ABSTRACT

JAMES A. GARFIELD AND RUTHERFORD B. HAYES:
A STUDY IN STATE AND NATIONAL POLITICS

by
John Thomas Houdek

The original intent of this study was to focus upon the
Hayes-Garfield relationship and the role they played in nation-
al and state politics during the years from 1876 to 1881 --
the period of their closest association. It soon became ap-
parent, however, that a careful consideration of their devel-
opment to 1876 was necessary for one to understand, as well as
compare and contrast, their personalities, character, values,
ideals and political behavior. Certain phases of John Sher-
man's long political career which directly involved Garfield
and Hayes are also examined in some detail. This dissertation
is based principally upon the rich and extensive Garfield,
Hayes and Sherman collections, as well as on the papers of
such contemporaries as William Henry Smith, Warner Bateman,
James Comly, Charles Foster, Jacob Cox and Murat Halstead.

Obvious similarities in the lives of Garfield and Hayes
tend to obscure equally Significant and fundamental differences,

both of kind and degree, that set them clearly apart. Unlike

Hayes, Garfield knew the meaning of want and felt its blight-
ing influence from youth into early manhood, even as a prom-
inent congressman he lacked Hayes's financial security. He
remained sensitive, perhaps inordinately so, to the advantages
enjoyed by one who, like Hayes, was born into comfort and gen-
tility. Throughout his life Hayes was the more circumspect of
the two and his abiding fear that some associate's scandalous
conduct might besmirch his good name did much to shape his
political behavior. Garfield was not, like Hayes, a thorough-
going Radical and while Hayes remained preoccupied with war-
born issues, Garfield quickly sensed that monetary and finan-
cial questions would become major issues in the future and set
out to master these subjects. Hayes abandoned Congress for the
governorship in an era of waning executive power, an office
Garfield and Sherman scorned, but which Hayes viewed as a
stepping-stone to the presidency. While Garfield sought and
won national prominence and decision-making power in the dom-
inant branch of the federal government, Hayes found content-
ment in Columbus building a modest but solid record that re-
flected his commitment to small government and limited legis—
lative activity. For Hayes politics was an evocation, for
Garfield a vocation.

After 1876, the fortunes of the two men were closely
linked. Garfield played a major role in the election settle-
ment, an event that has yet to be adequately assessed. Although
Garfield expected to be a candidate for the—Senate, at Hayes's

request he remained in the House where he became minority leader.

John Thomas Houdek

As Hayes unfolded his plans for the South and civil service
reform, Garfield swallowed his misgivings, supported him loyal—
ly and struggled to prevent an open party revolt. Neither
Garfield nor many of his contemporaries fully appreciated that
the motives behind Hayes’s policies were far more political
and expedient than idealistic. Garfield's influence with the
President reached a high point in 1879 during the Democratic
attempt to emasculate federal election laws. During this
struggle Garfield proved his mettle as a House leader while
Hayes not only frustrated an attempt at legislative coercion,
but reasserted his commitment to the defense of Negro political
rights. Although Hayes did not expand presidential powers, he
made a significant contribution as a self-assured and steady
defender of presidential prerogatives, especially in the matter
of appointments.

In the struggle to succeed Hayes, Garfield found himself
in the unwelcome dual role of dark horse and key figure in the
hopeless bid for the nomination by the cabinet member closest
to Hayes -- John Sherman. In the exciting convention of 188C,
Garfield emerged as a leader in the successful fight to over-
turn the unit rule; this victory resulted in a deadlocked con-
vention and the nomination of Garfield rather than Grant. Three
chapters are devoted to the struggle for succession and its
aftermath.

His final months in office saw Hayes make the last of his

several unavailing pleas for civil service reform legislation

and congressional aid in enforcing the civil rights amendments.

John Thomas Houdek

During the same period his freely given advice to Garfield re-
garding campaign tactics, cabinet-making and the temperance
issue are a further revelation of Hayes as a shrewd and real-
istic political practitioner.

Hayes generally approved the course of the abbreviated,
but promising Garfield administration, although the Star Route
investigation left him troubled. Meanwhile, in his frequent
assessments of his own presidency, Hayes left further evidence
of the importance of political considerations in the policies

ts assassination, he head-

he pursued. Following his successor
ed the committee that raised the money and chose the site for

the Garfield Memorial.

JAMES A. GARFIELD AND RUTHERFORD B. HAYES:

A STUDY IN STATE AND NATIONAL POLITICS

by

John Thomas Houdek

A THESIS

Submitted to

Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1970

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research underlying this study has been made easier by
the expert services of members of several libraries. The Direc-
tor of the Hayes Memorial Library, watt P. Marchman, has been
most generous with his help and encouragement. I am also in-
debted to his assistants, Mrs. Ruth Ballinger and Mrs. Rose Sberna,
not only for their skillful assistance, but for helping to make
my stays at Fremont a very pleasant experience. Mrs. Alene Lowe
White, the Librarian of the Western Reserve Historical Society,
and her staff ably assisted work there. I would also like to
thank staff members at Ohio State Historical Society, the Ober-
lin College Library and the Toledo Public Library for their aid.
Finally, Dr. C. Percy Powell and John de Porry of the Manuscripts
Reading Room of the Library of Congress introduced me to the use
of this unrivalled collection and were unfailingly gracious and
helpful.

I am deeply indebted to Professor Harry J. Brown for sug-
gesting the topic of this dissertation and for his patience and
encouragement. Both he and Professor Marjorie E. Gesner have
read the manuscript with great care and their suggestions have
contributed materially to whatever merit it may possess.

There is one other person without whose steady support and
unfailing faith this project would not have been completed -- my
wife Caiplyn M. Houdek.

ii

INTRODUCTION

The late nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of

Ohio and Ohioans as a strikingly potent force on the American
political scene. Throughout the Civil War era and for decades
thereafter they would, as Presidents, Cabinet members, Justices
of the U. S. Supreme Court, Senators, Congressmen and Governors,
play a remarkable role in the shaping and direction of national
affairs. Ohio herself was a kind of United States in microcosm
and perhaps this offers the most satisfactory explanation of why
she and her sons enjoyed such political prominence. Her politi-
cal life was uncommonly vigorous and here the two party system
flourished with a rivalry so intense that elections were often
decided by the slimmest of margins. This vitality was fostered
by the presence of two blocs of relatively homogeneous voters
reflecting their predominently Northeastern or Southern origins
and strongly committed to one or the other of the major parties.
For many years one of the subjects of this study, James A. Gar-
field, represented just such an enclave, the staunchly Repub-
lican Western Reserve. Ohio politics also tended to polarize
around the rival cities of Cleveland and Cincinnati, the latter
the setting for Rutherford B. Hayes’s entry into public life._
John Sherman, whose long career in politics in intertwined with
those of Garfield and Hayes, reflected the political expediency

iii

 

demanded of an Ohioan bent upon long tenure in the United
States Senate.

Garfield and Hayes, Whose careers converged especially
during the period from 1876 to 1881, rank among the most prom-
inent Republican politicians of the Gilded Age. The political
history of this era has all too often been represented as a
dreary wasteland, peopled by selfish and short-sighted cynics
at the beck and call of major business interests and preoc-
cupied with perpetuating the bitterness of the Civil War for
purely partisan purposes. During recent years, historians
have begun a long needed re-examination of these years and
this has paid dividends in the form of a more accurate, bal-
anced and sympathetic picture of a much maligned era. This
re-appraisal will not turn the traditional picture upside down;
it will not transform the era’s political leaders into flawless
statesman -- but it will substantially modify the tendency to
dismiss this as an age of political cynicism. It is hoped
that this tudy of Hayes and Garfield will cast further light
on the Republican scene during the postwar years.

The initial intent of this dissertation was to focus upon
the Hayes—Garfield relationship during the years from 1876 to
1881 -- the years of their closest association. It quickly be-
came evident, however, that a careful consideration of their
lives before 1876 was imperative if one was to understand pro-
perly, as well as compare and contrast, their personalities,
character, values, ideals and political behavior. While ex-

amining these earlier years as well as those of the presidential

iv

period, I have relied chiefly on the abundant primary sources
in the Hayes and Garfield collections, as well as the papers
of contemporaries like John Sherman, William Henry Smith,

Warner Bateman, James Comly, Charles Foster, Jacob Cox and

Murat Halstead.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWIJEDGMENTS O O O O O O O O O O I O O O O 0

INTRODUCTION 0 I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Chapter

1

ONU'l-l-‘KNM

x1

9
1O
11
12

BUCKEYE BEGINNINGS:

THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF HAYES AND GARFIELD

WINNING LAURELS IN WASHINGTON AND COLUMBUS
ADVANCEMENT AND ADVERSITY . . . . . . . .
THE HGOOD GOVERNOR? REWARDED . . . . . . .
COMPROMISE YIELDS A TARNISHED VICTORY . .

AN INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING:
A 'NEW DEFARTURE' TAKES SHAPE . . . . .

UNDER FIRE BUT PUSHING ON . . . . . . . .
PRESIDENTIAL POLICIES VINDICATED? . . . .
THE STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION . . . . . . .
VOHIO TO THE FRONT . . . AGAIN? . . . . .
CONVENTION AFTERMATH: A TAINTED VICTORY? .

CONCLUDING AND OPENING SCENES . . . . . .

EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

ii

iii

56
97
144

204

247
291
340
382
420
460
489
529
537

CHAPTER 1

BUCKEYE BEGINNINGS:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF HAYES AND GARFIELD

When the lives of Garfield and Hayes are compared, it
might appear to the casual observer that the similarities
easily outweigh the differences. Both were native Ohioians,
sons of New England pioneers drawn westward by the promise of
a more abundant life. Each grew to manhood in a fatherless
home, but each young man was deeply influenced by a strong-
willed mother. Equally able as students, they finished their
formal training in the culturally rich atmosphere of New
England and exhibited an uncommon scholarly bent for the rest
of their days. By the outbreak of the Civil War, they had
gained some prominence within their respective communities and
professions, had joined the young Republican party and had been
elected to public office. They entered the war as officers in
Ohio volunteer units, took part in sharp and bloody actions and
distinguished themselves in the service of the Union; an exper-
ience which had a deep and enduring impact on both men. Their
military service won rewards for them in the form of election
to the House of Representatives and significant advantages
during later political contests. After the passage of years

1

2
had brought a substantial measure of prominence within the
Republican party (three terms as Ohio's governor for Hayes
and leadership in the House for Garfield), one succeeded the
other as his party's compromise candidate for the presidency
and reached that office after close elections.

Such obvious similarities in the personal histories of
Hayes and Garfield tend to obscure equally significant and
fundamental contrasts, both of kind and degree, that set them
clearly apart. Hayes grew to manhood in a household where the
somewhat stifling atmosphere created by his mother and beloved
sister was tempered in a salutory fashion by the forceful
character of a substitute father and benefactor, Sardis
Birchard. Sophia Hayes's brother contributed a masculine
influence and VieWpoint, fiancial security and the advantages
of his wide-ranging business and financial contacts. When
major decisions were to be made, especially if they involved
Hayes's career, Sardis's opinion was often decisive. Nor was
this potent and pervasive force removed by Sardis's death in
1874, for Hayes inherited the bulk of his property and suc-
ceeded him as the comfortably fixed squire of Fremont.
Garfield enjoyed no such benevolent relationship. This is not
to say that he grew up bereft of the sympathetic attention of
family and friends, quite the contrary, but rather that he
simply received nothing approaching the advantages provided
for Hayes.

But the contrasts between the early years of the two
extends beyond the impact or absence of a benefactor to the

general area of the environment in which each developed.

5

Although both boys were pioneers' sons, Hayes was the product
of a semi-urban frontier rather than the hard-scrabble rural
setting of the Garfields. Perhaps the difference between farm
life on the Western Reserve and life in the small town of
Delaware appears to be of slight importance, but this is not
true. Whether one considers housing, income, security, sur-
roundings or educational opportunities, it is clear that the
young Hayes was in the superior position. He grew up in a two
story brick home, in a family with an above average income,
his youth was marked by security and stability and a sound
private school education was provided for him at the proper
time. Garfield knew the meaning of want and felt its blighting
influence from his youth into young manhood -- even as a prom-
inent congressman years later, he had not yet entirely escaped
from financial insecurity. He was sensitive, perhaps exces-
sively so, to the advantages that came to one born into com-
fortable and genteel surroundings. Late one evening, while
campaigning for Hayes during his presidential bid, Garfield
was introduced to the candidate's early life:

. . . I lay in bed & read Howell's life of Hayes

to the 53rd page. I am charmed with it, and with

Hayes. His student life is a revelation to me,

which endears him to me very much. He had this

advantage over me, that he was never oppressively

poor. I have this morning seen the house where

he was born. It is a substanial brick building --

now used as a furniture shop and far better than

any mother or I ever had until I built ours at

Washington. They had property enough to start
him to school early, so that he graduated four

years younger than I did. My favorite theory of

4

hereditary influence is strongly illustrated in
his case.

(hrfield'sjlog cabin origin and canal boat days may have been
mﬂitimﬂ.assets, ideally suited for the rhapsodizing style
Oftmmmaign biographies and stump speakers, but the subject
lﬂmsaU3was scarcely nostalgic when reflecting upon the want
andcuudeness of those early years.

NOr was this the only occasion upon which Garfield would
lamaN3his disadvantaged youth. Some fourteen years earlier,
durhugthe Civil War, when such recollections had not yet been
meLhnmd by time and political achievement, he had unburdened
himmﬂf‘to his close friend, Harry Rhodes, as follows:

As I look them (the years) over (it was his thirty-
first birthday), I am made very sad and can hardly
tell why. To some men the fact that they came up
from poverty and single-handedness is a matter of
pride. There is, at times, a little touch of
gratification in my heart at what I have accomplished,
but on the whole, reviewing it all, I lament sorely
that I was born to poverty and allowed to catch up
any or no chance habits of mind, body, morals and
manners, and in this chaos of childhood seventeen
years passed before I caught up any inspiration
'Mﬂch was worthy of manhood, or which would lead me
to begin to find the path of manhood and life.
Precious 17 years in which a boy with a father and
some wealth might have become fixed in manly ways
and have attained half of all the preliminary work
of books.

Iatan in the same letter, he declares that "I would, God knows
mykmart, this hour joyfully surrender all I have attained
codhil have 17 years of my beginning replaced by the same

nmﬂmr under the skillful hand of an able man, both in purse,

1James A. Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, Sept. 20, 1876.
Garﬁeld Papers, Library of Congress. Hereafter cited as
Garfield Pap ers .

5

head and heart (Sardis Birchard neatly fits this description).
Letlusnever praise poverty, for a child at least. Better be
pomrin.old age than at the time when money can buy culture of
soulﬂ' Garfield's lamentations may appear melodramatic and
ovamﬁawn, but it would be difficult to escape the conclusion
thattmese formative years left him marked in a way that he was
1minﬂﬂly aware he could never fully erase. Garfield came out
offirude and unSOphisticated environment -- Hayes was the
prommm of security and gentility. Garfield grew up, but Hayes
was reared.2

Although both men were college trained, their educational
hismnw'emphasizes the contrasts of their formative years. For
Emyes,tudght, able, favored with a comfortable and stable
Huddle class background, college was an unchallenged prereq-
IﬂSlte for gentlemanly pursuits. His academic preparation
begnlin a small private primary school in his hometown, after
whhﬂihe was guided for a time by a local lawyer who had form-
erkyimtored at Yale. In 1836, at the age of fourteen, he

's study, followed by another

mmermiNorwalk Academy for a year
yanrat Isaac Webb's Preparatory School at Middletown, Connec-
timfh Hayes might well have stayed on in the East and entered
YaUaaS his Uncle Sardis and others strongly advised, but his
Emmer was determined to place him closer to home in what she

bdieved was a more strongly religious atmosphere. Thus, he

enmnmd Kenyon College at Gambler, Ohio, soon after his

 

2Nov. 19, 1862, in Frederick D. Williams, ed., The Wild
Idfecﬁ the Army (East Lansing, 1964), pp. 181—82,

6
sixteenth birthday. Kenyon, a well-established school of the
genteel tradition, had the distinction of reaching into the
South for many of its students. The southern contingent had
been dwindling as sectional animosities mounted, but Hayes
contacts with well-born southern classmates during these
years were to make a lasting impression on him. Here he formed
a close and enduring friendship with the militant southerner,
Guy Bryan, that would survive the Civil War. As the peace-
make in an intersectional row within a campus society, Hayes
anticipated his later efforts as President and private citizen
to promote intersectional harmony and cooperation at the na-
tional level.

During these pleasant Kenyon years, many facets of Hayes's
character, interests and inclinations come into clearer focus.
His intellectual equipment was obviously top rate, but deSpite
a very strong academic record, capped by valedictory honors,
he avoided the scholarly pose and seemingly attempted to con-
ceal rather than parade his ability. His wit was quick, his
personality sunny, his love of good times genuine, but he was
unusually level-headed and mature at the same time. Hayes
was active in student affairs, outgoing and popular, yet care-
ful in his choice of intimate friends, several of whom would
remain close to him for the rest of his life. In this sense
he differed from the young Garfield who was more anxious to
be liked and quicker to allow familarity which he sometimes
came to regret. While in Washington during the Civil War,

Garfield's wife would advise him to shield himself with a

little more reserve in the new circles to which you are now

7

Iming introduced. Be a little more select in your choice of
cmmpanions, and admit no one to intimacy who is not at least
ymurequal." There is no evidence to indicate that Hayes
eversﬂood in need of such counsel. At Kenyon, Hayes became
an acmye and skillful debater and as his interest in public
Spaﬂdng and politics grew, his Whiggish sentiments, undoubt-
edbrfostered by the distinct Whig bias of Kenyon, became more
prmumnced. He also displayed an introspective turn of mind,
asnmny a diary entry reveals. Several times during this
Imrimihe expressed discontent with his progress and applica-
thnland reasserted a powerful determination to attack his
wonklﬁth renewed vigor. The diary habit, which he shares
wiuiGarfield, often furnishes revealing insights into his
nuﬂdly maturing character, e.g., a healthy sense of self-
zumreciation, a susceptibility to flattery, a generous supply
of mmmmn sense and an abiding determination "to acquire a
dmracter distinguished for energy, firmness, and perserver-
ance."3

While young Hayes had progressed along a smooth, well-
;mbttmicourse, Garfield, nine years his junior, enjoyed few
ofiwyes's advantages during his formative years. His primary
trahﬁng followed the typically irregular catch-as-catch-can
suds Of the rural public schools of that day. After a few

semﬁbns in district schools, intermingled with substantial

 

3Lucretia Garfield to Garfield, Oct. 8, 1862, in Williams,

ed-,'ild Life of the Army, p. 158 n. 42 and Rutherford B.
HaVeSIJiary, June 19, 1841, in Charles R. Williams, ed., Diar
iyiletters of Rutherford B. Hayes (5 vols.; Columbus, 192 ,

I, 57.

 

8

doses of manual labor (which Hayes would much later conclude
was good for a young man), he found employment on a canal
boat out of nearby Cleveland. After a few weeks on the water,
nature interceded in the form of a severe attack of malaria
which drove him home. Upon recovering, he determined, thanks
to the urging of his mother and the financial assistance of
his Older brother, to continue his education. At this cross-
road in his life, the seventeen year old Garfield was about
to undertake, in terms of educational experience, what Hayes
had matter-of-factly completed at this age. For the better
part Of a year, but with several interruptions, Garfield
studied at a nearby Free Will Baptist institution, Geauga
Seminary. From here he was drawn to Hiram and the Eclectic
Institute, "a superior academy" recently founded by the
Disciples of Christ, where he remained from 1851 to 1854.
During these hectic years, one finds very little that can be
compared with the relaxed and self-assured atmosphere in which
Hayes pursued his education. Poverty still plagued him and
work was essential for his maintenance. He began with manual
labor, including carpentry and then moved on to the demanding
duties of a district school teacher, laboring under circum-
stances reminiscent of those Edward Eggleston would later
describe. While still enrolled as a student at the Eclectic,
he began conducting classes at that school and before he left
for the East to earn his bachelor's degree, he had become a
regular member of the faculty.

Until he entered Williams College in 1854, Garfield

attended schools that were raw and unsophisticated in comparison

9

with those to which Hayes was sent. But if the curriculum

at Hiram often fell short of college calibre, the intensity

of Garfield's application did much to offset this disadvantage.
Like Hayes, he possessed a first-rate mind, plenty of deter-
mination, an active and curious intellect and energy to match
his resolution. But his development was circumscribed by the
intensely sectarian and intolerant Disciple community in which
he moved, an atmosphere the religiously uncommitted Hayes
would have found unbearable. Garfield would experience nothing
akin to the relatively cosmopolitan Kenyon until he broke away
from Hiram. In the meantime, he was deeply involved iri his
sect's activities as a teacher, a lay leader and often as a
preacher. He was sheltered from the outside world, reassured
by his widening circle of friends and admirers ("brothers and
Sisters“), and often severely critical of those whose views or
conduct differed from those of the smug Disciple society. But
this chapter in Garfield's history ended with his decision to
complete his education at Williams. In the unfamiliar and far
richer New England atmosphere, his well-entrenched attitudes
and patterns of response were challenged, while his relation-
ship with his church and community underwent a subtile, but
ultimately significant modification. Under the benign influ-
ence Of President Mark Hopkins and an able faculty, his in-
tellectual horizons were expanded, his outlook grew gradually
more secular and tolerant and his curiosity found satisfaction
and encouragement. He responded to this challenge (as he had

to earlier schooling), with an unfeigned eagerness and

1O

enthusiasm. On the other hand, Hayes's determination (which
he, like Garfield, often reenforced with self-admonishing
diary entries) apparently Sprang as much from a sense of duty
as from a natural taste for scholarship so noticeable in
Garfield's character. Hayes recognized this gift for and bent
toward scholarship and after Garfield's death observed in his
diary that he had "just read President Hinsdale's account of
Garfield as a student and teacher. Here was his strength. In
both capacities he was a model. He had large faculties --
memory, analysis, fluency, the debating faculty; ..."4

Hayes too, had left Ohio for the East to finish his train-
ing. Well before leaving Kenyon, it had been decided that he
would prepare for a legal career, and so in the fall of 1842
he began the standard reading program in a Columbus law office.
He diligently followed the accepted course of reading for
several months, goading himself all the while with a methodical
and censorious diary account of his progress. The self-taught
approach left much to be desired and late in the summer of
1843, Hayes entered Harvard’s Dane Law School. There under
the tutelage of men like Joseph Story, he took good advantage
of a formal education of a calibre available to very few of
his contemporaries. What is more, his experience was not con-
fined exclusively to legal studies, for he sampled the offer-

ings of George Bancroft, Richard Henry Dana, Jared Sparks and

 

4Hayes Diary, Feb. 21, 1883, in Williams, ed., piary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 110.

11
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow as well as the political oratory of
Daniel Webster, John Quincy Adams, Rufus Choate and Robert
Winthrop. As yet, he was only mildly interested in politics,
but his ambition "to listen to some of the great lights of
New England" drew him to many political rallies. Of all the
orators he heard at these meetings, he was most impressed with
Webster. As he solemnly declared in his diary: "Daniel Webster
has been styled 'the godlike' in derision. But if any man born
of woman deserves the epithet, it is Daniel Webster."5 Hayes
would never see fit to revise his estimate of Webster and would
thereafter often use him as a yardstick by which to measure the
stature of contemporary politicians such as Garfield.
Like the Garfields, the Hayes family had its roots in

New England, where a number of kinfolk still lived. It was
natural for Hayes, who like Garfield was very conscious of his
New England ties, to Spend nearly two weeks of his first winter
vacation while at Harvard visiting his grandmother, uncles and
cousins in Vermont. After returning to Cambridge, he redoubled
his efforts as he neared the end of his first year at Dane Law
School. This might have marked the end of his formal training,
but he was determined to put in one more term and so after a
summer in Ohio, he returned to put the finishing touches on his
legal training. Near the close of his Harvard sojourn he made
Hus revealing diary entry, an entry that helps one understand

boulthe young and the mature Hayes:

 

5Hayes Diary, Nov. 14, 1843, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, I, 126.

12
In two or three weeks I shall leave the Law

School, and soon begin to live. Heretofore I have

been getting ready to live. How much has been left

undone it is no use to reckon. My labors have been

to cultivate and store my mind. This year the char-

acter, the whole man must receive attention. I will

strive to become in manners, morals, and feelings a

true gentleman. The rudeness of a student must be

laid off, and the quiet deportment of a gentleman

put on, not merely to be worn as a garment, but to

become by use a part of myself. I believe I know

what true gentility -— genuine good breeding —- is.

Let me but live out what is within, and I am vain

enough to think that little of what is important

would be found wanting.

Although such reflections, such estimable resolutions,
are scarcely unique to one of Hayes’s position and era (similar
entries can be found in the diaries of Garfield and other con-
temporaries), they do reflect a prominent feature of his char-
ater, a primary motivating force in both his private and public
life: a preoccupation with exhibiting at all times and under
even the most trying circumstances "true gentility -- genuine
good breeding." This determination set him apart from many of
the period's so-called politicos and in the postwar era estab-
lished his kinship with the eastern-led reform element --
those of the genteel tradition. For many, this prominent
characteristic would enhance his attractiveness as a candi-
date for public office, eSpecially during an era marred by
political corruption and impropriety. It would also give a

gmteel, quasi-reform tone to his administrations at Columbus

amiibshington. On the other hand, while his "good breeding"

 

6Hayes Diary, Jan. 1, 1845, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, I, 162.

_D

1)
was advantageous to Hayes as lawyer, soldier or "capitalist",
it served to limit his effectiveness as a party leader, kept
his legislative achievements modest, and ultimately alienated
a goodly portion of the Republican party from him while he
occupied the White House. He became "a true gentleman", but
only partially fulfilled his political promise, perhaps be-
cause he lacked Garfield's instinct for politics, a character-
istic whose growth may have been atrOphied by Hayes's pre-
occupation with the "manners, morals, and feelings of a true
gentleman."

Like Hayes, Garfield completed his undergraduate work
with distinction. He graduated from Williams as one of its
best scholars and returned to Ohio to what appeared to be a
secure and untroubled position of leadership at Hiram. His
place was guaranteed, he seemed destined to make his mark as
an educator, and his eastern education and academic bias
promised to bring his smooth and steady advancement. But as
with Hayes at the same point in life some dozen years earlier,
this period of Garfield's life was by no means untroubled.
Certainly Garfield received more satisfaction from his teach-
ing than did Hayes from his first years as a lawyer, but he
1ms not wholly content with the role of a mere teacher. He
the a pusher, a man on the make and he soon had his eye on the

prhuﬂpalship of the Eclectic. Shortly after his return from

‘mllhmm he won that position, although the cost in terms of

14

broken friendships, suspicion and animosity was rather high.7
Not yet active in politics outside the Eclectic, his penchant
for church and campus politics nevertheless betrayed a growing
inclination toward such activity, and had since his Williams
years become considerably more interested in public questions.
But unlike Hayes, he was not naturally drawn toward politics
early in life; on the contrary, he had scorned such activity
until his Williams experience. And although the Reserve was
a hotbed of antislavery activity, Garfield could conclude after
some consideration that the "simple relation of master and
slave is not unchristian."8 Even as late as his departure for
Williams he appeared to have been largely unmoved by the great
sectional issue. He continued to see much in politics that
disturbed and repelled him, yet his interest was clearly emerg-
ing and we find him applauding the achievements of the young
Republican party. Thereafter, his commitment to the antislav-
ery cause and his interest grew apace.

One might argue that Garfield‘s bid for a political
office -— three years after his return to Hiram -- was a
natural development, although one in which his growing anti-
slavery sentiments acted as a catalyst, but his ambition, self-

confidence, gregariousness, fondness for speaking and debate

 

7During the contest for the principalship both Garfield
mm.Norman Dunshee, a veteran Eclectic teacher, had their
sumxnmers in the board of trustees and the college community.
Hmeovmg Dunshee and others accused Garfield of scheming to
Set the post and feelings ran high in both camps.

8Garfield Diary, Sept. 29, 1850, in Harry J. Brown and
Fmﬂerhm:D. Williams, eds., The Diary of James A. Garfield
(2 vols.; East Lansing, 1967). I, 60.

 

15

all pointed toward political activity well before the Williams
years. His success there as a campus leader, student editor,
debater and speaker suggested a broader and more secular
theatre of operations than that which continued to absorb his
energies and satisfy his ambitious nature. After returning to
Ohio, he initiated his break with past preoccupations by Speak-
ing for the Republican party in the Fremont campaign. During
the next two years, thanks to his preaching, some highly
successful debates with an advocate of spontaneous generation
and evolution, and his leadership and teaching at Hiram, he
became a familiar figure to a substantial number of the area's
residents. He also found himself hankering for public office.
This ambition, coupled with growing dissatisfaction with the
limited challenges and Opportunities offered the teacher-
administrator, led a group of friends who knew his mind to call
upon him to bid for the Republican nomination for state senator --
a race thrown wide-open by the death of the party's leading
candidate. This step was clearly in line with Garfield's
inclinations and after securing the blessing of Hiram's
trustees and teachers (support that was as important politi-
cally as it was for his peace of mind), he easily won the

prize. With a new goal before him, he charged toward it with
great energy and enthusiasm, betraying in the process his
tmwerful predisposition for the politician's life and satis-

fyhmgthose instincts that had heretofore found but temporary

amiinsufficient outlets.

HEB was a good year for Garfield and his fellow Ohio

Rﬂmblhmns. The returns gave him the election by a wide

16
margin and his party control of the statehouse, house and
senate. Although his career in the senate was cut short by
the Civil War, the experiences of his short stay at Columbus
were to have an unusually potent and pervasive influence on his
future. He was taken away from a familiar but confining envi-
ronment and thrust into a challenging and unfamiliar world
where his political mettle promptly would be tested. Garfield
proved that he had an aptitude for politics and soon appeared
at sufficient advantage to attract some attention from the
press, and more significantly, from two major political figures:
Salmon P. Chase and William Dennison, each of whom would have a
hand in shaping and forwarding his political career. He also
began to win some friends and allies within his own age group:
some were rising young politicians, some were newspapermen and
others were the behind the scenes workers who wanted no elective
post for themselves, but were indispensable to the office-
seeker. His brief stint in the senate also encouraged him to
consider taking a further step up the political ladder. The
young senator had not only demonstrated considerable skill on
the stump and in the senate chamber, but it was also apparent
that he possessed a talent that might be crucial to his advance-
ment: an instinct for politics.
Soon after his return to Ohio in 1845, Hayes had moved to
lower Sandusky (later Fremont) where his Uncle Sardis was a
mﬂidly established merchant and land speculator. Under his
‘mmle%3watchful eye, he established a partnership with another
Wmnglawyer and for the next two years vegetated while his

Pnunicelenguished, his health declined and his depression

17
deepened. His condition disturbed both Hayes and his family,
so much so that he turned to volunteer service in the Mexican
War as an attractive avenue of escape and recuperation. The
prOSpect of a military interlude was no mere passing fancy, and
after enlisting the aid of prominent friends he bid for a
lieutenancy in one of the companies being formed at Fremont.
His hopes were dashed when the two physicians whose counsel he
had promised to follow declared that such an adventure would be
a foolhardy move (one gave him no more than six weeks in the
Mexican climate). Therefore, the disappointed Hayes recharted
his course and spent a summer visiting relatives in New England.
He returned to Fremont considerably strengthened, but another
year of being mired in the same old ruts left him in such a
state that a rest and a change in climate seemed imperative.
SO it was that he and his uncle undertook a journey to the
Texas ranch of his Kenyon classmate and lifelong correspondent,
Gay Bryan. His diary and letters during this sojourn provide
ample evidence of the pleasant and restorative effects of
these months. What is more, young Hayes's glimpses of southern
civilization made a lasting impression that would color his
views of the South and Southerners for many years to come.
By the time he returned to Ohio, Hayes was convinced that

his health and general prospects required him to abandon

ITemont for a more promising and challenging locale. Cincinnati
wastﬁs choice. The bustling metropolitan atmosphere of the

‘QumuxCity' contrasted sharply with the dullness and pro-

‘ﬂnchﬂism of Fremont. This city, where North and South met

am.mhmﬂed, had fostered a lively social and cultural life

18

into which Hayes eagerly plunged. He joined a literary club,
went to lectures, attended church services and renewed his
friendship with several college chums who were on their way
to becoming established lawyers. As he put it in his diary,
he was "now living again as a student, with abundant leisure
and few cares. Why may I not, by a few hours spent in syste-
matic study, regain all I have lost in the last three or four
unfortunate years spent or wasted at the North?" But his
regrets were not easily or quickly removed despite the fact
that his professional prospects were looking up and his
personal problems receding. Nevertheless, he continued to
lament over the "waste of those five precious years at Sanduskyl
Shall I recover what I have lost?," he wondered.9

During his Cincinnati years he continued to strengthen his
intellectual resources and expand his social experience without
necessarily modifying his basic outlook and values. He read a
great deal, but not only in the law, for his reading ranged
over the areas of literature, history and philosophy and in-
cluded the further study of German. He apparently believed that
"Western lawyers, Cincinnati lawyers, do neglect too much what
is termed learning, scholarship. Let me read and reread the
best poets, as Shakespeare, Milton, Byron; the model prose

writers, or speakers rather, as Burke, Webster," he resolved.1O

 

9Hayes Diary, Jan. 25 and Jan. 31, 1850, in Williams, ed.,
Dung and Letters of Hayes, I, 279 and 280-81.

1OHayes Diary, Dec. 17, 1859, in Williams, ed., Diaryyand
Letters of Hayes, I, 546-

19

His use of "best" and "models" is revealing. Then, as later
in life, he was preoccupied with quality, character, excellence,
well identified and established authority -- the criteria he
might use to evaluate men, their opinions and their conduct.
This was useful to one whose social life continue to expand.
Once or twice each Sunday he attended church and he became an
active member of the Literary Club, where he enlarged his
acquaintance with prominent or soon to be prominent Cincinnatians,
among them several who would later hasten his political rise.
In order to forward himself professionally and improve his
public delivery, he frequently addressed Odd Fellows‘ meetings
and appeared as a moderate temperance Speaker. He also joined
in the political contests of the day, although he did not yet
display any inclination to become a candidate. His Literary
Club's sponsorship of a lecture program afforded him an ex-
cellent opportunity to hear, talk with and size up such notables
as Ralph Waldo Emerson. His impressions of this celebrated
figure are as interesting for whatthey reveal as to Hayes's
keen critical faculties as for what they say about Emerson.
He wrote thus:

He strikes me, contrary to my preconceived notions

of him, as a close, keen observer rather than a

profound thinker. There is no legic or method in

his essays or lectures. A syllogism he despises.

The force of a connected chain of reasoning his

mind seems incapable of appreciating. There is

no such thing as one of his thoughts following

from another. The natural result of this lack of

logic is that one finds it next to impossible to

grasp and hold fast to what he says. When you
leave the lecture-room you remember that he said
many witty, sensible, pretty, and some deep things,
but you feel at a loss where to begin in attempt-
ing to recall them. The whole lecture seems but

20

a bead-string of suggestions, fancies, ideas,

anecdotes, and illustrations, having no connection

except that they are upon the same subject. They

are all either quaint, paradoxical, sensible,

humorous, or have some other element which gives

them interest if no positive value.11

From a social and intellectual standpoint alone, it is
clear that the move to Cincinnati represented a wise, if
belated change. But Hayes's professional prospects also grew
brighter, although rather slowly. After almost a year in his
new location, we find Hayes writing deSpondently that "two
years must find me with a living and increasing busineSS or I
quit the city and probably the profession." However, this
brief period of dejection, magnified perhaps by the Fremont
fiasco, was followed by a steady upswing in his fortunes.
With the arrival of 1852, he could cheerfully write: "So be-
gins the new year. Rather prosperously with me. Money and
friends more abundant than ever." Hayes was on his way. Soon
he began to impress the members Of the bench and bar, particu-
larly for his work during the trial of a woman accused in a
sensational double murder. His defense of this obviously de-
ranged young woman before the Ohio State Supreme Court on
grounds of insanity won the reversal of a lower court decision
and what Hayes had fought for -- her confinement in a mental
institution rather than execution. Thereafter, Hayes was

associated in other important criminal and civil cases, and in

the most famous of these contests joined with Salmon Chase to

 

11Hayes to Fanny Flatt, June 12, 1850, in Williams, ed.,
Inary and Letters of Hayes, I, 313.

21

save a Negro girl from reenslavement. After five years in the
Queen City, he had achieved a large measure of success and an
enviable reputation among his peers that warranted this rather
smug diary entry: "I cannot but look back with a feeling of
gratification, not to say pride, I told Uncle Sardis that in
five years I believed that he and every other friend I had
would be glad that I had gone to Cincinnati. It is enough to
fill me with pleasant feeling that I am sure that my hope has
been realized." After the passage of another five years, he
had grown yet more contented and pleased with his achievements,
but no less concerned as to his respectability and public image.
"Without any extraordinary success," he wrote, "without that
Success which makes men giddy sometimes, I have nevertheless
found what I sought -- a respectable place. Good!"12

By this time Hayes had also become quite active in politi-
cal affairs, pursuing an interest that began with the campaign
of 1840 during his student days. From then On, although his
interest and involvement might fluctuate from campaign to
campaign, he remained a staunch Whig, eventually an anti-sla-
very Whig, until the birth of the Republican party. But
neither as an increasingly active anti-slavery Whig, nor as a
"charter member" of the Ohio Republican party, did he give the
impression that he would become more than a loyal party worker.

While his interest in political affairs was genuine and his

 

12Hayes Diary, Jan. 5, 1852; Dec. 25, 1854 and Dec. 24,
1859, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, I, 404;

475 and 547.

 

22

commitment to party strong, he brought a measure of aloofness
and disinterestedness to the political side of his life that
set him apart from the 'typical' party man. It was only
when the slavery problem emerged as the paramount issue that
one senses a change in Hayes's stance. "I was an earnest and
active Republican 'from the start‘," he would later recall,
"and aided in the organization of the party in Ohio in 1855.
An anti-slavery Whig before that date, I took no interest or
part in the Know Nothing movement to which I was opposed on
principle; but believing slavery one of the great evils and
crimes of the country, I enlisted in the first party which was
organized to oppose it with any prospect of success, with my
whole soul in the work."13

His interest in politics had quickened under the impact
of the growing slavery crisis, yet it was, as it would always
be, an activity that was tempered by a certain restraint and
governed by a priority system which was not open to amendment.
In his diary in the 1850's, he wrote: ". . . my sense of duty
determines me to keep on in the path I have chosen -- not to
dabble in politics at the expense of duty to my family and to
the neglect of my profession, but to do what I can consistent-
ly with other duties to aid in forming a public opinion on
this subject which will mitigate and finally eradicate the

evil." Although clearly recognizing that slavery was an evil,

 

13Quoted in Charles R. Williams, The Life of Rutherford
Birchard Hayes (2 vols; Boston, 1914), I, 106 n.

23

he was unable to respond solely on an emotional basis, his
character and scholarly bent demanding something more. It was
necessary to "study the subject," Hayes declared, and in so
doing he showed that he shared Garfield's inclination to exam-
ine a major issue with care before taking a public stand on it.14

Hayes made his debut as an office seeker in a successful
bid for the city solicitorship of Cincinnati in 1858. In that
year the City Council chose Hayes, the American party nominee,
to fill out the unexpired term of the recently deceased solici-
tor. Hayes was only one of several evenly matched candidates
for the post and the Council needed more than a dozen ballots
to reach its decision. Hayes began with a mere four votes, yet
he eventually secured eighteen votes and victory. What some
would call the Hayes luck had apparently begun to do its work.
Six months later he won the unanimous support of Cincinnati
Republicans for a full term as solicitor and emerged the win-
ner in an election in which he outpolled every other candidate
on his party's ticket. Soon there was talk of a position on
the state Supreme Court, but he quickly squelched such Specu-
lation. He was too content with the easy burden of his muni-
cipal post and his substantial law practice "not working hard,
not working much," he confided to his Uncle Sardis. "I earn
my salary, I am sure, and am therefore conscience clear. I
have read a good deal this winter -- more than usual -- some

history, some poetry, some religion, biography, and miscellaneous

 

14Hayes Diary, Oct. 30, 1856, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, I, 503-

24

matter; but no novels and no politics. I am intending to go
into politics and novels as soon as I finish three or four
books that I have now on hand. I never enjoyed life better."15

From this time on, as private citizen or office holder,'
Hayes maintained this well-ordered leisurely manner of living
that bespoke dignity, gentility and self-assurance. He had no
taste for the frantic pace in law, politics or business. He
had no wish to achieve "extraordinary" success as a lawyer,
only the assurance that he had the reSpect of his fellow law-
yers and citizens and a measure of financial security; there
was no inclination to emulate the style of his chief political
idol, Daniel Webster. Neither did he find a steady fare of
rancorous political exchanges, bitter partisan struggles, con-
spicuous bids for preference, shrewd manueverings and a pre-
occupation with patronage and expediency to his taste. The
atmosphere in which the professional politician flourished, his
techniques and tools, were not much to his liking. For the
refined young lawyer, public service promised to complement
neatly his professional activities, while in later years it
seemed to stem from a combination of noblesse oblige, the
challenge of a difficult contest, a hankering after the pres-
tige that accompanied high office, party loyalty and perhaps
the feeling that political preferment was a proper reward for
service rendered to country and party. Moreover, he seemed to

view an elective office as an end in itself (a garment to be

 

15Hayes to Sardis Birchard, Feb. 4, 1860, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, I, 551.

25
carelessly worn and then cheerfully shucked), as much as a
means to an end. He retained a strong sense of duty, but once
in office the law of diminishing returns soon began to operate,
his enthusiasm flagged as he tired of his public and party
responsibilities and became increasingly uneasy about the pos-
sible besmirchment of his reputation by subordinates in whom he
had placed his trust. Whether he was a congressman, governor
or president, he was soon yearning for the pleasures and free-
dom of private life.

As the nation drifted closer to war, one finds Hayes cam-
paigning perfunctorily for Lincoln, but clearly disturbed over
his candidate's chances for a clear-cut victory. "I cannot get
up much interest in the contest. A wholesome contempt for
Douglas, on account of his recent demagoging, is the chief
feeling I have," he confessed.16 But as Ohio's October elec-
tions neared, he became a more active and enthusiastic cam—
paigner. His party's showing in the states voting in October
removed some of his doubts as to victory in November, but they
were quickly replaced by a growing concern over the Iultra
South' and the threat of secession in response to a Republican
triumph. If South Carolina and a few more states broke away,
Hayes speculated in his diary, would other slave states event-
ually follow suit or would the "influence of the conservative
States draw back into the Union or hold in the Union the ultra

States? I think the latter. But at all events I feel as if

 

1OHayes to Sardis Birchard, Sept. 30, 1860, in Jilligmg,
93-, Diary and Letters of Hayes, I, 504.

26
the time has come to test the question. If the threats are
meant, then it is time the Union was dissolved or the traitors
crushed out."17 By this time, Garfield had settled on the
second of these alternatives, but his strong Unionist senti-
ments notwithstanding, Hayes clung to the hope of a peaceful
adjustment of sectional differences as 1860 drew to a close.
By the beginning of the new year he had put such hopes behind
him and concluded that secession and a civil war were within
sight; nevertheless he feared "disunion and war less than
compromise." The nation could survive these blows and if
necessary the free states could carry on by themselves and would
make "a glorious nation," he concluded. "I do not feel gloomy
when I look forward," this diary entry continues. "The reality
is less frightening than the apprehension which we have all had
these many years. Let us be temperate, calm, and just, but
firm and resolute. Crittenden's compromise! NO, no."18 A few
weeks later he repeated the belief, shared by other moderates,
that the seceded states might well be allowed to depart in
peace and that such a solution would not "prove that the ex-
periment of popular governmentis a failure," but rather that
"the experiment of uniting free and slaveholding States in one
nation is, perhaps, a failure. Freedom and slavery can, per-

haps, not exist side by side under the same popular government.

 

17Hayes Diary, Nov. 6, 1860, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, I, 566.

‘8Hayes Diary, Jan. 4, 1861, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, II, 2.

27

There probably is an 'irrepressible conflict' between freedom
and slavery."19 As a member of the citizens' committee to
escort Lincoln to Cincinnati on his way to be inaugurated,
Hayes declared himself pleased with Lincoln's moderate and
wary attitude, his unwillingness to be drawn into either a
"radical" position on the slavery issue deSpite pressure from
Cincinnati Germans or toward a compromise on the extension of
slavery as others urged. "This gave me great satisfaction,"
he recorded, for Lincoln's combination of strength, patience,
moderation and kindness was consistent with what Hayes would
continue to admire in public servants and seek to embody in
his own public career.2O

Although the Republican party secured the White House as
a result of the 1860 contest, they were beaten in many a local
contest during the spring of 1861. So it was in Cincinnati,
where faced with a coalition of Democrats and Know-Nothings,
Hayes anticipated the failure of his bid for a second full term
as city solicitor. He accepted his defeat philosophically and
took comfort in the fact that he had, nevertheless, polled the
largest vote of any Republican on the municipal ticket. More-
over, a letter to his Uncle Sardis just prior to the poll re-

veals what became the typical Hayes attitude toward public

office. He wrote as follows:

 

19Hayes Diary, Jan. 27, 1861, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, II, 4.

2OHayes to Sardis Birchard, Feb. 15, 1861, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, II, 5-6.

28

"I have got out of the office pretty much all the good
there is in it -- reputation and experience. If I quit now, I
shall be referred to as the best, or one of the best Solicitors,
the city has had. If I serve two years more, I can add nothing
to this. I may possibly lose."21 He was attracted to politics,
yet scarcely in the fashion of a typical politician and office-
seeker. This and much higher offices would give him a chance
to serve, to fulfill an obligation he sincerely felt was his,
but public offices were more significantly a means by which
one's reputation and prestige might be enhanced in a socially
and personally acceptable manner, a valuable experience that one
should seek, but always with gentlemanly good taste and bearing.
To gain an office in such a way (at least to be convinced of
this in his own mind), seemed almost more significant than
gaining the office itself. And then there was that nagging fear
that he would not get through his term in office without injury
tohis reputation despite his own exemplary conduct. A clean
rumrd is important to most officeholders, but with Hayes it
‘wmsof paramount significance and seemingly as crucial as what
jheachieved while occupying the office. Few of his contemporar-

ieSere as sensitive as he was on this point.

The coming of the Civil War touched off a chain of events

21Hayes to Sardis Birchard, March 29, 1861, in Williams,
9d” Diary and Letters of Hayes, II,-7.

29

in which both Hayes and Garfield were caught up -- events
which reshaped and influenced them in a deep and lasting fashion.
The fall of Sumter convinced Garfield that "a long and sangui-
nary war"22 must follow, a war that could not and should not
"stop short of complete subjugation."23 Soon he was using all
his "leisure time in reading military science and the cam-
paigns of Napoleon and Wellington." But his attention was not
focused solely on the war and soldiering -— he was also contem-
plating the next step in his political ascent. Just before
declaring his interest in Napoleon and Wellington, he had told
his wife: "If I should go to Congress we would move there for
the winter. (Isn't this a fine specimen of unhatched chicken?)"24
He never succeeded in divorcing himself from his powerful
political ambitions -- perhaps never wished to -- and thus his
military history would be deeply colored and significantly
shaped by political considerations.

Although Garfield was quick to offer Governor Chase his
'rervices in any capacity he may see fit to appoint me," he
lmrdly intended to begin his military service as less than a

mﬂonel; indeed his hopes leaped as high as brigadier general.25

 

22Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, April 14, 1861, in
Wﬂiiams, ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 7.

23Garfield to Harry Rhodes, April 14, 1861, in Williams,
ed” Wild Life of the Army, p. 6.

24Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, April 14, 1861, in
Wﬂlhmm, ed., Wild Life ogﬁthe Army, p. 8.

25Garfield to Harry Rhodes, April 17, 1861, in Williams,
ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 9.

50

He also viewed the time he would spend in the army as a service
to the Union and to himself as well, a sound investment that
might pay handsome dividends in the political arena before
the conflict was settled. With this in mind, he declared that
should he enter the army, "he ought to have at least as high a
position as a staff officer."26 Garfield’s initial campaign
for the command of a volunteer regiment being raised in his
neighborhood ended in frustration, although surely not because
of any coyness on his part. After several months had passed,
during which he turned down an appointment as a lieutenant
colonel, he accepted a commission at this rank in a regiment
that was still to be raised. In commenting upon this decision,
he wrote to his mother that his "reasons for going into the
army . . . (were) many, but chiefly because the men of mili-
tary experience were most all now in the service, and still
more were needed for the new regiments. The Governor wrote
to me again and I felt it would not be manly or honorable for
me to stay away from the contest longer." He added that he
'hid not go from any mere desire to be in battle and gain a
name," yet one is tempted to say that he was engaging in just
a bit of self-deception in this regard.27

The task of filling the ranks of his paper regiment, the

Emmy-second Ohio Infantry, fell to Garfield and his energy

 

26Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, May 5, 1861, in Williams,
ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 13.

27Garfield to Eliza Garfield, Aug. 30, 1861, in Williams,
ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 33.

 

31

and talents (well suited to such an undertaking) brought it to
a successful conclusion after three months of concentrated
labor. He then threw himself into the chore of readying him-
self and his men for the field and his energetic approach soon
paid off in a well-trained and equipped regiment whose affec-
tion he had won through an even-handed and sympathetic hand-
ling of his troops. He also set about preparing himself, as
would many another green citizen-soldier, by studying the
works of the masters of military science who had shaped the
tactics of his professional fellow officers. His lack of pro-
fessionalism was perhaps not without its advantages, for he
was less susceptible to the sometimes stultifying influence of

military school preparation. As a well qualified judge of his
military achievement puts it:

At a time when the nation's ranking military offi-
cers brimmed with maxims expounded in Henri Jomini's
Precis de l'art de la guerre and placed particular
emphasis on the conquest of territory, Garfield in-
sisted that the true objective of an army was the
destruction of the enemy's army. To save the Union,
he believed it was necessary to subjugate the South,--
not by taking her cities, girdling her with expeditions,
or blockading her ports, but by pulverizing her great
armies. To achieve that goal he appreciated the
importance of concentrating against the foe, using
surprise tactics, and making adequate provision for
security; but above all he stressed the efficacy of
Offensive operations. By word and deed he left little
room to doubt his faith in the offensive as the king
of the battlefield. In his campaign in Eastern
Kentucky his was the aggressor force; in the Shiloh-
Corinth campaign, in which he had no independent
command, he deplored the snail-paced advance of the
Union armies; as Chief of Staff in the Army of the
Cumberland he urged his commander to strike, strike,
strike; and from the opening gun he insisted that

‘um Union must wage a war of conquest. For an

amateur soldier he showed remarkable understanding

 

32

of the nature of the military challenge the nation
faced and of what was needed to meet it.28

As a unit of the Army of the Ohio, Garfield began cam-
paigning in eastern Kentucky in the winter of 1861, eventually
as the commander of the Eighteenth Brigade. AS he put it
revealingly, General Don Buell, his commander, "said (and I
fully agree with him) that he would much have preferred to have
me with him in the grand column, but yet he said I would have
a much greater chance for distinction."29 As in the case of
Hayes, who was then serving in western Virginia, he was par-
ticipating in a side show, the outcome of which would have
little effect on operations in the major theatres. Neverthe-
less, if Garfield's victory here in January 1862, over an
Opposing force of Confederates in the Sandy Valley was of
limited significance as a part of the larger picture, it
brought him rewards commensurate with a victory of major pro-
portions. Not only did he receive congratulations from the
commander of the Army of the Ohio, but he was also praised by
General George McClellan. The press, especially that of Ohio,
yes most generous in its treatment of his exploits and he him-
mﬂf was scarcely self-effacing while giving his correspondents
aihll survey of his work in the Sandy Valley. Within two
wake of his victory, the ambitious young colonel received

(Umnks in part to the efforts of friends as highly placed as

 

28Williams, ed., Wild Life of the Army, xvi-xvii.

29Garfield to Harry Rhodes, Dec. 17, 1861, in Williams,
ed., Wild Life of the Army, pp. 49-50.

 

33
Secretary of the Treasury Chase) what he craved most of all and

believed he had earned -- the rank of brigadier general. He

was now equipped in terms of prestige and title with that which

could and would in the near future lift him on to the national
political stage and influence his political fortunes for the
next twenty years. Surely he was cognizant of how easily he
could serve both his political future as well as the cause of
the Union without hypocrisy or the appearance of self-serving
and those interested in his political advancement were quick
to remind him of this fact. With but minimal effort on his
part, Garfield, the politician-soldier, could watch his stock
rise with each properly publicized blow he struck against the
forces of disunion and slavery. Hayes was not blind to such
facts, but as we will see, he was more than content with his
military duties and quite willing to wait until the war's end
before trading his command for a seat in Congress.

During the spring and summer of 1862 Garfield saw further
action at Shiloh, Corinth and in northern Alabama as a part of
Ihmll's army, but despite the significance of these campaigns,
km grew increasingly discontented and restless, a condition
‘Hmt was aggravated by deteriorating health. As early as mid-
February, we find him complaining to his wife that he had "for
aihw days been feeling more depressed than at any time since"
cunning the army. "For many reasons," the letter continues,

'memwmal to myself, I have been feeling that I would be glad
tobecmt of the perplexities of war and enter again the

haunts of peace, but I am perfectly aware that a few weeks

 

54
of quiet would make me desirious of being in the strife again."33
Garfield told one correspondent: "I sometimes think I should
like to be in my old seat again, but if I were I suppose I
should pine for the activity of the field." Such fretfulness
frequently visited him if he suspected that his upward course
had hit a snag, was about to be reversed, or if the prospects
Of further advancement in his present line of endeavor had
dimmed. To Garfield, the military direction offered by the
President and his chief professional and non-professional com-
manders alike appeared shot through with serious flaws. He
complained of "the constant, timid croaking of a lot of officers
who (are) not willing to risk anything for the sake of success."51
IUrthermore, he suspected the West Pointers among them of
secretly harboring treasonous pro-slavery sentiments. "My
heart and hOpe have been down in the depths since I came here
(Tennessee)," he wrote. "I find an attempt so persistent and
almost universal that I have come to believe there is something
amounting to a conspiracy among the leading officers, especially
those of the regular army, to taboo the whole question of anti-
wavery and throw as much discredit on it as upon treason." He
fmmd himself “coming nearer and nearer to downright abolition-
imﬂ and declared: "Before God I here second my conviction that

thespirit of slavery is the soul of this rebellion, and the

 

30Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, Feb. 15, 1862, in
Wulhmm, ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 68.

31Garfield to Wallace Ford, Feb. 14, 1862, in Williams,
edu Wild Life of the Army, p. 67.

 

35

incarnate devil which must be cast out before we can trust in
any peace as lasting and secure. It may be a part of God's
plan to lengthen out this war till our whole army has been
sufficiently outraged by the haughty tyranny of proslavery
Officers and the spirit of slavery and slaveholders with whom
they came in contact . . ."32

Garfield's growing political ambitions also served to up-
set him, for he imagined his chances of winning a seat in
Congress were threatened as the public's attention shifted away
from mere brigade leaders and centered on his superiors in
Buell's army. He found his "position . . . in some respects
very unpleasant" and lamented thus: "I don't feel as though I
can personally accomplish much where I am, but yet will try."33
His spirits seemed to rise, however, when friends at home urg-
ing him to bid for the Republican nomination from his district.
He confessed that he "should be pleased to take part in the
legislation of the next few years. If the people should of
their own motion see fit to call me to that place, of course I
Should be greatly pleased. . ."34 After hearing more of the
nmvement to secure his nomination he wrote home as follows:
'H.am free to confess that I would like to be a member of the

naﬂzone (Congress). Please write me more about it. If the

 

32Garfield to Harry Rhodes, May 1, 1862, in Williams,
ed”,Wild Life of the Army, pp. 89-90.

33Garfield to Harry Rhodes, May 1, 1862, in Williams,
wu,iﬂld Life of the Army, p. 90.

34Garfield to Harry Rhodes, May 19, 1862, in Williams,
ed., mid Life of the Army, p. 98.

36

people of the district should see fit to elect me of their own
choice, I shall be gratified." As if in anticipation of the
kind of criticism sure to come his way, he quickly added: "I
remember to have promised Almeda (Booth, a close friend) not
to use the military as a stepping stone to political prefer-
ment, and I shall make no effort. But if the people want me,
they can say so even if I should not be out of the army till
December."35

Within two weeks Garfield's unhappiness with his present
prospects as a part of the Army of the Ohio had so increased
that he could unburden himself to Harry Rhodes, one of his
chief political boosters in this way:

. . . I do not feel comfortable in (the) present
surroundings. You have divined the situation per-
fectly. While a battle was imminent, I felt my
duty to meet the issue was paramount to every other
consideration. If now the war in the west is sub-
stantially ended, and its future operations are to
consist of holding positions here and there, and
keeping down guerillas (precisely what Hayes seem-
ed contented to do), then I shall feel that I can
much better serve the country in some other capacity.
Let the war be what it may, if I am to serve under
such a weak and narrow man as I now obey, I shall
feel that I am doing the country but little good
and myself but little credit. I confess freely
(that) as a matter of choice I would greatly pre-
fer a seat in Congress to my place in the army, or
indeed to any place which West Point management
will be ligely to assign me. So much for my‘yyg-
ferences.3

ButGarfield also recognized that any move on his part to

 

3’5Garfield to Harry Rhodes, May 28, 1862, in Williams,
ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 104.

36June 10, 1862, in Williams, ed., Wild Life of the Army,
P.112.

 

37

reach toward his political goal would surely be misunderstand
and might be his undoing. "I believe I entered the service
with patriotic motives," the restless and troubled volunteer
protested to Rhodes, "and in good faith, and with no small
struggle made in offering of myself. I cannot for a moment
think of taking any course which may even by inference throw
a shadow of suSpicion upon those motives as being for political
or demagogical purposes. And should I resign, go home and seek
the nomination to Congress, it seems to me that the whole year's
work would be miscontrued."37 He explained his position to
another close friend and political mentor, Harmon Austin:

"To remain in the army and follow the military as

a profesion was never any part of my plan. I have

always intended and still intend to resign my com-

mission as soon as the active work of the war is

done. It seems to me that the successful ending of

the war is the smaller of the two tasks imposed up-

on the government. There must be a readjustment of

our public policy and management. There will spring

up out of this war a score of new questions and new

dangers. The settlement of these will be of even

more vital importance than the ending of the war."
Zﬁmt is more, Garfield continued, "I do not hesitate to tell
youthat I believe I could do some service in Congress in that
Work,and I should prefer that to continuing in the army."38
Hjjseyes were already focused on the exciting and critical

work 0f reconstruction.

At this point, Garfield's worsening health came to his

37June 10, 1862, in Williams, ed., Wild Life of the Army,
p. 112.

38June 25, 1862, in Williams, ed., Wild Life of the Army,
P.1153-

38
rescue, and following the advice of his doctor he took a leave
which brought him home in time to mend both his health and his
political fences. It was during his convalescence that the
Republicans of his district met to fill out their ticket. With
an ailing, but ambitious candidate close at hand, his allies
and advocates prepared for their contest to block the nomina—
tion of the incumbent. Meanwhile, Garfield remained true to
the tradition or superstition that the office must seek the man
and like Hayes and others of this persuasion, he was equally
dependent on the open and energetic efforts of intimates who
knew their man's carefully concealed aSpirations. Unlike the
other five candidates for the nomination, he did not appear
at the convention, but his disinterested posture may well have
been an asset rather than a liability. His military accom-
plishments were still fresh in the minds of Western Reserve
residents who were likewise familiar with him as a teacher,
ImeaCher and sometime state senator, whose now powerfully held
anti-slavery sentiments would strike a sympathetic chord among
Emmy in this longtime hotbed of abolitionism. He won the
nonhmtion by a slim majority and only after a hot and pro-
tlmcted struggle. A seat in the next Congress was now assured,
butluahad mixed feelings about the prospects of holding such
an office, confessing that he scarcely knew "whether to be
sad or gratified." He predicted that the next four years in
mmgiwess would "probably be as fatal to political longevity
astﬂle 'war is to personal life and health." "I would not,

-mWeV131?," he went on to say, "wish to be cowardly and Shirk

39

the responsibility of thinking and acting because the times
are dangerous. So I shall try the rough sea, if the bullets
will let me alone."39 Congressional life would prove a "rough
sea", but he was probably exaggerating its dangers a bit in
order to forestall those who might accuse him of abandoning
the battlefield for a safer and more secure line of endeavor.

Of more immediate importance, however, was his as yet
uncompleted military obligation -- an obligation he was honor
bound to complete, although hopefully somewhere other than in
the Army of the Ohio. At this point his dilemma was resolved
by a call to Washington by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton for
reassignment, a development in which one sees the hand of his
friend Salmon Chase. Thus it was that Garfield reached
ihshington well before he had expected to, where circumstances
kept him unassigned, but with a promise of another promotion,
fbr four months. At last he was in the center of things, the
imuse guest and protege of Salmon Chase, brought into contact
iﬁth leaders in all walks of life, intrigued by a capital
seaming with political tensions while the nation's leaders
stmmgled deSperately to repair their faltering war machine.
IieimS in his element: dipping into national politics, excited
by'its most seductive features, power, prestige, challenge and
ferment, but as yet unmindful of the heavy toll exacted from
those who became professional politicians. Perhaps this in-

‘eruChe completed his break with Hiram's world (it was a

‘

‘i

39Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Sept. 12, 1862, in Williams,

ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 135.

4O
seperation; never a divorce) and set him upon the path he
would thereafter follow.

But if Garfield found much pleasure and excitement in
Washington, such rewards were a good deal offset by his mount-
ing uneasiness and frustration as one proposed assignment
after another failed to materialize. Nevertheless, deep as
was his concern with his own future it was overshadowed by
the pessimism he felt for the cause with which his fortunes
were linked. From Washington he wrote in October 1862: "If
the Republic goes down in blood and ruin, let its obituary be
written thus: 'Died of West Point.1 Unless help comes soon,
that ignominious death will stare us in the face. For myself,
I say in all sincerity I have no wish to survive this republic
. . . I am passing through a terrible ordeal of personal
suffering over the whole matter. I cannot believe I shall be
kept here much longer. The first day I came Stanton offered
um Western Virginia (Hayes's theatre) but I resolved I would
not Choose but let them put me where they pleased."40 He was
smmmhat cheered by the size of his majority in his congress-
iomﬂ.contest, which he thought was "the largest majority of
anyomain.any state, so far as I have seen." But a proposed
(unantion against Charleston in which he was to have a prom-

inent role was held up and he was soon longing to return to

‘40Garfield to Harry Rhodes, Oct. 5, 1862, in Williams,
ed, WiLLd Life of the Army, pp. 153-54.

41

Ohio. This, however, was out of the question for he "could
not bear to be seen home again without having been in the field
first," he confessed.41 Then as his Washington stay dragged on
into the new year, concern over the possible need to resign his
seat in Congress because of his military status was added to
his growing list of worries. Finally, after four months of
frustration, he was sent west to join General William Rosecrans's
Army of the Cumberland for what would be his last tour of duty.

Rosecrans sized up his man with great care over a period
of some weeks and apparently pleased with what he found, offer-
ed him the post of chief of staff or a division command.
Garfield's decision was complicated by his election to Congress,
for as an aspiring politician he sensed the impact his choice
might have upon his future. He elected to take the staff
position, but he did not rest easy with his decision, for now
his military reputation would tend to rise or fall with that
(H his commander. He put the matter thus before making his
decision: "By taking that position I should make a large in-
-vmﬁmmnt in General Rosecrans, and will it be wise to risk so
;mudistock in that market." As chief of staff, and one who
jhopmito be "a kind of alter ego"42 to his commander, Garfield

Warsfavorably situated to "go to work thoroughly and vigorously

 

41Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, Nov. 16, 1862, in
Milieuns, ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 180.

42Garfield to Harry Rhodes, Feb. 14, 1863, in Williams,
ed, WiILd Life of the Army, p. 234.

42
to make as much out of this army" as he could.43 Indeed, his
commitment to a strategy of modern warfare, his decision to
take his seat in Congress a year hence ("I would like to help
fight the wild beasts in that Ephesus.") and his anxiety over
his reputation and possible disqualification, dictated prompt
and decisive action against Bragg's Tennessee forces. But
Rosecrans's procrastination and the timidity of his fellow
officers bedeviled Garfield, who in a mood of despair declared
that on the eve of a well-planned and apparently acceptable
offensive "there seemed to fall down upon the leading officers
Of this army as suddenly as a bolt from the blue a most deter-
mined and decided opinion that there ought to be no immediate
or early advance. Officers who to my certain knowledge were
restless and impatient for a forward movement became suddenly
conservative and cautious, and think masterly inactivity the
chiefest of virtues."44 Finally, late in June 1863, the Union
forces began a series of actions which by summer's end had
inested Tennessee from Confederate hands. Thus far Garfield's
"investment” in Rosecrans was paying belated, but handsome
diﬂidends. However, the chief of staff was only temporarily
alumased; he was soon unhappy again over Rosecrans's failure
to ﬂﬂlbw up his recent victories. In a letter to his power-

ful friend Salmon Chase, he criticized the delay that had

 

‘IBGarfield to Lucretia Garfield, Feb. 26, 1863, in
Mllialns, ed., Wild Life of the Army, p. 240.

44Garfield to Harry Rhodes, June 11, 1863, in Williams,
ed., Wild Life of the Arm , pp. 275-76.

43

preceded the recent victorious campaign and carefully explained
that his pleas for "most vigorous activity" had fallen upon
deaf ears. He should, he said, ”never cease to regret the sad
delay which lost us so great an opportunity to inflict a mortal
blow upon the center of the rebellion." Worse still, the Army
of the Cumberland was again inactive, he complained, and so
far Rosecrans had "been singularly disinclined to grasp the
situation with a strong hand and make the advantage his own."
Garfield protested that although he loved "every bone" in his
commander's body, yet he was forced to confess that "even the
breadth of . . . (his) love . . . (was) not sufficient to cover
this almost fatal delay" in following up their recent victory
over Bragg. When Rosecrans began his tardy advance he encoun-
tered a powerful Confederate counteroffensive at Chickamauga
1mich forced him to retreat to Chattanooga. The Union's
summer successes were now.partially annulled. Tennessee re-
mained in Union hands, but the Confederate army had not only
escaped destruction, it had bounced back to rout what Garfield
hadcmlled "in many reSpects by far the best (army) the coun-
tryims ever known."45

The reversal at Chickamauga, throughout which Garfield
had labored wisely and heroically, led to Rosecran's dismissal.
Garfield, on the other hand, was left with an improved military
imputation and a promotion to major general. His personal

nmutzttion was somewhat tarnished, however, for one day he

‘

7—

45Garfield to Solomon Chase, June 27, 1863, in Williams,
at, Tfj.J.d Life of the Army, pp. 289-90-

44

would be blamed for his chief's dismissal. He had begun to
criticize his chief as a military leader under the influence
of his growing frustration prior to the opening of the battles
that had won Tennessee for the Union. Next he took his case
to Chase on the eve of the offensive that ended at Chickamauga.
This reversal simply underscored Garfield's critique of his
commander and gave his strictures unexpected weight and prom-
inence. Through Chase this letter had reached Lincoln where
it became a part of the growing body of criticism of Rosecrans,
criticism that undermined him with the administration and con-
tributed to his dismissal. To some degree, Garfield's conduct
in this affair was but the culmination of more than two years
of persistent and outSpoken attacks on West Point leadership
and views. Apparently, he also believed that as a congressman-
elect he was obliged to prod his fellow officers into action
imile exposing what he considered costly and inescusable delays
tum blunders. He did so in letters and conversations so timed
and worded as to enhance and protect his reputation. Moreover,
aslﬂs time in the field grew shorter, his frustration grew
promntionately. Golden Opportunities to crush the enemy
appmned, yet he and the Union were denied the fruits of a de-
cisiwavictory because his associates allowed them to pass
unexploited in spite of his pleas for prompt action.

While Garfield's letter and subsequent interviews with
Suntcul and Lincoln did not decide Rosecrans's fate (except in

HM egress of the commander's strongest partisans), they stand

a8reggI‘ettable, perhaps indefensible, acts on the part of a

45
presumably loyal subordinate and trusted friend. Moreover,
this affair is illustrative of a recurring and troublesome
problem concerning Garfield's character as it was seen by con-
temporaries whose opinions can not be dismissed out of hand.
Such widely separated but comparable incidents as his success-
ful bid for the principalship of the Eclectic, the dismissal
of Rosecrans, and his role in the struggle for the GOP nomina-
tion in 1880 reveal an inordinate ambition, a nagging sense of
insecurity and a bent toward scheming and intrigue that he
could not always restrain or mask. On such occasions he was
led to employ the tactics of an opportunist, tactics that
implied a certain insensitivity to the possible consequences
cm his conduct and raised painful questions in the minds of
some participants and observers in regard to his personal
integrity and moral courage. An introspective man, Garfield
was probably alert to such flaws in his character; possibly he
11ad them in mind when he wrote the following lament to an
iyﬁﬁmate friend in 1862:
It (his development) has been a sad task, pain-
fully toiled at, and with but poor success. Hardly
a day passes in which I do not find sad traces of
the 17 years" chaos; hardly a day when some fortu-
nate young son of early opportunities does not make
me feel my inferiority to him in things whereof I
lament, but must always lament. Such experiences
.make me feel a sympathy with Spartacus.
Reduce the questions of life to fight, storm,
on? any main strength operations and Spartacus and
.I can stand up erect. Possumus esse reges (we can
1363 kings), but in the thousand little things of
lnimie, in the under—currents of the soul that should
flow in the channels of virtue and high-minded royal
11(3110r, how sadly weak and inferior I feel. I can
ELIJJj.dO, by the sheer brute force of outer sense and

.IreeILigious obligation, keep myself in the path of
IIICDZFality and public respect, but it does not come

 

46
to me as an easy natural current whose fountain was
opened in the far-off years of youth and whose flowery
banks have become the sweet Eden of my life. I must
do with a gladiator‘s strength what those thrice
fortunate souls (Hayes, for example?) cogéd do as a
matter of fixed habit from sweet chOIce.
Unfortunately, Garfield's censors were reenforced in their View
of his shortcomings by his occasional but honest ambivalence
in matters of public policy. Understandable, even laudable in
retrospect, his moments of indecision or wavering would lead
Hayes to record in 1883 that Garfield was "not firm, not a
moral force. He leaned on other -- could not face a frowning
imrld; his habits suffered from Washington life. His course
at various times when trouble came betrayed weakness." Hayes
concluded by declaring that his "vacillation when leading the
Ibuse, place him in another list from Lincoln, Clay, Sumner,
au.the other heroes of our civil history."47
For the moment, however, all was well with Garfield. His
,services at Chickamauga had won him a major generalship and
slnutly after that battle he had received orders that relieved
llinlof his military responsibilities. He and his recent com-
Inanderwere still fast friends and the latter was most compli-
mentary as he reluctantly freed him for duty in the coming
session of Congress. His anxiously sought after and jealously

gmrnded military reputation secure, he now faced the pleasant

imaapeCIt of a reunion with family and friends before testing

k

‘iéscsarfield to Harry Rhodes, Nov. 19, 1862, in Williams,
ed” Ifﬁ_3Ld.Life of the Army, pp. 181-82.

_ ‘4“77riayes Diary, Feb. 21, 1883, in Williams, ed., Diary
wetters of Hayes, IV, 110.

47
his mettle on the legislative battleground.

At this moment, Hayes was still deeply involved in a con-
test with the Confederates in West Virginia, where he served
throughout most of the war. Along with many other Cincinnatians
he had received Lincoln's call for volunteers with "unbounded
enthusiasm" and a sense of relief. He contributed the reso-
lutions for the city's major rally while personally rejoicing
in the new militancy and unity. "We are all for war," he told
his Uncle Sardis, and he liked it, for "anything is better than

the state of things we have had for the last few months. ."43

Perhaps his happiness was enhanced by the fact that here was a
golden opportunity for the military adventure he still yearned
for as well as an excuse to leave a profession that was be-
gnning to lose its attractiveness. He had come to feel that
Hm law denied him some of the independence he demanded, and
perhaps he also believed that the point of diminishing returns
11ad been reached insofar as its rewards were concerned. More-
oTﬂﬂ3 he had lost his position as city solicitor when he and
‘tzuaentire Republican slate had gone down to defeat in a recent
(gity’election. He was leaning toward a closer association with
his uncle in Fremont, a development that the latter was anxious

to effect. But the opening shots of the Civil War changed all

0f thiis and Hayes, while resisting the temptation to volunteer

‘

48Iiayes Diary, May 10, 1861 and Hayes to Sardis Birchard,

Audi 1 ES, 1861, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,
II: 16 and 9-

48
at once, took the lead in organizing and directing a drill
company drawn from his Literary Club. By mid-May he had
reached his decision. It was his belief, he announced, that
"this was a just and necessary war and that it demanded the
whole power of the country; that I would prefer toggo into it
if I knew ;_was to die, or be killed in the course of it, than
to live through and after it without taking any_part in it."49
In this struggle, Hayes declared some two months later, "I '
could not feel contented if I were not in some way taking part
in it. I should feel about myself as I do about people who
lived through the Revolution, seeing their neighbors leaving
home, but doing nothing themselves -- a position not pleasant

to occupy."50

 

Hayes entered the service of the Union as a major in the

 

hmnty-third Ohio Volunteer Infantry in June of 1861 and did
net resign his commission until four years later. The Twenty-
-third was a three year or duration outfit, whose officers
(Garfield might have been one) were appointed by the Governor,
Emilliam Dennison, rather than being elected by the troops.
111KB Garfield, Hayes was without military training or experi-
ence, but made good use of the available literature to repair
his deficiencies. He obviously relished the work of organi-

zatioziyand training and soon won the affection of the men

‘QSQEMyes Diary, May 15, 1861, in Williams, ed., Diary and
.Letters of Hayes, II, 17.

5OHayes to Sardis Birchard, July 21, 1861, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, II, 39.

_

49

serving under him. At the very outset of his service, he was
under the command of the man with whom Garfield completed his
tour of duty, William Rosecrans. It was late in July when
Hayes's regiment moved out of Ohio and into western Virginia
to replace departing short term troops in the work of holding
territory, protecting railroads and routing a sizeable force

of guerrilas. He found himself limited to such minor opera-
tions for the better part of the war, although he would dis-
tinguish himself in two major actions: the Antietam campaign,
in which he was wounded in the battle of South Mountain, and

in Philip Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley in 1864.
Although Hayes was anxious to test himself under fire, this
experience was denied to him for several months when Rosecrans
appointed him adjutant general. But eventually he requested
mm received a fighting assignment in which his gallant leader-
tmﬂp and daring won him a promotion to lieutenant colonel --
ga.rank he considered more prestigious than those brigadier-
,skﬂps handed out as political rewards. He had good reason to
beﬂjeve that this and later promotions were earned on the battle-
;field and could not, therefore, be impugned. When he was event-
ually'elevated to major general near the war's end, he was
certain that he had paid for his laurels in full on the
battleafields of "the divinist war ever waged."51

Jllsthough Hayes "spent most of his war years in . . . West

thi11:121, a kind of pocket away from the main conflict, where

X

5 1Hayes Diary, Feb. 25, 1887, in Williams, ed., Diary
%Letters of Hayes, IV, 312.

O

K )7

reputations were hard to make," he retained a bouyant Spirit

and an optimistic and cheerful outlook despite conditions that

would have set Garfield to grumbling.52 Even when his duties

as adjutant general kept him from what he craved, Hayes was

still delighted with life in the army. "I think," a letter to

his sister's husband ran, "I have
my life as much as the last three
ships, separation from family and
notion that I am doing what every

to do, leaving the agreeable side

never enjoyed any period of
months. The risks, hard-

friends are balanced by the
man, who possibly can, ought

of things as clear profit."55

In contrast to Garfield's frequent bouts with illness and per-

sistent miseries, he believed he "was never healthier" in his

life than during these years. When he heard of newspaper re-

ports of suffering among the tr00ps, he testily declared they

imre "exaggerated." "The truth is," he said, "it is a rare

thing for a good soldier to find much cause for complaint."54

iﬂubughout his army years, in both letters and diary, one

;finds.him employing a cheerful tone and laudatory adjectives

130 describe situations that others must have painted in dark-

eI-cxﬂors. What is more, in battle it seemed to his comrades

that he led a charmed life as he escaped death time and again

despite the unusual risks he took while leading his men. He

ESEWD. Harry Williams, ed., Hayes: Thegpiary of a President,

lea—1881 (New York, 1964): XV-

5535r1ayes to William Platt, Oct. 9, 1861, in Williams, ed.,
2Egz: £LIld.Letters of Hayes, II, 113.

Eiégfiayes to Sophia Hayes, Nov. 9, 1861, in Williams, ed.,
2333' zaacld Letters of Hayes, II, 143.

ed

M

1

U1

did not escape unscathed, however,for he had several horses

shot from under him and was wounded some five times, on one
occasion seriously enough to require a two months' recuperation.
At this point, friends and relatives urged him to use this
opportunity to leave the army, but he was determined to re-

sume his duties and did so.

Hayes‘

s heroic conduct on the battlefield was not only a
source of satisfaction to him, it was also welcomed by friend-
ly newspapermen, especially his politically potent friend
William Henry Smith, a journalist who would soon be elected
Ohio secretary of state and eventually head the Western Associ-
ated Press. These journalists were pleased to use their press
power to enhance their friend's availability. Finally in

1864, Smith and others collaborated to present him with the

zmmination for the House from the Cincinnati district. Hayes

umdoubtedly believed he deserved the reward, but at first he

;neither declined nor accepted the honor, deciding instead to

"let the thing take its own course. . ."55 Later, he allowed

iiisrmme to be used, but as he told his uncle: "As to that

(gandidacy for Congress, I care nothing at all about it --

neither for the nomination nor for the election."56 But he

was.not all that indifferent, as his comments to Smith reveal:

'Wy iﬂianks for your attention and assistance in the premises.

'3

"

55anes to Sardis Birchard, July 30, 1864, in Williams,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, II, 488.

56Hayes to Sardis Birchard, July 30, 1864, in Williams,
Qiary and Letters of Hayes, II, 488.

52

I cared very little about being a candidate, but having con-
sented to the use of my name I preferred to succeed."57 One
can be sure that he now "preferred to succeed" in the contest,
but to his everlasting credit (and his political advantage)
he sharply dismissed the suggestion he leave his post to cam-
paign for Congress. "An officer fit for duty who at this
crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in
Congress ought to be scalped."58 These sentiments, wholly
genuine, would be put to good use in this campaign and in
future contests, including his bid for the presidency in 1876.

Hayes's victory at the polls was personally satisfying,
for like Garfield he had hoped someday to sit in Congress, but
he was far more content than Garfield with his work in the army
and showed no inclination to abandon a position which was in-
tensely satisfying. After receiving news of his election he
told his wife that "my particular gratification is much less
than it would be, if I were not so much gratified by my good
11mm.in winning 'golden opinions' in the more stirring scenes
agxmnd here. My share of notoriety here is nothing at all,
glny'my‘gggl share of merit is also small enough, I know; but
the consciousness that I am doing my part in these brilliant

actions is far more gratifying than anything the election

57Hayes to William Henry Smith, Aug. 24, 1864, in
;ﬁlli£lﬂls, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, II, 497.

, 58Hayes to William Henry Smith, Aug. 24, 1864, in
‘HlLiélIIIEu ed., Diary and Letters of Hgyes, II, 497.

53
brings me."59 This comment seems to reflect Hayes's desire to
maintain an independent stance, aloof and unstained by the

"notoriety" of some of his fellow officers, jealously guard-

 

ing his good name while resting content in the knowledge that
he was earning laurels while enjoying this experience more than
any other he was to have during his lifetime. Unlike Garfield,
he had not sampled legislative life first hand, yet he probably
had concluded that a congressman's work would be far less ex-

citing, less rewarding and a good deal more risky, for here one

might suffer from guilt by association or be forced to share a
collective guilt if one's party or a faction thereof was caught
in error or wrong-doing. Moreover, he was convinced that at
Um moment the task of crushing the rebellion was more signifi-
wmt than the doings of Congress and more satisfying to his
self-image.

Their wartime experiences led both Hayes and Garfield to
express similar opinions concerning West Point leadership and
the problem of the Negro. About the time the latter had begun

to tnaice his doubts as to West Pointers, Hayes too, was ex-
pressing milder reservations as to the supposed superiority

of these professionals. Perhaps the recent 'disasters and

dia:oxn;zwagements will make the ultimate victory more precious,"
hechecszeared. "But how long? I can wait patiently if we only
doncrt. gget tricked out of victories. I thought McClellan was

tOmend 2111 this. We have had our last defeat; we have had

\

F 590913. 21, 1864, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of
was II, 528.

54

our last retreat," Hayes reflected. He thereupon remarked
philosophically: “Well, well, patience. West Pointers are no
better than others."60

Hayes's opinion of emancipation also underwent a change.
"I am gradually drifting to the opinion that this Rebellion
can only be crushed finally by either the execution of all
traitors or the abolition of slavery." He had concluded that
it was wiser to allow .

. . . the border States, in which there is Union
sentiment enough to sustain loyal State Governments,
dispose of slavery in their own way; abolish it in
the permanently disloyal States -- in the cotton
States -- that is, set free the slaves of Rebels.
This will come, I hope, if it is found that a
stubborn and prolonged resistance is likely to be
made in the cotton States. President Lincoln's
message, recommending the passage of a resolution
pledging the aid of the general Government to
States which shall adopt schemes of gradual eman—
cipation, seems to indicate that the result I

look for is anticipated by the Administration.

I hope it is so.

Astm Lincoln, Hayes was considerably more generous in his
comments than was Garfield. "Lincoln is perhaps not all that
we could wish, but he is honest, patriotic, cool-headed, and
safe. I don't know any man that the nation could say is,
Qmjel? all the circumstances, to be preferred in his place."
3h; (pyjtimism was seldom dimmed despite frequent Union set-n
ba¢K£;.. His outlook was pretty well summed up in his remark
'Umt .1163 thought it would "come out all right. Wars are not

\

6OHayes Diary, Oct. 29, 1861, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, II, 127.

6 1Hayes Diary, March 27, 1862, in Williams, ed., Diary
i181 Letters of Hayes, II, 218-19.

55

finished in a day." Perhaps he had in mind what he termed

"croakers and grumblers -- people who do more mischief than
avowed enemies to the country."62 He might well have so

labeled Garfield had he read some of the latter's correspond-

ence.

After serving with distinction and with an admirably

cheerful mien Hayes resigned his commission just four years

after enlisting. It had been a good four years and he had ful-

filled an old yearning to become a genuine military hero. More

than twenty years later he confessed: "I am more gratified by
friendly reference to my war record than by any other flattery.

Of course I know that my place was a very humble one -- a place

taterly unknown in history. But I am also glad to know that I

'mm one of the good colonels." He left the army a brevet major

gmmral, but he noted that it was his "feeling, often expressed"
aﬁmr becoming a colonel, that he preferred" 'to be one of the

gomicmlonels to being one of the poor generals.'" He was so

’ﬁecided" in his opinion that he "often considered the question
of declining promotion to the brigadier-generalship,"63 and had
sanetximes regretted that he ever accepted it. One can be sure

that .klis political supporters harbored no such regrets as
General Hayes, a "prime political prOSpect" prepared to join
Generqagl. Garfield in Ohio's congressional delegation.64

\

észgfiayes to Lucy Hayes, Oct. 19, 1861, in Williams, ed.,
Eﬁgny allﬂti Letters of Hayes, II, 120.

63Hayes Diary, May 13, 1886, in Williams, ed., Diary and
W. IV. 287-

ESZ+PViJLliams, ed., Diary_of a President, xvi.

 

CHAPTER 2

WINNING LAURELS

IN WASHINGTON AND COLUMBUS

In December, 1863 Garfield entered the tense and troubled

atmosphere of the Thirty-eighth Congress. He had resigned his

commission before taking his seat, yet his reluctance to aban—
Mm.a now familiar and rewarding field of labor (perhaps re-
uﬁorced by pangs of conscience) made him hope that he might
also continue his military service, and the President and
Smnetary of War promised to hold an opening for him. He may
have appreciated that he was of greater value to the adminis-
tration in the House than in the field, but this did not bring
hiy1_peace of mind. Just as at earlier crucial junctures in
.Qisvglife, he was left fretting as to whether his was a wise
decision. By the spring of 1864, he was speculating that if
the tfxiion should suffer "disaster", he must rejoin the army.
'T'ayn égreatly tried by the question of my duty to the country,"
4s wzrcnise, and "have for several days been feeling that I have
hard14y' ‘tkmaright to hold back from the country the success and
eXpeITiJBIICB I had in the service. . ." But mingled with
Garfixelxi’s; stout patriotism, one suspects, was the fear that
Ei luCImativ13 endeavor had been prematurely abandoned before it

56

57
4 had been used to maximum advantage. However, such disturbing
thoughts gradually faded as he became absorbed in legislative

1 activities that would prove to be more consistently stimulat-

 

~ ing and satisfying than life in the Union army.1
Garfield's army experience had not been, as it had been
for Hayes, the high point of his life, making all that followed

1 essentially anticlimactic. It had been an exceptionally pro-

 

fitable and maturing experience for him, a time of transition
during which he had completed his divorce from earlier pre-
occupations. It was the take-off point in his political career.
He was now a member of Congress: he had reached a goal that had
lmen in his thoughts for at least six years. In a letter writ-
tmion 'Oongress' paper in January 1857, he had asked in a
Lmstscript if it was not "prophetic that my last word to you
awed on the picture of the Congress Capital?"2 Prophetic or
not, his brief experience in the Ohio Senate suggested what
would soon become clear: political activity provided an avenue
for Garfield's ambition and an occupation that satisfied his
Seﬂlju-concept, challenged his intellect, and absorbed the bulk
Qf’ljjws restless energy as had no other line of work.

Pihen Garfield took his seat in the House, he enjoyed

 

'1¢I£100b D. Cox, Military Remininiscences of the Civil War
(2.V()]_E;-, Cincinnati, 1900), II, 6 and quoted in Theodore C.
Smitkl, {the Life and Letters of James_§bram Garfield (2 vols.;
We, Havmm.

1 2Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Jan. 15, 1857, in Mary L.
" Binsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdalﬁe Letters: Correspondence

I Egngeeml Jalnes Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale (Ann
1 aFoor. 1949). p. 17.

l

 

 

 

J.)

5
advantages that were unknown to most freshmen congressmen. He
was fresh from the field of battle where he had earned a pro—
motion to major general and been lavishly praised by his com-
mander, he had been called to the House by the President and
he was patronized by a powerful Secretary of the Treasury.

What is more, he represented a safe district within a key state
in a body where political longevity yielded rich dividends.
With such credentials, it was not surprising that he should

at once be placed on the prestigiOls Committee on Military

1)

Aff

.irs. General Robert Schenck, the fellow Ohioian who chair-

1

ed this committee, soon initiated Garfield‘s congressional
baptism by assigning him the delicate and burdensome task of
mwising the conscription law. But such an undertaking was
mﬂcomed by one who had claimed: "In some small degree, I rep—
resent on this floor the Army of the Republic. . ." With
characteristic zeal, he plunged into his assignment, lamenting
only that a "long absence from political life has left me sad-
ly’ behind in all current political learning and I must make up
fol“ jgt by hard work." He quickly repaired this deficiency and
Soozl llis diligent and studious approach would mark him as one
Of.t11¢3 hardest working members of Congress. He not only gave
his xfegxzy best to committee work, but also took to the floor to
Shea}; (311 a variety of topics outside the province of committee
eSsiésrlnﬂéintS, often at the behest of less outspoken colleagues.
He di_sc3crvered, however, that his loquaciousness and "polished
'Dericniss" Ivexe doing him injury among his weary listeners.

Illereaditer, he curbed himself and developed a plainer,

 

 

59
instructive style that won laurels for him in the House and on
the stump. "It was not willful oratory coming out of his
temperament", a colleague recalled, "but it was a large and
massive power of presenting facts and inferences."3
The opening session of the Thirty-eighth Congress found
Garfield's party divided into several unstable factions. A
very substantial majority were moderates, but as the months
passed their strength was eroded as a smaller, but aggressive
band of radicals grew stronger. Fewer still were those of a
conservative persuasion and those who might be labeled moder-
ate radicals. Garfield's record in his first congress places
him squarely in the radical camp.4 He was, for example, an
earnest advocate of confiscation on the grounds that this
wmﬂd dislodge slavery's principal support and break the
nmlevolent influence and overweening power of the great plant-
ers. "It is well known," he argued during a debate on con-
fiscation, "that the power of slavery rests in large plantations;
that21me planter's capital drives men to the mountains, where
‘Litnarty always loves to dwell, and to the swamps and by-places
of ‘tfle South; but the bulk of all the landed estates is in the

ﬁancigs of the slave—owners who have plotted this great con-

spiIgELng." Looking to the future, he predicted that "if we

35(30ngressional Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., p. 403;
Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, Dec. 21, 1863, in Smith, Life
and Letters of Garfield, I, 365-66 and Garfield Scrapbook

ho, 52: (Charles Foster interview). Garfield Papers.

Alkivixi Donald, The Politics of Reconstruction, 1863-1867
(Baton Rouge, 1965), pp. 87, 89.

6O
{ant a lasting peace . . . we must put down its guilty cause;
we must put down slavery; we must take away the platform on

which slavery stands -- the great landed estates of the armed

 

rebels of the South. Strike that platform from beneath their
feet, take that land away, and divide it into homes for the
. men who have saved our country." The rebellion would be put

1 down, he concluded, "when you take away its chief prop, slavery

 

-and landed estates." What was demanded, he implied, was a far-
reaching social revolution which would effect an "economic
liquidation of the old planter aristocracy."5

Garfield entered the House with a view of Lincoln that
Imt him in essential agreement with the Radicals. Neverthe-
less, when Lincoln pleaded the necessity of a new and effective
waft law, he unhesitatingly supported the President and the
amwu Moreover, as the time to choose a presidential nominee
cheW'near, his radicalism was laid aside in favor of political
realism. Although he believed that the party "could do better"

.and rﬁth John Sherman supported Chase's bid for the nomination,

be? gsoon abandoned the effort, telling Chase that to continue
the struggle "could only distract the party." The administra-
tiozl 218d fallen well short of his expectation, yet "it would
2m 31 1121tional calamity to alienate the radical element from
Mr. Lincoln. . ." As in the case of his later disenchantment

with. C}1want's administration, he would not openly give aid and

5Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., lst sess., p. 404 and
stuletﬁl Stuampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 186571877 (New
York. 1965), p. 42.

 

 

 

61
comfort to divisive elements that threatened his party's
survival.6
A radical, but scarcely a docile follower of his faction's
leaders, Garfield essayed an independent, sometimes an ideal-
istic course within the loose framework of the Union party.
House leaders did not command his voice and vote and on more
than one occasion he challenged the majority of his party and
the whole House as well. Thus, while he favored generous boun-
ties for reenlisting veterans, he spoke and voted against a
bill prolonging the life of the bounty system for volunteers,
although his was but one of two dissenting votes. Later he
successfully insisted that volunteers enlist from their home
districts rather than from those paying a larger bounty. In
alike manner he opposed his own committee's bill reinstating
‘ﬂm rank of lieutenant general with its accompanying resolu-
tion calling for Grant's promotion to this rank. A amid the
debate on the draft bill, he sharply rebuked the House for
elizﬂxmting, by a better than two to one margin, a clause
azbolgishing the commutation provision (whereby a draftee could
thuici service by paying a three hundred dollar fee). Satis-
.qugég' as such independence might have been he soon came to
app1753c31ate the wisdom of greater flexibility, caution and the
DH%31HEIISiC approach in legislative affairs. This change was
Dredgicg-taable, for unlike Hayes, but like so many others in-

cludgixlg; 'the President, he "lacked that inward serenity enjoyed

5Garfi eld to Harmon Austin, March 4, 1864 and Garfield to

Colonel Dumars (‘1), Feb. 25, 1864. Garfield Papers.
Letterbook-

 

62
by those who never question their own values or doubt their
moral rectitude. . ."7 But this course, too, could and would
prove hazardous. During his first session, Garfield saw fit
to accept less than a whole loaf on the question of equal pay
for White and Negro soldiers, but only after consistently
voting for equality. Some of his constituents promptly took
him to task for failing to insist on all or nothing. Smart-
ing under this attack, he answered his critics by Spelling out
what became his legislative philosophy. If reasonably certain
that the House would reject a measure in the form he desired,
he would feel it necessary to grant "some concession. . . for
the sake of getting as near it as we could." In a letter to a
district editor, the young congressman explained, "I only de-
sire to use a wise discretion and not lose a practical good
for a remote possibility of something better."8 He clung to
this approach throughout his legislative career, yet it was
precisely this posture that led some to conclude that here was
a man who lacked backbone and moral courage.

By the end of his first session, Garfield knew that a
significant number of his Republican constituents were dis-
pleased with their new representative. Some were upset because
he had not insisted upon equal pay for Negro volunteers, others

accused him of being lukewarm in his support of radical

 

7Stampp, Reconstruction, p. 57.

8angggssional Globe, 38th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2472 and
kufield to William C. Howells, June 18, 1864. Garfield

PaPers. Letterbook.

63

reconstruction measures and still others were dngruntled by
a rumor that he favored and perhaps had helped to draft the
Wade-Davis Manifesto. He replied to his censors in a bold
speech before the nineteenth district's nominating convention.
After denying any connection with the Manifesto, he bluntly
set forth his personal declaration of independence:

Abraham Lincoln was not my first choice. (He had

supported Chase until his bid was defeated in party

caucus and then had carefully steered clear of the

Cleveland convention that nominated Fremont.) I

made no factious opposition however to his nomina-

tion at Baltimore. . . I hold it to be my privilege

under the Constitution and as a man to criticize

any acts of the President of the United States. I

cannot go to Congress as your representative with

liberty restricted in this reSpect in any degree.

If I go to Congress I must go as a free man. I

cannot go otherwise and when you are unwilling to

grant me my freedom of opinion to the highest de-

gree I have no longer a desire to represent you.
The convention responded to their young congressman's idealized
conception of his office with a renomination by acclamation.
It was a speech that he might not have dared to make in a more
closely contested district, as for example, Hayes's Cincinnati
constituency. But Garfield's performance was, nevertheless,
one in which he and his wife would continue to take extra-
ordinary pride. During the ensuing campaign he stumped with
typical energy and enthusiasm, smiting the Democrats hip and
thigh despite advice that he temper his partisanship. The
result was an endorsement by a margin of nearly three to one

cwer his Democratic rival.

Garfield returned to Washington to find that the

9Quoted in Smith, Life and Letters of Garfield, I, 379-

64

considerable success of Union arms had sharply altered the mil-
itary picture, for now it was the Confederate outlook that was
bleak. Once again he voted in harmony with a now strengthened
radical faction and mirrored its harsh assessment of the Lincoln
administration. Dissident elements on the Western Reserve
again accused him of failing to represent accurately his dis-
trict's sentiment. Garfield reSponded to his critics by re-
iterating his conviction that he must be a representative in
the fullest sense of the word, not a mere robot. He must be
able to exercise his own judgment, employ his intellect, not
simply echo the shifting and contradictory sentiments of his
constituents. He Spelled out his views in the following
manner: "I believe a representative should get all the light
on every matter of public importance that his position en-
ables him to and then Speak and vote in such a manner as will,
in his judgment, enhance the best interests of his constituents
and the whole country." Should the voters persist in their
criticism and find him to be "deficient in ability, judgment
or integrity" they might correct the situation by replacing
him. But so long as he held office, he concluded, "his course
should be guided by his own judgments, based upon the sugges-
tions of his constituents and all other attainable informa-
tion."10

The emotion-charged issue of civil rights for Negroes

wmﬂd.offer him ample opportunity to apply his interpretation

10Quoted in Smith, Life and Letters of Garfield, I, 382
“palletter to his constituents, April 7, 1865).

 

65
of representative democracy. With the war's end, this pro-
blem had begun to weigh heavily on Congress, with the suffrage
question perhaps the crux of the matter. Garfield was "fully
persuaded that some degree of intelligence and culture should
be required as a qualification of suffrage," he told the
House, "but let it apply to all alike," he warned his col-
leagues. "Let us not commit ourselves to the senseless and
absurd dogma that color of the skin shall be the basis of
suffrage, the talisman of liberty." He acknowledged that it
was "perilous to confer the franchise upon the ignorant and
degraded; but if an educational test cannot be established,
let suffrage be extended to all men of prcper age regardless
of color."11 His view of the question coincided neatly with
that of Hayes when he entered Congress and reflected their
great faith in the beneficial influence of education. But
these two gentlemen were undoubtedly more radical on the Negro
question than a goodly number of their fellow Ohioians, in-
cluding their mutual friend and Republican gubernatorial
nominee, Jacob Cox.

Cox had been Garfield's warm friend and correspondent ever
since their days together in the Ohio Senate and for a time he
had been Hayes's commander in western Virginia. Although urged
to bid for the governorship himself, Garfield had Supported his
friend, but soon found himself disturbed and embarrassed when

'um latter's view of the Negro question came to light. Cox,

 

11Burke A. Hinsdale, ed., The Works of James Abram
W (2 vols.; Boston, 18:82-83), I, 87.

66
who eventually argued for a separate black American state,
told Garfield that the Confederate South would accept the
Thirteenth Amendment, but would surely "be a unit against Negro
suffrage." If this were made a prerequisite for their read-
mission, he continued, they could appeal to the country that
they were now fully in step with middle western and western
states in their treatment of Negroes. He concluded that if the
party made suffrage th§_issue, they would be beaten in the up-
coming election, "for the Army, although grown radically anti-
slavery, has nevertheless increased instead of diminishing
pride and prejudice of race, and will not go with you."12 The
nominee's analysis was discerning, for as late as 1870 it was
with considerable risk that the GOP went before the country
with the Fifteenth Amendment since it was more likely to lose
than to gain Republican votes in several key northern states,
including Ohio.13 Cox Spoke for many Northerners, especially
soldiers who had seen southern duty, when he called Garfield's
attention to the "irreconcilable conflict of races at the
South." This conflict and the army's attitude were "patent"
facts, he insisted, and in view of this it was important that
they confer before the campaign in order to arrive at some

mutual accord on the question.14 In a letter to Cox, Garfield

 

12Jaoob Cox to Garfield, July 21, 1865. Garfield Papers.

13John and LaWanda Cox, "Negro Suffrage and Republican
Bﬂitics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction
Ehstoriography," The Journal of Southern History, XXXIII

(Mamet, 1967), 503-330.
14Jaeob Cox to Garfield, July 21, 1865. Garfield Papers.

67
suggested it would be premature to decide reconstruction policy
at this time and Cox responded that this was "precisely" his
idea of the wisest approach during the campaign. This stra-
tegy would be successful, he predicted, intimating that it
might well undercut those Copperheads who were employing ra-
cist appeals to lure away Republican veterans, while simul-
taneously encouraging the radicals to more extreme policies.15
As Cox's views became known, they stirred up a hornet's next
of Opposition among those of a radical persuasion on the Western
Reserve and elsewhere. One of Garfield's constituents insisted
that it "may be wise to make conditions upon which men may
vote, but pgyggh while negroes are fggg, can you make gglg;
one of those conditions."16 But Cox mirrored the feeling of
far more Ohioians than either Garfield or Hayes were wont to
admit. For the time being racial conservatism prevailed and
Cox swept into office with a far larger majority than would
Hayes in the two succeeding gubernatorial elections, while the
legislative contests secured the House and Senate for the party
by majorities of two to one. Perhaps with these results in
mind, Garfield concluded that if Congress were unwilling to
insist upon universal suffrage, the next best policy would be
exclusion of the rebel states for the time being. He was also

given to understand from correspondents in the South that the

 

15Garfield to Jacob Cox, Aug. 5, 1865. Garfield Papers.
Lanerbook. Jacob Cox to Garfield, Aug. 9, 1865. Garfield
Papers.

16Harmon Austin to Garfield, Aug. 6, 1865. Garfield
Papers.

68

suffrage issue was hurting the party there and that in states
like Louisiana the secessionists had taken over once more.
This, in addition to reports of the abuse of the freedmen,
may have both strengthened and weakened Garfield's radical-
ism.17 As the radical element in Congress grew and began to
unfold its reconstruction plans, he was placed in an awkward
position. Unlike Hayes, a consistent and thorough-going
radical, he probably worried as to whether or not Stevens was
proposing "a new revolution," as Cox put it.18 He continued
to look upon himslef as a radical, although he would compile
a moderate voting record on key reconstruction issues brought
to a roll-call vote. In Ohio, his party remained badly divided
on the suffrage issue and only after a long wrangle at their
1866 state convention did they unanimously adOpt a resolution
"endorsing the Declarationpf;lndependence" as a compromise
move. At the same moment, Garfield was given to understand
that the Republicans of his area were staunchly radical in
their outlook.19

Although he was genuinely concerned with the vexing
political and social problems arising from the War and its

aftermath, Garfield did not choose to follow the acknowledged

 

17Garfield to Jacob Cox, Aug. 5, 1865. Garfield Papers.
Letterbook. Lionel Sheldon to Garfield, Nov. 21, 1865.
Garfield Papers.

18Donald, Politics of Reconstruction, pp. 96, 100 and
Jacob Cox to Garfield, Jan. 1, 1866i Garfield Papers.

19James Comly to Garfield, Jan. 17, 1866 and William C.
Howells to Garfield, March 26, 1866. Garfield Papers.

69
party chieftians and make them his major interest during the
Reconstruction era. At least as early as the campaign of
1865, he had begun to follow through on an interest in finan—
cial and monetary affairs that steemed from his contacts with
Chase and his friends during the fall and winter of 1862. He
and the Secretary had "conversed a good deal on currency," he
had written at the time, and he had also "read a good deal on
the subject." His studies included the "great debates of
Webster, Calhoun and Benton," he continued, and took him into
English history as well. He then ventured to predict that
"the great currency question will be renewed with new and
interesting features resulting from our huge national debt. . ."20
Ymen a bad ankle forced him from the stump in 1865, he reported
that he used the time to "read the history and philosophy of
'Um tariff question very thoroughly" and followed up his study
imth a lecture on ’The Mercantile System' at Poughkeepsie,
lbw York. During the following winter, he recorded with ob-
vious satisfaction, that his wife had given him "the credit of
Mung more continuous study of the voluntary kind since we came
kmre than she has ever known me to in the same length of time."
HE had been concentrating on "Paper Money and the Currency,"
he wrote, and found the subject to be "very full of live ideas

and issues."21 Moreover, he began to demonstrate that his

2OGarfield to Harry Rhodes, Dec. 7 and Nov. 2, 1862.
Galfield Papers. Letterbook.

21Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Oct. 14, 1865, in Smith,
'Life and Letters of Garfield, I, 389 and Garfield to Harry
Rhodes, Jan. 22, 1865, in Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale
Letters, p. 73.

7O
assignment to military affairs did not prevent him from pur-
suing his growing, perhaps by this point, his primary interest
in finance. His initial contributions from the floor were
modest, but by the final session of the Thirty-eighth Congress,
he was participating in nearly every discussion of taxation,
currency and banking.

When the Thirty-ninth Congress met in December 1865,
Hayes joined Garfield in the Ohio delegation. The Republicans
were by now divided into several factions -- Radicals, Stevens
Radicals, Independent Radicals, Moderates and Conservatives --
on reconstruction issues. The radical element had grown in
numbers and power since Congress had last assembled and now
mﬂmumbered the Moderates and Conservatives. Hayes quickly
identified himself with Stevens and his allies; indeed, his
voting record places him among the dozen odd Ultra-Radicals
muing his brief stay in the House. Garfield's record on the
mmm key reconstruction measures places him in the moderate's
camp during these years, although he continued to think of
kﬂmself as a good Radical. Both men accepted the congression—
Elplan of reconstructidn and Hayes told his Texas friend Guy
Iﬁyan "that if we carry these elections, this plan contains
323 best terms you will ever get -- and they_should be prompt-
llraccepted." Hayes's credentials as a Radical were unim-
Peachable. {e loyally followed his faction's leaders, voted
TEﬁpﬂarly and predictably, yet on not one occasion did he
'Warticipate in the debates on reconstruction that dominated

hissterm of service. He may have felt that some Radical proposals

 

 

 

 

 

71

were too harsh and unwise, but except for a vague hints of
this, he kept any such thoughts strictly to hinself.22

Garfield began his second term in Congress with the in-
tention of pursuing in earnest his interests in finance. With
this in mind he took the unusual step of asking to be taken
off the Committee on Military Affairs and assigned instead to
a committee where he could, as he put it, "study finance."
This, he was convinced, would be the paramount question for
years to come and with the enthusiastic support of Chase and
Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCulloch, he was placed on the
powerful Ways and Means Committee.23 He continued to keep
abreast of contemporary scholarship concerning financial matters
and frequently searched the economic history of the United
States and Great Britain for the light it might shed on con-
temporary fiscal and monetary problems. Certainly, the attrac-
tiveness of his chosen field stemmed in part from the fact that
itlent itself so naturally to scholarly analysis. This suited
ins inclinations well, as it allowed him once more to be both a
mmolar and a teacher. For as Hayes wrote after his death:.
"Here was his strength. In both capacities he was a model."

Heexcelled in "memory, analysis (and) fluency," Hayes

22Donald, Pglitics of Reconstruction, pp. 95-104; Hayes
tOGuy Bryan, Oct. 1, 1866, in Williams, Diary and Letters of
Erma, III, 32; Hayes to Russell Hastings, May 20, 1865, in
Hﬂliams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, II, 584; Hayes to
Luquayes, May 16, 1866 and Hayes to William Dickson, Jan. 19,
136k in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 25, 58.

23Garfield to Harmon Austin, Dec. 13, 1865. Garfield
Pamnm. Letterbook and Smith, Life and Letters of Garfield,
L.390.

 

 

72
declared, and Garfield consciously and conscientiously employed
these assets and skills to achieve leadership in finance.24
But this scholarly approach was not for Garfield an unmixed
blessing. It robbed him of the smug self-assurance of those
whose views were primarily acts of faith and it denied to him
the comfort of adopting simple solutions for complex problems.
He was inclined to compromise when he might better (from a
purely partisan standpoint) have stood firm -- and he some-
times defended a minority opinion when it might have been more
expedient to retreat. Moreover, he was persuaded to follow a
moderate course when discussing related issues like the tariff,
despite the attractiveness of a doctrinaire approach and to
modify his opinions when consistency won the most applause.
He sometimes found that his views were too advanced for the
times and offensive to those who, in an era of partisan excess,
failed to appreciate the implications of his approach to
questions of public policy.

During this session, the conflict between the radical
ﬁtment and President Johnson grew more heated. Both Garfield
am.Hayes hoped some understanding might be arrived at. After
'ﬁsiting the President at Johnson’s request, Garfield observed
Umt he hoped that the GOP might work in harmony with the
meident. "I gave him the views of the earnest men, North,

aSI.understand them," Garfield continued, "and we tried to

 

24Hayes Diary, Pet. 21, 1883, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, IV, 110.

 

 

75
look over the whole field of the difficulties before us.

Sumner and Boutwell and . . . some foolish men among us are

all the while bristling up for a fight and seem anxious to
make a rupture with Johnson. I think we should assume that
he is with us, treat him kindly, without suspicion and go in
a firm, calmly considered course, leaving him to make the
breach with the party if any is made. I doubt if he would do
it under such circumstances."25 But soon the moderate and
conciliatory young congressman found himself torn between
Johnson's request for support and radical pressure to support
congressional reconstruction plans. While Hayes soon con-
cluded to follow a radical course, Garfield deferred his de-
cision as long as possible and tried to steer a moderate course.
Although the President was "fast falling into the hands of our
enemies," Garfield wrote, he nevertheless "tried to take ground
for both him (Johnson) and Congress to stand on."26 After the
nmture occured, he initially followed his moderate inclina-
‘ans, spoke very little and did not, like Hayes, support
Ashley's resolution calling for an investigation of Johnson's
cmnduct nor for Steven's resolution demanding the creation of
Mm Joint Committee of Fifteen. He abstained during all three
rMJ.calls on the Steven's resolution and voted in the minority

tolay Ashley's resolution on the table; he supported the

25Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Dec. 11, 1865, in Hinsdale,
ML, Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 76-77.

26Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Feb. 13, 1866, in Hinsdale,
Why Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 78-79.

 

 

 

74
latter when it came before the House in the following session.
He came to believe that Johnson's impeachment would probably
be a desirable thing, but believed conviction by the Senate
was not then possible. Yet he was sure that impeachment would
seriously upset the country and wrote to a friend that "as a
question of policy" he considered such a move to be "ruinous
both to the party and to the general peace of the country."
For the time being, he persisted in his moderate course. "I
am trying to do two things," Garfield explained to Burke"
Hinsdale, "viz. be a radical and not be a fool -- which, if I
am to judge by the exhibitions around me, is a matter of no
small difficulty."27 In hope of solving his dilemma and sat-
isfying his real interests, he determined to concentrate large-
ly on questions of finance, while quietly following what he
considered a "radical" course.

Garfield‘s nomination to a third term seemed a foregone
mmclusion, but unlike Hayes, he encountered some little
difficulty. He had not been sufficiently extreme on recon-
Emruction issues for some voters; he was accused by others of

lming a free trader; his role in the Milligan case28 upset

27Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Jan. 20 and Jan. 1, 1867,
hiHinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 94, 88.

23". . . he appeared before the Supreme Court of the
muted States as the associate of the distinguished Democrat,
Jemmﬂah S. Black, and others, in ex parte Milligan, a case
whhwimade constitutional history. Garfield’s side represent-
ed‘wm petitioner Milligan, who had been sentenced by a
mtmtary court during the war. The major issue before the
cmum was the competence of military courts in wartime to try
chﬁlians in areas remote from the war zones where the regular
cmums were open. The decision was for the petitioner."
Brmniand Williams, eds., Diary of Garfield, I, xlix-1.-

 

 

75

many of his supporters and even Cox warned him that he must
pay more personal attention to key constituents. However, he
was cautioned that "the most violent & telling opposition,"
as one advisor put it, arose from his nearly solitary support
of an unpopular conscription bill which also enjoyed the
support of Secretary Stanton and General Grant.29

While the nomination was hanging fire, Garfield moved to
defend himself against his critics, especially those who
attacked him for his role as a defense counsel in the Milligan
case. While he surely aided his cause with some of his con-
stituents, it was pointed out to him by a discerning supporter
that the unthinking majority would continue to say: "I want no
man in Congress that will apologize for traitors."30. His
attempt to be a thinking man's tribune was to be no easy matter.
Fbr while his constituency might be relatively well educated,
its partisanship tended to give it tunnel vision on any ques-
'Hon that became a political issue. Thus, as would happen
'Hme and again, Garfield was driven into a defensive posture
am he undertook to explain and justify himself before his
constituents.

Despite his determination to be an independent repre-
Samative Garfield achieved only a portion of the autonomy he

waved. He could not escape the need to compromise, to accept

29Jacob Cox to Garfield, May 4, 1866 and Harmon Austin
toCﬁrfield, June 12, 1866. Garfield Papers.

30Harmon Austin to Garfield, July 2, and July 20, 1866.
Garfield Papers .

 

 

76
a half-a-leaf in legislative matters -- and at times he would

also feel compelled to support what was essentially the lesser

of two evils. Thus, for one reason or another, he was forced

to live with and practice expediency. Hayes, on the other

hand, escaped the necessity of frequently defending and ex-
plaining himself, although he cherished his independence no
less than did Garfield and believed himself to be essentially
independent. By virtue of breeding and ample means, by fol-
lowing the safer route of state politics, by choosing his
issues carefully and often simply maintaining a discreet
silence, he largely escaped the problems and dangers that
Garfield's character and political situation predestined for
him. Hayes also chose the executive role in an era of limited
and declining executive power, while Garfield sought and won
decision making power in a strong and increasingly powerful
lmanch of government. Finally, by making his public life
nmrely "episodes", as he called them, Hayes would come much
nearer to realizing their common desire for autonomy and peace
of mind.31

While Garfield's interest in congressional activity was
mﬂckening, Hayes was frankly looking for a way to escape to
Who. His experience in Washington had been far from satis-
ﬁﬂng. He dreaded the necessity of living apart from his
mely after four years of frequent wartime separations. Unlike

Lmnmtia Garfield, Lucy Hayes was not of a mind to live in

 

31Hayes to William H. Smith, Dec. 19, 1881, in Williams,
ed.,IHary and Letters of Hayes, IV, 56.

77

Washington and soon Hayes was writing to her that "'Politics
is a bad trade' runs in my head often. Guess we'll quit. . ."
It was "lonely and bad," he complained to her, and there was
"nothing in the small ambition of Congressional life or in the
gratified vanity which it sometimes affords, to compensate for
separation from you."32 He saw himself as a kind of glorified
errand boy for his constituents -- men and women who were pre-
occupied with pensions, claims and federal employment, petty
matters of great moment only to the petitioners.33 He found
some pleasure in supporting his party's programs, especially
in securing the fruits of the Union victory, but his vote was
usually unneeded and he did not choose to test his influence
in debate. Perhaps he began to feel as if he had been demoted
to the ranks after having received "laurels" as a leader of
men in a great conflict. He might have become a House leader
and then moved on to the Senate, but he did not care to sac-
rifice the necessary time; his district, moreover, was not as
safe as some.

And yet, although he was an unaggressive congressman,
Hayes seems to have gained considerable respect among his
colleagues during his short stay in Washington. During the

1876 presidential campaign, Garfield remarked that upon

_ 323ayes to Lucy Hayes, July 9, 1865; March 29 and June 17,
kﬁ6, in Williams, ed., Diaries and Letters of Hayes, III, 2,
21’ 2?.

33Hayes to Lucy Hayes, Jan. 10, 1866 and Hayes to Murat
Ikdstead, Feb. 2, 1866, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters

ofimyes, III, 13, 16.

78
entering the House, Hayes was determined "not to make the mis-
take of talking too much and he became the most patient listen-
er in the Capitol. When it was known that he advocated the
passage of a bill, it was pretty sure to pass. 'Hayes says
it's all right' was a valuable endorsement," Garfield claimed.34
Be that as it may, his committee assignments were undistinguish-
ed and certainly not likely to bring him to the attention of
the House and the country as were Garfield's. He was chairman
of the Joint Committee on the Library, yet he Spoke of it as
"one of the no-account committees in the public sense" though
admitting that it had "some private interest." He Spoke jest-
ingly of it as his "Fine Arts Committee" controlling as it were
"the whole bouquet business." But to his uncle Sardis, he con-
fessed that his duties were pleasant and involved "no labor
worth mentioning." But, he cautions his uncle, this letters
"is for your private contemplation," concluding that "the
dodge is rather a lucky one as I now see it."35 His committee
did, however, make Significant contributions to the expansion
of the Library and such work did in fact coincide very nicely
idth Hayes's life-long interest in books and Americana. For
1me most part, however, his Washington years failed to meet

ins expectations, modest as they were.36 Moreover, he probably

 

34Williams, Life of Hayes, I, 281.

35Hayes to Sardis Birchard, Dec. 11, 1865 and Hayes to
SOMﬂa Hayes, Feb. 4, 1866, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letuns of Hayes, III, 10-11, 17.

55Hayes to Sardis Birchard, Feb. 2, 1867 and Hayes to
Imcylkqes, June 17, 1866, in Williams, ed., Diary and

Letuns of Hayes, III, 40, 27-

 

79
yes troubled by what he saw and heard of the less than exem-
plarly conduct of some colleagues and their associates -- and
he feared that although he would remain personally pure, his
frpotless record might be stained by the process of guilt
tIlIough association. He quickly formed an unflattering opinion
(Di? Washington life and then and there concluded that it was
Ilc3t conductive to the cultivation of those characteristics he
Inc>st admired. Years later, after he had returned to Washington
5153 chief executive, he would remark that Garfield's long stay
‘111 this unhealthy environment had had a demonstrably detri-
IIlental influence upon him.37
AS the time drew near to choose a candidate for the gover-
‘norship of their state, Garfield, Hayes and Cox found them-
selves placed in political juxtaposition. Early in 1867,
both Hayes and Garfield came under pressure to bid for the
honor, as it was assumed that the party would either reject
'Um incumbent because of his racial views or he would volun-
tarily step aside. Garfield was determined to stay with his
inesent line of work and clearly believed the role of a
House.leader was within his graSp, and greatly preferable to
'Um governor's largely ceremonial functions. He visited
CMombuS and found "an almost universal desire among the
Smmtors and Representatives that" he enter the contest, he
wmme, but he told them he "would not think of it, and they

mustsmy no more about it." He also confessed to a friend:

 

37Beyes to Austins Snead, April 25, 1881, in Williams,
ed., Diary_and Letters of Hayes, IV, 10.

80

N 1 0
. . . I have some hope that in a few years more I may make

myself strong and a power in the field I am cultivating." He

therefore called upon his friends in the Assembly to support

(Box, for although he admitted that Cox wasn't in all respects
tdae man they wanted, yet he made a good governor.3"8 The
illcumbent however, soon took himself out of contention, there-
Ilzpon setting the stage for Hayes's entry into the contest. At
1?ﬁ_rst, he remained properly noncommital, but as the pleas for
kli_s candidacy grew more urgent and numerous, he found himself
Hreally puzzled" as to what course to follow. "This is the
Irruth as I now See it: I have no ambition for Congressional
lgife." And Hayes wrote, "I have no ambition for Congressional
reputation or influence -; not a particle. I would like to be
out of it creditably. If this nomination is pretty likely, it
would get me out of the scrape, and after 3282.1 am out of
political life decently. On the other hand, I ought not and
lel not resign my seat in Congress to be governor unless the
Imople of my district approve it."39 Press support for his
rmmination grew, his friends, especially those from Garfield's
district, became more insistent, and finally as county dele-
gmte elections took place his selection became a certainty.
imreover, once the state legislature had ratified the
quteenth Amendment and proposed a Negro suffrage amendment

38Garfield to Harmon Austin, April 22, 1867. Garfield
Papers. ILetterbook.

39Bayes to Sardis Birchard, Feb. 2, 1867, in Williams,
“L, Iﬂary and Letters of Hayes, III, 59-40.

81
to the state constitution his "chiefjersonal objection" to
running, as he had put it, was removed and he made ready to

abandon Congress despite substantial Opposition among his

<30rmtituents. "I do not regret the new step," Hayes observed.

"lit gets me out of worries I shall be glad to be rid of."40
fie: thereupon easily won nomination to an office that few of
his peers cared to bid for.

Although he had supported the ratification of the Four-
‘téaemth Amendment, Governor Cox had been an embarrassment to
Huaany Ohio Republicans because of his conservative racial views.
iRtavertheless, he reflected the majority opinion on the Negro
Strffrage issue in the state for several years to come. Hayes
sensed this, yet it did not discourage him from cleaving to
a radical line throughout the campaign even though on election
night he would blame his apparent defeat partly on his radical
Emand. He won the election, however, by a very Slim margin
ammough the Democracts easily took control of the legislature
and the voters of his old congressional district chose a
Immocrat to succeed him. What is more, the proposed state
mmfrage amendment was spurned by a fifty vote margin, there-
bytmderscoring voter sympathy with Cox's point of view. It
ims clearly a personal victory for Hayes, but perhaps all the
mmm satisfying for just that reason.

Garfield had been traveling in Europe while Hayes cam-

Mﬂgmed for the governorship and when he returned to his

40Hayes to William H. Smith, May 25, 1867 and Hayes to
&uois Birchard, June 20, 1867, in Williams, ed., Diary and
imiters Of Hayes, III, 42, 45.

82

congressional duties he found the contest between Johnson and

Congress far more heated. He steered shy, in SO far as possible,

of the drive toward impeachment and instead followed his in-

‘telost in financial issues. The impeachers first attempt to

gmain House support for their action was defeated with Garfield
‘vrating with the majority against the measure despite his ap-
IDIPehension about the reaction this might evoke in his district.
lieaanwhile, he pursued his chosen Speciality, steeping himself

3111 the literature of fiscal and monetary history. "I laid my-

Seelf out to study very thoroughly the history Of English
Zfixnance, during the Napoleonic wars;" Garfield recalled years
lmiter, "went over the debates and the Speeches and the writers
of the time and then traced it down through our own Revolution-
ary times, Hamilton's time, Jackson's time, until I had made a

very thorough study, keeping copious notes as I went along of

What I read."41 He emerged from this experience an even

stauncher advocate Of sound money, resumption and contraction;

and he was an outspoken supporter of the contractionist policies

of Secretary of the Treasury McCulloch. Hayes, although a

mmnd money man, had differed with him on contraction and had
voted with the majority against Garfield and the McCulloch

Eumroach. On matters of tariff legislation, Garfield tried

misteer a course between extreme protectionism and free trade.
Agﬂn.he was much influenced by his study of history and the

cmﬂmmporary academic discussion of the tariff issues, He

 

41Smith, Life and Letters of Garfield, I, 400-O1.

83
stated his position well when he argued in these words:
"Duties Should be so high that our manufacturers can fairly
compete with the foreign product, but not SO high as to enable
‘them to drive out the foreign article, enjoy a monopoly of the
Invade and regulate the price as they please."42 He was con—
£3c210usly staking out his position in finance, although he was
Ilcnt yet in reach of what he aspired to -- the chairmanship of
We. ys and Means .

As his 1868 congressional contest approached, Garfield
:fcrund himself in trouble at home once again. During the final
ilnpeachment proceedings in the House he had been absent for
Esonm days, returning just in time to cast an unneeded vote
against the President. But in his district it was rumored

that he had failed to be present for the vote and he was again
compelled to defend himself. The fact that his absence from
the House was occasioned by his association with the prom-
inent Democrat Jeremiah Black, Buchanan's Attorney General, as
zicounsel in a lawsuit, led to even sharper criticism. It was
ummonly held, an advisor warned, that he "had not done much
'Umt the people can see,”and many say they fear you are
Smmmthissing (Sic) too much with Judge Black &c &c &c."43

Iﬁs most determined opponents introduced Ben Wade's name into

42Hinsdale, ed., Works of Garfield, I, 205.

43Harmon Austin to Garfield, April 5, 1868. Garfield
Papers.

 

84
the prenomination struggle and Garfield countered by offering
to step aside in favor of the popular veteran. Wade then
assured him that he would not enter the contest, although this
did little to dampen the spirit of the anti—Garfield forces.44
Pie was accused of taking his European trip at government ex-
;peense when he was badly needed in the last state election cam-
Lpsijgn and of being too friendly with Johnson's unpopular Sec—
I?sztary of the Treasury, Hugh McCulloch. Garfield was attacked
ifCDl'being a partner of Jeremiah Black (a partnership agreement
llsid been prepared, but was never entered into) and finally of
ifsiiling to vote for the articles of impeachment. His opponents
Gnarried their fight into the nominating convention and there
“the struggle became especially vicious. "Your good name was

‘ wrote one observer. He was

dragged in the mire considerably,’
accused of being a "drunkard, a whoremonger" and of going
abroad to seek a cure for a disease that reSulted from what
his critics referred to as his "Sins at home." He was a
gambler, a "rake" and had become "immensely wealthy out of jobs
and fraud," his enemies claimed, and was therefore unfit for
Ins Office.45 Despite these attempts at character assassina-
‘Uon he was renominated and then elected by a healthy margin.
In the Fortieth Congress, Garfield was returned to the

MUitary Affairs Committee as its chairman, instead of being

44Garfield to Lyman Hall, June 10, 1868 and Garfield to
J.IL Ensign, June 9, 1868. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

45Edward Fitch to Garfield, June 13, 1868 and Harry
Emodes to Garfield, June 25, 1868. Garfield Papers.

85
given the chairmanship of Ways and Means as he had hoped.
His staunchly held contractionist views and his stand on the
tariff precluded his appointment to the latter committee at
this time, and he took the setback in stride and began making
nuajcr Speeches reviewing financial issues despite his committee
zasssignment. By the fall of 1868 he had gained sufficient
svtature in the House to be considered by some as a possible
(Baandidate for the speakership. For the time being his more
Elnibitious friend, James G. Blaine, who sought and received
(Esirfield's support, had the inside track in the contest.
<3sirfield's eyes were focused on Ways and Means and he had
areason to be optimistic about his chances. "I am sure that it
could well be of advantage to you to have someone in the chair,"
Blaine had written him, "on whose friendship you can rely --
and I trust you can rely on mine."46 Meanwhile he continued
to build his reputation as an expert on monetary and fiscal
policy, corresponding with students of financial issues like
Inward Atkinson and David Wells and receiving their plaudits
and those of his plain-Spoken and idealistic friend, Jacob Cox.
'T am proud of you," wrote the latter, "for . . . taking your
cmuse on finance & political economy generally together with
ymu'pluck in upholding the dignity of your intellectual con-
vhﬂdons . . . and you can be very sure indeed that Egg friend

atloast thinks you 'deserve well of the country.”47

46Nov. 10, 1868. Garfield Papers.

47Bdward Atkinson to David A. Wells, May 15, 1868 and
Jacob Cox to Garfield, Dec. 3, 1868. Garfield Papers. Garfield
'UJHarry Rhodes, May 7, 1868. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

86
Garfield had also begun to mellow and shed some of the
idealism of the youthful congressman. The following comments
reveal something of the hard realities facing the active legis-
JJELOI and they provide a partial answer to those who found
Itault with his work and Spoke disparagingly of his lack of moral
ccaurage. "There are many things done here which to a man not
111 the whirl and pressure of Congressional life, must seem
ESTrupid and absurd," he told a friendly, but doctrinaire
C3C>Irespondent, "--but it must be borne in mind that we are all
‘tkle time confronted with the question, what can be gppg -- not
ﬁllet would be well to do if we were able to do what we please."
Ema was still, however, restive under what he considered the
:attempts of constituents to dictate to him or restrict his
freedom as a legislator. With a touch Of haughtiness, he re—
marked that it was his fixed Opinion that he bore to "his
cmnstituents a relation Similar to that of a lawyer to his
dients." His duty was to "watch and defend their interests --
‘mu to uSe his own judgment in reference to the particular
nmthod of doing so." He was Similarly reluctant, as was Hayes,
tO'seek' SO much as a renomination to Office. To have knowing-
ly'Worked for myself and failed," Garfield wrote, would be
Mﬂnful indeed. And although he Was recognized as an unusually
eiﬁmtive and popular stump Speaker, much in demand Outside his
dishﬂct, he also disliked winning voter support for himself by

"mﬂaver, and by begging them to give me their votes. . ."48

48Garfield to Wilder, June 15, 1868; Garfield to
1% T. Spear, June 24, 1868 and Garfield to Harmon Austin,
Jnneiﬂh 1868. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

u,

87

 

He preferred to win his constituents votes with his congress-
ional record.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the Democratic control
of‘the Ohio legislature, Hayes had found the governorship to
lae quite to his liking. Certainly he was not pleased when
'tlle legislature selected his recent gubernatorial opponent,
lrhemocrat Allan Thurman, to succeed Ben Wade in the U. S. Senate

11(3r with its attempt to repeal Ohio's ratification of the

IFWDurteenth Amendment. But as a governor without veto power

1163 could not justly be criticized for the enactment of un-

ipcapular legislation by either party; neither could the censorious
:find fault with him if his recommendations came to naught. In
contrast to his congressional experience, he was obviously
contented in Columbus. "I am enjoying the new office," Hayes
told uncle Sardis. "It Strikes me at a guess as the pleasant-
est I have ever had.. Not too much hard work, plenty of time
to read, good society, etc., etc. . .," he concluded cheer-
ﬂﬂly.49 Even with his limited authority, he enjoyed a much
gmeater sense of achievement and felt far more at ease than
tmen a member Of the House.

He was nominated for a second term in 1869 and again took

Maths stump against a powerful Democratic Opponent and presi-
dmﬂial aspirant, George Pendleton. Hayes was a careful student
ofIhetoric whose study of the leading orators of the past and

kamiobservation of contemporary masters 'gave him a life-long

4'9Jan. 17, 1868, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of
H—aLe—S.’ III, 51.

 

88
appreciation for what he called 'elocution' . . . ," accord-
ing to a study of Hayes as a public speaker. Although he was
not a Scholar in the classical Sense as was his friend Cox, he
was well versed in U. S. political and constitutional history.
His approach to the problems of his era reflected an historical
perspective and he frequently buttressed his line of reason-
ing with pertinent quotations embodying legal and historical
precedents. AS a speaker, this tendency was one of his strong
points; another was his preference for the plain style of public
address. This bias neatly reflected and complemented his style
as a private citizen and a public figure. Contemporaries did
not view Hayes as a great Speaker, yet he seemed to reach his
audiences both with his message and the impression that he was
"Scrupulously conscientious and . . . honest in all his pur-
Poses. . ." What he had to say seemed both creditable and
Sincere and perhaps it was this quality as much as the 'issues'
'that tipped the scales in his favor in one closely contested
eﬁiection after another.50
During the campaign against Pendleton in 1869, the suf-
flnage issue continued to occupy a prominent place. The Ohio
jLegﬁslature had just refused to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment

and_the voters had again rejected a suffrage amendment to the

stateconstitution by a considerable margin. The Republicans

 

50Upton S. Palmer, "An Historical and Critical Study of
the Speeches of Rutherford B. Hayes" (unpublished Ph.D.
(ﬁssertation, University of Michigan, 1950), pp. 638-39.
imyes to Manning Force, April 18, 1871, in Williams, ed.,
Dhgy and Letters of Hayes, III, 140.

89
campaigned on a platform endorsing the Fifteenth Amendment
while maintaining a discreet silence on the money issue. But
Garfield, who had been battling for soundness in the House
against heavy odds, made it the motif of his campaign speech-
es despite the rising tide of inflationism in the GOP. John
Sherman and Oliver Morton were two of the more prominent
Republicans who leaned in this direction at the moment.
Pendleton, of course, made money the central theme of the
Democratic campaign since he was a powerful and influential
advocate of the so—called 'Ohio Idea'. Hayes was seemingly not
troubled by any doubts on the financial question, nor was he
tempted to desert 'soundness' for the sake of expediency. He
came to his financial opinions naturally, and unlike Garfield
his orthodoxy was an article of faith only and was not sig-
nificantly influenced or reenforced by study. But neither the
greenback issue nor the suffrage debate were sufficient to
enlive an essentially dull campaign or arouse the apathetic
electorate. Hayes won reelection, but by only some 7,500 votes
and although his party now controlled the legislature, the
reform Republicans of the Cincinnati area held the balance of
power in that body.

Hayes's duties during his second term, continued to suit
his taste in politics. The office did carry with it a certain
dignity, independence and social prerogatives. In Columbus he
had the stage to himself and the power and prestige, limited

as it was, came with the office and did not have to be fought

for asit did in the House of Representatives. He had first

90
entered the office bent upon making a reputation as a gover-
nor with backbone and proudly recorded when his second term
was drawing to a close that he was "making a reputation for
firmness . . . all around." He was equally anxious to make
his mark as an uncommonly even-handed and gpgg.governor and
left office believing he had fulfilled his hOpes. As he told
his uncle Sardis, "true or not, the common remark is that I
am the most esteemed of the governors within memory of people
living." Yet on the very first day of his "freedom", as he
called it, he betrayed an abiding fear of somehow being
touched by scandal. "For a week or two past," Hayes confessed,
"there has been a feeling with me that something might happen
to cast a shadow on the four years of good fortune in the
governor's office."51 In his diary he recorded that public
life ”has been on the whole pleasant. . . But for ten years
and over my salaries have not equalled my expenses, and there
has been the feeling of responsibility, a lack of indepen-
dence, and a necessary neglect of my family and personal
interests and comfort. . ."52 What is more, the issues that
had once stirred him were being overshadowed by the emerging
issues that Garfield had set out to master. Thus "the great
questions which have so occupied my thoughts and enlisted my

feelings," Hayes reflected, "the great questions of freedom

 

51Hayes to Sardis Birchard, Jan. 18, 1871 and Jan. 9,
1872, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 128,
190. ‘

52Hayes Diary, Dec. 31, 1871, in williams, ed., Diarv
.QE.Letters of Hayes, III, 185.

91

for the slaves and the unity of the Nation, liberty and
nationality are now settled." It was, as he viewed it,
irrevocably established "that all men are to have in this
country equal civil and political rights. . ." Moreover,
those "small questions of today about taxation, appointments,
etc., etc., are petty and uninteresting," he confided to his
diary. And he could not consider after participating "in the
glorious struggle against slavery during the last seventeen
years, now to endure the worry and anxiety belonging to po-
litical life for the sake of honors of office merely, and
without subjects interesting me deeply involved in the
struggles."53

Hayes's record as governor was solid but modest and
accurately reflected his commitment to small government and
limited legislative activity at every governmental level. As
a Republican with Whig antecedents, he felt that it was to his
credit that he had avoided extreme partisanship in his appoint-
ments and placed 'good’ Democrats on state boards. He re-
corded that although he "was assailed as untrue" to his party,
the experiment proved successful.54 In the matter of appoint-
ments and in his general conduct as governor, he revealed his
genteel conservatism and anticipated his approach to his

duties as president a few years later. This is not to claim

53Hayes Diary, March 16, 1871, in Williams, ed., Diary
agilmtters of Hayes, III, 135.

54Hayes Diary, Jan. 9, 1872, in Williams, ed., Diary
agilmtters of Hgyes, III, 389.

92
non-partisanship for Hayes, for he was by his own admission a
stout party man, but rather to point up that he probably recog—
nized the essential balance of the two parties in Ohio and the
nation during his era.

As governor, the position of Hayes on financial questions
was decidedly conservative. He sought to preserve economy in
government at both state and local levels and was especially
troubled by the evidence in Ohio of the municipal corruption
and ballooning expenditures that accompanied the beginnings of
America's urbanization. Although he had told a correspondent
that "all sorts of reforms are desirable in our tax and revenue
laws", this was the type of work that he considered "petty and
uninteresting" and he left office without undertaking such re-
forms. He took some cautious steps in the direction of civil
service reform and prided himself on the quality of his ap—
pointees. However, he called for but did not receive the con-
stitutional provisions supporting the limited use of the merit
system.55 Thus his civil service reforms were of limited
effectiveness and duration just as were similar efforts during
his presidency.

Hayes also endorsed state regulation of railroads in an
era of growing agitation for closer government supervision of

enterprise. But for the most part, he was characteristically

55Hayes to Charles Nordhoff, April 5, 1870 and Hayes
Emmy, March 16, 1871, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters
Ofihyes, III, 94, 135. Harry Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes
andHis America (Indianapolis, 1954), p. 246. Daniel R.
Poruuy Governor Rutherford B. Hayes," Ohio History, LXXVII

“Unter, Spring, Summer, 1968), 68.

93
cautious and loyal to the common belief that the government's
regulatory role in the economy must remain limited. He was
not, however, blind to the growing inequality of wealth, the
amassing of great fortunes by the few and their misuse of
power. But unlike Garfield, he made no mention of a need for
a program of taxation based on the sources of wealth, nor did
he show any partiality toward the troubled farming class.
Indeed, he was himself busy amassing a modest fortune in a
growing number of real estate ventures during the 1870's.
Hayes did champion with some energy, however, remedial legis-
lation of a humanitarian sort -- the outgrowth of an abiding
commitment to good works. His administration witnessed the
enactment of Ohio's first coal mining safety code and he gave
careful and compassionate attention to penal reform, the
Soldiers' Orphans' Home, the Board of Charities, a graded
prison, prison enlargement, improvement of penal discipline,
the Girls' Reformatory, and mental health facilities. He
studied penal problems with especial care, sought out expert
opinion and brought about or paved the way for real improve-
ment in the treatment of offenders of all types. Hayes also
led the fight to use Ohio's Morrill Act lands for the estab—
lishment of the future Ohio State University, against power-
ful forces that wished the funds to be divided among the
amoral existing schools. In his own eyes, however, his major
adnevement was securing, by the narrowest margin, legislative
Eumroval of the Fifteenth Amendment. Republican leaders in

wamnmgton kept their eyes on this struggle in Ohio, for they

94

knew the strength of racism there and elsewhere and appreci-
ated the risk they had taken in urging this amendment. As a
result, Hayes received a good deal of praise from the nation's
capital for his role in gaining ratification by a key
Republican state. He was pleased and proud of his contribution
and seemed to consider it the capstone of the entire recon-
struction effort.56

His political fortunes continued to look promising as his
term of office drew to a close. By March 1871 he knew that he
stood a better than even chance of returning to Washington as
Sherman's successor in the Senate. But while he did "not
expect or desire to withdraw from all interest and participa-
tion in passing events," he declared, he was simply "out of
the race for promotion." He told those who urged him to
challenge Sherman that he would "not be a candidate and shall
avoid being made one, for the senatorship or for any other
high office." While his attitude stemmed in part from a de-
sire to give more attention to family and business affairs,
it also reflected a wariness of associating himself with a
sinking ship, in a moral sense: the Grant administration.
"The Administration of Grant has been faithful on the great
questions or the rights of the colored people," he reflected,
"and has been successful in dealing with the debt. These are
the great matters, and for this the people ought to sustain

ii." But he considered the Santo Domingo affair to be "a

56Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes, pp. 246-48 and Porter,
Wkwernor Hayes,ﬁ_pp. 67-69, 73-75.

 

 

.- .. -‘

95

blunder" and concluded that the "personal affairs of the Ad-
ministration . . . (had) been badly managed in many instances."
Grant's acceptance of gifts, his promotion of the givers, his
quarrel with Sumner and the latter’s removal from the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee were deeply disturbing to Hayes.
This led him to write, like Garfield, that "for the first time
. . . sober people" wondered if Grant should be renominated,
although "the wise heads" had up until recently insisted that
he must be chosen again. He believed that "such advisers as
handler, Cameron, and Conkling . . . (were) too influential
with Grant." Such men were "not safe counsellors," he insisted.
"I hope that the disasters sure to follow this," his diary
continues, "will make them pause and reflect. Otherwise a new
candidate, or defeat, -- perhaps, defeat in any event, —-
awaits the Republican party in 1872."57 This might well be the
best time, personally and politically, to occupy himself with
private pursuits.‘ In his diary he wrote: "‘He who lives a
great truth is incomparably greater than he who but Speaks
it.'" Was this not what Hayes was aiming for in both his
private gpg.public life? Yet the very act of holding office,
especially higher office, put one in a position of depending
upon the integrity of others whose conduct might injure one‘s
good name and reputation. Thus he would continue to take an

interest in politics and would "very likely be a candidate for

57Hayes Diary, March 16, 1871, in Williams, ed., Diary
EglLetters of Hayes, III, 135-36 and Barnard, Rutherford B.

Hayes, 246.

96
subordinate positions," he declared, but his ambition was used
up. "Out of public life is independence," he confided to his
wife. "There may be times of loneliness and lack of excite-
ment, but the general result must be good . . ."58 Perhaps he

had simply and shrewdly laid aside his ambition until a more

propitious time.

58Hayes Diary, April 10, 1871; Hayes to John Hopley,
April 29, 1871 and Hayes to Lucy Hayes, May 7, 1871, in
Wtﬂiams, ed., Diarypand Letters of Hayes, III, 138, 141, 142.

CHAPTER 3
ADVANCEMENT AND ADVERSITY

During Hayes’s Columbus years, Garfield continued his
climb toward financial leadership in the House, but not with-
out some difficulty. By 1868 his monetary views had left him
"standing nearly alone among western members," he wrote, and
under fire at home, too.1 By early 1869, however, he found
that his financial views were gaining support in Congress and
many who had opposed him only a year earlier were now in his
camp, although nearly every resumptionist had his own plan
and could see no other. Garfield himself had come to be
concerned that the gold premium was falling too rapidly and
favored a slower, but still steady course toward resumption.
His tariff views continued to create problems for him and
grumbling district iron men accused him of abandoning pro-
tection for free trade. He denied their accusations of tariff
.heresy and reiterated his belief that ultra-measures simply
'would prove to be their undoing. His efforts from the floor
of the House were now attracting more attention, especially

Ihis stoutly partisan replies to ’Southern Brigadiers' and his

 

1Garfield to Joseph Hawley, July 26, 1868. Garfield

Papers.
97

98

frequent clashes with his chief northern antagonist, Ben Butler.
Both Cox and Hayes had congratulated him on his efforts against
Butler. Hayes wrote to tell him that it was ”absolutely nec-
essary that on such occasions (the debate on Butler’s motion
to censure Ben Wade) somebody Should have the pluck to talk
truth and sense, and it is a fortunate circumStance to have a
man of position and ability to do it."2

Some Ohioians again pressed Garfield to bid for the gover-
norship in 1869, reasoning that he would "thoroughly rouse the
enthusiasm of the party throughout the state," as one corres-
pondent assured him, was essential to Republican success that
year. But he would have no part of it and led his organization
in the nineteenth district in support of Hayes for a second
term; then as a delegate to the state convention, he supported
the incumbent in what Hayes termed a "capital speech." The
Governor hoped he would make "arrangements to speak for the
Committee during the canvass at a long list of meetings" and
the State Executive Committee echoed these sentiments, sug-
gesting however, that he Spend more time in those areas where
his friends had not yet heard him speak. Perhaps the chairman
of the Committee, who was very well disposed toward Garfield,
but cool toward Sherman, had a senatorial bid in mid for him,
for at this time Garfield was receiving encouragement from

other correspondents to challenge the none-too-popular John

« «m---—o .‘"-

 

mum --. ‘-

 

"‘_-" -"--

2Hayes to Garfield, Feb. 18, 1869. Garfield Papers.

99

Sherman and his efficient organization.3

Garfield’s attempts to ease the minds of the protection-
ist element in his district had failed and they continued to
hound him because of his apparently unorthodox views. One such
critic, a Mahoning Valley iron man, confronted him with a fav-
orite protectionist argument. A tariff reduction, he reasoned,
struck ”the hardest blow upon the working classes of the coun-
try." It would necessitate a shut-down of iron works or at
the very least a Vlarge reduction in the prices of labor" in
order to meet the competition of lower European wages. Garfield
was advised by sympathetic supporters that the tariff question
was indeed a crucial issue and they doubted that he could be
reelected if he voted for a reduction. In the minds of the
protectionists he was suspect, for while compiling an essen-
tially protectionist voting record, he had associated with known
tariff reformers, refused to take an ’ultra’ stand and accepted
downward revision as an ultimate goal. It seemed to be "high
time you understood each other," wrote an old friend, but it
was difficult for the iron men and others whom Joseph Medill
called "the High Tariff ManiacsV-to understand that Garfield
was no free trader. One big diStrict iron producer probably
apoke for many of his fellow protectionists when he was quoted

as declaring that Vscholars, thinking men, and fools all favor

—— —_———'-

 

3N. P. Bailey to Garfield, May 13, 1869; Hayes to Garfield,
June 26, 1869 and R. D. Harrison to Garfield, July 23, 1869.

Garfield Papers.

100

free trade, but the practical men are protectionists.“11L

Essentially futile as it would be, for years Garfield
continued the effort to clarify his position on tariff questions.
Late in 1869 he pointed out that exorbitant profits, such as
those reaped by the tariff sheltered salt interests, had al—
ready brought on a sharp public reaction. It would "be a fatal
mistake,” he warned the officers of a Youngstown firm, "for our
manufacturers to resist every proposed modification or reduc-
tion of the Tariff. . .3 Free trade or at least a policy of
moderation was gaining Strength among congressmen from the
Northwest, as was a policy of moderation in New England. If
he were truly a free trader, he would then "insist on such a
general increase in the tariff rates as to make them pro-
hibitory,“ Garfield advised another iron man, for "the reaction
from that policy would bring free trade in a very Short time."
He neatly summed up his dilemma with the lament that "it is ‘
very much easier to be extreme than it is to be judicious."5
The old matter of his independence as a representative was also
involved, since it appeared to him that the ultraprotectionists
wished to own and manipulate him like a puppet. But if he
could not be Vtheir free representative," he assured a close

friend, that he would rather Vnot be their representative at all."

4Brown and Bonnell & Co. to Garfield, Dec. 16, 1870;
Harnmn Austin to Garfield, Jan. 23, 1869; Joseph Medill to
Garfield, March 1, 1870 and Harry Rhodes to Garfield, April

21, 1870. Garfield Papers.

5Garfield to Brown and Bonnell & 00., Dec. 22, 1869 and
Garfield to James Ward & 00., Harris Blackford & Co. and
Thomas Carter, Dec. 29, 1869. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

101

For it was patent, he observed, that Vmany of these men want
a Representative that they can own and carry around in their
pantaloons pocket.? A moderate, but not a crippling, reduc-
tion designed to undercut the free traders, appeared to him
to be the soundest course to follow. He recognized that his
moderate course would alienate free traders and extreme pro-
tectionists alike, giving him a heavy load to bear in his bid
for re-election in 1870. He entered this contest reluctantly,
wishing that he might escape to private life, but he was re-
warded with a decisive victory after having opposed ultra-
protectionism throughout the campaign.6 Moreover, the outcome
of that year’s congressional contests convinced him that the
revenue reformers’ cause had generally gained strength. There-
fore, he was reassured in his opinion, he told Blaine, that the
Republican party should hold to a moderate course, "with the
ship‘s head pointed toward? the reformerst view of the question.7

With yet another victory behind him, his friend Blaine in
the Speaker's chair and as a recognized specialist in financial
questions, Garfield had ample reason to be optimistic concern-
ing his promotion to the chairmanship of ways and Means. Blaine
had, in fact, come as close ”as he ought to" to telling him the
post was his, Garfield confided to Cox, and such would surely

be the case unless outside pressure prevented it. He was most

 

6Garfield to Francis Servis, Jan. 28, 1870; Garfield to
Harnmn Austin, Jan. 31, 1870; Garfield to R. P. Cannon, March
19, 1870 and Garfield to Harry Rhodes, May 30, 1870. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook.

7oct. 20, 1870. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

102
confident in late 1870, but by the time Congress reconvened
in 1871, he was not nearly so certain. Blaine was under "heavy
pressure? from protectionist interests to keep him off the
committee, he reported to Cox, and had therefore broken pre-
cedent and deferred his appointments until Congress would meet
again in December. ”The impression is gaining ground," con-
cluded Garfield, Vthat he is tricky.ﬁ Blaine kept him strictly
in the dark as to his intentions and while he made no effort
on his own behalf, he received steady and substantial support
from Ohio and elsewhere. But even some of these friends and
supporters believed him to be "in sympahty with the anti-pro-
tectionists," as one correSpondent warned him.8 As it turned
out, the conSiderable and hearty backing he enjoyed among

known revenue reformers was support he might well have done

2 f

safer Henry

without, for by mid-summer it appeared that the
Dawes was to be tapped for ways and Means. Garfield consoled
.himself with the thought that given the Republican party's
"shattered condition", the tariff issue was unlikely to be
dealt with so as to ﬁbenefit the country, or confer any honor
on the Committee.” By summer's end his faith in Blaine had
been well undermined and he seemingly cared far less for the
post than he once had. Then when he discovered that the com-

mittee would have a protectionist majority were he made its

chaiiman, he was relieved to be made chairman of Appropriations,

 

8Garfield to Jacob Cox, Oct. 25, 1870 and March 23, 1871.
Garfield Papers. Letterbook. John Q. Smith to Garfield,
.Aug. 21, 1871. Garfield Papers.

 

',b

103

thus escaping what he believed would have been a ”humiliating
position.” Indeed, developments during the life of this
Congress convinced him that the blow had been a blessing in
disguise.9

During the fall and winter of 1871-72, Ohio’s three most
prominent soldier-politicians, Hayes, Garfield and Cox, were
reluctantly drawn into a struggle over the senatorial seat
held by John Sherman. As the bitter contest waxed and waned,
elements of the unstable and disunited anti—Sherman forces
polarized in turn about each of these mutual friends. None of
the trio professed to hold Sherman in high esteem. Only re-
cently, Garfield had declared that he had "never been more
dngusted with Sherman than during this short Session. He is
very conservative for 5 years and then fiercely radical for
one.” His radicalism regularly surfaced during the year of
his re-election. Garfield also professed to find "disgusting"
the tactics employed by ”the official gang of understrappers".
who were ”at work setting up the Sherman job.” He had "no '
stomach for a fight that . . . (had) such elements of nasti-
ness in it,” Garfield declared, despite his belief that the
majority of Ohio's ”thoughtful men" were against Sherman.10

Although it developed that none of the three would openly

challenge Sherman for his office, each would have accepted the

 

9Garfield to Samuel Bowles, March 31, 1871 and Garfield
to William C. Howells, Dec. 12, 1871. Garfield Papers.
Letterbook.

1OGarfield to Harry Rhodes, April 21, 1871 and Garfield
to Jacob Cox, Aug. 14, 1871. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

104
honor under the proper circumstances. Garfield, for example,
was flattered by the attention of those who sought to pit him
against the incumbent, but he preferred to remain in the House
for two more years, when Thurman's term would end. At that
time, he assured one of his supporters, he could with ”no im-
propriety” seek the post. Soon, however, he was being even
more strongly urged to enter the contest and his pleasure over
reports of stout opposition to Sherman in Cleveland and else-
where was barely concealed. He concluded, nevertheless, to
pursue a non-committal course, yet he wished to be kept well
informed as to significant developments. He was unwilling to
precipitate a break, but if one appeared imminent, he believed
that he ”ought to have something to say, about who shall be
chosen.”. He had lost none of his ambition, his yearning for
preferment, and like Sherman, but unlike Cox and Hayes, he was
not above laying a few ’wires' of his own. Like Cox, he was
genuinely repelled by the Shermanites' use of tKing Caucust to
restrain and discipline legislators, robbing them of just that
independence which these two men held dear.11 They evidently
believed the defeat of Sherman would deal a severe blow to the
'use of the caucus system for dictatorial purposes. Hayes, on
the other hand, who managed to preserve his independence with-
in party lines, acted consistently in this contest to sustain
idle caucus as a necessary piece of party machinery.

A

11Garfield to Halsey Hall, Oct. 25, 1871; Garfield to
{Racob Cox, Nov. 7, 1871 and Garfield to Francis Servis,
IDec. 12, 1871. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

105

As anti-Sherman sentiment grew, Cox, who was gaining
favor as a possible stop-Sherman candidate, wrote to Garfield
that if he ”were disposed to make a fight” for the nomination,
he would not consider the ”odds as discouraging.” An open
fight by one of the three was imperative, for as former gover-
nor William Dennison correctly noted, the Senator's real
‘strength lay in ”the absence of any well defined opposition.”
With this in mind, Sherman's forces were basing ”everything on
the necessity of upholding the caucus rule," Garfield was told.
But as he in turn suggested to Cox, this ploy could easily be
made to fail, to which the latter replied that while either of
them ”could do it, . . . (it) would no doubt require precisely
the active effort to organize an opposition which neither" of
them would undertake.12 Nevertheless, some members of Grant’s
official family were fearful that Cox might indeed make an
open and successful bid for Democratic help and in this manner
defeat Sherman. "We don't want Cox here as an opponent of the

' a spokesman for Sec-

Administration and by Democratic favor,f
retary of the Interior Columbus Delano informed Hayes. If

Sherman's defeat appeared likely, either Dennison or Hayes must
be ready to ”step in and unite our friends in the Legislature,”

he cautioned. Hayes replied to his anxious correSpondent that

helnmmelf gave no credence to such rumors and followed this up

12Jacob Cox to Garfield, Oct. 17, 1871; William Dennison
t0Garfield, Nov. 11, 1871; Garfield to Cox, Nov. 1, 1871 and
Jamﬂ>Cox to Garfield, Nov. 21, 1871. Garfield Papers.
Iﬁtterbook.

 

106
with a reassuring letter to John Sherman.13
When the Republican legislators gathered in caucus, Sherman
was quickly declared his party's choice, although some eight
members who voted for him declared they would not be bound by
the decision. Thus as the time of reckoning drew near, either
Garfield, Hayes or Cox was still in a position to snatch the

's grasp. As the manuevering continued,

office from Sherman
Garfield's friends and advisors provided him with a rather con-
fusing picture of affairs at Columbus, along with an abundance
of conflicting advice. And in spite of urgings to the con-
trary, he first freed one supporter to act according to his

own best judgment and then sent the following message to seven
legislators from his own district: "Your dispatch came last
night. I have taken no part, whatever, in the Senatorial Con-
test, have written to no member, except yesterday to Conrad.”
He told this group that he believed ”the law of 1866 was de-.
signed to remove the choice of senators, from the Caucus, to
the Legislature, but of that you must judge. Do as you think
best about presenting my name. No others of you have any
authority from me.” He was not Optimistic about his chances,
but believed his quasi-candidacy could, to use his words, "do
.no harm.” On the contrary, it might well have put him in a
verw'embarassing position and laid him open to sharp attack

:for aiding and abetting the saboteurs of Republican unity: he

 

13M. D. Leggett to Hayes, Nov. 9, 1871; Hayes to M. D.
Legggett, Nov. 15, 1871 and Hayes to John Sherman, Nov. 18,
1Ei71, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters, III, 173-175.

 

107

again seemed to have been engaging in his familiar little game
of self-deception. Apparently he wished to maximize his chances
of taking all the marbles without risking any of his own and
without shouldering the responsibility of openly challenging
Sherman. Some found fault with Garfield for failing to go
"squarely into the fight,” he complained to a friend, but he
might also have been censured for failing to take himself
"squarely” out of the struggle as did Hayes and Cox. He later
confided to an intimate friend that "the Democrats tendered to
me their unanimous vote and enough republicans to elect, with
the help of democrats, expressed themselves willing to bolt
from the Caucus domination.” But he perceived that he "would
be considered as placed under obligations, and therefore de-
clined," Garfield remarked.14

Cox had steadily supported independent action, and any
Republican challenge to what he called ”King Caucus". Yet he
crippled the effectiveness of partisans by discouraging each
and every attempt to bring him into the fight. He steadily
"refused any & all proffers of an understanding with the
Democracy," he assured Garfield.15

Hayes too, flatly refused to have anything to do with the
revolt against Sherman and his use of the caucus, despite the

lxrgent pleas of two midnight legislative emissaries who told

 

14Quoted in Garfield to Halsey Hall, Jan. 5, 1872.
(krrfield Papers. Letterbook. Garfield to Burke Hinsdale,
JaJr. 11, 1872, in Hinsdale, ed., Garfigldjﬁingdalephetters,
p. 185.

15Jacob Cox to Garfield, Jan. 12, 1872. Garfield Papers-

 

108

him that he could be elected if only he would allow them to
use his name. But he avoided like the plague any association
withthe Democracy. He urged upon his callers "the importance
‘of not splitting the Republican party; of electing a Republican
President once more, at least; that the defeat of Grant now was
to give the Government to the enemies of the recent amendments
and to unsettle all.” He concluded by telling his visitors:
"I can't honorably do it, and there is no use talking. . .”
The experience left him certain that the office could have been
his and obviously pleased that his refusal had, as he boasted
to his uncle Sardis, given him ”position, and, true or not,
the common remark is that I am the most esteemed of the gover-
nors within the memory of people living.”16

Sherman came away from the struggle victorious once again,
although Garfield, Hayes, or Cox might well have upset him.
Cox reported to Garfield that he had "learned in a perfectly
authentic way that it was thought the union could be most
easily effected upon” Garfield. But the anti-Sherman Republi-
cans and their Democratic sympathizers were stimied in their
efforts when the Republican Lieutenant Governor and presiding
officer gavelled down their attempted mutiny. Cox was "ab—
solutely certain that Sherman wd. not have been elected except
for-the act of the Lt. Gov. in interrupting the change of

'votes, after it had begun & had been carried forward sometime

“ mﬂ'-“‘—. -‘- “'- - 2.-
V‘___—_———————‘ -——————‘——_

16Hayes Diary, Jan. 10, 1872 and Hayes to Sardis
Birchard, Jan. 9, 1872, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letpgpg
of Haygg, III, 190-91. . .

 

 

109
under his own recognition.” He assured Garfield that "had the
changes gone on, enough Republicans wd. have changed to decide
agt. Sherman, & had the Democracy all voted for me, these
Republicans would have done so, or would have so voted as to
postpone the election and then compare votes." Cox said that
he was certain of the accuracy of his report.. Garfield was
disgusted by the tactics of the lieutenant governor, pointing
out to Cox that an appeal might be made to the U. S. Senate.17
For his own part, he probably agreed with friends that he was
better advised to wait and bid for the senatorship held by the
Democrats. As it was, he had maintained his loyalty to the
party and its power structure and had come away with enhanced
popularity after a significant show of strength.

With his term ended, Hayes left Columbus and the gover-
norship with a distinct sense of relief -- he was once again
an ”independent” citizen of Cincinnati. He turned from poli-
tics to the purSuit of business interests, mainly land specu-
lation in Ohio and Minnesota, plus a bit of dabbling in rail-
road promotion in the hOpe that a projected Toledo to Columbus
line might enhance the prosperity of his future home, Fremont.
He borrowed heavily from affluent relatives to support his
land purchases, determined to assure a secure and comfortable
existence for himself and his family. Perhaps he also hoped
'to make his mark as a shrewd, but upright businessman on the

ordeu'of his long dead father -- the very best businessman his

_ —— — i ——

17Jacob Cox to Garfield, Jan. 12, 1872. Garfield Papers.
Imrtterbook. Garfield to Jacob Cox, Jan. 16, 1872. Garfield

Papers.

110
undeniably successful uncle Sardis had ever encountered.

But while stepping out of public life was a simple affair,
staying free of political commitment proved to be difficult.
Against his wishes, he was made a delegate to the 1872 Repub-
lican National Convention, but while he was not at all eager to
join in an unqualified endorsement of the Grant administration,
he concluded that it would ”be smoother to go than by resign-
ing to get ranked with the Greeley men (the dissident Liberal

Republicans). . .”

As a member of the platform committee at
Philadelphia, he drew up most of that document and returned to
Ohio clearly pleased by the unexpected harmony and enthusiasm
he had witnesses.18 He was now receiving many letters calling
upon him to bid for the nomination to his old congressional
seat, but his stock reply was that it was simply ”‘out of the
question’.” He believed that after having declared his inten-
tion to several active candidates in the field, he could not
now honorably even so much as mention that only a draft would
bring him out. He was nominated, however, deSpite his pro-
tests and although he attempted to withdraw, he was told that
to do so would be disastrous to his party. He could not ”get
out of it creditably,” he insisted to an intimate friend, al-

though it was ”distasteful” mainly for reasons of a "private

nature.” Yet it also tickled his ego. The candidate confessed

 

18Typescript of the Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, May 1872.
Hayes Memorial Library. Hayes to Sardis Birchard, May 14 and
June 10, 1872, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,
III, pp. 203-04. .

111
to his diary that ”the whole thing is, I confess, flattering."19
Another unsolicited nomination -- another laurel to add to those
already won.

After a week of campaigning, Hayes concluded, realisti-
cally, that the outcome was more in doubt than he had initially
believed. The second district was a Greeley stronghold and
Hayes, certain that Greeley must be defeated, did not putt his
punches. Once at it, he enjoyed the work, perhaps because he
anticipated defeat and looked forward to being ”free” within
a short time. He preferred victory, but was not anxious about
it, for as Hayes remarked in his diary, "I don’t want to go to
washington"; the nomination itself and his very willingness to
undertake the contest was satisfaction enough. Well before the
campaign concluded, he anticipated his defeat (apparently few
other did), but scarcely the disasters suffered by his party at
every level in the Cincinnati area. The magnitude of the set-
back was such that it left "no personal sting,” he insisted.
Grant’s victory in Ohio a few weeks later was Solid conso-
lation; Hayes, moreover, took great pleasure in the fact that
he had not only run well ahead of his ticket in October, but

had outpolled Grant, as well.20

 

19Hayes to Sardis Birchard, July 24, 1872; Hayes Diary,
July 25; Aug. 7 and Aug. 8, 1872 and Hayes to Manning Force,
Aug. 10, 1872, in Williams, ed., Diary and_Letters of Hayes,
III, 203, 207, 209-10.

2OHayes Diary, Sept. 8, 1872; Hayes to Sardis Birchard,
Sept.EL 1872; Hayes Diary, Oct. 4, 1872; Hayes to Sardis
Ihxnhard, Oct. 6, 1872; Hayes Diary, Oct. 19, 1872 and Hayes
t01kﬁm Hayes, Nov. 8, 1872, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters ofJIiayes, III, 212, 215, 216, 218.

.”-

 

 

112

Hayes‘s steady party loyalty was not overlooked by the
Grant administration, although it might better have been. In
March 1873 he was surprised to find he had been appointed
Assistant Treasurer for Cincinnati. His initial reaction was
one of gratification that he had been so remembered. It en-
abled him, he wrote, ”to decline an office of profit” as he
was about to leave Cincinnati for Fremont, and it would allow
him to ”leave with a well-rounded political record." But he
was actually piqued by the pettiness of the reward.’ The only
reason to accept the President’s offer of such an office, he
scornfully recorded his diary, would be ”as a means of keeping
hunger from the door. After what I have been and had and
done, it would be small potatoes to grasp this crumb.” Yet
he took quite another line in a letter to his wife. She should
not ”feel otherwise than flattered,” he assured her, for this
was ”the most important office in the West.” And most im-
portant of all, ”the glory of it" was that he could and cer-

' His declination and

tainly would decline this "good office.'
appreciation were soon forwarded to Grant, but he was denied
the pleasure of rejecting the offer by the witless and pro-
voking action of Sherman in requesting that the appointment go
over his confirmation by the Senate. He was confident this
step did not stem from hostility nor was injury intended, he
assured the Senator, yet it "was calculated . . . to injure me
and.to wound my feeling, and frankness requires that I should

Emy'that I think you were in error in your views of duty

underthe circumstances. The incident was closed with an

 

113

apologetic letter of explanation from Sherman and apparently
it left no hard feelings, or so it seems.21

During the final months of Hayes’s second term, Garfield
had found himself faced with another unwanted, but persistent
effort to bring him into the gubernatorial contest, this time
as the successor to Hayes. Garfield records that the Governor
had, in a recent conversation, urged ”that the necessities of
the case in our next campaign, would require me to make the
sacrifice.”~ But the office was by no means suited to his
tastes, he protested, his salary would drop by $1000, his law
practice, a much needed supplement to his congressional salary,
would have to be abandoned and he would surely leave Columbus

' He tried to discourage his eager

"almost broken financially.f
Supporters, but as the party’s outlook grew darker, the pres-
sure to make the bid mounted. Press support grew, and the
State Committee Chairman wrote to him that after a careful
survey of the situation.hg felt that there was no one who had
”so many warm personal friends . . . who will give you their
Support for Governor if it will be accepted.” Some even
claimed that in the absence of a positive declination, a nomi-
nation by the people was not unlikely. He was begged not to
remove himself irrevocably from the race, for withlnm at the

head of the ticket, the party would then attract the young

voters ("the past four years we have not been able to do 80.”)

 

21Hayes Diary, March 26, 1873; Hayes to Lucy Hayes, March
97, ”W3 and Hayes to John Sherman, April 2, 1873, in Williams,
ed-,I)iary and Lgtters of Hayes, III, 233, 234, 236.

114

and this was clearly imperative if both the executive and
legislative branches were to be controlled. Others wrote in
a similar vein or, like former governor William Dennison,
offered their aid.22

But Garfield's eye was fixed upon congressional prefer-
ment and supporters like Dennison agreed that the chairman-
ship of Ways and Means was preferable to the governorship.
Some correspondents, however, reasoned that his election as
governor would assure his certain promotion in the near future,
but he remained skeptical. Sherman and Schenck had arrived in
the Senate (actually the latter had not been a senator) via

another route, he responded, and he was unwilling to be re-

moved from the'line of Congressional promotion" at this time.
Some also urged Garfield to take the governorship and then
immediately challenge Sherman for his seat from a position of
greater strength. Even those who admitted to him that the
governorship ”could have no especial charm for a gentlemen of
your ardent temperament and active turn of mind” were sure
that party needs would demand this sacrifice of him. On the
other hand, a few close friends vehemently insisted that he
must not allow himself to be pressed into service, for there
was but the slimmest chance of a Republican victory and if he

was victorious, he would be stepping down rather than up the

political ladder. It was even rumored that Sherman's friends

 

22Garfield to William Ritezel, Dec. 22, 1870 and Garfield
t0 Reuben, March 24, 1871. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.
Richard Harrison to Garfield, Dec. 24, 1870 and William Dennison
t0<kufield, Dec. 24, 1870. Garfield Papers. -

115
had initiated this boom so as to remove Garfield as a possible
contender for the Senate. Garfield had no intention of trying
for the governorship, but there was political capital to be
gained from the situation. He seems to have agreed with his
chief political advisor who gave him the following intelli-
gence: ”The truth is that no good man wants it. The office
went a begging when Hayes was first elected for that very
reason.”23 Garfield continued to solicit the advice of trust-
ed friends at Columbus, perhaps because he wished to discover
just how his entry into the contest might affect his chances
in the senatorial struggle, should he decide to enter that
contest. Then, despite continued encouragement, he firmly de-
clined to have any part of the governorship and Hayes's good
friend, Edward Noyes, took the nomination and ultimately the
office.

Like Hayes, Garfield had come to have strong reserva-
tions concerning the Grant administration well before the party
made its decision to stay with the incumbent. In the fall of
1870, the reform-minded Jacob Cox had resigned his post as
Grant's Secretary of the Interior. As he paraphrased it in a
letter to Garfield, he had informed the President that his
”committal to civil service reform seems to be a load you do
not chooSe to carry, so here's my resignation.” The split
between the President and the independent-reform Republicans

had begun to widen. As a supporter 0f civil service reform

 

23Garfield to Harry Rhodes, Jan. 28, 1871. Garfield
Papamh Letterbook. William Ritezel to Garfield, Jan. 10,
18712um.Harmon Austin to Garfield, Jan. 29, 1871. Garfield

Papers.

116
and a friend of Cox, Garfield’s reaction to this event was
predictable, but surprisingly harsh. It was ”a clear case
of surrender” by Grant, he replied to Cox, ”to the political
vermin which infest the government and keep it in a state of
perpetual lousiness.” Would that he, too, might seek refuge
in the legal profession from the "noise and nastiness" in
the offing, he lamented to his friend. The party would need
"all its prudence and wisdom in steering clear of the dangers
ahead,” Garfield warned Hayes at this time. There was, in-
deed, considerable public support of Cox, but although Grant
made a bow in the direction of reform in his annual message,
neither Cox nor Garfield harbored much hope for reform pro-
gress under his leadership. It appeared to Cox that orthodox
Republicans were bent upon excluding their reform brethren
from office. He cited an attempt to secure a Superior Court
judgeship for a well known Ohio revenue reformer which Hayes
himself had recently blocked, declaring, according to Cox,
that he would ”under no circumstances appoint him. . ." But
then Hayes could write off the Cox episode and Santo Domingo,
too, as ”merely sensations of the day” which would not alien-
ate the people "as long as the AdminiStration is glghp on the
South and the Democracy Egggg.”24 And so it seemed.

Shortly after leaving Grant's cabinet, Cox informed

 

24Jacob Cox to Garfield, Oct. 24, 1870. Garfield Papers.
Garfield to Jacob Cox, Oct. 25, 1870 and Garfield to Hayes,
Dec. 10, 1870. Garfield Papers. Letterbook. Jacob Cox to
Garfield, Nov. 21, 1871. Garfield Papers. Hayes to Charles
Nordhoff, March 13, 1871, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters

of Hayes, III, 133-34.

117
Garfield that he had become involved in ”forming a little
organization of Revenue Reform & Civil Service Reform Repub-
licans" in Cincinnati. The Liberal Republican movement was
taking shape. A week later, he hastened to reassure Garfield
that he and his associates hadn’t a third party in mind, for
this was a spontaneous development, chiefly aimed at encour-
aging a ”better & freer style” of political discussion. As
the liberal movement gained strength and the disenchantment
with Grant’s administration increased, Garfield began serious-
ly to consider leaving politics in favor of law and the finan-
cial security it promised and he craved. His loyalty to the
party was strained, and although never in real doubt, he
obviously had no stomach for the work of white-washing a soil-
ed administration. ”I have kept close to my work," Garfield
confided to a close friend, "and tried to keep entirely out
of politics. . .” He confesSed to the same correspondent that
”very few republicans in Washington personally” desired Grant’s
liomination or believed it best for country and party. And yet
Inost would support him if they must and Garfield was one of
inlese troubled and reluctant partisans. "It would be a great
'blessing to the party,” he said, "if we could select another
1min." In a letter to Cox, he betrayed his essential agreement
witdl those he referred to as.some of the party’s "best men"
thaﬂ: Grant could not be returned to the White HouSe, and he

predjxcted that the incipient liberal movement would undoubtedly

118
”accomplish a great deal of good.”25
. Meanwhile Garfield had assumed his heavy responsibilities
as chairman of the Appropriations Committee, approaching his
tasks as systematically and objectively as possible, search-
ing for the ”laws” that influenced government expenditures.
His heavy work load and conscientious approach kept him labor-
ing for an average of more than fifteen hours a day from Feb-
ruary until mid-May in 1872 and more "crushing hard work" lay
ahead. Yet he believed that he had "never been so succeSSful. . .”
He continued to support civil service reform, but found it
discouraging that Congress should treat it with what he call-
ed ”contempt.” He foresaw that the Republican party was moving
into an era of storm and stress and predicted to a friend that
perhaps 1872 would witness its "last victory, if not its first
defeat.” The GOP's best hope, he reckoned, ”lay in the people's
fear that with the Democrats in power, the work of the last
several years would be undone.”26 Hayes and a good many lead-
ers shared this belief. Indeed, it was an article of faith
and the rallying cry of countless Republican campaigns during
this era. In the campaignfto select his successor as governor

in 1871, Hayes had insisted that the ”important question" was

 

25Jacob Cox to Garfield, March 20 and March 27, 1871.
Garfirﬂd.Papers. Garfield to William C. Howells, April 10,
'H372 and Garfield to Jacob Cox, April 8, 1871. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook.

26Garfield Diary, Jan. 19, 1872, in Brown and Williams,
eds., Iﬂary_2f‘9a;§ield, II, 9; Garfield to Harmon Austin,
nay 1CD, 1872; Garfield to Sam Hayward, April 19, 1872;
Gariﬁxild to'William Farrar, April 27, 1872 and Garfield to
Saniihayward, April 19, 1872. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

119
could the Democrats ”safely be trusted" to "faithfully obey
and enforce the Amendments” if they took control of the
national government on the heels of an Ohio victory? No, he
declared, for they were neither ”sound" nor ”to be trusted.”
Yet only a little later, he wrote to his friend Guy Bryan in
Texas that the tide of ”sectional bitterness" was ebbing and
would never flow again.. ”The old strifes are about to end,”
Hayes assured him. ”An era of good feeling prevails here to
a degree not seen before in fifty years."27 One wonders how
he could pen these sentiments after concluding a campaign in
which his Speeches were predicted upon the essential disloyalty
and shiftiness of the Democrats -- a contest which could only
have aroused rather than soothed sectional animosity and
suspicion.

Although he was surprised at the outcome of the Liberal
Republican gathering, Garfield did not take the Cincinnati
nominations lightly. It was ironic, but the course of events
there had gone ”far to maintain the caucus system in all its
'viciousness,” he wrote to the disappointed Cox. Yet, he con-
tinued, if the Republican convention had ”the foresight and
courage" to dump Grant for a unifying figure, all might be well.
But the outcome at Cincinnati had for the time being doomed
'Urriff reform hopes, although the prospect for improvement had

beeul bright when Congress convened, Garfield claimed. Greeley’s

n-m-“-----‘—'--_r-—- u- -uw-----u.-——’-

27Hayes Diary, June 12, 1871 and Hayes to Guy Bryan,
Dec. :24, 1871, in Williams, ed., Dia£y_and_Letter§_gf_Hgygg,
III, 147, 180. .

 

120

nomination had ”destroyed utterly all hopes" of the kind of
revenue reform Cox and others had in mind when the movement
was begun. Garfield believed that a substantial number of
reforms were indeed necessary and sympathized with the Liberals’
major aims, he felt they should be made from within the party
structure.28

Hayes, as has been mentioned, was not blind to the errors
and shortcomings of the Grant administration, which he called
”many and mortifying.” But in spite of guarded references to
independent attitudes and the ”new parties and new divisions . .
in plain view ahead”, he would have nothing to do with the
break-away movement. While he agreed with Greeley on amnesty
and had much in common with the genteel reformers who were
prominent in the Liberal effort, he was determined to exer-
cise his independence within party lines. And as a private
citizen he could, as he undoubtedly anticipated, retain the
confidence of both stalwarts and reformers far more easily than
he could have as an Officeholder in a time of unrest, upheaval
and realignment.29

With political activity set aside for the moment, Hayes
was able to continue his pursuit of ”buying, selling and im-
proving real estate,” as his diary describes it. It is in-

structive to note that even as a capitalist (and this is how

 

 

--— -— --—

28Garfield to Jacob Cox, May 14 and Sept. 14, 1872.
Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

29Hayes to Charles Nordhoff, March 13, 1871; Hayes to.
GtW'Bryan, Dec. 24, 1871 and Hayes Diary, March 28, 1875, in
Vhlliams, ed., Diary and Lgppgps pf Hayes, III, 134, 180, 269.

121

he described himself) he was ever the scrupulous gentleman,
declaring that he did ”not intend to take advantage of people’s
necessities” and would pay only a fair price for his purchases.
In Ohio, his attention centered on Toledo where he hOped ris-
ing land values might make his share in several joint ventures
worth no less than a million dollars in fifteen to twenty
years. Another joint investment in land and a building in
Duluth brought him heavy debts and some worry, but even at that
and without the security he inherited from his uncle Sardis, he
enjoyed the kind of case that Garfield would never know.30

Following his unsuccessful congressional campaign, Hayes
had returned to Fremont and his uncle’s estate, where he could
enjoy the leisure, independence and home which perfectly suit-
ed his genteel middle class inclinations. Hereafter politics
would be more than ever before an avocation, almost a di—
version or hobby -- an outlet for his strongly developed sense
of noblesse oblige and nourishment for his fair-sized ego.
The scope of his land dealing continued to expand during 1873
and 1874. He shared ownership of considerable mineral rights
and acreage in West Virginia and put the value of his Toledo
and Columbus holdings at a quarter of a million dollars. By
1873 he was moving steadily toward his stated goal of creating
a solid estate for himself and his family. But he worried, too,
for he found himself managing a debt of over forty-six thousand

dollars and was anxious lest he be driven into a corner.

30Hayes Diary, April 22 and 30, 1873, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 238, 241.

122
Although he was a debtor, he was in no wise tempted by the
spreading inflationist doctrine, declaring that he could
shoulder his burden without Special relief, and was pleased
that Grant had vetoed the so-called inflation bill.31 He con-
tinued to take an active interest in politics, too, and gave
his party all the aid he could from the stump, particularly
during the 1874 campaign.

During his congressional service, Hayes and more than a
few of his colleagues -- including Garfield -- had mirrored
the enduring American faith in the improvability of man and
the possibility of accelerating that process through education.
By 1875 this emphasis on the efficacy of education and bene-
ficient powers of time had become for Hayes twin panaceas for
his nation’s Negro and immigrant problems. In a letter to
Buy Bryan he declared ”that the most important thing in Texas,
as everywhere else, is education for all”, hastening to add,
however, that he opposed forcible integration. The Southern
dilemma was hardly unique, for mushrooming northern cities
also had large uneducated masses to contend with. The thing
to fear, he told his friend, was ”the evil of rule by ignorance”
which must be countered not by political disenfranchisement of '
this group (thus abandoning a national commitment), but by

leading the unenlightened toward full partnership in public

 

 

31Hayes Diary, Sept. 13, 1873; Hayes to Amos Birchard,.
April 21, 1874 and Hayes to Manning Force, April 27, 1873, in
Vﬁlliams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayeg, III, 248-49,
255-560 . .

123

affairs. ”The whites of the South must do as we do,” he
gently chided Bryan, ”and forget to drive gnd learn to lead
the ignorant masses around them.” He believed that he and his
Texas friend were now closer together than when they had been
schoolmates at Kenyon and he predicted that they would ”pro-
bably soon vote the same ticket.” But, he hastened to add,
this would come to pass only if the hope of slavery’s return
in some other guise was forever abandoned.32

The implication appears to be that so long as vestiges
of the old South and the lost cause were kept alive, that sec-
tion was not to be fully trusted to hold the reins of national
government. In spite of a desire for sectional harmony and
their personal good feeling toward individual southerners,
Hayes, Garfield and men of a similar persuasion demanded proof
positive of their former enemy’s good intentions. A kind of
deposit of earnest money must be made before the thought of a
Democratic administration would be tolerable. Yet surely they
were troubled as the years passed by the repetition of the
sectional theme in its most exaggerated and bitter form. Hayes
and especially Garfield fastened upon other themes by the mid-
seventies, and correctly anticipated major issues of the near
future. They cautioned that fresh political motifs must be
considered. But given the essentially even balance of power
between the two parties during the twenty years following 1875,

the sectional theme was unusually seductive and steadily paid

 

32Jan. 2, 1875, in Williams, ed., Diapy and Letters of
Hayes, III, 262-63.

124
handsome dividends at the polls. Party loyalty and faith in
party ’principles’, however vague and vapid, drew party regu-
lars back to the familiar themes time and again, and eased the
minds of those whose consciences told them sectionalism was

essentially divisive and lacked creditability.

Late in the summer of 1872, the Credit Mobilier scandal
broke upon the American scene like a whirlwind, leaving politi-
cal wreckage scattered in its wake. Garfield for one, was
struck a stunning blow. He had anticipated that this company
spelled trouble some time earlier, and deemed it fortunate, as
he told a friend, that he had ”never fully concluded to accept”
Oakes Ames's offer of Credit Mobilier stock and so had not '
received any dividend. The money that had passed between the
two men, he contended, had been a loan from Ames to him some
years earlier following his European trip. He told his friends
that stock had been offered, but that after a warning from
Jeremiah Black, he had turned down the offer. In a letter to
an intimate friend, he wrote as follows: ”Whatever may have
been the follies, and blunders of my public career, it is a
satisfaction to me to be perfectly conscious that I have done
nothing of which my best friends can feel ashamed, or anything
which my worst enemies can justly condemn.” This may have been
accurate, but friends would feel chagrined and critics would
feel their strictures were justified as they contemplated his

cmnduct. .AS one of his closest friends put it, more than a

125

few of his supporters believed that he ”ought to have told the
whole story from the time Ames approached” him to the end of
the episode.33 '

The full story, which his friend and Washington journalist
Donn Piatt had from Black more than two years before the scan-
dal broke, was apparently less incriminating and damaging than
the half-truths and incomplete statements made by Garfield.
And as friendly, but candid allies of Garfield informed him,
public opinion was running strongly in Ames's favor during the
first months of the episode, simply because it was felt that
he had made a ”clean breast” of things. Perhaps the most
lamentable feature of the affair was the impact it had on
Garfield's closest friends -- those men who willingly under-
took the painful task of defending him in his district. One
of the most faithful supporters spoke for them all when he
wrote: ”While I have no doubt of your purity, I have been made
very sad, that you have been placed in a bad light before the
country. We have all looked to you as a model of truth &
noble manliness, & you will consequently suffer more in public
estimation than if you had before been looked upon in a doubt-
ful light.” He concluded by admonishing him that ”whatever you
do, take care of your conscience even at the expense of your
reputation.” Garfield would have been well advised, person-

ally, and politically, to have adhered strictly to this sage

_ _ ‘ﬁ‘

33Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Dec. 31, 1872, in Hinsdale,
eda, Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, p. 202; Garfield to Frank
Mamnu Jan. 9, 1873. Garfield Papers. Letterbook. Burke
lﬁrsdale to.Garfield, Jan. 20, 1873, in Hinsdale, ed.,

Garfield-jiinsdale Letters, p. 209.

 

126

counsel. As it was, his reputation continued to suffer, even
among those people who saw nothing wrong in what they under-
stood had happened, primarily because his denials seemed to
them indicative of a lack ”of true courage to confess the
truth.” Despite the concerted efforts of his defenders and
his own often repeated explanation, he was informed that
”while very few regard you as gggyggtgg.nearly all regard you
as under a cloud.” This cloud continued to dog his footsteps,
sometimes at a distance, yet seldom failing to cast its sha-
dow across his path. ”You must fight it out until you out-
live it or out grow it,” his chief political advisor told him.
It proved to be sound advice.34

The fight waxed and waned over the next eight years, but
this blot upon Garfield's record proved to be indelible. And
in later years, as in 1872-73, he was ”more censured for
denying” a transaction with Ames, he was assured, than he would
have been had he ”frankly acknowledged it & claimed the pur-
chase was made in good faith that it was all right." This was,
in fact, ”a double hit, not only at your sagacity & judgment
but still greater at your integrity," he was told. "In short
it is often said, tI do not blame him half so much for taking
the stock as for lying about it after he had it.’” This kind

of judgment lent weight to the persistent charge that he was

w——~——-———~_ —~———— ‘

34Donn Piatt to Garfield, Sept. 29, 1872; John Robison

to Garfield, Feb. 1, 1873; Harmon Austin to Garfield, Feb. 6,
1873; John Robison to Garfield, Feb. 9, 1873 and Harmon Austin
in Garfield, Feb. 6, 1873. Garfield Papers.

127

wanting in moral courage and backbone and could not as Hayes
would put it, ”face a frowning world.”35

On the heels of this bruising experience came the so-
called Salary Grab, a decision to increase retroactively
legislative, executive and judicial salaries through a rider
attached to an appropriations bill. The public reaction to
the increase in congressional compensation was exaggerated
and unreasonable and nowhere was it more violent than in
Garfield’s district. After vigorously opposing the salary
rider, he had voted for it in the end, arguing that only thus
could the appropriation measure win approval and an extra
Session be avoided. When word of his action reached Ohio,
{the initial reaction of one correSpondent was to call it ”the
finishing stroke” to Garfield's once promising political
career. Garfield, in turn, was ready to abandon his post
"in dngust” and leave "a field where ten years of earnest,
honest work goes for nought in the face of one vote. . .” He
admitted it might be judged "a mistake”, but it was ”honestly
made” after having voted no ”less than fifteen times" against
the salary provision. He argued that a final nay vote could
not possibly have changed the outcome. He was quite aware
that he stood within the ”shadow” of Credit Mobilier, but as
he summed it up in one letter, ”I was determined I would not

do a cowardly act because of that shadow; nor would I, on

 

35Harmon Austin to Garfield, Feb. 6, 1873. Garfield
Papers. ,Hayes Diary, Feb. 21, 1883, in Williams, ed., Diary
and.Letters of Hayes, IV, 110.

128
account of it, shrink from what seemed to my duty.”36 It was
as if he was bent upon disproving the accusation that he lack-
ed moral courage and backbone and was thus unfit to serve in
the House and act as one of its leaders. But by his action
in this matter, he simply added weight to the argument that he
was wanting in backbone and did not have the courage of his
convictions.

Garfield's justification of his course may have satisfied
some of his ”thinking” friends, one advisor informed him, but
there was not ”one in ten” who would ever be satisfied with his
explanations. And he was now warned, if he accepted his extra
pay, all would surely be lost.37 He did deny himself the
additional salary shortly after it was approved, but he did
not do so at once and in conjunction with a public statement
of the reasoning behind his final vote. Therefore he and his
advisors felt such an announcement must then be delayed for a
time, lest he appear to be acting under duress. Like most of
his colleagues, he had been stunned by the violence of the
public’s reaction and realized too late that explanations

backed up by self-denying declarations should have come at once.38

 

36Harmon Austin to Garfield, March 4, 1873. Garfield
Papers. Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, March.19 and March 21,
1873, in Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 218,
21. Garfield to Harmon Austin, March 22, 1873. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook.

37Harmon Austin to Garfield, March 23, 1873 and Thomas
McLain to Garfield, March 24, 1873. Garfield Papers.

38Harmon Austin to Garfield, March 27, 1873. Garfield
Papamn Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, March 19, 1873, Hinsdale,
ed.,Cmrfield-Hinsdale Letters, p. 218. Garfield to Henry
Ibssema April 5, 1873. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

 

129
What is more, Garfield's stand was conditioned by his view of
his position as an independent representative -- an idealistic,
high-minded, but politically inexpedient notion, even in a
relatively tsafet district.

The double burden of Credit Mobilier and the Salary Grab
appeared to be too heavy a load to be borne without collapse.
Township delegates gathered to nominate constitutional conven-
tion delegates from his district approved a resolution asking
for his immediate resignation. And while it was asserted that
only one-quarter of the county’s Republicans would support this
demand, he was told by one informant that ”99/100ths' of his
party would Censure him for his vote. Harmon Austin again
neatly summed up the situation when he wrote as follows: "The
chief argument among the masses is that you preached reform in
expenses & was (Sic) elected with understanding & contract that
you were to have 5000 & then on the last day after all your
work was done you voted yourselves $2500 more & that they say
is stealing.” Probably few of his constituents realized the
connection between Credit Mobilier and his vote for salary
increases. The appropriation bill contained provisions, which
he had staunchly supported, designed to strike an effective
blow ”against those who had already robbed the Pacific rail—
road” at the government‘s expense, he explained. Therefore,
he reasoned, had he ”attempted to defeat the bill on its
final passage . . . (his) vote might have been construed into

a willingness to prevent a prosecution of plunderers" with

whmniﬂs name had been linked. Moreover, as Appropriations

 

130
Committee chairman, he insisted that he was uniquely charged
with the responsibility of putting such bills through the
House, notwithstanding its grave Shortcomings. It came down
to a matter of priorities, but unfortunately the majority of
his constituents did not judge them as did Garfield. To vote
againSt the bill ”merely to avoid criticism,” he contended,
"would have been an inconsistent and cowardly act. . ." He
would not apologize for a vote he still approved of, but ad—
mitted to having made his ”full share of blunders and mistakes”
and perhaps this act ”added another to the list."39 His pub-
lished defense or the salary vote, and an announCement that he
had denied himself extra pay, was followed by an extended
pamphlet review of the Credit Mobilier affair. He was confi-
dent that he had now put before the public a strong brief on
his behalf that would serve to counteract the efforts of
journalists like Charles Dana to crush him.

By mid-summer, Garfield appeared self-assured, predicting
that at that moment he could win renomination and reeelection.
Recent events had created a powoer-keg-like situation and the
"salary increase was the match that lighted the fuse,” he told
one friend. It was a tangible thing that everybody could
understand, he continued, but it was not as most thought ”the

chief cause of their rage.” His re-election, however, still

‘— —

59Harmon Austin to Garfield, March 27, 1873; Thomas McLain
to Garfield, March 29, 1873; Harmon Austin to Garfield, March
$3,1873 and Garfield, ”To the Republican Voters of the Nine—
teenth District, " Hiram, April 21, 1873 (1st draft, dated
Hiram, April 1 ). '. Garfield Papers.

131

remained in doubt; moreover Garfield, a powerful stump speaker,
was ohagrined to find that Governor Noyes and the State Central
Committee were giving him the cold—shoulder in the 1873 state
campaign. The man for whom there had been more calls during
the last gubernatorial contest than for any other speaker found
it hard to hold himself in check and bear this treatment with
equanimity. When the Republicans met with defeat at the polls,
he found himself Sharply assailed in the press and charged by
some with the responsibility for his party‘s setback.4O His
prospects for promotion, once so bright, had also been dealt

an exceedingly heavy blow during the preceding year. Edwin

Cowles, editor-publisher of the Cleveland Leader, had intended

 

to back Garfield for the presidency in 1876, he told Blaine,
but that was now out of the question no matter ”how pure and
innocent" Garfield might be. One might reasonably assume that
without these scandals, Cowles would not have been alone in

his intentions. It also lends added interest to speculation
engaged in by Garfield‘s intimate friend, David Swaim. After
conversations with Garfield touching upon the next presidential
nomination, and a bit of personal reconnoitering, Swaim sug-
gested that someone was anxious to knock Garfield effectively
out of contention for highest party honors. He had concluded,
he wrote to Garfield, that ”Blaine had put up a job to kill off

a few prominent men who would likely be in his way in the future"

—__ _-_
—— w.

4OGarfield to John Q. Smith, Aug. 5, 1873; Garfield to
imimon.Austin, Sept. 19, 1873 and Garfield to William C.
Homﬂls, Oct. 27, 1873. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

132

and he was "still inclined to that belief. . ." The investi-
gation itself had been instigated with Garfield‘s prior know-
ledge and encouragement.41

When Garfield returned to Washington that fall, he feared
that he might be made to suffer‘when it came to committee
assignments. He was heartened, therefore, when the Ohio Re-
publican members unanimously supported his reappointment as
chairman of Appropriations. After being reassigned to that
important post, he immediately let it be know that despite its
unpopularity, he must and would pursue an austerity program in
his committee: the depressed national economy demanded it.
Once again, he found himself regularly working some fifteen
hours daily, but it was to some purpose for he soon announced
proudly that a ten million dollar reduction over 1873‘s appro-
priations had been achieved and departmental estimates reduced
by some fifteen million.42 As Garfield pursued his stated
goal of trimming federal expenses, he succeeded in stirring
up a hornets‘ nest in his own district. How could he think of
reducing Ashtabula‘s harbor appropriation when other Lake Erie
ports were being ”allowed the full estimates,” complained one

unhappy constituent. Moreover, at the very same moment, he

 

41Edwin Cowles to James G. Blaine, Nov. 25, 1873 and
David Swaim to Garfield, March 29, 1873. Garfield Papers.
Garfield Diary, Dec. 1, 1872, in Brown and Williams, eds.,

Diary of Garfield, II, 120.

42Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Nov. 24, 1873 and Jan. 8,
1874, in HinSdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 252—53,
271-72. Garfield to Simon Wolcott, Feb. 27, 1874. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook.

133

was warned that Since ”your friends are urging your renomina-
tion on the ground of your superior ability to help them it
makes your Situation still more embarrassing. . .” The plight
of the thrift-minded congressman was in no wise enviable. On
the one hand the powerful Columbus Postmaster and editor,
James Comly, must be reassured that postal appropriations were
safe, and yet Garfield would be asked by another correspondent
to believe that ”rigid economy in all governmental affairs was
heartily endorsed by all” of his constituents. To add to his
woes, and in Spite of his known concern over inordinate rail-
road power and the emerging threat of monopoly power in general,
the Granger movement in his district was gaining momentum and
seemed destined to become yet another thorn in Garfield's
side.43

AS convention time approached in his district, the threat
of a sharp fight for renomination began to recede, but then
quite suddenly the prohibition issue assumed frightening pro-
portions and on top of this the Democratic controlled legis-
lature seemed bent upon redistricting Garfield out of his safe
haven.44 Nevertheless, his Optimism concerning renomination
and re-election grew, although his hopefulness was more than
matched by his reluctance to undertake the battle his less

optimistic supporters believed was imperative. in a letter

 

43Harmon Austin to Garfield, Feb. 11, 1874 and Enos
Brainerd to Garfield, Feb. 13, 1874. Garfield Papers.

44George Ford to Garfield, April 10, 1874; Halsey Hall
to Garfield, April 12, 1874 and Harmon Austin to Garfield,
4Pril 16, 1874. Garfield Papers.

134
to Cox, Garfield wrote that he ”sincerely longed to be out of
public life”, and he was obviouSly deeply distraught by the
Stinging press attacks upon him. He stayed on only because the
defense of his ”good name” demanded it, he insisted. The com—
bination of overwork and personal agony also had its physical
repercussions, in the form of an afflication his doctors
labeled ”neuralgic dypepsia.” At this point he queried his
supporters as to the advisability of a European trip -- to be
taken at campaign time! Not only was he seriously considering
such a venture, but he was thinking of associating himself with
an American investment scheme in Europe of doubtful character,
one that promised to involve him in a Schenck-like Scandal. It
might very well compel him and his ”friends to carry another
weight," one of his friends hastened to warn him. Yet the trip
might save him from a personally distasteful and protracted
campaign of self-defense, offer the much needed rest and re-
habilitation, and perhaps financial rewards as well. But with
the truly admirable support of loyal friends, he undertook an
onerous task and after easily winning renomination, carried
the election by a reduced, but substantial margin. "Quite a
feat", wrote his friend and neighboring congressman, Charles
Foster, for he had been ”subjected to the most merciless fire

within. . . (Foster‘s) recolleCtlon."4D Garfield might well

 

45Garfield to Jacob Cox, March 20, 1874. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook. Garfield Diary, June 25, 1874, in Brown
and Williams, eds., Diary of Garfield, ll, 340. Harmon Austin
to Garfield, June 29, 1874 and Charles Foster to Garfield,
Oct. 20, 1874. Garfield Papers.

 

-,—__._.. __.._._ . .__,..—-—-—...,_—_—

“w-M .- ..... .

135

feel he had won a vindication and could now freely consider
a return to private life -- in the near future.

Victory did much to brighten his political outlook and
buoy up his damaged spirits, yet he was not optimistic as to
his party‘s future. The congressional contests had given the
Democrats control of the House for at least the next two years
and matters like the continued employment of federal troops in
the South for political purposes threatened future injury to
his party. The fall and winter of 1874-75 witnessed an explo-
sion over the interference in Louisians political affairs by
General Sheridan and his troops. The Negro had undoubtedly
been suffering dreadfully in that state, where his rights had
been violated with impunity, Garfield admitted, but Sheridan‘s
actions might ”turn the tide of public indignation against him
and the adminiStration. ”46

Genuinely upset by the episooe, Garfield was initially
critical of Sheridan‘s conduct, but kept his counsel in the
House -- apparently much to the satisfaction of his consti-
tuents. Charles Foster, a member of the committee Congress
sent South to investigate the affair, was quoted as declaring
that if Grant was to support the carpetbag regime for two more
years, and this seemed probable, it would be "utterly out of
the question to elect a Republican President in 1876.” Both

Foster and Garfield believed the intempcrate use of military

 

4bGarfield to Harmon Austin, Jan. 9, 1875. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook.

 

136

force was politically self-defeating, not only in the South,
but in the North as well. AS the ’facts’ of the case were
developed, support in Ohio for Grant’s course grew, and per-
haps many Republicans, who like Harmon Austin saw ”serious
wrong on both sides”, came to believe that "success in 1876
depends upon the revival of the spirit of 1868 -- and letting
the people see the rebellion is still as rank as ever in the
Southern heart.”47 Garfield's sympathies were with the suf-
fering southern Negroes, but mingled with this feeling was an
appreciation of the political benefits the GOP might reap,
thanks to southern misconduct. He had predicted during his
campaign for re-election in 1874 that Democratic control in
the South would bring back rebellion with a vengence. He even
came to speak out in defense of Sheridan's conduct and follow-
ed this up with a blast against a hot statest right speech
made by Georgia’s Ben Hill -- a speech which was received with
excessive praise.48

In Ohio, at least, the party did seem to be recovering
nicely from its 1873 setback. Garfield openly favored Hayes
for the gubernatoral nomination in 1875, and referred to him

as "an unexceptionable man” who had ”run so well in all parts

47Unidentified clipping in Charles Henry to Garfield,
Jan. 10, 1875 and Harmon Austin to Garfield, Jan. 15, 1875.

Garfield Papers.

48Garfield to Harmon Austin, Jan. 9, 1875. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook. Orlando Morgan to Garfield, Jan. 27,
1875 and Irvin McDowell to Garfield, Feb. 9, 1875. Garfield
Papers. Smith, Life and Letter§_of Garfield, I, 593-595.

137
of" Ohio that it was probable that he would do so again. He
was genuinely pleased when the Ohio GOP chose Hayes as their
standard bearer, especially since it was reported that this
would bring many Liberal Republicans back into the fold for
this crucial contest. Not only the nomination, but the party's
sound money platform cheered him, for now, he declared, the
Republicans ought surely to take control of the state from the
Democracy. He wrote to Hayes of his efforts to secure support
for him in northern Ohio and of the out-of-state speakers he
hoped to bring into the contest. While in Washington, Garfield
told the nominee, he would urge the National Committee ”to make
strenuous efforts to raise money for our campaign, so that
nothing may be wanting to push it with vigor." As to campaign

tactics, he predictably urged a forthright stand for monetary

t I

soundness , confident that the gains made on that issue would
easily outweigh the losses. He campaigned as much as his
temporarily impaired health would allow and concluded his effort
satisfied that he had done his best in his own area, where he
declared, he was now ”stronger . . . than ever before." Poli-
tically, he was well along the road toward recovery, but what

he termed as ”the bread and butter question" was again troub-
ling him. A point of no return was drawing near for Garfield

as far as his career in politics was concerned and yet if he
moved soon enough, he could assure his financial security and
attend personally to his childrenst education, too. "That done,

I could re-enter public life with a freer mind and without that

anxhﬂw which so constantly pursues me now," he reflected. The

138

idea of a permanent resignation from politics was not in his
plans.49

Less than two years after Hayes left active political
life, he had once again been chosen to head the Republican
ticket in his state. When the legislative caucus came out
strongly for him he was flattered, for he believed a third
term for an Ohio governor was unprecedented. To his diary he
admitted it was ”a feather” he would be pleased to sport. But
his investments demanded close attention, GOP hopes for October
seemed dim and yet he was quite prepared to fight and lose if
the ”cause was wholly and clearly good and important," he de-
clared. But he had his doubts. Like his Liberal brethren, he
did not ”Sympathize with a large share of his party’s leaders,”
he confeSsed to his diary. What is more, he hated ”the cor- .
ruptionists” headed by Ben Butler, doubted the ”ultra measures
relating to the South” and was genuinely disturbed by the talk
of a third term for Grant. It was also suggested that a victory
would give gym good position in the contest for the presidential
nomination in 1876 and this struck a responsive chord. The
thought had surely crossed his mind, his ambition not being
dead, although he could not help but be aware that he stood
fairly well back in his party's ranks as a national figure.
ﬂHﬂlS he responded to the idea with this comment to his journal:
'Thiw wild! What a queer lot we are becoming! Nobody is out of
reach.of that mania.” To an intimate friend who assured him

49Garfield to John Q. Smith, April 16, 1875; Garfield to
Hayes, June 24, 1875 and Garfield to John Q. Smith, Oct. 30,
1875. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

139
a third term at Columbus would make him the next President, he
admitted he would like the governorship again, but was anxious
to secure financial independence, too. He could not become a
candidate for the nomination, he insisted, and his decision
was Vfinal.? Business affairs must for now take precedent over
politics.50.

The urging continued, however, and although he told him-
self he was rno less averse? than ever, Hayes was available.
If those in the race should withdraw and if the convention
should, with full knowledge of his preference, call upon him
to make the bid, he would abide by their decision. "A general
demand by the party that has honored me so often," diary entry
ran, VI regard as a command which I must obey.” Tn politics
as in the army, he was the uncomplaining and obedient soldier,
ever ready to do his duty. But at the same time, he was an
egoist of sorts, who cherished the prospect of just such a call
and was keenly aware of the possible political consequences of
an election to a third term. The nomination, however, could
not be sullied: the avowed candidates must voluntarily abandon
the field in his favor. He would not be a party to an open
contest with the major contender, Alphonso Taft, and so in-
formed his spokesmen in Cincinnati. This was all they needed
to know. They skillfully manuevered Taft into an untenable
position, robbed him of much of his support and won the nomi-

nation for Hayes. A mutual friend of the two men thereupon

 

50Hayes Diary, March 28 and April 14, 1875 and Hayes to
WEUjam Bickham, April 14, 1875, in Williams, ed., Diary
andIetters of Hayes, III, 269-70. -

14o
moved that the decision be made unanimous (which was important
to Hayes) and the job was completed. Hayes, genuinely dis-
turbed lest his reputation be endangered by the tactics used,
had moved to protect it by writing a letter declining the
honor. This proved unnecessary, however, for Taft’s son him-
self asked that Hayes be chosen by acclamation and that, Hayes
recorded complacently, Fwas splendidly carried.” He was cer-
tain that he had done all he could to prevent his own nomi-
nation and help his opponent and could not justifiably be held
responsible for his defeat.51 His reputation was still safe.
Once again he had remained true to his conviction that one
must wait to be called upon to bid for an office -- a commonly
held belief in which ethics and superstition were intermingled

with the ’lessons'

of American political history.

Hayes quickly settled upon the issues that must take a
prominent place in the coming campaign. The Ohio GOP must
”rebuke thetgempcracy by a defeat for subserviency_to Roman
Catholic demand§,? he declared to his diary.52 He apparently

hoped that the party could concentrate on demonstrating that

the Democracy could not be trusted with the reins of power

 

51Hayes Diary, May 31 and June 3, 1875, in Williams, ed.,
Diary,and_Letters of Hayes, III, 273-74.

52Hayes Diary, June 3, 1875, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 274. The Democratic controlled legis-
lature—had enacted legislation providing that every person
confined to state prisons and hospitals should be allowed to
choose the type of religious service he‘ wished. All were
to be provided with generous and equal facilities for religious
purposes. The bill was intended to make possible the appoint-
mmﬂ;of Catholic priests as State chaplains. Heretofore only
Protestants had held this post.

141
while steering clear of national issue like the money question
which would soon, nevertheless, become the major issue in the
contest. But after receiving Garfield’s opinions on the
question of campaign tactics, he replied by saying that "your
ideas are precisely mine.” The inflation question, which Hayes
had at first hoped to play down, would have to be fought out
in Ohio even though it would cost the party votes. This issue
would come to overshadow the significant, but essentially
regional, religious question. Developments in Ohio were care-
fully watched by Republicans in neighboring states like Pennsyl-
vania, where the GOP hoped to benefit in terms of strategy and
impact from the Ohio experience. Out-of-state speakers from
both parties entered the fray and Ohio Republicans quickly
called upon the party‘s best stump men to come to the aid of
their hard-pressed brethren. "I trust4you will make your
arrangements,” Hayes urged Garfield, "to give us all your time
until the election. W§_n§§g_it.9 What was most required was
the help of the party's foremost advocates of soundness and
this meant national figures like Garfield, Sherman and the re-
patriated Carl Schurz. Sherman opened the campaign with Hayes
and to him the candidate admitted that he had not so much as
seen a copy of the Resumption Act.53 The key to success, he

believed, was to hit hard on the twin issues of "honest money

 

53Hayes Diary, June 4, 1875, in Williams, ed., Diary of
a President, pp. 5-9. Hayes to Garfield, June 22, 1875..
Garfield Papers. Hayes to John Sherman, June 29, 1875, ln

Vﬁlliams, ed., Diary and Letters oprayes, III, 282.

 

 

142

and no sectarian interference with the schools." Hayes cam-

*‘—-m—“--wu

paigned diligently, but he was experiencing financial set-

backs himself and said jokingly that "nothing but infla tl’ on

 

will relieve me for the next months.V' As election time ap-
proached, he was disturbed by the mounting number of defections
of Republicans to the inflationist camp, apparently in response
to the impact of hard times. Wages had begun to fall sharply
in Ohio, While the retail price of staple food items remained
at pre—depression levels.54

On election day Hayes recorded that he was as "nearly
indifferent, on personal grounds, to the result . .'. as it is
possible to be." He preferred victory, he admitted, but this
would bring a push for the presidential nomination and a nom-
ination Vwould make? his Vlife a disturbed and troubled one"
for months to come.' Moreover, defeat for the party in 1876'
was Valmost a certainty.? He did, in all likelihood, prefer
the ﬁquiet life? he had chosen in coming to Fremont from
Cincinnati. The election’s outcome was in doubt for some time
and he believed the Democrats were Vbent on counting him out”,
but he won by a slim margin after all. The margin of victory
seems to have been reduced by the influx of New York financial

aid for the Democrats and the influence of the New York press

--..“- ”‘-

 

5I‘FHayes to William Bickham, July 10, 1875 and Hayes to
Charles Nash, Sept. 12, 1875, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters cf Hayes, III, 284 and 293. Forrest W. Clonts, 1TThe
Political Campaign. of 1875 in Ohio," Ohio State ArchaeolOgical

and Historical Quarterly, XXXI (1922), 46 n.

 

 

' 143
among Ohioians.55

As soon as the outcome was confirmed, the rural Ohio
press began touting Hayes as the party’s best hope in 1876.
His correSpondents, too, began to talk about the office,
adding in almost the same breath the reminder that this office
in particular must seek the man. The man's friends of course
might work toward that goal and as early as October 1875 one
of them was predicting that Morton, Conkling and Blaine might

well kill each other off, thus clearing the way for Ohio’s

 

favorite son, Rutherford B. Hayes.56

— —
—— ~—

55Hayes Diary, Oct. 12 and 17, 1875, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 295. Clonts, ”Campaign of

1875,? p. 87.
S6Manning Force to Hayes, Oct. 18, 1875. Hayes Papers.

CHAPTER 4
THE ”GOOD GOVERNOR" REWARDED

During the months following his victory, the movement to
make Hayes the Republican presidential nominee gained momentum
in Ohio and began to attract a modest amount of attention else-
where. But Hayes, true to his "rule and preference" and to a
powerful American political tradition, was determined to main-
tain a passive demeanor -- to be a ”mere onlooker", as he put
it. Those who had sought the presidential office seldom won
it, a close friend warned him, ”and Morton, Conkling, Blaine,
who might as a means of defeating each other in the end unite
on you, would fight against you, if you should become too
prominent before the convention meets." During the next twelve
months, the wisdom of this advice and the Hayes campaign stra-
tegy that embodied it, was amply demonstrated. His guberna-
torial victory had given him a chance for the nomination,

Hayes believed, and made it certain that Ohio would make him

her favorite son, but he was determined to play his hand care-

fully and covertly. He appeared almost fearful that interest
144

145

in him would ”die out with the subsidence of interest in the
recent election.” And, as if anxious to immunize himself
against the sting of a probable defeat and what Garfield had
termed the humiliation of working for oneself and being de-
feated, he declared that he intended ”not to mix in it, or
heed it; to go right along as if no such talk existed." Per-
haps his attitude was designed to impress upon his supporters
the need for diligent effort on their part.1

Jacob Comly, editor of the Columbus Journal and post-
master of that city, was one of Hayes’s closest and most use-
ful friends during this period. He and William Bickham of the
Dayton Journal steadily kept Hayes's name before the people
during a time when his candidacy had yet to attract much firm
support. Comly, who had been one of the first to suggest the
presidency to Hayes, was exceedingly careful to inspire good
will rather than animosity among the leading contenders and
their partisans, precisely the strategy Hayes himself followed.
"The question of a second choice,” the iguynal insisted, ”in
this case is of first importance.” And although he was tolerant
of leading state figures with presidential ambitions, Hayes
himself was critical of those second ranking figures who thrust

themselves forward to let all know they were available. After

all, as governor he had purposely avoided allusions to national

1Hayes to Guy Bryan, April 23, 1876; Hayes to William H.
Smiﬂn April 23, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary_and;getters of
Hayes, III, 316 and Manning Force to Hayes, Oct. 18, 1875. .
Haymslapers. Hayes to Manning Force, Nov. 2, 1875, in Willlams,
ML, Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 297.

146

politics except when a constitutional amendment was before the
legislature.2

While the Governor’s political prospects were being de-
cided, Garfield had returned once again to the question of
leaving office to pursue -- perhaps temporarily -- a full time
career in law. Eager as he was to provide for his family’s
financial security, he readily admitted there was ample reason
for him "to be glad to continue in public life." In a letter
to Harmon Austin, he spelled out two reasons for remaining in
the House: ”I am regarded rather as the leader of the sound
currency doctrine and shall be glad to help make it triumphant.
Furthermore, if the Republicans carry the next Presidency, it
is very likely that any position I might desire, would be open
to me in the Administration.” This would appear especially
likely if Blaine became President. He was also being advised
by Austin that his prospective Cleveland law partner had a
rather unsavory personal reputation and to join him might con-
stitute yet another ”mistake” on his part. Moreover, the po—
litical situation in the nineteenth district was improving and
another victory there was necessary to achieve full political
rehabilitation. Garfield was likewise well aware of the Hayes
boomlet and perhaps was anticipating that if Hayes were nom-
inated, there would be heavy pressure put on him to stand for
re-election. But for the time being, his party was out of

power in the House, he had lost his chairmanship and been

 

2Ohio State Journal, Jan. 8, 1876, p. 2.

147

transferred as a minority member to Ways and Means. He was
now simply a senior opposition leader and still overshadowed
and outshone by Blaine. What is more, he was uncertain as to
just how effectively he would function in his new role and
whether it would suit his tastes in politics. Perhaps he
agreed with a close friend who suggested he might not be at
his best in this role because he was too sensitive and lacked
the pugnacious qualities of a Blaine. ”Had it ever occurred

' if we were of

to you that you and I would be more 'effective
coarser make?” the friend wrote. In reply, Garfield acknow-
ledged that he, too, had considered the matter and admitted
that it might be true.3

In January 1876 John Sherman entered the picture by en-
dorsing Hayes’s candidacy in a letter that received consider-
able press attention. Hayes was pleased, yet at the same time
piqued, by Sherman’s statement that "he (Hayes) was not great-
ly distinguished in the army.” The candidate admitted this
was ”perfectly true in the sense in which Sherman intended it
should be received.” He had not risen above a division
command, yet ”in his grade he was distinguished.” He followed
this diary entry with a nine point summary of his service record,

probably intended for political use by his boosters, although

it also has the appearance of an effort to reassure himself

 

3Garfield to Harmon Austin, Nov. 3, 1875 and Harmon Austin
to Garfield, Oct. 31, 1875. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.
Burke Hinsdale to Garfield, Jan. 4, 1876 and Garfield to Burke
Hinsdale, Jan. 7, 1876, in Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale

Letters, pp. 326, 329.

148
that Sherman had failed to do justice to his ’golden years'.
”In more than fifty engagements, large and small,” Hayes noted
proudly in his diary, ”he (Hayes) was always conspicuous for
personal daring, self-possession, efficiency. That is a piece

’8

of brag, but I think it does not overstate.” DeSpite Sherman
heavy-handed candidness, Hayes fully realized the value of
this letter and especially its quick endorsement by General
Sheridan, who suggested his ticket: Hayes and Wheeler. But he
was ”ashamed” to ask, the candidate confided to his wife, "who
is Wheeler?”' W. T. Sherman also approved of his brother‘s.
letter. ”I agree with you that no one should be President un-
less he was with us heart and soul in the Civil War," he wrote
to Senator Sherman, ”and Hayes fills the bill perfectly."4 If
the General’s words reached Hayes they must have pleased him
enormously.

But no one in Washington, Garfield claimed, knew quite
what to make of the Sherman endorsement, save that it was in-
tended to put an end to talk of a third term for Grant. It
was thought that Sherman did not believe the Hayes movement
would amount to much except to keep the Ohio delegation united.
Garfield assessed the situation in this way:

. . . When they find that Hayes cannot be nominated,

its result will be valuable. It is also thought
that the letter precipitates Hayes’s candidacy at so

4Hayes Diary, Feb. 1, 1876 and Hayes to Lucy Hayes, Jan.
30, 1876, in-Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III,
302-03, 301. William T. Sherman to John Sherman, Feb. 1, 1876,
in Rachel S. Thorndike, ed., The Sherman Letters (New York,

1894), p. 347.

149

early a day as to make his chances of success less.

I do not find that the mention of his name excites

much enthusiasm outside of Ohio. He would make an

eminently respectable President, and I should be

glad on many accounts to see him elected. Still,

he certainly would not be the strongest man we

could choose. If we could unite the Ohio dele-

gation, and succeed in giving the vote of our State

to Blaine as a second choice, I think it would be

a good thing. At all hazard Morton should not be

nominated; it would be ruinous.5

Following Sherman‘s letter, the G. A. R. also put its
stamp of approval on Hayes's candidacy. His stock was rising,
but he concluded realistically that the movement was as yet
confined primarily to ”Ohio and Ohio people.” William Henry
Smith, surveying political prospects in the Northwest, re-
ported that ”except to Ohio friends here you are not known as
an old-time Republican: Taft has been spoken of much more
frequently than you have -- but usually for the second place."
He hoped Sherman's letter would change this and, like Sheridan,
suggested a Hayes and Wheeler ticket. But the anticipated
solid support of his own state and the possibility of a dead-
locked convention turning to him, made Hayes all the more cer-
tain that passivity was ”on all accounts” the wisest policy.
By early February, he considered his nomination to be possible,
but "not at all probable.” He obviously cherished the wide-
spread and growing support in his own state, but still refused
to believe he would develop much strength as a first choice

outside of Ohio. During the first six weeks of his third term

at Columbus, not a-day passed that did not bring letters and

 

5Garfield to ”Dear Captain", Feb. 5, 1876. Garfield
PaperS. Letterbook. .

150

visitors, sometimes ”a succession of callers” on the subject.
His replies were typically brief and guarded -- perhaps he was
letting his silence work for him, just as it had in similar
situations. While he did not encourage his boosters, neither
were they discouraged save when they spoke of "efforts at
organization or management" for it would not do for a "passive
candidate" to have anything to do with such undertakings. All
of the talk about him centered upon his availability, he insist-
ed. "Let availability do the work then," he told his diary.6

As a friend and supporter of Blaine, Garfield was put in
something of a tight spot by the Hayes candidacy. Blaine men
among his correspondents advised him that Hayes aroused little
spontaneous enthusiasm, but deserved Ohio's solid backing, at
least initially. Garfield, too, believed that a united dele-
gation was imperative, but hoped they would turn to "a second
choice” if they found Hayes had no choice. "So far as I know,"
Garfield wrote to a Michigan friend, "Blaine is the favorite
second choice with most of the people of Ohio. . .” On the
other hand, he observed that the country had "never been so
near the time set for Presidential nomination, with so much
uncertainty in both parties in regard to their candidate." It
was his conviction that "Ohio ought not so commit herself to

any one man that she cannot act with reasonable freedom and

——_——_—~—“w~ﬁ“——u— ————__v——‘_- ——v— “—_“--------

6Hayes to Lucy Hayes, Jan. 30, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
Diarypand Letters of “Hayes, III, 301. William H. Smith to
Hayes, Jan. 29, 1876. Hayes Papers. Hayes to Guy Bryan,
Feb. 10,1876 and Hayes Diary, Feb. 15, 1876, Williams, ed.,

Diary andngyters ofygayes, III, 304, 305.

151
;p111dence in regard to the choice when the time comes." And
hﬂligle admitting that Hayes would do well in Ohio as a presi-
ciezlixial nominee, he doubted that he would do as well outside
of‘ llis state as would a man who was more widely known.7
Garfield continued to consider retirement, although those
hdlC) sspoke or wrote to him about it discouraged him from leav-
ingg Inclitics. His interest in politics remained keen. He
110136361 to become a delegate-at-large to the national convention,
€18 Esome of his correSpondents had already suggested. If this
PIWDWIed.impossible, he wished to be a member of his district’s
<1el_esgation, but only if this met with the approval of his
!friends”. At the same moment he was being advised that the
drﬁiift of public sentiment was that he should be a delegate-at-
laI‘ge. He deeply feared Morton's nomination, considering him
"tcrtally unfit, both morally and politically” to be the Repub-
ZLicnan standard bearer. Apprently he felt that Ohio should
giﬂre Hayes a very fair opportunity at the convention, but then
843 a unit, stand ready to transfer their vote to Blaine or
3peliuips to Bristow. Yet he did not fully trust Blaine nor
alﬂrrove of his methods. As for Grant, Garfield openly opposed
a tuiird term bid and had voted for the anti-third term reso-
luﬁxion.in December 1875 which the Democrats had sponsored.8
In the House, Garfield was adjusting to his role as an

\

—~ ———— —— ——
'— ——— _— ‘—

7Garfield to Frank Mason, Jan. 28, 1876; Garfield to W. A.
quison” Feb. 5, 1876 and Garfield to Harmon Austin, Feb. 9,
‘8 Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

8Garfield to Harmon Austin, Feb. 9; 4 and Jan. 24, 1876.
Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

152

ogxposition leader, and soon finding an opportunity to dem-

culsrtrate his prowess. Blaine, with the hope of boosting his

plressidential stock, had purposely baited the Democrats with

2a liairsh.attack on Jefferson Davis during a debate on an am-

llessixy bill, blaming him for What happened at Andersonville and

(otlleeir southern prisons. Ben Hill of Georgia took the bait and

1:1 ea fiery rebel reply defended the Confederacy and its Presi-

de1113. This set the stage for a rejoinder by Garfield, who was

dfitsexrmined to demonstrate that he could give a Blaine style
IN33?j?ormance while avoiding what he considered Blaine's error
311 3_osing his temper. He worked up his Speech with some care,

Sa3tfisfied that it was ”one of the most successful” he had ever

Inadite. In his effort, he repeated, With additional corrobora-

tjfvwa evidence, Blaine's accusations. He hoped to keep his
'tenvper, ”crush” Hill's arguments and yet display a generous
a"tTtZitufie.toward the South. ”Nearly all the Democrats admit
timit my speech was fair and in good temper,” he reported to
-Auﬁatin proudly. Unlike Blaine, who had demanded that Davis
””3 excluded from amnesty, he followed a more conciliatory

aPDI‘oach. He Spoke as follows:

Let me say at the outset that so far as I am per-
sonally concerned, I have never voted against any
proposition to grant amnesty to any human being who
has asked for it at the bar of this House. Further-
more, I appeal to gentlemen on the other side of me
in this hall many years whether at any time they have
found me truculent in Spirit, unkind in tone or feel-

ling toward those who fought against us in the late
war.

‘7—

9Garfield Diary, Jan. 12, 1876 and Garfield to Harmon
A'118t3Ln, Jan, 16, 1876.. Garfield Papers. Hinsdale, ed.,
EErks of Garfield, II, 219.

153
Blaine made another strong attack on the following day,
tuit; Garfield believed he again failed to keep his temper and
kulzrt himself by being ”aggressively personal. . .” Although
(kalriiield had declared during his speech that no congressman
<3011].d.”regret more sincerely than he did the course that the
deituarte” was taking, he later concluded it had served a valu-
atiLea purpose. The people had been awakened to the real atti-
‘Ulélea of the Confederate south and surely he had never received
301311 general and generous praise. Yet he was disturbed, too,
t11£ttz a single speech should do more for his reputation than
luadi years of work with financial questions. ”Now of course,"
Chi]?1?ield assured a friend, ”I regard my financial work as
be3t‘ter intellectual work than this.” Be that as may, his
Eiterture as a partisan Spokesman in the House now rivalled his
:relhatation as a leader in finance, but he did not wear the
maIltle comfortably. He seemed troubled by the whole turn of
eVTﬂdtS, and Shortly afterwards could be found recording the
ifOJQLowing sentiments in his journal: ”. . .I prefer to keep
SiLLent for a while in accordance with my own views of policy
Emmi also in accordance with a good letter I received today
frwnn Dr. Hopkins, Speaking in the kindest terms of my Amnesty
SDeeoh (the reply to Hill) and suggesting that I ought not to
Spenak as often as I have formerly done.” He promptly replied
-to 1118 former mentor, explaining and juStifying the purely
palrtisan effort he had heretofore avoided during House debates.1O
-.__

10Garfield Diary, Jan. 13, 1876; Garfield to Burke Hinsdale,
Jan. 18, 1876; Garfield.Diary, Feb. 3, 1876 and Garfleld to Mark
HOPkignS, Feb. 5, 1876. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

154
As it became apparent that Hayes would receive the solid
kmacﬂiing of the Ohio state convention, Blaine advised Garfield
arid. other pro-Blaine Ohioians not to pit him against the Gover-
1103?, but to keep him in mind as a second choice. Meanwhile
(hazzfﬁield was being told that Hayes's chances were improving
arud. 'that he was the likliest choice in the event that Blaine,
Conkling and Morton eliminated each other. That it was neces-
sanrjy' for Garfield to tread cautiously is borne out by the
fOil-lowing statement from W. D. Bickham, who was a friend of
hj~E3, but a staunch Hayes man, too. ”Some of the papers," he
'WIWD‘te to Garfield, ”are using your name freely as an antagonist
of? Iiayes, and a partisan of Blaine; that you intend to organize
570111? district for Blaine & c. I don't believe a word of it.
HEFvwa you any objection to writing me about it.”11
Late in February, Garfield was cautioned that many Ohio

RePublicans now favored the repeal of resumption and advised
tkuit a moderate stand on the money question would attract more
v0“tes than would an unyielding one. This prompted him to in-
qudgre of Hayes as to ”the drift of sentiment among our friends
311 Ohio.” Hayes responded that he had been too busy to keep
tI‘Elck of the drift of public opinion, but it was his ”notion"
thErt the real battle was ”to be between inflation and sound '
cu~11‘2rency” and that they ”need not divide on details, on methods,
OI"time When. The previous question will again be irredeemable
palberas a permanent policy, or a policy which seeks a return
—~___

11Garfield Diary, Feb. 23, 1876 and William Bickham to
Garfield, Feb. 28, 1876. Garfield Papers.

155

to coin. My opinion is decidedly against yielding a hair's

breadth.” At this point, one is reminded of a comment made
by Garfield some five years earlier on the money question.
”I am satisfied that it is like astronomy,” he told a friend,

”in this, that our first views are generally wrong. I feel

far less certainty in my positions now than I did two years

ago- The subject is very complicated in itself, and from its

connection with party politics is beset with difficulties on

all Sides.” At issue ”is not simply what is the true theory

of finance,” he insisted, ”but what can be done with all the
Political and business forces now operating on the country."12
Hayes seemed to imply that Garfield, a consistent and

fairly courageous supporter of a return to specie payments,

needed strengthening on this question. With an air of flattery

mixed with reproach, he reminded him that the attitude of their
fellow Republicans would ”depend on the conduct of our leading
men. It is for them to see that the right sentiment is steadi-
1y upheld. We are in a condition such that firmness and adher-
ence to principle are of peculiar value just now. I would
Consent’ to no backward steps,” he admonished his friend. His
C3orlcluding advice must have appeared naive to one who had not
led. Hayes’s essentially sheltered existence. ”To yield or
COIIlpromise is weakness, and will destroy us," the Governor

QCDIltinued. ”If a better resumption measure can be substituted

\_

12Garfield to Hayes, March 2, 1876. Hayes Papers. Hayes
to Garfield, March .4, 1876. Garfield Papers. Garfield to
Charles Henry, Dec. 31, 1871, in Frederick A. Henry, Captain
Henry of Geauga; A Family Chronicle (Cleveland, 1942), p. 239.

156
fwmr the present on, that may do. But keep cool. We can better
:aikford to be beaten in Congress than to back out.” He con-
c]:uxied by cautioning Garfield that his letter was not to be
'ussemi or quoted by its recipient -- an injunction which made it
21 lojgt easier to be so positive and unyielding.13
Early in March, 1876, Garfield journeyed to New Hampshire
Vﬂneazre he delivered some seven Speeches in a vigorous stumping
tﬂDllnr through the Granite State. He enjoyed considerable suc-
ceassss in handling his audiences and returned to Washington great-
Ely“ :refreshed and exhilarated. When the Republicans won a vic-
tc>lﬁy by a larger majority than he had expected, he attributed
it; Inainly to the blatant ”rebelism of the present House of
RePresentative.” On the other hand, most of the GOP’S troubles
luiéi resulted from Grant’s having employed "military rather than
Ciﬁfil methods in chosing (sic) a cabinet, and in appointments
Eeﬂlerally," he concluded. At about this time, Hayes was giv-
ing; a friend his opinion that Washington doings were injuring
130th parties. ”Both are, therefore," he wrote hopefully, "more
axui more disposed to look for candidates outside of that at-
moSphere.”14
As the time for Ohio’s Republican state convention approach-

eda. John Sherman wrote to Hayes from Washington of the "great

ifeeur" there that Ohio would follow Indiana's lead and make a

13Hayes to Garfield, March 4, 1876. Garfield Papers.

14Garfield Diary, March 9, 14 and 15, 1876. Garfield
Papers. Hayes to D. K. Smith, March 9, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
1&3, and Letters of Hayes, III, 307.

157
Ctzrrency plank that was ”not sound and square in favor of
syaecde resumption.” To do so, he warned, ”would be a fatal
nuisatake" that would bring defeat in several nominally Republi-
cmarl states. ”Garfield tells me," he continued, ”that our
pcasuition on the currency question and the reactionary tendency
oi? tﬂde 'Confederate Houset saved us in New Hampshire." Since
Shariaite duties would probably prevent his attendence and his
"131reasence might invite antagonism,” he hoped Hayes and his
Ifrﬁixands would work for soundness. .In his reply, Hayes in-
sisted that there was not ”the least danger" that the platform
ccmunittee would veer in the direction of inflation.15 The con-
VVBIltdon would adopt a sound, but somewhat softened plank on
tllea troublesome issue.
By late March, Hayes was noting with satisfaction that
'thia bulk of Ohio's county conventions had adopted resolutions
favoring him and that probably all their delegates favored his
candidacy. Benjamin Bristow seemed to be their second choice,
he observed with little enthusiasm, for while he admitted that
1318 Whiskey Ring affair had given him ”prestige as the repre-
sentative of reform” -- he was not ”sure” Bristow was to be
plTiferred above all other candidateS. The tpassivet and in-
diiiferent Hayes then made this revealing journal entry:
It will be a small disappointment for me to give up
my chances. With so general an expression in my

favor in Ohio and a fair degree of assent elsewhere,
especially in States largely settled by Ohio people,

\“m «"‘ﬂ -aam“.-- -‘-- m...“ -«ﬂ--“M‘-- -m----_._-“

‘ 15John Sherman to Hayes, March 18, 1876 and Hayes to John
Sherman, March 20, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary QQLEEEEEES.
Ws, III, 308-09. ‘

158
I have supposed it was possible that I might be
nominated. But with no opportunity, and no desire,
to make combinations, or to lay wires, I have not
thought my chance worth much consideration. I feel
less diffidence in thinking of this subject than
perhaps, I ought.
fie: tvas supremely, perhaps naively, confident that he could
thallclle the chief executive’s role with relative ease. ”It
Eseeanns to me that good purposes and the judgment, experience,
allot .firmness I possess, would enable me to execute the duties
of the officewell. I do not feel the least fear that I should
fail. This all looks-egotistical,” he admitted, "but it is
Si4rlcere.” Garfield, who on the other hand, had been in a
'béillter position to evaluate the demands placed upon a president,
had stated flatly that Hayes ”certainly would not be the strong-
east; man” the party could nominate.16 He apparently felt that
to elevate Hayes to the presidency would be to spread his tal-
errts and capacity rather thin.
Garfield claimed that a considerable ”number of prominent
Inerﬂ' in the capital wanted him to go as a delegate to Cincinnati,
bu"G'he did not ”personally care much about it," he told a close
I‘riend. He had at first wished to be at Columbus when Ohio
maﬂie its decision and then to be a delegate to the national
CC>Ilclave. But despite urging to the contrary, he asked Austin
tkﬁit his name be withdrawn were he proposed as a district dele-

gafte to Cincinnati, although he would still accept a position

\

16Hayes Diary, March 21, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diagy
§£21_Letters of Hayes, III, 309. Garfield to Charles Henry,

Feb. 5,7876. GarfieldPapers.

159
313 delegate-at-large. Austin’s warning that it would be a
"suavere” contest in which he was very likely to suffer further
.pcalxitical wounds undoubtedly influenced his decision. It was
llcrt only the recent Scandals and his friendship for Blaine
tﬂigitz placed him in a vulnerable position, but some friends were
eavwerl then speaking of him as a possible dark-horse candidate.17
fie tvas ultimately appointed a delegate to the state convention
fﬁrrann Portage county, whose convention passed no resolution on
a Iicmninee, hence leaving him in an uncommitted position on the
CITULcial question. But he was unable to go to Columbus because
.WEHS’S and Means was at that time considering a tariff bill which
dfiuuanded his close attention. When it appeared that Noyes and
Skleﬁrman were to be the Ohio delegates-at-large, he was warned
'Uhiat Hayes would be putty in their hands. ”I hope the time will
SC>Orl.come,” wrote a district newspaperman, ”when that gang of
:Buﬁnners will disappear from Ohio politics.”' Obviously there
WEis no love lost between certain of Garfield's supporters and
those of Hayes and Sherman -- added reason for a pro-Blaine man
tomove with caution. His refusal to be a district delegate
W343 personally a wise move that would please those who ”other-
wiise would have complained,” Austin assured him, for the

'fOJLIowing reasons:

There is a very deep & decided feeling on the part
of a large number of people of this district, that
Hayes is the best man in the nation for our next

17Garfield to Charles Henry, Jan. 24, 1876; Garfield to
HEEL‘ImonAustin, March 18, 1876; Harmon Austin to Garfield,
March 2, 1876 and George Ford to Garfield, March 11, 1876.

Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

160
President and so strong is that feeling that any mod-
erate support of him, on your part, would at once
array them against you. The feeling is also enter-
tained by a large number that he is not your first
choice & if you should be a delegate, & he should
fail to get the nomination, you would be largely in

their judgment, chargeable with the responsibility,

and of course would provoke a new element of opposi-
tion to you.1

In his anxiety to aid Blaine, Garfield had underestimated
Hayesis strength and the Skill of his management and nearly
committed himself to a course that might have dealt another
heavy blow to his political standing and his personal in-
tegrity. His friends who attended the convention, reported
that they ready to withdraw his name were it presented, be-
cause of opposition to him from his own district. "The feel-
ing for Hayes was very determined from every part of the state,
& came direct from the people, and Ohio will stand for him
until he is nominated, or there is no possible chance, and
there seems to be a firm belief that he is to be our next pres-
ident,” this report continued. Perhaps Hayes had failed to
carry the state by an overwhelming margin in 1875, but his
great personal popularity at the grass roots level was not to
be doubted, and it appeared that Blaine could count on no help
from Ohio until his nomination was a certainty. Garfield ad-
mitted to Austin that his advice had been ”wholly right" and
declared he was ”exceedingly glad” his name had not been
thought forward.' ”The Managers of that Convention were evi-

dmﬁly jealous of all men who were known to be intimate friends

 

18Halsey Hall to Garfield, March 21, 1876 and Harmon
.Mmtin to Garfield, April 26, 1876. Garfield Papers.

161
of Blaine or Bristow, and if I had been elected, it would have
been after a Sharp opposition,” Garfield concluded. He had
not been interested in being a delegate to either convention,
he told another friend, and would have gone only ”for the sake
of helping friends (Blaine, surely) when the second choice
came as come it must.”19
But Garfield was not the only national figure who encoun-

tered opposition at Columbus. Hayes had been most anxious to
have Sherman lead the Ohio delegation at the national conven-
tion. Yet when his name was presented it aroused such reSponse
that the manager of the Sherman forces withdrew it. And when a
few votes were still cast for the Senator, his Spokesman was
forced to point out that he had withdrawn it by Sherman‘s
authority. Hayes wrote consolingly to Sherman that it had been
”the general wish” that he head Ohio's delegation, and assured
him that he would have won the honor ”by acclamation if it had
not been withdrawn.” It was a bit of'a blow and an ”annoyance"
to Hayes, for Sherman had been the only man he ”felt at liberty
to commend,” he confided to Bickham and he ”was certainly dis-
appointed” at this turn of events. Perhaps it was Simply in-
dicative of Hayes's inability to exert effective political
discipline and leadership over those who were attached to him
as a man and a popular governor -- one who represented his

Imrty well, but did not, perhaps did not care, to lead it. He

19Wallace Ford to Garfield, March 30, 1876; Garfield to
Hanmm.Austin, April 7, 1876 and Garfield to Charles Henry,
Ahml 7, 1876. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

162

contented himself with noting that the incident would ”be
understood by all who” wanted to understand it, while the re-
mainder could never be satisfied.20

The convention had ”instructed the senatorial delegates
and requested the distriCt delegates ’to use their earnest
efforts to secure his nomination',” Hayes recorded in his
journal. And this had been done with a Spirit and sincerity
which was ”certainly very flattering.” He again noted that he
had ”discouraged rather than encouraged” the effort on his be-
half and would now be pleased if ”he could in some satisfactory
way drop out of the candidacy.” He spoke of the ”embarrassment”
of his position and although confident that his equanimity .
would carry him through it, he repeated that he ”would like to
be out of it.” It would appear that Ohio's solid support,
which had come after he was certain he had ”done absolutely
nothing" for himself, was all he really desired! This final
honor from the people of his state, empty though it would be
without victory at the convention, would apparently be as sat-
isfying as the office he then held, Scorned though it was as
a 'glorified clerkship” by men like Garfield and Sherman. But
despite his professed desire to bow out, he wrote Edwin Cowles,
the pro-Blaine editor-publisher of the Cleveland:Leadey, that
he had the ”right . . . to considerate treatment” by Ohio's

MHegation. ”If I am to be voted for at all, and as long as

 

20Wallace Ford to Garfield, March 30, 1876. Garfield
PEipers. Hayes to John Sherman, March 31, 1876 and Hayes to
Wﬂliam Bickham, April 1, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and

letters of Hayes, III, 310.

 

163

I am voted for at all,” Hayes queried, ”may I not reasonably
expect the solid vote of the State?” However, when a "con-
siderable number” of delegates favored withdrawal, he Wished
it to be done quickly, insisting that he was ”so indifferent
that he could speak of this matter as impartially as if another
man were involved."21 How powerfully the notion that the office
must seek the man gripped him and how often it seemed necessary
to reenforce his conviction that he was only a passive com-
petitor!

Hayes also denied that thus far the ”management" by his
friends had been a Significant factor in his success, in fact

he insisted that if his nomination’

s success hinged on this
his ”chances (could) be put down as zero." The most he could
hope for would be that ”the march of events" might proceed
”undisturbed by friendly management either Wise or otherwise.”
Yet he was by no means indifferent to the tactics of his sup-'
porters and gave the following advice to one of them, William
Bickham: ”You must also see that, as I well know, some of my
best friends are Bristow men. If others lose temper, we must
not. Your idea of keeping in position to support the nominee

without anything to recall, or to give aid to the common ad-

versary, is a sound thing.”22 Such concern seemed to belie

 

21Hayes Diary, April 2, 1876 and Hayes to Edwin Cowles,
Adﬁl.6, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Lette;§_of Hayes,
III, 310-12.

22Hayes to William Dickson, May 3, 1876 and Hayes to
Wtﬂiam Bickham, April 26, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Lmnmrs of Hayes, III, 317-18.

164
his professed indifference to the course of the contest.

He was clearly very much pleased when Garfield wrote to
congratulate him on his ”bearing” during a trying time. And
perhaps in part because of his hopes for Blaine, Garfield
suggested that the Governor’s ”friends ought not for some time
yet, to make an aggressive fight, nor involve . . . (him) in
any antagonism” which was precisely the strategy Hayes and
his boosters were pursuing. Ohio should back him solidly and
bide their time until the ”break up which must come as the
weaker candidates drop out,” Garfield counseled. When Garfield,
writing early in May, declared that he wished to "repeat with
more emphasis than before . . . that we are all delighted with
the sensible and masterful way in which you are bearing your-
self," Hayes was touched. It is a compliment””. . . I prize
more than the prospects of Success, -- if I can continue to
deserve it,” one of his journal entries ran. It was his hope,
he replied to Garfield, that he might keep his head and avoid
”doing or saying anything unjust or even uncharitable towards
Competitors or their supporters. . .” And happily for Hayes,
this turned out to be politically the very wisest course he
could have followed. Garfield had also allowed that Hayes was
steadily gaining support with those he referred to as ”our:
most thoughtful people.” These were precisely the people
lmose approval Hayes would consistently cherish most of all --

hland out of office.23

 

23Garfield to Hayes, March 2, 1876. Hayes Papers. Hayes
Dhuy, May 7, 1876 and Hayes to Garfield, May 17, 1876, in
Wﬂdiams, ed., Diary and_Letters of Hayes, III, 318-19.

165

Shortly before the Mulligan Letters affair broke upon
Blaine, Hayes was forewarned by William Henry Smith that some-
thing was in the offing. Hayes had replied to his friend that
he was ”glad” that no one active in his campaign had been in-
volved in bringing this matter before the public. He did not
know, of course, that Smith and a number of mutual friends in
the Western Associated Press had played active roles in trying
to stall Blaine’s drive for the nomination. ”Nothing is to be
gained by pulling down, and if there was,” he cautioned shrewd-
ly, "let it be done by somebody else.” He counted it fortunate
that he was as he saw himself, "a mere locker-on . . ."
Garfield, too, had heard something of the allegations from
Blaine himself on the very day Smith had forewarned Hayes.
Garfield's recollection of his own experience with the press
was painfully fresh in his mind and he sympathized with and

made ready to aid his friend. He admired Blaine'

8 handling of
the issue before the House, predicting that his hopes at the
convention depended upon the effectiveness of this Singular
performance. Garfield had been supporting Blaine in his presi-
dential aspirations since the latter discussed his intentions
with his character. Early in April 1876, he confided to a
friend that he wished ”Blaine was less of a politician" and

”a higher (type) of man” and one

concluded that Bristow was
Whose ”election would need no apology.” Then on the eve of
ﬁn convention, he admitted to the same intimate friend, that

Bhﬂhe was ”by no means . . . (his) ideal of statesmanship."

Nmnmtheless, he insisted, a Blaine administration would be

166

”honest and brilliant”, far better than Grant's and ”very much
better" than if Mortoh or Conkling were elected. He said noth-
ing about what one could expect from Hayes.24L

Garfield expected that Blaine yguld be the nominee. He
expressed his pleasure at Mississippi Republican's support of
Hayes, but assured them that Blaine was their steady friend
despite feeling to the contrary. If Hayes could not be nom-
inated, he hoped the South would come to Blaine's aid as they
would ”find him an able and firm defender of their rights.”
By midsMay, he considered that the race had ”narrowed down to
Blaine in the front rank and Hayes in the seCond.” But he con-
tinued to aid his fellow Ohioian, nevertheless. Shortly after
he was elected chairman of the Veteran Soldiers National Associ-
ation, he suggested to Hayes that he might arrange for the con-
vention of the Association to be held in Cincinnati at conven-
tion time, so as to aid Ohio's favorite son. Hayes replied
confidentially that such a gathering ”would have an influence
on the result” of the convention's work, thus he must not
"meddle" with it. But he added, steps Should be taken to see
that the veterans aeted in concert once the nominations were
made. Garfield thereupon decided to call a business meeting
instead of a public gathering in order to lay plans for the

"future work.” Hayes, meanwhile, came to believe his prospects

 

 

 

‘ ———~-——- _-.'--

24William H. Smith to Hayes, April 18, 1876. Hayes
iﬂqmrs. Hayes to William H. Smith, April 23, 1876, in
Wtﬂiams, ed., Diary and_Le§3e£§_9f_Haye§, 315-16. Garfield
'UJBurke Hinsdale, June 8, 1876. Garfield Papers. Western
Remnwe Historical Society. Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, June
8,1876, in Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinggale_L§§§e£§, p. 334.

167
were improving, although he thought Blaine had not been ser-
iously hurt by the Mulligan affair and that his delegate
strength was such that his nomination was ”not improbable.” He
then set down the following reflections in his journal:

AS a candidate before the people, his newly acquired

wealth, his schemes for getting the nomination, and

his connection with the money interests depending for

success on legislation, will damage him. But with two

or three hundred delegates in his favor, will not all
of the loose odds and ends gravitate to him? It so

seems. If he fails, the next (probability) is a

combination for selfish ends to make a candidate

among the friends of the leading candidate. This

would not be in my favor. My independent position,

aloof from bargaining, puts me outside of the list

from whom the managers will select. It is only in

the contingency of a union between those who look for

availability in the candidate and those Who are for

purity and reform in administration, that I am a

probable nominee.

It was a shrewd evaluation that belied his supposed political
naivete' and indifference toward pre-convention maneuverings
and it neatly illustrates his self-image as well.

Within two days of this entry, he was writing to tell
Sherman that his presence at Cincinnati would "specially grati-
fy” him. While he did not intend to abandon his ”passive"
attitude, he assumed that it might become necessary to with-
draw his name. ”To be able to act on this and other possible
questions," Hayes urged, ”it is important for me that I have

friends of experience and sound judgment on the ground, by

Whom I can be advised of the exact condition of things and of

 

25Garfield to Charles Clark, April 17, 1876; Garfield Diary,
Mmy16, 1876; Hayes to Garfield, May 7, 1876 and Garfield to
Harri, May 12,1876. Garfield Papers Letterbook. Hayes Diary,
thy 19, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,
III, 319- 20.

168

the proper course to be taken.” A week later, he confided to
his diary that his mind turned to political affairs ”a good
deal, and yet not anxiously or uneasily.” He continued to
appear far more concerned only that he ”pass creditably through
the ordeal” than that he come away with the prize. When sound-
ed out by the Republican Reform Club, he declined to write
"for publication” because this would violate his rule against
”promoting” his own candidacy. But to his diary, he averred
that he was ”in print fully and explicitly” in support of the
Liberals' stand for monetary soundness and reform of the civil
service. Since he took no active part in the campaign on his
behalf and nothing but optimistic reports came across his desk,
he could remain contented that he was ”so untouched by this
whole business.”26

Meanwhile, in the House, Garfield continued to oppose what
he deemed the unwise and blundering tactics of the Democrats.
Thus he vigorously fought their determination to reduce dras-
tically diplomatic and consular appropriations for South
America and the Far East. This was Shortsighted economy, he
argued, and it would strike a crippling blow at a valuable and
inexpensive service. He also attacked Speaker Randall for now
recommending substantial reductions in the appropriations bill
after opposing cuts during the past years. And he carried on

his fight against any measures aimed at inflating the currency.

 

26Hayes to John Sherman, May 19, 1876; Hayes Diary, May
26,1876; Hayes to Gouverneur Carr, May 25, 1876 and Hayes to
Wﬂliam H. Smith, May 31, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diagy and
Letters of Hayeg, III, 320-23. .

169

The brilliance of Elaine's parliamentary maneuvers frequent-
ly impressed him, but he was moved to record that he ”showed
more partisanship” than he liked to see.27

But legislative affairs were not the only matters that
occupied Garfield's time. When William Dennison came to him
with the story of Bristow‘s troubles with the Grant adminis-
tration, Garfield advised that Bristow ”stand in his place
until he was turned out and under no circumstances resign.”
Perhaps with Cox’s experience in mind, he called attention to
"the evil consequences to him and the party” should he quit
his post. He continued to mull over a law partnership in
Cleveland, but this mid-May diary entry indicates very simply,
Where his affection lay. ”My presence here has been wanted,
I hear, in the debate which Blaine had with Lamar. I am glad
to have been missed and am glad to return.” When the Demo-
cratic controlled Ways and Means Committee turned to tariff
revision, he gave his closest attention to preventing what he
deemed was their determination to ”break up the present tar—
iff. . .”28 In committee, he voted against the tariff pro-
posal of the Democrats on the ground that it was too extreme
and poorly constructed, although he had noted earlier that he
favored "a policy about midway between the doctrine of the two

Parties, with slow progress toward the Democratic view.” In

27Garfield Diary, Feb. 3 and March 22, 1876. Garfield
Papers. - .

28Garfield Diary, Feb. 9 and March 14, 1876 and Garfield
‘bCJJohn Robison,-April 11, 1876. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

170

theory, at least, he was not yet trustworthy on this issue.
For a time, he thought that Grant's "eyes . . . (had) been
opened to the fact that mischievous people have been associ-
ated with him.” But this optimism was Short-lived and he soon
reverted to his customarily critical view of the General’s
leadership, as when he noted in his journal that Don Cameron's
nomination for Secretary of War had ”surprised and disgusted"
him.29 1

The attacks initiated by the New York Sun on Blaine in
reference to the Fort Smith and Arkansas railroad and the
Northern Pacific railroad bonds served to draw Garfield even
closer to his friend. After having so recently passed through
a time of trouble during which he, too, had been severely
handled by that paper, and given his belief that the popular
press had become irresponsible and prone to character assas-
ination, he instinctively sympathized with and stood ready to
aid Blaine. At first he feared that the Northern Pacific
affair would mean Blaine's defeat, although he hoped this

's presidential hOpeS

would not be so. He had discussed Blaine
and prospects with him several times during the past twelve
months, often at the latter's request, and he was ”depressed”
by this series of attacks on him. He watched "the progress of
these assaults upon Blaine with anxious intereSt.” After a

lengthy conversation with Cowles about Blaine’s situation, he

Concluded that it appeared doubtful that he could "recover

29Garfield Diary, March 21; April 11; Feb. 28 and May 22,
15376. Garfield Papers. -

171

from the Mulligan complications.”30 But Blaine's defense of
himself on the floor of the House gave him second thoughts.
”I have never witnessed so dramatic a scene since I have been
in the House,” his diary reads. ”It may give Blaine the nomi-
nation. The feeling tonight is that it will, though I am not
so sure of his election as I would be glad to be.” Did he again
have in mind the unpleasant need to apologize for a candidate?
Three days later he called on Blaine, who told him he had re-1
ceived 150 letters of support from all parts of the nation.
Garfield had by now concluded that he might well be chosen
after all, although he realized that ”some doubt the effect of
these letters upon his success as a candidate. He certainly is
not the highest type of reformer. Hardly a reformer at all,”
he admitted. Then as if to reassure himself about this friend,
Whom he did not fully trust or know, he recorded on the eve of
the convention that he was certain Blaine would give the nation
”an honest and brilliant administration.” The following day he
Conferred with Bristow, perhaps at Elaine’s suggestion and en-
couraged a friendly relationship between the two candidates.
He argued that ”they were naturally allies” and apparently
Bristow agreed With him.31

The balloting at Cincinnati began on June 16, with 378
votes required for a nomination. Blaine received 285 on the

first ballot; he was followed by Morton, Bristow, Conkling and

30Garfield Diary, May 27; 30; June 1 and 4,1876.
Garfield Papers . -

31Garfield Diary, June 5; 8 and 9, 1876. Garfield PaperS.

172
Hayes with 125, 113, 99 and 61 votes respectively. After four
ballots, Blaine‘s total had risen by only seven votes and on
the next roll call, Michigan left the Blaine camp to give
Hayes an additional 22 votes. Blaine’s vote on the sixth bal-
lot stood at 308, while Hayes trailed at a distance with 113
after Indiana had abandoned Morton in his favor. Next, Bris-
tow was taken out of the running in favor of Hayes, after which
New York and Pennsylvania swung behind the Ohioian to give him
384 votes and the rpize.

A number of known factors combined to make Hayes’s victory
possible. In the first place, there was the man himself and
his unblemiShed public and private record. He was General
Hayes, who possessed a solid war record and maintained a strong
identification with its veterans. He had made two successful
fights for soundness against powerful Democratic gubernatorial
opponents and he was on friendly terms with the Grant adminis-
tration, yet under no obligation to it. Jacob Cox summed it

up admirably:

General Hayes as a soldier had been modest one, but
his courage had been tested, and had shone more nobly
with the demands upon it. He had in civil life been a
strict party man, but in his votes in Congress, and

in his acts as Governor, he had solved his doubts in
favor of the purest principles and of the most honest
course. He had avoided collisions and had followed
acknowledged leaders, but he had never allowed party
devotion to compromise his personal integrity. He
had never been willing to break out of party lines, but
he had given countenance and assistance to reform in
every way short of this. His whole life had been one
of unostentatious but pure morality, and no one could
come very near him without learning that he was a man
‘to whom no corrupt proposal could be made, and who

173

would not tolerate corruption.32

Not only was Hayes's record greatly to his advantage,
but the management of his campaign was especially astute and
effective. It ”was a model of discretion, conducted with
extreme care not to give offense to anyone,” Murat Halstead
recalled years later. ”There were Blaine men and Bristow men
in the Ohio delegation, but they never got an excuse to get
away from the Ohio men.” What he called the strategy of
”conciliation won,” he Concluded. But the combination of an
ideal compromise candidate and skillful management would not
have yielded a victory save for fortuitious circumstances over
which the Hayes people had little or no control. The Mulligan
affair had dealt Blaine, directly and indirectly, a sharp blow.
William Henry Smith had a small hand in breaking this story,
but so did H. V. Boynton, Richard Smith, Murat Halstead and
Joseph Medill from Bristow’s camp and W. R. Holloway of Indi-
anapolis, who was a Morton supporter. These powerfully sit-
uated men hOped to weaken Blaine by making the letters public,
but none wished to earn the enmity of Blaine's partisans by
having the deed traced to their doorstep. However, they were
not adverse to seeing one of their co-conspirators blamed. And
indeed, Bristow’s camp was blamed by many Blaine men. On the
very day William Henry Smith had informed Hayes of the plan to

’expose' Blaine, the latter had summoned Garfield to his side

to henar an informant tell of a plot by Conkling and his

 

:52Jacob D. Cox, ”The Hayes Administration,” Atlantig
Mgnthly, LXXI-(June, 1893), 822. '

174

associates to injure Blaine by insinuating a conflict of
interests involving him and the Fort Smith and Little Rock.
And at Blaine's request, Garfield had prepared and signed a
"statement of the conversation in full” for his use.33

Blaine's collapse three days before the convention open-
ed weakened his position by calling his physical and mental
health into question and it left his campaign floundering dur-
ing a crucially important period. The Split between the Bristow
and Blaine forces became an unbridgeable gulf after Mrs. Blaine
turned Bristow away when he came to call on her stricken hus-
band -- because She, like many Blaine partisans, still blamed
him for initiating the recent attacks on her husband. Garfield
thereupon conferred with Dennison and Bristow in an effort to
protect Mrs. Blaine from newspaper publicity, discussing among
other things the statement Bristow and Dennison were to make
public. He also busied himself with frequent visits to the
Blaine residence and after the Senator recovered his senses a
day before the convention began its work, he called Garfield to
his side to consult with him. Ohio undoubtedly entered into
their conversation, for ”there were at least 16 men . . . in
the Ohio delegation who Were for Blaine,” the manager of the

Bristow forces at Cincinnati later reported. But they were

 

33Murat Halstead, ”Recollections and Letters of Presi-
deniilHayes,” Independent, LI (February 16,.1899), 486;

Barnaurd, Rutherford B. Ha es,-pp. 284-85 and Garfield Diary,
.April. 18, 1876. Garfield Papers.

 

.“

..

 

 

175
”held fast by the fact that Hayes was before the Convention.”34
O BristOw seemed to pose the most serious threat to the .
hopes of Hayes, yet his actual strength was very limited. He
had attracted a fair body of supporters, but they were attach-
ed to him as ”Bristow ’the symbol of Reform” and not as Bristow

' and Schurz told Hayes as much after the convention

the man,1
had adjourned. He had found most of his support among con-
servative Easterners and a number of the nation’s most power-
ful newspapermen. H. V. Boynton, the leader of this band, had
lured Richard Smith and Halstead from Blaine's camp into the
Bristow organization, and they in turn recruited Joseph Medill
and Samuel Bowles. Many other journalists came to Bristow’s
aid, as did many Liberal Republicans, although not all were
optimistic that a man who had gathered as many avowed opponents
as Bristow could be nominated. As his biographer concludes,
although ”Bristow‘s spirited warfare against corruption had
endeared him to the masses and gained him the backing of the
'best and weightiestt elements within the party, his chances
for the nomination were practically nil. Even his supporters
admitted that ’nothing short of a miracle! could force him
thrbugh the convention.” His forces were ineffectively orga-
.nized.and inexperienced and their role in bringing out the
lhrlligan letters ultimately hurt their own candidate as well

as Iris chief rival. Finally, Bristow himself was unenthusiastic

 

354tarfield Diary, June 11; 12 and 16, 1876. Garfield
PaPeIES- John M. Harlan to Benjamin H. Bristow, June 19, 1876.
23mist01w Papers. Library ochongress. Microfilm copy in Hayes
lhﬂnorieal Library.. Hereafter cited as Bristow Papers.

176

about his candidacy and made but a feeble effort to give it
the leadership necessary to make it more than a short-lived
boom, or ”bubble”, as it has been called. Nevertheless, he
brought a modest body of delegates to the convention whose
votes were denied to Blaine, Morton and Conkling, but who
readily moved to the Hayes column at the critical moment. On
the other hand, it appears highly unlikely that supporters of
that trio of Stalwarts would have frustrated Hayes's hopes by
going over to Bristow in the event of a convention deadlock.35

Michigan’s switch from Blaine to Hayes on the fifth ballot
”caused a stampede among the Bristow forces," John Harlan
assured his law partner following the convention. It appeared
that Blaine men would vote for Hayes, but not for Bristow while
Bristow's Michigan friends believed that Blaine must be stopped
at all costs. ”The union of that delegation on Hayes was a sur-
prise to us,” Harlan reported, ”and as soon as it was done I
felt that our case was hopeless.” He claimed that Indiana's
failure to come over to Bristow prompted the Michigan dele-
gation to make their break to Hayes. As far as the Indiana
delegation was concerned, James Tyner and his friends claimed
that he was mainly reSponSible for their state's switch to
Hayes on the Sixth ballot.36

It is not difficult to understand why a reformer like

 

‘35Edwin B. Thompson, ”Benjamin Helm Bristow” (unpublished
Ph-D- dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1940), pp. 330,
342, ;373,

36John Harlan to Benjamin Bristow, June 19, 1876. Bristow
Papers . .

177

Bristow would stand little chance of winning the Hoosier vote,
but why was Blaine denied their support? In 1871, Blaine had
given Tyner to understand that he would be made chairman of
the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads if he was chosen
Speaker. Blaine became speaker, but then denied Tyner the
appointment he coveted, and with an eye to the 1876 convention,
used the post in an attempt to curry Simon Cameron’s favor.
Tyner thereupon angrily confronted the Speaker and was report-
ed to have made the following threat: ”. . .I shall be a dele-
gate to that convention; I shall go there to prevent your
nomination, and I shall uSe every power that I have to prevent
it, and I think I shall be successful.” Despite Elaine's
offers of the English mission for Morton and a cabinet post
for Tyner, the latter, in a closed caucus, persuaded Indiana
to go for Hayes.37

Following Indiana’s decision, Bristow’s delegates were
freed to Hayes, as Harlan took his partner out of the contest.
Although the Kentuckian had failed, the effort on his behalf
had been instrumental in stopping Blaine, and had thereby con-
tributed to the nomination of the reform-minded Hayes. Bris-
tow, however, believed that Harlan had acted too hastily, but
his complaint does not appear justified. It appears, however,
that Harlan did have some kind of understanding with Hayes's
managers. Whether it can be linked to his appointment to the

Supreme Court by Hayes is highly questionable. ”I don't

--‘_‘ C .‘-_

 

 

 

37E. J. Edwards, ”Reminisences of James G. Blaine,"
Chautauquan, XVII (1893), 47-48. .

178

believe you could have nominated Bristow without part of the
Blaine vote,” Bowles later told Halstead. The plan was to
demonstrate that Blaine could not be nominated, but the anti-
Blaine forces were also fearful of prolonging indecision be—
yond five or six ballots. Conkling's New York delegation
tried for an adjournment after the sixth ballot, but were de-
feated. Thereafter both the New York and Pennsylvania dele-
gations caucused and Conkling delivered his state’s votes to
Hayes, while Pennsylvania withdrew her favorite son, and cast
30 votes for Blaine and 28 votes for Hayes. Since Hayes won
with only five votes to Spare, Pennsylvania‘s decision was
crucial and her rejection of the unit rule was blamed for
Blaine's defeat. However, Blaine's managers had consistently
fought the unit rule and the support they had received in their
effort had been vital to the growth of Blaine's strength after
the first roll call. Pennsylvania's delegation had agreed at
one time, however, to follow the majority once their favorite
son was dropped, but Blaine‘s managers could not then re-
establish what they had urged the state to abandon.38

Hayes had correctly predicted that if Blaine failed, he
himself was the likliest compromise nominee. Yet he continued
to confide to his diary that failure would ”be a great relief --

a setting free from bondage.” The responsibilities that would

-‘m-“-‘ .‘.‘~. -“-—-_-~ i-.- --

 

 

38Thompson, "Benjamin Bristow,” pp. 371-72 and Samuel
Bowles to Halstead, June 22, 1876. 'Halstead Papers. Cincinnati
Historical Society. .Microfilm c0py in Hayes Memorial Library.
Hereafter cited as Halstead Papers. Frank B. Evans, Pennsy_-
vania Poliggqs, 18 211877: A Study:in.Political Leadegshlp
(Harrisburg, 1966 , pp. 261-62.

 

179
accompany were sobering. It would be a heavy burden, he con-
cluded, although it would not be ”overpoweringly strong."
When Blaine sensed his impending defeat, Garfield records that
Blaine immediately dispatched his congratulations, a message
that ”for a few moments quite unmanned me,” wrote Hayes.
Availability, management, the unbridled march of events and
perhaps the Hayes 'luck’ had combined to do their work. ”Fri-
day has been a lucky day for me before,” the nominee observed
to his diary.39 '

The first order of business for the nominee was his let-
ter of acceptance -- a document that was especially important,
given his position as a compromise candidate. At first he was
inclined to be characteristically brief, believing that it was
merely a formality. Well before his nomination he had been
reminded by Cox that the Liberals would not only make civil
service reform a campaign issues, but would ”insist on its
execution afterward.” Cox again called HayeS'S attention to
the importance of reform, immediately after the convention con-
cluded its work. The key question of the day, he wrote, was,
could ”Hayes free the Presidential office from the management
and practical control of the machine politicians.” The candi-
date's uprightness alone was insufficient, he warned; he must
also make his intentions clear, develop a program for reform

and hold to it resolutely if he hoped to win reform support.

—“ w —— ‘ 7“-

39Hayes Diary, June 16, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Imrbters of Hayeg, III, 326 and Garfield Diary, June 16, 1876.
Garfield Papers? Hayes Diary, June 18, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 326.

180
The next administration would be evaluated on the basis of
its reform achievements. ”The President who will devote a
term to that (civil service) reform,” Garfield noted in his
diary, "& make it sure will stand among the foremost bene-
factors of his country.”40 Cox's fellow Liberal, Schurz, also
hastened to advise Hayes that civil service reform merited a
prominent place in his Letter. Hayes replied that he wished
to make it ”Egg issue of the canvass -- to be perfectly ex-
plicit, decided, and square, but pale; in regard to it,” and
indicated he was considering a single term declaration as well.
Garfield added his voice to those of the Liberals in urging the
importance of the reform issue. He wrote to Hayes of his hope
that he would ”not fail to make a pointed allusion to the re-
form of the Civil Service” in his Letter. ”All classes of
Republicans are looking for your letter with great anxiety,”
he assured him, ”for more than any other year of our history,
the campaign will turn upon your exposition of the platform.”

Both Garfield and Schurz urged Hayes to emphasize resumption

!

and Hayes did use the essence of Schurz 8 suggested bold

statement on the questionf1L1

Well before his Letter appeared, Hayes had written to

 

1+0Hayes to John Sherman, June 23, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
lhary and Letters of Hay_s, III, 328; Edward A. Huth, ”Presi-
dmﬁsRutherford B. Hayes; Civil Service Reformer" (unpublished
Ih. D. dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1943), p. 70
and Garfield Diary, July 7, 1876. Garfield Papers.

41Hayes to Carl Schurz, June 27, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
lhary and Letters of Hayes, III, 329; Garfield to Hayes,
Duy'1,1876 and Carl Schurz to Hayes, June 20,23 and July 1,
1876. Hayes Papers.

181
Garfield that he hoped his statements on resumption and re-
form would meet with his approval. When the Letter did ap-
pear, Garfield commented in his diary that it was indeed ”a
very clear and sensible document.” He assured the candidate
that "all our friends who believe in good government are re-
joiced," while its critics were the very men whose approval
would "be a damage to the cause.” Hayes himself labeled it
”bold and honest" and thought that although it would "offend
Some and cool the ardor of others", the people as a whole would
receive it well. Most important of all, he concluded with his
customary self-assurance, it was ”the true course.” He had
promised to put a stop to the system of congressiohal patron-
age and pledged himself to a single term as a vital first step
in that direction.42 Most Stalwarts were apparently not ser-
iously offended by what they took to be but an expedient move
designed to bring many dissident Liberals back into the fold
and seperate Hayes from what he would call "the unfortunate
methods and men” of Grant’s administration.' But anxious as he
was to divorce himself from Grantism, he did not wish to al-
ienate the President and his people. Thus when Thomas C. Platt
came to Columbus with the information that Grant was angry be-
cause he understood the single term pledge to be a reflection

lumn him, Hayes hastened to explain himself to the President.

 

42Hayes to Garfield, July 8, 1876 and Garfield Diary,
July 10, 1876. Garfield Papers. Garfield to Hayes, July 11,
”W6. Hayes Papers. Hayes Diary, July 8, 1876, in Williams,
ec1o, Iﬂary and Letters of Hayes, III, 333.

182
"Nothing, I assure you, is further from the fact," the candi-
date explained in a letter to the President. "In addition to
the reason given in the letter," Hayes continued, ”there was
another which had much weight with me.” He was, he said, "not
a prominent candidate outside of" Ohio while Vat least four"
of the losers were more prominent than Hayes.' Moreover, ”five
leading candidates" were younger than the nominee and thus
might "all reasonably expect to be candidates” four years
hence, he reasoned. VIt seemed to me therefore that nomin-
ated as I was, it would tend to unite and harmonize their
friends if it were certainly known that I would not be in the
way four years from now.V This would Wsurely strengthen" the
Hayes administration, he.concluded.43 'But just how, one is
moved to ask? Hayes was not insincere in revealing his rea-
sons for making the one-term pledge, but he did omit a third
and most important motive for this seemingly selfless and ex-
pedient move: he simply had no desire to serve for more than
four years and was already dreading even this much bondage.
Moreover, it was the kind of gesture which he relished, and he
was sure it would contribute to his good reputation.

While Hayes was preparing his Letter, Garfield was coming
to a decision on the question of his retirement from public
life. The beginning of summer found him not only weary, but
'kgeatly distressed? as he rested in Ohio among friends and

h

43Hayes Diary, Dec. 18, 1879 and Hayes to Ulysses S.
Chant, July 14, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of

@212; III, 582, 334.

183

discussed his future course. It appeared "almost necessary,”
he told his diary, to seek re-election Vpartly to aid Hayes in
.Ohio, & partly to seal up the charges which were not altogether
given over two years ago.? On July 1, he noted that his re-
ception upon returning to the House had been ”very pleasant
and cordial" and that his brief contribution to the debate
then in progress ”was welcomed? by friendly colleagues who
assured him that he had Wbeen greatly needed.V It comes as no
surprise that he thereupon recorded his decision to stand for
re-election, with the following words:

I do this with great reluctance; for I really want

to get out of Congress; but don't quite see how I can

in the midst of this Presidential Campaign. I am not

at all happy in the prospect of continuing in Congress.

In fact I have been greatly depressed at the prospect

of this unsettled mode of living with my large family.

If we lose the next Congress, I will certainly resign

next year. This I record for a memorial.
His anxiety for his family was genuine, yet he knew he had
vacillated in the face of the question for years. Moreover,
he appreciated, without fully understanding, the tenacious hold
politics had upon him. He was made unhappy both by the thought
of retirement and that of re-election. ”Inconsistent human
nature," he mused.44

On July 1, Garfield informed Hayes that he would prgbably

4’“Garfield Diary, June 22; July 1 and 2, 1876. Garfield
Papers. . -

184
stand for re-election, but would definitely give all the time
he could afford to what promised to be Va very hard and close
contest. . .9 On the same day, he informed his good friend
and advisor, Harmon Austin, that he could unietlyv let it be
known that he wguld run again. Perhaps he wished Hayes to
understand that he was almost persuaded to make the sacrifice
on his account alone and it seems likely that he was solicit-
ing a direct request from Hayes that he stand for re-election.
Undoubtedly, he felt an obligation to his party and a fellow
Ohioian, but Elaine’s defeat had left him uncertain as to what
his position might be in the event of a Republican victory.
With Blaine in the White House, he might well have expected
to be a major figure in the administration, but how would he
stand with Hayes? They were on friendly terms, but he was
scarcely an intimate friend and his preference for Blaine at
the convention had been an open secret. Was he seeking to
establish a closer relationship with Hayes, a certain sense
of_obligation on the candidate’s part, in the hope that this
would give him position with a Hayes administration? He cer—
tainly gave friends the impression that his decision had
either been made after Hayes had solicited his aid or that at
the very least that it had been significantly influenced by
Hayes’s wishes. Hayes did express his hope that Garfield would
run again as well as the hope that he would meet soon with the

campaign’s managers to map strategy.45

45Garrield to Hayes, July 1, 1876; Garfield to Austin,
Julof 1, 1876 and William K. Rogers to Garfield, July 10, 1876.
Garfi eld Papers. Letterbook.

‘-

 

 

185

Blainet

s elevation to the Senate also affected Garfield's
decision, for it led his friends in Congress "to insist very
strongly" that he stay on, he assured a friend. And while he
cautioned Austin that a message urging him to stand for re-
election ”must not be made public”, he nevertheless sent it
along with the suggestion that it be used ”confidentially”
within his inner circle of friends and supporters. To a good
friend and district editor, he wrote that although he ”was
strongly desirous of withdrawing” from politics, Hayes wanted
him "to stand again” and moreover his friends were "very de-
sirous” that he remain in Congress. He also had the speaker-
ship in mind when he made his decision. Thus he confided to
Austin that with Blaine going to the Senate and Wheeler paired
with Hayes, a Republican House victory would clear the track
for him. ”The fact that this has been Spoken of by so many
friends,” he continued, ”shows how strong the feeling towards
me is here, where I am best known.” Former governor Dennison
was one of those who told him that he should be the speaker
were the Republicans to win control of the House in the coming
election. With his decision made, Garfield became eager that
his bid for re-election be well managed and urged Austin not
to ”hesitate to incur any expense for travel and time you may
think best to get a full & fair expression of the popular will.”
He would, however, take no direct part in winning renomination,.

although he desired a strong endorsement that would forestall

the nomination of an independent candidate and the very

186
considerable ”scratching” that had occurred in his last con-
test.46 ‘

As the presidential campaign gained momentum, Hayes’s
Letter of Acceptance proved to be a significant campaign doc-
ument, although it had but little influence on the conduct and
strategy of the campaign. It may be assumed that he neither
expected nor desired to be closely identified with this opera-
tion. As in the case of the campaign for his nomination, he
preferred to be a bystander and await the victory that would
put him in a position to exert himself with more effect. Those
who held the reins of national party power were, after all, not
his kind, and the tactics they encouraged or tolerated were not
to his liking. But he had made his position clear and he felt
confident that although the campaign represented a blatant con-
tradiction of the letter and Spirit of his statement of accept-
ance and all he believed he represented, his reputation was
safe. It was as if he thought of himself as a passenger on a
train on the way to the White House, managed by a crew that was
necessary to a successful trip, but whose conduct had no real
significance for him beyond this piece of work.

Some of his liberal supporters, however, were not con-
tented to let matters take their course. When Schurz complain-
ed to him that officeholders were being assessed as usual,

Hayes replied (and surely he could not have believed this

——. _
_-‘ -—

46Garrield to Hayes, July 1, 1876; Garfield to William G.
Howells, July 19, 1876; Garfield to Harmon Austin, July 4,
1875; Garfield to Halsey Hall, July 1, 1876 and Harmon Austin
to Garfield, Aug. 2, 1876. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

187
himself) that he did not ”think” this would be encouraged by
the National Committee. ”We can (and are doing it) commit the
party to right doctrines by resolutions of clubs, meetings, and
the like, until there will be left no basis for the objectors.
But I suspect the main thing is to be like flint when action
(for reform) is had,” he wrote. ”Beyond that I do not see how
I can act efficiently,” Hayes pleaded, betraying his essential
powerlessness. His eyes were focused on the future and in a
later message to Schurz, he assured him ”that if ever I have
charge of an Administration this whole assessment business
will go up thook, line and sinker'.” And to an old friend he
naively wrote that ”with the party fully (1) committed to the

’ implementation would ”not be as difficult” as its

reform,f
opponents claimed it would be.' ”I hate assessments,” he de-
clared early in August to William Henry Smith, for they were

”all wrong” and would surely do ”more harm than good."47 Schurz,
still less than satisfied with Hayes’s response to his com—
plaints, continued to bother the candidate on the subject,

while Hayes patiently assured him that he had put a stop to

"all the practices you complain of within my reach.” But as

one scholarly study notes, ”the system of political assess-

ments reached its height” during this very campaign. Per-

lmps in exasperation Hayes pointed out in an unfinished and

luwent note to his liberal friend, that ”worse things” than

— —w “m-m----

 

--‘-'-“ «I. -

——— w—v-

47Hayes to Carl Schurz, July 24, 1876; Hayes to Carl
SChurz, Sept. 15, 1876; Hayes to William Dickson, July 14,
1876 and Hayes to William H. Smith, Aug. 10, 1876, in Williams,
9d., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 335, 358, 333-34, 343.

188

assessments had been reported to him. Some weeks later, he
professed to be surprised at Schurz’s claim that government
workers in Washington were being assessed, although he paid
no heed to Schurz's pleas that he publicly denounce ”all
practices not in entire harmony” with his Letter. He merely
assured him that he hoped soon to discuss the situation with
Cox, and that Schurz might rest easy, for if elected he could
be trusted to fulfill his promises faithfully. ”No political,
no partisan duty, (if such things can be called duties!) --
at any rate, no partisan or personal service shall be required,
or allowed to be required of public officers,” he resolved.48

Two days after his first exchange of letters with Schurz
on the subject, Hayes wrote to Richard McCormick, his only
contact on the National Committee, reminding him of his pub-
lic pronouncement on ”what ought to be required of office-
holders” and enclosing a clipping asserting that assessments
were sanctioned by the Committee. If this was true, he wish-
ed them to know that it was ”a plain departure from correct
principles and ought not to be allowed. I trust the committee
will have nothing to do with it,” he concluded, undoubtedly
sure that his protest would fall upon deaf ears, particularly
since McCormick himself had little influence within the Com-
mittee. A week later, he informed Schurz of his action and

48Hayes to Carl Schurz, Aug. 25, 1876, in Williams, ed.,

Ihary and Letters of Hayes, III, 352; Dorothy G. Fowler, The
Qébinet Politician:The Postmasters General, 1829:1909 (New
york, 1953), p. 157; Hayes to Schurz, Aug. 25 and Sept. 6,
1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 352,

354, j354 n.

 

189
of his decision to confine himself only to such protests. He
did, however, go so far as to send Schurz a copy of his letter
to McCormick, cautioning him that it was ”forprivate use only”
until he should approve its publication.49 But this was as
far as he would go in mollifying Schurz and those for whom he
spoke. And Hayes would not have gone this far had it not been
for reform pressure and his desire to keep as many liberals in
his camp as possible and attract new recruits.

Meanwhile, he continued subtly to encourage Schurz to pur-
sue other themes, those which Hayes clearly believed were polit-
ically more potent and would pay bigger dividends on election
day. An undue emphasis on reform issues might alienate im—
portant elements within the party whose support was essential
to his success. Indeed, Hayes was walking a tight rope during
these months and Was keenly aware of the problems he faced as
the compromise candidate of a party whose prospects for vic-
tory appeared dim. He had to win over or appear to be cap-
tured by those liberal dissidents who had bolted the party in
1872, but who had not as a whole identified with him before
his nomination. They were essential to a GOP victory, yet his
relationship to them must be carefully controlled so as not to
offend men like Garfield who spoke for many party regulars
idmn he commented that while he was pleased to have them re-

turning to the fold and joining in the effort to elect Hayes,

49Hayes to Richard C. McCormick, Sept. 8, 1876 and Hayes
130 Carl Schurz, Sept. 15, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diaryiand
Letters of Hayes, III, 355, 357.

190
they had no ”right to assume the leadership of” the party and
”dictate to those who have bolted.”5O Hayes had to cultivate
his relationship with the reform element with care, for he
also had to contend with the Stalwart element and the Grant
clique, who occupied key positions in the party organization
and held the reins of power in this campaign. These men were,
by and large, anathema to Hayes, yet they, too, were as nec-
essary to him as he was to them and an uneasy facade of har-
mony had to be maintained. But Hayes was well suited for this
difficult role and he handled it with more ease than one might
suppose -- because he was in fact, type cast for it. During
the campaign leading to his nomination, he had been a model of
discretion, conciliation and dignified reserve, a man bent up-
on offending no one. This was the Hayes approach, it was his
political style and it not only worked admirably for him dur-
ing the presidential campaign, but it saw him safely through
the bitter contest that followed.

The work of Congress dragged on for some two months after
the presidential nominations had been made, and quite natu-
rally much that was said and done there was calculated to in-
fluence the outcome of the campaign. During this period,
Garfield gained substantially in stature and, without knowing
it, took important steps toward assuming a prominent role in
the post election contest and in the Hayes administration.

Ibyes’s Letter had not only pleased Garfield, but he was

50Garfield to Jonathan Scofield, July 1, 1876. Garfield
Papers, . _

191
flattered that his suggestions had apparently influenced its
composition. While he believed the GOP choice met with gen-
eral approval, if not with the enthusiasm that ”some others
(Blaine?)" might have engendered, he concluded that it was
"perhaps the safest choice.” He was bothered, however, by the
fact that he did not know Hayes as well as he did the front
runners at Cincinnati. But as he met and questioned men who
knew him intimately, he came to feel ”better about the Gover-

’s qualities," as he put it in his diary.51

nor
As the campaign got under way it became increasingly ap-
parent that neither the GOP nor its nominee were to be con-
strained by the elevated tone of the Letter of Acceptance.
Hayes had declared to Schurz that civil service reform was to
be the issue, and his Letter implied that he wished to hasten
the reconciliation of the North and South. Yet he made no
significant attempt to encourage party regulars to emphasize
the reform issue in the campaign, and merely contented himself
with reassuring reform spokesmen that all would be well -- if
only he was victorious. As to the South, he used his evalu-
ation of the trend of public opinion in Ohio to justify a de-
parture from the Spirit of his Letter. Beyond a shadow of a

doubt, he insisted in a letter to Schurz, ”a vast majority of

‘the plain people’ think of this as the main interest in the

51Garfield Diary, July 7 and 1c, 1876. Garfield Papers.
Garfield to Charles Henry, July 22, 1876. Charles E. Henry
PaPers. Hiram College. Hereafter cited as Henry Papers.
Garfield to William C. Howells, July 19, 1876 and Garfield
Diary, July 15, 1876. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

192

canvass: A Democratic yictgry will bring_the_ Re be ellipn into

 

 

power.” After Garfield had delivered his widely and lavishly
praised reply to Lamar, Hayes joined in the applause, assur-
ing him that it would ”do good.” For, he argued, ”23;;main

issue must- belt. is achsefehiw aliow the-§§§§ll1913ll9_9.9¥1§

 

into_p9wer. . ." This and Tilden‘s unfitness for the office

put the Democrats on the defensive and reflected ”a decided
and growing” popular opinion. After receiving a copy of the
speech from Garfield he repeated his opinion that this was

the ”true issue”, as the common people viewed it.52

'While visiting him in Columbus in mid-September, Garfield

recorded that he was favorably impressed with Hayes’s ”clear
analysis of the movements of the Campaign” including his be-
lief that the sectional issue now overshadowed all other is-

sues in voters'

minds. While dining with Hayes and Schurz,
he undertook to ”show Schurz how the war issues were dwarfing
all others. ” And as Hayes put it in referring to Garfield's
inclination to bring the silver question forward, they ”need
not, facing the Solid South, borrow any troubles about de-
tails of the money controversy. . .” Since they had won a
major victory for sound money in 1815, Hayes insisted they

"might undertake the greater task of pacification under the en-

forcement of the amended Constitution,” Murat Halstead recalled

N...- - -‘ *_ '— —'

52Hayes to Carl Schurz, Aug. 9, 1876,_in Williams, ed.,
Diary_ and Letters of Hayes, III, 340; Hayes to Garfield,
AUG- 5 and 12,1876. Garfield Papers.

193
years later.53 It is obvious then, why Hayes saw nothing in-
consistent about emphasizing the danger of rebel rule, while
promising to promote intersectional harmony. This would be
impossible if the challenge of the ‘Solid South' was not de-
feated.

It was at this time that Hayes called Schurz's attention
to what he believed had become the two major campaign issues:
”the danger of a 'united South’ victory, and Tilden's record
as a reformer.” He reminded another correspondent that they
were the emerging pre-occupation of both the press and the
stump speakers, and it was a telling approach, he declared.
"Our strong ground is the dread of the solid South, rebel rule,
etc., etc.,” he insisted in a letter to Blaine, and urged him
to emphasize this on the stump. ”It leads people away from
’hard times'” which, he had decided by September, was the GOP's
"deadliest foe.” After visiting with Blaine, during his swing
through Ohio, he found that they were in nearly perfect agree-
ment as to the South. ”By conciliating Southern whites, on
the basis of obedience to law and equal rights, he (Blaine)
hopes we may divide the Southern whites, and so protect the

colored people,” Hayes recorded in his journal.54 This was

to be the essence of his southern policy as president.

___

53Garfield Diary, Sept. 17, 1876. Garfield Papers.
Halstead, ”Recollections and Letters,” p. 488.

54Hayes to Carl Schurz, Sept. 15, 1876, Williams, ed.,
2i§£y;and Letters of Hayes, III, 358; quoted in Gail Hamilton,
Eiggggiﬁi of Jamgg G. Blain§.(Norwich, 1895), p. 422 and
Hayes Diary, Oct. 4, 1876, in-Williams, ed., Diarygand Letters

Eigﬂayes, III, 364.

194

Hayes's closest friends and political aides steadily
emphasized the sectional theme during the campaign. One of
the chief architects of the Hayes victory in Cincinnati,
William Henry Smith, was a leading advocate of bloody shirt
tactics during the presidential campaign. This was the ploy
that aroused western Republicans when nothing else worked, he
assured Comly late in August. The latter was urged to tele-
graph Robert Ingersoll to abandon Maine and with Noyes arouse
Ohioians to the dangers of rebel rule. Yet, unaccountably,
Hayes apparently counted on carrying some of the Confederate
South and in early July had urged Garfield to stir up the
Congressional Campaign Committee on this matter. It was ur-
gent that he see what the party could do in North Carolina,
for there was no time to lose. Hayes was certain that if
Garfield visited that state, he could ”do great good."55

As the campaign gained momentum, Hayes‘s diary and cor-
respondence also provide occasional glimpses of his equivocal
attitude toward the presidential bid. First of all, he hoped
to remain as completely passive as possible, preferring to
hear neither good nor bad campaign reports. Victory was mani-
festly less important than maintaining his self-respect and a
clear conscience. He wrote ”the following honest words” to
(me of his oldest and most intimate friends: ”Now that the

flush of gratification upon the nomination is about at an end,

55Edgar L. Gray, ”The Career of William Henry Smith,
POIitician-Journalist”-(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University, 1950), p. 87 and Hayes to Garfield, July 8,

1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 333.

195
I begin to prefer the independence of a private citizen.” He
asserted that he would be the "most contented” defeated can-
didate in U. S. history. And in a letter to Lucy Hayes, he
confessed that when by himself, he ”always” wished to be "a
quiet private citizen again." Defeat would fulfill this Wish
and he ”almost” hoped for it. ”Independence is such a com-
fort and blessing. . ." Yet on this very day he was instruct-
ing a friend to solicit from John M. Forbes the financial help
that was deemed imperative were Indiana to be saved.56 Late
in September, he noted in his journal that the presidency would
”be a sore trial. Health, comfort, happiness, all imperilled,
if not sacrificed” while he could find much ”satisfaction” in
defeat. Nearly a month later, he claimed he was ”almost in-
different” about the outcome and could find ”many reasons for
thinking defeat a blessing." He was sure he would stand by
his Letter, he told his diary, ”but what conflicts and annoy-
ances would follow!” He had lost some of his earlier optimism
and naivete as to the problems facing a reform president and
he was now beginning to be a bit uneasy. "I do not fear my
pluck or constancy a particle. But to be deceived by rogues,
to find many a trusted reformer no better than he should be --

here would be humiliation and troubles without end.”57 It was

56Hayes to Schurz, Aug. 9, 1876; Hayes Diary, Aug. 13,
1876; Hayes to Lucy Hayes, Aug. 13, 1876 and Hayes to William
Regers, Aug. 13, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of

ﬂexes, III, 540, 344-45.

57Hayes Diary, Sept. 24 and Oct. 22, 1876, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 365, 370.

196
precisely his hypersensitivity to such dangers that left
Hayes an uneasy Officeholder and which at once limited his
tangible achievements as an executive, but enabled him to
make those intangible contributions that reflected a lifetime
of modest but pure public service.

By August, the outlook for the Republicans had grown
markedly bleaker. After Schurz had sent him a very grim
estimate of affairs, Hayes replied that the greater the odds
against success, the ”nobler” would be the effort. Schurz
insisted that although ”an upright, able, and well-meaning
gentleman,” Hayes had been consistently loyal to Grant and was
so indebted to the Stalwarts that they would hold the reins of
power during his presidency and make his Letter of Acceptance
a mere scrap of paper. Schurz pleaded with him to shatter
this impression with some sort of public statement, but Hayes
would not break his self-imposed silence. By mid—August, it
was apparent that the party was in serious trouble in Indiana.
During a lengthy conversation with Morton, Hayes was told that
if Indiana was lost in October, defeat in November was nearly
certain. Using election figures, Morton demonstrated the
essential balance of party strength in Indiana ever since 1860.
He also claimed that four-fifths of the growing voter strength
of the Greenback party was being drawn from Republican ranks.
Ebyes quoted Morton as saying that ”money and speakers” were
rmcessary to carry the state -- about $100,000 from outside
(ﬁ‘the state as compared with some $55,000 in 1872. After

hearing this sobering appraisal, a depressed Hayes made the

197

following journal entry:

0n the whole, his talk was not encouraging. The use

of money, I have little faith in, and I am confident

no such large sum can be raised. I mean to get

through cheerfully and firmly and with clean hands.

If defeated, there will be no bitterness in the dis-

appointment, and I shall have my self-respect and an

approving conscience.
Schurz’s and Morton's pessimistic reports shattered the com-
forting illusion nourished by Hayes and his intimates that
all was well. The nominee did not care to ”give much thought
to the prospects” of the campaign and "preferred not to know
much that would either depress or elate.”58 Certainly he did
not want to become involved in the potentially dangerous and
nasty business of funding raising. He found the passive,
aloof, cautiously optimistic posture comfortable and comfort-
ing and insofar as his reputation and equanimity were con-
cerned -- much safer. He wanted victory, but he did not wish
to go beyond encouraging and suggesting themes to stump Speak-
ers, and doing what he could to compensate for the National
Committee's mismanagement.

Following the Morton interview, he wrote Conkling to say
he was ”anxious” to have his help in Indiana and Ohio as soon

as possible. He went out of his way to flatter the egocentric

58Hayes to Carl Schurz, Aug. 9, 1876; Carl Schurz to
Ha.Ves, n. d.; Hayes Diary, Aug. 13, 1876 and Hayes to Carl
SChurz, Aug. 9, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of
Hayes, III, 540, 541-42, 345-44, 540.

198

New Yorker, assuring him that his state could still decide
the contest even if Indiana was lost, but implying that if
he came West, Indiana might yet be saved. "Your presence
here will impart to our canvass life and enthusiasm,” Hayes
wrote, ”and insure that energetic effort which brings out a
full vote and commands success.” Even if Conkling appeared
in only the major urban centers, Hayes would consider that he
”placed the country and all of us under great obligations.”
Years later, he implied that Conkling‘s retirement ”to his.
tent in a fit of sulk" had been a significant factor in the
election's outcome.59l

Hayes also urged, through an intermediary, ”liberal. . .
exceptionally liberal appropriations" for Indiana by the
party organizations in Illinois and New York with some suc-
cess. He first telegraphed and then wrote Blaine, informing
him that the great rally to be held at Warren, Ohio, where he
was to speak, might well be the ”turning point” of the entire
canvass. Garfield had campaigned in Maine at the request of
Hayes and the National Committee with the understanding that
Blaine, Frye and Hale would reciprocate. Hayes warned Blaine
that Garfield would ”dare not face the people of Warren (he
did not explain why)” and the meeting would have to be can-

celled if he failed to appear. ”This would be very disastrous,”

 

“ — 7-.“

59Hayes to Roscoe Conkling, Aug. 15, 1876 and Hayes
Diary, June 29, 1888, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of
Hayes, III, 547 and IV, 396.

199
wrote Hayes urgently.6O

Garfield, who had been laboring diligently for Hayes end
his own re-election was drawn to Hayes through his reading of
his friend Howell’s campaign biography as this diary entry re-
veals: ”I find my heart warming up towards Hayes very much,
since I find how true and thorough he was in Student life and
habits. It is a joy to speak for a man whose stuff and spirit
one can wholly & cordially approve of.”61 Did Garfield per-
haps have Blaine in mind when he wrote this?

The Ohio election results in October did not serve to en-
courage a cheerful outlook. Overall the party made gains, but
the Democrats took CinCInnati and environs and two close friends
of Hayes, Stanley Matthews and Manning Force, lost congressional
races. 0n the other hand, Hayes was pleased by the victories
of McKinley, Cox, Garfield, Foster and others whom he consider-
ed ”cronies" and wno, he believed, would support civil service
reform and financial soundness. Garfield and his backers were
satisrled that he had finally recovered from the blows received
in 18Y2-73 and now stood ”completely Vindicated” as Austin put
it. Garfield, meanwnile, was counting on the speakership if

the Republicans carried the House.b2

- — - ——-‘-—

-* v ————— —

 

 

COHayes to James Root, Aug. 22, 1876 and Hayes to Blaine
(telegram), Sept. 20, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters
0f Hayes, III, 351, 261.

51Sept. 19, 1876. Garfield Papers.

62Hayes to Carl Schurz, Aug. 17, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
Qialy and Lettere_ef Hayee, III, 346 and Harmon Austin to
Garfield, Oct. 23, 1876. Garfield Papers.

200

Hayes blamed the vote losses in Ohio towns and cities on
the depression and recognized that the use of the Catholic-
school issue had hurt the party among Catholic immigrants. It
worried him that his opposition to ”Catholic & all sectarian
interference with political affairs” had been construed to
mean he opposed suffrage rights for foreigners. The latter
charge was given added force when Hayes was endorsed by the
nativist Order of the American Alliance, and when his secre-
tary replied that the candidate was ”deeply gratified” by their
action. This, in addition to the Ohio gubernatorial candidate’s
association with the temperance movement, undoubtedly cost the
Republicans votes and contributed to the defection of German
voters, including former lieutenant governor Jacob Mueller.
Garfield, who had predicted a close contest as far back as
July, warned late in October that the outcome was ”now danger-
ously close.”63 But Hayes assured the Secretary of the Na-
tional Committee that ”all non-Catholic foreigners” had re-
mained loyal and that the party's majority could be doubled
”in November without effort.” He believed that Wisconsin was
"safe” and that the party stood ”as well as ever with the
Germans.” Indiana had gone to the Democrats, as he had an-

ticipated, but the outlook for November was much better.64

63Hayes to Richard McCormick, Oct. 14, 1876, in Williams,
8d., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 367; Barnard, Rutheyfeyd
B. Hayes, p. 312; Garfield to Austin, Oct. 23, 1876. Garfield
Papers.

61‘LHayes to Richard McCormick, Oct. 14, 1876 and Hayes to
William H. Smith, Oct. 14, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 367, 368.

201

Hayes had been especially anxious about Ohio, since those
who urged his nomination most strongly had argued that Ohio
was necessary for victory and Hayes was the only man who could
surely carry that state. ”After all this,” wrote the candi-
date, ”the loss of Ohio in October would have been a sore
mortification.” He confessed that he could take a defeat in
the presidential race ”far more philosophically . . . than the
loss of Ohio in October.” He was most concerned with the Re-
publican performance in his own ward, the town of Fremont and
his county and congressional district. He now recorded with
satisfaction that they had done ”very handsomely” and he con-
sidered the results a ”gratifying” endorsement by Ohio and his
neighborhood. He now was sure that he would encounter no dif-
ficulty in carrying his own state in November. He was con-
cerned, however, with what he termed the ”know-nothing charges”
made against him. But these were ”more than met (get by denial
or explanation) but by charging the Democrats with their Oath-
olic alliance,” Hayes explained to a friend. To this end, the
Grey Nun’s Act of Governor Tilden's administration (legisla-
tion authorizing Catholic schools to issue public-school
teacher certificates) had been worked up for general distri-
bution as a campaign document. It was a ”very effective" and
"complete reply," wrote Hayes approvingly. But the accusers
were not silenced, he‘dig find himself denying the charge and

it undoubtedly cost him votes in November.65

65Hayes Diary, Oct. 15, 1876; Hayes to William H. Smith,
Oct. 20, 1876 and Hayes to W. S. Ridgway, Oct. 24, 1876, in
Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 368-69, 369,
370-71.

202

Hayes might have appeared optomistic, but his facade of
cheerfulness concealed a growing feeling of apprehension. He
not only spoke of defeat, but for the first time mentioned the
possibility of a ”contested” election and a resulting "conflict
of arms." He was greeted by large crowds while visiting the
Centennial exhibits in Philadelphia on Ohio Day, October 26,
and delivered six short talks there without, as he phrased it,
”saying anything” he might regret. But he returned to Ohio
”feeling that with the probabilities of fraud and violence --
fraud, North; violence, South -- the chances are that we shall
lose the election." However, he immediately made reference to
what was already known as the ’Hayes luck'. "My luck is the
other way,” he reassured himself, and indeed it appears that
his experience as a soldier and a politician peg convinced him
he was the beneficiary of a special providence. Garfield, too,
noted that he had never felt so unsure about the outcome of a
presidential contest.66

During the final week of the campaign, Hayes continued to
refer to defeat as a very real possibility, admitting now that
the Democratic triumph in Hamilton County (Cincinnati), had
denied his ”friends the prestige of victory" and might mean
"the difference between victory and defeat.” Of course, he
insisted, the October setback had been ”due to bribery and re-

peating”, just as a defeat in November could be attributed

66Hayes Diary, Oct. 22 and 29, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 370, 371 and Garfield Diary,
Nov. 7, 1876. Garfield Papers.

203
mainly to ”hard times.” Both he and Garfield believed that the
depression would lead men to vote for a change in Washington,
and Garfield saw a historical parallel between 1876 and the
situations in 1836, 1848 and 1856. But Hayes emphasized that
hard times made it easier to hire men to violate election laws
and defeat would come, ”if at all, by crime -- by bribery and
repeating North and violence and intimidation in the South.”67
It was as if he were preparing himself for a disputed election,
readying himself to believe that he would have won a clear-cut

victory had law and order prevailed.

67Hayes Diary, Nov. 1, 1876, in Williams, ed., Dieyy
and Letters of Hayes, III, 371-72 and Garfield Diary, Nov. 6,
1876. Garfield Papers.

CHAPTER 5

COMPROMISE YIELDS A TARNISHED VICTORY

The election did not settle the Hayes - Tilden contest --
rather it touched off yet another struggle that lasted until
the eve of Hayes’s inauguration and tested the mettle of the
two candidates. Both parties claimed the electoral votes of
South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana. Hayes needed every one
of the contested votes for victory; Tilden needed but one.
Although tvisiting statesmen’ went south to see that the three
states’ returning boards did their work 'properly‘ (Garfield
was one of those sent to Louisiana by Grant), Congress still
had to resolve the dilemma of several sets of double returns
and with a Democratic House and a Republican Senate, consti-
tutional guidelines were of little help. Therefore a compro-
mise was struck creating a bi-partisan Electoral Commission
(Garfield was one of its members) to determine which set of
returns should be counted. Its decisions awarded every dis-
puted vote, and hence the presidency, to Hayes despite efforts
in.the House to block the count’s completion. Throughout this
Struggle Garfield occupied a center stage position as a major
fbrce in the effort to put Hayes in the White House. He also
had a hand in some of the behind-the-scenes manuevering and

204

205
so-called 'bargains' that facilitated the peaceful settlement
of a struggle that might have taken a dangerous turn. Hayes,
meanwhile, maintained a passive pose throughout these trying
months, although he was aware of much that was done on his be-
half, often giving such activities his tacit approval and en-
couragement. He also busied himself with cabinet making chores
and arrived at significant decisions that would guide his ad-
ministration's approach to civil service reform and the southern
problem.

As the returns trickled in, Hayes's belief that the odds
favored the Democrats seemed to be borne out. Despite his
optimistic predictions, even Ohio was not delivering the an-
ticipated majority. ”The effect was depressing," he admitted.
Later on in the evening, a report of sizeable Tilden majorities
in New York city led Hayes to conclude that there was no longer
”a chance for Republican success.” Personally, he took this
apparent setback calmly and cheerfully. Unlike some of his
party's leaders, he did not subscribe to the notion that ec-
onomic recovery depended upon a Republican victory, not did
he anticipate ”any great or permanent injury” to the nation’s
”financial affairs”, but he did believe the cause of civil
service reform, too, would receive a severe setback. As on
election day, he reiterated his conviction that the South
would ”be the great sufferer”, for it would ”drift toward
chaos again." The cause for which he had enlisted years be-
Ibre, and which he had once believed secure, was now endangered.

Epilowing his supposed defeat, he lamented that now ”the

206

Amendments will be nullified, disorder will continue, pros-
perity to both whites and colored people will be pushed off
for years.”1

He was especially anxious about the southern Negro: what
would the future hold for him? His prospects appeared grim
and forboding, to say the least. It is indeed tempting to
write off the use of bloody shirt tactics in 1876 as the tri-
umph of expediency over idealism or as a bit of political dem-
agogery. But did this not also reflect a sincere and deeply
felt concern on the part of men like Hayes and Garfield for
the welfare of the Negro, the South as a whole and the nation's
future, as well? Keeping the major aims of the Civil War and
radical reconstruction in mind, as well as recent rebel speech-
es in Congress, is it so difficult to square the encouragement
of such tactics with the professions of his ’letter'? The de-
sire for a Republican victory likewise reflected, among other
things, Hayes's conviction that he "could do more than a Dem-
ocrat to put Southern affairs on a sound basis.”2

The incomplete returns of Tuesday evening forecast defeat,
but as more complete tallies became available on Wednesday, the
picture brightened and the suSpense mounted. The Republican
National Committee claimed the presidency by a single elec-

toral vote by virtue of victories in Louisiana, South Carolina

—‘——— ——__ —————— —_ -

1Hayes Diary, Nov. 11; 7 and 11, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
Inary and Letters of Heyee, III, 375, 373, 370»

2Hayes Diary, Nov. 11 and 12, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
lhgfy and Letters_ef;Hayee, III, 376-77.

207

and Florida. The Democrats also claimed these states. Hayes,
however, believed that Florida belonged to the Democrats, al-
though he had ”no doubt both fraud and violence intervened to
produce the result.” This was undoubtedly true in ”many South-
ern States,” he concluded. He was prepared to accept defeat,
finding comfort in his belief that the Republicans and ”fair-
minded men” knew and ”history” would surely record, that "by-
fraud, violence, and intimidation and by a nullification of
the Fifteenth Amendment”, his party had been robbed of a le-
gitimate victory. It was a foregone conclusion that Hayes and
the GOP would find and accept evidence of Democratic misdoings --
it remained only to find a suitable means of legitimatizing
their claim of victory. Meanwhile, Hayes continued to insist
that a fair election in the confederate south would have given
him not simply a slim, but a substantial, majority in the
Electoral College. There is no reason to believe he was in-
sincere in this conviction. Had the Fifteenth Amendment
”been obeyed and enforced,” he wrote ten years later, the Re-
publicans ”would have had a majority of the pgpular vote of
the ceuntrytand_at least 203 electoral votes to Tilden's 166.”
And they would have carried not only Louisiana, Florida and .
South Carolina, but Alabama and Mississippi, as well.3

For the moment, however, Hayes appeared resigned to de-
feat, consoled by his belief that on personal grounds it was

3Hayes Diary, Nov. 12, 1876; Hayes to Schurz, Nov. 13,

1876 and Hayes Diary, Dec. 10, 1886, in Williams, ed., Diary
Egg Letters of Hayes, III, 377-78, 378 and IV, 297. -

208

altogether preferable to success -- but not for long. At this
point, a telegram from Dennison claiming that Hayes was ”un-
doubtedly elected" and South Carolina, Florida and Louisiana
would be carried despite Democratic efforts to the contrary,
revived his hopes. He immediately took steps to make Dennison's
dispatch public and thereafter began claiming that "undoubtedly,
a fair election in the South would have” produced a substantial
electoral and pOpular margin and that given ”a fair canvass"
victory was yet possible.4 .

Like Hayes, Garfield had initially anticipated defeat,
but he, too, became somewhat more hopeful as claims of GOP
majorities in some southern states appeared in the press. ”It
would be strange, indeed,” he mused in his diary, ”if Hayes.
should carry it by one majority. The people, who indulge a
touch of superstition, say it is like his luck; that he has
always squeezed through by a small majority, and will do so
now.” But ”the people" were not alone in this feeling; Hayes,
too, appears to have believed his luck would carry him through
to victory.5

During the week following the election, Republican party
managers busied themselves seeing to it that Hayes‘s 'luck'
would work once again. The National Committee's claim of

victory and 185 electoral votes immediately touched off an

 

 

4William Dennison to Hayes (telegram), Nov. 12, 1876 and
Hayes to William H. Smith, Nov. 13, 1876, in Williams, ed.,

Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 378, 379.
5Garfield Diary, Nov; 8, 1876. Garfield Papers.

209
extended and violent exchange between the two parties and en-
couraged party leaders to take steps calculated to make good
their claims. As Hayes knew, his hopes rested with the Re-
publican controlled returning boards and their authority to
review and reject district returns -- perhaps a sufficient
number to give him all the electoral votes in dispute and a
narrow victory. Under the direction of Postmaster General
James Tyner, five special agents and the Second Assistant
Postmaster General were sent south to watch over the canvass
in the three disputed states. Meanwhile, the Department of
Justice, under Attorney General Alphonso Taft, an Ohioian,
was busy countering Democratic efforts to take these states
away from the GOP. William Chandler telegraphed Governor
Daniel Chamberlain of South Carolina and Stephen Packard, Re-
publican gubernatorial candidate in Louisiana, and Senator S.
B. Conover of Florida, who were apprized of the situation,
urged to be vigilant and hold their states for Hayes. They
replied confidently that Hayes had carried their states and
very shortly the Republican press was making unqualified claims
of victory.6 Even without the often mentioned joint efforts
of Zachariah Chandler, William Chandler and the New York Timee,
the Republicans would certainly have moved to secure Florids,
Louisiana and South Carolina for their candidate. But their
efforts did serve to revive and unite a dejected party organi-

zation, prepare the nation for a Republican victory snatched

6Fowler, Cabinet Politician, p. 161; James Comly to
HayeS, Jan. 8, 1877 and Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes, p. 319.

210
from the jaws of defeat and forward those activities that
ultimately secured the disputed electoral votes for Hayes.
Such efforts also served to re-enforce the cry of fraud against
the Democrats, which men from Hayes on down were already pre-
pared to take up.

Like Hayes and Garfield, Grant at first anticipated de-
feat, but when the outcome appeared in doubt and upon Governor
Kellogg's request, he called upon prominent party leaders to
visit New Orleans to witness and report on the work of the re-
turning board. When Garfield received the President's tele-
gram asking him to undertake this mission, he declared himself
to be ”a good deal embarrassed.” First of all, he believed
Grant Was exceeding his presidential powers to so act and that
as his agent, he would be placed in a highly vulnerable posi-
tion. "Second, I did not know who else was going,” he wrote
to Hinsdale, ”and I might find myself associated with violent
partisan Republicans who would attempt to count our side in
per fes aut hefas." Although he was convinced that the Dem-
ocrats were guilty of criminal acts during the election, he
was not as yet prepared to believe a fair canvass would auto-
matically produce a Republican victory. And perhaps he rec-
ognized that neither. presidential candidate could be inaugu-
rated without arousing cries of fraud (if it was Hayes) and
intimidation and violence (if it was Tilden). Some four years
earlier, anticipating a disputed election someday, Garfield
had attempted unsuccessfully to secure a resolution calling

Upon the House Judiciary Committee to determine ”what legislation

211

was necessary to provide for a contest of the election of
presidential electors.” And, he reported to Hinsdale, Sena-
tor O. P. Morton had also tried and failed to get Senate
action on this matter. Now the problem was compounded and he
succinctly outlined the dilemma his country faced in this way:
”We are now on the verge of a double difficulty. The first
and immediate one is this: what shall be done to secure an
honest and faithful count and return of the votes actually
cast? At the present moment it seems that the result hangs
on the count of the vote of Louisiana; and the Democratic party
asserts that the Governor . . . and his Board of Canvassers
will not act honestly in the premises, but will count Hayes in
at all hazards.”7

Two days after Garfield penned these remarks, Hayes wrote
to Schurz that should he "feel like going to Louisiana, it
would gratify” him were he to do so. Schurz did not make the
trip. Sherman went to New Orleans, but he was unhappy with
his role as a ”visiting statesman.” In a written letter to
his wife after arriving in New Orleans, he made this abundant-
ly clear with these words:

I have been assigned a much more conspicuous position

here than I wished and am almost sorry that I came.

We are acting only as witnesses but public opinion

will hold us as partisans. . . This whole business is

a thankless, ungracious task not free from danger

entirely unofficial and at our individual expense. . .
I frequently regret that I ever came. Grant in 8

7Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Nov. 11, 1876, in Hinsdale,
8d., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 340-41.

212

years did not remember my existence until he had this

most uncomfortable task to pegform and then by his

selections forced me to come.

Garfield and his colleagues had arrived in New Orleans
in mid-November, whereupon they quickly rejected a Democratic
offer to join them in urging the election board to count and
report only those votes actually cast, instead of votes le-
gally cast, the goal to which the Republicans were committed.
Thereafter, a committee representing each of the political
parties observed the returning board's proceedings while in-
dividual observers like Garfield heard testimony and prepared
briefs bearing on certain parishes, to be presented to the
board. "Much of the testimony is hearsay,” Garfield admitted
to his diary, ”but there is enough lawful evidence to startle
me with the strength of the case to be made." What he found
strongly re-enforced his inclination to believe the Democrats
had stolen the election.9

After returning to Ohio, he described his Louisiana ex-
perience to Burke Hinsdale in this way: ”I have been in what
seemed a different world from ours -- a World in which the
modes of thought and action are, in many respects, un-American

and un—Republican.” On the basis of a careful study of the

situation, Garfield continued:

 

8Hayes to Carl Schurz, Nov. 13, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 379; John Sherman to Cecilia
Sherman, Nov. 20; 24 and 25,.1876, quoted in Jeannette P.
Nichols, ”Rutherford B. Hayes and John Sherman,” Ohio History,
LXXVII (Winter, Spring, Summer, 1968), 132.

'9Garfield Diary, Nov. 15 and 25, 1876. Garfield Papers.

213

I can only say that, making all due allowances for

the exaggeration which partisanship and the sense of

personal wrong naturally make, I know of nothing in

modern history so destructive of popular government,

and so shocking to humanity as the conduct of the

Rebel Democracy during the four months that preceded

the late election in Louisiana. They acted upon a

preconcerted plan and intended to do just enough

violence and murder to accomplish their purpose and

no more. But in their zeal they so far over did it

as to make a remedy possible.
This evaluation coincides with the conclusion drawn by the au-
thor of a recent study of the Louisiana campaign, who speaks
of the Democrats resorting to ”a campaign of terrorization."
Garfield was certain that Hayes had won a clear majority of
the legitimate ballots, but he admitted to Hinsdale that he
would have insisted ”upon throwing out the vote of these parish-
es if there were nothing depending upon it in reference to a
choice of President.” His experience left him certain of the
Republican case, he assured Hayes, yet he feared it would be
”impossible for . . . northern people to understand how dif-
ficult a thing it is for anything like regularity and order to
be brought out of such chaos as this, in a few days.” He
pleaded for patience while ”the mill of the law” did its
work.10

But the Republican case was not left to depend upon legal
methods alone. Hayes's longtime friend and supporter, William

Henry Smith, dispatched as a representative, a Chicago business

man Charles Farwell, to New Orleans before the arrival of the

 

1OGarfield to Burke Hinsdale, Dec. 4, 1876, in Hinsdale,
ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp.-343-44; Fanny Z. L. Bone,
”Louisiana in the Disputed Election of 1876,” Louisiana His-

torical Quarterly, XIV (1931), 564 and Garfield to Hayes,
Nov. 23, 187 . Hayes Papers.

214
'visiting statesmen'. Smith later assured Hayes that Farwell
was their ”right hand man in Louisiana and it was he who first
reached Kellogg and Packard. . . and thwarted the Democrats.”
Moreover, since election time, Farwell had ”furnished $20,000
to keep Kellogg's Collector of Taxes from being indited (sic)
and matters from being aired in court,” Smith claimed. There-
after Packard's and Kellogg's behavior had been determined by
Farwell’s promises to them, Smith asserted shortly after the
Hayes administration had been launched. Garfield does not
appear to have made promises to critically placed Louisiana
Republicans, but among his associates who were accused of
busying themselves with such efforts was John Sherman. Elec-
tion supervisors David A. Weber and James E. Anderson later
claimed that during interviews with the Senator and in an ex-
change of letters they had received assurances that their co-
operation would not go unrewarded, even to the point of making
provision for them to leave Louisiana if need be. Sherman not
only reassured Hayes that Louisiana definitely belonged to
their party, but characterized Returning Board members J.
Madison Wells and Thomas C. Anderson as ”thoroughly honest and
conscientious" as far as he could determine. He further com-
mended Anderson to him as one who had acted ”conscientiously
and judiciously” during this crucial interval, as Hayes

phrased it in his diary.11

 

11William H. Smith to Hayes, Dec. 5, 1876; Barnard,
Imtherford B. Hayes, pp. 465-66 and John Sherman to Hayes,
Nov. 23, 1876. Hayes Papers. Hayes Diary, Nov. 26, 1876 in
Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 381.

215

Hayes’s reaction to Sherman‘s report from New Orleans
was to reply that he felt as the Senator did ”about the whole
business,” insisting that a "fair election” would have brought
them no fewer than forty southern electoral votes. But cer-
tain as he was that he deserved victory, Hayes was clearly
worried that his supporters might try ”to defeat one (Demo-
cratic) outrage and fraud by another.” He cautioned Sherman
that ”there must be nothing crooked” on the part of their party.
Perhaps it was his anxiety over the possibility of a tainted
victory and perhaps shrewdness as well, that prompted him to
confide to Schurz that defeat would ”be a relief.”12

But even before a decision had been rendered in Louisiana,
he was visited by a New Orleans newspaperman who claimed to
give him the authentic views of no fewer than three prominent
southern politicos: Lucius Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi, Senator
John Gordon of Georgia and wade Hampton of South Carolina. He
was certain to be inaugurated, the South simply wanted peace,
honesty in federal offices, and would put up no fight, he was
told. They claimed to favor the guaranteeing of Negro rights,
wanted no promises from Hayes, but nevertheless would support
him insofar as they could while remaining within the Democratic
structure. Hayes replied by reassuring his informant that his

'Letter‘ ”meant all it said and all it implied.”13 This

 

12Hayes to John Sherman, Nov. 27, 1876 and Hayes to Carl
Schurz, Nov. 26, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary andzgetter§_ef
Hayee, III, 381-82, 381.

13Hayes Diary, Dec. 1, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary_ang
Letters of Hayes, III, 382—83.

216
conference was but one of the earliest examples of why Hayes
would grow progressively more optimistic about solving the

’southern problem'

if only he was granted the opportunity.

On December 4, with their work in New Orleans completed,
Garfield, Sherman and four of their colleagues paused on their
way to washington to report fully and in person to Hayes. They
advised him that the Republicans who had visited New Orleans
were unanimously of the opinion that he was legally entitled

t

to Louisiana s electoral votes. They reported, as Hayes noted:

That largely more parishes and polls ought to be thrown

out for violence and intimidation than was necessary to

elect the whole Republican ticket, state and national;

that a fair election would have given the Republicans

not less than thirteen to fifteen thousand majority;

that the intimidation was deliberately planned and

systematically executed by means of rifle clubs or-

ganized in the parishes selected for the process of

intimidation known as 'bull-dozing.’
He had once harbored some doubts as to Louisiana, but as he
commented to Schurz, his ”conversations with Sherman, Garfield,
Stoughton and others settled the question" with him.14

Yet the question was not really settled with satisfactory
finality then or later in the minds of many of his contem-
poraries. Moreover, Hayes‘s own frequent allusions to the
subject in his diary and letters betray a nagging modicum of
doubt and embarassment on his part -- as when he emphatically

declared in an 1885 letter that he had ”never had any doubt as

to the legality or the fairness of the final result.” Not

 

11+Hayes Diary, Dec. 5, 1876 and Hayes to Carl Schurz,
Dec. 6, 1876, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayee,
III, 384-85, 386.

217
only had Garfield, Sherman and their associates given him
their personal assurances ”in the strongest terms,” Hayes
wrote, but ”more than this, one of the ablest and most influ-
ential Democrats in the country (Hancock?), who was perfectly
familiar with the inner history of the whole affair on the
Democratic Side, told me that no intelligent or candid man of
his party could claim the election of the Democratic party if
he conceded the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment.” This
gentleman contended that had the Negro vote been included,
Hayes would have been entitled to even more southern states.
As far as Louisiana is concerned, a careful study of the sit-
uation there documents the use of fraud, violence and intimi-
dation without restraint by both parties and makes clear that
the Republican controlled state political machinery was a de-
cisive factor in delivering the state’s vote to Hayes. It is
impossible to say just what a fair and legal poll might have
produced and it seems reasonable to conclude that no partisan
or non-partisan body could at the time hope to determine to
what candidate her electoral votes belonged.15 But the fact
remained that Louisiana’s returning board and those in South
Carolina and Florida made their decisions in favor of Hayes.
He therefore seemed assured of victory by the margin of a

Single electoral vote -- but the struggle had really only be-

gun.

 

15Hayes to Hugh Campbell, Feb. 16,1885, quoted in Hayes
Inary, Feb. 16, 1885, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of

Hayes, IV, 191 and Bone, ”Louisiana in the DiSputed Election,1

PD- 564-65.

218

Meanwhile, Republican liberals were voicing their doubts
about the Louisiana settlement. ”I am unhappy in the invol-
untary belief,” Cox admitted to Schurz, ”that we cannot sus-
tain the action of the Louisiana Returning Board, & that we
are in danger of what seems to me almost fatal, the inaugura-
tion of Hayes by fraudulent returns.” Hayes was not under the
influence of the "right advisers,” he asserted; thus the pol-
icy of drift had now taken over. Schurz replied that he shared
Cox's feeling of apprehension and had tried to persuade Hayes
that he should publicly demand ”a settlement of the presidential
question by some other means than the mere use of party power. . ."
He viewed the action of the returning boards as ”to say the
least, suspicious.” But while Hayes appeared to agree with
him "in the abstract" continued Schurz, he doubted that the
Governor was doing anything ”to influence the counsels of the
party at Washington. . ." He reiterated his conviction that
Hayes was simply permitting ”things to drift”, but this, he
had not yet learned, was precisely the passive role which
Hayes preferred.16

In each of the three vital states, the decision for Hayes
was challenged and Congress received not one, but two sets of
returns. Moreover, a technicality brought two sets of elec-

toral votes from Oregon, and the possibility of an additional

 

16Jacob Cox to Carl Schurz, Dec. 25, 1876. Schurz Papers.
Library of Congress. Microfilm copy in Hayes Memorial Library.
Hereafter cited as Schurz Papers. Carl Schurz to Jacob Cox,
Dan 28, 1876. Cox Papers. Oberlin College Library. Here-
after cited as Cox Papers.

219
and deciding vote for Tilden no matter what happened regard-
ing the southern contests. An atmosphere of mutual recrim-
ination quickly developed and partisanship reigned supreme.
Garfield had predicted that the New Orlean's committee‘s re-
port to Grant, would undoubtedly be ”bitterly” attacked.
”Doubtless we are ourselves partisan in making it,” he candidly
admitted in his diary, ”but we have sought to exhibit the
truth." He was not happy, however, with Sherman's insistence
upon including praise for board members in their report, a

’s dis-

sentiment he shared with the Representative from Hayes
trict, Charles Foster. MeanWhile House Democrats had taken
the offensive, and on the advice of friends who argued that he
was needed in washington, Garfield declined an appointment to
a committee to visit Florida. Significant divisions within
the Democrat party, divisions which astute Republicans would
exploit, were revealed when a proposal to impeach Grant was
resisted in caucus by Ben Hill and other prominent southern
delegates. "Wise management may break the strength of the
Southern Democracy," Garfield speculated. The Republicans
"ought to have the old Whig element” at their side in the up-
coming struggle, he continued, thus anticipating what became
an essential element in Hayes's effort to split the white
South politically. This hope, which they shared with other
party members, was Carefully cultivated by men like Casey

Young of Tennessee, who let Garfield know that some fifty

Democrats might rally to Hayes's side if only his southern

220

policy proved satisfactory to the South.17

Shortly thereafter, Garfield was urged by Representative
Alpheus Williams of Michigan, writing on behalf of Young, to
make a speech in the House outlining his views of how the South
would fare under a Hayes administration. Williams had been
told that the South wanted reassurance from a man of Garfield’s
stature and relationship to Hayes, that the latter’s course
would truly be ”conciliatory & tend to harmonize the unhappy
state of feeling there, growing out of party division upon the
n

color line” and that as President, his course would give the

South a good government . . .” Once again the promise that
fifty southern Democrats would unite with House Republicans

was used as bait. Williams urged that with the Democrats
struggling for unity, the GOP should lose no time if they in-
tended to split the opposition. Garfield forwarded William’s
letter to Hayes with the following comment: ”I think one of the
worst things in all our past management of the South, has been
the fact that we have not taken into our confidence, and united
to our support, a class of men, whose interest are identified
with the South, and who will help divide the white people po-
litically." He thereupon outlined in some detail a speech he

proposed to make dealing with the GOP claim to the presidency

and the economic and political program a Republican chief

 

— “-'-—-————

17Garfield Diary, Dec. 6, 1876. Garfield Papers. Gar-
field to Hinsdale, Dec. 26, 187 6, in Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-
Hinsdale Letters, p. 349 and Charles Foster to James-CBEI‘,”
Dec. 1876.10, James Comly Papers. Ohio State Historical
Ekmiety. Hereafter cited as Comly Papers. Garfield Diary,
Ike. 7 and 11, 1876. Garfield Papers.

221

executive could be expected to pursue.18

Despite the violent words and sensationalism commonly used
by the Speakers and the press during this critical period, Gar-
field believed the Situation in mid-December afforded his party
reason for cautious optimism. Amidst the commotion, purposely
generated and maintained by House leaders like Samual Randall
and Fernando Wood with the hope of forcing the election into
the House, Garfield perceptively advised Hayes that ”two forces
are at work. The Democratic business men of the country are
more anxious for quiet than for Tilden; and the leading south-
ern Democrats in Congress, especially those who were Whigs,
are saying that they have seen enough and don’t care to follow
the lead of their northern associates. . .” He had very re-
cently been told by several of his ”most thoughtful” fellow
Republicans that this was an opportune moment to divide the
Democrats, ”at least . . . on their policy of violence and
resistance.” But action must be taken quickly. He did not
believe that anything like fifty southerners would act with
the GOP, and indeed, he was unsure as to exactly ”what sort of
assurances the South” desired. But while emphasizing that no
one should be ”the custodian of . . . (Hayes's) policy and
purposes . . . or have any power to commit or embarrass” him,
it would be most helpful if those southern opponents of ex-
tremism could ”in some discreet" manner be reassured of Hayes‘s

good intentions toward their section. He reported that ”several

_=_ ———¢-—--—

18W. B. Williams to Garfield, Dec. 11, 1876. Garfield
Papers. Garfield to Hayes, Dec. 12, 1876. Hayes Papers.

222

Southern men have said, within a week, that in matters of in-
ternal improvements -- they had been much better treated by
Republicans than they were likely to be by the Democrats --
and they talk a good deal about the old Whigs having been
forced, unwillingly, into the Democratic party.”19

And yet Garfield was not optimistic that the southern
conservatives would enjoy much success in checking the influ-
ence of the more militant northern Democrats. However his
skepticism did not discourage tbargain minded’ southerners,
and they persisted in their efforts through the early months
of 1877. He was soon being urged by another self-appointed
Dixie spokesman, Albert J. Kellar of the Memphis Ayalaeehe,
to make a speech on southern policy, thereby capitalizing on
an incipient division within the southern bloc. Garfield, how-
ever, remained cautious and unconverted, in part because he did
not fully trust such men as Kellar and Young. Nevertheless,
he continued to hope for southern aid in forestalling any se-
rious threat to the ratification of Hayes's election and his
peaceful inauguration. But even so, he also worried that the
cry of fraud might rob a Hayes administration of its prestige
and effectiveness from the very outset.2O

Meanwhile, in the House, he busied himself resisting Tom
Scott’s Pacific railroad bill, although such a stand was not

likely to attract the support of internal improvements-minded

__ h ——

19Garfield to Hayes, Dec. 12, 1876. Hayes Papers.

2OGarfield Diary, Dec. 13 and 18, 1876 and Garfield to
Harmon Austin, Dec. 15, 1876. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

223
southerners to him and his party. Comly's report to Hayes of
a conversation with Garfield (fresh from a meeting of the Pa-
cific Railroad Committee) and Foster on this subject is in-
structive.

Both Garfield and Foster regret (Comly wrote) that
the Republican party was so Squarely committed
against further subsidies as to prevent them from
advocating the building of the Texas Pacific R. R.
by the help of Congress. They thought a large fol-
lowing might be gained for the Republican party in
the South by favoring this road, and both assented
that Texas might be made a Republican State by ad-
vocating the road. Garfield said he had made a
serious breach in the Southern Democratic line by
advocating an appropriation for Galveston harbor
which was defeated by the objection of Holman. Both
said they had no doubt of being able to build up a
strong southern following for a Republican Adminis-
tration, by advocating such Southern public improve-
ments as has been granted to the North during the
war. They regretted that the whole business of
subsidies to railroads had been brought into dis-
repute by the injudicious fostering of small local
lines, while Pacific roads had paid a thousand fold
for aid extended to them.21

Hayes himself avoided commitments, private or public,
and wisely maintained an open and friendly attitude toward
his many callers and correspondents. He rejected suggestions
that it might be necessary to visit Washington, for he wished
to ”take no active part in present complications,” he advised
Sherman. And in response to Garfield's letters, he stoutly
maintained that he was "wholly uncommitted on persons and
policies” beyond what those letters and statements already
made public contained. Then in a neat reversal of his cam-
paign views and with pacification evidently on his mind, he

21Garfield Diary, Dec. 20, 1876. Garfield Papers. James
Comly to Hayes, Jan. 8, 1876. Hayes Papers.

224

assured Garfield that now ”the war feeling has no hold in Ohio
worth a moment's consideration." Hayes also refused to be
drawn into the scheme designed to assure his election and
inauguration, then (December) being hatched by William Henry
Smith, his journalist allies and Colonel Kellar. He absolute-
ly would not be ”committed to details,” he insisted in a letter
to Smith, although he had given high priority to restoring
"peace and prosperity to the South. . ." He informed this in-
timate friend that those ”two things I would be exceptionally
liberal about are education and internal improvements of a
national character.” He concluded this letter by flatly de-
claring that a preoccupation with politics and ”too little
attention to business” had been ”the bane" of that section.22
Hayes appeared to hope that his administration might find poli-
tics in adjournment as he took the lead in healing wounds caused
by the war and its aftermath.

Despite continuing pressure from well-intentioned friends,
Hayes clung to his determination to avoid becoming entangled
in efforts on his behalf. Thus he rejected the suggestion, as
had Garfield, that he appoint a personal representative to
Speak for him in washington -- volunteers would have to suf-
fice. However, he did reassure his friends in the capital,
that their ”equitable right” to Louisiana was "indisputable.”
He clearly wished to avoid like the plague any association

with schemes designed to put him in the White House. There

 

22Hayes to John Sherman, Dec. 17, 1876; Hayes to Garfield,
Dec. 16, 1876 and Hayes to William H. Smith, Dec. 24, 1876, in
Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 392, 390, 393.

225

were already a sufficient number of Ohioians present in
Washington who could "give such facts” as to his ”general
ways of thinking and action,” he believed. This would suffice
to achieve everything that was "right and practicable,” Hayes
declared emphatically in a letter to Edward Noyes. And as he
was well aware that he was being accused of scheming to secure
the presidency, he found it comforting to know ”how unfounded
all such" allegations were. Hayes was not, however, completely
inactive. He was at pains to counter Conkling's influence and
reassure Grant of his cordial friendship. This is borne out
by the following excerpt from Comly’s report to Hayes upon his
return from his mission to washington on the Governor‘s behalf:

I then told him (Grant) there was one point upon which

I was authorized to Speak to him confidentially, by

authority; and I repeated your language to me, about

your stauch friendship for the President from the time

of Fort Donelson down to this day; and about your de-

sire to avoid anything that could seem to be a re-

flection upon the President that there was not one

chance in a million that you would appoint Bristow to a

Cabinet position, in view of the fact that he had made

himself so personally obnoxious to the President and to

so large a section of the Republican party. The Presi-

dent was much gratified at this assurance, and Showed

strong emotion. It was plain that he had not been

without the need of assurance, and that the doubt in

his mind had been skillfully manipulated by somebody.23

AS December wore on, Garfield became increasingly fearful
that the Democrats might just go so far as to use force to

achieve Tilden's inauguration. Yet he also anticipated that

the Republicans might receive some ”unexpected help” from

 

23Hayes to Samuel Shellabarger, Jan. 2, 1877; Hayes to
Edward Noyes, Dec. 31, 1876 and Hayes to A. D. Shaw, Dec. 31,

1876, in Williams, ed., Diayy and Letters of Hayes, III, 399,
397, 398. James Comly to Hayes, Jan. 8, 1877. Hayes Papers.

226
southern Democrats (although he remained suspicious of their
good faith), if only they were carefully handled. Among those
negotiating with southerners, with the idea of dividing the
Democrats along sectional lines, fostering the growth of
southern Republicanism and guaranteeing Hayes's inauguration,
were William Henry Smith and several of his journalist allies
who had worked either for the nomination of Hayes or Bristow.
Their chief southern contact was Colonel Andrew Kellar, owner-
editor of the Memphis Avalanche, a Confederate veteran who
bitterly opposed Tilden and wished to encourage the growth of
conservative Republicanism in the South, while at the same
time aiding the southern Negro. In December, Kellar came to
washington where he joined forces with another journalist,
Henry V. Boynton, in an intensive campaign to rally southern
congressional support of Hayes. By December 21, they were
confidentially assuring Smith that Ben Hill and Casey Young
plus some thirty southern House members were with them.
Smith was warned, however, that southern loyalty must be pur-
chased with a federal subsidy for Scott's projected Texas and
Pacific Railroad. Smith and his associates appeared much
surer that this Scheme was both workable and dependable than
did Garfield, who was cognizant of what was going forward on

this front.24

Meanwhile, Comly, who was busy in Washington on behalf of

 

24Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Dec. 18, 1876, in Hinsdale,
ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 347-48 and Gray, 'Career
of William Henry Smith,” pp. 119-24.

227
Hayes, had been told that the South was ”ready to meet any
overtures of peace half way,” for, thanks to northern ex-
tremists and charges of corrupt bargains between southern
Democrats and northern Republicans, the split within the
Democracy was ”widening rapidly.” Ben Hill was a leading
representative of this conservative southern faction, infor-
mants assured Comly, while Lamar, who was ”the center of this
sentiment” was now prepared to cooperate with the GOP. If
only Hayes could be persuaded to make some public overture
to these dissidents before they returned home for Christmas
recess, all might be well. But Hayes could not be persuaded
to abandon his silence and held tenaciously to his conviction
that "the true position” was ”'hands off.’” Moreover, he
recognized with unqualified pleasure that he had succeeded
in remaining a passive contender -- very nearly a mere by-
stander.25 The power and responsibility for settling the
dispute lay in Washington and with Washington figures, where
and with Whom he counted for little either as a person or as

a meaningful influence.

The perplexing question facing Congress was how to deal
with the double sets of returns from the disputed areas.

According to the Constitution, the president of the Senate

25W. H. Roberts to James Comly, Dec. 14, 1876. Comly
Papers. Hayes to A. D. Shaw, Dec. 31, 1876, in Williams, ed.,
Qatar and Letters of Hayes, III, 398.

228
was to count the electoral votes, but no guidelines were pro-
vided for the handling of double returns. Had neither major
candidate claimed an electoral majority, it would have been
up to the House to choose the President, but this had not
happened. Between 1865 and 1876 the House had in fact assumed
the power to deal with this dilemma, by the passage of Joint
Rule 22. By virtue of its provisions, if either house re-
jected a state's votes, they would simply not be counted, and
if this left no candidate with a majority, the choice would
then be left up to the House of Representatives. The rule
was readopted by the Democratic House in 1876, but not by the
Republican controlled Senate, thus robbing Congress of a de-
vice that had been used to deal with double returns in the
1872 presidential contest. Thus a new decision, acceptable
to both parties, as to how the count should proceed was now
imperative.

Hayes himself strongly favored a count by the Vice Presi-
dent, who might be expected to accept only the Hayes votes
from the states in dispute. After carefully studying earlier
electoral counts, Garfield turned states righter in an attack
upon House Democrats' attempt to have the Louisiana returning
board arrested and brought before the House on contempt charges.
He accused the Democrats of undertaking a ”fatal assault upon
Whatever there may be of sovereignty in the thirty-eight
States.” It was better to allow Tilden‘s election by fraudu-
lent nmmhs, he argued, than to violate the constitutional

limitations placed upon the federal government in regard to

229

presidential elections. Hayes apparently agreed. While dis-
claiming any desire to ”influence” the activities of his
supporters in Washington, he confided his opinion to Sherman,
declaring that ”everything in the nature of a contest as to
electoral votes is an affair of the States.” Sherman believed
that an appeal to the Supreme Court from ”any decision of” the
Vice President was ”the only constitutional solution of the
difficulty.” He admitted immediately, however, that this would
necessitate House approval which could not be won.26 A com-
promise solution was in the offing and seemed destined to win
approval. If this was so, Hayes told his journal, the elec-
tion‘s outcome would undoubtedly be influenced to his disad-
vantage. Meanwhile, he operated on the assumption that he
Egglg be the victor and therefore continued to work on his
cabinet and his inaugural address. Perhaps he took heart from
Comly’s report that Conkling had actually conceded his victory,
and only had doubts as to how it Should be verified.27

While Sherman, Garfield and most of Hayes's supporters
pressed for a decision by the president of the Senate, power-
ful interests pleaded for a compromise solution to end a state

of affairs they considered to be most damaging to the nation's

 

26Hayes to John Sherman, Jan. 5, 1877, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 400 quoted in Smith, Life of
Garfield, I, 627; Hayes to John Sherman, Jan. 21, 1877 and John

\-

Sherman to Hayes, Jan. 18, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 406, 405.

27Hayes Diary, Jan. 21 and 17, 1877, in Williams, ed.,

Diar and Letters of Ha es, III, 404, 402 and James Comly to
Hayes3, Jan. 8, 1877. Hayes Papers.

230
economy. This compromise proposal took the form of a fifteen
member electoral commission with five members each selected
by the House, the Senate and the Supreme Court. The decisions
of this extra—constitutional body would be determined by a
simple majority and would be binding unless rejected by beth
houses of Congress. It therefore appeared that only the threat
of a filibuster stood in the way of a final decision by inaugu-
ration time.

Garfield along with other friends of Hayes was greatly
distressed by this turn of events. He had considered the com-
promise committee a ”mistake” to start with and disgustedly
commented that they might ”better go back to the days of the
Roman Augurs at once and inspect the entrails of a calf and
the flights of birds.” He also feared Conkling might yet turn
against them and ”lose us the Presidency", suggesting that
Conkling's bitterness stemmed from his poor Showing at the
convention and the party's failure to carry New York state.
Hayes was of the same opinion. Comly had already received
"2322: that there was already active danger” in Conkling's
attitude toward the matter of the count. For his part, Sherman
objected to Conkling’s appointment to the compromise committee
(Ferry claimed it was wise to give him an interest in the
matter), although he himself had turned down the Vice Presi-
dent’s offer to appoint him to the committee on the ground
that it would be ”impolitic.” At this point, Garfield attend-
ed all urgent gathering of Hayes men -- Sherman, Taft, Dennison

and Clomly, at which Sherman reported that Conkling would not

231

support their position on the electoral count. Comly in-
formed Hayes that after some discussion, the conferees decided
to expand their group ”very cautiously taking in only thorough-
ly reliable and discreet friends.” When it was suggested that
southern Republicans should be seen, Sherman remarked heatedly,
"I will do anything I can, but I'll be damned if I do that. I
can't talk with those fellows -- don’t know how to get at them.
Somebody else must do it.” Thereupon Attorney General Taft
volunteered (with a wink) that given his official relationship
to them, he might have considerable success with such negogia-
tions.28

Throughout January, Garfield was involved in conferences
with other party leaders, working to counter Conkling's in-
fluence in the Senate and to secure Grant's recognition of the
Packard government lest it collapse. ”So another snag is pull-
ed,” he commented, after Grant had acted to shore up the Re-
publican regime in Louisiana, ”but a heavy load is laid upon
Hayes, if he comes in.” His diary entry for the following day,
when the 'defection' of Conkling and others appeared certain,
shows him distressed and yet refusing to give up hOpe. His
initial impression of the Joint Committee’s recommendation was
that it constituted ”a surrender of a certainty” which he feared
would mean that hereafter the final determination in the choice
Of a president would always lie with Congress. Garfield found

"Political sentiment . . . greatly divided” on the compromise

\-

v—w—“'--“mﬂ—-“ﬂ~ﬁﬂ‘ mac—1.“- C.“‘ ﬁﬁ__‘ H I 0-.

 

£28Garfield Diary, Jan. 4 and 5, 1877. Garfield Papers.
J8m853 Comly to Hayes, Jan. 8, 1877. Hayes Papers.

232

bill and he analyzed its reception thus:

The businessmen of the Count(r)y are clamorously in

favor of it. They care more for results than for

methods. More for an escape from present evils than

for a time enduring rule of action. On the contrary,

extreme partisans oppose the bill because it makes

the result uncertain, which they believe can be made

eertain without the bill. I incline to oppose the

bill for its faulty, and probably unconstitutional

method -- and for the evil which may result from it

hereafter.2

Both Hayes and Sherman were unhappy with the turn of
events. The former considered the Electoral Commission un-
constitutional and ”a surrender, at least in part of our case."
He insisted that unless it met with two-thirds approval in the
House and Senate, ”the President’s veto ought to prevent it
from becoming a law.” But Grant had in fact encouraged
Conkling to secure its adoption and had no thoughts of a veto.
Sherman, too, was fearful that the Democrats would ”have all
the advantage” in the selection of Commission members and would
surely choose ”bitter partisans.” Moreover, Senate Republicans
were ”in the power of men who” opposed his election, he con-
fided gloomily to Hayes. ”I cannot be mistaken in attributing
this hope to Conkling and others whom I suspect but must not
name,” Sherman concluded.30

Garfield was especially concerned over the situation in
Louisiana and his fears were compounded when Grant informed

29Garfield Diary, Jan. 14; 15 and 18, 1877. Garfield Papers.

30Hayes Diary, Jan. 21, 1877 and John Sherman to Hayes,
Jan. 18, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letterseof Hayes,
404, 405.

233

him that he believed that Packard could not be maintained in
power and would be run out of the state immediately after the
election was decided. Garfield was concerned over the Louisi-
ana dilemma, for he could not ”see how the vote for electors
and that for Governor" could possibly be separated. He under-
stood, however, from a New Orleans correspondent that the inau-
guration of Hayes would be generally well received there if
Nichols was allowed to come in as governor; and that Louisi-
anians would not support any violent resistance undertaken by
their northern brethren. At another gathering of Ohio Repub-
licans about mid-January, a poll revealed that of the partici-
pants, only Foster ”decidely favored” the compromise bill,
while one colleague remained undecided and the remainder op-
posed the measure. Foster explained to Hayes that he had al-
ways discounted the Democratic "threats" and was ”persuaded
now with Watterson" that the Democracy would not resort to
violence and that for this reason Watterson had supported the
compromise.31

But Garfield remained unconverted, declaring in his jour-
nal that he was "more than ever” convinced it was ”a dangerous”
bill which he was determined to fight with all his power. And
as he prepared his argument against it passage, he conferred
with William Evarts, who assured him that it was indeed con—

stitutionally indefensible. He also tried to shore up Blaine,

31Garfield Diary, Jan. 20, 1876 and Lionel Sheldon to
Garfield, Jan. 13, 1877. Garfield Papers. Charles Foster to
Hayes, Jan. 21, 1877. Hayes Papers.

234

whom he thought was ”wavering in regard to the bill”, by
shrewdly reminding him ”that the West would never forgive the
East, if they deserted” them on this issue. In a letter to
Hayes he passionately denounced what he labeled the Senate
need only have backed Ferry, for the ”danger of violent re-
sistance" to Hayes's inauguration ”had absolutely passed away. . .
House Republican committee members ”would never have agreed to
the bill but from the conviction that enough Republican Sena-
tors would follow Conkling to leave Ferry without support."
He continued hopefully, if their party lost ”a great advantage”
they were left with ”an even chance -- possibly more than even”
of success. Republican committee members were ”confident” of
victory under the compromise and he was being urged by Republi-
cans favoring the bill not to oppose it since they wished to
place him on the Commission.52

Despite stout opposition, the compromise measure won
House approval. Before its passage, Garfield had spoken for
over an hour in a fruitless but self-satisfying attempt to de-
feat the commission bill. The efforts of Smith, Boynton and
their journalist and railroad allies to block the bill were
likewise futile. Although over two-thirds of the House's
Republicans voted against it, some party members, including

Foster, were among the 191 Representatives supporting the bill.33

 

32Garfield Diary, Jan. 20; 22 and 24, 1877. Garfield
Papers. Garfield to Hayes, Jan. 19, 1877. Hayes Papers.

33Garfield Diary, Jan. 25, 29 and 50, 1877. Garfield
Papers. Henry Boynton to William H. Smith, Jan. 26 and 50,
7877 and J. R. West to William H. Smith, Jan. 19 and 22, 1877.
Wittiaxm.Henry Smith Papers. Indiana Historical Society. Here-
aftez‘ cited as Smith Papers.

235

Hayes adjusted to the turn of events easily, remarking
philosophically that ”what Congress and the popular sentiment
approve is rarely defeated by reason of constitutional objec-
tions.” Furthermore, he reflected that ”after a full and pub-
lic hearing”, defeat before the Commission would by no means
be "mortifying” although victory would "be in all reSpects
more satisfactory.” On the day the Supreme Court selections
to the Commission were announced, he wrote in his diary that
While preferring victory, he was certain ”that for our happi-
ness failure is to be preferred."34

Garfield was flattered and not really surprised when a
party caucus selected him as one of the members of the Com-
mission he had so recently and vehemently opposed. His good
Democratic friend, Jeremiah Black, urged him to decline the
honor, citing his staunch opposition to the compromise and
the fact that he was already committed on Louisiana. Garfield
admitted that he might indeed, ”be embarrassed" by accepting
the honor. But after consulting with friends, he discovered
that he "could not withdraw without displeasing” Republican
congressmen and so determined to allow the matter to take its
own course, secure in the belief that if the House rejected
him, none of his party would accept a seat on the Commission.
When some twenty Democrats did refuse to vote for him, he pro-
fessed to believe they had done him ”a service.” He recorded

With satisfaction that it was a fact ”that an overwhelming

34Hayes Diary, Jan. 26 and 51, 1877, in Williams, ed.,
Eieny' and Lettereﬂef Hayes, III, 409-10, 411.

236

majority of the foremost Democrats of the House voted for
me, . . . (while) a few Confe(de)rates and Northern Extre-
mists of no particular weight in the House voted against me.”35

The Senate and House appointees, as expected, left the
Commission evenly divided between the two parties, but the
selection of five Supreme Court members seemed certain to give
the Republicans the advantage, for the Court contained only
two acknowledged Democrats. For a time, however, it appeared
that David Davis might insure a degree of impartiality as the
odd man, but he was elected to the U. S. Senate from Illinois
before the compromise cleared the House and immediately de-
clared he was unavailable for such duty. After several pro-
tracted meetings, Joseph Bradley, a Grant appointee, became
the fifth court member. The Republicans were understandably
pleased, although Hayes's intimate friend, Stanley Matthews,
would later claim that party leaders knew that Davis, too,
would have been with them. But so were the Democrats, in-
cluding Bradley’s Democratic colleagues on the Court, for they
had the utmost faith in his impartiality.36 After all, Tilden
needed but one electoral vote to triumph, and the odds were
distinctly in his favor.

Florida was the first case to be referred to the Com-

mission from the joint session of the two houses. The

 

35Garfield Diary, Jan. 27; 29 and so, 1877. Garfield
PaPers.

36Williams, Life of Ha es, I, 537 n. 1 and Barnard,
Rumierford B. Hayes, pp. 36 -67.

237

decisiin in this case turned primarily upon the question of
whether or not the Commission should ’go behindt the returns.
On February 7, after nearly a week of arguments by Democratic
and Republican cousels, the Commission made its first decision --
a preliminary opinion regarding the admissability of what Gar-
field called ”extrinsic evidence.” The vote followed party
lines, leaving Bradley to cast the deciding opinion. After
some minutes of suspense, he reached the point in his presen-
tation of that opinion that revealed he had aligned himself
with his Republican colleagues. ”I read the arguments in the
Congressional Reeerg and can't see how lawyers can differ on
the question,” Hayes noted in his diary. Yet it was strictly
a partisan division, he mused, demonstrating ”the strength of
party ties.” The outlook now appeared much brighter, he ad-
mitted, and his supporters were ”very confident of success.”
Shortly thereafter, Florida's vote did go to Hayes by what
would become a familiar eight to seven decision. Predictably,
an angry Democratic House rejected the ruling, but this was a
futile gesture, Since the Republican controlled Senate voted
it approval. The frustrated Democrats heaped criticism on
Bradley, eventually going so far as to suggest that he had
been bribed to vote for Hayes.37

In the case of Louisiana, the Commission again refused

to go behind the returns. The outcome was not a forgone con-

37Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes, pp. 369-71 and Garfield
Diary, Feb. 1, 1877. Garfield Papers. Hayes Diary, Feb. 8,
1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 413-14
and Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes, pp. 372-73.

238

clusion, however, and Garfield considered the eleven hour
session at which the ruling was finally made, to have been
his most enervating experience since Chickamauga. Bradley
again read his opinion last, and, Garfield records, they ”had
no hint of the conclusion to be reached until Bradley was
twenty minutes into his speech. The suSpense was painful, and
the efforts of members to appear unconcerned, gave strong proof
of the intensity of the feeling.” His decision actually brought
a Sigh of relief to his listeners. At least to this point, it
does not appear to have been a cut and dried affair. Hayes
remarked that there was ”still some doubt, but apparently very
little, of the result.”38

In the Oregon case, a technicality involving only one of
the three electors was involved and this time the Commission
ruled unanimously against the certificate of the Democratic
elector, just as Garfield had predicted. They then accepted
the vote of the Hayes elector, giving Oregon to the Republicans
by an eight to seven decision.39

The Democratic claim to South Carolina was admitted to
be especially weak since Hampton had made no effort on Tilden's
behalf. The Democrats attempted, therefore, to have both the
Hayes and the Tilden certificates disallowed, thereby in-
validating the state’s presidential contest altogether and

denying to Hayes votes necessary for his success. They even

 

 

38Barnard, Rutherfgrd B._Hay§§, p. 374 and Garfield Diary,
Feb. 16, 1877. Garfield Papers. Hayes Diary, Feb. 17, 1877, in
Williams, ed., Diary and Letteg§_gf_HayeS, III, 416.

39Barnard, Ruthepfpgth. Hayes, p. 376 and Garfield Diary,
Feb, 21, 1877. Garfield Papers.

239

went so far as to admit that Democrats hee in fact intimidat-
ed Negro voters there. The Commission unanimously rejected
the Tilden electors, but again reflected their essential
partisanship on the question of hearing evidence on the charge
that this was not a free election. In doing so, they frustrated
an attempt to throw the election into the House for a final
settlement. By the same eight to seven division, South Caro-
lina's votes were alloted to Hayes. It was now only necessary
for the two Houses to complete the Count to give Hayes a 185
to 184 electoral vote victory over Tilden. But this process
could be stalled by a Democratic filibuster in the House and
March 4 might well arrive without a declaration of Hayes's
election.4O

House Democrats had already employed delaying tactics
earlier in the count and GOP leaders were deeply troubled. On
February 13, Garfield noted that it was obvious that the Dem-
ocrats hoped to ”delay the decision as long as possible.” He
pointed out that ”they vote for the longest time, the longest
recesses and the most frequent adjournments.” Then on February
17, Speaker Randall went so far as to refuse to recognize the
secretary of the Senate, thus enabling his party to move and

tS Louisiana

approve a recess so that a vote on the Commission
decision would be delayed until at least the 21st. Garfield
remarked in his diary that the Democracy seemed bent upon pre-

venting the business at hand, although ”some of the better men

4OBarnard, Rutherford R,_Hayes, pp. 375, 377.

240

among” them explained they simply wanted ”time to cool down
the fiery Spirits cf their extreme men.” Garfield had long
since advised Hayes that the GOP had less to fear from south-
ern Democrats than from their northern colleagues. For, he
wrote, ”the leading southern Democrats in Congress, especially
those who were old Whigs, are saying that they have seen war
enough, and don't care to follow the lead of their northern
associates who, as Ben Hill says, ’were invincible in peace

and invisible in war.’”

A recent study by Thomas B. Alexander
of southern Whigs of this era, concludes that while but a hand-
ful would abandon their Democratic ties to support Hayes, many
quietly accepted his inauguration. This conclusion is based
not only on editorial opinion in many southern nCWSpapers, but
also on numerous letters -- some of them addressed to corres-
pondents who sent them on to Hayes. Alexander is led to ques-
tion 0. Vann Woodward’s heavy emphasis on the significance of
the Texas and Pacific Railroad lobby in countering and dis-
arming militant southerners. ”Considering the fact that many
southern Whig leaders had all through the reconstruction years
denounced the northern Democratic leadership, a more detailed
study of the individual old-line Whigs in Congress might well
establish the conclusion that the Southern bloc would have act-

ed as it did in 1877 had there been no railroad lobby involved,”

he concludes.41

 

41Garfield Diary, Feb. 15 and 17, 1877. Garfield Papers.
Garfield to Hayes, Dec. 12, 1876. Hayes Papers. Thomas B.
Alexander, ”Persistant Whiggery.in the Confederate South, 1860-
1877," Journal:of Southern History, XXVII (August, 1961), 524—25.

241

Taking advantage of the brief respite they had won, the
Democrats met in caucus on the evening of February 17 to make
certain strategy decisions. Randall boldly urged his party
”to support legislation making the Secretary of State the act—
ing President until another election could be held.” He argued
that the House should adjourn each day without taking action
until the Senate agreed to this proposition.” If the Senate
refused, the failure to complete the count by March 4 would
necessitate another presidential election. Among the consider-
able number of hard-liners supporting Randall, it was reported,
were ”south and border states representatives who were repelled
by or had reservations regarding the political and economic

’s friends were holding out. But Randall

concessions.” Hayes
and his militant allies were out-numbered and defeated ”by an
alliance of southern and business minded Democrats who wanted
the count completed. . ." The majority decided to await the
Commission’s Oregon decision before determining their response.”2
When Oregon was called and awarded to Hayes, Randall again
came under heavy pressure from angry Democrats. The militants
were bent on stalling the count with a filibuster and in caucus
Randall seemed fully committed to their tactics. He sharply

’s friends

attacked southern colleagues for bargaining with Hayes
and warned that there was no guarantee that as president Hayes
would honor these promises. After a heated discussion, the

filibusterers once again failed to win party approval of their

1+2Evans, ”Pennsylvania Politics,” pp. 300-01.

242

strategy. However, bargaining southerners did begin demand-
ing firmer pledges of concessions from the Hayes people. And
although they lacked caucus support, the militant minority
believed themselves to be free to pursue their tactics; after
all, Randall was obviously in their camp and he was the pre-
siding officer of the House.43

For the next two days, Randall did nothing to disappoint
his militant associates, and they generally had their own way.
Then on Friday, February 24, an attempt to prevent a vote on
the Oregon decision by adjourning until 10 A.M. the following
Monday, was easily defeated. An irreconciliable thereupon
moved an adjournment until 9:30 on Monday, an objection was
raised, and Randall quite unexpectedly sustained it, ruling
the motion dilatory and out of order. The House went into an
uproar with numerous members reacting ”violently to this ar—
bitrary disregard of House rules,” a recent study of Pennsyl-
vania politics reports. ”Many pounded and Slammed their desks,
others mounted their chairs and shouted for recognition, while
still others rushed forward to the speaker's desk.” But the
decision held and the count proceeded. As Garfield noted in
his journal, the decision on the initial motion ”was a saving
vote.” Randall's ruling came, as Jacob Cox put it, "at a well-
chosen moment, when the temper of the House was likely to rally
to him” -- as the vote on adjournment had just revealed. During

the days that followed his decision, Randall was under much

 

45Evans, “Pennsylvenia Politics,“ p. 301.

243

pressure. Both Republicans and Democratic businessmen plead-
ed with him to end the unsettled state of affairs by complet-
ing the count, spelling out in no uncertain terms the serious-
ness of the situation and the unanimity of business opinion on
the question.44

Although the militants persisted in their filibustering
tactics, the count went on with the House vainly rejecting the
South Carolina decision and then moving on as far as Vermont
before adjourning. 0n the following day, March 1, the count
resumed in an unimaginably wild House session, with the ir-
reconcilables ”more determined than ever,” Garfield recorded.
The militants were in fact losing strength, for the interrup-
tion of the count engineered by Abram Hewitt had won, as he
hoped it would, a guarantee of Democratic control of Louisiana.
Moreover, Randall successively put down all efforts to delay
House action despite bitter minority opposition, including
that of three-fourths of Pennsylvania’s sixteen Democratic
representatives.45 Randall’s private explanation for his con-
duct during these critical days ran as follows: ”If I had done
differently, I would have been ruined and dngraced -- a small
matter when compared with the future certainty of the disin-

tegration of our party and as I believe to be followed by an

 

 

.___
-‘

44Evans, ”Pennsylvania Politics,“ pp. 501-05 and Garfield
Diary, Feb. 24, 1877. Garfield Papers. Cox, "Hayes Adminis-
tration,” 824.

~———

 

ZJ’BI'L‘vans, ”Pennsylvania Politics,“ pp. 303-04 and Garfield
Diazjr,.March 1, 1877. Garfield Papers. Evans, “Pennsylvania

'Politics,” p. 304.

244

end of liberty in the Country & a succession of military
elections.” The most careful recent study of Randall’s con-
duct at this time concludes that when the count had proceeded
so far that it was a matter either of completing it or resort-
ing to violence, Tilden sent a telegram to the Speaker approv-
ing the completion of the count. As he had done earlier when
he supported the compromise bill after initially opposing it,
Randall yielded to Tilden's views. Randall’s seemingly con-
tradictory behavior, therefore, stemmed from his faithfulness
to an irresolute leader and attests to his stout partisanship.
He was also influenced by his own personal economic interests

insofar as the negogiations involving Hayes'

s friends, the
Scott interests and certain southerners, were concerned.46
Although he had opposed aid to the Texas and Pacific rail-
road and was alarmed by the effort to form a coalition of
southern conservatives and northern Republicans, Randall was
distinctly sympathetic toward the propositions advanced by
Hayes's supporters. He had been a consistent friend and de-
fender of the South and its interests and wished to foster the
growth of his party and support for himself in that section.
What is more, he had ”many influential business friends and
supporters in both parties” and was most sensitive to the
political situation's unsettling effect on the economy and to

businessmen’s desire for a peaceful solution of the problem.

He himself stood to profit from such a solution, for he had

1+6Quoted in Evans, ”Pennsylvania Politics,” p. 306 and
Eyans, “Pennsylvania Politiee," pp. 307-08.

245

formed a clandestine partnership with a New York businessman
designed to promote the building of an Ohio railroad. Late
in January 1877, his partner informed him that the working
out of a contract for the construction of an added ninety
miles of the railway -- an agreement that would net the part-
ners bonds worth some $100,000 as well as between 300 and 500
acres of coal bearing land -- depended upon the peaceful com-
pletion of the count.47

It has been customary since the publication of C. Vann
Woodward’s Reunion and Reactiee, to emphasize the work of the

’s Western Associ-

Texas and Pacific lobby, allied with Hayes
ated Press friends, in explaining why southern congressional
leaders like Lamar, Reagan, Singleton and Hill did not join

’s

their irreconciliable colleagues in preventing the Ohioian
inauguration. But in his perceptive account cf Watterson's
role in the settlement, Joseph Wall contends that the South
deserves no particular blame nor praise for countering the
filibuster. A study of the roll call on motions designed to
hold up the count Shows that a larger percentage of southern
and border state representatives than northern Democrats sup—
ported stalling tactics. It was only after Louisiana congress-
man Levy, a consistent backer of the filibuster, told his fel-

”'solemn

low southerners that Hayes spokesmen had given him
assurances'” of Hayes’s conciliatory intentions toward the

South, that the percentage of southern Representatives

 

--—-—w— -__— ‘—

47Evans, ‘Pennsylvania Politics,“ pp. 307-08.

246

supporting a filibuster fell slightly below that of their
northern colleagues. Wall concludes by insisting that no
simple or Sharply drawn explanation (like that of Woodward’s)
suffices to explain the conduct of the several congressmen
during these hectic weeks a sound and persuasive conclusion.48

Perhaps the historian will forever be frustrated in his
attempts to find an adequate explanation for the complex and
contradictory series of events that mark the count's comple-
tion. And as Wetterson himself noted, there were those ”double

constructions possible to men:

s actions, the contradictory
promptings, not always crooked.” Then there are those highly
publicized events like the Wormley Conference that tend to
mask and mislead more than they reveal.49
If one is denied a wholly satisfactory explanation of why
the count was completed in time, an eyewitness, James A. Gar-
field, provides uS with a fine account of the last hours of
the drama:
At times there was more violence and disorder than I
have ever seen in the House. Beebe of New York sprang
upon the desk and screamed with all his voice. Wis—
consin was reached and filibustering resumed, then I
took more part in managing our side and got the corners
of the filibusters' plans and at a few minutes after
four o'clock in the morning a final vote was reached
and they were defeated.
A short time later, the Senate joined the House and their task

was completed -- Hayes was declared duly elected to the presidency.50

- - mb"—.---———‘—.- - --"

 

M-W'- u-mr -‘w-’ '

 

Z1‘8Joseph Wall: Henry. WePierepn; Messimmctegjerei (New
York, 1956), pp. 161-64.

’“'-m -

49Quoted in Wall, Henry Watterson, p. 163.

50Garfield Diary, March 1, 1877. Garfield Papers.

CHAPTER 6

AN INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING:

A fNEw DEPARTURE? TAKES SHAPE

A new approach to the southern problem and the initiation
of an equally controversial effort at Civil service reform
dominated the first nine months of the Hayes administration.
The President’s cabinet selections touched off an outburst of
criticism within his party that grew to crescendo proportions
as his generous policy toward the South failed to bring the
hoped for Democratic response. By December a serious split
had developed between the GOP and Hayes -- a rift that was
aggravated by the President’s determination to redeem his civil
service pledge in his own fashion. Throughout these trying
months Hayes maintained a calm bearing and an optimistic out-
look while party friends like Garfield swallowed their mis-
givings, supported him loyally and struggled to prevent an
open revolt against Hayes by Republican congressmen.

The ’peaceful settlement' that awarded Hayes the presi-
dency did not insure a peaceful transfer 0f power and a veil
of apprehension and forboding hung over Washington as March 5
approached. On March 3, House Democrats pushed through a reso—
lution declaring Tilden to be the lawful victor. The Republicans,

247

248

under Garfield's leadership, decided to offer no opposition,
although Garfield soon found himself questioning the wisdom
of that decision. He feared the Democrats, who he admitted
were "very bitter", might then "make their resolution the basis
of some revolutionary proceeding." Meanwhile, the House rushed
to complete vital appropriations legislation that had been side-
tracked by the presidential contest:I

By March 14, only the Army bill remained unfinished,
primarily because the Democrats insisted upon a provision ban-
ning the employment of federal troops in Florida or Louisiana.
Garfield and the Republicans stoutly resisted this clause
while the Democracy in turn refused to accept the bill without
the ban; thus the session ended with the Army unprovided for.
It was hardly an auspicious background against Which to launch
an administration pledged to reconciliation and harmony. During

the waning hours of the session, Garfield had asked his Demo-

H

cratic colleagues if they thought it wise and prudent and
magnanimous" to demand a provision whose passage would excite
old suspicions and fears in view ”of evidences of a better

understanding? and Vrenewcd efforts to bury the bitterness of
the past. . ."2 It was a sincere query, for Garfield was not

'5 desire to

fond of rancorous partisanship, and shared Hayes
foster intersectional reconciliation and harmony. But his

seasoning in the national arena left him cautious and skeptical.

_ '- - —~ ‘— ———* ‘ _‘ —

1Garfield Diary, March 3, 1877. Garfield Papers.

200ngressignal_§ggprg, 44th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 2248.

249
Thus he never embraced the exagerrated and essentially naive
hopes Hayes and the uninitiated would cling to in the face of
rebuffs and rejection.

Hayes's remarks as he left Columbus for washington sig-
naled that the southern question was to be the first order of
business once he took office. His generous intentions and good
will toward the South had been a prominent feature of his ’Letter'
although his unhesitating encouragement of bloody shirt tac-
tics seemed to belie these conciliatory phrases. But with the
election behind him, he began to speak and write of amending
the southern situation through education and internal improve-
ments. "My anxiety to £2 something to promote the pacifica-
tion of the South is perhaps in danger of leading me too far,"
he suggested in a letter to Schurz. Without wishing to "re-
flect on the use of military power in the past," he continued,
Schurz could be sure that all of that would end under a Hayes
administration save only in "emergencies” which he did not
again anticipate. He said nothing of the Negro, but was most
concerned with stimulating southern economic revival through
"education, emigration and immigration (and) improvements",
although agreeing with Schurz that they must proceed gradually
and with caution. Hayes willingly admitted, however, that he
was ”not anxious to assume? this responsibility although "the
South was more on . . . (his) mind than anything else." The
Objective seemed clear enough to him, but he was indecisive
and unsure of the means to be employed. ”Perhaps we must be

COntent to leave that to time -- taking care not to obstruct

250

time’s healing process by injudicious meddling," he concluded.3

And while he remained quite certain of his hopes for the South,
a consistent and effective policy eluded him.

Hayes approved of the efforts of close friends like Comly,
Matthews, Smith and others to revive Whiggism in the South
under the Republican banner, thus giving the party a national
rather than a sectional base; he approved as well the building
of an accord between GOP moderates and Democratic conservatives.
Furthermore, it was hoped this might end southern party divisions
along the color line, giving the GOP a southern wing that did
not "depend upon the Negro for its main strength and that could
command the respect and support of Southern conservative whites.”
Cox reported that in a mid-January conversation with Hayes, the
latter had asked for his frank opinions on the South and reply-
ing with equal candidness, had agreed "very cordially" with
Cox's views. Cox summarized his own opinions as follows:

. . . our Republican administration & leaders
are responsible for the continuance of the "color line"
in the South, because a right policy would have abol-
ished it - that things cannot & must not go on so --
that means must be found to gain support from a con-
siderable fraction of the native white population
there, even at the risk of some temporary offense to
negro leaders, because the permanence of the rights
of the blacks themselves must depend upon the ces-
sation of a struggle between the races -- that this
can be done without imperilling any of the rights
of the blacks or diminishing the full effect of the
constitution as amended, but implies only frank de-
cisions as to their present fitness & availability
for the more important class of offices. I urged,

‘ __

3Williams, Life of Hayes, II, 4 and Hayes to Carl Schurz,
FEb. 4, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,

251

& he received very kindly, the suggestion that if

inaugurated, he should make at an early day an

official tour through the South both to see & be

seen and to thus declare in act the opening of the

era of real peace.

Thus the main features of Hayes’s policy as it was ultimately
worked out were in his mind by mid-January.

Those endeavoring to enlist southern aid to effect Hayes's
peaceful inauguration and a political realignment in the South,
had spoken of offices, perhaps a cabinet level appointment for
that section and generous economic attention, including federal
aid to a southern trans-Mississippi railroad. Hayes was most
anxious "to get support from good men of the South, late Re-
bels. How to do it is the question," he remarked in his diary
in mid-February. Personally, he said, he had the "best dis-
position towards the Southern people, Rebels and all." He was
even considering a souther Democrat for his cabinet, yet who
"among the capable and influential good men" there would accept
the offer? Former Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston came
to his mind, but this was a question that demanded more thought.
After a meeting with Frederick Douglass and James Poindexter
on the souther question, at which his ideas met with their
approval, he reaffirmed his determination to assert firmly and

maintain the constitutional rights granted the Negro. But he

did not say how he hoped to fulfill this promise.5

 

4Vincent DeSantis, "President Hayes’s Southern Policy,"

Journal of Southern History, XXI (November, 1955), 476 and
Jacob Cox to Carl Schurz, Jan. 26, 1877. Schurz Papers.

5Hayes Diary, Feb. 17 and 18, 1877, in Williams, ed.,
Inery_and Letters of Hayes, III, 416-17.

252

Later in February, after friendly southern congressmen
had been disturbed by a hostile article appearing in the Chip
State qugnal, which it was thought reflected Hayes’s views,
he considered making a short talk to allay their suspicions.
As he recorded it in his journal, the undelivered speech pledged
to the South that he would assuredly be guided by the spirit of
his 'Letter'; in truth, if he were now composing this document,
he ”would give . . . the Southern question greater emphasis."
He appreciated southern longing for "peace" and "repose", but
first of all to realize these goals, the civil rights amend-
ments must ”be scaredly observed and faithfully enforced," he
insisted. Secondly, he was anxious ”to do what may constitu-
tionally be done to make them again prOSperous and happy." But
the situation demanded Neconomy, honesty, and intelligence" in
the administration of local affairs, and a program that would
end sectionalism and Ntend to wipe out the color line." Busi-
ness and industry, immigration and education all wanted encour-
agement. NWe do not want a unified North nor a united South,"
he pleaded in conclusion, but rather Va united country."6

In his inaugural the South Egg given precedence over all
other subjects. He emphasized the importance of its problems
and the need for effective and equitable solutions. But as
his pre-inaugural reflections revealed, he entered office

without a firm commitment to a Specific route by which he might

 

6Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes, p. 383 and Hayes Diary,
Feb. 25, 1877, Williams, ed., Diary_and Letters of Hayes, III,
421.

253

reach his self-determined goals, although his remarks clearly
implied a hands-off policy toward the South. As for the Negro,
he seemed to be putting southerners, especially his "good men
of the South", on their honor to uphold the freedman's rights
and to guarantee them a role in the reunited nation, although
not necessarily a large role in government. He emphasized his
belief that the federal government had a "moral obligation" to
confirm and shield the Negro in his rights. It was as if he
wished to demonstrate that he had no intention of abandoning
a cause for which he had fought as a soldier, a congressman
and a governor. He emphasized the need for national rather
than sectional unity and implied that southern problems were
most likely to be solved through education, federally aided if
necessary, and the simple passage of time. The southern econ-
omy also demanded attention, Hayes noted, but he went no fur-
ther than to allude to the "considerate care" of the federal
government, "within the limits prescribed by the Constitution
and wise economy.f'7 The indecision and caution expressed in
his letter to Schurz seemed now to govern him and those who,
like the Texas and Pacific lobby, had hoped for more, were
disappointed.

Although Grant’s administration had come close to elim-
inating the last vestiges of military reconstruction, removal

of the small army units propping up Republican governments in

7James D. Richardson, ed., Compilation of the Messages
and Pa ers of the Presidents, 178§-1891 T10 vols., washington,
1907 , pp. 442- .

254
South Carolina and Louisiana was left to Hayes. It consti-
tuted his first major dilemma. Characteristically, he acted
cautiously and only after much deliberation, although he had
no real choice in the matter. Perhaps he would have preferred
to support, for at least a time, both Chamberlain and Packard.
Tom Donaldson, a close family friend, arrived at this conclu-
sion after a conversation with Lucy Hayes in August 1877.
Donaldson remarked that he would have supported the Republican
claimants, to which she replied: "Why, what could Mr. Hayes do
but what he did? He had no army." In October of that year,
Donaldson recorded that the President told him after seven
years of using the army, Grant, in the face of sharply reduced
Republican strength in the South, recognized that this approach
would have to be abandoned. "This was the condition when I
came in as President," Hayes told Donaldson,"so I had to act
promptly. Besides, if my plan fails our party will be aided
by it and the Independents stopped from further talk. In ad-
dition the House was against me and I had no army, and public
sentiment demanded a change of policy," Hayes continued, call-
ing attention to a circumstance often overlooked in studies of
his era. "'Neither the Republican nor Democratic party now has
control of the country,'” he observed, according to Donaldson,
"'and for many years there has been an element working between
the lines of the parties and this element holds the balance of
power in the country.’” This faction enjoyed a priority in

his thinking, for if they could be satisfied, victory in 1880,

255

with southern aid, might be assured.8

But after two weeks in office, Hayes remained undecided
as to how to end federal military presence in Louisiana and
South Carolina. He was determined that the army should not be
used for political purposes in the future, but he was not yet
ready to order them to abandon their assignments. The Demo-
cratic claimants, Hampton in South Carolina, and Nicholls in
Louisiana, had won de facto power without resorting to violence;
in fact they had pledged themselves to peace and had maintained
it despite intense pressure from extremist colleagues. Yet
Hayes may have wished to have stronger guarantees that Repub-
licans in these states would not suffer under Democratic rule.
Furthermore, it was clear that neither Packard nor Chamberlain
would voluntarily surrender his claim, as hopeless as their
situation appeared, and both expected the President’s aid and
support.9

As he continued to search for the most expedient solution
to his problem, Hayes was heartened by the nomination of his
close friend Matthews to fill Sherman's vacated Senate seat.
This appeared to him to be "an endorsement of the policy of
peace and home rule -- of local self government." As one
southerner suggested, his section's conservatives did not look
for a northern Vsurrender", but simply unchallenged white su-

premacy in local government. But Hayes was troubled, on the

 

: 8Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, Aug. 28 and Oct. 17, 1877.

9Hayes Diary, March 23, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 429.

256

one hand, by the news that Na number of Southern Republican
members" were about to defect to the Democrats and on the other
hand by the opposition of those he labeled ”ultra Republicans”
to a "liberal policy toward late Rebels. . ." He thereupon
listed these possible approaches to the Louisiana and South
Carolina dilemma: a second election; a decision by the state
legislatures; the recognition of Packard and Chamberlain, who
would then be left "to their own state remedies"; or the with-
drawal of the troops and the situation left "to take care of”
itself. He was sure that the troops must go, but remained un-
certain and distressed as to how the Republican claimants should
be handled. He turned to his cabinet for advice. All except
Devens "seemed indisposed" to support Packard with the army.
Evarts advised that the states, not the army, must settle dis-
puted elections. Hayes himself, according to his diary, was
convinced that “the people" would no longer tolerate the main-
tenance of one of two rival governments with federal troops.
"If this leads to the overthrow of the g2 jugg government in
a State, the de facto government must be recognized," he cone
cluded matter-of-factly. But the official family unanimously
decided to send only an investigative commission to Louisiana.10

Hayes remained convinced that it was not his "duty" to
settle disputed state elections with federal forces, although

as president, he was bound to preserve federal "authority" and

 

1OHayes Diary, March 16, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diapy
and Letters of Hayes, III, 427 and J. W. Porter to John Sherman,

March 10, 1877. Hayes Papers. Hayes Diary, March 16 and 20,
1877, in Williams, ed., Diagy andyhetters of Hayes, III, 427-28.

257

peace between the several claimants. Local self—government,
as he defined it, meant Vthe determination by each State for
itself of all questions as to its own local affairs." Did this
mean he was ready to abandon the Negro? Quite the contrary.
”The real thing to be achieved is safety and prosperity for
the colored people,? he insisted. Both Congress and the pub-
lic were clearly opposed to military solutions and longed for
the restoration of racial and sectional harmony; this however
could be achieved Vonly . . . by peaceful methods."11

About this time, Garfield confided to Whitelaw Reid that
after ”an abundance of kind talk in the direction of pacifi-
cation . . . what was needed was a positive and unmistakable
act of pacification.? Hayes undoubtedly shared this sentiment,
but he would not be hurried. A month later, Garfield assured
Reid that Veverything? now depended upon the South's willing-
ness to Vreciprocate." "The practical teSt is whether they
will give Hayes the organization of the House," he continues.
He was not hopeful, but Hayes remained optimistic.12

Meanwhile, the President continued to harbor the hope
that the dilemma in the two states might be solved by making
"one government out of two. . .9 But in case this could not

be realized, if compromise proved impossible, the administra-

tion would be forced, except for peace—keeping purposes, to

11Hayes Diary, March 23, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 429.

-_‘-'.

12Garfieldto Whitelaw Reid, March 14 and April 10, 1877.
Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

258

"adopt the non-intervention policy" he had contemplated. The
hOped for ’adjustments’ were to be made through the use of the
investigative commission and by calling Chamberlain and Hamp-
ton north to confer with the President. Although the troops
were certain to be withdrawn, it is evident that southern ex-
tremists remained suspicious that pre-inaugural understandings
were about to be repudiated.13

Chamberlain and Hampton did not receive identical treat-
ment at the hands of the President. As early as March 7,
Hayes had indicated to Hamilton Fish that Chamberlain would
not be sustained, although he was considering him for the
marshalship of the District of Columbia (the office later
awarded to Frederick Douglass). Later that month, when Chamber-
lain arrived in Washington, he found that Hayes's views had
not changed and that his case was hopeless. Hampton, who had
assured Hayes by letter in December 1876 that peace and the
rights of all citizens were being preserved in his state, re-
assured him upon reaching Washington, that "the rights" and
the interests of all would be protected and secure. After
receiving his invitation to confer with Hayes, Hampton gave
the President his "assurance that no.proscription shall be ex-
ercised here on account of political opinions; that no dis-
crimination shall be made in the administration of justice;

and that all citizens of both parties and both races shall be

13Hayes Diary, March 23, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diagy
and Letters of Hayes, III, 429 and R. C. Tucker, "Life and
Public Service of E. John Ellis," Louisiana Historical _Q_ar-

terly, XXIX, 736- -37-

259

regarded as fully protected by, and amenable to, the laws."
In his letter of invitation, Hayes had conveyed his wish to
end the federal military presence as soon as possible. After
their cordial meeting and before leaving Washington, Hampton
made yet another written pledge to Hayes, apparently repeating
those verbal promises made during their conversation.

I repeat therefore (Hampton wrote), that if the Fed—

eral troops are withdrawn from the State House, there

shall be on my part, or that of my friends no resort

to violence, to assert our claims, but that we shall

look for their maintenance solely to such peaceful

remedies as the Constitution and laws of the State

provide. I shall use all my authority to repress the

use or exhibition of force, in the settlement of all

diSputed questions, and this authority shall be ex-

ercised in such a manner that the peace shall be pre-
served.

This was precisely the kind of pledge Hayes wished to receive.
A federal military presence was no longer justified and those
remaining problems should be settled under "the constitution
and laws of the State.” He therefore directed Secretary of
War McCrary to order the removal of the small body of soldiers
from the Statehouse at Columbia. Now only Louisiana remained
to be redeemed.14

Although the decision to send an investigating commission
to Louisiana to expedite a settlement did not come until March
20, Hayes had apparently approved this approach some weeks

earlier. Fish, who consistently encouraged Hayes to pursue a

14Allan Nevins, Hamilton Fish; The Igner History of the
Grant Administration (New York, 1936), p. 859; Wade Hampton
to Hayes, Dec. 28, 1876; March 26 and 31, 1877, in Hampton
Jarrell, Wade Hamptgnyand the Negroi_The Road Not Taken
(Columbia, 1949), pp. 171, 173-74 and Hayes to George W. McCrary,
April 3, 1877, in Williams, ed., Life of_Hayes, II, 52-53.

26O

moderate policy was asked to join the commission, but refused,
noting that Vice President Wheeler and Thurlow Weed had al-
ready done likewise. Flt looks to me," Fish complained in
his diary, ”like a makeShift to gain time and occupy the pub-
lic attention, or an expedient to find someone or something
to share the responsibility” of the administration’s decision
and serve as a scapegoat for whatever public or party criticism
it spawned. He assured Hayes, through Evarts, that the troops
would have been removed had Grant remainted in office.15

The Louisiana Commission, a fact-finding body, was in-
tended to effect Hayes’s wish to "make one government out of
two in each State.” Nicholls had already made considerable
progress toward this goal, by winning control (without vio-
lence) of the state supreme court and the state senate, thus
fostering the formation of one legislature. This body, it was
hoped, could then ’adjust’ the remaining problems, thus re-
lieving Hayes of an onerous task. When the commission reach-
ed New Orleans, they found Nicholls in unchallenged control of
the senate, but not the house. By shrewd bargaining, however,
enough Packard men were won over to give Nicholls undisputed
possession of the house as well. The Democratic legislature
thereupon adopted a resolution pledging, much as had Hampton,
to ”accept in good faith . . . in letter and spirit" the re-
construction amendments; to enforce ”the laws rigidly and im-

partially?; to promote Vkindly relations between white and

 

15Andrew Kellar to William H. Smith, March 23, 1877.
Smith Papers. Nevins, Hamilton Fish, pp. 859-60.

261

colored citizens?; and to promote equal education for both
races. They further promised that the Nicholls administration
would "discountenance any attempted persecution, from any quar-
ter, of individuals for past political conduct." In a letter
to the commission, Nicholls, too, pledged himself to these
commitments. The commission reSponded by recommending that
Hayes immediately order the troops withdrawn. He quickly fol-
lowed their advice. Meanwhile, the Packard legislature cau-
cused and resolved to give up the fight, counseling Packard to
follow suit.16

With the troops removed, Hayes now anticipated peace, and
of equal importance, Nsecurity and prosperity for the colored
people." The pledges bearing on the Negro that came in response
to his new departure policy left him in a cheerful mood. "I
am confident this is a good work,“ he observed to his diary.
But, he added cautiously, ”time will tell." He had taken a
calculated risk and was prepared to be disappointed, yet he
hoped it would serve to advance sectional good will and Cooper-
ation. Hayes, who strongly believed that economic recovery
would be hastened by the restoration of political tranquility,
was encouraged in his experiment by the nation‘s businessmen.
A meeting of New York commercial and financial figures early
in March enthusiastically backed the President's views on the

South. Another gathering of that city's financiers called for

 

16B. F. Lathrop, ed., ”An Autiobiography of Francis T.
Nichols," Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVII (1934), 254-56;
Memoirs Of Thomas Donaldson, Oct. 18, 1882 and quoted in
Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes, pp. 429-31.

262

troop removal in a letter to Evarts. To the west, Merchants
and Cotton Exchanges joined in approving resolutions request-
ing the removal of federal troops. These sentiments were ech-
oed by commercial and financial organizations and interests
in Philadelphia, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland and Minneapolis.
The commercial press in the North joined in such appeals, point-
ing out, for example, the grave injury being done to the economy
in South Carolina and Louisiana as evidenced by conditions in
Charleston and New Orleans.17

So far, Hayes's policy had followed the course charted by
Cox in their January meeting -- during which he had "agreed
very cordially? with this liberal Republican's views. Further-
more, in line With Cox’s suggestion that he “make at an early
day an official tour through the South", he and members of the
official family did make a goodwill speaking tour of over two
weeks’ duration through Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia and
Virginia in September 1877. Earlier, in August, he had trav-
elled for eight days in Vermont and New Hampshire, speaking
spontaneously and seeking “to impress the people with the im-
portance of harmony between different sections, States, classes,
and races, and to discourage sectionalism and race and class
prejudice.v His views neatly paralleled those of Cox, whose
opinions on the southern problem he had earlier solicited.

"The lapse of time has so far consolidated and established the

 

17Hayes Diary, April 22, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 430 and Stanley P. Hirshon, Farewell
to the Bloody Shirt: Northern Republicans and the Southern

Negro, 1817-1893 (Bloomington, 1962?, pp. 31-32.

263
political rights of the Negroes,? Cox's argument ran, ”that
their seperate organization as a party is no longer esSential
to their safety. On the contrary, it is the cause of their
greatest danger. The whites of the South will recognize the
political equality if this does not threaten to continue the
rule of a class distinguished by gagg . . .9 But if the color
'line was not removed from the picture, Negroes throughout the
South would find that, as in Mississippi, their political
rights existed in name only and with the intention of enlarg-

"real

ing the congressional representation of the South's
governing class. . .N18 Hayes was pleased with his New Eng-
land trip, but he returned from his southern swing positively
jubilant. VReceived everywhere heartily,” despite a frank
discussion of the primacy of the civil rights amendments and
the need to upgrade public education, he recorded in his diary.
”The country is one and united! I am very happy to be able to
feel that the course taken has turned out so well.” He had
sought the good will of the 'good men' of the South and hon-
estly believed he had won it. The ”vital steps" had been taken,

he told a friend, and as for whatever the outcome might be,

Hayes would rest secure in the knowledge that he had "meant

well.919

18Jacob Cox to Carl Schurz, Jan. 26, 1877. Schurz Papers.
Hayes Diary, Aug. 26, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diayy andyggptgpg
of Haygg, III, 442, and Jacob Cox to Hayes, Jan. 31, 1877.
Hayes Papers. _

19Hayes Diary, Sept. 6, 1877 and Hayes to William M.
Dickson, April 22, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary_§gqyggttg£§
of Hayes, III, 443, 431. - .

264

One of the "results" Hayes anticipated was Democratic
help in making Garfield the speaker of the House. He had been
encouraged in this hope as early as February 17, when Smith
confidentially informed him that if Key received a cabinet
post, conservatives in Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi and
Texas would "follow him and support" the Hayes administration.
Nine southerners were already "pledged" to help the GOP elect
Garfield speaker, either by giving him their votes or by ab-
senting themselves when the House convened, Smith assured him.
On the very same day, Garfield met with Sherman to talk over
the makeup of Hayes's cabinet. Sherman appeared to want the
Treasury post, while favoring Garfield as his successor in the
Senate. "Just now the road forks for me," Garfield mused --
along one route lay the speakership, along the other a senator-
ship. He was not inclined to be very hopeful concerning the
former, but others were considerably more optimistic and en-
couraging. There had been some Speculation that Garfield might
join Sherman in the cabinet, but Hayes had no such intentions.
When Ohio legislators from Garfield's district were sounded
out on the senatorship by a friend, the pollster told Garfield
it was interesting to see how many still harbored reservations
based upon the 1873 scandals. Characteristically, he decided
to let "events take care of themselves" and apparently did

80.20

‘_ _ — VV

20William H. Smith to Hayes, Feb. 17, 1877. Hayes Papers.
Garfield Diary, Feb. 17, 1877; Thomas McLain to Garfield, Feb.
20, 1877 and Garfield Diary, March 11, 1877. Garfield Papers.

265

When Hayes arrived in Washington, he had asked Garfield
to stay on in the House, where he believed Garfield could for
the moment ”be more useful in the work of pacification of the
country, which his administration has undertaken," Garfield
telegraphed a leading supporter in the Ohio legislature. He
would not, therefore, be a candidate for the Senate. Hayes re-
peated his request in later conversations, averring a belief
that he could help Garfield organize an administration House.
Apparently Garfield had not yet given Hayes his answer, for he
records only that he ”promised to consider the matter and talk
with him again." The fact was that he "was a little nettled"
that the President should be so anxious to put his intimate
friend Stanley Matthews in the Senate seat vacated by Sherman,
seemingly at his expense. He undoubtedly felt slighted and
ill-used, in view of the yeoman service he had performed in
securing the presidency for Hayes. But he quickly caught him-
self, confessing to his diary that his momentary pique was un-
reasonable: no doubt Hayes "sincerely" wished his help and he
was duty bound to give it. Meanwhile the advice from Ohio was
that it would be wiser to remain in the House and aim for the
Senate in 1880 than to oppose Matthews in the legislative cau-
cus. But the situation was complicated when Garfield learned
that he had enjoyed a lead over Matthews in a pre-caucus poll.
He candidly analyzed his state of mind as follows:

I recognized in myself an infirmity of will in

choosing what to do in reference to the Senator-

ship. It is a choice, not of evils, but of goods,

266

with many contingencies attached to each. On the

whole, I am attracted by the suggestion to do the

unusual thing of declining the senatorship, and

staying in the House.21

Hayes was indeed "very anxious" that he assume the leader-
ship of his party in the House, Garfield reported, after yet
another conference with the President. Hayes even went so far
as to put his request in the form of a letter, which Garfield
was free to publish. On the following day, he telegraphed
supporters in Ohio, indicating he had bowed to Hayes's wishes.
He undoubtedly hoped that his sacrifice would be properly ap-

preciated by the Ohio electorate; but, he speculated, the pub-

11

a

lic would quite as likely . . . charge it to timidity about
making the canvass as to any other motive.” He was now urged
to endorse one of the remaining contenders, but resisted the
temptation.22

Then, just three days after accommodating Hayes, the
President, apparently fearing Matthews might be beaten, had
second thoughts. He told Garfield that “he did not want an
inexperienced person like Howland nor a hostile one like Taft,”
Garfield records, Wand did not know but I had better be a can-
didate.? A perturbed Garfield declined, pointing out that he

21Garfield to Thomas McLain, March 1, 1877 (draft of
telegram); Garfield Diary, March 5 and 6, 1877; Myron Streator
to Garfield, March 7, 1877; Garfield Diary, March 10, 1877 and
Thomas McLain to Garfield, March 8, 1877. Garfield Papers.

22Garfield Diary, March 10; 11 and 12, 1877. Garfield
Papers.

267

had already commited himself irrevocably.23

Matthews won the contest, but Garfield and many of his
friends believed the honor could have been his. Yet this
would have required him to meet Matthews in a sharp, head-on
fight, rather than seek the kind of accommodation Ohio's major
political figures preferred when two or more of them discover-
ed they were on a collision course. Moreover, he had not been
truly certain that he could win the nomination until after his
decision had been made and others, too, shared his doubts.
Apparently many of his friends also wished to see him remain
a representative and in a position to be of greater service.
But Garfield obviously resented Hayes‘s meddling, believing he
might have missed his chance of becoming a senator. He com-
plained to a friend that he considered the President's re-
quest ”hardly just”, but concluded it was advisable to "be more
generous than the rest of them. . .” His ”generosity', how-
ever, should pay some dividends and he reiterated his hope
that his supporters would ”appreciate the sacrifice" he had
made in the face of ”almost certain” victory. Several Ohio
friends were asked to advise him of the peoples' reaction.221L

It is common to put forward the hope of making Garfield
speaker with southern aid as the explanation for Hayes's in-

tervention in the senatorial contest. But Hayes seemed to

 

23Garfield Diary, March 14, 1877. Garfield Papers.

2("Garfield to Charles Henry, March 13, 1877. Henry .
Papers. Garfield to Harmon Austin, March 14, 1877. Garfield

Papers. Letterbook.

268

emphasize the help Garfield could give him, especially with
pacification rather than the Speakership itself, during their
conversations. Privately, Hayes was also most anxious to re-
ward Matthews for his service before the Electoral Commission,
which he believed had determined the outcome of the contested
election. Because of this and Matthews' behind the scenes
negotiations with southern leaders prior to inauguration, as
well as their intimate friendship, the President viewed Matthews’
senatorial bid as a means of gauging the northern response to
his pacification policy. When Matthews was nominated, he re-
corded, as noted above, that this was indeed ”an endorsement
of the policy of peace and home rule -- or local self govern-
ment.” Could he have felt the same way had Garfield been the
party's nominee? Was Hayes also operating on the assumption
that he would have an opportunity to promote Matthews to the
Supreme Court, thereby giving Garfield a second opportunity to
move up the political ladder?25

During a long talk with Matthews early in April, Garfield
found him troubled both as to his "standing in the party" and
his election to a full term in the Senate. He distinctly pre—
ferred a place on the Supreme Court to the senatorship and
believed his wish would be fulfilled in the near future. Ap-
parently he also wanted the assurance that Garfield would not
compete with him for the Senate and perhaps this led him to

25Hayes Diary, March 23, 1889 and March 16, 1877, in
Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, IV, 458-59 and
III, 427. Garfield Diary, April 2, 1877. Garfield Papers.

269
speak optimistically of Garfield's chances of taking the
speakership and to promise his aid to that end. Years later,
Hayes spoke in his diary of contributing to, if not controlling,
Matthews nomination and election to the Senate. Moreover, fol-
lowing his election, the new Senator gave Garfield an account
of the affair. According to Garfield’s diary, Matthews told
him that he had not considered bidding for the senatorship
”until Hayes suggested it, that he replied it naturally belonged
to Garfield who would probably be nominated at any rate." Hayes
replied "that that could be amicably arranged.” This led Gar-
field to conclude that ”after all, the public view is the cor-
rect one, that Hayes inaugurated his candidacy."26 He left not
further comment on the affair, but his belief that he had been
a convenient sacrifice must surely have been re-enforced by

Matthews' confession.

In mid-March, a House Republican caucus had made Garfield
its unanimous choice for speaker. He was not optimistic as to
his chances for victory, for despite predictions to the con-
trary, he fully expected the Democrats to organize the House.
So did the perceptive Charles Foster, who with Matthews had
been deeply involved in negotiations with certain southerners

to insure the completion of the count. It was also about this

 

26Garfield Diary, April 2, 1877. Garfield Papers. Hayes
Diary, March 23, 1889, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of
Hayes, IV, 458 and Garfield Diary, Nov. 2471877. Garfield

Papers.

270
time that Andrew Kellar, a party to these negotiations, was
assuring William Henry Smith that men like Lamar and Gordon
were undependable and that time was needed during which Key
must be firmly supported and also given power over federal
appointments in the South outside the Post Office. But Gar-
field's contact with southerners made him dubious that Hayes's
policy would encourage a realignment in southern politics. ”I
fear party lines cannot be obliterated by generosity," he re-
flected, hoping nevertheless, events would prove him wrong.27
However, another party to the anti-filibuster effort, S. C.
Boynton, remained hopeful, assuring Garfield that Hampton would
aid the GOP in organizing the House and that Hampton and the
President had discussed the matter during their meeting. But
was Garfield the man upon whom Democrats would unite? Charles
Foster, who represented Hayes’s home district, told Garfield
that he had been approached by a man claiming to speak for 28
southern Democrats who, this spokesman averred, would support
Foster for the speakership ”in a certain contingency, and upon
certain conditions (Foster did not elaborate) named by him."
According to this gentlemen, he was the only Republican who
could be elected. Meanwhile, the abundance of press specula-
tion on the speakership was becoming ”very absurd and annoying,"
a-‘vexed Garfield recorded. He remained essentially pessimistic,

Eﬂ.though he believed the speakership to represent a means of

27Garfield Diary, March 9; April 6 and 9, 1877 and
(Hmarles Foster to Garfield, March 30, 1877. Garfield Papers.
.Mmirew Kellar to William H. Smith, March 20, 1877. Smith
1%q3ers. Garfield Diary, March 27, 1877. Garfield Papers.

271

testing the sincerity of those southerners who supported
Hayes’s approach. If they were to give Hayes the House, the
President might score a success. ”If not," he observed,
mirroring the mood of many Republicans, ”his friends North
will not tolerate a continuance of his Southern Scheme."28

Indeed, after only a month in office, a skeptical party
was prepared to revolt unless their President’s policy produced
immediate clear-cut political gains. In answer to criticism
of his course in Louisiana, brought to his attention by his
intimate friend William Henry Smith (who confessed he felt
"deeply for our good old Republicans” whose minds were "filled
with doubts”), Hayes replied that he shared Smith’s feelings
on the matter. ”If anything can be done to soften this to the
really good men involved I will be glad to do it," the Presi-
dent wrote. His reference to ”really good men” is significant.
He was not particularly anxious concerning those he considered
extremists or corruptionists. The decision in Louisiana was
the ”only possible” course and it was ”for the best," he in-
sisted to Smith. He was confident that ”all wise and good
people sooner or later” would agree with him. ”I shall not
forget my duty to the staunch Republicans," he assured friends.

Both his party and the Negro would benefit from his experiment,

he hoped.29

 

28Garfield Diary, April 4, 1877; Charles Foster to Gar-
field, March 21, 1877 and Garfield Diary, April 6, 1877.
Garfield Papers.

29William H. Smith to Hayes, n. d. and Hayes to William
H. Smith, April 22, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diapy and Letters

of Hayes, III, 431-32.

272

Moreover, while abandoning the use of federal troops,
Hayes was by no means abandoning the civil rights amendments,
and beginning with his ’Letter', he had consistently insisted
that they be obeyed and enforced. Smith himself had been under
pressure from Charles Farwell, who, it seems, had ”promised
(Packard and his friends) that they should be sustained” and
was now outraged at their abandonment and asked Smith to say
so to Hayes. The Republican party's objectives remained con-
stant, but the approach and the emphasis were undergoing a
basic alteration. With but one exception, the President's
policy of harmony and the building of a native white Republican
party in the South, was adopted by his nineteenth century Re-
publican successors.30

's time was as Cox had

But the party’s reSponse in Hayes
predicted it would be in his January letter. ”Selfishness"
and ”honest but narrow partizanship” would combine to stimy
his efforts, Cox had warned Hayes. There will be "doubts &
fears thrust at you, your fidelity to principle may even be
questioned, but you will triumph & the world will then regret
that it doubted,” he had written reassuringly. Cox had not
only shown remarkable prescience as to the reception that
would greet 'the policy', but had accurately anticipated

Hayes’s view of the affair. The Hayes course had not been

without its defenders, however, for it was publicly upheld

 

BOCharles Farwell to William H. Smith, March 6, 1877.
Smith Papers. Vincent P. DeSantis, ”President Hayes's South-
ern Policy,” p. 494.

273

by Stalwart Senator Morton of Indiana and by former President
Grant. During his last days in office Grant had concluded,
under Fish's urging and despite heavy pressure to the con-
trary, to leave the decision as to Louisiana to Hayes, lest
he commit his successor to a distasteful policy. He did how-
ever, write as follows to Packard on March 1, frankly express-
ing his views as to Packard's claim to office: "I feel it my
duty to state frankly that I do not believe public opinion
will support longer the maintenance of State Government in
Louisiana by the use of the military, and that I must concur
in this manifest feeling.” In view of this judgment, it is
understandable that after leaving office Grant declared that
he would have acted just as Hayes did regarding federal forces
in New Orleans.51

Hayes was clearly troubled by the view that he had be-
trayed both the Negro and his party. Even his appointment of
Frederick Douglass as marshal of the District of Columbia was
regarded ”as a sort of vicarious atonement for the abandonment

of the Fifteenth Amendment” and as an act of appeasement by

some critics. On the other hand, the District bar was ”in a
state of mind” over his choice, Hayes recorded. One set of
”ultra Republicans” attacked his leniency toward former Rebels,
while extreme Democrats fumed over the recognition of Negroes.
"I suspect I am right in both cases,” he concluded as his

characteristic self-assurance returned. He believed the

 

31Jacob Cox to Hayes, Jan. 31, 1877. Hayes Papers.
Nevins, Hamilton Fish, pp. 855-56.

274
people, at least the 'best people! were with him and deter—
mined to maintain a cool and detached attitude -- a non-
partisan approach. Both in newspaper interviews and private
correspondence, Hayes sought to reassure the people with re-
spect his continuing loyalty to his party and the cause of
Negro rights. Typical of his attitude, was a note to W. D.
Bickham in which he expressed his pleasure at a recent piece
in the latter’s Dayton paper on the southern problem. He
wrote as follows:
I know how sore a trial this business is to staunch
anti-slavery veterans like you. I expect many to
condemn. I shall not worry or scold if they do. I
know they mean well. It is a comfort to know also that
I mean well. It will, I trust turn out that I am right.
If not, I am a sound Republican still and always.
Public criticism of the Hayes approach by leading stal-
warts had begun soon after he had taken office. Responding
to rumors that by prior arrangement Packard would not be
recognized, Blaine commented caustically in the Senate that
if Packard was not legally entitled to his office, neither
then was Hayes. Even the President’s friends, Garfield in-
cluded, were troubled on this account. The same question had
been raised when Hayes met with the outgoing Grant Cabinet
for advice and counsel. Fish records that Cameron, Robeson,

Taft and Chandler all argued for recognition of Packard’s

government, and ”Chandler, with some indiscretion, remarked

 

32Benjamin A. Quarles, ”The Public Life of Frederick
Douglass" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin, 1941), p. 279, Hayes Diary, March 16, 1877 and
Hayes to William Bickham, April 22, 1877, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 427, 431.

275

to the President that the Packard Government was chosen on the
same vote on which he was declared elected President. Gov.
Hayes rebuked him, and several members of the Cabinet simul-
taneously interposed, manifesting disapproval of this great
indecency.”33

Early in April, former Senator Benjamin Wade, an old-line
abolitionist and radical who had seconded Hayes’s nomination
at Cincinnati, bitterly assailed the President‘s policy in a
letter reprinted later that month in the New York Tyipgng. Re-
ferring to his long record as an exponent of emancipation and
justice for the Negro, wade began by saying he had been led
to believe that Hayes agreed with completely. ”But I have
been deceived,” Wade lamented, "betrayed, and even humiliated
by the course he has taken to a degree that I have not the
language to express." He spoke of Hayes's conferences with
"two of the worst malignant enemies” of the Negro to be found
in the South, at which he sought the best means of placing
"these colored people under the iron heel of their most bitter
enemies, and reduce them to a condition unfortunately worse
than before they were made free.” To so abandon them "would
be a crime as infamous” as re-enSlavement, and this after
Negro lives had been risked to give Hayes the power he was now
misusing. Hayes also appeared to be contemplating the des-
truction of the GOP. "Some have attempted to excuse him by

saying that he 'means well,'" Wade concluded contemptuously,

33Nevins, Hamilton Fish, p. 858.

276

”but hell is paved with just such good intentions." Old
abolitionist leaders like Garrison and Phillips also attacked
the administration for abandoning the Negro and when the Re-
publican National Committee met in April, only Foster came to
the President’s defense.34

However, Garfield like most GOP leaders, was willing to
give this new departure a fair trial, but the truce would end
when the House convened in special session in October and the
speakership was decided. Garfield himself was frequently
visited by those with schemes for organizing a Republican
House, but he continued to be most skeptical. Nevertheless,
liberal Republicans like Cox remained hopeful. Time was of
the essense, Cox advised Garfield, and asked his help in de-
laying the calling of a Special session of Congress until Fall.
Hayes must be given a chance, for although the initial efforts
did appear ”to favor the Southern Democrats -- the division of
the old white element there must come later," he argued. With
the passage of time, the likelihood of electing Garfield speak-
er would grow, Cox concluded, and the disposition of the speak-
ership could be considered a fair test of southern good faith.
Hayes, too, remained optimistic, and in a lengthy conversation
on April 3 with Garfield and Matthews, declared he was ”will-
ing to favor internal improvements in the South, including the

Southern Pacific Railroad, if that will bring Southern support

 

34Quoted in Hirshon, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt, pp.
34- 35 o

277

to the Administration and make it worth while."35

Southern Democratic leaders and the party press responded
to the troop removal and Hayes's generosity toward them in
filling federal offices, by lavishing praise on him and his
policy. As one correspondent pointed out to Garfield, they
followed it up with pleas for continued party loyalty. For a
brief period following his inauguration there was a flurry of
speculation over rumors that Hayes intended to enlist the aid
of former Whigs and Douglas Democrats in reviving his party in
the South. An abundance of letters giving examples of Whig un-
happiness at being a part of the Democracy and invariably in-
cluding patronage advice filled Hayes‘s incoming correspon-
dence until federal appointments were nearly finished. Even
the staunchest southern Democrats like Representative E. John
Ellis of Louisiana were anxious that Hayes and his northern
brethren be placated and abuse of them stilled. "Our hopes
of levees and Pacific Roads and Brazilian Mail Lines is in
Hayes," Ellis reminded his brother. "Every consideration of
interest dictates that we court and woo him. We will do this
if the papers will aid us.” It appears that Hayes would have
been pleased to see the House choose a Republican speaker,
preferably Garfield, but was quite unwilling to enter into any

bargains to this end.36

 

35Garfield Diary, April 6 and 9, 1877; Jacob Cox to
Garfield, April 18, 1877 and Garfield Diary, April 3, 1877.

Garfield Papers.

36Alexander, ”Persistent Whiggery," 305-29; Tucker, ”E.
John Ellis,” 739 and John Defrees to Garfield, May 4, 1877.

Garfield Papers.

278

Garfield and members of his circle were not sanguine and
one may doubt that Hayes was truly as hopeful about his chances
of bringing off a realignment of southern politics as he some-
times appeared. He confided to a good friend and advisor on
April 22 that while the vital steps” in his southern policy had
been taken, he believed that southerners would ”not yet, if ever,
desert their party organizations.” Yet some ten days later, he

painted a picture filled with the rosiest optimism for the ed-

itor of the Dayton (Ohio) Journal. ”The pacification policy
still gains,” he wrote. '”I am confident it will secure North

Carolina, with a fair chance in Maryland, Virginia, Tennessee,
and Arkansas, and am not without hopes of Louisiana, South
Carolina, and Florida.” But a New Orleans friend insisted to
Garfield that it was ”utterly impossible" for a Republican
nominee for the speakership to get so much as a single Demo-
cratic vote from Louisiana. Another Ohioian living in Savannah
assured him that the solid South could not be split by the
President's policy.37

Hayes's enthusiasm was probably more than a trifle cooled
by the report Jacob Comly brought back from Louisiana later in
May. Comly had undertaken an extended fact-finding mission to
New Orleans to aid the administration in making federal appoint—

ments in Louisiana and to assist in the building of the nucleus

 

37Hayes to William Dickson, April 22, 1877 and Hayes to

William Bickham, May 3, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and
‘Letters of Hayes, III, 431, 432. Lionel Sheldon to Garfield,

‘May 5, 1877 and James Atkins to Garfield, Aug. 10, 1877.
Garfield PaperS..

 

279

of a native white Republican party there. However, after
surveying the scene, he found to his great surprise that the
solid South was rapidly emerging and that his party's pros-
pects were nil. He was disgusted, he told his wife, by the
blatant political selfishness he observed and the utter lack
of appreciation of Hayes's policy; but remained certain 'the
policy' was essentially correct. Upon his return he composed
a lengthy report in which he encouraged Hayes in his experi-
ment, but advised him that "any appointment to conciliate any
element must be first asked for by that element. Even taking
itsmost prominent representative man, and appointing him for
the purpose of conciliation, will produce the opposite effect,
if made without their motion.” Yet Hayes continued to believe,
as an autumn diary entry put it, that the southern question
seemed ”to be on a good footing.” His nomination to the Board
of Trustees of the Peabody Education Fund by its southern mem-
bers pleased him, as did his unanimous selection as a trustee.
This proved his pacification policy was ”approved by the whole
country,” he observed with satisfaction.38

But once the House had returned in mid-October to act on
the Army appropriation measure left uncompleted in March, it
became obvious that the South had failed the first test of its

sincerity. Democratic ranks held firm as Randall was chosen

 

38Eugene Kleinpell, ”The Life of James M. Comly,” (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1937),
p. 170 and Jacob Comly to Hayes, May 27, 1877. Hayes Papers.
Hayes Diary, Oct. 4, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters

of Hayes, III, 444.

280

speaker over Garfield by a strict party vote. If Hayes was
upset by this event, he did not let it be known. Indeed, he
reminded himself that in his first annual message, he must
"congratulate the country on the fact that the pacification,
on the basis of the Amendments, has gone forward so well.”
Perhaps the impression that he anticipated practical results
from his approach had been misleading; perhaps all he had
really hoped for was literally pacification and reconciliation.
As Tom Donaldson insisted years later, Hayes had repeatedly
explained his policy to him and in essence "it was mainly to
put the South on its gggd_behavior.” He knew it would fail
but in so doing it would silence liberal dissidents and en-
sure a GOP victory in 1880.39

A breach in Democratic ranks might have been opened had
Hayes personally taken decisive steps to build a coalition
between liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats, but
he preferred a cautious policy of personal non-involvement.
Moreover, while Postmaster-General Key tried indirectly to in?
fluence the President‘s conduct by forwarding letters from
southern correspondents describing the political instability
there, he refrained from pressing Hayes to capitalize on the
situation. Key's biographer explains the situation in this way:

Too handicapped by Hayes's lack of insight into the

Southern problem of political realignment, and too

limited by his own concern over a balanced handling

of the demands of political expediency and the needs
of civil service, Key failed to contribute his full

 

39Hayes Diary, Oct. 18, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 448 and Thomas Donaldson to

William H. Smith, Nov. 5, 1877. Smith Papers.

281

share to forcing the Administration into decisions
necessary for the Southern victory.

Hayes had written that ”’the let-alone policy' seems now
to be the true course” as early as his 1875 gubernatorial cam-
paign. He had undertaken his experiment firm in the belief
that southern Democrats would not then, perhaps would never,
abandon the Democratic organization. He hoped, nevertheless,
for their aid in his efforts to reform the civil service, per-
haps by forming a temporary union with the liberals and thus
overcoming the resistance of the stalwarts. He considered
that the ”vital steps” in his effort to resolve the southern
dilemma had, by late April, been taken. Now, with this accom-
plished what should he undertake next, he asked himself.
Southerners felt "in good temper” toward him and would ”look
kindly" on his civil service reform intentions, he assured a
friend. It was to this work that he now turned his energies,
while maintaining an attitude of watchful waiting toward the
South. He was now prepared to return to the work to which he
had given precedence in his 'Letter‘ -- reformation of the
civil service.41

Hayes's southern policy had come under sharp, but spo-
radic fire between March and October, but when not a single

southerner supported Garfield’s bid for the speakership of

 

4ODavid Abshire, ”David McKendree Key; A Study in Re-
construction Politics”.(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgetown University, 1958), p. 396.

41Hayes to Guy Bryan, July 27, 1875 and Hayes to William
Dickson, April 22, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters

of Hayes, III, 286, 431.

282
the House, the President came under a heavy and stinging
attack. He was forced to admit that it was ”now obvious" that
the opposition of both House and Senate Republicans to this ad—
ministration was ”very decided." In his diary he analyzed the
targets of his critics -- the Cabinet, his civil service di-
rective and his patronage policy. The latter he admitted, con-
stituted ”a total departure from the principles, traditions
and wishes of the party.” He clearly recognized that he was
attempting a fresh approach, in seeking to build Republicanism
in the South without resorting to traditional tactics. He
recognized that only a few Republicans favored all of his paci-
fication measures, although he believed most supported at least
some part of his program. Garfield reports that a mid-October

's revealed "great

meeting of some twenty Republicans at Sherman
differences of opinion in regard to the President's policy"
with the distinct likelihood of a split in Republican ranks.42
In the Republican controlled Senate, his party was al-
ready in revolt. On November 10, a caucus was called to con-
sider their grievances regarding appointments and southern
policy. Senator Edmunds, the new majority leader, since Mor-
ton's death, presided and took a neutral and conciliatory stand
while Matthews, Dawes and Hoar came to the defense of the Pres-

ident. The caucus finally elected to send a grievance committee

to the White House. As its chairman, Edmunds was to inform the

 

-.-‘ --———--- -- -’- -’-& ----."- - -

 

 

ﬂ--- -r -_- f--—

42Hayes Diary, Oct. 29, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Lett§;§_gf_ﬁgy§§, III, 449. Garfield Diary, Oct. 19,
1877. Garfield Papers...

283

President of the Judiciary Committee's intention to report
out Democratic nominees unfavorably where acceptable Republi-
cans were available. In the words of Edmunds, Hayes's views
were ”more suggestive of a political dreamer than of the sober
sense of a statesman.” As a result of his approach, a strong
Republican party would eventually emerge in the South, the
President contended. He would continue, in the matter of ap-
pointments, to choose Republicans of quality if available, if
not, he would nominate worthy Democrats. According to Edmunds,
he broke in at this point saying that a Democrat would never
win pig support unless he unequivocably supported the war
amendments and promised to enforce them scrupulously upon his
confirmation. Hayes colly replied that as he saw it, the oath
taken by federal officeholders was quite adequate.43

Some observers believed that Hayes was repeating Andrew
Johnson's southern policy. Henry Adams wrote to Henry Cabot
Lodge that it was ”Andrew Johnson over again, with more re-
spectability and a better balance of parties." Samuel Smalls
of the Atlanta Constitution, who had been Johnson’s private
secretary, claimed Johnson's policy had now been justified by
Hayes's course. Even his cabinet reflected his identification
with Johnson's approach, Smalls claimed. He noted that Evarts
had supported Johnson's southern policy and that Thompson,

Schurz and Devens, too, had endorsed his course -- the course

435elig Adler, ”George F. Edmunds” (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1936), pp. 173-74.

284

Hayes was now pursuing.44

In spite of such uncomplimentary comparisons and a con-
tinuing barrage of criticism, Hayes remained confident that he
was correct. Indeed, he was heartened by some of these stric-
tures, believing that they simply proved the correctness of
his course. What is more, he was certain that "a large ma-
jority of the best people (his kind of people)" were in com-
plete agreement with him. He wrote that he was pleased with
the "favorable comment from independent papers . . . and no-
tably the religious newspapers", but admitted that the ma-
jority of both Democratic and Republican journals were criti-
cal and his congressional supporters were few. However, he
considered himself a "non-partisan President" and it was to
be expected that as such he would "be feebly supported, if at
all, in Congress or by the press,””he declared. Not only did
staunch GOP partisans find his course distasteful, but Demo-
crats, too, were not inclined to back enthusiastically an ad-
ministration they had not elected, he admitted. It would now
be his purpose, therefore, ”to keep cool" and respond to cri-
tics genteely while clearly demonstrating his ”sincerity and
firmness.”45 .

But the administrations's policies were in serious trouble

___
——-
——

44Hayes Diary, Oct. 24, 1877, in Williams, ed., piggy
and Letters of Hayes, III, 449, Henry Adams to Henry C. Lodge,
Dec. 2, 1877, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., The Lettprs of
Henry Adam§ (2 vols., Boston, 1930-38), I, 303 and Memoirs of
Thomas Donaldson, Nov. 29, 1877.

45Hayes Diary, March 12 and Oct. 24, 1877, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayeg, III, 450.

285

even in Ohio. Following the Republican state convention, over
which he presided, Garfield reported that they had ”got through
in fair shape” but inflation sentiment was swelling and numer-
our party members had been injured by Hayes's southern policy.
Moreover, he was not especially optimistic concerning GOP pro-
spects in the October contests. Indeed the results were a dis-
appointment. The Democracy easily won the governorship and
took control of the house and senate by healthy margins. One
of Sherman's chief political lieutenants, Warner Bateman, re-
ported that everyone was ”astonished" at the outcome and although
he claimed that Ohio remained Republican, there was "widespread
indifference and dissatisfaction.” The depression and labor
unrest hurt the party, Bateman obServed, but more importantly,
Hayes's southern experiment ”was distasteful to many, and some
openly voted the Democratic ticket (as) an expression of their
dngust, while still more staid at home.” The situation was,
Bateman said, "aggravated by a half—hearted defense" of the
southern policy by some campaigners, and "a general ignoring"
of the matter by a majority of those who Stumped the state. '
Thus Garfield, who made some three dozen speeches, seems to
have made money and finance his theme (which took some courage)
while saying very little about Hayes and the South.46

In his analysis of the election, Garfield emphasized the

voter apathy common in an off year contest, as well as ”the

46Garfield to Albert Riddle, July 30, 1877. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook. Warner Bateman to John Sherman, Oct.
11, 1877.. warner Bateman Papers. Garfield Diary, Aug.,
Sept. and Oct., 1877. Garfield Papers.

286

effects of the Civil Service Policy and the dissatisfaction
with the southern policy.” One might fairly assume that an
examination of that fall’s contests in other northern states
would reveal a similar response to Hayes’s approach to the
southern question. But Hayes appeared untroubled by the re-
buff his party received in Ohio and elsewhere and would admit
to errors in only one area. Because of his ”anxiety to com-
plete the great work of pacification” he had "neglected to give
due attention to removals.” This had brought "some bad appoint-
ments", some ”mistakes” in removals and ”delays in action.”
But he would now undertake to correct these matters.47 .

Late in October, Garfield undertook to ”speak very plain-
ly” to Hayes on party affairs and especially the southern poli-
cy. According to his diary, he told the President that during

his southern tour,

he proferred pacification and good will but nowhere
spoke as though he did it as the representative of
the people who elected him. He thus made his friend
fear, and his political enemies hope, that he was
acting as though he was not in alliance with his
party, and when the South praised him, they dis-
praised his party. It would have been more just

and more politic to have associated his party with
his proffers of good will.

Assuredly this was a major weakness of Hayes's highly personal,
'non partisan' approach during his first year in office, but
it was quite consistent with his earlier political history.

Obviously it contributed to the belief that his Republicanism

 

47Garfield Diary, Oct. 10, 1877. Garfield Papers. Hayes
Diary, Oct. 24, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diapy and Letters of

Hayes, III, 450.

287

was suspect -- a view that pained and annoyed him. Garfield
followed up his criticism by showing Hayes a resolution he
proposed to introduce if the Democrats took up the southern
question. As he described it, the resolution, which met with
Hayes's approval,_combined ”approval of pacification with a
full recognition of the rights of all classes under the amend-
ed constitution.”48

If Hayes was disappointed that the South had failed to
help organize an administration House he concealed his feeling
very well. A trip to Richmond late in October left him con-
vinced that the South contained ”thousands of intelligent
people who . . . (were) not Democrats and who would like to
unite with conservative Republicans of the North.” These forays
into the South visibly bolstered his spirits and reassured him
of the ultimate wisdom of his new departure. Early in November,
he used his diary to note a number of topics for consideration
in his annual message to Congress. Among these items he in-
cluded ”improvements, railroads and levees(?)” But he was re-
ferring to what was already going forward in these areas and
no mention of future internal improvements was to be made in
the message he delivered to Congress in December. Clearly
Hayes was instinctively wary of subsidies and fearful of the
corruption that sometimes followed in their wake. Eager as he
was to help promote southern prosperity, his enthusiasm was

tempered by sober second thoughts and the advice of men like

 

48Garfield Diary, Oct. 26, 1877.’ Garfield Papers.

288

Schurz. He had toyed with the idea of federal promotion of
internal improvements, education, immigration and emigration,
but in a February letter to Schurz he revealed what had by
March become his true (and natural) position. ”Perhaps,” he
wrote, "we must be content to leave that to time -- taking care
not to obstruct time’s healing processes by injudicious med—
dling. I will think of it."49 A month later, in his inaugural
address, he had made it clear that despite the efforts of
Smith, Boynton, Kellar, Dodge and the Scott interests, the
President had no intention of becoming involved with a federal
subsidy for the Texas and Pacific railroad. Huntington's sub-
sequent demonstration that he could build a southern line with-
out federal aid simply re-enforced Hayes in his views.

Nevertheless, those who had been involved in the pre-
inaugural negotiations and 'understandings' continued to ex-
pect or at least hope that Hayes would come out in support of
a subsidy. As noted above, in an April discussion with him
and Matthews, Hayes had, according to Garfield, indicated his
willingness to support ”internal improvements in the South, in-
cluding the Southern Paeific Railroad" if his help was likely
to win ”Southern support to the administration to make it worth
'while.”. Southern Spokesman like Henry Watterson as well as

Hayes’e Texas friend Guy Bryan reported that the President would

49Hayes Diary, Nov. 3 and 5, 1877 and Hayes to Carl
Schurz, Feb. 4,1877, in Williams, ed., Diapy and Letters
of Hayes, III, 450, 413.

289
aid the Texas and Pacific project.5O Thus Hayes appeared to
have reversed himself on internal improvements, but in reality
he was convinced that with the removal of the troops and the
securing of pledges from the Hampton and Nicholls governments,
the essential measures of his policy had been undertaken. He
now intended to focus his attention on civil service reform
while he awaited the South’s response to his gestures of good-
will. Contrary to what he said or seemed to say, Hayes really
had little faith in the efficacy of subsidies as a means of
triggering Democratic defections.

Late in November, Governor Zebulon Vance of North Carolina
assured Tom Donaldson that the South was already solid and that
while southern Democrats appreciated the withdrawal of troops
and the recognition of party members, the hope that this would
persuade Democrats to vote ”the Republican or Hayes ticket”
was without foundation. Furthermore, he claimed that South
Carolinians were indifferent toward the Southern Pacific pro-
ject which he, an anti-subsidy man, branded as ”a Scheme to
help Tom Scott", as it then stood. Hayes was being petted and
misled, he continued, by those who, claiming to understand the
South, assured him that Democratic support was forthcoming and
that the old Whigs were alive again.51

Certainly the thesis that Hayes abandoned his stand on

 

50Garfield Diary, April 3, 1877. Garfield Papers. 0.

Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction; The Compromise of 1877
and the End of Reconstruction (2d ed., rev.; Garden City,

1956), pp. 243- 44.
51Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, Nov. 27, 1877.

290
federal aid because the Democrats failed to give the admin-
istration control of the House does not stand up. He had
never truly abandoned the 'hands-off’, non-interventionist
course he had determined upon before entering the White House.
Moreover, this was the 'safest‘ approach for one who lived in
dread of something akin to a Credit Mobilier scandal besmirch-
ing his administration. Surely he did not consider himself
committed to any Specific policy by the efforts and suggestions
of Smith, Boynton, Kellar and their allies. H. V. Boynton, for
one, was bitterly disappointed by Hayes's course on internal
improvements, but in commenting on this caustic journalist's
criticism of him, the President declared that Boynton knew,
"of course, very little of what was expected. The truth is,
I had no confidants in regard to it.”52 In other words, those
who led some sutherners to expect generous federal aid from a
Hayes administration only assumed or imagined they were in a
position to deliver on their assurances. The interpretation
they and others placed upon the vague expressions of the 'Letter'
and the Inaugural Address were unwarranted. Furthermore, they
were misled (perhaps purposely?) by Hayes’s brief flirtation
with subsidies during his first weeks in office. He had in
fact, shifted much of his attention from southern affairs to
civil service reform by mid-summer, and by the fall and winter

of 1877-78, reform centering on the New York Custom House, had

upstaged pacification.

-..—-.—-- ‘.——“—‘~- -

 

-- ‘— -‘ a...-

“—~_" -—‘— —

52Hayes Diary, April 11, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary
.ind Letters 9f Hayes, III, 594.

CHAPTER 7

UNDER FIRE BUT PUSHING ON

During 1878 the criticism of Hayes grew widespread and
intense, while the President, although stung, stubbornly held
to his unpopular policies. A Silver purchase act was easily
repassed over Hayes's veto with a majority of his own party
deserting him. Moreover, the first two rounds of the custom
house struggle went to Conkling and though Hayes had his own
way once Congress adjourned many reformers remained dissatis-
fied. And although a Democratic investigation designed to
discredit Hayes recoiled on its instigators, the success of
the Democrats in the off-year elections, the emergence of an
undeniably solid South and the violation of the Negro’s po-
litical rights in that section confirmed Hayes's critics in
their condemnation of his southern policy. The year would
draw to a close with the gulf between the President and his
party as wide as ever, but with Hayes self-assured and find-
ing cause for Optimism.

AS the policies of the Hayes administration began to take
shape, it became apparent that his independence extended not
only to his party, but to the reform element as well. He re-
fused to be shackled either by his fellow Republicans or the

291

292
the reformers. Although the latter desired a thorough house-
cleaning in the ’departments', he was not so inclined. His
appointment policy, as Schurz and Evarts helped him develop
it, was hardly revolutionary. He spoke of an eight year term
for civil servants and this, coupled with his failure to tturn
the rascals out', meant the retention of officeholders who were
utterly unacceptable to reformers and the very antithesis of
all they had been fighting for. As the months passed, the re-
formers' estimate of the President rose and fell by turns as
he or his department chiefs either met or failed to meet re-
form expectations. Thus Sdhurz's effort in the Interior Depart-
ment were well received, while the Postoffice, Treasury and
Navy Departments were quite another matter. As noted previ-
ously, Hayes was preoccupied with the southern question imme-
diately after taking office, but he was soon able to give re-
form more personal attention. The investigation of the New
York Customs House by the Jay Commission is a case in point.
Its revelations of wrongdoing, inefficiency and spoilmanship
were by no means startling to the well-informed, but the Pres-
ident's failure to remove the chief Spoilsmen, Chester Arthur
and Alonzo Cornell, was a Shock. Obviously, John Sherman's
presidential aspirations and his less than lukewarm attitude
toward reform were a factor here, although like Sherman, Hayes,

too, preferred gentle persuasion to vigorous action.1

_— ____. “—

1Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing_the Spoils: Ayﬁistqpy of the
Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana, 1961),

PP. 1E5‘530

293
Hayes, however, was by no means finished with the sub-
ject of reform and first in a May 26th letter to Sherman and
later in his famous Executive Order of June 22nd, he made this
quite clear. In the Sherman letter, he announced his agree-
ment with the recommendations made thus far by the Jay Com-
mission. He wrote in part as follows:

It is my wish that the collection of the revenue
should be free from partisan control, and organized
on a strictly business basis, with the same guar-
anties for efficiency and fidelity in the selection
of the chief and subordinate officers that would be
required by a prudent merchant. Party leaders
should have no more influence in appointments than
other equally respectable citizens. No assessments
for political purposes on officers or subordinates
Should be allowed.

In the June 22nd 'Order’ which was to apply to all Departments,
he simply repeated protions of his letter to Sherman:
No officer should be required or permitted to take
part in the management of political organizations,
caucuses, conventions, or election campaigns. Their
right to vote and to express their views on public
questions, either orally or through the press, is
not denied, provided it does not interfere with the
discharge of their official duties. No assessment
for political purposes on officers or subordinates
should be allowed.
Although reformers were quick to demonstrate their pleasure
at this turn of events, they still cautioned that tireless
enforcement was imperative if anything was to be gained.2
But if reformers took heart at the revival of their
cause, party regulars believed this order dealt a crippling

blow to party politics in America. They argued that they

 

2Richardson, ed., Messages app Papers of thgtfresidents,
VII, 451-52 and Hoogenboom, Outlawing_the Spoils, pp. 153-54.

294
would be hamstrung were the President's directive strictly
obeyed. Assessments constituted a dependable and significant
source of funds for the party treasury and the thousands of
party faithful in public offices were important cogs in the
party’s machinery. Crys of protest and disbelief went up all
along the line, from congressmen to postal clerks. And these
strictures sprang not only from considerations of party and
the threat to partisan vitality and efficiency. Friends of
reform like Garfield were upset on yet another count. Writing
to Burke Hinsdale in September 1877, he argued for his view
in the following manner:

I believe my criticism of Hayes' Civil Service order
is sound though it is difficult to make the criticism
without being misunderstood. There is too much pro-
clamation in his method. If he found his subordinate
officers meddling unwarrantably in machine politics
he could have corrected it by a few examples. In-
stead of that he has issued a general order Which
interferes with the undoubted rights of citizens.
Streator has a right to a voice in nominating town-
ship, county, and state officers and the exercise of
that right does not interfere with his duties as P.M.
at Hiram. Of course the case is different where 8000
people from all parts of the Union are serving the
United States in the city of New York and combine to
run the politics of that city. He was right, in in-
terfering there. Again, his order, as a matter of
prudence, has injured the cause of reform and alien-
ated many from its support. It is the business of
statesmanship to wield the political forces so as not
to destroy the end to be gained. Take it in a larger
view: The 70,000 federal office holders are among the
most active citizens in political matters. If they
are Sponged out as a political force, it weakens our
system at it weakest point, namely: in the nomination
of candidates. The number of citizens who attend
primary meetings is already too small. Hayes's order
makes it smaller still, and increases an apathy which
is already dangerous. The ambition to hold an office
which a man is fit for is an honorable one and I am
glad that ambition increases political activity.

295
Hayes weakens it and offers no substitute.3
If the reformers were heartened by the appearance of
Hayes's ‘Order', they were less than pleased with the admin-
istration's handling of Customs House reform at New York.

Hayes'

S initial strategy included the promotion of Arthur out
of New York and into the counsularship at London, with his
Naval Officer Alonzo Cornell similarly well cared for. But
the Collector declined to be manuevered out of the most lu-
crative of all federal posts and Cornlee followed suit. Nor
was Conkling willing to Sit on his hands while his chief ap—
pointee was sacked, whatever the President's motives might be.
The imperious Senator would need help, but allies were easily
found in his own machine, the Senate, among his increasingly
dngruntled fellow congressmen, and last but not least, in

’S eye was already fixed on

Hayes‘s own Cabinet. John Sherman
the White House and he was eager to win over this politically
potent arm of the Treasury to his side and gain its undivided
loyalty.4

The watchwords became harmony, conciliation and balance.

'embarrassed' -— the

No one, least of all Sherman, must be
Secretary's standard word for describing a variety of cir-
cumstances he wished to avoid. If Evarts, who seems also to

have had presidential hopes, was indeed a prime mover in this

affair, then let him be soothed by an appointment, but not at

3Sept. 10, 1877, in Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale
Letters, p. 377.

4HOOgenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, p. 157.

296
the expense of Arthur and the Conkling forces. It seems that
such concerned parties as Evarts, the reformers, William Henry
Smith, Arthur, and Conkling were not amenable to Sherman‘s
wishes. None but Sherman and Hayes were willing to accept
half a loaf. Then as reform pressure mounted and evidence of
corruption grew more impressive, Hayes, faced with a stubborn
Arthur and Cornell, moved into the reform camp as well.5

By the fall of 1877 the issue was joined and there was
little hope for a compromise. The Customs House would be re-
organized and Arthur and Cornell would be replaced. Conkling's
response was predictably violent and abusive, but it was not
the administration, but New York Republican unity, that suf-
fered most severely. When Hayes’s appointments were made pub-
lic, political considerations took precedence over reform de-
sires. The appointees were not clearly of a reform stripe,
but politicians, who, like the President, were clean, sober
public servants and sound party men. With the struggle shift-
ed to the Senate, the contest grew more heated. Arthur chimed
in with the claim, not without some foundation, that he too,
had practiced a form of civil service reform as Collector.

Well before the special Session of Congress had adjourned,
Conkling had won the first round of the fight when his Com-
merce Committee spurned Hayes's nominees.6

ManWhile, the civil service order had been watered down

5Hoogenboom, Outlawingpthe Spoils, pp. 157-58.

6Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, pp. 158-62.

297

significantly in the name of expediency and to meet the po-
litical needs of the reform element. Secretary of State
Evarts, with an eye to the future, Showed unusual concern for
the wishes of the Illinois and Pennsylvania delegations to
Congress as regarded their preference among nominees to re-
present the United States in Germany and Great Britain. Such
action flew squarely in the face of the President’s determina-
tion to assert his independence of Congress in making appoint-
ments, despite Conkling's recent victory. The mildness of the
reform proposals in Hayes's Annual Message of 1877 was likewise
disheartening. His request for executive discretion in appoint-
ments was neither what reformers wanted, nor what Congress
would accept; and his call for an appropriation for the mori-
bund Civil Service Commission was hardly indicative of the
sweeping reforms he had led the Independents to expect.7

Hayes recognized that he had given reform insufficient
attention, and he sketched out the following ideas for a spe-
cial message on the subject. "There should," he wrote, "be
legislation (which) would relieve Congressmen from all re-
sponsibility-for the appointments. They must neighter seek
to control, nor even influence appointments.” In the absence
of such legislation, he must of necessity work out and issue
rules. Officeholders must be prevented from actively manag-
ing political affairs, he continued, and examinations used to

fill lesser positions. He favored the retention of all worthy

 

— i— —

7Hoogenboom, Outlawing tpp Spoilp, pp. 163—64.

298
officeholders for "their terms" and the formulation of regu-
lations.8 Although these concepts had and would to a con-
siderable degree guide Hayes's executive conduct, the spe-
cial message on civil service reform was never to be deliver-
ed. What is more, the subject was not so much as mentioned
in his second annual message a year later.

Thus far the Hayes approach to reform had aroused dis-
content among the several factions of Spoilsmen, the reform
element and the Hayes men alike. Members of the latter group,
like Garfield and Cox, were sharply critical of the failure
of the President to develop a sound and meaningful reform
program. In answer to Garfield’s inquiry, Jacob Cox sub-
mitted the following assessment of Hayes's efforts.

You will see from my speech here (Toledo) last night
that I see very clearly the need of the President s
going further, & pystematiging with Congress the
modes of appointments. I had a talk with him on the
subject, saying that in my opinion we could not rest
on the chances of the personal desire of the Presi-
dent to further a reform, but must have systematic
reductions of pig patronage as well as that of
others. He said that when we meet in Oct. he would
try to have an understanding with those who 'meant
business' in the matter & would cooperate in what
seemed right.

Let us accept the position that M.C.'S are divorced
from patronage, then take the next step that the
Prest. must be put substantially in the same cate-
gory, & as a recompense give Cabinet officers seats

in the house, & we shall then have ministerial govern-
ment with proper responsibilities attached. Don't let
us go back, & it will be going back if we let the
clamor for something like the old fashioned distri-
bution of spoils get the upper hand. No one can be
more annoyed personally than I am here by some of

 

8Hayes Diary, Dec. 6, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and
_ptters of Hayes, III, 452.

299

the immediate results but I brave it cheerfully in
the hope that we shall get ovep.9

Early in December 1877, Hayes again submitted his customs
house nominations to the Senate, declaring to a chief support-
er in the struggle, William Henry Smith, that it was now a
question of ”Senatorial usurpation." Ultimately, he believed,
"the claim of a Single Senator to control all nominations in
his State will be found so preposterous that it will fall of
its own weight.” He thereupon congratulated Smith (and in-
directly himself, too) on Smith‘s confirmation as Collector
at Chicago despite the opposition of both Illinois Senators
to the removal of his predecessor. The New York contest moved
Hayes to reflect that the initial and ”most important step"
in the reform effort was the defeat of Senatorial dictation.
Perhaps he should not demand that every major appointee agree
with him on this question, but that all who wished to be con—
sidered Republicans in good standing simply accept the party's
national civil service plank. He admitted this requirement
was perhaps rather extreme, yet were the struggle to continue,
he would give it consideration.1O Needless to say, he never
adopted so radical an approach.

By mid-December, round two of Hayes's contest with Conk-
ling and the Senate was over. General E. A. Merritt, who was

on good terms with both Conkling and Arthur, was confirmed as

 

9Jacob Cox to Garfield, Sept. 16, 1877. Garfield Papers.

1OHayes to William H. Smith, Dec. 8, 1877 and Hayes Diary,

Dec. 9, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,
III, 453.

300
surveyor. But Theodore Roosevelt, Sr., Arthur's replacement,
and L. Bradford Prince, Cornell's designated successor, were
handily defeated, with only six Republican Senators voting to
confirm them. Although disappointed, Hayes vowed that the
struggle would be resumed, for he was certain of the correct-
ness of his position. Thanks to senatorial courtesy, the
Senate had allowed itself to be held captive by Conkling, he
insisted, but that hold would ultimately be broken. He re-
gretted that a serious breach had developed between him and
his party, but he did not feel responsible and would endeavor
not to aggravate the situation unnecessarily. While anxious
to promote reform, he was quite unwilling to destroy or ir-
reparably harm party unity and organization in the process.11
He by no means forgot his political responsibilities as the
titular head of the GOP.

Now that a soft approach had been tried without success,
Smith urged Hayes to assault "the abuses in New York in ear-
ppgp." He was especially vehement concerning the frauds per-
petrated there in the levying of duties which gave New York
merchants a sizeable advantage over their competitors in
Chicago and other ports. He earnestly recommended that the
fight against Conkling be put on this basis as a means of
stripping him of some of his support. In the meantime, Hayes,
obviously troubled by the rift between himself and his party,

11Hayes Diary, Dec. 12, 1877 and Hayes to Manning Force,
Dec. 12, 1877, in Williams, ed., Diaryyand Letters of Hayes,
III, 454. ,

301

was searching for a means of restoring GOP unity. Perhaps
the Cincinnati platform offered ”the best means” upon which
to reunite the party, he speculated, and if a problem arose
over the interpretation of this plank then his 'Letter’ and
past state platforms should be consulted. It was as if Hayes
was searching for documentary proof of his rightness, while
forgetting the essentially utilitarian rather than idealogi-
cal or covenatal role of the platform in American politics,
and overlooking the fact that he and the liberal-reform ele-
ment were virtually alone in their literal reading of such
documents as iron-clad pledges. He was at pains to reassure
George W. Curtis that his own loyalty to the reform cause was
unflagging, and he solicited Curtis's counsel in the prepara-
tion of his proposed message on reform.12

At the same time, Hayes was obviously stung by accusations
that he was being untrue to his party despite so many years of
conspicuous loyalty and service. It appeared, according to
Henry V. Boynton, that the opponents of the President were
trying to make him out to be another Andrew Johnson and to
organize his party against him in both houses of Congress.
Indeed, it was true that Hayes's friends could not be counted
on to make even a half-hearted defense of his administration
and policies. In the House, there were perhaps fifteen to

twenty members Who, while believing Hayes to be a sound

 

12William H. Smith to Hayes, Dec. 13, 1877; Hayes Diary,
Dec. 18, 1877 and Hayes to George Curtis, Dec. 31, 1877, in
Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Ha es, III, 455-56, 456,
457. . .,.

302
Republican, objected to his attack on machine style politics
because he failed to discriminate between the merely objec-
tionable and the corrupt organizations and, as Boynton phras-
ed it, "the legitimate and necessary organization of the party."
These cengressmen were not yet actively opposing him, but their.
genuine anxiety over the future of their party's structure made
them vulnerable to those who argued that the GOP could be saved
only by uniting it against Hayes.13

Meanwhile, Hayes had concluded that the best defense
against insinuations of disloyalty was a good offense, i.e.,

a presentation of his interpretation of the Republican party,
”its genius, mission and duty.”14 This approach silenced but
few critics and attacks centering on his reform efforts, his
Republicanism and the southern policy grew more intense. He
was made painfully aware that while he represented his party,
he did not in fact lead it; and this in Spite of his convic-
tion that the "best people" were with him in his struggle.
For the moment, he was a man without a party.

Garfield had returned to Washington and his role as mi-
nority leader with reluctance that January, remarking that the
”financial craze” had again fastened itself upon the American
mind and he was ence more left "fighting for financial honor
against the majority” of his party and many members of the

Ohio delegation, as well. After over a decade of championing

.r— puf~~m

 

13Gincinnati Daily Gazette, Feb. 1, 1878, p. 5.

14Hayes Diary, Jan. 19, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 458.

303

‘soundness‘

, he had wearied of the struggle. He admitted that
it might yet be enjoyable and challenging if it involved and
valued ”logic, reason, (and) sense”, but instead, he lamented,
it was ”a fight of interest against honor -- the brute force
of votes against knowledge.” What is more, Hayes did ”not Seem
to be master of his administration," Garfield was compelled to
conclude, and he feared that he had overestimated the Presi-
dent's "force & nerve. . ."15

Indeed, the strain had begun to tell on the President and
a frequent visitor to the White House reported that he aged
markedly during these months. ”I have a dull headache at
night," Hayes admitted to his diary. "No severe pain. Nothing
acute, but it leads me to ask, what does it mean?" He con—
tinued to sleep as well as usual, and his discomfort was gone
by morning, yet the headaches had ”rather increased the last
few weeks,” he recorded.16

One is reminded at this time of trial for Hayes, of the
dilemma that plagued Garfield throughout his public life.
While considering retirement in 1876, he had sought Jacob Cox’s
advice and in recalling their conversation years later, Cox
averred that Garfield ”fully realized that he could not speak
his own thoughts or advocate or support the measures he really

believed to be the best for the country, but was limited to

doing the best he could consistently with maintaining his

 

15Garfield Diary, Jan. 7 and 19, 1878. Garfield Papers.

16Hayes Diary, Jan. 27, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 458-59.

304
position in his district and his party.” Hayes, of course,
firmly believed a man was handicapped seriously if he came to
the presidency by way of Congress.17 But given his unenvi-
able position in the winter of 1878, a longer tour of duty in
the House might have worked to his advantage and to the ad-
vantage of the reforms he so earnestly sought to effect.

To add to Hayes's woes, inflationist sentiment had gain-
ed such momentum among the people and in Congress that a Sil-
ver coinage bill was destined to reach his desk sometime in
February. Although the House billfs free coinage provision
would be removed in the Senate, it nevertheless seemed to
Hayes that he must not approve the measure. During an ex-
tended discussion of the bill with Garfield, he told his
House spokesman that he hOped the measure would pass untem-
pered by amendments, so that he might have a still solider
basis for a veto. Garfield voted against the measure in the
House, but it passed by a better than two to one margin. He
had, in his own words, ”stood alone in Ohio”, in fact "there
were but half a dozen ness in the whole MisSissippi Valley.”
The President’s young friend and frequent White House guest,
William McKinley, was one of those who knuckled under to in-
flationist pressure from his district. In the Senate, Matthews,
too, defected to the silverites. The silver bill dreW'ma-

jority support from both parties in Congress, although the

 

17Jacob Cox to William H. Smith, July 14, 1885. Smith
Papers. Hayes to Austine Snead, April.25, 1881, in Williams,
ed., Diagy~and Letters of Hayes, IV, 10.

305

voting in the northeastern delegation testified to the con-
tinuing sectional influence in that body. In New England
alone, a majority of both parties opposed it, as did the Dem-
ocrats from the Middle Atlantic states whose Republican rep-
resentatives were evenly Split on the issue.18

Like Garfield, Hayes did not oppose Silver coinage in
toto, and would not ”veto a bill which guarded the rights of
creditors and operated in futuro,” but this bill stained and
tainted the nation's credit, he maintained. As a debtor na-
tion, low interest rates were impressive to us. ”Expediency
and justice both demand honest coinage," he concluded.19

Vying for the public's attention with the silver bill
was the trial in New Orleans of Thomas C. Anderson on elec-
tion fraud charges. The former parish elections supervisor

’S electoral

had been a key figure in the diSpute over Louisiana
votes. This event dealt a severe blow to Hayes's southern poli-
cy, for it appeared to him to violate the pledges made by
Nicholls and his legislature that no such prosecutions would

be undertaken. Yet he continued to have faith in the Gover-
nor’s ”honor,” he insisted, knowing full well that he Simply
had no other ehoice in the matter. Although Hayes‘s confi-
dence in the South's good faith was fading, he clung stub-
bornly to his policy of pacification. But for others this

was the last straw. Garfield reacted with an angry outburst

 

18Garfield Diary, Jan. 19 and 28, 1878. Garfield Papers.
Hannah G. Roach,-”Sectionalism in Congress (1870-1890),”
American Political Science Review, XIX (Aug., 1925), 512.

19Hayes Diary, Feb. 3, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 459.

306

in a letter to a friend in New Orleans.

The policy of the President (he wrote) has turned

out to be a give-away game from the beginning. He

has nollied suits, discontinued prosecutions, of-

fered conciliation everywhere to the South, while

they have Spent their time in whetting their knives

for every Republican they could find. I am tired of

this kind of warfare and now prcpose to fight them

whenever they make an attack.
Some two weeks later, Garfield notes that he ”criticized the
President's course kindly but plainly” in a speech that ap-
peared to make an uncommonly ”strong impression on the House”
and won the approval of members with opposing views. It ap-
peared that Hayes was not of presidential stature and Suffer-
ed from what Garfield called ”the worst infirmity, the fear
of being influenced” by fellow Republicans of greater stature
and strength, and so cut himself off from the aid all chief
executives so sorely needed. Garfield’s Speech was an attempt
to ”kindly and gently . . . open his eyes.”20

By mid-February, the Senate had passed a modified version
of the silver bill and returned it to the House. There, ex-
treme silverites tried to block the measure because of the
Senate's moderating amendments, but is passed easily. Gar-
field Spoke but briefly during the House debate on the bill,
simply expressing, as he recalled in his diary, his ”belief
in bi-metallism and . . . regret that this bill, though im-

proved by the Senate would not bring the two metals into

equipoise.” He thereupon voted with the majority in support

 

2QHayes Diary, Feb. 15, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of _Hgyes, III, 459; Cincinnati Daily Gazette, Feb. 13,
1878, p. 1; Garfield to Lionel Sheldon, Feb. 12, 1878; Garfield
Diary, Feb. 19 and March 3, 1878. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

307

of the Senates amendments and then, joined by a handful of
westerners, supported a fruitless attempt to table the measure.
But although he had remained as loyal to soundness as Hayes,
he nevertheless lacked his chief’s self-confidence, remarking
that time would tell whether his vote had been well-advised or
not. Actually he believed that the bill would lead to ”some
good results” and did not view its passage as a tragic mistake.21

Hayes had ”given the subject some study and much anxious
reflection,” he confessed to his diary and had concluded to
veto the measure although he fully expected to be overruled by
Congress. He thought of softening his rejection by outlining
the kind of silver measure he would approve, but, in fact,
limited himself to expanding upon his major objection to the
bill, i.e., that it constituted a violation of the national
faith and credit. While he, too, wished to increase silver
coinage, it must be done by issuing ”Silver dollars of full
value, which will defraud no man,” his veto message ran. After
reading the message to his Cabinet, he found that only Thompson
squarely opposed his course and although Sherman and McCrary
feared a veto, they could see no alternative. Privately,
Sherman believed a veto might damage his own presidential pros-
pects. Moreover, he had word that the Greenback movement was

catching fire in Ohio and GOP prospects in the coming elections

—
—— —— ‘-

21Garfield Diary, Feb. 21, 1878 and Garfield to Harmon
Austin, March 3, 1878. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

308

were not bright.22 The Secretaryts uneasiness also reflected
the view of August Belmont, who disliked the bill, but favor- _
ed its approval lest the financial community suffer a severe
jolt. Sherman thought Hayes might merely withhold his Sig-
nature, but this suggestion was dismissed by the President.
Evarts, whom Hayes consulted while writing his veto message,
along with Key, Devens and Schurz, all backed him in his de-
cision. In the face of heavy pressure from within his party
and strong opposition among the voting public (”You can have
no idea how our friends were stampeded at the critical moment,”
he told Smith), the President refused to authorize what he con-
sidered to be ”dishonest.”23

At the very least, his action gained for him the appro-
bation of the party’s sound money element, including many who
until then had been critical of his administration. Moreover,
it demonstrated to doubters, wrote Smith, who was busy with
the organization of a hard money league, that he possessed the
courage of his convictions. This praise was especially wel-
comed by one who prided himself on his steadfastness and what
his generation liked to call 'moral courage'. Hayes never

ceased to take pride in this veto and when,,in a Harper’s

 

22Hayes Diary, Feb. 17, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary_and
Letters of Hayes, III, 460; Richardson, ed., Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, VII, 488; Jeanette P. Nichols, ”John
Sherman: A Study in Inflation,” Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XXI (Sept., 1934),187 and James’Robinson toIVohn
Sherman, Feb. 21, 1878. Sherman Papers.

23Hayes Diary, Feb. 26, 1878; Dec. 20,1885 and Hayes to

William H. Smith, March 6, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diar and
Letters of Hayes, III, 461- 62; IV, 257 and III, 465-88.

309

Weekly article published in 1885, Sherman was given credit for
the decision as well as for the veto message, he was clearly
disturbed. He wrote to Sherman asking for a brief statement
of correction from his hand which he in turn could pass on to
George W. Curtis. Thus far he had scrupulously avoided answer-
ing such charges personally, he noted with pride, and he pre-
ferred not to break his Silence now. Although Hayes closed
his letter by assuring Sherman that he was delighted with the
"wide and good fame that you more than deserve”, it was clear
he was not about to add to it at the expense of his own jeal-
ously guarded reputation.24

The silver act was easily repassed over the veto, with
Garfield being the sole Ohio Republican voting to sustain the
President. Garfield remarked to his diary that Hayes had not
only been ”unable to influence a Single vote, but lost some
votes in each House. He has pursued a suicidal policy towards
Congress and is almost without a friend."25

The veto served as a fitting capstone to a crowded and
troubled year in office. As the President evaluated the past
year (that seemed "but a day"), he reflected that he had tried
to fulfill his obligations. The leisurely pace at Columbus
had not, however, prepared him for the pressure and pace of

life in washington. "The crowd of business, the urgent

 

24William H. Smith to Hayes, March 4, 1878. Hayes Papers.
Hayes Diary, Dec. 20, 1885 and Hayes to John Sherman, Dec. 21,
1885, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, IV, 256-57,
257.

25Garfield Diary, Feb. 28, 1878. Garfield Papers.

31C

misrepresentations poured into my ears by men who ought to be
trustworthy,” he lamented, had ”led to mistakes -- serious
mistakes -- mainly in appointments. . ." He remained con-
fident, however, that on the whole he had been correct and
took pleasure in his conviction (and it was well founded_ that
he had ”been firm and self-possessed on the most difficult and
trying occasions." Yet, he candidly admitted, he "was not
liked as a President or in Congress.”26

But Hayes was wont to draw solace and strength from op-
position and criticism in a way that other men fed upon praise
and acceptance. His advice to Garfield at the time of the
Credit Mobilier and Salary Grab episodes illustrates his phi-
losophy as an Officeholder. Hayes recalled that he had en-
couraged Garfield with the following words: ”Garfield, cheer
up; don't go around moping; it amuses and encourages your en-
emies, because they see you are annoyed. All men who are in
the lead must be abused, and abuse does a public man good; so
cheer up; you will come out all right.” He claimed that Gar-
field had thanked him for his counsel and encouragement time
and again over the years.27

The President's course had met with some approval, too,
and he placed an inordinate amount of emphasis on the recep-
tion his efforts had engendered, North and South, from those

he considered to be the ”best people.” AS to the majority, he

 

26Hayes Diary, March 1, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diagy
and Letters of Hayes, III, 462-63.

27Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, Oct. 21, 1886.

311

would be satisfied to submit to ”the judgment of the sober
second thought -- of the people.” He hastened to assure his
Texas friend, Guy Bryan, that newspaper rumors to the con-
trary, the Louisiana prosecutions had not altered his ap-
proach to the southern problem in the very least. His letter
continues thusly:

I am confident and my confidence grows stronger,

that I decided wisely at the beginning, and that my

true course is to keep straight on. Good men who are

prudent and thoughtful will do nothing to increase

irritation, and will do all they can to promote har-

mony. Sectionalism and race antagonism are decreas-

ing. Each new outbreak of either is feebler than

its predecessor.28

Despite his emphasis on and the continuing controversy
over civil service reform and the southern policy, Hayes
claimed to believe that monetary questions were now the para-
mount issues. It would be soundness versus inflation for a
time, he predicted, but the party would close ranks and minor
sources of disunity would be overlooked once the GOP had ab-
sorbing issues upon which they agreed, questions which would
set them apart from the Democracy. According to Garfield,
Hayes told him the party ”could be reunited in opposition to

inflation” and asked for his help in the New Hampshire con-

 

28Hayes Diary, March 1, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 463 and E. W. Winkler, ed., ‘The
Bryan-Hayes Correspondence,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly,
XXVII (April, 1924), 311-12.

312

test. Garfield took advantage of the occasion to advise the
President bluntly that if he wished to enjoy ”any influence"
in the party a part of his reform program had to be abandon-
ed. Whereupon Hayes replied by likening ”the Situation with
Lincoln's unpopularity in Congress!” After a dinner party
at Elaine's, at which the administration was presumably 'dis-
sected', Garfield recorded that he was amazed at how thorough-
ly Hayes had ”lost his hold upon his party.”29

For the moment, Hayes and the bulk of his party were at
logger-heads and with the exception of independent or religious
journals, the nation's partisan press was Openly hostile. But
as he noted cooly, it was not remarkable that ”a non-partisan
President or Administration” should find little favor with
congressmen and journalists. However, not only were partisan
Republicans critical, but he was forced to admit that those
Democrats toward whom he once looked for help found ”no in-
terest in heartily supporting an Administration they did not
elect.” Although it was wishful thinking, he maintained that
his party had grown stronger rather than weaker as a result of
his efforts. This was a time of political floundering, ”a
period when old questions are settled, and the new are not
yet brought forward,” he concluded perceptively. ”Extreme
party action,” he declared, ”if continued in such a time would

ruin the Party. Moderation is its only chance. The party

 

29Hayes to William H. Smith, March 6, 1878, in Williams,

ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 466; Garfield Diary,
March 1 and 2, 1878, Garfield Papers.

313
out of power gains by all partisan conduct of those in power."30
Hayes was looking to 1878 and more particularly to 1880. There
was obviously a method and a theory behind what some saw as
political madness or at best naivete.

Not only were Hayes’s powers of political analysis im-
pressive and penetrating, but as Tom Donaldson remarked some
years later, there was as much politics per Square inch in his
makeup as in any man. Murat Halstead, a friend and a percep-
tive observer of Hayes Since their Literary Society days in
Cincinnati, insisted, his facade of indifference toward 'pbli-
ticking' concealed a shrewd and calculating drive for politi-
cal preferment. He let his boosters enjoy an exaggerated eval-
uation of their contributions and along with others probably
accepted his 'luck' as a factor in his success. In reality
little was left to chance and much more was cleverly antici-
pated than met the eye. He remarked to Garfield in 1878, that
the latter's major political error had been to turn down a bid
for the governorship in 1867 (an office which he should yet
seek), intimating all the while, Garfield reports, ”that it
was the surest road to the Presidency.”31 This seems to bear
out Donaldson's and Halstead's claims.

Perhaps by way of reassuring himself, Hayes recorded in

his diary that taken together, his first year's efforts had

 

30Hayes Diary, March 12, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 466-67.

31Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, May 6, 1879 and Garfield
Diary, July 23, 1878. Garfield Papers.

314

”produced results.” To the South, it had brought ”Peace,
safety, order . . . to an extent not known for half a century."
The riots growing out of the great railroad strikes had been
handled with dispatch, without a striker being shot, and his
Mexican policy had been both forceful and fruitful. As to
civil service reform, he had avoided neoptism, a clear departure
from Grantism, while ”machine work . . . in caucuses or elec-
tions” by civil servants had ended and ”Congressional dicta-
tion resisted -- for the most part successfully." He was proud
that in.his first year he had removed fewer people than any
president since J. Q. Adams and that officeholders now enjoy-
ed an appropriate degree of security. He took particular pride
in his judicial appointments and in those diplomatic officers
appointed or retained by his administration. He even took
note of "Bureau officers”, including unhappily, the arch-
spoilsman James Tyner, among those appointees in whom he and
presumably his country and party could take justifiable pride.
Soundness had also been upheld against a rising tide of in-
flationary pressure and his administration was remarkable for
its unusual ”purity and efficiency.32

Hayes hoped, however, that when friends of reform sup-
ported him, they would not be too demanding. By necessity

his cabinet had to contain men without reform backgrounds and

32Hayes Diary, March 12, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 466—67.

315

disappointments were inevitable as traditional practices died
hard. ”With the cheap money craze and the bloody-shirt policy
on my hands at the same time," he recalled in a letter to
Curtis in 1885, ”with the first attempt to rescue the civil
service from party leaders”, the Situation was far different
from that presently faced by Grover Cleveland.33

For various reasons, friends of reform were dissatisfied
with the President's reform efforts. It was precisely Hayes’s
”vague notions of Civil Service Reform, & his wretched prac—
tice upon it,” observed Garfield, that had been the major
cause of his unpopularity. Perhaps he would soon be forced
to state publicly his differences with the President's poli-
cies and practices, he speculated early in March. MeanWhile
he was inclined to agree with those who believed the adminis-
tration had ”been an almost fatal blow to his party." As for
reform achievements, the staunch reformer and admirer of Hayes,
Jacob Cox, also admitted to a deep disappointment in the Pres-
ident. According to Garfield, Cox told him that Hayes "had
utterly failed to accomplish anything in the way of Civil
Service reform -- and that could be defended by any class of
politicians.” The feeling grew stronger, Garfield concluded
ruefully, that Hayes was simply too small to fill the presi-

dential shoes.34

———_ —‘ —

33Hayes to George Curtis, Jan. 5, 1885, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, IV, 182.

34Garfield Diary, March 3 and 4, 1878. Garfield Papers.

316

While others found fault, we find Hayes taking heart from
the results of New Hampshire's March election, which brought
victory to what he called ”the administration ticket”, des-
pite the opposition of one of his bitterest critics, W. E.
Chandler. He was therefore encouraged to be increasingly loyal
to the cause of reform. And yet it was far from pleasant to
see ”friends made sour” when he failed to heed their desires.
What is more, the criticism he had suffered during his first
year had not been exactly ”comforting, to say the least,” he
said. But he found comfort in reading J. Q. Adams's diary,
which he thought demonstrated that James Monroe faced nearly
identical problems during his presidency. He found strength
in his belief, re-enforced by the New Hampshire results, that
”the second thought of the best people” was behind him in his
efforts.35

He continued to trust that the legal action taken against
members of the Louisiana Returning Board would come to a fair
and just conclusion, although he was almost alone in his be-
lief. In the event of a favorable outcome, he must confer
with ”judicious” congressmen to consider how best to carry
out the reform planks of the 1876 platform. He resolved to
call soon for the civil service report Dorman Eaton was pre-
paring and then attempt to press ahead with the work of reform.36

His intentions remained good, but the kind of vigorous,

 

35Hayes Diary, March 13 and 15, 1878, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters_of Hayes, III, 468.

36Hayes Diary, March 16, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 469.

317
systematic and cooperative effort he had in mind would not
come to pass. His diary and letters offer no explanation of
his inaction save his belief that 'the people' were not yet
ready to put the weight of popular opinion behind legislative
reform measures.

When Louisiana's Supreme Court overturned the decisions
against returning board members, Hayes placed the most favor-
able interpretation upon its ruling. Although the decision
was based on a technicality, he chose to view it as the tri-
umph of ”the best public opinion" over the hostility of the
”ruffian class, the implacables (the Bourons among them), and
the press. . .” The better peOple of the South had won out
over the violent element: pacification had begun to bear fruit.
He had something more than mere politics in mind. He was
equally concerned, as well he might be, with the restora-
tion of the nation's economic health and this called for
national harmony, unity and a kind of new era of good feel-
kings, he reflected in his diary. Surely this goal has not
been given sufficient emphasis by those examining the motives
behind his pacification policy.37

Hayes's remarks in his diary concerning his reform
achievements and his intention to step up his efforts reflect-
ed in part the growing reform discontent with his failure to

make a thorough job of it. Hayes received his severest blow

 

37Hayes Diary, March 21, 1878; Hayes to Lucy Hayes,
March 21, 1878 and Hayes Diary, March 22, 1878, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Lgiters of Hayes, III, 470-71.

318

when William Henry Smith tendered his resignation as Collector
at Chicago in protest over the failure of the reform effort to
get off the ground in Sherman's domain. The President was
genuinely upset at this turn of events and after discussing
Smith's grievances with the Secretary, hastened to assure him
that he ”thought” Sherman too, concurred on Smith's principal
complaints. He did not accept the resignation, believing that
after ”full explanation" his friend would change his mind.
Meanwhile, he hoped the affair would not be made public. In
the event Smith remained unsatisfied, it was Hayes's ”earnest
wish" that they confer before Smith made a final decision.38
The President was justifiably disturbed, for if Smith carried
out his intentions, the administration would receive a serious
blow, especially in the eyes of reformers. Powerful journal-
ist allies of Smith and the Western Associated Press would
likely rally to his support and Hayes would lose what little
press backing he enjoyed. Reform leaders like Curtis, who
were already discontented with Hayes, would probably open fire
in earnest. He might well find himself divested of much of
the support of the ‘best people' who meant so much to him.

With Eaton's report expected within the month, Hayes set
down in his diary those reform ideas he wished to emphasize.
First, he hoped ”to seperate office—holding_from_political
management.” This he felt had been for the most part achieved

thanks of his June 22nd order which had been ”very generally

 

38Hayes to William H. Smith, March 27, 1878, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of_Hayes, III, 472.

319
obeyed.” He admitted that some obedience was "nominal rather
than real”, but federal officials usually claimed they obeyed
it and the handful of exceptions were not significant enough
to necessitate action. It was now up to Congress to enact
legislation laying down rules of conduct for office-holders.
Secondly, the ”legitimate and constitutional exercise" of the
Presiden’ts appointive powers must be re-established. Its
usurpation by Congress was for the moment being largely aban-
doned, he contended. Most congressmen had admitted that they
Should not resort to dictation and all but a few had abandoned
attempts to so much as ”influence appointments.” He conceded
that the change had created "irritation and misunderstanding;”
yet it was most advisable to relieve congressmen of the ter-
rific clamor of hordes of office seekers. Executive efforts
were by themselves inadequate, he admitted; effective legis-
lative action was both possible and imperative. Thidrdly,
legislation was needed to provide a System for determing of-
fice seekers' qualifications and on the other hand to detail
a just and proper basis for dismissal of incumbents. Hayes
also wished to see Cabinet members given seats in Congress and
the revival of the Civil Service Commission with an adequate
appropriation. Since Congress had not acted to advance the
desired improvements, he concluded, "the principles avowed"
by the Democratic and Republican conventions could simply not
be given "a fair trial.” Nevertheless, as chief executive,
he considered it to be his ”duty" to apply these principles

insofar as possible, and he repeated his conviction that the

320

majority of the public would sustain him.39

Although Hayes continued to be at odds with the majority
of his party in Congress, he eagerly seized upon whatever seem-
ed to hint at a change of heart toward his administration.
Thus he was pleased when a GOP congressional caucus meeting
early in April declined to adopt Senator Aaron Sargent’s reso-
lution condemning Hayes’s June 22nd order and asking him to
withdraw it. This informal gathering had taken place at the
home of John Sherman, who had agreed to convey its wishes to
Hayes. The participants were supposed to reflect fairly the
various shadings of congressional opinion on reform and this
seems to have been true. A substantial majority argued that
party health and effectiveness demanded the use of patronage
for political purposes and that congressional control of pa-
tronage was logical, while the President, through his cabinet,
Should only arbitrate disputes over appointments. As Cox re-
called, the bulk of the conferees dismissed Hayes's efforts at
”reform as theoretically pretty and even ultimately desirable,
but wholly visionary and impractical.”40

It was now the Senate versus the Republican party on the
issue of senatorial patronage prerogatives, Hayes believed.
If office holders were allowed to manage political affairs,
men would be selected primarily on the basis of political Skill

and although the service would expand, business efficiency

 

39Hayes Diary, March 30 and April 1, 1878, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 473-74, 476.

4OCox, ”The Hayes Administration," pp. 828-29.

321

would decrease. ”The Howe and Sargent system is that Senators
shall make office-holders and that the office-holders shall
make the Senators.” Then betraying the strong vein of polit-
ical expediency that underlay his advocacy of reform, Hayes
asked how many victories the GOP could win with such a philoso-
phy. The public would mount a cry against office-holders and
"the party on the wrong side of the question would go under,"
he cautioned.41

Hayes’s supporters at the aforementioned caucus were of
a similar opinion. According to Cox, ”a very small but deter-
mined minority forced the meeting to face the explicit terms
of the party platform and the pledge of the President's letter
of acceptance as repeated in his first regular message. They
asked which party would likely bear the penalties of hypocrisy
and pharisaism, if, by organized effort, they should succeed
in repudiating these pledges.” The meeting broke up without
taking any formal action and Hayes was Spared the receipt of
an anti-reform ultimatum that would surely have done serious
damage to the reform effort.42

While acknowledging that his 'order' had left the party
discouraged during the past fall’s campaigns, Hayes contended
that the office holders' places in the party organization had
now been taken by men who brought a much needed vitality and

energy with them. The election victories in Rhode Island and

 

41Hayes Diary, April 13, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 477-78.

42Cox, ”The Hayes Administration," p. 829.

322

New Hampshire demonstrated this, he claimed. The people had
long been restless under the lash of office-holders, and com-
plaints against their rule were all too common. Moreover,
”Jefferson and the earlier statesmen” were against it, as were
”Clay and Webster and other Whig leaders,” wrote this latter-
day Whig. He felt certain that Sargent and Howe did not ”re-
present the best sentiment of the party” on this crucial issue
and accepted the view that ninety per cent of Milwaukee's Re-
publicans objected to Howe’s stand. After all, he had received
a petition protesting Howe's Senate assault on his policy en-
dorsed by that city's ”best Republicans.”43

And while Hayes did not excuse the ”mistakes in methods"
or require that his approach be used, he did insist that the
goals remain constant. If a better approach was offered, he
stood ready to adopt it, but the goal he had defined must not
be forsaken. Civil servants must confine themselves to their
assigned duties and not form into ”political machines.” The
president’s power of appointment might be governed by Congress
to promote ”honesty, efficiency, and economy,” but it ”must
not be transferred to the Senate.” This would be unconsti-
tutional and with office-holders dictating to rather than
serving the people, the GOP, ”a party of principle” would be
seriously injured. Shortly after this, during a long talk
with Garfield, Hayes reviewed his appointees, claiming as

Garfield recalled with more than a trace of disbelief, that

V‘

43Hayes Diary, April 13, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diagy
and Lettersyqf Hayes, III, 478.

323

”they would compare favorably with those of any of his prede-
cessors.” The President again reflected his high regard for
the opinion of tthe best people' and added that he also en-
joyed the unanimous support of both the Protestant press and
college presidents.44

Hayes's pacification and civil service policies continued
to meet with more opposition than favor, but he perservered,
confident in the correctness of his views and sure of the
support of a genteel elite with which he had long identified.
He was reminded that one of these gentlefolk, the old Whig
Robert Winthrop, had said in effect, that everyone had a hand
in forming public opinion and so all could, to some extent, be
held accountable for its temper and direction. Perhaps this
view shaped Hayes's concept of his role as a political leader,
for he closed this diary entry with the following suggestive
quotation, apparently from Winthrop: ”Opportunity, powers, and
the employment of them.”45 Does not this provide a key to
understanding Hayes‘s self-image as chief executive in Colum-
bus and washington?

There is every indication that his unusual sense of self
confidence seldom deserted him while in office and then only
briefly. Upon receiving notice of his nomination in 1876

(”the great moment of my life”), he recalled, he had ”felt a

w —_ -

44Hayes Diary, April 13, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayeg, III, 478-79 and Garfield Diary, April
19, 1878. Garfield Papers.

45Hayes Diary, April 21, 1878, in Williams, ed., piggy
and Letters ofyHayes, III, 479. .

324

sense of responsibility -— a sobered feeling”, but this emo-
tion was crowded aside by a more characteristic attitude.
Given sound judgment, ”with a cheerful and elastic temper,
with firmness, with an honest purpose to do right, and with
some experience in affairs," he recorded, he could handle the
presidency well. However, the burdens of the presidency and
perhaps well concealed doubts as to the wisdom of his course
had begun to exact their toll and by mid-April of 1878 one
friend described him as looking weary and worn out.46

If reform and the southern policy brought grief in their
wake, Hayes could take satisfaction from the substantial pro-
gress being made toward resumption. While remarking upon the
success of the Treasury's recent $50,000,000 bond offering, he
noted that the gold premium had nearly disappeared and de facto
resumption by election time would surely be "a feather in our
cap."47 Shortly after taking office, Secretary Sherman had
begun building up the gold reserve, a prerequisite for resump-
tion, by means of loans and the accumulation of surplus rev-
enues, until the Treasury held over $130,000,000 in coin on
hand for resumption purposes at the end of 1878. Ironically,
the very act of creating a large reserve tended to buoy up the
premium on gold, thus making the preconditions for resumption’s

attainment harder to achieve. Although Sherman contributed

 

46Hayes Diary, April 28, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 480 and Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson,

April 18, 1878.

47Hayes Diary, April 14, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 479.

325

significantly to the achievement of resumption, he undertook
no effort to lower the price level, a basic obstacle to suc-
cess. The ratio of American to English prices had been too
high for successful resumption in 1876, but by 1877-78, Ameri-
can prices had fallen sufficiently to have allowed for re-
sumption had there been an inflow rather than a substantial
outflow of capital during those years. Thus in the absence
of a determined policy of deflation, resumption took place as
soon as the conditions for success were present. However, in
all fairness to Sherman, in this time of deflation the Trea-
sury’s resistance to demands to expand the money supply was
comparable, as one scholar points out, "to the pursuit of de-
flationary measures at a time of price Stability. The infla-
tionist movement is ample evidence that this fact was under-
stood at the time,” he concludes.48

When Clarkson Potter introduced the resolution that paved
the way for his committee's investigation of the recent presi-
dential contest, Hayes immediately labeled it the work of
"Tilden Democrats” assisted by Stalwarts "of the Chandler sort."
A study of the northern congressional Democrats of this period ‘
indicates that he was essentially correct in his analysis.
The joint caucus, in which the proposed investigation was de-
bated, witnessed a collision between northerners in search of

issues for the campaigns of 1878 and 1880 and southerners who

 

48James K. Kindahl, ”The Economics of Resumption: The
United States, 1865-1879" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago, 1958), pp. 58-60.

326

were pleased with pacification and did not want it upset. Al-
though their effort failed, Casey Young of Tennessee present-
ed an amendment to the Potter resolution declaring that it
was not their (the southerners) intention to challenge Hayes’s
title to his office.49

Hayes not only dismissed the investigation as a purely
partisan venture that would recoil upon its organizers, but
he also condemned it as ”revolutionary”, designed to overturn
the decision made by the Electoral Commission with congression-
al approval. Moreover, it would upset the business community,
hinder pacification, revive sectionalism and deepen the ”color
line." The whole affair was but a cheap Tammany Hall manuever,
he contended, and would serve only to injure the South where
only ”peace, education, improvements, and immigration” were
desired. The southerners who were supporting the resolution
were Simply obeying a caucus decision, Hayes told Guy Bryan.
He found comfort in his belief that ”the better brethren” of
both parties and every section despiSed it. Characteristically
he placed his faith in southern gentlemen like Lamar, Stephens .
and others, who had prevented their ”section from being swept

into a most dngraceful performance.”50

 

49Hayes Diary, May 14, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters ofyﬁayes, III, 481 and Albert V. House, ”Northern
Congressional Democrats as Defenders of the South During Re-
construction,” Journal of Southern History, VI (Feb., 1940), 69.

50Hayes Diary, May 14, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and

Letters of Ha es, III, 481 and Hayes to Guy Bryan, July 27,
1878, in Winkler, ed., ”Bryan-Hayes Correspondence,” p. 315.

327

Hayes, who shared Garfield’s concern for education, was
concluding about this time that this undertaking constituted
the nation’s ”greatest present . . . concern." What is more,
it offered the most effective antidote for the ”evils now most
dreaded.” The widest and most equitable distribution of pro-
perty was a problem in every civilized nation, one diary en-
try ran, but ”as a rule, where education is most general the
distribution of property is most general.” To increase and
distribute knowledge, he insisted, was to increase and dis-
tribute wealth. An equal opportunity to hold property was
best guaranteed by providing equal educational opportunities.51
Hayes thinking along these lines not only agreed with the
thinking of contemporaries like Garfield, but would find a
good deal of support among today's students of American econ-
omic development as well as from the leaders in the so-called
second era of reconstruction.

In preparing for a talk at a coming visit to Hampton
Institute, Hayes noted that the freedman required ”something
more than the learning of the school house.” To be sure il-
literacy had to be defeated, yet ”industry, self-reliance,
self-control, economy, thrift . . .(were) of still great im-
portance. Progress of the Negroes might best be judged by

their material achievements, he believed.52 He said nothing

 

51Hayes Diary, May 15, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 482.

52Hayes Diary, May 19, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diaryiand
Letters of Hayes, III, 482.

328
of political and social achievements, persuaded perhaps that
these would follow naturally in the wake of their economic
progress. As to economic progress it would best be hastened
by holding to a pacification policy that allayed sectional and
racial animosities while stimulating business recovery and gen-
eral economic growth.

The decision to investigate the presidential contest in
Louisiana and Florida along with the accusations made against
Noyes and Sherman were certainly upsetting to Hayes despite an
outward appearance of indifference. Still he took heart, he
told his absent wife, because Hampton and other southerners
were openly critical of Potter's efforts and because he sensed
that some once hostile Republicans were now ”in a better tem-
per.” Garfield found that his party was indeed beginning to
draw together in the face of the Democratic challenge. Hayes,
too, probably surmised that the investigation would do more to
reunite the party and the administration than anything he was
either willing or able to do. Moreover, signs of southern
goodwill like the letters written by Alexander Stephens and
Postmaster General Key at this time strengthened his belief
that the better element of that section wanted no part of this
affair.53

Despite his continuing conflict with Conkling over the

 

53Hayes Diary, May 19, 1878 and Hayes to Lucy Hayes,
May 20, 1878,.in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,
III, 482, 483; Garfield to Harmon Austin, May 20, 1878.
Garfield Papers. Letterbook. Abshire, "David M. Key,”
pp. 405-06. . . .

329

Custom House appointments, Hayes refused to be drawn into a
personal quarrel with the New York senator. After mention-
ing to James Tanner, the pension lobbyist, and others that
Butler and Conkling were commonly believed to be the insti-
gators of the Potter business, he was asked by Tanner to fur-
nish verification of the charge so that it could be used a-
gainst Conkling. Hayes replied that the rumor might not be
true, but accurate or not, he wanted no part of a personal
assault on the Senator. ”My course is not based on personal
grounds," his letter to Tanner concluded. In an 1889 diary
entry, he recalled that while he had done as much as possible
for reform, for the welfare of the South and for monetary
soundness, he had never forgotten party obligations. "I ap-
pointed Stalwarts and supported Stalwarts whenever it Would
harmonize or strengthen the party -— my own personal prefer-
ences notwithstanding.” He had acted out of the belief that
”all good measures would suffer” were the party defeated in
1880. ”Result, a great victory in 1880” -- a victory for
which he clearly took considerable credit.54

As the 1878 congressional campaigns got underway, Hayes
kept a wary eye on the South. His public pronouncements on
the late war remained conciliatory, too much so in the view

1

of some. At a Newark, Ohio, soldiers reunion, it bothered

Garfield that in his Speech the President mentioned nothing

 

 

u“---‘.“‘--~-“--m-‘ ‘- “_ w “ -'-“.-_". ‘

 

51+Hayes Diary, July 27, 1878; Hayes to James Tanner,
July 27, 1878-and Hayes Diary, Sept. 12, 1889, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 491 and IV, 508.

330

of ”the rightness of our cause.” Garfield sought to correct
this omission by emphasizing it in his short talk to the
veterans. Hayes continued to look for administration gains
in the South and was pleased with Andrew Kellar's progress in
his bid to represent the Memphis district, but regretted some-
what that the candidate had gotten ”mixed up with soft money. . ."
Yet if this Served to divide the South’s solid front this .
rigid opponent of inflation conceded, he thought the GOP might
greet it warmly.55

As the tempor of political activity increased, Hayes once
more assured himself that civil service reform had made some
headway under him. Assessments were no longer permitted even
by anti-reformers. Civil servants had generally stopped inter-
fering ”in party management” and no political duties were re-
quired of any officeholder.' Yet according to a careful study
of the Postoffice Department, the President ”was very naive if
he really believed-that his executive order had changed the
management of the party or had freed officeholders from politi-
cal assessments.” For example, that spring the secretary of
the party’s congreSSional committee, George Gorham, appealed
to all federal officeholders earning over $1000 a year to con-
tribute voluntarily a minimum of 1% of their salary for cam-
paign purposes. The circular Gorham used was no different
from the one used before Hayes undertook his effort to reform

the postal service and end assessments. Of the $106,000 raised

 

—'—- —-.u- -_- -—

55Garfield Diary, July 22, 1878. Garfield Papers. Hayes
to William H. Smith, Aug. 5, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 495.

331

by the committee in 1878, some $93,000 was 'contributed' by
federal employees. Hayes himself, of course, held that 'con-
tributions' were quite proper; only assessments were taboo.
The circulars used in raising money had never spoken of man-
datory assessments. For that matter, the Postoffice Depart-
ment had laid down a rule against assessments, but allowed
voluntary contributions, the year before Hayes entered office.56

During the 1878 campaign Hayes fully supported a heavy
emphasis on the money question, including the stand taken by
Maine’s Republicans who Simply ignored the administration and
campaigned on an thonest moneyt platform. ”Not a liSp or sug-
gestion in favor of Hayes. . .,” Blaine boaSted to William
Chandler. But the President chose to liken the contest to his
1875 campaign, declaring that soundness was ”now the real issue
before the country” and the only really significant question
then facing the nation. But as the Nation had commented early
in July, it appeared from many a Republican platform that the
Civil war was not yet over; that the federal government was
in imminent danger of seizure by a group of revolutionaries,
and ”in order to foil them all other subjects must, and very
properly, be neglected.” By mid-August, however they reported
with satisfaction that Galusha Grow in Pennsylvania and Ben-
jamin Harrison in Indiana were emphasizing economic and finan-

cial questions in their gubernatorial campaigns. From Ohio,

 

56Hayes Diary, Aug. 6, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 495 and Fowler, The Cabinet Politician,

p. 171.

332

the State Republican Chairman reported to Sherman that the
money issue had overshadowed ”all other questions, and.mg§£
be met” -- a view confirmed by other Ohioians.57

During the fall of 1878, the President and a large party
journeyed to the West Coast, returning with the feeling that
the trip had ”strengthened” his administration, although his
reception, Hayes thought, also proved it was "already strong."
A few days later he observed that a year and a half of "abuse”
and ”honest but Severe criticism" had not soured Lucy and him.
He was certain that his regime was stronger than ever before
and that his ”appeal to the people on grounds of a non-partisan
character” had been crowned with success. He may have been
right, but the fact remains that his name was Seldom mentioned
during the campaign and stumpers like Garfield concentrated on
the twin themes of sound money and equality for all citizens
under the law.58

Out on the hustings, Garfield found the ”soldier feeling
much revived,” explaining it as a ”reaction" to Hayes's south-
ern policy. He also observed that Hayes was received without
much enthusiasm by Ohio crowds that Fall. Garfield, on the

other hand, seems to have been met with warmth and enthusiasm

 

57July 31, 1878. William 0. Chandler Papers. Library
of Congress. Microfilm copy, Hayes Memorial Library. Here-
after cited as Chandler Papers. Hayes Diary, Aug. 2,61878,
in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Ha e§, III, 9 ; The
Nation (July 4, 1878), 1 and (Aug. 5, 1878), 88 and James
Robinson to John Sherman, Aug. 10, 1878. Sherman Papers.

58Hayes Diary, Oct. 1 and 5, 1878, in Williams, ed.,

Diayy_§nd Letters of Hayes, III, 500, 501. Garfield Diary,
Aug. 21, 1878. Garfield Papers.

333

and from all parts of Ohio came calls for his services as a
speaker. He carried his campaigning into Maine and Massa-
chusetts as well, dwelling there on the dangers of greenback-
ism and inflation. He was greatly pleased with the campaign
(although not necessarily its outcome) and with the generous
reception he had received. Meanwhile, Ohio's Republicans con-
tinued to doubt Hayes’s Republicanism and the State's party
chairman asked Sherman if the President could not make a bold-
ly partisan exhortation ”declaring that Democratic success
would be a calamity. . .”59

One might suppose that the rosy optimism of Hayes's diary
entries following his western excursion was born of a belief
that all was well in the southern states, too. But in one of
these entries he recorded that South Carolina's Negro congress-
man, Joseph H. Rainey, had reported to him that the employ-
ment of ”intimidation and violence” to deny Carolina Negroes
their political rights was widespread. Hayes responded to
this intelligence by noting that South Carolina's political
grouping remained along the color line. Most white men were
Democrats and most Negroes were Republicans, yet there was
”no political principle in dispute between them." It was
Simply a matter of the former having ”the intelligence, the
property, and the courage which make power” while the bulk of

¥

59Garfield Diary, Aug. 28 and Sept. 17, 1878; James
IRobinson to Garfield, Aug. 12, 1878; Garfield Diary, Sept.
22-10, 1878 and Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, Sept. 2, 1878.
(3arfield Papers. James Robinson to John Sherman, Aug. 1,

1878. Sherman Papers.

334
the latter were ”ignorant, poor, and timid.” In his estima-
tion, the Situation would not improve until the white people
were divided. He mentioned nothing about remedying the Situ-
ation through federal intervention to protect the Negro in his
constitutional rights, but merely turned again to his pet theme
of monetary and fiscal soundness.6O

At about this time, Hayes became concerned that his good
friend William Henry Smith was working and worrying to the
point of a break-down. Hayes’s response to this Situation
would not in itself warrant attention, but that it seems to
reflect not only his sincere concern for a close friend, but
something of his political philosophy as well. "Don't allow
these things (custom's service problems) to worry you. Do
the best you can without too much labor or friction and let
them go at that,” he cautioned. ”Let things work themselves
out. Turn over to others some of your labors,” he admonished
his friend.61 '

Hayes was pleased with the outcome of the October elec-
tions, apparently having feared that they would not ”turn out
so well. . .” Nevertheless, the so-called ”Southern outrages”
of that fall‘s campaign upset him, as well they might, and he.
determined to repeat his long-standing views on the subject

of civil rights in his Second annual message to Congress.

 

6OHayes Diary, Oct. 5, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 501-02.

61Hayes to William H. Smith, Oct. 6, 1878, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Lgtters of Hayes, III, 502.

335

The ”good people,” he said in his diary, insisted on equal
justice for all and an end to the denial of political rights
on a racial basis. Indeed, one such leader, Wade Hampton,
had made a genuine effort against heavy odds to keep his
pledge to protect the Negro in his rights. Hampton's most
recent biographer avers that his ”chief political struggle
during his term as governor of South Carolina was to be with
the Gary (an extreme racist) faction and the Gary point of
view toward the Negro. Ironically enough, however, it has
been Hampton and his fellow 'aristocrats' and ’Bourbans' who
in the North have unjustly borne much of the onus for the ex-
clusion of Negroes from the political life of the state,” this
study continues. It would seem, therefore, that Hayes's trust
in the conservative Democrats of South Carolina was not en-
tirely misplaced, for while they retained power they safe-
guarded a number of the Negro's civil rights despite heavy
opposition.62

Although the November returns gave the Democrats control
of the Senate and an increased majority in the House, dashing
any hopes of Splitting the solid South, Hayes claimed the out-
come was ”very gratifying. . .” New England's support of
monetary Soundness and the decisive defeat of Ben Butler (”the
most dangerous and wicked demagogue we ever had," Hayes thought)
was satisfying. It was his belief that in the northern states,

his party was, with the possible exception of 1866, more

 

62Hayes to William H. Smith, Oct. 7, 1878, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 503 and Jarrell, Wade

Hampton, pp. 120,162.

336

vigorous than in any year since the Civil War. According to
a confidential report by Richard Smith to Sherman, the party
had never been in better shape for a campaign. The agitation
over Hayes‘s policies, Smith claimed, had subsided because he
was being almost entirely ignored, politically speaking. This
left the anti-Hayes Republicans without a target and suffi-
ciently well pacified to close ranks with an eye to victory in
1879 and 1880. Perhaps this was what Hayes had really hoped
for after all -- a resurgance of Republican strength and unity
in the North that would culminate in presidential and congres-
sional victories in 1880.63

Hayes, Sherman and Garfield did not agree in their assess-
ments of the election in the South. While frankly admitting
the emergence of a ”substantially solid" South, Hayes observed
that the Republicans were hurt by poor organization and voter
apathy. He also reiterated his conviction that there could be
no expectation of a favorable outcome in the South until the
whites were divided, for given their poverty, ignorance and
timidity, the Negroes simply could not "stand alone against
the whites.9 Sherman‘s reSponse to the abuse of the Negro was
much harsher than his chief‘s° "The first imperative duty of
the people of this country,” he told a political lieutenant
in Ohio, "is to put down in some decisive way this wholesale

barbarism of a people who are, after all, nothing but pardoned

 

63Hayes Diary, Nov. 6, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 508 and Richard Smith to John Sherman,

Dec.’21, 1878. Sherman Papers.

 

337
rebels" now using force to seize greater political power at
the expense of the constitutionally granted rights of the freed-
men. After hearing Elaine‘s Senate speech reviewing southern
conduct during the recent election, Garfield commented that
Blaine would have done well to contrast southern behavior "with
their professions to Hayes -- that if let alone, the negro.
would be fully protected.f'61Jr One can be certain that many a
Republican, including Hayes himself, was ruefully reflecting
on this very matter.

'The President determined to refer to the election's out-
come in his Annual Message as a judgment against "all revolu-
tionary schemes? and as evidence of support of reform and pro-
gress toward resumption. “It is in one word a verdict against
Butlerism," he said. Although he regretted that the better
people of the southern states had been denied a place in the
Democratic sweep through a lack of organization, he was cer-
tain that "many good and conservative men" had emerged vic-
torious. Moreover, it was likely that most of them in their
minds and opinions opposed Butlerism, which, he repeated with
obvious relish, had just received a sharp condemnation from
the better elements in Massachusetts and the other conserva-
tive northern states. To his way of thinking this meant that
a majority in the next Congress would be in agreement with his

64Hayes Diary, Nov. 6, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary_and
Letters of Hayes, III, 508-09. John Sherman to Warner Bateman,
Nov. 16, 1878. Bateman Papers. Garfield Diary, Dec. 11, 1878.

Garfield Papers.

 

338

views on three key issues.65

About a week later, he appeared less optimistic. Al-
though VPotterismV was dead, he admitted that "Butlerism --
cheap money schemes? were still alive. But the silver issue
and the opposition to banks as creditors would presumably
split the Democrats, he predicted, thus strengthening the GOP.
Nevertheless, he respected the strength of inflationist senti—
ment and speculated that if it could be concentrated in just
one party, that party might temporarily control the national
government. He also seemed disturbed by reports of the whole-
sale denial of the Negro’s political rights in South Carolina
and Louisiana during the election. And this had happened, he
pointed out, in spite of the solemn pledges made in 1877.66

The concept of the southern Negro as a ward of the feder-
al government had in fact been abandoned, although Hayes re-
mained a firm friend of the Negro and continued to call for
the guarantee of his constitution rights. Unfortunately he
and his party lacked the strength in Congress to enforce the
war amendments; their abandonment of the Negro was in conse-
quence far more complete than was intended. Moreover, north-
ern white public opinion was cool if not openly hostile to a
vigorous civil rights policy. Although Hayes's policy aimed

at bringing conservative white southerners into the GOP camp,

 

65Hayes Diary, Nov. 6, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 509.

66Hayes Diary, Nov. 12, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 509-10.

339
he was likewise anxious to increase, if possible, his party's
following among Negroes. He was most certainly sensitive to
and distressed by the abridgment of the freedman’s rights, but
he placed his faith in the division of the whites and in the
educational and economic progress of the black man rather than
federal intervention; for this, he believed, was most likely

to bring the Negro a full partnership in American society.

CHAPTER 8
PRESIDENTIAL POLICIES VINDICATED?

The fifteen months following his second annual message
witnessed a dramatic improvement in Hayes's standing with the
GOP. In his second message, Hayes deplored the violation of
the civil rights amendments during the recent southern con-
gressional contests and called for their strict enforcement
as he would again a year later. Early in 1879, he courageous-

ts solution to the Chinese problem and

ly rejected Congress
moved to resolve it diplomatically. Later that year he waged
a battle with the Democrats over appropriations bills’ riders
designed to emasculate federal election laws. As Hayes de-
terminedly vetoed one rider-encumbered measure after another,
his badly divided party regained its unity and drew closer to
him as his popularity soared. After calling for congressional
enactment of civil service reforms in his third report to Con-
gress, Hayes turned his attention to the Isthmian canal ques-
tion. Throughout these busy months, Garfield proved his met-
tle as House minority leader and presidential advisor, eSpecial-
ly during the crucial struggle over the riders.

The generally optimistic tone of the state of the union

message appeared by and large to have met with a good reception,

340

341
Hayes thought, although he anticipated that the extremists,
both North and South, would greet it with derisive remarks.
When Fernando Wood launched a sharp attack on the President’s
discussion of civil rights violations in the South during the

's defense.

1878 elections, Garfield immediately came to Hayes
This touched off a sharp exchange during which other Republi-
can House members found themselves defending the views of one
they had more often criticized and derided. But the bitter-
ness of the "Stalwarts and irreconcilables" and "the extreme
sectionalismﬁ of the Bourbons would undoubtedly keep him
company until he left office, Hayes recorded with resignation.
He remained sure, nevertheless, that his southern policy was
correct, remarking that if the expected resignation of Attor-
ney-General Devens took place, he would, if Republican Stal-
warts would allow it, move to appoint A. H. H. Stewart to the
post. But, he lamented, "the probability is that the attacks
on such a course by the bitter brethren would damage the good
cause of pacification more than his appointment could benefit
it."1 As it turned out, Devens did not resign, yet it seems
fair to assume that despite disappointments arising out of the
South’s treatment of the Negro, Hayes was by no means prepared
to put aside his determination to allay sectionalism and take

up the bloody shirt. He was unswervingly committed to building

southern Republicanism by appealing to the respectable and

 

1Hayes Diary, Dec. 4, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diagy‘and
Letters of Hayes, III, 513 and Garfield Diary, Dec. 2, 1878.
Garfield Papers. Hayes Diary, Dec. 4, 1878, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 513.

342
conservative South and believed nothing could be done (con-
sistent with his principles) that would win the good will of
extremists of either party..

Garfield continued to View Hayes's hopes for the South
with pessimism. In his opinion (and in that of many a Repub-
lican), southern affairs could not "be adjusted in a day, or
a year" and perhaps he feared, a generation would not suffice.

's efforts in 1877 to make Hayes see

This brings to mind Blaine
that he was indulging in a gross over-simplification of complex,
persistent and deeply rooted problems. Taking his cue from the
President, yet obliquely critical of him too, Garfield advised
his party in the House that they could not "repeat the recent
old issues in the old forms." Personally, he favored a debate
on Vthe election outrages in the South, (but) it should be on
the new basis of affairs -- i.e., after the tender of local
self-government?2

The protracted contest over the confirmation of Merritt
and Burt remained unsettled as the new year opened and per-
haps because of this Hayes again resolved to take up a general
reform effort. Reform could and would be successful only if
congressmen were stripped of their patronage prerogatives, he
insisted in his journal. He was therefore determined to make
civil service reform the motif of a special message to accompany
Dorman Eaton's anticipated report (he had failed to so much as

mention reform in his second message), if and when Merritt and

 

2Garfield to Hayes, Dec. 20, 1878. Hayes Papers. Gar-
field Diary, Dec. 10, 1878. Garfield Papers.

343
Burt won confirmation. Meanwhile, the public too, ”must be
educated to expect and require? its representatives to refrain
from appointing civil servants, while constituents must in
turn expect no such favors from their congressman. Further-
more, congressional abstention must apply to both major and
minor appointments, Hayes believed. The continuing struggle
with Conkling was essentially "a test case," he insisted; thus
it took on a special significance.3 '

In his Recollections, Merritt recalls some enlightening
details concerning his appointment. He had just arrived at
his home in Potsdam, New York, when a telegram recalled him to
New York City to confer on a vital matter with an emissary
from Washington. In New York, John Defrees, a close friend
of Hayes, explained the proposed changes at the Custom House
and offered him the collectorship. Merritt initially reject—
ed the offer, believing the "action at the time . . . very sure
to increase the factional controversy" in the New York GOP.

He also doubted his ability to handle the post given the
"bitter hostility that would be engendered? since Arthur was
chairman of New York City’s Republican Committee and his
friends filled almost every important Custom House post. De-
frees returned to the capital, but Merritt was asked to stay
on in New York until he should receive further word from
Washington. Sherman telegraphed the following day arranging

for a meeting with Merritt at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, at which

 

3Hayes Diary, Dec. 8 and 16, 1878, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 513-14, 514.

344

he agreed that the proposed action was poorly timed, but
pointed out that Hayes ”was stronger than the people sup-
posed”, determined and ”personally” wished Merritt to take
the collectorship. Merritt asked for twenty-four hours to
think over the offer. Sherman also sketched the anticipated
course of action should Merritt refuse and named alternative
candidates for the post.4

Although agreeing that Hayes’s intentions were ill-advised,
Sherman urged Merritt to accept the offer and asked him to ”form-
ulate (his) thinking" on the matter. The Secretary agreed with
Merritt, but declared that Hayes was determined and would not
"listen to . . . his advice.” Should Merritt's views reach
Hayes, another man might be tapped without awaiting Sherman’s
return. Therefore these views were not forwarded to Washington,
and Sherman again pressed Merritt, as a personal favor, to ac-
cept the appointment. Since the city’s press had ”condemned”
the initial action against Arthur and Cornell, Merritt now paid
a late night call on Reid to explain matters to the powerful
editor. He returned the following morning, at Reid‘s request,
and was told that while Reid disapproved of the planned removals,
Merritt would, if he accepted, receive friendly treatment. La—
ter that day Merritt did accept the appointment and then at
once visited Arthur to explain the circumstances and why he had
agreed to the proposed change. He told Arthur that ”a change

had been determined upon and that . . . (his) policy would be

 

* -.-~- —— ‘— _

 

 

 

_——V‘“ _m“--

4Edwin A. Merritt, Recollectiongkj828-1211 (New York,
1911), p. 110. .

345

to continue all that part of the Custom House force which were
performing their duties.” He and Arthur remained friends des-
pite Arthur’s ouster.5

As a personal friend of Arthur, Sherman later explained
to Justin Morrill, he had ”preferred to try to execute the re-
forms proposed with him in office rather than with a stranger”
and Hayes had agreed to this approach. Slowly it became clear,
he continued, that neither the Collector nor the Naval Officer
sympathized with the Jay Commission's advice and were not only
able but meant to block ”their fair execution.”6

By mid-December 1878, it appeared that most senators pre-
ferred confirmation, yet a majority of Conkling's colleagues
either hesitated out of deference to their Chamber’s tradi-
tions or because they feared retribution by the haughty New
Yorker. But by January Merritt was reporting to Sherman that
there was general support for confirmation at Albany and among
the New York congressional delegation; furthermore, Cornell now
wished to withdraw from the contest. As the struggle dragged
on, Hayes's judgment of his protagonist became increasingly
severe. Conkling was similar to Ben Butler, but "more power-
ful because he . . . (was) vindictive and not restrained by
conscience,” he concluded. In keeping with his belief that a
legislative career was poor preparation for an executive, the
President noted that ”the most noticeable weakness of Congressmen
5Merritt, Recollections, pp. 110-11.

6John Sherman to Justin Morrill, Dec. 14, 1878. Sherman
Papers. Letterbook.

346
is their timidity. They fear the use to be made of their
‘record.’ They are afraid of making enemies. They do not vote
according to their convictions from fear of consequences.”7
Throughout this scornful critique runs the implication that
where congressmen were timid and fearful, Hayes was courageous
and forthright. It is likewise apparent from this and other
recorded opinions, that he considered the executive office to
be the preeminent branch of government and one whose occupants
were on the whole superior to legislators who labored in a pol-
luted and debilitating atmosphere that left them tainted and
sadly lacking in moral courage.

Despite the disappointments, defeats and dissension that
had plagued him throughout 1878, Hayes’s Christmas diary entry
was characteristically cheerful. ”We are prosperous; our main
ideaS-more acceptable than ever,” he wrote. It was true that
the economy was recovering, but it can be doubted that his
”main ideas” had gained much support among the politicians.
Perhaps however, he was referring to the party's rank and file,
and who is to say, keeping 1880 in mind, that his estimate was
wholly erroneous. Resumption seemed a certainty, he continued
with understandable pride, but when he declared that his "South-
ern policy (was) safely vindicated” one finds it difficult to
grasp his meaning. Neither the results of the 1878 contests

nor the violence and intimidation that accompanied them in some

 

7Edwin Merritt to John Sherman, Jan. 11, 1879. Sherman
Papers. Hayes Diary, Dec. 16, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of_Hayes, III, 514.

347

areas of the South justified this statement. The GOP lost
six seats in the House and one in the Senate, while the party's
southern branch was gravely weakened. In 1876, the party had
carried 125 of the 294 southern counties with black majori-
ties; in 1878 they took but 62.8

The northern Republican press freely charged southern
Democrats with the use of murder, fraud and a variety of crim-
inal acts in gaining their victory. Most assuredly, there was
a dramatic falling off in the number of Republican ballots cast
in 1878 as compared with earlier elections. The remnant of the
hoped for partnerShip between conservative white southerners
and the GOP was all but demolished. There had been, accord—
ing to one eminent scholar,

. . . a sudden wave of agrarian radicalism in 1878

that swept the South out of control of conservative

leaders and into temporary alliance with the West.

Southern farmers of the Jacksonian tradition who

had submitted to the leadership of the Whig—Democrats

only in the emergency of Redemption now grew restive

and unhappy. The millenium of subsidies promised by

the Redeemers failed to materialize, and the depres-

sion deepened.
Meanwhile, Republican attacks on Hayes's southern policy be-
came increasingly numerous and bitter following the November
elections. Even Hayes was quoted as confessing to an inter-
viewer from the Washington Naigonal Republican that he was

”reluctantly forced to admit that the experiment was a fail-

ure. The first election of importance held Since it was

 

 

8Hayes Diary, Dec. 25, 1878, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 516 and DeSantis, ”President Hayes
Southern Policy,” p. 492.

348

attempted has proved that fair elections with free suffrage
for every voter in the South are an impossibility under the
existing condition of things.” Nevertheless, he did not blame
the Bourbon leaders in whom he had placed his faith, but south-
ern whites as a whole and especially the ”ruffian” element.9

In his second annual message, as in private, Hayes did
not Speak as if he believed that his ”experiment” had been a
”failure.” He was forced to admit, however, that what had
happened in certain southern congressional districts and gen-
erally throughout South Carolina and Louisiana forced one to
conclude that the Negro’s constitutional rights had been
”overridden and their participation in the elections not per-
mitted to be either general or free.” Therefore, Hayes not
only called upon Congress to investigate the election of its
members, but repeated his determination, as announced in his
first message, to uphold the civil rights amendments. He de-
clared that ”whatever authority rests with me to this end (to
inquire into and punish violations of federal election laws)
I shall not hesitate to put forth. . ."10

However, he concluded his discussion of the topic on a
positive and hopeful note. He claimed that while total unity

and an era of good feelings were not yet at hand, the tide was

 

. 9C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New Southyp187131915
(Baton Rouge, 1951), p. 47 and Natignal Republican, Nov. ' ‘
23, 1878, quoted in Hirshon, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt,

pp. 49-50.

1ORichardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 494.

349
certainly running in that direction and with growing strength.
Public opinion would, despite political partisanship and state
and sectional loyalities, demand that throughout the United
States citizenship should ”mean one and the same thing and
carry with them unchallenged security and respect."11 Per-
haps in Hayes's mind, both the conduct of the recent campaign
and its outcome seemed a qualified -- a relative -- success --
better than some had predicted, but not as bad as others had
foreseen. Moreover, his interpretation of the northern con-
test could be viewed as a vindication of his policy. He also
seemed quite content to serve out his term without doing any
more than consolidating what he believed were his gains. One
gets the impression that he viewed his work as essentially com-
pleted and that nothing new was either contemplated or, for
the moment, needed.

The last round of the New York contest began early in
1879. Under pressure from William Henry Smith and using in-
formation gathered by Smith’s friends, Sherman effectively
answered Arthur's protest against his dismissal. In so doing,
Sherman successfully conveyed the impression that he had been
wholly committed to the cause of reform from the very outset.
Meanwhile, Hayes was looking to one of his favorite author-
ities, James Madison, to find support for his case against
senatorial dictation. Merritt and Burt were finally approved

by the Senate, but only after a sharp debate and only with the

 

’11Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 495.

350

aid of Democratic votes. Hayes chose to emphasize the thirteen
Republicans who had voted with him this time and the several
others who were reputed to be favorably diSposed toward his
appointees. He viewed the victory as signaling a significant
shift in senatorial opinion in his favor while dealing a tell-
ing blow to Conkling.12

He hastened to congratulate and assure Merritt (and Burt,
too), that the Custom House was to be run ”on strictly governed
business principles” as set forth in the Civil Service Com-
mission’s recommendations. In the matter of removals and ap-
pointments, Merritt was to be ”perfectly independent of mere
influence. Neither my recommendation, nor that of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, nor the recommendations of any Member of
Congress, or other influential person, should be Specially re-
garded,” Hayes cautioned the new Collector. In filling spe-
cial positions, Merritt was expected to exercise a personal
preference, but this was to be strictly limited. Moreover,
none were to be ousted simply because of their close ties to
Arthur nor appointed because they were administration men.
In a letter to Burt, Hayes asked him to confer with Merritt
and Graham and formulate rules, consistent with the recommen-
dations of Grant's Civil Service Commission, for the conduct

of their duties.13

 

12Hayes Diary, Jan. 22, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 518-19 and Andrew Kellar to William H.
Smith, Feb. 8, 1879. Smith Papers. Hayes Diary, Feb. 4, 1879,
in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters g§_Hayes, III, 519.

13Hayes to Edwin Merritt, Feb. 4, 1879 and Hayes to Silas
Burt, Feb. 6, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of

Hayes, III, 520, 520-21.

351

Hayes seemingly was as anxious to have the Custom House
administered in an efficient and businesslike manner as he
was to have sound civil service rules introduced. For that
matter, to him and others, reform was fundamentally a means
of achieving such efficiency and soundness. Moreover, it was
Hayes's fond hOpe that the experiment in New York City would
convince all but implacable machine men of the efficacy of
reform. After all, as he had told the Senate, this office
collected over two-thirds of all customs revenues. But he
believed that no sweeping or enduring reforms were possible
until the public ceased demanding favors from their represent—
atives. In order to establish truly sweeping and enduring re-
forms legislative action was imperative, but this in turn
would not be forthcoming while congressmen busied themselves
winning appointments for their constituents. He hastened to
add that it was not for him to dictate ”rules for the person-
al conduct” of congressmen in such matters and whether volun-
teered or solicited, he wuld ”certainly give due weight to
information received from” members of Congress. It was in the
public's interest to free their representatives from ”all
responsibility for appointments” and this depended mainly on
the citizenry itself. His diary reflections on reform con-

tinues:

Let government appointments be wholly separated from
congressional influence and control except as pro-
vided for in the Constitution and all needed reforms
of the service will speedily and surely follow. Im-
pressed with the vital importance of good adminis-
tration in all departments of government, I must do
the best I can unaided by public opinion, and opposed

352

in and out of Congress by a large part of the most
powerful men in my party.

This was to remain Hayes’s view of his position on re-
form throughout the remainder of his term in Office. And it
helps to explain why he made but little effort to secure re-
form legislation and confined himself instead to executive
communications, 'sound' appointments and to encouraging and
supporting his cabinet members in the good work. It EEE the
best he gggld do, but he hoped that his efforts would win con—
verts among the politicians and the public in order that a
more comprehensive and permanent program might be forthcoming.

Reformers however, had been led to expect much more in
the way of concrete achievements. "In direct proportion to
the clearness and completeness of Mr. Hayes’s avowals as to
his reform purposes,” wrote Edward Cary in the International
Review, "have been the disappointment and discouragement which
have been produced by his entire neglect to carry them out."
The President had been weak, irresolute and demonstrated an
”utter incapacity to understand his opportunities and duties.”
Of his cabinet members, only Schurz had a clear understanding
or a strong committment to methodical reform. Only one rule
had been announced thus far -— the order of June 22nd -- which
Cary dismissed as ”worthless” as a practical measure. Not

only had the President made enduring contributions to reform,

 

14Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,

VII, 511 and Hayes Diary, Feb. 14, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 521.

353

Cary insisted, but he had actually hindered the cause by mere-
ly appearing to understand reform needs and by failing to fight
for reform legislation.15

Hayes took steps to answer such severe critics when he
approved a set of modified rules worked out by Merritt, Burt
and several other officers in New York. Then a body of rules
by which appointments, promotions and dismissals would be
governed at the New York post office were approved by the Pres-
ident, and promulgated by Postmaster-General Key on May 1.
These regulations were sent out to postmasters in large cities
across the country for their adoption, although subject to
amendments they believed necessary.16

Nevertheless, Hayes’s reform efforts had fallen short of
the comprehensive and radical program of the purists. He
believed, however, that he had made a sincere and significant
attempt and had done his best despite obstructionism, indif-
ference, and outright hostility. And while his reforms lack-
ed permanance and might not outlive his administration, it is
doubtful that Congress could have been moved to pass a civil
service act during his term in office. Thus he confined him-
self, perhaps realistically, to executive action and here his
achievements were sometimes modestly successful, although more
often unencouraging. A careful study of the New York Customs

House makes the point that there was no means of implementing

 

15Edward Cary, ”The Administration and Civil Service Re-
form,” International Review, VI (March, 1879), 228-BO.

16Huth, ”President Rutherford B. Hayes,” pp. 228-29.

354

the rules and ”no central authority responsible for their ex-
ecution. As a result, very little was accomplished on a prac-
tical level outside New York and possibly Boston.” What is
more, Sherman disapproved of Merritt’s and Burt’s rules, al-
though he did enforce them.17

When in reSponse to the outcry over the considerable in-
flux of coolies, the House and Senate enacted Chinese exclu-
sion legislation, Hayes sympathized with Congress's purpose,
for he too, was anxious to stem this ”labor invasion" It could
not be properly called immigration since no women or children
came, he reasoned, and considering the American record of
treatment of such ”weak races” as the Negro and the Indian, the
outlook appeared discouraging. He predicted oppression of the
Chinese, which in turn would ”make hoodlum or vagabonds of
their oppressors.” This immigration should be discouraged, he
declared, but the Chinese exclusion act appeared incompatible
with the provisions of the Burlingame Treaty and if so, it must
bevetoed.18

As the bill awaited final action by the House, the Pres-
ident concluded that it indeed violated major provisions of a
treaty we had sought and which the country, including the West
coast, had received with enthusiasm. The treaty had been ad-

vantageous to us, and we now had an important economic and

‘- m--~‘--.-

 

~— ———— _~—

17William Hartman, ”Politics and the Patronage: The New
York Custom House, 1852-1902” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

Columbia University, 1952), pp. 225, 222-23.

18Hayes Diary, Feb. 20, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters_of Hayes, III, 522.

355

religious stake in faithfully upholding it. We were not jus-
tified in unilaterally abrogating it, especially since we had
been aware of an incipient immigration problem when we pressed
the agreement on the Chinese. ”If we assume it to have been a
mistaken policy,” Hayes reasoned, ”it was our policy” from be-
ginning to end. ‘In his mind it was clear that our good reputa-
tion, the tgolden’rulet and the protection of Chinese citizens
here and Americans in China, demanded he veto the bill. At the
same time, Hayes recognized and appreciated the feelings of
west coast inhabitants. He was ready to move with dispatch to
alleviate their problem while maintaining the national faith
and, he hoped, ”without any real or substantial departure from”
America’s established attitude toward immigration.19

When Hayes called him to the White House to discuss the
bill, Garfield advised a veto and came away certain that the
President would so act. On the following day, Garfield voted
in the minority to table the bill, while remarking in his diary
that opposition to the measure was becoming very powerful. When
it came, Hayes's veto met with general approval save on the West
coast where it was, in his own words, ”bitterly denounced” and
he was even burned in effigy. Perhaps somewhat taken aback by
the intensity of the reaction, he confided to his journal that
a body of unassimilable, wage depressing, exclusively male im-
migrants "must be hateful.” The situation demanded correction,

for, he concluded, these people could not ”safely be admitted

 

19Hayes Diary, Feb. 23, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 523-24.

 

356
into the bosom of our American society." But it had to be
solved by following proper diplomatic procedures and he has-

tened to take steps in this direction.20

As his administration entered its third year, Hayes
found himself engaged in a sharp and protracted struggle with
the Danocratic majority in Congress. The Forty-fifth Congress
had failed to pass the army'appropriations bill and the legis-
lative, executive and judicial appropriations bill because the
Republican Senate had rejected House riders attached to these

‘s test

measures. The riders would have repealed the juror
oath and the federal election law sanctioning the army's use

to maintain order at the polls in national elections. Hayes
immediately responded to this challenge by calling the Forty-
sixth Congress into special session on March 18 to finish its
work. Thanks to the 1878 elections, the Democrats now con-
trolled both chambers of Congress, a situation they had not
enjoyed since James Buchanan’s first Congress. Hayes's con-
versations with Greenbackers in the new Congress had led him

to believe they might be counted upon to unite with the Repub-
licans against the Democratic riders. But Garfield dismissed
this hope as simply ”another case of the President’s optimism."21

2Gearrield Diary, Feb. 23 and 24, 1879. Garfield Papers.
Hayes Diary, Feb. 28, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters

of Hayes, III, 526.
21Garfield Diary, Feb. 23, 1879. Garfield Papers.

357
Thus far, the Republican Senate had frustrated the Demo-
cratic effort to exclude the federal government from the polls;
now only Hayes stood between them and success. But from the
outset he was a determined opponent, almost welcoming what he
considered would be a difficult and perhaps prolonged struggle
and certain that a popular majority would stand with him against

” He would resist the Democracy

”this revolutionary course. . .
tenanciously, not only because ”the purity, the honesty, the
sanctity of the ballot-box” was imperilled, but above all be-
cause it was a revolutionary attempt through legislative coer-
cion to rob the executive of his independence and a fundament-
al constitutional prerogative by forcing him to approve a

1

measure he opposed in order to Secure necessary supplies'.

He would have no part in establishing so 'dangerous'

a pre-
cedent and would support unswervingly the independence of the
three branches of government.22

He was not, however, an implacable opponent of any and
all modification of federal election laws. He favored their
improvement, e.g., an abandonment of test oaths and the use
of the army at the polls, but he refused to approve such ef-
forts in the face of what he termed ”unlawful duress and
menace. . .” Thus if a repeal of the test oaths were attach-

ed to an appropriation measure, he would veto the bill, since

he was convinced this was simply a bid to ”breakdown the

 

22Hayes Diary, March 9 and 18, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 528-29, 529.

358

functions of the Executive by coercion.”23

At House Republican caucuses, Garfield, who had been the
”party’s unanimous choice for Speaker, declared that it would
be their strategy ”to make no trades or combinations with any
party or faction or accept any official favors at the hands of
this Congress but to act together as an independent united
fighting minority remembering that the stake" they fought for
was 1880. He advised his colleagues to abstain from intro-
ducing any legislation and oppose all measures except those
germane to appropriations. His strategy won unanimous ap-
proval.221L

For their part, the Democrats sought and secured a three
day adjournment to give their House and Senate steering com-
mittees time to settle upon a strategy. They were "much di-
vided in sentiment,” GOP Representative Joseph Hawley advised
his wife. The radicals wished to transform the Special ses-
sion into a regular sitting of Congress, but their more con-
servative brethren wanted to deal only with appropriations and
the repeal of election laws, he continued. The re-election of
Randall as Speaker was a victory for the conservatives, yet
the ”extremists” were determined and self-confident and Hawley
fretted that a long general session would seriously upset the

business community.25 As it turned out, the conservative view

 

23Hayes Diary, March 18 and 21, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 530, 531.

24Garfield Diary, March 17, 1879. Garfield Papers.

25March'21,-1879. Joseph Hawley Papers. Library of
Congress. Hereafter cited as Hawley Papers.

359
prevailed among the Democrats, although the more extreme ele-
ment continued to be heard from.

As the Democrats readied themselves for a showdown, Hayes
appeared ready to approve a repeal of the juror‘s test oath
and the law authorizing the army's use at the polls, while ad-
mitting that the statute authorizing the appointment of mar-
shals to keep the peace at polling places might also ”require
extensive modification.” Nonetheless, such peace officers --
disinterested men -- were nearly indispensable, he insisted.
Since the states kept the peace during state elections, was
it not logical that the federal government should function
similarly at the polls during national elections? Moreover,
it had been amply demonstrated, as recently as the fall of
1878, ”that the protection and conduct of national elections
cannot safely be left to the States,” he wrote. Therefore,
he could not, with a clear conscience, approve the present
election laws' repeal until Congress provided a substitute of
equal effectiveness. As Hayes saw it, the proposed legisla-
tion admitted ”the right, the duty, and the necessity for
national supervision” by the federal government, while deny-
ing the means to fulfill this obligation. As for the claim
that while the states might employ both civil and military
force at the polls, while the federal government might only
supervise and observe, this was simply unacceptable and un-

constitutional, Hayes observed.26

 

26Hayes Diary, March 22, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diar
and Letters of Hayes, III, 531-32.

 

L /—

360

The law authorizing the use of federal forces to pre-
serve the sanctity of national elections had been passed in
response to widespread frauds in New York in 1868. The 1878
contests, Hayes pointed out, demonstrated that ”state regula-
tions . . . (were) not to be relied on to secure free and fair
elections” in certain states. He was convinced, in fact, that
had these elections been properly regulated, the measures he
objected to would not now command a majority in the House.
Had there been ”free and fair elections" in every state over
the past several years, he contended, the Republicans would
now control both House and Senate. He insisted that the Con-
stitution conferred ”supreme authority on the National Govern-
ment as to the regulation of the national congressional elec-
tions” and to deny this was clearly unconstitutional. Again
recent experience argued for the improvement of election laws
and against simply substituting state police power for federal
police power as the security force during national elections,
Hayes concluded late in March.27

Hayes continued to think through the contest with Con—
gress in the lengthiest diary entries of his presidency. It
was as if he were trying to provide what the congressional de-
bates generally failed to provide, i.e., a thorough review of
the questions in dispute. His diary analyses, in which he
returned time and again to the judgments noted above, showed

him to be a stout and uncompromising nationalist in the

 

27Hayes Diary, March 23 and 25, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
jDiaE[and Letters of Hayes, III, 533-34, 535-36.

361

Websterian tradition, as well as a jealous and determined
guardian of executive prerogatives. It was ”another revolu-
tionary movement” much like the Potter hearings, he assured
his friend Smith, however, were the Democrats not embarrassed
by the extreme positions taken earlier by some of their fire-
brandSSpokesmen, they would abandon the fight immediately.
Instead, as he correctly predicted, there would be a prolong-
ed struggle. ”Of course, I don't care to use the military,”
he confided to Smith. ”But the state rights heresy that the
Nation can not enact safeguards for national elections, and
the still more dangerous doctrine that a bare majority” of the
House and Senate could take over ”all the powers” of the ex-
ecutive branch was utterly unacceptable.28 '

When a rider repealing the authority to use the army as
a peacekeeper during elections was attached to the army ap-
propriations bill, the rider itself did not disturb Hayes,
for the army would not and could not be so employed. But this
measure denied the federal government either the military 23
the civil power to maintain order at the polls during national

!

elections, while it left unimpaired the states powers. Such

blatant discrimination was wrong, Hayes insisted, yet he would

approve unhesitatingly legislation ”preventing any soldiers

whether state or national, from interfering in the elections. . .”

But as the case stood, the contest could not and should not

“ ----..- ~‘--- -'-'-"I—‘- _~_ — w“_—_—-‘“‘-“-‘M‘“- ‘~- “

28Hayes Diary, March 27, 1879 and Hayes to William H.
Smith, March 27, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary aag Letter§_qf
Hayes, III, 556-38, 538-39.

 

n/

362

be settled by compromise for it was a revolutionary proceed-
ing. And while he stood ready ”at the proper time and in the
proper way” to correct the election laws' displeasing features,
the Democracy's efforts so far were not deserving of consid-
eration. He contended that it was ”the true rule of legisla-
tion . . . that each measure should stand or fall on its own
merits” and he reiterated his conviction that the army bill
rider was clearly unconstitutional.29

Garfield entered the 'riders' contest with what Anson G.
McCook told a White House gathering he considered ”the best
speech he had ever listened to"; Hayes added that ”all praised
it." Hawley leaves us a vivid description of the dramatic
scene in the House chamber during Garfield's effort. He had,
he wrote,

never seen deeper excitement among Republicans than

yesterday, under Garfield’s speech. The galleries

were crowded, the floor was full. Secretary Evarts

and many senators were on the floor. On one side

Garfield, ten feet off sat Gen. Sherman, on the

other, thirty feet off sat Gen. Joe Johnston,

Sherman‘s ablest antagonist. In his invalid wheel—

ed chair, occasionally nervously rolling himself

about the area in front of the Speaker, was Aleck

Stephens, Vice President of the Confederacy. Near

them was Reagan, Postmaster General of the Con-

federacy among forty or fifty ex-confederate of-

ficers.
Garfield's presentation ”was powerful -— immensely so," Haw-
ley concluded and his party was ”at fever heat.” Among the

many congratulatory letters Garfield received was one sug-

gesting that the presidential nomination might be his in 1880

 

A '---’-- -“-. '----W-mmm---'D--

29Hayes Diary, March 28 and 29, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary_and_Ley§ers of_Hayes, III, 539, 540-41.

363

if his affairs were properly managed. After lavishly praising
him, McCook warned him against an attempt to ”’bamboozle'” him
into entering the Ohio gubernatorial race.30

Hayes was pleased to find his party moving to his support
in what he considered to be a critical struggle with the op-
position. And when Evarts dismissed the whole affair as mere-
ly an attempt to create issues for 1880 and recommended that
Hayes steer clear of it, the President was obviously surprised.
"He doesn't seem to see that it is merely a new form of the
.old conflict between ultra state rights and the national doc-
trines,” he remarked to his diary. Later in the same entry,
he elaborated upon this analysis of the contest. The contest
was in no way ”partisan” nor was it a "question of race or
color. The old question, State’s rights always . . . (seemed)
closely relaed to sectional and race conflicts, but this . . .
(was) chiefly as a reminiscence. No present interest of a
Sectional character . . . (was) involved,” Hayes insisted. He
reiterated this conviction in a later diary entry.31

As the army bill moved through the Senate, Hayes deter-~
mined to veto it without hesitation. But before sending up
his rejection, he conferred fully with Garfield and gave him
an advance copy of the veto message so that he might prepare

a defense of it before the House. No sooner was this done

30Hayes Diary, March 31, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letteya of Hayes, III, 542-43 and Joseph Hawley to
Henrietta Hawley, March.30, 1879. Anson McCook to Garfield,
n. d. Garfield Papers.

31Hayes Diary, March 31 and April 7, 1879, in Williams,
ed., Diary and_Letters_pf Hayeg, III, 543, 546.

364
then he was busy preparing another veto, this in answer to
the civil appropriation bill. In both veto messages, he re-
produced the substance of his diary objections to the Demo-
cratic riders. Not only did Hayes’s cabinet approve of the
reasoning behind his messages, but he noted with satisfaction
that the unfriendly party members who pretended he might not

veto the bill were now few in number ”

-- only the implacable --
the patronage brokers.” The President's veto promised to scan
lidify the party in his own state and render the term 'Stal-
wart' meaningless, for even the sharpest critics of pacifica-
tion would be ”appeased”, Ohio's Republican State chairman
assured Garfield.32

Hayes believed it likely that the Democrats would try to
pass a separate measure barring the use of soldiers at the
polls. If such a bill conceded the right to employ civilian
peace officers at polling places and the principle of ”ggpa-
gayg bills for general legislation,” he thought he might Sign
it. But the Democrats soon passed a new and separate bill
barring military interference at elections. "They call them
war measures,” he confided to his diary, "and think that as

the war is ended these laws Should now be mustered out.” The

Democracy had failed to be either ”conservative or . . .

 

32Hayes to William H. Smith, April 25, 1879, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 548 and Garfield Diary,
April 26, 1879. Garfield Papers...Richardson, ed., Messa es
and Papers of the Presidents, VII, 523-32, 532-36; Hayes
Diary, April 27 and 28, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 549-50, 550 and James Robinson to
Garfield, ApriI 26,.1879. Garfield Papers.

365

politically wise.” Then warming to his subject, he became a
soldier once more, Saying, ”but we don't muster out the flag
nor the powers of the law and of the Constitution which en-
abled us to gain victory. We don't muster in again the evils
that caused the war.” And in a final burst of wartime spirit,
he observed, ”Besides, it is for the victors to say what shall
remain, not for the vanquished.”33

As the protracted contest Waxed and waned, Garfield drew
noticeably closer to Hayes. After spending an hour with the
President discussing the veto for the military interference
bill, he wrote as follows to his wife: ”I think I have never
had so much intellectual and personal influence over him as
now. He is fully with his party. . .” And Hayes, while re-
flecting on the speeches made during the debate on this bill,
declared that of all the speakers, Garfield had made the best
presentation of the case.34

Tom Donaldson reports Hayes’s reaction to the Democratic
effort thusly: ”Now it is time to call a halt and (striking
his hand on the table) this thing of States Rights has gone
far enough.'” As Garfield remarked to his diary, Hayes was
presented with ”a gruand opportunity to make a plea for nation-
alism against extreme states rights.” And this is precisely
what he had in mind. When the President's unyielding nation-

alism united with his determined opposition to the Democratic

 

33Hayes Diary, May 1 and 11, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayas, III, 550, 551.

34Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, May 10, 1879. Garfield
Papers. Memoirsof Thomas Donaldson, May 6; 7; 8 and 9, 1879.

366

riders, it is not surprising that GOP congressmen, many of
whom had been heretofore cool if not hostile toward Hayes,
suddenly underwent a change of heart. Not only had he ”so-
lidified” the GOP, wrote Smith, but he had also brought back
some disSidents who had formerly ”voted with the Democrats.”35

Immediately after the veto was read, House Republicans.
tried to pass a riderless army bill and fell short of a ma-
jority by only eight votes. This was significant, Garfield
noted, because up until then the Democrats had claimed they
had been voting for appropriations while the Republicans had
been opposing them. The Democrats were left in an angry mood,
Garfield explained to his wife. ”Now," he wrote, "we have all
voted for appropriations pure & simple -- and they have voted
’no‘!" The second veto had ”staggered” the Democrats, he ob-

served and for days they were ”wholly at sea."36

About this time, Hayes began to take note of the sizeable
emigration of Negroes from the South, sommenting that its re-
sult would be ”altogether favorable.” He reasoned that it
'would tend to ”force the better class of Southern people to
suppress the violence of the ruffian class, and to protect
colored people in their rights.” The emigrants Should be en-
couraged to fan out over the Northwest, find permanent employ-

ment and buy homes, he urged. When a young Negro educator

 

35Memoirsof Thomas Donaldson, May 6; 7; 8 and 9, 1879 and
Garfield Diary, May 10, 1879. Garfield Papers. William H.
Smith to Hayes, May 10, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and

”getters of Hayes, III, 552 n.

36Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, May 12; 15 and 17, 1879.
Garfield Papers.

367
from Florida called at the White House, Hayes questioned him
closely, asking whether there had been evidence of an exodus
of Florida blacks. No, his visitor replied, whereupon the
President advised them to stay in the South, for although he
recognized they were ”assaulted and bulldozed” this would ul-
timately be corrected by ”time and the North. . ." The immi-
grant Negroes had suffered greatly, Hayes admitted, but the
planters had been awakened to the crucial importance of the

Negro'

s labor; and this was a necessary lesson which would
benefit the black race in years to come. He concluded by
assuring his youthful visitor of his deep personal concern
for the Negro and of his intention to help them attain pros-
perity.37

Early in June, Hayes learned that the Joint Democratic
Caucus Committee had developed an approach to the deadlocked
situation that would allow the Democracy to moderate their
position without losing face. He speculated that if they
meant to gain their point only by withholding a part of the
needed appropriations, he doubted that he could justify a veto
of their measures. If however, their aim was to restrict ex-
ecutive authority by prohibitions, he would again resort to
a veto. Then as the Democratic plan unfolded, he found fault

with themfor trying to ”creep out” of their difficulties ”in-

stead of squarely backing out of their awkward position or

 

37Hayes Diary, May 25, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diagy and
Letters of Hayes, III, 553-54. Memoirsof Thomas Donaldson,

July 23, 1879.

368

manfully sticking” it out. Since their attempt to repeal the
laws they disliked had been frustrated, they would therefore
try to make their enforcement impossible and unlawful. This
represented yet another attempt to coerce the president,
thought Hayes. At this point, with the embarrassment of many
more moderate Democrats in mind, Garfield asked Hayes to look
into the possibility of a compromise solution, but Hayes re-
mained deadset against any concessions on his part.38

It is not surprising that the responsibilities of the
presidency had by now become a heavy and vexing burden which
Hayes was ever more anxious to toss off. He and Lucy talked
of their ”laborious, anxious, slavish life. It has many at-
tractions and enjoyments, but she agrees so heartily with me
as I say: ”'Well, I am heartily tired of this life of bondage,
responsibility, and toil. I wish it was at an end! I re-
joice that it is to last only a little more than a year and
a half longer.'” It was one of their ”greatest comforts” that
he had made the single term pledge in his 'Letter'. That had
been ”a lucky thing,” he confessed to his journal, as well as
a "valuable . . . precedent for a reform."39

Ohio politics again intruded upon the scene when the
Democrats chose Thomas Ewing as their candidate for governor.

This move, Hayes Speculated, might ”prove disastrous to the

 

38Hayes Diary, June 2 and 4, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary_and Letters oleayes, III, 555, 556 and MemOInsof Thomas
Donaldson, May 29, 1879. —

39Hayes Diary, June 6, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 557.

369

Republicans” for Ewing was a strong and exceptionally well
equipped candidate, who would try to win the united support
of the Democrats and the Greenbackers, and together they out-
numbered the Republicans. It was imperative, Hayes advised,
for the GOP to counter attack with a vigorous campaign em-
phasizing the record of Ohio's Democratic legislature, finan-
cial issues and the behavior of the Democratic Congress. The
latter was a most significant issue, he insisted, for it rep-
resented a ”revival of the nullification and secession doc-
trines of Calhoun” and would offer ample grounds for censure

'sound')

and attack. Ewing’s financial views (which were not
would, however, probably be the paramount issue -- ”a real
living issue,” he reflected privately. It was claimed that
the Ohio contest would have an important bearing on the presi-
dential competition and that a Democratic victory would not
only boost Senator Thurman‘s chances for a nomination, but
would make it probable that his party would carry Ohio in
1880.40

In his continuing struggle with congressional Democrats,
Hayes confessed that the judicial appropriations bill which
they presented to him in June, caused him some indecision.
It left the executive without the means of enforcing the

election laws. This alone would not justify a veto, he be-

lieved, but if its intent was nullification without repeal,

 

4OHayes Diary, June 7, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 557-58 and Richard Smith to John Sherman,

Dec. 21, 1878. Sherman Papers.

 

370

a veto might be necessary, even though the law would have to
be applied only on a very limited scale during the coming
fiscal year. For again Congress would be attempting to coerce
the executive and to deny that the election laws were consti-
tutional and necessary. He ultimately vetoed the measure.41

As the struggle drew to a close, Congress presented Hayes
with a legislative appropriations bill and an army appropria-
tions measure. He could approve the former although it was
poorly written and the appropriations were insufficient, but
this, he concluded, did not justify a veto. As for the army
bill, it contained a clause prohibiting its use as ”a polige
fgyga” during elections; moreover it enjoyed bi-partisan sup-
port both in and out of Washington. Garfield, who had been
carrying a heavy load as House minority leader, reported that
Conkling and several of his colleagues who preferred ”a breach
between the President and his party rather than harmony” were
trying to persuade House Republicans to reject the bill. But
as Garfield explained it, they believed by supporting the bill
they ”surrendered nothing” for all were certain that Hayes was
”bound by his previous veto messages to Sign it.” At this
point, Garfield acted decisively to thwart Senate attempts to
lead party members in the House astray by preventing the con-
vening of a joint caucus and by pointing out in a Speech that
his party might ”safely” follow him in supporting the measure.

The bill thereupon passed through the House easily, opposed

 

 

41Hayes Diary, June 11, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diar
and Letters of Hayas, III, 559.

371

by only a handful of Republicans along with some eighteen
prominent Democrats who considered it ”a surrender by their
party,” Garfield reported.42

Hayes felt that his position on the use of the army at
the polls, as expounded in his veto of the army bill, had now
been generally accepted by both parties. The army was to be
committed only if the law could not be enforced solely by
civilian authorities. This had been his original position and
had been the law of the land when the special session was con-
vened and neither had changed in the interim. Hayes, there-
fore, accepted the legislative bill and the army bill that
was enacted with no truly restrictive rider. He vetoed the
judicial appropriations bill because it appeared that the
Democrats again sought to nullify the election laws by pre-
venting their enforcement. Once again it raised the question
of legislative dictation and the objectionable state rights
doctrine, Hayes argued, while admitting "the right and duty
of national supervision by leaving untouched the supervisors.”
This veto, Hayes noted, seemed ”to be well received by party
friends” while the Democrats were "thrown . . . into the
greatest confusion.”43

Garfield confirms that the Democrats were enraged and

threatening to adjourn, in which case he understood Hayes

 

42Hayes Diary, June 20, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 560-61 and Garfield to Lucretia

Garfield, June 12,‘1879. Garfield Papers.

43Hayes Diary, June 20 and 25, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 561-62, 562.

372

would immediately call a second special session together.
Were they to adjourn for a second time, Hayes would not again
recall Congress, but simply ”shut up the courts" according to
Garfield, who admitted to his wife that he was a loss to know
what would happen, although the struggle’s end was near at
hand. Hayes argued that the whole movement appeared about to
break up and he was elated. For his part, Garfield believed
the army bill's approval represented a major personal victory
for him over the implacables who wished to continue ”a harm-
ful warfare which would have implied our willingness to use
the Army as an ordinary instrument for running elections."
Although he had run ”some risk in assuming it,” he observed,
he felt his views would eventually meet with general approval.44

The contest now rapidly drew to a close. An attempt to
adjourn the House without making judicial appropriations was
defeated handily by the GOP with the help of seventeen Demo-
crats and the entire Greenback contingent. Meanwhile, in the
Senate, Allan Thurman had done an about face and was now vig-
orously urging appropriations with Q2 riders attached. After
several uproductive caucuses, and just as Hayes had antici-
pated, a judicial bill Without funds for marshals or deputy
marshals and without provisions that had prompted his earlier
veto, was passed. And although its riders repealed the test-'
oath and the non-partisan jury statues, Hayes signed it into law.45

_¥

41+Garfield To Lucretia Garfield, June 22, 1879 and Gar-
field Diary, June 23, 1879. Garfield Papers.

45Hayes Diary, June 25, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 562.

373
But the struggle had not quite ended, for a seperate

marshals appropriation bill with the objectionable provi-
sions of the earlier judicial bill was soon on Hayes's desk.
The effect of these provisions ”would be a denial to the
United States of the right to execute its laws,” wrote Hayes
in vetoing the measure. By vetoing this bill, he in effect
chose to leave the U. S. marshals and their deputies unpro-
vided for rather than to surrender the principles he had
maintained throughout four previous vetoes. Congress then
adjourned and the struggle was for the time being at an end.
It was generally believed that Hayes intended to reconvene
Congress again, just as soon as this special session adjourn-
ed. Garfield tried to convince him that another session would
be inadvisable and the President adopted his advice. "The
Democrats completely abandoned the main ground which they
first took,” Garfield boasted to an intimate friend, ”and the
most sensible among them do not hesitate to admit, privately,
that it was wholly untenable.” Like Hayes, he believed the
session had welded the party ”more than anything since 1868”
and this brought the promise of victory in 1880.46

The contest left Hayes ”experiencing one of the 'ups' of
his political life,” he remarked, for never, not even in the
weeks following his nomination, had he received such fulsome
praise and support. Jacob Comly, for example, believed the

r -1-— Jun '

46Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the_Presidents,
VII, 546 and Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, June 30, 1879.
Garfield Papers. Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, July 7, 1879,
in Hinsdale, ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, p. 429.

374

party was once more safely reunited. The pacification policy
had been necessary, he claimed, in order to satisfy those who
had been critical of military reconstruction, for otherwise
they would have deserted the party. Now all were as "stalwart
as Old Zach of Michigan,” he declared. The press, too, had be-
come very flattering toward Hayes and while he thought this
phenomenon would be short-lived, he relished it, believing as
he did that he had earned the peoples' faith and trust. He
had maintained his views against both supporters and opponents
in his party, he told his diary. The former had wanted him to
reject the repeal of the test oaths, the non-partisan juries
provision and the prohibition of the army's use as a police
force during elections. He had rejected their advice, but
felt nevertheless, that he had clearly ”vindicated the power
of the National Government over congressional elections and
the separate authority of the Executive. . .” AS a conse-
quence the President had won ”a clear-cut victory” and estab-
lished ”a poWerful precedent against congressional encroach-
ment on the executive power by means of appropriation riders,”
Leonard White has concluded.47

Hayes, according to White, had defended his position

successfully and maintained the viability of the veto. The

 

47Hayes Diary, July 3, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 564 and James Comly to Captain
June 9, 1879. Comly Papers. Letterbook. Hayes Diary, July
3, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III,

564 and Leonard D. White, The Re ublican Era: A Stud in Admin-
istrative History, 1869-1901 (New York, 1958),p 38.

375

primary interest of the Democrats had not been to restrict
presidential power, but to emasculate federal election laws.
The use of riders was an expedient made necessary because they
lacked the votes needed to pass a bill amending those laws
over a veto. Their party, in fact, had long honored the con-
cept of a strong and independent executive, as Hayes had point-
ed out by his reference to Andrew Jackson during the contest.48
When Ohioians went to the polls in October to select a
governor and a legislature, they would also decide whether
Thurman would remain in the Senate or be replaced by a Repub-
lican. Reflecting upon this contest, Hayes admitted that while
the Democrats possessed good men of ability these responsible
leaders were ”powerless in the presence of the bad and reck-
less elements of their party” or were ”at least unable to con-
trol the general course of their party.” By way of contrast,
similar elements within the GOP were forced to ”take their
direction from the better elements of their party,” he con-
tended. As it turned out, Charles Foster, not Thurman, took
the governorship after a campaign in which the Republicans
emphasized monetary soundness and the supremacy of the nation-
al government. The Republican victory in the gubernatorial
contest and a majority of legislative races represented a
severe defeat for ”Inflation and States rights,” the Presi-
dent declared happily. Ohio had vindicated his position on

the silver bill and his stand in the recently completed

 

48White, The Republican Era, p. 38.

376
struggle with Congress.49

Garfield was also pleased with the campaign and its out-

come. After tirelessly stumping in Ohio for his friend Foster
and Republican assembly candidates, he proudly told his wife
of the recognition his efforts had won for him. ”The Presi-
dent told:me,” he wrote, ”that he had heard several prominent
people say that my Speeches are making a remarkable impression
on the public -- much greater than any others‘ in the field."
He had nearly recovered the stature he had lost in 1873-74
and once again higher political honors were in the offing.
The only Ohio Republican who appeared less than completely
pleased was the governor-elect, who had contributed $18,000
to the campaign while the officeholders (perhaps taking ad-
vantage of Hayes's torder’) had contributed but $3,000, al-
though a second appeal had been made.50

The outcome of the November elections had given his party
"victory . . . complete everywhere in the North except in New
York,” Hayes recorded jubiliantly. He blamed the apparent de-
feat in New York (the final tabulation gave the GOP four out
of seven state posts) on a poor turnout because of ill-feeling
toward Conkling and his nominee for governor, Alonzo Cornell.

Hayes remarked that personally he had done his best ”to save

 

49Hayes Diary, Oct. 14 and 15, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 574-75, 575.

50Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, Oct. 8, 1879. Garfield
Papers. Charles Foster to Sidney Warner, Nov. 22 and Dec. 16,
1879. Charles Foster Papers. Western Reserve Historical

Society.

377

the cause by urging friends to lay aside their opposition.”
But as it was, the Republican Showing in the North was uni-
formly better than it had been in 1878, except for New York.
And there, although Cornell took the governorship, the problem
Hayes insisted, was ”too much Roscoe Conkling and his machine
politics.” The administration might have prevented Cornell's
nomination, but wisely chose to give the machine a free hand.
Conkling could not, therefore, complain of administration
harassment as he had in the case of the Custom House changes.
Some very good men, independent of Conkling, had been nomi-
nated, William Henry Smith was told, and as friends of the
administration had exercised great caution, there were left
”no wounds to heal.”51

The choice of Cornell to head the ticket had left some
New York reform leaders like Jay deeply troubled. The admin-
istration could have prevented a nomination that was an "in-
sult and outrage” he complained to Schurz -- one that left
”the better class” of Republicans bitterly disappointed and
disgusted. The appeals from Washington for all to unite be-
hind the ticket led Jay and his colleagues to wonder if the
reform pledges were now to be abandoned since the adminis-
tration had been so silent on the subject. Schurz, however,
hastened to assure him that Hayes had not abandoned the good

work, and an apparently molified Jay quick by passed the word

51Hayes Diary, Nov. 5, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Haygg, III, 576-77 and George Tichenor to William

H. Smith: Sept. 6, 1879. Smith Papers.

 

378

along to his associates. For his part, Hayes interpreted
Cornell's victory as a gift from those Tammany men who had
bolted their party and refused to support Tilden's nominees.
As a result, Hayes anticipated (and with obvious relish) Til-
den's defeat in the 1880 Democratic National Convention or
later in the presidential race.52

In his third annual message, referring to recent state

's de-

elections, Hayes once again repeated his administration
termination to protect the political rights of all citizens
everywhere in the nation. Garfield believed that the Negroes
now ”had their fate in their own hands” and once they became
”self-supporting” they would eventually win "a permanent hold
in the domain of citizenship.” He cited their role in Vir-
ginia’s senatorial contest, where they held the balance of
power thanks to a divided white vote, although he regretted
their sending the readjuster William Mahone to Washington.

Yet like Hayes, and most of his northern brethren, he had con-
cluded some time earlier that ”the betterment of the negro
race must necessarily be the work of time.” His party was
neither abandoning the Negro nor the civil rights amendments,
but they were abandoning the notion that the freedman could

be quickly and simply drawn into the mainstream of American

life. Thus in his message, Hayes called upon Congress to

strengthen federal election laws and urged state authorities

 

 

_——-'r---W=__ ——

52John Jay to Carl Schurz, Oct. 17 and Nov. 7, 1879.
Schurz Papers. Hayes Diary, Nov. 5, 1879, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 577.

379
to cooperate in the effort.53
Civil service reform had gone unmentioned in 1878, but
now the President returned to the subject. He recalled his
promise to submit Dorman Eaton's report as soon as it was
feasible, but it had since been deemed most desirable to in-
clude in it an analysis of England’s reform program. Eaton
had made such a study at Hayes's request and now his com-
prehensive report, the completion of which had been delayed

2

by Congress S failure to make any appropriation for the Civil

’8 work, would soon be put in their hands.

Service Commission
He commended Eaton's review of the British experience to Con-
gress and assured his listeners that his own "views . . . con-
cerning the defects and abuses in” the civil service remained
unchanged; if anything, he approached the task of reform with
a heightened ”sense of duty. . .” He thereupon launched into
a lengthy plea for congressional action on behalf of reform,
thus giving this subject a preeminent place in his message.54
As he entered the new year,(1879) the question of an
Isthmian canal provided Hayes with an opportunity to exhibit
again his powerfully nationalistic outlook. From the outset,
he was determined that the United States should control the

canal whether it was built in Panama or Nicaraugua. It was

the ”most important” question before the Senate, he insisted

r

53Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 560- 61 and Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, Dec. 20,1879, in
Hinsdale, ed., Garfield- Hinsdale CorreSpondence, pp. 430- 31.

54Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 561-66.

380
to his diary, at a time when Ferdinand DeLesseps and French
interests seemed destined to control the projected Panama
canal. The moment had arrived ”when the American doctrine on
the subject ought to be explicitly stated," Hayes continued,

and he essayed to do just that.

In my judgment (he wrote) the United States regard
the commercial communication, whether by railroad

or canal, between the two oceans across the Isthmus
at any of the points which have been suggested, as
essential to their safety and prOSperity. They wish
it to be understood by all concerned that the United
States will not consent that any European power Shall
control the railroad or canal across the Isthmus of
Central America. With due regard to the rights and
wishes of our sister republics in the Isthmus, the
United States will insist that this passageway shall
always remain under American control. Whoever invests
capital in the contemplated work should do it with a
distinct understanding that the United States expects
and intends to control the canal in conformity with
its own interests.55

Nor was the Monroe Doctrine the sole basis for the U. S.

’s economic

interest. It was vitally important to the nation
well-being and was ”essential for national defense” as well,
Hayes argued in a later diary entry. So strongly did he feel
about the matter, that he did not wait for his cabinet officers’
opinions on the question, but simply presented the above views
in cabinet session. If the canal was foreign controlled, Amer-
ica's ”commanding and natural position among the nations would
be endangered,” for, he insisted, ”. . . our interest in the

subject was greater than that of all European nations put to-

gether.” He intended to make his views known in a Special

 

55Hayes Diary, Feb. 7, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters_9f Hayes, III, 586.

381

message to Congress, so that all interested parties might
know the American position. As for his cabinet, it was near-
ly unanimous in its support of his position; and while Evarts
did not strongly favor an immediate response, he preferred a
response soon, Hayes observed. About a week later, the Pres-
ident reiterated his belief that a European controlled canal
was simply out of the question. ”Either an American canal or
no canal must be our motto,” he wrote in his diary.56

In one of his few references to civil service reform that
winter, he referred to his attempt to reduce "nepotism and fa-
voritism” in the federal government and the Army. As he ex-
plained to his wife's cousin, he did not suppose he could put
an end to these abusive practices in four short years, but he
intended that his ”example . . . (should) be a protest against
it.” Meanwhile, he was not himself deterred from favoring
friends with federal appointments and was quite unhappy when
0. P. Morton’s son was rejected through the operation of sen-
atorial courtesy. He believed this concept had been greatly
weakened during his administration, but feared that it was
about to be revived and was at a loss as to how he might ef-
fectively counter the trend. What is more the President's
party seemed more interested in selecting his successor than

in reform.57

 

56Hayes Diary, Feb. 11 and 20, 1880, in Williams, ed.,
Dyaryaand Letters of Hayes, III, 587-88, 589.

57Hayes to Mrs. , Feb. 5, 1880 and Hayes Diary,
Feb. 7, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,

III, 584-85, 585-86.

CHAPTER 9
THE STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION

In spite of a defeat at the hands of the Democrats in
state and national contests in 1878 and the party’s return to
what was apparently to be a narrower geographical base, a sharp
and exciting struggle for the GOP presidential nomination had
already begun. Grant, Blaine and Sherman emerged as the lead—
ing contenders, with William Windom, George F. Edmunds and
Elihu Washburne the lesser figures in the field. Garfield was
cast in the role of the not—so-dark horse; he was also a key

t

figure in Sherman s bid for the prize.

's support

As the Grant boom gained momentum and Blaine
grew, John Sherman realized that his position as Secretary of
the Treasury had its disadvantages. ”I soon found that the
fact that I held an office which compelled me to express my
opinions was a drawback rather than a benefit, and, while I
had the natural ambition to attain such a distinction, I was
handicapped by my official position,” he observed in his Reg-
ollections. ”As a presidential candidate,” one scholar has
remarked, ”Sherman acted on the assumption that he who had
done most to disappoint the inflationists nevertheless could

be nominated and elected, for the beneficiaries of sound

382

383

currency should see to that.”1

Indeed, as a presidential hopeful, the Secretary did
carry a heavy handicap into the race, one that was not light-
ened as the contest grew more heated. Ohio was the late
nineteenth century’s unrivalled producer of presidential can-
didates and successful dark horses, two of whom Sherman him-
self helped put in the White House. Once his intentions be-
came known, he immediately became fair game for rivals and
critics who were aided and encouraged by the fact that he was
unable to put together an effective organization for promotion
and self-defense. He had begun his political career ”as a
compromise candidate,” writes his most discerning biographer,
”indebted to party factionalism for his place in office; and
thereafter the intricate manuevering which makes a state legis-
lature choose such a man for Senator, left a record of mis-
understandings which lessened the probability of hearty state-
wide support for the presidential nomination." Moreover, his
political lieutenants, competent as they were at keeping him
in the Senate, simply were not up to handling a presidential
candidacy.2

Sherman’s prospects for success were limited for other
reasons as well. Perhaps most damaging of all was the grow-

ing conviction that Sherman could be neither nominated nor

 

 

1John Sherman, Recollections of Fort Years in the House,
Senate and Cabinet: An Autobiography (2 vols., Chicago, 1895),
II,605 and Nichols, ”John Sherman,” p. 188.

2Nichols, ”John Sherman," p. 188.

384

elected because his own state would not give him its united
support. Eastern businessmen upon whom he counted heavily
appear to have arrived at this conclusion well before the con-
vention met. His intimate connection with Hayes's adminis-
tration and its unpopular policies also worked to his disad-
vantage. What is more, Sherman, unlike Hayes and Garfield,
had not gone before the peOple as a candidate for nearly two
decades; his ”real electorate was the relatively small group
in the Ohio legislature.” And although he had campaigned
regularly on behalf of others, he ”communicated no colorful
personality, no magnetic current. Rather, he remained aloof;
and in some subtile way men felt, and resented, that assump-
tion of superiority in which he privately took refuge."3

Sherman had gained a reputation for being cold, myster-
ious and cynical. He was tagged ”The Icicle of the Treasury”
or ”The Ohio Icicle” and even those who were aware of his very
human qualities knew he carried a heavy burden into his cam-
paign. Immediately after leaving office, Hayes would write
to his former Treasury chief as follows: ”I read the parting
between you and the treasury people. It was an affecting and
interesting occasion. Your remarks were extremely felicitious.
The notion that you are too cold in temperment will not out-

last many such scenes.”4 Unfortunately for the Secretary,

the ”notion” persisted.

 

3Nichols, ”John Sherman,” p. 189.

4Nichols, "John Sherman,” pp. 189-90 and Hayes to Sherman,
March 6, 1880. Sherman Papers.

385

Sherman's bid for the presidential nomination had begun
in earnest by late 1879 and as he was careful to explain in
his memoirs, he ”severed all connections between . . . (his)
duties in the treasury and the necessary correspondence caused
by . . . being named as a candidate for President.”5 He there-
upon implies that he used his patronage power to further him-
self politically, but then hastens to deny this implicitly..
Yet Sherman was neither so innocent as he would have his read-
ers believe, nor so great a blackguard as his harshest crit-
ics insisted. Certainly no clear-cup separation of official
duties and private affairs existed, yet neither was the pub-
lic interest seriously or consistently subordinated to his
political ambitions. Nevertheless, there is evidence that
Sherman used his treasury people for political work and that
his appointments reflect a conscious effort to place in key
positions those who would act as his political agents and
supporters.

Quite unintentionally, Hayes had cleared the way for a
succession struggle with his letter of acceptance —- that is,
if he was taken at his word. At the end of an extended para-
graph on civil service reform, he had appended this self-deny-
ing pledge:

The declaration of principles by the Cincinnati con-

vention makes no announcement in favor of a single

Presidential term. I do not assume to add to that

declaration; but believing that the restoration of

the civil service to the system established by
Washington and followed by the early Presidents can ,

 

5Sherman, Recollegyions, II, 607.

386

be best accomplished by an Executive who is under

no temptation to use the patronage of his office to

promote his own re-election, I desire to perform

what I regard as a duty in now stating my inflexible

purpose, if elected, not to be a candidate for elec-

tion to a second term.
This declaration reflected Hayes‘s moralistic bent, a dread of
scandal and his distaste for the time-honored congressional en-
croachments upon presidential independence in the matter of ex-
ecutive appointments. But it also revealed something of his
attitude toward public life -- his view of politics as an avo-
cation rather than the voation it was for men like Garfield
and Sherman. Yet it likewise showed him to be an astute stu-
dent of American politics, who sensed that such a pledge would
not only make his nomination more platable to party profession-
als, but would also aid him in his bid for the presidency.

Although he said nothing about the single term in his in-
augural address, his intimates could hardly have failed to
comprehend that this would be but a four year performance. In
a conversation With Tom Donaldson only seven months after en-
tering office, Hayes ”talked of the time when he should go out
of office, retire, and the pursuits he Should follow. He had
no earthly use for politics after his term was done,” Donald-
son reports. This is not to claim that Hayes would not harbor
some hope of a popular movement on his behalf in 1880. Such
a demonstration by ’the peoplet would have been pleasant, per-

haps made all the more so by a properly appreciative declina-

tion on his part. But surely he did not covet a second term

6Williams, Life of Hayes, I, 461.

387
and he ﬂag genuinely eager to be out of it, just as he had
been while a member of the House years earlier. It may well
be that ”his strong streak of ambition had been satisfied the
moment he attained office. He had really wanted not so much
to be President as to have beeg President,” observes his most
recent biographer.7 Obviously, Hayes did not relish politi-
cal life as did the many professionals who surrounded him and
this fact was not lost upon the well-informed whether or not
they were personally intimate with the President. Given this
state of affairs, the way was cleared at an unusually early
point for those bent upon winning party favor in 1880.

Hayes had hoped to avoid the embarrassments that might
arise should a cabinet member become a presidential candidate,
by carefully excluding (he hoped) the likely contenders from
his official family. Nevertheless, its leading figure, John
Sherman, began nursing presidential hopes well before the ad-
ministration was a year and a half old -- as early as the fall
of 1878. However, he carefully discouraged the use of his
name, praiSed Grant and argued that so far he seemed to be
the party‘s choice. From his New York vantage point, White-
law Reid already saw Garfield as Ohio’s strongest presidential
prospect; but others saw a spontaneous Sherman movement rapid-
ly gaining strength in Ohio as the year drew to a close. Mean-
while, both Sherman and Garfield were coming under pressure to
bid for the governorship, a post which Hayes believed an I

7Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, Oct. 15, 1877 and Barnard,
Rutherford B. Hayes, p. 488.

388
important way station along the road to the White House. And
as I have noted, Hayes was reported to have been ”cordially
in favor” of Garfield's nomination, apparently for this rea-
son.8

Although neither he nor any of the other aspirants could
be absolutely certain that Hayes would be a mere bystander in
1880, Sherman's intimacy with the President must have convinced
him that the way would not be blocked by that gentleman. Thus
assured, Sherman initiated a program designed to bring him
within reach of his goal during his first year in office.
Thereafter, his role in the currency struggle, his appoint-
ments, his part in the New York Custom House fight, his con-
ciliatory attitude toward other contenders for the nomination
and his attempts to manage the Ohio GOP, all betray a hope he
would harbor for over a decade.

Even the most cursory survey of Sherman’s initial bid
for the nomination must shed light on more than the man and
his methods. It necessarily involves and reveals to some de-
gree something of Hayes and his administration, the lively
and nationally significant Ohio political scene, the mounting
struggle between the leading contenders for party favor and
the man who emerges with the prize. James A. Garfield re-

luctantly, yet perhaps unavoidably, became entagled in the

 

8John Sherman to O. H. Booth, Oct. 18, 1878. Sherman
IPapers. Letterbook. Whitelaw Reid to Garfield to James Comly,
:Nov; 19, 1878. Comly Papers. Henry Moulton to John Sherman,
jDec. 16, 1878. Sherman Papers. William Farrar to Garfield,
IDec. 31, 1878. Garfield Papers. Cincinnati Daily Gazette,
:Dec. 26, 1878, p. 1 and Dec. 27, 1878, p. 1.

389
:

twires laid on Sherman's behalf; and he and his friends figures
so importantly in the Sherman effort, that to exclude them from
an account of it would serve to distort the picture seriously.
Moreover, as the events of the months preceding the convention
unfolded, they would seem to confirm the view that Garfield's
personal and political history during the final year and a half
of his life had indeed been predetermined by more than two de-
cades of state and national political associations and activity.
John Sherman was not the only prominent Ohioian who har-
bored ambitions for political preferment during the Hayes years.
By early December 1879, Garfield was making it clear that he
badly wanted the senatorship and was not disposed to depend
solely upon the benevolence of Sherman and his friends to se-

!

cure it. One receives some insight into Sherman s political

ts brother-

methods from the advice of Henry Moulton, Sherman
in-law and political aide, to Garfield as to how to build leg-
islative support in a senatorial contest. It was, as Garfield
told one of his supporters, ”not to work directly upon a mem-
ber -- but to get his constituents to work on him, so that he
will feel that the sentiment of his county requires him to act."
Using this technique, Garfield was assured, Sherman often won .
the support of legislators personally opposed to his election.
Garfield apparently took the counsel to heart, for in a letter
to his close friend and ardent supporter, Charles Henry, he
wrote thus: ”We should have as many discreet men as possible,

from all parts of the State, who are willing to do so, go to

Columbus soon after the meeting of the Legislature, and bring

390

the pressure of public opinion steadily and discreetly to bear
upon the members.” Although he contemplated his departure from
the House ”with some sadness,” he confessed, he believed his
health would break if he did not ”escape the responsibilities
and labor of leadership” by entering the Senate. Nevertheless,
he found newspaper speculation about him and the senatorship
to be ”premature and embarrassing” to him and his friends.9

In a second letter to Henry a few days later, Garfield
revealed the reciprocity Sherman expected for his sacrifice
in the matter of the Senate seat.

John Sherman (he wrote) is exceedingly anxious that

I shall come out in a public letter favoring his

candidacy for the Presidency. I have said to his

friends that I am willing to aid in my proper way in

giving him the Ohio delegation in the National Con-

vention, but I do not think it wise to make any pub-

lic declaration on the subject until after the Sena-
torial election. He is very anxious and his friends

are pressing.

Perhaps Sherman and his friends, some of whom did not regard
Garfield with much favor, were fearful that once elected he
might pursue an independent course, supporting the Secretary
only half-heartedly or worse still, move into the camp of his
old friend, James G. Blaine. They understood Garfield enjoy-
ed widespread support for the Senate and that his election
was nearly certain. At the same time, he appeared eager to
succeed, if possible, without Sherman’s help or the appear-

ance of ‘a deal'; and he hoped to win the senatorship while

avoiding the type of management that had become Sherman’s

 

9Garfield to Charles Henry, Nov. 24 and Dec. 20, 1879.
IIenry Papers. -

391
political trade mark. Thus while he and his friends were not

idle, he was determined to stay away from Columbus while the

contest was on, in spite of advice to the contrary.10

But as Garfield's election became more certain, pressure
from the Sherman camp intensified. A Sherman confidant, Warner
Bateman, told the Secretary that ”Garfield might as well commit
himself at once. . . (James W.) Robinson (Republican State
Committee Chairman) had better press him when he reaches
Washington to take his stand.” A few days earlier, in a re-
port to Sherman, Bateman provided an example of just what he
meant.

On Tuesday evening (he wrote) I called on Garfield,
as I informed you I would, and had a pleasant and
frank conversation with him. He told me of his con-
versation with you, and of his intention to support
you, said it was painful to go against Blaine, who
had been his associate and intimate friend for so
many years, but gave very earnest reasons why he
could not support him, and explained the grounds,
both personal and public, why he should support
(you). I urged him to take his stand publicly and
at once in your behalf, saying that in that case he
would doubtless be accepted by your friends as their
pioneer and leader, which would in my judgment add
largely to his personal advantage in public life.

But in Spite of this prodding and the uncomfortable position

in which he found himself, Garfield stood his ground and

postponed a public endorsement.11

1OGarfield to Charles Henry, Dec. 8, 1879. Henry Papers.
William Bickham to John Sherman, Dec. 8, 1879 and Warner
Bateman to John Sherman, Dec. 12, 1879. Sherman Papers. James
Robinson to Garfield, Dec. 29, 1879 and Thomas Nichol to Gar-
field, Dec. 31, 1879. Garfield Papers.

11Warner Bateman to John Sherman, Dec. 12 and 8, 1879.
Bateman Papers. Letterbook.

392

Although the relationship between Garfield, the Western
Reserve, the senatorship and Sherman's ambitions was clear
enough to any Ohio voter of this era, it is less obvious some
ninety years later. Garfield was the leading, but not the
sole candidate for the Senate, and an easy and decisive ver-
dict in his favor was imperative were Sherman to go to Chicago
as his state‘s favorite son. Bateman put it this way: ”I have
a letter today from Henry S. Sherman, who says, among other
things, that the friends of Garfield in the Reserve, will be
disposed to hold you (Sherman) responsible for the vote of
your friends elsewhere on the Senatorship. This is a point
of some delicacy that may be increased by the action of (Ed-
win) Cowles (editor-publisher of the Cleveland_Leage£) and
(John T.) MaCk (owner-editor of the Sandusky Register). The
first gentleman-was cool and the latter consistently hostile
toward Sherman and his candidacy. ”If Garfield is put through
as Senator without bitter controverSey,” W. D. Bickham advised
Bateman, ”He can and will, I think, help us to secure the Re-
serve -- for the Reserve is where the danger lies.” Henry
Sherman had made the following observations in a letter to

Bickham:

Uncle John would probably be the choice of the North-
ern Ohio delegation now, but if his friends and the

‘ anti-Grant men in Cincinnati & Southern Ohio -- Hal-
stead & others -- are going to make a fight on the
Senatorship and succeed in defeating or greatly im-
perilling the chances of General Garfield, it will
be pretty hard to get a Sherman delegate appointed to
the Natl convention from the Reserve. Sherman ought

393
to give this some consideration.12
A few days later, he saw fit to modify his initial estimate.
He wrote then as follows:

I am glad to know I overestimated the feeling against
Garfield, for I think (& I have been assured by a
friend of Garfield) that if he is elected he will head
the Northern Ohio delegation in the Convention for
Sherman. At all events some of his strongest & most
influential friends will work hard for Sherman. . .

If Garfield comes out strongly for Sherman he can
easily carry this part of the state & will have con-
trol of Cowles of the Leader, who recently went off

on a tangent for Grant.

At the same moment, Robinson was insisting to Sherman that a
letter from-Garfield following on the heels of his election
would ”help us very much.”13

’8 chief rival

The groundwork for the candidacy of Sherman
was laid by his advocates, Senators Conkling, Cameron and Lo-
gan, while Grant was yet abroad on his triumphal and well-
times world tour. He returned to the United States in Sept-
ember 1879 and upon disembarking at San Francisco, he pro-
ceeded by easy stages to Galena, Illinois, and after a time
journeyed on to Philadelphia. From the West Coast to the
East Coast his progress was marked by demonstrations of af-
fection and respect from enthusiastic crowds along his route.

3

The men who hOped to launch a ’Grant Boom could scarcely

have asked for a better start.

12Warner Bateman to John Sherman, Dec. 31, 1879; William
Bickham to Warner Bateman, Dec. 29, 1879 and Henry Sherman to
Werner Bateman, Dec. 30, 1879. Bateman Papers. Letterbook.

13Henry Sherman to Warner Bateman, Jan. 5, 1880. Bate-
man Papers. James Robinson to John Sherman, Jan. 6, 1880.

Sherman Papers.

’-

 

394

Grant had as yet neither declared nor denied his candidacy
publicly, but this was scarcely a problem. Those on the inside
usually knew where the General stood and for others he had help-
ful hints. Thus it was with Hayes’s old friend and correspon-
dent, James Comly, whom Hayes had made U. S. Minister to Ha-
waii. In San Francisco one evening following his return, Grant
sent for Comly, who was informed by the General's secretary that
he was to be the first to be told about the ”third term business."
In the course of their two hour interview, Comly learned that .
Grant did not feel he was ”needed for a candidate” and would do
nothing to secure the honor. Comly concluded that he would ac-
cept the nomination if proffered. This information was quickly
passed on to Hayes, for as Comly wrote, ”I am not quite foolish
enough to suppose that General Grant talked to me for any rea-
son personal to myself. I think I was expected to write to you
about.it. . .”14 Certainly Grant had no reason to vie with
Hayes for the nomination and he probably wished to be certain
that the incumbent would not stand in his way should he bid for
a third term. But Hayes had no intention of becoming any pros-
pective candidate’s rival, least of all U. S. Grant’s.

Hayes and Sherman were Sharply split in their views of a
third term for Grant. In an 1887 interview with Hayes, William
Henry Smith had an opportunity to learn just how the President
viewed the third term issue. In spite of his experience with

and intense dislike for the prime movers behind the Grant boom,

 

14Quoted in Kleinpell, ”Life of James Comly," p. 243.

395

. . . Hayes (wrote Smith) refused to see any great

danger in again re-electing Grant, and while pledged

to a single term and believing that reforms in govt.

could only come through Presidents pledged to a

single term, he believed worse could befall the coun-

try in the election of a corrupt, bad man. He held that

Grant’s nature was so honest and simple that no new pre-

cedents would be fastened upon the govt.
But Sherman‘s view of the matter was not so sanguine. In April
1880, he confided to Smith that ”while I have the warmest per-
sonal feeling for Gen. Grant, I still think his nomination
would be fatal to us in the election and therefore I ought not
take any position as betWeen him and Blaine."15

Late in 1879, Murat Halstead must have received some in-
dication of Hayes's attitude toward Grant. In a note to the
President, he advised that ”it would be unfortunate for the
word to go out that you prefer Grant to Blaine for next Pres-
ident. The next thing Blaine's friends would prefer Grant to
Sherman. The second choice of everybody therefore gets every-
thing. As the case stands the third term idea fades. . .,"
he concluded. After paying a call on Grant at Philadelphia
in December 1879, Hayes was warned by the S rin field Re ub-
lican (whose editor was friend of Halstead's) that this visit
might be interpreted to mean he favored Grant for another
term.16 But with characteristic propriety, perhaps keeping

Halstead’s advice in mind, Hayes did not make public his pre-

ference for Grant over Blaine.

 

15”William H. Smith, Memorandum, Dec. 14, 1887 and John
Sherman to William H. Smith, April 19, 1880. Smith Papers.

16Murat Halstead to Hayes, Nov. 28, 1879. Hayes Papers.
Springfield Republican, Dec. 26, 1879, p. 4.

396
As convention time drew near, it became clear that the
Grant boom was something to be reckoned with and that desig-

nating him as the ”second choice of everybody” was wishful

's estimate that ”the indications here (Wash-

thinking. Sherman
ington) are rather favorable to him” was far more realistic.
Grant partisans in the federal establishment were already hard

at work. One of Sherman:

s Philadelphia supporters complained
bitterly to the Secretary that old Grant appointees in his
city openly campaigned for their benefactor despite civil ser-
vice rules that handicapped the Sherman effort. Garfield
warned that Grant's nomination "is not only among the possi-
bilities, but unless some decisive action is taken, it is
likely to be made.” Such an error could be prevented only if
Blaine and Sherman cooperated, he argued, while each gathered
as much support as possible. ”If Blaine can carry New Eng-

11

land and some of the Western States,” Garfield reasoned, and

Sherman Ohio and some other States, Grant will hardly enter
upon the struggle. . .” Ohio, Garfield thought, would be
well advised to give Sherman a solid delegation, for only thus
could Grant be stopped and the state's party unity be main-
tained.17

Other politically astute observers were of a similar
opinion as Grant's prospects improved. Halstead added that
a convention in Cincinnati offered the best chance for

17John Sherman to Warner Bateman, Dec. 31, 1879. Bateman
Papers. J. W. Frazier to John Sherman, Oct. 16, 1879. Gar-
field Papers. Letterbook. ‘

397

frustrating the General.18 For that matter, the call to sup-
port Sherman seemed predicted largely upon the need to stop
Grant. But Grant’s forces were soon to sin a significant
victory by getting the convention placed in Chicago where Grant
would enjoy, it was supposed, certain advantages over his com-
petitors. Richard Smith and H. V. Boynton now grew worried
over Grant's strong showing and began urging that a greater
effort be made on Sherman's behalf.19

At the same time, loyal Hayes men were initiating a move-
ment for his renomination. In a letter to Webb Hayes in March
1879, William Henry Smith claimed to see a rising feeling of
gratitude toward Hayes for his service to nation and party.
He believed, or wanted to believe, that this would result in
his renomination and re-election. Two months later, while
visiting the President, Smith and Hayes talked at length about
the coming presidential race. Hayes indicated that he was a-
ware of Smith's efforts on his behalf and said he would prompt-
ly and decisively squelch any second term movement. "You are
so near to me,” he admonished Smith, ”that whatever you may
say will be considered as coming from me, and therefore I wish

you to banish all such thoughts and be discreet in What you

 

18Murat Halstead to William Chandler (telegram), Dec. 16,
1879 and Whitelaw Reid to William Chandler, Dec. 13, 1879.

Chandler Papers. Springfield Republican, Dec. 18, 1879, p. 5.

19Warner Bateman to J. T. Brooks, Dec. 15, 1879; Warner
Bateman to M. M. Granger, Dec. 15, 1879 and Warner Bateman to
R. M. Steiner, Dec. 15, 1879. Bateman Papers. Letterbook.
RichardiSmith to William H. Smith, Dec. 27, 1879 and Henry
Boynton to William H. Smith, Dec. 27, 1879. Smith Papers.

398

say and do.”20

By early January, Garfield found himself in a delicate
position. His own political aspiration, the pressures from
the Sherman camp and the various schemes and conflicting ad-
vice of friends were combining to make his path a thorny one.
Many of his supporters held sharply anti-Sherman views, as the
following analysis by A. L. Conger of Akron, chairman of the
State Central Committee, indicates.

Many of your friends (wrote Conger to Garfield) are‘

strong Grant men and I am seeking to preserve & unite

the Grant men. It will be a great mistake if we give

Ohio to John Sherman. The business men throughout

the state are very much opposed to him. Sherman could

not pull as many votes in this area as Grant or wash-

burne & he would be defeated in the state by an over-

whelming majority as I view the matter.2

Sherman had gained a reputation for pursuing a markedly
expedient course throughout his political career. He entered
the House as a compromise candidate from a district torn by
the slavery issue and had thereafter been a follower rather
than a leader on issues leading to the war. He had followed
a policy of drift in the quarrel with Johnson and when faced
with the politically explosive money issue had veered first
toward ”inflation” and then back to ”soundness” as political
needs dictated. But after years of seeking to cultivate the

good will of hostile interest groups, he arrived at 1880 with-

out the hearty political support of the inflationists or the

 

20William H. Smith to Webb Hayes, March 31, 1879. Hayes
Papers. Quoted in Gray, ”William Henry Smith,” D. 161.

21A. L. Conger to Garfield, Jan. 2, 1879. Garfield Papers.

399
anti-inflationists. As one perceptive historian of Ohio poli-
tics has observed, Sherman was acutely conscious of the need
to be accepted by Wall Street’s men of wealth; he also under-
stood it was vital that ”his personality and adaptability to
the popular cause” be reCOgnized. He appreciated the need to

indulge party leaders'

special interests in the event they were
to commit their party to putting him in the White House. But
on each count Sherman found himself in a quandry. He simply
lacked the charisma which made the candidacies of Clay, Blaine
and Theodore Roosevelt a virtual certainty -- his personal
history revealed ”nothing stimulating or romatio" that rose
above his public record.22

Sherman sincerely believed that resumption's success and
the nation’s healthier economy amply demonstrated his finan-
cial sagacity. He appeared, accordingly, to believe that ”his
claim upon his party for its highest reward was fully vindicat-
ed.”23 But even the Secretary's native state was not united
in Support of his nomination -- indeed, it seemed that either
Grant or Blaine was the choice of most Ohioians.

Although Garfield enjoyed wide and enthusiastic backing
in Ohio in his bid for promotion, at least some of Garfield's

and Sherman's friends distrusted each other. The former fear-

ed that Sherman also had his eye on the Senate and might bid

 

22Clifford H. Moore, ”Ohio in National Politics, 1865-1896,"
Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications, XXXVII (1928),

327. .
23Moore, ”Ohio in National Politics,” p. 324.

400

for it should Garfield fail to endorse him promptly. But on
the other hand, some were worried that a public endorsement
of Sherman prior to the election might be the only thing that
would prevent a Garfield victory. Meanwhile, when opposition
to Sherman boiled up in the Akron area, Sherman's brother-in-
law blamed it on Garfield's friends, who he claimed thought
Sherman or Hayes was working against Garfield and had ”taken
this measure to get even.”24 .

Sherman, although suSpect in the eyes of many a Garfield
man, was in fact quietly smoothing the way for Garfield's elec-
tion. Thus, through Foster, Sherman persuaded Halstead to rec-
ognize the benefits he might reap from Garfield's friendship
and refrain from attacking Garfield and admit that his succeSs
was a certainty. Indeed, this seems to have been the general
instruction given out to pro-Sherman journalists.25

But Garfield was still in an uncomfortable position --
caught in a cross fire generated by Sherman, Blaine or Grant

partisans who wished to make use of him. Shermant

s pressure
for a public endorsement mounted and although this seems to
have stemmed from his desire to counter-act an anticipated

push for Grant by Taft, Matthews and other Cincinnati people

once the party met in convention, it was no less onerous. And

not only were Grant men seeking his backing for their candidate,

 

24Lionel Sheldon to Garfield, Dec. 15, 1878 and Charles
Henry to Garfield, Dec. 10, 1879. Garfield Papers. Henry
Moulton to John Sherman, Dec. 31, 1879. Sherman Papers.

25R. D. MusSey to Charles Foster, Dec. 16, 1879 and
Thomas Nichol to Garfield, Dec. 31, 1879. Garfield Papers.

401

but the shrewd Foster wrote to Garfield to say (and the impli-
cation was clear) that Blaine was ”really strong with many of
our friends. . .”26

Undaunted by the growing odds against victory, Sherman
and his backers continued to build cautiously toward their
goal. In Ohio, the real key to any considerable success he
might enjoy involved cultivating the hearty support of influ-
ential newspapermen like Halstead, Richard Smith and Edwin

'indirect' aid from Thomas

Cowles. He already anticipated
Nichol and his Honest Money League not only in Ohio, but
throughout the Northwest. But as Bateman told William Henry
Smith, it was high time they began building an organization
by establishing Sherman clubs among businessmen in New York,
Boston, Milwaukee, Philadelphia and Chicago; in the last
named city he hoped Smith himself would assume a leading role.
Smith, already busying himself on Sherman's behalf in Chicago,
Milwaukee and Madison, was urging the Secretary to appoint
Nichol a revenue inspector in the Chicago district so that
his superiors might ”find work for him in Wisconsin, where

he . . . (would) be at home.” Smith also wished to know if
Hayes had as yet come up with a means ”for taking care of Gen.

Rust. . .”27 Obviously at least one of Hayes’s closest friends

and staunchest supporters did not view the June 22nd 'Order' as

26Charles Henry to Garfield, Dec. 16, 1879 and Charles
Foster to Garfield, Dec. 17, 1879. Garfield Papers.

27Warner Bateman to William H. Smith, Dec. 3, 1879.
Bateman Papers. William H. Smith to John Sherman, Dec. 3,

1879. Sherman Papers.

402
did his President.

When, in November 1879, Sherman decided finally that he
would not make a bid for the Senate, but would seek a higher
post, Garfield’s position and power played a key role in his
decision. Sherman wrote thus with reference to the matter:

After full reflection I concluded to write to Dayton

the reason why I do not think it advisable for me to

be a candidate. If there was any doubt about it the

apparent concentration of opinion in favor of Garfield

would remove the doubt, but without reSpect to this I

think my course is the proper one. Having been elected

three times -- as long a period as anyone from Ohio has
ever held office -- it does not seem exactly right to
stand in the way of others by becoming a candidate.
If Sherman had been truly candid, and it was not in his nature
to be so, he would have said it was not politically expedient
to stand in the way of a popular Ohioian who was certain to
play a prominent and perhaps decisive role in his bid for the
presidential nomination.28

Meanwhile, Conger was writing Garfield as follows:

. . . we shall send you to the Senate -- but don't

identify yourself with Sherman’s candidacy, for we

shall fight him to the bitter end -- we Shall carry

a number of outside Dists against him, & we ought to

have the Reserve solid for Grant & with your help we

can get the four Delegates at Large. Then when the

time comes if we don’t want to go for Grant we can

carry the state for whom we please.2
If by this final sentence Conger was hinting at the possibil-
ity of nominating Garfield, the latter’s dilemma had become

just a bit more serious than it had been to that point.

 

28John Sherman to Warner Bateman, Nov. 3, 1879. Sherman
Papers.

29A. L. Conger to Garfield, Jan. 2, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

403

Sherman had been seeking to strengthen his chances for
success since taking office. In spite of Hayes's executive
order, he had used his appointive power in an attempt to en-
list a loyal following within his department. The revelations
of the Potter Committee strongly suggest that he was instrumen-
tal in rewarding many an unworthy southern Republican, again
perhaps with an eye to the future. Probably Sherman was among
those whom Hayes had in mind when at the end of his first year,
he complained that ”the urgent misrepresentations poured into
my ears by men who ought to be trustworthy have led to mis-
takes -- serious mistakes, mainly in appointments. . .” In
New York City, especially during the Custom House struggle,
Sherman's preoccupation with the presidency emerges once more.
He appears to have been working at cross purposes with Hayes
at times in his effort to mollify powerful machine leaders
who might play a role in his future. His support of the ousted
Cornell for the governorship can not be written off as mere
loyalty to a fellow Republican. For that matter, his super-
vision of the customs service in general leads one to believe
that he viewed it as an admirably suited vehicle for the pro-
motion of his candidacy and so used it. Thus, as one implac-
able Ohio critic pointed out, the Secretary was guilty of
”unscrupulous and corrupt use of patronage" as evidenced by

the fact that the Louisiana ”returning board, their relatives

& aides” drew $46,800 as Treasury employees, while ”KelIOgg‘s

404

henchmen” were being cared for with posts worth $80,000 per
annum.3O

!

Indeed, Sherman s department was not known as a model of

civil service purity. He had frequently come under sharp at-
tack for allegedly manipulating the service to meet his own
political needs. One such slap at the Secretary appeared in
the February 19, 1880 issue of The Nation which reported that:

Secretary Sherman has been busy throughout the week

debasing the public service to further his own sel-

fish plans over a pretty wide stretch of territory,

we judge from the reports of the New York Times. . .

It has discovered his hand in . . . a ’spontaneous'

popular uprising of Boston merchants, and . . . in

some ugly manipulations of the civil service in St.

Louis. In this city he has compelled Surveyor

Graham to attempt to decoy the business men into

’Spontaneous‘ support of him, while at the same time

he has kept Collector Merritt away from his business at

the Custom-house in order to tmanufacture’in the

northern part of the State.

Some influential figures within the eastern business com-
munity were not taken with Sherman either. Henry Lea, the
historianéreformer, replying to a confidential letter from
Schurz about Sherman’s candidacy, declared that he had lost
confidence in him while a Senator, as he seemed to ”have no
convictions that were not at the mercy of temporary expediency."
He dismissed him as nothing more ”than a machine politician”

who was ”perhaps a shade better than Conkling or Blaine. . .”31

Evidence of Sherman’s attempts to ”manufacture sentiment”

 

3OHayes Diary,.March 1, 1879, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 462-63 and Lionel Sheldon to
Garfield, Dec. 15, 1879. Garfield Papers.

31The Nation, xxx (Feb. 19, 1880), 127 and Henry Lea to
Carl Schurz, Dec. 8, 1879. Schurz Papers.

 

405

in his favor can be discovered in letters passing between him
and his close associates during the months immediately pre-
ceding the convention. Late in 1879, in a letter responding
to Bateman's plans for organizing Sherman clubs, he wrote as
follows: ”It would seem you have adopted a very good plan for
Cincinnati, but in New York, Boston and Chicago it was thought
best not to form clubs whose general tendency was known and
that is being done by independent movements.” And, he added
significantly, Bateman could contact Surveyor Graham concerns
ing New York. So much for custom house reform. Late in Jan-
uary, Sherman discussed the feasibility of one of his politi-
cal appointments with Bateman. ”I know Baker very well (he
wrote) and have high respect for his abilities. I could make
him a temporary InSpector of Customs at $4. a day immediately
if desired, which would enable him under instructions from here
to visit the different ports in that State (Minnesota). If
this is desirable please advise me at once.” A few days ear-
lier, after asking Bateman to take overall charge of matters
for him, Sherman advised him that ”Moulton has a good office
opened, and Hon. Samuel Knox who has an appointment in the
Treasury from the 1st of November, can look after all matters
as to Ohio.”32

In the meantime Garfield had emerged the victor in the
contest for the senatorial nomination, but not without some

help from Sherman partisans. Moulton, who warmly favored

 

32John Sherman to Warner Bateman, Dec. 31, 1879; Jan.
28 and 31, 1880. Bateman Papers.

406
Garfield, confided to the Secretary that
. . the unanimous nomination of Garfield was caused
by the break in the Hamilton county delegation, and
two of those who broke (out of three) declined to vote
for Matthews or Taft because they thought doing so
would look like opposing you . . . for the reason that
both Matthews and Taft were to some extent in favor of
Grant. I should be glad to have Genl Garfield compre-
hend this.
He also assured his chief that the caucus would have nominated
him ”for the Presidency with greater enthusiasm than Garfield. . .”
One can be reasonably sure that Garfield got the message as

's

the pressure for a letter of endorsement mounted. Sherman
strength at Columbus surprised even his most loyal friends,

but the threat of Blaine and even Grant had by no means been
erased. The way was now cleared for Garfield to make his pub-
lic declaration in favor of Sherman.

Garfield was elated at the manner of his nomination (by
acclamation), writing in his diary that he believed it to be
”unparalleled in the history of the state. It leaves me un-
trammeled by any commitments, or complications with any member
of the Legislature,” he observed with pleasure. And The Nation
maintained that ”General Garfield is one of the Republican
statesmen of the day, a real orator, and whose speeches one
cannot easily Sketch before he delivers them -- that is, he
is not a party hack, and has personal opinions and utters

them." Shortly after his victory in the Republican legislative

caucus, Garfield returned to Ohio; Charles Henry (one of his

 

33Henry Moulton to John Sherman, Jan. 7, 1880. Sherman
Papers.

407

managers in the contest) provides us with this pen portrait
of his exuberant spirits:

Before I had time to shake his hand, he threw both

arms around me, lifted me from the floor and swung

me around with his old time boyish way. He seemed

so happy to be six years in the Senate where he could

measure swords in a dignified and courteous discussion

instead of the rough-and-tu ble, witty, sarcastic Cave

of the Winds of the House.3

Once the senatorship was within his grasp, Garfield began
to receive still more evidence of the considerable support he
might expect were he to enter the presidential sweepstakes.
Some correspondents even precisely predicted the deadlock and
ultimate outcome of the convention as early as January. As an
old friend put it, he had ”heard hundred(s) say it was only
the prelude to the Presidency & many demand it at once.”55
Garfield's bid for the Senate had been especially well-managed,
observers reported, and his support was unusually strong and
enthusiastic.36

As his name continued to be linked with presidency, Gar-
field was cautioned against taking a prominent part in the

Sherman effort, but this proved unavoidable. Late in January,

R. A. Horr, acting on Sherman's behalf (he represented Sherman's

 

 

‘ ——m-“—--‘.-

—“ _

34Garfield Diary, Jan. 7, 1880. Garfield Papers. The
Nation, XXX (Jan. 8, 1880), 20 and quoted in Frederick A.
Henry, Captain Henry of Geauga (Cleveland, 1942), p. 291.

35Thomas Nichol to Garfield, Jan. 9, 1880; Lionel Shel-
don to Garfield, Jan. 10, 1880 and Harry Rhodes to Garfield,
Jan. 12, 1880. Garfield Papers.

36Henry Moulton to Garfield, Jan. 7, 1880; James Robinson
to Garfield, Jan. 7, 1880 and Charles Foster to Garfield, Jan.
7, 1880. Garfield Papers. .

408
home county in the Ohio Senate), wrote to Garfield as follows:
”I very much desire a public expression from you on the Pres-
idential question, an expression that will let your friends
know whether you are a candidate yourself and if you are not
whose nomination you prefer.”37 Sherman was clearly impatient
and wished to bring him into his camp in a definitive manner.
He obviously hoped to nip the incipient Garfield boomlet in
the bud, while giving his own presidential stock a significant
boost.

But presidential talk continued to crop up frequently in
Garfield’s correspondence. Sherman's outlook was not bright,
he was told, but in case of a deadlock, he stood an excellent
chance of receiving the prize.38 A friend reporting on a meet-

' organization in Garfield district,

ing of,a county veterans
declared that ”there was not a Sherman man” among the approx-
imately 160 Republicans at the gathering. 'Blaine was the fa-
vorite, followeiby Grant and then Garfield, for whom ninety
per cent would vote were he the party's nominee.39

Shortly before Garfield’s response to Horr appeared, the
Springfield Daily Republicaa published an evaluation of Sher-
man as a preSidential hopeful which serves to point up some of

37Lionel Sheldon to Garfield, Jan. 7, 1880 and R. A.
Horr to Garfield, Jan. 20, 1880. Garfield Papers.

38Joseph Irwin to Garfield, Jan. 27, 1880; Joseph Howells
to Garfield, Jan. 28, 1880; Moore to Garfield, Jan. 28,
1880 and James Norton to Garfield, Jan. 28, 1880. Garfield

Papers. .

39Halsey Hall to Garfield, Jan. 29, 1880. Garfield
Papers. .

409
the reasons why the Secretary’s candidacy received less than
an enthusiastic reception from many another party member. It
ran as follows:

On all subjects besides slavery he is a man of ex-
pediency, rather than principle, ingenious at comproe
mise, indefatigable in squaring logic to practical
necessities, and hence a doer and accomplisher, where
nicer men would stick at nothing less than the ideal.

He has stood with Mr. Hayes for honesty and ef-
ficiency in public service, but the organic reform
of the civil service will scarcely thrive at his
hands, unless he broadens and rises to a higher po-
sition under the pressure of public opinion, to which
he is sensitive. It is here that he leaves something
to be desired, here that his candidacy is on trial.
He is the candidate at this moment who best promises
to hold the substantial strength of his party, to
tempt the independent vote in the absence of any-
thing better, and perhaps to make something better
possible. He is at this moment at the very top of
the column of availability, but he should be the
minimum. Above him there is yet a chance to name
some man nearer to the ideal standard. Bﬁlow him
the party cannot go and hope for success. 0

This is an essentially fair appraisal, but Sherman's re-
form record was not the paramount question to many a Republi-
can -- especially those in the South. In a letter to Sherman,
Warner Bateman shed some light on what the southern situation

demanded when he recounted a conversation with a young Arkansas

Republican.

I told him concerning the recognition of Ark. Repub-
licans (Bateman wrote) that I had no authority to
speak for you but could speak of you: that you were ;i
always in favor of a pure but at the same time par-
tizan administration; that if elected President you
would be a Republican President and Republicans

would be appointed to office . . . and would no doubt
give your recognition and support in your local

 

40Springfield Daily Republican, ;Jan. 13, 1880, p. 4

410

appointments to Southern Republicans on precisely the

iiggtggrms upen which Northern Republicans would be
Obviously Sherman’s southern policy would not be that of Hayes.

On January 26, Garfield responded to Horr's inquiry,
stating that it had to be borne in mind that Ohio remained a
closely contested state, for despite an impressive GOP vic-
tory in October, ”there majority over all opponents . . . (had
been) less than one per cent of (Ohio's) voting population."
Therefore any disunity in the coming presidential contest '
might prove fatal. Upon whom then could Ohio’s Republican's
”most effectively unite?” Garfield was certain it was John
Sherman, who had ”earned this recognition. . . by twenty-five
years of conspicuous public service.” He recognized, however,
that some of his party did not share all of the Secretary's
views. He hoped that others in the race would not be attack-
ed. Ohio Republicans ”Should fairly and generously recognize
the merits of all,” he said, ”but I think they ought to pre-
sent the name of Mr. Sherman to the National Convention and
give him their united and cordial support.”42

Garfield‘s letter of endorsement met With a mixed re-
ception among his supporters. Some were disappointed that he
had underwritten Sherman's candidacy. At least one friend

thought that he had ”said just enough to antagonize the friends

 

1+1Werner Bateman to John Sherman, Jan. 29, 1880. Bateman
Papers. Letterbook.

42Garfield to R. A. Horr, Jan. 26, 1880, quoted in Smith,
Life and Letters of Garfield, II, 949.

411

of Grant and Blaine and not enough to satisfy Sherman's
friends” or the candidate himself. Garfield for his part,
hoped his letter would ”put to rest the loose talk in the
papers" linking him ”with the presidency just enough to em-
barass” him. However, friends remained united in their belief
that the presidential talk would not be squelched by his state-
ment. He was assured that ”good judges" considered him "the
best dark horse. Keep straight on -- you are strong where the
rest are weak. So was Lincoln in 1860," he was reminded. In
the meantime, steps should be taken to insure against accusa-
tions of betrayal should Sherman fail.43

Some correspondents doubted Sherman's ability to secure
a 'solid' Ohio delegation, but insisted that Garfield was
Ohio's real favorite and could easily capture the state in a
contest with Sherman.44 Such assessments were "not mere gush,
not indiscreet outbursts of superserviceable friends, not flat-
tery," he was assured, but were ”the words of truth and sober-
ness” that simply reflected the political facts of life. As
William C. Howells put it, although his own county's news-
papers had come out for Sherman, this was about all that could
be said on the subject. ”The Sherman men are Simply Sherman

men. The Blaine men are enthusiastic Blaine men.” But he too,

 

43Lionel Sheldon to Garfield, Jan. 30, 1880. Garfield
Papers. Garfield to Charles Henry, Jan. 26, 1880. Henry
Papers. Charles Henry to Garfield, Jan. 31, 1880. Garfield

Papers.

44William Slade to Garfield, Jan. 31, 1880; H. D. Smalley
to Garfield, Feb. 15, 1880 and N. B. Sherwin to Garfield, Feb.

18, 1880. Garfield Papers.

412

had concluded that neither of three front runners would win
the prize.45

It was clear that Sherman faced serious problems in Ohio,
but his supporters continued to paint a rosy picture of his
prCSpects. W. D. Bickham reported to Hayes that he was "sur-
prised at Blaine‘s strength in Ohio, although it crops out just
where it did in 1879, but not quite so vigorously." He con-

ts and the soli-

cluded, nevertheless, ”that Ohio was Sherman
darity of the delegation was not in serious jeopardy."46 Bate-
man, too, predicted that Ohio would go solidly for the Secretary.

But if the Ohio outlook appeared promising in early Jan-
uary to some Sherman supporters (or was made to appear so in
their reports), it was obvious that all was not well in other
states. Eastern friends were concerned at what they considered
was a lack of energy and positiveness in the Sherman campaign.
And in nearby Chicago the campaign was in the doldrums. After
receiving William Henry Smith’s report on the Chicago situa-
tion, Moulton replied as follows:

I did not suppose from the information that reached

me that his friends in Chicago were so largely in a
minority as it appears to you to be the fact. I had
supposed that when it became apparent that General
Grant would be out of the way as it is now practical-
ly the case, that Mr. Sherman would have a large ma-
jority of the businessmen -- of your city -? I had

no idea to the contrary until I received your letter.47

 

45W. B. Spear to Garfield, Feb. 21, 1880 and William C.
Howells to Garfield, Feb. 21, 1880. Garfield Papers.

46William Bickham to Hayes, Jan. 19, 1880. Hayes Papers.

47Henry Moulton to William H. Smith, Jan. 29, 1880.
Smith Papers.

413

As the contest for the nomination moved into late winter,
Sherman suffered further setbacks. A Sherman intimate blamed
the Ohio State Republican chairman, James Robinson, for pre—
cipitating an anti-Sherman -- pro-Blaine movement by certain
dngruntled Republicans and of antagonizing, ”instead of
managing” A. L. Conger, the State Central Committee's chair-
man. A few days later, Robinson complained bitterly to Sher-
man about Conger, whom he labeled ”a . . . small souled, ma-
lignant disturber.” He was trickster, wrote the angry Robin-
son, who by March declared that ”Conger completely deceived
our friends with his professions of friendship for you. He de-
clared himself in public for you, but in every instance offi-

ts true colors are

cially acted with the opposition.” Conger
betrayed in the following exerpt from a letter he wrote to
Washburne. ”Since I saw you recently at your House in Chicago
I have had a lively time with the Sherman.men of our state who
tried to gppge by trickery the call for our coming state con-
vention. But I held them level, & busted that set up job. We

have held our own, & shall get some Grant delegates from this

state.” With such 'friends', Sherman's eventual failure is

scarcely surprising.48

Meanwhile, presidential talk centering on Garfield stead-
ily grew. During a call on him, Governor Pound of Wisconsin

predicted that the Chicago gathering would be forced to choose

 

48James Robinson to Sherman, Feb. 6 and March 11, 1880.
Sherman Papers. A. L. Conger to Elihu washburne, Feb. 12,
1880. Elihu Washburne Papers. Library of Congress.

414

a dark horse and Garfield would probably be the man. ”He ap-
proved of the attitude I had taken on the subject,” Garfield’s
diary reads, ”but wished me to hold myself free from any en-
tanglements, So that should the contingency arise to which he
referred I might be unfettered.” Garfield indicated that he
was well aware of ”the course of comments in the public press
and in numerous letters” he had received in recent weeks, but
professed not to take the speculation seriously. In any case,
he intended to ”act in perfect good faith towards Mr. Sherman
and do nothing that would in the slightest degree interfere
with his chances for success. . .”49

During the following weeks, he frequently conferred with
Sherman on the political situation and acted as a loyal sup-
porter. When stout opposition emerged in northern Ohio, he
agreed to help the Secretary's floundering campaign and late
in February, he journeyed to Cleveland to speak and work on
Sherman's behalf and against Grant. But he was not optimistic

's chances, even in his own state, declaring that

about Sherman
it was obvious the Reserve would indeed be ”very difficult to
carry" for Sherman.50 '

Garfield refused to encourage directly those who per-
sisted in their efforts on his behalf. Thus when Wharton Bar-

ker called on him and revealed what he had done and planned to

do to make Garfield the nominee, Garfield records that he made

 

1+9Garfield Diary, Feb. 11, 1880. Garfield Papers.

.5OGarfield Diary, Feb. 17 and 27, 1880. Garfield Papers.

415

this reply:

I told him I would not be a candidate and did not

wish my name discussed in that connection, and if

anything happened to me in that connection, it

would only be in case the Convention at Chicago,

should find that they could not nominate either of

the candidates and I should do nothing to procure

such a result, that I was working in good faith for

Sherman and should continue to do so.
According to Garfield, Sherman had already confided to him that
were he unable to win the nomination, ”he preferred me to any
other man and that he would be entirely willing to have his
strength transferred to me.”51

Meanwhile, Blaine's real and potential strength in Ohio
was growing and his people were stepping up the pace of their
activity. As Charles Foster read it, the real strength of the
Blaine movement centered upon opposition to Sherman and his
friends. He seriously doubted that a solid Sherman delegation
was possible save through an agreement with Blaine‘s friends
that their man would be the second choice of the state's dele-
gation. The Governor, who had very likely sounded out the
Blaine men, thought they would agree to such a proposal and
”that we ought to agree to this,” he told Sherman.52

By this time Sherman lieutenants were busy setting up
campaign committees in Cincinnati, New York, Columbus and Chica-

go. Treasury officials like William Henry Smith were asked to

render aid and cooperation in such undertakings. The Chicago

 

51Garfield Diary, Feb. 18, 1880. Garfield Papers.

52Charles Foster to John Sherman, Feb. 14, 1880. Sherman
Papers. . . .

416

committee ”need not interfere with you in any plan of your own,
but you might make it an instrument to assist you," the candi-
date advised the Collector.53 In New York, the appointment of
the reformer Merritt as Collector did not prevent Sherman’s
use of Custom House personnel, including Merritt, to help a-
long his cause. A series of letters running from August 1879
to May 1880, brought Sherman news of the political situation
in that State from the Collector. It is also apparent that
those under Merritt were working for their chief.

Late in February, Foster, who was already acting with
the state Sherman committee, wrote to warn Garfield that
Grant's nomination would give Ohio to a ”fair” Democratic nom-
inee and reduce its Republican delegation in Congress by "at
least three members. . .” Moreover, Foster concluded:

If Grant's nomination is to be defeated, Ohio must

go into the convention a solid and positive force

for somebody. Sherman is a candidate, and we Should

with a delegation of our ablest men, support him, and

continue the support discreetly and sensibly. When

the time comes (if it does come) to support another,

then Ohio should wheel into line solidly for him. If

no antagonisms are engendered between the friends of

Sherman & Blaine there is no doubt but what we can
give the solid vote of Ohio to Blaine.

I wish Blaine’s friends could be made to under-
stand the situation. In fact, I think many are be-
ginning to feel the importance of a good understand-
ing with Sherman’s friends.

From the foregoing you will understand why it
is, that I have advised against the Cleveland meeting
in Sherman's interest at which you were to speak.5

 

53John Sherman to William H. Smith, Feb. 23, 1880.
Smith Papers.

54Charles Foster to Garfield, Feb. 23, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

417
These candid observations from Foster’s pen offer further ex-
planation of why Sherman’s drive for the nomination was pre-
destined to failure and why Foster’s and Garfield’s role as

Sherman'

s advocates were not only uncomfortable, but perilous.

While Grant and Blaine shifted into high gear and the
prOSpects of a dark horse steadily improved, Sherman's drive
continued to flounder, especially in his own state. The per-
ceptive Governor Foster offered his explanation of the problem
in Ohio. He noted that the anti-Sherman sentiment was "be-
ginning to develop itself in the form of a boom for Blaine,"
although Grant enjoyed but little support. Keeping this in
mind, he confided to Garfield, he was ”quietly laboring for
(a) united delegation for S. with B. as a united second choice."
Foster found such a compromise agreeable to Blaine partisans,
but Sherman's enemies, who were bent upon his defeat, seemed
to favor Grant and were dissatisfied with the proposition. It
also appeared that there were those who wished to rebuke Gar-
field and Foster by defeating Sherman, thereby striking a blow
against a triumvirate some believed was attempting to rule the
state’s party for their own selfish purposes.55

Meanwhile, Foster had already encountered a problem in-
volving his loyalty to Sherman -- and warned Garfield that he,
too, might find himself in a Similar position. He confided

to Garfield that he himself was being mentioned as a vice

presidential candidate with Blaine, while Garfield was a

w_ — ——

55Charles Foster to Garfield, Feb. 13, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

418
presidential dark horse. Blaine supporters had been using
Foster’s name since December, at which time Foster had writ-
ten Sherman to assure him of his undivided loyalty to him.
Nevertheless, he remained anxious that Sherman understand that
he was still loyal and could not be ”carried off by talk." As
matters stood, he hoped that Blaine’s growing strength might
”arouse the friends of Sherman & give him a united delegation,"
for without such an effort he stood to lose several delegates.56

Blaine s threat to Sherman in Ohio and elsewhere continued

ts friends. Bateman cautioned Halstead lest

to trouble Sherman
he say something that could be construed as pro-Blaine talk --
for Sherman's outlook seemed bright only if Ohio gave him her
solid backing. But Bateman acknowledged to Foster that the
vigor of the attack on Sherman by Blaine partisans in Ohio and
the strength of their support was a matter of surprise to him.
In his reply, Foster counseled ”kind and careful treatment of
Blaine men in Ohio,” advice which was quite in line with Sher-
man's philosophy, too. Meanwhile, in Chicago, Smith was striv-
ing to antagonize neither Blaine nor Grant boomers. In the
face of the growing strength of Sherman's opponents, he too,
deemed a solid Ohio delegation imperative for success.57

This was how the picture stood for Sherman as his cam-
paign entered its final three months, months during which his

56Charles Foster to Garfield, Dec. 27, 1879 and Charles
Foster to Garfield, Feb. 13, 1880. Garfield Papers.

57Warner Bateman to Charles Foster, March 6, 1880; Charles
Foster to Warner Bateman, March 9, 1880 and John Sherman to
Warner Bateman, March 9, 1880. Bateman Papers. Letterbook.

419

prospects for success worsened rather than improved. But at

1

least one of Sherman s campaign managers had finally put his

finger on a major deficiency in the Secretary's drive, a short-
coming that stemmed from his lackluster personality. ”The ele-

!

ment in Sherman s canvass that is perhaps lacking is boom. . .,"

Warner Bateman declared.58

 

58Warner Bateman to Charles Foster, March 6, 1880.
Bateman Papers. Letterbook.

CHAPTER 10
”OHIO TO THE FRONT . . . AGAIN”

As the pre-convention struggle entered its final stages,

'S prospects dimmed while those of his major opponents

Sherman
grew stronger. Even Garfield, a reluctant dark horse as well
as a key figure in Sherman’s drive, found his presidential
prospects brightening. The convention itself opened with a
bruising battle over procedural questions that ended in defeat
for Grant's forces and meant a deadlocked convention rather
than a quick decision for the General. After failing to u-
nite on any of Grant’s avowed rivals, including Sherman, the
weary delegates finally turned to one of their own most con-
spicuous leaders to bear the party standard in 1880.

Early in March, a straw vote taken in Norwalk, Ohio, re-
sulted in 30 tallies for Blaine, 30 for Grant, 30 for Garfield,
and but 7 votes for Sherman. And this in a community repre-
sentative of a district Sherman had once represented in the
House. Meanwhile, Blaine was gaining strength in Ohio, main-
ly at Grant's expense, Since he was the second choice of most
Grant supporters. As for Sherman, ”cold & selfish -- is the
verdict,” Garfield was advised by an ardent supporter, who

had his ear to the ground in Ohio. Throughout March, Garfield

420

421

continued to receive presidential propositions and further
evidence of Blaine’s popularity among Ohioians and their con-
siderable apprehension over the possibility of Grant's nomina-
tion. From Connecticut, David A. Wells reported that federal
officeholders, ”evidently instructed,” were active in a so-
called Sherman 'boom'. ”But some of the leading men have no
heart and I think I shall be able to persuade the most influ-
ential man to work for you & the moment Sherman's nomination
becomes impracticable to carry the Conn Delegation over to
you," Wells assured Garfield.1

Although many Ohio Blaine men favored a solid delegation,
Foster observed, ”the best possible management” was necessary
to achieve this result. The strategy was to convince Blaine
and Sherman partisans that both men were needed to stop Grant
and avoid the calamity that seemed certain to befall Ohio Re-
publicans were he chosen to bid for a third term, as Foster
feared would be the outcome at Chicago. In the meantime, the
leaders of Sherman’s organization were anxious to know Blaine’s
attitude toward Ohio -- hopeful that he would encourage unity
on Sherman’s behalf. It appears however, that federal employ-
ees working for Sherman's nomination (and they included em-
ployees of the Post Office, as well as the Treasury) were al-
so involved in efforts to suppress the activities of federal

workers who labored on Blaine’s behalf.2

 

1Charles Henry to Garfield, March 8, 1880; S. Jones, Jr.
to Garfield, March 15, 1880 and David A. Wells to Garfield,
March 19, 1880. Garfield Papers.

2Charles Foster to Garfield, March 22, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

422

In Ohio itself, Sherman’s friends had tried to set an
early date for the Republican State Convention, but were frus-
trated, as has been noted, by Blaine men, who won a postpon-
ment until April 28. AS W. D. Bickham related it to the
Secretary, his cause had not simply been ”mismanaged” it had
"not been managed at all.” Robinson and Dennison had failed
to do their homework and to plot an effective course of action.
Ultimately, Sherman suffered from the animosity and craving
for revenge on the part of one faction or another and Conger
had again worked covertly for the anti-Sherman and the pro-
Blaine people. Nevertheless, Bickham hoped the results of
this preliminary test of strength would hurt Sherman only out-
side his native state. But conditions in Ohio continued to

I

look anything but promising. What is more, Sherman s two

chief lieutenants in his pre-convention campaign returned to
Ohio early in March from washington, thereby leaving his na-
tional organization virtually leaderless and apparently with-
out so much as a general campaign plan. One of these absent
leaders, Henry Moulton, was distressed with the state of af-
fairs on the home front and so informed his brother-in-law,

John Sherman.

I must call your attention (he wrote) to the fact
that the seeming want of shrewd management (es-
pecially in Ohio) is damaging your prospects . . .
Governor Dennison is too old in politics to per-
mit himself to be dictated to by younger men who
are managing things. If the money can be raised,
I propose to have a committee formed here that
will undertake to see to your affairs and then

423

without any more foolishness go to work and do what
is to be done.3 _—

Sherman readily admitted that the postponment of the Ohio
State Republican Convention had hurt his prOSpects, for ”even
if the delegation is made solid,” he wrote, ”by the delay we
have lost other States. Doubting delegations will range for
Blaine or Grant.” And he would come to feel that Blaine and
his supporter had done him as much harm in Ohio as they could.
A few days later, he called the postponment a gross error, but
not as harmful as at first assumed, as his informants' commu-
niques caused his spirits to rise in spite of this set-back.
But Bateman’s bitterness over the affair remained strong.

”The stupidity and blundering of our friends at Columbus has
been extreme and almost uncomprehensible,” he told Sherman.
Soon thereafter, Sherman seemed once more to have been de-
pressed and petulant. He remarked to a Cleveland friend that
the delay had seriously weakened him, and he vowed that if he
were not given a nearly solid Ohio delegation, he would not,
stay in the race. ”I am not a beggar for this doubtful and
dangerous honor of a nomination,” Sherman declared. Earlier
in this letter, he emphasized the significance of Garfield's
Western Reserve to his prospects. ”If I thought the intelli-
gent and considerate judgment of the Republicans of the Re-
serve was against my candidacy, I would withdraw at once,” he

3W. B. Shattuck to William Chandler, March 13, 1880.
Chandler Papers. William Bickham to John Sherman, March 14,
1880; Thomas Nichol to John Sherman, March 15, 1880 and Henry
Moulton to John Sherman, March 17, 1880. Sherman Papers.

424

asserted. Had he been opposing men more attractive and more
likely to be chosen president than Grant and Blaine, the whole-
sale defection of the Reserve might have materialized. As it
was he won its general, if unenthusiastic support. And this
situation served to place additional pressure on Garfield, as
was clearly reflected in a Sherman manager's letter in which
he urged the Secretary to ”see Garfield and at least have him
prevent instructions for Blaine (that is, at the approaching
district convention).{'4

Sherman was likewise troubled by accusations broadcast
by the somewhat eccentric, but moderately influential, Edwin

ts

Cowles, that he was under the thumb of the Catholics. Sherman
unusually warm reply to this charge reveals some interesting
intrafamily tension. ”The truth is,” wrote Sherman to a Cleve-
lander, ”that for three years Ellen Sherman (W. T. Shernan’s
wife), the only Catholic connected with me by birth or marriage
has refused to write to me or ask me to do anything because she
says I am so prejudiced against her and the Catholics that I
will do nothing. . .” He added that he did not believe that
the total body of Catholics among Treasury appointees amounted
to 2 per cent. But suspicions of a pro-Catholic bias on his
part did not cease.5

4John Sherman to Warner Bateman, March 18, 22 and 24,
1880. Bateman Papers. Warner Bateman to John Sherman, March
22, 1880; John Sherman to W. C. McFarland, March 29, 1880 and
W. C. McFarland to John Sherman, March 29, 1880. Sherman
Papers. .Letterbook.

5John Sherman to James Hoyt, March 22, 1880 and B. D.
Fearing to John Sherman, April 11, 1880. Sherman Papers.

425

The Negro question was also troubling Sherman, as evi-
denced by a letter apparently written for general distribu-
tion by the secretary of the National Sherman Committee. Its
recipients were assured that the candidate was a stout and
steady friend of the Negro who had brought more Negroes into
the Treasury Department than had any of his predecessors and
would remedy the wrongs committed in the South under Hayes.
The letter noted that these were wrongs for which the Secre-
tary was not ”wholly responsible.”6

As the meeting time for Ohiois district Republican con-
ventions drew near, Sherman's aides grew increasingly nervous
over opposition to their man. Nevertheless, the candidate
himself appeared optimistic and certain of a nearly unanimous
delegation that would stay with him until the end. But his
supporters were especially uneasy over their prospects in
Garfield's and Foster's districts, districts which contained
some of Ohio's most adamant anti-Sherman men. Garfield him-
self was not at all eager to become further involved in Sher-
man's drive and appeared to hope -- however unrealistically -—
that he might be able to stay on the sidelines from this point
on. Surely the knowledge that he was being touted as a dark
horse and that some supporters were already actively working
for his nomination, disposed Garfield to avoid further en-
tanglement in Sherman’s drive for the nomination. But his

was a truly painful predicament, and one from which there was

6B. D. Fearing to ”Dear Sir”, March 19, 1880. Bateman
Papers. .- .

426

really no escape. He could not refuse to gratify Sherman in
view of the latter’s role in Garfield’s senatorial bid; more-
over, he was constrained by political conventions and informal
rules of seniority that called him to a supporting role in
this affair. If he refused to go to Chicago in any capacity
whatsoever, he might well stand convicted of treachery and in-
gratitude in the eyes of many Republicans, both in and out of
Ohio. If he further committed himself to Sherman's cause, he
laid himself open to similar charges should Sherman fail while
either he or his friend Blaine emerged with the prize. And
should the anti-Grant forces in the convention turn to him as
their last best hope of preventing a disaster for the party
(the nomination of Grant), he_was in no position to reject the
offer absolutely. Faced with this dilemma, it is not surpris-

ing that Garfield vacillated during the months preceding the

Is

convention, thereby arousing serious doubts among Sherman
lieutenants as to his loyalty and dependability. And it comes
as no surprise that the events at Chicago should lead some men
in Sherman's camp to conclude that Garfield had played a double
game throughout the struggle for the party’s top honor.

By early April, Garfield’s position had become still more
uncomfortable, for the question of whether he would go to the
convention as a delegate-at-large or as a district delegate
would soon demand an answer. If he declined a district dele-
gateship, he surely would arouse suspicion and hard-feelings.

He would also seemingly belie his contention that he was not

a candidate for the nomination and stood firmly committed to

Sherman. He likewise understood, from the man who would head
the Ohio delegation, that friends of Sherman believed it to be
most significant to the candidate that he be a part of it. He
concurred in this view, Dennison continued, and he hoped Gar-
field would agree to lead the delegation and so advise his
district supporters. But on the heels of this message came
another from Garfield’s district, advising him that by and large
his constituents were cool toward the Secretary’s nomination.
Garfield complained to a confidant that he was caught ”between

’s lieutenant insisted he

two fires.” On the one hand, Sherman
go to Chicago as a district delegate, but they had not made
their wishes known until appep he had told aspirants for the
delegateship from the nineteenth district that their path would
not be blocked by him. Under the circumstances, he inclined
toward neither seeking nor, if it was offered, declining a
district delegateship. For numerous reasons, Garfield's let-
ter continued, ”I would be embarrassed to go to Chicago, while
on the other hand, I do not wish to Shirk the responsibility,
nor appear to be negligent of Sherman's interests." He then
made his view of Sherman’s candidacy crystal clear and shed
some light on the reasons behind his tacit approval of efforts
on his behalf. ”While I do not think,” he said, ”he has much

of a chance, if any, of the nomination, I still think, if we

want to prevent Grant's nomination, we ought to give Ohio to

Sherman.”7

By April, Sherman leaders like Warner Bateman began to
voice serious doubts as to the solidarity of the state’s dele-
gation for the favorite son. Their worries centered on Fos-
ter’s and Garfield's areas, where dislike of Sherman and/or
loyalty to Blaine had found vigorous expression in the deter-
mined opposition of men like John C. Beatty and John T. Mack.
Moreover, in a conversation with Bateman in Washington, Gar-
field had not spoken ”with that degree of confidence that I
would like to hear,” Bateman reported. Whatis more, he gave
Bateman to understand that he would not be or could not be a
delegate from his district. A visibly disturbed Bateman
quickly dispatched a message to former governor Dennison, de-
scribing his conversations with Garfield and urging Dennison
and Foster to use ”such influences as you think necessary with
Garfield to get him to run.” As noted above, Dennison was
quick to act on this appeal; But this was precisely the course
of action Garfield wished to avoid; indeed, he hoped his dis-
trict's delegates might be chosen without reference to Sherman.
A few days later, Bateman met with a group of congressmen at
his Washington rooms. Garfield had returned to Ohio for a
brief visit, but Bateman was told that he understood Sherman's

wish that he attend the State Republican Convention as a delegate

 

7William Dennison to Garfield, April 9, 1880; George
Clement to Garfield, April 10, 1880 and Garfield to Harmon
Austin, April 16, 1880. Garfield Papers. Letterbook. Warner
Bateman to William Dennison, April 11, 1880. Bateman Papers.

Letterbook.

429

from the nineteenth district. If Garfield had deluded himself
into believing he might avoid further involvement in Sherman’s
drive, his illusion now appeared to be shattered. For when
Batemen informed Dennison that Garfield really had to be a
part of the delegation, he was very likely reflecting his
chief's point of view. Governor Foster too, must be pressed
into service, Bateman continued, for the Secretary now relied
on Ohio for his standing at Chicago.8

Meanwhile, in a ”Strictly Confidential” letter, Foster ad-
vised Garfield that Dennison had overstated Foster’s approval
of Garfield's vying for a delegateship. He too, had been press-
ed to take such a step, was always ready to assist the Secre-
tary and would, if he discovered it was advisable to do so, be
a candidate for delegate. He hoped that by shrewdly managing
affairs he could secure Sherman delegates from his district,
although it favored Blaine, he pointed out, as did ”every dis-
trict in Ohio, if the two men are placed upon equal conditions."
For that matter, Foster asserted, ”if your_support & mine were
withdrawn from Sherman there would be nothing left of his can-
didacy and his friends know it, and it just a little unkind to
hint even that we are not doing our whole duty to his canvass."
After insisting that he had ”never worked harder, or more skill-
fully for any cause than” Sherman’s and severely criticizing
the management of Sherman's campaign, Foster touched upon another

source of embarassment for Garfield and himself. He wrote to

 

8Warner Bateman to William Dennison, April 6 and 11,
1880. Bateman Papers. Letterbook.

430

Garfield as follows:

You are embarrassed by the mention of your name

(which by the way would be a popular man in Ohio)

for the first place on the ticket, and I have been

sorely perplexed by the mention of my name for the

second place.

I take it that you feel as I do, that any such

use of your name under existing circumstances would

be a grave error, and I feel the same in relation to

myself. In fact if I was offered the second place

and felt at liberty to do as I pleased, I would de-

cline it. If Sherman‘s fool friends will permit it,

he will get.the delegation solid, not as hearty sup-

porters, but partly because he is an Ohio man, and

partly because many Blaine men see that B's chances

are bettered by it.9

Garfield‘s hesitancy surely reflected in large part the
open secret that he was a dark horse, as well as his knowledge
of a continuing effort to bring off his nomination. Wharton
Barker, the prime mover in the Industrial League, had not only
been corresponding with Garfield on tariff issues and a com-
mercial union with Canada, but on the presidential question,
too. He had numerous communications from influential New
Englanders and Westerners, Barker claimed late in February,
who favored Garfield's being a candidate and wondered when the
Philadelphians would make their move. ”We believe that at
present it is best for us to keep quiet,” Barker continued,"
but we shall next week send the enclosed circular to the chair-
man of Republican County Committee(s) all over the country and

we hope good will come of it.” He also reported that there

were a large number of prominent Republicans in Philadelphia

 

9Charles Foster to Garfield, April 17, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

431

who were strongly against the choice of either Grant, Blaine
or Sherman. On the other hand, there was broad support for
Garfield, as the one who hag to emerge as a leading candidate
at the convention and thus was being carefully watched. Bar-
ker claimed that opposition based upon the suspicion that
Garfield was a free trader had been laid to rest, thanks to
Garfield's recent letter to Barker on the subject. ”In a
word," Barker observed, ”that letter of yours stating how you
became a member of the CObden Club in my hands and in those
of such men as I saw fit to place it has worked the change."
By early April, Barker was convinced that Grant’s stock had.
declined while Garfield's was on the rise. A month later, he
assured Garfield that now everyone had to admit that the Grant
boom had collapsed. Moreover, he asserted that he was sur-
prised to find the General's supporters were altogether ready
to take up Garfield in the event Grant was removed from the
race. Then in mid-May, he reported that although Don Cameron
intended to remain loyal to Grant, even he had begun to lose
faith in the possibility of bringing off his nomination.10

Blaine's popularity and activity on his behalf in Ohio
continued to plague Sherman and his friends. Blaine probably
anticipated that his only chance of defeating Grant lay in
effecting a shift of Sherman delegates to his side after the
initial balloting had taken place. And by continuing to press

Sherman's people in Ohio, Blaine was able to secure an under-

 

1OWharton Barker to Garfield, Feb. 28; March 2; April 6;
May 7 and 18,1880. Garfield Papers.

432

standing that in return for abstaining from making an overt
attempt to upset Sherman's bid for a solid delegation, he
would become the state’s second choice. Furthermore, he need-
ed Sherman's help if Grant's boom was to be weakened and event-
ually broken down. Blaine himself made all this clear to Sher-
man's friends in washington and to Sherman as well, through
the Washington Blaine Club chairman. For the time being, Sher-
man's candidacy was essential to Blaine's hopes, as it was pre-
dicted that without Sherman in the field, Grant could defeat
Blaine. The importance of some understanding with Blaine, if
not with all of his Ohio friends, was underlined by Foster in
these words:

The instincts of masses of our people are largely

for Blaine (he told Sherman), this feeling coupled

with personal hostility to you, to the Administra-

tion, and favoritism for Grant, is combined under

the Blaine banner, and without doubt this combina-

tion can capture several of the districts, if in
the end the sensible men among them think it wise

to do so.1

Among the Blaine people were those bent upon defeating
Sherman at any cost, others who desired to pay Sherman the
compliment of a favorite son vote, and those who wanted to stay
with Sherman as long as he had a chance for success, but with
the clear intention of going over to Blaine should Sherman
withdraw. Given this state of affairs, the reluctance of both
Garfield and Foster to make a fight for Sherman against the

Blaine partisans in their district conventions is more easily

 

11Warner Bateman to G. H. Foster, April 13, 1880. Bate-
man Papers. Letterbook. Charles Foster to John Sherman,

April 16, 1880. Sherman Papers.

433
appreciated. Apparently both men hoped to maintain party
harmony even at the expense of sending a few anti-Sherman del-
egates to Chicago where the Sherman delegates quickly would
come to realize what some Ohioians already suspected -- that
Sherman's cause was hopeless, save as a means of stopping Grant.
But the Secretary continued to be optimistic, writing confi-
dentially to W. H. Smith that he expected a ”substantially
solid delegation” who would support him ”in good faith to the
end." He had concluded, however, that Blaine supporters had
done all they could to hurt him in Ohio, Blaine's hands-off
policy notwithstanding. Nonetheless, he would not abandon
his initial intention of maintaining amicable relations with

the major contenders. Warner Bateman reflected the reasoning

I

behind this tactic when he wrote that Sherman s strength would

be insufficient to win an early victory at Chicago. Victory
could be his only with the help of Grant and Blaine men.
Blaine meanwhile, was complaining thus to Halstead:

Had Sherman cleared the track and let me bore down
on Grant in Ohio, I would have been able to run right
over him in Illinois. But you will see that the
'favorite son' cry makes the step a very hard one
for any other candidate in Grant s home. I suggest
these views because Schurz and others have too of-
ten urged upon me that Sherman’s defeat in Ohio
would nominate Grant. Precisely the reverse in the
case, if Grant shall win, your acute eye will dis-
cover that Sherman's demand that his own State
should support him (paved the way for) Grant's suc-
cess in Illinois.

—
w“_ —-
“ ‘——

12John Sherman to William H. Smith, April 19, 1880. Smith
Papers. Warner Bateman to Emery Foster, April 20, 1880. Bate-
man Papers. Letterbook. James G. Blaine to Murat Halstead,
April 23, 1880. Halstead Papers.

434

Blaine's line of reasoning may have seemed logical to
him, but in retrospect it appears more likely that Sherman's
withdrawal in Ohio would have ”cleared the track” for none
other than U. S. Grant, not the Senator from Maine. Follow-
ing a conversation in mid-April with Blaine, Garfield record-
ed that the Senator was bitter toward Sherman, claiming (and
accurately, too) that the Sherman letter supporting Hayes in
1876 had been written with the intention of hurting Blaine
and that even now Sherman preferred Grant to him. ”I like
Blaine,” Garfield mused, ”-- always have -- & yet there is an
element in him which I distrust.”13 There were undoubtedly
many others who 'liked' him, but harbored similar reservations;
and there were many who would have preferred Grant to Blaine
in the White House.

Although Foster and Garfield shied away from the role of
district delegates, their value ruled out anything less than

ts brother-in-

active leadership for them at Chicago, Sherman
law advised him. It was now suggested that they go as dele-
gates-at-large, with the hope that they could hold any rebels
in line with the majority of the delegation. ”Their presence
in the delegation will have such a commanding influence over
the doubtful Districts, that there would be very little dis-
position to act independently of the majority of the dele-

gates,” Moulton reasoned. But Garfield was singled out to

carry a still heavier burden than he was inclined to assume,

 

13Garfield Diary, April 14, 1880. Garfield Papers.

435

for he was soon approached by Bateman to place Sherman's name
in nomination.14

The Secretary had agreed that it would be ”politic” to
include both Foster and Garfield among the quartet of delegates
at-large. He revealed,however, some suspicion of their loyal-
ty by his remark that although both their districts appeared
to oppose him, and seemed nearly alone in their attitude, he
did not question the genuineness of their support. What is
more, both men wished to go to Chicago, Sherman assured Bate-
man, after receiving a letter from Foster and conferring per-
sonally with Garfield. Indeed, Garfield did write to his
trusted political aide, Harmon Austin, asking him to keep his
name out of the district convention, as he was to go to Chica-
go as a delegate-at-large. The nineteenth district's conven-
tion ultimately chose two stout Blaine men to go to Chicago
as delegates, but gave them no instructions. ”It was simply
a Blaine craze,” Garfield was told by a member of that conven-
tion, "and when I found how over-whelming the feeling was, I

was glad your name was not presented by authority. . ._"15

2

Garfield was important, perhaps essential, to Sherman s

hopes, but after he had given Sherman his best in a nominating

speech, could he be depended upon to stand up under the terrific

 

14Henry Moulton to John Sherman, April 23, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Thomas Nichol to Warner Bateman, April 25, 1880.
Bateman Papers.

15John Sherman to Warner Bateman, April 25, 1880. Bate-
man Papers. Freeman Thorp to John Sherman, April 29, 1880.
Sherman Papers. Julius Converse to Garfield, April 24, 1880.

Garfield Papers.

436
pressure of a national political convention in which he was

's reflections on this

the outstanding dark horse? Sherman
question reveal that he harbored some doubts. He commented
thus:

Garfield‘s great abilities and influence in the con-

vention make it important that he should go, and the

only doubt expressed of him by anyone is that as he

has failed to influence his District it is not poli-

tic to give him so advanced a position among my friends.

It is a defect in his character that often at criti-

cal moments he wavers when firmness is indispensable.
With the Ohio dissidents in mind, Sherman also dispatched a
letter to Governor Foster, strongly urging him to carry his
district in order to defeat the extremely outspoken Mack, whose
selection ”would be mortifying” to Sherman, after what Sherman
described as Mack’s abuse of him and his slandering of his
dead brother, Charles Sherman. Sherman believed (or chose to
believe) that his stock was rising the country over and a re-
cent visit to New York City and Philadelphia had convinced him
that Grant would be out of the picture before the convention
opened -- leaving Blaine and him to fight it out.16 Sherman’s
incredibly fond hope may also have been based upon the antici-
pation of victory in the struggle with Grant for southern del-
egates -- a contest in which his Treasury officials were obvi-
ously active participants. Thus it was reported that every

one of the Deputy Collectors of Internal Revenue in Georgia

were busy at their state convention on the Secretary’s behalf,

 

16John Sherman to Warner Bateman, April 25, 1880. Bate-
man Papers. John Sherman to Charles Foster, April 26, 1880
and John Sherman to W. P. Canaday, April 26, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Letterbook.

437
although many really favored Grant.17
At this time (late April), leading independent Republi-
cans were pushing ahead with their effort to stop Grant and
nominate Garfield. 0n the evening of April 24, Barker made
a long call on Garfield, during which he reported on the presi-
dential question at length. Garfield recorded the substance
of Barker’s remarks in his diary in these words:
The independent Republicans of Pa. headed by Wanye
McVeagh & Barker, have secured McManes & his associ-
ates who have pledged a majority of the Pa. delegation
to oppose Grant at Chicago. This will make his nom-
ination impossible, and at first help Blaine. Then
Mass. & nearly all N.E. except Maine, will throw its
weight with N.Y. against Blaine -- and break him.
Pierrepont says, after Grant, Conkling will favor
Garfield. Barker today visited the President who
says Sherman is in the field to prevent the nomina-
tion of Grant or Blaine -- that Garfield can carry
Ohio solid as B. cannot, and in case the other two
are broken, Sherman will.give way for G.
Barker was confident his predictions would prove accurate and
called the following evening to so insist, although Garfield
thought it unlikely, claiming he would be ”greatly distress-
ed” were he to feel differently.18 President Hayes was ap-
parently undisturbed by Barker's scheme, and there is no evi-
dence that he warned his Secretary of the Treasury of what
was afoot.

Back in Ohio, Sherman received a setback when Mack was

elected from Foster‘s district as a delegate to the national

 

17 Tichenor to William H. Smith, April 28, 1880.
Smith Papers. James Atkins to Garfield, May 1, 1880. Gar-

field Papers.
18Garfield Diary, April 24 and 25, 1880. Garfield Papers.

438

convention. Moulton claimed that had Foster come out Square-
ly and made a fight of it, he could have defeated Mack, but
he backed away from the scrap for fear of embarrassing friends.
The incident left Moulton and others in the Sherman camp sus-
picious of Foster. Then, after the nineteenth district con-
vention elected its delegates, it became obvious that there
would be other dissidents in the delegation. But for some rea-
son, perhaps political obtusness arising from being forced to
operate outside familiar political environs, Sherman persist-
ed in believing that at the very most there might be a couple
of Blaine men in Ohio's delegation. Yet they too, he thought,
would vote for him in the early balloting.19

Sherman clung to this hope in the face of evidence to the
contrary. John Beatty, a warm friend of Garfield, but stub-
bornly anti-Sherman and pro-Blaine, had bested the strongest
Sherman candidate handily after making his position crystal
clear. Garfield's letter endorsing Sherman had left his
stoutest supporters thereabouts most unhappy, Beatty told him.
Moreover, Beatty claimed that Sherman’s delegate strength in
the district’s convention would have been virtually nil with-
out this letter. He insisted that Garfield owed Sherman noth-
ing. "I well remember,” he wrote, "when Cam Lyman travelled
all over this district slandering you that he retained his
place in the government service through the aid of John Sher-

man who doubtless set him on your track.” When Garfield

 

19Henry Moulton to John Sherman, April 29, 1880. Sherman
Papers. John Sherman to William H. Smith, April 26, 1880.

Smith Papers.

439

passed Beatty's letter along to the Secretary, the latter de-
nied even knowing such a man as Lyman and dismissed the accu-
sations as ”pure fiction.” For his part, Beatty reminded
Garfield that without exception, those candidates who were
ready to pay Sherman the compliment of a favorite son vote
had been beaten at the district convention and that Garfield
himself, although chosen a delegate-at-large at the state
convention, had not received majority support from his own
district.2O

Other friends, aware of the dangers inherent in Garfield‘s
position, insisted that neither he nor Foster should go to
Chicago, but then readily admitted that it was impossible for
them to do otherwise. Garfield himself preferred not to go
to Chicago, but felt duty bound to attend if chosen. Two of
his most intimate friends and advisors disagreed at this point.
Austin contended it would be a great mistake for him to attend,
while Hinsdale argued that unless Garfield’s letter supporting
Sherman was merely part of a ”’jobﬁ” unless he was insincere
and his public actions did not reflect his private feelings,
he must attend and do his best for the candidate. Garfield
had once again placed and/or allowed himself to be placed in
a position from which he desperately wished to escape -- but
escape was impossible. Apparently Garfield was suspect in

the eyes of many pro-Sherman members of the state convention.

 

2OJohn Beatty to Garfield, May 3, 1880 and John Sherman
to Garfield, May 15, 1880. Garfield Papers.

440

Bateman confided to Tom Nichol that ”it would have been quite
easy to have fanned a flame of suspicion against Garfield, but
it was promptly suppressed by Moulton, Dennison and myself."21

On-the-spot reports of the state convention received by
Garfield varied. Foster spoke of a ”strong majority for Sher-
man” while Grant was ”nowhere.” But he also reported great
enthusiasm for Blaine who was generally the second choice of
all gathered at Columbus. On the other hand, the staunchly
anti-Sherman Lionel Sheldon claimed that not only did nearly
one-third of the convention oppose Sherman, but that they in
turn mirrored the feeling of at least two-thirds of Ohio’s
Republicans. Sheldon very genuinely regretted that Garfield
and Foster persisted "in parading before the people the pres-
sure of . . . (their) high positions in behalf of a man the
voters did not want." It is noteworthy that Hayes's favorite
young congressman, William McKinley, who acted as temporary
chairman of the convention, delivered a rousing keynote ad-
dress (”Crimes Against the Ballot”) in which he betrayed more
than a little partiality for Blaine. His most recent biogra-
pher notes that after encouraging his state to stand behind
Sherman, McKinley ”could not forbear mentioning duties to

Grant and above all to his idol, the 'peerless debater, the

 

‘=—-'-“- ——-

‘C—- —_—— ‘

21Worthy Streator to Garfield, May 3, 1880. Garfield
Papers. Burke Hinsdale to Garfield, April 23, 1880, in
Hinsdale, ed., Garfield;Hinsdale Letters, pp. 450-51. Warner
Bateman to Thomas Nichol, April 30, 1880. Bateman Papers.

441
fearless statesman, James G. Blaine.”22
Like Garfield, Foster acknowledged that he, too, had hoped
until the very eve of the convention that he might be spared,
but he informed Garfield that "Mr. Sherman himself selected
the names and of course his friends could not do otherwise than
yield.” He had wanted no part of the task of promoting Sher-

ts candidacy, but now the two of them were saddled with far

man
heavier responsibilities than those of the average delegate-
at-large. Moreover, their roles would be "delicate in view

of the fact that . . . (they were) expected to promote Mr.
Sherman's candidacy. More of this when we meet," he conclud-
ed cryptically. Foster was now nearly certain that Sherman
could not secure a solid delegation and believed he might

lose as many as nine votes to Blaine. Foster's message trou—
bled Garfield, for he thought it implied they were to shoulder

t

the entire burden of Sherman 8 drive; Foster hastened to cor-

rect this misunderstanding.23

A few days later, in a note to Garfield, Sherman offered
some counsel as to how Ohio's divided delegation should be
handled. It was inadvisable to acknowledge any Blaine-Sherman
split within the Ohio delegation, he continued. Preferably

the effort to win over the dissidents should continue, for he

-é-- _"-— w'"‘- '*

 

 

- --- --"-—-“

 

-220harles Foster to Garfield (telegram), April 28, 1880
and Lionel Sheldon to Garfield, April 29, 1880. Garfield
Papers. H. Wayne Morgan, ”The Congressional Career of William

McKinley” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
California at Los Angeles, 1959). p. 82.

23Charles Foster to Garfield, May 4, 1880 and Charles
Foster to Garfield, May 10, 1880. Garfield Papers.

442
chose to believe reports that the determination of certain of
these men, including one implacable foe, was growing weaker.
And even Foster was persuaded that Sherman's outlook was
brightening as they approached the middle of May. But then,
too, so were Garfield's presidential prOSpects, friends sug-

’s name in

gested when they learned he was to place Sherman
nomination. ”Do your level best,” advised Harry Rhodes, "your
own golden hour may have struck,” for whether Sherman won or
lost, Garfield would be in a very advantageous position.
Nichol wrote that while Milwaukee Republicans would vote for
Sherman most would prefer Garfield were he a candidate and
would solidly support him if he entered the competition.24

As Sherman's campaign entered its final week, he began
to estimate his vote on the first or second ballots ”at about
190 with a fair chance of success." Bateman estimated 115 to
175 votes initially, but admitted Sherman's strength was un—
certain -- he would receive less than one hundred votes through-
out the early balloting. Although Sherman still hoped for a
solid or very nearly solid vote from Ohio, it was clear that
Blaine would have nine Buckeye votes from the start. Richard
Smith, who had been attacking Blaine vehemently in his Cincin-
nati Gazette for months because he believed the nomination of

either Blaine pp Grant would be disastrous for the nation and

the party, reflected a greater sense of reality than many

 

24John Sherman to Garfield, May 8, 1880; Charles Foster
to Garfield, May 10, 1880; Harry Rhodes to Garfield, May 14,
1880 and Thomas Nichol to Garfield, May 16, 1880. Garfield

Papers.

443

another Sherman man when he wondered ”where the votes are to
come from to nominate Sherman.” On the other hand, Hayes pro-
fessed to see danger in Sherman becoming too strong "’and as-
suming necessarily the responsibilities of a furious contest
with Grant and Blaine.'”25

The embarrassing division in the Ohio delegation worried
Garfield, but taking his cue from Sherman, he advised acting
as if they were united until the rebels, if they could not be
won over, broke with the majority. He had attempted by letter,
to reason with several of the implacables, but to no avail,
even in the case of his admirer Beatty. Bateman offered the
suggestion that the most outspoken anti-Sherman man, Mack, be
isolated, thus creating such antagonism between him and the
majority of the delegation as would undermine his influence

’s

with them. But this strategy, perhaps typical of Sherman
mode of operation in senatorial contests, was not followed.

In the face of the hopelessly divided Ohio delegation, Sherman
could take heart from William Henry Smith‘s report of a con-
versation he had recently had with John Logan. Logan had
assured him that no matter what happened to Grant, neither
Blaine nor Washburne would succeed. Grant's forces would turn
either to Edmunds or Sherman. He directed Smith to ”’tell
Secretary Sherman that he stands the best chance now, and that
if he will manage his affairs carefully and in the right

25John Sherman to Parker Chandler, May 1, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Warner Bateman to William H. Smith, May 9, 1880 and
Richard Smith to William H. Smith, May 7, 1880. Smith Papers.

444

direction he can get that nomination.”26

Help for Sherman in Ohio, with a conspicuous string at-
tached, now arrived from the Blaine camp. Eugene Hale inform-
ed Sherman that Blaine had expressed his wish that Ohio vote
unanimously for Sherman as long as he was a contender. Blaine,
well aware of the unhealable rift within the Ohio delegation
could afford to be generous without risk and obviously hoped
that Sherman would reciprocate once his case appeared hopeless.

I told Hale frankly that I was in no position to

make alliances, (Sherman informed Bateman) and that

I could not promise Blaine the vote of the Ohio del-

egation, that I was opposed to the unit rule (did

he have any other choice?) and would do all I could

to leave to each delegate upon his responsibility to

his constituents, the right to vote according to his

conscience, and that I would not seek to control the

votes of delegates from Ohio if I ceased to be a

candidate.
After this bit of characteristic self-deception, Sherman con-
cluded that Blaine's forces realized the significance of the
Shermanites help in opposing the unit rule. Consequently,
Blaine would presumably make an honest effort to counter a
split among the Ohio delegates. Sherman enclosed, among other
messages, a note from Whitelaw Reid informing him that Blaine
had written Ohio friends to advise them strongly that in spite
of their desires, it was imperative that they vote for Sherman
on the first ballot. The implication here is apparent and it

aroused suspicion in Sherman's camp. Did this mean that Blaine

hoped that the futility of the Secretary's bid would become so

 

26Garfield to John Sherman, May 10, 1880. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook. Warner Bateman to Charles Foster, May
18, 1880. Bateman Papers. Letterbook. William H. Smith to
John Sherman, May 10, 1880. Sherman Papers.

445
obvious after the first ballot as to bring about his with-

drawal in Blaine'

s favor? A few days later, during a con-
versation with Garfield, Blaine professed that he had not
entered the contest with the expectation of victory, indeed
he had made the bid only because he was convinced he repre-
sented the best hope of stopping Grant and perhaps there was
truth to this statement. Furthermore, Garfield reported,
Blaine believed Grant's nomination altogether likely. It was
at about this time that Garfield reportedly told Bateman that
”ruinous rumors were finding their way into currency among
better informed persons as to Blaine that would render success
with him as a candidate almost impossible.”27

It is to be expected that a candidate's supporters, es-
pecially his managers, should exude optimism, but two letters

from Warner Bateman late in May, give some sense of the weak-

ness of at least one of Sherman's chief lieutenants. In a

11

letter to fellow delegate Dennison, he pronounced Blaine a

dead duck." And, he continued, it was perfectly obvious to
him that the real contestants were to be Sherman and Grant,
who was the major threat to Sherman's hopes. Bateman's es-
timate of the size of Grant's force was accurate enough, but
he erred terribly when he declared himself convinced that the

General;s strength was ”built on too many stilts to be very

 

27John Sherman to Warner Bateman, May 20, 1880 and
Whitelaw Reid to John Sherman, May 20, 1880. Bateman Papers.
Garfield Diary, May 23, 1880. Garfield Papers. Warner Bate-
man to William Dennison, May 5, 1880. Bateman Papers. Letter-

book.

446

well secured.”28 A public campaign statement to this effect
might have been justified, but when made to another delegate --
a seasoned veteran in the game of politics -- it reveals a
serious deficiency in terms of political astuteness and judg-
ment.

The optimism of the Sherman camp should have been a good
deal dampened by their candidate's report late in May, that
"all plans to raise any considerable sums to aid . . . (him)

in this contest seem to have failed. . ." A Secretary of the

's genuinely significant achievement be-

Treasury with Sherman
hind him might justifiably have expected a more generous re-
ception from men of means, but apparently they were either
doubtful as to his chances at Chicago or simply not attract-
ed to him as a candidate. Sherman was unaware that a rising
young member of the Philadelphia’s business elite, Wharton
Barker, was writing to Schurz (who for months had been fully
apprised of the doings of Barker and his associates) that he
was now persuaded that they had to take up Garfield and do all
they could on his behalf. Barker concluded by asking Schurz
whether there was any possibility that the Secretary might
withdraw in favor of Garfield.29 Schurz obviously told his

fellow cabinet member nothing of what Barker had in mind --

 

28Warner Bateman to J. A. Gary, May 22, 1880 and Warner
Bateman to William Dennison, May 22, 1880. Bateman Papers.
Letterbook.

29John Sherman to Henry Moulton, May 21, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Letterbook. Wharton Barker to Carl Schurz, May 24,
1880. Schurz Papers.

447
for that matter, neither did Hayes, who also knew what was
being planned.

Meanwhile Sherman continued to be hopeful; in fact it was
not until the very eve of the convention that the Secretary's
almost pathetic and utterly unfounded faith in the ultimate
loyalty of Ohio’s delegation began to crack. He was upset,
he confessed to Dennison, by a press report that morning de-
claring that nine or ten Buckeye delegates were now determined
to support Blaine. This was not true, he trusted. Evidently,
Sherman's hopes for solid Ohio support were based in part on
earlier promises from the Blaine camp and to Sherman's mind,
defection would indicate deception. Sherman advised that if
these nine or ten delegates voted for Blaine, all contact or
cooperation with the Senator and his supporters should be end-
ed. ”If delegates will not respect a preference expressed by
such a Convention as that of Ohio,” Sherman continued, ”they
should not only be remembered in the future but should be cut
off from all communications for the present." This hardly
squares with his earlier pronouncement that he "would do all . . .
(he) could to leave to each delegate upon his responsibility
to his constituents, the right to vote according to his con-
science. . ."30

Federal employees continued to work on Sherman's behalf,
although it appears that in some cases, they joined forces

with Grant men against Blaine's supporters. Moreover, Hayes

 

30John Sherman to William Dennison, May 31, 1880 and John
Sherman to Warner Bateman, May 20, 1880. Bateman Papers.

448
was pursuing a hands-off policy as regards the enforcement of
his civil service order. When Sherman passed on to him Bate-

man'

s pleas that Hayes order Baltimore custom house employees
seeking to manage the Maryland State Convention back to their
duties, Hayes answered Sherman thusly: ”What do you advise?
It seems to me that my interference now would be too late for
good and might do great harm. Besides it is a departure from
the course heretofore taken.” Sherman was apparently having
his troubles with fellow Cabinet members too, as regards the
enforcement of ”Order No. 1.” He complained to Key in the
following terms:
Is this not pressing the Order No. 1 partially.

Mr. Belcher is a friendly delegate to the Chicago

Convention unanimously elected by the Georgia Con-

vention as a Delegate at large. I can name scores

of Post Masters who have actively & violently oppos-

ed me at primaries & Conventions. . . I hope the

order will not be urged against a Postal Clerk to

prevent him from attending the Convention.
A little later, Sherman asked Hayes to appoint an Alabama Sher-
man supporter to a District Attorneyship. All except one fed-
eral Officeholder in Alabama had worked against him, Sherman
claimed, and this appointment was imperative.31 It seems cer-
tain that there were many federal employees laboring for the
Secretary in both the North and the South and in the latter
section, they helped deny support to Grant that might well

have given his victory at Chicago.

 

31Warner Bateman to John Sherman, May 6, 1880; Hayes to

John Sherman, May 6, 1880 and John Sherman to David Key, May
19, 1880. Sherman Papers. Letterbook. John Sherman to
Hayes, May 27, 1880. Smith Papers.

449

During his final conference with Sherman on May 25, Gar-
field asked the candidate to ”suggest frankly what he con-
sidered the strong points of his public life” in order that
he might recommend him to the delegates in the best possible
light. This he would leave up to his nominator, Sherman re-
plied, although he ”suggested that the chief characteristic
of his life from boyhood up, had been courageous persistence
in any course adopted,” Garfield's diary records. Sherman’s
assessment provides an interesting example of the contrast be-
tween one’s self-image and the image others had of him. It
may also serve to help us understand how and why he could bid,
with every hope of success, for his party's presidential nom-
ination in three successive national conventions despite the
great odds against his success. Certainly the man who was to
place his name in nomination and who might well determine his
success or failure was neither optimistic nor enthusiastic as
he left for Chicago. On May 28, Garfield noted that he under-
took his duties ”with much reluctance," confessing that he
disliked ”the antagonisms and controversies which . . . (were)
likely to blaze out in convention" -- a gathering which he as
a dark horse and already suspect in the Sherman camp, desper-
ately wished to avoid.32

A bruising struggle over the unit rule began as soon as
the GOP gathered at Chicago for their conclave. The Grant

forces believed that a revival of the unit rule and the ap-

pointment of a dependable tool as temporary chairman were

 

32Garfield Diary, May 25 and 28, 1880. Garfield Papers.

450

essential to their cause. The fate of the rule, the restora-
tion of which might well have given Grant the nomination, was
tied to the chairmanship. With the right man in the chair the
old rule might be restored, a bitter floor fight such as had
erupted over the same issue in 1876 avoided and the Grant men
placed in command of the convention. The plan was essentially
sound and workable, but Sherman's and Blaine‘s supporters
learned of it in time to forestall the Grant men's scheme. At
his very first meeting with his fellow-at-large delegates,
Garfield reported that he exhorted his colleagues to oppose
the unit rule and support the district rule boldly and aggres-
sively. With this in mind, he proposed they join with those
who believed such matters overshadowed in significance the
outcome of anyone's candidacy. His opinion ultimately won out
and gained the support of Blaine's backers, as well. As chair-
man of the national committee, Don Cameron played a key role
in the Grant plan, yet his was a vulnerable position. Thus,
when Blaine and Sherman leaders discovered what was going for-
ward, their threat to oust Cameron from his office was enough
to discourage his efforts and insure the appointment of a
neutral temporary chairman, George F. Hoar.33

The Republican meeting opened in Chicago on June 2 and
did not adjourn until June 8. It was the longest convention
in GOP history and one of its most exciting. Conkling’s
waspish and sarcastic efforts to manage things touched off

33Leon B. Richardson, William E. Chandler: Repablican
(New York, 1940), pp. 250-52 and Garfield Diary, May 29, 1880.
Garfield Papers.

451

what proved to be a series of bitter encounters with his op-
ponents. On the second day, the convention heard the report
of the committee on permanent organization and chose Hoar as
its permanent chairman. During the evening session, a motion
was made (and ultimately tabled) to bring in the rules com-
mittee report before that of the credentials committee, al-
though the convention had agreed to hear the latter first.
Conkling sought to block this maneuver with an amendment,.but
was defeated by a substantial margin. During the unit rule
after the unanimous vote of a delegation had been challenged.34

Early on the third day of the convention the way was
opened for Garfield when Conkling proposed the following res-
olution: ”Resolved, as the sense of this Convention that every
member of it is bound in honor to support its nominee, who-
ever that nominee may be; and that no man shall hold a seat
who is not ready to so agree.” Clearly, Conkling sought to
bind to his man, if nominated, the numerous delegates who took
strong exception to Grant, the third term or both, and to ban-
ish any uncompromising anti-Grant delegates. A voice vote on

'noes’ which Conkling

this resolution revealed a scattering of
determined to ferret out through a roll call. Although only
three West Virginians spoke up under these trying circumstances,
Conkling was quick to demand their removal. This time he won
a good deal of support, but a clever and conciliatory speech
by Garfield swayed the convention toward a moderate course on

34Smith, Life aadeetters of Garfierg, II, 968 and
Richard C. Bian, Conventioa:pecisions and VotingReggrds (Wash-

ington, 1960), pp. 110-11.

452

this issue and Conkling was moved to acquiesce.35

As the credentials committee, itself embroiled in a heat-
ed contest, was not yet prepared to report, the convention
agreed to hear but not to act upon the rules committee report.
Their most significant proposition spelled out and upheld the
privilege of each delegate to vote and See his vote recorded,
the unit rule notwithstanding. A minority report for the most
part pled for the retention of the unit rule. At this point,
and before any debate had taken place, the convention took up
the long delayed credentials report. The committee, after
struggling long and heatedly over some fifty cases, had come
up with a long majority report and a still bulkier minority
report. After spending considerable time on preliminaries,
the delegates finally began the explosive task of settling
state contests. Here the crucial point was reached with Ill-
inois, where the party managers were accused of disregarding,
during the state convention, the delegates selected by dis-
trict conventions. Instead, they had substituted, through a
special committee, Grant men for the original delegates. The
pro-Grant national committee had-seated the delegates, but the
anti-Grant majority on the credentials committee reversed this
decision while the minority upheld the national committee.
The majority report for the Illinois contests was upheld only
after separate roll call votes for three districts had ended

in small but consistent majorities for the anti-Grant forces.

 

35Bian, Convention Decisions, p. 111 and Smith, Life and
Letters of Garfield, II, 971-72.

453

Kansas presented a similar problem; again the state convention
and certain districts had elected different delegates. In
this case, the majority report offered a compromise by which
the ten contesting delegates would share Kansas’s votes. The
convention accepted this proposal by a large majority. In
West Virginia, the committee again faced the fundamental ques-
tion of whether to seat district or state convention chosen
delegates. This time, perhaps because of weariness as much
as anything, the majority report inconsistently sided with the
state convention, whereupon the national convention accepted
the minority report for the first time.36

After finishing with its credential work, the convention
returned to the question of the unit rule. The Grant men, who
now undoubtedly saw the handwriting on the wall, tried to put
off a decision on this crucial issue. They proposed that the
convention begin at once with the business of nominations.
Again Garfield emerged as a leader among the anti-Grant forces,
vigorously supporting the majority report and the rules com-

mittee chairman. In a test of strength the Grant ment

s pro-
posal was rejected by some two hundred votes. The fate of the
unit rule had been determined and the majority report was ac-
cepted by acclamation.37

Except for its statements‘on the nature of the Constitu-

tion (”The Constitution of the United States is a supreme law,

 

36Richardson, William E. Chandler, p. 254 and Bian, Con-
vention Decisions, pp. 111-13.

37Bian, Convention Decisions, p. 113.

454

and not a mere contract.”) and popular education (”The work
of popular education is one left to the care of the several
states, but it is the duty of the National Government to aid
that work to the extent of its constitutional power.”), the
platform did not move beyond the politically commonplace. It
aroused no debate and was approved by a voice vote. But at
this point, an amendment was introduced supporting the Presi-
dent‘s efforts on behalf of civil service reform and calling
upon the executive and legislative branches to join in a con-
certed effort to enact the merit system. In the debate that
followed several outspoken anti-reform men made their views
perfectly clear, while others came to the aid of the cause and
the administration with the result that the resolution passed
easily.58

The speeches nominating Blaine and Grant were a study in
contrasts. Blaine was the first of the major candidates to
be presented to the convention. His strategy called for James
Joy, the powerful Michigan railroad magnate, to do the honors.
The presentation could have scarcely been bungled more effec-
tively. On the other hand, Conkling's Speech on Grant's be-
half, was a classic example of gilded age political oratory.
Unfortunately, Conkling's sarcasm and disdainful attitude to-
ward the other candidates, as well as his earlier ill-tempered
efforts from the floor, did much to reduce the effectiveness

of his performance. Moreover, anti-third term sentiment was

 

38Bian, Convention Decisions, pp. 113-14.

455

strong and Grant's shortcomings while occupying the White
House were still fresh in the minds of the delegates.39

It now fell to the reluctant and uneasy Garfield to sing
the praises of the third and final major hopeful, John Sher-
man. After listening to the exaggerated rhetoric of the pom-
pous Conkling, he undertook to present his man with an extem—
poraneous effort that emphasized the seriousness of the work
at hand by briefly outlining the history of the GOP and lec-
turing his listeners on the urgent need for party harmony.
After describing the type of man the presidential office de-

‘s career in the

manded, Garfield went on the sketch Sherman
public service, concluding with a formal nomination in which
he spoke Sherman's name for the first time during his entire
presentation.4O Following upon the heels of Conkling’s high-
ly affected and sharply partisan presentation, Garfield's mod-
erate and able speech struck a responsive chord among many of
his listeners. Surely, this along with his earlier contribu-
tions from the floor, boosted his stock among the delegates
as a likely and attractive compromise candidate.

Throughout the first seventeen ballots the strength of
the three major contenders remained very nearly as it had been
on the initial vote, while none of the minor nominees -- Win-

dom, Washburne and Edmunds -- showed promise of emerging as

compromise candidates. This situation was nearly unchanged

 

39Bian, Convention Decisions, p. 114.

4OGarfield to Lucretia Garfield, June 6, 1880. Garfield
Papers. Bian, Convention Decisions, p. 114.

456
after a 28th roll call had been taken. The convention then
voted, by a comfortable margin, to adjourn over the protest
of Conkling. The results of the first balloting of the fol-
lowing day showed a small break toward Sherman, whose total
rose to 116 thanks to a shift by Edmunds backers. The Grant
and Blaine blocs held firm. On the 34th ballot, Grant rose
to 312, 67 votes shy of the 379 necessary for victory. Sher-
man, who had risen to 120, fell to 107, while Blaine held his
ground at 275. However, it was on this poll that a shift be-
gan that would nominate Garfield. Ever since the second roll
call, with the exception of the 14th through the 17th ballots,
he had been receiving one to three votes, but now Wisconsin,
whose 20 votes had been split four ways, put 16 votes in his
column. On the next ballot, Indiana shifted from Blaine's
camp into Garfield's column with 27 tallies to boost his total
to 50. At the same time, Grant held firm, while Blaine and
Sherman began to fade. On the last ballot, Grant's faithful
306 stayed with him, but a massive defection of Blaine and
Sherman supporters easily put Garfield over the top with 399
votes. The anti-Grant forces, which had defeated earlier ef-
forts on the part of the New York Senator to manage the con-
vention, had given Garfield the Republican presidential nomi-
nation. The vice presidential contest revealed a different
combination, one much like that which had nominated Hayes.
The great bulk of Arthur's support came from Grant men with

some little help from those in Garfield's camp, the Ohio

457

delegation in particular.41

The sharp and exciting struggle at Chicago had been vit-
ally interesting to Hayes. By the fourth day of the conven-
tion, Grant's nomination seemed out of the question to him.
The delegates dislike of his campaign managers (Cameron and
Conkling) and their tactics, anti-third term sentiment and
Grant's ”failure as President” led him to this conclusion,
wrote Hayes. The unit rule's defeat, an effort in which Gar-
field played a key role, pleased him greatly. He remarked to
his diary that another ”immediately valuable result . . .
(was) the condemnation Of the machine as organized and managed
by Conkling and Cameron”, and he probably believed, a commen-
dation of him and his pOlicy. Yet he was truly sorry, too,
that Grant, whom he called America's "first soldier and a man
of many sterling qualities” had been ”so himiliated and de-
graded . . . by his unprinCipled suppOrters." He determined
that he should recommend a single six year presidential term
in his last message to Congress.42

Hayes greeted Garfield's selection as his party’s standard
bearer, as ”the best that was possible” -- and ”altogether
good.” The convention’s achievements had been valuable, he
observed, again citing the rejection of the unit rule, the
third term and ”the rule or ruin Senators, who usurped the

power of the people.” He was personally very gratified by

41Bian Conventig_ Decysygaa, pp. 115-16.

 

42Hayes Diary, June 5, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayea, III, 600.

458
the nomination, he wrote, because it represented a defeat for
his bitter opponents and a victory for a staunch friend. Ohio
had once more been honored and civil service reform had been
endorsed. ”The sop thrown to Conkling in the nomination of
Arthur, only serves to emphasize the completeness of his de-
feat,” he recorded with obvious relish. Indeed, the egocen-
tric Senator had been ”crushed," he concluded almost gloating-
ly. But his mind turned quickly from the convention to the
coming campaign, which he predicted would be ”close and fierce"
with defeat quite possible.

The self-made man theme, he believed, must become the
watchword, the Slogan of the Garfield campaign and must be ex-
ploited in every possible way. ”The truth is no man ever
started so low that accomplished so much in all our history,”
he noted in a burst of enthusiasm. It occurred to him that a
campaign dwelling on ”personal characteristics” came along
about every twenty years and he cited the campaigns of Jackson,
Harrison and Lincoln. And now Garfield joined the list. ”The
boy on the tow path has become in truth the scholar and the
gentleman by his own unaided work. He is the ideal candidate
because he is the ideal self-made man. If he were not in pub-
lic life he would be equally eminent as a Professor in a Col-
lege, as a lecturer, as an Author, an essayist or a Metaphysi—

cian,” Hayes commented with satisfaction.43

!

Hayes continued to react enthusiastically to the convention s

—.

43Hayes Diary, June 11, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diarypand
Letters of Hayes, III, 601.

459
work -- moreover, he had high hopes for November. As soon as
Garfield returned to Washington, he was closeted with the
President for several hours. According to Hayes, he told the
nominee ”that his personal history as an ideal self-made man
would be the most popular force of the canvass.” As the nom-
inee ”was anxious to know the feelings of Sherman (whom he had
nominated) as to his loyalty to him,” Hayes sought to put his
mind completely at case on this matter. The office had sought
the man, Hayes believed, while self-seekers had been defeated.
His administration and all he had stood for had been endorsed,
while his enemies had been vanquished. He was elated: had
there ever been a convention that could ”Show as much good and
as little harm?” he inquired of Smith, who had observed the
proceedings in person. As for the nominee, no public man since
Franklin had been ”so completely the work of his own ambitious
labor.” This fact Should encourage America's ambitious young
men and win their support as well. The party should concen-
trate on capturing the allegience of the large body of "men
of no party ties,” Hayes advised. And if only the people could
be convinced that Garfield would be elected, he speculated, per-
haps they might ”carry several Southern States. What a victory
that would be: But --4 Despite GOP defeats and ’outrages',

Hayes hopes fer the South had not been entirely dampened.44

 

44Hayes Diary, June 15, 1880 and Hayes to William H.
Smith, June 18, 1880, in Williams, ed., piary and Letters of
Hayes, III, 601-02, 605-06.

CHAPTER 11

CONVENTION AFTERMATH:
A TAINTED VICTORY?

Although the work of the Republican National Convention
of 1880 may be quickly and rather simply outlined, it deserves
a second and somewhat more detailed review, especially as it
involves Garfield and Sherman. How was it that Garfield and
not Sherman emerged from this conclave as Hayes’s heir? How
and why had the candidate lost while his nominator won their
party's highest honor? And what of the convention's aftermath
and its impact on the Sherman - Garfield relationship?

If there had been any hope that Sherman would reCeive
the solid or nearly solid support of his native state, it was
dashed when a card signed by nine Ohio delegates appeared in
the Chicago papers the morning of June 2, stating that the
undersigned would vote for Blaine and not for Sherman. The
dissidents also pointed out that, significantly, the delegates
representing Hayes's and Foster's districts, as well as those
from Garfield's district opposed the choice of their state
convention. Among those opposing Sherman was S. V. Harkness,

11 em-

a partner and associate of John D. Rockefeller, who was
bittered against" Sherman, explained Foster, because of the

460

461
Secretary’s decision on Standard Oil's importation of hoop
iron. This ruling had cost Standard some $400,000 according
to Harkness, but apparently his feelings had not been discov-
ered until after he was chosen a delegate.1
The divided Ohio delegation played a crucial role in

's failure before the convention. After the initial

Sherman
ballots had demonsrated Sherman’s limited vote potential, Rich-
ard Smith observed that the Secretary’s major infirmity lay in
the Ohio delegation, who, were they unanimously and enthusias-
tically behind Sherman, could secure his nomination. He de-
clared that ”some of the Ohio delegation are not only voting
against Sherman, but sneering at him, and trying to impress
other delegations that Ohio's support is not sincere.” These
same detractors were backing Garfield, Smith said, although
they did so in the face of his objections. Garfield was a
sincere Sherman supporter, who would work for him until the
end while stoutly opposing any attempt to make him a candidate.
Nonetheless, as Smith hadereviously noted, Garfield might
emerge as a compromise choice, for his popularity was unques-
tionably widespread.2

Ever since reaching Chicago, Garfield had found himself
both pleased and embarrassed by the attention he received.

He was trying to keep a level head, he told his wife, but he

 

1Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 2, 1880, p. 1; Charles
Foster to John Sherman, June 23, 1880 and James Robinson to
John Sherman, July 1, 1880. Sherman Papers.

2Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 4, 1880, p. 1.

462
longed most of all to be away from ”the extraordinary passion,
suspicion and excitement” of the tumultuous gathering. He
had begun to feel fairly sure that both Grant and Blaine
would fail and perhaps because of this feeling, his own posi-
tion grew increasingly more uncomfortable.

You can hardly imagine (he wrote) the embarrassment

I have been in, from the moment of my arrival here --

by the number of delegates from all quarters who are

openly expressing the wish that I was the Ohio candi-

date. So much of this is said as to put me in con-
stant danger of being suspected of ambitious designs;

but I think I have been so prudent as thus far to

disarm most of the suspicious ones. I shall do no

act that will in the smallest degree be untrue to

myself or my associates -- and I do not (think) any-

thing will come out of the deeps to me. But I am

greatly surprised at the number of prominent dele-

gates who want to bring out my name.

Meanwhile, Richard Smith was observing that despite the
presence of several favorite sons, should Garfield’s name be
presented after a deadlock had clearly developed, it would
attract considerable support. He believed, however, that Gar-
field was not encouraging such a move and was sincerely back-
ing the Secretary. Former Governor Dennison came forward
with an explanation for the several reports of disloyalty on
the part of Foster and Garfield that had already reached Sher-
man. He related that Sherman's opponents were busy circulat-
ing rumors that Blaine and Grant supporters in several states,
including New York, were prepared to join in giving Garfield

the prize. This greatly annoyed Garfield, who, Dennison

claimed, was doing his best to check this effort. Sherman,

 

3Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, May 21, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

463

however, remained hopeful, assuring Dennison that the rumors
concerning Foster and Garfield did not disturb him. ”Their
fidelity now will be their strength hereafter. Above all I
hope that Ohio will yet give me its united support,” he said.4

Others were less optimistic about Sherman’s chances.
Garfield’s wife, a more perceptive observer in this case than
the Secretary, was admitting to her husband that she had begun
almost to fear that the party would turn to him, thus putting
him in a most difficult position given the presence of the
several frustrated candidates. On the preceding day, fresh
from the bitter struggle to abolish the unit rule, Garfield
had told to his wife that since writing to her the morning of
the 2nd,

the signs have multiplied that the convention is

strongly turning its attention to me. Large numbers

of men are confident that will be the result. I

should think there was something to it, but for the

contest I am to have with Conkling. If I win that

fight, it will be likely to embitter him and his

followers against me. If I lose it the convention

will lose its interest in me. So I am between two

fires.
On the following day, he reported to her that the talk of
taking him up continued to be embarrassingly commonplace. He
wrote thus:

As to myself -- I have only time to say that with-

out any act or word of mine to induce it, there has

been growing hourly a current of Opinion -- which,
were Ohio and I honorably free -- might nominate me.

 

 

4Cincinnati Dail Gazette, June 1, 1880, p. 1; William
Dennison to John Sherman (telegram), June 2, 1880 and John
Sherman to William Dennison, June 3, 1880. Sherman Papers.
Letterbook.

464

As I am situated -- until my full obligations are

discharged, I would a thousand times rather help

Sherman than to get it myself.5

In the terrific floor fight over the unit rule, Garfield's
effective leadership and influence was widely recognized.
Moulton reported to his brother-in-law that Garfield's answer
to Conkling had been splendid and that it was not certain what
might have been the outcome had he not silenced Conkling with
a timely effort from the floor. In a letter to Mrs. Garfield
reviewing the struggle over the reports of the Credentials and
Rules Committees, Garfield made this comparison: ”The mental
and physical strain of the week ending with two days and nights
of Chickamauga -- were hardly less than that which Chicago has
brought upon the men of this convention.” He felt he had been
more successful than most delegates in maintaining his com-
posure and this had been no mean achievement. For, he con-
fessed, the convention had often seemed more like Paris ”at
the height of the French Revolution than America.”6

As for his Speech nominating Sherman, a speeCh which drew
so much attention to the speaker himself, Garfield leaves a
somewhat ambiguous record. Writing to his wife on June 2, he
declared that it had been ”a frightful mistake” not to have
written his presentation before coming to Chicago. ”It now

seems inevitable that I shall fall far below what I ought to

 

5Lucretia Garfield to Garfield, June 4, 1880; Garfield
to Lucretia Garfield, June 3 and 4, 1880. Garfield Papers.

6Henry Moulton to John Sherman, June 4, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, June 6, 1880. Gar-
field Papers.

465

do,” he continued, while adding that the belief that he would
be given the nomination was gaining strength among many dele-
gates. If he could but escape from his dilemma and return to
his Ohio farm home, he would be contented. But after making
his presentation, he reported to Mrs. Garfield in quite another
vein:

I persevered to the end, in not writing a Speech; I

marshalled a few ideas in line, and left room in

their ranks for any things that might come from the

suggestions of the hour -- and in this, I think I

was fortunate -- for Conkling's speech gave me the

idea of carrying the mind of the convention in a

different direction. In that, I think I had some

success. At least, it was success of a better kind

than his.7

Others were of a similar opinion. The Springfield Repup-
lican spoke of it as being ”about the best” of the nominating
speeches and a few days later referred to Garfield‘s ”fine
oratory” at the convention. In answer to Sherman's message
of congratulations on his effort, Garfield telegraphed his
thanks to the nominee and admitted he had not written out his
speech, but had ”waited until after Conkling’s speech, and in-
tended it a reply (to) his methods.” In his autobiography,
Chauncey Depew singled out Conkling’s and Garfield's nominat-
ing speeches for special praise, giving them "the highest rank”
among convention orations. He then contrasted Conkling’s
speech (”perfectly prepared" and ”delivered with dramatic ef-

fect") With Garfield’s spontaneous effort. Garfield, says

Depew, "avoided the dramatic element, in which he could not

 

7Garfield to Lucretia Garfield, June 2 and 6, 1880.
Garfield Papers.

466

compete with Conkling, but delivered a speech along the lines
of the average thought and general comprehension."8

Garfield's stock was undoubtedly rising and it was com-
monly remarked that he had nominated himself -- not Sherman.
Indeed, Sherman was warned that in this Speech Garfield must
have intended to aid himself rather than the Secretary. Mean-
while, Garfield continued to be told of his developing strength,
it was even claimed that Mississippi would support him unani-
mously were the convention to reach an impasse.9 On June 5,
Sherman had received a ”Bulletin” declaring that a reliable
source reported that IoWa, ConneCticut and Indiana would go
for Garfield were no decision reached by the fourth ballot.
A dispatch appearing in the New York Herald predicted that
Garfield might be taken up if Sherman withdrew, noting that
as Sherman's nominator, ”his speech and manner, it is thought,
will make a very favorable impression on the convention." The
Herald pointed out that when Garfield’s selection by his dele-
gation to serve on the Rules Committee was announced it was
greeted by applause which indicated he had "not been forgot-
ten . . . in the calculation of thoughtful men.” One of Sher-

man’s informants at Chicago advised him that Foster had joined

 

8S rin fielayDaily Republican, June 8, 1880, p. 5; June
14, 1880, p. 4 and Garfield to John Sherman, June 6, 1880,

and Garfield to John Sherman (telegram), June 6, 1880. Sher-
man Papers. Chauncey M. Depew, My Memoirs of Eighty Years
(New York, 1922), pp. 120-21.

9Depew, Memoirs of Eighty Years, p. 121; Moore, ”Ohio in
National Politics,” p. 334 and H. C. French to Garfield, June
6, 1880. GarfieldoPapers.

467
with other delegates in a conspiracy to make Garfield a can-
didate and hand over Sherman’s supporters to him. It was
claimed that Garfield was fully cognizant of this scheme.10
On the eve of the balloting, Richard Smith made the fol-
lowing observation in his Gazette dispatch:

The Sherman managers are very hopeful to-night, but
their greatest source of weakness is the want of
compactness in the Ohio delegation. The vote of the
delegation will be thirty-four for Sherman, nine for
Blaine, and one for Edmunds. These ten will not vote
for Sherman, even if they could nominate him, while
the second choice of a large proportion of the thirty-
four is Blaine, unless Garfield should be entered.

In that event all the anti-Sherman men would vote for
Garfield, and he would have the solid vote of the
delegation. This is used as an argument by delegates
outside of Ohio in favor of Garfield. Indiana is
ready to support Garfield, also Connecticut, and it
is intimated that Conkling is more friendly to Gar-
field than to either Edmunds or Washburne. This

kind of talk is hurting Sherman, Without opening the
way to Garfield. Dennison, Foster and Garfield have
positively stated that Ohio has and will have no
other candidate than Sherman, and they intend to nom-
inate him, if possible, and they believe it possible.
If Sherman had the Ohio delegation solid he would be
nominated, and it is my opinion that if Garfield were
presented with Ohio solid at his back he would be
nominated.11

Smith's conclusion that Sherman now had more strength
than ever before was seconded in a message from Ben Butter-
worth to Sherman, but Butterworth also warned the candidate
that while he had ”enough generals" he did not enjoy "good
generalship” -- a fundamental weakhess in Sherman's effort
from its very inception. As the leader of the Buckeye contin-

gent, ”Grandmother D. (Dennison) lacks dash and decision,”

 

1O(”Bulletin”),_June 5, 1880. Sherman Papers. Moore,
”Ohio in NationaloPolitics,” pp. 333 and 333-34.

11Cincinnati Daily Gazette, June 7, 1880, p. 1.

468

Butterworth complained, ”and is never in possession of infor-
mation needful to necessary & prompt action.” Butterworth
had, therefore, taken it upon himself to assume by default
some of the leadership powers and now asked for Sherman's ap-
proval of his action. Sherman quickly authorized him to ne-
gotiate with his opponents' supporters. "Be firm & bold,” he
admonished him, and obviously troubled by the weakness of his
southern support, asked: ”What is the matter with Virginia,
Texas, Maryland and Souttharolina?” In Virginia at least,
Sherman's strategy of using federal officeholders to forward
his bid proved to be a disappointment, for some seven civil
servants who came to Chicago as delegates voted steadily for
Grant despite efforts of the Shermanites to detach them.12

Shortly after the balloting began on June 7, Sherman re-
ceived the following memo from Blaine -- a message that goes

1

far toward explaining just why Sherman s forces could not ef-

fect a shift of votes from Blaine to their man:

If Mr. Blaine permits his column to be broken,
his friends in Chicago say that Iowa, Nebraska,
Kansas, Nevada, California, Oregon & twelve votes
in the Territories will go to Grant. In addition
to this Mr. Elaine's Southern votes will go to
Grant, as also his vote in Deleware & that part
of N. J. led by Gen. Sewall, & also part of Indiana.

Don Cameron with Mr. Blaine out of the way
will recover a large part of the Pa delegation for
Grant.

12Ben Butterworth to John Sherman (telegram), June 7,
1880 and John Sherman to Ben Butterworth (telegram), June 7,
1880. Sherman Papers. Otis Russell to Warner Bateman, June
17, 1880. Bateman Papers.

469
Mr. Sherman meanwhile is not able to present a

united vote of his own state, one fourth of it stea-

dily refusing to vote for him. Senator Blaine's

friends are firmly convinced that to attempt to trans-

fer his strength to any other candidate would nomi-

nate Grant at once. >If that result is reached Mr.

Blaine & his friends are determined that none of

this responsibility shall lie at their door.
Sherman immediately notified Bateman that Blaine's convention
managers "advised strongly against any break in his forces”
and that Blaine concurred in this advice. Sherman also told
his managers that they should not submit to Grant's nomination
until everything possible had been done to defeat him. In a
second message, he stated that he favored Blaine over Grant
for the welfare of the party. "Though feeling personally
friendly to Grant," Sherman continued, ”I regard his nomina-
tion as the suicide of the Repn party."13

On the second day of balloting, Sherman’s hopes were
buoyed a bit by news from the Pennsylvania delegation, al-
though few seemed to share his optimism. McManes, the leader
of the anti-Cameron forces, promised to give Sherman at least
twenty votes as soon as Blaine‘s cause appeared hopeless and
wished the Secretary to know this. McManes, however, appears

3

to have been bent on destroying Don Cameron s influence in

the Pennsylvania GOP and so stuck with Blaine until the big

break for Garfield. Moreover, on this same day, Garfield was

also being urged to throw his weight and presumably Sherman s

votes behind Blaine, lest Grant emerge victorious. Wharton

 

13”Memo by Blaine”, June 8, 1880; John Sherman to Warner
Bateman.(telegram), June 8, 1880. Sherman Papers. Two un-
signed penciled messages signed by Sherman. Bateman Papers.

47o

Barker, just returned to Philadelphia from Chicago was tele-
graphing Schurz that were Sherman only out of the way” Gar-
field could be named. He pleaded with Schurz to ”do What you
can, otherwise I fear it will be Grant.”14

By early afternoon Sherman apparently recognized what
was happening at Chicago. He wired Dennison qualified per-
mission to aid the movement to Garfield, just as Dennison was
wiring to ask Sherman to release the Buckeye delegation.
”Whenever the vote of Ohio will be likely to assure the nom-
ination of Garfield I appeal to every delegate to vote for
him,” Sherman's instructions ran. "Let Ohio be solid."
Dennison was told to convey his plea in the Secretary‘s name
to all who had supported him. Shortly before receiving this
message, Bateman had wired Sherman that ”Wisconsin and Indiana
have voted for Garfield with much enthusiasm, our vote is
restive.”15

In a second message Bateman conveyed the sad tidings to
his chief. ”The movement for Garfield,” he reported, "swept
with lightnihg rapidity through the Convention while I was
writing the last telegram." He called it ”the escape of a
tired convention.” Sherman wired in return that Garfield's

nomination was "generally satisfactory." But in his message

 

148. B. Benson to John Sherman (telegram), 9:45 A.M.,
June 8, 1880. John Frazier to John Sherman, Sept. 6, 1880.
Sherman PaperS.. Stephen Elkins to Garfield (telegram), June
8, 1880. Garfield Papers. Wharton Barker to Carl Schurz
(telegram), June 8, 1880. Schurz Papers.

15John Sherman to William Dennison (telegram), 1:48 P.M.,
June 8, 1880 and Warner Bateman to John Sherman (telegram),
June 8, 1880. Sherman Papers. . .

471

to the nominee, Sherman congratulated him ”with all . . . (his)
heart” adding with apparent sincerity that Garfield had ”saved
the Republican party & the country from a great peril & as-
sured the continued success of Republican principles."16

Although the convention’s work met with general approval
within party ranks, it also left a legacy of distrust, suspi-
cion and ill-feeling that would plague the Ohio GOP for some
time to come. This was a product not only of the conduct of
Ohio's nine anti—Sherman delegates, but also of the growing
suspicion of disloyalty on the part of Garfield and Foster.
Indeed, soon after the party had gathered in Chicago reports
came to Sherman claiming that Governor Foster coveted a place
on the ticket with Blaine or, if Garfield took the prize,
Sherman's old seat in the Senate. Garfield's obvious popu-
larity on the floor and in the galleries (which Barker claimed
he had managed), his conspicuous and well recognized role in
the fight against the unit rule and Conkling and his methods,

's nominator placed him an extreme-

and his position as Sherman
ly vulnerable position. As it turned out, Lucretia Garfield
could not have been more correct when she wrote on June 4

that she was ”half afraid” that the convention would turn to
her husband. 'She had warned him that under those circumstances
”the place would be most unenviable with so many disappointed

4.;

16Warner Bateman to John Sherman (telegram), June 8, 1880.
Sherman Papers. John Sherman to Warner Bateman (telegram),
June 8, 1880. Bateman Papers. John Sherman to Garfield (tele-
gram), June 8, 1880. Garfield Papers. _

472

candidates.” And so it proved to be.17

Following the convention, Sherman received many letters
purporting to explain why his drive for the nomination had
failed so miserably. The shrewd Ben Butterworth said that
"the one great need . . . was the presence on the field of
pap competent Major Genl. to whom all information should have
been given & who should have passed upon all moves to be made
in the presence of the enemy.” He testified to Dennison's
and Bateman’s loyalty, advisihg that they had done all with-
in their power for Sherman. Moreover, he wrote, Garfield had
in every way been loyal. The want of a single powerful lead-
er in the Sherman camp, one who would have been ”quick to dis-
cern & prompt to act, lost the battle,” he insisted. Butter-
worth contended that it would have beeh as simple to initiate
a break for Sherman as for Garfield. The opportunity had
presented itself, but with ”so many brigadiers firing at cross
purposes . . . the confidenCe of the Blaine men in our ability
to control the field” was shaken. On the other hand, Grant’s
supporters were led as an able general leads his forces. So
it was for the most part with Blaine’s managers, too. Thus,
while Hale and Conkling were constantly aware of what was
happening, Dennison simply was not.18

The reports of other participants and observers generally

 

17Moore, "Ohio in National Politics,” p. 333 and Lucretia
Garfield to Garfield, June 4,1880. Garfield Papers.

18Ben Butterworth to John Sherman, June 11, 1880. Sher-
man Papers.

473

re-enforced Butterworth's conclusions, especially his exonera-
tion of Garfield. Thus William Henry Smith, who some years
later would reverse himself, was quick to warn Sherman that
"there may be an effort made to poison yr. mind towards Gar-
field, but believe nothing to his injury. He was loyal to
you, and behaved honorably in the highest degree.” In a very
long letter, Moulton, too, cautioned his brother-in-law against
giving credence to accusations of disloyalty among his sup-
porters, although there had been and would be a good deal of
talk. He singled out Garfield for special attention with
these words:

Whoever may have been guilty of lukewarmness or bad

faith, it is certain that General Garfield can not

be charged with either. I consider him entitled to

your full confidence and I took considerable pains

to ascertain the facts before I arrived at my con-

clusions. I am particular about this matter be-

cause the charge of treachery was freely circulated

from the day the convention met until it closed.
As far as he could tell, he said, there had been ”a precon-
ceived effort among the Grant men to create and circulate the
impression that you were betrayed by your friends." Grant's
backers did this with the object of spreading dissension with-
in Sherman's ranks. Henry Cabot Lodge of the Massachusetts
delegation and Charles Grosvenor of the Ohio delegation also
vouched for Garfield's loyalty and told of his refusal to be

used as a compromise candidate despite separate requests from

each of them.19

 

19William H. Smith to John Sherman, June 11, 1880 and
Henry Moulton to John Sherman, June 11, 1880. Sherman Papers.
Smith, Life and Letters of Garfield, II, 978, 981.

474

In its review of the convention, the Cincinnati Daily
Gazette explained Garfield's selection in this way. After
the delegates had got the feel of things, first Sherman and
then Washburne were brought forward without attracting signif-
icant support. Thereupon, Garfield was tried and this exper-
iment met with success. Once the break for Garfield started
it was unstoppable and despite Garfield's efforts to dis-
courage it, it was not within his power to prevent his nomina-
tion. It was the product of a feeling that had been develop-
ing inside and outside of the convention ever since its second
.day.20

Richard Smith, the probable author of this analysis, also
made a personal report to Sherman in which he laid the Secre-
tary’s failure primarily to divisions within the Ohio delega-
tion, claiming that with a solid delegation he might have suc-
ceeded. He admitted that Sherman's interests could have been
handled more effectively, but he spoke of the inevitability of
the outcome, a decision "reached in a panic, when it was any-
body to beat Grant on one side and Elaine on the other." Had
Sherman "been a delegate and not a candidate," Smith argued,
the convention would have tapped him. But, the Cincinnati
journalist hastened to add, Sherman must not infer "from this
that Garfield did anything intentionally for himself, or that

he did not work faithfully” for Ohio’s candidate. Such a

 

2OCincinnati Daily Gazette, June 11, 1880, p. 4.

475

supposition would be unjust, for the result came despite Gar-
field. As Smith pointed out, Garfield enjoyed ”the advantage
of being on the ground. The delegates saw and heard him; he
took and when looking around for someone to unite upon they
fell upon him.f'21

The dejected Sherman had another explanation for a defeat
that had injured him deeply. "The fates seemed to be against"
his success, he told one supporter. Had the contest between .
Elaine and Grant been less bitter, had "either . . . volun-
tarily broken I would have been the nominee," he wrote. As
it was the move was left up to the Washburne and Edmunds people
and although the Massachusetts delegation finally came over to
him it was too late. Had they come to his aid Monday night he
was very certain he would have won the nomination. He had as
yet seen nothing to diminish his faith in Garfield, yet he
occasionally could not Vhelp feeling that the course of his
friends and neighbors -; the nine who refused to vote for . . .
(him) throughout the long controversey . . . (might) have been
influenced by a desire to accomplish what actually occurred."
Then Sherman unburdened himself of some of the suspicions that
were undoubtedly running through his mind as contradictory re-
ports of Garfield’s and Foster's conduct came across his desk.

He wrote as follows:

If he (Garfield) is responsible for (the anti-Sherman
delegates) it will raise a suspicion as to his hon-
orable conduct. He was instructed by the Convention

_1_

21Richard Smith to John Sherman, June 11, 1880. Sherman
Papers. _

476

to do all he could to support me, he was selected
by me as a delegate at large after personal con-
versations with him, and if then he was in any way
privy to a conspiracy to defeat me it must in the
end impair his position, and if I believed it I
could not as a matter of course, hold office under
him. I have seen no evidence of the truth of such
a suspicion, but it does seem to me that he did all
he reasonably could have done to advance my nomina—

tion, and that his own was a natural escape from an
embarrassed position by a tired convention.2

By the end of June Sherman claimed he had truly become
adjusted to his defeat and in fact had been troubled only by
doubts concerning Foster and Garfield. He had now relieved
»Garfield "from all suspicion of perfidy" but Foster's behavior
and reports thereof had Vpainfully impressed" him to the det-
riment of the Governor. 'Meanwhile, Garfield was being assured
(as he quite desperately wished to be) that knowledgeable men
had been telling Sherman of his loyalty. But Foster continued
to hear that Sherman was ﬁggqss" although in his letters to
the Governor he Spoke kindly of Garfield and expressed a de-
sire to renew his Hold friendly relations? as Foster put it.23

Warner Bateman, Sherman's chief confidant in his bid for
the nomination, now came forward with a long and detailed re-

port which opened by pointing out that on the whole the con- .

vention's outcome had been a pleasant one. He reported that

 

22John Sherman to o. A. Trimble, June 12, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Letterbook.

23John Sherman to H. c. Hedges, June 28, 1880. Sherman
PaperS.. Letterbook. Charles Foster to Garfield, July 20,
1880. Garfield Papers. .

477
Grant’s support had been exceptionally "solid . . . well man-
aged and aggressive? but nonetheless many Sherman supporters
had really expected Grant to triumph or withdraw early in the
balloting. When it became clear that Blaine supporters of-
fered Sherman his only hope, a protracted effort was made by
Dennison, Garfield, Butterworth and Bateman to persuade Elaine's
managers to aid Sherman, but to no avail. In Indiana, Harrison
had spoken very well of Sherman and indeed had for his own part
favored him until Monday evening. But from that time on he
moved toward Washburne and Vtalked less and less encouraging-
ly." Late Monday, Harrison told Bateman he would move to break
the deadlock very shortly. When Massachusetts shifted to Sher-
man, it was hoped New Jersey, Indiana and perhaps Wisconsin
might join the movement, but this did not materialize. As for
suspicions of disloyalty concerning Garfield, Bateman believed
that if there had been any premeditation in the break for Gar-
field, the plotters must have been few in number. Certainly
the movement succeeded because the anti-Grant men were im-
patient and discouraged by the failure of those they had tried
to nominate and increasingly fearful that Grant would triumph
unless something was done immediately. But in addition to
this he felt certain that one or two Sherman men had been
scheming to 'try outt Garfield. Nevertheless, Bateman insisted:
VI want to say here that after much reflection and a close watch
of Garfield from the beginning I am satisfied_hg;wa§ (not) a
party to it. He was in his conciliatory and philosophic way I

am satisfied perfectly loyal to you and did nothing and said

478
nothing that was inconsistent with the truest friendship to
you." Bateman continued:
It would perhaps be well for you so to say to him.
During the progress of the last ballot, in much
apparent emotion, he came to me to inquire what it
meant. He protested in the utmost earnestness that
he had nothing to do with the movement and asked me
whether I thought he had. He said he would rather
be shot to death by the inch than to have furnished
any just ground for such suspicion and desired if I
should vindicate him against any charge of unfaith—
fulness to you.2
A few days after his initial report, Bateman wrote to
Sherman offering this critique of the strategy used by Sher-

ts supporters in the convention. He believed their tac-

man
tics during the balloting had been wrong. Massachusetts had
been prepared to go for Sherman early on Monday, New Jersey
was ready to help when called upon and Harrison believed he
could deliver 25 votes for the Secretary. Had all these votes
been called for and delivered, along with help from Wisconsin,
South Carolina, Connecticut, Vermont, Virginia, and Minnesota,
Sherman could have surged forward with from 160 to 170 votes.
But Sherman leaders were advised to avoid anything that would
aid Grant or hurt Blaine. Aid from Indiana would hurt Blaine
and help from Massachusetts would undermine Edmunds and pos-
sibly add some Vermont votes to Grant’s column. Obviously,
Sherman faced a serious dilemma. His prestige at Chicago was

reduced and his potential support was committed to others.

This only served to strengthen Elaine and prevented his

 

24Warner Bateman to John Sherman, June 12, 1880. Bateman
Papers. Letterbook.

479

supporters from breaking to Sherman. Moreover, Sherman would
have been better served had the interests of others had less
influence in the Sherman camp, Bateman claimed. As it was,
his nomination was gone of the 'might have beensl’" Sherman‘s
modest vote was used to demonstrate his essential weakness and
this in addition to faulty management prevented his drawing
the anti-Grant men to his side.25

Five days later, Bateman told Sherman that Hale and Chand-
ler were dismayed soon after the balloting began; in fact by
the evening of the first day of balloting, they were "thor-
oughly demoralized.” Had it not been for the steady aid of
pretended friends of Sherman, Elaine's forces would have given
way to Sherman. In fact, the Ohioans had agreed to an adjourn-
ment with the understanding that Elaine's forces would come
over to Sherman, only to have them reverse themselves later
and call for Sherman’s surrender to them. Foster, too, thought
it was more logical for 95 votes to go to 285. But these 285
votes included from sixty to seventy Sherman votes, Bateman ‘
noted. After asking Sherman to destroy this letter, Bateman
asserted that, frankly, they had been ”paralyzed by the joint
efforts of Dennison's vanity and Foster's service to others."
Sherman had brought together the necessary support and cleared
the way for Garfield's success, Bateman concluded. Within two
days, Bateman saw fit to repeat his advice that were Garfield
elected, Foster must not be allowed to go to the Senate --

25Warner Bateman to John Sherman, June 16, 1880. Bateman
Papers. Letterbook.

480

and offered further 'evidence' of Foster's double-dealing.26

Other reports of the convention shed somewhat different
light on Garfield's success and Sherman’s failure. The Spring-
field Dailprepublican reported that James Robinson had re-
lated that Ohio Shermanites had concluded on Tuesday morning
that their cause was hopeless and were in the process of poll-
ing their southern allies to see how many would go over to
Blaine. Some nineteen agreed to do so and forty-three Ohioans
decided to join them, but the flight to Garfield began before
they had an opportunity to make their move. In his report to
Hayes, William Henry Smith contended that ”the accidental
presence of Garfield in the Convention“ explained his nom-
ination, for the anti-Grant forces would have combined as
easily on another man.27

As for Wisconsin’s key role in Garfield's victory, John
B. Cassoday, a member of that delegation, offered an insider’s
view of Wisconsin's break in a statement appearing in the
Janesville (Wisconsin) Gazettg shortly after the convention.
"In view of many wild and untruthful statements made in re-
gard to the alleged combination or agreement by which the
nomination of Mr. Garfield was effected, it may be well to
state the exact facts and thus dissipate all speculation,"

Cassoday observed. Monday, after twenty-eight inconclusive

 

26warner Bateman to John Sherman, June 21 and 23, 1880.
Bateman Papers. Letterbook.

27Springfield Dailprepublican, June 15, 1880, p. 4 and
William H. Smith to Hayes, June 15, 1880. Hayes Papers.

481

ballots, some twenty Wisconsinites, fearing that unhealable
rifts in the GOP might result if either Blaine or Grant were
chosen, visited Massachusetts headquarters. In their meeting
they concluded to send a committee (Gov. John G. Smith, Ver-
mont; Harrison, Indiana and Cassoday, Wisconsin) to consult
with the Blaine and Sherman managers. Hale, Frye and Hamlin
were obdurate, and in Spite of being told Indiana was restive
and that Blaine could not expect additional votes, they in-
sisted victory would be theirs in Tuesday's balloting. A
visit with Sherman spokesmen, who had no advice to offer, was
interrupted by the arrival of Elaine’s lieutenants calling to
confer with the Sherman men. The following morning, after
learning that the Blaine - Sherman conclave had proved fruit-
less, the Wisconsin delegation, meeting informally with six-
teen delegates, decided that Vunder all the circumStances, the
wisest thing for them to do was to unite, sooner or later, and
make a break for Garfield, who had become exceedingly popular
with the entire convention.“28

When the convention reconvened, Cassoday continued, Har-
rison’s and Washburne's Connecticut, Illinois and New Jersey
supporters were told that Wisconsin would switch to Garfield
unless more Washburne votes were in the offering. Harrison
responded by expressing his great respect and faith in Gar-
field, and while promising nothing, he left the impression

that should Wisconsin break for Garfield, Indiana would follow

28St. Paul Pioneer_ng§§, June 9 (7), 1880, clipping in
Garfield Scrapbook, Campaign #13. Garfield Papers.

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482
suit. washburne’s vote increased slightly on the 32nd and 33rd
ballots with Indiana providing twelve of his forty-four votes.
But Washburne's Indiana support fell to six votes on the 34th
roll call, at which time Wisconsin decided to switch to Gar-
field and did so. None of Elaine's managers, nor any Ohio
delegate, nor Garfield himself had any idea that any such move
was about to be made. Wisconsin's break was brought about by
the Blaine and Sherman managers' determination to stand by
their candidates until the very end and the belief that Gar-
field so clearly enjoyed everyone’s "confidence . . . that any
reasonable prospect of his nomination" would crack the solid
backing of the major contenders.29 '

Frederick Jackson Turner's father, commenting on Wiscon-
sin’s break for Garfield, made this statement: "It is absolute-
ly certain that no delegate outside our delegation suspected
that anything of the sort was about to happen. They could
not have done so, for we didn't know ourselves what we were
going to do until a moment before."30

In a letter to Carl Schurz, young Henry Cabot Lodge, a
member of the Massachusetts delegation, explained the Bay
State's course and offered this comment on the Sherman effort:

Our policy was simple. The first day we devoted our-

selves to holding Edmunds & thereby all the minority

candidates firm. Tuesday we turned over to Sherman
not in hope of nominating him but to define our

 

--v.‘

Garfield Scrapbook, Campaign #13. Garfield Papers.

30Herbert J. Clancy, The Presidential Electign of 18§q
(Chicago, 1958), p. 114.

483

position & hold him up which we did successfully at

a very critical moment. Sherman had no chance. We

worked hard to make a combination on him Monday

night & failed utterly. Garfield was thoroughly

loyal to Sherman but there was no heart in the move-

?:?§1 Ohio did not mean business & every one felt

Yet Sherman seems to have grown more and more certain that
he not only could have, but should have been his party’s choice.
As he met delegates and observers of the convention and receiv-
ed a fuller and more exact picture of the inner workings of
the convention, he confided to Bateman, it appeared "to be
perfectly clear that . . . (his) nomination was not only prac-
ticable, but, all things considered, would have been best for
the party and the country." Sherman claimed this would have
served to shift the emphasis of the campaign to questions of
business and finance where the GOP had the advantage.32

In 1883, Wharton Barker claimed that he had, with Gar-
field’s prior knowledge and tacit approval, engineered the
latter's victory in 1880 at Chicago. Barker's revelations re-
vived the discussion of the convention within Sherman‘s circle
of friends. Bateman professed great surprise that Garfield
should have been privy to Barker’s plans. He thereupon res
viewed Garfield's conduct and while noting some of his short-
comings as a Sherman worker, concluded that it ”was all con-

sistent with the most sincere good faith and fidelity" to Sher-

man. He described once again Garfield’s reaction to his

 

31Henry Cabot Lodge to Carl Schurz, June 27 ( ), 1880.
Schurz Papers. - .

32John Sherman to Warner Bateman, June 29, 1880. Bate-
man Papers.

I"

 

484

nomination, insisting that "he seemed so dumbfounded and ter-
rified, and presented as perfect a picture of distress . . .
(that it) would be uncharitable to suspect him of any compli-
city with any scheme aiming at his nomination."33

Shortly after the convention had adjourned, Barker had
written to Garfield of his months of labor on his behalf. He
claimed the outcome had been ”in exact accordance with the plan
arranged and to Genl. Streight and Gov. Pound much honor is
dus.” As for his motives in this episode, Barker declared
that he had been bent on destroying the Cameron machine and
constructing in Pennsylvania ”a party of true Republicans, led
by politicians to be sure, but under the direction of manu-
facturers, merchants and bankers, a party of the people."311L

Despite Bateman’s message Sherman now seemed ready to
believe that Garfield had been disloyal to him. "I fear," he
wrote to Bateman, Vthat the evidence is conclusive that long
before Garfield voluntarily assumed to manage my canvass at
Chicago he consented to and aided in the most effective way
to place himself in nomination. While I say this to you who
more fully than any one shared my confidence I do not wish it
repeated to others and will do nothing to deepen the fault of
one who now is beyond human jurisdiction. Perhaps the temp-

tation was too great for poor nature."35

 

33Werner Bateman to John Sherman, July 18, 1883. Bateman
Papers.

34Wharton Barker to Garfield, June 15, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

35John Sherman to Warner Bateman, July 23, 1883. Bateman
Papers.

485

Some weeks after eommenting to Sherman on the 1883 Barker
revelations, Bateman had a long conversation with Benjamin
Harrison. This exchange led Bateman to discuss again the 188C
convention with Sherman. Harrison had told Bateman that he had
visited Garfield on Sunday, June 6, and mentioned the possi-
bility of Garfield’s being brought out as a compromise choice,
adding that he would enthusiastically support such a move.
Garfield answered that it was impossible for him to be a can-
didate and it appeared to Harrison that he was giving no en-
couragement to a Garfield boom. After giving up the attempt
to work out a common strategy among those outside the Grant
camp, Harrison, whose delegation wanted to break for him, but
bowed to his determined opposition, had decided to wait for a
break in the deadlock which came when Wisconsin went for Gar-
field. Before Wisconsin was reached on the 34th ballot one
of its delegates visited Harrison, Bateman continued, and in-
formed him Wisconsin would break for Garfield and called upon
the Hoosiers to join them on the 35th ballot. Harrison pledged
them cordial backing and on the following roll call all except
14 Indianians voted for Garfield. Later Harrison received
Cassoday's congratulations for the contribution he and his
state had made. Bateman concluded that no matter what he
might have done or left undone, the result would have been the
same unless perhaps he had protested in person to Garfield

against the effort to nominate him.36

_ I. __

——— __i

36Warner Bateman to John Sherman, Aug. 8, 1883. Bateman
Papers. Letterbook. Springfield Daily Republigan, June 10,
1880, p. 4 and Harry J. Sievers, Benjamin Harrison, vol. II:

Hoosier Statesman, 1865-1888 (New York, 1959), p. 172.

486

In 1895, prompted by the appearance of Sherman’s memoirs,
Richard Smith, in a long letter to William Henry Smith, dis-
cussed Sherman's 1880 bid for the nomination. Smith had
warned Garfield that he should ready himself for a break to
him, but Garfield had replied that "such an occurrence would
not be acceptable to him, that he would be accused of disloy-
alty to Sherman and that above all other things he wished to
avoid," Smith recalled. He still believed that Garfield had
acted loyally for Sherman, noting that Garfield had come to
him and requested him to "defend him against charges of dis-
loyalty that were then being made by Grant men and Blaine men
and others." It is not likely that Richard Smith persuaded
William Henry Smith to his generous point of view, for several
years earlier, in a memo of one of his retrospective conver-
sations with Hayes, Smith had written thus:

We agreed, too, as to Garfield's treachery to

Sherman. I related how Thomas M. Nichol informed

me of the plan of Thad. C. Pound, Jere M. Rusk and

other Wisconsin Congressmen (to throw the vote of

that state to Garfield as was done), some weeks before

the convention, and Gen. Hayes told me of several

conversations with Garfield before the convention.

One was to this effect: That Gen. Garfield came to

him and said he was going to be embarrassed in pre-

senting Sherman’s name on account of the mention of

his own name in connection with the nomination.

The nineteenth century closed with Garfield’s contempor-
aries unable to agree on the question of his loyalty to Sher-
man's cause in 1880. It can be safely assumed, however, that

37Richard Smith to William H. Smith, Oct. 21, 1895.
Smith Papers. William H. Smith, Memorandum of a conversation
with Hayes, Aug. 9, 1880. Hayes Papers.

487
he was neither guilty of "treachery" as some would have it,
nor wholly without fault, intentional or otherwise. For
while he labored loyally for Sherman at Chicago, he did so
reluctantly and with the knowledge that there were those who
had been, or under the proper conditions would be, working to
nominate him. But then Hayes, Schurz and other 'friends’ of
Sherman also were aware of this situation. Garfield was not
a genuine admirer or a close personal friend of the Secretary's
and held out little hope for his success. Like other Sherman
endorsers, including Hayes, he viewed the Secretary‘s candi-
dacy as a part of the effort to stop Grant and thus save the
party from an anticipated disaster. Obviously Garfield was
not at all eager to become entangled in Sherman's drive, but
it is equally obvious that the realities of state and national
politics left him with no real choice in the matter. He might,
however, have made his position as a dark horse clearer to
Sherman -- been more candid and frank -- and appeared less
willing in their conversations to undertake his assignment as
delegate-at-large and nominator. Nonetheless, it is doubtful

’8 course, for

that such candor would have changed Sherman
surely he tapped Garfield in part because he wag so prominent
a dark horse.

At Chicago, Garfield's conspicuous success in the fight
against Conkling and the unit rule undoubtedly enhanced his
popularity and boosted his presidential stock, but again he

did only what his conscience, his position and political real-

ism demanded of him. That his conduct was consciously dictated

488
by a desire to win the nomination in 1880 or that he was sur-
reptiously following a preconceived strategy is not plausible.
Garfield might have done more to discourage his supporters
both before and during the convention, although he undeniably
did on more than one occasion discourage the use of his name.
Yet perhaps in politics such rebuffs can never be made to ring
quite true. He might also have expressly and dramatically for-
bidden anyone to support him as the Wisconsin delegation did,
but then he was unconvinced that anything would happen alcng
these lines until it was too late for such a disclaimer to
have much effect. Although Sherman's cause appeared hopeless
by Tuesday morning, Garfield's selection was far from inevit-
able. Moreover, he was not blessed with the 20—20 hindsight
of his critics and detractors which might have allowed him to
nip in the bud those movements that would bring him an unex-
pected and unwelcome prize. Perhaps those who found him
guilty of treachery were motivated in part at least, by a de-
sire for a neat and Simple explanation for Sherman’s defeat
and/or further support of their belief that Garfield was de-

ceptive and lacking in moral courage.

CHAPTER 12
CONCLUDING AND OPENING SCENES

During its final months, the Hayes administration was
upstaged first by the presidential campaign and then by Gar-
field's cabinet-making efforts. Nevertheless, Hayes pushed
on to the end, justifying his southern policy and repeating
his conviction that universal education alone could rid the

'3 major con-

South of slavery’s bitter heritage -- the nation
cern. He also defended his civil service efforts against
liberal criticism and reiterated his plea for congressional
cooperation in this area. Although carefully avoiding any
involvement in the campaign itself, he did not hesitate to
offer Garfield his opinions concerning campaign tactics --
nor was he silent while the president-elect made ready to
succeed him in the White House.

”A pen picture? of Hayes appearing in the Philadelphia
21mgs, that spring had given its author, H. V. Boynton, an
opportunity to express publicly some of the long smoldering
resentment he felt toward the administration and in parti-
cular its southern strategy. In an extended diary entry,
Hayes responded privately (as was his life-long habit) to

several of Boynton's charges. He put the matter in this way:

489

490

First, the southern policy is re resented as very
different in practice from what its friends' under-
stood it would be when they supported it. I know,
of course, very little of what was expected. The
truth is, I had no confidants in regard to it. My
judgment was that the time had come to put an end
to bayonet rule. I saw things in the South which
could only be accounted for on the theory that the
War was not yet ended. Many Southern people evi-
dently felt that they were justified in acts which
could only be justified in time of war towards the
common enemy. My task was to wipe out the color
line, to abolish sectionalism, to end the war and
bring peace. To do this I was ready to resort to
unusual measures, and to risk my own standing and
reputation with my party and the country.1

Although the southern policy was undertaken hopefully and
sincerely, Hayes viewed it firSt of all as a necessary and ex-
pedient program that might well yield but few of the hoped for
results. Whether it succeeded or failed, it was certain to
strengthen the party for 1880 and this, too, was a fundamental
consideration. With few exceptions, Hayes's political wisdom
was underestimated by his contemporaries, a fact now recog-
nized by most students of his era. However, W. T. Sherman,
for one, thought him "a better politician than John Sherman
or Blaine or any of the rest of them." As he remarked to Tom
Donaldson, the "Hayes policy of generosity and conciliation
towards the South had forced them to show their true character.
They had repelled his peace advances, and had compelled the
North to see that they could not be trusted."2

As evidence of the risks he was willing to take as regards

 

1Hayes Diary, April 11, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 594-95.

2Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, Dec. 20, 1879.

491

the South, Hayes cited the appointment of Key to a cabinet
position and of many another southern Democrat to lesser fed-
eral posts, including a woman as postmaster of Louisville,
all in the face of sharp criticism. "My object was to end
the war --,9 he said, "restore confidence in the South in the
justice and good will of a Republican Administration. The
army was withdrawn because I believed it a constitutional duty
and a wise thing to do.” And with the exception of Boynton,
he claimed, there was no original supporter of pacification
who did not now support it. He denied, and it was clearly a
sore point with him, that the ”tried Republicans at the South
were totally abandoned. As for charges that his policy had
all but ruined the Republican party in the South, he pro-
tested that the ?practical destruction of the Republican or-
iganization in the South was accomplished before" his southern
strategy was announced or his civil service order was issued.3

Although he and Garfield had just finished fighting Dem-
ocratic attempts to amend federal election laws through the
use of riders, he was by no means ready to abandon his paci-
fication policy. When it came time to appoint a successor to
Postmaster Key, who had been appointed to federal judgeship,
Hayes was determined to choose a well known southerner. He
seriously considered three men: Joshua Hill of Georgia, James
Alcorn of Mississippi and Horace Maynard of Tennessee. He

finally settled on the latter. According to John Sherman,

 

3Hayes Diary, April 11, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 595.

492
Hayes also wished to ?recognize the conduct of Gen. Longstreet
as one who, having served in the rebel army, had fairly acqui-
esced in the results of the war and had acted as a true Re-
publican.?4 He ultimately appointed Longstreet to fill May-
nard’s old post as minister to Turkey.

During July, Hayes gave a good deal of thought to civil
service reform. Perhaps, he thought, he should point out in
his final message that real reform could not be achieved with-
out the aid of legislation. When The Nation attacked his ap-
proach to reform in its July 8th issue, he was a bit perturb-
ed. "Agreeing with The Nation on this subject," one diary
entry ran, ?I would like to make it clear to all such friends
of the reform, that public opinion and Congress must be right
on the question before we can have a thorough and complete
Reform. The President has neither time, nor authority, nei-
ther means nor men, to gather the information required to make
.appointments and removals.? Earlier, while listing twenty
areas in which his administration had "been successful in a
marked degree? Hayes had made this assessment of his reform

endeavors:

In fine, I have not done as much to improve the sys-
tem and methods of the civil service as I hoped and
tried to do, but I have improved the service in all
of its branches until it is equal to any in the
world -- equal to that of any previous Administra-
tion. Look at its purity, efficiency, freedom from
scandals, and decide as to its merits.

 

4John Sherman to J. Hill, May 22, 1880. Sherman Papers.
Letterbook. -

5Hayes Diary, July 9; 11 and April 11, 1880, in Williams,
ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 608, 609, 597.

493

While acknowledging that Hayes had improved the service
somewhat, The Nation had scolded him for using his appointive
power "lavishly to reward party and personal services." He
had been especially generous in rewarding those men -- "good,
bad, or indifferent? -- who had a hand in his gaining office.
The reformers were left feeling betrayed, The Nation continued,
believing along with the spoilsmen that Hayes’s reforms lacked
support, were impermanent and would not outlive his adminis-
tration. Moreover, it charged, the supposedly effective rules
laid down in both the Post Office and Treasury departments,
rules in which Hayes took such pride, had been violated with
regularity.6

Ardent reformers like John Jay, George W. Curtis and
Jacob Cox had long since become impatient with Hayes's approach

to reform. Writing to Cox in May 1878, Curtis had wondered

11

when the President would, in a special message outlining a

reasonable system,? call upon Congress for legislative action.
"I think you hit the nail squarely," he continued, "in saying
that he has broken up one system without establishing another.
This leaves him open to the charge of a peculiarly personal
administration.? Indeed, the last two years of Hayes’s ad-
ministration generally bear out this assessment. In a letter
to Schurz in 1878, John Jay reported that ?great disappoint-
ment has been expressed at the non-appearance of the Special

Report on Civil Service Reform which the President last year

 

6The Nation, XXIX (Sept. 11, 1879), 168.

494
announced to Congress as presently forthcoming.? Even though
the Democratic majority prevented congressional action, it
was imperative that a proposed system be brought before the
public.7

Hayes returned to the subject of reform in three succes-
sive and lengthy mid-July diary entries. As was his custom
when critics touched a sensitive nerve, he reviewed the sub-
ject historically, rationalized his deficiencies and called
attention to his achievements -- all in the privacy of his
journal.8 These confidential expositions relieved tensions,
buttressed his self-confidence and reassured him of the wisdom
of his conduct -- and all without ever going before the public
on the subject. Such an act would have been repugnant to and
out of character for Hayes, while his diary offered a far more
acceptable -- and comfortable -- outlet for his private
thoughts.

It was obvious that Hayes was certain he could carry re-
form little further. The principle features of a thorough-
going reform could not be enacted in the face of House and
Senate opposition, he told his diary. The burden of guilt,
so to speak, lay with Congress and not with the chief execu-
tive. Only with congressional cooperation could the reforma-
tion be made truly ?radical, thorough, and complete. . .? He

noted approvingly what Garfield had said on this subject:

 

7George W. Curtis to Jacob Cox, May 3, 1878. Cox Papers.
John Jay to Carl Schurz, Nov. 7, 1879.

8Hayes Diary, July 12; 13 and 14, 1880, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 610-11, 611-12, 612-13.

     
  

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495

"’Experience has proved that with frequent changes of Admin-
istration, no system of reform can be made effective and perm-
anent without the aid of legislation.'? But he admitted,
Congress would not be moved to take effective action until
forced into it by public opinion.9

The initial and principle step toward an effective and
thorough reconstruction of the System, Hayes insisted, would
be the abolition of "congressional patronage," plus the res-
toration of those presidential appointive powers that Congress,
notably the Senate, had seized. A major aim of his efforts
had been to "break down . . . congressional patronage, and
eSpecially Senatorial patronage." And despite intense oppo-
sition and all manner of hostility, he recorded proudly that
he had enjoyed "great success." Even so much as an attempt
at congressional dictation had ended, he continued, and his
exclusive claim to fill executive appointments was implicitly
recognized. He had concluded, it appears, that he could for-
ward the cause of reform ?in no way so effectively as by
rescuing the power of appointing to office from congressional

leaders."10

Beginning with the selection of his cabinet in the face
of widespread congressional criticism, he had repeatedly
challenged Congress. Thus he had asserted his authority and

independence until he could now appoint a "collector of the

 

9Hayes Diary, July 13, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary_and
Letters of Hayes, III, 612.

1OHayes Diary, July 14, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, III, 612-13.

   
  
  
   
  
 

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496
port and a postmaster at Philadelphia almost without a sug-
gestion even from Senators or Representatives! Is not this a
good measure of success for the Executive to accomplish almost
absolutely unaided in Congress?" he asked.11 This then, was
Hayes's answer to the criticisms voiced by the reform breth-
ren. He had set out to reach a goal that he believed to be
an essential prerequisite for a comprehensive and drastic re-
form effort. It was a politically realistic goal and under
the circumstances, an attainable if transitory achievement.
When it came to reform, he had determined to take half a loaf
rather than none, unlike his stand on resumption and riders.
He counted on his strategy to hasten the growth of reform
sentiment in Congress and among voters. Moreover, it was al-
so the approach which he personally favored and which not only
reflected his political philosophy, but brought into play the
strongest features of his character and personality. The is-
sues involved seemed clear-cut and indisputable to Hayes and,
unlike Garfield, he appeared to be wholly free of any doubts
that his was the 'right' side in the struggle.

It comes as no surprise that when Garfield's letter of
acceptance appeared, Hayes was not entirely satisfied. Gar-
field had "made a mistake in not speaking more explicitly on
the civil Service," Hayes observed. He then made a character-
istic reference to politicians' tendency to "trim, to talk so

equivocally as to have the benefit of opposing nobody,? which

 

11Hayes Diary, July 14, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary_and
Letters of Hayes, III, 613.

497

was, he concluded censoriously, ?contemptible." As for him-
self, he habitually Spoke on public issues "squarely and with
distinctness? if he spoke at all. And while he did not ques-
tion the correctness of the candidate's true reform views, he
believed his letter did raise some disturbing questions. A
month later, perhaps mirroring his evaluation of Garfield's
character and moral courage, he agreed with William Henry
Smith that the letter was not forceful. But, he added, "his
speeches . . . are good and we must bring to the front his
record.?12

Unlike Garfield, Hayes failed to appreciate the degree
of polarization within Republican ranks or that his adminis-
tration was a burden as well as a boon to the candidate. Cer-
tainly there were those who feared that Garfield might con-
tinue Hayes's civil service policies unchanged. Thus Garfield
felt compelled to frame a letter of acceptance that would
allay such fears, unite rather than distract his party and
heal wounds incurred during the struggle for the nomination.
He was determined that neither Stalwarts nor Half-Breeds should
have grounds for complaint. So he had in effect modified the
.platform’s civil service plank by declaring that he would con-
fer with men ?whose knowledge of the communities in which the
duties are to be performed best qualifies them to aid in mak-

ing the wisest choice? when making appointments. As he told

 

12Hayes Diary, July 19, 1880 and Hayes to William H.
Smith, Aug. 19, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of
Hayes, III, 614, 622. . -

498

Whitelaw Reid, he had ?paid all to the regulars that they . . .
(could) reasonably ask? and in the process had "considerably
tried the temper of the independents.?13

Garfield answered critics of his civil service reform
statement by calling attention to his record on the subject,
for he was obviously angered by their tendency to treat his
letter as if he had ?never spoken before.? Thus he told
Schurz that no congressman had ?said or done more in behalf
of real reform? than he had. What is more, he was seeking to
"shift the battleground from the person of the appointee to
the principles on which the office shall be held. He assured
the mildly critical John Sherman that he had no intention of
retreating on the issue, but was "fully persuaded that Con-
gress? should attack the subject and establish tenure stand-
ards so as to end capricious removals.11+

Garfield was clearly eager to correct Independent Repub-
licans' notions concerning his reform declaration. He asked
Burke Hinsdale to write a letter to The Natiqn or better yet
persuade E. L. Godkin to adopt his view of civil service re-
form. Moreover, he would like to see an article covering
these views, which were as follows:

Earnest as Pres. Hayes’ efforts have been -- he has

made the mistake of merely antagonizing Congress --

and trying to effect a reform without legislative

aid. I would shift the line of battle and, by pre-

senting in a message a well considered plan of civil
service, urge its adoption by Congress as law.

 

13Whitelaw Reid to Garfield, June 26, 1880 and Garfield
to Whitelaw Reid, July 21, 1880. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

14Garfield to Carl Schurz, July 22, 1880 and Garfield to
John Sherman, July 2, 1880. Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

499

This would perhaps include a four year term for clerks, spe-.
cific rules governing removals and provisions shielding them
against removal for any other reasons. He believed this ap-
proach would ?bring all the reform sentiment of the county to
bear upon Congress, and would sooner or later result in a law
which would greatly narrow the field of uncertainty, that now
makes the life of an appointer so miserable." Moreover, this
would have a permanence that mere executive action did not
offer.15

Obviously, Garfield still did not see eye to eye with
Hayes on civil service reform. As for Hayes's order banning
participation of civil servants in caucuses and conventions,
this not only interfered ?with the lawful rights of citizens,"
but placed ?the badge of political disability? upon them, he
contended. And while his letter of acceptance was no attack
on Hayes, he insisted that officeholders should not be denied
the rights of all citizens. Briefly, he had attempted ?to
lift the movement for reform to a higher line which should
harness Congress into the work of making a permanent better-
ment of the service.? He also considered that Hayes had erred
in standing against consultation with congressmen. He agreed
that congressional dictation was wrong, but better presidential
appointments could be made after consultation. If Indepen-
dent Republicans adopted these views, they could make his

15Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, July 25, 1880, in Hinsdale,
ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 454—55.

5OO

"lead effective for good." If they took it to be "a surren-
der to the machine" they would "hurt the cause and cripple"
him.16

Although he was discreet, Hayes did not hesitate to offer
Garfield campaign advice and analyses from time to time. In
a mid-June memo, he had defined the issues of the campaign.
First, there was attempt, "in Congress, in the Supreme Court
and in the Country at large to re-establish the State Rights
doctrine of Calhoun and the Rebellion" against the determined
resistance of the GOP. Second, there was the fact that a Re-
publican administration and its measures had brought prosperity
to both the government and the people. Thirdly, he believed
the campaign should focus on the ”character, life, and Services"
of its candidate.17

Later, as the campaign began to gain momentum, Hayes ex-
pressed his conviction that Garfield could speak out with maxi-
mum effectiveness on what he called the congressional Democrats’
sanctioning of "the practical nullification of the Fifteenth
Amendment." But, he cautioned, probably with the Stalwarts
in mind, it must "be calmly done." He should, for example,
call attention to the Democratic platform and the wholesale
denial of the Negro's political rights in South Carolina, Lou-
isiana and Mississippi. One could easily demonstrate, he con-

tinued, that because of the Fifteenth Amendment's virtual

 

—— ——

16Garfield to Burke Hinsdale, July 25, 1880, in Hinsdale,
ed., Garfield-Hinsdale Letters, pp. 455-56.

17Hayes to Garfield, July 16, 1880. Garfield Papers.

501

nullification, the GOP had in recent years been denied control
of both houses of Congress. Moreover, the South’s failure to
keep its promise to uphold this amendment was "the cause of
the failure of all efforts towards complete pacification. It
is on this hook that the bloody shirt now hangs," Hayes stern-
ly insisted.18

It was true enough that during the greater part of the
post re-construction era, Hayes's party lacked the political
power necessary to guarantee the civil rights amendments.
However, Hayes did initiate a southern policy that placed
greater emphasis on building white Republican strength in the
South while conserving, perhaps augmenting, the black vote.
And at least during his own administration, he did not join
the growing number of northerners who agreed generally with
those southerners who claimed that the freedman was as yet
unprepared for full citizenship. Nor did he accept the re-
lated notion that genuine sectional reunification and inter-
sectional economic development required the elimination of
phg divisive element in American political life -- the Negro.19
He was not, as one recent study has claimed, reverting to
bloody shirt tactics,2O but he did feel that he had been be-

trayed by some southerners and he was prepared to make the

 

18Hayes Diary, July 21, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 615.

19Vincent P. De Santis, Republicans Face the Southern
Question: The New:erarture Years; 1817-1897 (Baltimore, 1959),
PP- 74é75.

2OHirshon, Farewell to the Bloody Shirt, pp. 45-61.

502
question of equal political rights for all citizens a major
campaign theme.

How would Hayes solve the persistent racial and economic
problems plaguing his country? Education was the answer --
"universal education,? in which the federal government would
play a significant role, and here, too, he and Garfield were
in essential agreement. Education, not the bloody shirt it
turned out, was the mOtif of a speech by Hayes at a great re-
union of Ohio soldiers later in August. He summarized his re-
marks in this manner:

. . . I tried to show that to complete the victory
gained by the Union arms it was necessary that the
means of education should be amply provided for all
parts of the country. Wherever universal education
prevails in the United States, the results of the war
are cheerfully accepted and the constitutional amend-
ments embodying those results are inviolable. Ignor-
ance is the enemy most to be dreaded by the friends of
free government. Ignorant voters are powder and ball
for the demagogues. The right to vote will lose its
value in our country if ignorance is permitted to pre-
vail in any considerable portion of it. The school-
master alone can abolish the evils which slavery has
left in the South. Universal education is the only
safe foundation for universal suffrage. Men cannot

be fitted for the duties of citizenship in a republic
without free schools. Jefferson said: 'Without edu-
cation universal suffrage will be a farce and a tra-
gedy, and perhaps both. In too many instances elec-
tions are already the farce he predicted.

(Therefore, he concluded, "let us hasten to provide for all our
countrymen the means of instruction, that we may escape the
tragedy which Jefferson predicted."21

Education and time, these were Hayes's (and Garfield's)

studied answers to the southern problem. These ameliorative

 

21Hayes to ?Dear Sir", Aug. 16, 1880, in Williams, ed.,
Diary_and Letters of Hayes, III, 620-21.

503

forces offered the best hope for both black and white in that
section. Education held the key to the South's economic, po-
litical and social problems and it alone would insure the per-
manence of our form of government. But many a Negro, believing
that his race was being totally abandoned, reacted to Hayes's
southern policy with growing suspicion and criticism. Never-
theless, they would continue to align themselves, when cir-
cumstances permitted, with the GOP and not with the Democrats
or the Independents. Despite the real or apparent indifference
of the Republicans toward the Negro in the post Reconstruction
era, his best hope still lay with Lincoln's party rather than
with the Democrats, wrote Frederick Douglass some years later.22

Not only was Hayes full of optimism and ready with advice
for Garfield as the campaign gained momentum, but he was also
ready to contribute prudently to bringing off a Republican vic-
tory. He tried to promote party harmony through his appoint-
ments during this period, especially in key states like Penn-
sylvania. Although he advised Garfield that reports that he
would take to the stump in California during his trip to the
West Coast that summer were erroneous, he was sure he could
help out and would gladly do so. However, it would not in-
volve ?improper, or questionable methods." Hayes also cau-
tioned Garfield, confidentially, to avoid the inkstand like
the plague -- ?write no letters to strangers, or to anybody
else ppfpoliticsﬂ23 Garfield did not heed this bit of advice,

22DeSantis, Republigap§_ﬂggp_phe Southern estion, p. 87.

25Hayes to Garfield, July 23 and 26, 1880. Garfield Papers.

504

but carried on a most extensive political correspondence
throughout the campaign. For unlike Hayes during the 1876
presidential contest, Garfield played a very active role in
managing affairs all through the summer and fall.

Most Republican leaders (including Garfield) considered
New York's vote crucial to the party’s success and early in
the campaign Garfield came under heavy pressure to make a trip
to New York City to assuage Conkling and his faction. But the
candidate was most reluctant to undertake such a fence-mending
trip at any time. He resisted advice to go East early in July,
a move which Hayes believed ?would have been almost suicide.”24
Later that month, Garfield declared to Hayes that while the
New York meeting was ?greatly against . . . his judgment," he
was persuaded that it would be ?perilous” to reject the coun-
sel of the National Committee. However, he would go only "on
the condition that Mr. Sherman & leading men of all shades of
republicanism? should be in attendance. Would Hayes, on his
behalf, ask Sherman to be in New York City on August 5? He
assured the President that he would make no concessions to
?sulking? New Yorkers, that he would not offer gpy Republican.25

He was undoubtedly worried about the reaction of Inde-
pendent Republicans to the proposed conclave. He remarked
that although Independents were already ?disappointed and

worried? by what they called his capitulation to party Regulars

 

24Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson, July 10, 1880.

25Garfield to Hayes, July 31, 1880. Smith Papers. Notes
on the Garfield-Conkling controversey. Almon F. Rockwell
Papers. Library of Congress.

505

in his letter of acceptance, they had stood by him nonetheless.
Might not a New York parley "positively alienate? the very
faction whose votes might decide the election’s outcome?
"This is the one question that gives me panic," he confessed.26

Nevertheless, a variety of circumstances made the New York
trip imperative. Conkling's forces feared a replay of the
Hayes administration, Garfield was told, and of losing their
position as "the Republican party of New York." They also
feared that Schurz would be carried over into Garfield's cab-
inet and were especially fearful that Sherman would again head
the Treasury. Moreover, reconciliation was significant inso-
far as raising a substantial amount of campaign funds among
New York capitalists was concerned.27 ~Not only was Stephen
Dorsey (Secretary of the Republican National Committee) press-
ing for the meeting, but for some time he had been laying the
groundwork for it. Thus any backing off by Garfield became
nearly impossible. Dorsey’s presumption in arranging for and
then announcing the meeting angered some party leaders, in-
cluding Blaine, Marshall Jewell (Chairman of the Republican
National Committee) and W. E. Chandler. In fact, "as an orig-
inal question," Garfield was told, they would have advised

him not to come East.28

— -—“-‘— r-

26Garfield to James G. Blaine, July 30, 1880 and Garfield to
William Chandler, July 26, 1880.; Garfield Papers. Letterbook.

27Whitelaw Reid to Garfield, July 30, 1880; Charles Henry
to Garfield, July 26, 1880 and William Chandler to Garfield,
July 24, 1880. Garfield Papers.

28Stephen Dorsey to Garfield, July 25, 1880 and William
Chandler to Garfield, July 28, 1880. Garfield Papers.

506

'safe’ speeches

Garfield made over two dozen brief and
enroute to and from the August 5th gathering and while in New
York City did his best to reassure New York's Regulars that
they and their chief would be fairly treated. As it turned
out, Conkling chose not to be among the bevy of party leaders
of every hue who gathered at the Fifth Avenue Hotel. Although
Garfield conferred with Conkling's lieutenants, he was piqued
by his behavior. But he came away better aware of Conkling's
waning strength, secure in the knowledge that he had made a
generous and conciliatory gesture and feeling that if he had
made the trip "without mistakes" he would be pleased. Unfor-
tunately, the participants Came away with conflicting views
of just what the meeting had settled. Conkling’s men be-
lieved that New York party leader and banker, Levi Morton,
stood a good chance of becoming Garfield's Treasury chief and
that New York’s patronage would be in the hands of its Regulars.
Garfield came away with no such understanding. While he be-
lieved that ?probably much good had been done," he felt sure
in his own mind that he had participated in "no trades" and
that "no shackles" bound him.29 I '

With but few exceptions, the collection of assessments
went merrily forward during the campaign in spite of Hayes ban
on such activity. Jay Hubbell, Chairman of the Republican

Congressional Committee, wrote to Garfield complaining that

 

29Garfield to Hayes, Aug. 18, 1880. Smith Papers. H.
Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics,
1877-1896 (Syracuse, 1969), p. 109 and Garfield Diary, Aug. 7,
1880. Garfield Papers.

 

507
Schurz's stand against assessments in his department would cost
them $100,000 because the example would injury fund raising
elsewhere. By late August, Hubbell was complaining to Gar-
field that he could not ?even think of the Interior Department
without using cuss words.? They ought, he said, to have raised
$20,000 there, but would not realize $5,000. In mid-October,
Hubbell wrote to Sherman complaining that he was without money
to pay campaign bills, after going all out to aid the campaign
in Ohio and Indiana. He needed $20,000 within a week to en-
sure a Republican majority in the next House. Would Sherman
do what he ?consistently" could do to have the Treasury Depart-
ment "pay up this week," he asked.30 Obviously assessments
upon federal office holders were still commonplace. It was
reported for example, that levies upon postal employees ranged
from three per cent to seven per cent of their salaries. In
Garfield’s own state, congressional and national committees
had assessed all federal personnel while turning a deaf ear

to pleas to leave some room for state assessments.31

As the campaign moved into the late summer, the President
and the man who would succeed him continued to agree on most
campaign issues. In a letter to an Iowa correspondent, Hayes

quoted approvingly from these remarks of Garfield’s during

 

30Jay Hubbell to Garfield, July 8; Aug. 23 and Oct. 18,
1880. Garfield Papers.

31H. S. Neal to William Chandler, Oct. 2, 1880. Chandler

Papers. Springfield Daily Rgpublican, Oct. 26, 1880, p. 4 and
George Nash to Garfield, Aug. 19, 1880. Garfield Papers.

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508

his visit to New York City: "'These veterans of the war meet
tonight to stand guard around the sacred truths for which we
fought.'" What were these truths, asked Hayes rhetorically?
They were ?national unity, the supremacy of the National Govs
ernment, and the equal rights for all men before the law."
The inviolability of the union had been permanently establish-
ed and although federal supremacy was still questioned and
challenged by some, it seemed certain to be accepted and sus-
tained. Hayes thought, however, that one could not deny "a
dangerous practical denial" of the Fifteenth Amendment. "One
of the most cogent arguments in favor of extending the right
'of sufferate to the freedman was that it would furnish them
with the means of self-protection, he told his Iowa friend.
But experience had shown that the grant of suffrage "to be ef—
fective, must be wielded by the skill and intelligenCe which
training and education alone can give.? Thus to insure and
protect equality, America must take another step and provide
that education for all its citizens "without which wise and
honest self-government? was not possible. Hayes earnestly
wished to see New England’s concept of universal education
become a national commitment, institutionalized and legisla-
tively guaranteed.32

By August, the campaign was becoming more heated and,
contrary to the standard interpretation, the tariff question

had already emerged as a significant issue. For example,

 

32Hayes to Frank Hatton, Aug. 24, 1880 and Hayes Diary,
Dec. 8, 1880, in Williams, ed., Diapy and Letters of Ha es,
III, 623-24 and 629. —

 
  
  
  
    
  

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509

Pennsylvania'

s State Committee was trying to reach industrial
workers with a campaign song entitled ?The Workingman‘s Guide"
which assured them that Garfield and Arthur favored the pro-
tective tariff. They were further advised to protect them-
selves by rejecting free trade -- for it was protectionism
that had brought an increase in their wages and full employ-
ment. And from Ohio's Mahoning Valley, Garfield was informed
that the tariff issue would seriously hurt the Democrats among
the laborers there. The National Committee was also beginning
to emphasize the tariff issue. They began to send out more
tariff material and prepared an appeal to labor and business
interests on the grounds that rising wages and prices had
come thanks to Republican protectionism. Edward McPherson,
Secretary of the Republican Congressional Committee, informed
Garfield that he was preparing some ?special? tariff documents
to be used in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and other industrial
states.33

The Republicans continued their emphasis on the tariff
issue -- apparently to good advantage. Jewell thought that
even Democratic businessmen were becoming increasingly uneasy
about Democratic control. The tariff for revenue only plank
had begun to hurt the Democrats and the GOP was quick to take
advantage of the situation. Their national committee made

ready to distribute a tariff tract containing a government

 

33H. E. Gordon to Garfield, Aug. 28, 1880; B. s. Higley
to Garfield, Aug, 28, 1880; Marshall Jewell to Garfield, Aug.
26, 1880 and Edward McPherson to Garfield, Aug. 21, 1880.
Garfield Papers.

  
   
 
  
   
  
 
  
  
  

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510

comparison of wage rates in the United States with those in
Europe. One hundred thousand copies in English and fifty
thousand in German had been ordered, for Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, New York and Connecticut were calling "very loudly"
for such literature. From Cleveland, Edwin CoWles reported
that he had prepared a tariff circular playing upon the theme
of high tariff -- high wages and vice versa and had distri-
buted twenty thousand copies in English and German. He and
his people also hoped to publish a weekly paper emphasizing
the tariff issue, in English, German and Bohemian editions
during the duration of the contest.34

Their unexpected defeat in Maine shook the Republicans,
although Blaine for one had warned Jewell not to "believe the
bragging of the papers or the stump orators" who visited him.
Jewell blamed poorer business and labor conditions there than
elsewhere for the defeat, but assured Garfield that he would
now arouse businessmen and get them to open their purses. In-
deed, businessmen disturbed by the Maine defeat did begin to
contribute generously to the Republican effort. It was at
this point that Blaine apparently recommended that the party
drop the bloody shirt and take up protection as the main

issue.35

The tariff issue did come to the front increasingly in

34Marshall Jewell to Garfield, Sept. 7, 1880 and Edwin
Cowles to Garfield, Sept. 11, 1880. Garfield Papers.

35Marshall Jewell to Garfield, Sept. 14, 1880 and
William C. Hudson, Random Recollections of an Old Political

Reporter (New York, 1911), p. 112.

   

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511

Ohio, Indiana and New York, while the sectional issue received
less attention. It appeared to Jewell that the GOP campaign
was ”settling down largely into a tariff fight" while the
Democrats concentrated on personal attacks, i.e., the accusa-
tions that had been brought against Garfield involving the
DeGoyler pavement contract and Credit Mobilier during the
1870's.35 The candidate himself urged the pushing of the
business question, especially the tariff issue, while not over-
looking or overdoing the "solid South” argument. Indeed, it
was reported that in a state like Vermont, the bloody shirt
still seemed most effective.37

It was the tariff question that was given special at-
tention by the Republicans, who continued to make much of the
Democrat's tariff for revenue only plank. Moreover, Hancock’s
October 7th statement, declaring the tariff to be essentially
a local issue, played into the Republican's hands. Jewell
assured Garfield that in both New Jersey and Connecticut the

' and audiences

campaign was centering on the 'business issue
seemingly never tired of hearing the tariff question discuss-
ed. Jewell claimed that if New Jersey, Connecticut and New
York were carried it would be on the tariff question. The

Maine setback had aroused the business community and "set them

 

36Springfield Daily Republican, September 28, 1880, p. 4;
September 29, 1880, p. d; October 5, 1880, p. 4 and Marshall
Jewell to Whitelaw Reid, Sept. 27, 1880. Whitelaw Reid Papers.

Library of Congress.

37Garfield to John Sherman, Sept. 25, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Springfield Daily Republican, September 7, 1880, p. 4.

512

to thinking," another correspondent told Garfield.58 Indeed,
Wharton Barker reported that his Philadelphia businessmen's
committee had raised $60,000 by early October, nearly two-
thirds of which had gone west, while one-third of the $30,000
gathered by the Union League had been similarly dispatched.
A week later, he reported that they had raised and used some
$105,000. ”The business, tariff fight . . . had done the work"
and the businessmen were with them, Barker reported, pleased
with the change in campaign strategy.39

Following GOP victories in Indiana and Ohio (where they
gained six House seats), it was commonly stated that the tariff
question had been the “chief issue" that had changed votes in
those states. However, the southern question, fear of a change
and an appreciation of the Hayes administration had also play-
ed significant roles in these states, it was claimed. On the
other hand, a friend of Hayes admitted that it was "surpris-
ing how many Republicans are out with the present Administra-
tion.” He had discovered that in many a district, it was "the
heaviest load the party . . . had to carry."40

Although Hancock's October 7th tariff statement undoubt-
edly hurt the Democrats, it was probably offset in some states

by the Morey Letter which appeared two weeks later. This

 

38Marshall Jewell to Garfield, Oct. 8 and 15, 1880 and
Thomas McLain to Garfield, Sept. 27, 1880. Garfield Papers.

39Wharton Barker to Garfield, Oct. 7 and 16, 1880. Gar-
field Papers.

4OSpringfield_Qaily Republican, October 18, 1880, p. 4
and Richard McCormick to Garfield, Sept. 18, 1880. Garfield
Papers.

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513
letter, purportedly in Garfield's hand, announced his opposi-
tion to the restriction of Chinese laborers emigrating to the
United States. Democratic leaders initially believed it to
be genuine and made generous campaign use of it. It soon be-
came apparent, however, that the document was a forgery and
the use of such a tactic even drew fire from Democratic papers}1L1
Garfield's loss of California and Nevada may have been due to
this letter, but his opposition to unilateral restriction had
been well known since 1879. Moreover, since it was generally
accepted as a forgery in most papers some days before the elec-
tion, it probably worked to his advantage in the key November
states.

As it was, Garfield's popular margin was less than 10,000
votes, although he won an impressive 214 to 155 electoral vic-
tory. To no one's surprise, New York, where the Democratic
nominee for mayor or New York City probably lost that state
for Hancock, decided the election’s outcome. But the presence
of a Greenback candidate in the field and the renewal of the
charges brought against Garfield during the 1870's served to
reduce his margin and kept him from winning a popular majority.
Despite Hayes's hopes to the contrary, the South went solidly
for Hancock. The GOP did, however, improve its showing over
that of 1876 and although it lost Delaware, New Jersey, Nevada
and California, it was by a margin of only some 4,100 votes.
The Republicans also took control of the House for the first

time since 1874, but could control the Senate only with the

 

41Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, pp. 118-19.

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514
aid of two Independents. The victory not only confirmed

Hayest

s belief in the political wisdom of his course as pres-
ident, but reassured him that his policies enjoyed majority
approval. Garfield attributed his victory chiefly to "dis-
trust of the solid south, and of adverse financial legislation"
should the Democrats take over.42 He was also aided by his
record and reputation as a veteran public servant, his rise
from humble circumstances and by the manner in which he had
handled himself during the campaign. And surely the Republi-
can's use of the tariff issue aided their cause in a most sig-
nificant way.

Soon after the election, Hayes visited Mentor where he
expressed his great pleasure at the election's outcome. If
Hayes was quick to take some credit for the victory, Garfield
was equally quick to recognize the President's contribution.
Whatever his critics might say Hayes had "given the country a
very clean Administration and his party . . . (had) not been
handicapped in the late contest by any scandals caused by him,"
Garfield wrote in his diary. Later that month during a visit
to washington, Garfield conferred at length with Hayes on such
matters as retirements, appointments and White House person-
nel.43

While Garfield began the difficult and delicate task of

putting together a cabinet, Hayes presented his final annual

 

1+2Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, p. 120 and Garfield to
John Sherman, Nov. 4, 1880. Sherman Papers.

43Garfield Diary, Nov. 4 and 24, 1880. Garfield Papers.

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515

message to Congress. In it he once again focused upon the
violation of the Negro's constitutional rights in the recent
elections. He asserted that such violations had "perhaps,
not been manifested in the recent elections to any great ex-
tent in acts of violence or intimidation." Nevertheless, the
opponents of full political rights for the Negro had, by prac-
ticing fraud relative to every phase of the election process,
successfully defeated his use of the right that preserved all
others -- the right to vote -- a privilege constitutionally
guaranteed to the freedman, he warned Congress.44

The right of every qualified citizen to cast his ballot
without restraint and to have it properly recorded was still
the fundamental issue, his message continued. Once this mat-
ter was correctly decided, the United States would be freed
of a heritage of discord and such issues as economy and effi-
ciency in government, internal improvements, the tariff, taxes,
education, finance and questions of similar significance would
then receive the attention they deserved. It was apparent
that by 1880 Hayes believed the Negro question was serving to
distract the government and the people from giving proper at-
tention to significant contemporary issues of more recent ori-
gin.45

Hayes insisted that the determination to maintain citizen's

 

44Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 601.

45Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 601-02.

516

constitutional rights remained strong and would remain the
federal government’s major concern. "Happily, the history of
the late elections shows that in many parts of the country
where opposition to the fifteenth amendment has hiterto pre-
vailed it is diminishing, and is likely to cease altogether
if firm and well-considered action is taken by Congress,".he
said. He again called upon the House and Senate to see that
their members were fairly elected before seating them. Mean-
while, he would, if given adequate financial support, "prose-
cute unsparingly? those who had violated the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of other citizens. Effective action depend-
ed upon congressional cooperation, which Hayes knew would not
be forthcoming.46

After treating civil rights, Hayes turned his attention
to education, calling it ?the best and surest guaranty of the
primary rights of citizenship. . .4 He insisted that universal
suffrage must be Vsupported by universal education." So con-
vinced was he that public education deserved the country's
serious consideration, that he called upon Congress to make
supplemental grants of land, and, if need be, cash, to school
funds in those states with large numbers of enfranchised, but

uneducated citizens.47

Civil service reform was given more attention than any

 

46Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 602.

47Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
VII, 602-03.

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517

other subject dealt with in this final message. For the third
time during his administration, he asked for congressional co-
operation in the effort. Definite rules regulating the appoint-
ment, promotion and removal of civil servants were imperative,
Hayes warned Congress, in order to insure equal treatment of
all applicants Vand the most economical and efficient admin-
istration of the public business." His justification of re-
form on the basis of economy and efficiency put Hayes in step
with many a progressive reformer of the early 20th century.
He bolstered his argument for reform by citing the experiments
at New York’s Custom House and Post Office and pronounced
their results to be most valuable. He reasoned that the pro—
cedures developed there might ”be fairly considered conclusive
(and) should be extended to all subordinate positions."48

Although Hayes took much pride in 'breaking up' the as-
sessments system, at least one expert had his doubts about the
effectiveness of Hayes's efforts. On February 19, 1881, in
compliance with the Hayes’s request of December 4, 1880, Dor-
man Eaton submitted his long-awaited report to the President --
a 123 page document entitled The "Spoil§f_§ystem and Ciyil
Service Refprm in the Custom House-and Post-Office at New::9rk.
In this thorough appraisal, Eaton reported that removals at
the Custom House were no longer being made for "partisan or
merely political reasons" and agreed with the President‘s

favorable evaluation of the results of the competitive

 

48Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers pfpthe Presidents,
VII, 603.

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518

examination system which had appeared in his messages of 1879
and 1880. But he criticized the rules used in New York for
failing to go even as far as Grant had in an 1872 executive
order in which he had banned assessments. In the 1880 contest,
Eaton claimed, both the GOP and the Democrats tried in the most
determined and arrogant manner to compel federal office hold-
ers to accept a system of assessments. Such demands were made
by national as well as state committees, the former insisting
on an assessment amounting to three per cent of federal postal
and custom's employees' earnings. As Hayes's own Vice-Presi-
dent recalled in his memoirs, a 9New York justice took a room
at the Astor House, took off his coat, sent for all the clerks
in the post office across the street, and levied a tax on each."
In this campaign the GOP Congressional Campaign Committee, us-
ing traditional methods, was reported to have collected over
$100,000 from federal civil servants alone.49

Garfield began preparing for his presidency immediately
after his victory. From that point on, he was preoccupied
with the task of constructing a cabinet designed to insure a
harmonious and successful administration. During a visit to
washington in early November, he had conferred with Sherman
about his future and had a very frank discussion with a prime
cabinet prospect, James G. Blaine. A bit later, Hayes re-

ported that Blaine was ?favorably spoken of" for the State

 

49Dorman B. Eaton, The"Spoils" System and Civil Service
Reform in the Custom-House andﬁPost-Office at New York (New
York, 18817, pp. 64: 79. Quoted in Fowler, The Cabinet Pol;
tician, p. 172.

   
 

 

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519

Department ?in all quarters? and although predicting a de-
clination, he suggested that Garfield make the offer. After
satisfying himself that Blaine would not use the post "as a
camping-ground for fighting the next presidential battle,”
Garfield chose him to head the State Department. Thus Blaine,
his faction and New England had been recognized and rewarded.50

When the choice of Blaine became known, the more diffi-
cult task of filling the Treasury post became still more on-
erous. Here, the claims of Conkling and his people who wish-
ed to control the great economic and patronage power of the
Treasury combined to ensure a protracted and sharp contest
for this post. Much to his annoyance, Garfield had discover-
ed that Morton and other Conklingites believed that he had
committed himself to appointing a New Yorker (probably Morton
if he wished it) to the Treasury. Garfield rejected this
contention. He believed that such an appointment would cre-

ate ?a congestion of financial power? at the nation'

8 money
center that would greatly upset the West. He observed to his
diary that the ?collection & management of revenue should be
kept as far apart as possible.4 Hayes entered the picture by
remarking that if he knew Garfield's choice for Secretary of
the Navy, he would appoint him then to replace the resigning
Charles Thompson. Perhaps, he thought, this position would
Vsuit Morton & the N. Y. muddle.V Although pressure on Gar-

field to fulfill the 'understanding' concerning Morton and the

 

50Garfield Diary, Nov. 27, 1880 and copy by Joseph Stan-
ley Brown from Garfield Memo Diary, Nov. 27, 1880. Garfleld

Papers.

520

Treasury mounted, he remained firm. So far Conkling seemed
well disposed toward the incoming administration and Garfield
was ready to meet him halfway, but without giving up the con-
trol of presidential prerogatives. He seemed as determined as
Hayes to maintain executive privileges.51

As Garfield wrestled with the problem of factionalism
within his party, he found himself agreeing with Blaine's
grouping of the GOP into the following three units: the Blaine
faction, the Grant faction and the Independents. Garfield
thought that while the first group was the party‘s "chief
force," the Grant men could "not be ignored or neglected" and
that he must recognize and deal with them fairly without
shackling himself in the process. As for the Independents,
their methods were most impracticable, but they included a
class of voters who should be kept within the GOP and some ef-
fort should be made to hold them fast. He recognized their
able service in the election and hoped to rally all support-
ers of civil service reform behind a drive to get Congress
to enact legislation defining and establishing the tenure of
most minor offices and the criteria for removal. This was
necessary so as to save congressmen and the president from
the hordes of petty office-seekers.52

Shortly after his election, Garfield was unavoidably

 

51Garfield Diary, Nov. 27, 1880; Hayes to Garfield, Dec.
16, 1880; Garfield Diary, Dec. 20 and 19, 1880. Garfield
Papers 0

52James G. Blaine to Garfield, Dec. 10, 1880 and Gar-

field to James G. Blaine, quoted in Gail Hamilton, Biography
of James G. Blaine (Norwich, 1895), pp. 490-91, 493.

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521

drawn into another situation involving John Sherman. Both
Governor Foster and Sherman were manuevering for Garfield's
Senate seat and their sparring match threatened to end in a
politically bloody head-on clash. Many people looked to Gar-
field to settle the problem amicably. However, he had been
putting off certain cabinet decisions precisely because he
was determined not to interfere in several other senatorial
contests then in progress in spite of heavy pressure to the
contrary. He let it be known that he would remain neutral in
this contest, too, although he admitted to his diary that

’s defeat would leave him where he could scarcely

Sherman
”accept anything else.“ With him out of office, there would
arise a Vdissatisfaction in Ohio, dangerous to the party,"
whereas Foster's withdrawal would insure harmony. And while
Garfield observed that it would be difficult to find an equal-
ly able successor to Sherman, yet his retention in the Treas-
ury would create many Userious resulting embarrassments."53
Foster’s withdrawal in mid-December before the contest
reached the legislature left Garfield greatly relieved. Years
later, Foster explained that, according to Sherman, Garfield
had asked the latter whether he preferred to stay in the cab-
inet or return to the Senate. Sherman took this to mean that
Garfield did not really want him for the cabinet and so he

declared in favor of the Senate for that reason. Foster also

understood Garfield to be asking him not to bid for the Senate

 

53Richard Smith to John Sherman, Dec. 1, 1880. Sherman
Papers. Garfield Diary, Dec. 8, 1880. Garfield Papers.

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when he advised Foster that it would be unwise to "superannu-
ate Mr. Sherman.?54

During January and February, Garfield’s preoccupation
continued to be cabinet making. He was not lacking for ad-
visors and advice as he struggled to heal party rifts, fore-
stall further divisions and weigh the many claims made upon
him. For example, although Hayes was careful to point out
that Nathan Goff, who had replaced Thompson as Secretary of
the Navy, did not expect to be retained under Garfield, he,
Goff would make a good appointee. However, Goff did expect
to be reappointed to the District Attorneyship he had resign-
ed at Hayes's request and which Hayes had held open for him.
"I_hppe_you will_see no objection to_thi§," Hayes told Gar-
field.55

The problem of satisfactorily recognizing New York con-
tinued to be a major one for Garfield. Like it or not, Gar-
field was drawn into the struggle between Conkling and his
opponents in New York's Republican party. Eager as he was
to give some satisfaction to the Conklingites, Garfield re-
fused to succumb to the growing pressure to give Morton the
Treasury, even when Conkling himself visited him at Mentor.
He would not name Morton to ”more than the war or the Navy."
Over Conkling's objection, he offered the Attorney-General-

ship to Judge Charles J. Folger, a Conkling man, only to have

 

54Garfield to Charles Foster, Dec. 15, 1880. Garfield
Papers. Letterbook. Charles Foster to Charles Henry, Nov.
25, 1895, quoted in Henry, Captain Henry, p. 515.

55Hayes to Garfield, Jan. 8, 1881. Garfield Papers.

      
    
  

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523

him decline late in February. He thereupon turned to Morton
with the Navy post, in the hope of yet satisfying New York
Stalwarts, and received his acceptance just before starting
for Washington on February 28.56

But Garfield's cabinet-making problems were destined to
plague him beyond inauguration day. As a result of pressure
from the Conkling faction, Morton declined the Navy post on
March 2. Garfield then turned to Louisiana’s William Hunt to
fill the position. Hayes had offered a favorable evaluation
of Hunt some weeks earlier, apparently at Garfield's request.
Garfield’s selection of New York City's reform postmaster,
Thomas James, only served to further antagonize Conkling, al-
though James was a Conkling man. On the other hand, Robert
Lincoln’s selection as Secretary of War was generally satis-
fying, especially to the Illinois Grant faction. Wayne
MacVeagh's appointment as Attorney-General pleased Pennsylvania's
Independents without provoking his in-laws, the Camerons.
Finally, although William Allison of Iowa had agreed to take
the Treasury on March 3, he ?broke down” on Garfield the fol-
lowing day and was replaced with William Windom of Minnesota.
It was Vnot an ideal cabinet,? Garfield admitted, but it was
Va good combination of esse et Vl222l-557

While Garfield was struggling with cabinet problems, Hayes

was advising his old friend Guy Bryan that never had anyone

 

56Garfield Diary, Feb. 16, 1881. ,Garfield Papers. Smith,
Life and Letters of Garfield, II, 1082-87.

57Hayes to Garfield, Jan. 28, 1881. Garfield Papers.
Smith, Life and Letters of Garfield, II, 1091-98.

524

left the White House with fewer regrets, fewer disappointments
and less resentment, nor with a greater feeling of personal
contentedness with the outcome of his administration than he
did. He admitted that his term had been filled with diffi-
culties and troubles at first, but now he was sailing along
on calm seas and beneath sunny skies.58

His successor was scarcely optimistic concerning his life
in the White House. ?I must confront the problem of trying to
survive the Presidency -- or as it is said of criminals --
live it down,? Garfield had written despondently in December.59

And even Hayes, as he looked back upon his term, admitted
that he and Lucy would leave Washington ”gladly" although they
had "upon the whole enjoyed? their stay. Yet they disliked
the burdens, the discomforts and the distressing personal suf-
ferings they could not relieve. There was, moreover, the ever-
present threat of scandalous or criminal behavior on the part
of men they were forced to trust and the presence of so much
else that stood in the way of pleasant and contented living.
Therefore to retire from their prominent position to a free,
independent and safe life on their estate in ?obscureV Fremont
would cause no regrets. Nor had Hayes forgotten two of his
most implacable critics while recording these thoughts, add-
ing that were there Vany two men in the country whose opposi-

tion and hatred . . . (were) a certificate of good character

 

58Hayes to Guy Bryan, Jan. 1, 1881, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of Hayes, III, 632-33.

59Garfield Diary, Dec. 11, 1880. Garfield Papers.

 

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slicre .11 f

 

525

and sound statesmanship, they . . . (were) Conkling and But-
ler.“ He was undoubtedly sincere when he declared he enjoyed
"the satisfaction of being fully endorsed by the hatred and
opposition of both of these men.f‘6O

On the other hand, he was quite disturbed by rumors that
Garfield would abandon the temperance stand taken by the
Hayeses. As he put it in his journal, he was "no fanatic" on
the issue and did not "sympathize with the methods of the ul-

tra temperance people.V

He opposed temperance legislation,
believing the cause would be "most surely promoted by moral,
religious, and educational influences and by the influence of
example.” His diary explanation for the banning of wine and
liquor from the White House neatly illustrates the mixture of
idealism and political expediency that underlay much of his
presidential policy. The step was taken for the reason that
it was ”right, wise, and necessary" and in response to "the
large support given . . . (him) by sincere friends of the
temperance reform." And last, but not least, it was done be-
cause he thought it would aid the party by winning converts
"from the political Temperance party” and would prevent the
defection of many (Republicans) who would otherwise leave . .
to join" that party. If Garfield was to abandon Hayes's
stand, he would suffer politically and personally. He would

appear to Flack the grit to face fashionable ridicule," Hayes

 

6OHayes Diary, Jan. 16, 1881, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters omeayes, III, 637-38.

—_——_———_———

526

contended, returning once more to a favorite theme.61

The President even went so far as to prepare a memoran-
dum for Garfield, outlining reasons for keeping the White
House dry. The drinking American was "in danger of becoming
the victim of drunkenness, licentiousness, and gambling," he
warned his successor. Moreover, a rejection of the reform
would rejuvenate the Prohibition party which had nearly dis-
appeared from view and "give it votes enough to put in jeop-
ardy the Republican ascendancy in Maine, New Hampshire,
Connecticut, New York, Ohio, Indiana, and perhaps thirty
northern congressional districts." The political implica-
tions of the issue were obviously very significant to Hayes.
He cautioned Garfield that to abandon the reform would "ser-
iously damage . . . (his) personal reputation and . . . politi-
cal prOSpects.? At this point, he cited the widespread sup-
port of his position by the Protestant establishment and "the
friends of education and temperance. . ." Finally, he sought
to drive home the issue’s political significance with the fol-
lowing candid advice:

You as a professing Christian and lay preacher will

be regarded as lacking the courage of your convictions

if you abandon it. It will be said quite as much by

men of the world as by others that you lack! the grit

to face fashionable ridicule. That you can t afford.

The general wish is that you have two terms. You

will surely be renominated if you wish to be, or I am

much mistaken. You can t be elected, however, if you

so deal with this question that from five to ten per

cent of the Republican voters are diverted to Temper-
ance candidates in the great States of the North.

61Hayes Diary, Jan. 16,1881, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 638.

527

Your duty to the Republican party is to let well

enough alone on the subject. The moment you reject

the reform it becomes a political question which in

the hands of the Temperance leaders will surely take

from us States and congressional districts which we

can't spare.

But if the matter were left unchanged, Hayes asserted, dis-
sension would be negligible; none would be "seriously offended"
and many would be pleased.62 .

As his term drew rapidly to a close, Hayes again re-
flected on the troubles that began with his inauguration. He
wrote in his diary that Democratic extremists had excoriated
him as an imposter, while ultra-Republicans had attacked him
for being ungrateful and traitorous. He now appeared certain,
however, that he was leaving office with the favor, thanks and
the endorsement of the Ybest people" the country over, regard-
less of party ties. To his own surprise, he reflected with
satisfaction, he had retained a solid and sustaining belief
that he could form and lead a government which would meet the
nation’s needs and gain its support.63

Meanwhile, Garfield was contemplating his term of office
with anything but pleasure. "Few people would believe that I
go away (from Ohio) with great sadness," he told a close friend,
"but such is the fact. I know I am bidding good-bye to my old

freedom, and to many good friends -- whose countenances and

counsels I shall miss -- and worst of all, I know very many

 

624Memorandum for GarfieldV, Jan. 17, 1881, in Williams,
ed., Diary_and Letters of Hayes, III, 639-40.

63Hayes Diary, Jan. 23, 1881, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, III, 640.

528
of them will be disappointed in me, and some will be alienated."
He would be ?compelled to live in great social isolation," he
observed, predicting that almost all who now come to him would
want some favor they believed he could or ought to give them.
This would embitter ?the pleasure of friendship,“ he lamented.
A longtime friend noticed that he ?never seemed the same man
after he was nominated for President.v Garfield enjoyed ”happy
moments? this friend recalled, Vbut they soon gave place to that
depression of spirits which would cling to him in spite of all."
Sensing his melancholy, Hayes tried to cheer him with the as-
surance that his cabinet selections had removed "all sinister
doubts? and that Van able and happy Administration" was a cer-
tainty. Your troubles fare all over now,? he told the Presi-
dent.64 Unfortunately, they had only begun.

Of the many commendations Hayes received from the hun-
dreds of visitors to the White House during his last days in
office, he was especially pleased with the clergy’s compli-
ments. ?The burden of the talk on all sides," his March 2nd
journal entry ran, ?is a clean, honest, independent, and suc-
cessful Administration.f'65 This had been Hayes's aim when he
became president and he left Washington certain in his own mind

that he had achieved his purpose.

 

64Garfield to Harmon Austin, Feb. 7, 1881. Garfield
Papers. Charles Henry quoted in Henry, Captain Henry, pp.296-97
and Hayes to Garfield, Mar. 6, 1881. Garfield Papers.

65Hayes Diary, Mar. 2, 1881, in Williams, ed., Diapy and
Letters of Hayes, III, 648.

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EPILOGUE

Garfield entered upon his duties with anything but a light
heart and the events of his brief tenure only served to accent-
uate his feeling of foreboding. It was a burdensome and crisis
ridden four months. He was plagued by a veritable horde of
office seekers and compelled to meet Conkling’s challenge in
the matter of New York appointees as had Hayes. Garfield was
determined to recognize the Empire State’s Stalwarts led by
Conkling, without forgetting the Independents led by William
Robertson, who had declined to back Grant at Chicago and in-
stead had supported Blaine and then Garfield. He, like his
predecessor, also wished to assert his independence of the
imperious Conkling. After first naming several Conklingites
to New York posts, he assigned the prize, the collectorship
of the port of New York, to Robertson, without consulting
Conkling.

This action touched off a harsh and protracted contest
reminiscent of the Hayes-Conkling struggle. Once again
Conkling turned to his brother senators for aid. But the
conciliatory efforts of a specially formed GOP caucus commit-
tee were to no avail, for Garfield would not withdraw Robert-
sonﬁ name. As he put it, he wished a quick answer to the

question of whether he "was a registering clerk of the Senate

529

550
or the Executive of the government."1 This was the essence
of Hayes's position during his contest with Conkling.

Although Hayes had no intention of returning to politics
in any capacity, his interest in public affairs would remain
as keen as ever. He obviously found great pleasure in dis-
covering any event or statement that could be construed (some-
times with difficulty) as endorsing his administration. Nat-
urally he followed the work of the Garfield administration
with considerable interest. Given his pride in and evaluation
of his achievements at the New York Custom House, it does not
come as a surprise that he should view Merritt’s removal as
collector and reassignment as Consul at London with disfavor.

As the struggle entered its second month, it became ev-
ident that Conkling would press for the confirmation of his
men and then bring about the Senate's adjournment before
Robertson's appointment could be acted upon. Garfield shrewd-
ly countered by withdrawing his Conklingite appointees, virt-
ually forcing the Senate to face up to the Robertson question.
Thereupon, New York's Senators, Conkling and Platt, resigned
their seats, anticipating justification through quick re-
election. This was an act of desperation, and only served to
emphasize the erosion of Conkling’s power and the imminence of
his defeat. Indeed, the Senate lost no time in confirming
Robertson and after a long struggle at Albany, both Conkling
and Platt were defeated for re-election. Garfield had won a

signal victory and his personal and political stock soared.

 

1Garfield Diary, April 30, 1881.

531

Many of the doubts concerning his moral courage evaporated.

Hayes viewed the affair with mixed emotions. Following
Conkling’s and Platt’s resignations, he observed that it was
"a wretched business. They make a strong point in claiming
that to remove Merritt is a violation of the President’s
principles as laid down in his inaugural message, and of all
sound principles on the subject." Yet, he admitted, it was
important to settle the question of senatorial courtesy, for
it was the Vfirst step toward clearing the way for a reform of
the service.? This almost reconciled him to Merritt's removal.2

Although Garfield’s abbreviated administration seemed
dominated by his struggle with Conkling, its achievements were
not limited to this area.. Thus, Secretary of the Treasury
Windom, with Garfield's support, achieved a notable victory
in refunding over $600,000,000 worth of bonds at a one and one—
half to two per cent interest rate savings.. At the State De-
partment, Blaine, given a relatively free hand, continued the
Hayes policy on the Panama Canal question, while his nascent
Pan-Americanism gave promise of a brilliant secretaryship.
In the Post Office, the reform-minded James pursued an investi-
gation of frauds purpetrated in the administration of the Star
Routes in sparsely populated Western areas.

The New York Times had been pressing for an investigation
of the frauds when James took office and after receiving Gar-

field’s permission to pursue the task to a conclusion, James

 

2Hayes Diary, May 18, 1881 and Hayes to Manning Force,
May 21, 1881, in Williams, ed., Diary and Letters of Hayes,

IV, 19.

532

and Attorney General MacVeagh set to work. Garfield observed
that he was ?surprised that it could so long have escaped the
attention of the Hayes Administration."3 His initial response
was to simply remove Second Assistant Postmaster-General Thomas
Brady, the man implicated in the frauds, but following his
cabinet's advice Garfield asked for and received Brady's res-
ignation. Brady struck back by publishing Garfield campaign-
time letter to Jay Hubbell asking how the fund raising was
going among federal employees and calling upon Brady for help
in the Post Office Department. MacVeagh warned the President
that the investigation might strike highly placed men, might
cause the loss of the GOP's majority in the Senate and injure
men who insisted that Garfield was "under personal obligations
to them for services rendered during the campaign -- one per-
son (Brady) in particular who . . . asserted that without his
management you could not have been elected.” But Garfield re-
portedly ordered them to 4gb ahead regardless of where or whom
you hit" and not simply Vprobe the ulcer to the bottom,
but . ... cut it out.{'4 'He gave the investigation his steady
support.

When the Star Route affair broke, Hayes commented in al-
most apologetic tones in his diary that while Congress had

ample means and great powers, he had neither the "means to

 

3Garfield Diary, April 14, 1881.
4Quoted in Smith, Life and Letters of Garfield, II, 1158.

I“...

 

' 531118 3"; ,.

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, I”.J‘(OKIIA ,1

 

533

take testimony or compel witnesses to testify,”5 Hayes was
obviously troubled that the scandal might threaten the purity
of his administration and referred to the subject in several
diary entries and letters. Since he had relied so heavily on
First Assistant Postmaster General James Tyner, he was pleased
that he was as yet unaccused, but admitted that ”all agree
that Key.was honest but unexperienced and too confiding."
Hayes complained that his enemies were now attacking him for
failing to discover and put an end to the frauds. However,
upon taking office, it was believed that the Post Office was
honestly and efficientyly run. Postmaster-General Tyner had
had Vlarge experience,4 Hayes wrote, Hand was capable and ef-
ficient (and also had supported Hayes at Cincinnati and was a
friend of Morton's).f‘6 Brady enjoyed the same reputation, he
noted, therefore he did not wish to change what seemed to be
in sound condition. As the investigation dragged on, Hayes
wrote that he would not make denials or explanations until
the situation required it. ?Haste to deny or explain is al-
ways a sign of weakness,? he concluded smugly.7

Hayes continued to show a lively interest in civil ser-
vice reform and its progress under his successor. He also

referred time and again to what he considered were his achieve-

 

5Hayes Diary, April 28, 1881, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, IV, 10.

6Hayes Diary, May 3, 1881, in Williams, ed., Diary and
Letters of Hayes, IV, 12.

7Hayes.to VDear Sirv, May 3, 1881, in Williams, ed.,
‘Diaryand Letters of Hayes, IV, 14. -

534
ments in that area and remained sensitive to criticism of them.
The Nation always talked as if he had Vbut one thing to do,
but one reform to establish, and as if men to aid were as
plenty as blackberries,f he complained.8 Hayes readily ad-
mitted that during his term he had wrought no miracles and
that machine politics remained ?deeply rooted“ in the American
political system.9 What is more, his references to the sub-
ject seem to re-enforce the notion that the major objective
of his reform efforts was business-like efficiency.

Hayes was equally jealous of the good reputation of his
administration in general and never seemed to tire of repeat-
ing, in diary entries and letters, his personal evaluation of
what he had faced and what he had achieved. Some months after
leaving office, he nicely summarized What he would repeat for
years to come concerning his administration‘s accomplishments
in these words:

The Administration came in with the Republican party

discordant, disheartened, and weak. When the Admin-

istration closed, its party was united, strong, con-
fident, and victorious. At its beginning the South

was solid and the North divided. At its close the

North was united and the South divided. At the be-

ginning both houses of Congress had been lost. When

it closed both houses were regained. I can say with

truth: -- !I left this great country prosperous and

happy and the party of my choice strong, victorious,

and united. In serving the country I served the
party.‘10

 

8Hayes Diary, March 11, 1881, in Williams, ed., Diapy
and Letters of Hayes, IV, 3.

9Hayes to R. U. Johnson, Sept. 5, 1881, in Williams, ed.,
Diapy and Letters of Hayes, IV, 34.

1OHayes Diary, Dec. 29, 1881, in Williams, ed., Igary and
Letters of Hayes, IV, 58. -

535

Following the shooting of Garfield, Hayes observed to
Sherman that should the President recover, as he then (July)
anticipated, the terrible event would "vastly increase the
President's power and popularity.” Stalwartism would lose
power and ”thus this great calamity may turn out well for the
President and for the country.” The public was now ready to
back reform as it had not been during his administration.
Therefore, Garfield could undertake any needed reforms with
the assurance of full public support, Hayes asserted. But he
seemed less certain that such would be the President's course.11

As a member of The Garfield Monument Board, Hayes played
an active role in raising funds for a suitable memorial struc-
ture and selecting its site. It was on his motion that the
Board selected what was then an oat field on a ridge near the
southern end of Lake View Cemetery as the location for the
massive but unimposing Garfield Memorial. "From this point,"
Hayes wrote, ?there is a noble view of the city and suburbs,
and of Lake Erie for many miles. The monument will be like a
city set upon a hill -- in sight from land and lake."12 One
can only regret that Garfield was not memorialized as Hayes
would be -- with a handsome museum and library -- a research
center set in a beautiful grove.

When in 1889 the monument's dedication was about to take

 

11Hayes to John Hay, July 8, 1881, in Williams, ed.,
Diary and Letters of_Hayes, IV, 25.

12Hayes Diary, June 27, 1883, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, IV, 120.

   
   
  
  

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536

place, Hayes, who would preside at the affair, called upon
Garfield's old friend, Jacob Cotho deliver the dedication
address. Cox was reluctant to do so because his recent
speech on Garfield before the Army of the Tennessee had been
given wide press coverage and been published in pamphlet form.
Hayes would not take no for an answer. He pleaded with Cox
to put aside his reservations in words that might well be
applied to our other martyred Presidents:

I urged that justice to Garfield demanded of him the

sacrifice of his feelings, that Garfield had suffered

in two ways by the injudicious praise of those who

knew him only in a general way. They had attributed to

him powers and qualities which did not belong to him,

and which all who knew him well thoroughly understood

were not the truth about him. Others, his enemies,

took advantage of these mistakes and the result is a

belittling of his character and powers.1
Perhaps these comments, Hayes's last diary appraisal of a man

whose political career was intertwined with his, may suffice

to bring this study to a close.

 

15Hayes Diary, March 6, 1889, in Williams, ed., Diary
and Letters of Hayes, IV, 451.

BI BLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

A“ s

 

‘-
m.
1

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

MANUSCRIPT MATERIAL

The papers of Garfield and Hayes are the most important
sources for tracing their careers. All but a very small
portion of the rich and extensive Garfield collection is in
the Library of Congress, although a few items of value can be
found in the Ohio State Historical Society and the Hayes Me-
morial Library. The Western Reserve Historical Society has
a small collection of Garfield papers as well as scrapbooks
for the presidential period. The even more extensive and
equally valuable Hayes Papers are housed in the Hayes Memorial
Library along with a very useful collection of microfilm se-
lections from the papers of most of the public figures Whose
lives touched his. The more than six hundred volumes of John
Sherman Papers in the Library of Congress are indispensable
for an adequate understanding of GOP politics of his era.

Other manuscript collections that have been of consider-
able importance in this study include the William Henry Smith
Papers in the Indiana Historical Society (microfilm copy,
Hayes Memorial Library, hereafter cited as microfilm, HML)
and the Ohio State Historical Society; the Murat Halstead
Papers in the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio

537

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538

(microfilm, HML); the James Comly Papers at the Ohio State
Historical Society and the Jacob Cox Papers in the Oberlin
College Library. Because of their long and intimate relation—
ship, the Smith Papers are especially valuable for Hayes’s
entire career. The Comly collection is useful for Hayes's
political activity through 1877, while the Halstead materials
contain items of value for both Garfield and Hayes as well as
Ohio and national politics. The Cox manuscripts include a

few items of interest, especially as regards Hayes’s civil
service reform policy and his southern strategy. What we have
in the way of Charles Foster Papers at the Ohio State Histor-
ical Society and the Western Reserve Historical Society shed

ts drive for the presidency and

considerable light on Sherman
Ohio politics. The same can be said of the warner Bateman
Papers in the Western Reserve Historical Society, a little
used, but most helpful collection for anyone interested in
John Sherman. The Memoirs of Thomas Donaldson in the William
Henry Smith Papers in the Indiana Historical Society are a
mine of information and opinion on the Hayes-Garfield years
and deserve to be edited and published.

Other papers of lesser importance, but nonetheless of
value for certain aspects of this study or for general back-
ground information include the Chester Arthur Papers, Library
of Congress (mircofilm HML); the Benjamin Bristow Papers,
Library of Congress (microfilm HML); the William Chandler
Papers, Library of Congress (microfilm HML); the Joseph Hawley

Papers, Library of Congress; the Carl Schurz Papers, Library

 

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539
of Congress (microfilm HML) and the Elihu Washburne Papers,

Library of Congress. Some valuable insights into Garfield's
personality and political history can be gained from the papers
of his longtime friend Charles Henry in the Hiram College Li-
brary. The Toledo Public Library's collection of Clark Wag-
goner Papers have been largely unexploited, but they deserve
greater attention for the light they shed on Ohio and national
politics from the viewpoint of a newspaperman and federal

Officeholder.
PRINTED PRIMARY MATERIALS

Although the greater part of the extensive papers left
by Hayes and Garfield must be consulted in manuscript form,
a significant portion have been or are being edited and pub-
lished. Thus in Charles R. Williams, ed., Qiary and Letters
gprutherford B. Hayes (5 vols.; Columbus, 1924) one can find
most of Hayes’s diary along with most of his important letters.
Valuable as this edition is, some of its diary entries are in-
completely reproduced, Williams has made corrections in Hayes's
spelling and grammar and there are almost no explanatory notes.
More recently, T. Harry Williams has edited the diaries for
the presidential period as Hayes: The Diary of a President,
1875-1881 (New York, 1964). This edition reproduces the diary

 

entries exactly as they are in manuscript, including crossed
out words and sentences, misspellings and errors in grammar.

Garfield‘s diary during the period 1848-1874 has been edited

  
  
  
  
  
  

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540
with extraordinary care and thoroughness by Harry J. Brown and
Frederick D. Williams as The Diary of James A. GarTTgTd (2
vols.; East Lansing, 1967). The remainder of the Garfield Diary
will be forthcoming. Two editions of Garfield letters have
appeared thus far. Mary L. Hinsdale, the daughter of Gar-
field's close friend Burke Hinsdale, has ably edited Garfield-
Hinsdale Letters: Correspondence between James Abram Garfield
and Burke Aaron Hinsdale (Ann Arbor, 1949). Frederick D.
Williams, ed., The Wild Life of the Army; Civil War Letters
2T_James A. Garfield (East Lansing, 1964) skillfully intro—
duces and edits an especially important body of Garfield
correspondence. Burke A. Hinsdale's Th3 Works of James A.
Garfield (2 vols.; Boston, 1882) contains Garfield's most im-
portant written and spoken efforts. Finally, correspondence
between John and William T. Sherman edited by Rachel S. Thorn-
dike in The Sherman Letters (New York, 1894) helps to bring
the views and relationship of these famous brothers into
clearer focus.

No study of politics during the Hayes-Garfield years can
afford to overlook the CongressiohhT_nghh and the thghggghgh-
al Record and of course these sources are indispensable for a
adequate appreciation of Garfield's long congressional career.
A careful and disinterested reading of this record not only
gives one a 'feel' for the political currents of the era, but
undermines the notion that national politics during the Gilded
Age were characterized solely by expediency, irresponsibility,

indifference and hypocrisy. James D. Richardson, ed., A

 

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541
Compilation.oThhhe Messagesﬁahg_Papers o§_the Presidents,
1159-1897 (10 vols.; washington, 1907) is a necessity for any-
one seeking to understand Hayes's conception of presidential

powers and responsibilities.

SECONDARY WORKS

Several books dealing with postwar politics have influ-
enced the development of this dissertation. For the immedi-
ate postwar years, Kenneth Stampp's The Era of Reconstructioh,
1865-1817 (New York, 1965) is a superbly developed and lucidly
written interpretation, while in David Donald’s The Politics
of Reconstructioh4_1863-1861(Baton Rouge, 1965) the author
undertakes an interesting experiment in the use of statistical
techiniques to unravel the complexities of reconstruction pol-
itics. In the New American Nation Series, John Garraty imag-
inatively explores the economic, political and social-intel-
lectual history of The New Cohhghwealth, 1871-1899 (New York,
1968). Even more recently H. Wayne Morgan has reassessed post
reconstruction politics with style and penetration in.§£22
Hayes to McKinley: National Party_Politics,i1877-1ﬁ96 (Syra-
cuse, 1969).

Biographical studies that have contributed to a better
understanding of the subjects of this study include Charles

R. Williams, The Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes (2 vols.;
Boston, 1914) and the much superior Harry Barnard, Rutherford

B. Hayes and His America (Indianapolis, 1954). This well

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542
written study, the product of very thorough research, concen-
trates on Hayes the man rather than Hayes the politician.
Theodore C. Smith's The_h1fe and Letters of Jameeéhhham Gar-
TTer (2 vols.; New Haven, 1925) is a generally uncritical,
but indispensable work that should be supplemented by Robert
G. Caldwell’s more critically interpretive l2ﬂ2§24;_g§££léii3
Party ChTeTETah (New York, 1931). Captain Henhy_of Geauge;
h_TemTTy Chronicle (Cleveland, 1942), Fredrick Henry's de-
lightful biography of his father, Garfield's good friend,
Charles Henry, sheds light on Garfield, his friends and Ohio
politics. Volumes IV and V of The History of the State of
thg, Eugene H. Roseboom's The_QTyTTTWar Era, 1850-182é
(Columbus, 1944) and Philip D. Jordan's QhTo Cgmes of Age,
l812;1299 (Columbus, 1943) provide one with an adequate sur-
vey of the entire Ohio scene.

Several monographs and biographies for the period from
the nomination of Hayes for the presidency through the settle-
ment of the disputed election proved to be helpful. The pene-
trating examination of ghhyentiehZDecTsions and Vghhhg_Records
(Washington, 1960) by Richard C. Bian were most revealing for
the GOP gathering of 1876 and that of 1880, too. Frank B.
Evans sheds some very important new light on the role of
Samuel Randall and Pennsylvania in the settlement of the dis-
puted election in his Pennsylvahha Politicsy1782-1BZZ; h_§hhgy
in Political Leadership (Harrisburg, 1966). In hehgyhﬂahhegggg;
Reconstgeeted ReheT (New York, 1956), Joseph F. wall offers a

convincing re-evaluation of Watterson's part in this episode.

543

Both studies supplement and qualify C. Vann Woodward's he-
union ane Reaction; The Compromise of 18IZ_and the End of
Reconstruction (2d. ed., rev.; Garden City, 1956), a brilliant-
ly executed, but too sharply drawn analysis of the settlement
of the disputed election of 1876. Finally, the closing scenes
of the Grant administration and something of the opening scenes
of the Hayes administration can be followed through Allan
Nevins, Hamilton Fish, The Inner History of the Grant Admin-
istration (New York, 1936)..

The southern problem, civil service and the money ques-
tion have each attracted considerable scholarly attention. C.
Vann Woodward's Origins of the New South, 1811:1913 (Baton
Rouge, 1951) is the premier work on its subject. In hephhTT-

cans Face the Southern ghestion: The New Depagture Years, 18]]-
1892 (Baltimore, 1959), Vincent P. DeSantis presents a well-

 

balanced treatment of the motives and policies of the GOP

toward the South and the Negro. Stanley P. Hirshon'

5 Farewell
he_hhe Bloody Shirt;,Northern Republican and the Southe£h
Negro, 1811-1893 (Bloomington, 1962) focuses on an important
topic, but erroneously claims that Hayes abandons pacification
for stalwartism by the middle of his term. The Hayes-Hampton
relationship and this Redeemer’s policies are well covered in
Hampton Jarrell, wade Hampton and the Negro; The Road Not Taken
(Columbia, 1949). Ari Hoggenboom's Ougyaping,the_§poils; A
hystory of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865:1883 (Ur-
bana, 1961) is a critical study which thoroughly examines the

motives (often political) and methods of the reformers,

 

  
   
  
  
   
  
   

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544
including Hayes. Leonard D. White’s The Republican Era,_1865-
12991_hh_Administra§Tve History (New York, 1958) covers the
work and duties of the evolving federal bureaucracy and com-
ments on the effects of civil service reform measures. A sel-
dom-used, but valuable commentary on the Hayes—Conkling struggle
can be found in Edwin A. Merritt's Recollection,,1828-1911 (New
York, 1911). A full review of the reformer-spoilsman contest
in New York City by a contemporary reformer is presented in
Dorman Eaton's The XSpeTTSV System and Civil Service Reform in
The Custom;hguse and Post-Office at Newylprk (New York, 1881),
while The Cabinet Politician; The Postmasters Geheral,,1§gg—
[1292 (New York, 1943) by Dorothy G. Fowler contains a wealth
of information on the operation of the spoils system and the
campaign techniques of that era. Finally, for the money ques-

tion, Irwin Unger’

s The Greenback Era; A social and PeTitTheT
history of American TThance, 1865-1819 (Princeton, 1964) answers
almost any question one might raise on that subject.
The 1880 Republican convention and campaign are covered
in Herbert J. Clancy, The_T£esident;gl hTection of 1880 (Chicago,
1958), but they deserve fuller and more imaginative treatment.
'Among those biographies of contemporaries of Hayes and
Garfield that have been useful, often for general information
and background, are: Leland L. Sage, William_Boyd Aill§221_£
Study in Practical Politics (Iowa City, 1956); George F. Howe,
gheeter A. Arthur (New York, 1934); Gail Hamilton (Mary A.
Dodge), Biography of James G. Blaine (Norwich, 1895); David

S. Muazey, James Gillespie Blaine; A Political Idol of Other

 

   
  
   
   

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545
Days (New York, 1934); Leon B. Richardson, William E. Chandler,

 

Republican (New York, 1940); Donald B. Chidsey, The Gentlemah
From New Tork;,A Life of Roscoe Conkling (New Haven, 1935);
James w. Nielson, Shelby M. Cullom333eirie State Republipan
(Urbana, 1962); Oscar D. Lambert, Stephen Bentoh Elkins (Pitts-
burgh, 1955); Bernard Dyer, ghe Public Career of William M.
Evarts (Berkeley, 1933); William B. Hesseltine, Ulysse§_§;
Grant, Politician (New York, 1935); Harry J. Sievers, Ben amih
hgghlggh, Vol. II: heesier Statesmah (New York, 1959); H.

Wayne Morgan, William Mehinley and His America (Syracuse, 1963);
Robert M. McElroy, Levi Parsons Mortohy_Banker,_Tiplomat, and
Statesmeh (New York, 1930); Royal Cortissoz, The Life of White-
law Reid (é vols.; New York, 1921); Claude Fuess, ge;;_§phh;g,
Reformer (New York, 1932) and Alexander C. Flick, Samuel Jgheg

Tilden; A Study in Political Sagacity (New York, 1939).
REMINISCENCES AND MEMOIRS

Certain recollections and autiobiographical works have
been helpful in answering specific questions and providing
general background information. Among them are: James B.
Angell, The Reminiscehees of James Burrill Angell (New York,
1912) which sheds light on Hayes and the Chinese question;
James G. Blaine, Thhhty Years of Congress;:Trom_hihcoln to
Garfield (2 vols.; Norwich, 1884-1886); Jacob D. Cox, Military
Reminiscences of the Civil war (2 vols.; Cincinnati, 1900);

Chauncey M. Depew, My Memoigs of Eighty Years (New York, 1922);

..,.
-: I-

 

546
John Foster, Diplomatic Mehgihe (2 vols.; Boston, 1909) is
enlightening on the Mexican problem and the State Department
under Evarts; William 0. Hudson, hhhdom Recollections of an
Old Political Reporte; (New York, 1911) and John Sherman,
Recollections gT_Fgrty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet;

hh Autobiography (2 vols.; Chicago, 1895).
ARTICLES

One can scarcely undertake a study of Ohioans in state
and national politics without becoming indebted to Clifford
H. Moore's excellent ?Ohio in National Politics, 1865—1896,"
Chip Archaeolegigal and Historical gharterly, XXXVII (1928),
220-427. Several articles shed light on the years of Hayes
governorship, among them Forrest W. Clouts, "The Political
Campaign of 1875 in Ohio,? Ohio State Archaeological ahe
Historical Quarteriy, XXXI (1922), 38-97. Irwin Unger has
considered the same campaign in his thoroughly developed
"Business and Currency in the Ohio Gubernatorial Campaign of
1875," Mid-America, XLI (January, 1959), 27-39. The fullest
and most recent evaluation of Hayes three terms at Columbus
can be found in Daniel R. Porter’s VGovernor Rutherford B.
Hayes," Chio History, LXXVII (Winter, Spring, Summer, 1968),
59475.. ' ' '

Among those articles that focus on the national scene
during the Reconstruction years, John and LaWanda Cox have

made a good case for the risks taken by the GOP in its support

 

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547
of the Fifteenth Amendment in their ”Negro Sufferage and Re-
publican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction
Historiography,? Journal of Southern History, XXXIII (August,
1967), 303-30. Oone facet of the relationship between the two
wings of the Democratic party in this era is explored in Albert
V. House, ?Northern Congressional Democrats as Defenders of
the South During Reconstruction," Journal of Southern History,
VI (February, 1940), 46-71. On a related subject, Hannah G.
Roach makes an important contribution to understanding con-
gressional voting patterns in ”Sectionalism in Congress (1870-
1890),V American Political Science Review, XIX (August, 1925),
SOC-26. In ?The Contribution of Samuel J. Randall to the Rules
of the National House of Representatives,” American_Political
Science Review, XXIX (October, 1935). 837;41 considers a pro-
ject in which Garfield played a significant role.

The period from Hayes's nomination through the settlement
of the disputed election has attracted a good deal of scholarly
attention. Kenneth E. Davison's "The Nomination of Rutherford
Hayes for the Presidency,V Ohio Histor , LXXVII (Winter, Spring,
Summer, 1968), 96-110, is the most able and recent study of
that event, while Edwin E. Thompson,VThe Bristow Presidential
Boom of 1876,? Mississippi Valley:Historical Review, XXXII

(June, 1945), 3-30, examines Bristow’s failure at Cincinnati.

1

An interesting explanation of Indiana's role in Blaine s de-

feat can be found in E. J. Edwards, ”Reminiscences of James G.
Blaine,? Chautauguan, XVII (1893), 44-48. Hayes’s choice of

Key for his cabinet is considered in Albert V. House, "President

.1me . '

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548

Hayes'

Selection of David M. Key for Postmaster-General,"
Journal of Southern Histor , IV (February, 1938), 87-93.. A
wealth of detailed information on Louisiana’s part in the
settlement of the Hayes-Tilden contest may be found in Fanny
Z. L. Bone, ?Louisiana in the Disputed Election of 1876,"
Louisiana Historical QuarterIY.XIV (1931), 408-40, 549-65;

XV (1932),'93-116, 234-67. This study should be supplemented
by Benjamin F. Lathrop, "An Autobiography of Francis T.
Nichols,? Louisiana;gistorical Quarterly, XVII (1934), 246-67
and Robert C. Tucker, ?The Life and Public Service of F. John
Ellis,? Lguisiana Historical Quarterly, XXIX (July, 1946),
679-77S,which provide important information on the role and
attitude of two key figures in the election settlement.

Hayes's new departure in southern policy has been most
perceptively examined by Vincent P. DeSantis in ”President
Hayes’s Southern Policy,? gournal_gf(Southerngﬂistory, XXI
(November, 1955), 476-94. .For some insight into Hayes's view
of the southern problem and his feelings toward that section,
see Edward W. Winkler, ed., ?The Bryan-Hayes oorrespondence,"
Southwestern_ﬂistorical Quarterly, XXVII (April, 1924), 305-.
328. ‘ ' ‘

Among those articles that focus, at least in part, on
the President's civil service reform efforts are: Lee Necomer,
VChester A. Arthur: The Factors Involved in His Removal From
the New York Customhouse,? ﬂ§w;lgrk Histgry, XVIII (October,
1937), 401-10 and two articles by William Hartman, ?The New

York Custom House,? New York History, XXXIV (April, 1953),

549

149-63 and ?Pioneer in Civil Service Reform: Silas W. Burt
and the New York Custom House,? New York Historical Society
Quarterly,XXXIX (October, 19555, 369-79. Edward Cary, "The
Administration and Civil Service Reform,” International Re-
112E: VI (March, 1879), 227-33 is a fair example of a refor-
mer's critique of Hayes's experiments in civil service reform.

There are several enlightening articles on members of
Hayes's cabinet. John Sherman was easily the major figure
in the official family and a close friend and political con-
fidant throughout the presidential years. Their special re-
lationship is nicely surveyed in Jeannette F. Nichols, "Ruther-
ford B. Hayes and John Sherman,? Ohio History, LXXVII (Winter,
Spring, Summer, 1968), 125-38. 'Her examination of VJohn
Sherman and the Silver Drive of 1877-78: The Origins of the
Gigantic Subsidy,? Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarter-
ly, XLVI (April, {937), 148-65 is most helpful on the silver
issue during the Hayes administration and along with "John
Sherman: A Study in Inflation,9 Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XXI (September, 1934) is enlightening as to Sherman
the man, his views and his politics. The relationship between
Hayes and the staunchest reform member of his cabinet is re-
viewed in Carl Wittke, ?Carl Schurz and R. B. Hayes," thg
Historical Quarterly, LXV (October, 1956), 337-55. Secretary
of State Evarts did not impress at least one member of the
diplomatic corps as can be seen in Paul Knaplund and Carolyn
M. Clewes, eds., ?Frivate Letters from the British Embassy in

Washington to the Foreign Secretary Lord Granville, 1880-1885,"

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550
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1941,
I, 75-183.

After the death of Hayes in 1893, Jacob D. Cox and Murat
Halstead, two men who knew him well, recalled the man and his
administration in ?The Hayes Administration," Atlantic Monthly,
LXXI (June, 1893),'819—832 and "Recollections and Letters of
President Hayes,9 Independent, LI (February 16, 1899), 486-89.

A perceptive review of the men who bid for the Republican

fr

presidential nomination in 1880 can be found in "Republican
Candidates for the Presidency," Atlantic Monthly, XLV (April,
1880), 549-58. The claim that Garfield's nomination was due
to Wharton Barker’s management is detailed in the latter’s

"The Secret History of Garfield’s Nomination," Pearson s

Magazine, XXXV (May, 1916), 435-43. Barker’s work on Gar-
field's behalf have been considered in Frank B. Evans, "Whar-
ton Barker and the Republican National Convention of 1880,"

Pennsylvania History, XXVII (January, 1960), 28-43.
DISSERTATIONS

The growing number of dissertations with a late nine-
teenth century focus have contributed significantly to a re-
evaluation of this era. Among those that this study has
benefited from is David Abshire, "David McKendree Key; A Study
in Reconstruction Politics" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Georgetown University, 1958), a sympathetic and often en-

lightening biography of Hayes's major southern appointee.

     
    
  
 

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551
One gains some insight into the rupture between Hayes and his
party over his southern and civil service policies in Selig
Adler, "The Senatorial Career of George Franklin Edmunds,
1866-1891? (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State Uni-
versity, 1956). William Henry Smith deserves further treat-
ment, if only because of his significance in Hayes’s political
life, although a competent survey of his activities can be
found in Edgar L. Gray, "The Career of William Henry Smith,
Politician-Journalist” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio
State University, 195C). William Hartman’s thorough and well
written study, VPolitics and the Patronage: The New York
Custom House, 1S52-1902? (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University, 19oz) makes a substantial contribution
to an understanding of Hayes’s reform efforts there, while
Edward A. Huth presents a moderately helpful survey of the
entire Hayes reform effort in ”President R. B. Hayes; Civil
Service Reformer? (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Western
Reserve University, 1943). James K. Kindahl offers a care-
fully developed analysis of the economic factors involved in
resumption in ?The Economics of Resumption; The United States,
1865-1879" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1958). James Comly is another important Hayes
associate who deserves further attention, although Eugene
Kleinpell, ”The Life of James M. Comly" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Ohio State University, 1937) is a gracefully
written and thorough study. In "The Congressional Career of

William McKinley? (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University

 

552
of California at Los Angeles, 1959), H. Wayne Morgan nicely
captures the essence of the political maturation of this pro-
tege of Hayes. The views and political activities of a major
Negro spokesman and Hayes appointee are adequately dealt with
in Benjamin Quarles, ?The Public Life of Frederick Douglass"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1941).
The man who was defeated by Hayes for the presidential nom-
ination and was later embittered by Hayes's failure to recog-
nize him as expected is the subject of Edwin B. Thompson’s
"Benjamin Helm Bristow? (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin,-1940). And finally, Upton S. Palmer
evaluates and analyzes Hayes as a public Speaker in his long
and detailed VAn Historical and Critical Study of the Speeches
of Rutherford B. Hayes? (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Michigan, 195C).

THE PRESS

Among the journals that have been of value, either in a
general way or for their commentaries and analyses of events
of the period covered in this study are the National Repub-
ligan, a sharply partisan Republican paper that often found
fault with both Hayes and Garfield; the New York Timgs; the
New York Tribune; The Nation; the Springfield Daily Republican;
the marinate pan; Gazette and the MState Jourpar. The

 

Nation and the Tribune were generally sympathetic toward Hayes

and his presidential policies, although they sometimes found

him insufficiently liberal on such questions as southern

553

policy and civil service reform. The Gazette and the Journal

 

reflected the views of editors who not only were well acquaint-

ed with Hayes and Garfield, but had played a role in their

political rise.

 

 
 
  
 
 
 
  

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