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AN IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN
INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM IN PUBLIC
HOUSING: A TWO-CITY CASE STUDY

By

Steven Michael Edwards

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ABSTRACT

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Policy analysts have become concerned with program implementation recently. Easy to conceptualize, implementation is a complex and difficult process. Analyses of programmatic failure are so common that they are neither interesting nor important. Compliance with policy decisions is not necessarily a virtue, and should not always be expected. Social programs, especially large-scale federal projects, operate in complex environments subject to internal and external influences. The study of program implementation must, then, adopt an approach which captures the subtleties of outcomes and outputs.

This study evaluates the implementation of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing (UIACP). It describes what happened in selected housing projects as a result of the anti-crime program's political and bureaucratic momentum. It discusses the relationship between policy decisions at various levels of government and the implementation process. It also describes the results of the program.

Of the sixteen public housing authorities (PHA) which participated in the UIACP, two form the basis of this study: Lucas

Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo, Ohio) and Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, Ohio). These two sites possessed the range of programmatic content sought by HUD and relatively complete information concerning their anti-crime efforts.

Although planners believe that they evoke innovative social responses, most new programs simply revitalize old efforts at the local level. Recognizing the weight of "tradition," this study concludes that policy making is an on-going process which overlaps with implementation activity. Once the PHA's submitted proposals and HUD provided funding, policy making became a continuous ebb and flow involving HUD staff, local government officials, PHA administrators, and "street-level" bureaucrats. The implementation literature which portrays program activity in terms of distinct phases simply is not accurate in relation to the two housing authority sites.

This study also concludes that implementation problems are not uniform across sites. The scale of the housing developments selected for the anti-crime program affected the anticipated outcome. PHA's were free to select developments based on eligibility requirements, which encouraged the inclusion of as many units as possible. The interest in creating large demonstration areas simply drowned the UIACP. Given time constraints, a work culture among staff did not develop and trust among the residents was difficult to establish.

Dedicated to my family

Janis, Gregory, and Christopher

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Introduction

The study of social program implementation is a recent concern of program evaluators and policy analysts. During the era of the Great Society, when social programs (good ideas) raised expectations and the subsequent execution of those ideas led to frustration (as many programs failed to achieve the desired promises) did the issue of implementation become identified as the critical missing link to a successful program.¹ Public policy scholars, Walter Williams and Richard Elmore, have concluded that "[t]he greatest difficulty in devising better social programs is not determining what are reasonable policies on paper, but finding the means for converting those policies into viable field operations that correspond reasonably well to original intentions."² Conceptually, the implementation process is a

¹N. Gross J. Giacquinta and M. Bernstein, Implementing Organizational Innovations: A Sociological Analysis of Planned Educational Change (New York: Basic Books, 1971); J. Pressman and A. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); J. Murphy, "Title I of ESEA: The Politics of Implementing Federal Educational Reform," Harvard Educational Review (February 1971): 35-53; P. Berman and M. McLaughlin, Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change: The Finding in Review IV, R-1598/4-HEW, The Rand Corporation, April 1975; M. Derthick, New Towns In-Town, The Urban Institute, 1972; M. Johnson, Counterpoint: The Changing Employment Service, Olympus, 1973.

²W. Williams and R. F. Elmore, Social Program Implementation (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. xii.

rather uncomplicated matter in which three distinct phases can be identified. First, there is the planning phase. This includes activities such as the formation of the policy, legislative support, authorization, informing others about the policy, and so forth. The second phase is the start-up, the beginning of new procedures and the empowering of new groups with responsibility for the task(s) to be undertaken, etc. It is possible and most often the case that these two phases may be repeated a number of times in order for the program to become operational, particularly if there are multiple agencies involved in the innovation. Finally, fine tuning is a step that begins immediately after start-up as adjustments are made and continued throughout the program to the point that the policy is "routinized."³

While this may appear conceptually easy to accomplish, program implementation is an exceedingly complex and difficult task to carry out. Graham Allison has observed:

If one is primarily interested in what government actually does, the unavoidable question is: What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified? My estimate is about 10 percent in the normal case, ranging as high as 50 percent for some problems. . . .⁴

The difficulties of program implementation have been so great for many social experiments that some scholars believe it is doubtful

³This simple diagram is not meant to suggest that policy change no longer takes place at the point that implementation ends because change is constantly taking place. It simply means that implementation ends when normal (routine) operations are established.

⁴Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), p. 276.

whether the studies produced results useful for decision making. In the field of criminal justice, for example, Malcolm Klein reviewed more than 200 evaluations of juvenile diversion and deinstitutionalization programs and concluded that there had been no test since the programs had not been implemented properly.⁵

For many scholars, the study of program implementation has been the documentation of program failure through case histories of single policies which were implemented by a single agency. While these investigations have been helpful in illuminating the importance of implementation issues, the documentation of program failure has become so common that to discover once again that a program as implemented different from that proposed is now neither a very interesting nor an important finding. Compliance with policy decisions is not necessarily a virtue, and is certainly not generally to be expected. Social programs, especially large-scale federal projects, operate in a complex environment and are subjected to powerful internal and external shaping forces. Recently, however, the study of implementation has tended to favor much broader approaches to capture the subtle elements of program outcomes and outputs. Again, Allison points out:

If analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve desired policy outcomes, they will have to develop ways of thinking analytically about a larger chunk of the problem. It is not that we have too many good analytic

⁵M. W. Klein, "Deinstitutionalization and Diversion of Juvenile Offenders: A Litany of Impediments," in Crime and Justice, eds.: N. Morris and M. Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

solutions to problems. It is rather, that we have more good solutions than we have appropriate actions.⁶

Current theories of implementation⁷ seem to substantiate this line of thought. Van Horn and Van Meter, for example, propose a causal model of the variables they believe to be predictive of successful implementation. Similarly, Schneider offers not a theory of implementation, but a broad framework--a set of factors (viability, integrity, capacity, and scope)--that help identify relevant aspects of policy and/or agency practice as to whether implementation has occurred or not.⁸ For example, consider the concept of policy capacity. Capacity is concerned with agency activities and those of the target population. More specifically, capacity refers to acceptable level(s) of involvement: the level of activities, numbers of clients, costs, and other operations governed by the policy. Similarly important is the concept of policy viability--does the program exist? If the elements of the program (people, resources, and organization) do not exist, then the program cannot be considered to have been "alive" or workable.

⁶Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 276.

⁷C. E. Van Horn and D. S. Van Meter, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework," Administration and Society 6 (1975): 445-468; P. Berman, "The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation," Public Policy 26 (1978): 157-184; Klein, "Deinstitutionalization and Diversion," p. 145; M. Q. Patton, Utilization-Focused Evaluation (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978).

⁸A. L. Schneider, "Studying Policy Implementation: A Conceptual Framework," Evaluation Review 6 (6) (December 1982): 715-730.

Finally, it is worth pointing out that an evaluation of program policy implementation is a different and independent activity from an evaluation of program tasks and activities that were specified in the outcomes of the initial policy or legislative mandate. This distinction is critical and often ignored in many policy implementation studies. It is important to mention this distinction because if the quality of the implementation were to rest on whether tasks and activities achieved the goals of the policy, and these were not met, there would be no way to determine whether policy failures were due to defective implementation or inadequate theoretical conceptualization.

A Description of a Federal Anti-Crime Demonstration Project

The focus of this dissertation is the study of social program implementation. Presented in this section is a description of the social program selected for study: The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developments (HUD), Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing (UIACP). This brief description is divided into two parts: (1) a discussion of the development of the HUD anti-crime program (its political importance and legislative intent), and (2) a discussion of its programmatic design (the concept of co-targeting federal funds and the establishment of federal partnerships).

Program Development

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing (UIACP) flowed from President Jimmy Carter's 1978 National Urban Policy. Specifically, the program was created for local public housing

authorities with the express purpose of reducing crime, the fear of crime, and improving the quality of life for citizens residing in public housing (see Appendix A for a definition of the term "public housing.") Like many federal programs, this was a large and ambitious enterprise. Forty million dollars would be distributed by HUD to thirty-nine public housing authorities across the country, which could demonstrate that they had comprehensive and workable strategies to reduce crime and crime-related problems. Of the thirty-nine public housing authorities funded, sixteen were selected by HUD for intensive evaluation

to determine whether or not the demonstration produced effective strategies for mitigating crime and vandalism in public housing in order that a safe living environment might be provided for their residents, particularly the elderly.⁹

A complex set of forces gave rise to the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. In the congress there was not only interest, but support for developing a federal initiative to respond to crime and the fear of crime experienced by the residents of public housing. Both Congressman Claude Pepper of Florida and Congresswoman Mary Rose Oaker of Ohio had constituents who requested federal assistance to do something about crime and the victimization of residents. The tragic death of a well-known elderly public housing resident in Miami, and the substantive interest of a special assistant within HUD, led to the sponsorship of the Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. The members of congress mandated a program, but with the provision

⁹Housing and Community Development Act and Amendments of 1978, Sec. 207 (b)(2), p. 15.

that no additional funds be appropriated. Given this momentum, the Department of Housing and Urban Development held two conferences to discuss the issues of crime and security. The first conference, held September 1978, brought together persons closest to the problems of crime (residents, management, and security staff) to gain advice from them regarding the activities HUD should include in a program to reduce crime and the fear of crime in public housing. The second conference held in October, 1978, convened experts in the field of crime prevention to identify the essential components for an effective crime prevention program.

These two conferences further shaped the anti-crime program HUD designed. Not only were the concerns of those persons closest to the issues solicited, but the available crime prevention literature and research were reviewed to develop a conceptual framework for attacking the crime problem in public housing. With respect to the incidence of crime, the group participants confirmed residents' perceptions; crime is higher in public housing than in other big city neighborhoods. Moreover, fear of crime was a very serious problem. The outcomes of these two conferences proved helpful to the HUD staff in designing the anti-crime program. A synthesis of conference information convinced staff that their anti-crime efforts would need to be much more comprehensive in program structure than previous community crime prevention efforts.

Shortly after these conferences President Carter signed into law The Public Housing Security Demonstration Act of 1978. It directed

the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to "promptly initiate . . . a program for the development, demonstration, and evaluation of improved, innovative community anti-crime and security methods, concepts, and techniques to mitigate the level of crime in public housing and their surrounding neighborhoods."¹⁰

Program Design

The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was designed by HUD staff as a prototypical community crime prevention program, whose core assumption was that the action(s) of citizens (in this case, residents of public housing) is central to the maintenance of order, control of crime, and the improvement of the quality of life in public housing. The program would establish partnerships among thirteen federal offices, and would rely heavily on the activities of public housing authorities (PHA's), other public (local government), and private sector agencies, and the police. The assumption that grounded this program concept was that crime-free and orderly neighborhoods can only be secured through the social control activities of citizens supported by local agencies. The intent of the Act that authorized the UIACP was to co-target federal funds from thirteen participating agencies and direct those funds to public housing authorities, so that they could develop community "self-help" crime prevention programs. The idea of co-targeting funds was consistent with Carter's plan to more effectively utilize existing federal resources. The co-targeting

¹⁰Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1978, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Report No. 95-1795, p. 15.

concept was a means of getting several federal agencies to identify common issues (problems) and then contribute a portion of existing agency resources (monies) to the solution of the common problem (see Appendix B for a list of the agencies and amounts of funds they contributed).

Concerned with the need to design a comprehensive crime control program that upgraded PHA management, improved the physical environment, provided better police service, established links with community social services, and galvanized resident interest in crime prevention, HUD staff organized the authorized funds and activities of the sponsoring agencies into three areas for the anti-crime program:

- Public Housing Authority Responsibilities

- Programs by and for Tenants

- Local Government and Private Sector Responsibilities

By the nature of these categories, the UNIACP was designed as an umbrella, under which a vast array of activities could be implemented at the local level to accomplish the primary directives of the enabling legislation. HUD anti-crime staff then specified seven program areas for the above categories, so that a particular structure might emerge as the anti-crime program for each participating public housing authority. The seven program areas, with a brief description of their rationale and suggested program activities follow:

1. Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention: HUD staff believed that PHA management had a direct and immediate responsibility for crime prevention within a public housing project. Management, they believed, influences the safety of residents in planning anti-crime

efforts, serving as a contact point with outside agencies and by its own development of policies and practices. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following:

- a. Implementing training programs for housing project managers and maintenance staff to teach them how to identify security problems
- b. Improve PHA-tenant screening (for occupancy) and eviction policies in response to anti-social behavior
- c. Appointment of a qualified public safety coordinator for the anti-crime program
- d. Develop programs that encourage maintenance of project property such that tenants have a feeling of pride and stake in the security of their residential environment.

2. More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign: The idea of physically redesigning an environment to reduce victimization has been much discussed. One argument has been that physical change (target hardening) encourages the formation of territorial attitudes and behavior so that citizens will adopt a greater sense of responsibility for their surroundings. Thus the likelihood of impeding or apprehending an offender is increased. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following:

- a. Expansion of the private space for which each tenant is responsible

- b. Changes in fencing and clustering to better protect tenants and afford them more control over their living space
- c. Rehabilitation of individual housing units
- d. Installation of better indoor and outdoor lighting and improved landscaping to enhance the project's appearance
- e. Provide better control over lobby access and improved window and door security
- f. Installation of burglar alarms and closed circuit TV monitors.

3. More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation: HUD anti-crime staff believed that if the community "self-help" concept of this crime prevention program were to succeed, those who composed the community must have active, significant, and meaningful involvement. The emphasis in this area was for residents to assist the local police in patrolling their neighborhood, providing escort services for elderly residents, and disseminating anti-crime information to other residents. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following:

- a. Increased use of adult and youth foot patrols block/floor/lobby crime watches for surveillance purposes
- b. Involving the tenants in the planning and implementation of the PHA's anti-crime program
- c. Develop tenant "operation identification" property stenciling and registration program

- d. Increased use of tenant sponsored anti-crime media campaign, educational workshops, and crime reporting campaigns
- e. Provision of technical assistance and training to help tenants organize anti-crime efforts.

4. Increased Full- and Part-Time Employment of Tenants: Since a large proportion of crime in and around public housing was believed to be committed by teenagers, HUD staff felt that an employment program would be a significant contribution to a community crime prevention program. Not only would youth be employed in meaningful work, but they would be exposed to "world of work" skills needed for full-time employment. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following:

- a. Increased training and employment of tenants to install security hardware, to make capital improvements and architectural changes, and to help maintain and rehabilitate PHA property
- b. Employment of tenants as community service representatives, public safety officers, and lobby monitors
- c. Employment of tenants as leaders of organized tenant anti-crime programs
- d. Employment of tenants as leaders of cultural, educational, and recreational programs that increase tenant cohesion.

5. More and Improved Social Services to Combat Crime or Assist

Victims/Witnesses: HUD staff believed that special services could act as a complement to the other program areas in reducing crime and the fear of crime. Social services could add to increasing a sense of well-being and increase social cohesion among residents, especially the elderly and single female household heads. Innovations that dealt with drug, alcohol abuse, or mental and emotional disorders were encouraged, as were victim/witness services. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following:

- a. Counseling programs to assist tenants who are especially vulnerable to crime, i.e., single female household heads, youth, and elderly--to cope with personal and family problems
- b. Employment counseling for the underemployed and unemployed
- c. Increased recreational, educational, and cultural activities for residents
- d. Day care services for the children of employed parents and for the elderly
- e. Develop escort services for the safety or protection of children, women, and the elderly
- f. Implementation of neighborhood dispute courts, witness assistance programs, and other local level innovations.

6. Increased Use of City Police Officers: Traditionally it has been thought that the police deter crime. However, with fiscal

retrenchment underway in many cities and the fact that police do not like to patrol public housing projects, HUD staff believed that approaching the local police with training packages that addressed the need for sensitivity to life in the projects would improve police service for residents. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following:

- a. Establishment of precinct stations in public housing projects
- b. Increased use of city police or project foot patrols, "vertical" patrols, and family crisis intervention teams; improved academy training of police used in these activities so that they may have a better understanding of, sensitivity to, the tenant population
- c. Efforts to improve relations between the city police and public housing security staff
- d. Installation of special telephone "hotlines" to facilitate improved crime reporting by public housing tenants.

7. Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources: The development of stronger linkages with other programs from local government and the private sector was seen as taking an "ecological-approach" to crime control. If the PHA's anti-crime program was to have success, it would have to account for the displacement of crime. Encouraging the partnership of local government and the private sector was seen as the best means for developing an effective anti-crime program. Activities that HUD encouraged/suggested applying PHA's to develop included the following:

a. Increased anti-crime targeting by local business and industry in the form of employment opportunities and by local government in the form of Community Development Block Grants and CETA prime-sponsor job slots.

b. Increased anti-crime targeting and coordination from state agencies to gain HEW Title XX and LEAA state planning agency funds.

To insure that local PHA's developed the particular program clusters that were desired, HUD anti-crime staff "coached" the cities to develop what they believed important. Emphasis was given to sensitivity training for the police. Increased tenant involvement in PHA anti-crime affairs, and modernization efforts which focused on creating defensible space through redesign, rather than the traditional hardware, such as locks and window bars. However, despite the efforts made by HUD to design a "standardized" program emphasis, there was considerable variety in the programs proposed. In some PHA's employment was central; in others, it was modernization. Local "fine-tuning" depended on the particular housing project, the experience and strength of the PHA and tenants, the political culture (nationally and locally), the resourcefulness of agencies, the dominance of formal and informal leaders, and other factors.

Finally, HUD staff selected the cities to be included in the evaluation of the anti-crime program. The bases for selecting the sixteen PHA's varied. HUD considered such factors as: probability of success, special interest in the site by HUD staff, and political interests. The sixteen local public housing authorities

selected were located in the following cities: Baltimore, MD; Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Dade County, FL; Hampton, VA; Hartford, CT; Jackson, TN; Jersey City, NJ; Louisville, KY; New York, NY; Oxnard, CA; San Antonio, TX; Seattle, WA; Tampa, FL; and Toledo, OH.

Summary.--The HUD anti-crime program was not only unique in its funding approach (co-targeting federal funds to begin the self-help process), but the design of programs offered an empirical test of both physical redesign (hardware) strategies and public and private social services (software strategies) working together under the structure of a community anti-crime program. Though the concept of community (collective) crime prevention is not new, it certainly has proliferated in the United States in the last ten years.¹¹

This program differed from much of what has been traditionally understood about crime and the fear of crime. In the past the focus has been on individual responses to crime.¹² According to a recent assessment of informal (collective) social control activity, most of the studies undertaken have tested a similar set of hypotheses;

. . . the level of social solidarity (friendships, neighboring, community attachment) in a predetermined area unit (blocks, neighborhoods, census tracts) affects informal

¹¹Collective crime prevention refers to private citizens acting together to deal with crime. It does not include organized responses of criminal justice organizations, officials, or professionals. Collective responses to crime may be either informal (such as a group of neighbors assisting each other), or formal (an anti-crime program of an organization).

¹²W. G. Skogan, et al., Executive Summary: The Reactions to Crime Project. The Center for Urban Affairs and Policy Research (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, February 1982).

control, which affects crime; informal control also affects subjective crime-related attitudes--fear and the perception of crime and other neighborhood problems; these subjective reactions to crime, in combination with social solidarity and informal control, are expected to affect collective responses to crime.¹³

Some attention and research has been directed to the notion that physical design has an effect on the prevention of crime. Jane Jacobs originally proposed the concept of "environmental" crime prevention noting its importance to the vitalization of neighborhoods. According to Jacobs, the uses of public space, especially sidewalks, provide a most important function to public safety.

The first thing to understand is that the public peace--of cities is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as the police are. It is kept primarily by an intricate, almost unconscious network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves and enforced by the people themselves. In some city areas--older public housing projects and streets with very high population turnover are often conspicuous examples--the keeping of public sidewalk law and order is left almost entirely to the police and special guards. . . . No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal casual enforcement of it has broken down.¹⁴

Oscar Newman¹⁵ later re-invigorated this concept by attempting to link certain physical design features of communities with the development of informal control and thereby establish a connection between physical design and crime. However, research that has examined

¹³S. W. Greenberg, W. M. Rohe, and J. R. Williams, Interim Report, Informal Social Control and Crime Prevention at the Neighborhood Level: Synthesis and Assessment of the Research, Denver Research Institute, August 1, 1982.

¹⁴J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), pp. 31-32.

¹⁵O. Newman, Defensible Space (New York: MacMillan Co., 1972).

both physical design and collective responses to crime is so limited that researchers¹⁶ have noted the need for more descriptive inquiry on the variations and operations of neighborhood responses to crime. This dissertation seeks to examine such a joint anti-crime program.

Study

This dissertation outlines a process evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The purpose of this study is to examine the implementation process of this federal program in a subsample of local public housing authorities. As previously mentioned, the selection of the sixteen sites in the larger evaluation was done by the HUD staff. It was a purposive sample, for the criteria HUD staff used consisted of the probability of success, special interest in the sites by HUD staff, and political interests.

The sixteen city evaluation¹⁷ was not only physically large to manage, but also more complex than anticipated. Each public housing authority selected for the evaluation included multiple housing projects in the design of its anti-crime program. Given the design

¹⁶Robert K. Yin, et al, "What is Crime Prevention?" in National Criminal Justice Reference Services, How Well Does It Work: Review of Criminal Justice Evaluation, 1978 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 107-134; Aaron Podolesfsky and Fredric DuBow, Strategies for Community Crime Prevention: Collective Responses to Crime in America (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas Publishing Company, 1982).

¹⁷The author was the project director of the sixteen-city process evaluation while on the staff of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

and environmental characteristics of public housing, these multiple housing projects had to be considered as separate neighborhood communities. Therefore, what was already thought of as a large evaluation project with sixteen authorities, became significantly more complex with the realization that there were, in fact, sixty-six communities to be evaluated.

In order to design a manageable dissertation, the larger evaluation sample was not used; instead, a subsample of two public housing authorities was selected for study: Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo, OH) and Cuyahoga, Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, OH). These sites were chosen for a number of reasons including first, the completeness of information at hand regarding their anti-crime programs, and second, the range of programmatic content that was sought by HUD. Each site had a particular program emphasis: Toledo offered youth employment, while Cleveland proposed modernization (installation of security hardware and environmental redesign). Last, the author's first-hand knowledge of each site was facilitated by numerous on-site visits to each location over the course of the evaluation.

The fundamental objective of this dissertation is to present a process evaluation of the implementation of this anti-crime program, that is, to determine (describe) what actually happened in the sample of housing projects, as a result of the authorization, funding, and general political and bureaucratic momentum generated by the anti-crime program. Through careful observation of the programmatic activities of the funding sources, this process evaluation will ask the

following questions: (a) what was the character of each program?, (b) how much activity was generated?, and (c) what factor(s) seemed to play important role(s) in determining the levels, shapes, and timing of the various programs?

In seeking to determine and characterize what actually happened in the sample of PHA's included in this study, it is important to emphasize that this study does not assume that the course of events in each site was powerfully shaped by HUD, by the anti-crime proposal developed by the PHA and accepted by HUD, or by the tenants of the "target" projects, or even by the decisions of the housing authority anti-crime staff. All these factors might have been important in giving shape to the program. Additionally, at the sites there might have been existing institutions with their own limited set of interests and capabilities which were simply re-invigorated by the federal anti-crime monies and continued to do what they had been doing in the past. The point is that this study attempts to: (a) identify the policy-decision process at the various levels of government; (b) describe the implementation process--those steps taken to field the program; and (c) describe program outputs or activities. This evaluation does not focus on program outcomes, which is not to say they are not important, they are. However, due to the size and complexity of the broader evaluation, only the implementation issue is discussed in this dissertation.

Evaluation of Process: A Design

This study is part of a larger evaluation conducted for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. In the larger evaluation HUD specified that it would address seven program areas--those were discussed earlier--and the evaluation would include both (a) an impact assessment, and (b) a detailed process evaluation. HUD specified that the process evaluation would include:

1. Description of the relevant environment into which a program is introduced
2. Description of the process by which a program is implemented or fails to be implemented
3. Continuous measurement of the experimental program's operations over time
4. Identification of proximate and intermediate effects of the program
5. Identification of intervening events that affect implementation and project outcomes
6. Attribution of causality in implementation and in assessing program performance
7. Identification of unanticipated consequences
8. Provide judgments useful for prescriptive policy analysis and management of similar programs in the future

The process evaluation addresses these issues by conceptualizing the problem of crime and security within public housing in terms of "self-defense-capabilities." That is, three factors thought to

influence the ability to create self-defense capacities of public housing were identified:

1. The capacity of the housing project to provide economic, recreational, and social opportunities to residents who would otherwise be troublemakers in the project

2. The physical arrangements that create convenient and inconvenient opportunities to commit offenses with some assurance that they will go undetected (e.g., hallways, lighting, ease of entry and exit, etc.)

3. The vigilance of the community and the willingness to mobilize police or to intervene on the behalf of apparent victims.

Though this conceptualization refines the manner in which to view the task at hand, there remains a wide and diverse range of issues to be addressed by the process evaluation. To know everything about all the seven major program elements and their arrangement of importance in each site at the outset of the evaluation would be impossible. Therefore, information would have to be collected selectively, interpreted, and translated back to an action context.¹⁸ To make this possible, the process evaluation would have to approach its task with either an explicit or an implicit frame of reference--whether it be called a theory, a conceptual framework, or an ideographic map.¹⁹

¹⁸C. Argyris, "Using Qualitative Data to Test Theories: Review Essay," Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 672-279.

¹⁹J. Van Maanen, "Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organizational Research," Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 520.

Such a frame of reference would limit data collection to the areas assumed to be the most relevant. Although the degree of required focusing could/would change from site to site, in this program evaluation that would be viewed as necessary and an important element to account for activities and developments across sites. The need for standardization in the collection of qualitative data becomes apparent. Developing a frame of reference provides a way to standardize methods and perspectives and can be of practical value in training and managing data collectors. Ultimately, it also guides the interpretation of the data and facilitates translating the findings back into the action context.

Data for the process evaluation will be drawn from:

- Observation of relevant actors and groups (families, residents, public housing authority staff, program staff, resident groups, service agency staff, etc.)
- Informal interviews with the same sources as above
- Formal interviews (questionnaires standardized for use in all sites, for use with PHA staff, program staff, other relevant groups and individuals)
- Document review (grant proposal(s), agency record analysis, memos, letters, etc.)

Overview

This dissertation will be presented in six chapters. The problem under examination, and the importance of implementation issues in the development of federal programs such as Urban Initiatives

Anti-Crime Program in Public Housing have been outlined in Chapter I. A synthesis of the crime prevention literature, to include the development of the concept of crime prevention, a focus on community (collective) crime prevention efforts, and the problem of crime in public housing is presented in Chapter II. The research design of the process evaluation for this federal anti-crime initiative is examined in Chapter III. A presentation of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority case studies is presented in Chapter IV. A cross-site analysis of the case studies is discussed in Chapter V. And, the conclusions and recommendations are offered in Chapter VI.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Since the 1960's, the topic of crime has had a prominent place on the list of concerns for those who reside in the United States. According to Wesley Skogan, there is good reason:

Postwar trends in violent and serious property crime sketch a clear pattern: low rates relative to the size of the population from 1946 to 1964, then a dramatic upturn between 1964 and 1975. During the first period the officially recorded rate of violent crime (incidents per thousand persons in the population) rose from 1.1 to 1.3; during the second period it jumped to a high of 4.8, a 337 percent increase. The smallest component of the increase was contributed by the murder rate. Murders were relatively infrequent, and from a low in 1957 of only .04 murders per thousand to a high in 1979 of .10, the homicide rate rose "only" 150 percent. . . . Major assaults climbed 375 percent during the post war period to a high of 2.3 per thousand, while robbery jumped 543 percent to 6.2 per thousand. . . . The most serious property crime, burglary . . . increased 500 percent during 1946-1975 period, from a low of 2.5 per thousand to a high of over 15 per thousand persons.²⁰

To document exactly why crime surged in the United States, as it did, is a very complex task. The increase was not simply a result of better reporting and measurement, but such factors as the promoting of law and order issues in the 1964 Presidential election, public fear

²⁰ Wesley G. Skogan, "Crime in Contemporary America," in Violence in America, eds.: H. G. Graham and T. R. Gurr, rev. ed. (New York: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 376-377.

as a result of the civil disorders that occurred during the summers of 1965, 1966, and 1967; and a series of controversial U.S. Supreme Court decisions. These are only a few of the major issues that promoted crime, the fear of crime, and the desire to control crime, to achieve a special conspicuousness in the development of the Nation's Urban Policies. The Federal government, believing it had the responsibility to establish a "get tough" policy on crime,²¹ authorized numerous commissions and supported various task forces to examine the problem of crime in America (see Appendix C). Many recommendations were made, however, the most prominent proposals advocated organizational and structural reforms of the justice complex to manage the crime problem. Specifically, these groups urged the unification, consolidation, and the integration of criminal justice agencies and services.

The concept of community crime prevention (citizen involvement), also drew support from just about every national commission or special task force report that examined the crime problems in America,²² however, the idea was not taken seriously by justice policy makers as a strategy of importance. Part of the reason for this was the nation's long investment and belief that crime control rested with

²¹For an in-depth discussion of these issues, consult Thomas E. Cronin, Taniz Z. Cronin, and Michael E. Milakovich, U.S. v Crime in the Streets (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), specifically Chapter 4: Legislating for the War on Crime; Chapter 5: Law and Order in the 1968 Election; and Chapter 6: Launching the War on Crime.

²²Particularly strong supportive statements can be found in the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, and the 1973 National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals.

paid, uniformed professionals--the police. From the mid-1900's (the beginning of the new police reform era) policing, thought by many to be the soul of the justice complex, was reshaped in ways significantly different from the past. Changed were the sources of police legitimacy, tactics, technology, management practices, and the standards by which the police were to be judged. The "new" police became much more focused on criminal apprehension: oriented to the enforcement of laws and became surprisingly unaccountable to elected officials. In addition, they increasingly used management principles derived from the ideas inherent in scientific management in an effort to become more efficient and only reluctantly provided or supported order maintenance and other social service activity. Though the reform period lessened corruption and improved the management of policing, two of the major goals of the reform period, the consequences were that it "down-graded" community order maintenance activities and removed the public from much of the responsibility for crime prevention. These are important points, for they have had a powerful impact on shaping crime prevention activity in the last twenty years.

While the nation has wanted to believe that government leadership would be able to reduce crime and the fear of crime (as a nation we have historically relied upon our government to solve society's complex and overwhelming problems), and the professional police reform model was the appropriate strategy for effecting crime, the fact is that the complexity of the crime issue is such that we realize that there are limits in the government's ability to intervene. Therefore,

we must develop more comprehensive strategies to solve the problem of crime.

This brief introduction has endeavored to describe the context in which the concept of community crime prevention has been placed. The remainder of this chapter attempts to provide a theoretical understanding for the design of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime program. Specifically reviewed is the literature that addressed community (collective) crime prevention. Community (collective) crime prevention refers to private citizens acting together in neighborhoods, block groups, and organizations either formally or informally, to do something about crime. Not included in this discussion are organized responses of criminal justice organizations or officials.

This review of the literature is not long, for two reasons: (1) there has been far less research conducted on collective crime prevention responses than on individual crime prevention efforts,²³ and (2) much of the literature documenting the crime problem in public housing projects is the work of every small group of people.

This chapter is divided into two major sections. First, there is a discussion of the development of contemporary community crime prevention and its various forms. The second half of this chapter focuses on the problem of crime in public housing, specifically the

²³The distinction between individual and collective crime prevention is really for examination purposes. Individual crime prevention practices are, in fact, part of crime prevention actions, and it is difficult at times to make a clean distinction between the two. For this study, individual crime prevention activity will mean that the individual is the unit of analysis, responsible for his/her activity. This study is concerned with collective actions in formal and informal settings.

extent of the problem, three factors thought to contribute to the crime problem and concludes with the importance of those factors for the design of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in public housing.

The Development of Contemporary Community Crime Prevention

Contemporary community crime prevention has its beginning in the 1930's in the work of two University of Chicago sociologists, Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay. Shaw and McKay had developed a delinquency prevention program based on the belief that juvenile delinquency was a product of neighborhood disorganization rather than individual disability.²⁴ Their study, the Chicago Area Project (CAP) sought to organize low income areas through indigenous leaders and self-help community organizations in order to contribute to the welfare of juveniles.²⁵ The reason this work was so influential was its emphasis on indigenous leadership and community fieldwork. It emphasized contact with youth gangs.

The direct result of this early research were a number of studies conducted in the 1950's and 1960's which "examined the spatial co-variation of crime and delinquency with populations and housing characteristics that had come to be associated with social

²⁴Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).

²⁵S. Korbin, "The Chicago Area Project: A 25 Year Assessment," Annals of the American Academy of Political Science (March 1959).

disorganization--racial and ethnic minorities, high density, poverty, single person households, rental housing, and residential instability."²⁶

In the past ten years or so, the concept of community/collective crime prevention has gained much more support than it had at either time in the 1950's or 60's. In part, this is due to a change in the thinking of the police,²⁷ as well as federal and state justice officials, about the importance of citizen involvement in community crime prevention efforts. At the federal level, there has been the creation of the Office of Community Anti-Crime Programs within the National Institute of Justice, to oversee and assist the development of community anti-crime programs. Even as recently as 1981, the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime acknowledged that there is a need for more citizen involvement in the management of crime prevention measures. The task force encouraged the development of self-regulating neighborhoods and communities as recognition of the limits of government in a free society.

What is evident from this interest is the basic assumption of publicly sponsored crime prevention (active citizen involvement in the justice complex) has gained not only recognition, but legitimacy from public officials. As a recently published guide about community crime prevention states:

²⁶Greenberg, et al., Informal Social Control, p. 3.

²⁷William K. Hart, Comments on citizen crime prevention quoted in Tempo 4(1) (January 1982).

. . . in the absence of citizen assistance, neither more police nor incarceration and improved technology can, effectively combat crime. Self-protection and insulation become the major theme of citizens who have lost faith in the ability of the law enforcement/criminal justice system to abate crime, and in the collective ability and power of community residents to address the problem, marshal resources and increase neighborhood safety. . . . Citizen involvement in the effort can make a difference. There are indications that where a sustained, well-organized citizen anti-crime activity is being carried on, neighborhood stability and security is enhanced, citizen reporting of crime increases, visible deterrents against crime are established, and overall police-community relations improved. . . . One of the most beneficial effects of citizen involvement in crime prevention is the increased neighborhood interaction it fosters and its role in restoring concepts of mutual assistance, civic responsibility, and accountability.²⁸

The emergence of such responses can be attributed to a number of developments; however, there seem to be four general factors that have influenced the development of community crime prevention.

1. Increasing Level of Crime and the Fear of Crime: Previously described was the dramatic increase in the crime rates from 1964 to 1974. Whether or not the increase was actually as dramatic as the statistical information indicates, the fact remains that this information was powerful in shaping the public's and governmental officials' attitudes and beliefs about crime. The public continues to believe that the nation has a crime problem, despite the fact that the social indicators detect that some serious crimes have peaked and others have declined. Nevertheless, there is the fear of crime problem. According to a recent report:

²⁸Citizens Involvement Network, A Community Guide to Crime Prevention (Washington, D.C.: Office of Police Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, August 1977).

. . . More than 40% of the U.S. Population is afraid that they will be a victim of a serious incident, e.g., murder, rape, robbery, or an assault if they walk alone in their neighborhoods at night. . . . Crime and the fear of crime have like a dark dye, permeated the fabric of American life.²⁹

Whether this is an exaggeration of the perceptual data is immaterial; for both citizens and public officials believe that the risk of crime has increased and that is justification enough to influence public policy.

2. A Sense of Limits of Government's Ability to Solve Social Problems: Despite the fact that as a nation, we have historically looked to our government to solve society's complex problems, and believed that government had the capacity to do so, we now realize that relying on the government would be abdicating responsibility. Reports have cited the inability of the schools to teach,³⁰ hospitals to provide health care,³¹ correctional institutions to provide rehabilitation,³² and the inability of the police to manage crime.³³ This

²⁹The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime: America Afraid, A-T-O, Inc., September 16, 1980; also see Gallop Polls quoted in U.S. News and World Report, 12 January 1980, p. 49.

³⁰James Coleman, et al., Equality and Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

³¹Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis (Institute for Social Research, 1976).

³²Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks, Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment: A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies (Springfield, MA: Prager, 1975).

³³Gerald Caplan, "Reflections on the Nationalization of Crime, 1964-1968," Law and the Social Order 3 (1973): 583-635; George L. Kelling, "Police Field Services and Crime," Crime and Delinquency 24 (1978): 173-184; Ann M. Newton, "Prevention of Crime and Delinquency," Criminal Justice Abstracts 10 (1978): 245-266.

growing sense of the limits of governmental institutions has led citizens and public officials to devise programs that emphasize shared responsibility as a means of augmenting and/or replacing the works of government.

3. The Mobilization of the "Community Movement": Beginning with the Kennedy Administration, when the call for citizens to participate in government was made, the "community movement" gained its strength. Community organizations, welfare rights groups, and minority organizations, as well as neighborhood groups, all had their political birth during this intense civil rights era.³⁴ Since this period, community organizations have become powerful local political institutions. They have, in many locations, developed broad agendas, using the crime problem, not only to gain visibility, but political respect.

4. Criminal Justice Agencies have begun to Encourage Citizen Participation: As a consequence of numerous factors, criminal justice agencies have now begun to actively encourage citizen participation. The community movement, concerned with the rising rates of crime, and the sense of the limits of governmental agencies, have persuaded justice officials to rethink their strategies of crime movement. Evidence is mounting that justice officials are retreating from the belief that only the professionals are responsible for the control of crime.³⁵ While some officials believe this involvement is an attempt

³⁴Daniel Bell and Virginia Held, "The Community Revolution," Public Interest 19 (Summer, 1969): 142-177.

³⁵Jon VanTil, "Citizen Participation in Criminal Justice: Opportunity, Constraint, and the Arrogance of the Law," Journal of Voluntary Action Research 4(1-2) (1975): 69-74; George L. Kelling,

to demonstrate that citizens will not participate if given the opportunity and, therefore, the goal of community crime prevention will not be met; others believe that the increased citizen involvement indicates that we have entered a new phase of crime management--self-help. Program funds have been made available at all levels of government to encourage programs of citizen involvement.

Range of Community [Collective] Crime Prevention Responses

The range of approaches and the type/emphasis of community (collective) crime prevention responses varies considerably. There have been attempts to classify responses,³⁶ but none has done an adequate job, since so little is known about the dynamics (processes) of community crime prevention approaches, due in part to the lack of descriptive research.

The following discussion is a general outline of the different types of collective crime prevention responses. By no means are these types of responses mutually exclusive. The fact is there is a good deal of overlap in the practice of these approaches. This general sorting of prevention responses is presented only to get an understanding of what is available.

"Order Maintenance, Quality of Urban Life, and Police: A Line of Argument," paper in preparation, 1983; James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, "Broken Windows," Atlantic Monthly (March 1982): 29-38.

³⁶Leonard Bickman, et al., Citizen Crime Reporting Projects: Final Report I and V, National Evaluation Program, Phase I Report Applied Social Psychology Program (Chicago: Loyola University, 1976; Robert K. Yin, et al., Patrolling the Public Beat: Building Residents and Residential Patrols (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1976).

1. Crime Control Responses: This type of response is the most frequently organized and studied collective crime prevention activity. It is an approach that emphasizes surveillance (identification) of potentially illegal behavior (individuals committing such) and the intervention to apprehend (rapid reporting to the authorities of the offender's behavior and actions.) In the late 60's, when this activity first appeared, many were citizens' patrols concerned with monitoring police activity in an effort to pressure the police for better crime control efforts.³⁷ Now these types of efforts have become more passive in their activities, oriented more to surveillance and reporting. The form these crime control responses usually take are citizen patrols that concentrate on residential or street surveillance within neighborhoods or high rise apartment buildings.

2. Crime Prevention Responses: This response refers to efforts that attempt to correct the causes of crime (social, economic, and environment). For example, crime prevention responses may attempt to correct the lack of employment opportunities, improve standards/conditions of housing, provide better recreation facilities and supervision, and in the absence of social cohesion, create community solidarity.³⁸ Often, however, collective crime prevention responses employ

³⁷Gary T. Marx and Dane Archer, "Community Police Patrols and Vigilantism," in Vigilante Politics, eds.: H. Jon Rosenbaum and Peter C. Sendensberg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), pp. 129-157.

³⁸The term social solidarity refers to the disposition of the members of the community. Percy Cohen has noted: "The solidarity of a group, a quasi-group, or collectivity is a readiness to act in concert for certain purposes. . . . Solidarity in any social system may derive from interests which stem from internal social relations, or it

youth and improve residential security by urging "target hardening" efforts, e.g., installation of better locks, using timers on lights, engraving valuable property, etc. Additional efforts may include educational meetings conducted by police officers or security experts as to the techniques that make one more vigilant to crime.

3. Social Service Responses: Community crime prevention programs that fall under this category are typically victim/witness assistance services. There have been, however, some programs that provide elderly escort services, neighbor telephone checks, drug and alcohol referral services, telephone "hot-line" reporting services, youth recreation, educational instruction (GED), etc. By no means does this list of activities complete the range of activities included under this heading. For many programs this category has been a "catch-all" for programmatic activity that has not "fit" into either of the other two.

The program emphasis that these general types of responses can undertake is very diverse. For example, collective responses can be focused on one type of crime, burglary or robbery in most instances, or they can deal with a range of crimes depending upon how comprehensive and intense the community determines it wants to make the effort. Under some circumstances, it is possible for crime-focused organizations to take a multi-issue orientation. Organizers, using crime as a mobilizing issue, gain community support and then when

may result from external pressures or as is common, it may result from both." Percy S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 135.

community concern lessons, re-focus on other issues, e.g., sanitation, street repair, and so forth. More typically, however, community organizations add the crime issue to their agenda as a means of gaining visibility or revitalizing their organization after they have dealt with other issues.

Crime in Public Housing

In order to understand the crime problem in public housing, it is necessary to assess the size and importance of public housing to the nation's cities. The purpose for which public housing was initially developed was to ensure decent and affordable housing for the nation's low and moderate income families. Since 1940 it has grown to be an important factor in meeting the housing needs of many Americans. For example, "In 1970 there were 2.7 million people--over 1 percent of the nation's population--living in federally aided public housing."³⁹ Eight years later the "investment" in public housing for the large cities had grown even greater. As public housing scholar Raymond Struyk has pointed out:

. . . In 1978, for big cities [the 31 with populations over 400,000] public housing is a significant investment of the available housing stock, as 29 cities represented 31 percent (373,500) housing units] of the national program; the 2,900 other authorities administered the remaining 814,000 units. Further, under the system used to dispense operating subsidies, these few Authorities absorbed 58 percent of all such subsidies provided by the federal government for the 1976-1977 fiscal year.⁴⁰

³⁹A. P. Solomon, Housing the Urban Poor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), Appendix A, p. 5.

⁴⁰R. J. Struyk, A New System for Public Housing (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980), p. 5.

While we have an assessment of the physical conditions of the nation's public housing stock and its importance to the housing needs of low-income persons, we do not have a national picture of the crime problem in public housing. Much of what is known about public housing problems has been learned from the large housing authorities located in the big cities, and what we know about crime in public housing (fear, victimization) has come from those same big cities. Therefore, the literature documenting the crime problem in public housing is neither extensive, nor adequate to describing or measuring the crime problem. There is some information, however, that indicates crime and the fear of crime are issues that warrant the attention of those who fund, manage, and operate public housing.

There is little need to re-state how crime has affected citizens in the United States. Not all segments of the population are equally affected by crime.⁴¹ Some groups are more vulnerable than others, especially residents of public housing. Just how much more vulnerable is the question.

Research conducted by William Brill in 1976 in the Millvale Housing Project in Cincinnati, and the Murphy Homes in Baltimore in 1977, found the reported average robbery rate per 1,000 persons 21.8 and 114.1, respectively.⁴² When compared to the national average,

⁴¹Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization in the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1977).

⁴²William Brill and Associates, Millvale Safety and Security Evaluation, Cincinnati Housing Authority, 1976; also, William Brill and Associates, Comprehensive Security Planning: A Program for Murphy Homes, Baltimore, Maryland (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing

approximately 6.5 robberies per 1,000 persons, reported in 1977 by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, these figures for public housing developments were extremely high. Similarly in the Nickerson Gardens in Los Angeles, Brill found the reported assault rate to be 49.8 per 1,000 persons,⁴³ in contrast to the national average, again reported by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to be 25.3 per 1,000 persons.⁴⁴ As there are not sufficient data available from other public housing authorities to present a national assessment of crime in public housing, these figures cannot be considered representative information. They are, however, an indication that the issue of crime in public housing is in need of further investigation.

Similarly, like the incidents of robbery and assault, fear of crime was also found to be as intense in public housing. Research conducted by Rosenthal et al.,⁴⁵ Perlmut,⁴⁶ and Brill found fear of crime a significant concern among residents. Brill's research of

and Urban Development, Office of Police Development and Research (Special Report), 1975.

⁴³Brill, Comprehensive Security Planning.

⁴⁴Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Criminal Victimization in the United States.

⁴⁵S. J. Rosenthal, et al., Developing a Comprehensive Security Program in Public Housing (Philadelphia, PA: The Housing Management Institute, Center for Social Policy and Community Development, Temple University, 1974).

⁴⁶D. J. Perlmut, Security in HUD: Subsidized and Insured Multi-Family Housing Projects: An Analysis of the Problems and Some Proposals for the Future, prepared for the National Housing Law Report, Berkeley, California, 1978.

four housing developments in the Boston Housing Authority,⁴⁷ reported that 60 percent or more of the respondents believed it very dangerous to:

- Wait for a bus alone at night (75 percent)
- Go to shopping areas at night (71 percent)
- Ride the elevator in their public housing complexes at night (63 percent)
- Walk down the hallway in their public housing complex at night (60 percent)

Among elderly residents of public housing, fear of crime is an especially prominent concern. Though the research is limited, it indicates that the elderly believe they are more vulnerable and as a result, behave as though they are more vulnerable by locking themselves in their apartments and altering their style of living.⁴⁸

Unfortunately, the literature indicates that little is known about the extent and impact of crime in public housing. While the issue of crime has always been a concern to housing administrators, most have only approached its control from a physical environmental design perspective. Public housing has always had funds available for modernization development. Few funds, however, have been available for

⁴⁷William Brill and Associates, Victimization, Fear of Crime, and Altered Behavior: A Profile of Four Housing Projects in Boston (Washington, D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1975).

⁴⁸M. Lawton, L. Nahemov, S. Yaffe, and S. Feldman, "Psychological Aspects of Crime and Fear of Crime," in Crime and the Elderly, eds. Jack Goldsmith and Sharon Goldsmith (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1976).

handling social problems like community crime prevention. Nevertheless, factors that contribute to the crime problem in public housing can be identified from the research and literature.

Factors Contributing to Crime in Public Housing

Despite the fact that the crime prevention literature on crime prevention in public housing is not extensive, a broad review of it identifies three factors that appear to contribute to the crime problem: physical design characteristics, social factors, and governance policy. The following discussion of these factors is not meant to be extensive, but helpful in understanding why the seven elements of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program were important.

1. Physical Design Characteristics: In 1961 the idea of physical design affecting community interaction and crime was introduced. Jane Jacobs, in her study of American cities, observed that crime and the physical environment were directly related in a systematic, observable, and controllable manner. According to Jacobs, there are three essential environmental characteristics that must be present for public areas to be safe:

First, there must be a clear demarcation between what is public and what is private space. Public and private space cannot ooze into each other as they do typically in a suburban setting or in projects. Second, there must be eyes upon the street, eyes belonging to those we might call the natural proprietors of the street. . . . And third, the side-walk must have users on it fairly continuously, both to add to the number of effective eyes on the street and to induce the people in buildings along the street to watch the sidewalks in sufficient numbers.⁴⁹

⁴⁹Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, p. 35.

The thesis of these characteristics is that the physical environment, through surveillance, deters crime as it increases the risk of apprehension. The theoretical importance of Jacobs' work is its contribution to understanding how the physical environment affects an increase or decrease in crime. Other scholars, namely Oscar Newman and C. R. Jeffery have since refined and expanded Jacobs' notion--Newman with his work in public housing,⁵⁰ and Jeffery with his development of a theoretical framework for environmental crime prevention based on the criminological concepts of deterrence and rehabilitation.⁵¹ What scholars and practitioners have found in the relationship between physical design characteristics and crime is that:

First, the physical environment can independently prevent crime [or make it difficult] through "target hardening." Second, changes in the physical environment can change the behavior of residents in ways that increase the likelihood that an offender will be impeded and/or apprehended. Third, regardless what the residents do, the physical design of the environment can deter an offender from choosing a particular location as a target. Lastly, the combined impact of the above three can be made even stronger if there is consideration given to the social factors of crime and if residents are actively involved in the planning and implementation of the crime prevention programs.⁵²

2. Social Factors Contributing to Crime: Where the physical design characteristics have had a large role in contributing to the defense of crime and the fear of crime in public housing, social

⁵⁰Newman, Defensible Space.

⁵¹C. R. Jeffery, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977).

⁵²W. V. Rouse and H. Rubenstein, Crime and Public Housing (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Neighborhood Initiatives. American Institutes for Research), in preparation.

factors seem to have a hand in the crime problem in public housing. Housing Administrators and the researchers who have examined public housing agree that social factors--broadly defined to include lack of social services for drug abuse, alcohol abuse, crisis intervention, employment opportunities--contribute to the vulnerability of residents. These social factors seem to inhibit residents from developing a sense of social integration and cohesion. The lack of tenant participation in community activities has lessened their sense of community control.

3. Governance Policy: The third factor that the crime prevention literature broadly identifies as having an effect on the crime problem in public housing is governance policy. Governance policy is defined here as those activities that public housing officials do in operating and regulating Authorities with respect to crime and security.

The governance structure of public housing is such that it places the responsibility on the local housing authority to decide what and how it will provide security for its tenants. Housing administrators have many options from establishing their own security force to relying on local law enforcement. In addition, public housing authorities can establish internal management policy with respect to security matters, e.g., tenant screening and eviction guidelines. While this may seem like PHA's have substantial control over establishing policy for crime control, the fact is that authorities are severely restricted.

One of the most serious limitations administrators confront is the lack funds made available for security matters. If an authority determines it wants to create its own security department, there are no special funding provisions available from the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Housing authorities have to either allocate funds from its operations subsidy, or seek resources through grants. Providing any level of formal security, like a security force, is an expensive task to undertake as well as difficult to administer. For many PHA's, there is a need for a security force,⁵³ but grant funds do not last long enough to allow for proper training or the establishment of a work culture. In addition, because grant monies are so uncertain, it is difficult for housing authorities to plan their security programs. Housing administrators have felt for some time that if policies were established at the Federal level which provided for stable fundings that the quality of life in developments would improve. Residents would feel comfortable knowing that the authority had the capacity to respond to their security requests.

Another policy problem for PHA officials that contributes to the crime problem in public housing is the difficulty they experience in evicting tenants that engage in anti-social behavior. Court opinions have been very cautious about giving Authority's the ability to evict tenants without substantial just cause. While this has frustrated local officials, the rulings have outlined the policies and

⁵³Perlgut, Security in HUD-Subsidized and Insured Multi-Family Housing Projects.

strategies they need to adopt. In a paper presented at a HUD conference in 1978, the Columbus, Georgia Housing Authority stated:

Recent Court cases, revisions to the landlord tenant laws, and the Legal Aid Society, have virtually destroyed our traditional tool, eviction. Since we [the Public Housing Authority] must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the undesirable tenants, we must have at our disposal a trained staff of investigative and enforcement personnel.

Conclusion

This literature review began by outlining how the topic of crime has come to be such a prominent issue, and how it has effected social policy at both federal and state government. Important to this discussion was the subject of community crime prevention and why, within the past decade, it has gained in popularity as a strategy for controlling crime. Focal to its popularity is its basic assumption, active citizen involvement in the prevention of crime.

The central theme of this chapter, however, was crime in public housing. Discussed was the importance of public housing and why crime is/seems to be a problem. Unfortunately, the literature documenting crime in public housing is neither extensive, nor well-developed in describing the problem. What is known, however, about crime and the fear of crime in public housing is that it is much more extensive than most people had anticipated.

Three general factors were identified as contributing to the problem of crime: physical design, social conditions, and governing policy. These were the three factors around which the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was designed. The crime prevention

literature noted that the type of community crime prevention program most effective were those that closely integrated these three factors.

CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF STUDY

Introduction

This study is a process evaluation designed to examine the implementation of a multi-element anti-crime program developed and funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development for local public housing authorities. The research sites selected for this dissertation are a subset, drawn from the large evaluation project conducted by the author while employed by the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management at Harvard University.

Ideally, when designing and conducting intensive evaluation research of a social intervention, such as an anti-crime program, procedures to maximize causal inference should be followed. These procedures are possible with the application of true experimental designs (Pretest-Posttest Control Group Designs)⁵⁴ which allow the experimenter direct manipulation of factors (treatment and contextual variables) to be studied, through the randomization of treatment variables,

⁵⁴Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1963).

controlling for internal and external validity issues.⁵⁵ However, when conducting evaluation research of a social intervention, limitations arise which make the use of true experimental designs extremely difficult, if not impossible, due to the complexity of the research task. Such was the case in this study.

In the overall evaluation, the Department of Housing and Urban Development specified that the evaluation address the seven program areas (previously discussed in Chapter I) and that the evaluation include both: (a) an impact assessment, and (b) a detailed process evaluation. The impact assessment was to focus on before/after analysis of crime, victimization, vandalism, youth employment, fear of crime, and related behaviors and attitudes. The process evaluation was to provide a detailed account of what anti-crime activities were planned, implemented, and maintained. Circumstances were such that true experimental designs were not feasible as there was neither random selection of research sites nor the ability to randomly select control group sites due to "nuances" of the HUD selection and funding process. Additionally, the issue of site selection/funding, affected evaluator control of the actual implementation as well as intervention activities, which allowed for a variety of unmeasured, as well as unknown factors to influence the projects and their outcomes.

⁵⁵ Internal validity is the degree to which observed changes in the dependent variable can be attributed to the assumed casual variable rather than some other factor including measurement of description of error. External validity refers to the generalizability of findings beyond the confines of the particular study.

Evaluation of Process

In the larger evaluation effort, HUD stipulated that the process evaluation include the following:

1. Description of the relevant environment into which the program is introduced
2. Description of the process by which a program is implemented or fails to be implemented
3. Continuous measurement of the experimental program's operation over time
4. Identification of proximate and intermediate effects of the program
5. Identification of intervening events that affect implementation and project outcomes
6. Attribution of causality in implementation and in assessing program performance
7. Identification of unanticipated consequences
8. Provide judgments useful for prescriptive policy analysis and management of similar programs in the future

The process evaluation addressed these issues by conceptualizing the problems of crime and security within public housing in terms of "self defense capabilities." That is, three factors thought to influence the ability to create self-defense capabilities of public housing were identified:

1. The capacity of the housing project to provide economic, recreational, and social opportunities to residents who would otherwise be trouble-makers in the project
2. The physical arrangements that create convenient and inconvenient opportunities to commit offenses with some assurance that they will go undetected (e.g., hallways, lighting, ease of entry and exit etc.).
3. The vigilance of the community and the willingness to mobilize police or to intervene on behalf of apparent victims

Though this conceptualization refined the manner in which to view the task at hand, there remained such a wide and diverse range of issues to be addressed by the process evaluation that to know everything about all the seven major program elements and their arrangements of importance in each of the sixteen evaluation PHA's at the outset of the evaluation would have been impossible. Therefore, it was determined that information needed to be collected selectively, interpreted, and translated back to the action context.⁵⁶ To make this possible, the process evaluation would have to approach its task with either an explicit or an implicit frame of reference--whether it be called a theory, a conceptual framework, or as Van Maanen has

⁵⁶C. Argyris, "Using Qualitative Data to Test Theories: Review Essay," Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 672-679.

described, an ideographic map. According to Van Maanen ideographic maps are a convention of qualitative methods that:

. . . originate when a researcher figuratively puts brackets around a temporal and spatial domain of the social world. These brackets define the territory about which descriptions are fashioned. These descriptions are essentially ideographic maps of the territory which must be read and interpreted by the investigator if any nomothetic statements are to result from this study. Doing description is the fundamental act of data collection in a qualitative study. But the map cannot be considered the territory because the map is a reflexive product of the map makers invention. The map maker sees himself quite as much as he sees the territory. There are however better and worse maps and qualitative researchers seek to construct good ones by moving closer to the territory they study in the physical sense as well as in the intellectual sense by maximizing the use of such artificial distancing mechanisms as analytic labels, abstract hypotheses and formulated research strategies.⁵⁷

Such a frame of reference would limit data collection to the areas assumed to be the most relevant, and the degree of required focusing would more than likely change from site to site. In this program evaluation that would be viewed as necessary and an important element to capture implementation activities and program developments across sites. Additionally developing such a frame of reference would provide a means to standardize methods and perspectives that would be of practical value in training and managing data collectors. Ultimately, it would guide the interpretation of the data and facilitate translating the findings back into the action context.

To suggest, however, that there are systematic, highly developed theories of program initiation, implementation, and

⁵⁷J. Van Maanen, "Reclaiming Qualitative Methods for Organizational Research," Administrative Science Quarterly 24(4) (December 1979): 520.

performance would be a bit overstated. There is, nevertheless, an applicable literature⁵⁸ that assisted in forming a frame of reference or guide to asking the "right" questions about the activities (events). Such an "ideographic map" is presented in Table 3.1. Conceptualization of the anti-crime program in this fashion allowed for the identification of a variety of forces (pre-conditions, actors, ideas, and skills) likely to have great impact on the initiation, implementation, and performance of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, as well as the understanding of what data/information needed to be collected at each stage.

Data Collection

Observer Selection

To collect process data and information, the evaluation proposal for the overall study specified that a person be hired part-time (twenty hours per week) in each of the evaluation sites as the on-site process data observer. The use of observers for data collection has proven to be an excellent technique in other large-scale and complex evaluation research projects as long as data collection was

⁵⁸Paul Berman and M. W. McLaughlin, Federal Programs Supporting Educational Change: Implementing and Sustaining Innovations R1589/S-- HEW, 1979; Mary Ann Wycoff and George Kelling, The Dallas Experience: Organizational Reform (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1979); Jerald Hage and Michael Aiken, Social Change in Complex Organizations (New York: Random House, 1970); K. Knight, "A Descriptive Model of the Intra-Firm Innovation Process," Journal of Business 40 (October 1967): 478-496; Nancy Milo, "Health Care Organizations and Innovations," Journal of Health and Social Behavior 22 (1979): 163-173; Gerald Zaltman, Robert Duncan, and Jonny Holbek, Innovations and Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

Table 3.1.--Evaluation Ideographic Map

Activity (Event)		Data Source
City Political Actors		
Initiation	Encouragement (or lack of) to obtain outside funding	Interviews with political figures, PHA officials
	Provision of resources	Review of records
	Planning	
	Political Activity	
Implementation	Provision of Resources	Interviews with political figures
	Political Activities	Media Analysis
	Coordination between City and other agencies	Interviews with political figures, tenants Record review
	Program Ideas	Same as above
	"Start Up Activities"	Same as above
Performance	Coordination between City and other agencies	Interviews with political figures Record review Observation
	Provision of resources	Same as above
	Agency and Political support	Same as above
Public Housing Authority		
Initiation	Decision to apply for program	Interview PHA staff, City Officials, tenants leaders
	Draft Application	Review Agency Documents Interviews--Same as above
	Negotiate project plan with HUD	Same as above

Table 3.1.--Continued

Activity (Event)		Data Source
Implementation	Refine Program Plans	Interview PHA staff, City officials, tenant leaders
	Identification of vendors, consultants	Interview PHA staff, vendors, consultants
	Development of Program Staff	Interview PHA staff, Anti-Crime Program Staff, tenants, and tenant leaders
Performance	Project/Program Activities	Records review, Observation Interviews with Program Staff and Tenants
	Program Administration, Management, Coordination Activity	Observation, Interviews with Program Staff, tenants, and other relevant actors
Public Agencies		
Initiation	Definition of Crime Problem in Public Housing	Recorded Crime Data/ Records
	Present Police Practices and Strategies regarding crime in public housing	Interviews with Police, PHA officials, and tenant leaders
	Activity of Police in planning Anti-Crime Program	Interviews with Police, PHA officials, and tenant leaders
Implementation	Internal <u>planning</u> for new activities	Observation, Interviewing Police Officials
	Internal <u>training</u> for new activities	Same as above
	Internal planning to Administer new efforts	Same as above
Performance	Project Activity (i.e., police/tenant patrols team policing etc.)	Observation, interviews with police, PHA officials and tenants
	Administration, Supervision Management Activities	Interviews with police officials

Table 3.1.--Continued

Activity (Event)		Data Source
City and Social Service Agencies		
Initiation	Definition of Crime Problem in public housing	Interview agency officials, Review documents
	Support planning and Grant preparation	Same as above, Review agency documents
	Contribute/Agree to some level of participation in program	Same as above Observation
Implementation	Review Program Plans	Interview Agency and City Officials
	Review Process Materials applications, payments etc.	Interview Agency and City Officials Review Agency and departmental records
	Identify vendors, process bids	Same as above
Performance	Project Activities	Records, Observation, Interviews with tenants, community leaders, PHA, and City officials, etc.
	Project Support Activities	Same as above
	Administration, Supervision, management activities	Same as above
Residents and Resident Leaders		
Initiation	Generation of ideas regarding program design, form, and content	Interviews with tenants, tenant leaders, Housing Authority officials
	Political Activities within Housing Project. Internal/External forces influencing political/power distribution	Same as above Record Review Media Analysis
	Tenant Organization	Same as above

Table 3.1.--Continued

	Activity (Event)	Data Source
Implementation	Develop working patterns with PHA officials, consultants, and anti-crime staff	Observation Same as above
	Planning and Consulting in program development	Interview with tenants, tenant leaders, housing authority officials
Performance	Management of program elements, liaison, consult, advocate represent residents	Interviews with PAH officials, vendors, consultants and project staff
		Record Review
		Observation
Contractors and Vendors		
Initiation	Technological and Material capabilities	Record Review Interviews with HUD, PHA officials, and contractors and vendors
	Program Extensions of exisiting activity	Same as above
Implementation	Installing and/or providing goods and services	Record Review
		Interviews with tenants tenant leaders, PHA staff, and city officials
		Observations
Performance	Servicing and maintaining goods and services	Record Review
		Observation
		Interviews with tenants, tenant leaders, PHA staff, and city officials

Table 3.1.--Continued

Activity (Event)		Data Source
Media		
Initiation	Publicity about crime, housing, and anti-crime program	Media Analysis
		Interviews with PHA staff, residents, tenant leaders, political figures, and agency needs
	Publicity about particular residents living in the demonstration area	Same as above
Implementation	Publicity about plans for the Anti-Crime Program	Same as above
Performance	Publicity about the success or failure of the Anti-Crime Program	Same as above
Exeogeneous Events		
Initiation	Any random major event unpredictable happening in the demonstration area to effect the program, e.g., prolonged police strike, major fire, serious (heinous) crime event	Observation
		Media Analysis
	Any major serendipitous event, e.g., receipt of major grant, tenant elected mayor, etc.	Interviews with relevant actors and those affected by the event
Implementation	Same as above	Same as above
Performance	Same as above	Same as above

standardized, observers closely supervised, and the data collection process closely monitored.⁵⁹ Selection of quality observers was critical to the process evaluation; a great deal of effort was placed in selecting the best available persons for the position in each of the evaluation sites. An observer position description was developed that outlined the qualities sought in candidates (see Appendix D). At a minimum, candidates had to possess a bachelor's degree, as it was felt that completion of the academic experience demonstrated acceptable writing and communication skills, as well as a developed sense of discipline. In general, candidates were sought who were bright, pleasant, and articulate people that we believed would "fit" into the public housing environment comfortably. In the final analysis, however, it was probably more important that people displayed a sense of calm and maturity than anything else.

Most of the recruitment of candidates took place at colleges and universities located in or near the evaluation city. Staff visited academic departments (sociology, psychology, political science, anthropology, criminal justice), spoke with college Deans and department chairpersons, to locate potential candidates. Those people who expressed an interest in the position were asked to submit a resume, as well as supporting materials (course papers, published articles) they felt would be representative of their best analytic and written

⁵⁹George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1974); Mary Ann Wycoff, The Birmingham Anti-Robbery Project (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation (Unpublished manuscript)).

work. Thoroughness and writing ability were the two important factors that were screened for in the documents.

On-site time of senior staff was limited, and therefore, additional screening techniques (observational tests, practice interviews, or the checking of references) were not used in the selection process. Candidates were interviewed in person and based on their presentation of themselves, our impressions, and the needs of the site, persons were selected for an "advisory" interview conducted by housing authority staff and tenant leaders. (More will be said about the "advisory" interview shortly.)

During our interview with the candidates, they were asked numerous questions about themselves, their experience(s), academic work, and their future. For example, candidates were asked: Why they were interested in the position? Had they taken courses in criminal justice, criminology, sociology, research methods? Had they any experience(s) with crime, violence, the police, or the criminal justice system? What were their perceptions about public housing and residents? Did they have any familiarity with the demonstration area?, and so forth. During the course of the interview, candidates were provided as much information about the nature of the work to be performed as possible--what it meant to be a field observer, the conditions in which we anticipated they would be working, and that there would be no on-site supervision. And they were asked how they felt about these arrangements.

A concern of the evaluation staff in the selection of the on-site observer was sex and race; would such factors affect

acceptance by the subjects and would it have an impact on the quality of data collected? From the outset of the evaluation, staff knew that the residents of most of the demonstration areas were young, single females, heads of households with two or more dependents. Our concern was whether the observers should match the demographic characteristics of the demonstration area(s). It was decided that unless extenuating circumstances prohibited it, like the applicant pool did not include our criteria or the "best choice" did not meet the criteria, the observer should match the observed group.

Generally, the observer staff was recruited during the initial site visit made by the author. However, as the PHA and anti-crime program staffs were unaware how the evaluation was being conducted, time was spent informing the participants of the evaluation design and that the process evaluation group would have a part-time staff person "on-site" following their program developments: attending anti-crime meetings, interviewing residents and program staff about their perceptions of the program, reviewing program documents, and so forth. Needless to say, there was much anxiety and concern by program staff about the process evaluation having a person "watching" their program.

To lessen this concern and promote acceptance of the process evaluation, as well as facilitate entree of the observer into the anti-crime program, we asked the housing authority staff, anti-crime program staff, and resident leaders to participate in the selection of the on-site observer in an advisory capacity. This was done primarily out of concern that we might select someone who was unacceptable

or could not work with the group. Our data collection rested on the ability of the observer to be "accepted." It was made clear to the program principals that the evaluators would retain full responsibility for the selection, training, supervision, and firing of the observer.⁶⁰

The "bringing-in" of housing authority staff and resident leaders into the selection process had important meaning. Prior to this initial site visit, communications between program staff and the evaluators had been very limited and much concern [anxiety] had developed and was expressed about the evaluation. Public housing officials and program staff were concerned about the political impact of the evaluation and its ramifications. We, too, were concerned about this. By asking the principals to participate in the selection of the person who would be collecting the data seemed to communicate to them that the evaluators were committed to doing not only a proper/serious study, but were interested in working with the program staff and residents and respecting their position.

Observer training.--Prior to the observers' assuming their data collection role, they were required to attend an intensive three-day training session held in Chicago, Illinois. In preparation for this training, the observers were all sent a packet of readings designed

⁶⁰It turned out that by having the PHA staff, anti-crime staff, and resident leaders interview the observer candidates that the candidates were given time to rethink their decision, as well as ask questions about the program that we were not able to answer. Quality data collection meant that the observers had to feel comfortable with the situation as well, and this opportunity seemed to let every one have an opportunity to express his/her concerns.

to introduce them to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, the research design of the evaluation, public housing and poverty issues, and observation methods and techniques (see Appendix E for a list of the materials). Many of the observer staff had not been involved in research of this nature (doing observation) prior to their employment and it was believed by senior staff that these materials would give a brief, but adequate, introduction to what the observers would encounter in training, as well as in the field. The three-day training session was specifically designed to cover how to observe and interview persons, preparing the observers with a working knowledge of their PHA's anti-crime program components by component, how to use the data collection forms, and introduction to the rules and procedures they were working under and required to follow (what to do if they found themselves in situations they were uncomfortable with and if they thought they were in "trouble").

Data Collection Activity

The data that the observers were to collect were to be generally drawn from the following sources:

- Observation of relevant actors and groups (families, residents, public housing authority staff, program staff, resident groups, service agency staff, etc.)
- Informal interviews (questionnaires standardized for use in all sites, for use with PHA staff, program staff, other relevant groups, and individuals)

--Document review [grant proposal(s), agency record analysis, memo's, letters, etc.]

The observers were instructed that upon returning to their sites, they should "ease into" their work, not necessarily begin formal (structured) interviewing, but wait a few weeks until comfortable with the site. As they had already met the program principals during the "advisory" interview, entree had been secured for the observer to approach program staff. The best way to get acquainted with their program was to immerse themselves by initially asking the following questions of program staff and resident leaders.

1. Questions about program design

What cluster of programs is proposed in each site?

Who proposed them? Why?

How active is the tenant organization?

Were tenants involved in the design of the program?

Does the program seem related to the problem?

What is the history of the proposal?

Who developed the proposal and what relationship is there between the proposal author(s), the administrators, and the housing residents?

Who is to benefit from the program? In what ways?

What is the implementation schedule?

2. Questions about program implementation

What is the implementation schedule?

Who are the decision-makers and what is the relationship between these decision-makers, managers, and project residents?

What resources are available? From where?

Were consultants used? What are their characteristics?
Who hires them? What impact do they have?

What implementation strategies are used?

How is the implementation of each program element timed?

What specific start-up problems arise?

What problems are encountered in implementation?

How do they effect the implementation schedule? How? Why?

3. Questions about operational coordination with other programs

What are the relationships between the implementing agencies and supporting agencies?

What other anti-crime programs are operating?
How do they interact with the new programs?

What conflicts develop? Between whom? How are they resolved?

What resistances actually occur? By whom? How are they resolved?

How do projects change?

4. Questions probing tenant perceptions of programs

How are the programs perceived by various groups?

How aware of the programs are the residents?

What effect do the programs have on the tenant organizations?

5. Questions about the performance of programs

What are the programs? Are they executed as designed?

What are the resistances to the programs?

What effect do the evaluators have on the program?

What are the reactions of the press and other media?

How successful do various relevant constituencies view the programs as being?

How likely is it that the program will continue after funding is no longer available?

Formal process evaluation data collection activities were of two major types: (a) standardized forms and (b) narratives (see Appendix F, for a list of site data collection). In the overall evaluation, standardized data collection consisted of case report information from those sites that were funded for social service programs from the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA), and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's, Victim/Witness Office. In addition, PHA's that received Department of Labor Youth Employment (DOL/YCCIP) funds were asked a series of questions about their programs. Narrative data collection/information came from on-site observers logs of meetings, observations, and telephone conversations, as well as the development of critical event timeliness (see Appendix G for data collection forms). The observer logs focused on the content of each program and were based on encounters of the observer during tenant council meetings, anti-crime oversight team meetings, and interviews conducted with key informants in and associated with the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. The critical event timeline chronicled the authorization, implementation, and operation of each PHA's program.

In the subsample of sites selected for this study (CHHA and LMHA), there was a full array of data collection activity. With respect to standardized data collection, ADAMHA data was gathered from the LMHA program. (CMHA did not have an ADAMHA program.) Victim/

Witness case data was gathered from LMHA, but not from the CMHA program as that site did not apply for funds. Both sites, however, received DOL/YCCIP funds, and standardized data were collected on those programs. Narrative data (observer logs) were collected in the CMHA program as that site had an on-site observer. Narrative data collection for LMHA was done not by an on-site observer, but the author, during numerous visits and telephone calls with program staff. It had been decided by senior evaluation staff early in the larger evaluation that it would be important to "keep our feet on the ground" and the author selected LMHA on his site. While there is unevenness in the detail of data collected for those two sites, it is not believed to be a critical factor as the important shaping events were captured in data collection or during the final review of draft reports examined by both CMHA and LMHA program staff and PHA officials.

Sampling

Sampling for evaluations that rely on observational data is unlike that for other types of research. In such evaluations, sampling is not designed (prescribed) or executed in advance of data collection, but is continually carried on throughout the study. The vagaries of access to information, field relations, and subjects who contribute to the study are such that it simply requires a less rational procedure than the highly rational prescriptive procedures of systematic sampling theory.⁶¹

⁶¹Leslie Kish, Survey Sampling (New York: Wiley, 1965).

In this study, the decision about sampling, namely, whom to observe, when to observe, whom to interview--was made on the basis of what Glazer and Strauss have described as theoretical sampling:

Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generalizing theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory whether substantive or formal.⁶²

The sampling process is determined by the data previously collected, the interpretation of those data, and the emerging and constantly changing circumstances. The observer, immersed in the situation, is constantly reviewing and rechecking data. As patterns emerge, lines of communication open, and they are pursued. In other words, there is constant interplay of understanding between the past and the present.

This is the sampling plan of the qualitative researcher. He or she "reads" the situation, draws tentative hypotheses, interviews, observes, reviews tentative hypotheses, develops new tentative hypotheses, again "reads" the situation, and goes back to collect data.

Limitations of the Process Evaluation

Process evaluations which rely primarily upon qualitative data, that is, descriptive accounts of events, actions, and thoughts of participants and responses to established policy and future direction, are very attractive studies to undertake and to report.

⁶²B. G. Glazer and A. L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1967), p. 45.

According to Miles, it is the qualitative data that gives them this attraction:

. . . they are rich, full, earthy, holistic, "real," their face value seems unimpeachable; they preserve chronological flow where that is important, and suffer minimally from retrospective distortion; and they in principle, offer a far more precise way to assess causality in organizational affairs than arcane efforts like cross-lagged correlations [after all, intensive field work contains dozens of "waves" of data collection, not just two or three]. . . .⁶³

Despite these attractive features, there are methodological weaknesses and practical (administrative) limitations that affect all studies that utilize qualitative methods. In the larger study from which this disseration is drawn, efforts were made to minimize the limitations of the research design, however, methodological limitations were unavoidable.

The hallmark of process evaluations that rely upon qualitative data (interviewing and observation) is the intentional stratagem of approaching the research task with very general and loosely specified concepts of what is important to the problem under examination. The virtue often cited for approaching research in this "non-standardized" manner is the ability to change research direction on the basis of new and incoming data, in order to uncover the essence of the problem/situation being studied. The aim of the unstructured research

⁶³Matthew B. Miles, "Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979).

approach is to provide a "flexible guide to field work to make the most of the individual peculiarities of the situation in which you find yourself."⁶⁴

However, this approach has generated much spirited methodological debate between those who consider themselves rigorous "qualitative" researchers and those who consider themselves rigorous "quantitative" researchers. The quantitative group criticize the qualitative group for nonstandardized data gathering, e.g., slipshod sampling, failing to document assertions quantitatively, and accepting impressionistic accounts that the qualitative initiated could not distinguish from purely impressionistic accounts.⁶⁵ The qualitative advocates counter, claiming that structured data gathering (e.g., the survey method) is essentially a preconceived idea, overly concerned with numbers and samples, and that such approach destroys the conception of a social system.⁶⁶

⁶⁴John P. Dean, Robert L. Eichhorn, and Lois R. Dean, "Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Method," in An Introduction to Social Research, 2nd ed., ed.: John T. Doby (New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 274-279.

⁶⁵See Harry Alpert, "Some Observations on the Sociology of Sampling," Social Forces 31 (1952): 30-31; Robert C. Hanson, "Evidence and Procedure Characteristics of 'Reliable' Propositions in Social Science," American Journal of Sociology 62 (1958): 357-363.

⁶⁶See Conrad Arensberg, "The Community Study Method," American Journal of Sociology 60 (1952): 109-124; Howard S. Becker and Blanche Greer, "Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison," Human Organization 16 (1957): 28-34; A. Vidich and J. Bensman, "The Validity of Field Data," Human Organization 13 (1954): 20-27.

Though these discussions seem more philosophical than methodological, they, nevertheless, illuminate an important point that research which relies upon qualitative data (unstructured observation and interviews) has limitations, that in many respects are compounded by the research task.

In this study, such limitations were evident. Despite the feelings of some quantitative researchers, the disciplines in social science have long relied on qualitative methods (observation and interviewing) to provide description of the workings of the "black box," and to generate information for formal hypothesis testing. Traditionally, qualitative methods have been practiced by university-based researchers (solo operators)⁶⁷ or (lone wolves)⁶⁸ who independently conceive, conduct, analyze, and publish their research. Though much has been written about how to conduct "lone wolf" research (the advantages and limitations)⁶⁹ it has principally been directed to/for other "lone wolves," not those interested in using the

⁶⁷Peter K. Manning, "The Researcher: An Alien in the Police World," in The Ambivalent Force, eds.: A. Neiderhoffer and A. Blumberg (Chicago: Dryden Press, 1974).

⁶⁸Carl P. Florez and George L. Kelling, "Issues in the Use of Observers in Large-Scale Program Evaluation: The Hired Hand and The Lone Wolf" (January 31, 1960) (unpublished manuscript).

⁶⁹Eugene J. Webb et al., Unobstrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); William F. White, "Observational Field Methods," in Research Methods in Social Sciences, eds. M. Jahoda, M. Deutsch, and S. Cook, 1st ed., Vol. II (New York: Holt, 1951), pp. 493-513; Robert K. Bain, "The Researcher's Role: A Case Study," Human Organization 9(1) (1950): 23-28; George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons, Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969).

methodology to evaluate large-scale public service and social policy programs that employ multiple observers.

The use of employed observers (hired hands) as principal data collectors in large-scale social action research and evaluation projects has become popular.⁷⁰ These "hired hands," though they use the qualitative methods practiced by the lone wolves, find their research situations to be much more complex, with limitations and problems much more pronounced. For instance, where the interest of the "solo operator" is to observe, learn, be unobtrusive, and responsible only for his/her action(s) and research, the typical "hired hand" researcher is employed for a discrete period of time, is generally interested in specific behaviors, collects data as a job, and turns it over to those employing him/her, becomes bored with the repetition of activity and questions asked and then moves on. By nature of this arrangement, he/she is not representing him/herself but, an organization, does not have to be concerned with entree to the host organization, does not usually collect data for purpose of understanding basic phenomena, but collects data for someone else to evaluate (judge) the work of others. Inasmuch as the host organization has a vested interest in the evaluation, the hired hand poses a much more serious threat to the agency than the solo operator. This

⁷⁰George L. Kelling et al., The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Washington, D.C.: The Police Foundation, 1974), pp. Mary Ann Wycoff, The Birmingham Anti-Robbert Project (to be published by the Police Foundation, in preparation).

is an important and critical distinction between the two types of observers, and has serious consequences for the research conducted.

There are additional complexities. Qualitative research requires the development of close relationships with those being studied and the hired hand continually feels divided as to whom he/she should be loyal to--the employing organization or to those he/she "feels" the closest. The concern for cooptation and observer bias are very real problems, especially if the hired hand is functioning (as was the case in this research) as a lone wolf (without on-site supervision). These situations happen not because the observer is a "bad person," but more as an artifact of the structure of hired hand research. The hired hand did not conceive the research issue and more than likely will not see it to completion (final write up). Hired hands often see themselves as having little professional investment in what they are doing and, therefore, the complexities become so much more intense that it is easy for them to lose perspective and affect every aspect of the evaluation.

Take, for example, the problem of observer bias. There are numerous ways bias can affect the observer and data collection. Dean et al., have pointed out that because the direction of observation studies changes frequently,

. . . on the basis of the emerging data, there is great danger that the research worker will guide the inquiry in accord with the wrong impressions he had gotten from the first informants contacted. Or his own personal characteristics or personality needs may attract him into stronger relationships with certain kinds of informants than with

others, and thus prepare the way for his receiving an undue amount of information from persons who are biased toward one point of view.⁷¹

Schatzman and Strauss have presented an argument that the problem of bias is linked to one's perspective. They note:

The difference in defining perspective is compounded by the fact that several perspectives can be used simultaneously: the perspective of a stated sub-unit or a single actor, of the leadership, or the entire organization, and so on. Then there are perspectives interest in the observer that probably relate closely to his personal view of man and human life as tragic, humorous, ridiculous, pathetic, and the like. These too will undoubtedly influence not only what he will attend to, but how he will conceptualize. Also the researcher can look at his activities artistically, scientifically, or "philosophically," and these break down into sub-perspectives.⁷²

Realistically, it is not possible to eliminate observer bias; all that can be done is to manage it by monitoring the observer staff and their data collection. As Myrdal suggested, "There is no device for excluding bias in social sciences than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific and sufficiently concretized value premises."⁷³ As this study was relying upon on-site observers to collect the data, efforts were made during recruitment and selection to uncover the valuations the candidates had about the research on which they would be working. Those who expressed strong negative feelings about the work were eliminated from consideration, while those who had strong positive feelings were continued for

⁷¹Dean et al., "Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Methods," p. 276.

⁷²Leonard Schatzman and Anselm L. Strauss, Field Research (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 55.

⁷³Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944), p. 1043.

consideration as it was felt that erring on the positive (aggressive) side would make management of that person "easier." (Remember, the observers would be working alone, without on-site supervision, and under those arrangements to be a "self-starter" was an important factor.)

Staff believed that bias could be managed in the following way. The on-site observers were required to mail their data to the project director for review and critique as they completed interviews and observations. As the data were received, the information was examined by this author and a research assistant, not only for content and detail, but for the emerging "story" the observer was describing; this was an attempt to determine the reporting bias of the observer. After each reviewed the data independently, the reviewers would meet to discuss the progress of the observer's data collection efforts. Twice, during the data collection period (at the half-way point and near the conclusion), each observer's data file was "audited" to insure completeness of data gathered for each program component. This audit procedure consisted of reviewing each of the observer's data logs, summarizing the information according to the seven program areas, then chronologically ordering the information by the date it was collected. When the audit summary was complete, it was possible to "see" the information for each evaluation site. This "picture" enabled the project staff to see where the observer had been spending time collecting information, what their bias (focus) was in collecting the data, and most importantly, what additional information we needed to make the

data file complete. Though this was an extremely labor intensive task, it was the most direct way we could effectively manage the data collection process.

While the data audits were a major data management effort, more frequent contacts were had with the observers through regular telephone conversations; this was to insure the quality of the data collection effort. During the Chicago training sessions, the observers were encouraged to call and keep the "home office" advised of major developments; staff, in turn, would contact the observers to give them feedback on how they were doing, where they could improve, and how they should conduct follow-ups based on their reports. This was an attempt to meet emotional needs (insure them that they were part of a larger evaluation team and the work they were doing was important).⁷⁴ Though this was time consuming, the process did seem to work very well as there were few difficulties with the observer staff. In the larger evaluation, only two people were terminated for failure to perform the tasks they were hired to do. The observers in this subsample performed very well.

Similar to the limitation of bias is the concern of the observer over-identifying with the subjects in the study. This is more commonly known as the observer "going-native." In this study, as in most observational research, the role of the observer requires that he/she

⁷⁴For a more detailed discussion of the potential threats to the interpretation of observational data, see Morris S. Schwartz and Charlotte G. Schwartz, "Problems in Participant Observation," American Journal of Sociology 60 (1955): 343-354.

establish relationships (friendships) with informants to gain information. Because most observational research requires a significant investment of time in establishing these contacts, there is the concern for the observer growing too close to the subjects (developing over-rapport) and losing objectivity in the collection of data. In this study, the concern for over-rapport was great as the observers were employed as hired hands, conducting lone wolf assignments, and without on-site supervision.

In many respects the role of the observer in this study was anxiety producing. They were employed as temporary, part-time staff, asked to respond to an absent evaluation group, give up data and information that they had worked very hard to collect, be critical of program staff and participants, and work in an environment that was not necessarily warm to an evaluation.

Since this was the first time most of the observers had participated in anything like this, they were likely to over estimate the amount of rapport necessary to gain cooperation. The desire to get along well with the observed under these conditions did lead to some observer insecurity and over identification. In the larger evaluation there were minor instances of the observer becoming too involved. However, in the subsample selected for this study, there is no indication that the observers lost objectivity due to over-identification. In the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland) and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo), there is every reason to believe that data collection remained relatively neutral.

To manage over rapport becoming a serious issue, every effort was made to make the observers feel that they were part of a close staff. Contact with the observers was personalized as much as possible. Telephone checks were made regularly to "see how they were doing," and how they were being received at their site by the program staff. Though it was made clear to the observers that their site was their responsibility and the project director would not interfere with their work without discussing it with them, the project director did reserve the right to call the anti-crime coordinator to discuss the work of the observer to ascertain how they felt the evaluation was progressing.

It was realized that limited degrees of co-optation, over rapport and bias would take place and that little could be done to prevent it. What could be done was to manage the problem by cross checking data to see if it were consistent with impressions based upon project staff site visit(s), knowledge of the site, and telephone conversations with the observers and program staff. In those instances where a concern was felt about data gathering, much closer attention was paid to the data submitted by the observer.

One of the frequent criticisms of observational methods is that the data collected does not represent what took place because the observer's presence has a reaction on the program activities being observed. There is some validity to their criticism, particularly in the initial phases of an observational research. However, there is enough experience (lone wolf) with this technique to indicate

that the observed, while they may not completely forget about the researcher, do continue to practice business as usual and become open with the observer.⁷⁵ This was certainly the case in this study. From the beginning of the evaluation the observed knew that there would be an on-site evaluator. In a limited fashion, the observed had a hand in the selection of the observer and felt "comfortable" in knowing what was going to be done for the evaluation. The longer the observer was on-site, the more quickly he/she was "accepted" and able to "fit" into the environment. It was known that the project had succeeded in overcoming reactive effects of the observer's presence when the observed began to give off the record information.⁷⁶

Administratively, there were many more limitations with this study. The collection and analysis of qualitative data is an extremely labor intensive operation, particularly when field work efforts need to be coordinated to make the data systematically "comparable." The field observers found that within a short period of time, they were overloaded with data due to the range of program activity to be observed and collected, and the time that it took to write up these events (interviews, and observations). It was not surprising then that the observers found it easier to attend meetings and observe developments

⁷⁵An example of this point is made in William Greider's article, "The Education of David Stockman," The Atlantic, December 1982.

⁷⁶The presence of the observer should not always be seen as a negative effect or "disturbance" to the study. Observers may prove to be a catalyst that causes the observed to concentrate on what they are to do, bring staff together (serve as a rallying point) that may make for a better program and "test" of the intervention.

than write up those events. After all, attending these events had to be done as it was data, and it was also where the action was (it was not with the past events; they were history and probably did not mean anything now that this new information was at hand). In every instance, the observers fell behind with the data write ups, despite efforts of the project director to encourage, then demand, and finally, beg for the reports.

Summary

This chapter has outlined the research design of a process evaluation for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's, Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in public housing. The research design conceptualized the problem of crime and security within public housing in terms of "community self-defense capabilities." That is, three factors thought to influence the ability to create self-defense capabilities were outlined: (1) the ability of a housing authority to redirect the effort of trouble makers; (2) the physical design of a housing project that creates convenient and inconvenient opportunities to commit offenses, and (3) the vigilance of the community to intervene in criminal situations.

In this study, two public housing authorities (the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority) were selected for examination from the larger evaluation. The process evaluation was to provide a detailed account of activities planned, implemented, and maintained in each program. The essence of this or any other process evaluation is best summarized by Miles in

his discussion of attempting to apply a variation of another model of analysis.

Though these [and our other] rules of thumb seemed reasonable and desirable and reduced anticipatory analysis anxiety a good deal, we found that the actual process of analysis during case-writing was essentially intuitive, primitive and unmanageable in any rational sense. As we have noted, the data cards were not used, and fieldworkers and analysts [usually, but not always the same person] read through the write-ups and interim analysis, selected data, and arranged the information using a chronologically-organized case outline derived from the general conceptual framework of the study. While one can remember occasional use of the "rule of thumb" (e.g., a pause to search for negative experience), the analysis process is more memorable for its moments of sheer despair in the face of the mass of data, alternating with moments of achieved clarity, soon followed by second-guessing skepticism ["would someone else come to the same conclusion?"].⁷⁷

The point is that process evaluations are complex, time consuming, and anxiety driven enterprises, especially if they involve multiple sites. This is why it is best to "triangulate" data collection activity. By collecting different kinds of data, from different perspectives that address the same event; analyze each group of data independently, draw generalizations, not only will the accuracy of one's opinion be improved, but if the findings of the data converge, the toilsome task of synthesis is made somewhat easier. If, on the other hand, the findings diverge and measurement error is not a factor, other theories have to be sought. One way to resolve divergent findings is to validate the interpretations of the data with other researchers, program reviewers, and program staff. Such was the case with the data in this study.

⁷⁷Matthew B. Miles, "Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979): 597.

In Chapter IV, a presentation of the process data collected for the research sites of CMHA and LMHA will be presented. This is the first step of a two-part analysis, case study analysis of the evaluation sites.

CHAPTER IV

PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDIES

Introduction

It is the nature of a process evaluation that a continuous interaction takes place between data collection and data analysis. That is, data analysis consists of an integration of qualitative and quantitative data. This approach has been called the multi-method/multi-trait technique,⁷⁸ triangulation,⁷⁹ and goal-system state analysis.⁸⁰ All of these terms describe an approach that combines a variety of qualitative and quantitative techniques to the study of the same phenomenon.

This chapter contains the presentation of case study data (process data) collected for the subsample of the research sites selected for this dissertation. The collection of process data required that a variety of data collection techniques--narratives and standardized data forms--be "blended" to develop and deepen our understanding of site developments. Of special interest for this study is

⁷⁸D. T. Campbell and D. W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix," Psychological Bulletin 56 (1959): 81-105.

⁷⁹E. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Methods: Non-Reactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

⁸⁰S. D. Sieber, "The Integration of Fieldwork and Survey Methods," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1335-1359.

the term "triangulation." Jick points out that "triangulation" has come to describe both within-method and between-method techniques, but is particularly relevant when multiple methods are used.

Triangulation, however, can be something other than scaling, reliability, and convergent validation. It can also capture a more complete, holistic, and conceptual portrayal of the unit[s] under study. That is beyond the analysis of overlapping variance, the use of multiple measures may also uncover some unique variance which otherwise may have been neglected by a single method. It is here that qualitative methods, in particular can play an especially prominent role by eliciting data and suggesting conclusions to which other methods would be blind. Elements of the context are illuminated. In this sense triangulation may be used not only to examine the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives, but also to enrich our understanding by allowing for new or deeper dimensions to emerge.⁸¹

The analysis for this study is presented in a two-step process. This chapter presents the first step of analysis, the case studies (case analysis) for the evaluation sites, the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cleveland, Ohio), and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (Toledo, Ohio). In each case analysis, the method of triangulation was used to bring together data from a variety of sources and to focus it on the issues of implementation. From this presentation of separate case studies, the second step of analysis, a cross-site analysis (synthesis) of implementation issues that affected these two sites is presented in Chapter V. While the methodology for cross-site analysis is not well defined in the literature,⁸² it

⁸¹T. D. Jick, "Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979): 603.

⁸²M. D. Miles, "Qualitative Data as an Attractive Nuisance: The Problem of Analysis," Administrative Science Quarterly 24 (December 1979): 590-601.

is similar to that for a separate case study. That is, the case studies for the subsample will be reviewed; processes and patterns will be searched for higher and higher levels of generalization and combined to structure interpretation, recommendation, and conclusions.

Case Studies

Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority--Cleveland, Ohio

Local Context

The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) is located in Cleveland, Ohio. Cleveland is a heavily industrial city located on Lake Erie, at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River. The principal industries have been shipping, steel, automotive production, oil and gas refining and diversified light manufacturing. It is a city that has experienced decline since the 1950s. Business and industry have moved from the central city into the suburbs, leaving behind reduced population and declining tax base. Though community leaders have worked hard to attract business and industry back to Cleveland, the recession in the national economy has prevented a sustained revitalization from occurring. Standard Oil of Ohio (SOHIO) has made a substantial commitment to renewing the downtown area with the construction of a new high-rise office building that will house the corporation's new headquarters.

In the past few years there has been an emphasis on changing the image of Cleveland. Housing stock within the city is old and there has been little new home construction. Instead, efforts have been placed on gentrification in an attempt to promote neighborhoods

and cultural backgrounds. One of the best examples of gentrification has been on the near West Side of Cleveland, in a community called Ohio City. This area, known for the West Side (Cleveland) Market--a large indoor/outdoor pavilion, stocked with ethnic food stuffs (fruits and vegetables and meats) attracts consumers and visitors from all over northeastern Ohio. The surrounding community is dotted with Victorian architecture (homes and businesses), with much of the housing having undergone extensive restoration. It is within this community that CMHA's anti-crime program was located.

The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority was established in 1933, and given the responsibility for housing the needy of Cuyahoga County. Today CMHA has the management responsibility for thirty-six estates that contain 12,076 living units. The management of the Authority has historically been very centralized and bureaucratic.

CMHA is a unique authority in that it has its own police (security) force. It is a fifty-five person department, administered by a chief of police and deputy who are administratively responsible to the executive director of CMHA. Each officer on the force has received certified security training and holds a private police commission issued by the Cleveland Police Department.

The demonstration area that CMHA selected for the UNIACP were two housing projects (Riverview and Lakeview estates), located in the "West 25th Street Corridor" of Ohio City. Each housing project has multiple buildings--a high-rise for elderly and handicapped and low-rise (two- and three-story walk-ups) for families. Years ago

when these projects were constructed, they were model communities. Today, due to deferred maintenance of yards, buildings, and streets, the area is in need of repair. It is not the model community it once was due to increased noise from an elevated expressway that is located next to the Lakeview Estates.

Despite the fact that there is much revitalization underway in the Ohio City neighborhood, there is also much crime, especially street crime committed against the elderly residents who live in public housing. The deterioration of community standards and the physical decline of buildings that surround the two public housing developments has contributed to much of the crime problem. In fact, it was the elderly residents of Riverview who approached their congressional representative (Mary Rose Oaker) to do something about the crime problem in their neighborhood.

Program Development

There appear to be two primary reasons why CMHA decided to apply for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program and to select Lakeview and Riverview Estates as the demonstration area. First, the UIACP offered CMHA an opportunity to obtain funds. As with most PHA's, operating funds are not in abundance and any additional funds obtained would assist in reducing the strain and competition for a piece of the basic operating subsidy allocated by the federal government. The UNIACP money would, in effect, allow the PHA to take care of the security "problems" in the estates. Secondly, the two developments were located within the same community (one that was

getting a lot of attention) and they were essentially contiguous with similar problems. Initially, however, only Riverview was selected to benefit from the funds. It had the largest number of elderly and the high-rise was in need of extensive physical security redesign (the entrances and lobby area). When CMHA realized that it could increase the amount of the requested funds by including Lakeview maximizing the number of residents served (See Appendix H for eligibility requirements), the decision was made to include Lakeview. Both estates had a number of elderly residents and it was CMHA's intention to improve their quality of life.

Though the two projects are only seven blocks apart, they are very different in design and character. Lakeview faces Lake Erie and is predominantly a low-rise development with 617 family units. The buildings are two- and three-story walk-ups that were built in 1933. The residents, according to CMHA records, are mostly white. Adjacent to the low-rise garden apartments is the new Lakeview elderly high-rise. It is twenty stories tall, with 214 units which house mostly white residents.

The Riverview development is located on a hillside, overlooking the Cuyahoga River with a view of downtown Cleveland. Though the environment that surrounds the estate has declined, the location is still prime real estate for development (private housing apartments) given the view and access to the downtown area. Riverview, like Lakeview, has both high-rise and low-rise units. It was built in 1963 and has a total of 831 units. The low-rise garden apartments

are two- and three-story walk-ups (152 units) occupied mostly by black families. The high-rise, on the other hand, is 15 stories tall with 573 living units, and it is occupied by both elderly and handicapped white and black residents. A unique feature of the high-rise development is that within the building is a medical diagnostic unit for the elderly operated by the Lutheran Hospital which is located across the street. This high-rise, given this medical unit and a Golden Age Center, also located in the building, attract a number of elderly in the community for these services.

The writing of CMHA's anti-crime proposal was accomplished by a team of CMHA staff: the Deputy Chief of CMHA Security, the Assistant Executive Director of CMHA, the CMHA staff attorney, and the CMHA Director of Social Services. The principal author, however, was the Deputy Chief of Security who had much influence in the theme and direction of the proposal. The group interpreted the HUD proposal request as a security program, not a social service program. Therefore, their initial interest was to concentrate on improving the security for elderly residents in the two estates. In conversation with HUD staff, however, the CMHA team discovered that the UNIACP was to be a much broader initiative than merely improving the physical security of an estate. HUD was encouraging social services, and mandating that residents participate in every aspect of the program, to include the development of the proposal. Concerned that they may not be awarded the funds, CMHA included the three resident leaders on the planning team--presidents of the tenant councils. Though

these residents did not participate in the writing of the proposal they did "sign-off" on the concepts outlined.

1. Public Housing Modernization	\$671,000
2. Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program	150,000
3. Community Development Block Grants	114,000
4. Local Match	<u>186,500</u>
TOTAL	\$1,121,500

The modernization funds were directed to the following: purchase of security screens, improvement of exterior lighting, redesigning the flow of pedestrian walkways, installation of smoke detectors, emergency power generators, and communications equipment. The Department of Labor funds were to be used for hiring and training youth as security "cadets"; and, the Community Development Block Grant funds were to purchase security training for residents and to pay for additional sworn security officers for the CMHA police department.

What is clear from the above budget is the program's focus was modernization--improving the physical security of the developments. Social services were only important because that is what HUD wanted to stress. CMHA did not apply for funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's Victim/Witness Assistance Program, as this service was being provided by a local agency. CMHA did apply for funds from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and the Department of Health, Education & Welfare,

Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA), but was turned down as the proposals were too "vague."

CMHA submitted their proposal in June, 1979, and were notified in September, 1979, that they were a finalist. Before funds were awarded though, they were required to make some revisions and modifications to their proposal. HUD asked, as it did from all participating authorities, that the anti-crime coordinator report directly to the PHA Executive Director that CMHA complete a vulnerability analysis; and, that they delete from their modernization program the smoke alarms, elevator fire system, emergency generators, and any other items that dealt with safety as opposed to crime prevention, and they eliminate the DOL funding for the resident security commission staff. HUD also requested that CMHA create stronger linkages with community agencies, especially the Cleveland Police Department, public and private sector agencies that could leverage more for the program, and increase tenant participation in the program as it was designed to improve their quality of life.

Once CMHA knew it was a program finalist, it appointed its anti-crime coordinator in October, 1979. Due to unexpected circumstances, the person who was appointed was the Deputy Chief of Security (reasons why will be discussed in detail later). CMHA believed that the appointment of a coordinator would give the program administrative legitimacy and allow for enough planning time to prepare for the implementation of the program elements.

In summary, CMHA's program was principally a security (target hardening) modernization program. It was not an innovative program,

but an attempt at trying the traditional crime prevention technologies. Social services had only limited roles in this program and much of that was already being provided by existing agencies working in the demonstration area. Though HUD desired tenant participation in these programs, it was not an emphasis in CMHA's program other than for the DOL program.

The remainder of this case analysis is a discussion of the implementation of each of the four major program components. This presentation is not the full case study,⁸³ but a detailed overview that has illuminated major developments, to give the reader an informed discussion of program development and implementation issues. Each program category is discussed by presenting what the PHA proposed to do, followed by a description of what actually happened.

Program implementation

Improved PHA management of crime prevention.--Proposed initiatives designed to augment CMHA's capacity to ensure public safety at the demonstration sites included: appointment of an anti-crime coordinator, improved tenant screening and eviction procedures, hiring additional security staff; training security staff; training project managers and maintenance staff to be more aware of crime prevention needs, and conducting a gerontology workshop.

⁸³For a complete case study, see Kathleen Natalino, "Cleveland: Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program," in A Process Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, ed.: Steven M. Edwards (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, November 1982) (Draft Report).

The anti-crime coordinator and the assistant were hired, as proposed. The anti-crime coordinator position was filled by the Dupty Chief of CMHA security. Though he was the principal designer of the proposal, he did not intend to have the position. When he wrote the position he had another person in mind, whom he believed was better suited for interacting with the tenants and handling the "human relations" of the program. However, at the behest of the Executive Director of CMHA, the Deputy Chief was appointed to the position of Public (anti-crime) Coordinator.

This was not a poor choce, given the experience he brought to the position, his intimate understanding of the program, and his operating knowledge of the CMHA bureaucracy. However, his orientation as a professional law enforcement officer clearly set the tone for the program. As far as he was concerned, crime prevention and security matters were the responsibility of professionals and involving tenants in such matters was not efficient administration.

The assistant public safety coordinator position was filled by two people over the period of the program. The first individual was a retired Cleveland police officer. He had the responsibility for coordinating and maintaining relationships with the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC), as well as the day-to-day operations of the program. The residents did not seem to accept his assistance and conflict developed to the point that they could not agree on anything. The assistant resigned this position in April 1981.

The second coordinator was a police officer with the CMHA department. She was not only interested in the work, but found it a

challenge to work with the residents. She was able to establish better relations with the residents and set up training sessions that helped them organize meetings and develop a newsletter. The residents were so appreciative of this help that they tried to get CMHA to allow her to continue similar work when she returned to her police duties.

CMHA did attempt to improve their screening and eviction procedures, but found there were legal difficulties. CMHA had been using the services of a local social service agency that was acting as a clearing house for housing applicants. This agency would attempt to gain information about the past housing history of the applicant regarding disruptive behavior. The CMHA legal department believed that if they were to continue with this practice for only the demonstration area, they would be discriminating against those people attempting to live in either Riverview or Lakeview.

The eviction procedures were equally problematic. Tenants did want the disruptive residents removed. However, despite the fact tenants signed leases that outlined behavior that was grounds for eviction, the courts would only accept documentation that the person failed to pay the rent. To remove the disruptive tenant, someone had to make out a complaint and testify in a court. Most tenants, however, were unwilling to do this out of fear of reprisal. CMHA began to computerize its documentation on the disruptive tenant by issuing a "Notice to Violator" ticket. This gave CMHA security officers the ability to cite people for lease violations. Once a person received a notice they had 24 hours to report to the manager

to discuss the problem and to make correction. If the tenant chose not to see the manager, this information was processed and placed in the computer for future reference.

CMHA did hire and train the additional security personnel they proposed for the demonstration area. In fact, the training was given to the new security cadets, as well. Managers and maintenance personnel were to receive human relations and security training; however, difficulties developed with the subcontractor (they wanted \$5,000 more than had been agreed to) and this training was cancelled. Also cancelled was the gerontology workshop as the CETA funds were cut by the federal government.

More and improved community anti-crime service facilities and physical redesign.--This area was the centerpiece of the CMHA anti-crime program. CMHA proposed the following activities for the demonstration area: installation of security screens, exterior lighting and dead bolts; redesigning of walkways from the low-rise units; controlling foot traffic to and from the target sites; designing a security control center in the Riverview estate; installation of a closed circuit TV surveillance camera in Lakeview high-rise; redesign the mailbox area for both estates; obtaining a computer terminal; and acquiring communications equipment for the CMHA security force.

The modernization/improvement work for CMHA's anti-crime program proved to be very slow and bureaucratic. The above list of items was split into a number of separate bid packages, and those activities that could be easily accomplished were put out to bid first.

The closed circuit TV system for the Lakeview high rise and the exterior lighting for Riverview were two of the first modernization activities to be completed. The remainder of the proposed activity was delayed. The Anti-Crime program had no control over the development of the "bid packages" and the writing of the specifications for the work. It was established policy that the CMHA Modernization department handle modernization/improvement work as they had the expertise. The anti-crime coordinator did his best to encourage a faster work pace, but there was a bureaucracy that dictated how work should be done, and little could be done to circumvent this process. It was frustrating to residents to see "nothing" happen in a program that had initially promised so much, so quickly.

There were other delays encountered in addition to the bureaucracy of the modernization department. A change of the manager of Riverview temporarily halted the redesign of the High Rise lobby. The new manager would not approve of the lobby redesign plans as the new lobby was reducing the size of the manager's office space. The design architect drafted alternative plans three times, and each time they were defeated by the manager. CMHA finally transferred the manager; the replacement approved the plans and work proceeded. This was an important step because the lobby redesign included the plans for the electronic entry/exit control system. There were so many doors that led to the outside, there was no controlling these exists, and with the electronic system residents felt that they would be much safer. This new manager was so interested in seeing the work pace

increased, that he informally allowed tenants to install security screens, if they could demonstrate that they were capable of the task.

CMHA's anti-crime modernization program was very complicated and technologically sophisticated. It required that some of the activities be completed in sequence and as most of the estimates for the modernization component were drafted in 1979, by 1981 the costs were a victim of economic inflation. The shifting of budgeted line items required approval from the tenant council and HUD central in Washington; and this took time. An example is the installation of mail boxes in the Riverview Low-Rise estates. CMHA had allocated sufficient funds to replace the mail boxes; however, when it came time to do the work, they could not just replace the boxes as new regulations required mail boxes to be bigger. The present boxes were set in glazed tile in the entry way of each building and the work required to enlarge the mail box area would have been very expensive. CMHA then decided to construct free-standing mail posts outside of each complex of apartment buildings. Though this was less expensive than removing the glazed tile, it was more than just replacing the mail boxes as the cost of constructing the pre-form standing units had not been anticipated. The resident councils involved faced a decision of where to put the priority for the limited funds they had for the program. Would it be the security screens, the mail boxes, or the exterior lighting that would take the cut? These choices were difficult for the residents, as they wanted everything that they believed had been "promised" to them with this program. It turned out

that the pre-form mail boxes were installed as were the security screens because some items were less expensive and the saving was shifted around.

The installation of the deadbolt locks on all the doors of apartments, as originally proposed, was later determined to present a much greater problem than a help. In the elderly high rise units, deadbolts were not installed out of concern for emergency situations. If it were necessary to enter an apartment under those conditions, it would require extensive damage to the door and frame. In the low rise units, the deadbolts were installed, but only on the rear door of the apartment.

In summary, most of the improvements outlined in the proposal were completed, despite the fact work was slow and the process bureaucratic. It was not anticipated that there would be so much involved in gaining approval for the selection of work tasks.

More tenant anti-crime participation.--CMHA proposed to HUD that it would establish an Estate Security Commission that would be composed of a volunteer advisory council and a paid staff of residents. This Commission was to be involved in developing educational, training, and community service programs (viz., the Friendly Visitor Program) for residents.

HUD, in reviewing this aspect of CMHA's proposal, felt that this commission, as outlined, might be too restrictive for insuring tenant participation. In fact, HUD found this to be one of the weakest aspects of the proposed program. The thrust of the UNIACP was to

give tenants meaningful participation in the broad aspects of the anti-crime program. CMHA revised their proposal, stating that the Security Commission would "involve tenants at all levels of programming; they would have sweeping authority for the selection and deployment of staff, definition of work responsibilities, and the evaluation of performance of staff." The Commission was given a budget of \$4,500, as the tenant imprest fund to administer and run their operation. Staff included one full-time person (paid) and two half-time (paid) positions.

In practice, this resident commission had little meaningful participation in either the design or the operation of the anti-crime program. The commission, known as the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC), was dominated by a few residents who had been interested and active in other projects sponsored by CMHA.

RACC held meetings, but they were directed primarily by the anti-crime coordinator. He would transmit information about the progress of the program and submit activities (many after the fact) for approval. RACC had little or no say in the selection of the DOL supervisor or the cancelling of the human relations training with a local community college. The anti-crime coordinator did mention that he found working with such a group inefficient since it took them so long to decide anything. However because HUD wanted tenant participation, he would deal with the group, but only when he had to and under the conditions he felt best. He would structure what they could decide, as he believed he was (for CMHA) administratively responsible for the anti-crime program.

RACC did administer the Family Visitor Program, made attempts to organize block clubs, slide shows, and publish a newsletter. But, it was not a significant policy decision group in the anti-crime program.

Increased full- and part-time employment of tenants.--One of the principal objectives of the UIACP was to offer residents a panorama of employment opportunities. The Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program (YCCIP) was to create for CMHA, eight security guard positions, two emergency maintenance technicians and two program aides. In addition, CMHA proposed the hiring of adult residents to staff the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC). RACC was planned for five people, but due to budget limitations, staff was reduced to one full-time director and two part-time assistants.

The director's position for RACC was to be elected. People applied and an election was held among the residents as to who would be representing them. The person who was elected was a former tenant leader. Her staff of two were selected by the RACC leadership.

The most significant employment program MCHA undertook was the DOL/Youth security guard program. These 16 to 19 year olds were to provide interior building security for the elderly residing in the high-rise buildings of Riverview and Lakeview. CMHA had experience with this type of program in the past, when CETA money was available. This experience gave the anti-crime coordinator familiarity with the training needs of cadets, as well as the difficulties they would encounter.

The DOL program was intentionally designed by CMHA not to be a "make-work" program, but an experience that would qualify the participants for similar work in the private security industry. It was the anti-crime coordinator's desire to have the youth experience the same "problems" as a full-time employee. Applicants for the DOL program were required to complete CMHA employment applications, and those youth interested in the security positions were required to complete the CMHA police application. The youth were told that if they were accepted, they would be expected to attend GED classes if they had not completed high school.

The cadets were issued uniforms and sent to a 120 hour peace officer training program at a local university. At the completion of their training, they were given certificates and commissioned by the City of Cleveland as Private Security Police Officers. These youth worked without firearms and were placed inside the high-rise buildings. The youth were expected to perform their assignments and function as a full-time security officer. CMHA evaluated and disciplined these youth as though they were regular staff. For many youth it was difficult work because the structure was so tight. A few were terminated for various reasons: insubordination, sleeping on duty, stealing, etc. The discipline structure was such that many youth did not want this type of work.

The youth hired for the maintenance positions were given on-the-job-training with the full-time employees of the maintenance department. Usually they were assigned to a crew of an individual staff person for instruction.

The youth program seemed to work well for CMHA. There was controversy about the program, especially from the elderly residents. Many of the elderly did not want these youth in their building even though they were performing a security function. Other elderly believed this program to be the most positive experience CMHA had initiated in a long time and sincerely hoped that CMHA would continue the program.

More and improved services to combat crime or assist victims/witnesses.--This area of CMHA's proposal was not very strong. In fact, when HUD reviewed it, they termed it "inadequate," and asked CMHA to develop services for the elderly and youth. CMHA responded to the request by outlining the participation of a local drug abuse program (QUEST), a youth recreation program that was currently working in the demonstration area, and by establishing linkages with the Cuyahoga Youth Services Coordinating Council which sponsored a Victim/Witness Incident Team and a Family Violence Program. In addition, CMHA told HUD they would seek ADAMHA and OJJDP program funds.

HUD accepted CMHA's response and required no further commitments from them. CMHA did apply for the ADAMHA and OJJDP funds as proposed, but the reviewers found their proposal vague and declined to award the funds. In fact, this program area did not materialize as outlined by CMHA. The QUEST program was to provide two youth counselors to CMHA, but there was no interest in seeing that the counselors receive the training for the duties they were to perform

and the program faded quietly. No one asked for it, and no one missed it.

The recreation program proposed was an existing activity that had been in operation in the demonstration area for some time. It was staffed by parents who volunteered their time to see that the children had some supervised recreation program.

The Youth Council that was proposed was another activity that was in existence prior to the anti-crime program. The anti-crime program was to provide funds for leadership training at a local community college, but the training was cancelled when the college attempted to charge more than had been agreed to at the time the proposal was submitted.

The Victim/Witness Incident Team was not implemented. Difficulties developed between the staff of the anti-crime program and the staff of the Family Violence Program as to who was going to provide 25-hour coverage for the call-back program. These differences were not resolved and the program did not take place.

In summary, this was one of the weakest areas of the CMHA program. The proposal drafters were not particularly interested in developing these social services, but at HUD's insistence, they made an effort.

Increased use of better trained city police officers.--A key element in HUD's design of the UNIACP was for the PHA's to establish better relationships with their local police department. HUD believed that any effort a community could muster for a crime

prevention program would require support from the local police. CMHA is unique though, in that it has its own 55 person security department. Officers have full police powers while on duty. HUD wanted the PHA's to "leverage" more support from the local police, regardless of the present circumstances.

The Cleveland Police Department was providing, as part of its patrol deployment plan, two person response units to public housing developments (city wide) at the time the proposal was drafted. HUD wanted more of a commitment and repeatedly urged CMHA to "leverage" more support as the present police services did not constitute an increase nor were they leveraging additional police services. CMHA, aware that it would not receive any additional Cleveland police, proposed crisis intervention and sensitivity training for Cleveland officers to make them more aware of resident needs and frustrations, as well as monthly meetings with CPD officers, PHA staff, and residents to discuss problems and suggest improvements for better relationships. In practice, only the sensitivity training was provided. There were no monthly meetings held nor was crisis intervention training provided. The Cleveland Police Department did not look upon the CMHA department as "real" police and simply did not want to be bothered with their program. CMHA, not in a political position to "leverage" support, had to settle for their response.

Stronger linkages with programs from local government and other sources.--CMHA proposed for this program area that numerous local linkages would be developed, that QUEST, the country's Victim/

Witness Program, and a local community college would provide "in-kind" match support to the CMHA program. In addition the City of Cleveland pledged \$50,000 of its CDBG money to renovate the Lakeview Community Center and to develop an urban park behind the Riverview high rise.

When it was time to deliver on these proposed items, many of the agencies had terminated their relationship with the anti-crime program. As previously discussed, the QUEST program was not implemented; the Victim/Witness program and the training to be provided by a local community college were cancelled. The city's CDBG funds were not used for the renovation of the Lakeview Community Center, instead part of the funds were used to pave the city streets that ran through the development.

In summary, there were little additional institutional linkages developed with either local government or the private sector as a result of this program. Many of the linkages that were developed were personal, and when people changed positions with an organization, the relationship if it was important, had to be renegotiated.

Conclusion

As in most complicated programs, there are few clear conclusive statements that can be made. Most often the conclusions are mixed, and this is certainly the case with the CMHA anti-crime program. In the demonstration estates the tenant organizations were well established and well-attended. Though the tenants were not included in the initial planning for the program, they were able to influence some of its aspects, e.g., the mail boxes. Certainly the

program increased resident awareness of the needs and responsibilities for security.

What was frustrating for the tenants (and staff) and not realized or understood at the beginning of the program was the delay the modernization program would encounter. It was not a simple matter to redesign a lobby or to install an electronic security system. These public monies required that specifications be drafted and competitive bids be solicited to insure that there were no irregularities.

Finally, there is little question that the thrust of this program was the improvement of security hardware. Though HUD may have desired more citizen participation in certain aspects, there does not seem to be resident concern that the program missed their most pressing need. From the inception of the program, residents, especially the elderly, wanted help with their crime problem, and for many that was interpreted to mean creating secure living environments.⁸⁴

Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority--(Toledo, Ohio)

Local Context

The Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (LMHA) is located in Lucas County, Ohio. Lucas County is situated in the agriculturally rich, flat plains of northwestern Ohio, and surround the country's largest city--Toledo. Toledo, an industrial, ethnic and solidly democratic city, is surrounded by one of the staunchest Republican areas

⁸⁴See Appendix I for a chronology of major program events and a summary of the seven proposed and implemented program areas.

in the nation. It is a factory town, settled within the midwest industrial triangle of Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; and Cleveland, Ohio. Though Toledo is too diversified to be labeled a one-industry town, it is most noted for its manufacturing contribution to the automobile industry--automobile glass and as the "home" of the Willy's Jeep.

The Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority is a veteran housing authority, established in 1933. Seven of the Authority's developments were built before 1945. Today, LMHA has forty-two housing projects that comprise more than 4,000 housing units for more than 10,000 low and moderate income persons and their families. The Authority has a staff of 150 employees who direct and maintain operations for this enterprise.

As is the case with many of the nation's public housing authorities, operating funds provided by the Federal government in accordance with the Department of Housing and Urban Development's performance funding system, have not been to the level where many public housing authorities are able to correct maintenance and environmental problems in a timely fashion. According to one public housing expert:

Public housing [nationally] is clearly in trouble. In the past five years, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, in an effort to upgrade public projects, has awarded almost half of the available funds under a Targeted Projects Program and almost 70 percent of the funds under a Public Housing Urban Initiatives Program to projects rated "badly distressed". . . Staff members of HUD's field offices rated 18 percent of large [operating more than 3,000 units] Authorities as "troubled." Eighty-six percent of the

Authorities manage more than 3,000 units. Five PHA's in the largest cities are effectively bankrupt.⁸⁵

Such was the situation faced by the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority. There are deteriorated buildings and over-used and under-maintained electrical, water, and heating systems as a result of deferred routine and nonroutine maintenance. LMHA believed that these problems exacerbated the problem of vandalism, which contributed to an increase in the number of unit vacancies and a general decline in the number of liveable units, the environment of the projects, and a decline in the quality of life.

Though LMHA did not feel that the vandalism problem was "out-of-control" (1979 housing authority records placed the cost of vandalism at \$60,000), it did believe that it was pervasive enough that to correct it would require "a tremendous amount of effort and time in terms of face-to-face contact with residents, paperwork either for internal or external reports, evictions, or counseling."⁸⁶ As a housing authority already experiencing fiscal retrenchment, it was financially able to allocate the necessary resources to correct these problems based on HUD's performance funding structure.⁸⁷ The Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was perceived by LMHA as providing the

⁸⁵Raymond J. Struyk, A New System for Public Housing (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980), p. xiii.

⁸⁶Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority, Anti-Crime Proposal, June 21, 1979.

⁸⁷For a detailed discussion of public housing financing, see Raymond J. Struyk, "Chapter 4, Fiscal Conditions," in A New System for Public Housing (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980).

means whereby the Authority could develop programs to resolve some of their management and security maintenance problems.

Program Development

Under the eligibility requirements established by HUD (see Appendix H) LMHA had a housing development large enough (Brand Whitlock Homes) to meet the HUD specifications. However, LMHA did not "feel comfortable" submitting a proposal for just this development because of its physical closeness to three other developments-- McClinton Nunn Homes, Albertus Brown Homes, and Port Lawrence Homes. LMHA, therefore, designed its proposal as though these developments were contiguous and identified the demonstration area as Brand Whitlock et al.

The selection of these target sites was made with a view to maximizing the number of residents who would benefit from program activities. LMHA specifically sought to strengthen its application by choosing both family developments and an area which houses a considerable number of elderly residents. The table below shows the breakdown of the developments involved, the number of units in each development, and the number of family and elderly residents residing in each.

TABLE 4.1.--LMAH Developments

Brand Whitlock:	372 Units	206 family	166 elderly
McClinton Nunn	151 Units	78 family	73 elderly
Port Lawrence	196 Units	178 family	17 elderly
Albertus Brown	96 Units	77 family	17 elderly

Second, Brand Whitlock et al. and McClinton Nunn are situated near downtown Toledo in an area whose history of high crime and victimization rates had already, in 1979, made it a target of urban development efforts. Washington Village, a community development project adjacent to the Brand Whitlock complex is a test site for an urban revitalization initiative which makes housing lots available at costs below market value. While LMHA was drafting its urban initiatives, anti-crime proposal, Owens-Illinois, the large glass manufacturing concern, broke ground in the downtown area for construction of an \$118 million office facility. Given these efforts to rehabilitate the local housing stock and upgrade the downtown commercial base, LMHA determined that an anti-crime program would be most appropriately implemented in the area of South Toledo, informally referred to by housing authority officials as the Brand Whitlock area.

For purposes of the anti-crime program, the housing units of Brand Whitlock, Port-Lawrence, and Albertus Brown were collectively referred to as Brand Whitlock et al. First occupied in 1943, the brick housing units of Brand Whitlock et al., are primarily of row types, two- and three-story design. At the time LMHA drafted its proposal, the turnover rate for apartments was 26 percent and the vacancy rate approximately 8 percent. McClinton Nunn is a new and smaller development. Also of row type townhouse construction, it was first opened for occupancy in 1965. The turnover rate was quoted at 13 percent and the vacancy rate was estimated at 2 percent of the project's 151 dwelling units.

The surrounding area of the demonstration sites is primarily residential. Most properties are modest bungalows built during the 1920's. The value of these homes range from \$12,000 to \$25,000 with the median residential property value at \$15,000 (n.b.--quotations computed in 1979 dollars). Some rental properties are scattered throughout the community. Two-bedroom units are available for monthly rentals ranging from \$80 to \$140. The local population is principally Black (90%). The remaining 10 percent is White, primarily of Polish descent. The residents are blue-collar workers, many of whom are employed at industrial plants on the southern and western fringes of this residential area.

In the development of its anti-crime proposal, LMHA was fortunate in that they not only had prior experience with community anti-crime programs, but had benefit of a recent HUD General Maintenance and Management review of the entire authority that identified project specific needs. This review proved to be of great value to the authors of the proposal in identifying the modernization work that would be suggested. Therefore, when the anti-crime program proposal was posted by HUD, LMHA knew that it wanted to undertake an aggressive and comprehensive program that would focus on the problems of vandalism by emphasizing the employment of as many tenants as possible in the program for improving the physical environment of the demonstration area.

The Deputy Director of the Housing Authority initially proposed that the LMHA make application for the UIACP funds. Once the

Authority's Board of Directors approved his proposal to solicit funds and ratified his selection of the target sites, he began to draft the application in May-June 1979, with assistance from the Authority's Director of Community Services and her assistant. LMHA had the usual difficulty agencies have in designing program to proposals--shortness of time; however, since the Deputy Director had extensive experience with proposal preparation, he had little difficulty obtaining agreements/support for the proposal from city social service agencies, city departments (police) and the private sector.

As required by the HUD guidelines, tenant recommendations were solicited during the stage of program design. No recognized tenant organization capable of providing substantive input existed in the demonstration sites of that time. Proposal authors did successfully solicit tenant advice from the authority-wide Central Residents Council, a body of representatives from each of LMHA's 42 housing projects, and thus Brand Whitlock area and McClinton Nunn residents concerns were at least technically represented.

The anti-crime program proposal submitted to HUD on June 21, 1979, focused on two objectives: repairing vandalism and deteriorated property and promoting employment opportunities for residents. Modernization funds in the amount of \$300,000 were requested for the installation of new doors and door frames in Brand Whitlock, security screens in McClinton Nunn, and both peepholes and plywood window guards in Albertus Brown. No funds were requested for modernization improvements at Port Lawrence because monies had already been procured for

new windows and doors under the terms of a comprehensive exterior modernization and rehabilitation grant not part of the UIACP.

The centerpiece of the anti-crime program, as conceived by HUD and understood by LMHA, was the provision of gainful employment opportunities for residents. The second largest block of funds requested by LMHA was to finance a new payroll for tenant maintenance and security workers. The housing authority applied for \$132,500 from the Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation Improvement Program component, in order to hire 30 youth and 4 adult supervisors. In addition, \$67,000 was requested from Community Development Block Grant monies so that the Housing Authority might hire 10 adult residents to work as block captains in the neighborhood watch program.

As distinguished from some other evaluation sites, LMHA did not determine who would fill the position of anti-crime coordinator prior to filing their application; the goal of recruiting a crime prevention coordinator from outside the ranks of housing authority personnel was explicitly incorporated into the text of the proposal. The application specified that the authority viewed the anti-crime program as an excellent opportunity to "revitalize" and "enrich" the administrative staff.

Notification of semi-finalist status and an accompanying invitation for revisions to the proposal were received from HUD in August 1979. HUD proposal reviewers requested clarification from LMHA of certain budget items and a demonstration of local government's and community agencies' prospective involvement in the program through

procurement of appropriate letters of support. HUD wanted the PHA to secure local leverage to support the program after the federal funds had been extinguished. HUD also indicated that LMHA's reliance on the aforementioned Maintenance and Management Review as a means of identifying security related modernization needs did not meet HUD's requirement that a separate vulnerability analysis be conducted prior to filing the UIACP application. The authority complied by undertaking its own internal vulnerability analysis. All submission requirements for semi-finalists were met by the deadline of August 31, 1979.

Announcement that LMHA had been selected as a program finalist was received on December 26, 1979, along with concomitant instructions for further refinements of the proposed program design. This round of revisions focused on program area 2.3 (More and Improved Services to Combat Crime and Assist Victims/Witnesses) and, again, on program area 3.2 (Stronger Linkages with Program from Local Government and Other Sources). LMHA's two-fold response assured incorporation of the following additional services. The authority agreed to hire a part-time social worker to provide counseling services to the elderly tenants. As proof that the housing authority had the capacity to ensure the participation of local service agencies in the anti-crime program, a list of committed agencies was forwarded to the HUD staff.

Persuant to learning of the housing authority's status as a program finalist, and prior to receipt of a guarantee that funds would

be awarded to LMHA, the Deputy Director elected to hire an anti-Crime Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator. The housing authority thus assumed a financial risk in order to assure that key staff members could effectively organize the anti-crime program well ahead of its official beginning. These two administrators also undertook the responsibility of drafting subsidiary proposals for funding from federal agencies designated to provide grants for complementary social service initiatives to be integrated with the "target-hardening" and tenant employment components. They devoted three months to drafting these ancillary applications for funds.

In summary, the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority's multi-faceted urban initiatives anti-crime program design was ratified by HUD during the Spring of 1980. The total operating budget of \$841,000 consisted of \$751,000 of authorized federal funds and \$90,000 of local match pledges. Program components that LMHA applied to and was awarded are itemized below in terms of funding categories. The remainder of this case analysis is a discussion of the implementation of each of the seven program areas in the proposal submitted by LMHA. This presentation is not the full case study,⁸⁸ but a detailed overview that has illuminated major developments, to give the reader an informed discussion of program development and implementation issues. Each program category is discussed by presenting what the housing authority

⁸⁸ For the complete case study, see Steven M. Edwards, "Toledo: Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program," in A Process Evaluation of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, ed.: Steven M. Edwards (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, November 1982) (Draft Report).

1. Public Housing Modernization	\$300,000
2. Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program	132,000
3. Community Development Block Grants	67,000
4. Department of Health, Education & Welfare/Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration	48,000
5. Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention	83,000
6. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Victim/Witness Assistance Program	20,000
7. Urban Parks and Recreation Recovery Program	100,000
8. Local Match	<u>90,000</u>
TOTAL	<u><u>\$841,000</u></u>

proposed to do, followed by a description of what actually happened.

Program Implementation

Improved PHA management of crime prevention.--Proposed initiatives designed to augment LMHA's capacity to ensure public safety at the demonstration sites included: appointment of an anti-crime coordinator and assistant; improvement of tenant selection and eviction procedures; expansion of a telephone hotline service for reporting suspicious events; establishment of a tenant imprest fund; and development of a computerized project and living unit specific file of criminal transgression committed by residents.

The anti-crime coordinator and the assistant coordinator (he was to function as a job expeditor) was hired, as proposed. Both individuals brought community organizing skills to their jobs. The anti-crime coordinator had been working as a crime prevention coordinator in a neighborhood anti-crime program in two LMHA developments in East Toledo. This was not an LMHA program, but an activity subcontracted to the Salvation Army by a community group. In that program the anti-crime coordinator was responsible for implementing community crime prevention measures through a teen drop-in center. In addition, he had the responsibility for staff supervision and records maintenance as well as the establishment of a neighborhood block watch and a senior citizen escort service. From LMHA's perspective, he was the ideal person for their position, not only for his experience but also he was the kind of person who could contribute to the enrichment of the authority's staff--he was also a recent law school graduate.

Shortly after the anti-crime coordinator was hired, the assistant coordinator's position was filled. This person also brought an extensive experience base to the position and to the housing authority. He had been employed in OEO poverty programs in the late 1960's and had most recently been working with the Toledo Economic Council, assisting minority individuals develop and expand new commercial businesses in the community. Since he would have primary responsibility for the youth employment component (Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program), his prior employment would prove most helpful.

The initial proposal that LMHA submitted to HUD addressed the issue of improving the procedures for tenant screening as a means for improving the authority's management of crime prevention activity. Since public housing is often termed the "housing-of-last-resort," the courts have required PHA's to demonstrate cause why persons should not be afforded public assisted housing. Improving the capacity to screen prospective tenants was seen as a way of reducing the problems administrators and tenants face. OMHA proposed the use of a screening committee comprised of tenants, staff of the LMHA occupancy department, and representatives of the housing developments manager's office. It was envisioned that the screening committee would develop and use a computerized applicant profile to improve screening procedures.

While this was a good proposal idea, it did not materialize for a number of reasons, principally because the demonstration area housing manager was reluctant to give up any power to the anti-crime program. LMHA's organizational philosophy was that the project manager is the person who has responsibility for all activity in his or her development and this included the screening and eviction of tenants. Though efforts were made to include the manager in anti-crime program activities, she had been left out of the planning of the program and therefore did not feel she had to support what would be a short-term effort. The computerized tenant profile was never developed.

LMHA also proposed to improve tenant eviction procedures by making use of the pre-occupancy program the authority had recently instituted. This orientation program introduced new residents to their

responsibility for the property and the control of family members when they assume public housing residency. The tenant eviction procedures were to go into effect when a tenant's "anti-social" behavior (viz. criminal activity) came to the attention of PHA staff or resident council members. Such residents would first be given a referral and asked to attend orientation classes; and, if they refused, they would be threatened with eviction, an option allowed by the signed lease. If there was repeat criminal activity, such documentation would be enough to start an eviction proceeding if the PHA staff so desired. This program, however, never really got organized to the point that it was able to evict tenants. When the authority began to lay-off employees in July 1980 due to fiscal cuts, the program ceased to operate. Eviction stayed a rare event, to be practiced only by the manager of the development.

There were a number of activities proposed to improve tenant and management relations. One was the training of youth hired under the DOL program to perform security patrol duties. With vandalism a key problem that the authority wanted to correct, it was believed that this program would involve the youth to improve their community. Though the youth were to be trained and carry two-way radios, parents objected on the basis that the work would put them at-risk and make them snitches. There was so much opposition to this program that it was not produced. Instead, the thirty youth who were hired for the security positions were assigned to the maintenance aide portion of the program.

There were other programs outlined that were to improve tenant participation and give residents "control" of the program. A tenant imprest fund was to be established to give residents administrative responsibility for the Block Captain Program and the telephone "hot line" service. The community social service agency that the residents were to work with in establishing the "hot line" went out of business as funds became difficult to acquire. And, as a result, the "hot line" concept never materialized. The Block Captain program, however, was established with 10 residents working part time essentially as staff for the project manager, doing various tasks: handing out notices, monitoring and reporting crime activity, supervising clean-up activities (yard work) in their area of responsibility, community organizing.

Despite the theoretical strength of the concept, it was not the success that the authority had anticipated. There were difficulties in getting residents to apply for the program as many apparently thought that the program was a "spy-on-your-neighbor" activity and there were residents who did not want to be involved. Also, as the program was an extension of the manager's office and the manager had little commitment to the concept of the anti-crime program, the manager did little to manage the block captains and they became discouraged. There was also a problem with role changes. Previously, the manager was seen by the tenants as an enforcer of Authority policy and now was in the position of working with and supervising the same residents as staff.

In summary, other than the selection of the two people who would be administering the program, which was probably the most important point, there was little that was accomplished in improving the PHA's ability to manage a crime prevention program. The Block Captain concept was initiated, but not taken very seriously as a tool to prevent crime or to improve the quality of life for residents. The other aspects simply did not get started for one reason or another.

More and improved community anti-crime services, facilities, and physical redesign.--The following "target-hardening" measures were proposed in the LMHA application: the elimination of door vision panels and the installation of security doors with frames, raised door panels, peepholes, and self-locking hasps on ground floor windows. It was further proposed that LMHA would purchase six hand-held radios and allocate office space to both the Anti-Crime Coordinator and representatives of participating local service agencies.

The proposed modernization and redesign work that LMHA outlined was accomplished within the period of the anti-crime program with the exception of the development of self-locking hasps. In fact, the proposed design for the installation of raised door panels was improved and installed with no additional costs. The completion of modernization work turned out to be one of the easier tasks for the anti-crime program to complete. In part, the reason for this was that PHA's are accustomed to performing modernization work and this just became another task to be completed. The installation of the

self-locking hasps was not completed because a design could not be worked out that would satisfy the need.

Office space was provided for the anti-crime program, but none of the local service agencies accepted the invitation to establish an office on site. There was an effort made to open an on-site police substation, but the police department did not even respond to the invitation. It seems that this idea was just good grantsmanship on the part of the Deputy Director to get the proposal accepted by HUD.

LMHA did purchase the six hand-held radios, though they would not be used for the youth patrol. Instead, the radios were used by staff of the anti-crime program.

In summary, the actual modernization work proved to be one of the easier tasks to accomplish. It was very much a straight process activity that had been designed in the early stages of the program. With the assistance of the vulnerability analysis and the maintenance review conducted by HUD, it was easy for the authority to know what it wanted to do.

More tenant anti-crime participation.--The centerpiece of the HUD anti-crime program was the promotion of resident involvement in public housing crime prevention measures. LMHA proposed to delegate the responsibility for resident involvement to the Brand Whitlock Tenant Council by having them administer the Block Captain Program, Toledo Police Department Information Sessions, and the youth patrol.

However, after LMHA was awarded the funds, the housing authority decided that it was not the best idea to give that much responsibility to an organization that was so loosely structured. In the Brand Whitlock area, tenant organizations experienced much turnover in leadership and for an organization to have fiscal responsibility with changing leadership could be problematic. Therefore, they were not accorded control of the tenant imprest fund. That remained the responsibility of the housing authority's anti-crime coordinator as did much of the effort to involve tenants in the anti-crime program. The block captain program was undertaken, but as previously mentioned was not the success that everyone had anticipated. The youth patrol concept was resisted by parents and later restructured for the youth to work as maintenance aides. The city police did make visits in the crime prevention van, but these were nothing more than the traditional efforts police make to citizen groups that request crime prevention presentations--locks and citizen awareness.

In summary, there was little resident control in this anti-crime program. Citizen participation was limited to the authority hiring residents for various positions, and while there were a number of residents hired, it was not the type of program participation that mobilized the community to prevent crime.

Increased full- and part-time employment of residents.--One of the principal objectives LMHA had for the UIACP was to offer residents a panorama of employment opportunities. The Department of Labor/Youth Community Conservation and Improvement Program (YCCIP) was to create

for LMHA, 12 positions for youth security patrollers and 18 positions for youth maintenance aides. Although this was the only organized employment program, LMHA also proposed to hire block captains, two part-time radio dispatchers for the telephone "hotline" program, and 20 full-time positions in 10 small businesses developed by and for residents. It was the intent for the YCCIP program to give project youth (ages 16 to 19) skills that would be marketable for someone with a high school education or less. The PHA's were to develop employment positions that would be at the entry level in order that a youth might qualify for a position in the "outside" job market.

LMHA originally proposed that some youth be hired as security patrollers (this is what HUD was encouraging PHA's to develop). While some saw this program as co-opting youth, it was worth the effort to attempt to create a positive experience.

The criteria for hiring youth was as follows: (1) there needed to be a demonstrated financial need to be employed. Since most people living in public housing quality (recipients of AFDC), need was not an issue; (2) The youth must have been a resident of the demonstration area for at least 90 days prior to the program; and (3) the resident must desire the employment. There were few problems for persons to meet these requirements. In fact, nondemonstration area parents tried to get LMHA to admit their children to the program there was such a desire for employment.

One of the aims HUD encouraged PHA's to attempt in the design of their youth employment program was to mix "good" (nondelinquent)

and "bad" (delinquent) youth in hopes that the "good" kids would act as positive influences. LMHA took this suggestion and tried to improve on it by recruiting females as well as youth presently in school and those who had dropped out.

As previously mentioned, the youth security patrol concept was eliminated after parents voiced concern over the safety of their children. Parents felt that having children patrol the projects would be dangerous since some people might see them as "snitches" and attempt to injure them. Faced with this problem, the housing authority, employed the youth as part-time maintenance aides, cleaning and beautifying the grounds of the developments (e.g., street and parking lot cleaning, trash removal, apartment and office cleaning, lawn care, and window cleaning).

Much of what these youth learned during their employment were basic world of work skills--getting to work on time, communications skills, how to listen. In addition, the Authority offered and encouraged those who had not finished high school to enroll in the GED program offered by the authority.

LMHA believed that the DOL/YCCIP program achieved its objective--it employed a number of project youth. However, whether it had a positive impact on shaping the youth's attitudes toward gainful employment, remains to be seen. Much of the work tasks for the youth were of the "make-work" variety. This was the first time the the housing authority had attempted a program of this nature and did alot of learning as the program was operated. When the Authority

began to experience fiscal cutbacks and was forced to lay off union maintenance staff, grievances were registered that the youth were performing union assigned work. At times it was difficult for the youth to get interested in their jobs as the Authority was careful not to have them perform union tasks.

The other employment programs proposed by LMHA had similar implementation difficulties. The block captain program, which has been previously discussed, suffered from acceptance by the project manager and as a result did not become the type of program that was originally anticipated. The telephone "hot line" was not implemented due to funds being cut for the program that was to operate it. And, the small business program only was able to start one resident business in the funding period allocated for the anti-crime program.

The difficulties encountered for the tenant orientated small business effort were more than anyone had anticipated. Though LMHA staff were well qualified to support such an effort, they found it difficult finding an interested tenant willing to make the effort. In the funding period of the project (18 months), only one tenant was willing to attempt to venture and that happened almost by accident.

In July, 1980, the housing authority expanded its office space and was in need of janitorial services as their contractor was going to charge them more money. The anti-crime coordinator convinced the authority to hire a woman who wanted to start her own cleaning service under this component. Both the anti-crime coordinator

and the assistant coordinator worked to get this woman started in business. They enrolled her in a small business class at local community college, had her trained by a local supplier of industrial cleaning products, and both gave her emotional support for the venture. Though it was difficult for her at first, she has remained in business a year and a half.

More and improved services to combat crime or assist Victim/Witnesses.--Three programs which fall under this social service umbrella were proposed and funded. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) financed component was to provide information and referral services regarding substance abuse and mental health concerns. The proposed Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) program was to furnish organized and supervised recreational activities for both after school hours and summer months/school vacations for children living in the demonstration area. A victim/witness assistance program was proposed as well. In addition to these funded components, two initiatives were designed to address the needs of elderly tenants. LMHA proposed to hire a part-time social worker to provide counseling services for senior citizens, as well as to establish an elderly-youth exchange.

The ADAMHA proposal submitted by LMHA was written in February, 1980, by both anti-crime coordinator and his assistant. Despite the fact that there was very little documented evidence that drugs, alcohol, or mental health problems were a problem in the demonstration

area, the decision was made by staff to pursue the funds. The strength of the proposal rested on three points: (1) there was an active AA group operating in the community; (2) "common community knowledge" had it that drugs were available; and (3) there was political support for the program as a PHA board member was very interested in the topic.

LMHA designed this component, not as a treatment model, but as an information, dissemination, and referral program. The proposal drafters believed that good professional treatment programs were available and this effort did not need to duplicate those services. What the demonstration area needed were community outreach workers. Three social worker aides (residents) would be hired and directed by a professional social worker who would also serve as the program director. Thirty residents applied for the social worker aide positions. According to anti-crime staff, the quality of candidates was very good, the three persons hired all brought prior job skills to the positions. Two of the aides had worked in similar programs as counselors and the third person had recently completed a secretarial program.

Perhaps, however, the best surprise for this program were the qualifications of the person selected as the ADAMHA director. For that position, LMHA hired a young woman who had grown up in the same project area and left to attend university, in pursuit of a bachelors degree in social work. She had just recently graduated and was looking for employment when the position opened. The combination

of her education and her knowledge of the community were the reasons that she was chosen for the position.

Under the direction of senior staff, the ADAMHA program embarked upon a strategy of strengthening tenant organization as a means of not only generating tenant interest in the anti-crime program, but also making residents aware of the ADAMHA component. Staff organized outreach efforts for both adults and youth, however, these efforts proved to be of limited utility. The outreach efforts designed to educate the youth to the dangers of drugs and alcohol, consisted of after-school cartoons and movies to attract the children, then in between these films, staff would present educational lectures on the detrimental health effects of drugs and alcohol. Staff believed this approach was a moderate success as every session attracted a large number of children.

Efforts to educate the adults, especially the elderly, proved to be much more problematic for the staff. Several door-to-door canvasses were made to talk with elderly residents about the ADAMHA component and to get them involved in the anti-crime program. However, few elderly or adults wanted to take advantage of the program. A review of ADAMHA case files found that staff documented 25 referrals to local agencies.

According to the anti-crime coordinator, part of the problem with this component was supervision. The ADAMHA director was not a strong leader (this was her first full-time job with staff responsibility) and she had difficulty motivating staff. Most of the cases that staff received were referrals made by the project manager's

office for families failing to pay rent on time.⁸⁹ As the staff became more and more "unproductive," LMHA began to use them for special events and programs where there was need for adult supervision.

The victim/witness program was the second social service program designed by LMHA. Though a victim/witness program already existed within the Lucas County Prosecutor's Office. LMHA decided to seek the funds. The grant guidelines instructed applicants that if a victim/witness program existed, efforts should be made to link programs as there was only \$20,000 available to field a program. The prosecutor's office offered to train the staff person LMHA hired for the director's position.

The anti-crime coordinator and assistant wrote the victim/witness proposal, outlining the cooperative work agreement that had been developed with the prosecutor's office. In addition, an existing service agency (the Second Chance Academy) agreed to share their telephone "hotline" services with the victim/witness program. The Second Chance Academy had been doing similar community work in the demonstration area and it was believed that working through this group, victim/witness program visibility could be made easier and quicker. Conceptually, the proposal was strong, however, after LMHA received funding, the Second Chance Academy lost its funding and went out of

⁸⁹The housing authority administration believed that failure to pay rent was a symptom of other problems and when this came to the attention of the manager's staff, someone would investigate why the rent was not paid.

business. The hot line was lost as there were no funds available to support it.

The director for the victim/witness program had sole responsibility for the program's operation. There were no additional staff other than an occasional volunteer. The staff person that LMHA hired for the position was not a resident, but was very familiar with the area as she had grown up near the demonstration site. She was well known to the residents and as a result had little trouble with program awareness. Despite the fact that the program had good visibility and that the director was reading police incident reports daily to make sure she knew what incidents had been reported to the police, her total case load remained very small; nine were recorded where assistance was rendered. In discussions with the director, she believed that serious crime was not a problem for the community. A few incidents such as burglary and petty theft happened, but there were few incidents where a resident was able to take advantage of the Ohio victim's compensation act. In discussion with residents, it seems that they saw no need to involve the victim/witness coordinator since most times incidents were private disputes.

Finally, there is the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Program (OJJDP). LMHA designed this element as a recreational program for project children. The City of Toledo had lost substantial funds due to the fiscal problems of the area and was forced to cut the city's recreational program. The city was not able to open public parks and swimming pools or to organize team sports. LMHA believed that because a large number of children lived

in the demonstration area and the city no longer had a recreation department supporting activity that it needed to organize a recreational program to reduce boredom and prevent vandalism. The person who LMHA hired as director of this component was a popular neighborhood resident who had been a professional basketball player. He not only understood the needs of the children, but was a positive role model. Though OJJDP was not interested in funding recreational programs, LMHA was able to convince the staff that this was a necessary part of their anti-crime effort. This recreational program essentially developed programs that interested the youth and kept their time occupied. Basketball teams, baseball teams, and a track team were formed, as well as a number of indoor sport programs.

In summary, with the exception of the OJJDP program, providing direct social services (ADMAH and Fictim/Witness programs) was difficult for LMHA to do. To some extent, there was not a need for either program; no demands were made for the programs. Other established community social service agencies had much more experience and were certainly able to handle the case loads that these programs generated. To expect a service program to gear up on short notice, create a work culture and gain the confidence of the catchment population in a funding period of 18 months was a little too optimistic.

Increased use of better-trained city police officers.--One of the key elements in the design of the UIACP was for PHA's to establish better relationships with local police departments. Any effort that a community mustered for preventing crime would require the support of

the local police. LMHA proposed to collaborate with the Toledo Police Department to improve the quality of relations between officers and residents in the following manner.

One of the first activities outlined was the possibility of youth patrollers, after they had received their training, accompanying officers on assignments. Though it was the type of program that HUD wanted to see, LMHA was not able to organize it. Parents rejected the idea of youth patrollers and the local police would not allow it. Discussions with anti-crime staff revealed that this idea was little more than "good grantsmanship."

In addition to suggesting that youth be trained as "cadets," LMHA proposed sensitivity training for police officers assigned to the Grand Chitlock area. This training program developed by anti-crime staff attempted to demythologize life in public housing. Police generally do not like to patrol public housing areas, which are seen to be inhospitable. Police officers, therefore, tend to overreact to situations unless they have had experience in the environment. LMHA proposed developing a training program that would show what life was like in the projects. Senior staff developed the presentation and it was presented to a select group of police (officers in community relations, crime prevention, and the training bureau) for review. Despite its being well received by the group, LMHA was not allowed to make a presentation to regular patrol officers as part of in-service training. LMHA was, however, able to make a presentation to police recruits training in the academy in November 1982. It

remains to be seen whether this training becomes an established practice.

Suggested as part of the sensitivity training program was a weekend "live-in" experience, whereby officers would stay with a family to acquaint themselves with the difficulties of public housing life. This aspect of the program, however, did not come about. In fact, there is no indication that the police department knew about this aspect of the proposal.

As another means of increasing police visibility and temporarily better relations, LMHA proposed the establishment of a police substation in the demonstration area. LMHA anticipated that the visibility of police officers would promote positive role models for the youngsters. This also did not come about, however, for a different set of reasons which were mostly financial. The city already had a substation two miles from the Brand Whitlock area, however, due to fiscal problems experienced by the city, that substation was closed to conserve resources. It did not make any sense to open a substation in a particular community under these circumstances.

In summary, the police department did participate in this anti-crime program, but due to unanticipated financial problems experienced by the city, they were not able to have a stronger role. In some respects, there are indications that police participation was over-proposed. To think that city fathers and police department administrators would establish a substation in public housing without political reasons was a bit unrealistic, just as it was to think that police officers would volunteer for the live-in experience. It may,

however, have been LMHA's strategy to propose the obtuse in hopes that they would receive the better part of the traditional response.

Stronger links with programs from local government and other sources.--LMHA had identified 15 local agencies and governmental organizations whose services were to be integrated with program activities. This was an important aspect of the program in HUD's view, in that these agencies would be the bases for community support after the HUD funds had run out. If the PHA could demonstrate a number of community agencies and private businesses were willing to support such an effort then maybe additional funds could be leveraged either from the public sector or the private sector.

The linkage of the greatest magnitude in LMHA's program was with the Toledo Department of Community Development. Community Development was undertaking an urban renewal project in the "new downtown" section of Toledo known as Washington Village. This program was located near Albertus Brown Homes and was designed to revitalize the area by targeting \$4,000,000 to build 60 moderately priced (\$60,000 to \$70,000), single-family homes. However, due to federal economic cutbacks with the change in presidential administrations, this program did not materialize.

One of the local private sector linkages that was successful was with a local business located adjacent to the Port Lawrence Homes. This firm desired to expand its operations and approached the city of Toledo and LMHA about purchasing 3.5 acres that belonged to LMHA and the City. It was agreed in the sale that since this land

deal took most of the recreational space away from the residents of Port Lawrence that the money would be set aside to be used in the building of a recreational facility for residents and other citizens of the area at some future date. Additionally, the firm offered to make available to LMHA, for the residents of the Brand Whitlock area, first opportunity at some of the new jobs that were anticipated as a result of the expansion.

The other linkages outlined in the proposal turned out to be little more than pledges of support and cooperation if asked to participate in the anti-crime program. Many of the agencies listed were already involved with LMHA before this program was established. In sum, there were few additional community linkages made as a result of the anti-crime program.

Conclusion

There is little evidence to indicate the anti-crime program increased resident participation. Tenant organizations in the participating housing developments were almost nonexistent prior to the anti-crime program. The central tenant council was the only organization that was consulted for ratification of proposed activities in the design phase of the program. There was essentially no resistance to the anti-crime program by residents. Parents' concerns were only voiced when it became known that youth were to be used as patrollers, but when the change was made to hire them as maintenance aides opposition died.

Despite the fact that the block captain program was not the anticipated program staff had hoped for, and that the social service programs (ADAMHA and Victim/Witness) had small case loads, there were no major problems with the anti-crime effort. In fact, there is little indication that crime was a mobilizing issue for residents. LMHA made mistakes in the program, but it was their first effort in providing social services to residents.⁹⁰ In the past, that activity had been contracted out or was provided by city social service agencies. It must be remembered that the UIACP was a complex social program that required a great deal of cooperation from the federal agencies participating, the staffs of the PHA's, local supporting agencies and the residents.

⁹⁰See Appendix J for a chronology of major program events and a summary of the seven proposed and implemented program areas.

CHAPTER V

CROSS SITE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES

Introduction

This chapter, the second step of the analysis of this process evaluation, is a cross-site analysis (synthesis) of implementation issues that affected the Cuyahoga and Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority's Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. As previously stated in Chapter IV, what a cross-site analysis is and how it is conducted, is not well defined in the literature. However, it is similar to the methods of analysis for a separate case study. That is, the case studies for the Cuyahoga and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authorities will be reviewed, processes, and patterns will be searched for higher and higher levels of generalization, and then combined to structure interpretations, recommendations, and conclusions. What is presented in this chapter is an analysis (synthesis) that captures the subtle elements for program performance and explains the factors which affected performance in both the Cuyahoga and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authorities anti-crime programs.

Cross-Site Analysis

Six cross-site themes can be identified as important objectives for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. They are: governance, employment, modernization, social services, resident

anti-crime participation and program leveraging. These themes are discussed, not with the intention of comparing the Cuyahoga and Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority's programs as though one program is better than another, but to summarize important objectives of the UIACP design for each PHA.

Governance

A central objective of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program was to change the "governance" of public housing developments. That is, the anti-crime program was designed to influence the management structure, organizational processes, and personnel selection and development of the PHA by promoting the importance of security and the control of crime. Whether the PHA was developing/conducting selection and eviction procedures of tenants, devising modernization (target-hardening and defensible space) projects, choosing resident social service programs, or developing linkages between the PHA and outside agencies to increase the capacity of the PHA, concern for security and the control of crime were to be the central objectives. In addition, the anti-crime program was to provide residents with a stronger and more direct role in the governance of the demonstration sites. It was HUD's hope that if the anti-crime program were successful, the role of tenants authority-wide would be stronger with respect to the governance issues. After all, residents were the objects of criminal victimization, and it made sense that they should have a persuasive part in determining not only anti-crime efforts, but authority operations that improved their quality of life.

To accomplish these changes in governance, HUD mandated the position of anti-crime coordinator and required it be placed in the authority's table of organization, reporting directly to the executive director of the housing authority. The anti-crime coordinator was not only to manage the coordination of the program, but was to insure the commitment of the PHA to matters of security and crime. The anti-crime coordinator was also to insure that residents had participation in all levels of the program, in policy development and program management and in the delivery of social services. In effect, the coordinator was to be an advocate for both the residents and the authority when matters of security were discussed.

HUD also required each PHA to establish an advisory "oversite Committee," composed of top-level administrators and representatives of local agencies involved with the PHA; and, residents were to have equal representation on this committee. Additionally, residents were to have access to a "tenant imprest fund," money to be used by the tenant organization to insure independence from the PHA to develop cohesion among residents regarding matters of security and governance.

How successful was the UIACP in changing the governance of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (LMHA)? To a large extent, the change in governance depends on what existed in each site prior to the UIACP and how receptive the PHA and residents were to the objectives of the program.

Prior to the UIACP, both PHA's had administered and cooperated with a number of community anti-crime activities. LMHA had been involved with three community crime prevention programs: the Second Chance Academy, the Northern Heights Community Development Corporation, and the Salvation Army's Community Crime Prevention Program funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Each of these programs were designed to mobilize residents against crime, by creating community support for, and education in, crime prevention activities and techniques. Though these programs were for residents, residents had little influence in the design or administration of the programs.

CMHA was unique in that it has a tradition of emphasizing security and the control of crime as it had its own certified police (security) department. Crime prevention activity, such as property identification programs, crime awareness seminars and block and floor watch programs were directed not by residents, but by officials of the security department who believed that professionals had the responsibility for the control of crime. CMHA also had prior experience operating youth security cadet programs they had established with CETA funds. As a result of these efforts, the PHA was very familiar with the problems and needs of a community crime control program.

Both PHA's had extensive experience with modernization (target-hardening) work, as each had modernization departments that developed and coordinated authority modernization needs. Neither authority, however, had experience providing direct resident social intervention

services, such as HUD had outlined for the ADAMHA and victim/witness programs. Both PHA's relied on community social service groups to provide this type of resident services.

Though both PHA's had experience with anti-crime efforts, none of the past programs or activities required them to significantly involve residents in the governance of the programs of the authority's operations. Traditionally, programs and activities were prescribed by the funding source and administered by the PHA. There is no indication, however, that the resident governance objective, promoted by HUD discouraged CMHA or LMHA from applying for or subscribing to the outline of the UIACP. LMHA wrote proposals and received funding for each of the program elements incorporated in the design of the UIACP. CMHA, whose only serious intent was improving the physical security of the demonstration area, wanted little to do with the social services elements of the program, as they believed these social services were being provided by established professional social service agencies. Though CMHA wrote proposals for ADAMHA and Victim/Witness funds, the programs were not funded because the reviewers found the proposals too "vague." It was only when CMHA was informed by HUD that they would have to develop a DOL/YCCIP program, did they realize how it would benefit the security theme of their program and how it would contribute to improving the security department. As previously mentioned, CMHA had in the past developed such programs and found it "easy" to outline youth employment, especially if it meant being funded for this anti-crime program.

With respect to resident participation influencing a change in the governance of either CMHA or LMHA, there is no indication that there was a change. LMHA's resident participation in authority programs was weak prior to the program, and remained weak during and after the UIACP. The tenant imprest fund was controlled by the PHA due to the instability of the tenant organization. Tenant leadership was constantly changing and LMHA did not want the tenant organization controlling resources. The block watch residents, hired to be "after hours" staff, were not accepted as staff by the housing development manager. Though a few residents were hired to staff the ADAMHA program, they did not have significant influence in the governance of the program or the operations of the PHA. The residents of CMHA's demonstration area, particularly the elderly, were organized, but also had little influence in the planning or implementation of the anti-crime program. In both locations, the tradition of not having residents participate in conceptualizing, planning, managing, and operating programs was well established before the UIACP and tended to follow that tradition, rather than change practices.

In summary, there is little indication that the UIACP changed the governance of either CMHA or LMHA. Both sites were already oriented to security matters and there was little resident participation in either authority's organizational structure. There was little evidence of the program creating linkages with other external agencies in either city. In many ways, the orientation of these programs was "business as usual," in spite of HUD's objective to broaden resident

influence in the governance of the PHA. In some respects, this might have been predicted because for both sites, the UIACP provided a small amount of money in contrast to other federal programs; and, it was of limited duration. To anticipate that such a program would influence the operation of either authority was a bit unrealistic, given that it is difficult for many programs to gain a substantial foothold within an agency under the best of circumstances. In addition, a number of people (residents, staff, and non-PHA staff) needed to be convinced that the problems the UIACP was seeking to correct were, in fact, problems. The more important lesson, however, may be that when people (residents and staff in this case) have gained positions of power, it is difficult, if not impossible, to influence them to relinquish some of it to someone else, no matter what the reason.

Employment

HUD was very explicit in its belief that the employment of public housing residents, particularly youthful residents (16 to 19 years old), would significantly improve the quality of life for all tenants. The development of constructive employment opportunities, it was thought, would provide income, raise self-esteem, and otherwise occupy time that had been directed to criminal behavior. In addition, residents would be involved in the program whose emphasis was to improve the conditions of public housing by developing job-training skills that could be used in the private sector, and thus set a constructive example for other residents.

The only specific funded employment element in the UIACP was the DOL/YCCIP program. HUD, however, realized that this was an important theme in the design of the anti-crime program and encouraged PHA's to develop a variety of employment programs using whatever resources they had at their disposal. In the larger evaluation study, all PHA's provided project youth with jobs using the DOL/YCCIP money. Most PHA's, however, devoted resources to the development of skills and job banks, career counseling programs coordinated by a program staff person (jobs developer/manpower specialist) who would also provide educational and training opportunities. Adult resident employment opportunities were provided with victim/witness program money, Community Development Block Grant funds, and modernization improvement money.

The resident employment programs in CMHA and LMHA were only similar in that both authorities had a DOL/YCCIP program. CMHA did not propose or create a job developer position, while LMHA did. The LMHA job developer had primary responsibility for the DOL program, but also worked as the assistant anti-crime coordinator. Much of what the job developer did with the thirty youth in the program was to develop basic introductory training sessions on how to do various maintenance tasks. While he provided some career counseling, there is no indication that the youth benefited from his efforts in gaining employment in the private sector. LMHA did propose that the job developer would create a skills bank. However, it was not done as there were few skills which the youths possessed.

The DOL/YCCIP funds that CMHA and LMHA received were primarily designed for youth security aide employment. While this was controversial employment for LMHA, CMHA was able to field a strong security aide program complete with security aide training at a local university and certification by the city of Cleveland upon successful completion of the training. It was a demanding program that required exceptionally high standards and adherence to discipline and regulations. Though it was not a popular employment program--there were difficulties recruiting youth--it was "successful" in placing youth, who had completed the program, in the private sector. CMHA also hired some of the youth for full-time regular security employment.

Both CMHA and LMHA had outlined that some of the DOL/YCCIP youth would be employed as maintenance and modernization aides. CMHA had two slots and LMHA had 15 openings. However, when LMHA experienced parental opposition to the youth security concept, all youth employment positions were shifted to the maintenance aide category. For both PHA's, maintenance aide employment was not very successful. Many of the work tasks were of the "busy-work" variety and gave the youth few marketable skills for employment in the private sector.

Neither CMHA nor LMHA anticipated opposition to the maintenance aide program from their maintenance unions;, but it happened. The maintenance union at LMHA became a powerful shaping force in muting the impact of the work experience for youth. Union leaders filed grievances every time a youth performed tasks remotely related to

those in the job description of a union member. This action forced the youth to do trash pick-up, painting parking lines in the parking areas, and other low status and unrewarding work which the union members would not perform. In the CMHA program, though they had included the union leadership in the design of the maintenance aide program, the union members staged a brief four hour wildcat strike because an aide was installing exterior security lighting, a skilled job according to the striking union members.

Maintenance work was selected by both PHA's as appropriate youth employment for a number of reasons: (1) maintenance needs were great in the PHA, (2) performing this work was a way of developing pride in the community, and (3) maintenance employment offered the best chance for full-time employment either within or outside of the authority at the conclusion of the DOL program. Unfortunately, like other public housing authorities around the nation, both CMHA and LMHA were experiencing reductions in their operating subsidy which was forcing them to make reductions in staff. Authority maintenance departments were being affected and the union leadership saw this program as an attempt by PHA management to undermine the union. Despite the Authority's efforts to dispel this thinking, union resistance made the youth employment programs difficult and time-consuming projects to administer. Training youth for private sector employment was affected as well, as there were few opportunities for the youth to practice skills learned in training due to the restrictions which the union imposed. While this may seem to describe the

DOL/YCCIP program as a less than favorable program, it was not. CMHA had success with the security aides, and LMHA was able to provide youth with paid employment and community involvement, and to generally demonstrate to the residents that youth could act responsibly, given an opportunity.

The employment of adult residents in the anti-crime program was designed primarily to give residents an opportunity to become involved in the program, and to place them in staff positions to influence the operations of the anti-crime program and the administration of the housing authority. In the CMHA program, there were three adult resident employment positions. These positions were to administer the Residents' Anti-Crime Coordinating Council (RACC). However, the group members did not have much influence in the governance of the program or the authority, as the anti-crime coordinator did not let them have anything to control other than the small amount of money in the tenant imprest fund. LMHA, on the other hand, had more adult resident positions in its program. Staff of the ADAMHA component and the block watch captains were all positions set aside for adults. However, as in the CMHA program, these positions had no influence in the operation of the program or the housing authority. Theoretically, the block watch captains were to have influence in the governance of the demonstration area. But since the Authority did not change its policy of locating all responsibility with the project manager, and the project manager did not take part in the design of the anti-crime program, she did not accept the

resident block captains as staff. Consequently, the block captains had no influence in the administration of the program.

In summary, though CMHA and LMHA had difficulties in starting their employment programs, they did seem to be moderately successful in that they employed a number of residents, gave training and were able to see some program participants gain employment in the private sector. The work they performed, though not "high status," was important to improving the physical and aesthetic quality of the projects. Though residents were not able to gain a foothold in the governance of the anti-crime program or the authority, they did believe they were part of an important program. Given the time constraints of the UIACP and the amount of work it took to select, hire, train, and create a work culture with the limited skills residents brought to the positions, the employment programs did quite well.

Modernization

It was HUD's intention that the modernization element of the anti-crime program have two principal themes: (a) upgrade existing anti-crime equipment and facilities for the PHA and (b) modernization funds should be used to create "defensible space"⁹¹ within the

⁹¹The term "defensible space" used in this discussion is based on the definition given by the advocate of the concept, Oscar Newman. According to Newman, "defensible space" describes "the range of mechanisms--real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance--that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents . . . for the enhancement of their lives, while providing security for their families, neighbors, and friends." Oscar Newman, Defensible Space - Crime Prevention through Urban Design (New York: Collier Books, 1973), p. 3.

demonstration community. HUD believed that if PHA's incorporated these themes into their modernization program and integrated anti-crime program strategies into an effective whole, the community crime prevention effort would be very strong. For the participating PHA's, these modernization funds were very important. Not only would they help with the lagging capital improvements schedule, but the funds would demonstrate to residents that the authority was committed to improving the quality of life of residents by attempting to reduce crime. All the PHA's participating in the study had modernization departments which were well established with extensive experience and traditions in the implementation of modernization improvements. Despite the fact that they were highly bureaucratic departments in which to get approval for modernization work, they knew the physical needs of the housing developments. PHA's were so ambitious in outlining their modernization needs in the proposals that HUD reviewers questioned the applicants as to whether they could complete the proposed activity within the scheduled two year time-frame of the program.

The two PHA's in this study had different approaches to the role of modernization in the design of their anti-crime program. For CMYA, modernization improvement was essentially the whole anti-crime program. The Authority wanted to improve some of its existing safety and security needs by providing additional police equipment for the security force (emergency generators and some computer equipment), but also wanted to physically redesign the lobby of its large

elderly high-rise, as well as to improve the access control of the building with a sophisticated electronic entry/exit system. LMHA was more modest in its approach to anti-crime modernization. LMHA viewed modernization as an element that was part of the overall program, not the entire program. The modernization program LMHA outlined was only to improve access control to apartments with the installation of exterior door viewers and to install deadbolt locks to make the apartments more secure.

Both CMHA and LMHA made general capital improvements with modernization funds as part of the anti-crime modernization program. LMHA installed resident mail boxes and replaced worn-out exterior windows and frames by justifying them as anti-crime needs. Residents mail was not secure under the former arrangement, and it was very important that monthly assistance checks were not stolen. Installation of exterior windows were seen as part of the "target-hardening" of resident apartments. CMHA installed smoke alarms and exterior lights as measures to improve the safety and security of residents.

The point of this discussion has been to illuminate that modernization activity was generally performed as outlined in each authority's proposal. The PHA's knew what they wanted to do with the modernization funds and did it. However, since the anti-crime staffs did not have any expertise in the administration of modernization improvement funds (bid specifications, legal requirements, and so forth) anti-crime staffs were not held responsible for these portions of the program. Once the modernization monies were released to the

PHA, they were turned over to the modernization department, which was well established in the structure of the authority. Typically, and especially in the case of CMHA, this meant that the bureaucracy of the modernization process would act independently of the anti-crime program and slow much of the anticipated work that residents had been promised would take place very quickly.

Social Services

HUD perceived that the residents of public housing were in need of social services, and that the delivery of an array of social services would benefit the success of the anti-crime program and improve the quality of life for all residents of the community. HUD would provide funds for ADAMHA and Victim/Witness programs; however, authorities were encouraged to develop additional social services they believed important to the objectives of the anti-crime program. Victim/Witness programs were seen as important in assisting residents with the emotional problems of crime and in understanding the criminal justice process. Alcohol and drug abuse programs were believed necessary in reducing crime, as they were seen as contributing factors to the crime problem, for youth, as well as adults. Both alcohol and drugs were seen as debilitating to establishing a sense of community. All residents were seen as potential targets for these programs, but they were especially geared for the elderly, youth, and women. The elderly were singled out because of their vulnerability to crime, the heightened fear that crime invokes and the altered living style that the concern for crime produces. Women, especially

young women who were single, heads of households were perceived in need of social services to help them cope with the problems of public housing living. Finally, project youth (in the crime-prone years) were selected for social service programs because of their tendency to become involved in illegal activity.

HUD presented a number of models to assist PHA's develop what was appropriate for their particular needs. Community based self-help programs were stressed; traditional professional social services were encouraged and advocacy programs (legal assistance, educational programs) were considered as appropriate programs for PHA's to undertake. HUD encouraged PHA's to model community programs after some other successful program like the House of Umoja (Philadelphia), the Delancy Street Foundation (San Francisco), Operation Push (Chicago), and the Huckleberry House (San Francisco).

In the larger study, a variety of social service programs were developed, but none of the evaluation sites modeled their programs after those emphasized by HUD. Instead, most took the traditional approach of subcontracting social services to strengthen local ties or they attempted to deliver the services as part of an organizational change strategy.

Of the two research sites in this study, only LMHA offered social services to the residents. CMHA did apply for social service funds (ADAMHA and Victim/Witness), but their proposals were not funded. While this might be seen as a disappointment for the authority's anti-crime program, there is no indication that there were any

demands from residents for the anti-crime program to provide these services. However, CMHA did attempt to have existing community agencies provide social services as part of the local match contribution, but for one reason or another, these programs did not sustain their commitments after the anti-crime money was awarded. There were existing social services provided to the demonstration area prior to the UIACP, but these services did nothing to enhance the scope of the program.

The situation, however, was different for LMHA. As has been discussed, LMHA applied for all the program funds available in the anti-crime program and was fortunate in having their social service proposals (ADAMHA, Victim/Witness, and OJJDP) accepted for funding. Both the ADAMHA and the Victim/Witness programs were structured as referral services, and despite attempts made by these program staffs to do outreach work, neither program was very successful in securing clients. The ADAMHA program only recorded referring 25 cases and the victim/witness program reported handling 9 cases. In spite of what had previously been believed about the importance of this type of social services for residents, there was simply little demand, or low perception of the programs by residents.

The OJJDP program, which was geared toward providing youth recreation services, was by far the most popular social service offered by LMHA. Its programs were well attended due to the varied program schedule offered, and the serious commitment the program director gave to helping youth with their problems.

There seem to be a variety of important factors in the LMHA ADAMHA and Victim/Witness programs as to why they did not serve more residents. It has already been mentioned that there was low demand. But contributing to low demand was the staff problem of establishing credibility with residents in a limited period of time. Even with residents working as staff, in the case of the ADAMHA program, the funding period was not long enough to establish a reputation that the program was viable. Related to this issue of program credibility was the problem some residents had with other residents' functioning as professional social service staff in the personal affairs of residents. Some residents believed that their problems would be the topic of other's conversations, and therefore, did not want to participate in the anti-crime program's social services.

These programs were not funded long enough to establish a "culture of work." Most residents and certainly staff knew that the "life" of the anti-crime program was determined by the available funds. Staff were recruited, hired, trained, and told to function like the staff of a professional social service office. Since the social service staff in the LMHA program were residents, directed by a young and inexperienced person, they responded to the role as they thought best. Supervision was not strong and the staff was left to improvise their own supervision and work habits. When all realized that these programs would terminate, staff morale declined, and work production ceased. While this description of LMHA's social services may seem a failure, it is better to think of these problems as lessons learned for future efforts.

Tenant Anti-Crime Participation

HUD was explicit about the importance of resident participation in the anti-crime program. To encourage applicant PHA's to conceptualize their anti-crime activities as HUD wanted them to, HUD did two things. First, it strongly recommended that PHA's study the anti-crime activities implemented by communities that had received Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Community Anti-Crime Program funds. These programs, according to HUD staff, represented an approximation of the community anti-crime model HUD wanted to see achieved. Secondly, HUD specified that applicant PHA's should be mindful of certain themes for this anti-crime program.

- Increased tenant cohesion and organization around crime-prevention issues.
- Expanded use of tenant foot patrol for surveillance.
- Improved tenant/police relations through the use of neighborhood conflict resolution forums.
- Increased use of tenant anti-crime media campaigns, crime prevention vans, educational workshops, crime reporting campaigns, and operation identification.

HUD advocated the design of creative anti-crime programs by encouraging tenant participation through the concept of "turf reclamation." That is, "turf reclamation" represented, "pulling together significant segments of the community--residents, PHA management, security patrols, local police, and others to form an association of

people strong enough to take "control" over their environment and establish community standards."⁹²

Most all of the evaluation sites believed that the best vehicle for creating strong tenant participation in the anti-crime program was through the demonstration area resident organization. By working with this group, residents would not only have involvement, but the PHA would meet the HUD mandate that residents have input into the development and operation of the program.

Resident anti-crime participation tended to follow three models in anti-crime programs. First, and due mostly to encouragement from HUD, residents were to be actively (proactively) involved in providing security for the demonstration area. That is, tenants (adults and youth) would patrol the project area in defense of crime and acts of vandalism. It was believed that this approach would develop strong, positive attitudes and feelings among tenants toward the community. The second form, less formal, but defensive in character, was resident surveillance activity. The practice of surveillance was conceived by the program designers to be a broad activity that would involve residents in block, floor, or lobby watches, acting as the "eyes and ears" for the community. The third and final broad participatory anti-crime form was passive community activities, e.g., elderly escort services, apartment check services, elderly neighbor watch programs, and so forth.

⁹²Interagency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program, First Annual Report, March 31, 1980, Guidebook Section, p. 24.

Both CMHA and LMHA initially proposed the development of all three models of tenant anti-crime participation. However, as previously has been mentioned, LMHA received parental opposition to the idea of youth performing security patrol and was forced to abandon its plan. Though proactive security functions remained important, LMHA tended to focus more on resident surveillance activity performed in the block watch program than anything else. CMHA, on the other hand, was so predisposed with the importance of security that developing resident participation, especially among the elderly, was very easy. The youth security patrol was generally received very well by the residents; surveillance activity in the block and floor watches was already in existence and the youth cadets did perform some passive anti-crime services, like elderly escort services and property identification (engraving).

Despite HUD's emphasis that PHA's encourage and support tenant anti-crime participation, much of what seems to have been done in encouraging resident participation were "warmed-up" versions of past programs. Both the PHA and residents had been through similar program experiences and each knew how the other would respond, despite HUD's efforts to create cooperative partnerships. In both authorities, tenants were not politically active in the administration of the authority, nor were they strongly unified as a body. The interest of the PHA's was to administer a program responsible and the interest of the tenants was to get out of the program whatever it was offering that would improve their quality of life.

"Leveraging"

Just as the issues of security and tenant participation were central concepts in the design of the UIACP, so was the issue of "leveraging." The program designers believed that if the UIACP were to establish a lasting foothold in a community at the conclusion of the funds, PHA's would have to make efforts at institutionalizing the anti-crime program through the support of other local agencies. HUD believed that the best way to do this would be to require commitments from local agencies. In effect, PHA's, through the UIACP, were to leverage funds.

HUD encouraged that a broad array of local public and private agencies be approached to support the anti-crime program. In fact, during the proposal review process, HUD continually stressed that PHA's secure more and "stronger" commitments from community and city agencies, especially the local police. HUD was not particularly concerned as to how the police department was involved, as they could contribute a variety of police tactics and services to the program: foot patrol, team policing, crisis intervention, human services, community relations, or even possibly establish a police substation in public housing. HUD did not allocate funds to purchase these services, but expected that the cities and PHA's would contribute the costs of these services as in-kind match as evidence of the commitment to this type of anti-crime program.

Both CMHA and LMHA outlined local police involvement in their anti-crime program. For CMHA, however, the involvement of the Cleveland

Police Department was essentially to receive sensitivity training for a select group of officers who patrolled the projects. The intent of this training was to improve the behavior of officers who dealt with public housing residents and to improve their response to calls for service to the projects. For numerous reasons though, the Cleveland Police Department did not make further commitments to the program. CMHA had its own full-time security force that had on-duty arrest powers and the City saw no reason why it should commit more police services to CMHA beyond what it was already receiving.

LMHA also proposed that local police officers be given sensitivity training, but that it be done by the PHA staff. The training was essentially to focus on the problems residents encounter living in public housing, how they view the police, and the criminal justice process, and what could be done to improve relationships between the two groups. LMHA believed that one of the activities that police and the residents could perform together would be patrolling the housing developments. In addition, if the police department established a sub-station in the demonstration area, that would go a long way to improving a sense of commitment.

As discussed in the previous chapter, however, most of these proposed activities did not come about for LMHA. While it initially appeared that stronger linkages would be developed and the leveraging of additional commitments for the program would occur, only the sensitivity training was performed, and that was to a select group of police officers. The Toledo Police Department did support the concept of the

anti-crime program, but they were not able to commit any personnel or to respond any differently to this community as a result of the program.

Despite the fact that HUD "encouraged" the PHA's to leverage the local police, the PHA's had no clout to insure their participation. Though they had letters of support, community social innovation does not come easy for police departments no matter what the intention. Neither HUD nor the local PHA understand how powerful and independent city police departments can become. Unless PHA's and/or residents are extremely influential with local politicians, leveraging police services when the police are not interested is difficult, especially when police support is necessary.

Besides the police, HUD encouraged linkage development with other local government agencies, social service agencies, and private sector business. CMHA had listed a number of local agencies and departments that were contributing services, however, it was not the orientation of the coordinator to cultivate these relationships. As a result, the services just lost interest in providing assistance to the anti-crime program and went away. Those agencies that continued to be involved with CMHA, in most cases, were providing service to residents of CMHA property in other developments. The bottom line is that CMHA did not develop any stronger linkages or leverage any additional support as a result of the anti-crime program.

LMHA was a similar story, except that through an innovative arrangement with a local manufacturer, the housing authority was able

to secure 19 paid employment positions for qualified residents of the demonstration area. Though this arrangement did not happen as a result of the anti-crime program, it was attributed to the effort as the emphasis of LMHA's program was resident economic development.

While these efforts are disappointing, it does not mean that residents were not served or the agencies that were involved were not going their jobs. It simply means that the anti-crime program failed to establish institutional linkages. There are explanations as to why this happened. First, most of the agencies that HUD was encouraging establishment of relationships with were in the public sector and there were simply no slack resources in those agency budgets to allow institutional relationships to develop. Both the PHA's in this study were located in cities that were heavily affected by the retrenchment in the national economy. The social service agencies, city departments, and the private sector were forced to utilize the "slack" resources they had for their survival. Secondly, leveraging commitment from another agency was time consuming. The anti-crime program was operating within a limited time frame, and for staff to carry out program elements (develop a work culture among staff, convince residents the program was serious, and so forth) as well as to develop strong linkages that would support the program concept at the conclusion of funds was simply unrealistic. This, combined with the fact that most anti-crime staffs did not believe that the program would last, contributed to the staff's feeling pessimistic about the whole enterprise.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The Department of Housing and Urban Development Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (UIACP) was a multi-federal agency effort designed as a comprehensive community crime prevention program. Funds contributed by a number of federal agencies were made available to public housing authorities to implement programs devised to reduce crime and alleviate the fear of crime. The program's core assumption was that the action(s) of citizens (residents) of public housing is central to the maintenance of order, control of crime, and the improvement of the quality of life. The program required that partnerships be created among public housing management, residents, the private sector, and local government, especially the police. The intent was to develop community "self-help" crime prevention programs which would remain active even after the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program funding concluded.

Though HUD understood that the control of crime was a local concern, it, nevertheless, believed that the initiative for developing models and the funds for crime control measures was a federal responsibility. HUD outlined three premises upon which anti-crime measures were founded. First, any effort attempted at the local level

would need the endorsement and active participation of the local housing authority. Secondly, the participation of tenants, not only as beneficiaries of the program, but also as staff was essential to insure commitment to the effort. Finally, if program activities were to be perpetuated beyond the funding period, linkages to local government and other community agencies would have to be established. None of these premises was cited as inherently superior to any other, but all were accorded equal weight in HUD's comprehensive package of crime reduction strategies.

The HUD anti-crime program was unique in that it co-targeted federal funds to the problem of crime and the fear of crime. Additionally, the program design was an "empirical test" of both physical redesign strategies and public/private services combined in the structure of a community (collective) crime prevention program. Though crime prevention programs have been conducted in the past, and were popular, most of them had been concerned with individual responses to crime. Though some research has examined both physical and collective responses to crime, however, it has been so limited, and the number of strategies combined so few, that researchers have observed the need for more descriptive inquiry on the diversity and functioning of community responses to anti-crime programs.

In this chapter the study is reviewed and summarized. The first section is a summary of the purpose and the method of the study. Included in this brief review is a discussion of the subsample of sites selected for this study, the data collection process, the

training of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority on-site observer and the information which was to be included in formal data collection. The second section of this chapter contains the conclusions and recommendations for this study. These conclusions and recommendations are based on the data gathered for the case studies and the discussion in the six-point cross-site analysis.

Purpose and Method of the Study

The purpose of this study was to present an examination of the implementation process of the U.S. Department of Housing, Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in public housing, in a subsample of public housing authorities drawn from a larger study. This dissertation sought to determine (describe) what actually happened in the public housing projects selected, as a result of the authorization, funding, and general political and bureaucratic momentum generated by the anti-crime program. This description was important because if one is to understand the way program(s) are actually implemented, one has to get inside the "black box." Process evaluations are critical to understanding what it is that does or does not work, and why it does or does not work. Without these two pieces of information, there can be no transfer of knowledge about programs and program implementation.

Through careful observation of the programmatic activities of the funding sources, this process evaluation addressed three general questions: (a) what was the character of each program?; (b) how much program activity was generated?; and (c) what factor(s) seemed to

play important role(s) in determining the level(s), shape(s), and timing of the various program(s)?

This study is based on a subset of data from a broader evaluation project conducted by the author while on the staff of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The larger evaluation project, conducted for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, was designed to evaluate sixteen of thirty-nine public housing authorities funded under HUD's, Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. This program sought to achieve a reduction in crime and the fear of crime for residents of public housing grounded on the assumption that the actions of residents were central to the program. In the larger evaluation, HUD selected the evaluation sites because (a) it wanted to insure success of the program; (b) there were special interests in the sites by HUD anti-crime staff; and (c) there were political interests in the program. The two public housing authorities selected for this study were the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) (Cleveland, Ohio) and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (LMHA) (Toledo, Ohio). These two sites were selected for the completeness of data, range, and emphasis of programs offered, and the author's first-hand knowledge of site developments due to numerous visits made to each site.

To collect process data and information, the design of the larger evaluation specified that a person be hired part-time (twenty hours per week) in each evaluation site as the on-site process

observer. In the two housing authorities selected for this study, only the CMHA site had an observer. Senior evaluation staff believed that it would be important to keep their "feet-on-the-ground," and the author of this dissertation selected the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority as his site to evaluate.

After an intensive three-day observer training session conducted by the evaluation staff, the observers were instructed to "ease-into" their sites and to get comfortable with the anti-crime staff, the surroundings, and the residents before formal data collection activity was undertaken. The observers were to immerse themselves in program developments by attending anti-crime related meetings, talking with program staff, tenant leaders, and public housing officials. Formal data collection activity consisted of two major types: (a) standardized forms and (b) descriptive narratives. The standardized data collection consisted of case reports of the social service programs (viz. ADAMAH and Victim/Witness). The narrative data collection/information came from the observer's written logs of meetings, observations, and telephone conversations, as well as the development of critical event timelines and chronicled the authorization, implementation, and operation of the PHA's anti-crime program. The written logs focused on program content and were based on the encounters the observer had during tenant council meetings, anti-crime oversight team meetings, and interviews with key informants involved with the PHA's anti-crime program.

The following discussion examines the conclusions and generalizations for this study. It is assumed that the reader is familiar

with both the presentation of the individual case studies for the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority as well as the presentation of the six-point cross-site analysis.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In Chapter I, it was noted that the study of program implementation has been primarily concerned with documenting program failure. Though these investigations have been helpful in illuminating the importance of implementation issues, the documentation of program failure has become so common that to discover it once again is neither interesting nor important. Compliance with policy decisions is not necessarily a virtue, and is generally not to be expected. Social programs, especially large-scale federal projects, operate in complex environments and are subjected to powerful shaping forces. Though federal program designers would like to believe that their new programs will create new and different responses, the fact is that most new programs simply revitalize old efforts at the local level. There never seems to be enough time or fiscal resources available to sustain the new effort to overcome the past or the vested interests. Therefore, at the conclusion of a complex social program, it is not surprising that there are few conclusive statements that can be made. Most often, the conclusions are mixed. That was certainly the situation with the two programs examined in this dissertation. There are, however, general findings of this process evaluation that can be important in two ways: (1) by expanding and developing the growing

body of implementation theory; and (2) by assisting those developing collective anti-crime programs in neighborhoods, communities, or cities.

Policy-Making is an Ongoing Process
and Overlaps with Implementation
Activity

In Chapter I it was discussed that the implementation process is a relatively straight forward matter, which consists of three general phases--planning, start-up, and routinization. In the planning phase, such activities as the formulation of policy, support, authorization, and dissemination of policy information takes place, while the start-up phase marks the beginning of new procedures and the authorization of new groups with the responsibility of the task(s) to be undertaken. What that discussion of the implementation process was attempting to point out was that those two phases are usually repeated a number of times in order for a program to become operational, particularly if there are multiple agencies involved in the innovation.

While the implementation literature may present a tidy discussion of program activity taking place in three major phases, (with those phases repeated a number of times in order for a program to become operational, then not to be repeated again, after the program becomes functional) such was not the case in the implementation of the multi-agency Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. In the UIACP, once the PHA's proposals were submitted, reviewed, revised, approved and funded, policy making continued by HUD staff, local government

officials, PHA administrators and "street level bureaucrats," continuously, throughout the program.

The influence of HUD officials was constant. In the initial stages of the anti-crime program, HUD threatened to withhold funds so that they could "shape" the PHA's response. In both of the PHA's in this study, HUD "coached" them how they were to respond to certain aspects of the program. In addition, HUD encouraged (demanded) the active participation of residents in the program and the demonstration that residents were involved in all phases of the design and initiation.

Federal policy-making influence even extended well into the period of program activity. The UIACP began as a Carter Administration initiative, with the promise to participants that the program would be extended an additional two years. PHA's and tenants operated under that assumption for some time, until the Reagan Administration decided not to continue funding. The HUD anti-crime office was dismantled, and the PHA anti-crime staff and tenants, who had been encouraged to rely upon them, quickly found themselves without support, and bewildered as to how they should operate their program.

On the local level, policy making was also a continuous process. Once PHA's had received the funds, despite HUD's interest in maintaining control, local officials found that they had a number of means at their disposal to continue to shape or reshape their anti-crime program. For example, projects would be implemented along lines different than proposed, viz., use of the DOL funded youth or

the anti-crime staff differently than planned. This was certainly the case in LMHA, for both the DOL security aides and the social service staff were utilized for different purposes. Additionally, promised administrative patterns could be ignored as they were in both sites (requiring the anti-crime coordinator to be directly accountable to the PHA executive director); in-kind contributions could be modified (keeping police services constant rather than increasing them, or dropping social service agencies that lost interest in the program); or token efforts could be undertaken (police sensitivity training for a small, specially selected group, as was the case in the CMHA and LMHA programs).

Moreover, "street-level" bureaucrats (e.g., residents and anti-crime program staff) also continued to translate policy decisions into particular forms--sometimes congruent with federal and PHA policy-making and sometimes not. Some had goals of their own (political activity, power, and authority); others improvised job placement.

Though it has been pointed out that this study was not interested in documenting implementation failure, such documentation does help to explain why many of the outputs that had been anticipated for the program were not achieved. For example, both CMHA and LMHA proposals for increased police service did not represent firm policy decisions, at least by people in positions to make such decisions. The sensitivity training did not come about as anticipated, in either site; LMHA did not establish a police substation or even get the "live-in" program out of the proposed stage. However, more

importantly, is the meaning that there is good reason to believe that there were local implementation successes which were only tangentially related to federal interests. Therefore, viewing policy making and implementation as overlapping processes which shape program outputs, recognizes that implementation efforts may be viewed as a disaster from one point of view and a success from another.

Problems are Not Uniform
Across the Sites

A core assumption of the UIACP was that crime and the fear of crime were serious problems for the residents of public housing. Data and information presented by both the federal government and local housing authorities substantiated that fact. However, there was no ability within the UIACP to distinguish between the differences of the crime problem(s) for applying PHA's. LMAH received \$20,000 for its victim/witness program, a sum of money that was uniform to other PHA's that received victim/witness money. Likewise, the situation was similar for the ADAMHA program. Again, never minding the differences (the enormity or the meagerness of the particular problem in the particular PHA) made the level of funding irrelevant.

The scale of the housing developments selected for the anti-crime program affected the expected impact of the anti-crime effort. The applying PHA's were given complete freedom in selecting the housing development(s) to be included in their proposal. All that PHA's were required to follow were the unit eligibility requirements which encouraged (rewarded) a PHA for including as many units as possible in

its program. It is no wonder then that CMHA selected the high rise units of Riverview and Lakeview as the sites for the program. Given the larger the number of units served by the program, not only would the PHA be eligible for more funds, but the chances were better that the program would be selected for funding. LMHA, not having any large high-rise buildings, consolidated three housing projects "on-paper" not only to increase the service population, and the chances for funding, but the dollar amount of the proposal. Therefore, given the interest in making the demonstration area large, it is not surprising that the UIACP was simply drowned in both sides, due to the time constraints of the program, the difficulty in developing a work culture among program staff, the difficulty of establishing trust among residents and the number of residents to be served by the program.

HUD's Selection of PHA's for the UIACP
was Based on Criteria other than the
PHA's Capacity for Administering an
Anti-Crime Program; e.g., Politics,
Elegance of the Proposal, or
Special Interests

HUD's selection of sites for the anti-crime program was not necessarily made on the capacities of a PHA (that is, agency activities and those of the target population) to administer the program. Instead, selection decisions were based on pluralistic criteria. For example, unless a PHA wrote a sloppy proposal, the PHA would be funded due to either recent publicity about serious crime problems, being located in a "special" congressional district, or if the PHA were

located in an important political city in an election year. Additionally, well-written (elegant) proposals were hard for federal funders to resist since they seemed to recognize a match between authority skills and the capacity to administer a program.

In the case of the two PHA's in this study, there is little information to indicate that either site had the capacity for this complex program prior to its inception. Both PHA's had limited experience with anti-crime programs that emphasized either a "hardware" or "software" approach. While it is not surprising that agencies get funded with little consideration for capacity, it is important to point it out because it demonstrates the structure of the relationship that exists between local level and federal level administrators. Those administering federal programs are required to "get-the-money" out and are simply prerated to go to great lengths to see that their program(s) are implemented. Therefore, in sites where funding was required because of political influence or where elegant proposals were written, the task of the federal administrators is to keep the sites in line with federal requirements. The responsibility is different, however, if it appears that the capacity exists in a site to administer a program. In those situations, federal officials seem to be more facilitating and assisting rather than concerned with enforcing regulations or program compliance.

Pluralism Abounds

All too often, when we think of special programs, it becomes easy to conceptualize the program as an independent activity which

carries much influence, while at the same time not being influenced by other interests. We tend to forget that agencies have departments, that organizations have bureaus, that neighborhoods have special interests, and that even residents of public housing have factions with special interests. The impact of this pluralism was dramatic and consequential for both CMHA and LMHA.

In both sites, what was striking about the PHA's, was how relatively uninfluential they were with local government, especially the police. Neither PHA had bargaining power to direct or to garner resources. The constituents for the PHA were the residents who had little political sway. In city government, e.g., the police, operate in a complex demand structure, and how services are allocated, is dependent on how much "clout" is brought to bear by the community. To think that the PHA would be able to influence the police department or city government with the "clout" of a small, limited duration program was unrealistic. Vested interests in other, longer term programs and projects overshadowed the UIACP at the local government level.

Departments within the PHA also have vested interests. The anti-crime program was the "new program" for the moment in both housing authorities in this study. It is not surprising then that the UIACP was viewed as an opportunity for the PHA to initiate organization change and staff development. LMHA clearly had this in mind with the selection of anti-crime staff. CMHA, on the other hand, saw the progream funds as an opportunity to make some needed capital improvements in the name of resident security.

Social service agencies also were institutions with their own vested interests. Many of the agencies that pledged support and signed cooperative agreements to provide services were confronted with declining fiscal resources. The result was (especially in CMHA) that agencies which agreed to provide services, simply pursued their own interests with little sense of accountability to the PHA.

Finally, tenants were simply not just tenants as they too had vested interests in the program. When the information got out that there were jobs available, residents demanded that they get them all or they would not cooperate with the program. Parents, when they found out that their children might be functioning like police officers, patrolling the housing project for "problems" (as was the case in LMHA), objected to the concept because they were convinced the work would put the children at risk. In CMHA tenant leaders saw the program as giving them a voice in their living affairs and an opportunity to try to strengthen their tenant leadership.

The point of this discussion is that there was a plethora of cross-currents that affected the programs in each site. No program comes into an agency anew and expected to reshape past or existing activity. Though the UIACP was interpreted by many to do that, there were just too many competing interests to allow it to happen. Each interest group attempted to claim some basis of legitimacy. The shape of the program in each site was to a large extent determined by the resolution or lack of resolution of these competing claims.

Economic Turn-Downs, Inflation, and
the Development of New Policies
Regarding Federal Spending have
Powerful Effects on the Imple-
mentation of a Program

In many respects, the UIACP was in difficulty even before the PHA's received their funds. In 1979, when the program was conceived, until 1980, when the funds were made available, economic inflation had cut into the planning efforts of the PHA's modernization programs. Moreover, the economic decline and the new federal policies reduced the size of federal resources available for the program. The result was that cities and other agencies were competing against each other for a larger portion of the declining resource pool. Community social service agencies viewed the UIACP funds as resources to maintain their viability and therefore were willing to sign cooperative agreements to provide services to the tenant population.

When program participants discovered that the UIACP would not be refunded as had been anticipated, the interest in the program concept from all sides declined dramatically. What had been anticipated as a four-year, possible a five-year effort, was now only twelve to eighteen months long. As the UIACP had been given much special treatment and created many problems for established PHA staff, there was little support for the HUD staff by the PHA's when it appeared that the HUD staff would be disbanded. The HUD staff had lost its ability to leverage (shape) PHA responses. Housing authorities were relatively free to run their programs as they saw fit. The effect was in the end that the PHA's shaped the anti-crime program to their goals and objectives, not as HUD wanted to see the program.

Skills were Lacking Among the
Anti-Crime Staff

This issue has been discussed generally in each of the cross-site analyses. The lack of appropriate skills, however, was such an important factor in the implementation and success (or lack of success) of a program that it deserves to be discussed once again.

Both CMHA and LMHA had little experience in the management of social service (software) programs. In fact, CMHA really did not attempt to operate social services--their proposals for victim/witness and ADAMHA funds were rejected. LMAH, on the other hand, did attempt to deliver social services, but the staff was so disorganized and distracted by the short funding life of their programs that the results were rather disappointing. Both housing authorities were simply more comfortable focusing on housing maintenance and developing housing policy. Staff selected for the anti-crime program, though capable, were often uninitiated in the area of public housing policy and simply did not know how to respond. The political/institutional areas they were required to work in were simply out of the domain and interest of many people working in the anti-crime programs. For example, as staff were required to leverage commitments, the inexperience of staff seems to account for some of the low levels of activity in this area (other factors, included the economic down turn and the lack of power and influence within local government). Whether leveraging would have led to project continuation in either site is hard to determine.

Even the tenant organizations in each site were stymied by the lack of organizational skills. Though the CMHA tenant council staff was to receive organizational training, it was cancelled by the anti-crime coordinator as a result of a dispute with the subcontractor. For some reason, the policy-makers just assumed that the skills existed and would emerge during the program. The fact was, however, that for most resident leaders, responsibility for the imprest fund, management of a few paid staff, and a voice in matters that would effect their lives, was a first-time occurrence and the residents did not know how to respond to this new position. Tenant meetings became forums for personal harangues and general chaos, that gave little substantive input to program development.

Local Police Play an Important Role in Community Anti-Crime Efforts

The commitment of local police to an anti-crime effort is viewed by tenants as an indication that the authorities are taking the problem of crime seriously. In CMHA, despite the fact that the authority had its own security force, residents wanted Cleveland Police as well. The story was the same in LMHA. Residents, if they could leverage more support, wanted more police presence, and they would accept the local police in any strategy--foot patrol, aggressive patrol, off-duty work, team policing, etc. Adult residents liked the police around. Police visibility is simply important to a community anti-crime program.

Residents Given a Choice Between Improving the Physical Security of their Apartments or Improving the Defensibility of the Housing Development, will Accept the "Quick-Fix" (e.g., Locks, Solid Core Doors, Security Screens, etc.)

If the concepts of the defensible space strategy are meaningful to creating self-defense capacities within public housing developments, and meaningful tenant input into decision making is to be maintained, considerable effort will have to be made to translate defensible space concepts into language that is persuasive to tenants. If it is not translated, tenants will opt for the "quick-fix."

The CMHA modernization program is a good example of this generalization. Due to the lengthy bureaucratic delays encountered in the modernization program, the anti-crime coordinator had to regularly convince residents that the physical security improvements for the housing developments were going to take place. The residents, especially the elderly living in the Riverview high rise, had been led to believe that the anti-crime program would quickly improve the physical security of their environment. The "fanfair" in announcing the program contributed to this belief. When the promises did not come about as the politicians had said they would, residents believed that they had been misled, and were willing to compromise the long-term securing improvement for those of the "quick'fix" variety. Residents simply did not understand or did not want to believe the

bureaucracy associated with modernization. To preserve the residents from draining resources for the short term, the anti-crime coordinator was continually translating developments.

Resident Employment was the Strongest and the Weakest Part of the Anti-Crime Program for both CMHA and LMHA

On the other hand, resident employment programs in both sites were very strong. The positions were filled with little difficulty; training, especially for the youth in the CMHA program was very sophisticated; turnover was moderate given the time frame of the program; supervision was adequate; and there was not evidence of corruption in the employment programs. There were a variety of reasons why employment was such a strong element. First, there was a broad consensus within the housing authorities about the value of employment for residents (both youth and adults). Second, both PHA's had experience operating such programs and were aware of the types of demands and problems made by residents. Therefore, when resistance was encountered by LMHA about the youth's being employed as security patrollers, an alternative employment plan was at hand.

On the other hand, however, the employment element was also the weakest program because one of its primary goals was to secure permanent employment for participants in the private sector; the results were rather disappointing. For the most part, neither PHA was able to secure permanent employment for a large number of its participants. At least two factors account for this development. First, in both CMHA and LMHA the anti-crime programs were initiated

in cities during the worst economic down-turn since the Great Depression, and both cities had substantial unemployment. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that tenants of public housing, often lacking in marketable skills, should have a difficult time finding permanent work under such circumstances. Secondly, both CMHA and LMHA were unsuccessful in their attempt to leverage resources and services from institutions in the public and private sectors. No doubt the economic down-turn affected the ability to leverage resources and the ability of institutions to respond. However, the PHA's general inability to leverage resources seems to reflect both a lack of the required political power and skill that existed within the PHA.

Program Synchronization of Programmatic
Elements was a Constant Problem
Throughout the Anti-Crime Program
for HUD Staff as well as PHA Anti-
Crime Staff

From the moment the federal funds were authorized, HUD staff was under great pressure to get the program funds out as quickly as possible to the participating PHA's. The relatively short-time spans between HUD's request for proposals, PHA's submissions, applicant revisions based on the HUD staff comments, and final approval, rushed the entire planning phase of the UIACP. This rush to fund programs had serious consequences for both CMHA and LMHA, especially since the program design stressed the integration of crime prevention strategies into an effective, tightly coordinated whole. The haste with which these sites were required to operate in order to secure the program funds did not allow them the time to anticipate the delays

and/or problems they would encounter--especially CMHA anti-crime staff with its modernization program. Residents were led to believe, due to the political visibility given the program, that it would be funded immediately and that activity would be swift. When program activities did not happen as quickly as residents thought things should, they became concerned. The fact was that the rush, with which the program was implemented, negated the development of strong alliances and understandings with residents, as well as public and private institutions.

Additionally, both PHA's were required to involve residents in every phase of program development and implementation, which increased the number of people involved in decision-making processes. Present knowledge about program implementation suggests that expecting a program to be implemented with a number of clearance and decision points⁹³ in such a short time period, was simply unrealistic. The rush to distribute the program funds at the federal level, and the haste with which CMHA and LMHA were required to develop a program proposal to qualify for the funds blinded both the federal and local policy makers to that reality. This set the stage for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program in both the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority and the Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority.

⁹³Pressman and Wildavsky define clearance and decision points as follows: "Each time an act of agreement has to be registered for the program to continue, we call a decision point. Each instance in which a separate participant is required to give his consent, we call a clearance." See Jeffery L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973), p. xvi.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

A DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING

APPENDIX A

A DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC HOUSING

Often the term public housing means many things to different people. For this dissertation, there is a need to present an "understanding" of its meaning. A most comprehensive description of the term is offered by a knowledgeable expert of public housing policy, Mr. Raymond J. Struyk:

. . . public housing refers to "conventional" or "low rent" public housing, that is housing constructed and operated by local Public Housing Authorities [PHA's] under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as ammended. [The 1937 Act] is the oldest national housing program to assist renter households until very recently, when the Lower Income Housing Assistance Program [Section 8] replaced it. [The concept of public housing began] with triple objectives of generating employment, eliminating slums, and providing good housing for needy households; its present mission is almost exclusively to assist [economically] poor households to live in adequate housing. . . .

Public housing should not be confused with other rental assistance programs under which private developers who own the dwellings receive various subsidies to provide good housing to moderate--and low--in come households. Public housing is owned and operated by local governments Authorities, typically distinct from municipal government with the cost of construction and some operating expenses borne by the federal government.¹

¹Raymond J. Struyk, A New System for Public Housing: Salvaging A National Resource (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1980), pp. 3-4.

APPENDIX B

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM
FUNDING SOURCES

APPENDIX B

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT URBAN INITIATIVES ANTI-CRIME PROGRAM FUNDING SOURCES

Department of Housing and Urban Development

Low Income Public Housing Modernization Program	\$20,000,000
Community Development Block Grant Program	2,072,000
Community Development Block Grant Technical Assistance	178,000

Department of Labor

Community Conservation and Improvements Program	7,410,000
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Department of Justice

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention	1,074,500
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Technical Assistance	15,500
Office of Criminal Justice Improvements Victim/Witness Program	340,000
Office of Community Anti-Crime Program Technical Assistance	60,000

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration	477,000
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Technical Assistance	22,715

Department of Interior

Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service Urban Parks Program	913,089
Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service Urban Parks Program Technical Assistance	10,000

Local Match

Non-Hardware Anti-Crime Efforts	8,013,558
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TOTAL	\$40,586,647
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APPENDIX C

NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSIONS AND SPECIAL TASK FORCES

APPENDIX C

NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSIONS AND SPECIAL TASK FORCES

National Commissions

- 1965 to 1967 -- President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice
- 1967 to 1968 -- National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
- 1968 to 1969 -- National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
- 1970 to 1971 -- Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
- 1973 -- National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals

Special Task Forces and National Professional Groups

*American Bar Association (Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards for Judicial Administration and Model Judicial Code)

APPENDIX D

RESEARCH ASSISTANT LETTER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAM IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

MARK H. MOORE, *Faculty Chairman*
GEORGE L. KELLING, *Executive Director*

Harvard Law School
501 Pound Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 495-5188

RESEARCH ASSISTANT

Seeking an individual to work part-time (20 hour work week, with some flexibility, may require some weekend work) with a Harvard University based national research project in the area of crime prevention. This project is co-funded by the Police Foundation, Washington, D. C. Length of employment is anticipated to be fourteen (14) months.

Individual must be highly motivated; able to work in a highly unstructured environment with minimum supervision. In addition to working flexible hours, individual will be responsible for conducting interviews with a broad range of people, collecting recorded information, writing reports/summaries, monitoring program developments, and other duties as assigned.

Requirements: Bachelor's or Master's degree, excellent writing and communication skills, sensitivity, attention to detail, sense of confidentiality, tactfulness, and maturity. Previous research experience or familiarity with criminology or criminal justice helpful, especially with observational methods.

Steven M. Edwards
Project Coordinator

APPENDIX E

OBSERVING READING LIST

APPENDIX E

OBSERVER READING LIST

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APPENDIX F

PROCESS EVALUATION DATA FORMAT

PROCESS EVALUATION DATA FORMAT

Standardized Data Collection				Narrative	
ADAMHA FORM	DOL/YCCIP Questions	Victim/Witness Form	Observer Field Logs a. telephone b. meeting c. interview	Critical Event Time Line	
Baltimore Charlotte Chicago Louisville San Antonio Seattle Toledo	Baltimore Charlotte Chicago Cleveland Dade County Hampton Hartford Jackson Louisville New York City* Oxnard San Antonio Seattle Tampa Toledo	Baltimore Charlotte Chicago Hartford Jackson Jersey City Oxnard San Antonio Seattle Toledo	Baltimore Charlotte Cleveland Dade County Hampton Hartford Jackson Jersey City Louisville Oxnard San Antonio Seattle Tampa	Baltimore Charlotte Cleveland Date County Hampton Hartford Jackson Jersey City Louisville Oxnard San Antonio Seattle Tampa Toledo	

*No Date

APPENDIX G

OBSERVER DATA COLLECTION FORMS

Project Number 1 2 3

OBSERVER'S LOG
(Interview)

- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|----------------------------|------|--|-------|--------|--|------|--|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1. | Date: Day | | | Month | | | Year | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| 2. | Time Interview Began: | Hour | | | Minute | | | | | | | | | | |
| | (express in military time) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | | |
| 3. | Time Interview Ended: | Hour | | | Minute | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | | |
| 4. | PHA Staff or Tenant Number | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 18 | 19 | 20 | | | |
| 5. | PHA Number | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 21 | 22 | | | | |
| 6. | Evaluation Staff Member | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 23 | 24 | 25 | | | |
| 7. | Reason for Interview: | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 26 | 27 |

(Attach additional page if necessary.)

8. Topics of Interview (1 Primary, 2, 3, etc.)

11: Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention (specify and rank): 26

12: More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign (specify and rank): _____

- ____ 21: More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation (specify and rank): _____ 30
- ____ 22: Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants (specify and rank): _____ 31
- ____ 23: More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ Witnesses (specify and rank): _____ 32
- ____ 31: Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers (specify and rank): _____ 35

___32: Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other
Sources Which Co-target on the Project and the Surrounding Neigh-
borhoods (specify and rank): _____

34

___40: Evaluation Issues (specify and rank): _____

35

___88: Other (specify and rank): _____

36

9. Content of Interview: _____

37 38

39 40

41 42

(Attach additional pages if necessary.)

Comments (Impressions, Interpretation, Action taken, Diagnosis, etc.):

43 44

45 46

(Attach additional pages if necessary.)

Project Number 1 2 3

OBSERVER'S LOG
(Meeting)

- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|--|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|
| 1. Date: Day | ___ | ___ | Month | ___ | ___ | Year | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |
| 2. Time Meeting Began: Hour | ___ | ___ | Minute | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (express in military time) | | | | | | | | | | | | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | |
| 3. Time Meeting Ended: Hour | ___ | ___ | Minute | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | |
| 4. PHA Number | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 18 | 19 | |
| 5. Evaluation Staff Member | ___ | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 20 | 21 | 22 |
| 6. Number of persons in attendance | ___ | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 23 | 24 | 25 |
| 7. Primary PHA Staff | ___ | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 26 | 27 | 28 |
| 8. Primary Tenant Representative | ___ | ___ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 29 | 30 |
| 9. Describe Group Composition | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

(Attach additional pages if necessary.)

Project Number 1 2 3

10. Purpose of Meeting

31 32

(Attach additional pages if necessary.)

11. Topics of Meeting (1 Primary, 2, 3, etc.)

11: Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention (specify and rank):33

12: More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facilities and Physical Redesign (specify and rank):34

21: More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation (specify and rank):35

Project Number 1 2 3

10. Purpose of Meeting

31 32

(Attach additional pages if necessary.)

11. Topics of Meeting (1 Primary, 2, 3, etc.)

11: Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention (specify and rank):33

12: More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facilities and
Physical Redesign (specify and rank):34

21: More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation (specify and rank):35

Project Number 1 2 3

22: Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants (specify and rank): 36

23: More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ Witnesses (specify and rank): 37

31: Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers (specify and rank): 38

32: Stronger Linkages with Problems from Local Government and Other Sources Which Co-target on the Project and the Surrounding Neighborhood (specify and rank): 39

40: Evaluation Issues (specify and rank): 40

Project Number 1 2 3

____88: Other (specify and rank): _____ 41

12. Content of Meeting

42 43
44 45
46 47

13. Comments (Impressions, Interpretation, Action Taken, Diagnosis, etc.)

48 49
50 51
52 53

____ 22: Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants (specify and rank): _____

25

____ 23: More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ Witnesses (specify and rank): _____

26

____ 31: Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers (specify and rank): _____

26

____ 32: Stronger Linkages with Problems from Local Government and Other Sources Which Co-target on the Project and the Surrounding Neighborhoods (specify and rank): _____

27

__40: Evaluation Issues (specify and rank): _____

28

__88: Other (specify and rank): _____

29

8. Content of Discussion (Describe in Narrative)

30 31

(Attach additional pages if necessary.)

9. Comments (Impressions, Interpretation, Action Taken, Diagnosis, etc.)

32 33

(Attach additional pages if necessary.)

City Number: 1 2Site Number: 3 4 5Case Number: 6 7 8

ADAMHA ACTIVITY

1. Referral Source: _____ 9 10
 Referral Source Case No. (if known): _____
2. Type of Referral: _____ 11
 ___1: Alcohol abuse
 ___2: Drug abuse
 ___3: Mental health
 ___4: Other (specify): _____
 ___9: Unknown
3. No. of Times Seen: _____ 12 13
4. Age of Client: _____ 14 15
5. Sex: _____ 16
 ___1: Male
 ___2: Female
 ___9: Unknown
6. Race: _____ 17
 ___1: White
 ___2: Black
 ___3: Hispanic
 ___4: Asian/Native American
 ___5: Other (specify): _____
 ___9: Unknown

7. Marital Status:

☐ 01: Single - Never Married18 19☐ 02: Separated☐ 03: Divorced☐ 04: Married☐ 05: Widow/Widower☐ 06: Common-law☐ 07: Other (specify): _____☐ 99: Unknown

8. Years of Education: _____

20 21

9. Presently Employed?

☐ 1: Yes22☐ 2: No☐ 9: Unknown

10. Date of Referral: Day _____ Month _____ Year _____

23 24 25 26 27 28

11. Reason for Referral: _____

29 30

(attach additional sheets if necessary)

12. What is client seeking? _____

31 32

(attach additional sheets if necessary)

13. Case Disposition and Reason: _____

33 34 35

(attach additional sheets if necessary)

14. Counselor Assessment (Prognosis): _____

36 37 38

(attach additional sheets if necessary)

City Number: 1 2Site Number: 3 4 5Case Number: 6 7 8

VICTIM/WITNESS ACTIVITY

1. Referral Source: _____
 Referral Source Case No. (if known): _____ 9 10
2. 1: Victim
2: Witness 11
3. Age: _____ 12 13
4. Sex:
1: Male 14
2: Female
3: Unknown
5. Race: 15
1: White
2: Black
3: Latino
4: Asian/Native American
5: Other
9: Unknown
6. Type of Crime: _____ 16 17
7. Date of Incident: Day _____ Month _____ Year _____ 18 19 20 21 22 23
8. Date of First Contact: Day _____ Month _____ Year _____ 24 25 26 27 28 29
9. Number of Contacts: _____ 30 31
10. Building Number: _____ 32 33
11. Case Action (specify whether charges filed and/or pending): 34 35 36

 (attach additional sheets if necessary)

12. Case:

☐ 1: Open37☐ 2: Closed13. Age of Offender: 38 39

14. Sex of Offender:

☐ 1: Male40☐ 2: Female☐ 9: Unknown

15. Race of Offender:

☐ 1: White41☐ 2: Black☐ 3: Latino☐ 4: Asian/Native American☐ 5: Other (specify): _____☐ 9: Unknown

16. Offender's Relationship to Victim:

42 43☐ 01: Spouse☐ 02: Live-in boyfriend/girlfriend☐ 03: Other friend☐ 04: Parent☐ 05: Son/daughter☐ 06: In-law☐ 07: Neighbor☐ 08: Other (specify): _____☐ 99: Unknown

APPENDIX H

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

APPENDIX H

ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

The eligibility requirements for the public housing authorities applying for the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program were very specific. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) wanted a focused program application that stressed an integrated and comprehensive approach to reducing crime and improving the quality of life for residents. It was HUD's intention that the money not be used authority-wide, but directed to a specific project, that was either a family, elderly or mixed development. HUD directed that:

Applications can encompass more than one project . . . if the projects are contiguous to one another and it can be demonstrated that comprehensive crime prevention for these projects is appropriate for whatever geographic area is covered. The project(s) chosen must have a total of at least 200 public housing units in management. The projects must have the same form of tenant organization . . . which for purposes of this program can include anything from a loosely structured tenant activity group to a formally organized association with adopted by laws.¹

The Department of Housing and Urban Development also set terms for the maximum total amount of federal funds that could be requested by an authority in its application. It was as follows:

¹U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Notice H79-11, PHA, p. e.

If the projects
targeted for the
anti-crime program
contain:

Total federal
amount requested
shall be:

200 - 1000 units	up to 500,000
1001 - 2000 units	up to 1,000,000
2001 - 3000 units	up to 2,000,000
3001 - 4000 units	up to 3,000,000
4001 - + units	up to 4,000,000

Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Notice H79-11, PHA, p. 3.

APPENDIX I

CLEVELAND

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS AND PROGRAM REVISION

CLEVELAND--CHRONOLOGY

- August, 1979 -- The CMHA submitted application versions required of semi-finalists.
- September, 1979 -- The CMHA received notification of selection to participate in the Anti-Crime Program. Work begun on the final application. The Riverview project manger was replaced.
- October, 1979 -- Public Safety Coordinator hired.
- November, 1979
- December, 1979 -- William Brill Associates, Inc., conducted vulnerability analysis. Oversight Team members were selected and began meeting.
- January, 1980 -- Final CMHA submitted an application for ADAMHA funds but was not granted an award.
- February, 1980
- March, 1980
- April, 1980 -- The CMHA received MOD, CDBG, and DOL awards. Cooperative agreements for CDBG and DOL funds were signed. Twelve residents were elected to the RACC (Resident Anti-Crime Commission). Three CMHA patrolmen were hired to work exclusively in the site. Additional security guards were hired with CETA funds. The Family Violence Center initiated an Emergency Call-Back System for the site.
- May, 1980 -- William Brill Associates, Inc., was selected to perform comprehensive programming for the MOD program.
- June, 1980 -- Monthly meetings for the RACC continued, applications were taken for a full-time Program Director. The DOL Coordinator was hired. Job Descriptions were posted for DOL position of: 8 security guard cadets; two program aides; and two EMT's (emergency maintenance technicians).

- June, 1980
(Continued)
- The Family Violence Center terminated the Emergency Call-Back System. CETA funds were no longer available to hire security guards.
- July, 1980
- An Assistant Public Safety Coordinator was hired. He and the President of the RACC attended a training session conducted by the National Center for Community Anti-Crime Programs in Texas. Youth applicants were screened, interviewed, tested, selected, and hired for the DOL positions.
- August, 1980
- Preliminary plans made for training for RACC and Anti-Crime Program staff members at Cuyahoga Community College. The DOL Coordinator left the program. The security cadets were issued uniforms and equipment and received CPR training from the American Red Cross. EMT's began work. The West Side Mental Health Center began a needs assessment. A HUD official conducted a site visit.
- September, 1980
- Security cadets were enrolled in a 120-hour Basic Peace Officer Training program at Case Western Reserve University. The possibility of an urban park was explored. Another HUD official conducted a site visit.
- October, 1980
- Brill Associates completed the programming and MOD work plan development. HUD approved the final MOD budget and work plan. RACC training at Cuyahoga Community College was cancelled due to cost. A new DOL coordinator was hired. Three youth cadets and one EMT left the DOL program.
- November, 1980
- An Anti-Crime Program office was constructed at the CMHA Central Office. An RACC office was furnished and opened in the Riverview high-rise. A "hot-line" was installed in the Lakeview highrise. Arthur Sanders, Inc., was hired to prepare A & E bid specifications. Five cadets graduated from the Police Officer Training Program and received Private Police Commissions from the Cleveland Police Department. Cadets and "match" patrolmen began Operation I.D. The DOL coordinator, the Police Auxiliary, and the Cleveland Police Response Unit met to foster a closer working relationship.

- December, 1980 -- An RACC Program Director and two part-time aides were hired. A new EMT was hired. The DOL Coordinator and the cadets showed crime and safety films. The commander of the CPD Police Response Unit for the sites was replaced.
- January, 1981 -- The MOD architect met with Anti-Crime Program staff. The RACC Program Director and the DOL Coordinator attended a seminar in Norfolk. A new cadet was hired. DOL cadets and "match" patrolmen conduct a new resident orientation program.
- February, 1981 -- The MOD architect met with RACC and staff members of the sites. The CMHA held several police training sessions for cadets, who continued anti-crime meetings and presentations to residents. A program aide resigned. The CMHA Executive Director requested a no-cost extension for the program until December 1981. The Public Safety Coordinator became the chairman of a CMHA administrative streamlining committee.
- March, 1981 -- The MOD architect met with Anti-Crime Program staff and Riverview staff. The first anti-crime newsletter was printed and distributed. The needs assessment conducted by the West Side Mental Health Center was completed. One new program aide and one new cadet were hired. Cadets distributed emergency telephone number stickers on request, received more in-house police training, and ran an Operation I-Spy.
- April, 1981 -- The Assistant Public Safety coordinator resigned. The two housing managers were replaced. The Anti-Crime Program provided security for a meeting to April, 1981, discuss crime problems of the Rear West Side.
- May, 1981 -- A new Assistant Public Safety Coordinator was hired. The RACC Program Director initiated a daily check-in program for the elderly. Anti-Crime staff developed a presentation on the program and vandalism. Two cadets left the program. Three new cadets and one EMT were hired.

January, 1981

February, 1981

March, 1981

April, 1981

May, 1981

The Assistant Police Chief, responsible for the
The two housing managers were contacted. The
Anti-Crime Program was presented to the
meeting to April, 1981, during a crime reduction
of the new housing area.
The Assistant Police Chief, responsible for the
The two housing managers were contacted. The
Anti-Crime Program was presented to the
meeting to April, 1981, during a crime reduction
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The two housing managers were contacted. The
Anti-Crime Program was presented to the
meeting to April, 1981, during a crime reduction
of the new housing area.

- June, 1981 -- Specifications were prepared and bidding was completed for the T.V. camera system at Lakeview. The preparation of specifications for lighting at both sites was completed. EMT's worked on replacing lights in Riverview.
- July, 1981 -- Site managers and staff received training on problems of the elderly. A Resident Emergency Handbook was printed and distributed. A "Hot List" program was initiated to facilitate the return of stolen goods to the owners.
- August, 1981 -- The contract for the T.V. system at Lakeview was awarded. The second issue of the Anti-Crime newsletter was printed and distributed. The DOL Coordinator's position was terminated as funds were exhausted. Six new EMT's were hired. Two cadets who had completed one year in the program were hired by the CMHA Department of Safety and Security.
- September, 1981 -- The CMHA learned that the no-cost extension to December 1981 was approved by HUD. A contract was awarded for the lighting after the specifications and bid had been approved by the CMHA board. Bids were solicited for the Riverview highrise lobby redesign. All project managers were briefed on the use of the Notice to Lease Violators developed by Anti-Crime staff. Two cadets left the program and two were enrolled in the Peace Officer Training program. An Anti-Crime Day was held at the Riverview highrise with participation from the Cleveland Police Response Unit and the Police Auxiliary.

	1.1 Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention	1.2 More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facili- ties & Physical Redesign	2.1 More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation
H.U.D. Specifications*	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Appointment of a knowl- edgeable crime prevention coordinator. 2. Screening of tenants and tenant selection guidelines. 3. Distribution and group- ing of residents. 4. Tenant eviction. 5. Tenant-management rela- tions. 6. Targeting of programs to specific individuals/ groups associated with crime. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Access control. 2. Distribution of space for social functions. 3. Target hardening. 4. Circulation and trans- portation patterns to pro- mote tenant cohesion and territoriality. 5. Clustering units. 6. Creation of defensible space. 7. Development of service facilities (on site or neighborhood). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased tenant cohesion. 2. "Turf Reclamation." 3. Tenant/youth foot patrols. 4. Block/floor/lobby watches. 5. Improvement of police/ tenant relations. 6. Educating tenants on security-related matters. 7. Tenant input into planning and implemen- tation of the entire Anti-Crime Program.

* For a more compre-
hensive description of
HUD guidelines for
each programmatic cate-
gory, see the Urban
Initiatives Anti-Crime
Program Guidebook.

<p>2.2 Increased Full- and Part-Time Employment of Tenants</p>	<p>2.3 More and Improved Ser- vices to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ Witnesses</p>	<p>3.2 Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers</p>	<p>3.3 Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources which Co-target on the Projects and the Surrounding Neighborhoods</p>
<p>1. Establishment of an employment and training program. 2. Training and employ- ment of tenants in modernization and mainte- nance tasks. 3. Training and employ- ment of tenants in community service func- tions.</p>	<p>1. Alcohol abuse pro- grams. 2. Drug abuse programs. 3. Youth programs. 4. Victim/witness pro- grams. 5. Programs for the elderly. 6. Crisis intervention programs.</p>	<p>1. Police foot patrol, domestic dispute, team- policing patrols. 2. Police as "human service trouble shoot- ers." 3. Relations among PHA personnel police and tenants. 4. Precinct stations in projects</p>	<p>1. Local government com- prehensive, targeting with anti-crime planning with component programs in specific housing projects. 2. Anti-crime targeting of neighborhood organiza- tions. 3. Anti-crime targeting of local business with the provision of employ- ment opportunities.</p>

	1.1 Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention	1.2 More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facilities & Physical Redesign	2.1 More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation
Cleveland Proposed	Activities included: (1) appointing a Public Safety Coordinator and hiring an assistant; (2) improving tenant screening and eviction procedures; (3) hiring additional security personnel; (4) training security project managers and maintenance personnel; and (6) conducting a gerontology workshop.	Activities included: (1) the installation of security screens, exterior lighting, and dead-bolt locks; (2) redesigning walkways from low-rise units; (3) controlling pedestrian access to and egress from the target site; (4) redesigning a closet/storage room for use as a Guide/Security Control Center; (5) the installation of closed-circuit TV surveillance cameras; (6) redesigning north and south entrances to high-rise and vestibule mail-box area; (7) the acquisition of a computer system; and (8) the acquisition of communications equipment for the PHA security force.	Activities included: (1) administering a Friendly Visitor Program; (2) developing educational programs for tenants; and (3) organizing an Estate Security Commission.

	1.1 Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention	1.2 More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facili- ties & Physical Redesign	2.1 More Tenant Anti-Crime Par- ticipation
Cleveland Actual	<p>The Deputy Chief of the PHA police force was appointed Public Safety Coordinator in October 1979. After the position ended in December 1981, he became a special assistant to the PHA's Executive Director. The PHA has received background information on housing applicants from a local social service clearinghouse, but the effects of this "screening" mechanism has so far been limited. The PHA has made significant improvements to its eviction procedures, however, with the purchase of a computer system in November 1981 and a "Notice to Violator" ticket system for observed lease violations. PHA personnel and residents received training in August and September 1981.</p>	<p>An Anti-crime office was constructed and a closed-circuit TV system was installed by the autumn of 1981. The PHA also purchased hand-held walkie-talkies, media equipment, a car, and a computer terminal using HUD MOD funds. Work on a number of other activities--the Riverview lobby changes and the installation of exterior lighting and mailbox units, security screens, and dead-bolt locks --continued through the spring of 1981.</p>	<p>The Public Safety Coordinator and other PHA staff in security and community relations began organizing the estate security commission in February and March 1980. Known as the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC), the organization made attempts to form block clubs, made several slide shows, and assisted in the publication of a newsletter. When the Anti-Crime Program officially ended in December 1981, RACC members expressed their intention of continuing to function as a resident anti-crime body. The Friendly Visitor Program was an on-going activity and is still in operation.</p>

	Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants	More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses	Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers	Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources which Co-target on the Projects and the Surrounding Neighborhoods
Cleveland Proposed	<p>Activities included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. implementing a DOL-sponsored youth employment program; 2. informing youths of available careers; 3. hiring residents to serve on the Estate Security Commission. 	<p>Activities included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. implementing Program QUEST, a drug abuse program aimed at building healthy family relationships 2. organizing a Youth Council 3. organizing a Victim/Witness Incidents Assistant Team 4. instituting a Property Identification Program 5. developing a Family Violence Program, and 6. instituting a round-the-clock call-back service. 	<p>Activities included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. providing crisis intervention and sensitivity training to police officers and complaint clerks assigned to the target sites; and 2. establishing a program of monthly meetings for residents, PHA staff, and city police officers. Both of these activities were to have been implemented by the PHA. 	<p>Activities included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. using City CDBG funds to improve public services in neighborhood strategy areas adjacent to Riverview Estate. 2. developing an urban park in an area behind Riverview Estate, and 3. conducting a feasibility study for the proposed urban park.

	Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants	More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses	Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers	Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources which Co-target on the Projects and the Surrounding Neighborhoods
Cleveland Actual	Tenant employment occurred largely through the DOL-sponsored youth employment program and the Resident Anti-Crime Commission (RACC). A tenant leader was selected to serve as RACC Program Director on 9-25-80; two additional tenants were hired to serve as aides. The DOL youth aides were hired on 8-4-80. In accordance with the desires on the part of the Public Safety Coordinator to prevent the DOL component from becoming a "make-work" program	Program QUEST never materialized; neither of the two persons in charge of youth programs at the 2 estates were interested in implementing the program. The Victim/Witness incidents Assistant Team, similarly, was not implemented. The proposed Family Violence Program was implemented, however, and instituted the emergency call-back system. The Youth Council was already in existence when the Anti-Crime Program began, and the program merely expanded the range of	Cleveland Police Department response units were occasionally invited to participate in Anti-Crime Program activities, but their involvement in the program as a whole appears to have been quite limited. CPD officers in each of the 11 special response units did, however, attend a 2-day training session sometime before April 1980.	The CDBG budget included funds to renovate the Lakeview Community Center, but no work has been done. The city did elect to use some CDBG funds to pave the streets at the Lakeview Estate, however, and the West Side Mental Health Center did conduct a tenant needs assessment; neither activity had been proposed, but both were billed to the program as local matches. The feasibility study was conducted as proposed, but no action has been taken on the recommendations of the firm which conducted the study.

	Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants	More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses	Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers	Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources which Co-target on the Projects and the Surrounding Neighborhoods
Cleveland Actual (Continued)	the youths underwent rigorous training. Six youths were retained as full-time PHA security guards when DOL funds were exhausted.	on-going activities. Property marking was done by "match" patrolmen and DOL youths.		

APPENDIX J

TOLEDO

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS AND
PROGRAM REVISION

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

TOLEDO--CHRONOLOGY

May, 1979

- Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority (LMHA) received HUD notice 79-11, informing them of the anti-crime program.
- LMHA began setting up staff meetings to review the guidelines of the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program (UIACP) and to plan tenant meetings.

June, 1979

- LMHA held its first meeting with residents about the anti-crime program.
- LMHA Board of Directors authorized the staff of LMHA to apply for the funds, passing resolution #4969. Board approval was unanimous.
- LMHA staff held meetings with Toledo City Manager about the Anti-Crime Economic development concept, and the executive director of the regional planning unit.
- LMHA met with Second Chance Academy staff, and the Toledo Economic Opportunity Planning Association. Meeting was to review components of UIACP and encourage input from and coordination with the neighborhood anti-crime staff.
- LMHA staff began drafting the proposal and continued to meet with elderly tenants.
- LMHA submitted proposal to HUD on June 21, 1979.

July, 1979

August, 1979

- LMHA senior staff met in Washington, D.C., with Lynn Curtis and staff about proposal application.
- For semi-final consideration LMHA was to have to HUD, no later than 32 August 1979, revisions. LMHA submitted them 30 August 1979.

- August, 1979
(Continued)
- LMHA staff met with the Director of the Criminal Justice Training Center to negotiate a specific training commitment to the UIACP. The Housing Authority also asked for additional letters of commitment from the Criminal Justice Training Center and the Economic Opportunity Planning Association.
- September, 1979
- October, 1979
- LMHA was notified by HUD they were selected as a semi-finalist for the anti-crime program. Would need to make some revisions.
- November, 1979
- LMHA was asked to conduct a vulnerability analysis. LMHA staff conducted vulnerability analysis.
- December, 1979
- Vulnerability analysis was submitted to HUD on 13 December.
 - LMHA received second request from HUD to revise proposal. LMHA was also notified by HUD that they were a finalist in the UIACP.
 - LMHA received second request from HUD to revise proposal elements. These revisions due to HUD February 1, 1980. LMHA was also informed they were a finalist in the UIACP.
- January, 1980
- LMHA hires Anti-Crime Coordinator and Assistant Coordinator. Began meeting with community agencies and developing proposals for other funding categories: ADAMHA, OJJDP, DOL, Victim Witness.
- February, 1980
- Anti-Crime Coordinator and Assistant finalized ADAMHA, OJJDP, and Victim/Witness proposals.
 - LMHA staff worked with the Toledo Lucas County Planning Commission and County officials to prepare a coordinated Urban Parks grant application.
- March, 1980
- Anti-Crime staff made revisions to the DOL/YCCIP grant application.
- April, 1980
- Housing Authority notified that they were awarded ADAMHA, OJJDP, and Victim/Witness funds.

- April, 1980
(Continued)
- Cooperative efforts continued with Second Chance Academy; Toldeo Police Division; National Alliance of Businesses; the Board of Community Relations; the Center for Women; the Criminal Justice Training and Education Center; and the Economic Opportunity Planning Association's Crime Prevention Program.
- May, 1980
- Anti-Crime staff met with the University of Toledo's Center for Women, the Criminal Justice Training and Education Center, and the Board of Community Relations.
- June, 1980
- Block Captain training program workshops were underway at the University of Toledo, Center for Women and the Board of Community Relations.
 - Enrolled youth supervisors in a private police training program at Owens Technical College.
- July, 1980
- Block Captain training workshop completed.
 - Training workshops for DOL/YCCIP component underway.
 - Anti-Crime staff members attend UIACP conferences in Washington, D.C.
- August, 1980
- Senior citizen basic education class field trip to Ohio State Fair.
 - 30 DOL youth complete 5 week training program. Presented awards at a banquet held in the Brand Whitlock Community Building.
 - Four youth supervisors complete 120 hour private police training program at Owens Technical College.
 - Anti-Crime staff met with representatives of the Lucas County Juvenile Court and the Ohio Youth Commission, as both agencies expressed an interest in locating satellite offices in the Brand Whitlock area.
 - Victim/Witness Coordinator set up a series of crime prevention education sessions for residents with the Toldeo Police Departments Crime Prevention unit. First session was held in Port Lawrence.

August, 1980
(Continued)

- Three Port Lawrence residents were hired by local construction company working on the comprehensive modernization program in Port Lawrence.

September, 1980

- Toledo Board of Education resumes its participation in Project Open Door after a three-month absence, during which time the project was run by ADAMHA Director.
- ADAMHA work plan completed and sent to Washington, D.C. HUD offices.
- 30 DOL/YCCIP youth began working as maintenance aides in the Grand Whitlock area.
- The Lucas County Juvenile Court has committed itself to locating a satellite probation office in the OJJDP facility in the Brand Whitlock Community.
- Gunckel Elementary School officials have agreed to allowing the OJJDP program to use the school gym and one classroom.
- OJJDP work plan has been completed and sent to Washington, D.C., HUD offices.
- Victim/Witness program director begins working with the Lucas County Prosecutors Victim/Witness Assistance program.
- Victim/Witness work plan has been completed and sent to Washington, D.C., HUD Office

October, 1980

- ADAMHA program director begins screening and interviewing applicants for the three social worker sites' positions. Also begins to set up training programs for staff with local agencies.
- The thirty youth in the DOL/YCCIP program have completed their second month in the work program.
- Adult Basic Education classes, given under the OJJDP program element, begin on a regular basis.
- OJJDP program offices are established.

October, 1980
(Continued)

- Victim/Witness program director continues to set up crime prevention education workshops with the Toledo Police Department.
- Victim/Witness Coordinator appeared on local public television program. Explained the role of victim/witness program in public housing.
- Toledo Anti-Crime Program had site visit by staff member of the Cleveland area office.

November, 1980

- ADAMHA Director continues to assist Toledo Board of Education personnel with Project Open Door.
- In-Service Training program is formulated for DOL/YCCIP youth.
- OJJDP program offices are prepared for move-in.
- Victim/Witness program is to move the Port Lawrence Homes. Anti-Crime program is decentralizing program services.
- Anti-Crime staff attend Ohio Welfare Conference in Columbus. Workshops at conference covered family violence crisis intervention, etc.

December, 1980

- ADAMHA program hires three full-time resident social worker aides. These new staff members begin orientation.
- DOL/YCCIP youth begin a series of in-service training sessions. Sessions are given by the cooperative extension service of Ohio State University.
- OJJDP program director organizes a series of four sessions on food and nutrition for pre-adolescents.
- OJJDP program hires two part-time staff persons for the recreation program utilizing the Gunckel School gymnasium.
- Victim/Witness program moves into new offices in Port Lawrence. Telephones have been installed.

January, 1981

- ADAMHA staff attend training and orientation programs local service agencies provide. Also are attending sessions at the University of Toledo Center for Women. These sessions include: stress communication skills, single parenting budgeting of personal finances, and job seeking techniques.
- DOL program staged a career day. Toledo area businessmen and professionals came to Brand Whitlock Homes to tell youth about careers.
- Four Anti-Crime staff members attended conference in Washington on specific responsibilities they had with anti-crime program. HUD sponsored.
- Toledo Clutch and Brake hired two Port Lawrence residents, per agreement with President of Toledo Clutch and Brake.
- Toledo Youth Development program placed a full-time staff person with the OJJDP program, given the growth of the program and its activity in the Brand Whitlock Youth Council. This staff person is officially assigned to the Anti-Crime program, but under the employment of East Toledo Helping Hand.

February, 1981

- ADAMHA program and staff move into new office space.
- DOL youth begin to receive job placement and counseling as the DOL staff realizes the program is nearing completion.
- OJJDP staff organize basketball and volleyball teams.
- OJJDP staff arranges free admission and use of Lucas County Recreation Center.
- Victim/Witness Coordinator approaches the Lucas County prosecutor about supporting the Victim/Witness program in Brand Whitlock.

March, 1981

- ADAMHA staff reorganize to facilitate better client intake.

March, 1981
(Continued)

- ADAMHA staff order materials for presentations. Materials consist of information on Drug and Alcohol Abuse.
- ADAMHA staff training continues, and contacts made with key local agencies to support the program.
- DOL program is working with Block Captains to insure clean grounds.
- Job Placement and Career Counseling program continue for DOL youth.
- OJJDP program hires two part-time aides. Also, OJJDP program orders and receives 15 passenger van to use for transportation of youth to recreational events.
- Victim/Witness program coordinator continues to look for other funding, to extend the program.

April, 1981

- ADAMHA staff receive training materials and approach public schools about presentations to children.
- OJJDP program continues to organize recreation programs.
- Victim/Witness Coordinator continues to seek other funding.

May, 1981

- ADAMHA staff go door to door in the demonstration area to inform residents of program.
- DOL staff encourage youth to apply for summer CETA employment program.
- DOL career counseling continues.
- OJJDP program is now serving 300 youth. Has four part-time staff. Continues to organize recreation programs.

June, 1981

- ADAMHA staff continue to publicize the program. Staff holds Alcohol and Drug Abuse Awareness Day for residents.
- DOL program runs out of money.

June, 1981
(Continued)

-- Victim/Witness Coordinator begins to work
part-time administering summer lunch
program.

	1.1 Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention	1.2 More and Improved Community Anti-Crime Service Facili- ties & Physical Redesign	2.1 More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation
H.U.D. Specifications*	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Appointment of a knowledgeable crime prevention coordinator. 2. Screening of tenants and tenant selection guidelines. 3. Distribution and grouping of residents. 4. Tenant eviction. 5. Tenant-management relations 6. Targeting of programs to specific individuals/groups associated with crime. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Access control. 2. Distribution of space functions. 3. Target hardening. 4. Circulation and transportation patterns to promote tenant cohesion and territoriality. 5. Clustering units. 6. Creation of defensible space 7. Development of service facilities (on site or neighborhood) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increased tenant cohesion. 2. "Turf reclamation." 3. Tenant/youth foot patrols. 4. Block/floor/lobby watches. 5. Improvement of police/tenant relations. 6. Educating tenants on security-related matters. 7. Tenant input into planning and implementation of the entire Anti-Crime program.

*For a more comprehensive description of HUD guidelines for each programmatic category, see the Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program Guidebook

2.2 Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants	2.3 More and Improved Ser- vices to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/ Witnesses	3.1 Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers	3.2 Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources which Co-target on the Project and the Surrounding Neighborhoods
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establishment of an employment and training program. 2. Training and employment of tenants in modernization and maintenance tasks. 3. Training and employment of tenants in community service functions. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alcohol abuse programs. 2. Drug abuse programs. 3. Youth programs. 4. Victim/witness programs. 5. Programs for the elderly 6. Crisis intervention programs. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Police foot patrol, domestic dispute, team-policing patrols. 2. Police as "human service trouble shooters." 3. Relations among PHA personnel, police and tenants. 4. Precinct stations in projects. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Local government comprehensive, targeted anti-crime planning with component programs in specific housing projects. 2. Anti-crime targeting of neighborhood organizations. 3. Anti-crime targeting of local business with the provisions of employment opportunities.

	1.1 Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention	1.2 More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses	2.1 More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation
Toledo Proposes	Activities included: (1) the appointment of a Public Safety Coordinator; (2) hiring an Assistant Coordinator/Job Expeditor; (3) improving tenant selection and eviction procedures; (4) establishing a tenant imprest fund; (5) expanding and existing hotline service; and (6) developing a computer program in order to gather project- and unit-specific information on criminal activities.	Activities included: (1) the installation of security doors, frames, and hardware; (2) the installation of raised door panels and peepholes; (3) the installation of self-locking hasps on ground floor window vents; (4) the elimination of door vision panels; (5) the provision of office space for the Public Safety Coordinator and neighborhood organizations; and (6) the acquisition of 6 hand-held radios, a base station, and other incidental supplies.	Activities included: (1) hiring 10 residents to serve as block captains; (2) having the Brand Whitlock Area Tenant Council administer a number of anti-crime activities, including the Block Captain Program, the Toledo Police Department information sessions, the Youth Patrol Program, and the Second Chance Academy's Identification Engraving Program; and (3) making use of the police department's Crime Prevention Van.

	1.1 Improved PHA Management of Crime Prevention	1.2 More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses	2.1 More Tenant Anti-Crime Participation
Toledo Actual	<p>The PHA appointed an Anti-Crime Coordinator and hired an Assistant Coordinator/Job Expeditor as proposed. No changes were made to tenant selection and eviction remains at the discretion of the individual site managers. The hotline service was phased out when the Second Chance Academy went out of business, and the proposed tenant imprest fund was never established. The PHA began developing a computerized applicant profile system, but this activity ground to a halt when the PHA lost its programmer to the private sector.</p>	<p>Security doors, frames, and hardware were in place by July 1981. The PHA also installed mailboxes outside each apartment. The self-locking hasps on ground floor window vents, however, were not installed. Office space was made available to the Anti-Crime Coordinator, but not in the community building as had been proposed. Neighborhood organizations, however, declined similar offers to office space. The 6 hand-held radios were purchased as proposed, but one was subsequently stolen.</p>	<p>Twelve residents were hired to serve as block captains, but the Block Captain Program reportedly did not work out as planned. The Brand Whitlock Area Tenant Council did not have control of an imprest fund, and did not direct the implementation of any of the above mentioned activities. The Crime Prevention Van made 3 visits to the project.</p>

	2.2 Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants	2.3 More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses	3.1 Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers	3.2 Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources with Co-Target on the Project and the Surrounding Neighbor- hoods
Toledo Proposed	Activities included: (1) implementing a DOL-sponsored youth employment program; (2) hiring residents to serve as block captains; (3) estab- lishing a Policeman's Youth Explorers Corps; (4) hiring a part- time resident assist- ant for Second Chance Academy's Identifica- tion Engraving Pro- gram; (5) hiring 2 part-time radio dis- patchers for Second Chance Academy's hot- line; and (6) creat- ing approximately 20 full-time positions in 10 small businesses developed by and for residents.	Activities included: (1) the implementa- tion of an ADAMHA- funded alcohol and drug abuse program; (2) the implementa- tion of an OJJDP- sponsored youth pro- gram; (3) the imple- mentation of an LEAA- sponsored victim/ witness program; (4) hiring a part-time social worker to pro- vide counseling to elderly residents; and (5) establishing an Elderly-Youth Exchange Program.	Activities included: (1) providing sensi- tivity training to officers assigned to Brand Whitlock; (2) having 20 officers live in furnished apartments in the tar- geted projects for a weekend; and (3) estab- lishing a police sub- station in the demon- stration site. All of these activities were to have been implemented by the PHA.	The proposal identifies 15 local government agencies and neighbor- hood organizations offering services which were relevant to the Anti-Crime Program.

	2.2 Increased Full- and Part-time Employment of Tenants	2.3 More and Improved Services to Combat Crime or Assist Victims/Witnesses	3.1 Increased Use of Better Trained City Police Officers	3.2 Stronger Linkages with Programs from Local Government and Other Sources with Co-Target on the Project and the Surrounding Neighborhood
Toledo Actual	<p>Thirty youths completed a 5-week training program in August 1980 and began working regular shifts as part-time maintenance aides; all youth patrol positions had been eliminated by that time, due to the potential hazards that it posed to participants. The PHA also hired 12 residents to serve as block captains. One resident business was established during the Anti-Crime Program--the EJ Cleaning Service. None of the part-time resident assistants or radio dispatcher positions were ever filled, however, since the Second Chance Academy was phased out before the Anti-Crime Program began.</p>	<p>The PHA hired a Director and 3 assistants with the ADAMHA funds it received; the new staff members reportedly had a moderate caseload. The only person staffing the victim/witness program was a Director, who reportedly had a small caseload. There was no formal elderly program created through the Anti-Crime Program; the ADAMHA staff did handle cases of elderly drug abuse, but the Elderly-Youth Exchange Program never materialized.</p>	<p>The PHA was not able to arrange for sensitivity training of the police academy, but did provide such training to officers in 3 police units--the community relations unit, the training division, and the crime prevention unit. No officers lived in apartments at the demonstration site, and no police substation was ever established. The PHA did, however, make a desk and a phone in the anti-crime office available to the police.</p>	<p>Many of the agencies identified in the proposal offered on-going services, and made no new commitments to the Anti-Crime Program. The Toledo Clutch and Brake Company did offer 19 job slots to qualified residents of the targeted sites; the PHA has so far identified only 3 residents for the positions. Second Chance Academy, on the other hand, made new commitments, but was phased out before the Anti-Crime Program began.</p>

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