MSU LIBRARIES -_. RETURNING MATERIALS: P1ace in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES wiI] be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. R to S M a ,«1-‘21; V icy-squ- Jr)“ I; 5% :l ,\¢: '0‘: £00??? A334, at» “3227 AN IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A TWO-CITY CASE STUDY By Steven Michael Edwards A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY College of Social Science 1984 .53 '~i—- 43‘" r/ ABSTRACT AN IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM IN PUBLIC HOUSING: A THO-CITY CASE STUDY By Steven Michael Edwards Policy analysts have become concerned with program implementa- tion recently. Easy to conceptualize, implementation is a complex and difficult process. Analyses of programmatic failure are so common that they are neither interesting nor important. Compliance with policy decisions is not necessarily a virtue, and should not always be expected. Social programs, especially large-scale federal projects, operate in complex environments subject to internal and external influ- ences. The study of program implementation must, then, adopt an approach which captures the subtleties of outcomes and outputs. This study evaluates the implementation of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban DevelOpment's (HUD) Urban Initiatives Anti- Crime Program in Public Housing (UIACP). It describes what happened in_§elected housing project§ SSW? result_of the_anti-crime_programfs political and bureaucratic momentum. It discusses the relationship between policy decisions at various levels of_government and the implementation process. It also describes the results of the program. 0f the sixteen public housing authorities (PHA) which par- ticipated in the UIACP, two form the basis of this study: Lucas” Steven Michael Edwards Metropolitcan Housing Authority (Toledo, Ohio) and Cuyahoga Metro- w ru.....;-...-....._‘,... ..,.. ’1- politan Housing Authority (Cleveland Ohio). These two sites r— possessed the range of programmatic content sought by HUD and rela- tively complete information concerning their anti-crime efforts. Although planners believe that they evoke innovative social responses, most new programs simply revitalize old efforts at the local level. Recognizing the weight of "tradition," this study con- cludes that policy making is an on- going process which overlaps with ‘M‘—»—M implementation activity. Once the PHA' 5 submitted proposals and HUD F—Mg‘ provided funding, policy making became a continuous ebb and flow involving HUD staff, local government officials, PHA administrators, and "street-level" bureaucrats. The implementation literature which nun—”v.“ “.4 r—r’ ‘T portrays program activity in terms of distinct phases simply is not 1 accurate in relation to the two housing authority sites. # -v-_------ MM.” 1...... “p . This study also concludes that implementation problems are not uniform across sites. The scale of the housing developments selected for the anti-crime program affected the anticipated outcome. PHA's were free to select developments based on eligibility requirements, which encouraged the inclusion of as many units as possible. The interest in creating large demonstration areas simply drowned the UIACP. Given time constraints, a work culture among staff did not develop and trust among the residents was difficult to establish. Dedicated to my family Janis, Gregory, and Christopher 11 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Graduate study is not an activity that one undertakes without much assistance, support, and the accumulation of a number of debts to others who in various ways made this dissertation possible. Knowing that I cannot thank everyone by name, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my parents, family, fellow students, faculty, and university staff for their patience, assistance, and encourage- ment. My sincere appreciation to members of my program guidance and dissertation committees, who have "put up with me" through the years: Kenneth E. Christian, my chairman, who was always there when I needed a hand and a quiet word; William Davidson, who was always accommodat- ing even in his sabbatical year; Cleo Cherryholmes, who willingly sat on another justice committee; Robert Trojanowicz, who was always willing to be of assistance; and John Hudzik, who provided direction and criticism and focus to my program of study. To each of you I want to say thanks for nurturing me when I needed it, railing at me when I (often) needed it, and patting me on the back (often undeserv- ingly) to keep me going. Special thank you's are in order to two individuals I have beem most fortunate to know closely and to have the opportunity to work with at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni- versity: George L. Kelling and Mark H. Moore. Both contributed 111 greatly to my personal and professional development. The opportunity to be the project director for the Harvard portion of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program evaluation was simply a "blessed event" that I will always treasure. To Peter K. Manning, the Dean's appointed representative who read this dissertation, thank you for your careful and critical comments. I wish to thank my wife, Janis, my children, Gregory and Christopher, for their devotion during this long time. Without their support, this would not haVe been possible. Finally, a last word of thanks to Ellie Christian for her kind words of encouragement to me and my family through this experience. Needless to say, any blame for errors, omissions, or bad manners should be directed to me. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES LIST OF APPENDICES Chapter I. INTRODUCTION A Description of a Federal Anti-Crime Demonstration Project Program Development. Program Design Study . . . . . Evaluation ofProcess: A Design Overview . . . . II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Introduction . . . The DevelOpment of Contemporary Community Crime Prevention . . Range of Community [Collective] Crime Prevention Responses . . . . . . . . . Crime in Public Housing Factors Contributing to Crime in Public Housing Conclusion . III. DESIGN OF STUDY Introduction . . . Evaluation of Process . Data Collection . Observer Selection . Data Collection Activity Sampling Limitations of the Process Evaluation Summary Page viii ' ix Chapter IV. PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDIES . Introduction Case Studies . Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority-- Cleveland, Ohio . . Luggs Metropolitan Housing Authority--Toledo, 1o . . . . . . . . . . V. CROSS SITE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES Introduction . Cross-Site Analysis Governance Employment Modernization Social Services . Tenant Anti-Crime Participation “Leveraging" . . . . . VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Introduction Purpose and Method of. the Study Conclusions and Recommendations Policy-Making is an Ongoing Process and Overlaps . with Implementation Activity. Problems are Not Uniform Across the Sites Hud' 5 Selection of PHA' s for the UIACP was Based . on Criteria other than the PHA' 5 Capacity for Administering an Anti- Crime Program . Pluralism Abounds Economic Turn- Downs, Inflation, and the Develop- . ment of New Policies Regarding Federal Spending have Powerful Effects on the Implementation of a Program . Skills were Lacking Among the Anti- Crime Staff Local Police Play an Important Role in Community Anti -Crime Efforts . Residents Given a Choice Between Improving the Physical Security of their Apartments or Improving the Defensibility of the Housing DevelOpment, will Accept the "Quick Fix" . Resident Employment was the Strongest and the Weakest Part of the Anti-Crime Program for both CMHA and LMHA . . . . . vi Page 82 82 84 84 105 137 137 137 138 143 148 151 155 158 162 162 164 167 168 171 172 173 176 177 178 179 180 Chapter Page Program Synchronization of Programmatic Elements was a Constant Problem Throughout the Anti- Crime Program for HUD Staff as well as PHA Anti-Crime Staff . . . . . . . . . 181 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 BIBLIOGRAPHY vii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 3.1 Evaluation Ideographic Map . . . . . . . . . . 53 4.1 LMAH Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 viii LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix A. A Description of Public Housing . B. The Department of Housing and Urban Development Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program Funding Sources . C. National Crime Commissions and Special Task Forces D. Research Assistant Letter . E. Observing Reading List F. Process Evaluation Data Format G. Observer Data Collection Forms H. Eligibility Requirements 1. Cleveland: Chronology of Major Events and Program Revision . . . . . . . . . . . J. ‘Toledo: Chronology of Major Events and Program Revision . . . . ix Page 184 186 188 190 192 195 197 213 216 228 The material in this project was part of a supported contract (HG-5231) awarded to the Police Foundation and subcontacted to Harvard University by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Points of view or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not represent the official positions or policies of the individual housing authorities, the U.S. Depart- ment of Housing and Urban Development, the Police Foundation, or Harvard University. CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM Introduction The study of social program implementation is a recent concern of program evaluators and policy analysts. During the era of the Great Society, when social programs (good ideas) raised expecta- tions and the subsequent execution of those ideas led to frustration (as many programs failed to achieve the desired promises) did the issue of implementation become identified as the critical missing link to a successful program.1 Public policy scholars, Walter Williams and Richard Elmore, have concluded that "[t]he greatest difficulty in devising better social programs is not determining what are reasonable policies on paper, but finding the means for converting those policies into viable field operations that correspond reasonably well to original intentions."2 Conceptually, the implementation process is a 1N. Gross J. Giacquinta and M. Bernstein, Implementing Organi- zational Innvoations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change (New York: Basic Books, 1971); J. Pressman and A. WildavSky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); J.7Murphy,*“Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Educational Reform," Harvard Educational Review (February 1971): 35-53; P. Berman and M. McLaughlin, Federal Programs SupportinggEducational Change: The Finding in Review IV,R-1598/4-HEW, The Rand Corporation, April 1975; M. Derthick, New Towns In-Town, The Urban Institute, 1972; M. Johnson, Counterpoint: The ChangingEmployment Service, Olympus, 1973. ,\ ( ~\:W2 Williams and R. F. Elmore, Social Program Implementation (New Yor : Academic Press, 1976), p. xii. 1 rather uncomplicated matter in which three distinct phases can be identified. First, there is the planning phase. This includes activi- ties such as the formation of the policy, legislative support, authori- zation, informing others about the policy, and so forth. The second phase is the start-up, the beginning of new procedures and the empower- ing of new groups with responsibility for the task(s) to be undertaken, etc. It is possible and most often the case that these two phases may be repeated a number of times in order for the program to become opera- tional.particularly if there are multiple agencies involved in the innovation. Finally, fine tuning is a step that begins immediately after start-up as adjustments are made and continued throughout the program to the point that the policy is "routinized."3 While this may appear conceptually easy to accomplish, program implementation is an exceedingly complex and difficult task to carry out. Graham Allison has observed: If one is primarily interested in what government actually does, the unavoidable question is: What per- centage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified? My estimate is about 10 percent in the ?2;2al.case4 ranging as high as 50 percent for some prob- The difficulties of program implementation have been so great for many social experiments that some scholars believe it is doubtful 3This simple diagram is not meant to suggest that policy change no longer takes place at the point that implementation ends because change is constantly taking place. It simply means that implementation ends when normal (routine) operations are established. 4Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 276. whether the studies produced results useful for decision making. In the field of criminal justice, for example, Malcolm Klein reviewed more than 200 evaluations of juvenile diversion and deinstitutionaliza- tion programs and concluded that there had been no test since the programs had not been implemented properly.5 For many scholars, the study of program implementation has been the documentation of program failure through case histories of single policies which were implemented by a single agency. While these investigations have been helpful in illuminating the importance of implementation issues, the documentation of program failure has become so common that to discover once again that a program as imple- mented different from that proposed is now neither a very interesting nor an important finding. Compliance with policy decisions is not necessarily a virtue, and is certainly not generally to be expected. Social programs, especially large-scale federal projects, operate in a complex environment and are subjected to powerful internal and external shaping forces. Recently, however, the study of implementation has tended to favor much broader approaches to capture the subtle elements of program outcomes and outputs. Again, Allison points out: If analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve desired policy outcomes, they will have to develop ways of thinking analytically about a larger chunk of the problem. It is not that we have too many good analytic 5M. W. Klein, "Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of Impediments," in Crime and Justice, eds.: N. Morris and M. Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). solutions to problems. It is rather, that we have more good solutions than we have appropriate actions. 7 seem to substantiate this Current theories of implementation line of thought. Van Horn and Van Meter, for example, propose a causal model of the variables they believe to be predictive of successful implementation. Similarly, Schneider offers not a theory of implementation, but a broad framework--a set of factors (viability, integrity, capacity, and scope)--that help identify relevant aspects of policy and/or agency practice as to whether implementation has occurred or not.8 For example, consider the concept of policy capacity. Capacity is concerned with agency activities and those of the target p0pulation. More specifically, capacity refers to acceptable level(s) of involvement: the level of activities, numbers of clients, costs, and other operations governed by the policy. Similarly important is the concept of policy viability—-does the program exist? If the elements of the program (peOple, resources, and organization) do not exist, then the program cannot be considered to have been "alive" or workable. 6Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 276. 7C. E. Van Horn and D. S. Van Meter, "The Policy Implementa- tion Process: A Conceptual Framework,“ Administration and Society 6 (1975): 445—468; P. Berman, "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementa- tion," ublic Policy 26 (1978): 157-184; Klein, "Deinstitutionalization and Diversion," p. 145; M. Q. Patton, Utilization-Focused Evaluation (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978). 8A. L. Schneider, "Studying Policy Implementation: A Con- ceptual Framework," Evaluation Review 6 (6) (December 1982): 715-730. Finally, it is worth pointing out that an evaluation of program policy implementation is a different and independent activity from an evaluation of program tasks and activities that were specified in the outcomes of the initial policy or legislative mandate. This dis- tinction is critical and often ignored in many policy implementation studies. It is important to mention this distinction because if the quality of the implementation were to rest on whether tasks and activi- ties achieved the goals of the policy, and these were not met, there would be no way to determine whether policy failures were due to defective implementation or inadequate theoretical conceptualization. A Description of a Federal Anti-Crime Demonstration Project The focus of this dissertation is the study of social program implementation. Presented in this section is a description of the social program selected for study: The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD), Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing (UIACP). This brief description is divided into two parts: (1) a discussion of the development of the HUD anti-crime program (its political importance and legislative intent), and (2) a discussion of its programmatic design (the concept of co-targeting federal funds and the establishment of federal partnerships). Program Development The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing (UIACP) flowed from President Jimmy Carter's 1978 National Urban Policy. Specifically, the program was created for local public housing authorities with the express purpose of reducing crime, the fear of crime, and improving the quality of life for citizens residing in public housing (see Appendix A for a definition of the term "public housing.") Like many federal programs, this was a large and ambitious enterprise. Forty million dollars would be distributed by HUD to thirty-nine public housing authorities across the country, which could demonstrate that they had comprehensive and workable strategies to reduce crime and crime-related problems. Of the thirty-nine public housing authorities funded, sixteen were selected by HUD for intensive evaluation to determine whether or not the demonstration produced effec- tive strategies for mitigating crime and vandalism in public housing in order that a safe living environment might be provided for their residents, particularly the elderly.9 A complex set of forces gave rise to the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. In the congress there was not only interest, but support for developing a federal initiative to respond to crime and the fear of crime experienced by the residents of public housing. Both Congressman Claude Pepper of Florida and Congresswoman Mary Rose Oaker of Ohio had constituents who requested federal assistance to do something about crime and the victimization of residents. The tragic death (Hi a well-known elderly public housing resident in Miami, and the substantive interest of a special assistant within HUD, led to the sponsorship of the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The members of congress mandated a program, but with the provision 9Housing and Community Development Act and Amendments of 1978, Sec. 207 (b)(2), p. 15. that no additional funds be appropriated. Given this momentum, the Department of Housing and Urban DeveTOpment held two conferences to discuss the issues of crime and security. The first conference, held September 1978, brought together persons closest to the problems of crime (residents, management, and security staff) to gain advice from them regarding the activities HUD should include in a program to reduce crime and the fear of crime in public housing. The second conference held in October, 1978, convened experts in the field of crime prevention to identify the essential components for an effective crime prevention program. These two conferences further shaped the anti-crime program HUD designed. Not only were the concerns of those persons closest to the issues solicited, but the available crime prevention literature and research were reviewed to develop a conceptual framework for attacking the crime problem in public housing. With respect to the incidence of crime, the group participants confirmed residents' per- ceptions; crime is higher in public housing than in other big city neighborhoods. Moreover, fear of crime was a very serious problem. The outcomes of these two conferences proved helpful to the HUD staff in designing the anti-crime program. A synthesis of conference infor- mation convinced staff that their anti-crime efforts would need to be much more comprehensive in program structure than previous community crime prevention efforts. Shortly after these conferences President Carter signed into law The Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. It directed the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to "promptly initiate . . . a program for the development, demonstration, and evaluation of improved, innovative community anti-crime and secur- ity methods, concepts, and techniques to mitigate the level of crime in public housing and their surrounding neighborhoods."10 Program Design The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was designed by HUD staff as a prototypical community crime prevention program, whose core assumption was that the action(s) of citizens (in this case, residents of public housing) is central to the maintenance of order, control of crime, and the improvement of the quality of life in public housing. The program would establish partnerships among thirteen federal offices, and would rely heavily on the activities of public housing authorities (PHA's), other public (local government), and pri- vate sector agencies, and the police. The assumption that grounded this program concept was that crime-free and orderly neighborhoods can only be secured through the social control activites of citizens supported by local agencies. The intent of the Act that authorized the UIACP was to co-target federal funds from thirteen participating agencies and direct those funds to public housing authorities, so that they could develop community "self-help" crime prevention programs. The idea of co-targeting funds was consistent with Carter's plan to more effectively utilize existing federal resources. The co-targeting 10Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 95-1795, p. 15. concept was a means of getting several federal agencies to identify common issues (problems) and Huyicontribute a portion of existing agency resources (monies) to the solution of the common problem (see Appendix B for a list of the agencies and amounts of funds they con- tributed). Concerned with the need to design a comprehensive crime control program that upgraded PHA management, improved the physical environ- ment, provided better police service, established links with community social services, and galvanized resident interest in crime prevention, HUD staff organized the authorized funds and activities of the sponsor- ing agencies into three areas for the anti-crime program: --Public Housing Authority Responsibilities --Programs by and for Tenants --Local Government and Private Sector Responsibilities By the nature of these categories, the UNIACP was designed as an umbrella, under which a vast array of activities could be implemented at the local level to accomplish the primary directives of the enabling legislation. HUD anti-crime staff then specified seven pro- gram areas for the above categories, so that a particular structure might emerge as the anti-crime program for each participating public housing authority. The seven program areas, with a brief description of their rationale and suggested program activities follow: 1. Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention: HUD staff believed that PHA management had a direct and immediate responsibility for crime prevention within a public housing project. Management, they believed, influences the safety of residents in planning anti-crime 10 efforts, serving as a contact point with outside agencies and by its own development of policies and practices. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following: a. Implementing training programs for housing project managers and maintenance staff to teach them how to identify security problems b. Improve PHA-tenant screening (for occupancy) and eviction policies in response to anti-social behavior c. Appointment of a qualified public safety coordi- nator for the anti-crime program d. Develop programs that encourage maintenance of project property such that tenants have a feeling of pride and stake in the security of their residential environment. 2. More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign: The idea of physically redesigning an environ- ment to reduce victimization has been much discussed. One argument has been that physical change (target hardening) encourages the forma- tion of territorial attitudes and behavior so that citizens will adopt a greater sense of responsibility for their surroundings. Thus the likelihood of impeding or apprehending an offender is increased. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA‘s to develop included the following: a. Expansion of the private space for which each tenant is responsible 3. 11 Changes in fencing and clustering to better protect tenants and afford them more control over their living space Rehabilitation of individual housing units Installation of better indoor and outdoor lighting and improved landscaping to enhance the project's appearance Provide better control over lobby access and improved window and door security Installation of burglar alarms and closed circuit TV monitors. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation: HUD anti-crime staff believed that if the community "self-help" concept of this crime prevention program were to succeed, those who composed the commu- nity must have active, significant, and meaningful involvement. The emphasis in this area was for residents to assist the local police in partrolling their neighborhood, providing escort services for elderly residents, and disseminating anti-crime information to other resi- dents. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following: a. Increased use of adult and youth foot patrols block/ floor/lobby crime watches for surveillance purposes Involving the tenants in the planning and imple- mentation of the PHA's anti-crime program Develop tenant ioperation identification" property stenciling and registration program 4. 12 Increased use of tenant sponsored anti-crime media campaign, educational workshops, and crime report- ing campaigns Provision of technical assistance and training to help tenants organize anti-crime efforts. Increased Full- and Part-Time Employment of Tenants: Since a large proportion of crime in and around public housing was believed to be committed by teenagers, HUD staff felt that an employment pro- gram would be a significant contribution to a community crime preven- tion program. Not only would youth be employed in meaningful work, but they would be exposed to "world of work? skills needed for full- time employment. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following: a. Increased training and employment of tenants to install security hardware, to make capitol improve- ments and architectural changes, and to help main- tain and.rehabilitate PHA property Employment of tenants as community service repre- sentatives, public safety officers, and lobby monitors Employment of tenants as leaders of organized tenant anti-crime programs Employment of tenants as leaders of cultural, educational, and recreational programs that increase tenant cohesion. 13 5. More and Improved Social Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses: HUD staff believed that special services could act as a complement to the other program areas in reducing crime and the fear of crime. Social services could add to increasing a sense of well-being and increase social cohesion among residents, especially the elderly and single female household heads. Innovations that dealt with drug, alcohol abuse, or mental and emotional disorders were encouraged, as were victim/witness services. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following: a. Counseling programs to assist tenants who are especially vulnerable to crime, i.e., single female household heads, youth, and elderly--to cape with personal and family problems b. Employment counseling for the underemployed and unemployed c. Increased recreational, educational, and cul- tural activities for residents d. Day care services for the children of employed parents and for the elderly e. Develop escort services for the safety or protection of children, women, and the elderly f. Implementation of neighborhood dispute courts, witness assistance programs, and other local level innovations. 6. Increased Use of City Police Officers: Traditionally it has been thought that the police deter crime. However, with fiscal 14 retrenchment underway in many cities and the fact that police do not like to patrol public housing projects, HUD staff believed that approaching the local police with training packages that addressed the need for sensitivity to life in the projects would improve police service for residents. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested apply- ing PHA's to develop included the following: a. Establishment of precinct stations in public housing projects b. Increased use of city police or project foot patrols, "vertical" patrols, and family crisis intervention teams; improved academy training of police used in these activities so that they may have a better understanding of, sensitivity to, the tenant population c. Efforts to improve relations between the city police and public housing security staff d. Installation of special telephone "hotlines" to facili- tate improved crime reporting by public housing tenants. 7. Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources: The develOpment of stronger linkages with other pro- grams from local government and the private sector was seen as taking an "ecological-approach" to crime control. If the PHA's anti-crime program was to have success, it would have to account for the dis- placement of crime. Encouraging the partnership of local government and the private sector was seen as the best means for developing an effective anti-crime program. Activities that HUD encouraged] suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following: 15 a. Increased anti-crime targeting by local business and industry in the form of employment opportunities and by local govern- ment in the form of Community Development Block Grants and CETA prime- sponsor job slots. b. Increased anti-crime targeting and coordination from state agencies to gain HEW Title XX and LEAA state planning agency funds. To insure that local PHA's developed the particular program clusters that were desired, HUD anti-crime staff "coached" the cities to develop what they believed important. Emphasis was given to sensi- tivity training for the police. Increased tenant involvement in PHA anti-crime affairs, and modernization efforts which focused on creat- ing defensible space through redesign, rather than the traditional hardware, such as locks and window bars. However, despite the efforts made by HUD to design a "standardized" program emphasis, there was considerable variety in the programs proposed. In some PHA's employ- ment was central; in others, it was modernization. Local "fine-tuning" depended on the particular housing project, the experience and strength of the PHA and tenants, the political culture (nationally and locally), the resourcefulness of agencies, the dominance of formal and informal leaders, and other factors. Finally, HUD staff selected the cities to be included in the evaluation of the anti-crime program. The bases for selecting the sixteen PHA's varied. HUD considered such factors as: proba- bility of success, special interest in the site by HUD staff, and political interests. The sixteen local public housing authorities 16 selected were located in the following cities: Baltimore, MD; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Dade County, FL; Hampton, VA; Hartford, CT; Jackson, TN; Jersey City, NJ; Louisville, KY; New York, NY; Oxnard, CA; San Antonio, TX; Seattle, WA; Tampa, FL; and Toledo, OH. Summary.--The HUD anti-crime program was not only unique in its funding approach (co-targeting federal funds to begin the self- help process), but the design of programs offered an empirical test of both physical redesign (hardware) strategies and public and pri- vate social services (software strategies) working together under the structure of a community anti-crime program. Though the concept of community (collective) crime prevention is not new, it certainly has proliferated in the United States in the last ten years.11 This program differed from much of what has been traditionally understood about crime and the fear of crime. In the past the focus has been on individual responses to crime.12 According to a recent assessment of informal (collective) social control activity, most of the studies undertaken have tested a similar set of hypotheses; . . thelevel of social solidarity (friendships, neighbor- ing, community attachment) in a predetermined area unit (blocks, neighborhoods, census tracts) affects informal 11Collective crime prevention refers to private citizens acting together to deal with crime. It does not include organized responses of criminal justice organizations, officials, or profes- sionals. Collective responses to crime may be either informal (such as a group of neighbors assisting each other), or formal (an anti- crime progam of an organization). 12W. G. Skogan, et al., Executive Summary: The Reactions to Crime Project. The Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, February 1982). 17 control, which affects crime; informal control also affects subjective crime-related attitudes--fear and the perception of crime and other neighborhood problems; these subjective reactions to crime, in combination with social solidarity and informal control, are expected to affect collective responses to crime.13 Some attention and research has been directed to the notion that physical design has an effect on the prevention of crime. Jane Jacobs originally proposed the concept of "environmental" crime pre— vention noting its importance to the vitalization of neighborhoods. According to Jacobs, the uses of public space, especially sidewalks, provide a most important function to public safety. The first thing to understand is that the public peace-- of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as the police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves and enforced by the people themselves. In some city areas--older public housing projects and streets with very high population turnover are often conspicuous examples--the keeping of public sidewalk law and order is left almost entirely to the police and special guards. . . . No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal casual enforcement of it has broken down.14 Oscar Newman15 later re-invigorated this concept by attempting to link certain physical design features of communities with the development of informal control and thereby establish a connection between physical design and crime. However, research that has examined 13s. w. Greenberg, w. M. Rohe, and a. R. Williams, Interim Report, Informal Social Control and Crime Prevention at the Neighbor- hood Level: Synthesis and Assessment of the Research, Denver Research Institute, August 1, 1982. 14J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 31-32. 150. Newman, Defensible Space (New York: MacMillan Co., 1972). 18 both physical design and collective responses to crime is so limited that researchers16 have noted the need for more descriptive inquiry on the variations and operations of neighbrohood responses to crime. This dissertation seeks to examine such a joint anti-crime program. étu_d.x This dissertation outlines a process evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The purpose of this study is to examine the implementation process of this federal program in a subsample of local public housing authorities. As previously mentioned, the selection of the sixteen sites in the larger evalua- tion was done by the HUD staff. It was a purposive sample, for the criteria HUD staff used consisted of the probability of success, special interest in the sites by HUD staff, and political interests. 17 was not only physically large The sixteen city evaluation to manage, but also more complex than anticipated. Each public hous- ing authority selected for the evaluation included multiple housing projects in the design of its anti-crime program. Given the design 16Robert K. Yin, et al, "What is Crime Prevention?" in National Criminal Justice Reference Services, How Well Does It Work: Review of Criminal Justice Evaluation, 1978 (Washington, D.C}: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 107-134; Aaron Podolesfsky and Fredric DuBow, Strategies for Community Crime Prevention: Collective Responses to Crime in America (Springfield, Il: Charles (1 Thomas Publishing Company, 1982). 17The author was the project director of the sixteen—city process evaluation while on the staff of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of the John F. Kennedy School of Govern- ment at Harvard University. 19 and environmental characteristics of public housing, these multiple housing projects had to be considered as separate neighborhood commu- nities. Therefore, what was already thought of as a large evaluation project with sixteen authorities, became significantly more complex with the realization that there were, in fact, sixty-six communities to be evaluated. In order to design a manageable dissertation, the larger eval- uation sample was not used; instead, a subsample of two public housing authorities was selected for study: Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo, OH) and Cuyahoga, Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, OH). These sites were chosen for a number of reasons including first, the completeness of information at hand regarding their anti-crime programs, and second, the range of programmatic content that was sought by HUD. Each site had a particular program emphasis: Toledo offered youth employment, while Cleveland proposed modernization (installation of security hardware and environmental redesign). Last, the author's first-hand knowledge of each site was facilitated by numerous on-site visits to each location over the course of the evaluation. The fundamental objective of this dissertation is to present a process evaluation of the implementation of this anti-crime program, that is, to determine (describe) what actually happened in the sample of housing projects, as a result of the authorization, funding, and general political and bureaucratic momentum generated by the anti- crime program. Through careful observation of the programmatic activi- ties of the funding sources, this process evaluation will ask the 20 following questions: (a) what was the character of each program?, (b) how much activity was generated?, and (c) what factor(s) seemed to play important role(s) in determining the levels, shapes, and tim- ing of the various programs? In seeking to determine and characterize what actually happened in the sample of PHA's included in this study, it is impor- tant to emphasize that this study does not assume that the course of events in each site was powerfully shaped by HUD, by the anti-crime proposal developed by the PHA and accepted by HUD, or by the tenants of the "target" projects, or even by the decisions of the housing authority anti-crime staff. All these factors might_have been impor- tant in giving shape to the program. Additionally, at the sites there might have been existing institutions with their own limited set of interests and capabilities which were simply re-invigorated by the federal anti-crime monies and continued to do what they had been doing in the past. The point is that this study attempts to: (a) identify the policy-decisiongprocess at the various levels of government; (b) describe the implementationgprocess--those steps taken to field the program; and (c) describe program outputs or activities. This evaluation does not focus on program outcomes, which is not to say they are not important, they are. However, due to the size and com- plexity of the broader evaluation, only the implementation issue is discussed in this dissertation. 21 Evaluation of Process: A Design This study is part of a larger evaluation conducted for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. In the larger evaluation HUD specified that it would address seven program areas-- those were discussed earlier--and the evaluation would include both (a) an impact assessment, and (b) a detailed process evaluation. HUD specified that the process evaluation would include: 1. Description of the relevant environment into which a program is introduced 2. Description of the process by which a program is implemented or fails to be implemented 3. Continuous measurement of the experimental program's operations over time 4. Identification of proximate and intermediate effects of the program 5. Identification of intervening events that affect implementation and project outcomes 6. Attribution of causality in implementation and in assessing program performance 7. Identification of unanticipated consequences 8. Provide judgments useful for prescriptive policy analysis and management of similar programs in the future The process evaluation addresses these issued by conceptualizing the problem of crime and security within public housing in terms of "self-defense-capabilities." That is, three factors thought to 22 influence the ability to create self-defense capacities of public housing were identified: 1. The capacity of the housing project to provide economic, recreational, and social opportunities to residents who would other- wise be troublemakers in the project 2. The physical arrangements that create convenient and inconvenient opportunities to commit offenses with some assurance that they will go undetected (e.g., hallways, lighting, ease of entry and exit, etc.) 3. The vigilance of the community and the willingness to mobilize police or to intervene on the behalf of apparent victims. Though this conceptualization refines the manner in which to view the task at hand, there remains a wide and diverse range of issues to be addressed by the process evaluation. To know everything about all the seven major program elements and their arrangement of importance in each site at the outset of the evaluation would be impossible. There- fore, information would have to be collected selectively, interpreted, and translated back to an action context.18 To make this possible, the process evaluation would have to approach its task with either an explicit or an implicit frame of reference--whether it be called a theory, a conceptual framework, or an ideographic map.19 18C. Argyris, "Using Qualitative Data to Test Theories: Review Essay," Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 672-279. 19J. Van Maanen, "Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organi- zational Research," Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 520. 23 Such a frame of reference would limit data collection to the areas assumed to be the most relevant. Although the degree of required focusing could/would change from site to site, in this pro- gram evaluation that would be viewed as necessary and an important element to account for activities and developments across sites. The need for standardization in the collection of qualitative data becomes apparent. Developing a frame of reference provides a way to standard- ize methods and perspectives and can be of practical value in training and managing data collectors. Ultimately, it also guides the interpre- tation of the data and facilitates translating the findings back into the action context. Data for the process evaluation will be drawn from: --0bservation of relevant actors and groups (families, residents, public housing authority staff, program staff, resident groups, service agency staff, etc.) --Informal interviews with the same sources as above --Formal interviews (questionnaires standardized for use in all sites, for use with PHA staff, program staff, other relevant groups and individuals) --Document review (grant proposal(s), agency record analysis, memos, letters, etc.) Overview This dissertation will be presented in six chapters. The problem under examination, and the importance of implementation issues in the development of federal programs such as Urban Initiatives 24 Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing have been outlined in Chapter I. A synthesis of the crime prevention literature, to include the devel- opment of the concept of crime prevention, a focus on community (collective) crime prevention efforts, and the problem of crime in public housing is presented in Chapter II. The research design of the process evaluation for this federal anti-crime initiative is examined in Chapter III. A presentation of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority case studies is presented in Chapter IV. A cross-site analysis of the case studies is discussed in Chapter V. And, the conclusions and recommendations are offered in Chapter VI. CHAPTER II REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Introduction Since the 1960's, the topic of crime has had a prominent place on the list of concerns for those who reside in the United States. According to Wesley Skogan, there is good reason: Postwar trends in violent and serious property crime sketch a clear pattern: low rates relative to the size of the population from 1946 to 1964, then a dramatic upturn between 1964 and 1975. During the first period the officially recorded rate of violent crime (incidents per thousand persons in the population) rose from 1.1 to 1.3; during the second period it jumped to a high of 4.8, a 337 percent increase. The smallest component of the increase was contributed by the murder rate. Murders were relatively infrequent, and from a low in 1957 of only .04 murders per thousand to a high in 1979 of .10, the homicide rate rose "only" 150 percent. . . . Major assaults climbed 375 percent during the post war period to a high of 2.3 per thousand, while robbery jumped 543 percent to 6.2 per thousand. . . . The most serious property crime, burglary . . . increased 500 percent during 1946-1975 period, from a low of 2.5 Ber thousand to a high of over 15 per thous- and persons.2 - To document exactly why crime surged in the United States, as it did, is a very complex task. The increase was not simply a result of better reporting and measurement, but such factors as the promoting of law and order issues in the 1964 Presidential election, public fear 20Wesley G. Skogan, “Crime in Contemporary America," in 1193 lence in America, eds.: H. G. Graham and T. R. Gurr, rev. ed. (New York: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 376-377. 25 26 as a result of the civil disorders that occurred during the summers of 1965, 1966, and 1967; and a series of controversial U.S. Supreme Court decisions. These are only a few of the major issues that pro- moted crime, the fear of crime, and the desire to control crime, to achieve a special conspicuousness in the develOpment of the Nation's Urban Policies. The Federal government, believing it had the responsi- 21 authorized numer- bility to establish a "get tough" policy on crime, ous commissions and supported various task forces to examine the problem of crime in America (see Appendix C). Many recommendations were made, however, the most prominent proposals advocated organizational and structural reforms of the justice complex to manage the crime problem. Specifically, these groups urged the unification, consoli- dation, and the integration of criminal justice agencies and services. The concept of community crime prevention (citizen involve- ment), also drew support from just about every national commission or special task force report that examined the crime problems in America,22 however, the idea was not taken seriously by justice policy makers as a strategy of importance. Part of the reason for this was the nation's long investment and belief that crime control rested with 21For an in-depth discussion of these issues, consult Thomas E. Cronin, Taniz Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich, U.S. v Crime in the Streets (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), specifically Chapter 4: Legislating for the War on Crime; Chapter 5: Law and Order in the 1968 Election; and Chapter 6: Launching the War on Crime. 22Particularly strong supportive statements can be found in the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Adminis- tration of Justice, and the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. 27 paid, uniformed professionals--the police. From the mid-1900's (the beginning of the new police reform era) policing, thought by many to be the soul of the justice complex, was reshaped in ways significantly different from the past. Changed were the sources of police legiti- macy, tactics, technology, management practices, and the standards by which the police were to be judged. The "new" police became much more focused on criminal apprehension: oriented to the enforcement of laws and became suprisingly unaccountable to elected officials. In addition, they increasingly used management principles derived from the ideas inherent in scientific management in an effort to become more efficient and only reluctantly provided or supported order maintenance and other social service activity. Though the reform period lessened corruption and improved the management of policing, two of the major goals of the reform period, the consequences were that it "down-graded" community order maintenance activities and removed the public from much of the responsibility far crime prevention. These are important points, for they have had a powerful impact on shaping crime prevention activ- ity in the last twenty years. While the nation has wanted to believe that government leader- ship would be able to reduce crime and the fear of crime (as a nation we have historically relied upon our government to solve society's complex and overwhelming problems), and the professional police reform model was the appropriate strategy for effecting crime, the fact is that the complexity of the crime issue is such that we realize that there are limits in the government's ability to intervene. Therefore, 28 we must develop more comprehensive strategies to solve the problem of crime. This brief introduction has endeavored to describe the con- text in which the concept of community crime prevention has been placed. The remainder of this chapter attempts to provide a theoreti- cal understanding for the design of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program. Specifically reviewed is the literature that addressed commu- nity (collective) crime prevention. Community (collective) crime prevention refers to private citizens acting together in neighborhoods, block groups, and organizations either formally or informally, to do something about crime. Not included in this discussion are organized responses of criminal justice organizations or officials. This review of the literature is not long, for two reasons: (1) there has been far less research conducted on collective crime prevention responses than on individual crime prevention efforts,23 and (2) much of the literature documenting the crime problem in public housing projects is the work of every small group of people. This chapter is divided into two major sections. First, there is a discussion of the development of contemporary community crime prevention and its various forms. The second half of this chapter focuses on the problem of crime in public housing, specifically the 23The distinction between individual and collective crime pre- vention is really for examination purposes. Individual crime preven- tion practices are, in fact, part of crime prevention actions, and it is difficult at times to make a clean distinction between the two. For this study, individual crime prevention activity will mean that the individual is the unit of analysis, responsible for his/her activ- ity. This study is concerned with collective actions in formal and informal settings. 29 extent of the problem, three factors thought to contribute to the crime problem and concludes with the importance of those factors for the design of HwaUrban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in public hous- ing. The Development of Contemporary Community Crime Prevention Contemporary community crime prevention has its beginning in the 1930's in the work of two University of Chicago sociologists, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay. Shaw and McKay had developed a delin- quency prevention program based on the belief that juvenile delinquency was a product of neighborhood disorganization rather than individual disability.24 Their study, the Chicago Area Project (CAP) sought to organize low income areas through indigenous leaders and self-help community organizations in order to contribute to the welfare of juveniles.25 The reason this work was so influential was its emphasis on indigenous leadership and community fieldwork. It emphasized con- tact with youth gangs. The direct result of this early research were a number of studies conducted in the 1950's and 1960's which "examined the spatial co-variation of crime and delinquency with populations and housing characteristics that had come to be associated with social 24Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942)} 25S. Korbin, "The Chicago Area Project: A 25 Year Assessment," Annals of the American Academy of Political Science (March 1959). 30 disorganization--racial and ethnic minorities, high density, poverty, single person households, rental housing, and residential instabil- ity.“26 In the past ten years or so, the concept of community/collec- tive crime prevention has gained much more support than it had at either time in the 1950's or 60's. In part, this is due to a change 27 as well as federal and state justice in the thinking of the police, officials,about the importance of citizen involvement in community crime prevention efforts. At the federal level, there has been the creation of the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs within the National Institute of Justice, to oversee and assist the development of community anti-crime programs. Even as recently as 1981, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime acknowledged that there is a need for more citizen involvement in the management of crime prevention measures. The task force encouraged the development of self-regulating neighborhoods and communities as recognition of the limits of government in a free society. What is evident from this interest is the basic assumption of publicly sponsored crime prevention (active citizen involvement in the justice complex) has gained not only recognition, but legiti- macy from public officials. As a recently published guide about community crime prevention states: 26Greenberg, et al., Informal Social Control, p. 3. 27William K. Hart, Comments on citizen crime prevention quoted in Tempo 4(1) (January 1982). 31 . in the absence of citizen assistance, neither more police nor incarceration and improved technology can, effectively combat crime. Self-protection and insulation become the major theme of citizens who have lost faith in the ability of the law enforcement/criminal justice system to abate crime, and in the collective ability and power of community residents to address the problem, marshall resources and increase neighborhood safety. . . . Citizen involvement in the effort can make a difference. There are indications that where a sustained, well-organized citizen anti-crime activity is being carried on, neighborhood sta- bility and security is enhanced, citizen reporting of crime increases, visible deterrents against crime are established, and overall police-community relations improved. . . . One of the most beneficial effects of citizen involvement in crime prevention is the increased neighborhood interaction it fosters and its role in restoring concepts of mutual assistance, civic responsibility, and accountability.28 The emergence of such responses can be attributed to a number of develOpments; however, there seem to be four general factors that have influenced the development of community crime prevention. 1. Increasing Level of Crime and the Fear of Crime: Previ- ously described was the dramatic increase in the crime rates from 1964 to 1974. Whether or not the increase was actually as dramatic as the statistical information indicates, the fact remains that this infor- mation was powerful in shaping the public's and governmental officials' attitudes and beliefs about crime. The public continues to believe that the nation has a crime problem, despite the fact that the social indicators detect that some serious crimes have peaked and others have declined. Nevertheless, there is the fear of crime problem. Accord- ing to a recent report: 28Citizens Involvement Network, A Community Guide to Crime Prevention (Washington, D.C.: Office of Police Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 1977). 32 . . . More than 40% of the U.S. Population is afraid that they will be a victim of a serious incident, e.g., murder, rape, robbery, or an assault if they walk alone in their neighborhoods at night. . . . Crime and the fear of crime have ggke a dark dye, permeated the fabric of American ife. Whether this is an exaggeration of the perceptual data is immaterial; for both citizens and public officials believe that the risk of crime has increased and that is justification enough to influence public policy. 2. A Sense of Limits of Government's Ability to Solve Social Problems: Despite the fact that as a nation, we have historically looked to our government to solve society's complex problems, and believed that government had the capacity to do so, we now realize that relying on the government would be abdicating responsibility. Reports have cited the inability of the schools to teach,30 hospitals 31 to provide health care, correctional institutions to provide reha- 32 bilitation, and the inability of the police to manage crime.33 This 29The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime: America Afraid, A-T-O, Inc., September 16, 1980; also see Gallop Polls quoted in U.S. News and World Report, 12 January 1980, p. 49. 30James Coleman, et al., Equality and Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966). 31Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis (Institute for Social Research, 1976). 3ZDouglas Lipton, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks, Effective- ness of Correctionngreatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies (Springfield, MA: Prager, 1975). 33Gerald Caplan, "Reflections on the Nationalization of Crime, 1964-1968," Law and the Social Order 3 (1973): 583-635; George L. Kelling, "Palice Field Services and Crime," Crime and Delinquency 24 (1978): 173-184: Ann M. Newton, "Prevention of Crime and Delinquency,“ Criminal Justice Abstracts 10 (1978): 245-266. 33 growing sense of the limits of governmental institutions has led citi- zens and public officials to devise programs that emphasize shared responsibility as a means of augmenting and/or replacing the works of government. 3. The Mobilization of the “Community Movement": Beginning with the Kennedy Administration, when the call for citizens to par- ticipate in government was made, the "community movement" gained its strength. Community organizations, welfare rights groups, and minority organizations, as well as neighborhood groups, all had their political 34 Since this period, birth during this intense civil rights era. community organizations have become powerful local political institu- tions. They have, in many locations, develOped broad agendas, using the crime problem, not only to gain visibility, but political respect. 4. Criminal Justice Agencies have begun to Encourage Citizen Participation: As a consequence of numerous factors, criminal justice agencies have now begun to actively encourage citizen participation. The community movement, concerned with the rising rates of crime, and the sense of the limits of governmental agencies, have persauded justice officials to rethink their strategies of crime movement. Evidence is mounting that justice officials are retreating from the belief that only the professionals are responsible for the control of crime.35 While some officials believe this involvement is an attempt 34Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, "The Community Revolution," Public Interest 19 (Summer, 1969): 142—177. 35Jon VanTil, "Citizen Participation in Criminal Justice: Opportunity, Constraint, and the Arrogance of the Law," Journal of Voluntary Action Research 4(1-2) (1975): 69-74; George L. Kelling, 34 to demonstrate that citizens will not participate if given the oppor- tunity and, therefore, the goal of community crime prevention will not be met; others believe that the increased citizen involvement indicates that we have entered a new phase of crime management-~self-help. Pro- gram funds have been made available at all levels of government to encourage programs of citizen involvement. Range of Community [Collective] Crime Preventioanesponses The range of approaches and the type/emphasis of community (collective) crime prevention responses varies considerably. There 36 but none has done an have been attempts to classify responses, adequate job, since so little is known about the dynamics (processes) of community crime prevention approaches, due in part to the lack of descriptive research. The following discussion is a general outline of the different types of collective crime prevention responses. By no means are these types of responses mutually exclusive. The fact is there is a good deal of overlap in the practice of these approaches. This general sorting of prevention responses in presented only to get an under- standing of what is available. "Order Maintenance, Quality of Urban Life, and Police: A Line of Argument," paper in preparation, 1983; James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows," Atlantic Monthly (March 1982): 29-38. 36Leonard Bickman, et al., Citizen Crime Reporting Projects: Final Report I and V, National Evauation Program, Phase I Report Applied Social Psychology Program (Chicago: Loyola University, 1976; Robert K. Yin, et al., Patrolling the Public Beat: Building Residents and Residential Patrols (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1976). 35 1. Crime Control Responses: This type of response is the most frequently organized and studied collective crime prevention activity. It is an approach that emphasizes surveillance (identifi- cation) of potenially illegal behavior (individuals committing such) and the intervention to apprehend (rapid reporting to the authorities of the offender's behavior and actions.) In the late 60's, when this activity first appeared, many were citizens' patrols concerned with monitoring police activity in an effort to pressure the police for 37 Now these types of efforts have better crime control efforts. become more passive in their activities, oriented more to surveillance and reporting. The form these crime control responses usually take are citizen patrols that concentrate on residential or street sur- veillance within neighborhoods or high rise apartment buildings. 2. Crime Prevention Responses: This response refers to efforts that attempt to correct the causes of crime (social, economic, and environment). For example, crime prevention responses may attempt to correct the lack of employment opportunities, improve standards/ conditions of housing, provide better recreation facilities and super- vision, and in the absence of social cohesion, create community soli— 38 darity. Often, however, collective crime prevention responses employ 37Gary T. Marx and Dane Archer, "Community Police Patrols and Vigilantism," in Vigilante Politics, eds.: H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sendensberg (Philadélphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), pp. 129-157. 38The term social solidarity refers to the disposition of the members of the community. Percy Cohen has noted: "The solidarity of a group, a quasi-group, or collectivity is a readiness to act in con- cert for certain purposes. . . . Solidarity in any social system may derive from interests which stem from internal social relations, or it 36 youth and improve residential security by urging "target hardening" efforts, e.g., installation of better locks, using timers on lights, engraving valuable property, etc. Additional efforts may include educational meetings conducted by police officers or security experts as to the techniques that make one more vigilant to crime. 3. Social Service Responses: Community crime prevention programs that fall under this category are typically victim/witness assistance services. There have been, however, some programs that provide elderly escort services, neighbor telephone checks, drug and alcohol referral services, telephone "hot-line" reporting services, youth recreation, educational instruction (GED), etc. By no means does this list of activities complete the range of activities included under this heading. For many programs this category has been a "catch-all“ for programmatic activity that has not "fit" into either of the other two. The program emphasis that these general types of responses can undertake is very diverse. For example, collective responses can be focused on one type of crime, burglary or robbery in most instances, or they can deal with a range of crimes depending upon how compre- hensive and intense the community determines it wants to make the effort. Under some circumstances, it is possible for crime-focused organizations to take a multi-issue orientation. Organizers, using crime as a mobilizing issue, gain community support and then when may result from external pressures or as is common, it may result from both." Percy S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 135. 37 community concern lessons, re-focus on other issues, e.g., sanitation, street repair, and so forth. iore typically, however, community organizations add the crime issue to their agenda as a means of gaining visibility or revitalizing their organization after they have dealt with other issues. Crime in Public Housing In order to understand the crime problem in public housing, it is necessary to assess the size and importance of public housing to the nation's cities. The purpose for which public housing was ini- tially developed was to ensure decent and affordable housing for the nation's low and moderate income families. Since 1940 it has grown to be an important factor in meeting the housing needs of many Ameri- cans. For example, "In 1970 there were 2.7 million people--over 1 per- cent of the nation's pouplation--living in federally aided public 39 housing." Eight years later the "investment" in public housing for the large cities had grown even greater. As public housing scholar Raymond Struyk has pointed out: . . In 1978, for big cities [the 31 with populations over 400,000] public housing is a significant investment of the available housing stock, as 29 cities represented 31 percent (373,500)housing units] of the national program; the 2,900 other authorities administered the remaining 814,000 units. Further, under the system used to dispense Operating subsidies, these few Authorities absorbed 58 percent of all such subsi- dies provided by the federal government for the 1976-1977 fiscal year.40 39A. P. Solomon, Housing the Urban Poor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), Appendix A, p. 5. 40R. J. Struyk, A New System for Public Housing (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980), p. 5. 38 While we have an assessment of the physical conditions of the nation's public housing stock and its importance to the housing needs of low-income persons, we do not have a national picture of the crime problem in public housing. Much of what is known about public hous- ing problems has been learned from the large housing authorities located in the big cities, and what we know about crime in public \\\ ,-’X’//‘.\/’F\ J . _r \\/ housing (fear, victimization) has come from those same big cities. : Therefore, the literature documenting the crime problem in puplic housing is neither extensive, nor adequate_tp describing or measypjpg, m__“." ’_. — the crime problem. There is some information, however, that indi- ‘ .WW—v— _4——->-e .1. r. cates crime and the fear of crime are issues that warrant the atten- tion of those who fund, manage, and operate public housing. There is little need to re-state how crime has affected citi- zens in the United States. Not all segments of the population are 41 Some groups are more vulnerable than equally affected by crime. others, especially residents of public housing. Just how much more vulnerable is the question. Research conducted by William Brill in 1976 in the Millvale Housing Project in Cincinnati, and the Murphy Homes in Baltimore in 1977, found the reported average robbery rate per 1,000 persons 21.8 and 114.1, respectively.42 When compared to the national average, 41Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimi- zation in the United Stptes (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print- ing Office, November 1977). 42William Brill and Associates, Millvale Safety and Security Evaluation, Cincinnati Housing Authority, 1976; also, William Brill and Associates, Comprehensive Security Planning: A Program for Murphy Homes, Baltimore, Maryland (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing 39 approximately 6.5 robberies per 1,000 persons, reported in 1977 by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, these figures for public housing developments were extremely high. Similarly in the Nickerson Gardens in Los Angeles, Brill found the reported assault 43 rate to be 49.8 per 1,000 persons, in contrast to the national average, again reported by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administra- 44 As there are not sufficient tion to be 25.3 per 1,000 persons. data availabe from other public housing authorities to present a national assessment of crime in public housing, these figures cannot be considered representative information. They are, however, an indication that the issue of crime in public housing is in need of further investigation. Similarly, like the incidents of robbery and assault, fear of crime was’also found to be as intense in public housing. Research 45 46 conducted by Rosentahl et al., Perlgut, and Brill found fear of crime a significant concern among residents. Brill's research of and Urban Development, Office of Police Development and Research (Special Report), 1975. 43Brill, Comprehensive Security Planning. 44Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victim- ization in the United States. 4SS. J. Rosenthal, et al., DevelOping_pComprehensive Security Program in Public Housing (Philadalphia, PA: The Housing Management Institute, Center for Social Policy and Community Development, Temple University, 1974). 46D. J. Perlgut, Security in HUD: Subsidized and Insured Multi-Family Housing Projects: An Analysis of the Problems and Some Proposals for the Future, prepared for the National Housing Law Report, Berkeley, California, 1978. 40 four housing developments in the Boston Housing Authority,47 reported that 60 percent or more of the respondents believed it very dangerous to: --Wait for a bus alone at night (75 percent) --Go to shopping areas at night (71 percent) --Ride the elevator in their public housing complexes at night (63 percent) --Walk down the hallway in their public housing complex at night (60 percent) Among elderly residents of public housing, fear of crime is an especially prominent concern. Though the research is limited, it indicates that the elderly believe they are more vulnerable and as a result, behave as though they are more vulnerable by locking them- selves in their apartments and altering their style of livinéi:39,x Unfortunately, the literature indicates that little is known about the extent and impact of crime in public housing. While the issue of crime has always been a concern to housing administrators, most have only approached its control from a physical environmental design perspective. Public housing has always had funds available for modernization development. Few funds, however, have been available for 47William Brill and Associates, Victimization, Fear of Crime, and Altered Behavior: A Profile of Four HouSTng Projects in Boston (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1975). 48M. Lawton, L. Nahemov, S. Yaffe, and S. Feldman, "Psycho- logical Aspects of Crime and Fear of Crime," in Crime and the Elderly, eds. Jack Goldsmith and Sharon Goldsmith (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976). 41 handling social problems like community crime prevention. Nevertheless, factors that contribute to the crime problem in public housing can be identified from the research and literature. Factors Contributing to Crime in Public Housing Despite the fact that the crime prevention literature on crime prevention in public housing is not extensive, a broad review of it identifies three factors that appear to contribute to the crime problem: physical design characteristics, social factors, and governance policy. The following discussion of these factors is not ' I meant to be extensive, but helpful in understanding why the seven !\ elements of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program were important. 1 E 1. Physical Design Characteristics: In 1961 the idea of physical design affecting community interaction and crime was intro- duced. Jane Jacobs, in her study of American cities, observed that crime and the physical environment were directly related in a system- atic, observable, and controllable manner. According to Jacobs, there are three essential environmental characteristics that must be present for public areas to be safe: First, there must be a clear demarcation between what is public and what is private space. Public and private space cannot ooze into each other as they do typically in a ! suburban setting or in projects. Second, there must be 3 eyes upon the street, eyes belonging to those we might . i call the natural proprietors of the street. . . . And third, ‘ the side-walk must have users on it fairly continuously, i both to add to the number of effective eyes on the street and to induce the people in buildings along the street to watch the sidewalks in sufficient numbers.49 \ 1 49Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, p. 35. 42 The thesis of these characteristics is that the physical environment, through surveillance, deters crime as it increases the risk of apprehension. The theoretical importance of Jacobs'work is its contribution to understanding how the physical environment affects an increase or decrease in crime. Other scholars, namely Oscar Newman and C. R. Jeffery have since refined and expanded Jacobs' notion--Newman with his work in public housing,50 and Jeffery with his development of a theoretical framework for environ- mental crime prevention based on the criminological concepts of deterrence and rehabilitation.51 What scholars and practitioners have found in the relationship between physical design characteristics and crime is that: First, the physical environment can independently prevent crime [or make it difficult] through "target hardening." Second, changes in the physical environment can change the behavior of residents in ways that increase the likelihood that an offender will be impeded and/or apprehended. Third, regardless what the residents do, the physical design of the environment can deter an offender from choosing a particu- lar location as a target. Lastly, the combined impact of the above three can be made even stronger if there is consid- eration given to the social factors of crime and if resi- dents are actively involved in the planning and implementa- tion of the crime prevention programs. 2. Social Factors Contributing to Crime: Where the physical design characteristics have had a large role in contributing to the defense of crime and the fear of crime in public housing, social 50Newman, Defensible Space. 51C. R. Jeffery, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977). 52W. V. Rouse and H. Rubenstein, Crime and Public Housing Washington, D.C.: Institute for Neighborhood Initiatives. American Institutes for Research), in preparation. 43 factors seem to have a hand in the crime problem in public housing. Housing Administrators and the researchers who have examined public housing agree that social factors--broadly defined to include lack of social services for drug abuse, alcohol abuse, crisis intervention, employment opportunitiese-contribute to the vulnerability of residents. These social factors seem to inhibit residents from developing a sense of social integration and cohesion. The lack of tenant partici- pation in community activities has lessened their sense of community control. 3. Governance Policy: The third factor that the crime pre- vention literature broadly identifies as having an effect on the crime problem in public housing is governance policy. Governance policy is defined here as those activities that public housing offi- cials do in operating and regulating Authorities with respect to crime and security. The governance structure of public housing is such that it places the responsibility on the local housing authority to decide what and how it will provide security for its tenants. Housing admin- istrators have many options from establishing their own security force to relying on local law enforcement. In addition, public hous- ing authorities can establish internal management policy with respect to security matters, e.g., tenant screening and eviction guidelines. While this may seem like PHA's have substantial control over establish- ing policy for crime control, the fact is that authorities are severely restricted. 44 One of the most serious limitations administrators confront is the lack funds made available for security matters. If an author- ity determines it wants to create its own security department, there are no special funding provisions available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Housing authorities have to either allocate funds from its operations subsidy, or seek resources through grants. Providing any level of formal security, like a security force, is an expensive task to undertake as well as difficult to administer. For many PHA's, there is a need for a security force,53 but grant funds do not last long enough to allow for proper training or the establishment of a work culture. In addition, because grant monies are so uncertain, it is difficult for housing authorities to plan their security programs. Housing administrators have felt for some time that if policies were established at the Federal level which provided for stable fundings that the quality of life in develop- ments would improve. Residents would feel comfortable knowing that the authority had the capacity to respond to their security requests. Another policy problem for PHA officials that contributes to the crime problem in public housing is the difficulty they experience in evicting tenants that engage in anti-social behavior. Court opin- ions have been very cautious about giving Authority's the ability to evict tenants without substantial just cause. While this has frus- ' trated local officials, the rulings have outlined the policies and 53Perlgut, Security in HUD-Subsidized and Insured Multi-Family Housing Projects. 45 strategies they need to adopt. In a paper presented at a HUD confer- ence in 1978, the Columbus, Georgia Housing Authority stated: Recent Court cases, revisions to the landlord tenant laws, and the Legal Aid Society, have virtually destroyed our traditional tool, eviction. Since we [the Public Housing Authority] must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the undesirable tentants, we must have at our disposal a trained staff of investigative and enforcement personnel. Conclusion This literature review began by outlining how the t0pic of crime has come to be such a prominent issue, and how it has effected social policy at both federal and state government. Important to this discussion was the subject of community crime prevention and why, within the past decade, it has gained in populartiy as a strategy for controlling crime. Focal to its p0pularity is its basic assumption, active citizen involvement in the prevention of crime. The central theme of this chapter, however, was crime in public housing. Discussed was the importance of public housing and why crime is/seems to be a problem. Unfortunately, the literature documenting crime in public housing is neither extensive, nor well-developed in '7? describing the problem. What is known, however, about crime and the‘q f l 1 fear of crime in public housing is that it is much more extensive , than most peoole had antiticpated. 1 Three general factors were identified as contributing to the problem of crime: physical design, social conditions, and governing policy. These were the three factors around which the Urban Initia- tives Anti-Crime Program was designed. The crime prevention 46 literature noted that the type of community crime prevention program most effective were those that closely integrated these three fac- tors. CHAPTER III DESIGN OF STUDY Introduction This study is a process evaluation designed to examine the implementation of a multi-element anti-crime program developed and funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel0pment for local public housing authorities. The research sites selected for this dissertation are a subset, drawn from the large evaluation project conducted by the author while employed by the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard University. Ideally, when designing and conducting intensive evaluation research of a social intervention, such as an anti-crime program, pro- cedures to maximize causal inference should be followed. These pro- cedures are possible with the application of true experimental designs (Pretest-Posttest Control Group Designs)54 which allow the experimenter direct manipulation of factors (treatment and contextual variables) to be studied, through the randomization of treatment variables, 54Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rana McNally and Company, 1963). 47 48 controlling for internal and external validity issues.55 However, when conducting evaluation research of a social intervention, limita- tions arise which make the use of true experimental designs extremely difficult, if not impossible, due to the complexity of the research task. Such was the case in this study. In the overall evaluation, the Department of Housing and Urban Development specified that the evaluation address the seven program areas (previously discussed in Chapter I) and that the evaluation include both: (a) an impact assessment, and (b) a detailed process evaluation. The impact assessment was to focus on before/after analysis of crime, victimization,vandalism, youth employment, fear of crime, and related behaviors and attitudes. The process evaluation was to provide a detailed account of what anti-crime activities were planned, implemented, and maintained. Circumstances were such that true experimental designs were not feasible as there was neither random selection of research sites nor the ability to randomly select control group sites due to "nuances" of the HUD selection and funding process. Additionally, the issue of site selection/funding, affected evaluator control of the actual implementation as well as intervention activities, which allowed for a variety of unmeasured, as well as unknown factors to influence the projects and their outcomes. 55Internal validity is the degree to which observed changes in the dependent variable can be attributed to the assumed casual vari- able rather than some other factor including measurement of description of error. External validity refers to the generalizability of find- ings beyond the confines of the particular study. 49 Evaluation of Process In the larger evaluation effort, HUD stipulated that the process evaluation include the following: 1. Description of the relevant environment into which the program is introduced Description of the process by which a program is implemented or fails to be implemented Continuous measurement of the experimental program's operation over time Identification of proximate and intermediate effects of the program Identification of intervening events that affect implementation and project outcomes Attribution of causality in implementation and in assessing program performance Identification of unanticipated consequences Provide judgments useful for prescriptive policy analysis and management of similar programs in the future The process evaluation addressed these issues by conceptualiz- ing the problems of crime and security within public housing in terms of "self defense capabilities." That is, three factors thought to influence the ability to create self-defense capabilities of public housing were identified: 50 1. The capacity of the housing project to provide economic, recreational, and social opportunities to residents who would otherwise be trouble- makers in the project 2. The physical arrangements that create convenient and inconvenient opportunities to commit offenses with some assurance that they will go undetected (e.g., hallways, lighting, ease of entry and exit etc.). 3. The vigilance of the community and the willingness to mobilize police or to intervene on behalf of apparent victims Though this conceptualization refined the manner in which to view the task at hand, there remained such a wide and diverse range of issues to be addressed by the process evaluation that to know every- thing about all the seven major program elements and their arrange- ments of importance in each of the sixteen evaluation PHA's at the outset of the evaluation would have been impossible. Therefore, it was determined that information needed to be collected selectively, 56 To make interpreted, and translated back to the action context. this possible, the process evaluation would have to approach its task with either an explicit or an implicit frame of reference--whether it be called a theory, a conceptual framework, or as Van Maanen has 56C. Argyris, "Using Qualitative Data to Test Theories: Review Essay," Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 672-679. 51 described, an ideographic map. According to Van Maanen ideographic maps are a convention of qualitative methods that: . orginate when a researcher figuratively puts brackets around a temporal and spatial domain of the social world. These brackets define the territory about which descriptions are fashioned. These descriptions are essentially ideographic maps of the territory which must be read and interpreted by the investigator if any nomothetic statements are to result from this study. Doing description is the funamental act of data collec- tion in a qualitative study. But the map cannot be considered the territory because the map is a reflexive product of the map makers invention. The map maker sees himself quite as much as he sees the territory. There are however better and worse maps and qualitative researchers seek to construct good ones by moving closer to the terri- tory they study in the physical sense as well as in the intellectual sense by maximizing the use of such artificial distancing mechanims as analytic labels, abstract hypothe- ses and performulated research strategies.5 Such a frame of reference would limit data collection to the areas assumed to be the most relevant, and the degree of required focusing would more than likely change from site to site. In this program evaluation that would be viewed as necessary and an important element to capture implementation activities and program developments across sites. Additionally developing such a frame of reference would provide a means to standardize methods and perspectives that would be of practical value in training and managing data collectors. Ultimately, it would guide the interpretation of the data and facili- tate translating the findings back into the action context. To suggest, however, that there are systematic, highly developed theories of program initiation, implementation, and 57J. Van Maanen, "Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organiza- tional Research,“ Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 520. 52 performance would be a bit overstated. There is, nevertheless, an applicable literature58 that assisted in forming a frame of reference or guide to asking the "right" questions about the activities (events). Such an "ideographic map" is presented in Table 3.1. Conceputaliza- tion of the anti-crime program in this fashion allowed for the iden- tification of a variety of forces (pre-conditions, actors, ideas, and skills) likely to have great impact on the initiation, implemen- tatipp, and performance of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, as well as the understanding of what data/information needed to be collected at each stage. Data Collection Observer Selection To collect process data and information, the evaluation pro- posal for the overall study specified that a person be hired part-time (twenty hours per week) in each of the evaluation sites as the on-site process data observer. The use of observers for data collection has proven to be an excellent technique in other large-scale and complex evaluation re.earch projects as long as data collection was 58Paul Berman and M. W. McLaughlin, Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change: Implementing and Sustaining Innovations R1589/8-- HEW, 1979; Mary Ann Wycoff and George Kelling, The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1979); Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, Social Change in Complex Organizations (New York: Random House, 1970); K. Knight, "A Descriptive Model of the Intra-Firm Innovation Process," Journal of Business 40 (October 1967): 478-496; Nancy Milo, "Health Care Organizations and Innovations," Journal of Health and Social Behavior 22 (1979): 163-173; Gerald Zalt— man, Robert Duncan, and Jonny Holbek, Innovations and Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973). 53 Table 3.1.--Evaluation Ideographic Map Activity (Event) Data Source City Political Actors Initiation Encouragement (or lack of) Interviews with political to obtain outside funding figures, PHA officials Provision of resources Review of records Planning Political Activity Implementation Provision of Resources Interviews with political figures Political Activities Media Analysis Coordination between City Interviews with political and other agencies figures, tenants Record review Program Ideas Same as above “Start Up Activities" Same as above Performance Coordination between City Interviews with political and other agencies figures Record review Observation Provision of resources Same as above Agency and Political Same as above support Public Housing Authority Initiation Decision to apply for Interview PHA staff, City program Draft Application Negotiate project plan with HUD Officials, tenants leaders Review Agency Documents Interviews--Same as above Same as above 54 Table 3.1.--Continued Activity (Event) Data Source Implementation Refine Program Plans Interview PHA staff, City officials, tenant leaders Identification of vendors, Interview PHA staff, consultants vendors, consultants Development of Program Interview PHA staff, Staff Anti-Crime Program Staff, tenants, and tenant leaders Performance Project/Program Activities Records review, Obser- vation Interviews with Program Staff and Tenants Program Administration, Observation, Interviews Management, Coordination with Program Staff, Activity tenants, and other relevant actors Public Agencies Initiation Definition of Crime Problem Recorded Crime Data/ in Public Housing Records Present Police Practices Interviews with Police, and Strategies regarding PHA officials, and crime in public housing tenant leaders Activity of Police in Interviews with Police, planning Anti-Crime Program PHA officials, and tenant leaders Implementation Internal planning for new Observation, Interview- activities ing Police Officials Internal training for Same as above new activities Internal planning to Same as above Administer new efforts Performance Project Activity (i.e., Observation, interviews police/tenant patrols team policing etc.) Administration, Super- vision Management Activities with police, PHA offi- cials and tenants Interviews with police officials 55 Table 3.1.--Continued Activity (Event) Data Source City and Social Service Agencies Initiation Definition of Crime Problem Interview agency offi- in public housing cials, Review documents Support planning and Grant Same as above, Review preparation agency documents Contribute/Agree to some Same as above level of participation Observation in program Implementation Review Program Plans Interview Agency and City Officials Review Process Materials Interview Agency and applications, payments City Officials etc. Review Agency and departmental records Identify vendors, Same as above process bids Performance Project Activities Records, Observation, Interviews with tenants, community leaders, PHA, and City officials, etc. Project Support Activities Same as above Administration, Super- Same as above vision, managmenet activities Residents and Resident Leaders Initiation Generation of ideas regard- Interviews with tenants, ing program design, form, and content Political Activities within Internal/ External forces influencing political/power distribution Housing Porject. Tenant Organization tenant leaders, Housing Authority officials Same as above Record Review Media Analysis Same as above 56 Table 3.1.--Continued Activity (Event) Data Source Implementation Develop working patterns with PHA officials, con- sultants, and anti-crime staff Planning and Consulting in program development Performance Management of program elements, liaison, consult, advocate represent resi- Observation Same as above Interview with tenants, tenant leaders, housing authority officials Interviews with PAH officials, vendors, con- sultants and project dents staff Record Review Observation Contractors and Vendors Initiation Technological and Material Record Review capabilities Program Extensions of exisiting activity Implementation Installing and/or pro- viding goods and services Performance Servicing and maintaining goods and services Interviews with HUD, PHA officials, and contractors and vendors Same as above Record Review Interviews with tenants tenant leaders, PHA staff, and city offi- cials Observations Record Review Observation Interviews with tenants, tenant leaders, PHA staff, and city offi- cials 57 Table 3.1.--Continued Activity (Event) Data Source Media Initiation Publicity about crime, Media Analysis housing, and anti-crime program Interviews with PHA staff, residents, tenant leaders, political fig- ures, and agency needs Publicity about particular Same as above residents living in the demonstration area Implementation Publicity about plans for Same as above the Anti-Crime Program Performance Publicity about the success Same as above or failure of the Anti-Crime Program Exeogeneous Events Initiation Any random major event Observation unpredictable happening . . in the demonstration area Med1a Analys1s to effect the program, Interviews with rele- e.g., prolonged police vant actors and those strike, major fire, seri- affected by the event ous (heinous) crime event Any major serendipitous event, e.g., receipt of major grant, tenant elected mayor, etc. Implementation Same as above Same as above Performance Same as above Same as above 58 standardized, observers closely supervised, and the data collection process closely monitored.59 Selection of quality observers was critical to the process evaluation; a great deal of effort was placed in selecting the best available persons for the position in each of the evaluation sites. An observer position description was developed that outlined the qualities sought in candidates (see Appendix D). At a minimum, candidates had to possess a bachelor's degree, as it was felt that completion of the academic experience demonstrated acceptable writing and communication skills, as well as a developed sense of discipline. In general, candidates were sought who were bright, pleasant, and articulate people that we believed would "fit" into the public housing environment comfortably. In the final analy- sis, however, it was probably more important that people displayed a sense of calm and maturity than anything else. Most of the recruitment of candidates took place at colleges and universities located in or near the evaluation city. Staff visited academic departments (sociology, psychology, political science, anthropology, criminal justice), spoke with college Deans and depart- ment Chairpersons, to locate potential candidates. Those people who expressed an interest in the position were asked to submit a resume, as well as supporting materials (course papers, published articles)' they felt would be representative of their best analytic and written 59George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Prevgptive Patrol Ex eriment (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1974); Mary Ann Wycoff, The Birmingham Anti-Robery Project (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation (Unpublished manuscript). 59 work. Thoroughness and writing ability were the two important factors that were screened for in the documents. On-site time of senior staff was limited, and therefore, addi- tional screening techniques (observational tests, practice interviews, or the checking of references) were not used in the selection process. Candidates were interviewed in person and based on their presentation of themselves, our impressions, and the needs of the site, persons were selected for an "advisory" interview conducted by housing authority staff and tenant leaders. (More will be said about the "advisory" interview shortly.) During our interview with the candidates, they were asked numerous questions about themselves, their experience(s), academic work, and their future. For example, candidates were asked: Why they were interested in the position? Had they taken courses in criminal justice, criminology, sociology, research methods? Had they any experience(s) with crime, violence, the police, or the criminal justice system? What were their perceptions about public housing and residents? Did they have any familiarity with the demonstration area?, and so forth. During the course of the interview, candidates were provided as much information about the nature of the work to be performed as possible--what it meant to be a field observer, the con- ditions in which we anticipated they would be working, and that there would be no on-site supervision. And they were asked how they felt about these arrangements. A concern of the evauation staff in the selection of the on-site observer was sex and race; would such factors affect 60 acceptance by the subjects and would it have an impact on the quality of data collected? From the outset of the evaluation, staff knew that the residents of most of the demonstration areas were young, single females, heads of households with two or more dependents. Our concern was whether the observers should match the demographic characteristics of the demonstration area(s). It was decided that unless extenuating circumstances prohibited it, like the applicant pool did not include our criteria or the "best choice" did not meet the criteria, the observer should match the observed group. Generally, the observer staff was recruited during the initial site visit made by the author. However, as the PHA and anti-crime program staffs were unaware how the evaulation was being conducted, time was spent informing the participants of the evaluation design and that the process evaluation group would have a part-time staff person "on-site" following their program developments: attending anti-crime meetings, interviewing residents and program staff about their percep- tions of the program, reviewing program documents, and so forth. Needless to say, there was much anxiety and concern by program staff about the process evaluation having a person ”watching" their program. To lessen this concern and promote acceptance of the process evaluation, as well as facilitate entree of the observer into the anti-crime program, we asked the housing authority staff, anti-crime program staff, and resident leaders to participate in the selection of the on-site observer in an advisory capacity. This was done primar- ily out of concern that we might select someone who was unacceptable 61 or could not work with the group. Our data collection rested on the ability of the observer to be "accepted." It was made clear to the program principals that the evaluators would retain full responsibility for the selection, training, supervision, and firing of the observer.60 The "bringing-in" of housing authority staff and resident leaders into the selection process had important meaning. Prior to this initial site visit, communications between program staff and the evaluators had been very limited and much concern [anxiety] had devel- oped and was expressed about the evaluation. Public housing officials and program staff were concerned about the political impact of the evaluation and ‘its ramifications. We, too, were concerned about this. By asking the principals to participate in the selection of the person who would be collecting the data seemed to communicate to them that the evaluators were committed to doing not only a proper/serious study, but were interested in working with the program staff and residents and respecting their position. Observer training.--Prior to the observers' assuming their data collection role, they were required to attend an intensive three-day training session held in Chicago, Illinois. In preparation for this training, the observers were all sent a packet of readings designed 60It turned out that by having the PHA staff, anti-crime staff, and resident leaders interview the observer candidates that the candi- dates were given time to rethink their decision, as well as ask ques- tions about the program that we were not able to answer. Quality data collection meant that the observers had to feel comfortable with the situation as well, and this opportunity seemed to let every one have an opportunity to express his/her concerns. 62 to introduce them to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, the research design of the evalua- tion, public housing and poverty issues, and observation methods and techniques (see Appendix E for a list of the materials). Many of the observer staff had not been involved in research of this nature (doing observation) prior to their employment and it was believed by senior staff that these materials would give a brief, but adequate, introduc- tion to what the observers would encounter in training, as well as in the field. The three-day training session was specifically designed to cover how to observe and interview persons, preparing the observers with a working knowledge of their PHA's anti-crime program components by component, how to use the data collection forms, and introduction to the rules and procedures they were working under and required to follow (what to do if they found themselves in situations they were uncomfortable with and if they thought they were in "trouble"). Data Collection Activity The data that the observers were to collect were to be generally drawn from the following sources: --Observation of relevant actors and groups (families, residents, public housing authority staff, program staff, resident groups, service agency staff, etc.) --Informal interviews (questionnaires standardized for use in all sites, for use with PHA staff, program staff, other relevant groups, and individuals) 63 --Document review [grant proposal(s), agency record analysis, memo's, letters, etc.] The observers were instructed that upon returning to their sites, they should "ease into" their work, not necessarily begin formal (structured) interviewing, but wait a few weeks until comfortable with the site. As they had already met the program principals during the "advisory" interview, entree had been secured for the observer to approach pro- gram staff. The best way to get acquainted with their program was to immerse themselves by initially asking the following questions of program staff and resident leaders. 1. Questions about program design What cluster of programs is proposed in each site? Who proposed them? Why? How active is the tenant organization? Were tenants involved in the design of the program? Does the program seem related to the problem? That is the history of the proposal? Who developed the proposal and what relationship is there between the proposal author(s), the administrators, and the housing residents? Who is to benefit from the program? In what ways? What is the implementation schedule? Questions about program implementation What is the implementation schedule? Who are the decision-makers and what is the relationship between these decision-makers, managers, and project residents? 64 What resources are available? From where? Were consultants used? What are their characteristics? Who hires them? What impact do they have? What implementation strategies are used? How is the implementation of each program element timed? What specific start-up problems arise? What problems are encountered in implementation? How do they effect the implementation schedule? How? Why? Questions about operational coordination with other programs What are the relationships between the implementing agencies and supporting agencies? What other anti-crime programs are operating? How do they interact with the new programs? What conflicts develOp? Between whom? How are they resolved? What resistances actually occur? By whom? How are they resolved? How do projects change? Questions probing tenantgperceptions ofpprograms How are the programs perceived by various groups? How aware of the programs:are the residents? What effect do the programs havecNIthe tenant organizations? Questions about the performance of programs What are the programs? Are they executed as designed? What are the resistances to the programs? What effect do the evaluators have on the program? What are the reactions of the press and other media? 65 How successful do various relevant constituencies v1ew the programs as being? How likely is it that the program will continue after funding is no longer available? Formal process evaluation data collection activities were of two major types: (a) standardized forms and (b) narratives (see Appendix F, for a list of site data collection). In the overall evaluation, standardized data collection consisted of case report information from those sites that were funded for social service pro- grams from the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA), and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's, Victim/ Witness Office. In addition, PHA's that received Department of Labor Youth Employment (DOL/YCCIP) funds were asked a series of questions about their programs. Narrative data collection/information came from on-site observers logs of meetings, observations, and telephone conver- sations, as well as the develOpment of critical event timeliness (see Appendix G for data collection forms). The observer logs focused on the content of each program and were based on encounters of the observer during tenant council meetings, anti-crime oversite team meetings, and interviews conducted with key informants in and associated with the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. The critical event timeline chronicled the authorization, implementation, and operation of each PHA's program. In the subsample of sites selected for this study (CHHA and LMHA), there was a full array of data collection activity. With respect to standardized data collection, ADAMHA data was gathered from the LMHA program. (CMHA did not have an ADAMHA program.) Victim/ 66 Witness case data was gathered from LMHA, but not from the CMHA program as that site did not apply for funds. Both sites, however, received DOL/YCCIP funds, and standardized data were collected on those programs. Narrative data (observer logs) were collected in the CMHA program as that site had an on-site observer. Narrative data collection for LMHA was done not by an on-site observer, but the author, during numerous visits and telephone calls with program staff. It had been decided by senior evaluation staff early in the larger evaluation that it would be important to "keep our feet on the ground" and the author selected LMHA on his site. While there is unevenness in the detail of data collected for those two sites, it is not believed to be a critical factor as the important shaping events were captured in data collection or during the final review of draft reports examined by both CMHA and LMHA program staff and PHA officials. meme Sampling for evaluations that rely on observational data is unlike that for other types of research. In such evaluations, samp- ling is not designed (prescribed) or executed in advance of data collection, but is continually carried on throughout the study. The vagaries of access to information, field relations, and subjects who contribute to the study are such that it simply requires a less rational procedure than the highly rational prescriptive procedures of systematic sampling theory.61 61Leslie Kish, Survey Sampling (New York: Wiley, 1965). 67 In this study, the decision about sampling, namely, whom to observe, when to observe, whom to interview--was made on the basis of what Glazer and Strauss have described as theoretical sampling: Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generalizing theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is controlged by the emerging theory whether substantive or formal. 2 The sampling process is determined by the data previously collected, the interpretation of those data, and the emerging and constantly changing circumstances. The observer, immersed in the situation, is constantly reviewing and rechecking data. As patterns emerge, lines of communication open, and they are pursued. In other words, there is constant interplay of understanding between the past and the present. This is the sampling plan of the qualitative researcher. He or she "reads" the situation, draws tentative hypotheses, interviews, observes, reviews tentative hypotheses, devel0ps new tentative hypo- theses, again "reads" the situation, and goes back to collect data. Limitations of the Process Evaluation Process evaluations which rely primarily upon qualitative data, that is, descriptive accounts of events, actions, and thoughts of participants and responses to established policy and future direc- tion, are very attractive studies to undertake and to report. 62B. G. Glazer and A. L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualative Research (Chicago: Aldine Pub- lishing Co., 1967), p. 45. 68 According to Miles, it is the qualitative data that gives them this attraction: . they are rich, full, earthy, holistic, "real," their face value seems unimpeachable; they preserve chronological flow where that is important, and suffer minimally from retrospective distortion; and they in prin- ciple, offer a far more precise way to assess causality in organizational affairs than arcane efforts like cross-lagged correlations [after all, intensive field work contains dozené3 of "waves" of data collection, not just two or three]. . . . Despite these attractive features, there are methodological weaknesses and practical (administrative) limitations that affect all studies that utilize qualitative methods. In the larger study from which this disseration is drawn, efforts were made to minimize the limitations of the research design, however, methodological limitations were unavoidable. The hallmark of process evaluations that rely upon qualita- tive data (interviewing and observation) is the intentional stratagem of approaching the research task with very general and loosely spe- cified concepts of what is important to the problem under examination. The virtue often cited for approaching research in this "non- standardized" manner is the ability to change research direction on the basis of new and incoming data, in order to uncover the essence of the problem/situation being studied. The aim of the unstructured research 63Matthew 8. Miles, “Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979). 69 approach is to provide a "flexibile guide to field work to make the most of the individual peculiarities of the situation in which you find yourself."64 However, this approach has generated much spirited methodologi- cal debate between those who consider themselves rigorous "qualita- tive“ researchers and those who consider themselves rigorous "quanti- tative" researchers. The quantitative group criticize the qualitative group for nonstandardized data gathering, e.g., slipshod sampling, failingixidocument assertions quantitatively, and accepting impres- sionistic accounts that the qualitative initiated could not distinguish 65 The qualitative advocates from purely impressionistic accounts. counter, claiming that structured data gathering (e.g., the survey method) is essentially a preconceived idea, overly concerned with numbers and samples, and that such approach destroys the conception of a social system.66 64John P. Dean, Robert L. Eichhorn, and Lois R. Dean, "Limi- tations and Advantages of Unstructured Method," in An Introduction to Social Research, 2nd ed., ed.: John T. Doby (New York: Meredith Publiching Company, 1967), pp. 274-279. 65See Harry Alperts, "Some Observations on the Sociology of Sampling," Social Forces 31 (1952): 30-31; Robert C. Hanson, "Evidence and Procedure Characteristics of 'Reliable' Propositions in Social Science," American Journal of Sociology 62 (1958): 357-363. 66See Conrad Arensber , "The Community Study Method," American Journal of Sociology 60 (1952?: 109-124; Howard 5. Becker and Blanche Greer, "Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison," Human Organization 16 (1957): 28-34; A. Vidich and J. Bensman, "The Validity of Field Data," Human Organization 13 (1954): 20-27. 70 Though these discussions seem more philosophical than method- ological, they, nevertheless, illuminate an important point that research which relys upon qualitative data (unstructured observation and interviews) has limitations, that in many respects are compounded by the research task. In this study, such limitations were evident. Despite the feelings of some quantitative researchers, the disciplines in social science have long relied on qualitative methods (observation and interviewing) to provide description of the workings of the "black box," and to generate information for formal hypothesis testing. Traditionally, qualitative methods have been practiced by university- based researchers (solo operators)67 or (lone wolves)68 who inde- pendently conceive, conduct, analyze, and publish their research. Though much has been written about how to conduct "lone wolf" research )69 (the advantages and limitations it has principally been directed to/for other “lone wolves," not those interested in using the 67Peter K. Manning, "The Researcher: An Alien in the Police World," in The Ambivalent Force, eds.: A. Neiderhoffer and A. Blum- berg (Chicago: Drydon Press, 1974). 68Carl P. Florez and George L. Kelling, "Issues in the Use of Observers in Large-Scale Program Evaluation: The Hired Hand and The Lone Wolf" (January 31, l960) (unpublished manuscript). 69Eugene J. Webb et al., Unobstrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); William F. White, "Observational Field Methods," in Research Methods in Social Sciences, eds. M. Jahoda, M. Deutsch, and S. Cook, lst ed., Vol. II (New York: Holt, 1951), pp. 493-513; Robert K. Bain, "The Researcher's Role: A Case Study," Human Organization 9(1) (1950): 23- 28; George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, Issues in Participant Observa- 1963) A Text and Reader (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 71 methodology to evaluate large-scale public service and social policy programs that employ multiple observers. The use of employed observers (hired hands) as principal data collectors in large-scale social action research and evaluation 70 These "hired hands." though they use projects has become popular. the qualitative methods practiced by the lone wolves, find their research situations to be much more complex, with limitations and problems much more pronounced. For instance, where the interest of the "solo operator" is to observe, learn, be unobtrusive, and respon- sible only for his/her action(s) and research, the typical "hired hand“ researcher is employed for a discrete period of time, is gen- erally interested in specific behaviors, collects data as a job, and turns it over to those employing him/her, becomes bored with the repetition of activity and questions asked and then moves on. By nature of this arrangement, he/she is not representing him/herself but, an organization, does not have to be concerned with entree to the host organization, does not usually collect data for purpose of under- standing basic phenomena, but collects data for someone else to evaluate (judge) the work of others. Inasmuch as the host organiza- tion has a vested interest in the evaluation, the hired hand poses a much more serious threat to the agency than the solo operator. This 70George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1974), pp. Mary Ann Wycoff, The Birmingham Anti-Robbert Project (to be published by the Police Foundation, in preparatihh). 72 is an important and critical distinction between the two types of observers, and has serious consquences for the research conducted. There are additional complexities. Qualitative research requires the development of close relationships with those being studied and the hired hand continually feels divided as to whom he/she should be loyal to--the employing organization or to those he/she "feels" the closest. The concern for cooptation and observer bias are very real problems, especially if the hired hand is functioning (as was the case in this research) as a lone wolf (without on-site super- vision). These situations happen not because the observer is a "bad person," but more as an artifact of the structure of hired hand research. The hired hand did not conceive the research issue and more than likely will not see it to completion (final write up). Hired hands often see themselves as having little professional investment in what they are doing and, therefore, the complexities become so much more intense that it is easy for them to lose perspective and affect every aspect of the evaluation. Take, for example, the problem of observer bias. There are numerous ways bias can affect the observer and data collection. Dean et al., have pointed out that because the direction of observation studies changes frequently, . . . on the basis of the emerging data, there is great danger that the research worker will guide the inquiry in accord with the wrong impressions he had gotten from the first informants contacted. Or his own personal character- istics or personality needs may attract him into stronger relationships with certain kinds of informants than with 73 others, and thus prepare the way for his receiving an undue amount of information from persons who are biased toward one point of view.71 Schatzman and Strauss have presented an argument that the problem of bias is linked to one's perspective. They note: The difference in defining perspective is compounded by the fact that several perspectives can be used simultaneously: the perspective of a stated sub-unit or a single actor, of the leadership, or the entire organization, and so on. Then there are perspectives interest in the observer that probably relate closely to his personal view of man and human life as tragic, humorous, ridiculous, pathetic, and the like. These too will undoubtedly influence not only what he will attend to, but how he will conceptualize. Also the researcher can look at his activities artistically, scientifically, or l'philoso- phically,“ and these break down into sub-perspectives.72 Realistically, it is not possible to eliminate observer bias; all that can be done is to manage it by monitoring the observer staff and their data collection. As Myrdal suggested, “There is no device for excluding bias in social sciences than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific and sufficiently concretized value premises."73 As this study was relying upon on-site observers to collect the data, efforts were made during recruitment and selection to uncover the valuations the candidates had about the research on which they would be working. Those who expressed strong negative feelings about the work were eliminated from consideration, while those who had strong positive feelings were continued for 71Dean et al., "Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured MethodS." p. 276. 72Leonard Schatzman and Anselm L. Strauss, Field Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 55. 73Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 1043. 74 consideration as it was felt that erring on the positive (aggressive) side would make management of that person "easier." (Remember, the observers would be working alone, without on-site supervision, and under those arrangements to be a "self-starter" was an important factor.) Staff believed that bias could be managed in the following way. The on-site observers were required to mail their data to the project director for review and critique as they completed interviews and observations. As the data were received, the information was examined by this author and a research assistant, not only for content and detail, but for the emerging "story" the observer was describing; this was an attempt to determine the reporting bias of the observer. After each reviewed the data independently, the reviewers would meet to discuss the progress of the observer's data collection efforts. Twice, during the data collection period (at the half-way point and near the conclusion), each observer's data file was "audited" to insure completeness of data gathered for each program component. This audit procedure consisted of reviewing each of the observer's data logs, summarizing the information according to the seven program areas, then chronologically ordering the information by the date it was collected. When the audit summary was complete, it was possibe to "see" the information for each evaluation site. This "picture" enabled the project staff to see where the observer had been spending time collect- ing information, what their bias (focus) was in collecting the data, and most importantly, what additional information we needed to make the 75 data file complete. Though this was an extremely labor intensive task, it was the most direct way we could effectively manage the data collection process. While the data audits were a major data management effort, more frequent contacts were had with the observers through regular telephone conversations; this was to insure the Quality of the data collection effort. During the Chicago training sessions, the observers were encouraged to call and keep the "home office" advised of major developments; staff, in turn, would contact the observers to give them feedback on how they were doing, where they could improve, and how they should conduct follow-ups based on their reports. This was an attempt to meet emotional needs (insure them that they were part of a larger evaluation team and the work they were doing was important).74 Though this was time consuming, the process did seem to work very well as there were few difficulties with the observer staff. In the larger evaluation, only two people were terminated for failure to perform the tasks they were hired to do. The observers in this subsample performed very well. Similar to the limitation of bias is the concern of the observer over-identifying with the subjects in the study. This is more commonly known as the observer “going-native." In this study, as in most obser- vational research, the role of the observer requires that he/she 74For a more detailed discussion of the potential threats to the interpretation of observational data, see Morris 5. Schwartz and Charlotte G. Schwartz, "Problems in Participant Observation," American Journal of Sociology 60 (1955): 343-354. 76 establish relationships (friendships) with informants to gain infor- mation. Because most observational research requires a significant investment of time in establishing these contacts, there is the con- cern for the observer growing too close to the subjects (developing over-rapport) and losing objectivity in the collection of data. In this study, the concern for over-rapport was great as the observers were employed as hired hands, conducting lone wolf assignments, and without on-site supervision. In many respects the role of the observer in this study was anxiety producing. They were employed as temporary, part-time staff, asked to respond to an absent evaluation group, give up data and information that they had worked very hard to collect, be criti- cal of program staff and participants, and work in an environment that was not necessarily warm to an evaluation. Since this was the first time most of the observers had par- ticipated in anything like this, they were likely to over estimate the amount of rapport necessary to gain cooperation. The desire to get along well with the observed under these conditions did lead to some observer insecurity and over identification. In the larger evaluation there were minor instances of the observer becoming too involved. However, in the subsample selected for this study, there is no indication that the observers lost objectivity due to over- identification. In the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland) and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo), there is every reason to believe that data collection remained rela- tively neutral. 77 To manage over rapport becoming a serious issue, every effort was made to make the observers feel that they were part of a close staff. Contact with the observers was personalized as much as possi- ble. Telephone checks were made regularly to "see how they were doing,“ and how they were being received at their site by the program staff. Though it was made clear to the observers that their site was their responsibility and the project director would not interfere with their work without discussing it with them, the project director did reserve the right to call the anti-crime coordinator to discuss the work of the observer to ascertain how they felt the evaluation was progressing. It was realized that limited degrees of co-optation, over rapport and bias would take place and that little could be done to prevent it. What could be done was to manage the problem by cross checking data to see if it were consistent with impressions based upon project staff site visit(s), knowledge of the site, and tele- phone conversations with the observers and program staff. In those instances where a concern was felt about data gathering, much closer attention was paid to the data submitted by the observer. One of the frequent criticisms of observational methods is that the data collected does not represent what took place because the observer's presence has a reaction on the program activities being observed. There is some validity to their criticism, particu- larly in the initial phases of an observational research. However, there is enough experience (lone wolf) with this technique to indicate 78 that the observed, while they may not completely forget about the researcher, do continue to practice business as usual and become open with the observer.75 This was certainly the case in this study. From the beginning of the evaluation the observed knew that there would be an on-site evaluator. In a limited fashion, the observed had a hand in the selection of the observer and felt "comfortable" in knowing what was going to be done for the evaluation. The longer the observer was on-site, the more quickly he/she was "accepted" and able to "fit" into the environment. It was known that the project had succeeded in overcoming reactive effects of the observer's presence when the observed began to give off the record information.76 Administratively, there were many more limitations with this study. The collection and analysis of qualitative data is an extremely labor intensive operation, particularly when field work efforts need to be coordinated to make the data systematically "comparable." The field observers found that within a short period of time, they were overloaded with data due to the range of program activity to be observed and collected, and the time that it took to write up these events (interviews, and observations). It was not surprising then that the observers found it easier to attend meetings and observe developments 75An example of this point is made in William Greider's article, "The Education of David Stockman," The Atlantic, December 1982. 76The presence of the observer should not always be seen as a negative effect or "disturbance" to the study. Observers may prove to be a catalyst that causes the observed to concentrate on what they are to do, bring staff together (serve as a rallying point) that may make for a better program and "test" of the intervention. 79 than write up those events. After all, attending these events had to be done as it was data, and it was also where the action was (it was not with the past events; they were history and probably did not mean anything now that this new information was at hand). In every instance, the observers fell behind with the data write ups, despite efforts of the project director to encourage, then demand, and finally, beg for the reports. Summary This chapter has outlined the research design of a process evaluation for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's, Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in public housing. The research design conceptualized the problem of crime and security within public housing in terms of "community self-defense capabilities." That is, three factors thought to influence the ability to create self-defense capabilities were outlined: (I) the ability of a housing authority to redirect the effort of trouble makers; (2) the physical design of a housing project that creates convenient and inconvenient opportuni- ties to commit offenses, and (3) the vigilance of the community to intervene in criminal situations. In this study, two public housing authorities (the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority) were selected for examination from the larger evaluation. The process evaluation was to provide a detailed account of activities planned, implemented, and maintained in each program. The essence of this or any other process evaluation is best summarized by Miles in 80 his discussion of attempting ix) apply a variation of another model of analysis. Though these [and our other] rules of thumb seemed reasonable and desirable and reduced anticipatory analysis anxiety a good deal, we found that the actual process of analysis during case-writing was essentially intuitive, primitive and unmanageable in any rational sense. As we have noted, the data cards were not used, and fieldworkers and analysts [usually, but not always the same person] read through the write-ups and interim analysis, selected data, and arranged the information using a chronologically- organized case outline derived from the general conceptual framework of the study. While one can remember occasional use of the "rule of thumb" (e.g., a pause to search for negative experience), the analysis process is more memor- ale for its moments of sheer despair in the face of the mass of data, alternating with moments of achieved clarity, soon followed by second-guessing skepticism ["would someone else come to the same conclusion?"].77 The point is that process evaluations are complex, time con- suming, and anxiety driven enterprises, especially if they involve multiple sites. This is why it is best to "triangulate" data collec- tion activity. By collecting different kinds of data, from different perspectives that address the same event; analyze each group of data independently, draw generalizations, not only will the accuracy of one's opinion be improved, but if the findings of the data converge, the toilsome task of synthesis is made somewhat easier. If, on the other hand, the findings diverge and measurement error is not a factor, other theories have to be sought. One way to resolve divergent find- ings is to validate the interpretations of the data with other researchers, program reviewers, and program staff. Such was the case with the data in this study. 77Matthew B. Miles, "Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nui- sance: The Problem of Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979): 597. 81 In Chapter IV, a presentation of the process data collected for the research sites of CMHA and LMHA will be presented. This is the first step of a two-part analysis, case study analysis of the evaluation sites. CHAPTER IV PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDIES Introduction It is the nature of a process evaluation that a continuous interaction takes place between data collection and data analysis. That is, data analysis consists of an integration of qualitative and quantitative data. This approach has been called the multi-method/ 79 multi-trait technique,78 triangulation, and goal-system state 80 All of these terms describe an approach that combines a analysis. variety of qualitative and quantitative techniques to the study of the same phenomenon. This chapter contains the presentation of case study data (process data) collected for the subsample of the research sites selected for this dissertation. The collection of process data required that a variety of data collection techniques--narratives and standardized data forms--be "blended" to develop and deepen our under- standing of site developments. Of special interest for this study is 78D. T. Campbell and D. W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discrimin- ant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix," Psychological Bulletin 56 (1959): 81-105. 79E. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Methods: Non-Reactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)} 80S. D. Sieber, "The Integration of Fieldwork and Survey Methods," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1335-1359. 82 83 the term "triangulation." Jick points out that "triangulation" has come to describe both within-method and between-method techniques, but is particularly relevant when multiple methods are used. Triangulation, however, can be something other than scal- ing, reliability, and convergent validation. It can also capture a more complete, holistic, and conceptual portrayal of the unit[s] under study. That is beyond the analysis of overlapping variance, the use of multiple measures may also uncover some unique variance which otherwise may have been neglected by a single method. It is here that qualitative methods, in particular can play an especially prominent role by eliciting data and suggesting conclusions to which other methods would be blind. Elements of the context are illu- minated. In this sense triangulation may be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives, but also to enrich our understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge. The analysis for this study is presented in a two-step process. This chapter presents the first step of analysis, the case studies (case analysis) for the evaluation sites, the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, Ohio), and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo, Ohio). In each case analysis, the method of tri- angulation was used to bring together data from a variety of sources and to focus it on the issues of implementation. From this presenta- tion of separate case studies, the second step of analysis, a cross- site analysis (synthesis) of implementation issues that affected these two sites is presented in Chapter V. While the methodology 82 for cross-site analysis is not well defined in the literature, it 81T. D. Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action," Administrative Science_Quarterly 24 (Decem- ber 1979): 603. 82M. 0. Miles, "Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (Decem- ber 1979): 590-601. 84 is similar to that for a separate case study. That is, the case studies for the subsample will be reviewed; processes and patterns will be searched for higher and higher levels of generalization and combined to structure interpretation, recommendation, and conclusions. Case Studies Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Author- ity--Cleveland, Ohio Local Context The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) is located in Cleveland, Ohio. Cleveland is a heavily industrial city located on Lake Erie, at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River. The principal industries have been shipping, steel, automotive production, oil and gas refining and diversified light manufacturing. It is a city that has experienced decline since the 19505. Business and industry have moved from the central city into the suburbs, leaving behind reduced population and declining tax base. Though community leaders have worked hard to attract business and industry back to Cleveland, the recession in the national economy has prevented a sustained revitalization from occurring. Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO) has made a substantial commitment to renewing the downtown area with the construction of a new high-rise office building that will house the corporation's new headquarters. In the past few years there has been an emphasis on changing the image of Cleveland. Housing stock within the city is old and there has been little new home construction. Instead, efforts have been placed on gentrification in an attempt to promote neighborhoods 85 and cultural backgrounds. One of the best examples of gentrifica- tion has been on the near West Side of Cleveland, in a community called Ohio City. This area, known for the West Side (Cleveland) Market--a large indoor/outdoor pavilion, stocked with ethnic food stuffs (fruits and vegetables and meats) attracts consumers and visitors from all over northeastern Ohio. The surrounding community is dotted with Victorian architecture (homes and businesses), with much of the housing having undergone extensive restoration. It is within this community that CMHA's anti-crime program was located. The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority was established in 1933, and given the responsibility for housing the needy of Cuyahoga County. Today CMHA has the management responsibility for thirty-six estates that contain 12,076 living units. The management of the Authority has historically been very centralized and bureau- cratic. CMHA is a unique authority in that it has its own police (security) force. It is a fifty-five person department, administered by a chief of police and deputy who are administratively responsible to the executive director of CMHA. Each officer on the force has received certified security training and holds a private police commission issued by the Cleveland Police Department. The demonstration area that CMHA selected for the UNIACP were two housing projects (Riverview and Lakeview estates), located in the "West 25th Street Corridor" of Ohio City. Each housing project has multiple buildings--a high-rise for elderly and handicapped and low-rise (two- and three-story walk-ups) for families. Years ago 86 when these projects were constructed, they were model communities. Today, due to deferred maintenance of yards, buildings, and streets, the area is in need of repair. It is not the model community it once was due to increased noise from an elevated expressway that is located next to the Lakeview Estates. Despite the fact that there is much revitalization underway in the Ohio City neighborhood, there is also much crime, especially street crime committed against the elderly residents who live in public housing. The deterioration of community standards and the physical decline of buildings that surround the two public housing developments has contributed to much of the crime problem. In fact, it was the elderly residents of Riverview who approached their con- gressional representative (Mary Rose Oaker) to do something about the crime problem in their neighborhood. Program Development There appear to be two primary reasons why CMHA decided to apply for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program and to select Lakeview and Riverview Estates as the demonstration area. First, the UIACP offered CMHA an opportunity to obtain funds. As with most PHA's, operating funds are not in abundance and any additional funds obtained would assist in reducing the strain and competition for a piece of the basic operating subsidy allocated by the federal govern- ment. The UNIACP money would, in effect, allow the PHA to take care of the security Pproblems" in the estates. Secondly, the two developments were located within the same community (one that was 87 getting a lot of attention) and they were essentially contiguous with similar problems. Initially, however, only Riverview was selected to benefit from the funds. It had the largest number of elderly and the high-rise was in need of extensive physical security redesign (the entrances and lobby area). When CMHA realized that it could increase the amount of the requested funds by including Lakeview maximizing the number of residents served (See Appendix H for eligi- bility requirements), the decision was made to include Lakeview. Both estates had a number of elderly residents and it was CMHA's intention to improve their quality of life. Though the two projects are only seven blocks apart, they are very different in design and character. Lakeview faces Lake Erie and is predominantly a low-rise development with 617 family units. The buildings are two- and three-story walk-ups that were built in 1933. The residents, according to CMHA records, are mostly white. Adjacent to the low-rise garden apartments is the new Lakeview elderly high-rise. It is twenty stories tall, with 214 units which house mostly white residents. The Riverview development is located on a hillside, overlook- ing the Cuyahoga River with a view of downtown Cleveland. Though the environment that surrounds the estate has declined, the location is still prime real estate for development (private housing apartments) given the view and access to the downtwon area. Riverview, like Lakeview, has both high-rise and low-rise units. It was built in 1963 and has a total of 831 units. The low-rise garden apartments 88 are two- and three-story walk-ups (152 units) occupied mostly by black families. The high-rise, on the other hand, is 15 stories tall with 573 living units, and it is occupied by both elderly and handicapped white and black residents. A unique feature of the high- rise develOpment is that within the building is a medical diagnostic unit for the elderly operated by the Lutheran Hospital which is located across the street. This high-rise, given this medical unit and a Golden Age Center, also located in the building, attract a number of elderly in the community for these services. The writing of CMHA's anti-crime proposal was accomplished by a team of CMHA staff: the Deputy Chief of CMHA Security, the Assistant Executive Director of CMHA, the CMHA staff attorney, and the CMHA Director of Social Services. The principal author, however, was the Deputy Chief of Security who had much influence in the theme and direction of the proposal. The group interpreted the HUD proposal request as a security program, not a social service program. There- fore, their initial interest was to concentrate on improving the security for elderly residents in the two estates. In conversation with HUD staff, however, the CMHA team discovered that the UNIACP was to be a much broader initiative than merely improving the physi- cal security of an estate. HUD was encouraging social services, and mandating that residents participate in every aspect of the program, to include the development of the proposal. Concerned that they may not be awarded the funds, CMHA included the three resident leaders on the planning team--presidents of the tenant councils. Though 89 these residents did not participate in the writing of the proposal they did “sign-off" on the concepts outlined. 1. Public Housing Modernization $671,000 2. Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program 150,000 3. Community Development Block Grants 114,000 4. Local Match 186,500 TOTAL $1,121,500 The modernization funds were directed to the following: pur- chase of security screens, improvement of exterior lighting, redesign- ing the flow of pedestrian walkways, installation of smoke detectors, emergency power generators, and communications equipment. The Department of Labor funds were to be used for hiring and training youth as security "cadets"; and, the Community DevelOpment Block Grant funds were to purchase security training for residents and to pay for additional sworn security officers for the CMHA police department. What is clear from the above budget is the program's focus was modernization--improving the physical security of the develop- ments. Social services were only important because that is what HUD wanted to stress. CMHA did not apply for funds from the Law Enforce- ment Assistance Administration's Victim/Witness Assistance Program, as this service was being provided by a local agency. CMHA did apply for funds from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven- tion (OJJDP) and the Department of Health, Education & Welfare, 90 Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA), but was turned down as the proposals were too "vague." CMHA submitted their proposal in June, 1979, and were notified in September, 1979, that they were a finalist. Before funds were awarded though, they were required to make some revisions and modifi- cations to their proposal. HUD asked, as it did from all partici- pating authorities, that the anti-crime coordinator report directly to the PHA Executive Director“ that CMHA complete a vulnerability analysis, and, that they delete from their modernization program the smoke alarms, elevator fire system, emergency generators, and any other items that dealt with safety as opposed to crime prevention, and they eliminate the DOL funding for the resident security commission staff. HUD also requested that CMHA create stronger linkages with community agencies, especially the Cleveland Police Department, public and private sector agencies that could leverage more for the program, and increse tenant participation in the program as it was designed to improve their quality of life. Once CMHA knew it was a program finalist, it appointed its anti-crime coordinator in October, 1979. Due to unexpected cir- cumstances, the person whOiwas appointed was the Deputy Chief of Security (reasons why will be discussed in detail later). CMHA believed that the appointment of a coordinator would give the program administrative legitimacy and allow for enough planning time to pre- pare for the implementation of the program elements. In summary, CMHA's program was principally a security (target hardening) modernization program. It was not an innovative program, 91 but an attempt at trying the traditional crime prevention technologies. Social services had only limited roles in this program and much of that was already being provided by existing agencies working in the demonstration area. Though HUD desired tenant participation in these programs, it was not an emphasis in CMHA's program other than for the DOL program. The remainder of this case analysis is a discussion of the implementation of each of the four major program components. This presentation is not the full case study,83 but a detailed overview that has illuminated major developments, to give the reader an informed discussion of program development and implementation issues. Each program category is discussed by presenting what the PHA proposed to do, followed by a description of what actually happened. Program implementation Improved PHA management of crime prevention.--Proposed initia- tives designed to augment CMHA's capacity to ensure public safety at the demonstration sites included: appointment of an anti-crime coordinator, improved tenant screening and eviction procedures, hiring additional security staff; training security staff; training project managers and maintenance staff to be more aware of crime prevention needs, and conducting a gerontology workshop. 83For a complete case study, see Kathleen Natalino, “Cleve- land: Urgan Initiatives Anti-Crime Program," in A Process Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Prggram, ed.: Steven M. Edwards (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, November 1982) (Draft Report). 92 The anti-crime coordinator and the assistant were hired, as proposed. The anti-crime coordinator position was filled by the Dupty Chief of CMHA security. Though he was the principal designer of the proposal, he did not intend to have the position. When he wrote the position he had another person in mind, whom he believed was better suited for interacting with the tenants and handling the "human relations" of the program. However, at the behest of the Executive Director of CMHA, the Deputy Chief was appointed to the position of Public (anti-crime) Coordinator. This was not a poor choce, given the experience he brought to the position, his intimate understanding of the program, and his operating knowledge of the CMHA bureaucracy. However, his orienta- tion as a professional law enforcement officer clearly set the tone for the program. As far as he was concerned, crime prevention and security matters were the responsibility of professionals and involv- ing tenants in such matters was not efficient administration. The assistant public safety coordinator position was filled by two people over the period of the program. The first individual was a retired Cleveland police officer. He had the responsibility for coordinating and maintaining relationships with the Resident Anti- Crime Commission (RACC), as well as the day-to-day operations of the program. The residents did not seem to accept his assistance and conflict developed to the point that they could not agree on anything. The assistant resigned this position in April 1981. The second coordinator was a police officer with the CMHA department. She was not only interested in the work, but found it a 93 challenge to work with the residents. She was able to establish, better relations with the residents and set up training sessions that helped them organize meetings and develop a newsletter. The residents were so appreciative of this help that they tried to get CMHA to allow her to continue similar work when she returned to her police duties. CMHA did attempt to improve their screening and eviction procedures, but found there were legal difficulties. CMHA had been using the services of a local social service agency that was acting as a clearing house for housing applicants. This agency would attempt to gain information about the past housing history of the applicant regarding disruptive behavior. The CMHA legal department believed that if they were to continue with this practive for only the demonstration area, they would be discriminating against those people attempting to live in either Riverview or Lakeview. The eviction procedures were equally problematic. Tenants did want the disruptive residents removed. However, despite the fact tenants signed leases that outlined behavior that was grounds for eviction, the courts would only accept documentation that the person failed to pay the rent. To remove the disruptive tenant, some- one had to make out a complaint and testify in a court. Most tenants, however, were unwilling to do this out of fear of reprisal. CMHA began to computerize its documentation on the disruptive tenant by issuing a "Notice to Violator" ticket. This gave CMHA security officers the ability to cite people for lease violations. Once a person received a notice they had 24 hours to report to the manager 94 to discuss the problem and to make correction. If the tenant chose not to see the manager, this information was processed and placed in the computer for future reference. CMHA did hire and train the additional security personnel they proposed for the demonstration area. In fact, the training was given to the new security cadets, as well. Managers and maintenance personnel were to receive human relations and security training; however, difficulties developed with the subcontractor (they wanted $5,000 more than had been agreed to) and this training was cancelled. Also cancelled was the gerontology workshop as the CETA funds were cut by the federal government. More and improved community anti-crime service facilities and physical redesign.--This area was the centerpiece of the CMHA anti-crime program. CMHA proposed the following activities for the demonstration area: installation of security screens, exterior light- ing and dead bolts; redesigning of walkways from the low-rise units; controlling foot traffic to and from the target sites; designing a security control center in the Riverview estate; installation of a closed circuit TV surveillance camera in Lakeview high-rise; redesign the mailbox area for both estates; obtaining a computer terminal; and acquiring communications equipment for the CMHA security force. The modernization/improvement work for CMHA's anti-crime program proved to be very slow and bureaucratic. The above list of items was split into a number of separate bid pacakges, and those activities that could be easily accomplished were put out to bid first. 95 The closed circuit TV system for the Lakeview high rise and the exterior lighting for Riverview were two of the first modernization activities to be completed. The remainder of the proposed activity was delayed. The Anti-Crime program had no control over the develop- ment of the "bid packages" and the writing of the specifications for the work. It was established policy that the CMHA Modernization department handle modernization/improvement work as they had the expertise. The anti-crime coordinator did his best to encourage a faster work pace, but there was a bureaucracy that dictated how work should'be done, and little could be done to circumvent this process. It was frustrating to residents to see “nothing" happen in a program that had initially promised so much, so quickly. There were other delays encountered in addition to the bureau- cracy of the modernization department. A change of the manager of Riverview temporarily'haltedthe redesign of the High Rise lobby. The new manager would not approve of the lobby redesign plans as the new lobby was reducing the size of the manager's office space. The design architect drafted alternative plans three times, and each time they were defeated by the manager. CMHA finally transferred the manager; the replacement approved the plans and work proceeded. This was an important step because the lobby redesign included the plans for the electronic entry/exit control system. There were so many doors that led to the outside, there was no controlling these exists, and with the electronic system residents felt that they would be much safer. This new manager was so interested in seeing the work pace 96 increased, that he informally allowed tenants to install security screens, if they could demonstrate that they were capable of the task. CMHA's anti-crime modernization program was very complicated and technologically sophisticated. It required that some of the activities be completed in sequence and as most of the estimates for the modernization component were drafted in 1979, by 1981 the costs were a victim of economic inflation. The shifting of budgeted line items required approval from the tenant council and HUD central in Washington; and this took time. An exampleis the installation of mail boxes hithe Riverview Low-Rise estates. CMHA had allocated sufficient funds to replace the mail boxes; however, when it came time to do the work, they could not just replace the boxes as new regulations required mail boxes to be bigger. The present boxes were set in glazed tile in the entry way of each building and the work required to enlarge the mail box area would have been very expensive. CMHA then decided to construct free-standing mail posts outside of each complex of apartment buildings. Though this was less expensive than removing the glazed tile, it was more than just replacing the mail boxes as the cost of contructing the pre-form standing units had not been anticipated. The resident councils involved faced a decision of where to put the priority for the limited funds they had for the program. Would it be the security screens, the mail boxes, or the exterior lighting that would take the cut? These choices were difficult for the residents, as they wanted everything that they believed had been “promised“ to them with this program. It turned out 97 that the pre-form mail boxes were installed as were the security screens because some items were less expensive and the saving was shifted around. The installation of the deadbolt locks on all the doors of apartments, as originally pr0posed, was later determined to present a much greater problem than a help. In the elderly high rise units, deadbolts were not installed out of concern for emergency situations. If it were necessary to enter an apartment under those conditions, it would require extensive damage to the door and frame. In the low rise units, the deadbolts were installed, but only on the rear door of the apartment. In summary, most of the improvements outlined in the proposal were completed, despite the fact work was slow and the process bureau- cratic. It was not anticipated that there would be so much involved in gaining approval for the selection of work tasks. More tenant anti-crime participation.--CMHA proposed to HUD that it would establish an Estate Security Commission that would be composed of a volunteer advisory council and a paid staff of resi- dents. This Commission was to be involved in developing educational, training, and community service programs (viz., the Friendly Visitor Program) for residents. HUD, in reviewing this aspect of CMHA's prOposal, felt that this commission, as outlined, might be too restrictive for insuring tenant participation. In fact, HUD found this to be one of the weak- est aspects of the proposed program. The thrust of the UNIACP was to 98 give tenants meaningful participation in the broad aspects of the anti-crime program. CMHA revised their proposal, stating that the Security Commission would "involve tenants at all levels of program- ming; they would have sweeping authority for the selection and deploy- ment of staff, definition of work responsibilities, and the evaluation of performance of staff." The Commission was given a budget of $4,500, as the tenant imprest fund to administer and run their opera- tion. Staff included one full-time person (paid) and two half-time (paid) positions. In practice, this resident commission had little meaningful participation in either the design or the operation of the anti-crime program. The commission, known as the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC), was dominated by a few residents who had been interested and active in other projects sponsored by CMHA. RACC held meetings, but they were directed primarily by the anti-crime coordinator. He would transmit information about the progress of the program and submit activities (many after the fact) for approval. RACC had little or no say in the selection of the DOL supervisor or the cancelling of the human relations training with a local community college. The anti-crime coordinator did mention that he found working with such a group inefficient since it took them so long to decide anything. However because HUD wanted tenant participation, he would deal with the group, but only when he had to and under the conditions he felt best. He would structure what they could decide, as he believed he was (for CMHA) administratively responsible for the anti-crime program. 99 RACC did administer the Family Visitor Program, made attempts to organize block clubs, slide shows, and publish a newsletter. But, it was not a significant policy decision group in the anti-crime program. Increased full- and part-time employment of tenants.--One of the principal objectives of the UIACP was to offer residents a panorama of employment opportunities. The Department of Labor/Yough Community Conservation and Improvement Program (YCCIP) was to create for CMHA, eight security guard positions, two emergency maintenance technicians and two program aides. In addition, CMHA proposed the hiring of adult residents to staff the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC). RACC was planned for five people, but due to budget limitations, staff was reduced to one full-time director and two part-time assistants. The director's position for RACC was to be elected. People applied and an election was held among the residents as to who would be representing them. The person who was elected was a former tenant leader. Her staff of two were selected by the RACC leadership. The most significant employment program MCHA undertook was the DOL/Youth security guard program. These 16 to 19 year olds were to provide interior builidng security for the elderly residing in the high-rise buildings of Riverview and Lakeview. CMHA had experience with this type of program in the past, when CETA money was available. This experience gave the anti-crime coordinator familiarity with the training needs of cadets, as well as the diffi- culties they would encounter. 100 The DOL program was intentionally designed by CMHA not to be a "make-work" program,but an experience that would qualify the partici- pants for similar work in the private security industry. It was the anti-crime coordinator's desire to have the youth experience the same "problems" as a full-time employee. Applicants for the DOL pro- gram were required to complete CMHA employment applications, and those youth interested in the security positions were required to complete the CMHA police application. The youth were told that if they were accepted, they would be expected to attend GED classes if they had not completed high school. The cadets were issued uniforms and sent to a 120 hour peace officer training program at a local university. At the completion of their training, they were given certificates and commissioned by the City of Cleveland as Private Security Police Officers. These youth worked without firearms and were placed inside the high-rise buildings. The youth were expected to perform their assignments and function as a full-time security officer. CMHA evaluated and disci- plined these youth as though they were regular staff. For many youth it was difficult work because the structure was so tight. A few were terminated for various reasons: insubordination, sleeping on duty, stealing, etc. The discipline structure was such that many youth did not want this type of work. The youth hired for the maintenenace positions were given on- the-job-training with the full-time employees of the maintenance department. Usually they were assigned to a crew of an individual staff person for instruction. 101 The youth program seemed to work well for CMHA. There was controversy about the program, especially from the elderly residents. Many of the elderly did not want these youth in their building even though they were performing a security function. Other elderly believed this program to be the most positive experience CMHA had initiated in a long time and sincerely hoped that CMHA would continue the program. More and improved services to combat crime or assist victims/ witnesses.--This area of CMHA's proposal was not very strong. In fact, when HUD reviewed it, they termed it "inadequate," and asked CMHA to develop services for the elderly and youth. CMHA responded to the request by outlining the participation of a local drug abuse program (QUEST), a youth recreation program that was currently working in the demonstration area, and by establishing linkages with the Cuyahoga Youth Services Coordinating Council which sponsored a Victim/Witness Incident Team and a Family Violence Program. In addition, CMHA told HUD they would seek ADAMHA and OJJDP program funds. HUD accepted CMHA's response and required no further commit- ments from them. CMHA did apply for the ADAMHA and OJJDP funds as proposed, but the reviewers found their proposal vague and declined to award the funds. In fact, this program area did not materialize as outlined by CMHA. The QUEST program was to provide two youth counselors to CMHA, but there was no interest in seeing that the counselors receive the training for the duties they were to perform 102 and the program faded quietly. No one asked for it, and no on missed it. The recreation program proposed was an existing activity that had been in operation in the demonstration area for some time. It was staffed by parents who volunteered their time to see that the children had some supervised recreation program. The Youth Council that was proposed was another activity that was in existence prior to the anti-crime program. The anti-crime program was to provide funds for leadership training at a local community college, but the training was cancelled when the college attempted to charge more than had been agreed to at the time the proposal was submitted. The Victim/Witness Incident Team was not implemented. Diffi- culties developed between the staff of the anti-crime program and the staff of the Family Violence Program as to who was going to pro- vide 25-hour coverage for the call-back program. These differences were not resolved and the program did not take place. In summary, this was one of the weakest areas of the CMHA program. The proposal drafters were not particularly interested in developing these social services, but at HUD's insistence, they made an effort. Increased use of better trained city police officers.--A key element in HUD's design of the UNIACP was for the PHA's to establish better relationships with their local police department. HUD believed that any effort a community could muster for a crime 103 prevention program would require support from the local police. CMHA is unique though, in that it has its own 55 person security department. Officers have full police powers while on duty. HUD wanted the PHA's to "leverage" more support from the local police, regardless of the present circumstances. The Cleveland Police Department was providing, as part of its patrol deployment plan, two person response units to public housing devel0pments (city wide) at the time the proposal was drafted. HUD wanted more of a commitment and repeatedly urged CMHA to "lever- age" more support as the present police services did not constitute an increase nor were they leveraging additional police services. MCHA, aware that it would not receive any additional Cleveland police, proposed crisis intervention and sensitivity training for Cleveland officers to make them more aware of resident needs and frustrations, as well as monthly meetings with CPD officers, PHA staff, and resi- dents to discuss problems and suggest improvements for better relationships. In practice, only the sensitivity training was pro- vided. There were no monthly meetings held nor was crisis interven- tion training provided. The Cleveland Police Department did not look upon the CMHA department as "real" police and simply did not want to be bothered with their program. CMHA, not in a political position to "leverage" support, had to settle for their response. Stronger linkages with programs from local government and other sources.--CMHA proposed for this program area that numerous local linkages would be developed, that QUEST, the country's Victim/ 104 Witness Program, and a local community college would provide "in-kind" match support to the CMHA program. In addition the City of Cleveland pledged $50,000 of its CDBG money to renovate the Lakeview Community Center and to develop an urban park behind the Riverview high rise. When it was time to deliver on these proposed items, many of the agencies had terminated their relationship with the anti-crime program. As previously discussed, the QUEST program was not imple- mented; the Victim/Witness program and the training to be provided by a local community college were cancelled. The city's CDBG funds were not used for the renovation of the Lakeview Community Center, instead part of the funds were used to pave the city streets that ran through the development. In summary, there were little additional institutional link- ages developed with either local government or the private sector as a result of this program. Many of the linkages that were developed were personal, and when people changed positions with an organiza- tion, the relationship if it was important, had to be renegotiated. Conclusion As in most complicated programs, there are few clear con- clusive statements that can be made. Most often the conclusions are mixed, and this is certainly the case with the CMHA anti-crime program. In the demonstration estates the tenant organizations were well established and well-attended. Though the tenants were not included in the initial planning for the program, they were able to influence some of its aspects, e.g., the mail boxes. Certainly the 105 program increased resident awareness of the needs and responsibilities for security. What was frustrating for the tenants (and staff) and not realizedcn~understood at the beginning of the program was the delay the modernization program would encounter. It was not a simple matter to redesign a lobby or to install an electronic security system. These public monies required that specifications be drafted and competitive bids be solicited to insure that there were no irregularities. Finally, there is little question that the thrust of this program was the improvement of security hardware. Though HUD may have desired more citizen participation in certain aspects, there does not seem to be resident concern that the program missed their most pressing need. From the inception of the program, residents, especially the elderly, wanted help with their crime problem, and for many that was interpreted to mean creating secure living environments.84 Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authorit --(Toledo, Ohio) Local Context The Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (LMHA) is located in Lucas County, Ohio. Lucas County is situated in the agriculturally rich, flat plains of northwestern Ohio, and surround the country's largest city--Toledo. Toledo, an industrial, ethnic and solidly demo- cratic city, is surrounded by one of the staunchest Republican areas 84See Appendix I for a chronology of major program events and a summary of the seven proposed and implemented program areas. 106 in the nation. It is a factory town, settled within the midwest industrial triangle of Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; and Cleveland, Oho. Though Toledo is too diversified to be labeled a one- industry town, it is most noted for its manfuacturing contribution to the automobile industry--automobile glass and as the "home" of the Willy's Jeep. The Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority is a veteran hous- ing authority, established in 1933. Seven of the Authority's develop- ments were built before 1945. Today, LMHA has forty-two housing projects that comprise more than 4,000 housing units for more than 10,000 low and moderate income persons and their families. The Authority has a staff of 150 employees who direct and maintain opera- tions for this enterprise. As is the case with many of the nation's public housing authorities, operating funds provided by the Federal government in accordance with the Department of Housing and Urban Development's performance funding system, have not been to the level where many public housing authorities are able to correct maintenance and environmental problems in a timely fashion. According to one public housing expert: Public housing [nationally] is clearly in trouble. In the past five years, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, in an effort to upgrade public projects, has awarded almost half of the available funds under a Targeted Projects Program and almost 70 percent of the funds under a Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program to projects rated "badly distressed". . . Staff members of HUD's field offices rated 18 percent of large [operating more than 3,000 units] Authorities as "troubled." Eighty-six percent of the 107 Authorities manage more than 3,000 units. Five PHA's in the largest cities are effectively bankrupt.85 Such was the situation faced by the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority. There are deteriorated buildings and over-used and under- maintained electrical,water, and heating systems as a result of deferred routine and nonroutine maintenance. LMHA believed that these problems exacerbated the problem of vandalism, which contributed to an increase in the number of unit vacancies and a general decline in the number of liveable units, the environment of the projects, and a decline in the quality of life. Though LMHA did not feel that the vandalism problem was "out- of-control" (1979 housing authority records placed the cost of vandal- ism at $60,000), it did believe that it was pervasive enough that to correct it would require "a tremendous amount of effort and time in terms of face-to-face contact with residents, paperwork either for internal or external reports, evictions, or counseling."86 As a housing authority already experiencing fiscal retrenchment, it was financially able to allocate the necessary resources to correct these problems based on HUD's performance funding structure.87 The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was perceived by LMHA as providing the 85Raymond J. Struyk, A New System for Public Housing (Washing- ton, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980), p. xiii. 86Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority, Anti-Crime Preposal, June 21, 1979. 87For a detailed discussion of public housing financing, see Raymond J. Struyk, "Chapter 4, Fiscal Conditions," in A New System for Public Housing (WAshington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980). 108 means whereby the Authority could develop programs to resolve some of their management and security maintenance problems. Program Development Under the eligibility requirements established by HUD (see Appendix H) LMHA had a housing development large enough (Brand Whit- lock Homes) to meet the HUD specifications. However, LMHA did not I'feel comfortable" submitting a proposal for just this development because of its physical closeness to three other developments-- McClinton Nunn Homes, Albertus Brown Homes, and Port Lawrence Homes. LMHA, therefore, designed its proposal as though these developments were contiguous and identified the demonstration area as Brand Whit— lock et al. The selection of these target sites was made with a view to maximizing the number of residents who would benefit from program activities. LMHA specifically sought to strengthen its application by choosing both family developments and an area which houses a con- siderable number of elderly residents. The table below shows the breakdown of the developments involved, the number of units in each development, and the number of family and elderly residents residing in each. TABLE 4.1.--LMAH Developments Brand Whitlock: 372 Units 206 family 166 elderly McClinton Nunn 151 Units 78 family 73 elderly Port Lawrence 196 Units 178 family 17 elderly Albertus Brown 96 Units 77 family 17 elderly 109 Second, Brand Whitlock et al. and McClinton Nunn are situated near downtwon Toledo in an area whose history of high crime and victimi- zation rates had already, in 1979, made it a target of urban develop- ment efforts. Washington Village, a community development project adjacent to the Brand Whitlock complex is a test site for an urban revitalization initiative which makes housing lots available at costs below market value. While LMHA was drafting its urban initiates, anti- crime proposal, Owens-Illinois, the large glass manufacturing con- cern, broke ground in the downtown area for construction of an $118 million office facility. Given these efforts to rehabilitate the local housing stock and upgrade the downtown commercial base, LMHA determined that an anti-crime program would be most appropriately implemented in the area of South Toledo, informally referred to by housing authority officials as the Brand Whitlock area. For purposes of the anti-crime program, the housing units of Brand Whitlock, Port-Lawrence, and Albertus Brown were collectively referred to as Brand Whitlock et al. First occupied in 1943, the brick housing units of Brand Whitlock et al., are primarily of row types, two- and three-story design. At the time LMHA drafted its proposal, the turnover rate for apartments was 26 percent and the vacancy rate approximately 8 percent. McClinton Nunn is a new and smaller development. Also of row type townhouse construction, it was first opened for occupancy in 1965. The turnover rate was quoted at 13 percent and the vacancy rate was estimated at 2 percent of the project's 151 dwelling units. 110 The surrounding area of the demonstration sites is primarily residential. Most properties are modest bungalows built during the 1920's. The value of these homes range from $12,000 to $25,000 with the median residential property value at $15,000 (n.b.--quotations computed in 1979 dollars). Some rental properties are scattered throughout the community. Two-bedroom units are available for monthly rentals ranging from $80 to $140. The local population is principally Black (90%). The remaining 10 percent is White, pri- marily of Polish descent. The residents are blue-collar workers, many of whom are employed at industrial plants on the southern and western fringes of this residential area. In the development of its anti-crime proposal, LMHA was fortunate in that they not only had prior experience with community anti-crime programs, but had benefit of a recent HUD General Mainte- nance and Management review of the entire authority that identified project specific needs. This review proved to be of great value to the authors of the proposal in identifying the modernization work that would be suggested. Therefore, when the anti-crime program pro- posal was posted by HUD, LMHA knew that it wanted to undertake an aggressive and comprehensive program that would focus on the problems of vandalism by emphasizing the employment of as many tenants as possible in the program for improving the physical environment of the demonstration area. The Deputy Director of the Housing Authority initially pro- posed that the LMHA make application for the UIACP funds. Once the 111 Authority's Board of Directors approved his proposal to solicit funds and ratified his selection of the target sites, he began to draft the application in May-June 1979, with assistance from the Authority's Director of Community Services and her assistant. LMHA had the usual difficulty agencies have in designing program to proposals--shortness of time; however, since the Deputy Director had extensive experience with proposal preparation, he had little difficulty obtaining agree- ments/support for the proposal from city social service agencies, city departments (police) and the private sector. As required by the HUD guidelines, tenant recommendations were solicited during the stage of program design. No recognized tenant organization capable of providing substantive input existed in the demonstration sites of that time. Proposal authors did suc- cessfully solicit tenant advice from the authority-wide Central Residents Council, a body of representatives from each of LMHA's 42 housing projects, and thus Brand Whitlock area and McClinton Nunn residents concerns were at least technically represented. The anti-crime program proposal submitted to HUD on June 21, 1979, focused on two objectives: repairing vandalism and deteriorated property and promoting employment opportunities for residents. Modernization funds in the amount of $300,000 were requested for the installation of new doors and door frames in Brand Whitlock, security screens in McClinton Nunn, and both peepholes and plywood window guards in Albertus Brown. No funds were requested for modernization improve- ments at Port Lawrence because monies had already been procured for 112 new windows and doors under the terms of a comprehensive exterior modernization and rehabilitation grant not part of the UIACP. The centerpiece of the anti-crime program, as conceived by HUD and understood by LMHA, was the provision of gainful employment opportunities for residents. The second largest block of funds requested by LMHA was to finance a new payroll for tenant maintenance and security workers. The housing authority applied for $132,500 from the Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation Improvement Pro- gram component, in order to hire 30 youth and 4 adult supervisors. In addition, $67,000 was requested from Community Development Block Grant monies so that the Housing Authority might hire 10 adult residents to work as block captains in the neighborhood watch program. As distinguished from some other evaluation sites, LMHA did not determine who would fill the position of anti-crime coordinator prior to filing their application; the goal of recruiting a crime prevention coordinator from outside the ranks of housing authority personnel was explicitly incorporated into the text of the proposal. The application specified that the authority viewed the anti-crime program as an excellent opportunity to "revitalize" and "enrich" the administrative staff. Notification of semi-finalist status and an accompanying invitation for revisions to the proposal were received from HUD in August 1979. HUD proposal reviewers requested clarification from LMHA of certain budget items and a demonstration of local government's and community agencies' prospective involvement in the program through 113 procurement of appropriate letters of support. HUD wanted the PHA to secure local leverage to support the program after the federal funds had been extinguished. HUD also indicated that LMHA's reliance on the aforementioned Maintenance and Management Review as a means of identifying security related modernization needs did not meet HUD's requirement that a separate vulnerability analysis be conducted prior to filing the UIACP application. The authority complied by under- taking its own internal vulnerability analysis. All submission requirements for semi-finalists were met by the deadline of August 31, 1979. Announcement that LMHA had been selected as a program finalist was received on December 26, 1979, along with concommitant instruc- tions for further refinements of the proposed program design. This round of revisions focused on program area 2.3 (More and Improved Services to Combat Crime and Assist Victims/Witnesses) and, again, on program area 3.2 (Stronger Linkages with Program from Local Govern- ment and Other Sources). LMHA's two-fold response assured incorpora- tion of the following additional services. The authority agreed to hire a part-time social worker to provide counseling services to the elderly tenants. As proof that the housing authority had the capacity to ensure the participation of local service agencies in the anti- crime program, a list of committed agencies was forwarded to the HUD staff. Persuant to learning of the housing authority's status as a program finalist, and prior to receipt of a guarantee that funds would 114 be awarded to LMHA, the Deputy Director elected to hire an anti-Crime Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator. The housing authority thus assumed a financial risk in order to assure that key staff members could effectively organize the anti-crime program well ahead of its official beginning. These two administrators also undertook the responsibility of drafting subsidiary proposals for funding from federal agencies designated to provide grants for complementary social service initiatives to be integrated with the "target-hardening" and tenant employment components. They devoted three months to drafting these ancillary applications for funds. In summary, the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority's multi- faceted urban initiatives anti-crime program design was ratified by HUD during the Spring of 1980. The total operating budget of $841,000 consisted of $751,000 of authorized federal funds and $90,000 of local match pledges. Program components that LMHA applied to and was awarded are itemized below in terms of funding categories. The remainder of this case analysis is a discussion of the implementation of each of the seven program areas in the proposal submitted by LMHA. This pre- 88 but a detailed overview that sentation is not the full case study, has illuminated major developments, to give the reader an informed discussion of program development and implementation issues. Each program category is discussed by presenting what the housing authority 8For the complete case study, see Steven M. Edwards, "Toledo: Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program," in A Process Evaluation Of the Urban Initiaties Anti-Crime Program, ed.: Steven M. Edwards (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, November 1982) (Draft Report). 115 1. Public Housing Modernization $300,000 2. Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program 132,000 3. Community DevelOpment Block Grants 67,000 4. Department of Health, Education & Welfare/Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration 48,000 5. Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention 83,000 6. Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis- tration Victim/Witness Assistance Program 20,000 7. Urban Parks and Recreation Recovery Program ' 100,000 8. Local Match 90,000 TOTAL $841,000 proposed to do, followed by a description of what actually happened. Program Implementation Improved PHA management of crime prevention.--Proposed ini- tiatives designed to augment LMHA's capacity to ensure public safety at the demonstration sites included: appointment of an anti-crime coordinator and assistant; improvement of tenant selection and evic- tion procedures; expansion of a telephone hotline service for reporting suspicious events; establishment of a tenant imprest fund; and devel- opment of a computerized project and living unit specific file of criminal transgression committed by residents. 116 The anti-crime coordinator and the assistant coordinator (he was to function as a job expeditor) was hired, as proposed. Both individuals brought community organizing skills to their jobs. The anti-crime coordinator had been working as a crime prevention coordinator in a neighborhood anti-crime program in two LMHA develop- ments in East Toledo. This was not an LMHA program, but an activity subcontracted to the Salvation Army by a community group. In that program the anti-crime coordinator was responsible for implementing community crime prevention measures through a teen drop-in center. In addition, he had the responsibility for staff supervision and records maintenance as well as the establishment of a neighborhood block watch and a senior citizen escort service. From LMHA's perspective, he was the ideal person for their position, not only for his experience but also he was the kind of person who Could contribute to the enrichment of the authority's staff--he was also a recent law school graduate. Shortly after the anti-crime coordinator was hired, the assistant coordinator's position was filled. This person also brought an extensive experience base to the position and to the hous- ing authority. He had been employed in 0E0 poverty programs in the late 1960's and had most recently been working with the Toledo Economic Council, assisting nfinority individuals develop and expand new com- mercial businesses in the community. Since he would have primary responsibility for the youth employment component (Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program), his prior employment would prove most helpful. 117 The initial proposal that LMHA submitted to HUD addressed the issue of improving the procedures for tenant screening as a means for improving the authority's management of crime prevention activity. Since public housing is often termed the "housing—of-last-resort," the courts have required PHA's to demonstrate cause why persons should not be afforded public assisted housing. Improving the capacity to screen prospective tenants was seen as a way of reducing the problems administrators and tenants face. OMHA proposed the use of a screening committee comprised of tenants, staff of the LMHA occupancy department, and representatives of the housing developments manager's office. It was envisioned that the screening committee would develop and use a computerized applicant profile to improve screening procedures. While this was a good proposal idea, it did not materialize for a number of reasons, principally because the demonstration area housing manager was reluctant to give up any power to the anti-crime program. LMHA's organizational philosophy was that the project manager is the person who has responsibility for all activity in his or her development and this included the screening and eviction of tenants. Though efforts were made to include the manager in anti-crime program activities, she had been left out of the planning of the program and therefore did not feel she had to support what would be a short-term effort. The computerized tenant profile was never developed. LMHA also proposed to improve tenant eviction procedures by making use of the pre-occupancy program the authority had recently instituted. This orientation program introduced new residents to their 118 responsibility for the property and the control of family members when they assume public housing residency. The tenant eviction pro- cedures were to go into effect when a tenant's "anti-social" behavior (viz. criminal activity) came to the attention of PHA staff or resi- dent council members. Such residents would first be given a referral and asked to attend orientation classes; and, if they refused, they would be threatened with eviction, an option allowed by the signed lease. If there was repeat criminal activity, such documentation would be enough to start an eviction proceeding if the PHA staff so desired. This program, however, never really got organized to the point that it was able to evict tenants. When the authority began to lay-off employees in July 1980 due to fiscal cuts, the program ceased to operate. Eviction stayed a rare event, to be practiced only by the manager of the development. There were a number of activities proposed to improve tenant and management relations. One was the training of youth hired under the DOL program to perform security patrol duties. With vandalism a key problem that the authority wanted to correct, it was believed that this program would involve the youth to improve their community. Though the youth were to be trained and carry two-way radios, parents objected on the basis that the work would put them at-risk and make them snitches. There was so much opposition to this program that it was not produced. Instead, the thirty youth who were hired for the security positions were assigned to the maintenance aide portion of the program. 119 There were other programs outlined that were to improve tenant participation and give residents "control" of the program. A tenant imprest fund was to be established to give residents administrative responsibility for the Block Captain Program and the telephone "hot line" service. The community social service agency that the residents were to work with in establishing the "hot line" went out of business as funds became difficult to acquire. And, as a result, the "hot line“ concept never materialized. The Block Captain program, however, was established with 10 residents working part time essentially as staff for the project manager, doing various tasks: handing out notices, monitoring and reporting crime activity, supervising clean-up activi- ties (yard work) in their area of responsibility, community organiz- ing. Despite the theoretical strength of the concept, it was not the success that the authority had anticipated. There were difficul- ties in getting residents to apply for the program as many apparently thought that the program was a "spy-on-your-neighbor" activity and there were residents who did not want to be involved. Also, as the program was an extension of the manager's office and the manager had little commitment to the concept of the anti-crime program, the manager did little to manage the block captains and they became discouraged. There was also a problem with role changes. Previously, the manager was seen by the tenants as an enforcer of Authority policy and now was in the position of working with and supervising the same residents as staff. 120 In summary, other than the selection of the two people who would be administering the program, which was probably the most important point, there was little that was accomplished in improving the PHA's ability to manage a crime prevention program. The Block Captain concept was initiated, but not taken very seriously as a tool to prevent crime or to improve the quality of life for residents. The other aspects simply did not get started for one reason or another. More and improved community anti-crime services, facilities, and physical redesign.--The following "target-hardening" measures were proposed in the LMHA application: the elimination of door vision panels and the installation of security doors with frames, raised door panels, peepholes, and self-locking hasps on ground floor windows. It was further proposed that LMHA would purchase six hand-held radios and allocate office space to both the Anti-Crime Coordinator and representatives of participating local service agencies. The proposed modernization and redesign work that LMHA out- lined was accomplished within the period of the anti-crime program with the exception of the development of self-locking hasps. In fact, the proposed design for the installation of raised door panels was improved and installed with no additional costs. The completion of modernization work turned out to be one of the easier tasks for the anti-crime program to complete. In part, the reason for this was that PHA's are accustomed to performing modernization work and this just became another task to be completed. The installation of the 121 self-locking hasps was not completed because a design could not be worked out that would satisfy the need. Office space was provided for the anti-crime program, but none of the local service agencies accepted the invitation to estab- lish an office on site. There was an effort made to open an on-site police substation, but the police department did not even respond to the invitation. It seems that this idea was just good grantsmanship on the part of the Deputy Director to get the proposal accepted by HUD. LMHA did purchase the six hand-held ratios, though they would not be used for the youth patrol. Instead, the radios were used by staff of the anti-crime program. In summary, the actual modernization work proved to be one of the easier tasks to accomplish. It was very much a straight process activity that had been designed in the early stages of the program. With the assistance of the vulnerability analysis and the maintenance review conducted by HUD, it was easy for the authority to know what it wanted to do. More tenant anti-crime participation.--The centerpiece of the HUD anti-crime program was the promotion of resident involvement in public housing crime prevention measures. LMHA proposed to delegate the responsibility for resident involvement to the Brand Whitlock Tenant Council by having them administer the Block Captain Program, Toledo Police Department Information Sessions, and the youth partrol. 122 However, after LMHA was awarded the funds, the housing author- ity decided that it was not the best idea to give that much responsi- bility to an organization that was so loosely structured. In the Brand Whitlock area, tenant organizations experienced much turnover in leadership and for an organization to have fiscal responsibility with changing leadership could be problematic. Therefore, they were not accorded control of the tenant imprest fund. That remained the responsibility of the housing authority's anti-crime coordinator as did much of the effort to involve tenants in the anti-crime program. The block captain program was undertaken, but as previously mentioned was not the success that everyone had anticipated. The youth patrol concept was resisted by parents and later restructured for the youth to work as maintenance aides. The city police did make visits in the crime prevention van, but these were nothing more than the traditional efforts police make to citizen groups that request crime prevention presentations--locks and citizen awareness. In summary, there was little resident control in this anti- crime program. Citizen participation was limited to the authority hiring residents for various positions, and while there were a number of residents hired, it was not the type of program participation that mobilized the community to prevent crime. Increased full- and part-time employment of residents.--One of the principal objectives LMHA had for the UIACP was to offer residents a panorama of employment opportunities. The Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program (YCCIP) was to create 123 for LMHA, 12 positions for youth security patrollers and 18 positions for youth maintenance aides. Although this was the only organized employment program, LMHA also proposed to hire block captains, two part- time radio dispatchers for the telephone Mhotline" program, and 20 full-time positions in 10 small businesses developed by and for residents. It was the intent for the YCCIP program to give project youth (ages 16 to 19) skills that would be marketable for someone with a high school education or less. The PHA's were to develop employment positions that would be at the entry level in order that a youth might qualify for a position in the "outside" job market. LMHA originally proposed that some youth be hired as security patrollers (this is what HUD was encouraging PHA's to develop). While some saw this program as co-opting youth, it was worth the effort to attempt to create a positive experience. The criteria for hiring youth was as follows: (1) there needed to be a demonstrated financial need to be employed. Since most people living in public housing quality (recipients of AFDC), need was not an issue; (2) The youth must have been a resident of the demonstration area for at least 90 days prior to the program; and (3) the resident must desire the employment. There were few problems for persons to meet these requirements. In fact, nondemonstration area parents tried to get LMHA to admit their children to the pro- gram there was such a desire for employment. One of the aims HUD encouraged PHA's to attempt in the design of their youth employment program was to mix "good" (nondelinquent) 124 and "badV (delinquent) youth in hopes that the Vgood" kids would act as positive influences. LMHA took this suggestion and tried to improve on it by recruiting females as well as youth presently in school and those who had dropped out. As previously mentioned, the youth security patrol concept was eliminated after parents voiced concern over the safety of their children. Parents felt that having children patrol the projects would be dangerous since some people might see them as "snitches" and attempt to injure them. Faced with this problem, the housing authority, employed the youth as part-time maintenance aides, cleaning and beautifying the grounds of the developments (e.g., street and parking lot cleaning, trash removal, apartment and office cleaning, lawn care, and window cleaning). Much of what these youth learned during their employment were basic world of work skills--getting to work on time, communi- catings skills, how to listen. In addition, the Authority offered and encouraged those who had not finished high school to enroll in the GED program offered by the authority. LMHA believed that the DOL/YCCIP program achieved its objec- tive--it employed a number of project youth. However, whether it had a positive impact on shaping the youth's attitudes toward gain- ful employment, remains to be seen. Much of the work tasks for the youth were of the "make-work" variety. This was the first time the the housing authority had attempted a program of this nature and did alot of learning as the program was operated. When the Authority 125 began to experience fiscal cutbacks and was forced to lay off union maintenance staff, grievances were registered that the youth were performing union assigned work. At times it was difficult for the youth to get interested in their jobs as the Authority was careful not to have them perform union tasks. The other employment programs proposed by LMHA had similar implementation difficulties. The block captain program, which has been previously discussed, suffered from acceptance by the project manager and as a result did not become the type of program that was originally anticipated. The telephone "hot line" was not implemented due to funds being cut for the program that was to operate it. And, the small business program only was able to start one resident business in the funding period allocated for the anti-crime program. The difficulties encountered for the tenant orientated small business effort were more than anyone had anticipated. Though LMHA staff were well qualified to support such an effort, they found it difficult finding an interested tenant willing to make the effort. In the funding period of the project (18 months), only one tenant was willing to attempt to venture and that happened almost by acci- dent. In July, 1980, the housing authority expanded its office space and was in need of janitorial services as their contractor was going to charge them more money. The anti-crime coordinator convinced the authority to hire a woman who wanted to start her own cleaning service under this component. Both the anti-crime coordinator 126 and the assistant coordinator worked to get this woman started in business. They enrolled her in a small business class at local commu- nity college, had her trained by a local supplier of industrial cleaning products, and both gave her emotional support for the ven- ture. Though it was difficult for her at first, she has remained in business a year and a half. More and improved services to combat crime or assist Victim/Witnesses.--Three programs which fall under this social service umbrella were proposed and funded. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) financed component was to provide informa- tion and referral services regarding substance abuse and mental health concerns. The proposed Office of Juvenile Justice and Delin- quency Prevention (OJJDP) program was to furnish organized and super- vised recreational activities for both after school hours and summer months/school vacations for children living in the demonstration area. A victim/witness assistance program was proposed as well. In addition to these funded components, two initiatives were designed to address the needs of elderly tenants. LMHA proposed to hire a part-time social worker to provide counseling services for senior citizens, as well as to estabish an elderly-youth exchange. The ADAMHA proposal submitted by LMHA was written in Febru- ary, 1980, by both anti-crime coordinator and his assistant. Despite the fact that there was very little documented evidence that drugs, alcohol, develop additional social services they believed important to the objectives of the anti-crime program. Victim/Witness programs were seen as important in assisting residents with the emotional problems of crime and in understanding the criminal justice process. Alcohol and drug abuse programs were believed necessary in reducing crime, as they were seen as contributing factors to the crime problem, for youth, as well as adults. Both alcohol and drugs were seen as debilitating to establishing a sense of commu- nity. All residents were seen as potential targets for these pro- grams, but they were especially geared for the elderly, youth, and women. The elderly were singled out because of their vulnerability to crime, the heightened fear that crime invokes and the altered living style that the concern for crime produces. Women, especially 152 young women who were single, heads of households were perceived in need of social services to help them cope with the problems Of public housing living. Finally, project youth (in the crime-prone years) were selected for social service programs because of their tendency to become involved in illegal activity. HUD presented a number of models to assist PHA's develop what was appropriate for their particular needs. Community based self- help programs were stressed; traditional professional social services were encouraged and advocacy programs (legal assistance, educational progfams) were considered as appropriate programs for PHA's to under- take. HUD encouraged PHA's to model community programs after some other successful program like the House of Umoja (Philadelphia), the Delancy Street Foundation (San Francisco), Operation Push (Chicago), and the Huckleberry House (San Francisco). In the larger study, a variety of social service programs were developed, but none of the evaluation sites modeled their programs after those emphasized by HUD. Instead, most took the traditional approach of subcontracting social services to strengthen local ties or they attempted to deliver the services as part of an organizational change strategy. Of the two research sites in this study, only LMHA offered social services to the residents. CMHA did apply for social service funds (ADAMHA and Victim/Witness), but their proposals were not funded. While this might be seen as a disappointment for the author- ity's anti-crime program, there is no indication that there were any 153 demands from residents for the anti-crime program to provide these services. However, CMHA did attempt to have existing community agencies provide social services as part of the local match contribu- tion, but for one reason or another, these programs did not sustain their corrmitments after the anti-crime money was awarded. There were existing social services provided to the demonstration area prior to the UIACP, but these services did nothing to enhance the scope of the program. The situation, however, was different for LMHA. As has been discussed, LMHA applied for all the program funds available in the anti-crime program and was fortunate in having their social service proposals (ADAMHA, Victim/Witness, and OJJDP) accepted for funding. Both the ADAMHA and the Victim/Witness programs were structured as referral services, and despite attempts made by these program staffs to do outreach work, neither program was very successful in securing clients. The ADAMHA program only recorded referring 25 cases and the victim/witness program reported handling 9 cases. In spite of what had previously been believed about the importance Of this type of social services for residents, there was simply little demand, or low perception of the programs by residents. The OJJDP program, which was geared toward providing youth recreation servcies, was by far the most popular social service offered by LMHA. Its programs were well attended due to the varied program schedule Offered, and the serious commitment the program director gave to helping youth with their problems. 154 There seem to be a variety of important factors in the LMHA ADAMHA and Victim/Witness programs as to why they did not serve more residents. It has already been mentioned that there was low demand. But contributing to low demand was the staff problem of establishing credibility with residents in a limited period of time. Even with residents working as staff, in the case of the ADAMHA program, the funding period was not long enough to establish a repu- tation that the program was viable. Related to this issue of program credibility was the problem some residents had with other residents' functioning as professional social service staff in the personal affairs of residents. Some residents believed that their problems would be the topic of other's conversations, and therefore, did not want to participate in the anti-crime program's social services. These programs were not funded long enough to establish a "culture of work." Most residents and certainly staff knew that the "life" of the anti-crime program was determined by the available funds. Staff were recruited, hired, trained, and told to function like the staff of a professional social service Office. Since the social service staff in the LMHA program were residents, directed by a young and inexperienced person, they responded to the role as they thought best. Supervision was not strong and the staff was left to improvise their own supervision and work habits. When all realized that these programs would terminate, staff morale declined, and work production ceased. While this description of LMHA's social services may seem a failure, it is better to think Of these problems as lessons learned for future efforts. 155 Tenant Anti-Crime Participation HUD was explicit about the importance of resident participa- tion in the anti-crime program. To encourage applicant PHA's to conceptualize their anti-crime activities as HUD wanted them to, HUD did two things. First, it strongly recommended that PHA's study the anti-crime activities implemented by communities that had received Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Community Anti-Crime Program funds. These programs, according to HUD staff, represented an approximation of the community anti-crime model HUD wanted to see achieved. Secondly, HUD specified that applicant PHA's should be mindful of certain themes for this anti-crime program. --Increased tenant cohesion and organization around crime-prevention issues. --Expanded use Of tenant foot patrol for surveillance. --Improved tenant/police relations through the use of neighborhood conflict resolution forums. --Increased use of tenant anti-crime media campaigns, crime prevention vans, eduational workshops, crime reporting campaigns, and operation identification. HUD advocated the design of creative anti-crime programs by encouraging tenant participation through the concept of "turf reclama- tion." That is, "turf reclamation" represented, "pulling together significant segments of the community--residents, PHA management, security patrols, local police, and others to form an association of 156 people strong enough to take "control" over their environment and establish community standards."92 Most all Of the evaluation sites believed that the best vehicle for creating strong tenant participation in the anti-crime program was through the demonstration area resident organization. By working with this group, residents would not only have involvement, but the PHA would meet the HUD mandate that residents have input into the develOpment and operation of the program. Resident anti-crime participation tended to follow three models in anti-crime programs. First, and due mostly to encouragement from HUD, residents were to be actively (proactively) involved in providing security for the demonstration area. That is, tenants (adults and youth) would patrol the project area in defense of crime and acts of vandalism. It was believed that this approach would develOp strong, positive attitudes and feelings among tenants toward the community. The second form, less formal, but defensive in character, was resident surveillance activity. The practice of surveillance was conceived by the program designers to be a broad activity that would involve residents in block, floor, or lobby watches, acting as the "eyes and ears" for the community. The third and final broad participatory anti- crime form was passive community activities, e.g., elderly escort services, apartment check services, elderly neighbor watch programs, and so forth. 92Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, First Annual Report, March 31, 1980, Guidebook Section, p. 24. 157 Both CMHA and LMHA initially proposed the development of all three models Of tenant anti-crime participation. However, as previously has been mentioned, LMHA received parental opposition to the idea of youth performing security patrol and was forced to abandon its plan. Though proactive security functions remained important, LMHA tended to focus more on resident surveillance activity performed in the block watch program than anything else. CMHA, on the other hand, was so predisposed with the importance of security that developing resident participation, especially among the elderly, was very easy. The youth security patrol was generally received very well by the residents; sur- veillance activity in the block and floor watches was already in existence and the youth cadets did perform some passive anti-crime services, like elderly escort services and property identification (engraving). Despite HUD's emphasis that PHA's encourage and support tenant anti-crime participation, much of what seems to have been done in encouraging resident participation were "warmed-up" versions of past programs. Both the PHA and residents had been through similar program experiences and each knew how the other would respond, despite HUD's efforts to create cooperative partnerships. In both authorities, tenants were not politically active in the administration of the authority, nor were they strongly unified as a body. The interest Of the PHA's was to administer a program responsible and the interest of the tenants was to get out Of the program whatever it was offering that would improve their quality of life. 158 ”Leveraging" Just as the issues of security and tenant participation were central concepts in the design of the UIACP, so was the issue of "leveraging." The program designers believed that if the UIACP were to establish a lasting foothold in a community at the conclusion of the funds, PHA's would have to make efforts at institutionalizing the anti-crime program through the support of other local agencies. HUD believed that the best way to do this would be to require commit- ments from local agencies. In effect, PHA's, through the UIACP, were to leverage funds. HUD encouraged that a broad array of local public and private agencies be approached to support the anti-crime program. In fact, during the proposal review process, HUD continually stressed that PHA's secure more and "stronger" commitments from community and city agencies, especially the local police. HUD was not particularly con- cerned as to how the police department was involved, as they could contribute a variety of police tactics and services to the program: foot patrol, team policing, crisis intervention, human servcies, community relations, or even possibly establish a police substation in public housing. HUD did not allocate funds to purchase these services, but expected that the cities and PHA's would contribute the costs of these services as in-kind match as evidence of the commitment to this type of anti-crime program. Both CMHA and LMHA outlined local police involvement in their anti-crime program. For CMHA, however, the involvement of the Cleveland 159 Police Department was essentially to receive sensitivity training for a select group of Officers who patrolled the projects. The intent Of this training was to improve the behavior of officers who dealt with public housing residents and to improve their response to calls for service to the projects. For numerous reasons though, the Cleve- land Police Department did not make further commitments to the pro- gram. CMHA had its own full-time security force that had on-duty arrest powers and the City saw no reason why it should commit more police services to CMHA beyond what it was already receiving. LMHA also proposed that local police officers be given sensi- tivity training, but that it be done by the PHA staff. The training was essentially to focus on the problems residents encounter living in public housing, how they view the police, and the criminal justice process, and what could be done to improve relationships between the two groups. LMHA believed that one of the activities that police and the residents could perform together would be patrolling the housing developments. In addition, if the police department estab- lished a sub-station in the demonstration area, that would go a long way to improving a sense of commitment. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, most of these proposed activities did not come about for LMHA. While it initially appeared that stronger linkages would be developed and the leveraging of additional commitments for the program would occur, only the sensi- tivity training was performed, and that was to a select group of police officers. The Toledo Police Department did support the concept of the 160 anti-crime program, but they were not able to commit any personnel or to respond any differently to this community as a result Of the pro- gram. Despite the fact that HUD "encouraged" the PHA's to leverage the local police, the PHA's had no clout to insure their participation. Though they had letters of support, community social innovation does not come easy for police departments no matter what the intention. Neither HUD nor the local PHA understand how powerful and independent city police departments can become. Unless PHA's and/or residents are extremely influential with local politicians, leveraging police services when the police are not interested is difficult, especially when police support is necessary. Besides the police, HUD encouraged linkage development with other local government agencies, social service agencies, and private sector business. CMHA had listed a number of local agencies and departments that were contributing services, however, it was not the orientation Of the coordinator to cultivate these relationships. As a result, the services just lost interest in providing assistance to the anti-crime program and went away. Those agencies that continued to be involved with CMHA, in most cases, were providing service to residents Of CMHA property in other developments. The bottom line is that CMHA did not develop any stronger linkages or leverage any addi- tional support as a result of the anti-crime program. LMHA was a similar story, except that through an innovative arrangement with a local manufacturer, the housing authority was able 161 to secure 19 paid employment positions for qualified residents of the demonstration area. Though this arrangement did not happen as a result of the anti-crime program, it was attributed to the effort as the emphasis of LMHA's program was resident economic development. While these efforts are disappointing, it does not mean that residents were not served or the agencies that were involved were not going their jobs. It simply means that the anti-crime program failed to establish institutional linkages. There are explanations as to why this happened. First, most of the agencies that HUD was encouraging establishment of relationships with were in the public sector and there were simply no slack resources in those agency budgets to allow institutional relationships to develop. Both the PHA's in this study were located in cities that were heavily affected by the retrenchmant in the national economy. The social service agencies,city departments, and the private sector were forced to utilize the "slack" resources they had for pheip survival. Secondly, leveraging commitment from another agency was time consuming. The anti-crime program was operating within a limited time frame, and for staff to carry out program elements (develop a work culture among staff, convince residents the program was serious, and so forth) as well as to develop strong linkages that would support the program con- cept at the conclusion of funds was simply unrealistic. This, com- bined with the fact that most anti-crime staffs did not believe that the program would last, contributed to the staff's feeling pessimistic about the whole enterprise. CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Introduction The Department of Housing and Urgban Development Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (UIACP) was a multi-federal agency effort designed as a comprehensive community crime prevention pro- gram. Funds contributed by a number of federal agencies were made available to public housing authorities to implement programs devised to reduce crime and alleviate the fear of crime. The program's core assumption was that the action(s) of citizens (residents) of public housing is central to the maintenance of order, control of crime, and the improvement of the quality of life. The program required that partnerships be created among public housing management, residents, the private sector, and local government, especially the police. The intent was to develop community "self-help" crime prevention programs which would remain active even after the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program funding concluded. Though HUD understood that the control of crime was a local concern, it, nevertheless, believed that the initiative for develop- ing models and the funds for crime control measures was a federal responsibility. HUD outlined three premises upon which anti-crime measures were founded. First, any effort attempted at the local level 162 163 would need the endorsement and active participation of the local housing authority. Secondly, the participation of tenants, not only as beneficiaries of the program, but also as staff was essential to insure commitment to the effort. Finally, if program activities were to be perpetuated beyond the funding period, linkages to local govern- ment and other community agencies would have to be established. None of these premises was cited as inherently superior to any other, but all were accorded equal weight in HUD's comprehensive package of crime reduction strategies. The HUD anti-crime program was unique in that it co-targetet federal funds to the problem of crime and the fear of crime. Addi- tionally, the program design was an "empirical test? of both physical redesign strategies and public/private services combined in the structure of a community (collective) crime prevention program. Though crime prevention programs have been conducted in the past, and were popular, most of them had been concerned with individual responses to crime. Though some research has examined both physical and collective responses to crime, however; it has been so limited, and the number of strategies combined so few, that researchers have observed the need for more descriptive inquiry on the diversity and functioning of community responses to anti-crime programs. In this chapter the study is reviewed and summarized. The first section is a summary of the purpose and the method of the study. Included in this brief review is a discussion of the subsample of sites selected for this study, the data collection process, the 164 training of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority on-site observer and the information which was to be included in formal data collection. The second section of this chapter contains the conclu- sions and recommendations for this study. These conclusions and recommendations are based on the data gathered for the case studies and the discussion in the six-point cross-site analysis. Purpose and Method of the Study The purpose of this study was to present an examination of the implementation process of the U.S. Department of Housing, Urban Ini- tiatives Anti-Crime Program in public housing, in a subsample of public housing authorities drawn from a larger study. This disser- tation sought to determine (describe) what actually happened in the public housing projects selected, as a result of the authorization, funding, and general political and bureaucratic momentum generated by the anti-crime program. This description was important because if one is to understand the way program(s) are actually implemented, one has to get inside the "black box." Process evaluations are critical to understanding phop it is that does or does not work, and ghy_it 1 does or does not work. Without these two pieces of information, there can be no transfer of knowledge about programs and program implementation. Through careful observation of the programmatic activities of the funding sources, this process evaluation addressed three general questions: (a) what was the character of each program?; (b) how much program activity was generated?; and (c) what factor(s) seemed to 165 play important role(s) in determining the level(s), shape(s), and timing of the various program(s)? This study is based on a subset of data from a broader evalua- tion project conducted by the author while on the staff of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The larger evaluation project, conducted for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, was designed to evaluate sixteen of thirty-nine public housing authorities funded under HUD's, Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. This program sought to achieve a reduction in crime and the fear of crime for residents of public housing grounded on the assump- tion that the actions of residents were central to the program. In the larger evaluation, HUD selected the evaluation sites because (a) it wanted to insure success of the program; (b) there were special interests in the sites by HUD anti-crime staff; and (c) there were political interests in the program. The two public housing author- ities selected for this study were the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) (Cleveland, Ohio) and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (LMHA) (Toledo, Ohio). These two sites were selected for the completeness of data, range, and emphasis of programs offered, and the author's first-hand knowledge of site developments due to numerous visits made to each site. To collect process data and information, the design of the larger evaluation specified that a person be hired part-time (twenty hours per week) in each evaluation site as the on-site process 166 observer. In the two housing authorities selected for this study, only the CMHA site had an observer. Senior evaluation staff believed that it would be important to keep their "feet-on-the-ground," and the author Of this dissertation selected the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority as his site to evaluate. After an intensive three-day observer training session con- ducted by the evaluation staff, the observers were instructed to "ease-into" their sites and to get comfortable with the anti-crime staff, the surroundings, and the residents before formal data collec- tion activity was undertaken. The Observers were to immerse them- selves in program developments by attending anti-crime related meetings, talking with program staff, tenant leaders, and public housing Officials. Formal data collection activity consisted of two major types: (a) standardized forms and (b) descriptive narratives. The standardized data collection consisted of case reports of the social service programs (viz. ADAMAH and Victim/Witness). The narra- tive data collection/information came from the Observer's written logs of meetings, observations, and telephone conversations, as well as the development of critical event timeliness and chronicled the authorization, implementation, and Operation of the PHA's anti-crime program. The written logs focused on program content and were based on the encounters the observer had during tenant council meetings, anti-crime oversite team meetings, and interviews with key informants involved with the PHA's anti-crime program. The following discussion examines the conclusions and generali- zations for this study. It is assumed that the reader is familiar 167 with both the presentation of the individual case studies for the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority as well as the presentation of the six-point cross- site analysis. Conclusions and Recommendations In Chapter I, it was noted that the study of program implemen- tation has been primarily concerned with documenting program failure. Though these investigations have been helpful in illuminating the importance of implementation issues, the documentation of program failure has become so common that to discover it once again is neither interesting nor important. Compliance with policy decisions is not necessarily a virtue, and is generally not to be expected. Social programs, especially large-scale federal projects, operate in complex environments and are subjected to powerful shaping forces. Though federal program designers would like to believe that their new pro- grams will create new and different responses, the fact is that most new programs simply revitalize Old efforts at the local level. There never seems to be enough time or fiscal resources available to sustain the new effort to overcome the past or the vested interests. Therefore, at the conclusion of a complex social program, it is not surprising that there are few conclusive statements that can be made. Most Often, the conclusions are mixed. That was certainly the situa- tion with the two programs examined in this dissertation. There are, however, general findings Ofthis process evaluation that can be important in two ways: (1) by expanding and developing the growing 168 body of implementation theory; and (2) by assisting those developing collective anti-crime programs in neighborhoods, communities, or cities. Policy-Making is an Ongoing Process and Overlaps with Implementation Activity In Chapter I it was discussed that the implementation process is a relatively straight forward matter, which consists of three general phases--planning, start-up, and routinization. In the planning phase, such activities as the formulation of policy, support, authorization, and dissemination of policy information takes place, while the start-up phase marks the beginning of new procedures and the authorization of new groups with the responsibility of the task(s) to be undertaken. What that discussioncfl’the implementation process was attempting to point out was that those two phases are usually repeated a number of times in order for a program to become Operational, particularly if there are multiple agencies involved in the innova- tion. While the implementation literature may present a tidy dis- cussion of program activity taking place in three major phases, (with those phases repeated a number of times in order for a program to become Operational, then not to be repeated again, after the program becomes functional) such was not the case in the implementation of the multi-agency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. In the UIACP, once the PHA's proposals were submitted, reviewed, revised, approved and funded, policy making continued by HUD staff, local government 169 officials, PHA administrators and "street level bureaucrats," con- tinuously, throughout the program. The influence of HUD officials was constant. In the initial stages Of the anti-crime program, HUD threatened to withhold funds so that they could "shape" the PHA's response. In both of the PHA's in this study, HUD "coached" them how they were to respond to certain aspects of the program. In addition, HUD encouraged (demanded) the active participation of residents in the program and the demonstra- tion that residents were involved in all phases of the design and initiation. Federal policy-making influence even extended well into the period of program activity. The UIACP began as a Carter Administra- tion initiative, with the promise to participants that the program would be extended an additional two years. PHA's and tenants operated under that assumption for some time, until the Reagan Administration decided not to continue funding. The HUD anti-crime office was dis- mantled, and the PHA anti-crime staff and tenants, who had been encouraged to rely upon them, quickly found themselves without support, and bewildered as to how they should operate their program. On the local level, policy making was also a continuous process. Once PHA's had received the funds, despite HUD's interest in maintaining control, local officials found that they had a number of means at their disposal to continue to shape or reshape their anti-crime program. For example, projects would be implemented along lines different than proposed, viz., use of the DOL funded youth or 170 the anti-crime staff differently than planned. This was certainly the case in LMHA, for both the DOL security aides and the social service staff were utilized for different purposes. Additionally, promised administrative patterns could be ignored as they were in both sites (requiring the anti-crime coordinator to be directly account- able to the PHA executive director); in-kind contributions could be modified (keeping police services constant rather than increasing them, or dropping social service agencies that lost interest in the program); or token efforts could be undertaken (police sensitivity training for a small, specially selected group, as was the case in the CMHA and LMHA programs). Moreover, "street-level" bureaucrats (e.g., residents and anti-crime program staff) also continued to translate policy decisions into particular forms--sometimes congruent with federal and PHA policy- making and sometimes not. Some had goals of their own (political activity, power, and authority); others improvised job placement. Though it has been pointed out that this study was not interested in documenting implementation failure, such documentation does help to explain why many of the outputs that had been antici- pated for the program were not achieved. For example, both CMHA and LMHA proposals for increased police service did not reppresent firm policy decisions, at least by people in positions to make such deci- sions. The sensitivity training did not come about as anticipated, in either site; LMHA did not establish a police substation or even get the "live-in“ program out of the proposed stage. However, more 171 importantly, is the meaning that there is good reason to believe that there were local implementation successes which were only tangen- tially related to federal interests. Therefore, viewing policy making and implementation as overlapping processes which shape program out- puts, recognizes that implementation efforts may be viewed as a disaster from one point Of view and a success from another. Problems are Not Uniform Aoross the Sites A core assumption of the UIACP was that crime and the fear of crime were serious problems for the residents of public housing. Data and information presented by both the federal government and local housing authorities substantiated that fact. However, there was no ability within the UIACP to distinguish between the differences of the crime problem(s) for applying PHA's. LMAH received $20,000 for its victim/witness program, a sum of money that was uniform to other PHA's that received victim/witness money. Likewise, the situa- tion was similar for‘the ADAMHA program. Again, never minding the differences (the enormity or the meagerness of the particular problem in the particular PHA) made the level of funding irrelevant. The scale of the housing developments selected for the anti- crime program affected the expected impact of the anti-crime effort. The applying PHA's were given complete freedom in selecting the hous- ing development(s) to be included in their proposal. All that PHA's were required to follow were the unit eligibility requirements which encouraged (rewarded) a PHA for including as many units as possible in 172 its program. It is no wonder then that CMHA selected the high rise units of Riverview and Lakeview as the sites for the program. Given the larger the number of units served by the program, not only would the PHA be eligible for more funds, but the chances were better that the program would be selected for funding. LMHA, not having any large high-rise buildings, consolidated three housing projects "on- paper" not only to increase the service population, and the chances for funding, but the dollar amount of the proposal. Therefore, given the interest in making the demonstration area large, it is not sur- prising that the UIACP was simply drowned in both sides, due to the time constraints of the program, the difficulty in develOping a work culture among program staff, the difficulty of establishing trust among residents and the number of residents to be served by the pro- gram. HUD's Selection Of PHA's for the UIACP was Based on Criteria other than the PHA's Capacity for Administering an Anti-Crime Program; e.g., Politics, Elegance of the Proposal, or Special Interests HUD's selection of sites for the anti-crime program was not necessarily made on the capacities of a PHA (that is, agency activi- ties and those of the target population) to administer the program. Instead, selection decisions were based on pluralistic criteria. For example, unless a PHA wrote a sloppy proposal, the PHA would be funded due to either recent publicity about serious crime problems, being located in a "special" congressional district, or if the PHA were 173 located in an important political city in an election year. Addi- tionally, well-written (elegant) proposals were hard for federal funders to resist since they seemed to recognize a match between authority skills and the capacity to administer a program. In the case of the two PHA's in this study, there is little information to indicate that either site had the capacity for this complex program prior to its inception. Both PHA's had limited experience with anti-crime programs that emphasized either a "hardware" or "software" approach. While it is not surprising that agencies get funded with little consideration for capacity, it is important to point it out because it demonstrates the structure of the rela- tionship that exists between local level and federal level adminis- trators. Those administering federal programs are required to "get- the-money" out and are simply prerated to go to great lengths to see that their program(s) are implemented. Therefore, in sites where funding was required because of political influence or where elegant proposals were written, the task of the federal administrators is to keep the sites in line with federal requirements. The responsibility is different, however, if it appears that the capacity exists in a site to administer a program. In those situations, federal officials seem to be more facilitating and assisting rather than concerned with enforcing regulations or program compliance. Pluralism Abounds All too often, when we think of special programs, it becomes easy to conceptualize the program as an independent activity which 174 carries much influence, while at the same time not being influenced by other interests. We tend to forget that agencies have departments, that organizations have bureaus, that neighborhoods have special interests, and that even residents Of public housing have factions with special interests. The impact of this pluralism was dramatic and consequential for both CMHA and LMHA. In both sites, what was striking about the PHA's, was how relatively uninfluential they were with local government, especially the police. Neither PHA had bargaining power to direct or to garner resources. The constituents for the PHA were the residents who had little political sway. In city government, e.g., the police, Operate in a complex demand structure, and how services are allocated, is dependent on how much "clout" is brought to bear by the community. TO think that the PHA would be able to influence the police department or city government with the "clout" of a small, limited duration pro- gram was unrealistic. Vested interests in other, longer term programs and projects overshadowed the UIACP at the local government level. Departments within the PHA also have vested interests. The anti-crime program was the ”new program" for the moment in both housing authorities in this study. It is not surprising then that the UIACP was viewed as an Opportunity for thelMUlto initiate organi- zation change and staff development. LMHA clearly had this in mind with the selection of anti-crime staff. CMHA, on the other hand, saw the progream funds as an opportunity to make some needed capital improvements in the name of resident security. 175 Social service agencies also were institutions with their own vested interests. Many of the agencies that pledged support and signed COOperative agreements to provide services were confronted with declining fiscal resources. The result was (especially in CMHA) that agencies which agreed to provide services, simply pursued their own interests with little sense of accountability to the PHA. Finally, tenants were simply not just tenants as they too had vested interests in the program. When the information got out that there were jobs available, residents demanded that they get them all or they would not cooperate with the program. Parents, when they found out that their children might be functioning like police officers, patrolling the housing project for "problems" (as was the case in LMHA), objected to the concept because they were convinced the work would put the children at risk. In CMHA tenant leaders saw the pro- gram as giving them a voice in their living affairs and an opportunity to try to strengthen their tenant leadership. The point of this discussion is that there was a plethora of cross-currents that affected the programs in each site. NO program comes into an agency anew and expected to reshape past or existing activity. Though the UIACP was interpreted by many to do that, there were just too many competing interests to allow it to happen. Each interest group attempted to claim some basis of legitimacy. The shape of the program in each site was to a large extent determined by the resolution or lack of resolution of these competing claims. 176 Economic Turn-Downs, Inflatioh,_and the DevelOpment of New Policies Regarding Federal Spendiog have Powerful Effects on the Imple- mentation of a Program In many respects, the UIACP was in difficulty even before the PHA's received their funds. In 1979, when the program was con- ceived, until 1980, when the funds were made available, economic inflation had cut into the planning efforts of the PHA's moderniza- tion programs. Moreover, the economic decline and the new federal policies reduced the size of federal resources available for the pro- gram. The result was that cities and other agencies were competing against each other for a larger portion of the declining resource pool. Community social service agencies viewed the UIACP funds as resources to maintain their viability and therefore were willing to sign coopera- tive agreements to provide services to the tenant population. When program participants discovered that the UIACP would not be refunded as had been anticipated, the interest in the program concept from all sides declined dramatically. What had been antici- pated as a four-year, possible a five-year effort, was now only twelve to eighteen months long. As the UIACP had been given much special treatment and created many problems for established PHA staff, there was little support for the HUD staff by the PHA's when it appeared that the HUD staff would be disbanded. The HUD staff had lost its ability to leverage (shape) PHA responses. Housing authori- ties were relatively free to run pheip programs as they saw fit. The effect was in the end that the PHA's shaped the anti-crime program to their goals and Objectives, not as HUD wanted to see the program. 177 Skills were Lacking Among the Antl-Crime Staff This issue has been discussed generally in each of the cross- site analyses. The lack of appropriate skills, however, was such an important factor in the implementation and success (or lack of success) of a program that it deserves to be discussed once again. Both CMHA and LMHA had little experience in the management of social service (software) programs. In fact, CMHA really did not attempt to operate social services--their proposals for victim/witness and ADAMHA funds were rejected. LMAH, on the other hand, did attempt to deliver social services, but the staff was so disorganized and distracted by the short funding life of their programs that the results were rather disappointing. Both housing authorities were simply more comfortable focusing on housing maintenance and developing housing policy. Staff selected for the anti-crime program, though capable, were often uninitiated in the area of public housing policy and simply did not know how to respond. The political/institutional areas they were required to work in were simply out of the domain and interest ofmany people working in the anti-crime programs. For example, as staff were required to leverage commitments, the inex- perience of staff seems to account for some Of the low levels of activity in this area (other factors, included the economic down turn and the lack of power and influence within local government). Whether leveraging would have led to project continuation in either site is hard to determine. 178 Even the tenant organizations in each site were stymied by the lack of organizational skills. Though the CMHA tenant council staff was to receive organizational training, it was cancelled by the anti-crime coordinator as a result of a dispute with the subcon- tractor. For some reason, the policy-makers just assumed that the skills existed and would emerge during the program.“ The fact was, however, that for most resident leaders, responsibility for the imprest fund, management of a few paid staff, and a voice in matters that would effect their lives, was a first-time occurrence and the residents did not know how to respond to this new position. Tenant meetings became forums for personal harangues and general chaos, that gave little substantive input to program development. Local Police Play an Important Role in Community Anti-Crime Efforts The commitment of local police to an anti-crime effort is viewed by tenants as an indication that the authorities are taking the problem of crime seriously. In CMHA, despite the fact that the authority had its own security force, residents wanted Cleveland Police as well. The story was the same in LMHA. Residents, if they could leverage more support, wanted more police presence, and they would accept the local police in any strategy--foot patrol, aggres- sive patrol, off-duty work, team policing, etc. Adult residents liked the police around. Police visibility is simply important to a community anti-crime program. 179 Residents Given a Choice Between Improving_the Physical Security ' of their Apartments or Improving the Defensibility of the Housing Development, will Accept the "Quick-Fix" (e.g., Locks, Solid Core Doors, Security Screens, etc.) If the concepts of the defensible space strategy are meaning- ful to creating self-defense capacities within public housing developments, and meaningful tenant input into decision making is to be maintained, considerable effort will have to be made to trans- late defensible space concepts into language that is persuasive to tenants. If it is not translated, tenants will opt for the "quick- fix." The CMHA modernization program is a good example of this generalization. Due to the lengthy bureaucratic delays encountered in the modernization program, the anti-crime coordinator had to regularly convince residents that the physical security improvements for the housing developments were going to take place. The residents, especially the elderly living in the Riverview high rise, had been led to believe that the anti-crime program would quickly improve the physical security of their environment. The "fanfair" in announcing the program contributed to this belief. When the promises did not come about as the politicians had said they would, residents believed that they had been misled, and were willing to compromise the long- term securing improvement for those of the "quick'fix" variety. Resi- dents simply did not understand or did not want to believe the 180 bureaucracy associated with modernization. To preserve the residents from draining resources for the short term, the anti-crime coordinator was continually translating developments. Resident Employment was the Strong- est and the Weakest Part of the Anti-Crime Program for both CMHA and LMHA On the other hand, resident employment programs in both sites were very strong. The positions were filled with little difficulty; training, especially for the youth in the CMHA program was very sophisticated; turnover was moderate given the time frame Of the pro- gram; supervision was adequate; and there was not evidence of corrup- tion in the employment programs. There were a variety of reasons why employment was such a strong element. First, there was a broad consensus within the housing authorities about the value of employ- ment for residents (both youth and adults). Second, both PHA's had experience Operating such programs and were aware of the types of demands and problems made by residents. Therefore, when resistance was encountered by LMHA about the youth's being employed as security patrollers, an alternative employment plan was at hand. 0n the other hand, however, the employment element was also the weakest program because one of its primary goals was to secure permanent employment for participants in the private sector; the results were rather disppointing. For the most part, neither PHA was able to secure permanent employment for a large number of its participants. At least two factors account for this development. First, in both CMHA and LMHA the anti-crime programs were initiated 181 in cities during the worst economic down-turn since the Great Depres- sion, and both cities had substantial unemployment. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that tenants of public housing, Often lacking in marketable skills, should have a difficult time finding permanent work under such circumstances. Secondly, both CMHA and LMHA were unsuccess- ful in their attempt to leverage resources and services from institu- tions in the public and private sectors. No doubt the economic down- turn affected the ability to leverage resources and the ability of institutions to respond. However, the PHA's general inability to leverage resources seems to reflect both a lack of the required poli- tical power and skill that existed within the PHA. Program Synchronization of Programmatic Elements was a Constant Problem Throughout the Anti-Crime Program for HUD Staff as well as PHA Anti- Crime Staff From the moment the federal funds were authorized, HUD staff‘ was under great pressure to get the program funds out as quickly as possible to the participating PHA's. The relatively short-time spans between HUD's request for proposals, PHA's submissions, applicant revisions based on thelflulstaff comments,and final approval, rushed the entire planning phase of the UIACP. This rush to fund programs had serious consequences for both CMHA and LMHA, especially since the program design stressed the integration of crime prevention strate- gies into an effective, tightly coordinated whole. The haste with which these sites were required to operate in order to secure the program funds did not allow them the time to anticipate the delays 182 and/or problems they would encounter--especially CMHA anti-crime staff with its modernization program. Residents were led to believe, due to the political visibility given the program, that it would be funded immediately and that activity would be swift. When program activities did not happen as quickly as residents thought things should, they became concerned. The fact was that the rush, with which the program was implemented, negated the development of strong alliances and understandings with residents, as well as public and private institutions. Additionally, both PHA's were required to involve residents in every phase of program development and implementation, which increased the number of people involved in decision-making processes. Present knowledge about program implementation suggests that expecting a program to be implemented with a number of clearance and decision points93 in such a short time period, was simply unrealistic. The rush to distribute the program funds at the federal level, and the haste with which CMHA and LMHA were required to develop a program proposal to qualify for the funds blinded both the federal and local policy makers to that reality. This set the stage for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in both the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority. 93Pressman and Wildavsky define clearance and decision points as follows: "Each time an act of agreement has to be registered for the program to continue, we call a decision point. Each instance in which a separate participant is required to give his consent, we call a clearance." See Jeffery L. Pressman and Aaron 8. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973), p. xvi. APPENDICES 183 APPENDIX A A DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING 184 APPENDIX A A DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING Often the term public housing means many things to different people. For this dissertation, there is a need to present an "under- standing" of its meaning. A most comprehensive description of the term is Offered by a knowledgable expert of public housing policy, Mr. Raymond J. Struyk: . . . public housing refers to "conventional" or "low rent" public housing, that is housing constructed and operated by local Public Housing Authorities [PHA's] under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as ammended. [The 1937 Act] is the oldest national housing program to assist renter households until very recently when the Lower Income Housing Assistance Program [Section 8] replaced it. [The concept of public housing began] with triple objectives of generating employment, eliminating slums, and providing good housing for needy households; its present mission is almost exclusively to assist [economically] poor households to live in adequate housing. . . . Public housing should not be confused with other rental assistance programs under which private developers who own the dwellings receive various subsidies to provide good housing to moderate--and low--in come households. Public housing is owned and Operated by local governments Authori- ties, typically distinct from municipal government with the cost of construction and some operating expenses borne by the federal government.1 1 ing, A National Resource (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980), pp. 3-4. 185 Raymond J. Struyk, A New System for Public Housing: Salvag- APPENDIX B THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM FUNDING SOURCES 186 APPENDIX B THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM FUNDING SOURCES Department of Housing and Urban Development Low Income Public Housing Modernization Program Community DevelOpment Block Grant Program Community Development Block Grant Technical Assistance Department of Labor Community Conservation and Improvements Program Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Technical Assistance Office of Criminal Justice Improvements Victim/Witness Program Office of Community Anti-Crime Program Technical Assistance Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Technical Assistance ‘ Department of Interior Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service Urban Parks Program Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service Urban Parks Program Technical Assistance Local Match Non-Hardware Anti-Crime Efforts TOTAL 187 $20,000,000 2,072,000 178,000 7,410,000 1,074,500 15,500 340,000 60,000 477,000 22,715 913,089 10,000 8,013,558 $40,586,647 APPENDIX C NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSIONS AND SPECIAL TASK FORCES 188 APPENDIX C NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSIONS AND SPECIAL TASK FORCES National Commissions - President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice 1965 to 1967 1967 to 1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 1968 to 1969 1970 to 1971 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1973 -- National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Special Task Forces and National Professional Groups *American Bar Association (Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards for Judicial Administration and Model Judicial Code) 189 APPENDIX D RESEARCH ASSISTANT LETTER 190 HARVARD UNIVERSITY JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL or GOVERNMENT PROGRAM 1N CRIMINAL wsnca roucr AND MANAGEMENT m H. )6an Far-by Cid-II- HMMSdnool GEORGE l. KELUNG. Eur-flu Dinner 50: I'd-ad Hall Cambridge, Maurine“: 02:38 (6'7) 495-5I88 RESEARCH ASSISTANT Seeking an individual to work part-time (20 hour work week, with some flexibility, may require some weekend work) with a Harvard University based national research project in the area of crime prevention. This project is co-funded by the Police Foundation, Washington, D. C. Length of employment is anticipated to be fourteen (14) months. Individual must be highly motivated; able to work in a highly unstructured environment with minimum supervision. In addition to working flexible hours, individual will be responsible for conducting interviews with a broad range of people, collecting recorded information, writing reports/summaries, monitoring program developments, and other duties as assigned. R uirements: Bachelor's or Master's degree, excellent writing and communication skills, sensitivity, attention to detail, sense of confidentiality, tactfulness, and maturity. Previous research experience or familiarity with criminology or criminal justice helpful, especially with observational methods. Steven M. Edwards Project Coordinator 191 APPENDIX E OBSERVING READING LIST 192 APPENDIX E OBSERVER READING LIST Chatterton, M. R. "From Participant to Observer--Dilemmas of the Research Process in a Study of Urban Police Work." Sociogische Grids, The Netherlands, 1978. Cloward, Richard, and Piven, Francis Fox. "The Professional Bureau- cracies: Benefit Systems as Influence Systems." Ihg_ Politics of Turmoil, Poverty, Race, and the Urban Crisis. Cloward, Richard, and Piven, Francis Fox. "Low-Income PeOple and the Political Process." The Politics of Turmoil, Poverty, Race, and the Urban Crisis. Dexter, Lewis A. "Chapter Two: Suggestions for Getting, Conducting, and Recording the Interview." Elite and Specialized Inter- viewing. Chicago: Northwestern University, 1970. Florez, Carl P., and Kelling, George L. "Issues in the Use of Observers in Large Scale Program Evaluation: The Hired Hand and the Lone Wolf." (Unpublished draft), December 4, 1979. Kelling, George L. "Politics as Social Science Methodology." In Advances in Applied Social Pyschology, Vol. 1. Edited by RObert F. Kidd and Michael J. saEs. Lawrence Erlbaum Associated, Publishers, 1980. Kelling, Groege L. "Development of Staff for Evaluations (A Retrospective View)." Emergency Medical Services Research Methodology. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. "Basic Conclusions on the National Tenant Management Demonstration." Tenant Management: Findings from a Three-Year Experiment in Public Housing. 193 194 Mayhew, Pat. "Defensible Space: The Current Status of a Crime Prevention Theory." The Howard Journal 18 (1979): 150- 159. Miller, S. M. "The Participant Observer and Over-Rapport." In Participant Observation: A Text and Reader. Edited by Geroge J. McAll andIJ. L. Simmons. Boston: Addison- Nesley Publishing Company, 1969. Punch, Muarice. "Backstage: Observing Police Work in Amsterdam." Urban Life 7 (3) (October 1978). Schatzman, Leonard, and Strass, Anselm L. "Strategy for Watching." In Field Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973. The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program: Questions and Answers. (AuthOr unknown.) Weiss, Carol H. “The Turbulent Setting of the Action Program." In Evaluation Research. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, 1972. Wilson, Sheena. "Vandalism and Defensible Space on London Housing Estates." Tackling Vandalism, Home Office Research Study, NO. 47. Yin, Robert K. "The Case Study Crises: Some Answers." Administration Science Quarterly (March 1981). Yin, Robert K. "What is Citizen Crime Prevention?" How Well Does it Work? Review of Criminal Justice Evaluation 1978. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1978. APPENDIX F PROCESS EVALUATION DATA FORMAT 195 mama oz. oumPOH OOOFOH ensue magmp ensue mppuwmm m_uummm mpuummm om=0pc< cum owcouc< cum owco»:< com ucmcxo acmcxo ucmcxo compo» «have xgo> 3oz mp_m>mw=OA mppw>mwzom mpuummm mppw>mw=om have ammcma have zmmcma owcoOz< cam :Omxumc :Omxuma comxumw acmcxo ucoeucm: oumPOF ucompcmz ugomucmz xpmo ammcmw cognac: mpuummm counsel couaEmz camxumq zuczou meme owcouc< cam zuczou mama Nuance mums vcoeucm: acmpm>mpu mppw>mwaom ccmpm>m_u ucm—m>m_o ommuwsu ommuwgu ommuwzu mupopcmzu menopause wuuopcmzu mpuo_cmcu muuopcmnu mcosmupmm mcoswupmm mcoewupmm mcoswupmm mcoewppmm 3mw>cmpcw mew; mewp mcwpmms . scam moo; vpmwd cm>cmmno m>wpoccmz cowbum_Fou ammo umNCutmucmam Hm mmmuomm 196 APPENDIX G OBSERVER DATA COLLECTION FORMS 197 Project Number "TY-'7?- OBSERVER'S LOG (Interview) Date: Day_ _ Month_ _ Year_ _ '1T"TT"3_"7"-8—"9' Time Interview Began: Hour __ Minute_ _ (express in military time-)- TO— -ll_ '17 "T3— Time Interview Ended: Hour__ _ Minute_ _ 'TZ"T?F'TTF'17F PHA Staff or Tenant Number _ __ _ _ __ __ 18 I9 2 PHA Number _ __ _ ‘21" 2 Evaluation Staff Member _ _ __ TEY'TST'TEE' Reason for Interview: TRF'TEE (Attach additional page if necessary.) Topics of Interview (1 Primary, 2, 3, etc.) ___ll: Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention (specify and rank): 7%? _12: Pore and Improved Comunity Anti-Crime Service Facilities and 79" Physical Redesign (specify and rank): 198 22: 23: 31: 199) ___21: More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation (specify and rank): Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants (specify and rank): More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ Witnesses (specify and rank): Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers (specify and rank): 46 I.) h) ZCNJ 32: Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other 34 Sources Which Co-target on the Project and the Surrounding Neigh- borhoods (specify and rank): ___90: Evaluation Issues (specify and rank): ___ ___88: Other (specify and rank): .___ 35 9. Content of Interview: ._______ 37 E 'ET'TRT 'ZT"T§' (Attach additional pages if necessary.) Connents (Impressions, Interpretation, Action taken, Diagnosis, etc.): 7ET"7V (Attach additional pages if necessary.) 1201 OBSERVER'S LOG (Meeting) Date: Day_ __ Month_ _ Year_ _ Time Meeting Began: Hour__? Minute_______ (express in military timET_ Time Meeting Ended: Hour _ _ Minute__ _ PHA Number_ _ Evaluation Staff Member _ __ Number of persons in attendance Primary PHA Staff __ _ Primary Tenant Representative ___ Describe Group Composition Project Number ___ ___ ‘1" 2 3 (Attach additional pages if necessary.) ZNJZ Project Number .___ ___ "1" 2 3 IO. Purpose of Meeting '_—'TET 3 (Attach additional pages if necessary.) ll. Topics of Meeting (1 Primary, 2, 3, etc.) ___Jl: Inproved PHA Management of Crime Prevention (specify and rank): ___]2: More and Improved Connmnity Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign (specify and rank): ___Zl: More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation (specify and rank): 7?? 203 Project Number lO. Purpose of Meeting (Attach additional’pages if necessary.) ll. TOpics of Meeting (1 Primary, 2, 3, etc.) ___ll: Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention (specify and rank): ___}2: More and Improved Connmnity Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign (specify and rank): ___Zl: More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation (specify and rank): 22: ___23: 31: 32: 40: 204 Project Number 17'? Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants (specify and ___ 36 rank): More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ ____ 37 Witnesses (specify and rank): Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers (specify ___ 38 and rank): Stronger Linkages with Problems from Local Government and Other 75$ Sources Which Co-target on the Project and the Surrounding Neigh- hood (specify and rank): Evaluation Issues (specify and rank): 205 Project Number T7“?— ‘___88: Other (specify and rank): ____ 41 l2. Content of Meeting ’47—'3- 1T7:— T177— l3. Comments (Impressions, Interpretation, Action Taken, Diagnosis, etc.) “Fa—T W—ST' 206 TELEPHONE LOG Date: Day_ _ Month_ _ Year__ __ Time: Hour_ _ Minute_ _ (express in military time) PHA Number __ __ PHA Staff or Tenant Number __ Evaluation Staff Member _ _ Origin of Call ___l: PHA or Tenant _2: Evaluation Staff Topics of Interview (l Primary, 2, 3, etc.) _ll: Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention (specify and rark): Project Number __8: Other _l2: More and Improved Comunity Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign (specify and rank): _Zl: More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation (specify and rank): 22: 23: 3l: 32: 207 Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants (specify and rank): More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ Witnesses (specify and rank): Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers (specify and rank): Stronger Linkages with Problems from Local Government and Other Sources Which Co-target on the Project and the Surrounding Neigh- borhoods (specify and rank): h 9. 208 _ _40: Evaluation 155ues (specify and rank): _“_88: Other (specify and rank): Content of Discussion (Describe in Narrative) (Attach additionaT pages if necessahy.) Comments (Impressions, Interpretation, Action Taken, Diagnosis, etc.) (Attach additional pages if necessary.) 2C '2? TRT'TT‘ 7?? TE? 209 City Number: _ -T" 2 Site Number: _ _ _ 3 4 5 Case Number: “17"?" "B— ADAMHA ACTIVITY Referral Source: Referral Source Case No. (if known): Type of Referral: 1: Alcohol abuse "' ’TT 2: Drug abuse 3: Mental health 4: Other (specify): ___9: Unknown No. of Times Seen: ___.____ 12 .15 f ' : _ Aceo Client __ M TS Sex: ___l: Male 75 ___2: Female __9: Unknown Race: ___ I? _l: White : Black Hispanic Asian/Native American : Other (specify): : Unknown l0. ll. 12. I3. 14. 210 Marital Status: 01: Single - Never Married 02: Separated O3: Divorced 04: Married ___05: Widow/Widower 06: Common-law 07: Other (specify): ___99: Unknown Years of Education: __ _ Presently Employed? ___]: Yes ___2: No ___9: Unknown Date of Referral: Day _ __ Month __ __ Year _ _ Reason for Referral: 23 24 25 26 27 28 (attach additional sheets—if'necessary) What is client seeking? (attath‘idditional sheets if necessary)’ Case Disposition and Reason: ”333573—5— (attach additional sheets if necessary) Counselor Assessment (Prognosis): (attach additional sheets if necessary) 2211 City Number: Site Number: ‘3' ‘T’ ‘3“ Case Number: T‘TT VICTIM/WITNESS ACTIVITY 1. Referral Source: Referral Source Case No. (if known): T W 2. ___l: Victim . ___2: Witness 'TT ___J: Male ‘nr 2: Female 3: Unknown us as 00 n O C O ___}: White ___2: Black 3: Latino : Asian/Native American :Oflwr : Unknown 6. Type of Criue: '11? THE 7. Date of Incident: Day_ __ Month__ __ Year___ __ 'TB"TTF'TRF TTT"22"TET 8. Date of First Contact: Day_ __ Month__ _ Year_ __ _ WKNWWM 9. Winter of Contacts: __ __ ‘SO"IT IO. Building Nuuber: __ '52"33' Tl. Case Action (specify whether charges filed and/or pending): 'SI"5§"53' ICCOC 0 0M 5 E! S “BCQSSIfwa 212 12. Case: 1: Open _2: Closed 13. Age of Offender: _ _ 14. 15. 16. Sex of Offender: ____l: Male ___2: Female ___JB: Unknown Race of Offender: ___}: White __2 Black __3 Latino ___;A Asian/Native American 0’ Other (specify): 0 Unknown Offender's Relationship to Victim: Ol: Spouse OZ: Live-in boyfriend/girlfriend 03: Other friend __04: Pa rent _05: Sonlda ughter 06: In-law O7: Neighbor 08: Other (specify): 99: Unknown APPENDIX H ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 213 APPENDIX H ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS The eligibility requirements for the public housing authori- ties applying for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program were very specific. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) wanted a focused program application that stressed an integrated and comprehensive approach to reducing crime and improving the quality of life for residents. It was HUD's intention that the money not be used authority-wide, but directed to a specific project, that was either a family, elderly or mixed development. HUD directed that: Applications can encompass more than one project . . . if the projects are contiguous to one another and it can be demonstrated that comprehensive crime prevention for these projects is appropriate for whatever geographic area is covered. The project(s) chosen must have a total of at least 200 public housing units in management. The projects must have the same form of tenant organization . . . which for purposes of this program can include anything from a lossely structured tenant activity group to a formally organized association with adopted by laws.1 The Department of Housing and Urban Development also set terms for the maximum total amount of federal funds that could be requested by an authority in its application. It was as follows: 1U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Notice H79-11, PHA, p. e. 214 Source: 215 If the projects targeted for the anti-crime program contain: 200 - 1000 units 1001 - 2000 units 2001 - 3000 units 3001 - 4000 units 4001 - + units Total federal amount requested shall be: up to 500,000 up to 1,000,000 up to 2,000,000 up to 3,000,000 up to 4,000,000 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban DevelOpment, Notice H79-11, PHA, p. 3. APPENDIX I CLEVELAND CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS AND PROGRAM REVISION 216 August, 1979 September, 1979 October, 1979 November, 1979 December, 1979 January, 1980 February, 1980 March, 1980 April, 1980 May, 1980 June, 1980 CLEVELAND--CHRONOLOGY The CMHA submitted application versions required of semi-finalists. The CMHA received notification of selection to participate in the Anti-Crime Program. Work begun on the final application. The Riverview project manger was replaced. Public Safety Coordinator hired. William Brill Associates, Inc., conducted vulnerability analysis. Oversite Team members were selected and began meeting. Final CMHA submitted an application for ADAMHA funds but was not granted an award. The CMHA received MOD, CDBG, and DOL awards. Cooperative agreements for CDBG and DOL funds were signed. Twelve residents were elected to the RACC (Resident Anti-Crime Commission). Three CMHA patrolmen were hired to work exclusively in the site. Additional security guards were hired with CETA funds. The family Violence Center initiated an Emergency Call- Back System for the site. William Brill Associates, Inc., was selected to perform comprehensive programming for the MOD program. Monthly meetings for the RACC continued, appli- cations were taken for a full-time Program Director. The DOL Coordinator was hired. Job Descriptions were posted for DOL position of: 8 security guard cadets; two program aides; and two EMT's (emergency maintenance tech- nicians). 217 June, 1980 (Continued) July, 1980 August, 1980 September, 1980 October, 1980 November, 1980 218 The Family Violence Center terminated the Emergency Call-Back System. CETA funds were no longer available to hire security guards. An Assistant Public Safety Coordinator was hired. He and the President of the RACC attended a training session conducted by the National Center for Community Anti-Crime Programs in Texas. Youth applicants were screened, interviewed, tested, selected, and hired for the DOL positions. Preliminary plans made for training for RACC and Anti-Crime Program staff members at Cuyahoga Community College. The DOL Coordi- nator left the program. The security cadets were issued uniforms and equipment and received CPR training from the American Red Cross. EMT's began work. The West Side Mental Health Center began a needs assessment. A HUD official conducted a site visit. Security cadets were enrolled in a 120-hour Basic Peace Officer Training program at Case Western Reserve University. The possibility of an urban park was explored. Another HUD official conducted a site visit. Brill Associates completed the programming and MOD work plan development. HUD approved the final MOD budget and work plan. RACC training at Cuyahoga Community College was cancelled due to cost. A new DOL coordinator was hired. Three youth cadets and one EMT left the DOL program. An Anti-Crime Program office was constructed at the CMHA Central Office. An RACC office was furnished and opened in the Riverview high- rise. A "hot-line" was installed in the Lake— view highrise. Arthur Sanders, Inc., was hired to prepare A & E bid specifications. Five cadets graduated from the Police Officer Training Program and received Private Police Commissions from the Cleveland Police Depart- ment. Cadets and "match“ patrolmen began Operation 1.0. The DOL coordinator, the Police Auxiliary, and the Cleveland Police Response Unit met to foster a closer working relation- ship. December, 1980 January, 1981 February, 1981 March, 1981 April, 1981 May, 1981 —-—-—-"--u-A..n—L L... 219 An RACC Program Director and two part-time aides were hired. A new EMT was hired. The DOL Coordinator and the cadets showed crime and safety films. The commander of the CPD Police Response Unit for the sites was replaced. The MOD architect met with Anti-Crime Program staff. The RACC Program Director and the DOL Coordinator attended a seminiar in Norfolk. A new cadet was hired. DOL cadets and "match" patrolmen conduct a new resident orientation program. The MOD architect met with RACC and staff members of the sites. The CMHA held several police training sessions for cadets, who con- tinued anti-crime meetings and presentations to residents. A program aide resigned. The CMHA Executive Director requested a no-cost extension for the program until December 1981. The Public Safety Coordinator became the chairman of a CMHA administrative streamlining committee. The MOD architect met with Anti-Crime Program staff and Riverview staff. The first anti- crime newsletter was printed and distributed. The needs assessment conducted by the West Side Mental Health Center was completed. One new program aide and one new cadet were hired. Cadets distributed emergency telephone number stickers on request, received more in-house police training, and ran an Operation I-Spy. The Assistant Public Safety coordinator resigned. The two housing managers were replaced. The Anti-Crime Program provided security for a meeting to April, 1981, discuss crime problems of the Rear West Side. A new Assistant Public Safety Coordinator was hired. The RACC Program Director initiated a daily check-in program for the elderly. Anti- Crime staff developed a presentation on the program and vandalism. Two cadets left the program. Three new cadets and one EMT were hired. June, 1981 July, 1981 August, 1981 September, 1981 220 Specifications were prepared and bidding was completed for the T.V. camera system at Lakeview. The preparation of specifications for lighting at both sites was completed. EMT's worked on replacing lights in Riverview. Site managers and staff received training on problems of the elderly. A Resident Emergency Handbook was printed and distributed. A "Hot List" program was initiated to facilitate the return of stolen goods to the owners. The contract for the T.V. system at Lakeview was awarded. The second issue of the Anti-Crime newsletter was printed and distributed. The DOL Coordinator's position was terminated as funds were exhausted. Six new EMT's were hired. Two cadets who had completed one year in the pro- gram were hired by the CMHA Department of Safety and Security. The CMHA learned that the nO-cost extension to December 1981 was approved by HUD. A contract was awarded for the lighting after the specifi- cations and bid had been approved by the CMHA board. Bids were solicited for the Riverview highrise lobby redesign. All project managers were briefed on the use of the Notice to Lease Violators developed by Anti-Crime staff. Two cadets left the program and two were enrolled in the Peace Officer Training program. 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LMHA began setting up staff meetings to review the guidelines of the Urban Initiatives Anti- Crime Program (UIACP) and to plan tenant meetings. LMHA held its first meeting with residents about the anti-crime program. LMHA Board of Directors authorized the staff of LMHA to apply for the funds, passing resolu- tion #4969. Board approval was unanimous. LMHA staff held meetings with Toledo City Manager about the Anti-Crime Economic develop- ment concept, and the executive director of the regional planning unit. LMHA met with Second Chance Academy staff, and the Toledo Economic Opportunity Planning Asso- ciation. Meeting was to review components of UIACP and encourage input from and coordination with the neighborhood anti-crime staff. LMHA staff began drafting the proposal and continued to meet with elderly tenants. LMHA submitted proposal to HUD on June 21, 1979. LMHA senior staff met in Washington, D.C., with Lynn Curtis and staff about proposal application. For semi-final consideration LMHA was to have to HUD, no later than 32 August 1979, revisions. LMHA submitted them 30 August 1979. 229 230 August, 1979 -- LMHA staff met with the Director of the Criminal (Continued) Justice Training Center to negotiate a specific training commitment to the UIACP. The Housing Authority also asked for additional letters of commitment from the Criminal Justice Training Center and the Economic Opportunity Planning Association. September, 1979 October, 1979 -- LMHA was notified by HUD they were selected as a semi-finalist for the anti-crime program. Hould need to make some revisions. November, 1979 -- LMHA was asked to conduct a vulnerability analysis. LMHA staff conducted vulnerability analysis. December, 1979 -- Vulnerability analysis was submitted to HUD on 13 December. -- LMHA received second request from HUD to revise proposal. LMHA was also notified by HUD that they were a finalist in the UIACP. -- LMHA received second request from HUD to revise proposal elements. These revisions due to HUD February 1, 1980. LMHA was also informed they were a finalist in the UIACP. January, 1980 -- LMHA hires Anti-Crime Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator. Began meeting with community agencies and developing proposals for other funding categories: ADAMHA, OJJDP, DOL, Victim Witness. February, 1980 -- Anti-Crime Coordinator and Assistant finalized ADAMHA, OJJDP, and Victim/Witness proposals. -- LMHA staff worked with the Toledo Lucas County Planning Commission and County officials to prepare a coordinated Urban Parks grant appli- cation. March, 1980 -- Anti-Crime staff made revisions to the DOL/ YCCIP grant application. April, 1980 -- Housing Authority notified that they were awarded ADAMHA, OJJDP, and Victim/Witness funds. April, 1980 (Continued) May, 1980 June, 1980 July, 1980 August, 1980 231 Cooperative efforts continued with Second Chance Academy; Toldeo Police Division; National Alliance of Businesses; the Board of Community Relations; the Center for Women; the Criminal Justice Training and Education Center; and the Economic Opportunity Planning Asso- ciation's Crime Prevention Program. Anti-Crime staff met with the University of Toledo's Center for Women, the Criminal Justice Training and Education Center, and the Board of Community Relations. Block Captain training program workshops were underway at the University of Toledo, Center for Women and the Board of Community Relations. Enrolled youth supervisors in a private police training program at Owens Technical College. Block Captain training workshop completed. Training workshops for DOL/YCCIP component underway. Anti-Crime staff members attend UIACP confer- ences in Washington, D.C. Senior citizen basic education class field trip to Ohio State Fair. 30 DOL youth complete 5 week training program. Presented awards at a banquet held in the Brand Whitlock Community Building. Four youth supervisors complete 120 hour pri- vate police training program at Owens Technical College. Anti-Crime staff met with representatives of the Lucas County Juvenile Court and the Ohio Youth Commission, as both agencies expressed an interest in locating satellite offices in the Brand Whitlock area. Victim/Witness Coordinator set up a series of crime prevention education sessions for resi- dents with the Toldeo Police Departments Crime Prevention unit. First session was held in Port Lawrence. ' 2 l ‘>'._ v- ,‘I .. .- . l 16., 1;. (it“fv‘ '- 1: I: -‘ -.. ~. 4:71 15.-1‘ inf-r. ; A l . - , 'fitmttrgri . l .‘ . ~ , 12‘? datum: is! ‘. . . , : .x * August, 1980 (Continued) September, 1980 October, 1980 232 Three Port Lawrence residents were hired by local construction company working on the comprehensive modernization program in Port Lawrence. Toledo Board of Education resumes its partici- pation in Project Open Door after a three- month absence, during which time the project was run by ADAMHA Director. ADAMHA work plan completed and sent to Washing- ton, D.C. HUD offices. 30 DOL/YCCIP youth began working as mainte- nance aides in the Grand Whitlock area. The Lucas County Juvenile Court has committed itself to locating a satellite probation office in the OJJDP facility in the Brand Whitlock Community. Gunckel Elementary School officials have agreed to allowing the OJJDP program to use the school gym and one classroom. OJJDP work plan has been completed and sent to Washington, D.C., HUD offices. Victim/Witness program director begins working with the Lucas County Prosecutors Victim/Witness Assistance program. Victim/Witness work plan has been completed and sent to WAshington, D.C., HUD Office ADAMHA program director begins screening and interviewing applicants for the three social worker sites' positions. Also begins to set up training programs for staff with local agencies. The thirty youth in the DOL/YCCIP program have completed their second month in the work program. Adult Basic Education classes, given under the OJJDP program element, begin on a regular basis. OJJPD program offices are established. October, 1980 (Continued) November, 1980 December, 1980 233 Victim/Witness program director continues to set up crime prevention education workshops with the Toledo Police Department. Victim/Witness Coordinator appeared on local public television program. Explained the role of victim/witness program in public housing. Toledo Anti-Crime Program had site visit by staff member of the Cleveland area office. ADAMHA Director continues to assist Toledo Board of Education personnel with Project Open Door. In-Service Training program is formulated for DOL/YCCIP youth. OJJDP program offices are prepared for move-in. Victim/Witness program is to move the Port Lawrence Homes. Anti-Crime program is decen- tralizing program services. Anti-Crime staff attend Ohio Welfare Conference in Columbus. Workshops at conference covered family violence crisis intervention, etc. ADAMHA program hires three full-time resident social worker aides. These new staff members begin orientation. DOL/YCCIP youth begin a series of in-service training sessions. Sessions are given by the cooperative extension service of Ohio State University. OJJDP program director organizes a series of four sessions on food and nutrition for pre. adolescents. OJJDP program hires two part—time staff persons for the recreation program utilizing the Gunckel School gymnasium. Victim/Witness program moves into new offices in Port Lawrence. Telephones have been installed. January, 1981 February, 1981 March, 1981 234 ADAMHA staff attend training and orientation programs local service agencies provide. Also are attending sessions at the University of Toledo Center for Women. These sessions include: stress communication skills, single parenting budgeting of personal finances, and job seeking techniques. DOL program staged a career day. Toledo area businessmen and professionals came to Brand Whitlock Homes to tell youth about careers. Four Anti-Crime staff members attended confer- ence in Washington on specific responsibilities they had with anti-crime program. HUD spon- sored. Toledo Clutch and Brake hired two Port Lawrence residents, per agreement with President of Toledo Clutch and Brake. Toledo Youth Development program placed a full-time staff person with the OJJDP program, given the growth of the program and its activity in the Brand Whitlock Youth Council. This staff person is officially assigned to the Anti-Crime program, but under the employment of East Toledo Helping Hand. ADAMHA program and staff move into new office space. DOL youth begin to receive job placement and counseling as the DOL staff realizes the program is nearing completion. OJJDP staff organize basketball and volleyball teams. OJJDP staff arranges free admission and use of Lucas County Recreation Center. Victim/Witness Coordinator approaches the Lucas County prosecutor about supporting the Victim/Witness program in Brand Whitlock. ADAMHA staff reorganize to facilitate better client intake. March, 1981 (Continued) April, 1981 May, 1981 June, 1981 235 ADAMHA staff order materials for presentations. Materials consist of information on Drug and Alcohol Abuse. ADAMHA staff training continues, and contacts made with key local agencies to support the program. DOL program is working with Block Captains to insure clean grounds. Job Placement and Career Counseling program continue for DOL youth. OJJDP program hires two part-time aides. Also, OJJDP program orders and receives 15 passenger van to use for transportation of youth to recreational events. Victim/Witness program coordinator continues to look for other funding, to extend the program. ADAMHA staff receive training materials and approach public schools about presentations to children. OJJDP program continues to organize recreation programs. Victim/Witness Coordinator continues to seek other funding. ADAMHA staff go door to door in the demonstra- tion area to inform residents of program. DOL staff encourage youth to apply for summer CETA employment program. DOL career counseling continues. OJJDP program is now serving 300 youth. Has four part-time staff. Continues to organize recreation programs. ADAMHA staff continue to publicize the program. Staff holds Alcohol and Drug Abuse Awareness Day for residents. 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mmussmos eseu .smus uso .msseeoeo soo—s me u>sem oe meseusmus we uesss ompe $5 use .meses -eoeeses oe uumos es eese museNes eesesueoo use oe uou .usse eese >.s ueeess ueseu sees ues msosesmoo posees seoo» see emeuse uosesuessee esseueses me messsm seesmus use 3.8: semes use 82 em=m=< ss Eesmoso msessese see:-m e ueee—osoo mseoo» xessss seseo< ouueos uosssossmsuz mssusoosssm use use eounoss use so eumses-ou ses: muosoom seseo use esussse>ow Peoos soss msesmoss ses: memessss sumsosem ~.e s msuuesso uueeos seeo euseese .sueeum so emu uemeusose H.m mummusee3\msseos> emsmms so usssu eesEou oe muus>sem ue>ossse use usoz m.~ mesesus so esesSo ism eese -eses use ussos uumeusose N.m BIBLIOGRAPHY 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Allison, Graham T. 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