x-A

“WWAA‘WWA‘AEMMA?AAFAA‘RE':ARA-29:33:"’-“-‘"' v . - .. -1f*'{’.‘fi-.a,~ _. . :": - -

‘ u'i’E‘; (FL

‘‘‘‘‘‘‘

A conneuous MODEL FOR LAM ENFORCEMENT .1 '

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT-5;?

...,

Thesis .for the Degree of M S.
" ‘ MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
; , DENNIS WAYNE CATLIN _ .

L "'f'1974

 

 

 

 

 

 

LI BRARY l
Mic} Egan Start: i
Umvcrszty t?

“WANNANAN HAVANA

3 12793 10702 4519

  
  

 

ABSTRACT

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

By

Dennis Wayne Catlin

This study addresses the problem of a lack of research in the
law enforcement field with respect to the application of organiza-
tional and management development techniques to law enforcement
agencies. Law enforcement agencies are feeling the extreme pressures
of social change and must learn to adapt organizationally if they are
not to become antiquated.

In the private sector, business and industry have had exten-
sive experience with programs of organizational and management
development for the last forty years. The need for such programs was
the result of the rapid technological change which has been experi-
enced. Organizations in the private sector have reached a point
where they recognize that any program of management development will
have a better chance of success if it is linked to an organizational
development effort. Likewise, organizational devel0pment programs
which do not incorporate a component of management development will
find a reduced success ratio.

The case study presented here is a descriptive analysis of
an organizational and management development program which was carried

out over a period of ten months in a police department on the East

I?
’_ I'
-. ,,

figs-t

€D55L) Dennis Wayne Catlin
Coast. The department, referred to as Riverside, has a sworn compli-
ment of 250 officers and serves a city of approximately 96,000.

This program of organizational and management development
utilized several of the techniques currently practiced in the private
sector. It combined the use of process consultation with technical
assistance as strategies of organizational development. In the
original project model, the command staff composed of the ranks of
sergeant and above, were to play an integral role in the organizational
development effort. This was to be accomplished through their partici-
pation in task forces which were designed to identify organizational
problems and develop alternative solutions. During the life of the
project, several modifications of the processes were necessary pri-
marily as a result of intervention into the project by various top
administrators in the department and officials from the city's
political structure.

As a result of the research in Riverside, this study concludes
that there are five minimum criteria which should be met before any
program of organizational and management development is undertaken in
a law enforcement agency. These criteria are as follows:

I. Explicit commitment to the program from tOp level
management.

II. An understanding of the developmental program by
the participants.

Ill. An unfreezing process consisting of education and
training experiences for the management personnel
which should occur external to the organization.

IV. A reinforcement of the unfreezing process through
management's participation in the organizational
development process.

V.

Dennis Wayne Catlin

A program of long term third party intervention
in the change program.

As a result of the research, there is proposed a Contiguous

Model for Organizational and Management Development which meets the

criteria outlined. This model consists of the following four compo-

nents which must exist simultaneously or in close proximity to each

other:

Assessment of support by the political and organiza-
tional leadership. This assessment should occur on a
continuous basis throughout the developmental process.

 

 

Management development training external to the

 

organization. This can be accomplished through edu-

 

cational institutions or other programs such as those
offered by state law enforcement training commissions.

Continuous internal management development through

 

participation in the organizational development

 

effort.

Long term consulting assistance. This is presently

 

offered by private organizations on a contractual
basis. It is suggested that the current movement to
have state law enforcement training commissions pro-
vide such service holds much promise in delivering
high quality, long term assistance.

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

By

Dennis Wayne Catlin

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

School of Criminal Justice

I974

Copyright by
DENNIS W. CATLIN

I971:

The material in this project was prepared under Grant No.
73-Nl-99-l023 from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
U.S. Department of Justice. Researchers undertaking such projects
under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their
professional judgment. Therefore, points of view or opinions
stated in this document do not necessarily represent the official
position or policy of the U.S. Department of Justice.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deep appreciation to the individuals
without whose assistance and encouragement this project could not have
been completed.

First and foremost, to my wife, Jan, whose encouragement,
understanding and assistance made the task more enjoyable.

To Dr. John McNamara for his guidance as Chairman.

To Dr. Larry Hoover who constantly served as a sounding board
for many of the technical and conceptual problems encountered.

To Kenneth Christian who gave me the opportunity to work on
the Riverside project.

To John Conley, John Gilson and Jim Barbee who so graciously
allowed me to draw upon their experiences with and contributions to
the Riverside project.

To my parents whose foresight, faith, sacrifice and constant
encouragement were the primary factors in reaching this level of

higher education.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Chapter
I. THE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
NEED FOR THE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY . 5
THE CASE STUDY APPROACH . 6
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 7
DEFINITION OF TERMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FORMAT OF THE STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . II
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ll
MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY:
FROM THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE ORGANIZATION . . . . . I3
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3. METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A7
THE CASE STUDY APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . A7
HISTORY OF PROJECT DEVEOPMENT . . . . . . . . . A8
PROPOSED MODEL FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT . . . . . 50
THE MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT TRAINING TEAM . . . . . 52

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY GROUP . . . . . . . . SA

iv

Chapter

A. MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE RIVERSIDE POLICE

DEPARTMENT: A CASE STUDY . . . .
FORMAT OF CHAPTER .

INTRODUCTION: A CLIMATE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL AND
MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT . . . .

PRELIMINARY DATA GATHERING AND PROBLEM ANALYSIS .
PROFILE OF COMMAND STAFF

IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM AREAS AS PERCEIVED BY
THE COMMAND STAFF . . . .

INITIAL PROJECT ORIENTATION AND TRAINING SESSIONS
IMPLEMENTATION OF ORIGINAL MODEL .

MODIFICATION ONE: A CHANGE IN TASK FORCE
COMPOSITION . . . . . . . .

MODIFICATION TWO: A CHANGE IN THE ROLES OF THE
PROJECT COMPONENTS . . . . . . . . .

MODIFICATION THREE: A CHANGE IN THE TASK FORCE
ARRANGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . .

CONTIGUOUS MODEL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL
AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION
MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS
A CONTIGUOUS MODEL

CONCLUSION . . . . . .

APPENDIX .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Page

6A
6A

66
68
7I

81
89

I03

I16

I28

I35

IAO
IAO
IA]
147
I52
153
I7I

Table

\IO‘U'I

IO.

II.

l2.

I3.

LIST OF TABLES

Composition of Department by Status
Distribution of Sworn Personnel

Average Years of Experience by Rank of Command
Personnel . . . .

Experience Profile of Captains

Experience Profile of Sergeants .

Experience Profile of Lieutenants

Formal Educational Level for Command Personnel

Major Weaknesses of Riverside Police Department as
Perceived by the Command Personnel

Commanders Suggestions for Improving the Riverside
Police Department .

Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department as
Perceived by Patrolmen

Major Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department
Arranged into Major Administrative Categories

Task Force Composition .

Responsibilities of Captains and Lieutenants as
Articulated by Incumbents

vi

Page
58
58

73
75
77
78
80

83

87

88

95
I00

ll5

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

I. Organizational Chart of Riverside Police
Department . .

2. Reorganization of Riverside Police Department .

3. Meeting Activity of Operations Task Force

vii

Page

59
99
I 07

Chapter I
THE PROBLEM

It is trite to note the accelerating pace of technological

and social change, the pace is already taking on the qualities
of a nightmare.

No research is needed to establish the validity of this state-
ment; one needs only to look about or experience a few days of life.
However, if a person were to look at the organizational life and struc-
ture of law enforcement agencies the validity might be in doubt. Law
enforcement's response to change can be, at best, termed inadequate.
Patrick V. Murphy, President of the Ford Foundation, recently stated
that most police departments were ”primitive” in meeting their respon-
sibilities.2

Law enforcement must begin to adapt organizationally to the
impact of change before it becomes an antiquated institution. The
type of adaptability required for an adequate response to rising
crime, increased bombings along with social unrest requires personnel

in management positions who are adequately trained and educated to

deal with organizational change. In addition to the change from

 

lAlfred J. Marrow, David Bowers, and Stanley Seashore, Manage-
ment bnyarticipation: Creating a Climate for Personal and Organiza-
tional Change (New York: Harper and Rowe, I967I, p. 132.

2Portion of a speech given by Patrick V. Murphy at Lehigh
University in Bethesda, Pennsylvania, published in Crime Control

Digest, Volume VIII (July 29, I974), 3.
I

without, law enforcement agencies are not immune to the widely spread-
ing changes which are occurring in all work organizations. The once
accepted concept of authoritarian leadership is being eroded away.
There is an increased demand on the part of all employees to have some
say in the direction of their destiny.3 This may crop up in the form
of union demands or simply in the daily attitude of the officer toward
his supervisor. This deveIOpment means that managers and executives
must adopt new leadership styles if they expect to maximize the
utilization of the most precious commodity--human resources.“ Quick
succinctly states it in this manner:

The authoritarian model (of leadership) does not have the
flexibility that is necessary to make effective use of human
resources. An innovating organization requires a different
structure of the relationship between people. It requires a
team organization rather than a command organization.

The day has passed when the manager or executive in a law
enforcement organization can operate by the seat of his pants. It is
Inescapable that the task for management is becoming more complex and
demanding more expertise. Law enforcement managers will need system-
atic education and training to meet the demands placed on them.

The need for adequate management training which was so

prominently reflected by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement

 

3Robert Tannenbaum and Warren Schmidt, ”How to Choose a
Leadership Pattern,” Harvard Business Review, March-April I958,

P- 95.

 

hlbid.

SThomas Quick, Your Role in Task Force Management (Garden
City: Doubleday and Co., I972), p. 38:

and the Administration of Justice6 has been underscored by numerous
authors and authorities and was most recently reconfirmed by the
National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards andGoals.7
This study will look at the trends in development and training
activities which are an integral part of attempts to upgrade the
management and executive personnel in law enforcement agencies. It
will present a contiguous model of organizational and management
development based on a synthesis of the current trends in industry and

business with the experience of the researcher in actually implementing

a program of development in a law enforcement agency.
NEED FOR THE STUDY

In reviewing the report on the police developed by the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, there is
little doubt that the implementation of many of the standards will
require significant organizational development efforts. The degree of
organizational change required in many cases is staggering. For
example, Standard 5.2 discusses consolidation of police services and
recommends that ”any minimum police agencies which employ fewer than

ten employees should consider consolidation for improved police

 

6President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington: Government

Printing Office, l937), p. Ihl.

7National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, The Police (Washington: Government Printing Office, I973),

Po 399.

 

8

efficiency and effectiveness.” The Commission goes on to recommend
consolidation at any level where it will improve the delivery of
police services.

The resultant organizational change required to implement this
standard and many of the others will have to be dealt with by all law
enforcement personnel. However, it could be suggested that the mana-
gers and executives will bear the brunt of the shock waves of any
type of organizational development program to increase effectiveness.
If law enforcement managers and executives are resisting organiza-
tional change based on total social change, how can they respond to
the change thrust upon them by the Standards and Goals Report?

It would appear that any modellin'organizational change or
development should include a management development component to
expedite the change effort. In attempting to locate such organiza-
tional development models in law enforcement, the researcher, as
others before him, has found the hunting sparse.

In fact the few published models of executive and management
development, as will be pointed out in the next chapter, tend to be
relatively limited in variety. These program models are with a few
exceptions not integral parts of an overall organizational deveIOpment
effort. They tend to be programs which are held external to the
organizational environment with the assumption that the improvement of
management skills will hence improve organizational effectiveness.

This assumption has met with serious doubt by other organizations in

 

8Ibid., p. 109. 9lbid.

business and industry. It likewise deserves more than passing con-
sideration for law enforcement if the development of effective managers

is to meet the overwhelming demands of the occupation.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Business and industry responded to the technological revolu-
tion out of a sheer need for survival. They recognized the need for
effective management development programs far sooner than did law
enforcement and have been engaged in a long process of trial and error.
It would seem ludicrous for law enforcement to engage in the replica-
tion of fruitless efforts.

This study is an attempt first of all to ascertain the current
state of the art with respect to organizational and management devel-
opment efforts in law enforcement. This, compared with experience of
business and industry, should assist us in reducing wasted effort in
programs which have proven to be of limited effectiveness in other
organizational settings. Second, this study will contribute to the
somewhat scarce body of knowledge in the field of organizational and
management development in law enforcement. The case study reported
here reflects an organizational change program with emphasis on a
management deveIOpment component.

Finally, this study has broad implications for the achievement
of standards reported by the National Advisory Commission's Report
which requires organizational change and development. The model pre-

sented in this study will provide some of the necessary support to the

achievement of those standards which would address themselves to man-

agement deveIOpment components of organizational change programs.

THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

The objective of the research reported here essentially
involves the attempt to evolve a model for the integration of a man-
agement training component into organizational development programs.
The model which is presented in this study draws heavily on several
developmental models currently utilized in business and industry.

Due to the conceptual nature of the model, the research
objective is essentially exploratory in nature. Since this type of
research objective did not lend itself to empirical testing, the
descriptive case study was selected as the research methodology. Con-
sistent with the case study methodology the research will rely heavily
on the participant-observer technique supported by data obtained
through interviews and administration of questionnaires.

The police department in which this project was carried out
will be referred to as the Riverside Police Department. The author
is sincerely indebted to those who participated in this project.
Therefore, in order to report the findings as objectively as possible
and still maintain the well deserved confidentiality of the partici-
pants, the author has arbitrarily selected a fictitious name for

this city.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study addresses itself primarily to the methodology and
process of management development. Therefore, only limited references
will be made to curricula for management training.

The case study approach is subject to several methodological
limitations. The researcher fully acknowledges the strong biased
viewpoint which is inherent in the participant/observer technique.
For that reason this study will not attempt to address the question
of success measurement of this project.

The researcher also acknowledges the limitations imposed by a
single case research design. Therefore, generalities resulting from
the results of this research do not necessarily have global implica-
tions. Beckhard addresses this limitation with particular respect
to organizational deveIOpment strategies and models. He states that:

There are a number of cases in my own experience where a

particular intervention or change strategy which was effec-
tive in one organization or under one set of conditions, has
been borrowed and applied to another organization or set of
conditions without any diagnosis as to its appropriateness
in the second organization, this is a form of cookbook solu-
tion and it tends to produce failure rather than success.
Therefore the purpose of this study will not be to generalize but rather

to provide some insight to the management deveIOpment process as it

relates to law enforcement.

 

loRichard Beckhard, Organizational Development Strategies and
Models (Reading: Addison Wesley, I973), p. 96.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Organizational development is a term which has evolved over a
period of time in the field of business and industry. It might be
helpful to review definitions presented by two prominent authorities
in the field of organizational development.

In defining the term organizational development, Winn states
that organizational development:

lmplies a normative re-educational strategy intended to

effect systems of beliefs, values, and attitudes within the
organization so that it can adapt better to the accelerated
rate of change in technology, industrial environment, and
our society in general . . . . It also includes formal
organizational restructuring which is frequently initiated,
facllltgted and reinforced by the normative behavioral
change. '

Beckhard states that an organizational development program
”involves a systematic diagnosis of the organization, the development
of a strategic plan for improvement and the mobilization of resources
to carry out the effort”!2

For purposes of this paper, organizational development will
be defined as a strategic plan which combines the systematic diagnosis
of organizational problems and the development of a strategic plan for

improvement of the organization in Order that the organization will be

able to respond efficiently and effectively to change. Management

 

l'Alexander Winn, ”The Laboratory Approach to Organizational
Development: A Tentative Model of Planned Change,” The Journal of
Management Studies, VI (May, I969). I55.

lzBeckhard, p. 2.

deveIOpment for purposes of this paper will be considered one of the
integral strategies for organizational development.

Managgment development is also a term which has a variety of
meanings. In the narrowest scope the term applies strictly to programs
of management training. In the broadest sense, management development
would include a total program of personnel deveIOpment involving fore-
casting of personnel resource needs, a system of personnel promotion,
along with a system of personnel evaluation. In the fields of business
and industry management development experts heavily rely on complex
systems of forecasting personnel resources in terms of management and
a resulting complex system for management replacement. For purposes
of this paper, the term management development will primarily deal with
the training aspect of a developmental program with some consideration

for personnel evaluation and promotion.

FORMAT OF THE STUDY

Chapter 2 of this study will present a review of the literature
with respect to organizational and management development efforts in
business and industry as well as law enforcement. The bulk of the
literature review focuses on business and industry's efforts since
they have pioneered the field and law enforcement is just beginning
to take its first journey into the territory.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in the research
reported in this study. The research is a descriptive analysis of
the implementation of an organizational and management development

model in the Riverside Police Department.

IO

Chapter A presents the case study along with a descriptive
analysis of the implementation of the original model and the subsequent
modifications of the model which occurred.

Chapter 5 presents a contiguous model for law enforcement and
organizational development. It is important to stress at this time
that the model is not derived solely from the case study. Rather it
is derived from a synthesis of material researched and presented in
the review of the literature using the case study as a template. In
essence, the development of this model was the goal of this entire

study.

Chapter 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION

Little has changed since Germann wrote in I962 that ”there is
a significant deficiency in the amount of material available to the
researcher on police executive development."'3 If there is a lack of
literature on police executive development, there is even less directly
relating to organizational development efforts within law enforcement.

The author must,Ias others before him, rely on the material
from the fields of business and industry regarding organizational and
management development experiences. It would prove valuable for law
enforcement to consider the management development trends in business
and industry and their evolution since the beginning efforts just
after World War II.14

By comparing current law enforcement management development
techniques with the various stages through which business and industry
have passed, it is possible to assess the state of the art with

respect to law enforEement. Even more importantly, it may assist in

avoided wasteful replications of efforts which have already been tried

 

l3A. C. Germann, Police Executive Development (Springfield:
Charles C. Thomas, I962), p. l2.

H(Elton T. Reeves, ”Management Devel0pment: A Conceptual Con-
tinuum,” Training and Development Journal, September, I968, p. 3.
ll

 

l2

and proven questionable in effect. Finally, such a comparison and
analysis of the literature is of primary importance with regard to this
work since it seeks to present a model of organizational development
with emphasis on the management development component of such a model.
In this manner law enforcement can avoid the trial and error stages
which were experienced by business and industry. Once law enforce-
ment has reached that point, it can fully realize the maximum benefits
of further experimental and developmental work done in the field of
business. This in essence will facilitate the technical transfer of
such efforts from business and industry to law enforcement, thereby
reducing the necessity for multiple efforts in each field.

This review of the literature will focus on (I) the trends of
management development in business and industry, (2) strategies of
organizational development with particular emphasis on the management
development component, and (3) management and organizational develop-
ment efforts in the field of law enforcement.

It will be seen that there has been a definite trend in the
emphasis of management development in business and industry from its
inception after World War II to the present. At the outset management
development programs placed emphasis on the individual manager. These
efforts aimed at increasing the individual manager's competence in
almost complete isolation from his organization; the general thesis
being that if the manager is more effective he will make the organiza-
tion more effective. Slowly this concept gave way to a more
organizationally based philosophy of management development. This

resulted from the apparent problem of transfer from the training

environment to the organizational setting. There emerged training
efforts which were designed to facilitate the transfer of this train-
ing to the organizational setting. Most recently, the emphasis has
been toward what can be termed an organic approach to management
development. It can be viewed as an attempt to merge all of the tradi-
tional methods of organizational development such as consulting,
utilization of task forces, and change agent theory, with the manage-
ment development function to make the two contiguous.

The available material relating to organizational and manage-
ment deveIOpment in law enforcement is somewhat limited in nature and
narrow in scope. The researcher could locate no published literature
which dealt with a conscious effort to merge organizational deveIOp-
ment strategies with a program of management development. Therefore
materials of a more general nature will be presented.

MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY:
FROM THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE ORGANIZATION

Introduction

 

In the reporting of the material compiled under this section
of the review of the literature it would be convenient if one could
develop discrete categories of management development techniques which
have evolved over the past thirty years. However, due to the evolu-
tionary nature of the process, the material does not lend itself to
such neat boundaries of division.

The early programs placed the responsibility for management

development on the individual manager. Programs of executive development

IA

were almost exclusively of the college or university type in which the
manager was removed from his organizational environment. He was
expected to increase his competency in such a setting and upon return
to the organization be a more effective manager and increase the
effectiveness of the organization. These programs dealt almost
entirely with material of a cognitive nature and of practical emphasis.
The lengthy university programs gave way to short courses and seminars.
In the early sixties there emerged the philosophy that effec-
tive management was a function of the manager's skill in human
relations. There resulted a proliferation of what has been termed
sensitivity training or T-group training. In the initial stages this
T-group training was conducted in what was termed ”stranger” labora-
tories. As in the past the manager was removed from his organizational
environment and the training took place in isolation from the organiza-
tion with other individuals with whom the manager had no working
relationship. These efforts experienced the same problems as the
prior developmental programs. Little or no evidence of transfer of
skill, ability, or attitudes from the training environment to the
organizational setting was evident.'5 This led to the development of
what is termed Cousin and Family T-group training programs. The
Cousin T-group training programs involved managers from the same
organization who did not work together and were trained in the same

laboratory setting. A further modification of this is the Family

 

ISQuick, p. 97.

l5

T-group setting where those who had working relationships were trained
in the same program.

The change from emphasis on seminars and college programs to
T-group training was a change from cognitive and skill oriented train-
ing to affective or attitudinal training. From the Family T-group
training emerged such efforts as organizational task forces and team
building development programs.

Currently, there is a prevailing philosophy which could be
termed an organic orientation to management devel0pment. Theorists
have recognized that there are beneficial effects to all of the previ-
ously attempted efforts in management development when they are merged
with general strategies of organizational development and utilized in
an eclectic fashion.

For purposes of some structure the material in this section
will be presented in the following manner: (I) A presentation of total
material related to programs which emphasized a responsibility of the
individual manager to develop skills and transfer those to the organiza-
tional setting. Included will be a discussion of university and
college programs, seminars, short courses, and T-group training which
are conducted outside of the organizational environment. (2) Material
dealing with the initial efforts to overcome the problem of training
transfer from the classroom or T-group training sessions to the
organizational setting. This would include such management development
techniques as cousin and family T-groups, team building, and task force
decision making. Also a discussion of those efforts which merge

organizational development strategies with the management development

l6

process. Included in this discussion will be general techniques of
organizational development such as the traditional consulting model,
process consultation technique, and the managerial grid theory of
organizational and management development.
Management Develogment Efforts
Emphasizing the DeveIOpment of
Individual Competence
College and university programs were the first sources of
management development training for business and industry. The first
of these appeared on the scene in approximately l91I8.l6 The initial
growth of such programs was slow at first but steadily increased in
papularity. House reported in I967 that:
In I953 only four universities offered programs specifi-
cally conceived and directed for executives, whereas today
more than A0 universities offer advanced management training
ranging in duration from several weeks to several months. 7
Among the various college and university programs, there tends
to be a similarity of emphasis not only with regard to philosophy but
also the general course content. Andrews, in a I966 report of a study

of 39 such programs, found that there was remarkable similarity in

stated program purpose.l

 

16Robert J. House, Management Development: Design, Evaluation,
Implementation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, I967):
p. I0.

 

I7IDicI., p. 9.

IBKenneth R. Andrews, The Effectiveness of Universi£y_Manage-
ment Development Programs (Boston: Harvard Press, l966), p. 37.

l7

All the programs aimed to broaden, that is to expose
men to new horizons and to enlarge their outlook toward the
events taking place around them. 9
He further states that most of the courses taught fall into the follow-
ing eight general categories:
I. Human problems of administration in business organization

2. Labor relations

3. Policy formulation, general management or the tasks of
top management

A. Social economic and political environment of business

5. Marketing management

6. Financial management

7. Control, accounting, and other uses of quantitative data

8. Personal improvement courses (public speaking, Speed
reading, conference leading, executive health, etc.)

The general methodology of training in these programs relies
heavily on lectures and discussion groups more recently combined with
role playing and decision making exercises.2]

This type of management development program is generally long
term in nature varying in length from three or four weeks to six, nine,
and even twelve weeks.22 One of the advantages is the uninterrupted

attention given to the course since the manager has been released from

 

'9Ibid., p. 39. 2°

2lDerek Williams, ”Uses of Role Theory in Management and
Supervisory Training,” The Journal of Management Studies, VI (October,

1969), A3.

Ibid., p. AI.

22American Society of Training Directors, Training and Develop-
ment Handbook (New York: McGraw Hill, I967), p. 39].

I8

daily responsibilities and there is a concentration of effort which
maximizes the potential benefit.23 Perhaps one of the greatest
benefits is that which is most widely acknowledged by the participants.

It is expressed as an Opportunity to:

Rub his mind against the minds of executives from other
industries, companies, functions and places . . . his imagina-
tion is stirred by discovering that other organizations facing
problems similar to those confronted by his own firm have used
different solutions successfully. Formally and informally in
daytime classes and in nighttime bull sessions his thinking is
challenged, prodded, stimulated, exercised and broadened.2

Another advantage closely related to the foregoing although somewhat

more subtle is:

The physical and psychological removal of the executive
from the presence, the pressures, and the overall atmosphere
of his job. He leaves his office, company, and his family for
several weeks or months, and he lives in a wholly new environ-
ment. He experiences indefinable yet valuable personal release
of the kind commonly associated with a change of scene as on a
vacation. He gains a sense of perspective, a chance to look
back at his job and the way he has been handling it without
the distractions of company affairs and families, and free from
the presence of decisions, deadlines and commitments.

Another author puts it in these terms:

These programs or courses inject an external viewpoint on
problems and offer a breadth of background not available inter-
nally . . . . the exchange of viewpoints can modify attitudes,
create new interest, develop tolerance of others' ideas, and

 

23'Ibid.

2“Melvin Anshen, ”Executive DeveIOpment: In Company vs
University Programs,“ Harvard Business Review, May-June, I957,

p. 85.
25Ibid.

I9

help in highlighting changes in political and social condi-

tions . . . . the academic atmosphere accompanying certain of

these programs stimulates some pggple to acquire a deeper

knowledge of the subject matter.

Closely related to the college and university programs are
those which can be characterized as seminar in nature. These are
essentially shorter versions of the university programs. Generally,
they range in length from a few days to a week or 50.27 Nevertheless
the course content and methodology are markedly similar. They are pre-
dominantly classroom oriented utilizing lectures, small groupidiscussion,
role playing and simulation.28 One of the major reasons for the great
popularity of the seminar approach is based on the tenet that a great
deal of information can be provided to a large number of people at one
time, thus reducing the ”exposure to training cost per person."29
It is easily concluded from both the course content and

methodology of university and seminar development programs that the
emphasis is on imparting the cognitive types of knowledge and skills.
There is an emphasis on the invidual with little or no. consideration
for the organizational environment from which the manager has come and
to which he must return. The assumption is that if the manager

becomes more competent through a management development program he

will be able to increase the effectiveness of his organization upon

 

6American Society of Training Directors, p. 39.
27Ibid.

28Elton T. Reeves, Manggement Development for the Line Manager
(New York: American Management Association, I972), p. 65.

29House, p. 65.

20

30

his return. These programs are conceived and designed on the assump-

tion that the participant's organizational climate is favorable for

3i

development. Because the participants in the programs come from many
firms and industries the content material must take a general approach.
This necessitates further interpretation of the material
by the individual for his personal use. Without later encour-
agement, this interpretation is frequently neglected, thereby
possibly minimizing the return from the training by making
the transition to the work situation more difficult.32
Another concern with respect to management seminars and univer-
sity programs is the matter of supply and demand. Even with the
proliferation of seminars, university programs, and short courses there
are not enough programs of this type to satisfy the demand.33 If
companies rely on this form of management development, there tends to
result a shotgun pattern which appears to be wasteful since it does not

3A

provide a continuous pattern of development. Nevertheless, seminars
and college programs still provide a significant amount of the man-

agement development training occurring in this country.

 

30John Wilson, Donald Mullen, and Robert Morton, ”Sensitivity
Training for Individual Growth-Team Training for Organizational
DeveIOpment,” Training and Development Journal, January, I968, p. A7.

3lAndrews, The Effectiveness of University Management Develop-
ment Programs.

32

American Society of Training Directors, p. 39.

33Anshen, p. 3A.

3“Kenneth R. Andrews, ”Is Management Training Effective,”
Harvard Business Review, March-April, l957. P. 7].

21

In the late I9SOs and early l960s there was an increased
interest in the role which human and interpersonal relations played
in organizational effectiveness. Out of this fascination grew the
management programs which are based on sensitivity training principles.

The primary vehicle of sensitivity training outside of the organiza-

35

tional setting is the Basic T-group.
Golembiewski in discussing T-group training states:

The Basic T-group or sensitivity training group deals
largely with personal learning about the self in interper-
sonal group situations. In roughest terms the Basic T-group
(”T” is for ”training”) may be defined as a small group of a
dozen or so ”normals" generally strangers who meet in an
”unstructured setting” for an extended period of time with a
”Trainer" having a strong background in the behavioral sci-
ences. By ”unstructured setting” is meant thatthe Basic
T-groups typically have no specific task to perform, and the
focus is on learning from the inter-reactions generated in
whatever activities they engage in. The trainer play§6a
critical role in this purposive early non-directness.

Ordiorne describes the T-group in the following manner:

T-groups have also been defined as ”deveIOpmentaI groups,”
“laboratory education,” Ieaderless groups. Their essence is
the playing down of an overt behavior on the part of the
trainer with the actions of the group during a session being
determined by the members. Its emphasis is usually on the
”here and now.” The group has no purpose assigned to it by
authority figures, but it is usually understood that it is
to be a training session to study interpersonal relations in

groups.

 

35Georges S. Ordiorne, Trainingiby Objectives (London:
MacMillian Ltd., I970), p. Sl.

36Robert T. Golembiewski, Renewing Organizations: The
Laboratory Approach to Planned Change (Ttasca: Peacock Inc.,

I972); p. 7A.

37Ordiorne, loc. cit.

22

It is interesting to note that T-group training in terms of
course content and methodologies is an antithesis to the seminar and
university programs. While the seminar and university programs empha-
size cognitive knowledge and managerial skills there is little emphasis
on attempts to change attitudes. The T-group has as its primary goal
the change of attitudes regarding interpersonal relations and behavior.
With respect to this, Winn points out that the ”T-group represents a
complete change from learning situations participants have been accus-
tomed to. The concern of the T-group is with the immediate, existential
confrontation and the 'here and now' experience.”38

The goals of T-group training have been summarized by one
author as follows:

T-groups have two major purposes. First their members

analyze the data generated by their own here and now inter-
actions. These interactions cover a broad range. Thus

T-group members:

I. Explore the impact<rftheir behaviors, values and atti-
tudes on others.

2. Determine whether they want to change their behaviors,
values or attitudes.

3. Experiment with new behaviors, values or attitudes if
individuals consider change is desirable.

A. Develop awareness of how groups can both stimulate and
inhibit personal growth and decision making.

The second goal of T-group members is to work to develop
insight and behavioral skills to facilitate both analysis
and action in the T-group as well as in back home situations.

 

38Winn, p. l57.

3gGolembiewski, p. 76.

23

At the end of a T-group training session “a successful partici-
pant as he knows himself at the end of his T-group experience, will be
much the same person.as he is known to others."l'0

Since literally thousands of managers and executives have been
trained utilizing the human relations training method or T-group
training, one might assume that it has received major acceptance by
those who were considered authorities in the field of management
development. However, this is not entirely the case. Its proponents
as well as its opponents are sharply divided with respect to the
effectiveness and desirability of utilizing this technique of manage-
ment development. One of its strongest opponents states that:

A detailed study of the periodicals in which research

reports on effectiveness of sensitivity training might have
been reported between I9A8 and l96l shows that not a single
conclusive piece of research has been reported that proves
that sensitivity training changes behavior of trainees
overtly back on the job . . . . leading figures in the
field flatly state that there is no evidence that sensi-
tivity training changes behavior back on the job.

In a sense, we encounter a problem here which is similar to
that of the traditional university and seminar approach. It is essen-
tially the question of transfer of learning, or in this case a
transfer in the behavior change to the job situation. As Maugham
observes:

A change of attitude or behavior in a training situation

does not necessarily imply the changes will be transferred to
the work situation back home, nor does it signify that the

 

A0
Al

Ibid., p. 75.

Ordiorne, pp. 52-53.

2A

changes will be maintained over a long period of time and

both of t ese are prerequisites for effective managerial

training.
Winn succinctly states the problem in the following manner:

The critical question here is the question of transfer.

How does one transfer one's insight, the deeper understand-

ing of group phenomena, the realization of how one's

behavior affects others, from a micro-culture of a labora-

tory into the outside world?“3
He goes on to reflect that the culture in most organizations tends to
undermine new learning and that the theories with which the partici-
pants return to the organizational setting are of the ''magic mountain

. A
varIety.”

Those who strongly support sensitivity or T-group training are
just as adamant as the opponents in providing rationale and evidence
which supports transfer of training and the production of a change
which is sustained in the on-the-job situation.“5 The most often
described benefit of T-group training is that it tends to unfreeze
old behavioral patterns.“6 Sensitivity training has often been used
in organizations which require significant change to increase their

effectiveness. In these cases, the unfreezing events incurred by

utilization of sensitivity training have been used with success in

 

hzlain Maugham and Gary L. Cooper, ”The Impact of T-Groups on
Managerial Behavior,” The Journal of Management Studies, VI (October,

l969). 55.

A3Winn, p. l58.
AA

 

Ibid., p. 159.
A5

A6

Wilson, Mullen, and Morton, p. A8.

Golembiewski, p. 7A.

25

order that change might begin within the organization.“7 Alban and
Politt view the use of T-groups in the following context:
Many of us have found the T-group experience enormously
helpful in developing awareness of ourselves and the other
people that we live and work with. The problem is that
relationships are fundamentally different when bosses and
subordinates are toggther and the power is unequal and that
changes everything.

To summarize, the review of the literature thus far has dealt
with those management development programs which are typically provided
outside of the organizational environment. We have looked at the uni-
versity and college programs and seminars which are primarily aimed at
providing managerial knowledge and skills to the participants. The
Basic T-group has also been discussed. _It is important to note that
even though the T-group represents a significant deviation from the
traditional management training program it still holds in common many
of the problems and disadvantages of the traditional type of program.
Both traditional and sensitivity training programs can be most validly
criticized on the point that there is little evidence of significant
impact on organizational effectiveness. Both types of training programs
have the common problem of transferring knowledge and skills or a
change in attitudinal behavior.to the organizational setting. Those

who receive sensitivity training are not necessarily more considerate

of their employees than when they left. Those who have obtained

 

h7Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore, p. 232.

ABBillie T. Alban, L. Irving Politt, ”Team Building,” O.D. -
Emegging Dimensions and Concepts: A Collection of Papers, ed. Thomas
H. Patten, Jr. (Washington: American Society of Training Directors,

I972). P- 33-

26

Specific management and executive skills may not be able to implement
or utilize those skills unless the organizational environment is
conducive to supporting the use of new skills and/or changed behavior.

House points out that:

A good deal of theory and research advanced in the last

several years suggests that management development efforts

must be more broadly based and more than mere classroom exer-

cises by being designed to fit into or change the existing

organizational climate. 9
By the very nature of the fact that the management development programs
discussed here occur in isolation from the organizational setting it
would be a serious error for any organization to rely exclusively on
this type of management deveIOpment.

The primary benefits reaped from these types of training pro-
grams are in terms of their ability to unfreeze old behavioral patterns
and stimulate the participants. This can be used to great advantage
by developing a predisposition for organizational change and develop-

50

ment.

Management Development as a
Component of Organizational
Development

 

As indicated previously, one of the problems experienced with
traditional management development techniques and Basic T-group pro-

grams is the problem of transfer of the skills, knowledge and change

 

I49House, p. 3l.

50John T. Voss, ”An Evaluation of California State Personnel
Board's Management Development Institute“ (unpublished master's thesis,
Michigan State University, I972), p. 30.

27

of attitude to the job setting. Recognizing this, those who have been
involved in management training sought a method to facilitate this

5l

transfer. As some authorities point out, ”management training pro-
grams have often been ineffective not because they were bad programs
but because they were not integrated with other aspects of the total

”52

organizational system. House feels:

Studies clearly demonstrate that if development is to
be successful it must be geared not only to the participant's
needs and learning abilities but also to the particular
requirements and practices of the organization in which he
manages.

The resulting trend was toward management development taking
place in the organizational setting utilizing some of the strategies
and methods which have become associated with total programs of
organizational development.

It is necessary to review some of the material regarding
techniques and strategies of organizational development with respect
to those which have application to management development techniques.
Since the material addressing itself to the total field of organiza-
tional development is voluminous, the scope of the review will be nar-
rowed to those strategies which can be directly related to management
development.

Organizational development is a term which has evolved in

the literature and the precise meaning of which is not always agreed

 

SI
52
53

House, p. IOZ.
Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore, p. 227.

House, p. II.

28

upon. For example, Bennis describes organizational development as ”a
response to change, a complex educational strategy intended to change
beliefs, attitudes, values, and structures of organization . ."5h
Beckhard, on the other hand, states that "an organizational develop-
ment program involves a systematic diagnosis of the organization, the
development of a strategic plan for improvement, and the mobilization of
resources to carry out the effort."55 Even though the definitions of
organizational development differ from author to author, there is gen-
eral agreement that organizational development includes management
developmental efforts.56
Since management development is in essence educational strategy,
there is an almost essential necessity for the presence of some type
of change agent in the form of a consultant, trainer, or teacher. The
change agent for the most part is external to the organization or

57

client system. Whatever the role of the change agent is, his primary
function is to facilitate the improvement of the organization through
various techniques and strategies of intervention. The trend toward
organizational development as the focal point for management develop-
ment programs is exemplified by the fact that those who were at one
time in positions of management development have now moved into

58

organizational development roles.

 

5“Warren G. Bennis, Organizational Development: Its Nature,
Origin, and Prospects (Reading: Addison-Wesley, I969), p. 2.

56
58

SSBeckhard, p. 2. Ibid., p. A9.

57

Bennis, pp. Il-IZ. Beckhard, p. 2].

29

One of the first management development strategies which has
found its way into the organizational setting is a modified version
of the Basic T-group. This modification is in the form of what is now
described as the Variant T-group. The Variant T-group is essentially
the same in purpose and goals as the Basic T-group with the exception
that the participants are composed of individuals who normally work

59

together. This form of T-group is often called a ”core group,”
”action group,” or ”family group."60 Another form of the Variant
T-group is the ”Cousin” T-group. This type is composed of partici-
pants who work for the same organization, but do not necessarily work
with each other.6l The ”family” T-group is most consistent with
organizational development efforts. Winn in his experience with
T-group training at Alcan of Canada indicates that although they had
used the basic stranger and cousin T-groups they were not as successful
as had been hoped. They turned then to the organizational T-group
which ”establishes a form of reference for working through and man-
aging conflict."62

Even though the essential idea is that the T-group has now
been placed in the organizational setting to effect behavioral and
attitudinal change with respect to members of that organization, there
is still much controversy with respect to its effectiveness and the

advisability of using this type of training vehicle. At least one

author has serious doubts about the advisability of utilizing T-group

 

59Golembiewski, p. 7A. 6oWinn, p. l6l.

6lQuick, p. 97. 62Winn, p. 56.

30

training either for the individual or in an organizational setting
since it is a powerful method to change attitudes and behaviors. He
suggests:

At present it is virtually impossible to predict the con-
sequences of T-group training for any individual or organiza-
tion. The limited evidence concerning the conditions required
for effective use of T-groups prompts us to recommend that
this be used only for experimental methods conducted under
conditions permitting useful observation of the emotional
responses of participants. 3

In many organizations the family T-group has given way to

organizational training laboratories which differ from the T-group in
terms of their goals. Maugham and Cooper describe the purpose of

organizational training laboratories as being:

A. To identify problems facing the work group system and
the reasons for their existence.

8. To invent possible solutions to the problems in the form
of needed system changes. ‘

C. To plan implementation of these solutions through regular
and newly constructed channels.

The organizational T-group represents a move away from the
strict human and interpersonal relations training of the T-group setting
to a more problem centered goal directed training group. As Winn puts
it, "the laboratory approach places the stress on assembling competen-
cies necessary to do the job, on team management and on problem

solving."65

 

63House, p. 7l.

6“Maugham and Cooper, p. 67.

65um, p. 163.

3]

It is not difficult to infer from the material relating to the
use of family T-groups and organizational training laboratories that
one of the obvious goals is to develop a team approach to organiza-
tional development. In the case of the family T-group, the goal is
to develop a management team which will be able to relate effectively
to each other and to the organization as a whole. The organizational
training laboratory is much like the T-group program with the exception
of the fact that it leads to team building for the purpose of
accomplishing some specific organizational goal. However, there are
those who are involved in organizational and management deveIOpment who
feel that team building should be centered around the accomplishment
of organizational tasks.66

Team building as a management development strategy often takes
place in work groups or task force settings in organizations. The
purpose is to improve the effectiveness and ability of the group to
diagnose and analyze their problems, develop decision making ability,
and implement strategies of organizational change.67

An effective management team as defined by one author includes
a number of features such as:

(l) understanding, mutual agreement and identification

regarding the goals of the group; (2) open communication;
(3) mutual trust; (A) mutual support; (5) effective manage-
ment of conflict; (6) developing a selective and appropriate

use of the team concept; (7) utilizing appropriate member
skills and (8) developing appropriate leadership.

 

66 67

Alban and Politt, p. 33. Ibid., pp. 38-AO.

8Bennis, p. 2.

32

The use of task forces in organizations has become a major tool
for team building and organizational development. Some innovative
theorists in organizational development feel that the task force con-
cept could be the key to organizations of the future. Such organiza-
tional structure would not be hierarchical in nature but would be
composed of task forces of individuals with a wide range of skill.69
The major bonus of using task forces in organizational change efforts
is that it becomes an effective tool for management development.70

With few exceptions, organizational deveIOpment efforts entail
the use of a change agent. The role of the change agent may vary
from trainer to traditional consultant.

The oldest form of organizational deveIOpment efforts were
centered around a change agent role which is of the traditional con-
sultant model. These change efforts are typically referred to in
terms such as organizational survey or management studies. In these
change programs the consultant was invited by the organization to
conduct a study and make recommendations for organizational improve-
ment.

In the literature the relationship between the client organiza-

tion and the consultant is often compared to a doctor-patient relation-

ship.7l In this analogy the client organization asks the consultant

 

69Quick, p. AO. 7°Ibid., p. 58.

7Warren G. Bennis, “Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral
Science to Planned Organizational Change,” Planning of Change, eds.
Warren G. Dennis and others (New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston,

Inc., I969), p. 7I.

33

to come to the organization, diagnose its problem(s) and recommend
solutions which will cure the organization of its ills. Too often,
however, the recommended solutions are based on inadequate supply of
information. The executives or managers often do not themselves know
what is ailing the organization and cannot describe the symptoms the
organization is experiencing. Since organizations are often as complex
in social systems as the body is in physiological systems, diagnosis
is virtually impossible if the patient cannot at least approximate a
statement of symptoms. The analogy also goes awry when one considers
that it is seldom an organization dies if it does not take the medi-
cine prescribed by the consultant. It may become less effective if
it does not, but its immediate demise is unlikely except where cost-
effectiveness is critical. Tilles concludes that ”unlike the patient
who consults a physician, the executive asking for outside advice
cannot absolve himself from the responsibility for diagnosis."72 He
goes on to observe that ”the client organization if it needs help can
only help itself."73
Process consultation has emerged as a new strategy for
organizational deveIOpment which significantly alters the traditional
client-consultant relationship. The fundamental principle is to help

the organization and its managers to help themselves in diagnosis of

their problems, deVelopment of alternative solutions and implementation

 

72Seymour Tilles, “Understanding the Consultants Role,”
Harvard Business Review, March-April, l96l, p. 92.

73Ibid.

3A

of change programs. Process consultation draws on much of the experi-
ence with and capitalizes on the benefits of organizational labora-
tories, team building efforts and task force approaches to
organizational development.

Schein defines process consultation as "a set of activities on
the part of the consultant which help the client perceive, understand
and act upon process events which occur within the client system.”7h
He further contends that ”improvement in organizational effectiveness
will occur through effective problem finding in the human process area,
which in turn will depend on the ability of the managers to learn
diagnostic skills."75

By its very definition, process consultation is an educational
strategy which bears directly upon management development. Process
consultation encompasses management deveIOpment efforts such as team
building and the improvement of interpersonal and intergroup relations.
.As with many other modern organizational development strategies,
process consultation uses the group as its vehicle and often this
group is in the form of management task forces. It centers around
the group problem solving process of decision making and therefore is

76

consistent with the concept of management by participation.

 

7“Edgar H. Schein, Process Consultation: Its Role in Organiza-
tional Development (Reading: Addison-Wesley, I969), p. 9.

75Ibid.

76Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore, pp. I-l9.

35

The brief review here of managerial and organizational develop-
ment techniques indicates that business and industry have developed
quite a ”bag of tricks.” Often an organization will select a particular
technique such as T-group training and use it exclusively only to
find out that when T-group training is used in a vacuum from other
types of prOgrams it does not achieve its maximum benefit. It is
therefore not surprising that most experts in the field are looking
toward an eclectic or organic approach to the organizational and man-
agement development programs wherein all or several of the above
techniques are instituted.

Reddin discusses such a technique in his description of “3-0

"77

Organizational Effectiveness Program. He suggests the use of a

managerial style seminar as a technique to unfreeze the organization

78 The eight other stages of

and increase the potential for change.

his program include such techniques as team building seminars, objec-

tive setting conferences, as well as training in interpersonal and

. . . 79

intergroup communications.
Blake and Mouton describe the Managerial Grid concept of

organizational development which is aimed at the development of team

management. It incorporates off-site training laboratories which

accomplish the unfreezing objective. These are used in conjunction

 

77W. J. Reddin, “The 3-D Organizational Effectiveness Pro-
gram,” Training and Development Journal, March, I968, p. 22.

78

 

Ibid., p. 23.

79Ibid., pp. 23-28.

36

with family T-group training and goal setting workshop conferences with
the manager.80

Davis describes an organic problem solving method which is
being used in a corporation called TRW Systems. This is a total
organizational program aimed at increasing the total effectiveness of
the managers as well as the company. It is also aimed at team develop-
ment utilizing a range of programs from stranger T-groups to the use
of external change agents in the form of process consultants.

It would appear then that business and industry has had a long
and varied experience with a wide range of management development
techniques. The conclusion can be drawn that often the most effective
program is one in which there is a synthesis of a few or several tech-
niques. Also the bulk of the literature indicates that the management
development process loses effectiveness if it is not an integral part
of a total organizational deveIOpment program. With these perspectives
in mind, the state of the art with respect to organizational and man-

agement development in law enforcement can be examined and some

comparisons made.

 

80Bennis, “Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to
Planned Organizational Change,” pp. 7l-72.

8lSheldon Davis, “An Organic Problem Solving Method of Organiza-
tional Change,” Planning of Change, eds. Warren G. Bennis and others
(New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, I969), pp. 357-70.

 

37

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
EFFORTS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Unlike the available literature in business and industry, that
which addresses organizational and management development in law
enforcement is not voluminous. Therefore, rather than limiting the
scope of the review only to those organizational development efforts
which are directly related to management development, it will be
necessary to draw from some organizational development efforts with
broader applications.

Law enforcement management training and development has been
largely a process of acquiring management skills by coming up through
the ranks. The fallacy of this is obvious. It has been pointed out
by numerous authors that management skills are not inherited simply

by attaining rank.82 The President's Commission in its Task Force

 

Report¢ The Police comments, ”an officer is not qualified to administer
the complex affairs of a large department or to supervise the perform-
ance of others simply on the strength of police experience acquired in
subordinate positions."83 As Newman and Price point out,
The task structure of the police organization does not
prepare one to be a police executive. This is not a new
observation, but it is important enough to bear restatement,

if we are going to commit manpower and money to a highly
specific involvement in police executive education.8

 

82Allen 2. Gammage, Police Training in the United States
(Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, I963), p. l56.

83President's Commission, p. IAO.

l'Charles L. Newman and Barbara R. Price, "Police Executive
Development: An Educational Program at Pennsylvania State University,”
The Police Chief, April, I97A, p. 7A.

 

38

Initial efforts at providing management training can be attribu-
ted to such organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of
Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Southern Police
Institute, and Northwestern Traffic Institute. One can easily draw
some comparisons between the early efforts in management devel0pment
by business and industry at the university and college level with pro-
grams offered by the above organizations. Each of the above programs
bears a marked similarity in terms of methodology to the college and
university programs discussed earlier in this chapter. For example,
the Northwestern Institute offers a nine month management course, the
National Academy program offered by the FBI is four months in length
and the Southern Police Institute offers courses from two to five weeks
in length.85 This compares to the early history of management deveIOp-
ment in business and industry where the college and university programs
which were offered varied in length from two to three weeks to several
months. In addition, Kenny points out that there is a current trend
for management and executive development courses to be offered by
colleges and universities.

These programs do, however, suffer from the same problems of
similar type courses in business and industry. The demand for such
courses significantly outstrips the ability of these institutions and

organizations to provide programs which will have a significant impact

 

85Carl B. Saunders, Upgrading the American Police (Washington:
The Brookings Institute, I970), pp. AI-A3.

39

86

on the number of managers in law enforcement agencies today. In
addition Saunders notes that there may be some skepticism when looking
at the course content of these programs. For example, the National
Academy which is designed for middle and upper management personnel
has only I92 of the four months devoted to active management train-
ing.87
With the recent advent of state law enforcement training com-
missions, there has been developed a new delivery system for law
enforcement management training. By I972, 63% to 68% of the states
having law enforcement training commissions offered management train-
ing varying in length from 30 hours to l20 hours.88 An examination
of a sample of these state programs conducted by Nash reveals that
they are almost exclusively of the seminar type. He noted that there
was a trend away from the lecture discussion format of training in
these programs with an increased utilization of role playing and case
study.89 The reason for the use of the seminar format is, however,

logical. It provides a cost effective method of training with a

limited amount of instructional resources. There are far more people,

 

86ibid., p. 72. 87

Ibid., p. 73.

8Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council, Law
Enforcement Trainipgpin the United States: A Survey of State Law
Enforcement Training Commissions (Lansing: Michigan State Police,

T572). PP- 8'10-

89William C. Nash, ”A Proposed Curriculum for Police Manage-
ment Training in the State of Michigan” (unpublished graduate research
paper, Michigan State University, I972), p. A8.

 

A0

for example, who are trained in the lecture/discussion method than
those who have expertise in sensitivity training.

There is some indication that sensitivity or T-groups types
of management training programs are being tried on a limited basis in
law enforcement. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department has
experimented with a method similar to the organizational T-group.9o
There is no extensive reporting of the utilization of this technique
for law enforcement management development. It has received wider
acceptance in law enforcement with respect to the training of those
officers who serve in police-community relations functions.91

It would appear from the scarce material related to law
enforcement management deveIOpment that the vast majority of such
efforts lies in training programs which with a few exceptions are
external to the organizational environment. These programs are pri-
marily of the seminar or classroom type which are aimed at providing
the manager with knowledge and skills which are supposed to make the
managers more effective. The concern over the question of the trans-
fer of skills and attitudes from the training environment to the
organization in these programs is of vital importance. It has been
recognized that there is serious doubt regarding the impact of such

programs when the participant returns to the organizational environ-

ment:

 

90John P. Kenney, Police Administration (Springfield: Charles
C. Thomas, I972), p. 22].

9lDonald Bernstein, ”Sensitivity Training and the Police,”
Police, May-June, I960, pp. 77-79.

Al

Impact varies widely, but a general observation must be
that the current police administration environment generally
mitigates against change . . . . A re-evaluation of current
executive development and middle management programs is in
order.92

Only the largest law enforcement agencies can afford to support
a management training program which is internal to the organization.
The costs for such a program are prohibitive to medium and small
sized departments. At the present time they must rely on the available
programs offered by state and federal agencies as well as colleges
and universities.

Reports of organizational development efforts with management
training components in law enforcement agencies are to the author's
knowledge almost nonexistent. One of the few programs is one currently
underway in Dayton, Ohio, which is being conducted through the Dayton-
Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center. This is an effort to
train command officers in management by objectives and is unique in
the sense that it combines training seminars with the organizational
development process to implement management by objectives in the
organization. The program was designed by the Battelle Center for
Improved Education. Their consultants are working with management
personnel of the Dayton Police Department to develop organizational
and unit objectives. At the same time seminars are being provided to

develop the skills related to management by objectives. The Police

Department is responsible for carrying out the redesign process while

 

92John P. Kenney, Police Administration (Springfield: Charles
C. Thomas, I972), p. 22l.

A2

Battelle plays a re-educative role. The project is designed so that
the system will eventually be self-sustaining.93

Since the advent of the Omnibus Crime Control Act there has
been some interest among law enforcement agencies in organizational
deveIOpment. These have been generally aimed at attempts to increase
line level and operational performance. In some cases, they have
involved complex methods of crime pattern analysis, response time, and
allocation of resources. There is little indication that complex
organizational development programs have been undertaken that are
geared to a management or personnel deveIOpment program.

One exception is the current Patrol Projects Task Force Pro-
gram at the Kansas City Police Department. It is aimed primarily at
increasing Operational effectiveness. The project design involves the
personnel of the department in the development process. Although not
consciously a personnel development program, the very nature of the
process which is being used has a bonus effect on such development.

The program is funded by the Ford Foundation as an attempt to
improve patrol operations in the department. The task force process
is the vehicle which is being utilized to improve the organization's
operational effectiveness.

In this case, the task force membership is comprised primarily

of patrol personnel which include the commanding officer of a division,

 

93Dayton-Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center and
Battelle Center for Improved Education, “Management by Objective: Plan
to Increase the Effectiveness of the Dayton Police Department” (Dayton:
Dayton-Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center, undated), pp. l-3.
(Mimeographed.)

A3

a sergeant, a captain, and five or six patrolmen. Also included is a
member of the staff planning division and a consultant from the Police
Foundation. The task forces analyze critical patrol problems and
present solutions to the Chief.9h Kansas City has had a positive
experience with this arrangement for organizational change. Their
experience, however, with the task forces was not without some diffi-
culty. It was observed that ”police are by nature action oriented.

r.”95

Planning strategy has cast them in a new role altogethe Due to
the action orientation, they found that there was a tendency for the
task force, after identifying a problem, to go out and seek an
immediate solution. It was with respect to this problem that the
Police Foundation personnel acted in the role of process consultants
to slow the process down and “postpone action until adequate problem
analysis, program design, and evaluative planning had been accom-
plished."96 The whole project has had far reaching implications for
management and the decision making process. It has pushed the
decision making process to the lowest possible level. It has been
observed that:

While the task forces were created to design patrol strate-

gies for the department . . . there is set up a model of

organizational change that may have a more sweeping effect on
the department than the patrol experiments themselves.

 

9fiThe Police Foundation, Kansas City Patrol Projects, I973

(Washington: Police Foundation, T973), pp. 5-8.
”Ibid., p. 6. 96Ibid., p. 7.

97ibid., p. 8.

AA

The Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department has recognized the
valuable assets of utilizing the task force approach in the implementa-
tion of a career deveIOpment program in law enforcement agencies.

They fully realize that the implementation of a career development
program in an agency calls for some drastic organizational change.
Such a program would require significant support on the part of the
management of the department. They suggest that:

The strong resistance to change inherent among all

organizations is chiefly attributable to the fact that in

‘traditional hierarchical structures decision makers have

the greatest amount to lose. They of all peogge have the

strongest reasons for keeping the status quo.
The use of task forces not only promotes program accpetance but provides
a coordinated approach to problem solving in the organizational set-
ting.99

A discussion of organizational development efforts in law
enforcement must also include a consideration for the use of consultants
as a strategy. There has been a general increase in the use of con-
sultant services in all public service organizations including law

lOO

enforcement agencies in recent years. Primarily, the traditional

consultant model has prevailed in law enforcement organizations. This

 

98U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, Career Development for Law Enforcement, A Technical
Assistance Publication resulting from research conducted by the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1973). p. ii5.

99ibid., p. ll8.

looJohn A. Martin, ”Selection and Use of Outside Consultants:
Suggested Guidelines for Law Enforcement Executives,” Police, May-
June, I970, p. 25.

A5

model was discussed earlier in the section dealing with consulting
models in business and industry. There is a strong temptation in law
enforcement to rely on the doctor/patient concept of consulting.
Although this is a legitimate organizational development technique
there are some inherent problems. Typically, the organization will
hire a consultant or consulting firm to come in and study the organiza-
tional problems and recommend remedies. In this case the responsi-
bility for the problem definition, data gathering, and development of
solutions is vested in the consultant. There is little or no input
from the management of the organization. It is little wonder that
when a final report is made by the consultants that the probability
of implementation of change is extremely low. The management is most
likely to want to maintain the status quo and can in effect ”cop out”
by using the excuse that the consultants really didn't know what the
problem was and the solutions are impractical. After all, the manage-
ment has had no vested interest in the recommended changes and feels
that change represents nothing more than a threat to their comfortable
status quo. The problem with this type of organizational development
strategy has been recognized by business and is becoming more apparent
to those In the law enforcement field. As Kenney points out:
Although not widespread, a notable improvement is taking

place in approaches to organizational development in police

agencies. Process consultation is replacing the traditional

administrative survey approach in which consultants or con-

sulting firms prepare a prescriptive report for change, more

often than not boiler plated, with limited participation of

agency personnel in deciding their own fate. Process con-

sultation involves the police manager and his personnel and
the consultant in joint diagnosis of agency problems and both

A6

become actively involved in generating the remedies. This
approach assures the departmental personnel of thorough under-
standing of changes which they have agreed should be made.I°I

In summary it would appear that management training in law
enforcement has been primarily of the seminar or classroom type with
little emphasis on the integration of the management development
process into the organizational setting. The few attempts which are
being made to take an integrated approach have occurred in some of the
larger departments. With respect to organizational deveIOpment within
law enforcement, the primary strategy has been the utilization of the
traditional consulting model. There is some indication that the use
of task forces combined with process consultation is being attempted
as an organizational development strategy. There is little to indi-
cate that a conscious effort has been made to make management training
a component of the organizational development process.

The research reported here relates a case study where this in
fact was the approach taken in the organizational development effort.
This program consciously centered on an effort to involve the manage-
ment of a medium sized police department in a training process
integrated with other strategies of organizational development. The
prime vehicle in this process was the task force concept. Initially
the consultant role was that of the process type but throughout the

project it became necessary to rely on a spectrum of organizational

development strategies.

 

lo'Kenney, p. 2l9.

Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

The research reported in the next chapter is a case study of
the implementation of an organizational and management model in a
moderate sized New England city. As previously stated in Chapter I,
the fictitious name of Riverside will be used to preserve confi-
dentiality.

Chapter 2 points out that there is limited published material
in the field of law enforcement on the utilization of organizational

and management development techniques which are currently being applied

in business and industry. Furthermore, the author could locate no

in-depth studies of such management development efforts in law enforce-
ment. This presents a void in research which must be filled if a
model of organizational and management development is to be designed
which will address some of the problems stated in Chapter I.

Therefore the objective of the research conducted and reported

in this study is to explore essentially new territory or at least

unreported territory in the field of management development in law

enforcement. In addition to being exploratory in nature the objective
of the case study is to descriptively analyze one effort in management

development using a model which heretofore is somewhat new.

A7

A8

Since the goal of this thesis is to deveIOp and present a
contiguous model for organizational and management development, it
was essential to conduct an in-depth descriptive case study to fill
the void of material on the subject in the field of law enforcement.

The case study method is best suited for the type of descrip-
tive analysis required here. The primary research technique which
was used is commonly referred to as the participant/observer technique.
In this case, the researcher was integrally involved in the management
development program at the Riverside Police Department. He served as
one of the primary training consultants in the project.

During the project period, the researcher as well as other
members of the Management Training Team were involved in data gather-
ing utilizing questionnaires, interviews and objective observation.
The results of the data gathering will be used in conjunction with the
report of subjective observations to increase the objectivity of the

descriptive analysis.
HISTORY OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

The Executive DeveIOpment Training Project at the Riverside
Police Department was initiated in the same manner as many organiza-
tional study and consulting contracts. The procedure is one in which
the Riverside Criminal Justice Planning Office and the police depart-
ment developed a request for proposals to meet what were perceived as
the needs of the Riverside Police Department with respect to manage-

ment development. The request for a proposal was sent to several

A9

consulting firms and was received by a consulting firm with which the
author is associated.

This request for proposal asked for the development and imple-
mentation of a management training program for the command staff of
the Riverside Police Department. The objectives as stated in the
city's request were (I) to address local problems and provide assistance
for operational and management concerns; (2) to emphasize the implemen-
tation of solutions to problems rather than the study of problems;

(3) to increase the police department's problem solving capabilities
by using internal resources with consulting assistance to make the
department more knowledgeable of current management techniques; (A) to
Inform and expoSe the command staff to the latest technological
developments in the fields of data handling, information systems and
communications; (5) to increase communication flow among all levels

of the department to more effectively utilize department resources;
(6) to expose the department to the latest techniques in personnel
management and supervision.

The request listed five areas which were perceived to be major
problems within the department. They were (I) planning and research,
which included resource allocation; (2) training, both recruit and
in-service; (3) police recruitment; (A) records; and (5) promotion
assignment procedures.

As is generally the case with such requests for proposals,
the Information about the department and exact goals tended to be

somewhat sketchy. However, this request was interpreted as an appeal

50

for an organizational development program with particular emphasis on
a management training component.

In responding to this request for a proposal the consulting
firm with which the researcher is associated took into consideration
the disadvantages of a traditional approach to such a request. The
idea of providing a traditional, lecture-discussion group training
program was rejected. Also rejected was the total reliance on the
traditional model of consulting as a strategy for organizational
development. The resulting model which was proposed to the City of
Riverside was one which was of an eclectic nature. This model was
designed to rely heavily upon the command staff members of the River-
side Police Department as the initiators of organizational change.

The model relied heavily upon the task force concept of organizational
development with the consultants serving in a process consultation
type of role as facilitators and instructors to provide the department

with guided self-initiated change through the task force arrangement.
PROPOSED MODEL FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

It was proposed that the students or command staff members
would serve on task forces designed to attack organizational problems.
In the original model and proposal it was suggested that the task
forces would be divided on the basis of the five major problem cate-
gories which were delineated in the request for proposal. In other
words, there would be five task forces composed of command staff

members which would address the problems of (l) planning and research;

5l

(2) training; (3) police recruitment; (A) records; (5) promotion and
assignment procedures.

The model provided for the consultants to act in both the
traditional and process consultation roles. In terms of the tradi-
tional role the consultants would do some organizational study and
surveys which would then be provided to the task force for informa-
tion and decision making purposes. When necessary the consultants
would also act as technical advisers in areas in which the command
staff had limited expertise.

The command staff members would participate in all stages of
problem solving and would play a significant role in the decisions
relating to the implementation of management and change models within
the organization. The departmental personnel would set their own pace
of development.

Procedurally the command staff would divide into the five major
task forces for purposes of problem definition. They would conduct
analysis of data with the assistance of the consultants and develop
proposals for implementation of programs to resolve the defined prob-
lems. Each of the proposals coming out of a task force would be
reported to all of the task forces to be reviewed and then submitted
to the Chief for his approval and ultimately to the Board of Police
Commissioners. As originally designed, all members of the command
staff would be required to take part in the development program
including the Chief of Police.

Essentially, then, the model was designed in order that

(l) problem areas within the organization would be identified by those

52

individuals working within it; (2) objectives for the project would be
set through the consensus of the task forces and it could be deter-
mined which objectives were both reasonable and obtainable for the
individuals involved; (3) solutions to organizational problems would
have the consensus and therefore the backing of those who would be in
charge of implementation and those who would have to experience the
effects of change; (A) a viable process would have been set up to
allow for a continuing re-examination of objectives, goals and problems
long after the initial project ended; (5) implementation would be more
successful if the above elements were present.

The model was designed so that each task force would have a
consultant who would act in the role of facilitator and trainer, with
emphasis on developing the problem solving capabilities of the members
of each task force. When necessary the consultant would provide addi-
tional technical expertise in order to broaden the total resource scope

of the task force.

THE MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT TRAINING TEAM

Throughout this report reference will be made to individuals
who participated in the Management Development Program at the Riverside
Police Department. These individuals will be referred to separately
and at times collectively as the Management Development Team.

The primary members of the Team consisted of the Director,

Mr. John Conley, who currently serves as Chairman of the Criminal
Justice Studies Program, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma;

Mr. John Gilson, Director of the Dayton Montgomery County Criminal

53

Justice Training Center in Dayton, Ohio; and the author who currently‘
serves as Supervisor of Program Planning for the Michigan Law Enforce-
ment Officers Training Council.

In addition to the primary training team, two individuals
served as technical advisors. Mr. James T. Barbe, Corrections Coordina-
tor, Dayton Montgomery County Criminal Justice Center, served in a
technical capacity and conducted a task analysis which was utilized
to develop position descriptions for the various supervisory and man-
agement levels in the Riverside Police Department. Mr. Kenneth
Christian, Instructor, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State
University, provided technical assistance in the initial phases of
the project and during the model development stage.

In view of the total team nature of this development program
special acknowledgment must be given to all of the above individuals
in terms of their contribution of data which is reported in this
study and utilized in the model development presented in the final
chapter. Where possible the researcher will indicate the team member
other than himself who was responsible for the development of data
presented in this report. It is impossible to acknowledge all of the
specific contributions which each team member made; therefore, the
researcher cannot and will not take full credit for the data gather-
ing, analysis and presentation reflected in the case study report.

Due to the complex nature of the project and the overlapping roles of
the team members a full acknowledgment of the equal contributions made
by each team member in the gathering, analysis and presentation of

data must be made perfectly clear.

5A
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY GROUP

Socio-Economic Setting

The city of Riverside is a moderately sized New England town
with an approximate population of 96,000 and covers approximately 36
square miles. The city has experienced a trend of depressing economy
since shortly after World War II due to the decline of its major
industry which was the manufacture of textiles. The city has a pri-
marily white population with two major ethnic groups consisting of
Portuguese and Irish. The integration of the ethnic groups has
been almost complete with respect to work, school and family groups.
The population of the city has been in steady decline until the
last decade when it began leveling off at the current pOpulation

figure.

The Political Environment

Riverside has a strong mayor-city council form of government,
both of which are elected. However, the New England philosophy of
the town meetings still prevails. This results in every citizen's
feeling as though he must take an active part in the political process.
Politics play an important role in the lives of the citizens and,
as will be pointed out, the police department is no exception.

The Mayor of Riverside appoints a three man Board of Police
Commissioners who serve as the mayor's administrative arm with respect
to the police department. The police commissioners are citizens who
perform this function without remuneration. The commissioners are

generally political allies of the mayor and their terms run concurrent

55

with his. The mayor designates one of the three commissioners to be
chairman and the chairman is virtually the primary decision maker.

At the time the project began, the commission consisted of a
sausage factory owner, an amusement park owner, and the director of the
local Criminal Justice Planning Office who served as the chairman.
However, shortly after theproject began this chairman resigned and he
was replaced by a florist shop owner. It is interesting to note that
before the mayor was elected to his current position he owned a
funeral home. Although the connection may be coincidental, it is
curious in light of the relationship which exists between the funeral
and florist businesses.

With the exception of the period of time when the Director of
the Criminal Justice Planning Office was the chairman, there have been
few people serving as commissioners who have had any law enforcement
administration background. In addition, few have had background in
conducting the affairs of an organization consisting of approximately
350 employees and a budget of three and a half million dollars.

Had the board been merely a citizen group to monitor the gen-
eral welfare of the department or set broad policies, this type of
representation would not have been serious. However, the Board, and
in particular the chairman, become involved in the day-to-day opera-
tion of the department and often made unilateral decisions affecting
the total organization. Because of their political allegiance to the
mayor the board in effect has little or no influence over his decision

making. However, they have total power over the operation of the

56

police department. Therefore they are quick to execute any adminis-
trative or operational decisions which the mayor chooses to make.

An interesting paradox unfolds when the operation of the Board
of Police is analyzed in context with the role of the civil service
system. The employees of the Riverside Police Department belong to a
statewide civil service system which develops tests for the various
positions in the police department, administers these tests and pro-
vides a roster of eligible candidates either for hiring or for promo-
tion. The civil service protection given to the Chief is designed
to isolate the department from political pressures. However, since
the chief is not really the administrative head of the department but
rather the Board of Police is, there resultsaicircumventing of all of

the logic for civil service protection.

Crime Pattern

The crime pattern in the city of Riverside followed the
national trend of a steady rise until I973. During I973, the crime
rate dropped 29%. The reason for this sudden drop is difficult to
isolate. There was no significant change in the operational procedure
of the department with a correSponding increase in effectiveness.
There were, however, some major changesauuiinnovations in other facets
of the criminal justice system which in all likelihood contributed to
this decrease. In considering a major drOp in the category of breaking
and entering some preliminary observations can be made.

Until I972, the prosecution of offenders was the responsibility

of the police department. This meant that police officers were

57

responsible for the role of prosecuting attorney. Recently, however,
federal funds were secured to pay for a prosectuing attorney with a law
degree. During I972 and I973 major convictions were obtained against
several of the city's professional burglars. This resulted in their
imprisonment.

A second major change which occurred was the institution of a
Community Service Officers Program. The primary function of the pro-
gram was to provide security for the low income housing projects. This
program was instituted by the Criminal Justice Planning Office utilizing
federal funds. Although the C50 program was formally attached to the
police department, it essentially operated as a separate organiza-
tional entity. The director of the project took his guidance from the
director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office as opposed to the
Chief of Police. An independent evaluation of the C80 program which
was conducted indicated that it had substantially impacted on the

crime pattern in the housing projects.

Organizational Setting

The personnel complement of the Riverside Police Department
during the project was approximately 3A9. Table l reflects the compo-
sition in terms of sex and sworn status.

A total of 29% of the police department is in the non-sworn
category while 7l% are sworn personnel. Table 2 reflects the manpower
distribution at the halfway point of the project (during the project

there were major reorganizations which shifted some of the categories).

Table l

Composition of Department by Status

58

 

 

Category Number Percentage
Male sworn 2A6 70.5
Female sworn 2 0.6
Male non-sworn 6O I7.2
Female non-sworn __Al__ _JJ;JL_
Totals 3A9 IOO%

 

Table 2

Distribution of Sworn Personnel by Rank

 

Deputy Lieuten-

 

Chief Chief Captains ants Sergeants Patrolmen
Number I 2 A l2 27 202
2 °' 0 AR 0 8% l 6% A 8% IO 9% 81 5%
Force . . . . . .

 

project was initiated.

Those modifications will be discussed in deeper detail.

Figure l reflects the formal organizational structure when the

During the project this was modified twice.

An important consideration with respect to the organizational

setting of the project was the absence of the police chief during the

entire project.

He was seriously ill and underwent surgery during the

project; for short periods of time the chief would return to work for

59

muz<zmhz_<x
4<zu.m

   
  

w >hmm<m

achaummomm >hxmaomm

w 4_<w

hmzou

 

mmu_>mwm
uu<hm

zo_h<u.z:zzou
. . mm _>¢mm
w oz_zz<4¢ uu<hm

 

 

 

oz_z_<xh

moxoumm

  

.. .
um_:u >h3mmo

   

zo_h<o
i_u_Hzmo_

mzo_p<sm¢
u_emmzoa

m4_zm>:w

       

    

  

oz<zzou
:hsom

    
    

oz<zzou
:Hmoz

  

 

 

 

zo_H<w_hmm>z_
4<z_z.xu

—

zo_m_>_o
rack—z:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

xom_>o< zo_kuwm
4<um4 m>_h<mhm_z_zo 4<zmmhz_ mu_>
— — mu_gom — Illlh
no um_:u
mu_4om
no ox<om
ucoEuLmaoo ou__0m Ov_mco>_¢ mo ucmzu _mco_umn_cmmco .— chum—u

60

a few hours a day. This placed a strain on the organization decision
making capability and significantly influenced the impact of the
project, since he was unable to participate in some of the critical
decision making points. Although the acting chief could have, and
was empowered to make decisions, he often failed to do so due to his
tenuous position.

The union to which the members of the department belonged is
one which is somewhat prevalent in the East and New England area. In
terms of the labor contract all members of the department belong to
the same union and the contract covered everyone with the exception of
those in the roles of Deputy Chief, and Chief of Police. This in
essence meant that the city and the police department allowed a
situation to develop where the contract, in ackafacto sense, drew
the line between management and labor at the Deputy Chief level. This
type of contract reinforced the non-management and supervisory status
roles of those who were at the rank of sergeant through captain. This
institutionalized reinforcement and the failure of the city to perceive
those in such positions in a management role significantly impacted on

the management training process.

Organizational Change Histony

The management development program was not the first experience
which the Riverside Police Department has had with organizational
change. In I967, a traditional management study was done by a reputable
consulting firm. At the time the study began, the department was

Operating from two substations geographically located in the city with

6l

respect to population density. As was the trend during the 605, this
firm recommended consolidation of the substations into the main police
building, the theory being that it would increase efficiency and
reduce duplication, particularly of staff support efforts. This
report included all of the necessary systems to support such a con-
solidation. Unfortunately, the city adopted only those portions of
the report which would result in a savings to the city. As a result,
recommendations of the report were adopted piecemeal.

The city recognized the money saving benefit of closing two
substations and placing the entire force in the main police station,
which had been constructed in l9l6. They failed, however, to adopt
the recommendations of the study which called for renovation of the
building to be consistent with the consolidation.

The closing of the substations dealt a severe blow to the
morale of the department. The district commanders interpreted the
move as an attempt to undermine their position. Many other members
of the command staff felt that the consolidation impaired their
ability to maintain good relationships with the community.

The experience of having change thrust upon an organization
by an external change process is often demoralizing and seldom
results in increased effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, it
creates a climate which mitigates against any further change efforts.

Due to the social and ethnic composiion of Riverside, the
city and the department did not experience the change demanding events
which occurred in cities of similar size during the l960s. There were

no racial confrontations, political upheaveals or student demonstrations

62

which would have forced the department to adapt to the nationally
changing social environment. At this time other cities of similar
size began to seek fiscal and other resources which were most immedi-
ately available through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

This did not occur in Riverside until recently, when a local
Criminal Justice Planning Office was established in Riverside. Until
this time few federal resources were channeled into the Riverside
Police Department.

The first Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office also
served as the Chairman of the Board of Police. He began using federal
monies to implement change programs within the police department.
However, these change programs were for the most part conceived by
his staff and imposed on the department with little or no consensus
from the members of the department as to their effect on the total
Organization. As a result, the programs were tolerated rather than
welcomed.

Two examples of such programs were the Community Service
Officer program and the funding of two positions for civilian planning
and research personnel for the department.

The Community Service Officer Program was previously discussed
with respect to its impact on the crime pattern. Also pointed out
was the fact that it Operated as an organizational entity within the
police department. This program was never accepted by the members of
the department, and most of the command staff did not consider it as
part of the department. The Director of the project was a civilian

paid at the captain's level. However, he did not report to the Deputy

63

or Chief of Police; he reported directly to the Director of the
Criminal Justice Planning Office, In addition, he was never considered
formally or informally as a member of the staff and never participated
in staff meetings. To make matters worse, the federal money available
for this project provided him with new office equipment and a private
office, neither of which were privileges of the other captains, the
total effect being an almost total rejection of the program by the
department.

Just prior to the beginning of the management development pro-
gram, federal funds were used to hire two civilian personnel to serve
as planners in the department. As with the C50 program, the depart-
ment had little or no involvement in the decision to institute a
civilian planning and research unit. A prior planning and research
unit existed in the department which was manned by a uniform patrolman.
The unit ceased existence with the retirement of the incumbent. The
hiring of two civilians at a higher pay level was an affront to the
sworn personnel of the department. According to one of the civilian
planners, their introduction to the command staff occurred at a staff
meeting which was called by the Chief. Present at the meeting was
the Chief, his deputy and two captains. This was the total effort on
the part of the Chief to initiate the planning and research unit.

The organization's total experience with respect to recent
change was almost exclusively negative. It is little wonder that the
management development program was received with somewhat less than

enthusiastic optimism.

Chapter A

MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE RIVERSIDE

POLICE DEPARTMENT: A CASE STUDY
FORMAT OF CHAPTER

Due to the case study nature of the research reported here,
a brief description of the format of this chapter is in order.

The first section of the chapter will discuss the type of
climate which is generally believed to be necessary for oganizational
and management development to occur. This section is important since
it sets the stage for comparison of the actual climate which did
exist.

The next section will deal with the data gathering activities
which occurred prior to the beginning of the project. This data
regarding the organization and command staff was used in determining
the initial direction oftfimaprogram. Included in this section will
be a presentation of the data which was used to profile the command
staff of the police department who were the target group of the
project. Also presented in this section will be the data which was
gathered in an attempt to determine the problem areas which were per-
ceived by the command staff. This data was fed back to the commanders
at the beginning of the program and will be referred to in the

remainder of the study.

6A

65

The third section outlines the initial project orientation
sessions and some general observations made by the Training Team of
the command staff.

The remaining sections represent a series of delineations of
critical points during the project. Since the complex events which
occur in an organization cannot be divided into discrete time frames
there may occur some overlap in terms of actual time. Therefore, the
sections should not be considered finite points but rather general
perimeters for purposes of logical presentation. Presented in these
sections will be the implementation of the original developmental
model, and the subsequent three modifications of the model. Each of
the modifications was precipitated by some external or internal event
which altered one of the components of the program.

The first modification resulted in a change in the composition
of the task forces. .The second resulted in a change in the roles of
the Training Team and the command staff. The final modification
resulted in a change in the arrangement iyf the task forces. When
discussing each of the modifications, the critical events surrounding
the modification will be discussed. Also presented will be an analysis
of the events as they affected the total project.

As previously mentioned, the researcher was assigned to work
primarily with the Operations Task Force. Therefore, the majority of
the data with respect to task force operations and activities will be
drawn from the researcher's experience with this task force. Refer-

ences and data with respect to the operations of the other task forces

66

and training team members will be used to supplement when it will aid
in presenting an overall picture.
INTRODUCTION: A CLIMATE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

Various authors and authorities in the field of organizational
and management development have discussed some of the requirements
which are essential to the success of such programs. At this point it
might be well to discuss a few of those requirements for success since
the Training Team had every reason to believe that these requirements
existed.

Bennis suggests that no organizational development strategy or
method can be successful without the existence of the following basic
conditions:

(I) Members of the client organization desire change;

(2) key decision makers mustlegitimizethe planned change
through their involvement in and their active support of the
development process; (3) a general consensus of the direction
of change must exist among all levels of the client's power
structure; (A) a change agent(s) must be present in the
leadership structure. 02
Another author suggests that no management development effort can
succeed unless top management meets two fundamental requirements:
”Active participation in the establishment of the development program
and acceptance of the responsibility for providing an environment

conducive to development.“03

 

lozBennis, Organizational Develppment. PP- hh'h7'

'03House, p. 60.

67

Other authors stress the importance of a favorable organiza-
tional climate for management development to occur. There must exist
a climate in which managers who participate in decision making do so
in a climate in which they are confident of fair treatment and they
will not be subjected to arbitrary injustice or capricious judgment
by the superiors.]04 There must also be an absence of political
maneuvering for position with penalities for unfair personal competi-
tion and petty conSpiracy. In addition, there cannot exist a system
where preferential treatment is based on grounds other than approval
of performance, such as blood relationships, friendship, ethnic,
educational or social background.105

The Training Team had every reason to believe that a positive
climate existed for an innovative organizational development and
management training program within the Riverside Police Department.

The Chairman of the Board of Police (who was also the Director of
Criminal Justice Planning Office) assured us that the key decision
makers including himself were anxious to see the successful implementa-
tion of this program. Speaking for the police department and the
administration of the city, he claimed that the department personnel
wanted change and to improve the organization and their management

capabilities. These apparent conditions combined with the potential

of the chairman/director who qualified as a change agent in a

 

lolI'T. J. Roberts, Developing Effective Managers (London:
Institute of Personnel Management, I967), p. 60.

losAndrews, The Effectiveness of University Management
Development Programs, p. 2A7.

68

leadership position made the prOSpects of successful implementation

very positive.
PRELIMINARY DATA GATHERING AND PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Since the Training Team knew little about the actual background
of the members of the command staff, it was necessary to secure this
information before proceeding with the project. In addition, several
months had passed since the request for a proposal had been received
by the Training Team which outlined previewed organizational problem
areas. The team was aware that at least one major change had taken
place, the hiring of a civilian planning unit, which could have
affected those problem areas. Finally, it would be necessary to
compare the perceptions of the command staff with the actual opera-
tions of the organization. To accomplish these objectives, the
Training Team utilized questionnaires, interviews and observations to
gather this data. The answers to these questions gave the Training
Team a better understanding of what the general staff perceived as
problems and also allowed the team to compare the new data to the
original problem definitions listed in the Request for Proposal.

Each member of the command staff (forty-four) from sergeant
through chief received a questionnaire, which was coded, along with a
stamped self-addressed envelope. The envelope had the out-of-state
addreSs of the Project Director on its face. As a result, the respond-
ent could fill out the questionnaire, insert it into the envelope, and

deposit it in a U.S. mail box for delivery to the Director's home,

69

l,OOO miles away. Forty responses were received out of the forty-
four questionnaires issued.

In order to provide the group with a degree of perspective
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the organization, the team
gathered information from the patrolmen. In April a team member
attended four separate roll calls and asked the patrolmen to write the
three strongest and three weakest points about the organization. These
cards were collected immediately by the consultant. The team tabulated
the responses and presented the data to the command staff for compari-

son. Fifty patrolmen responded to the questions.

Questionnaires

Because the Management Development Program had been initiated
to improve the administrative and decision making capabilities of the
total command staff, the consultants felt it necessary to gather back-
ground data on the personnel involved. The data gathered included
the amount and type of police experience, level of formal education
and the amount of prior management training. Added to these categories
were questions relating to organizational problems.

The questionnaire, a sixteen-page document, was designed to
acquire data on the individual's professional educational, and
experiential background (see Appendix). Through this document the
Training Team gleaned such information as the type and length of
service, educational level, training experience by type of course,

and other data.

7O

Attached to the background document were four open-ended
questions which dealt with the strengths and weaknesses of the organiza-
tion. The questions were asked in the following order:

I. What are the major strengths of the organization?

2. What are the major weaknesses of the organization?

3. What do you personally feel you can do to improve
the organization?

A. What action would you like to see taken to improve
management of the organization?

Interviews

The Program Director, John Conley, met with each member of the
command staff to explain the use of the questionnaires, answer ques-
tions, and give instructions. During these interviews it was learned
that the command staff did not understand the nature of the project.
The basic confusion centered on the widespread belief that the
project was simply another outside study team coming into the depart-
ment to make recommendations for improvement. It was emphasized with
each person that the project was a training program which would utilize
internal task forces to analyze problems with the aid and advice of the
Training Team. It became obvious that during the initial training, fur-

ther explanation was not only in order, but would be a vital necessity.

Observations

The Training Team utilized their visits to the department to
observe methods of administration and Operation. Various staff,
administrative, and line functions were explained by departmental

personnel. This procedural information was compared with actual

7I

operations in order to determine inconsistencies and locate areas
which could be improved. This activity took place consistently through-

out the term of the project.

PROFILE OF COMMAND STAFF'06

The police department had a total of forty-three commanders.
This figure included one chief, one deputy chief, five captains,
twelve lieutenants, and twenty-four sergeants. Each of these
people received their promotion after qualifying on a state adminis-
tered civil service exam. The pattern in Riverside has been that the
mayor selected the top candidate on the Civil Service list; he did not
utilize the prerogative of selecting the best qualified of the top
three. All the commanders accumulated their police experience with

the Riverside department.

Longevity

The bulk of the command personnel had more than twenty-five
years of service with the department. Indeed, half of the thirty-
four respondents fell within this category including four persons who
had more than thirty years of service with the department. The chief
and deputy had, respectively, twenty-seven and thirty-seven years of
service. The four captains had the highest average longevity level of
twenty-eight and a half years. The lieutenants had the second highest

mean longevity ofthe ranks with twenty-five years, only three years

 

'06The data presented here was gathered by Mr. John Conley,
Project Director, prior to the time the author joined the project.

72

less than the captains. Eight of the eleven lieutenants had more

than twenty-six years on the force. The sergeants are divided between
the over and under twenty-five year mark. Eight have more than
twenty-five years on the force and twelve have less. The overall mean
is slightly under seventeen years.

The higher ranks have a disproportionately higher longevity
figure with no representation from the under twenty year group. Only
one lieutenant has less than twenty years on the force. As a result,
all the top commanders accumulated the bulk of their experience prior
to the push for police management reform which gained momentum in
the mid nineteen-sixties and has not yet peaked. The significance of
the longevity figures, however, becomes clearer when viewed in con-
junction with the type of experience accumulated by the top-level

administrators.

Experience

The higher-level command personnel accumulated an equal amount
of experience by rank. Each of the captains, chiefs, and deputies
served an average of four years in each rank of patrolman, sergeant,
and lieutenant (see Table 3). The lower command staff also amassed
equal amounts of experience by rank, but they served longer in each
rank. Sergeants and lieutenants Spent, respectively, eleven and
eight years as a patrolman and six years as a sergeant. This is an
average of three and shkyears longer than any of the present captains,
the deputy, or the chief had to wait for a promotion. The discrepancy

of time spent in grade by higher and lower ranks is explained by the

Table 3

Average Years of EXperIence by Rank

of Command Personnel

73

 

Chief and Deputy Chief

Rank

 

Patrol
Sergeant
Lieutenant
Captain
Deputy Chief

Rank

 

Patrol
Sergeant
Lieutenant
Captain

Rank

 

Patrol
Sergeant
Lieutenant

Rank

 

Patrol
Sergeant

CAPTAINS

LIEUTENANTS

 

SERGEANTS

Average No. of Years

--\Jw.=-\n
\nunnoo

Average No. of Years

A.25

3.75
A.25
l5.00

Average No. of Years

8.27

5.90
ll.A5

Average No. of Years

ll.l0
6.A2

 

7A

rapid growth of the department just after WOrld War II. There will be
another rapid promotion rate within the next decade. This will occur
not because of growth, but because of attrition when the upper level
commanders apply for retirement.

The distribution of experience by assignment does not follow
the neat pattern illustrated by rank. The two top positions had an
overall average experience figure of almost half that of the lower
ranks. More important is that the higher ranks from captain to chief
had a narrower background than the lower ranks of sergeant and lieuten-
ant (see Table A). The higher ranks except for the chief served most
of their early years in the uniform division and as division commanders
(pre-l967 precinct commanders). The chief served in various inside
clerk and quasi-administrative positions throughout his police career.
With rare exception the captains did not serve in other operational
units and they had little or no experience in the specialized adminis-
tration or staff services area.

The exceptions are Significant, however, because of the length
of time an individual worked in a particular area. For example, one
captain spent ten years as a division commander compared to his peers
who spent approximately five years at that position. Another captain
served in the Criminal Investigation Division for twenty-two years
whereas his peers spent from six months to five years in that division.
The overall experience level of captains is limited to two or three
operational units. The exceptions lean toward an even narrower
experience factor because they worked in only one unit or position

for the bulk of their career.

Table A

Experience Profile of Captains

75

 

Police Experience By Rank

 

 

 

 

 

 

PATROL SERGEANT LIEUTENANT CAPTAIN
Years No. Years No. Years No. Years No.
A 3 2 l 3 l ID I
5 I 3 2 A I I6 2
7 I 5 2 I8 I
Mean A.25 3.75 A.25 l5
Police Experience By Assigpment
PATROL STREET SUPERVISOR UNIFORM COMMANDER C.I.D.
Years No. Years No. Years No. Years No.
A 3 2 l 0.5 l 0.5 l
5 l 3 2 l 3 3 l
7 l 5 I
22 I
Mean A.25 3.75 0.87 7.75
DIVISION COMMANDER STAFF SERVICES TRAFFIC
Years No. Years No. Years No.
5 0.5 l l
6 5 I
l0
Mean 7 2.75 l
COMMANDER TACTICAL SQUAD VICE 5 INTELLIGENCE
Years No. Years No.
A 1 2.5

. Captains

 

 

Total Number - 5

Number of Respondents - A

76

The lower ranks, on the other hand, served in many areas of
the organization (see Tables 5 and 6). This increased experience
factor is inversely related to the rank structure; the lower the rank,
the broader the experience. This characteristic is explained by the
rigidity which had developed in the upper ranks because most of
these peOple achieved their promotion at the same time. A second
explanatory element is that the department became very inflexible with
regard to positions which could be held by certain ranks. For example,
captains held only the uniform or C.I.D. commands and lieutenants
served primarily in the capacity of watch or shift commanders. AS a
result, the department relied on sergeants to fill supervisory posi-
tions in other units.

As was true of the higher ranks, the lieutenants and sergeants
are heavily experienced in the uniform division units. The lieutenant
rank also suffers from problems of rigidity. For example, two per-
sons in this rank served over twelve years with C.I.D.; one worked in
traffic for over fifteen years and one served as the clerk/secretary
for the Board of Police for over ten years. This job domination is
offset slightly by the four to eight people who served in vice,
tactical squad, training, and records/communication. I

It is at the sergeant level that breadth of experience becomes
a norm. Persons holding this rank had experience in most of the
Operational units and in the records/communication sections (see
Table 5). But one person held the same job for twenty-one years and
two others have been in the same position for five years. It appears

that the sergeants have benefited from a wider opportunity to work in

77
Table 5

Experience Profile of Sergeants

 

PATROL

Police Experience By Rank
SERGEANT

 

 

 

 

Years No. Years No.
l-5 2 Less Than I 2
6'10 9 I-5 6
ll-lS 3 6-l0 l
l6-l9 A ll-l5 3
20-25 I 20-25 I
Police Experience By Assignment
PATROL STREET SUPERVISOR C.I.D.
Years No. Years No. Years No.
l-5 A Less Than I l Less Than I l
6-l0 l2 l-S l2 l-S l
ll-l5 2 6-l0 3 ll-l5 3
l6-l9 2 ll-IS l
l6-l9 I
Mean 8.5 A.A7 8.0
TACTICAL RECORDS/COMM. VICE
Years No. Years No. Years No.
l.0 l l l O.A l
I.A l 2 2 0.5 l
l.6 I 6 l 3.0 l
2.0 3 9 I 5.0 I
Mean l.83 A.0 2.23
TRAFFIC JUVENILE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION SAFETY
Years No. Years No. Years No. Years No.
5 l l 5 l 2l l

Sergeants

Total Number - 25

Number of ReSpondents - 20

78
Table 6

Experience Profile of Lieutenants

 

 

PATROL
Years No.
l-S A
6-I0 5
ll-IS I
20-25 I
Mean 8.27
PATROL
Years No.
O-I_ .I
l-S‘ 3
6-l0 A
ll-l5 I
Mean 5.55
RECORDS/COMM.
Years No.
l-S A
6-l0 I
Mean 3.62
C.I.D.
Years No.
5 l
l2-I3 2
Mean l0

Lieutenants

Police Experience By Rank

 

SERGEANT LIEUTENANT
Years No. Years No.
l-S 5 Less Than I l
6-l0 6 l-5 l

6-I0 2
ll-l5 I
16-19 6
5.90 ll.A5

Police Experience by Assigpments

 

 

 

 

STREET SUPERVISOR WATCH COMMANDER
Years No. Years No.
I-5 7 Less Than I l
6-IO 2 I-S 3
6-10 I
ll-l5 l
A.7A A.77
TACTICAL SQUAD TRAINING VICE
Years No. Years No. Years No.
I 3 2.5 I 2 I
2 l 3.0 I 3 l
l.25 2.75 2.5
TRAFFIC CLERK/BOARD OF POLICE
Years No. Years No.
l5.5 l l0.S l
l5.5 I0.5
Total Number - l2 Number of Respondents - ll

 

79

different areas within the organization with only a couple of instances
of position domination.

The experience pattern illustrated by the above discussion had
a number of effects on the department and the training project. The
top level administrators have a narrow police background. As a result,
the organization emphasized line units and ignored administrative and
Support services functions. The historical pattern which allowed
certain positions to be held by the same individual not only stymied
personal growth, but also contributed to kingdom building. These per-
sons became secure in their positions because they outlasted the
numerous changes in department heads and supervisors. This security
fostered the entrenchment of procedures which soon became outdated and
stifled any attempt to change the operation. The overall consequence
of this pattern was a breakdown of coordination to the point where
the organization did not operate as a single entity, but as a number
of separate units loosely held together by a weak chain of command

and incomplete notions of police functions.

Education

The overall mean level of education for the command staff is
ll.5 years (see Table 7). The captains have a mean educational level
of I3.6 and the sergeants have l2.l years. It is the lieutenant rank
which pulls the level down because it has a mean of l0.5 years. There
is not much that can be said about this low educational level for the
department. It speaks for itself. Many of the commanders, however,

are aware of the facts and are not happy with them. The organization,

Table 7 8
0

Formal Educational Level for
Command Personnel

 

Education

8 yrs.
9 yrs.
l0 yrs.
ll yrs.
l2 yrs.
l3 yrs.
IA yrs.
l5 yrs.

Mean ll.5 yrs.

Education

l2 yrs.
IA yrs.
I5 yrs.

Mean l3.67 yrs.

Education

8 yrs.
9 yrs.
l2 yrs.
l3 yrs.

Mean l0.5 yrs.

Education

9 yrs.
l0 yrs.
l2 yrs.
l3 yrs.
IA yrs.
l5 yrs.

Mean l2.l7 yrs

All Personnel

 

Number

3'“
NO‘O‘WOW?‘

Total 35

Captains

Number

dun-N

Total A
Lieutenants

Number

JP-B‘N-i

Total ll

Sergeants

Number

dU‘lNVWN

Total 20

 

8l

on the other hand, has not encouraged educational achievement in any
way. There is no educational incentive system and no procedure for
easing the conflict of duty schedules and college semesters. Given
these problems and lack of support, it is laudable that as many as
IA people have accomplished one or two years of college.

The overall low educational level affected the training pro-
gram in a number of ways. The personnel were not accustomed to the
rigors of study and, therefore, shied away from reading training
material. Not having been exposed to the free-flowing discussions
and debates of a college classroom, the staff had no training or
inclination to analyze the issues from a content or substantive level.
This is not to suggest that there was no debate on the various pro-
posals in the task forces. To the contrary, the discussion was
generally extensive, but the lack of training and experience in this
function delayed the results. The Training Team had to bring the
discussion back to the main issues and attempt to guide the groups to
closure. By the end of the project some members of the command staff
began to show much improvement in their ability to analyze proposals
and focus on the substantive matters.

IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM AREAS AS
PERCEIVED BY THE COMMAND STAFF

In the initial Request for a Proposal, the department listed
the following five problem areas which they felt need solution:

I. Planning and research

2. Training

82

3. Recruitment

A. Records

5. Promotion and assignment procedure

These areas had been delineated approximately six months
before the project was initiated. During that period of time at least
one major change had occurred. The Criminal Justice Planning Office
had secured funds to provide two civilian planners. Obviously this
should have impacted on the perception of problem areas. It was also
probable that other events had occurred to alter previewed problem
areas.

It was for this reason that the training team gathered the
information on the weaknesses and strengths of the department as
expressed by members of the command staff in response to the question-
naire. The Training Team was also interested to determine how the
perceptions of the command staff compared with those of the line
level personnel. Therefore fifty patrolmen were asked to respond to
several questions.

Weaknesses of the Department

as Perceived by the
Command Staff

 

 

Table 8 reflects the rank order of the major weaknesses as
perceived by the members of the command staff. There was a total of
ll3 responses which fell into the 33 general categories. Since the
question was open ended, the responses were placed in these categories

based on some subjective interpretation.

83
Table 8

Major Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department as
Perceived by the Command Staff

 

Response Items Responses

 

 

d
NWO

Political Interference in Management of organization
No Eraining . ..................... .
Poor Communications working enviornment ..... . . . .
Lack of Manpower. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pay . . ........ . . . . .............
No education incentive . . . . . . . . ..... . . . i
Lack of communication and coordination among units .
No Space . . . . . . ......... . . . . i
Morale...- ooooo ooo‘ooo ....... 000.1
4
d

_I—o-d-d—P—I—d-d—d—NNNNNNNWWWWJ—‘J-‘WWO‘O‘NQ—m

m-P-PWWN-‘Nm

One-man cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Poor recruitment and selection . . . . . . . . . . . . .
No delegation of authority ......... . . . . .
No discipline and control . . . . ...........
Poor equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... I
No recognition . . . . ....... . . . . . ..... I
No standard operating procedure . . . . ..... . . . . 7
Lack of foot patrols . . . . . . ... . . ....... . A
Centeralized operation . . . ........... . . . .
Poor allocation of resources ............
Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . .
No money . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . .....
Weak Civil Service Exams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grievance procedure . . . . . . . ...... . . . . .’. .
Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . .
Too many swonn personnel in clerical positions

No management . . . . . .............
No chain of command . . . . . . . . . . .

Poor records system ..... . . . ...........
Efféciency decrease on weekend ............. .
Lack of sergeants . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Poor court testimony . . . . . . . .......
No parking for public . . . . . ....... . . . . . ..
Publlc apathy ........... . . . . . . . . . . . .

Loxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxoxouococoonooooooooosososopbw

oooooooooooo———————NNNwwwkrmma‘

 

TOTAL 113 l00

 

 

 

8A

The responses ranged from political influence at the top to
public apathy at the bottom of the list. It is significant to note
that no training is the only weakness which corresponds to one of the
original five problem areas stated in the Request for a Proposal. This
supported the Training Team's assumption that priorities might have
changed or that the original five problem areas were a product of a
perception by those other than the command staff.

The number one item,“political interference in management of
the organizationJ'did indeed reflect a serious problem area. This is
a function of the total environment of the department as well as the
citizens of Riverside in the political life of the city. It is also
a function of the relationship between the Board of Police and the
mayor. The Board of Police has ultimate decision making authority
over the department. Since they dictate the transfer of members in
the department as well as promotions, one must be a political being
to receive the best assignments and promotions. The most important
decision which an officer can make as far as his successful career
development is concerned is his support of a mayoral candidate and
the cultivation of political allies on the Board or City Council. An
individual who works for a successful mayoral candidate, has kept
socially visible to the political powers, and has a good relationship
with at least one board member can program a very successful career.

The department as a whole verbally decries the political
interference and the accessibility of favored positions and jobs to
its members, yet individually they will utilize those political chan-

nels. The result is a top heavy command staff who mistrust each other

85

to the point that all decisions are questioned as politically oriented
and career related. This disorganization and mistrust have resulted
in a lack of open decision making and the abdication of sound leader-
ship in favor of ”under the table” manipulation of department adminis-
tration and organization motivated by self-interest. The lack of
command cohesiveness has allowed the police union to negotiate con-
tracts virtually unopposed. This has resulted in a police contract
which makes the path to department control virtually closed to those
presently in a command position.

Ranked fourth was"lackof manpower." This is not an uncommon
complaint for most departments. It should be noted, however, that
with a police to pOpulation ratio of 2.5 officers per thousand that
this should not rank as highly as it did. However, when viewed in
relationship to the working schedule, this takes on a different
perspective.

All members of the Riverside Police Department with the excep-
tion of deputy chiefs and the chief work aIkMH"-and two-Shift cycle.
This means that the officers work four days and are off two. This
equates to a 37-I/2 hour work week over a year's period of time.

Such a schedule, although of great benefit to the officers, at the
same time puts a tremendous strain on manpower resources.

The problem area which ranked third, ”poor communications
working environment,” is a fact. The communications room was a Storage
room next to the cellblock. It was cramped, dark, lacked ventilation
and sound proofing, and required a weekly extermination service to

eliminate the flea problem.

86

Suggestions by Command Staff
for Improving Riverside
Police Department

 

 

Table 9 represents the responses of commanders in terms of sug-
gestions to improve the department. It is interesting to note that
suggestions #l-A reflect the general goals of the program. They also
reinforce the concern of the staff for the political interference in
the administration of the department as well as their perceived
inability to control the destiny of the department. These problems
more accurately reflected the concerns of the command staff than the
major weaknesses.

Comparison of Patrolmen's List

of Weaknesses With Those of
the Commanders

 

 

AS previously indicated, the Training Team gathered informa-
tion from fifty patrolmen regarding the strengths and weaknesses of
the police department. Table l0 reflects the ranking of weaknesses.

The number one weakness can be somewhat disregarded, Since it
reflects an emotional response to the recent shooting of a patrol
officer. The department responded to this issue by using two-men cars
in high crime areas. By the time the project started the response
was less emotional to this issue.

The most striking comparison was with the second ranked item
which received only one less response than number one. The ”assignment
not by ability but by politics" indicated that the patrolmen were

cognizant of the political maneuverings as were the commanders.

87

Table 9

Commanders' Suggestions for Improving the Riverside Police Department

 

* Number Making
Suggestion the Suggestion

Ongoing systematic management training. . . . . . . . . . . l0

Give Chief full aOthority to manage department. . . . . . . 7
Select people for positions on basis of quality . 7
Open staff meetings-problem solving . . . . . . A
25 new men . 3

Open administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Redesign schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Improve communications Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Rotate men systematically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Improve promotional opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Abolish Captain rank and use Deputy Chief rank.

Design command selection criteria

New management

More discipline

One-man Police Commissioner

Decentralized operation

Educational incentive

Two-man cars

Establish departmental ombudsman

Advisory board to Board of Police

*No number indicates only one commander making suggestion

 

88
Table l0

Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department as Perceived by Patrolmen

 

 

WEAKNESS NUMBER WHO EXPRESSED
One man cars . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . IA
Assignment by ability and not politics ......... l3
Management ................ . . . . . . . 8
Old equipment .......... . . ....... . . 8
Conflict between supervisors and patrolmen ....... 7
Wages. . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . ..... ' 7
Lack of manpower . ............... 5
Poor SUpervision techniques . . . . ......... . A
Court . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . . . A
No education incentive . . . . . ....... . . . . . 3
Working conditions .................. . 3
Mo backing from all ranks . . . . ........... 3
Lack of physical test prior to employment ....... 2
Lack of discipline . . ................. 2
No tralning ..... . . ........... . . . . 2
Need new communication system ............ . 2
Conflicting orders ...... . ....... . . . . . 2

Men paying for damage to cruisers whlle on duty . . . . l

Probationary policemen ................. l
Lack of educated SUperlors . ..... . . . ...... l
Court overtime . . . . . . .............. . l

Vacation time . . . . . . . ... . . . . ......... l

 

89

The patrolmen expressed concern over the management of the
department as well as the relationships between supervisor and patrol-
men as major weaknesses.

The patrolmen's perceptions seem to support the need for the
type of organizational deveIOpment which was the objective of the

project.
INITIAL PROJECT ORIENTATION AND TRAINING SESSIONS

Two orientation and initial training sessions were scheduled
for the months of August and September. The primary goal of these
sessions was to present the scope and nature of the program. Since
it was evident from interviews that the entire project was not under-
stood by the command staff, these sessions were essential. In
addition, they were to be training sessions at which time introductory
material regarding management by objective, participative decision
making, and group problem solving would be presented. In addition,
the training team was to feed back the information which had been
gathered by the questionnaires regarding the commanders' and patrol-
men's perceptions of the department.

Each session, both in August and September, was two days in
length. Half of the command staff would attend one day while the

remainder would be present for the second.

90

August Session
This session was held on two days in mid-August, I973. The

following discussion reflects the objectives and the events surrounding

the August session.

OBJECTIVE #I: TO ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY AND A WORKING RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE CONSULTING TEAM AND THE MEMBERS OF THE
COMMAND STAFF.

 

The importance of accomplishing this objective on the outset
of any development project cannot be overstressed. This objective
must be accomplished before such a project can be expected to move

forward. ”The quality of the client-agent relationship is pivotal to

lO7

the success of the change program.“ In SUpport of this position

the following four points which are made by Bennis were considered:

l. The client system should have as much understanding of
the change and its consequences, as much influence in
developing and controlling the fate of the change, and
as much trust in the initiator of the change as is
possible.

2. The change effort should be perceived as being as self-
motivated and voluntary as possible. This can be
effected through the legitimization and reinforcement
of the change by top management and by significant
reference groups adjacent to the client system.

3. The change program must include emotional and value as
well as cognitive (informational) elements for successful
implementation. It is doubtful that relying on solely
rational persuasion is sufficient. Most organizations
possess the knowledge to cure their ills; the rub is
utilization.

A. The change agent can be crucial in reducing the resistance
to change. As long as the change agent acts congruently
with the principles of the program and as long as the

 

'07Bennis, “Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science
to Planned Organizational Change,” p. 78.

9i
client has a chance to test competence and motives (his

own and the change agent's), the agent should be able to

provide the psychologicg68support necessary during the

risky phases of change.

It was obvious to the researcher that there was significant
anxiety about studies, surveys and consulting teams who might impose
change from outside the department. This point can be documented by
an incident which took place on the evening prior to this session.

At that time the Training Team arrived at the police station Simply
to meet a few members of the command staff. Upon entering the

front door of the Station, the team was apparently recognized by a
patrolman standing in the lobby. He was overheard making a statement
to another member of the department, ”Watch out, we are being evalu-
ated.” It was obvious that his perception of the function of the
team was to evaluate the department and recommend change.

This point was further exemplified during a conversation
which the researcher had with some members of the command staff that
evening. At that time, the distaste which they had for studies of
their department was emphasized by a lengthy dissertation reciting the
results of a I966 study done of their department which created unantici-
pated and unwanted change.

During the training session, two things were very evident.
First, there was a definite lack of understanding about the project
and process which would be utilized during the program. Secondly, the

members of the command staff were completely unaware of their role in

the process. There was some open hostility to the program and the

 

'oaibid., pp. 77-78.

92

team at the outset of each meeting. However, as the meetings proceeded,
the hostility was transformed into an obvious concern about the need

for change, and a complete frustration with their inability as indi-
viduals or a command staff to effect change. At times there appeared

to be a state of almost complete despondency on the part of the command
staff.

Because of the historical patterns of administration of the
Riverside Police Department, the staff would not or could not believe
that anybody was serious about changing the inefficient management.

As a result, the Training Team, convinced that an honest and trustful
relationship was mandatory for project success, reviewed the contract
arrangements and the project's goals.

This type of explanation continued to be a necessity throughout
the project's life. The team constantly had to forcefully answer
charges such as ”you're the mayor's man,” ”whatever you do here will
be against the men and for the administration,“ ”politics is too strong
and they will oppose changing anything.”

The strategy used by the team to answer these charges involved
candid responses and comparative examples. The team consistently used
management examples to illustrate how the Staff could limit the
political impact and rectify their internal problems. Examples given
included job descriptions and a performance evaluation system to
limit arbitrary assignments and a procedure manual to standardize
Operations.

This procedure worked on the borderline sceptics, those people

who wanted change but were wary of its possibility. The problem

93

remained, however, because the team aimed its effort at the middle
element of the group with the objective of having this core of staff
people commit themselves to the project. The fringe element of
obstructionists was expected to either fall in line or become ineffec-
tive once the moderates supported the project.

It is the researcher's opinion that at the conclusion of the
two days of meeting, considerable progress was made toward establish-
ing a viable change relationship. However, this optimism was somewhat
dimmed by two factors. First, there was detected an almost historically
based attitude of pessimism and defeatism on the part of the staff.
Secondly, much work would have to be done to establish credibility
for the project as well as give it greater visibility throughout the
entire department. The concern in this regard was supported coinci-
dentally enough by another comment which was overheard as the team
walked out of the back door of the station on the afternoon of the
second day of the meetings. A patrolman who was standing by the door
of the communications room apparently recognized the team and commented
to the other officers in the communcations room, “We're being evalu-
ated.” Then he paused, looked us over and stated, "You won't last
long.“

OBJECTIVE #2: T0 EXPOSE THE COMMAND STAFF TO THE PRINCIPLES AND

PROCESS WHICH WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE EXECUTIVE
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

 

As previously stated, it was obvious that there was a complete
misunderstanding of the role of the team and the process which would
be employed in the project. During the meetings, no other matters

were discussed until it was obvious that the members of the command

9A

staff were cognizant of the process, the role of the team and their
role in the process. This was accomplished utilizing a lecture-
discussion technique. It appeared that the hostility against the
project and the team waned as the staff developed a better understand-
ing of the objectives of the project. As the hostility was transformed
to expressions of concern for change, the team began to introduce

data to assist the command staff in directing their energies.

OBJECTIVE #3: T0 FEED BACK TO THE COMMAND STAFF THE COMPLETED DATA
GENERATED BY THEIR RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

 

This consisted of presenting to the command staff the summary
of their responses aggregated with those of the patrolmen regarding
the strengths and weaknesses of the department. Each member was given
a copy of the data and it was also presented to them in chart form.

The primary information which was utilized is presented in
Table II. In this table, the Training Team arbitrarily reorganized
the responses regarding weakness of the department into four
administrative categories: (I) personnel, (2) staff services,

(3) line operations, and (A) management and administration.

The purpose of providing this material to the command staff
was twofold. First, it provided them with a point of reference with
regard to how the other members of the organization viewed the River-
side Police Department. Secondly, it provided them with an introduc-
tion to the utilization of research data for decision making.

It was readily apparent that the staff was not accustomed to

utilizing this type of data feedback in the decision making process.

Table II

95

Major Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department

Arranged into Administrative Categories

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Responses
Administrative Category
Response Item # 2
PERSONNEL
No training.... ..... . . . . . . . . ...... . ll 3I.A
No education incentive . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 6 l7.l
Pay ......... . . . . . . . . ..... 6 l7.l
Morale . . . . . . . ......... . . . . A ll.A
Poor recruitment . . . . . . . . . . 3 8.6
No recognition . . . ....... . . . 2 5.7
Weak Civil Service Exams . . . . ...... . . . l 2.8
Grievance procedure ............... I 2.8
Union. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... l 2.8
Total . . 35 l00
LINE OPERATIONS
Lack of manpower ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 25.0
Lack of communication and coordination among units . . 5 I7.8
One man cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ A IA.2
Poor equipment . . . ..... . . . . ...... 3 l0.6
Lack of foot patrols ............... 2 7.l
Schedule ..... . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7.l
Poor allocation of resources ........ . . 2 7.l
Lack of sergeants .......... . . . ..... l 3.7
Efficiency decrease on weekends ...... . . . l 3.7
Poor court testimony . . . . . . . . . ...... l 3.7
Total 28 l00

 

 

Table II (Continued)

96

 

Administrative Category
Response Item

MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Responses

 

 

#iz

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political interference . ............. l9 6l.2
No delegation of authority . . ....... . 3 9.7
'No discipline or control ................ 3 9.7
No standard Operating procedures .......... 2 6.5
Centralized Operation . . . . ............. 2 6.5
No management ................ . . . . . l 3.2
No chain of command . ............ l 3.2
Total 3l I00
STAFF SERVICES
Poor communications ................ 8 80.0
Poor records system . . . . . . . l l0.0
Too many sworn officers in clerical positions ..... l l0.0
Total . . . IO IOO
OTHER
No Space . . . . . . ................. 5 55.6
No money ......... . . ............ 2 22.2
No parking for public . . . . ........... l ll.l
Public apathy . . ....... l ll.l
Total l0 IOO

 

 

 

97

Most commanders were hard pressed to absorb the material at the
initial exposure.

OBJECTIVE #A: TO MAKE PRELIMINARY DECISIONS REGARDING THE PROBLEM
AREAS TO BE TACKLED AND TO SELECT TASK FORCES.

 

The command staff was not entirely comfortable with the
original five delineated areas after briefly reviewing the data which
had been presented to them. They felt that some additional time
would be required to review the data, settle on problem areas, and
form task forces.

Therefore, a second orientation meeting was scheduled for the
end of September, at which time the task forces would be formed.

The Training Team suggested that prior to the next session,
the command staff Should meet in a staff meeting (I) to discuss the
data and (2) to make some preliminary decisions regarding problem
areas to be addressed. It was felt that this staff meeting without
the team present would be an opportunity to measure the commitment of
the command staff, their coordinating effectiveness and their ability

to set priorities on complex matters in a group setting.

Interim Events

The entire command staff djd meet as a group the beginning of
September. The purpose of this meeting was to review the data pre-
sented and begin preliminary decision making on problem areas.
However, the purpose was never accomplished.

At this meeting the Chairman of the Board of Police (also
Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office) was present. He

usurped the meeting purpose to present a reorganization plan which

98

included the appointing of a second deputy position. He had not advised
the Training Team that he had a planned reorganization in mind. In
fact, the first indication the training team had that he presented this
plan was when they arrived in Riverside for the second Initial Orienta-
tion Session.

The organization chart presented in Figure 2 was ratified by
the Board of Police Commissioners a few days after the staff meeting

with no modification from the command staff.

September Session

The September session began with a heated discussion of what
had occurred at the command staff meeting early in September.

The commanders had varying views. Some felt that the Commis-
sioner had attended the meeting to explain ”his” reorganization plan
because information had leaked to the news media about it the day
before. He apparently claimed that the leak to the news had in fact
forced him to create a second deputy position. Others interpreted it
as an effort to get the command staff to rubber stamp the proposal and
have the project superficially support the reorganization.

Almost to a man, they all agreed that they had been used as a
political tool and that that was essentially what the management
development project was all about.

The presentation of the reorganization plan by the Commis-
sioner at the meeting of the command staff obviously had a significant
impact on the project and was only the beginning of a series of events

which would shape the direction of the project.

99

   

 
    

>hwu<m
w 07:52.

ammoz¢<

«chauumoxm

>hxmmoxm
hxaou

oz< 4_<w

 
 

zo_h<u_z:zzou az_z_<¢k

    

moxouum oz< uz_zz<sa

 

zo_h<m:m_z_zo<
um_:u >h3mmo

 

 

 

zo.h<u

I_u_hzmo_

 

mzo_h<4mm
u_hmmto.

can“?

     
      
   

ozarzou
remoz

m4_zm>=1.

     

zo_m_>_o
zmoe.z:

zo.h<o_kmm>z_
4<z_z_xu

      
    

um_:u >h mun

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

m ma>o< Hz<hm_mm< zo_h<o_Hmm>z_
4<om4 >.p<¢hm_z_zo 4<zmmkz_ mu_>
_ I— “U.Soa a _
no
um.:u
mu_40m
no o¢<om

 

 

ucoEuLmquo ou__0m oo_mco>w¢ mo co_umn_cmmeoom .N Oczm_u

IOO

In discussing this event with the Training Team, the Commis-
sioner could offer no reasonable explanation why he had nOt discussed
”his” plan for reorganization with them. He did state that he would
discuss any future plans which would affect the department ahead of
time and rely on the Management Development Program to initiate
change in the department. He said it was too late to stop the
appointment of a second deputy and the resulting reorganization.

The major objective of this September session was to identify
problem areas and divide into task forces. The command staff decided
to divide into task forces which were somewhat in line with the
administration categories used to report the data back to them (see
Table l2: Personnel, Staff Services, Line Operations, Management and
Administration). The task forces established were:

I. Personnel and Training

2. Communications

3. Operations

A. Organization and Administration

Table I2

Task Force Composition

 

 

Rank Organization Communication ::;?:?::l Operations
Deputy Chief l - - -
Captains 2 - l 2
Lieutenants 8 l A 2
Sergeants __3_ _5_ __Z_ _5_
Total IA l2 9

 

IOI

The Communications Task Force was created since there was
an immediate need to resolve some problems with respect to the instal-
lation of a new communications system.

The members of the command staff each volunteered for an
assignment on one of the task forces. The general composition is
presented in Table l2.

Since the Training Team felt that self-direction was important,
there was no intervention in developing the composition of the task
forces. As can be seen from Table l2, this resulted in an Organization
and Administration Task Force which was somewhat top heavy.

In order to give some direction to the task forces for their
first meeting, the following objectives were set by the Training Team:

I. To set a first meeting date.

2. To select a chairman.

3. To set up a schedule of meetings through December 30,

I973.

A. To set up a tentative schedule for team members to
meet with task forces.

5. To discuss the role of staff service units such as
Planning and Research, Legal Aid, and Administrative
Aid.

Summary of Initial Orienta-
tion Sessions

 

 

It should be noted that the two initial orientation meetings
occurred as a result of an order from the Chief of Police directing
all persons from the rank of sergeant and above to attend. Such
mandatory attendance required the payment of overtime according to the

union contract to everyone except the deputy chief. It was felt that

l02

this was reasonable since it was a training program as was the entire
project, and any department which wishes a successful training pro-
gram must be willing to provide payment to those in attendance.

This would be true with any training program. There was generally
excellent attendance at both of these meetings. Attendance at each
represented approximately 90% of the entire command staff.

Although considerable effort was expended in establishing an
understanding of and legitimacy for the training program, the team
never felt confident that the apparent support was real. During the
orientation sessions it was clear to the team that the command staff
had little faith in any positive results generating from this pro-
gram. Most commanders in attendance were there only because they
were ordered. Based on the questions which were asked by several com-
manders, it was obvious that there was little understanding of this
project and that there had been no groundwork or explanation for the
team's presence. First, there had been no effort made prior to the
team's arrival by either the mayor, Criminal Justice Planning Office
(CJPO), or command staff to explain the objectives of the project, the
reason for selection of the team, or the support which could be
expected from city hall. The command staff generally felt that the
team would simply do a study similar to the previous consulting effort
and that they had to ”put up” with the study in order that federal
LEAA funds could be utilized to renovate their dispatch facility with
modern equipment. Second, given this lack of commitment which was
apparent at several levels, the team realized progress would be

hampered until a trust level could be established. Third, an effort

l03

had to be made by the city, the board, and the Criminal Justice
Planning Office (CJPO) to indicate their support for the project if
the team ever hoped to make significant inroads. Fourth, the
Criminal Justice Planning Office had to understand the significance
of convincing the mayor and board on the objectives of the program
and emphasizing the importance of non-interference in departmental
organization until the project ended.

From this point forward, the command staff met in their
respective task forces and with the Training Team member assigned to
each group. Each member of the training team had responsibility
for one task force. These task forces formed the core of the project
and served as the vehicle for training. Each of the task forces had
certain areas of responsibility and each experienced different types
and levels of success and problems.

During the duration of the project, internal and external
events significantly impacted on the project which resulted in modi-
flcation of the task force arrangement and objectives as well as the

roles of the components.

IMPLEMENTATION OF ORIGINAL MODEL

Introduction

In order to support the management development model utilizing
the task force arrangement, it was necessary to establish a procedure
which would provide for maximum coordination. This procedure would

also have to be designed to insure maximum participation by all members

IOA

of the command staff. Therefore, the following procedure was set

into motion:

I.

7.

Each task force would work independently to identify
organizational problems. The members of the Training
Team would be responsible to insure that each task
force would not duplicate effort.

The role of the Training Team member was primarily to
be a resource person and facilitate the group in
problem identification and development of alternative
solutions.

Planning and research, the legal advisor, and the

administrative aide would provide resource material,
data, and management information for decision making.
They would participate in task forces when requested.

The task forces would identify problems, develop
alternative solutions, and write up a staff study.

The staff study would be provided to members of each
task force for review. The staff study would be
reviewed in a meeting of all members of the command
staff. It would be accepted, rejected, modified,

or sent back to the originating group for revision.

The completed staff study would be forwarded to the
Chief for approval.

It would then go to the Board of Police Commissioners
for action.

In addition to the above procedure, the training team set up

its own internal mechanism of coordination. It was imperative that

the team members be informed at all times of the progress of each

task force.

This was necessary to avoid duplication of effort in

the problem definition and solution seeking phases.

Operations Task Force

The

individuals

original task force started out with nine members. These

selected the Operations Task Force as their choice for

lOS

participation. Of the nine, seven worked uniform division days. The
two captains of the uniform division were on this task force as well
as two lieutenants. There were two daytime uniform sergeants and

one night shift uniform sergeant. The remaining two sergeants

were assigned to Criminal Investigation Division; one worked days and
one worked nights.

Of the original members, seven filled out the background
questionnaire which was passed out at the beginning of the project.
It is important to note that of those in the task force who answered
the questionnaire none listed any previous training in the area of
management and supervision. This fact was well demonstrated throughout
the task force meetings. There was a general lack of understanding
of the role of management, much less some of the general principles.
It often became necessary to incorporate the general principles of
administration and management in the taSk force meetings in order to
bring the level of competence up to a point where decision making
theory could be explained. This lack of previous training also-
possibly added to the general dysfunction of the organization.

The Operations Task Force became immediately operational and
from the outset seemed determined to solve some of the organizational
problems in the operational areas.

Its first meeting was approximately one week after the final
orientation session. Its original objective was to meet at least
once a week. During the course of the task force's life it met a

total of sixteen times between September and January.

I06

Figure 3 reflects the activity of the task force in terms of
number of members participating in each meeting.

AS can be seen from the graph, attendance at the task force
during September and October remained high and the task force appeared
to be on its way to identifying and solving organizational problems.
The minutes of the task force meetings as well as the observation by
the Training Team member indicated that the process was moving forward.

For example, at the last orientation meeting of the command
Staff, the following objectives were outlined for the first meetings
of each task force:

I. Select a chairman.

2. Set a schedule for task force meetings through
December.

3. Set schedule for training team members.

A. Discuss and determine the role of Planning and
Research in relations to Operations Task Force.

5. Select prOblem areas in terms of priority.

During the initial meeting the task force worked through all
of these objectives to a reasonable degree. They elected one of the
Uniform Division lieutenants as chairman. They established a weekly
schedule of meetings through the month of December. This schedule
was devised so that on the meeting date, the maximum number of mem-
bers wOuld be on duty.

A considerable amount of time was spent on the last two
objectives. Since the role of Planning and Research was not clearly
defined when the unit was instituted, many misconceptions prevailed.

One of the major functions which the Training Team member served was

l07

:bzoz

 

 

. an... . eon . >oz . uuo . uaom
m- m— a- m. N. __ o. m Tm n m Rm m .m a mwmxsz oz_hmuz

iii—

II&

In
W"
3
W”

J N
a

_Ilm mm
H.
n.
3

'0 m
V.
N
a
3

In

la

la

mecca xmoh mco_umcoao mo >u_>_uu< mc_uooz .m 0L:m_m

l08

to point out the necessity of Planning and Research as a valuable
tool to the task forces. There was initial resistance to using
Planning and Research and considerable criticism of what they pro-
duced. However, by the end of October, there was a steady exchange
of valuable information between the Operations Task Force and Plan-
ning and Research. The task force began making specific requests
for information, and Planning and Research made the information
readily available.

The available data as the group proceeded during September
and October strongly indicated that the members were making an honest
effort to identify organizational problems and develop alternative
solutions. The most significant factor indicating this was the shift
in the task force from some of the original attitudes displayed in
the September orientation meeting.

For example, during the initial two meetings, one of the
prevalent attitudes was that nothing could be solved operationally
unless the two uniform divisions (North and South) were geographically
separated in the city. The members of the command staff were adamant
that many of their current problems resulted from the centralization
of the department as a result of the l966 management study. However,
one of the first problems which the Operations Task Force began to
address was the problem of space allocation. It is significant that
the task force shifted from concentrating on one solution to weighing
a variety of solutions which included a search for alternating sub-
station Sites as well as the development of alternative uses of the

currently existing facility. A subtask force was appointed to look

l09

at alternative sites and Planning and Research was requested to
supply information on the desirability of a substation. Planning
and Research was also requested to make recommendations concerning
the allocation of space in the current facility.

Organization and Administra-
tion Task Force

 

 

This task force had its first meeting one week after Opera-
tions met. This group began studying a number of administrative
problems but their primary concerns were political interference,
delegation of authority and the development of a standard Operating
procedures manual.

During the early stages of the task force's operation there
was much confusion which centered around their lack of knowledge
about how to conduct a task force meeting. The team member concen~
trated on using the various incidents as training tools. For example,
a member submitted a proposal to the group but did not have c0pies
for each member and the discussion floundered. The team member used
this situation to illustrate the value of providing everyone with
copies of items to be discussed.

Another example is that the prOposal did not have a clear
statement on objectives, problem definition, supporting data, or
expected solution. The team member used this episode to illustrate
time wasted, confusion, and frustration because of an ill-prepared
proposal. The process of the task force meetings was as important as

their product. The training emphasis was to prepare the staff in

IlO

the techniques of management and decision making as well as developing
solutions. I

The task force had difficulty focusing on one issue or problem
at a time. This situation developed because they failed to set clear
objectives for their meetings. Initially they did not even have an
agenda available for the members. The team member focused on the
utility of clear objectives for meetings to provide direction as well
as assist in their own evaluation of their progress.

The confusion and floundering prevalent at the earlier meet-
ings were due partly to the task force members' attempts to search for
and clarify their roles. Many of these individuals had not worked in
a group environment prior to these meetings. The mixed rank compo-
sition of the task force also required adjustments for some of the
members. Both the higher and lower ranks had to modify their roles
from superiors and subordinates to equals within the task force
arrangement. The degree to which the group accomplished this role
modification was an indication of their individual commitment to the
development program.

During the task force meetings some members did submit
numerous proposals for discussion. These included an internal advisory
board, structural changes, personnel evaluation system, and various
modifications of existing operational policies. The task forces
blundered through these proposals during the early meetings, but
became quite sophisticated in their approach later in the program.
They changed their focus from the personality of the initiator to the

substantive value of the proposition. Some members critically

III

evaluated the model under discussion and made significant improvements
in the original proposal. This was particularly true of the personnel
evaluation model which began as a thrust at one group of peOple but
resulted in a broad policy proposal with protective mechanisms inserted
to prevent arbitrary use by an unscrupulous administrator.

The task force served as a clearinghouse of information for
the staff. Many federally funded programs had become operational in
the department with little direct involvement on the part of the command
staff. The task force invited people from Planning and Research, the
legal advisor, and the administrative aide to the Chief (all federally
funded positions) to present information on their programs, discuss
their objectives, and determine their utility to the administration
of a large municipal police department. 0n the other hand, these
support units also sought out the task force for the submission of
prOposals for improving the department. This quickly evolved to the
point where the task force was recognized as a policy and action
review group who had the authority to pass judgment on the proposal.
The task force became a legitimate decision making body within the

chain of command.

Training Task Force

The initial meeting of the task force flowed rather smoothly
despite a considerable amount of apprehension regarding the credi-
bility of the project and whether or not their efforts would prove to
-be fruitful. The team member assured the task force that a genuine

effort would result in marked improvement in the Riverside Police

ll2

Department since their decisions would get support from the Board of
Police.

The task force quickly identified theproblems which they felt
needed immediate consideration and action. After much discussion, it
was decided that there were numerous areas which needed immediate
training. The task force requested the team member for the training
task force to develop a systematic plan for solving the training
problem. The team member indicated that at the October meeting the
task force would receive an implementation plan, instruction in
systematic training development, and numerous source books for task
force reference. The task force was instructed to meet every other
week to determine the problems which had a direct bearing on the
absence of training. They were further instructed to set a schedule
of meetings for the rest of the calendar year.

It was obvious after the first meeting that several factors
had presented themselves which required observation in future task
force meetings.

I. The task force was not prepared for the team

itinerary which was originally designed for imple-
mentation.

2. Support for theproject was not indicated from within

the task force, the police department, the Criminal
Justice Planning Office, nor the police board.

3. Training and personnel development for the department

in the past was virtually non-existent. Data on
past programs was scattered and sparse indicating
that internal department training programs were no
more than information-giving sessions.

A. The task force was not ready for self-directed

activities, and considerable guidance would be
required.

Il3

5. The task force chairman exhibited a disdain for the
program which created a critical situation.

Communications Task Force

 

This task force was originally composed of seven people
including three lieutenants and four sergeants. The primary concern
of this group was the location of the new communications system which
had been purchased with LEAA funds. The team member encouraged the
group to add the training of communications personnel to their study.
The task force held five meetings; gathered considerable data on
specifications; met with the contractor, the city engineer, and the
Criminal Justice Planning Office; and compiled their information into
a report. The report recommended that the new equipment be installed
on the third floor and that the communications center also be moved
from its present cramped location to the third floor.

There was some confusion after the task force submitted its
proposal to the Deputy Chief for approval. Rumors circulated that
the recommendation had been reversed and that it was to be installed
on the first floor. The Planning and Research unit polled twenty-five
of the forty-four commanders, and they favored the third floor twenty-
three to two. Subsequently, the Chief wrote an order for the third
floor installation.

Other Organizational Develop-
ment Efforts Initiated

 

The Riverside Police Department lacked one essential element
which is important to any personnel development program. They had no

positions specifications other than some very general job descriptions

IIA

which were used by the state civil service system. In order to assist
the department in the management development effort, the Training Team
initiated a job analysis of the various command level positions. The
objectives of this effort were to:
l. Interview command and supervisory personnel to
gather descriptive statements on their job responsi-

bilities and the tasks they perform.

2. Formulate task statements based on an analysis of
the collected data.

3. Formulate job descriptions for the major command
classifications.

As a result of this effort, twenty-five supervisors were inter-
viewed by a project consultant (not one of the regular Training Team).
The list included one acting chief, one deputy chief, three captains,
seven lieutenants, and thirteen sergeants. This group represented
over fifty percent of the command staff and is a representative sample
of each classification level from the three work shifts.

After the data was collected in its raw form, it was analyzed.
The pattern illustrated by the compiled data proved significant.

There was little evidence of consistency of job responsibilities, as
articulated by the persons interviewed, either within the classification
or among the shifts. Table I3, which depicts the articulated responsi-
bilities for captains and lieutenants, illustrates the point of
overlapping and inconsistency. Note that only a few responsibilities
were mentioned by more than one individual in the same rank.

This confusion and lack of clarity of the responsibilities
for various rank levels is a result of many factors. First, the

department did not have job descriptions for the ranks or the various

II5

Table I3

Responsibilities of Captains and Lieutenants as
Articulated by Incumbents

 

CAPTAIN
* Number Claiming

Responsible for: Same Responsibility,

Felony investigations

Overseeing investigations of juvenile cases
Aiding in outside agency investigations
Processing and transporting persons in custody
Processing criminal evidence

Reviewing department reports

Inter-departmental communications

Assisting Chief on special assignments

Reports and communications from previous shifts
Inter-and Intra-departmental correspondence
Satisfying business left over from previous Shift
Patrolman job assignments

Special events

LIEUTENANT

Operations of patrol personnel

Roll call proceedings

Police Reports

Recruit school

Special assignment in staff services
Juvenile prosecution in court
Grievance Committee for Police Board
Special services to department
Coordination of department activities
Supporting men in investigations
Counseling men '
Processing officers' reports

Issuance of warrants and subpoenas
Duty assignment of personnel
Evaluation of officers

Coordination of watch 2
Departmental correSpondence and reports 2
Processing citizen complaints

Closing completed shift

WN

* No number indicates only one incumbent articulated responsibility

 

ll6

positions within a rank (the department relied on the brief, sterile
generalities of the civil service classifications). In many cases,
the personnel simply did not know what the particular position
required of its incumbent. Only three or four persons could clearly
identify their responsibilities and distinguish between a responsi-
bility and a task.

It is of substantial importance to note that few of the
articulated responsibilities could be interpreted as being of the
management nature. This strongly supported the observations by the
Training Team members that the command staff members did not perceive
themselves as managers or supervisors.

This data was synthesized with job description data from
twenty other departments to develop position specifications for the
five rank classifications of sergeant, lieutenant, captain, deputy

chief and chief.

MODIFICATION ONE: A CHANGE IN
TASK FORCE COMPOSITION

During the months of September, October, and early November
several events occurred which created a modification of the original
model.

As previously mentioned, in September between the first and
second orientation meetings, the Chairman of the Board (also Director
of the Criminal Justice Planning Office) announced a surprise reorgani-
zation. This had a demoralizing impact on the project but was not in

and of itself a fatal blow. As can be seen by the previous discussion

ll7

the project was implemented and began to move ahead. However, several
events took place which, having occurred at the embryonic stages of
the project development, had both immediate and long range impact.

The majority of these events occurred during the month of October and
were as follows:

I. The Chairman of the Board of Police announced his
resignation effective the end of October.

2. The Board of Police voted to discontinue the pay-
ment of overtime for the command staff to
participate in the Management DeveIOpment Program.

3. The Mayor announced the appointment of a local
florist shop owner as the new Chairman of the
Board of Police.

A. The Criminal Justice Planning Office announced the
funding of a Regional Police Academy in Riverside.

5. The appointment of the second Deputy Chief (previ-
ously a uniform division captain) was announced.

These incidents occurred without any input from the task
forces or the Training Team. Indeed, the Chairman of the Board verbally
stated to the team members that he would not take any action which
would directly affect the department without conferring with the team
and the task forces. This statement was in response to an inquiry
regarding the coordination of efforts.

The appointment of the second deputy was anticlimactic because
the affected groups were aware of it. The discontinuance of the over-
time, although talked about for weeks, severely impacted the task
force composition. The command staff saw this as a sign of a lack of
support for the program. This decision came at a very critical stage

in the project. The task forces were beginning to set objectives and

ll8

timetables, and it appeared that some initial successes were only a
short time away. The overtime decision discouraged many members from
further attendance just when the task forces were beginning to
solidify. The decision in effect provided a de facto selection process
for members who would attend the training task forces. Attendance was
now determined by the time of day the task force meetings were held.
If an individual was working when a meeting was held, then he might
have attended. Of course, some of the command staff used the overtime
decision as an excuse for not attending because they did not desire to
participate in the first place.

The board used this argument in their rationalizing away the
attendance problems articulated by the training team. But the fact
is that the malingerers were a tiny minority of the command staff.

The majority were sincerely interested in the training project and
had hopes of achieving change. They were understandably cautious,
however, when the board raised a red flag of non-support by deciding
not to fund further overtime.

The board claimed that the city simply did not have the funds
to pay for the high overtime costs. This argument disintegrated,
however, under closer scrutiny. The board decided on the basis of
the August and September meetings which involved the total command
staff in pre-set times. The task forces had already decided by
October to hold their meetings at times suitable for the various shift
representatives. For example, the Organization Task Force rescheduled
their meetings from two o'clock in the afternoon to three o'clock or

three-thirty in the afternoon. They decided that this time period

ll9

would require only an hour overtime for the people on the four to
twelve o'clock shift and possibly an hour overtime for the day people.
Only those very few people who were on a day-off would be paid for

the full meeting time. This would have the effect of substantially
decreasing the overtime costs, but the board did not accept the Train-
ing Team's argument.

A second element that weakened their reason for the non-
overtime decision was that the city expended funds for extra purchases
and Special needs. In October, $2,500 was transferred to the police
department budget for the second deputy position. Furthermore,
another $l,9OO was transferred to the department in January, I97A, to
cover increased costs for the third deputy position. Finally, in
December, I973, the City Council approved an additional appropriation
of $2,000 to buy shotguns. It is obvious that money was available if
the board wanted to request it. Also obvious was that the Management
Development Program was not as high a priority as shotguns or new
positions.

Alteration of Task
Fotce Composition

 

 

The cumulative impact of these events on the task forces in
general was a 50-60 percent drop in attendance.

The effect of the events on the Operations Task Force peaked
at the end of October when attendance in a task force meeting reached
a low of three persons (see Figure 3). In addition, for the remaining
meetings of the task force, night shift members participated irregu-

larly if at all. The task force was composed essentially from that

l20

point on of daytime uniform personnel. One vital criterion for the
success of any task force operation is the participation by a repre-
sentative sample of the organization which will be affected by the
change. This representation was no longer true of the Operations
Task Force.

The Organization and Administration Task Force suffered the
least in terms of lost attendance since they had already rescheduled
their meetings to meet the needs of their members. At least three
members came to the meetings regularly even though they didn't receive
overtime pay.

The Communications Task Force by this time had shrunk to only
three active members. They had achieved their objective on location,
but had failed to take up the issue of in-service training and non-
sworn staffing of the communications unit. This occurred in spite of
the team member's efforts to keep the task force together by submitting
a complete training model for them to utilize. Shortly thereafter,
this task force dissolved.

The Training Task Force was the hardest hit by membership
loss; only one-third of its members remained active. Over and above
the overtime issue, two other factors played heavily on the cohesive-
ness of the task force. First was the announcement that Riverside
would be the headquarters for a federally funded regional police
training center.

The effect of this announcement superseded the objectives and
problems which the task force had set, since most felt the RPD would

no longer have a training operation. Second, a twenty-five man recruit

l2l

class had started with the Training Task Force chairman solely responsi-
ble for the training. The total impact was the dissolution of this

task force.

Operations Task Force Activity

During the first meeting in November it was necessary for the
Training Team member to Spend an extensive amount of time attempting
to increase the morale level of the task force which was still feeling
the impact of the events which precipitated the demise of two of the
task forces. Because the task force had already spent a considerable
amount of time on the space allocation problem, the energies of the
Training Team were focused on that problem area.

AS a result of a department-wide concern about the current
space allocation, the Administrative Aide had suggested that technical
assistance be secured from LEAA to do an architectural study. During
mid-November an architectural study team came to Riverside. At this
time they met with the chairman of the Operations Task Force. The
Training Team member attempted to set up a procedure which would insure
a link of communication between the Operations Task Force and the
architectural study.

Although the task force met regularly, there was growing
resistance by the task force members to work on their own and complete
staff studies for submission. They continued to be willing to discuss
problems and alternative solutions, but they never seemed to go beyond
that point. The attitude began to develop that they did not have the

time to work on staff studies and conveyed the impression that they

l22

felt participation on the task force voluntarily is all that should be
expected of them. They were willing to review proposals for and make
suggestions about staff studies, but they did not want to devote any
time outside of the task force meeting.

It was during this period of time that Planning and Research
developed a proposal for the annual census which involved manpower
allocation. This was presented to the task force as a vehicle to
obtain command staff support. The Operations Task Force reviewed the
proposals and both were approved after some modification. This pro-
posal was also approved by the Organization Task Force.

During a meeting in early December the chairman of the task
force resigned. The reasons given were numerous, but centered basically
on the frustration as a result of perceived non-support by top-level
administrators. The major point was that decisions were being made by
the ”administration” on matters which the task force was studying, and
no input was requested from the task force.

Cited as an example was a decision reached by the Operations
Task Force that the new communications center be located on the first
floor. This decision came out as a result of their study of space
allocation. Because their recommendation conflicted with the Communi-
cations Task Force, a joint meeting of all chairmen was called. They
agreed on the third floor site and reported this to their task forces.
Subsequently, rumors claimed that it was to be placed on the first
floor. The confusion frustrated the members, and the chairmen indi-
cated the futility of trying to submit proposals into an inefficient

organizational structure.

I23

Other examples cited were decisions by the Mayor's office and
the Board of Police to consider the purchase or lease of a garage
across from the station for vehicle use. Since the Operations Task
Force had focused on space allocation and the first information they
had received about this possibility was from the newspaper, it was
interpreted as an obvious affront to the task force operation. Finally,
since the architectural study team's first appearance in Riverside
there had been no contact between the team and the Operations Task
Force. The architect was basing his operation in Planning and Research.

It became necessary to determine if the Operations Task Force
wanted to continue to operate. This question was brought up in the
mid-December meeting when the chairman resigned. The members voted
unanimously to continue the task force arrangement and voted in a new
chairman. But they felt that some modification was necessary since

they did not believe they should be required to write the staff reports.

Other Task Force Activity

The Organization and Administration Task Force concentrated
on the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Manual during this period.
They decided to accept the Training Team member's suggestion that a
capable individual be assigned full time (on a temporary basis) to
work on the manual. The group submitted this proposal to the Chief,
and at the end of November a sergeant was assigned to Planning and
Research for the sole purpose of developing a procedure manual. The
team member and Planning and Research provided the individual with

models of manuals used by other police departments.

IZA

The procedures in the development of the manual were extensive.
The person working on the SOP collected all the Chief's memos, Chief's
orders, letters, and miscellaneous items related to the operations and
policy of the department. This material was synthesized and collated
to avoid duplication and to streamline the procedures. Discrepancies,
inconsistencies, and policy voids were cleared up by contacting appro-
priate command officials as the issues arose, rather than waiting until
they were collected in the new manual.

The task force heard periodic reports on the status of the SOP
and monitored its completion. The individual compiling the document
also became a member of the task force.

The task force also heard and discussed proposals for various
changes in the administrative structure, processes, and activities of
the organization. One such example was the building security plan sub-
mitted by Planning and Research. This form of activity continued to
be the routine of the task force efforts. Other larger problems, such
as the SOP, were handled separately.

As previously mentioned, the Training Task Force was dissolved
early in the project. The chairman, who had no time for task force
business due to recruit training, admitted that only one meeting had
occurred since the team's departure in September and that the meeting
was non-productive. A meeting was scheduled for the fourth week in
October when the team consultant was to conduct a lengthy discussion
of training materials. Only four participants attended this meeting,
one of whom resigned. Only a small portion of the material was

covered, and levels of response were minimal. After the meeting, the

I25

chairman was queried for an explanation of the poor response. He
enumerated the points mentioned above and also stated that his method
of communication had been a memo posted on the bulletin board. A
suggestion was made to use a more viable form of communication for the
next meeting. He indicated that he did not have time to devote to

the task force and asked the team to appoint a new chairman. He was
instructed to call the next meeting for that purpose. The meeting

was never called, and the task force disbanded. The Communications
Task Force dissipated after the decision was made to locate the com-

munications room on the third floor of the police station.

Summary and Conclusions

The effect of these critical events resulted in the dissolu-
tion of two task forces. The remaining two were active but showing
signs of possible dissolution. All of these elements, the critical
incidents and the behavior of the task forces, created some minor
changes in the role of the Training Team and forced them to evaluate
the process for possible remedies.

During the period under discussion, the Training Team spent a
considerable amount of time trying to get the task forces to focus on
their original objectives. Yet it became increasingly difficult to
maintain credibility with the task force members when major organiza-
tional changes occurred without the input of the task forces or the
training team.

The team attempted to solidify the channels of communication

between the city administration, including the CJPO and the command

l26

Staff. One facet of this effort was to request a news release from
the Mayor's office indicating his belief in and support of the project.
This request was raised in late September and again in early and mid-
October, but the statement did not appear in the newspaper until mid-
November, six weeks after the initial request. Apparently the Training
Team viewed the problems related to the project as more chronic than
did the city officials.

Given these deveIOpmentS, the decrease in attendance, and the
dissolution of two task forces, it was necessary to determine whether
to continue the project. The CJPO and the team jointly decided to
continue the effort with the two remaining task forces and those who
voluntarily attended.

The basic objectives did not change, although it was obvious
that with a 60% decrease in participation the overall production of
the task forces would be somewhat less. The Training Team members
assigned to Organization and Operations task forces continued to act
in the process-consultation model by acting as group facilitators and
resource persons.

The team member who had been assigned to the Training Task
Force modified his role in the training process. He began a training
needs and resource inventory to be used in the event that the Regional
Training Academy became a reality.

The fragile credibility relationship between the Training Team
and the task force was severely strained. The actions of the Chairman
of the Police Board contradicted what the Training Team had been

articulating to the task forces. These activities also indicated that

I27

the key leadership of the organization did not or would not understand
the purpose, rationale, or objectives of the program. Their activity
forced the Training Team away from training to healing wounds,
troubleshooting after the critical incidents, and interpreting those
actions for the task forces.

From this point forward the frustration level increased, the
training process suffered, and the task force productivity decreased.
The team, however, decided to try to pull the project back on course.
This decision was based on the assurance by the CJPO that no further
actions of a non-emergency nature would be initiated until the
project was completed or without the training consultants being
informed.

Obviously, as a result of the change in the task force compo-
sition, and the other events which were occurring, the role of the
Training Team was beginning to change. It, however, was not until
late December and early January that this began to be formalized.

In addition to this external event, some internal role changes
were developing within the operational procedure of the task forces.
Since the task forces were not initiating organizational change pro-
posals, Planning and Research became understandably frustrated in
the delay of change implementation. Planning and Research had identi-
fied areas of change and improvement which they perceived as being
ready for implementation and were impatiently waiting for the task
forces to request information and recommendations or take action. As
a result, Planning and Research began to take on the role of initiator

by submitting proposals to the task forces for their review.

l28

In December, the Training Team, CJPO, and Planning and Research
met to review the goal of the project, the operational procedures to
date, and the alternative procedures and modifications which could be
made to increase the activity of the task forces. The result was an
agreement that Planning and Research would continue to work through
the task forces and the Training Team would outline alternative pro-
cedures available to accomplish the training objective.

In January the team submitted an alternative letter to the
CJPO and the two remaining task forces. This letter contained several
alternatives including termination of the project. The task forces
and the CJPO independently favored an alternative suggestion requiring
the team to submit proposals to the task force. The team agreed and
began to reorganize its effort in that area.

MODIFICATION TWO: A CHANGE IN THE ROLES OF
THE PROJECT COMPONENTS

The necessity to further modify the program became apparent
to the Training Team and other components in late December and early
January. Internal and external events began to impact on the original
roles of the Training Team and the task forces.

During the months of November and December the Training Team
spent a considerable amount of time encouraging the task forces to
engage in self-initiated research and the development of proposals.

It was apparent that the departmental structure and dynamics did not

support or encourage the participants to engage in this type of

l29

modeling activity as part of their jobs. The task forces began to
show slack in their study efforts and in their motivation.

In late December a rumor was circulating within the police
department that there was going to be another major reorganization and
that a third deputy chief's position was going to be created. Attempts
to confirm this by members of the Training Team were fruitless. The
new director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office denied any
knowledge of such a reorganization. Attempts to meet with the new
chairman of the board were also without effect. Letters requesting a
meeting were unanswered and several attempts to locate him at his
florist shop were also fruitless.

The announcement of the creation of the third deputy position
in early January was done without giving prior information of the
decision to either the Training Team members or the task force
members. This key external event took both the Training Team and the
task force members completely by surprise with the exception of uncon-
firmed rumors, and made it extremely difficult for the Training Team
to maintain the posture that the Mayor, CJPO, and the Board of Police
were supportive of the original goals of the project. It was particu-
larly difficult to rationalize the original argument for not paying
overtime because the money was not available in view of the ready
accessibility of an additional $l,900 for a new third deputy chief.
Modification of the Roles of
Prgject Components

The letter outlining the alternatives available for the con-

tinuation of the project was submitted to the task forces in late

I30

January. Both the Operations and Organization task forces selected
by vote the alternative in which the Training Team would take a more
affirmative role in recommending change. This role was closely
aligned to the traditional consulting role.

In this modification the procedure was established whereby
the Training Team and Planning and Research developed models, studies,
and recommendations for organizational and operational change. These
models would be submitted to each task force for their approval, modi-
fication, or rejection. If approved either in the original or modified
form, they would be forwarded to the Chief (or Acting Chief, depending
on the status of the Chief's health) for approval. If they required
board approval, they would then be forwarded to the board. Obviously,
the team member was taking a more direct role in controlling and
supervising the task force which resulted from the second major modi-
fication. By changing the role from facilitators to initiators the
team also assumed more control over the agenda and, therefore, the

meetings.

Task Force Activity

 

In early January the Organizathmw Task Force experienced a
period, albeit brief, of revitalized energy. The group had to vote
for a new chairman. The increasing administrative duties which fell
to the person holding that position (because of the absence of the
Chief) forced him to resign the added burden of chairing the task
force. He did not, however, resign from the task force itself. The

new chairman was a night shift lieutenant around whom there had been

l3l

some controversy. He was viewed by the Mayor, Director of CJPO and
the Chief as a trouble maker.) The men of the department, however, had
high respect for him as a leader.

With any organization, new leadership brings in new ideas and
motivations. The meetings in January covered a number of issues and
topics. One suggestion discussed by the group involved the establish-
ment of a compensatory time-off system for attendance at staff
meetings. A second positive incident was the attendance of four
new members.

The team members submitted, as a result of the modification of
their role, material on job descriptions, personnel evaluation systems,
and transfer procedures for their evaluation. These documents were
not completed models. The objective was to have the task force
review these samples and modify them to fit their needs. The samples
were designed in such a way that it was a very short step from the
documents to a completed self-sufficient policy or procedure. The
task force, however, failed to respond to these documents in future
meetings. They claimed that there was too much material (only I
twenty pages had been submitted which covered five separate and inde-
pendent policies or procedures), but the team concluded that the task
force simply did not want to spend time on task force business outside
of the meeting arrangement. This attitude was supported by the lack
of organizational support for the administrators to perform these
functions as part of their daily responsibilities. The historical

pattern of administration simply had not created the atmosphere or

I32

provided the methods for administrative planning, studying, or imple-
menting new procedures.

At the end of February, the board ordered the transfer of the
person serving as chairman of the task force. He was shifted from the
north to the south command. The individual involved perceived this
action as an attempt to separate him from another active participant
on the task force. AS a result, he resigned as chairman and the task
force collapsed. All but two of the group felt that the transfer
resulted because the task force was beginning to move into an analysis
of the decision making process of the organization and the board to
determine the actual procedures involved. This interpretation was
supported by more than half-a-dozen commanders from all levels of the
organization. These persons believed that a message was included in
that transfer--don't attempt to change too much.

The training team could not document these allegations, but
the belief of the commanders, whether erroneous or distorted was sub-
stantial enough to question the rationale for the transfer and to
dissolve the task force.

The Operations Task Force engaged in little activity during
the months of January and February. Unlike the Organization Task
Force the change in leadership did not result in an infusion of new
momentum. Of the four meetings in January, three were called at the
initiative of either the Training Team member or Planning and Research.
During this period of time, the Training Team and Planning submitted
several proposals for their review. These included a Civil Disturbance

Unit proposal and one on the hiring and training of civilian dispatchers.

l33

The objective was to maintain momentum by focusing on items on which
the task force could reach closure. Both the Training Team and Plan-
ning and Research had a series of other proposals ready for
consideration. However, the collapse of the Organization/Administra-
tion Task Force took the steam out of Operations and the task force

dissolved by the end of February.

Summary and Conclusions

 

The elements necessary for organizational development to occur
simply did not materialize. Key administrators and officials operated
on the basis of short-range and ad hoc decision making. Their activi-
ties indicated that they either did not understand or ignored the
fundamental needs of the project.

The task forces existed longer than the team expected, given
the cumulative effect of the external incidents. Indeed,the dedica?
tion of some of the task force members to an all-out attempt to rectify
the problems of the department in spite of the setbacks was encouraging
to the Training Team.

For the duration of the project the Chief of the police depart-
ment was seriously ill and did not participate in the training project.
When he could attend to his duties the team attempted to bring him
up-to-date on the activities. This absence, however, created a
serious administrative vacuum which hindered the decision making
process in general and the task forces in particular. Top adminis-
trators were reluctant to take any action for fear of having their

decision reversed by the Chief at a later date. This stumbling block

I3A

affected the task forces because they saw the fruits of their effort
stalled in the decision process and ineffective in achieving imple-
mentation.

Another problem had developed with respect to the decision
making process. Ever since the overtime issue caused the de facto
selection process in the task force attendance there was a problem
of having sufficient chain of command present at task force meetings.
This often hampered decisions in that it gave the Acting Chief an
excuse for not approving proposals which came from the task forces.
An example of this problem occurred just before the remaining two
task forces dissolved.

The Planning and Research Unit developed a proposal for a
federally funded Civil Disturbance Unit. This proposal was presented
to the Operations Task Force. Present at that meeting were two
Uniform Division captains and two Uniform Division lieutenants. This
task force modified the proposal. It was then presented to the
Organizations Task Force. Present at this task force meeting was the
Deputy Chief of Staff Services (who was also acting Chief when the
Chief was absent), the captain of the Criminal Investigation Division,
two Uniform Division lieutenants and sergeants. This task force also
approved the proposal.

When the proposal reached the Chief's office, the Chief of
Police had returned briefly to duty. He approved the proposal and
forwarded it to the Board of Police. However, by the time the Board
of Police met to consider the proposal, the Chief had gone back on

Sick leave and the Deputy of Staff Services was acting as Chief. When

I35

the Board of Police asked the acting Chief his opinion on this pro-
posal, he stated that he felt it should be reviewed by the entire
command staff before approval by the Board. He made this response
even though he was present at the Organizations Task Force meeting
when it was approved. This was a strong indication that the Board
did not view the task forces as legitimate decision making bodies.

The dissolution of the two remaining task forces was obviously
a severe blow to the entire project. 'If the project was to continue
it would be necessary to reach some agreement between the department,
the Board of Police, the Criminal Justice Planning Office and the
Training Team regarding the future direction and commitment to the
program by each of the components.

MODIFICATION THREE: A CHANGE IN
THE TASK FORCE ARRANGEMENT

In early March the members of the team met with the CJPO and
members of the police board to discuss the status of the project.
This was the first time any member of the Training Team had the oppor-
tunity to meet with the new Chairman of the board Since his appointment
the previous November. In view of the collapse of the remaining task
forces, this meeting was necessary to determining the final thrust
of the project. The following alternatives were presented by the
Training Team:

I. Reinstate the original model with complete support from

the board and the Mayor. Included would be all of the
command staff participating in task forces. The sup-

port would require an order of mandatory attendance with
the payment of overtime.

I36

2. Terminate the project.

3. Continue the project with no task forces and have the
Training Team work in the traditional consultant role.

A. Continue the project with an Executive Task Force
made up of the division commanders and above. This
would require mandatory attendance at Executive Task
Force meetings and the payment of overtime for those
participating on off-duty time. This task force would
have to meet at least twice monthly during the remain-
ing two months of the project.

The decision made by the Training Team, the CJPO, and the Board
of Police created a condensed task force composed of the three deputies,
four captains, one lieutenant (staff services), and one sergeant (vice-
commander). The new group was called the Executive Task Force and
was to meet once a week until the end of May which was the termination
date for the project. Any night lieutenants who attended the meetings
would be paid overtime rates from project funds. All other personnel

on the task force who attended on off-duty time would be paid by the

department.

An Unfreezing Event

In the original model, the Training Team had proposed that
several members of the command should go to other departments for the
purpose of seeing how some departments operated. The plans for this
trip were postponed several times due to the unclear direction of the
project. The Training Team felt, however, that whatever the eventual
direction was, the trips would be of benefit to Riverside commanders.

In order to receive maximum benefits from such a trip, the
Training Team selected a department which was similar in size of

department and jurisdiction. The city was also selected to be similar

I37

in terms of operating under a Board of Police Commissioners. The
department selected was in a midwestern state and will be called
Middle City.

Middle City is approximately I35,000 in population. The Mid-
dle City Police Department has 250 sworn officers. The political
environment was similar to Riverside in that there was a strong Mayor-
City Council form of government. The Board of Police is composed of
eight members. The membership includes professions such as engineers
and lawyers, criminal justice educators and administrators, and
citizen representatives. This board is appointed by the Mayor but
serves for a definite period of time without regard to the tenure of
the Mayor. The Chief is appointed by the board and serves at their
pleasure. However, the distinct difference between this board and the
Riverside board is that in Middle City the board recognizes the Chief
as a professional police administrator and they act as a broad policy
making body.

The trip to Middle City occurred in March shortly before the
new Executive Task Force became functional. One deputy, one captain,
one lieutenant, two sergeants, and one police commissioner partici-
pated in the trip. The group was very impressed by the smooth
operation and obvious professionalism of the Middle City Police
Department. Once the group had seen a department of similar size
running far more efficiently than their own, they began to see the
value of the policies, models, and administrative leadership dis-

cussed in the task forces.

I38

In comparing Riverside Police Department to the department
they visited, they agreed that several areas within their department
and the board's present role needed improvement and change and that
better communications appeared to be a key to successful change. The
result of the trip was a meeting between the board members and the
command staff which reached some mutual agreements:

l. The command staff, at the insistence of the Board of

Police, agreed to meet twice weekly to discuss
department problems and improve internal communica-
tions.

2. The police board committed itself to attending

every fourth meeting to discuss areas of mutual con-
cern.

3. The police board committed itself to a thorough

review and consideration of all plans emanating
from the task forces and the team.

Modification of the Task
Force Arrangement

 

 

The new task force limited the number of personnel involved.
It also required that the team submit completed proposals to the task
forces for review. The team, at this point in the project, worked
primarily in the traditional consulting role. The team had resisted
this development, but the project history and the desires of the
police board and the CJPO combined to influence the team's decision.

This decision was based also on the team's desire to leave
the department with the basic administrative tools upon which they
could build. The combined task force was to accept the team's

recommendations for review. As a result of this arrangement the

I39

team submitted various plans and policies during the last phase of
the project. They included the following:

I. Job descriptions for the ranks

2. Performance evaluation system

3. Transfer policy

A. Improve records system design

5. Training resource and needs study

6. Reorganization plan

Finally, the standard operating procedure manual was also
completed by the task force. The manual went through three major
revisions before it was submitted for approval. A vast amount of
work and energy was expended by the individual assigned to compile
the SOP, the Planning and Research unit, and the task forces in their
effort to bring about an orderly master file of the numerous loose-
leaf binders which were filled with confusing and contradictory orders
and policies. At the time the project ended there were plans on the
part of the Board of Police to continue the weekly task force meet-

ings as a vehicle for department communication and decision making.

Chapter 5

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZA-

TIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

The model presented here is based on the research conducted
which consists of the Review of the Literature as well as the Case
Study. The author has drawn upon the experience of others in
organizational and management development as well as the experience of
the implementation of such a project in the Riverside Police Depart-
ment.

Business and industry have had over forty years of experience
with managerial and organizational deveIOpment. Although Significant
strides have been made from the initial efforts of management develop-
ment after World War II, leaders in the field would be the first to
state that organizational development is still an art, the tools of
which are far from being perfected. However, based on this experience
in the private sector and the research from the case Study, some
minimum criteria for a substantial program of organizational and

management development can be presented.

IAO

IAI

MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS

Explicit Commitment by Top
Level Management

 

 

It is crystal clear that the potential success of any deveIOp-
mental program is highly dependent on an explicit, overt and active
commitment by the top executives of any organization. This is a
predominant theme running through the literature of organizational
and management development and was vividly illustrated in the experi-
ence at Riverside.

At the outset of the program in Riverside, there appeared to
be this commitment. The Chairman of the Board of Police, who also
served in the dual role of Director of the Criminal Justice Planning
Office, guaranteed his full support of the project prior to its
implementation. However, this apparent support was short lived.

The first sign of erosion of support was the surprise announce-
ment of a reorganization plan by the Chairman. This was closely
followed by the cancellation of overtime pay by the Board of Police.
Repeated attempts to get the Mayor and the Board of Police to show
an increased level of commitment were fruitless.

It should be pointed out that organizational and management
development efforts in public agencies such as police departments may
differ from efforts in the private sector. Due to the complex
political environment, it is often extremely difficult to ascertain
where the exact focus of responsibilityland leadership exists. This
is particularly true in police departments which are organized with

a board of police.

M2

Boards of police vary in authority from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. The two ends of the spectrum are represented by the
situations in Riverside and Middle City.

In Riverside, the board was composed of laymen with little or
no administrative experience in the criminal justice system. However,
by historical tradition in New England, the Board of Police has com-
.plete administrative control over the department. This control ranges
from broad policy to daily operational decisions. The Chief of Police
was merely a figurehead who carried out the orders of the board. The
board in turn was completely responsive to the Mayor's dictates. Since
the members were appointed by the Mayor and served concurrently with
his term, they executed any directive he issued with respect to the
police department.

In contrast, the Middle City Police Board was composed of
professionals, several of whom had long careers in the criminal jus-
tice system. They, however, acknowledged that the Chief of Police
was the professional administrator of the department. Their role was
to determine broad policies and do long range planning for the depart-
ment. The total management system was the responsibility of the Chief.
Since the board in this case was elected by the populace, they owed
no political allegiance to the mayor or other political officials.

There is little definitive research on the roles of police
boards in various jurisdictions. Their existence in the political and
management scheme adds a degree of complexity in the process of ascer-
taining whether or not there is a total commitment to an organizational

or management development program. In Riverside, the commitment by the

M3

Chief could not be regarded as a commitment from the top management.
The Board of Police and the Mayor's commitment would be necessary.
However, in Middle City, the Chief is the top administrator and his
commitment to such a program would in all likelihood be sufficient.
An Understanding of the Devel-

Opmental Program by the
Participants

 

The understanding of the developmental program by the partici-
pants is in a sense the prerequisite for obtaining their commitment to
such a program. Any organizational or management deveIOpment program
which is implemented without this prior understanding will, at the
worst, fail, and at the least, be delayed in implementation.

This was the case in Riverside. It was apparent that little
groundwork had been laid by the top executives of the department.
This, in and of itself, may have not been fatal. It did, however,
at the very minimum, result in a loss of valuable time. Two months
were expended while the training team carried out activities designed
to introduce the command staff to the project and process.

This lack of an attempt to inform the participants is probably
an initial indicator of the top executives' commitment to 3 develop-

mental program.

An Unfreezing Process

There must exist both an organizational and individual predis-
position to change. The total organization must be able to recognize
the need for change and feel that change can be a positive effect

instead of negative. Inherent in the organizational predisposition

lhh

to change is that of the individual members of organizations. For
purposes of this discussion, the emphasis is on the managers of the
organization. 1

Many authorities feel that this predisposition to change can
best be brought about through some type of unfreezing process. This
unfreezing process with respect to the management level of the
organization can come about in a variety of ways. The most constantly
sighted is through an educational or training experience. This could
consist of a traditional management training program or a T-group
training experience.

One of the primary problems encountered at the Riverside
Police Department was this apparent lack of predisposition for change
on the part of the management of the organization. The data on the
background of the command staff indicated that they had little
cognitive conception of the management much less the change process.
They were locked into a somewhat static organizational structure and
the organization had experienced only unsatisfactory change efforts.

The value of an unfreezing event was demonstrated by the trip
of the command staff to Middle City. This was the beginning of the
attitudinal change which resulted in some interest in change toward
the end oftflmaproject. Had this event occurred much sooner with enough
commanders, the total project may have been more effective in changing
the organization. The added advantage of thistrjp>was that one of the
Police Commissioners also took the trip. This resulted in a change in
attitude on the part of all the Police Commissioners, thereby legiti-

matizing the change effort. This experience is consistent with the

IAS

concept of sending managers from business and industry to training pro-

grams which are external to the organization in an effort to unfreeze

old attitudes, concepts and behaviors.‘09

Reinforcement of the
Unfreezing Process

 

The antithesis to the necessity of an unfreezing program for
effective organizational develOpment is the need to capitalize on, and
reinforce the change in, attitudes and behavior which so often
accompanies the external training program.

If the manager has experienced such a change in his personal
outlook toward the organization, he will in all likelihood lose that
renewed spirit if the organization does not capitalize on it.”0
Management training for training's sake is a waste of time and
resources if it is not integrated with a total program of management
and organizational development.

Had a program of management training which was external to
the organizational environment taken place prior to the implementation
of the internal management development program at Riverside, it is
the author's opinion that more significant change would have occurred.
The managers would have been more predisposed to the change process
and in all likelihood would have had a higher level of competence in
managerial skill to cope with the task force problem solving process.

Unfortunately, by the very nature of the system of awarding

contracts which was used in the Riverside case, the Training Team did

 

'09Alban and Politt, p. A2. IIOQUiCk, P- 93°

I46

not have the necessary data available to realize a lack of managerial
training existed in the department. The original model, prOposal and
contract were based on the information supplied by the City of Riverside
in the Request for a Proposal. It was not until after the contract was
awarded and the project implemented that the Training Team was able to
obtain sufficient background data to make this determination. It is

the opinion of the author that the model would have had greater impact
with a group of managers predisposed to organization develOpment

through a series of off-site training seminars.

Third Partyilntervention

 

It is a generally accepted change concept that any substantial
organizational development program requires third party assistance,
typically in the form of a change agent acting in the consultation
role.111 This intervention process must be of a long term nature to
have lasting impact on the organization's ability to maintain the
developmental process after the intervention ceases.”2

In addition it should be long term in order that the change
agent(s) is able to learn enough about the organization and devel0p a
relationship of joint diagnosis with the managers.”3

By the very nature of a long term arrangement, the change

agent(s) develops a vested interest in the success of the change

program. All too often, consultants have been involved in recommended

 

IllAlan and Politt, p. #2. lleuick, p. 97.

1'3Kenny, p. 2l9.

lh7

change programs knowing full well that they will have no involvement
in their implementation.

The long term assistance process should identify and build a
reserve of resources within the organization which will help maintain
the change effort after the assistance has ceased. It will result in
the reduced reliance on substantial assistance in the future. In addi-
tion, once the organization is able to identify its own problems and
is aware of its own resources, it will be better able to ascertain the

exact nature of assistance it requires thereafter.

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL

The model presented here describes the components of an
organizational and management development program which meets the
previously outlined criteria. The model is contiguous in the sense
that all of the components must exist simultaneously or in close
proximity to each other.

Assessement of Support
by the Leadership

 

 

Since any organizational or management development program
requires the explicit support of the top administrators of the organiza-
tion, it is essential that an assessment of this leadership support be
conducted before proceeding with the developmental project.

Due to the political nature of a law enforcement agency, ascer-
taining the focus of authority may be difficult. This will depend on

the political structure of the jurisdiction in question as well as the

lh8

informal organizational structure. No such developmental program should
be undertaken until this has been resolved.

One initial indication of degree of commitment would be the
level of understanding of the program by the participants. If there
is an indication that the scheduled participants do not understand the
scope of the program, caution should be exercised in proceeding until
the commitment level is established.

This commitment must be continuous throughout the developmental
process. Provision for project termination should be made when this
commitment level is substantially reduced. In a few cases, the reduced
commitment level may occur intentionally. However, it is more likely
that it will result from a shift in the political makeup of the
jurisdiction or changes in the administration of the organization.
Management Development Training
External to the Organization

This component is essential for two reasons. First, the
management level of the organization must possess a minimal level of
management competency to cope with organizational change. These
skills are not inherited with promotion to management positions. They
must be deveIOped through the education and training process. Second,
for any organization to undergo a change program, the management level
of the oranization must have a positive attitude toward the develop-
mental effort. This is particularly true of law enforcement
organizations which are highly traditional in hierarchial organiza-

tional patterns.

M9

This required attitudinal change can most often be best accom-
plished through some type of management training or educational
experience. It is essential that the key management people of the
organization be periodically removed from the organizational environ-
ment and exposed to new concepts and attitudes.

Until recently the delivery of high quality, consistent
management training for law enforcement personnel has been limited.
There is, however, a developing effort which may serve to significantly
resolve this problem. As previously referred to in the Review of the
Literature, many states now have law enforcement training commissions
which are beginning to provide management training to supervisors,
middle managers and executives. It is the author's opinion that these
commissions provide the best promise for the delivery of a substantial
amount of the necessary management training experiences.

Since few departments can support an extensive management
training effort, any program of organization development requiring
participation of the management level should capitalize on the train-
ing efforts of these commissions.

Continuous Internal Management
Development Through Participa-

tion in the Organizational
DeveIOpment Effort

 

Management training is often fruitless unless the organization
capitalizes on the unfreezing effect of external training and reinforces
the newly acquired skills. This can be effectively accomplished if the

management training effort is linked to a program of organizational

150

development. Succinctly stated, organizational development and the
management training effort are mutually dependent.

Successful organizational development depends on the attitude
and skills of the management personnel. Conversely, the maintenance
of positive attitudes and newly acquired skills can be effectively

accomplished by the participation in organizational development efforts.

ang_Term Consulting Assistance

As previously indicated, any substantial developmental effort
requires long term third party intervention. Generally, this is in
the form of consulting services from a source external to the organiza-
tion. Both process consultation and technical assistance are usually
necessary. Essentially, an organizational development effort will
require a change in the relationship of various members of the organiza-
tion. This will require the services of someone with a background in
process consultation. Technical assistance will be required to pro-
vide a broad base of expertise which most law enforcement organizations
are not able to maintain on a full time basis.

Organizational development is a long term process. Few develop-
ment efforts which are short term in nature have lasting impact.
Generally, the organization will drift back to a status quo situation
after the program is terminated. The ultimate objective of any develop-
mental effort is to develop the skills and attitudes within the
organization which will allow it to sustain the change program with

minimal assistance.

l5l

It is difficult to estimate the length of time during which
third party intervention is necessary. This would depend on the state
of the agency as well as the status of the other components of this
model. It is doubtful, however, that a moderate to large police
department could be self sustaining in the change process with less
than a year of such assistance.

As with management training, few departments have the resources
readily available to secure long term assistance. Historically,
organizational development efforts in law enforcement have been of the
management survey type. These surveys are generally conducted by
independent consulting firms and are conducted on a contractual basis.

There is, however, a movement within some states to provide
consulting services to law enforcement agencies on a statewide basis
through the state law enforcement training commissions. A few
states such as California, New Jersey and Michigan have initiated such
efforts. This concept has received support from the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards. In its report,

The Police, the Commission recommended that ”every state should immedi-
llh
II

 

ately establish a management consultation service. They further

state that such service ”is a logical extension of the present services
HllS . .

rendered by these commussuons.
It would appear that consulting services provided by such an

agency would best support the type of organizational development effort

 

lthational Advisory Commission, The Police, PP~ 289'90-

”Slbid., p. 290.

l52

suggested by this model. The service would be readily available and
in all likelihood could be provided on a long term basis. In addi-
tion, it would appear that such an agency would have a vested interest
in the criminal justice system and would therefore strive to provide

a high quality service.
CONCLUSION

It is the author's opinion, based on the research presented
here, that a program of organizational and management development must
contain the minimum components of the above model. Due to the lack
of published research, few models for such developmental programs
exist in the law enforcement field. Essentially, the components are
derived from some of those models which have been utilized in the
private sector and were modified for testing in Riverside.

Further research is necessary to test additional models
from the private sector in public law enforcement agencies. This
research is essential if organizational development efforts are to
keep pace with the rapid rate of change which exists and to which law

enforcement agencies must be able to respond.

APPENDIX

l53

IEQNLHMMHHWHMNWW
HR
POLICE EXECUTIVES OF
THE RIVERSIDE POLICE DEPARIT‘ENT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTIONNAIRE #

 

l5’-I

l55

The questionnaire you have just received is long and detailed.
we hape that you will take your time filling in the answers and that
you will be as accurate as you can. We attempted to design the
questionniare to get the necessary information we need, but at the
same time not burden you with long answers.

The Information you provide will assist us in further organizing
the project. All information will be held In STRICT CONFIDENCE and
will only be seen by the Executive Development Training Team.

we thank you for your c00peration. Upon completion of the
questionnaire, please return in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.

l56

' STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

 

SECTION I

OCCUPATIONAL DATA

 

 

ill! ill I'll. . l
I I {II [all T II II. {I I] I I III

I57

 

STRICTLIZCONFIDENTIAL

#

 

OCCUPATION DATA

l. Present Occupational Title:

 

 

2. How long have you held this present position?

 

(total no. years)

3. How long have you been employed in this particular police
department?

 

(total no. yearSTvT

A. Please fill in the following section, listing all ranks held,
beginning with patrolman, Indicating the total number of years
spent at each level for the department presently employed in

only.

 

RANK YEARS

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. A) Have you ever held any positions within your present police
department as a civilian (as opposed to a sworn position)?

YES NO

 

 

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following Space .)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

 

#

 

B) If ”yes” above, please describe that job or position:

 

 

 

6. If you have been employed within your ppesent department for
sometime you undoubtly have enjoyed a variety of assignments
to the major Specialty areas found in municiple police service.
Would you summarize this information by filling in the box on
the next page, using the example below as your guide. Please
list all Operational and staff assignments. If all or part of
previous police service was outside of present department, see
section 7 also. (Using reverse chronology will probably help
your recall on this).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EXAMPLE
Specialty Area Rank Held Briefly Describe Duties No. of
Years
Patrol Div. Patrolman Routine Patrol 3 .
Juvenile Div. Patrolman Juvenile Officer I
. Investigated
Detective Div. Detective Property Crimes 2
Patrol Div. Sepgeant Watch Supervisor 3
Traffic Div. Sergeant Watch Supervisor
Patrol Div. Lieutenant Watch quervisor 3
Communications/Records Lieutenant Officer in Charge 3
Patrol Div. Captain Division Commander 3
Chief of Police A

 

 

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following space

l59

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
#7. fl

“"“

 

#

Briefly Describe Duties No. of Years

 

Specialty Area Rank Held

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(If you need more space, use the reverse side of this sheet)

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page

and check (X) the following space .)

I60

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
“W vvvvv

 

#

 

7. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT

A) List below in the spaces provided all full-time jobs which
you held previous to employment in your present department?
Include military service where applicable. Begin with the
last full time job held which immediately preceded your
present occupation and work backwards, chronologically,
from there; approximate where necessary.

 

Length of Time Brief Description of Job City and State

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following space.

 

l6l

 

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

#

 

7. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT, continued.

B) Have you held additional part or full-time jobs while
employed as a police officer?

I. YES NO

 

 

2. If yes, please describe below:

Brief Description of Job For How Long of a Period

 

 

 

 

 

 

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following Space .)

I62

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

#

 

SECTION II
EDUCATION AND

TRAINING DATA

 

I63
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

I
II. EDUCATION AND TRAINING DATA: Please check boxes where apprOpriate.

I. Grade School - check highest grade completed:

 

T—TB—Il—‘S—‘E—TB-(grades)
2. High School - check highest grade completed:

(grades)

9 I ll l2

3. Trade School - check highest grade completed:

 

 

I— T 3- What flilrwas taught?-

A. College and/or University - check highest full year completed:

 

1" 2" 3" 5" E" 3"
Did you receive a degree?

yes no
Check degrees received:

. . . . . . (Specify )

AA AS BA BS ' MA MS OTHER

What was your major area of study?

 

(Major Area of Study)

5. iLaw School - check highest full year completed.

 

Did you receive a degree?

ES fifi’

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following Space .)

I64
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

Are you a member of any state bar association?

YES NO (States)

 

 

6. List below all recruit and In-service training which you have

received from your present department or previous ones excludln
role-call training_pr other informal trainingsessions. (See
next section for FBI, SPI, Northwestern, and Michigan State
University courses).

Title of Training Session Length of Training Period

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following space .)

I65
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

#

List below all Special training received outside of your department,
i.e., FBI National Academy, FBI Regional Schools and Seminars, SPI,

Northwestern Traffic Institute, Police-Community Relations
Institute MSU, etc.

Title of Course Sponsoring Ageppy Length of Course

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(If you need more space, use the reverse side of this sheet.)

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions

very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following space .)

I66
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

#

 

8. List below all police or Similar professional journals/magazines/
newsletters to which you subscribe to or read regularly.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A
(Title?
B
(Titlé)*
C
(Title)
D
(Title)fi
E
TFTitle)
F
TTitIEY
G
(Title)
H

 

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following space .)

I67

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

9. Please answer the following questions in essay form. If you need
additional space, attach more sheets to this questionnaire.

A. What do you believe are the major strengths of the Riverside
Police Department?

I68

STRICTLY CONFVIDVENTIAL

 

#

B. What do you believe are the major weaknesses of the Riverside
Police Department?

I69

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

#

C. What action would you like to see taken to improve the
management of the organization?

I70

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

 

#

D. What are you best qualified to do to improve the management of
the organization?

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

 

 

 

1'3".

I7I

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS

American Society of Training Directors. Trainipg and Development
Handbook. New York: McGraw Hill, l967.

 

Andrews, Kenneth R. The Effectiveness of University Management Devel-
opment Programs. Boston: Harvard Press, l966.

 

 

Beckhard, Richard. Organizational Development Strategies and Models.
Reading: Addison Wesley, I973.

Bennis, Warren G. Organizational Development: Its Nature, Origins
and Prospects. Reading: Addison Wesley, l969.

 

Bennis, Warren G., and others (eds.). Planning of Change. New York:
Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, Inc., l969.

BOpp, William J. Pplice Personnel Administration. Boston: Holbrook
Press, Inc., I97AZ

Gammage, Allen Z. Police Training in the United States. Springfield:
Charles C. Thomas, l963.

Germann, A. C. Police Executive Development. Springfield: Charles C.
Thomas, I962.

Golembiewski, Rober T. Renewing Organizations: The Laboratory Approach
to Change. Itasca: Peacock Inc., l972.

House, Robert J. Management Development: Design, Evaluation, Imple-
mentation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, l967.

Kenney, John P. Police Administration. Springfield: Charles C.
Thomas, I972.

 

Marrow, Alfred J., David Bowers, and Stanley Seashore. Management by
Participation: Creating a Climate for Personal and OEgenizationaI
Change. New York: Harper and Rowe, l967i

Ordiorne, George 5. Training By Objectives. London: MacMillian Ltd.,

I970.

172

I73

Patten, Thomas H., Jr. (ed.). OD - Emerging Dimensions and Coppepts:
A Collection of Papers. Washington: American Society of Training
Directors, l972. '

 

The Police Foundation. Kanseg City Patrol Projects, I973. Washington:
The Police Foundation, l973.

Quick, Thomas. Your Role_in Task Force Management. Garden City:
Doubleday and Co., I972.

Reeves, Elton T. Management Development for the Line Manager. New
York: American Management Association, I972.

Roberts, T. J. Developing Effective Managers. London: Institute of
Personnel Management, I967.

Saunders, Carl B. Upgrading the American Police. Washington: The
Brookings Institute, I972.

Schein, Edgar. Process Consultation: Its Role in Organizational
Development. Reading: Addison Wesley, I969.

 

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.
The Police. Washington: Government Printing Office, l973.

 

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
Task Force Report: The Police.. Washington: Government Printing
Office, I967.

U.S. Department of Justice. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
Career DeveIOpment for Law Enforcement. A Technical Assistance
Publication resulting from research conducted by the Los Angeles
County Sheriff's Department. Washington: Government Printing
Office, l973.

PERIODICALS

Andrews, Kenneth R. ”Is Management Training Effective,” Harvard
Business Review, March-April, l957. PP. 155-66.

Anshen, Melvin. “Executive Development: In Company vs University
Programs,‘I Harvard Business Review, May-June, I957, pp. 83-89.

nu

Bernstein, Donald. ”Sensitivity Training and the Police,” Police,
May-June, I960, pp. 75-79.

Martin, John A. "Selection and Use of Outside Consultants: Suggested
Guidelines for Law Enforcement Executives,” Police, May-June, I970,
pp. 38-AO.

Maugham, Ian, and Gary L. Cooper. ”The Impact of T-Groups on Mana-
gerial Behavior,” The Journal of Management Studies, VI (October,

I969). 53-72.

Murphy, Patrick V. Portions of a Speech presented at Lehigh University
in Bethesda, Pennsylavnia, published in Crime Control Digest,
Volume 8, Number 30 (July 29, l97A), p. 3.

Newman, Charles L., and Barbara R. Price. ”Police Executive Develop-
ment: An Educational Program at Pennsylvania State University,”
The Police Chief, April, l97h, pp. 7h-76.

 

Reddin, W. J. ”The 3-D Organizational Effectiveness Program,” Train-
ing and Develppment Journal, March, I968, pp. 22-28.

Reeves, Elton T. Management Development: A Conceptual Continuum,”
Training and Development Journal, September, I968, pp. 29-35.

Tannenbaum, Robert, and Warren Schmidt. "How to Choose a Leadership
Pattern,” Harvard Business Review, March-April, I958, pp. 95-l0l.

Tilles, Seymour. ”Understanding the Consultants Role,” Harvard
Business Review, March-April, I96], pp. 87-98.

 

Williams, Derek. “Use of Role Theory in Management and Supervisory
Training,” The Journal of Management Studies, VI (October, I969),

pp. 3A6-65.

Wilson, John, Donald Mullen, and Robert Morton, ”Sensitivity Training
for Individual Growth - Team.Training for Organizational Develop-
ment,” Training and DeveIOpment Journal, January, I968, pp. A7-53.

Winn, Alexander. “The Laboratory Approach to Organizational Develop-
ment: A Tentative Model of Planned Change,” The Journal of
Management Studies, VI (May, I969), pp. I55-68.

I75
OTHER SOURCES

Dayton-Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center and Battelle
Center for Improved Education. ”Management by Objectives: Plan
to Increase the Effectiveness of the Dayton Police Department.”
Dayton: Dayton-Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center,
undated. (Mimeographed.)

Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council, Law Epforcement
Training in the United States: A Survey of State Law Enforcement
Training Commissions. Lansing: Michigan State Police, I972.

Nash, William C. “A Proposed Curriculum for Police Management Training
in the State of Michigan.” Unpublished graduate research paper,
Michigan State University, I972.

Voss, John T. ”An Evaluation of California State Personnel Board's
Management Development Institute." Unpublished master's thesis,
Michigan State University, I972.

"IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIls