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ABSTRACT

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

By

Dennis Wayne Catlin

This study addresses the problem of a lack of research in the law enforcement field with respect to the application of organizational and management development techniques to law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement agencies are feeling the extreme pressures of social change and must learn to adapt organizationally if they are not to become antiquated.

In the private sector, business and industry have had extensive experience with programs of organizational and management development for the last forty years. The need for such programs was the result of the rapid technological change which has been experienced. Organizations in the private sector have reached a point where they recognize that any program of management development will have a better chance of success if it is linked to an organizational development effort. Likewise, organizational development programs which do not incorporate a component of management development will find a reduced success ratio.

The case study presented here is a descriptive analysis of an organizational and management development program which was carried out over a period of ten months in a police department on the East

Coast. The department, referred to as Riverside, has a sworn complement of 250 officers and serves a city of approximately 96,000.

This program of organizational and management development utilized several of the techniques currently practiced in the private sector. It combined the use of process consultation with technical assistance as strategies of organizational development. In the original project model, the command staff composed of the ranks of sergeant and above, were to play an integral role in the organizational development effort. This was to be accomplished through their participation in task forces which were designed to identify organizational problems and develop alternative solutions. During the life of the project, several modifications of the processes were necessary primarily as a result of intervention into the project by various top administrators in the department and officials from the city's political structure.

As a result of the research in Riverside, this study concludes that there are five minimum criteria which should be met before any program of organizational and management development is undertaken in a law enforcement agency. These criteria are as follows:

- I. Explicit commitment to the program from top level management.
- II. An understanding of the developmental program by the participants.
- III. An unfreezing process consisting of education and training experiences for the management personnel which should occur external to the organization.
- IV. A reinforcement of the unfreezing process through management's participation in the organizational development process.

- V. A program of long term third party intervention in the change program.

As a result of the research, there is proposed a Contiguous Model for Organizational and Management Development which meets the criteria outlined. This model consists of the following four components which must exist simultaneously or in close proximity to each other:

- I. Assessment of support by the political and organizational leadership. This assessment should occur on a continuous basis throughout the developmental process.
- II. Management development training external to the organization. This can be accomplished through educational institutions or other programs such as those offered by state law enforcement training commissions.
- III. Continuous internal management development through participation in the organizational development effort.
- IV. Long term consulting assistance. This is presently offered by private organizations on a contractual basis. It is suggested that the current movement to have state law enforcement training commissions provide such service holds much promise in delivering high quality, long term assistance.

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

By

Dennis Wayne Catlin

A THESIS

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Chapter 1

THE PROBLEM

It is trite to note the accelerating pace of technological and social change, the pace is already taking on the qualities of a nightmare.¹

No research is needed to establish the validity of this statement; one needs only to look about or experience a few days of life. However, if a person were to look at the organizational life and structure of law enforcement agencies the validity might be in doubt. Law enforcement's response to change can be, at best, termed inadequate. Patrick V. Murphy, President of the Ford Foundation, recently stated that most police departments were "primitive" in meeting their responsibilities.²

Law enforcement must begin to adapt organizationally to the impact of change before it becomes an antiquated institution. The type of adaptability required for an adequate response to rising crime, increased bombings along with social unrest requires personnel in management positions who are adequately trained and educated to deal with organizational change. In addition to the change from

¹Alfred J. Marrow, David Bowers, and Stanley Seashore, Management by Participation: Creating a Climate for Personal and Organizational Change (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1967), p. 132.

²Portion of a speech given by Patrick V. Murphy at Lehigh University in Bethesda, Pennsylvania, published in Crime Control Digest, Volume VIII (July 29, 1974), 3.

without, law enforcement agencies are not immune to the widely spreading changes which are occurring in all work organizations. The once accepted concept of authoritarian leadership is being eroded away. There is an increased demand on the part of all employees to have some say in the direction of their destiny.³ This may crop up in the form of union demands or simply in the daily attitude of the officer toward his supervisor. This development means that managers and executives must adopt new leadership styles if they expect to maximize the utilization of the most precious commodity--human resources.⁴ Quick succinctly states it in this manner:

The authoritarian model (of leadership) does not have the flexibility that is necessary to make effective use of human resources. An innovating organization requires a different structure of the relationship between people. It requires a team organization rather than a command organization.⁵

The day has passed when the manager or executive in a law enforcement organization can operate by the seat of his pants. It is inescapable that the task for management is becoming more complex and demanding more expertise. Law enforcement managers will need systematic education and training to meet the demands placed on them.

The need for adequate management training which was so prominently reflected by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement

³Robert Tannenbaum and Warren Schmidt, "How to Choose a Leadership Pattern," Harvard Business Review, March-April 1958, p. 95.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Thomas Quick, Your Role in Task Force Management (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1972), p. 38.

and the Administration of Justice⁶ has been underscored by numerous authors and authorities and was most recently reconfirmed by the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.⁷

This study will look at the trends in development and training activities which are an integral part of attempts to upgrade the management and executive personnel in law enforcement agencies. It will present a contiguous model of organizational and management development based on a synthesis of the current trends in industry and business with the experience of the researcher in actually implementing a program of development in a law enforcement agency.

NEED FOR THE STUDY

In reviewing the report on the police developed by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, there is little doubt that the implementation of many of the standards will require significant organizational development efforts. The degree of organizational change required in many cases is staggering. For example, Standard 5.2 discusses consolidation of police services and recommends that "any minimum police agencies which employ fewer than ten employees should consider consolidation for improved police

⁶President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 141.

⁷National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, The Police (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 399.

efficiency and effectiveness."⁸ The Commission goes on to recommend consolidation at any level where it will improve the delivery of police services.⁹

The resultant organizational change required to implement this standard and many of the others will have to be dealt with by all law enforcement personnel. However, it could be suggested that the managers and executives will bear the brunt of the shock waves of any type of organizational development program to increase effectiveness. If law enforcement managers and executives are resisting organizational change based on total social change, how can they respond to the change thrust upon them by the Standards and Goals Report?

It would appear that any model for organizational change or development should include a management development component to expedite the change effort. In attempting to locate such organizational development models in law enforcement, the researcher, as others before him, has found the hunting sparse.

In fact the few published models of executive and management development, as will be pointed out in the next chapter, tend to be relatively limited in variety. These program models are with a few exceptions not integral parts of an overall organizational development effort. They tend to be programs which are held external to the organizational environment with the assumption that the improvement of management skills will hence improve organizational effectiveness. This assumption has met with serious doubt by other organizations in

⁸ Ibid., p. 109.

⁹ Ibid.

business and industry. It likewise deserves more than passing consideration for law enforcement if the development of effective managers is to meet the overwhelming demands of the occupation.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Business and industry responded to the technological revolution out of a sheer need for survival. They recognized the need for effective management development programs far sooner than did law enforcement and have been engaged in a long process of trial and error. It would seem ludicrous for law enforcement to engage in the replication of fruitless efforts.

This study is an attempt first of all to ascertain the current state of the art with respect to organizational and management development efforts in law enforcement. This, compared with experience of business and industry, should assist us in reducing wasted effort in programs which have proven to be of limited effectiveness in other organizational settings. Second, this study will contribute to the somewhat scarce body of knowledge in the field of organizational and management development in law enforcement. The case study reported here reflects an organizational change program with emphasis on a management development component.

Finally, this study has broad implications for the achievement of standards reported by the National Advisory Commission's Report which requires organizational change and development. The model presented in this study will provide some of the necessary support to the

achievement of those standards which would address themselves to management development components of organizational change programs.

THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

The objective of the research reported here essentially involves the attempt to evolve a model for the integration of a management training component into organizational development programs. The model which is presented in this study draws heavily on several developmental models currently utilized in business and industry.

Due to the conceptual nature of the model, the research objective is essentially exploratory in nature. Since this type of research objective did not lend itself to empirical testing, the descriptive case study was selected as the research methodology. Consistent with the case study methodology the research will rely heavily on the participant-observer technique supported by data obtained through interviews and administration of questionnaires.

The police department in which this project was carried out will be referred to as the Riverside Police Department. The author is sincerely indebted to those who participated in this project. Therefore, in order to report the findings as objectively as possible and still maintain the well deserved confidentiality of the participants, the author has arbitrarily selected a fictitious name for this city.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study addresses itself primarily to the methodology and process of management development. Therefore, only limited references will be made to curricula for management training.

The case study approach is subject to several methodological limitations. The researcher fully acknowledges the strong biased viewpoint which is inherent in the participant/observer technique. For that reason this study will not attempt to address the question of success measurement of this project.

The researcher also acknowledges the limitations imposed by a single case research design. Therefore, generalities resulting from the results of this research do not necessarily have global implications. Beckhard addresses this limitation with particular respect to organizational development strategies and models. He states that:

There are a number of cases in my own experience where a particular intervention or change strategy which was effective in one organization or under one set of conditions, has been borrowed and applied to another organization or set of conditions without any diagnosis as to its appropriateness in the second organization, this is a form of cookbook solution and it tends to produce failure rather than success.¹⁰

Therefore the purpose of this study will not be to generalize but rather to provide some insight to the management development process as it relates to law enforcement.

¹⁰Richard Beckhard, Organizational Development Strategies and Models (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1973), p. 96.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Organizational development is a term which has evolved over a period of time in the field of business and industry. It might be helpful to review definitions presented by two prominent authorities in the field of organizational development.

In defining the term organizational development, Winn states that organizational development:

Implies a normative re-educational strategy intended to effect systems of beliefs, values, and attitudes within the organization so that it can adapt better to the accelerated rate of change in technology, industrial environment, and our society in general It also includes formal organizational restructuring which is frequently initiated, facilitated and reinforced by the normative behavioral change.¹¹

Beckhard states that an organizational development program "involves a systematic diagnosis of the organization, the development of a strategic plan for improvement and the mobilization of resources to carry out the effort."¹²

For purposes of this paper, organizational development will be defined as a strategic plan which combines the systematic diagnosis of organizational problems and the development of a strategic plan for improvement of the organization in order that the organization will be able to respond efficiently and effectively to change. Management

¹¹Alexander Winn, "The Laboratory Approach to Organizational Development: A Tentative Model of Planned Change," The Journal of Management Studies, VI (May, 1969), 155.

¹²Beckhard, p. 2.

development for purposes of this paper will be considered one of the integral strategies for organizational development.

Management development is also a term which has a variety of meanings. In the narrowest scope the term applies strictly to programs of management training. In the broadest sense, management development would include a total program of personnel development involving forecasting of personnel resource needs, a system of personnel promotion, along with a system of personnel evaluation. In the fields of business and industry management development experts heavily rely on complex systems of forecasting personnel resources in terms of management and a resulting complex system for management replacement. For purposes of this paper, the term management development will primarily deal with the training aspect of a developmental program with some consideration for personnel evaluation and promotion.

FORMAT OF THE STUDY

Chapter 2 of this study will present a review of the literature with respect to organizational and management development efforts in business and industry as well as law enforcement. The bulk of the literature review focuses on business and industry's efforts since they have pioneered the field and law enforcement is just beginning to take its first journey into the territory.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in the research reported in this study. The research is a descriptive analysis of the implementation of an organizational and management development model in the Riverside Police Department.

Chapter 4 presents the case study along with a descriptive analysis of the implementation of the original model and the subsequent modifications of the model which occurred.

Chapter 5 presents a contiguous model for law enforcement and organizational development. It is important to stress at this time that the model is not derived solely from the case study. Rather it is derived from a synthesis of material researched and presented in the review of the literature using the case study as a template. In essence, the development of this model was the goal of this entire study.

Chapter 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

Little has changed since Germann wrote in 1962 that "there is a significant deficiency in the amount of material available to the researcher on police executive development."¹³ If there is a lack of literature on police executive development, there is even less directly relating to organizational development efforts within law enforcement.

The author must, as others before him, rely on the material from the fields of business and industry regarding organizational and management development experiences. It would prove valuable for law enforcement to consider the management development trends in business and industry and their evolution since the beginning efforts just after World War II.¹⁴

By comparing current law enforcement management development techniques with the various stages through which business and industry have passed, it is possible to assess the state of the art with respect to law enforcement. Even more importantly, it may assist in avoided wasteful replications of efforts which have already been tried

¹³A. C. Germann, Police Executive Development (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1962), p. 12.

¹⁴Elton T. Reeves, "Management Development: A Conceptual Continuum," Training and Development Journal, September, 1968, p. 3.

and proven questionable in effect. Finally, such a comparison and analysis of the literature is of primary importance with regard to this work since it seeks to present a model of organizational development with emphasis on the management development component of such a model. In this manner law enforcement can avoid the trial and error stages which were experienced by business and industry. Once law enforcement has reached that point, it can fully realize the maximum benefits of further experimental and developmental work done in the field of business. This in essence will facilitate the technical transfer of such efforts from business and industry to law enforcement, thereby reducing the necessity for multiple efforts in each field.

This review of the literature will focus on (1) the trends of management development in business and industry, (2) strategies of organizational development with particular emphasis on the management development component, and (3) management and organizational development efforts in the field of law enforcement.

It will be seen that there has been a definite trend in the emphasis of management development in business and industry from its inception after World War II to the present. At the outset management development programs placed emphasis on the individual manager. These efforts aimed at increasing the individual manager's competence in almost complete isolation from his organization; the general thesis being that if the manager is more effective he will make the organization more effective. Slowly this concept gave way to a more organizationally based philosophy of management development. This resulted from the apparent problem of transfer from the training

environment to the organizational setting. There emerged training efforts which were designed to facilitate the transfer of this training to the organizational setting. Most recently, the emphasis has been toward what can be termed an organic approach to management development. It can be viewed as an attempt to merge all of the traditional methods of organizational development such as consulting, utilization of task forces, and change agent theory, with the management development function to make the two contiguous.

The available material relating to organizational and management development in law enforcement is somewhat limited in nature and narrow in scope. The researcher could locate no published literature which dealt with a conscious effort to merge organizational development strategies with a program of management development. Therefore materials of a more general nature will be presented.

MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: FROM THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE ORGANIZATION

Introduction

In the reporting of the material compiled under this section of the review of the literature it would be convenient if one could develop discrete categories of management development techniques which have evolved over the past thirty years. However, due to the evolutionary nature of the process, the material does not lend itself to such neat boundaries of division.

The early programs placed the responsibility for management development on the individual manager. Programs of executive development

were almost exclusively of the college or university type in which the manager was removed from his organizational environment. He was expected to increase his competency in such a setting and upon return to the organization be a more effective manager and increase the effectiveness of the organization. These programs dealt almost entirely with material of a cognitive nature and of practical emphasis. The lengthy university programs gave way to short courses and seminars.

In the early sixties there emerged the philosophy that effective management was a function of the manager's skill in human relations. There resulted a proliferation of what has been termed sensitivity training or T-group training. In the initial stages this T-group training was conducted in what was termed "stranger" laboratories. As in the past the manager was removed from his organizational environment and the training took place in isolation from the organization with other individuals with whom the manager had no working relationship. These efforts experienced the same problems as the prior developmental programs. Little or no evidence of transfer of skill, ability, or attitudes from the training environment to the organizational setting was evident.¹⁵ This led to the development of what is termed Cousin and Family T-group training programs. The Cousin T-group training programs involved managers from the same organization who did not work together and were trained in the same laboratory setting. A further modification of this is the Family

¹⁵Quick, p. 97.

T-group setting where those who had working relationships were trained in the same program.

The change from emphasis on seminars and college programs to T-group training was a change from cognitive and skill oriented training to affective or attitudinal training. From the Family T-group training emerged such efforts as organizational task forces and team building development programs.

Currently, there is a prevailing philosophy which could be termed an organic orientation to management development. Theorists have recognized that there are beneficial effects to all of the previously attempted efforts in management development when they are merged with general strategies of organizational development and utilized in an eclectic fashion.

For purposes of some structure the material in this section will be presented in the following manner: (1) A presentation of total material related to programs which emphasized a responsibility of the individual manager to develop skills and transfer those to the organizational setting. Included will be a discussion of university and college programs, seminars, short courses, and T-group training which are conducted outside of the organizational environment. (2) Material dealing with the initial efforts to overcome the problem of training transfer from the classroom or T-group training sessions to the organizational setting. This would include such management development techniques as cousin and family T-groups, team building, and task force decision making. Also a discussion of those efforts which merge organizational development strategies with the management development

process. Included in this discussion will be general techniques of organizational development such as the traditional consulting model, process consultation technique, and the managerial grid theory of organizational and management development.

Management Development Efforts
Emphasizing the Development of
Individual Competence

College and university programs were the first sources of management development training for business and industry. The first of these appeared on the scene in approximately 1948.¹⁶ The initial growth of such programs was slow at first but steadily increased in popularity. House reported in 1967 that:

In 1953 only four universities offered programs specifically conceived and directed for executives, whereas today more than 40 universities offer advanced management training ranging in duration from several weeks to several months.¹⁷

Among the various college and university programs, there tends to be a similarity of emphasis not only with regard to philosophy but also the general course content. Andrews, in a 1966 report of a study of 39 such programs, found that there was remarkable similarity in stated program purpose.¹⁸

¹⁶Robert J. House, Management Development: Design, Evaluation, Implementation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 10.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁸Kenneth R. Andrews, The Effectiveness of University Management Development Programs (Boston: Harvard Press, 1966), p. 37.

All the programs aimed to broaden, that is to expose men to new horizons and to enlarge their outlook toward the events taking place around them.¹⁹

He further states that most of the courses taught fall into the following eight general categories:

1. Human problems of administration in business organization
2. Labor relations
3. Policy formulation, general management or the tasks of top management
4. Social economic and political environment of business
5. Marketing management
6. Financial management
7. Control, accounting, and other uses of quantitative data
8. Personal improvement courses (public speaking, speed reading, conference leading, executive health, etc.)²⁰

The general methodology of training in these programs relies heavily on lectures and discussion groups more recently combined with role playing and decision making exercises.²¹

This type of management development program is generally long term in nature varying in length from three or four weeks to six, nine, and even twelve weeks.²² One of the advantages is the uninterrupted attention given to the course since the manager has been released from

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 39.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

²¹ Derek Williams, "Uses of Role Theory in Management and Supervisory Training," The Journal of Management Studies, VI (October, 1969), 43.

²² American Society of Training Directors, Training and Development Handbook (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 391.

daily responsibilities and there is a concentration of effort which maximizes the potential benefit.²³ Perhaps one of the greatest benefits is that which is most widely acknowledged by the participants. It is expressed as an opportunity to:

Rub his mind against the minds of executives from other industries, companies, functions and places . . . his imagination is stirred by discovering that other organizations facing problems similar to those confronted by his own firm have used different solutions successfully. Formally and informally in daytime classes and in nighttime bull sessions his thinking is challenged, prodded, stimulated, exercised and broadened.²⁴

Another advantage closely related to the foregoing although somewhat more subtle is:

The physical and psychological removal of the executive from the presence, the pressures, and the overall atmosphere of his job. He leaves his office, company, and his family for several weeks or months, and he lives in a wholly new environment. He experiences indefinable yet valuable personal release of the kind commonly associated with a change of scene as on a vacation. He gains a sense of perspective, a chance to look back at his job and the way he has been handling it without the distractions of company affairs and families, and free from the presence of decisions, deadlines and commitments.²⁵

Another author puts it in these terms:

These programs or courses inject an external viewpoint on problems and offer a breadth of background not available internally the exchange of viewpoints can modify attitudes, create new interest, develop tolerance of others' ideas, and

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Melvin Anshen, "Executive Development: In Company vs University Programs," Harvard Business Review, May-June, 1957, p. 85.

²⁵ Ibid.

help in highlighting changes in political and social conditions the academic atmosphere accompanying certain of these programs stimulates some people to acquire a deeper knowledge of the subject matter.²⁶

Closely related to the college and university programs are those which can be characterized as seminar in nature. These are essentially shorter versions of the university programs. Generally, they range in length from a few days to a week or so.²⁷ Nevertheless the course content and methodology are markedly similar. They are predominantly classroom oriented utilizing lectures, small group discussion, role playing and simulation.²⁸ One of the major reasons for the great popularity of the seminar approach is based on the tenet that a great deal of information can be provided to a large number of people at one time, thus reducing the "exposure to training cost per person."²⁹

It is easily concluded from both the course content and methodology of university and seminar development programs that the emphasis is on imparting the cognitive types of knowledge and skills. There is an emphasis on the individual with little or no consideration for the organizational environment from which the manager has come and to which he must return. The assumption is that if the manager becomes more competent through a management development program he will be able to increase the effectiveness of his organization upon

²⁶American Society of Training Directors, p. 39.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Elton T. Reeves, Management Development for the Line Manager (New York: American Management Association, 1972), p. 65.

²⁹House, p. 65.

his return.³⁰ These programs are conceived and designed on the assumption that the participant's organizational climate is favorable for development.³¹ Because the participants in the programs come from many firms and industries the content material must take a general approach.

This necessitates further interpretation of the material by the individual for his personal use. Without later encouragement, this interpretation is frequently neglected, thereby possibly minimizing the return from the training by making the transition to the work situation more difficult.³²

Another concern with respect to management seminars and university programs is the matter of supply and demand. Even with the proliferation of seminars, university programs, and short courses there are not enough programs of this type to satisfy the demand.³³ If companies rely on this form of management development, there tends to result a shotgun pattern which appears to be wasteful since it does not provide a continuous pattern of development.³⁴ Nevertheless, seminars and college programs still provide a significant amount of the management development training occurring in this country.

³⁰ John Wilson, Donald Mullen, and Robert Morton, "Sensitivity Training for Individual Growth-Team Training for Organizational Development," Training and Development Journal, January, 1968, p. 47.

³¹ Andrews, The Effectiveness of University Management Development Programs.

³² American Society of Training Directors, p. 39.

³³ Anshen, p. 34.

³⁴ Kenneth R. Andrews, "Is Management Training Effective," Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1957, p. 71.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was an increased interest in the role which human and interpersonal relations played in organizational effectiveness. Out of this fascination grew the management programs which are based on sensitivity training principles. The primary vehicle of sensitivity training outside of the organizational setting is the Basic T-group.³⁵

Golembiewski in discussing T-group training states:

The Basic T-group or sensitivity training group deals largely with personal learning about the self in interpersonal group situations. In roughest terms the Basic T-group ("T" is for "training") may be defined as a small group of a dozen or so "normals" generally strangers who meet in an "unstructured setting" for an extended period of time with a "Trainer" having a strong background in the behavioral sciences. By "unstructured setting" is meant that the Basic T-groups typically have no specific task to perform, and the focus is on learning from the inter-reactions generated in whatever activities they engage in. The trainer plays a critical role in this purposive early non-directness.³⁶

Ordiorne describes the T-group in the following manner:

T-groups have also been defined as "developmental groups," "laboratory education," leaderless groups. Their essence is the playing down of an overt behavior on the part of the trainer with the actions of the group during a session being determined by the members. Its emphasis is usually on the "here and now." The group has no purpose assigned to it by authority figures, but it is usually understood that it is to be a training session to study interpersonal relations in groups.³⁷

³⁵Georges S. Ordiorne, Training by Objectives (London: MacMillan Ltd., 1970), p. 51.

³⁶Robert T. Golembiewski, Renewing Organizations: The Laboratory Approach to Planned Change (Itasca: Peacock Inc., 1972), p. 74.

³⁷Ordiorne, loc. cit.

It is interesting to note that T-group training in terms of course content and methodologies is an antithesis to the seminar and university programs. While the seminar and university programs emphasize cognitive knowledge and managerial skills there is little emphasis on attempts to change attitudes. The T-group has as its primary goal the change of attitudes regarding interpersonal relations and behavior. With respect to this, Winn points out that the "T-group represents a complete change from learning situations participants have been accustomed to. The concern of the T-group is with the immediate, existential confrontation and the 'here and now' experience."³⁸

The goals of T-group training have been summarized by one author as follows:

T-groups have two major purposes. First their members analyze the data generated by their own here and now interactions. These interactions cover a broad range. Thus T-group members:

1. Explore the impact of their behaviors, values and attitudes on others.
2. Determine whether they want to change their behaviors, values or attitudes.
3. Experiment with new behaviors, values or attitudes if individuals consider change is desirable.
4. Develop awareness of how groups can both stimulate and inhibit personal growth and decision making.

The second goal of T-group members is to work to develop insight and behavioral skills to facilitate both analysis and action in the T-group as well as in back home situations.³⁹

³⁸Winn, p. 157.

³⁹Golembiewski, p. 76.

At the end of a T-group training session "a successful participant as he knows himself at the end of his T-group experience, will be much the same person as he is known to others."⁴⁰

Since literally thousands of managers and executives have been trained utilizing the human relations training method or T-group training, one might assume that it has received major acceptance by those who were considered authorities in the field of management development. However, this is not entirely the case. Its proponents as well as its opponents are sharply divided with respect to the effectiveness and desirability of utilizing this technique of management development. One of its strongest opponents states that:

A detailed study of the periodicals in which research reports on effectiveness of sensitivity training might have been reported between 1948 and 1961 shows that not a single conclusive piece of research has been reported that proves that sensitivity training changes behavior of trainees overtly back on the job leading figures in the field flatly state that there is no evidence that sensitivity training changes behavior back on the job.⁴¹

In a sense, we encounter a problem here which is similar to that of the traditional university and seminar approach. It is essentially the question of transfer of learning, or in this case a transfer in the behavior change to the job situation. As Maugham observes:

A change of attitude or behavior in a training situation does not necessarily imply the changes will be transferred to the work situation back home, nor does it signify that the

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 75.

⁴¹ Ordiorne, pp. 52-53.

changes will be maintained over a long period of time and both of these are prerequisites for effective managerial training.⁴²

Winn succinctly states the problem in the following manner:

The critical question here is the question of transfer. How does one transfer one's insight, the deeper understanding of group phenomena, the realization of how one's behavior affects others, from a micro-culture of a laboratory into the outside world?⁴³

He goes on to reflect that the culture in most organizations tends to undermine new learning and that the theories with which the participants return to the organizational setting are of the "magic mountain variety."⁴⁴

Those who strongly support sensitivity or T-group training are just as adamant as the opponents in providing rationale and evidence which supports transfer of training and the production of a change which is sustained in the on-the-job situation.⁴⁵ The most often described benefit of T-group training is that it tends to unfreeze old behavioral patterns.⁴⁶ Sensitivity training has often been used in organizations which require significant change to increase their effectiveness. In these cases, the unfreezing events incurred by utilization of sensitivity training have been used with success in

⁴²Iain Maugham and Gary L. Cooper, "The Impact of T-Groups on Managerial Behavior," The Journal of Management Studies, VI (October, 1969), 55.

⁴³Winn, p. 158.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 159.

⁴⁵Wilson, Mullen, and Morton, p. 48.

⁴⁶Golembiewski, p. 74.

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order that change might begin within the organization.⁴⁷ Alban and Politt view the use of T-groups in the following context:

Many of us have found the T-group experience enormously helpful in developing awareness of ourselves and the other people that we live and work with. The problem is that relationships are fundamentally different when bosses and subordinates are together and the power is unequal and that changes everything.⁴⁸

To summarize, the review of the literature thus far has dealt with those management development programs which are typically provided outside of the organizational environment. We have looked at the university and college programs and seminars which are primarily aimed at providing managerial knowledge and skills to the participants. The Basic T-group has also been discussed. It is important to note that even though the T-group represents a significant deviation from the traditional management training program it still holds in common many of the problems and disadvantages of the traditional type of program. Both traditional and sensitivity training programs can be most validly criticized on the point that there is little evidence of significant impact on organizational effectiveness. Both types of training programs have the common problem of transferring knowledge and skills or a change in attitudinal behavior to the organizational setting. Those who receive sensitivity training are not necessarily more considerate of their employees than when they left. Those who have obtained

⁴⁷ Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore, p. 232.

⁴⁸ Billie T. Alban, L. Irving Politt, "Team Building," O.D. - Emerging Dimensions and Concepts: A Collection of Papers, ed. Thomas H. Patten, Jr. (Washington: American Society of Training Directors, 1972), p. 33.

specific management and executive skills may not be able to implement or utilize those skills unless the organizational environment is conducive to supporting the use of new skills and/or changed behavior.

House points out that:

A good deal of theory and research advanced in the last several years suggests that management development efforts must be more broadly based and more than mere classroom exercises by being designed to fit into or change the existing organizational climate.⁴⁹

By the very nature of the fact that the management development programs discussed here occur in isolation from the organizational setting it would be a serious error for any organization to rely exclusively on this type of management development.

The primary benefits reaped from these types of training programs are in terms of their ability to unfreeze old behavioral patterns and stimulate the participants. This can be used to great advantage by developing a predisposition for organizational change and development.⁵⁰

Management Development as a Component of Organizational Development

As indicated previously, one of the problems experienced with traditional management development techniques and Basic T-group programs is the problem of transfer of the skills, knowledge and change

⁴⁹House, p. 31.

⁵⁰John T. Voss, "An Evaluation of California State Personnel Board's Management Development Institute" (unpublished master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1972), p. 30.

of attitude to the job setting. Recognizing this, those who have been involved in management training sought a method to facilitate this transfer.⁵¹ As some authorities point out, "management training programs have often been ineffective not because they were bad programs but because they were not integrated with other aspects of the total organizational system."⁵² House feels:

Studies clearly demonstrate that if development is to be successful it must be geared not only to the participant's needs and learning abilities but also to the particular requirements and practices of the organization in which he manages.⁵³

The resulting trend was toward management development taking place in the organizational setting utilizing some of the strategies and methods which have become associated with total programs of organizational development.

It is necessary to review some of the material regarding techniques and strategies of organizational development with respect to those which have application to management development techniques. Since the material addressing itself to the total field of organizational development is voluminous, the scope of the review will be narrowed to those strategies which can be directly related to management development.

Organizational development is a term which has evolved in the literature and the precise meaning of which is not always agreed

⁵¹House, p. 102.

⁵²Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore, p. 227.

⁵³House, p. 11.

upon. For example, Bennis describes organizational development as "a response to change, a complex educational strategy intended to change beliefs, attitudes, values, and structures of organization" ⁵⁴ Beckhard, on the other hand, states that "an organizational development program involves a systematic diagnosis of the organization, the development of a strategic plan for improvement, and the mobilization of resources to carry out the effort." ⁵⁵ Even though the definitions of organizational development differ from author to author, there is general agreement that organizational development includes management developmental efforts. ⁵⁶

Since management development is in essence educational strategy, there is an almost essential necessity for the presence of some type of change agent in the form of a consultant, trainer, or teacher. The change agent for the most part is external to the organization or client system. ⁵⁷ Whatever the role of the change agent is, his primary function is to facilitate the improvement of the organization through various techniques and strategies of intervention. The trend toward organizational development as the focal point for management development programs is exemplified by the fact that those who were at one time in positions of management development have now moved into organizational development roles. ⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Warren G. Bennis, Organizational Development: Its Nature, Origin, and Prospects (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 2.

⁵⁵ Beckhard, p. 2.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 49.

⁵⁷ Bennis, pp. 11-12.

⁵⁸ Beckhard, p. 21.

One of the first management development strategies which has found its way into the organizational setting is a modified version of the Basic T-group. This modification is in the form of what is now described as the Variant T-group. The Variant T-group is essentially the same in purpose and goals as the Basic T-group with the exception that the participants are composed of individuals who normally work together.⁵⁹ This form of T-group is often called a "core group," "action group," or "family group."⁶⁰ Another form of the Variant T-group is the "Cousin" T-group. This type is composed of participants who work for the same organization, but do not necessarily work with each other.⁶¹ The "family" T-group is most consistent with organizational development efforts. Winn in his experience with T-group training at Alcan of Canada indicates that although they had used the basic stranger and cousin T-groups they were not as successful as had been hoped. They turned then to the organizational T-group which "establishes a form of reference for working through and managing conflict."⁶²

Even though the essential idea is that the T-group has now been placed in the organizational setting to effect behavioral and attitudinal change with respect to members of that organization, there is still much controversy with respect to its effectiveness and the advisability of using this type of training vehicle. At least one author has serious doubts about the advisability of utilizing T-group

⁵⁹Golembiewski, p. 74.

⁶⁰Winn, p. 161.

⁶¹Quick, p. 97.

⁶²Winn, p. 56.

training either for the individual or in an organizational setting since it is a powerful method to change attitudes and behaviors. He suggests:

At present it is virtually impossible to predict the consequences of T-group training for any individual or organization. The limited evidence concerning the conditions required for effective use of T-groups prompts us to recommend that this be used only for experimental methods conducted under conditions permitting useful observation of the emotional responses of participants.⁶³

In many organizations the family T-group has given way to organizational training laboratories which differ from the T-group in terms of their goals. Maugham and Cooper describe the purpose of organizational training laboratories as being:

- A. To identify problems facing the work group system and the reasons for their existence.
- B. To invent possible solutions to the problems in the form of needed system changes.
- C. To plan implementation of these solutions through regular and newly constructed channels.⁶⁴

The organizational T-group represents a move away from the strict human and interpersonal relations training of the T-group setting to a more problem centered goal directed training group. As Winn puts it, "the laboratory approach places the stress on assembling competencies necessary to do the job, on team management and on problem solving."⁶⁵

⁶³House, p. 71.

⁶⁴Maugham and Cooper, p. 67.

⁶⁵Winn, p. 163.

It is not difficult to infer from the material relating to the use of family T-groups and organizational training laboratories that one of the obvious goals is to develop a team approach to organizational development. In the case of the family T-group, the goal is to develop a management team which will be able to relate effectively to each other and to the organization as a whole. The organizational training laboratory is much like the T-group program with the exception of the fact that it leads to team building for the purpose of accomplishing some specific organizational goal. However, there are those who are involved in organizational and management development who feel that team building should be centered around the accomplishment of organizational tasks.⁶⁶

Team building as a management development strategy often takes place in work groups or task force settings in organizations. The purpose is to improve the effectiveness and ability of the group to diagnose and analyze their problems, develop decision making ability, and implement strategies of organizational change.⁶⁷

An effective management team as defined by one author includes a number of features such as:

(1) understanding, mutual agreement and identification regarding the goals of the group; (2) open communication; (3) mutual trust; (4) mutual support; (5) effective management of conflict; (6) developing a selective and appropriate use of the team concept; (7) utilizing appropriate member skills and (8) developing appropriate leadership.⁶⁸

⁶⁶Alban and Politt, p. 33.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 38-40.

⁶⁸Bennis, p. 2.

The use of task forces in organizations has become a major tool for team building and organizational development. Some innovative theorists in organizational development feel that the task force concept could be the key to organizations of the future. Such organizational structure would not be hierarchical in nature but would be composed of task forces of individuals with a wide range of skill.⁶⁹ The major bonus of using task forces in organizational change efforts is that it becomes an effective tool for management development.⁷⁰

With few exceptions, organizational development efforts entail the use of a change agent. The role of the change agent may vary from trainer to traditional consultant.

The oldest form of organizational development efforts were centered around a change agent role which is of the traditional consultant model. These change efforts are typically referred to in terms such as organizational survey or management studies. In these change programs the consultant was invited by the organization to conduct a study and make recommendations for organizational improvement.

In the literature the relationship between the client organization and the consultant is often compared to a doctor-patient relationship.⁷¹ In this analogy the client organization asks the consultant

⁶⁹Quick, p. 40.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 58.

⁷¹Warren G. Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," Planning of Change, eds. Warren G. Bennis and others (New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. 71.

to come to the organization, diagnose its problem(s) and recommend solutions which will cure the organization of its ills. Too often, however, the recommended solutions are based on inadequate supply of information. The executives or managers often do not themselves know what is ailing the organization and cannot describe the symptoms the organization is experiencing. Since organizations are often as complex in social systems as the body is in physiological systems, diagnosis is virtually impossible if the patient cannot at least approximate a statement of symptoms. The analogy also goes awry when one considers that it is seldom an organization dies if it does not take the medicine prescribed by the consultant. It may become less effective if it does not, but its immediate demise is unlikely except where cost-effectiveness is critical. Tilles concludes that "unlike the patient who consults a physician, the executive asking for outside advice cannot absolve himself from the responsibility for diagnosis."⁷² He goes on to observe that "the client organization if it needs help can only help itself."⁷³

Process consultation has emerged as a new strategy for organizational development which significantly alters the traditional client-consultant relationship. The fundamental principle is to help the organization and its managers to help themselves in diagnosis of their problems, development of alternative solutions and implementation

⁷²Seymour Tilles, "Understanding the Consultants Role," Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1961, p. 92.

⁷³Ibid.

of change programs. Process consultation draws on much of the experience with and capitalizes on the benefits of organizational laboratories, team building efforts and task force approaches to organizational development.

Schein defines process consultation as "a set of activities on the part of the consultant which help the client perceive, understand and act upon process events which occur within the client system."⁷⁴ He further contends that "improvement in organizational effectiveness will occur through effective problem finding in the human process area, which in turn will depend on the ability of the managers to learn diagnostic skills."⁷⁵

By its very definition, process consultation is an educational strategy which bears directly upon management development. Process consultation encompasses management development efforts such as team building and the improvement of interpersonal and intergroup relations. As with many other modern organizational development strategies, process consultation uses the group as its vehicle and often this group is in the form of management task forces. It centers around the group problem solving process of decision making and therefore is consistent with the concept of management by participation.⁷⁶

⁷⁴Edgar H. Schein, Process Consultation: Its Role in Organizational Development (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 9.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Marrow, Bowers, and Seashore, pp. 1-19.

The brief review here of managerial and organizational development techniques indicates that business and industry have developed quite a "bag of tricks." Often an organization will select a particular technique such as T-group training and use it exclusively only to find out that when T-group training is used in a vacuum from other types of programs it does not achieve its maximum benefit. It is therefore not surprising that most experts in the field are looking toward an eclectic or organic approach to the organizational and management development programs wherein all or several of the above techniques are instituted.

Reddin discusses such a technique in his description of "3-D Organizational Effectiveness Program."⁷⁷ He suggests the use of a managerial style seminar as a technique to unfreeze the organization and increase the potential for change.⁷⁸ The eight other stages of his program include such techniques as team building seminars, objective setting conferences, as well as training in interpersonal and intergroup communications.⁷⁹

Blake and Mouton describe the Managerial Grid concept of organizational development which is aimed at the development of team management. It incorporates off-site training laboratories which accomplish the unfreezing objective. These are used in conjunction

⁷⁷W. J. Reddin, "The 3-D Organizational Effectiveness Program," Training and Development Journal, March, 1968, p. 22.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 23-28.

with family T-group training and goal setting workshop conferences with the manager.⁸⁰

Davis describes an organic problem solving method which is being used in a corporation called TRW Systems. This is a total organizational program aimed at increasing the total effectiveness of the managers as well as the company. It is also aimed at team development utilizing a range of programs from stranger T-groups to the use of external change agents in the form of process consultants.⁸¹

It would appear then that business and industry has had a long and varied experience with a wide range of management development techniques. The conclusion can be drawn that often the most effective program is one in which there is a synthesis of a few or several techniques. Also the bulk of the literature indicates that the management development process loses effectiveness if it is not an integral part of a total organizational development program. With these perspectives in mind, the state of the art with respect to organizational and management development in law enforcement can be examined and some comparisons made.

⁸⁰Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," pp. 71-72.

⁸¹Sheldon Davis, "An Organic Problem Solving Method of Organizational Change," Planning of Change, eds. Warren G. Bennis and others (New York: Holt, Reinhardt and Winston, 1969), pp. 357-70.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

Unlike the available literature in business and industry, that which addresses organizational and management development in law enforcement is not voluminous. Therefore, rather than limiting the scope of the review only to those organizational development efforts which are directly related to management development, it will be necessary to draw from some organizational development efforts with broader applications.

Law enforcement management training and development has been largely a process of acquiring management skills by coming up through the ranks. The fallacy of this is obvious. It has been pointed out by numerous authors that management skills are not inherited simply by attaining rank.⁸² The President's Commission in its Task Force Report: The Police comments, "an officer is not qualified to administer the complex affairs of a large department or to supervise the performance of others simply on the strength of police experience acquired in subordinate positions."⁸³ As Newman and Price point out,

The task structure of the police organization does not prepare one to be a police executive. This is not a new observation, but it is important enough to bear restatement, if we are going to commit manpower and money to a highly specific involvement in police executive education.⁸⁴

⁸²Allen Z. Gammage, Police Training in the United States (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1963), p. 156.

⁸³President's Commission, p. 140.

⁸⁴Charles L. Newman and Barbara R. Price, "Police Executive Development: An Educational Program at Pennsylvania State University," The Police Chief, April, 1974, p. 74.

Initial efforts at providing management training can be attributed to such organizations as the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Southern Police Institute, and Northwestern Traffic Institute. One can easily draw some comparisons between the early efforts in management development by business and industry at the university and college level with programs offered by the above organizations. Each of the above programs bears a marked similarity in terms of methodology to the college and university programs discussed earlier in this chapter. For example, the Northwestern Institute offers a nine month management course, the National Academy program offered by the FBI is four months in length and the Southern Police Institute offers courses from two to five weeks in length.⁸⁵ This compares to the early history of management development in business and industry where the college and university programs which were offered varied in length from two to three weeks to several months. In addition, Kenny points out that there is a current trend for management and executive development courses to be offered by colleges and universities.

These programs do, however, suffer from the same problems of similar type courses in business and industry. The demand for such courses significantly outstrips the ability of these institutions and organizations to provide programs which will have a significant impact

⁸⁵ Carl B. Saunders, Upgrading the American Police (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1970), pp. 41-43.

on the number of managers in law enforcement agencies today.⁸⁶ In addition Saunders notes that there may be some skepticism when looking at the course content of these programs. For example, the National Academy which is designed for middle and upper management personnel has only 19% of the four months devoted to active management training.⁸⁷

With the recent advent of state law enforcement training commissions, there has been developed a new delivery system for law enforcement management training. By 1972, 63% to 68% of the states having law enforcement training commissions offered management training varying in length from 30 hours to 120 hours.⁸⁸ An examination of a sample of these state programs conducted by Nash reveals that they are almost exclusively of the seminar type. He noted that there was a trend away from the lecture discussion format of training in these programs with an increased utilization of role playing and case study.⁸⁹ The reason for the use of the seminar format is, however, logical. It provides a cost effective method of training with a limited amount of instructional resources. There are far more people,

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 72.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 73.

⁸⁸ Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council, Law Enforcement Training in the United States: A Survey of State Law Enforcement Training Commissions (Lansing: Michigan State Police, 1972), pp. 8-10.

⁸⁹ William C. Nash, "A Proposed Curriculum for Police Management Training in the State of Michigan" (unpublished graduate research paper, Michigan State University, 1972), p. 48.

for example, who are trained in the lecture/discussion method than those who have expertise in sensitivity training.

There is some indication that sensitivity or T-groups types of management training programs are being tried on a limited basis in law enforcement. For example, the Los Angeles Police Department has experimented with a method similar to the organizational T-group.⁹⁰ There is no extensive reporting of the utilization of this technique for law enforcement management development. It has received wider acceptance in law enforcement with respect to the training of those officers who serve in police-community relations functions.⁹¹

It would appear from the scarce material related to law enforcement management development that the vast majority of such efforts lies in training programs which with a few exceptions are external to the organizational environment. These programs are primarily of the seminar or classroom type which are aimed at providing the manager with knowledge and skills which are supposed to make the managers more effective. The concern over the question of the transfer of skills and attitudes from the training environment to the organization in these programs is of vital importance. It has been recognized that there is serious doubt regarding the impact of such programs when the participant returns to the organizational environment:

⁹⁰ John P. Kenney, Police Administration (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1972), p. 221.

⁹¹ Donald Bernstein, "Sensitivity Training and the Police," Police, May-June, 1960, pp. 77-79.

Impact varies widely, but a general observation must be that the current police administration environment generally mitigates against change A re-evaluation of current executive development and middle management programs is in order.⁹²

Only the largest law enforcement agencies can afford to support a management training program which is internal to the organization. The costs for such a program are prohibitive to medium and small sized departments. At the present time they must rely on the available programs offered by state and federal agencies as well as colleges and universities.

Reports of organizational development efforts with management training components in law enforcement agencies are to the author's knowledge almost nonexistent. One of the few programs is one currently underway in Dayton, Ohio, which is being conducted through the Dayton-Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center. This is an effort to train command officers in management by objectives and is unique in the sense that it combines training seminars with the organizational development process to implement management by objectives in the organization. The program was designed by the Battelle Center for Improved Education. Their consultants are working with management personnel of the Dayton Police Department to develop organizational and unit objectives. At the same time seminars are being provided to develop the skills related to management by objectives. The Police Department is responsible for carrying out the redesign process while

⁹² John P. Kenney, Police Administration (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1972), p. 221.

Battelle plays a re-educative role. The project is designed so that the system will eventually be self-sustaining.⁹³

Since the advent of the Omnibus Crime Control Act there has been some interest among law enforcement agencies in organizational development. These have been generally aimed at attempts to increase line level and operational performance. In some cases, they have involved complex methods of crime pattern analysis, response time, and allocation of resources. There is little indication that complex organizational development programs have been undertaken that are geared to a management or personnel development program.

One exception is the current Patrol Projects Task Force Program at the Kansas City Police Department. It is aimed primarily at increasing operational effectiveness. The project design involves the personnel of the department in the development process. Although not consciously a personnel development program, the very nature of the process which is being used has a bonus effect on such development.

The program is funded by the Ford Foundation as an attempt to improve patrol operations in the department. The task force process is the vehicle which is being utilized to improve the organization's operational effectiveness.

In this case, the task force membership is comprised primarily of patrol personnel which include the commanding officer of a division,

⁹³Dayton-Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center and Battelle Center for Improved Education, "Management by Objective: Plan to Increase the Effectiveness of the Dayton Police Department" (Dayton: Dayton-Montgomery Criminal Justice Training Center, undated), pp. 1-3. (Mimeographed.)

a sergeant, a captain, and five or six patrolmen. Also included is a member of the staff planning division and a consultant from the Police Foundation. The task forces analyze critical patrol problems and present solutions to the Chief.⁹⁴ Kansas City has had a positive experience with this arrangement for organizational change. Their experience, however, with the task forces was not without some difficulty. It was observed that "police are by nature action oriented. Planning strategy has cast them in a new role altogether."⁹⁵ Due to the action orientation, they found that there was a tendency for the task force, after identifying a problem, to go out and seek an immediate solution. It was with respect to this problem that the Police Foundation personnel acted in the role of process consultants to slow the process down and "postpone action until adequate problem analysis, program design, and evaluative planning had been accomplished."⁹⁶ The whole project has had far reaching implications for management and the decision making process. It has pushed the decision making process to the lowest possible level. It has been observed that:

While the task forces were created to design patrol strategies for the department . . . there is set up a model of organizational change that may have a more sweeping effect on the department than the patrol experiments themselves.⁹⁷

⁹⁴The Police Foundation, Kansas City Patrol Projects, 1973
(Washington: Police Foundation, 1973), pp. 5-8.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

The Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department has recognized the valuable assets of utilizing the task force approach in the implementation of a career development program in law enforcement agencies. They fully realize that the implementation of a career development program in an agency calls for some drastic organizational change. Such a program would require significant support on the part of the management of the department. They suggest that:

The strong resistance to change inherent among all organizations is chiefly attributable to the fact that in traditional hierarchical structures decision makers have the greatest amount to lose. They of all people have the strongest reasons for keeping the status quo.⁹⁸

The use of task forces not only promotes program acceptance but provides a coordinated approach to problem solving in the organizational setting.⁹⁹

A discussion of organizational development efforts in law enforcement must also include a consideration for the use of consultants as a strategy. There has been a general increase in the use of consultant services in all public service organizations including law enforcement agencies in recent years.¹⁰⁰ Primarily, the traditional consultant model has prevailed in law enforcement organizations. This

⁹⁸U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Career Development for Law Enforcement, A Technical Assistance Publication resulting from research conducted by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 115.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁰⁰John A. Martin, "Selection and Use of Outside Consultants: Suggested Guidelines for Law Enforcement Executives," Police, May-June, 1970, p. 25.

model was discussed earlier in the section dealing with consulting models in business and industry. There is a strong temptation in law enforcement to rely on the doctor/patient concept of consulting. Although this is a legitimate organizational development technique there are some inherent problems. Typically, the organization will hire a consultant or consulting firm to come in and study the organizational problems and recommend remedies. In this case the responsibility for the problem definition, data gathering, and development of solutions is vested in the consultant. There is little or no input from the management of the organization. It is little wonder that when a final report is made by the consultants that the probability of implementation of change is extremely low. The management is most likely to want to maintain the status quo and can in effect "cop out" by using the excuse that the consultants really didn't know what the problem was and the solutions are impractical. After all, the management has had no vested interest in the recommended changes and feels that change represents nothing more than a threat to their comfortable status quo. The problem with this type of organizational development strategy has been recognized by business and is becoming more apparent to those in the law enforcement field. As Kenney points out:

Although not widespread, a notable improvement is taking place in approaches to organizational development in police agencies. Process consultation is replacing the traditional administrative survey approach in which consultants or consulting firms prepare a prescriptive report for change, more often than not boiler plated, with limited participation of agency personnel in deciding their own fate. Process consultation involves the police manager and his personnel and the consultant in joint diagnosis of agency problems and both

become actively involved in generating the remedies. This approach assures the departmental personnel of thorough understanding of changes which they have agreed should be made.¹⁰¹

In summary it would appear that management training in law enforcement has been primarily of the seminar or classroom type with little emphasis on the integration of the management development process into the organizational setting. The few attempts which are being made to take an integrated approach have occurred in some of the larger departments. With respect to organizational development within law enforcement, the primary strategy has been the utilization of the traditional consulting model. There is some indication that the use of task forces combined with process consultation is being attempted as an organizational development strategy. There is little to indicate that a conscious effort has been made to make management training a component of the organizational development process.

The research reported here relates a case study where this in fact was the approach taken in the organizational development effort. This program consciously centered on an effort to involve the management of a medium sized police department in a training process integrated with other strategies of organizational development. The prime vehicle in this process was the task force concept. Initially the consultant role was that of the process type but throughout the project it became necessary to rely on a spectrum of organizational development strategies.

¹⁰¹ Kenney, p. 219.

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

The research reported in the next chapter is a case study of the implementation of an organizational and management model in a moderate sized New England city. As previously stated in Chapter 1, the fictitious name of Riverside will be used to preserve confidentiality.

Chapter 2 points out that there is limited published material in the field of law enforcement on the utilization of organizational and management development techniques which are currently being applied in business and industry. Furthermore, the author could locate no in-depth studies of such management development efforts in law enforcement. This presents a void in research which must be filled if a model of organizational and management development is to be designed which will address some of the problems stated in Chapter 1.

Therefore the objective of the research conducted and reported in this study is to explore essentially new territory or at least unreported territory in the field of management development in law enforcement. In addition to being exploratory in nature the objective of the case study is to descriptively analyze one effort in management development using a model which heretofore is somewhat new.

Since the goal of this thesis is to develop and present a contiguous model for organizational and management development, it was essential to conduct an in-depth descriptive case study to fill the void of material on the subject in the field of law enforcement.

The case study method is best suited for the type of descriptive analysis required here. The primary research technique which was used is commonly referred to as the participant/observer technique. In this case, the researcher was integrally involved in the management development program at the Riverside Police Department. He served as one of the primary training consultants in the project.

During the project period, the researcher as well as other members of the Management Training Team were involved in data gathering utilizing questionnaires, interviews and objective observation. The results of the data gathering will be used in conjunction with the report of subjective observations to increase the objectivity of the descriptive analysis.

HISTORY OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT

The Executive Development Training Project at the Riverside Police Department was initiated in the same manner as many organizational study and consulting contracts. The procedure is one in which the Riverside Criminal Justice Planning Office and the police department developed a request for proposals to meet what were perceived as the needs of the Riverside Police Department with respect to management development. The request for a proposal was sent to several

consulting firms and was received by a consulting firm with which the author is associated.

This request for proposal asked for the development and implementation of a management training program for the command staff of the Riverside Police Department. The objectives as stated in the city's request were (1) to address local problems and provide assistance for operational and management concerns; (2) to emphasize the implementation of solutions to problems rather than the study of problems; (3) to increase the police department's problem solving capabilities by using internal resources with consulting assistance to make the department more knowledgeable of current management techniques; (4) to inform and expose the command staff to the latest technological developments in the fields of data handling, information systems and communications; (5) to increase communication flow among all levels of the department to more effectively utilize department resources; (6) to expose the department to the latest techniques in personnel management and supervision.

The request listed five areas which were perceived to be major problems within the department. They were (1) planning and research, which included resource allocation; (2) training, both recruit and in-service; (3) police recruitment; (4) records; and (5) promotion assignment procedures.

As is generally the case with such requests for proposals, the information about the department and exact goals tended to be somewhat sketchy. However, this request was interpreted as an appeal

for an organizational development program with particular emphasis on a management training component.

In responding to this request for a proposal the consulting firm with which the researcher is associated took into consideration the disadvantages of a traditional approach to such a request. The idea of providing a traditional, lecture-discussion group training program was rejected. Also rejected was the total reliance on the traditional model of consulting as a strategy for organizational development. The resulting model which was proposed to the City of Riverside was one which was of an eclectic nature. This model was designed to rely heavily upon the command staff members of the Riverside Police Department as the initiators of organizational change. The model relied heavily upon the task force concept of organizational development with the consultants serving in a process consultation type of role as facilitators and instructors to provide the department with guided self-initiated change through the task force arrangement.

PROPOSED MODEL FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

It was proposed that the students or command staff members would serve on task forces designed to attack organizational problems. In the original model and proposal it was suggested that the task forces would be divided on the basis of the five major problem categories which were delineated in the request for proposal. In other words, there would be five task forces composed of command staff members which would address the problems of (1) planning and research;

(2) training; (3) police recruitment; (4) records; (5) promotion and assignment procedures.

The model provided for the consultants to act in both the traditional and process consultation roles. In terms of the traditional role the consultants would do some organizational study and surveys which would then be provided to the task force for information and decision making purposes. When necessary the consultants would also act as technical advisers in areas in which the command staff had limited expertise.

The command staff members would participate in all stages of problem solving and would play a significant role in the decisions relating to the implementation of management and change models within the organization. The departmental personnel would set their own pace of development.

Procedurally the command staff would divide into the five major task forces for purposes of problem definition. They would conduct analysis of data with the assistance of the consultants and develop proposals for implementation of programs to resolve the defined problems. Each of the proposals coming out of a task force would be reported to all of the task forces to be reviewed and then submitted to the Chief for his approval and ultimately to the Board of Police Commissioners. As originally designed, all members of the command staff would be required to take part in the development program including the Chief of Police.

Essentially, then, the model was designed in order that (1) problem areas within the organization would be identified by those

individuals working within it; (2) objectives for the project would be set through the consensus of the task forces and it could be determined which objectives were both reasonable and obtainable for the individuals involved; (3) solutions to organizational problems would have the consensus and therefore the backing of those who would be in charge of implementation and those who would have to experience the effects of change; (4) a viable process would have been set up to allow for a continuing re-examination of objectives, goals and problems long after the initial project ended; (5) implementation would be more successful if the above elements were present.

The model was designed so that each task force would have a consultant who would act in the role of facilitator and trainer, with emphasis on developing the problem solving capabilities of the members of each task force. When necessary the consultant would provide additional technical expertise in order to broaden the total resource scope of the task force.

THE MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT TRAINING TEAM

Throughout this report reference will be made to individuals who participated in the Management Development Program at the Riverside Police Department. These individuals will be referred to separately and at times collectively as the Management Development Team.

The primary members of the Team consisted of the Director, Mr. John Conley, who currently serves as Chairman of the Criminal Justice Studies Program, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Mr. John Gilson, Director of the Dayton Montgomery County Criminal

Justice Training Center in Dayton, Ohio; and the author who currently serves as Supervisor of Program Planning for the Michigan Law Enforcement Officers Training Council.

In addition to the primary training team, two individuals served as technical advisors. Mr. James T. Barbe, Corrections Coordinator, Dayton Montgomery County Criminal Justice Center, served in a technical capacity and conducted a task analysis which was utilized to develop position descriptions for the various supervisory and management levels in the Riverside Police Department. Mr. Kenneth Christian, Instructor, School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, provided technical assistance in the initial phases of the project and during the model development stage.

In view of the total team nature of this development program special acknowledgment must be given to all of the above individuals in terms of their contribution of data which is reported in this study and utilized in the model development presented in the final chapter. Where possible the researcher will indicate the team member other than himself who was responsible for the development of data presented in this report. It is impossible to acknowledge all of the specific contributions which each team member made; therefore, the researcher cannot and will not take full credit for the data gathering, analysis and presentation reflected in the case study report. Due to the complex nature of the project and the overlapping roles of the team members a full acknowledgment of the equal contributions made by each team member in the gathering, analysis and presentation of data must be made perfectly clear.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY GROUP

Socio-Economic Setting

The city of Riverside is a moderately sized New England town with an approximate population of 96,000 and covers approximately 36 square miles. The city has experienced a trend of depressing economy since shortly after World War II due to the decline of its major industry which was the manufacture of textiles. The city has a primarily white population with two major ethnic groups consisting of Portuguese and Irish. The integration of the ethnic groups has been almost complete with respect to work, school and family groups. The population of the city has been in steady decline until the last decade when it began leveling off at the current population figure.

The Political Environment

Riverside has a strong mayor-city council form of government, both of which are elected. However, the New England philosophy of the town meetings still prevails. This results in every citizen's feeling as though he must take an active part in the political process. Politics play an important role in the lives of the citizens and, as will be pointed out, the police department is no exception.

The Mayor of Riverside appoints a three man Board of Police Commissioners who serve as the mayor's administrative arm with respect to the police department. The police commissioners are citizens who perform this function without remuneration. The commissioners are generally political allies of the mayor and their terms run concurrent

with his. The mayor designates one of the three commissioners to be chairman and the chairman is virtually the primary decision maker.

At the time the project began, the commission consisted of a sausage factory owner, an amusement park owner, and the director of the local Criminal Justice Planning Office who served as the chairman. However, shortly after the project began this chairman resigned and he was replaced by a florist shop owner. It is interesting to note that before the mayor was elected to his current position he owned a funeral home. Although the connection may be coincidental, it is curious in light of the relationship which exists between the funeral and florist businesses.

With the exception of the period of time when the Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office was the chairman, there have been few people serving as commissioners who have had any law enforcement administration background. In addition, few have had background in conducting the affairs of an organization consisting of approximately 350 employees and a budget of three and a half million dollars.

Had the board been merely a citizen group to monitor the general welfare of the department or set broad policies, this type of representation would not have been serious. However, the Board, and in particular the chairman, become involved in the day-to-day operation of the department and often made unilateral decisions affecting the total organization. Because of their political allegiance to the mayor the board in effect has little or no influence over his decision making. However, they have total power over the operation of the

police department. Therefore they are quick to execute any administrative or operational decisions which the mayor chooses to make.

An interesting paradox unfolds when the operation of the Board of Police is analyzed in context with the role of the civil service system. The employees of the Riverside Police Department belong to a statewide civil service system which develops tests for the various positions in the police department, administers these tests and provides a roster of eligible candidates either for hiring or for promotion. The civil service protection given to the Chief is designed to isolate the department from political pressures. However, since the chief is not really the administrative head of the department but rather the Board of Police is, there results a circumventing of all of the logic for civil service protection.

Crime Pattern

The crime pattern in the city of Riverside followed the national trend of a steady rise until 1973. During 1973, the crime rate dropped 29%. The reason for this sudden drop is difficult to isolate. There was no significant change in the operational procedure of the department with a corresponding increase in effectiveness. There were, however, some major changes and innovations in other facets of the criminal justice system which in all likelihood contributed to this decrease. In considering a major drop in the category of breaking and entering some preliminary observations can be made.

Until 1972, the prosecution of offenders was the responsibility of the police department. This meant that police officers were

responsible for the role of prosecuting attorney. Recently, however, federal funds were secured to pay for a prosecuting attorney with a law degree. During 1972 and 1973 major convictions were obtained against several of the city's professional burglars. This resulted in their imprisonment.

A second major change which occurred was the institution of a Community Service Officers Program. The primary function of the program was to provide security for the low income housing projects. This program was instituted by the Criminal Justice Planning Office utilizing federal funds. Although the CSO program was formally attached to the police department, it essentially operated as a separate organizational entity. The director of the project took his guidance from the director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office as opposed to the Chief of Police. An independent evaluation of the CSO program which was conducted indicated that it had substantially impacted on the crime pattern in the housing projects.

Organizational Setting

The personnel complement of the Riverside Police Department during the project was approximately 349. Table 1 reflects the composition in terms of sex and sworn status.

A total of 29% of the police department is in the non-sworn category while 71% are sworn personnel. Table 2 reflects the manpower distribution at the halfway point of the project (during the project there were major reorganizations which shifted some of the categories).

Table 1
Composition of Department by Status

Category	Number	Percentage
Male sworn	246	70.5
Female sworn	2	0.6
Male non-sworn	60	17.2
Female non-sworn	<u>41</u>	<u>11.7</u>
Totals	349	100%


Table 2
Distribution of Sworn Personnel by Rank

	Chief	Deputy Chief	Captains	Lieuten- ants	Sergeants	Patrolmen
Number	1	2	4	12	27	202
% of Force	0.4%	0.8%	1.6%	4.8%	10.9%	81.5%

Figure 1 reflects the formal organizational structure when the project was initiated. During the project this was modified twice. Those modifications will be discussed in deeper detail.

An important consideration with respect to the organizational setting of the project was the absence of the police chief during the entire project. He was seriously ill and underwent surgery during the project; for short periods of time the chief would return to work for

Figure 1. Organizational Chart of Riverside Police Department



a few hours a day. This placed a strain on the organization decision making capability and significantly influenced the impact of the project, since he was unable to participate in some of the critical decision making points. Although the acting chief could have, and was empowered to make decisions, he often failed to do so due to his tenuous position.

The union to which the members of the department belonged is one which is somewhat prevalent in the East and New England area. In terms of the labor contract all members of the department belong to the same union and the contract covered everyone with the exception of those in the roles of Deputy Chief, and Chief of Police. This in essence meant that the city and the police department allowed a situation to develop where the contract, in a de facto sense, drew the line between management and labor at the Deputy Chief level. This type of contract reinforced the non-management and supervisory status roles of those who were at the rank of sergeant through captain. This institutionalized reinforcement and the failure of the city to perceive those in such positions in a management role significantly impacted on the management training process.

Organizational Change History

The management development program was not the first experience which the Riverside Police Department has had with organizational change. In 1967, a traditional management study was done by a reputable consulting firm. At the time the study began, the department was operating from two substations geographically located in the city with

respect to population density. As was the trend during the 60s, this firm recommended consolidation of the substations into the main police building, the theory being that it would increase efficiency and reduce duplication, particularly of staff support efforts. This report included all of the necessary systems to support such a consolidation. Unfortunately, the city adopted only those portions of the report which would result in a savings to the city. As a result, recommendations of the report were adopted piecemeal.

The city recognized the money saving benefit of closing two substations and placing the entire force in the main police station, which had been constructed in 1916. They failed, however, to adopt the recommendations of the study which called for renovation of the building to be consistent with the consolidation.

The closing of the substations dealt a severe blow to the morale of the department. The district commanders interpreted the move as an attempt to undermine their position. Many other members of the command staff felt that the consolidation impaired their ability to maintain good relationships with the community.

The experience of having change thrust upon an organization by an external change process is often demoralizing and seldom results in increased effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, it creates a climate which mitigates against any further change efforts.

Due to the social and ethnic composition of Riverside, the city and the department did not experience the change demanding events which occurred in cities of similar size during the 1960s. There were no racial confrontations, political upheavals or student demonstrations

which would have forced the department to adapt to the nationally changing social environment. At this time other cities of similar size began to seek fiscal and other resources which were most immediately available through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.

This did not occur in Riverside until recently, when a local Criminal Justice Planning Office was established in Riverside. Until this time few federal resources were channeled into the Riverside Police Department.

The first Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office also served as the Chairman of the Board of Police. He began using federal monies to implement change programs within the police department. However, these change programs were for the most part conceived by his staff and imposed on the department with little or no consensus from the members of the department as to their effect on the total organization. As a result, the programs were tolerated rather than welcomed.

Two examples of such programs were the Community Service Officer program and the funding of two positions for civilian planning and research personnel for the department.

The Community Service Officer Program was previously discussed with respect to its impact on the crime pattern. Also pointed out was the fact that it operated as an organizational entity within the police department. This program was never accepted by the members of the department, and most of the command staff did not consider it as part of the department. The Director of the project was a civilian paid at the captain's level. However, he did not report to the Deputy

or Chief of Police; he reported directly to the Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office, In addition, he was never considered formally or informally as a member of the staff and never participated in staff meetings. To make matters worse, the federal money available for this project provided him with new office equipment and a private office, neither of which were privileges of the other captains, the total effect being an almost total rejection of the program by the department.

Just prior to the beginning of the management development program, federal funds were used to hire two civilian personnel to serve as planners in the department. As with the CSO program, the department had little or no involvement in the decision to institute a civilian planning and research unit. A prior planning and research unit existed in the department which was manned by a uniform patrolman. The unit ceased existence with the retirement of the incumbent. The hiring of two civilians at a higher pay level was an affront to the sworn personnel of the department. According to one of the civilian planners, their introduction to the command staff occurred at a staff meeting which was called by the Chief. Present at the meeting was the Chief, his deputy and two captains. This was the total effort on the part of the Chief to initiate the planning and research unit.

The organization's total experience with respect to recent change was almost exclusively negative. It is little wonder that the management development program was received with somewhat less than enthusiastic optimism.

Chapter 4

MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE RIVERSIDE

POLICE DEPARTMENT: A CASE STUDY

FORMAT OF CHAPTER

Due to the case study nature of the research reported here, a brief description of the format of this chapter is in order.

The first section of the chapter will discuss the type of climate which is generally believed to be necessary for organizational and management development to occur. This section is important since it sets the stage for comparison of the actual climate which did exist.

The next section will deal with the data gathering activities which occurred prior to the beginning of the project. This data regarding the organization and command staff was used in determining the initial direction of the program. Included in this section will be a presentation of the data which was used to profile the command staff of the police department who were the target group of the project. Also presented in this section will be the data which was gathered in an attempt to determine the problem areas which were perceived by the command staff. This data was fed back to the commanders at the beginning of the program and will be referred to in the remainder of the study.

The third section outlines the initial project orientation sessions and some general observations made by the Training Team of the command staff.

The remaining sections represent a series of delineations of critical points during the project. Since the complex events which occur in an organization cannot be divided into discrete time frames there may occur some overlap in terms of actual time. Therefore, the sections should not be considered finite points but rather general perimeters for purposes of logical presentation. Presented in these sections will be the implementation of the original developmental model, and the subsequent three modifications of the model. Each of the modifications was precipitated by some external or internal event which altered one of the components of the program.

The first modification resulted in a change in the composition of the task forces. The second resulted in a change in the roles of the Training Team and the command staff. The final modification resulted in a change in the arrangement of the task forces. When discussing each of the modifications, the critical events surrounding the modification will be discussed. Also presented will be an analysis of the events as they affected the total project.

As previously mentioned, the researcher was assigned to work primarily with the Operations Task Force. Therefore, the majority of the data with respect to task force operations and activities will be drawn from the researcher's experience with this task force. References and data with respect to the operations of the other task forces

and training team members will be used to supplement when it will aid in presenting an overall picture.

INTRODUCTION: A CLIMATE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

Various authors and authorities in the field of organizational and management development have discussed some of the requirements which are essential to the success of such programs. At this point it might be well to discuss a few of those requirements for success since the Training Team had every reason to believe that these requirements existed.

Bennis suggests that no organizational development strategy or method can be successful without the existence of the following basic conditions:

- (1) Members of the client organization desire change;
- (2) key decision makers must legitimize the planned change through their involvement in and their active support of the development process; (3) a general consensus of the direction of change must exist among all levels of the client's power structure; (4) a change agent(s) must be present in the leadership structure.¹⁰²

Another author suggests that no management development effort can succeed unless top management meets two fundamental requirements: "Active participation in the establishment of the development program and acceptance of the responsibility for providing an environment conducive to development."¹⁰³

¹⁰²Bennis, Organizational Development, pp. 44-47.

¹⁰³House, p. 60.

Other authors stress the importance of a favorable organizational climate for management development to occur. There must exist a climate in which managers who participate in decision making do so in a climate in which they are confident of fair treatment and they will not be subjected to arbitrary injustice or capricious judgment by the superiors.¹⁰⁴ There must also be an absence of political maneuvering for position with penalties for unfair personal competition and petty conspiracy. In addition, there cannot exist a system where preferential treatment is based on grounds other than approval of performance, such as blood relationships, friendship, ethnic, educational or social background.¹⁰⁵

The Training Team had every reason to believe that a positive climate existed for an innovative organizational development and management training program within the Riverside Police Department. The Chairman of the Board of Police (who was also the Director of Criminal Justice Planning Office) assured us that the key decision makers including himself were anxious to see the successful implementation of this program. Speaking for the police department and the administration of the city, he claimed that the department personnel wanted change and to improve the organization and their management capabilities. These apparent conditions combined with the potential of the chairman/director who qualified as a change agent in a

¹⁰⁴T. J. Roberts, Developing Effective Managers (London: Institute of Personnel Management, 1967), p. 60.

¹⁰⁵Andrews, The Effectiveness of University Management Development Programs, p. 247.

leadership position made the prospects of successful implementation very positive.

PRELIMINARY DATA GATHERING AND PROBLEM ANALYSIS

Since the Training Team knew little about the actual background of the members of the command staff, it was necessary to secure this information before proceeding with the project. In addition, several months had passed since the request for a proposal had been received by the Training Team which outlined previewed organizational problem areas. The team was aware that at least one major change had taken place, the hiring of a civilian planning unit, which could have affected those problem areas. Finally, it would be necessary to compare the perceptions of the command staff with the actual operations of the organization. To accomplish these objectives, the Training Team utilized questionnaires, interviews and observations to gather this data. The answers to these questions gave the Training Team a better understanding of what the general staff perceived as problems and also allowed the team to compare the new data to the original problem definitions listed in the Request for Proposal.

Each member of the command staff (forty-four) from sergeant through chief received a questionnaire, which was coded, along with a stamped self-addressed envelope. The envelope had the out-of-state address of the Project Director on its face. As a result, the respondent could fill out the questionnaire, insert it into the envelope, and deposit it in a U.S. mail box for delivery to the Director's home,

1,000 miles away. Forty responses were received out of the forty-four questionnaires issued.

In order to provide the group with a degree of perspective regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the organization, the team gathered information from the patrolmen. In April a team member attended four separate roll calls and asked the patrolmen to write the three strongest and three weakest points about the organization. These cards were collected immediately by the consultant. The team tabulated the responses and presented the data to the command staff for comparison. Fifty patrolmen responded to the questions.

Questionnaires

Because the Management Development Program had been initiated to improve the administrative and decision making capabilities of the total command staff, the consultants felt it necessary to gather background data on the personnel involved. The data gathered included the amount and type of police experience, level of formal education and the amount of prior management training. Added to these categories were questions relating to organizational problems.

The questionnaire, a sixteen-page document, was designed to acquire data on the individual's professional educational, and experiential background (see Appendix). Through this document the Training Team gleaned such information as the type and length of service, educational level, training experience by type of course, and other data.

Attached to the background document were four open-ended questions which dealt with the strengths and weaknesses of the organization. The questions were asked in the following order:

1. What are the major strengths of the organization?
2. What are the major weaknesses of the organization?
3. What do you personally feel you can do to improve the organization?
4. What action would you like to see taken to improve management of the organization?

Interviews

The Program Director, John Conley, met with each member of the command staff to explain the use of the questionnaires, answer questions, and give instructions. During these interviews it was learned that the command staff did not understand the nature of the project. The basic confusion centered on the widespread belief that the project was simply another outside study team coming into the department to make recommendations for improvement. It was emphasized with each person that the project was a training program which would utilize internal task forces to analyze problems with the aid and advice of the Training Team. It became obvious that during the initial training, further explanation was not only in order, but would be a vital necessity.

Observations

The Training Team utilized their visits to the department to observe methods of administration and operation. Various staff, administrative, and line functions were explained by departmental personnel. This procedural information was compared with actual

operations in order to determine inconsistencies and locate areas which could be improved. This activity took place consistently throughout the term of the project.

PROFILE OF COMMAND STAFF¹⁰⁶

The police department had a total of forty-three commanders. This figure included one chief, one deputy chief, five captains, twelve lieutenants, and twenty-four sergeants. Each of these people received their promotion after qualifying on a state administered civil service exam. The pattern in Riverside has been that the mayor selected the top candidate on the Civil Service list; he did not utilize the prerogative of selecting the best qualified of the top three. All the commanders accumulated their police experience with the Riverside department.

Longevity

The bulk of the command personnel had more than twenty-five years of service with the department. Indeed, half of the thirty-four respondents fell within this category including four persons who had more than thirty years of service with the department. The chief and deputy had, respectively, twenty-seven and thirty-seven years of service. The four captains had the highest average longevity level of twenty-eight and a half years. The lieutenants had the second highest mean longevity of the ranks with twenty-five years, only three years

¹⁰⁶The data presented here was gathered by Mr. John Conley, Project Director, prior to the time the author joined the project.

less than the captains. Eight of the eleven lieutenants had more than twenty-six years on the force. The sergeants are divided between the over and under twenty-five year mark. Eight have more than twenty-five years on the force and twelve have less. The overall mean is slightly under seventeen years.

The higher ranks have a disproportionately higher longevity figure with no representation from the under twenty year group. Only one lieutenant has less than twenty years on the force. As a result, all the top commanders accumulated the bulk of their experience prior to the push for police management reform which gained momentum in the mid nineteen-sixties and has not yet peaked. The significance of the longevity figures, however, becomes clearer when viewed in conjunction with the type of experience accumulated by the top-level administrators.

Experience

The higher-level command personnel accumulated an equal amount of experience by rank. Each of the captains, chiefs, and deputies served an average of four years in each rank of patrolman, sergeant, and lieutenant (see Table 3). The lower command staff also amassed equal amounts of experience by rank, but they served longer in each rank. Sergeants and lieutenants spent, respectively, eleven and eight years as a patrolman and six years as a sergeant. This is an average of three and six years longer than any of the present captains, the deputy, or the chief had to wait for a promotion. The discrepancy of time spent in grade by higher and lower ranks is explained by the

Table 3
Average Years of Experience by Rank
of Command Personnel

Chief and Deputy Chief

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average No. of Years</u>
Patrol	5.0
Sergeant	4.0
Lieutenant	3.5
Captain	7.5
Deputy Chief	11.5

CAPTAINS

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average No. of Years</u>
Patrol	4.25
Sergeant	3.75
Lieutenant	4.25
Captain	15.00

LIEUTENANTS

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average No. of Years</u>
Patrol	8.27
Sergeant	5.90
Lieutenant	11.45

SERGEANTS

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average No. of Years</u>
Patrol	11.10
Sergeant	6.42

rapid growth of the department just after World War II. There will be another rapid promotion rate within the next decade. This will occur not because of growth, but because of attrition when the upper level commanders apply for retirement.

The distribution of experience by assignment does not follow the neat pattern illustrated by rank. The two top positions had an overall average experience figure of almost half that of the lower ranks. More important is that the higher ranks from captain to chief had a narrower background than the lower ranks of sergeant and lieutenant (see Table 4). The higher ranks except for the chief served most of their early years in the uniform division and as division commanders (pre-1967 precinct commanders). The chief served in various inside clerk and quasi-administrative positions throughout his police career. With rare exception the captains did not serve in other operational units and they had little or no experience in the specialized administration or staff services area.

The exceptions are significant, however, because of the length of time an individual worked in a particular area. For example, one captain spent ten years as a division commander compared to his peers who spent approximately five years at that position. Another captain served in the Criminal Investigation Division for twenty-two years whereas his peers spent from six months to five years in that division. The overall experience level of captains is limited to two or three operational units. The exceptions lean toward an even narrower experience factor because they worked in only one unit or position for the bulk of their career.

Table 4
Experience Profile of Captains

Police Experience By Rank											
<u>PATROL</u>			<u>SERGEANT</u>			<u>LIEUTENANT</u>			<u>CAPTAIN</u>		
Years No.			Years No.			Years No.			Years No.		
4	3		2	1		3	1		10	1	
5	1		3	2		4	1		16	2	
			7	1		5	2		18	1	
Mean	4.25		3.75			4.25			15		

Police Experience By Assignment											
<u>PATROL</u>			<u>STREET SUPERVISOR</u>			<u>UNIFORM COMMANDER</u>			<u>C.I.D.</u>		
Years No.			Years No.			Years No.			Years No.		
4	3		2	1		0.5	1		0.5	1	
5	1		3	2		1	3		3	1	
			7	1					5	1	
									22	1	
Mean	4.25		3.75			0.87			7.75		

<u>DIVISION COMMANDER</u>			<u>STAFF SERVICES</u>			<u>TRAFFIC</u>		
Years No.			Years No.			Years No.		
5	1		0.5	1		1	1	
6	1		5	1				
10	1							
Mean	7		2.75			1		

<u>COMMANDER TACTICAL SQUAD</u>			<u>VICE & INTELLIGENCE</u>		
Years No.			Years No.		
4	1		2.5	1	

Captains	Total Number - 5	Number of Respondents - 4
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The lower ranks, on the other hand, served in many areas of the organization (see Tables 5 and 6). This increased experience factor is inversely related to the rank structure; the lower the rank, the broader the experience. This characteristic is explained by the rigidity which had developed in the upper ranks because most of these people achieved their promotion at the same time. A second explanatory element is that the department became very inflexible with regard to positions which could be held by certain ranks. For example, captains held only the uniform or C.I.D. commands and lieutenants served primarily in the capacity of watch or shift commanders. As a result, the department relied on sergeants to fill supervisory positions in other units.

As was true of the higher ranks, the lieutenants and sergeants are heavily experienced in the uniform division units. The lieutenant rank also suffers from problems of rigidity. For example, two persons in this rank served over twelve years with C.I.D.; one worked in traffic for over fifteen years and one served as the clerk/secretary for the Board of Police for over ten years. This job domination is offset slightly by the four to eight people who served in vice, tactical squad, training, and records/communication.

It is at the sergeant level that breadth of experience becomes a norm. Persons holding this rank had experience in most of the operational units and in the records/communication sections (see Table 5). But one person held the same job for twenty-one years and two others have been in the same position for five years. It appears that the sergeants have benefited from a wider opportunity to work in

Table 5
Experience Profile of Sergeants

Police Experience By Rank					
PATROL		SERGEANT			
Years	No.	Years	No.		
1-5	2	Less Than 1	2		
6-10	9	1-5	6		
11-15	3	6-10	1		
16-19	4	11-15	3		
20-25	1	20-25	1		

Police Experience By Assignment					
PATROL		STREET SUPERVISOR		C.I.D.	
Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.
1-5	4	Less Than 1	1	Less Than 1	1
6-10	12	1-5	12	1-5	1
11-15	2	6-10	3	11-15	3
16-19	2	11-15	1		
		16-19	1		
Mean	8.5	4.47		8.0	

TACTICAL		RECORDS/COMM.		VICE	
Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.
1.0	1	1	1	0.4	1
1.4	1	2	2	0.5	1
1.6	1	6	1	3.0	1
2.0	3	9	1	5.0	1
Mean	1.83	4.0		2.23	

TRAFFIC		JUVENILE		INTERNAL INVESTIGATION		SAFETY	
Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.
5	1	5	1	5	1	21	1

Sergeants	Total Number - 25	Number of Respondents - 20
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Table 6
Experience Profile of Lieutenants

Police Experience By Rank									
PATROL		SERGEANT		LIEUTENANT					
Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.				
1-5	4	1-5	5	Less Than 1	1				
6-10	5	6-10	6	1-5	1				
11-15	1			6-10	2				
20-25	1			11-15	1				
				16-19	6				
Mean	8.27	5.90		11.45					
Police Experience by Assignments									
PATROL		STREET SUPERVISOR		WATCH COMMANDER					
Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.				
0-1	1	1-5	7	Less Than 1	1				
1-5	3	6-10	2	1-5	3				
6-10	4			6-10	1				
11-15	1			11-15	1				
Mean	5.55	4.74		4.77					
RECORDS/COMM.		TACTICAL SQUAD		TRAINING		VICE			
Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.
1-5	4	1	3	2.5	1	2	1		
6-10	1	2	1	3.0	1	3	1		
Mean	3.62	1.25		2.75		2.5			
C.I.D.		TRAFFIC		CLERK/BOARD OF POLICE					
Years	No.	Years	No.	Years	No.				
5	1	15.5	1	10.5	1				
12-13	2								
Mean	10	15.5		10.5					
Lieutenants Total Number - 12 Number of Respondents - 11									

different areas within the organization with only a couple of instances of position domination.

The experience pattern illustrated by the above discussion had a number of effects on the department and the training project. The top level administrators have a narrow police background. As a result, the organization emphasized line units and ignored administrative and support services functions. The historical pattern which allowed certain positions to be held by the same individual not only stymied personal growth, but also contributed to kingdom building. These persons became secure in their positions because they outlasted the numerous changes in department heads and supervisors. This security fostered the entrenchment of procedures which soon became outdated and stifled any attempt to change the operation. The overall consequence of this pattern was a breakdown of coordination to the point where the organization did not operate as a single entity, but as a number of separate units loosely held together by a weak chain of command and incomplete notions of police functions.

Education

The overall mean level of education for the command staff is 11.5 years (see Table 7). The captains have a mean educational level of 13.6 and the sergeants have 12.1 years. It is the lieutenant rank which pulls the level down because it has a mean of 10.5 years. There is not much that can be said about this low educational level for the department. It speaks for itself. Many of the commanders, however, are aware of the facts and are not happy with them. The organization,

Formal Educational Level for
Command Personnel

All Personnel

<u>Education</u>	<u>Number</u>
8 yrs.	1
9 yrs.	4
10 yrs.	3
11 yrs.	0
12 yrs.	13
13 yrs.	6
14 yrs.	6
15 yrs.	2
Mean 11.5 yrs.	Total 35

Captains

<u>Education</u>	<u>Number</u>
12 yrs.	2
14 yrs.	1
15 yrs.	1
Mean 13.67 yrs.	Total 4

Lieutenants

<u>Education</u>	<u>Number</u>
8 yrs.	1
9 yrs.	2
12 yrs.	4
13 yrs.	4
Mean 10.5 yrs.	Total 11

Sergeants

<u>Education</u>	<u>Number</u>
9 yrs.	2
10 yrs.	3
12 yrs.	7
13 yrs.	2
14 yrs.	5
15 yrs.	1
Mean 12.17 yrs	Total 20

on the other hand, has not encouraged educational achievement in any way. There is no educational incentive system and no procedure for easing the conflict of duty schedules and college semesters. Given these problems and lack of support, it is laudable that as many as 14 people have accomplished one or two years of college.

The overall low educational level affected the training program in a number of ways. The personnel were not accustomed to the rigors of study and, therefore, shied away from reading training material. Not having been exposed to the free-flowing discussions and debates of a college classroom, the staff had no training or inclination to analyze the issues from a content or substantive level. This is not to suggest that there was no debate on the various proposals in the task forces. To the contrary, the discussion was generally extensive, but the lack of training and experience in this function delayed the results. The Training Team had to bring the discussion back to the main issues and attempt to guide the groups to closure. By the end of the project some members of the command staff began to show much improvement in their ability to analyze proposals and focus on the substantive matters.

IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM AREAS AS PERCEIVED BY THE COMMAND STAFF

In the initial Request for a Proposal, the department listed the following five problem areas which they felt need solution:

1. Planning and research
2. Training

3. Recruitment
4. Records
5. Promotion and assignment procedure

These areas had been delineated approximately six months before the project was initiated. During that period of time at least one major change had occurred. The Criminal Justice Planning Office had secured funds to provide two civilian planners. Obviously this should have impacted on the perception of problem areas. It was also probable that other events had occurred to alter previewed problem areas.

It was for this reason that the training team gathered the information on the weaknesses and strengths of the department as expressed by members of the command staff in response to the questionnaire. The Training Team was also interested to determine how the perceptions of the command staff compared with those of the line level personnel. Therefore fifty patrolmen were asked to respond to several questions.

Weaknesses of the Department
as Perceived by the
Command Staff

Table 8 reflects the rank order of the major weaknesses as perceived by the members of the command staff. There was a total of 113 responses which fell into the 33 general categories. Since the question was open ended, the responses were placed in these categories based on some subjective interpretation.

Table 8

**Major Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department as
Perceived by the Command Staff**

Response Items	Responses	
	#	%
Political Interference in Management of organization . . .	19	16.8
No training	11	9.7
Poor Communications working environment	8	7.1
Lack of Manpower.	7	6.2
Pay	6	5.3
No education incentive	6	5.3
Lack of communication and coordination among units . . .	5	4.4
No Space	5	4.4
Morale	4	3.5
One-man cars	4	3.5
Poor recruitment and selection	3	2.6
No delegation of authority	3	2.6
No discipline and control	3	2.6
Poor equipment	3	2.6
No recognition	2	1.8
No standard operating procedure	2	1.8
Lack of foot patrols	2	1.8
Centralized operation	2	1.8
Poor allocation of resources	2	1.8
Schedule	2	1.8
No money	2	1.8
Weak Civil Service Exams	1	0.9
Grievance procedure	1	0.9
Union	1	0.9
Too many sworn personnel in clerical positions	1	0.9
No management	1	0.9
No chain of command	1	0.9
Poor records system	1	0.9
Efficiency decrease on weekend	1	0.9
Lack of sergeants	1	0.9
Poor court testimony	1	0.9
No parking for public	1	0.9
Public apathy	1	0.9
TOTAL	113	100

The responses ranged from political influence at the top to public apathy at the bottom of the list. It is significant to note that no training is the only weakness which corresponds to one of the original five problem areas stated in the Request for a Proposal. This supported the Training Team's assumption that priorities might have changed or that the original five problem areas were a product of a perception by those other than the command staff.

The number one item, "political interference in management of the organization," did indeed reflect a serious problem area. This is a function of the total environment of the department as well as the citizens of Riverside in the political life of the city. It is also a function of the relationship between the Board of Police and the mayor. The Board of Police has ultimate decision making authority over the department. Since they dictate the transfer of members in the department as well as promotions, one must be a political being to receive the best assignments and promotions. The most important decision which an officer can make as far as his successful career development is concerned is his support of a mayoral candidate and the cultivation of political allies on the Board or City Council. An individual who works for a successful mayoral candidate, has kept socially visible to the political powers, and has a good relationship with at least one board member can program a very successful career.

The department as a whole verbally decries the political interference and the accessibility of favored positions and jobs to its members, yet individually they will utilize those political channels. The result is a top heavy command staff who mistrust each other

to the point that all decisions are questioned as politically oriented and career related. This disorganization and mistrust have resulted in a lack of open decision making and the abdication of sound leadership in favor of "under the table" manipulation of department administration and organization motivated by self-interest. The lack of command cohesiveness has allowed the police union to negotiate contracts virtually unopposed. This has resulted in a police contract which makes the path to department control virtually closed to those presently in a command position.

Ranked fourth was "lack of manpower." This is not an uncommon complaint for most departments. It should be noted, however, that with a police to population ratio of 2.5 officers per thousand that this should not rank as highly as it did. However, when viewed in relationship to the working schedule, this takes on a different perspective.

All members of the Riverside Police Department with the exception of deputy chiefs and the chief work a four- and two-shift cycle. This means that the officers work four days and are off two. This equates to a 37-1/2 hour work week over a year's period of time. Such a schedule, although of great benefit to the officers, at the same time puts a tremendous strain on manpower resources.

The problem area which ranked third, "poor communications working environment," is a fact. The communications room was a storage room next to the cellblock. It was cramped, dark, lacked ventilation and sound proofing, and required a weekly extermination service to eliminate the flea problem.

Suggestions by Command Staff
for Improving Riverside
Police Department

Table 9 represents the responses of commanders in terms of suggestions to improve the department. It is interesting to note that suggestions #1-4 reflect the general goals of the program. They also reinforce the concern of the staff for the political interference in the administration of the department as well as their perceived inability to control the destiny of the department. These problems more accurately reflected the concerns of the command staff than the major weaknesses.

Comparison of Patrolmen's List
of Weaknesses With Those of
the Commanders

As previously indicated, the Training Team gathered information from fifty patrolmen regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the police department. Table 10 reflects the ranking of weaknesses.

The number one weakness can be somewhat disregarded, since it reflects an emotional response to the recent shooting of a patrol officer. The department responded to this issue by using two-men cars in high crime areas. By the time the project started the response was less emotional to this issue.

The most striking comparison was with the second ranked item which received only one less response than number one. The "assignment not by ability but by politics" indicated that the patrolmen were cognizant of the political maneuverings as were the commanders.

Table 9

Commanders' Suggestions for Improving the Riverside Police Department

<u>Suggestion</u>	<u>* Number Making the Suggestion</u>
Ongoing systematic management training.	10
Give Chief full authority to manage department.	7
Select people for positions on basis of quality	7
Open staff meetings-problem solving	4
25 new men	3
Open administration	2
Redesign schedule	2
Improve communications operation	2
Rotate men systematically	2
Improve promotional opportunities	2
Abolish Captain rank and use Deputy Chief rank	
Design command selection criteria	
New management	
More discipline	
One-man Police Commissioner	
Decentralized operation	
Educational incentive	
Two-man cars	
Establish departmental ombudsman	
Advisory board to Board of Police	
*No number indicates only one commander making suggestion	

Table 10

Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department as Perceived by Patrolmen

<u>WEAKNESS</u>	<u>NUMBER WHO EXPRESSED</u>
One man cars	14
Assignment by ability and not politics	13
Management	8
Old equipment	8
Conflict between supervisors and patrolmen	7
Wages.	7
Lack of manpower	5
Poor supervision techniques	4
Court	4
No education incentive	3
Working conditions	3
No backing from all ranks	3
Lack of physical test prior to employment	2
Lack of discipline	2
No training	2
Need new communication system	2
Conflicting orders	2
Men paying for damage to cruisers while on duty	1
Probationary policemen	1
Lack of educated superiors	1
Court overtime	1
Vacation time	1

The patrolmen expressed concern over the management of the department as well as the relationships between supervisor and patrolmen as major weaknesses.

The patrolmen's perceptions seem to support the need for the type of organizational development which was the objective of the project.

INITIAL PROJECT ORIENTATION AND TRAINING SESSIONS

Two orientation and initial training sessions were scheduled for the months of August and September. The primary goal of these sessions was to present the scope and nature of the program. Since it was evident from interviews that the entire project was not understood by the command staff, these sessions were essential. In addition, they were to be training sessions at which time introductory material regarding management by objective, participative decision making, and group problem solving would be presented. In addition, the training team was to feed back the information which had been gathered by the questionnaires regarding the commanders' and patrolmen's perceptions of the department.

Each session, both in August and September, was two days in length. Half of the command staff would attend one day while the remainder would be present for the second.

August Session

This session was held on two days in mid-August, 1973. The following discussion reflects the objectives and the events surrounding the August session.

OBJECTIVE #1: TO ESTABLISH CREDIBILITY AND A WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONSULTING TEAM AND THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMAND STAFF.

The importance of accomplishing this objective on the outset of any development project cannot be overstressed. This objective must be accomplished before such a project can be expected to move forward. "The quality of the client-agent relationship is pivotal to the success of the change program."¹⁰⁷ In support of this position the following four points which are made by Bennis were considered:

1. The client system should have as much understanding of the change and its consequences, as much influence in developing and controlling the fate of the change, and as much trust in the initiator of the change as is possible.
2. The change effort should be perceived as being as self-motivated and voluntary as possible. This can be effected through the legitimization and reinforcement of the change by top management and by significant reference groups adjacent to the client system.
3. The change program must include emotional and value as well as cognitive (informational) elements for successful implementation. It is doubtful that relying on solely rational persuasion is sufficient. Most organizations possess the knowledge to cure their ills; the rub is utilization.
4. The change agent can be crucial in reducing the resistance to change. As long as the change agent acts congruently with the principles of the program and as long as the

¹⁰⁷ Bennis, "Theory and Method in Applying Behavioral Science to Planned Organizational Change," p. 78.

client has a chance to test competence and motives (his own and the change agent's), the agent should be able to provide the psychological support necessary during the risky phases of change.¹⁰⁸

It was obvious to the researcher that there was significant anxiety about studies, surveys and consulting teams who might impose change from outside the department. This point can be documented by an incident which took place on the evening prior to this session. At that time the Training Team arrived at the police station simply to meet a few members of the command staff. Upon entering the front door of the station, the team was apparently recognized by a patrolman standing in the lobby. He was overheard making a statement to another member of the department, "Watch out, we are being evaluated." It was obvious that his perception of the function of the team was to evaluate the department and recommend change.

This point was further exemplified during a conversation which the researcher had with some members of the command staff that evening. At that time, the distaste which they had for studies of their department was emphasized by a lengthy dissertation reciting the results of a 1966 study done of their department which created unanticipated and unwanted change.

During the training session, two things were very evident. First, there was a definite lack of understanding about the project and process which would be utilized during the program. Secondly, the members of the command staff were completely unaware of their role in the process. There was some open hostility to the program and the

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., pp. 77-78.

team at the outset of each meeting. However, as the meetings proceeded, the hostility was transformed into an obvious concern about the need for change, and a complete frustration with their inability as individuals or a command staff to effect change. At times there appeared to be a state of almost complete despondency on the part of the command staff.

Because of the historical patterns of administration of the Riverside Police Department, the staff would not or could not believe that anybody was serious about changing the inefficient management. As a result, the Training Team, convinced that an honest and trustful relationship was mandatory for project success, reviewed the contract arrangements and the project's goals.

This type of explanation continued to be a necessity throughout the project's life. The team constantly had to forcefully answer charges such as "you're the mayor's man," "whatever you do here will be against the men and for the administration," "politics is too strong and they will oppose changing anything."

The strategy used by the team to answer these charges involved candid responses and comparative examples. The team consistently used management examples to illustrate how the staff could limit the political impact and rectify their internal problems. Examples given included job descriptions and a performance evaluation system to limit arbitrary assignments and a procedure manual to standardize operations.

This procedure worked on the borderline sceptics, those people who wanted change but were wary of its possibility. The problem

remained, however, because the team aimed its effort at the middle element of the group with the objective of having this core of staff people commit themselves to the project. The fringe element of obstructionists was expected to either fall in line or become ineffective once the moderates supported the project.

It is the researcher's opinion that at the conclusion of the two days of meeting, considerable progress was made toward establishing a viable change relationship. However, this optimism was somewhat dimmed by two factors. First, there was detected an almost historically based attitude of pessimism and defeatism on the part of the staff. Secondly, much work would have to be done to establish credibility for the project as well as give it greater visibility throughout the entire department. The concern in this regard was supported coincidentally enough by another comment which was overheard as the team walked out of the back door of the station on the afternoon of the second day of the meetings. A patrolman who was standing by the door of the communications room apparently recognized the team and commented to the other officers in the communications room, "We're being evaluated." Then he paused, looked us over and stated, "You won't last long."

OBJECTIVE #2: TO EXPOSE THE COMMAND STAFF TO THE PRINCIPLES AND PROCESS WHICH WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN THE EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

As previously stated, it was obvious that there was a complete misunderstanding of the role of the team and the process which would be employed in the project. During the meetings, no other matters were discussed until it was obvious that the members of the command

staff were cognizant of the process, the role of the team and their role in the process. This was accomplished utilizing a lecture-discussion technique. It appeared that the hostility against the project and the team waned as the staff developed a better understanding of the objectives of the project. As the hostility was transformed to expressions of concern for change, the team began to introduce data to assist the command staff in directing their energies.

OBJECTIVE #3: TO FEED BACK TO THE COMMAND STAFF THE COMPLETED DATA GENERATED BY THEIR RESPONSE TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

This consisted of presenting to the command staff the summary of their responses aggregated with those of the patrolmen regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the department. Each member was given a copy of the data and it was also presented to them in chart form.

The primary information which was utilized is presented in Table 11. In this table, the Training Team arbitrarily reorganized the responses regarding weakness of the department into four administrative categories: (1) personnel, (2) staff services, (3) line operations, and (4) management and administration.

The purpose of providing this material to the command staff was twofold. First, it provided them with a point of reference with regard to how the other members of the organization viewed the Riverside Police Department. Secondly, it provided them with an introduction to the utilization of research data for decision making.

It was readily apparent that the staff was not accustomed to utilizing this type of data feedback in the decision making process.

Table 11

**Major Weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department
Arranged into Administrative Categories**

Administrative Category Response Item	Responses	
	#	%
PERSONNEL		
No training.....	11	31.4
No education incentive	6	17.1
Pay	6	17.1
Morale	4	11.4
Poor recruitment	3	8.6
No recognition	2	5.7
Weak Civil Service Exams	1	2.8
Grievance procedure	1	2.8
Union.	1	2.8
Total . .	35	100
LINE OPERATIONS		
Lack of manpower	7	25.0
Lack of communication and coordination among units . .	5	17.8
One man cars	4	14.2
Poor equipment	3	10.6
Lack of foot patrols	2	7.1
Schedule	2	7.1
Poor allocation of resources	2	7.1
Lack of sergeants	1	3.7
Efficiency decrease on weekends	1	3.7
Poor court testimony	1	3.7
Total . .	28	100

Table 11 (Continued)

Administrative Category Response Item	Responses	
	#	%
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION		
Political interference	19	61.2
No delegation of authority	3	9.7
No discipline or control	3	9.7
No standard operating procedures	2	6.5
Centralized operation	2	6.5
No management	1	3.2
No chain of command	1	3.2
Total . . .	31	100
STAFF SERVICES		
Poor communications	8	80.0
Poor records system	1	10.0
Too many sworn officers in clerical positions	1	10.0
Total . . .	10	100
OTHER		
No space	5	55.6
No money	2	22.2
No parking for public	1	11.1
Public apathy	1	11.1
Total . . .	10	100

Most commanders were hard pressed to absorb the material at the initial exposure.

OBJECTIVE #4: TO MAKE PRELIMINARY DECISIONS REGARDING THE PROBLEM AREAS TO BE TACKLED AND TO SELECT TASK FORCES.

The command staff was not entirely comfortable with the original five delineated areas after briefly reviewing the data which had been presented to them. They felt that some additional time would be required to review the data, settle on problem areas, and form task forces.

Therefore, a second orientation meeting was scheduled for the end of September, at which time the task forces would be formed.

The Training Team suggested that prior to the next session, the command staff should meet in a staff meeting (1) to discuss the data and (2) to make some preliminary decisions regarding problem areas to be addressed. It was felt that this staff meeting without the team present would be an opportunity to measure the commitment of the command staff, their coordinating effectiveness and their ability to set priorities on complex matters in a group setting.

Interim Events

The entire command staff did meet as a group the beginning of September. The purpose of this meeting was to review the data presented and begin preliminary decision making on problem areas. However, the purpose was never accomplished.

At this meeting the Chairman of the Board of Police (also Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office) was present. He usurped the meeting purpose to present a reorganization plan which

included the appointing of a second deputy position. He had not advised the Training Team that he had a planned reorganization in mind. In fact, the first indication the training team had that he presented this plan was when they arrived in Riverside for the second Initial Orientation Session.

The organization chart presented in Figure 2 was ratified by the Board of Police Commissioners a few days after the staff meeting with no modification from the command staff.

September Session


The September session began with a heated discussion of what had occurred at the command staff meeting early in September.

The commanders had varying views. Some felt that the Commissioner had attended the meeting to explain "his" reorganization plan because information had leaked to the news media about it the day before. He apparently claimed that the leak to the news had in fact forced him to create a second deputy position. Others interpreted it as an effort to get the command staff to rubber stamp the proposal and have the project superficially support the reorganization.

Almost to a man, they all agreed that they had been used as a political tool and that that was essentially what the management development project was all about.

The presentation of the reorganization plan by the Commissioner at the meeting of the command staff obviously had a significant impact on the project and was only the beginning of a series of events which would shape the direction of the project.

Figure 2. Reorganization of Riverside Police Department



In discussing this event with the Training Team, the Commissioner could offer no reasonable explanation why he had not discussed "his" plan for reorganization with them. He did state that he would discuss any future plans which would affect the department ahead of time and rely on the Management Development Program to initiate change in the department. He said it was too late to stop the appointment of a second deputy and the resulting reorganization.

The major objective of this September session was to identify problem areas and divide into task forces. The command staff decided to divide into task forces which were somewhat in line with the administration categories used to report the data back to them (see Table 12: Personnel, Staff Services, Line Operations, Management and Administration). The task forces established were:

1. Personnel and Training
2. Communications
3. Operations
4. Organization and Administration

Table 12
Task Force Composition

Rank	Organization	Communication	Personnel Training	Operations
Deputy Chief	1	-	-	-
Captains	2	-	1	2
Lieutenants	8	1	4	2
Sergeants	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>
Total	14	6	12	9

The Communications Task Force was created since there was an immediate need to resolve some problems with respect to the installation of a new communications system.

The members of the command staff each volunteered for an assignment on one of the task forces. The general composition is presented in Table 12.

Since the Training Team felt that self-direction was important, there was no intervention in developing the composition of the task forces. As can be seen from Table 12, this resulted in an Organization and Administration Task Force which was somewhat top heavy.

In order to give some direction to the task forces for their first meeting, the following objectives were set by the Training Team:

1. To set a first meeting date.
2. To select a chairman.
3. To set up a schedule of meetings through December 30, 1973.
4. To set up a tentative schedule for team members to meet with task forces.
5. To discuss the role of staff service units such as Planning and Research, Legal Aid, and Administrative Aid.

Summary of Initial Orientation Sessions

It should be noted that the two initial orientation meetings occurred as a result of an order from the Chief of Police directing all persons from the rank of sergeant and above to attend. Such mandatory attendance required the payment of overtime according to the union contract to everyone except the deputy chief. It was felt that

this was reasonable since it was a training program as was the entire project, and any department which wishes a successful training program must be willing to provide payment to those in attendance.

This would be true with any training program. There was generally excellent attendance at both of these meetings. Attendance at each represented approximately 90% of the entire command staff.

Although considerable effort was expended in establishing an understanding of and legitimacy for the training program, the team never felt confident that the apparent support was real. During the orientation sessions it was clear to the team that the command staff had little faith in any positive results generating from this program. Most commanders in attendance were there only because they were ordered. Based on the questions which were asked by several commanders, it was obvious that there was little understanding of this project and that there had been no groundwork or explanation for the team's presence. First, there had been no effort made prior to the team's arrival by either the mayor, Criminal Justice Planning Office (CJPO), or command staff to explain the objectives of the project, the reason for selection of the team, or the support which could be expected from city hall. The command staff generally felt that the team would simply do a study similar to the previous consulting effort and that they had to "put up" with the study in order that federal LEAA funds could be utilized to renovate their dispatch facility with modern equipment. Second, given this lack of commitment which was apparent at several levels, the team realized progress would be hampered until a trust level could be established. Third, an effort

had to be made by the city, the board, and the Criminal Justice Planning Office (CJPO) to indicate their support for the project if the team ever hoped to make significant inroads. Fourth, the Criminal Justice Planning Office had to understand the significance of convincing the mayor and board on the objectives of the program and emphasizing the importance of non-interference in departmental organization until the project ended.

From this point forward, the command staff met in their respective task forces and with the Training Team member assigned to each group. Each member of the training team had responsibility for one task force. These task forces formed the core of the project and served as the vehicle for training. Each of the task forces had certain areas of responsibility and each experienced different types and levels of success and problems.

During the duration of the project, internal and external events significantly impacted on the project which resulted in modification of the task force arrangement and objectives as well as the roles of the components.

IMPLEMENTATION OF ORIGINAL MODEL

Introduction

In order to support the management development model utilizing the task force arrangement, it was necessary to establish a procedure which would provide for maximum coordination. This procedure would also have to be designed to insure maximum participation by all members

of the command staff. Therefore, the following procedure was set into motion:

1. Each task force would work independently to identify organizational problems. The members of the Training Team would be responsible to insure that each task force would not duplicate effort.
2. The role of the Training Team member was primarily to be a resource person and facilitate the group in problem identification and development of alternative solutions.
3. Planning and research, the legal advisor, and the administrative aide would provide resource material, data, and management information for decision making. They would participate in task forces when requested.
4. The task forces would identify problems, develop alternative solutions, and write up a staff study.
5. The staff study would be provided to members of each task force for review. The staff study would be reviewed in a meeting of all members of the command staff. It would be accepted, rejected, modified, or sent back to the originating group for revision.
6. The completed staff study would be forwarded to the Chief for approval.
7. It would then go to the Board of Police Commissioners for action.

In addition to the above procedure, the training team set up its own internal mechanism of coordination. It was imperative that the team members be informed at all times of the progress of each task force. This was necessary to avoid duplication of effort in the problem definition and solution seeking phases.

Operations Task Force

The original task force started out with nine members. These individuals selected the Operations Task Force as their choice for

participation. Of the nine, seven worked uniform division days. The two captains of the uniform division were on this task force as well as two lieutenants. There were two daytime uniform sergeants and one night shift uniform sergeant. The remaining two sergeants were assigned to Criminal Investigation Division; one worked days and one worked nights.

Of the original members, seven filled out the background questionnaire which was passed out at the beginning of the project. It is important to note that of those in the task force who answered the questionnaire none listed any previous training in the area of management and supervision. This fact was well demonstrated throughout the task force meetings. There was a general lack of understanding of the role of management, much less some of the general principles. It often became necessary to incorporate the general principles of administration and management in the task force meetings in order to bring the level of competence up to a point where decision making theory could be explained. This lack of previous training also possibly added to the general dysfunction of the organization.

The Operations Task Force became immediately operational and from the outset seemed determined to solve some of the organizational problems in the operational areas.

Its first meeting was approximately one week after the final orientation session. Its original objective was to meet at least once a week. During the course of the task force's life it met a total of sixteen times between September and January.

Figure 3 reflects the activity of the task force in terms of number of members participating in each meeting.

As can be seen from the graph, attendance at the task force during September and October remained high and the task force appeared to be on its way to identifying and solving organizational problems. The minutes of the task force meetings as well as the observation by the Training Team member indicated that the process was moving forward.


For example, at the last orientation meeting of the command staff, the following objectives were outlined for the first meetings of each task force:

1. Select a chairman.
2. Set a schedule for task force meetings through December.
3. Set schedule for training team members.
4. Discuss and determine the role of Planning and Research in relations to Operations Task Force.
5. Select problem areas in terms of priority.

During the initial meeting the task force worked through all of these objectives to a reasonable degree. They elected one of the Uniform Division lieutenants as chairman. They established a weekly schedule of meetings through the month of December. This schedule was devised so that on the meeting date, the maximum number of members would be on duty.

A considerable amount of time was spent on the last two objectives. Since the role of Planning and Research was not clearly defined when the unit was instituted, many misconceptions prevailed. One of the major functions which the Training Team member served was

Figure 3. Meeting Activity of Operations Task Force



to point out the necessity of Planning and Research as a valuable tool to the task forces. There was initial resistance to using Planning and Research and considerable criticism of what they produced. However, by the end of October, there was a steady exchange of valuable information between the Operations Task Force and Planning and Research. The task force began making specific requests for information, and Planning and Research made the information readily available.

The available data as the group proceeded during September and October strongly indicated that the members were making an honest effort to identify organizational problems and develop alternative solutions. The most significant factor indicating this was the shift in the task force from some of the original attitudes displayed in the September orientation meeting.

For example, during the initial two meetings, one of the prevalent attitudes was that nothing could be solved operationally unless the two uniform divisions (North and South) were geographically separated in the city. The members of the command staff were adamant that many of their current problems resulted from the centralization of the department as a result of the 1966 management study. However, one of the first problems which the Operations Task Force began to address was the problem of space allocation. It is significant that the task force shifted from concentrating on one solution to weighing a variety of solutions which included a search for alternating substation sites as well as the development of alternative uses of the currently existing facility. A subtask force was appointed to look

at alternative sites and Planning and Research was requested to supply information on the desirability of a substation. Planning and Research was also requested to make recommendations concerning the allocation of space in the current facility.

Organization and Administration Task Force

This task force had its first meeting one week after Operations met. This group began studying a number of administrative problems but their primary concerns were political interference, delegation of authority and the development of a standard operating procedures manual.

During the early stages of the task force's operation there was much confusion which centered around their lack of knowledge about how to conduct a task force meeting. The team member concentrated on using the various incidents as training tools. For example, a member submitted a proposal to the group but did not have copies for each member and the discussion floundered. The team member used this situation to illustrate the value of providing everyone with copies of items to be discussed.

Another example is that the proposal did not have a clear statement on objectives, problem definition, supporting data, or expected solution. The team member used this episode to illustrate time wasted, confusion, and frustration because of an ill-prepared proposal. The process of the task force meetings was as important as their product. The training emphasis was to prepare the staff in

the techniques of management and decision making as well as developing solutions.

The task force had difficulty focusing on one issue or problem at a time. This situation developed because they failed to set clear objectives for their meetings. Initially they did not even have an agenda available for the members. The team member focused on the utility of clear objectives for meetings to provide direction as well as assist in their own evaluation of their progress.

The confusion and floundering prevalent at the earlier meetings were due partly to the task force members' attempts to search for and clarify their roles. Many of these individuals had not worked in a group environment prior to these meetings. The mixed rank composition of the task force also required adjustments for some of the members. Both the higher and lower ranks had to modify their roles from superiors and subordinates to equals within the task force arrangement. The degree to which the group accomplished this role modification was an indication of their individual commitment to the development program.

During the task force meetings some members did submit numerous proposals for discussion. These included an internal advisory board, structural changes, personnel evaluation system, and various modifications of existing operational policies. The task forces blundered through these proposals during the early meetings, but became quite sophisticated in their approach later in the program. They changed their focus from the personality of the initiator to the substantive value of the proposition. Some members critically

evaluated the model under discussion and made significant improvements in the original proposal. This was particularly true of the personnel evaluation model which began as a thrust at one group of people but resulted in a broad policy proposal with protective mechanisms inserted to prevent arbitrary use by an unscrupulous administrator.

The task force served as a clearinghouse of information for the staff. Many federally funded programs had become operational in the department with little direct involvement on the part of the command staff. The task force invited people from Planning and Research, the legal advisor, and the administrative aide to the Chief (all federally funded positions) to present information on their programs, discuss their objectives, and determine their utility to the administration of a large municipal police department. On the other hand, these support units also sought out the task force for the submission of proposals for improving the department. This quickly evolved to the point where the task force was recognized as a policy and action review group who had the authority to pass judgment on the proposal. The task force became a legitimate decision making body within the chain of command.

Training Task Force

The initial meeting of the task force flowed rather smoothly despite a considerable amount of apprehension regarding the credibility of the project and whether or not their efforts would prove to be fruitful. The team member assured the task force that a genuine effort would result in marked improvement in the Riverside Police

Department since their decisions would get support from the Board of Police.

The task force quickly identified the problems which they felt needed immediate consideration and action. After much discussion, it was decided that there were numerous areas which needed immediate training. The task force requested the team member for the training task force to develop a systematic plan for solving the training problem. The team member indicated that at the October meeting the task force would receive an implementation plan, instruction in systematic training development, and numerous source books for task force reference. The task force was instructed to meet every other week to determine the problems which had a direct bearing on the absence of training. They were further instructed to set a schedule of meetings for the rest of the calendar year.

It was obvious after the first meeting that several factors had presented themselves which required observation in future task force meetings.

1. The task force was not prepared for the team itinerary which was originally designed for implementation.
2. Support for the project was not indicated from within the task force, the police department, the Criminal Justice Planning Office, nor the police board.
3. Training and personnel development for the department in the past was virtually non-existent. Data on past programs was scattered and sparse indicating that internal department training programs were no more than information-giving sessions.
4. The task force was not ready for self-directed activities, and considerable guidance would be required.

5. The task force chairman exhibited a disdain for the program which created a critical situation.

Communications Task Force

This task force was originally composed of seven people including three lieutenants and four sergeants. The primary concern of this group was the location of the new communications system which had been purchased with LEAA funds. The team member encouraged the group to add the training of communications personnel to their study. The task force held five meetings; gathered considerable data on specifications; met with the contractor, the city engineer, and the Criminal Justice Planning Office; and compiled their information into a report. The report recommended that the new equipment be installed on the third floor and that the communications center also be moved from its present cramped location to the third floor.

There was some confusion after the task force submitted its proposal to the Deputy Chief for approval. Rumors circulated that the recommendation had been reversed and that it was to be installed on the first floor. The Planning and Research unit polled twenty-five of the forty-four commanders, and they favored the third floor twenty-three to two. Subsequently, the Chief wrote an order for the third floor installation.

Other Organizational Development Efforts Initiated

The Riverside Police Department lacked one essential element which is important to any personnel development program. They had no positions specifications other than some very general job descriptions

which were used by the state civil service system. In order to assist the department in the management development effort, the Training Team initiated a job analysis of the various command level positions. The objectives of this effort were to:

1. Interview command and supervisory personnel to gather descriptive statements on their job responsibilities and the tasks they perform.
2. Formulate task statements based on an analysis of the collected data.
3. Formulate job descriptions for the major command classifications.

As a result of this effort, twenty-five supervisors were interviewed by a project consultant (not one of the regular Training Team). The list included one acting chief, one deputy chief, three captains, seven lieutenants, and thirteen sergeants. This group represented over fifty percent of the command staff and is a representative sample of each classification level from the three work shifts.

After the data was collected in its raw form, it was analyzed. The pattern illustrated by the compiled data proved significant. There was little evidence of consistency of job responsibilities, as articulated by the persons interviewed, either within the classification or among the shifts. Table 13, which depicts the articulated responsibilities for captains and lieutenants, illustrates the point of overlapping and inconsistency. Note that only a few responsibilities were mentioned by more than one individual in the same rank.

This confusion and lack of clarity of the responsibilities for various rank levels is a result of many factors. First, the department did not have job descriptions for the ranks or the various

Table 13

**Responsibilities of Captains and Lieutenants as
Articulated by Incumbents**

CAPTAIN**Responsible for:***** Number Claiming
Same Responsibility**

Felony investigations
 Overseeing investigations of juvenile cases
 Aiding in outside agency investigations
 Processing and transporting persons in custody
 Processing criminal evidence
 Reviewing department reports
 Inter-departmental communications
 Assisting Chief on special assignments
 Reports and communications from previous shifts
 Inter-and Intra-departmental correspondence
 Satisfying business left over from previous shift
 Patrolman job assignments
 Special events

LIEUTENANT

Operations of patrol personnel	
Roll call proceedings	2
Police Reports	3
Recruit school	
Special assignment in staff services	
Juvenile prosecution in court	
Grievance Committee for Police Board	
Special services to department	
Coordination of department activities	
Supporting men in investigations	
Counseling men	
Processing officers' reports	
Issuance of warrants and subpoenas	
Duty assignment of personnel	
Evaluation of officers	
Coordination of watch	2
Departmental correspondence and reports	2
Processing citizen complaints	
Closing completed shift	

* No number indicates only one incumbent articulated responsibility

positions within a rank (the department relied on the brief, sterile generalities of the civil service classifications). In many cases, the personnel simply did not know what the particular position required of its incumbent. Only three or four persons could clearly identify their responsibilities and distinguish between a responsibility and a task.

It is of substantial importance to note that few of the articulated responsibilities could be interpreted as being of the management nature. This strongly supported the observations by the Training Team members that the command staff members did not perceive themselves as managers or supervisors.

This data was synthesized with job description data from twenty other departments to develop position specifications for the five rank classifications of sergeant, lieutenant, captain, deputy chief and chief.

MODIFICATION ONE: A CHANGE IN TASK FORCE COMPOSITION

During the months of September, October, and early November several events occurred which created a modification of the original model.

As previously mentioned, in September between the first and second orientation meetings, the Chairman of the Board (also Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office) announced a surprise reorganization. This had a demoralizing impact on the project but was not in and of itself a fatal blow. As can be seen by the previous discussion

the project was implemented and began to move ahead. However, several events took place which, having occurred at the embryonic stages of the project development, had both immediate and long range impact. The majority of these events occurred during the month of October and were as follows:

1. The Chairman of the Board of Police announced his resignation effective the end of October.
2. The Board of Police voted to discontinue the payment of overtime for the command staff to participate in the Management Development Program.
3. The Mayor announced the appointment of a local florist shop owner as the new Chairman of the Board of Police.
4. The Criminal Justice Planning Office announced the funding of a Regional Police Academy in Riverside.
5. The appointment of the second Deputy Chief (previously a uniform division captain) was announced.

These incidents occurred without any input from the task forces or the Training Team. Indeed, the Chairman of the Board verbally stated to the team members that he would not take any action which would directly affect the department without conferring with the team and the task forces. This statement was in response to an inquiry regarding the coordination of efforts.

The appointment of the second deputy was anticlimactic because the affected groups were aware of it. The discontinuance of the overtime, although talked about for weeks, severely impacted the task force composition. The command staff saw this as a sign of a lack of support for the program. This decision came at a very critical stage in the project. The task forces were beginning to set objectives and

timetables, and it appeared that some initial successes were only a short time away. The overtime decision discouraged many members from further attendance just when the task forces were beginning to solidify. The decision in effect provided a de facto selection process for members who would attend the training task forces. Attendance was now determined by the time of day the task force meetings were held. If an individual was working when a meeting was held, then he might have attended. Of course, some of the command staff used the overtime decision as an excuse for not attending because they did not desire to participate in the first place.

The board used this argument in their rationalizing away the attendance problems articulated by the training team. But the fact is that the malingerers were a tiny minority of the command staff. The majority were sincerely interested in the training project and had hopes of achieving change. They were understandably cautious, however, when the board raised a red flag of non-support by deciding not to fund further overtime.

The board claimed that the city simply did not have the funds to pay for the high overtime costs. This argument disintegrated, however, under closer scrutiny. The board decided on the basis of the August and September meetings which involved the total command staff in pre-set times. The task forces had already decided by October to hold their meetings at times suitable for the various shift representatives. For example, the Organization Task Force rescheduled their meetings from two o'clock in the afternoon to three o'clock or three-thirty in the afternoon. They decided that this time period

would require only an hour overtime for the people on the four to twelve o'clock shift and possibly an hour overtime for the day people. Only those very few people who were on a day-off would be paid for the full meeting time. This would have the effect of substantially decreasing the overtime costs, but the board did not accept the Training Team's argument.

A second element that weakened their reason for the non-overtime decision was that the city expended funds for extra purchases and special needs. In October, \$2,500 was transferred to the police department budget for the second deputy position. Furthermore, another \$1,900 was transferred to the department in January, 1974, to cover increased costs for the third deputy position. Finally, in December, 1973, the City Council approved an additional appropriation of \$2,000 to buy shotguns. It is obvious that money was available if the board wanted to request it. Also obvious was that the Management Development Program was not as high a priority as shotguns or new positions.

Alteration of Task Force Composition

The cumulative impact of these events on the task forces in general was a 50-60 percent drop in attendance.

The effect of the events on the Operations Task Force peaked at the end of October when attendance in a task force meeting reached a low of three persons (see Figure 3). In addition, for the remaining meetings of the task force, night shift members participated irregularly if at all. The task force was composed essentially from that

point on of daytime uniform personnel. One vital criterion for the success of any task force operation is the participation by a representative sample of the organization which will be affected by the change. This representation was no longer true of the Operations Task Force.

The Organization and Administration Task Force suffered the least in terms of lost attendance since they had already rescheduled their meetings to meet the needs of their members. At least three members came to the meetings regularly even though they didn't receive overtime pay.

The Communications Task Force by this time had shrunk to only three active members. They had achieved their objective on location, but had failed to take up the issue of in-service training and non-sworn staffing of the communications unit. This occurred in spite of the team member's efforts to keep the task force together by submitting a complete training model for them to utilize. Shortly thereafter, this task force dissolved.

The Training Task Force was the hardest hit by membership loss; only one-third of its members remained active. Over and above the overtime issue, two other factors played heavily on the cohesiveness of the task force. First was the announcement that Riverside would be the headquarters for a federally funded regional police training center.

The effect of this announcement superseded the objectives and problems which the task force had set, since most felt the RPD would no longer have a training operation. Second, a twenty-five man recruit

class had started with the Training Task Force chairman solely responsible for the training. The total impact was the dissolution of this task force.

Operations Task Force Activity

During the first meeting in November it was necessary for the Training Team member to spend an extensive amount of time attempting to increase the morale level of the task force which was still feeling the impact of the events which precipitated the demise of two of the task forces. Because the task force had already spent a considerable amount of time on the space allocation problem, the energies of the Training Team were focused on that problem area.

As a result of a department-wide concern about the current space allocation, the Administrative Aide had suggested that technical assistance be secured from LEAA to do an architectural study. During mid-November an architectural study team came to Riverside. At this time they met with the chairman of the Operations Task Force. The Training Team member attempted to set up a procedure which would insure a link of communication between the Operations Task Force and the architectural study.

Although the task force met regularly, there was growing resistance by the task force members to work on their own and complete staff studies for submission. They continued to be willing to discuss problems and alternative solutions, but they never seemed to go beyond that point. The attitude began to develop that they did not have the time to work on staff studies and conveyed the impression that they

felt participation on the task force voluntarily is all that should be expected of them. They were willing to review proposals for and make suggestions about staff studies, but they did not want to devote any time outside of the task force meeting.

It was during this period of time that Planning and Research developed a proposal for the annual census which involved manpower allocation. This was presented to the task force as a vehicle to obtain command staff support. The Operations Task Force reviewed the proposals and both were approved after some modification. This proposal was also approved by the Organization Task Force.

During a meeting in early December the chairman of the task force resigned. The reasons given were numerous, but centered basically on the frustration as a result of perceived non-support by top-level administrators. The major point was that decisions were being made by the "administration" on matters which the task force was studying, and no input was requested from the task force.

Cited as an example was a decision reached by the Operations Task Force that the new communications center be located on the first floor. This decision came out as a result of their study of space allocation. Because their recommendation conflicted with the Communications Task Force, a joint meeting of all chairmen was called. They agreed on the third floor site and reported this to their task forces. Subsequently, rumors claimed that it was to be placed on the first floor. The confusion frustrated the members, and the chairmen indicated the futility of trying to submit proposals into an inefficient organizational structure.

Other examples cited were decisions by the Mayor's office and the Board of Police to consider the purchase or lease of a garage across from the station for vehicle use. Since the Operations Task Force had focused on space allocation and the first information they had received about this possibility was from the newspaper, it was interpreted as an obvious affront to the task force operation. Finally, since the architectural study team's first appearance in Riverside there had been no contact between the team and the Operations Task Force. The architect was basing his operation in Planning and Research.

It became necessary to determine if the Operations Task Force wanted to continue to operate. This question was brought up in the mid-December meeting when the chairman resigned. The members voted unanimously to continue the task force arrangement and voted in a new chairman. But they felt that some modification was necessary since they did not believe they should be required to write the staff reports.

Other Task Force Activity

The Organization and Administration Task Force concentrated on the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Manual during this period. They decided to accept the Training Team member's suggestion that a capable individual be assigned full time (on a temporary basis) to work on the manual. The group submitted this proposal to the Chief, and at the end of November a sergeant was assigned to Planning and Research for the sole purpose of developing a procedure manual. The team member and Planning and Research provided the individual with models of manuals used by other police departments.

The procedures in the development of the manual were extensive. The person working on the SOP collected all the Chief's memos, Chief's orders, letters, and miscellaneous items related to the operations and policy of the department. This material was synthesized and collated to avoid duplication and to streamline the procedures. Discrepancies, inconsistencies, and policy voids were cleared up by contacting appropriate command officials as the issues arose, rather than waiting until they were collected in the new manual.

The task force heard periodic reports on the status of the SOP and monitored its completion. The individual compiling the document also became a member of the task force.

The task force also heard and discussed proposals for various changes in the administrative structure, processes, and activities of the organization. One such example was the building security plan submitted by Planning and Research. This form of activity continued to be the routine of the task force efforts. Other larger problems, such as the SOP, were handled separately.

As previously mentioned, the Training Task Force was dissolved early in the project. The chairman, who had no time for task force business due to recruit training, admitted that only one meeting had occurred since the team's departure in September and that the meeting was non-productive. A meeting was scheduled for the fourth week in October when the team consultant was to conduct a lengthy discussion of training materials. Only four participants attended this meeting, one of whom resigned. Only a small portion of the material was covered, and levels of response were minimal. After the meeting, the

chairman was queried for an explanation of the poor response. He enumerated the points mentioned above and also stated that his method of communication had been a memo posted on the bulletin board. A suggestion was made to use a more viable form of communication for the next meeting. He indicated that he did not have time to devote to the task force and asked the team to appoint a new chairman. He was instructed to call the next meeting for that purpose. The meeting was never called, and the task force disbanded. The Communications Task Force dissipated after the decision was made to locate the communications room on the third floor of the police station.

Summary and Conclusions

The effect of these critical events resulted in the dissolution of two task forces. The remaining two were active but showing signs of possible dissolution. All of these elements, the critical incidents and the behavior of the task forces, created some minor changes in the role of the Training Team and forced them to evaluate the process for possible remedies.

During the period under discussion, the Training Team spent a considerable amount of time trying to get the task forces to focus on their original objectives. Yet it became increasingly difficult to maintain credibility with the task force members when major organizational changes occurred without the input of the task forces or the training team.

The team attempted to solidify the channels of communication between the city administration, including the CJPO and the command

staff. One facet of this effort was to request a news release from the Mayor's office indicating his belief in and support of the project. This request was raised in late September and again in early and mid-October, but the statement did not appear in the newspaper until mid-November, six weeks after the initial request. Apparently the Training Team viewed the problems related to the project as more chronic than did the city officials.

Given these developments, the decrease in attendance, and the dissolution of two task forces, it was necessary to determine whether to continue the project. The CJPO and the team jointly decided to continue the effort with the two remaining task forces and those who voluntarily attended.

The basic objectives did not change, although it was obvious that with a 60% decrease in participation the overall production of the task forces would be somewhat less. The Training Team members assigned to Organization and Operations task forces continued to act in the process-consultation model by acting as group facilitators and resource persons.

The team member who had been assigned to the Training Task Force modified his role in the training process. He began a training needs and resource inventory to be used in the event that the Regional Training Academy became a reality.

The fragile credibility relationship between the Training Team and the task force was severely strained. The actions of the Chairman of the Police Board contradicted what the Training Team had been articulating to the task forces. These activities also indicated that

the key leadership of the organization did not or would not understand the purpose, rationale, or objectives of the program. Their activity forced the Training Team away from training to healing wounds, troubleshooting after the critical incidents, and interpreting those actions for the task forces.

From this point forward the frustration level increased, the training process suffered, and the task force productivity decreased. The team, however, decided to try to pull the project back on course. This decision was based on the assurance by the CJPO that no further actions of a non-emergency nature would be initiated until the project was completed or without the training consultants being informed.

Obviously, as a result of the change in the task force composition, and the other events which were occurring, the role of the Training Team was beginning to change. It, however, was not until late December and early January that this began to be formalized.

In addition to this external event, some internal role changes were developing within the operational procedure of the task forces. Since the task forces were not initiating organizational change proposals, Planning and Research became understandably frustrated in the delay of change implementation. Planning and Research had identified areas of change and improvement which they perceived as being ready for implementation and were impatiently waiting for the task forces to request information and recommendations or take action. As a result, Planning and Research began to take on the role of initiator by submitting proposals to the task forces for their review.

In December, the Training Team, CJPO, and Planning and Research met to review the goal of the project, the operational procedures to date, and the alternative procedures and modifications which could be made to increase the activity of the task forces. The result was an agreement that Planning and Research would continue to work through the task forces and the Training Team would outline alternative procedures available to accomplish the training objective.

In January the team submitted an alternative letter to the CJPO and the two remaining task forces. This letter contained several alternatives including termination of the project. The task forces and the CJPO independently favored an alternative suggestion requiring the team to submit proposals to the task force. The team agreed and began to reorganize its effort in that area.

MODIFICATION TWO: A CHANGE IN THE ROLES OF THE PROJECT COMPONENTS

The necessity to further modify the program became apparent to the Training Team and other components in late December and early January. Internal and external events began to impact on the original roles of the Training Team and the task forces.

During the months of November and December the Training Team spent a considerable amount of time encouraging the task forces to engage in self-initiated research and the development of proposals. It was apparent that the departmental structure and dynamics did not support or encourage the participants to engage in this type of

modeling activity as part of their jobs. The task forces began to show slack in their study efforts and in their motivation.

In late December a rumor was circulating within the police department that there was going to be another major reorganization and that a third deputy chief's position was going to be created. Attempts to confirm this by members of the Training Team were fruitless. The new director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office denied any knowledge of such a reorganization. Attempts to meet with the new chairman of the board were also without effect. Letters requesting a meeting were unanswered and several attempts to locate him at his florist shop were also fruitless.

The announcement of the creation of the third deputy position in early January was done without giving prior information of the decision to either the Training Team members or the task force members. This key external event took both the Training Team and the task force members completely by surprise with the exception of unfirmed rumors, and made it extremely difficult for the Training Team to maintain the posture that the Mayor, CJP0, and the Board of Police were supportive of the original goals of the project. It was particularly difficult to rationalize the original argument for not paying overtime because the money was not available in view of the ready accessibility of an additional \$1,900 for a new third deputy chief.

Modification of the Roles of Project Components

The letter outlining the alternatives available for the continuation of the project was submitted to the task forces in late

January. Both the Operations and Organization task forces selected by vote the alternative in which the Training Team would take a more affirmative role in recommending change. This role was closely aligned to the traditional consulting role.

In this modification the procedure was established whereby the Training Team and Planning and Research developed models, studies, and recommendations for organizational and operational change. These models would be submitted to each task force for their approval, modification, or rejection. If approved either in the original or modified form, they would be forwarded to the Chief (or Acting Chief, depending on the status of the Chief's health) for approval. If they required board approval, they would then be forwarded to the board. Obviously, the team member was taking a more direct role in controlling and supervising the task force which resulted from the second major modification. By changing the role from facilitators to initiators the team also assumed more control over the agenda and, therefore, the meetings.

Task Force Activity

In early January the Organization Task Force experienced a period, albeit brief, of revitalized energy. The group had to vote for a new chairman. The increasing administrative duties which fell to the person holding that position (because of the absence of the Chief) forced him to resign the added burden of chairing the task force. He did not, however, resign from the task force itself. The new chairman was a night shift lieutenant around whom there had been

some controversy. He was viewed by the Mayor, Director of CJP0 and the Chief as a trouble maker. The men of the department, however, had high respect for him as a leader.

With any organization, new leadership brings in new ideas and motivations. The meetings in January covered a number of issues and topics. One suggestion discussed by the group involved the establishment of a compensatory time-off system for attendance at staff meetings. A second positive incident was the attendance of four new members.

The team members submitted, as a result of the modification of their role, material on job descriptions, personnel evaluation systems, and transfer procedures for their evaluation. These documents were not completed models. The objective was to have the task force review these samples and modify them to fit their needs. The samples were designed in such a way that it was a very short step from the documents to a completed self-sufficient policy or procedure. The task force, however, failed to respond to these documents in future meetings. They claimed that there was too much material (only twenty pages had been submitted which covered five separate and independent policies or procedures), but the team concluded that the task force simply did not want to spend time on task force business outside of the meeting arrangement. This attitude was supported by the lack of organizational support for the administrators to perform these functions as part of their daily responsibilities. The historical pattern of administration simply had not created the atmosphere or

provided the methods for administrative planning, studying, or implementing new procedures.

At the end of February, the board ordered the transfer of the person serving as chairman of the task force. He was shifted from the north to the south command. The individual involved perceived this action as an attempt to separate him from another active participant on the task force. As a result, he resigned as chairman and the task force collapsed. All but two of the group felt that the transfer resulted because the task force was beginning to move into an analysis of the decision making process of the organization and the board to determine the actual procedures involved. This interpretation was supported by more than half-a-dozen commanders from all levels of the organization. These persons believed that a message was included in that transfer--don't attempt to change too much.

The training team could not document these allegations, but the belief of the commanders, whether erroneous or distorted was substantial enough to question the rationale for the transfer and to dissolve the task force.

The Operations Task Force engaged in little activity during the months of January and February. Unlike the Organization Task Force the change in leadership did not result in an infusion of new momentum. Of the four meetings in January, three were called at the initiative of either the Training Team member or Planning and Research. During this period of time, the Training Team and Planning submitted several proposals for their review. These included a Civil Disturbance Unit proposal and one on the hiring and training of civilian dispatchers.

The objective was to maintain momentum by focusing on items on which the task force could reach closure. Both the Training Team and Planning and Research had a series of other proposals ready for consideration. However, the collapse of the Organization/Administration Task Force took the steam out of Operations and the task force dissolved by the end of February.

Summary and Conclusions

The elements necessary for organizational development to occur simply did not materialize. Key administrators and officials operated on the basis of short-range and ad hoc decision making. Their activities indicated that they either did not understand or ignored the fundamental needs of the project.

The task forces existed longer than the team expected, given the cumulative effect of the external incidents. Indeed, the dedication of some of the task force members to an all-out attempt to rectify the problems of the department in spite of the setbacks was encouraging to the Training Team.

For the duration of the project the Chief of the police department was seriously ill and did not participate in the training project. When he could attend to his duties the team attempted to bring him up-to-date on the activities. This absence, however, created a serious administrative vacuum which hindered the decision making process in general and the task forces in particular. Top administrators were reluctant to take any action for fear of having their decision reversed by the Chief at a later date. This stumbling block

affected the task forces because they saw the fruits of their effort stalled in the decision process and ineffective in achieving implementation.

Another problem had developed with respect to the decision making process. Ever since the overtime issue caused the de facto selection process in the task force attendance there was a problem of having sufficient chain of command present at task force meetings. This often hampered decisions in that it gave the Acting Chief an excuse for not approving proposals which came from the task forces. An example of this problem occurred just before the remaining two task forces dissolved.

The Planning and Research Unit developed a proposal for a federally funded Civil Disturbance Unit. This proposal was presented to the Operations Task Force. Present at that meeting were two Uniform Division captains and two Uniform Division lieutenants. This task force modified the proposal. It was then presented to the Organizations Task Force. Present at this task force meeting was the Deputy Chief of Staff Services (who was also acting Chief when the Chief was absent), the captain of the Criminal Investigation Division, two Uniform Division lieutenants and sergeants. This task force also approved the proposal.

When the proposal reached the Chief's office, the Chief of Police had returned briefly to duty. He approved the proposal and forwarded it to the Board of Police. However, by the time the Board of Police met to consider the proposal, the Chief had gone back on sick leave and the Deputy of Staff Services was acting as Chief. When

the Board of Police asked the acting Chief his opinion on this proposal, he stated that he felt it should be reviewed by the entire command staff before approval by the Board. He made this response even though he was present at the Organizations Task Force meeting when it was approved. This was a strong indication that the Board did not view the task forces as legitimate decision making bodies.

The dissolution of the two remaining task forces was obviously a severe blow to the entire project. If the project was to continue it would be necessary to reach some agreement between the department, the Board of Police, the Criminal Justice Planning Office and the Training Team regarding the future direction and commitment to the program by each of the components.

MODIFICATION THREE: A CHANGE IN THE TASK FORCE ARRANGEMENT

In early March the members of the team met with the CJPO and members of the police board to discuss the status of the project. This was the first time any member of the Training Team had the opportunity to meet with the new Chairman of the board since his appointment the previous November. In view of the collapse of the remaining task forces, this meeting was necessary to determining the final thrust of the project. The following alternatives were presented by the Training Team:

1. Reinstate the original model with complete support from the board and the Mayor. Included would be all of the command staff participating in task forces. The support would require an order of mandatory attendance with the payment of overtime.

2. Terminate the project.
3. Continue the project with no task forces and have the Training Team work in the traditional consultant role.
4. Continue the project with an Executive Task Force made up of the division commanders and above. This would require mandatory attendance at Executive Task Force meetings and the payment of overtime for those participating on off-duty time. This task force would have to meet at least twice monthly during the remaining two months of the project.

The decision made by the Training Team, the CJPO, and the Board of Police created a condensed task force composed of the three deputies, four captains, one lieutenant (staff services), and one sergeant (vice-commander). The new group was called the Executive Task Force and was to meet once a week until the end of May which was the termination date for the project. Any night lieutenants who attended the meetings would be paid overtime rates from project funds. All other personnel on the task force who attended on off-duty time would be paid by the department.

An Unfreezing Event

In the original model, the Training Team had proposed that several members of the command should go to other departments for the purpose of seeing how some departments operated. The plans for this trip were postponed several times due to the unclear direction of the project. The Training Team felt, however, that whatever the eventual direction was, the trips would be of benefit to Riverside commanders.

In order to receive maximum benefits from such a trip, the Training Team selected a department which was similar in size of department and jurisdiction. The city was also selected to be similar

in terms of operating under a Board of Police Commissioners. The department selected was in a midwestern state and will be called Middle City.

Middle City is approximately 135,000 in population. The Middle City Police Department has 250 sworn officers. The political environment was similar to Riverside in that there was a strong Mayor-City Council form of government. The Board of Police is composed of eight members. The membership includes professions such as engineers and lawyers, criminal justice educators and administrators, and citizen representatives. This board is appointed by the Mayor but serves for a definite period of time without regard to the tenure of the Mayor. The Chief is appointed by the board and serves at their pleasure. However, the distinct difference between this board and the Riverside board is that in Middle City the board recognizes the Chief as a professional police administrator and they act as a broad policy making body.

The trip to Middle City occurred in March shortly before the new Executive Task Force became functional. One deputy, one captain, one lieutenant, two sergeants, and one police commissioner participated in the trip. The group was very impressed by the smooth operation and obvious professionalism of the Middle City Police Department. Once the group had seen a department of similar size running far more efficiently than their own, they began to see the value of the policies, models, and administrative leadership discussed in the task forces.

In comparing Riverside Police Department to the department they visited, they agreed that several areas within their department and the board's present role needed improvement and change and that better communications appeared to be a key to successful change. The result of the trip was a meeting between the board members and the command staff which reached some mutual agreements:

1. The command staff, at the insistence of the Board of Police, agreed to meet twice weekly to discuss department problems and improve internal communications.
2. The police board committed itself to attending every fourth meeting to discuss areas of mutual concern.
3. The police board committed itself to a thorough review and consideration of all plans emanating from the task forces and the team.

Modification of the Task Force Arrangement

The new task force limited the number of personnel involved. It also required that the team submit completed proposals to the task forces for review. The team, at this point in the project, worked primarily in the traditional consulting role. The team had resisted this development, but the project history and the desires of the police board and the CJP0 combined to influence the team's decision.

This decision was based also on the team's desire to leave the department with the basic administrative tools upon which they could build. The combined task force was to accept the team's recommendations for review. As a result of this arrangement the

team submitted various plans and policies during the last phase of the project. They included the following:

1. Job descriptions for the ranks
2. Performance evaluation system
3. Transfer policy
4. Improve records system design
5. Training resource and needs study
6. Reorganization plan

Finally, the standard operating procedure manual was also completed by the task force. The manual went through three major revisions before it was submitted for approval. A vast amount of work and energy was expended by the individual assigned to compile the SOP, the Planning and Research unit, and the task forces in their effort to bring about an orderly master file of the numerous loose-leaf binders which were filled with confusing and contradictory orders and policies. At the time the project ended there were plans on the part of the Board of Police to continue the weekly task force meetings as a vehicle for department communication and decision making.

Chapter 5

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

The model presented here is based on the research conducted which consists of the Review of the Literature as well as the Case Study. The author has drawn upon the experience of others in organizational and management development as well as the experience of the implementation of such a project in the Riverside Police Department.

Business and industry have had over forty years of experience with managerial and organizational development. Although significant strides have been made from the initial efforts of management development after World War II, leaders in the field would be the first to state that organizational development is still an art, the tools of which are far from being perfected. However, based on this experience in the private sector and the research from the case study, some minimum criteria for a substantial program of organizational and management development can be presented.

MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS

Explicit Commitment by Top
Level Management

It is crystal clear that the potential success of any developmental program is highly dependent on an explicit, overt and active commitment by the top executives of any organization. This is a predominant theme running through the literature of organizational and management development and was vividly illustrated in the experience at Riverside.

At the outset of the program in Riverside, there appeared to be this commitment. The Chairman of the Board of Police, who also served in the dual role of Director of the Criminal Justice Planning Office, guaranteed his full support of the project prior to its implementation. However, this apparent support was short lived.

The first sign of erosion of support was the surprise announcement of a reorganization plan by the Chairman. This was closely followed by the cancellation of overtime pay by the Board of Police. Repeated attempts to get the Mayor and the Board of Police to show an increased level of commitment were fruitless.

It should be pointed out that organizational and management development efforts in public agencies such as police departments may differ from efforts in the private sector. Due to the complex political environment, it is often extremely difficult to ascertain where the exact focus of responsibility and leadership exists. This is particularly true in police departments which are organized with a board of police.

Boards of police vary in authority from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The two ends of the spectrum are represented by the situations in Riverside and Middle City.

In Riverside, the board was composed of laymen with little or no administrative experience in the criminal justice system. However, by historical tradition in New England, the Board of Police has complete administrative control over the department. This control ranges from broad policy to daily operational decisions. The Chief of Police was merely a figurehead who carried out the orders of the board. The board in turn was completely responsive to the Mayor's dictates. Since the members were appointed by the Mayor and served concurrently with his term, they executed any directive he issued with respect to the police department.

In contrast, the Middle City Police Board was composed of professionals, several of whom had long careers in the criminal justice system. They, however, acknowledged that the Chief of Police was the professional administrator of the department. Their role was to determine broad policies and do long range planning for the department. The total management system was the responsibility of the Chief. Since the board in this case was elected by the populace, they owed no political allegiance to the mayor or other political officials.

There is little definitive research on the roles of police boards in various jurisdictions. Their existence in the political and management scheme adds a degree of complexity in the process of ascertaining whether or not there is a total commitment to an organizational or management development program. In Riverside, the commitment by the

Chief could not be regarded as a commitment from the top management. The Board of Police and the Mayor's commitment would be necessary. However, in Middle City, the Chief is the top administrator and his commitment to such a program would in all likelihood be sufficient.

An Understanding of the Developmental Program by the Participants

The understanding of the developmental program by the participants is in a sense the prerequisite for obtaining their commitment to such a program. Any organizational or management development program which is implemented without this prior understanding will, at the worst, fail, and at the least, be delayed in implementation.

This was the case in Riverside. It was apparent that little groundwork had been laid by the top executives of the department. This, in and of itself, may have not been fatal. It did, however, at the very minimum, result in a loss of valuable time. Two months were expended while the training team carried out activities designed to introduce the command staff to the project and process.

This lack of an attempt to inform the participants is probably an initial indicator of the top executives' commitment to a developmental program.

An Unfreezing Process

There must exist both an organizational and individual predisposition to change. The total organization must be able to recognize the need for change and feel that change can be a positive effect instead of negative. Inherent in the organizational predisposition

to change is that of the individual members of organizations. For purposes of this discussion, the emphasis is on the managers of the organization.

Many authorities feel that this predisposition to change can best be brought about through some type of unfreezing process. This unfreezing process with respect to the management level of the organization can come about in a variety of ways. The most constantly sighted is through an educational or training experience. This could consist of a traditional management training program or a T-group training experience.

One of the primary problems encountered at the Riverside Police Department was this apparent lack of predisposition for change on the part of the management of the organization. The data on the background of the command staff indicated that they had little cognitive conception of the management much less the change process. They were locked into a somewhat static organizational structure and the organization had experienced only unsatisfactory change efforts.

The value of an unfreezing event was demonstrated by the trip of the command staff to Middle City. This was the beginning of the attitudinal change which resulted in some interest in change toward the end of the project. Had this event occurred much sooner with enough commanders, the total project may have been more effective in changing the organization. The added advantage of this trip was that one of the Police Commissioners also took the trip. This resulted in a change in attitude on the part of all the Police Commissioners, thereby legitimizing the change effort. This experience is consistent with the

concept of sending managers from business and industry to training programs which are external to the organization in an effort to unfreeze old attitudes, concepts and behaviors.¹⁰⁹

Reinforcement of the Unfreezing Process

The antithesis to the necessity of an unfreezing program for effective organizational development is the need to capitalize on, and reinforce the change in, attitudes and behavior which so often accompanies the external training program.

If the manager has experienced such a change in his personal outlook toward the organization, he will in all likelihood lose that renewed spirit if the organization does not capitalize on it.¹¹⁰

Management training for training's sake is a waste of time and resources if it is not integrated with a total program of management and organizational development.

Had a program of management training which was external to the organizational environment taken place prior to the implementation of the internal management development program at Riverside, it is the author's opinion that more significant change would have occurred. The managers would have been more predisposed to the change process and in all likelihood would have had a higher level of competence in managerial skill to cope with the task force problem solving process.

Unfortunately, by the very nature of the system of awarding contracts which was used in the Riverside case, the Training Team did

¹⁰⁹Alban and Politt, p. 42.

¹¹⁰Quick, p. 93.

not have the necessary data available to realize a lack of managerial training existed in the department. The original model, proposal and contract were based on the information supplied by the City of Riverside in the Request for a Proposal. It was not until after the contract was awarded and the project implemented that the Training Team was able to obtain sufficient background data to make this determination. It is the opinion of the author that the model would have had greater impact with a group of managers predisposed to organization development through a series of off-site training seminars.

Third Party Intervention

It is a generally accepted change concept that any substantial organizational development program requires third party assistance, typically in the form of a change agent acting in the consultation role.¹¹¹ This intervention process must be of a long term nature to have lasting impact on the organization's ability to maintain the developmental process after the intervention ceases.¹¹²

In addition it should be long term in order that the change agent(s) is able to learn enough about the organization and develop a relationship of joint diagnosis with the managers.¹¹³

By the very nature of a long term arrangement, the change agent(s) develops a vested interest in the success of the change program. All too often, consultants have been involved in recommended

¹¹¹Alan and Politt, p. 42.

¹¹²Quick, p. 97.

¹¹³Kenny, p. 219.

change programs knowing full well that they will have no involvement in their implementation.

The long term assistance process should identify and build a reserve of resources within the organization which will help maintain the change effort after the assistance has ceased. It will result in the reduced reliance on substantial assistance in the future. In addition, once the organization is able to identify its own problems and is aware of its own resources, it will be better able to ascertain the exact nature of assistance it requires thereafter.

A CONTIGUOUS MODEL

The model presented here describes the components of an organizational and management development program which meets the previously outlined criteria. The model is contiguous in the sense that all of the components must exist simultaneously or in close proximity to each other.

Assesment of Support by the Leadership

Since any organizational or management development program requires the explicit support of the top administrators of the organization, it is essential that an assessment of this leadership support be conducted before proceeding with the developmental project.

Due to the political nature of a law enforcement agency, ascertaining the focus of authority may be difficult. This will depend on the political structure of the jurisdiction in question as well as the

informal organizational structure. No such developmental program should be undertaken until this has been resolved.

One initial indication of degree of commitment would be the level of understanding of the program by the participants. If there is an indication that the scheduled participants do not understand the scope of the program, caution should be exercised in proceeding until the commitment level is established.

This commitment must be continuous throughout the developmental process. Provision for project termination should be made when this commitment level is substantially reduced. In a few cases, the reduced commitment level may occur intentionally. However, it is more likely that it will result from a shift in the political makeup of the jurisdiction or changes in the administration of the organization.

Management Development Training External to the Organization

This component is essential for two reasons. First, the management level of the organization must possess a minimal level of management competency to cope with organizational change. These skills are not inherited with promotion to management positions. They must be developed through the education and training process. Second, for any organization to undergo a change program, the management level of the organization must have a positive attitude toward the developmental effort. This is particularly true of law enforcement organizations which are highly traditional in hierarchical organizational patterns.

This required attitudinal change can most often be best accomplished through some type of management training or educational experience. It is essential that the key management people of the organization be periodically removed from the organizational environment and exposed to new concepts and attitudes.

Until recently the delivery of high quality, consistent management training for law enforcement personnel has been limited. There is, however, a developing effort which may serve to significantly resolve this problem. As previously referred to in the Review of the Literature, many states now have law enforcement training commissions which are beginning to provide management training to supervisors, middle managers and executives. It is the author's opinion that these commissions provide the best promise for the delivery of a substantial amount of the necessary management training experiences.

Since few departments can support an extensive management training effort, any program of organization development requiring participation of the management level should capitalize on the training efforts of these commissions.

Continuous Internal Management
Development Through Participa-
tion in the Organizational
Development Effort

Management training is often fruitless unless the organization capitalizes on the unfreezing effect of external training and reinforces the newly acquired skills. This can be effectively accomplished if the management training effort is linked to a program of organizational

development. Succinctly stated, organizational development and the management training effort are mutually dependent.

Successful organizational development depends on the attitude and skills of the management personnel. Conversely, the maintenance of positive attitudes and newly acquired skills can be effectively accomplished by the participation in organizational development efforts.

Long Term Consulting Assistance

As previously indicated, any substantial developmental effort requires long term third party intervention. Generally, this is in the form of consulting services from a source external to the organization. Both process consultation and technical assistance are usually necessary. Essentially, an organizational development effort will require a change in the relationship of various members of the organization. This will require the services of someone with a background in process consultation. Technical assistance will be required to provide a broad base of expertise which most law enforcement organizations are not able to maintain on a full time basis.

Organizational development is a long term process. Few development efforts which are short term in nature have lasting impact. Generally, the organization will drift back to a status quo situation after the program is terminated. The ultimate objective of any developmental effort is to develop the skills and attitudes within the organization which will allow it to sustain the change program with minimal assistance.

It is difficult to estimate the length of time during which third party intervention is necessary. This would depend on the state of the agency as well as the status of the other components of this model. It is doubtful, however, that a moderate to large police department could be self sustaining in the change process with less than a year of such assistance.

As with management training, few departments have the resources readily available to secure long term assistance. Historically, organizational development efforts in law enforcement have been of the management survey type. These surveys are generally conducted by independent consulting firms and are conducted on a contractual basis.

There is, however, a movement within some states to provide consulting services to law enforcement agencies on a statewide basis through the state law enforcement training commissions. A few states such as California, New Jersey and Michigan have initiated such efforts. This concept has received support from the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards. In its report, The Police, the Commission recommended that "every state should immediately establish a management consultation service."¹¹⁴ They further state that such service "is a logical extension of the present services rendered"¹¹⁵ by these commissions.

It would appear that consulting services provided by such an agency would best support the type of organizational development effort

¹¹⁴National Advisory Commission, The Police, pp. 289-90.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 290.

suggested by this model. The service would be readily available and in all likelihood could be provided on a long term basis. In addition, it would appear that such an agency would have a vested interest in the criminal justice system and would therefore strive to provide a high quality service.

CONCLUSION

It is the author's opinion, based on the research presented here, that a program of organizational and management development must contain the minimum components of the above model. Due to the lack of published research, few models for such developmental programs exist in the law enforcement field. Essentially, the components are derived from some of those models which have been utilized in the private sector and were modified for testing in Riverside.

Further research is necessary to test additional models from the private sector in public law enforcement agencies. This research is essential if organizational development efforts are to keep pace with the rapid rate of change which exists and to which law enforcement agencies must be able to respond.

APPENDIX

PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT INVENTORY
FOR
POLICE EXECUTIVES OF
THE RIVERSIDE POLICE DEPARTMENT

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTIONNAIRE # _____

The questionnaire you have just received is long and detailed. We hope that you will take your time filling in the answers and that you will be as accurate as you can. We attempted to design the questionnaire to get the necessary information we need, but at the same time not burden you with long answers.

The information you provide will assist us in further organizing the project. All information will be held in STRICT CONFIDENCE and will only be seen by the Executive Development Training Team.

We thank you for your cooperation. Upon completion of the questionnaire, please return in the enclosed self-addressed envelope.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION I

OCCUPATIONAL DATA

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

I. OCCUPATION DATA

1. Present Occupational Title: _____
_____2. How long have you held this present position? _____
(total no. years)3. How long have you been employed in this particular police
department? _____
(total no. years)4. Please fill in the following section, listing all ranks held,
beginning with patrolman, indicating the total number of years
spent at each level for the department presently employed in
only.

RANK	YEARS

5. A) Have you ever held any positions within your present police
department as a civilian (as opposed to a sworn position)?

____ YES ____ NO

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions
very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page
and check (X) the following space _____.)

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B) If "yes" above, please describe that job or position:

6. If you have been employed within your present department for sometime you undoubtedly have enjoyed a variety of assignments to the major specialty areas found in municipal police service. Would you summarize this information by filling in the box on the next page, using the example below as your guide. Please list all operational and staff assignments. If all or part of previous police service was outside of present department, see section 7 also. (Using reverse chronology will probably help your recall on this).

EXAMPLE

Specialty Area	Rank Held	Briefly Describe Duties	No. of Years
Patrol Div.	Patrolman	Routine Patrol	3
Juvenile Div.	Patrolman	Juvenile Officer	1
Detective Div.	Detective	Investigated Property Crimes	2
Patrol Div.	Sergeant	Watch Supervisor	3
Traffic Div.	Sergeant	Watch Supervisor	2
Patrol Div.	Lieutenant	Watch Supervisor	3
Communications/Records	Lieutenant	Officer in Charge	3
Patrol Div.	Captain	Division Commander	3
	Chief of Police		4

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space ____.)

[illegible]

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space _____.)

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7. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT

- A) List below in the spaces provided all full-time jobs which you held previous to employment in your present department? Include military service where applicable. Begin with the last full time job held which immediately preceded your present occupation and work backwards, chronologically, from there; approximate where necessary.

<u>Length of Time</u>	<u>Brief Description of Job</u>	<u>City and State</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space. _____)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

7. PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT, continued.

B) Have you held additional part or full-time jobs while employed as a police officer?

1. ____YES ____NO

2. If yes, please describe below:

<u>Brief Description of Job</u>	<u>For How Long of a Period</u>
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space _____.)

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SECTION II
EDUCATION AND
TRAINING DATA

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

11. EDUCATION AND TRAINING DATA: Please check boxes where appropriate.

- 1.
- Grade School
- check highest grade completed:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (grades)

- 2.
- High School
- check highest grade completed:

9 10 11 12 (grades)

- 3.
- Trade School
- check highest grade completed:

1 2 3 What skill was taught?

- 4.
- College and/or University
- check highest full year completed:

1 2 3 4 5 6

Did you receive a degree?

yes no

Check degrees received:

AA' AS' BA' BS' MA' MS' OTHER (Specify _____)What was your major area of study? _____
(Major Area of Study)

- 5.
- Law School
- check highest full year completed.

1 2 3 4

Did you receive a degree?

YES NO

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space _____.)

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Are you a member of any state bar association?

YES NO ; (States)

6. List below all recruit and in-service training which you have received from your present department or previous ones excluding role-call training or other informal training sessions. (See next section for FBI, SPI, Northwestern, and Michigan State University courses).

[illegible][illegible]

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space _____.)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

7. List below all special training received outside of your department, i.e., FBI National Academy, FBI Regional Schools and Seminars, SPI, Northwestern Traffic Institute, Police-Community Relations Institute MSU, etc.

<u>Title of Course</u>	<u>Sponsoring Agency</u>	<u>Length of Course</u>
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
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(If you need more space, use the reverse side of this sheet.)

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space _____.)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

8. List below all police or similar professional journals/magazines/newsletters to which you subscribe to or read regularly.

A _____
(Title)

B _____
(Title)

C _____
(Title)

D _____
(Title)

E _____
(Title)

F _____
(Title)

G _____
(Title)

H _____

(We would find any comments you might have on the above questions very helpful. If you have any enter them on the back of this page and check (X) the following space _____.)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

9. Please answer the following questions in essay form. If you need additional space, attach more sheets to this questionnaire.

A. What do you believe are the major strengths of the Riverside Police Department?

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- B. What do you believe are the major weaknesses of the Riverside Police Department?

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- C. What action would you like to see taken to improve the management of the organization?

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- D. What are you best qualified to do to improve the management of the organization?

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