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THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

By

Jean-Luc Renaud

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
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ABSTRACT

THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

By

Jean-Luc Renaud

The growing number of newly-independent nations who joined the various international organizations, starting in the 1950s, have changed the priorities on these organizations' agendas to the point where about 80 percent of all United Nations resources and 90 percent of its personnel are at present devoted to improving human welfare of the Third World through economic and social development. Like all other agencies of the United Nations system, the specialized agency in charge of telecommunication matters--the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)--was naturally called upon to assist the developing countries in the establishment of their telecommunication networks.

One might have expected that the ITU--established in 1865--would not have survived the changing geopolitical environment caused by the newly-independent nations asserting their power within international forums. Such was not the case, however. Not only is the ITU today the oldest international organization but it has the largest membership, larger than the United Nations itself.

The longevity of the ITU is unique in the annals of international organizations. It is due to the fact that the Western industrialized nations who created an organization mostly geared toward technical coordination, equipment specification and

operating standards, and therefore uniquely responsive to their needs, have come to accept the idea of their special duty as a group to assist their less-endowed counterparts in the Third World which involves redirecting the ITU toward policy planning.

The purpose of the study is to document and explain this changing dynamics. The investigation is two-fold. First, it provides an historical account of the origin and evolution of technical-assistance activities, under the aegis of the ITU, targeted to developing countries. Second, it proposes and tests three hypotheses aimed at explaining the reasons for the longevity of the ITU in the midst of a changing political and technological environment. The research reveals

1) that to a large degree the basic instrument of the ITU, namely its flexible Convention, accounts for the integration of conflicting demands within the institutional framework, even though this arrangement may have reached the point of diminishing return in view of the complexity of the Union.
2) that as telecommunication networks become more sophisticated and global in scope, the technologically advanced nations who manage them are increasingly dependent upon a healthy organization and for the sake of stability are ready to accommodate unrelated demands.
3) that it is the unique characteristic of the ITU's province--telecommunication--which accounts for the centrality and longevity of the organization, since all nations are compeled to collaborate if they want to safeguard their domestic telecommunication systems.

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During my research trip to the headquarters of the International Telecommunication Union in Geneva, I benefited from the expert assistance of Mr. El Zanati, Chief of the Library, as well as Messrs. Sakran and Pinto. They will find here the expression of my appreciation.

I am also in debt to the Renaud and Komiya families for their financial support during my time at Michigan State. Last, but not least, I am infinitely grateful to my wife, Megumi, for her unqualified support during these four demanding years. She made it possible to fulfill a long-time dream of completing a doctoral degree in telecommunication in this land of opportunity.

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INTRODUCTION

International organizations have traditionally been of marginal interest not only for the so-called "realist" scholars, but for virtually all citizens and national decision-makers of developed countries, with the exception of those persons directly connected with the study or operation of international institutions. During the last two decades, however, this lack of interest has been reversed. An important factor accounting for the increased attention to international organizations was the decolonization which led to a rapid expansion of United Nations membership in the 1960s.

The raw-materials prices and shortages during the 1970s, moreover, helped the developing countries collectively to assert themselves as active members of the international system in which they emphasized the work of the United Nations more than did the established, economically developed states. Through the forum of the U.N. General Assembly, developing countries also articulated the life-and-death importance of accelerating their economic and social development. These countries called for the expansion of financial and technical assistance programs of existing international agencies, and for the creation of new agencies. These demands were already enunciated in the 1964 Declaration and the Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Information and telecommunications were not items on early

agendas for development. Development and assistance concepts and strategies were largely dominated by economists. Mass media messages and telecommunication systems were not thought of as significant correlates of development.

In their 1973 meeting in Algiers, however, the heads of states of the Non-Aligned Movement determined that "developed countries should take concerted actions to reorganize existing communication channels which are a legacy from the colonial past." This determination provided the momentum for looking at information as a natural resource over which developing countries should assert sovereign rights and, with telecommunication supports, should be utilized like any other resource in the process of development. Later on, the implementation of telecommunication systems started to be seen as a promoter of development rather than as the consequence of development.

The growing number of newly-independent nations, in joining the various international organizations, have changed the priorities of these organizations' agendas to the point where about 80 percent of all United nations resources and 90 percent of its personnel are at present devoted to improving human welfare of the Third World through economic and social development. Like all other agencies of the United Nations system, the specialized agency in charge of telecommunication matters--the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)--has not been left unaffected by the post-World War II geopolitical redistribution of power. It was naturally called upon to assist the developing countries in

the establishment of their telecommunication networks.

An examination of the origin and evolution of development-assistance activities undertaken by the ITU could well be a promising road to understanding the way in which the objectives and discourse rooted in the NIEO have impacted upon the ITU.

The expansion of the mandate of the ITU, compared with that of other international organizations, toward addressing the specific needs of its developing constituency, has been remarkable.

World War II had deeply shaken the colonial empires and initiated the process of decolonization. The basic instrument of virtually all the other U.N. agencies, established only after World War II, embodied the ideas of emancipation. To those organizations, development-assistance activities were naturally rooted in their basic instruments.

Such was not the case of the ITU. The Union was established in 1865 by a small group of twenty European countries interested solely in coordinating the technical operations of their telegraph, then telephone and radiocommunication systems. Their preoccupations were still reflected in the 1947 ITU convention, namely, (1) to allocate the radio-frequency spectrum and register radio-frequency assignments in such a manner as to avoid harmful interference between radio stations in different countries; (2) to establish tariffs for the use of telecommunication services as low as possible consistent with sound administrative practices; (3) to undertake studies, formulate recommendations, and publish

information on telecommunication matters. The idea of assisting members in building their telecommunication infrastructure was not part of the ITU's mandate as all were at a somewhat similar industrial stage.

Unlike the recently created international bodies, enmeshed almost since their inception with development-assistance activities, the ITU has enjoyed eighty years of relative "lethargy" so far as its founding members, the technologically-advanced countries, were concerned. It is only in the late 1950s that the Western industrialized nations started to react to demands of the emerging developing nations by insisting that the activities of the ITU remain within the purely technical domain defined by its convention.

One might have expected that the ITU would not have survived the change in geopolitical environment caused by the newly-independent nations' asserting their power within international forums. Such was not the case, however. Not only is the ITU today the oldest international organization but it has the largest membership, larger indeed than the United Nations itself. Moreover, owing to technological progress and to the importance of telecommunication networks in the national and worldwide economy, the ITU is increasingly asserting its centrality. The longevity of the ITU is unique in the annals of international organizations.

This longevity is a testimony of the acceptance by the industrialized nations of the development-assistance agenda

imposed upon the organization by the Third World countries who now compose the Union's largest constituency. In contrast with the past, the ITU is today overwhelmingly concerned with technical assistance to developing countries. The industrialized countries' acceptance of this expanded agenda is remarkable and should not be taken for granted. After all, no state is forced to join an organization whose mandate they disagree with, and states can always terminate their organization's membership as well. Not every international body is universal in scope, and some nations have actually withdrawn from existing organizations.[1]

Unlike what happened with the mandate of the other international organizations, the fundamental shift in that of the ITU toward development assistance has taken place in a relatively short period of time considering the Union's 120 years of existence. The adjustment of the ITU to the new environment shaped by the concerns of developing countries has been initiated only thirty years ago. It is nothing short of a Copernican revolution that the industrialized countries, who created the organization, came to accept in the 1980s what they had vehemently opposed in the 1950s, namely, that the ITU is no longer uniquely concerned with technical coordination matters but is solidly engaged in policy planning and technical assistance to

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[1]The United States had temporarily withdrawn from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in the mid-1970s, and this country and Great Britain have pulled out from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1985. The United Stated had threatened to withdraw from the ITU in 1982, but for reasons unrelated to the Union's changing agenda.

the Third World. It is this changing dynamics which is the subject of the present dissertation.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The dissertation, besides an introduction that provides the background to the study, and a conclusion that assesses the effectiveness of the ITU in the field of technical cooperation and delineates future trends, is composed of four parts.

Part 1 presents the purpose of the study, the formulation and rationale for the hypotheses to be tested, and the methodology used.

Part 2 sets the context of the investigation. At which stage in the development thinking do information and its supports emerge as developmental factors? The nature of the response of international organizations to Third World demands in this domain is analyzed. It also provides a brief historical overview of the International Telecommunication Union as well as the structure and function of the ITU's various organs.

Part 3 gives the institutional history of the ITU's activities in the specific domain of technical assistance to developing countries. It presents the chronology of events which led to the ITU's concern with development issues and the evolution of its mandate as a result of the power redistribution within its constituency.

Part 4, proposes, through the testing of the hypotheses, an explanation of the reasons which account for the longevity of the ITU despite the conflicting demands made upon the organization. It also includes a review of other factors that might account for the internal dynamics of the ITU.

PART I

FRAMEWORK OF THE INVESTIGATION

CHAPTER 1

PURPOSE, HYPOTHESES, RATIONALE, METHODOLOGY

Purpose of the Study

Though a number of specialized agencies of the United Nations system have been analyzed, the ITU, the oldest U.N. agency and the one having the largest constituency, has rarely been the center of scholarly attention, (see Appendix A). Is the ITU a global actor in its own right, or does it merely provide an arena for the political maneuvering of national interests? How well has the international organization done in creating for itself some degree of autonomy from member-states? These questions are surely important to students of international organizations, and therefore it is worthwhile to examine the way in which the ITU conducts its operation, resolves conflicts, reaches decisions, implements policies, and manages new demands.

The study examines the dynamics at work in the ITU by focusing on its development-assistance program. The ITU, surely, administers other types of programs. Assistance activities, however, are the newest service offered by the Union and has become over the years the most prominent one. Moreover, at the United Nations--of which the ITU is a specialized agency--development-assistance activities presently occupy 80 percent of its personnel and 90 percent of its resources.

An historical examination of development programs within the ITU will, therefore, provide an understanding of how an international organization responds to environmental changes, how the structure, function, goals, and performance of the organization have been affected by the geopolitical redistribution of power, and how the dynamics of decision-making has evolved.

The purpose of the dissertation is then two-fold. First, it will provide an historical account of, and analyze the reasons for the evolution of the ITU specifically regarding assistance programs targeted to the development of telecommunication services in the Third World. Second, it will attempt to provide an explanation for the longevity of the ITU in a changing political and technological environment.

Formulation of Hypotheses

The study will test the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:

> It is the flexibility of a Convention, unlike the relative stability and rigidity of a Constitution, which has enabled the ITU, by allowing evolutionary changes in the composition of its organs, to modify its agenda so as to integrate the new demands of the Third World constituency for development assistance.

Hypothesis 2:

> It is the increasing reliance of developed countries on global telecommunication systems and new technologies which has led them to accommodate Third World pressures for development assistance in an effort to maintain the cohesion of an international arrangement whose disruption would have severe consequences for the industrialized countries.

Hypothesis 3:

> It is the unique nature of its domain of jurisdiction--telecommunication--which has guaranteed so far the longevity of the ITU since the protection of a nation's telecommunication systems is directly tied to the need for collective agreements regarding the allocation of radio frequencies, satellite orbit allotment, and standardization.

Rationale for Hypothesis 1

In the history of multilateral treaty-making, the International Telegraph Conventions of the previous century emerge as unusual instruments. Rights and obligations appearing in them were not limited to States alone, but extended to legal and natural persons. Upon acceptance of certain obligations, private telegraph enterprises, for example, were admitted to the advantages of the Telegraph Convention and Regulations. Today's involvement of private telecommunication agencies in the work of the ITU follows the early practice of the Telegraph Union [2] (see Appendix B).

Unlike the United Nations, the ITU has not experienced the unfortunate destiny of the League of Nations. The ITU already had more than 70 years of collective practices at the end of World War II. The 1947 Atlantic City Conference established a new Convention and additional organs to respond to new demands. In its essence, a Convention provides more flexibility than a Constitution and this may well be the reason why the ITU is able to assert its centrality through a continuous process of adjust-

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[2] J. H. Glazer, "The Law-Making Treaties of the International Telecommunication Union Through Time and in Space, Michigan Law Review, 60/3 (January 1962), p. 307.

ment to the changing political and technological environment.[3]

The Plenipotentiary Conference is the supreme organ of the ITU. Its authority stems from the fact that it, and it alone, has the power to amend the International Telecommunication Convention. The Convention gives the ITU its legal authority, establishes its structure, and defines its functions. It follows that the dynamics at work at Plenipotentiaries has a direct impact on the ITU as a whole. Each conference has seen an increase in the number of delegates elected to administrative organs. It also represented a larger variety of interests.

Development-assistance issues, which under the more rigid institutional framework of a Constitution might have severely shaken the organization's structure, have been channeled at the ITU into specific actions such as technical assistance and training in connection with other United Nations agencies.

The Plenipotentiary is also a political event in which the representatives of member countries attempt to secure changes in the ITU's structure and functions that will give them some appreciable advantage. The advantage could range from the chairmanship of a committee, or of the Conference itself, to decisions which would give advantage to a national telecommunication industry, or even technical assistance in the upgrading of a domestic telecommunication network.

Although ITU conferences, in the tradition of the Union,

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[3]See for a discussion of Convention and Constitution, C. Barret and H. Newcombe, "Weighted Voting in International Institutions," Peace Research Reviews, 2/1 (1968).

generally decide all matters of any importance by consensus, voting sometimes occurs. The rules are simple. All decisions are decided by simple majority vote. Voting by secret ballot may occur when requested by five delegations. However, given the tremendous increase in Recommendations and Amendments of all kinds, the increasing membership, and the diverging interest of the constituencies of both developed and developing countries, it is somewhat remarkable that the rule of consensus is so widely used.[4]

Rationale for Hypothesis 2

Beginning with telegraphy, then telephony, radiocommunication, and digital networks born out of the marriage of computer and telecommunication technologies, the transmission of information is transborder in character.

As the information sector has come to occupy more than half of the industrialized nations' workforce, the relationship between computer/telecommunication technologies and economic progress has become widely recognized.[5] Sovereign states are obviously part of a global economy. International enterprises are more than ever dependent upon a secure global web of transmission channels. World markets have superseded domestic markets in the

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[4]See G. A. Codding and A. M. Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union in a Changing World (Dedham, MA: Artech House, 1982.

[5]See M. U. Porat, The Information Economy, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Telecommunications Special Publication 77-12 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).

strategy of the major telecommunication-equipment manufacturers and service providers. Radiocommunication uses a scarce resource, the electromagnetic spectrum, whose allocation calls for international coordination.[6] It is of the utmost importance that standards, as well as radio-frequency allocations, can be developed in time for the emerging new services, so that interworking between installations for basic services can be safeguarded, and efficient communication between facilities for different kinds of public and specialized services can be guaranteed. Standardization is also necessary from an economic point of view, in order to reduce the need for a great variety of different techniques or for complex conversion equipment. Standardization is therefore of great importance to telecommunication operators and customers in both the developed and the developing world. Interdependence between telecommunication systems worldwide is a prerequisite for the orderly development of global telecommunication systems.[7]

ITU documents suggest that the increasing acceptance by the industrialized countries of the development agenda imposed upon the ITU by the Third World constituency echoes the increasing reliance of the technologically-advanced countries on the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee

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[6]See B. Segal, "ITU Plenipotentiary Conference and Beyond," Telecommunications Policy (December 1983), pp. 326-334.

[7]R. Naslund, "ITU Conference in Nairobi: Confrontation or Mutual Understanding?" Telecommunications Policy (June 1983), pp. 100-110.

(CCITT). These industrialized countries are doing critical work in CCITT circles regarding the standardization of equipment and operation for the implementation of global digital telecommunication networks supporting their respective industrial infrastructure. The immediate benefits of the CCITT outcome are not so clear to members with a restricted telephony base. Some developing countries have suggested that there might be a case for cutting back on budget allocations for the International Consultative Committees (CCIs) to make available more for technical assistance, which is of more immediate relevance to the majority of members.[8]

The receptiveness of developed countries to the demands of their less well-endowed counterparts stems from an imperative to maintain the status quo to the extent that the higher the stake in world-wide telecommunication networks, the higher the cost of breaking up the collective arrangements that make their operation possible.

Rationale for Hypothesis 3

Established in 1865, the ITU survived two World Wars and numerous other international conflicts. It has adapted to coordinate the ever-increasing international use of rapidly developing telecommunication technology while taking on many new members with different concerns and priorities. It will be argued that the reasons for the ITU's longevity and centrality in the

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[8]J. Solomon, "Rejoinder, The Politics of Relevance and the ITU," Telecommunications policy (September 1983), p. 244.

field of telecommunication may have to do with the unique nature of its domain of jurisdiction--telecommunication.

The desire for self-preservation and the recognition that order in the world community is essential if vital resources are to benefit everyone have created pressures for cooperation and mutual problem-solving. Equitable and efficient management of the environment and national resources, and the orderly development of international telecommunication systems, are vital to national interests. The context within which international decision-making occurs is therefore characterized by world tensions at one level, and pressures for self-preservation and collective agreement at another.

The effectiveness of the ITU can be assessed by looking at the way in which this organization prevents and resolves conflicts in radio-frequency assignments and the frequency with which the conflict-resolution procedure has been used. The ITU Convention encourages members to settle their disputes involving interpretation or application of the Convention or Regulations outside the ITU through procedures established by other treaties to which they are parties. History shows that these procedures have been largely ignored.

From time to time, it has been suggested that the ITU needs to become more active in the conflict-resolution process, ostensibly because the high stakes involved in contemporary

global telecommunication conflicts warrant it.[9] This concern, however, may be irrelevant regarding the ITU because of its unique domain of jurisdiction, unknown in other international bodies, namely, telecommunication. As nations become more dependent upon telecommunication, they will be less able to ignore situations that render their services unusable. Similarly, as their level of financial commitment to telecommunication facilities and services increases, nations will be less willing to risk actions that would diminish the returns on investment.

Clearly, the incentives for international cooperation before conflicts arise can only be expected to become stronger. Such cooperation is most likely to exist when it is in a nation's self-interest. If, for example, a member nation desires international recognition and protection of its frequency assignments, it must adhere to international standards. Catering to its members' self-interests is one of the ITU's greatest strengths, and one which distinguishes it from other international organizations. As a nation's stake in advanced telecommunication systems increase, its willingness to prevent conflict will permeate other areas of interest to the ITU community such as accommodating demands of developing countries.[10]

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[9]D. Leive, The Future of the International Telecommunication Union (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970).

[10]D. C. Gregg, "Capitalizing on National Self-Interest: The Management of International Telecommunication Conflict by the ITU," Law and Contemporary Problems, International Telecommunications, 45/1 (Winter 1982), pp. 38-52.

Methodology

Since the study offers an historical perspective on the internal activities of the ITU, it borrows the research tools of historiography, namely, the use of primary and secondary sources as well as interviews. The entire collection of ITU documents is available at the organization's Central Library and Documents Section at the Geneva headquarters, where the author spent one month. The holdings also include a working collection of the documents and publications issued by the United Nations and the specialized agencies of interest to the ITU. The successive International Telecommunication Conventions are examined and reference is made to documents issued by World Administrative Conferences as far as they relate to development assistance.

The investigation focuses, however, mostly on the relevant information contained in the documents issued by the Administrative Council and the Plenipotentiary Conferences, complemented with interviews conducted at the Geneva headquarters with long-time ITU personnel involved in technical assistance to provide elaboration and context where needed.

The Administrative Council--the ITU's governing board--gives a clear, living record of the climate for an international organization's dependency on sovereign nation-states. Since its inception in 1947, membership in the Council has increased from 18 to 41. The Council as such was created in order to provide an organ of manageable size that can give top management some policy direction in the long intervals between the general assemblies of

the Plenipotentiary Conference--the supreme organ of the ITU which makes laws and revises the International Telecommunication Convention. By representing about 25 percent of the total membership, the Council reflects the desire of many developing nations for a voice in top management. Of the three duties assigned to the Administrative Council under Article 8 of the Convention, one specifically points to the developing countries: "It shall promote international cooperation to the developing countries by every means at its disposal..." This provision was added in 1959, at a Plenipotentiary that might be called a watershed in the ITU's evolution toward truly worldwide participation.

The two other duties assigned to the Administrative Council are, a) facilitating the implementation of the Convention, regulations, and decisions of the various ITU conferences by member countries, and b) ensuring the efficient coordination of the work of the Union and exercising financial control over its organs.[11] The responsibility is therefore political as well as fiscal. It appears that Administrative Council meetings have become more political with the increasing shift of membership strength to developing nations. Issues in world politics that may be particularly contentious at the time are likely to be taken up in the Administrative Council. The Council provides a safety valve for national ambitions and points to controversy. It

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[11] International Telecommunication Convention, Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973, Art. 8.

permits some international actors to be heard who are unable to make a distinctive contribution to the technical and operational substance of agreement-making.

The examination of the documents and proceedings issued by the Administrative Council's meetings is most important to the understanding of the internal dynamics of the ITU since the Administrative Council is the official surrogate of the ITU between Plenipotentiary Conferences. However, for several reasons, including the fact that the Council meets for only a few weeks a year, that it does not represent the ITU's entire membership, and that developing countries have historically been more effective in exerting influence on larger meetings, the Council's activity does not totally mirror its parent's. In order to complete the picture for this study, the proceedings of Plenipotentiary Conferences are also analyzed.

Aware of the limitation of these official sources, the author also consulted secondary sources, such as the literature written by observers. The art of political persuasion and lobbying is an important aspect of the decision-making process within any organization, and the ITU is no exception. These activities are hardly recorded in official documents. Nevertheless, what is available is the outcome: propositions, resolutions, reservations, law, agreement, votes, etc. The author believes that, over a period of 40 years, it is possible to delineate clear shifts, trends, and orientations, however incomplete the data.

CHAPTER 2

THE RISE OF TELECOMMUNICATION IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Approaches to Development

The thinking about development was induced by the need to solve policy problems. Development economics did not arise as a formal theoretical discipline, but was fashioned as a practical subject in response to the needs of policymakers to advise governments on what could and should be done to allow their nations to emerge from chronic poverty. The term "economic development" was rarely used before the 1940s. There came the recognition that "there will be an insistent demand in many parts of the world for rapid progress in economic development after the war."[12]

During the pioneering period most economists came to interpret economic development as denoting growth in per capita real income in underdeveloped countries. Some, however, emphasized that development meant growth plus change, especially change in value and institutions. This concept was embodied in what came to be known as the modernization paradigm.[13] Most Western theorists in economics and politics conceived of patterns and forces which catapulted Europe and America into modernity as

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[12]E. Stanley, World Economic Development (Montreal: International Labor Office, 1944), p. 26; see also, among the pionners in development thinking, K. Mandelbaum, Industrialization of Backward Areas (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1947).

[13]Among its leading theorists were W. W. Rostow, The Stage of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960) and B. H. Higgins, Economic Development (New York: Norton, 1959).

being more than part of a culturally specific, one-time historical phenomenon. They concluded from these experiences that modernization is a deterministic, inexorable, and universal process in which all societies participate or which is inherent in the development of every society. Like biological evolution, development was assumed to be irreversible.

The problems of development were thrust upon economists by the breakup of colonial empires in Asia and Africa during the Second World War and shortly thereafter. Nationalist demands of the interwar period were fulfilled in the postwar period, and imperialism and colonialism were in full retreat. The Charter of the United Nations pointed to the goal of colonial emancipation. Colonialism was on the way out far more rapidly than had first seemed possible at the end of the World War II, and many colonies soon emerged as nations.

Unlike the League of Nations in the earlier years, the United Nations immediately became enmeshed in the colonial problem. The Asian-African bloc symbolized a fundamental change in the balance of world forces. The self-assertion of Asian and African peoples through nationalism and political self-reliance led to a drive for development. The leaders of the new nations insisted that international attention be given to their development problems. Areas that had been considered in the eighteenth century as "rude and barbarous," in the nineteenth century as "backward," and in the prewar period as "underdeveloped" now become the "less-developed countries" or the "poor countries"--

and also the "emergent countries" and "developing economies."

Development programs, national planning boards, and industrial development corporations soon proliferated in the 1950s and 1960s. The economist's tool kit, moreover, began to provide some modern techniques that could support the formulation of a development plan--especially input-output analysis, dynamic programming, and simulation of growth models. Visiting missions and foreign advisers began to cooperate with local planning agencies in producing analyses and policy recommendations underlying development plans. A development plan commonly aimed at a forced take-off and high-speed development, with a large amount of public investment and deliberate industrialization at its core, and it supplanted the market mechanism with physical planning that involved the government in numerous decisions of a direct, specific character.[14]

The efforts of the industrialized world to engineer change in the developing countries had been generally unsuccessful. Conventional modes of analysis and associated strategies began to be challenged by the structuralist approach. Unlike the neoclassical economists who assumed a smoothly working market price system, structuralists' analysis attempted to identify specific rigidities, lags, shortages and surpluses, and other characteris-

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[14]The "Soviet way of industrialization" had some influence in stimulating planning. See the writing by M. Dobb, Some Aspects of Economic Development; P. Baran, "On the Political Economy of Backwardness," Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies (January 1952); and Baran, The Political Economy of Backwardness (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957).

tics of the structure of developing countries that affect economic adjustments and the choice of development policy.[15] Structuralism later evolved into "dependency" theory which attempts to explain the causes of underdevelopment in terms of unequal relations between the "center," the industrialized countries, and the "periphery," the developing countries.

The newly-independent countries, whose growing number strengthen their voting power within international forums, called for a "new deal," a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The 1964 Geneva United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) represented a critical event in the evolution of the NIEO. Its Final Act contains most of the basic principles, proposals, measures and problems that have been considered and discussed in international development forums ever since. It enunciated a new set of goals to strive for and a program that differed from the traditional wisdom and rules of the post-war international economic order including the regulation of commodity markets, preferential access to the markets of the industrialized countries, and, more importantly, development assistance targets. Moreover, it recommended the creation of new institutions devoted to the realization of these goals. As important as

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[15]Structuralism's leading work is P. Prebish, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations, 1950). See also D. Felix, "Structural Imbalances, Social Conflict, and Inflation," Economic Development and Cultural Change (January 1960); and L. Solis, "Mexican Economic Policy in the Post-War Period: The Views of Mexican Economists," American Economic Review, Supplement (June 1971), pp. 34-43.

these results of UNCTAD was the emergence of the Group of 77 as the negotiating instrument of Third World countries.

The 1973 oil crisis gave an added dimension to the NIEO debate. For the first time, the powerful industrialized countries experienced a situation in which decisions vital to their welfare were being taken elsewhere. Their dependence on extraterritorial decisions made them more responsive to the development needs of their less-endowed counterparts.

Telecommunication in Development

Development communication study in the last three decades has largely followed the rise of the modernization paradigm in its generalizations and research methodology about mass media and the modernization process. The preoccupation with the economic determinism of Western models of developments and the role of the mass media is reflected in the work of Lerner and Rogers.[16] As the attempts at directed change never materialized, the associated thinking about communication lost much of its vigor.

The lost of momentum of modernization and diffusion theories and the emerging conceptual tools of structuralism and dependency in the 1970s have created the impetus for considering, from a different perspective, communication content and its support as

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[16]D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1955); E. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969).

integral elements of development processes.[17] The ownership and operation of telecommunication systems, not items on early development agendas, became the focus of increasing attention.

An historical analysis of the expansion and operation of the British news agency, Reuters, in the late 1800s and early 1900 ,taken as an example, reveals the extent to which communication apparatuses play a crucial role in defining relationships between states.

The systems of transportation and information were essential elements in the process of defining the relationships between the two parties, colonizer and colonized, within the imperial system. The British wire service was able to play a crucial role in the international micro-system of advancing capitalism. Reuters built his Eastern empire originally on the cotton trade. He supplied British merchants operating as far as East Asia with data on harvests and production of cotton in India. His political information on China and the rest of the region was added to his specialist information on cotton and then he was able to construct within India a local sub-continental network which collected information for his other clients. In the case of Persia, Reuters even contracted to build not only the national telegraph system itself, but also a railway from the Caspian to

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[17]The central concept of diffusion theory is that innovations trickle down, that is, diffuse autonomously from those in direct contact with external sources of information to other members of the community--insuring a multiplier effect for the activities of the change agent. Diffusion approach, like modernization approach, is based on a mechanistic assumption. See E. M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: Free Press, 1962).

the Persian Gulf plus branch lines. Around this enterprise he planned to develop a large series of transport-dependent industries including timber, minerals, agriculture.[18]

It remains that the debate about communication which later translated into the call for a New World Information Order (NWIO), which echoed the NIEO in substance and terminology, concentrated foremost on the effects of foreign media on indigenous social and political systems. It is only more recently that consideration of lack of telecommunication infrastructure, reliance on foreign transmission networks, and technological dependency entered the picture. Whether it focused on the communication software or hardware, the debate turned communication into a dynamic component of the development process. UNESCO became the forum, par excellence, where the Third World attempted to design a global strategy. In 1978, the 20th UNESCO General Assembly received the interim report of the MacBride Commission, Many Voices, One World: Towards a New, More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order. For all the shortcomings of such a compromise document, it does identify many of the expectations and aspirations of Third World countries concerning communications.

Though focusing on mass media problems and questions of freedom of the press, the report also raised such economic issues as "differential communications pricing policies," "international

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[18]A. Smith, The Geopolitics of Information (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980);

actions...to alter telecommunications tariffs that militate against small and peripheral users," and more equitable sharing of the electromagnetic spectrum and geostationary satellite orbital slots. In one of the recommendations, "New Technologies and Information's Role in Development," the report seems to prefer the rapid incorporation of the new information technologies (satellites, computers, telecommunications, and broadcast) into the development plans for all countries. Although some cautions are voiced about the problems of giving priority to high technology, the commission seems to feel that countries that do not follow this policy will be left behind in the rapidly developing sector of many economies in the industrialized countries.

This last aspect, the growing importance of the information sector in developed economies due to the merging of computer and telecommunication systems which came to be known as "telematics," the establishment of global networks allowing the international flow of data as well as evidence of a correlation between telephone and economic development has shifted the debate away from consideration of mass media content and toward the improvement of point-to-point telecommunication networks and telephone systems, in particular, in developing countries. [19] This new emphasis has brought the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) into to center of development activities.

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[19] See A. P. Hardy, "The Role of the Telephone in Economic Development." Telecommunication Policy 4/4 (December 1980).

For years, efforts at economic development have placed primary focus on building roads, delivering electrical power, constructing schools, and building dams. Prime attention was focused on these "basic" infrastructures that, more often than not, did not include telecommunications. For a number of years, the amount of money in aid and soft-loans for telecommunications has been at a level of only 4 percent, or less, of total programs. This relatively small emphasis has been largely the result of the following factors: (1) It has, in many instances, been assumed that commercial money could be attracted for telecommunications investment; (2) It has been assumed that telecommunication is a low-priority need, in terms of infrastructure development; (3) the relationships between broadcast communications, educational programming and two-way telecommunication, in terms of their interrelated impact upon education, health, agricultural development and other programs, have not been well understood or appreciated; and (4) perhaps most significant, there has been a lack of appreciation by political and economic leaders, at the national and international levels, that telecommunication is a significant factor in creating economic development. Most leaders do not realize that without reliable means of communications, significant progress toward economic development is difficult, if not impossible.

Contrary to these political and economic leadership views, the importance of telecommunication, not just as a "desirable" service, but as a basic human need, has been increasingly

recognized. The emphasis on the development of communication support to achieve economic and technological progress is beginning to be understood and appreciated worldwide.[20]

In the decade of the 1960s, the international community had already come to accept the results made possible by outer-space technology in areas such as communications, meteorology, and management of the earth's environment and its resources. As a response to the expression of this new interest by a growing number of countries, the United Nations convened in Vienna, in 1968, the First United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to inform member states of the results and the potential of space applications, to discuss how nations might benefit from active participation, and to consider a possible role of the United Nations in this effort. The conference provided a stimulus within the United Nations for new initiatives to enable as many countries as possible to take part in the opportunities available for applying space technology to the needs of economic, social, and cultural development. The United Nations system directed its attention to the area of space applications and each of the organizations within the system undertook programs to promote outer-space applications in the developing countries.

The World Bank is the largest multilateral source of funds for telecommunications. Between 1962 and 1983 it made 93 loans

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[20]J. N. Pelton, "Intelsat, Communications Development and World Communications Years," Telematics and Informatics 1/1 (1984), pp. 75-76.

and credits for a total of $2.7 billion to 42 countries to help finance telecommunication projects costing $10 billion. Through its lending, the World Bank seeks whenever necessary to (1) ensure adequate autonomy of operating entities from government; (2) promote tariffs that result in the efficient use of existing plant and new investment, full cost recovery, and the transfer to government of surplus profits; (3) extend basic communications services to rural and low-income urban areas as required to meet equity and regional development objectives; (4) reduce the number of operating entities when needed to obtain economies of scale; (5) identify and remedy inadequacies in enterprise organization structure, project implementation capacity, and operation and maintenance; (6) strengthen manpower planning, and long-term technical and financial planning; and (7) establish and improve commercial accounting, information systems, service performance targets, and other management tools.[21]

Telecommunications projects are relatively fast to prepare and straightforward to supervise, and are in this sense among the most cost-effective World Bank operations. Even though the World Bank is the largest multilateral source of funds for telecommunications, its lending in this sector represents a very small percentage of the total distribution of loans, and a decreasing one, in relative terms (see Figure 1). In the 1969-73 period, telecommunications accounted for 5.4 percent; in 1974-78 for 2.3

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[21]B. Wellenius, "Telecommunications in Developing Countries," Finance & Development (September 1984), p. 35.

FIGURE 1

Sectoral Distribution of World Bank Group Loans, 1975-1980



Source: World Bank Reports. Reproduced from Telecommunications and Development (Geneva: ITU/OECD, 1983).

Notes: The data used here are three-year averages. The seven sectors presented in this figure amount on an average to 80 percent of the total loans of the World Bank Group.

percent, and in 1979-1981 for 1.7 percent. Over the last three years, it increased to slightly over 2 percent. These figures may, however, be somewhat be misleading, as telecommunications is frequently a component of projects in other development sectors such as health, education, and agriculture. Nevertheless investment in telecommunications remains small.[22]

The reason for such a relative low level of investment is not that there is a lack of demand for telecommunications services; in developing countries there is typically a large gap between the supply and demand for telephones and telex. The reason for the inadequate investment is also not that telecommunications entities are not financially profitable. In general, in developing countries, reasonably well managed telecommunications entities can generate large local-currency financial surpluses. Some authors have blamed international public and private financial institutions and the World Bank, in particular for this situation. The World Bank limits its involvement in the telecommunications sector to that of lender of last resort when no appropriate financial sources are available. The comparatively limited involvement in this sector revolves around the fact that the Bank attempts to focus its lending on "basic needs," projects which have a significant direct and demonstrable impact on those who fall in the lowest 40-percent income group in a country, and the fact that there are few substitutes for Worl Bank funds in

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[22] World Bank figures cited in R. Naslund, "ITU Conference in Nairobi: Confrontation or Mutual Understanding?" Telecommunications Policy (June 1983), p. 101.

these low-income project areas. In a sector like telecommunications, on the other hand, substitute funds are smetimes available (bilateral aid, supplier credits, commercial bank loans).

It is hard to find any evidence to suggest that the historical reluctance of the World Bank to finance telecommunication projects reflects the Worl Bank's unwillingness to involve itself in politically-sensitive issues. Unlike UNESCO's involvement in software design of communication programs--a potentially sensitive issue--the Worl Bank's loans go to the building of telecommunication hardware.

In many respects, the World Bank's small amount of lending for telecommunications projects reflects the small investment in telecommunication facilities in developing countries themselves, which in recent years was in the neighborhood of 0.3 percent of the GDP, although some upward trend has been noticed since the mid-1970s, in many of the OPEC countries, in particular. The level of investment in telecommunications in non-OPEC developing countries, however, is still in most instances less than half the average annual investment in the more developed countries.[23]

Saunders summed up the most serious reasons for the somewhat low rate of investment in the sector in developing countries:[24]

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[23]R. J. Saunders & C. R. Dickenson, "Telecommunications: Priority Needs for Economic Development," Telecommunications Journal 46/9 (September 1979), pp. 556-570.

[24]R. J. Saunders, "Telecommunications in Developing Countries: Constraints on Development," in M. Jussawalla & D. M. Lamberton (eds.) Communication Economics and Development (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 195.

1. A lack of enumeration and quantification of the benefits of telecommunications investment relative to what is done in other sectors.

2. A perception that telecommunications investments, while profitable in a financial sense, confer direct benefits only upon a relatively narrow - and privileged - portion of the population of a developing country.

3. Tariff policies which in the short run do not promote an efficient allocation of telecommunications resources.

4. Institutional and organizational problems both within and exogenous to the telecommunications operating entities.[25]

Two major reports published in 1983 provided the much-needed empirical support for the thesis that the implementation of telecommunications facilities directly impacted upon the economic growth of developing countries. The first report, entitled Telecommunications and Economic Development, was conducted by the World Bank.[26] It is a massive microeconomic and macroeconomic analysis of the benefits of telecommunication in developing countries. The six key questions addressed by the authors can be summarized as follows:

1. Can the economic value of the benefits of telecommunications investment be demonstrated and better estimated quantitatively?

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[25]One additional constraint associated with government priorities, benefit enumeration, and tariff policies relates to the scarcity of foreign exchange. A lack of the foreign exchange necessary to import telecommunications equipment is a major constraint to the development of the telecommunications as well as other import intensive sectors in many developing countries. Hence, telecommunications entities which can generate large local currency surpluses are in many instances unable to absorb them due to the unwillingness of governments to allow them to be converted into foreign exchange.

[26]R. J. Saunders, J. J. Warford, and B. Wellenius, Telecommunications and Economic Development (Baltimore, MA: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983)

2. To whom do these benefits accrue?

3. What investment, regulatory, tariff, or other policies might best maximize the benefits, and under what circumstances?

4. How do these benefits compare with the costs of expanding the capacity and coverage of a telecommunications system?

5. What scale of investment, and what level of effort to overcome the constraints on efficient telecommunications sector expansion, can be justified by economic analysis?

6. Is sector organization and management a major constraint on sector efficiency?

The second study, Telecommunications for Development, was jointly prepared by the ITU and the OECD. It integrates 18 case studies into a general theoretical framework provided by five macro-economic studies: correlational approaches developed by Hardy, benefits of rural telecommunications in the United States, by Parker; the economic costs of inadequate telecommunications, by Berry; telecommunications in rural Africa, by Clarke and Laufenberg, and the Lesser-Osberg's general theory of socio--economic benefits of telecommunications.[27]

In order to raise the level of awareness of both public and private entities, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring 1983 as World Communications Year (WCY) and designated

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[27]See A. Hardy, The Role of the Telephone in Economic Development (Stanford, CA" Stanford University Press, 1980); E. B. Parker, Economic and Social Benefits of the REA Telephone Loan Program (Stanford, CA" Equatorial Communications, 1981); J. F. Berry, Comments on the Contribution of Telecommunications to Development: The Case of France and Spain (Association Fran\aise des Utilisateurs du Telephone et des Telecommunications: Marnes--la-Coquette, 1981); D. G. Clarke and W. Laufenberg, The Role of Telecommunications in Economic Development With Special Reference to Rural Sub-Saharan Africa (Geneva: ITU, 1981); B. Lesser and L. Osberg, The Socio-Economic Development Benefits of Telecommunications (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1981).

the ITU as the lead agency for carrying out the objectives of WCY.[28]

In view of the deterioration of the global economic situation, there is evidence, in recent years, that the role of multilateral institutions such as the World Bank in assisting developing countries with telecommunications investment programs is in many cases not replaceable by other agencies or groups.

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[28]Resolution A/RES/36 40, (November 19, 1981).

CHAPTER 3

THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION

Historical Overview

The principal instrumentality for maintaining world order in telecommunication has been and continues to be the International Telecommunication Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, (see Figure 2). The ITU is a direct descendant of the International Telegraph Union, which was established in 1865. The ITU historian G. A. Codding contends that the present organization "can be considered the oldest existing intergovernmental organization and the forerunner of many of the international organizations today."[29]

By the end of the 1850s, the impediments to public telegraphic correspondence across European frontiers approached intolerable proportions. Telegraph wires from two countries would come to a common boundary and stop. The situation was ripe for international action. In 1864 the French Imperial Government sent invitations to all the major European countries to attend a conference in Paris to negotiate a convention which would provide a uniform international telegraph system. The International Telegraph union was born the following year.

At the Berlin Radio Conference of 1906, a separate organization, the International Radiotelegraph Union was formed to deal

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[29]G. A. Codding, The International Telecommunication Union: An Experiment in International Cooperation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952)

FIGURE 2



Taken from United Nations publication – Sales No. E.75.I.13.

with the telegraph's wireless counterpart. The two organizations merged in 1932 to form the International Telecommunication Union. The ITU is not only the oldest international organization, but its current membership of over 160 exceeds that of the United Nations membership, (see Appendix C).

Few changes occurred in the structure and functions of the ITU from 1932 until after World War II. The Atlantic City conferences of 1947 has been hailed for modernizing the ITU; it made three fundamental changes in the structure of the Union. First, it created an Administrative Council of eighteen members to meet annually to take charge of the administration of the Union between plenipotentiary conferences and to provide liaison with the newly created United Nations organization. Second, it was decided to internationalize the predominantly Swiss secretariat. Third, it created the International Frequency Registration Boeard (IFRB). Finally, the Atlantic City conferences for the first time in the history of the ITU attempted to describe the aims and purposes of the Union for inclusion in the basic treaty. They were:

- To maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunication of all kind.

- To promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunication services, increasing their usefulness and making them, so far as possible, generally available to the public.

- To harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of

those common ends.[30]

Although a number of conferences and meetings were held in the interval between Atlantic City and the Geneva plenipotentiary conference of 1965, there were few demands for any substantive change in the structure and function of the ITU. Politics did arise but dealt mainly with non-technical issues. One fact about the first hundred years of the ITU should also be noted. With one exception all the major elected officials of the ITU were citizens of Western Europe or the United States. That one exception was Andrada of Argentina, who served as the secretary general from 1954-1958.

The developing nations have brought about the most important change in the function of the ITU since 1932 by expanding the Union's mandate toward technical-assistance activities. For a number of reasons, however, this change was slow in coming. Although the new nations were quick to join the ITU as soon as they became independent members of the international community, it took some time for them to become a majority in the ITU and to realize the fact. It took even more time for the developing nations to recognize the importance of telecommunication services to the development process. Finally, the developing nations had to awaken to the need to perfect effective politics of alliance to achieve their desired ends.

Although the postwar process of converting colonies into

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[30]International Telecommunication Convention, Atlantic City, 1947, Atlantic City, 1974, Art. 3.

independent states had made a good start by 1959, the Plenipotentiary Conference of that year was a normal one in that the developed Western nations tended to manage the course of business without a great deal of opposition. Two decisions were made, however. The first was to increase the number of members of the Administrative Council. The second one was an addition to Article 4 of the ITU Convention, "Purposes of the Union," to the effect that the ITU would in the future assist developing countries in implementing telecommunication facilities. This second decision decision were more a recognition of what the United Nations was already doing, and an acceptance of the responsibility to help, rather than the result of any massive politicking on the part of the new nations. The major political issue of the 1959 conference was the proposal by the Soviet Union to exclude the delegation of the Republic of China and invite the People's Republic of China.

By 1965, the environment had changed drastically. Membership in the Union had grown to 129. The new majority was vocal and insistent. Two important changes took place. The first proposal, accepted by the assembly, was to enlarge the Administrative Council so as to include representatives from developing countries. The second was a U.S. proposal to abolish the IFRB. This proposal met the opposition of the Third World constituency, which claimed that the IFRB was aiding the new states in the selection of radio frequencies, something they found difficult to do in view of their stage of development. It was agreed to reduce the size of the IFRB. The important political news at Montreux

was no longer the East-West conflict, but the attack by the developing countries on South Africa and Portugal, eventually leading to the expulsion of the former.[31]

If the new politics of the developing countries caused the most excitement at the 1965 conference in Montreux (Switzerland), their demands for development assistance probably caused the most consternation to the American delegation. Although the new nations were able to push through a number of proposals increasing ITU activity in development assistance, they failed to achieve their three major goals: the establishment of a special ITU technical assistance fund in addition to that provided by the U.N. Development Program; the establishment of regional ITU offices in the less developed areas of the world to aid the countries in those areas in developing telecommunications system; and the creation of a new and separate organ in the ITU to deal exclusively with development-assistance matters, which organ would be independent of the secretary general. This failure on the part of the new majority can be attributed in about equal parts to the persuasiveness of the developed countries, a fear of an additional financial burden, and the fact that the developing countries were still not well organized.

The 1973 Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference saw the overall membership grow from 129 to 146. The ITU secretariat was led by a Secretary-General from a developing country. The conference was dominated almost entirely by the concerns of the

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[31]Codding and Rutkowski, pp. 44-45.

developing nations. Fifteen major proposals concerning development assistance were discussed, thirteen of which were approved. The two proposals defeated were the establishment of regional offices and the creation of a consultative committee dealing exclusively with development matters. The U.S. delegation started to express doubt on the continuing usefulness of the ITU as an international regulatory agency for telecommunications.[32]

The debate surrounding the New International Economic Order permeated the ITU's subsequent conferences and meetings. Since development issues became prominent, more details will be provided in the next chapter.

Organizational Structure

The ITU is composed of four permanent organs, the Secretariat, the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), and the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). In addition, the Union's functions are carried out by three non-permanent organs, the Plenipotentiary Conferences, Administrative Conferences, and the Administrative Council,[33] (see Figure 3).

The General Secretariat provides continuity and permanance. It is the chief executive and legal representative of the ITU,

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[32]Ibid., p. 50.

[33]For a detailed presentation of the ITU's structure, see Codding and Rutkowski, Chapter II, "Decision-Making Structure," pp. 59-182.

Structure of the International Telecommunication Union



FIGURE 3

Source: IEEE Transactions on Communications 24/7 (July 1976), p. 702.

responsible for carrying out orders of the Administrative Council and managing the ITU's permanent staff. It ensures the application of the financial and administrative regulations, prepares and submits future work plans, and prepares cost-benefit analyses of the work of the headquarters for the Administrative Council. The General Secretariat undertakes administrative arrangements for the specialized secretariats of the permanent organs and appoint staff. It must also report to the Council any decision taken by the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

The CCITT and the CCIR are close to being international organizations in their own right. The supreme organ in each is the Plenary Assembly which normally meets every three years and which is made up of delegates from all interested administrations and any recognized private operating agencies. The Plenary Assembly chooses questions that it wishes to study and create Study Groups to deal with them.

There are some differences in the mandates of the two Consultative Committees as well as in their methods of operation. The duties of the CCIR are to study technical and operating questions relating specifically to radiocommunication without limits of frequency range and to issue recommendations on them. The duties of the CCITT are similar regarding telegraph and telephone except that in addition to technical and operating questions it can also study tariff questions. In recognition of the fact that the distinctions between telegraph, telephone, and radio are fading as a result of new technologies, the two

Consultative Committees are increasingly forming joint working groups.

The IFRB's essential duties are set forth in Article 10 of the Convention:

a) to effect an orderly recording of frequency assign ments made by the different countries and of the positions assigned by them to their geostationary satellites in accordance with the procedures pres- cribed in the Radio Regulations; and

b) to furnish advice to members of the Union with a view to the operation of the maximum practical number of radio channels in those portions of the spectrum where harmful interference may occur and to the equitable, effective, and economical use of the geostationary satellite orbit.

The Board is made up of five persons considered the "custo- dians of a public trust." They should not act as representatives of their respective countries.

Decision-making at the ITU is the prerogative of conference of delegates from member countries. The Union holds two types of such conferences, the Plenipotentiary Conference and the Adminis- trative Conference.

The Plenipotentiary Conference is the supreme organ of the ITU and has the exclusive power to amend the basic treaty, the International Telecommunication Convention. In addition, it has been given a number of task of a more specific nature which include:

a) to consider the report of the Administrative Council on the activities of the Union since the previous Plenipotentiary Conference;

b) to determine the fiscal limit for the expenditures of the Union until the next Plenipotentiary Confe- rence;

c) to fix the basic salaries, salary scales, and the allowance and pension system for officials of the Union;

d) to examine and approve (if necessary) the accounts of the Union.[34]

Each country which is a member of the ITU has the legal right to be represented at a Plenipotentiary Conference. A number of international organizations send observers. The structure of such conference can be divided in three components: the formal meeting of delegates of all countries, the informal gatherings involving unofficial consultations between groups of delegates, and the Secretary-General and members of his staff involved in the conference work. The Plenipotentiary Conference meets every five to nine years at a place decided upon by the preceeding conference.

Administrative Conferences are of two types, world and regional, and are convened to consider specific telecommunications matters. The World Administrative Conference can take up any telecommunications question of a worldwide character including the partial or complete revision of the Radio, Telegraph, and Telephone Regulations. The specific agenda is determined by the Administrative Council with concurrence of a majority of the Union's members and must include any question that a Plenipotentiary Conference wants placed on its agenda. World Administrative Conferences also review the activities of the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). Such conferences can be

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[34]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 60.

convened by a decision of the Plenipotentiary Conference. The most prominent one was the 1979 World Administrative radio Conference. The agenda of a Regional Administrative Conference must deal only with specific telecommunication questions of a regional nature.

The Administrative Council, meeting every year, is the agent of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference in the relatively long intervals between meetings of that body. The 1982 Convention articulates three major areas of concern for the Council: ensuring the efficient coordination of the work of the Union, taking steps to facilitate the implementation of the Convention, Regulations and decisions of the various ITU conferences, and determining the ITU's policy of technical assistance. While the Convention goes into considerable detail about these duties, the work of the Council in the past can be summarized in three categories: a) external relation which include formal contact with the United nations, the specialized agencies, and other international agencies; b) coordination of the work of the permanent organs of the Union which includes the review of the annual reports on their activities, temporarily filling vacancies among elected officials, and arranging for the convening of Plenipotentiary and Administrative Conferences; c) administration, responsible for drawing up regulations for administrative and financial activites of the Union, supervising the functions of the various organs, including the Secretariat, the Consultative Committees and the IFRB, reviewing and approving the annual

budget of the Union.

Development assistance activities are taking an increasingly important share of the Administrative Council's time. The Council, created in 1947, was probably the most important addition ever made to the structure of the ITU.

PART II

HISTORY OF THE ITU'S TECHNICAL-COOPERATION ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER 4

THE EMERGENCE OF A SERVICE

The newest service that is performed by the ITU, in particular for its members from developing areas, is technical cooperation, known prior to 1965 as technical assistance. An historical account of the origin and evolution of the ITU's technical-cooperation activities, articulated around Plenipotentiary Conferences, is offered in this Part. The convening of a Plenipotentiary Conference, the ITU's supreme organ, is a milestone in the history of the Union.

The present chapter 4 begins with this introductory note and a definition of terms, then covers the period 1950-58, which includes the 1952 Plenipotentiary Conference and the first World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC). Chapter 5 covers the period 1959-64, Chapter 6, the period 1965-72, and Chapter 7, the period 1973-78. Each period begins with an account of a Plenipotentiary Conference. Chapter 8 covers the years 1979-81--rich in events--which include the second WARC, UNESCO meetings, and a detailed presentation of the proposals to restructure the ITU Technical Cooperation Department. Finally, Chapter 8 covers the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference and the three following years.

By following the chronology of events, this historical account provides an understanding of the interplay of the various

actors, of how and why certain ideas gained (or lost) momentum, and of the interdependence between the topics dealt with.

Although temporary prominence was gained by some themes such as the relations between the ITU and the other U.N. specialized agencies or the establishment of national telecommunication training institutes, others have been permanently debated. Most of them set in opposition developed and developing countries. These key themes are briefly introduced below.

Financing of Technical-Cooperation Activities.

The industrialized countries have constantly insisted that all ITU cooperation activities be financed exclusively through the United Nations Development Program, whereas the developing countries are requesting that these activities be financed by the ITU's ordinary budget.

Revision of the ITU Convention.

The ITU's basic instrument is revised at every Plenipotentiary Conference, the Union's Supreme organ. Whereas the industrialized countries have attempted to keep it unaltered, the developing countries have generally succeeded in amending it so as to shift the agenda of the Union toward development assistance.

Representation in ITU Organs

In view of the growing number of newly-independent countries joining the ITU membership, pressure has been put on the Administrative Council and other organs to increase the number of seats

assigned to developing countries. The industrialized countries have always insisted that expertise, rather than geography, presides over the selection of Councilors.

CCIs' Lack of Responsiveness

The CCITT and CCIR have been under continuous criticism for their lack of involvement in assisting developing countries. These countries, moreover, have historically been under-represented in the CCIs, and effective measures have been taken to remedy this situation.

Regional Offices

To respond better to their needs, the developing countries have called for the decentralization of the ITU's administrative and technical functions. This proposal has been opposed by the developed countries, which feared that it might occasion an unbearable financial burden on the ITU.

Preferential Treatment on Technical Matters

Developing countries have insisted, against their technologically-advanced counterparts, that planning mechanisms be instituted in the allotment of geostationary orbital slots and in allocation of radio-frequency bands. This issue was most prominent in the 1959 and 1979 World Administrative radio Conferences.

Private-Sector Involvement in the ITU's Work

This issue opposed principally East and West. The Soviet Union has always been critical of the use by the ITU of personnel

recruited from the private telecommunication-equipment manufacturers. They accused in particular the Western European countries for using the ITU as a marketplace.

Telecommunication and Economic Development

Over the last ten years, the growing evidence of a correlation between telecommunication infrastructure and economic development has made developed countries and financial institutions more responsive to the specific needs of the Third World.

Definition

The expression "technical cooperation" acquired its present meaning only in the early 1950s, and thus, is not defined in the ten volumes of the Grand Larousse nor in Robert's Dictionnaire Alphabetique et Analogique de la Langue Francaise. One finds the verb "to cooperate," which Robert defines as: "To act in conjunction with somebody," which is very general, although it could also be applied to "technical cooperation" as it is understood today. Robert defines "cooperation" in the political sense, as "a policy whereby a country makes a contribution to the economic or cultural development of less developed countries."

The 20-volume Encyclopedia Universalis, which is the French equivalent of the Encyclopedia Britannica, does not have a special chapter on "technical cooperation" as such. To find any information on the subject, one has to refer to the chapter entitled "United Nations." It is worth noting that technical cooperation is closely linked with the activities of the United

Nations system. The concept is therefore very recent, and only came into being after the end of the Second World War.

Thus, in the long chapter devoted to the United Nations, which mentions the fact that the ITU is an international organization which existed long before the United Nations and which---since the creation of the U.N.--has become a specialized agency of the U.N. system, one find an explanation of the origin of development-assistance activities. The problems of U.N. member states whose development lagged behind that of other members rapidly assumed global dimensions following the decolonization process, as a result of which the United Nations was joined by a majority of new African and Asian states, all underdeveloped. The pressure exercised by these states since their admission to the U.N. has helped to "orient the activities of the United Nations system toward development problems." Hence the United Nations and the specialized agencies substantially increased their "operational" activities, which were added to their normal activities. Further on one reads:

> [The United Nations Development Program has the funds,] and the projects implemented by means of these funds are generally carried out by the specialized agencies acting as "executing agencies"... This situation evidently results in a coordination of their activities through the organs of the UNDP, which goes far beyond the coordination than can be achieved by the Economic and Social Council. Thus the whole United Nations system has been radically transformed (emphasis in text).[1]

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[1]For further elaboration on this subject see, Mohamed Mili, "The Institutional Framework of Technical Cooperation in the ITU," in Telecommunication Journal 46/8 (1979), pp. 466-469.

Codding notes that there is an honest difference of opinion over the definition of development assistance.

> In a way, almost any action that would result in the improvement of the lot of an administration could be classified as development assistance. To a great extent that has been the position of the ITU. The ITU, so the story goes, has been involved in the development assistance activities since 1865 when the delegates to the Paris Telegraph Conference shared their experiences, and, in the process, some of the delegates learned how to make improvements in their telegraph services.[2]

The following historical analysis rests upon the more restricted, and more widely used, definition of technical assistance, namely, assistance to new or developing countries. As a matter of fact, the ITU official documents themselves provide the starting point for the analysis as they discuss the merits, and reticences, of joining the United Nations Program of Technical Assistance, particularly in view of the fact that the ITU became a Specialized Agency of the United Nations in 1947.

The Early 1950's: "Extreme Prudence" Toward Technical Assistance

At its fifth session in 1950, the Administrative Council discussed, in a general way, the question of the United Nations Program of Technical Assistance in relation to the ITU. Gerald Gross, Assistant Secretary-General of the ITU, has attended several meetings of the Technical Assistance Bureau (TAB) set up by Resolution 222 (IX) of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1949. He had learned that four countries--Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan--had submitted requests for

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[2]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 284.

assistance in the field of telecommunications, within the framework of larger schemes entrusted to UNESCO. Gross asked the TAB and the Technical Assistance Committee (TAC) to consider the possibility of allocating a nominal percentage of their budget to the ITU so that "the ITU would not be at a real disadvantage if any real program of technical assistance in the field of telecommunications was requested by one of its Members." He added that this was merely "a precautionary measure designed to protect the position of the ITU."

Compared with other specialized agencies, the industrialized nations, the tenors of the ITU were not very much interested in involving the Union in technical-assistance matters. The ITU has been asked by TAC and TAB to do more in the field of technical assistance than to draw up a list of telecommunication experts, from among whom the United Nations intend to choose an expert for Afghanistan.

In its report to be presented at the sixth Administrative Council in 1951, the Secretary-General of the ITU stated that the notion of technical assistance was no more than embryonic at the time of the Atlantic City Conference, so that there was no clear ruling in the Convention regarding the question whether the ITU should or should not take part in a plan of technical assistance. Article 1 of the Agreement between the UN and the ITU recognizes the ITU "as the specialized agency responsible for taking such action as may be appropriate under its basic instrument for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth therein." Article 3 of

the Convention explains what those purposes are, and although it might be held that technical assistance is one of the means of attaining certain of the purposes set out in paragraph 1, this idea gained no support from paragraph 2 of the same article, which is clearly restrictive in character.

The above interpretation seems to be confirmed by what the Atlantic City Conference itself did about a request for technical assistance put forward by a country represented at the Conference. It merely issued an Opinion to the effect that:

> The ITU recognizes the necessity of rendering immediate assistance to the countries Members of the Union, that were devastated by WWII, in order to rehabilitate their telecommunication systems and expresses the hope that the United Nations draw the attention of its competent organs to the importance and the urgency of this problem, which is part of the general problem of reconstruction.[3]

The extreme prudence of the ITU in engaging in assistance activities was reflected in another statement by the Secretary-General which, interestingly, parallels some of the fears expressed by developing countries much later:

> It should not be forgotten that a good many international telecommunication services are provided by private operating agencies of long standing, most of their equipment, also, being supplied by private companies. This being so, any advice offered to a country on the development of its telecommunication would certainly risk being misunderstood, by reason of the commercial or political repercussions it might have.[4]

In order to be in line with the other UN specialized agencies while protecting its domain of jurisdiction, a Draft

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[3]Doc. 831/CA6 (1951), p. 7

[4]Ibid.

Resolution on Technical Assistance was submitted to the Council's plenary session by Committee 4. It stressed for the first time "the importance of telecommunication progress in international cooperation and particularly in speeding up of economic and social development of under-developed countries."[5] The Resolution requests the directors of the International Telephone Consultative Committee (CCIF), the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), and the International Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCIT) to collaborate in the operation of technical assistance, and invites the ECOSOC to make nominal allocation of funds for technical assistance in the field of telecommunication with the advice of the ITU.[6]

At the same session a text was issued entitled "Possibilities for the Participation of the ITU in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance Within Present Budgetary and Constitutional Limits." So far the ITU was represented to the TAB as an observer. The ITU has historically been very proud of its uniqueness and independence, and its attachment to the UN system has not gone without heated debate. Some were reluctant to fully participate to cooperative-assistance efforts fearing for the independence of the Union. The representative from Yugoslavia argued for a stronger commitment of the ITU to the goals of the United Nations Charter in a style which lays the bases for a shift in

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[5]The study borrows the terminology in use at the time. "Under-developed countries" will later be replaced by "developing countries."

[6]Doc. 922/CA6 (1951).

the agenda of the organization that will find a concrete form much later; it also reflects an understanding of the ITU Convention somewhat different from the Secretary General:

> We ourselves feel that technical assistance is one of the most positive and concrete of the United Nations tasks, and that the Union should throw itself wholeheartedly into such work. If we consider the problem from this angle, we can be sure of representing the interests of those member-countries for which this technical assistance is indispensable if they are to attain the ends set forth in the international Telecommunication Convention.[7]

The idea of joining as a full participant the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance gained momentum and the Secretary General reported to the 7th session of the Administrative Council (1952) the current position of the Union. His document included for the first time a definition of what is understood by "technical assistance" offered by the Expanded Program. It is worth quoting him at some length as the entire analysis revolves about it:

> At first sight, it might be supposed that "assistance" implies unilateral help, and that countries fall into two classes, those that give and those that receive. In point of fact, the work is a cooperative one, designed to raise the standard of living in underdeveloped countries <u>in the interests of the community of nations</u> (emphasis in text). In practice, the countries in which Technical Assistance programs are under way are themselves making a considerable effort which, in the last resort, will redound to the advantage of the community of nations.
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> Moreover, it will be well to state that the word "technical" is here used in its widest sense, and covers all branches of economic and social activities.
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> Lastly, it should be emphasized that the Technical Assistance programs are carried out on the national level, that is to say, they aim primarily at the

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[7]PV CA/25, Doc. 970/CA6 (1951), p. 15.

> internal development of the countries concerned, the international benefits which might result therefrom being only incidental, at least for the immediate future.[8]

What technical assistance consists of at the time is worth examining as the scope of activities will be enlarged under the joint effort of an increasing number of developing countries to modify the purposes of the ITU:

> "Assistance" at once suggests financial help; hence the idea has got abroad that Technical Assistance largely consists of the grant of funds to enable underdeveloped countries to procure, for example, the equipment they need. In fact, however, the funds devoted to Technical Assistance are comparatively small, and the assistance consists essentially of the following:
> a) the dispatch, to underdeveloped countries, of experts to study the problems on the spot and draw up recommendations for the development of the country;
> b) the grant of "scholarships" and "fellowships" to nationals of such countries, in order that they may visit more developed countries to complete their studies or to acquire further knowledge in their own special line;
> c) the organization, in such countries, of study circles or lecture tours.
> d) the supply of equipment--chiefly demonstration equipment. However, the credits available being comparatively low, such equipment is of necessity supplied in small quantities only.[9]

The ITU became officially a "participating organization" of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, by decision of the 13th session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC Resolution 400 (XIII)) and under the arrangement outlined below for 1952:

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[8] Doc. 1007/CA7 (1952), p. 2.

[9] Ibid, pp. 2-3.

a) funds should be made available for projects in the field of interest of the ITU by the United Nations out of its share of the Special Account;[10]
b) the United Nations should make separate provisions for technical assistance in the telecommunication field in its estimates for 1952;
c) the United Nations should also undertake the administrative services of projects in this field;
d) ITU would request the United Nations to represent the Organization on the Board when the agenda of the Board did not include items of direct interest to the Organization.[11]

The ITU had to decide whether it wanted to go on participating in the way agreed upon or whether it wanted to operate on exactly the same footing as the other specialized agencies, i.e., whether it wanted to administer itself the telecommunication assistance credits and to negotiate itself with the governments requiring assistance. Should it choose the second of these two alternatives, the Secretary General saw serious political problems arising out of relations with individual governments. More generally, he was wary of the task before the Union, and with premonition, noted:

> What this amounts to is that the Union, arriving late on the scene [of development assistance], has not been confronted with a thoroughly organized and established system in which to find its place. [...] It will, then, have to collaborate in developing the organization of an immense enterprise which is still embryonic--an enterprise which, in endeavoring to attain the goal it has set for itself, may yet evolve considerably.[12]

In less than a year, from June 1951 to February 1952--the

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[10]The regular budget of the Expanded Program for 1952 did not allow for an allocation to the ITU. Budgetary provision would be made, starting 1953.

[11]Doc. 1007/CA7 (1952), p. 5.

[12]Ibid., p. 14.

first year of technical assistance--the ITU had sent 41 experts dispatch in 12 countries. On request from the Administrative Council, the International Consultative Committees were asked to delineate the scope of their activities in technical assistance. The CCIR responded that, by publishing its recommendations on many technical questions, its ordinary task, it has always been engaged in assistance activities. The CCIR would make an effort to make results available to developing countries as well as give advice on the preparation of lists of experts. Both the CCIT and the CCIF responded along the same line. The three organs had no clear idea of the way in which they could actively participate to assistance activities.

The Soviet Union placed the delivery of technical assistance to developing countries in the larger geopolitical context of colonialism and dependency. Unlike the European colonial powers that largely dominated the ITU, the Soviet Union was working hard at placing itself as the "natural ally" of the emerging Third World nations, recognizing that the European countries had already a foothold in territories that might become profitable markets for the private telecommunication industry. This is reflected in the Soviet delegate's statement at the Plenary session of the 1952 Administrative Council:

> It must be pointed out that it [Technical Assistance to underdeveloped countries] should not be used by those granting it as a pretext for meddling in the internal affairs of the countries requesting it... Technical Assistance to underdeveloped countries must be granted exclusively through the U.N.(emphasis in text) and must provide measures to promote the economic progress of those countries and the strengthening of their economic

> independence; it should not be accompanied by requests for privileges of a political, economic, or military nature for the countries granting that assistance.[13]

Though in favor of technical assistance, he criticized the Secretary General of the ITU for not having acted through the U.N. in responding to a request by Ethiopia, but complied with a request from the World Bank which was carrying out a work program of its own in this country.

Likewise, the Soviets were suspicious that the ITU would allow consulting firms and the private sector in general to take part in the technical assistance as experts:

> It is well known that private firms, including those which prepare projects and give expert advice, represent commercial organizations which are interested, not in the granting of Technical Assistance, but solely in the most advantageous commercial conditions from which to extract the maximum profit. Private firms are solely interested in extending their commercial activities, and are bound by considerations of patents, etc. Private consulting firms are generally closely connected with industrial companies, and are guided in their actions and decisions by the latter.[14]

Many years later, developing countries expressed similar fears at the practices of private telecommunication companies. As a matter of fact, European countries have always been active in providing the ITU with experts and utilize the Union as a marketplace; the ability to offer favorable financing, technical assistance, and on-site experts provides an advantage to the

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[13]Doc. 1239/CA7 (1952), p. 11

[14]Ibid., p. 12

nationally-controlled telecommunication corporation.[15] The Soviet Union made some proposals to remedy this situation that were overwhelmingly defeated in votes.

The 1952 Plenipotentiary Conference of Buenos Aires

The Plenipotentiary Conference opened in Buenos Aires in the midst of the Cold War and the international mood was not cordial. The major issues revolved around attempts to plan the radio bands and the functioning of the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). The conference ratified the decisions made the year before at the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (EARC) which had adopted the several plans which had been drafted and a notification and recordation scheme for the remaining radio bands. This was a highly contentious issue. The USSR unsuccessfully urged that the IFRB be abolished and that the Union reverts to the 1939 Berne List of notified stations on the basis that there was no new International Frequency List in the Radio Regulations and that this body involved "tremendous" financial outlay. This position was supported by all the other Eastern European Communist countries and attacked by all other non-Communist delegations. The small countries vehemently supported the maintaining of the IFRB since it provided them with a much-needed

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[15] L. Milk, in a 1984 report prepared for the U.S. State Department, entitled "United States Participation in the ITU: A Study of Policy Alternatives," cites the concern expressed frequently by US officials that the foreign administrations are more effective in overseas markets because of their active involvement with the ITU' expert program. They suggested that the United States adopt a similar strategy.

instrument to monitor services and then assist them in the rational implementation of telecommunication systems. The United States underlined the necessity of the IFRB work in recording frequency allocations at a time of tremendous increase in the number of radio operators. It is interesting to note that thirteen years later, it was the United States that pushed for the elimination of the IFRB for reasons presented later.

The Administrative Council presented a report of the activities of the ITU from 1948 to 1952 to the Plenipotentiary Conference. The section concerning technical assistance was endorsed but the leading delegations wanted the ITU to be very cautious in committing itself in this new direction. The United States submitted a proposal (which was passed by the Conference as Resolution 25) requesting the Administrative Council to prepare every year a review of the Union's activities in the field of technical assistance and of its relation to the Expanded Program.

Great Britain was of the opinion that the ITU's activities in this field should be very limited and that the role of the Secretary General "should merely be to establish relations between countries requiring assistance and those prepared to give it".[16] The British stand echoed a position widely shared by the group of industrialized nations who were extremely reluctant to modify a functional status quo which so far had benefited them. The argument these nations brandished to counter any significant

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[16]Doc. 199/PC 1952, p. 4

change in the ITU's task was one thought to be palatable to the developing countries, namely that assistance activities would occasioned an unbearable financial burden on the donors, the industrialized countries. The "financial burden" argument will be a recurring theme throughout the debate on ITU-administered assistance activities.

Owing to the influence of developing countries, the Secretary-General will later take a more active role with respect to development assistance. The current head, Richard Butler, was largely elected by the Third World countries for his position on those issues, a position which has placed him at odds with the United States.

In conformity with the decisions passed at the Buenos Aires Plenipotentiary Conference the previous year, the Secretary-General of the ITU forwarded to the ECOSOC a report that clarified the respective responsibilities of the ITU and the United Nations in technical assistance. The ITU is responsible for all of the technical aspects of programs for assistance in the field of telecommunication, but the relevant administrative questions are the province of the United Nations. The Union approves the projects, finds the experts, gives advice on the placing of fellows and scholars, comments on the experts'reports, etc., and the United Nations concludes the agreements for assistance with the countries concerned, concludes all the formalities and handles the administrative arrangements for sending the experts and fellows, their allowances, installation, etc. In addition,

the administrative expenses incurred by the ITU in respect of its participation in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance are refunded by the United Nations.

Compared with the undertakings of other international organizations regarding development assistance at that time, the attitude of the ITU vis-a-vis technical assistance was timid. It consisted mainly of placing holders of scholarships and finding experts. The Union's part in recruiting experts was described as "complex and delicate." Every request for assistance was submitted to all the member countries, which thus had a chance to express their views in each particular case--bearing in mind the requesting country--on the qualifications of their experts with the specialized knowledge required. The candidates' applications were examined by the higher officials of the Union in the Coordination Committee and comments on the technical aspect were forwarded to the United Nations with all the information concerning the candidates. The files were then submitted to the country asking for assistance, and that country had the last word on the choice of experts. This work gave rise to fairly voluminous correspondence.[17]

The Mechanics and Problems of Financing Technical Assistance

The financing of technical assistance program in general has become a problem that, to this day, has not been solved. The demands put upon the Expanded Program by a growing number of

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[17]Doc. 1277/CA8 (1953).

developing countries kept increasing. The financing of the Expanded Program gave rise to extensive discussion, especially in the ECOSOC. The main difficulty arose from delay in payment of the contributions announced. In 1953, a sum of $22,395,687 was pledged by sixty-nine countries. Of this amount, $18,939,010 was actually paid leaving an unpaid balance of close to 3,5 million dollars. This situation has affected telecommunication technical assistance and forced the ITU to postpone the execution of projects already planned. The cost of the programs implemented with the aid of the ITU during 1953 was $129,181.[18] It gives some idea of the lack or priority of telecommunication as a component of the overall assistance programs of the United Nations.

Resolution 492 (XVI) of the ECOSOC and Resolution 722 (VIII) of the United Nations General Assembly urged states participating in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance "to continue to give it their full support, financial and other, so as to ensure its essential and natural development and help it to meet the growing needs of the underdeveloped countries" It also urged members "to contribute so as to meet to the maximum extent possible the program needs for the coming year." It also expressed the view that, "for the orderly development of programs, it would be useful to have assured financial support for a period longer than a year, even if the establishment of accurate long-term estimates of the requirements of the Program is not

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[18]This amount covers the despatch of 12 experts in the field in 6 countries (Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan, Malaya, Pakistan), and nine holders of fellowships.

feasible."[19]

Commenting on the report on technical assistance by the newly-elected Secretary-General from Argentina, M. A. Andrada, the delegate from Spain hoped that technical assistance will be delivered on an ever-increasing scale to developing countries in view of the fact that "as a new international activity, technical assistance is without doubt the most important and significant." The Soviet Union reiterated its concern that technical assistance must be channeled by the United Nations and "must assist the economic development of underdeveloped countries and thus strengthen their economic independence."[20] This reflected the growing effort of the Soviet Union to gain influence among the new countries.

In 1955, the area of cooperation of the ITU was refined and expanded so as to include: a) the organization of national telecommunication services; b) studies of the construction, organization, operation and maintenance of telecommunication facilities, and, in particular, c) economic studies designed to determine telecommunication requirements. It was Great Britain's turn to ensure that "ITU officials must always display the most rigorous impartiality in the advice they give either to experts or to national administrations, and that they will refrain from recommending any particular type of commercial equipment."[21] The

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[19]See Doc. 1480/CA9 (1954), pp. 9, 11.

[20]Doc. 1552/CA9 (1954).

[21]Doc. 1762/CA10 (1955), p. 10.

establishment of an annual technical assistance program was also proposed whereby the ITU would help requesting governments, in collaboration with the resident representatives of the Expanded Program's TAB, to establish their annual telecommunication technical assistance program, in accordance with ECOSOC Resolution 542 (XVIII).[22] The power of the Secretary General was sightly increased by giving him the authority to sign agreements on an ad referendum basis, in cases of emergency.

So far the International Consultative Committees had not been very active in seeking ways to increase the level of their participation to technical assistance program. Two complementary draft resolutions related to the CCIs were proposed by the USSR and adopted by the 1956 Administrative Council session. The Soviet Union took the directors of the CCIs to task to find ways and means of granting technical assistance to underdeveloped countries and to inform those more fully of the work being carried out under the auspices of the ITU. The Council's Committee 3 instructed the Secretary General to bring forcefully to the attention of developing countries the advantages gained by participation in the activities of the CCIs, of the new CCIT, in particular. From now on, the participation of those countries in these activities will be problematic. It is interesting to note that, thirty years later, the Council is still urging developing countries to actively participate to the CCIs' work. The Soviet

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[22]ECOSOC, while energically calling for development-assistance activities, did not singularized the potential contribution of telecommunication.

resolution also included the delivery of modern equipment as a way to increase the level of technical assistance.[23]

The mood in the United Nations in general was toward assistance to developing countries. There was the recognition that neither the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance nor other existing programs of the specialized agencies could meet the needs of a ever-growing number of Third World nations. These nations themselves, by joining the United Nations organization, were giving a new direction to the goals of the UN. In 1957, The UN adopted Resolution 1219 (XII) "Financing of Economic Development," which proposed the creation of a new, separate Special Fund which would provide "systematic and sustained assistance in fields essential to the integrated technical, economic, and social development of the less developed countries." This Special Fund, with financial resources principally derived from voluntary annual contributions of governments, was directed toward enlarging the scope of the UN programs of Technical Assistance in certain basic fields to be defined by a Preparatory Committee and "shall finance only projects which would make a contribution to the economic development of the requesting countries."[24]

In his presentation of the UN Resolution to the 1958

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[23]The terminology used to refer to the developing countries was changing. It was suggested that the phrase "under-developed countries" be replaced by "countries the telecommunications system of which are not quite sufficiently developed." Egypt proposed "Administrations with insufficiently-developed networks." The former version was adopted in Resolution 346. See Doc. 1878/CA11 (1956), p. 4.

[24]See Doc. 2012/CA13 (1958).

Administrative Council, the Secretary-General of the ITU noted that the Union could greatly benefit from these additional resources. The ITU as a specialized agency started two years later than the other specialized agencies as a member of the Technical Assistance Board. All financial resources had already been allocated to the existing TAB members. The Union was under a considerable handicap because of the lack of funds for telecommunication projects, when the ITU members began to request telecommunication projects in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. This was particularly acute, because the ITU which is a regulatory rather than an operating agency, has no regular program of this kind of its own. The fact that the Secretary-General was a national of a developing country, Argentina, may have accounted for his relentless efforts to bring the ITU into the mainstream of technical assistance to the Third World. He emphasized that telecommunication plays a most important part in all aspect of the economy, deserves to be financed by the Special Fund, and that the ITU should lose no time in participating to the establishment of this Fund. It is the message he delivered to the first Preparatory Committee in March of 1958 in New York where he succeeded in adding to the UN Resolution the task of "surveying the problems related to the development of transportation and communication system;" a mention that committed the ITU to action while at the same time, protecting the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union.[25]

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[25]Doc. 2077/CA13 (1958), pp. 1-2.

Financial problems plagued the UN development programs and, consequently, affected the ITU. The countries financing the UN Special Fund for Technical Assistance were considerably lower than those which had been announced for 1957. Hence the figures notified to participating organizations for the preparation of their partial totals for the 1959 program, which had been based on the 1958 contributions, had to be reduced. For example, the amount fixed for the ITU was $267,000 whereas the Union had $299,000 for the 1958 program. The limited scope for telecommunications under the program was apparent if it is considered that $500,000 would have been necessary to meet requests by administrations. [26]

In February 1958, the Permanent Office of the Arab Telecommunication Union informed the ITU that it agreed to the creation of a regional training center for telecommunication staff. The Center would be located in Cairo and its aim would be to give theoretical and practical training to engineers, technicians and other staff of the administrative and operational services of countries belonging to the Arab Telecommunication Union.[27]

This proposal had been made by the Union the previous year and represented the first attempt to decentralize ITU's activities. That same year the Administrative Council had approved a cooperation agreement between the Union and the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) for the improvement of

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Doc. 2020/CA13 (1958), p. 18.

telecommunications in that region.

The ITU has historically exercised extreme caution in joining or collaborating with other international bodies. This was a reflection of the "founding fathers'" unwillingness to let the Union itself impinge upon their national sovereignty. They had designed a Convention that did not bind the members to any decision that could be detrimental to their national interests and that allowed for Reservations to the Final Protocol. In that respect, the ITU was rather unique among the other specialized agencies of the United Nations system as the basic instrument of those agencies does not allow for Reservations. This general attitude could be evidenced in the slowliness to sign the agreement between the United Nations and the ITU in 1947, the delay in joining the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in 1952, and the caution at participating to the establishment of the Special Fund in 1958, despite the wholehearted support for these new activities in the field of assistance expressed in numerous declaratory statements.

The question then arose as to which authority would negotiate and sign on behalf of the ITU agreements regarding the practical conditions for participation in the activities of the Special Fund, and whether the Plenipotentiary Conference should not adapt the relevant provisions of the Convention so as to make the regulations more flexible as far as agreements concluded with other organizations about technical assistance activities.

CHAPTER 5

1959-1965: THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

The Plenipotentiary Conference was convened in Geneva, 1959 concurrent with the meeting of the general World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC). Although most of the industrialized nations felt that few changes were necessary to the Convention regarding the functioning of the Union, the new developing country members began to introduce changes to provide for their special needs.

Many Western delegations were unwilling to modify the purpose of the Union (at that time, Article 3) so as to reflect the new direction taken by the ITU. They preferred to stretch the meaning of existing "Purposes" as the new Acting Secretary-General Gerald Gross attempted to do by observing that Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Convention:

> clearly authorizes the Union to help in the implementation of projects under the aegis of the Special Fund, in view of the fact that one of the Union's purposes is the promotion of international cooperation in the development of telecommunication technical media.[28]

The developing countries were not satisfied with this simple declaration of intent and pushed for an explicit statement of the new role of the ITU. They found allies in Eastern European countries. Czechoslovakia then Poland, with a contribution from Mexico, proposed to insert the following new paragraph to Article 3:

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[28]Doc. 13/PC 1959, pp. 3-4.

> to foster the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and networks in countries underequipped with telecommunication facilities by providing technical assistance either within the framework of the independent activities of the different organs of the ITU or through the United Nations.[29]

A first draft read "...within the framework of the ITU..." but some industrialized countries, wary at the prospect of the ITU financing directly assistance projects, requested the change embodied in the above proposal, thus, defused some of their fears. The original drawing would have translated into a greater financial burden for the larger contributors,

Poland was of the opinion that without this stated purpose and in view of the limited amount of funds available in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, many countries would not make sustained efforts to help developing countries. It also felt that the International Consultative Committees should be of greater use than at present to the underdeveloped countries. The proposal was eventually passed thanks to the developing countries' delegations present at the Plenipotentiary which, from this point onward, began to take an increasingly important part in shaping the role of the ITU. Although technical assistance activities had been approved some years earlier by the Administrative Council, this amendment to the Convention represented a formal assumption of responsibility.

In view of the increased involvement of the ITU in technical assistance and the growing number of experts dispatched in the

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[29]See Doc. 183/PC 1959, Proposal 304.

field, Egypt proposed a tighter organization of the technical assistance of the Union into three steps: 1) giving expert advice to administrations on certain problems or projects; 2) planning and estimating projects, and arranging a scheme for their execution; 3) execution of the project. This plan is aimed at making better use of the experts' time.[30]

Within the context of a shortage of capital for telecommunication projects due to ever-growing demands from new country members, Mexico proposed the establishment of an International Telecommunication Development Bank.[31] On the one hand, existing international banking institutions for industrial promotion and development lacked special capital credits for telecommunication; on the other hand it was necessary to obtain credit from financial organizations, to be granted on easy terms, so as to establish special funds for telecommunications. This proposal did not find sympathetic ears among the donor countries. It is only in the early 1980s that the World Bank recognized the importance of telecommunication in the development process and began to allocate credits for telecommunication projects. The Plenipotentiary restated emphatically that, while instructing the Secretary General to approach inter-governmental and private agencies to know whether they would be prepared to associate themselves with an international financing scheme, the Union shall by no means be

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[30]See Annex to Doc. 64/PC 1959.

[31]See Proposal 334, Doc. 260/PC 1959.

committed to financial operations.[32] At the Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference twenty-three years later, however, due to the overwhelming influence of the developing countries and other factors explained later, the industrialized nations proposed the establishment of a Special Voluntary Program under the auspices of the ITU to finance telecommunication projects in the Third World.

Electoral Procedures

An important procedural aspect that bears directly on the involvement of the ITU with technical assistance matters was the procedure for electing the members which were to serve on the Administrative Council and the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of the ITU and its organs. The regional distribution for the seats at the Administrative Council was figured on a mathematical basis, with the number of countries in each region determining the number of seats. According to the previous Convention (Buenos Aires, 1952), still in force, the Council consisted of 18 seats.

The problem was how to reconcile the provisions of the Buenos Aires Convention limiting the number of seats in the Administrative Council to 18 and those of the new Convention calling for 25 seats since the Union's membership had increased to 101. The developing countries in concert with the Eastern bloc wanted the present Plenipotentiary Conference to elect a 25--member Council that would take office immediately without waiting

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[32]Doc. 2310/CA15 (1960).

for the new Convention to be ratified, against the will of the Western countries which wanted to re-elect only 18 Councilors. Great Britain, supported by the United States, took the lead in fighting the proposal and lost the battle.[33]

The U.S. and British opposition to the enlargement of the Administrative Council reflected the efforts of the Western industrialized nations to maintain their commanding influence within the Council at a time when they were increasingly loosing their historical dominance within ITU plenary assemblies. They invoked a legal technicality to fight the developing countries's proposal. Since the revised Convention had not been ratified by all contracting governments--a procedure that takes generally two years--the new provision concerning a Council of 25 members would have to come into force at the time of the next Plenipotentiary Conference, in 1965, thus providing the Western countries with a 6-year "respite."

In view of the under-representation of the Asia-Australasia group, the delegate from Ceylon, backed by Burma, requested an additional seat in the Council. Rumania, while agreeing with the above proposition but wary of increasing the number of seats, suggested that the number granted to the Americas and Western Europe should instead be decreased by one each. China, sympathetic to Ceylon's request calculated that even if the Rumanian formula was adopted the Eastern European Region would still be favored. It came as no surprise, then, that the Western indus-

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[33]Doc. 190/PC 1959, pp. 50-52.

trialized countries led by Canada found any change of the current status unacceptable and Ceylon's proposal was defeated by 41 votes to 31 and 2 abstentions. The fact that a secret vote was requested--an infrequent occurrence in ITU proceedings--shows how sensitive the subject of representation was and continues to be, (see Table 1). Voting took place along political blocs: the Eastern bloc in support of the proposition, the Western bloc opposing it.

TABLE 1

Number of ITU Members, Number of Seats in the ITU Administrative Council, and Percentage

Regions	1947			1952			1959			1965			1973			1982		
	M	S	%	M	S	%	M	S	%	M	S	%	M	S	%	M	S	%
Americas	22	5	20	23	5	22	23	6	26	25	6	24	27	7	26	30	8	27
W.Europe	21	5	24	21	5	24	21	6	28	25	6	24	26	7	27	26	7	27
E.Europe	9	3	33	10	3	30	10	3	30	11	3	27	11	4	36	12	4	33
Africa	9	2	22	10	2	20	15	4	25	39	7	18	44	9	20	49	1122	
Asia+Pac	17	3	18	23	3	13	27	6	22	28	7	25	37	9	24	40	1127	
Total	78	18		87	18		96	25		128	29		145	36		157	41	

Sources: ITU Doc. 27/PC (1973), p. 3; Telecommunication Journal (November 1982), p. 740.

Another important change in the Convention was an amendment to the effect that from now on the Secretary-General of the ITU and the Assistant Secretary- (Secretaries-) General would be elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference instead of by the

Administrative Council. This change had important implications for the developing countries because it was perceived that a Council in which the Western industrialized nations and their friends still had a commanding influence would hardly elect a Secretary- General sympathetic to their concerns and aspirations. A case in point was the election of Gerald Gross, a US citizen. According to historian Codding, it was perhaps the most contested election in the history of the Union. It took three ballots and Gross was elected by 51 votes to 35 to France's Jean Rouviere. This contrasts sharply with the 1973 one-ballot election of Tunisia's Mohamed Mili who obtained 104 votes; his rival receiving only 23.[34]

The Plenary Assembly of the Plenipotentiary Conference is a forum which witnesses the subtle (and not so subtle) exercise of international politics, where alliances are done and undone according to the current strength (or weakness) of the participants. The Western industrialized countries were steady losing their early dominance to the advantage of the developing countries. The Eastern European countries were increasingly aligning themselves with the Third World in order to gain power. The Latin American countries, which had gained their independence more than a century ago, were joining the emerging nations after having initially evolved within the sphere of influence of the United

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[34]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 179.

States.[35]

From the standpoint of the Third World, the forum of predilection was and continues to be the Plenary Assembly where, by their sheer number, they could defeat any proposal from the developed world they found unsatisfactory to their interests. At the opposite side of the spectrum, the industrialized countries preferred that decisions be taken in smaller forums, like the Administrative Council or the CCIs, in which they could exercised greater influence owing to their expertise.

A concrete example of international politics was the debate concerning the electoral procedure for the Assistant Secretaries-General of the ITU. Canada, echoing the feeling of many Western delegations critical of the fact that the Secretary-General be elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference, suggested that Assistant Secretaries General be elected by the Administrative Council in a separate vote. The Canadian delegate explained that:

> It would be unwise to bring the selection of Assistant Secretaries General into the Plenipotentiary Conference, which is necessarily a political forum. No other organization in the United Nations family, so far as I can ascertain, leaves the selection of Assistant Secretaries-General to its general conference organs. I hope that some of the delegations here who want the Secretary-General to be elected by the Plenipotentiary will see some advantage in leaving to the Administrative Council the election of the Assistant Secretaries General.[36]

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[35]F. S. Pearson and J. M. Rochester, International Relations: The Global Condition in the Late Twentieth Century (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company); see Part 4 "National Actors and International Interactions," pp. 103-144.

[36]Doc. 214/PC 1959, p. 92.

The proposition to have separate elections for the Secretary general and his Assistants barely passed by 35 votes to 34. Poland asked that the first vote for the Secretary General be taken by secret ballot "more likely to give a clearer picture of the wishes of the meetings." The Plenary Assembly, voting by secret ballot, decided by 59 votes to 14 with 2 abstentions, that the Convention be amended so that the Secretary General of the Union would henceforth be elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference instead of the Administrative Council. A second vote decided the election of the Assistant Secretaries General along the same line, against the desire of the Western industrialized countries.[37]

What made the ITU unique among the other specialized agencies was that its basic instrument is a Convention and not a Charter. A Convention, easier to modify than a Charter, made the Union more responsive to the new demands of the developing countries joining its membership. It also explains why technical assistance as a purpose of the Union gained momentum.

Amendments to the Convention

The Plenipotentiary made a series of amendments and additions to the Convention as well as passed Resolutions that reflect the involvement of the ITU with technical assistance to developing countries. Following is a summary of the modifications.

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[37]Ibid., p. 95.

Amendment to Article 3 indicated that the Union has directed its efforts towards assisting new or developing countries;

Amendment to Article 5 gave the Administrative Council the possibility of increasing the scope of activity in the sphere of technical assistance;

Amendment to Article 7 related to provisions whereby the CCIs will be encouraged to direct their activities towards technical assistance;

Addition to Article 8 instructed the Secretary General to collect and issue information which may be of particular use to new or developing countries. A set of Resolutions has been passed regarding development assistance;

Resolution Concerning the Administration of Technical Assistance noted that the Plenipotentiary Conference decides to terminate the agreement made with the United Nations regarding the administration of technical assistance projects in the field of telecommunications. Henceforth the Union will itself take over the administrative work connected with the projects in its program;

Resolution on Participation by the Union in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance of the United Nations confirmed Buenos Aires Resolution 25 and states that the union shall participate in the Expanded Program;

Resolution Concerning the Debiting of Administrative and Operational Costs Resulting from ITU's Participation in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance was adopted in response to a United Nations proposal to the effect that the administrative costs of Technical Assistance should be debited to the budgets of the organizations. In this resolution, the Union expressed the view that the expenses in question should continue to be borne by the Expanded Program, but prescribed the steps to be taken if, as a result of a formal decision of the United Nations, it should be obligated to defray those costs partly or entirely;

Resolution on the Rules to be Applied for Participation by the Union in the Expanded Program set out ways of making technical assistance experts' missions more effective;

Resolution on the Financing of Telecommunication Development called upon the Plenipotentiary to instruct the Administrative Council to study the possibility of taking action aimed at facilitating the financing of telecommunication development plans;

Recommendation on the Activities of the International Consultative Committees in the Sphere of Technical Assistance was addressed to future Plenary Assemblies of the CCIs to avoid any doubt

as to the views of the Plenipotentiary conference when the possibility is examined of granting increased assistance to new or developing countries;

Addition to the General Regulations stated that the Directors of the CCIs shall participate in the Union's technical assistance activities, particularly within the framework of the UN Expanded Program and Special Fund;

Resolution on the Improvement of Telecommunications in Asia and the Far East called upon the Plenipotentiary Conference to instruct the Administrative Council to continue the work already begun in cooperation with ECAFE to improve telecommunication facilities in these regions.[38]

In Plenary assemblies, the International Consultative Committees were under increased pressure to involve themselves more directly in technical assistance. It was undoubtedly a reflection of the fact that few members from developing countries were involved in the specialized work taking place in smaller forums. The 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference had addressed several recommendations to that effect. Lacking more concrete directives in the 1952 Convention, and especially in the absence of adequate financial arrangements, the Plenary Assembly of the CCIR merely recorded officially the important aspect of the problem of technical assistance furnished directly by the ITU. The new Constitution instructed the CCIs "to continue joint studies with a view to recommending suitable means, having regard to technical and economic considerations, for linking to the world telephone network regions not yet connected thereto" as well as "to extend the activities of the Plan Committee on Development of the International Telecommunications Network to

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[38]See Doc. 420/PC 1959, pp. 2-5.

latin America setting up an appropriate Working Party for that purpose."[39]

The 1959 World Administrative Radio Conference

The subject of technical assistance to new or developing countries, in an engineering sense as distinct from financial help, was also one of the major preoccupations of the World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC), held parallel to the Plenipotentiary Conference in 1959.

A large number of the members of the ITU which were represented at the WARC expressed the view that one of the major drawbacks in the exploitation and development of radiocommunications in many parts of the world was the difficulty experienced, especially by new or developing countries, in securing suitable interference-free radio frequencies for the operation of their circuits in an efficient and economical way. This difficulty was stated to apply not only in respect of existing circuits, but also for the establishment of new circuits. As radio was the means to which these countries usually turn in the first place in order to obtain their essential communications most economically and in the simplest form, their representatives made recurrent pleas to the WARC for the adoption of procedures which would give them the use of frequencies, free from interference, in the already congested radio spectrum. They held the view that, within the framework of the permanent organs of the ITU, adequately

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[39]Resolutions 35 and 36 the Plenipotentiary Conference, Geneva, 1959.

expanded to cope with the necessary additional work involved, a positive and direct aid could be afforded to them.

The WARC established an Ad Hoc Group (known as the Panel of Experts) to study and analyze proposals and provide adequate recommendations. Two years later, this Group produced an Interim Report on "Preliminary Recommendations Relating to Technical and Economic Assistance" that did no more than reiterate the desirability of assisting developing countries in allocation of radio frequencies and calling upon the ITU to sponsor a world-wide technical and economic project to achieve it. The WARC's outcome fell far short of the expectations of developing countries.

The WARC considered that the IFRB's duties, functions and staff resources should be expanded to undertake the necessary work but it was made quite clear that assistance to the extent desired would not be possible with the resources at present at the Board's disposal. The Plenipotentiary included in its ceiling for expenditure special sums for the "additional requirement of the IFRB."[40]

The Soviet Union, who had in the past advocated the elimination of the IFRB, opposed this budgetary allocation resulting in an increase of the ITU's overall budget and requested the Plenipotentiary record in the Final Protocol the following reservations:

> In view of the decision taken by the Plenipotentiary Conference, approving a very substantial increase in the expenses of the Union, the Soviet delegations

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[40]See doc. 2373/CA15 (1960).

> reserves the right, if needed be, to consider limiting the USSR financial contribution to the International Telecommunication Union.[41]

It was the first time that a member threatened to retaliate against an action deemed contrary to the interest of ITU members by withholding its contributions to the Union.

The financing of telecommunication development was again discussed at the 1960 session of the Administrative Council in light of a debate at the UN General Assembly on the creation of the International Development Association (Resolution 1420 (XIV)) and banks for industrial development and development companies (Resolution 1427 (XIV)). It was decided to follow closely these developments and, in the meantime, the Secretary General took it upon himself to consider how telecommunications administrations might best be informed about the facilities offered by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).

The 1960s: New Countries, Growing Demands

The ITU began its collaboration with the newly-established UN Special Fund in 1961. Several projects for Special Fund assistance had been prepared the preceding year. A project submitted by the Republic of China concerned the setting up of a Telecommunications and Electronics Training and Research Center at Taipei. Another project for a similar training center was submitted by Libya. Two other projects were still being studied

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[41] Doc. 447/PC 1959, p. 273.

for the establishment of a telecommunication training center in the Philippines, and a project to assist the Federation of Malaya and Singapore to extend and modernize the training facilities existing in Kuala Lumpur. The establishment of the Telecommunications Training and Research Center, agreed upon by the Arab Telecommunication Union in 1958, to be located in Cairo, was still being studied. Other countries had notified that requests for assistance were under preparation, namely, Ceylon, Iraq, and Colombia. The Special Fund financed projects on a matching basis, the government of the requesting country providing the other half.

The Deputy Secretary-General Sarwate noted at the 1961 meeting of the Administrative Council's Committee 3 (Relations with International Organization and Technical Assistance) that the African countries that had recently attained independence would also submit requests for assistance on a large scale. Thus, it could be expected that there would be a considerable increase in the field of the Union's activities.

This growing activity and strengthening of ties between the ITU and other international bodies such as the UN Special Fund, left some developed countries uneasy about the prospect of increased financial burden and administrative and operational activities put upon the Union. The delegates from Great Britain wondered whether the Union

> might not risk unduly increasing the flow of requests to the Special Fund if it drew the attention of its Members to the advantages of preliminary enquiries to assess investment potential and to the assistance

possibilities in this respect.[42]

West Germany and Switzerland were not clear about the exact role of the Union in the Special Fund projects and considered that the Council was not adequately informed about these activities. They were told that the Union's role consisted in finding experts and submitting their names to the countries concerned: on the other hand, it informed the Special Fund of the details supplied by the countries concerned. Once an inquiry was over, the Union helped the requesting country to negotiate with the World Bank or other sources for the international financial assistance it required to put a given project into effect. Assistance by the Special Fund was confined to three specific fields: a) the setting-up of training institutes; b) the setting-up of research institutes, and c) preliminary inquiries to assess investment possibilities. In the final analysis, it was the Fund itself which approved each project individually.[43]

The delegate from the USSR recalled that his country had taken part in the Special Fund since its inception, nevertheless he could not approve the project submitted by the Republic of China. USSR did not recognize the Chiang Kai-shek government and lost no opportunity, in the accreditation procedure starting annual plenary sessions, to call for the admission of the People's Republic of China and the expulsion of the Taiwan government.

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[42]Doc. 2658/CA16 (1961), p. 10.

[43]Ibid.

The 1961 session of the Administrative Council had very little time to examine the question of the financing of telecommunication development. The matter was discussed at length the following year. Many developing countries found it difficult to identify the range of financial institutions, public and private, disposed to provide for investment in telecommunication projects. India requested a list of names of financial institutions, both governmental and private, which were prepared to give financial assistance in this field. The Secretariat had to reply that the only financial institution with which the ITU kept up relations as a specialized agency was the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, adding that the Secretariat had not so far been instructed to prepare such a list.

As a matter of fact, the Secretary-General had previously proposed to take over this task but the Administrative Council had rejected his proposal in an apparent move by the industrialized countries to prevent too close an integration of the ITU in the web of international organizations perceived to jeopardize the independence of the Union. The Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries opposed the Secretary General's proposal on the ground that the ITU should in no way, shape, or form deal with private capital.

Financing Telecommunication Assistance

Since the previous year, the Secretariat has had important contacts with the World Bank. In particular, an official of the Union was called upon to take part in a mission organized by the

Bank for the purpose of obtaining information about the conditions in which it would be possible to finance telecommunication plans in the six countries of Central America. The experience acquired by the ITU official was summed up as follows:

> The chief problems raised by telecommunication development were financial ones. Requirement have in general been thoroughly studies, plans for equipment drawn up and the manufacturers offer all the necessary equipment. But the governments very often lacked the necessary funds, especially when they have to buy their telecommunication equipment abroad as is usually the case.[44]

Many financial institutions, both governmental and private were prepared to finance telecommunication development plans, but the countries in search of capital were not all in exactly the same position in this respect. Irrespective of their nature, the financial institutions were prepared to make loans only subject to the twin conditions: a) that investments were made on the basis of plans that had been recognized as perfectly sound technically and economically, and b) that the telecommunication administrative and operating services were properly organized. Thus, financing problems were transformed into planning and organization problems, two domains in which the ITU could play an efficient role, both as part of its normal activities and under the heading of technical assistance.

Many were of the opinion that the most important role that can be played by the ITU as regards the financing of telecommunication development was to cooperate with telecommunication

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[44]Doc. 2734/CA17 (1962), p. 2

administrations and financial institutions in preparing investment plans and solving organizational problems. It would act only in an advisory capacity and even then only at the request of the interested parties.

The discussion within ITU circles about the financing of telecommunication assistance was fueled by the debate taking place at the United Nations and the ECOSOC on the general question of development assistance. Resolutions were adopted on "Establishment of a United Nations Capital Development Fund" (1521 (XV)), "Accelerated Flow of Capital and Technical Assistance to the Developing Countries" (1522 (XV)), "Financing of Economic Development of Less Developed Countries Through Long-Term Loans and in Other Advantageous Ways and Ensuring an Increasing Share in World Trade for Their Products" (1524 (XV)), and "International Flow of Capital" (780 (XXX)). In addition, the UN General Assembly, at the dawn of the Second Development Decade, adopted Resolution 1715 (XVI) "United Nations Development Decade (II): A Program for International Economic Co-operation." This Resolution requested the Special Fund to do what the ITU had not been willing to do, namely:

> To consider the desirability of establishing a service to provide developing countries upon request with information and guidance concerning the policies, rules, regulations, and practices of existing and future sources of development capital and assistance necessary to enable the less developed countries to determine for themselves the most appropriate sources to which they may turn for assistance as needed.

The ITU, as well as other specialized agencies, were invited to submit any relevant information on that matter.

1962 was the time to reflect on the past ten years of ITU collaboration with the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and to examine future trends. In the contacts that the ITU Secretariat has had with the new and developing countries during the past year, it was noticed that they were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of telecommunications for their economic development. Having deployed a large part of technical assistance resources to basic necessities like food, health, etc., during the first decade, they were now beginning to recognize that support services, such as communications and transportation, should be developed as well, if the former were to become fully effective. This recognition, however, did not translate immediately into a concrete national development agenda.[45]

Focus on Africa

The 1961 program was the first to be managed entirely by the ITU. The Expanded Program and the ITU, in particular, were faced with the challenge posed by the coming into the international scene of the newly independent African countries. Although a sum of money was allocated late in 1960, for a special Supplementary Program for the African countries, it had taken more than a year to work out the first detailed program for each of these countries.

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[45]See G. A. Codding, "The United States and the ITU in a Changing World," Telecommunication Journal 44/5 (1977), pp. 231-235.

In addition to the African countries, which were increasingly calling upon the Union's help in securing technical assistance, those in Central and South America have commenced making requests to assist them in studying and formulating their requirements and obtaining a share in the different programs. The Union's program for the years 1961 and 1962 provided for assistance to 45 countries, twelve of which were under the Supplementary Program for Africa, (see Table 2).

An interesting feature was that 83 percent of the total expenditure in the ITU program for 1961 (not taking into account the Supplementary African program) was for experts. The balance was devoted to fellowships and the purchase of equipment. In the Supplementary Program for Africa, experts accounted for 19 percent, equipment 53 percent and fellowship 29 percent.[46] On the one hand, the large budgetary share for equipment reflects the low level of telecommunication infrastructure in Africa compared with other developing countries from the Asian and Latin American continents. On the other hand, the equally large share of expenditure for fellowships, as compared with allocations for experts, reflects the reluctance of the newly independent African countries to rely upon experts from the former European colonial powers. From now on, the African countries will take a more active posture to push for the satisfaction of developing countries' needs within ITU forums.

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[46]Doc. 2757/CA17 (1962), p. 2.

TABLE 2

Dollar Value of UNDP and ITU Assistance Provided to Developing Countries by Regions in the Period 1965 to 1981 (in Thousands)

Year	Africa	Americas	Asia & Pacific	Europe & Mid. East	Inter-Regional	Total
1965	1,185	562	1,570	35	7	3,358
1966	1,601	815	1,913	66	72	4,467
1967	1,762	878	2,815	78	43	4,945
1968	2,072	933	1,775	83	19	4,883
1969	2,175	950	1,864	166	70	5,226
1970	1,865	1,442	2,501	244	0	6,051
1971	2,751	1,749	2,980	217	1	7,697
1972	3,121	1,879	3,625	367	50	9,048
1973	3,861	2,204	4,401	276	n.a.	10,743
1974	4,312	2,785	5,279	238	75	12,689
1975	6,093	4,517	4,786	3,295	147	18,383
1976	7,196	3,778	4,065	4,785	418	20,242
1977	5,472	2,685	3,460	4,976	503	17,096
1978	5,910	2,801	5,661	6,797	446	21,615
1979	7,723	5,024	5,831	7,174	212	26,064
1980	11,271	4,782	7,829	9,156	306	33,353
1981	15,773	4,280	9,581	10,242	415	40,293

Note: Statistics up to and including 1974 were based on the following geographical distribution: Africa, Americas, Euro-Asia including the Middle East. Since 1975 the Middle East was separated from Asia and the Pacific, but amalgamated with Europe

Sources: Telecommunication Journal 49/10 (1982), p. 667.

In 1963, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the ITU and the Economic Commission for Africa with two basic objectives:

a) to accelerate the development of telecommunications in the African region and to secure appropriate priorities for telecommunication projects within the overall development programs of the countries concerned;

b) to work out a plan and build up a comprehensive, self-contained and modern regional telecommunication

> network to meet the immediate and long-term needs of all countries of the region, including interconnections of the African network with the world-wide telecommunication system.[47]

This second objective will give birth to the largest project ever conducted under the aegis of the ITU, the Pan-African Telecommunication Network (PANAFTEL).

Aid to Africa will represent an ever-increasing part of the telecommunication component available through the Expanded Program. By 1964, the incidence of the program among the areas of the world was in the following proportion: Africa--50 percent; Asia and the Far East--36 percent; Latin America--12 percent; Europe--2 percent.

One of the problems faced by the Union was that, with the expansion of assistance program, the number of experts required had increased. Also, there had been a growing tendency on the part of the recipient countries to call for experts with experience in training. The source of recruitment had so far been almost exclusively the Post, Telegraph and Telephone administrations (PTTs) of the industrialized countries. In view of the large demand and emphasis on training, it had become increasingly difficult to find candidates from administrations only. The Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries have always been adamant in their opposition to allow the ITU to tap the expertise of the private sector, i.e., consulting firms and equipment manufacturers. It is worth noting that twenty years

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[47]Doc. 3129/CA19 (1964), p. 3.

later, the group of socialist countries has manifested the same opposition regarding the private sector's contribution to the Special Voluntary Program for technical Cooperation established at the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference at Nairobi.

The ITU Organs Called Upon

The ITU organs, IFRB and CCIs, were called upon to help developing countries in their efforts to build up appropriate telecommunication infrastructures. Ethiopia submitted a proposal urging the IFRB to organize seminars in order to assist those countries in radio frequency management.[48] This brought into light the problem encountered by a federally-structured body such as the ITU in its efforts to coordinate technical assistance. The Union was composed of fairly autonomous organs, the Secretariat, the CCIR, the CCITT, and the IFRB. By organizing the ITU along the line of a federation, the founding members showed their unwillingness to create an all-powerful supranational body that might impinge upon their national sovereignty. By the same token, they made it difficult for the body to coordinate any type of activities. At a time when all the other UN specialized agencies were intertwined in order to better respond to the needs of developing countries, the ITU was increasingly at a disadvantage. The new membership was pushing for the unification and coordination of the separate ITU organs. At the 1963 Administrative Council, the Working Party on Technical Assistance issued a

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[48]Doc. 2842/CA17 (1962).

report, found inadequate by many, suggesting a closer collaboration between the General Secretariat and the other permanent organs in order to render technical assistance more effective.[49] It was the opinion of the delegation of Colombia that "the Technical Cooperation Department was not organized in such a way as to let Administration know the importance and magnitude of its responsibilities." In a strongly worded statement, it found it

> inadmissible that, within an administrative hierarchy adapted to the customs of any other international organization, of which all the Members of the Union are Members, there should exist a department of such extraordinary importance managed by one official of grade lower than those whose work he coordinates. This is a disconcerting fact, unique in any organization of the kind. The delegation of Colombia proposes that, not only from the standpoint of a sound hierarchical structure, but also from elementary courtesy towards the newly developing countries, and to show the importance attached by the Union to this Department, the Director of the Technical Cooperation Department should be regraded [emphasis in text],... [50]

Mexico's representative thought that the Working Group had dealt with the problem of technical cooperation rather lightly, which caused him some surprise: "It was possible that their decisions had been based on preconceived ideas." He recalled that when the Group had been set up, pressure had been brought to bear to restrict its membership, so that its work had not met with general acceptance. It was a disguised criticism of the domination of the Group by developed countries, the chairman of which was the United States delegate. With the next Plenipotentiary

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[49]Doc. 3022/CA18 (1963).

[50]Doc. 3060/CA18 (1963), p. 2.

Conference only two years away, quite severe criticism was already being levelled at the Union from outside sources for not fully accomplishing its duties with respect to technical assistance, particularly in light of the "pile-up of resolutions from the Plenipotentiary Conference, an abundance of funds received from the United Nations, and a large reserve of energy in its staff to travel unceasingly throughout the world."[51]

The pressure on the ITU for greater commitment in assistance was further intensified by a proposal by the Secretary General of the United Nations to consolidate the Special Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in a new United Nations Development Program (UNDP).[52] The consolidation was aimed at streamlining the activities carried on separately and jointly by the two existing bodies, simplifying organizational arrangements and procedures, facilitating overall planning and needed coordination of the several types of technical cooperation programs carried on within the United Nations system of organizations and increasing their effectiveness. A UNDP Inter-Agency Consultative Board would be established in place of the EPTA Technical Assistance Board and the Consultative Board of the Special Fund, and would include the Head of the specialized agencies. The Economic and Social Council endorsed this proposal.

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[51]Doc. 3106/CA18 (1963), p. 5.

[52]UN Resolution 1020 (XXXVII).

CHAPTER 6

1965-1972: IMPACT OF THE UNPD ON THE ITU

The 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference was held in Montreux, Switzerland. It was the year of the 100th anniversary of the ITU. Between 1959 and 1965, the membership of the Union increased from 96 to 129 mostly by the participation of African states whose number increased from 16 to 38 during this period. In order to reflect the new situation, Tunisia proposed to raise the number of seats on the Administrative Council allocated to Africa from 4 to 7, so as to pay "due regard to the need for equitable representation of all parts of the world." [53] The Conference, by secret vote, adopted the addition of four more seats on the Council, three of which were to go to Africa and one to Asia, totaling 29.

Dissatisfaction was voiced concerning the Secretary-General's past conduct of assistance activities, and Mohamed Mili from Tunisia was elected Secretary-General with a comfortable majority. The major issues discussed were proposals for the establishment of regional ITU offices, a separate ITU technical assistance fund, and a proposal to convert the Convention to a permanent Constitution.

Proposal for ITU's Own Technical Assistance Program

Saudi Arabia was first to propose the establishment of ITU's own program of technical assistance along the lines of the

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[53] Doc. 4/PC 1965.

programs which have long been a regular feature of many other UN agencies such as World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and UNESCO. The number of experts supplied had fallen much below demand. One of the major difficulties in the way of adequate supply was thought to be the lack of a technical assistance program in the ITU itself. The Saudi proposal noted that:

> It is understood that now it is a part of the general technical assistance program with the result that the United Nations and the developing countries have to pool all the requirements and try to meet competing interests. As is well known the rapid development of the telecommunication services in all the developing countries is of primary importance and its priority has to be high. National administrations of the telecommunication services will be in a better position to appreciate the programs if they are directly funded and managed by the ITU itself.[54]

Malaysia was next in line to propose a similar in-house program accompanied with an elaborate rationale. All technical assistance on telecommunication matters was at present provided through the UN Expanded Program. EPTA program were planned on a biennium basis whereby bids for technical assistance in any given country were prepared by that country's ministries and departments and coordinated by the relevant national planning authority, which is charged with the task of adjusting bids to meet the budget authorized by the UN Technical Assistance Bureau in New York. The bids always far exceeded the funds available and the task of trimming and deleting is bound to become somewhat

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[54]Doc. 63/PC 1965, p. 3.

arbitrary, no matter how carefully national priorities are weighted.

This can be especially harmful to the smaller and more specialized branches of government dealing with matters such as telecommunications since their very real needs for assistance are often overshadowed by the clamor for assistance in the much broader fields of health, agriculture, education and so on. Since these latter fields are of much greater magnitude and are of greater political significance to the national coordinating authority, it is not surprising that the smaller, more specialized bids such as those for telecommunication assistance tend to be among the first to be deleted or trimmed.

Conversely, if in any given biennium a telecommunication administration has been fortunate in getting adequate EPTA assistance (or even assistance through UN Special Fund), there is some tendency at coordinating level to regard this as a valid reason for diverting to other fields EPTA funds for the next biennium. All this means that the supply of technical assistance for telecommunications is apt to be sporadic and disjointed and this militates against the steady build-up of expertise in the country itself. The Malaysian proposal envisioned that the establishment of an ITU Regular Program of Technical Assistance on an adequate scale would go far towards smoothing out these irregularities and ensuring steady growth in the technical capabilities of ITU's developing members.[55]

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[55]Doc. 76/PC 1965, pp. 1-2.

Then, Mexico submitted a proposal of its own aiming at an identical goal. Criticism was levelled against the slow-moving procedure of the current organization, and at the shortage of fellowships. In order to minimize the financial burden occasioned by the setting up of a regular ITU assistance program, Mexico proposed a three-way contribution scheme: a) from the UN Expanded Program; b) from the requesting administrations; and c) from the Union.[56]

In a report by the Secretary-General, it was apparent that there was little enthusiasm at the level of the ITU Secretariat for the above proposal. It was explained that the Union's hands were tied by the rules governing the allocation of funds by the EPTA. Furthermore, EPTA assistance to the various fields of activity was done by governments over which the ITU has no control. In 1960, the Secretary-General had proposed to the Administrative Council a program called "Technical Assistance in Kind." The first element of this program was to invite developed countries to make offers of training facilities to technicians from developing countries. The second element was to invite telecommunication administrations of developed countries to organize seminars on selected subjects in their less endowed counterparts. The Secretariat was well aware of the piece meal nature of these proposed measures. It also questioned the value of a regular program in light of the fact that the unfulfilled amount of assistance will always exist. Finally, criticism was

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[56]Doc. 95/PC 1965.

levelled against the proposed regular program on financial ground. Should financing be on an assessment basis,i.e. by including it as a part of the regular contribution of the members, or on a voluntary basis which means creating an extra budgetary fund to which members would be invited to contribute?

Whereas the Secretary-General expressed reservation to the Saudi, Malaysian and Mexican proposals, delegates from developing countries in Committee 8 (Technical Cooperation) of the Plenipotentiary Conference warmly endorsed them. The Working Party set up to further examine the matter issued a document that displayed a lack of unanimity. [57] Some thought that the Working Party's terms of reference were to prepare a Resolution to organize the regular program, when in fact they were to study the "possibility" of establishing a regular program.

The Committee 8 finally decided against the principle of establishing a regular technical assistance program by 19 votes to 20, with 9 abstentions. The industrialized countries had successfully overcome the developing countries' attempt at setting up a regular program by raising the specter of the increase in the contributory unit payable by member countries that such a program would occasioned. The industrialized countries had rejected alternative methods of financing that were not to affect the ITU budget. One of those alternatives was to rely on annual voluntary contributions by administrations who could afford it, which meant that of the industrialized countries. This

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[57] Doc. 324/PC 1965.

financing scheme was rejected on the basis that the budget of national telecommunication administrations was not to be used for development-assistance activities as those activities were financed, through the EPTA, by separate budgetary allocations.[58]

On many occasion the USSR and the USA shared common views on ITU matters, and this has continued to the present. The USSR was willing no more than the US to increase its contribution to the ITU budget to support new programs and institutions. This position put the Soviet Union in a somewhat difficult position vis-a-vis those it considered its "natural allies," the developing countries who were pleading for help. To convince them that the USSR was on their side, the Soviet delegates explained at several occasions that:

> the Soviet Union, better than anyone, understands the needs of developing countries. The USSR, acting alone, has advanced from devastating wars to a high level of development. His delegation was not against an ITU regular program but expected a thorough study and full details, rather than a broad treatment.[59]

Establishment of Regional Offices

Somewhat related to the above discussion was a series of proposals for the establishment of telecommunication training centers. Saudi Arabia took the lead by proposing the establishment of an International Telecommunication Studies Institute to train experts. It was felt that senior officers of the administrations who are responsible for directing the policy of telecom-

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[58]Doc. 521/PC 1965, p. 7.

[59]Ibid., p. 8.

munication services, supervise the planning, and approve projects were handicapped in the developing countries, with lack of information and data on which they could base their decision. They had to depend largely on the information provided by manufacturers or employ consultants both of which courses were not judged to be satisfactory. They wanted to avoid the feeling of imposition which is unavoidable with the taking of advice from foreign experts, consultants or manufacturers.

In its report, the Secretary-General supported the idea of a telecommunication training center for senior officials of the developing countries to keep them abreast of the latest technical developments. He also realized that most of the newly independent countries had enormous plans for expansion of their telecommunication systems. Twenty-year master plans were being drawn and determining specifications had become a highly specialized task.

Senior officers needed high-level training. The stumbling block in this and other similar proposals was the question of funding. It is at this level that the industrialized countries, although in minority representation, could exercise influence because they were the only group of countries in a position to increase their contribution to the ITU budget, and they were very reluctant to do so.

The tensions between the large group of developing countries pushing for new instruments, under the Union's aegis, to assist them and the resistance of the group of developed countries to slow down any new project requesting additional financing, was

displayed in Plenary meetings. The delegate of Switzerland feared that the establishment of a higher telecommunications institute might multiply the dispersal of efforts as regards the training and instruction of specialist. The Soviet delegate warned that the resources available for technical assistance should be used entirely for technical assistance and the least for administrative purposes. The US delegate agreed and was of the opinion that trips to seminars and visits to other countries could be financed more readily than would be a permanent center.[60] A Working Party was set up to make recommendations and ended up drafting a mild Resolution entitled "Improvement of ITU Facilities for Providing Information and Advice to New or Development Countries."

The same fate was reserved to a proposal by thirteen Latin American countries to establish a Regional Center for the Study of Space Communications in Latin America.[61] In that case, the Committee adopted an Opinion in which it expressed "the hope that it would be possible to install such centers in the various regions of the world." There was always the fear that if the contributory shares were increased due to this kind of initiative, there would be a tendency for countries to lower their class of contribution.

The decentralization of the ITU administrative and technical activities into regional offices located in the developing countries was increasingly seen as a way to assist more effecti-

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[60] Doc. 374/PC 1965.

[61] Doc. 223/PC 1965.

vely those countries. As far back as 1948, at the second session of the Administrative Council, two proposals submitted by Haiti and Cuba called for the establishment of a Liaison Office in the Western Hemisphere to facilitate the distribution of document to the countries of that region.[62] In 1963, the Administrative Council rejected proposals for regional offices in Bangkok, Africa and Latin America on the ground that the Convention did not authorize the creation of such offices.

At the 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference, Malaysia proposed that the ITU should establish regional offices at select centers throughout the world on the lines of Field and Regional Offices already functioning for UN agencies such as WHO, ILO, and UNESCO.[63]

UNDP is Born

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) became the ITU's main purveyor of funds when the UNDP absorbed the Special Fund and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance in 1965/66. Under the UNDP, the ITU and the other executing agencies worked to help local governments to plan the telecommunication sector of their Country Program to be submitted to the UNDP. After a project had been assigned, the ITU was mainly in charge of recruiting experts, placing fellows in training programs, and purchasing any necessary equipment.

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[62]Doc. 14/CA2 (1948)

[63]"From Assistance to Cooperation," Telecommunication Journal 40/8 (1973), p. 391.

Whereas the developing countries wanted to expand the ITU's cooperation activities by the establishment of new organs, which would translate into a budget increase, the industrialized countries wanted to improve the effectiveness of the existing ones and better utilize the money available, a position strongly advocated by the USSR. Resolution 33, adopted at the Montreux Plenipotentuary Conference, requested the administrations to cooperate with the Secretary-General in furnishing the requisite information to enable a study of the effect of technical assistance projects as precisely as possible.

Also, the new Article 11 of the Montreux Convention required that a Coordination Committee should "examine the progress of the work of the Union in Technical Cooperation and submit recommendations through the Secretary-General to the Administrative Council."

The program of technical assistance in kind of the ITU was scrutinized. There was a need for a better coordination and progressive planning in organizing seminars, an important task of the Union. In addition, there were problems related to participation in the seminars. New and developing countries were often very distant from the places where seminars were held, and in most cases, their administrations could not release their engineers for long periods. Finally, there was a financial problem. Although the host countries bore the cost of organizing seminars, which represented a considerable help for developing countries, the latter still had to pay the travel expenses of the

persons they sent and these expenses came to appreciable amounts and could not be covered by technical assistance funds. Some delegations suggested that, with special UNDP authorization, it might be possible to allocate funds to cover the cost of participation in seminars.[64] This solution, however, did not seem possible.

Developing countries were pressing for more experts. The ITU had so far relied entirely on its member administrations to provide experts. While it has been possible so far to recruit them, it has been becoming increasingly difficult to find suitable candidates in adequate numbers. The main reason for this state of affairs had to do with the fact that several developing countries, in Africa, especially, were drawing large master plans comprising both national and international networks. These project required highly sophisticated expertise. To some extent, the shortage of experts was attributable to the fact that industrialized countries with well developed telecommunication systems have themselves plans for large-scale expansions, which tended to keep experts home.

The procedure applied at that time for the examination of reports by experts on mission was far too summary. The conclusions to be formulated by the Technical Cooperation Department and the Coordination Committee were supposed to be based on a critical analysis of the reports. But it was practically impossible to make such an analysis without qualified ITU experts to

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[64] Doc. 3573/CA21 (1966).

examine reports, projects and program from the technical point of view so that the Union might be in a position to make pertinent recommendation to the governments concerned.[65]

Through its Resolution 29, the Plenipotentiary Conference decided to create a group of four specialist engineers to give expert advice to developing countries in the particular fields of network planning, preparation of specifications and system evaluation. The four engineers would be recruited in two stages: the first two in 1967 and the other two in 1968, for both budgetary and tactical reasons. They would be stationed at the ITU headquarters.

The recurring criticism should not overshadow the ITU's successes. With the assistance of the Union, a national telecommunication school which was capable of accepting 275 students had been inaugurated in Algeria. Malagasy was pleased to inform the Council that the National Posts and Telecommunications Institute in this country was working perfectly. Each year 250 students were graduating. China's Institute of Research and Professional Training had made considerable progress.

Reorganizing the ITU's Technical-Cooperation Activities

The major event of the late 1960s was undoubtedly the reorganization of technical cooperation in the ITU in light of the newly-established UNDP. There was a need to reassess the organizational structure of the ITU through which technical

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[65] See Doc. 3672/CA22 (1967).

cooperation was provided to developing countries. It is worth presenting at some length the present and proposed ITU framework for technical cooperation.

As distinct from traditional technical cooperation activities, such as ITU conferences and meetings, which are carried out on behalf of all countries in the interests of both national and international telecommunications, work under the UNDP is organized for the benefit of specific countries and almost always on the basis of purely national projects. It therefore involves the permanent organs of the Union in questions which have an undoubtedly political aspect and it is for this reason that it is effected under the responsibility of the Secretary-General but in close cooperation with the heads of the other permanent organs.

The role assigned to the permanent organs of the ITU in the UNDP machinery may be classified as follows:[66]

a) general policy of the Program--participation in coordinating bodies (General Assembly, ECOSOC, Governing Council of the UNDP, Inter-Agency Consul tative Board, Administrative Council on Coordination);

b) study of requests for assistance--preparation of projects--programming--coordination with bilateral assistance program:

c) recruitment of experts;

d) granting of fellowship and placing of fellowship holders;

e) order for equipment;

f) instructions for experts and fellowship holders;

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[66]See Doc. 3665/CA22 (1967).

g) assistance to experts on mission (interim reports, correspondence with experts and Administrations, visits by officials from headquarters;

h) evaluation of projects (final reports and correspondence with Administrations);

i) organization of seminars.

It should also be noted that UNDP projects chiefly concern: a) vocational training; b) the planning of networks and installations leading to orders for equipment; and c) the organization of telecommunication services.

Technical cooperation services were organized in a Department of the General Secretariat comprising: a) an EPTA division; b) a Special Fund Division, (these two Divisions had the same sort of duties and were each divided into three sections corresponding to the geographical distribution of the projects: Africa, Latin America, and the rest of the world); c) an Operations Division which centralized the administrative work; and d) a budget and program control unit.

The collaboration of the IFRB and the CCIs in technical cooperation activities was ensured: a) through the Standing Committee on technical Cooperation consisting of the heads of the permanent organs; b) through the circulation of documents for any relevant comments; and c) through the consultation of specialized officials in other organs by the Technical Cooperation Department as the occasion arises.

If one analyzes the manner in which the functions listed earlier are performed with the method of organization just described, one can notice that the operation is far from satis-

factory. On the one hand there does not appear to be sufficient coordination between the various technical cooperation activities (EPTA), Special Fund, bilateral assistance, etc.) while on the other hand, action by the specialized officials of the various organs is insufficient. Three example illustrate this contention:

> a) Practically no advice is given to the various countries on the usefulness of the telecommunication projects which they propose to include in their technical cooperation programs under the EPTA of the Special Fund, or on the coordination of these projects with other sources of assistance open to them.
>
> b) The Standing Committee on Technical Cooperation, composed of the heads of the permanent organs, is perfectly qualified to settle questions of principle but is practically unable to deal with details.
>
> c) No systematic appraisal is made of finished pro jects. [67]

The Secretary-General of the ITU envisaged an organization in which the various permanent organs would be associated more closely with day-to-day technical cooperation activities under the UNDP and would be better able to coordinate these activities with the traditional cooperation for which they are themselves responsible, (see Figure 4). It was proposed a Technical Cooperation Department comprising:

a) an Operational Division responsible for the following matters: general program policy; programming; study and preparation of projects in cooperation with the Technical Coordination Division (see below); representation on UNDP bodies; reports on the activities of the Department to the Administrative Council, to members and to UNDP bodies.

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[67] See Doc. 3660/CA22 (1967).

FIGURE 4

The Organization of Technical Cooperation in the ITU



b) an Administrative Division, whose duties would be those performed by the existing Operations Division and the existing program control unit: administrative questions concerning the working of the Department; recruitment of experts and placing of fellowship holders; formalities relating to orders for and deliveries of equipment for projects; financial aspects of the program.

c) a Technical Coordination Division, composed of a small core of officials attached to the Technical Cooperation Division and a certain number of specialists attached to the secreta riats of the various permanent organs. The purpose of this Division would be to ensure day-to-day cooperation and coordination between the permanent organs. It would examine: requests by countries; job descriptions for experts; program for fellowship-holders; information and advice for experts at the beginning and during their missions, either from Union headquar ters or on the spot; comments on reports by experts and fellowship-holders; appraisal of completed project.

d) the Group of Engineers.

The Directors of the CCIs and IFRB, who were under constant criticism for their lack of involvement in assistance activities, agreed with this proposal. A Draft Resolution instructed the Secretary-General to establish the new organization with effect from January 1, 1968.

At the 24th session of the Administrative Council in 1969, proposals were made to alter the structure of the one-year old Technical Cooperation Department. The precise demarcation of responsibilities between the Operations and Technical Divisions has given rise to some difficulties due to the artificial separation of the planning of projects from their implementation. This situation was further aggravated by the decision of the UNDP to introduce, starting in 1969, new programming procedures called "continuous programming." These new procedures enable countries to request assistance--in the form of new projects of the

extension of existing ones--as and when the need occurs. Under the old biennial programming, projects were planned and approved every two years and the interim period was available for implementation.

These drawbacks could be removed, according to the Secretary-General, by basing the structure of the Technical Cooperation Department on a regional organization. The following measures should be taken: a) placing the planning, programming and implementation of a project entirely under the responsibility of a single Division; and b) replacing the existing Operations and Technical Divisions by three Area Divisions, each responsible for a geographical region: Africa, the Americas and Euro-Asia.[68]

The amount of work being done by the ITU in the field of professional training had been steadily rising and it has become obvious that an ever-increasing need for training facilities existed in a large number of member countries. It was, therefore, proposed to create a new Training Division. The revised organizational chart would include: a) Group of Engineers, b) Training Division, c) Area Divisions, and d) Administrative Division.

It is interesting to note that the concept of regionalization of the ITU activities, unpopular a few years ago, was now reintroduced by the Secretariat itself. It is true that the regionalization proposed was to take place within the Geneva headquarters. The USSR as well as the Western industrialized countries, however, were worried that this change might actually

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[68]Doc. 3862/CA24 (1969).

lead to the setting up of regional office which would make coordination even more difficult and increase Union expenses. This was not the view of Mexico who, as the proponent of the idea, expected the Administrative Council to go to the ultimate conclusion of the process: the establishment of separate regional offices.[69] This is an illustration of the changing dynamics within the various organs of the Union due to the ever-increasing membership of the development countries.

As a matter of fact, the 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference had adopted Resolution 7 to continue efforts to fully achieve geographical distribution of Union staff in all the organs. This will be a recurring theme in the subsequent annual meetings, brought by the African countries in order to increase the number of seats allocated to them. Being the newest members to join the Union, with the poorest telecommunication infrastructure, they were the most vocal in requesting assistance and many times succeeded in obtaining what they had asked for. This was reflected in the 1967/68 budgetary allocation. Out of a total of $3,275,088, Africa's share was $1,326,250, Asia and the Far East's, $607,497, Latin America's, $895,889, the Middle East's $393,402, and Europe's, $52,050. Under the program approved, 66 countries received assistance during 1967. Of these 23 were in Africa, 9 in Asia and the Far East, 23 in Latin America, 6 in the Middle East, and 5 in Europe.[70]

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[69]Doc. 3927/CA24 (1969), p. 4.

[70]Doc. DT/3/CA23 (1968).

Pearson and Jackson Reports: ITU Faces a Changing Environment

The debates about the changing structure of the ITU's cooperation activities does not take place in a vacuum; its cannot be dissociated from the larger debate about the entire restructuring of technical cooperation of the United Nations itself. In fact, the ITU had to respond to proposals made and changes instituted at the higher echelons of the UN organization since the ITU had to abide by the rules of the UNDP which was financing the Union-related projects.

At the 1970 session of the Administrative Council, in Committee 3, the Secretary-General presented the general conclusion of two reports, one prepared by Lester Pearson, entitled "Partners in Development," the other by Sir Robert Jackson, "A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System".

The terms of reference of the Pearson Report, issued by the Commission on International Development, an independent body instituted and financed by the World bank, was more encompassing than the Jackson Report and complemented it. Seen as a whole, its recommendations embodied "a strategy for the strengthening of international cooperation for development." The Commission made the following points, summarized below:

a) To be successful, development must be a partnership based on joint effort towards clearly defined goals; performan ce of all participants, donors and recipients, can be more effectively reviewed

b) Aid, trade and investment policies are interrelated, and certain measures should be taken to ensure that they are harmonized in support of development.

c) Trade policies of advanced countries that raise obstacles to the growth of export earnings of developing countries should be changed, and advanced countries should grant general, non-reciprocal tariff preferences to the manufactures of developing countries.

d) The volume of official development aid should rise to 0.7 percent of gross national product by 1975 if possible, and in no case later than 1980, as part of an increase in the overall flow of resources to 1 percent of donors' GNP by 1975.

e) The proportion of the multilateral component of aid should be raised from 10 percent of total official assistance to a minimum of 20 percent by 1975.

f) The International Development Association (IDA) should have a larger role in the aid system, with its resources expanded from the present $400 million to $1,500 million by 1975.

g) Measures should be taken to alleviate the debt problem of developing countries by liberal use of long-term debt rescheduling and other means, and to reduce future debt problems by fixing an interest rate no higher than 2 percent on official development assistance loans, with maturity and grace periods of 25 to 40 years and 7 to 10 years respectively.

h) A fund should be established within the World Bank to subsidize interest rates on some Bank loans.

i) The United Nations should appoint a Commissioner for Population; and international program should be launched through the World Bank, in consultation with the World Health Organization (WHO) for the mobilization of research in the field of fertility control.

j) Greater resources should be made available for education al research and experimentation looking to new education stem conceived by and for developing countries.

k) The President of the World bank should call a conference in 1970 of heads of international and national agencies and representatives of donor and recipient countries, to discuss the creation of machinery to relate aid and development to other areas of foreign economic policy.[71]

The Jackson Report, commissioned by the Governing Council of

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[71] Ibid.

the UNDP, was to assess the capacity of the United Nations system to deliver an effective program of technical cooperation to developing countries, first, at the present level of resources and, second, on the assumption that those resources might be doubled within five years.

It was proposed that the programming of UN development cooperation activities should, as far as possible, be synchronized with the development planning cycle of each country and should cover all inputs from the UN system, as well as be closely related to the World bank plans for subsequent investment. The UNDP was retained as the central authority with sole responsibility, within the UN system, for technical cooperation and pre-investment activities. The detailed organizational proposals, therefore, designed, firstly, to centralize all policy decisions affecting technical cooperation on UNDP and, secondly, to decentralize as much operational authority as possible to the country level. It was suggested that the Resident Representatives should more or less play the same central role as UNDP itself at the headquarters level and their position and offices would be strengthened accordingly. The proposed structure for UNDP has had a regional bias and was designed to be gradually decentralized geographically when conditions become favorable.

While there were quite varying degrees of criticism expressed by the various boards that reviewed the proposal, especially from some of the bigger agencies, there was a general acceptance, in principle, of most of the basic recommendations of the report,

for instance, of the so-called "Ten Precepts" summarized as follows:

First, the introduction of a programming method which would enable all inputs from the UN development system to be programmed comprehensively at one time in a program corresponding to the needs and the duration of each country's national development plans.

Second, effective and prompt execution of approved projects, having recourse, as necessary, to all available methods and resources within and without the system.

Third, controlled evaluation, designed to maintain the accountability of the administrator of UNDP for the use of all resources contributed to UNDP, to measure results, to judge the effectiveness of the methods used, and to draw conclusions which may be applied with benefit to future operations.

Fourth, effective follow-up conceived as an integral part of each project from the outset.

Fifth, the introduction of an efficient information system.

Sixth, organizational reforms at the country, regional and headquarters level designed to integrate the components of the UN development system more closely. These should combine greater control at the center with maximum decentralization to the field level, where the authority of the Resident Representative should be greatly strengthened.

Seventh, proper staffing of the operation at all levels, involving far-reaching measures to attract and retain the best qualified people available.

Eighth, a financial framework designed to ensure the smooth running of the operation, through which the maximum possible amount of funds entrusted to the UN development system for development cooperation should be channelled, the head of the central organization being held personally accountable for their use.

Ninth, maximum use of all modern managerial and administrative aids and techniques to ensure an effective, expeditious and economical operation.

Tenth, maximum flexibility on the part of governments and the system alike to permit adaptability to changing circumstances and a speedy and effective response to new challenges

and opportunities as they arise.[72]

A representative from the UNDP was invited to the Administrative Council, in 1970, to elaborate on the Jackson Report. He hoped to see an increasing amount of assistance being provided by UNDP/ITU in such areas as the development of satellite communications, educational TV (in association with UNESCO) and of the electronic and telecommunication industries (in association with the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)). One of the benefit of the Report was that the ITU would participate in the consideration of coordinated inputs to national programs at a very early stage.

Continuing Debate on Regional Offices

The recommendations also gave an impetus to the debate about regionalization of ITU's activities. The UNDP had now established more than 90 field offices headed by Resident Representatives. The ECOSOC had endorsed the Report in Resolution 1530 (XLIX). The regional bureaus would start operating on June 1971 at the UN headquarters in New York, with transfer at a later date to the regions

Mexico who had vehemently advocated that the same initiative be taken by the ITU, noted that:

> it was a very old-fashioned method for the Union to direct its activities in all parts of the world from Geneva and it rendered those activities tardy, incomplete and often useless, as well as extremely expensive, when officials or experts had to be sent out, incurring heavy travel costs and subsistence expen-

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[72]See Doc. 4031/CA25 (1970).

ses.[73]

The concerns expressed by some delegations from the industrialized countries about the setting up of regional ITU offices were directly related to the problem of recruiting the adequate number of experts. The growing demand in experts originated by developing countries could not be met anymore by the Union's own pool. According to the Australian delegate, it was no time to disperse the small number of engineers with a broad range of expertise to many parts of the world. Age restriction, availability, and language requirements militated against expanding the pool of experts. For Canada's delegate, the new programming processes adopted by UNDP did not necessarily justify an increased regional presence by the ITU.

Western European countries, who more often than not used the ITU as a marketplace, suggested that the Union make greater use of volunteers "lent" by administrations or private firms to the ITU. The USSR, however, had strong reservations about this proposal; it did not consider a volunteer corps appropriate within the framework of the United Nations; the use of volunteers was a matter for national and not international arrangements. Although it was reminded that the ITU's role in respect to volunteers was purely an intermediary one, namely putting a would-be recipient in touch with a would-be donor, the Soviet Union was suspicious (as it has always been) at the attempt by the private sector to use the ITU as a stepping stone for

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[73]Doc. 4213/CA26 (1971), p. 4.

expanding to the developing countries its product markets. According to Algeria, developing countries sometimes lost the services of their own nationals when they were induced by tempting offers from industrial firms to works abroad after a period of training.[74]

The UNDP had been approached by the Secretary-General for additional funds to support several new experts. While accepting seven new posts, UNDP rejected three, which disturbed a number of delegates since the entire ITU development program depended upon UNDP budgetary allocations. The delegates from Great Britain and Mexico suspected that the UNDP decision was based on "arbitrary or political grounds," an accusation denied by the UNDP representative present at the Administrative Council's session. The Council unanimously decided to bring the problem to the attention of the forthcoming Plenipotentiary Conference.

The idea that the ITU's ordinary budget be used for technical cooperation purposes and to cover expenses of additional experts, in particular, resurfaced at the 1973 session of the Administrative Council. This represented a major problem for the industrialized nations. If technical cooperation expenditures were to be charged to the ITU ordinary budget, Switzerland, according to its delegate, would be placed in a difficult position, since its contribution to the Union had so far been paid out of the PTT budget, whereas his country had a separate budget for technical cooperation. It would be very complicated to

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[74]Doc. 4492/CA28 (1973), p. 5.

share costs between two sections of the national budget, and the Council might therefore recommend the Conference to consider the possibility of separating the two ITU budgets, to facilitate national accounting.[75]

Pakistan suggested that some of the developed countries which were already providing bilateral assistance might consider supplying the ITU with aid in the form of a separate technical cooperation fund. This suggestion was also supported by Saudi Arabia who would urge the forthcoming Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference to establish a special fund for financing projects in developing countries. This idea acquired a life of its own. Nearly ten years later, at the Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference, in 1982, a group of Western European countries proposed to establish a Special Voluntary Fund under the aegis of the ITU.

Brazil made a statement that turned out to be interpreted by some industrialized countries as a warning, namely "if technical assistance was one of the Union's most important tasks, some other activities might have to be curtailed in order to release funds for it." It had the character of a warning because a large part of the ITU budget was affected to the CCIs whose work, while of some use to the developing countries, become increasingly more important to the industrialized countries planning for integrated telecommunication networks. As a matter of fact, during the years following the Montreux Plenipotentiary Conference, the CCIs were

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[75]Doc. 4499/CA28 (1973), p. 4.

constantly reminded of their duties to take more active measures to assist developing countries.

The early 1970s were also marked by a renewed interest about "the future of the Union," termed after a paper presented by the Deputy Director-General of the Australian Post Office, Mr. Sawkins. The debate concentrated on the drawing of a permanent Charter to replace the present Convention. This matter is of great importance to the discussion of the ITU' technical cooperation activities as it opposed developed and developing countries. The subject will be fully articulated in a later part.

CHAPTER 7

1973-1978; ONE AGENDA: DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference opened in 1973 in the midst of difficult times. The cartel of OPEC countries had sharply raised the price of oil which placed the oil-dependent industrialized world and the Western European countries, in particular, in a critical situation. For the first time, their economies' health was at the mercy of decisions made elsewhere, in the developing world. This situation of extreme dependence pressured the developed countries to reassess their relationship with their less well-endowed counterparts in the Third World and made them more responsive to the demands of the developing countries embodied in the call for the New International Economic Order.

It is therefore no surprise that the 1973 Conference was almost completed dominated by the concerns of the developing countries, with special emphasis on development cooperation. 131 of the 146 members attended, (see Table 3). Some thirteen major proposals dealing with this subject were discussed in committee and Plenary sessions, eleven of which were approved. Many of these were extensions or updates of Recommendations passed in Montreux in 1965, but there were some innovations. Resolution 19, for instance, requested that the Union make a special effort to help meet the need of the "least" developed countries and Opinion 2 asked the developed countries to "take into account the requests for favorable treatment made by developing countries in

service, commercial, or other relations in communications." The most controversial, however, was the decision to create a special technical cooperation fund "to meet the needs of the developing countries who submit urgent requests for assistance to the Union."[76] The whole subject of the creation of ITU regional offices in the lesser developed areas of the world was raised again, as was the issue of a new International Consultative Committee for Technical Cooperation. Finally, the discussion about proposals to changes the Union's basic instrument into a Charter that was initiated the previous years was carried on.

TABLE 3

Membership Attendance of ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences

Plenipotentiaries	Members	Attendees
Atlantic City, 1947	78	76
Buenos Aires, 1952	87	82
Geneva, 1959	96	88
Montreux, 1965	129	122
Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973	146	131
Nairobi, 1982	157	147

Sources: Codding and Rutkowski, op. cit., p. 61; Telecommunication Journal 49/10 (1982), p. 740.

Geographic Representation

The Conference first tackled the matter of the geographical

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[76]Resolution 31.

representation within the Administrative Council. The membership of the ITU had increased from 128 to 145 in the 8-year period since the past 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference. The number of African countries had increased from 39 to 44, and the Asian countries, from 28 to 37. They legitimately requested additional seats. They were helped in their efforts by the Soviet Union who, consistent with its policy of strengthening ties with its "natural allies," noted:

> There is no doubt that if the principle of equitable representation of the various regions of the world in the ITU's organs were put into effect, the ITU would be able to draw upon the rich experience and knowledge of experts of various countries and would be in a position to act rapidly and skillfully to meet the needs and requirements of the member countries in all regions of the world.[77]

The USSR wanted the principle to be put also into effect in "all departments and at all levels" in the ITU. Committee 7 (Organs of the Union) was invited to reflect on the question whether, in the event of the adoption of an increase in the membership of the Council to 36, there would be any need for a formal rotation procedure. The Council needed members with experience in administrative, financial, and economic matters and with a broad understanding of many complex issues and a few permanent seats might be considered.

This suggestion was opposed by the developing countries, especially. Guinea stated that "no country should be allowed to monopolize a Council seat on the grounds of its alleged experien-

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[77]Annex to Doc. 99/PC 1973, p. 13.

ce." It was up to the Plenipotentiary Conference to re-elect Council members if its wishes to do so. A proposal for compulsory rotation was also under attack as it would run counter to freedom of election in the Plenipotentiary Conference. Zambia, however, supported the principle of rotation, ensured on a regional basis, because "it would reduce tension at election time and would save much of the time spent in lobbying at Conferences."

The United States withdrew its initial objection to increasing the Administrative Council's size provided that the following proposals were accepted as a whole in the interest of unanimity and of meeting the views of developing countries. First, an increase of membership to 36 could be recommended with 7 members each from Regions A and B, 4 from Region C, and 9 each from Regions D and E.[78] Second, there should be no provision in the basic instrument concerning rotation of membership. Third, the following recommendation should be made to the Plenary:

> It is the unanimous view of Committee 7 that the Plenary recommend to the members present that, when they exercise their sovereign right to vote for members of their choice for the Administrative Council, they bear in mind the need for a proper balance between experience, expertise, and continuity, on the one hand, and the great benefit to be gained by both the ITU and the countries involved from the widest possible participation by developing countries as members of the Administrative Council, on the other hand.[79]

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[78]Region A consists of the Americas; Region B, Western Europe; Region C, Eastern Europe and Northern Asia; Region D, Africa; Region E, Asia and Australia.

[79]See Doc. 124/PC 1973, p. 6.

The United States proposal satisfied every circle and was adopted by acclamation.

The conflict between technical expertise and geographical representation in election procedures to the ITU permanent organs arising from developing countries' strength in the supreme organ of the ITU was illustrated during the debate about the election of the Board of the IFRB. Under current practices, Board members of CCIR, CCITT and IFRB were elected during Administrative Conferences, IFRB board members being elected at Administrative Radio Conferences. A number of delegations from the developing countries proposed that IFRB board members be elected at Plenary Conferences, instead. The rationale was that the specialized Administrative Conferences are not representative of the ITU membership since few developing countries can afford attendance and their input in IFRB's agenda and work program was, consequently, very limited.[80] The dissatisfaction with the current situation stemmed from the fact that developing countries relied increasingly on IFRB recommendations to solve their radio interference problems. It was compounded with the fear that the developed countries, dominant within IFRB, might not commit all their energy as some were pushing for the its abolition.

The Western European countries, the United States, Canada and Australia were adamantly opposed to changing the status quo.

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[80]This fact was substantiated by the attendance figures provided by the Secretariat. The 1963 Space Conference had been attended by 71 members out of 124, the 1966 Aeronautical Conference, by 56 out of 129, the 1967 Maritime Conference, by 70 out of 131 and the 1971 Space Conference, by 100 out of 140.

The delegation from the latter was of the opinion that the election of the IFRB board by the Plenipotentiary Conference "struck at the very concept of the ITU as a federated organization and, for no good reason, negated the principle laid down in Article 13 of the Montreux Convention." The delegate of Zambia, echoing the position of its neighbors, pointed out that:

> Each member of the Board, apart from being a thoroughly trained technician, was required to be familiar with geographic, economic and demographic conditions within a particular area of the world. Accordingly, the IFRB transcended the sphere of radio alone, and should be elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference, the supreme organ of the Union. Moreover, that body was more representative than any Administrative Conference, and it was dangerous to leave such an important election in the hands of relatively few countries.[81]

The USSR could not understand why the supreme organ of the ITU, an organization primarily concerned with technical questions, should be precluded from electing any senior officials of the Union, all of whom should be competent in technical matters. Nor could he follow the argument that election by the Plenipotentiary Conference would undermine the federal structure of the Union, since that structure was determined not by the body which elected officials, but by the Plenipotentiary. In fact, the status of the members of the IFRB could only be enhanced if they were elected by the Union's supreme organ.

The developing countries' attendance record to Administrative Conferences and the numerous meetings of the Study Groups was poor. The main reason was a financial one. In addition, these

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[81] Doc. 145/PC 1973, p. 5.

countries could not afford to send abroad for long periods of time, specialized engineers whose expertise was needed at home. Mexico submitted a draft proposal, "Helping New or Developed Countries to Attend CCI Study Group Meetings," suggesting that some meetings be held in developing countries and under less expensive conditions than apply to world conference. Most of the meetings were held at the headquarters in Geneva, in the center of the industrialized world. The rational for the proposal was rather elegant:

> Different countries have different reasons for attending CCI Study Group meetings. The developed countries, more particularly the highly industrialized ones, have of course a technical interest, but their special motivation is economic, since the final recommendations are reflected in the equipment which such countries make and sell, whereas the main concern of new or developing countries is for technical and operating matters. Consequently, the financial aspect of participation is a minor one for developed countries (indeed, it can be looked on as an investment) whereas for new and developing countries participation is a heavy financial burden.[82]

Given the unknown financial burden that the Mexican proposal would impose on the ITU budget, it was referred to Committee 4 for further consideration.

Regional Offices (Cont'd)

The discussion on the setting up of ITU Regional Offices was revived by a Draft Resolution from Venezuela. This Draft came under fire from many quarters. Mexico, an energetic proponent of the idea, deplored the fact that the Secretary-General, after

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[82]Doc. 199/PC 1973, p. 2.

initially submitting reports favorable to the establishment of regional offices, had changed his mind. The Secretary-General responded he had hope that UNDP would cover the incurred expenses but the UN agency declined.[83]

The lack of funding was at the core of the opponents' arguments since there was a general reluctance to use the ITU's ordinary budget for this purpose. The Western industrialized countries as well as the Soviet Union and its neighbors were joined by some developing countries to recognize that up to this day no quantitative assessment had yet been made to document the benefits of decentralizing the ITU's technical cooperation activities. For Malaysia, a cost/benefit analysis was of the first priority. No consensus had even emerged from the work of the previous Administrative Council regarding the principle of regional offices.

The USSR was of the opinion that the creation of regional branches could have dangerous consequences as there was a real danger of them duplicating the work done by other regional bodies. Moreover, it doubted very much that the large number of experts required under the proposal could be found, in the first place. There was the fear that regional offices would become mere clearing-houses.[84]. West Germany noted that regional experts were more effective than regional offices.

The proponents, like Nigeria, proposed that the Plenipoten-

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[83]Doc. 213/PC 1973.

[84]Doc. 261/PC 1973, p. 3.

tiary Conference adopt the principle of establishing regional offices in spite of the fact that there were financial obstacles to its achievement. Once the principle accepted, a separate study could be made to find some way of financing them. Many developing countries shared this view. A motion indicating that Committee 6 was in favor of the creation of regional offices was put to vote and was accepted by 47 in favor, 42 against and 1 abstention.

The resulting Resolution instructed the Secretary General "to carry out a thorough study of all aspects of the establishment of regional offices, including their functions and their relations with the ITU Technical Cooperation Department." It also called for the setting up of "pilots offices" in order to better assess the cost and effectiveness of the projected regular regional offices.[85] Japan, preoccupied with the financial ability of the ITU to carry out such project, proposed to limit the number of pilot offices to "one or two," the French suggested only one. Mexico and Peru opposed them and won in votes.

The industrialized countries had lost the battle in Committee 6, but not the war. The following move illustrates one of the unique features of the ITU Convention. It provides for Reservations and, under the present circumstances, the developed countries used this device in order not to be bound by a majority decision they found contrary to their national interest as it might lead to an increase in their ITU contribution.[86]

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[85]Resolution 5, Doc. 229/PC 1973.

[86]See Doc. 372/PC 1973, pp. 9-10.

ITU Pressured to Set Up its Own Technical Cooperation Program

The question of the establishment of a Special Fund for technical cooperation under the auspices of the ITU resurfaced with a joint proposal from Nepal and Sri Lanka, "Emergency Fund for Technical Cooperation," resolving:

> to create a fund with voluntary contributions of the countries by means of cash contributions, the awarding of fellowships or making available experts or new or used equipment, but in perfect condition to satisfy the need of the new or developing countries who will request ITU assistance of an urgent nature.[87]

Oman followed suite with a proposal of its own aiming at the same objective but drawing on the ITU's regular budget.

Many developing countries were concerned with the shortage of UNDP funds for project financing. It was due not only to the increasing number of countries requesting assistance , but also to the expansion of national and regional telephone networks such as the Pan African Telecommunication Network. In addition, there was a need for upgrading the various national telecommunication training schools set up with the help of the ITU.

Other specialized agencies engaged in joint work with the ITU complained about the Union's performance. The UNESCO considered that the ITU's participation in its investigation missions had, in the past, been hampered by a lack of sufficient financial flexibility in the ITU, which could participate more effectively in interdisciplinary teams if funds were made available for the purpose in the Union budget. In fact, the proposed Special Fund

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[87] See Doc. 89 and 103/PC 1973.

was not a novel idea, and its proponent was asking the Union to align itself on other international organizations like the Universal Postal Union (UPU) who had already established voluntary funds to give speedy assistance which might not be available through UNDP.

The proposal met the opposition of the industrialized nations who thought that all assistance funds should be channelled through UNDP for the reasons that the PTTs, operating on a non-profit basis did not have resources earmarked for technical cooperation. These funds were provided by contribution to UNDP from national technical cooperation agencies. From this standpoint, these nations were not prepared to increase their contribution to the ITU's regular budget and they were not able to contribute to a voluntary fund either. Japan brought to the attention of Committee 6 that the Jackson Report, while proposing the restructuring of UNDP assistance, criticized the independent policy followed by various specialized agencies. He warned that a special fund would clash with the UNDP system. The United States threatened that if such a fund were to be created, it would not contribute to it.[88]

The idea of having the ITU's regular budget used for technical assistance was also not popular with many small financially-stricken developing countries such as Botswana, since it would result in an increase in their contribution to the ITU. It is the reason why they preferred the idea of a voluntary fund

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[88]See Doc. 374/PC 1973.

furnished by the developed countries. Mexico and Argentina did not share this view. In addition, they thought a special fund should not be restricted to urgent projects but cover desirable ones as well.

In Committee 6, the principle of establishing a special fund was adopted by 45 votes to 9, with 11 abstentions. The proposal to furnish part of the resources of the fund from ITU's regular budget was rejected by 40 votes to 19, with 9 abstentions.

Japan first opposed contribution from private undertakings on the ground that it might violate the principle of neutrality of the international organizations. The objection was overturned since the ITU membership includes recognized private operating agencies. The Committee settled on the following provision:

> to create a special technical cooperation fund with voluntary contributions from Member States, recognized private operating agencies, and industrial and scientific undertakings, contributions from the latter being made to the Union through the administration concerned.[89]

This proposal was adopted by 35 votes to 5, with 29 abstentions. The abstention of the industrialized countries showed how much the idea of supplementary assistance under the aegis of the ITU has gained ground in Committee 6. In the past, such idea would have faced a clear-cut rejection by the same countries.

Since 1947, despite a growth and diversification of the work of the Union on a scale which could not possibly have been foreseen at that time, the only change in the structure of the

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[89]Doc. 410/PC 1973, p. 4.

Union has been the merging of the CCIT and the CCIF into the CCITT. The admission to the Union of 68 new members, most of whom are either new or developing countries, has given technical cooperation, which was a non-existent activity in 1947, considerable importance both in magnitude and in variety, which is comparable to, if not greater than, that of the present CCIs and IFRB. The CCIR and CCITT have engaged themselves in some assistance activities. But it became clear that these measures, makeshift solutions dictated by the need to cope with a continuously increasing workload, were inadequate for proper fulfillment of Article 4 (No. 23) of the Montreux Convention. From 1965 to 1972, the dollar amount spent on technical assistance provided by the Union was eight times that for the period 1959-1965 and all signs point to the fact that this rate will have to be increased in the future.[90]

The above was in substance the rationale underlying the proposal by Argentina to set up a permanent organ called "International Committee for Technical Cooperation in Telecommunications," organized along the same lines as the CCIR and CCITT. The idea was supported by a similar proposal by Kuwait. After a short discussion the proposal was overwhelmingly rejected by 50 votes to 10, with 9 abstentions. The developed countries did not want to spread the Union's jurisdiction into an additional semi-autonomous organ, and the developing countries were worried that a new organ would occasion additional administrative expenses taken

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[90]See Doc. 96/PC 1973.

out of a budget already insufficient to cover traditional development-assistance activities.

The Plenipotentiary Conference also approved a Resolution introduced by Lesotho, subsequently revised to make clear the ITU's budget would not be used, requesting that the 25 countries designated by the United Nations as the "least developed countries" be given priority in technical cooperation.[91]

The question of the establishment of a permanent Constitution gave rise to heated debates. Secretary-General Mili, in an unusual departure from his otherwise serene posture, expressed strong reservation about changing the ITU's basic instrument. His partisan stand meant to appeal to the Third World constituency. The industrialized countries, which favored the adoption of a Constitution, were able to pass a resolution calling for the establishment of a special Study Group to examine the matter. The Study Group worked from 1967 to 1969 to carry out the Montreux mandate. The report was presented at the present Conference. At Malaga-Torremolinos, however, the developing countries composed the clear majority and had second thoughts on giving a minority substantive veto right concerning any fundamental changes in the structure or functions of the ITU. As a result, while it accepted the breakdown between the various provisions as suggested by the working group, the Conference refused to give the basic provision the title Constitution and decided to,postpone any decision on whether to raise to majority needed to modify them until the next

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[91]Doc. 240/PC 1973.

plenipotentiary.

As instructed by the Plenipotentiary Conference the previous year, the Secretary General submitted to the 1974 session of the Administrative Council a draft of the Regulation for the Administration of the ITU Special Fund for Technical Assistance. One of the Articles stipulated that "cash contributions shall not carry reservations concerning their allocation" and that "equipment offered as a contribution to the Fund may be accepted on condition that it may be used in connection with a vocational training project administered by the Union as part of assistance to a country in the event of natural disaster."[92] The latter clause was certainly included to alleviate the fears of the Soviet Union that equipment provided by private companies might be used as a promotional tool to expand markets in developing countries and subject them to economic dependency. The Regulations were approved and by the end of January 1975 the amount of cash contributions pledged totalled Sw. frs.100,304. and a few countries and private companies promised other types of assistance (equipment, training, visits, seminars, etc). This results were not very encouraging, according to the head of the Technical Cooperation Department.

Great Britain and Sweden, critics of the Fund, noted that the assistance "pledged" or "promised" would have been available without a Special Fund. Spain contended that the list of contributors might well give the impression that only a few countries

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[92]Doc. 4590/CA29 (1974), p. 3.

were contributing to technical cooperation, whereas a number of countries were providing large-scale assistance on a bilateral basis. In addition, Cable and Wireless Ltd (U.K.) and L. M. Ericsson (Sweden) which offered aid, did not get the approval from their donor country, as specified in the Regulations, and had to be deleted from the list.[93]

Since the setting up of Regional Offices had not been accepted, the work of ITU experts became increasingly important, especially those regional experts who had to assist in and monitor the implementation of national projects in several countries as well as regional projects. In the absence of funding for the recruitment of additional experts, the ones in the field had to do an increasing amount of travelling as more and more telecommunication networks and training schools were set up in their respective region, (see Figure 5).

This was a result of the new directives that had been required to bring the activities of regional experts into line with changes in UNDP general policy. Until recently the regional experts' work had been confined to helping countries to draw up their country programs and to advising the UNDP Resident Representatives on telecommunication problems. Regional experts were now being asked to keep in closer touch with specific projects. In addition, they would be expected to spend a longer time in each country they visited and so enhance their advisory role to each of the countries in their region. Several delegates from

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[93]Doc. 4816/CA30 (1975), pp. 4-5.

FIGURE 5

Main Stages of Country Programming and Project Preparation



1. Fixes IPF for each country.
2. Helps prepare sectoral study.
3. Prepares request for UNDP assistance.
4. Evaluates requests from different sectors, establishes priorities and prepares country programme.
5. Approves country programme.
6. Assists with formulation and preparation of project
7. Is responsible for preparing and submitting project document
8. Assesses and submits project for UNDP approval.
9. Approves project up to 400,000 dollars.
10. Approves projects of over 400,000 dollars.
11. Signs project document.
12. Takes steps for project implementation

Expert procedure

13. Submits candidatures.
14. Transmits candidatures.
15. Requests technical opinion.
16. Supplies technical opinion.
17. Communicates choice of candidate.
18. Transmits choice.
19. Recruits expert.

Fellowship procedure

20. Chooses candidate and prepares programme proposal.
21. Transmits above documentation.
22. Assesses candidature, proposes and locates appropriate institution.
23. Prepares course programme.
24. Sends instructions to fellow.
25. Organizes fellow's departure.

Source: ITU Doc. 5816 (CA37) 1982, p. 25.

developing countries requested explanations as to why ITU experts had not visited their country, which had caused delay in the implementation of some national system. The reason was that experts were principally concerned with regional project such as the Pan African Telecommunication Network (PANAFTEL) or the Middle East Telecommunication Network (MEDARABTEL). Additional personnel requested by these delegates was out of question due to the refusal of the UNDP to allocate more money.[94] The UNDP, however, was currently studying measures designed to help ITU wipe out the deficit of some Sw. frs. 1,500,000 in its Technical Cooperation account resulting from rental costs for premises, not considered administrative costs, therefore not reimbursed by UNDP.

Telecommunication and Government Priorities

According to the Secretary-General, the main factor which hindered implementation of technical cooperation activities was the difficulty of getting telecommunication projects accepted and accorded reasonably high priority by the central governmental planning of the country concerned. Under the new "program" approach adopted by the UNDP, the projects submitted by the various ministries were no longer dealt with in isolation but integrated in the development plan drawn up by the government for the country as a whole. It was one of the first time that the developing countries' policy was criticized for being part of

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[94] See Doc. 4658/CA29 (1974).

the problem underlying the slow progress of cooperation activities. From now on, governments of those countries will be urged to bring telecommunication matters higher in the national development agenda. Recommendations to this effect will figure prominently in the Report issued ten years later by the Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunications Development.

The message started to be heard. There were encouraging notes that government officials at the most senior level were becoming conscious of the importance of telecommunications to their development programs. In Africa, the ITU now administered more UNDP-financed regional projects than most other agencies. Several projects were making good progress: PANAFTEL, for which some 90 percent of the required finance has already been negotiated, the pre-investment survey for MEDARABTEL, in which 25 countries were participating, the Inter-American Telecommunication Network, and the Asian Telecommunications Network. ITU's technical cooperation activities in 1974 had increased by about 18 percent compared with 1973, and telecommunication projects financed by UNDP had increased by 12 percent.

UNDP procedures both for programming and implementation of projects were now becoming stabilized in a more effective and easy to follow form. Authority was being delegated increasingly by UNDP Headquarters to its Resident Representatives in the field and sought advice and help from ITU regional experts. This delegation was welcomed since it facilitated ITU's work in view of the large number of regional telecommunication projects.

Reorganizing the Technical Cooperation Department

In 1969, during its 24th session, the Administrative Council had examined the organizational set-up of the Technical Cooperation Department and approved the proposal made by the Secretary-General to reshape the Department on a regional concept, i.e., replacing the existing Operations Divisions and Technical Division by the three Regional Divisions (Africa, the Americas, and Euro-Asia). This geographical distribution was made on the basis of continents.

The debate about this restructuring was taking place in the wake of the examination by the ECOSOC of the Jackson Report on the capacity of the United Nations Development System. One of its main features was the creation of four Regional Bureaus: 1) Africa; 2) Latin America; 3) Asia and the Pacific; 4) Europe, Mediterranean and Middle East. The percentage of the total Indicative Planning Figures (IFPs) for the First UN Development Cycle (1972-1976) distributed among the Regional Bureaux was as follows: Region 1, 30.5 percent; Region 2, 26.9 percent; Region 3, 21.4 percent; Region 4, 21.2 percent.[95]

In synchrony with UNDP programs, the ITU's technical cooperation structure had to be geared to administer this demand if effective programming and realization of an increasing number of projects was to be included in the telecommunication sector. Thus, in 1974, more than 43 percent of the total Union's field expenditure was realized through the implementation of projects

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[95]Doc. 4730/CA30 (1975), p. 3.

under the jurisdiction of the Euro-Asia Division, against about 34 percent under the Africa Division and 22 percent under the Americas Division. At the time, the Euro-Asia Division was responsible for the Union's technical cooperation activities in the very vast and diversified area of Europe, the Middle East, Continental Asia and the Pacific, which makes it difficult from the management point of view to take into account the various features of each sub-region. Furthermore, the Middle East evolved more and more as a separate entity with its own development and problems. this state of affairs was recognized by the United Nations which established in Beirut the UN Economic Commission for West Asia.

The increased revenue from oil exports in some of the Middle East countries has resulted in large-scale development projects in the area thus creating a greater need for new and modern telecommunication facilities. Consequently, many countries in the area have multiplied their requests to the ITU, not for financial assistance, but to provide experts and advice in the planning, specification and evaluation of highly sophisticated telecommunication projects, as well as for the establishment of telecommunication training institutions.

On the basis of the above considerations, it was proposed to create in the ITU Department of Technical Cooperation a fourth Regional Division by splitting into two the existing Euro-Asia Division, i.e., Asia and the Pacific Division on the one hand, and Europe and the Middle East Division on the other. An increase

in staffing was also requested.[96]

In the course of 1975, a member of the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit, prepared a "Report on Some Aspects of the Technical Co-operation Program of the International Telecommunication Union."[97] This report's findings were presented at the 1976 Administrative Council session. The inspector offered for consideration by the Council, a series of recommendations including the following:

> - The predominantly "sectoral" or technical approach to telecommunication problems (including mass communication) should be broadened to take into account the growing interlocking aspects of telecommunications with social development, including education and public information.
>
> - The ITU should formulate a "program" of technical cooperation. This program should be the result of the combined efforts of all the permanent organs of the Union, the final responsibility being vested in the Secretary-General.
>
> - The Special Fund for Technical Cooperation should give priority to such matters as natural disasters and the needs of the least-developed countries.
>
> - The Union should study the possibility of resorting to the international credit institutions as main contributors to the Special Fund.
>
> - In view of the growing needs of the developing countries and the reiterated insistence on "field activities" rather than on "headquarters activities," the Union should increase the use of funds from the regular budget, for technical cooperation activities, including the payment of part of the overhead costs.
>
> - The relationship between telecommunications and development and the relationship between the program of technical cooperation and the national development plan

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[96] Doc. 4730/CA30 (1975), pp. 5-6.

[97] (JIU/REP/75/9)

of each country should be emphasized by the ITU in order to get wider international and national support.

- At the country level--as at the regional and global levels--the technical cooperation input of the Union should begin at the pre-programming stage, taking into account the inter-connection between telecommunications and development.

- The ways and means of transferring telecommunications technology between developing countries should be fully explored. The use of national experts in UNDP/ITU projects should be encouraged.

- Since the bulk of the population of developing countries lives in rural areas, the improvement of rural telecommunications should have priority in the technical cooperation program of the Union. The development of human resources should be closely related to the development of rural telecommunications.[98]

The inspector noted that he has been unable to find in the Convention adopted at malaga-Torremolinos any specific provision to the effect that the ITU is constitutionally forbidden to use funds from its ordinary budget to share in the cost of technical cooperation. Moreover, no consideration appears to have been given to the possibility of receiving contributions from other intergovernmental organizations, including worldwide or regional financing agencies. The stipulation that, according to Resolution 21, contributions of private operating agencies and scientific or industrial organizations are subject to the approval of the administration of the donor country, was considered to be an important restriction imposed on the Fund. At the end of his Report, the inspector invited the Union to a "time-consuming and painful exercise" to discuss in full the following challenging

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[98]Annex 1 to Doc. 4925/CA31 (1976), pp. 6-8.

question: "the federal structure of the Union, which is without parallel in the UN system, is it, or is it not, a great constraint to the Union's ability to discharge its present day functions?"

The ITU and the Other Specialized Agencies

The originality of the Report is to be found in the invitation to explore the relation between telecommunication and economic development. The idea will gain momentum and will be on the agenda of the World Bank who issued an in-depth study on this matter in 1983 and will be the subject of joint study by the ITU and the OECD, published the same year. In addition, there will be a proliferation of articles on the topic.[99]

The years 1974-1976 were marked by an intense activities within United Nations circles. The UN General Assembly passed a series of resolutions concerning development and economic cooperation in the wake of the Fourth Conference of the Heads of States of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Algiers in September of 1973.[100] The New International Economic Order was at the agenda

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[99]Robert J. Saunders, Jeremy J. Warford, Bjorn Wellenius, **Telecommunications and Economic Development** (Baltimore, MA.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983) (A World Bank Publication); William Pierce and Nicolas Jequier, **Telecommunications for Development** (Geneva: ITU, 1983) (ITU/OECD Report).

[100]See Res. 3172 (XXVIII) "Holding of a Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Development and International Economic Cooperation;" Res. 3177 (XXVIII) and Res. 3241 (XXIX) "Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries;" Res. 3251 (XXIX) "Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries; Res. 3343 (XXIX) "Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Development and International Economic Cooperation;" Res. 3362 (S-VII) "Development and International Economic Cooperation;"

of UN meetings and all the UN specialized agencies were called upon the improve the lot of developing countries in view of the growing gap between them and the industrialized nations and the slow rate of progress in the implementation of the goals and objectives of the International Development Strategy. The Algiers Conference had called for the convening of a Special Session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to development problems.[101]

The ITU participated at the Special Session, held in September 1975. The Union was invited to recognize more fully that an adequate telecommunication infrastructure is a necessity for the stimulation of international trade and industrialization, two items on the agenda of the Special Session. The Union was going to collaborate to the establishment of an international center for the exchange of information on science and technology and stimulate their transfer to developing countries, also on the Session agenda. Finally, under the rubric "Food and Agriculture," the ITU was to undertake studies on small capacity transmission systems suitable for rural telecommunications.[102]

The Secretary General informed the Administrative Council that both in ECOSOC and in the United Nations General Assembly, the ITU had been criticized and reproached by member governments because of the lack of attention it had so far paid to the Development Decade. Tangible proof would have to be furnished

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[101]See UNGA Resolution 3172 (XXVIII).

[102]Doc. 4888/CA31 (1976).

that the Union was determined to take part in the effort undertaken in that connection.[103]

This international debate on cooperation and development had somewhat energized the ITU involvement in this field. Despite the above criticism, the Union was able to show that progress had been made in cooperation activities during the 1971-1975 period.

Whereas many UN specialized agencies were engaged in joint projects or exchanging information of common relevance, the ITU was still generally working in isolation which had led other international bodies to criticize its absence of commitment to collaborative efforts directed to developing countries. This organizational behavior may well be explained by the unique character of the ITU. The Union was established long before any other international organization by a closely-knit community of Western European nations who wanted to protect as much as possible their national interest by conceding a very limited area of jurisdiction to the intergovernmental organization. This was best embodied in a federated structure that prevented the organization to become tentacular and reduce the sovereign decision-making of its members.

At the 32nd session of the Administrative Council, the Secretary-General delivered a statement, entitled "Telecommunications, an Important Factor in Economic and Social Development: Role of the ITU in this Domain," which articulated the modalities

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[103]Doc. 4981/CA31 (1976), p. 6.

of collaboration with other specialized agencies.[104] By becoming increasingly aware of the role of telecommunications in all facets of national development, the ITU realized the need to share resources with other bodies whose projects comprise a communication component. This move is also explained by the historical tendency of the Union to protect its exclusive mandate on telecommunication matters.

In December 1976, the UN General Assembly adopted the resolution "Cooperation and Assistance in the Application and Improvement of National Information and Mass Communication Systems for Social Progress and Development," inviting "the government of the developing countries to give due regard to the establishment and/or strengthening of their national mass communication systems within the framework of their overall development plans" and it requested UNESCO "to continue and intensify its program for the development of mass communication systems, especially for the benefit of developing countries."[105]

The ITU Secretary-General, who wanted the bring the Union in the mainstream of specialized agencies, saw an opportunity for collaboration and thus informed UNESCO of the mandate and role of the Union. UNESCO's Director-General responded positively:

> Unesco's action, which relates to the content of the message, since it is an educational, scientific, cultural and ethical activity, only becomes significant and effective to the extent that a parallel, or even concerted, activity, is carried out with respect to the

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[104]Doc. 5073/CA32 (1977).

[105]See A/RES/31/139.

> message transmission infrastructure. This is brought out clearly when we are called upon to advise the Member States on information policy.[106]

With the adoption by the Administrative Council of Resolution 800 entitled "Telecommunication , An Important Factor in Economic and Social Development: Role of the ITU in this Domain," a close collaboration with UNESCO was initiated and, from this day, the ITU carried out more readily its "obligations" vis-a-vis the other member organizations of the United Nations system.

UNDP Policy Impacts Upon the ITU

Although previous statements emphasized the excellent relations between the ITU and the United Nations Development Program, a number of countries from all groups were increasingly unhappy with the level of support provided by the UNDP in view of the Union's growing development activities. UNDP had to make some adjustments in its program since 1975 when it became apparent that for a variety of reasons there had been a marked rise in its total expenditure without a similarly large increase in the resources available to it.

UNDP had been repeatedly asked to finance expenditures occasioned by additional ITU regional experts. These requests had been turned down on the ground that the Governing Council had decided that 82 percent of total UNDP resources would be used for country programs. It had always insisted on keeping that percentage, and would in fact prefer to increase it and decrease the 18

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[106] Ibid., p. 3.

percent now set aside for regional and inter-country programs. This policy put the ITU in a difficult situation because precisely these programs that the Union were emphasizing, as reflected in the figures. ITU total expenditures had grown from 3 percent of total UNDP expenditures in 1972 to 4.45 percent in 1976, and ITU inter-country expenditures had grown over the same period from 2.84 percent to 5.85 percent.

If UNDP were unwilling to finance, through regional experts, this component of ITU's cooperation activities, several large projects would be put in jeopardy due to delay in implementation. The contract of some regional experts was not being reconducted. The delegate from Senegal noted that PANAFTEL activities would undoubtedly suffer. The delegate from India expressed concerned regarding the lack of continuity in the regional coordination of the Asian Telecommunications Network.[107]

Another aspect of the uneasy relations between the ITU and UNDP was the reluctance of the latter to reimburse the Union's administrative overhead expenses, a deficit mainly due to unfavorable fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate. The 1976 budget had included a freezing of 24 posts financed from the Technical Cooperation Department which had gradually reduced the staff to the level of 1972. Due to efficiency measures, however, the assistance actually provided in 1976 exceeded that furnished in 1972. But these measures had a limit.

The industrialized countries, who had vehemently opposed any

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[107]Doc. 5100/CA32 (1977), pp. 2-3.

ITU funding other than through UNDP, recognized the need for a more flexible approach if ITU's entire development edifice was not to collapse. A consensus had been reached on the principle of the establishment of a Fund under the aegis of the ITU. The above situation helped make it more palatable to the developed countries. These delegations, however, made it clear that "any urgent measures to meet an immediate need should not be construed by anyone inside or outside the ITU as diminishing the Union's basic dependence on UNDP for funds.[108] There was the feeling that if UNDP was informed that the Union had found its own solution, it might wash its hands of the problems.

Given the state of affairs, it comes as no surprise that the discussion on the future of technical cooperation at the ITU occupied much of the 32nd session of the Administrative Council. The main issue was how to finance regional experts in light of UNDP's budgetary restrictions. The number of regional experts in Asia had in effect been reduced from three to one. In Africa, the Union had lost its remaining two experts. Two of the three experts in Latin America had left their posts .

The delegate from Morocco suggested that thoughts should be given to the possibility of integrating appropriations for regional experts within the ordinary budget of the Union. He reminded that the Group of Engineers concerned with technical cooperation matters were already charged to the ordinary bud-

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[108]Doc. 5110/CA32 (1977), p. 3.

get.[109] The same was true of the Training Division, starting in 1974. These precedents having been established, it hardly seemed unreasonable to ask the ITU to go somewhat further and to take more responsibility for technical cooperation. The idea was still unpopular with the developed countries who preferred the solution of increasing their UNDP contributions, which a few actually did. For Sweden, a relatively large contributor to technical cooperation through UNDP,

> a decision by one international organization working in a specialized field to change its rule would inevitably influence the totality of an individual country's contribution to technical assistance as a whole or else the manner in which that total contribution was distributed among various specialized agencies. The governments of the donor countries had to retain an overview of the use to which their technical assistance contributions were put.[110]

In order to overcome the objections of the industrialized countries, Zaire proposed three sources of financing: first, the income from the sales of ITU service stamps, courtesy of the Swiss PTTs; secondly, interest on ITU deposit accounts and interest on payments in arrears; and thirdly, the sum of one million Swiss francs which had been set aside to cover the arrears of an administration which had unexpectedly paid its contribution. If these solutions were precluded by the Convention, proposals could be forwarded to the next Plenipotentiary Conference and, if accepted, lead to appropriate changes in the

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[109] Under Resolution 17 of the Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference.

[110] Doc. 5100/CA32 (1977), p. 8.

basic instrument, a processus unique to the ITU.

The third solution was rejected on the basis of accounting procedures. The second solution presented some difficulties since those funds were inputs in the Union's ordinary budget and therefore could not be used for special purpose without approval of the Plenipotentiary. In addition, the figures were more a result of the system of bookkeeping. The first solution did not meet objection; revenues from the sale of stamps provided a steady source of income: 340,00 Sw. frs in 1974, and, as much as one million Swiss francs in 1976. Indeed, UNDP might consider that the ITU was not doing enough to extricate itself from its difficulties, and the solution of using income from stamp sales to establish a special technical cooperation fund would demonstrate initiative on the part of the Union.[111]

Delegates from industrialized countries were of the opinion that not enough had yet been done to convince UNDP of the need to reverse its decision concerning the financing of regional experts. It was decided that members of Committee 3 (Technical Cooperation) of the Administrative Council whose countries were represented on the UNDP Governing Council should make sure that those representatives would make the Union's views known at the next Governing Council session. These efforts have been marked by some success. In 1978, UNDP had notified the ITU of its definite agreement to finance eight regional experts. Assurances had been received that the necessary funds would be available until 1981,

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[111]Doc. 5116/CA32 (1977).

the end of the current UNDP programming cycle, a limit that raised some concerns for continuity.

The Future of Technical Cooperation

The Plenipotentiary Conference was critically important, especially to the developing countries since they were in a position through their majority to make changes in the Convention that would reflect their concerns. They wanted to make sure that the next Conference to be held in 1982 at Nairobi be brought up-to-date on the implementation of Resolutions, Recommendations, and Opinions adopted at Malaga-Torremolinos and what were the financial difficulties the ITU faced so as to propose adequate measures to improve cooperation activities. Delegates from developing countries called upon the Secretary-General to prepare detailed reports. The representative from India put forth a proposal, subsequently approved, calling for the establishment of a "Working Party to Study the Future of Technical Cooperation Activity by the ITU" to enable the Council to make a complete review of all aspects of technical cooperation with a view to submitting proposals to the next Plenipotentiary Conference, in preparation for the next Plenipotentiary Conference.[112] An informal open-ended Working Group will be set up in 1979.

The future of technical cooperation was also on the agenda of the Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC) held at Buenos Aires in September 1978. The

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[112]See Doc. 5275/CA33 (1978), p. 5 and Doc. 5277/CA33 (1978) (India's proposal).

Conference's goal was to help advance the establishment of the new international economic order (NIEO). The main objectives may be summarized as follows:

a) to encourage national self-reliance by increasing the creative capacity of the developing countries for the purpose of enabling them to solve their development problems in the light of their own values and their specific needs;

b) to promote collective self-reliance by sharing and pooling the developing countries' resources and capacities;

c) to define joint positions for the developing countries and strengthen their negotiating abilities in their economic relations with the advanced countries;

d) to take full advantage of existing institutions and possibilities and of the resources available for international cooperation by ensuring maximum efficiency and economy in the use of these resources.[113]

The Conference, to which the ITU actively participated, unanimously adopted the "Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing TCDC." The Plan proposed that developed countries and their institutions should base their voluntary contributions to operational programs of the United Nations development system; provide financial support on a voluntary basis to technical cooperation between two or more developing countries, accelerate the process of untying their aid resources, and in their economic and technical cooperation activities give the priority to TCDC in intercountry projects and programs. UNDP was also called upon to revise its policies in order to adapt

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[113]Doc. 5312/CA34 (1979).

them to future activities.

The Conference was important in that it urged governments of developing countries to be more actively involved in setting priorities in national development agenda. The developed members of the ITU had consistently asked their less endowed counterparts to give more careful consideration to telecommunication matters in their overall development planning as a way to alleviate some of the difficulties encountered while approaching financial institutions. A more forceful commitment to telecommunication development might entice UNDP to earmark more resources to projects in this field. The ITU's Secretary-General lost no opportunity to carry this message to the TCDC Conference.

1978 had been marked by a slow recovery in the level of cooperation afforded by the ITU. This was the message heard by many delegates at the 1979 session of the Administrative Council. The Union began to regard rural telecommunications as a matter of priority and a world-wide project on rural telecommunications was being planned to consider fundamental guidelines.[114]

At the same session, the United States submitted a Draft Resolution on the terms of reference of the Working Party on the future of ITU Technical Cooperation which should work during the four Administrative Council sessions leading to the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference. The terms of reference were stated as follows:

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[114]Doc. 5366/CA34 (1979).

- to review the technical cooperation activities of the permanent organs of the Union in all their forms, and to assess the extent to which these have served to fulfil the purposes of the Union as embodies in No. 19 of the Convention;[115]

- to study the costs borne by the ITU for such activities and to identify the difficulties encountered in optimizing their benefits, as well as the problems due to insufficiency of funds, and to recommend measures for effecting improvements;

- to review the work of the Union as the executing agency for telecommunication projects financed under the United Nations Development Program and to suggest possible measures for making it even more effective;

- to examine whether the existing arrangements for reimbursement of costs to the ITU as the executing agency for telecommunication projects financed by UNDP are adequate and to suggest revived criteria, if necessary, for handling the work more efficiently;

- to examine possible alternative methods for making available to the Union additional financial resources, which can be devoted to technical cooperation and assistance activities, under the Union's own control, and to make suitable recommendations;

- to examine the manner in which the Funds-in-Trust are draw upon by the Union for rendering technical assistance and to recommend measures for more efficient utilization of these funds;

- to examine whether the ITU can play any useful role in respect of bilateral and multilateral programs for technical cooperation and assistance in the field of telecommunications concluded by Member countries.[116]

It had been said earlier that radio matters were of critical importance to the developing countries since radiocommunication

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[115]A No. 19 of the International Telecommunication Convention, 1973, states that one of the purposes of the Union is to "foster the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and networks in developing countries by every means at its disposal, especially its participation in the appropriate programs of the United Nations."

[116]Doc. 5377/CA34 (1979).

was a substitute for not yet developed terrestrial wired telephone networks. This was illustrated by the insistence of developing countries to safeguard and expand the work of IFRB.

CHAPTER 8

1979-1981: TECHNICAL COOPERATION REVISITED

World Administrative Radio Conference

The World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) which opened in September 1979 was therefore important in that it represented the culmination of years of prior efforts and reflected the concerns and expectation of the world telecommunication community. The last such general conference had occurred in 1959. Its importance was heightened by the fact that it represented a forum as large as the Plenipotentiary Conferences and developing countries, by their sheer number, would be more effective in shaping up its agenda than in smaller meetings.

One of the pre-WARC 79 conferences was the Telecommunication Coordinating Meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries for the Preparation of WARC 79 held in May of that year at Yaounde (Cameroon). It adopted a number of proposals that were considered beneficial to the developing countries. An ad hoc group was created to meet on occasion to "bring out common or coordinated points of view."[117]

The opening of the Conference was characterized by an unprecedented struggle over the chairmanship that lasted a week. The meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries which was held in Havana a few weeks earlier had decided that the chairman of WARC 79 should come from a developing nation. The Western bloc, under the

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[117]See Codding and Rutkowski for further information on WARC 79 proceedings, pp. 71-80.

leadership of the United States, countered with pro-Western candidates. Finally, after a series of fruitless confrontations, the head of the Argentinean delegation was accepted by both sides.

Twenty years had elapsed since the first WARC in 1959. The 1979 gathering was important in that it was the closest thing to a Plenipotentiary; large conferences had historically advantaged the Third World constituency. It was, moreover, the first technical meeting where the developing countries faced their industrialized counterparts in a common front to advance their objectives. These objectives were different from those of the developed countries.

Whereas the agenda of the technologically-advanced countries included the allocation of radio frequency bands for the operation of new satellite and terrestrial communication services, that of the developing countries was primarily to question the historical decision-making process regarding the allocation of radio frequencies. In particular, these countries challenged the "first come, first served" policy which presided so far over the allotment of geostationary orbital slots on the ground that it might jeopardize the future use of satellites for their national development as there may not be anymore slot left when they will be in a position to operate their own satellites.[118] Colombia

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[118]The geostationary orbit is the only equatorial orbit on which satellites can provide terrestrial locations with 24-hour communication services. With the ability to accommodate only a limited number of satellites, this orbit is thus a scarce resource.

even proposed that the equatorial countries assume sovereignty over that part of the geostationary orbit located in their space.[119] In addition, the developing countries wanted to reserve for themselves large numbers of high-frequency bands--portions of the radio spectrum that the industrialized countries wished to use for specialized telecommunication services--needed to operate their shortwave fixed service networks, a substitute to the underdeveloped telephone systems.

Where planning mechanisms were not sought, the developing countries demonstrated their ingenuity by drawing upon various preferential treatment norms adopted in many other international forums during the decade.

The outcome of WARC 79 as far as technical cooperation is concerned was the adoption of six specific Resolutions and one Recommendations reviewed at the 35th session of the Administrative Council in 1980 who was asked to submit to the next Council session a study of ways and means to implement them. The Recommendations relate to the development of national radio frequency management, the introduction and development of computer assistance in radio frequency management within administrations, technical cooperation with the developing countries in maritime telecommunications and in the study of propagation in tropical areas, the role of telecommunications in integrated rural development, international cooperation and technical assistance

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[119]Doc. 196/WARC 79. The equatorial countries are Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire.

in the field of space communications. The Recommendation relates to a handbook for computer-aided techniques in radio frequency management.[120]

Codding notes that, "the import of WARC 79 was its display of the respective skills, needs, and power of developed versus developing nations, and the ability of the ITU to serve as a useful forum for negotiated international agreements."[121]

Relations With UNESCO

In 1977, the ITU had formalized its collaboration with UNESCO and the two sister organizations have prepared a report for the 33rd session of the UN General Assembly. The subsequent years, the relations strengthened. UNESCO had been involved for some times with literacy campaigns as well as with the design of educational programs for the rural population. Telecommunication support services were increasingly being seen as essential for the implementation of these programs. UNESCO's interest in telecommunications was an underlying element in the establishment of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. The Commission met between 1977 and 1979 under the chairmanship of Mr. Sean MacBride and presented its final report **Many Voices, One World** in 1980.

The Intergovernmental Conference for Cooperation on Activities, Needs and Programs for Communication Development, held in

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[120]For further description, see Res. 5, 7, 15, 16, 37, 316; Rec. 31 in Doc. 5467/CA35 (1980),

[121]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 51.

Paris in April 1980, was attended by ITU representatives. The discussions centered on the enlargement of the concept of communication (previously in UNESCO more or less confined to mass media) with a new concept of social communications being referred to but, as yet undefined. Obviously, taken with the interest and complexity associated with transfer of information and with communications in all of its ramifications, social communications could have a much wider functional role of interest to many organizations, and not merely confined to any one institution such as UNESCO. In any event, the ITU stressed the Union's basic responsibility in the UN system in regard to the means of distribution and associated telecommunications infrastructure, as well as coordination with other agencies in the UN system.

Significant recommendations of interest to the ITU were adopted by consensus by the Conference. Member states were called upon:

- to contribute to the creation and consolidation of appropriate systems of communication at the material and logistic levels, taking into account the requirements of endogenous development;

- to identify the priority areas in national investment plans and communication development programs which justify support and financing by competent national or international bodies;

-to give highest priority to the creation or development of the national and regional infrastructures which are necessary for communication, to the improvement of professional and technical training as well as to the setting up of production structures to ensure a more balanced exchange of information and cultural products;

International and regional organizations were asked:

- to intensify their reciprocal cooperation with a view to the more effective utilization of their existing or

> potential human and material resources, in the communication development field, in support of the common aims which those organizations pursue;
>
> - to provide additional resources to information and communication development programs and to support efforts made by developing countries to set up infrastructures and facilitates for social communication, telecommunication or informatics which will enable them to transmit or receive information of all kinds at an acceptable cost.[122]

Most importantly, the Conference decided to establish an International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC), which was formalized by a Resolution at the 21st session of the UNESCO General Conference in Belgrade, 1980, implemented by an Intergovernmental Council. IPDC's objectives were a concrete articulation of the above principles and a response to the call for a New World Information Order (NWIO), a controversial subject that dominated UNESCO forums. One of IPDC's objectives was "to strengthen cooperation and coordination activities of UNESCO with other specialized agencies concerned, especially with the International Telecommunication Union."[123]

With the Organization for Economic Cooperation and development (OECD)--an international body with a membership restricted to the industrialized countries, the ITU has embarked on a project to clarify the "public good" contribution of telecommunication investment in the rural and isolated areas. There was already evidence of some interesting trade-offs. This initial

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[122]See CC-80/CONF.212/DR.8 contained in ITU Doc.5495/CA35 (1980), Annex 6.

[123]Ibid., p. 5.

study was to meet the particular need of UNESCO.

It is recalled that the establishment of the IPDC was due to the initiative of the United States who wanted to deflect attempts made by some developing countries to have UNESCO take a series of stringent measures to redress the perceived imbalance in information flow between developed and developing countries. These measures were judged to be inimical to the interests of the Western industrialized nations. It is no surprise that the US delegate in the Administrative Council expected that the ITU would participate on an equal footing with UNESCO in the UNDP's Intergovernmental Council. For different reasons, the Soviet Union and nations within its sphere of influence were also pushing for a close collaboration with UNESCO in the implementation of IPDC objectives. Unlike the Western nations, they resolutely sided with the developing countries in their attempts to establish a new world information order. There was a question as to why another agency had been able to take action in a matter involving the ITU. According to the delegate from India, there was a feeling in UNESCO circles that the ITU had not responded sufficiently to the needs of the developing world.[124]

It should be noted that for the first time in ITU's history, the important Committee 3 (Technical Cooperation) was chaired by a representative from a developing country, Senegal. His election coincided with the African Telecommunications Conference and, more importantly, the launching of the Plan of Action for the

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[124]Doc. 5561/CA35 (1980).

United Nations Transport and Communications Decade in Africa. This set of circumstances put the African continent on the forefront of ITU's preoccupations.

The main objective of the African Telecommunications Conference was to provide a forum for all interested parties to review the progress of the all-important PANAFTEL project and to define the objectives, targets, and strategies for the development of telecommunications during the second phase of the Decade (1983-1987). The timing of the Conference was opportune since the decisions and recommendations will help to give a definitive direction to the formulation of projects for the UNDP's Third Regional Program for Africa (1982-1986).[125]

Difficulties in Financing ITU's Cooperation Activities (Cont'd)

Each year the Administrative Council is informed of the total value of technical cooperation projects implemented by the Union and of the income received by the Union to defray the cost of the activities undertaken by the Technical Cooperation Department in support of these projects. Although the level of technical cooperation project activities has shown an appreciable increase in recent years with consequent increases in the dollar value of projects implemented, the level of support cost received from the UNDP in terms of Swiss francs has fallen far short of actual expenditure. The level of income had been adversely affected by the strength of the Swiss currency in relation to the

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[125]For further information, see Doc. 5617/CA36 (1981).

US dollar which has increased the budget deficit of the Technical Cooperation Department.

Each year the ITU had submitted a formal request to the UNDP for reimbursement of the support cost deficit incurred during the previous year. The ITU, however, does not qualify for support cost flexibility arrangement (that would cover unusually significant exchange rate fluctuations), applied by UNDP to executing agencies with project expenditures not exceeding US $10 million. This was a matter of great concern to the ITU. Following consideration of new, more limiting UNDP guidelines that would reduce the reimbursement rate of annual project support costs from 14 percent to 13 percent, the ITU together with all other agencies which have suffered from the appreciation of the currency of their headquarters locations in relation to the US dollar, categorically stated that they could not accept the basic premise by UNDP that no compensation for losses already sustained had been envisaged by the Governing Council.

The circumstances which led ITU to take this very firm stand have been described in detail over a number of years. The Technical Cooperation Department of the Union is staffed at a modest level considering the program of activities being executed. There has been no growth in the number of staff since 1973. The value of the projects implemented by the Union has grown by a factor of three over the period 1973-1980 and the number of projects administered have almost doubled during this time. Income from support costs over the same period, in terms of Swiss

francs, has remained substantially static. However, costs, and staff costs in particular, have escalated at a substantial rate, well beyond the capacity of the Union to absorb the extra expenses involved. The Administrative Council was invited to express its concern that decision being taken by inter-governmental bodies of the UN system external to the ITU will result in additional financial obligations being placed on the Union if the existing level of technical cooperation activities is to be maintained or increased.[126]

The industrialized countries were adamant in their opposition to draw upon the ITU's ordinary budget to solve the problem. They suggested that time had come for the Administrative Council to subject the budget of the Technical Cooperation Department to careful scrutiny and conduct a thorough review of arrangements for the organization of the Department, something which had never been done. The Department should reduce its overheads and make a selection among the various projects. They wished the Secretary--General had devoted greater consideration to the invitation by ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly for executing agencies to review their working methods, arrangements, staffing, etc., with a view to making significant reductions in overall support costs. The developing countries feared that the Union might reduce its cooperation activities.[127]

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[126]Doc. 5619/CA36 (1981).

[127]Doc. 5677/CA36 (1981).

Candid Look at ITU Technical Cooperation Activities

The Draft Report of the Working Group on the Future of ITU Technical Cooperation Activities was delivered at the 1982 session of the Administrative Council. This comprehensive document was critically important because if was the first time in the history of technical cooperation activities that the Union had been engaged in the exercise of reviewing its past performance and in recommending courses of action. The document was also important by its timing; it was issued seven months prior to the convening in Nairobi of the Plenipotentiary Conference whose agenda will be dominated by technical cooperation items due to the large attendance from developing countries.

It is, therefore, worth summarizing at some length the recommendations issued by the Working Group as they clearly reveal the sectoral shortcomings of the present organizational structure of the ITU.[128]

Funding for technical cooperation activities.

The ITU should continue to participate in the UNDP as an executing agency given that its participation had proven to be of great help in assisting developing countries. As from 1982, UNDP will apply a new system of additional support cost reimbursements resulting from currency exchange fluctuations, under which the executing agencies such as the ITU will be required to absorb a

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[128]Doc. 5758/CA37 (1982). In presenting these recommendations, the Drafting Group did not strive for unanimity. They are possible recommendations arising from the group discussions.

All the quotes in the following summary are contained in pp. 12-15 of the document.

percentage of the loss due to currency fluctuations. It was therefore recommended that the ITU should provide in its regular budget to cover the loss of the income in the Technical Cooperation budget. The role of the Union as an executing agency of UNDP does not completely satisfy the needs of developing countries. For its technical cooperation activities, it relies solely on UNDP, an organization over whose development programs the ITU has no control. The Union should have its own technical cooperation program funded from its regular budget, so as to improve assistance, particularly to developing countries.

In addition to voluntary contributions, the Special Fund for Technical Cooperation should be based on a percentage of the ordinary budget of the Union with a view to carrying out priority development projects. A substantial increase in the credit allocated to finance short-term specialist missions is recommended since those have proved extremely useful in that they precisely meet the requirements at present expressed by beneficiary countries in connection with specific and urgent problems.

Personnel issues for technical cooperation.

In continuation of the efforts already made to provide the Technical Cooperation Department with a number of permanent posts, it is recommended that as many additional posts as may be justified, at all levels, may be made permanent. The ITU should prepare a list of experts in various fields with member administrations, whose services can be made available at short notice, with the view to using them for short expert missions or semi-

nars. The ITU should increase the staff of the Group of Engineers to cover not only conventional specialties such as switching, broadcasting, space radiocommunications, planning, management and organization, etc., but also the new telematic services; the members of the Group should continue to be highly specialized and experienced engineers.

Publications.

The cost of publications should be examined and fixed at a reasonable level so that they be accessible in sufficient numbers to the administrations of developing countries. Handbook on planning, maintenance, and operation of telecommunication systems should be kept up to date in order to assist the developing countries as reference texts. At the conclusion of a World or Regional Administrative Radio Conference, the IFRB should prepare a handbook to explain and illustrate in simple terms the decisions and the procedures adopted by the conference concerned.

CCIs and IFRB issues.

The CCIs should undertake all possible measures to improve the adaptation of current and future activities to the needs of the developing countries by:

- publication of simplified versions of appropriate CCI texts;

- joint preparation and organization of seminars and symposia. As far as possible, the documentation of the seminars should be sent to participants for prior study and analysis to permit the participating administrations to derive maximum benefit from the seminars;

- establishing Special Preparatory Meetings for Administrative Radio Conferences;

- setting up a Special Study Group (SSG) by each of the CCIs, where all questions of specific and immediate concern to developing countries, though individually coming under the terms of reference of the different Study Groups (GAS), can be considered together. It would be necessary to ensure that experts from advanced countries who normally participate in the relevant regular GASs also participate in the SSGs.

The CCIs should undertake all possible efforts to augment the possibilities which may ensure a more active participation of developing countries in the various activities of the CCIs by:

- combination or sequential grouping of meetings of several related GASs and/or Working Parties;

- organizing seminars relating to the activities of specific GASs in the various regions;

- organization of meetings of specific Working Parties or GASs in one region if problems directly related to this region are dealt with.

Training.

Staff and material resources of the Training Division should be augmented to meet the urgent needs of the developing countries and to ensure the conduct of Course Development in Telecommunications (CODEVTEL) activities on a worldwide basis, the continuation of efforts, the consolidation of the results obtained by the ITU in developing bases for the establishment of training standards and the transfer of modern educational technology for vocational training in the developing countries. The IFRB should standardize and keep up-to-date its training programs so as to reflect specific desires of administrations and permit uniform application of the procedures of Radio Regulations by all administrations and particularly those of developing countries.

Regional activities.

In the context of the increasing quantum and complexity of the technical cooperation and technical assistance tasks of the ITU at the regional level, it is necessary to make a beginning with the setting up of Regional Offices of the Union; such offices should be staffed at an adequate level and delegated sufficient authority to enable them to establish an effective regional presence of the Union in regard to the functions of all the organs of the Union. The duties, functions, and strength of the Union's establishment at headquarters should be reviewed and revised accordingly. The Regional Offices, as proposed, should be provided with a complement of a group of experts in specific telecommunication disciplines so as to be able to respond promptly and meaningfully to the current and emerging needs of the respective regions.

Greater emphasis should be given to the organization of regional seminars to reflect, and build up, better awareness of the work of all the technical organs of the Union; the subjects to be treated at these seminars should be of particular relevance to the regions. The Union should institute measures at the headquarters and in the proposed regional offices to facilitate exchange of experience and expertise, as also for transfer of technology among the developing countries within the region as well as between regions. This involves identification of specific areas of capability where TCDC would be fruitful and which can be determined through interaction between the Union and the adminis-

trations.

Priorities for technical cooperation.

Taking into account that the developing countries place on the list of priorities, as most important, the following tasks:

- training in all activities connected with the development, operation, maintenance, management, etc., of telecommunication;

- telecommunication in rural areas--concepts, ideas, and subsidiary activities;

- transfer of technology;

- elimination of disparities in the state of telecommunication taking into account the differences and peculiarities of each developing country;

It is recommended that the ITU shall:

- broaden the flow of information concerning the cooperation activities that can be provided;

- lay special stress on solving the problems of cooperation in education and training on a full scale and at all levels.

- provide adequate information to technicians and management personnel on aspects of telecommunication networks of all levels;

- be guided in its activity in the area of technical cooperation by the necessity of achieving steady and equal progress in the development of technical telecommunication structures for each of the countries within a region.

Transfer of technology.

The ITU should step up its efforts to assist impartially the developing countries in introducing modern technology by the following means:

- improving the dissemination of technological information, particularly that concerning technology of relevance to the developing countries;

- promoting the standardization of telecommunication equipment and material;

- assisting the developing countries to identify their overall telecommunication requirement, assess their own potential to absorb the technology proposed and draw up a national development policy in that area;

- assisting the developing countries by planning the introduction of any new technology into their networks and industry.

Rural telecommunications.

Until now insufficient emphasis has been given to the importance of telecommunications as a stimulus to development, particularly in rural areas; rural telecommunications make for greater stability in rural settlements, thus avoiding the major migratory movements experienced at present, and could help gradually to convert them into economically useful sectors:

- the ITU should show the way and support studies which demonstrate the vital impact of telecommunications on the development of rural areas; and at the same time encourage recognized Private Operating Agencies and telecommunication equipment manufacturers to take an interest in such development and supply telecommunication equipment which meets the needs of the developing countries (emphasis in text);

- the ITU Technical Cooperation Department should take the necessary steps to offer direct advice which contributes to the construction of the rural telecommunication networks needed for the development of rural areas;

- the ITU with the assistance of member administrations should encourage private companies and manufacturers dealing in telecommunications and electronics to provide assistance in the development of, in particular, rural telecommunications networks in developing countries.

Finally, the report calls for an improvement in the amount of coordination at the General Secretariat level and the perma-

nent organs in matters of technical cooperation in the interest of the Union and for the efficient delivery of such activities to the developing countries. The document was approved for submission to the forthcoming Plenipotentiary Conference.

In accordance with a request made at the Administrative Council session the previous year, the Secretary-General submitted at this year's Council session his report of "Organization and Methods of the Technical Cooperation Department." This report was intended to provide a thorough and comprehensive view of technical cooperation activities at ITU headquarters, the first ever conducted, without duplicating arguments already taken into consideration by the Working Group on the Future of ITU Technical Cooperation Activities. The main conclusions of the report can be summarized as follows:

> 1) Between 1973 and 1981 the technical cooperation program comprising all the projects which ITU has implemented, rose from roughly 10 to 40 million dollars. The reorientation of filed requirement during the period under report created an increasedburden on the headquarters' level in connection withthe administration, monitoring of projects andprovision of technical backstopping.
>
> 2) The number of posts in the Department has not increased since 1973 in line with restrictions imposed to combat the shortfall in income forsupport costs owing to the unfavorable dollar-Swissfranc exchange rate.
>
> 3) The continuous assessment of the Department's work has confirmed the validity of its present structure and organization and highlighted the staff's motiva tion. Nevertheless, the growth in activities together with the increased complexity of projectsdo present problems, particularly as regards qualityof work since priority is given to activitiespermitting the budget to be balanced.

The guidelines and measures already adopted or to be completed as a result of the continuous assessment of the Department's work and the proposals formulated by outside consultants relate to improvement in procedures and standards, management statistics and data, recruitment of experts, fellowships, and equipment.[129] Given the lack of time to discuss the report and the number of controversial proposal it contained, it was decided that it would not be submitted at the Plenipotentiary Conference.

Subsequent discussions reveals that the areas of the Union's cooperation activities most affected by the shortage of funds was that of regional experts. In the past three years, UNDP had provided the ITU with supplementary funding for additional experts, but the Governing Council had abolished the posts of all four regional experts in the third UNDP programming cycle (1982-1986).[130]

The CODEVTEL (Course Development in Telecommunication) project was well under way and performed at the general satisfaction of the beneficiary countries. The training standards put forward in the Training Development Guidelines produced by the project had a considerable impact on course development methods in the countries visited by the missions. Concerns were raised, however, about it continuation. UNDP had financed the pilot projects initiated in 1975 and because of its success had agreed

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[129]See Doc. 5816/CA37 (1982).

[130]Doc. 5851/CA37 (1982).

to finance the second phase, but he resources available for global projects in contrast to those available for national or regional projects, were very limited. Despite the Union's urgent appeals for financial support in the new phase after 1982, the reply from UNDP so far had been that credits would not be available and there was not much likelihood of that position being modified.

India expressed regret at the virtual total non-participation of industrialized countries although most of the courses related to equipment imported from them. The Union ought to insist on manufacturers providing training courses within the CODEVTEL framework for the operation and maintenance of equipment at the time when it was being provided. Great Britain and other developed countries recognized the complementarity of interests between them and buyers of their products. To some extent, ITU-administered cooperation programs were being used a showcases for telecommunication equipment.

The Soviet Union, which has consistently claimed that the ITU and all other UN specialized agencies should aim at fighting colonialism and ensure the political and economic independence of developing countries, has always feared that this "showcase" policy would helped expand Western manufacturers' markets in the developing countries and, thus, perpetuate dependent relations. To the developing countries, the "showcase" aspect of cooperation meant, foremost, an added responsibility on the part of the industrialized nations to increase their level of assistance

which might be translated in them taking over the financing of CODEVTEL if UNDP funding is discontinued.[131]

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[131]Doc. 5856/CA37 (1982).

CHAPTER 9

1982-1985: MILESTONE FOR THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The sixth ITU Plenipotentiary Conference opened September 1982 at Nairobi. Since the previous Plenipotentiary (Malaga-Torremolinos), nine years ago, there have been numerous changes in the world community and in the UN system which have affected the ITU.

In 1974 the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration about the establishment of a new international economic order (NIEO) and a program of action for its implementation. This program looks for the transformation of the economies of developing countries by giving those countries a substantial share in world industrial production and trade. It calls for measures to make developing countries technologically self-sufficient.

Two commissions have been the focus for attention: the Brandt Commission, which described the great disparities between rich and poor countries and formulated a development strategy for the 1980s, and the MacBride Commission, which assessed the imbalances and differences between developed and developing countries in the field of communications. At the UNESCO General Conference (Belgrade, 1980) the final report of the MacBride Commission was debated and an International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC) was approved. It called for the need to strengthen the coordination of activities in the field of information and communication of UNESCO with other UN specialized agencies and in particular with the ITU.

Alongside the growing insight and awareness of the great disparities between the countries of the world, the global economic recession has contributed to increase the differences and to make it more difficult to bring about concrete actions to ease the situation, especially for the least developed countries. The value of UNDP assistance provided to developing countries has fluctuated a great deal since 1973. There has been a downward trend in telecommunication investment supported by multilateral aid authorities.

One of the most striking aspects of the Nairobi Plenipotentiary was the number of delegates who participated--almost 900 from 157 member countries. During the period 1973-1982, 17 countries became members of the ITU--all developing countries. They naturally expected to have a part of the ITU activities devoted to their needs. The Conference produced 76 Resolutions, one Recommendation, and three Opinions. Decisions taken strengthened the rules in the International Telecommunication Convention about technical cooperation activities performed by the permanent organs of the ITU. Some of the developed countries, however, were of the opinion that development cooperation should not become a primary task of the ITU.[132]

A representative of a developing country, Senegal, was

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[132]For more information about the general atmosphere of the Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference, see Ruben Naslund, "ITU Conference in Nairobi: Confrontation or mutual understanding?" **Telecommunications Policy** (June 1983), pp. 100-110, and George A. Codding, Jr. "The Changing Nature of the ITU Plenipotentiary," **Telecommunications Policy** (December 1983), pp. 317-325.

chosen to chair the all-important Committee 6 (Technical Cooperation). In an apparent attempt to deflect the anticipated pressures by developing countries to require that the various elements of technical cooperation activities be covered by the ITU's regular budget, the United States submitted to the conference a resolution calling for a review of the overall management and operations of the technical cooperation activities of the Union by an independent study team, convinced that significant improvements can be made to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of existing programs, thereby achieving more benefit for the same costs.

A report on the Technical Cooperation Department operations had been presented earlier that year at the Administrative Council but it excluded two major aspects of cooperation activities dealing with operation outside of Geneva, particularly: 1) regional presences and the relationship of ITU field personnel and developing countries to the Geneva operation and, 2) the constraints under which the ITU conducts its TC activities as required by UNDP. In addition, the Working Group to Study the Future of ITU Technical Cooperation Activities had issued its report which did not contain any critical analysis of the effectiveness of current programs and no clear indication of priorities. By reviewing cost accounting, regional relations, budget, and operation, the proposed independent report would not overlap with the previous ones.[133]

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[133]Doc. 163/PC 1982.

As anticipated, the search for alternative sources of financing became the subject of numerous discussions. Tanzania noted that Resolution 21 of the Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary establishing the Special Fund for Technical Cooperation had been poorly implemented. The level of contributions was "disappointedly low." Some countries, developed and developing, had indeed made generous efforts, but there were others--again, developing as well as developed--which, on account of their relatively favorable economic situation, could have contributed.

The objectives of Resolution 19 calling for Special Measures for the Least Developed Countries had not been achieved either. Contributions to the Special Fund, which was supposed to finance the development of telecommunication services in those countries, were too meager to make a positive impact.

The Soviet Union was of the opinion that Resolution 19 was directed mainly to the capitalist countries since it bore no responsibility for the worsening situation in the developing world. The underlying cause of the present situation in the LDCs was

> the disastrous effects of the economic crisis in the Western world. A glance at the United Nations list of least developed countries showed that they were those that had suffered most grievously from colonialism, neo-colonialism and the disruption of the capitalist system.[134]

Many developing countries were somewhat disturbed at the ITU's response pattern to their problems. Every time they would

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[134]Doc. 267/PC 1982, p. 5.

call for help, the Union responded by setting a group which would prepare a report that generally felt far short of proposing detailed, concrete, and manageable solutions. In the words of the Argentinean delegate, these meetings "had given rise to no more than high-sounding resolutions and special funds without any credit allocations." This criticism was obviously directed to the donors, namely the industrialized countries that initiated these reports, who acted as if they were temporizing. For example, regarding the least developed countries, at Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference, the developed countries succeeded in doing little more than reiterating Resolution 19 (adopted at Malaga--Torremolinos in 1973) in the form of a new Resolution 27 "Special Measures for the Least Developed Countries," and reducing the annual membership contribution for LDCs from one half to one eighth of a unit. Many delegations underlined that the ITU was in urgent need of a coherent policy.

From the standpoint of the developed countries, the governments of the developing countries were not sufficiently aware of the importance of telecommunication in their national economy which resulted in a lack of commitment in seeking alternative financing scheme. To which the delegate of India responded that

> if developing countries had to choose between bread and telecommunication, they would choose the former and it was then the FAO which would benefit from UNDP resources. The fact that governments did not include telecommunications among their priorities in the UNDP program should not be used as an excuse not to have a ITU telecommunication development program.[135]

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[135]Doc. 374/PC 1982, p. 7.

The ITU was in the process of completing a series of case studies, jointly conducted with the OECD, aimed at providing a detailed assessment of the contribution of telecommunication to development, in particular to rural development. The countries which were most in need of technical assistance were the least aware of the importance of telecommunications economic development and social progress. That is why the United Nations had proclaimed 1983 "World Communication Year," with the ITU as the leading agency for implementing it.

The agenda of Committee 6 was dominated by the discussion of the Working Group report on the future of ITU technical cooperation. Developing countries were making headway. The idea according to which the entire technical cooperation activities, including the Special Fund, should be supported by the ITU's regular budget gained momentum as it was articulated by an increasing number of countries.

The developed countries began to realize that outright opposition to such a proposition had to be balanced with propositions of their own. A more effective use of existing resources on the part of the Union could go some way in relieving the tensions but was obviously not sufficient.

It may be that industrialized countries recognized that UNDP was not going to increase its financial commitment to the ITU in view of UNDP's diminishing resources. 1981 contributions to UNDP had dropped 6 percent compared to 1980 and in 1982, 1 percent compared to 1981. That was a far cry from the objective

laid down by the Governing Council which had envisaged an annual increase of 14 percent. The delegate of Great Britain was surprised that just under 2 percent of the UNDP budget went to the telecommunication sector while his country devoted 10 percent of its capital investment to it. There was the realization that the UNDP was meant to be no more than a catalyst in the study of urgent development problems and the promotion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

On the other hand, recent economic studies highlighted in greater depth that the development of telecommunication was a prerequisite for overall development in all countries. These findings made them more aware of the fact that assisting developing countries in the building up of telecommunication infrastructures would produce long-term benefits for the donor countries as well by expanding product markets.[136] A group of Western nations submitted a draft Resolution "Research on the Interrelation between Telecommunication Infrastructure and Development," aimed at providing impetus for additional quantitative studies,[137] (see Table 4).

Kenya voiced the concern of many by arguing that, although most of the deliberations had focused on the UNDP, the latter should not be allowed to hold up the work of the ITU. Once projects were operational they were no longer of priority interest to UNDP:

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[136]Doc. 299/PC 1982.

[137]Doc. 325/PC 1982.

> An activity that had matured to a great extent should become an activity in its own right. The ITU had given birth to a baby called "technical cooperation," it is now time that it should be properly structured and appropriately provided with resources to stand on its own.[138]

TABLE 4

Distribution of the World's Telephones, Population, Income, and Telephone Density

Regions	% of World Population	% of World Income	Telephone per 100	% of World Telephone
U.S.A.+Canada	6,1	26,2	75,4	43,2
Japan	2,8	10,1	52,0	11,8
Europe	12,0	35,8	44,4	32,5
U.S.S.R.	6,8	10,0	9,9	4,9
Africa	10,4	2,9	0,8	0,4
Asia	53,7	9,2	2,2	3,3
Latin America	8,2	5,8	5,5	3,9

Sources: Sauders, et. al., op. cit., p. 6; The Missing link, pp. 103-105.

Committee 4 (Finances of the Union) was naturally discussing similar matters. Peru and Algeria formally proposed that technical cooperation be supported by the ITU's ordinary budget. A tally showed that 12 delegations opposed the idea and 33 supported it. The Soviet Union, an unlikely ally of the Western nations in its adamant opposition to this move, observed:

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[138]Ibid., p. 8.

> Under the present Convention, the purpose of the Union was to enhance communication between peoples by improving the effectiveness of telecommunication networks; to include technical cooperation activities in the ordinary budget would be radically to change the thrust of ITU activities.[139]

To Indonesia, however, "the majority of developing countries were now judging the sincerity of the developed countries on the subject of technical cooperation and assistance." The mood was confrontational over the level of increase in the 1983 budget devoted to technical cooperation. Algeria introduced an idea that worried some industrialized countries and may have accounted for their willingness to respond to the developing countries' concern by introducing the two Resolutions examined next. It was suggested that reductions could be made in CCI activities, which represented 68 percent of the program of conferences and meetings. The delegate noted that the developing countries contributed one-fifth of that sum, which amounted to technical cooperation in reverse, since it was the developed countries, as equipment manufacturers, that benefited most directly from CCI activities. Unwillingly, therefore, he could accept some reduction in the CCI program as a trade-off for the expansion of technical cooperation activities, otherwise it would become necessary to review the basis of contribution by members or adopt a voluntary base for the participation of developing countries in CCI activities.[140]

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[139]Doc. 396/PC 1982, p. 5.

[140]Doc. 485/PC 1982, p. 3.

Committee 6 seemed to be moving toward the inclusion in the Union's budget of a list of specific technical cooperation activities and of appropriate arrangement for their funding. It is at this juncture that a group of Western industrialized and developing countries submitted a resolution calling for the establishment of a "Special Voluntary Program for Technical Cooperation." This proposal can be seen as the most prominent outcome of the Plenipotentiary Conference.[141] It resolves:

> to set up a special voluntary program for technical cooperation based on contributions in currency, training services, or in any other form to meet the telecommunications needs of developing countries,

and urges member countries, their recognized private operating agencies (RPOAs), scientific and industrial organizations (SIOs), and other entities and organizations:

> to make available directly or through the ITU or other appropriate body the technical cooperation in any form required to meet more effectively the telecommunications needs of the developing countries.

A group of developing countries proposed some amendments to the above proposal in a view to strengthen its commitment to cooperation. In particular, a sentence was added which called for "narrowing the ever increasing gap between the developing and developed countries to achieve a new world economic order."[142]

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[141] Doc. 219/PC 1982. The countries are West Germany, the United States, Japan, Great Britain, Greece, Singapore, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cyprus, Ghana, Guyana, Jamaica, Lesotho, Uganda, Philippines, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Lebanon.

[142] Doc. 250/PC 1982.

The Historical Move of the Developed Countries

Ten days later, it was the turn of West Germany, Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and Philippines to propose an amendment of historical importance since it would provide the basis for the establishment of the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development which will be subsequently embodies in a Resolution.[143] It called for the setting up before the next meeting of the Administrative Council of a Special Commission of the highest decision makers in industry, operating agencies, and administrations from both the developed and developing worlds and representatives from key financial institutions such as the World Bank, UNDP and private banks with the following remit:

> a) to examine the totality of the existing and possible future relationships between countries involving technical cooperation and a transfer of resources in order to identify the most successful methods of such transfer;
>
> b) to recommend a range of methods including novel and as yet untried ones for stimulating telecommunication development in the developing world in ways which serve the interests of governments, operating companies, the public, and specialized user groups in the developing world and of the public and private sector in the developed world;
>
> c) to consider the most cost-effective way in which the ITU could stimulate and support the range of activities envisaged;
>
> d) to report by the end of 1983--World Communication Year--at the latest.[144]

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[143]Doc. 367/PC 1982.

[144]Doc. 291/PC 1982.

To Great Britain, its main sponsor, the Special Commission should be established with a similar status to that of the Brandt Commission, whose task would be "to overcome the bottlenecks in the transfer of resources, by confronting the Special Voluntary Program's limits, political will, and bureaucratic inertia."

The Special Voluntary Program was a clear improvement over the Special Fund which had been created in 1973. Whereas industrialized countries such as Australia saw the concept of special voluntary arrangements as the only practical way of making a significant effort to narrow the gap between countries at various stages of development, developing countries like Indonesia stated that the importance of the Voluntary Program could not be over-emphasized and not seen as a substitute for the duties of the ITU's permanent organs.[145]

In line with the spirit of the Program, the United States announced the establishment of the U.S. Telecommunications Training Institute (USTTI), entirely financed by private funds. The US administration under President Reagan was calling upon the private sector, at home and abroad, to play a greater role in development initiative so as to diminish governmental involvement. The United States warned that it might move away from multilateral arrangement such as the Voluntary Program, and increased bilateral assistance if the ITU concluded it was necessary to have line items in the regular budget for technical cooperation.

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[145]Doc. 489/PC 1982, p. 2.

Developing countries favored multilateral financing, particularly in light of the difficulties experienced in the past in respect of suppliers' credits, conditions of grants and loans which depended on the political climate between the donor and the recipients, tied credit arrangements and, generally speaking, the limited ability of recipients to choose the technology and consultants they wanted. There was some resistance on the part of those countries and the Soviet Union, in particular to have the private sector assume such as important role in the Voluntary Program;

> The proposals for increased private investment in technical assistance constituted a radical change and demonstrated concern not for the interests of developing countries but for those of private capital. The World Bank, well known for its non-democratic decision-making, was also involved in the trend.[146]

Australia introduced a document regarding the establishment of ITU regional offices. The idea has been quite unpopular in the past among the industrialized countries who feared that it would result in an increased financial burden on the Union's budget. The document, however, listed measures tending to show that the cost of decentralization would be low given the savings which could be made at ITU headquarters. The principle of a regional presence was endorsed and a Resolution to that effect instructed the Secretary General,

> to carry out the necessary cost/benefit and organizational studies, including that of the Technical Cooperation Department at the Union Headquarters, with an objective of achieving a strengthened regional

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[146]Ibid., p. 6.

> presence which will be as economical as possible and at the same time improve the effectiveness of the Union's activities.[147]

Another item which figured prominently on the agenda of the Plenipotentiary Conference and of Committee 8 (Purposes, Composition, Rights, Etc.) concerned the amendments to the Convention and, more broadly, the proposition to change it into a Charter. An in-depth examination of the issues at stake is provided in another part of the present study.

Article 4 of the Convention was judged of sufficient importance to warrant a full-scale discussion in the Committee. Article 4 comprises two parts, the first relating to the purposes of the Union (Nos. 12 to 14) and the second to its activities (Nos. 15 to 21). Previous Plenipotentiary Conferences had amended Article 4 by adding to the second part items related to assistance to developing countries, but the first part had remained unchanged and did not specifically address the Union's technical assistance to developing countries.

Algeria, backed by Cameroon, proposed that one of the purposes of the Union listed in the first part of Article 4 refer explicitly to cooperation activities toward the developing countries. This major change would legitimize the use of the Union's regular budget for supporting these activities, which had long been Algeria's stand. While most countries, developed and developing, found it desirable to introduce into Article 4 the principle of fostering "technical assistance" to developing

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[147]DT/68/PC 1982, p. 3.

countries, the industrialized nations wanted to restrict it to an activity (listed in the second part) and not one of the primary purposes of the organization. The industrialized countries judged it unacceptable. The Soviet Union had submitted a counter--proposal involving the addition of a provision on technical assistance in the second part of Article 4 that found much agreement among the Western nations. But, in the word of the Algerian delegate, "the USSR proposal, supported by the wealthier countries, only reshuffled the text of the existing Convention without changing its substance."[148] After lengthy debates, the Algerian proposal was narrowly defeated in committee by 28 votes to 26, with 9 abstentions. In Plenary meeting, however, the proposal was accepted.

In a last note about, the Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference, it should be noted that Richard Butler was elected Secretary--General of the ITU because of its appeal to developing countries, particularly his stand on technical cooperation activities. In many respects, the developing countries offered a unified front which led them to take somewhat inflexible postures. This "radicalization" is illustrated in the fact that even though the incumbent Mr. Mili was from a developing country and had supported back in the 1960s developing countries' attempts to make the Union more responsive to their needs, he was not considered to be any longer the developing country candidate due

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[148]See Doc. 431/PC 1982 and Doc. 505/PC 1982.

to his perceived lack of concern about LDC issues.[149]

The Voluntary Program and the Independent Commission

Beginning in 1983, the sessions of the Administrative will be monopolized by discussions about telecommunications and socio-economic development, but most of all by the Special Voluntary Program for Technical Cooperation and the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development.

The 1983 session of the Council began discussion on ways to implement the resolutions adopted at Nairobi. The Conference had expressed its willingness to pursue studies on "Telecommunication Infrastructure and Socio-Economic Development." A small "Socio-Economic Studies Unit" was created within the Technical Cooperation Department. A special cash contribution from the UNESCO-administered International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC) enabled the Union to continue and complete the ITU/OECD study subsequently published the same year under the title "Telecommunications for Development." Special attention was given to the preparation of this report as it would be of great use for the soon-to-be formed Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development. The report was aimed principally at government and international economic planners, at senior management levels of telecommunication administrations and those whose task it is to decide upon the balance of funds to be

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[149]As reported in L. Milk, "United States Participation in the International Telecommunication Union: A Study of Policy Alternatives." Paper prepared for the US State Department, 1984.

devoted to the various sectors of the economy within developing countries.[150]

The objectives and guiding principles of the Special Voluntary Program for Technical Cooperation would be:

> a) to enhance a better sharing of resources in order to maximize benefits to all ITU members, particularly those in special need;
>
> b) to stimulate the development activities and foster a wider cooperation between the ITU donors and recipients of aid with a primary focus on the efforts of the developing countries to achieve self reliance;
>
> c) to ensure that technical cooperation activities are responsive to the needs and their delivery is timely.[151]

Although sufficient time is required for the Program to gather momentum, activities had already been generated. Switzerland had become the first country to initiate concrete measures as it decided to finance a telecommunication training project in Zimbabwe and contribute to the realization of Rwanda's national rural telecommunications program. Finland had agreed to finance a pilot project aiming at promoting the integrated development of the rural network of Sri Lanka. West Germany had provided finance for the preparatory activities related to the Regional African satellite Communication System for African Development. Australia was co-financing a study of the benefits of telecommunications development in Vanuatu.

The Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications

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[150]Docs. 5948/CA38 and 6115/CA39 (1983).

[151]Doc. 6126/CA39 (1983).

Development was given its organizational basis. Although it is voluntary and independent, it would require secretarial assistance assumed to be provided by the ITU. Unlike the MacBride Commission which was significantly funded from the regular budget of UNESCO, it was very improbable that the results of the appeal for voluntary funds which the Secretary-General has made would be sufficient to provide for the Commission to organize its work on identical lines as the MacBride Commission (even if it wished to do so), particularly in the engagement of a wide range of consultancy experts, round-tables, etc. It should, therefore, set up its own methods of work. The Council endorsed the list of candidates to serve on the Commission and identified the main issues it has to examine in order to fulfil its mandate. These are:

a) the present state of telecommunications world-wide;

b) the role of telecommunications in economic and social development;

c) technology, including the available choices, the transfer of technology, local manufacture, research and development;

d) internal organization and management, including training and maintenance;

e) financing the expansion of telecommunications from both existing and possible novel sources of capital'

f) the role of international organizations.[152]

On another note, there was concern expressed regarding the accumulation of support costs which had not been reimbursed and

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[152]Doc. 6129/CA39 (1983).

thus led to the continuing disagreement over the manner in which the problem should be solved. Developing and developed countries clashed on whether this deficit should be recouped by the ITU's ordinary budget or not in view of UNDP's refusal to increase allocations to the Union.

The tendency reported in 1983 towards a slowing down of activity financed by UNDP became even more pronounced during the course of 1984, because of economic constraints and uncertainty in the UNDP general program arising from the fact that the approved (UNDP) growth in forecasts for the present program cycle was not realized. Towards the end of the year, however, there were some indications that the level of resources available to UNDP was beginning to level out and even to show a slight upturn, even after taking into account an allowance for inflation. The increased value of the dollar with respect to the Swiss franc was not, however, entirely able to compensate for the reduced availability of program funds and this led to continuing constraint exercised in the headquarters of the Technical Cooperation Department, this in turn reflecting adversely on the implementation of many projects.

This lack of resources was reflected in the budgetary allocations made in favor of the least developed countries. Only 200,000 Sw. frs could be provided to implement the Nairobi Resolutions 27 and 32 "Special Assistance for the Least Developed Countries." A very meager amount considering that of the above sum, 100,000 Sw. frs. was earmarked the rehabilitation of Chad's

telecommunication network. However, the Administrative Council was able to continue support to the CODEVTEL project.

It is remembered that UNESCO had established an International Program for the Development of Communication (IPDC) in 1981 which led to recognition of the need for much closer liaison between the ITU and UNESCO. At its 1985 session, the Administrative Council identified four broad areas for which UNESCO/ITU liaison seems essential and should be strengthened:

> a) the technical evaluation of (i) telecommunication development projects to be submitted to the Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC through the ITU or (ii) IPDC approved projects which contain substantial telecommunication components;
>
> b) joint UNESCO/ITU development projects (e.g., the establishment and reinforcement of news agency networks such as the Pan African News Agency (PANA) and the Organization of Asia-Pacific News Agency (OANA) networks;
>
> c) UNESCO activities and projects which might touch upon or be concerned with substantive ITU activities (e.g., telecommunication tariff matters, communication infrastructure, teleinformatics, etc.). In particular, the Intergovernmental Informatics Program (IIP) could become as important a field of cooperation between UNESCO and the ITU as the IPDC;
>
> d) the presentation to the Intergovernmental Council of the IPDC, through the ITU, of development assistance projects on behalf of ITU members.[153]

Two features of ITU/IPDC/UNESCO cooperation required special attention. On the one hand, it had to be recognized that many of the projects submitted to the IPDC have a considerable telecommunication component, even through it is not explicit in the description that they provide telecommunication services or are

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[153]Doc. 6332/CA40 (1985).

related to the provision of such services. On the other hand, the ITU had to be able to respond to greater involvement by UNESCO in data transmission matters. A Nairobi Plenipotentiary Resolution requested that appropriate credits be included in the ITU's annual budget for maintaining liaison with the Intergovernmental Council, the Secretariat of the IPDC, and the UNESCO operational unit.

Progress was noted regarding the Special Voluntary Program for Technical Cooperation. Obviously, the Program was much more successful in attracting contributions of all kind than its predecessor, the Special Fund for Technical Cooperation. In the first year since it became operational, more industrialized nations had committed resources to cooperation projects. In addition, $2,380,000 in cash contribution, $2,700,000 in equipment and services, and $10,000 in fellowships.[154]

By far, the most important item under review in ITU circles, in 1985, was the just-released Report of the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunication Development, entitled "The Missing Link." The Report was officially presented at the First World Telecommunications Development Conference, held in Arusha, Tanzania, in May of that year ubder the auspices of the ITU. The Conference was "special (neither Plenipotentiary nor administrative) as far as its terms of reference and objectives were concerned, and the only one of its type to be organized by the Union in the post-war period. It issued a number of recommen-

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[154]Doc. 6292/CA40 (1985), p. 6.

dations and appeals to both developed and developing countries embodies in the "Arusha Declaration on World Telecommunications Development."[155]

The Report is in many respects a milestone in the history of the ITU. It represents the fruit of more than 30 years of relentless efforts by the developing countries to bring their industrialized counterparts to recognized that technical cooperation may well be the primary purpose of the ITU. For the first time, the group of developed countries would be engaged in a massive and coordinated effort to help their less-endowed neighbors in building telecommunication networks. The Report is foremost the product of a political will. Sir Donald Maitland, the chairman of the Independent Commission, reminded its colleagues that "our task is essentially political in character."

The recommendations of the Report will undoubtedly be at the center of preoccupation of ITU meetings in years to come. For that reason, it is worth quoting them at some length.[156] Under the headline "International Cooperation,"

> developing countries should consider pooling their purchases of appropriate equipment including terminals and components. When purchasing equipment, developing countries should ensure that the contract included commitments on the supply of spare parts, training, commissioning, post-installation and maintenance;

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[155]For more information, see Doc. 6302/CA40 (1985) Addendum 2.

[156]See The Missing Link, Report of the Independent Commission for World-Wide Telecommunications Development, (Geneva: ITU, 1984); Chapter 10.

Under "Training,"

telecommunications operators in developing countries should review their training needs and resources, and prepare systematic training plans; that developing countries use the resources available through IPDC; that industrialized countries organize seminars to improve the qualifications of experts from developing countries; that the ITU supplement the catalogue of training opportunities with information about training opportunities in the private sector; and that operators and manufacturers consider how they can enhance the training opportunities they offer to developing countries;

Under "Research and Development and Local Manufacture,"

the major regional and sub-regional political and economic organizations should consider as soon as possible how best R & D institutes might be established;

developing countries should review the possibilities for local or regional manufacture. manufacturers in industrialized countries should consider the scope for cooperation with developing countries in local or regional manufacture;

Under "Financing the Development of Telecommunications,"

developing countries should review their development plans to ensure that sufficient priority is given to investment in telecommunications;

developing countries should make appropriate provision for telecommunications in all projects for economic or social advance and include in their submissions a checklist showing that such provision is being made;

in order to increase the flow of resources immediately, countries and international organizations with development assistance programs should give higher priority to telecommunications;

those who provide international satellite systems should study urgently the feasibility of establishing funds to finance earth segment and terrestrial facilities in developing countries;

as a means of reducing trade risks in the telecommunications sector and the cost of insuring against these, industrialized countries should extend export/import

> financing and insurance cover to suppliers of telecommunications equipment. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) should consider including telecommunications in its proposal for multilateral guarantees against non-commercial risks. Where projects are financed in part by IBRD loans, finance agencies should consider cross-default arrangements as a form of insurance;
>
> member states of the ITU should consider setting aside a small portion of revenue from calls between developing countries and industrialized countries to be devoted to telecommunications in developing countries or contributed for example to a fund to finance pre-investment costs;
>
> member state of the ITU, in collaboration with international finance agencies, should study the possibility of a revolving fund and of telecommunications investment trusts as methods of raising funds for investment in telecommunications, with a view to putting these ideas into effect by the next Plenipotentiary Conference at the latest.

The Secretary-General of the ITU, in the light of these recommendations, was asked to study the idea of an organization to coordinate the development of telecommunications world-wide (WORLDTEL) and submit his conclusion to the next Plenipotentiary Conference. The recommendation which, more than any other, was the focus of attention regards the establishment of a Center for Telecommunications Development. The Commission recommended that,

> as an immediate step to improve the present arrangements for assisting developing countries, a Center for Telecommunications development be established by the Administrative Council of the ITU during 1985. The Center would comprise a Development Policy Units, which would collect and analyze data on policies and experiences from around the world; a Telecommunications Development Service organized into teams of specialists to offer high caliber advice to developing countries on aspects of creating and operating an effective public network; and an Operations Support Group, which would provide assistance with specific projects. The work of the Center would complement the activities of the Technical Cooperation Department of the ITU.

The idea of the Center was also presented in the form of Draft Resolution 929. The Center established within the framework of the Union would operate "on the basis of voluntary funding and with its own separate and identifiable budget." It would have an Advisory Board whose guidelines would be, quote:

> a) to provide, within the policy guidelines laid down by the Administrative Council, necessary directions to the Center for its functioning; and to ensure that it is responsive to the needs and views of its potential contributors and beneficiaries;
>
> b) to mobilize the resources required for the advisory services of the Center to meet in coordination with the Technical Cooperation Department, the needs of developing countries and to ensure that an adequate part of those resources is available on a stable and continuing basis;
>
> c) to establish a biennial program and resources budget, keeping in view the imperative need for optimum utilization of all the resources available;
>
> d) to oversee generally the working of the Center;
>
> e) to recommend to the Secretary-General the appointment of suitable persons of eminence as Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director of the Center;
>
> f) to ensure close and effective coordination of its activities with those of the Technical Cooperation Department and other international organizations for cost effective utilization of resources available to the Center;
>
> g) to make the utmost use of available governmental and non-governmental know-how at national and regional levels.[157]

Structural and financial aspects of this enterprise nourished most of the discussions taking place in Committee 3 (Technical Cooperation) as well as in Plenary meetings of the Administrative

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[157]Doc. 6385/CA40 (1985).

Council. There was a general identity of views among both developed and developing countries over most of the provisions of the Draft Resolution. The United States and other Western nations wanted the structure and functions of the Center to evolve gradually so as to allow for flexible adjustments on the part of the donor countries. This meant that the Center should be guaranteed some degree of independence from the ITU and have its own identity. On the contrary, developing countries preferred complete integration of the Center within the ITU framework and be subject to its guidance. In addition, they requested that the Resolution contain a more precise clause on financing so as to ensure that voluntary contributions would be forthcoming on a firm and regular basis.[158]

The thrust of the Western industrialized countries was to produce a text that appeals to potential donors, namely the private sector. To facilitate rapid action, therefore, those donors should be given an opportunity of expressing their views. As could be expected, the Soviet Union found this approach unacceptable;

> It was of course desirable to attract funds for the development of telecommunications in the developing countries, but the Union could not be turned into a kind of charitable organization selling tickets for a benefit performance. It would be most unwise to invite third parties to witness what should be a serious, workmanlike discussion of specific action and procedures. If the Center was to become a large-scale commercial activity, countries which adopted a different approach would no doubt prefer to stand aside from its

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[158]Doc. 6368/CA40 (1985).

activities.[159]

The Center for Telecommunication Development

The third and fourth sessions of the Administrative Council were entirely devoted to discussion of the Report. From the standpoint of the Western industrialized countries, the Center should be financed by private sector contributions or it should not exist. The Report was based on an examination of the situation of telephone networks, but the Algerian delegate pointed out that telecommunications are not confined to the telephone; they concerned also broadcasting, aeronautical, maritime, meteorological telecommunications, etc. which have no commercial implications, and to which it is difficult to extend the conclusions drawn on the subject of the telephone network. Assistance was greatly needed in these fields, and it was doubtful that the private sector alone would be interested in extending assistance, through voluntary contributions, to these domains of activity which guarantee no return on investment.[160]

Although divergence of opinion were expressed, the principle and most of the implementation measures of the Center were widely accepted. By June of 1985, the cash donations for the Independent Commission amounted to almost 1 million Swiss frs.

The Plenipotentiary Conference in Nairobi added a significant and specific complement to the purposes of the Union by

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[159]Doc. 6394/CA40 (1985), p. 3.

[160]Doc. 6353/CA40 (1985), p. 35.

inclusion of relevant references in the Preamble and the Nairobi Convention itself, in particular Article 4, with regard to development activities. Specific provision has been made to strengthen the Union's role in promoting and providing supportive action as a complement to its role of regulatory, standardization and coordination activities. The Conference made immediate arrangements to strenghten cooperation and advice--training course development, training standrads and information to facilitate some prerequisite preparations in the planning and operation of networks, specifications, etc.

Since 1982, the technical cooperation requested by developing countries has gradually widened in scope and this has led to the Union becoming involved through projects/activities financed by extra-budgetary resources in planning, specification, participation in the search for investment finance, implementation and operation of networks, indeed, all aspects of the development of a telecommunication system. Some of the practical effects of these changes on the work of the Technical Cooperation Department, reported in 1985, were stated as follows:

> - A much more intimate involvement with all aspects of telecommunication development. Master plans and specifications drawn up by teams of experts engaged for the purpose by the ITU from its members, the former consisting of several hundred pages, have to be carefully reviewed, approved and published.
>
> - Many administrations of developing countries find great difficulty, for personnel, financial or geographical distance reasons in taking part in major conferences and meetings of the Union. Thus the Department has become increasingly involved in a vast range of meetings, seminars, workshops and conferences at regional or sub-regional level to prepare countries

> for conferences, to disseminate the results of the work of the Union, and to bring to their notice developments in technology appropriate to their needs.
>
> - There is an increased demand to the Department to field short-term missions in the UNDP programs and Trust Fund programs, to address specific problems of a precise technological nature.
>
> - The demand is increasing for high technology expertise in fields such as fiber optics, satellite communications, digital equipment and network planning, etc. This expertise is scarce world-wide and the demand is, thus, more difficult to satisfy in the time scale desired.[161]

The program delivery for 1984 of UNDP and Trust Fund projects amounted to $23.6 million. 54 missions by the Group of Engineers and short-term specialists were undertaken to support developing countries. The staff of the Training Division undertook 94 missions. 63 fellowships were provided for participation in seminars. The introduction of modern office techniques continued and data bases have been established, (see Table 5)

The last three years represent somewhat of a turning point in the history of development-assistance activities conducted by the ITU. By initiating both the Voluntary Program of Technical Cooperation and the Center for Telecommunications Development, the technologically-advanced countries have taken a drastic step toward meeting many of the demands of the developing countries. It remains to be seen if these efforts will be sustained in the future

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[161] Doc. 6279(Add.3)/CA 40 (1985), p. 2.

TABLE 5

Dollar Amount Spent on ITU's Technical Cooperation Activities (in Thousands)

Year	Expert Missn.	Fellow ships	UNDP	ITU Total	ITU Deficit	Total UNDP	%total UNDP
1960	32	18	269	293	24	30.2	0.9
1961	38	65	354	425	71	38.8	0.9
1962	59	82	915	977	62	64.8	1.4
1963	81	97	1,283	1,345	62	74.5	1.7
1964	115	119	1,970	2,172	202	100.0	1.0
1965	159	138	2,964	3,358	394	102.2	2.9
1966	184	208	4,069	4,467	398	134.4	3.0
1967	209	222	4,424	4,945	521	143.5	3.0
1968	231	283	4,343	4,883	540	180.6	2.4
1969	237	340	4,710	5,225	515	190.0	2.5
1970	241	412	5,524	6,051	527	210.0	2.6
1971	255	460	7,326	7,696	370	261.0	2.8
1972	309	467	8,383	9,047	664	277.0	3.0
1973	345	457	9,803	10,742	939	274.0	3.6
1974	385	683	11,067	12,688	1,621	295.0	3.7
1975	526	666	16,604	18,837	2,233	426.3	3.9
1976	493	497	17,170	20,241	3,071	406.3	4.2
1977	526	423	12,315	17,095	4,780	338.0	3.6
1978	543	463	16,038	21,614	5,576	435.6	3.7
1979	584	618	20,716	26,064	5,348	547.6	3.8
1980	630	649	27,539	33,352	5,813	676.2	4.1
1981	727	726	33,302	40,293	6,991	731.6	4.5

Sources: Telecommunication Journal 49/10 (1982), pp. 647, 677. Doc. 5322 (CA34) 1979; Doc. 6146 (CA39) 1984.

In view of the way in which the key themes, introduced at the beginning of the present historical account, have evolved over the last thirty years, future trends can be delineated.

Financing of Technical-Cooperation Activities.

It appears unlikely that the ITU's ordinary budget will ever be utilized to finance an in-house development program, especial-

ly in light of the establishment of an alternative revenue source, namely, the Voluntary Program.

Revision of the ITU Convention

The call of the developed countries for the transformation of the ITU's basic instrument into a Constitution is gaining ground among the newly-industrialized countries. The record attendence at the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference and the resulting increase in the workload has began to convince developing countries of the necessity to adopt a more stable instrument. It is likely that some administrative regulations will become constitutional items.

Representation in ITU Organs

As the ITU membership has stabilized, a result of the end of the decolonization process, it is probable that issues related to the representation of the Third World constituency in the ITU organs, and in the Administrative Council, in particular, will fade away.

CCIs' Lack of Responsiveness

This will remain a thorny issue between developed and developing countries. The level of sophistication of the work being conducted in the CCITT, in particular, will widen the gap between the technologically-advanced countries, who benefit from it, and their developing counterparts, concerned with the establishment of basic telecommunication infrastructures.

Regional Offices

Developing countries may be winning the battle for the decentralization of the ITU, a move which can help them in the allocation, planning, dispensing, and management of resources for telecommunication development. Financing schemes may make this regionalization attractive to the industrialized countries.

Preferential Treatment on Technical Matters

A compromise will be reached on the subject of the allotment of geostationary orbital slots and the assignment of radio-frequency bands. Such move was initiated in the Summer of 1985 at a specialized conference.

Private-Sector Involvement in the ITU's Work

The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies are losing grounds in their opposition to the involvement of private telecommunication-equipment manufacturers in the financing of development activities through the Voluntary Program, in particular. Those entities will probably become even more involved since they provide the much-needed financial resources and expertise.

Telecommunication and Economic Development

The growing recognition by Third World governments of the contribution of telecommunication in national economies will give international financial institutions the incentives to provide loans for investment in telecommunication in developing countries.

PART III

HYPOTHESIS TESTING AND REFLECTIONS ON THE ITU'S DYNAMICS

CHAPTER 10

HYPOTHESIS 1: INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE CONVENTION

In order to survive, an international organization, like a living organism, has to adjust to a changing environment. The historical analysis has documented the extend to which the ITU has integrated, over time, in its structure, work program, and basic instrument, the new demands imposed on it by the growing membership of developing countries. In view of the fact that the ITU was established by a small club of Western industrialized countries at a time when concerns about the Third World were a moot question, it is remarkable that this 120-year-old institution is taking for granted today what it refused to consider only thirty years ago, namely, that one of its main purposes is technical cooperation to the developing world.

Obviously, the ITU is not the only specialized agency of the United Nations to be concerned with questions of development assistance to the Third World. The fundamental difference between the other specialized agencies and the ITU is that the former were created after World War II[1] when the process of decolonization began, and its call for it directly or indirectly enshrined in their respective Charters or Constitutions, whereas the latter

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[1]With the exception of the International Labor Organization (ILO), a holdover of the 1920 League of Nations, and the Universal Postal Union (UPU).

established in the mid-nineteenth century.

No such concern was reflected in the basic arrangements of the ITU and in particular in the first International Telecommunication Convention established when the International Telegraph Union and the International Radiotelegraph Union merged into the modern International Telecommunication Union in 1932.

The fact that the ITU was born in an era immune from preoccupations of development assistance has led us to hypothesize that the "secret" of the ITU's adaptation to the contemporary environment characterized by an overwhelming concern for development assistance to the Third World may well be found in the flexibility of the Union's basic instrument, its Convention. A Convention can be modified and amended much more easily and, consequently, can respond more quickly to new demands than can a Charter or Constitution.

As a way of introduction, one should be reminded that the international telecommunication law currently in force, was established under the auspices of the ITU. It forms part of the existing public international Law, the main instrument being the Convention itself with the Administrative Regulations regarded as annexed to this Convention. The provisions of the Convention are contained in the "Basic Provisions" which provide the institutional framework regarding the law and regulation-making process through treaty conferences. It should be noted that the provisions of the Convention concern and govern the field of international telecommunications as distinct from national ones, for

which the sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommunication is fully recognized. Those provisions are supplemented by the "Administrative Regulations," which regulate the use of telecommunication and are binding on all members. These Administrative Regulations consist of the Telegraph, Telephone, and Radio Regulations. As far as the hierarchy of norms is concerned, the provisions of the Convention represent the first and highest category of norms; in case of inconsistency between a provision of the Convention and a provision of the Administrative Regulations, the Convention prevails.[2]

History of the Amendments to the Convention

It can be anticipated that any change in the Convention may have important consequences. It is the reason why the ITU's basic instrument has been (and undoubtedly, will remain) the focus of attention in the Union's circles.

We propose to test the above hypothesis by examining in some detail the amended Conventions produced by the successive Plenipotentiary Conferences. Concentrating on the basic principles which shape the Union, its objectives, governing bodies and essential activities in the field of development assistance, the following considers the succession of changes and the more significant innovations that have emerged.

The Plenipotentiary Conference at Nairobi in 1982 coincided with the 50th anniversary of the one held at Madrid in 1932,

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[2]Article 42 (No. 173) International Telecommunication Convention, Nairobi 1982.

which ended with the signing on December 9 of that year of the first Convention of the International Telecommunication Union.

The preamble of the Madrid Convention (1932) described the Convention as a treaty between States, affirming that "the...Plenipotentiaries of the Governments named above, being assembled in conference in Madrid, have, by common consent and subject to ratification, concluded the following Convention." The Convention of Atlantic City (1947) expressly recognized "the sovereign right of each country to regulate its telecommunication" and specified that the purpose of the Convention was to ensure "the effectiveness of telecommunication." The Buenos Aires Convention (1952) added the objective of "facilitating relations between the peoples" by means of telecommunications. In the Nairobi Convention (1982), the preamble was modified to recognize "the growing importance of telecommunication for the preservation of peace and the social and economic development of all countries" and includes "facilitating...economic and social development among peoples" as one of the purposes of efficient telecommunication services.

Article 3 (later to become Article 4) on the Purposes of the Union appeared for the first time in the Atlantic City Convention, where they were defined as follows:

1) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunication of all kinds;

2) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunication services, increasing their usefulness and making

them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;

3) to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those common ends.

The second part of the article listed certain means of achieving those ends and required the Union to:

1) allocate the radio-frequency spectrum and register radio frequency assignments in such a manner as to avoid harmful interference between radio stations in different countries;

2) establish rates for the use of telecommunication services as low as possible consistent with sound administrative practices;

3) promote the adoption of measures to insure the safety of life;

4) undertake studies, formulate recommendations, and collect and publish information on telecommunication matters for the benefit of all members and associate members.

The activities to be undertaken to meet the objectives were amended and were specified in all subsequent Conventions, with the exception of the Buenos Aires Convention, as follows: the Geneva Convention (1959) required the Union to

> foster the creation, development and improvement of telecommunication equipment and networks in new or developing countries by every means at its disposal, especially its participation in the appropriate programs of the United Nations.

The proposal for this provision was submitted by Poland. Its importance lies in the fact that, for the first time in the history of the ITU, a provision was directed specifically to assistance to developing countries. According to ITU historian Codding, this decision "considered to be of special benefit to the new members, appeared to be more a gift from the Western--

dominated majority rather than a victory won by the Third World."[3] the Malaga-Torremolinos Conference (1973) added a clause to the Convention which instructed the Union to "coordinate efforts with a view to harmonizing the development of telecommunications facilities, notably those using space techniques." After heavy criticism from Eastern and Western industrialized nations, the developing constituency succeeded in modifying Article 4 of the Nairobi Convention (1982) so as to promote technical assistance from an activity to a purpose (one of the three) of the Union, namely, "to promote and to offer technical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommunications." Furthermore, the Convention stipulates that to achieve that objective the Union should "foster international cooperation in the delivery of technical assistance to the developing countries." The decision potentially cleared the way for using the regular budget to cover expenses incurred in the implementation of technical cooperation.

Anticipating Article 5, Structure of the Union, various articles appeared in the Madrid Convention (1932) on such organs of the Union as the Plenipotentiary Conference, the International Consultative Committees (CCIs), which in those days were the CCIT, the CCIF and the CCIR, and the Bureau of the Union which, although not a permanent organ, was the forerunner of the General

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[3]George A. Codding, "The New Nations and the International Telecommunication Union: Some Policy Implications for the Future," in H. S. Dordick (ed.) Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1978), p. 362.

Secretariat mentioned in the Atlantic City Convention (1947). The Atlantic City Plenipotentiary Conference have been hailed for modernizing the ITU; though it did fairly extensive work in changing the structure of the Union, it did, however, fundamentally little to change its functions. One of the fundamental changes made by the Conference was the creation of an Administrative Council composed of eighteen members who, according to the Convention, "would be elected by the Plenipotentiary Conference with due respect to the need for equitable representation of all parts of the world." The Council is to meet annually to take charge of the administration of the Union between Plenipotentiary Conferences.

The Council became the most powerful policy-making body of the ITU as it sets most of work program of the Plenipotentiaries. To gain control of it means to shape to a large extent the destiny of the Union. The fight over an increase of the Administrative Council membership has been on the agenda of all Plenipotentiary Conference as recorded in the successive Conventions. The number was increased to 25 at Geneva, to 29 at Montreux, to 35 at Malaga-Torremolinos and to 41 at Nairobi.

The increase in the Council's membership illustrates the flexibility of a Convention to respond rapidly to the changing environment and to adapt to the new demands of developing countries which now represent the majority within the Administrative Council. These new concerns are reflected in the evolving task of the Council as specified in the Convention. The Geneva

Convention specified "the promotion of international cooperation, especially through Union participation in the appropriate programs of the United Nations." The Nairobi Convention requires that the Council "shall determine each year the policy of technical assistance."

In the Malaga-Torremolinos Convention (1952), a distinction was drawn between the Plenipotentiary Conference, administrative conferences, and the Administrative Council, on the one hand, and the permanent organs, which were the General Secretariat, the IFRB, the CCIR, and the CCITT, on the other. The organizational structure of the Union gave it a federal character that differentiates it from the other United Nations specialized agencies.

The Plenipotentiary is a political event in which the representatives of member countries attempt to secure changes in the ITU's structure and functions that will give them some appreciable advantage. This advantage could range from chairmanship of a committee, or the Conference itself, to a decision which would give the advantage to a national telecommunication industry, or even technical assistance in the upgrading of a domestic telecommunication network. This decision is done individually or by groups based on common geographical, economic, or ideological considerations.

No specific articles were devoted to the Plenipotentiary Conference until the Atlantic City Conference. The Plenipotentiary Conference was mentioned along with administrative conferences in the Madrid Convention, which also stated that "the

provisions of the present Convention are subject to revision by conferences of Plenipotentiaries of the Contracting Governments," making these Conferences the supreme body of the Union, although their status was not explicitly established until the Convention of Montreux (1965).

The Geneva Convention (1959) was amended so that the Secretary-General and his Assistant (later Deputy), until now elected by the Administrative Council, were chosen by the Plenipotentiary Conference. This amendment was opposed by the Western industrialized countries which feared that a aspiring candidate to the ITU's helm, by trying to appeal to the larger constituency of the Plenipotentiary, might develop a power base of its own and ultimately "escape" from the control of the major industrialized nations which dominated the Administrative Council. The delegates at the 1947 Atlantic City Conference had created a Secretariat-General with very limited power, reflecting in that the historical desire of the major telecommunication operators to ensure that the ITU would not interfere with their interests.

The electoral power of the Plenipotentiary Conference was subsequently broadened to include, in the Malaga-Torremolinos Convention, the members of the IFRB and, in the Nairobi Convention, the Director of the CCIs. This last move was considered dangerous by some delegations from developed countries who feared that Directors of the CCIs would be elected on the basis of political rather than technical strength.

In 1952 and 1959, many of the proposals for change had as their purpose the elimination of problems that had arisen as a result of the major reorganization of the ITU, accomplished at the 1947 Atlantic City Plenipotentiary. Since 1965, the workload of the committees on changes to the Convention has been dominated by the attempt by newer members of the ITU to eliminate practices which they considered gave special privileges to certain of the older developed countries. The decision to elect the Directors of the CCIs in the Plenipotentiary is a case in point. The Nairobi Conference was especially busy in this respect.

World and regional administrative conferences have evolved with regard to their duties, although the basic one of revising the Regulations annexed to the Convention has always been retained. In subsequent Conventions, the function of the radio administrative conferences was limited, revision of the General Regulations being removed and a stipulation being inserted in the Conventions of Montreux and Malaga-Torremolinos reading: "Administrative conferences shall normally be convened to consider specific telecommunication matters. Only items included in their agenda may be discussed by such conferences." The latter clause was proposed by some developed countries who feared that these conferences would become "politicized" by countries introducing matters thought to be irrelevant to telecommunication. Lastly, the Nairobi Convention goes even further by stating:

> When adopting resolutions and decisions, administrative conferences should take into account the foreseeable financial implications and shall try to avoid adopting resolutions and decisions which might give rise to

expenditure in excess of the upper limits on credits laid down by the Plenipotentiary Conference.

This clause, proposed mainly by industrialized countries, was aimed at ensuring that the ITU ordinary budget would not be used to support technical assistance programs, a proposal by developing countries that was gaining ground.

The IFRB and Allotment of the Geostationary Orbital Slots

Another fundamental change in the structure of the ITU, of great importance to the developing countries, was the creation of the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). Its essential duties were "to effect an orderly recording of frequency assignments made by the different countries" and "to furnish advice to Members...with a view to the operation of the maximum practicable number of radio channels."

The changing task of the IFRB was reflected in the successive Conventions. The Buenos Aires Convention added "to any additional duties concerned with the assignment and utilization of frequencies...in preparation for or in pursuance of the decisions of a (competent) conference" and "to maintain such essential records as may be related to the performance of its duties."

The geostationary orbit (GSO) has been for fourteen years, since the 1971 WARC-Spa, considered in the International Telecommunication Convention as a "limited natural resource," and over that period several principles and procedures have been introduced with the intention of allowing all states access to this

resource. It is at an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference (EARC) in 1963, however--only one year after the launch of Telstar--that developing countries first commented on the use of satellite communications. This comment resulted from the intrusion of the UN General Assembly promulgations into the work of the ITU. At the UN there had been unanimously expressed the view that satellite communications should be made available on a non-discriminatory basis to all states.[4] Resolution Spa 2-1 introduced the idea that "the radio frequency spectrum and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources and should be effectively and economically used." It should be noted that Resolution Spa 2-1 was not introduced by the developing countries but by the USSR.[5]

At the Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary in 1973, the Convention was updated to include the new principles and procedures resulting from WARC-Spa-71. Accordingly, the terms of reference of the IFRB were expanded to include "recording of the

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[4] See General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) of September 20, 1961.

[5] The USSR did not display an ability to place satellites in the GSO until 1974 (Cosmos 637) and was, therefore, equally concerned about access to the orbit. In addition, Article 7 of WARC-Spa was not introduced by the developing countries; the prime movers were Canada, Sweden, and France. Article 7 states: In devising the characteristics of a space station in the broadcast-satellite service, all technical means available shall be used to reduce to the maximum extent possible, the radiation over the territory of other countries unless a agreement has been previously reached with such countries (ITU, EARC-Space, Ref 6, annex 5, p. 117). See also the work of the Committee 6, especially Document 414-E, 397-E where the USA commented on the various drafts and spoke in favor of the final text.

positions assigned by countries to geostationary satellite." Of some significance is Article 33 of the Convention, which was intended to incorporate the spirit of Resolution Spa 2-1:

> ...members shall bear in mind that radio-frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources, that they must be used efficiently and economically [by all states]...<u>according to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal</u> (emphasis added).[6]

This addition did not meet with any objection from the developing countries who interpreted it in terms of equity in the use of the orbit. However, it was subsequently considered, by developing countries, as allowing a <u>res nullius</u> regime. In this latter interpretation, the "spirit" of Article 33 was negated, heightening the fears of developing countries that their most powerful counterparts could not be relied on to adhere to general principles of equitable access and, thus, led the developing countries to advocate rigid mechanisms that would allow access. Article 33 was modified, in 1982, at the next Plenipotentiary Conference at Nairobi to remove the last part of the article.[7] This modification was made in response to the developing countries' challenge of the "first come, first served" policy which so far dictated geostationary orbit allotments. The Nairobi Convention also instructed the IRFB to take account of "the needs of Members requiring assistance, the specific needs of developing

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[6]International Telecommunication Convention, Malaga--Torremolinos, Geneva, ITU, 1973, p. 20.

[7]M. Naraine, "WARC-ORB-85: Guaranteeing Access to the Geostationary Orbit," Telecommunications Policy (June 1985), pp. 100-101.

countries, as well as the special geographical situation of particular countries" and "to provide technical assistance in making preparations for and organizing radio conferences...and assistance to the developing countries in their preparations for these conferences."

Representation in ITU Organs

On the subject of representation in the various ITU organs, since the Government of the Swiss Confederation was responsible for the organization of the Bureau of the Union, the Madrid Convention contained no provision concerning the status of Union staff. No specific article appeared until the Geneva Convention, although the subject was dealt with at Atlantic City in the article on the General Secretariat. The article with its present title, "Elected Officials and Staff of the Union," was introduced in the Montreux Convention. The article specified that elected officials "shall all be nationals of different countries, Members of the Union" and emphasized that staff should be recruited "on as wide a geographical basis as possible." This has created problems. Geographical distribution does not necessary equate technical competence and there has always been a tension between the two criteria, and over which should prevail.

The developed countries, though sympathetic to the need for fair geographical representation, have always insisted upon the technical expertise of the potential candidates for posts, whereas the developing countries, though recognizing the importance of technical and administrative competence, have continu-

ously emphasized the criterion of geographical representation. This conflict illustrates the differing perceptions between the developed countries, who see the ITU purely as a technical agency, and the developing countries, who look at the Union as a policy-making body.

The current situation is one where most of the high-level positions in the different organs of the ITU are still occupied by officials from the European countries and the USA, and the low level positions by representatives from developing countries. Whatever the provisions of the Convention to that effect, it is very difficult for delegates of a Third World nation to be promoted to a position previously occupied by somebody from the industrialized world, particularly in specialized organs like the CCIs.[8]

The change in the financial participation of the members follows the changing environment. The Madrid Convention quoted a scale of contributory units from 3 to 25, with a total of six classes. Two more classes of 30 units and 1 unit were added at Atlantic City. The Buenos Aires Convention introduced the half-unit and five other intermediate units. The Nairobi Conference has extended the scale to include classes of 40 units and 1.5 as well as 1/4 and 1/8 units, the last-named to be reserved "for the least developed countries as listed by the United

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[8]See "List of Permanent and Temporary Posts With Incumbents at 15 May 1985," International Telecommunication Union, Geneva. The problems of promotion was mentioned in an interview with an ITU delegate who requested anonymity.

Nations and other countries determined by the Administrative Council." Since the Madrid Convention every Member has been free to choose its class of contribution

There was the desire of many at Nairobi to change over to a UN contribution system which would have placed the USA in the 25-percent contribution bracket rather than the current 6-percent. This move was fought hard by the industrialized countries who sought to retain the voluntary contributory system.

In term of general expenses of the Union, the Atlantic City Convention classified expenditures as "ordinary" and "extraordinary," the former including the costs of the Administrative Council and the permanent organs of the Union, the latter the expenses of Plenipotentiary Conferences, administrative conferences and meetings of the CCIs. The Nairobi Conference also included in the expenses of the Union the costs of "technical cooperation and assistance provided to the developing countries," an article vehemently fought by many developed nations and the United States in particular.[9]

ITU's Adaptation to Its Environment

The ITU's behavior appears to conform to the principle of "congruity" according to which, at a given point in time and space, a group's attitude is in some state of equilibrium with its environment. If and when some of the elements of the structu-

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[9]F. Molina Negro & J. M. Novillo-Fertrell Y Paredes, "The International Telecommunication Convention from madrid (1932) to Nairobi (1982): Half a Century in the Life of the Union," Telecommunication Journal 49/12 (1982), pp. 814-818.

re are altered, an inconsistency is introduced into the prevailing structure. As Tannenbaum suggested, "One of the main means of accommodating such an inconsistency is for modifications to occur in attitudes toward the environment, changes in accord with the maintenance of a new state of equilibrium."[10]

By allowing for constant modification, the ITU's Convention tends to reflect the preoccupations, needs, and demands of the majority of the organization's constituency. But the majority, as is true in all world bodies, has shifted from the industrialized countries to the developing countries during the late 1960s.[11] The powerful Western European industrialized nations who in the late nineteenth century created an organization responsive to their needs, had to cohabit in the first half of the twentieth century with their Eastern European counterparts whose political agenda was different.

During these years, the emerging nations born in the wake of decolonization tried unsuccessfully to direct the attention of the ITU toward their specific "under-developed situation," (the terminology used at the time). At the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, the balance of power within the Union shifted in favor of

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[10]Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Congruity Principle: Retrospective Reflections and Recent Research," in R. P. Abelson et al. (eds.) Theories of Cognitive Consistency (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968), p. 63.

[11]There are exceptions. The OECD, whose membership is restricted to the developed countries, has obviously not been affected by this shift. The OECD was an outgrowth of efforts by the United States to help rebuild Western European economies after World War II and to promote economic cooperation among the industrialized democracies.

the developing countries who attained a majority status. It was then the turn of the developed countries, both Eastern and Western, to be on the defensive and relentlessly fight the proposed amendments to the Convention aimed at changing the initial purpose of the ITU. But to a great extent, the developing countries have achieved much of their original agenda.

From this summary presentation, it can be observed that at any time the status quo, whatever it is, usually protects the interests of a particular group of members. In order to slow down and possibly bring to a halt a process engineered by the developing constituency aimed at altering fundamentally what was perceived to be the historical purpose of the Union, in which technical assistance to developing countries was only incidental, the industrialized countries have been attempting to change the ITU's basic instrument into a Charter, which is believed to bring organizational stability by making its subjection to amendment more difficult.

Discussion About a Constitution

The debate on whether the ITU should replace its Convention with a Charter is intimately linked with the evolving nature of the former.

The first thought given to a complete redraft of the International Telecommunication Convention was contained in a proposal by Paraguay (Document 16) submitted to the 1959 Plenipotentiary Conference at Geneva. The Conference passed Resolution 39 instructing the Administrative Council to study it and make

recommendations to the next Plenipotentiary Conference at Montreux (1965). At its 1960 meeting the Council realized that the Paraguayan proposal did not advocate simply a redraft of the Convention but the preparation of a completely new Charter.[12]

At the 1965 Plenipotentiary, Japan made a proposal "Suggestion for establishment of an ITU Constitution. From than on, Japan become a leading proponent calling for a Constitution. The reasons for the perceived need to move away from the present Convention had little to do with the arguments put forth in more recent times by a number of developed countries, namely, the lack of stability of the Union's basic instrument and the inconvenience of having each Plenipotentiary Conferences ratify after long debates a revised version of the Convention. Japan's arguments were of a purely legalistic and financial nature:

> 1) The present Convention guarantees non-ratifying countries the membership in the Union by granting to a signatory government, the rights conferred on Members of the Union, for a period of two years from the date of its entry into force, even though it may not have deposited an instrument of ratification.
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> 2) The Members of the Union under the regime of the Buenos Aires Convention of 1952, which have not ratified the Geneva Convention nor acceded thereto, actually share in defraying the expenses of the Union. How can this fact be legally explained?[13]

At the same Plenipotentiary, Argentina proposed the transformation of the Convention into a Charter invoking arguments which are still those of today's proponents for a change, namely,

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[12]See doc. 2499/CA15

[13]Doc. 19, PC 1965

for the ITU to be in line with all other UN specialized agencies and to provide the Union with an instrument that does not require constant revisions owing to the increasing number of countries joining the ITU. The proposal called for "the elevation to a Constitution which can only be amended with the approval of two-thirds of the Members."[14] Committee 9 (Editorial Committee) resolved to set up a Group of Experts with instructions to prepare a Constitutional Charter for the ITU. The Soviet delegation suggested that the discussion be deferred until the Committee had studied all the proposals for amending the existing Convention, stating that the existing Convention has proved its effectiveness and that there was no data to decide whether a new Charter would be superior to the Convention. Cuba contended that it might be a difficult matter to accept a permanent Constitution which must also remain democratic in character. Committee 9, however, voted in favor of replacing the Convention by a Charter by 51 votes to 40, with 9 abstentions. It was then the turn of the Plenary Assembly to vote Resolution 35 instructing the Administrative Council to set up a Study Group with the following term of reference:

> - to prepare a draft Constitutional Charter and General Regulations for the International Telecommunication Union, based upon the decisions taken by, and the discussions which took place at the Plenipotentiary Conference (Montreux, 1965), the Convention and the experience of the Union, the Constitutions and the experience of other specialized agencies of the United nations, and the comments, suggestions, and proposals

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[14] Doc. 91, PC 1965

submitted by Member countries.[15]

A special study group was created which worked from December 1967 to March 1969, to carry out the 1965 Montreux mandate. The report was presented to the 1973 Plenipotentiary at Malaga-Torremolinos. By 1973, however, the developing countries were in the majority, and had second thoughts on giving a minority substantive veto rights concerning any fundamental changes in the structure of functions of the ITU, As a result, although it accepted the breakdown between the various provisions as suggested by the working group, the Malaga-Torremolinos conference refused to give the basic provisions the title "Constitution" and decided to postpone any decision on whether to raise the majority needed to modify them until the next Plenipotentiary.

In the meantime, at the 1971 Administrative Council session, Mr. E. Sawkins, from the Australian Post Office presented an influential document on the future of the ITU. It was severe regarding the possibility for the Union to adapt to the changing telecommunication environment. Strengths were noted. They included; a) the spirit of international cooperation which is based on the tradition of consensus; b) the empirical base of the Union's work, rooted in tried and proven practices rather than on speculative theory; c) commercial and political impartiality illustrated by the fact that the Union's recommendations although not mandatory, have great persuasive effect; and d) cross-fertilization of ideas through international consultation in which the

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[15]Doc. 394/PC 1965.

private sector participates.[16]

The document, however, gave greater emphasis to the weaknesses in the operation and effectiveness of the Union. a) the most damaging weakness is that the Union operates too slowly a result of the unanimity rule; b) the Union follows rather than lead. Other organizations take up break-throughs in technology and tend to bypass or supersede the Union by the rapidity with which they exploit the new techniques in world communications; c) administration and working methods materially contribute to its slowness in operation. Perhaps too much insistence on control by members has led the Union into too much rigidity, and not enough delegation of authority from Plenipotentiary Conferences to the Administrative Council; d) inability to adapt its institutional structure quickly enough to meet a changing world environment and workload which leads to a failure to meet the challenging need of a rapidly developing world; and e) uncoordinated technical assistance with financial organizations to rationalize overall effort and avoid duplication.[17]

Although the document did not call specifically for the drafting of a new Charter, it suggested a basic restructuring. In its response to the document, the United State delegation challenged Sawkins's harsh criticism of the Union, underlining that, notwithstanding its shortcomings, the ITU had been effective to date in adapting to change and in facilitating the growth

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[16]Doc. 4178/CA26 (1971), Annex, pp. 8-9.

[17]Ibid., pp. 13-14.

in telecommunication activities throughout the world.[18]

As a matter of fact, of all the industrialized countries, the United States was the least convinced of the need to equip the ITU with a permanent Charter. A 1972 US proposal for the work of the 1973 Plenipotentiary Conference at Malaga-Torremolinos seems to echo the position that the new, developing countries will later take in their opposition to a Charter, but not for the same reasons:

> The United States consider that the Union's present structure is well suited to carry out its purposes of maintaining international cooperation and promoting technological development in international telecommunications. This structure has evolved during one hundred eight years of successful operation and should not be hastily altered. We therefore propose only minor refinements to correct what we deem to be deficiencies in the Union's workings. [...] Whether to fix the Union's structure on a permanent basis at a time when the volume of international telecommunications is rapidly expanding, the technology undergoing fundamental change and new institutional arrangements evolving should be carefully considered.[19]

This reflected the position of the United States on the work of the ITU. Its leadership was not yet challenged by the numerous African countries that are joining the organization. The United States with the other industrialized countries was still dominant in the organs of the ITU. Many Latin American countries were evolving in the sphere of influence of the US. The structural and organizational arrangements of the ITU met the needs of the US, be it in radio-frequency allocations or in the establishment of

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[18]Doc. 4264/CA27 (1972)

[19]Doc. 22, PC 1973.

technical standards. The call for development assistance was not yet fully articulated by the Third World and therefore was not considered yet as a disturbing element. The United States did not have any strong reasons for altering the status quo which has enabled it to maintain an uncontested leadership in the organization. This situation will later change when the United States will no longer be in a position to influence so much the work of the Union owing to its minority status along with its Western European counterparts.

As the US interest in keeping the existing Convention faded, the developing countries took over the fight, but with very different arguments. For them, the flexible character of the present Convention would enable the ITU to be more responsive to their needs and concerns by allowing for continuous revision in the purposes and work program of the Union in such a way as to reflect more quickly the new demands. The flexibility of this contractual arrangement allowed for am ever increasing representation of the Third World countries in the organs of the ITU. Commanding a majority in the Plenary Assemblies, they were better able to set the agenda of the organization. A Constitution requiring a two-thirds (or any other more restrictive formula) would not have allowed them to shape the work program of the Union.

Though supporting the present Convention on the ground that it enables the ITU to adapt to the advancing technology, India was of the view that whether the Union continue with its Conven-

tion or adopt a Constitution, it should be subject to amendment by simple majority in the Plenipotentiary Conference, as is currently practiced.[20]

It is worth quoting at some length the statement by Secretary-General Mili made at the Plenary meeting of the 1973 Plenipotentiary, because the statement includes all the arguments put forth since then by the Third World constituency (as well as the united States) opposing a permanent Charter:

> If we want the ITU to retain its youthful character despite its advanced age, it is essential that its fundamental instrument should be revised and amended regularly to allow mainly for two new factors:
> 1) the large-scale advent of the developing countries to the international arena. In the past ten year, the ITU has been enriched by the accession by a large number of new Members. To provide the necessary assistance to these new Members, our organization is developing apace. This is therefore not the time to fix a rigid pattern by means of a permanent basic text, when this evolution has not yet run its course. I am convinced that the period of five or six years to come will entail adjustment which will have to be made to the Convention at the next Plenipotentiary Conference. I am also certain that this development will persist for a long time to come, at least until the developing countries have reached the level of the industrially developed countries. You will agree with me that this is not for tomorrow. In short, it is in the interest of the developing countries, for the time being, not to have a permanent instrument for the union.
> 2) the explosion in telecommunication media. Over the past ten years, telecommunication satellites and high-capacity coaxial cables have revolutionized telecommunication media. This revolution is still in its infancy and it is essential that the ITU's basic Act should be able to match these development. Since these new media concern mainly the industrially developed countries, it is not in their interests either that the Union should be equipped with a

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[20]Doc. 64/PC 1973.

permanent instrument.[21]

To the concerns expressed by Japan over the ratification procedure, Mili responds that the signing of the Convention by the Plenipotentiaries already committed governments, the ratification by parliaments (or by other appropriate bodies) being only a pure formality. No country has yet refused to ratify any ITU Convention. The same may not apply to a permanent Constitution. If so the ITU would thus run the risk of being faced with an institutional void having serious consequences. To those who hold that one advantage of a Constitution is that it would be unnecessary to revise it in its entirety at each Plenipotentiary Conference, Mili replies that it is not necessary to revise the Convention in its entirety either. Finally, the Secretary-General commends the work of the Charter Study Group, "provided that we maintain the term "Convention" for the new instrument and that we do not require a two-thirds majority for its revision."[22]

The delegate from Brazil, an active proponent of a Charter, was unhappy with Mili's statements. He was echoed by the Argentinian delegate who had been "surprised and hurt by the unexpectedly aggressive tone of some of the expressions used." But Italy as well as Saudi Arabia supported the Secretary-General's position. For many, the difference between a Convention and a Constitution was more semantic than substantial. The stumbling block was the amendment clause of the two-thirds majority.

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[21] Doc. 152, PC 1973, pp. 2-3

[22] Ibid., p. 5.

The 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference at Nairobi witnessed a resurgence of activity regarding the draft of a Charter with a greater polarization in the positions of the respective delegations. Participation to the Conference was at an all time high. Details of the Convention were the subject of lengthy discussion and the resulting pace of deliberation was too slow for many industrialized countries, which did not conceal their dissatisfaction. An increasing number of those delegations underlined the fact that had the ITU adopted a permanent Charter, it would have sped up proceedings. This attitude was most evident in Committee 8 (Rights and Obligations). Japan resubmitted the proposal it presented 17 years ago. Most of the Western European countries actively supported the establishment of a Charter.[23] The Committee submitted to the Plenary assembly a proposal "Basic Instrument of the Union," instructing the Administrative Council to draft the text of a Constitution to be presented at its 1983 session. The Plenipotentiary passed the Resolution and set up a Group of Experts.[24] As part of a bargaining process, developing countries did not oppose it. They had been successful in other fronts: the Assembly had modified the purpose of the Union stating technical assistance as one of its three objectives; ITU funding for development activities had gained momentum, and Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and West Germany introduced two Resolutions on the Special Voluntary Program and on the

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[23]Doc. 266, PC 1982.

[24]Doc. DT/58/PC 1982.

Independent Commission for World Wide Telecommunications Development (Maitland Commission).

The successive sessions of the Administrative Council devoted most of their work at the study of the voluntary program for technical cooperation. The Maitland Commission submitted its Report in 1985, and the result of the Group of Experts on the draft of a Constitution is expected for the 1989 Plenipotentiary Conference.

Some "newly-developed" countries, particularly in Asia, had started to join the rank of the Western industrialized countries regarding the posture to adopt in ITU circles. An increasing number of delegations from developing countries have come to realize that in view of the all-time high ITU membership and the overwhelming workload that the last Plenipotentiary Conference had to deal with, the effectiveness of the Convention may have reached the point of diminishing returns. The basic instrument which has served developing countries rather well over the last 30 years may began to disserve them by slowing down decision-making processes to a point of paralysis, a situation that benefits nobody.

In addition, the developing countries have succeeded in redesigning the structural and operational framework of the ITU so as to make the Union responsive to their needs.

The creation of a new Constitution will not be easy, and there will have to be serious political debate on key issues of principles such as the contributory unit and voting rights. If

the major telecommunication countries such as the USA, the USSR, Japan, West Germany, France, and the UK are ever to be persuaded to increase their relative contributions--which may be necessary if the ITU is to grapple with the new range of tasks likely to emerge as progress to the ISDN accelerates--can the one member, one vote system continue unmodified?

The above considerations support our contention that the basic instrument of the ITU permits an evolutionary process which has enabled the Union to adapt to its changing environment.

CHAPTER 11

HYPOTHESIS 2: CCIS' WORK AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

It has been hypothesized that the increasing acceptance by the developed countries of the technical-cooperation agenda imposed upon the Union by the Third World constituency stems from an imperative to maintain the operational capability of the ITU. As the stake of the industrialized countries in worldwide telecommunication networks increases, the cost for those countries of breaking up the collective arrangements that make their network operation possible iincreases as well.

The information sector today occupies more than half of the industrialized nations' work force.[25] World markets have superseded domestic markets in the strategy of the major telecommunication equipment manufacturers and service providers. Beginning with telegraphy, then telephony, radiocommunications, and digital networks born out of the marriage of computer and telecommunication technology, the transmission of information is transborder in its essence. It is, as well, of the utmost importance that technical and operational standards can be developed to ensure system interface on a world-wide basis with the economic advantages derived from them.

Work in these domains is conducted within the International Consultative Committees, permanent organs of the ITU. Because of the advanced state of telecommunication in the industrialized

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[25]See Porat, op. cit.

countries and in view of the emerging sophisticated integrated services digital networks (ISDNs), the CCI work is critically important to those countries. The benefits of the CCI outcome are not so clear to members with a restricted telephony base, the developing countries.

The CCIR

In order to test the above hypothesis, we propose to examine in some detail the origin and the work program of the two International Consultative Committees of the ITU, the CCIR and CCITT, and how they came to be so important to the industrialized countries that these countries increasingly accepted the technical assistance agenda imposed upon the Union by the developing countries.

Following World War I, it became evident that radiocommunications were destined to provide a multitude of new services, with the likely result being an inefficient use of the radio spectrum. In consequence, an International Radio Telegraph Conference met in Washington in 1927 to consider the best occupation of the spectrum then considered usable. During the course of discussions it was found that, owing to the difference in propagation characteristics of radio waves as a function of the frequency, a profound study of these characteristics was required. The Conference therefore decided to set up a special technical committee to study radio technical subjects. The International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) was born. World War II put an end to these international forums, and it was not

until 1948 that the CCIR was able to resume its schedule of plenary sessions.

As part of the effort of the 1947 Atlantic City Plenipotentiary Conference to operate the ITU on a more structured and regularized basis, the CCIR was made a continuing, instead of periodically, convening body. The change also reflected the growing importance of CCIR work in establishing international standards, as well as providing advice to the newly created International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB).

Later, a large number of countries, many of which had just acquired their independence, showed an interest in developing their national telecommunication networks, which were either virtually non-existent, or, in the case of the newly independent countries, had been established with the needs of the former colonial power in mind. The problem was complicated by the fact that nearly all these countries were situated outside the temperate zone, in regions of desert, semi-desert. tropical rain, forest, thunderstorm belt, etc., where the climatic phenomena were but poorly understood and where detailed data on the propagation of electromagnetic waves were very scarce. Studies on these phenomena were undertaken but, lacking sufficient data covering several years which would permit a statistically valid assessment to be made, little real progress was immediately possible.

Requests for information naturally involved additional studies, carried out in the developed countries, in an endeavor

to separate the problems specific to the new or developing countries from those common to any part of the world desirous of extending its network of radiocommunications.

This period of transition, during which the concept of technical cooperation was to undergo fundamental modification from cooperation between nations whose radiocommunications networks were at approximately equal levels of development to cooperation between nations, some of which had highly developed networks and some of which had practically none, necessarily involved a high degree of rethinking. In consequence, a certain time was bound to elapse before really effective measures could be taken.

A starting point in active participation by the CCIR in the technical cooperation program is 1959, when the IXth Plenary Assembly, held in Los Angeles, adopted some Resolutions in anticipation of decisions taken by the Geneva Plenipotentiary Conference of the ITU (1959). The Plenipotentiary Conference adopted two articles in the International Telecommunication Convention which directly involved the ITU in technical-cooperation activities, and at the same time adopted Recommendations which directed the attention of the CCIR and the CCIT to the necessity of taking active steps to implement these decisions.

The Plan Sub-Committee for Africa which met in Dakar in 1962 expressed the opinion that the countries of Africa should make the greatest possible use of the aid that the CCIs can lend them a) by taking an active part in the work of the CCIR Study Groups,

sub-study groups and working parties; b) by consulting the CCIs about problems of special interest to Africa; and c) by sending officials for training courses with the specialized secretariats of the CCIs.[26]

The CCIR Study Groups, with their meetings and documentation, were aimed to provide a first-class forum in which representatives of the new or developing countries can ventilate their problems and discuss possible approaches to their solution with experts from the whole world. One of the difficulties for these meetings to be effective as assistance is the lack of knowledge as to the particular problems involved arising from the special conditions in the countries requiring assistance. To obviate this it would be most desirable that those countries send representative to CCIR meetings and set forth their problems. Because of the increasingly sophisticated nature of the technical discussions, however, few delegates are able to participate; which failure creates a vicious circle.

The 12th Plenary Assembly of the CCIR, in 1970, established a Technical Cooperation Committee which among other things invited the technically advanced countries to accept staff members proposed from other administrations for training. This Committee was set up in response to the increasing worries of industrialized countries that the work of the technical meetings of the CCIs crucial to their administrations, be slowed by

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[26]S. A. Sathar, "The International Consultative Committees and the Problems of the New and Developing Countries," Telecommunication Journal 31/1 (January 1964), pp. 21-22.

actions taken by dissatisfied members of the Third World in administrative, supervisory, forums.

The CCITT

World War I produced a surge in interest in rapid and efficient communications that did not diminish at war's end. Telephony was one of the principal beneficiaries of this new interest. It became clear that there would be social, political, and economic advantages if the European countries could create an efficient telephone network linking capital cities. One of the early advocates of the need for an organ to bring the European administration together to set standards was Frank Gill, President of the British Institute of Electrical Engineers. A meeting was held in Paris in 1923. The agenda was:

1) Selection of desirable characteristics for long distance international telephone lines;

2) Determination of operating and maintenance methods forlong-distance international telephone lines;

3) Drawing up of a program of work for establishing an international telephone network capable of meeting European needs;

4) Constitution of a central controlling organization for the development of European international telephony.

It adopted the name International Consultative Committee on Long-Distance Telephone Communications, later abbreviated to the French acronym CCIF. The Paris conference also decided on the creation of an International Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCIT). Although these two committees received the imprimatur of the 1925 conference of the International Telegraph Union, in

effect they remained almost completely independent until 1947.[27]

There was a general rule carefully observed in CCIF activities that no problem should be tackled by the CCIs unless that problem had international repercussions. Subsequently, this restricting rule disappeared in 1949 from the texts governing the running of the CCIF.

Not until 1951 was consideration given to CCIF participation in the Technical Assistance Program. The XVIth Plenary Assembly decided that the CCIF could assist the Program by: a) studying technical problems coming within the scope of CCIF studies, and disseminating technical information; and b) offering technical advice in connection with the appointment of experts or the action to be taken with a view to the professional training of technical personnel. A CCIF official lamented that the Recommendations issued by the Committee's work were very little known, especially in the developing countries. The first reason might have been that these developing countries are not even aware of the CCI activities. Second, the volumes containing the CCI Recommendations are too expensive. Prices are high because the number of copies printed is small, and the number of copies printed is small precisely because distribution is so restricted; again a vicious circle. Third, these volumes are too technical and cannot be understood by less trained personnel.[28] It is

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[27]R. Chapuis, "The Role of an International Telecommunication Consultative Committee in Technical Assistance," Telecommunication Journal 2 (February 1957), p. 33.

[28]Ibid.

interesting to note that technical assistance was seen as a question of disseminating knowledge, not actually field work.

The Atlantic Conference of 1947 spent much time considering the proper place of the CCIs in the ITU's organizational structure. Many delegates were worried that in bringing the committees into closer relationship to the ITU they should not deprive them of the characteristics, including independence, that permitted them to work effectively. According to the Swiss delegate, the CCIF had been able to do so well over the years because it had been allowed to work "with complete independence and to adapt itself, according to the various cases, to the continually changing needs created by the inevitable evolution of engineering techniques."[29]

In 1956, the CCIF and the CCIT merged into the modern International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT).

The methods of work of the CCIR are considerably different owing to the nature of their subject matter and the relative isolation that has historically existed between the CCITT and the CCIR. The CCIR work is narrowly confined to radio propagation and facilities, and has engaged in only a fraction of the activity as the CCITT. Another significant difference is the comparatively reduced status of CCIR Recommendations. The CCITT's Recommendations are generally regarded as mandatory by operators of

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[29]as quoted in Codding, The International Telecommunication Union, pp. 297-298.

international telecommunication networks. The CCIR's Recommendations on the other hand are generally just that--recommendations--with few exceptions.

One of the aspects of the work of the consultative committees that has intrigued its observers over the years is the participation of individuals from private entities along with individuals from government agencies in important aspects of decision-making. It seems clear that the participation of private operating agencies and the manufacturers of telecommunications equipment in the establishment of international standards is more than merely symbolic. These groups are given a wide opportunity to affect the work of the study groups where the basic research takes place.

Both the CCIR and the CCITT have not been left unaffected by the call for technical assistance to developing countries. Under the terms of Article 13 of the International Telecommunication Convention (Geneva,1959) both the CCIR and the CCITT are required to:

> pay due attention to the study of questions and to the formulation of recommendations directly connected with the establishment, development and the improvement of telecommunication in new or developing countries in both the regional and international fields.

In paragraph 179 it has been further laid down that "at the request of the countries concerned each Consultative Committee may also study and offer advice concerning their national telecommunication problems." The Plenipotentiary Conference of Geneva 1959 also approved a Recommendation No. 2 in which it is

provided that the CCIs should consider the possibility of

> 1. Setting up sub-groups in the appropriate study groups to be specially responsible for studying problems of particular interest to new or developing countries;
>
> 2. In particular instructing these sub-groups to extract any provisions from Consultative Committee Recommendations likely to be of interest to new or developing countries and to present these provisions in as clear and useful form as possible.[30]

The Plenipotentiary Conference of Montreux 1965 gave due consideration to the problems encountered in the implementation of Recommendation No. 2 and the experience of the Plenary Assemblies of the CCIs held before 1965 in tackling the problems of the new or developing countries. In 1965, a new provision to Article 14 was incorporated:

> There shall be a World Plan Committee, and such Regional Plan Committees as may be jointly approved by the Plenary Assemblies of the CCIs. These Plan Committees shall develop a General Plan for the international telecommunication network to help in planning international telecommunication services. They shall refer to the CCIs questions the study of which is of particular interest to new or developing countries and which are within the terms of reference of those Consultative Committees.

Resolution 28 on "Methods of Improving Technical Cooperation" recommends that the CCIs "consider ways of improving their operation and procedures to enable them to respond more quickly to questions raised by the new or developing countries;" and also encourages the governments of those countries "to participate in the Study Groups of the International Consultative Committees." In fact, from now on, the pressing call to developing countries

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[30] International Telecommunication Convention, Geneva 1959.

to actively participate in CCIs' work becomes a leitmotiv.

A major effort in strengthening the ties between the new or developing countries and the ITU occurred at the 1964 CCITT Plenary Assembly when it was decided to establish a Committee D (New and Developing Countries) as well as five Special Autonomous Working Parties, designated GAS in accordance with French nomenclature. The main accomplishment of these GAS has been the production of handbooks dealing with specific aspects of telecommunications of interest to developing countries. These handbooks had raised expectation for solutions among many of these delegates, but they assumed experience and technical knowledge generally absent in the Third World.[31]

If there is little doubt as to the merits of the GAS handbooks, it remains to be seen what impact they have had and, particularly, whether their circulation is wide enough to serve the purpose of the technical cooperation which was their raison d'etre. It must be said, however, that the work done is far from having been fruitful. The circulars inviting orders for certain of these handbooks give some idea of the possible readership. One of the main targets, the students at schools for telecommunication engineers or technicians, does not appear to have been reached. The sales figures for the GAS handbooks are much smaller

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[31]G. D. Wallenstein, "Handbooks of the Consultative Committees: Bridges Between International Standardization and national Telecommunication Development," Telecommunication Journal 43/10 (1976), p. 636.

than had been expected.[32]

Only two GAS remain active and have received considerable attention of delegates from developing countries, GAS 3 (Economic and Technical Comparison of Transmission Systems) and GAS 5 (Economic Studies at the National Level in the Field of Telecommunications). It seems that a tutorial GAS group is not the place to bring about world standardization of telecommunication systems. This place belongs to the regular study groups and constitutes their principal reason for existence.

Poor Attendance by the Developing Countries

The history of developing countries' involvement in the CCIs is an unhappy one. One of the most important characteristics of participation in the work of the CCIs is the predominance of the developed nations, which is visible in the attendance at Plenary assemblies but more striking in the working groups. At the 1979 CCIR plenary assembly, 19 out of 27 of the OECD were represented, as were 6 out of 10 Warsaw Pact nations. Only 36 Third World countries were represented out of a possible 117 and only a few countries from the poorest Third World nations. The Third World made a much better showing at the 1976 Geneva CCITT plenary, but all but one of the 49 missing delegations were from the developing countries of the Third World. In the study groups, the

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[32]See R. Chapuis, "The Dissemination of Technical Information by the ITU as a Form of Technical cooperation: The Work of the CCITT Special Autonomous Working Parties "GAS" and Publication of Special Issues of the Telecommunication Journal: Possible Lines of Action," Telecommunication Journal 39/6 (1972), pp. 372-378.

predominance of developed nations is most apparent. In 1977, for instance, of the 39 countries which participated in the CCIR's 13 study groups, only 14 were from the Third World. In 1979, 44 countries took part in the 17 regular CCITT study groups; of these, only 15 could be classified as Third World, and only one had attended a majority of the study groups.

As far back as 1966, the XIth Plenary Assembly of the CCIR urged that the CCIs should consider ways and means of improving their operation and procedure to enable them to respond more quickly to questions raised by new and developing countries. It also realize that administrations from developing countries find it difficult to follow the work of the CCIR in an efficient manner. It decided to set up an International Working Party to study the question of reorganization of the work of the CCIR.

A number of officials used Telecommunication Journal, ITU's official monthly publication, to urge LDCs to take a more active part in the work of the CCIs. For example, S. A. Sathar, from Pakistan's Telegraph and Telephone Directorate (development) and ITU expert, concluded an 1968 article as follows:

> First of all, it will be most desirable for these [developing] countries to collaborate to the greatest extent possible by participating in the World Plan and Regional Plan Committees and formulating questions of special interest to be studies by the CCIs in relation to the planning of their national telecommunication networks. They should endeavor to participate actively in the normal work of the CCIR and CCITT Study Groups and submit as early as possible any questions they would like studied by the different Groups of the CCIs in accordance with the provision of paragraph 190 of the Montreux Convention, 1965. They should, in particular, follow very closely the work of the Special Autonomous Working Parties which are engaged in the

> preparation of special handbooks. As these handbooks are primarily meant for helping new or developing countries it would be very valuable if representatives of such countries took an active interest in the preparation of these handbooks, particularly in making known the general and special problems which should be dealt with by the Working Parties.[33]

This call was echoed in a 1973 contribution to Telecommunication Journal by Brazil's J. de Mesquita:

> The preceding is a plea for the attendance of a large number of developing countries in CCIR and CCITT meetings. As a national of a developing country, the author personally feels that sending delegates to these meetings is not only desirable, it is more and more essential. Even if we leave aside their technical aspects, they are excellent training for participation in international conferences.[34]

In 1968, the participation of these countries was so unsatisfactory that it was the turn of the 4th Plenary Assembly of the CCITT to pass Resolution 3 which include the follwoing important provisions:

> a) New or developing countries should take a more active part in the work of the CCITT by sending suitable delegations to the meetings;
>
> b) The CCITT, with the assistance of volunteering administration, should help countries who ask for specifications of equipment.
>
> c) The CCITT should organize seminars periodically for the benefit of new and developing countries.[35]

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[33]S. A. Sathar, "The International Consultative Committees and the Problems of New or Developing Countries: A Review of Progress," Telecommunication Journal 35/1 (1968), p. 20.

[34]J. de Mesquita, "Developing Countries and the Work of the International Consultative Committees," Telecommunication Journal 40/3 (1973).

[35]S. A. Sathar, "The International Consultative Committees and the Problems of New or Developing Countries: A Review of Progress," Telecommunication Journal 38/9 (1971), p. 642.

Many reasons have been given for the failure of the developing countries to respond to the work of the CCIs. First, the developing countries lack the expertise necessary to participate effectively at a high technical level. As a result, the CCITT's study group consists essentially of delegates from advanced countries, more interested with the mainstream of the Committee's work which is agreement-making for application of new technology. Second, the developing countries lack the finances needed for participation. They cannot afford to send delegates to the study group meetings, especially in view of the fact that there are so many to attend, nor can they spare the competent personnel at home to follow developments in the two committees. The situation has created a vicious circle: without participation by developing countries, the study groups and committees have found it difficult to identify satisfactorily questions and problems of specific concern to these countries,[36] (see Figure 6).

Irrelevance of the CCIs' Work to Developing Countries

More recently, expression of dissatisfaction have been leveled against the CCIs by the developing countries regarding their work programs and decision-making process. According to this criticism, the CCIs pay insufficient attention to the problems and interests of the ITU's developing member states. This criticism is two-pronged. First, the charge is made that the subjects considered are disproportionately those that concern

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[36]Codding and Rutkowski, p. 102-104.

FIGURE 6

Participation in the CCITT in 1980

COUNTRIES (Administrations or Recognized Private Operating Agencies)	Study Groups and their Working Parties																	Plan			Joint Working Party	Special Autonomous Study Groups			VII Plenary Assembly	TOTAL
	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII	CMBD	World	Africa	Latin America	I.TG	GAS3	GAS5	GAS6		
Afghanistan																										—
Albania																									×	1
Algeria																		×	×					×	×	4
Germany (Fed. Rep. of)	×	×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×			×	×	20
Angola																										—
Saudi Arabia																		×						×	×	3
Argentina		×					×											×		×					×	6
Australia	×	×		×	×	×	×	×	×	×		×	×		×	×		×							×	16
Austria		×	×	×	×	×						×	×		×	×		×							×	11
Bahamas																										—
Bahrain																		×								1
Bangladesh																									×	1
Barbados																										—
Belgium	×	×	×			×		×	×	×	×	×	×		×	×		×							×	16
Benin																		×	×						×	3
Byelorussia																									×	1
Burma																										—
Bolivia																										—
Botswana																										—
Brazil		×								×	×		×			×		×				×			×	8
Bulgaria													×		×	×		×								4
Burundi																										—
Cameroon																		×	×						×	3
Canada	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×	×	×	×	×	24
Cape Verde																										—
Central African Rep																			×							1
Chile																		×		×					×	3
China	×	×	×	×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×	×	×		×	21
Cyprus	×									×								×							×	4
Vatican																										—
Colombia																				×					×	2
Comoros																										—
Congo																		×	×						×	3
Korea (Rep. of)			×					×																	×	2
Costa Rica																										—
Ivory Coast																		×	×						×	3
Cuba																		×							×	2
Djibouti																										—
Denmark	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×	×	×	×	×		×	×					×		×	17
Dominican Republic																										—
Egypt																		×							×	2
El Salvador																										—
United Arab Emirates																										—
Ecuador																										—
Spain	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×	×	×	×	23
United States of America	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×	×	×	×	×	24
Ethiopia																		×							×	2
Fiji																										—
Finland	×	×	×		×		×	×		×	×	×		×	×	×	×	×				×			×	17
France	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×	×	×	×	×	24
Gabon																		×	×						×	3
Gambia																										—
Ghana																										—
Greece										×								×							×	2
Guatemala																										—
Guinea																		×							×	2
Guinea-Bissau																										—
Equatorial Guinea																										—
Guyana																										—
Haiti																										—
Upper Volta																		×							×	2
Honduras																										—
Hungary	×	×	×	×	×	×	×		×		×	×		×	×	×	×	×				×			×	19
India	×	×	×	×	×	×		×			×	×	×	×	×	×		×							×	19
Indonesia																		×					×	×	×	4
Iran																		×						×		2
Iraq										×								×								2
Ireland	×		×	×		×		×	×	×	×	×	×	×		×	×	×				×		×		16
Iceland																									×	1
Israel																							×			1
Italy	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	26
Jamaica																										—
Japan	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	×			×	×	×	×	×	24
Jordan																		×					×		×	2
Democratic Kampuchea																										—
Kenya																		×	×						×	3
Kuwait										×								×							×	2
Lao P.D.R.																										—
Lesotho																										—
Lebanon	×																	×							×	2
Liberia																									×	1
Libya																										—

COUNTRIES (Administrations or Recognized Private Operating Agencies)	Study Groups and their Working Parties																		Plan			Joint Working Party	Special Autonomous Study Groups				VII Plenary Assembly	TOTAL
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	XVIII	CMBD	World	Africa	Latin America		LTG	GAS3	GAS5	GAS6		
Liechtenstein																											x	1
Luxembourg																											x	1
Madagascar																			x								x	1
Malaysia																												—
Malawi																												—
Maldives																												—
Mali			x													x			x								x	2
Malta																												—
Morocco																			x								x	1
Mauritius																												—
Mauritania																											x	1
Mexico																			x		x						x	2
Monaco																											x	1
Mongolia																												—
Mozambique																												—
Nauru																												—
Nepal																												—
Nicaragua																			x									1
Niger																			x								x	1
Nigeria	x	x								x	x								x						x	x	x	8
Norway	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x				x				x	19
New Zealand											x	x			x		x	x									x	6
Oman																			x									1
Uganda											x								x	x						x	x	5
Pakistan																			x								x	2
Panama																					x							1
Papua New Guinea																												—
Paraguay	x																				x							2
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				x	x	x		x	23
Peru																			x		x							2
Philippines																			x								x	2
Poland			x											x		x			x								x	5
Portugal	x	x	x	x						x	x						x		x						x		x	10
Qatar																			x								x	2
Syria																											x	1
German Dem. Rep.	x	x	x		x	x	x				x	x		x					x								x	11
D P R of Korea			x																								x	2
Ukraine																											x	1
Romania																			x								x	2
United Kingdom	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				x	x	x	x	x	24
Rwanda																			x								x	2
San Marino																												—
San Tome and Principe																												—
Senegal																			x	x						x	x	4
Sierra Leone																												—
Singapore																											x	1
Somalia																												—
Sudan			x								x																x	3
Sri Lanka																												—
South Africa (Rep. of)																												—
Sweden	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				x		x	x	x	22
Switzerland	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x				x	x			x	22
Suriname																			x									1
Swaziland																												—
Tanzania	x											x			x				x						x		x	6
Chad																												—
Czechoslovkia										x									x								x	1
Thailand										x	x								x								x	2
Togo			x																x								x	1
Tonga																												—
Trinidad and Tobago																												—
Tunisia																			x							x	x	3
Turkey																			x								x	2
U S S R	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x				x				x	20
Uruguay																					x							1
Venezuela					x	x					x																x	4
Viet Nam																					•							—
Yemen A R																			x									1
Yemen (P D R of)																												—
Yugoslavia					x	x	x									x			x								x	6
Zaire																												—
Zambia																			x									1
Total of Countries	25	27	30	21	24	21	23	19	19	20	33	23	19	26	20	24	25	17	76	11	9	13	14	17	20	35		

Source: ITU Doc. 5621 (CA36-40), March 1981.

primarily the developed states. Secondly, it is alleged that the recommendations pay insufficient attention to the interests of the LDCs. Often Recommendations simply "register" the de facto state of affairs in industrialized countries. To amplify this point, since the Recommendations frequently involve systems with several variables, many trade-offs are possible, for instance between cost and versatility. The interests of states in these trade-offs will vary, depending among other things on their level of economic development.

Frequently, the Recommendations have substantial financial implications. Local communications systems are usually designed with local conditions in mind, and consequently there are many variations among them. Connecting them can require modifications in one or more of the systems. In cases of this nature, the Recommendations of the International Consultative Committees will determine how the burdens of making modifications will be distributed. When new technology is involved, Recommendations specifying standards may mean giving legitimacy to certain patent holders and not to others. Recommendations can obviously involve millions of dollars. Influence varies with the issue being considered, but it is almost never distributed equally. For example, it would be extremely unlikely that a Recommendation concerning telephones would be formulated which did not take into careful account the interests of the United States, which has almost half the telephones in service in the world.

Both because of the non-binding character of Recommendations

and the substantial financial stakes involved, great efforts are made in the CCIs to achieve consensus and unanimity. Although majority voting is the formal rule in Plenary Assemblies, it is almost never invoked. Plenary Assemblies generally accept the conclusions of Study Groups with little or no modifications. Since the objective of participating in the activities of the CCIs is to make it possible to communicate with others, the unequal distribution of influence in Study Groups seldom results in states' exercising veto powers. Rather it means that all participants will compromise, but some will compromise more than others.[37]

At the 1973 Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference, the Argentinean delegation proposed the establishment of a new International Committee for Technical Cooperation in Telecommunications to coexist along with the CCIR and CCITT. The proposal was rejected in view of efforts in this area already being conducted within the existing Consultative Committees, especially the CCITT.

A recent innovation in procedure is the emergency device known as the "provisional recommendation," which was introduced because it was felt that technical advances sometimes demand solutions that cannot wait for the next plenary assembly. If adopted by unanimous agreement of the administrations and private

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[37]For further information about the dynamics at work with the CCIs, see H. K. Jacobson, "International Institutions for Telecommunications: the ITU's Role," in E. McWhinney (ed.) The International Law of Communications (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1971), pp. 51-68.

operating agencies represented at a meeting of a study group, such recommendations can enter into force without awaiting the next Plenary assembly's approval. When the Plenary does meet, these provisional recommendations come before it for final approval in the normal way.[38] This procedure further relegates LDC representatives to powerless position. Because of the usually small size of their delegations, they tend to limit themselves to attending the general assemblies where, in conjunction with other LDC delegations they have a forceful voice due to their sheer number, whereas in small working committees they are overwhelmed by the number and expertise of their counterparts from industrialized countries. Dissatisfied with their lack of technological and political clout in those committees, they have threatened in general assemblies to exercise pressure by controlling the budgetary allocation to the CCIs and push them to address questions more relevant to their needs.

If the CCIs have not been so far greatly responsive to the specific concerns of the developing world, recent developments regarding the changing nature of the CCITT suggest that the situation may even worsen.

Importance of CCITT to Developed Countries: Toward ISDN

In the 1960s and 1970s, the CCITT had began to assume jurisdiction over all telecommunication matters except those

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[38]M. Mili, "International Jurisdiction in Telecommunication Affairs," #6 Telecommunication Journal, 40/XII (December 1973), p. 746.

narrowly related to radiocommunication.[39] The most dramatic changes occurred at the seventh plenary assembly of the CCITT in the fall of 1980. Looking at the likely course of technological developments over the next decades, the CCITT completely revamped its study group structure and program around the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) concept, with its Study Group 18 to play the lead role. The assembly, recognizing the tremendous technological changes that will impact the world's "information transport" networks, formally recommended that its jurisdiction be expanded to encompass all telecommunications except radio. It has since become the paramount ITU organ, engaging in by far the most important and greatest volume of work.[40]

The CCITT Plenary assembly 1984 attempted to secure a more functional infrastructure to accommodate the ISDN environment. During the 1981-84 activity period, Study Group XVIII had jurisdiction over most ISDN matters, and coordinated ISDN-related work of other groups. That approach was changed somewhat in the new organization which orients most of the CCITT study groups around ISDN, and diffuses more of the responsibilities.[41]

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[39]The ITU Radio Regulations defines radio as the propagation of electromagnetic waves in space without artificial guide, (Chapter I, Article 1).

[40]It should be noted that although the terms "telegraph" and "telephone" constitute the CCITT's name, its formal jurisdiction is defined in terms of all telecommunications matters, except those specifically relating to radio. In fact, most of the CCITT's current work only indirectly relates to telegraph and telephone matters.

[41]A. Rutkowski, Integrated Services Digital Networks (Dedham, MA: Artech House, 1986), pp. 6-7.

It can be said that the dominant function of CCITT becomes the study of ISDN matters. This is also reflected by the fact that the 1984 assembly elected the former Chairman of Study Group XVIII and the veritable godfather of the ISDN concept, Theodore Irmer, to the position of Director of CCITT.

More than any other telecommunication system, the development of sophisticated all-digital integrated networks is almost exclusively the province of the Western industrialized countries as they require a highly developed telephone base which developing countries do not have. These latter countries are increasingly alienated from the work of the CCITT, an organ which has been constantly reminded (and generally failed) to raise its level of commitment to technical cooperation.

The CCIs are becoming as important to developed countries as the push for ITU sponsored technical cooperation is for developing countries. At Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference in 1982, the spokespersons for the Third World made clear that for them it was important to have better representation and more technical assistance from the CCIs. Progress within CCIs is important for telecommunication developments in the industrialized world. The immediate benefits are not so clear to members with a restricted telephony base. Some developing countries suggested that there might be a case for cutting back on Budget allocations for the CCIs to make available more funds for technical assistance, which is of more immediate relevance to the majority of members.

What was hardly acceptable to developing countries is that,

on the one hand, the CCI work, so critical to developed countries, is integrally part of the ITU budget, and as this work expands, so will ITU budgetary allocations. On the other hand, allocations for ITU technical assistance, of critical importance to developing countries, come from the shrinking UNDP budget; and the prospect for ITU contributing to this budget appears slim as the largest contributor, the industrialized countries, are so far unwilling to increase the ITU income. In short, Third World countries were reluctant to allow CCI work to expand while their urgent needs could not be adequately addressed.

If pushed too far, this approach could alter the whole nature of the ITU. If more and more of internal ITU resources are diverted to technical assistance the time could come when the PTT administrations in Europe and their counterparts in North America and Japan, the very same which are conducting ISDN-related work within the CCIs, might conclude that the ITU did not reflect their own interests and alternative arrangements might appear preferable.[42]

The search for an alternative forum will probably not happen. Too much work has already been done in CCIs to dismiss them and it is probably too late to consider an alternative to the present body. The cost of shifting to other international bodies or establish new technical forums is increasing as time goes by. The CCITT has established standards and interface specifications which constitute the basis for the emerging

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[42]See Solomon, "Rejoinder"

ISDN-related industry. Europe, North America, and Japan already have plans to have ISDN-type services, based on computer and communication technologies, in place by 1990-95. The technology is moving fast, and the leading manufacturers and network operations in the world are locked in an intense competitive struggle to win a lion's share of this new and highly sophisticated market. Convergence and the rapid development of new advanced network services are bringing new players such as IBM and other data-processor companies such as ICL, NEC and Fujitsu, more and more in the center of network operation.

The ITU faces two divergent challenges. First, it must demonstrate a capability of meeting the rapidly changing technological and commercial needs of the advanced countries. Second, it must demonstrate a capability of securing a transfer of telecommunications resources to the developing world.

It is in light of this situation that one understand the two Resolutions 19 and 20 of the International Telecommunication Convention adopted at Nairobi in 1982--proposed by the UK and cosponsored with the USA, Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany--which established the special Voluntary Program to promote greater technical cooperation through the ITU and the high-level Independent Commission for Worldwide Telecommunication Development.[43]

These two proposals directed to satisfying the needs of the

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[43]J. Solomon, "The Future Role of International Telecommunications Institutions," **Telecommunications Policy** (1984), p. 216.

developing countries can be seen as the bargaining chips that the industrialized countries put on the negotiation table in a move to secure the new work agenda of the CCIs relevant to them. They succeeded in having the 1982 Plenipotentiary Conference, dominated by Third World countries, endorse a Swedish and Japanese initiative to hold a World Administrative Telephone and Telegraph in 1988 (WATTC-88). WATTC-88 adds an important new dimension to ISDN work because of the potential for that conference to embody ISDN concept in a treaty instrument which would govern certain telecommunication arrangements among the ITU's member nations, mainly in the most advanced ones, for the time being.

CHAPTER 12

HYPOTHESIS 3: CENTRALITY OF TELECOMMUNICATION

The preceding historical account of the evolution of the ITU's activities toward development assistance to the Third World has revealed the extent to which all parties, the industrialized countries in particular, have been striving to preserve the operational capability of the Union. The cost incurred to them could be regarded as their reluctant acceptance of a new agenda imposed upon the Union by the developing countries, namely, technical cooperation, which largely diverged from the initial agenda established in 1865, coordination of telecommunication services among industrialized nations.

The longevity of the ITU, despite profound changes in the global geo-political environment over the past forty years, has been successfully linked to the uniqueness of the organization's basic instrument, the Convention--allowing for the integration of new elements into the existing structure. Hypothesis testing has shown that the institutional cohesion is also due to the critical importance of the ITU's specialized bodies for the progress of telecommunication systems in advanced countries, which leads those to accommodate unrelated demands of new actors.

The third hypothesis which is explored in this section is related to a more fundamental reason for the Union's success in managing conflicting inputs. It states that it is the unique nature of its domain of jurisdiction--telecommunication--which has guaranteed so far the longevity of the ITU, since the protec-

tion of a nation's telecommunication system is deeply rooted in the need for collective agreement regarding the sharing of scarce natural resources, namely, the radio frequency spectrum and the geostationary satellite orbit.

The unique characteristic of telecommunication has in turn impacted upon the institutional framework of the ITU as well as upon decision-making procedures.

As an introduction, it is worth noting that juridically, the law of communications has been considered under the general heading of international law, and the specific heading of international administrative law. Before World War II, a new notion became dominant among the scholars treating administrative matters which concerned, in one way or another, the international community. According to this new notion, communications belonged in the category of international public service, rather than that of mere public service, and thus transferred out of the sphere of domestic or internal administrative law into that of international administrative law. Consequently, such international bodies as the ITU and the Universal Postal Union (UPU), which are open to the participation of all states and even to non-governmental enterprises, became international associations of a non-political character.[44]

In his examination of international organizations, Goodspeed attributes cooperative efforts in technical fields such as

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[44]H. Valladao, "South American Contributions to Solutions of the Jurisdical Problems of Telecommunications and Direct Satellite Broadcasting," in E. McWhinney, op. cit., pp. 138-148.

telecommunication to their physical characteristic of "transcending purely national frontiers."[45]

Telecommunications Call For Cooperation

For several reasons, states could hardly have confined their communications within their own boundaries. Commerce is a major one. A nation that engages in trade and seeks to enjoy the benefits of specialization requires an ability to communicate across state borders. States also have political relations with one another which can be facilitated by communications. Even adversaries can find it helpful to communicate. When communications must cross borders, however, only international collaboration can assure that they will reach their destinations.

Even the simple telegraph required substantial cooperation. An efficient system required at least a measure of agreement on the standardization of equipment, operating procedures and, to a lesser extent, administrative procedures, including rates for services. More complex technology required correspondingly more elaborate agreements. The obvious benefits to be gained from international collaboration have generally been compelling, and starting with the 1849 treaty between Austria and Prussia providing for the linking of their telegraph lines, international cooperative arrangements have closely followed technological developments.

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[45]S. Goodspeed, (ed.) The Nature and Function of International Organization (New York: Oxford University press, 1959), p. 4.

In automatic telephony, international customer dialing has been made possible, in spite of seemingly forbidding obstacles presented by a multitude of national dial configurations and different signaling systems. For many years there was no incentive for standardizing these aspects, since the completion of telephone calls across national borders required the intervention of operators. The through-connection could be handled by patching two (or more) separate voice circuits together. With automation, electronic signals have to do the work of routing and switching. To accomplish this operation, these signals either have to be compatible all the way through, or have to be machine-translated from one standard to another at gateways and switching points. The CCITT collaboration among national operating agencies should be successful as pressure for expanding international trade, requiring efficient telecommunication networks, was increasing. Most of this work was accomplished in the 1960-1968 period.

A similar success story can be told about standardization in data communication. Data transmission emerged rapidly as a field requiring standardization during the late 1950s to keep pace with the introduction of computers.

The need for international cooperation became even more important when wireless communications came into use. Because electromagnetic waves embodying radio messages travel through the atmosphere rather than through wires or cables, radio transmissions are not restricted by the territorial considerations that first prompted in ternational coordination of wire communica-

tions.

Furthermore, even a nation's domestic radio communications can have international ramifications. The physical properties of radio make it difficult to confine transmissions within political boundaries. If the right technical and atmospheric conditions exist, radio waves originating in one country can be received, not just in neighboring jurisdiction, but also across the world. Harmful interference can be averted or minimized only through careful coordination of the power, direction, and timing of transmissions on the same or adjacent frequencies. It is well recognized that unless users of radio as a means of national as well as international communication would be greatly diminished and, in some circumstances, totally destroyed.[46] Because the commercial applications of radio are quite lucrative, existing users of radio in industrialized countries are consuming more spectrum space. At the same time, demand for frequencies from the developing countries has contributed to the crowding of the spectrum because remote or isolated areas and people can be linked together more quickly and economically with radio communication than with transportation systems or wire communication system.

A Look at WARC-79

The 1979 World Administrative radio Conference (WARC) was the theater of a global bargaining process regarding the alloca-

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[46]S. Chen, "The Theory and Practice of International Organization," in Goodspeed, op. cit., p. 147.

tion of radio frequencies and the allotment of geostationary orbital slot for communication satellite.

An issue arose over the popular and congested high frequency (HF) region of the radio spectrum, which is used internationally in shortwave radio communication. Over the last thirty years there had been a five-fold increase in the number of shortwave transmitters, which, combined with a significant augmentation in their transmitting power, has left only one-third of the frequencies free of interference.[47] The United States and other developed countries argued at the 1979 WARC that additional high frequencies should be allocated for international shortwave broadcasting of the type done by Voice of America, the BBB World Service, and Radio Moscow. This proposal was opposed by Third World countries, who fear that it would interfere with their domestic uses of the shortwave frequencies for telephone services and other point-to-point communications.

The developed countries tried to persuade other countries to follow their lead in shifting most domestic point-to-point transmissions to microwaves and cables, thereby freeing more of the HF region for services that depend upon its unique attributes for long-distance broadcasting. Representatives of the Third World opposed such a change, arguing that it would be very costly and would subject them to more undesired foreign propaganda broadcast. They in turn proposed assigning shortwave frequencies

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[47]Francis S. Ronalds, "Voices of America," Foreign Policy 34 (Spring 1979), p. 157.

to specific countries. A decision was made at the 1979 WARC to hold a two-part mini-WARC beginning in 1983 to formulate the world's first shortwave broadcasting plan, which would include frequency allocations to national radio services and stations.[48]

Because communication from space satellites can generally be directed to larger geographical areas of the earth with greater reliability than can conventional terrestrial radio transmissions, the need for international cooperation and the potential for conflict in the satellite field is accentuated. As the use of satellite technology increases, international policy conflicts over occupancy of the geostationary orbit may be manifested in head-to-head conflicts among nations competing for a finite number of orbital slots in which to position satellites.

The 1979 WARC witnessed a 60-percent increase in ITU membership over the last meeting held twenty years ago, entirely through the addition of developing countries. The use of geostationary satellite for telecommunication was seen as a more cost effective way of implementing telecommunication networks in the developing countries, in particular, than conventional ground systems. The "first come, first served" policy that presided so far the allotment of geostationary orbital slot, a scarce resource, was fought by Third World countries since all slots would be occupied by their industrialized counterparts by the time they would be in a position fo operate their own system.

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[48]Marvin S. Soroos, "The Commons in the Sky: The Radio Spectrum and Geosynchronous Orbit as Issues in Global Policy," International Organization 36/3 (Summer 1982), pp. 665-677.

They called for an a priori allotment policy that naturally was opposed by the technologically advanced countries. Given the critical importance of satellite communication for all countries, the 1979 WARC ended up with medium solutions acceptable by all, further refined in the 1985 Space WARC.

The failure or inability of any nation to conform to complex international standards will deprive it of important benefits and may impede other nations from taking full advantage of the new technology as well.

As nations become more dependent upon telecommunication, they will be less able to ignore situations that render their services unusable. Similarly, as their level of financial commitment to telecommunication facilities and services increases, nations will be less willing to risk actions that would diminish the return on investment.

Telecommunications And Self-Interest

Clearly, the incentives for international cooperation before conflicts arise can only be expected to become stronger. Such cooperation is most likely to exist when it is in a nation's self-interest. If, for example, a member nation desires international recognition and protection of its frequency assignments, it must adhere to international standards. Catering to its member's self-interests is one of the ITU's greatest strengths that distinguish it from other international organizations. As a nation's stake in advanced telecommunication systems increase, its willingness to prevent conflict will permeate other areas of

interest to the ITU community such as accommodating developing countries' demands.[49]

From time to time it has been suggested that the ITU needs to become more active in the conflict-resolution process, ostensibly because the higher stakes involved in contemporary telecommunication conflicts warrant it.[50] One way to evaluate the need for such change is to examine the history of conflict resolution in the ITU, with particular emphasis on arbitration, currently the strongest available measure for settlement of disputes between ITU members. In the past, the arbitration procedures have been largely ignored, with members preferring to resolve their disputes through bilateral negotiation.[51] Most important, the reluctance of nations to resort to binding forms of conflict resolution administered by an ITU organ in the past does not appear either to have diminished the organization's effectiveness or to have adversely affected world telecommunication order.

The desire for self-preservation, and the recognition that

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[49]D. C. Gregg, "Capitalizing on National Self-Interest: The Management of International Telecommunication Conflict by the ITU," Law and Contemporary Problems, International Telecommunications, 45/1 (Winter 1982), pp. 38-52.

[50]David Leive, International Telecommunications and International Law: The Regulation of the Radio Spectrum (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970), pp. 313-315

[51]Of the few cases in which resort to arbitration was attempted, none involved harmful interference. The one significant reported arbitration case under the ITU procedures involved a 1935 dispute over suspension of telegraph services. See discussion of the "Affaire de la Societe Radio-Orient (France v. Egypt)," in Codding, op. cit., pp. 309-311.

order in the world community is essential if vital resources are to benefit all mankind, have created pressures for cooperation and mutual problem-solving. Equitable and efficient management of the environment and of national resources, and the orderly development of international telecommunication systems, are vital to national interests. The context within which international decision-making occurs is therefore characterized by world tensions at one level, and pressures for self-preservation and collective agreement at another.

In the final analysis, the success of any international endeavor requires the voluntary cooperation of the sovereign nations involved. Realistically, such cooperation is most likely to exist when it is in a nation's self-interest. Voluntary compliance is most likely to be attained if the organization has a "worldwide" domain of jurisdiction rather than loosely defined "international." The ITU survives because the coordination of telecommunication services can only be worldwide. This is a very critical distinction, since the terminology "international" is often applied to commercial interworking and agreements that do not necessarily enjoy voluntary acceptance by all affected parties. Under the ITU approach to worldwide standardization or resource allocation, universally approved, is preferable to the notion of a single standard that would be ignored or counteracted by dissenting parties.

The nature of the ITU's province results in the fact that the nation-state needs not be seen as an obstacle to future

expansion of working agreements, at least in the less political fields. In fact, the nation-state's administrative departments fulfill a vital role by shaping, interpreting, and adapting the worldwide standards, plans and resource allocations to the varying social and cultural conditions of each state. There are indirect built-in incentives for stability by increasing public investment in, and dependence on, international agreements.

Though ITU is testimony to the virtual necessity for collaboration among states, it and its history also reflect the desire of states to retain maximum control over communication processes. Communication systems could have been organized on an international basis, and ITU or some similar body given responsibility for their operation. Instead, communication systems have generally been organized within individual nations with operational responsibility assigned to national entities. Occasionally groups of nations have joined together to organize and operate communication systems. Intelsat and Intersputnik are the most comprehensive of these, but even these do not have universal membership. States have insisted on maintaining control of communication systems individually, or sharing control only with friendly states, primarily because of the importance of such systems to the civilian and military functions of government.

The functions which developed states were willing to assign to the ITU therefore have been limited to facilitating connections among systems, as those systems were expanding, and to preventing these systems from interferring with one another.

States have seen ITU as a framework within which they could settle such matters by bargaining among themselves, not as an independent, decision-making agency.

Viewed in one perspective, the unwillingness of states to assign more than the most limited functions to ITU might be regarded as a serious liability for the organization. It has certainly served to constrain the Union's growth. In another perspective, though, it may actually have been an asset, for had the Union had more extensive functions, particularly in the operation of communication systems, it might not have been able to weather the many crises among its members that it has successfully withstood. ITU's limited role has served to insulate it from the ebb and flow of tensions in world politics.[52]

Telecommunications and Unanimity Rule

In view of the unique domain of jurisdiction of the ITU--telecommunication, and the fact that telecommunication matters cannot but call for worldwide inforcement, the resulting third characteristic of the Union's work is that decision-making is overwhelmingly achieved through unanimity rule rather than majority rule. Both because of the non-binding character of recommendations and the substantial financial stakes involved, great effort are made in the International Consultative Committees, for example, to achieve consensus. Although majority voting is the formal rule in Plenary assemblies, it is almost never

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[52]H. K. Jacobson, "International Institutions for Telecommunications: the ITU's Role," in E. McWhinney, pp. 51-68.

invoked.

Developed countries' receptiveness to the demands of their less-endowed counterparts stems from an imperative to maintain the stability of the ITU to the extent that the higer the stake in worldwide telecommunication networks, the higher the cost of breaking up the collective arrangement that make their operation possible. The unanimity rule, fundamentally linked to arrangement-making in the field of telecommunication, is central to this dynamics and require further exploration.

It is argued that an international agreement-making system--voluntary, as it cannot be enforced by any authority standing above the sovereign parties involved--must be designed with a important criterion: the pursuit of a common purpose in the manner of a positive-sum game, so that all affected parties derive benefit from the agreements according to their own judgment.

This stipulation is derived from the concept of increasing the individual's economic self-interest in a positive-sum game, through advantages gained by collective action, put forth by Buchanan and Tullock who have argued that "...net external costs are reduced to zero by the operation of the unanimity rule."[53] This concept will be explained below.

In the 19th and early 20th centuries the most common procedure for making collective decisions among nations was the

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[53]James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965).

rule of unanimity. Statesmen considered unanimity to be a "first principle" of international organizations.[54] Sayre, however, charged that unanimity was based on the "dogma of the equality of states" and warned that an organization adopting it would be capable only of "petty action." Contemporary social scientists as well as international legal specialists hastily conclude that the deficiencies of certain international organizations derive from their use of unanimity rule:

> This "consensus" or "prior consultation" principle, though it is acclaimed by some as new and progressive, may however degenerate into the ancient principle of requiring the unanimous consent of every state to a treaty or alliance. The whole development of the United Nations has been toward increasing dilution of this unanimity principle toward the democratic principle of majority voting.[55]

Most scholars, according to Freeman and Cannizzo, have failed to recognize the conditions under which unanimity represents an efficient and reasonable rule of arriving at collective decisions among member governments.[56] Claude identified and dispelled the ideological bias towards majority rule, rightly pointing out that "the will of the majority of states is not necessarily entitled to the ideological prestige which democracy confers upon majority decision... (moreover) majority rule is not

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[54]F. B. Sayre, Experiments in International Organizations (New York: Harper & Row, 1919), pp. 150, 151.

[55]C. Barret and H. Newcombe, "Weighted Voting in International Institutions," Peace Research Review, 2/1 (1968), pp. 66-67.

[56]See J. R. Freeman & C. A. Cannizzo, "Constitutions, Covenants, and Charters: An Analysis of Decision Rules in International Organizations," Journal of Peace Research, 3/18 (1981), pp. 277-290.

a natural law of social morality."[57] In fact:

> Majority decisions in the equalitarian UN General Assembly are likely to be undemocratic in the sense that they do not represent a majority of the world's population, unrealistic in the sense that they do not reflect the greater portion of the world's real power, morally unimpressive in the sense that they cannot be identified as expressions of the dominant will of a genuine community, and for all these reasons ineffectual and perhaps dangerous.[58]

In line with this argumentation, the ITU has always made of point of following the rule of consensus. Unlike other international organizations, the ITU is based on a framework that interfers least with the national interest of its members. Those members have been very reluctant to move in a direction that might jeopardize the sovereign control of telecommunication. Consequently, the ITU is a sort of federation of autonomous organs, and the Convention allows for reservations for the states who do not ratify the entire set of regulations (especially true of radio communication). In case of deadlock, votes have been taken, but there has always been stigma attached to this procedure. The lengthy discussions on detailed aspects of the ITU's work, which frustrate a increasing number of developed countries, aim at reaching a consensus, being understood that there is always a "automatic majority" of developing countries that would carry any vote.

Applying a generalized economic theory of constitutions, the

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[57] I. L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 124-125.

[58] Ibid, pp. 125-126.

analysis of Buchanan and Tullock implies that any government contemplating joining an international organization--for the purpose of either eliminating a negative externality or to achieve some joint benefit--must consider two separable and distinct kinds of costs: the costs which it expects to incur as a result of its actual participation in the organized, international activity, and the cost it expects to incur as a consequence of the actions of other members, actions over which it may have no control. More specifically, a government must take into account the expected costs it will incur in reaching collective decisions and also the expected costs that may be imposed on it by the actions of other members. These two costs are denoted decision-making costs and external costs, respectively.

The first kind of cost varies positively with the number of members required for a collective decision; as more and more members of the organization are required for collective action, bargaining and negotiation become more unwieldy, leading to an increase in decision-making costs. External costs are incurred by states put in minority. Such an outcome is less likely as the decision rule approaches unanimity. In other words, if a group of states consider some collective action undesirable, they know that under unanimity this action will never be taken since they can always veto the corresponding collective decisions.

The sum of the decision making costs and the external costs are the interdependence costs of collectivization. In the model of Buchanan and Tullock, it is assumed that commonality of

interests is a rarity. Although such may be true of most international organizations, it is not true of the ITU, where there is a commonality of interest, namely, the use of the electromagnetic spectrum, a limited natural resource. To understand the bargaining process taking place within the ITU meetings and the increasing response of the developed countries to the demands of their developing counterparts, one needs to introduce another kind of costs: the exclusion cost, the cost of not joining the ITU. Without a consideration of this kind of costs, one would fail to understand why the industrialized countries, numerically a minority, and having to face a major shift in the purpose of the organization they created, do not intend to quit. It is argued elsewhere that the best way of protecting the national interest with regard to telecommunication is to subject oneself to an orderly allocation of radio frequencies and satellite orbital slots. This orderly allocation can only take place within the cooperative arrangements of an international body. To join is to decrease the exclusion costs of establishing national (and international) telecommunication networks. The operation of those systems increasingly depends on the technical standardization work accomplished in concert with other nations at the ITU.

Unwilling to jeopardize the organizational structure of the ITU, the developed countries reluctantly accept the challenge offered by the Third World in pushing for development assistance. This reluctance and the negotiation process are the source of what has been termed decision-making costs. Decision-making costs

of the developed countries are positively related to the number of developing countries joining the Union.

In the absence of mechanisms of enforcement or coercion, the external costs can be represented as being the anarchical use of the radio spectrum as a retaliatory action by some developing countries. The disruption of one's telecommunication system is a very high cost, indeed. And the unanimity rule does note seem to reduce this potential danger.

For the developing countries the costs are spread differently. The cost of not joining the ITU, the exclusion cost, from the point of view of telecommunication operators, is not as high as for the industrialized countries, since many of those countries are poorly equipped. Reliance on the radio spectrum is not as great although it is important.

As more and more studies are showing the correlation between the establishment of telecommunication networks and economic development, most of the developing countries realize the danger of not building these systems. To establish telecommunication systems, the developing countries must rely on the financial assistance from the industrialized countries channeled through the ITU. The developing countries need the ITU more than ever before as outside sources (UNDP) are no longer satisfactory. This dependence on the generosity of the industrialized world represents the external costs for developing countries. A reluctance on the part of the developed countries to participate in the financing of telecommunication projects in the Third World would

translate into very high external costs.

Developing countries realize the need to accommodate the concerns of their developed counterparts and are likewise unwilling to disrupt the institutional framework of the ITU. They incur decision-making costs by having to negotiate with the industrialized countries.

From all the above considerations, it seems clear that the unanimity rule, which is common practice within the ITU, reduces the various kinds of costs. The permanence of the ITU is critical to both developed and developing countries because of the exclusion costs that would incurred without it. As a consequence of the different distribution of the diverse costs, both groups of countries appear to have strengths to be used and weaknesses to be exploited by the other party. The ITU may not be able to maintained ad eternum its effectiveness if any type of majority rule keeps a particular group of countries dissatisfied for an extended period of time. This assessment seems to explain why some developing countries are fighting to prevent the transformation of the ITU Convention into a Charter with a two-thirds amendment clause. The Third World is not monolithic and any group of countries could find itself in a minority. Unanimity through the reach of consensus is still to be preferred. Any government is afraid that without unanimity severe costs will be imposed on it by the other members of the organization. Everybody wants to make sure that its vote is necessary to pass resolutions.

The unanimity rule thus become the ideal basis for democra-

tic group decision-making, on economic grounds. This situation sheds additional light on the requirement for unanimous adoption of standards. Since these unanimous agreements are possible only upon considerable compromise for many participants, it can be assumed that each compromiser is prepared to internalize the costs of compromise. The effect of such internalizing, in the case of telecommunications, may be redesign of equipment or of an operating practice back home. The partners in unanimous agreement would then have incurred an internal cost, and thus assured zero external costs in the interactive operations with other parties.[59]

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[59]For further examination of this concept, see Gerd D. Wallenstein, International Telecommunication Agreements (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1980).

CHAPTER 13

THE ITU IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Additional Explanatory Factors

Do international organizations merely provide an arena for the political maneuvering of national interests or are they global actors in their own rights? Determining which role fits the ITU is a difficult task. The determination is complicated by the uniqueness of the ITU. On the one hand, the nature of telecommunication compels all nations to delegate a large coordinating responsibility to the ITU; on the other hand, the federated organization of the Union reflects the unwillingness of the founding members to grant substantial powers to the Union so as to retain a maximum control over the operation of telecommunication systems. The transformation of the initial purpose of the Union from that of a purely coordinating agency to that of an agency deeply involved in technical-cooperation planning suggests that the ITU's role has evolved over time. It may be that the Union plays simultaneously each of the three roles assigned to international organizations.

The present investigation has identified three factors which account for the longevity of the ITU, namely: a Convention adaptable to the changing environment; the importance of the International Consultative Committees to the technologically-advanced countries; and the unique nature of telecommunication. These key factors lead us to believe that the Union has created for itself some degree of autonomy from member states and has

become a global actor in its own right.

It is not, however, the intention of the study to imply that these factors, though key, are the only ones explaining the ITU's longevity. Nor does the study imply that the ITU need become an independent actor as a necessary condition for its longevity. In this section are briefly reviewed some other factors that might possibly account for the centrality of the ITU as it engaged in development assistance. They include: a) the ITU Secretariat and the Secretary-General; b) the recognized private operating agencies (RPOA); c) the patterns of alignments and associated issue-areas; and d) the financing mechanisms. Further research should investigate more fully the relative impact of these factors on the expansion of the ITU's mandate toward the satisfaction of the needs and demands of the developing countries.

The Secretary-General and the Secretariat.

An international secretariat can enhance its role beyond administrative tasks and contribute significantly to the decision-making process for their various spheres of activity.

Six men have been Secretary-General of the ITU since the end of World War II: Franz von Ernest (Switzerland), 1948-49; Leon Mulatier (France), 1950-53; Marco Aurelio Andrada (Argentina), 1954-58; Gerald C. Gross (United States), 1958-65; Manohar Balaji Sarwate (India), 1966; Mohamed Mili (Tunisia), 1966-82; and Richard Butler (Australia), from 1982 to the present.

The comparative assessment of the Secretary-General's personal contribution is made difficult since the mode of

election has changed over time. From 1947 to 1959, Secretaries-General were elected by the Administrative Council. Since 1959 they have been elected by the Plenipotentiary Conferences. The strength of the respective constituencies is different in these two bodies. In view of the growing number of developing countries that have joined the ITU over the years, it is safe to assume that the Plenipotentiary Conferences, numerically dominated by the Third World constituency, have elected individuals more in tune with the aspirations of newly-independent nations than had the Administrative Council where developed countries could more easily assert their priorities. Indeed, the declared goal of the 1959 decision of moving the electoral process to the Plenipotentiary Conference was to achieve a better representation of the ITU constituency.

The power of those who have been Secretaries-General has also been determined in part by the nature of the office, which has been shaped by the Union's historical development. The federal character of the ITU secretariat is a fundamental factor limiting the power of the Secretary-General. It was only in 1965 that a coordination committee, consisting of the Secretary-general, his deputy, and the heads of the CCITT, CCIR and IFRB, was formally recognized. The 1965 Convention empowered the Secretary-General to act on urgent matters even in the face of a hostile majority on the committee.

The Secretaries-General up to the election of Gerald Gross in 1958 appeared to have had a very restricted concept of their

office, confining themselves largely to routine administrative functions. Gross, (1958-65), took the initiative to gain the ITU's inclusion in the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. But, to the dissatisfaction of the newlyindependent countries, he also pushed hard for the adoption of a Constitution. Mili, (1966-82), was more deeply engaged in making the ITU responsive to the concerns of the developing countries. The current head, Butler, (1982-), is not only currently pursuing his predecessor's active involvement in technical-assistance activities, but is taking an even more agressive posture in this domain. His stand antagonized the United States, which was very public in its support of Butler's opponent at the 1982 Nairobi Plenipotentiary.

From the standpoint of the developing countries, the fact that Gross was a U.S. citizen was both an asset and a liability. He was an asset to the Union to the extent that he was in a position to make technical assistance more palatable to the world's most powerful and largest donor country, the United States. But he was a liability in view of the fact the United States never fully embraced the ITU's technical-assistance mandate. Indeed, Gross's election was the most contested in the history of the ITU.

To a lesser extent, Mili was faced with a similar problem. Coming from a developing country, Tunisia, he enjoyed the support of the ITU's largest constituency, the Third World. He thus presided over the reshaping of the Union's mandate. At the same time, he was not always perceived by the industrialized countries

to represent fully their interests. It remains that Mili was elected by an overwhelming majority.

The current Secretary-General does not seem to face his predecessors' problems, and, to a large degree, is in a position to satisfy both developed and developing constituencies. On the one hand, Butler, a citizen of Australia, appears to be in tune with the preoccupations of all the medium-size industrialized nations which constitute the First World other than of the two superpowers. On the other hand, Butler has won the support of the Third World for his strong personal commitment to ITU-sponsored development-assistance activities. It is worth noting that, unlike his predecessors who had engineering backgrounds, Butler was trained as a telecommunication administrator. This fact is not without importance at a time when the ITU is increasingly called upon to provide planning-related assistance.

Undoubtedly, the ability of the Secretary-General successfully to take initiatives depends largely on the network of personal relations that he can establish and maintain.

The secretariat and the inner circle of national delegates who have a long and intimate connection with the Union have handled the frequent and relatively routine issues arising from overlap between ITU's domain of jurisdiction and those of other specialized agencies, and there have been hardly any boundary conflicts. More serious boundary problems arose with the United Nations itself. Although the Transport and Communications Commission of the ECOSOC did not pose the threat that some within the

ITU feared that it might, the regional economic commissions--particularly the Economic Commission for Africa and the General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space--have taken actions that many in ITU regarded as challenging the Union's primary jurisdiction in the field of telecommunications. In virtually every case the secretariat has been successful in asserting the Union's claims.

The Recognized Private Operating Agencies.

The ITU Convention allows for the membership of recognized private operating agencies (RPOA), namely, private telecommunication-equipment manufacturers and telecommunication-service providers. These entities take an active part in much of the ITU's work related to their business such as equipment and signaling standardization. Representatives from private firms are part of the national delegations, and, in the recent years, largely compose the pool of ITU experts sent to developing countries on technical-assistance missions.

The problem of dual loyalties has surfaced. Is the ITU's interest likely to be given priority when dispatched experts come from private firms whose main interests are in the selling of equipment worldwide? Although condemned by the ITU Convention, the use of the ITU by private firms to foster their interests might perhaps produce benefits for the developing countries as well.

The use of the technical consultants program of the ITU by European countries has been cited as evidence of continued

European domination of the ITU.[60] Unlike the United States, which has generally displayed a lukewarm commitment to international organization, particularly in view of its current minority status, the European countries have historically maintained a strong relations with the ITU. Large manufacturing concerns in Europe such as Siemens, Thomson CSF, Ericsson, and Cable and Wireless Ltd., send consultants to the Third World through ITU programs. These consultants suggest programs to build or improve telecommunications facilities. They develop personal relationships with the telecommunication administrators in these countries, and as a result these nations give the consultants' corporations the long-term contracts.

In view of the growing recognition by the Third World authorities of the importance of telecommunication in their economic development, it is probable that in the future they will become even more attractive markets for the industrialized countries.

Fearful of losing ground within the ITU, the Soviet-bloc countries, with their centralized economies, have consistently criticized their Western counterparts for using the Union as a marketplace, but they have not been able to halt this trend, as recent developments show. The establishment of the Special Voluntary Program of Technical Cooperation and of the Center for Telecommunication Development at the 1982 Nairobi Plenipotentiary Conference was strongly supported--in fact initiated--by some

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[60]Milk, p. 33.

Western European countries and Japan. This Center is expected to draw a code of conduct to ensure that private manufacturers do not abuse their dominant position in the Third World in selling obsolete or inappropriate equipment, as has probably been the case in the past. It may be assumed that as the U.S. firms follow the path of their Western European and Japanese counterparts, the United States will strengthen its commitment to the ITU and be less likely to threaten to withdraw and seek alternative arrangements in case of political conflicts.

The ITU Convention, by making the provision for the participation of RPOAs, has introduced into decision-making mechanisms actors whose agendas are likely to be different from the governments of their host countries. These private concerns are guided by economic interests rather than political priorities. They are moreover transnational in character and they control global markets. The ITU is not perceived by them as being an autonomous actor but as a stepping stone, a means to obtain their self-defined goals. Whereas the ITU may not be seen by national governments as central to the fostering of their political agenda, the Union is instrumental in expanding private firms' markets in the developing countries. Consequently, it is possible and probable that benefits incurred to those countries in need of telecommunication infrastructure.

Patterns of Alignments and Issue-Areas.

Although the competition between East and West can be discerned in some of the outcomes of the ITU work, it is far less

evident than in the polarized stands displayed in other specialized agencies such as UNESCO. The path from wartime collaboration to Cold War and then to competitive coexistence has been blurred by the nature of the ITU's province. Even though the Buenos Aires Plenipotentiary Conference, convened in 1952 during the height of the Cold War, was marked by a number of sharp controversies, the atmosphere since then has been considerably calmer.

For many of ITU's purposes, its members can be regarded as black boxes: their ideological alignment and internal political system make no difference. Technical and operating questions relating to international collaboration in telecommunications are affected hardly, if at all, by whether a regime is communist, socialist, or capitalist. The nature of the regime may have a greater effect on the administrative aspects of international collaboration, but here too its force can be minimized. Conflict between members, however, will affect ITU, particularly if telecommunications are used in their conflict.

Another reason why ideologies play a less important role in ITU than in other world bodies is that the technology of telecommunications makes for strong pressure toward universality within the ITU: the members of the organization want and need to have most states as collaborators, and most states see the need to collaborate. Even adversaries desire to communicate with one another on a number of occasions. Furthermore, quite apart from their international operations, and regardless of any political

conflicts, all countries must be concerned about what other countries do if they are to minimize the possibilities of harmful interference with their own international communications.[61]

The major point of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union has centered in the IFRB. The IFRB was mandated by the 1947 Atlantic City Conference to be actively involved in the the allocation of radio frequencies, with the power to refuse registration if necessary. The United States, responsible for the creation of the Board, supported this expansion of jurisdiction. In practice, however, the IFRB played a much more modest role than initially anticipated. The Soviet Union sought to prevent the implementation of the Atlantic City decision out of fear that it might jeopardize its sovereignty in the frequency-allocation sphere. The USSR was also concerned about being outvoted in the ITU and the IFRB after having been defeated on a number of important votes.

More generally, the work being done in ITU circles was deemed as important to both sides and the criticism of "politicization" has hardly ever surfaced within the East-West context. Conflicts emerged between North and South, between rich and poor countries. Although the Soviet Union and the other Eastern-bloc countries sought to gain influence among the Third World on the pretext that they had never been colonialists, the socialist

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[61] See H. K. Jacobson, "ITU: A Potpourri of Bureaucrats and Industrialists," in R. W. Cox and H. K. Jacobson (eds.), The Anatomy of Influence: Decision-Making in International Organization (London: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 59-101.

countries generally sided with their Western industrialized counterparts when it came to respond to the developing countries' requests for assistance. Both East and West saw development-assistance as a distortion of the ITU's original mandate, whereas the newly-independent countries saw it as a natural expansion of the Union's responsibility toward its enlarged constituency.

The Third World does not form a monolithic bloc. As countries like Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore achieve progress--and are thus called "newly-industrialized"--they tend to shift their allegiance away from the group of developing countries, and today they side more often than not with the the group of developed nations. As shown by their voting patterns, their attitude toward the ITU's assistance program increasingly reflect those of the technologically-advanced countries.

It is difficult to assess how differently the ITU's action toward its Third World constituency would have evolved, had the East and West been in disagreement over the substance and form of technical-assistance activities.

Financing Mechanisms.

The financing mechanisms are not without consequence on the manner in which the ITU's technical-assistance activities have been initiated and administered. The distribution of financial burden in ITU is very different from that in other U.N. specialized agencies. Whereas the United Nations adopted a contributory system based on a country's GNP, with the exact amount set by a committee of the General Assembly, the ITU has a system in which

the amount that each ITU member country contributes to the Union's budget depends upon the contributory class that it selects according to a scale from 40 units to 1/8 unit.[62] Members are free to choose any class of contribution, although a resolution of the Montreux Plenipotentiary suggested that it would be helpful if members choose a class of contribution "most in keeping with their economic resources."[63]

The United States's contribution to the United Nations amounts to the statutory limit of 25 percent of the U.N.'s total income, but that to the ITU represents only 6 percent of the ITU's income. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union is the largest contributor. Although it has chosen a 30-unit contributory class for itself-- as have the United States, France, and Great Britain--it also subscribes to a class-1 contribution for Byelorussia and a class-3 contribution for the Ukrainian S.S.R. According to this financing scheme, middle powers bear a large share of the ITU's costs.

One explanation for the negative attitude within the ITU toward financing its own technical-cooperation program relates to the fact that the ITU contribution of many countries is a charge on the budget of the telecommunications administration, which is supposed to be self-supporting and perhaps even to show a profit.

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[62]The 1/8 unit is reserved to the group of least-developed countries as defined by the United Nations.

[63]International Telecommunication Convention, Montreux, 1965, Resolution 15. The 1980 value of one unit was 120,000 Swiss frs.

In programmatic matters involving costs, middle powers have a large voice, and it has generally been a negative one.

Of all industrialized countries, not only has the United States been the most reluctant to allow the expansion of the ITU's mandate toward development-assitance activities, but it is also the most adamantly opposed to the Union's financing its own assistance program. Because the United States contributes a relatively small percentage of the ITU's overall budget, it is not in a position to have the commanding influence that it has within other forums. The threat of withdrawing from the ITU for disagreement over policy matters would not have the serious financial consequences that UNESCO is currently experiencing after the U.S. pullout in 1985, a decision which occasioned a 25-percent decrease in this agency's budget.

By moderating the influence of the two superpowers--which happen to share a common view on the financing of technical-assistance activities--the financial arrangement adopted by the ITU has helped more than hurt the Union in pursuing these cooperation activities.

A number of developing countries have argued in favor of the U.N. financing plan, which they deem much more equitable than the ITU's current system. The Union's scheme put a disproportionate burden on countries with weak economies relative to that on the advanced countries who gained most from the work of the ITU.[64]

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[64]According to the UN system, the ratio between the smallest and the largest contribution is 1 to 2500; the ITU scheme produces a ratio of 1 to 120 (excluding the special 1/8-unit

Moreover, the Union's system of voluntary contribution, it was argued, enables donors, when they meet decisions they find detrimental to their interests, potentially to retaliate by decreasing the amount of their contribution. After the 1965 Montreux Conference eight of the states chose lower contribution classes. But most importantly, the ITU's system does not guarantee stable revenue sources at a time when the ITU cannot rely any longer on an increase in UNDP contribution and is prisoner of UNDP decisionmaking process, (see Appendix D, middle chart).

The dependence of the ITU on UNDP funds for its service activities means that a large proportion of the operational decisions as to which states should receive assistance and how much they should get are out of the Union's hands. All projects must originate with a request from the recipient government; in the end the projects must be approved by UNDP organs, particularly the resident representative and the Governing Council. About all that ITU can do is to try to stimulate requests, but its efforts in this regard are hampered by the absence of a program financed by the Union's own budget. The fact that UNDP itself has had few effective powers of central planning at either the international level or the national level has been forcefully criticized as an abandonment of development goals in favor of the satisfaction of the sectoral interests of agencies,[65] (see Figure

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class for the least-developed countries).

[65]United Nations, A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System (Geneva: United Nations, 1969), 2:12a and table 4, app. 6.

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Further study should examine the extent to which the ITU contributory scheme and the dependence on UNDP funds have helped or hurt the implementation of the Union's technical-assistance activities.

The ITU and Functionalism

The three key factors accounting for the centrality of the ITU, which have been identified through the hypothesis testing of the present study, suggest that, to some degree, the Union's position in the world scene conforms to the functionalist principles.

The functionalist model emerged after the Second World War as a major alternative to the more widely held and persuasive approaches of "political realism." In contrast to the "Realpolitik," which elevated the nation-state to the position of supreme international actor, functionalism specified a course of development, through international organizations, which would eventually spell doom for the nation-state. This approach essentially ignored considerations of state power and political influence as having any significance for what was to be explained.

The starting point, according to Mitrani, its leading exponent, was to concentrate upon particular task, problem, or function, and to attempt to exclude the distorting element of ideology, dogma, or philosophical system. Hence the oft-quoted functionalist dictum that "form follows function": the function itself suggests the extent of the area and form of the adminis-

FIGURE 7

Flow of Funds and Patterns of Influence Related to the ITU's Technical Cooperation Activities



tration within which it is to be tackled. Functionalism postulates that cooperation must begin in areas of "low politics" issues which can be "decoupled" from "high politics" such as the more symbolically and ideologically charged political processes. By confining decision-making to relevant technical considerations, non-rational behavior--that is, decision-making seeking personal, party, or other sectional gains--is reduced if not eliminated. It is argued that the growth of functional international organization would erode the basis for identification with the nation-state by bringing together individuals from different nations into a more "neutral" international context.

Developed countries voiced their concern at the ITU's becoming "politicized," that is, they perceived that controversial issues not always relevant to the agency' work were introduced by nations to further their political interests. An idea developed that economic and social programs were "non-political" in nature, and that the specialized agencies should not, therefore, be "politicized." To the extent that the specialized agencies are thought of in functionalist terms, it is not surprising that dissatisfaction with their performance is often expressed in charges of "politicization." Those who see "politicization" as an organizational defect are likely to accuse "irresponsible" states of distorting the purposes of a specialized agency by attempting to place inappropriate controversial items on the agenda, and development assistance to the Third World was seen as such.

Wallenstein argued that at first glance, the rational for development-assistance is persuasive. If agreement-making is to be effective for all participants, with their voluntary cooperation, then all must be in a position to participate and cooperate in the knowledge of what is involved. The human resources required for technical agreement-making, however, are becoming scarcer in view of the enhanced demand for more and diverse agreements. These are the same resources in demand for assistance to developing countries.

The dilemma confronting most representatives of advanced technology states is more complicated than the choice of budget preferences would indicate. It is a question not only of human resources and financial limitations, but ultimately of the principal personal motivation for seeking agreement in the first place. This motivation feeds on the recognition of technical and administrative problems caused by uncoordinated telecommunication services and systems. The delegates to conferences are conversant with such problems and are, by and large, eager to minimize them. The delegates concentrate their efforts on the substance of the new problems, and, logically therefore, on those people who are contributors to this substance. These are their colleagues from other high-technology organizations. By contrast, concentration on the problems of the developing countries tends to distract from participation in the technological problems of the future, in favor of a tutorial effort to overcome the past. The attention devoted to interests of developing countries may translate into a

personal disillusionment with the entire agreementmaking systems on the part of the principal contributors to new technology. Indications of such disillusionment have appeared in recent years, particularly at the Plenipotentiary Conference of Malaga-Torremolinos, 1973.[66]

An alternative view considers "politicization" as an indicator of forces bearing on the organization, that is, as a function of the environment within which the institution operates and of the problems that it addresses. International organizations should and do reflect the realities of the international system. "Politicization" can be viewed as part of a planetary bargaining process in which the Third World nations negotiate with the developed nations regarding the relative importance of various global problems. One could view the confrontations as part of a continuing process to "widen the circle of international decision-making" or to "integrate dissatisfied powers into the central management of the international system.[67]

Conventional functionalist theory stressed that agencies should meet the criteria of being technical, functionally specific, and essential.[68] An agency is called "technical" when

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[66]Wallenstein, International Telecommunication Agreements.

[67]G. Lyons, D. A. Baldwin and D. W. McNemar, "The 'Politicization' Issue in the U.N. Specialized Agencies," in D. A. Kay (ed.) The Changing United Nations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977), p. 85.

[68]See E. B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); I. L. Claude, Plowshares: The Problem and Progress of International Organizations 3rd ed. (New York: Random House,

there is a body of sophisticated professional or scientific knowledge that is necessary to the conduct of its work. It is "functionally specific" when its work relates to one specialized area of public policy. It is "essential" when the function performed is necessary to intercourse among nations. According to this theory, organizations having such characteristics should not be much affected by world political cleavage or what we can call the pattern of conflicts and alignments.

The findings of the present study, concurring with Jacobson's own investigation,[69] partially confirmed the functionalist concepts in the case of the ITU in that this organization, being both technical and functionally specific has been affected less than others by world political cleavages.

The ITU's task of securing international agreements on the use of radio frequencies and standards for equipment may be considered as both essential and international in scope. What is implied in the use of the concept of essentiality is a compeling need for states to organize the performance of certain tasks internationally. If this need is very high, the task may come in time to be regarded as essential because the actors will have become used to having it performed internationally.

The ITU was originally designed as a technical and universal organization rather than a political organization with a restricted membership. There was a strong initial notion within the ITU

1964), chap. 17.

[69]See Jacobson, in Cox and Jacobson, op. cit.

that technical decisions can and should be taken on technical grounds and that it will be possible for experts to agree on technical issues.

In reality, of course, the distinction between technical and non-technical issues is often far from obvious. This ambiguity is reflected in the dissatisfaction surfacing in the industrialized nations during the 1960s, when the developing countries started to take the ITU to task to involve itself in technical assistance.

Technical cooperation to developing countries is no longer perceived by the earlier opponents as an "irrelevant" issue. The ITU is no longer a club of like-minded countries preoccupied exclusively with technical coordination and standardization of operating procedures. As a consequence, the traditional concept of functionalism has lost some of its explanatory power as applied to the ITU.

The call for technical cooperation goes beyond purely technical aspects. It includes request for assistance in developing financing schemes and policy planning. The new states that have come to constitute the majorities in the ITU were not attracted by functionalism. They were interested in building, rather than in breaking down, national sovereignty, and they looked to international organizations to effect redistribution so as to facilitate their development, something about which functionalism had little to say. Furthermore, individuals became disillusioned with functionalism when its promised benefits with

respect to peace and security failed to materialize. Nor were younger recruits to international organization, reading the historical record of functionalist activities and noting its ineffectiveness in broader issues, attracted to its teleological goal.

The decline in functionalist thinking as it relates to the ITU does not mean that the Union's various constituencies question the centrality of the Union. The controversy about the IFRB, for example, illustrates the desire of the developing countries to strengthen the ITU. The IFRB was not abolished at the Montreux Conference in 1965 largely because of the votes of the African, Asian, and Latin American members of the ITU. Developing countries in general felt a pressing need for space on the frequency spectrum. They felt that the rich and established states, mainly because they were established, had more than their fair share of the spectrum. Rightly or wrongly the developing countries saw the IFRB as a protector of their own interests and as an instrument that they could use in their efforts to gain more space on the spectrum. They saw the IFRB also as a resource for technical advice that they badly needed. To a limited extent, then, decolonization has lent some support to the notion of institutional autonomy and authority for ITU to the extent that developing countries turned to international bodies for help.

Cox and Jacobson contend that the ideology that has supplanted functionalism for general purposes is "developmentalism." In all of the agencies, one can find some persons--and more

frequently large numbers of them--who are dedicated to the notion of development. Developmentalism, though, is a value commitment rather than a carefully articulated, coherent ideology. It is not relevant, as was functionalism, to the transformation of the international system by strengthening authorities other than those of nation-states. It is a pledge to do something for the poorer parts of mankind, a pledge to which both the United States and the Soviet Union could subscribe, albeit for their own reasons, and one warmly welcomed by the majority of member states, the recipients of the proffered assistance. It is a pledge, moreover, to attain a tangible goal: progress toward it can be measured and actually achieved. Consequently, the doctrine is infinitely more satisfying to individual participants than functionalism is.

Developmentalism in many respects contradicts, implicitly if not explicitly, the political values underlying functionalism. Developmentalism stresses the coordination and coherence of economic policy at the national level, whereas functionalism seeks to stimulate sectoral interests and their transnational linkages. Developmentalism leads to stress upon centralization of policy control and action at the international level, whereas functionalism favors the autonomous growth of sectoral international agencies. Developmentalism stresses the primacy of the general interest of the collectivity in development, whereas functionalism places a higher value upon the freedom of indivi-

duals and of associations distinct from the collectivity.[70]

The ITU as a Communication Network

One can view the ITU according to how far it involves the effective policy-making processes of governments rather than how independent of states it has become. This view leads towards a fuller understanding of the role of international organizations in international relations, though their role does not appear to conform to the ultimate goal of functionalism.

In this perspective, international organizations are sensitive communications networks within which the power holders in world affairs have been responsive to signals from the less powerful without abandoning the control of action to them. International organizations facilitate the orderly management of intergovernmental relations without significantly changing the structure of power that governs these relations, at least in the short term and somewhat beyond. Over their longer history, the greatest potential for change from international organizations may lie in the opportunity that they give the less powerful to influence the climate of opinion and the accepted values according to which action is determined.[71]

Thus, the ITU can be seen as a medium for gaining widespread acceptance of the obligation on the part of the wealthier and

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[70]See Cox and Jacobson, pp. 403-405.

[71]See I. L. Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," International Organization, 20/3 (Summer 1966), pp. 367-79.

more powerful to give technical assistance to the poorer and weaker; and it may be a means of giving the less powerful majority of countries a greater collective voice in the management of world telecommunications, to the extent that this majority is able to take advantage of the available communications networks by aggregating persuasive views.

At times the industrialized countries have criticized their developing counterparts for substituting rhetoric for concrete propositions in ITU general assemblies and thus misusing the organization's forums. This situation takes a new meaning in light of Claude's contention that

> its [United Nations] debating society aspect is not to be deplored and dismissed as evidence of a 'slump' but that it deserves to be examined for evidence of the functional adaptation and innovation that it may represent.[72]

Claude's thesis is that the function of collective legitimization is one of the most significant elements in the pattern of political activity that the United Nations has evolved in response to the set of limitations and possibilities posed by the political realities of our time. Collective legitimization has been thrust upon the organization by member states. It is an answer, not to the question of what the United Nations can do, but to the question of how it can be used.

Referring to the ITU, collective legitimization suggests that it is an agency capable of bestowing politically weighty

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[72]Inis L. Claude, The Changing United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 25.

approval and disapproval upon projects and policies. One may question whether proclamations of approval or disapproval by the Union, deficient as they typically are in both formal legal significance and effective supportive power, are really important. The answer is that statesmen, by so obviously attaching importance to them, have made them important. They take collective legitimacy seriously as a factor in international politics.

A major campaign has been waged in the U.N. to delegitimize colonialism, to invalidate the claim of colonial powers to legitimate possession of overseas territories--in short, to revoke their sovereignty over colonies. The ex-colonial states have not confined themselves to using the U.N. or the ITU, for that matter, for legitimization of the campaign for definitive liquidation of the colonial system. In the telecommunication sphere, they have undertaken, in concert with other developing countries, to use the organization to secure the establishment and general acceptance of the doctrine that they have a right to receive, and advanced states have a duty to provide, assistance in promoting telecommunication development.

CONCLUSION

The study has explored the evolution of the ITU as it engaged in technical assistance to the developing countries. This evolutionary process was not only discernible in the changing priorities of the Union, it was also reflected in the changing attitude of the actors. What was initially considered unacceptable forty years ago has come to be seen as part, perhaps the most important, of the Union's mandate. The Western industrialized nations who created an organization mostly geared toward technical coordination, equipment specification and operating standards, and therefore uniquely responsive to their needs, have come to accept the idea of their special duty as a group to assist their less-endowed counterparts in the Third World which may involve redirecting the ITU toward policy planning.

The purpose of the study has been to document and explain this changing dynamics. The investigation was two-fold.

First, it provided an historical account of the origin and development of technical-assistance activities, under the aegis of the ITU, targeted to developing countries. In accomplishing this task, the study maps a territory largely unexplored.

Second, it proposed and tested three hypotheses aimed at explaining the reasons for the longevity of the ITU in the midst of a changing political and technological environment.

The research has revealed

1) that to a large degree the basic instrument of the ITU, namely its flexible Convention, accounts for the integration

of conflicting demands within the institutional framework, even though this arrangement may have reached the point of diminishing return in view of the complexity of the Union.

2) that as telecommunication networks become more sophisticated and global in scope, the technologically-advanced nations which manage them are increasingly dependent upon a healthy institution, and for the sake of stability are ready to accommodate demands unrelated to their interests

3) that it is the unique characteristic of the ITU's province--telecommunication--which accounts for the centrality and longevity of the organization, since all nations are compelled to collaborate if they want to safeguard their domestic telecommunication systems.

Evaluating the ITU's performance in the provision of assistance to developing countries is difficult. The proposal from representatives of developing countries that ITU begin financing technical-cooperation activities from its own budget has been rebuffed by the donors, the industrialized countries. The situation may change but had it been adopted earlier, the proposal would have had the effect of giving a certain priority to telecommunications. Under the present system, states must decide whether the UNDP funds that they might receive should be used for telecommunications or for some other purpose. It remains that few states are really willing to take the position that telecommunications should be accorded an absolute priority. ITU training enterprises have been more innovative and lively than

those that were run under colonial rule by metropolitan powers. These training activities have also been held to be less efficient than those managed by commercial enterprises. There is little interaction between those elements of the ITU engaged in technical cooperation activities and those engaged in its more traditional functions. Undoubtedly the tasks are different, but it is not inconceivable that greater interaction might lead to the formulation of more innovative projects, some of which might have an impact on the feelings of developing states about the Union's traditional functions and the conduct of these states in these functions, (see Appendix E).

Institutional reform is on today's agenda. If a constitutional charter is adopted, no longer would it be possible to reconsider ITU's basic mandate and institutional structure at each Plenipotentiary Conference. Undoubtedly the adoption of a Charter would ease the burden of these conferences. On the other hand, it could mean that the ITU's mandate and institutional structure would be firmly set for some years to come, for the experience of the United Nations and the specialized agencies indicates that charters are seldom amended--and when they are, the changes are minor. With all its disadvantages, the ITU's present system of reconsidering the entire Telecommunication Convention at each Plenipotentiary Conference may allow greater flexibility than a constitution.

If the flexibility of a charter is to be renounced, then it is incumbent on all participants in future meetings to reconsider

not only how well ITU has performed its functions in the past, but also how adequate it is to the needs of the future. Clearly the demand for telecommunication facilities will increase. At the same time, the less-developed countries are strongly interested in the rapid development of their economies, and this development will involve increased telecommunication facilities. Normal growth in established sectors plus demands stemming from these newer sources will have to put increased burdens on the Union. Perhaps the ITU with its present organs is adequate to meet these demands, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that as the Union approaches the twenty-first century, it may need to streamline, modernize, and supplement its inheritance from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The system of allocating radio-frequencies through Administrative Conferences has been attacked by representatives of both developed and developing countries. The former are uneasy about having such a complicated technical matter decided by majority vote in a forum where the technical qualifications of the participants are not assured; they would like to limit the role of Administrative Radio Conferences and increase the jurisdiction of the CCIR and its Recommendations. The latter, on the other hand, feel overpowered by the developed countries with their immense technical resources, and oppose any change that would be translated as a loss of their power by transferring these matters to the Consultative Committees in which they do not (or cannot)

actively participate.[1]

It is hard to conceive of a system fundamentally different from the present one that would be widely accepted. There is little evidence that states would be willing to turn such a sensitive matter over to a group of experts or a small council of governmental representatives. The composition of this group would become crucial, and the possibility of reaching agreement would be extremely remote.

It is mostly the financing aspect that accounts for the historical reluctance of the industrialized countries fully to embrace technical-cooperation activities directed to developing countries as an integral part of the ITU's mandate. Thus, the opposition of the industrialized countries to use the Union's regular budget for this purpose. Some long-time participants in ITU-administered technical-cooperation programs feel that more often than not, the financing argument is a dubious one. The issue may revolve around the dichotomy between engineers and administrators.

Most of the delegates from the developed countries are specialists, engineers, and technicians. Because telecommunication networks already exist, these delegates are primarily interested in operating standards, signaling, and equipment specifications, all of which relate to telecommunication services. As a consequence, examination of the economic impact of

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[1]See A. Rutkowski, "Deformalizing the International Radio Arrangements," Telecommunications Policy (December 1983), pp. 309-316.

telecommunication systems on the general performance of the economy is largely irrelevant to them. Developing countries, on the contrary, send administrators and managers primarily preoccupied with the establishment of not-yet-existing telecommunication infrastructure, and much less interested with CCITT Recommendations. To delegates from these countries, planning is fundamental.

UNESCO, through its International Program for Development of Communication (IPDC), became the first agency to deal with communication problems specific to the Third World countries. In many respects, the IPDC is for developing countries what the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is for the developed countries. But UNESCO is embroiled in controversy that affects its credibility in the eyes of the industrialized members and OECD is perceived by developing countries to be a "club of the rich." The ITU, which has gained the credibility of all sides, would seem to be the appropriate forum for the implementation of technical cooperation programs. Paradoxically, the administrators from the Third World are in a better position to convince their counterparts in the First World that by helping them they would help themselves as well.

There are already signs that developed countries are interested in sending non-technical experts to ITU forums. These experts have started to work on economic analyses of the impact of telecommunication on economic development. It is probable that, in the future, those countries will send more telecommuni-

cation managers. As a matter of fact, the last ITU Secretary-General to be[10] engineer by training was Mohamed Mili who retired in 1982. Richard Butler, the current head, is an administrator. Managers and administrators speak the same language and may recognize that network implementation in developing countries is to the advantage of all parties. There is the perception that what the ITU needs is the realization of the common interest which will build the basis for the political will necessary to expand ITU development assistance.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Note on International Organizations

The Yearbook of International Organizations (1976-77) lists eight criteria for inclusion under the rubric of international organization. They are summerized by Archer as follows:[1]

1. The aims must be genuinely international with the intention to cover at least three states.

2. Membership must be individual or collective participation, with full voting rights, from at least three states and must be open to any individual or entity appropriately qualified in the organization's area of operations. Voting must be so that no one nationalo group can control the organization.

3. The basic instrument must provide for a formal structure giving members the right periodically to elect governing bodies and officiers. Provision should be made for continuity of operation with a permanent headquarters.

4. Officers should not all be of the same nationality for more than a given period.

5. There should be a substantial contribution to the budget from at least three states and there should be no attempt to make profits for distribution to members.

6. Those with an organic relationship with other organizations must show it can exist independently and elect its own officials.

7. Evidence of current activities must be available.

8. There are some negative criteria: size, politics, ideology, fields of activity, geographical location of headquarters, nomenclature are irrelevant in deciding whether a set-up is an "international organization" or not.

The Union of International Associations (UIA) distinguishes between Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), as does the United Nations. In the

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[1]Clive Archer, International Organizations (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 32.

conventional sense, IGOs are all those organizations that owe their existence to formal treaties or comparable legal instruments and that are directed by functionaries designated through formal governmental actions. Under this definition, any organization that does not require a governmental treaty pr other formalized, government-ratified instrument for its operation is an INGO. This concurs with the language used in the U.N. ECOSOC Resolution of Feb. 1950.

The distinction of IGOs and INGOs can seem arbitrary and unclear. Yet it is an important criterion for an organization's powers, legal status, and effectiveness. A clearly intergovernmental organization may serve as an umbrella for a number of relatively autonomous suborganizations, including one or more that operate at the nongovernmental level. A case in point is the International telecommunication Union. The ITU not only has a federated structure comprising the CCIR, CCITT, and IFRB, but it allows for the participation of Recognized Private Operating Agencies (RPOAs), Scientific and Industrial Organizations (SIOs), and International Organizations (IOs). Those entities contribute to the budget of the ITU.

The ITU might be thought of as a hybrid INGO, since it includes both governmetal and non-governmental representation. However, if such a hybrid organization has been established by a treaty or convention between government, as is the case of the ITU, it should be counted as an IGO.[2]

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[2] A. J. N. Judge, "International Institutions: Diversity, Borderline Cases, Functional Substitutes, and Possible Alternatives," in Taylor, P and Groom, A. J. R. (eds.) International Organization: A Conceptual Approach (London: Frances Pinter, 1978), p. 57.

APPENDIX B

Note About Convention and Charter[3]

To shed light on the unique features of the International Telecommunication Convention of the ITU, comparison is made with the Charter of the United Nations.

Both instruments state the principles of universal representation and of "one country, one vote." Both Convention and Charter can be revised by their supreme organs-the Plenipotentiary Conference, in the case of the ITU, and the General Assembly, in the case of the United Nations.

The modality for revision, however, is what differentiate fundamentally the ITU from the UN. The ITU Convention can be amended by a simple majority, where as modification of the UN Charter requires a two-thirds majority, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Any one of the permanent members can prevent the entry into force of an amendment even though it may be ratified by all other members of the United nations.

The veto power granted to the five permanent members has serious repercussions in the balance of force between states. The Charter maintains ad eternum the five major powers (USSR, USA, Great Britain, France, China) as permanent members. They can veto proposals to admit new members to the UN.

The Basic Provisions of the ITU Convention contain a clause permitting a member to withdraw from the Union by denouncing the Convention by simple notification through diplomatic channels to the SecretaryGeneral. In contrast, no formal right has been given in the UN Charter of withdrawing from the organization. Although by stating that "coersion will not be brought to bear on a member wishing to withdraw," the Charter implies a recognition of the right to withdraw at one's own discretion.

The ITU Convention, by "fully recognizing the sovereign right of each nations to regulate its communications," is actually non-binding as it allows for Reservations to its Final Protocol. The standard formula states:

> The delegation of _____ reserves for its government the right: 1) not to accept any financial measure which might lead to an increase in its contributory share in

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[3]Information on the ITU Convention is borrowed from Codding, op. cit., Chapter 9 "Basic Arrangement," pp. 203-222. Discussion of the UN Charter relies on M. Waters (ed.), The United Nations: International Organization and Administration (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967) and M. Hill, The United Nations System: Coordinating Its Economic and Social Work (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1978).

> defraying Union expenses; 2) to take any action it deems necessary to protect its telecommunication services should any member fail to observe the terms of the International telecommunication Convention.

The provision for Reservations is a unique feature that distinguishes the ITU Convention from the UN Charter, in which no reservation is made with regard to the fundamental provisions concerning the purpose of the Charter. Consequenly, when a member does not honor a UN Charter provision, it finds itself in breach of contract by negating the "principle of the binding force of agreements," a situation which may possibly lead to a institutional crisis. Through a blend of obligatory requirements and convenient escape clauses, the ITU Convention does not allow for this situation to occur.

Another basic difference between the ITU Convention and the UN Charter relates to the financing mechanisms. ITU members are free to choose any class of contribution to defray the Union's budget, though a Resolution invites members to select a class of contribution "most in keeping with their economic resources." The UN contributory system is supervised by a 18-member Committee on Contributions, which assesses each country's contribution on a pro-rata basis using a formula that adjusts national income (using a 10-year average) upward or downward according to per-capita income but with the provision that no contributor shall pay less than .01 percent or more than 25 percent of the total.

Until the 1970s the U.S. paid considerably more. In 1946, it contributed to nearly 40 percent of the UN regular budget. In 1970, after a series of gradual decrease had lowered the U.S. contribution to 31.5 percent, a Commission recommended a reduction to a level not to exceed 25 percent. This financing scheme, however, gives undue influence to the major powers. The top 10 contributors to the current UN budget account for nearly 78 percent of the total.

In view of the recent debates in the ITU regarding the wisdom to equip the Union with a more stable Charter, it is worth noting that the United Nations is similarly discussing the revision of its Charter. But, unlike the concern of the ITU, the UN attempts to answer the following question:

> Is it possible to inject sufficient flexibility into the Charter in order to provide room for adaptation, without at the same time making it too easy for groups of member states to upset, through the amendment procedure, the delicate balance of power that had been worked out between the large and small states?

APPENDIX C

List of the 161 Members of the ITU with Indication of Date of Their Admission in the Union (April 1985)

Germany F.R.	1866	China	1920	Cameroon	1960	Tonga	1972
Austria		Czechoslovakia		Central African R.		Oman	
Belgium		Venezuela		Chad		U.A.E.	
Denmark		Equador		Congo		Bangladesh	1973
Spain		Finland		Ivory Coast		German D.R.	
France		Poland	1921	Gabon		Quatar	
Greece		Albania	1922	Mali		Bahamas	1974
Hungary		Ireland	1923	Niger		Gambia	
Italy		Lebanon	1924	Senegal		Bahrain	1975
Luxemburg		Syria		Benin	1961	Mozambique	
Norway		Honduras	1925	Cyprus		Papua New Guinea	
Netherlands		Nicaragua	1926	Madagascar		N. Korea	
Portugal		Dominican Rep.		Nigeria		Angola	1976
Rumania		El Salvador	1927	Togo		Cape Verde	
Sweden		Haiti		Sierra Leone		Comoros	
Switerland		Liberia		Zaire		Guinea-Bissau	
Turkey		Paraguay		Burgina Faso	1962	Sao Tome & Pcp	
USSR		Afghanistan	1928	Rwanda		Suriname	
Yugoslavia		Iraq		Somalia		Djibouti	1977
India	1869	Vatican	1929	Tanzania		San Marino	
Iran		N. Yemen	1931	Mauritania		Zimbabwe	1981
Great Britain	1871	Costa Rica	1932	Algeria	1963	Grenada	
Egypt	1876	Ethiopia		Burundi		Belize	
Brazil	1877	Burma	1937	Jamaica		Brunei	1983
New Zealand	1878	Byelorussia	1947	Liechtenstein		Namibia	
Australia		Jordan		Uganda		St Vincent & Gren.	
Japan	1879	Pakistan		Mongolia	1964		
Bulgaria	1880	Ukraine		Kenya			
Thailand	1883	Israel	1948	Malawi	1965		
Argentine	1889	Saudi Arabia	1949	Malta			
Sri Lanka	1897	Indonesia		Singapore			
Uruguay	1902	Viet Nam	1951	Trinidad & Tobago			
Iceland	1906	S. Korea	1952	Zambia			
Bolivia	1907	Kampuchea		Barbados	1967		
Chile	1908	Laos		Guyana			
Canada		Libya	1953	Lesotho			
Mexico		Morocco	1956	Maldives			
Monaco		Tunisia		Botswana	1968		
United States		Nepal	1957	S. Yemen			
South Africa	1910	Ghana		Mauritius	1969		
Philippines	1912	Sudan		Nauru			
Panama	1914	Malaysia	1958	Equat. Guinea	1970		
Colombia		Guinea	1959	Swaziland			
Guatemala		Kuwait		Fiji	1971		
Peru	1915						
Cuba	1918						

Source: Telecommunication Journal 52/4 (1985), p. 131.

APPENDIX D

General Statistics of the ITU's Technical Cooperation Activities

Growth and Nature of the Assistance Provided by the ITU



Financing of the ITU's Technical Cooperation Activities



Growth in Membership of the ITU, the Administrative Council, and Significant Events





LATIN AMERICA

Netherlands Antilles 1
Assistance — Financial Department — Maintenance

Argentina 2
Message switching centre

Bermuda 3
Telecommunication legislation

Brazil 4
Telecommunication research and development

Chile 5
National telecommunications planning

Cuba 6
Development of telecommunication services and equipment

Ecuador 7
National Telecommunications Training Centre and national development plan

El Salvador 8
Expansion of the telecommunications system

Guatemala 9
Preparation of short-, medium- and long-term training plans

Haiti 10
Telecommunications development

Honduras 11
Training Centre of the "Empresa Hondureña de Telecomunicaciones (HONDUTEL)

British Virgin Islands 12
Advice on telecommunication services

Nicaragua 13
Training Centre

Panama 14
Training Centre
Maritime radiocommunications system

Peru 15
Expansion of telephone network

Suriname 16
Assistance to TELESUR in Organization, Training, Switching and introduction of new services

Trinidad and Tobago 17
Telecommunications Training Centre

Uruguay 18
National Telecommunication Training Centre
Data communications

Venezuela 19
Tariffs, frequency management, planning
Central Laboratory



EUROPE AND MIDDLE EAST

Albania 20
Fellowships in telecommunications and broadcasting
Development of telecommunication networks

Saudi Arabia 21
Telecommunications broadcasting training institutes (Jeddah and Riyadh)
Telecommunications experts and advisers
Special telecommunication network for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Advisory services for the satellite broadcasting system project
Advisory services to the Ministry of Information
Technical assistance to the Telegraph Department, Ministry of PTT

Bulgaria 22
Expanding the activities of the Telecom Research Institute, e.g.:
1) computer-aided network planning
2) computer-aided maintenance

Cyprus 23
Radio frequency management and monitoring

United Arab Emirates 24
Telecommunications adviser to EMIRTEL

Greece 25
Upgrading of the telecommunications maintenance organization
Reorganization of telecommunications

Hungary 26
Modern telecommunication techniques

Jordan 27
Development of the Telecommunication Training College
Assistance to Administration in Energy and Air Condition ing

Kuwait 28
OPAS experts

Oman 29
Expert in frequency management

Poland 30
Fellowships in advanced telecommunication techniques

Qatar 31
Development of radio and television broadcasting
Telecommunications development (frequency management)

Yemen (A.R.) 32
Telecommunication training institute
Organization and operation of telecommunications

Romania 33
Improvement of telecommunication services

Czechoslovakia 34
Modern telecommunication techniques

Turkey 35
Development of training in telecommunications

Yemen (P.D.R. of) 36
Telecommunications Development

Regional Projects
MEDARABTEL (Middle East and Mediterranean Telecommunication Network project)
Implementation phase of Master Plan
Translation and Arabisation of Telecommunications Glossary Terms
Radio propagation study and frequency planning
ITU/GULFVISION project (FM)
European Regional Project for International Telecommunication Development
TCDC
Cooperation in telecommunication training among Arab states
Interregional Projects
Course development in the field of telecommunications (CODEVTEL)

AFRICA

Algeria 37
Telecommunications Institute, Oran

Angola 38
Telecommunication training
Telecommunications engineering assistance

Botswana 39
Assistance in radio frequency management
Assistance in sound and television broadcasting

Burundi 40
Telecommunications Adviser

Cameroon 41
Technical assistance for the development of a national television network
National telecommunications network rehabilitation unit

Central African Republic 42
Planning
Assistance for initial investment in the Master Plan

Congo 43
Telecommunications planning, maintenance and operation

Ivory Coast 44
Telecommunications planning
INTELCI — Informatics and telematics studies

Djibouti 45
Establishment of a telecommunications training centre

Egypt 46
Training in television and broadcasting

Ethiopia 47
Upgrading of the Telecommunications Training Institute

Gambia 48
Rural Telecommunication Development

Equatorial Guinea 49
Telecommunications development

Lesotho 50
Assistance to Lesotho Telecommunications
Two-way radio network for rural health delivery

Malawi 51
Radio frequency management and radio monitoring

Mozambique 52
Assistance in telecommunications
Assistance in broadcasting

Namibia 53
Preparation of Plans for Telecommunications

Niger 54
Assistance in telecommunications planning
Assistance in the inspection of equipment

Nigeria 55
Telecommunications planning (Phase II)
Course development for telecommunications

Rwanda 56
Integrated programme of assistance in telecommunications

Senegal 57
Planning, development of services, and further training of telecommunications personnel

Somalia 58
National Telecommunication Training Institute (Phase II)
Telecommunication Development Planning

Sudan 59
Establishment of a Telecommunications Test, Repair and Maintenance Centre, Khartoum

Swaziland 60
Engineering assistance to the Posts and Telecommunications Department

Chad 61
National telecommunications school at Sarh

Tunisia 62
Postal and telecommunication school, Tunis

Uganda 63
Rehabilitation of the telecommunications network (Phase II)
Establishment of a Central Repair Depot

Zaire 64
Assistance in the rehabilitation of plant and training

Regional Projects
Preparatory assistance for the development of broadcasting in Africa (Nairobi, Kenya)
Development of the Pan-African News Agency (PANA)
PANAFTEL — Telecommunications maintenance — Pan-African network
PANAFTEL — Pan-African telecommunications network
Multi-country post and telecommunication training scheme (Phase II). Blantyre, Malawi (For Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland)
Advanced multinational telecommunications school, Dakar — Senegal
Assistance in telecommunications at Lutako Gourma
African regional satellite communications system (Telecommunications for rural development)



ASIA AND PACIFIC

Afghanistan 65
Telecommunication Training Centre

Bangladesh 66
Telecommunication Training Centre
Development of Broadcasting Services

Bhutan 67
Manpower Development: Telegraphic Services

Burma 68
Telecommunication and Postal Training Centre
Development of Telecommunications

China 69
Improvement of training capability of the Beijing Institute of P and T
Development of Telecommunications

Korea (Republic of) 70
Korea Telecommunications Research Institute

India 71
Follow-up support to Advanced Level Telecommunication Training Centre
Expansion and modernization of telecommunication services
Research and development programme of experimental satellite earth station, Ahmedabad
Expansion of monitoring facilities for UHF/microwave and satellite transmissions
Augmentation of training facilities at experimental satellite communication earth station, Ahmedabad
Telecommunication Research Centre for development of new techniques and technologies
Modernization / augmentation of the existing facilities for radio frequency spectrum monitoring, radio direction finding and in-service training

82

86 **85**

In-house data processing facilities for monitoring organisation/wireless planning and coordination wing
Research and development programme of Space Applications Centre, Ahmedabad
Training programme on video technology

Iran 72
Tehran — Isfahan Coaxial cable installation

Indonesia 73
Telecommunication Test and Development Centre

Lao (P.D.R.) 74
Telecommunication Training and Planning

Malaysia 75
Telecommunication Planning and Development

Maldives 76
Transit and Transport (Facilities and Equipment) for LDCs — Procurement of Equipment for Coastal Radio Station for Maldives.

Mongolia 77
Development of Rural Telecommunications

Nepal 78
Telecommunications Training Centre
Telecommunications Maintenance and Management

Pakistan 79
Survey and System Design for Telecommunication links for remote areas

Papua New Guinea 80
Advanced Training in Telecommunications

Philippines 81
Development study of telecommunication sector

Western Samoa 82
Telecommunications development
Telecommunications Training (Fellowships)

Singapore 83
Telecommunications Training Programme

Sri Lanka 84
Telecommunications Training Centre
Development of Telecommunications

Tokelau 85
Telecommunications Development

Tonga 86
Telecommunications Development

Regional Projects
Telecommunications Training (South Pacific)
Telecommunications Development (South Pacific)
Support to Telecommunications (Study, Training, etc.) — ASEAN
Rural Telecommunications in the least developed countries of Asia and the Pacific
Telecommunication Maintenance
Radio Frequency Monitoring and Management
Teletraffic engineering training
Course development in the field of telecommunications (CODEVTEL)

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