.;....)...x., ... 7: a....,....._..... . . : : air. . .....:.. 2.12... ....:.::.:..:1_ ...__,_...~.::/...._ {.11 :L. A“....f.._..£.. ,: 5...}...- .1 .:.\ .1. 911‘11‘ . . y , [HEW ‘ I? A, E t I . ‘ R 1.}! ‘|\W lu/ I. u L P11.“ u‘.‘ x ‘ .u. 1., .‘ |y . x a ‘ “ I . MKI‘EUIIIPITIIVX, {U1 . ‘ [\.‘\ 111 ‘ 3‘. ..r“DL.Ivbll'|l\..rli‘K Thesns for thé Degree of Ph, D MICHIGAN STATE UNTVERSITY JOHN KARL HUDZTK 1971 4- .»4. l ‘ LIBRARY ‘ ; Michigan State University “€513, This is to certify that the thesis entitled Firearms Legislation: The 90th Congress presented by John Karl Hudzik has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Ph. D. degree in Political Science /‘ ;' //) [1: I 1/4?» ‘/ ' / J16?— 11.7 Major professor Date 5/5/77 FEREAPJIS This is. a irersy over lire '.‘::«\n was J . n lultal‘mé ueoat T7 ABSTRACT FIREARMS LEGISLATION: THE 90th CONGRESS By John Karl Hudzik This is a study of the recent and continuing con- trmmrsy over firearms legislation, and in particular of Um firearms debate and voting of the 1968 session of the muted States Senate. The goal of the study is explica— fibn of this issue of public policy rather than any mani— festattempt to establish the validity of some general mmml of legislative behavior. Nevertheless, some of the fhmings of this study may have applications beyond the hmwdiate topical interest of firearms legislation. Analysis is begun with an examination of the womfing of the Second Amendment; the Amendment was heavily (Whated in the Senate, and this is an attempt to give that (mbate perspective. After a thorough review of Anglo— American legal traditions, the conclusion is drawn that Um Second Amendment merely protects the rights of the states to maintain militia forces; the Amendment does not gmrantee an individual and unregulable right to arms. q. me resea: behavior a: “ton can be a :21 types, defi: a:.:1.osoon1ca1;v ‘ O I .:..::;ora:ea unte: ‘u. ‘a ~>ltion leYe . wu—wvw— } John Karl Hudzik The research model for examining Senate firearms wfljng behavior assumes that contending sides on gun leg- hflation can be differentiated by the construction of idmfl.types, defined in a behavioral sense rather than in arflfilosophically deductive sense. Two procedures are hnmrporated under this general approach. First, through cmmdative scaling techniques and roll call analysis, imfices of firearms voting behavior are constructed for Sawtors and, in turn, related to roll call divisions on ainmmer of other policy questions; included are welfare Immsures, law enforcement, foreign policy, military eXpendi- uMes, and racial integration. Nine hypotheses are gener- atmiin this respect and several relationships are mumvered through the use of chi square statistics and myeement cluster matrices. The second procedure relates firearms voting to hmmgraphic characteristics through the use of correla— thn1and SQRR analysis. Demographic characteristics hmflude concepts such as urbanization, ethnic and racial ammosition, level of domestic violence, income distribu~ tuniand property value, work force configuration, level mfeducational attainment, the mix of economic activity, pamfisan identification, electoral behavior, and level of lumting activity. To secure more detailed information on Hume variables, some analysis is extended to the House of anesentatives and Congressional Districts. Several o: szrsagly {above : ;e:si:}' is by far 'ariables, cone 1 -Ql‘f Ya~.r QT Au“ $\:L$‘kb- V 3" ran] .~.\ .. it: dial) C ;;racial tempos 2;;aatly with gm“. jack and white C the urban race ignited gun res iLEaszem, Soutl‘ furore value i1 images. But 5 31511386 in tbei: iii: firearms re: biliblice stat. riifiCéltions, b. 11be law~abidi The Gutt :mnstrated tha Mal to Sept a: . SUDDOrt £01, éizerbus ' The a John Karl Hudzik Several of these demographic variables correlated strongly (above i.4) with firearms voting; population dmmity is by far the most important of these demographic variables, correlating highly (+.60 and +.70) with support fin gun restrictions. Of the twenty—four demographic variables analyzed, only those which correlated highly wiflipopulation density also correlated highly with gun wning. Partisan identification, electoral competition, and racial composition were not found to correlate signi— fitantly with gun voting although representatives of both black and white constituencies most immediately affected by Um urban race riots of the sixties overwhelmingly mmported gun restrictions. Regional cleavages, along mrEastern, Southern-Western division, were found to have farnwre value in describing the gun vote than partisan deavages. But Southerners Were far more politically oriented in their opposition than Westerners, insisting Umt firearms restrictions were a step toward an even— tual police state. Westerners, neglecting the political rmfifications, believed restrictions would do more harm u)the law-abiding sportsman than to the criminal. The Guttman scale analysis of firearms voting demonstrated that the firearms issues before the Senate from May to September, 1968, became more stringent and fimt support for these stringent positions became more gmmrous. The assassinations of Martin Luther King and .35:er Kennedy, 31 5:310 play no : A final 51 ::LL call behaviO' $5.55, an; const .3: several not. John Karl Hudzik Robert Kennedy, and their subsequent public impacts, was found to play no small part in this change. A final summary of findings in terms of firearms roll call behavior, voting on other selected policy issues, and constituency demographic characteristics pro- duced several notable differences between proponents and opponents on gun legislation. HREAPNE 1“ Part1 De' FIREARMS LEGISLATION: THE 90th CONGRESS By John Karl Hudzik A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY. Department of Political Science 1971 Cg) Copyright by JOHN KARL HUDZIK 1971 For my family and Walt ii Numerous fiessor Alan 6} ‘tie reseaTC.n ‘ 1.2‘2riA2ar, who .::Efering auib2 gie entire P3 iffsrts of these llan)‘ feli fined their til Iiihazrk Robert 1 in for their E Watered. El: fishy Politicai inter lnstitu‘ Eiiient technical “This of the e ..:TlC&l service: C“! ‘H .. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Numerous people have contributed to this study. Professor Alan Grimes, chairman of my dissertation commit- tee,encouraged interest in the firearms topic and was nwst helpful in guiding me through several redefinitions of the research design. Professors Charles Press and Edward Azar, who also served on the committee, were prompt hroffering guidance and provided helpful criticism through— mn the entire project. I am deeply appreciative of the efforts of these committee members. Many fellow graduate students and friends also Offered their time and energies. In particular, I wish tOthank Robert Forsythe, David Klingman, and Stanley Cdmn for their helpful advice on the many problems I mmountered. Elizabeth Powell of the Michigan State Uni— versity Political Data Archive and Leighton Price of the (bmputor Institute for Social Science Research offered pafient technical assistance during the collection and analYSis of the data. Trisha Love tirelessly provided derical services for the several drafts of the disserta— tion. A special iris and Sheldon :enconplete th :::e from my dut foice at hichiga I an most xninuousiy have A special debt of gratitude is due Professors Jay Arfis and Sheldon Lowry for the encouragement they gave mm to complete the study and the time they made available tonw from my duties in the Multidisciplinary Programs Office at Michigan State. I am most indebted to my father and mother who cmninuously have encouraged my efforts. iv {BEATLEDGEEEENIS .ISI OF TABLES TIRCJUCTIOX . Summ TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Chapter I. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION . 9 The Problem of Meaning in Constitutions . . 10 The Anglo-Saxon Imprint . . . . . . . 15 Settlement to Revolution . . . . . . . 20 The Revolutionary Period . . . 24 ‘ The Constitution and the Bill of Rights . . 29 Madison Proposes . . . 35 Judicial Interpretation . . . . . . 40 1 State Courts and Constitutions . . . . . 49 Some Related Issues . . . . . . . . 60 Conclusion . . . . . . . . 63 Footnotes--Chapter I . . . . . . . . 65 II- FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS: ROLL CALL VOTING . . . 72 a Roll Calls as Behavioral Measures . . . . 73 Selection of Senate Roll Calls . . . . . 80 Analysis of Multiple Roll Calls . . 82 A Description of Senate Firearms Roll Calls. 91 An Analysis of Senate Firearms Roll Calls 107 Guttman Scale Results - - . . ii: A Look at the Scale Extremes 132 Summary . . 134 Footnotes-~Chapter II III. FIREARMS ROLL CALLS AND OTHER ISSUES 138 Categorizing the Roll Calls . . . . . . ijg Similarities in Voting Divisions . . . . 171 Clustering Related Issues . . . . . . 177 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . v nan FIREARMS CH Roll Data Fire Sun: :a, ‘ .LJ. SWhRRI Sunn lmpl Appendix Appendix Chapter Page IV. FIREARMS VOTING AND CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS . . . . . . . 179 Roll Call Voting and Constituencies . . . 179 Data Gathering . . . . 188 Firearms Roll Calls and Constituency Characteristics . . . . . . . . 190 Summary . . . . . . . . 234 Footnotes-—Chapter IV . . . . . . . . 237 V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . 240 Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . 241 Implications of Findings . . . . . . . 251 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 l vi ck Regior *3 Order Gut Oppose 4- Oppose 3T Swpm :ih SUppOI Party .‘J‘L “€11.31 Cal helm Cal iii' Legal Cal 2:1,; Legal Ca] l \ ECOHOE i Cal .Je. Etonon Cal y ldfi' ECOnon ‘ Cal ‘ iii| C0mmun l cal III-3. III-4. III-5, III—6. III-7, III-8. LIST OF TABLES Regional Voting on Roll Call #39 Order of Firearms Roll Calls in Guttman Scaling Oppose All Gun Bills Oppose All Except One Gun Bill Support All Gun Bills Support All But One Gun Bill Party and State in Firearms Voting Welfare Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #66 Welfare Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #61 . Legal Procedures and Firearms Roll Call #61 . Legal Procedures and Firearms Roll Call #42 and #38 . . Economic Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Ca11#61 . . . . . . . Economic Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #42 . - - Economic Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #38 . . . . . . Communism Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Calls #61 and #66 . - - - Page 108 121 127 128 129 129 131 155 158 159 159 160 Firear- Denogr Correl Den Rol Fir Fir lnterc Var Wit 0ND COrrel Act A Table Page I III—9. State Powers and Firearms Roll l Call #66 . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 IILJD. State Powers and Firearms Roll Call #61 . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 III-11. Racial Issues and Firearms Roll Calls l #66 and #61 . . . . . . . . . . . 165 ILDTZ. Political Roll Calls and Firearms I Roll Calls #66 and #61 . . . . . . . 167 l INT—13. Political Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Calls #42 and #38 . . . . . . . 167 Ill-14. Civil Disturbance Roll Calls and ; Firearms Roll Call #66 . . . . . . . 169 l . III-15. Civil Disturbance Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #61 . . . . . . . 170 III-16. Firearms Roll Call Cluster Analysis . . . . 173 i III-l7. Firearms and Non-Firearms Roll Call Cluster . 175 ; IV~1. Demographic Variables . . . . . . . . 191 l g IV—Z. Correlation Coefficients of Population 2 Density Variables and Firearms f Roll Calls . . . . . . . . . . . 198 E IV—3. R Population Per Square Mile and a i Firearms Voting: Senate . . . . . . 200 . IV‘4- Y Population Per Square Mile and T Firearms Voting: House . . . . . . . 201 i lV«5, Intercorrelation Coefficients of Economic L Variables and Correlation Coefficients g with Firearms Voting . . . . . . . . 203 i IV-6. House Districts: Median Dollar Value—- 1 Owner Occupied Units and Firearms Voting . 205 I , ; IV—7. Correlation Coefficients of Hunting Activity and Gun Voting by State . . . . 210 viii l Ii. Correl Per and IT. Firear Ill. Correl Fir of . '1 ‘ -WH. 1' ant Par :5“. Correl To: 3-13. Compar be: Der Tar % Table | IV-8. IV-9. l IV—lZ. IV-13. IV-lO. IV-ll. Correlation Coefficients Between Percentage of Population--Negro and Firearms Voting Firearms Voting and Selected Urban Areas Correlation Coefficients Between Firearms Voting and Measures of Electoral Competition X2 and C Statistics for Analysis of Party Firearms Voting . Correlation Coefficients Between Firearms Voting and Selected Variables Comparison of Correlation Coefficients Between Firearms Voting and POpulation Density Using all Other Independent Variables . . . . . . . ix Page 215 218 230 This is IQLIIOIEIS‘Y OVCI iiiiu‘d)‘ 01‘ U the United T firearms legislé 111,: issue into] .55 Congress he 2:: use and pose is question s'r sites of the E J;I;.ogue of \'ei .M 3-11. It is rea ‘2; the piece“ all include SC national queS i'tfirst chapte To date, :ilength with t ..l~i LongreSS ‘ ‘T A z I E l INTRODUCTION This is a study of the recent and continuing cmunbversy over firearms legislation. In particular it is a study of the firearms debate during the 1968 session ofthe United States Senate. Unfortunately for the analyst, lirearms legislation is an immensely complicated and vola— ‘Ule issue involving a very basic constitutional question: (Mes Congress have the constitutional authority to regulate ‘Um use and possession of firearms? The importance of fins question should be evident after reviewing the cmbates of the Senate during 1968, because chief among the cauuogue of verbal symbols used by opponents of gun restrictions were those associated with the Second Amend~ nwnt. It is reasonable, therefore, that an investigation hub the proceedings of the Senate firearms controversy wouhlinclude some documented investigation of the con~ :nitutional question itself. That question is raised in ‘Um first chapter of this study. To date, there is only one academic study dealing atlength with the topic of firearms legislation in the 9OUiCbngress—-The Congressional Quarterly Almanac for L928. However, sometimes 511 if; maintains t reins of Sout :ggrsing firearr §:;,re55men and ::isob\'ious t1" giiote does 11' Senate and House namely stror try of the fire 11% crerall pat‘, 3,5 regional sc CQ also “0f the dim inotomy is of 1115,0115 0f cons. ibbmhicai f ieiinition, i.e LIlSeWatiVes' 317911510115 Of a is: not Seek t View Split 1 ‘e is StFor... b h~'- . ulltlon, as d :‘JUR . .ot the r01 Ar etontlusion T—— 1968. However, it deals with the topic in only a loose 2 mnlsometimes summary fashion. The Congressional Quarterly (an maintains that the gun control vote can be explained hiterms of Southern and Western Congressmen and Senators qmosing firearms restrictions and Eastern and Midwestern Congressmen and Senators supporting such legislation. But itis obvious that a simple regional description of the gmivote does little to explain the real nature of the Senate and House firearms votes. In addition, although a nwderately strong regional pattern appears in force on mmny of the firearms roll calls, there are departures frbm Um overall pattern within many of the regions. In sum, ' HTS regional schema has limited value. CQ also puts forth a conservative-liberal explana— Ubn of the division on firearms. The conservative—liberal dichotomy is of doubtful value, however, in that the defi~ intions of conservative and liberal are not based on a mndosophical foundation but rather on a regional-party defhfition, i.e., Republicans and Southern Democrats are cmwervatives. In addition to avoiding the philosophical mensions of a conservative-liberal dichotomy, the CQ cbes not seek to test the existence of a conservative— liberal split in terms of issue orientation. Moreover, Umre is strong evidence to suggest that the conservatiVe coalition, as defined by CO, Was not operative during fmn of the roll calls votes on firearms in the Senate. The conclusion seems warranted that regional and :‘r:. 1..” :2 .ti 1.5 C011 13' CI .1 50516 i 3 regional-partisan explanations of the vote, while not lacking in validity, are incomplete. There are at least two other considerations that detract from the Congressional Quarterly‘s use of the con— servative coalition concept. First, it is held by CO that Um conservative coalition is in effect only when a major— ity of Republicans and Southern Democrats vote similarly misome issue. We may question this from a number of standpoints: First, what value is there in using a con— cept that is always right by definition, that is non— falsifiable, that may be mere tautology; what value is flwre in using a normative concept that distinguishes Imither philosophically nor in terms of issues; can it be said there is no orchestrated conservative cooperation whmra majority of Republicans and Southern Democrats do rmt vote on the same side of an issue? Second, on the seven Senate roll call votes during which CQ maintains Hm conservative coalition was in operation, there are significant numbers of Republicans and, in a few cases, some Southern Democrats voting differently than the ”con— servative majority.” These alarming departures are inex— plicable within the definitional matrix of CQ‘s ”conserva— tive coalition." This study begins where Congressional Quarterly leaves off. Analysis is with a few exceptions limited to Um United States Senate from 1967 to 1968. I have chosen urexplore this controversy over firearms for two reasons: ll 4 , Ifirst, there is presently no thorough academic documenta— l thniof the full content and scope of the recent Senate fin‘House) debate on firearms. Second, eXploration of Hmacontending arguments and the forces behind them will lwlp to place in better perspective a debate that is likely to be with us for some time to come. But there are zflso questions at the immediate level of normal human r mndosity which ask for answers. Why were bills strictly regulating the use of firearms debated so heatedly and i extensively in Congress? Why were some forms of regulation, such as the banning of mail order sales, acceptable, while 'Um registration of firearms was unacceptable? There is inisimple explanation of the Congressional action, which should be of no surprise to anyone. The systematic expla- : rmtion of Congressional activities on gun legislation must I take into account many variables which is in part the reason for the breadth of this study. The basic approach of this research model assumes flmt Senate proponents and opponents on gun legislation cmibe differentiated by the construction of ideal types MUch are defined in a behavioral sense rather than awstractly in a philoSOphically deductive sense. Analysis of UM>Senate begins by identifying concrete positions on leicy questions and forming behavioral profiles for gun 1egislation proponents and opponents. Two propositions are incorporated under this gen- enfl.approach. First, it is held that roll call behavior 1_—___’ 5 migun legislation can be used to construct indices of cnmosition and support among Senators for firearms regu— latflnn It is also held that firearms roll call voting can be related to roll call behavior on a number of other issues decided by the Senate in 1968. These issues huflude welfare legislation, law enforcement and criminal Inocedures, foreign policy questions, and the military. Thelwpothesis is that Senators divide on these issues in :fiwhion similar to their division on gun legislation and Umt these divisions will offer one distinguishing dimen— sion for the profiles. The second proposition holds voting on firearms restrictions is related to State demographic characteris- tics. These characteristics include concepts such as lnbanization, ethnic and racial heterOgeneity, levels of mmmstic violence, income distribution and prOperty ‘wflues, work force configurations, levels of educational auminment, types of economic activity, partisan identifi— of the present debate and as will become clear no lexicon, nor any manipulation of meaning, will settle the issue in a reasonable manner. The attempt at literal interpretation fails to produce agreement. Philosophical deductive reasoning frequently is Lmed to augment arguments built on literal interpretation. The deduction, here, begins with the rather simple premise Umt men have a natural obligation, and a concomitant lunural right, for self-defense. From this natural obli- yfldon and right is deduced the obligation and concomitant right to personally possess the means of self-defense. Ihpm the premise that these rights and obligations are rmtural to the individual is deduced the principle that socufl.or political interference post-dates the right; therjght is not a product of the state and, therefore, it cmwmt be abrogated by political or social manipulation. The English Bill of Rights (1689) is taken as the grmuzand original statement of the unimpeachable right of Unaindividual to defend himself with appropriate ~weaponry. The Bill specifies that, "the subjects which aneprotestants, may have arms for their defense as allowed by law."2 Setting aside the rather obvious gap between lmunmge in the Bill and the interpretation above, it is hneresting to note that the English view the Glorious Rewflntion and its Bill of Rights not as revolution but as 13 rehmtatement: the Bill of Rights does not by law promul— gafi3a new set of rights for Englishmen, but reasserts and codifies fundamental rights existing in the traditions of Um nation. Edmund Burke, in Reflections on the French Ikvolution, gives the most eloquent and forthright expres- simiof this view, making it clear that the Glorious Revol- Lnion returned the nation to its legal traditions.3 Burke's implicit as well as compelling assumption is that the rights are not dependent for existence on the mums of legislative action. Indeed, the whole line of argmwnt is faintly reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes who chduces from the natural order of things the natural obli— gafion to remain in symphony with that order; and from the mnigation he deduced the natural right to certain things. Sealin this light, a right to have arms is founded on prhmiples existing prior to political or social arrange- mmfis. Men may possess arms not by the grace of the state Mm by their very being and their obligation to nature and themselves. The foregoing example of deductive argument has Mmrecise empirical groundings, for there is no scientific Way to examine the components of man's essential nature, especially the abstract qualities of obligation and right. th we have instead is a good example of proof by defini~ fion for if the premise that man naturally possesses cer— tahlabsolutely inviolable rights is accepted, then it mmt be asserted that they are indeed inviolate, even by 'r———.—+— w 14 9 gnwernment. The deductive method allows drawing conclu- shnw, given certain premises, but there is no objective vmy to determine the correctness of these premises. It (mes little good to cite that Hobbes, and especially Locke, wndd agree that the basic rights of man are never alien- zfled by social or political contract, for this does little nmre than establish a historical belief in these premises. Even though history cannot be used to resolve the issue of correctness when dealing with metaphysical pre- IMses, an examination of history ought to tell us in what regard these premises have been held. Locke and Hobbes nwy prove little, but their historical impact, the impact dfothers, and the events of history may provide us with { arnbfile of meaning that can be related to the Second 1mmndment. Very simply, the task is one of deciding how Um subject of arms and their regulation has been treated inifistory. In particular, has the having of arms been recognized as a collective right or as an individual right hiEnglish and American legal traditions? Is there prece— dmuzfor limiting the conditions under which arms may be lmrne? Is there precedent for denying the possession of amm altogether? I intend to avoid the issue of whether mmrdo have a natural and unimpeachable right to bear arms mkldetermine instead what the practice has been in the past. . _..———— ___'————-—-.._. 1'? 15 The Anglo-Saxon Imprint There appears to have been no common law guarantee of bearing arms comparable to the right to trial by jury or the necessity of having legislative approval for taxa— tion.4 Indeed, there are specific instances in English law of the bearing of arms being disallowed. The most cmmwnly cited early legislation is the Statute of North- }mmpton (1328) which specifies that no man could be ”armed by night or by day in fairs, markets, nor in the presence . . . . S ofjustices or other ministers. ." The Forest and Game Law in the British Code also offer evidence of early reyflation on not only the uses to which weapons could be applied, but the places and manner in which arms might be borne. These views are further recorded in a number of early judicial cases.6 A more serious limiting precedent in English legal lustory involves prohibitions against the possession of arms. Under the Statutes of Charles II we find, ”that no person who had no lands of yearly value of 100 pounds, oflmr than the son and heir of an esquire or other persons oflfigher degree" could even keep a gun.7 At least in the seventeenth century the common law ”right” to have and keg)arms is nothing more than a class right, a right of Um privileged, for the message from Charles II is clear Umt the low born and the unpropertied are not to be armed. Wm tradition of limiting possession has been continued in England with such legislation as the Gun License Act (1870), l6 Um Pistols Act (1903), and the Firearms Act (1937), all of which have variously restricted the use of firearms in England. It is necessary to conclude that statutory and cmmwn law recognition is given early in English history to um limitation of arms possession. There is no doubt that the militia (or collective) bearing of arms receives consistent support and approval in English Common Law. Blackstone notes King Alford (871-899) organized the first militia and ”made all subjects of his dominion soldiers.”8 This probably begins England's tra- ditional regard for the citizen army or the militia and lflackstone's interpretation of it is probably the basis for the modern belief that a common duty to bear arms exists, for "all subjects were made soldiers.” The feudal tradition of ”knight service” was required of a Lord until 1660; thus the concept of militia duty had a long and rich lflstory. But the popularity of a militia defense was not simply the product of the desire to have a home grown army, for the militia was principally meant to provide a check against the potential excesses of standing armies. The escapades of King John and his standing army are the pro- bable progenitures of the common law distrust of standing ammes, a distrust strengthened by the excesses of the peacetime standing army prior to the Glorious Revolution. 'Uw armed citizenry, or more literally an armed nobility wiflrtenants, provided the principal mode of defense Q. .. . 1 .1 .\ 11 L . 1 x . I v . 1 .1 .\u e v. A 11 u 1. y\ . L a \ r h n1.u 1k L1- 1; L .\. «\n v1\ v1 (1» H T. C . .J ,1 f N. 1 . t c . .\.. Hwy 1 .1 In ..1. 1\ t g .. .. . . . .. f. . .. .. .. .w .A. \I :1 w. .1. l, . U ‘___— 17 against both external and internal enemies at least until Um restoration of the Stuarts in 1660.9 Although the ”right to bear arms” is often repeated without reference to militias, it is plain that Um origin of the concept is intimately linked to the ypwth of an English reliance on militias. Both the obli— gafion and right to bear arms is opposite to the idea of a government army in the English tradition.lo But for some the individual obligation to join in the nation's afllective non—professional defense is distilled to pro— mme an individual right to arms for both the defense of Imtion and of self.11 By what tortuous logic a collective any becomes an essential individual right is unclear. Nevertheless the argument is that if the duty of the citi— zmiis to arm himself for participation in an organized 1m1itia his need to possess appropriate arms cannot be denied.12 If the militia tradition is considered together wiflrstatutory regulations up to 1689, a number of conclu— mons are warranted. First, the common law tradition Miows regulation of the use, carrying, and possession of amm, such that no generally inviolable right can be emserted. Second, the conception of a militia (collective immed citizenry) appears to be the only context within much the private possession and carrying of arms is given MW khuiof hearing. This does not establish a principle flat the possession and carrying of arms cannot be l8 1 regulated; nor does it suggest the keeping of arms is necessarily to be tolerated outside militia service. Third, the private possession of arms for militia service seems to be derived only from the obligation that the arms Inst be privately supplied. Fourth, in the absence of a clearly stated right to possession for private reasons one Imwt presume that any Eight to arms is dependent on the duty to serve in a militia. The right cannot be taken as a first-order individual right, but only concomitant to acollective duty. Blackstone is in agreement with this latter point for not only does he relegate the bearing of arms to a second or third level right but states plainly that the bearing of arms is to be regulated under normal statutory law: . no man should take up arms, but with a view to defend his country and its laws. . . . Rights consist primarily, in the free employment of personal security, of personal liberty, and private property. 80 long as these remain invio- late, the subject is perfectly free;. . . . to 1 vindicate these rights when actually attacked or violated, the subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and free course of justice in the courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning of the king and parliament for redress of grievances; and lastly, to the right of having and using arms for self- preservation and defense. (But the bearing of arms) are to be suitable to (the) condition and degree gof the subject), and such as are allowed by law. 3 Traditions prior to 1689 offer no real support for filindividual and inviolate right to bear arms. However, 0PPonents of restrictive gun legislation take great joy in 1markening back to the English Bill of Rights (1689) as 19 1 the written expression of the absolute right to keep and bear arms. Is this, indeed, the case? The Bill specifies ‘%hat the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law."14 Two important qualifications in the language of Hm Bill itself severely circumscribe its support of an absolute individual right. In the first instance the right to have arms is clearly subject to statutory law for the citizen may have arms but only ”as allowed by law.” hithe absence of restrictions over what the law may dis~ allow, the conclusion is plain; the right to bear arms is that as legislation allows. The second qualification centers about the religious qualification in the Bill. It is unlikely that all non— Protestants are excluded from this right of having arms. mu if this were the case, the blow is devastating, for Um right would come not from nature and deep English tradition but from membership in a religion, itself short filtradition. What is more likely, however, is that this provision in the Bill of Rights served to redress the umalance between Protestants and Catholics in respect to flm possession of arms. Indeed, the complaints against James II specifically included that "several good subjects, being protestants, [were] disarmed, at the same time when Papists were both armed and employed, contrary to law."15 And as one observer notes: 20 Parliament did not appear to be claiming for the people a right of individual self—defense or self— \ effacement, but rather the general right, as a pop- ‘ ‘ ulace, to remain armed in the face of impossible military impositions. The resulting guarantee that Protestants might have arms for their defense neces— sarily related to the political grievances against King James. . . . More specifically, the grievance underlying the guarantee was that Protestants had been deprived of weapons 'at the same time when Papists were . . . armed.’ The imposition lay more in the discrimination than in the disarming. The conclusion seems inescapable that if the mean— hg of the Second Amendment to the United States Consti— union is linked to English Common Law, it is dubious any kind of inalienable individual right to have arms can be asserted. At best, it may be ventured that the "right” marbe enjoyed only as the government will allow and only asnmintaining a militia is necessary. Settlement to Revolution The principal constitutional link between Colonial Mmrica and England is held to be the pre—Revolutionary belief that English Common Law applied equally in the New WHdd.l7 But this is too simple a position, for Colonial conditions and Colonial reinterpretations of the English Cmmmn Law altered and added to English law in a variety of ways. Significantly, most of the political leaders who launched the state on their new course did not want the citizen' 5 personal rights dependent upon the common law alone. - From the earliest times each colony only borrowed from the common law those parts which suited its peculiar circumstances. Indeed, the whole catalog of human rights which colonists reviewed during the years preceeding Lexington—Concord had been regarded not as common law rights, but as natural rights. 21 The English Common Law in respect to arms was not borrowed en toto, nor was it merely considered common law. Because the frontier was never far away and colonial revenues were short, in practice there was less regulation of arms in the colonies than in England. The private hear- ing of arms was deemed essential for not only personal defense but for the protection of the colony at large as well. The view that arms were essential to the security of the colonies is reflected in many of the original colonial charters, including Georgia's: And we do by these presents for us, our heirs and successors, will grant and ordain, that the said corporation and their successors, shall have full power for and during and until the full end and term of twenty-one years, to commence from the date of these our letters patent, by any commander or other officer or officers, by them for that purpose from time to time appoint, to train and instruct, exercise and govern a militia, FOR THE SPECIAL DEFENCE AND SAFETY OF OUR SAID COLONY. . . . [Emphasis added.)19 ’Hmre is, however, no statutory, charter, or constitutional statement in early Colonial history which would seem to alter the fundamental nature of English Common Law on the mmject of arms regulation. Specifically, there is no organic law restricting the degree to which government may Itgulate the possession and use of arms. The essential point is that the employment of arms in the Colonies was 1mmh more frequent and necessary than in England. In accordance with its needs each colony had its own militia organization generally composed of every able bodied man from l6—60. Very few males were excluded from the d1 class 22 the duty and this coupled with the general absence of class distinctions produced a readily definable egalitarian view on the possession of arms. As a result, the colonial IMlitia experience approached more closely than in England um lgyee £2 masse. Colonial conditions, therefore, pro- duced some subtle changes in one aspect of the English Common Law ”right” to bear arms: from a feudal base the colonies moved to an egalitarian conception of militia service; to meet the realities of the frontier, the pri- vate keeping and bearing of arms took on much more signi— ficance than in England. Both of these changes occurred within the general framework of existing English law as flwre is no evidence to suggest basic English philosophi- cal or constitutional principles were threatened in the Colonies. Further, there is no record of debate or com- nwnt to indicate the practice of maintaining a univer— sally—armed citizenry involved anything more than the necessities of the time. Furthermore, if a general belief hrthe fundamental right of all citizens to keep and bear amw for private reasons was held, there is no statutory record of it prior to the mid—1770's. There is more than casual academic support for the belief that Colonial America was little concerned with abstract philosophical thinking. Instead, it was mani— festly pragmatic in its approach to problem solving, poli— Heal or otherwise.20 As noted, by Louis Hartz, there was alack of class—based political oppressions characteristic 23 21 It is reasonable that the of European feudal society. absence of a specific declaration of an individual right to bear arms can be related to both the pragmatic nature of the American life and to the lack of class—based poli— tical conflict. It can be argued, in other words, that the pre-Revolutionary absence of a statutory statement on Um right to bear arms (aside from militia duty) was due to the lack of a political importance for the concept: It is difficult to locate a grievance in early colonial lustory that would necessitate the political protection of a right to bear arms. This, of course, does nothing to deny the possibility that a popular belief in the right to bear arms, for even purely personal reasons, did rmt exist. To say that it did or did not, however, would be mere conjecture at this point. The argument thus far has presented only the flfliowing: First, English Common Law in theory and prac— Uce admits that the keeping and bearing of arms is regu- latable but that nothing in colonial statutes denies this. Second, arms were in practice much more a general part of life in the colonies. Third, the militias were much more broadly inclusive of the ”people” than in England. And flnmth, there is no evidence that the keeping and bearing of arms is given a constitutional meaning different from flmt existing in English law. 24 The Revolutionary Period The bearing of arms begins to have strong political importance in the Colonies during the latter half of the lfighteenth Century. But the political furor over guns was not linked to class antagonisms;22 and it was less a matter of individual right than it was a reaction to the excesses of standing armies and the disarming of Colonial militias.23 flw basic political issue was not the guarantee of an Mmolute right to bear arms, but legal recognition of the Qflonial preference for militias over standing armies, for ‘xhe true strength and safety of every commonwealth or lhflted monarchy is the bravery of its free holders, its militia.”24 The assuming of military rule by the British cmnfled with a concerted British effort to ineffectualize Qflonial militia resistence provided ample material for revolutionary writers. The innumerable resolves, state- nwnts, and declarations seldom failed to mention the shUster activities of the British standing army or the 25 In 1774 one of the amtempts to disarm the militia. Suffolk Resolves castigated General Gage for seizing IMlitia gun powder. The tradition of importance which hmigrown around militias during the hundred years prior t01J74 was underscored at Lexington and Concord as Gmmral Gage's precipitous attempt to destroy militia amw at Concord in 1775 led to farmers shooting at red amts to protect the collective supplies of the militia. 25 In all of the political grievances of the colonists, how— ever, there is no record that the complaints included reference to a right to bear arms for private reasons. It was not the disarming of individuals per £2 which pre- cipitated colonial insecurities, but it was the disarming of the people as the militia. The actions at Lexington and Concord seem to indi- cate that the issue of arms—bearing was certainly in the forefront of the catalogue of colonial grievances. Although there is no doubt that the issue was inflammatory, its omission from the list of complaints found in the Declaration of Independence casts some doubt that its Umortance was on a par with issues of taxation or cruel mulunusual punishment. But whatever its importance rela— tive to other issues, there is no denying the issue Of arms elicited considerable debate. The debate, however, was only as it related to military excesses. Uppermost in the minds of the colonists was a fear of military rule, the two prime manifestatlons of which were the beliefs that (1) standing armies were acceptable only under the most stringent con- trol of the civil authority and only under extra- ordinary circumstances, and that (2) the m111t1a Was the proper instrument in a free society to Pro" Vide for the defense and safety of the 1nd1v1dual States. Apparently, no grievance leading or con— tributing to the Revolution involved the d1sarmlfig of an individual, and no evidence shows that eit e: the populace or the revolutionary leaders cogcelVe any individual right to bear arms as haV1ng tiIns Violated by British colonial pollCY- The 3 b 6 Of Lexington and Concord were not engendere y British intentions to disarm a Sipgie-ma36 bUt rather their move to disarm the mllltla- .1 r -1 26 As it is important to note that the early period of colonial America is marked in part by a heightened reliance on individual initiative for self—protection, it is equally important that the latter half of the period be described in terms of an increasing awareness of the Mmortance of the militia. Herein lies the beginning of a confusion over what the right to keep and bear arms prescribes. Prior to 1789 do American traditions support wrinviolable right to the personal possession of arms, or does the personal possession of arms only relate to a IMlitary obligation based on the dictum that a ”common— wealth or limited monarchy” may only remain free as its Citizens comprise the main military force? The over— whelming weight of material in the revolutionary period amports the collective meaning of the ”right.” The Principle is most apparent in some of the early state Constitutions. In North Carolina, for example, the 1776 constitution specifies That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defense of the State; and as standing armies, in h time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, they oug t not to be kept up; and that the military should b: kept Under strict subordination to, and governed y the civil power. The key ideas are “for the defense of the State” and the references to the military, for they indicate the over— fiding attachment of the concept of arms bearing to military “utters, These concepts are also recorded in the 1776 Declaration of Rights in Virginia, for the only reference to-um People having arms is for militia duty: 11: 27 That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the e0 1e, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and gOVerned by, the civil power.28 [Emphasis Added.) There are some notable exceptions to this general view, however. The early enumeration of rights in Pennsyl— vania and Vermont support not only a collective bearing of arms but an individual one as well: Pennsylvania: That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the c1v11 power.29 [Emphasis Added.] Vermont: That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the State; and, as standing armies, in the time of peace, are danger- ous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and . that the military should be kept pnder StIlCE subordi— nation to, and governed by, the c1v11 power. [Emphasis Added.] Um effect of these two provisions is to give a new world statutory credence to the right to bear arms for personal (mfense. It is particularly interesting in view of the Ith that the Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges, ”which Continued in force from 1701 until 1776 and was the most articulate declaration of rights of man laid down prior . 31 t0 the Revolution,” omitted mention of such a right. Wm inclusion of an independent right in Pennsylvania canprobably be attributed to the fact that radical factlonS were in control of the Pennsylvania drafting convention; mrthe whole, the document is much more radical than the 28 g Virginia declaration.32 In the state constitution making immediately following the Virginia and Pennsylvania con— ventions, however, the rest of the states, with the exception of Vermont, either neglected the issue of arms and militias or followed the Virginia preference for a collective construction. Vermont's departure is partially the result of the influence of Dr. Young (one of the ‘dadicals" who had drawn up the Pennsylvania constitution), and partially because the Vermont convention was also nmre disposed to radical ventures.33 For example, Vermont apparently intended to abolish slavery and indentured servitude altogether, a position quite radical for the period. But the overriding tenor of the postnPennsylvania convention period was to support only the right to keep arms for the common defense and further to place such rights in articles dealing broadly with the issue of the military: Massachusetts, 1780: The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to lib- erty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority and be governed by it. The predominate mood in these early constitutions, and the one later reflected in the Second Amendment, is Hmt collective defense implies something more than a loosely organized group of private citizens. Indeed, Phrases such as "well-regulated," and "under exact sub— ordination to, and governed by, the civil power" meant to u .-. -_;.;-_~1._==-.rn. 2 9 j comvey the restricted nature of the collective bearing of arms. In 1833 Justice Story queries: ”. . . how is it practicable to keep a people duly armed without some ”35 organization, it is difficult to see. Granted, the force of Story's lament is pitched toward a declining huerest in militia duty, but the implicit meaning is also clear--militias require not only an armed citizenry, mm regulations of the ways in which those arms should be Imed. And in the words of another observer: To quote Bishops Statutory Crimes, section 793: 'In reason the keeping and bearing of arms has reference to war and possibly also to insurrec- tions where the forms of war are so far as pos~ sibly observed.‘ The phrase itself, 'to bear arms,’ indicates as much. The single individual or the unorganized crowd, in carrying weapons, is not spoken of or thought of as 'bearing arms.‘ The use of the phrase suggests ideas of a military nature. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights In the deliberations of the Philadelphia Convenn Hon, there is no record of any proposal recognizing an hMividual right to possess weapons.37 George Mason‘s mwuccessful attempt to include language identifying the nulitia as the recognized guardian against the excesses 0f standing armies is the closest the Convention appears 38 to have come to the issue. For most of the convention Hm delegates avoided the general issue of a Bill of Rights; 'Where apparently was general agreement that the new Imtional government would not infringe the state bills of 39 rights," Following the Convention, one of the Federalist 30 arguments was that no bill of rights was needed as rights were already protected under state constitutions. The Convention had previously seemed disposed toward accepting this argument and, along with it, the state preferences for the generally collective meaning described in the pre— vious section. This is not surprising as the Convention was more concerned with creating an operational government and enumerating powers than in listing rights. Not only was Mason's proposal for a prefatory bill of rights rejected, but many of the later piecemeal attempts to include state— nwnts of rights also met with rebuff.4O Nevertheless, as the frame of national powers began to take shape in the Convention, Pickney, Gerry, Mason and Randolph became the leading spokesmen against the failure to include a bill of rights. The exclusion erupted into frenzied anti—federalist activity both during and after the Convention with George Mason's ”Objections to the Pro- posed Federal Constitution” becoming the chief rallying cry over the issue of a bill of rights. But there is no nwntion in Mason's catalogue of Philadelphia omissions of Um need to secure an individual right to arms. Instead, Um only relevant referense is that, "there is no declara- tion of any kind. . . . against the dangers of standing armies in time of peace.”41 It seems that Mason, the great advocate of a bill of rights, saw militias and standing armies as the chief issues, not whether or not individuals should possess arms.42 31 '7' The weight of anti-federalist arguments (combined with the state practice of including a bill of rights) seriously threatened passage of the Constitution. From late 1787 through 1788 the controversy boiled during the ratification debates of the several states. Delaware gave first and unanimous approval to the proposed consti- tution, apparently with little or no debate. Pennsylvania, the second to ratify, gave no official recognition to the anti—federalist call for a bill of rights but anti-federal- ist opposition was strong and produced a public call out" side the Convention for a bill of rights in amendatory form. ”Robert Whitehill, William Findley, and John Smilie, all from the western part of the state . . . were outspoken champions of the anti~federalist cause."43 Meeting at lbrrisburg, the anti—federalists proposed a number of amendments including: That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves, their state, or the United States, and for killing game, and no law shall be enacted for disarming the people except for crimes committed or in a case of real danger of public injury from individuals, and standing armies shall not be kept up in time of peace, and the military shall be subordinate to the civil power. There is a clear intent here, and consistent with the earlier Pennsylvania Constitution, to declare a personal right to possess arms. Along with the reaffirmation of filindividual right for purposes of self—defense, we note the first instance of a right to hunt, probably owing to the western-frontier character of much of Pennsylvania. 32 New Jersey and Georgia followed Pennsylvania in ratifying the Constitution: in each there was less debate multhe vote was unanimous. Connecticut ratified the Con- stitution with no call for a bill of rights. ”The meager records of the Connecticut Convention reveal no objections over the omission of a bill of rights in a state which had nmre than a hundred years of experience with written guarantees for personal liberty."45 Massachusetts became the first state to recommend Um amendatory adoption of a bill of rights. None of the Massachusetts nine proposals, however, contains a right to bear arms, collectively or individually.46 During the Convention, Samuel Adams did propose an amendment smacking of an individual right, but later voted against it himself. Maryland approved the Constitution without formal amend— nwnt, but a committee recommended later that 13 proposals be considered by the first Congress; none of them dealt with a collective or an individual right to arms. South Carolina ratified the Constitution while proposing some amendments, none of which were related to the question of arms. New Hampshire proposed twelve amendments, seven of 7 Much are now found in the first Ten Amendments to the Con- stitution. The Twelfth proposed amendment stipulated, 'What Congress shall never disarm any citizen except fimh as are or have been in actual rebellion.”48 There is every reason to believe an individual right to arms is being asserted here, but obviously not one which can 33 countenance or support armed revolution: Bearing arms is RH‘the protection of oneself against nature and other men or in defending the nation against internal or external threats. It is likely Virginia's ratification, with pro— posed amendments, had the most profound effect on the nature of the first Ten Amendments to the Constitution. '%part from the political generalities set forth in the first seven articles, and the Tenth and Twelfth every specific provision in the Virginia proposals later found a place in the Federal Constitution, except the one allow~ ing conscientious objectors to avoid being armed if they hired substitutes."49 Seventeenth, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia com- posed of the body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State. That standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and protection of the Community will admit; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power. Nineteenth, That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead. There is ample evidence that the Virginia debates cwer possessing arms were in one way or another always linked to militias. The bone of contention in the Vir- ghfia Ratification Convention was the belief that the Ikderal government possessed a residual power under the {Hoposed Constitution to disarm state militias. The states 34 Hwy have been disposed to allow the Federal government eXpanded military discretion, but they were not willing u>surrender all of their own potential for raising mili— tary forces. There is no evidence to support the claim th the Virginia Amendments intended to directly protect a.citizen's right to bear arms, but only indirectly to In the first prevent the disarming of state militias. place, historians are in general agreement that the term 'tearing arms" is a military concept. Second, the first sentence of Proposition Seventeen explicitly places the twaring of arms in a military context. Third, the debates hithe Ratification Convention support a clear intent to Feller and Cot- protect the viability of state militias. ting have summarized the relevant portions of that debate as follows: The militia clause of the Constitution proved to be the subject of extensive debate.. In response to entreaty to state his specific objections to the Constitution, Patrick Henry expressed inter alia the alarm among the Anti-Federalists that 'you (the state legislature) are not to have the right of having arms in your own defense.’ Mr. Less of West- moreland, a member of the Federalist camp, rose next 'I cannot understand the implication of to reply: the honorable gentleman, that because Congress may arm the militia, the states cannot do it . . . The states, are, by no part of the plan before you, pre~ eluded from arming and disciplining the militia, should Congress neglect it.‘ This exchange illustrates the precise point of Federalist and Anti~Feder~ The former contention between . . alist on the need for a bill of rights. declared that, since the Constitution established government of enumerated powers, no bill of rights . Anti—Federalists, however, was necessary. . . argued that many powers could be implied from the enumerated ones and, therefore, a bill of rights was required to preserve certain liberties. 35 Nowhere does it appear that the delegates to the Virginia Convention were concerned with a supposed individual right to carry weapons. The New York ratification included a grab bag of proposed amendments but none of these which had not already been proposed by previous state ratifying conven— Hons were ultimately adopted in the Federal Bill of Rights.52 The package did include, however, the following: That the People have a right to keep and bear Arms; that a well regulated militia, including the body of the People capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural and safe defense of a free State;53 [Emphasis Added.] Particular attention should be placed on the phrase ”the people capable of bearing arms," for the implication is that only some people may possess arms under provisions of fins amendment. Specifically, it is only that portion of Um populace capable of military service who would seem to have a right to bear arms. The capitalization of the \prd ”People” in the first clause should also lead to Hewing the word in its collective and political sense. North Carolina recommended an arms provision which was wonhfor—word, the same as Virginia's. Madison Proposes The general strategy in the state ratifying conven— tions had been to accept the Constitution as written, but wiflrthe clear understanding that recommended amendments would be submitted to the first Congress for consideration. It is generally considered that Madison was the principal muhor of the first Ten Amendments to the Constitution. 36 Madison‘s agreement to author the amendments probably stems from the compromise in Virginia, which resulted in Um acceptance of the Constitution, but only after the Federalists agreed to push for the proposed Virginia amendments.S4 In addition, Madison felt honor—bound to a campaign pledge to support a bill of rights.55 More importantly, Madison was concerned that intemperant pro- posals could ruin the fabric of the new Constitution and Hum wished to lead the movement for a bill of rights and squash attempts at altering the basic structure of the document. As Madison himself writes: The friends of the Constitution. . . . wish the revisal to be carried no further than to supply additional guards for liberty, without abridging the sum of power transferred by the States to the general Government or altering previous to trial the particular structure of the latter. On June 8, 1789, Madison offered his package of amendments and they included an arms provision remarkably similar to sections 17 and 19 of the Virginia Ratification Convention's proposed amendments. The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person. The language of this amendment presents us with an inter- pretative conundrum: does the second phrase establish an individual right to possess arms, or must that phrase be set in the meaning of the entire amendment and interpreted H)provide a collective-militia right only? Literal inter there is me Iadis propo ma an an sms' 53113: ha ‘CHSC Ihe H I GIT). D'mead.n 37 interpretation will not provide an adequate answer for there is no way of determining which of the above positions is necessarily correct. It is evident, however, that hhdisons' language is very close to that of the Virginia prOposals, and the analysis of the Virginia wording, vdflch indicated a collective meaning, can be extended to an analysis of Madison's wording. More importantly, Madi- sons' last clause clearly places the balance of meaning on the side of relating the bearing of arms to the need of maintaining militias. The right of the people to bear arms can be seen as a concomitant to a ”fundamental maxim of free government": the militia is the best defense for a free country.58 There is no evidence from Madison's pen, (n from preceeding debate in Virginia, that anything but preventing the disarming of militias was the issue at hand. In Congress, Anti~Federalists did not clearly com- nmnt on the existence of an individual right to possess arms. Madison's prOposal was altered during House and Senate debates. There is no record of debate in the Senate; the House Journal shows debate was confined to the conscientious objector clause. The principal issues in the House debate are represented below in the remarks of Gerry and Benson: Gerry: This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against the mal- administration of the government; if we would suppose that, in all cases, the rights of the peo- ple would be attended to, the occasion for guards of this kind would be removed. Now, I am (4-,; 1 bur» 38 apprehensive, sir, that this clause would give an opportunity to the people in power to destroy the constitution itself. They can declare who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent them from bearing arms. What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty. Now, it must be evident that, under this provision, together with their other powers, Congress could take such measures with respect to a militia, as to make a standing army necessary. Now, if we give a discretionary power to exclude those from militia duty who have religious scruples, we may as well make no provisions on this head. For this reason he wished the words to be altered so as to be confined to persons belonging to a religious sect scrupulous of bearing arms Benson: Mr. Benson moved to have the words 'but no person religiously scrupulous shall be compelled ‘ to bear arms,‘ struck out. He would always leave ‘ it to the benevolence of the Legislature for, modify it as you please, it will be impossible to express it in such a manner as to clear it from ambiguity. The House debate calls no attention to a supposed natural right to bear arms individually, but centers on the issue of whether, on religious grounds, anyone may object to the bearing of arms in the militia. Nor is there anything in am debate in the House to suggest the accepted usage of the phrase ”to bear arms" as a military one was altered hiany way. The House terminated its own debate on the Amendments, after a short time, and referred the fate of the Amendments to a select committee of eleven to hammer out final language. The committee made two important changes in Madison's wording concerning the soon to become Second Amendment. First, it reversed the order of the first two phrases giving, to some, a much stronger 39 nfilitia-relatedness to the right to bear arms. Second, it defined the militia as ”composed of the body of the e0 1e,” makin it clear militias were not sim l indi~ P P g P Y viduals, but the corporate armed strength of the citizenry The committee version read: A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but no person reli— giously scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.6 Senate action on the arms amendment produced the final wording for what was to become the Second Amendment. Two changes from the House version were adopted. First, the conscientious—objector clause was dropped and although there is no way of knowing the reason, it is possible an argument similar to Benson's was put forth in the Senate. If this was the case, the dropping of the clause was done for linguistic reasons: there being no way to guarantee the exclusion without offering the Federal government a means of subverting state maintenance of militias. The Senate also dropped reference to the militia as "composed of the body of the people," and we are presented no reason why. Feller and Gotting have referred to the Senate changes as follows: The Senate wording was again changed to the form which was finally adopted as the second amendment. If the various alterations of Madison‘s original offering were the result of anything other than stylistic considerations, there is no record of it. The central idea, that the people of the states had a right to be protected against the devitalizing of the state militia, remained intact. In short, the right to keep and bear arms is the right to maintain an effective militia.61 tiona the S C3565 40 Judicial Interpretation The continuous interpretation given to Constitu- tional prOVisions by the judicial system has not bypassed the Second Amendment, although the number of relevant cases at the Federal level is small The Supreme Court has had only a few opportunities to rule directly on the applicability of the Second Amendment. U.S. v Cruikshank (1876) presented the Court with an opportunity to make its first direct interpretation of the Second Amendment.63 In the opinion of the Court the Second Amendment guaranteed no absolute personal or collective right to bear arms The second amendment declares that [the right]. . . . shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen means no more than that it shall not.be infringed by Congress. ' This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government. .64 The effect of the Cruikshank opinion is to restrict the powers of the Federal Government alone, leaving, we may presume, no restraint on state regulation of arms The dec151on is consistent with other Supreme Court rulings of fiw time, most notably Hurtaldo v California in 1884 65 This dec1s1on, involving questions of due process, qua11~ fied other guarantees in the Bill of Rights by restricting the applicability of the Bill of Rights only to actions of the Federal government The whole process of generally restricting the Bill of Rights to Federal activities led Justice Black, in 1940, to suggest ”the states had been given leave to violate with impunity" the whole range of personal rights and immunities guaranteed under the B111 41 of Rights.66 The issue here, however, is not whether the applicability of the Bill of Rights should be so restricted by the Court, but that the Cruikshank decision has not been over-ruled by the Court. The Second Amendment remains today restricted to Congressional and Presidential actions, even though the Court has, in the last thirty years, extended the protections of many of the other Ten Amend— nmnts to include state activity.67 In Presser v Illinois (1886) the Court Upheld the nwaning of the Cruikshank decision, but also spoke more directly to the militia-relatedness of the Second Amend— ment.68 The bearing of arms in respect of militia duty was held not to be a ”right” guaranteed to private militia organizations. An Illinois statute forbidding ”bodies of nwn to associate together as military organizations, or to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law"69 was, therefore, held to be constitu— tional. The meaning of the decision is to strike out the notion that private groups are afforded the right to bear arms under protections of the Second Amendment. Nuough what may be obiter digta, the Court seems to go even further and suggest the Amendment affords protections Only to those who qualify for militia service: It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable Of bearing arms constitute the reserved military f0rce or reserve militia of the United States as Well as of the States, and, in view of this prer- antive of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States cannot, even lay— lng aside the constitutional prOViso in question 42 out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.70 The Court never makes clear in the Presser decision, how— ever, whether the Second Amendment simply guarantees a conditional or class right to bear arms: namely, only those capable of military service may bear arms. What appears more important in the Presser decision is that states cannot infringe on the powers of the National govern— ment in maintaining a national militia. The meaning is notably the reverse of that in the Cruikshank decision, for, whereas there the Federal government is prohibited from disarming citizens, the Presser decision makes apparent that the states are also restricted as they may not inter- fere with national prerogative in maintaining an armed citizenry for the national defense. It is worthy of note that the Presser decision refers only to the concept of a right to arms as it relates to the necessity of maintaining a militia. Two subsequent cases heard before the turn of the century added weight to the view that the Second Amendment refers only to the National government. In Miller v Texas 0894), the Court upheld the authority of the state to Prohibit the carrying of dangerous weapons.71 In Robert~ son v Baldwin (1897), the Court upheld a similar provision.72 Some have held, however, that the Robertson View on arms was dictum and, therefore, not truly controlling.73 43 In U.S. v Miller (1939) the Court first squarely net the issue of Federal regulations of firearms.74 The effect of this decision was to qualify the rather broad prohibition against Federal interference first stated in Cruikshank. The Miller decision dealt with the National Firearms Act of 1934. Among other things, it outlawed the interstate transportation of unregistered shotguns whose barrel lengths were under 18 inches. The nub of the Miller decision was: In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a 'shotgun having a barrel length of less than eighteen inches in length' at this time has some reasonable rela— tionship to the preservation of efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.75 This opinion is of insurmountable importance for it indicates the first explicit High Court recognition of the principle that the Second Amendment protects a collective right only. Importantly, it sets the principle that Federal regulation may restrict the bearing and the keeping of arms not related to militia service. Therefore, the individual right to keep and bear arms, not so related, is restrictable. Being consistent with the ”Ashwander mnes,” however, the Court did not explicitly enumerate Um collective principle alluded to above. Rather, as Feller and Gotting point out, "it preferred to dispose of Hm case on what was essentially a matter of proof, adopting FIIIf_________________________________——_7 44 the familiar qualification that the right covered only 76 The weapons ordinarily used in civilized warfare." logic is clear, however, that the court implicitly had in mind the principal of a collective right. And there is explicit lower court approval for the collective interpre— tation, for in U.S. v Adams (1935) the bearing of arms was held to be related ”to the collective body and not to ”77 This lower court ruling preceeded individual rights. | the Miller case by four years, and yet was not over-ruled by that decision. The Miller case, far from settling the issue of ' the right to bear arms, has left a great residue of con— fusion: what may be regulated and in what manner? Although arms may be required to have a ”reasonable relationship to Um preservation of a well regulated militia,”78 in prac— tice, modern warfare can be shown to exclude few if any arms from its warehouse of efficient devices. The logical extension of the Miller Case is that tanks, bazookas, machine guns and anti—personnel devices are not regulable by the Federal government. Extending this line of argu- nwnt by way of the Presser decision, we might also conclude that states are also prohibited from such interference. And in carrying the argument to its most extreme but pernicious bounds, atomic bombs are also a matter of private weaponry. It is doubtful that the Court, the National Rifle Association, or any other group would consciously advocate 45 pushing the logic of the Miller argument to its extreme. Additionally, however, the argument can be posed that the Miller argument excludes any arm from private ownership and maintenance: Arguable, the Court's use of the phrase 'reasonable relationship to the preservation of efficiency of a well regulated militia' justifies a more circumspect implication, that at the present time when the state militia is armed through the state government, no privately owned weapons bear a reasonable relation- ship to the maintenance of the militia's effective— ness. This argument consciously recognizes that practically, if th in theory as well, militias are no longer composed of farmers with home—grown flint locks but are professional, semi—standing armies, supplied with a sophisticated weaponry so costly that only the Federal government can afford supplying much of it. Two Circuit Court cases subsequent to the Miller decision have shed some light on these issues. In 1942 the First Circuit Court in Cases v United States called close attention to the argument that extensions of the Miller case could be used to put down nearly any regula- ton whatsoever: Apparently, then, under the Second Amendment, the federal government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual as well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or use of any weapon which has any reasonable rela~ tionship to the preservation or efficiency of a well— regulated militia. However, we do not feel that the Supreme Court in this case was attempting to formu- late a general rule applicable to all cases. The rule which it laid down was adequate to dispose of the case before it and that we think was as far as the Supreme Court intended to go. At any rate the 46 hensive and complete would seem to be already out- dated, in spite of the fact that it was formulated only three and a half years ago, because of the well known fact that in the so called 'Commando Units' some sort of military use seems to have been found for almost any modern lethal weapon. In view of this, if the rule of the Miller case is general and complete, the result would follow that, under present day conditions, the federal government would be empowered only to regulate the possession or use of weapons such as a flintlock musket or a matchlock harquebus. . . . Considering the many variable factors bearing upon the question it seems to us impossible to formulate any general test by which to determine the limits imposed by the Second Amendment but that each case under it, like cases under the due process clause, must be decided on its own facts and the line between what is and what is not a valid federal restriction pricked out by decided cases falling on one side or the other of the line. rule of the Miller case, if intended to be compre— The First Circuit Court interprets the Supreme Court as not formulating a general principle but merely settling a single case in a manner most consistent with its own rules of avoiding broad issues whenever possible. But the First Circuit Court goes on to state a qualified principle of its own even after suggesting such should not be attempted: . But to hold that the Second Amendment limits the federal government to regulations concerning only weapons which can be classed as antiques or curiosities. . is in effect to hold that the limitation of the Second Amendment is absolute. . It seems to us unlikely that the framers of the Amendment intended any such result. It is explicit in this decision that the Second Amendment (hes not offer an absolute protection to the keeping and bearing of arms. Aside from settling individual cases by the use of restricted arguments, the Court is not willing 47 to provide much of a definitional boundary as to what may be regulated and how. The Court does make clear in Cases v United States that although private possession for pur- poses of maintaining a militia may well be protected under some circumstances, a person having or using an arm for reasons primarily unrelated to militia efficiency may come under legislative restriction. The Circuit Court not only applies the question of whether the arm itself is mani- festly related to militia efficiency, but asks as well whether the primary purpose of possessing such a weapon is related to the militia: . . there is no evidence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military organi- zation or that his use of the weapon under the circumstances disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the only inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the indictment was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and simply on a frolic of his own and Without any thought or intention of contributing to the effic1ency of , the well regulated militia which the Second Amendment was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free state. We are of the view that, as applied to the appellant, the Federal Firearms Act does_not. conflict with the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.82 The Third Circuit Court in United States v Tot U942) added another important view to the meaning of the Second Amendment.83 Speaking specifically to the issue of individual versus collective rights, the Court Cites lustorical data to support its view that the Second Amend- HWHt was not adopted with individual rights in mind. The Court additionally holds no absolute right to bear arms is found in common law: 48 It is abundantly clear both from the discussion of this amendment contemporanious with its proposal and adoption and those of learned writers since this amendment, unlike those providing for protec— tion of free speech and freedom of religion, was not their militia organizations against possible encroach— ments by the federal power. . . . The almost uniform course of decision in this country, where provisions similar in language are found in many of the State Constitutions, bears out this concept of the consti— tutional guarantee. . . But further, the same result is definitely indi— cated on a broader ground and on this we shoud pre- fer to rest the matter. Weapon bearing was never treated as anything like an absolute right by the common law. It was regulated by statute as to time and place as far back as the Statute of Northhampton in 1328 and on many occasions since. The decisions under State Constitutions show the upholding of regu— lations prohibiting the carrying of concealed wea- ‘ pons, prohibiting persons from going armed in certain pUblic places and other restrictions, in the nature of police regulations, but which do not go so far as substantially to interfere with the public interest protected by the constitutional mandates. In summarizing Federal Court decisions, we may note that the Supreme Court has generally upheld regulation 0f firearms, but for reasons which avoid the key constitu— tional issues. Circuit and district court opinions have also upheld the regulation, but generally giving more exPlicit treatment to these constitutional issues. Taken as a whole, the Federal Courts have; upheld numerous reEUIations as constitutional; expressed preference for a C011ective rather than an individual view of the SeCOHd Amendment; and interpreted historical antecedents as cir— Omwcribing the intended meaning of the Second Amendment. up} an ilth Jed I'h'u to P1 i i l i ii I] =— a: State Courts and Constitutions Historically, confusion over the right to bear arms is manifested in state constitutions. It is still present. It has already been noted that two state consti- tutions prior to 1789 (Pennsylvania and Vermont) had pro- visions authorizing an individual interpretation to the right to bear arms. Yet for the one hundred years follow- ing the adoption of the United States Constitution, the writing of state constitutions included many more direct references to an individual right to arms. From 1789 to 1889 twenty-four states (or 65%) had explicit provisions in their constitutions on the bearing of arms.8 Roughly half subscribed to a collective right similar to provisions in the United States Constitution, with the other half following Pennsylvania's lead in declaring an individual right to arms as well. The indi- vidual right was loosely stated as "the right of the people to bear arms in defense of themselves [Emphasis Added] and the state."86 Although no final meaning can be given to the word ”themselves,” the presumption can be made that it was included to reflect a right to arms aside from militia duty. Two of these states, however, qualified the implied individual right by allowing the legislature 87 to prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons. Virtually all sectiOns of the country are included hithe list of states subscribing to a non-militia related right, although in nearly every instance the individual {hill I iii . . 50 right was first written into the state's constitution at a time when the state had large unsettled regions or was generally sparsely populated. In these states the explicit inclusion of the right to bear arms for self! defense probably reflected the environmental necessities of the frontier.88 Later, as constitutional revisions took place in many of these states there was little change in arms provisions even though many of them had lost their frontier flavor. It is likely this is due to some retin cence to alter a bill of rights as previously written. Thus, early provisions guaranteeing an apparent individual right to bear arms were kept. In the one hundred years following the drafting of the United States Constitution, approximately one-third of the states adopted language similar to the United States Constitution and excluded explicit mention of an individual right to bear arms. Georgia and North Carolina adopted the language most closely in stating that, “a well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”89 The others adopted language less precisely in line with the National Document, but clearly failing to mention explicitly a right to arms aside from purposes for the common defense. Wording in the 1857 Constitution of Kansas is representative of this last group: 51 That the citizens of this state shall have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defense. 0 In nearly all the state constitutions having arms provisions there is a fairly consistent linguistic pattern closely associating the bearing of arms with provisions on standing armies and militias. This format either includes military references in the same article with the right to bear arms or places the article on bearing arms in close proximity to the group of articles having to do with the military. Examples of both are reproduced below: North Carolina: A well—regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up, and the military should be kept under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power. Tennessee: Section 24 That the sure and certain defence of a free people is a well-regulated militia; and as standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to freedom, they ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and safety of the com— munity will admit, and that in all cases the mili— tary shall be in strict subordination to the civil authority. Section 25 That no citizen in this State, except such as are employed in the Army of the United States or militia in actual service, shall be sub~ ject to corporal punishment under martial law. Section 26 That the freemen of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defence. Section 27 That no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner prescribed be law. 52 Section 28 That no citizen of this State shall be compelled to bear arms, provided he will pay an equivalent, to be ascertained by law.92 By way of these examples the feeling, if not the proof, is that the concept of a right to bear arms was closely associated with the idea of militia duty and with the problems of standing armies. Such a feeling may be mere tautology, however, for arms are very generally linked to ndlitary matters in the main. The simple set of points to be made is that only 65 per cent of the states had amendments guaranteeing some right to arms. Of these, half included an individual right to bear arms. With the exception of Rhode Island, Colorado and Missouri, all of these states linked the concept of arms-bearing with other military matters. The state constitutions today closely resemble the pattern outlined above for the first one hundred years following adoption of the United States Constitution. Thirty—five of the fifty states have Second Amendment type articles in their constitutions, while twenty of the thirty- five make reference to a right-to—arms aside.from providing for the militia.93 In Pennsylvania, for example, ”the right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves Uhmhasis Added.] and the state shall not be denied."94 And in Connecticut, ”Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.” From 1890 to the Present twelve states added provisions to their constitu— tions dealing with arms, and one state, California, drOpped its arms provision. For the most part the additions are the product of new states joining the Union. Seven of the twelve opted to include a personal right to arms, reflect— ing an increasing trend away from the wording of the United States Constitution, as today we may note, 60 per cent of the states with arms provisions in their constitutions identify a personal right. But there is an important qualification to be noted in regard to this trend, as eleven of the twenty states providing a personal right allow that the state legisla— tures may variously restrict the general right to keep and bear arms. Missouri, for example, allows that this right ”shall not justify the carrying of concealed wea- H96 pons. Florida provides that ”the legislature may pre— scribe the manner in which they [arms] may be borne."97 Washington precludes the authorization of ”individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men.”98 Only ten states provide for an individual right to arms in generally unrestricted language. Wyoming and South Dakota, of the states gaining admission since 1890, are .included in this last group. A general pattern in state constitutions may be seen as follows: first, roughly half of the states pro~ vide for a right to arms for purposes of selfndefense, but over half of these qualify the general nature of that right and specifically allow the state legislature to restrict the keeping and bearing of arms; the inclusion of 54 a personal right to arms is much more characteristic of state constitutions in the second one hundred years of the nation's history than in its first, although the consti— tutional enumeration of restrictions on that right are also more characteristic of the second hundred years. Sixty per cent of the state constitutions either omit reference to a right to bear arms or follow closely the wording of the United States Constitution as it relates to the militia and the common defense. Third, there is no regional pattern apparent except that the Rocky Mountain states and the South West, as well as most of the states carved out of the territory won during the War of 1812, have adopted language specifying an individual right to arms. There may be a note of the frontier in this last point, as all of these states were sparsely populated and wilderness in nature when the personal right to arms was first placed in their constitutions. This does not explain, however, why other such "frontier” states either followed the wording of the United States Constitution or neglected to provide a right to arms at all. Last, the Stylistic format of linking arms-bearing to other military issues continued in force during the second hundred years of the Republic. An examination of current statutory provisions of the states dealing with firearms clarifies these constie tutional questions. Here there is clear evidence that the right to bear arms is nowhere considered an absolute 55 and unregulable right, constitutionally guaranteed. Congressman John Dingell, of Michigan, speaking before the Senate Juvenile Delinquency Sub—Committee, estimated that ”there are over 20,000 laws governing the sale, distri— bution and use of firearms ."99 local laws prohibiting the carrying and use of firearms within city limits and there are a variety of other laws regulating firearm use. What is more important, however, is that all but five states prohibit possession of fire- arms (specifically handguns) by certain categories of people.100 Twenty states now require purchasers of hand- guns to fill out applications prior to purchase. ”All but two of these states' screening system are permissive in that they exclude individuals from owning guns only if the state can give a reason, such as a criminal record or mental incompetency."101 Handguns and concealable weapons come under much nmre restrictive sanction than do shotguns and rifles. in general this is not surprising in View of the fact that at least ten state constitutions specifically allow for regulation of such firearms. What is surprising is that UHrty-five states restrict possession of handguns without specific language in their constitutions authorizing such legislation. Only eleven states prohibit certain classes 0f people from possessing shotguns or rifles and of these eleven only seven require applications be filled out prior to purchase.102 All are familiar with 56 There is no consistent policy among the states in the registration of firearms except for handguns. Gener- ally the registration or application which does precede purchase of a handgun attempts to eliminate only the most undesirable or unstable elements from having handguns; there is little or no attempt to restrict possession fur- ther. Massachusetts and New York are the only states having registration laws which place the burden of proof on the individual, requiring that he show proper reason why he should be issued a gun permit. The laws in both states, however, apply only to handguns and concealable weapons. The registration of rifles and shotguns is not commonplace. State courts have generally upheld the constitu- tionality of various legislative acts denying both use and possession of guns (primarily handguns). The dramatic exception is Bliss v Commonwealth (1822), where the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled the right to bear arms was not to be abridged, even under the general police powers of the state.103 The decision served as a catalyst for a constitutional amendment specifically authorizing Um legislature to prohibit the carrying of concealed weapons. Even given the general position that state courts have upheld various legislative restrictions, ”a sizable number of state decisions have expressly acceded to the View or have assumed that individuals inherently possess 57 r the right [to arms], although subject to certain restric~ tions.”104 Generally these restrictions have been author— ized in respect of handguns, and other weapons, such as brass knuckles, or in restricting possession to ”desir— able" elements. Although the pattern of most state supreme court decisions seems to follow the above in alluding to a confused right to keep and bear arms, many courts, in the same breath, have provided opinions, the effect of which are to greatly widen the discretionary powers of state legislatures. The Supreme Court of Kansas, for example, permits the State Legislature to prohibit ”the promiscuous carrying of deadly weapons."105 In Idaho, the legislature may not prohibit a citizen from "bearing arms,“ but it may "regulate the exercise of that right” within the police powers of the State.106 The Idaho Court places no apparent restriction on the legislature in regulating the bearing of arms. In South Carolina the legislature is empowered absolutely to prohibit the carry~ ing of deadly weapons in order to keep the peace of society.107 The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Divi— sion), ruling on the Sullivan Act which outlaws possession 0f handguns except by permit, upheld as an appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, the registration 0f handguns.108 Many of the state courts have followed a logic Similar to that employed by the Supreme Court and ruled that 3 i I l h D l h l h l I ams rela tion. In “commonly and are a; as well a lid in tht ah "indiv: that the 3 0f the st: A and relate that in tl Sistency E largely 3C $01119 Very the immedi Do“ State L“awfully hear arms, 'i'“ that use free 0 tendency t, decisims 1 Precedent” liens of s, inThe: writer 58 arms related to militia service are excluded from regula— tion. In Texas, arms free from regulation are those ”commonly kept, according to the customs of the people, and are appropriate for open and manly use in self—defense, as well as are proper for the defense of the state.”109 And in the City of Salina V Blaksley a "collective” versus an ”individual" right to arms is upheld, suggesting further that the right to bear arms is a right only for a member of the state militia.110 A simplistic analysis of state arms legislation and related court decisions might lead to the conclUSion that in the absence of sweeping Federal regulations incon— sistency and diversity have reigned supreme. Although largely accurate, such a summary would be precipitous for some very important patterns are to be discovered below the immediate surface of analysis. In the first place, most state court decisions, with some exceptions, have carefully avoided reference to an unimpeachable right to bear arms. But they have also generally avoided the posi— tion that state legislatures may regulate possession and use free of restraint. The effect of this has been a tendency to severely circumscribe the impact of gun decisions by avoiding references to reincarnated uancient precedent” and relying almost wholly on specific applica— tions of state constitutional and statutory language. it seems impossible to see any definable trend in the opinions of the courts. . . . About all this writer is willing to concede from this review is 44444-———__————_—————————---IIIIIIIIIIIIIIII that th upon to legisla guage c on by t marshal h this res sions has arguments h state polic to constitu Pro reviewed, hhnis th Fight to in can tl‘aditi ifaiition’ the hiStor W“ usag used to doc Wight be in the from Tlgulatims these State «the right 0 liteSSaril), Praciice he: “Ting of : hlESpectiv‘ 59 that the various state courts--if and when called upon to determine the constitutionality of firearms legislation——will react more to the specific lan— guage of the state constitution and the data relied on by the state legislature than they will to the marshalling of anc1ent precedents.11 In this respect the numerical weight of state court deci— sions has favored legislative restrictions, although the arguments have varied from citing appropriate reserves of state police powers to denying a nonncollective meaning to constitutional arms provisions. Provisions in state constitutions have already been reviewed. The only remaining point of importance to be drawn is that some of them record the only recognizable right to individual possession of firearms in Anglo-Ameri— can tradition. Not being traceable to any known legal tradition, their inclusion is the likely product of selec- tive historical interpretation, as well as the consequences of gun usage in the United States: history could not be used to document a legally recorded individual right, but it might be shown to demonstrate a practical fact of life in the frontier environs. Nearly every state has gun regulations. This makes it abundantly clear that even Uwse states whose constitutions exclude infringement of Um right of individuals to keep and bear arms do not necessarily associate regulation with infringement. In practice nearly all states have admitted the keeping and bearing of arms is subject to regulations of some kind, irrespective of the language in the state constitution. [hactica itis on the Fift guns, ha nms reg hMividu ill his ct effectivt National hmendhen‘ Under prr required Machine 1 mese arr h The 2 be me imp0] Punls theyI fire; Tunj that and L idem OVer l The ‘th F exercise hderal g ht not q NgUIate Some Related Issues While the Second Amendment appears to have little practical merit in prohibiting the regulation of firearms, it is one of the curiosities of the American system that the Fifth Amendment, manifestly unrelated to the issue of guns, has been the bete noire threatening existing national arms regulations. Under Fifth Amendment provisions, the individual may not be forced to give evidence that will aid in his conviction. In January, 1968, the Supreme Court effectively limited enforcement of provisions of the National Firearms Act by extending protections of the Fifth Amendment to registration requirements in the Act.112 Under provisions of the National Firearms Act, persons were required to register certain types of arms, such as sub— machine guns and sawed-off shotguns, if they possessed these arms contrary to provisions in the Firearms Act. The act outlined numerous requirements which must be met for a person to legally acquire, transport, import, or make certain firearms and criminally punished any failure with these provisions. Fur— ther, the act provided that one who possessed a firearm acquired by him in violation of these requirements must register The Court reasoned that the practical effect of both the registratiOn and unlawful possession sections were, therefore, identical and that neither section could be enforced over fifth amendment objections. 13 The Act previously had been upheld as a constitutional exercise of the commerce and regulatory powers of the Federal government.114 Importantly, the Haynes decision did not question powers of the National government to regulate the possession and flow of firearms through comercs regulatr byway < which at the i551 to requj this QUE the Secc 0f the 5 both SUI: Providin arms for ht‘comes Congept Second A fashmn' Militia his it 3p therefol. TQSpect constitu the Mir Amendmen hldual 1‘ mm may 61 commerce powers. The issue was not whether arms may be regulated, nor, presumably, whether regulation could be by way of taxation. In this respect the Miller decision, which authorized regulation, was allowed to stand. Rather, the issue turned on internal statutory defects which were to require self incrimination.115 Is the Second Amendment outdated? The answer to this question is largely dependent on whether one views the Second Amendment as only guaranteeing the existence of the state militia forces, or whether one sees it as both supporting militias over standing armies, as well as providing the individual with an inviolable right to bear arms for personal reasons. The Second Amendment easily becomes outdated if the first view is accepted, for, the concept of militia prevalent at the time of writing the Second Amendment no longer exists in any recognizable fashion. The practice of personally arming oneself for militia service (state or Federal) is no longer acceptable as it apparently was during the Eighteenth Century. If, therefore, the private bearing of arms is authorized in respect of militia duty, and if private arms no longer constitute the weaponry of a militia, in what respect is the private possession of arms guaranteed under the Second Amendment? If the second position is accepted, that an indi1 vidual right exists independent of militia duty, an argu— ment may be made that the Second Amendment is not substant dthough has no m anteeing course, hal evi no indiv hside fr hnndnen militia from farm urba to b resi gang Woul lnnillin SEC0nd A ‘ lthaOti hpgrtan fight to “Tife'l that the m he as ‘ Addition t hendmen “missib iiiiii______________.........--IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIx 2% 6 2 h substantially outdated. The argument may be made that although legally the militia relatedness of the Amendment has no modern application, it is legally binding in guar- anteeing the remaining individual right to arms. Of course, this whole argument ignores the weight of histor- ical evidence presented in this chapter, which admits of no individual right to arms receiving consistent support. Aside from this, however, the argument that the Second Amendment is contemporary in its application to a non- militia right ignores an important sociological fact; . bearing arms today is a very different thing from what it was in the days of the embattled farmers who withstood the British in 1775. In the urban industrial society of today a general right to bear efficient arms so as to be enabled to resist oppression by the government would mean that gangs could exercise an extra— legal rule which would defeat the whole Bill of Rights. 116 This argument has been opposed by the forces unwilling to admit further restrictions on arms: the Second Amendment must be reinterpreted in the context of a chaotic Twentieth Century to recognize the increased importance of the Second Amendment in guaranteeing the right to self—defense in an age of proliferating civil Strife.ll7 In rebuttal, however, the point can be made that the indiscriminatory arming of a citizenry is likely to be as devastating as its indiscriminatory disarming. Additionally, it does not seem plausible that the Second Amendment can rightfully be interpreted to guarantee the admissibility of extra-legal action over the rule of law. Granted, ‘ defense 11; even to t in the en Several s New York, the right repressio these am: to rerolu that the arms fer Shotm to and) thus [he inclu canmt be h We a Warm iCa1 hOCUmentj of aIns. i h arms) as regulatm Write 0f ‘ Clearly I 1rlIIIIII--------"-"'-—_ “'IIIII"’ 63 Granted, the right of revolution and the right of self- defense have a rich tradition in Anglo—American history, even to the extent that the Magna Carta permits rebellion in the event the declarations signed by John are not kept. Several state ratifying conventions, including Virginia, New York, and North Carolina, offered amendments granting the right of the people to revolt under conditions of repression. But both Houses of the First Congress rejected these amendments and, thereby, refused to codify a right to revolution.118 There is no reason to believe, therefore, that the Second Amendment impliedly includes a right to arms for purposes of revolt. American history may be . shown to guarantee a moral and a natural right to revolt and, thus, to the securing of the means of revolt. But the inclusion of such a right in the American Constitution cannot be admitted. W What ought to be evident after this perusal of history is that the issue of arms regulation is immensely complicated. The great weight of historical data precludes documenting an unregulable right to the personal possession of arms. There are innumerable examples of the uses of arms, as well as the place and manner of bearing, being regulated, proscribed and limited. With the exception of some of the state constitutions, the bearing of arms is Clearly related to militia duty rather than to a natural right or consists of arms remains, given t} regulati 04 right of the individual. And finally, history records a consistent approval of restricting the individual bearing of arms to protect the peace of society. The question remains, however, to decide what is reasonable regulation, given the needs of society. At what point does reasonable regulation become unwarranted infringement? eonpeter in trigla ever, 31 and stat Constitr “Mt WP and ms), p “hi and men: pri this is an the C FOOTNOTES-~CHAPTER I 1Glendon A. Schubert, Constitutional Politics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). 2Arthur E. Sutherland, Constitutionalism in America: Origins and Evolution of Its Fufidamental Ideas (New York; Blaisdell Publishing, 1965), p. 93. Sutherland's book is a competent introduction to the growth of constitutionalism in England and the United States. Of primary value, how- ever, are the verbatum reproductions of charters, petitions and statutes which have become part of the "English Constitution." 3Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1955). 4Lucilius A. Emery, "The Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 28 (March, 1915), p. 473. SEdward III, c. 3 (1328). 6George D. Newton and Franklin E. Zimring, Fire- arms and Violence in American Life (United States Governv ment Printing Office, 1969). See footnote 13 on page 255. This is a staff report prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. 7Emery, 0p. cit., p. 473. I Blackstone Commentaries 409. 9Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 253. 10Frederic Stimson, The American Constitution (New York: Scribners, 1923), p. 73. 11See, for example, Nicolas V. Olds, ”The Second Amendment and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,” Michigan §£ate Bar Journal, Vol. 46 (October, 1967). 65 hmglish necessar militia alone t} In pract only to firmatic James B. heep ant Universi levee er refers t l”henomen lav ‘ m v‘or fail formed t heter Fe‘ EEO“ ' mm d L< i" thepi: 66 12It is not at all clear from a cursory reading of English military traditions if the concept of a militia necessarily referred to only those actually enrolled in militia service, or to the people in general. In theory alone the principle of Levee en masse seems to be confirmed. In practice, however, the obligatlon to bear arms applied only to a few and thus there probably is no ongoing con— firmation through use of a truly ”people's” army. See James B. Whisker, "The Second Amendment: The Right to Keep and Bear Arms“ (an unpublished dissertation at the University of Maryland) for an interesting discussion of levee en masse. 13I Blackstone Commentaries 143-144. l4Sutherland, op. cit., p. 93. 151 William and Mary (1689). The word l'employed" refers to Catholics serving in the standing army. l6Ralph Rohner, ”The Right to Bear Arms: A . Phenomenon of Constitutional History,” Catholic UniverSIty Law Review, Vol. 16 (1967), p. 59. 17A reading of the original Colonial Charters sel— dom fails to present evidence that English Common Law formed the basis of law in the colonies. 18Robert A. Rutland, Birth of the Bill of Rights 1776—1791 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), p. 42. 19Benjamin P. Poore, The Federal and State Consti— tutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the United States (Washington: United States Government F?Tfitffig‘oeefce, 1877), p. 376- 20Even the earliest observers of the Republicls aCtivities, De Tocqueville for example, called attention to this view. 21Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1955). 221bid., p. 36. 23 ' - ' 255 Also see Newton and Zimr1ng, op. Cit., P° ' ,’ Peter Feller and Karl Gotting, e Second Amendment. A . . ., 61 Second Look ” Northwestern Univer51t Law Rev1ew, Vol. , t966: P. 49: so, t e grievances against England listed 1n the 1777 New York Constitution support this View. 24Ibid., p. 255m. Review, ,hmendmel [Little (Indiana 67 25Peter Feller and Karl Gotting, "The Second Amendment: A Second Look," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 61 (March-April, 1966), p. SOn. 26 Ibid., p. 53. 27Poore, op. cit., p. 1410. 28;p;g., p. 1909. 29;p;g., p. 1542. 30;pgg., p. 1860. 31Rutland, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 32Ibid., p. 44. 33Ibid., p. 64. 34Poore, op. cit., p. 959. 35Joseph Story, Constitution of the United States (Little Brown: 1873), Book III, p. 747. 36Emery, op. cit., p. 476. 37Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 256. 38Max Farrand, United States Constitutional Con— vention (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), Vol. IV, p. 59. 39Rutland, op. cit., p. 112. 4OIbid., Chapter IV. 41Cecelia Kenyon, ed., The Antifederalists (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), p. 195. 42Feller and Gotting, o . cit., p- 57- 43Rutland, op. cit., p. 135. 44 ' ' d What it Edward Dumbould, The Bill of Rights an MEEE§_22§§X (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957), P. 12. 45Rutland, op. cit., p. 143. 46Jonathon Elliot, The Debates in the Several State ConVentions on the Adoption of the Federal Constltutlon K . . . (Phlladelphia: J. P. Llpplncott, 1836), Vol. III. hhlican 9- 005, and \ imlem o 68 47Feller and Gotting, op. cit., p. 59. 48Dumbould, op. cit., p. 182. 49Ibid., p. 47. 501b1d., p. 185. SlFeller and Gotting, op. cit., pp. 59~60. 52Dumbould, op. cit., p. 30. 531618., p. 189. 54Feller and Gotting, op. cit., p. 61. SSDumbould, op. cit., p. 23 and p. 33n. 56Ibid., p. 24n. 57Ibid., p. 207. 58Feller and Gotting, op. cit., p. 61. 59Joseph Gales, Annals of the Congress of the United States (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), Vol. I, pp. 749-752. OODumbould, op. cit., p. 62. OlFeller and Gotting, op. cit., p. 62. 62Robert A. Sprecher, ”The Lost Amendment,” American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 51 (July, 1965), p77n37“‘_"* 6392 U.S. 542. 6492 U.S. 553. 6 S110 U.S. 516. 66Irving Brant, The Bill of Rights: Its Origin .EELEEEEiES (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 356. , 67See Robert Sprecher, op. cit., p. 666 for a reV1CW Of related Supreme Court cases. 68116 U.S. 252. 69Sprecher, op. cit., p. 666. 70116 U.S. 265. tions u [The CO Florida Whereas 69 71153 U.S. 535. 72165 U.S. 275. 73Sprecher, op. cit., p. 666. 74307 U.S. 174. 75307 U.S. 178. 76Feller and Gotting, op. cit., p. 65. 7711 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Fla.). 78307 U.S. 178. 79Feller and Gotting, op. cit., p. 66. 80Cases V. United States, 131 f. 2d 916 (1st cir; 1942), p. 922. 811bid., p. 922. 821bid., p. 923. 83131 r. 2d 261 (3d cir. 1942). 84Ibid., p. 266. . 85Poore, 03. cit. A review of all state constitu— tions up to 1889 formed the basis for thls flgure. 86Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, California. (The constitutions of Florida and Ohio are inconSIStent as Florida adopts the individual view in a later constitution, whereas Ohio drops it in a later constitution). 87Kentucky and Missouri. 88The idea of an unsettled frontier was strong, Particularly in the western states, and it led to no little consternation. Feller and Gottlng, op. C1t., p. 67n quote Luther Martin in I Elliot's Debates 371: 'It would be absurd that the militia of the western settlements, who were exposed to an Indian enemy, should either be confined to the same arms or exercise as the militia of the Eastern or Middle States.” Apparently, the ability to respond quickly and reasonably to the menace of the fron51er H 1nvested in many the desire to have the m111t1a locally COntrolled. , 89Poore, o . cit. North Carolina adopted this language only after the Civil War. Ralph R [up to the sub States lfississ States .‘Eississ SUb‘COm lelons ‘ Umse 6 fight a loll 46 Blaksle) 70 901bid., p. 610. glIbid., p. 1421. 921bid., p. 1675. 93Rohner, o . cit., At the end of this article, Ralph Rohner has constructed an appendix of all modern (up to 1965) state constitutional provisions dealing with the subject of arms. 94Pennsylvania Constitution, Article I, Section 21. 95Connecticut Constitution, Article I, Section 15. 96Missouri Constitution, Article I, Section 23. States having similar language include Colorado, Kentucky, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico. 97Florida Declaration of Rights, Section 20. States having similar language include Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah. 98Washington Constitution, Article I, Section 24. 99Hearings before Senate Juvenile Delinquency Sub-Committee, 89th Congress, lst sess. (1965), p. 376. 100Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 88. Convicted felons and those judged mentally incompetent are generally those excluded. lOlIbid., p. 89. lOZIbid., pp. 92-93. 103 . 251 2 tht (Ky.) 90, 13 Am. Sec. . 104 Feller and Gotting, o . cit., p. 63. 05Nicholas V. Olds, "The Second Amendment and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms,” Michigan State Bar Journal, V01. 46 (October, 1967), p. 18. Olds cites Salina v Blaksley, 72 Kansas 230. 06In re Brickey, 9 Idaho 597. 107State v Johnson, 16 S.C. 187. 108Moore V Gallup 45 NYS 2d. 63; 267 App. Div. 64. 109State v Bake, 42 Texas 455. 110Rohner, op. cit., p. 77. Guarani 19'5‘7)‘, 71 111Ibid., p. 77. 112Haynes v U.S., 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 113Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 266. 114U.S. v Miller 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 115Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 266. 116 Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 91. 117Sprecher, op. cit., p. 667. 118Pound, 6p. cit., p. 161. on SOHM sions L unwl 111111} ri\1l i eSpeci; Jetisit thumbol 111114-51 in 5001 HI“: 1: ”Prom k'Ount, determj Plises CHAPTER II FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS: ROLL CALL VOTING The product of legislative business is a decision on some matter of public policy or private interest. Deci— sions are rendered in a variety of ways which include both formal and informal methods. Two Senators may meet in a hallway, for example, and informally agree not to place rival bills before the chamber. Often, however, and especially when decisions are to have the force of law, decision making involves the formal processes of legisla— tive voting as well. Voting may take a variety of forms in legislative chambers but not all of these are useful to the political analyst. Some of the voting, for example, is conducted in secret sessions and thus the knowledge of who voted for what is obscured. Non-record open voting likewise presents a problem, for whether the method is voice vote, head count, or hand count, the result is always the same: the determination of a majority, but no indication of who com- Prises that majority. Roll call voting is of particular Value, however, as it not only identifies a majority and 72 a minor lt pro< men anr legislz in its measure Per5pec measure legislz beharic Content some 0h E1 Senat deCislc fraught actions lotes i be exam Want it 1 tatiVe 8"“151 The aha 'ha mm . ,I II" ll'il'" I g. 73 a minority, but it specifies precisely who comprises each. It produces an endurable record of what for most Congress— men and Senators is the single most important and visible legislative act. Roll Calls as Behavioral Measures This chapter makes use only of roll call voting in its analysis. The exclusive use of roll calls as measures of legislative behavior should be put into proper perspective for even though they can be seen as behavioral measures, there are a variety of other measures of human legislative behavior. For example, we can view the behavior of Senators in floor debates through the use of content analysis. Such an exercise might provide us with some objective measures and data and interpretations of a Senator's verbal behavior, and thus, insight into his decisions.1 But the measuring of verbal behavior is fraught with inaccuracies and is also very time consuming; actions on roll calls are much more easily viewed and analyzed. The primary methodological attraction of roll call Votes is that they provide an abundance of data that can be examined statistically. Roll calls lend themselves to qUantitative analysis because they are already in quanti‘ tative form, and are relatively easy to manipulate in analysis.2 The nature of roll—call voting makes empirical ' ' - tes are analysis comparatively easy. Roll call v0 _ 'hard' data; also, they are public data. Dav1d lying issues consis one an( issues tions ; 0f the ln 6ij ull’erse itlS( dVil‘iSit 1le a1 This 15 the m L characI the ebb r011 Ca Us to (l plOduci Call all 1' 110,5 0 L _, 74 Truman observes that, 'like statistics on elections, they represent discrete acts the fact of whose occurrence is not subject to dispute. They do not depend for their validity as data upon verbal Roll call analysis is of particular use in identi— fying voting blocs: What are the salient and divisive issues before the Senate or the House? Do antagonists consistently display similar voting behavior vis—a-Xis one another? Over a variety of roll calls on similar issues, do Senators behave similarly? Answers to ques- tions such as these provide a useful description of some of the behavior of legislators, and allow a first step in explaining legislative decision making. Whereas the divisions of legislators and the diverseness of issues may be noted with important interest, it is equally important to explore the causes of such divisions, or at least to discover what other characteris— tics are associated with legislative voting divisions. This latter concern includes, for example, discovering the relationship between roll call voting and constituency characteristics. A note of general caution should be interjected on the abuses of roll call analysis. The various forms of roll call analysis are primarily processing tools, enabling us to digest and sort large quantities of behavioral data, Producing descriptions of the data as results. But T011 Call analysis itself does not allow one to offer explana- tions of voting divisions and issue groupings; at best, It provides 115er laerin attem to remember th manifestation uthdty. The behavior is me spectrum which ml informal c course, possib these types of nilnot test treated for wh Single We of There the legisl be11E1Vior. assumption liltive beh ”lent Syrnbo Consistent C011eagues legltlmate behavior 11‘ proCGSS’ roll~call . The th call analysis : 11 i JEIIIOd) but M l 15, individual a . smgle iSSUe lens of Demo“, IIIIIIIIIIII:________________________——______—___-__‘—__‘7Fi’77 ' "‘IIIIII" 75 1 provides usefully packaged information that can be used later in attempts at explanation. Second, it is important to remember that roll call voting is only one behavioral manifestation of a much wider universe of legislative activity. There is no reason to suspect that roll call behavior is necessarily representative of this wider spectrum which includes verbal behavior, committee voting, and informal contacts with other legislators. It is, of course, possible to presume a general similarity in all these types of behavior, but roll call analysis alone will not test such presumptions. Roll calls must be treated for what they are: a particular measure of a single type of legislative behavior. There is much to be said in favor of studying the legislative process in terms of legislative behavior. But whether the roll~call vote is the best unit of analysis is another matter. The assumption is that what 'really counts' in legis— lative behavior is the ultimate and public commit- ment symbolized by the vote. If a legislator consistently votes with the majority of his party colleagues on a great many issues, it may be legitimately inferred that he is 'partisan' in behavior not only in the roll-call stage of the process, but also in earlier phases. But the roll-call vote cannot be taken as proof of this.4 The third important qualifier in the use of roll call analysis stems not so much from the nature of the method, but rather from the quality of the data. That 18, individual roll calls are very seldom Concerned with a single issue or question of policy. More often than not a single roll call includes questions of procedure, prob— lems of personality conflict, as well as a multiplicity of issues substai As a result, a delicate handl fused by a mu] quantitative a condition is ] package a gre; Roll calls on often offer a Even a with the prob] legislators. ,. it ”preper to r011 can.5 1 avoided as lon manipulated to tudes‘ For ex ianiry in thi applied to f,“ are not diStil analygis‘ The tmles are broa Wes 31110118 th with r011 call acase, attitu “plain relati variables. 76 issues substantively related to some general issue at hand. As a result, analysis of some roll calls requires extremely delicate handling. Indeed, some roll calls are so con— fused by a multiplicity of issues that any meaningful quantitative analysis becomes impossible. This latter condition is largely the case with ”omnibus bills” which package a great number of issues under a single vote. Roll calls on simple amendments to more complex bills often offer a more simplified analytical task. Even after all this, however, we are still left with the problem of deciding what combination of the legislators' "true attitudes,” as well as those he felt it ”proper to diSplay,” were embraced by the particular roll call.5 This is a thorny problem, but one largely avoided as long as roll call data is not analytically manipulated to "prove” the existence of underlying atti— tudes. For example, during the greater part of the inquiry in this study, roll call profiles are themselves applied to further analysis; individual attitude constructs are not distilled from the roll calls and used in the analysis. The notable exception to this is where atti— tudes are broadly associated with environmental differ- ences among the states, and this is associated, in turn, with roll call behavior on firearm legislation. In such a case, attitudes are hypothetical constructs used to explain relationships between dependent and independent variables. l l l l l This number of que behavior, who issue of gun 90th Congress in the firear firearms roll voting divisi divisions on In it diChotomous m if Present an "al on an 155 the in Stre: 1959 COHEI‘ESS Could be give: Studies of a ‘ ceuent) for a. of a Single n tive PFOCess_v tells Us Very hoclgmm‘1 of floor debates: ledge of bill of course, is a . ruling of m' ( .—: 77 This chapter uses roll call analysis to answer a number of questions. Defined in terms of roll call behavior, who were the proponents and opponents on the issue of gun legislation in the U. S. Senate during the 90th Congress? What were the principal issues at stake in the firearms roll calls? In what respect did different firearms roll calls divide the Senate differently? Do voting divisions on firearms legislation parallel voting divisions on other issues? In its simplest form, roll call analysis is a dichotomous measure of legislative behavior. A Senator, if present and voting, will usually vote either yea or nay on an issue. In most studies all yes votes are equal in strength, as are all no votes. David Truman's 1959 Congressional study is an exception for yes votes could be given one of two values, as could no votes.6 Studies of a single roll call vote are not without pre- cedent, for as Duncan MacRae notes, ”the detailed study of a single roll call can give insight into the legisla— tive process.”7 But analysis of a single vote usually tells us very little without exhaustive research into the background of the vote, including committee discussions, floor debates, parliamentary maneuvers, as well as a know~ ledge of bill sponsors, proponents and opponents. This, Of course, is something that might be done even with the analysis of many roll calls. The 2 tion is of li analyzed. Tl absenteeism, for any giver A committee c personal aff; any liVen mon ”Single vote stantively re Will eliminat short TUIl faC Secon ‘0 reflect th views rather illsitions' B ola recent n lance when a examined 0Ver Third one issue, mal This is espec. While“ matte: bills whoSe C, handwill les: The us tl' hithey be ( 78 The analysis of Senate voting on firearms legisla- tion is of little value unless many roll call votes are analyzed. The reasons for this are quite plain. First, absenteeism, although largely random in the Senate, can for any given roll call produce disastrous consequences. A committee or sub-committee in session, bad weather, personal affairs, and many other factors can combine at any given moment to drastically alter the complexion of a single vote. However, an analysis of a series of sub- stantively related votes over an extended period of time will eliminate much of the excessive influence of these short run factors. Second, individual roll call votes have a tendency to reflect the short run importance of temporarily held views rather than to reflect long range, more permanent, positions. But the heat of a fresh debate or the effect of a recent national event are likely to be of less impor- tance when a number of roll calls on a given issue are examined over time.8 Third, a single roll call, manifestly concerning one issue, may actually hide another issue or issues. This is especially true with roll calls on bills whose subject matter is heterogeneous. Analysis of several bills whose contents are related primarily to the issue at hand will lessen the effect of these secondary issues. The use of a large number of roll calls requires that they be categorized or grouped for easier management. Two types of calls are grc to each othei intuitively c the content c hearings may The relative dependent on categories ar ”firearms leg legislation" method of cat lation, Guttm “"9 approach Where qualitatiVe j methOd TElies teChniques to lhis SGCOnd m ltgiSlatOrs 8., "We Simila: lend a narrow intuitiVe met] leneral defin; Comp‘jsition. ”“8 Similai substilntiVeI)’ 79 Two types of groupings are employed here. First, roll calls are grouped according to their substantive similarity to each other. This requires the analyst to proceed intuitively categorizing various roll calls according to the content of the bills. Floor debates and committee hearings may be aids when the wording of bills are obscure. The relative specificity of the categories is largely dependent on the needs of the analyst. In this study the categories are general, having broad boundaries such as ; "firearms legislation," "military expenditures,” ”welfare legislation” and the like. As a check on the intuitive method of categorization, as it applies to firearms legis- lation, Guttman scaling is used to supplement the intui- , tive approach. Whereas the grouping method above largely involves qualitative judgments and intuitive processes, the second ; method relies more heavily on statistical-quantitative techniques to provide initial insight into groupings. This second method groups roll calls according to how well legislators agree on a group of votes ”in the sense of voting similarly on issues.” Such groupings often trans— cend a narrow issue area, such as might be found by the intuitive method above, and require that we specify more general definitions to include their more heterogeneous composition. This second method is useful for discovering voting similarities over a number of bills apparently not substantively related. It may be discovered, for example, that Senator firearms leg the quantita ing, it is s to determine We may, for l setting the . general cate; growth of Fe With Sclectmn 0f according to C3115 approac are diSCardeg ticipants is of the 1.011 c culls having min ‘ , Orlty Cate na)’ seem hars of spuriouSly respeq of Cu marginal Tequ at 90:10 0r 1 reasonable he The p ageneity in r I 80 that Senators vote similarly on issues as far ranging as firearms legislation and debt limits. Nevertheless, after the quantitative analysis has provided this broader group— ing, it is still essentially left to intuitive processes to determine substantively in what way they are related. We may, for example, decide that firearms legislation and setting the debt limit are sub—issues of a much more general category of roll calls having to do with the growth of Federal powers. Selection of Senate Roll Calls With all of these considerations in mind, the selection of Senate-90th Congress roll calls was made according to the following considerations. First, roll calls approaching unanimity (affirmative or negative) are discarded as their ability to discriminate among par— ticipants is of minimal value. Additionally, because some of the roll calls are used in Scalogram Analysis, roll calls having less than 20 per cent of the Senators in the minority category are also discarded. This requirement may seem harsh, but the effect is to reduce the probability of spuriously high coefficients of reproducibility in respect of Guttman scales.9 Under other circumstances marginal requirements might not be so extreme, set perhaps at 90:10 or 10:90. Such a relaxed criterion does not seem reasonable here, nor necessary. The problems of absenteeism and substantive heter— Ogeneity in roll calls has already been discussed. The ’- y i z w i v solution to t non-policy re the matter of any roll call ship particip substantive h ple titles we example, the Crime Bill. The c Policy~relate the criteria Criteria are having to do men“; i.e ”gal procedu ting the debt TheSe Categor calls Were pl. of the analys R011 , were l‘etained out of 595 r0: lst and 2nd 8‘ fled for Teas( however, Were uflan . . lllllty 1n n FIIIIIIIIZ:::_________________________—'“__—___"’T7" 81 solution to these concerns produced two other systematic, non-policy related criteria for selecting roll calls. On the matter of absences, it was arbitrarily decided that any roll call having less than 75 per cent of the member- 10 On the matter of ship participating would be rejected. substantive heterogeneity, roll calls on bills with multi— ple titles were also discarded. This included, for example, the final vote on President Johnson's Omnibus Crime Bill. The criteria listed above are all systematic, non- policy-related criteria for selecting roll calls because the criteria are measured quantitatively. Policy-related criteria are also applied, however, for only roll calls having to do with particular areas of public policy were selected; i.e., social welfare, military expenditures, legal procedures, relations with communist nations, set- ting the debt limit, civil rights, and states rights. These categories were intuitively defined and the roll calls were placed in them applying the subjective criteria 0f the analyst. Roll calls meeting all of the above requirements were retained for analysis. These criteria qualified 66 out of 595 roll calls listed for the Senate, 90th Congress, lst and 2nd sessions.11 Most of the bills were disquali— fied for reasons related to the policy criteria. Some, however, were eliminated because of unanimity or near unanimity in voting patterns. With a very few exceptions, the criteria portions grc ing roll cal therefore, 1 roll calls 1 Gene other roll C in this stud exPloration W0 roll Cal lhg Scores f. r011 Calls, “OH‘Scalar t. th‘O queStiOng iltOrs group: [front are t} hrlerson, Wat sures of indi Analysis.” R ”Wiring the is Colltrasted among grOUP m determine Wha Memes of rc Sion’ first an action On Sing ’7— u" 82 the criteria involving absenteeism and marginals (pro- portions greater than 80:20) were not applied as the remain- ing roll calls met these minimal requirements. In a sense, therefore, the 66 roll calls are the total of therusable roll calls for the Senate (1967-1968). Analysis of Multiple Roll Calls Generally, roll calls are used in analysis with other roll calls, primarily for reasons discussed earlier in this study. This may extend from the rather simple exploration of legislative voting similarities between two rell calls to the much more complex processes of deriv— ing scores for legislators from scales based on a group of roll calls. The simpler forms of analysis, or those using non-scalar techniques, are meant to provide answers to two questions: In what fashion do roll calls and legis- lators group? How cohesive are these groups and how dif- ferent are these groups in respect of voting behavior? Anderson, Watts and Wilcox list several statistical mea- sures of indices of cohesion in ”Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” Rice‘s Index of Cohesion, characterized as nwasuring the numerical size of factions within a group, is contrasted with measures of interpersonal agreement among group members. In essence the latter measures determine what percentage of the time legislators agree on a series of roll calls.12 ”The Rice Index measures cohe~ sion, first and foremost, as a function of aggregate group action on single roll calls.”13 various cohe analyze and . roll calls (1 The agreemen‘ was selected First, a com} bers of both PTOgram, was Program used offered a me using all of Was able to roll calls wi Senators on o The b the number of ’7— 83 A major difference between the Rice index and the indexes based on interpersonal agreements lies in the primary units that each analyzes. For the Rice index (or the indexes of absolute and relative cohesion), the individual roll call is taken into account and is analyzed as a unit. Average indexes of cohesion are calculated from Rice measures for a series of votes. In measures of cohesion based on interpersonal agreement, the unit of analysis is the dyad, or pair of legislators. A large num- ber of roll calls must be taken into account to pro- duce an accurate measure of agreement for one dyad, and a myriad of possible dyads must be analyzed. In other words, the Rice index measures cohesion first and foremost as a function of aggregate group action on single roll calls. The techniques for determining agreement of pairs focus primarily on cohesion as a function of interpersonal, dyadic relationships.14 The primary advantage of agreement indices over the various cohesion indices is the ability to simultaneously analyze and aggregate large numbers of both legislators and roll calls (especially if computers assist in the process). The agreement index mode of measuring intra-group cohesion was selected here over the Rice index for two reasons. First, a computer program, equipped to handle large num— bers of both roll calls and legislators in an agreement program, was readily available. Second, the agreement program used in conjunction with a clustering program offered a means of combining both Senators and roll calls using all of the 66 selected roll calls. Essentially, I was able to supplement the intuitive approach of grOUping roll calls with one that combined either roll calls or Senators on objective behavioral criteria. The basic formula of the agreement program counts the number of roll calls on which two Senators agree (F), divided by t multiplied l: for purposes Absd a Senator ha agreement or hand, he ma vote because In this case this particu written into calls involv Not all abse: ever. Some side or the have to be h however, has to vote but through the no." The re for those Se 84 divided by the total number of roll calls considered (T), multiplied by 100 to render a score on the scale of 100 for purposes of comparison. Agreement = ¥ x 100 Index (Al) Absences present a dilemma in the analysis. If a Senator had been present would his vote have been in agreement or disagreement with his colleague? On one hand, he may have deliberately been absent so as not to vote because he was in partial agreement with both sides. In this case we can assign 1/2 the units of agreement for this particular roll call absence. This procedure can be written into our program by adding l/Z the number of roll calls involving one abstention (A). A1 = x 100 F + 1/2 A 15 T Not all absences can be interpreted as abstentions, how- ever. Some absent Senators would assuredly vote with one side or the other. If this were the case, absences would have to be handled differently. The data in this study, however, has very few absences as such. Those who wish to vote but cannot be on the floor are incorporated here through the data category of "announced yes" or "announced no." The remaining small number of absences may account for those Senators who had no strong or fixed opinion or who shared any event, Mea (Al) fails there is be the most fr inter-group square (X2) tion which ' difference and 'nay' i Regrettably the non-rand tionally, X2 which a diff probability difference e attribute or The the strength 0f some char 0n the numbe study both v reports the 15.707.17 Int aIlalyst to " who shared in supporting arguments from both sides. In any event, their number is small. Measuring the intra-group cohesion of various groups (Al) fails to tell us how much disagreement or.distance there is between groups. One of the simplest, and perhaps the most frequently used, statistical tools for measuring inter-group differences is the statistic known as chi- square (X2). Computing a X2 is a relatively simple opera- tion which "provides a means of determining whether the difference in the portion of the (two) groups voting 'yea' and 'nay' is larger than that expected by chance."16 Regrettably, this does little to tell us what accounts for the non-random differences between the two groups. Addi- tionally, XZ does not allow us to specify the degree to which a difference exists. Simply, X2 only specifies the probability of our being correct in saying a non-random difference exists between two groups in respect of some attribute or behavior. The Contingency Coefficient (C) is a measure of the strength of difference between two groups in respect of some characteristic. The maximum value of C depends on the number of categories in the responses. In this study both variables have only two responses and Ferguson reports the maximum value of C under such circumstances is .707.17 In the case of X2 it is often very useful for the analyst to "eyeball" displays of the contingency tables (generally are built. example tha large and s cohesive th The techniques Likewise, t techniques, on the use provide us cribing the participant the above an Gutt method for d subjects, fo technique as to some dimer surrounding 0f inferring 011 a cumulati aCarrion cont 86 (generally 4 cell tables here) on which those statistics are built. Inspection of such tables may indicate for example that although the differences between groups are large and significant (C, X2) one group is much more cohesive than another (Al). The advantages and disadvantages of statistical techniques are more often than not in the eye of the user. Likewise, the advantages and disadvantages of using scale techniques, over the techniques just discussed, depends on the use intended. The methods just described will provide us some means of categorizing roll calls, of des- cribing the voting behavior of Senators, and of grouping participants. However, Guttman scaling will do all of the above and it will also present additional information. Guttman scaling was originally developed as a method for determining whether a group of responses, by subjects, form a scale. Guttman scaling is an ordinal technique as it seeks only to order subjects according to some dimension. As first used, this ordering technique arranged subjects according to their responses to quesn tionnaire items. Later, use was extended to a variety of other behavioral measuring devices such as judicial voting and roll call voting.18 The principal bone of contention surrounding the use of Guttman scaling is the practice of inferring underlying attitudes from a rank order based on a cumulative pattern.19 ReSponses to statements having a common content are noted as favorable or unfavorable. Subjects w are said t content of Th tudes are as long as totalit of does little ing an abst sured by th problem of : manifestatic Peterson: A cumulz but not tion of attitude lative p attitude Van out of the technique if reSponses. " into in the 87 Subjects with the greatest number of "favorable” reSponses are said to have the most favorable attitude toward the content of the statements. The criticisms of inferring such underlying atti- tudes are numerous.20 There is the problem, for example, of directly defining an attitude based on responses to a limited number of items. Guttman asserts this is prOper as long as one assumes the attitude is a "delimited totality of behavior with respect to something."21 This does little to solve the methodological problem of decid- ing an abstract "delimited totality" does indeed get mea- sured by the questionnaire or whatever. This serious problem of inferring attitudes from some set of behavioral manifestations is most succinctly put by Spaeth and Peterson: A cumulative pattern may be considered a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for the identifica- tion of an attitude. That is, a single underlying attitude implies a cumulative pattern, but a cumu- lative paggern does not imply a single underlying attitude.“ Vanderslik suggests that the most apprOpriate way out of the problem is ”to treat Guttman scaling as a technique for assessing the dimensionality in decisional responses.”23 In this case, the link between the items of the questionnaire and the roll call become much more direct, avoiding the intervention of attitudes. So too, the emphasis of the inquiry is changed from attempting to find an attitude in someone to one of measuring an attri— bute in the roll call items. Torgerson defines an atribute a hm immedia common to a m Um deci hssuming s dle attrib hrgerson s todiscover The prll set of ”form a the iter r€5pon5v by this items tc cOmplex: be cons: reSpect 0f the 5 the altf be Order 3 scale attribut Sta] ion when 5P Semre in sc °fquestions Roll Calls d hut take th the specific Pucess defi rollcallS h utribUte’ t ueseleCted 88 attribute as a measurable property capable of gradations. The immediate task becomes one of finding a property common to all items in the scale and relating that property to the decisions made by the subjects. The resultant scale (assuming scalability) is along the dimension of the scal- able attribute and not some dubious attitudinal construct. Torgerson states the problem of Guttman scaling as trying to discover whether both subjects and items form a scale. The primary problem will be to determine whether the set of items and the set of individuals tOgether ”form a scale.” Can we order the subjects and/or the items along a continuum in such a way that the -responses of subjects to items can be accounted for by this order? Can we consider the responses to the items to be dependent on a single (though perhaps complex) attribute? Can the responses to the items be considered as indicating a relationship, with respect to a single attribute, between the 'position‘ of the subject and that of the item categories? Can the alternative response categories within an item be ordered? If so, we shall say that the items form a scale for this group of subjects, or that the attribute to which all of the items refer is a scalable attribute.25 Scales involving roll calls present special prob- lems when specifying attributes. The problem is less severe in scales using questionnaires, for the construction of questions can be done with a Specific attribute in mind. Roll calls do not offer the analyst such a chance for he must take the roll calls as given. Under such conditions, the specification of attributes is essentially an intuitive process defined by the analyst and Operationalized in the roll calls he uses.26 Definition and measurement of the attribute, therefore, becomes a function of which roll calls are selected. Put ecting roll determining ducibility tion. "In all of the rank positi is the numb Perfect sca view his p0, items. Add; reliably inc be SUSPeCtec assumPtions question of what level c Crit approxmatin from a “Umbe and Edlpards' called the C d PelCthage The perCental accepted an e SUEEEsted an —i——’— 89 Putting aside for the moment the problem of sel— ecting roll calls, inquiry may be made into the problem of determining when a "good" scale has been produced. Repro- ducibility is the central concern in answering this ques- tion. ”In a perfect scale, the responses of a subject to all of the items can be reproduced from knowledge of his "27 In turn, the definition of error A rank position alone. is the number of responses erroneously predicted. perfect scale requires, however, that each subject correctly View his position Vis-a-Vis the attribute and all the Additionally, it is required that each item reliably inquires about the same attribute.28 It should items. be suspected that only rarely all of these conditions and The assumptions will congeal to form a perfect scale. question of finding a ”good scale," therefore, depends on what level of error we are willing to accept. Criteria for accepting a scale as sufficiently approximating the results of a perfect scale have come from a number of sources, including Guttman, Torgerson, and Edwards. Guttman himself first suggested what is called the coefficient of reproducibility which produces 29 a percentage of non-scale reSponses. CR = l - total number of errors number of subjects x number of items The percentage of error becomes, (l-CR). Guttman originally 30 accepted an error of 15 per cent, but Torgerson has suggested an error of 10 per cent as the outer limit in accepting 5 tion, for 1 any single present in category of only be 8 p would be pr roll call r cent. Not maximize th. and all sta‘ would be p01 TorEerson h; Criteria“ 1. f 90 l accepting a scale.31 "But this is not a sufficient condi~ tion, for the simple reason that the reproducibility of i any single statement can never be less than the frequency l : present in the modal category.”32 If all items had a modal category of 92 per cent, the greatest error possible would only be 8 per cent. The greatest possibility of error would be present in those statements (two categories in roll call responses) where the modal category was 50 per cent. Not all statements, however, may be allowed to maximize the possibility of error for ”with a perfect scale, and all statements dividing .5 and .5, only two scores would be possible.”33 To avoid these and similar problems Torgerson has suggested the application of a number of 34 criteria: 1. Ten items should be used when the items are dichotomous. Z. A considerable range of marginals should be employed. 3. No modal category should have more than 80 per cent of the responses. 4. No large number of subjects should be found to have the same non—scale responses. 5. There should be no more than 15 per cent error in any category. 6. Each category of each item should have more non-error than error statements. With a fet these crit Rc study to p of Firearm The cumula resultant are then r characteri A The activity 01 Congress is and Robert Wrote into the Federal . 011 June 6 w l and Safe St interState ' The by OCtober l . 0f 10ng guns . rifles, and l from proVisi nation of Ke restriCt the 91 With a few minor exceptions, which will be noted later, those criteria were applied to this study. Roll calls and Guttman scaling are joined in this study to produce a measurable range of behavior in respect of Firearms roll calls in the Senate of the 90th Congress. The cumulative techniques of Guttman scaling, and the resultant scale scores for Senators respecting this issue are then related to other roll calls and to constituency characteristics. A Description of Senate Firearms Roll Calls The great majority of debate and all the roll call activity on firearms legislation in the Senate of the 90th Congress is limited to its second session (1968). Shocked into action by the assassinations of Martin Luther King find Robert Kennedy, Congress, in two separate actions, rote into law the strongest Federal gun provisions since the Federal Firearms Act of 1938. The first action came n June 6 when Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control nd Safe Streets Act containing provisions outlawing the nterstate shipment and sale of hand guns. The second major Congressional action, completed V October 10, prohibited the interstate shipment and sale f long guns and ammunition to individuals. Shotguns, .fles, and ammunition had been specifically excluded om provisions in the Omnibus Crime Bill but the assassi- tion of Kennedy on June 5 revitalized attempts to strict these other items as well; strong pressure was also kindl and owner Tydings ca was defeat Th May 16 and legislatio: call votes nearly eve: sales to re dealt with fat as roll C31 COmpone aCtions iS SYStematic analysis Us hOWeVe 1‘ . The Wary respon l.- Crime Comm prWisions I banning Mai] guns and r11 caused the J all “3 proposa Offered an a restfictions 92 so kindled to enact measures requiring gun registration d owner licensing. But the amendment offered by Senator dings calling for the registration-licensing of firearms .s defeated in September by a Senate vote of 31-55. The Senate took fourteen roll calls votes between .y 16 and September 18 to settle the issue of firearms >gislation, while the House recorded only four such roll .11 votes. Likewise, the Senate roll calls covered arly every major gun issue, from banning mail order ,les to registration-licensing, while House roll calls alt with a much more restricted range of issues. Inso- r as roll call votes are important to the major analyti- 1 components of this study, analysis of Congressional tions is largely limited to the Senate where a more stematic and thorough analysis can be made. Some minor lysis using the House roll call data is used later, ever. The Senate Judiciary Committee was assigned pri~ y responsibility for the Administration's Omnibus me Control Bill, under Title IV of which were lodged visions pertaining to arms. The Administration proposed ning mail order sales of all firearms including shot— ; and rifles; the breadth of this prohibition initially ;ed the Judiciary Committee to reject the entire firen proposal by a vote of 4-9. It was only after Dodd red an amendment excluding long guns and shotguns from rictions in the bill that the Judiciary Committee passed the fins secon L one day IV, as rep following sional Qua PI‘t and sh Prt gun to PR foreig ster we PODS nc Prc for gUI liCensi The Wmedtob [hearms pr werePropos expanded Co me“ts I‘ofle shotguH Pro lb" Edward t l italic“, 0f: 111a 29-53 93 assed the Title IV handgun provisions by a 9-7 vote. his second committee vote on Title IV was taken April , one day after the death of Martin Luther King. Title V, as reported by the Judiciary Committee, contained the ollowing general features as summarized by the Congres— ional Quarterly. Prohibited the sale of firearms, except rifles and shotguns, to persons under the age of 21. Prohibited the over-the-counter sale of a hand- gun to a person not living in the dealer's state. Prohibited the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of 'destructive devices' and gang- ster weapons. Made illegal the sale of a firearm to a felon, fugitive or a person under indictment. Curbed the importation of surplus military wea- pons not suitable for target shooting or hunting. Provided specific federal licensing standards for gun dealers and manufacturers and increased licensing fees.35 The May 16, 1968 Senate floor debate of Title IV oved to be important as five separate amendments to the rearms provisions were defeated. Four of the amendments re proposed by Senate liberals and would have variously sanded coverage of the Bill. Three of the four amend— 1ts reflected Administration attempts to have rifle and vtgun provisions reinserted into the language of Title Edward Kennedy, acting as a vehicle for the Adminis- tion, offered such an amendment, but it was defeated a 29—53 Roll Call vote (Roll Call #38).* Congressional ‘5 Roll Call number and those which follow correspond numbering system I have devised. Appendix A converts e numbers to their equivalents as reported by the r—University Consortium for Political Research in Ann r, Michigan. ‘ Quar sopp Dodd call Jaco in T WOUL I‘ifl. Oder barn frOm Vote Senal Sale 94 uarterly reports law enforcement officers gave hearty upport to Kennedy's Amendment.‘6 Senator Dodd also offered an amendment adding ong gun coverage to the bill but with a seemingly important 'fference. Dodd's amendment would have allowed state gislatures to exempt their states from the long gun pro— sions, an obvious attempt to placate the interests of ral states which felt the long gun provisions were duly harsh toward them.. MR. JAVITS. Representing, as I do, a State with both a large urban and a large rural population, it is perhaps clearer to me than to some Senators that this is really a city-rural issue. We did not think of gun registration, in fact we had no reason to, until we had 70 percent of our population in the cities, where every man cannot have a rifle hanging above his fireplace. dd's compromise produced negligible results as a roll 11 vote of 29—54 defeated the measure (Roll Call #39). ob Javits also sought to include long gun provisions Title IV similar to Dodd's amendment. Javits' proposal ld have required a mail order buyer of shot guns or les to submit a sworn affidavit stating that he was r 18 years old, that no local law prohibited him from ing the gun, and that state law did not prohibit him m receiving the gun. Javit's measure failed by a e of 30-47 (Roll Call #40). After the issue of long guns seemed decided, the te considered an amendment offered by Brooke of achusetts that would have prohibited absolutely the or delivery in interstate commerce of a variety of w0t mai buy The the iii t. .Jmni Was ‘ 9S ther weapons, including machine guns, bombs and hand renades. This would amend Title IV, as reported by the diciary Committee, for there, these weapons could be rchased as long as the chief law enforcement officer of re locality attested to their intended use for lawful asons. The amendment was defeated 30—47 (Roll Call #41). terestingly, Dodd voted against Brooke's amendment as . unwarranted exercise of police powers.38 Senator Hruska of Nebraska who staunchly opposed st firearms legislation offered the only floor anti- ministration amendment to Title IV. Hruska's amendment 11d have allowed hand guns to be purchased through the Lls on submission of an affidavit to the dealer that the 'er was not legally prohibited from purchasing the gun. r effect was to alter the general prohibition against ‘ mail purchase of handguns. The amendment also carried it provisions for less restrictive licensing standards firearms dealers. The amendment was rejected 37-45 ll Call #42). By voice vote the Senate rejected an rdment by Bennett of Utah which would have ”set mini- mandatory jail terms and fines for persons convicted pecific crimes in which a firearm was used.”39 On May 23, by a 72—4 vote, the Senate passed the bus Crime Bill, including the Title IV handgun provi- as generally outlined above. The most controversial legislation on firearms ebated after passage of the Omnibus Crime Bill, as Robert Kennedy's assassination revived the seemingly settled issue. H.R. 17735, passed in September, became a major center of controversy, in part because of its restrictions on long guns, but most importantly because of 'epeated attempts at including registration—licensing pro— 'isions. The final provisions of the bill, however, did .ot include the registration and licensing of firearms nd owners; proposals for such restrictions were defeated n both houses by overwhelming margins. The provisions of .R. 17735 are numerous, but a summary of major features icludes that: (1) it prohibited the mail order and other iterstate shipment of firearms (long guns in particular) rd ammunition in transaction between dealers of one state .d buyers of another; (2) with exceptions, it banned er—the—counter sales of firearms and ammunition to per- ns from out of state;* (3) it made allowance for the tra-state mail order shipment of arms only if the buyer Lles to buyers from contiguous states were not banned. Ler exceptions as listed in the 1968 Congressional Quar- ly Almanac (p. 550): ”Permitted a person outside his own te to replace a firearm that was lost, stolen or broken er signing a sworn statement to that effect. Permitted on-resident of a state to rent or borrow a firearm for porary use for lawful sporting purposes. Permitted oment and receipt of firearms and ammunition when sold issued by the Secretary of the Army to members of the .onal Rifle Association (NRA) or certain eligible .lian rifle ranges. Permitted shipment of firearms and Lnition particularly suitable for sporting purposes to ers of the U.S. Armed Forces on active duty outside United States and to clubs recognized by the Depart— of Defense whose entire membership is composed of such ans.” 97 bmitted to the seller a sworn statement that he was herwise legally allowed to receive the guns or ammuni- on; (4) it prohibited importing foreign made military rplus; (5) it disallowed the sale of shotguns, rifles, i ammunition to persons under 18, and the sale of hand— 15 and its ammunition to those under 21. Several pro- sions concerning licensing procedures for dealers were .0 included. The second round of Senate debate and roll calls an on June 18 when Thomas Dodd's Senate Judiciary, enile Delinquency Subcommittee passed S3633 (Senate nterpart to H.R. 17735), banning the mail order and er-state shipment of rifles, shotguns and ammunition.* same sub—committee opened hearings June 26 on bills Lously requiring the licensing of gun owners and the .stration of all firearms. The mood of the Senate, as as the nation, had changed dramatically in one month, Kennedy's death played no small part in that change. ral Senators on the sub—committee altered earlier sition to restrictions. Whereas long gun restrictions been soundly defeated in the Senate one month earlier, Senate now seemed willing to go even further and give 1g consideration to registration—licensing features. itwo are actually synonomous. S3633 is the Senate halent of H.R. 17735. The Senate actually passed 17735 but only after substituting the language of l 98 } Among the Senators on the Subcommittee who voted for the bill was Roman L. Hruska (R Neb.), who had been the staunchest Senate supporter of the position of the National Rifle Association (NRA) against strict gun regulations. Hruska said public opinion has 'crystallized' in favor of strong controls and it was 'reasonable for the Congress to review its work in the light of changing circumstances.40 The Senate Judiciary Committee was scheduled to gin hearings on S3633 June 27. Hearings actually began July 9, however, and it was not until September 6 that '33 was reported out by the Judiciary Committee in a 3 vote. The Bill, as reported, contained most of the visions finally passed by the Senate but the final com- tee vote produced several "separate views,” basically lective of the divisions which had occupied the Commit— during much of the summer. Fong (R Hawaii), Hart (D ligan), Tydings (D Maryland), Scott (R Pa.), and :hers (D Fla.), in a separate opinion, called S3633 lequate, advocating in addition to its present features, stration provisions. This is especially interesting iew of the fact that Hart had voted against rifle and gun mail order restrictions during deliberations over e IV of the Omnibus Crime Bill. Eastland (D Miss.) Thurmond (R S.C.) and McClellan (D Ark.) all voted ist 83633 and its mail order long gun prohibitions. l Although $3633 did not contain registration and tsing features, proposals for such engendered consid~ e Committee debate. Tydings (D Md.), the chief nent of licensing-registration, tried unsuccessfully number of occasions to have the committee amend 99 633 in this respect. Several close committee votes were ported to have been taken with Tydings' proposals .rrowly going down to defeat. This debate, coupled with 'dings' threat to bring the issue of registration to the snate floor caused considerable consternation among uponents of registration. The result was that Dirksen t 111.), Hruska (R Neb.), Burdick (D N.D.), and Thurmond l S.C.) offered separate views to the majority report of re Judiciary Committee, stating unequivocal opposition to Ly Federal licensing and registration requirements. These major divisions in the Judiciary Committee U are to reflect subsequent divisions in debates on the enate floor over 83633. First, there was the faction tposed to nearly any form of Federal regulation of rearms. Second, there were those who favored banning i1 order and interstate shipment of firearms, but opposed gistration licensing. Finally, there were those who ored registration—licensing along with banning inter- te transactions between dealers and buyers. Debate on the Senate floor over S3633 had been radic during most of the summer months, but on Sept- er 12 the fate of the bill came under close scrutiny serious debate began with Dodd scolding the NRA for kwards thinking and questionable tactics. Mr. President, the National Rifle Association can see a little of the 19th century in just about everything. Spokesmen for the National Rifle Association repeatedly appeared before congressional committees and suggested, for example, that simple laws to disarm the criminal would result in the ultimate confiscation of all 100 firearms from the public, thus leaving it exposed to invasion by a foreign power. They believe, in short, that a handful of untrained riflemen and pistol shooters could and would route a modern war machine with tanks, cannons and jet fighters in the event that the U.S. military resistance collapsed. Seldom a month passes that an NRA official fails to cite some imagined, if not total fictional, example of a modern Nation collapsing because its citizenry were not armed to the teeth with Saturday night specials and fowling pieces. . . . Mr. President, there is the specter of the Old West spooking the front offices of the National Rifle Association. At the National Rifle Association, it is a man and his gun against the world. At the National Rifle Association, America has not changed substantially from the frontier of 100 years ago. It dwells on the concept of the armed citizen to the point where a significant portion of its magazine, the American Rifleman, is devoted to it. The National Rifle Association keeps its own version of a box score on the accomplishments of the armed citizen. In fact, each month, the magazine runs a standing feature column called 'The Armed Citizen.’ Any detailed study of the column would have to conclude that it suggests citizen arm against citizen for 'self—pro- tection.‘ The gun is worshipped almost as an entity p'whose mere presence' prevents crime. l The National Rifle Association had generated great sure since the death of Robert Kennedy, accusing gun rictions supporters of whipping up public fervor and ing Congress to react without proper time to think. enuinely strong the NRA pressure was is questionable nators generally had to deal with competing pressures, RA on one side, and public opinion polls on the other ng that most Americans faVOred stronger gun curbs. Roll call voting on S3633 is first recorded on mber 16. The first roll call was on a Judiciary ttee amendment excluding shotgun shells, rifle ammuni— and .22 calibre rimfire ammunition from provisions of '11. This amendment would have virtually eliminated 101 Ll ammunition, except for handgun ammunition, from estrictions in the bill. The Senate refused the amend— ent 36-41 (Roll Call #58) and thus significantly expanded he bill's effect. On September 17 a roll call on Dodd's mendment to tighten qualifications for licensed firearms ealers was defeated 42-45 (Roll Call #59). Dodd's con- ern, and the concern of many other Senators was that the riterion established for gaining a dealer's license pre- ented an important loophole in the bill. Dodd's amend~ ent would have required, among other things, the dealer o maintain a place of business, as well as actually arry on business; the intent was to issue dealers licenses nly to those who genuinely intended to become dealers. procedural motion by Senator Allott (R Colo.) to table ‘motion to reconsider Dodd's amendment passed 45-39 011 Call #60). September 18 records considerable Senate debate d voting, as well as the passage of H.R. 17735. Included the day's proceedings were amendments from proponents of rearms restrictions seeking registration-licensing, and ndments from opponents restricting the applicability of bill. Importantly, a series of roll calls on registra~ n and licensing all were defeated by large margins. first such amendment was proposed by Tydings and called the general registration of firearms and the licensing owners. Tydings had led the fight in the Senate for istration and licensing, although he was not the only — r 102 to offer such a bill. The Administration, through 1, submitted its own registration bill (83691) requir— Federal registration even where states had their own istration laws; additionally, it visited certain penal- s on states which did not enact licensing laws. Dodd also submitted his own registration bill earlier 604) as had Tydings (83634). These registration bills er reached the floor of the Senate, however, being tled up in the Judiciary Committee. The only recourse left to Tydings and others was raise the registration issue on the Senate floor by posing amendments. Tydings' amendment called for manda— V registration of all firearms, and in two years, manda- / licensing of all those who purchased firearms. Tyd— 5 himself was explicit that no one, not already pro— ted by law, would place in jeopardy his possession of rearm merely by registration. For the record, I stress this amendment imposes no inconvenience, no burden, no fee, no tax, no expense to the gun owner other than the cost of a 6-cent tamp or two. All of its procedures of registration nd licensing can be accomplished by mail. There is o discrimination involved in the issuance of the icense or the registration certificate. It is andatory. The issuance of the registration certifi— ate is automatic. gs statement was an attempt to take steam out of the rgument that registration was a step away from confis— n. Also, as Tydings points out, his amendment was a eal more moderate than the Administration backed bill 43 . . In particular, Tydings' amendment allowed states 103 rith their own registration requirements to preempt the 'ederal requirements under certain circumstances. Tydings' mendment lost miserably by a vote of 31—55 (Roll Call 61) even though its provisions might have been appealing 0 those jealous of guarding state prerogatives in the rea. Registration did not die here, however, Senator ickson (D Wash.) next proposed an amendment which pro— lded that no license would be renewed or granted to Lrearms dealers, importers, or manufacturers, or collec- >rs in states not having ”effective firearms control aws.” Jackson's amendment sought no Federal level regis- fation or licensing of owners; rather, it would create )nditons under which states would be forced to provide eir own registration provisions. Jackson had voted ainst Tydings' Amendment, but that was in conformity th his public stand that registration should be promul- ted at the local and state level only. This is a moderate bill. It does not go nearly as far as the administration bill. This is a bill which, if enacted, would put the burden on the States. It would afford some degree of protection to the citizens of the United States, and it would result, in my judgment and in the judgment of all the law enforcement officials who have testified before our subcommittee, in the saving of countless lives and countless treasure of our people. kson's amendment failed by a vote of 35-48 (Roll Call ). 104 Senator Brooke was next to propose a registration endment, modified in some respects to take the sting out the term ”registration.” The amendment I propose would create the framework for local, State, and Federal Governments to cooper- ate voluntarily in the collection and sharing of limited information concerning the identity, loca— tion, and ownership of firearms. First, the amend- ment provides for the filing of data on firearms, together with the names, addresses, ages, and social security numbers of their owners, with local law enforcement officers. The information could be filed either by mail or in person. Second, it relies on incentives, rather than any sanctions, to persuade local authorities to transmit this data to a national inventory. Third, it provides clear authority for States to create their own inventories and to exempt themselves at any time from coverage of the national system. 5 amendment, however, was defeated 31-53 (Roll Call #63), opponents of registration were not to accept registra— tn in any form. Brooke's amendment would have required lers and manufacturers to transmit information on the and the buyer to local authorities and to the Depart- of the Treasury. The last attempt at registration through roll call vity came on Tydings' amendment to require licensing the carrying of concealed weapons. Even though previous te had established a practical difference between lation of handguns and other firearms, the Senate ed to pass any sort of Federal registration for even alable weapons. The vote on Tydings' amendment was (Roll Call #64), and spelled final defeat for pts at registration and licensing. In this respect, ssue of registration and licensing invoked a nearly 105 iform response among Senators: no matter who was sponsible for the registration and what was to be regis- red, none was to be allowed. Senator Murphy (R Calif.) attempted to seriously Lken provisions of 83633 by offering an amendment ,horizing the importation of firearms ”not particularly ceptible to criminal uses." The amendment would have eated one of the original goals of H.R. 17735, that is, wing the importation traffic in cheap foreign arms. amendment failed 78-6 (Roll Call #65). H.R. 17735 finally passed the Senate on September 1968, by a vote of 70-17 (Roll Call #66). The final visions of the bill were generally unchanged from those orted out by the Judiciary Committee. Minor changes been accepted by voice vote but these largely had to ith simple modifications in language. Two of these e votes, however, are of more than casual interest Senator Dominick (R Colo.) proposed prison sentences p to life for use of a firearm during a crime of ence. The amendment passed. Also passed, was an dment proposed by Brewster (D Md.) that no level of rnment was empowered to legalize confiscation of nry used for legal purposes. Brewster, from the same as Tydings, generally favored gun restrictions, so unlikely the amendment was designed to do anything lacate interests who were nervous about the potential onfiscation. 106 A summary of these roll calls brings a number of initial findings to mind. There were two distinct battles over firearms in the Senate. The first, fought prior to Kennedy's assassination, was largely over the issue of whether long guns and ammunition should be banned from the mails and from inter-state shipment or purchase. The proponents of such measures lost this battle, although they did win approval of similar prohibitions for hand guns. Passage of the hand gun proposal seemed in doubt, iowever, until King's assassination apparently dislodged ‘itle IV from the Senate Judiciary Committee. The second battle was fought after Kennedy's ssassination and the issue was no longer whether there ould be any additional regulations but rather how much ew regulation. With important switches in positions on ang gun mail order prohibitions by Hart (D Mich.), rurmond (R S.C.), Burdick (D N.D.), and Bayh (D Ind.) 1 the Juvenile Delinquency Sub—Committee it became >parent very soon after Kennedy's death that long gun ‘ohibitions were no longer in serious doubt. The new inority issue, and the one staunchly supported by never $re nor less than about one—third of the Senate, concerned gistration and licensing of firearms and owners. This dtle for even stricter measures was also lost, as the ptle for long gun prohibition was lost earlier. The i bassination of another Senator or President may have ll tered votes once again, however. p l l ../7 It is interesting to note that the final vote on l.R. 17735 included 17 Nays. This and other information tresented here indicates a number of Senators were nalterably opposed to restrictive gun legislation. Thus, n addition to the bloc of 30 or so Senators strongly dvocating restrictive measures, even in the form of egistration, there is also a bloc of staunch opponents. 1 the middle is a bloc which apparently switched views rom May to September. Several questions are suggested. Which Senators Irmed which blocs? How may the blocs and Senators be fferentiated? Were the voting patterns of Senators on rearms legislation consistent? The rest of this chapter d all of the next concern this question. An Analysis of Senate Firearms Roll Calls Four of the fifteen Senate roll calls dealt in Tious fashion with the issue of banning long guns from : mails and from interstate commerce in general (Roll ls #38, #39, #40, #66). Three of these roll calls were en on May 16 and the fourth (#66) on September 18. ional and party patterns are discernable on the first he roll calls and to some extent on the fourth. Num— % 38 and 39 sought to ban mail order shipments of long ; altogether (#39 allowing states to exempt themselves m such restrictions). Roll call #40 required a buyer rugh the mails to submit an affidavit stating no local tate law was being violated by receiving the long gun. 108 The votes on these three measures were nearly identical, and even though the Administration supported adding long guns to the Omnibus Crime Bill, a majority of both parties refused the measure. Roll call #39 is typical of this action as 37 out of 60 Democrats and 23 out of 33 Repub- licans opposed the measure. Deeper analysis discloses 17 3f the 37 Democratic nay votes were from the South. This, rowever, leaves only a bare majority of non—southern Demo— :rats supporting long gun restrictions. Analysis of roll :alls #38 and #40 reveals a similar pattern. The apparent importance of regionalism as a distin— uishing variable on long gun restrictions extends far eyond the South. Table II-l presents the regional voting atterns for roll call #39. A listing of the states icluded in each region appears in Appendix B. .BLE II-l.—-Regional Voting on Roll Call #39. 2 m ‘< Region Yea New England Mid—Atlantic East North Central West North Central Solid South ‘ Border States \lkDALNl-J H 0'14:- Mountain States Pacific States External States lr—IHI—‘wa-PU'IU'I'D )...I lNU’I (N (N Ch 0 CWWWM. is s 109 v England gives over—whelming support for restrictions long guns with moderately strong support coming from a Mid-Atlantic and East North Central states. Beyond is Eastern area, however, support erodes rapidly, )ecially in the South and the West. Opposition is rongest among the Southern, the Rocky Mountain, and the :ific state Senators who, with only a few exceptions, :e nay on the issue. States in the Central North West 7e also opposed to restriction. Interestingly, many of :se same states have or have had provisions in their ate constitutions authorizing an interpretation of an lividual right to keep and bear arms. (More will be .d on this in Chapter V). These regional patterns are altered somewhat by 1 call #66 taken in September on the same issue of g gun restrictions. In this instance, three and one— f months after Robert Kennedy‘s death, restrictions the interstate shipment of long guns passed over- lmingly; the relative structure of opposition among regions remained remarkably the same, while changing >thers. No opposition is recorded to H.R. 17735 among .tors from New England, the Mid~Atlantic States, the North Central States, or from the Border States. The South, and the Rocky Mountain States, however, each eight opposing votes, accounted for 16 out of the 21 votes cast on H.R. 17735. Three opposing votes from Vest North Central States and one each from the 110 ’acific and External States accounted for the rest of the >pposition. More Democrats (16) opposed H.R. epublicans (5), 17735 than did even though the Administration gave the easure full support. This is not surprising, however, as l any Southern Democrats vehemently opposed gun restrictions n any form. Additionally, several Democratic Senators rom the Rocky Mountain and Western states reported (on re Senate floor) significant, strong, and definite con- :ituency opposition to any form of gun restrictions. cept for the South, Republican and Democratic opposition fairly evenly split and limited to the Rocky Mountain ates and the North West Central States. But Southern position, along with Rocky Mountain opposition, proved ierally to be the most vehement of the session. Aside from the usual complaints that gun restric— tns would not do anything to solve the problems of me and violence, Southern opinion was out in force testing that restrictions were a step away from con— cation and an eventual police state. Strom Thurmond S.C.) expressed this view on September 18. Mr. President, I am opposed to Federal regulation of arms and Federal licensing of gun owners. To my way of thinking, we need effective law enforcement at every level of our Government rather than a prolifer— ation of gun laws directed primarily at law abiding taxpaying citizens in this great Nation. . . . Law— abiding citizens should be allowed to keep guns in d their homes for the protection of their families an prOperty. Existing State and local laws should be enforced vigorously. . . . A Federal system of gun registration and licensing would requ1re a large 111 Federal police force. A Federal police force could lead to a police state. 6 James Eastland (D Miss.) seems almost as certain as Thurmond that doom would befall the Nation. In my judgment, the supporters of strict Federal gun registration and licensing laws and the sup- porters of Federal gun confiscation and gun leg— islation realize that they will not get such leg- islation enacted in this session of Congress. However, they are attempting to curb or eliminate the sale of weapons to private citizens by making the criminal liabilities of gun dealers so broad, vague, and nebulous as to discourage and deter any person from engaging in this lawful business. . . . Mr. President, 1 voice my strong opposition to this amendment and to any bill which could and inevitably would limit the right of our citizens to keep and bear arms. I do so for many reasons: First, such laws would be merely an opening wedge to the restriction and licensing of all weapons; second, it would be the first step toward a dis- armed citizenry, and, finally, a disarmed citizenry would mean that Socialists and criminals will con— trol this Nation. Comments from Rocky Mountain State Senators seemed, >n balance, more restrained than in the South. Although no ystematic content analysis was made of the differences, or reasons already given, Western opposition in debate as less politically oriented than Southern comments. hat is, the issue was not so much whether a police state 15 around the corner, but rather one of deciding whether 1n restrictions would actually aid in reducing the crime ‘oblem, while not unduly penalizing the sportsman. Peter minick (R C010.) is representative of this approach in e debates of September 18 as is Alan Bible (D Nev.). minick: I have been old time and time again by peOple in my State, and people from other States who have written me, that if the pending measure is passed, the situation will be very Similar to -___a—_=BW Sh 112 that which was experienced during prohibition times. The crooks will continue to operate and get their guns anywhere they can. They will get guns by breaking into stores and stealing them, as they are doing at the present time. ible: I am unalterably opposed to Federal registration of firearms and Federal licensing of the thousands of law—abiding people in my State of Nevada and the millions of sportsmen, hobbyists, and other responsi- ble, law-abiding citizens throughout the Nation who cherish their right to keep arms without this kind of interference from the Federal Government. . . . Fire- arms controls can be dealt with effectively by the States and cities of the country, depending on the special problems and conditions confronting each of them. The registration of firearms was considered in four parate roll calls (#61, #62, #63, #64). All of these ‘11 calls took place on September 18 leaving no convenient portunity for analysis of the issue over time. It is of rked interest, however, that registration was given no aring in Senate Committees or in the Senate chamber ring May. But two weeks after Kennedy's assassination least three separate bills were placed before the rate on the topic of registration-licensing. The substance of roll calls #61, #62, #63, and #64 e discussed earlier in this chapter. Roll calls #61, and #63 all dealt with various measures for the , istration-licensing of all weapons, whereas roll call restricted licensing to hand guns. The party and tonal patterns described in the analysis of long gun calls held in the analysis of registration roll calls. red, regional patterns seem even more pronounced in respects. The South was unanimously opposed to 113 registration restrictions, while the Rocky Mountain and Central North West states offered overwhelming opposition (5—23). Support eroded somewhat (8-3) in the New England states since the May long gun vote, but majority support for registration was clear as it was in the Mid~Atlantic and Central North Eastern States. Roll call #64 (hand gun licensing) produced two Southern defections from the unanimous vote of opposition recorded on other registra- tion-licensing measures. Smathers of Florida and Yarbor— ough of Texas both favored the hand gun licensing. Neither Yarborough nor Smathers are considered entrenched conservatives, but with the exception of Yarborough's pro-labor stands neither are blazing liberals either. Their reasons for switching were not recorded in the Senate debate. In the Midwest, Bayh (D Ind.) and Griffin (R Mich.) )oth switched earlier registration opposition to support if hand gun licensing. Actually, Griffin had voted in avor of Jackson's Roll Call (#62) and Brooke's Roll all (#63), both of which were attempts at gaining support or weakened registration proposals; Bayh had not favored ither. The reasons for Griffin‘s switch are not at all tear, although his counterpart, Hart (D Mich.), consis- :ntly supported registration proposals. Both men, how— 'er, did not join into the debate of September 18, except r Griffin to rise in support of roll call #64. The tstate hunting industry in Michigan, as in many of the 114 Western states, is a large and profitable business; but there is also Detroit with all of the concomitant problems 3f urban crime and violence. The cross-pressures from :hese two sources likely produced a decision not to raise tore fuss than necessary. Additionally, Griffin's out- tate electoral support probably accounts for his incon~ istent behavior in relation to registration. Much of his interpretation is conjecture, however. A particularly close vote came on Roll Call #59 I which Dodd sought to tighten restrictions on qualifi— itions for licensed firearms dealers. Again, opposition liefly centered in the Rocky Mountain and Southern states. .t important switches were made in the other Regions from position to support. Murphy's (R Calif.) amendment (Roll Call #65) ald have made importation of firearms immensely easy, 1 thus produced disastrous consequences for the intent of )ponents on H.R. 17735. The issue, made Clear by Mur~ ' and Hansen (R Wyo.), was that the bill was meant to p open to hunters and collectors the trade in foreign dware. Dodd reminded the Senate that 80 per cent of guns used in crime were foreign made49 and Pastore R.I.) accused Murphy of representing the special inter— ; of arms importers. Joining Murphy and Hansen in ing for the bill were Curtis (R Neb.), Hickenlooper Iowa), Hruska (R Neb.), Thurmond (R S.C.), and Bayh 115 (D Ind.). The key to understanding some of the seven votes may lie with Pastore's accusation. Guttman Scale Results The technique of Guttman scaling was employed in .he analysis of firearms roll calls to provide answers to wo questions: In what respect, or along what dimension, ere the gun bills related? Second, would Guttman scaling emonstrate the existence of fairly consistent voting locs on firearms? The initial hypotheses regarding this atter matter had been rather simplistic. First it was ssumed there were two stable but rather small groups of anators who were always at opposite ends in terms of .rearms roll calls. The one interesting exception to .is proved to be roll call #65 on Murphy's amendment. 6 overwhelmingly lop—sided vote on this roll call is e only one on which at least 20 per cent of the Senators re not in the minority category. The middle group, ther large in size, was moderately inclined toward some fiSiOD in gun legislation. The inference for this :umption had largely been drawn from a reading of the .gressional Record where it appeared a small minority vocal Senators on both sides consistently held sway in debate. This should normally be expected as Senate ate and voting goes, but the volatility of the debate the controversy engendered between these groups was small matter. Indeed, both sides insisted the very Lc free nature of a democratic society was being 116 :hreatened; one side insisting that gun curbs would produce 1 police state, and the other side insisting that the lack 3f curbs would return us to the lawless state of the jungle. 0n the matter of scaling roll calls along some dimension, the initial statement of hypotheses was also simplistic: the dimension of the scale was in terms of what was being regulated and in what manner, or in terms of "severity of restrictions.” Specifically, it was hypo— thesized that restrictions on hand guns would prove to be least objectionable while registration requirements would prove to be most objectionable. The theory behind Guttman scaling has already been discussed at some length. Some of the most severe restraints on the cumulative scaling of firearm roll calls, however, were not theoretical but rather machine oriented. The CDC 3600 computer using the BMD 058 program for Gutt— 5 . nan scaling was applied to the firearms roll calls.50 1 Tive of the fifteen firearms roll calls and 30 of the 101 I ienators were dropped from the analysis for the time being. ihe five roll calls were dropped for a variety of reasons. \5 I I Fey essentially duplicated roll call #38 on banning long irst, roll calls #39, #40, and #41 were dropped because pns from the mails. Prior analysis had demonstrated Sting alignments were similar among all four and, thus, )thing would be gained by the inclusion of all of them. Ill call #38 was chosen from among this group for two 117 reasons: (1) it contained the least absences of any of the four; (2) it stated most clearly the issue of banning long guns from the mails. Roll call #60 was omitted from the Guttman scale as it was simply a procedural question concerning recon- sideration of Dodd‘s Amendment (Roll Call #59) which is retained in this analysis. Roll call #65 was also dropped as its margins were too dispersed to have any likely payoff in the analysis. It was decided that all other roll calls would be kept. Torgerson suggests, as noted earlier, that at least ten items should be used when the responses are dichotomous. The decision on retaining all of the registration roll calls was made with this in mind but also because some subtle substantive differences among the four registration roll calls offered hope for discriminating among partici— )ants. Roll call #12 which would have authorized a signi- ?icant reduction in appropriations to the National Board er the Promotion of Rifle Practice, was also retained. he National Rifle Association was the chief inheritor f free ammunition supplied through the Board. Although roll call on this topic was not manifestly concerned .th gun restrictions, many Senators frequently complained rout the influence of the NRA, and as a curiosity item, seemed reasonable to explore the relationship between iving money to the NRA” and opposing gun restrictions. 118 Cutting 30 Senators from the analysis poses a more erious dilemma than dropping roll calls. The problem ere was computor-induced; that is, the appearance of bsences created not only a problem of scoring but essen- ially changed the response patterns from dichotomous to richotomous. The implications of this were disastrous n terms of computer time and cost as time requirements ith trichotomous response patterns increase exponentially ith the addition of each subject and variable. A deci- ion was made to temporarily discard any Senator who was )sent during any one of the ten chosen roll calls. ickily, this only involved 30 of the 101 Senators who sat iring the 90th Congress. An initial Guttman scale using 1e 71 remaining respondents was constructed. The respondents who had absences were placed into re initial computor-constructed scale by hand. At this int the problem of scoring absences became an irritation. nsider the following example, for instance, where l is yes vote, 2 is a no vote, and 0 is absent. Assume ten 11 calls have been arranged according to the decreasing 1ber of yea votes in each roll call (the primary pro- [ure used in Guttman scaling to order items). Roll Call # l 6 8 2 9 7 5 4 3 10 ator X's Vote 2 2 2 0 Z 1 1 l 1 1 problem is obvious: how do we score roll call #2 for LtOT X? In spite of the absence it is apparent support and opposition begins between roll calls #9 and #7. 119 The assumption is made that if he were present he would have voted ”nay” on roll call #2. But the problem of absence becomes particularly distasteful when absences 'ntervene between support and opposition scores. Roll Call # l 6 8 Z 9 7 5 4 3 10 enator Y's Vote 2 2 2 2 0 l l l 1 Should roll call #9 be recorded yes or no? This troblem has been dealt with in a variety of ways. Vander— lik suggests assigning a scale value of .5 to the absent ategory and a scale value of l to each yea category.51 owever, as long as the number of categories is even, I refer to assign the value of the modal category. In this ase, roll call #9 would be assigned a 1. In case of two asences intervening at the cutting point, and there being 3 modal category, the zeroes would each be assigned one ‘ the two possible values. As absences become more numerous, problems of value signment become difficult and hazardous. For this rea— n, Senators with particular kinds of absence patterns re permanently discarded from the Guttman scale: (1) ey failed to vote on at least half of the ten r011 ls; (2) they did not vote on any of the September gun 1 calls; or (3) they did not vote on any of the regis— tion bills. Seventy—one Senators had no absences and 5 qualified for inclusion in the computor constructed le. Of the remaining thirty, eighteen met all of the ve ”absence“ requirements and thus were placed in the 120 Guttman scale by hand; twelve were permanently excluded. In the end, therefore, 89 out of 101 Senators were included in the Guttman scale. Of the twelve who were not, nine missed more than half of the selected roll call votes, one (Goodell) missed the entire Second session until September, two others missed important votes on the registration issue. Five of the excluded twelve would likely have opposed restrictions while four would have shown support, but this is mostly guess work based on a limited number of votes. The Guttman scale constructed by the CDC 3600 computor accomplished three tasks: (1) it arranged the roll calls in order of the proportion of votes that are yea; (2) it arranged Senators in terms of decreasing sup- port for the ten roll call votes; and (3) it computed CR and MMR statistics. CR has already been discussed. MMR stands for Minimal Marginal Reproducibility; it is defined as the average number of modal responses for the set of items under investigation.52 The larger the gap between MMR and CR, the better, as it reduces the chance that a high GR is due to spurious or random causes. The Guttman scale using 71 Senators produced a CR of .93944 (.94) and an MMR of .62113 (.62); the difference between CR and MMR is .32 which is certainly acceptable. dding the eighteen additional Senators by hand did not ppreciably affect values of CR and MMR. Rounded to hun- reths, CR remained at .94 and MMR at .62. 1,, 121 The order produced by the Guttman scale for the ten roll calls was, going from highest to lowest in proportion of yea votes: TABLE II-2.——Order of Firearms Roll Calls in Guttman Scaling. Roll Call # Description 66 H.R. 17735-Banning inter—state mail order of long guns—-September. 42 Handguns purchased through the mail on sub- mission of affidavit. 58 Excluding shotgun, rifle or 22 cal. ammuni- tion from provisions. 59 Tightening qualifications for licensed dealers. 62 States penalized for not proposing own registration laws. 64 Licensing of concealable weapons. 38 Add long gun coverage to Title IV--May. 63 Collect certain information on all firearms. 61 Registration licensing of all firearms at Federal level. 12 Reduce support for National Rifle Practice Board. Several interesting findings are suggested by this order of roll calls. The position of roll call #66 should be compared with that of roll call #38. Both bills essen- tially call for the regulation of the same items (long guns) and in the same manner (banning from the mails and restricting of interstate purchases); yet, bills calling for registration-licensing separate the two in scale posi— tion. What seems equally important is that thirty~two 122 Senators switched from opposition to support while voting 3n essentially identical bills. This suggests that degree 3f restriction is not the only dimension at work in the scale. Time and historical events seem important as well, for the two bills are separated by four months and Kennedy's assassination. A small stretch of the imagination may be applied toward extending the time argument to roll call #12 taken in August of 1967. Roll Call #12 sought to decrease the funds available for free ammunition, yet it received the least support of any of the Senate roll calls on firearms. It may well be that the vote on this bill was taken at a time when the issue of firearms restrictions and the furtherance of the use of firearms was no large issue. But it may also be that few Senators wished to openly ntagonize the National Rifle Association. One thing is lear at least, from August 1967 through September 1968 he issues before the Senate became more radical and the upport for these radical positions became more generous. Of the Bills decided in 1968, Tydings amendment 011 Call #61) which called for registration—licensing all firearms received the least support. This is not rprising since it was the most comprehensive bill in rms of what was being regulated, and the most radical terms of the mode of regulation. Actually, the differ- ce between this roll call and roll call #63, in terms of oportion of the total votes that were yes, is zero, as 123 both record 31 yea votes (N of 89 Senators). But this is not surprising since #63 changed the word ”registration” to the phrase "collect certain information" and left the rest of #62 relatively unchanged. Their similarity gig-a- xis the scale reflects their similarity in substance. The other registration bills differ in a number of substantive respects; but differences on the scale, although present, are small. Roll call #62, placing the burden for regis— tration on the states, and roll call #64, requiring the licensing of hand guns are only slightly more popular forms of registration (36 and 37 yea votes respectively). The conclusion may be drawn, but only very weakly, that the degree of restriction advocated in roll call #64 was less than that in #61. Also, it seems that requiring state registration rather than Federal registration was a slightly less severe form of restriction. What appears more important about the four regis- tration bills is the over—riding importance of their similarity as registration bills. The number of yes votes in the four registration bills only range from 31 to 37; in the Guttman scale, four scale positions for :hese roll calls include only seven Senators. What this leans is that the registration bills offer very little iscriminating value. Indeed, the over-riding importance f the concept of registration in producing consistently es or no voting patterns seems clear. Yet, a reading of le amendments indicates large substantive differences: .ere was variation in what was being regulated (hand guns ' all guns) and there was variation in who was doing the :gulation (Federal or State). But there was g9 varia— ton in the mode of regulation as all four bills proposed agistration-licensing. This supports, and clarifies irther, one of the initial hypotheses stated earlier: pponents and proponents formed fairly consistent groupings n the registration issue, with little vote switching, ven though the content of the registration bills differed ubstantially in many respects. Roll calls #42 and #58 presented a problem in the nalysis as they both were amendments from opponents of un restrictions; all other items in the Guttman scale ere offered by supporters of gun restrictions. In order or yes votes to mean the same thing throughout the scale, e., favoring gun restrictions, the votes and meanings f roll calls #42 and #58 were reversed or reflected. Roll 111 #42 would have severly circumscribed the hand gun #ovisions in Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Bill. A ‘flected yes vote, therefore, was in opposition to cir— mventing Title IV provisions. Roll call #58 presented e same mechanical problem but substantively sought to rcumvent regulation features of H.R. 17735 by eliminating 11 order restrictions on just about all types of ammuni- )n. In terms of scale position and proportion of yes :es, #42 and #58 are very similar. These votes were en four months apart, however, and differed substantively. 125 Their closeness on the scale is explained not so much by their substance but by the date of the roll call. That is, roll call #42, which was taken in May refused to weaken handgun proposals, while roll call #58, taken in September, refused to weaken long gun proposals. If both roll calls had taken place in September the expectation is that the amendment to weaken hand gun provisions would have met with much stronger resistance than the one aimed at weakening long gun measures. As it was, opposition to the two proposed amendments was similar in overall propor— tion of yes votes and in who was voting yes. There are some exceptions to this last point, how— :ver. Byrd (D Va.), Mansfield (D Mont.), and Boggs (R Del.) all voted to slacken hand gun requirements, but pposed efforts at watering down long gun provisions, as id Morse (D Oregon) and Hill (D Ala.). On the other and, Smathers (D Fla.), Jackson (D Wash.), McGee (D 10.), Fulbright (D Ark.), McClellan (D Ark.), and ,lender (D La.) were opposed to hand gun revisions but vored down-grading long gun measures. All of these dis— epancies are scale errors as they depart from what should ve been consistent voting, given the scale arrangement. 2 first group (Boggs, etc.) should have opposed both empts at limiting coverage; the second group (Smathers, .) should have favored both attempts. The switch by first group is likely to be explained in terms of the .t change in Senate opinion between May and September; 126 whereas, this group probably questioned the necessity of hand gun restrictions in May, there was no question of the need for both handgun and long gun provisions in September. The second group was generally more opposed to various gun restrictions than the first as measured by Guttman scale scores; additionally, the great importance attached by the NRA and other opposition groups to any long gun provisions is reflected in these votes. In effect, this second group did not recognize the time dimension recognized by the scale. No errors appear among those with the highest and lowest Guttman scale scores; all of the departures from the expected are among Senators with medium scores or medium high opposition scores. A Look at the Scale Extremes The time dimension seems to be as important in this Guttman scale as the degree of restriction dimension; both seem to be useful toward explaining the relative array of roll calls and Senators. It is also interesting to note that the assumption there were two stable minorities unal— terably supporting and opposing gun restrictions, is con— firmed by the Guttman scale. Indeed, fifteen Senators oted nay on every restriction bill, while another twenty— wo voted nay on everything except H.R. 17735. On the ther hand, fourteen Senators supported every restriction ill while eight more gave affirmative support on nine of he ten bills. A review of the states and parties for hese opposing forces is interesting. 127 TABLE II-3.——Oppose All Gun Bills. State Party Name Utah R Bennett Utah D Moss N.D. D Burdick N.D. R Young Miss. D Eastland Miss. D Stennis S.C. R Thurmond S.C. D Hollings Idaho D Church Ariz. R Fannin Ga D Russell Mont. D Metcalf Nev D Bible S.D. R Mundt Alaska D Gruening 128 TABLE II—4.--Oppose All Except One Gun Bill. State Party Name Neb. R Hruska Neb. R Curtis Colo. R Allott Colo. D Dominick Wyo. D McGee Wyo. R Hansen Tenn. R Baker Texas R Tower Calif R Murphy Idaho R Jordan Ore R Hatfield N.H R Cotton Kan R Carlson Nev D Cannon Ark. D McClellan Ark. D Fulbright Ala. D Sparkman Ala. D Hill N.C. D Ervin N.C. D Jordan La. D Ellender Ga D Talmadge TABLE II-S.—-Support All Gun Bills. State Party Name V D Pastore R.I. D Pell Mass. R Brooke MaSS- D Kennedy Md. D Tydings N.J. R Case Hawaii D Inouye Conn. D Dodd N.H. D McIntyre Minn. D Mondale Pa. D Clark N.Y. R Javits Ohio D Young w15C_ D Nelson TABLE II—6.-—Support All but One Gun Bill. State Party Name Mich. R Griffin Mich. D Hart Calif. R Kuchel Md. D Brewster N.J. D Williams Hawaii R Fong Conn. D Ribicoff W. Va. D Randolph 130 There are obvious party and regional patterns in this display of extremes. First, those who opposed all restrictive gun bills were all from rural states; five were Republican and nine were Democrats; the South, the Rocky Mountain states and the Dakotas account for all these votes. The regional pattern offers nothing new, but the party alignments do; even after subtracting Southern Demo— crats and Republicans, more Democrats opposed all gun bills than Republicans. However, table II—4 questions the Democratic majority, as the Democrats have only a three vote majority for the two strongest opposition scores on the Guttman scale. However, the Democratic majority is pronounced at the other end of the scale where 16 out of 22 of the staunchest supporters of gun restrictions are Democrats. No Southerners are among the strong sup— porters and only one Rocky Mountain Senator can be found \in this group. Most of the support among these groups is from the East, East North Central, and New England States. No doubt, both party and region are associated ‘with gun voting, but there is also a high association between party and region. Which is the more important variable? One method available for examining this ques- tion is to see if Senators from the same state and differ- ant parties vote differently. With three exceptions, the differences between arties, within states, is minimal. The Guttman Scale cores range from 1—11; ruling out New Hampshire, Tennessee, 131 ‘ABLE II-7.——Party and State in Firearms Voting. Scale §tate Senator Party Score Difference .rizona Hayden D 9 2 Fanin R 11 Iawaii Inouye D l l Fong R 2 .daho Church D 11 1 Jordan R 10 [aine Muskie D Absent ? Smith R 2 Iassachusetts Kennedy D l 0 Brooke R l ( ichigan Hart D 2 0 Griffin R 2 ew Hampshire McIntyre D 1 10 Cotton R 11 ew Jersey Williams D 2 1 Case R l orth Dakota Burdick D 11 0 Young R 11 regon Morse D 9 l Hatfield R 10 annsylvania Clark D l 1 Scott R 2 Luth Carolina Hollings D 11 0 Thurmond R 11 uth Dakota McGovern D 10 l Mundt R 11 nnossee Gore D 2 8 Baker R 10 xas Yarborough D 6 4 Tower R 10 ah Moss D 11 0 Bennett R 11 )ming McGee D 10 0 Hansen R 10 IIIIIIIIIIIIIEIII3T___________T‘7___________________———_'W 132 and Texas, the thirteen remaining states have an average between party scale difference of only .62 scale posi- tions. It also continues to be obvious that the major dif— ferences in scale scores can be reported by region but it is also important to note that comparisons between parties within individual states show Republicans taking stronger opposition stands more often than Democrats; Democrats are more opposed than Republicans in two states, while Repub- licans are more opposed in seven states. New Hampshire, Texas, and Tennessee present the only sizable differences between parties within states. These apparent anomolies are not entirely explain— able although some interesting distinctions may be drawn. First, the Republicans in all three states were more opposed to gun restrictions than the Democrats. Second, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1968) considers the Lepublican Senator in each case more ”conservative“ on ocial and economic matters than the Democrat, but this 5 generally the case in respect of Republicans and Demo- rats from the same state in any event. Summary The great bulk of firearms debate and voting in the 3th Congress took place in 1968 between May and September. iring this period the provisions of bills and amendments l gun regulation. became more radical and the Senate .pport for these radical positions more generous. A eat deal of this changing Senate opinion on regulations ,. 1,, 133 related to the assassinations of King and Kennedy as 1856 tragedies seemed to play no small part in extricat- Lg various firearms bills from the seemingly interminable :bates within Senate committees. Even after the assassi— ltiOflS, however, Southern and Western opposition to gun >gislation remained firm as Western Senators were con- :rned that gun regulations would penalize the law-abiding uortsman, and Southern Senators were convinced that gun ‘gulations would lead to confiscation and an eventual rlice state. While Southern and Western Senators con— stently opposed all forms of regulation, Eastern and dwestern Senators gave nearly unanimous support to mail der prohibitions, while being much less supportive of gistration requirements. There is no apparent relationship between firearms ting and partisan identification. Although Republicans ierally record higher opposition scores than Democrats, r greater differences in gun voting records occur among gions than between the two parties. Whatever weak rela- unship exists between party and gun voting, it is likely ributable to the regional nature of party support. y ‘9’.— FOOTNOTES-~CHAPTER II lDuncan MacRae, ”Some Underlying Variables in agislative Roll Call Votes,” Public Opinion Quarterly Summer, 1954), p. 181. 2Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Llen R. Wilcox, Legislative Roll Call Analysis (Evanston, Llinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 6. 31bid., pp. 5—6. 4John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, 1d LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explora- _ons in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley and >ns, Inc., 1962), p. 239. . 5MacRae, op. cit. 6David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A ,se Stud (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), . 326—329. 7Duncan MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional pVoting erkeley University of California Press, 1958), . 301. 8Following the death of Robert Kennedy and its ‘t immediate impact, more than one Senator rose to cau— n the Senate against voting for gun restrictions in heat of the moment. 9Warren S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling w York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958), p. 324. 10Anderson, op. cit., see pp. 78-84 for a short icussion of selection criterion involving problems of .enteeism. 11The raw data consisting of short substantive des- ptions of each roll call, as well as the voting records each Senator and Representative for each roll call, was plied through the Inter—University Consortium for Poli~ a1 Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. All analyses using 1 calls made use of this Inter-University Consortium data. 134 135 12 Anderson, op. cit., p. 40. l3lbid., p. 43. l4lbid., p. 43. 15Arend Lijphart, ”The Analysis of Bloc Voting in .he General Assembly,” American Political Science Review Vol. 57 (December, 1963), ppT"a67Tal7TT‘THE‘KEFEEEEEt‘E6fipU?6r rogram used here is largely the product of this article. ouble abstentions are treated as perfect agreement between wo representatives in the same fashion that double yeas nd double nays are. The reasoning is that both repre— entatives agree that both sides to the argument have erit. Of course, there is no indication of whether or at both representatives agree on what specifically is ttractive about both sides. l6Anderson, op. cit., p. 45. 7George A. Ferguson, Statistical Analysis in ; cholo and Education (New York: McGraw-Hill Book )mpany, 1966), pp. 234~236. 8See for example Glendon Schubert, Quantitative .alysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe, I111n01s: The ee Press, 1959), Chapter 5. lglbid. 20Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, Scales for 8 Measurement of Attitudes (New York: McGraw-Hill Book fipany, 1967). ZlSamuel A. Stouffer, Louis Guttman, Edward A. :hman, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Shirley A. Star, and John A. Lusen, Measurement and Prediction (Princeton: Princeton .versity Press, 1950), p. 51. 22Harold J. Spaeth and David J. Peterson. ”The tensionality of Civil Liberties Dec151on Making: A .gitudinal Analysis,” Mimeographed paper, 1967. Forth— ing, in the Midwest Journal of Political Sc1ence, ust, 1971. 23Jack Vanderslik, Constituencies and Roll Cail ing: An Analysis of the House of Representatives or 88th Con ress unpublished dissertation 1n the Depart- ———————efie—_—’ . . . . t of Political Sc1ence, Michigan State Univer51ty, 1967, 46. 24Torgerson, op. cit., p. 26. 251bid., pp. 301-302. 136 26Vanderslik, op. cit., p. 46. 27Torgerson, op. cit., p. 318. 28Vanderslik o cit 47 p. ., p. . hat perfect scales are seldom found. 5 saying he made a ”lucky hit" cale. Vanderslik reports He quotes Schubert once and found a perfect 9Torgerson, op. cit., p. 319. 30L. Guttman, ”The Cornell Technique for Scale and itensity Analysis,” Education Psychological Measurement, Jlume #7 (1947), pp. 247-280. 31Torgerson, op. cit., p. 323. 32Allen L. Edwards, Techniques of Attitude Scale )nstruction (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1571, p. 191. 33Ibid., p. 192. 34Torgerson, op. cit., p. 324. 35Congressional Quarterly Service, The Congressional arterly Almanac——l968 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly c., 1969), p. 231. 36Ibid., 232. 37Congressional Record: United States Senate, lume 114, Number 152, September 18, 1968, p. 810925. so see the debates on Firearms in the Congre551onal ‘ :ord-—Senate, for May 16, 1968. Dodd and others make it ear that the immediate and most forceful intent of the gislation was, indeed, directed toward urban areas. so, the Dodd amendment of May 16 would have made it more fficult for persons under 18 to purchase a long gun. 38Congressional Record: United States Senate, .ume 114, Number 84, May 16, 1968, p. 85682. 39Congressional Quarterly Almanac, op. cit., p. 236. 4 01bid., p. 558. 41Congressional Record: United States Senate, ume 114, Number 148, September 12, 1968, p. 510699. 42 ' ' ' d States Senate, Congre551onal Record. Unite ume 114, Number 152, September 18, 1968, pp. 810917— 18. ‘ ._ I“. >- -‘¢_~..—_ 48 50 Ibid. 491bid., p. $10981. , p. W. J. Dixon, ed., 'U’U’U'Utd 137 810934. 810934. 810968. 810928. 810931. 510926. BMD: Biomedical Computer Pro- grams (Los Angeles: Health Services Computing Facility, Department of Preventive Medicine and Public Health, School of Medicine, University of California). 51 52 Vanderslik, o . cit., pp. 63—64. Edwards, op. cit., p. 193. ri— CHAPTER III FIREARMS ROLL CALLS AND OTHER ISSUES One of the hypotheses stated in the introduction )f this study was that roll call divisions on firearms ould be similar to roll call divisions on certain selected .ssues. That is, the groups which tended to vote on one (ide or the other on the selected issues would also, as roups, vote on one side or the other in terms of firearms 011 calls. The question remains as to whether this is ctually true. The question must also be posed as to which roups match with which sides. Party may correlate highly with many and perhaps ,1 of these issue areas. Thus, the additional information 1covered by analyzing the issues irrespective of party y be small. However, at least two concerns direct that e analysis should be attempted anyway. First, votes on rearms were not strictly partisan affairs; perhaps an alysis of specific issue areas may isolate additional formation on the split in firearms votes. Secondly, :hough many issues are associated with party voting 138 139 alignments, it would be useful to know which of these issues are more related to the firearms votes than others. Answers to these questions will be sought by using wo techniques. The first technique involves forming four ell contingency tables among the sixty-six selected roll alls; the purpose is to determine whether roll calls on pparently different issues produce similarities in oting patterns. X2 and C are reported for these tables here appropriate. The Agreement Index (AI), described earlier, will ‘so be used in conjunction with a clustering program to etermine in what manner all sixty-six roll calls group r "cluster.” That is, which roll calls, in which com— .nation, produce high agreement in the voting patterns the Senators. It is not asserted, here, that AI and may be used to verify each other. They are simply two chniques used separately to produce additional informa- on. Policy related criteria have already been des- Lbed that determined which non—firearms roll calls were be selected. The policy areas selected were social .fare roll calls, roll calls on civil disturbances, 1 calls on military expenditures, roll calls on legal cedures, roll calls on relations with communist nations, economic related roll calls. Included also, were a ited number of roll calls on fair—housing provisions, rtes rights” issues, and Congressional redistricting. 140 The titles of these policy areas are not intended to be precise but rather imprecise, offering convenient lOOkS on which a number of loosely related roll calls may >e hung. It is perhaps more accurate to say the roll .alls define the title rather than vice versa. Neverthe- ess, it ought to become clear momentarily that each itle denotes a particular kind of roll call, although he intuitive and subjective process of categorizing has sulted in some forcing. Categorizing the Roll Calls The category of gun votes has already been given lple attention. The next largest category of roll calls rre those falling under social welfare legislation. st of these roll calls deal with appropriations or proval of Johnson's ”Great Society“ welfare programs. e following roll calls are included in that category: , #15, #16, #17, #22, #23, #24, #32, #36, #51, #55. A 11 description of each of these roll calls (as well as >se following) is given in Appendix A. A wide variety issues are found under the social welfare heading, luding roll calls on appropriations for the Teachers' ps, monies for the Rent Supplement Program, grants to vate industry to train the disadvantaged, monies for Headstart Program, requirements to employ low—income ;ons, and liberalized earnings tests for welfare recipi- B. Social welfare may include a complex universe of ,es: medicare, social security, aid to the poor, 141 lemployment insurance and so on. Deliberately, and as >t to over—complicate the analysis, social welfare here . defined in terms of those programs primarily addressed the poor. On the normative side, the issue is whether ciety through government should provide for the materi— ly disadvantaged. Many of these bills contain appro— iation measures and thus it is difficult to separate e issues of welfare programs from the issue of money. t there is no necessary reason that they should be; for lfare is, here, the material support of a part of society all of society. The next largest category of roll calls is entitled rgal procedures,” and includes nine roll calls. Again, title is crude but it is meant to include roll calls ling with arrest and trial procedures and wiretapping visions. As such, legal procedures are properly part a larger category of roll calls broadly dealing with issue of civil liberties. What is extracted here is t portion of roll calls dealing primarily with the l liberties of the accused during arrest and trial. roll calls included are: #31, #43, #44, #45, #46, #47, #49, #50. Specifically, these roll calls deal with cs such as admittance of voluntary confessions in ence, the admissibility in evidence of eyewitness imony, and authorization of wiretap. Nearly all of roll calls relate to Congressional attempts at over— 'ng recent Supreme Court decisions directed toward 142 rial proceedings and arrest procedures, including the allory, Miranda, and Stovall decisions. One of the interesting points of debate on fire— rms in the Senate was the apparent difference between )ponents and proponents of gun restrictions on how to aal with criminals. Opponents of gun restrictions sserted crime could only be stopped by harsher penalties #d a reversal of the recent rulings of the Supreme Court ‘ trial procedures. Proponents of gun restrictions [emed unanimous in their views that crime was engendered social causes, that increased penalties would not lve the problem, and that restricting the use of guns uld remove some of the temptation. Although these ews seemed apparent in the debate, the question remained ether voting records would support them. The third largest group of roll calls is entitled .1itary” and includes topics such as appropriations for itary construction, monies for an anti-ballistic sile system, funds for military research and develop- t, questions of national security and civil defense rOpriation. Nine roll calls fall under this category: #13, #14, #18, #34, #35, #37, #52, #54. These roll .5 were primarily curiosity items, checking to see if ures on military expenditures would relate in any way irearms roll calls. The fourth category of roll calls deals broadly the tOpic of civil disturbances and is labelled 143 ”disturbance.” Roll calls #11, #26, #27, #28, #29, #56, and #57 are grouped here. These roll calls include call~ ing for investigation of the economic and social causes of crime, extending Federal protections during civil disturbances, prescribing penalties for inciting civil disturbances, and refusing monetary aid to campus disrupters. In many respects this category is the twin of ”legal Pro- cedures” in that it deals with civil liberties; however, 'ts main concern is not the court room but rather the Essues of penalties, police protection and investigation )f the causes of crime. It raises more specifically than )efore the issue of ”cracking down” on the criminal and :he disrupters. The category entitled "economic” is meant to ncompass a variety of roll calls on setting the debt imit, and requiring a balanced budget. It includes 011 calls #1, #3, #6, #7, and #33; number 3 allows tax redit for educational purposes. This is a very small sample” from a much larger universe of bills which may : one time or another involve economic issues: anti— 'ust policy, price and wage controls, anti—inflation asures and the like. The limited scope of economic 115 in this study reflects the paucity of economic sues meeting the statistical prerequisites set here. Two categories have three roll calls each. The *st is referred to as ”state powers" and is meant to ntify the group of roll calls that in a loose manner 144 )ncern the issue of reducing Federal powers or increasing :ate authority in various programs. Included are roll 111$ #20, #21, and #53. The other group is labelled tommunism” and is a very rough denotation for three roll .lls loosely having to do with the ”spectre of communism." 11 call #9 forbids credit transactions with nations ving aid to North Vietnam; roll call #10 provides that edit transactions with communist countries may only pro— ed if the President deems such in the National interest; 11 call #19 calls for a reduction in appropriations for e Subversive Activities Control Board. As such, #9 and 0 deal with external Communism and #19 with internal nmunism. One of the less serious aspects of the gun )ate has been the belief that disarming the citizenry 11d make a "Communist take-over" easy. Although the 111 number of roll calls here cannot adequately deal .h all the ramifications of such a position, they can ,d some insight into the proposition that opponents and ponents on gun legislation had dissimilar views toward to communist nations. Two other small groups of roll calls are identified this study. One labelled ”race” identifies two roll Is on racially related matters of civil rights. R011 L #25 and #30 both deal with fair housing provisions. other category, called ”political,” identifies two calls on the question of Congressional District tportionment (roll calls #4 and #5 respectively). Of 145 course, the term political can incorporate any number of roll calls on a great variety of topics. A serious problem had to be solved before the con- tingency table analysis across these issues could proceed. The problem may best be explained by an example. Imagine two "welfare” roll calls, one which increases appropria- tions for Head Start and the other which decreases appropriations. Assuming all other things are equal, a les vote on both means two very different things. It is 1 problem similar to that encountered during the Guttman ;cale program when it was imperative that ”all yeas meant :ssentially the same thing, i.e., pro~gun regulation. It .5 equally important here for the sanity of the analyst .nd the reader that some convenient method of identifying ommon and uncommon yeas and nays is found. The procedure dopted here is a visual one, and not one involving the echanical reflection of bill and roll call meaning. ssentially, the procedure requires finding some general 1d overriding question within each of the specified itegories along which yea may be evaluated. For example, 1 the category ”state powers” the common denominator is lether state powers or federal powers are enhanced by Le bill or amendment; under social welfare it is whether prepriations for welfare are increased or decreased, or ether earnings tests are liberalized or tightened. der ”communism” the general question is whether the 11 takes a "hard line" toward communists or a "Soft one.” 146 In the category ”disturbance" the question is whether penalties are increased for civil disturbances (this loose wording is dealt with later). The "legal” category speci— fies roll calls which may be seen as dealing in some respect with the rights of the accused. Under "military” the question is whether increased or decreased appropria- tions (or support or rejection of new hardware) is advanced. The remaining four categories are explained later. The reader is cautioned to avoid the temptation at this point to affix labels of conservative and liberal to these delineations as the development of these underlying limensions are preliminary and purposefully loose. Their >rimary purpose is to aid in the statement of the follow— ng initial hypotheses concerning the relation of gun roll alls to these other issues. Nine general and preliminary hypotheses are to be ested on the relationship between the gun roll calls and he other roll calls: H Support for gun restrictions is positively 1 associated with support for social welfare programs. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 8, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 32, 36, 51, 55) H2 Support for gun restrictions is positively associated with ”protecting the rights of the accused” in respect of trial and arrest. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 31, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50) 147 3 Support for gun restrictions is negatively associated with support for military expendi- tures and hardware. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 2, 13, 14, 18, 34, 35, 37, 52, 54) H4 Support for gun restrictions is negatively associated with restrictions on the debt limit and demands for a balanced budget. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 1, 6, 7, 33) H5 Support for gun restrictions is negatively associated with a hard line toward communism and communist nations. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 9, 10, 19) 6 Support for gun restrictions is negatively associated with attempts at increasing state powers vis-g-vis the Federal government. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 20, 21, 53) H7 Support for gun restrictions is positively associated with support for racially moti- vated fair housing provisions. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 25, 30) H8 Support for gun restrictions is positively associated with support for congressional redistricting and reapportionment. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 4, 5) H9 Support for gun restrictions is negatively associated with increasing penalties for criminal behavior and civil disturbances. Test: (Roll calls 38, 42, 61, 66) (roll calls 11, 26, 27, 28, 29, 56, 57) All of these hypotheses are tested by using con- ngency tables. Each table has four cells and thus 1 148 2 . . . . egree of freedom. X is reported in all instances With .05 level of significance holding constant for all 2 ibles at a X value of 3.84. C is also reported in all 1stances, having an upper limit of 7.07. Analyses of ilence and cell frequencies are also made throughout. Similarities in Voting Divisions Hypothesis Hl suggests that those supporting gun strictions also support welfare proposals; the reverse, e., Opponents of gun restriction are also opponents of lfare proposals is also suggested. Generally, the cone ngency table analysis supports the hypothesis, although t for all gun bills, and not for all bills in the wel— re category. Gun roll call #66 produced only one X2 out of even that was significant, indicating that a very weak negligible relationship existed between final passage H.R. 17735 and welfare measures. Interestingly, one :nificant X2 is reported using welfare roll call #36 ch had less to do with welfare appropriations than ,ply with encouraging the employment of low income per- 5 and the unemployed. None of the welfare measures ling with questions of appropriations produced signi— ant results when compared with roll call #66. But with ew minor exceptions #66 produced no significant X2 with of the non—gun roll calls. This should be expected as asult of the small N who voted against roll call #66. requency cross tabulation of how the Nay voter on roll 149 :all #66 voted on each welfare issue was made, however, :0 determine if opponents to gun restrictions on roll call ‘66 were also opponents of welfare legislation. Table fII-l reports these frequencies as well as the X2 and C ;tatistics between welfare roll calls and the gun roll :all on H.R. 17735 (#66). 'ABLE III-l.--Welfare Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #66. Frequency Distribution of no voters on #66 x Welfare ;un Welfare X2 C Valence yes no 66 8 2.20 .16 + 6 12 66 15 2.13 .15 ? 11 9 66 16 2.92 .18 + 9 11 66 17 3.71 .20 ? 5 15 66 22 3.49 .21 + 5 12 66 23 .25 .06 + 11 4 66 24 .79 .09 - 10 11 36 32 3.52 .20 + 7 13 36 36 4.92 .25 + 5 11 56 51 2.78 .18 - l3 5 )6 55 .61 .09 + 10 7 = Welfare roll call favorable to increased welfare eXpendi— tures. plus (+) in the valence column indicates a yes vote on 0 bill was favorable to increased welfare appropriations liberalized earnings test; a minus means the opposite. 11 calls #55, #24, #16, and #15 produce little variation 150 the voting patterns of the nay gun voters which may iicate multiple issues were involved. However, #36, 2, #8, and #32, all of which were pro welfare bills, und only minor support among those who voted no on R. 17735. The two roll calls on bills unfavorable to welfare propriations (-) produced mixed results among nay voters. 11 call #17 would have reduced Emergency Employment Act nds but it also would have funded private industries who d on—the-job training programs for the disadvantaged. e great majority of no voters on H.R. 17735 also voted on roll call #17. On roll call #51, however, also favorable to welfare programs as it sought to reduce prepriations, the same group overwhelmingly supported 5 anti-welfare bill. The difference between #17 and #51 that #17 supports private efforts at retraining the Sadvantaged; both sought to decrease welfare appropria— 1115 . Roll call #61 (Tyding's registration bill) pro- tes a very strong relationship between guns and welfare. 1e III-2 reports X2 and C for tabulations between roll 1 #61 and all welfare votes. The frequencies represent welfare voting records of the yea voters on roll call That is, cross tabulations on the welfare roll calls made for those who vote yes on the registration bill. —+ 151 \BLE III~2.~~Welfare Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #61. .— Frequency Distribution of yes voters on #61 x welfare in Welfare X2 C Valence yes no 61 8 33.89 .54 + 28 3 61 15 26.52 .48 ? Z 31 61 16 25.31 .47 + 30 l 61 17 21.31 .44 ? 24 8 61 22 33.67 .55 + 25 l 61 23 3.84 .20 + 21 5 61 24 22.25 .45 - 2 30 61 32 25.01 .47 + 28 4 61 36 11.10 .37 + 23 6 61 51 21.78 .46 - 8 24 5 61 55 4.82 .25 + 23 th one exception the X2 and C results are all very large, dicating a strong relationship exists between support r welfare and support for gun registration. With only 0 roll call exceptions yea voters on registration over— elmingly supported pro-welfare roll calls and strongly jected the anti-welfare roll calls. The two exceptions e roll calls #15 and #17, both of which have confusing guage and could have intuitively been scored either 5 or minus. The same analysis between welfare roll calls and roll calls was repeated for firearms roll calls #38 #42. X2 and C values reported were generally signi- ant and strong, although not quite on the order of — i 152 those reported for the registration roll call (#61). Additionally, a check of the frequency tabulations using these other gun roll calls indicated the same patterns among the participants existed. In summary, the strong relationship between welfare expenditures and firearms regulation voting cannot be denied. The correlates of such a relationship should sur— prise no one as it is no secret that support for welfare programs of this nature follow the same regional, urban— rural, and party splits that characterized the gun vote. There is no necessary cause and effect relationship implied between welfare and firearms roll calls by the high X2 and C values; rather, they would seem to indicate a common response by Senators from states sharing a common problem: the urban sprawl with the concomitant problems of the poor and violence. Interestingly, those who Opposed H.R. 17735 but favored welfare measures were generally from the Rocky Mountain, Pacific and North West Central states; Southerners as a rule opposed REED types of mea- “ures. This suggests some interesting points. First, hose who are in favor of both firearms restrictions and elfare legislation, consistently turn to government for edress of social ills. Those opposed to restrictions ivide on welfare, one group showing consistent behavior, he other not. The consistent grOUp are the Southerners ho refuse governmental welfare assistance while at the 153 ;ame time rejecting governmental regulation of one of the -ast vestiges of individualism, the armed citizen. The -nconsistents are those who support government welfare )rograms but reject governmental remedy of other social ills such as violence. In part, this latter inconsistency nay be attributable to the belief that gun regulation may accomplish no good while welfare programs will. It may, iowever, be more pernicious than that: give the ”poor” a few loaves to keep them happy, but let us keep our guns as the final line of defense. Hypothesis HZ suggests a relationship exists between support for gun restrictions and support for the civil rights of the accused in trial and arrest procedures. As with welfare roll calls, the cross tabulations of roll :all #66 and the ”legal" roll calls only produced a few ignificant relationships. Roll call #31 admitting volun- ary confessions in evidence, #46 also dealing with the dmission of confessions, and #48 which would have allowed ederal judicial interference with a trial court's deci- ions to admit eyewitness testimony were all significant t the .05 level, although their C values were weak. The ther ”legal” roll calls produced no significant rela~ ionships in conjunction with roll call #66. The nay oters on roll call #66 (H.R. 17735) opposed all of the egal” roll calls which, except for one, were all favor- le toward the recent Supreme Court decisions on trial d arrest procedures. Although the variation in these 7’— 154 frequencies are weak, there is some SUpport for the reverse H2 hypothesis that those opposed to gun restrictions were desirous of overturning court decisions ”favoring" the criminal. Much stronger relationships for H2 are found using, again, the registration gun bill. Table III—3 reports consistently high X2 and C values for these cross tabula~ tions. The yea registration voters consistently support pro-Supreme Court stances while strongly rejecting the single roll call (#31) which would have weakened Court decisions on the admissibility of confessions in evidence. TABLE III-3.--Lega1 Procedures and Firearms Roll Call #61. Frequency Distribution of yes voters on #61 x Legal Procedures Legal 2 Gun Procedures X C Valence yes no 61 31 30.75 .52 - 1 28 61 43 21.20 .44 + 21 9 61 44 24.41 .47 + 20 10 61 45 23.93 .47 + 19 ll 61 46 20.82 .44 + 28 2 61 47 28.74 .50 + 19 ll 61 48 12.68 .36 + 26 4 61 49 12.45 .36 + 21 9 61 50 20.41 .44 + 18 12 = Pro Supreme Court roll call on trial and arrest pro- cedures favorable to accused. 155 Strong relationships consistent with HZ are also produced using firearms roll calls #38 and #42. For the most part X2 and C values are high. TABLE IlI-4.--Lega1 Procedures and Firearms Roll Call #42 and #38. Legal 2 Gun Procedures X C Valence 42 31 16.49 .40 - 42 43 14.48 .38 + 42 44 13.74 .37 + 42 45 11.20 .34 + 42 46 20.89 .44 + 42 47 9.53 .31 + 42 48 18.41 .42 + 42 49 19.87 .43 + 42 50 13.95 .37 + 38 31 8.89 .31 — 38 43 10.35 .33 + 38 44 11.16 .34 + 38 45 10.76 .33 + 38 46 16.23 .40 + 38 47 10.13 .32 + 38 48 14.42 .38 + 38 49 10.35 .32 + 38 50 9.67 .32 + “hese findings are consistent with the dimensions of the enate firearms debate outlined in Chapter II. It seems elatively clear here, based on this limited analysis, hat the issues of guns and crime were related in more 156 than just the debate. What seems puzzling, however, is that those who are least desirous of protecting the rights of the accused (and generally they are those who are most vocal about crime and criminals) are the ones least will— ing to restrict use of the violent tools of the criminal. Perhaps it stems from a genuine belief that gun regulation will disarm only the law-abiding citizen, and thus serve no useful purpose. But this seems strange for police agencies, the usual ally of those who suggest recent SUpreme Court decisions allow the guilty to go free, have consistently supported strict gun regulations. What may be equally plausible under these circumstances is that the fear of crime and the criminal produces a double barrel reaction: (1) tighten up the court system but (2) let me, the law-abiding citizen, keep my gun as the last ditch of defense; society has proved to be ineffective in con- trolling crime and riots, and there is no irrefutable assurance that restrictions on guns will increase security. The H3 hypothesis suggested a relationship existed between gun regulation and military expenditures. With a few minor exceptions the contingency table analysis between firearms regulation and military expenditures roll calls produced insignificant findings. X2 and C values were generally low even among relationships using the firearms registration bill. Frequency cross~tabulations for yea voters on the registration bill as well as for nay voters on H.R. 17735 were discouragingly non-productive. 157 Two of the military bills offer some exception to this general evaluation. Roll call #52 which would have barred anti—ballistic missile funding did discriminate among gun proponents. A frequency cross-tabulation of nay voters on H.R. 17735 indicates strong support for anti— ballistic missile funding; but most of this support comes from the South as most non—Southern opponents of H.R. 17735 were also opponents to funding the anti-ballistic missile. Yea voters on Tydings' registration bill all supported, by a 2-1 margin, cutting anti~ballistic missile funds. The second exception in the military bills is roll call #2 which by virtue of its wording may belong in a number of issue categories other than military. The roll call, on motion by Thurmond, declared an executive con- vention could not be construed in any way as weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its own security. The bill must have awakened great fervor in many an anti-communist as well as the ”militant.” Nay voters on H.R. 17735 overwhelmingly supported the measure while yea voters on the registration bill opposed the measure 32-1. As the wording and subsequent debate on these bills (#2, #52) demonstrate, the issues involved more than the usual matter of authorizing funds for mili- tary procurement. The anti-ballistic missile system vote, especially more than the other bills in this grOUp, followed closely the regional pattern outlined for firearms 158 voting. Interestingly, 29 Democrats and 12 Republicans voted to restrict ABM funds, only one of the Democratic votes was from the South. H4 relates gun bills to certain economic issues, chiefly debt limits and balanced budgets. These two issues, and one giving tax credits for college educations, have been grouped under the heading ”economic.” As with other issues, relationships between voting on roll call #66 and the economic roll calls proved to be negligible. Analysis with roll calls #61, #42, and #38, however, all produced significant X2 and moderately high C values. The excep- tion is roll call #3 which allows tax credit for college education and apparently has nothing in common with fire— arms roll calls. TABLE III—5.-—Economic Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #61. Frequency Distribution of yes voters on #61 x Economic un Economic X2 C Valence yes no 61 l 11.10 .34 + 29 3 61 3 .08 .03 + 19 8 61 6 19.25 .43 - 6 23 61 7‘ 13.52 .37 - 6 24 61 33 13.12 .37 — 0 32 = Bill or amendment favorable toward raising the debt limit or refusing the requirement for a balanced budget. 159 TABLE III~6.«-Economic Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #42. Gun Economic X2 C Valence 42 l 19.34 .43 + 42 3 .87 .10 + 42 6 9.84 .32 - 42 7 7.90 .29 — 42 33 19.91 .44 — TABLE IIIv7.--Economic Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #38. Gun Economic X2 C Valence 38 1 23.32 .46 + 38 3 .15 .04 + 38 6 6.46 .26 - 38 7 7.04 .27 — 38 33 8.58 .30 — The relationship between questions of the public debt and a balanced budget and issues of firearms control seems clear enough. For example, the great majority of the yea voters on the registration bill opposed attempts at restricting the debt limit and of forcing the President to submit a balanced budget; they in turn overwhelmingly supported permanently expanding the debt limit. In this respect the economic "conservative” and the economic ”liberal” took opposing sides on the gun issue. HS holds that support for gun restrictions is negatively associated with a ”hard line" towards Communism IIIIIIIIIll-IllllllI---————__W 160 or Communist nations. Admittedly, the conceptualization of ”hard line" is imprecise. Here, it refers to two bills restricting loans to Communist nations or nations who trade with North Vietnam (roll calls #10 and #9 respec— tively). Roll call #19 which would have reduced expendi— tures for the subversive activities control board is also included here. TABLE III—8.-—Communism Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Calls #61 and #66. Frequency Distribution of yes voters on #61 x Communism Gun Communism X2 C Valence yes no 61 9 32.10 .54 - 12 19 61 10 6.28 .27 ~ 10 19 61 19 8.07 .29 + 19 13 66 9 1.73 .15 ~ 12 2 66 10 .09 .03 - 9 66 19 .12 .04 + 7 12 - ~ ”Hard Line” toward Communism or Communits nations. The results, although somewhat inconclusive, indicate a relationship exists between firearms regulation and aid to communist nations. X2 and C values are not significant for roll call #19, however, as well as for contingency tables using gun roll call #66. The strongest X2 and C values are reported between roll call #9, which would stop credit to any nation "aiding” North Vietnam, and roll call #61, which is the registration bill. Firearms restriction supporters generally vote nay on bills which would restrict relations with Communist nations, while the opposite is true of the proponents of firearms regulation. In this last respect, it is interesting to note that the nay voters on gun roll call #66 (H.R. 17735) voted by a 12-2 margin in favor of the restrictive wording of roll call #9. H6 holds that attempts to increase the powers of states is inconsistent with attempts at federally restrict~ ing the use or possession of firearms. Three roll calls (#20, #21, #53) were available to test this hypothesis. Two would have variously increased the authority of the state in respect to the administration of Federal programs. The third roll call (#21) is an issue of a slightly dif- ferent cast as it would reduce the Federal share of spending in personnel training programs. TABLE III-9.—-State Powers and Firearms Roll Call #66. Frequency Distribution of no voters on #66 x State's Powers State's 2 Gun Powers X C Valence yes no 66 20 .52 .08 - 10 10 66 21 .17 .04 — ll 66 53 1.61 .15 - 10 7 - = Support for increase in State's Powers relative to the Federal Government's powers. IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII-‘::_____________—__*‘Tfi7 162 TABLE III-lO.-—State Powers and Firearms Roll Call #61. Frequency Distribution of yes voters on #61 x State's Powers State's 2 Gun Powers X C Valence yes no 61 20 28.18 .50 - 5 24 61 21 18.69 .42 - 8 20 61 53 26.75 .52 - l 24 Roll calls #20 and #53 clearly seek to expand the powers of states; the X2 and C values for these roll calls are generally significant and large when using registra- tion bill #61. Additional X2 and C tests were made using roll calls #38, #42, and #66, but here the results were mixed. As usual, #66 offered little discriminating value, but a cross tabulation of the nay voters on #66, using the states powers roll calls, indicates the issue of states rights is not a sufficient condition to explain the firearms voting behavior of the most ardent restriction opponents. Clearly, the nay voters on firearms are split on the roll calls dealing with increasing state powers. This is not surprising as both the Guttman scale analysis and a quick reading of the Congressional debate will con- firm: for many opponents of restrictions, the issue of which governmental level should do the restricting was secondary to the view that there should be no regulation at all. 163 The converse, however, is true for the most ardent supporters of gun restrictions. One of the central points made by proponents of restrictions was that states acting individually could not control the traffic in firearms; the necessity for Federal action, therefore, seemed plain. It is not surprising that advocates of strong Federal Controls in firearms would resist encroachments against Federal powers in other areas as well. Table III-10 demon- strates overwhelming margins in this direction in the voting patterns of the yea registration Senators. Analysis using roll calls #38 and #42 proved to be somewhat inconsistent on this point although still generally supportive of the H6 thesis. But a comparison of the relative strengths of X2 and C produced by the May long gun vote (#38) over the September registration bill (#61), indicates roll call #38 produced consistently less strong relationships than #61 across all state's powers roll calls. That is, the states' powers issues are better predictors of registration votes than they are of votes on including long gun provisions in a mail order ban. Although the Guttman scale analysis indicated the voting patterns for roll calls #38 and #61 were similar, it did show the registration bill to be the strongest restrictive measure in terms of scale arrangement; perhaps part of the minor over-all predictive differences between #38 and #61 may be accounted for by the fact that registration— licensing being more radical, differentiates more clearly 164 the opposing factions on the issue of states' powers as well. H7 posits the existence of a positive relationship between support for firearms provisions and support of Fair Housing Provisions. Analysis using roll calls #25 and #30, both of which would have weakened fair-housing provisions, indicates a moderately strong relationship exists. Fair housing provisions all have a racial over- tone, however, and the basic Southern-Western and Easter— Midwestern split over firearms should also be reflected in this racially motivated group of roll calls as well. Indeed, it is plain that the Eastern—Midwestern supporters of registration were nearly unanimous in their opposition to watering down fair housing provisions. Opponents of firearms restrictions, as characterized by nay votes on roll call #66, are interestingly split on the issue of fair housing. MOSt of the nay voters on H.R. 17735, how- ever, who also vote to restrict fair housing proposals, are from the South; with the important exception that eight, or 50 per cent, of the Rocky Mountain Senators voted in favor of roll call #25 which would have excluded single dwelling private homes from fair housing provisions. Although the strength of Southern rejection was nowhere as strong in the Rocky Mountain States, the significant X2 and C values between guns and fair housing cannot simply be dismissed as Southern vs. non-Southern regionalism. The reasons for the association are not altogether plain; 165 TABLE III-ll.--Racia1 Issues and Firearms Roll Calls #66 and #61. Frequency Distribution of no voters on #66 x Race Gun Race X2 C Valence yes no 66 25 8.12 .29 ~ 14 66 30 8.02 .29 - 11 10 Yes voters on #61 x Race 61 25 25.69 .47 - 2 31 61 30 14.80 .38 - l 29 - = Bill or amendment Opposed to Racial Integration. perhaps it is the product of partisan and/or regional vari— ables working together. The thesis also has been advanced that suburbanites simultaneously opposed fair housing provisions and gun restrictions, fearing blacks on both accounts. The Senate data will not allow testing of this thesis; House data may. Some further analysis along this issue was attempted using House data; roll calls on two bills were compared: (1) the final vote on H.R. 17735 and (2) a bill which would have made the use of Federal funds for the cross- town bussing Of school children to achieve racial balance illegal. The pitfalls of using only two roll calls are to be noted. Additionally, cross-town bussing and fair housing are not precisely the same issues, although both have racial overtones. But the analysis of the H.R. 17735 166 roll call and the bussing roll call in the House indicate the regional patterns in voting on guns and fair housing in the Senate were duplicated in the House. That is, most opposition to both gun restrictions and bussing came from the South. Twenty—nine non—Southern representatives voted against both H.R. 17735 and bussing, but nearly all of them represented rural districts in their states. The thesis that suburbanites might oppose both gun restrictions and bussing receives very weak support here; only Ohio's first district (bordering Cincinnati), Missouri‘s fourth district (bordering Kansas City), Kentucky's fourth dis- 1 trict (bordering Louisville) and Tennessee's seventh and eighth districts (bordering Memphis) could in any way be used to support that thesis; Representatives from these districts voted against both roll calls. More will be said on the nature of suburban support for gun restric— tions in the next chapter. H8 presumes a relationship exists between attempts at Congressional redistricting and firearms voting. A good deal has been written in the past on the urban—rural split over the issue of redistricting or reapportionment. It was expected that the firearms issue, also in part a rural—urban issue, would produce significant X2 and C values when related to the redistricting question. in 167 TABLE III—12.-—Political Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Calls #66 and #61. Frequency Distribution of no voters on #66 x Political Gun Political X2 C Valence yes no 66 4 .79 .09 + 8 11 66 5 3.71 .20 + 9 10 Yes voters on #61 x Political 61 4 19.73 .43 + 26 5 61 5 11.36 .34 + 28 3 + = Bill or amendment favoring redistricting proposals. TABLE III—13.—-Political Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Calls #42 and #38. Gun Political X2 C Valence 42 4 8.03 .29 + 42 5 9.45 .31 + 38 4 8.35 .29 + 38 5 9.64 .31 + Significant X2 and moderate C values are reported in both these tables with the usual exception of roll call #66. An analysis of the nay frequencies on #66 and the yea frequencies on #61, however, indicates that the redistricting question is not given favorable treat~ ment one way or the other in the former case, while in the latter case overwhelming support among yea registration l, 168 voters for redistricting is recorded. The support for redistricting among registration supporters is largely due to the fact that the majority of supporters for registra— tion come largely from urban states. Of course, much of the Opposition to firearms comes from rural states. This Opposition in respect of roll call #61 is interesting when cross tabulated with redistricting proposals; 70 per cent of the nay voters on roll call #61, who also voted against Kennedy's redistricting proposals, were from Southern states; however, those Opposed to H.R. 17735, but favoring redistricting, were those primarily from Wyoming, Montana, Utah, Nevada, North Dakota, Missouri, and South Dakota. Obviously Congressional redistricting issues do not divide neatly with gun roll calls along regional lines. There is also some reason to question whether the urban— rural split is the best description for redistricting roll calls. H9 hypothesizes a relation between bills concern- ing penalties for criminal behavior and firearms voting. The origin of this hypothesis came from an unsystematic review of the Senate firearms debate where it seemed evident that Opposing sides on the issue of gun legisla- tion were viewing differently how crime and criminals ought to be treated. Proponents of gun restrictions argued that harsher penalties would not solve the crime problem; that part of the crime problem was traceable to the aCCGSSibilitY of the firearm. Opponents of gun restrictions IIIIIII:___________________________________—__—_____’TT ” 169 insisted that only harsh penalties would dissuade the criminal and no amount of governmental regulation would keep firearms out of the hands of criminals. Roll calls were selected to test if, indeed, opposing sides on gun issues took opposing sides on the issue of penalties. TABLE III-l4.——Civil Disturbance Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #66. Frequency Distribution of no voters on #66 x Civil Disturbances Civil 1 Distur— 2 Gun bances X C Valence yes no 66 11 4.32 .24 + l 9 66 26 1.88 .14 - l3 6 66 27 4.05 .21 + 6 15 66 28 .31 .06 — 16 4 66 29 5.78 .25 ~ 12 8 66 56 1.55 .15 + 4 12 66 57 3.56 .23 + 4 12 * = favorable toward increasing penalties. On balance, the relationships uncovered earlier between firearms roll calls and legal procedures roll calls remained in force between firearms roll calls and roll calls on criminal penalties. Proponents of firearms restrictions continued their ”crackdown” on criminals by increasing and extending penalties for crime and civil disturbances. Supporters Of gun restrictions took the opposite view, however, rejecting those bills which would have extended 170 TABLE III-15.--Civil Distrubance Roll Calls and Firearms Roll Call #61. Frequency Distribution of yes voters on #61 x Civil Disturbances Civil Distur- 2 Gun bances X C Valence yes no 61 11 19.88 .47 + 18 6 61 26 25.51 .47 ~ 6 26 61 27 24.82 .46 + 27 6 61 28 7.04 .27 - 19 13 61 29 19.55 .43 — 2 28 61 56 22.26 .49 + 19 7 61 57 24.81 .52 + 21 4 Federal penalties or created new penalties for criminal behavior. Of particular notice is roll call #11 which called for the investigation of the economic and social causes of civil disorders and crime. Although this roll call does not directly concern the issue of penalties, floor debate made it clear that the alternative argument to increasing penalties was to eradicate the social and economic causes Of crime. By an overwhelming margin, yea voters on the registration bill supported the measure while nay voters on roll call #66 rejected the measure. The same pattern is apparent on two roll calls (#56 and #57) which sought to give universities the prerogative of withdrawing Federal funds from students participating in disruptive activities; both roll calls were an attempt to water down attempts at making such fund withdrawals mandatory. 171 X2 and C values were significant but moderate for three out of seven analyses using roll call #66 (H.R. 17735) and the ”disturbance" roll calls; they were, as usual, significant and strong using the registration roll call (#61). Supplementary contingency tables using gun roll calls #42 and #38 also produced significant chi squares and moderate C values. Clustering Related Issues The analysis of roll calls intuitively grouped and individually related through X2 and C statistics has given \ some indication that firearms voting divisions were similar . to voting divisions on other issue areas. Unfortunately, \ with the analysis of each roll call taking place separately, the problem of identifying which roll calls and in which combinations produce the most consistent voting alignments among Senators becomes difficult. Of course, we already have some idea for example, that welfare roll calls pro— duced greater non-random differences than did military related roll calls, but this does little to enumerate the differences among roll calls within each category. An agreement matrix used in conjunction with a clustering program, offers a way of ordering each roll call in terms of the voting agreement it produces with other roll calls. This procedure involved four steps here. First, using the agreement formula described earlier, all sixty-six Senate roll calls were compared with each other in terms of the voting patterns of Senators. Al was 172 computed for all such combinations and placed in a sixty- six by sixty-six matrix. Second, the computor began clustering or grouping roll calls in terms of the average agreement of pair-wise values; that is, the computer began searching for those combinations of roll calls which were similar to one another in terms of roll call behavior. Third, the average within cluster agreement or similarity (AVGS) was computed for combinations ranging in size from two roll calls to all of the roll calls. Fourth, the clusters of various size were finally rank ordered in terms of their AVGS and listed for analysis. Under this procedure, smaller clusters of roll calls should produce higher AVGS statistics as the smaller the number of roll calls, the greater the probability of agreement among Senators. Likewise, it should be expected (or perhaps wished) that roll calls substantively homo— geneous will cluster among themselves before clustering with other roll calls. This of course need not be the case, as many an analyst has discovered. Indeed, the intuitive and the agreement cluster methods are both employed here because although agreement clustering is an objective means of grouping roll calls, it does not always produce objectively identified issue areas. The agreement cluster results for this analysis points out several relationships among the sixty-six Senate roll calls. First, in terms of average, overall agreement measures, firearms roll calls cluster among 173 themselves first before clustering with any other roll calls. Roll calls #65 and #66 are the two exCeptions to this, as neither one of them cluster with the other gun roll calls until after other substantive issues have joined the basic gun cluster. This is not surprising as the low minority marginal in #65 and the relatively low minority marginal in #66 preclude high pair—wise agreements with the other gun votes. The thirteen remaining gun votes and their clustering order are presented in Table Ill—16. TABLE III—16.——Firearms Roll Call Cluster Analysis. Cluster Number (CN)* AVGS Roll Calls 2 94.5 59.60 10 91.3 58,59,40 17 88.2 61,62,63,64 26 ‘ 84.7 38,39,40,6l,62,63,64 44 81.6 38,59,40,58,59,60,61,62,63,64 50 80.9 58,39,40,42,58,59,60,61,62,63,64 65 78.5 12,38,39,40,4l,42,58,59,60,6l,62 63 64 , *Corresponds to computor print out cluster number; 121 separate clusters were constructed and rank ordered according to AVGS values. Similar to the results of the Guttman scale, the relative similarity between long gun votes and the regis— tration votes is apparent (cluster number 26). The relatively high AVGS reported for roll calls #59 and #60 , , , 174 (CNZ) and #38, #39, and #40 [CNlO) support the reasons given earlier for using only one roll call from each of these groups in the Guttman scale. What is most worthy of mention, however, is that a non-gun bill does not appear in the firearms cluster even after 65 separate clusters have been constructed. The reasons for this are not at all simple, especially after X2 and C values between gun and non~gun issues were reported at high levels. Obviously, there is a high degree of voting similarity on gun bills and a lower degree of voting similarity when any other issue is grouped with gun roll calls. This would seem to confirm the hypothesis that firearms roll calls form a distinctly objective policy area separate from the other issues examined here. But as the agreement Cluster demonstrates, this objective quality of separateness is only a relative condition for at lower levels of agreement other issues do ”cluster with the firearms roll calls.” That is, there is indeed strong voting similarity among firearms roll calls but to a lesser degree there is also evidence of voting simi— larities among firearms and other issues. The contingency table analysis gave us some idea of which issues, gener- ally and intuitively defined, seemed associated with fire- arms roll calls. The agreement cluster now allows more specific definition of what these issue areas are, as well as enumeration of which roll calls within each area produced the highest degrees of similarity. 175 The first clustering of gun roll calls and other roll calls involves twenty—two non—gun roll calls (cluster 91). These roll calls are defined in the clustering pro- gram as those which produce the highest average voting similarity of any grouping of gun and non—gun bills. As such, they are useful in this analysis for identifying those issues which in terms of roll call behavior are most related to firearms voting. TABLE III-l7.~—Firearms and Non-Firearms Roll Call Cluster. Proportion of Cluster Original Number Intuitive Number AVGS Roll Calls of Bills Category 91 72.301 31,43,44,45 7/9 Legal 6,47,48 Procedures 8,15,16,17 Social 22 5/11 Welfare 26,27,29 3/7 Disturbance 6,7 2/5 Economic 25 1/3 State Powers 53 l/Z Race From Table III-17 it is patently clear that roll calls on legal procedures are most consistently related to issues of firearms regulation. Social welfare legislation also appears important although the proportion of the original bills included is smaller than for the legal procedure's category. The proportion for the social wel— fare category does, however, become larger (5/9) if we 176 rule out roll calls #15 and #17 which were earlier classi— fied as ambiguous. Conspicuous by their absence are any of the military roll calls but this is consistent with the relatively low X2 and C values reported for that group. Also, none of the ”communism" or ”political" roll calls are included, but again, this reflects the relatively low X2 and C statistics reported for these as well. Interest- ingly, cluster number 92, with an AVGS of 72.026 includes roll call #9 which banned credit transactions with nations giving aid to North Vietnam. The AVGS difference between cluster #91 and #92 is less than .3 of a point on a scale of 100, indicating the roll call on Communism (#9) is approximately as closely related to all firearms votes as the rest of the roll calls appearing in Table III-l7. Although the Guttman scale analysis of firearms denied any overwhelming importance for the issue of states' rights or states' powers, both the agreement cluster and the contingency table analysis indicates some relation— ship exists on the issue. The small number of roll calls included in the states' powers category, however, precludes making a firm judgment on the strength of the issue. Race and guns are related by roll call #25 (a fair housing roll call) in the cluster analysis; unfortunately, the cluster program does little to explain if factors other than region are associated with the relationship. Whereas the contingency table analysis using X2 and C sought to analyze the relationships between the other issues and selected gun votes individually, the cluster agreement program determined in what respect the gun roll calls as a group related to other issues. In this respect, it confirms a number of general findings concerning which of the other issues and roll calls are most closely related to firearms voting in general. Summary Several issues produce voting divisions similar to those uncovered in firearms voting. The most consistent voting divisions in this respect involve votes on social welfare, criminal procedures, and civil disturbances. That is, those who supported firearms regulations also supported social welfare legislation, and they opposed stiffer criminal penalties as well as attempts at revers- ing recent Supreme Court decisions on arrest and trial procedures. The opposite may be said for those opposed to gun restrictions. There is some support, here, for the thesis that the economic "conservative” opposed gun restrictions while the economic ”liberal" supported such regulations. There is almost no support for the belief that voting divisions on military expenditures had any apparent similarity to divisions on the firearms roll calls; the same may be said of voting on racially related issues. Also, these opposed to gun restrictions did not seem to consistently advocate expansion of state powers over the powers of the Federal government; those advocating gun ; 7 178 restrictions, however, were generally shown to favor expan- sion of the powers of the Federal government over a wide range of issues. Finally, there is only moderate support for the belief that those who opposed gun restrictions favored a ”hard line“ toward communism and communist nations. CHAPTER IV FIREARMS VOTING AND CONSTITUENCY CHARACTERISTICS There is a great deal of literature describing, favorably and unfavorably, the linkage of Congressional voting and constituency demographic characteristics. The task for this chapter is not one of exploring this lit- erature in depth but rather of determining in what respect there is theoretical and practical precedent for the job of relating Senate firearms voting records to statewide demographic characteristics. Roll Call Voting and Constituencies The analysis of constituency characteristics and roll call voting presumes that, in fact, there is some communication and influence passing between a representa— tive and his constituency. The presumption is a rela- tively new one insofar as it plays a role in the empirical investigation of constituencies and representatives; but its importance in the writings of normative theorists is age old and falls under one of three models: (1) The Burkean model, to which history has attached great weight , 179 180 directs the representative to vote his own judgment of what is the best interest of the constituency, independent of the will of the constituency;1 (2) Opposite this is the mandate model which prescribes that the representative is bound to vote both the interest and the will of his con- stituency; (3) The third model assumes representatives are elected in partisan elections, by virtue of their membership in national parties. Representatives should, therefore, vote the will of the party and the parties become responsible to the electorate. Concerning this third model, Miller and Stokes conclude that, The conception of representation implicit in the doctrine of responsible parties shares the idea of popular control with the instructed—delegate model. Both are versions of popular sovereignty. But 'the people' of the responsible two—party system are conceived in terms of a national rather than a local constituency. The Burkean model has been criticized for its seemingly ivory tower attitude toward the demands of local constit— uencies. On the other hand the mandate and party models both seem to require that representatives (Senators included) take care to estimate the desires of electorates, for implicit in both these models is the threat that unhappy electorates will recall representatives. It has been suggested that all three of these models find prac— tical use in the United States and that the relative importance of one over the other depends on the nature of the public policy being debated.3 All three models are ll.|l: .lil ll.ll.,‘l1|1|l1!lll Illlllxlilll IIIA 181 primarily prescriptive models, however, advocating various relationships between representatives and constituencies. Prescriptive models do not provide information on whether representatives actually make decisions in con- formity with one of the models. Does the representative simply follow his conscience, or does he follow the party, or the mandate of his constituency? Lewis Froman has suggested that most congressional decisions involve plural pressures that may be summarized in terms of five types of pressure: ”constituency, party, institutional, executive, 4 But Froman is also quick to point out and personal.” that pressures from constituencies are perhaps the most important type.S Implicit in Froman‘s reasoning, and supported somewhat by other empirical findings, is the belief that the importance of constituency pressures is heightened by the relative weakness of the other types of pressures; it is not so much that Congressmen are con- stantly bombarded with constituency sentiments, but rather that the decentralized character of the party system and the decentralized political organization of Congress make sanctions from those quarters seem potentially less important than constituency electoral sanctions. Even though some may view party as a relatively weak influence, most of the early literature uses party as the primary independent variable.6 The importance of party pressures and partisan alignments in roll call voting continues to be a problem 182 for the analyst. The fact that there is strong party voting and loyalties in Congress on a variety of issues cannot be disputed. But this in itself does not disprove the importance of constituency pressures. The two par- ties very often reflect important constituency differ- ences. We have already seen that although party corre— lates somewhat with firearms voting records, other vari- ables do as well, such as regionalism, and it is no secret that partisan identification correlates highly with many other variables. Voting studies have generally indicated that the two parties have disproportionate backing from different groups in society and that these groups may be defined using numerous variables such as social, cultural, and economic factors. Additionally, ”it has not been shown that partisan unity is independent of constituency characteristics; much less that party positions are the basis of decision making by representa— tives in opposition to the interests they perceive in their constituencies.”7 Perhaps most important in this respect, is the great number of correlations that have been found 8 between various demographic data and party voting patterns. Party allegiance, for example, has been correlated with a number of factors including ethnic composition of the con- stituency, levels of urbanization, income characteristics, and so on. Demographic variables have also been shown to covary with voting in Congress, but the strength of these correlations, as well as the particular ecological variables —:—-—~——~—fi 183 involved, switch from issue to issue. In this respect, Jack Vanderslik found, for example, that differences between Southern and Northern Democrats in respect of foreign trade and agricultural policy are relatively slight when compared to their differences over civil liberties and urban improvement.9 Most of the conclusions that have been drawn about the relationship between constituency characteristics and legislative voting behavior have been based on data from the House of Representatives and from state legislative assemblies. This literature is less than clear about the effect of constituency influences when the composition of the constituency is heterogeneous, which generally becomes the case when moving from the Congressional District to the state level analyses of the United States Senate. In such a case, the legislator may choose to represent only some part of his constituency (the partisan majority electing him), or he may attempt to modify his stand vis-a—vis the entire constituency, or he may simply decide the issue irrespective of constituency pressure. It should be suspected that this problem becomes more acute as more people, over larger geographical areas, are represented by a single person. Taking this into account, it might be expected that correlations between demographic factors and voting behavior will be weaker for Senators than for Representatives. The assumption, here, however, is that the effect of the more heterogeneous state-wide 184 constituencies of the Senate will not hide, but simply reduce somewhat the correlations between Senate constitu— ency characteristics and firearms roll call voting. This conclusion seems warranted by recent research. Clausen and Cheney report that the effect of constituency pres- sures seems less in the Senate, but the conclusions of their own research is that ”the same set of forces are operative on Senators and Representatives,” producing similar patterns but of different magnitudes.10 Even so, this chapter will examine the question of differences in constituency impact between the two Houses by briefly examining the relationship between constituency charac- teristics in Congressional Districts and firearms voting in the House. Simply finding a series of correlations, high or otherwise, between constituency characteristics and leg- islative voting only demonstrates an association between the two; simple correlations as such, unfortunately, do not demonstrate a direct impact of constituency will on the voting behavior of the legislator. Research in the early 1960's indicated the question of constituency influ- ence might be better examined by looking at whether there was a relationship between the political attitudes of the electorate and decisions in Congress. Miller and Stokes, while examining three policy areas, found considerable agreement between constituency attitudes and the roll 11 call. While it is plain that the strength of correlations 185 will depend very much on the policy question at hand, Miller and Stokes, and later Cnudde and McCrone, believe an underlying relationship between mass attitudes and 12 The influence governmental decisions generally exist. of constituency attitudes was found, however, to pass through ”the Congressman's perception of the district's views. ,”13 and thus a one-to-one relationship between constituency attitudes and roll call votes should not be expected on this account: perceptions of attitudes and the actual attitudes are often different. Miller and Stokes report considerable belief among Congressmen that legislative voting behavior affects chances for re-election. the idea of reward or punishment at the polls for legislative stands is familiar to members of Congress, who feel that they and their records are quite visible to their constituents. Of our sample of Congressmen who were opposed for re-election in 1958, more than four—fifths said the outcome in their districts had been strongly influenced by the electorate's response to their records and personal standing. 4 The presumption is, of course, that Congressmen actually do believe their behavior is taken into account by their constituencies; if this is true, it seems reasonable that Congressmen will attempt to court the favor of the voter.15 Courting favor, however, implies knowing what is favored. The problem of evaluating constituency wants and attitudes is no small affair. In 1960 Campbell et al. reported some very interesting findings, especially intern esting for those who would know constituency attitudes; a“- —:—_——i7 186 The quality of the electorate' 5 review of public policy formation has two closely related conse— quences for those who must frame the actions of government. First, it implies that the electoral decision typically will be ambiguous as to the specific acts government should take. The thinness of the electorate's understanding of concrete policy alternatives—~its inability to respond to government and politics at this level-—helps explain why efforts to interpret a national election in terms of a policy mandate are speculative, contradictory, and incon- clusive. The second consequence of the quality of the public's review of policy formation is that the electoral decision gives great freedom to those who must frame the policies of government. The consequences for those who ”need to know” the prefer- ences of the public do not need explication. Even if a {A Congressman or a Senator does want to follow the dictates of his constituency, how does he find out what they are? No doubt, the methods of estimation are numerous and may include listening to special interests, reading mail, sending out surveys and making personal appearances. These methods, however, allow Senators to speak with only a few constituents and allow some interests a better hear- ing than others. It is not beyond reason to believe that Senators and Representatives also use the tools of aggregate analy- sis which are available to the social scientist. Gener- ally, the Senator has lived a long time in his state, and the Representative a long time in his district; it is reasonable that each knows the important demographic sta- tistics of the area. Knowledge of how people make a living, as well as what kind of living they make, is the business of a Senator and a Representative. ”The gross 187 measures of constituencies may (therefore) constitute a reasonable basis for estimating constituency interests as well as roughly correspond to the representatives' own best estimates of what their constituencies want.”17 This short discussion, as well as the literature concerning the relationship between constituencies and representatives, leaves a great deal unanswered. But it is an immensely complicated question concerning on one side differing theoretical models of representation and widely divergent policy issues, while on the other side, 4‘ incorporating great amounts of demographic, social, econ- omic and political data. In what respect each of these factors is operative, and under what circumstances, remains to be seen. What seems clear, however, is that the gross characteristics of constituencies measured by census and related data is, in the view of many analysts, relatable to the output of legislative bodies. The question under examination in this study concerns finding associations between state demographic characteristics and firearms votes in the Senate. Specifically, the issue is not one of trying to prove conclusively that constituencies do influence Senators, although some discussion of the rela— tionship between constituency characteristics and party will be held. Rather, the primary question is to deter- mine in what respect there is an association between fire— arms vote and state aggregate characteristics. 188 Data Gathering Demography is the empirical study of population characteristics of three types: changes in population size, composition of the population, and the spatial dis— tribution of populations. The demographic concepts and measures employed, here, in the study of firearms legis- lation touch all of these concerns. As a scientific tool demography offers means of providing measures of the state and Congressional District characteristics used in this study. The principal problem in this respect is i: finding demographic variables whose information is aggre- gated according to state and District boundaries. Theoree tically, this is no problem for all the data decennially collected by the United States Census Bureau can be aggre- gated according to nearly any geographical unit. The practical problems of such a venture are immense, however, for the individual researcher. The great expense and time involved in converting even a single measure from census tracts to Congressional Districts is generally prohibitive. Luckily, all is not lost as the Census Bureau pub- lishes after each census The Congressional District Data 3993, containing a great deal of demographic information arranged according to state and Congressional District. The solution is not quite as simple as this for the 90th Congress, however. By 1967 several states had redistricted, producing substantial changes in district boundaries, and consequently, significant changes in District demographic 189 figures from those reported in the 1963 Data Book. In Alabama, for example, all Congressional Districts were coded ”at large” in the 1963 publication, but later redis- tricting assigned each of them to a portion of the state. Census Bureau supplements were used in recording data of thirty-one states, while data for states which had not redistricted as of 1967 were taken from the 1963 Dapa 899k; In all cases, data is based on the 1960 national census and is, therefore, somewhat questionable for use in the period 1967-1968. Just on the basis of interpola- tion it might be more useful to use 1970 census data, but this unfortunately is not available. In any event, the assumption is that population changes between 1960 and 1967 generally do not affect any of the overall patterns discovered in this study between firearms voting and state and District characteristics. The demographic concepts chosen for analysis in this study reflect three basic questions: (1) Do the relative differences in the urban—rural compositions of populations correlate with differences in the firearms voting records for representatives of those populations? (2) Do differences in the economic characteristics of populations correlate with differences in the firearms voting records of representatives of those populations? (3) Do differences in population electoral behavior, i.e., party preferences,electora1 pluralities, and turnover characteristics, correlate with the firearms votes of the llll'lllJ 190 representatives of these populations? Most demographic concepts and measures used here were selected with these inquiries in mind. A few, however, were not, and their inclusion is meant to satisfy some miscellaneous personal curiosities encountered during the early stages of research. These miscellaneous concepts include the fol— lowing population characteristics: levels of educational attainment, age characteristics, and ethnic and racial compositions. Table IV—l presents a listing of the measures drawn from the Congressional District Data Book, and from other sources, which were used to operationalize the demographic concepts just mentioned. The table also footnotes the sources of the measures and provides the data card column numbers where the data is punched. ”D-S” indicates whether the data is collected for the state as a whole (8), or for Congressional Districts (D), or for both. Fuller explanations of these measures, and the methods employed in calculating them, will be presented as their effects are analyzed. Firearms Roll Calls and Constituency Characteristics Senate roll call voting on firearms was treated as the measure of the dependent variable in this analysis, while all of the constituency data were treated as measures for the independent variables. The Guttman scale scores of 89 Senators provided the measures of position on firearms ‘7'“. .11, WW 1 ||.ll J Hm-mm me mH m-m oEoo:H ceroz HH oNlmN mNH mH m-Q onOHmEou Hoocom we made» :meoz OH - mH m-m 0&0: am mm NNH so Hoosom :mHm mo mummy snow mcHondEou :OHumHzmom mo bemused m NN-HN ma 0H m-o 6m< cease: w - mH m-Q Huoum :MHoMom mH om mH we pogo GOHumHzmom Hmpoe mo ucoonom n mH om m-m HHmhzm-cmns3n5m -qapuav coupwoauHmmeHo puauumam o 5H-oH om mH m-m amps: mH page GOHumHsmom Hence one we ucooaom m mH-HH em mH m-m oHHZ oamscm pom QOprHsmom a l OH-m Nm mH m-Q 00-0mmH w ”:oHumHsmom cH owamsu ucooaom m n-o a mH w-m chHuoon Haapcmeammaa .oeaH--soama wchcHz new ummu ouo> pqooaom N m H mH m-m oomH--d0Hpoon HprcopHmosd-xuomd mchcHz H e-m m a boom COHpmonHpaopH uoHHpmHm Hmconmoamcou N-H mH m-Q owou cOHpmonHucopH opmpm GEsHou xEouH ouocuoom m-Q EopH a oHanHm> ohmo ooasom --ous:om .mmHQmHta> oagdaamo56a--.H->H mqmocaa wchcHZ new ApaHmasHm Hmeuwed --COHpoeHm HmeeHmmeam:eu oomH u am am e shame maacaHz --c0HuoeHm HmceHmmonceu oomH m wm-am MN m seuaa weaned: sou spHHaasHa eaouuoa--Na Beam meaemm NN em mN m agasoaaa waaceaz--ma Baum ceaeom HN mm-em mN m speed meaaeaz How zuHHethm udeuaom--Hw pmom euecow om mm mN m «aseaaa maaacaz--aa eaom ooaaom 0H Nm-am NN e ecoseHeaoe omeowoe UHEeceem uoHHumHQ we xeocw < om-me 0e 0H m-e oammz ma page COHumHsmem HeweH ecu we ecousem wH 2 w we-ee smm aH m-e maaHHoe ca name mauve: AH me-oe aeN aH m-e mean: eoaasuuo -Heczo we osHe> omHHoQ cmeez OH mm-mm awH mH m-e amaaoe mean: ma page oohem Mao: one we uqoohom mH mm-om Hm m-Q Hexaez Ewen mH wage oehom Mae: ecu we useoaem «H mm-em HN m-m amHHou osHm mH “may oohem Mae: esp we pcooaom mH mm-mm omH mH m-Q wezeHmEec: ceHustaom OHeZ ecu we pceohem NH GESHOU «EopH ouoapoem m-Q EouH a oHanHm> .phmu meadow --eossem . .UeSCHucou--.H->w mqm vamp meadow --eos:em .wochuCOu--.H->H mqm HmHHeQ :MHwoz o.H Nm. - AH. - we. Hm. HmHv HaHHoe moaaz\ouaom shoes o.H ma. - MH. - am. - HaHU aoxaoz Esam\6oaom shoes o.H mo. No. HMHV caHHoe 65Hm\ousom ago: a o.H mo. ANHU pokeHmEoCD monE we ucooaom o.H mHHV oEoecH cmeoZ mm am AH OH mH 4H mH NH HH moHanta> .quuo> mEHmouHm Hqu mucoo -waeou :oHumHeHHeu paw moHansm> oHEecoem we mucoHonwoou cOHomHonaoesouaH-- m->H mHmonm coo.OHw o>oem esHm> z macho mneau cH Hoeesz asehw we w HmHHom cmeoz .mcHHe> maneoHHm one mHHc: weHQSUeO podBO--eSHw> HmHHeQ :wHeoz ”meoHaane owner--.e->H mqmom monmu Mom oomom memcooHH sow epHmwu Hem eoSmmH boommH momceoHH whoonsm op mowaooHH mcHoqsm wcHucsz Hepoe pmeu Hmoeh .885 .3 meat; use Ba .3232 33%: do 386E860 532928-29: mam? 211 l 1 of the hunting industry. But figures measuring the total . economic impact of hunting on a state might be found to correlate highly with opposition to firearms restrictions while the restricted range and minimal impact of licensing fees do not. Data on the full range of the economic impact of hunting was not available, however. Of course, such data would have been very useful in establishing a relationship between the economic dimensions of the hunt— ing industry and firearms voting. The moderate measure of such economies used here, i.e., income from licensing fees, suggests (r of .26) hunting income and opposition to restrictions are positively associated. But there is no necessity to conclude, nor is there any evidence to sup— port, that any of the legislation contemplated in the Senate would have had disastrous consequences on these revenues. To this end, several amendments to Title IV and to H.R. 17735, insisted upon by Western Senators to protect the legitimate hunting uses of firearms, were passed by the Senate. The high inter-correlation between the number of hunters and hunting revenues, however, leaves Open the question of how important economic con~ sideratiens were in relation to questions of ”restricting a life style.” That is, was Senate opposition explicable in terms of potential economic disaster for the Western states or was it the product of sentiment and fear that the traditional and habitual use of firearms was threatened? Unfortunately, this study cannot answer that question, 212 primarily because of the lack of data. In the absence of conflicting evidence it seems reasonable that both issues were variously important in the make—up of opposi— tion. The states with the largest percentages of people engaged in hunting are the most opposed to gun restric— tions. The importance of the percentage measure cannot be over—estimated; Michigan and New York, for example, have over 1,000,000 licensed hunters (three times as many as any Western state). Senators in both states overwhelm~ ingly supported gun restrictions. In both states, how~ ever, large concentrations of urban living non—hunters overshadowed the effect of the hunter and his opposition to gun restrictions. Yet, there is no indication that the non-hunting public was as vocal in supporting gun restrictions as the hunter was in voicing opposition. This is important for understanding, in part, the structure of opposition and support for gun restrictions. Information presented here and earlier indicates the presence of a vocal state hunters‘ ”lobby“ was a neces— sary but not a sufficient condition for Senators to voice opposition to firearms restrictions. Nearly all states whose Senators voiced opposition to restrictions had a relatively large percentage of the state‘s population licensed for hunting; several states, however, with large numbers of licensed hunters supported restrictions. In these latter cases large urban concentrations are found 213 in each of the states; the effect of the ”hunting lobby” in such states is lessened under these circumstances. This serves to support the finding made earlier that states with both rural and large urban concentrations tended to support gun restrictions. Unfortunately, data on the number of licensed hunters by Congressional Dis- trict is not available and cannot be used to test this finding further. The importance of the closeness of an urban concentration seems apparent, but the strength of the correlation between gun voting and licensed hunters also is important to note. The inter-correlation between population density and the number of hunters in a state is high {—.68) which leaves the question of whether hunters or some general rural orientation to life had the greatest negative effect on gun restrictions. But part of the rural orientation to life includes the rifle hanging over the mantle. Two factors, then, become associated with an urban—rural split. First, the incidence of crime, especially violent crime, correlates positively with urban densities. The inter— pretation of firearms legislation as being directed toward the problem of urban crime, rather than any manifest rural firearms problem, is consistent with the findings above. So too is the View that National firearms controls would restrict and penalize rural populations more than the urban. In this latter respect, the banning of mail order sales is seen as limiting the chief sources of firearms 214 materials for rural populations, while not measurably affecting or limiting the availability of firearms in the omnibus commercial markets of the urban setting. The urban—rural split is not simply the product of a single issue of life style or of crime, but of both. The patterns of support and opposition outlined above suggest a careful weighing of both factors played a cru- cial role in determining the structure of opposition and support. The relative propinquity of large urban areas balanced against the habits of firearms use can explain much of the voting behavior. The strength of regional voting patterns can in large measure also be related to such factors for population density and firearms usage both have regional identifications. Earlier, it was suggested wealth correlated posi- tively with support for gun restrictions. Many of the nation's richest districts are adjacent to major metro— politan areas and the theme of "protecting property” from the increased incidence of urban crime may be viewed in respect of this closeness. One facet of this theme involved the urban race riots of the mid-sixties. The thesis has loosely been advanced that the recent urban riots produced distrust and uneasiness in the black and white populations of urban-suburban concentrations; the distrust, in turn, was held to have overshadowed the crime related reasons for gun restrictions and produced, instead, a public reaction in both black and white 215 communities to keep the arms of self defense free from restraints. Did suburban representatives, especially those from districts close to the major mid—sixties riots, sup— port restrictive gun bills? Did predominately black and/or ghetto black district representatives support or oppose restrictions? (This, in view of the fact that several radical black organizations, including the Black Panthers, openly opposed gun restrictions for obvious reasons.) Did the percentage of the states population that was Negro covary with Senate voting? TABLE IV—8.--Correlation Coefficients Between Percentage of Population--Negro and Firearms Voting. All States or All Non~Southern All Districts States or Districts Senate Firearms Scale Scores .24 —.32 House Firearms Voting .15 -.51 Figures from Table IV-8 indicate differences between the Senate and the House in respect of the two variables are to be measured in degree rather than in kind. House firearms voting refers to a single vote on July 24 on an amendment by Representative MacGregor to exclude ammunition from provisions of H.R. 17735. The bill and the roll call were reflected here so that a yes vote meant rejection of this attempt to weaken provisions 216 of H.R. 17735. With a yes vote being recorded as a one (1) and a no vote as a two (2), support for gun restric- tions assumed a lower value (1) relative to opposition (2). This is consistent with Senate Guttman scale scores where the lower score indicates support for restrictions and the higher score opposition to restrictions. It should be expected, therefore, that if per cent of the population that is Negro covaries positively with support for gun restriction, the correlation should be negative. This was the case only in respect of non—Southern states. The broad and general opposition of Southern Senators and Representatives, to gun restrictions, has already been discussed; with much of the nation's Negro population located in the Southern states, the positive correlations between per cent Negro and opposition to firearms restric- tions is understandable. However, the expected negative correlation between the two variables is produced when Southern States and Districts are excluded from the analysis. with a majority of the non-Southern Negro population living in urban areas, it is clear that Repres- entatives from urban ”black" Districts tended to support gun restrictions. To examine the question of race riots and their effect on firearms legislation more closely, review was taken of the voting records of Representatives from dis- tricts in and surrounding Newark, Chicago, Detroit, and 217 Los Angeles. Specifically, how did Congressmen from and about these ”riot torn” areas vote on firearms legislation? None of the House roll calls in Table IV—9 dealt with the issue of registration-licensing. Two roll calls concern amendments to H.R. 17735: Roll call #19 is the MacGregor amendment described earlier; roll call #21 came on an amendment by Congressman Latta to ”exempt people, organizations, and institutions engaged in competition and military training from provisions“ of H.R. 17735. The bill had the obvious favor of the National Rifle Associa— tion. Roll call #22 concerned the final passage of H.R. 17735. A nay vote on roll calls #19 and #21, coupled with a yes vote on #22 would produce the most consistently supportive position on gun restrictions. In every district but one with a Negro population of 20 per cent or more, the most supportive voting record on restrictions (2,2,1) is recorded. The one exception i U) Chicago's Second District with a Negro population of 20 per cent. Even so, pro—regulation stances were taken on roll calls #19 and #22. Districts classified as urban but with less than 20 per cent black population and located close to the urban core generally supported restrictions. The same may be said of suburban, white, high income districts bor- dering the urban core. Only one district (California‘s seventeenth) took the most negative stance on restrictions (1,1,2); the District ranks 67th nationally in median 218 H H N ooovH N cans: Nm H N N OOQOH 0H cash: Hm H N N oommH 0H amps: om H N N oommH o :wHH: mN H N N oom¢N H swag: wN H H H ooomH N swan: NN H N N OONON o sway: 0N H N N ooomH o amenabsm mN H H H OOHBH H cmnhsasm VN H H H OONMH m :mQHSQSm MN H N N OOHNH H :mnhb NN m m N OOOHH mo amps: HN H H H OONmH q cmnhb ON H N N oomeH o QNLHDLSm mH N H H oouwH e CGQHSQSm NH Hucsou moHowd< mOH H N N eHmeH N qmflasazw NH N H N NeNMH N swag: NH H N N oomNH m cmnhsnsm OH H N N SSH m :25 3 H N N momMH we Sachs eH H N N ommw mm meHD MH H N N mHMHH Nm swan: H uHopqu NN HN mH wchsoE onmsuoo oamoz\c0HumHsmom GOHHNOHM a poHHpmHQ psopmwom szu .02 HHmu HHom gonzo wo osHm> oz“ wo N -HmmmHu do Hmconmopwcou stHom :meoz aqupoanmom mEHmoHHm co COHuHmom .mmop< Emma: popuoHom Ham wcho> mEHmome-- .m->H mqm<9 219 amok n H« .ucompm n m H H H oomNH m :mnHSDSm NH H N N ooomN m emanznzm mH H N N oomOH m @3134 NH H H N OONON o mama: HH H H N ooNON H :mnHSHSm OH H N N OOONN e amen: a H N N oomeH o cane: N H N N OOHNHH mN awn—MD m H N N ooeNH NN case: a H N N ooaoH m emnH: m H N N OOHNH v fimnhbnzm v H N N oomNH ON mama: m H H N OOQOH ON Gan—MD N H N N OONOH NN amen: H ONNUHHU H N N dashsnzm mH H mm M OOGMH m HHGQHDQHSW VH H N N GONmH NH canH: NH H N N ooan o mmflhsnsm NH- H N N oommH mN cmahsnzm HH H N N oomNH NH amnesnsm OH H N N oomNH N gangsnsm a H N N OOONH N :NHH: N H H N OONQN N canssnsm N H N N OONNH N gmnhsnsm m Ngmzmz ON :63“: 44433 a.) .voschcou--.m->H mHm mEHonHm Huhmm Ho mHmAHms< How mOHumHumpm U paw x--.HH->H mqm mEmehflm COGZHOM mwdmflUwamou HHOHHNH®HHOUII.NHI>H MHM HmHHoQ ewHeoz HOHV M NH. me. ma. - 0N< amHeoz HNV em. me. we. - Hooum QNHoHom mH wasp eOHpmHsmom Heuoe Ho ucoohod HNV we. - we. - om. Hoxeoz EHmm mH page eoHom HMO: esp mo pcoohom HNHV om. o.H om. - emmH: mH gasp coHpmH -smom Hmpoe egg we punched Hmv o.H em. om. - oHHz eHasem eon aoHHaHsaoa HNV mcoprHoHHou Neopum oHHz ohmswm dang: coHHmHsmom moHoom mEHmmHH mo Hem eoHpmHzmom we N :mEuusw .m HanHm> psopcomoqu .moHsmHHm> Haepcmmoch Hospo HHm mchD NHHmeeQ COHpmHsmom pew mcHwo> mEHonHm coozpom mweoHonmoou :oHuwHoHHou Ho nomHHmmEou--.MH->H MHm panHem HNV Newmm mcheHz How AHHHNHDHA H:QUHom--HN Hmom oueeom HoNU Nuhmm NcHecHz--HN “mom museum HmHV keyed mchcHz How NHHHNHDHQ Heeeaem--Nw “New egmcem HNNV egmez mH HNSH cer -mHsmem Hmuoe may we “ceohem HNHV .pezaHpcou--.mH->H mHm visions of the bill. - fungi?“ Roll Call Number 20 Y 412 N 11 Variable Number 0406 July 24, 1968 P0 To amend H.R. 17735 by adopting the Poff substitute to the Casey amendment regarding penalties for use of a gun to commit a felony. Roll Call Number 21 Y 225 N 198 Variable Number 0407 July 24, 1968 Latta To amend H.R. 17735, so as to exempt, peOple, organizations, and institutions engaged in competition and military train— ing from provisions of the bill under certain Circumstances. Roll Call Number 22 Y 305 N 118 Variable Number 0408 July 24, 1968 To pass H.R. 17735. Roll Call Number 24 Y 167 N 125 Variable Number 0467 October 3, 19 7 Flood To recede from disagreement to Senate amendment no 63 to H.R. 18037, and concur therein With an amendment. The Senate amendment strikes out sec. 409, prOViding that no 285 part of the funds appropriated may be used for busing of students, or to force any children attending secondary school to attend a particular school against the choice of his parents. And inserts in lieu thereof a new section 409, which adds (elementary schools) to the language, and adds the phrase (in order to overcome racial imbalance). The House amendment would retain (elementary schools), but eliminate the racial imbalance phrase. APPENDIX B 286 The following codes for states are similar to those used by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. All data analyses and references to regions found in the body of the disserta- tion are according to these groupings. New England 01. Connecticut 02. Maine 03. Massachusetts 04. New Hampshire 05. Rhode Island 06. Vermont Middle Atlantic 11. Delaware 12. New Jersey 13. New York 14. Pennsylvania East North Central 21. Illinois 22. Indiana 23. Michigan 24. Ohio 25. Wisconsin West North Central 31. Iowa 32. Kansas 33. Minnesota 34. Missouri 35. Nebraska 36. North Dakota 37. South Dakota hxternal States 81. Alaska 82. Hawaii 287 Solid South 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 40. Alabama Arkansas Florida Georgia Louisiana Mississippi 1 North Carolina . South Carolina Texas Virginia "4, “— Border States 51. 52. 53. 54. 56. Kentucky Maryland Oklahoma Tennessee West Virginia Mountain States 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. Arizona Colorado Idaho Montana Nevada New Mexico Utah Wyoming Pacific States 71. 72. 73. California Oregon Washington ":li'-1W