The first essay, "An Empirical Study of Anti-Cartel Enforcement Policies in Korea'' investigates and compares the impacts of the anti-cartel policies on stabilizing cartels and voluntarily revealing incriminating evidence. The three policies, which were innovated in Korea around 2005, are the following: i) a more generous and predictable leniency program, ii) expansion of resources, and iii) a harsher maximum fine ceiling. In order to identify these policy effects, hazard rate models are used with a sample of 327 cartel cases determined by the Korea competition agency from 2000 to 2010. The results show that the new leniency program and the resource expansion have a significantly positive impact on destabilizing cartels in the short run, while the long run effects for both policies are ambiguous. Also, the announced harsher fine rule, as well as the actual fines imposed by the competition authority, decrease the duration of discovered cartels. Pertaining to evidence disclosing sthe effects of the three policies, a raised fine ceiling shows significantly greater impact than the new leniency program. However, the expansion of resources fails in disclosing incriminating evidence.The second essay, "An Empirical Study of Cartels with Ringleaders in Korea'' explores how a cartel organization strategically chooses its structure to alleviate cheating and to sustain collusion. It focuses on organizational roles of cartel ringleaders. Using a choice model with a sample of Korea's 327 cartel cases from the 2000 to 2010, the research identifies the features of cartel ringleaders, and then analyzes in what kinds of situations they tend to appear. The findings indicate that cartel ringleaders are more prevalent in the circumstances where a cartel is more difficult to sustain. The probability of ringleader-involved cartels increases as more firms, greater size asymmetry, or less product homogeneity exists in a cartel. It is probable that a cartel endogenously develops its organizational structure in response to market circumstances. By choosing a ringleader-based cartel structure, firms can make incentive-compatible constraints less binding by reducing distrust among themselves. This finding is confirmed for aggressive ringleaders who play an active role in cartels (i.e., determining cartel plans) compared to organizational ringleaders who play an administrative role in cartels (i.e., convening meetings). Last, the findings indicate that ringleaders are significantly less likely chosen in cartel structures under the circumstances where other alternative monitoring mechanisms, such as an industry association, exist. Finally, the third essay, "What Governs Cartels?: Evidence from Korea'' explores what actually governs a cartel. Even though multiple firms cooperate to manage a cartel, the cartel frequently develops additional monitoring mechanisms to sustain it. This study investigates what types of monitoring mechanisms a cartel has, and whether they effectively stabilize a cartel or not. The study also compares the impact of different types of monitoring on cartel stability. Expectedly, mechanisms controlling a cartel significantly decrease the likelihood of cartel death. However, involvement of an industry association is less effective in stabilizing a cartel than existence of regular meetings composed of cartel firms. Also, an industry association increases stability less in cases of ``death by anti-trust'' cartels than in cases of ``natural death'' cartels. However, a regular meeting in a cartel decreases the likelihood of death more in ``death by anti-trust'' cartel cases than in ``natural death'' cases. Last, involvement of a higher level of personnel in each firm with a cartel stabilizes ``natural death'' cartels, while it destabilizes ``death by anti-trust'' cartels.
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