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SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF HOMOGAMOUS AND HETEROGAMOUS MARRIAGES IN KUWAIT

presented by

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has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for

Doctoral degree in Sociology

Thomas (6

Major professor

Date August 4, 1986

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0-12771

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SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF HOMOGAMOUS AND

HETEROGAMOUS MARRIAGES IN KUWAIT

By

Fahed Al-Naser

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

The Department of Sociology

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ABSTRACT

SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF HOMOGAMOUS AND HETEROGAMOUS MARRIAGES IN KUWAIT

by

Fahed Al-Naser

In recent years a new social structure has developed in Kuwait. The spread of education to members of both sexes, cultural contact with Western and Eastern worlds, and significant immigration of foreigners to Kuwait have led to a more heterogamous population, with Kuwaiti citizens becoming a minority in their society. This heterogamous society has experienced an increase in the incidence of heterogamous marriages, not only in terms of nationality, but also in terms of religion, sect, and caste.

A systematic, random sample of couples has been drawn from Kuwait's marriage statistics of 1974 and 1984, with regard to age, nationality, religion, caste, education, and occupation. The data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. The frequency and percentage distributions of various heterogamous and homogamous marriages were presented, and chi-square tests were applied to test hypotheses. The study's results showed that the general age at marriage decreased for men and slightly increased for women between 1974 and 1984. The general mean age difference between husbands and wives decreased across the decade. Kuwaitis showed an increased in marrying across religious lines, especially among highly educated men and those holding high status occupations, but marriages between members of the two Islamic sects, Shia and Sunni, decreased from 1974 to 1984.

Marrying from different nationalities increased between 1974 and 1984. When Kuwaiti men marry women of other nationalities, they prefer to marry Arab women. Those Kuwaiti men who marry women from non-Arab countries are more likely to have high socioeconomic statuses, with a great deal of education and high status occupations.

Marrying from other social/tribal groups also increased in Kuwait between 1974 and 1984, especially among highly educated men and men with high status occupations. Surprisingly, the data showed that Kuwaiti men, in general, preferred to marry women who had similar educational and occupational levels as their own.

The study's general conclusion is that the socioeconomic change which has been taking place in the last three decades in Kuwait has had a tremendous effect on Kuwaitis' marriage values in general and on mate selection customs in particular. DEDICATION

To my

mother

father

brothers

and sisters,

this work is dedicated.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The assistance and supervision I have received from my academic advisor, the chairperson of my doctoral committee, is greatly appreciated. From the beginning of my program, step by step through the preparation of this dissertation, Dr. Thomas Conner's support, insight, patience were a light that guided my path through the educational maze and gave me the encouragement to write this work.

Helpful advice also came from Dr. Margaret Bubolz of the Department of Family and Child Ecology, which added a great deal to my knowledge of the ecological approach of studying the family.

Thanks go to Dr. Christopher Vanderpool; his socio-political background and comments on the Middle East were very beneficial.

Appreciation is extended to Dr. Harry Perlstadt for his helpful sociological comments and advice.

I also want to extend special thanks to dean's representative, Dr. Robert McKinley. His anthropological point of view and comments were very helpful.

I want to extend my appreciation to the Statistics Department employees at the Ministry of Justice in Kuwait, without whom I would not have been able to secure necessary statistics.

Last, but not least, special thanks to all of the people who encouraged and supported me while I was writing this dissertation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The economic, social, and political changes taking place, not just in Persian Gulf societies, but in all Arab societies, are a result of many historical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors. Economic factors, especially the discovery of oil in Gulf societies, have played a great role in accelerating the process of socioeconomic development.

Because of the historical, political, and socioeconomic similarities of Gulf societies (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emerates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman), modern Arab societies experienced similar hardships related to rapid changes in socioeconomic structure. After a long and complete isolation from the non-Arab world, as well as each other, these once-primitive, orthodox societies of the Persian Gulf region found themselves suddenly accumulating a fortune larger than any other a society ever accumulated in a short time. As described by one specialist of the area, they imagined their people as new Aladdins with magic lamps (Al-Rumaihi, 1979).

Kuwait is unique among the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula societies because of (a) its strategic geographic location on sea and land trade routes which provided important contacts with other cultures, (b) its relative political freedom, and (c) the relative freedom of its press in recent years.

The economic prosperity that was heralded by the discovery of huge reservoirs of oil in Kuwait played a significant role in the socioeconomic development of the country. When oil became the main industry and source of livelihood for Kuwaitis, a large population of immigrants of different colors,

creeds, religious persuasions, and national origins flooded the country, affecting tremendously the sociocultural composition of Kuwait. This expansion of the Kuwaiti population resulted in the build up of governmental services such as education, health services, and social welfare.

In recent years, the Kuwaiti society has developed a new structure. The spread of education to members of both sexes, cultural contact with Western and Eastern worlds and significant immigration of foreigners to Kuwait have led to a more heterogeneous population, with Kuwaiti citizens becoming a minority in their own society. This heterogeneous society has experienced an increase in the incidence of heterogamous marriages, not only in terms of nationality, but also in terms of religion, sect, and caste.

In most societies, mate selection operates within rather carefully defined limits. This is also true in Kuwait. A Kuwaiti youth, for instance, is expected to marry someone who shares his/her own religion, caste, nationality, age, and socioeconomic status, a practice referred to as "assortative mating" or "hom ogam y."

Statement of the Problem

In view of the strong influence of the factors listed above, and the tendency toward heterogamy, the potential exists for a revolutionary change in the marital habits of Kuwaitis, particularly in the manner in which marriages are arranged and the predictable rise in the number of heterogamous marriages in Kuwait. However, the outcome of this kind of sociological change has not been studied.

Documentation exists describing how these factors have influenced other social institutions of Kuwaiti society; however, the study upon which this research report is based was a pioneering effort to investigate the incidence and explanation of homogamous and heterogamous marriages. It was conducted in the context of the socio-cultural change that has accompanied the altered political and economic circumstances of Kuwait.

Marriage constitutes a fundamental social institution in any society, and the majority of marriages will fit in the homogamous category in terms of nationality, religion, sect, caste, and age. However, a minority will fit into the heterogamous category of marriage, which means that some marriages will cross the lines of nationality, religion, sect, caste, or age.

People challenging the traditional homogamous norms and customs assert both the right and the desirability of marriage between persons of different groups. Persons who practice heterogamy would be committing a deviant behavior from well-established norms and values of marriage.

This report will emphasize and explain the socio-cultural characteristics of the two kinds of marriages. It will examine the degree to which the traditional homogamous nature of marriage may have undergone a change in light of current social, economic, political, and religious realities of Kuwait.

Furthermore, when Kuwaiti men marry non-Kuwaiti women, many Kuwaiti women remain unmarried and suffer the consequences of the negative social status that traditional Kuwaiti norms assign "unmarried women." When Kuwaiti women marry non-Kuwaiti men, political problems for the government can arise, such as civil rights, political participation, employment, and rights of citizenship.

Purpose of the Study

Since this study is dealing with different variables in order to study the patterns of marriage in Kuwaiti society, it is helpful to indicate other types of patterns related to the marriage institution in general in Kuwait. The rate of

homogamous and heterogamous marriages will be utilized to examine the flexibility of cultural norms in the selection of mates. It is also a good indicator of groups' acceptance and cultural and social absorption in the Kuwaiti society. Furthermore, low rates of intermarriage might reflect a history of discrimination and conflict among dominant and subordinate groups.

Kuwait is an Islamic country. Its laws and social institutions are governed by Islamic law (Sharia jurisprudence). Islam sanctions marriage not only as a social contract, but also as a holy sacrament. Sexual contact outside marriage is prohibited and is punishable by severe penalties. Indeed, Islam regards marriage as one of the most basic cohesive bonds of society and the basis for a contractual and holy bond in the family. According to Islamic teachings, the only condition spouses must satisfy is that they profess Islam or one of the other Semitic religions—Judaism or Christianity. Considerations of class, color, and race are repugnant to the Islamic moral code. Yet members of different groups (e.g., Assails and Bayssaries) seldom, if ever, intermarry, and marriage between individuals professing Islam but belonging to different races or nationalities is rare.

The purpose of the study was to examine the variables of age, nationality, religion, caste, education, and occupation and to determine the extent to which the principles of equity, justice, and social choice, preached by Islam in the selection of mates, are followed in practice. The study was to demonstrate if and to what degree Kuwaitis' perceptions of homogamy and heterogamy as marriage values and customs have undergone a rapid social change. Furthermore, the study was to indicate the social and cultural factors that are likely to foster or affect intermarriage and explain the dimensions of heterogamous and homogamous marriages in Kuwaiti society. It was also

intended to compare attitudes regarding homogamy and heterogamy in Kuwait, Middle Eastern societies in general, and Gulf societies in particular.

The study focused on (a) the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of homogamy and heterogamy in Kuwait, (b) the degree of intermarriage in Kuwait, and (c) an analysis of socio-demographic characteristics such as age, religion, nationality, education, occupation, and caste of those persons most likely to intermarry. In addition, the study was intended to determine if there are any marriages between individuals from different socioeconomic, educational, or occupational backgrounds.

Need for the Study

Though the government of Kuwait maintains up-to-date statistical records of social, educational, economic, and political data for study and planning, only a few analyses examine the changes in Kuwaiti social institutions from a sociological perspective. Minimal academic research of changes resulting from the recent, unprecedented, and continuing influx of ethnically different immigrant populations into Kuwait has been conducted.

The examination of the institution of marriage in Kuwait from a sociological perspective is badly needed. Of equal importance is the development of a body of knowledge regarding homogamy and heterogamy in Kuwait. Available sociological literature about these phenomena is scanty and unanalyzed in Kuwait and elsewhere.

Different factors related to homogamy and heterogamy were selected for analysis based on their contribution to the understanding of the structure of marriage and "social life" in general in Kuwaiti society.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Literature on homogamous and heterogamous marriages in Kuwait or in the Middle East in general is very rare. There are a few anthropological and ethnographical studies concerning the basis of mate selection, marriage norms, and values of tribal societies in the area. Anthropologists (Barth, 1956; Ayoub, 1959; Patai, 1962; Antoun, 1972) have studied patrilateral parallel cousin marriages (FDB) among Bedouin tribes. There are, however, few sociological studies, and those that exist are about family structure and marriage customs in general (Nahas, 1956; Goode, 1963: Protho & Diab, 1982).

In many cultures, education, caste, religion, race or nationality, age, and other cultural factors play a significant role in the choice of a mate. Even in the most industrialized societies, these factors have not been entirely eliminated in the choice of marriage partners.

In the last half century, homogamy and heterogamy have become a more common subject of scientific research, especially in the United States. Two theories emerge from the literature. August Hollingshead (1950) differentiates between theories of homogamous and heterogamous marriages as "like attracts like" and "opposites attract" (p. 619). These two theories represent the points of view of the sociologist and the psychologist, respectively. The sociologist looks at socioeconomic and cultural factors and concludes that people tend to marry partners similar to themselves, whereas the psychologist looks at psychological characteristics and concludes that people tend to choose mates unlike

themselves. Hollingshead discusses the cultural factors in the selection of

marriage partners among newlyweds in New Haven and states:

Sociologists have focused, in the main, upon factors external to the individual. As a consequence, sociological research has stressed such things as ethnic origins, residential propinquity, race, religion, socioeconomic status, and social characteristics in general. (p. 620)

Goode (1964) explains that the phenomenon of homogamy may be due to the

prejudices or ethnocentrism of groups-a feeling of superiority (p. 60). He adds

that people also tend to choose mates who are similar to themselves

... both because their groups press them to find mates like themselves and because the market process will move them to see that their best marriage opportunity is with someone who has similar qualities. (p. 53)

Adams' study (1979) of mate selection in the United States also emphasizes

the social factors in homogamy.

Another factor which will deepen the attractiveness of a relationship is salient categorical homogeneity, meaning that couple members are from the same social categories--racial, ethnic, religious, etc., mentioned above---and these categorical distinctions are important or salient to them (Burr, 1973). Such categorical salience can to some extent be subsumed under value consensus, but it has an element of rapport, cultural insight, and being able to understand the other's motives and behaviors as well. (p. 262)

Even in the Soviet Union, which claims to be a classless, casteless, non-

religious, and non-racist society, ethnically homogamous marriages are the norm.

In this regard, Shlapentokh (1984) adds that

In any event, the ethnically homogamous marriage continues to be the more frequent type of alliance between men and women than those between ethnic groups. In 1977 the proportion of mixed marriages was only 14.9 percent, a modest increase over 1959 when the figure was 10.9 percent of all marriages. It is characteristic that, as a rule, members of non-Russian minorities, even if they live in regions where Russians prevail in numbers (meaning that theoretically they meet more Russians than members of their own nationality), more often than not, Russians prefer to marry within their ethnic groups. (p. 102) This study investigates several factors as they pertain to homogamy and heterogamy; these are age, religion, nationality, caste, education, and occupation.

Age

Age is one of the sociobiological factors that may have a great influence on marital choice for both sexes and interacts with other factors such as education and occupation. King (1952), using a southern United States, non-white population, Blood and Wolfe (1960) in Detroit, and Lock (1951), using a random sample in a rural Indiana county, all found that spouses tended to be in the same age range. Furthermore, the groom is generally older than the bride, with the median age for men being higher than the median age for women. In his 1950 study, Hollingshead discussed this socio-cultural factor for homogamy and heterogamy, noting that

While there is a very strong association between the age of the husband and the age of the wife at all age levels, it is strongest when both partners are under 20 years of age. Men above 20 years of age tend to select wives who are in the same five-year age group as they are or a younger one. After 20, the percentage of men who marry women younger themselves increases until age 50. After 50, the marital partners tend to be nearer one another in age. (p. 622)

Nye and Berardo (1973) mention the preferred difference in age for husband and wife for Americans. "On the average the husband is three years older than his wife in current American society. It has been estimated that six out of seven men are the same age as or older than their wives" (p. 143).

The age difference between husband and wife has started to narrow, and the gap is getting smaller, especially in Western, industrialized societies.

From the last part of the nineteenth century until 1960, the average ages at marriage for both men and women moved downward. In 1890, for example, the median ages at marriage were 26.1 for men and 22.0 for women. By 1960, these averages had dropped to 22.8 and 20.3. They they began to rise again. They climbed to 23.2 and 20.8 in 1970 and rose farther to 23.0 for men and 21.3 for women in 1976. (Leslie, 1979, p. 213)

There has also been a narrowing age range within which most people marry. In his book <u>The Social Context of Marriage</u> (1966), Richard Udry states

In six of seven American marriages, the groom is as old as, or older than, the bride. In two out of three marriages, the difference in age is less than five years. An indication of the increasing importance of companionship in American marriages is the tendency for the difference in age of bride and groom to narrow in recent years. (p. 206)

Dixon (1971) calculated the husband-wife age difference in 55 Middle Eastern, Asian, and European countries. The author found that in 27.3% of the countries, the average difference is less than three years; in 40.5%, the gap was three or less than four years; in 10.9%, it was four or less than five years; and in 21.8% of the countries, the age difference was five or more years. In the same study, Dixon found that husbands tended to be older than their wives in all societies studied, ranging from 1.9 years' age difference in Yugoslavia to nine years in Libya. According to Dixon's study, in the Middle East, grooms are an average of 5.3 years older than their brides. Eastern European grooms were 2.9 years older, and Asian grooms were 4.7 years older. The average was 3.8 years for all 55 countries examined. The countries that had the greatest age difference between groom and bride were Libya with a difference of nine years and Iran with close to seven years' difference.

Most Western social scientists have reported that in Middle Eastern communities, in general, both men and women marry at early ages. Goode (1963) stated.

In traditional India, the young girl was supposed to be married, at the latest, by puberty; whereas, the Arab tradition dictated that she was to have attained puberty. This condition was not measured by years, however, and was defined rather flexibly. As a consequence, Western travelers in Arab countries have reported that many girls were married at 9 or 10 years of age. (p. 105) With reference to Islam, he added,

Moslem laws did not specify any particular age for marriage; and when there was such a specification, the ages were to be rather low (for example, Ottoman law specified 12 years for males and 9 years for females).

A study of marriage in the United Arab Emirates summarized marriage age

as follows,

Traditionally, the age of the groom was not important, and the bride might be anywhere from twelve years upwards. Although Islam stipulates no special age for either the bride or groom, it is generally accepted that both must attain puberty. The average age at marriage of the older as well as the younger women interviewed was 16 or 17 years. (Soffan, 1980, p. 33)

It should be emphasized that, of course, the choice of marriage age was not

necessarily made by the principals, but by the elders who arranged the marriages of their children.

After reviewing marriage contracts from Sunni religious courts of Sidon and Tripoli from 1965 as far back as records were available, Prothro and Diab (1974) found that,

The average age of brides has increased steadily since the decade of the 1930s, and the proportion of brides married at age 15 or younger has decreased since then. The average age of grooms has been lower since 1950 than it was before then, so of course the age difference between bride and groom has been less in recent years than it was in the first half of the century. (p. 32)

In Kuwait in the past there were no laws specifying any particular age for marriage, rather that was left for the elders to decide by interpreting Islamic law. In 1976 the minimum age of marriage was specified at 15 for females and 17 for males. Laws concerning age at marriage are intended to assure reasonable maturity in the contracting parties and to make certain that the parties are old enough to give valid consent. Furthermore, the spread of education for both sexes, urbanization and modernization have acted to delay marriage for both sexes until after they have jobs. The present study assumes that the age of marriage is rising for both males and females, especially among educated persons and those holding higher level occupations, because they are the segments of the population most influenced by the processes of urbanization and modernization. The study also assumes that there is a difference between the age of marriage of males and that of females, with females' ages always being lower than males' ages at marriage.

Al-Thakeb (1974) concluded his argument about age at marriage for Kuwaitis by saying, "In summing, in comparing respondents' attitudes and the actual age for marriage in 1971, one recognizes the trend toward a rising age at marriage" (p. 179). Also, he adds that some of his figures indicate that there is more desire among women to close the gap in age differences between husbands and wives.

The assumptions that Kuwaiti men and women today are older at marriage than their ancestors were and that the age difference or gap at marriage between men and women is getting smaller are in accordance with what Goode (1963) expected when he stated, after reviewing data about age at marriage in Lebanon,

These generational data show clearly that the age at marriage has been rising in Lebanon. Additional evidence of at least potential change is to be found here and there in the apparently higher ages of marriage in urban areas than in the rural areas. In addition, the evidence suggests that university people marry at relatively mature ages, and this, too, we would expect to find as the population moves away from traditionally arranged marriages. (pp. 110-111)

About the assumption of age differences between husbands and wives, Goode (1963) says, "We would also expect to find the change noted in other cultural areas—that is, a narrowing of the age difference between husband and wife (this should be especially noted in the Arab world, since the age difference was substantial in the past)" (p. 111) Based on the above discussions, this study tests the following propositions.

- 1. The difference in the mean age between spouses decreased between 1974 and 1984.
- 2. The average age at time of marriage increased between 1974 and 1984.

Religion

Hollingshead (1950) found that for Americans "next to race, religion is the most decisive factor in the segregation of males and females into categories that are approved for nuptiality" (p. 623). Ninety percent of the marriages in his study involved partners from the same religious group; the remaining heterogamous marriages were distributed evenly among Catholics, Protestants, and Jews.

Burgess and Wallin (1943) found a statistically significant relation between mate selection and religion. Religious affiliations (Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, none) and such indices of religious affiliation as Sunday school attendance, church attendance, and church membership were all significantly associated.

Religious affiliations provide, then, something of "the four walls" within which Americans choose mates, especially when the religious faith or denomination places a great emphasis upon marriage within the group. Such prescriptions of intrafaith marriages are especially evident in the teaching of the Roman Catholic and Jewish religions. Based on a study of 1000 engaged couples residing in the Chicago metropolitan region, Burgess and Wallin (1943) concluded that assortative mating takes place by social factors such as religious affiliation and behavior, family background, courtship behavior, conception of marriage, social participation, and family relationship. When the religious affiliation was tested, the investigators found that there was a great pressure, both internal and external, exerted upon persons to marry within their own religious groups, and couples showed a high degree of "like marrying like."

There are a number of studies of marriages in the USA between Christians and Jews; most Americans consider such marriages undesirable because of the religious differences are great. Landis (1965) notes that "there are no legal barriers to marriage across religious lines, yet most church groups advise against it. The Catholic group places important restrictions on inter-faith marriages, and the orthodox group prohibits it altogether" (p. 213). Marriage between persons of different protestant sects, however, is not generally disapproved, especially between persons belonging to the "mainline" protestant sects.

In spite of these stated restrictions, there is a certain amount of nonconformity, especially among college students. Gordon (1966) studied attitudes of 5407 college students in some 40 universities of the nation and found that 37% of the non-Jews would marry Jews, and 56% of the non-Catholics would marry Catholics. In the total sample, half did not favor marriage to a person of another religion. We should remember, however, that these are attitudes, not behaviors. However, the norms of religious homogamy apparently have not been as strong as effective, espeically in recent years in the United States. We observe that many persons are now willing to marry persons of different religions and to change their own religions to those of their spouses. This is consistent with the view that marriage in the United States has become largely a secular institution.

In a study of homogamy in south India, Driver (1984) found that only 14 of his 414 married respondents were married to persons who differed from themselves in religion. The religious combinations for these 14 husband-wife pairs were: eight Hindu-Christian, one Muslim-Christian, and five Christian-Hindu. Seven of these couples belonged to the lower class and seven to the

middle class. These inter-religious marriages constituted 5.4% of the total of 414 marriages, of these half were lower-class marriages and half middle-class marriages. However, even when it comes to marriage within the same religion but different sects, the situation is almost similar to marrying from other religions due to some differences between the two sects, and we find the social interaction between different sects will be minimal.

Abrar Hussain (1976), in his study of marriage customs among Muslims in India, stated that inter-sect marriages between people of the Shia and Sunni sects were common 50 years ago in Utar Pradesh, but such marriages are not prevalent between the two sects at present. The author concluded that "Sunni marriages used to take place previously, but in the last 50 years or so the relations between both sects have become strained due to certain controversies" (p. 85). One such controversy is the political situation, especially in recent years, and the Islamic resurgence occurring in the area which minimizes interaction between the sects..

Constitutionally, Kuwait is an Islamic country, and Islam plays a very important role in shaping the social institutions of the country. Islam regards marriage as an act of worship and as a holy ritual enjoined on all the faithful. Muslim men are allowed to marry women belonging to any of the Semitic religions--Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--because they profess faith in one God. A Muslim woman, however, according to the tradition developed from interpretations of Koranic verses, does not enjoy the same right to marry a non-Muslim. This view is based on the thesis that children belong to the father, and they must follow the father's religion and on the principle of equity as discussed in Abdal Ati (1977). He summarized it as follows:

... a non-Muslim man is forbidden to marry a Muslim woman because he is not her equal in religion. Nor it is lawful for a <u>debaucher</u> to marry a <u>continent</u>, decent woman for the same reason. If religious compatibility is obtained, any other consideration is of secondary importance. This is the logic of Quran and the Sunnah of the prophet, particularly as interpreted by the critics. (p. 88).

Although both sexes can marry members of other sects, intermarriage between members of the Shia and Sunni sects is rare, primarily because of differences in the concept of Islamic history that each sect promotes among its members and in the laws of inheritance. In this regard, Westermark (1921) states,

Islam has also made religion a bar to intermarriage. The Koran said in explicit terms: "Marry not a woman of the polytheists until she embraces Islam," but it also declared that such women as are of chaste reputation and belong to the spiritual sects or believe in a revealed or moral religion are lawful to Moslems. From these and similar directions, two somewhat divergent conclusions have been drawn by Sunni and Shia lawyers. The Sunnis recognize as legal and valid a marriage contracted between a Moslem on the one side and a Hebrew or Christian woman on the other, but hold that the marriage between a Moslem and a Magian or Hindu woman is invalid. Some of the Shias, on the other hand, do not recognize as legal a permanent contract of marriage between a Moslem and a woman following any other creed, but allow a temporary contract (Muta) extending over a certain specified period with a Christian, Jewish, or Magian female. Both schools prohibit a Moslem from marrying an idolatorous female, or one who worships the stars or any kind of fetish whatsoever. In no circumstances is a Muhammadan woman permitted to marry a man who is not a Moslem. (p. 59)

Religion in Kuwait is more than shared values, customs, and habits. Kuwait is a proclaimed Islamic state. Though it is not a theocracy in the accepted sense of the term, it is ruled according to some Islamic religious laws. Indeed, the country's entire customs, laws, and social institutions are regulated by Islamic Sharia or jurisprudence. No law can be passed in Kuwait in contravention of the Islamic traditions handed down over the centuries. Marriage laws and regulations are part of this tradition, and marriage between a Kuwaiti Muslim woman and a man of any other religion is not permitted. Marriage between Kuwaiti Muslim males and women of non-Semitic religions is similarly proscribed. Though Islamic traditions allow marriage between Muslim males and non-Muslim females, such alliances are looked upon with social disfavor. Even marrying within the same religion but from different sects is a controversial issue.

Since the Shia and Sunni sects interpret the Islamic traditions and history differently, each sect has its own inheritance laws, social laws, and personal laws. As a result of these differences, each sect has tended to concentrate in its own neighborhood, built around cultural or community centers and a mosque. Thus, contacts with members of other sects are minimal. Urbanization, modernization, and educational opportunities have, however, increased contacts with different sects, so increasing cross-sect marriage is to be expected.

The Shia sect does not encourage its followers to marry people from other sects or other religions; the only exception they make is that they will marry women from other sects. Hussain (1976) concluded that,

It has been observed generally Shias do not consider it proper to have marital relations with non-Shias. They are of the opinion that they can accept the daughters of other Muslims (including converts) as wives prepared to act according to their husbands' wishes after marriage. But they are not at all willing to give their daughters to the above categories at any cost. (p. 189).

The author confirmed the previous idea from his respondents when he concluded, "Shias do not contract marriages with the followers of other religions. This fact confirmed that not a single Shia is prepared to establish matrimonial relations with Sunnis, Qadiyanis, Hindus, Parsis, Christians, Jews, and converted Muslims" (p. 189). In truth, we expect to see some breakthroughs in all of these restrictions. Hussain found that only five marriages took place between Sunnis and Shias during the last 25 years, and all were love marriages.

With the spread of education, one would expect people to be more flexible with old traditions.

Based on these particular social and religious circumstances, this study will examine the following propositions.

- 3. The proportion of cross-religious marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 4. The proportion of cross-sect marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 5. College graduate males enter into more cross-sect marriages than do non-college graduate males.
- 6. College graduate males are more likely to marry across religions than are non-college graduate males.
- 7. Males in high status jobs enter into more cross-religion marriages than do males in lower status jobs.
- 8. Males in high status jobs enter into more cross-sect marriages than do males in lower status jobs.

Nationality

Discrimination based on nationality tends to erode if one of the spouses is educated abroad or has had exposure to different cultures. Burges and Wallin (1953) reported a significant relation between the nationality of an individual and his/her choice of a spouse with regard to his/her being native or foreign. Nationality identification in the United States is probably still important, although less so than in the years of great immigration. Most people believe in the superiority of their own kind and exert pressure upon their youth to marry within their own groups.

Robert Blood (1969), with regard to international marriages in the USA, concluded that the extent to which international marriage requires cultural retraining depends upon the particular cultures involved. Mates from English speaking countries have fewer transitions to make than those who must learn a new language. Western Europeans lead a way of life closer to that of North Americans than Orientals or Arabs. Then, too, members of high-status international marriages have often had a cosmopolitan upbringing that provides the tools of assimilation. Blood adds:

International marriages apparently occur more often between American men and foreign women than vice versa. Which partner is the American and which country the couple will live in are crucial determinants of the problems involved. International marriages are so rare that it is impossible to find data on their success. It seems probable that their rates of failure are higher than homogamous marriages, but studies of surviving marriages involving Japanese war brides in this country show that some couples can cope to their own satisfaction with the difficulties involved. (p. 86)

Society as a whole seems to work toward the survival of a homogamous marriage. The social pressures and that promote homogamy in the first place operate to cement homogamous marriages. Approving parents and friends lend the couple their support and encouragement. In another work, Blood (1972) adds that

The importation of a foreign spouse is frequently resisted by members of the domestic kin group and even more by the foreign kin who will lose contact with their emigrating offspring. Once the marriage takes place, however, the receiving group may tend to shift their focus from resistance (now that it is too late) to assistance in resocializing the stranger. (p. 299)

Churches, clubs, and ethnic organizations provide cohesion-creating opportunities for joint leisure-time activities. The emotional identification of husband and wife with the same groups gives an in-group feeling of common destiny and freedom from potential conflicts.

Blood (1972) discussed marriage across nationality lines and why individuals try to avoid it: "International marriage imposes differential status on the two partners. The foreigner alone must learn the new culture, while the native becomes the chief cultural tutor. This alters the structure of marriage in favor of domination by the native partner (other things being equal)" (p. 299).

Although Islam's strong moral strictures places no barriers on race, color, and class considerations in the choice of a mate, so long as both parties believe in one God and in Islam, considerations of nationality and race play an important role in marriage in Kuwait. Nationality considerations work particularly against immigrant minorities in matters of marriage.

Marriages across religious lines often involve marriages across nationalities, especially in a country such as Kuwait that is dominated by a single religion. Since an increasing number of Kuwaitis are going abroad to Western countries for higher education, the incidence of intermarriage has increased, particularly among the highly educated. A very good historical study of Kuwait by Zahra Freeth (1972) reported on marriages between the sons of wealthy Kuwaiti families with European women and how this helped Kuwaiti women to liberate themselves in the early 1960s.

The new generation is widely travelled. Many of the men have married British, American, or German wives, and since these girls would not consent to being shut away in women's quarters, but understandably insist on leading European-style lives, going out with their husbands, jointly entertaining in their own houses, they have set an example which helped Kuwaiti girls to achieve similar freedom. (p. 33)

Although the study does not give us any statistics about the percentage of Kuwaitis who married cross-nationally, at least some Kuwaitis have married people of other nationalities since the beginning of Kuwait's modernization process. Based on the literature on homogamy in general, however, one would assume that if Kuwaitis would marry non-Kuwaitis, the preference would be for non-Kuwaiti Arabs because of the similarity in their cultural backgrounds. This is generally true, but there are cases, especially those of males educated in Western and Eastern countries, of Kuwaiti men marrying non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab women.

It should be noted that, when a Kuwaiti contracts a marriage, s/he looks forward to developing, maintaining, and continuing a relationship with his/her inlaws. S/He generally shies away from marriages that will involve visitation to distant places and countries in fulfillment of family obligations. Although Kuwaitis enjoy the highest per capita income in the world, they find the cost of visiting their in-laws in distant countries prohibitive.

Another factor that discourages international marriages is that the government of Kuwait provides financial support to native Kuwaiti newlyweds to set up a house and subsidizes the payment of the mehr or bride price, but this financial incentive is denied if one of the partners happens to be a non-native Kuwaiti or a foreigner. If an individual comes from a wealthy family or has a high income, of course, government financial assistance would not affect the decision of marriage choice. Since the government of Kuwait builds special townships only for Kuwaiti citizens, and non-Kuwaitis are officially prohibited from living within these townships, there is a concentration of different nationalities within their own townships and neighborhoods--a situation not conducive to marriages across nationalities. In light of these particular social conditions in Kuwait, the following propositions will be examined by the study.

- 9. The proportion of Kuwaiti-non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 10. College graduate males were more likely to marry across nationalities than were non-college graduate males.
- 11. College graduate males were more likely to make Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab marriages than non-college graduate males.

Caste

In the United States and the West, race refers to blacks, whites, Asians, Indians, Hispanics, and other groups; in terms of this definition, marriage across racial lines is not a common phenomenon in the U.S. Some U.S. states previously forbade interracial marriages; and in some others, they are not encouraged.

Hollingshead (1950) found that racial prejudices place the strongest, most explicit, and most precise limits on whom an American may or may not marry,

regardless of the law. "Although interracial marriages are legal in Connecticut, they are extremely rare, and non-occurrent in New Haven in 1948" (p. 621).

Laswell and Laswell (1982) assert that

Race is as good an example as any of endogamy. Although a few persons do choose persons who are of different race, the majority do not do so. Interracial marriage accounts for only about three percent of all marriages in the U.S. In a decision handed down June 12, 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that laws prohibiting interracial marriages were unconstitutional. Before that decision, forty states had such laws at one time or another. In spite of the change in the laws, however, in many communities informal sanctions still operate to cause members of certain racial or ethnic groups to marry only within these groups. (p. 152)

Even in the U.S., with its relative freedom in mate selection, racial segregation is such that there are unwritten sanctions in many areas discouraging choosing a mate from another race. Though these sanctions have no legal force, they are so powerful that they have a prohibitive effect. Every minority group has its own class and religious barriers, built within itself against interracial marriages.

In the Kuwaiti context, what we might call caste occupies the place race does in the U.S. for defining potential spouses. Most Arabs trace their origins to their tribal roots and discriminate against each other along tribal lines which, in fact, operate as strongly as the race prejudice and bias of the West. Kuwaitis divide themselves into two classes or castes--those who call themselves Assails, or noble patricians, and those who describe themselves as Bayssaries, the common people. Dickson (1956) clearly defines the division of Kuwaiti Arabs along tribal lines.

Both the Arab al Ariba and the Arab al Musta Ariba divided themselves into superior and inferior tribes. Those of aristocratic descent are Sharif tribes; they are <u>asil</u>, pure in origin and blood. All the rest are non-Sharif and willingly accept this distinction. (p. 83)

The distinction between these tribes is very old and is based on the wealth and power of the respective tribes, as some studies have indicated.
A study of Bedouins in the Arabian Peninsula indicates the importance of the distinction. "The only tribes which count in the desert as 'Bedouin' are camel-herding tribes descended from an ancestor who is generally accepted as noble. Other lesser tribes are known as 'Arab' but not Bedouin' (Kay, 1978, p. 74). Describing the power structure of the tribes, Kay adds:

In practice they (the lesser status tribes) may now be richer than the Bedouin tribes, but in the past they lacked the power to raid or fight, having no camels, and it was not considered fair play to raid them. Political power rested with the noble tribes and used to be quite disproportionate to their numbers. (p. 74)

The author identified still more lower status tribes in the Bedouin tribal

structure:

Beneath the lesser warring tribes and the noble Bedouin tribes, there were tribes, the lesser tribes sheep-herding, who were left in peace to rear their flocks around the edges of the desert, providing they paid the Bedouin for the privileges. Below the shepherd tribes in the social hierarchy of the desert were the Sana (blacksmith tribe) and Sulubba, a tribe of tinkers and trackers. And beneath them were the Negro slaves who were to be found in every Bedouin camp. (p. 75)

The classification quoted above essentially describes the hierarchical social structure of the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula. With regard to their matrimonial practice, Kay adds, "Men marry within their own tribe, or, if occasionally they marry outside it, they must choose a bride from a tribe on an equal footing" (p. 73). In the new era after the discovery of oil, the spread of modern ideas and the flood of immigrants from the surrounding Arabian countries and Iran have led to the rise of non-aristocratic rich people in every class and tribe of the population. The notions of nobility and aristocracy are so deeply entrenched in the thinking of the Arab world, however, that they are still strongly influential in the choice of marriage partners.

Patai's (1962) study of tribes in the Middle East begins with a statement of distinction between the noble and vassal tribes: "A characteristic of Middle

Eastern social organization is the presence among the nomadic population of superior or noble tribes on the one hand and of inferior or vassel or client tribes on the other" (p. 251). When the author discusses the phenomenon in detail, especially in terms of marriage, he emphasizes that the restriction on marriage for men is more flexible than it is for women.

Marriage restrictions are stringent only as far as women are concerned. While no special stigma is attached to a man marrying lower than his class, the marriage of a woman to a man of lower status would not only be resented but would be a cause justifying forced intervention. (p. 258)

There is some acceptance of this phenomenon, but if an individual who belongs to an assail tribe does not behave within the tribal marriage rules, the whole tribe will be stigmatized and the couple will be isolated from the tribe's social activities. Some tribes do, however, show flexibility in allowing male members to marry out of their tribes or below their levels in cases of internal problems in the tribe, low fertility rates, and the tribe's small size. Men may even marry their slaves, who belong to the tribe, or they may marry from lower tribes for political and strategic reasons.

A study about the same phenomenon in a small village in South Yemen reported, "Thus they argue that a man ought to marry one of equal descent status to himself, but that if no such suitable spouse exists he may marry a woman of lower descent" (Bujra, 1971, p. 93). Such a marriage would be allowed because the children will belong to the same status as their father's tribe, not their mother's.

Even though men might be permitted to marry women from lower status groups, marriages between people of assail tribes or the same socioeconomic status tribes always enhanced the social consistency of the tribe. Ismael (1982) reported the following in her book about social change in Kuwait: More mobile than sheep herders (in terms of distance, speed, and range in the continuous search and competition for pasture land and water), camel herders achieved hegemony in the desert and assure aristocratic origins as a legitimation (known as Sharif Bedouin tribes). They maintained their exclusiveness through rules of marital exchange that precluded intermarriage with tribes of non-Sharif origins. (p. 18)

This phenomenon is also mentioned by Al-Rumaihi (1979) in his study of Arabian Gulf societies before the discovery of oil. The study emphasized the former economic base for this distinction between people.

The families classified themselves as of noble origin (Assel) and of exotic origin (Busary). This classification is a social one with a potent economic base. Its economic base has since been changed but its social aspect still survives to the present day. (p. 9)

The author continues by explaining that traditional marriage does not occur between these groups, leading to a "...kind of social gap in making an affinity with each other," and affecting children's attitudes: "... the children are brought up with a blind obedience to the family head. They believe blindly in a set of rules of behavior and social conventions that they are to follow" (p. 9).

This social phenomenon is still fairly strong in Kuwaiti society; but factors such as urbanization, modernization, and Westernization, and especially the spread of college education for both genders, are likely to lead to more marriages that ignore old caste distinctions, particular as the society's economic base erodes. Based on the situation in Kuwait with regard to caste, the study will examine the following propositions.

- 12. The proportion of cross-caste marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 13. College graduate males are more likely to enter into cross-caste marriages than non-college graduate males.
- 14. Men with high status jobs are more likely to enter into crosscaste marriages than those with lower status jobs.

Education and Occupation: Indicators of Socio-Economic Status

Many studies have combined the effects of education and occupation on the nature of marriage: the higher the educational level, the higher the occupational level and the higher the chances of upward mobility leading to a greater possibility of heterogamous marriage being an acceptable choice. If a person is educated abroad, s/he is more likely to contract a heterogamous marriage across nationality, religion, and caste in the environment that is free from family and tribal pressures.

Burgess and Wallin (1943) found that in the U.S., education

... acts as a selective factor in marriage. There is a markedly greater-than-chance probability that persons with graduate or professional training will select marriage partners of the same educational level. The same is true of persons who have had college experience and those with high school education or less. (p. 114)

Further, many studies have indicated that women with higher education and professional positions tend to marry "up" in terms of social status, whereas the opposite is true of men in similar educational and professional status. This is particularly true of patrilineal societies, because, in such societies, a married woman's social status is that of her husband. In this regard, Robert Bell (1963) points out

Most Americans usually select a mate from the same general educational level. As a rule, men marry women of the same or a lower level of education, and women marry men of the same or higher educational level. This is more likely to be true among the highly educated. In the lower social classes, formal education is less important in separating the male from the female in mate selection. The higher the educational level, the greater the importance attached to education by both men and women and, therefore, the greater importance attached to men having the same or higher levels of education than women. (p. 58) Landis (1955) explains that women marry up or within their social group as women tend to be more socially pressured. He also explains why men are excused for going in the opposite direction:

It is easier for a man to marry down the economic or educational level. If a woman is beautiful, he is excused, often envied, even though she falls short in many other qualities. At the same time, many social groups are critical of the woman who marries a socially, economically, or educationally inferior man. This is not particularly so because she is giving up a higher standard of living. Actually, the criticism such a woman draws upon herself results from a complex of social attitudes and traditions. (p. 213)

Stroup (1966) presents similar conclusions:

The social class position is another factor associated with mate selection. There is a pronounced tendency for people to marry within their own social class. Men, however, are more inclined than women to choose mates from social ranks beneath themselves. Practically the same statement can be made regarding educational level, which is not surprising since these two factors seem to be associated.

In the past, American men usually married women with equal or lower educational levels, and women married men with equal or higher educational levels. One reason for this was that, until recently, more men than women had completed college. In addition, because women generally married men of the same age or older, their spouses were more likely to have achieved higher levels of education before marrying. But now that more women than men are graduating from high school and women are just as likely as men to finish college, it is possible that this pattern will change.

In his study "The Social Context of Marriage," Udry (1966) indicated that,

Since education in the United States tends to be fairly closely related to occupation, income, and other social class variables, it should be expected that mates will select one another from similar educational levels. On the other hand, since men marry women slightly their junior, one might expect some differences in educationGenerally speaking, the figures show a tendency toward homogamy in education. (p. 211) Another study by Golanty and Harris ("Marriage and Family Life," 1982) emphasized intelligence and education as factors in choosing partners. The authors found that marriage partners tended to have the same range of intelligence as well as education.

Many other studies have pointed out that, even early in the century, people tended to marry those with similar educations and occupations (see, for example, Marrin, 1918; Centers, 1949; Burgess & Wallin, 1943). As most studies have noted, women tend to experience more social pressure than men to marry up or at their own social levels. With regard to the behavior of men, it may be added that Kuwait is a patriarchal society, dominated by the male as the central figure in the social scene; and if a man marries a woman below his educational and occupational status, he does not suffer a loss in his social position. In fact, he elevates his spouse to his.

Also, education makes men and women more independent and provides the breadth of vision to withstand the tribal and family pressure to submit to the will of the elders. Such heterogamous marriages may even cut across nationality, race, and sectarian lines.

However, in this regard it must be pointed out that the government of Kuwait, as a matter of national housing policy builds house for the native population and either sells or rents them out to native Kuwaitis at a rental based on the capacity of the allotee to pay. The quality of housing depends upon the economic status of the prospective allotees. Thus, neighborhoods come to represent not only the socio-economic status of the residents, depending on whether they live in low-income or high-income townships, but also a segregation of Kuwaitis from non-Kuwaitis who generally live apart in their own colonies. In other words, these policy actions of the government create national and socioeconomic segregation. Based on these social and economic realities in Kuwait, this study will examine the following propositions specifically related to the social conditions in the country.

- 15. There were more marriages between people of similar educational level in 1984 than 1974.
- 16. There were more marraiges between people of similar occupational level in 1984 than 1974.

Finally, this investigator anticipates that, despite the fact that the social climate of the country is not conducive to heterogamy, the spread of education and economic independence will induce some men, particularly, to seek mates outside their homogeneous groups.

CHAPTER III

KUWAIT: BACKGROUND

Kuwait, unlike other countries in the Middle East, has little, if any, recorded ancient history, although there is some scattered information and a few archeological studies. The traditional community consisted of a few tribes that had immigrated from the heart of the Arabian peninsula around 1716. The royal family, which is still in control of the country, consists of members of one of these tribes. This initial wave of immigration of major tribes was followed by that of many other large tribes, clans, and extended families from neighboring areas. The traditional community that grew up was structurally simple and dependent upon very limited natural resources. In an historical study that outlined the origins of Kuwaiti society, its activities, and its political structure, El-Ebraheem (1975) said:

... simple political community has been in existence in Kuwait since its settlement by the Utibi tribe in about 1716. The political system of early Kuwait was very primitive indeed. The tribe was at the center of the social system. The economy was simple and based on fishing and pearling. The town, although small, was the center of commercial activities...(p. 20)

The turning point in the history of Kuwait was the discovery of oil in 1946 and the subsequent influx of oil revenues and immigrants. In 1961 Kuwait became an independent political state and, for many socio-economic and political reasons, became one of the fastest developing countries in the region. Although the discovery of oil accelerated the changes and helped shape rapid socioeconomic change, Kuwait's comprehensive socioeconomic development was the product of many factors. These changes brought the society from a primitive and traditional society to one that is highly modernized with the highest per capita income in the world.

Kuwait is situated on the ancient trade route that links the continents of Africa and Asia. Before the discovery of oil, the main occupation of Kuwaitis was pearl fishing, and their seafaring brought them in contact with the far-flung lands of Asia and Europe. In addition, when it became a British protectorate in 1899, Kuwait's contact with the Western world increased.

Long before the influx of immigrants and oil wealth, with their potential for profound social change, Kuwait was divided into two social classes or castes: the Assails who have always enjoyed political power and socioeconomic influence, and the Bayssaries who are the common, less-affluent people. These castes have always maintained strict marital segregation between themselves. In recent decades, immigration has been so massive that immigrants now outnumber native Kuwaitis. Today, Kuwaitis constitute 43% of the country's population.

Marriage and Mate Selection

Like any other social institution, marriage in Kuwait has been affected by the social changes taking place during the last 30 years. Like all Middle Eastern countries, Kuwait has been experiencing socio-political changes that relate to social, political, and economic circumstances in the whole area. The recent history of Kuwait can be divided into three stages that affect the mate selection process: (a) before the discovery of oil and before World War II (1950s and before), (b) after the discovery of oil and the beginning of modernization and urbanization (1960-1977), and (c) an Islamic resurgency stage and its influence on people's behavior (1977 to recent years). Each of these stages will be discussed. In the pre-modern stage, marriage was based on relationships involving widespread networks and exchange obligations between families. The family performed many functions, among them the socialization the children and the protection of society's values and norms. Individuals gained their status from their families and had no individual independence outside the family. Consequently, marriage was more the concern of the family than of the individual. Pre-marital relations between sexes were not allowed, and families made sure that their offspring interacted only with other families at the same socioeconomic level.

The social structure of pre-modern Kuwaiti society centered on tribes or extended families (hamulas). Individuals married; not only within their tribes, but also within their extended families. Patrilateral, parallel marriage was widely practiced. This type of proscribed marriage was especially common among Bedouins. Patai (1955) explained that among Bedouin tribes, first cousin marriages were the invariable rule. A girl belonged, by right, to the son of her father's brother unless he expressly renounced his right to marry her. Even then, she could not marry without his permission. If a girl broke this rule or her parents prevailed upon her to marry someone else, her rightful husband (her first cousin) was expected to murder her if possible. According to Patai, this was the cause of most tribal killing of women. The practice of parallel cousin marriage had the effect of protecting the tribe/clan's wealth and power from outsiders, avoiding the payment of a full bride-price, and strengthening sentimental attachment for kin.

The point here is that, in the pre-modern Kuwaiti society, marriage was preferably within the extended family (i.e., patrilateral, parallel cousins) or, at least, within a clan or tribe. If a marriage did take place outside the tribe, it was supposed to be between tribes of the same socioeconomic level and

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background. Interaction between different groups was so rare in pre-modern Kuwait that one could speculate that there were no heterogamous marriages at all.

Once Kuwait was established as a major trade route and became an active economic center of the region in the nineteenth century, Persian and Indian (non-Arab) people began to settle in the country. In fact, the Persian community in Kuwait is one of the oldest in the country; it adheres to the Shia sect of Islam, unlike the Arab majority which follows the Sunni sect. In the past, members of the two sects lived separately from each other in their own communities; intermarriage was virtually unknown. Marriage of Kuwaiti Muslims with members of non-Muslim groups such as Christians and Jews was unheard of. These groups were very small and their norms and values were very different from those of Muslims. When the Jewish community left the country in 1948 to occupy Palestine, Kuwait was left with one dominant religion (Islam, 95%) with Christianity being a very distant second in number.

As different cultural groups settled in Kuwait, they became isolated and their members did not interact with the natives, who considered themselves to be nobles and the newcomers--who spoke different languages and had strange customs--to be aliens. Specific areas or ghettos developed for each ethnic group; for example, the majority of people coming from Persia and Shia sect families lived in Sharq, and later settlers from the Arabian peninsula went to Murgab. Most of the clans and families from the Arabian peninsula were Sunnis, while most Persians were Shias. Nationality lines were not clear because there were no independent states prior to 1950, and tribal ties were stronger than the national units that did exist. Even members of non-tribal groups in pre-modern Kuwait would not marry non-Arabs because they came from cultures alien to the natives. The dominant religion was Islam, with Christianity being the second largest. The Kuwaiti government's massive program of labor immigration brought new religions, such as Hinduism, Sikhism, and Buddhism, into a predominantly Muslim country.

Although Islam does not specifically place emphasis on the cultural background or socioeconomic status of a proposed marriage partner, no intermarriages between religions or between sects (Sunni and Shia) were reported in Kuwait in the pre-modern period, primarily because of the prevalence of parallel, and cross-cousin marriage.

The second phase in the history of Kuwaiti mate selection, as described here, was after the discovery of oil. A new state was "born" with its accompanying institutions and socioeconomic and structural changes. In this period, the whole society passed through a process of modernization. Indications of the modernization in Kuwait have been summarized in a study of modernization and development by Sirhan (1980).

Modernization was made possible by the capital surplus generated by the depletion of a non-renewable resource--oil. Modernization of Kuwaiti society is quite apparent in several areas such as the rise of some modern institutions, the establishment of modern infrastructure, and the availability of better health, education, and other social services. It is even apparent in the change in attitudes, individual behavior, family relations, and social values. It is also apparent in the adoption of a modern legal code which replaced the tribal and traditional law by European concepts of legal relations in society. (p. 276)

In the realm of marriage, modernization has moved the mate selection process from being entirely in the hands of parents to giving young people more responsibility in the choice.

A very good study of Kuwait families and marriage (Al-Thakeb, 1974), with data collection done in 1973, concluded that respondents appeared to have different attitudes toward the role of parents regarding their sons and daughters' marriages than had previously existed. "In a clear departure from the traditional pattern, nearly 81% prefer that a son select his future wife with his parents' approval. Only 10% approve of parents choosing the daughter-in-law with son's approval" (p. 259).

This element of choice extends, although to a lesser extent, to daughters as well as sons. The study continues, "Only seven percent of the survey sample approved of parents choosing sons-in-law without the girls' serious approval. Nearly 44% prefer that parents select their sons-in-law with daughters' approval. In a clear departure from the past, almost half of the respondents prefer that a daughter select her future husband, but with her parents' approval" (p. 259). This is surprisingly different from the past.

The author continued by stating that with the impact of Western ideology, words like <u>love</u> and premarital relationships are not foreign and are no longer prohibited. More than 50% of the respondents felt that love is necessary before engagement and marriage. A majority of respondents (80%) felt that it is important to know a future spouse before marriage.

During this period, there were many same-age marriages and marriages in which wives were older than their husbands. There were also more crossnationality marriages with people from Arabian and non-Arabian countries and more cross-religious and cross-sect marriages. There were more Shia-Sunni marriages than ever before as an effect of the social change occurring in the country. More mate selection was being done on the basis of individual personality, and there were more marriages between people with the same educational or occupational levels. Porterfield (1982) asserts that, with greater opportunities for increased contact and interaction between different groups, most intermarriage occurs because individuals are simply in love. The third historic stage of mate selection is the Islamic revival or resurgence that began in 1975 and was very evident in the society by 1977. One of the indications of the Islamic revival is the return of veils among women, what one researcher calls a "re-veiling time." In the past women had been veiled; they shed the veils in the 1960s, but, with the Islamic revival, veils have returned. The researcher speculated that 70-80% of all young Kuwaiti women wear veils (Ali, 1985).* Since Islam is so important to this stage of Kuwaiti history, it is necessary to discuss the Islamic perspective on mate selection.

The third period shows that the Islamic resurgency has taken place very rapidly, not only in Kuwait, but in the whole Middle Eastern area. This phenomenon has affected the institution of marriage and the mate selection process. Because increased numbers of people are becoming religious, it is assumed that those who wish to marry obey religious instructions when choosing mates. One factor essential for a happy marriage is the right of free choice by both parties. Islam has given that right to men and women: men decide who and when they will marry, and women accept or reject men's offers without jeopardy. Siddigi (1975) reported, "Freedom of choosing one's partner for life has been extended both to men and women. No marriage in Islam can be valid without the consent of either partner" (p. 72).

To confirm this concept, Siddigi related the following story. "Another tradition from the collection made by Ibn Majah states: 'Ibn Umar says, "Uthman Mazun left behind a young daughter. My uncle, Qudamah, married her to me and did not even consult her. When the girl came to know of this, she disliked

^{*}For additional information about the historical roots of the Islamic revival in Kuwait, see <u>Kuwait: Religion and Politics</u> by Mohammad Ali, an upcoming dissertation from Michigan State University's Sociology Department.

the marriage and wished to marry Mughirah B. Shubah. So she was married to Mughirah¹¹¹¹ (p. 75).

In Islam, all Muslims are regarded as equals in the sight of God; the only criterion is piety or God-mindedness. Thus, the religious virtues of a prospective mate should be put above everything else. The prophet of Islam himself encouraged the marriage of his cousin from the noble tribe of Quraysh to the former black slave Zaid B. Haritha, and Abdel Rahman B. Oof, a famous prophet's close friend (Shaba), encouraged the marriage of his sister, also from the noble tribe, to the former black slave Billal Al-Habashi (the African) (Al-Istanbuli, 1981). Color, race, and social status should be totally ignored when choosing a mate. The only thing to be emphasized is piety.

Abdal Ati (1977) commented on this in his work on the family structure in

Islam:

The prophet encouraged the marriage of some former slaves to women of the Quraysh tribe whose members enjoyed the highest social standing and to whom such marriages would probably have been inconceivable, were it not for the "egalitarian spirit" of Islam. "Social equality" was thus replaced by the new concept of "religious equality."

What made the new principle of religious equality acceptable to the Arabs was most probably a combination of several factors. With the rise of Islam, there emerged a new community whose members were drawn together by a religious identity superseding the old forms of solidarity. In this community, practically every member was an "achieving" person and, in some capacity or other, rendered valuable services to the community. Theirs was a pioneering spirit of endurance, self-denial, and profound community. The prophet's leadership and his full sharing with them of the ups and downs of life must have been effective in leveling the traditional social barriers of lineage, wealth, and race. (p. 87)

In this current period of Islamic revival, more people are thinking of themselves as religious than did in 1974. Therefore, people in 1980s are more inclined to behave according to Islamic dictates about choosing mates for marriage than they were in the mid-1970s. Islam instructs that there is to be no premarital relationship between a male and a female. If a man wishes to propose marriage, he asks his mother to look for a wife for him. If he spots an available girl through friends or family, he asks his mother or sister to talk to her. If she says yes, the man makes an official visit to her in front of her family members where he lets the elder men in his family intervene for him to ask for her hand from the elder men in her family. At that point, the marriage contract is drawn up, after which the proposed groom may be alone with his proposed bride for the first time.

Although the Islamic religion allows its male followers to marry women from other Semitic religions, these marriages are rare among Kuwaitis in general for many reasons. People feel socially close when marrying from the same religion, with the same habits and customs and applied laws. So the marriage of Muslim and Christians is practically unheard of, and members of other religions are few in the society. Furthermore, due to the political conflict in the Middle East, there are no Jews in Kuwait so no marriages between Jews and Muslims take place in the society.

Some mosques or religious institutions also play a role in mate selection. People can go there to fill out application forms, explaining the characteristics they are looking for. These individuals will be matched, based on their religiousness.

There is no prejudice in Islam against any ethnic group, tribe, nationality, or sect; the family is the only group based on affinity that Islam recognizes. As Roberts (1982) notes in his study of Islam, "Islam is opposed to tribal solidarity, because the solidarity of believers should supersede the solidarity of the tribe" (p. 72). Thus, Islam does not prohibit marrying across caste. In addition, from the Islamic perspective, socio-economic status and educational or occupational status are not important. This Islamic revival period can be characterized as combining the traditional and modern ways of mate selection. Although the young man determines when he marries (his family and societal pressure play a role on when to marry), he still uses the traditional method of selecting a mate because there are few opportunities for young people to get to know each other. Furthermore, a man's family still has a role in the process of choosing his wife and in deciding the time of the marriage contract and the wedding day. The family does not interfere in the process of mate selection—that is based on individual choice; but the family mediates in introducing proposed mates and sometimes affects each partner's decision.

Demographic Structure

Kuwait's demographic structure before the first official census of 1957 is not known, although there is speculation based on travelers and historians' estimations. Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf (1908) estimated Kuwait's population to be 35,000 in 1907. Freeth (1956) estimated its total population at 60,000 in 1930, but Dickson (1956) believed Kuwait to have 160,000 people in 1952. The first official census, as shown in the annual statistical abstract in 1957, found the total population to be 206,473. By the second census in 1961, this had risen by 56% to 321,621, with a subsequent increase of 45% to 467,339 in 1965. By 1970, it reached 738,662, a 58% increase. By 1975, the population had reached 994,837, a 35% increase, and had another 36% increase gave 1,357,952 in 1980 (see Table 3.1). The last official census was taken in 1985 and showed a 24% increase to 1,695,128 (see Table 3.2). These figures show that, although the population has continued to increase, there has been a decrease in the rate of growth because the government has reformed immigration laws and restrictions In real figures, the population in Kuwait has in the country.

Table 3.1						
Population by	Gender i	n Census	Years	1957	and	1985

			Populatio	<u>n</u>	<u> </u>	Percentage	<u>e</u>
<u>Year</u>	Status	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	<u>Total</u>
1957	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti	59,154 72,904	54,468 19,947	113,662 92,851	28.7 35.3	26.3 9.7	55.0 45.0
	Total	132,058	74,415	206,473	64.0	36.0	100.0
1961	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti	84,461 116,246	77,448 43,466	161,909 159,712	26.3 36.1	24.1 13.5	50.3 49.7
	Total	200,707	120,914	321,621	62.4	37.6	100.0
1965	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti	112,569 173,743	107,490 73,537	220,0 <i>5</i> 9 247,280	24.1 37.2	23.0 15.7	47.1 52.9
	Total	286,312	181,027	467,339	61.3	38.7	100.0
1970	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti	175,513 244,368	171,883 146,898	347,396 391,266	23.7 33.1	23.3 19.9	47.0 53.0
	Total	419,881	318,781	738,662	56.8	43.2	100.0
1 975	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti	236,600 307,168	235,488 215,581	472,088 522,749	23.8 30.9	23.7 21.6	47.5 52.5
	Total	543,768	451,069	994,837	54.7	45.3	100.0
1980	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti	280,649 495,990	284,964 296,349	565,613 792,339	20.7 36.5	21.0 21.8	41.7 58.3
	Total	776,639	581,313	1,357,952	57.2	42.8	100.0
1985*	* Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti	337,243 627,333	342,358 388,194	679,601 1,015,527	22.3 37.0	20.2 22.9	40.1 59.9
	Total	964,576	730,552	1,695,128	56.9	43.1	100.0

**Provisional data

Source: Annual Statistical Abstract, 1985

				In	crease
Nationality	Gender	<u>1985</u>	<u>1980</u>	Number	Percentage
Kuwaitis	Males	337.243	280,649	56,594	20.2
	Females	342.358	284.964	57.393	20.1
	TOTAL	679,601	565,613	113,988	20.2
Non-Kuwaitis	Males	627.333	495,990	131.343	26.5
	Females	388.194	296.349	91.845	31.0
	TOTAL	1,015,527	792,339	223,188	28.2
TOTAL	Males	964.576	776.639	187.437	24.2
	Females	730.552	581.313	149.239	25.7
	TOTAL	1,695,128	1,357,952	337,176	24.8

Table 3.2 Primary Results of 1985 Censuses

Source: Central Statistical Office, Kuwait, April 1985

increased 720% since the first official census was taken in 1957. Hill (1972) commented on this increase in his demographic study of the Gulf states:

While the total numbers involved are small by international standards ... (it) represents one of the highest rates of growth in the post-war world. Even other exceptional communities such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Gibraltar, or the American Virgin Islands display lower rates of population increase than those prevailing in Kuwait. (p, l)

This rapid population growth has been accompanied by a rapid expansion in construction projects and health, education, and social services. This rapid population increase is attributed to several factors: (a) a naturally increasing birth rate, offset by a decreasing death rate as a result of improved health care; (b) an influx of immigrants from other countries; and (c) naturalization. As a result of the increase, density per square kilometer has risen from 12.9 persons in 1957 to 73.97 in 1980.

The 1985 official census reported that 40.1% of the population were Kuwaitis (679,601) and 59.9% were non-Kuwaitis (1,015,527). In 1980 the percentage for Kuwaitis was 40.7% and for non-Kuwaitis 58.3%, meaning that the proportion of Kuwaitis in the country dropped by 1.6% in five years (see Table 3.3). This trend actually began much earlier. The first official census in 1957 reported 55% of the population to be Kuwaitis. That figure dropped to 50.3% in 1961, to 47.1% in 1965, and to 47% in 1970. It increased to 47.5% in 1975 and fell to 41.7% in 1980.

Table 3.3

Primary Results of General Population Census of 1985; Distribution for Population and Gender Ratio According to Nationality

	Population	Percentage	Gende	r Ratio
	<u>1985</u>	<u>1980</u>	1985	<u>1980</u>
Kuwaitis	40.1	41.7	98.5	98.5
Non-Kuwaitis	59.3	59.9	161.6	167.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	133.6	132.0
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Source: Central Statistical Office, Kuwait, April 1985

Nationality Groups

In 1975, Arabs or people coming from Arabian countries numbered 419,187 (42.4%): 237,762 males and 181,762 females. The number of Arab females is lower than that of males, as would be expected among labor migrants. Thus, we might expect that some Arab males might marry Kuwaitis. People in Kuwait who came from Asian countries numbered 97,813 (9.8%) in 1975 (66,568 males and 31,245 females) and 204,104 (15%) in 1980 (147,956 males and 56,148 females). This sudden increase in males is accounted for by the commercial relations arising between the government of Kuwait and those of some Asian countries, such as South Korea, which allowed Asian companies opening branches in Kuwait to bring their own laborers with them (see Table 3.4). Table 3.4 Population by Gender and Groups of Countries in Census Years 1970, 1975, and 1980

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ر -میں مر		1970			1975			1980		Pe	rcentage	
Countries	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	1970	1975	1980
Kuwait	175,513	171,883	347, 396	236,600	235,488	472,088	280,649	284,964	565,613	47.0	47.5	41.7
Arab countri es	184,729	128,120	312,849	237,425	181 ,762	419,187	340,206	234,289	574,495	42.2	42.4	42.3
Asian	56,010	15,907	71,917	66, 568	31,245	97,813	147,956	56,148	204,104	9.7	9.8	15.0
African	488	188	676	317	123	044	868	702	1,601	0.1	*	0.1
European	2,637	2,179	4,816	2,327	1,953	4,280	5,765	4,219	9,984	0.7	0.4	0.8
America	434	476	897	422	392	814	1,068	929	1,997	0.1	0.1	0.1
Others	18	17	35	25	22	47	96	62	158	*	*	*
Not stated	52	24	76	84	84	168	ı	ı	'	*	*	*
Grand Total	419,881	318,781	738,662	543,768	451,069	994,837	776,639	581,313 1	,357,952	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Negligble figure

Source: Annual Statistical Abstract, 1984

People from non-Arab African countries represented fewer than one percent of the population in 1975 (440 people, 317 males and 123 females). In 1980, this number was 1601 (0.1%), 889 males and 702 females. Europeans in Kuwait in 1975 were 4280 in number (0.4% of the population), including 2327 males and 1953 females. In 1980, this figure was 9984 (0.8%), with 5762 males and 4219 females. The American population there numbered 814 in 1975 (0.1%), including 422 males and 392 females. In 1980, this figure had risen to 1997 (still 0.1%), including 1068 males and 929 females.

Data on the nationalities of the country's non-Kuwaiti population from the 1980 census reveal the following: the total population was 1,357,952 of which 565,613 were Kuwaitis '41.7%), 574,442 (42.3) were from other Arabian countries, 204,104 (15%) were from Asian non-Arabian countries, 1,601 (.1%) were from African non-Arabian countries, 9,984 (.8%) were from European countries, 1,852 (.1%) were from North American countries, 145 were from South American countries, and 158 were from Australia and New Zealand. Although Kuwaitis are in the minority in their own country, they are still the largest nationality group with 472,088 people; Jordanians-Palestinians are the second largest group with 204,179 people in Kuwait.

The non-Kuwaiti group is largely from neighboring Arab countries. This is not surprising since official Kuwaiti labor law gives priority for jobs to Arabs. Furthermore, Arabs have the same backgrounds and culture as Kuwaitis. The nationality that is increasing most rapidly is the Palestinian because of the political situation in their homeland.

In the 1980 census, the percentage of non-Kuwaiti Arabs decreased because of the importing of an Asian labor force. Arabs represented 72.5% of the population (574,495 people). In the meantime, non-Arab Asians increased to 25.8% (204,104), and there were 1.7% Africans, Europeans, and Americans. With these large numbers of people belonging to different national and ethnic groups, we would expect to find some inter-marriage between Kuwaiti citizens and immigrants. In addition, with Kuwaitis going abroad for higher education, there are occasionally marriages between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis in the non-Kuwaitis' home countries. During the 1982-83 academic year, 2682 Kuwaiti students (244 female and 2438 male) lived and studied abroad. Those who were single and of marriageable age were exposed and vulnerable to different cultures and highly expected to change their traditional attitudes toward marriage.

Gender Ratio

Of the 1,695,128 total population reported in the 1985 census (see Table 3.5), 964,576 were males and 730,552 were females, making the gender ratio 132 males for 100 females, a decrease from 1980 census figures which listed 133.6 males for 100 females. Kuwaiti males number 337,243 and females 342,358, making the gender ratio for Kuwaitis 98.5 males to 100 females. The number of non-Kuwaiti males is 627,333 and non-Kuwaiti females is 388,146, making a gender ratio of 161.6 males to 100 females. In 1980 the gender ratio was 98.5 to 100 for Kuwaiti males to females and 167.4 to 100 for non-Kuwaiti males to females. Previous statistics (see Table 3.6) show that the percentage of Kuwaiti males as a proportion of the total population has been decreasing. In 1957 it was 28.7%, in 1961 it was 28.7%, in 1961 26.3%, in 1965 24.1%, in 1970 23.7%, in 1975 23.8%, in 1980 20.7%, and in 1985 it was 19.8%. One would suppose that in contrast, the percentage of Kuwaiti females would increase, but not in a society like Kuwait that is open to immigration. Kuwaiti females, as a proportion of the total population, are also increasing: in 1957 it was 26.3%, in 1961 24.1%, in 1965 23%, in 1970 23.3%, in 1975 23.7%, in 1980 21% and in 1985 20.2%. There is no explanation for the relatively small increase in 1970 and 1975.

Table 3	.5				
Gender	Ratio	in	Selected	Census	Years

Year	Nationality	<u>Ratio</u> *	
1957	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total	108.6 365.5 177.5	
1 961	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total	109.1 267.4 166.0	
1965	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total	104.7 236.3 158.2	
1970	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total	102.1 166.4 131.7	
1975	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total	100.5 142.5 120.6	
1980	Kuwaiti Non-Kuwaiti Total	98.5 167.4 133.6	

*Males per 100 females.

Table 3.6Primary Result of 1985 Census' Gender Ratio

		Gend	ler Ratio
	Nationality	<u>1980</u>	<u>1985</u>
	Kuwaiti	98.5	98.5
	Non-Kuwaiti	167.4	161 .6
	Total	132.0	133.6
Source:	Central Statistical Of	fice, Kuwait, Apri	1 1985

Male immigrants have increased in number each census, and in 1975 they constituted approximately 31% of the total population. In 1985 they reached 37% of the population. In the same manner, immigrant females represented 9.7% of the total population in Kuwait in 1957, increasing to 23% in 1985, a very important figure since it represents almost one-quarter of the total population. The increase for non-Kuwaiti females in 1985 occurred because some immigrants, especially those from politically unstable countries such as Lebanon and Palestine, settled in the society, bringing their families with them from their home countries.

Male immigrants represent 37% of the total population in Kuwait while male Kuwaitis represent 19.8%. If we consider that immigrants are mostly young, participate in the labor force, and are of marriageable age, their numbers are significant. Kuwaitis represent a more stable segment of the population with large numbers of children and old people among them. For Kuwaitis, the gender ratio has decreased from 108.6 in 1957 to 104.7 in 1965, 102.1 in 1970, 100.5 in 1975, and to 98.5 in 1985.

For immigrants, the gender ratio picture is quite different. In 1957 it was 365.5 males for 100 females and decreased to 161.6 to 100 in 1985. This gender imbalance among immigrants occurs because immigrants are often single males who are making money to send to their families at home and saving to pay bride prices for marriage. The gender ratio has decreased for immigrants because most of the development plans for the country have been achieved and many jobs have been nationalized, thereby decreasing the need for immigrants. Labor migration, of course, has economic, political, and social effects. It not only leads to a heterogeneous population structure, but also created imbalanced age as well as gender ratios.

Age

Kuwaiti's 1975 and 1980 statistics show that the highest percentage of the population in 1975 (33%) and 1985 (29.2%) was between 0-4 and 5-9 years (see Table 3.7). This indicates that Kuwaiti society is young, a healthy phenomenon for an underdeveloped society.

In the 25-29 year old age group, non-Kuwaitis outnumber Kuwaitis (10.8% to 7.2% in 1975 and 12.3% to 7.3% in 1980). Another age group in which non-Kuwaitis outnumbered Kuwaitis is that of 30-34 year olds. In 1975, 9.8% of the population were non-Kuwaitis in this age group, while 5.4% in this age group were Kuwaitis; in 1980, non-Kuwaitis in the 30-34 year age group totaled 11.5% of the population, while Kuwaitis were 5.3%.

We notice that for the 25-29 and 30-34 year old age groups, the number of non-Kuwaitis almost doubled during census years 1975-1980, while the number of Kuwaitis increased only slightly, because most immigrants coming to Kuwait were of working age.

Another phenomenon in the age structure of the population is that for the age group 25-29 in 1975, represented 10.5% of the unmarried Kuwaiti male population, while 15,080 (22.4) of the unmarried male population were non-Kuwaitis, meaning that in 1975 non-Kuwaiti males who were single and of marriageable age more than tripled the population of Kuwaiti males who were single and of marriage age. The same situation occurred in 1980 when the number of unmarried males for the age group 25-29 was 10% for Kuwaitis and 25.9% for non-Kuwaitis. It is noted that the number of unmarried non-Kuwaiti males doubled between 1975 and 1980. As previously stated, this large number of immigrant males of marriageable age in Kuwait allows for greater probability that these immigrants will marry Kuwaiti females.

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			<u>1975</u>			<u>1980</u>	
			Non-			Non-	
Age Group		<u>Kuwaiti</u>	<u>Kuwaiti</u>	Total	<u>Kuwaiti</u>	<u>Kuwaiti</u>	<u>Total</u>
0 - 4	м	19.7	14.4	16.7	19.7	10.7	13.9
	F	19.2	19.8	19.5	18.8	17.2	18.0
	Т	19.5	16 .6	18.0	19.3	13.1	15.7
5 - 9	м	17.0	12.2	14.3	16.6	9.3	12.0
	F	17.0	16.6	16.8	16.0	15.0	15.5
	т	17.0	14.0	15.4	16.3	11.4	13.5
10 - 14	м	13.2	7.9	12.3	13.8	7.5	9.9
	F	12.7	10.6	11.8	13.5	11.9	12.7
	т	12.9	9.0	10.0	13.6	9.2	11.1
15 - 19	м	9.9	6.9	8.3	10.7	6.9	8.3
	F	10.8	7.6	9.3	10.9	8.3	9.6
	т	10.4	7.2	8.7	10.8	7.4	8.8
20 - 24	м	8.6	9.1	8.9	8.4	10.0	9.3
	F	9.1	8.7	8.9	9.3	8.5	8.9
	т	8.9	8.9	8.9	8.9	9.4	9.2
25 - 29	М	6.6	11.0	9.1	6.8	13.4	11.0
	F	7.7	10.5	9.0	7.7	10.4	9.1
	т	7.2	10.8	9.1	7.3	12.3	10.2
30 - 34	М	5.5	10.8	8.5	4.8	12.6	9.8
	F	5.5	8.4	7.0	5.7	9.5	7.7
	т	5.4	9.8	7.8	5.3	11.5	8.9
35 - 39	м	5.0	10.0	7.8	4.3	10.2	8.1
	F	4.6	6.5	5.5	4.7	6.9	5.8
	Т	4.8	8.5	8.8	4.4	9.0	7.1
40 - 44	м	3.6	7.3	5.7	4.0	8.3	6.7
	F	3.3	4.1	4.7	3.6	5.0	4.3
	т	3.5	6.0	4.8	3.7	7.1	5.7
45 - 49	м	3.1	4.9	4.1	3.0	5.2	4.4
	F	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.6	3.0	2.8
	Т	2.8	3.9	3.4	2.8	4.4	3.7

Table 3.7 Percentage Distribution for Population by Gender and Age Group in Census Years

(continued)

50 - 54	M	2.3	2.8	2.5	2.5	3.3	4.4
	F	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.6	3.0	2.8
	T	2.2	2.6	2.2	2.3	2.7	2.5
55 - 59	M	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.3
	F	1.6	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.2
	T	1.6	1.1	1.4	1.6	1.3	1.4
60+	M	3.8	1.4	2.4	3.8	1.1	2.l
	F	3.8	1.8	2.8	3.6	1.5	2.5
	T	3.8	1.6	2.6	3.7	1.2	2.2
TOTALS:	M	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	F	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	T	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 3.7, continued

In 1975, single males of age 15 years and over numbered 45,927 for Kuwaitis and 67,449 for non-Kuwaitis. In 1985, this age group numbered 55,167 for single Kuwaiti males and 122,492 single non-Kuwaiti males. Females in this age group were 28,787 Kuwaitis and 21,747 non-Kuwaitis in 1975 and 40,678 Kuwaitis and 39,983 non-Kuwaitis in 1980 (see Table 3.8).

These figures provide a picture of Kuwaiti society: single non-Kuwaitis males of 19 years or more years of age more than double the Kuwaiti population of the same age. Even adding the numbers of single Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti females in the year 1980 would not approximate the number of single non-Kuwaiti males for the same year.

Education

The history of formal education in Kuwait goes back to 1912 when the first school was opened. Soon after that, schools were opened in many places around the country, but education was still primitive and traditional. The real change in the development of education occurred after World War II and the discovery of

Table 3.8 Percentage Di	stributior	Populat	tion by (Gender, I	Age Gro	up, and /	Mari tal S	tatus								
			Ž	mber of	Females							Number	of Male	81		
	Sin	읣	Mar	ried	Dive	LCed	Wido	wed	Sing	븬	Mar	ied	Divo	prced	Wide	Pen
Age Group	٦I	, Z	뇌	х Х	지	X X	지	, X Z	지	ХX	지	х Z	지	х Z	괴	х Х
							2	51								
15 - 19	50.2	30.5	0.6	0.5	1.0	1.2	0.0	0.1	62.9	52.7	9.4	5.7	4.0	5.1	0.1	0.1
20 - 24	32.0	32.4	8.0	0.6	10.3	5.9	0.5	9.1	24.0	22.1	18.7	l6.3	11.7	11.2	0.7	0.9
25 - 29	10.3	22.4	15.2	I4.I	I6.7	17.0	8.1	2.5	8.0	12.3	20.3	23.1	13.2	15.9	[.]	9.1
30 - 34	3.3	8.2	15.9	20.7	15.4	16.6	6.1	4.9	2.3	5.0	15.2	19.8	9.61	12.5	2.5	3.2
35 - 39	1.5	3.3	15.5	21.4	12.2	16.4	2.8	B.2	1.0	3.1	12.8	15.1	12.6	12.7	4.0	6.6
40 - 44	0.8	1.6	11.5	16.1	9.1	17.1	3.1	9.0	0.6	2.0	8.4	9.1	11.3	13.4	6.6	9.4
45 - 49	0.5	0.8	9.8	10.8	8.9	12.3	2.4	10.2	0.3	. .	5.8	5.4	8.8	12.1	8.8	11.3
50 - 54	0.4	0.4	7.1	6.1	6.3	7.8	7.8	8.11	0.3	0.7	3.9	2.8	8.8	7.2	14.3	12.9
55 - 59	0.2	0.2	5.4	2.9	Å. 6	4.7	9.4	9.5	0.2	0.4	2.4	I.3	5.7	4.1	13.1	11.5
60+	0.6	0.2	071	2.8	15.5	6.0	68. 5	42.2	0.4	0.4	3.1	L.4	10.0	5.8	48.6	42.5
							<u>8</u>	ଛା								
15 - 19	53.5	27.0	0.7	0.4	3	0.6	0.2	5	609	52.0	6.9	3.6	3.7	3.3	6	0.2
20 - 24	30.7	31.7	7.9	4.3	11.5	7.1	0.8	1.8	25.3	22.0	17.6	14.0	13.5	9.9	0.6	0.8
25 - 29	10.0	25.9	16.1	I4.7	20.4	15.0	1.2	4.0	7.9	12.9	20.1	21.5	0.0	1.6	1.6	2.0
30 - 34	2.7	9.2	14.4	21.7	15.6	19.8	1.3	5.0	3.2	5.6	15.9	21.6	12.7	16.6	2.4	4.3
35 - 39	1:2	3.1	13.7	9.9	10.0	15.6	2.4	7.4	Ξ	2.9	13.2	15.8	11.2	13.4	4.3	5.9
44 - 04	0.6	1.4	13.0	16.6	8.4	15.2	3.5	9.2	0.5	2.0	9.7	E	12.0	13.6	7.0	1L8
45 - 49	0.3	0.7	9.9	10.6	9.2	9.0	3.9	9.3	0.3	1.2	6.5	6.3	10.0	9.6	9.2	11.2
50 - 54	0.3	0.6	7.9	6.6	T.T	7.2	6.1	12.8	0.2	0.7	4.3	3.4	7.2	8.7	13.0	14.3
55 - 59	0.2	0.2	5.2	3.0	3.6	4.0	7.4	9.6	0.2	0.4	2.6	1.5	5.1	4.3	12.3	11.6
6 04	0.5	0.2	11,2	2.2	15.5	6.5	73.2	40.8	0.4	0.3	3.2	1.2	9.7	4.6	49.5	38.9

oil. After the discovery of oil, the Kuwait government wisely spent a great deal of its oil revenue money on education, causing that sector of the society to expand rapidly.

Three stages of education were established: primary or elementary, intermediate, and secondary. In 1965 education became compulsory for all children of both genders at age six.

Education spread rapidly in Kuwait as more money was spent on it. Table 3.9 shows that numbers of schools increased from 142 in 1961-62 to 519 in 1982-83 and educated 51,909 students in 1961-62 and 334,942 in 1982-83. Teachers' numbers increased from 2551 in 1961-62 in to 25,137 in 1982-83. With the increases in the number of students and teachers, expenditures rose from KD 8.82 million in 1960 (Kuwait dinar = U.S. \$3.5) to KD 247 million in 1982-83 (source: ASA, 1984).

In addition, post secondary institutions, such as teacher training colleges, commercial (two-year colleges) and technological institutions, and vocational training colleges, grew in number and importance. There was one major university in 1966, the University of Kuwait. It opened with an initial enrollment of 500. During the 1983-84 academic year, this university accommodated 14,650 students, 7820 females and 6830 males (Table 3.10). More females than males attend the university because males have a greater variety of options, including police colleges, military colleges, and technological institutions. Men also study abroad in greater numbers than do women.

In 1975, which is the closest official census year for the sample year of the study (1974), there were 27,246 college degree-holders in Kuwait, 7,177 of whom were female and 20,069 were male. Of this number, 3,979 were Kuwaiti and 23,267 were non-Kuwaiti. Of the Kuwaitis, 1,224 were females and 2,755 were males; of the non-Kuwaitis, 5,953 were females and 17,314 were males (Table

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			Students			Teachers	
Years	<u>Schools</u>	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
19 61-62	142	30,860	20,230	51,090	1,371	1,180	2,551
1962-63	140	35,674	23,877	59,551	1,551	1,390	2,941
1963-64	157	41,511	28,597	70,108	1,890	1,699	3,589
1964-65	166	46,613	32,509	79,122	2,241	1,974	4,215
1965-66	176	53,550	38,238	91,788	2,680	2,356	5,036
1966-67	178	58,702	43,026	101,728	2,967	2,701	5,668
1967-68	195	64,366	47,655	112,021	3,342	3,053	6,395
1968-69	212	68,877	51,673	120,550	3,811	3,506	7,317
1969-70	224	73,262	55.783	129,045	4,235	3,984	8,219
1970-71	230	78,363	60,384	138,747	5,275	5,138	9,085
1971-72	245	84,460	66,219	150,679	5,275	5,138	10,413
1972-73	273	88,897	71,334	160,231	5,734	5,771	11,505
1973-74	287	93,371	76,046	169,417	6,199	6,408	12,607
1974-75	309	100,061	82,717	182,778	6,990	7,223	14,213
1975-76	326	109,873	92,034	201,907	7,484	7,988	15,472
1976-77	378	127,380	107,823	235,203	8,868	9,359	18,227
1977-78	394	136,714	116,498	253,212	9,673	101,01	19,774
1978-79	437	143,586	123,932	267,518	10,158	10,466	20,624
1979-80	457	152,656	132,677	285,333	10,039	11,515	21,554
1980-81	481	160,987	141,623	302,610	10,550	12,335	22,885
1981-82	510	170,812	151,700	322,512	11,748	12,619	24,367
1982-83	519	176,368	158,547	334,942	12,052	13,085	25,137
		•	•	•			

 Table 3.9

 Education at Government Schools

Table 3.10 Students in Kuwait University by Sex, Nationality and Educational Standard for 1983 and 1984

	Kuwaiti					
	S.Arabia	2,585 2,751 5,336	899 1,194 2,093	662 1,072 1,734	394 824 1,218	4,540 5,841 10,381
	Arabian Gulf and Foreigners	90 73 163	24 36 60	16 33 49	31 27 58	161 169 330
irst Semester Visitors	Other Arabs and Total	1,045 921 1,966	395 370 765	243 276 519	212 217 429	1,895 1,754 3,679
	Kuwaiti	3720 3,745 7,465	1,318 1,600 2,918	921 1,381 2,302	637 1,068 1,705	6,596 7,794 14,390
	s S.Arabia	2,452 2,214 4,666	971 1,423 2,394	725 1,096 1,821	511 1,019 1,530	4,659 5,752 10,411
	Arabian Gulf and Foreigners	82 39 141	27 34 61	272	39 E 65	155 163 318
a nester	and	1,068 896 1,964	445 436 881	263 303 566	240 270 510	2,016 1,905 3,921
cond Ser Visitor	Other Arabs Total					
S.		3,602 3,169 6,771	1,443 1893 3,336	1,008 1,436 2,444	777 1,322 2,099	6,830 7,820 14,650
	ndard	ℤ╙⊢	⋜╙⊢	⊻╙⊢	⋜∊⊢	X 7 T
	Educational Sta	Freshman	Sophomore	Senior	Senior	Total

Source: Annual Statistical Abstract 1986

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3.11). There are more male college-degree holders in Kuwait than female college-degree holders because males have a better chance to go to college.

In 1980, there were 61,566 college-degree holders in the country's entire population, 17,797 of whom were females and 43,769 of whom were males. In the Kuwaiti population, there were 52,692 college-degree holders, 14,431 of whom were females and 38,261 of whom were males. Of the non-Kuwaiti collegedegree holders in the country, 1,874 were female and 3,366 were male. One would expect the gap between males and females for Kuwaitis to be smaller in the future because more women in the 1980s have the opportunity to go to college. The proportion of college-degree holders has increased among both non-Kuwaiti males and females as the society attracts more professionals and there are more job opportunities and higher incomes for this segment of society. Among both male and female Kuwaitis, the number of college-degree holders has almost doubled since 1975, because the government encourages higher education for the development of the society.

The number of university and post-graduate level attendees increased. In 1975, 6.4% of non-Kuwaitis and 1.3% of Kuwaitis were involved in university and post-graduate level education. By 1985, these percentages had increased to 8.8% of non-Kuwaitis and 2.4% of Kuwaitis.

The past decade has also produced a decrease in illiteracy for the population 10 years of age and over. There were 104,860 (28.9%) non-Kuwaitis and 133,614 (44.6%) Kuwaitis illiterate in 1975; in 1985, 144,947 (24.2%) non-Kuwaitis and 132,803 (36.4%) Kuwaitis were illiterate. Although the numbers of illiterate non-Kuwaitis increased, the percentage of illiterates in the total population decreased. Among Kuwaitis, illiteracy decreased both in numbers and in percentage. The increase in numbers of non-Kuwaiti illiterates was primarily

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			1975					198	0
Educational Status		Non-Ku	wai ti	Ku	<u>waiti</u>		Non -K	uwai ti	<u>Kuwaiti</u>
liliterate	м	27.5	61,889	30.0	44,889	25.0	98,975	22.7	40,655
	F	31.3	42,971	59.1	88,734	22.9	45,972	49.6	92,148
	т	28.9	104,860	44.6	133,614	24.2	144,947	36.4	132,803
Read & write	м	24.7	55,786	20.9	31,287	23.0	99,212	18.0	32,259
	F	16.1	22,089	8.4	12,653	16.3	32,871	10.7	19,827
	т	21.5	77,875	14.7	43,940	22.1	132,083	14.3	52,086
Primary	м	17.3	39,067	26.7	39,989	14.1	55,881	26.7	47,682
	F	21.4	29,405	17.5	26,199	19.7	39,572	17.0	31,522
	Ť	18.9	68,472	22.1	66,188	16.0	95,453	21.7	59,047
Intermediate	м	11.6	26,036	14.0	20,919	12.8	50,650	19.3	34,481
	F	13.1	18,815	9.7	14,496	16.9	34,064	13.2	24,566
	т	12.4	44,851	11.8	35,415	14.2	84,714	16.2	59,047
Sec & below	м	11.2	25,311	6.6	9,806	13.5	53,716	10.2	18,211
Univ. level	F	13.1	17,984	4.5	6,797	17.0	34,119	7.7	14,311
	T	11.9	43,295	5.5	16,603	14.7	\$7,835	9.0	32,322
First Univ. &	м	7.7	17,314	1.8	2,755	9.6	38,261	3.1	5,508
post graduate	F	4.4	5,953	0.8	1,224	7.2	14,431	1.8	3,366
degrees	т	6.4	23, 267	1.3	3,979	8.8	52,692	Z.4	8,874
Not stated	м	0.0		0.0	18				
	F	0.0	2	0.0	17				
	т	0.0	2	0.0	35				
Total	M	100.0	225,403	100.0	149,654	100.0	396,695	100.0	178,796
	F	100.0	1 37, 219	100.0	150,120	100.0	201,029	100.0	182,740
	T	100.0	362,622	100.0	299,774	100.0	597,724	100.0	364,536
Sources Anm	ni S	i ta tistic	al Abstract	1986					

Table 3.11 Educational Status of Population and Their Percentage Distribution by Years 1975-1980

because of labor migration for blue collar and lower class jobs which attract the non-educated.

Religion

In 1957, 94.4% of the population listed its religion as Muslim, 4.7% as Christian, and 0.9% as belonging to other religions. In 1970, Muslims were 94.8% of the population, Christians 4.6%, and 0.6% were "other" (see Table 3.12). In 1980, 91.5% of the population were Muslims, 6.4% were Christian, and 2.1% were "other." Thus, in spite of the country's rapid population growth, religious distribution has remained almost the same. The slight increase in other religions has occurred because of the influx of Asian workers from Korea and Sri Lanka who are predominantly Buddhist. These data also underscore the fact that the bulk of the immigrant population came from Muslim countries.

The government's census does not break down the Muslim population by sect. It is well known, however, that the majority of Kuwaitis are Sunnis, with

	1957-1980
	Years
	Census
	igion in
	and Rel
	by Sex a
le 3.12	ulation
Tab	Рор

		A REAL PROPERTY AND A REAL							
Centus		Moslem			Christian			Others	
Years	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male
Populati	티								
1957	194.894	70,943	123,951	9.714	2,965	6.749	1.865	507	1,358
1965	439,687	170,049	269,638	24,640	9,947	14,693	3,012	1,031	1,981
1970	699,798	310,544	398,254	34,183	15,647	18,536	4,681	1,590	3,091
1975	944,781	426,973	517,808	44,718	22,007	22,711	5, 338	2,089	3,249
1980	1,242,711	539,716	702,995	87,080	35,728	51,352	28, 161	5,869	22,292
Percent	age								
1957	4.46	95.3	93.9	4.7	4.0	5.1	0.9	0.7	1.0
1965	94.1	93.9	94.2	5.3	5.5	5.1	0.6	0.6	0.7
1970	94.8	94.6	94.8	4.6	4.9	4.4	0.6	0.5	0.8
1975	95.0	94.6	95.2	4.5	4.9	4.4	0.5	0.5	0.6
1980	91.5	92.8	90.5	6.4	6.2	6.6	2.1	1.0	2.9

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Source: Annual Statistical Abstract 1986

Shias in the minority; therefore, one could predict from the numbers of people voting in national assembly elections that Shias total between 17 and 23% of the total Muslim population. The majority of the Shias came from the western part of Iran, with some coming from eastern Saudi Arabia and southern Iraq. They first settled in Sharq, an eastern Kuwait old city, moving from there to new townships like Breed al-Qar and Dasma as the population increased and society changed. When more townships and cities were built by the government and free houses were given to Kuwaiti citizens, many Shias began to mingle with Sunnis, altering the attitudes of each sect toward the other.

Labor Force

The labor force has been increasing rapidly for both males and females and for both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis, because the economic growth has led to the creation of a vast number of work opportunities. The state's expenditures on social services have increased the demand for manpower, a demand that the native population alone has been unable to satisfy. The labor force has been expanding and growing, from 80,229 in 1957 to 491,509 in 1980; but it is highly dependent on foreign labor. In 1980, Kuwaitis represented only 21.9% of the labor force, while non-Kuwaitis represented 78.1%.

In 1970, 62.9% of the Kuwaiti males 12 years and over were in the labor force. Of the Kuwaiti females, 2.1% were in the labor force. Of the non-Kuwaiti population, 91.4% of the females were in the labor force, and 17.4% of the females were in the labor force.

It is not surprising that non-Kuwaitis were represented in a higher percentage in the labor force than are Kuwaitis, because the non-Kuwaitis came to the country for the purpose of joining the labor force. For the same reasons,
non-Kuwaiti females also participated in the labor force at a higher rate than Kuwaiti females.

By 1980, this situation had changed slightly. The 1980 census showed that 66.8% of Kuwaiti males age 15 or over were in the labor force. Of Kuwaiti females age 15 years and over, 10.3% participated in the labor force, almost five times the percentage in 1970. For non-Kuwaiti males in 1980, 93.2%) were in the labor force. Of non-Kuwaiti females, 29.6% were in the labor force (see Table 3.13).

In his study of the economic development and structure of the Kuwaiti labor force, Al-Tarrah (1983) stated the following.

While social and cultural factors play a role in preventing indigenous women from participating in the labor force, it is also important that government policy reinforces the general social attitudes toward female employment. For example, employment policy tends to emphasize certain occupations, such as teacher or social worker, as proper for women. (p. 144).

Although the percentage of Kuwaiti women working outside the home has increased, it is still quite small, and the women who do work are largely confined to traditionally women's work such as teaching and nursing. Many Kuwaitis still find it unacceptable for women to work outside the home, and do not face economic need that would force women into the work force.

The distribution of the total labor force by occupations is shown in Table 3.14. Non-Kuwaitis outnumbered Kuwaitis in 1975 and in 1980 for almost all occupations. The only exception is that in 1975 Kuwaitis slightly outnumbered non-Kuwaitis (50.6%) in the agricultural, animal husbandry, and fishing and hunting sectors. The area with the second highest percentage of Kuwaitis was clerical and related workers where Kuwaitis represented 47% in 1974 and 40.9% in 1980.

Labor Force by Sex and	d Employm	ient Sțatus li	n Census Y	ears 1975-19	980				
		Kuwaiti			Non -K	uwaiti			
Employment Status	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
					1975				
Employed	78,301	7,295	85,596	183,596	27,475	210,999	261,825	34,770	296,595
Persons seeking work for the first time	4.701	172	4.873	1.090	204	1.294	5.791	376	6.167
Unemployed who worke	Pa		•	•		•	•		
before	1,365	10	1,375	395	50	445	1,760	60	1,820
Total labor force*	84,367	7,477	91,844	185,009	27,729	212,738	269, 376	35,206	304,582
Population	118,529	120,117	238,646	201,125	114,159	315,284	319,654	234,276	553,930
% Labor Force	71.2	6.2	38.5	92.0	24.3	67.5	84.3	15.0	55.0
					1980				
Employed	88,659	13,811	102,470	331,942	48,229	380,171	420,601	62,040	482,64]
Persons seeking work for the first time	3,943	343	4,286	2,344	835	3,179	6,287	1,178	7,465
Unemployed who worke	, pa		•	•		•			
before	986	18	1,004	358	41	399	1,344	59	1,403
Total labor force*	93,588	14,172	107,760	334,644	49,105	383,749	428,232	63,277	491,509
Population	140,014	147,311	287, 325	359,252	165,652	524,904	499,266	312,963	812,229
% Labor Force	66.8	10.3	37.5	93.2	29.6	73.1	85.8	20.2	60.5

elle V. in Cen ¢ 5 • and Fr Table 3.13 Labor Force by Sex

*Age 15 years and over

			<u>1</u> :	975			<u> </u>	780	
Divison of			Non-		۴		Non-		95
Occupation	Gender	<u>Kuwaiti</u>	Kuwaiti	<u>Total</u>	<u>Kuwaiti</u>	<u>Kuwaiti</u>	Kuwaiti	Total	<u>Kuwaiti</u>
Professional	м	5,677	22,002	27,679	20.5	8,909	44,698	53,607	16.6
and technical	F	4,062	10,095	14,157	28.7	7,189	17,465	24,654	29.2
workers	т	9,739	32,097	41,836	23.3	16,098	62,163	78,261	20.6
Administrative	м	1,024	1,787	2,811	36.4	2,043	4,043	6,086	33.6
and managerial	F	21	22	43	48.8	69	59	128	53 .9
workers	т	1,045	1,809	2,854	36.6	2,112	4,102	6,214	34.0
Clerical and	м	15,804	17,960	33,764	46.8	19,782	29,762	49,544	40.0
related	F	2,049	2,205	4,254	48.2	4,855	5,779	10,634	45.7
workers	T	17,853	20,165	38,018	47.0	24,637	35,541	60,178	40.9
Sales	M	6,162	17,618	23,780	25.9	5,145	25.346	30,491	16.9
workers	F	23	290	313	7.3	51	497	548	9.3
	Т	6,185	17,908	24,093	25.7	5,196	25,843	31,039	16.7
Service	Μ	31,798	30,719	62,517	50 .9	36,035	52,363	88,398	40.8
workers	F	1,102	14,681	15,783	7.0	1,539	24,196	25,735	6.0
	т	32,900	45,400	78,300	42.0	37,574	76,559	14,133	32.9
Agricultural,	м	3,884	3,805	7,689	50.5	3,830	5,947	9,777	39.2
animal hus-	F	13		13	100.0	40	9	49	81.6
bondry, fisher- men & hunters	T	3,897	3,805	7,702	50.6	3,870	5,956	9,825	39.4
Production	м	15,315	90,028	105,343	14.5	13,901	170,141	184,042	7.6
workers and	F	33	232	265	12.5	86	265	351	24.5
laborers	Т	15,348	90,260	105,608	14.5	13,987	170,406	184,393	7.6
Not	м	2		2	100.0				
odequately	F	2		2	100.0				
defined	Т	4		4	100.0				
Total	м	79,666	183,919	263,585	30.2	89,645	332,300	421,945	21.2
octivity	F	7,305	27,525	34,830	21.0	13,829	48,270	62,099	22.3
	Т	86,971	211,444	298,415	29.1	Ю3,474	380,570	484,044	21.4
Persons	м	38,863	17,206	56,069	69.3	50,369	26,952	77,321	65.1
with no	F	112,812	86,634	199,446	56.6	133,482	117,382	250,864	53 .2
occupation*	т	151,675	103,840	255,515	59.4	183,851	144,334	328,185	56.0
Totol	м	118,529	201,125	319,654	37.1	140,014	359,252	499,266	28.0
manpower	F	120,117	114,159	234,276	51.3	147,311	165,652	321,963	47.1
	T	238,646	315,284	553,930	43.1	297,325	524,904	812,229	35.4

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Table 3.14 Manpower/Labor Force (15 Years of Age and Over) by Gender and Division of Occupation and Nationality, 1975 and 1980

*including persons seeking work for the first time

The area with the lowest participation for Kuwaitis for both years was production workers and laborers. Kuwaitis represented 14.5% of this sector of the labor force in 1975 and 7.6% in 1980.

Table 3.14 also illustrates the extent to which Kuwaiti women are involved in the labor force. From 1975 to 1980, the percentage of the female work force that was Kuwaiti versus the percentage that was non-Kuwaiti in the professional and technical sector increased from 28.7% to 29.2%. In the administrative and managerial sector, the percentage of the female work force that was Kuwaiti increased from 48.8% to 53.9%. Overall, however, Kuwaiti women's share of the female work force declined from 1975 (51.3%) to 1980 (47.1%).

Summary

This chapter has presented a background review of Kuwait society in terms of several variables. It is clear that Kuwaiti society is fairly heterogeneous in terms of nationality, especially with migrants from many countries. In terms of religion, Kuwaiti society is homogeneous with Islam by far the dominant religion; and within Islam, the Sunni sect dominates (more than 75%). In terms of caste, Kuwaitis are divided between the minority (approximately 20%) Assail (nobles) and majority (approximately 80%) Baysary (common) peoples.

CHAPTER IV

STUDY DESIGN AND TECHNIQUES

The emphasis of this study is homogamous and heterogamous marriage patterns in Kuwaiti society. The sociological explanation of specific marriage behaviors will be examined in relation to past research through the analysis of marriage statistics. Information on nationality, age, education, occupation, religion, and names of spouses was collected from the Ministry of Justice in Kuwait which is responsible for registering marriages. Information concerning tribal origin, sect, and caste was collected from knowledgeable elders familiar with the history of Kuwaiti families and tribes.

Since the study was about Kuwaiti society, non-Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti marriages were excluded because they are not a stable factor in the society; such individuals most commonly return to their home countries. Also the lists of married couples includes previously married individuals who have second, third, fourth, etc., marriages. Furthermore, the study will not include Kuwaiti wives who married non-Kuwaiti husbands and stayed in their husbands' country and Kuwaiti husbands who married non-Kuwaiti wives and lived in their wives' countries.

The study population consisted of marriages officially registered by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice during the years 1974 and 1984 in which at least one of the marriage partners was a Kuwaiti. The two years, 1974 and 1984, were selected because they mark the end points of a decade during which considerable social change and transition toward modernity took place in Kuwait. In addition, these two years were chosen because each has particular characteristics and

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attributes. In 1974, the society was undergoing rapid socioeconomic change and moving toward modernization and urbanization. One of the major characteristics of 1984 was an Islamic resurgency with religious doctrines and instruction spreading among the youth of the society, and, thus, impacting on the institution of marriage, especially in relation to mate selection.

The study population was divided into three groups: male Kuwaiti/female Kuwaiti marriages, male Kuwaiti/female non-Kuwaiti marriages, and male non-Kuwaiti/female Kuwaiti marriages. In 1974 there were 2060 registered marriages involving at least one Kuwaiti partner, while in 1984 there were 5714 or almost three times as many marriages involving at least one Kuwaiti partner. The increase in marriages between 1974 and 1984 was consistent with the population growth in Kuwait.

A systematic, random sample of each of the three groups was selected for each year. The sample was selected by assigning sequential numbers to each case, selecting the first case using a random number table, and taking each n'th case, depending upon the proposed stratum size. The majority of the marriages involved two Kuwaiti partners. Selecting sample sizes that were strictly proportionate to strata sizes would result in under-sampling the two non-Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti marriage groups. Strata sizes were selected to produce adequate numbers of cases for analysis being selected. The population size, group size, and proposed sample sizes are presented on the next page.

Selection of the Sample

Sampling was complicated by the fact that the number of marriages increased dramatically between 1974 and 1984 and that the strata were of unequal sizes. Almost three times as many marriages took place in 1984 as took place in 1974. Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female was the most common type of marriage, while Kuwaiti male/non-Kuwaiti female was the second most common type, and non-Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female was the least common type of marriage.

A sample size of 15% of the total marriages recorded for each year was selected to provide enough cases for analysis while reducing the overwhelming workload of using all cases. Since there were large numbers of Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages recorded for each year, selecting 10% of the Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages would result in an adequate number of cases for analysis.

Marriages Registered in 1974 (Total Number of Marriages: 2060)

Nationalities of Couples (M/F)	Number	Percentage of Sample	Sample <u>Size</u>
Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti	1760	10%	176
Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti	230	31%	71
Non-Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti	70	100%	70
Total	2060	15%	317
	Marriages Registere	<u>d in 1984</u>	
Kuwai ti/Kuwai ti	3996	10%	399
Kuwaiti-non-Kuwaiti	850	27%	229
Non-Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti	870	26%	226
Total	5714	15%	854

In 1974 there were 2060 recorded marriages in Kuwaiti; of these, 85.4% were Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female. Selecting 10% of the Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages resulted in 176 cases. If 15% or 317 marriages were to be selected, this left 141 cases to be selected from the two remaining groups which involved a non-Kuwaiti partner. Only 70 non-Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages were recorded in 1974. Since so few non-Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages were recorded, the entire group was selected to ensure an adequate

number of cases for analysis. To meet the goal of selecting 15% of the marriage population for 1974 while ensuring adequate sample sizes, 71 cases or 31% of the Kuwaiti male/non-Kuwaiti female marriages were selected.

In 1984, there were 5714 recorded marriages in Kuwait; of these, 70% were Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female. Selecting 10% of the Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages resulted in selecting 399 cases. If 15% or 854 marriages were to be selected, this left 457 cases to be selected from the two remaining groups that involved a non-Kuwaiti partner. Since the two remaining groups involving at least one non-Kuwaiti partner were nearly equal, approximately equal numbers of cases were selected from each. Slight differences in the numbers of cases selected from each group resulted from the systematic random sampling approach that was used: 229 or 27% of the Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages and 226 or 26% of the non-Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female marriages were selected.

Analysis of the Data

This study examined variables individually for the groups based on the nationality and citizenship classification--Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti, Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti, and non-Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti--of both husbands and wives in the official registry of marriages in the state of Kuwait for 1974 and 1984. Age as a variable was tested to show age differences for spouses in the sample population. It will also showed the mean age at marriage for males and females for each group in the sample.

It is estimated that as many as 75 nationalities and races reside in Kuwait. "Nationality" is defined here as the national origin of individuals involved in marital relationships with native Kuwaitis within the country. The nationality variable was divided into three categories: native Kuwaitis, non-Kuwaiti Arabs, and non-Arabs.

The third variable that is used in the definition of homogamy and heterogamy for this study was religion since, as has been pointed out, religion is of fundamental importance in the social institutions of the country. In using religion as a variable in the definitions of homogamy and heterogamy, the individual married partners' declared religion was taken as the definition of their faith. In this connection, Shite and Sunni sects are treated as separate religions. Although official marriage statistics in Kuwait do not recognize Shias and Sunnis as different religions, marriage across these sects, at least in the past, was rare, and intermarriage between the sects was always treated as an act of cultural rebellion. The other religions found in any numbers in Kuwait are Christianity, Hinduism, and Sikhism. Marriage between a Christian and a Muslim, although rare, is mentioned in official records. If a marriage takes place between a Hindu or a Sikh and a native Kuwaiti, the official records do not show the religion of the non-Muslim party because Islamic law requires that the non-Muslim partner must first accept Islam before the marriage can be solemnized and recognized as legal; after such a conversion, both parties are entered as Muslims in the official register. Despite these difficulties in official records, the investigator did attempt to determine the sects of the married couple, in the case of marriage between a Shia and a Sunni, by consulting records of conversion, if possible, and by consulting community elders with regard to the surnames of married parties. It should be noted that surnames in Kuwait have an element in them that indicates whether the person is a Shia or a Sunni.

With regard to the education variable, the marriage was characterized as homogamous if both parties had the same educational level.

The variable of occupation reveals two kinds of occupations reported: (a) labor market occupations and (b) non-labor market occupations. Labor market occupations are classified in the official statistics of marriages into seven categories:

- 1. professionals and scientists, including specialists, professionals, engineers, airline pilots, M.D.s, economists, judges, teachers, attorneys, journalists, etc.;
- 2. legislative and executive managers and directors;
- 3. managerial workers, including supervisors, secretaries, telephone operators, etc.;
- 4. salespersons, agents, and those in private business;
- 5. service workers, those working in restaurants such as cooks, waiters, waitresses, and menial help;
- 6. fishermen and farmers; and
- 7. production workers, either factory- or blue-collar-workers.

For the purpose of this study, these jobs will be classified as follows:

- 1. all professionals, scientists, executives, directors, and legislators will be classified as having "high class jobs";
- 2. managerial workers and sales and service workers will be classified as having "middle class jobs"; and
- 3. fishermen, farmers, and all blue collars workers will be classified as having "low class jobs."

Occupations such as students and housewives, which are expected to be high in percentage, especially among women, are classified in the non-labor market category.

Marriages within these occupational categories were treated as homogamous; those across categories were treated as heterogamous.

Caste in Kuwait consists of two groups, the Assails and Bayssaries. If the coupled belonged to the same caste, they were treated as homogamously

married; if they belonged to different castes, the marriage was regarded as heterogamous.

The data were analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. The frequency and percentage distributions of various heterogamous and homogamous marriages were presented for each group. A chi square test was applied to test the hypotheses.

The chi square test of statistical significance was used to determine if there were a systematic relationship between two categorical variables. The t-test procedure was used to test for significant mean differences between groups using interval level dependent variables. Also, Cramer's v is used to measure the strength of the relationship between the two variables for the socioeconomic status propositions.

In this study, the relationship between years (1974 and 1984) and heterogamous/homogamous marriage variables was examined. Marriage trends across years were examined. Hypotheses about marriage trends were tested at an alpha = .05 level, indicating that there were fewer than five chances in 100 that a null hypotheses would be rejected when it was, in fact, true.

Propositions

- 1. The difference in the mean age between spouses decreased between 1974 and 1984.
- 2. The average age at time of marriage increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 3. The proportion of cross-religious marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 4. The proportion of cross-sect marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 5. College graduate males enter into more cross-sect marriages than do non-college graduate males.

- 6. College graduate males are more likely to marry cross religions than are non-college graduate males.
- 7. males in high status jobs enter into more cross-religion marriages than do males in lower status jobs.
- 8. Males in high status jobs enter into more cross-sect marriages than do males in lower status jobs.
- 9. The proportion of Kuwaiti non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 10. College graduate males were more likely to marry cross nationalities than were non-college graduate males.
- 11. College graduate males were more likely to make Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab marriages than non-college graduate males.
- 12. The proportion of cross-caste marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.
- 13. College graduate males are more likely to enter into cross-caste marriages than non-college graduate males.
- 14. Men with high status jobs are more likely to enter into crosscaste marriages than those with lower status jobs.
- 15. There were more marriages between people of similar educational level in 1984 than 1974.
- 16. There were more marraiges between people of similar occupational level in 1984 than 1974.

Sample Characteristics of the Study

In this section, a review of the sample's characteristics will be given for years 1974 and 1984, combined and individually, for a closer look at the sample for each variable: age, religion, nationality, occupation, education, and caste.

Age

There were 317 males and females who reported their ages for the year 1974; 854 males and females reported their ages in 1984. In 1974, the mean age at marriage for males was 28.2 years and for females 22.2 years; in 1984 this figure was 27.9 for males and 22.4 for females (see Table 4.1).

It is interesting to look at mean age at marriage for each nationality group. For Kuwaiti husband/Kuwaiti wife marriages in 1974, reported age at marriage for males was 25.4 years and for females was 20.2 years. In 1984, males had a mean age of 26.2 years at time of marriage and females had a mean age of 22 years (see Table 4.2).

For the second group, Kuwaiti husband/non-Kuwaiti wife, male mean age at marriage in 1974 was 35.8 years and female mean age was 23.8 years; in 1984 there were 227 cases in which male age was 30.8 years and female age was 22.8 years (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.1							
General Mean	Age	at	Marriage	for	Males	and	Female

Date	<u>N</u>	Male Mean Age at Marriage	Female Mean Age at Marriage
1974	317	28.2	22.2
1984	854	27.9	22.4

Table 4.2

Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti Husbands/Kuwaiti Wives

Date	<u>N</u>	Mean Age for Kuwaiti Husbands	Mean Age for Kuwaiti Wives
1974	176	25.4	20.2
1984	399	26.2	22.0

Table 4.3		
Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti Husband	ls/Non-Kuwaiti	Wives

Date	<u>N</u>	Mean Age for Kuwaiti Husbands	Mean Age for <u>Non-Kuwaiti Wives</u>
1974	71	35.8	23.8
1984	229	30.0	22.7

For the third group, non-Kuwaiti husband/Kuwaiti wife, the mean age at marriage in 1974 for males was 29.2 years and for females was 25.7 years; for the year 1984, male mean age at marriage was 27.5 years and female mean age at marriage was 22.6 years (see Table 4.4).

Table 4.4

Mean Age at	Marriage	for	Non-Kuwaiti	Husbands/Kuw	aiti	Wives
-------------	----------	-----	-------------	--------------	------	-------

Date	<u>N</u>	Mean Age for <u>Non-Kuwaiti Husbands</u>	Mean Age for Kuwaiti Wives
1974	70	29.2	25.7
1984	226	27.5	22.6

The first characteristic we notice from the sample is that men tend to marry women who are younger than they are. This is true for all three groups for both years and is typical for a patriarchal society like Kuwait.

Religion

Religious rules of Kuwait demand that the husband must be a Muslim for the marriage to be registered. Therefore, all males in recorded marriages were Muslim, with 994 (85.5%) listed as Sunni and 169 (14.5%) listed as Shia (see Table 4.5). Non-Muslim husband/Muslim wife marriages would not be reported and might have taken place in foreign countries. Females' religions are listed as 984 (84.6%) Sunni, 169 (14.5%) Shia, and 10 (0.9%) Christian.

It is disappointing that non-Muslim males are not included in the marriage statistics even though there are very few non-Muslim Kuwaitis. Non-Muslim, non-Kuwaitis register their marriages at their embassies, churches, or court.

Muslime	Males	<u>%</u>	Females	<u>%</u>
Sunnis Shias	994 169	85.5 14.5	984 169	84.6 14.5
Christians	0	0.0	10	0.9

 Table 4.5

 Religious Status for All the Population in the Sample

Nationality

The total population for which nationality is reported in the sample was 1163 married couples for the two years 1974 and 1984. Of the male population, 74.5% were Kuwaitis, 24% were non-Kuwaiti Arabs and 15% of whom were non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs. Females' nationalities for the two years included 75.1% Kuwaitis, 21.5% non-Kuwaiti Arabs, and 3.4% non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs (see Table 4.6).

We expect that numbers of non-Kuwaiti Arabs will be greater than those of non-Kuwaiti non-Arabs in the sample since that is the case in the general population.

	Kuwaitis	<u>%</u>	Non-Kuwaiti <u>Arabs</u>	<u>%</u>	Non-Kuwaiti <u>non-Arabs</u>	<u>%</u>
Males	867	74.5	279	24.0	17	1.5
Females	873	75.1	250	21.5	40	3.4
TOTAL	1740		529		57	

 Table 4.6

 Nationality Groups for Males and Females for All the Population Sample

Caste

Since the Bayssary caste is the majority in Kuwaiti society, it is expected that they will appear in greater numbers and proportions in the sample.

Males listed their castes primarily as Assail (185, 15.7%) or Bayssary (960, 81.9%), with 26 (2.2%) listing other castes. Females included 146 Assails (12.4%) and 971 Bayssarys (82.9%), with 54 (4.6%) listed as "other." For the two years, there were 331 Assail males and females and 1931 Bayssary males and females, with only 64 males and females listed as "other" (see Table 4.7).

Since it is easier for Assail males to marry females of other castes, there were more Bayssary and "other" females than males listed in registered marriages. In addition, they are the majority in the society.

	Males	<u>%</u>	Females	<u>%</u>
Assail	185	15.7	146	12.4
Bayssary	960	81.9	971	82.9
Others	26	2.2	54	4.6

lable	4./			
Caste	Status	for	the	Sample

- . . . -

Education

Educational background for males showed the following: illiterate 10.7%, literate (knowing how to read and write) 3.7%, having elementary education 17%, intermediate (finishing junior high school) 27.2%, finishing high school 26.1%, having two-year diplomas beyond high school (business, technological, or teacher institutes, etc.) 4.4%, holding university degrees 9.5%, holding Master's degrees 0.3%, and holding a doctoral degree 0.1%. Eleven (0.9%) did not state their educational levels.

Educational background for females followed this pattern: illiterate 17.6%, literate (knowing how to read and write) 2.2%, having elementary education 16%, finishing junior high school 32.4%, finishing high school 20.6%, having a two-year diploma after high school 2.1%, holding a university degree 6.5%, and holding a Master's degree 0.1%. Seventeen (1.5%) did not state their educational levels.

There are more illiterate females (17.6%) than males (10.7%). But more females (32.4%) than males (27.6%) had completed junior high school.

College-degree holders increased slightly in number from 1974 to 1984. In 1974, 7.1% of the husbands in recorded marriages had college degrees, while in 1984, 11.1% did (see Table 4.8).

Table 4.8

Educational Status for the Sample

	Males	<u>%</u>	Females	<u>%</u>	
Illiterate	124	10.7	205	17.6	
Literate (reads and writes)	43	3.7	26	2.2	
Elementary	198	17.0	197	16.0	
Intermediate (junior high school)	316	27.2	377	32.4	
Secondary (high school)	304	26.1	239	20.6	
Two-year diploma	51	4.4	25	2.1	
University degree	111	9.5	76	6.5	
Masters' degree	4	0.3	1	0.1	
Ph.D. degree	1	0.1	0	0.0	
Not stated	11	0.9	17	1.5	

Occupations

This variable is important for indicating the socioeconomic status for both husbands and wives. Occupations for females have been divided into five groups: (a) high status jobs, (b) middle status jobs, (c) low status jobs, (d) students, and (e) homemakers or housewives. Within this classification, there are two kinds of job: labor market jobs (high status, middle status, low status) and non-labor market jobs (students and housewives). For the total sample of 1163 (one case is missing), 938 females were out of the labor market, 342 (29.4%) as students and 596 (51.2%) as housewives. Fourteen (1.2%) hold high status jobs, 193 (16.6%) hold middle status jobs, and 17 (1.5%) have low status jobs. Therefore, the majority of women who are in the labor market have middle status jobs.

For males, the categories are the same, but the category of <u>homemaker</u> is eliminated. For the total sample of 1163, 41 cases (3.5%) are missing. Seventyone men (6.1%) hold high status jobs, 813 (69.9%) hold middle status jobs, 156 (13.4%) hold low status jobs, and 82 (7.1%) are students.

For 1974, statistics show the following jobs for the 294 people studied. For females, two (0.7%) held high status jobs, 29 (9.9%) held middle status jobs, seven (2.4%) held low status jobs, six (2%) were students, and 250 (85%) were homemakers. For males, 17 (5.8%) held high status jobs, 166 (56.5%) held middle status jobs, 100 (34%) held low status jobs, and 11 (3.7%) were students (see Table 4.9).

In 1984, the total jobs reported numbered 827. Twelve females (1.5%) held high status jobs, 160 (19.3%) middle status jobs, and six (0.7%) low status jobs, 332 (40.1%) were students and 317 (38.3%) were housewives. For males, 54 (6.5) held high status jobs, 646 (78.1%) held middle status jobs, 56 (6.8%) held low status jobs, and 71 (8.6%) were students (see Table 4.10).

Table 4.9						
Occupational	Status	for	the	Sample	in 1974	

	Males	<u>*</u>	Females	<u>%</u>	
High status	17	5.8	2	0.7	
Middle status	166	56.5	29	9.9	
Low status	100	34.0	7	2.4	
Student	11	3.7	6	2.0	
Homemaker	0	0.0	250	85.0	

Table 4.10 Occupational Status for the Sample in 1984

	Males	<u>%</u>	Females	<u>%</u>	
High status	54	6.5	12	1.5	
Middle status	646	78 . 1	160	19.3	
Low status	56	6 .8	6	0.7	
Student	71	8.6	332	40.1	
Homemaker	0	0.0	317	38.3	

The occupational status of the sample shows that there were more women in the labor force in 1984 than in 1974 as well as more students of both genders. In addition, there were more women in high status jobs in 1984 than in 1974, and the percentage of homemakers decreased from 1974 to 1984. All these facts are products of the social change and modernization going on in the country, with more women entering the labor market and more young people becoming students.

CHAPTER V

DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The relationship between intermarriage and several socio-cultural and demographic factors will be examined in this chapter. The analysis is based on two statistical methods: (a) an age variable, which will be tested with a t-test; and (b) the relationship between type of marriage (homogamous or heterogamous) and selected socio-cultural variables reflected in the hypotheses which will be tested with a chi-square test of significance.

Proposition One

The difference in mean age between spouses decreased between 1974 and 1984.

This proposition is based on the idea that the age gap between husbands and wives has grown smaller in Kuwait because more marriages are based on individual choice for men and more freedom for women to accept or reject the men who choose them. Even if a marriage is based on a premarital relationship, the partners will more likely be close in age now than they would have years ago, showing the reduced influence of family or parental decisions in their children's marriages. In addition, in the past men always married younger women and women always married older men; the spread of education, especially college education among women, has changed this statistic. Marriage is being delayed until education is completed, and the age gap between spouses is closing.

The data analysis shows that the difference in age between spouses decreased between 1974 and 1984. In 1974, the mean age difference for couples was 6.1 years. This difference had declined to 5.5 years by 1984, with a pooled

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variance estimate t-value of .12 and a one-tailed probability significance of .132. Since this figure is higher than the .05 alpha level of significance, we can accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in mean age difference for spouses between years 1974 and 1984 (see Table 5.1). It is, however, interesting to look for significant difference within each nationality group across years.

Table 5.1

T-test Results for Difference in Mean Age Differences of Spouses Between 1974 and 1984

Year	<u>N</u>	Difference	<u>T</u>	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	317	6.0	110	120
1984	854	5.5	-I . 1Z	.132

Kuwaiti Male/Kuwaiti Female Marriages

The null hypothesis that there was no change in age difference between Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti spouses between 1974 and 1984 is rejected at the .05 alpha level. A pooled variance estimate produced a <u>t</u> statistic of 1.66 with a one-tailed probability significance level of .045. The mean age difference between spouses in 1974 was 5.2 years (n = 176), and in 1984 (n = 399) 4.2 years. This represents a decline of one year in age difference between 1974 and 1984, which was statistically significant (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 T-test Results for Difference in Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti Marriages

Year	<u>N</u>	Mean Age Difference	<u> </u>	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	176	5.2		04.5
1984	399	4.2	1.00	.043

Kuwaiti Male/Non-Kuwaiti Female Marriages

The null hypothesis that there is no change in age difference between spouses between 1974 and 1984 is rejected at the .05 alpha level. A pooled variance estimate produced a statistic of 2.57 with a one-tailed probability significance level of .005. The mean age difference between spouses in 1974 was 12 years (n = 71) and in 1984 (n = 230) was 7.3 years. This represents a decline of 4.7 years in age difference between 1974 and 1984, a statistically significant difference (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 T-test Results for Difference in Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti/Non-Kuwaiti Marriages

Year	<u>N</u>	Mean Age Difference	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	71	12.0	2 57	00.5
1984	299	7.3	2.37	.005

Non-Kuwaiti Male/Kuwaiti Female Marriages

The null hypothesis that there was no change in the age difference between non-Kuwaiti men married to Kuwaiti spouses between 1974 and 1984 is accepted at the .05 alpha level. A pooled variance estimate produced a statistic of .71 with a one-tailed probability significance level of .235. The mean age difference between spouses in 1974 (n = 70) was 3.5 years and in 1984 (n = 226) was 4.9 years. This represents an increase of 1.4 years in age difference between 1974 and 1984 which was not statistically significant (see Table 5.4).

Year	<u>N</u>	Mean Age Difference	<u>T</u>	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	70	3.5	71	225
1984	226	4.9	•/1	.233

Table 5.4										
T-test Results	for	Difference	in	Mean	Age	at	Marriage	for	Non-Kuwaiti/Kuw	aiti
Marriages										

There is a general tendency to close the gap in age between spouses as age difference in years decreased from 6.0 in 1974 to 5.5 in 1984, almost a one year difference. For Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti marriages the difference in age between spouses decreased one year between 1974 and 1984; this was a statistically significant decrease, probably brought about by the social changes of the 1980s.

For the second group, Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti marriages, the age gap between spouses also decreased significantly from 1974 to 1984. This might indicate that there are more marriages based on individual choice between Kuwaiti men and non-Kuwaiti women. For the third group, non-Kuwaiti male/Kuwaiti female, the difference between spouses' ages increased from 1974 to 1984, but that difference is not significant. This increase might be related to the fact that young Kuwaiti women in addition to older ones began to marry non-Kuwaiti husbands.

Proposition Two

The average age of marriage increased between 1974 and 1984.

This proposition is based on the assumption that the spread of education might play a great role in increasing the age at marriage for both genders. Because men are financially responsible for maintaining their households and supporting their wives, as well as for paying bride prices and wedding costs, they prefer to delay marriage until they finish school and establish themselves in their work. Women prefer to finish school before they marry because they can then feel more secure about their futures. Furthermore, since young people now have more choices about when, as well as who, to marry, we expect to see them marry at a later age than was the case when these decisions were made entirely by parents.

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For men in 1974, mean age at marriage was 28.2 years; in 1984, it was 27.9 years. This difference of .3 years was very slight. With a pooled variance estimated t value of -.57 and a one-tailed probability significance of .282, higher than the .05 alpha level, we accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the years 1974 and 1984 in mean age at marriage for males.

For women in 1974, the mean age at marriage was 22.2 years; in 1984, it was 22.4 years, an increase of .2 years. With a t value of .47 and a one-tailed probability significance of .319, higher than the .05 alpha level, this difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, we can accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the years 1974 and 1984 in mean age at marriage for women (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). These figures, however, are for all groups combined for each year. The figures for each group individually for each year are presented below.

Year	<u>N</u>	Male <u>Mean Age</u>	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>					
1974	317	28.2	57	5/5					
1984	854	27.9)/	•262					

T-test Results for Mean Age at Marriage for Husbands

Table 5.5

Year	<u>N</u>	Female Mean Age	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	317	22.2	47	(20)
1984	854	22.4	.4/	•637

Table 5.6							
T-test Results	for	Mean	Age	at	Marriage	for	Wives

Kuwaiti Male/Kuwaiti Female

For this group, Kuwaiti men who married Kuwaiti women, the average age at time of marriage for men in 1974 was 25.4 years, while in 1984 it was 26.2 years, with a pooled variance estimated t-value of -1.21 and a one-tailed probability of .083 (see Table 5.7). Since this is greater than .05, there is close to a significant difference between years in age at marriage for men. Although there is a slight numerical difference, we neither rejected nor accepted the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two years--1974 and 1984.

For Kuwaiti women in this category, on the other hand, the mean age at marriage was 20.2 years in 1974 and 22 years in 1984, a difference of nearly two years, with a pooled variance estimated t-value of -3.94 and a one-tailed probability of .000 (see Table 5.8), which is significant. Since there was a significant increase in female marriage age between the years 1974 and 1984, we reject the null hypothesis.

The fact that age at marriage increased significantly for women between 1974 and 1984, but did not for men, is noteworthy. It may be that social changes, such as increased access to education, affected women more than men.

Year	<u>N</u>	Male Mean Age	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	176	25.4		083
1984	399	26.2	-1,21	.085

Table 5.7 T-test Results for Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti Men Marrying Kuwaiti Women

Table 5.8

T-test Results for Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti Women Marrying Kuwaiti Men

Year	N	Female Mean Age	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	176	20.2	2.04	000
1984	399	22.0	-3.74	.000

Kuwaiti Male/non-Kuwaiti Female

In the case of Kuwaiti husbands/non-Kuwaiti wives, the situation is surprisingly different from that for Kuwaiti husbands/Kuwaiti wives. The men's average age at marriage had decreased from 35.8 years in 1974 to 30 years in 1984, almost four years' difference, with a one-tailed pooled variance estimated t-value of 2.39 with a probability .09 which is relatively higher than the .05 alpha level (see Table 5.9). Therefore, we find close to significant change in age of marriage for men between 1974 and 1984 leading us to neither reject nor accept the null hypothesis.

For non-Kuwaiti women marrying Kuwaiti men, the average age at marriage in 1974 was 23.8 years; in 1984 it was 22.7 years. This is a decrease of almost one year with a t-value of 1.02 and a one-tailed probability estimate of .155 which is higher than the .05 alpha level (see Table 5.10). Therefore, there is no significant decrease in the ages of non-Kuwaiti women marrying Kuwaiti men between 1974 and 1984.

Table 5.9

T-test Results for Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti Men Marrying Non-Kuwaiti Women

Year	<u>N</u>	Male Mean Age <u>at Marriage</u>	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	71	35.8	2.22	20
1984	229	30.0	2.39	.09
		·····		

Table 5.10

T-test Results for Mean Age at Marriage for Non-Kuwaiti Women Marrying Kuwaiti Men

Year	<u>N</u>	Female Mean Age at Marriage	Ţ	<u>Р (Т)</u>
1974	71	23.8	1.00	155
1984	229	22.7	1.02	•122

Non-Kuwaiti Male/Kuwaiti Female

The average age at marriage for men in this group has decreased from 29.2 years in 1974 to 27.5 years in 1984, with a t-value of 1.56 and a one-tailed probability of .06 (see Table 5.11). The decrease in age of marriage for men in this group between 1974 and 1984 was, thus, close to significance.

For Kuwaiti women marrying non-Kuwaiti men, age at marriage in 1974 was 25.7 years and in 1984 was 22.6 years. The t-value was 3.42 and the onetailed probability was .000, which indicates there was a significant decrease between 1974 and 1984 in age at marriage for these women, and we reject the null hypothesis that there weren't any differences between years (see Tables 5.11

and 5.12).

Table 5.11

T-test Results for Mean Age at Marriage for non-Kuwaiti Men Marrying Kuwaiti Women

Year	<u>N</u>	Male Mean Age	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	70	29.2	1.57	07
1984	226	27.5	1.26	•06

Table 5.12

T-test Results for Mean Age at Marriage for Kuwaiti Women Marrying Non-Kuwaiti Men

Year	<u>N</u>	Female Mean Age	Ţ	<u>P (T)</u>
1974	70	25.7	2 4 2	000
1984	226	22.6	3.42	.000

In summary, for Kuwaiti men who married Kuwaiti women, there was an increase in age at time of marriage from 25.4 years in 1974 to 26.2 in 1984, a close-to-statistically significant increase. For Kuwaiti women marrying Kuwaiti men, there was a statistically significant difference as age at time of marriage increased from 20.2 years in 1974 to 22 years in 1984. For Kuwaiti men marrying non-Kuwaiti women, the age decrease was from 35.8 in 1974 to 30 in 1984, a statistically significant decrease. For the third group, non-Kuwaiti husbands/Kuwaiti wives, the age at marriage decreased for husbands with a close-to-significant difference between 1974 (29.2 years) and 1984 (27.5 years).

For wives, the age at marriage decreased between 1974 and 1984 from 25.7 to 22.6 years, a significant difference.

In general, the researcher expected to see closer ages at marriage between husbands and wives for all three groups, with marriage age remaining between 25 and 30 years for men and 22 and 26 years for women.

Proposition Three

The proportion of cross-religion marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.

This proposition is based on the assumption that underdeveloped countries like Kuwait need more new technology from both West and East. This results in increasing contact with other countries which, in turn, increases the amount of political, economic, and cultural change within the country. One of the most important factors in cultural change and contact for Kuwait is that the government has sent many students abroad, especially to non-Arab countries such as Great Britain, France, the United States, and Russia, all of which have cultures and religions very different from those of Kuwait. When these people are sent abroad, they are, for the most part, single and of marriageable age, giving them a chance to integrate into the foreign cultures and meet different people. One would expect this increased contact to produce an increase in the rate of cross-religion marriages. Furthermore, increased numbers of immigrants from different countries, especially from non-Muslim countries, increased the non-Muslim population of Kuwait, which, again, gives more opportunity for Kuwaitis to interact with foreigners.

The data analysis produced a raw chi square of 3.60156 and a significance of .0577 (technically, .06) which is slightly higher than the .05 alpha level. The increase in marriage across religions between 1974 and 1984 is not very significant, but the null hypothesis could not be rejected. In 1974 there were no reported cross-religious marriages in the sample, while in 1984 there were 10 cases, representing 1.2% of the marriages in the 1984 sample (see Table 5.13) that can be classified and heterogamous, with regard to religion.

Year	In-Religion	Across-Religion
1974		
Number	309	0
Percentage	100	0
1984		
Number	844	10
Percentage	98.8	1.2
Raw chi square: 3.60155	DF = 1	Significance: .0577

 Table 5.13

 Comparison of Cross-Religion Marriages in 1974 and 1984

This researcher's explanation for the paucity of cross-religion marriages in 1984, even given the increased opportunity for Kuwaitis to meet people of other religions, is that Kuwaiti men who marry women of other religions always try to persuade their wives to convert to Islam and be registered as Muslims. Although Islam allows Muslim men to marry women from other Semetic religions, Muslim men may feel that registering their marriages as Muslim will facilitate their wives' incorporation into the man's family and the new society. The data used here would not show marriages between Muslim women and men of other Semetic religions (Christianity) because such marriages are not registered in Kuwait under Islamic law but may be registered in the husbands' countries.

Proposition Four

The proportion of across-sect marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.

This proposition is based on the assumption that, since the two sects, Shia and Sunni, have been living together in the same society under one religion, Islam, and experiencing increased social change and spread of education, we will see a greater number of cross-sect marriages in 1984 than existed in 1974.

In 1974, 11.1% of marriages were across sect; in 1984, this proportion was 7.9%, with a raw chi-square of 2.8814 and a significance of .0896. Since this is relatively higher than the .05 alpha level, we can say that there is not a highly statistically significant difference. Therefore, it is neither rejected nor accepted.

				_
	Year	In-Sect	Across-Sect	
	1974			
	Number	272	34	
	Percentage	88.9	11.1	
	1984			
	Number	780	67	
	Percentage	92.1	7.9	
Raw	chi square: 2.8814	DF = 1	Significance: .0896	

Table 5.14 Comparison of Cross-Sect Marriages in 1974 and 1984

It would be interesting, however, to follow this trend in the future, especially since it is in the opposite direction from what was predicted. Contact with other cultures and the spread of education in Kuwait has created some flexibility in regard to marriage, but neither cross-religion nor cross-sect marriages have increased as predicted. It may be that the Islamic revival and resurgency in the area have created a new pride not only in Islam, but in one's particular sect of Islam, leading young people to reject marriage with people of other religions as well as with people of other sects of Islam.

Proposition Five

College graduate males enter into more cross-sect marriages than do non-college graduate males.

This proposition is based on the assumption that the higher a person's educational level, the wider his/her network of relationships with others and the more flexible s/he is about accepting traditional patterns. Therefore, it is assumed that cross-sect marriages would be greater for college graduates than for non-college graduates.

From the total number of non-college individuals (1032), 946 (91.7%) married within the same sect, while 86 (8.3%) married within different sects. Of the total number of college graduates (110), 96 (87.5%) married from the same sect, and 14 (12.7%) married within different sects.

The statistical analysis gives a raw chi square of 2.40203 and a significance of .1212, which is higher than the .05 alpha level; thus, there is no significant relationship between an individual's education level and cross-sect marriages. That means that people with college degrees marry cross-sect at the same rate that those without college degrees do; therefore, the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between college graduates and non-college graduates in marrying across sect is accepted.

The proposition was based on the assumption that the higher a person's educational level, the wider his/her network of relationships with others, the more flexible s/he is about accepting traditional patterns. Therefore, it was assumed that cross-sect marriages would be greater for college graduates than for non-college graduates. The results, however, showed that there is no

Number 96 14	
Number9614Percentage87.312.7	
Percentage 87.3 12.7	

 Table 5.15

 Comparison of Same-Sect Marriages and Educational Status

significant relationship between college education and marriage across sects. It may be that the Islam resurgence mentioned earlier has suppressed the proportion of cross-sect marriages, even among educated people.

Proposition Six

College graduate males enter into more cross-religion marriages than were non-college graduate males.

This proposition is based on the fact that people college degrees have had wider ranges of relationships with different segments of society and with different cultures and religions than have those without college degrees. In particular, a person who attends college abroad should be more likely to marry outside his/her religion than one who has not obtained such a foreign-based college degree. Furthermore, people with college degrees are expected to be more flexible toward traditional patterns of living, allowing them chances to marry those from other religions.

Muslim females were not included in this proposition since Islamic law forbids them to marry outside their religion. With a raw chi square of 27.77 and a significance of .000, we can say that there is a significant relationship between educational level and marrying across religion, since the significance was less than the .05 alpha level. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis that a college graduate is more likely to marry across religions than a non-college graduate cannot be rejected, although the number is too small to be significant (four cases or .04% reported marrying out of their religion from the total 1032). However, of 110 college graduates, six cases or 5.2% married out of their religion. The null hypothesis is rejected, and the alternate hypothesis that college graduates are more likely to marry across religions is accepted.

Group	Same-Religio	on Different-Religion
Non-college graduates		
Number	1032	4
Percentage	99.6	.04
College graduates		
Number	110	6
Percentage	94.8	5.2
Raw chi square: 27.77195	DF = 1	Significance: .000

 Table 5.16

 Comparison of Same-Religion Marriages and Educational Status

Proposition Seven

Males with high status jobs enter into more cross-religion marriage than do males in lower status jobs.

This proposition is similar to the previous proposition, since, as educational level increases, occupational status increase. Higher status occupations generally lead to more contact with people from different cultures and religions. This, in turn, may permit more flexibility about marrying someone of another religion.

It is interesting to note that all cross-religion marriages in this sample involved men with high or middle status jobs. Of the 71 men with high status jobs, four (5.6%) married from other religions; of the 1051 men holding lowerranking jobs, only five (0.5%) married women of other religions. With a raw chi square of 23.11283 and a significance of .000, less than the .05 alpha level, there is a significant relationship between occupational rank and marrying people of other religions. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between occupational rank and marrying people of other religions.

Table 5.17

Comparison of	EReligion	Marriages	and	Occupational	Status
---------------	-----------	-----------	-----	--------------	--------

Group	Same-Religi	on Different-Religion
High status job-holders		
Number	67	4
Percentage	94.4	5.6
Other job-holders		
Number	1046	5
Percentage	99.5	.5
Raw chi square: 22.23770	DF = 1	Significance: .000

Proposition Eight

Males in high status jobs enter into more cross-sect marriages than do males in lower status jobs.

This proposition is similar to Proposition Five in that a person with a high status occupation is also likely to have higher education and, for both reasons,

will have a wide circle of relationships, including people from different sects. Such a person is also more like to be flexible about adhering to social traditions.

From the total sample reporting religious sect information (1113), 95 men (8.5%) married women of different sects. Nine of the 95 men had high status jobs, and 86 had other kinds of jobs. Of the men in same-sect marriages, 58 held high status jobs, and 960 held jobs belonging to lower status.

With a raw chi square of 2.19018 and a significance of .1389 which is higher than the .05 alpha level, there is no significant relationship between holding a high status job and marrying across sect. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between higher status jobs and marrying across sect.

Table 5.18

Group	Same-Sect	Different-Sect	
High status job-holders			
Number	58	9	
Percentage	86.6	13.4	
Other job-holders			
Number	960	86	
Percentage	91.8	8.2	
Raw chi square: 2.19018	DF = 1	Significance: .1389	

Comparison of Same-Sect Marriages and Occupational Status

Proposition Nine

The proportion of Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.

This proposition is based on the indications of rapid social change taking place in Kuwaiti society leading Kuwaitis to have the opportunity to interact
with a wide range people from cultures and societies, not just from other Arab countries. This contact has increased because of the country's political, economic, and cultural needs and leads Kuwaitis to be more flexible about marrying people from other countries. In addition, there are more Kuwaiti students being sent to non-Arab countries such as Britain, the United States, France, the Soviet Union; therefore, we expect to see more marriages between Kuwaitis and those of non-Arab nationalities.

In the 1974 sample, there were 140 marriages between Kuwaiti husbands/non-Kuwaiti wives and non-Kuwaiti husbands/Kuwaiti wives. Of these, 126 (90%) were from other Arab countries and the other 15 (11%) were with non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs. In the 1984 sample, there were 456 marriages for the two groups combined (Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti/Kuwaiti). Of these, 409 (89.7%) were with non-Kuwaitis from other Arab countries and 47 (10.3%) were with non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs. With a raw chi square of .78763 and a significance of .3748, which is higher than the .05 alpha level, we accept the null hypothesis which states that the proportion of Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab marriages did not change between 1974 and 1984.

<u>Year</u>	Kuwaitis Married [.] Non-Kuwaiti/Ar <u>Spouses</u>	to Kuwaitis Married to rab Non-Kuwaiti/Non-Arab <u>Spouses</u>
1974		
Number	126	14
Percentage	90	10
1984		
Number	409	47
Percentage	89.7	10.3
Raw chi square: .78763	DF = 1 5	Significance: .3748

Table 5.19

Comparison of Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti Arab and Non-Arab Marriages, 1974 and 1984

Although our results showed that there was a slight increase of Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti, non-arab marriages, from 10% in 1974 to 10.3% in 1984, there was no significant difference between the years in marriages between non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs. One explanation is that there might be more marriages, but people who marry in a foreign country don't reconfirm their registrations in Kuwaiti marriage offices.

Proposition Ten

Male college graduates are more likely to marry across nationalities than were non-college graduates.

This proposition is based on the assumption that college graduates have a wider network of relationships than do non-college graduates. Therefore, they are exposed to more cultural contact with different nationalities, away from their families and tribal patterns.

As mentioned earlier, there were 1045 male non-college graduates in the sample; 510 (48.8%) married people of the same nationality and 535 (51.1%) married people of different nationalities. College graduates numbered 126; 66 (52.3%) married people of the same nationality and 60 (47.6%) married people of different nationalities. With a raw chi square of 3.04222 and a significance of .0811, this difference is not significant at the .05 alpha level. Therefore, the null hypothesis was neither rejected nor accepted.

The results show that there was a nearly significant relationship between having a college degree and marrying across nationalities, but not in the direction expected. Since the significant value is only slightly higher than the .05 alpha level, we can be flexible in rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference. For a society like Kuwait, it was expected to see illiterate or non-educated non-Kuwaiti women marry Kuwaiti men for many socioeconomic reasons, due to the high costs of marrying Kuwaiti wives. Also,

Group	Same-Nationa	ality Different-Nationality
Non-college graduates		
Number	510	535
Percentage	48.8	51.1
College graduates		
Number	66	60
Percentage	52.3	47.6
Raw chi square: 3.04222	DF = 1	Significance: .0811

 Table 5.20

 Comparison of Same-Nationality Marriages and Educational Status

sometimes it is easier to have a non-Kuwaiti than a Kuwaiti as a second wife, which is hard for Kuwaitis to accept.

Proposition Eleven

College educated males are more likely to marry non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs than are non-college educated males.

The proposition was based on the general assumption that college graduates who had contact with different cultures, particularly those who held college degrees from non-Arab countries and would be integrated into the societies in which they lived. The total number of people in the sample who married non-Kuwaitis was 585 males and females (three missing cases), 57 of whom married non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs and 528 of whom married spouses from other Arab countries. Of the total, 535 were non-college graduates and 50 held college degrees. Of non-college students who married non-Kuwaitis, 45 (8.4%) married non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs and 490 (91.6%) married non-Kuwaiti Arabs. Of the 50 with college degrees, 38 (76%) married non-Kuwaiti Arabs and 12 (24%) married non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs. With a raw chi square of 12.63559 and a significance of .0004, less than the .05 alpha level, there was a significant relationship between college education and marrying a non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab for both males and females.

The results of the study show that there is a significant relationship between level of education and likelihood of marrying non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs for both Kuwaiti husbands who married non-Kuwaiti wives and non-Kuwaiti husbands who married Kuwaiti wives. While 8.4% of the non-college graduates married non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs, 24% of the college graduates married non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs.

Table 5.21

Comparison of Kuwaitis Marrying Non-Kuwaiti Arabs and Non-Arab Spouses for Both Years and Genders

Group	Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti Ara	ab K./non-K. non-Arab
Noncollege gradu	lat es	
Number	490	45
Percentage	91.6	8.4
College graduates		
Number	38	12
Percentage	76	24
Raw chi square: 12.6355	9 DF = 1 Sig	gnificance: .0004

Proposition Twelve

The proportion of cross-caste marriages increased between 1974 and 1984.

This proposition is based on the fact that Kuwaiti society is in transition from traditional to modern. During this change, it is expected that traditionally important social characteristics will disappear or be gradually minimized. Although the caste division between Assail and Bayssary groups still exists, emphasizing tribal ethnocentrism and prejudice, this division is being minimized by the spread of education, urbanization, and cultural contact. This should lead to increased interaction with and intermarriage between tribes.

With a raw chi square of 3.84537 and a significance of .0499, which is technically equal to the .05 alpha level, there is a significant relationship between year and intra-caste marriages. In 1974 there were 24 cases (7.8%) of out-of-caste marriages, while in 1984 there were 102 cases (11.9%) of cross-caste marriages. Although the significance is close to the .05 alpha level, which might indicate a slow tendency toward marrying across-caste between the years 1974 and 1984, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in marrying across caste between the years 1974 and 1984.

Year	Same-Caste	Different-Caste
1974		
Number	282	24
Percentage	92.2	7.8
1984		
Number	755	102
Percentage	88.1	11.9
Raw chi square: 3.81537	DF = 1	Significance: .0499

Table 5	.22
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C	Compa	rison of	Cross-Caste	e Marriages	in	197	4 and	1984
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Proposition Thirteen

College graduate males are more likely to enter into acrosscaste marriages than non-college graduate males.

The proposition was based on the assumption that college graduate males have fewer family and tribal pressures than non-college graduate males. Also, the discrimination between Assail and Bayssary marriages was expected to lessen with the influence of modernization and urbanization.

With a raw chi square is 5.26203 and a significance of .0218, which is lower than the .05 alpha level, there is a significant relationship between educational level and marrying out of caste. There were 1036 non-college graduate cases in the sample; 930 (89.8%) of these marriages were between people of the same caste, and 106 (10.2%) were between people of different castes. Of the 96 college graduates, 82.8% married people of the same caste and 20 (17.2%) married people of different castes. The null hypothesis that there was no relationship between education and likelihood of marrying across caste was rejected, and the alternate hypothesis was accepted.

Table 5.23

Education	Same-Caste	Different-Caste
Non-College		
Number	930	106
Percentage	89.8	10.2
College		
Number	96	20
Percentage	82.8	17.2
Raw chi square: 5.26203	DF = l	Significance: .0218

Proposition Fourteen

Men with high status jobs are more likely to marry cross caste than those with lower status jobs.

This proposition is based on the assumption that men with high status jobs have not only social independence but also economic independence from family or tribal ties. With their wide networks of relationships, they are more exposed women from other castes than men with lower status jobs. Therefore, we would expect them to be more likely to marry such women.

In the total 1974 and 1984 sample, 71 men (6.3%) had high status jobs at the time of their marriages. Of these, 57 (80.3%) married within their castes and 14 (19.7%) married across-caste. Of the men who lower status jobs (1051 cases), 105 (10%) married across caste and 946 (90.6%) married within their castes.

With a raw chi square of 6.63800 and a significance of .0100, less than the .05 alpha level, we reject the null hypothesis that there is not a significant relationship between holding a high status jobs and marrying across-castes.

Table 5.24

Comparison of	Cross-Caste	Marriages and	Level	of Job	Held
---------------	-------------	---------------	-------	--------	------

Level of Job Held	Same-Caste	Different-Caste
High status		
Number	57	14
Percentage	80.3	19.7
Other statuses		
Number	946	105
Percentage	90.0	10.0
Raw chi square: 6.63800	DF = 1	Significance: .0100

Proposition Fifteen

There were more marriages between people of similar educational levels in 1984 than in 1974.

This proposition is based on the assumption that, with social change taking place in Kuwait, more people, especially women, are going to school and college in the 1980s than in the past. Furthermore, marriages are increasingly based on individuals choice without familial or tribal pressure. It is expected that we will see more marriages among people who have the same educational backgrounds.

For all groups combined in 1974 (287 reported cases), there were 84 illiterate women (29.3% of the total). Thirty-seven (44%) of these women married men who were also illiterate, six (7.1%) married literate men (those who could read and write but did not have formal education), 24 (28.6%) married men with elementary educations, 13 (15.5%) married men who had intermediate (junior high school) educations, two (2.4%) married men who had high school degrees (secondary education), and two (2.4%) married men who had two-year post-secondary diplomas (equivalent to associates' degrees). No illiterate women married men with university degrees. Thus, nearly half of the illiterate women married illiterate men.

Of the two literate, not formally educated women in the study (.7% of the total), one married a literate man, and the other married a man who had an elementary educations. Thus, both married men from almost the same level as they were.

Forty-six women in the study (16.2%) had elementary educations. Three of them (6.4%) married illiterate men, four (8.7%) married literate men, 12 (26.1%) married men with the same level of elementary education that they had, 16 (34.8%) married men with intermediate educations, five (10.9%) married men with secondary school degrees, five (10.9%) married men with two-year college degrees, and one married a man with a university degree.

Of the 287 women in the study, 74 (32.8%) had intermediate (junior high) educations. Of these, six (6.4%) married illiterate men, one (1.1%) married a literate man, 17 (18.1%) married men with elementary educations, 32 (34%) married men with intermediate educations, 25 (26.6%) married men with secondary school degrees, seven (7.4%) married men with two year diplomas, and six (6.4%) married men with university degrees.

Of the 39 women in the study with secondary school degrees (13.6% of the total), one (2.6%) married an illiterate man, one (2.6%) married a literate man, three (7.7%) married men with elementary educations, two (5.1%) married men with intermediate educations, 20 (51.3%) married men with secondary school degrees, eight (20.5%) married men with two year diplomas, and four (10.3%) married men with college degrees.

Fourteen of the women in the study (4.9%) held two year diplomas. None of these women married men who had less than elementary educations, two (14.3%) married men with elementary educations, three (21.4%) married men with intermediate educations, four (28.6%) married men with high school educations, two (14.3%) married men with two year diplomas, and three (21.4%) married men with college or university degrees.

Only eight women in the study (2.8%) had university degrees. One of them (12.%) married a man with an intermediate education, one (12.5%) married a man with a high school degree, and six (75%) married men with university degrees (see Table 5.25).

With a raw chi square of 212.83996, significance of .0000, and a Cramer's \underline{v} of .35157, there was a significance in marrying at the same educational level in 1974. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significance in

Table 5.25

1974 Sample Population

	_	FEMALE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL				•		
MALE EDUCATIONA	<u>A</u>	B	<u>c</u>	D	E	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	TOTAL
Illiterate	37	0	3	6	1	0	0	47
	44.0	0.0	6.5	6.4	2.6	0.0	0.0	16.4
Literate	6	1	4	1	1	0	0	13
	7.1	50.0	8.7	1.1	2.6	0.0	0.0	4.5
Elementary	24	1	12	17	3	2	0	59
education	28.6	50.0	26.1	18.1	7.7	14.3	0.0	20.6
Intermediate	13	0	16	32	2	3	1	67
education	15.5	0.0	34.8	34.0	5.1	21.4	12.5	23.3
Secondary	2	0	5	25	20	4	1	57
education	2.4	0.0	10.9	26.6	51.3	28.6	12.5	19.9
Diploma after	2	0	5	7	8	2	0	24
high school	2.4	0.0	10.9	7.4	20.5	14.3	0.0	8.4
University	0	0	1	6	4	3	6	28
degree	0.0	0.0	2.2	6.4	10.3	21.4	75.0	7.0
Master's degree	0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0.0	0 0.0
Doctoral degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COLUMN TOTALS:	84	2	46	94	39	14	8	287
	29.3	0.7	16.0	32.8	13.6	4.9	2.8	100.0

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square = 212.83994 df = 36 significance = .0000 Cramer's v = .35157 marrying from the same level of education for spouses in 1974. (Note that it was expected that the raw chi square value in the analysis would be high since we have many cell frequencies falling below five for a number of cells.)

By 1984, the educational situation had changed since there were more educational opportunities for both men and women by that time. There were 857 cases in the sample.

Illiterate women numbered 120 (14% of the total), of whom 44 (36.7%) married illiterate men, 14 (11.7%) married literate men, 23 (19.2%) married men with elementary educations, 29 (24.2%) married men with intermediate educations, six (5.0%) married men with high school education, and four married men who were university graduates.

There were 24 literate women in the sample (2.8%). One (4.2%) of them married an illiterate man, two (8.3%) married literate men, 10 (41.7%) married men with elementary educations, seven (8.3%) married men with intermediate level educations, two (8.3%) married men with high school degrees, one (4.2%) married a man with a two year diploma, and one (4.2%) married a man with a university degree.

There were 151 women in the study who had elementary educations (17.6% of the total). Of these, 18 (11.9%) married illiterate men, seven (4.6%) married literates, 45 (29.8%) married men with elementary educations, 45 (2918%) married men with intermediate educations, 29 (19.2%) married men with high school educations, three (2.0%) married men with two year diplomas, and four (2.6%) married men who had university degrees.

The number of women in the study with intermediate educations was 283 (33%). Of these, 13 (4.6%) married illiterate men, six (2.1%) married literate men, 41 (14.5%) married men with elementary educations, 111 (39.2%) married men with the same educational level, 90 (31.8%) married men with high school

degrees, eight (2.8%) married men with two year diplomas, 13 (4.6%) married men with university degrees, and one married a man who had a Master's degree.

Of the women in the study with secondary school educations (199 or 23.2%), none married illiterate or literate men, 16 (8.0%) married men with elementary educations, 46 (23.7%) married men with intermediate educations, 93 (46.7%) married men with high school educations, eight (4.0%) married men with twoyear diplomas, and 36 (18.1%) married men with higher educational levels or university degrees.

Eleven women (1.3% of the total) had two year diplomas. None of them married men who were illiterate, literate, or had elementary educations. One (9.1%) married a man with an intermediate education, six (54.5%) married men with high school educations, three (27.3%) married men with the two-year diplomas, and one (9.1%) married a man with a university degree.

The number of women holding university degrees in the 1984 sample was 68 (7.9% of the total sample population). One of these women (1.5%) married an illiterate man, none married literate men, three (4.4%) married men with elementary educations, seven (10.3%) married men with intermediate educations, 20 (29.4%) married men with high school educations, two (2.9%) married men with two-year diplomas, and 31 (45.6%) married men with university degrees. Three of the women (4.4%) married men with Master's degrees, and one (1.5%) married a man with a doctoral degree.

There is one case in this sample of a woman with a Master's degree who married a man with a high school education (see Table 5.26).

With a raw chi square of 478.40624 and a significance of 0.0, there was a greatly significant relationship in 1984 in marrying from the same level of education. The Cramer \underline{v} was .29240. In addition, the degree of association, as indicated by Cramer's \underline{v} , declined from .35157 in 1974 to .28240 in 1984, indicating

Table5.261984Sample Population

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	_	FEM/	ALE ED	UCAT	IONAL	LEVEL	•	
MALE EDUCATIONA LEVEL	L <u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>c</u>	D	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	TOTAL
Illiterate	44	1	18	13	0	0	1	77
Literate	14	2	7	6	0	0	0	29
	11.7	8.3	4.6	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4
Elementary	23	10	45	41	16	0	3	138
education	19.2	41.7	29.8	14.5	8.0	0.0	4.4	16.1
Intermediate	29	7	45	111	46	1	7	246
education	24.2	29.2	29 . 8	39.2	23.1	9.1	10.3	28.7
Secondary	6	2	29	90	93	6	20	247*
education	5.0	8.3	19.2	31.8	46.7	54.5	29.4	28.8
Diploma after high school	0 0.0	*in 1 4.2	cludes 3 2.0	one M 8 2.8	aster' 8 4.0	s hold 3 27.3	er at 2 2.9	100% 25 2.9
University	4	1	4	13	36	1	31	90
degree	3.3	4.2	2.6	4.6	18.1	9.1	45.6	10.5
Master's degree	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	4
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	4.4	0.5
Doctoral degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.1
COLUMN TOTALS:	120	24	151	283	199	11	68	857 *
	14.0	2.8	17.6	33.0	23.2	1.3	7.9	100.0
			CT UTES	one r	aster	2 11010	CT.	

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square = 478.40624 df = 56 significance = 0 Cramer's v = .28240 less likelihood for a person to marry someone of the same educational level. This might be because there are more marriages between spouses who have different levels of education, and it might be as assumed earlier that marriages based on pre-marital relationships or love relationships were higher in 1974 than in 1984, meaning that people tended to marry others from the same educational level more frequently in 1974 than in 1984.

In summary, there was a significant relationship in both 1974 and 1984 in marrying from the same level of education. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there was no significant relationship in marrying from the same educational level for both years for the total population of the sample combined. It remains to examine each group individually in terms of educational levels.

Kuwaiti Male/Kuwaiti Female Marriages

for the 1974 sample, 160 cases reported educational level. Of the 160 women, 46 (28.8%) were illiterate. Of these illiterate women, 17 (37%) married illiterate men, three (6.5%) married literate men, 16 (34.8%) married men with elementary educations, seven (15.2%) married men with intermediate level educations, two (4.3%) married men with high school educations, one (2.2%) married a man with a two-year diploma, and none married men with university degrees.

There was one literate woman in the sample, and she married a man with an elementary education.

There were 16 women with elementary educations in the sample. One (6.3%) married an illiterate man, two (12.5%) married literate men, three (18.8%) married men with elementary educations, seven (43.8%) married men with intermediate educations, one (6.3%) married a man with a high school education, and two (12.%) married men with two-year diplomas.

Of the 160 cases, 59 (36.9%) of the women had intermediate educations. Of these, one (1.7%) married an illiterate man, one (1.7%) married a literate man, nine (15.3%) married men with elementary educations, 29 (49.2%) married men with intermediate educations, 14 (23.7%) married men with high school degrees, and five (8.5%) married men with two-year diplomas.

Of the 30 (18.8%) women with high educations, one (3.3%) married a man with an elementary education, two (6.7%) married men with intermediate level educations, 17 (56.7%) married men with high schools educations, seven (23.3%) married men with two-year diplomas, and three (10%) married men with university degrees.

Of the six (3.7%) women who held two-year diplomas in the 1974 sample, one (16.7%) married a man with an intermediate level of education, two (33.3%) married men with high school educations, two (33.3%) married men with twoyear diplomas, and one (16.7%) married a man with a university degree.

Of the two women with university degrees in the study, both married men who held university degrees (see Table 5.27).

The results show a raw chi square of 171.58332 and a significance of .000, lower than the .05 alpha level. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that thee is no significant difference in marrying from the same educational level in 1974 for Kuwaiti husband/Kuwaiti wife marriages, with a Cramer <u>v</u> of .42277.

In the 1984 sample, 400 cases reported educational level; of these 400 women, 38 (9.5%) were illiterate. Fourteen of these women (36.8%) married men who were illiterate, seven (18.4%) married literate men, five (13.2%) married men with elementary educations, eight (21.1%) married men with intermediate educations, two (5.3%) married men with high school level educations, and two (5.3%) married men with university degrees.

Table 5.27

	_	FEMA	LEED	UCATI	ONAL	LEVEL	-	
MALE EDUCATIONA	L <u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>c</u>	D	E	<u>F</u>	G	TOTAL
Illiterate	17	0	1	1	0	0	0	19
	37.0	0.0	6.3	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.9
Literate	3 6.5	0 0.0	2 12.5	1 1.7	0 0.0	0.0	0 0.0	6 3.7
Elementary	16	1	3	9	1	0	0	30
education	34.8	100.0	18.8	15.3	3.3	0.0	0.0	18.8
Intermediate	7	0	7	29	2	1	0	46
education	15.2	0.0	43.8	49.2	6.7	16.7	0.0	28.8
Secondary	2	0	1	-4	17	2	0	36
education	4.3	0.0	6.3	23.7	56.7	33.3	0.0	22.5
Diploma after	1	0	2	5	7	2	0	17
high school	2.2	0.0	12.5	8.5	23.3	33.3	0.0	10.6
University	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	6
degree	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	16.7	100.0	3.7
Master's degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Doctoral degree	0 0.0	0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
COLUMN TOTALS:	46	1	16	59	30	6	2	160
	28.8	0.6	10.0	36.9	18.8	3.7	1.2	100.0

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square =171.58332 df = 36 significance = .0000 Cramer's v = .42277 Of the five (1.2%) literate women in the study, two married men with elementary educations, one married a man with an intermediate level education, and one married a man with a university degree.

Of the 63 women in the study (15.7% of the total) with elementary educations, four (6.3%) married illiterates, 18 (28.6%) married men with elementary educations, 26 (41.3%) married men with intermediate educations, 10 (15.9%) married men with high school educations, two (3.2%) married men with two-year diplomas, and three (4.8%) married men with university degrees.

Of the 130 women with intermediate educations in the 1984 sample, (32.4% of the total sample), one (0.8%) married an illiterate man, one (0.8%) married a literate man, 18 (13.8%) married men with elementary educations, 56 (43.1) married men intermediate educations, 42 (32.3%) married men with high school educations, four (3.1%) married men with two-year diplomas, seven (5.4%) married men who had university degrees, and one married a man with a Master's degree.

Of the 119 women in the study with high school educations, (29.7%), seven (5.9%) married men with elementary educations, 27 (22.7%) married men with intermediate educations, 54 (45.4%) married men with high school educations, six (5.0%) married men with two-year diplomas, and 25 (21%) married men with university degrees.

Four of the women (1.1%) held two-year diplomas. Of these, one married a man with an intermediate level of education, and three married men with high school educations.

Forty-two of the women (10.5%) held university degrees. One (2.4%) married a man with an elementary education, five (11.9%) married men with intermediate educations, 13 (31%) married men with high school educations, two (14.8%) married men with two-year diplomas, 18 (42.9%) married men with

university degrees, two (4.8%) married men with Master's degrees, and one (2.4%) married a man with a doctorate (see Table 5.28).

The results show a raw chi square of 281.80781 and a significance of 0.0, lower than the .05 alpha level. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that states there is no significant difference in 1984 for marrying at the same educational level. The Cramer \underline{v} was .34224, which is a decrease from the 1974 figure of .42277.

In summary, for Kuwaiti husband/Kuwaiti wife marriages, there was little change from 1974 to 1984; people tended to marry those from the same educational level. This may be due to the social changes sweeping the country in the early 1970s and the increase in premarital relationships and individual choices prevalent in the 1980s.

Kuwaiti Man/Non-Kuwaiti Woman Marriages

For the 1974 sample, 59 cases reported educational levels. In those 53 marriages, 23 of the women (39%) were illiterate. Of these, 10 (43.5) married illiterate men, three (13%) married literate men, five (21.7) married men with elementary educations, four (17.4%) married men with intermediate educations, and one (4.3%) married a man with a two-year diploma.

There was only one literate woman in the sample, and she married a man who was also literate.

Of the 14 women with elementary educations in the sample (23.7% of the total), one (7.1%) married an illiterate man, one (7.1%) married a literate man, three (21.4%) married men with elementary educations, six (42.9%) married men with intermediate educations, one (7.1%) married a man with a high school degree, and two (14.3%) married men with two-year diplomas.

	-	FEMA		UCATI	ONAL	LEVEL		
MALE EDUCATIONA	L <u>A</u>	B	<u>c</u>	D	E	<u>F</u>	G	TOTAL
Illiterate	14	0	4	1	0	0	0	19
	36.8	0.0	6.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.7
Literate	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	8
	18.4	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Elementary	5	2	18	18	7	0	1	51
education	13.2	40.0	28.6	13.8	5.9	0.0	2.4	12.7
Intermediate	8	1	26	56	27	1	5	124
education	21.1	20.0	41.3	43.1	22.7	25.0	11.9	30.9
Secondary	2	1	10	42	54	3	13	125
education	5.3	20.0	15.9	32.3	45.4	75.0	31.0	31.2
Diploma after	0	0	2	4	6	0	2	14
high school	5.3	20.0	4.8	5.4	21.0	0.0	42.9	14.0
University	2	1	3	7	25	0	18	56
degree	5.3	20.0	4.8	5.4	21.0	0.0	42.9	14.0
Master's degree	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	3
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.7
Doctoral degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.2
COLUMN TOTALS:	38	5	63	130	119	4	42	400
	9.5	1.2	15.7	32.4	29.7	1.0	10.5	100.0

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square = 281.80781 df = 48 significance = 0 Cramer's v = .34224

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Table5.28Kuwaiti Husbands/Kuwaiti Wives, 1984; Educational Level

There were 13 women with intermediate levels of education (22% of the total) in the sample. Two of these (15.4%) married illiterate men, four (30.8%) married men with elementary educations, one (7.7%) married a man who had an intermediate education, four (30.8%) married men with high school degrees, and two (15.4%) married men with college degrees.

Of the five (8.5%) women with high school educations, one (20%) married an illiterate man, two (40%) married men with elementary educations, one (20%) married a man with a high school education, and one (20%) married a man with a two-year diploma.

Three of the women in the sample held university degrees. One married a man with an intermediate education, one a man with a high school education, and one a man with university education (see Table 5.29).

With a raw chi square of 48.33556 and a significance of .0163, there was a significant relationship of marrying from the same educational in 1974. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in marrying from the same educational level. The Cramer <u>v</u> was .40687.

For the same group in 1984, the situation was somewhat different. Educational levels were reported for 230 cases. Of the 56 women (24.3%) who were illiterate in this group, 17 (30.4%) married illiterate men, four (7.1%) married literate men, 13 (23.2%) married men with elementary educations, 16 (28.6%) married men with intermediate educations, four (7.1%) married men with high school educations, and two (3.6%) married men with university degrees.

Of the 12 literate women, one married a literate man, five married men with elementary educations, five married men with intermediate educations, and one married a man with a high school education.

Thirty-three of the women (14.3% of the total sample) had elementary educations. Five (15.2%) of them married illiterate men, two (6.1%) married

Kuwaiti Husband/Non-Kuwaiti Wife Marriages, 1974: Educational Level

		FEMA	LE ED	UCATI	ONAL I	LEVEL		
MALE EDUCATIONAI	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>c</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	G	TOTAL
Illiterate	10	0	1	2	1	0	0	14
	43.5	0.0	7.1	15.4	20.0	0.0	0.0	23.7
Literate	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	5
	13.0	100.0	7.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5
Elementary	5	0	3	4	2	0	0	14
education	21 .7	0.0	21.4	30.8	40.0	0.0	0.0	23.7
Intermediate	4	0	6	1	0	0	1	12
education	17.4	0.0	42.9	7.7	0.0	0.0	33.3	20.3
Secondary	0	0	1	4	1	0	1	7
education	0.0	0.0	7.1	30.8	20.0	0.0	33.3	11.9
Diploma after	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	4
high school	4.3	0.0	14.3	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	6.8
University	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	3
degree	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.4	0.0	0.0	33.3	5.1
Master's degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	~ 0.0	0.0
Doctoral degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COLUMN TOTALS:	23	1	14	13	5	0	3	59
	39.0	1.7	23.7	22.0	8.5	0.0	5.1	100.0

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square = 48.83556 df = 30 significance = .0163 Cramer's v = .40687 literate men, nine (27.3%) married men with elementary educations, eight (24.2%) married men with intermediate educations, eight (24.2%) married men with high school degrees, and one (3.0%) married a man with a two-year diploma.

Of the 70 women with intermediate educations (30.4% of the total sample), four (5.7%) married illiterates, nine (12.9%) married men with elementary educations, 25 (35.7%) married men with the same level of education they had, 28 (40%) married men with two-year diplomas, and two married men with university degrees.

Of the 40 women with high school level educations, five (12.5%) married men with elementary educations, eight (20%) married men with intermediate educations, 19 (47.5) married men with high school educations, two (5.0%) married men with two-year diplomas, and six (15%) married men with university degrees.

Of the four women (1.7%) holding two-year diplomas, one married a man with a high school education and three married men with the two-year diplomas.

There were 14 women with university degrees in the sample (6.1%), of whom one married an illiterate, one married married a man with an intermediate education, four married men with high school educations, seven married men with university degrees, and one married a man with a Master's degree (see Table 5.30).

Kuwaiti husband/non-Kuwaiti wife marriages in 1984 had a raw chi square of 196.1747 and a significance of .000. Since this was less than the .05 alpha level, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in marrying from the same educational level. Cramer's \underline{v} value decreased from .40687 in 1974 to .34907 in 1984.

In summary, for both years we see that Kuwaiti men marrying non-Kuwaiti women prefer to marry from the same educational level. As previously

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		FEMA	LEED	UCATI	ONAL	LEVEL		
MALE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	<u>A</u>	B	<u>c</u>	D	E	<u>F</u>	G	TOTAL
Illiterate	17	0	5	4	0	0	1	27
	30.4	0.0	15.2	5.7	0.0	0.0	7.1	11.7
Literate	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	7
	7.1	8.3	6.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0
Elementary	13	5	9	9	5	0	0	41
education	23.2	41.7	27.3	12.9	12.5	0.0	0.0	17.8
Intermediate	16	5	8	25	8	0	1	63
education	28.6	41.7	24.2	35.7	20.0	0.0	7.1	27.4
Secondary,	4	1	8	28	19	1	4	66*
education	7.1	8.3	24.2	40.0	47.5	25.0	28.6	28.7
Diploma after high school	0 0.0	0 0.0	*inclu 1 3.0	des on 2 2.9	2 5.0	er's h 3 75.0	older, 0 0.0	8 3.5
University	2	0	0	2	6	0	7	17
degree	3.6	0.0	0.0	2.9	15.0	0.0	50.0	7.4
Master's degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.1	0.4
Doctoral degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COLUMN TOTALS:	56	12	33	70	40	4	14	230*
	24.3	5.2	14.3	30.4	17.4	1.7	6.1	100.0
				•	N		1	

Kuwaiti Husband/Non-Kuwaiti Wife Marriages, 1984: Educational Level

Table 5.30

*includes one Master's holder

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square =196.17470 df = 49 significance = .0000 Cramer's v = .34907 mentioned, this might be due to sweeping social changes in the country and marriages based on individual choices, helping us explain why the significance is higher in 1984 then in 1974.

Non-Kuwaiti Man/Kuwaiti Woman Marriages

In the 1974 sample, there were 68 cases in this group that reported educational level. Of the 68 women, 15 (22%) were illiterate. Ten of these women (66%) married illiterate men, three married men with elementary educations, and two married men with intermediate educations.

There were no literate women in this group in the 1974 sample.

Of the 16 women with elementary educations (23.6% of the sample), one married an illiterate, one married a literate man, six married men with elementary educations, three married men with intermediate educations, three married men with high school educations, two married men with two-year diplomas, and one married a man with a university degree.

There were 22 cases (32.6%) of women with intermediate levels of education. Three of these women married illiterate men, four married men with elementary educations, two married men with intermediate educations, seven married men with high school educations, two married men with two-year diplomas, and four married men with university degrees.

Four of the women (5.9%) had high school educations. One of these married an illiterate man, two married men with high school educations, and one married a man who had a university degree.

Eight of the women (II.8%) had two-year diplomas. Two married men with elementary educations, two married men with intermediate educations, two married men with high school educations, and two married men with university degrees. There were three women with university degrees in the sample, and all married men with the same level of education (see Table 5.31).

With a raw chi square of 61.63447 and a significance of .0006, lower than the .05 alpha level, we see there was a significant relationship of marrying from the same educational level in 1974, and we reject the null hypothesis. The Cramer v was .42577.

In the 1984 sample, there were 226 cases of non-Kuwaiti men/Kuwaiti women marriages. Of the 226 women, 26 (11.5) were illiterate. Thirteen (50%) of these women married illiterate men, three (11.5%) married literates, five married men with elementary educations, and five married men with intermediate educations.

Seven of the women were literate. One of these married an illiterate man, one married a literate man, three married men with elementary educations, one married a man with an intermediate education, and one married a man with a two-year diploma.

Fifty-five of the women (24.3%) had elementary educations. Nine of these (16.4%) married illiterates, five (9.1%) married literate men, 18 (32.7%) married men with elementary educations, 11 (20.6%) married men with intermediate educations, 11 (20.6%) married men with high school educations, and one married a man with a university education.

Of the 83 women with intermediate educations, (38.7%), eight married illiterate men, five (6.0%) married literate men, 14 (16.9%) married men with elementary educations, 30 (36.1%) married men with intermediate educations, 20 (24.1%) married men with high school degrees, two (2.4%) married men with twoyear diplomas, and four (4.8%) married men with university degrees.

Forty women (17.7%) held high school degrees. Of these, four (10%) married men with elementary educations, 11 (27.5) married men with

	-	FEMA	LEED	UCATI	ONAL	LEVEL		
MALE EDUCATIONA	Δ.	B	<u>c</u>	D	E	F	G	TOTAL
Illiterate	10 66.7	0 0.0	1 6.3	3 13.6	0 0.0	0.0	0 0.0	14 20.6
Literate	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2
	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.0	25.0	0.0	00	2.9
Elementary	3	0	6	4	0	2	0	15
education	20.0	0.0	37.5	18.2	0.0	25.0	0.0	22.1
Intermediate	2	0	3	2	0	2	0	9
education	13.3	0.0	18.8	9.1	0.0	25.0	0.0	13.2
Secondary	0	0.0	3	7	2	2	0	14
education	0.0		18.8	31.8	50.0	25.0	0.0	20.6
Diploma after	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3
high school	0.0	0.0	6.3	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.4
University	0	0	1	4	1	2	3	11
degree	0.0	0.0	6.3	18.2	25.0	25.0	100.0	16.2
Master's degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Doctoral degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COLUMN TOTALS:	15	0	16	22	4	8	3	68
	22.1	0.0	23.5	32.4	5.9	11.8	4.4	100.0

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square = 61.63447 df = 30 significance = .0006 Cramer's v = .42577

Table 5.31

Non-Kuwaiti Husband/Kuwaiti Wife Marriages, 1974: Educational Level

intermediate educations, 20 (50%) married men with high school degrees, and five (12.5%) married men with university degrees.

Three of the women (1.3%) held two-year diplomas. Two married men with high school educations, and one married a man with a university degree.

Finally, of the 12 women with university degrees, (5.3% of the study), two married men with elementary educations, one married a man with an intermediate education, three married men with high school degrees, and six (50%) married men with university degrees (see Table 5.32).

With a raw chi square of 127.08035 and a significance of .0000, which is less than the .05 alpha level, there was a significant relationship in marrying from the same educational level in 1984. The null hypothesis that there is no significant difference in marrying from the same educational level is rejected. The Cramer v was .30613, a decrease from .42577 for 1974.

In conclusion, we can see that non-Kuwaiti men had a tendency to marry Kuwaiti women from the same educational level as themselves in both 1974 and 1984. We can also say that Kuwaiti women who marry non-Kuwaiti men prefer husbands with the same educational level as themselves. It is noteworthy that the majority of these marriages are based on individual choice.

Summary

In summary, the analysis demonstrates that for all groups combined as well as for each group individually, there is a tendency to marry people with the same educational level. This is true for both sample years--1974 and 1984; there is no significant difference between the years.

There are a number of cases of men who married below or higher than their educational levels. For a Kuwaiti man to marry a woman higher educational level is unusual and violates the norm, indicating that some sacrifices have been

Table 5.32

	-	FEMA	LE ED	UCATI	IONAL	LEVEL	•	
MALE EDUCATIONA	<u>A</u>	B	<u>c</u>	D	E	F	G	TOTAL
Illiterate	13	1	9	8	0	0	0	31
	50.0	14.3	16.4	9.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.7
Literate	3	1	5	5	0	0	0	14
	11.5	14.3	9.1	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.2
Elementary	5	3	18	14	4	0	2	46
education	19.2	42.9	32.7	16.9	10.0	0.0	16.7	20.4
Intermediate	5	1	11	30	11	0	1	59
education	19.2	14.3	20.0	36.1	27.5	0.0	8.3	26.1
Secondary	0	0	11	20	20	2	3	56
education	0.0	0.0	20.0	24.1	50.0	66.7	25.0	24.8
Diploma after	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
high school	0.0	14.3	0.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
University	0	0	1	4	5	1	6	17
degree	0.0	0.0	1.8	4.8	12.5	33.3	50.0	7.5
Master's degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Doctoral degree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COLUMN TOTALS:	26	7	55	83	40	3	12	226
	11.5	3.1	24.3	36.7	17.7	1.3	5.3	100.0

Non-Kuwaiti Husband/Kuwaiti Wife Marriages, 1984: Educational Level

KEY: A = illiterate, B = literate, C = elementary education, D = intermediate education, E = secondary education, F = diploma after high school, G = university degree Chi-square = 127.08035 df = 36 significance = .0000 Cramer's v = .30613 made and that premarital relationships or love might have been involved in mate selection. One would expect to see a general pattern common to any patriarchal societies, of women having less education than their husbands. But in a society undergoing rapid social change such as Kuwait since the discovery of oil, marriage norms change. As results of this analysis show, in both 1974 and 1984, there is a tendency to marry someone of similar educational level.

Proposition Sixteen

There were more marriages between people of similar occupational level in 1984 than in 1974.

This proposition is based on the assumption that, since there are more women participating in the labor force in 1984 and since there is more individual choice exercised in selecting marriage partners, we will see more marriages between people with the same or similar occupational backgrounds or statuses in 1984 than we did in 1974.

In the 1974 sample, 294 of the cases reported occupations for both males and females. Of the men, 17 (5.8%) were categorized as having high status jobs, 166 (56.3%) were categorized as having middle status jobs, and 100 (34%) were considered to have low status jobs. The remainder of the cases (11 or 3.7%) were students.

Of those men holding high status jobs, four (23%) married women with middle status jobs, one (5.9%) married a woman with a low status job, and 12 (70.6%) married students. It should be noted that these students may someday have jobs of the same or similar statusus as their husbands' jobs.

Of those men holding middle status jobs, two (1.2%) married women with high status jobs, 18 (10.8%) married women with middle status jobs, and two (1.2%) married women with low status jobs. Four (2.4%) married students, and 140 (84.3%) married women who were housewives.

None of the men holding low status jobs married women with high status jobs. Five (5.0%) married women with middle status jobs, and five (5.0%) married women with low status jobs. One (1.0%) married a student, and 89 (89%) married housewives.

Of the ll men who were students, two (18.2%) married women with middle status jobs, possibly their own level in the future, and nine (81.8%) married housewives.

It is interesting that the lower the status of the husband's occupation, the higher the chances he will marry a housewife. Seventy percent of the those holding high status jobs, 84% of those with middle status jobs, and 89% of those with lower status jobs married housewives. Where the wife is a student, the situation is reversed: the higher status the man's job, the more likely he will marry a student. One percent of men with lower status jobs, 2.4% of men with middle status jobs, and 5.9% of those with higher status jobs married students. For men of all job categories, however, the preference is for wives to stay out of the labor force; the vast majority in all categories were housewives.

The analysis shows a raw chi square of 15.32435 and a significance of .2242, higher than the .05 alpha level. Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between a husband's job status and the job status of his wife in the 1974 sample (see Table 5.33).

In 1984 the situation was different. Of the total number of reported cases (827), 54 men (6.5%) had high status jobs. Of these, eight (14.8%) were married to women with high status jobs, 19 (35%) were married to women with middle status jobs, and 17 (31.5%) were married to women with lower status jobs. Ten (18.%) of these men were married to students.

TE MALE		MALE OC	CUPATIONS	
OCCUPATIONS	High Status	Middle Status	Low Status	<u>Student</u>
High status	0	2	0	0
	0.0	1.2	0.0	0.0
Middle status	4	18	5	2
	23.5	10.8	5.0	18.2
Low status	0	2	5	0
	0.0	12.0	5.0	0.0
Student	1	4	1	0
	5.9	2.4	5.9	0.0
Housewife	12	140	89	9
	70 . 0	84.0	89.0	81.6
TOTALS:	17	166	100	11
	100.0	100 . 0	100 . 0	100.0
Raw chi square = Cramer's <u>v</u> = .13	= 15.32435 181	df = 12	significance = .2	242

Table 5.33 Husband/Wife Occupational Status in 1974

Of the 646 men (78.1% of the total) holding middle status jobs, four (0.6%) married women holding high status jobs, 131 (20.3%) married women with the same job status, five (0.8%) married women with lower status jobs, 257 (39.8%) married students, and 249 (38.5%) married housewives.

Men with lower status jobs men represented 56 (6.8%) of the total. Of these, three (5.4%) married women with middle status jobs, one (1.8%) married a woman with a lower status job, 12 (21.4%) married students, and 40 (71.4%) married housewives.

Of the 71 (8.6%) students in the sample, seven (9.9%) married women who had middle status jobs, 46 (64.8%) married women with lower status jobs, and 18 (25.4%) married housewives.

With a raw chi square of 130.76094 and a significance of .000 which did not reach the .05 alpha level, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant relationship between job status of husband and wife in the 1984 sample. It is also obvious that there were more women in the labor force in 1984. Women with high status jobs married only men with high or middle status jobs, and a high percentage (31%) of men married women who were students (see Table 5.34).

PENALE		MALE O	CCUPATIONS	
OCCUPATIONS	High Status	Middle Status	Low Status	<u>Student</u>
High status	8	4	0	0
	14.8	3.6	0.0	0.0
Middle status	19	131	3	7
	35 . 2	20.3	5.4	9 . 9
Low status	0	5	l	0
	0.0	0 . 8	1.8	0.0
Student	17	257	12	46
	31.5	39 . 8	21.4	64.8
Housewife	10	249	40	18
	18.5	38.5	71.4	25.4
TOTALS:	54	646	56	71
	100 . 0	100 . 0	100.0	100.0
Raw chi square Cramer's <u>v</u> = .22	= 130.76094 1958	df = 12	significance = .00	0

Table 5.34 Husband/Wife Occupational Status in 1984

We will now look at each of the three nationality combinations.

Kuwaiti Husband/Kuwaiti Wife Marriages

For 1974, the total number of reported cases was 169. In this group, 91% of the women were housewives, while the majority of men held middle status (58.6%) or lower status (33.1%) jobs.

With a raw chi square of 9.14797 and a significance of .4237 which is higher than the .05 alpha level, we accept the null hypothesis that there was no significant relationship between husband and wife's occupational status in the 1974 sample (see Table 5.35).

	MALE OCCUPATIONS								
OCCUPATIONS	<u>High Status</u>	<u>Middle Status</u>	Low Status	Student					
High status	0	0	0	0					
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0					
Middle status	0	0	1	1					
	0.0	6.1	1.8	12.5					
Low status	0	0	1	0					
	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0					
Student	1	3	l	0					
	16.7	3.0	1.8	0.0					
Housewife	5	90	55	7					
	83.3	90 . 9	94.6	87.5					
TOTALS:	6	99	56	8					
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100 . 0					
Raw chi square Cramer's <u>v</u> = .13	= 9.14797 1433	df = 12	significance = .422	37					

Table 5.35 Kuwaiti Men/Kuwaiti Woman Marriages, 1974

In the 1984 sample, the total number of cases was 394, and a change is evident. There were more women in the labor market, and the housewife

percentage decreased to 28% of the women in the sample. Of the remainder, 24.1% held middle status jobs, and 45.7% held lower status jobs. Women with higher status jobs married men with high or middle status jobs only. In addition, 45% of the men with high status jobs married women with middle status jobs, and none of them married a woman holding a lower status job. Only 30% of the men with high status jobs married students who may in the future hold the same or higher level jobs than their husbands. Only 12.1% of the men with high status jobs married housewives. Thus, the lower the job status for Kuwaiti men, the greater the chances they will marry housewives (see Table 5.36).

Table 5.36

Kuwaiti Mer	/Kuwaiti	Woman	Marriages,	1984
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	MALE OCCUPATIONS			
OCCUPATIONS	<u>High Status</u>	Middle Status	Low Status	Student
High status	4	2	0	0
	1 2. 0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Middle status	15	75	0	5
	45.5	25.1	0.0	12.5
Low status	0	1	1	0
	0.0	0.3	4.5	0.0
Student	10	137	7	26
	30.3	4 <i>5</i> .8	31.8	65.0
Housewife	4	84	14	9
	12.1	28.1	63.6	22 . 5
TOTALS:	33	299	22	40
	100 . 0	7 5 . 9	5.6	10.2
Raw chi square Cramer's <u>v</u> = .23	= 67.42250 3883	df = 12	significance = .000	0

The results showed a raw chi square of 67.42250 and a significance of .000 which is not close to the .05 alpha level, meaning that there is a significant possibility of men marrying women with similar occupational status in 1984. Kuwaiti husband/Kuwaiti wife marriages in 1984 are more often between people from the same occupational status than those same marriages in 1974.

Kuwaiti Husband/Non-Kuwaiti Wife Marriages

In the 1974 sample, there were 58 cases in this category with occupations reported. The majority of the men in this group held middle status (62%) and lower status (24.3%) jobs. The women were largely out of the labor market (89% were housewives) or held middle status (5.2%) jobs.

With a raw chi square of 5.61520 and a significance of .9342, which is higher than the .05 alpha level, there was no significant tendency in this category for men to marry women with the same job status (see Table 5.37).

FFMALF	MALE OCCUPATIONS				
OCCUPATIONS	<u>High Status</u>	Middle Status	Low Status	<u>Student</u>	
High status	0	1	0	0	
	0.0	2.8	0.0	0.0	
Middle status	0	3	0	0	
	0.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	
Low status	0	0	1	0	
	0.0	0.0	5.9	0.0	
Student	0	l	0	0	
	0.0	2 .8	0.0	0.0	
Housewife	4	31	16	1	
	100 . 0	38 . 1	94.1	100.0	
TOTALS:	4	36	17	1	
	100 . 0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Raw chi square Cramer's <u>v</u> = .17	= 5.61520 964	df = 12	significance = .934	2	

Table 5.37			
Kuwaiti Men/Non-Kuwaiti	Woman	Marriages,	1974

In the 1984 sample, the occupational distribution for married couples changed. There were more women classified as students in 1984 than in 1974. Students were 27.1% of the women, and housewives were 60.5%. Men were concentrated in middle status jobs (84.8%) (see Table 5.38).

With a raw chi square of 13.24541 and a significance of .3515 which is higher than the .05 alpha level, we accept the null hypothesis that there was no significant tendency for men in the group to marry women of the same job status.

	MALE OCCUPATIONS				
OCCUPATIONS	<u>High Status</u>	Middle Status	Low Status	Student	
High status	0	2	0	0	
	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	
Middle status	2	21	0	0	
	18.2	11 .8	0.0	0.0	
Low status	0	1	0	0	
	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	
Student	3	45	2	7	
	27.3	25.3	18.2	70.0	
Housewife	6	109	9	3	
	45.5	61.2	81.8	30.0	
TOTALS:	11	178	11	10	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Raw chi square = Cramer's <u>v</u> = .145	= 13.24541 500	df = 12	significance = .3515		

Table 5.38 Kuwaiti Men/Non-Kuwaiti Woman Marriages, 1984
Non-Kuwaiti Husbands/Kuwaiti Wives

In the 1974 sample, there were 67 cases with occupational status reported for this category. Seven of the men (10.4%) had high status jobs, and four of these were married to women with middle status jobs. The other three were married to housewives.

Thirty-one (45.3%) of the men held middle status jobs. Of these, one (3.2%) was married to a woman with a high status job, nine (29%) were married to women with middle status jobs, two (6.5%) were married women with lower status jobs, and 19 (61.3%) were married to housewives.

Twenty-seven (40.3%) of the men had low status jobs. Four of these (14.8%) married women with middle status jobs, three (11.1%) married women with middle status jobs, and 20 (74.1%) married housewives.

Two of the men were students (3.0%), one of whom was married to a woman with a middle status job, and one to a housewife.

Sixty-four percent of the married women were housewives, while 26.9% held middle status jobs.

The raw chi square is 7.66833 and the significance is .5679 which is higher than the .05 alpha level; thus, we accept the null hypothesis of no significant relationship in non-Kuwaiti men marrying Kuwaiti women from the same occupational status.

In the 1984 sample, there were 227 cases in this group with occupational status reported. Ten of the men (4.5%) had high status jobs. Of these, four (40%) married women with high status jobs, two married women with middle status jobs, none married women with lower status jobs or women who were housewives. Four (40%) married students who may someday be in occupations of the same status as or higher than their husbands.

There were 169 (75.8%) men with middle status jobs in this category, none of whom was married to a woman with a high status job. Thirty-five (20.7%) married women with the same status jobs, three (1.8%) married women with low status jobs, 75 (44.4%) married students, and 56 (33.1%) married housewives.

	MALE OCCUPATIONS				
OCCUPATIONS	<u>High Status</u>	Middle Status	Low Status	<u>Student</u>	
High status	0	1	0	0	
	0.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	
Middle status	4	9	4	1	
	57.0	29.0	14.8	50.0	
Low status	0	2	3	0	
	0.0	6.5	11.1	0.0	
Student	0	0	0	0	
	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Housewife	3	19	20	l	
	42.9	61.3	7 9. 1	59.0	
TOTALS:	7	31	27	2	
	100 . 0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Raw chi square Cramer's <u>v</u> = .19	= 7.66833 532	df = 12	significance = .5679		

Table 5.39				
Non-Kuwaiti	Men/Kuwaiti	Women	Marriages,	1974

Men in the group with lower status jobs numbered 23 (10.3%). None of these was married to a woman with a high status job, three (13%) were married to women with middle status jobs, none was married to a woman with low status jobs, three (13%) were married to students, and 17 (73.9%) were married to housewives. There were 21 male students (9.4%) in this category. None of them were married to women with high status jobs, two (9.5%) married women with middle status jobs, none married women with low status jobs, 13 (61.9%) married students, and six (28.6%) married housewives (see Table 5.40).

Table 5.40

Non-Kuwaiti Men/Kuwaiti Women Marriages, 1984

	MALE OCCUPATIONS				
OCCUPATIONS	High Status	Middle Status	Low Status	<u>Student</u>	
High status	4	0	0	0	
	40.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
Middle status	2	35	3	2	
	20 . 0	20 . 7	13.0	9.5	
Low status	0	3	0	0	
	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	
Student	4	75	3	13	
	40.0	44.4	13.0	61.9	
Housewife	0	56	17	6	
	0.0	33 . 1	73 . 9	28.6	
TOTALS:	10	169	23	21	
	100.0	100.0	100.0	94.0	
Raw chi square = 108.24064 Cramer's <u>v</u> = .40224		df = 12	significance = .000)	

With a raw chi square of 108.24064 and a significance of .000 which is lower than the .05 alpha level, there was a great significance in 1984 between the occupational statuses of non-Kuwaiti husbands and their Kuwaiti wives (see Table 5.41).

To summarize, for all marriages taken as a group in the 1974 sample, there was no significant relationship between husband's occupational status and wife's occupational status. But in the 1984 sample, with all marriages combined, there was a highly significant relationship between husband's occupational status and wife's occupational status. This is because marriage was increasingly based on individual characteristics rather than family or tribal backgrounds. We expect to see this type of marriage increase in Kuwait.

For the group of Kuwaiti men who married Kuwaiti women in the 1974 sample, there was no significant relationship in occupational status, and most of the women (91%) were housewives. In the 1984 sample, the situation had changed, and there was a significant tendency for Kuwaiti men who married Kuwaiti women to have wives from the same job level as themselves.

For the 1974 sample of Kuwaiti men who married non-Kuwaiti women, there was no significant relationship between husbands and wives' occupations. This remained true for the 1984 sample, probably because most of these women were from countries with low standards of living or preferred their wives not to work out of the house but to take care of the children.

For the 1974 sample of non-Kuwaiti men who married Kuwaiti women, there was no significant relationship between a husband's occupational status and that of his wife. In the 1984 sample, however, there was a highly significant relationship between the occupational status of a non-Kuwaiti husband and that of his Kuwaiti wife.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION

The central focus of this study has been to provide an analysis of Kuwaiti marriage with respect to certain socio-cultural and demographic factors. Based on statistical analyses, hypotheses have been tested, investigated, and explained; and the variables influencing homogamous and heterogamous marriages for Kuwaiti society will be discussed in this chapter.

Kuwait offers an unusual opportunity to study change as it is taking place. In Kuwait, urbanization and Westernization have influenced society with a speed and intensity rarely found elsewhere. In addition, labor migration has produced a heterogeneous population.

After World War II and the discovery of oil, Kuwait developed rapidly with the use of oil revenues. Since the country lacked its own trained labor force, foreign labor was used extensively, giving the country an influx of people, particularly men, from other cultures. This brought Kuwaitis into interaction with people with different social, economic, and political views. In addition, many young Kuwaitis were sent abroad for education. Therefore, the whole society was, to some extent, exposed to and influenced by foreign cultures.

All aspects of the society have been touched, including family structure. Although the nuclear family existed before the current social changes occurring in the country, after the discovery of oil, the nuclear family has become a dominant feature of the society. Furthermore, tribal relationships are weakening. These changes have produced individuals who are more liberated from their families or tribal authorities than people of past generations. One

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aspect of this liberation is the relative freedom young people bring to the process of mate selection.

Marriage is a basic social institution; however, like any social institution, it is a product of socio-economic circumstances and situations. Social values and norms have a great role in determining mate selection and influence not only who one will marry but when.

But values and norms change. Things that were once taboo in Kuwait such as women working outside the home, higher education for members of both sexes, and intercultural contact leading individuals to be exposed to people from different cultures are now acceptable. Family structure has also changed. Fathers were formerly harsh, authoritative powers who determined their families' norms and values and passed them on to their sons and daughters; now they exhibit more flexibility and permit other members of the family, such as mothers and brothers, to share their authority.

For many Kuwaitis, the circle of marriage choices has become progressively wider. Socioeconomic changes have made it impossible to continue the traditional parallel cousin marriage custom. The first step in widening the circle is to permit marriage with people from families in one's neighborhood who are from the same religion and sect. Then come neighboring communities with similar cultural and ethnic background. The widening of the range from which marital partners may be chosen has become accompanied by a change in who does the selecting. It is no longer up to a family to choose a son or daughter's mate; the individual him/herself makes the selection. Increasing educational and employment opportunities have gradually changed many of the society's traditional social values and norms, and this has had an impact on the process of mate selection. Individual tastes and characteristics are increasingly replacing family concerns in the choice of marital partners.

Age

The analysis shows social change has affected age at marriage. Mean age at marriage differs for the three groups in this study from 1974 to 1984, but for the three groups combined, it decreased for men. In 1974, the mean age at marriage for men was 28.2 years and in 1984 it was 27.9 years. For women, on the other hand, there was a slight increase from 22.2 years in 1974 to 22.4 years in 1984.

Of the three groups in the sample, the only one showing an increase in mean age of marriage for both men and women was Kuwaiti husbands/Kuwaiti wives. The mean age of Kuwaiti men marrying Kuwaiti women increased from 25.4 years in 1974 to 26.2 years in 1984. Although the increase is small, it is higher, as the proposition anticipated. This may be because marrying a Kuwaiti woman requires a great financial burden of the groom, forcing him to wait to marry until he is financially secure. The mean age of Kuwaiti women marrying Kuwaiti men also increased—from 20.2 years in 1974 to 22.0 years in 1984. This may be because many women wait until they finish college education and feel economically secure before marrying. Another factor may be that, as the educated wives. Thus, more women remain in school longer before marrying. In addition, as individuals have increasing choice not only about who to marry but also about when, they are choosing to marry later.

A general reason for the increase in age at marriage is that parental expectations and duties have changed. At one time, it was a parental responsibility to arrange the marriages of their children; they wanted to discharge this responsibility as early as possible to be certain their children were well-settled. Two factors have changed this situation. First, as we have noted, young people have more say in their own marriages. Second, since life expectancy has increased, perhaps the perceived need for parents to arrange marriages of their children early has changed (Korson & Sabzwari, 1985).

Burchinal (1960), in his work on young marriage in 1960, predicted that rates of young marriages would decline; this has generally been true. He thought that the increased value placed on extending education would have an impact on young marriages. "Increased school and post-high school attendance should be associated with a reduction in young marriage rates" (p. 7). Since there is a relation between age at marriage and education, it is expected that we will see a relation between socioeconomic status and age at marriage as well. This researcher expects that the higher one's socioeconomic status, the older will be his/her age at marriage; conversely, the lower one's socioeconomic status, the younger will be his/her age at marriage, particularly among women. One reason for delaying marriage, especially for males, is a need to achieve a place in the occupational order, thereby assuring a bride's family of the welfare of their daughter.

For other groups in the study--Kuwaitis marrying non-Kuwaitis, mean age at marriage decreased. For Kuwaiti husbands/non-Kuwaiti wives, mean age at marriage for men decreased from 35.8 years in 1974 to 30.0 years in 1984; for women it decreased from 23.8 years in 1974 to 22.7 years in 1984. This indicates a change that is not obvious from the data presented here. Formerly, older men who, for various reasons, had been unable to marry Kuwaiti women, went to less wealthy neighboring countries to buy a wife or a second wife. But, with increasing social freedom, younger Kuwaiti men have made contact with non-Kuwaiti women, and, in addition, they have more discretion in picking their own wives based on personal characteristics and relationships.

For the last group, non-Kuwaiti husbands/Kuwaiti wives, mean age at marriage has also decreased for both husbands and wives. For non-Kuwaiti husbands, it has decreased from 29.2 years in 1974 to 27.5 years in 1984. For wives, it decreased from 25.7 years in 1974 to 22.6 in 1984. This decrease might be explained as follows. In the past, Kuwaiti women only married non-Kuwaiti men as a last resort--a last chance for marriage--which was, typically, at older ages. Now that marriage is based on personal choice and relationships and as society changes and women have more contact with others in educational institutions and in the workforce, they are more likely to meet non-Kuwaitis and to marry non-Kuwaitis as a choice, not as a last resort.

An additional factor influencing age at marriage, especially for Kuwaiti marriages, is the relative independence of children from family authority, especially economic independence. A young man must be financially independent of his family in order to marry. Therefore, he finishes school and gets a job before deciding who to marry and when. Since a young man has to cover marriage expenses (bride price, wedding ceremony, honeymoon, etc.), he delays that marriage until he can afford it.

Mean age differences between spouses for all groups combined decreased from 6.0 years in 1974 to 5.5 years in 1984. Also, when each group was examined individually, that mean age difference decreased. For Kuwaiti husband/Kuwaiti wife marriages, it decreased from 5.2 years in 1974 to 4.2 in 1984. For Kuwaiti husband/non-Kuwaiti wive marriages, it surprisingly decreased from 12 years in 1974 to 7.3 years in 1984. The non-Kuwaiti husband/Kuwaiti wife marriages was increased from 3.5 years in 1974 to 4.9 years in 1984.

We notice that the age gap between spouses is getting relatively smaller, meaning that people marrying others who are closer to their own age more than they used to. The only increase in age difference since 1974 was among non-Kuwaitis men who married non-Kuwaiti women, and that is because younger Kuwaiti women have been marrying non-Kuwaiti men. In addition, husbands are still older than their wives, a typical phenomenon in a patriarchal society where males are always heads of families. Another reason is that males must accumulate sufficient resources to pay the amount of male dowry (mahr) required for marriage. A man's usually being older than his wife may be because he has always been the primary provider for the family; the additional years of age enable him to complete his education and obtain successful work experience in an occupation. The utility for a man's marrying a younger woman is less obvious. It apparently has been centered on the greater beauty of young girls. A less obvious advantage of a wife's being younger than her husband is greater participation in sexual intercourse.

Another thing to be noted is that age difference between husbands and wives for all groups combined or individually, all more than five years, is that the husband is always older than the wife. This pattern is expected to exist in the Arab Middle East societies (Dixon, 1971). Some Western researchers consider age differences of three years or younger to be homogenous and those of more than three years as different degrees of heterogamy. However, with the increased intensive social change and urbanization going on in Kuwait, including the spread of college education and increase in numbers of women working outside the home, it is expected that spouses will be closer in age and more homogamous marriages will take place in the future. In the long run, we might see more same-age marriages, and societal changes will permit wives being older than their husbands.

In spite of the increase in age at marriage for Kuwaitis from 1974 to 1984, this researcher expects age at marriage to decrease for both husbands and wives. This is because of the current Islamic resurgence in which young people are turning to religion. Islamic doctrine encourages marriage when an individual is able to do so and prohibits pre-marital sexual relations or even close relationships between the sexes. Thus, young people will be turning to marriage at earlier ages. This idea is supported by the researcher's observation that more young people are getting married today than in previous years.

In a recent empirical study on immigration and social isolation in Kuwaiti society by Al-Jardwi (1984), the majority of the sample (63%) supported the ideal of early marriage age. The ideal of early marriage is still common in Kuwait, and many people will choose to follow the ideal, especially as they are increasingly swayed by Islamic teachings.

Religion

Religion is one of the major factors determining mate selection in Kuwait. Religious instruction insists that Kuwaiti females marry Muslims and that Muslim males marry Muslims or people of other Semitic religions. Thus, there are no marriages between Kuwaiti Muslim women and men of other religions, and it is very rare to see Kuwaiti Muslim men marry women from non-Semitic religions. In addition, such marriages would not appear in this sample since they are not registered in official records.

The influence of social change and contact with other cultures means that we would expect to see increasing numbers of marriages between Kuwaiti males and females from other religions. The data studied indicate that cross-religion marriages increased from 1974 to 1984. In 1974, there were no cross-religion marriages in the sample; in 1984, there were 10 (1.2%) Muslim men who married Christian women, a significance level of .0577. The percentage of men with college degrees who married across religions (5.22) is higher than the percentage of men without college degrees who did so (0.4%). It is expected that crossreligious marriages will occur with more frequency among individuals with more education because of their cross-cultural contact and wider circle of relationships.

The percentage of marriages between Shias and Sunnies decreased from 11% in 1974 to 7.9% in 1984. This is related to the Iranian revolution which has created sectarian prejudices among people of both groups. In addition, the Iraq-Iran war (Iraq being predominantly Sunni and Iran being Shia) has led people to think twice about marrying someone from another sect. The percentage of men with college degrees who married across sects 12.7%; the figure was 8.3% for men without college degrees. Thus, educational level has some impact on crosssect marriage, but it is minimal.

Marriage across religions is more common for men with high status jobs (5.6%) than for other men (0.5% for all other job statuses combined). In addition, 13.4% of the men who entered into cross-sect marriages held high status jobs, while 8.2% held all other kinds of jobs combined. Like education, occupation affects the tendency to marry across religions. There is a significant relationship between high status jobs and marrying across religion. This is primarily because the higher one's job rank, the wider is his/her circle of relationships and the greater his/her opportunities to travel and communicate with people of different groups. Marriage across sects does not follow this pattern. Even Kuwaitis holding high status jobs are sensitive about this subject and do not show the same significant numbers at they do in other categories.

Al-Jardawi's (1984) study of immigration and social isolation discussed many variables including religion. Seventy-two percent of the Kuwaitis and 88% of the non-Kuwaitis in his sample supported the idea that it was preferable to have relationships with people of the same religion or sect.

From the data, it is clear that men with college degrees and those with high ranking occupations are the most likely to marry across sect and across religion; they are the people who are least influenced by traditional attitudes toward marriage. They are the least vulnerable to family or tribal pressures and are the most likely to be exposed to people from other cultures and religions.

Despite the trend from 1974 to 1984, we expect fewer cross-sect or crossreligion marriages in the future because of the current socio-political situation within and outside Kuwait. This is especially the case with regard to marriage between Shias and Sunnis. There are many differences between the sects, especially in the realm of inheritance. Members of both sects want to avoid conflict, and marriage would exacerbate sectarian differences; each sect has its own mosques, clubs--even suburbs. Such marriages would also be affected by the Islamic resurgence mentioned earlier, which will discourage both cross-sect and cross-religion marriages. Islam does not prohibit marriage between people of different Semitic religions, but it does discourage it.

In general, marriage in Kuwait is homogamous with regard to both sect and religion. The few exceptions tend to occur with men of higher educational and occupational status.

Nationality

As mentioned earlier, social change has led to cultural contact with others as people are increasingly able to travel to other societies such as Europe and the United States and as opportunities in the labor market attract many different nationalities to Kuwait. For Kuwaiti men who marry in foreign countries, Islamic law requires them to register their marriages in the marriage registration office of the Ministry of Justice when they return to Kuwait. The problem is that Kuwaiti women who marry non-Kuwaiti men and stay in their husbands' countries do not register their marriages, making it difficult to include them in the study. People of marriageable age who travel are exposed to more non-Arabs than their counterparts who stay at home, and the more Westernization they experience, the more likely they are to marry people from non-Arab countries. Although we see an increase in this tendency between 1974 and 1984, this increase is not statistically significant. Educational level was also not generally significant in the marriage of Kuwaitis and other nationalities, except in the case of Kuwaiti men marrying non-Kuwaiti, non-Arab women; in this case men with college degrees were more likely to marry across cultures than men without college degrees.

The data analysis indicated that Kuwaiti husband/non-Kuwaiti non-Arab wife marriages increased from 10% in 1974 to 10.3% in 1986 and that, when Kuwaiti men do marry across nationalities, their first choice is a wife from an Arab country (90% in 1974; 89.7% in 1984). Men without college degrees married women of different nationalities more often than did men with college degrees (51.6 to 43.1%). Of the men without college degrees who married across nationality, 8.4% married non-Kuwaiti non-Arab women, while 24.0% of the men with college degrees who married across nationality married non-Kuwaiti non-Arab women. This demonstrates that education does not play a role when Kuwaiti men marry women from other Arab countries, since a higher percentage of men without college degrees than men with college degrees married these women. But for women from non-Arab countries, college-educated men married these women in a higher percentage than did men without college educations. It is interesting to note that numbers of Kuwaiti women marrying non-Kuwaiti men have increased across the years more than numbers of Kuwaiti men marrying non-Kuwaiti women. This might be explained by the fact that Kuwaiti women have only recently been involved in interactions with non-Kuwaiti men in Kuwait or abroad.

One common opinion is that Kuwaiti men marry women of other nationalities for financial reasons. First, the male dowry or mahr that Kuwaiti men are supposed to pay when marrying Kuwaiti women is very high. The amount varies depending upon family status, but the lowest cost is usually around \$7000 in recent years. In 1974 the mahr was around \$2500-3000. Furthermore, the mahr is part of the expenditures a groom should pay; furniture, gold sets, and marriage ceremony expenses are a man's responsibility as well, making to the total costs of marriage \$20,000-25,000. In spite of the fact that when Kuwaiti men marry non-Kuwaiti women, they are exempt from governmental financial assistance (which is almost \$6000), we still see the phenomenon of Kuwaiti men marrying non-Kuwaiti women increasing across the decade. Since Kuwait has a very high standard of living, these costs are very high. For a young man, even a college graduate, these costs might cause him to delay marriage until his financial situation is stable, or they could cause him to look outside his society. In many of Kuwait's neighboring countries, the standard of living is lower and there is no costly bride price or marriage expenses. In countries such as Egypt and Iraq, many girls look forward to helping their families financially by accepting marriage to Kuwaiti husbands; they will even accept husbands who might have more than one wife, a great age difference, or a handicap.

As an indication of how costly marriage is, especially among Kuwaitis with Bedouin origins, one of Al Qabas' Arabic daily newspaper columnists criticized Kuwaiti's high marriage expenses and asked families to "take it easy and facilitate the marriage" when he said:

.... when a young man asks a girl's hand in marriage, the family of the bride will ask for four or five "shrwat," and "sharwa" means a set of gold (necklace, earrings, bracelets), and the mother-in-law will go with the new groom to a gold shop where she will choose and the groom will pay, the value of which might reach a minimum of \$30,000, and this does not include the maher, the morning present for the bride. (1984, p. 6) The columnist concludes that the marriage bill could end up between \$45,000 and \$55,000; he, therefore, asked families to be kind and not ask for so much for marriage.

Not all Kuwaiti men who marry non-Kuwaiti women escape the high costs, however. Some men who been studying abroad or have lived out of the country for a long time select wives from the countries in which they have lived. In these cases, the common explanation that Kuwaiti men marry non-Kuwaiti women because of high financial demands from Kuwaiti brides' families does not hold. These women often have higher standards of living and, in addition, cost their husbands a great deal in traveling and visiting their home countries.

In this researcher's opinion, many dependent variables affect marrying across-nationalities; these include educational level, occupational level, previous marital status, and age. The cost of marriage to a Kuwaiti wife may well motivate some lower class men to marry across nationalities, but among those of higher classes, such marriages are probably based on individual selection.

In spite of the fact that non-Kuwaitis are the majority in the country (58.5% in 1980) and than many cultures are represented in the population, both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis tend to avoid interaction as much as possible. They often fear friendships with people of other cultures, even other Arabs. Non-Kuwaitis are not fully integrated into Kuwait society and with Kuwaitis, although the majority of the non-Kuwaitis are Arabs themselves with the same language, religion, and history as Kuwaitis. Al-Rayes (1979) explains:

The non-Kuwaitis gather in special places for each nationality, and the Kuwaitis have their own places, either in coffee shops or at home where they get together in a special place called <u>diwania</u>. The <u>diwania</u> is a place in the family dwelling where a group of Kuwaitis get together regularly at night to discuss everyday life or watch television. Most large families have a <u>diwania</u> as part of the status of the family. Non-Kuwaitis do not participate in these daily meetings This kind of social isolation makes the non-Kuwaitis create their own communities without which the non-Kuwaitis would find life frustrating. (p. 116)

Al-Jardawi (1985) reported that for Kuwaitis, visiting non-Kuwaiti friends represented only eight percent of all visits they make. The study also reported that 85% of the Kuwaitis and 83% of the non-Kuwaitis in the sample preferred to have friendships with same-nationality people. Kuwaitis prefer to live in special Kuwaiti-only suburbs; non-Kuwaitis also prefer segregated living areas where they will be with people of the same socioeconomic level and will not feel alienated. This indicates that both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis feel a social distance between the groups.

Al Jardawi's study indicated that 22% of the Kuwaitis sampled would marry heterogamously with non-Kuwaitis, but this represents only an ideal; when it comes to practice, we may see half that percentage of the non-Kuwaitis in the sample, 20.6% said they would marry Kuwaitis, 67.4% said they would not, and 12% said they were unsure. The study concluded that social change has weakened social relationships between people, and that both Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis in Kuwait prefer to have relationships with their own national groups because of their different customs, socioeconomic status, places of residence, and other factors.

When Kuwaitis do interact with people of other nationalities, the preference is for people from other Arab countries in the Gulf area since these countries have much in common in terms of customs and norms. It is interesting that when Kuwaiti women marry non-Kuwaiti men, they choose those who are living permanently in Kuwait and are integrated into Kuwaiti society, whereas Kuwaiti men marrying non-Kuwaiti women more often choose women living in other countries whom they bring to Kuwait to live. Finally, social values and customs are not the only obstacles to Kuwaitis marrying non-Kuwaitis; official

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citizenship laws also make it difficult for Kuwaitis to marry non-Kuwaitis. There are restrictive nationality laws in Kuwait which make it difficult for foreigners to become Kuwaitis.

Caste

Caste is another important factor affecting the institution of marriage in Kuwaiti. Caste is emphasized by Kuwaitis themselves and by their Arab neighbors. This study found a significant increase in cross-caste marriages from 1974 to 1984. In 1974 there were 7.8% cross-caste marriages, while in 1984 there were 11.9%. Of male college graduates in the total sample, 17.2% married across caste, while 10.2% of males without college degrees did so, a significant difference. Of those holding high status jobs, 19.7% married across caste, while 10.0% of those holding all other status jobs married across caste, again a significant difference. This is because college-educated men and those with high status jobs are liberated from the traditional pattern of marriage and have wider circles of relationships and more contact with those of other cultures.

In summary, although Kuwaitis still tend to be very conscious of tribal status, as Kuwait moves toward modernization and urbanization, the traditional caste system will decrease in importance with modern norms opposing and replacing older tribal customs. This anticipated social change in Kuwait, the researcher believes, will also bring about change in the rigid attitudes and behavior of people toward Assail and Bayssian marriages. As Al Jardawi's (1984) previously mentioned study found, 37% prefer kin marriage. This percentage is fairly high, meaning that the old idea of kin group marriage and parallel cousin marriage has not completely disappeared in the society.

It is expected that we will see more cross-caste marriages in the future, especially with the Islamic revival occurring in the area. People have started to consider marrying across caste since one of Islam's principles is social justice among people and the discouragement of tribal ethnocentrism.

Education and Occupation

It is expected that in a strongly patriarchal society like Kuwait, men will be more educated than their wives, although change has been taking place. The society still regards men as superior, although we expect to see an increasing number of marriages between people of the same educational level. High income and education appear to be positively related to heterogamous marriage; that is, the higher one's education and income, the more likely one is to marry outside of traditional rules. The present analysis supports this assumption since it appears that higher education and income people often work together as do lower education and income people, thereby offering them opportunities to interact.

Occupation is also influenced by education; the higher the social class, the greater the degree of occupational propinquity, a link that can be explained by the importance attached to educational similarity in the higher social classes. Belonging to a class means being conscious that one is like other individuals in characteristics, that one identifies with others in that class and they with him/her, and that one's thinking and behavior are influenced by the thinking and behavior of others in the class. However, in Kuwaiti society, when one speaks of marriage from the same educational level, that does not necessarily mean that the spouses had a premarital relationship or had dated on a college campus. Social interactions between the sexes are at a minimum; gender separation even occurs in institutions of higher education.

The results of the present study suggest a number of basic propositions or theoretical interpretations. First, the data suggest that more highly educated people marry "out" more often than people with less education. We can propose then that with higher education comes increased contact with other ethnic/racial groups, bringing an increased likelihood of out-marriage. We posit that Kuwaitis who attain college degrees come into more contact with non-Kuwaiti, non-Arabs than do people who do not attain college degrees, thus increasing their chances of intermarriage. The higher the educational level and occupation, the higher a person's socioeconomic status and the more possible that cross-cultural interaction would go beyond job-related friendships and lead to marriage.

This study shows that male university degree-holders and those with higher status jobs married across religions and across nationalities, including marriages with non-Arabs. They also married across tribal lines (across caste). But, surprisingly, college graduates and men with high status jobs did not marry across sect any more than others did. As explained earlier, this might be because the strength of sectarian divisions in the society has been enhanced by the Iranian revolution (Khoumanism) and the Islamic revival in the area. The study also showed a significant tendency for people with high status jobs to marry those with similar jobs in 1984, but not in 1974.

The level of communication between spouses is higher if they have comparable educational levels. Values change as education increases, and the level of sophistication usually rises as an individual gains social experiences related to educational activities. Also, meeting on college campuses or workplaces away from home reduces the amount of parental and community control over the choice of an individual's marriage partner. Young people have revolted against traditional institutions and values, leading them to reject taboos on choosing mates across lines.

This study showed that men and women in Kuwait tended to marry from the same educational level in both 1974 and 1984 for all groups, indicating that the individual mate selection process existed in the 1970s and that the social

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changes described earlier took place earlier than 1974; people had started to liberate themselves from family and tribal pressures even before the 1970s. However, the results of marrying from the same occupational level did not show their full significance until 1974, perhaps because there were not many women in the labor force until that time and those who were were concentrated in jobs generally considered gender-specific, such as teaching and nursing. Being in one of these professions does not give women much chance to meet men on the job. Additional social change in the 1980s brought more women to the labor market, and the 1984 results showed a significant difference in all groups together and a relative significance for other groups. In the future, we expect to see a greater tendency toward husband and wife having the same occupational level.

Educational level may have important implications for a woman who extends her formal education, particularly beyond the undergraduate degree. Advanced education and increased age place her in a marriage market in which the number of available males who are both older than she and have as much or more education than she has and older age is very limited. The pool is further limited by the fact that men are permitted to marry "down" both in age and education, so that the older, more educated woman faces competition from younger and less educated women for available unmarried men.

The discovery of oil and the resulting wealth and economic development gave the society new economic activities; traditional occupations such as pearl diving, fishing, and trading gave way to opportunities in managerial, professional, and service areas in private and governmental sectors. In addition, the gender composition of the labor force has changed as more women work outside the home and receive higher education. Thus, there is increased likelihood of marital partners being of the same educational and occupational levels simply because of the increased opportunities accorded to women in education and in the labor market.

In a study of 300 Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti families, Al-Jardawi (1984) found that 33% of the Kuwaiti men supported the idea of their wives working outside the home while 41% of non-Kuwaiti men did so. For the most part, the difference is economic; the Kuwaiti family does not need the woman's salary as much as the non-Kuwaiti family does. In the same study, 80% of the people interviewed supported the concept of women working outside the home. The difference of opinion related to the fact that, although Kuwaiti men are still conservative when it comes to the idea of wives or close family members working outside the home, <u>conceptually</u> they have more liberated ideas, indicating that Kuwaiti society is in the middle of a transitional process. In the past, no one would have agreed with even the <u>concept</u> of women working outside the home.

Why "Out-Marriage" (Heterogamy)?

A study by Cerroni-Long (1985) listed many specific factors in "outmarriages" or marriages outside the norm for a specific society; some of these are relevant to study of Kuwaiti marriages. First, a norm not felt as binding may lead to "out-marriage" as in the case of Assails in Kuwait who do not feel bound together as they did in the past. Even marrying people of other nationalities is possible because the society has changed and is no longer the same cohesive, homogeneous, fully-integrated community of earlier decades. The population has increased and has become more diverse. The religious factor, however, is still strong; people feel it binds them together.

Second, marrying heterogamously sometimes means a desire to gain psychological rewards, for example, marrying a foreigner from a higher socioeconomic status or marrying a much older person who might fulfill some desire.

Third, people sometimes marry "out" as a reaction against the norms and values of the society, expressing aggressive feelings against their own group, and feeling alienated from that group. In the case of Kuwait, we could consider cross-religion, cross-sect, cross-nationality, and cross-caste marriages as part of this category (see Table 6.1 for detail).

A factor that is particularly significant in controlling the behavior of people in Kuwait and the entire area at present is religion. Islamic doctrine encourages people to marry heterogamously in terms of such characteristics as nationality, caste, and socioeconomic class so long as they marry other Muslims. Religious values extend beyond nationality lines; for example, all Muslims are considered equal, regardless of nationality. In other words, under Islamic doctrine, there is no difference between a Muslim from Kuwait and one from Egypt or Lebanon; all are equal and welcome to marry each other. Therefore, given the current Islamic revival in Kuwait, we might expect to find more marriages across nationality lines as people realize that the bonds of Islam are stronger than those of nationality.

Religious doctrine also has a great influence on cross-caste marriage. Islam teaches that there is no difference among people in terms of race, color, or any kind of ethnocentrism; therefore, marriage between people of two social segments of Kuwaiti society (Assail and Bayssary) has increased under the current Islamic revival or resurgency, as religion encourages people to break through caste and socioeconomic class.

Demographic factors also influence the rate of out-marriage. Unbalanced gender ratios and numerically small communities lead people to seek marital partners in other groups. As Blau (1977) stated, "Any small group is more

Table 6.1 Efficient Causes of Types of Marriage

Generic Causes			Specific Causes		Resultant Marriages	
1.	The norm is not felt as binding.	la	Personal interpretation of the norm (e.g., attention to agathogamy but not to homogamy).	la	Marriage is excep- tionalinstance of non-conformity.	
		IЬ	Exceptional circumstances (e.g., war, temporary resi- dence abroad, emigration).	њ	Same as la.	
		lc	Breaking or loosening of ties with the original group of affiliations (e.g., loss of faith, acculturation).	lc	Same as la.	
2.	Breaking the norm allows to gain speci- specific rewards.	2a	Desire for socio-cultural or economic rewards.	2a	Marriage as exchange.	
		2Ъ	Desire for psychological rewards.	2Ъ	Marriage as a way to fulfill group- specific expecta- tions.	
3.	Personal deviance.	3a	Desire to fulfill personal expectations.	3a	Marriage as a way to achieve goals.	
		3Ь	Desire to confirm personal image of self.	3b	Same as 3a.	
		3с	Mental problems: feelings of inadequacy, alienation from and negative feelings toward one's group, guilt toward members of subordinate groups, rebellion to norms of one's own group, rebellion to authority and/or pressure of parents or peers, aggressive feelings toward members of out-groups, revenge- ful feelings toward dominant group.	3c	Marriage as outlet for or way to assuage specific mental problems.	

Source: Cerroni-Long, 1985

involved than a large one in intergroup relations between the two, unless the two groups have no social contacts" (p. 21). Blau derived theories to show how important group size is in out marriages: "The probability is that the rate of intergroup associations increases with declining group size for the groups distinguished by a given nominal parameter." Cerroni-Long (1985) also emphasized the influence of an unbalanced gender ratio on the tendency of people to marry outside the group.

Why "In-Marriage" (Homogamy)?

People marry homogamously, at least in Kuwait, for many reasons: social, economic, ethnic, cultural, and political. A person who has social reasons for marrying homogamously wants to maintain the distinction of the tribal group among other tribes; s/he wishes to protect the tribe's "blood lines." In Kuwait, there are many Bedouin tribes who have no power, but they have social status in the society. Marrying someone from a different group might cause a person to become isolated by being expelled from the extended family or tribal activities as a punishment for marrying out. Some people believe that when norms of homogamy are violated, the possibility of negative consequences for marital quality and stability is increased. So they marry homogamously to avoid these problems.

For some people, economic factors are important considerations. Families encourage their children to marry close relatives, such as parallel cousins, so that other families will not share their wealth. The same reason--the protection of wealth or land--is often given for inter-tribal marriage.

Religious doctrine sometimes force individuals to marry within their own sects or religious groups, thereby providing ethical or cultural reasons for homogamy. The Islamic religion, for example, does not recognize the marriage of a Muslim woman to a non-Muslim man, meaning that the proportion of women marrying across religion in Kuwait is zero. To illustrate how strong this factor is in controlling people's behavior, before the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East, there were some cross-sect marriages between Shias and Sunnis. But that number has declined in the 1980s because the revival of Islam and Khoumanism have created and fostered hatred between groups, leading them to marry homogamously in terms of religion or sect.

Finally, politics leads people to marry homogamously. For instance, the crisis between Iraq and Iran, during which the Kuwaiti government has been on the side of Iraq, has diminished intermarriage between Shias and Sunnis. Any crisis between countries in the area lowers the number of intermarriages. In addition, some royal families, like that in Kuwait, do not want their daughters to marry men of other countries because they do not want foreigners to share their political power.

The tendency to marry within one's own class, religion, and sect is fostered by the rationale that a shared socio-cultural heritage is conducive to successful marriage, as Pierre L. Vanden Berghe (1979) sums up:

In most societies, however, people tend to marry within a certain group, or simply prefer to do so, without there being strong taboos to forbid outmarriage. It is most probable that people who live close to each other, who share the same language and culture, and who constantly interact will also intermarry. Such in-marrying groups are what we usually mean when we talk of ethnic groups or tribes.

One seeks the company of those who are perceived as similar and selection is made from among them; i.e., one chooses a marriage partner because who perceived similarities with that person. Socialization has caused this behavior within people; parents press their children to marry from the same caste, religion, socioeconomic status. In addition, there is a general belief that similarities between husband and wife are positive; therefore, one seeks a marriage partner whom one believes possesses these similarities.

This practice of marrying within one's own group is described in a study of marriage and family life in the United Arab Emirate (1980):

The preference is for first-cousin marriages, between the paternal or maternal first cousins, although it is not unusual for marriages to be arranged outside the family circle. As long as the groom is of equal or better status than the bride, there is no problem. The most important factor taken into consideration when arranging marriage for one's daughter is that her intended spouse be equal to her in birth (being of pure Arab stock), religion, degree of freedom, and wealth or occupation. As long as the girls marry within the family, the question of inferiority does not arise. (p. 31)

The author adds that "in case of the ruling family, the Shaykh's daughters

are married to other Shaykh's sons, and always within the same family, so as to

keep the unit together" (p. 31), as well as to preserve the political and economic

power within the family. Despite that fact, Vander Berghe (1972) says:

Large industrial societies, or, indeed, even complex preindustrial societies, no longer conform to the simple blueprint where the solidarity of the ethnic group is coterminous with the entire society. Often, these large, complex societies are internally fragmented by ethnicity. This is the case for about 90 percent of the contemporary sovereign states: nearly all of them have within their body politic more than one ethnic community that regards itself as a separate people, in the sense we have just defined. Even in the most industrialized countries, ethnic sentiments of separate peoplehood are often deeply rooted and difficult to extirpate much as many states have tried. (p. 172)

Marriages outside one's group do take place and will continue to take place

because of the wider cultural contacts with the outside world, educational expansion and enlightenment, and new awareness of socio-cultural values and communication. However, Westermark (1922) remarks that:

Modern civilization tends more or less to lower or pull down the barriers which separate races, nations, the adherents of different religions, and the various classes of society. It has, therefore, made the endogamous rules less stringent and less restricted it has widened the limit within which a man or woman may marry and generally marries. This process has been one of vast importance in man's history. Largely originating in race or class-pride or in religious intolerance, the endogamous rules have in their turn helped to keep up and strengthen these feelings, whereas frequent intermarriages must have the very opposite effect. (p. 68)

As Cerroni-Long (1985) concluded in his study searching for factors related to heterogamous marriage:

The fact that women are acquiring increasing power of choice in their own right, the general tendency toward egalitarianism and secularism, the growing rejection of external pressure on personal choice, the decreasing preoccupation with procreation in marriage and the consequent creation of more conjugal-centered unions, all these factors seem to lead directly to a decrease in preoccupation with endogamous rules and to an increase in out-marriage. (p. 43)

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Gordon (1964) studied the phenomenon of out-marriage in the mid-1960s and concluded that it was "... the result of the general weakening of contemporary family and religious ties as well as the possession of similar educational, economical, and social backgrounds" (p. 60).

Heterogamy is a universal phenomenon, a worldwide trend towards ignoring traditional attitudes towards marriage that results from changing social conditions and the broadening outlook of young people. In searching for reasons that have led to social change in a society, it is impossible to pinpoint only one factor. There are many factors that bring about such change: both internal or subjective factors and external factors such as cultural contact or conquest.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although social change has been taking place in Kuwait for the last three decades, people are still under kin pressure and the country's traditional method of mate selection still exists. There have been breakthroughs, but only on the individual level and against family rules, sometimes with social punishment and restrictions. This indicates that the society is in a stage between tradition and modernization, a reform or transitional stage in which traditional and modern values exist together, and an individual may follow either, depending on his/her exposure to change and upon family and other social institutions. Marriage is, of course, not the only social institution experiencing this conflict between the traditional and the modern; social relationships, politics, economics, and other aspects of society are experiencing it also.

Because Kuwaiti society is in transition--not completely traditional and yet not fully modernized, the traditional pattern of marriage will continue for a while. Marital partners are still primarily chosen in the traditional manner: a young man asks his parents to find him a bride or he chooses one himself with his parents approval or consent; the couple, however, is not permitted any interaction before marriage. One aspect of traditional mate selection has changed, however. At one time in Kuwait, a man's wife was from his extended family, a parallel cousin, or, in the case of Bedouins, from the same clan or tribe. If that were impossible, she would come from a tribe of the same level as her husband's. In the case of urbanized groups, a mate not from the man's extended family came from a family with the same socioeconomic status as his. This concept is slowly changing. Although there is still a conflict about marrying from an "outgroup" in terms of nationality, caste, or religion, we see an increase in such marriages between 1974 and 1984.

Sociologists are interested in the pattern of homogamous and heterogamous marriages that shows social integration and social isolation between citizens and immigrants in all societies in the Arabian Gulf, and Kuwait is a good case study. The giving up of one's native cultural background and the acquisition of a new culture and identity have long been issues carrying political overtones. Social scientists are aware of the importance of ways in which immigrant groups participate in and integrate with the majority group. One indicator of the status of an immigrant group's assimilation process and even potential has been the group's tendency to intermarry with members of the majority society.

Marriage between people of different racial, ethnic, religious, and national groups is viewed by scholars as the surest means of assimilation and the most infallible index of its occurrence (Bugeelski, 1961; Warner & Srole, 1945). Moreover, rates of intermarriage have often been used to examine the permissiveness of cultural norms in the selection of a mate (Davis, 1941). Intermarriage rates in general are an indicator of a group's acceptance and cultural and social absorption into a society (Vander Zanden, 1972). Conversely, persistently high rates of in-group marriage are a good indicator of a majority group's willingness to preserve itself as a distinct cultural unit. Some scholars (i.e., Murguin, 1975) also say that low rates of intermarriage reflect a history of discrimination and conflict among dominant and subordinate groups.

This study has shown that Kuwaitis have a very strong tendency to marry homogamously in terms of religion, sect, nationality, and caste, although the numbers of those marrying across these lines has increased in the past 10 years,

especially among people of higher socioeconomic status who have college educations and high status jobs. Furthermore, many institutions in society are influenced by religions, and it is assumed that there is a cler invluence of other variables as well. We expect to see more marriages across national lines between Kuwaitis and people from other Islamic countries since Islam encourages marrying from the same faith, although marrying from other Semitic relgiions is not prohibited. Even if a Kuwaiti man married a Christian woman, he would want her to convert to his religion so that they could feel closer to each other in the culture and minimize the gap between them, thereby avoiding unnecessary conflicts. It is assumed that these kinds of marriages will be more dominant in the 1980s than there were before. Consequently, it seems that the Islamic resurgence has not only touched the political side of Kuwaiti life, but almost every aspect of social life and the institution of marriage as well. Kuwaiti society in general divides people on several levels. Among Kuwaitis themselves, there are Kuwaiti Assails and Kuwaiti Bayssaries. On official levels, there is a discrimination between Kuwaitis and non-Kuwaitis. Non-Kuwaitis tend to interact with members of their own ethnic and national groups. For example, Palestinians interact largely with Palestinians, Indians with Indians, and Egyptians with Egyptians. And none of these groups has become assimilated into Kuwaiti society. There is even conflict between members of the Shia and Sunni sects, although they are of the same religion. The evidence is that social interaction between members of these sects has been declining in recent years.

Limitations and Recommendations

Research on social life and behavior in Third World societies, particularly Arab societies in the Middle East, has its own difficulties, especially if the research depends on official data. Checking the names of married couples for

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this study required special permission from the highest official in the Ministry of Justice. The limitations of the data were particularly troublesome. The first was that some information was intentionally missing from the records, such as religious sect; the second is that permanent addresses for spouses' families are not specified, just the towns they are currently living in, making it difficult to determine their places of origin.

In the marriage report, there is a column for previous/current marriage status for the husband which indicates only whether he had a previous marriage contract. It would more helpful to know his specific marital status such as widower, divorcee, single, etc. In addition, occupations mentioned in the report are in very broad categories, not specific ones. For example, someone is labeled a "teacher" or "doctor," but no indication is given to his field of specialty. It would be helpful to be able to determine if there is a relationship between specialties and marriage patterns.

It was difficult to determine the sect or caste of participants as well. Many of the names were close to Sunni names, making it difficult to determine into which classification they should be placed. Few of the families who had tribal last names listed these names in marriage contracts, making it hard to determine if they belonged to Assail or Bayssarian tribes. Also, educational levels mentioned in the report were "elementary," "intermediate," "secondary," not a specific number of years, making it difficult to determine how close the educational levels of couples were.

Additional research is needed to determine whether homogamous marriages occur because people actually seek spouses with characteristics similar to their own or because people are sorted spatially by some characteristics and then marry someone at hand. Blau and Duncan (1964) noted the importance of studying spatial propinquity as a significant condition in mate selection, "From studies of residential patterns, we know that people living close to one another in space tend to be alike in socioeconomic characteristics. Hence a choice of mate solely on the basis of propinquity would give rise to some assortative mating by socioeconomic variables" (p. 356).

In spite of the study's limitations, it has attempted for the first time to examine some important socio-cultural correlations of Kuwaiti intermarriage.

Another gap in the data is that some marriages were registered in foreign countries only without re-registration in Kuwait's official offices. This fact made it difficult to include all couples in the study who married abroad. In addition, a study of Kuwaiti women who married non-Kuwaiti husbands and lived in their husbands' countries is needed for future research.

More analysis on other variables is also needed. For example, propinquity is important: is there a geographical determinant for marriage which has a great influence on intermarriage? Also, parents' socioeconomic status is an important factor in determining the status of a married couple, and this variable is recommended for study. Along with such analysis, future studies should focus on the socialization patterns of intermarriage, its impact on children, and its sociopsychological effects. Problems of adjustment between spouses of such marriages and the consequences of intermarriage for Kuwaiti society are also in need of discussion. Studying familial or parental relationships of heterogamously-married couples is important in determining how much society accepts this phenomenon. Demographic variables are also important: is there a preferred country a Kuwaiti looks to when he decides to marry out of his culture, either Arab or non-Arab? Which nationality groups tend to marry with Kuwaitis?

Another major topic to be studied in general is the degree of assimilation and rate of intermarriage among other nationality and ethnic groups living in Kuwait.

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