising questions about the Indian's position in the urban social structure, the authors focus on attitudes. For example, instead of considering whether Indian complaints about police were an indicator of domination, they comment that "the important point is not whether the above accounts are literally true."⁸ What is important is whether such perceptions "reinforce the already negative image of the police," and thus "operate to prevent the Indian from receiving the protection of the law."⁹ The study's final conclusions also seem to assume that any actual discrimination is the result of

personal prejudice. Thus although this study focuses some attention on the majority society, it still falls into the main body of urban Indian research where "urban social institutions are rarely subject to critical scrutiny" (Steele, 1982:286).

Joan Ablon's study of Indians in San Francisco is one of the earliest studies that questions the comparison of urban Indians to the nineteenth century European immigrants (Ablon, 1964).

Few have aspirations of social mobility, although they may wish to obtain some of the same sort of material possessions as are owned by those who are obviously of a higher social status than themselves. The general lack of the kind of motivation that first generation European ethnics have exhibited toward climbing the social ladder or even toward the amassing of money and social skills to prepare themselves or their children for this climb appears to be due partially to Indians thinking of themselves in a unique Indian social niche which is akin to the community social hierarchy, and partially to Indians' basic inhibitions against economic planning for the future and the amassing of personal wealth or material goods.¹⁰

These are strong indications that urban Indians are not about to surrender their culture. Indian subcommunities have emerged and become well-established in the cities to which Indians have migrated. Steele's examination of such a subcommunity in Kansas emphasizes the importance of activities in which people who shared "Indian" values were able to come together. Such values included a "strong emphasis upon family life and obligations" and "the ethic of mutual aid (especially to kin but also to other tribal members and other Indians)" (Steele, 1982:286). At the same time we see an observation

similar to one made by Ablon about the importance to Indians of rejecting certain "white" values. In this case, the "peculiarly Anglo values" that are rejected are "acquisitiveness, some forms of competition, and an exploitative attitude toward nature" (Steele, p. 287).

The point to be made is not that Indians who move to the city resist change. The assimilation model has distorted the whole issue of change as well as other issues. The extent and nature of change is problematic although some important observations can be made.

The adaptation of reservation Indians to the city does not necessarily imply drastic change. Ablon has claimed that "the adjustments most Indians make in learning the cues for living successfully in the white world seem to be superficial to their established basic personality structure" (Ablon, 1972:425).

Contrary to popular opinion, reservations are not usually cut off from the rest of American society, either economically or culturally. Joseph Jorgenson's use of the political economy model shows that Indian reservations have been tied to the American political economy through exploitative relationships for some time (Jorgenson, 1971). We will consider this model in depth but its immediate importance is that a social interaction between Indians and whites occurs in the context of economic and political inequality. In fact, reservation and urban Indians have this point in common.

Most Indians, reservation or urban, are constantly exposed to non-Indians. Indeed, any minority group that receives unequal treatment at the hands

of a dominant group must not only be exposed to it but must also learn to adapt to many different kinds of majority-minority interactions (Steele, 1982:285).

One last point is that it is unlikely that Indians escape the influence of the mass media. For the reservation Indian to be culturally isolated would mean that he is literally not "tuned in" to white society. There is no evidence that T.V. and radio signals stop at the boundary of the reservations. In sum, the Indians who relocate to the city are likely to already know a great deal about the "customs, habits, expectations and values" of whites.¹¹

Thus we must look to other factors to explore why Indian culture has been undergoing some extraordinary changes in the cities. If we think of ethnicity as revolving around shared cultural values or identity, it is appropriate to say that a new Indian ethnicity is developing in concurrence with urban Indian subcommunities. This "Pan-Indianism," the emergence of shared values and activities between different tribal groups, is perhaps the most important manifestation of cultural change amongst urban Indians. Price's study of Los Angeles Indians, the largest urban Indian population in the U.S., suggests that Pan-Indianism will have more than passing significance in major cities.

The great majority of Indians in the city clearly are ideologically and emotionally affiliated with Pan-Indianism. Pan-Indianism thus seems to emerge as a stabilizing element--and perhaps a permanent part--of the adaptation of the Indian migrant to the metropolitan area (Price, 1968:175).

The migration of Indians to cities had meant a resurgence of Indian ethnicity rather than its demise. The claim of the

assimilationists that acculturation is inevitable seems to be discredited. However, we cannot dismiss the assimilation model until we deal with the question of urban Indian poverty.

Indians are probably the most destitute of America's urban poor. In 1970 it was estimated that three-fourths of urban Indians lived below the poverty line for annual income of \$3,550 per family of four (Spencer, Jennings et. al. 1977). The assimilation model still can point to the lack of urban Indian acculturation as the cause of their poverty. However, the assimilation studies have addressed urban Indian inequality indirectly, if at all. The chief deficiency of the assimilation model is that it does not relate the impoverishment of urban Indians to an urban social structure that is based on racial and class inequality. The model is not conceptionally equipped for such a task.

In Milton Gordon's model, WASP dominance was assumed rather than examined. This dominance is discussed as if it exists only in the realm of values. Gordon sees the most essential manifestation of class stratification to be a status hierarchy. A key assumption underlying his whole discussion of acculturation is that non-WASPs recognize and accept WASP criteria for status and the resulting hierarchy.

In contrast, studies by Ablon and Steel suggest that the conscious rejection of some "white" values is an important part of urban Indian identity. Thus there are reasons to believe that Indians do not necessarily accept their subordinate position in American's cities. It seems more

appropriate to postulate that Indian-White relationships revolve around power and conflict rather than consensus.

The subject of my study, the American Indian Movement, represents one of the most direct responses to the various hardships that inequality imposes on urban Indians. The purpose of my study is to consider the relationship of this movement to the material conditions and power relations that Indians faced in its birthplace: Minneapolis, Minnesota.

B. Political Economy of Racism: Racial Definitions

It is partly through default that the assimilation model has dominated research on urban Indians. The inadequacy and paucity of research on urban Indians is symptomatic of the deficiency of mainstream sociological theories on race in general. The study of race in America has focused primarily on relations between blacks and whites. The position of non-black minorities is vaguely defined in much of the race literature (Moore, 1981). The key to this ambiguity is that the racism against such groups as Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans and American Indians is overshadowed by the rigid social perceptions of a black race.

American scholars tend to reify racial definitions. Their investigation of race is incomplete because of a narrowness of focus.

In this study emphasis is placed on the fact that race derives its significance from social context. This position is clearly presented in Pierre van den Berghe's treatment of race. A fundamental assumption is that the separation of

human beings into races is a social rather than a biological division. For van den Berghe, a race is:

A human group that defines itself and/or is defined by other groups as different from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable physical characteristics. These physical characteristics are in turn believed to be intrinsically related to moral, intellectual, and other non-physical attributes or abilities (van den Berghe, 1978:6).

We must direct our attention to the general social structure of a society to determine how race has taken on significance within that society. "Race is only a special case of more general social facts" (van den Berghe, 1978:6). Instead of being concerned with a general theory of race, our task is to place race relations within "the total institutional and cultural context of the society studied" (p. 6). Thus the significance of a racial definition must be determined from its specific historical, cultural and social context.

Because the U.S. is a capitalist class society, our first and foremost task is to explore the relationship between race and class relations. The importance of this analytic framework can be demonstrated as inadequacies of the assimilation model in its classical analysis are revealed.

During the eras of heavy immigration, very negative racial stereotypes, such as the following, were imposed on non-WASP Europeans:

It is fair to say that the blood now being injected into the veins of our people is 'sub-common.' You are struck by the fact that from ten to twenty percent are hirsute, low-browed, big-faced persons of obviously low mentality (Lieberson, 1980:25).

Milton Gordon's only consideration of these racial perceptions is as the ideological manifestation of WASP ethnocentrism, Anglo-Conformity. The assimilation model does not address this racism in the context of the period's class relations. It is useful to think of the immigrants as a low-wage labor pool that was being integrated into the expanding industrial work force. Strong arguments have been made that the pressure on these immigrants to accept "American" values and discard "ethnic" values was actually an element in the imposition of industrial worker discipline (Dawley, 1980). Racism was significantly represented in the Anglo-Conformity attacks on the immigrants' cultural values.

Stanley Lieberson has shown that a racist immigration quota system was used to regulate this labor pool:

These racial notions received official government support through the Immigration Commission formed by Congress in the first decade of the century. Freely using the term 'race' to refer to a variety of specific groups, the Commission concluded that the various European groups could be ranked superior or inferior in terms of their inherent biological capacity (Lieberson, 1980:25).

Race and class factors were an essential aspect of the immigrant's "cultural conflict" with American society. The historical case of the white ethnics highlights the fact that social definitions of race are flexible over time and between groups. There is a critical relationship between class and race in America whose development must be considered within a historical framework. My study will take the view that class dynamics provide the essential point of reference for analyzing the class-race configuration.

C. Political Economy of Racism: Capitalist Accumulation

Relations of class and race structure American society through a complex configuration of inequality and domination. Race and class are intertwined as the result of interdependent historical developments. However, we are forced to address this system through two relatively distinct literatures.

The analytic separation of race and class is more a reflection of theoretical limitations than of social reality. Although class relations should be seen as the underlying dynamic in the development of capitalist society, race cannot be considered merely its product. Racism has greatly shaped and facilitated the development of capitalism. It seems appropriate to state that causality between race and class moves in both directions.

Robert Blauner has provided a term--"racial capitalism"--and a theoretical challenge which are appropriate for the race-class question.

Race affects class formation and class influences racial dynamics in ways that have not yet been adequately investigated. The entire relation between race and class interest (and racial and class privilege) is an exceedingly complicated one that social theorists might well explore in deeper fashion. It is the most important question that must be faced in constructing a theoretical model of a social capitalist society (Blauner, 1972:28-29).

This study will not be able to break out of the theoretical dichotomy of race and class to any great extent, but will follow a tradition which seems to be developing the most sensitivity to this complex issue. This "political economy of

racism" is perhaps the most advanced attempt to integrate race and class into a single model of social inequality.

From my perspective an analysis of the development of class relations provides the most systematic theoretical framework for racial capitalism. The class analysis derived from the critical tradition of political economy allows the most comprehensive and sensitive examination of relations of power and inequality. The theoretical base largely consists of elaborations on Marx's insights into the internal logic of capitalist accumulation, as an expression of the class relations between capitalist and worker.

Utilizing such a framework does not necessarily mean that racial phenomena must be crudely translated into class terminology and then inserted into class analysis. When the political economy framework is applied to a given class-race configuration, it does allow us to see many aspects of racial inequality as explainable in terms of class. Yet at the same time, racial phenomena which do not fit into the class model become salient. Race, as an independent variable, reasserts itself and is reflected in the course that class relations take.

A brief review of some important developments in the political economy of racism will eventually lead us to an urban focus that is emerging in political economy. Contributions of this urban political economy provide the theoretical framework for my study of urban Indians.

One of the early break-throughs in the development of a political economy of racism was the adaptation of the colonial model for the analysis of black urban ghettos at the end of

1960's (Blauner, 1969). The analysis of the Pine Ridge reservation by Richard K. Thomas was a pioneering attempt to apply this model to American Indians (Thomas, 1966-1967). The colonial model allows us to tie developments in the reservation systems and Government Indian policy to shifting needs of other segments of the political economy (Jorgenson, 1971; 1978). It was through the racist structure of the reservation system that Indians were originally integrated into the political economy in the western two-thirds of the U.S. This model needs to be more widely applied and further refined. Some authors have noted that developments on reservations are paralleling shifts in Third World countries which have been conceptualized in the neo-colonial or dependency model (Anders, 1980).

On the basis of the research completed so far, it seems that the reservation system has facilitated the expropriation of various Indian resources rather than the exploitation of Indian labor. Thus most reservation Indians are poorly integrated into the class structure.

When the Indian becomes urban he enters into a different set of relationships within the same national political economy. We must look at the urban Indian with reference to the urban manifestation of the capitalist class structure (Bee & Gingerich, 1977).

In this study I am attempting to construct a political economy sketch of the urban Indian situation in Minneapolis from which the American Indian Movement emerged. The

relatively young tradition of urban political economy seems best equipped, conceptually, for an analysis of the Minneapolis class structure.

Urban political economy has inherited some enduring concepts from Marx's classical analysis which deserve a brief introduction. A formal definition of the concept of class is not emphasized as it is best defined by the essential relations that exist between capitalist and worker. The most basic component of their relationship is that the worker must sell his labor power to the capitalist in order to make his living. The capitalist, as owner of the means of production, and the worker's labor power, has the right to sell the worker's product in the market. The increase in money that the capitalist receives over his initial investment is "surplus value." However this surplus value actually originates in the "surplus labor" of the worker in the production process.

Surplus value originates in capitalist production through a process whereby labor produces more in value than is necessary to reproduce labor power. The value of labor power is equivalent to the socially necessary costs of maintaining the worker and reproducing the labor force (Hill, 1980:4).

When the capitalist expropriates the product of the worker's surplus labor and derives surplus value from it, Marx speaks of "exploitation." The capitalist re-invests this surplus value as capital into the production process. This cyclical "process of capital accumulation is the driving force of a capitalist society" (Hill, 1980:4).

The urban political economy perspective sees the process of urbanization to be intimately related to developments

in the capitalist mode of production. David Harvey has made some basic contributions in the attempt to understand urban physical transformations as manifestations of the social relationships of capitalist society. Harvey states that the "urban process implies the creation of a material infrastructure for production, circulation, exchange and consumption" (Harvey, 1978:113). This built environment is a network of use values that facilitates the production of value and surplus value.

Harvey divides the totality of physical structure which is a city into that which is used in production and that which is used in consumption (Harvey, 1978). The struggle between the capitalist and working classes is mainly expressed in these two fundamental spheres of life. Because of the separation of place of work from residence, these almost appear as two separate struggles. The conflict located in the workplace is over the wage rate, which provides the purchasing power for consumptive goods, and the conditions of work" (Harvey, 1976: 267).

The class struggle as reflected in the consumptive sphere is a particularly important focus in urban political economy. It is quite useful for understanding the domination of the urban poor, especially racial minorities. Harvey's work suggests that we can view this domination as an exploitative relationship benefiting various segments of the capitalist class. The struggle in the consumptive sphere "is against secondary forms of exploitation and appropriation represented

by merchant capital, landed property, and the like. This is a fight over the costs and conditions of existence in the living place" (p. 267).

Thus, in the sphere of consumption as in the sphere of production, the two classes face each other from conflicting positions of interest. In considering the urban Indian's involvement in class conflict, my study will focus on the struggle in the place of residence. To emphasize that domination and struggle in the sphere of consumption are based on opposing class interests, I will use the term "secondary exploitation." The tentativeness of this useage of exploitation is in recognition of the fact that the term in the Marxian tradition concerns a clearly defined relationship in the realm of production.

For Harvey, a basic manifestation of class struggle in the city is the fact that the built environment has become increasingly oriented to collective consumption. Through collectivization, consumption can be controlled, shaped and guaranteed so as to meet the needs of capitalist accumulation. Harvey's analysis proceeds to the point at which the capitalist state must be considered. The underlying conflict between capital and labor is reflected in the state's increasing role in collectivizing consumption (1976).

James O'Conner has provided a model of the capitalist state¹² that has proved quite useful for conceptualizing the state's role in production and consumption. Richard Hill discusses O'Conner's conceptual categories of the state budget and the functions they serve for capitalist accumulation.

On the one hand, social capital outlays are state expenditures required for private accumulation. There are two kinds of social capital: (1) social investment expenditures (social construction capital) are fixed capital outlays on means of production which increase the productivity of labor (e.g., transportation modes, research and development facilities, utility projects, industrial parks); and (2) social consumption expenditures (social variable capital) are consumption fund outlays requisite to the reproduction of labor power (e.g., schools, commuter facilities, health services) (Hill, 1980:9-10).

Capitalists can indirectly reap more profit by "maximizing the relative share of the budget devoted to social investment expenditures while restricting social consumption expenditures to that level necessary to reproduce the labor force according to the existing requirements of the productive forces" (Hill, 1980:10).

This is a crucial point where the conflict between workers and the capitalist class becomes articulated in state activity. The fact that these "social consumption services or social wages have increasingly been viewed by the working population as an integral part of wages" leads Hill to characterize this situation as "fiscal exploitation" (Hill, 1980:10).

Fiscal exploitation can be defined as a process which lowers the real wage of the working class by transferring part of the money wage via state tax, and expenditure mechanisms to social investment outlays and/or tax subsidies which generate surplus value for capitalist enterprises (Hill, 1980:11).

Hill has made a useful effort to integrate race into this scheme in his studies of Detroit. This allows him to relate racial discrimination to class exploitation in both the sphere of production and consumption.

Racial discrimination--exclusion from equal opportunity on the basis of race or national origin--is reflected in racial segregation by industry, by firm, by departments within firms, by occupation, and by territory-based institutions linked to segregated housing markets (Hill, 1980:6).

With consumption being increasingly collectivized, the "interconnections between exploitation and discrimination have increasingly been played out within the framework of state activity" (Hill, 1980:9). Further discussion of O'Connors' model of the state allows elaborations on these "interconnections" that will be particularly useful for my study.

The productive potential of a large portion of the city's population is not developed. The desperation of this reserve army "provides leverage for the capitalist class in its conflict with workers. Racial minorities such as Indians and Blacks are disproportionately represented in this "surplus population." This is a critical area where the relations of discrimination and exploitation form a configuration of "super exploitation" for racial minorities.

Discrimination fosters superexploitation of black workers through the medium of a segregated reserve army by enforcing lower wages, poorer work conditions, more frequent speed-up, less attention to health and safety standards, etc. in job categories, plants, and industries where work is primarily performed by black labor (Hill, 1980:8-9).

By capitalist logic, "social consumption expenditures" appropriate to reproduce the labor power of this surplus population are minimal. Hill integrates racial discrimination with his concept of class exploitation in the consumptive sphere--fiscal exploitation--to coin the term "fiscal super-exploitation"-- which, through the fiscal mechanism, is thus

reflected in the unequal distribution of social wages and/or tax burdens between each group of workers" (Hill, 1980:11).

Since the means of meeting the basic needs of daily urban life have been largely collectivized as government services, a paucity of social consumption expenditures can threaten the physical survival of this segment of the population. This creates a great potential for large scale rebellion. Thus it is necessary to control the inner city population through direct means as well as lessening the potential for rebellion through providing enough aid to maintain their physical existence. This social control is conceptualized as a third category of the state budget, "social expenses." Social expenses are projects and services necessary to maintaining stability and are most visible today in government expenditures on welfare, prisons and the police" (Hill, 1980:10).

Social consumption expenditures and social expenses are key concepts for the organization of this study. An attempt will be made to tie their respective function, "social reproduction" and "social control" to specific institutions. The study will focus on the effect of the corresponding institutional relationships on Indian life in Minneapolis.

The more specific question this study will explore, the relation of urban renewal and political activism, is also grounded in the urban political economy literature. This topic is especially important as it emphasizes the contradictions inherent in the role of the capitalist state and brings class struggle dramatically back into the model. Class

struggle is manifested as a "fiscal crisis" of the state and becomes salient in the form of political rebellion.

The increasing role of the state in the service of monopoly capital's interests eventually undermined the economic and political stability of major cities.

Although the state has socialized more and more capital costs and absorbs more and more expenses of production, the social surplus continues to be appropriated privately. The increasing socialization of costs and the continued private appropriation of profits creates a fiscal crisis: a "structural gap" between state expenditures and state revenues (Hill, 1978:217).

As central cities face various revenue problems, they are increasingly unable to "generate social-capital outlays to upgrade their resident labor force, to attract private capital and tax base, or to meet intensifying demands for social expenses generated by an increasingly impoverished resident population" (Hill, 1978:222). Thus a vicious circle maintains the fiscal crisis and political unrest.

City governments reacted to the revenue-expenditure gap with attempts at increasing the tax base of the central city. This was to be accomplished through the redevelopment of the central core. This "urban renewal" would "eliminate blighting slums, stimulate investment in the central business district, and provide the transportation infrastructure necessary to keep the CBD viable" (Mollenkopf, 1978:125).

Although most urban renewal is initiated in the name of better housing, Francois Lamarche has demonstrated that the main force in redevelopment--property capital--is attracted

to grander, non-residential projects (Lamarche, 1976). The fact that it destroys much more of the workers' housing than it replaces leads Lamarche to term urban renewal, "expropriation." The hardships that urban renewal imposes on workers includes the direct consequence of a shortage of dwellings at reasonable rents and the deterioration of renter housing awaiting renewal (Lamarche, 1976).

John Mollenkopf¹³ has attempted to link the imposition of urban renewal to the inner city riots and grass roots political activism of the 1960's. His main concern is to trace how the revenue crisis became a political crisis. In considering power his attention stays somewhat at the level of city hall instead of focusing on the basic institutional relationships of everyday inner city life. Thus his treatment of this grass roots activism is more suggestive than substantive. What his account hints at is that the attempts of those "neighborhood groups" to provide "decent housing" and to "reclaim public institutions," indicate¹⁴ that both material conditions and power relationships were essential factors in their political mobilization. This has suggested to me that a productive examination of Indian activism and AIM should be especially sensitive to power and inequality in Minneapolis Indian experiences with urban renewal, as well as in their institutional relationships in general.

III. SPECIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The general focus of this study is the relationship between Indian urbanization and the emergence of Indian political activism. Because of the political economy framework, "Indian urbanization" will be examined in terms of institutional "social control" and "social reproduction." The specific focus is the relationship between urban renewal and the origin of the American Indian Movement (AIM).

This research is taking the form of a case study of Minneapolis, Minnesota. The period 1960-1970 is appropriate for several reasons. An urban renewal program became well-established early in this decade and many of its projects were started and completed by the decade's end. This decade also sees the emergence of Indian political activity and the founding of AIM.

The manner in which key concepts are operationalized is consistent with the theoretical assumptions of political economy that have been outlined. To explore Indian relationships to institutional social control and social reproduction, we will try to determine the degree to which specific institutions of the "state" perform each function. Thus we will examine Indian relationships to police, welfare agencies,

schools, health services. This will actually involve two different "levels of the state"--county and municipality--although the latter is the primary focus.

In our specific consideration of the effect of the urban renewal program on Indians we will focus on social reproduction, particularly with regard to quantity and quality of housing.

There are two useful distinctions this analysis should involve. We should use the terms "fiscal exploitation" and "secondary exploitation" to differentiate between aspects of "housing exploitation" that are manifested in the state's activity as opposed to the action of landlords. In order to make this analysis sensitive to both racial and class forms of exploitation, we will add the term, "secondary super-exploitation." "Secondary superexploitation" is derived from Harvey's discussion of "secondary forms of exploitation" and will refer to the situation where landlords introduce racial discrimination into their struggle with workers over rents and conditions of existence in the living place.

In the operationalization of Indian political activism, "political activities" will be those which challenge or protest social, political and/or economic relationships. In analyzing this political activity, an attempt will be made to determine the degrees to which the contested relationships fall into the institutional social control and reproduction categories. With regard to our specific research focus, it is important to determine the degree to which the relationships

which AIM challenged, revolve around urban renewal and the housing situation.

Two research questions best summarize the research focus of this study. The general question is "to what extent did Indian political activism emerge in Minneapolis as a response to institutional social control and reproduction?" The specific research question is "how important a factor was urban renewal in the origin and evolution of the American Indian Movement?"

IV. BACKGROUND TO MIGRATION

The study of Minneapolis Indians cannot merely consist of an examination of their urban experiences. A relevant historical factor in the lives of all Minneapolis Indians is reservation life. Indian migration to the city was a very recent phenomenon. Many Minneapolis Indians were born and reached adulthood on Minnesota reservations.

It is necessary to look directly at the reservation system to understand why and how Minnesota Indians migrated to Minneapolis. This is not solely a historical question as a pattern of two-way migration between the reservations and Minneapolis has become established. A seasonal migration by a sizeable segment of the Minneapolis Indian population to the reservations illustrates the strong social ties between reservation and urban Indians.

Another reason not to consider reservation and urban Indians as separate entities is the fact that the reservation is not completely isolated from the rest of American society. The Indian reservation has long held a position in the U.S. political economy. This section will focus on the integration of the reservations into the U.S. political economy and the Government administration of this relationship. Such an examination provides the basic framework for understanding the circumstances in which Indians migrated to Minneapolis.

A. Reservations in Minnesota

Federal Indian policy has fluctuated greatly over the last hundred years, reflecting the struggle between white interests and advocates of Indian rights. At times attempts have been made to lessen the Indian hold on land and resources by extinguishing the Indian's legal status. Thus Indians and their allies have largely been on the defensive in their political attempts to influence National Indian Policy. Their main concern had been to hold onto or regain the special legal rights and status guaranteed to Indian tribes by treaties. However, this legal status is a two-edged sword. As important as it is for protecting Indians, it has also facilitated the exploitation of Indians within a colonial structure of domination--the Indian reservation.

The reservation has served as a racist institutionalization of economic exploitation. Racism against Indians is intertwined with white economic interests. White attempts to wrestle Indian land away gave birth to this racism. Racism has been linked to the economic exploitation of Indians ever since.

Reservations were established as direct means of social control over the Indians conquered in the nineteenth century. Reservations were not originally set up to expropriate resources but to ensure the security of land that had already been expropriated. Indians were physically isolated on land that was considered less valuable by whites.

In Minnesota, pressure mounted on Sioux and Chippewa bands to cede land after territorial status was achieved in

1849. In 1851, the Sioux ceded all their land in exchange for a small strip along the banks of the Minnesota River and "promises of annuities, education and farm equipment" (League of Women Voters, 1971:12). Starting in 1854, the Chippewas' bands were forced to cede vast areas of rich farmland and timberland. Only the Red Lake Chippewa Band was able to resist giving up its land.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) originated as a bureaucracy whose task was to manage reservations and Indians. Thomas (1966-7) has drawn comparisons between the BIA and the legal bureaucracies that had been set up to administer peoples colonized during European imperialism.

The control and administration of a people's affairs and destiny by outsiders from another culture is the prime characteristic of colonial model and American Indian reservations are an ideal type of this model (Thomas:51).

Later authors have especially emphasized that this domination is economically motivated and facilitated through a political-legal structure.

Typically the colonizers exploit the land, the raw materials, the labor, and other resources of the colonized nation: in addition a formal recognition is given to the difference in power, autonomy and political status, and various agencies are set up to maintain this subordination (Blauner, 1969:395 as quoted in Bee & Gingerrich, 1977:71).

The BIA was able to establish a large degree of control over many aspects of Indian life. The economic needs of Indians were considerable after military conquest although conditions varied somewhat between tribes. In Minnesota the traditional economic basis of the Sioux had been much more

disrupted than that of the Chippewa. Generally, the government's promise of basic goods and services was a chief means of ensuring that Indians would remain on the reservations. "These can appropriately be termed 'appeasement benefits,' because they operated to help keep Indians minimally docile rather than to provide a realistic basis for the development of economic self-sufficiency" (Bee & Gingerich, 73).

Under such tight outside control, the Indians' own socio-economic institutions deteriorated. The general outcome of these conditions was Indian economic dependence on the Federal Government.

The case of the Minnesota Sioux in 1862 sharply illustrated the result of this economic dependence if appeasement benefits were not forthcoming. Because of the Civil War, the Sioux's government agent did not receive funds to pay for their rations. The starving Indians approached the agent to allow them access to warehouses full of their food. The agent replied that "So far as I am concerned, if they are hungry let them eat grass or their own dung" (Brown, 1970). The agent's version of "Let them eat cake" ignited the "Great Sioux Uprising" in which 1400 Indians and whites died. Indian justice left a dead agent with his mouth stuffed full of grass. White justice took the form of the largest mass execution in U.S. history--the hanging of 37 Sioux--and the expulsion of almost all Sioux from Minnesota (Brown, 1970).

The roles of tribal leaders came to be largely developed in the context of Indian economic dependence. When Indians

were allowed to "democratically" choose tribal leaders, they tended to choose those Indians who were thought to be adept at interacting with whites. The appropriate tribal leader in this context was the man who could "get the most" out of the white government.

Even as the reservation system was becoming institutionalized, there were demands at various political levels that reservation land be opened to white development. With the rapid settlement of the West, even the marginal land of the reservation was in demand. For a sixty-year span, Government policy viewed the special legal status of Indians as temporary. The Dawes Act of 1887 initiated this period by encouraging the allotment of reservation land to individual Indians. The goal of the plan supposedly was to encourage Indians to become small farmers. The underlying assumption was that Indians would assimilate into the general population and thus cease to be a "problem."

The main result of this program was the loss of "86 million acres of the best Indian lands" (Spencer & Jennings, 1977:512). Through "honest" as well as dishonest means, whites relieved Indians of possession of their plots.

The Nelson Act of 1889 was the Minnesota application of the Dawes Act. "All Minnesota Chippewa reservations were eventually allotted except Red Lake, which had never ceded, and whose members tenaciously refused to allow their land to be broken up and partially sold" (League of Women Voters: 14). This enabled the timber industry to take over much of

Minnesota's woodlands. By 1969, the final result was that "trust allotment acreage in Minnesota had dwindled from almost 890 thousand acres to about 52 thousand acres" (p. 14).

Federal Indian policy was reversed in the 1930's. Under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, tribes were viewed as being long-term phenomena and the rights of Indians to retain their ethnic identity were recognized.

The IRA ended allotment, provided \$2 million for the purchase of Indian lands to be held in trust, authorized the return to the tribes of original reservation lands still unsold since allotment, and allowed tribes to go into business with the help of a revolving credit fund (p. 7).

However, nothing in the Act would alter the reservations' dependent position within the U.S. political economy. In many cases Indians retained only a small percent of their pre-allotment reservation land. This can be seen in Table 1 for Minnesota reservations. The six Chippewa reservations that re-emerged in Minnesota were collections of fragments. They consisted of a "crazy quilt of Indian tribal lands brought back or reverted after IRA, Indian trust allotments, county, state and U.S. Forest Land, and fee-patented (largely white-owned) property" (p. 27).

In its dependent position, the reservation was vulnerable to direct exploitation. This exploitation had already started to take form in the economic relationships established between reservations and local white economies in the early 1900's.

The BIA was charged with the responsibility of managing reservation resources so as to best benefit Indians. The BIA

TABLE 1
MINNESOTA INDIAN RESERVATION LANDS,
1962 and 1970
(1962 Figures in Parentheses)

Reservation	Indian Trust Land Tribal land (acres)	Individual Allotments (acres)	Government land* (acres)	Total Indian & Govern- ment land (acres)	% Original Reserva- tion
Grand Portage	37,390 (32,913)	7,283 (8,644)	79 (79)	44,752 (41,636)	82% (76%)
Fond du Lac	4,213 (3,932)	17,153 (17,702)	-	21,367 (21,634)	51% (52%)
Leech Lake	14,069 (12,320)	12,693 (11,402)	4 (4)	26,766 (23,726)	5% (4%)
Mille Lacs	3,552 (3,252)	68 (132)	-	3,619 (3,384)	(no bound- aries)
Nett Lake	30,034 (25,976)	11,744 (14,301)	5 (5)	41,784 (41,282)	41% (39%)
White Earth	25,568 (25,382)	1,993 (2,070)	28,555** (26,610)	56,116 (56,062)	8% (8%)
Red Lake	564,426 (564,363)	- (102)	-	564,426 (564,465)	100% (100%)
Upper Sioux	746 (746)			746 (746)	
Lower Sioux	1,743 (1,743)			1,743 (1,743)	
Praririe Island	543 (543)			543 (543)	
Prior Lake	258 (258)			258 (258)	

*NOTE: Purchased by the United States for BIA or Indian use--not in trust. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Minneapolis, Minn.

**NOTE: "Submarginal land" purchased by the Resettlement Administration of the Department of Agriculture, and later purchased under the Farm Security Administration Program for use of Indians. Legislation has been introduced from time to time to turn these lands over to the Indians completely. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Minneapolis, Minn.

(SOURCE: League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 1971:15)

negotiated leases with local whites so that they could use Indian land for farming or cattle raising. These leases were long-term and were priced considerably below market value. Thus, Indians were denied the use of some of their better land in exchange for substandard rents.

The BIA's negotiation of these leases were the first stage in utilizing the colonial structure of the reservation to facilitate expropriation of resources within the reservation itself.

The influx of federal money to meet Indian consumption needs indirectly created additional ties with the local white economy. These government funds did little to stimulate the internal economy of the reservation. The money that kept Indians fed, housed, and clothed "eventually winds up in the hands of the local white contractors, merchants and businessmen" (Anders, 1980:694).

A brief economic profile of Minnesota reservations will serve to illustrate their underdevelopment and poverty. This profile extracts information from Indians in Minnesota (1971).

- Leech Lake Reservation - The area's chief economic activities are tourism and a marginal wood products industry. Wild rice harvesting provides income for some. Unemployment was 37% and the median family income was \$1,500 in 1969.

- White Earth Reservation - It once contained rich Red River Valley farm land and virgin pine forests, which for the most part, ended up in white hands in 1900. Main activity now is seasonal work in lumbering and wild rice harvesting. The

unemployment rate was 36% in 1970 and 80% of Indian families had incomes below \$3,000.

- Mille Lac Reservation - Has non-commercial timberland and some lakeshore footage in recreation area. Also has a 40% unemployment rate and median family income of \$1,200 in 1969.

- Nett Lake - This is a remote area of Northern Minnesota with some timber. Indian families here try to supplement resources with game and berries. Unemployment was 60% and median family income was \$1,543 in 1969.

- Fond du Lac - Tribe owns a fish hatchery and some Indians work in wood products industry in neighboring town. Unemployment was 50% and 49% of families had an annual income of less than \$3,000.

- Grand Portage Reservation - Although 82% of the original reservation land still is in the hands of Indians, "land owned by non-Indians is strategically located on the reservation, affording them an economic advantage in the tourist trade" (p. 34). Timber and trapping provide seasonal income for some. Median family income was \$2,900 and unemployment was at 60% in 1970.

- Red Lake Reservation - The Red Lake Band has retained more autonomy and has developed somewhat more self-sufficiency. It has substantial forests that support an Indian-owned fishery. Unemployment was still high, however, at 47% and median family income was only \$1,550 in 1969.

- The Upper Sioux, Lower Sioux, Prairie Island and Prior Lake Reservations - Have high unemployment and low income from

leasing out farmland. Because of lack of money and farm equipment, they are not able to work their own land.

These poverty conditions were an important factor in Indian migrations to Minneapolis. Developments in Federal policy were also factors.

After World War Two local and state pressures were once again exerted on the national level to open up Indian lands and to end the special status of the Indian. We might suggest that various economic interests foresaw the future importance of the relatively undeveloped West in national economic growth. A primary point of interest was extensive energy resources on Indian lands. Although this was not the case in Minnesota, changes in "national" Indian policy affected all Indians.

B. The BIA Relocation Program

The National Indian Policy of the 1950's was yet another formulation of the "final solution" to the "Indian problem." Two programs, "tribal termination" and "urban relocation," were central in the Federal effort to dissolve reservations and Indian identity itself.

The termination program attempted to end this legal status of tribes while at the same time settling the issue of treaty claims, once and for all. Tribes which received final treaty settlements would be legally required to go through termination. There was enough opposition to this program that it was tried only on an experimental basis on two tribes, the Klamath of Oregon, and the Menominee of Wisconsin. The termination procedure quickly transformed the two relatively

prosperous tribes into landless, welfare wards of their states. Termination's thin veil of legitimation quickly dissipated and the resulting public outcry led to the abandonment of the program.

While termination represented the legal dissolution of a tribe relocation promoted its physical dissolution. Relocation involved the transfer of Indians from reservations to large cities. The official justification for relocation was that it would transform destitute reservation Indians into self-sufficient urban wage laborers.

To evade the charge that they were "dumping" Indians into the city the Bureau of Indian Affairs expanded existing educational and vocational programs and gave them an urban focus. Although the BIA officially disapproved of the migration of Indians outside of their program, the very existence of the relocation program was a strong stimulus for economic expeditions to cities. By 1970, approximately 100,000 Indians had relocated to the cities through the BIA program while perhaps twice as many have gone on their own (Spencer & Jennings, 1977).

Actually, it seems to have mattered little whether one was "prepared" through the BIA's programs. A large, national study which followed up on the BIA vocational training program concluded that it "had little apparent affect upon the subsequent employment records of relocatees" (Clinton, Chadwick & Bahr, 1975:131).

Although the BIA declared that relocated Indians would cease to be a Federal responsibility after a year, in practice

it expanded services to the cities based on its calculations of what it would take to keep Indians in the city.

Minneapolis is an example of a city whose proximity to the home reservations compelled the BIA to operate outside of its official policy. An important illustration is the BIA's funding of an Indian employment center late in 1966, so as to improve its performance. It was clear that the center had been serving an extremely mobile segment of the city's Indian population who were unlikely to establish permanent urban residence. "In one follow-up study in September of 1965, only 30 out of 315 applicants (9½ percent) could be located at their previous address and telephone numbers" (Harkins & Woods, 1968:11). In addition, this center had not been effective in establishing long-term employment for these Indians. Only 55 out of the 527 applicants (10.4 percent) placed during the six-month period of November 1966 to April 1967 were still employed at the end of the period (Harkins & Woods, 1968:7). The BIA hoped to improve the center's performance so as to root Indians in the city.

For the most part, the BIA assistance was of a token nature and had little effect on Indian residence patterns. What actually emerged was a somewhat regular interchange between reservations and cities. Many Indians shifted residence between reservations and the city with varying degrees of frequency. Joseph Jorgenson's explanation for this phenomenon emphasizes the social bonds between the reservation and urban Indian populations.

Kin constantly urge urban migrants to return because the reservation dwellers, particularly the aged and the female household heads, need support from the relocatees . . . The person who returns to the reservation might find only part-time work, but he might also hunt and fish, repair fences, farm, raise a couple of calves, provide an automobile for trips to the store, and the like. In return for the skills and the resources he provides, he receives support from his kin in the way of a place to live, mutual sharing of welfare income and commodities (Jorgenson, 1978:65-66).

It appears that a large segment of Minneapolis's Indian population met such kinship obligations through seasonal migrations. It is not possible to determine the magnitude of these migrations precisely but there is evidence that it was considerable. A Minneapolis Indian who had served as a newspaper reporter and as an employment center director, estimated the Indian population in the district of their heaviest concentration, to "vary from three to six thousand reflecting the seasons" (Vizenor, 1966:64). This perhaps reflects the importance of the seasonal subsistence activities of hunting, fishing and wild ricing on Minnesota reservations. A large number of Indians have never considered city life, itself to be anything but a temporary economic endeavor.

The mobility of Indians is one of the major factors which have thwarted attempts at population counts for both reservations and cities. The U.S. Census figure of 23,128 for the Minnesota Indian population in 1970 was contested by the Minnesota Indian Affairs Commission's estimate of 35,000 only three years later (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975: 9). BIA population estimates for Minnesota reservations (Table 2) are probably quite low also.

TABLE 2

POPULATION ESTIMATES OF MINNESOTA
INDIAN RESERVATIONS, 1970
(1960 figures in parentheses)

Reservation	Resident on tribal or allotted trust land	Adjacent to reser- vation and eligible for some BIA services	TOTAL
Grand Portage	167 (175)	45 (150)	212 (325)
Fond du Lac	549 (650)	195 (200)	744 (850)
Leech Lake	2,531 (2,350)	264 (400)	2,795 (2,750)
Mille Lacs	651 (500)	212 (300)	827 (800)
Nett Lake (Bois Forte)	498 (400)	177 (200)	675 (600)
White Earth	2,323 (2,150)	336 (400)	2,659 (2,550)
Red Lake	2,699 (2,900)	60 (300)	2,759 (3,200)
Upper Sioux	60 (80)	23 (40)	83 (120)
Lower Sioux	86 (120)	23 (40)	109 (160)
Prairie Island	78 (75)	8 (20)	86 (95)
Prior Lake	20 (10)	- -	20 (10)

SOURCE: League of Women Voters of Minnesota, 1971:29.

V. INDIANS AND THE MINNEAPOLIS POLITICAL ECONOMY

The Minneapolis Indian population is a rather nebulous entity for the U.S. Census Bureau. Perhaps this represents a minor triumph given the intensity with which other urban bureaucracies try to manage and control Indians. At least partially because of Indian mobility, both within Minneapolis and between the city and reservations, it is quite likely that the U.S. census total of 5,829 represents a low estimate. The Minnesota Indian Affairs Commission questioned this number and presented its own estimate of 6,500 (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975:12). Estimates by Indian groups which place the Twin City (Minneapolis-St. Paul) population at between 12,000 and 15,000 (p. 12) would approximately correspond to a range of 7,200 to 9,000 for Minneapolis alone.

Joseph Westermeyer notes that this population is quite familiar to a certain spectrum of institutions in Minneapolis.

Those institutions having the greatest contact with Indian people--the courts, police, welfare agencies and others--are the least adept at problem-solving and rehabilitation in the majority society. And institutions with a record of successful problem-solving have very little to do with Indians (Westermeyer, 1973:45).

It is necessary to add refinement to Westermeyer's observations but he captures the essence of Indians' institutional relationships in Minneapolis. In terms of concepts which we have specified as most important, institutional social control

overrides institutional social reproduction functions for Minneapolis Indians. The situation is a bit more complicated than the fact that Indians tend to have more contact with the institutions of social control than with those of social reproduction. In addition those institutions which we would usually consider to deal primarily with social reproduction, such as schools and health services, displayed aspects of social control that frequently override their social reproduction functions.

First we will consider Minneapolis Indian relationships with those institutions which most obviously have primary social control functions: police and welfare agencies.

There is a great deal of evidence that suggests that Indians experience an unusually intense degree of legal control. "In disporportion to their small ration in the total metropolitan population, Indians are heavily represented among those handled by the police and courts" (Wax, 1971:170). For example, the 1969 statistics for the Minneapolis Workhouse, a facility for minor offenders, showed "15% of its male inmates and 27% of its female inmates to be Indians" (League of Women Voters, 1971:129).

Most of the Indians caught up in the legal system have only committed minor public disorder type offenses, "misdeameanors--drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, simple assault, traffic offenses" (Wax:170).

Police activity against Indians most often revolves around drinking offences. In fact, police activity against

Indian drinkers is so heavy that it seems to represent an institutionalized interaction that permits the constant exercise of social control against Indians. "In Minneapolis in 1969, approximately one-third of the average 156 drunk arrests per week were of Indians" (League of Women Voters:139).

Historically, institutionalized sanctions against "public disorder" offenses developed in cities as rural migrants were being made to conform to industrial worker discipline (Dawley, 1980). The Indian situation in Minneapolis seems quite analogous. At various points throughout the legal system, the Indian's lack of proper worker characteristics leads to adverse judgments against him. This seems at least a partial explanation for the constant harassment of Indians by police for drinking.

Their arrests probably came as much from poverty and homelessness as from conduct, for a man who is encountered drunk, penniless, and without identification on Skid Row is more likely to be arrested than a similar individual with a wallet full of money in a fashionable district (Was:170).

Indians, especially those who are seasonal migrants, do not fare well at other points in the criminal justice system. "Alternatives to incarceration frequently demand things which are totally irrelevant to Indian life styles, e.g., a rigid 40-hour work week, fixed residence, credit rating, etc." (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975:62). An unfavorable pre-sentence investigation along such criteria "will follow the individual throughout the system" (p. 64).

The Indian also loses at the final discretionary point and thus his involvement with the criminal justice system is prolonged.

Minneapolis Workhouse statistics show that a higher percentage of Indian prisoners serve out their full sentences than do those of other races . . . Some have to stay in the state institution months longer than otherwise necessary because a job had not been found for them on the outside (League of Women Voters:137).

The substantial social control exercised by welfare agencies on Minneapolis Indians is a more complex situation. As discussed before, welfare was conceptualized as social control because of its function in defusing potential social rebellion. Welfare agencies seem to exercise social control over Minneapolis Indians, especially those who move frequently between reservation and the city, that is less directly related to such appeasement.

The main structural context is a political struggle between different levels of the "state" over who provides welfare for Minneapolis Indians. The BIA, the home county and Minneapolis welfare agencies debate over who will get stuck for Indian "social expenses." "One year's residency must be established before financial assistance is available from a new county of residence. In the interim, the county of previous residency must pay the client's costs" (p. 77). The interim period is usually a hardship for the Indian having a problem paying "the inflated city rents, because the lesser rural budget for shelter is used" (p. 77). Perhaps more significant is the frequency in which "an Indian family may be stranded in the city without funds while respective welfare departments argue over the family's needs and who is responsible" (p. 78).

This created a very antagonistic atmosphere for the Indian's relations with a welfare department. The migration of Indians to Minneapolis was matched by a steady increase throughout the 1960's in the welfare burden of Indians on Minneapolis. "The number of Indians on the Minneapolis relief rolls has increased nearly four times since 1957 to a 1968 total of 1,762" (Rigert, 1969:6).

The conflict nature of the welfare relationship was not reduced by the fact that "Minneapolis Relief Department had only one Indian employee even though Indians account for about 10% of relief recipients" (Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 7, 1969). This was not a good situation for Indian recipients whose "finances depend on personal decisions made by social workers" (Wetermeyer, 1973:47). Considerable social control was tied to welfare payments to Indians. This social control took the form of attacks on Indian culture. These attacks threatened the survival of Indian ethnicity through control exerted on Indian youth and Indian families. One Chippewa youth worker complained that "people try to make them (Indian youth) assimilate. They do not let them be themselves. Social workers try to make them over" (Rigert, 1968:4).

The power held over Indian families was more "threatening because of the social 'worker's capability to take children away from Indian parents" (Westermeyer:47).

Many Indian parents, considered reasonably responsible by their ethnic peers, did not hesitate to leave young children in the care of an eight or ten-year old while they went shopping, working, partying or visiting. Appearance of a social worker on the scene has often resulted in abandonment charges (p. 50).

In Minnesota "foster placement and state guardianship for Indian children runs 20 to 80 times that for whites" (p. 50). Since the marriage often broke up when a child was taken, these figures indicate a systematic undermining of "one of the strongest bonds of the Indian culture--the family" (League of Women Voters:135).

The Minneapolis health services jurisdictional situation was similar to that of welfare. This situation gave the health service relationship with the Indian, more potential for social control and diminished the quality of health care.

Because of the Minnesota poor laws at this time, one had to be a county or city resident to use the major public health facility in central Minneapolis: the Hennepin County General Hospital (Vizenor, 1966). Most relevant to low income Indians was the regulation that "Hennepin County General Hospital provides free care only to indigent patients who have resided in the county for one year without public assistance" (League of Women Voters:99). Health care for those Indians who moved between the reservation and Minneapolis became emeshed in a jurisdictional squabble between their home county, the Indian Health Service and Hennepin General Hospital. In non-emergency cases the "hospital will check first with the Indian Health Service or county of residency to see if they will pay the bill" (p. 99). Often they would not.

In this situation regulations tended to dominate the Indian and force him to forego health care for mobility. A medical survey of Minneapolis Indian households illustrates

the detrimental effect of these regulations on urban Indian health. Of the 389 households there were dental problems in 34 percent, acute medical problems in 21 percent, and chronic disease and disability in 11 percent. There were no medical or dental problems in only 11 percent of the households (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1975). When we reflect that free care was available at Hennepin General only in emergency cases, a final statistic becomes understandable. "Twenty-eight percent indicated that their primary source of medical care was a hospital emergency room" (p. 80).

Education is the last Indian institutional relationship we will consider in this sketch. The predominance of social control in Indian educational relationships at least partly reflects a minimum "social consumption expenditure" for Minneapolis inner city education. "In Minneapolis, over half of the schools with more than five percent Indian enrollment were built before 1893" (League of Women Voters:59). The physical deterioration of the Junior High School in the Indian district of Franklin Avenue was so great that the Assistant Principal of the Minneapolis school system called it "a monstrosity that should not exist" (National Council on Indian Opportunity, 1969:130). Physical resources were not the only educational handicap for Indian students.

Although Indian enrollment in the school system was two percent there were only "nine American Indian teachers in the entire system out of a total of 3,200" (Harkins, Woods & Sherarts, 1969:10). The primary relationship between Indian

students and white teachers in the inner city schools seemed to be one of conflict. A seminar on Indian culture and identity for teachers at Phillips High School reveals much about the situation of inner city Indian students.

Fifty percent of all Indian junior high students in Minneapolis attend Phillips. About 20 percent of its enrollment is Indian. The program had discussed Indian identity and suggested that programs in Indian culture and history be set up for Indian youngsters as part of their regular school day. Teachers turned the seminar into a discussion on discipline. 'Disruptive students don't have the right to disrupt the processes of the school. We're getting down to the hard core--the out law--you can't command his respect' (Minneapolis Tribune, Feb. 19, 1969:14).

With racist textbooks and unsympathetic teachers, Indians felt smothered by an atmosphere of cultural imperialism in the old battered schools. Not surprisingly, few suffered the ordeal all the way to graduation. Throughout the 1960's the Indian drop-out rate ranged from about 50 to 70 percent. In 1968, only 14 Indian students graduated from Minneapolis high schools in a school system with 1,357 Indian students (Minneapolis Tribune, June 12, 1968:32).

Another Indian institutional relationship, housing, is highlighted in the next two sections of this paper. The previous institutional relationships were largely tied to an inner city territory. Thus housing, which locates a person spatially, is viewed as being the most crucial institution of social reproduction.

VI. URBAN RENEWAL IN MINNEAPOLIS

The main Indian migrations to Minneapolis largely coincided with a period of dramatic spatial reorganization for the city--urban renewal. The first major piece of Federal legislation for urban renewal was the Housing Act of 1949. It "provided for financial assistance to communities for the construction of low rent public housing, plus slum clearance and redevelopment" (Vance, 1977:23). If this represented a commitment to improved housing it was short-lived. Improving the quality of housing was not a high priority in subsequent urban renewal programs.

The "urban crisis" these programs responded to, was not the same crisis that occupants of poor housing experienced. For the business and political elite, the urban crisis consisted of the "central city's loss of population to the suburbs, its growing minority population, expanding black slums, and threatened property values" (Mollenkopf, 1978:124). The fiscal manifestations of these developments was a "growing expenditure-revenue gap" (p. 124).

The Minneapolis that Indians moved into in the early 1960's was well into its urban crisis. Its suburbs were undergoing explosive growth while the central city itself was steadily declining in population. The Twin Cities suburban growth was nearly 115 percent from 1950 to 1960 while central areas declined 8 percent in population. For the most part this represented the movement of the affluent and middle classes

from Minneapolis. At the same time there was a steady migration into Minneapolis from the small towns and farms of the Upper Midwest. This was largely a low income, semi-skilled group which was fleeing the depressed mining and lumbering regions of Northern Minnesota.

The Indian migration is in some respects, part of a latter segment of this migration. The great majority of these migrants could not afford to live in the suburbs. Minneapolis, especially towards its center, became a concentration of people who could afford only cheap housing--the elderly, poor whites, blacks, university students, and, later on, Indians. The urban crisis for them was a shortage of decent low income housing.

This critical housing situation was largely ignored in the urban renewal carried out although it was ritually noted by those legitimating the program. The restriction that slum clearance be replaced by low rent public housing was lifted in a 1954 amendment to the Act. As a Minneapolis planner gleefully noted, the cleared areas could now "also become planned districts where a variety of uses, including private enterprise, could become part of the development" (Vance, 1977:23). In Minneapolis, as in other cities, private enterprise was able to dominate urban planning in an effort to solve its urban crisis.

Minneapolis provides clear illustrations of the developments which greatly alarmed various capitalist concerns tied to the central city.

The erosion of the city's industrial base became chronic during the 1960's. Between 1962 and 1970, 176 industries left Minneapolis. . .

The companies left behind 180 acres of land, 11,000 jobs, or 4 percent of the city's work force and \$1,666,000 in annual property taxes (Goldfield, 1976:79).

In addition to this threat to the revenue base, Minneapolis was faced with the prospect of increased expenditures. "By 1960, the decade's population totals would include 16,000 more elderly and 14,000 dependent children in the city, and over 60,000 fewer persons in the productive ages of 15 to 64" (Minneapolis Housing and Development Authority, 1967:4).

In response to this situation, major corporations, banks, large retail businesses and major property owners, 180 firms in all, founded the "Downtown Council" to revitalize the central district of Minneapolis (Henning, 1961). They sponsored a planning unit in the mid-1950's. Urban planning largely followed the vision of the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce that "the city should concentrate on the attraction of corporate headquarters, regional headquarters and branch offices--rather than manufacturing operations" (Johnson, 1969: 56).

The center of the city was to be restructured in the image of the "Corporate City" so as to exploit the strategic position of Minneapolis as metropole of the Upper Midwest. With a number of major corporations making up the core, it would serve as a regional and national headquarters for private, institutional and public organizations. The efficiency of a spatial link between various capitalist concerns was the main organizing principle.

The recommendations of one of the planning consultants, the Real Estate Research Corporation, provide a clear example of concrete applications of this organizing principle.

Within the central area, all activities should be arranged according to the amount of interchange desirable between them. As the ease of comparative shopping and combining visits to numerous kinds of stores on a single trip remained one of the important attractions of downtown, retail facilities particularly should be grouped. Only enterprises which concentrated great numbers of employees and other potential shoppers daily per acre of land should locate within walking distance of the major retail entertainment complex. The office complex was the most obvious candidate for this area (Altshler, 1967:218).

Corporate and public office buildings were strategically located so as to guarantee that their employees would be customers for major concentrations of commercial capital. For much the same reason the planning consultants "convinced the leading downtown retailers that their future economic health depended on significant part on the development of middle and upper income housing close to downtown" (Altshler, 1967:212).

Thus the poor were largely left out of the residential planning for the central city. The main concern was to get affluent consumers and tenants back into the downtown area. Luxury apartment buildings were constructed adjacent to this area. To make room for the office buildings, plazas, shopping malls and luxury apartment towers, a significant amount of cheap housing was demolished. Urban renewal directly intensified the housing crisis as it demolished nearly 12,500 units (League of Women Voters, 1971:110), at the same time that the need for low income housing was increasing.

Indirectly, the impact of urban renewal was also quite severe. Urban renewal caused land values to soar on the edge of development. It was observed that the value of "land on the path of development was climbing six times as fast as the rate of inflation" (Johnson, 1961:61). In such a situation, the presence of residential buildings does not add to the value of the property. From the landlord's point of view, there is no reason to upgrade or even maintain a rental unit on land where redevelopment is anticipated (LaMarche, 1976). With low income housing in such short supply, even neglected units would bring in a good rent. Thus the condition of low income rental housing was severely deteriorating throughout the period of urban renewal. By 1967, 20 percent of the rental units in Minneapolis were declared to be in a dilapidated condition (League of Women Voters:109).

The city planning department seemed to have developed tunnel vision in its attempt to maximize tax revenue potential in the central city. Its early land use evaluations display insensitivity to the fact that central city housing conditions were already critical for many people. Their reports indicate a desire to reduce the amount of land used for residential purposes. Thus we see criticism by the Minneapolis City Planning Commission that "Minneapolis uses ten percent more and for residential purposes than does the average city of its population size" (1959:iii). It seems appropriate to claim that increased concentration was intentionally planned for low income residential areas. The report contains more evidence to support this.

Minneapolis in 1956, used substantially less land for multi-family housing than did the average city of its population size. Minneapolis used only three percent of its developed areas for this purpose as opposed to six percent for comparable cities (p. iii).

Because of its location, urban renewal would intensify the housing shortage in low income areas. These low income areas were predominantly single family residences. The planners seemed to be counting on the illegal adaptation of these housing units to multi-family use, to partially offset the reduction of low income housing units. Interestingly, the planners suggested within this same report that the extent of unauthorized conversion to multi-family dwellings and the lack of code enforcement should be studied. Overcrowding, lack of facilities in illegally-converted dwellings and lack of code enforcement were all major characteristics of the Indian housing crisis ten years later.

VII. Indian Housing in Minneapolis

Indian settlement throughout the 1960's resulted in two general residential concentrations in Minneapolis. These two concentrations were toward the center of the city. The two concentrations were largely within two of Minneapolis's ten planning "communities" (Figure 1). The Indian concentration to the northwest of the center numbered 1,426 or 24 percent of the official total city Indian population and was within the "Near North Community" (Minneapolis Planning and Development, 1972:48). The Near North was also home for 8,530 Blacks who represented the highest percentage, 45 percent , of the city's Black population of 19,005 (p. 48).

The Indian concentration south of the center numbered 2,016 or 35 percent of the city Indian population. It fell within the community known as "Powerhorn." This district was the second largest for Blacks who numbered 5,290 or 28 percent of the city Black population (p. 48).

There were also 985 Indians within the "Central Community" who were largely concentrated adjacent to the Near North or Powderhorn Indian concentrations. The two Central Community Indian areas actually represent respective parts of the Near North and Powderhorn concentrations that are separated by the planning district boundaries (Figure 2).


MINNEAPOLIS PLANNING COMMUNITIES

Figure 1. SOURCE: Minneapolis Planning and Development Department 1972, p. x

PERCENT OF POPULATION WHICH IS INDIAN




Figure 2. Source: Minneapolis Planning and Development Department 1972, p. 53

The Near North and Powderhorn Indian concentrations represent Indian communities only in a very general sense. There are neighborhoods within these two general areas with a high enough percentage of Indians that they represent Indian communities in a meaningful sense. Actually we can say that "Indian Community" was in a state of "becoming" in the middle 1960's.

Our consideration of Indian housing will focus on an Indian community within the Powderhorn district. There are a number of reasons for this. The Powderhorn district holds the largest number of Indians of the planning districts. This is the district whose Indian population was said to vary from three to six thousand. Within Powderhorn are neighborhoods with the highest Indian concentration in the city. Exactly what constitutes the "Indian Community" here depends on how you group these neighborhoods together. Fay Cohen in her study of AIM's Indian Patrol delineated a "Franklin Avenue Indian Community" which crosses the district boundary to include part of the Central Community Indian concentration. This most exactly corresponds to AIM's home base. Model City planners and various surveys considered the portion of this same area that was within the Powderhorn boundary, to be the "Phillips Neighborhood." This was the worst area of housing in the city and eventually became a Model City urban renewal project. This was the location of AIM's critical struggle over control of the Model Cities Indian Center project. For Minneapolis residents less interested in finer geo-political distinctions,

the Franklin Avenue-Phillips area was known simply as "Indian Country" or "The Reservation."

Given their class situation, most Indians had few alternatives to residency in low income inner city districts. Public housing had a minimal effect as it was merely a token effort within the urban renewal program as late as 1969.

The choice for the poor may be either public housing or the slums and often the slums are the only choice. The city has only 900 public housing units for families--and a waiting list of 230 (Rigert, 1969:6).

By 1968 only 1 percent of this public housing was occupied by Indians (League of Women Voters, 1971:110). A one-year's residency requirement for getting into public housing was one barrier to many Indians.

A strong pattern of racial discrimination emerged to greatly reduce Indian housing options even further. This current of racism greatly facilitated "secondary exploitation" of Indians by landlords. Many landlords openly refused to rent to Indians. Social service personnel, housing officials and Indians were familiar with many stories of the Indian ordeal in finding a place to rent. One example was an "Indian couple that looked at nearly 40 apartment units in two days before finding a landlord who would rent to them and one of their children" (Rigert, 1969:6).

Besides open discrimination, many Indians were turned away because they could not meet certain criteria.

Many restrictions discriminate intentionally or unintentionally against the Indian renters: refusing children, demanding a "breakage fee" along with advance rent that puts the price out

of reach, and stringent credit checks (League of Women Voters:108-109).

Thus the Indian housing situation became one of desperation. This desperation caused many Indians to be vulnerable to "secondary super exploitation" by landlords. An official of the Minneapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority makes a very appropriate reference to an "exploitation market" in his summary of the Indian housing situation.

We have a rental market in Minneapolis wherein an Indian comes in and has few options where to live. For the most part, they are limited to substandard housing, apartments which are in many cases, barely liveable. Often these are owned by absentee owners. I think they can best be described more accurately as an exploitation market because that is what it really amounts to (National Council on Indian Opportunity, 1969:146).

The most general feature of this "secondary super exploitation" market is that the largest concentration of Indians in the city ended up in the worst housing area--Phillips Neighborhood. This neighborhood was predominantly a rental area as eighty percent of its 3,000 buildings were renter-occupied. A planner of the Housing and Redevelopment Authority reported that of these 3,000 buildings, "up to one-third are in need of immediate repair" (Visenor, 1969:1). Indians disproportionately live in the worst housing within the Phillips area itself. A study of Indian housing, the Craig Survey found that "70 percent of Indians living in the Phillips area live in substandard housing" (p. 1).

In many cases the landlords were able to play on Indian desperation to the extent that they charged rents at or above

the city wide average (\$82) for housing characterized as "not fit for human habitation."

In 75 percent of the residences surveyed, there were broken doors, broken plaster, broken stairs and lights that would not work. The plumbing was broken or not working in 36 percent of the rentals, and 82 percent had no fire extinguishers. A third had either no refrigerators or units that worked so badly they were useless. Yet the rent average for the units so described was \$82 per month (League of Women Voters:109).

Because Indian incomes were lower "the percent of income paid for rents in the Model Neighborhood was about 30 percent higher than in the rest of the city" (Visenor, 1969:1).

Another aspect of the housing exploitation market was that landlords affixed themselves as parasites on the elements of the population who had fixed incomes. A disproportionate percentage of residents depended on fixed incomes in these low-income areas--elderly on pensions and welfare recipients. Yet these people who are usually thought of as the most impoverished in the city, were valued as a relatively stable, dependable source of rent. Some landlords would allow only welfare families in. This was yet another hardship for those Indians who were ineligible for welfare or had tangled welfare situations. Some Indians claimed that if you received assistance you paid a higher rent. An Indian member of the Model Neighborhood Project claimed that if landlords "find out they are Aid for Dependent Children Families or welfare families, their rent is upped maybe \$15 to \$20 (National Council on Indian Opportunity: 68).

Directly and indirectly, the "secondary super exploitation" market results in over-crowding. Indirectly, many Indians had to cope with rents that were too high by moving in with their relatives. The Craig Survey reveals that crowded conditions were typical within these units.

There was an average of 3.5 persons per room in 71 percent of the residences surveyed, and 26 percent had two to five children sleeping in a single bed. One or more relatives lived within the family in 63 percent of the cases (League of Women Voters:109).

Exploitation directly causes over-crowding when landlords try to squeeze as much profit out of a dwelling as possible through subdivision. Thus people were crowded into "old homes that have been subdivided into as many as 15 apartments, renting from \$90 to \$150 each" (Minneapolis Tribune, 1969:6).

These practices go a long way in explaining lack of facilities and the deterioration of over-used facilities. The Minneapolis "secondary super exploitation" market was partially possible because of a lack of code enforcement by the city. The material well-being of these residents was not calculated to be worth the political or monetary costs of housing code enforcement.

Although Minneapolis has a housing code that purports to protect occupants from health and safety hazards, it is poorly enforced. The code requires mandatory yearly inspection of all multiple dwellings, but the city Housing Inspection crew is so short-staffed that it can only keep up with complaints (League of Women Voters:109).

Indians did not file very many formal complaints partly out of ignorance of their rights and partly because of intimidation.

Artificial scarcity gave landlords a great deal of power over Indian tenants. A leader of an Indian housing task force commented on her own past experiences. "You're afraid to get the landlord mad, even if the place is falling down around you and he's getting double what the rent should be. You keep moving" (Minneapolis Tribune, 1972:1).

For the Indians in condemned housing, the codes were irrelevant. "There are legal loopholes that enable landlords to ignore code rules. Houses scheduled for demolition, a considerable resource for poor Indian renters, need not be brought up to code" (League of Women Voters:109). Indians found themselves in a no-win situation as even if repairs were made, their rent was raised to cover it.

In a 1970 AIM Protest against housing discrimination, an Indian leader summed up the contradictory consequences of urban renewal. "Minneapolis, the most beautiful city in America, is the ugliest city in terms of treatment of American Indians" (Minneapolis Tribune, 1970:23).

VIII. THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT AND URBAN INDIAN POLITICS

The most significant consequence of the destitution and domination suffered by Minneapolis Indians was a search for an Indian political identity. It is useful to think of this search as consisting of three stages of political development: (1) Indian Politicization; (2) Urban Reform; and (3) Radicalization.

The inner city Indians who came together to form AIM were in a sense the dynamic agents of this political evolution. Members of this group were the first to articulate new political positions and the first to act on such positions. It is fair to say that they established a political atmosphere in each period which other Indians and whites were forced to deal with. AIM is the only group in the city that entered the final stage, "Radicalization." Thus, these three stages correspond most directly to transformation in the inner city political movement which became known as the American Indian Movement.

A. Indian Politicization: The Roots of AIM

As part of the urban poor, inner city Indians were on the passive end of institutional relationships which tended to reproduce their poverty. An Indian politics developed in Minneapolis as some Indians sought a more active role in improving the quality of their lives.

As Indians were developing their own political identity, black political activism served as an important point of reference. Black experiences in the city were comparable to those of Indians as is implied in the statement of AIM's first chairman, Clyde Bellecourt.

We know that when the black man started to fight back, to organize and call together black coalitions, black independence groups to begin demanding justice . . . a lot of attention was focused on the Indian community (National Council on Indian Opportunity, 1969: 170).

The Indian residential concentrations were also the main black areas. Blacks generally had the same unsatisfactory relationships with the police, schools and social service agencies and had similar restricted job opportunities.

What was most striking to Indians about black protest was its aggressiveness. This aggressiveness varied from organized public protest to the actual violence of riots such as occurred in Minneapolis during 1966. Generally, Indians perceived this aggressiveness to have been a successful tactic for getting agencies and programs to respond to black needs. Relative to themselves, Indians saw blacks as being more successful in getting services and aid as well as funding for black programs. Blacks also seemed to have much greater involvement in decision-making by gaining positions in agencies and poverty programs.

It seems fair to argue that the model of black political protest was an important factor in the polarization of Minneapolis Indians into two opposing camps. One group was

openly political and adopted aggressive protest tactics. Typically, these Indians held lower level positions in various social service agencies. They included social workers, school aides, employment counsellors, youth center workers and probation officers. Initially their activity consisted mainly of individual complaints on the services and treatment Indians received from urban agencies. Examples: A school social work aide criticizes attacks on Indian culture (Minneapolis Tribune, April 25, 1968:12). A group of twenty Indians, including a probation officer and an Indian youth worker who helped found AIM, confront State legislators on issues ranging from stereotypes in TV commercials to medical and welfare services in Minneapolis (Minneapolis Tribune, Dec. 29, 1968: 12). An Indian employee from Citizen Aid Center calls for an "Indian group to watch over police in the community. We must make sure that we are not singled out" (Minneapolis Tribune, Feb. 27, 1967:13).

The first public protest took place when thirty-five Indians picketed the Area Office of the BIA in Minneapolis in 1966. Although they made demands on their old traditional adversary, all of their concerns were urban problems: "urban orientation programs, assistance in housing, education, and employment, and referral assistance in using medical and legal facilities in the city" (Vizenor, 1966:13). Also notable about this first confrontation was the fact that "among the group were a number who would be instrumental in the later activist movement, including some of the founders of the American Movement" (Deloria, 1974:25).

Bellecourt sums up how the black protest model would affect this group's approach to Indian politics.

We have to take the same avenues in our Indian way that the black community has taken. We have to get together and go to these meetings. We have to show force (National Council on Indian Opportunity, 1969:173).

The other Indian camp had a much different view. Among this group were conservatives who defined the Indian Way as non-political, or moderates who advocated getting involved in the "system." The reaction of the latter to black protest was somewhat contradictory.

By not participating in their own affairs, Indian people have been largely left out of the foundation shaking going on in American cities. Indian people have not taken part in demonstrations, and violence, and sadly they haven't spoken up. The Indian wants no identification at all, though, with the black power movement. There's instead an Indian style and Indian way to do things. But nobody knows just what it should be (Minneapolis Tribune, Nov. 20, 1967:21).

Many in this group were middle class and from the suburbs. Their chief organization was the Upper Midwest American Indian Center (UMAIC) which originated in 1961 as an Indian cultural and service center. Some of them were occasionally elevated to the position of "Indian spokesman" when various white organizations or programs needed Indian representatives.

A great deal of antagonism resulted when they competed with the more militant Indians for positions in agencies and organizations. The typical AIM assessment of this group was to call them "Uncle Tomahawks" or "Indian experts."

One of our big problems in the Indian Community is a large group of Indian experts. They will be married to a white person. They live in the suburbs. They are far removed from the inner city and yet they will be hired into positions of high pay as Indian experts.¹⁵

An illuminating example of the tension between activist and conservative Indians is a controversy which arose in 1967. The director of the Indian Employment Center supported an Indian condidate for alderman, made public comments on services for urban Indians, and protested stereotyped advertising. A segment of the center's board of directors, specifically its white members and some Indians who belonged to UMAIC, chastized the director. In a secret meeting they drew up a set of guidelines which ordered the director to have "no position of leadership in any activist, pressure or propaganda group."¹⁶

Perhaps the first Indians who can be said to have adopted a militant approach as a group were youth groups. In April 1968, they carried out one of the earliest Indian protests in the city when they picketed UMAIC. They objected to UMAIC's management of federal funds for their youth center. They claimed that the UMAIC board or directors was self-appointed and was not elected by residents affected by its program.¹⁷ Soon afterwards they broke off from the program and formed their own center. There were significant ties between this Indian youth center and people who later became key figures in AIM. As an AIM member remarked, "we are trying to get this center set up so the youth can learn the system, whether they are able to change it or not" (National Council on Indian Opportunity, 1969:175).

B. Reform Activism: The Emergence of the American Indian Movement

When AIM came into existence on July 30, 1968, it was considered the first successful attempt to form a general coalition of Indians in Minneapolis. Observers claimed that there had been previous attempts to develop such a group that had failed.

There are a number of reasons why this attempt was successful. The immediate emotional climate was conducive to action. Recent incidents with police confirmed and intensified Indian beliefs that they were unduly harassed. For some time, Indians had been resentful of an unusually high police presence in their neighborhoods. The high degree of police activity made Indians much more susceptible to arrest for petty offenses than whites (Cohen, 1973).

A less immediate stimulus was the growing awareness of issues that Indians should forcefully pursue. It seemed that these issues were related and could be most effectively addressed by a single political organization which could maximize the Indian political voice. Many of those who formed AIM were both "unhappy with the situation of American Indians in the city and dissatisfied with other Indian organizations" (Cohen, 1973:44).

The chairman of AIM, Clyde Bellecourt, claimed to be "confident that 10,000 Indians in the Twin Cities can be melded into an effective self-help group" (Way, 1968:14). The more unified the Indian community appeared, the more likely it was that white officials would have to respond to their demands.

It was also hoped that such unity would increase the chances of federal funding of Indian projects. Black successes seemed to indicate that the government responded to demands when the protesting group could be dealt with as an organizational entity.

AIM placed a great deal of importance on a project that Minneapolis Indians had been discussing for some time: an urban Indian Center. It was envisioned that this center could meet essential psychological and material needs of the Indian community. Primarily it would serve as a social center with recreational facilities and cultural exhibits. In addition, it would be a central complex for the offices of Indian organizations and assistance programs of new migrants.

The city's policy of incorporating community "representatives" into its administrative machinery also helped coax forward a more unified Indian organization.

Because of previous fragmentation--when the city's Capital Long Range Improvements Committee (CLIC) wanted to add a member last week--one recommended by Indians themselves--they found no one group or coalition to whom to turn for a nomination (Minneapolis Tribune, 1968:20).

The day after its founding, AIM nominated one of its leaders, Dennis Banks, who was promptly accepted for the CLIC position. This incident is indicative of the comfortable relationship that existed between AIM and the city government for a brief period.

The development of AIM was intertwined with growing expressions of community among Minneapolis Indians. AIM's very

existence was based on an Indian social network of close, personal relationships.

Members tended to be each other's friends, relatives, or neighbors. Recruitment was based almost entirely on pre-existing social ties. A member would visit a friend or a relative, or someone he knew from his home town, reservation, school or prison (Cohen:45).

AIM defies our notions of a formal modern organization. It was a more wholistic social organization which cannot be reduced merely to its political aspects.

AIM had elements of a social club as well as of a reformist social-action group. It also had elements of a mutual aid society. Members helped each other with personal problems and they loaned money back and forth. . . Indians who were not active members sometimes turned to AIM for help. They called the office for rides. AIM provided referrals for jobs and housing, and gave out emergency food in some cases. There were several requests for emergency funds to help families meet funeral expenses for their relatives on the reservation (p. 52).

In its initial political activities, AIM wasted no time in establishing an assertive image. AIM was quite conscious of the pressure that Black political activities had used against the white power structure. The primary lesson that AIM drew from Black experiences was that Indian needs and demands had to be forcefully and publically articulated.¹⁸ Public action became the basis of identity for AIM members. Although AIM drew members from a number of different agencies and Indian organizations it was not really a coalition of groups. As its militance grew and was expressed in public activity, it became a distinct entity.

Members demonstrated their identification with the group by acts of commitment. Giving a speech in public was one such act. Participating in a protest demonstration or helping to staff the Indian Patrol were others. These actions set AIM members apart from other Indians and gave them the reputation of being "militants" (p. 48).

Fay Cohen's study of the AIM Indian Patrol provides some insights into the AIM membership that solidified around this commitment by 1970. She surveyed forty members of AIM who represented the "organization's active leadership and core of dedicated members" (p. 21).

The tribal affiliation of this group was fairly representative of the city Indian population. This perhaps indicates the credibility of AIM's effort to stress "Indianess over tribalism" (p. 46). The AIM group was 68 percent Chippewa, 10 percent Sioux, 10 percent other tribes and 12 percent non-Indian.

Most of the members, 65 percent, had been born on reservations, while 13 percent had been born in the Twin Cities.

The membership reflected a somewhat established urban Indian population, in that 60 percent had lived in Minneapolis for over five years. Only 18 percent had been there less than one year. AIM's territorial base is reflected in the fact that 63 percent of the members were East Franklin Avenue residents.

One of the most noteworthy characteristics of this group was its youthfulness. Eighty-five percent were under forty or more specifically, 70 percent were between the ages of twenty and forty. They also represented a better educated segment of the inner city Indian population as 85 percent had at least

some high school education and 30 percent had at least some college education.

Mass support for AIM from the general Indian population seems to have varied depending on the particular AIM activity and on the general social atmosphere. Cohen has emphasized the importance of a "crisis atmosphere" for the establishment of AIM itself. Thus, while the core group of AIM planned regular programs and protests, mass Indian involvement usually depended on their perception of immediate severe problems and was of a more spontaneous nature (Cohen, 1973).

The attempt of the core members of AIM to define Indian interests covered a wide spectrum. The group articulated its philosophy and goals about a month after its founding in a statement of objectives (Figure 3).

The objects of their protests ranged from stereotyped advertising to the material deprivation caused by the discrimination of landlords. The form of these protests were sometimes symbolic, often militant and occasionally though not frequently bordering on the violent. The following are samples of their activities.

They surveyed all the various governmental agencies in the city to determine if Indian employees were present in representative numbers. They showed that Indians were highly under-represented and held only the lowest level positions.¹⁹ This was in contrast to the fact that Indians had disproportionately high contact with most of these agencies.

OBJECTIVES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT

Short Range Objectives

- A. Establish a program to better the Indian housing problem
- B. Establish a program directed toward Indian youth
- C. Establish a positive program for employment of Indian Americans
- D. Establish a program to educate industry in the area of Indian culture and its effect on the Indian
- E. Establish a program to improve the communications between the Indian and the community
- F. Establish a program to educate the Indian citizen in his responsibility to his community.

Long Range Objectives

- A. To generate unification within the Indian people
- B. To inform all Indian Americans of community and local affairs
- C. To encourage Indian Americans to become active in community affairs
- D. To bring the economic status of Indian Americans up to that of the general community.

Figure 3 (Source: Cohen, 1973:47).

They criticized the largely black-staffed Office of Economic Opportunity programs for favoring blacks over Indians, especially in its employment services center. Thus black OEO officials had the unpleasant experience of having their offices picketed by another minority group.²⁰

AIM also tried to initiate programs that would address urban Indian needs. Two such proposals demonstrate AIM's strong ties with the Indian youth of the city. They requested financial support from the United Fund for the Indian youth centers in North and South Minneapolis. They also sought a pledge from the National Alliance of Businessman for 200 jobs for Indian youth.²¹

The most famous AIM project in Minneapolis was the Indian Patrol. Modeling themselves after an earlier Black Patrol, AIM members monitored police activity on Franklin Avenue. They hoped to reduce police harrassment and brutality against Indians on the streets. They also attempted to reduce targets for the police by driving drunks home and by breaking up fights.

Although relations between AIM and the police were often antagonistic, they were occasionally cooperative. AIM patrolees occasionally attempted to mediate police-Indian interaction. The reaction of the police varied but for a time City Hall publically expressed its approval (Cohen, 1973).

This is indicative of the fact that there were contradictory tendencies within AIM, especially in its early period. Despite their militancy they basically were taking a reformist

approach to the urban institutions. Many white leaders were sympathetic and cooperative with AIM initially.

It did not appear that AIM would pose a threat to the status quo. AIM leaders seemed to be on the verge of being swallowed up by positions in the establishment itself. For example, AIM's first chairman, Clyde Bellecourt, was a representative on both a city capital improvement committee and the Urban Coalition. The much larger black movement had been effectively stalled when its leaders were incorporated into agency and program positions in the city. As long as they only asked that urban agencies work better AIM leaders were very respectable outlaws.

Contrary to expectations AIM leaders became more militant instead of being co-opted. AIM increasingly articulated Indian objections to the unequal power relationships between government managers and the dominated poor population that is the essence of urban institutions. Indians did not want to be managed. AIM consistently stuck to the principle that people affected by government programs should take an active part in designing them.

Developments in AIM's relationship with the police are particularly illustrative of the antagonistic relationship that came to characterize AIM's relations to the power structure. Fay Cohen suggests that AIM members interpreted City Hall's praise for the Indian Patrol as granting it "quasi-official status" (Cohen, 1973:103). Indian patrolers, especially Bellecourt, regularly tried to involve themselves when the

police arrived at the scene. The police viewed the increasing boldness of the AIM patrollers as a threat to their authority.

In March of 1969, Bellecourt was charged with having "interfered with an arrest," three days after attempting to mediate an incident. In his own arrest Bellecourt's wrists were injured when he was handcuffed (Cohen, 1973). The response of AIM was to post a sign in their office window that said "Police are no good without their guns" (Cohen, 1973:70). The Indian community was equally aroused and a meeting called by AIM attracted 200 people. This meeting chaired by Bellecourt is a good example of the kind of spontaneous support which highly charged incidents generated for AIM.

Bellecourt asked people to sign a list if they had been treated unfairly so that they could be called upon to give their 'open testimony.' Then he described his recent encounter with police and showed slides of his bruised and abraded wrists. He accused police of 'an escalation of war against Indian people.' Bellecourt's testimony was followed by other accusations: that police invaded Indian homes, police were said to ignore Indian requests for help. Nothing was done to meet Indian needs, said one woman, 'because we've got brown faces. . . you've either got to be an affluent white or a black militant to get anything done.' The crowd cheered in agreement with her (Cohen, 1973:70-73).

At the same time that a split was occurring between AIM and the city government, Indians of more moderate organizations arose to compete with AIM as representative of the Indian community. Once positions started opening up for Indian representatives and employees in various agencies and poverty programs, organizations such as UMAIC became more active. The leadership that emerged in UMAIC at this time was somewhat

involved in politics but was much more moderate in tactics. Some Indian "moderates" dismissed militant tactics by claiming that "AIM members are just followers of the black movement" (Newlund, 1971:23). Instead they proposed working through positions in agencies and talked about the need for developing the "right types of leadership."²²

They were more accepting of the structural domination of the inner city Indian population. The director of UMAIC commented that "we don't have any money in the community. Therefore we are dependent on the power structure to provide us with resources."²³ They could perhaps be called "urban chiefs" in that they were willing to be intermediaries between a dependent urban Indian community and the government.

In contrast AIM stressed grass roots involvement of inner city Indians in these programs. AIM's position was that "the people who are going to make the changes are the people who have faced the conditions."²⁴

As AIM became more troublesome white leaders became more careful in who they chose to recognize as representatives of the Indian community. Thus AIM found their representatives to be consistently outnumbered by conservative Indians in decision-making bodies that were supposed to represent the Indian Community.

The conflict between AIM and UMAIC peaked during planning of the Indian Center. The Federal government promised financial support for the project through Model Cities, which appeared as a later stage of urban renewal in Minneapolis.

Part of the Southside Indian enclave on Franklin Avenue was involved in Model Cities planning. On the positive side the center would be an appropriate location. On the negative side major aspects of the planning process would be in non-Indian hands. The spending of this federal money had to go through an approved anti-poverty agency, the Minneapolis United Fund. The United Fund had the power to make the all-important choice of which Indian organization was to control the planning of the center. To AIM's dismay, in 1969 the United Fund chose UMAIC to develop the center. AIM complained that this was the result of a conspiracy between the conservative United Fund and UMAIC to deny inner city Indians the right of self-determination. AIM complained that UMAIC "contains too many whites, Indians married to whites and Indians from the suburbs."²⁵ Bellecourt bitterly appealed that AIM's activities up to this time represented the ability of the inner city Indian to help himself.

We wanted to design our own multi-purpose Indian center. Indian people are capable of doing this. We have demonstrated in the past nine months that we are capable of taking care of our own problem, and staffing our Indian center with Indian people.²⁶

C. Aim Radicalism and National Indian Militancy

After the Model Cities defeat AIM activities indicate a major shift in orientation. AIM largely withdrew from involvement in local Minneapolis issues and became increasingly active in militant Indian politics on the national level. AIM's last effort to influence the planning of the Indian Center was in September of 1969. In November of 1969, some of AIM's members

were involved in the occupation of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay. On March 21, 1970, Bellecourt's successor as AIM director, Dennis Banks, was one of the organizers of the occupation of a Bureau of Indian Affairs office in Denver. Three days later AIM seized the BIA office in Minneapolis itself. On May 22, 1971, AIM occupied the abandoned Naval Air Station in Minneapolis. On June 10, 1971, AIM held a demonstration at Mount Rushmore in South Dakota. In October of 1971, largely through the efforts of the Minneapolis leaders, the American Indian Movement became a national organization.

All of these demonstrations centered on Indian relations with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and treaties. AIM had shifted the focus of political struggle to the reservation. It seems that AIM had moved a step further in defining the "Indian Way" of political activity. In articulating the new shift in focus AIM leaders contrasted the Indian position with black aspirations. Bellecourt noted that blacks were "talking about civil rights and integration. That's their bag but it isn't ours. We're talking about treaty rights. Every occupation we've had to date has been based on treaties."²⁷

It seems that the conclusion which AIM drew from its urban struggles was that Indians should reject urban institutions rather than try to reform them. The idea of Indian self-determination seemed incompatible with the power relations encompassed in urban institutions. An example of this attitude in the Minneapolis setting was when AIM finally tired of trying to make the public school system sensitive to the needs of

Indian students. AIM established alternative schools in the early 1970's. In these "survival schools" most teachers were Indians, Indian language was a subject, and the Indian version of U.S. history was taught. The basic skills of reading, writing and math were taught in a relaxed, non-competitive atmosphere.²⁸

For the most part the odds were against the possibility of Indians developing control over their own lives in the city. In Minneapolis they were only 4 percent of the population. It seems that AIM came to see the reservation as a potential base of power for Indians. AIM chose to emphasize the positive side of the contradictory nature of the reservation's legal status. They were hopeful that the tribe's legal ownership of the reservation could be somehow translated into increased economic, political and cultural autonomy for Indians.

Although the militants started to talk in hopeful terms of the "separation of whites and Indians" they did perceive the dark side of the reservation's legal status: its colonial dependence and domination. Banks remarked that on his home reservation "we can't even sell our own lumber. The contracts with paper companies are in the hands of the whites."²⁹

It is interesting to note that the AIM militants saw urban life as an educational experience that would prepare Indians for the struggle over control of the reservation. AIM leaders called for "the urban Indian to return to the reservation to assist with economic development and reorientation of

Indian schools."³⁰ The comments of one AIM leader seem to indicate that the potential insights of urban life are indeed considerable.

The Indian's greatest enemy is a multiple kind of thing. I'm talking about an attitude. White man is an attitude. White man can be Indian, black or yellow as far as I am concerned. In a sea of white man, the Indian is a colony, the colony being social, political, educational, and above all, economic (Newlund, 1971:23).

IX. CONCLUSIONS

This study is an attempt to identify the social conditions which gave birth to the American Indian Movement in Minneapolis. A political economy framework was utilized so that an analysis might be sensitive to relations of power and material inequality which are manifested in the urban class structure. In addition an effort has been made to integrate concepts into an analysis which are sensitive to aspects of racial with class relations.

Two research foci have been utilized. The first is to determine the relationship between Indian urbanization and the emergence of Indian political activism. Here the general task has been to sketch the impact of class struggle in the sphere of consumption on the urban Indian. This sphere has largely been collectivized through the state.

In order to explain domination and inequality in the Indian's relationships to institutions of the state, we have tried to determine the degree to which these relationships are characterized by social control as opposed to social reproduction. The institutional relationships examined were police, welfare, health and education.

The second research focus is to determine how important a factor urban renewal was to the emergence of the American Indian Movement. This question follows Mollenkopf's argument

that inner city political rebellions were largely the result of urban renewal in the 1960's. Mollenkopf suggested that the political domination represented by the imposition of urban renewal, and the material deprivation urban renewal caused in housing, were the key factors. For this question social reproduction was operationalized as quantity and quality of housing. Several concepts were introduced so as to distinguish between class exploitation through the state (fiscal exploitation), class exploitation through class monopoly over land (secondary exploitation), and racial/class exploitation through class monopoly over land (secondary super exploitation).

Political activities were defined as those actions which challenge or reject social, political and/or economic relationships. In examining Indian political activism an attempt was made to determine the degree to which the contested relationships fall into the institutional social control or reproduction categories. With regard to the specific research focus, the task was to determine the degree to which the relationships which AIM challenged, revolve around urban renewal and the housing situation.

Findings

A. Institutional Relationships

There is strong evidence that Indians have unfavorable relationships with urban institutions. Indians have considerably more contact with those institutions whose primary function is social control as opposed to social reproduction. They have a particularly intense interaction with police. They are disproportionately arrested for minor offenses such as disorderly

conduct, vagrancy and drunkenness. The fact that one third of all arrests for drunkenness are Indians suggests that it is an institutionalized relationship which allows tight control over the Indian community. More evidence for this conclusion is provided by the many Indian complaints of discrimination and brutality against police.

There are other unfavorable aspects of the Indian's experience with the law which seem to relate more to his class characteristics. At several points in the judicial system where discretion is exercised the Indian loses out when he does not meet modern, "disciplined worker" criteria--fixed residence, credit ratings, and especially employment.

The most important aspects of the Indian's relationship with welfare seems to be racist attacks on Indian culture and family relations. The great frequency in which Indian children are taken away from their parents had led one author to state that the situation approaches cultural genocide (Wester-meyer, 1973). Welfare seems a considerable social control on the Indian community if we consider the high numbers on relief: 1,762 Indians in 1968.

There is a second major aspect of the Indian's institutional relationships which is harmful. Even institutions which are thought to be primarily for social reproduction exert such strong social control as to override social reproduction to a great degree. The inner city schools are physically deteriorated. Only nine teachers out of a total of 3,200 were Indian. Students had to deal with racist textbooks and

unsympathetic if not racist teachers. As a result, the Indian dropout rate was incredibly high; ranging from fifty to seventy percent.

With regard to health, residency requirements were a hardship. Thus it is likely that seasonal migrants do not have their health needs met in Minneapolis.

B. Urban Renewal

Urban renewal was primarily shaped by the desire to close the city's revenue-expenditure gap. It followed a plan that envisioned Minneapolis as a major corporate center, regionally and nationally. The emphasis in new construction was on office buildings and luxury apartments that would provide customers for downtown businesses. In spite of the fact that a low-income housing shortage already existed, housing construction was far down the list of priorities. Urban renewal destroyed 12,500 units while building only 1,000 low-income units.

The planners' calculations concerning residential use were rather irresponsible. It almost seems appropriate to label this urban renewal program "planned crowding." The city planners advocated using a smaller percentage of land for residential use and recommended using more multiple unit dwellings.

The result of urban renewal was a low-income housing crisis. In addition, landlords introduced a considerable amount of racial discrimination into their dealings with Indians. Discrimination was either overt or through "special

criteria" such as tough credit checks, high damage deposits, or no children rules. There were several ways landlords took advantage of this situation. Because they were anxious to get any housing, Indians rented condemned property with broken stairs, missing doors and broken plumbing. The landlords still were able to make them pay the average Minneapolis rent. There was also a great deal of overcrowding as Indians moved in with friends or relatives so as to manage the high rents.

One reason why this secondary superexploitation was possible was because of lack of code enforcement by the city. The city claimed that it was financially and politically impossible to enforce all codes. Fiscal exploitation in the form of urban renewal, lack of code enforcement and planned crowding facilitated racial discrimination by creating a housing scarcity. In sum, housing constituted a crisis point in social reproduction for Indians.

C. Indian Politics

From the earliest public protests, Minneapolis Indians have defined their interests over a wide spectrum. Even though the first public protest in 1966 was directed at the BIA, all of the issues raised were urban concerns - housing, education, employment and medical. Indians not only addressed issues concerning the services of urban institutions, but also the form of relationships they had to enter into with various agencies. They were particularly sensitive to the power inherent in the institutions as manifestations of the state. They not only wanted services, but they also wanted to participate in designing the relationships which provide a fundamental

framework for daily life in the inner city. This partly explains why perceptions of police harassment and brutality led to the largest mobilizations in support of AIM activities.

Institutional relationships relative to social reproduction are perhaps the most important factor in the development of an inner city Indian identity. They largely shaped the material conditions of life and thus are the basis for shared perceptions of injustice. Particularly important in Minneapolis were the housing conditions and landlord discrimination which in combination were experienced as a severe crisis for many inner city Indians.

D. Urban Renewal and Urban Political Rebellions

Can we support Mollenkopf's argument that urban political insurrections derive from urban renewal? It is fair to say that the urban renewal program was a significant factor in AIM's development, but it is one of several important factors. This study suggests that an entire political economy context must be drawn for urban political rebellions. Unequal relations of power characterize many points of the Indian's contact with urban society. It seems that Indian activism developed along these points of power as paralleling points of resistance. No other issue mobilized Minneapolis Indians like the open exercise of power, as was occasionally exercised by the police. The perception of police harassment was probably the most important factor in the actual origin of AIM.

The material conditions that inner city Indians shared seemed an important part of their sense of community. The

housing crisis was probably the single most important aspect of their material deprivation. Urban renewal was a key factor in creating an unbearable housing situation for Minneapolis Indians. What is important to note is that relations of domination were also involved in the actual implementation of urban renewal programs such as Model Cities. The struggle of AIM in Model Cities was similar to its struggles to get involved in other government programs. It seems that it was because Model Cities raised expectations about the redevelopment of local territory that AIM's struggle here, led to its crystalization as a radical political organization.

Implications of Case Study for Theory

The case of Indian activism in Minneapolis suggests that it might be useful to generalize elements of Mollenkopf's analysis beyond his focus on urban renewal. The two most important consequences of urban renewal that he discussed are the imposition of power and the resulting material hardships. The study of Minneapolis Indians suggests that power and material hardship are important aspects of their urban relationships in general. Mollenkopf identified two forms of urban political rebellion - riots and neighborhood activist organizations. The study of Indian politics found analogous phenomena in the form of spontaneous mass mobilizations and an organized movement - AIM.

The case of AIM implies that Mollenkopf's analysis was somewhat narrow. Although urban renewal was an important

factor in AIM's development, AIM originated in the context of more general relations of power and inequality. The Indians who formed AIM found the experiences of blacks to be similar to their own. Thus they adopted the public protest tactics of black power in an attempt to pressure institutional reform. As it evolved in struggle, AIM became quite concerned with revealing the power relations inherent in urban institutions. The identity of AIM's members revolved around this struggle.

In examining AIM's activities it is necessary to distinguish between the organized pursuit of Indian interests and the more spontaneous mass mobilization of Minneapolis Indians. It is an important question to consider how the two are related for political movements in general. AIM's mass support seemed dependent on the Indian community's perception of overt expressions of institutional power. Thus AIM protests were directed toward making manifest the power encapsulated in institutional relationships. AIM's later actions as a national organization seems to indicate that this was the strategy AIM developed in its Minneapolis struggles.

When AIM looked to reservations as the real bases of "Indian power," it was faced with the problem of generating wide scale support from many different Indian ethnic groups. What AIM tried to do was generate a conflict with the Federal Government with which most Indians could identify. This entailed combining the tactics of militant confrontation with issues that Indian peoples had in common. AIM's focus on the Bureau of Indian Affairs and treaty rights emphasized the

common injustices historically and presently shared by Indian peoples. The militance of the series of occupations appears to have aimed at forcing the system to reveal the coercion and power which ultimately hold Indian reservations in subjugation. This posed a legitimation problem for the Government and a possible source of unity and political mobilization for Indians.

American Indians provide an important case for exploring the relationship between consciousness of domination and the values which underlie resistance to domination. Pan Indianism seems to represent an ethnic self identification in response to the imposition of oppressive racial definitions and material relationships in cities. The American Indian Movement is a more radical articulation of Pan Indian identity. In its rejection of urban institutions, AIM has manifested consciousness of both racial and class aspects of domination.

One significant possibility is suggested in the political rebellions of both blacks and Indians. The imposition of oppressive racial definitions and hardships in racial capitalism tends to create an identity which serves as a basis for the rejection of that system. What is critical is the degree to which a political movement unites a group, through revealing the relations of domination to which the group is subjected.

END NOTES

END NOTES

1. Of the metropolitan areas with the greatest Indian population in 1970, conservative figures put the top seven with populations of 10,000 or more while the top fifteen had Indian populations of 5,000 or more. Robert F. Spencer & Jesse D. Jennings, The Native Americans (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).
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3. Jeanne Guillemin, Urban Renegades: The Cultural Strategy of American Indians (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
4. John Mollenkopf, "The Postwar Politics of Urban Development," Marxism and the Metropolis, William K. Tobb & Larry Sawyers (eds.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
5. See Nathan Glazer & Daniel P. Moynihan, Ethnicity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975).
6. From Table 5, p. 71, Milton Gordon, Assimilation in American Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
7. Robert S. Weppner, "Socioeconomic Barriers to Assimilation of Navajo Migrant Workers," Human Organization, 31 (1972): 313.
8. Howard M. Bahr, Bruce A. Chadwick & Joseph H. Stauss, "Discrimination Against Urban Indians in Seattle," Indian Historian, Winter 1972:8.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
10. Joan Ablon, "Relocated American Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area: Social Interaction and Indian Identity," Native Americans Today, Howard M. Bahr, Bruce A. Chadwick & Robert C. Day (eds.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).
11. C. Hoy Steele, "The Acculturation/Assimilation Model in Urban Studies: A Critique," Majority and Minority: The Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Relations, Steele & Norman R. Yetman (eds.) (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1982).

12. James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1973).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 117.
15. Public Forum before the Committee on Urban Indians in Minneapolis - St. Paul, Minnesota of the National Council on Indian Opportunity, March 18-19, 1969:90.
16. "Indian Job Center Head Wins Backing," Minneapolis Tribune, 11, April 1968, Section A, p. 26, 1.
17. "Indian Center Picketted," Minneapolis Tribune, 11 April 1968, Section A, p. 26, 1.
18. Vine Deloria Has claimed that "Indians were forced to adopt the vocabulary and techniques of the blacks in order to get their grievances serious consideration by the media." Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties (N.Y.: Delta, 1974).
19. Ron Way, "Indian Coalition Plans Action," Minneapolis Tribune, 6 August 1968, Section A, p. 14, 1.
20. "Indians Claim Bias by Negroes in Job Program," Minneapolis Tribune, 23 April 1968, Section A, p. 25, 3.
21. "One Indian Group Gives Initial Support to Others Program," Minneapolis Tribune, 9 February 1969, Section B, p. 4, 6.
22. Comment of Robert Carr in Public Forum, op. cit.: p. 135.
23. Comment of Robert Carr, director of UMAIC as reported by Sam Newland, "Indian Militancy," Minneapolis Tribune, 10 October 1971, Section A, p. 23, 1.
24. Comment of Clyde Bellecourt in Public Forum, op. cit.: 171.
25. Comment of AIM representative Charles Deegan as reported in "Model City Holds Indian Center Funds," Minneapolis Tribune, 18 July 1969, Section A, p. 18, 1.
26. Comment of Clyde Bellecourt in Public Forum, op. cit.: 173.
27. "Indian Militancy," Minneapolis Tribune, op. cit.
28. Susan Brady, "We Will Remember Survival School: A Visit with Women and Children of the American Indian Movement," Ms, 5 (July 1976):77-80.

29. "Indian Leader Backs Separation," Minneapolis Tribune,
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30. Ibid.

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