‘\l|" ml ”=38!!!” w" “2138??? 13,11; 34-1 1 2‘ mtg-VS?! 1‘07 A 15 8 \ W? OVERDUE FINES: 25¢ per day per item RETURNING LIBRARY MATERIALS: M Place in book return to remove charge from circulation records IN SEARCH OF AN ALLY: FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICA, 1919-1929 By Leo Winston Hindsley A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University . in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History 1980 ABSTRACT IN SEARCH OF AN ALLY: FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICA, 1919-1929 By Leo Winston Hindsley The deterioration of French-American relations in the past twenty years has prompted a search for the source of current expressions of anti-Americanism. Most point to the 19208 as the period which had the greatest influence in shaping the contemporary French image of the United States. In view of the scarcity of materials regarding French-American relations, there is a need for a study which ascertains more precisely how the French felt about the United States during the decade after World War I. This study goes beyond the tradition of the Marquis de la Fayette to determine how the French felt about Americans in the post-war period. In spite of successful cooperation during the Great War, the period of 1919-1929 proved to be exceedingly trying and turbulent for both nations. The theme of this study is that the celebrated friendship between the United States and France has been at once an historical myth and a reality. This study focuses on both public opinion and the attitudes of French diplomats and politicians. The offi- cial documents covering this period, housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Quai d'Orsay, were only recently opened for research purposes. These documents were thoroughly examined to discover the attitudes expressed by the French government. A wide range of French newspapers has been consulted to uncover the viewpoints of the journalists and politicians. A balance has been achieved between offi- cial diplomatic relations and the role of public opinion in determining the actual attitudes of the French toward the Americans. French expectations of peace and security, based upon promises inherent in Wilsonianism, made it difficult for France to accept the new structure of world power and her dependence on the United States. Having been weakened by the war, France was forced to recognize the new status of the United States as a world power. When the United States refused to guarantee French security, the French felt they were the victims of compromise and trickery. However, de— spite their disappointment, the French never abandoned the hope that the United States would prove to be a friend. France continued her effort to extract from the United States a commitment to guarantee French security. France saw her security and position among world powers being threatened. Furthermore, as the French be- came financially dependent upon the United States, the consequent resentment and frustration led to increased expressions of disappointment and bitterness toward Americans. That much of the bitterness was so easily overcome by the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Lindbergh's flight, and the visit of the American Legion- naires to France suggests that the basis for friendship continued to exist between the two nations; the numerous conflicts of national interest notwithstanding. Despite the paucity of French efforts to influence American opinion, France always desired American friendship and hoped to be the beneficiary of American financial and military power. In the midst of all the expressions of anti-Americanism, it was always understood that the United States would remain a friend to France. The mystique of the Marquis de la Fayette was still alive at the end of the decade. Recent French anti-Americanism was not predetermined by the frustration of the 19208, for most in both nations anticipated a bright future for French-American relations. To My Wife Darlene ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to Dr. Warren I. Cohen for his example of academic excellence. Without his inspiration and patient guidance, this study would not have been possible. I am also indebted to my wife for her unwavering encouragement and for her help in the preparation of the manuscript. iii II III IV VI VII TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction French-American Relations Before 1919 French Hopes and Dreams: the Wilsonian Peace Security Versus Disarmament: French Disappointments at the Washington Conference The Inter—Allied Debt Question The Kellogg-Briand Pact French Efforts at Influencing Public Opinion Summary and Conclusion Bibliography iv 1 18 37 99 130 .179 207 236 296 INTRODUCTION Sensitivity to anti-Americanism has often caused Americans to over-react to criticism and to accept articu- lated hostile views of the United States as the attitudes of the nation as a whole. This is especially true in French—American relations. In view of traditional French— American friendship, French criticisms have been baffling to Americans. Not understanding that Frenchmen are openly critical of everyone and of each other, Americans too often have mistakenly accepted these criticisms as a general dis— like for Americans. The deterioration of French-American relations in the past twenty years has prompted a search for the sources of current expressions of anti-Americanism. Most point to the 19203 as the period which had the greatest influence in shaping the contemporary French image of the United States. This decade is especially significant be- cause during the 19205 France experienced unprecedented cultural influences from America in the form of films, jazz bands, assembly lines and American tourists. Additional influences were felt due to the émigré: predominantly writers, artists and musicians. This study will attempt to ascertain more precisely how the French felt about the United States during this period. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, President of France, during 1 2 his visit to the United States in May 1976, made an appeal to both nations for a greater degree of mutual understanding as a prerequisite to improved French-American relations. The French president sounded a theme that has been expressed by both the French and the Americans since their first diplomatic encounter: that of the need for improved relations and understanding. Every fourth of July Americans are re- minded that the American colonies could not have won their independence without French aid; however, diplomacy between the United States and France has often been marked by mis- comprehension, suspicion and insecurity. This friendship, accentuated by extremes, can perhaps best be described as a love-hate relationship. This study is an attempt to look beyond the tradition of the Marquis de la Fayette in order to determine how the French felt about the Americans after World War I. I will also attempt to show the evolution of French attitudes and expectations in the decade following the war. It is under— stood that French attitudes were in part a response, or reaction, to American actions and moods, particularly in regard to major diplomatic events. Change and disillusion- ment are tangibly felt by one in tune with the French spirit. Official documents, newspapers and periodicals have been consulted in an attempt to understand the attitudes of the French peOple as well as official government policies. The theme of this study is that the celebrated friendship between the United States and France has been at once an 3 historical myth and a reality. The period of 1919-1929, in spite of successful cooperation during World War I, proved to be one of the most trying and turbulent for both nations. Yet, in spite of many frictions and controversies, the United States and France have generally managed to re- store a semblance of harmony and understanding, permitting sufficient cooperation to meet major crises challenging both nations. Personal contact, especially between educated Americans and Frenchmen, helped to keep the traditional friendship alive. During the years after World War I, relatively few Frenchmen visited the United States, but thousands of Americans toured France and learned to appre- ciate its natural beauty and the artistic and intellectual creations of its people. Many American artists and musi- cians, as well as intellectuals, made France their second home. American creative talent found the hospitality of the French and their intellectual stimulation most gratify- ing. Some Americans were, however, shocked by the apparent superficiality of French religion and the immorality of French literature, as seen from their own cultural bias. Still, on balance, the close cultural connections between Americans and French tended to take the sting out of the frequent diplomatic differences between the two governments. Thus, while there was at times diplomatic withdrawal, there was never cultural isolation.l Public opinion is a vague term which refers to the composite opinions of the general public; however, usually u the only tangible evidence of these attitudes is found in the opinions of the public leaders as expressed in press and public utterances. While American foreign policy was narrowly circumscribed by public opinion, in France public opinion played a different role. French foreign policy was in the hands of the professional diplomats who were, to a great extent, out of the reach of public opinion. Due to government interference and political affiliation, the French press, like French politics, was less representative of public opinion than was the press in the United States.2 This study focuses on both public opinion and the attitudes of the diplomats and politicians. The official documents of the French Foreign Office reveal the attitudes expressed by the press as well as the attitudes and posi- tions taken by the French government on specific issues. The unpublished documents used had only recently been de- classified and opened for research purposes at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d'Orsay). Public opinion in this period can best be ascertained through newspapers and periodi— cals. In the conventional study of diplomatic relations the emphasis has been focused upon an understanding of the of- ficial foreign policy and diplomacy of each country. However, the attempt in this study will be to discover French attitudes toward the United States as expressed by French public opinion as well as revealed in diplomatic records. There are, how- ever, many problems in attempting to evaluate the influence of public opinion in forming foreign policy and the imple- mentation of that policy. 5 First, the Foreign Office policy was determined in relative isolation, independent from other government affairs. There was an absence of machinery, in either the popular or parliamentary sectors, which might have provided a control on official policy. This is evidenced by the fact that the majority of the correspondence contained in the documents of the Ministre des Affaires Etrangéres dealt with public opinion, both in the United States and in France. Secondly, public opinion is intangible and it is difficult to establish a satisfactory conclusion relative to the influence of public opinion on the formation and expression of foreign policy. It is the opinion of this writer that there is a spirit and an attitude which can be detected and which did influence foreign policy, and which can only be appreciated through an understanding of the culture, mentality and "national character" of the people. Thirdly, the capturing of the state of mind of a people at any given time is a difficult problem as is any attempt to reconstruct the past. This was especially true before there were public polls to record opinion. This task is even more difficult when it is undertaken by one who is not a native of the country. Such an undertaking requires a recognition that an impartial evaluation is quite impossible. The many currents of opinion which contribute to the main- stream of public opinion rarely fuse into one. Of necessity one must select those considered to be the most influential by the French politicians and writers themselves. For ex- ample, the French Department of Foreign Affairs gave a daily 6 press analysis wherein reference was consistently made to what the department considered to be important in American and French dailies. Yet when the pressure of a crisis created a relative unanimity, it is never certain that this was the predominant point of view among the French. The problem is compounded when one must rely upon public ad- dresses, arguments in Parliament or Congress, explanations by diplomats or writings of editors and news correspondents, for each is attempting to represent public opinion as being in agreement with his respective point of view. It is pos- sible, however, through a comparison of the various expres- sions of opinion in a wide range of material, to reach some sound conclusions. An evaluation of traditions and of poli- tical and economic influences will make possible a valid representation of the state of mind of the peOple of a country in a given period. The French reader did not regard the daily paper as merely an entertaining pastime but expected, rather, to be informed of current political thoughts and directions. He chose from the incredible number of papers available those that best expressed his own opinions or those he considered to be the most reliable in reporting the news or reflecting the opposition's view. Circulation figures alone are a revealing indication of public opinion, for not only did French papers reveal public opinion but they also shaped it. Thus, since newspapers are important to this study, an in— troductory analysis of French papers of this period is essential. In 1919 the French press, representing all sectors of French opinion, reached great dimensions of distribution. There were no less than fifty-five daily papers printed in Paris alone. The three largest, 1e Petit parisien, le Matin and 1e Journal, each had a circulation of over one million. The French press was never uniquely a "presse d'information" but rather had a definite political commitment. Little ef- fort was made to conceal the political affiliation of most of the large dailies such as le Matin, le Petit parisien and le Figaro. Each of these papers had its own diplomatic and military reporters and an editor who interpreted the news along the lines of his political affiliation. The smaller dailies Openly espoused a precise political Opinion. Approx- imately forty of the fifty-five Paris dailies reported the news as propaganda. Generally, the press of this period can be classified as Left, Center or Right on the political spectrum. However, some newspapers are as difficult to classify as are French politicians. The Petit journal and the Petit parisien were the only Paris dailies that exercised a profound influence in the provinces. These had a large circulation all over France. Others such as le Matin_and le Journal were not distributed outside the large cities, although their articles were reproduced by the provincial press, increasing their influence. In short, the French press at once disseminated and attempted to form opinion.3 8 The French press exercised an increasingly important role in French politics. The Paris government in 1919 had managed to control the political opposition in Parliament and was struggling to control all opposition through press censorship. On several occasions, even before the Peace Treaty Commission, Clemenceau expressed his dislike of the large newspapers. The Clemenceau cabinet likewise attempted to suppress opposing voices in the news media in numerous ways. Censorship and suspension of publication for reasons of national security were the most effective. The government also maintained a strict censorship of the foreign press. These censorships, however, were not as effective as the government wished due to clumsy, arbitrary and blind application. This political involvement of the French press is il— 1ustrated by the fact that numerous directors of newspapers, such as Jean Dupuy of le Petit parisien, were personally involved in politics. French politicians and journalists alike had discovered since the Dreyfus affair that the press was an effective means of formulating public opinion. Indeed, political leaders were often writers for the large newspapers. Senators and deputies wrote frequently for the Paris dailies. For example, Paul Doumer, Louis Marin, Gaston Doumergue, Edouard Herriot and Raoul Péret were well known through the press. The journalistic influ» ence of the politicians came either from articles contributed to the newspapers or through their influence on the 9 editorials. Thus many politicians who never wrote for the press were influential as they acted as advisors to certain newspapers. This was the case with Briand through lg Matin. Even the large newspapers had a definite political position on all important issues. Each freely expressed opinions on political issues and, in short, most treated th news as propaganda. However, a definite political classifi- cation of the newspapers is difficult because one classified on the Left would often take the same position as a Right— oriented newspaper on certain issues. Some dailies such as le Rappel and l'AuroreJ traditionally classified as Left, supported the government in 1919. Thus one can only conclude that the newspapers represent the individualism of the politicians themselves. Still, an approximate classification is both useful and necessary. The important Left, Socialist and Syndicalist papers were l'Humanité, 1e ngulaire and le Journal du peuple. The Pacifist papers were la Bataille, la Vérité, l'Heure, l'Oeuvre and Bonsoir. The Nationalist Socialist papers, le Radical, la France libre, lg Rappel and even l'Homme libre of Clemenceau are generally included among the Left. The most influential Right papers included l'Action frangaise, la Libre parole, le Gaulois, la Liberté, l'Echo de Paris, la Croix, l'Avenir, l'Eclair, la Victoire, lg Figaro and le Journal des débats. This classification is also difficult because, for example, l'Eclair changed 10 position in 1919, as evidenced by the addition of J. Paul— Boncour as a regular contributor. At the same time Jacques Bainville and Edouard Herriot wrote for the Avenir and the 53:12,Whi0h supported Foch, denounced Clemenceau and were friendly toward Briand; therefore, they must be classified among the Center. Some other important Center newspapers included Démocratie nouvelle, l'Intransigeant, le Temps, 1e Journal, 1e Petit journal, Paris—Midi, l'Information and 1e Petit bleu. The three large Paris newspapers which almost had a monopoly on sales and distribution were the Petit parisien (2,000,000 circulation), le Matin (1,500,000) and le Journal (1,000,000). In addition to these three with over one mil- lion circulation, there were fifty-two daily newspapers in- cluding l'Echo de Paris, l'Intransigeant, la Croix, l'Excelsior, l'Oeuvre and l'Humanité, each exceeding one hundred thousand in circulation. L'Action francaise sold from sixty to eighty thousand copies, la Libre parole from ten to twenty thousand l'Avenir and 1e Journal des débats approximately twenty—five thousand. Among the most influential dailies, le Temps had a circulation of only seventy-five thousand. The newspapers of the Left had a more modest circulation: le Rappel and 13 Radical (10,000), la France libre (6,000), 1e Populaire and Clemenceau's l'Homme libre (10,000). Twenty of the more im- portant dailies had a circulation of less than five thousand. The press in the provinces was a reflection of the Paris press and will not figure greatly in this study. 11 Generally, the position a newspaper took depended upon an overall attitude toward the government and its initiatives toward the war, peace negotiations, security and the economy. For example, the Socialists and Pacifists were opposed to Foch and the "Paix de sécurité," were support- ers of Wilson and were fundamentally against Clemenceau. However, some Right dailies like les Débats and l'Eclair supported Wilson without being against Clemenceau. The most violent critics of Clemenceau were the largest papers, 13 Matin and le Journal which had a clientele among the middle class. Clemenceau, however, could count on the faithful sup- port of other large newspapers such as le Petit parisien and 1e Petit journal (the most apolitical of all French papers) which was read largely by the lower social class. The Petit parisien, with a circulation of two million, had tremendous influence because it belonged to Senator Jean Dupuy and was the voice of Parliament and the Clemenceau government. The cabinet of Clemenceau depended on the sup- port of the press of the Right; yet when its existence was threatened by problems over the peace negotiations the "press of the Left" would come to its aid. The Left dailies would usually support the government position agianst the extreme Right. The French press had the benefit of an outstanding group of journalists who were analysts of exceptional talent. The analysts were professional journalists, writers, profes- sors and politicians who used the press as a vehicle of confrontation of opposition opinion. Many members of l2 Parliament used the press as a means of extending their in- fluence upon the people also. For example, it was a common occurrence for the president of the Budget Commission for the Chamber to have numerous articles in the press criticizing his political enemies. Access to the press was extremely important to politicians such as Clemenceau, as it was the privileged vehicle for political opinion. 13 The following is a list of the influential Paris newspapers: L'Action frangaise: Royalist, Right publication of Charles Murras, Léon Daudet and Jacques Bainville. L'Avenir de Paris: Moderate Right, Briandist, publication of Charles Chaumet, deputy from la Gironde. Contri- butors: Bainville, Deputy Lémery, Edouard Herriot, Colonel Fabry. La Bataille: Syndicalist, publication of the CGT. Began publication in 1914 under the direction of Léon Jouhaux. Bonsoir: Left, Pacifist and anti-government. Began publica- tion January 13, 1919 under the direction of Gustave Téry. Contributors: Robert de Jouvenal and Henri Béraud. La Croix: Catholic. Contributors: J. Mollet, G. Goyeau, J. Girand and General Petetin. La Démocratie nouvelle: Centrist but critical of Clemenceau. Began publication in 1918 under the direction of Lysis. André Cheradame was the editor of foreign affairs. L'Echo de Paris: Right. Contributors: Pertinaux, Maurice Barres, Marcel Hutin, Gabriel Bonvalot and numerous parliamentarians. L'Echo du commerce: Publication of French commercial and economic interests. Contributors: H. Franck and Monserrat. L'Eclair: Changed from Right to Left. Director: René Wertheimer. Contributors: Rojon, G. Montorgueil, Admiral Degouy, Maxime Leroy and from February 1919, Jean Paul-Bancour. L'Europe nouvelle: Left or Liberal. Began publication in 1917. Supported Wilson. Contributors: Léon Jouhaux, Louise Weiss. L'Evenement: Center. Supported the government. Editor: Alexandre Israel. Contributors: Henri Paté, Alexandre Varenne, Alexandre Bérard. Political editor: George Reynald. Excelsior: Center. Parliamentarians: Raoul Péret and Lémery were contributors. La France: Left. Founded by Emile de Girardin. Contribu- tors: Parliamentarians A. Lebey and G. Bonnamour, J. L. Bonnet. Editors: Emile Buré and H. Laurier. 1'4 La France libre: Socialist. Began publication in 1918 by forty Socialist deputies. Director: Compere-Morel, Deputy Rozier and Deputy Veber. La France militaire: Military contributors: Generals Fonville, Malleterre and Prudhomme. Parliamentarians: L. Cornet, Senator Henri Cheron. Le Figaro: Right. Director: Gaston Calmette. Editors in Chief: Alfred Capus, Robert de Flers. Contributor: Parliamentarian Denys Cochin. Le Gaulois: Extreme Right. Director: Arthur Meyer. Contri- tors: René d'Aral, Colonel Rousset. Occasionally: Francois Mauriac. L'Heure: Republican. Socialist. Political director: Marcel Sembat. Contributors: Paul Aubriot, Léon Jouhaux, Alexandre Varenne, Léon Blum, Alphonse Aulard. L'Homme libre: Formerly l'Homme enchainé. Founded by Georges Clemenceau. Contributors: Bittard, Nicholas Pietri, Léo Gerville-Réache. Clemenceau with the assistance of Pietri edited l'Homme libre in 1919. Left National. L'Humanité: Director: Marcel Cachin since October 1918. Contributors: Longuet, Mayeras, Sembat, D. Renoult, Anatole France, C. Huysmans, Sixte Quenin. Socialist Centrist faction. L'Information: Center. Economic and financial supplement. Along with l'Echo du commerce the only daily commercial paper. Contributors: Paul Adam, Léo Chavenon, Charles Omessa, Admiral Degouy, Jules Moch. L'Information parlementaire: Center. Daily correspondence with departmental papers. Director: Armand Massip. L'Intransigeant: Center. Director: Léon Bailby. On February 11 Colonel Fabry was editor in chief. Contributors: Philippe Crozier, Georges Lecomte, Pierre MacOrlan. Le Journal: Center. Director: Georges Humbert. Contributors: H. Bidou, Saint Brice, Georges London, Binet-Valmer. Important parlementary contributors: Paisant, Damour, Pradier, Abbé Lemire, Raoul Péret, Boussenot, Brousse. Le Journal des débats: Conservative Right. Director: Etienne de Naleche. Published for one hundred years. Contri- butors: Gauvin, P. de Quirielle, H. Bidou. Important diplomatic column. 15 Le Journal du peuple: Socialist. Director: Henri Fabré. Contributors: Severine, A. Charpentier, Mayeras, Lucien Le Foyer, Charles Rappoport, Bernard Lecache, Henri Torres, Paul Vaillant-Couturieur, General Percin. La Justice: National. Director: Gratien Candace. Contri— butors: Charles Bronne, then Gaston Doumergue (Candace was a Socialist Republican who resigned January 8.). The paper changed political affiliation and became Nationalist in February. La Lanterne: Radical. Director: Felix Hautfort. Contri— butors: Latapie, Laskine. La Libre parole: Right. Founder: Edouard Drumond. Contri- butors: Paul Vergnet, Reverdy, Isoulet, Galli, General Petetin, Louis Marin, General de Saint Yves, Joseph Denais. Le Matin: Conservative. Director: Bunau-Varilla. Editor in Chief: Henri de Jouvenel. Contributorsc Stéphane Lauzanne, J. Sauerwein (diplomatic), Commander de Civrieux. L'Oeuvre: Pacifist, Radical. Began publication in 1915. Director: Gustave Téry. Contributors: Jean Hennessy, Charles Saglio, Barthe, Admiral, Degouy, General Verraux. Paris-Midi: Center. Director: A. Milhaud. Contributors: M. de Waleffe, Leblond. Merged with l'Evenement in June. La Patrie: Right. Director: Emile Massard. Le Pays: Pacifist. Editor in Chief: Gaston Vidal. Contribu- tors: Yvon Delbos, Victor Maugueritte, Théodore Ruyssen, A. Aulard, G. Séailles, Charles Debierre, Senator Rodriguez. Le Petit bleu: Center. Founder: Rochefort. Director: Alfred Oulman. Le Petit journal: Center. Contributors: Londres, Blumenthal, Fournol, Raoul Péret, Colonel Thomasson, Viviani. Le Petit parisien: Center. Director: Jean Dupuy. ("Largest newspaper circulation in the world" - 2,500,000). Contributors: G. Lechartier, Landry, Cheron, Aulard, Colonel Rousset, Engerand. La Petite république: Radical. Political director: Louis Puech. Director: Maurice Dejean. Important parle- mentary contributors: Augagneur, Fernand Merlin. 16 La Politique: Republican and Socialist. Began publication In 1919. Political director: Alexandre Varenne. Le Populaire de Paris: Socialist, Syndicalist. Minority tendency. Director: Jean Longuet. Contributors: Mayeras, Renoult, Paul Faure, Henri Barbusse, Frossard, Boris Souvarine, Paul Mistral. La Presse: Center Governmental. Founded by Emile de Girardin. Parlementary contributors: Escudier, André Lebey. Le Radical: Socialist Left. Contributors: P. Delmondy, Louis Ripault, J. Perchot, Verzenet, G. Rivet, Lanson, Colonel Pris. Le Rappel: Radical Left, Governmental. Founder: Auguste Vacquerie. Director: Edmond du Mesnil. Contributors: Louis Ripault, Camille Devilar, Georges Leygues. La République frangaise: Republican Left. Founder: Gambetta. Political director: Jules Roche. Contributors: Louis Marcellin, G. Bonnamour, Louis Latapie, Georges Bonnefous, Commander de Civrieux. Le Soir: Economic newspaper. Center. Governmental. Contri- butors: Gaston Doumergue, Rabaud, Dejean, Lémery, Laurent Eynac, Colonel Fabry, Brousse, Serre, Constant, Verlot, René Cassin. Important parlementary contri- butions. Supplement: Le Journal du commerce. Le Temps: Center. Represented the grande bourgeoisie. Political director: Adrien Hébrard. Contributors: F. Mommeja, Théodore Linenbaub, General de Lacroix, Lieutenant d'Entraygues, Charles Rivet, A. Guillerville. La Vérité: Pacifist. Left. Director: Paul Meunier. Con- tributors: Merrheim, Barbusse, Séverine, A. Charpentier, Fabrice, Pierre Massé, Charles Debierre, Le Foyer. La Victoire: Radical Right. Political director: Gustave Hervé. Contributors: G. Bienaimé. La Vieille France: Right. Anti-American. La Voix du peuple: Socialist and Syndicalist. FOOTNOTES 1 . . Crane Brlnton, The Americans and the French (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 53. 2Pierre Miquel, La Paix de Versailles et l'opinion publique francaise (Paris: Flammarion, 1972), pp. 9-36. 3E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1870-1919 (New York: Century, 1931), pp. 3-1u. 17 CHAPTER 1 FRENCH-AMERICAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1919 Although the subject of this study is French attitudes in regard to the United States after the Great War, it is important to establish mutual attitudes before the 19203. The emotional bond which drew the French and the Americans together too often led to expectations that clashed with the realities of divergent interests. The French contribution to American independence created a myth of traditional close association between the two countries. However, in actual fact, the attitude in each nation with respect to the other ranged from admiration to contempt. Their respec- tive interests dictated friction—producing policies which diplomacy was unable to resolve. The French—American Alliance of 1778 was the result of a long—time power struggle between France and Britain. The humiliating results of the "Great War for the Empire" which ended in 1763 predisposed France to encourage the independence movement in the colonies. Without the material and political aid of prestigious and powerful France, the colonies could not have successfully defied the more power- ful England. Despite the skepticism of many of the American colonies in regard to the "intriguing nation," the colonists 18 19 sought and finally received essential aid from France even though it was offered on competitive grounds. The essence of France's motive was explained by the Count de Vergennes when he said, "We shall humiliate our natural enemy, we shall re-establish our reputation and shall resume amongst the powers of Europe the place which belongs to us."1 The American Revolution became merely a phase in a war of international scope when France and Spain concluded an alliance and when Spain declared war on England on June 21, 1779. From a military point of View this turn of events obviously benefited the United States, although it presented the possibility of unwanted political entanglements in European intrigues. The American peace commissioners, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, quickly realized that neither France nor Spain was committed to American interests. The failure of France and Spain to wrest Gibraltar from England led to attempts to compensate Spain with territories east of the Mississippi. France, while supporting the desire for inde— pendence of the United States, wanted it to be small and politically dependent on France and economically strong enough to be beneficial to her. Once the peace commissioners became aware of France's designs, they felt no longer obli- gated to the provisions of the Alliance of 1778 and set out to conclude a peace with England apart from France. Britain had an interest in driving a wedge between the French and the Americans and succeeded by granting peace terms more 20 favorable to the United States than Vergennes thought possible. Neither the French nor the Americans lived up to the spirit of the alliance, for both independently ap- proached England hOping to gain the most advantageous terms for themselves. Early French—American relations reveal that self- interest guided both countries from their first encounter. Americans were determined that they would not be weak and dependent on French manipulators. Despite common roots in the Enlightenment, the French and Americans had not merged into a common national interest. The French and American Revolutions disturbed the political and social order of the Western world and, for a time, evoked sentiments of frater- nity, but trade interests soon forced France and the United States into quarrelsome controversies and ultimately into an undeclared naval war in the 1790s. The initial American response to the French Revolution of 1789 had been on the whole favorable. However, when France became involved in an external war, the United States was confronted with a serious dilemma. On the one hand, the Alliance of 1778 and a real sympathy on the part of the majority of Americans for the ideals of the French Revolution dictated that the United States should become involved on the side of France in her conflict with England. On the other hand, politically and economically weak America could not afford to become involved in a war which would probably destroy the young republic. Domestic and foreign affairs were tied together. Economic interests dictated that issues 21 relative to foreign trade would become the focal point in American foreign policy.2 Thus debate over ideological and economic considerations in foreign policy culminated in a crisis over the ratification of the Jay Treaty, divided the American people, and created the first party system.3 The revolutionary government of France expected aid from the United States as an ally and a sister republic. The neutrality policy of the Federalists in America thus ran counter to French expectations. The leaders of the young American nation did not yield to sympathies for the French cause but pursued a policy dictated by the necessity of trade and the preservation of peace and made concessions to Britain, irrespectiVe of French reactions. Divergent policies, moreover drove France and America increasingly apart. The Napoleonic era did not witness much improvement in French-American relations. Napoleon had visions of re- storing France's influence in North America by the acquisi- tion of Louisiana from Spain. Due to military and diploma- tic reverses, Napoleon decided to sell the Louisiana Territory to the United States. The arrogance displayed by Napoleon in his dealings with the United States showed a lack of understanding of both the government and the people. Napoleon failed to exploit the American dislike for England to France's advantage but instead provoked American wrath against the French by his arbitrary treatment of American shippers. Napoleon was unscrupulous and insensitive in the handling of American affairs and was increasingly unresponsive even as his powers increased in Europe. 22 As a consequence, the July Revolution of 1830 was viewed by Americans as an improvement in the French political system. After all, the citizen-king, Louis-Philippe, was on a constitutional throne and was not king of France but of the French people. The thirties, however, were to see one of the most bitter of America's quarrels with France. The cause of the outpouring of much bitter rhetoric was the continuous dispute over indemnities claimed by Americans for damages incurred during the war which ended in 1815. When France finally agreed to pay five million dollars for spoliation claims, the Chamber of Deputies simply refused to appropriate money to carry out the treaty. However, neither side wanted war for "so silly a cause" and both accepted British mediation. The memory of the angry dispute remained even though France paid the claims. Nothing more of significance happened on the diplo- matic level in French-American relations until the American Civil War. Taking advantage of the unfortunate situation, Napoleon III used the customary claim of unpaid foreign debts to dispatch troops to Mexico. The mission, conducted jointly by France, England and Spain, was supposed to be strictly to insure the collection of debts. However, the French used the occasion to set up a satellite state in Mexico with the Austrian prince as emperor. After Appomattox the American government used every diplomatic means to en- force the Monroe Doctrine. Tolerating the existence of a monarchy on their border 23 was unthinkable to Americans in 1860. Americans were ex- tremely unsympathetic toward French efforts to establish such an un—American institution in Mexico. In the final two years of negotiations, the Americans displayed an unu- sual firmness and patience which concluded in a settlement being reached without an ultimatum. Nevertheless, it was a serious and traumatic experience in the deteriorating re- lations with France. Even though the Third Republic was not America's kind of republic, at least it was not a monarchy. From 1867 until after World War I there was no major crisis causing bitterness such as that resulting from the XYZ affair, the Napoleonic wars, the spoliation claim or Napoleon III's adventure in Mexico. French eXpansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was chiefly in Southeast Asia and Africa and did not greatly concern Americans. There continued to arise, however, some minor points of irritation. For instance, although the United States had no colon- ial aspirations in Africa, it possessed a "peculiar" foothold on the west coast of Africa. Liberia, established by the American Colonization Society as a colony of freed slaves, became a de facto colony of the United States.” Even after Liberia became independent in 18H? generous American financial aid maintained its independence. When France offered its protection to the Liberian government, the United States let it be known that Americans were opposed to any attempt 24 to subvert the independence of Liberia for the aggrandizement of any colonial power. President Cleveland, for example, warned France to keep hands off Liberia by announcing "the moral right and duty of the United States to assist in all proper ways in the maintenance of its (Liberia's) integrity."5 American interest in Liberia involved the United States in colonial rivalries with France. In l88u when the French sought boundary adjustments in Liberia, both the United States and England objected. The French were warned by the State Department that America's intimate relations with Liberia entitled her to be involved in any boundary settlement. But two years later the French signed treaties with some tribal chiefs inside the Liberian territory. The State Department again informed France that the United States would protect Liberia's territorial sovereignty. Despite American protests, Liberia signed a treaty December 8, 1892, ceding to France the seacoast east of the Cavally River in exchange for certain territorial and financial compensations. France had, however, to the satisfaction of the United States, recognized the independence of the state of Liberia, one of the chief aims of the United States. The United States, under Taft and Roosevelt, established Liberia as an American sphere of influence. Americans assumed Liberian debts, re-organized its army, and made sure that it would be absorbed by neither France nor England. In other areas of Africa the United States was not directly involved. However, occasional differences between 25 the two nations were settled in the businesslike atmosphere which generally prevailed in French-American relations during this period. French determination to expand her empire, by diplomacy if possible, by force if necessary, led to American resentment. When France established a protectorate over Tunis in 1881, public opinion in the United States severely condemned the unprovoked attack on Tunis to force compliance to this treaty. The anti-colonial attitude of Americans was expressed in disparaging articles about French colonialism, leading Theodore-Justin Roustan, the French ambassador to Washington, to conclude that in crisis the French might discover that the presumed French-American friendship was only an illusion. The French rationalized that their empire building was a civilizing enterprise. They had the right to repre- sent Tunis in its relations with other countries. Conse- quently, the French refused to recognize the most—favored nation concessions the United States had previously gained from Tunis. The French also established a protectorate over Madagascar in 1885 and subjugated it. A decade later France refused to recognize the treaty rights of both the United States and Britain and informed them that the new arrange- ments on the island were incompatible with their anterior treaties with Madagascar. And in the Far East, despite their rivalry, the 26 European powers wanted to maintain a unified front vis-a-vis the Orientals. The desire to keep pace with the other European powers led the French to seek and to take advantage Of America's participation in Far Eastern affairs. In the resolution of complex rights disputes in Tonkin, Yunnan and Annam, the United States rendered services to the French government. The American friendly intervention demonstrated its international concern and usefulness to the French. Some American Opposition was provoked by the drawn—out discussions that culminated in de Lesseps' attempt to build the Panama Canal. This Opposition was not very determined because de Lesseps' enterprise was private and he worked diligently to win over business interests. Neither the French failure in the Panama Canal project nor the final American success caused anything like a crisis in French- American diplomatic relations. The Panama Scandal, said the Nation, was not the only reason for the disorder in French politics. It "simply brought to the boiling point the public indignation over the long series Of weaknesses and failures on the part of the ministry."6 The Panama Scandal was scornfully des- cribed in the Review of Reviews: It is impossible to conceal from the world that a large portion Of French society, financial, legis- lative and diplomatic has for years past been wallow- ing in a cesspool of corruption . . . the result is an Object lesson in the consequences of repudiating the moral law. In the period from the Franco-Prussian War to World War I Americans once more began to refer to France as "our 27 ancient ally." However, this did not prevent condemnation Of anything that seemed to be materialistic, intolerant, irreligious or unstable. French politics were described as fierce, undisciplined, mixed with passion and permeated with the spirit Of "revanche" and characterized by "an ex- travagant and unreasoning chauvinism." The French, however, were praised for the way they recovered from the impoverishment they suffered at the hands Of the Prussians to become "stronger and growing stronger, prosperous and happy beyond any nation in Europe." Between 1890 and 1900 American Opinion toward France was brought into sharper focus by the Franco-Russian Entente (189”), by the Panama Scandal which was made public in 1893, by the assassination of President Carnot in l89u and by the Dreyfus case which held center stage in 1898 and 1899. The Dreyfus case, more than any other event, brought French political and social affairs to the attention of Americans. The question of the guilt Of the Alsatian Jew, accused and convicted Of selling military secrets to Germany, produced both political and moral reactions from Americans. Sympathy for Dreyfus was strong in America. When Zola's letter, "J'accuse," caused the revelation of the sinister power Of the army and corruption in the French government, Americans were convinced that a great injustice had been done. The anti—Semitic agitation in France, the mob spirit, the suppression of freedom Of speech and evidence of a vengeful spirit against Germany caused most Americans to 28 Ificold France in disfavor. Elizabeth Brett White, in American (:Djpinion Of France, states that the "press throughout the ‘ILEIJnited States was practically unanimous in condemnation."8 'ZITIhe Independent called the case the "most disgraceful episode <::>.f modern political and military life."9 The Political Science Quarterly declared that When the state is merged in the army, there can be nO guaranty of civil liberty. . . . The government Of France . . . is indeed called a republic; but after we have read the Dreyfus case and the Zola trial, it can kindle nO spark of fraternal sympathy in the heart of any genuine American. When the new trial brought a verdict Of "guilty, with rnitigating circumstances," even more criticism was heaped Ilpon France. The Nation called the verdict an example of "French military justice, which the world now understands to be the grossest injustice under the forms Of law. France stands disgraced before the world by this terrible denial of justice."11 After Dreyfus had been pardoned and released, he asked for a new trial on the basis Of new evidence. A verdict of innocence was rendered at this time. The Review Of Reviews said, "It is not Dreyfus alone who has been vindicated, it is France herself . . . out Of the agita- tion over Dreyfus and the bitterness of the religious preju— dice that was aroused has come the church separation law and a new, tolerant regenerated France."12 Although there was no active ill—will against France over the Dreyfus case, it did make a bad impression and led to a great deal Of disparagement. With respect to the Spanish-American War, French 29 jpublic Opinion demonstrated a wide range of viewpoints, (depending on financial, religious and ideological interests. JFrench investors in Spain had an interest in avoiding war ]between the United States and Spain. The Franco-Spanish -trade volume was considerable although the the Franco—American “trade volume was twice as large. All things considered, fi- Jmancial interests dictated that France remain neutral. Be-