


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ABSTRACT

ART AS COMMUNICATION

by Howard McConeghey

This thesis is a philosophical dissertation on the requirements of an art education which would be based on a juristic philosophy. Juristic philosophy was first expounded by John F. A. Taylor in The Masks of Society.¹ It is concerned with the human social condition. "What are the conditions essential to the dignity of persons in any form of human community? That question is the burden of juristic philosophy."² A juristic philosophy takes the point of view of the implicated participant as distinguished from that of the objective spectator. In this respect it is closely allied to perceptual theories, and existential beliefs in psychology as well as in existential philosophical thought.

If reality, as it is knowable to man, consists not of isolated objects but of man's perception of them (a relationship between the object and the person) then the importance of commitment and the responsibility of the implicated individual become evident. Man may exist as a mere creature of nature, but to be a person is to oblige oneself freely

to respect the rights of others and to restrain the creatively impulse in favor of principled community. Freedom is the ability to choose the principled life, not the license of impulse, indecision, or merely habitual behavior. It is argued here that the freedom from tradition in art brings an awesome responsibility for genuine intense encounter with reality. As a mode of authentic response to reality, art is more an affirmation of reality than it is a communication with other men. Its purpose is the apprehension of the real, not the sharing of knowledge already possessed. Art is simultaneously a formulation and an investigation by which the artist achieves an apprehension of the world. Creation is a lonely enterprise which cannot be shared. The value of the created work is that it represents an authentic response, a valid mode of encounter, never that it depicts a part of reality, teaches a moral, or shares a specific emotion. It is suggested that while art demands freedom, it is only responsible freedom based upon a genuine encounter with reality and devoid of rubric, idealized pre-conception, or formula which can produce meaningful works of art.

From such a philosophical standpoint, the teaching of art is seen as necessarily a non-directive proposition. Like achievement in art, the specific goals of education cannot be fully determined beforehand. The control of learning is essentially the responsibility of the student. Rather than limiting the possibilities for growth and genuine response to a single "right" direction, the goal of

education must be left open to the infinite number of possibilities which personal encounter may discover. Education must center upon the individual integrity of each child and the development of critical awareness and concern in his encounter with reality. This constitutes an immensely difficult but nonetheless necessary goal for the responsible educator. Education becomes a dialogue. Its purpose is to nurture the living spirit, a thing as various as the number of students. No longer can education be considered a preparation for life. It must be a living encounter with relevant problems. Four requirements for creating a facilitating classroom atmosphere are quoted from Carl Rogers,³ and four general principles regarding art and the creation of art are formulated as follows:

Requirements for creating a facilitating classroom atmosphere.

1. Contact with Problems - Situations must be presented which can be perceived by the students as real problems relevant to his life.
2. The Teacher's Real-ness - "Congruence" - The teacher must feel acceptant toward his own real feelings.
3. Acceptance and Understanding - An unconditional positive regard for every student is important.
4. Provision of Resources - Materials and resources should be made available, not forced upon the student.

General principles regarding art and creativity.

1. Art Means Giving Form - Art is not illustration, narrative, or moralizing ideas, but the formulation of a meaningful world.
2. Work for Clarity - The process of formulation requires the utmost awareness and spontaneous insight. Only where clarity is achieved is form, and therefore meaning, attained.
3. Be Intense (Care Enough) - To achieve understanding in the face of reality requires constant diligence against delimiting idealization, sentimentality, the careless following of tradition and willful caprice or negligence.
4. Never Generalize - The only reality one can know is the reality of his direct encounter with the world and this is always personal.

¹John F. A. Taylor, The Masks of Society (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966).

²Ibid., p. iv.

³Carl Rogers, On Becoming A Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 286 ff.

ART AS COMMUNICATION

By

Howard McConeghey

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF EDUCATION

College of Education

1966

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4/12/67

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

One is indebted to so many people for his beliefs and ideas and for their development. First of all I want to express my gratitude to my doctoral committee for the freedom they have allowed me in my work and for their continuous guidance and inspiration.

The sympathetic counsel of Dean Melby at the very beginning of my doctoral work will always be remembered with warm appreciation. It was Dean Melby who guided me in the choice of philosophy as my cognate area of study, and who recommended Dr. Taylor for membership on my committee.

Dr. Taylor has, of course, influenced my entire understanding of the covenants of community and has helped to bring my own clouded and generalized thinking into focus. It was most certainly some benevolent fate which brought me into the sphere of this important and sympathetic influence. Our association has made my previous thinking meaningful and has given it direction while enlarging the horizon of my view.

Dr. Meyer has been helpful from the beginning. He has always been available and generous with encouragement and support during those mundane moments of discouragement or monotony when friendly and practical advice were needed.

Of course, the whole course of my study has been shepherded by Dr. Stearns who has been not only a capable and facilitating advisor, but a real friend as well as an inspiring example of genuine responsible teaching.

Also I want to express my gratitude to Dr. Paul Hurell whose lectures on existentialism were a most important influence on my thinking, and whose confidence in my ability was a real contribution to my study.

Dr. Thomas Green was also an early and a continuing influence on my thinking during my doctoral work as evidenced by the use of his manuscript in the body of this dissertation.

In addition I want to thank Thera Stearns for reading the manuscript of my thesis and suggesting important corrections, my sister, Ruth Mahon, for invaluable suggestions and my friend, James Chase for typing the rough draft and its many revisions, and my typist, Mrs. Mary Ann Lance.

Besides my specific indebtedness to the people mentioned above and the primary influence of Dr. Taylor's philosophy which is important enough to be given additional emphasis here, the development of my thinking over the past years has been influenced and shaped in important ways by the work of Martin Buber, Carl Rogers, and Karl Jaspers and that of Henry Schaefer-Simmern and Rudolph Arnheim.

Continuing influence from early contact with encouraging individuals would include high school teachers, Mrs. Illa

Mae Talley and Mrs. Mildred Cunningham, and college professors, John Horns and Felix Payant, and finally associates in art education, Sister Magadeline Mary, IHM and Sister Mary Corita, IHM of Immaculate Heart College, and Sister Joan Louise, CSJ of Avila College.

To all others whose influence and assistance has been ignored here, I want to offer my sincere gratitude.

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CHAPTER I

WHAT IS A JURISTIC PHILOSOPHY?

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the task of teaching art in the light of a consistent and compatible philosophy. Any philosophy, to be compatible with art education, must recognize that reality is not apprehended solely by the rational cognition of objective nature but that an equally valid and important aspect of reality can be known only by the sensible apprehension of what, of all the possibilities in nature, ought to be enacted. This is a normative apprehension of man's responsibility in the face of indifferent nature. It concerns not only the mechanical fact of nature but also the juristic fact of human community.

↓ Not all that is real may be known by objective and disinterested analysis which reveals only one aspect of a situation and leaves the equally revealing aspect of the implicated participant unseen. It seems evident, however, that the positivistic, technical knowing about reality has received almost exclusive attention in Western civilization, to the serious neglect of the juristic or normative knowledge of reality.

"We in the Western world are the heirs
of four centuries of technical achievements

in power over nature and now over ourselves; this is our greatness and, at the same time it is also our greatest peril. We are not in danger of repressing that technical emphasis. . . . But rather we repress the opposite . . .¹ we repress the sense of being . . ."

A juristic philosophy recognizes that an individual is himself a significant part of whatever he observes and that the reality of experience depends upon personal participation. Over 150 years ago Immanuel Kant pointed out that there are serious limitations to cognitive reason. There is a kind of knowledge (a kind with which we are all quite familiar and, in fact,) which we are wont to consider the only kind of true knowledge. This, of course, is objective scientific knowledge, the knowledge of facts. It is a technical knowledge, a knowledge of what is the case in nature, of what will follow particular physical events, of cause and effect. It is a knowledge, therefore, of power and control. Since the sixteenth century Western man has been able to achieve such great strides in his control over nature and to attain such power for physical good and evil, employing this kind of knowledge, that today we have come to consider it to be the only valid knowledge. The overwhelming advance in technical and scientific progress in the past four hundred years has apparently convinced us that this theoretical kind of knowledge is the sole basis for our appropriation of reality. /

¹Rollo May (ed.), Existential Psychology (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 20.

It remains true, nonetheless, that there is in addition a kind of reality which no unimplicated objective observer can experience. This mode of reality requires a kind of knowledge which is different from the technical theoretical knowledge of science. It requires a knowledge of obligation, a knowledge of what ought to be the case in human relations whether or not it actually is the case. It is concerned not with what are the limitations and possibilities within nature, but with limits which men will oblige themselves to maintain, limits which nature does not dictate, which man alone prescribes.

It is solely by such creative self-imposed limitation that man may achieve true human dignity. As a mere creature of nature man has no more dignity than any natural creature. It is only as he voluntarily obliges himself to limits which are not set by nature, but which he creates for himself, that man attains the dignity of a human being. Instead of remaining a mere creature of nature, bound exclusively by the requirements of nature, man may agree not to indulge his creaturely desires and appetites, but to limit his behavior in favor of better relations with his fellow human beings. Nature does not demand that we respect the person or the "rights" of the other fellow, and there is no dignity either in overpowering another to obtain what he has or in suffering such treatment. There is dignity in respecting the person and the "rights" of one's neighbor. This dignity man alone can achieve. And he can achieve it only by an act of acceptance--by accepting the

other as a person of worth and dignity--by treating him, as Kant would have it, as an end and never merely as a means. Nature does not require it of man. Such restriction of one's behavior has no basis in objective nature. Its base lies in creative human community, and it is only by transcending his purely creaturely being that man can achieve such dignity. Knowledge of this kind is knowledge of obligation, not knowledge of bare fact. For it often happens, alas, that a person knowing his duty, fails, in his finitude, to discharge it. The fact that one does not do his duty in no way challenges the validity of his obligation. If man is to have community at all, he will have it only to the extent that he respects the humanity of another and grants him the status of a person, not a mere thing in nature. The extent of his community will be the extent of those to whom he will grant this status and in whom he will admit the possession of rights which he is willing to respect. Such community is based upon mutual respect and is maintained by covenant frequently informal and unstated. The philosophy which ponders covenant is juristic. We require no judge to question the behavior of nature. We accept, as we must, the restrictions of nature as we exploit her possibilities. Whatever is possible can be done in nature, yet much of what can be done is not possible in human community.

This second kind of knowledge may be contrasted more fully with the first. Rather than being objective and scientific, it is a knowledge of commitment and partisanship;

rather than being a knowledge of facts, it is one of responsibility, of obligation. It is not a technical but a normative knowledge, not a knowledge of what is the case, but of what ought to obtain between persons; a knowledge of the human potential in every man. It is not a knowledge of cause and effect, but of the conditions of community. It is a knowledge, therefore, not of power and control, but of acceptance and affirmation. And it is based upon covenant, the covenant which is established between two persons who respect the rights of each other. This, then is the area with which a juristic philosophy concerns itself. A juristic philosophy seems to be most compatible with the concerns of art and art education. It has its roots in Kantian idealism and is also related to existential thought by its concern for personal commitment and authenticity in man's moral engagement with the emerging reality.

Juristic philosophy is the study of the covenants of civilization. It is an inquiry into the phenomenon of obligations in every detail of civilized activity, obligations which attach to persons as a condition of their membership in any form of human community. The term juristic philosophy was first used by John F. A. Taylor in his The Masks of Society where he says, "I entitle the study of the covenants of civilization juristic philosophy." Taylor proposes to generalize the term juristic and use it in a broader sense than is customary. "By juristic philosophy I do not understand the enterprise of jurisprudence.", he explains.

"The term jurisprudence suggests a narrowly legal interest, a formal and causal as distinct from the broadly moral meaning which I, in fact intend. By juristic philosophy I understand, on the contrary, an inquiry into the phenomenon of obligation in each of the several domains of civilized activity." And he adds, "In my extended usage an inquiry will be said to be juristic if its purpose is to exhibit the covenant of any form of human community--the constitution of a political order, the parliamentary law of a deliberative assembly, the rules of exchange in a market, the method of a science, the creed of a religion, the convention of a language or the style of an art."¹

Or again, "By 'juristic philosophy' I shall understand the general inquiry into covenants, an examination of the conditions of peace under law in whatever branch of human activity we chance to study it."²

The term "law" tends to be so strongly associated with the more common, narrower concept of jurisprudence that the term "principle" might better suggest the new and broader concept intended here. In order to understand this broad concept, it is imperative to make clear the idea that covenants are implied in all principled activity. As Taylor admits, the term jurisprudence suggests a narrow interest. But juristic is intended, in this new use, to have much broader moral meaning. It is concerned not only with the obligations of members in the political community, but equally with obligations of members in the scientific community or in the religious, linguistic and artistic

¹ John F. A. Taylor, The Masks of Society (New York: Appleton, Century, Crofts, Inc., 1966), p. 10.

² Ibid., p. 11.

communities. Perhaps it will be easier to understand the basis of a juristic philosophy if the reader will notice, along with Taylor, that all questions regarding the foundation of human society are of two kinds: questions of path and questions of covenant. Questions of path concern the limits which nature has imposed upon human behavior. They are technical questions whose answers must be sought in the domain of science. Questions of covenant are, on the other hand, questions of obligation, which concern the limits which men impose upon themselves. Their answers are to be found in the domain of justice, value and personal truth. That which makes man human rather than merely animal is not that which nature allows, but that which man obliges himself to do even though indifferent nature does not demand it. Thus all questions which are distinctively human fall among the questions of covenant and are juristic in nature.

Contemporary man is accustomed to cultivate questions of path and to neglect questions of covenant. Such questions do not admit of the kind of confirmation we are accustomed to requiring of matters of fact (empirical proof). For the juristic fact which challenges our understanding is not the physical event but the moral engagement. Such juristic covenants are the despair of our positivistic generation. They are indispensable to an understanding of the historical structure which we occupy. They are not amenable to what we understand as proof. "The positive sciences

are therefore unequal to conferring upon us an understanding of the objective foundations of our moral community."¹

"Questions of covenant require of us not an additional fact-finding but a taking of sides, a deliberate suspension of our moral neutrality in confronting fact, an alliance under principle."²

Juristic philosophy asks what are the rules which belong to community itself, which are so essential that without them there would be no community at all.

"What is the fundamental covenant of human community in any of its forms?

Or, to put the same question in different words: what is essential if men are to stand in the dignity of persons in each other's presence?"³

Taylor explains the importance of a juristic concern fully at the beginning of his book. "In all settled seasons of society the principles men live by are more stably secured by habit than by thought. The artist's craft, the legislator's policy, the saint's conduct - all rest implicitly on principles which a critical intelligence can discern. The discernment of these principles is essential to our understanding of the artist, the legislator, or the saint. Yet for the actor himself the principle is apt to remain latent and unspoken, its presence betrayed only in the activity over which it presides . . ."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 7.

²Ibid., p. 9.

³Ibid., p. 12.

⁴Ibid., p. 3.

"A conscious preoccupation with principle is always, in human affairs, the sign of an unsettled season. It belongs typically to seasons of struggle, to seasons of revolution and moral crisis when the times are out of joint and habits are confused and all men are filled with the doubts and irresolutions of lost Eden. In general, first principles are reflected upon only when they have been challenged. Unchallenged, they are simply illustrated in our quiet obedience."¹

"The twentieth century is an age of such moral arrest. The crises of human activity have multiplied so that there is no major sphere of human activity, no sphere in which human community is at stake, whose foundations have not been challenged or rudely shaken. The result is that in our historical situation the search for principle is no longer the exercise of an intellectual option; it has become, for all men of our times, an irrepressible moral necessity."²

The following is therefore an attempt to discover valid principles for the practice and the teaching of art. Science has come to regard the structure and process of the world as problematic. It has abandoned the doctrine of simple location. No longer is it possible to reach a logical completion of thought by ordering our reflection upon reality

¹Ibid., p. 4.

²Ibid., p. 5.

from any single point of view. Reality is conceived of as space-time relations and as knowable from multiple perspectives.

In an effort to speak truly of things in such a world, the artist must abandon his earlier concern with the representation of solid objects as seen from a fixed position and his former submission to ideal proportions based upon the human figure.

Art, as an authentic human act, must respond to man's new understanding of the world. It can no longer be considered to be a mechanical or idealized replication of isolated objects conceived from the view of classical Euclidian geometry. Rather, being a sensible revelation of man's implication in the reality of his total existence, genuine art will reflect the newer reality of probability and relativity. The task of contemporary art is to discover visible principles which will express this view of reality.

Art is a mode of response to reality. By genuine response man reveals what is real to him, and it is only in his authentic encounter with the world that he can achieve such a knowledge of reality. In other words, art is not the representation of some object or situation, real or ideal, which could be known before the act of creating the work of art. Rather art is an act of comprehending the world. It is a means of making the world meaningful and, therefore real for, oneself. Only as the work of art is created is meaning, and thus reality, achieved. Reality consists of the genuine encounter of a self with the objects

of the world. Art is, therefore, not self-expression but the expression of this encounter with the world. The self is only one factor in the equation. The artist constantly creates a new world for himself by continuous and intensely passionate response to the reality he faces. He does not reveal what he already knows but what he learns by this artistic mode of encounter with reality. Art is an investigation of reality and at the same time a formulation of the real.

The crisis of art in the twentieth century consists in the breakdown of the traditional concept of art as imitation, and the failure of many to discern principled decision in the newer expression. "Art has relinquished its relation to the visible world; therein lies its greatest challenge to our inherited concept of culture."¹ Creativity, in the present historical situation, demands constant inquiry and intense concern regarding what is real. No predetermined standard concept of reality is acceptable. What is demanded is a new way of looking at the world, a new stance toward reality. Just as science has discovered a new and more dynamic concept of matter and energy, so art has discovered a new concept of space and form. Art is no longer concerned with imitating objects as delimiting bodies, but it explores a new relationship between forms and space. Proportions are no longer pre-determined

¹ Alfred Neumeyer, The Search for Meaning in Modern Art (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1901), pp. 3-4.

by the human body, but are developed out of given variable relations which are considered for their own reality. Works of art are no longer a reflection or idealization of "real" objects, but they have an existence independent of the physical measurements of objects outside themselves. Works of art are themselves real objects. The achievement of a meaningful structure of form, an expressive Gestalt has taken over as a controlling principle where the imitation of an ideal once reigned. A shift in man's world outlook calls for a new art. If one speaks of art education then, he must speak of "teaching." Nonetheless, the term is used in quotation marks here, to indicate its new meaning. The teacher, today, has no assured traditional values to present to his student. When "the times are out of joint and habits are confused and all men are filled with doubts and irresolutions of lost Eden,"¹ there is no ideal with general validity which the educator may use as a model for his students. In such a time there is nothing for him to seek except the reality of the single individual child. Only that influence is valid in teaching which will facilitate the student in becoming an authentic self. The task of the "teacher" becomes one of developing the courage and self-confidence required for the student to respond with integrity and fortitude to the reality he faces. Because the responsibility for his learning rests preponderantly with the student (a reversal of the traditional attitude)

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 4.

the conventional approach to education is no longer valid. A "projective" education is one which will help the student to perceive reality with directness and integrity, not leaning upon standard concepts or traditional bias, but with an openness to his encounter with reality. We no longer believe that the development of a rational attitude is encouraged by exclusively rational means. Learning involves passion as well as the intellect. Reason must always be kept open for any eventuality, even when, at its outer limits, it encounters anti-reason. We know that reality includes the self which is experiencing reality. Reality is a personal encounter with the world, not the world isolated from its being apprehended.

Such a shift in man's view of reality alters the previously held notion that art is self-expression to read, "art is an expression of the individual's mode of encounter with reality." Not the self is to be expressed, but reality (which includes the self as a part of the relationship constituting reality). The teacher cannot know by tradition what this relationship ought to be for each student. Rather than to teach the way to draw an eye, for example, the teacher must understand not only that there is no universal way, but also that there is no generalized eye. There is only a particular eye seeing a specific reality and responding in an individual way. "Projective" art will be a structure of tensions built of relationships between forms. The right relationships between forms is never determinable a priori but is knowable only in the process of their combination.

For any given work of art, that structure is right which is the one exclusively possible expression of the specific reality under consideration.

The teacher can help the child to understand that for him, for each individual student, reality must be appropriated by direct perception; that instead of following rubric or formula, one perception must immediately and directly lead to further perception; that depending upon formula can only interfere with a genuine encounter. No lyrical interference of individual impulse or unexamined feeling should be allowed to overwhelm the outward incident or event. The contemporary encounter with reality would be one characterized by intensity and awareness. One's encounter must be serious enough to preclude the egotistical overwhelming of nature with one's private whim, unexamined habit, prejudice or consuming passion. One must remain a participant in the larger force of nature not an arbitrary ego, if he is to see the secrets of a genuine reality. It requires a reverence for reality which cannot be satisfied solely by the intellect, and which will not countenance the distortion of one's encounter with reality by standard formula or prescribed method.

CHAPTER II

ART AS COMMUNICATION

Although it cannot be denied that art does in some way communicate, it seems that unless one is careful of its meaning, the common phrase art is communication can be more confusing than it is helpful. The title of this dissertation "Art As Communication" has therefore been chosen for the specific purpose of drawing attention to this danger and of making very clear what the writer considers to be the way in which art can be said to communicate. Unfortunately, the term, communication, in this positivist culture, has come to mean the transmission of quite specific, well-defined ideas, requests or information, the meaning of which is clearly and identically understood by all parties concerned. Based on the objectivist tradition that what is external and visible is more fundamental than what is not, such a definition of the word, communication, when translated into terms of art would suggest that art communicates by means of imitating nature, or, at most, by portraying some hidden, but traditionally accepted ideal beneath the surface of nature.

Retaining such an outlook, many people expect a descriptive, an anecdotal, or a didactic communication from works of visual art. Illustration, the imitation of nature,

or symbolic idealization are still considered to be the goals of art. When one speaks of proportion, most people think in terms of the measurements of the human body, the measurements of a carcass, or of some ideal ratios relating to these measurements. The imitation of the idealized human figure was the goal of classical Greek art. Polykleites wrote a "canon" in which he formulated a comprehensive law of proportions in which, "the width of the middle finger was taken as a unit, and all other dimensions of the body were specified in terms of this unit."¹ Beauty was thought to consist in the proportions of the parts of the human figure; the relationship of finger to finger, and of all the fingers to the palm and wrist, and of these to the forearm, and of the forearm to the upper arm, etc. When one speaks of space, most people think of linear perspective, a Renaissance invention. If these people see an abstract painting, they ask, "What does it mean?", that is, "What, distinct from itself, does it refer to?"

Concomitant with this emphasis on artistic motivation as external to the individual is the exaggeration of the importance of talent. It is said that the artist works from inspiration, that his talent is a God-given quality. Such a notion may be popular because it excuses those without talent or inspiration from any responsibility for creative expression or even from understanding art. In addition,

¹H.H. Powers, The Message of Greek Art (Norwood, Massachusetts: Norwood Press, 1913).

this notion would seem to render the teaching of art superfluous since only the talented few could possibly have any valid reason for engaging in artistic activity, and these few work from inspiration, a source presumably far more helpful than a mere classroom teacher can be.

A third aspect of the positivistic tradition which is also erroneous and possibly even more dangerous, since it deals with a technically demonstrable aspect of works of art, is the belief that design is the end of art. Distortion, "misproportion" and the absence of linear perspective are accepted if the resulting work achieves a pleasing design. Harmony, then, the pleasing arrangement of lines, colors, and shapes, is taken to be the goal of art. No doubt one of the most pernicious aspects of art education today is the perpetuation of this half-truth and the consequent obscuring of the authentic purpose of art. Design and form are taught by rule as ends in themselves.

It is true that order is important in art, but order is important only as a means of expressing the artist's conception of the world and his relation to it, not for the sake of harmony or enjoyment. Forms in themselves have no value. It is what they are committed to express that is to be valued. However, the overwhelming number of Americans who are now teaching, or are preparing to teach in the elementary and secondary schools, have been raised in the positivist tradition. These are the people who, "don't know anything about art," but who presumably do know what they like. In the positivistic preference for externals,

in the concern for elements rather than patterns, in the insistence upon efficiency, present-day education has not given this majority of teachers a meaningful concept of art. The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate that communication in art is something quite different from illustration, imitation, propaganda or pleasing design. What art does communicate is more than anecdote, description or symbolic moral. The thesis here presented is that art is man's response to his contemporary situation; his communion with reality, and that art's purpose is to achieve an ordered and meaningful awareness of the human situation. In other words, to achieve authentic selfhood. The viewer may gain real insight into the nature of being human through the contemplation of works of art: art can communicate an authentic mode of response, but the artist's purpose must always remain personal--to discover his singular relationship to the world.

Regarding the notion that art is a substitute for nature (imitation) or that it presents an ideal reality symbolic of a more perfect existence, it seems necessary merely to point out that imitation gets one together only with the memory of something else. One would enjoy a landscape painting not as a work of art but as a reminder of a beautiful landscape, as a substitute. The newer thought recognizes that the artist is a significant part of the thing observed, that there is no such thing as an objective view of a fixed reality. If art is to be valued at all, its value must be inherent in the work itself, not in what

it causes the viewer to recall or to hope for. Society has valued art as communication and as a means of union among men. It is often called a universal language. No doubt art's value to society does reside in its ability to unite men in their common humanness. Certainly this aspect of art needs to be considered if one is to become clearly aware of art's role in uniting men.

In his, What Is Art, Tolstoy explained art as the communication of emotions. He insisted that art's effect as well as its goal is to cause the beholder to feel the exact emotion which the artist felt at the original encounter with reality which inspired the work of art. However, it seems that this is not only undesirable but quite impossible. Any man receiving another man's expression is responding not to the original object or situation which the artist faced but to an object or event, namely, a symbolic structure, which has been organized in contemplation of the original stimulus, in response to it. Therefore, this man is not likely to have the exact emotion which the artist had in the original encounter.

✱ If it is true that each individual becomes a significant part of his experienced reality, it seems obvious that an authentic response to reality could not be identical for two men facing the same stimulus. Each person's encounter with reality includes not only the object encountered but the personal encounter as well. It should be emphasized that the two men in question here are responding to entirely different stimuli, one to the original experience, the other

to the work of art. The experiencing of a work of art offers the possibility of an esthetic response to the human expression of another person. Rather than experiencing the artist's original emotion, the viewer may be made keenly aware of that emotion as a possible authentic response. Thus he may gain a deeper understanding of the possibilities for genuinely human encounter with the world, an additional alternative for men's participation in the total reality of existence.

In the covenant of art, Taylor says, "a human being discerns a role, a human alternative, a possibility of participation. It is but one of the possibilities. Its educative and civilizing virtue is that it exhibits this possibility, that it enlarges the range of human alternatives by one."¹

The artist cannot reveal the world to which he responds except through a genuine personal encounter, and such a relationship with reality is achieved only through complete personal response. The encounter modifies the experience, shapes it, makes it what it is.

Tolstoy, in speaking of art as communication, based his thesis on the possibility of shared similarities. He claimed that art is a means of union among men which is brought about, "by joining them together in one and the same feeling."² Art certainly is a means of union among men.

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 195.

²Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art?, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 123.

However, this union is the result not of shared similarities, but of shared possibilities of encounter. Of what value is the sharing of similarities? It would be an exchange which paradoxically is no exchange at all. It would be meaningless and would do nothing to promote union among men. It would merely reflect such union as happened already to exist. It could do no more than to recognize a kind of likeness which is shared merely by being a common attribute of several or many persons. (Tolstoy demanded universal appreciation.) This kind of sharing is one which could in no case be avoided and which requires no art for its recognition.

In reality communication in art is more an insistence upon the authentic singularity of the individual in his encounter with the world. Thus what one can share is his humanness. Authentic humanness is a uniquely individual decision and act, and can, therefore, not be shared by imitation, division or joint participation. To share in the humanity of community is, paradoxically, to act upon one's singular decision and one's personal response. Therefore, one shares not a precisely similar emotion but a particular authenticity which in concrete act may be different for each individual. It is the common bond of personal integrity which makes community and thus communication possible. In sharing the possibility of genuine individuality, one shares not the exact emotion, but a similar integrity in the face of reality. The reality of nature must be taken as common or given. If that is shared, it is certainly not as a result of any effect or art on the part of any individual. It

is, or may be, shared in common by every creature which exists as a part of nature. In other words, it is a phenomenon which must be responded to individually. What can be communicated is, thus, not nature, or a duplicate emotion, but a personal mode of response to the phenomena of reality. The response which a work of art objectifies is a human mode of encounter, one which is also possible for other men. The artist's mode of response, his style of mind, is communicated, and it is this which can unite men. Receiving this communication constitutes an enlargement of one's individual capacity for experience, because it indicates one of the possible modes of response which are available to mankind.

"Since it is impossible for man to have Transcendence in time as a knowable object, identical for everybody like something in the world, every mode of the one Truth as absolute in the world can in fact only be historical: unconditional for this Existenz but, precisely for this reason, not universally valid. For, since it is not impossible, but only psychologically infinitely difficult for a man to act according to his own truth, realizing at the same time the truth of others which is not true for him, holding fast to the relativity and particularity of all universally valid truths--since it is not impossible, he must not shirk the highest demand of truthfulness which is only¹ apparently incompatible with that of others."

In other words, communication springs from intercourse between persons who participate in a common world order and who cooperate in common tasks which humanize relations between them. The other becomes real as a person by one's being genuinely aware of himself. Communication is

¹Karl Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, trans. William Earle (New York: N.Y.: The Noonday Press, 1955), p. 100.

then, being an authentic person. Truth is individual and the truth of each person is the truth for him. Yet there is the truth of others. The world is not a public language but a secret text which must be understood by personal existence and can be known only by each one for himself--it can never be known for others by any person. Such a response, which acknowledges the inescapableness of the personal contribution of the respondent and assumes its risk, is what Jaspers intends by an "authentic" response.

Only if a person's response is authentic is he true to his being. Only then can he reveal the reality of being. But he can only reveal that reality which he is, and this he can reveal solely through genuine concern for the world which he encounters, through reverence for, and finally, through his unreserved response to that world. One does not reveal the world except through his individual encounter. One cannot communicate the authenticity of the world. That is beyond man's province. (In any case, one's affirmation might be so limited as to neglect, or so self-centered as to conceal, much which others might discern). What one can reveal--and communicate--is a particular human response to the world, one's personal mode of encounter. It is thus one's own authenticity as a human being which he can communicate. But this cannot be achieved except by genuine response to reality.

Here is the heart of art education and the goal of art--the achieving of individual authenticity. It is for this reason that design principles must not be taken as the

basis of art. Art education must be seen as something far more challenging than the development of taste and the teaching of the basic principles of design. Academic concern with form or design for its own sake is not art.

It becomes merely a discipline of form without the inherent value which could relate it to the human response. Instead of liberating the consciousness in the contemplation of reality and its meaning, such an approach to art becomes a renunciation of personal insight and of the possibility of selfhood. The practice of art along these lines demands, it is true, marked ability, but such practice is based upon a merely technical concern with form rather than upon a genuine critical encounter with reality. Such methods may develop skill in technique but construction becomes calculation and aspiration sinks to the level of mere demand for making records. Art loses all principle as a human mode of response. It cannot further the selfhood of the individual.

"Instead of the objectivity of an emblem of the super sensual, it has only the objective of a concrete game. The search, for a new attachment to form finds a discipline of form without the intrinsic value which could permeate the essence of man."¹

Form becomes technical calculation and aspiration becomes a mere demand for making records. There exists today a romantic attachment to technique and mechanical form which

¹Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1957), p. 142.

blocks meaning and limits self-development. Principles of design and styles of form are taken as absolute standards.

It is important to understand that there is no such thing as a right design or a wrong design which art students should follow or avoid. Man no longer lives in a world where he can decide what it is that everybody should know or do. Art is a problem of thinking intelligent, unprejudiced response to the reality one faces, not one of following rules and formulas to achieve clever technical variations. Art must be an expression of the human condition in the contemporary world.

There is a binding relationship between thought and action which constitutes an essential condition of man.¹ Without thought, the behavior of man would remain a mere happening of nature. Thus man's individuality can only be known through his deeds which constitute his authentic self. Man as a part of nature is a creature, a given phenomenon. This is an unavoidable situation. It is the bare thatness which men circumstantially, without premeditation or design, make actual. Man as a particular person is, on the other hand, an achievement to be attained only by his individual choice and action. It is the who. Nature makes each person a human animal, but if he is to become an individual self, it must be by his own doing. It is a result of what one does, of his own deeds. The answer to the question,

¹The main ideas in this paragraph are derived from an unpublished manuscript by Thomas Green formerly of Michigan State University.

"What am I?" is the same for all men. "I am a human animal." But the question "Who am I?" can only be answered by one who can say, "I am he who responds." (He who accepts the responsibility of his actions.)

"Man's position in the universe is unique in that he, as a responding being, becomes answerable for his actions. This is the moral aspect of his freedom. Respondo ergo sum now means that I am in so far as I accept the responsibility of my actions" ¹

It is possible not to respond, to remain a mere creature, for things done apart from any thought are not human deeds. Such mere events do not constitute true response and cannot culminate in works of art. Nor can they promote community among men. "My sensations are real in so far as they are responses. I reach reality, I am real, I have reality, in so far as I respond, and in so far as my responses become answers. I am real in so far as I am with the world and am partaking in the discussion in the world." ²

The artist can therefore achieve his own authenticity by genuine response. He achieves authenticity then not as a creature of nature, but as a human being who can transcend the natural animal that he is; who must transcend it to become an individual. He can reveal himself by a human response--an affirmation of reality.

¹F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (New York: Harper and Rowe, Publishers, 1958), pp. 200-201.

²Ibid., p. 96.

This revelation, this image of himself may, finally, alter, enlarge or divert the viewer's own response to the world, but it can never replace or duplicate it. It adds another object out there to be responded to and to be integrated into the viewer's total environment. It enlarges man's understanding of the nature of being human. It is not because the artist "transmits his feelings" by means of art, as Tolstoy supposes, but because he expresses his particular mode of humanity that the work of art serves as a means of union among men.

Art begins then, not, "when one person with the object of joining another or others to himself in one and the same feeling, expresses that feeling by certain external indications."¹ Art begins rather, when a person achieves authenticity (in the face of a real situation) through complete response, and expresses his response by certain external indications. Although such art is a means of union among men, and is indispensable for life and progress toward the well-being of individuals and of humanity, as Tolstoy says, it can hardly be for the purpose of "sharing one and the same feeling" that the act of art occurs. Rather it is a communion with reality, a saying of "yes" to the world, to the reality that one has been party to constituting. It is an affirmation of existence, the personal humanizing achievement of an authentic relationship with reality. An artist reveals the world to which he responds only through

¹Tolstoy, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

his individual encounter. He cannot, in other words, create the authenticity of the world. He may, however, communicate his own authenticity (which he does create) by responding fully and personally to the world, by affirming what he can of the already given world. The world is there. It is given and is not to be doubted. Only its meaning is to be pondered, and that in relation to an individual and to mankind.

As a result of man's transcendence of the natural state, he must achieve authenticity--not as a thing in nature, but as a human being--as a thing apart from nature, a self-conscious deliberative being with the power to choose, to affirm and therefore to become an individual person standing not only apart from nature but also by his choices standing apart from other men as this individual who acts in this unique human way. Man as an individual person can only be known through his deeds. Man as a part of nature is an animal. This is given; is unavoidable. It is what men are. It is their dispensation, just as the other objects in the world are given. Man as a person, on the other hand, is an achievement of his own thought and action. Richard E. Sullivan, the historian, has a way of saying on occasion: "Those social scientists can tell me what to do; they can't tell me what to be!" It is only through his deeds that one can know who a person is. It is his own actions which indicate his thoughts. But thoughts do not appear in a vacuum. Only by responding to reality do men think and act. It is, finally, from the depth of the artist that the depth of the

work of art is derived. The aesthetitian Eugene Veron says that mediocre artists have no style for the very reason that they are mediocrities--commonness.

One admires the genius of Rembrandt in the profound character which he imparted to everyone who posed for him. Thus did he react to the world around him. Other artists painting the same portraits, responding to the same objective reality revealed lesser selves or less authentic selves in their work. Rembrandt was an artist who could and did respond to his world with his total person. His genius was great. The sitters were the same who sat for lesser painters, or who could have done so. In Rembrandt's work, depth and greatness and human qualities can be seen which are lacking in the portraits of his contemporaries. It is his own greatness and his personal richness which he has been able to express-but he could do this only by responding to the reality of the sitter. He was able to respond more deeply because his perception was more penetrating and concerned. He was able to affirm more of reality, and more richly than other artists.

It seems worthwhile to suggest that in manifesting his own authenticity by an act of total response to reality, Rembrandt dignified, that is, gave dignity to, his sitter. This he did by exhibiting it in himself, by realizing his own individuality, by expressing his personal authenticity. The truth of his portrait is Rembrandt's truth. The quality of a portrait is not simply concerned with how closely it

resembles the sitter, but with what the artist realizes out of the phenomenon which he faces.

Perhaps it would be well to indicate that while the art of Rembrandt was meaningful in the 17th century, it would not be relevant if produced today. It is easy to think of art in its timelessness as having the same kind of validity for all cultures. However, if we remain alert to the fact that in its production a work of art results from a man's mode of response to his contemporary world, we will see that a response which completely expressed the sense of the times in the seventeenth century would be an inadequate response to our contemporary historical situation. If art must be a responsive echo of man's awareness of himself in his particular situation, the radical changes that have taken place in the three hundred years since Rembrandt's time would certainly demand a different, if no less human response. It is for this reason that the imitation of the masters cannot be a proper goal in the teaching of art.

What does this mean for the classroom teacher? How can the teacher help the child to manifest his authenticity in art, to respond with genuine individuality, to express his personal truth? Certainly not by teaching rules of design, Renaissance perspective or the "correct" proportions of human anatomy. There are two damaging results from such an academic approach: first it narrows the possible views of reality for the child to one standard, externally imposed view, secondly this method teaches the child to hold his

personal vision in contempt and to seek at all costs to see in terms of the external criteria judged best by his superiors.

If our academic formulas lead to a Renaissance conception of reality which cannot be adequate for the twentieth century and which is certainly not a natural response to the reality which the children of today encounter, then what can be taught at all? Most teachers know how to teach the well-formed rules of perspective and anatomy, the principles of color harmony and design. This is, today, the easy solution. The path suggested here is not an easy one and its novelty may strike some as being arbitrary. Any contribution of value in contemporary art education must, however, suggest a new direction. New directions are never easy. Nonetheless, modern art has already a tradition of more than half a century. We can look for direction from this tradition.

When Cézanne, the father of modern art, said that he wanted to realiser, that is, to "bring into being" his visual apprehension of nature, he was speaking of giving form to his personal response to reality. He said, "Peindre d'après nature, ce n'est pas copier l'objectif, c'est realiser des sensations."¹ Or, again, writing to his son:

"As a painter I am becoming lucid in the presence of nature. But with me the realization of my sensations is always hard. I cannot reach the intensity which appears to my senses, I have not the magnificent richness of color that animates nature."²

¹Elie Faure, P. Cezanne (Paris: Les Editions G. Crés et cie., 1923), pp. 45-46.

²R. H. Wilenski, Modern French Painters (New York, N.Y.: Reynal and Hitchcock, n.d.), p. 180.

At the same time he was proclaiming the twentieth century world-view that man, by the process of perception, becomes a part of the object perceived. Reality does not consist of the thing-in-itself, absolute and isolated. The only reality one can know is that of the encounter of the human consciousness with the thing perceived. Man can know the reality of objects only through his personal experiencing of them which colors and therefore becomes a part of that reality. A second aspect of Cézanne's revolutionary attitude toward art as form-giving concerns the fact that in order to realize (bring into being) one's visual apprehension of reality, it is necessary to moduler, that is, to adjust the material perceived in such a way as to retain in the work of art the vital intensity found in reality. This means he wanted to give the painting a form which has vitality and tension equal to, though not the same as, that created in his intense encounter with reality. Distortion was a necessary technique for achieving the vitality which would equal and the unity which would make meaningful the encounter with reality. Form thus becomes the means to create a unity of the total field of representation.

Charles Olson speaks of contemporary poetry as "projective" or "open" verse, or as "composition by field," thus making even more intense the modern insistence on unity through relationships. Perhaps the following suggestions may be considered to be a contribution toward a projective art, or composition by field in the visual arts. They are encompassed by a juristic philosophy.

Without belaboring the point, it seems clear that there is a parallel between theories of composition by field in the arts and cognitive, or perceptual field theories in contemporary psychology. In addition, all these theories are based upon the relativistic thinking of such philosophers as Whitehead and others.

While field theories of art must avoid formula, it is clear that projective art will be principled. In an attempt to make this approach more practical for the classroom teacher, the following four principles have been recognized.

I. ART MEANS GIVING FORM -- an understanding of what art is will be essential to achieving it. It must be emphasized that giving form to one's personal response to reality in no way implies copying the shape of the isolated object. Rather, it means making the object meaningful. Form is not a replica of the physical object, but a revelation of the artist's total encounter with reality. The artist cannot represent the object-in-itself but only the object-as-apprehended-by-him.

It may help in understanding how art means giving form if one thinks of form as an active force. Thus one may more easily understand the new concept and break the habit of thinking of form as the imitation of the physical dimensions of the object.

According to Charles Olson, "A poem is energy transferred from where the poet got it (he will have some several causations), by way of the poem itself to, all the way over to, the reader. Okay. Then the poem itself must, at all

points, be a high energy-construct and, at all points, an energy-discharge."¹ Further, Olson suggests that the poet (and his concept can be broadened to include any artist) must get in, at all points, ". . . energy at least the equivalent of the energy which propelled him in the first place, yet an energy which is peculiar to [art] alone and which will be, obviously, also different from the energy which the [viewer], because he is a third term, will take away."²

Art, then, is form-producing, not thing-producing. Out of the multiplicity of possible perceptions of reality, each individual must select and organize in order to construct a credible world. These basic principles of composition by field are presented in such a manner as to demand great exactitude from the artist while eliminating all standardized and de-personalized reaction. They are simple enough that very young children seem to get meaning from them, yet profound enough to be relevant to professional artists.

II. WORK FOR CLARITY -- Clarity means, of course, clarity of form, clarity of expression, not necessarily imitative replication of the object. John Ciardi has said,

¹Charles Olson, "Projective Verse (projectile (percussive (prospective vs. the NON-projective)," The New American Poetry: 1945-1960, ed. Donald M. Allen (New York, N.Y.: Grove Press, Inc., 1960), p. 387.

²Ibid., p. 387.

"The Form Is The Experience."¹ This might be explained by saying that only that form or design is right for any given work of art which is the exact revelation of the artist's response to the reality which propelled him to create it. Here we have no room for rubricised "public" or standard concepts of design or form.

Obviously such clarity can only be achieved by dint of the most intense concern.

III. BE INTENSE (CARE ENOUGH) -- Olson would say that the care, ". . . must be so constant and so scrupulous, the exaction must be so complete, that . . . assurance . . . is purchased at the highest -- 40 hours a day -- price."² And undoubtedly complete assurance is never achieved, even by a genius.

There is no mystery about how young boys achieve much skill in sand lot baseball. Ask any mother why her boy is late for supper, where he goes after school, or why he is rushing through his evening meal to hurry outside again. It is usually true when a child says, "I can't draw." It is less likely to be true, perhaps it is never true, that a child cannot learn to draw--if he wants to as badly as he wants to play ball. Few boys are geniuses, yet most boys spend the time and energy required to become proficient at

¹John Ciardi, "The Form Is The Experience," in Art Education, Journal of the National Art Education Assn. Vol. XIV, No. 7, 1961.

²Olson, op. cit., p. 389.

playing ball. One doesn't really need special talent, but one must care enough.

IV. NEVER GENERALIZE -- Stated in positive terms this principle would read, be specific. This does not necessarily call for great detail in a realistic sense. It calls for great decision regarding what it is that one wishes to express. It seems worth remarking that less detail would demand even greater freedom from generalization than does excessive detail. A good example of this is Japanese Haiku poetry. It is not the object-in-itself that one should try to depict, but the moment created by the duration of the authentic relationship which can be established with the object; the unique human encounter. Since every encounter is unique, no generality will do. An artist cannot repeat a cliché. He must state clearly and precisely his personal response in the presence of the world.

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND INDIVIDUALITY

Two aspects of the discussion of art as communication in Chapter II may require further consideration at this point. First, it may be helpful to discuss more fully what is meant by authenticity and how it relates to freedom and individuality. Second, the necessity for freedom in art and in the achievement of individual authenticity.

Authenticity, as here used, means the acceptance of one's moral responsibility for personal response to the reality one faces. It means a dialogue with life. It means awareness and concern. It is that existential choice demanded of man if he is to transcend his creaturely nature and become a person. This is a choice which nature does not command or require; one which a man may avoid making and thereby remain a mere creature swept along by the events in his environment, never taking a decisive, principled action. Men may pass their lives, but it could not be called living, in a state of apathy and indifference. To do so would be to abandon the human possibility. It would be to be careless. Nature is indifferent, it never enjoins one to make the moral choice. It merely limits the possibilities from which man may choose. Nature is without care. It does not weep for those it kills or rejoice at the birth or development

of its creatures. Nature is not concerned about the question of man's decision.

"Nature contains no ought, no obligation, for the reason that it leaves to its creatures no room for disobedience to itself. It simple is; and they are as it would have them be. You would injure another: there is nothing in nature which forbids it. You would love another: there is nothing in nature which commands it. The stone gravitates, the streams combine their burden of silt and salt into the ancient sea, the trees put forth leaf and fruit, the lamb feeds, multiplies and is fed upon, the man lives and labors and perishes. That is the pathos, the sufferance, of the natural condition. But the norm which men legislate for themselves is not their sufferance. It is their act, what they have for better or worse made for themselves, constituted within the indifference of mere nature, which is content that they should live or die, eat or be eaten, gain happiness or be afflicted, enslave themselves or make themselves free, so long as they do each of these things within the conditions which it disposes."¹

But man is concerned. Some men do make the choice. This is what makes the difference between man as a creature of nature and man as a human being. This choice is what constitutes an authentic person. It is what makes the difference between the chronological changes in nature and the history of man's achievement through his own deeds.

"By virtue of his presence in the world each person is a part of nature. By virtue of his presence in history he is apart from nature. The first is among the circumstances in which life is given. It is unavoidable. It is a consequence of what men are. The second, however, is by no means unavoidable. It is a consequence of what men do. The first is something given; the second something achieved

As a living creature every man, being a part of nature, is, like nature itself, amoral, indifferent, and without purpose

¹Taylor, The Masks of Society, p. 86.

Considered solely as a part of nature, man is not only amoral, but non-historical. Just as in nature there are laws but no duties, so also there are happenings, but no deeds. There are occurrences but no actions. Since events in nature cannot be seen as deeds, they cannot be seen as historical. . . . men are historical beings not by sufference of birth, nor by right of any kind, but solely by their deeds. They are historical beings because they are the doers of deeds, in some sense set apart from nature. Except for their actions, they exist only as things in nature; and in nature there are no actions."¹

Taylor says that it is the connection of events with meaning that is intended in describing them as historical.

"The outward event, which is seen, is the revelation of an inward meaning, which is not seen but imputed and reflected on. Thus the erosion of a stone is no part of the historical order; but the erosion of the Pyramid of Chephren is the disappointment of a man's pathetic aspiration after eternal life. . . . behind the thing, which is the object seen in nature, is the person, who is the subject acting in history."²

Implicit in this distinction between nature and history is the similar distinction between mere behavior and action. Authentic man is the thinker of thoughts and the doer of deeds. The behavior of nature has been labeled mere event. It must be made clear that the actions of men are also events. These same actions which are events can be viewed not simply from the perspective of a disinterested observer as an event, but also from the perspective of the implicated participant as an intended act. According to

¹Thomas Green, Action and Society: A Study in the Foundations of Education, unpublished manuscript.

²Taylor, op. cit., p. 24.

Taylor, the deeds of men may be submitted to questions of Path: questions which concern the limits nature has imposed upon their acts. The deeds of men are susceptible to explanation under general laws as natural phenomena. However, unlike the event in nature, man's deeds are also subject to questions concerning the limits which man imposes upon himself: questions of Covenant. "All that is distinctively human in our lives, in language, in art, in science, in religion, law, and logic--falls among [questions of covenant]." ¹

Freedom, as well as authenticity, becomes a matter of deciding which action to take within the limitations of nature's possibilities and which social principles one is willing to subscribe to. Men are themselves a part of nature. They are subject to the necessities of nature which shape their destinies and circumscribe their freedom. In addition, the conditions under which man lives are different in different cultures, locations and times. Born as if by chance at a particular time and place, to parents of a specific culture, men are subject to the necessities which chance has provided. They are children of their era, creatures of the existing culture--facts concerning which they have had no choice. This is the very basis of moral-individuality. Decisions must always be made within the context of decisions already made and acts already performed. This, too, is a condition within which life is given. The

¹Ibid., p. 6.

authentic life is something achieved within the confines of these necessities. Freedom is not only the setting of limits which nature does not provide: it is also the appropriation of a culture. It should be emphasized that what is meant by the phrase, "the appropriation of a culture" is more than the passive inheritance of a culture. That would be to treat the culture merely as "nature." What is here intended is the choosing of the culture one has passively inherited, the affirmation of its beliefs, as one's own, freely embracing it and standing for what it represents.

"Active participation together in the group life is the chief means of transmitting the culture from old to young, from group to individual. And the same participation with its resulting transmission forms the chief means for the development of individual or specific selfhood."¹

While it is true that the transmission of a culture from generation to generation is accomplished chiefly by means of dialogue, nonetheless, the individual appropriation of the culture would demand critical acceptance of, and personal commitment to the cultural norms.

To ignore the knowledge made available by civilization is, if not impossible, certainly not to act upon the reality one faces. It is to remain innocent, not free but thoughtless. Authentic freedom is, in the world today, an awesome responsibility.

¹William Heard Kilpatrick, Selfhood and Civilization (New York, N.Y.: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, reprint edition, 1947), pp. 34,35.

"This fragile life between birth and death can nevertheless be a fulfillment--if it is a dialogue. In our life and experience we are addressed; by thought and speech and action, by producing and by influencing we are able to answer. For the most part we do not listen to the address, or we break into it with chatter. But if the word comes to us and the answer proceeds from us then human life exists, though brokenly, in the world. The kindling of response in that 'spark' of the soul, the blazing up of the response, which occurs time and again, to the unexpectedly approaching speech, we term responsibility. We practice responsibility for that realm of life allotted and entrusted to us for which we are able to respond, that is, for which we have a relation of deeds which may count--in all our inadequacy--as a proper response. The extent to which a man, in the strength of the reality of the spark, can keep a traditional bond, a law, a direction, is the extent to which he is permitted to lean his responsibility on something (more than this is not vouchsafed to us, responsibility is not taken off our shoulders). As we 'become free' this leaning on something is more and more denied to us, and our responsibility must become personal and solitary."¹

Man must not only receive history as it has been made before his birth, he must also make history.

"For the account of human history must concern itself not simply with the necessities within which men act, but with what men realize out of the resources and prohibitions which in their time are given to them, and the reasons they assign to what they do or leave undone. Men are not only the creatures of history, but the creators of history as well. And that is a condition not in which life is given to the human animal, but one which is achieved by the human being. Men may refuse to act or, failing to understand the conditions of their day, failing to read the signs of the times, they may allow their time to pass, in which case they shall remain,

¹Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul Ltd., 1947), pp. 92, 93.

with respect to history, creatures swept along by the sequence of act and consequence without themselves ever acting.

Men are in that case non-historical; for the historicity of men resides not in their destiny which is given, but in their freedom which they seize, not in the things they suffer, but in the deeds they do. Both the powers of the natural world and the forces of culture and society impinge upon the deeds of men; both are inexorably involved in their works. Both to this extent, are of the creation, the order of nature. But insofar as men are historical, they surpass this nature. Their historicity is rooted not in their creatureliness, but in the concealed possibility of their deeds."¹

Humanity is not nature's event but man's achievement. To be an authentic human being means to act; to make judgements; to be partial, not indifferent; not neutral, but partisan. It means to intend and to accept the risk of what one does; not only to be implicated in an inexorable process, but to implicate one's self. "A person is free to the degree that he decides his course of action himself and decides it not on whim or prejudice, but on the merits of the case carefully examined."²

To be authentic, then, is to make decisions which, expressed in actions, are revealed in the world and which, in fact, constitute, for the individual, his world. It can be said that nothing exists until it has entered into one's discerning consciousness. It is at this point that freedom is discovered. Freedom is decision expressed in human act. Freedom does not mean to be unbound. To be loosed from personal commitment is to be incapable of real acts.

¹Green, op. cit.

²Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 178.

"To become free of a bond is destiny; one carries that like a cross, not like a cockade. Let us realize the true meaning of being free of a bond: it means that a quite personal responsibility takes the place of one shared with many generations. Life lived in freedom is personal responsibility or it is a pathetic farce."¹

Nature is not obliged. There is no agent in nature. It conforms to certain principles which the scientist has discovered. "But what is observed from this position of detachment is conformity to a rule, not obedience."² The reasons we illicit in trying to understand the behavior of nature are not justifying reasons but causal principles--empirical generalizations, not normative principles which nature is free to choose or reject. To be free as a bird is not to be free at all. It is to be impelled; to be swept along by necessity and impulse. A bird is not free to migrate, it has no choice. A plant is not free to suck up the moisture from the earth. It does not decide to do so. On the other hand, man's freedom consists in his ability to choose, within the limits which indifferent nature allows, those principles which he will obey. A man is free to formulate the principles of his action and to bind himself to obedience to those principles. Man may remain in his natural state. He may spend his time, like a child, without reflection. That is, sometimes believed to be the state of the majority of men most of the time. Some men, though they

¹Buber, op. cit., p. 92.

²Green, op. cit.

reflect, do not have the strength or the courage to act upon their reason. The failure to so act, the failure to implicate one's self constitutes a failure to become one's authentic self. It is a betrayal of one's authenticity and the denial of one's freedom.

Here the difference between child art and that of a mature artist can be seen. The child is truly "free as a bird." His work is admired because it is natural--and to the extent that it is natural. The natural intuitive and spontaneous development of the child is encouraged because it is believed that this is the only basis for the eventual development of thoughtful principled action in art. It was Freud who taught us that the instinctual, the irrational is prior to the capacity for ordered thought. Gardner Murphy explains that it is this irrational love which gives birth to rational thought. ". . . love can reach out and entwine within itself all the things, acts and relationships of this world It can love the act of knowing and the act of thinking. It can give rise to, or coalesce with the act of comprehending."¹

While freedom is the basis of adult art, it is not yet the basis of the art of young children. In fact, art education is the process of nurturing this natural love, making it broader and deeper as it develops and grows to "love

¹Gardner, Murphy, Freeing Intelligence Through Teaching (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), p. 23.

the very process by which it differentiates, analyzes, and makes meaningful reality."¹

If freedom is the act of formulating and choosing the principles one will obey, it must be emphasized that this does not necessarily imply a single or a "best" set of principles already established and waiting to be chosen. It is not merely a matter of looking over principles that are available and selecting those which most please the individual taste as one might do when choosing a new automobile. Freedom is a matter of forging meaningful principles from one's encounter with reality. It is a matter of what men realize out of the resources and prohibitions which are available to them, and of the reasons they assign to what they do or leave undone. "A person is free in the degree that he decides his course of action himself and decides it not on whim or prejudice but on the merits of the case carefully examined."²

It may be said then, that the authentic individual is one who chooses to act in response to reality. Who he is is revealed by his deeds. Thus not only does man's humanness reside in his acts, but so does his individuality. Any meaningful application of the term "individuality" to a man as a human person will concern itself neither with his numerical individuality (everything that is is numerically unique) nor with the uniqueness of his natural characteristics.

¹Ibid., p. 23.

²Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 178.

Nor can it be said that to express the fact that one is a member of the human species is a meaningful indication of his moral individuality. So equally are all other human beings members of the species--and by no choice of their own. It is true that Johnny is an individual because of his unique size, complexion, age and build, and because he is a single being. Having said this one nonetheless has not remarked in a meaningful manner regarding Johnny's moral individuality, but only of his individuality by circumstance, of unique attributes given to Johnny by nature or by his environment. Only his endowment has been discussed. A meaningful consideration of his individuality, on the other hand, depends on what Johnny does within the limitations of his endowment. It depends upon his choice, his decision, his acts. It is the result of his personal history, of his biography. Individuality is thus something achieved. Johnny might be described as a short somebody, as blond, stout, etc., or as the one assigned to the third seat in the second row. To suppose that such descriptions constitute Johnny's individuality would, however, be to ignore any moral implications of individuality. It would be to disregard Johnny's personal achievement of selfhood.

Individuality has to do not with what a person is, but with who he is; and this he reveals only by his deeds. He builds self, achieves selfhood by his personal response to reality. Being is becoming that authentic self which only one's deeds make one to become.

Thus one's individuality depends not upon the circumstance that his response must always be unique, but upon the circumstance that it must be genuinely his response. In principle it would be possible that more than one person might respond in a single way to certain phenomena. In practice it may be expected that most people will respond in a somewhat similar way to many specific situations. These responses can, nevertheless, be authentic aspects of each one's individuality. Individuality thus belongs to one not by right of birth but as a consequence of his own deeds. The bases of both man's humanity and of his individuality is action.

In contrast to the concept of individuality, although frequently confused with it is the concept of the value of the individual. Green¹ insists that a rational basis for the value of individuals can be found only in what does not suffice to discriminate between them, only in some property or capacity possessed by all alike, and thought to be indispensable to the humanity of each. In such case the end result would be the affirmation of the value of each individual at the cost of the devaluation of each one's individuality.

Green examines various claims for the inherent value of the individual and rejects them all upon these same grounds. Even the fact that man is a thinker of thoughts and a doer of deeds is no logical basis for the claim of his

¹Green, op. cit.

intrinsic value. There seems to be no natural property in men which is adequate to the moral belief in his intrinsic worth. Membership in the species homo sapiens is a relationship acquired by the simple adventure of being born, and it is undoubtedly true that no two are born exactly similar. However, this is not sufficient to constitute a reason for belief in the inherent value of the individual. It is equally true that no two leaves of any species of plant are exactly similar, yet we do not speak of the value of the individual leaf. The same may be said of any animal--the noble dog or the horse, for example, but in each case one chooses arbitrarily which if any individual he will cherish and value. In the order of nature the individual man has no more value inherently than any other animal. No law of nature requires that the individual be valued. In fact, virtually every civilization the world has known has chosen to consider large numbers of individual human beings as having no value. Thus, at various times so-called barbarians, non Caucasians, non Aryans, Negroes, Jews and the members of ghettos in every generation, the legal slaves in some, have been treated as if they had no individual worth.

While the uniqueness of each person has to do with who (by his deeds) he is: has to do with his individuality, the value of each person has no such basis. Green despairs of finding any logical basis for the concept of the value of the individual. He does find a clue in the Hebrew concept of the chosen people. According to this concept men

are valuable because God has chosen to value them. It is an arbitrary affirmation on the part of God, an act of will.

"When there is extracted from such a view the social principle implicit there, what is discovered is simply this: Men are valuable because and to the extent that other men regard them as members of their moral community. It is a thing not deserved or warranted. It is something done at the level of an avowal or an affirmation. It is an affirmation which is not necessitated as the end of an argument, but rather as the beginning of a community. If it is an affirmation required by anything, it is required not by the nature of men as individuals, nor by the requirements of reason, but as the necessary prerequisite for any human community."¹

¹ Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNITY AND COMMUNICATION

It was pointed out in Chapter III that the value of the individual is a social phenomenon not directly related to individuality. It is instead the basis for the establishment of community. One does not have value inherently. One has value, if he has it at all, by virtue of its bestowal by others. It is not a thing necessarily granted because it is deserved or withheld because of individual limitations. In some cultures, animals are granted positions of worth in the human community, while in others intelligent, cultured, creative individuals--members of minority groups--may be denied value and are therefore not accepted as members of the community. Such "valueless" individuals may be deported, destroyed, bound in slavery, or simply ignored. When men refuse to grant the status of person to any individual, they thereby set the limit of their community. In such a situation any attitude toward the outsider is permissible. He simply doesn't count. Anyone excluded from the moral community is denied value.

To be an individual means not merely to be implicated by circumstance but to implicate one's self, to take a stand. This, however, does not assure that one will be valued. To be valued as a person means to be the subject of rights,

but the acknowledgement by others that one has a right is a requisite to his having it. A right implies the duty of others to respect it. It requires community. One's rights depend, thus, not upon his claim to right but upon the willingness of others to admit that claim as privileged. Recent history has shown what happens when the claim to rights has not been admitted as privileged. Every right implies a duty on the part of others to allow one to exercise that right, and an obligation of restraint upon their actions. If a person has the right of ownership of his automobile, no other, no matter how urgent his need or how great his desire, may take it without the owner's consent. He may, in fact, take it by stealth, but he does not, either by taking it or by the fact that he now has it in his possession, acquire the right to it. All rights are grounded in this reciprocity, this mutuality of persons in community.

Human community thus is based upon questions of covenant, questions of obligation concerned not with limits which nature imposes upon man's relationship with man, but with limits which man imposes upon himself. Community is not a matter of fact but a question of legitimacy. The moral community is one to which all human beings are capable of belonging and into which all human beings may be accepted. Nonetheless, it is one to which one can belong only if he consents to the restraints of community and at the same time one to which a person may belong solely if his membership is allowed by others. They may reject him arbitrarily, just as he may refuse to join with them in community. In

such cases each is defining the limits of his community. Community depends upon covenant, an agreement to which both parties consent. This common bond, created by man, is the very achievement of civilization. The privilege of status is allowed only to those bound in community. By mutual admission of rights and duties each is bound as person to person in a relationship which nature has not demanded of them but which they freely choose to accept.

Men institute a community not by congregating in one place; something that sheep and wolves also do, who have no concern regarding the value of their brothers. Such a congregation, whether of wolves, sheep or men, does not constitute a community.

In community men stand as persons in the presence of each other. Here the moral situation is distinct from the natural situation is first found. Man's act as contrasted with nature's unreflective event is met. Thus it can be seen that it is only in community that one may gain freedom from the mere circumstantial events of natural existence. Community requires a normative decision, not a descriptive statement. One becomes not an objective observer but an implicated participant who must appraise his action in regard to the juristic covenant. One becomes implicated not by the circumstance of proximity or birth, not by unexamined habit, but by commitment to a principle of action.

Paradoxically, the act of affirmation which confers value upon another, that acceptance of the other one as a person, that openness to the institution of community, is

the human act by which one attains individuality. It is not the bestowal of value upon a person by someone else by which he achieves individuality. By that act one receives value but not necessarily moral individuality. It is the act of bestowing value upon the other person by which he gains individuality. The dumb acceptance of value which another may bestow upon a person, while it gives him a certain value in the eyes of this other one, does not give the person valued any individuality. Nor does it alone institute a community. Community demands mutuality, but individuality does not necessarily demand it. One may choose to value even those who do not include him in their community. Christ did this. By such an act a person may achieve individuality but, alone, he cannot institute a community. To institute a community one must also affirm the value of those who affirm it in him and oblige himself to so limit his acts as to observe their rights.

Membership in the moral estate of human community is dependent upon one's willingness to observe certain rules of order.

"For each man in community must build his expectations upon the behavior of others and apart from a settled order of relations in which behavior is circumscribed, there is no virtue in community either for keeper or kept. As I elect to live in community with others, I implicitly subscribe also to being kept by others. That is the imperious demand of society itself without which there can be no society at all."¹

¹Taylor, op. cit., p. 90.

Community, in this view, is a group of persons related by a system of agreements. To be a member of the community is to be a party to agreements. If one asks why men, not required by nature to take upon themselves the obligations of community, do, in fact, so oblige themselves, he will see that it is only by this act of dedication to obligations of their own choosing that men enact their peculiar function as human beings. To be human, man must pursue ends which men, not nature, have set.

Human freedom thus does not turn on the absence of law, but upon whether the law is self-imposed. Man is able to institute rules and to oblige himself to obey them. Members of a community act out of respect for one another's rights. By acknowledging rights which others hold, each freely acts under a self-imposed restraint for the sake of others. To act upon impulse or by reflex is not freedom, but to choose to restrain one's actions is to act freely.

Community is not entirely obligation, nor is it entirely for the sake of others. Each member has his own rights. The obliging of one's self to respect the rights of others is not an obligation solely for the sake of others. It is only this binding of one's self for other's sake which can permit that mutuality, that union of persons which constitutes community. It is here that the value of the individual becomes manifest. The extent to which each member acknowledges the rights that others hold is the extent to which he is willing to impose upon himself a restraint--not alone for the sake of others, but also for the sake of

himself in community with others. It is only by mutual respect that men may be related in the dignity of persons, as I and Thou, as subjects rather than objects of rights. In the mutual relationship of community each member walks equal under covenant. Each respects in the other a dignity, confers upon the other a status which in nature's indifference men do not have.

Only men can dignify human persons in community. By their own choice in a concert of persons men can create a human status which nature indifferently allows but which is not given to man by nature: which man must achieve by his own act. Man alone can institute a community in which he gains the status and dignity of individuality, the status of a human person instead of that of a mere creature of nature. He becomes an authentic individual by choosing that act of affirmation by which he at the same time gains value in the institution of community. It comes to this: through community man achieves his individuality. Selfhood can be achieved only in a social milieu and the surrounding culture not only enters essentially into the process of self-actualization but also enters essentially and profoundly into the resulting personality. Kilpatrick calls this self-actualization the "self-other process" and declares that ". . . only by the self-other process . . . has historic man been able to achieve his distinctly human attributes of language, critical thinking, sense of responsibility, conscience, and the use of standards."¹

¹Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 1.

Truly existential communication is a revelation of selfhood while it is also a binding together of historical men. Karl Jaspers insists that communication is so much man's comprehensive essence that not only his selfhood but reality, what is for any man, is also bound up with communication. The being that one is is in every form communication, and reality exists for people only insofar as it achieves communicability by becoming speech or becoming utterable. One becomes fully conscious only of what he is able to express to others. Reality is made to exist for a person through his expression or communication. It is in this sense that art is communication.

Since humanity, nature and all the complicated relationships in reality are still evolving, a definitive understanding is as little possible as the anticipation of the completed whole. While reality is infinite, man must remain finite. Thus a knowledge based solely upon rational or mechanistic thought must be rejected as are rejected all closed and completed systems of knowledge. Reality, being, is not something completed and isolated which one can seek out and know. Being is becoming.

"Thus the contemporary problem is not to be deduced from some a priori whole; rather it is to be brought to consciousness out of a basis which is now experienced and out of a content still unclearly willed. Philosophy as thought is always a consciousness of Being which is complete for this moment, but which knows it has no final permanence in its forms of expression.

Instead of some supposed total view of the actual and cultural situation, rather we philosophize in consciousness of a situation which again leads to the final limits and bases of the human reality. . . . In

philosophy we must always be ready, out of the present questioning, to elicit those ideas which bring forth what is real to us: that is, our humanity."¹

The contemporary historical situation requires a new stance toward reality, a stance which is less dogmatic and mechanistic. There is the empirical world of things which is other than reason, and there is reason, the non-rational and the rational in reality. However, all reality for man must appear in those forms in which it can enter into his consciousness. In order to exist for man, things must become articulated and thereby communicable through their ability to be thought. It is thus that Jaspers can say that reality, truth, is communicability. Abstracted from communication truth hardens into unreality.

Jaspers distinguishes three levels or modes of communicability: that of empirical existence, that of consciousness as such, and that of spirit. By spirit Jaspers means that aspect which tries to embrace all of one's experience, life and culture within certain ideal totalities. Spirit ". . . is the process of fusing and reconstructing all totalities in a present which is never finished yet always fulfilled. . . . Out of a continuously actual and continuously fragmenting whole, it pushes forward, creating again and again out of its contemporary origins its own possible reality."² In other words, spirit is the continuously

¹Jaspers, Reason and Existenz, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

²Ibid., p. 57.

summing up and organizing aspect of being. Each mode of communicability has its own right in encompassing reality and none can be omitted. Nonetheless, even together they cannot lead to a self-completed whole. Dissatisfaction with this incompleteness of the three modes of reality does not spring out of any of these modes. It springs out of reason and authentic humanness. This then is also the root of the universal will to communicate. Jaspers labels this source as "reason and Existenz." The communication of Existenz (authentic human essence) he says, is accomplished through the three modes, but only by breaking through and beyond them. To be self and to be authentic means to be in communication unconditionally.

"Existenz, then, only becomes apparent and thereby real if it comes to itself through, and at the same time with, another Existenz. What is authentically human in the community of reason and Existenz is not, as before in physical life, simply present in a plurality of naturally generated examples, which then find one another and bind themselves together. Rather communication seems to produce for the first time that which is communicating: independent natures which come to consciousness of themselves, however, as though they were not touched by the contingencies of empirical existence, but had been bound together eternally

Reason, having its substance in Existenz, arises from the authentic communication of one nature with another, and it arises in such a fashion that empirical existence, consciousness as such, and spirit are, so to speak, the body of its appearance. . . .

Reason is potential Existenz which in its thinking is continually directed upon an other, upon the Being which we are not, upon the world, and upon Transcendence. What these are then becomes communicable and, therewith, being-for-us, but in the formality through which they authentically touch Existenz."¹

¹Ibid., p. 92.

At the point where thought transcends to reason and authentic individuality, one can find nothing but the inner perception of the possibility of selfhood, a selfhood which is, according to Jaspers, unknowable and which becomes actual only as the communication of authenticity through reason. Without action we cannot know that men think, and without thought men would be incapable of what we have termed action. Their impulsive behavior would be mere event. We become an authentic self only through communication.

"to dream takes no effort
to think is easy
to act is more difficult
but for a man to act after he has taken thought, this!
is the most difficult thing of all"¹

This new stance toward truth and reality, which is required by the contemporary historical situation, is opposed by a dogmatic approach which assumes a permanent truth accessible to all and valid as something fixed outside man's existence. Truth is already there in the world waiting to be found. It is a given fact needing only to be transmitted to men. It is something to surrender to, something closed in itself, timeless, independent of men. Communication under such conditions would not be a cooperative production between persons but would be the giving of a possessed truth by him who possesses it. This is a truth to which men may refer but in which they cannot participate. The giving of such a

¹E.E. Cummings, as quoted by Charles Olson, op. cit., p. 389.

truth, instead of a questioning of it, destroys communication. The other does not really listen to such a giving since he is no longer even questioned.

Authentic existential truth is not found outside of its incorporation in communication. It cannot exist or ever be complete in isolation, for it arises only in and through communication. In this sense communication is true dialogue, the mutual knowing of persons. It cannot include the individual as isolated ego. It cannot be deceptive, superficial or degenerating. It is limitlessly clarifying and productive of authentic selfhood.

The understanding of truth as becoming demands of the individual a greater alertness and a more radical openness to experience. The existential view would be that it demands an openness which tries to bring every possibility into the medium of communication in order that it might attain being for one. The unlimited will to communicate means not merely to submit one's self to another person but to hear him, and know him, and to reckon with him and his truth even if that should necessitate a transformation of one's self.

This openness in reason is necessary for original and unrestricted communication. Charles Olson speaks of the getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as ego.

"It comes to this, the use of a man, by himself and thus by others, lies in how he conceives his relation to nature, that force to which he owes his somewhat small existence. If he sprawl, he shall find little to sing but himself, and shall sing,

nature has such paradoxical ways, by way of artificial forms outside himself. But if he stays inside himself, if he is contained within his nature as he is participant in the larger force, he will be able to listen, and his hearing through himself will give him secrets which objects share. And by an inverse law his shapes will make their own way. It is in this sense that the projective act, which is the artist's act in the larger field of objects, leads to dimensions larger than the man. For a man's problem, the moment he takes speech up in all its fullness, is to give his work his seriousness, a seriousness sufficient to cause the thing he makes to try to take its place along side the things of nature. This is not¹ easy. Nature works from reverence . . ."

Jaspers also insists that there are limits to man's "holding himself in reserve," his "hovering over" what he knows. The limits he says are at the point where he is himself as reason and where he is reason as potential self. One must remain open. One trusts the truth of others which is not his own truth but which, as truth, must contain the possibility of communication.

"It is risk to see the possible pushed to its highest degree, to dare to entice it out at the risk of one's openness and bearing responsibility for which men I trust and how I trust myself -- and knowing that on every level communication is possible only among equals. I must assume responsibility for failure and deception, perhaps as a crisis in which communication can for the first time grow, perhaps as a disaster which I cannot understand."²

In such communication men put their differences under rules, and under covenant stand equal in the dignity of

¹Olson, op. cit., p. 395.

²Jaspers, op. cit., p. 100.

persons. Such agreement presupposes potential humanness on each side. What is not and cannot become the same thing becomes related through transcendence which struggles toward the single reality.

The notion of this ideal single reality (which, in our finite historical situation is an unreality), as communication which reaches its goal; this very notion demands the elevation of communication to a transparent perfection in which there is no longer any need to communicate.

" . . . what the Whole is beyond all division can momentarily flash out. But this illumination is transitory in the world and, although of decisive influence upon men, incommunicable; for when it is communicated it is drawn into the modes of the Encompassing where it is ever lacking. Its experience is absolutely historical, in time out beyond time. One can speak out of this experience but not of it. The ultimate in thinking as in communication is silence."¹

If he wishes to regard the student as an individual person the teacher of art would do well to understand the solitary nature of the act of creation. Yet there is real danger in any misinterpretation of the meaning of individuality in art. While there is no universal rule for all art, there is no art without rule. The discipline required in the production of a work of art is self-discipline which cannot be imposed from the outside. Nonetheless, discipline of the most exacting nature is demanded.

¹Ibid., p. 106.

It may be helpful at this time to consider the following points from the preceeding discussion of communication in their relation to the teaching of art.

1. The process of creation in art is an endless clarification of reality and an endless production of self. Art is not the recording of some aspect of reality already known. It is a mode of clarification. Life does not reach a state of wholeness and then record itself. Each achievement of understanding alters the whole and leads to further development. It is not possible for a teacher to hand on to his students his appropriation of reality. Such an objectivist hope ignores the fact that the self is a vital part of the reality it experiences and that each person's encounter with reality is influenced by the total pattern of the self, past and present, and even future as that is anticipated by the self. Clarification is achieved then, not by learning to see the world as one's teacher sees it or as tradition has ordained it will be seen. Clarification is achieved by direct encounter, by an openness to experience and an integrity regarding one's conceptions in the face of reality--a readiness for anything which may be perceived. Such an openness and such integrity may be called authentic response. The teacher must not block such response by teaching "arty" devices or formulas. Truth is a developing truth. It is a demand that requires continuing surveillance.

2. Art achieves communicability. As suggested above, art is an authentic response to reality. In its

solitary production, art must be an individual achievement. "There are two forms, indispensable for the building of true human life, to which the originaive instinct, left to itself, does not lead and cannot lead: to sharing in an undertaking and to entering into mutuality."¹ Art is communion, communion with reality, not communication. Yet a communion which achieves clarity and meaning achieves, thereby, communicability. Art is a monologue and thus cannot be communication. What is revealed by the work of art is an authentic mode of encounter. The authentic self of the person is revealed by his deed.

Thus there is no, "look of art" to which we should attempt to educate. Perhaps one of the most prevalent weaknesses in art education is the academic demand, frequently unintentional, for some standard product. For the nineteenth century academy based upon Renaissance realism, a new academy based upon one or another modern movement in art has been substituted. While there is no universal standard for judging works of art, it is not impossible to recognize with some degree of success which works indicate a genuine openness in the search for truth. Work which employs rationally acquired formulas and techniques has a uniformity of appearance which can be readily detected by one who is alert to the problem. Having conscienciously avoided the use of devices and formulas as methods, the teacher must also be alert to the possibility that his student may learn them from

¹Buber, op. cit., p. 87.

other sources and apply them to his work in the mistaken idea that they will be valuable in his search for truth. Such practices usually result in glaring inconsistencies in the work. Yet the teacher must be careful not to reject a work that seems awkward if it is an authentic response by the student. Even in such awkward expressions the authority of genuine commitment can usually be recognized by the sensitive teacher.

3. The communion which is the creative activity of art cannot be ego-centered, willful or arbitrary. The artist wants to apprehend reality with his total being. He will have an insatiable desire for the truth. In that communion with reality which can produce a work of art the artist must bring into his relation to the truth more than the conditioned qualities of his self. He must bring an unconditioned total commitment to his demand for the truth. The quest for truth must be so constant and so scrupulous, the exaction must be so complete that one is willing to stake his life in the thinking it requires. The individual, personal, singular truth of such a radical communion with reality can never be a willful imposition of the self upon reality. It must never seek selfish ends. It may have but one goal and that is the unconditional truth which, alas, must be recognized as unconditional only by him who has achieved it through his radical communion with reality.

"For since it is not impossible, but only psychologically infinitely difficult, for a man to act according to his own truth, realizing at the same time the truth of others which is not truth for him, holding fast to the relativity and particularity

of all universally valid truths--since it is not impossible, he must not shirk this highest demand of truthfulness which is only apparently incompatible with that of others. The Idea of man cannot be projected too high so long as the absolutely impossible is avoided, that which contradicts his finitude in time."¹

Jaspers has indicated the immense difficulty of an open approach to art education. To help the student to accept the responsibility of acting according to his own truth is not impossible, and since it is not impossible, the teacher must not shirk this highest demand of education. It means an attitude of openness on the part of the teacher who must educate not from his personal truth and his idea of the student, but from the student's own reality.

Teaching for openness must be a non-directive process. The teacher may influence the student but he must constantly beware the possibility of interference. In our historical situation the teacher is no longer the bearer of assured values. It is the lack of such assurance which brings the demand for openness and a readiness for any truth which authentic response may discover. Like art, teaching must be communicability. It dare not be dogmatic. What were at one time assured values in art, proportion, perspective, design principles, etc. no longer satisfy the demands of truth. They are based upon the stable world of Newtonian physics and the absolute truth of Euclidean geometry. In a world of relativity and probability one must

¹Jaspers, op. cit., p. 100.

shoulder the responsibilities which once the culture carried for him.

CHAPTER V

ART AND THE HUMAN ACT

We have seen that man creates a community by establishing rules of order and by restraining his acts to obey these rules. Art also must have order and the artist establishes a rule or principle for the work of art. The difference is that in community the rules require a mutual respect whereas in art a single person, the artist, is involved in establishing and maintaining the principle. It is true that if the spectator is to understand the work as art, he must understand the principle of order which the artist has constituted in the work. However this has nothing to do with the creation of the work. It is a work of art only when it is completed, at which time its principle is, of course, already constituted. Whereas communication and community lead to sharing an undertaking cooperatively and to entering into mutuality, the creation of a work of art is a lonely enterprise. "Yes, as an originator man is solitary. He stands wholly without bounds in the echoing hall of his deeds. Nor can it help him to leave his solitariness that his achievement is received enthusiastically by the many" ¹

¹Buber, op. cit., p. 87.

The being of the world as an object is conceived within the individual, but not its being as a subject, the relationship between persons. It is not the originaive instinct but the instinct for communication which teaches the meaning of covenant, of community among equals.

The creation of a work of art is not, to use Buber's phrase, an affair "between man and man," rather it is an affair between man and reality.

"Here is an instinct which no matter to what power it is raised never becomes greed, because it is not directed to having but only to doing; which alone among the instincts cannot lead its subject away to invade the realm of other lives. Here is pure gesture which does not snatch the world to itself, but expresses itself to the world.¹

Art does not "invade the realm of other lives" but merely stands in testimony to the life and individuality of the artist. If a man would gain knowledge of art he must extend himself; he must look for the principle which underlies its order, the principle which the artist has put there and in which the work stands complete, its purpose achieved and its reason for existence fulfilled. Its individuality, like that of its creator is constituted in its being. However, like that of its creator, its value has another basis. Its value, once it has been created, is a social phenomenon. The timeliness of the artist's act is determined by historical conditions. If it answers to the demands of the historical situation, men will find in it a new dimension to human

¹Ibid., p. 86.

experience; if it does not, it will be unnoticed and thus valueless. The classical works of art which the Greeks and Romans admired and found meaningful and valuable were left to litter the Roman landscape for over a thousand years, or they were heated in kilns to produce lime. This, of course, did not affect their individuality or their incorporation of a formal order and unity as works of art. It merely affected their value as works of art. In the Renaissance they were again valued and their meaning rediscovered, and they are valued yet today. A work of art does not include the circumstance that it will be valued, or even that it will be observed.

Man creates the possibilities of a community by establishing covenants, rules of order, and by restraining his actions to obey those rules. Communication is man's orderly means of sharing and developing his understanding of himself, of the world and of all reality. Art, too, is a method of understanding one's self and the world, but the creation of a work of art, while it may facilitate the sharing of one's personal response to reality, is, in itself, a monologue, a communion rather than a communication.

Even when an artist exhibits his creation it may be questioned whether he is doing more than the scientist who may present a specimen for public view. A museum is less a place of communication than a place of contemplation. The completed work of art stands in relation to its public as a revelation of the artist's mode of participation. A sensitive public may gain an enriched concept of the world

by the contemplation of works of nature; it may gain an enriched concept of the role of man in the contemplation of works of art. It would be a misuse of language to label either case a matter of communication. When man creates a work of art, his act is, as Buber says, "pure gesture," communion. How is it then that we as spectators may understand and appreciate such a solitary act? In order to make visible a mode of response to reality the artist thinks and acts as a man, not only as a human animal, but as a man of a specific cultural and historical situation.

While he is speaking to no person, he is speaking yet in his native tongue, for he knows no other way of speech. His thoughts and his manner of thought are circumscribed by his culture even though he directs his thoughts toward Truth alone. His gesture, his act must be principled or it will not come into existence as a meaningful expression. It will not make sense to him. He makes rules which will express, in the material of his craft, his personal response to reality, and he follows such rules for the sole purpose of making the world meaningful to himself.

Art communicates because it represents an authentic human response to reality, not because it has any didactic, informative, or narrative purpose. It does not tell one how he should respond, rather it indicates how one person has authentically responded. Reality, experienced, is never the equivalent of one's experiencing it, which implicates the individual as well as reality, the encounter as well as the reality encountered.

"Only art ever records this encounter, the encounter of the person implicated, his dumb feel of the push of things, of being in the midst of things, of his oneness with them and separateness from them, his last inward solitary impassioned sense of his own identity, accepting or rejecting, accepted or rejected, before his world."¹

Thus the primary image in art is never its subject matter, the representation of nature. The primary image is the image of man's mode of encountering reality. The representation of a subject matter, the resemblance to the object in nature is, where it appears, the secondary image. Such representation can never be the object of art but that is not to say that it has no value in art. Representation has a value in the exact measure that it affects the artist's mode of encounter. "The artistic value of the secondary image is never in what it is but in what it does."²

It is just where art differs from nature that the human act can be seen. Art begins where nature is distorted by man.³ This difference from nature, this distortion, can make visible the part which the artist plays before nature, in revealing himself. Art is man's image of himself. It is a visible manifestation of a man's mode of encountering reality. A perfect replica of nature could reveal only the

¹John F.A. Taylor, Design and Expression in the Visual Arts (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1964), p. 220.

²Ibid., p. 222.

³Chapters VI and VII give more specific information regarding the process of visual perception.

aspect of nature. What the artist, and not nature, institutes makes visible his presence in the face of nature. It is uniquely art's province to provide an image of man's participation in Reality.

"In institutions of law, of economy, of science, of religion, a historian is able to rediscover, out of the patterns requickened, the very spirit of the dead. But in orders of law and economy and science and religion that spirit is never, as in architecture, presented, seriously felt as living presences are felt. That is art's creative novelty and distinction. . . . For all the arts alike . . . present this primary image in its sheer immediacy."¹

If art is not communication, it is nonetheless expression; the expression of one's inclusive response to his experience. Therefore we must now turn our attention to a brief discussion of the fundamental conditions of expression in art.²

The most sovereign principle of art has to do with its unity of form, the complementary relationship of each of its parts to the others in producing a visual whole. Art means giving form. Let us re-examine the four basic principles discussed in Chapter II from the point of view of those terms of design which are the fundamental conditions of expression in art. "The conditions under which sense is made

¹Taylor, Design and Expression . . . , p. 221.

²While a detailed discussion of design or visual perception is beyond the province of this dissertation, it does seem important to touch on several principles relative to the technical conditions which are requisite to the creation of any work of art. More complete information on this subject is found in Taylor's Design and Expression in the Visual Arts and Arnheims' Art and Visual Perception.

sharable are the one part of art, considered as an objective phenomenon, which men can profess to master in terms of principle."¹

I. Art Means Giving Form


An artist cannot create something out of nothing; he can only combine things already existing into a new unity. His creative act is that of ordering materials which nature provides. His problem is to create that combination of shapes, lines, colors, etc., which will bring forth the image of his participation in reality; which will give form to his sense of being. Just any combination will not give form to his particular experience. Jaspers has pointed out that man can never see the unity and completeness of an all inclusive Reality even though he believes in it. However, the artist must so organize his product that it attains within itself the unity which cannot be seen in the totality of the world. To do this it is necessary for him to limit his field of activity. In the pictorial field he thus isolates a specific sector of reality in which he can achieve that wholeness which is denied him in the face of the totality of the real world. Within this space the artist has control. He alone governs the form which it will have. "Then, since at least within that field which he has isolated the only changes to be observed are changes which he deliberately makes, he may regard those changes as pure reflections of himself acting."²

¹Taylor, Design and Expression . . . , p. 5.

²Ibid., p. 9.

In order to understand the transformation of the pictorial field which the artist accomplishes, it is necessary to understand that the bare field is not devoid of properties. The very act of seeing a bare field, say a smooth white rectangle like a sheet of paper or a canvas, includes the presence of an induced structure which, although not visible, is a force affecting the perception of every figure or shape the artist introduces into that field. While there are no visible lines at the central, vertical and horizontal axes of the rectangle or along the diagonals, observation will reveal that the balance and stability of any element introduced by the artist into the field is influenced by these axes as though they exerted some magnetic force upon it.

Figure I



The center, where these four main structural lines cross, exhibits the greatest force of attraction affecting the shapes used by the artist.

Figure II-a




Figure II-b





Figure II-c



In Figure II-a and Figure II-c we see that the disk is off center. We do not need to measure its position to see that. In addition we see a tendency for the disk to want to move toward the right, or toward the upper right hand corner respectively. Thus we see a tension, a force, a kind of energy created by the relationship between the disk and the invisible structural influence of the four axes. The disk remains most stable in the central location, Figure II-b where the four axes cross. These lines of force constitute a kind of invisible structural chart, a frame of reference, which helps to determine the balance value of any pictorial element just as the musical scale helps to determine the pitch value of each tone in a composition. Every visual pattern is therefore a dynamic pattern created by invisible forces or tensions. The value of any pictorial element will vary according to the placement it is given within the pictorial field. If its position in the pictorial field is changed, the value of an element will change though the element itself remains constant. That variation in value is determined by the field and not by the pictorial element. The forces affecting this value are, as we have seen, induced by the visual perception of the spectator.

"Just as a living organism cannot be described by its anatomy, so the essence of a visual experience cannot be expressed by inches of size and distance, degrees of angle or wave lengths of hue. These static measurements define only the stimulus, that is, the message sent to the eye by the physical world. But the life of a percept -- its expression and meaning -- derives entirely from the activity of the kind of forces that have been described. Any line drawn on a sheet of paper, or the simplest form modeled from a piece of clay, is like a rock thrown into a pond. It upsets repose; it mobilizes space. Seeing is the perception of action."¹

Arnheim suggests that these forces are psychological since they exist in our experience, and that they are also physically present in the brain. According to Gestalt psychologists, the cerebral area contains a field of electrochemical forces where such activity takes place during perception. Now it becomes more clear how one might think of form as an active force, a notion suggested in Chapter II. Every work of art is an energy construct which is organized to express the artist's mode of encounter with reality. The form, the relationship of tensions which is required will be determined by the content of the work, that is by the encounter which is being expressed. The right organization is that organization alone which will satisfy this single requirement.

The form which an artist gives to his response to reality consists thus in a balancing of the various forces to achieve a kind of equilibrium or unity which express the

¹Arnheim, op. cit., p. 6.

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specific experience. Within a selected field the artist produces a visual order or balance in relation to the invisible structural map.

II. Work For Clarity

An unbalanced work will seem accidental and transitory. It is therefore invalid and incomprehensible as an artistic statement. Its pattern is ambiguous and lacks decision or clarity. We must emphasize again that the term clarity as used here means clarity of form or organization. In a balanced composition clarity will be apparent in the fact that all such factors as shape, direction, location, etc. are mutually determined by each other in such a way that the whole assumes the character of inevitableness. A change in any part would destroy the unity and consistency of the whole. The tensions set up by the interplay of forms within the pictorial field must be handled in such a way as to create a structure which represents exactly the vitality of the reality being expressed as it is encountered by the artist. Thus while balance or equilibrium is a necessary aspect of all art, balance is not sufficient in itself for the creation of a meaningful work of art. It is doubtful if strictly a representational style (ordinarily called "realistic," but usually an idealized illustration of appearance) can constitute a meaningful representation of the new reality of twentieth century science and thought. The possibilities of equilibrium within any pictorial field are infinite. However, a work of art is never merely an image of balance.

"If we define art . . . as the striving for, and achievement of, balance, harmony, order, unity, we arrive at the same perverting one-sidedness as the psychologists did when they formulated the static conception of human motivation. Just as the emphasis of living is on directed activity and not on empty repose, so the emphasis of the work of art is not on balance, harmony, unity, but on a pattern of forces that are being balanced, ordered, and unified.

A work of art is a statement about the nature of reality. . . . The work of art is the necessary and final solution to the problem of how to organize a reality pattern of given characteristics."¹

III. Be Intense (Care Enough)

A work of art is the expression of a man's response to Reality. To body forth that response a specific equilibrium is required. That equilibrium which is needed in order that the work of art should have its desired effect is called, by Taylor, the normative equilibrium. "A normative equilibrium is that which every artistic imagination is committed to producing; that which, once produced, it is committed to preserving; that which, being lost, it is committed to restoring."²

It is a matter of how a man conceives his relation to nature. If he sees himself as a minor part of nature and responds with humility in the face of reality, he will be able to see reality with reverence and directness and his

¹Ibid., p. 26.

²Taylor, Design and Expression . . . , p. 28.

structures of tension will be able to stand beside the works of nature as monumental expressions of reality.

"You can't reproduce nature. You can only expose your nature, beside God, as authentically as you know how. You listen silently and that sacred power that is within you dictates and you obey, and that is what is called creation."¹

If on the other hand, man egotistically sees himself as greater than nature and exalts his soul, going beyond nature in his willful "perfection" of nature, interposing the individual ego between the self and nature than even the most perfect balance will remain a mere arrangement of artificial forms outside the man. The work will stand only as a decorative thing unable to speak in the presence of reality.

IV. Never Generalize

In a work of art, all the effort to balance the shapes, lines, colors, etc., occurs solely for the purpose of conveying a specific response to reality. This may be called the content of the work, even in abstract and non-representational art. It is only this content of a work of art that can determine what is the normative equilibrium for that work. The function of equilibrium, its norm or principle, is understood only in relation to the meaning which it helps make visible. The order in a work of art is expressive not because the Pattern is balanced, but because the type of balance it achieves is that particular balance which will

¹Marc. Chagall, Atlantic. June, 1958.

express the artist's individual response. It is expressive because it is principled, is created by the artist's initiative and decision.

"The artist's field is not an imitation of nature; it is a parcel of nature which he has caused to imitate him."¹

In thus creating an image of himself as he responds to reality, the artist has no place for generalization. Only one organization of forms out of the infinite possibilities for organization will satisfy the demand of his personal response to the reality of this particular encounter. It is only when man's imagination calls forth from the infinite number of views of reality multiple visual elements that he is aware of the complex task of organizing vision into meaningful concepts. That particular organization which will bring about clarity and meaning for him, as he asks what is real, will be an organization which reflects a man's individuality. It is not necessary to seek individuality for, like one's shadow, it moves with speed and dexterity exactly equal to that of its possessor. What is required is a reverent search for reality, a radical wrenching away from idealized preconceived perfection or willful caprice. Man must not interpose himself between what he is and reality. He must stand beside nature and commune with what is real. The artist's problem is to give the seriousness of himself

¹Taylor, Design and Expression . . . , p. 9.

as a participant in nature to his search for what is true. This requires a kind of reverence which cannot countenance any generalization or mere suggestion. The artist must really mean what he says as a revelation of the real.

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CHAPTER VI

TEACHING AND MOTIVATION

Dean Ernest Melby suggests that schools were not designed to be true educational enterprises, but were established to teach only a few knowledges and skills which children are unlikely to learn in the process of growing up. The knowledge taught under such circumstances is reading, writing and arithmetic. "It is the same for all children. All are expected to begin learning to read at the same chronological age, to progress at the same rate, to be together at 10 and 15."¹ Melby blames the lack of true educational enterprise on faulty emphasis in the school. " . . . The school thinks first of what the child must learn and second of the child. We do not measure what school subjects do to the child. We measure what the child does to the subject."²

"In a formed age there is in truth no autonomy of education, but only in an age which is losing form. Only in it, in the disintegration of traditional bonds, in the spinning whirl of freedom, does personal responsibility arise which in the end can no longer lean with its burden of decision on any church or culture, but is lonely in the face of Present Being.

¹Ernest O. Melby, "The Deprived Child: His Gift to Education," The Disadvantaged: Views and Opinions (East Lansing: Mott Institute for Community Improvement, College of Education, Michigan State University, Vol. 1, No. 4, June, 1966), n.p.

²Ibid.

In an age which is losing form the highly-prized 'personalities', who know how to serve its fictitious forms and in their name to dominate the age, count in the truth of what is happening no more than those who lament the genuine forms of the past and are diligent to restore them. The ones who count are those persons who -- though they may be of little renown -- respond to and are responsible for the continuation of the living spirit, each in the active stillness of his sphere of work."¹

True educational enterprises today are those which work for "the continuation of the living spirit." In our age we must be concerned with, "what the school subjects do to the child." Education fails when it demands the same knowledge and development from every individual. It fails when it insists upon a standard subject matter and does not encourage the living spirit; when it is not concerned with the humanity of the child as well as his intellectual growth. Dean Melby insists that, "It is our failure to respect the child, to believe in him and to care for him that . . . limits the growth of [even] average and above average children."²

The old approach to education may be the result of two beliefs which no longer seem valid. Even in the face of twentieth century psychology and philosophy, the idea that learning is an exclusively rational process persists. People still consider "telling" to be the major activity of teaching, and if it doesn't work the first time, teachers tell

¹Buber, op. cit., p. 102.

²Melby, op. cit., n.p.

again and again: drill the information into the child. It has not been understood that it is not the words the teacher utters, but, as Taylor says, the words he impregnates that can teach.¹ Education must deal differently with information. Teachers must be less the mediums of the transference of information (which can be secured through other means) and more the means for reflection, maturing, counseling and for learning how to use knowledge. This role the teacher must accept even though it takes a great deal of imagination and it shakes the comfortable traditional stability of what is now being done in teaching. Gardner Murphy points out that the nurture of rationality may lie in some other effort than the sheer encouragement of rational thought; indeed, that, "the rational may best continue to grow in the instructive soil in which it was engendered, and that too clear and sterile a surgical separation of thought from its ancestral and parental roots in love and impulse may threaten its validity."²

Finally, school is considered to be a preparation for life rather than part of real life. School and learning have been looked upon as a journey to some wonderful future which, whether the child realizes it or not, is well worth the pains of the trip. Is it any wonder that school and whatever learning is done there often seems unreal and meaningless? By the time the child has completed twelve years

¹Taylor, The Masks . . . , p. 235.

²Murphy, op. cit., p. 22.

of schooling, the habit of preparing for life and the idea that living must be pushed aside for such preparation are so strong that he has learned only to prepare for life, not to live it. One might almost wake up one morning dead, without ever having really lived.

Teaching should be a dialogue between the child and an adult. School should be not telling about life so much as sharing life. Life begins at least five or six years before school starts. It cannot be postponed or shunted to one side. School should be an experiencing of life, an example of good authentic living, a way of waking up to the very living one is now doing.

". . . the danger has arisen that the new phenomenon, the will to educate, may degenerate into arbitrariness, and that the educator may carry out his selection and his influence from himself and his idea of the pupil, not from the pupil's own reality . . . This is almost always due to an interruption or a temporary flagging of the act of inclusion, which is not merely regulative for the realm of education, as for other realms, but is actually constitutive; so that the realm of education acquires its true and proper force from the constant return of this act and the constantly renewed connection with it. The man whose calling it is to influence the being of persons that can be determined, must experience this action of his (however much it may have assumed the form of nonaction) ever anew from the other side. Without the action of his spirit being in any way weakened, he must at the same time be over there, on the surface of that other spirit which is being acted upon -- and not of some conceptional, contrived spirit, but all the time the wholly concrete spirit of this individual and unique being, who is living and confronting him, and who stands with him in the common situation of educating and being educated (which is indeed one situation, only the other is at the other end of it). It is not enough for him to imagine the child's individuality, nor to experience him directly as

a spiritual person and then to acknowledge him. Only when he catches himself from over there, and feels how it affects one, how it affects this other human being, does he recognize the real limit, baptize his self-will in Reality and make it true will, and renew his paradoxical legitimacy."¹

When one tries to manipulate the child's learning, it is necessary to shut off many paths, to block numerous opportunities in order to control the direction of learning. To achieve a direct route to that learning which it has been decided the child should attain, it is necessary to block much more which the child finds meaningful to life than the teacher is able to offer as preparation for life. By the time the child has finished school he has spent so much time doing what someone else wants him to do, "learning" what someone else tells him he should learn, and stifling his own inclinations and curiosity, that he is no longer capable of thinking for himself. Such an approach creates a breed of acquiescent followers who feel that they must please adults, and at all costs, avoid trouble, embarrassment, punishment and disapproval: who seeking answers to someone else's problems, are too busy being right to think for themselves.

"To a very great degree, school is a place where children learn to be stupid. A dismal thought, but hard to escape. Infants are not stupid. Children of one, two, or even three throw the whole of themselves into everything they do. They embrace life and devour it; it is why they learn so fast, and are such good company. Listlessness, boredom, apathy -- these come later. Children come to school curious; within a few years most of that curiosity is dead, or at least silent. Open a first or third grader to questions and you will be deluged; fifth graders say nothing.

¹Buber, op. cit., p. 100.

They either have no questions or won't ask them. They think, 'What's the catch?' Last year, thinking that self-consciousness and embarrassment might be silencing the children, I put a question box in the classroom, and said that I would answer any questions they put into it. In four months I got one question -- 'How long does a bear live?' While I was talking about the life span of bears and other creatures, one child said impatiently, 'Come on, get to the point.' The expressions on the children's faces seemed to say, 'You've got us here in school, now make us do whatever it is that you want us to do.' Curiosity, questions, speculation -- these are for outside of school."¹

Not only children and young people, but even teachers training in service tend to be more concerned with acceptable answers. They would even give an answer they know to be wrong, if they were sure the professor would give them a higher grade. Too often the student's concern is with what someone else expects rather than what is meaningful to him. The primary goal is a good grade. Students are afraid of getting poor marks. Holt indicates that children's strategies are aimed not at learning so much as they are aimed at avoiding embarrassment, disapproval and the loss of status. "These self-limiting strategies are dictated above all else by fear."² Are children being condemned to that miserable fate of the wretched souls who lived, according to Dante,

"Without or praise or blame with that ill band
of angels mix'd, who nor rebellious proved,
Nor yet were true to God, but for themselves
Were only. From his bounds Heaven drove them forth
Not to impair his Lustre; not the depth
of Hell receives them, lest the accursed tribe
Should glory thence with exultation vain.

¹ John Holt, How Children Fail (New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1966), p. 157.

² Ibid., p. 49.

. . . these of death
 No hope may entertain: and their blind life
 So meanly passes that all other lots
 They envy. Fame of them the world hath none,
 Nor suffers; Mercy and Justice scorn them both.

. . . I saw
 And knew the shade of him, who to base fear
 Yielding, abjured his high estate. Forthwith
 I understand, for certain, this the tribe
 Of those ill spirits both to God displeasing
 and to his foes. The wretches who ne're lived,
 . . ."¹

How can one know on any day what particular bit of knowledge or understanding is most needed by a child in order to clarify his personal concept of reality? The child alone can know this, and though he may not do it very well, he can make the choice much better than anyone else can.

Nor can the child be expected to be committed to purposes assigned to him. One is committed, if committed at all, to one's personal interests and devices. In school, by assigning concerns to the child, teachers develop slow minds which are never brought to the place of urgency through self-initiated interest.

Authentic education is related to a juristic philosophy. It is based on perceptual field theories of learning and presents a more realistic picture of growth and behavior. The perceptual theory is that behavior is not a question of the outside stimuli or forces to which one is exposed, but rather, it is a product of the perceptions of the individual; not what happens, but how it is perceived by the individual. This theory puts emphasis upon the

¹Alighieri Dante, The Divine Comedy, trans. Henry F. Cory, The Harvard Classics (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909), p. 13.

individual's unique feelings and insights and indicates in addition that the ultimate control and direction of behavior lies always within the personality of the individual rather than in the external forces exerted upon him.

Perception cannot be changed directly, it can only be facilitated. Problems of teaching must be looked at in terms of their meaning to the student, not in relation to their meaning to the teacher, or in relation to the curriculum, no matter how well organized, how logically sequential, or how "necessary" the outlined material. Learning is a problem of a total personality, of the student's personal discovery of meaning. Stated in a slightly more dramatic way this means ". . . that anything that can be taught to another is relatively inconsequential, and has little or no significant influence on behavior."¹

Since all of reality cannot be encompassed in a finite condition, what is really real (objects, persons, ideas and all interrelationships taken together) is beyond the province of reason. Finite reason cannot know the infinite Reality. The only possible resolution is that reason must be kept open and free for an encounter, at the very limits of reason, with that which may be alien to reason. The truth which may arise through Transcendence is not expressible in theory or in any teachable doctrine. Heidegger pointed out that the rational is not a just judge of the

¹Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming A Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), p. 276.

strictness of thinking. "It unscrupulously pushes everything not in conformity with it into the presumable swamp of the irrational, which it itself has staked out. Reason and its conceptions are only one kind of thinking and are by no means determined by themselves, but by that which has been called thinking, to think in the manner of ratio."¹

The point being made here is that subject matter pursued for itself is meaningless, and that teaching subject matter in arbitrary isolated doses, not related to the authentic being of the student, does not build the student's authenticity or help him to become more integrated and alive. Rather, arbitrary and isolated subject matter teaching has a perverse effect upon the becoming of the student. Only that influence which promotes genuine becoming is consequential. Only that influence which facilitates the coming into being of an authentic self can significantly influence behavior.

It should be evident that the only learning which is significant will be self-discovered self-appropriated learning. "Such self-discovered learning, truth that has been personally appropriated and assimilated in experience, cannot be communicated to another. As soon as an individual tries to communicate such experience directly, ". . . it becomes teaching, and its results are inconsequential."² Teaching,

¹Martin Heidegger, The Question of Being, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1958), p. 39.

²Rogers, op. cit., p. 276.

as the term is used here might also be called "propaganda" or what Buber has called, "the will to educate." It is an arbitrary curriculum selected as the result of the educator's idea of the student rather than from the student's individual reality. Buber's solution, like Rogers' is based upon the reality of the single individual. Buber uses the term "inclusion," Umfassung, or "envelopment" as it also has been translated. This is similar to what Rogers calls, "an unconditional positive regard" for the other person. It should be emphasized that what these men are concerned with is something more than empathy. Empathy means to transpose oneself over there to the other and feel things as the other feels them. Thus it means the exclusion of one's own concreteness. What is meant here is an extension of the self. It means experiencing the situation at one and the same time from one's own and from the other's point of view, the fulfillment of the complete presence of the total reality in which one participates.

Motivation for real learning is an inherent part of man's nature. "Motivation," in the sense it has been known in education is necessary only if the teacher is trying to manipulate the child and to control his learning. What is needed is that teachers permit the child to be in contact with problems that are relevant to his existence and to his personal concept of reality so that he perceives problems and issues which he wants to resolve. Rogers suggests three requirements demanded of the teacher who would permit the child to learn what is meaningful to him. First, the

teacher's real-ness. Rogers calls this "congruence" and describes it as,

" . . . the teacher's being the person that he is, and being openly aware of the attitudes he holds. It means that he feels acceptant toward his own real feelings Because he accepts his feelings as his feelings, he has no need to impose them on his students, or to insist that they feel the same way. He is a person, not the faceless embodiment of a curricular requirement, or a sterile pipe through which knowledge is passed from one generation to the next."¹

This is what is called authenticity. Its lack is perhaps one of the greatest and most prevalent barriers to better education. Most teachers, products of the schools in which they teach, have learned to prepare for some distant reality, to do what they are told to do and to learn what someone tells them they should learn. Teachers have not learned to face the objective reality of the immediate present except through some authority or standard such as the textbook, the principal or what was learned in teacher's college. It is extremely difficult to learn to be authentic and to face reality on spontaneous and objective terms rather than through some standard rules or descriptions. Yet this is a prime requirement of learning, of creativity, and of teaching.

Roger's second point, acceptance and understanding seem at first glance to be familiar ideas nearly always practiced. Most teachers claim to accept all of their students and to understand them. Nearly all take courses in

¹Ibid., p. 287.

psychology and in child growth and development! Yet what is required is something more than an intellectual understanding. It is sometimes called empathy. But, it is more than that. The teacher must accept the child as he is, and must understand the child's feelings. He must sense the child's private world as if it were his own, but without, as Rogers says, losing the "as if" quality. This is what Buber calls inclusion or envelopment. Rogers indicates ". . . the teacher who can warmly accept, who can provide an unconditional positive regard, and who can empathize with the feelings of fear, anticipation, and discouragement which are involved in meeting new material, will have done a great deal toward setting the conditions for learning."¹

The third requirement for creating a facilitating classroom climate in which significant learning can take place concerns the provision of resources. Rogers emphasizes that resource materials, including lectures and techniques should be made available to the students, not forced upon them. He suggests that the teacher would want his relationship to the group to be such that his feelings could be freely available to them, yet not be imposed on them or become a restrictive influence on them. Schools and teachers do a reasonably good job of providing resources, but they have not learned how to offer these resources. Resources are imposed. It is assumed that the teacher knows much better than the child what is best for him. What one thinks

¹Ibid., pp. 287-288.

he knows is best for the child to learn is not what he does learn when it is imposed upon him. The child's only significant learning will result from his concern with a problem that seems relevant to him.

Teachers must stop thinking of the way children should solve a problem, or the best way to do it. The child's own way is the best way. It is the only way. (It hardly seems necessary to insist at this point that what is meant here is the genuine way of the authentic individual, not any superficial reaction of the child, a simple reflex or mere childish impulse.

"We must recognize that children who are dealing with a problem on a very primitive, experimental, and inefficient level are making discoveries that are just as good, just as exciting, just as worthy of interest and encouragement, as the more sophisticated discoveries made by more advanced students.

In other words, the invention of the wheel was as big a step forward as the invention of the airplane -- bigger in fact. We teachers will have to learn to recognize when our students are . . . inventing wheels and when they are inventing airplanes, and we will have to learn to avoid the difficult temptation of showing slow students the wheel so that they may more quickly get to work on the airplanes. . . . knowledge which is not genuinely discovered by children will very likely prove useless and will be soon forgotten."¹

The task of the teacher is to help the child discover and develop for himself a reality which is meaningful to him in his own experience. The teacher does not have to devise artificial modes of motivation. The motivation for learning and growth springs from life's tendency for self-actualization. The human organism tends to seek all the differentiated

¹Holt, op. cit., p. 125. (Italics placed by the present writer for emphasis.)

channels of potential development which seem enhancing to the self. It is not necessary for the teacher to supply the energy that is required for growth to take place. This energy is generated by the child's contact with reality. But it is contact with reality only as the child experiences it, not as the teacher thinks it should be logically arranged, that is capable of generating the energy for genuine growth.

Teaching is not a technique of child management. It has nothing to do with manipulating and controlling children. Yet this is what has been done in schools for a long time.

"The 'old' educator, insofar as he was an educator, was not 'the man with a will to power,' but he was the bearer of assured values which were strong in tradition. . . . the 'old' educator represented particularly the historical world, the past . . . he instilled values. . . . the formed world; the world of history faces a particular generation, which is the world of nature renewed again and again, always without history."¹

The modern educator, Buber indicates, "takes on himself the tragedy of the person and offers an unblemished daily sacrifice, or the fire enters his work and consumes it." For him, "The life and particular being of all his pupils is the decisive factor . . . For in the manifold variety of the children the variety of creation is placed before him."² The old approach is based partly on the adherence to the teaching of the behavioral sciences which

¹Buber, op. cit., p. 93.

²Ibid., p. 95.

held that the way a person behaves is a result of the outside forces exerted upon him. Combs suggests an interesting analogy.

"Such a conception of the nature of human behavior leads to a method of dealing with human problems based upon fencing people in. It is a method familiar to any person who has lived on a farm or has ever driven the cows home from pasture. One goes down the lane from the barn to the pasture, carefully closing the gates where he does not want the cattle to go and opening those where he wants them to go, until he reaches the pasture. In the pasture, he irritates the herd in such fashion that they move forward and because the route has been carefully prepared in advance, move up the lane to the barn."¹

In the artificial atmosphere of directed activities the child comes to mistrust reality as he experiences it and to depend upon the formulas he has been taught. Therefore, it is the teacher's task to help the child to believe in his own individuality, his unique vision, and in his capacity to manage his experience.

In the visual arts language by which the child expresses his ideas visually and artistically is a language of form. While artistic form is usually recognized only in highly evolved professional works of art, children's work, when not distorted by external methods of teaching or by imitation of nature, does possess a definite structural order.²

¹Arthur W. Combs, "Personality Theory and Its Implications for Curriculum Development," Learning More About Learning: Papers and Reports from the Third ASCD Research Institute, edited by Alexander Frazier (Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1959), p. 6.

²Henry Schaefer-Simmern, The Unfolding of Artistic Activity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950).

Motivation in art which would help the child to give form to his own individual vision would be motivation away from cliché or formula and away from the imitation of nature. Art cannot be taught by means of science.

"However, the fallacy is widely diffused that by means of science . . . man may hope to become capable of possessing the world mentally as it actually is . . . even should science grasp the entire essence of the world scientifically, we still would have riddles to face the very existence of which would be hidden from science."¹

The artist submits the world to an absolutely different process of mental appropriation.

". . . Perception is something of independent importance apart from all abstraction and . . . the capacity for concrete perceiving has as strong a claim to be developed by regular and conscious use as the capacity for abstract thinking has. It should be understood that man can attain the mental mastery of the world not only by the creation of concepts but also by the creation of visual conceptions."²

Motivation in art must help the child to trust his personal vision. It will necessarily be non-directive regarding supposed ways that objects should be represented and that pictures should be composed. The teaching of rules of perspective, principles of design, proportion, etc. causes a student to replace his visual conceptions with rational ideas, and thus turn from expression to mere illustration or decoration. Henry Schaefer-Simmern used non-directive

¹Conrad Fiedler, On Judging Works of Visual Art, trans. Henry Schaefer-Simmern and Fulmer Mood (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949).

²Ibid., p. 40.

methods when he asked his students, "to work as slowly as possible; after completing the drawing, to observe it at length; if the outline was not clear enough, to fill it in with black ink to make a silhouette; and whenever a change seemed necessary, to start a new drawing."¹ Schaefer-Simmern worded his instructions in such a way as to demand constant clarity of perceptual experience while avoiding behavioral prescription. The way doesn't exist before it is taken. It is created as it is achieved--in both science and art. There is no chart which contains either the route to the goal or a diagram of the goal itself. It is generally understood that creative work in science, while it is an investigation is also a formulation based upon what is learned step by step in the process of investigation. Such investigation has a single purpose--to bring the world into a comprehensible and comprehended existence. However, it is less well accepted that creativity in art as well as in science begins only at that moment when a person is forced to create the world for himself by his discovering consciousness. In art the child learns what is true by formulating visual conceptions of the world. He doesn't first understand the world and then illustrate this discovery. One must learn by going where to go. This is an awesome truth.

I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow.
 I feel my fate in what I cannot fear.
 I learn by going where I have to go.

¹Schaefer-Simmern, op. cit., p. 73.

We think by feeling. What is there to know?
 I hear my being dance from ear to ear.
 I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow.

Of those so close beside me, which are you?
 God bless the Ground! I shall walk softly there,
 And learn by going where I have to go.

Light takes the Tree; but who can tell us how?
 The lowly worm climbs up a winding stair;
 I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow.

Great Nature has another thing to do.
 To you and me; so take the lively air,
 And, lovely, learn by going where to go.

This shaking keeps me steady. I should know.
 What falls away is always. And is near.
 I wake to sleep, and take my waking slow.
 I learn by going where I have to go.¹

It is difficult for teachers to remember that what is desired is that the student produce something which attains existence by that very production, not something which exists before the act of creation and can therefore be described and "taught." It is for this reason that the teacher must turn to the child for his subject matter. The child must develop a visual conception from his world of experience not necessarily from what adults see objectively as the world of reality. Art creates the form for something which does not yet in any way exist in the child's mind, but which this forming process clarifies and brings into being in his consciousness.

The teacher does not, of course, ask the child to draw whatever he wishes and then abandon him. How can he expect to know what in the child's experience is meaningful

¹Theodore Roethke, "The Waking," from Words For The Wind (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 124.

to him? He could hardly expect the same experience to have identical meaning for himself and the child. Therefore, the teacher must ask the student to choose his own subject and recognize the student's responsibility for the finished work, expecting him to examine it critically. The teacher would not criticize the work except that if the child indicates dissatisfaction he might be asked if he could do a better job. Such a term leaves the child uninfluenced by external academic ideas and free to consult his own perceptual experiences for enlightenment.

Assignments should be of such a nature as to encourage the development of sensitivity toward reality. For example, the teacher might ask, "How many different shapes of leaves can you find?" The assignment to collect many items each a different variety of a single color, or to collect one hundred of anything would stimulate interaction with reality. The student should decide what to do with what he has collected.

Another way to help the child to understand that personal responsibility for his expression is both expected and respected would be to show him, at appropriate times, all his previous works in the sequence of their production. This emphasizes for the student his progressive mastery of expression and offers assurance that his uniqueness and growth potential are valued. The child's progress may also be stimulated by showing him works of others--folk art, primitive art and other art which is appropriate to the child's own stage of perceptual development. It should be emphasized,

as Schaefer-Simmern insists, that only works appropriate to the child's own stage of development should be used for motivation.

Advice that the student work out each picture as clearly as possible is also "open" motivation, motivation which leaves to its producer the responsibility for the form of the final expression.

Murphy tells us that, "the great task of education is to evoke an understanding love, to fan its flame, to make creative love broader and deeper, reaching for all that exists."¹ He points out that the child makes abstractions on the basis of his own direct and often unique experience. The teacher must help him to become aware of the abstract principles of expression only as he discovers them himself, through his own experiences. The child develops personal conceptions only through direct encounter with reality.

There was a child went forth every day,
And the first object he looked upon, that object he became,
And that object became part of him for the day or a certain
part of the day
Or for many years on stretching cycles of years.²

The non-directive or open approach recognizes the importance of experience as the basis of all personal growth and realizes that the control of learning is, therefore, essentially the responsibility of the student. Rather than limiting the possibilities for growth to a single ideal

¹Murphy, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

²Walt Whitman, "There Was A Child Went Forth," from Leaves of Grass with an introduction by Gray Wilson Allen (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1960).

direction assumed to be the right one, such an approach leaves the end of education open to the infinite number of possibilities which personal experience may discover.

"The question which is always being brought forward -- 'To where, to what, must we educate?' -- misunderstands the situation. Only times which know a figure of general validity -- the Christian, the gentleman, the citizen -- know an answer to that question, not necessarily in words, but by pointing with the finger to the figure which rises clear in the air, out-topping all But when all figures are shattered, when no figure is able anymore to dominate and shape the present human material, What is there left to form?

Nothing but the image of God.

That is the indefinable, only factual, direction of the responsible modern educator."¹

¹Buber, op. cit., p. 102.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION IN ART EDUCATION

The difficulty that inevitably teachers must face in acquiring an understanding of art springs from the fact that the power of visual conception is alien to what they have come to expect in judgment. If he would understand art, one must descend from the height of his rational intellectual consciousness, the culmination of his life's work and the proud achievement of his profession. He must shift his whole approach to knowing and being in order to contemplate the world as a visual phenomenon rather than as an object for rational comprehension. All of our education, supported by our cultural mores, has been directed toward the achievement of a rational comprehension of reality. Art is alien to this approach. The teacher who would learn to understand and evaluate the art work of his students must learn to apprehend the world in a different way. He must place himself in a new relation to the world. He must realize that man can apprehend the world in a sense which is altogether different from the rational way which he has come to believe is the only way of apprehending it.

"Artistic activity begins when man finds himself face to face with the visible world as something immensely enigmatical, when, driven by an inner necessity and applying the

powers of his mind, he grapples with the twisted mass of the visible which presses in upon him and gives it creative form."¹

We are accustomed to facing the visible world not as something "immensely enigmatical" but as something to be understood by rational thought. It happens, however, that our exclusive dependence upon abstract thought makes the understanding of our visual perception more difficult. It has been said that if it were possible to teach geography to the carrier pigeon, the poor bird would lose his intuitive sense of orientation. Just so with man; we have lost our ability to see the world and to obtain meaning from our visual perception. We must realize with Jaspers that reason has its limits and that reason must be kept open and free for any encounter--even with what may be most alien to reason. The perfect rational appropriation of the world, if such were possible, would leave much of reality untouched (including art) and worse, this perfect scientific knowledge would hide from man the fact that gaps existed in his comprehension of reality. Olson suggests that a certain objectivity which he calls "objectism" is a requirement for the poet or artist.

"Objectism is the getting rid of the lyrical interference of the individual as ego, of the 'subject' and his soul, that peculiar presumption by which Western man has interposed himself between what he is as a creature of nature (with certain instructions to carry out) and those other creations of nature which we may, with no derogation, call objects. For man, himself, is an object . . ."²

¹Fiedler, op. cit., p. 48.

²Olson, op. cit.

In the evaluation of art this objectivity means that the grasping of visual qualities and the relationships between visual shapes is the only criterion. A painting is a painting. Interest in art begins only at that point where interest in literary content vanishes. That content of a work which can be conceptually understood and which can be expressed in verbal terms is not the artistic content of the work. Such content existed before it was incorporated in the work of art. The artist did not invent it, he merely used it. The same literary content is available to all artists alike and it, in itself, is neither increased when used by a great artist nor diminished when used by a mere dabbler. It is not the literary content but the artistic content, the visual quality, which is great in the one instance and lacking in the other.

Since it is our first impulse to judge a work of art by its literary content, we must constantly be on the alert to avoid this fallacy. The artistic content of a work of art has nothing to do with forms created by nature prior to the activity of art and independently of it. "At the last the deformation is all that counts, for it alone can declare visibly the part which man has played before nature in relating himself to it."¹ Artistic activity therefore resides in the creation of forms which only by that act of creation attain existence. What art creates is not an echo of the real world which has its existence without art.

¹Taylor, Design and Expression . . . , p. 224.

"What art creates is the world, made by and for the artistic consciousness."¹

Rather than to imitate nature, the artist's purpose is to develop his perceptual experiences into a visual conception--to create the form of something which does not yet exist; to obtain this visual conception which only by the creation of the work of art attains existence. The work should therefore be judged upon its success in achieving the form, which makes manifest this conception. This we have called, along with Taylor, the normative equilibrium.

"It is what actually all men mean by the artistic vision, by that vision of rightness which presides prescriptively over the acts of persons who in any way participate in art. Out of respect for it, solely out of respect for it, are the activities of the artist and critic ever commonly obliged, or their imaginations joined in a communion of sympathy."²

We have already formulated four "basic principles" for art. It is clear that the first principle, Art Means Giving Form, is a requirement for normative equilibrium and that the three others are suggestions for the student who would achieve such form. By form we mean a configuration which displays a unity and integration which seems inevitable and definitive for this particular work of art. A work of art has achieved such form when it cannot be broken into parts which would have completeness or autonomous existence by themselves. All parts are mutually determined by each other so that the whole assumes the character of

¹Fiedler, op. cit., p. 48.

²Taylor, The Masks . . . , p. 175.

necessity in all its parts. Any part would appear to be an incomplete fragment while together they constitute a unity and completeness which isolates itself as an autonomous expression. As Taylor suggests it is only out of respect for form--normative equilibrium--that the critic and artist have a common obligation. One judges a work of art not on the basis that it has certain forms, but on the basis that the forms it has are seen to be precisely those forms which are required to achieve the expression which they do more or less completely embody.

While it is impossible to formulate a rule for all art, each work of art incorporates its own rule of order inherently within itself. The forms employed impose a commitment in relation to the final structural pattern. Immediately as any form is introduced into the pictorial field all the other forms must relate to it and to the eventual form of the whole with perfect consistancy. The formal structure of works of visual art made by children and primitive peoples seems to be related directly to the natural development of human perception and visual conception. We learn from Arnheim and Schaefer-Simmern that the pictorial forms children produce grow organically according to definite rules of development, from the simplest to increasingly complex patterns in a process of gradual differentiation. Children at the different stages of perceptual development use a consistent structural order to create an indissoluble relationship of forms which can be seen to be obligatory. Their work can be seen to have a normative equilibrium.

Four stages of development may be briefly described here. Arnheim enunciates the law of differentiation. "According to this law, a perceptual feature will be rendered in the simplest possible way as long as it is not yet differentiated. The circle is the simplest possible shape available in the pictorial medium. Until shape becomes differentiated, the circle does not stand for roundness, but for any shape at all and none in particular."¹ For the sake of simplicity the four stages indicated by Schaefer-Simmern will be described. The reader is urged to read both accounts however. The intentional figure which has the shape of a circle is called the first stage of artistic configuration. Having no extension in direction, the circle is undifferentiated. It stands for anything, merely for "thingness" in the undifferentiated concept of the child. (Figure III) In stage two the circle becomes extended either vertically or horizontally, or simultaneously in both directions. The first differentiation of direction is that of the greatest contrast in which any difference is shown with the greatest possible differentiation. Any direction which is not vertical is seen as horizontal.

"In this way the figure obtains an orderly structure based on the greatest contrast of direction. All parts are related to one another by the horizontal - vertical order. Not one line can be changed without disturbing the structural order of form Only in their relation to the whole do the parts obtain structural meaning. Furthermore each single

¹Arnheim, op. cit., p. 172.

part is clearly discriminated from every other part. The relationship of the greatest contrast of direction of lines and the relationship of figure and ground constitute, together, an inseparable totality of form."¹
(See Figure IV)

Here we have a well-defined normative equilibrium even though the level of visual conception is not complicated. In the third stage of visual conception finer differentiations of direction can be made. While stage two used only right angles forming the greatest possible differentiation of direction, stage three employs acute and obtuse angles forming a greater variability of direction. "Now it becomes possible to distinguish between movements and stationary attitudes, a fact which proves that expression is a result of a definite stage of visual conceiving; that is, it is a product of visual cognition."² The vitality obtained by the increasing differentiation within this stage cannot be achieved by the imitation of nature. Artistic vitality and growth must result from the development of perceptual ability and the growth not of intellectual concepts but of visual concepts. (Figure V) The first three stages of visual conception have incorporated all the possibilities of differentiation within a single plane. Spatial depth is determined and defined by a structural organization in one plane. Figures in the distance are shown higher in the picture plane and smaller in size. (Figure VI) Stage three,

¹Schaefer-Simmern, op. cit., pp. 11, 12.

²Ibid., p. 14.




Figure III: In this picture copied from a young child's drawing the circular forms have already been given a perpendicular-horizontal orientation. The human form (with one eye) has two legs drawn at right angles from the body. Nonetheless the primal circle remains prominent.




Figure IV: Here we have the same subject as in Figure III, a boy running after his father's truck. However, the consistent use of a vertical-horizontal structure illustrates clearly this stage of visual development.




Figure V: These three figures copied from drawings done by first grade children indicate the greater vitality obtained with visual development from the stage of right angular conception to the greater differentiation of acute and obtuse angles. Just as in Figures III and IV, these drawings each represent a boy running.




Figure VI: The use of three baselines and decreasing size to indicate distance.

however, permits the development of a more advanced representation of depth by a kind of frontal isometric perspective made possible by the oblique angle of this stage. We speak of "a kind" of frontal isometric perspective in order to indicate that what we are discussing is not a mathematical or geometric form resulting from the rules of perspective by mere imitation or by rational calculation of any sort. Rather it is the result of the pictorial realization of visual conceiving, a complicated application of oblique lines related to a frontal cube and related to each other by the relation of parallelism. (Figure VII) Stage four is also concerned with depth in space. Here the appearance of space is achieved by overlapping. It is at this stage of visual conception that shading and light become functionally valid. Earlier they would be unnecessary, confusing and arbitrary. That is to say they would be non-artistic. They are not a part of man's natural visual development before stage four is reached and are not used by children in the earliest stages of development unless their use has been prematurely and intellectually acquired, in which case it would, of course, be a flaw rather than an asset to the work of art. (Figure VIII)

While these four stages of differentiation in visual conception indicate the development attained by the natural unfolding of the normal person's visual powers, it must be emphasized that many of us in our contemporary culture do not allow our visual powers to develop normally. We permit the development of abstract rational concepts to smother our




Figure VII: Houses copied from drawings made by children illustrate the use of isometric perspective with the development of the use of acute angles.

Figure VIII-a: This horse, copied from the drawing of a sixth grade child shows consistency and clarity in a rather complicated use of overlapping, especially in the drawing of the legs.





Figure VIII-b: This sixth grade drawing of a boy running is a clear and well-defined example of overlapping.



visual apprehension of reality. Artists will, of course, reach still more highly differentiated stages of visual comprehension. Nonetheless, a thorough understanding of the growth of visual perception through increasing differentiation as described by Arnheim and Schaefer-Simmern will greatly assist the teacher to think in terms of form rather than in terms of the imitation of nature in his evaluation of the art work of his students.

"From the preceding statements the conclusion must be drawn that in judging works of art one must strictly refrain from forming a fixed code of laws to which one can submit artistic phenomena from the beginning on. Always, understanding can follow achievements of the artist; it can never precede them. . . . Every acquired insight becomes an obstacle to further understanding as soon as it assumes the character of finality and is hardened in some rule or regulation."¹

The purpose of this chapter is to promote the creative teaching and the creative evaluation of child art, and to help teachers evaluate in such a way as to encourage the development by their students of a creative response to reality. Meaningful evaluation of works of art is possible only if one realizes that art is a valid response to reality but one quite alien to the scientific response to reality. The art work of the student should be approached with a willingness to accept the unexpected or unique rather than with any preconceived standard of excellence.

¹Fiedler, op. cit., p. 73.

If we examine the four basic principles previously enumerated in their relation to evaluation, we may be able to indicate a practical approach for teachers.

I. Art Means Giving Form

The above discussion on the progressive differentiation through four states of visual conceiving is pertinent to the evaluation of form in the child's work. It might be worth mentioning again that form, in itself is of no value. When we spoke of equilibrium we insisted on the necessity of a normative equilibrium and we were careful to tie the norm to expression.

II. Work For Clarity

It has already been pointed out that clarity is to be understood as clarity of form because the form determines the expression. Expression has its origin in a perceived pattern, a configuration of forces or tensions. In the first three stages of visual conception clarity is maintained by maintaining a consistent principle of organization and by employing only a primary figure-ground relationship. Where overlapping occurs in stage four we find also the development of light and shading to clarify the relation in space of the overlapping parts.

III. Be Intense (Care Enough)

An authentic personal or individual expression is an indication of real concern. This means an expression which avoids employing formulas for proportion, harmony,

perspective, etc. and which seeks to imitate neither nature nor a predetermined style of art. The execution of a work which is an authentic expression will indicate control and understanding of the tools and materials used which is commensurate with the expression.

IV. Never Generalize

"The perceptual pattern of a work of art is neither arbitrary nor a purely formal play of shapes and colors. It is indispensable as a precise interpreter of the idea the work is meant to express."¹ If the work indicates an openness to visual reality, an "objectism" as opposed to stereotype or rational abstract conception, if it achieves a specific expression, if it elicits a meaningful communication with the reality it projects, it can be said to have avoided generalization. Every element in such a work is indispensable for the one purpose of indicating the theme which embodies the nature of existence for the artist.

We must conclude that art is not communication. It is not a universal language but a unique, a singular language. Each work requires interpreting. However each work contains in itself, in the commitment of its forms, the key to its language. If it is not communication, art does, nonetheless present the possibility of communication. The creation of a work is a monologue, the authentic encounter of an individual with reality. Rather than communication, art is a

¹Arnheim, op. cit., p. 438.

communion with reality. But a sensitive observer may see in the work of art the authentic encounter which it represents. In this manner it may help not only the artist, but other men to understand the world and themselves as authentic individuals. The work of art enlarges the range of human alternatives. It may add a new dimension to the experience men are capable of.

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