' 'u‘d"!""“ '1 ,,‘ K n {(l ' ‘ ‘33 3:3 fit 4 m; V3 1 if m I h” l I l ‘1 H J M r5. I ‘ p! ( 1, (i F1» 1??! i ‘ o'mnuauuuaunumum. .-....u... MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY LIB ARIES lll ll "I ll llllllllilll mesh?» 3 1293 10672 2055 ll This is to certify that the thesis entitled AN ANALYSIS OF MICHIGAN STATE POLICE EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM OPERATIONS FROM 19 74 TO 1984 presented by Samuel Douglas Batten has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Master of SciencedPM?9inCriminal Justice Major professor Date June 182 1985 0—7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution MSU LlBRARlES RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. AN ANALYSIS OF MICHIGAN STATE POLICE EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM OPERATIONS FROM 1974 TO 1984 By Samuel Douglas Batten A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE School of Criminal Justice 1985 ABSTRACT AN ANALYSIS OF MICHIGAN STATE POLICE EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM OPERATIONS FROM 1974 TO 1984 By Samuel D. Batten This research looks at the incidents handled by a contemporary SWAT team over an eleven year period. The incidents were categor- ized by type. Other data include descriptions of hostage-takers and barricaded gunmen, use of deadly force, and method of resolving the incidents. The research method utilized is an analysis of official police records.' The entire population (143 incidents) was studied. Analytical techniques include frequency of occurrence, chi square, and phi. It was found that 63.6 percent of SWAT incidents involved either hostage—takers or barricaded gunmen. The main precipitating factors were domestic disturbances and mentally unstable subjects. Subjects used deadly force in 52.7 percent of the incidents. Between 44 and 66 percent of the subjects had prior police records. Negotiation was the method most frequently used in resolving the incidents. Nonetheless, police assault had to be used in a third of the cases. No statistical significance was found between: subjects' alcohol/drug use during the incident and their use of deadly force; alcohol/drug use and the ability of police to negotiate a peaceful settlement; subjects' threat of using deadly force and actually doing so; or the type of police agency requesting SWAT assistance and the incident terminating prior to SWAT'S arrival. CONTENTS Chapter: I. INTRODUCTION . Problem Statement Statement of Objectives II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE III. METHODOLOGY Introduction Sample . Definition of Terms Data Recording Analysis Limitations IV. FINDINGS SWAT Missions Requests for Assistance Hostage and Barricaded Gunman Incidents V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions Recommendations Personal Comments APPENDIX A: Data Sheet APPENDIX B: Code Key APPENDIX C: Director of State Police Letter APPENDIX D: ES Team Member Application Form APPENDIX E: ES Team Applicant Evaluation Form . APPENDIX F: Basic Concepts of Tactical Team OperatiOn APPENDIX C: Ten Commandments of Hostage Negotiation APPENDIX H: State Police Tactical Teams BIBLIOGRAPHY ,._. 94 94 99 106 112 113 117 118 120 122 123 126 130 Figure: LIST OF FIGURES Categorization by Type of 143 MSP EST Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trend in Requests for EST Assistance . . . . EST Response Time Relative Frequency of Subject Injuring and/or Killing Others in Hostage and Barricaded Gunman Incidents Trend of Hostage and Barricaded Gunman Incidents Terminating Prior to EST Arrival Rank of Officer Requesting EST Assistance 47 56 63 77 89 9O CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Problem Statement Police special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams are designed mainly to handle high risk incidents which cannot be adequately managed by regular, on—duty police officers. Such incidents may include, but are not limited to, hostage situations and barricaded gunmen. Most police organizations, except for very small departments, either have a SWAT team or have at some juncture considered forming one. In recent years some teams have been levied with additional taskings which might not have been planned for when they were origin- ally developed. Teams may be tasked with executive protection duties, management of hazardous material incidents such as chemical spills or radiation leaks, and other such incidents. What can a SWAT team do in such instances that a well trained and properly equipped cadre of regular police officers cannot? Clearly, responding to and handling such incidents was not originally meant to be within SWAT's purview of responsibility. Also in recent years police executives have attempted to dis— pell the notion of SWAT being a commando-type force to be called upon when all other attempts to resolve a particular situation have failed. Teams' use of deadly force has been down—played. Team members are supposed to be so well trained that deadly force will be used only as a last resort, after other less violent measures have been exhausted. The concept of controlled firepower is claimed by some to even save lives. A SWAT team member may be more selective in his or her use of deadly force than a normal patrol officer would be in the same situa- tion. Of course direct comparison of the two is impossible since the situations under study are life and death affairs and are not amenable to simple experiments. Still, it would be desirable to know how often deadly force is utilized by SWAT personnel. Knowing this information would have ramifications for training and equipping, as well as managing the teams in tactical situations. Some research has been conducted and much has been written on the topic of hostage negotiations. This is without a doubt an area of major importance to SWAT teams. Most teams were probably developed based on the concept that handling hostage situations would be their primary focus. This is a part of most teams' missions, but as one reads the literature espousing the current philosophy in the field, it is apparent that SWAT is acquiring more and more taskings. Attempts by any researcher to find data covering the entire spectrum of SWAT operations will be fruitless. Such data is not to be found in any literature. The Federal Bureau of Investigation either does not have it or will not release it.1 Anyone can pick up a popular text on the subject and read What SWAT teams are supposed to do (and there is even some disagree- ment on this point). But, what do they actually do in "real life?” There is no comprehensive research available concerning SWAT operations in toto, not just hostage incidents. What do they do and how do they do it? Can SWAT teams handle their various missions? Can they do it better than regular police officers? Are they adequately trained and 3 equipped to perform their various missions? Should SWAT be tasked with numerous and various missions, or will this eventually lead to generalization instead of specialization, thus making them more and more like regular officers? This research will attempt to address these and other concerns. Statement of Objectives An attempt has been made to describe the various missions of a contemporary SWAT team, and to show with what degree of frequency these missions are embarked upon. What occupies a SWAT team's time? What conditions lead up to the incident necessitating SWAT intervention; what precipitated or escalated the event? The Situation The research attempts to show how SWAT handles an incident, what the team does to rectify a particular type of situation. Is negotiation more successful than assault in dealing with hostage-takers? How often was deadly force employed either by the police or by the subjects involved in these incidents? These are the types of basic questions which will be addressed. The Subject The subjects (offenders) involved in these various incidents are also studied. The research delves into their backgrounds to ascertain whether or not there is any indication of prior criminal activity. Do those subjects with prior criminal histories resort to the use of deadly force more often than those without criminal backgrounds? Were the offenders typically "clear headed" when perpe- trating these incidents, or were many of them using alcohol or illegal drugs during the incidents? Did the use or non—use of these intoxi- cants affect the subjects' use of deadly force in any way? Knowing if there is a connection here might help police in future situations in deciding whether to act or not to act in a certain way. Alcohol/Drug Relatedness Did the subjects' use of alcohol and/or drugs have any bearing on the ability to arrive at a peaceful, negotiated settlement versus police having to mount an assault to conclude the episode? It would seem to be useful to know what effect, if any, alcohol and/or drugs had in this area. For instance, if it is found that 85 percent of all intoxicated subjects are eventually negotiated into surrendering, perhaps SWAT teams would be more likely to take a "wait and see" posture at the scene (this is not meant to imply that SWAT officers are "trigger happy"). If on the other hand only ten percent of these subjects are negotiated out, perhaps that is an indication that nego- tiators may want to explore different strategies than those currently used in dealing with these subjects, Deadly Force Is there any relationship between a subject's threat of using deadly force and his actually doing so? This information, if discern- able, should be of critical importance to police planners. Many of these subjects might threaten to shoot, stab, cut, or otherwise harm another with deadly force, but how often is that threat actually carried out? Is it something police planners can count on happening the majority of the time? Hypotheses A wide array of descriptive and summary statistics will be reported in tabular format (to be discussed in Chapter III). In addi— tion, the following hypotheses will be tested: 1. There is no one particular precipitating factor resulting in an incident escalating to the point where SWAT inter— vention is neceséary. 2. There is no relationship between a subject threatening the use of deadly force, and actually using deadly force. 3. There is no relationship between a subject's use of alcohol or drugs either during or immediately prior to the incident and the use of deadly force. 4. A subject's use of alcohol or drugs either during or imme- diately prior to the incident has no relationship to the ability of police to reach a peaceful, negotiated settlement. Chapter I Notes 1. Information concerning tactical teams was requested from the FBI academy. The request was not acknowledged. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF LITERATURE As one would probably expect, much has been written concerning SWAT. In a nutshell, the general theory behind SWAT operations is that the teams provide ready response to situations beyond the capabilities of normally trained and equipped law enforcement personnel. The SWAT Team Manual by R. P. Cappel is a fairly good work which offers insight into SWAT operations, tactics, and theories. Cappel asserts that the teams should be utilized in three basic types of situations: clearing a structure of barricaded persons, hostages and snipers; searching a wooded area for fugitives; and, apprehending known armed and dangerous individuals who have taken defensive positions. Presumably this last situation is referring to barricaded gunmen. The text outlines proce- dures for selecting team members, training, planning, selecting what the author feels is the right equipment, and many other details. The problem with Cappel's work, as well as Phillip Davidson's SWAT, is that they take a fairly simple approach to SWAT operations. This is a common thread running through many of the books and journal articles. Most authors seem to take for granted that everyone agrees that the concept of SWAT is sound and that the teams are needed. Most authors gloss right over the theoretical aspects of SWAT and dive right into the nuts and bolts of how to form your own SWAT team. They seem to be saying, "Be the first one on your block to have your very own SWAT team!" While there is without a doubt a need for some of these types of books, the redundancy and superficiality of the simplistic "how-to" approach is discouraging to the serious researcher. Most police executives probably do think that SWAT teams are needed, and rightly so. But what all are they going to be tasked with? At what point is that imaginary threshold reached where regular patrol officers or detectives can no longer be effective and SWAT has to be called upon? This is a managerial question. If a known barricaded gunman situation exists do regular patrol officers first respond to the scene and attempt to rectify the situation, or is SWAT mobilized and deployed immediately? If the department has only two officers on duty, armed with only pistols, maybe the decision to "call-out" SWAT is easily reached. What if, on the other hand, the department has many officers on duty, all with shotguns or rifles, and gas masks in the trunks of their patrol cars, all of whom wear bullet-proof vests as a matter of departmental policy, and the on-duty shift commander is a trained negotiator? What can a SWAT team do that this admittedly hypothetical cadre of ”normal" officers cannot? One can readily see that the point in time when SWAT should enter the scene is very nebulous and the management decision highly subjective. The serious researcher cannot get very far without sensing a sort of mystique surrounding the SWAT phenomenon. To a degree this may apply to police in general. After all, they have special uniforms, carry weapons, enforce societal norms, etc. Some see them as power brokers. Not everyone can be a police officer. Now take this already special category of people and choose from among them the smartest, the most physically fit, the best marksmen, etc. Send them to special schools; give them special uniforms and equipment; call upon them for the most dangerous (and highly publicized) missions. Is this a super elite force, the elite of the elite? Some undoubtedly think so, and it is reflected in some of the police trade magazines such as Police Product News. While these types of periodicals at times contain mean- ingful articles, they are mostly "slick and glossy, newsy" magazines. They are good for advertisers, good for publishers, and are sometimes enjoyable light reading, but rarely will one find an article of breath- taking enlightenment in them. These magazines go a long way toward perpetuating the police and the SWAT mystique. Probably some of the best sources of information concerning current philosophy of SWAT operations are the so—called professional journals or magazines. Periodicals such as The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin are an excellent bridge between the highly touted journals of academe and the trade magazines previously mentioned. Articles are normally well written and informative, and the authors are usually highly regarded professionals and practitioners. In his article, "Special Weapons and Tactics Teams — A Systems Approach," in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, G. W. Boyd stresses that the police agency should be treated as a whole entity with many interdependent parts, SWAT being one of those components and not a separate, elite force. He also speaks of SWAT teams terminating con- flicts with a minimum of force with emphasis being placed of the safe release of any hostages and apprehension of the subject through nego— tiations. This use of deadly force issue will be studied as a part of the research for this project. Even with a straightforward barricaded gunman situation, involving no hostages, SWAT teams will normally try 10 to negotiate or talk the subject into surrendering. In such a case the subject is thought of as holding him or herself as hostage. Another FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin article by C. H. Pitts, "Birmingham - A Tactical Operations Unit," is one of the few works to touch on the cost effectiveness of SWAT teams, albeit in an indirect manner. The Birmingham, Alabama police department was able to reduce the size of its tactical team by increasing the training of normal patrol officers in areas which were formerly in the domain of special— ized personnel. One can also see that in this case, the tactical duties performed by normal patrol officers and "special, tactical officers" are overlapping, the gap between the two groups is narrowing. A question previously addressed comes up once again: "Is there anything the SWAT team does which an adequately trained and equipped cadre of 'regular officers' cannot do?” It is quite obvious that some segment of the police force should be trained and equipped to handle high risk or "tactical" situations. Should all officers be trained and equipped as such? This is a question police administrators have to face. It might be nice to have all officers trained and equipped to handle tactical situations. But the issue of cost comes into play here. To perform some of the more hazardous tactical duties requires a great deal of frequent training. To the police administrator, training equates to police officers not being "on the street," resulting in either a decline in service or a need to call in another officer on his or her day off (with added conpensation) as a replacement. Whether directly, or indirectly, the bottom line is that extra training costs extra money. Someone has to pay for it, and taxpayers are not normally 11 too enthusiastic about increasing revenues. Nonetheless, these very high risk tactical situations occur infrequently. Therefore, every effort should be made by police agencies to ensure that their normal patrol officers, even with their nonspecialized training, are able to handle all but the most severe cases. This issue of possible over reliance on SWAT to handle cases will be dealt with in the research for this project. Even though it is not the main focus of this particular research project, any discussion of SWAT operations would be incomplete without at least mentioning hostage negotiations. Hostage negotiations have been much studied in recent years. Enough information exists to do several theses on this topic alone. Since, however, the thrust of the project at hand lies elsewhere, a brief encapsulation of the current thought on the subject will have to suffice. Dr. Irving Goldaber is a noted educator and police consultant who has done much study in the fields of conflict and violence, specifically hostage taking. His article, "A Typology of Hostage- I Takers,’ appearing in the June 1979 issue of The Police Chief, dis- cusses the various reasons why people take others as hostages, as well as some possible police responses for various hypothetical situations. Dr. Goldaber's classification of hostage—takers into the following categories just about covers all of the possibilities: —Suicidal Personality —Vengeance Seeker -Disturbed Individual —Cornered Perpetrator —Aggrieved Inmate —Felonious Extortionist -Social Protestor —Ideological Zealot -Terrorist Extremist 12 Dr. Goldaber's theory of hostage negotiation is that the nego— tiations should laSt as long as the negotiator feels able to predict with some degree of certainty what the next move of the hostage—taker will be, and that that move will not in any way endanger the lives of the hostages. It is always better to talk. No one is apt to get hurt as long as both sides are talking instead of shooting. When the point in time is reached where the negotiator no longer has control of the situation, where he or she cannot predict the hostage—taker's next move, that is considered to be the time when other alternative courses of action are taken, such as attempting to neutralize the hostage—taker by force. A 1974 article in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette, "Hostage Taking,‘ contains some limited statistical research concerning hostage-takers and their use of force. From January 1968 through April 1976 the research reveals that 3.8 percent of the hostages were killed and 6.6 percent were injured in international non-aviation hostage incidents. Surprisingly few statistics were available which could even begin to be related to what will later be revealed in the research findings. This was one of the exceptions. In their June 1979 article in The Police Chief entitled "Hostage Rescue Operations: Teaching the Unteachable," Richard W. Kobetz and H. H. A. Cooper discuss the new terrorist hostage—taker and how to deal with him or her. In this article, the aspect of negotia— tions is barely touched on. Rather, tactical, commando-type rescue is the main theme. The authors stress the need for extensive "hands—on” type training for the rescuers in the form of elaborate role playing scenarios. The advent of modern day terrorism has indeed muddied the 13 water for SWAT practitioners. Many experts feel that the United States is fertile territory for the terrorists to explore. SWAT teams now have to consider terrorism in its myriad forms in their planning. This is a mission which SWAT was not originally designed to handle, but which has been thrust upon it. The FBI, U.S. State Department, U.S. Marshall Service, and the Department of Defense have each formed some sort of counter-terrorist team in the last several years. Nevertheless, local on—duty police forces and SWAT teams will still be the initial response elements to any sort of terrorist incident. Counter—terrorist operations is a whole new ball game, and can be very sophisticated. A SWAT team encountering an idealogically motivated terrorist faces a radically different situation than when facing an inebriated husband holding his wife hostage subsequent to a domestic dispute. SWAT managers would be wise to realize this fact and not be over zealous by volunteering to handle situations for which their team is neither psychologically prepared nor physically equipped. Even though local SWAT teams might have to respond initially to deal with a terrorist incident, and may even end up managing the entire affair, doing so out of necessity versus out of choice is something else altogether. Although not known empirically, most police SWAT teams are probably not trained or equipped to engage a dedicated band of political terrorists in a combat type situation. At least one notable exception to this rule is the Los Angeles Police Deaprtment SWAT team. Formed as a result of the racial riots that took place in the summer of 1965 when officers found them— selves coming under sniper attack, the LAPD SWAT team appears to have grown into a very professional unit over the ensuing years.1 In 14 preparation for the 1984 Summer Olympics, they trained extensively in anti-terrorist operations. Los Angeles was where the SWAT concept was first extensively developed. Since the mid—1960's their team has been deployed on an average of forty4five to fifty times each year.2 A host of definitional perspective related problems also comes into play when one speaks of SWAT battling "terrorists.' One man's_ terrorist might be another man's freedom fighter. The concept of terrorism is somewhat like a political football. For instance, the FBI refused to acknowledge as terrorism the 1984 Christmas bombings of several abortion clinics in the state of Florida. By convention, however, the definition of terrorism is performing some violent act on one party for the purpose of influencing a third party. Using this definition, the abortion clinic bombings were indeed terrorism, since the bombers admitted doing so in order to scare away women who wanted to have abortions. Hopefully, this example points out one problem (but a major one) in battling "terrorism." Although Abraham H. Miller's Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations is not primarily concerned with SWAT operations, it does contain a condensed section on SWAT theory and philosophy. The basic concept is to take action oriented individuals who, Miller asserts, typically join a police department, and bring them together to work as a disci- plined team, acting only when told to do 50. Miller claims that disci- pline and controlled firepower are the key elements in SWAT operations. This book is one of the first works which attempts to discuss the role of SWAT and hostage negotiation in the context of dealing with terror— ists rather than the common criminal who is cornered attempting to rob a liquor store. In places, the book succeeds in that attempt. Miller 15 discusses international terrorism, hostage negotiations, and SWAT oper— ations (in that order). A most informative section of the book concerns various pro— blems facing SWAT teams: politics, the media, SWAT as a fad, etc. Many SWAT teams are kept afloat as a result of the sympathy and largess of local National Guard and active duty military units.3 If a good rapport exists between the police and these various military units, they can coordinate on training, perhaps exchange or borrow equipment from each other as the need arises, and do a host of other favors for the benefit of each party. In some cases this is done not out of the willingness of the police to do so, but because local politicians either will not or cannot approve sufficient monies for the SWAT team to obtain its own equipment, training area, or expert instructors. The notion of SWAT as a fad has some merit. While there is, without a doubt, a need for tactical type units in many areas, not every municipality or county needs its own SWAT team. This is especially true for less populated rural areas which may be policed by only a small sheriffs department. In such cases, mutual aid and assistance agree- ments involving several departments should be considered. This would lessen the financial impact and manpower burden on all departments con— cerned. Several departments in the area surrounding Detroit, Michigan have initiated such a program.4 In addition to mutual aid agreements, many state police agencies have a SWAT capability and are able to respond to serious incidents statewide. These state agencies have more funds at their disposal than most municipal departments and, these funds are available for training and equipping SWAT teams. The subject of this thesis, 16 the Michigan State Police Emergency Support Team, is an outstanding example of this. Why should a small municipal or rural police depart- ment spend large amounts of time and money forming its own SWAT team when a professionally trained and equipped state police team is only a phone call away? While there may be some benefits of having their own team, police executives should give this question serious consideration. Both sides of the equation should be weighed carefully. Nonetheless, many smaller departments, regardless of the need, either have formed or are presently forming their own teams. This is probably due in no small part to the fad and mystique of SWAT and professional jealousy of larger agencies which already have the teams.5 (Note: Miller's book contains a section concerning the basic elements of tactical procedures which is included as an appendix to this thesis.) One of the more recent publications on the market is a periodi- cal entitled The Tactical Edge. This is a quarterly magazine, published by the National Tactical Officers Association. While this magazine, like The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin and The Police Chief, is not a scholarly journal, it is a professional publication which provides a great deal of knowledge and insight into contemporary SWAT operations from the practitioner's point of view. Recent articles have delved into SWAT historical development, current state of the art, philoso— phical considerations of SWAT employment, and descriptions of various SWAT units around the United States. The magazine will surely prove to be a valuable resource. "The Use of SWAT Teams in Effecting the Service of Search Arrest Warrants by John A. Kolman explores the recent development of using SWAT teams for other than hostage or barricaded gunman situations. This is one of the themes of the research for this 17 thesis. SWAT teams are gaining additional missions not envisioned by planners when the teams were originally developed. Kolman states that SWAT can be used in effecting a warrant when a subject is known to be armed and dangerous, and is likely to use deadly force. If this infor- mation is known in advance is there really anything a SWAT team can do that other police officers could not? The prior knowledge would seem to be the key here. This gives the police time to plan and evaluate how to approach the situation. It would appear to be fairly simple: obtain a sufficient number of officers to set up and secure a perimeter, ensure they are well armed and in defensive positions, and have a nego- tiator standing by in case the subject does not surrender immediately. Of course there are extreme cases when all of this prior knowledge will not be available, the subject will be violent, and a tactical response will become necessary. But if the time is available, which is the premise of the article, why can regular patrol officers not be used to serve the warrant after all of the planning is done? If the regular officers know what they are going up against and have had sufficient time to plan and equip for the situation, then should they not be able to handle it? After all, they are trained police officers, not simply people who have been pulled off of the street. "The Varied Role of SWAT Within the Smaller Police Department" by Jerry Boyd stresses the need for police agencies to have a tactical response capability, although not necessarily a full time SWAT team. This notion makes common sense for smaller departments. Still, one has to consider what the definition of ”tactical response” is. Is not any police emergency response to an incident a form of tactical response? This article also advocates utilizing SWAT in executive protection 18 details and in major incident/disaster operations. "Impasse" by Michael A. Albanese is a first hand look into an actual SWAT incident which occurred in August 1983 in Los Angeles, California. The actual incident itself is not so interesting, but the detailed workings of the LAPD SWAT and Crisis Negotiation Team (CNT) is very revealing and offers the reader a lot of insight into how these situations are handled and the current philosophy behind them. This article is considered important from an historical aspect since the LAPD was one of the pioneer agencies in developing the SWAT concept. Motorola Teleprograms is an educational division of the Motorola communications conglomerate. One of their many publications is Hosta e Ne otiation for Police. Although the publication does not deal with tactical teams in a direct manner, it stresses the importance of maintaining control in crisis situations which is a primary role of SWAT. One of the key formulas is that of slowing down the situation, not acting aggressively and impulsively. Time decreases stress and anxiety in both the hostage-taker and the police, which should limit dangerous, hasty actions which might result in needless injuries or death. Hostage-takers are thought to be more likely to deal rationally with the police if they have a chance to calm down and reassess their own situations. This is one of the cornerstones of SWAT theory: respond to the scene of the incident, seal Off and secure the area, attempt to rectify the situation through negotiation while always remembering that time is an ally, not an enemy. It is a philosophy of containment. Eugene R. Ferrara has formalized and codified this in his training outline, SWAT Situations. The prime Objective according to Ferrara is to gain maximum control of a particular situation while 19 employing minimal force. This is accomplished via a five stage process. Containment. Reducing the subject's area of operation to a minimum through establishment of an inner perimeter (utilizing SWAT officers). Isolation. Establishing a safety zone around the immediate area. Evacuation of innocent parties and traffic control duties performed by regular officers takes place in this phase. Intelligence gathering. In this phase the police attempt to learn whatever they can regarding both the subject (description, identity, background, reason for actions) and the area (strengths and weaknesses of subject's position, entries, exits, etc.). Also of prime importance is what has taken place prior to SWAT's arrival. Negotiation. Trained negotiators attempt to resolve the incident without use of force in this phase, often the longest. Offensive action. Realizing that negotiation may not always work, plans are formulated for the use of chemical agents, assaults, or other neutralization tactics. This phase is employed as a last resort. A sensible approach for managing police activities at the scene of a major incident is detailed in the Special Threat Situation Planning Guide developed by the United States Army Military Police School at Fort McClellan, Alabama. Under the incident manager, the command officer in charge at the scene, are various action teams. A fairly rigid division of labor allows each element to concentrate its efforts in a specific, preassigned area. Under the incident manager one might expect to find the following operation sub—elements: SWAT, or some form of a tactical team. Negotiation team. (Self explanatory.) Logistics team. Responsible for various aspects of resource. Support such as obtaining any needed equipment, food, etc. Technical support team. Responsible for various Support areas such as intelligence gathering, communications, and management of fire, medical, and explosive ordinance disposal operations. Responsible for outer perimeter and traf— f bystanders if needed. Regular police support. fic control as well as evacuation o 20 A similar model is proposed by W. R. Olin in "Tactical Crisis Management: Challenge of the 80's” appearing in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (November 1980). Olin divides the taskings among negotiation, intelligence, counter-sniper, and assault groups. The author asserts that for a tactical response to be successful some sort of division of labor must be made. Both the Federal Republic of Germany and the Bavarian State Police adopted such models of operation after the debacle at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. Both agencies claim to have achieved more success using the division of labor models. It would appear that the SWAT concept is being refined here. What initially started out as bringing a group of officers together to form a SWAT team (thinking that a team is more efficient than individual officers) has now evolved into subdividing tasks within that team structure. Admittedly, some new taskings may have been added in some of these models, but what started out with just a SWAT team concept back in the 1960's has grown into a group of teams, or one large team with several small teams being included. The concepts have changed, and are changing all of the time to adapt to the situations which the teams might encounter. Variations of this format probably exist in many police agencies. This, or any similar model, allows the incident manager to remain somewhat detached from all of the minor decisions which must be made in an operation of any magnitude at all. The manager is responsible for ensuring controlled, effective utilization of police manpower; for ensuring that the incident flows smoothly to a successful resolution. The manager cannot be bogged down with minor details, hence the division of labor and delegation of critical duties to a staff of "lieutenants." 21 Several additional themes in the literature can be identified. First, although many SWAT teams are trained and equipped to handle mainly hostage-type situations, the teams have been tasked with and have volunteered for other missions such as executive protection, high risk warrant servings, and major incident/disaster operations. Second, SWAT can be viewed as having a certain mystique surrounding it, a sort of elite status. Thus many police agencies, regardless of the threat, the size of their budget, and ultimately the need, either have formed or are forming SWAT teams. A question that police administrators in these departments should be asking themselves is, "What can SWAT do for us that a well trained, adequately equipped patrol force cannot do?" The research to be conducted for this project attempts to address these, as well as some other questions by dissecting a large number of SWAT incidents, and studying just what all SWAT does and how it goes about accomplishing its stated tasks. This is dealt with in the following chapter. The most appropriate method for conducting this research is a quasi—content/historical analysis of official records. The studying of official records, which admittedly has some potential for pro- police bias, is the most feasible method for looking at a vast amount of data compiled over a substantial period of time.6 The records selected for this study contain data which is qualitative as well as quantitative in nature. 22 Chapter II Notes 1. Peter Harclerode, "SWAT: Los Angeles' Immediate Response to Armed Violence," International Law Enforcement, no. 22 (1984), p. 24. 2. Ibid., p. 30. 3. Bruce Zielsdorf, "SWAT Training Texas Style," Police Product News 5 (December 1981): 28. 4. Wyandotte News Herald, December 26, 1984. 5. A thesis completed in 1983 was not able to show that smaller police agencies created SWAT teams at the same rate as larger agencies, however it did speculate that the "mass media" might have played a role in portraying the teams as desirable. Even though this was speculative, according to the thesis it cannot be totally dis— counted. See R. D. Loveless, "The SWAT Innovation: The Diffusion of Special Weapons and Tactics Units in Michigan Police Departments” (master's thesis, Eastern Michigan University, 1983), pp. 98—99. 6. More implicitly, police records are neither compiled nor maintained for the purpose of conducting research. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY Introduction The method chosen for conducting the research is a variation of the content analysis technique. This is the only method feasible for studying such a large amount of data, covering such a large span of time with both a very limited budget and a limited amount of time to complete the project. The research design and procedures to be followed in this project are detailed in this section. They include a description of the sampling plan, the data studied, the data recording method, and the analytical techniques employed. Some limitations in the research are also detailed. Sample The SWAT team studied in this research is the Michigan State Police Emergency Support Team, or MSP/EST (hereafter, the terms SWAT, EST and ES Team are used interchangeably). The Michigan State Police Emergency Support Team was originally formed in 1974. There are approx— imately forty-five EST trained troopers statewide. Two full time MSP departmental psychologists are also team members. Whenever an incident occurs necessitating EST intervention, these troopers are summoned from the nearest state police posts, individually respond to the incident, and form a team. Team members perform the same day to day duties as other troopers, but are subject to mobilization if an EST incident 24 occurs in their area. A lieutenant at the State Police Headquarters is in charge of administration, supply, training, and numerous other support functions for the teams statewide. Fortunately, official records of incidents involving the MSP ES Teams are available dating back to 1974. Since the records are available, and since the number of incidents is a manageable figure, all of the incidents were studied. Thus, the sample for this study is the entire population of incidents involving the MSP/EST since the team's inception in 1974 up to the end of calendar year 1984. This yields 143 incidents over an eleven year time span. There is always the possi— bility that some reports have been lost or destroyed over the years, but this is considered remote in this case. Even though some of the actual reports are not of the highest quality, very good summary statistics have been tabulated and maintained indicating the total number of calls for each calendar year; these do coincide with the number of reports. (See Appendix C for access authorization to official records.) Data were compiled on numerous variables concerning SWAT oper- ations. As mentioned previously, SWAT teams perform a variety of missions. To find out exactly what these missions entail, the team calls were categorized by type as follows: 1. Hostage 2. Barricaded gunman 3. VIP security 4. Special arrest 5. Toxic incident 6. Other This scheme coincides with how the MSP/EST categorizes its own calls. 25 Should any contingencies have arisen which were not planned for, cate— gories could have been expanded, narrowed, or new ones created. Since the unexpected deviant cases were few in number, they were simply placed in the "other" category. Definition of Terms Barricaded Gunman or Hostage The difference between the hostage and barricaded gunman cate- gories is that in the latter, the subject is not holding other persons against their will. He is the sole subject. If others are present and are willing participants, they are not hostages but are themselves also barricaded gunmen. It is not necessary that the barricaded person actually be armed with a gun to be placed in this category. The subject may be armed with a knife, explosives, or another instrument which can cause deadly force. The barricaded person may not be armed at all, but be believed by police to be in possession of these instruments. VIP Security VIP security details are simply executive protection support, for instance provided at the request of the U.S. Secret Service for the president, vice president, or presidential candidate, or perhaps for the governor, provided at the request of his personal protection staff. Special Arrest The special arrest category includes not only high risk arrest details but also any kind of high risk warrant service, to include search warrants. In this category fall cases where there is a known or perceived very high risk of personal injury to the police officers in serving the warrant. Perhaps the criminal intelligence division 26 believed a certain residence to be occupied by an extremist terror- ist group. As a precaution regular officers requested assistance in serving the arrest or search warrant, and EST was mobilized to provide "back up." Toxic Incident Toxic substance incidents include train derailments where chemical tank cars are involved, tractor trailer accidents where a chemical leak has occurred, fires at chemical manufacturing facilities, any radiological or biological incidents, etc. MSP/EST may not be the overall incident manager in these instances, but they are many times among the first on the scene to conduct measurements in determining if in fact any leak has occurred. Other Incidents As previously mentioned a category labelled "other" was used as a catch-all for cases which did not fit neatly into any of the major categories. Time An attempt was made to gather data concerning the variable of time in these incidents. When did the first police officers respond to the scene? Granted, this is probably not when the incident started, but it is the best data available to at least fix a starting point to police involvement, to begin an "incident clock." The next time of interest is the time when EST was activated. This indicates how long the regular officers took in attempting to rectify the situation before calling for assistance. Next, when did EST arrive on the scene? This is not measured by when the first or second EST officer arrived, but 27 rather when a complete, functional EST unit was in place and ready to assume control of the incident. Finally, the time when the incident was terminated was recorded. Precipitating Factor Data were collected concerning a variable referred to as the incident "precipitating factor." To precipitate means to hasten the occurrence of something, though not necessarily to cause it. What ini- tially prompted the police to respond to the incident? If the situation is a hostage or barricaded gunman incident, did it originally start as a family squabble, or was it a bank robber who simply could not flee the scene before the police arrived? Were police perhaps responding to an assault and battery complaint, 3 fight between two persons which was not of domestic origin? Perhaps detectives were attempting an investi- gation and the suspect, fearing the consequences of his prior illegal activities, barricaded himself in his home. If the incident is a toxic substance spill, perhaps the precipitating factor was a railroad acci- dent or a manufacturing facility fire. This is what is meant by preci— pitating factor. Requesting Agency The MSP/ES Team responds to requests for assistance from many types of agencies. These requests were categorized according to whether they originated with county police agencies or sheriff departments; municipal, city, or township police departments; requests from regular troopers of the MSP; requests from other agencies such as the department of corrections, or requests from federal agencies such as the U.S. Secret Service. If more than one agency is at the scene of an incident, 28 the requesting agency was coded according to which agency was in overall control of the incident. For instance, if a county sheriff department was the first agency at the scene of an incident, and an official from that agency is the senior command officer at the scene, even though several MSP troopers might have arrived to provide back up, the county would be coded as the requesting agency. Concerning federal agencies, even though the Secret Service may not specifically request EST, but rather only "state police assistance," they would be coded as the requesting agency since that is where the request originated. Rank of Senior Officer Data were gathered concerning the rank of the senior regular police officer as well as the raw number of regular officers on the scene. This is for the purpose of perhaps learning if all logical attempts at rectifying the situation by regular officers had been attempted prior to requesting EST. If only two patrol officers were at the scene of a hostage incident, one might question how hard that agency actually tried to solve the problem before tossing the towel in and calling EST. Whereas, if an agency had ten officers on the scene being directed by a deputy chief, it becomes somewhat clearer that they are probably more interested in resolving the crisis. If nothing else, it would seem to indicate the degree of importance they attached to the incident. Subject Profile Several variables surrounding the subjects (offenders) in these incidents were looked at. First, the raw number of subjects in each incident was tallied. Subjects' race was categorized as white, 29 black, hispanic, oriental, indian, or other. This conforms to the MSP standard reporting format. Gender was described as either male or female. The subjects' raw age was expressed as the number of years since birth (as of the last birthday). Alcohol or Drug Use Subject alcohol and/or drug use either during the incident or immediately prior to the incident was noted. If there was no reference in the official report as to the use of these substances, there was in fact "no drug or alcohol use" assumed. The reason for this is that if the officers on the scene felt strongly enough that alcohol or drugs affected the subject in any way during the incident, this fact should have gone into one of the reports. Granted, this does not always happen. Nonetheless, the research only indicates positive alcohol/drug use if it is so stated in the report. If no mention was made of sub- stance abuse, there was a presumption of no use. Utilizing this scheme one would think that all cases would neatly fit into either a "yes" or "no” category. There were, however, cases which were so devoid of meaningful information that presuming "no use" would be a faulty deci- sion. (For instance where no report was done, information was compiled from a radio log.) For these cases an "unknown" category was used. (Using the previously mentioned scheme, the reader is cautioned that some subjects in the "no use" category probably did use alcohol or drugs.) Deadly Force Data were gathered concerning the use of deadly force in these incidents. Black's Law Dictionary, fifth edition, defines deadly force 30 as, "Force likely or intended to cause death or great bodily harm . It should be noted that a death need not occur for force to be deadly force. In the context of this research, if a gun was fired, that will be considered a positive use of deadly force whether or not anyone was actually killed or even injured. The "intent" is the operational portion of the definition. If "X" fired a shotgun at "Y," the intent that "X" was trying to kill or seriously injure "Y" was assumed. Whether or not "Y" was hit was irrelevent in compiling this statistic. Did the subject threaten to use deadly force, and did he in fact do so? These are two key variables. Injuries and Deaths The number of civilians as well as police officers injured and killed by the subject was determined. These were reported as straightforward numerical values. Shots Fired Were shots fired by the police anytime during the incident? This was broken down into two distinct periods of time: before the arrival of EST and after the team's arrival. No number of shots fired u n n was tallied; just a "yes, no, or "unknown" to the question, ”Were shots fired?" Method of Resolution Another key variable is that of method of resolution. How did police eventually rectify the situation? The categories include: negotiation, assault, police shooting of subject (by sniper), suicide by the subject, or terminated without EST assistance. The key 31 determinant here is which method concluded the episode. If negotiation had been taking place for five hours, and then tear gas was fired into the house and this brought the subject out, "assault" was noted as the method of resolution. Another way to think of it is, "what worked?" This is not meant to belittle the role of negotiators. 0n the contrary, unless there are some very unusual circumstances, negotiation will almost always be attempted as a first course of action. That does not mean, however, that it was the method which was successful in concluding the incident. Terminated Prior to EST Arrival The category "terminated prior to EST arrival" was noted if EST was in fact mobilized but the incident was terminated, by whatever method, prior to the team's arrival. Perhaps regular officers nego- tiated the subject out or he might have even been shot and killed. Those statistics concerning 292 the incident was terminated early were very rarely available since the ES Team usually did not accomplish a lengthy and detailed report if the team was not actually utilized at the scene. Disposition of Subject Data were gathered determining if the subject was arrested, and if so, for what type of charge as well as the agency bringing the charges. In some cases charges were not levied. Perhaps the subject had in fact committed no crime, or if the incident was a domestic dis- turbance maybe the injured party refused to file a complaint. Many times in the reports there were phrases such as "apprehended" or "taken into custody." These terms equate to arrest in the context of this 32 research. Formal charges may or may not have eventually been levied against the subject. That information was not able to be determined from the reports studied. If determinable at all, the arresting agency was only described as "local, MSP, other or unknown." Caution is observed in viewing this particular set of data in that many times there were several agencies at the scene of an incident and the arresting agency is simply reported as the agency which took custody of the subject and led him away. Theoretically the MSP could take a subject away from the scene only to turn him over to a sheriff's deputy or a city patrol— 1 man once clear of the scene. Prior Criminal History of Subject Data were gathered concerning the prior criminal histories of the subjects as well as the judicial disposition of the cases at hand. This data was garnered from state police computerized criminal histories. This system is notoriously inaccurate in the state of Michigan as in other states. For that reason, much of what was gathered here will not be reported in subsequent chapters of this project. As mentioned previously, there are several interesting associations which could be attempted with this variable, but not enough meaningful data could be gathered to accomplish this. Data Recording For this particular research, data recording was a fairly simple task (mechanically). While the process of poring over the reports was lengthy, once the data was found the task of recording it was an uncomplicated process. This is due to the fact that nearly all of the variables are nominal. A certain attribute either does exist or 33 it does not. Variables were assigned numerical values which in turn were recorded on a data recording sheet. Summary statistics were then compiled on all variables. The work was accomplished without computer assistance, due mainly to limitations of time and money. While the statistical computations would admittedly have been easier with such assistance, since funds were not available for that, the point is moot. (A Sample Data Sheet and Code Key appear as Appendices A and B respectively.) One person gathered all of the data. Reliability tests were conducted, however, to ensure adequate levels of both inter-observer agreement and intra-observer consistency. This will be discussed in subsequent portions of this chapter. Analysis The analysis took the form of describing relevant information from the incidents under study, summarizing data where possible, and then showing relationships between some of the data. All of this was shown in tables of summary statistics, graphs indicating past trends, and in two by two tables where bivariate analysis was used (relying on the chi square statistical procedure to indicate whether an association was statistically significant).2 In order to determine the various types of incidents in which EST was involved, the absolute frequency of occurrence of the different types of incidents was noted (broken down by calendar year). Both the absolute and relative frequency of occurrence of the types of incidents are shown for the entire period under study (summation). These are 34 shown tabularly. The following univariate data are shown tabularly using frequency of occurrence as the main descriptive technique: 1. Department/agency requesting EST assistance Incident precipitating factor Rank of senior regular officer at the scene Raw number of regular officers involved (mean and range) Subject age (median, standard deviation, range) Subject race Subject gender Subject alcohol/drug use during incident Civilian and police injuries and deaths Subject threat and use of deadly force Method of resolving the incident Criminal background of subjects Average incident duration Bivariate analysis using the chi square statistical procedure employed in two by two tables was the method used in the hypotheses tests . Both the tables and the mathematical computations for the following statistical associations were shown: 1. Department requesting EST assistance and incident termination prior to EST arrival. Subject use of alcohol/drugs and subject use of deadly force. Subject use of alcohol/drugs and ability of police to nego- tiate successfully. Subject threat of using deadly force and subject actually doing so. 35 Limitations Anyone who has ever studied official records will be fami- liar with their limitations and biases. People-are naturally unwilling to put anything in an official report which may make them or their agency look bad. This research was based on the contents of official police records which no doubt contained some of these built-in biases. One has to seek the best method for conducting the desired research, however. In this case the analysis of official records was the only feasible method for several reasons. The number of cases are numerous. Questionnaires, personal interviews, and telephone inter- views were not feasible to study the entire number of cases over the past eleven years. First, it is extremely doubtful that all of the parties involved in the incidents could have been tracked down. Even if this were successful, how clear could one's memory be about an incident which might have occurred five or ten years earlier, especially when these officers are involved in other routine police incidents with different names, dates, and facts of cases every day of the week in the course of their normal duties? Any method other than an analysis of records would have been logistically infeasible to study the entire eleven year period. Reliability The gathering of the data for this research was essentially a coding operation. The official reports were fairly simple to code. Efforts were made when constructing the data recording sheet primarily to attempt to gather data which was not subject to interpretation. Either the report stated that the hostage-taker was armed or not; the 36 incident terminated at 5 P.M. or 5:15 P.M. or whatever time was stated; the ES Team either used gas or it did not; things of this nature were dichotomized. As stated earlier, many of the reports contained very little information. Most of what was there was not subject to inter- pretation. There were no great semantical problems to overcome. Nevertheless, to ensure adequate reliability several measures were taken to minimize coder error. Krippendorff recommends several basic procedures which proved quite useful.3 The specific model used in this exercise was one of comparing tables of observed co-occurrences (agreements) with tables in which maximum agreement was shown, and then with tables indicating merely chance occurrences. For example, say two people were coding a report and wanted to determine their degree of agreement. For one category there might be five options to choose from. Maximum agreement would be if both coders chose option one, for instance. This would be indicated as "1.0," perfect. The probability of both coders choosing the same option by chance would be (.20)(.20) or .04. The tables of observed co—occurrences should (and did) more closely resemble the hypothetical maximum agreement tables than the chance tables. The test of "stability" is the weakest form of reliability, but was only one of the tests conducted. The stability test is used to uncover intra-observer inconsistencies. It is a test-retest model. Basically, after coding all of the reports, the original coder went back and pulled a sample of ten percent of the reports and recoded them blindly, not using the first data sheets as a crutch. Then the two sets of data sheets were compared. There was an acceptable level of agreement between the two sets of data recording sheets which exceeded 37 the level which would have been expected from a chance occurrence._ The test of "reproducibility" was used to uncover any inter— observer disagreements as well as intra-observer inconsistencies. Reproducibility is the degree to which a process can be recreated under different circumstances and using different coders. Other terms for reproducibility are "inter—coder reliability," "intersubjective agreement," or "consensus." The circumstances and locations of the coding could not be varied, but the most important element in this test of reproducibility-- the coder--was varied. A bit of further explanation is in order here. Even though there was an acceptable level of inter—subject agreement, it was only on a limited basis. That statement might sound a bit contradictory. In simpler terms, the tests of reproducibility which were conducted yielded acceptable results, but only limited testing was conducted. This was due to several factors. First, there was not sufficient time to recruit and adequately train other coders. Even if there had been time to do this there would have been no funds to pay for the coders' services. Second, it must be remembered that the research centered around official police reports. The police are understandably cautious concerning who has access to these records. Subjects involved in these incidents might bring suit against the police for defamation of character or similar charges. Even though the reports are matters of public record and such suits would probably be unfruitful, these things are considerations for the police. Just how reliable would these people be who would be delving into the chronicles of the ES Team? Would they possibly take what they had learned in some of the reports and use the 38 information for personal gain? It has been this researcher's experience that police officers do not particularly care for non-police persons rummaging through their official reports. Numerous controversial pieces of research which concluded by portraying the police in a not too favorable light are probably behind some police managers' not unfounded apprehensions.4 Also, the reports, understandably, could not be taken from the premises of the state police headquarters. There was simply not ample operating space for even several researchers to work. While the state police were very cooperative in furnishing both working space and supplies for one researcher, they had to make sacrifices just for that. More than one researcher/coder would have placed extreme demands upon the police and such a request could not in good conscience have been made. For these reasons an official of the Michigan Sate Police was chosen as an extra coder, or recoder. There was only one extra Coder which is in itself a limitation, but better this arrangement than no check on inter-observer agreement at all. The recoder blindly coded ten percent of the cases. The level of inter-observer agreement was acceptable at 100.0 percent; needless to say, this is significantly higher than chance agreement. The reliability test of "accuracy" is to determine the degree to which a process functionally conforms to a known standard, or yields what it is designed to yield. In most situations in which message contents are coded into categories of a data language, the standards against which the accuracy would be established are rarely available. In a content analysis of this type it is therefore largely 39 unrealistic to insist upon this strongest criterion of reliability. Such was the case with this research. Although if more resources had been available these tests of reliability might have been stronger, considering the subject matter and content of the reports, this researcher feels comfortable with the reliability of the tests as they stand. Another shortcoming in this research pertains to the portion of the report referencing computerized criminal histories, CCH's. Michigan's CCH's are, by the state police's own admission, incredibly erroneous. A third of all felony arrests in Michigan, including those for crimes as serious as murder and rape, officials say, are never reported by the arresting department to (the) Michigan State Police, the central repository where criminal records are kept.... In two-thirds of the arrests that are reported, no information exists as to whether the arrested person later was convicted or acquitted.... All told, the computerized criminal history records are so inaccurate that the Michigan State Police officer in charge of them, Capt. John Sura, recommends they be used for "no more than a cursory check."5 In fact, the following statement of caution appears on every computerized criminal history printout produced by the state police as a matter of standard operating procedure: The information contained herein is dependent upon CHRI data being reported to the central repository. System audits reveal Michigan's CHRI has serious arrest and disposition reporting problems. Further, it contains less than 15% of misdemeanor conviction data. There- fore, users should contact local agencies and courts if a complete history is desired.6 With these types of comments one would hardly feel comfortable relying on the CCHs for any type of meaningful hypothesis testing, or even for descriptive summary statistics. Still, the arrest and convic- tion data for subjects involved in the incidents studied were compiled. The utility of the data is very questionable. 4O Validity A measuring instrument is thought to be valid if it measures what it is designed to measure. The degree to which variations inside the process of analysis correspond to variations outside that process and whether the research findings represent the real phenomena in the context of data as claimed are determining factors in calculating validity. Several forms of validity will be discussed. Sampling validity assesses the degree to which available data are either an unbiased sample from a population of interest or sufficiently similar to another sample from the same population so that the data can be taken as statistically representative of that population. The population for this research is "all incidents for which the Michigan State Police ES Team was mobilized." A subsection or subsample, which will be discussed at length later is, "all hostage and barricaded gunman incidents involving the MSP/EST.” Access to all known official reports of these incidents was given. Due to the fact that the number of reports was manageable, the entire population was studied. Admittedly, there may not have been reports filed on some incidents, and perhaps the reports may have been lost, misplaced, or for some reason destroyed on some incidents. Even so, validity is not considered a problem with this research. There may be problems, however, if one tries to generalize this research to the larger universe of ”all SWAT-type incidents." The cases studied were only from one state's rural or small town settings, not from vast metropolitan areas such as Detroit, New York, or Los Angeles. Differences in cultural and socio—economic areas as well as myriad other factors influencing both the police and subjects in different 41 parts of the country have a bearing on the generalizability of this research to populations other than that originally mentioned. Correlational validity is the degree to which findings obtained by one research method correlate with findings obtained by another and thus justify their substitutability. Since this is the first research of this nature conducted on this particular population, there is no correlational validity. This may be a problem with the research, but always was and always will be a problem with the first research of its kind attempted with a particular set of data. This should not, however, dissuade the researcher from conducting the task at hand. Another weakness in this research is the fact that alternative solutions (solutions other than those actually used by EST) were not explored. The reasons for this are many and will not be delved into here. Also, an interesting hypothesis, but one which was not explored, is "What would regular police officers have done in the same situation and under the same circumstances?" A comparative analysis would have been most interesting to undertake. It is questionable, however, if an adequate research design could have been developed to address this question. Surely the results would have been highly debatable, for these situations are not amenable to simple laboratory type experimen- tation. Regardless of that point, such an attempt was beyond both the means and the focus of this research. Finally, construct validity will be briefly discussed. "When a content analysis is designed de novo, pragmatic validation is likely to be impossible, for it requires either past experiences with analy- zing the kind of data at hand or the availability of concurrent 7 . indicators about the phenomena to be inferred." Although this 42 statement might sound ominous, it need not be. Ensuring construct validity in this study was a relatively simple process. Several basic questions had to be asked in ensuring the analytical validity of this process. 1. Can the available knowledge be generalized to the particu- lar context within which the data are analyzed? Are the relationships between the data chance occurrences? Considering that the entire (or the vast majority of) the population rather than a sample of the popu- lation was studied, this should not be a problem. 2. Can valid generalizations be logically derived from the particular analytical procedure being used? The choice of a content analysis for the method of conducting this research was discussed, at length, previously. While there are inherent weaknesses in this form of research, considering the facts that the entire population was studied, and that the results of the research pretty much conformed to what the state police expected (domestic disturbances being the main precipitator of barricade incidents, subject often intoxicated, subject nearly always armed, etc.), it is felt that the weaknesses of the method were not overwhelming in this particular study. There are indeed limitations to this particular research. Perhaps more, perhaps less than one might expect. What the reader should remember though is that many times a researcher faces the choice of whether to conduct the research with the resources available, limited as they may be, and then carefully explain the weaknesses in the final product, or else not conduct the research at all. As has been stated in this section, there are some weaknesses in the method, and a degree of weakness in inter-coder reliability (with only one recoder). There 43 is, however, thought to be no weakness at all as far as sample validity is concerned (a very major shortcoming in many pieces of research). Given all of this information, this research project is consi- dered as having some limitations, but even with these limitations is still, within the proper context, a worthwhile and useful piece of research. It should be remembered, however, that the universe for this research is all Michigan State Police SWAT—type incidents. Generaliza- tion of these research findings to the larger universe of all SWAT incidents should not be attempted. 44 Chapter III Notes 1. Although data were gathered concerning these variables, it is not reported due to the fact that it is considered fragmentary and inaccurate. 2. The statistical procedure known as "phi" will be used to determine the strength of those relationships. It should also be noted that the chi square test in this context is not for the purpose of inferring from a sample to a population. but merely to determine statistical significance of relationships. 3. Klaus Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 129-32. 4. See, for instance, Richard Ericson, Making Crime: A Study of Detective Work (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), pp. 228—42. 5. Fred Girard, ”Faulty Data in Computer Loses Track of Criminals," Detroit News, 7 April 1985. 6. Taken from an actual criminal history printout. 7. Krippendorff, p. 167. CHAPTER Iv FINDINGS SWAT Missions The Michigan State Police Emergency Support Team is tasked with a variety of missions: -Barricaded gunman situations -Hostage situations -Sniper situations —VIP security —Special arrests during civil disorders -Dangerous chemical or radiation spills1 The teams may be mobilized either to support regular state police troopers, local law enforcement agencies throughout the state, and on occasion to assist a federal law enforcement agency, such as the Secret Service in an executive protection security detail. As indicated in both Table 1 and Figure 1, the research con- cluded that hostage and barricaded gunman incidents have kept the state police ES Team busy over the past eleven years. Together, these inci- dents resulted in ninety-one, or 63.6 percent of all calls for EST service. These two types of situations are considered by the state police to be very closely related and are in fact referred to as a single type incident in some of the hypotheses in this work. The reason for this is that the situations are tactically handled in a near identical manner. The only difference is that in a hostage situation, there are / 45 46 TABLE 1 Frequency of EST Regponse by Type of Incident Type Incident N A B (A and B) C D . n/% 1974 18 1 5 6/.33 9 2 1975 15 2 6 8/.53 2 0 1976 13 1 7 8/.61 4 O 1977 7 0 6 6/.85 0 O 1978 26 4 11 15/.57 3 2 1979 12 . 2 7 9/.75 0 1 1980 7 2 5 7/1.0 0 0 1981 9 1 6 7/.77 0 0 1982 11 4 4 8/.72 0 1 1983 12 3 6 9/.75 O 1 1984 13 1 7 8/.61 1 4 Total 143 21 70 91 19 11 Relative Frequency .147 .489 .636 .133 .077 Type Incident AFHostage B=Barricaded gunman C=VIP security D=Special arrest E=Toxic incident F=Other OOOHONNl-‘t—‘U'IH F1 H b.) .091 ONNt—IOObOOOO "1'1 \0 .063 7O 20 15 Raw # Cases 10 k\ ‘ 47 70 48.9 21 o '-__—7 14.74 19 13.3% 13 11 9.14 7.74 9 6.3% A B C D E F Type Incident ’TJITJUOU'J3> ll 11 II II II II Hostage Barricaded gunman VIP security Special arrest Toxic incident Other FIGURE 1 Categorization by Type of 143 MSP EST Incidents 48 multiple lives which the negotiators are attempting to save. In a barricaded gunman situation without hostages, the gunman himself is the only hostage. The gunman is in effect holding himself hostage. Tacti— cally, negotiation is still the first method the ES Team will attempt to use in resolving either situation. The MSP ES Team will, however, more quickly consider other options (besides negotiation) if no hostages are involved.2 Where negotiators might attempt to negotiate repeatedly in a case where hostages are being held, the use of gas, smoke, or an outright assault will be considered sooner in a barricaded gunman case. This is a matter of policy in the department, and the reasons for it appear to be sound. In a hostage case, the safe release of the hostages is of paramount importance. In a barricaded gunman situation, however, the ~gunman is considered to be more of a threat to himself, police officers, and innocent passers—by, than the police are willing to tolerate for prolonged periods of time. For example, negotiators may work dili- gently throughout the night to reach a peaceful settlement, but as day breaks and citizens start moving about, going to work, etc., it is considered a greater risk to allow the gunman to remain in place than to resolve the situation by whatever means possible.3 Although the pertinent data were known in only fifty-nine out of a total ninety-one hostage and barricaded gunman cases, the research does lend some credibility to this concept. The following model indi- cates that while in hostage situations negotiation and assault were nearly equally used to resolve the incidents, regardless of the inci- dent duration; in barricaded gunman situations assault was used twice as often as negotiations in incidents that lasted longer than three 49 hours. This is in marked contrast to barricaded gunman incidents which lasted less than three hours, where negotiation was in fact used more frequently than assault. Hostage Incidents Barricaded Gunmen x<3hr .Dcr0\bubronnwr40\H \wo\o\rbtnUHVLpu>H Dwvronooru~ncnanmto F4h3CHDCDCDUHDPQFJUJ N L2.) L») 00 O‘ l-* 0‘ (I) H H 143 .161 .265 .426 .475 .077 Type Agency County City and township MSP Federal Other Unknown mrnd Otw3> ”II“ “II“ CDCDCHDCDCDHCDCDCHA m N .014 l¢<3CDCDCH3CDCDCHDCD m H .007 55 be construed negatively, thinking that the state ES Team shuns requests from local agencies in favor Of responding to their own needs. Quite the contrary, it should be considered in a positive light in that the regular state police troopers are aware of and not hesitant to utilize the ES Team if they deem it necessary. Considering all of the material resources and training time which goes into creating and maintaining such a team, it would be foolish not to utilize it when dictated by the situation. Past trends in requests for EST assistance from local agencies and the state police are shown in Figure 2. Eleven, or 7.7 percent of the requests for EST assistance ori- ginated at the federal level. Nine of these were requests from the Secret Service for executive protection details. Even though the Secret Service might not have specifically requested use of the state police ES Team, it did request state police assistance. Since the request originated with the Secret Service, that is the way it was recorded. Of the remaining two requests from the federal level, one was from the FBI and one from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Both were requests for assistance in serving high risk warrants. Hostage and Barricaded Gunman Incidents Prior to this point reference has been made several times to "ninety-one hostage and barricaded gunman incidents.” As indicated in Table 1, these incidents comprise 63.6 percent of the requests for EST assistance. The reports of these cases also contained much more useful information than any of the other types of incidents. Even though the information was in many cases very minimal, it was still more than some of the other types. Enough information was available to compile some 56 20 - k 15 J 1"). Raw # \ ; 3 calls \ I I for EST 10 q \ f 1 5 - |\ |\ w (1) CO 0‘ O‘ 0‘ O‘ 0‘ 0‘ H H H H H H Calls from local police agencies """" Calls from MSP FIGURE 2 Trend in Requests for EST Assistance: 1974-1984 57 basic descriptive statistics and even to perform some simple hypothesis testing in the form of both univariate and bivariate analysis using the chi square test in two by two tables. Henceforth the bulk of this work, unless otherwise stated, concerns itself with these ninety-one C3883 . Precipitating Factors One of the more interesting findings in the research was dis— covering the precipitating factors in these incidents. To precipitate means to hasten the occurrence of something. The factors discovered may indeed have been more "causal" than precipitous, but based on the data, that cannot be claimed with any degree of reliability. Even so, a decision had to be made, and the term "precipitating" was a good middle ground term. Another way to consider what follows is by asking the question: "What immediately preceded the hostage or barricade incident, or what caused the immediate police response?" This is what is meant by "precipitating factor" in the context of this research. Two categories of precipitating factors individually far out- numbered all of the remaining categories. These two categories were domestic disputes and mentally unstable individuals. In thirty, or 32.9 percent of these cases domestic disputes were the precipitating factor. This is displayed in Table 3. In this context a domestic dispute is a family argument or argument between co-habitants of the same residence although they may not be family members, the typical husband and wife, or boyfriend-girlfriend argument. This is what prompted police officers to respond to the scene. Numerous other variables may also have been present, but such 58 csocxcs n w mamomm u m wocuo n H xwmuumo\uasmmm< u: Hanna: u e sponges ”e upmhwms o>wom so mumwfiumo>cfl Cu unsouum n e xemawpsm um AmoudEoUum pol women: n m oflumoeoa n< mucuomm wcwumUHmHoowm ANA. «so. HEN. ago. mmo. mmo. NNo. NNo. mmo. own. sucaseoua o>aumamx 1—1 H N N |'\ LA m N N m of: Ho Hence qwoa mmoa Nwoa Hmoa owoa omma H wmoa mmma omoa mmoa amoa HOHOMHONOMO OHOOOHHOOHO \‘T NHNHmmHNNHo OHHOOONOHHH OOOOHOOOHHN OOHNHOOOOOx—l OOOHOOOOHOO OOOOOHOOOHO OOHOOOHOOHO mmNva—Immmoq O rooowxommmmoomoo 1'1 1—1 :1: U LL. 13.1 G C.) m <2 Z w0uomm wcHumuwdfloowm mucopfiocH cmecso poomOstmm mam owmumox CH wouomm wcflumuwawomwm m m4m things which are the main precipitators: ”domestics” and "mentals." Generally, the difficulty in labelling these as "causal" is one of not being able to explore alternative experimentations in the 62 incidents studied. EST Response Time In the past much has been made over the ability of the MSP ES Team to respond to requests for assistanCe from local agencies in a timely manner. The perceived inability of MSP/EST to respond as rapidly as local police agencies has in fact been the basis for some smaller departments forming their own teams.lo Although the data were not known in a sufficient number of cases to rebut this line of reasoning, there is ample literature which suggests that if local agencies can at least contain the situation, EST response time, while important, is not critical. Harvey Schlossberg, a retired New York City Police negotiator and psychologist, is a celebrated trainer and negotiation consultant. He, and many others, suggest that time is on the side of the negotia- tors. As time passes, the hostage-taker begins to lose mastery over his world. The longer a hostage-taker has to consider his circumr stances, the more he also becomes interested in bringing the episode to a peaceful conclusion. He realizes that harming the hostages will only make matters worse for him.11 (It should be remembered that these are theories and may not apply to all hostage situations.) EST response time is indicated in Figure 3 and Table 4. 'Logic- ally, one would expect few responses immediately or very late, with most of them being in a middle range. This in fact has been the case over the years, with 21.9 percent of the responses being less than one hour, 60.9 percent between 1.0 and 2.0 hours, and 17.0 percent over two hours. As long as local police are able to contain the situation 15.. U) Q) U) C.’ O O. U) Q) a: 14.4 O 10- >\ U C; CD :1 O” G.) La LL. Q) U S— :3 p—vl O CO .0 < 63 0:00~0:29 0:30—0:59 \ 3:30—3:59 \ N 1:00-1:29 3:00—3:29 Hours/Minutes Response time was between 30 minutes and 2 hours in 83% of the cases. Mean response time (excluding the one extreme case) was 1:27. (N=41 out of 91 total hostage and barricaded gunman incidents.) FIGURE 3 EST Reponse Time 64 TABLE 4 Elapsed Time: EST Arrival and Incident Termination Absolute Frequency Relative Frequncy HourszMinutes of Incidents of Incidents % 0.00-0:29 2 5.9 0:30-0:59 3 8.8 1:00-1:29 6 17.6 1:30-1:59 5 14.7 2:00—2:29 7 20.6 2:30—2:59 1 3.0 3:00—3:29 2 5.9 3:30-3:59 2 5.9 4:00-4:29 1 3.0 4:30-4:59 2 5 9 5:00-5:29 0 — 5:30-5:59 O — 6:00—6:29 1 3 0 6:30-6:59 O — 7:00-7:29 1 3 0 7:30—7:59 0 — 8:00-8:29 0 — 8:30-8:59 1 3.0 67.6% of the incidents were resolved in the first 2:29 after EST arrived on the scene. Mean time of resolution (excluding the 3 most extreme cases) was 1:53. (N=34 out of a total 91 hostage and barricaded gunman incidents) 65 initially, EST response time should not be viewed too critically. The longer the hostage-taker has to consider his circumstances, the more likely a peaceful settlement will occur.12 This would seem to be preferable to an early termination by other than peaceful means. Hostage—Taker/Barricaded Gunman Data A full 93.4 percent of the subjects in these incidents were male. Only one subject was known to be female. Gender was undeter- minable from the reports in 5.5 percent of the cases. These would be cases where a request for service terminated prior to the arrival of EST and a report was not prepared. In 75.8 percent of the cases the subject was white. The sub- jects were black in only 2.2 percent of the cases. There was, however, a rather substantial "unknown" of 21.9 percent in this area. One possible explanation for the lack of minority subjects is that most of the MSP/EST incidents took place either in rural areas or in small towns. Cities such as Detroit and Flint which have large minority communities have their own police SWAT teams. Statistics from those teams might indicate a preponderance of minority subjects. In all of the literature reviewed both prior to and during the course of this research (which is considered a contemporary representa- tive sample), no typology according to gender or race was discovered. Thus, these findings cannot be corroborated with any known existing research or other literature. One of the most disappointing aspects of the data collection was attempting to work with the computerized criminal histories of the subjects involved in these incidents. Several of the original 66 TABLE 5 Hostage-Taker/Barricaded Gunman Descriptive Data Gender Race N A B C A B C D 1974 6 4 1 1 5 0 0 1 1975 8 8 0 0 7 0 0 1 1976 8 8 0 0 7 0 0 1 1977 6 5 0 1 4 0 O 2 1978 15 15 0 0 11 0 0 4 1979 9 9 0 0 8 0 0 1 1980 7 7 0 0 5 1 0 1 1981 7 5 0 2 4 0 0 3 1982 8 8 0 0 5 0 0 3 1983 9 8 0 1 7 0 0 2 1984 8 8 0 0 6 1 0 1 Total 91 85 1 5 69 2 0 20 Relative Frequency .934 .010 .055 .758 .022 0 .219 Gender Race A=Male A=White B=Female B=Black Czunknown C=A11 others D=Unknown Age Data Median=38 Standard deviation=10.83 Range=l6—60 67 objectives and one of the major hypotheses of this research project relied upon the use of these computerized records. Unfortunately, Michigan's central repository for criminal records is in such a state of disarray that almost any study dealing with these records is of dubious value at best. Even so, since the total population was being studied, it was felt that if a substantial percentage of records could be found, at least summary statistics would be compiled. As it turned out, this was the case. Enough bits of data (name, date of birth, etc.) were known about the subjects in 57.1 percent of the cases to obtain printouts of their criminal histories. These are referred to below as "known cases." Fifty-two criminal histories were checked out of a total ninety-one cases. In twenty—eight cases there was not sufficient data on the subject to obtain a criminal history. In eleven cases enough data were known, but the computers indicated there were no records on file. This could mean that (a) the subject had no criminal record or (b) there could have been a record at the local level but not at the central repository. Even where records were obtained the infor- mation contained in them is of questionable value. With such a high degree of ambiguity-concerning these records, no hypothesis testing was accomplished. As will be shown in a later section, when excluding the cases where the data were unknown, 30.6 percent of the subjects involved in sixty-two hostage and barricaded gunman incidents had been involved in violent felonies prior to the incidents being studied. The term "violent felonies" in this context equates roughly to felony level crimes against persons. Crimes counted in this category were murder, assault with a deadly weapon, assault and battery, rape, armed 68 robbery, etc. Hit and run was also included in this category. Granted, it was not known whether an individual was injured in the hit and run, but this was one of those instances where a decision had to be made, and the categorization was made as such. There were very few cases of hit and run. In twenty-two of sixty-two cases the subjects had criminal histories, but the nature of their crimes was less violent. Crimes in this category included forgery, driving under the influence of liquor, resisting arrest, larceny, etc. Burglary was also placed in this category. In all, at least 66.1 percent of the known subjects had some sort of arrest record which was on file at the central repository. Forty-five percent of the ninety-one hostage-takers and barricaded gunmen, even when counting the unknowns, had an arrest record. The unknown category accounted for 31.9 percent of all subjects. This is a fairly substantial figure and was one of the reasons for no hypo- thesis testing being included in the report. In actuality, many more of these subjects probably had some form of prior arrest/conviction record. The central records repository _ contains only a portion of all arrests/convictions in the state. There are numerous arrests and convictions which police agencies do not report to the state police criminal history division.13 Hence, when a reported 45.0 percent of the subjects had experienced prior contact with the police, that figure should be considered as the absolute lower limit. This is the reason for reporting the percentages while excluding the unknowns. Of the 31.9 percent of the subjects in the unknown category, surely many of them had criminal records. This could also be assumed 69 of the subjects in the "no record" category, alghough probably to a lesser degree. The main thing the reader should bear in mind in studying these statistics is that they are deflated. Whichever set of statistics one chooses to rely upon, basically anywhere between about 44 and 66 percent of these subjects had prior arrest records. Between approximately 21 and 31 percent were for vio- lent crime-against-person types of felonies. Either way one chooses to look at it, this is not a typical group of peOple. A substantial number had previously been arrested by police, some for very violent acts. When controlling for the precipitating factor in these inci- dents, where a domestic disturbance was the precipitator, 65.0 percent of the subjects had arrest records and 35.0 percent did not (unknowns excluded). This falls in the range predicted in the previous para- graph. More complicated analyses controlling for various other factors such as other precipitating factors, subject use of alcohol and/or drugs, and use of deadly force was undeterminable. With such large "unknown" factors in each category, by the time any analysis was completed the sample size was so insignificant as to be meaningless. For instance, if the research indicated that the subject always used deadly force, where the subject's mental instability was the precipi— tating factor in the incident, and where he had consumed alcohol during the incident, of what value is that information if the sample size where all data were known is only five incidents? All sorts of tests controlling for numerous variables could have been accomplished, but it would have in fact been an exercise in futility. There were very simply too many unknowns in each category, which by the time were 70 layered upon each other, being compounded with each new variable intro- duced, resulted in a very insignificant and meaningless sample. It is unfortunate that more could not have been shown, but such is probably the rule rather than the exception where a project is the first research attempted with a particular set of recorded data, as was the case here. Subject Alcohol/Drug Use In 36.2 percent of the cases studied the subjects used alcohol, drugs, or a combination of the two either during or immediately prior to the incident. While this may not be surprising, it should be con- sidered significant. It is to the officers' benefit to know if the subjects they are confronting have consumed any mood altering sub- stances. If the subject has consumed any type of depressant, perhaps the officers can simply wait until he falls asleep or passes out, and then apprehend him. This is exactly what happened in at least two instances. No harm came to either civilians or police officers in these particular cases. MBny people will behave differently than they normally would when they have consumed alcohol or drugs. It can be very beneficial for negotiators to know whether or not they are likely to encounter a subject who is intoxicated. Different negotiation strategies may be employed depending upon this and other variables. In 48.3 percent of the cases the subject had consumed neither alcohol nor drugs. However, 13.6 percent of this group was classified as "mentally unstable individuals." Therefore, only 41.7 percent of the subjects had neither consumed alcohol or drugs nor were they men- tally unstable. Only four out of ten subjects which EST was likely to encounter were "clear of mind" so to speak; and, this does not account 71 for a fairly substantial unknown factor. Unfortunately, no collateral evidence of this (or the contrary) was found in any literature. In 15.4 percent of the cases alcohol or drug use or non-use was not determinable from the available data. Subject Use of Deadly Force Several interesting, if not unsurprising findings from the research dealt with the use of deadly force by the subjects in these cases. Originally the researcher set out to determine whether or not the hostage-taker or barricaded gunman was armed at all with any type of instrument which could cause deadly force. This may sound like an amazingly large category, for many items can cause death: firearms, knives, baseball bats, frying pans, etc. Upon getting into the research, however, this was not at all a problem. As Table 6 indicates, all cases fit neatly into their respective categories. There were no "frying pan cases." In 87.9 percent of the hostage and barricaded gunman cases (N=91) the subject was indeed armed with some type of firearm. The researcher originally set out to determine what type of firearm the subject was armed with; whether it be a rifle, shotgun, or handgun. Repeated attempts at this proved fruitless. Many times the subject was armed with multiple weapons of different types. Also, in many cases the official reports alluded only to "firearms" without specifying what type of firearm. Only one thing is certain--the overwhelming majority of these subjects were armed with at least one type of firearm, which could cause deadly force. This bit of information might not be news to the EST officers who responded to these calls, but at least it has 72 TABLE 6 Possession of Weapons by Subject Weapons N A B C D E E 1974 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 1975 8 7 1 0 0 0 0 1976 8 6 1 0 0 0 1 1977 6 4 0 1 0 0 1 1978 15 14 0 0 0 0 1 1979 9 8 0 1 O O 0 1980 7 6 0 1 0 0 0 1981 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 1982 8 7 0 0 0 O 1 1983 9 8 0 0 0 0 1 1984 8 7 0 1 0 0 0 Total 91 80 2 4 O O 5 Relative Frequency .879 .022 .044 0 0 .055 Weapons AzFirearm D=Unarmed B=Knife E=Other weapon C=Unarmed, but F=Unknown initially believed to be armed 73 now been determined empirically that officers face potentially very dangerous situations on eight to nine out of every ten of these types of calls. In 2.2 percent of the cases studied the subject was armed with some kind of knife. In 4.4 percent the subject was believed to be armed with firearms, but it was subsequently determined that he was unarmed. In 5.5 percent of the cases these data were undecipherable from the reports or official records. In the ninety-one cases, 78.0 percent of the time the subject threatened to use deadly force. Fifty-two percent of the time he actually did use deadly force. A bit of clarification is in order at this point. In many of the cases it was not determinable whether the threats and use of deadly force occurred prior to the arrival of EST, after the team's arrival, or both. These data pertain to the incident as a whole, from the time it commenced until the time it ended. If, for instance, regular police officers responded to a domestic distur- bance where one party had shot the other with a firearm, then threatened to shoot the police when they initially made contact, then that case was coded as both the subject using and threatening to use deadly force even though EST had not yet been requested. One of the hypotheses of this research sought to explore the relationship between a subject's threat of using deadly force and his actually doing so. As indicated in Table 8, there was no statistically significant relationship between the two. In thirty-seven cases the subject threatened to use deadly force and actually did. In thirty-one cases, however, he did not use deadly force but had threatened to do so. In nine cases there was no threat, but deadly force was used. 74 TABLE 7 Subject Threat and Use of Deadly Force Threat Use N A B C A B C 1974 6 6 0 0 4 2 0 1975 8 8 0 0 3 5 0 1976 8 5 2 1 2 6 0 1977 6 4 2 0 3 3 O 1978 15 14 1 0 7 7 1 1979 9 8 0 1 7 1 1 1980 7 4 2 1 4 3 O 1981 7 6 l 0 4 3 O 1982 8 5 3 0 4 3 l 1983 9 4 4 1 6 2 l 1984 8 7 1 0 4 4 0 Total 91 71 16 4 48 39 4 Relative Frequency .780 .176 .044 .527 .428 .044 Threat Use A:Yes A=Yes B=No B=No (fiUnknown C=Unknown 75 TABLE 8 Relationship: Threat and Use of Deadly Force DF Threat Yes No Yes 37 9 46 Use of DF No 31 7 38 68 16 N=84 HO: No relationship between subjects' threat and use of deadly force. H1: Relationship exists between subjects' threat and use of deadly force. a = .05 df = 1 required CV = +3.841 x2 = .5611 .. No statistically significant relationship. phi = -.014 (virtually no relationship) 76 If a link could have been found here, it might have been of some use to negotiators. As mentioned before though, even if statisti- cal significance could have been shown, statistics mean one thing in an academic setting, in a research lab, or in a thesis, but they may mean nothing at all in a highly emotional human drama such as these cases. For instance, if it could be shown that there was a negative correlation between a barricaded gunman's threat of using deadly force and his actually doing so, and the correlation was .65 (high), would a police officer feel comfortable in taking heart in this fact and behave less cautiously encountering a gunman who had made such a threat? Probably not. Even though a researcher would probably be overjoyed that his hypothesis was correct and that he was able to show a .65 correlation, it would have absolutely zero real world applica- bility. Over the entire period under study eighteen non-police persons were injured and seven were killed in these incidents. Three police officers were injured and one was killed. Clearly these are violent cases with a higher than average percentage of violent subjects. The relative frequency of cases over the years in which persons (both civilian and police) have been injured or killed by the subject is shown in Figure 4. Although caution is urged in making a direct compa- rison with the figures in Table 9, a study of violence in hostage situ- ations from 1968 to April 1976 conducted by Dawe, seems to reveal a much less frequent incidence of violence.14 (Dawe's study did not take into account barricaded subjects without hostages.) Whereas in the incidents with the MSP/EST 19.8 percent of the time civilians were injured and 7.7 percent of the time they were killed, in Dawe's study Relative Frequency \1 O I 0" O 1 U1 0 1 p O L L...) O l N O l H O l MMMMM? Year FIGURE 4 Relative Frequencv of Subject Injuring and/or Killing Others in Hostage and Barricaded Gunman Incidents 78 TABLE 9 Frequency of Subject Injuring and Killing Civilians and Police (See Key) N A C 1974 6 l 1 0 1975 8 1 O 0 1976 8 3 O 1 1977 6 1 O 1 1978 15 3 1 0 1979 9 1 0 0 1980 7 0 1 0 1981 7 2 1 0 1982 8 2 1 0 1983 9 2 O 1 1984 8 2 2 0 Total 91 18 7 3 Relative Frequency .198 .077 .033 Key A=Civilians injured B=Civilians killed C=Police injured D=Police killed E=Total cumulative relative frequency Ot—‘OOOOOOOOO U y... .011 .333 .125 .500 .333 .266 .111 .143 .428 .375 .555 .500 NA .318 79 the figures are 6.6 and 3.8 percent respectively. There are several possible explanations for this. First, the figures in this report deal with frequency of inci- dents in which persons were injured or killed whereas Dawels work refers to the percentage of persons injured or killed (out of the total number of hostages). In other words, in this report "incidents" are the units of analysis whereas in Dawe's work "hostages" seem to be the units of analysis. Also, as mentioned above, Dawe's study only considered hostage incidents whereas the MSP study also considered barricaded gunmen with- out hostages. Perhaps including the barricaded gunmen increased the overall relative frequency of reported violence. Referring to the following model, the research would seem to support this notion to a degree. Whereas in strictly hostage incidents there was a 15.7 percent incidence of injury and 0.0 percent incidence of death, in barricaded gunman situations the figures are 26.0 and 10.0 percent respectively. As can also be seen, barricaded gunmen also used deadly force slightly more often than hostage-takers did. Relative Frequency Relative Frequency Deadly Force Use Hostage Incidents .473 Barricade Incidents .550 (N=88) (N=88) Dawe's statistics are of international incidents whereas the MSP/EST incidents are of course only in the state of Michigan. This also hinders the making of a direct comparison. Some criminologists are of the opinion that violence in general is much more prevalent in 80 the United States than in most other civilized societies.15 Since these two sets of data are not comparable, however, no support can be given to that argument here. Alcohol Drug Use and Use of Deadly Force Another of the hypotheses in this research attempted to deter- mine whether or not there was an association between a subject's use of intoxicants either during or immediately prior to the incident, and his use of deadly force. As Table 10 unfortunately reveals, no signi- ficant relationship could be shown. Subjects known to have not con- sumed alcohol or drugs used deadly force slightly more often than those who had. Of the subjects who did not resort to the use of deadly force, 37.1 percent of them had used intoxicants. Although this information will not show police officers any significant relationships, maybe it is not totally useless. If nothing else, at least they can see that because there is no apparent relationship, the presence or absence of use of intoxicants and controlled substances should not be relied upon when attempting to guess if the subject will or will not use deadly force. As slight as that contribution may seem, it is all that could be determined. Method of Resolution Turning the focus of the paper to the method the police used to resolve the incidents under study, one can readily see in Table 11 that one category accounted for the method of resolution in almost half of the incidents: negotiation. As mentioned at the outset of this work, hostage negotiation is not the main topic or sole point of interest in this research. 81 TABLE 10 Relationship: Subject Alcohol/Drug Use and Use of'DeadTy Force Alcohol/Drug Use Yes No Use of Yes 18 22 40 DF No 13 22 35 31 44 N=75 HO: No relationship between subjects' use of alcohol/drugs during or immediately prior to the incident and his/her use of deadly force. ' H1: Relationship exists between subjects' alcohol/drug use and use of deadly force. a = .05 df = 1 required CV = +3.841 x2 = .4741 {3 No statistically significant relationship. phi = .079 (virtually no relationship) 82 TABLE 11 Method Successful in Resolving Hostage and Barricaded Gunman Incidents Method N A B C D E' F G 1974 6 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 1975 8 3 3 0 0 1 1 0 1976 8 3 1 0 0 2 2 0 1977 6 1 2 0 1 0 2 0 1978 15 6 2 0 0 5 1 l 1979 9 3 2 0 0 4 0 0 1980 7 2 2 O 1 2 O 0 1981 7 3 2 0 0 2 0 0 1982 8 1 3 0 1 3 0 0 1983 9 2 1 0 O 5 1 0 1984 8 3 2 0 0 2 1 0 Total 91 29 20 0 3 29 9 1 Relative Frequency .318 .212 0 .033 318 .099 .011 Excluding early terminations (N=62) .476 .322 0 .048 NA .145 .016 Method A=Negotiation E=Terminated prior to B=Assault EST arrival C=Police sniper F=Other D=Subject suicide G=Unknown 83 Extensive theories, descriptions, or nuts-and-bolts "how—tos" are not discussed. Negotiation was, however, the method which was successful in resolving hostage and barricaded gunman incidents more often than any other method. When excluding the cases which terminated prior to the arrival of EST, negotiation was successful in 47.6 percent of the remaining cases. The casual observer might think that being able to successfully negotiate in only about half of the incidents is not inspiring. Many times though, the ES Team and its negotiators were called only as a form of last resort, after negotiators from local agencies had been unsuccessful. In simpler terms, many of these were "hopeless cases" or "lost causes" before EST was even requested. Considered in that light, one might look upon these cases where EST negotiations were successful in a more positive frame of mind. These subjects may indeed have given up in time anyway, without any assistance from EST negotiators. Nevertheless, this is an unknown, and should not in any way be inter- preted as belittling the efforts of the ES Team and its negotiators. EST negotiators are experienced, most are highly educated, and as men- tioned previously, they are trained and coached by two departmental psychologists who are themselves members of the team. What the 47.6 percent success rate just mentioned does not speak of are the countless hours of deliberate negotiation which for one reason or another did not work. Many of these situations might have been considered unsalvageable, but the ES Team always attempted negotiation as the first option. Never was there a case where the team simply burst upon the scene, charging in and firing weapons with- out first attempting a peaceful, negotiated settlement. (Appendix G is 84 a guideline of basic negotiation principles.) Another one of the main hypotheses in this research attempted to discover if there was a relationship between the use of alcohol or drugs by a subject and the ability of police to arrive at a negotiated settlement. Referring to Table 12, it is clear that at least in the cases under consideration there was no such relationship. Where enough data were known to use the case in the test (N=63), and where negotia- tion was the method which successfully resolved the incident, 64.9 per- cent of the subjects had not consumed the substances and 35.1 percent had. This sounds good until all of the facts are revealed to indicate that where negotiation was not Successful, 53.8 percent of the subjects had not consumed either of the substances while 46.2 percent had. Still, one can say that negotiation was more successful with persons who had not consumed alcOhol or drugs by nearly a two to one margin, as long as it is in context. Where negotiation was not successful, there was no discernable difference between consumption (N=12) and non- consumption (N=14). Despite all peaceful efforts, assault was the method of resolv- ing the incidents in 32.2 percent of the cases (again, excluding inci- dents which terminated prior to EST arrival). In this subset of incidents where assault was the method of resolution (N=20), some form of tear gas, smoke, other chemical agent, or combination thereof was used in 70.0 percent of the cases. This was for the purpose, of course, of attempting to flush the subject out. In some cases it worked, and in some cases it did not, resulting in EST officers actually having to enter the residence or building, searching for, and eventually appre- hending the offender. (In the original coding of the reports, "gas" 85 TABLE 12 Relationship: Subject Alcohol/Drug Use and Successful Negotiation Alc/Drug Use C 0 Yes No «4 4.) CO -.-4 u 0 Yes 13 24 37 co <1) Z .—-l :3 ‘3 No 12 14 26 m a Q) U U :3 m 25 38 N=63 HO: No relationship exists between a subject's use of intoxicants during or immediately prior to an incident and the ability of police to negotiate a peaceful settlement. H1: Relationship exists between subject alcohol/drug use and police negotiation success. a = .05 df = 1 Required CV = +3.841 x2 = .7772 J; No statistically significant relationship. phi = -.11 (extremely weak negative relationship) 86 and "assault" were treated as two separate and distinct categories. The lines of demarcation became unclear very early on, however, and the categories had to be combined.) As indicated in Table 11, 31.8 percent of the incidents were terminated prior to the arrival of EST. In some cases the methods used by regular officers to resolve the incident were known and in some cases they were not. Concerning EST though, these were cases considered serious enough for its mobilization, but in which EST did not participate. Whether or not these requests for assistance were made in haste is not known. The bottom line is that nearly one-third of the time when EST was mobilized for hostage and barricaded gunman incidents, the sit- uation terminated prior to the team's arrival. An original hypothesis in this research sought to discern how many of the requests for EST assistance were hasty, ill-advised requests. Enough reliable data were not available to accomplish this. The researcher then decided to ascertain if there was a relationship between the type of agency requesting EST assistance and incident termination prior to EST arrival. The logic behind this was to see if more requests from local agencies resulted in early termination than requests from the regular state police troops. If this proved to be so, the reason for it ”might" have been because local officers were not as well trained in determining the seriousness and dangerousness of the situation. As revealed in Table 13, however, no significant relationship could be determined between these variables. Of the thirty-one incidents which terminated prior to the team's arrival, fifteen were state police requests and sixteen were local agency requests. Local agency in this context equates to municipal, 87 TABLE 13 Relationship: Type Agency Requesting EST Assistance and Incident Termination Prior to EST Arrival Dept. Requesting Assistance MSP Local Yes 15 16 31 No 25 36 61 Incident Terminating Prior to EST Arrival 40 52 N=92 HO: No relationship exists between the type of agency requesting EST assistance and the incident terminating prior to EST arrival. H1: Relationship exists between requesting agency and early termination of incident. a = .05 df = 1 Required CV = +3.841 x2 = .4597 .3 No statistically significant relationship. phi = .07 (virtually no relationship) 88 township, and county police agencies including sheriff departments. Of the forty requests made by the state police, 37.5 percent of them term- inated early. Of the fifty—two requests from local agencies, 30.7 per- cent of them terminated early. Although this is almost one-third of the incidents, it might not be inordinately high when one pauses to consider exactly what kinds of situations these are. Who can predict from one minute to the next what a barricaded individual, possible mentally unstable, and most assuredly in an anxiety filled situation, will do? He might settle down for a long seige, go on a rampage, or simply walk out when asked to do so, if he is tiring of the situation. The relative frequency of these types of cases terminating early is shown in Figure 5. Police officers should receive some form of periodic training in how to assess a hostage or barricade situation. One should not, however, assume that a first level line officer will be the one making a request for EST. The line officer's request for assistance will go up the chain of command to the appropriate decision making point for his particular agency, and from that level the request will go to the state police. The request must go through the state police district headquarters before going to the main operations head- quarters in the state capitol. So, one can readily see that it is a system of checks all the way up. In theory it would be difficult for a hasty request to make it to the top of the ladder, and for mobilization to subsequently occur, without the request being stopped at one of the key decision points. Nonetheless, although it cannot be empirically proven from the data, some hasty requests probably do make it to the top and result in EST mobilization. Because police supervisors and executives will necessarily Relative Frequency 89 70. 60- 50‘ 40- 30a 20. 10., O a , 1\ f\ f\ r\ I'\ oo co co m w o o~ o~ ox o~ o~ o~ o~ cm «a H v-d H «—4 H ,_4 v-i v-1 «—1 F4 Year FIGURE 5 Trend of Hostage and Barricaded Gunman Incidents Terminating Prior to EST Arrival Relative Frequency 50_ 40 q 37% 30- '-“‘ 32% 20a 17% 10 ‘ 127. 27. . E"‘TL , uni 0°] A B C D E F Rank A=Patrolman/trooper B=Corporal C=Sergeant D=Lieutenant E=Captain F=Senior officer (chief, sheriff, or assistants) (N=41 out of a total 91 hostage and barricaded gunman incidents.) FIGURE 6 Rank of Officer Requesting EST Assistance 91 become involved in this decision making process, in October 1983 the lieutenant in charge of support for EST statewide devised and imple- mented a program of Crisis Communication seminars offered to local police officials.16 In these seminars the theories and concepts of the ES Team are explained. Local officials are made aware of what is available to them: what the ES Team can do for them. They are educated in how to handle crisis situations. It is both an informational and instructional program. 92 Chapter IV Notes 1. Emergency Support Team Traininnganual (n.p.: Michigan Department of State Police, n.d.), p. 1. 2. W. J. Parviainen, interview conducted concerning MSP/EST tactics at State Police headquarters, East Lansing, Michigan, April 1985. 3. Ibid. 4. John A. Kolman, "The Use of SWAT Teams in Effecting the Service of Search Arrest Warrants," The Tactical Edge 1 (Fall 1983): 7-10. 5. R. P. Cappel, SWAT Team Manual (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1979), p. 1—5. 6. J. H. McNamara, "SWAT: A Blessing or a Curse?" in L. A. Radelet, Police and the Community (rev. ed.) Glencoe Press, 1985 (in press). 7. Irving Goldaber, "A Typology of Hostage-Takers,” Police Chief 46 (June 1979): 22. 8. "Hostages - A Viewpoint," Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette, vol. 38, no. 10, p. 1. 9. The category "attempt to investigate or serve a warrant" was the precipitating factor in 7.7 percent of the cases. 10. Slow responses by MSP/EST were one reason for a group of smaller police agencies in the southeast Michigan Downriver area combining forces to form a cooperative, joint agency SWAT team. See Wyandotte News Herald, December 26, 1984. 11. Harvey Schlossberg, training pamphlet taken from a hostage negotiation school, Lansing, Michigan, June 1980. 12. Ibid. 13. Fred Gerard, "Faulty Data in Computer Loses Track of Criminals," Detroit News, 7 April 1985, sec. B, p. 3. 14. "Hostage Taking," ngal Canadian Mounted Police Gazette, vol. 38, no. 6, pp. 1-4. 15. See, for instance, Charles E. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), pp. 27-62. 93 Chapter IV Notes (cont'd) 16. The Crisis Communication program was developed jointly by Lt. W. J. Parviainen and Dr. Donald Rossi, both of the Michigan State Police. CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions After poring over eleven years' worth of SWAT type incidents, it is somewhat easier to answer the question posed in the initial chapters of this work: "What can SWAT do for a police department that a well equipped, highly trained cadre of regular police officers cannot do?" The answer to that question, however, is not concise, hence the follow- ing discussion. The very fact that a SWAT or EST type unit is organized as a team, a cohesive unit, and trains and responds as such, should be an advantage in certain situations. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the data studied, it could not be empirically proven that EST handled any situations "better" than regular officers could have. As mentioned at the outset of this report, the types of incidents studied are not amenable to simple laboratory type experimentation. One cannot observe an incident or read a report concerning how EST handled an incident and then "rewind the film" for regular officers to respond to and handle the same situation. The next best option would seem to be com- paring how EST and regular officers handled "similar" incidents, or perhaps devising some hypothetical base-line of information concerning what "might have happened" if regular officers had responded to an incident instead of EST. As is hopefully apparent, these types of comparisons would be highly speculative and the results very debatable. 94 95 Still, one can say that since EST is a team, there probably is a degree of organization in an EST response which might not be seen in a response by regular officers. EST officers in the agency studied are screened and evaluated in many areas, and also receive more training than regular officers. (Appendices D and E are examples of the formats used by the MSP EST to evaluate team applicants.) Again, though not proven empirically, if the hypothesis that training improves perfor- mance is accepted, one would probably expect EST officers who had been trained in hostage rescue operations to handle those situations better than untrained officers. Although this too is speculation, the logic behind it is not unsound. Concerning the issue of controlled firepower and restraint in using deadly force, EST always attempted to resolve the incidents first by using negotiation. This was successful in almost half of the cases. Police sniper fire was never used. In only one of the ninety-one incidents studied did EST officers fire a weapon. (One hostage-taker was injured.) Even with no comparison possible with what regular officers "might have done," this would appear to indicate a sense of restraint in using deadly force by EST officers. With respect to the variety of missions performed by EST, while executive protection duties and hazardous material incidents did comprise a small percentage of EST responses, hostages and barricaded gunman situations accounted for 63.6 percent of the requests for EST assistance. Special arrest and warrant service, a perhaps growing area of EST involvement, accounted for 7.7 percent of the calls. While EST appeared to be adequately trained and equipped to handle these missions, this was not proven empirically. Although the 96 data studied did not indicate any problems encountered in the incidents due to lack of training or equipment, that type of information might not necessarily be put in an official report. Perhaps if officers did feel they needed different training or equipment, they would have stated so through informal channels. No conclusions in this area were made. Hostage and barricaded gunman incidents were preceded imme- diately by domestic arguments in a third of the cases. In one-fourth of the cases the precipitating factor was determined to be a mentally unstable subject. Some of these "mentals" had extensive histories of mental health problems. "Mentally unstable" is a relative term; there- fore caution is advised in considering this finding. It was found that about half of the hostage—takers and barri- caded gunmen had criminal records. This figure is probably higher, considering the problems of under reporting in Michigan's computerized criminal history system. Thirty-six percent of the subjects used alco- hol or drugs either during or immediately prior to the incidents. In half of the cases studied the subject used deadly force. The subjects injured peOple in 19.8 percent and killed people in 7.7 percent of the cases. They are clearly a violent group of people. Still, no signi- ficant relationships were found between either subject threat and use of deadly force, or between subject alcohol/drug use and use of deadly force. The scene of a crisis is usually chaotic, not only in police incidents but it can be equated to other major emergencies and disasters also. What EST can do, indeed, what it did in the cases studied, is to restore a sense of composed, orderly control to a very chaotic situation. 97 Officers were prepared, they had rehearsed, and they had experienced it all before--normally much more recently than the regular officers involved. One might question whether or not conflicts in command might arise. between regular officers and EST officers at the scene of an incident. In only a very few cases was there any evidence of this in the reports studied. That is not to say there might not have been friction at times, but it was not reported. Still, this might be a concern, and several steps may be taken to alleviate, or at least to lessen the problem. There should be clear, well defined policies regarding EST mobilization and use at the scene. For what type of incidents will the team mobilize? Who has the authority to order mobilization? On the scene, who is in command of the team? Does it operate under directions of the senior officer at the scene, or is the team completely autono- mous, free to operate as the team leader deems necessary once the situ- ation has been turned over to the EST? If the team supports other police agencies, what are some of the basic guidelines for mobilization, on-scene command, and liability? These are only the basic policy questions which the police administrator must study, but they are some of the most important. Clear policies will help avert problems in a crisis situation. Another important aspect of what an E8 Team can do for an agency is in the nature of special equipment. In many cities, counties, townships, and states, fiscal economy is the new watchword. Some agencies are limited to zero growth budgets and some are even having to work with decreases in budgets. With this in mind there are only 98 limited funds to equip officers with the best equipment which might be used in these high risk incidents: camouflage uniforms, personal pro- tective gear, night vision devices, sniper rifles, assault rifles, loud speakers, tape recorders, and much, much more. It can all add up to quite a substantial sum. Granted, much of this type of equipment is team equipment and each officer will not be personally issued some of it, but the officer still has to learn how to use it. This entails training, and training also costs the department money. In simple economic terms it is more cost effective to have a well trained, well equipped ES team than to similarly train and equip all officers to handle high risk incidents. It would be nice to be able to do the latter, but most agencies will probably find that a luxury they cannot afford. Team training is another area where EST is economical. At the outset of this chapter one of the stated benefits of EST was good command, control, and the ability to work as a cohesive unit. To accomplish this, of course, requires training, not individually, but as a unit. Having one, or a limited number of these units would of course equate to having to release fewer officers for this periodic recurring team training. The Michigan State Police, for example, has roughly forty officers who come together for training as a team three times a year. This is far less than would be required to train all state troopers. It would be a never ending process. The costs would be prohibitive. One unit, or for very large agencies a limited number of units, is far more cost effective than training all officers. Finally, should EST have the variety of missions it does, or will having numerous missions eventually lead to generalization instead 99 of specialization? This is perhaps an unanswerable question, at least if one is to look for an answer by studying incidents involving EST. Nevertheless, the more any organization attempts to do, without a corresponding increase in size and resources, the more likely that organization probably will be to generalize. If a broad range of missions or taskings are levied upon EST, it cannot help but devote less time and resources for the original missions. At least in the agency studied, hpwever, a wholesale acceptance of a wide array of missions was not observed. EST's "bread and butter" is handling hostage and barricaded gunman incidents. Small, peripheral missions may come and go over the years, but the hostage—barricade cases will most likely be the mainstay. Planners should be cautious about adding new taskings. If regular officers can handle a situation as well as EST, why should EST get the tasking? Such would seem to be the case with hazardous material incidents. If enough toxic suits, oxygen tanks, and geiger-counters were available to pre-position them at each state police post, all officers could receive training on how to use the equipment and any officer could respond to a toxic incident. Days and days of training are not required in order to use this equipment effectively. EST should be able to spend the bulk of its time for hostage-barricade situations since that is where most of its time in the field is spent. Recommendations Prior to this report being written, the results of the research were orally presented to the Michigan State Police. The individual in charge of their EST program statewide was pleased with the results. This fact not withstanding, however, he (and this researcher) felt that 100 much useful information had been gained along the way which should be included in the final report. Some of the recommendations that follow are based solely on the research findings. Many of the suggestions, however, are based upon observations which the researcher made through- out his tenure at the state police headquarters. The old adage "two heads are better than one" fits the circumstances. Many things which a single individual, in this case a busy police executive/administrator, might overlook on a day-to—day basis, become clear to a researcher who has the luxury of giving an in-depth look into EST policies, proce— dures, etc. Thus, some of the recommendations which follow are based as much upon observation and practical experience as they are on the empirical research that was conducted. Finally, even though the project was conducted to fulfill an academic requirement, hopefully, it can also be used by the state police in helping to assess their plans and programs in the area of tactical team operations. Frequency of Use Even though hostage and barricaded gunman incidents comprised 63.6 percent of the MSP/EST calls over the entire eleven year period studied, there were still a total of only ninety-one of them (statewide). These types of incidents occur relatively infrequently. Smaller police agencies should consider this when deciding whether or not to form their own team, especially if a well trained, well equipped state police team is only a phone call away. Creating and maintaining an ES Team requires a lot of time, money, and expertise. Costs and benefits should be closely studied before starting a team. An ES Team would be used very infrequently in most jurisdictions policed by smaller agencies. 101 (Appendix H contains descriptive data on other state police tactical teams.) Requests for Assistance One of the objectives of this research was to determine what percentage of requests for EST assistance were hasty, ill-advised requests. As is the case so often when dealing with official documents, not nearly enough information was available to reach such a conclusion. Nonetheless, perhaps a portion of the 31.8 percent of the incidents which terminated prior to EST's arrival were hasty requests. The Crisis Communication Seminars which were started in October 1983 should be continued and possibly expanded. The police managers who will be making requests for EST assistance should continue to receive education concerning what to look for in potentially volatile incidents. They should also be well aware of their agency's capabilities and limita- tions. This knowledge concerning the combination of the dangerousness of the incident versus the capabilities and limitations of the police agency, is important in determining whether or not to request EST assistance. Every officer from the initially responding patrol officer or trooper up to and including the individual authorized to request state police EST assistance should receive some form of training in this area. Training of Negotiators The use of psychologists to train and coach negotiators should be continued. This recommendation is based primarily upon three obser- vations: (1) at least 36.2 percent of the subjects involved in the hostage and barricaded gunman incidents studied had consumed alcohol 102 and/or drugs either during or immediately prior to the incident; (2) at least 24.1 percent of the subjects were described by police as men- tally unstable; and (3) at least 32.9 percent of the time domestic disputes were the precipitating factor in these incidents. As well as being criminals, these subjects can be considered simply as people having frequent and substantial emotional and mental problems. If at all possible, specially trained professionals (such as psychologists or highly trained police officers) should be the ones dealing with these subjects. Even if the results of this research are not generalizable to the universe of all SWAT incidents, police managers in other police agencies might at least consider this. It seems to make just good common sense, even if the frequency of occurrence of the previously mentioned phenomena is not as high in some jurisdictions. Any kind of professional assistance which is available is worth at least exploring. Firearms Supplied The research indicated that a full 87.9 percent of the hostage-takers and barricaded gunmen were armed with some type of fire— arm. In fifty-two percent of the incidents the subject used deadly force either on civilians, police officers, or both (death need not occur for deadly force to be used). Clearly, these were volatile situ- ations frequently involving very dangerous individuals. As mentioned in the research, negotiation was always the first option explored in attempting to resolve the incidents. Nonetheless, should a tactical assault be deemed necessary, EST officers should have the best equip- ment available to handle the situation. 103 The MSP/ES Team should adopt a better handgun than the presently used .38 special revolver with fixed sights. There are volumes of lit- erature available attesting to the .38's lack of both firepower and shell capacity. There is also no need to reinvent the wheel with extensive research. Most professional police tactical teams use a 9MM, large capacity handgun. It is generally considered the best sidearm for police tactical team use.1 The 9MM has more shocking power (velo- city) than the .38 and some models have a fifteen round capacity (as opposed to six rounds for the .38). A favorable deal could surely be made with one of the many manufacturers who make a 9MM handgun. There are many excellent ones on the market, and extensive testing and research has been done in this area (see reference note). Response Time ES Team members could respond to the scene of an incident in a more expeditious manner if they had ”take-home" police cars. There have been many arguments both for and against the take-home car program. Empirical research, however, has shown that the life span of take-home cars increases while maintenance costs decrease. Another benefit, the Louisiana State Police has recorded over the past thirteen years that off-duty officers with take-home cars have performed 28,539 off-duty activities totaling some 8,968 hours.2 However, recent proposals to tax take-home cars as a fringe benefit may have some bearing on this in the future. Nonetheless, without question, officers would be able to respond quicker to incidents. The team equipment could be delivered to the scene by any on-duty officer. Team members would have their personal equipment in their possession and would take it with them to the scene. 104 As explained in the research, response time in hostage (and to a lesser degree barricaded gunman) incidents is a less critical element of EST operations. Nonetheless, some less enlightened police admini- strators will probably never be convinced of that, regardless of what the experts proclaim or what any research might suggest. Trying to lessen response time would be a politically, as opposed to an opera- tionally, based decision, but realities have to be considered. Unless EST response time is kept low, it is possible that more and more smaller police agencies might form their own teams. This could feasibly be dysfunctional for the community served, for it would take a great deal of time, money, and expertise to create a team which could replace the present service provided by the state police. Portable High Intensity Lighting Although not directly based upon any of the research findings, it was noted during the course of the research that in several cases where the ES Team was deployed during the hours of darkness officers had to maneuver their patrol vehicles in order to illuminate the scene with the car's headlights. This is not only a poor form of lighting, but could also get a valuable car damaged or possibly an officer injured or killed. Perhaps in the cases referred to there was no danger in doing this. Maybe adequate cover and concealment were available. Still, this is, on the whole, a poor practice. Portable, high intensity lighting is available to the ES Team and should be used in lieu of vehicle headlights whenever possible. 105 Live CCTV Coverage In one case where there was extensive media coverage, a news person broadcast live pictures into the mobile command post via a "mini-cam." This was a novel idea and might have sufficient merit to justify further exploration. At times the decision makers inside the van cannot, for whatever reason, actually see what is happening at the scene of the incident. Being able to actually view the scene might be an immense advantage. The key decision makers should not only hear, but should also be able to see what is happening. MSP should look into the feasibility of either procuring such devices on their own, or attempting to negotiate some form of mutually beneficial arrangement with a local news agency. Perhaps in exchange for the rights to market the film as training material, MSP could even arrange free use of such equipment from a company such as Motorola Teleprograms, a respected producer of law enforcement training films. These are only several options which could be explored. Development of a Data Base One of the most important aspects of this research was compiling the data for future use by the MSP/EST. As was previously pointed out, even though there was a wealth of reports available, the information contained in these reports was not organized or standardized in such a fashion as to be very useful to EST planners. As is readily apparent in some of the tables in this study, there was quite a bit of "unknown” information. The types of information which might be useful to EST planners is not necessarily the same information required in a standard police incident report. If any kind of ongoing data analysis is to be done, serious 106 consideration should be given to either (1) designing and implementing an EST report form or (2) designing and distributing to team members a checklist of information to be included in their narrative reports. The type of information to be included in the report should be deter- mined by what EST planners desire to study. One of the key elements would probably be the chain of events leading up to and eventually resulting in EST mobilization. Was the request for EST well thought out? Had all logical attempts to rectify the situation failed? Planners would also probably want to compile data on use of non-lethal force, use of lethal force, offender characteristics, and a host of other information surrounding the event. The data recording sheets used for this research might at least be a starting point. This research, limited as it might be, points out some inherent weaknesses in the present method of data collection. Yet, this report can be a good starting point from which better data can be collected and analyzed more thoroughly. This base of data tells MSP/EST where it has been, what it has done during its eleven year history. The history is now up to date. Data collection methods can now be refined to tell planners more, in order that their decisions can be more logically based. Personal Comments The following recommendations, while not based directly on the previously reported research findings, are items which are based upon observations made during the course of the research and which were considered sufficiently important to report here. 107 Continue the ES Team Program The researcher has no reservations whatsoever in recommending that the state police EST program be, at a minimum continued in its present state, but if at all possible expanded in some limited areas. This recommendation is based on several facts and opinions. While the research did not point out what might have happened in the incidents studied if EST were not available, it clearly indicated that EST was very successful in bringing some very volatile situations to peaceful conclusions. From the information available in the reports, the number of actual EST troopers seems to be sufficient to handle the requests for assistance. It is felt, however, that more emphasis needs to be given to the Support function. Although police tactical teams are nothing new, this area is rapidly expanding. Almost every department, no matter how small, has either formed or has considered forming its own tactical team. There are myriad worthwhile tactical schools and seminar/training sessions. It would be extremely difficult for one person to keep current in the field. Consideration should be given to assigning a second individual to the EST headquarters component. This wOuld allow one of the individuals to concentrate on day—to-day busi— ness while the other might be attending a seminar, conducting training, or travelling to meet and discuss tactics, philosophies, and theories with other SWAT commanders. Recommendations below follow directly from this. Increase Interagency Liaison and Training More needs to be done in the area of interagency training and liaison. The MSP/ES Team is very professional and well trained. There are, however, many other very professional police tactical teams that 108 might operate differently (for example NYPD, LAPD,.and FBI teams). Perhaps some sort of exchange program could be established whereby an MSP officer spends a month or so with one of these agencies and then one of the other agencies' officers spends a month with the MSP/EST. This could be shortened a bit to include only an observation period during one of the recurring formal training sessions. The researcher feels that the MSP/EST could also gain much by an informal exchange of information/technology program with various military police agencies. The military could also benefit in such an exchange. Although caution would have to be exercised so as to not involve military personnel in state law enforcement activities, an exchange of information and technology could only serve to benefit both parties. Intelligence Needs Many knowledgeable people think that domestic terrorism is on the rise. Like it or not, EST will probably play a role in combatting it. Preparing for this mission without sound intelligence is unwise. While the MSP does have an intelligence section, the research did not delve into how effective it was or how much liaison there was between it and the EST section. Where terrorist matters are concerned, the intelligence section should ensure that the EST section is thoroughly briefed (on an ongoing basis). Consideration might also be given to subscribing to one of the better commercial intelligence services such as the "Clandestine Tactics and Technology" service offered by the International Association of Chiefs of Police. This is also an area where the previously recommended increased 109 liaison activity could pay big dividends. Possible arrangements could be worked out with the Air Force Office of Security Police, Air Force Office of Special Investigations and Counterintelligence, or the Air Force Office of Anti-terrorism to exchange pertinent information. Other military branches have similar activities which might be explored. Contacts in these offices should be developed. This is where increased participation in training programs and seminars could be useful. Informal contacts made at such sessions are sometimes the most useful. In short, although the possible lack of intelligence may not appear to be a pressing need, it is hard to develop such a program in the heat of a terrorist incident. The ground is fertile to build an excellent program from the bottom up. This could be another role for the second support officer previously recommended. EST Mobile Command Vehicle Several improvements could be made to the EST mobile command vehicle. Status charts which could be marked with a grease pencil could be considered: one could indicate each trooper's name, location, time on—duty, etc.; one might be an important event or milestone chart; one might simply be a blank chart where diagrams could be made. These charts/boards are in extensive use in the military and have been found to be quite useful in helping to keep track of events during intense situations. Another idea would be to put a tape recorder in the mobile command vehicle. This vehicle is essentially a command post or a dis- patch center. A recorded transcript of the events taking place at the scene of an incident might be very useful for several reasons: compiling 110 after action reports, future training sessions, or if need be, in court cases. This is more of a nicety than a necessity, but could be looked into if such a device might be helpful. Closing Comments This research has shown what the various missions of a contem- porary SWAT team are, and how that team "handles" those missions. By far, hostage and barricaded gunman situations were the most frequent types of calls, and negotiation was the method most successful in resolving those incidents. The few basic hypothesis tests which were conducted revealed more about what is not known in this area than what is known. Human behavior is often times not very predictable, espe- cially in such highly emotional dramas as were the units of analysis of most of this study. There are some hard and fast rules in hostage negotiation, but it is mainly an operation of containment, with the police relying on time to wear down the subject. This seems to have been the best option in the past, and there appears to be no reason to change that strategy. 111 Chapter V Notes 1. See, for instance, Leroy Thompson, "Handgun of the Pros," Special Weapons 3 (Fall 1984): 18-19, and Chris McLoughlin, "SWAT Then and Now: Updating Hardware, Training, Intelligence," Law Enforcement Technology, April 1985, p. 42. ’ 2. "Tax Ruling on Police Vehicles Threatens Law Enforcement Effectiveness,” Police Chief 53 (April 1985): 14-23. 3. The author of this report is designing a report form for use by the MSP EST. The data to be gathered by the officers filling out the report closely parallels the data gathered for this report. Other data to be gathered will include items which were not to be found in the existing MSP reports, such as the chain of events leading up to the request for EST, and why local officials felt they could not handle the situation themselves. APPENDIX A 112 APPENDIX A Data Sheet Case # Date V1 .______ V10b Vlga Via __ v11 V18b Vlb Vlla v19 Vlc V12 Vld v13 V2 V13a V28 V13b V3 V13e V38 V13d V3b V13e V4 v13f V5 v14 V6 V14a V6a V15 V7 V16 V73 V16a V8 V16b V9 V16c V9a V17 V9b V17a V10 V17b V10a V18 APPENDIX B (a V1 Vla V1b Vlc Vld V2 V2a V3 V4 V5 V6 113 Code Key incident duration in raw hours time time time time type local police received call MSP/EST received call EST arrived on scene incident terminated incident 1=hostage 2=barricaded gunman 3=VIP security 4=special arrest 5=toxic incident 6=other precipitating factor 1=domestic 6=murder (attempted murder) 2=burglary 7=attempt to investigate/serve 3=robbery warrant 4=assault/battery 8=mental 5=escaped prisoner 9=other 88=unknown type agency requesting assistance 1=county 5=other state 2=municipal 6=federal 3=MSP 88=unknown 4=other local location 1=house 5=industrial complex 2=apartment 6=school 3=business 7=other 4=warehouse 88=unknown raw number of hostages suffix a suffix b known to the hostage—taker (family, etc.) unknown to hostage—taker (strangers) raw number of EST officers involved V6a V7 V7a V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 114 rank of senior EST officer 1=trooper 4=inspector 2=sergeant 5=other 3=lieutenant 88=unknown raw number of regular officers involved rank of senior regular officer 1=patrolman/trooper 6=inspector 2=detective 7=captain 3=corporal 8=other 4=sergeant 88=unknown 5=lieutenant raw number of suspects race of subject 1=white 5=oriental 2=b1ack 6=other 3=hispanic 88=unknown 4=indian subject age in raw years subject gender 1=male 2=female 88=unknown subject drug/alcohol use l=no 7=LSD 2=alcohol 8=PCP 3=marijuana 9=amphetamine 4=prescription 10=barbiturate 5=cocaine 11=other 6=heroin 88=unknown subject weapons 1=pistol 6=unarmed, but believed to be 2=rifle 7=unarmed 3=shotgun 8=other 4=knife 88=unknown 5=explosive 115 V13a subject threat of using deadly force 1=yes 2=no 88=unknown V13b subject use of deadly force 1=yes 2=no 88=unknown V13c raw number of civilians injured by subject V13d raw number of civilians killed by subject V13e raw number of police injured by subject V13f raw number of police killed by subject V14 = shots fired by regular officers prior to EST arrival 1=yes 2=no 88=unknown V14a shots fired by EST 1=yes 2=no 88=unknown V15 = method of resolving incident 1=negotiation 2=assault or gas 3=subject shot and injured 4=subject shot and killed 5=subject suicide 6=terminated without EST 7=other 88=unknown V16 = subject arrest 1=yes 2=no 88=unknown V16a V16b V16c V17 V18 V19 II 116 if arrested, what charge 1=felony 2=misdemeanor 88=unknown arresting agency 1=local 3=other 2=MSP 88=unknown judicial disposition of subject 1=active sentence 2=suspended sentence 3=probation 4=fine 5=referral to other agency 6=acquitted 88=unknown subject criminal history 1=violent felony 2=non-violent felony 3=violent misdemeanor 4=non—violent misdemeanor 88=unknown 99=no record subject marital status 1=married 2=not married 3=cohabitating with non—spouse 88=unknown after action report submitted 1=yes 2=no 88=unknown APPENDIX C STATE OF MICHIGAN awn | . I he? 14. JAMES J. BLANCHARD. GOVERNOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE 714 S. HARRISON RD.. EAST LANSING. MICHIGAN 48823 COL. GERALD L. HOUGH. DIRECTOR December 27, l98lI Capt. Samuel D. Batten ' 62LI_5 Rothbury Way #8 East Lansing, Michigan lI8823 Dear Captain Batten: Please accept my apologies for the delay in respond- ing to your request of November 30. Because the days preceding the holidays were extremely hectic for me, I am afraid I did not handle my correspondence in a timely manner. Lieutenant Parviainen has advised me of your interest in police emergency services in conjunction with obtain— ing your Master's degree. I have no objections to your review of Lieutenant Parviainen's reports on past incidents involving our Emergency Support Services, and I am confident he can be of great help to you in this area. uncerely, DIRECTO cc: Lt. J. Parviainen APPENDIX D NOTE: 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM APPLICANT INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE REVIEW PAST EXPERIENCE ON INDIVIDUAL'S BIOGRAPHICAL FORM PRIOR TO BEGINNING THE INTERVIEW. What do your friends call you? How old are you? Are you married? How does your wife feel about you being an E.S. Team officer? How long have you been with the department? What has been your experience in the department? Why do you want to be an Emergency Support Team officer? Describe what you think an Emergency Support Team officer's role should be. Do you see the chance of friction between E.S. officers and other field troopers? How much sick leave do you take each year? Do you have any outside commitments that may interfere with your Emergency Support Team duties? What do you feel the Michigan State Police owes you as an employer? What do you feel you owe the Michigan State Police as an employee? What have you done to prepare yourself for this position? (Physically, emotionally, etc.) What would you change in the department if you had the opportunity to do so? If you considered an order via the team leader to be ”ridiculous,” how would you relay your feelings to the rest of the team? 118 Emergency Support Team Applicant Interview Questionnaire Page 2 16. Could you offer the Emergency Support Team a two-year commitment? 17. What is your internal affairs record? 18. What is your best quality as a trooper that you would be bringing to the team? 19. What is your biggest failing? 20. If you were not one of the officers chosen for an Emergency Support Team position, what would your reaction be? 21. With reference to other candidates you know who have applied for the E.S. Team, how do you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 10? Why? 22. What questions do you have that we can answer for you? Comments: 119 APPENDIX E T OO-6O (4-8l) E.S. TEAM APPLICANT EVALUATION APPLICANTfiffi INTERVIEWERf_ 1. AA MOTIVATION: Based on what you consider as acceptable motivations, circle the response most appropriate for this candidate. Unacceptable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Acceptable Comments: SELF-EXPRESSION: Does this candidate express himself/herself and his/her ideas well? Expresses Poorly (1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) Expresses Well Comments: BACKGROUND & EXPERIENCE: To what degree do you feel this applicant's background and experience is commensurate with the needs of the Emergency Support Team Program? Not Commensurate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Commensurate Comments: - REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE: Consider the following: (a) Knowledge of duties; (b) Knowledge of various laws: (c) Knowledge of various departmental procedures. Based on these areas and any others you consider important in terms of knowledge, do you feel this candidate generally possesses requisite ‘ knowledge to perform as an effective E.S. Team officer? Does Not Generally Generally Possesses Possess Knowledge (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Knowledge Comnents: 120 -2- E.S. TEAM APPLICANT EVALUATION/APPLICANT 5. PERSONALITY-ATTITUDE: Would you anticipate this applicant's personality and attitude to have a positive or negative effect on the E.S. Team's operations? Anticipate a Anticipate a Negative (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Positive Effect Effect Positive Factors: Negative Factors: Conments: 6. APPEARANCE: To what degree would you anticipate this applicant's appearance to have a mostly "positive" or mostly "negative" effect on the E.S. Team's operations? Would Anticipate Would Anticipate fifi‘v’ifialéiti? <1) <2) <3) <4) <5) <6) <7) fiiiififllfiitlfi Negative Effect Positive Effect Cements: 7. EVALUATION: In your opinion do you feel this applicant would be an effective E.S. Team officer and a positive contribution to the team. Ineffective E.S. Effective E.S. Team Member -- Team Member r- Not a Good Con- (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) A Good Contribution tribution to the to the E.S. Team E.S. Team Comen ts : 8. Additional Comments:r_ 121 APPENDIX F APPENDIX F Basic Concepts of Tactical Team Operation1 Obtain all available pertinent information from patrol officers Exact location of incident Number and description of subjects Subject weapons Number hostages Action thus far (1) Any shooting, injuries, causlties, etc. (DO-DUO) Establish on-scene command post Who is in charge Number of officers involved What are available resources Assistants to handle intelligence, logistics/ communications, liaison O—OU‘OJ Establish inner perimeter Cover and concealment Noise and light discipline Consider evacuation of adjacent areas All intelligence from perimeter funnelled to CF O-OO‘DJ Uniform officers establish outer perimeter Contain the situation Obtain intelligence on subjects: criminal records, inter— view family and friends, etc. Negotiators attempt contact If a prolonged incident, arrange for a. Meals for trOOps b. Shift change (if possible) c. Media liaison officer (critical in a lengthy incident) d. Contact prosecutor for advice if needed Devise secondary tactics if negotiation fails APPENDIX G 123 APPENDIX *6 Ten Commandments of Hostage Negotiation2 I. Be conscious of both verbal and non-verbal language. You should: -choose words, tone of voice, and manner with care, —pre—screen statements from the suspect's point of View, -adapt conversation to the suspect's level of education and vocabulary, -a1ways speak softer and slower than he does, -avoid being abrasive, -avoid questions that allow only "yes" or "no" responses, -be conscious of non-verbal communication, such as: -stance -voice characteristics -facial expressions —do not use words, gestures, or posture that suggest you feel superior to the suspect, and -avoid unnecessary movement which may further excite a suspect already in a highly emotional state. II. Listen actively. Listen for: ~clues to the suspect's emotional state, truthful- ness, rationality, and willingness to negotiate in the tone and content of his remarks, —changes in the suspect's feelings or demands, -hints of his intentions, -opportunities to repeat back his own words to let him hear what he is saying, and —ways to keep him talking and busy with decision- making matters. 124 III. Avoid deadlines. If the hostage taker does not kill the hostages initially, chances are he will not -- if he is not pressured too fast or too hard. Therefore, in the interest of creating delays: —do not set time limits or agree to meet the hostage taker's deadlines, -be psychologically prepared for long negotiations, -guard against fatigue, depression, and impatience, and -keep well supplied with food and coffee with sugar. IV. Give hostages only minimal attention. The more impor- tance you attach to the hostages, the more the suspect will be tempted to use them as pawns to strengthen his position. To establish the medical status of the hostages, ask the suspect: "Is anybody hurt in there?" This lets him believe you are including him in the inquiry. V. Don't give away what you can use for bargaining: -avoid offering a hostage taker anything voluntarily, —avoid giving him anything without getting something in return, —avoid giving him more than he asks for, and -avoid dismissing any of his interests as "too trivial." VI. Refuse to negotiate demands for additional weapons or additional hostages. Also, never consider a police officer as a possible substitute hostage. VII. Strive for honesty. Keep promises. A double-cross may make the next negotiation harder -— or impossible. VIII. Be wary of civilian negotiators. People who claim they know the suspect ”better than anybody” or can ”handle him" may be just the ones who will detonate him into committing further violence. No civilian should be allowed to intercede unless his relationship with the suspect is extensively probed and understood, and then, only after the police have briefed the person thoroughly. IX. Approach a face to face negotiation situation with caution. Such close and risky contact requires that you: 125 —always make the suspect promise first not to hurt you, -never go face to face with more than one suspect, -always leave yourself an escape, —never face a man pointing a gun at you, -never turn your back on a suspect, -exchange physical and clothing description with suspect to avoid confusion, -be carefultxn1to move so close that you invade the suspect's ”attack zone,” -work hard at maintaining eye contact, and —be ready for incredible tension. X. Be prepared to be authoritative. Most of the time, you should create and maintain the impression that the suspect is in control of the situation. This keeps him from feeling helpless and hopeless. But with certain suspects, there may come a delicate moment when you can give a direct order that will be obeyed, at least long enough to benefit the police. Be alert to this opportunity, and be ready to make use of it. The negotiator should also avoid appear- ing weak or like a "push-over" to the suspect. If you are involved in a hostage negotiation situation and decide any of these guidelines should be side-stepped, be sure you understand why, and be doubly sure the probable gains clearly outweigh the risks. APPENDIX H 126 State Police Tactical Teams The information contained in this appendix is based upon an unpublished survey of state police agencies conducted by the General Services Administration. Of the fifty states, all but Hawaii have some form of state police or highway patrol agency. Thirty-three of these forty-nine state agencies have some form of tactical or special team. The information in this section concerns these thirty—three state police tactical teams. State Police Agencies having Tactical Teams 1. Alabama 18. Missouri 2. Alaska 19. Nebraska 3. Arizona 20. New Hampshire 4. Colorado 21. New Jersey 5. Connecticut 22. New Mexico 6. Delaware 23. New York 7. Florida 24. Oklahoma 8. Georgia 25. Rhode Island 9. Indiana 26. South Carolina 10. Iowa 27. South Dakota 11. Kentucky 28. Tennessee 12. Louisiana 29. Texas 13. Maine 30. Vermont 14. Maryland 31. Virginia 15. Massachusetts 32. Wyoming 16. Michigan 33. Washington 17. Minnesota Range of Requirements for Team Applicants 1. Volunteer 2. Good physical condition 3. Physical testing 4. Ability to work as a team member 5. Weapons proficiency 6. Emotional stability 7. Psychological review 8. Oral review board 127 9. Excellent work history 10. Recommendation of supervisor 11. Time in service 12. Prior military experience 13. Written re8ume required 14. Team votes on acceptance Range of Tactical Team Weaponry Handguns: .38 special caliber revolver .357 magnum caliber revolver 9MM semi—automatic .45 caliber semi—automatic Shotguns: .12 gauge pump action Assault Rifles: .223 caliber selective fire 9MM selective fire .30 caliber selective fire .308 caliber selective fire Sniper Rifles: .223 caliber 6MM .243 caliber 30.06 .308 caliber Range of Tactical Equipment Team: fire axe bolt cutters telephone telephone tap ammunition bullet resistant shields gas guns spotter scopes pry bars oxygen tanks fuel handler suit grappling hook pole climbers camera spare radios/batteries carbide saw radio frequency scanner portable radio repeater sleeping bags tents food supply chemical agents rope bull horn night vision devices battering ram periscope first aid kits/trauma kit metal detector rope ladders manhole cover hooks diving gear firefighting equipment Individual: weapons body armor helmet. portable radio binoculars mirror knife snow shoes parka mess kit Basic Training: In—service Training: Routine Training Areas: 128 protective mask rucksack rain gear paging device gloves flashlight canteen duffle bag pullover sweater skis/poles Range of Training Programs Ranges from three days to twenty-six weeks. Ranges from one day per year to three days per month marksmanship hand to hand combat chemical agents hand/arm signals rappelling building entry techniques physical conditioning evaluation small unit tactics hostage negotiation map/compass reading explosives assault/raid techniques terrorist organizations and tactics VIP security first aid tracking cold weather survival radiological emergencies underwater recovery 129 Appendices Notes 1. Paraphrased from Abraham Miller, Terrorism and Hostage Negotiations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 78-81. '2. Richard Gallagher and Charles Remsberg, Hostage Negotiation for Police (n.p.: Motorola Teleprograms, 1977), pp. 14-16. BI BLIOGRAPHY 130 BIBLIOGRAPHY Adair, James B. "SWAT Operations and Tactics." Special Weapons, Fall 1984, pp. 34—39. . "Cops in Black Battle Dress." Special Weapons, Fall 1984, pp. 40—43. ”After Action Report: Hostage Incident, Leighton Barracks, Wuerzburg, West Germany.” October 1980. Ayoob, M. 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