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TOWARD A HUMAN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH

OF ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN DESIGN

BY

Kamal El‘Din Beshir Awadallah

A THESIS

Submitted to
l Michigan State University
‘ in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF URBAN PLANNING

School of Urban Planning and
Landscape Architecture

1982

ABSTRACT
TOWARD A HUMAN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH
OF ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN DESIGN
BY

Kamal El-Din Beshir Awadallah

This thesis addresses the problem of the lack of
cooperation between designers from the environmental
design fields such as architecture and urban design, and
researchers from the emerging behavioral science. This
problem stems from a theoretical and professional gap
between the two fields. By focusing on the theoretical
gap which resulted in view of the relationship between
human behavior and the physical environment, this thesis
has suggested a reorientation of the designers determinis-
tic attitude (i.e. the physical environment determines
behavior) toward a human ecological approach. By
redefining architecture and urban design as a means for
designing adaptive spaces, a synthesis between the design
fields and behavioral science has been proposed as a base
for a conceptual framework that is aimed to close the
theoretical gap. Although this thesis does not propose
a closing of the existing professional gap between
designers and researchers, it indicates the need for

further attention to this problem.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My sincere gratitude to all those special persons
who contributed to the completion of this thesis.
Specifically, I am grateful to Dr. Steven Orlick who
served as my thesis chairperson, Dr. Ismet Kilincaslan
and Professor Duane Mezga for their suggestions and
constructive comments. Dr. Carl Goldschmidt and Professor
Sanford Farness must also be thanked for their guidance
and support offered me, whenever they were asked.

My wife Josiane, and my son, Karim, deserve a
special thanks for their love, patience, and understanding.

Thanks to Jane Rice Blaine, the Urban Design
librarian, for her cooperation whenever it was needed.

Finally, thanks to Judy Gilroy who had to

decipher my handwriting in order to type this manuscript.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chapter
I. HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT:
THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophical Orientations . . . . . . . .

Empiricism and Environmental Determinism
Rationalism and Nativism . . . . . . . .
Interactionalism and Transactionalism .
Theoretical Limitations . . . . .
Aspects of Man-Built Environment

Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . .
Environmental Perception, Cognition,
and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Ecological View . . . . . . . . . . .
Three Ways to Define Culture . . . . . . .
Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II. DESIGNING THE BUILT-ENVIRONMENT:
A THEORETICAL REORIENTATION . . . . . . . .

The Meaning of the Rational Design Process
The Architectural Design Bias . . . . . .
The Theoretical Limitations . . . . . .
The Professional Limitations . . . .
Architecture as Cultural Adaptation . . .
Redefining Architecture . . . . . . . .
Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iii

Page

H

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10

12
13
15
15
18

20

22
25
31
32

34

36
42
44
55
56
57
66

Page

III. TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN ECOLOGICAL

ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN DESIGN . . . . . . . . 67
General Theoretical Reorientation . . . . . 68
Specific Conceptual Reorientation . . . . . 77

Environmental Image . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Mental Mapping, Orientation and Meaning . 81
Spatial Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Personal space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Crowding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Territoriality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Defensible space . . . . . . . . . . 89
Behavioral Units (Structured Behavior) . . 9O
Behavioral setting . . . . . . . . . . . 9O
Behavior circuits . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Conceptual Framework for Human Ecological
Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Theories and Models . . . . . . . . 94
A Conceptual Descriptive Model . . . . . . 100
A Design Process Model . . . . . . . . . . 107
Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

iv

 

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page
1. The Perception Continuum . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2. The Cognitive Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3. Behavior-Environmental Inter—Relationships . . 27
4. An Ecologica1-Cu1tural—Behaviora1 Model . . . 29
5. Ascending Hierarchical Definition Structure

for Nouns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6. Closed Hierarchical Definition Structure
for Verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
7. Pruitt-Igoe Housing Scheme Blown Up in 1972 . 48
8. Confusion and Ugliness, Long Island . . . . . 51
9. Archology Hexahedron, A Scheme to House
170,000 Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10. Environment and Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . 71
ll. Behavior/Perception Continuums . . . . . . . . 74
12. Three—way Classification System for Models . . 99
13. Ideal Process of Model-making in Relation
to Reality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
14. A Conceptual Model (1): The Contextual
Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
15. A Conceptual Model (2): The Social/Economic
Organizational Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 104
16. A Conceptual Model (3): The Behavioral/
Perception Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
17. A Conceptual Model (4): The Cultural/Design
Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Figure Page

18. A Design Process Model (1): Design/Research
Cooperation Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

19. A Design Process Model (2): Design With

People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

vi

INTRODUCTION

Id_ea_

The idea of this thesis is derived from the emerging
awareness of the study of the relationship between human
behavior and the physical environment. This study has
shown a rapid development in the last decades, particularly
in the emerging field of behavior science. However, the
implications of such a study lies in the hands of the fields
of the environmental design, such as architecture, urban
design, interior design, and industrial design. Therefore,
there are two major fields for which, this study is impor-
tant. On one hand, there is a group of researchers from
social science fields such as psychology, anthropology,
geography, and sociology, who, through the initiation of
the multi-discipline behavior science, are concerned by
human behavior and the physical environment. On the other
hand there are the designers from the environmental design
fields.

Designers of the built-environment, although
practicing in different fields, have one common thing that
relate them to the study of behavior-physical environment.
That is; they deal with changing a specific physical
environment for meeting specific human activities.

Therefore, it is quite important for the designer in

 

general to know more about the relationship between the
physical environment and behavior, if he wants to design

the most appropriate environment. In this extent, the
designer of the built-environment, whether he is an

architect, urban designer, city planner, or interior designer,
is equally responsible for considering the importance of

the behavior—environment relations, particularly when a
physical design is taking place.

Although the study of behavior and the physical
environment is important for both the behavior scientists
and the environmental designers, they have contributed to
it quite differently. While the behavioral scientists
and researchers have been adjusting and shifting their
theoretical attitudes and orientations, based on research
findings, the environmental designers have been reluctant
to consider such reorientations. In brief, the views of
the relationship between human behavior and the physical
environment can be summarized as follows:

1. Deterministic approach: That is the physical
environment determines human behavior; in other words a
specific behavior is expected to result in a specific
builteenvironment.

2. Possibilistic approach: That is the physical
environment provides possibilities and constraints, within
which people make choices, the criteria for such choices

are mainly cultural.

3. Probablistic approach: That is the physical
environment does affect people's behavior not in terms of
determining or generating it, rather in terms of choices,
based on criteria attributed more to the physical setting.

The designers attitude reflects, to a great extent,
the deterministic approach, in that whenever a space or a
structure is designed there is always the assumption of
expecting, certain, desired, behavior to result. Moreover,
whether this assumption happens or not, the designers do
not bear responsibility for evaluation or follow up. This
task is left to researchers, who on the other hand, have
extended their theoretical views to the probabilistic
approach which has led to the emerging of what is called
the ecological approach. In other words, in viewing the
behavior-environment relations, it is important to consider

the context of this relationship, including culture.

Problem

The problem this thesis addresses is the lack of
cooperation between designers from the environmental design
fields--such as architecture, urban design, and city
planning——and researchers from behavior science, particularly
in regarding the relationship between behavior and the
built-environment. This problem has two dimensions. First,
there is a theoretical gap between designers and researchers

in those fields. Second, there is a professional gap.

The theoretical gap, as indicated in the previous
discussion, stem from the designers' reluctance to change
the deterministic attitude toward the built-environment
behavior relations. On the other hand, the professional
gap is a result of the difference in the intellectual
styles and goals of the designers and researchers. While
researchers are seeking the knowledge of the relationship
between behavior and the built—environment, for example,
designers are seeking the control of this environment.

In other words, designers, in general, are action-oriented,
and behavior scientists are research—oriented. This
difference in itself does not mean that there is a gap,
unless if there is no cooperation between the two
professions. This lack of cooperation between the
designers and the researchers, particularly at the profes-
sional level, can also be attributed to the kind of the
social, political, and economic environment within which
the two types of professions operate. This is what one may
call the "real world". Although the "real world" differs
from one designer to another, the problem is always the
same, in that there is the gap between the designer of a
specific environment and the actual users. The designers'
employer (who pays for the service) is in most cases, a
developer, who is looking forward to making a certain
profit, that is not necessary by meeting the needs of the

actual users. It is a typical case for a designer not to

meet or even know any of the users of his designed setting,
and in extreme cases he might not see the physical setting
at all. The researchers, on the other hand, are employed,
in most cases by academic or public institutions whose

goal is to increase the body of knowledge of the particular
area of research conducted, regardless of whether or not
the suggested implication of the findings are actually
considered by designers of the built—environment.

Another way to state the problem with its different,
although related, dimensions is, in terms of the relation-
ship between the physical-environment and human behavior,
where there is a gap between the designers in the environ-
mental design fields, and researchers in the behavior
science fields. This gap has two dimensions; one is
theoretical and the other is professional. This has led

to a lack of cooperation between the two professions.

Scope

The scope of this thesis is extending throughout
two major fields-—environmental design and behavioral
science. While the environmental design includes a range
of disciplines such as architecture, urban design, and
city planning, the focus within this field is on the aspect
of the physical design of the built—environment. In this
extent, the different design disciplines are used through—

out the thesis as to indicate to this design aspect. On

 

the other hand, the behavioral science includes another
range of disciplines from the social science, particularly
those disciplines which deal with human behavior by one
way or another. Such disciplines are, for example,
geography, anthropology, psychology, and sociology. The
particular focus on the behavior science, in this thesis,
is on its contribution to the study of the relationship
between behavior and the physical environment.

The key focus, then, is on design and the issue or
relationship between behavior and the built—environment.

In other words, as was indicated above, the environmental
design fields have a deterministic attitude in viewing this
relationship. On the other hand the behavioral sciences'
current approach is an ecological one. Therefore by
reconsidering the design deterministic approach a conceptual
framework can be developed between the two fields. The
purpose of this conceptual framework is to close the
theoretical gap between the designers and the behavioral
scientists, particularly, in View of the behavior—built-
environment relation.

This gap is not the only reason for the problem of
lack of cooperation between the designers and the behavioral
scientists. The professional gap accounts, as well, for
the same problem. However, the thesis is limiting itself

to the closing of the theoretical gap. In the mean time

some dimensions of the professional limitations and gap
within and between the design and behavior science will be

discussed.

Methodology

 

The methodology used in this thesis is an extensive
review of the literature pertaining to the problem of the
theoretical gap between behavioral scientists and environ—
mental designers, particularly in view of the relationship
between behavior and the physical environment. This review
has even extended within each discipline to include any
related issue and concept that may help develop the thesis.

This has already enabled the research of this thesis
to lay out a variety of theoretical and philosophical
orientations which resulted in the development of other
ideas and concepts used in the following chapters. Without
doing this, a synthesis between various disciplines of the
behavior science field and the environmental design field,

would never have been feasible.

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to propose a possi-
bility for an alternative, ecological, approach to the
deterministic attitude of the environmental design fields
toward the issue of behavior- built-environment relation.
This approach will, possibly, bridge the theoretical gap

between the design and the behavior science fields. In

turn, this will contribute to the study of the behavior—
environment in general by considering the implications of
the current View of the behavior science fields which is
an ecological, humanistic one. In addition, as the
researchers will have an access to the initial design
problems and questions the designers will be aware of

the possible implication of the research findings in this
area of study. This will help designers to design better

physical-environment for people.

Organization

This thesis is devided into three chapters.

The first chapter will be looking at the question
of how does the built-environment relate to human behavior?
The answer of this will be a review of the different
theoretical attitudes and philosophical orientations that
led to them. The chapter will then extend the review with
focusing on the current View of this relationship. This
theoretical review, although will use a range of different
disciplines, will particularly focus on the emerging behavioral
science field.

The second chapter will, then, shift the focus to
the design fields in an attempt to reconsider the deter-
ministic attitude held by designers, by looking at the
theoretical limitations. In doing this the chapter will

discuss the possibilities of reconsidering the meaning of

rationality in the design process. The chapter then will
discuss the possibility for defining architecture and
urban design in terms of cultural adaptation.

The third chapter will attempt to develop a
synthesis between design and behavioral science, in the
light of architecture and urban design defined as cultural
adaptation. The synthesis will be at a general theoretical
as well as a specific conceptual level. The chapter will
end by an attempt to develop two models. One is a concep-
tual framework model aimed to close the theoretical gap
between the environmental design fields and behavior science.
The second model is a design process one that has two
schemes. The first scheme will represent occasions
for cooperation between designers and researchers in the
design process. The second scheme will indicate the

possibility for designing with people.

CHAPTER I

HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT:
THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS

This chapter will commence the thesis by intro-
ducing an overview of the different theoretical orientations
concerning the relationship between human behavior and the
physical environment. The chapter will begin with a
discussion of the philosophical orientations which has
led to the various theoretical attitudes in viewing this
relationship. This will lead to the general theoretical
limitations within the disciplines undertaking behavior
environment study, which are integrated in the emerging
behavioral sciences. The discussion will then focus on
some specific concepts of man-built environment relation
which are interpreted to be the bases of the behavior
physical environment relation. This will be followed by
introducing the ecological View as it represents an impor—
tant emerging theme of viewing the whole notion of
behavior—environment interactions. Finally, the chapter
will end by indicating the importance of culture particularly
when viewing behavior in an ecological sense.

One of the fundamental questions, to start with,
is; in which way does the physical environment relate to

human behavior? This question is:

10

11

. . . an extremely difficult question to answer since
the evidence is often difficult to compare, is con-
tradictory and there is no consenses of generally
accepted theoretical position. (Rapoport, 77:p2).
According also to Rapoport, there is a range of theoretical
attitudes towards the answer of the question, from;
(1) Environmental Determinism; (2) Possibilism to
(3) Probabilism.

The environmental determinism attitude is, briefly,
that the physical environment determines human behavior.
This attitude is stronger in the field of planning and
design, particularly in architecture, however, it also
existed in cultural geography and anthropology. The
possibilism approach is, "that the physical environment
provides possibilities and constraints within which
people make choices based on other, mainly cultural,
criteria" (Ibid., 77:p2). This attitude is, much as
in geography, a reaction to the determinism one. The
current View, the probabilism, is stronger in the field
of environmental design research. It is a view of that
the physical environment does affect the people's behavior
but not in terms of determining it rather in terms of
choices based on criteria attributed to the physical
setting. In essence this View rejects the idea of that

the physical environment could generate or determine

activities or behavior.

12

Although there is a large number of disciplines
involved in these attitudes, the most crucial of all is
the environmental design in general and architecture and
planning in particular. They are the disciplines that
actually determine the final product of the built-
environment-—whether it is assumed to affect behavior or
not. Therefore, before extending the View over these
disciplines, it is important to lay out the state-of—the-
art of the philosophical grounds of the above attitudes.
By doing that, in the following section, the current

evolved view will then address itself.

Philosophical Orientations

 

Confronting to the question of the ways people know
or image their environment, I will try to go back to more
general context of how knowledge in general is attained,
in other words how an object is known by a subject. In this
case, it is important to broaden the focus, for a while,
to the general philosophical positions concerning the
object-subject question. This overview of theoretical or
rather philosophical positions can be discerned into "three
fundamentally different ways in which the relationship

between environment and behavior has been conceptualized"

(Moor and Golledge, 76:p12). These three directions are;
(1) empiricism and environmental; determinism
(2) rationalism and nativism, and

(3) interactionalism and constructivism

13

Each of these classes of theory is based on different
assumptions about the "organism, what factors influence
behavior, the nature of reality, and for those which include
treatments of knowledge, the way in which knowledge is
attained" (Ibid., 76:p12).

According to Moore and Golledge (76), there are
two extremes concerning behavior and environment between
which all these theories are stretched. One extreme is
that external environment entirely determines behavior;
and the other is that behavior are entirely determined by
internal biological and hereditary forces.

Empiricism and Environmental
Determinism

The empiricism was first articulated by the
eighteenth century British philosophers Locke, Berkeley,
and Hume. While the environmental determinism is a
twentieth century school, it is based on the positivism
and neopositivism expressed in the work of Comte, Mill,
Carnap, Wittgenstien, Reichenbach and others (see
Bochenski, 1966) (Moore and Golledge, 76:p12). Both the
empiricism and the environmental determinism agreed upon
that behavior in general, and knowledge in particular, are
Strictly under the control of the environment and that the

‘miiin.and only source of knowledge is sensation through
Vfltich "one only can grasp singular and material events"

(IIDid., 76:p12). They, on the other hand, disagree upon

14

the issue of the laws; the empiricism defined them as
posteriori and the neopositivism as periori to experience
(Ibid., 76:p12).

In this theoretical context, extended to the
twentieth-century environmental determinism, behavior is
defined as consisting of patterns of responses and is
assumed to be determined by the environment impinging on
a passive organism and selecting and reinforcing particular
responses. In other words, the environment acts on people
and we, then, are the product of the environment. There
are, in fact, sub-classes of theories that disagree on
defining other consequential issues such as knowledge and
representations. These are three major schools: strict
stimulus-response (S-R); mediational S-R; and cognitive
behaviorist theories (Moore and Golledge, 76:p12). In this
View, the environment is treated as real, objective and
normative existance totally independent of the observer.
This View was also, categorized as "man reducible to environ-
ment" (Overton and Reese, 77:p13), in which the basic
metaphysical assumption of the primacy of the material
world is the grounds.

This is, thought and actions of man are held to be

determined by and hence to derive from an independent,
stable material reality. (Ibid., 77:p13).

15

Rationalism and Nativism
The alternative Opposition to empiricism and

determinism is the position of rationalist and idealist
like Plato, Descartes, Spinozo, and Leibniz, which started
by the nativist contention that;

. . . knowledge is given immediately as an innate

idea, before experience; it is a basic act of pure

thought that opens all reality to us. Sensation

in this view, gives us nothing but images of

individual, particular things; that which is

designed by them is given not by sensation but

by innate ideas arising from our inherent powers

of intellection. (Moore and Golledge, 76:pl3).
This View can also be categorized as "environment reducible
to man" (Overton and Reese, 77:p15), that what is commonly
assumed that the environment is held to be itself merely a
construction of man. As such, behavior is defined as the
expression or projection of inherent (genetic and biological)
factors in the contest of a specific environment. This
second trend of theories is, therefore, resting on the

other extreme, opposite to the first environmental deter-

minism one.

Interactionalism and Transactionalism
.As expected from.theoretical streams, the third
alternative to both Opposite extremes is one which tries
t1) synthesize, and bridge the gap, between the two polarized
Viiews on the subject—object question.
This position is that of the interactionalism and

treansactionalism. A landmark of this position was Kant's

16

fundamental distinction between the matter (or content) of
knowledge and the form of knowledge. The first corresponds
to sensation and the second causes the matter to be arranged
in a certain order. The "matter" of knowledge is given

through experience (as believed in the empiricism), while

the form of knowledge, parallel to the rationalism, "is

given a priori" (Moore and Golledge, 76:p13). The form of

knowledge, as independent from the environment, is assumed
by Kant to be universal and constant.

For Kant, there were only two pure forms of
intitution - space for the outer senses and
time for the inner. All other contents of
reality are experienced in the context of space
and time. (Ibid., 76:pl4).

Interestingly, while both empiricism and rationalism,

although fundamentally opposite, agreed upon the premise
that one can understand the ultimate nature of reality,

Kant argued that, since there is no way for us to
apprehend the nature of ‘reality' except through
man, it is impossible to completely seperate the
process of knowing from the result and knowledge

. . . that there can be no complete understanding
of truth in either sense or reason; thus, instead

of knowledge ever representing exactly what is real,
what we take to be real is a product of the act of
knowing - that is, a 'construction of thought'.

(Ibid., 76:p14).
In this respect, the idealism, neo-Kantians represented
One pole of assumptions based upon denial of knowledge
tflnrough empirical methods and complete primacy of mind

CKnntrary to both the empiricism and rationalism with their

COqasequential theoretical echoes.

17

However, neo-Kantian theories of both phiIOSOphy
and psychology moved to a rather interactive position, in
xvhich the key word "grasp" was changed into "active con-
sstruction" of objects regarding knowledge of reality in
{general and environment in particular. In this View, the
:subject (man) plays an active role with the object
(environment). The result is that knowledge is the extent
to which the subject can construct the object. This view,
in this respect, is also parallel to that of the inter-
actional and transactional positions on environment-
behavior relations. Experience and behavior are assumed
to be influenced by intraorganismic and extraorganismic
factors operating in the context of ongoing transactions
of the organism-in-environment. Behavior can then be
attributed as a function of either biological or of environ-
mental factors, and it is more than being the summation of
them. A definition of behavior, therefore, is that it is
an interaction of biological (sensation), personality.
Socio-cultural and environmental factors each in the context
of the other and the context of their mutual interactions.
This View, in general, can also be called, "man and environ-
ment as interdependent systems" (Overton and Reese, 77:p15)
in which "two interdependent systems-~man and environment—-
reciprocally interact and exert formative influences on

each other" (Ibid., 77:p15).

18

Theoretical Limitations
These three philosophical orientations of the object
subject question, as briefly layed out above, to a certain
extent, represent the walls of the context of behavior,
cognition, and perception theory. The underlying point of
the subject-object question in this context is the concen-
trating on how one object is perceived, or known, by a
subject. This point, until very recently, was the obstacle
and limitation for an environmental perception study to be
undertaken. A great example of this limitation is the
Gestalt perceptual theory, which while having explicit
interest in the context, was primarily developed through
the study of form and object perception (Ittelson, 73zp2).
Ittelson (73) attributed this theoretical limitation

to that although some interest in the larger environment is
expressed in some opposing theories, their extremely narrow
definition of behavior and rigid concept of experimental
procedures,

. . . has driven the study of perception almost

exclusively into the highly contrived laboratory

situation, where object perception is virtually

the only avenue open for study. Thus, in the

history of experimental psychology and overwhelming

bulk of perception research has been carried out in

the context of object perception, rather than

environment perception, with the findings of the

former providing the basis for understanding the

latter. (Ibid., 73:p3).

This was a major phenomena, in the past 100 years, in the

psychological theories and views of perception.

19

As a result the investigation of perception has lost
the essential esthetic unity without which any pursuit
leads to chaos, rather than resolution. (Ibid., 73:
p3).

Therefore, the philosophical question of the
object-subject with all its multi-dimensions and assumptions
can be seen as the dilemma of the psychological theories
of perception. For centuries sensation, only, was
considered as a base for perception in what Lang (74:p99)
called sensation based theories. In contrast, what he
called information-based perception theory as developed
by psychologists such as James J. Gibson and Eleanor J.
Gibson (Lang, 74) which focuses not only on how the data
identified with the object of perception are delivered in
an organized way but on the discovery of how we process
phenomenal information and the relationships that come
to exist within it. It is not a denial of sensory
experience,

. . . but patterns within the entire context provided
by ambient light is said to be the basis of visual
perception rather than the defining qualities of
particular sensation. (Ibid., 74:p99).

Whether sensory based theory, or information-based
theory, architects have been reluctant to take any avenue
of theories which can be useful as to change their assump—
tions of one way causal relationship from environment to

man or object-on—subject effects (Ibid., 74:p100). This,

in turn, has not encouraged the researchers to investigate

20

and test their assumptions and hypothesis about this
relationship the thing that accounts for another kind of
theoretical limitations.

In analytical research work it is of the utmost
importance to know, at an early stage of the investi-
gation, whether a subordinate element stands in a
relation of mutual causal influence with all other
parts of the system, or whether it is an unchangeable
independent structure, influencing the whole by
'one—way' causation. (Lorenz, 68:p127).

Aspects of Man-Built Environment
Interactions

 

The previous sections discussed the philosophical
orientation of the theory of behavior-environment in the
behavioral science fields. If one considers that these are
the general contributions of these fields to the study of
behavior environment, this section, by looking at some
aspects of the current trend, can be specific contribu—
tions. The focus in this section will be on some of these
specific concepts of the man-environmental interaction.

In the last section it was concluded that the current
trend, despite the limitations in the behavioral science
is the transactional, interactional approach which
supports the importance of the context (larger environment)
in its broad definition of behavior as the process of
mutual interaction between man and the environment. Human
aspects interacting in this process was synthesized to be

attributed to biological (sensation) and personality

 

21

(socio-cultural) factors. It is also important to note
that the fundamental assumptions, upon which this current
trend is based, according to Rapoport's review, are;

(1) Knowing, perceiving, and evaluating the
environment is a dynamic process whereby information from
the external environment is constantly being received,
perceived (selected), and organized (based on evaluation)
and used to help individuals operate. This process with
its three facets, is what can be broadly called perception
(Rapoport, 77:p30). In this sense, perception, with its
different meaning, is inseparable component of behavior.

(2) Subjective conceptions of the environment
are "the ways in which people understand, structure and
learn the environment . . . this might better be called
ENVIRONMENTAL COGNITION (Ibid., 77:p3l). The variations
of these subjective conceptions between different individ-
uals are due to differences in past experiences about the
environment and also due to differences in their socio—
cultural environments, but not due to biological differences
(Moore and Golledge, 76:pll).

(3) The biological differences account, then, for
the different perceptual conceptions among different
individuals at a given time. These are merely sensory
information perceived differently by different (biologically)
individuals. This is, simply, to assert that we perceive

the environment differently.

22

(4) The combination of both the perceptual and
cognitive conceptions are accounting for the process by
which people make choice and select. "A better term
might be ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION OR PREFERENCE" (Rapoport,
77:p3l).

(5) Finally, information extracted from large-
scale external environments exist in some type of psycholog-
ical space, not like the geometrical one, but can help to
reproduce the same physical space (by training overtime),
(Moore and Galledge, 76:p10). "This is the space in which
configurations, characteristics, and meanings about the
world are held as mental images or cognitive representa-
tion" (Ibid., 76:p10).

Environmental Perception,
Cognition, and Evaluation

 

The above assumptions underline Rapoport's (77:p37)
position about the importance separating the different,
confusing, meanings of perception. The three meanings,
as presented above, while they form a continuum, as in
Figure 1, "it seems possible to separate them so that a
particular process belongs more or less in one of these
categories" (Ibid., 77:p31).

There are two, relating, although conceptually
different, meanings of the term environmental cognition

(Rapoport, 77:p108). One is based on psychological

23

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

__ . .wufikv 4h- . :.. liliesnar.,
é‘efifléfifbw‘éx . '» scoeN mos EvA wanes;
<1 J>

 

CONTINUUM

Figure l.--The Perception Continuum

SOURCE: Rapoport, 77:p3l

premises which stress the knowledge of the environment,
while the other is based on anthropological views which
tend to stress that "cognitive processes are concerned with
making the world meaningful and that there are different
ways in which meaning can be given to the world" (Ibid.,
77:p108). In other words, the underlying objective of the
two views is investigating two fundamental sets of variables,
the first is biological (for psychology) and the second is
cultural (for anthropology).

Cognition, from the latin word for 'getting to

know' refers both to the process of knowing and

understanding and the product - the thing known.

(Ibid., 77:p109).

The concept of cognition then, as a way of mediating

information about the environment, is very useful for the

behavior research. Figure 2 shows a diagram suggested by

Rapoport (77:p109), to illustrate the cognitive process.

24

   

 

 

‘ DECODED
fl , OR
READ I
Understand 1M: _
Figure 2.——The Cognitive Process

SOURCE: Rapoport, 77:p109

The process is assuming that the physical or the built-
environment is the physical expression of the cultural
cognitive categories "which, if the environment is meaning-
ful, produce the appropriate and intended cognitive
schemata" (Ibid., 77:p109). These cognitive representations
or schemata are the ones known as mental maps which in
general terms governs the process of imaging and since

they involve both spatial and temporal schemes, they, thus
guide one's orientation.

The term perception, in most of the social science
literature, is the most confusing one. However, as shown
above, Rapoport (77) seems to be aware of this confusion
and accordingly made the distinction between perception
and cognition as follows;

It is possible to distinguish between perceptual

cognition, or knowledge of environment, and symbolic
cognition or knowledge about the environment (Gibson,

25

1968). The former is perception, the direct sensory
response to things and places, while in the latter,
cognition, the information is preceded and may come
from indirect sources. While all people see the
world more or less the same way (Gibson 1968, p. 321)
they structure it and evaluate it quite differently.
(Rapoport, 77:pl78).

As such, perception is experiencing the environment
through, mainly, sensory, direct, interactions, while
cognition is knowing and comprehending the environment
by relaying, in most cases, on pre—coded information and
past experience. Both concepts are involved in everyone's
daily interactions with the environment. While people
want to understand (comprehend) the built-environment
cognitively, they also wish to experience it. By doing
this, although seeming contradictive but are complementary
to one another, criteria are used in the process of
evaluating the environment. One is clarity (based on
cognition) and the other is complexity (based on percep—
tion). The nature of perception, therefore, is a complex

multi-sensory one. It also depends, to a certain extent,

upon memory, cognitive representation, and culture.

The Ecological View

The previous sections of this chapter have already
indicated some theoretical concepts of the nature of man-
environment interactions. This section will deal with
another dimension, that is how can the relationship between

behavior and the physical environment be viewed in an

 

 

26

ecological context. In this respect, Roger Barker (69)

has developed his famous concept "behavior settings".

An important point to note, as Barker indicated in his

work, is that both the physical and the social environment

impinge on behavior. Barker summarized his attributes of

the relationship between behavior and environment by

defining the concept of behavior setting as follows:

1.

A behavior setting consists of one or more standing
patterns of behavior, which uniquely define the
behavior pattern in terms of both time and space.

Both man—made parts of a town and natural features
can comprise the milieu of, and thus affect, the
behavior setting.

The milieu encompasses, environs, and encloses
behavior and, hence, can be used to describe that
behavior setting.

The milieu (environment) is similar in structure to
the behavior, hence they affect each other in an
essential way.

The environment-behavior parts are so relating to
each other, if called synomorphs, structurally a
behavior setting is a set of such synomorphs.

While behavior and environment are related to, and
affecting each other they maintain a specific degree
of independence.

The underlying message Barker tried to convey was

'that while behavior is an inescapable component interrelated

unith the environment (the milieu), it has not been the

£311hdect of the physically oriented environmental designers.

E’eezrhaps one, admitted, difficulty in considering behavior,

iLss

that the environment affects behavior in an important.way.

EBIJnt: this environment is experienced by each individual

di fferently. Thus, predicting the environment-behavior

L

27

relation is quite a complex task--that will involve basic
theoretical consensus as well as methodological research
cooperation among a range of different disciplines.

Bonni Morrison (74) pointed out at the importance
of looking at the behavior—environment relation in terms
of three main environments; (1) Natural Environment,

(2) Man-Made Environment, (3) Behavioral Environment.
Figure 13 summarizes the inter-relationships between these

three environments.

ENVNMMENTAL lNT‘E-KFACE

agriculi'uv’ai—v induSIH‘ . Planning
0 5(6)): . designing
. fedmoioaq 0 Production

   

  
    
     

NATURAL . MAN- BUILT
ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT
.. ...-fag, ’. ( M B E J

. P’fi‘S‘G‘ . $000- m$\d

0 50(30- bu‘oloai .l

.oigzo'.
.....
.....

 

. . . ,. . .. .. MAN/
MAN/ BEHAVIORAL Euvm— BUM ENVIRONMENT
NATURrL Emm . r MENT ( fDE) W..—
' P35¢h°‘°3:ca‘
m EACE ’ 5° ‘5" - 'mFomaf'ion
- L)

sf 0 ‘Mrvi’dl’W‘ 66613! on
. ‘P'O‘kch‘m \_/ o CansunPIion
' ”Maw-vent

-1?Li.gure 3.—-Behavior—Environmental Inter—Relationships

SOURCE: Morison, 74:p176

 

28

This Inodel, although a very general framework that does

not propose any specific issue, is useful to look at as a
"conr2eptual tool". Its primary premises are: (l) the

need 'to use a systematic approach that is a complete human
ecoltngical perceptive in order to provide a broad and
holirstic view of a total system; (2) this View is important
to cxonsider in times of great specialization and fragmenta-
'tior1 of knowledge; and (3) no part of the man—behavior-
envdrronment system, as a complex framework, is an independent
entity.

Edwin Willems wrote, supporting flfis ecological
aEHProach of dealing with behavior as behavior—environment
urlits , that ,

. . . without this percepective, the bits and pieces
which we study so frequently in experiments and with
which we tinker so indiscriminately in psychotherapy,
behavior modification, and behavior pharmacology are
all abstractions that have lost much of their
scientific and practical usefulness because they

are seperated from the contextual interdependencies
of everyday life. (Willems, 77:p25).

This ecological approach emerged in both the field
0f psychology and of anthropology. The "ecological
Psychology has emphasized the need to study behavior in
more molar and natunflistic context" (Berry, 80:p83).

While, "a similar movement within anthropology was develop—
ing the point of view that the forms which a culture evolves

can and must be understood as adaptation to its habitat"

(Ibid., 80:p83). This movement is called cultural ecology.

29

The ecological psychology, as Barker's work discussed above,

was pushed further to a cross-cultural psychology, so to
increase "the range of independent variables". In fact

this shift toward accounting cultural variable in an
ecoloqical context indicates the failure of the traditional

psychology that looks at behavior from a narrow perspective.

As a response to this shift, Berry (80) has introduced a

model of "ecocultural psychology" in an attempt to incor-

porate ecological, cultural, acculturational, and behavioral

Variables into a single model, Figure 4.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EE°°.'°9y t Traditional Traditional.
Organisms Culture Behavior

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Accultural \ /
Influence
Contact Accultural l
Culture Behavior
Figure 4.--An Ecological-Cultura1-Behavioral Model

SOURCE: Berry, 80:p86

30

The underlying idea of this model is to bring the

cultural.and ecological elements together, as they both are

related to behavioral elements. These three basic elements

were ciefined by Berry (80), as follows:
(1)

Ecological: interactions between human organisms
and their habitat
(2)

Cultural elements: group-shared patterns of

behavior which are adapted to the group's habitat
(3) Behavioral elements

In gnarallel, there is another set of elements,

. O

. which is introduced through major contact with
1:echnologically dominant societies, includes the

aacculturative influences themselves (operating mainly
‘through urbanization and education), the contact

culture (a culture no longer simply in adaptation to
its habitat, but now also under these acculturative
influences), and acculturated behavior (consisting
of

'shifts' in behavior from previous levels, and
‘acculturative stress'

behaviors which are novel and
mildly pathological). (Ibid., 80:p85).
1318 relationships between all these elements are probabil-
‘isitic (rather than deterministic) and correlational (rather

1111an causal). This model also, according to Berry, espouses

a tiefinition of the concept of culture as an adaptation

t<Dol for groups and individuals to use in their interactions

with their environmental setting.

This approach, in general, is attempting to assert
that ecology, culture, and behavior are in fact interrelated
mutually, in such a way that any element can not be fully

understood without viewing it in its contextual place with

the other elements. Berry concluded that, while the human

variation is real, in responding to their varying

31

ecoLogical-cultural contexts, the characteristics of these
variations can be observed if a multi-level (individual,

group), and social level) of analysis is used (Ibid., 80.

p404) . Finally, he proposed that the implications of this

knowledge about the individual and group cultural and

behaxtioral variability should be in terms of "diversed

goaJAs" for development and planning. In other words,

correcting the traditional assumption of planners, that
generalized goals can be serving everyone in the society.
(What: it is to suggest being careful when setting goals

tfilatLInay overlook diversed values of different cultural
groups,

Three Ways to Define Culture

The above discussion has indicated that, within an

ecological View of the behavior-physical environment

re-lation, cultural variables are interrelated. It is,

tJaen, important to look at the different way by which the

r10tion of culture can be defined. Rapoport has pointed

Out that ,

Anthropologists agree about the centrality of
'culture' in defining humanity. Beyond that,
however, they disagree much more. Thus definitions

of culture abound. (Rapoport, 80:p9).

He, then, suggested that all definitions of culture can be

Viewed in three general views. The first definition is

that culture is a "way of life typical of a group". The

second view defines it as "a system of symbols, meanings,

32

and cognitive schemata transmitted through symbolic codes".
The third approach views culture as a set of adaptive
strategies for survival related to ecology and resources.

These three definitions can be seen in a continuum
that has these elements:

(1) culture as a way of life (manifestation)

(2) culture as system of symbols and meanings
(manifestation/adaptation)

(3) culture as a set of adaptive strategies
(adaptation)

Therefore, the two fundamental dimensions meanings of
<JUIinare are: manifestation, and adaptation. In the same
tiJne if one views culture as a system of symbols, meanings,
hetwill be looking at the means to achieve the dimension
ofmanifestation and/or adaptation. In other words, these
't~WO dimensions (manifestation and adaptation) represent
tide purpose of culture. People express their life
(Duanifestation), while coping with the environment
Ladeptation). It is, then, important to consider all
13hese dimensions when viewing the behavior-environment

3relation in an ecological context.

Summation

 

This chapter, by dealing with the question of how
the built-environment relates to people, has raised and
developed the following notes:

(1) There are three major philosophical/theoretical

attitudes toward man environment interactions. One is that

33

environment controls and determines human behavior; the

second is that behavior determines and constructs the

environment; and the third is that both environment and

behavior interact mutua lly .

(2) The current view in the emerging behavior

science is a human ecological one.
(3) The underlined assumption of this View is
that no part of the human behavior-environment system is
an independent entity and without multi-level analysis

considering the eco-cultural-behavioral variables no

advances could be made in our understanding of the human

behavior—built—environment relations.

CHAPTER II

DESIGNING THE BUILT-ENVIRONMENT:
A THEORETICAL REORIENTATION

The previous chapter has, already, demonstrated
the various theoretical attitudes towards the relationship
between human behavior and the built-environment, using a
variety of disciplines. The considerable contribution to
this relationship was shown to be made by researchers from
the emerging behavior science field--that is a multi-
discipline which includes researchers from mainly social
science fields. This contribution has reoriented the
traditional theoretical attitude of that the physical or
the built-environment determines human behavior (environ-
mental determinism), to a rather probabilistic View of this
relationship. In other words, that there is a relationship
between behavior and the physical environment but not
merely determined by physical criteria. This current trend
has also suggested the importance of the context of this
relationship the thing that accounted for the ecological
View in which cultural variables should also be considered.

On the other hand, the fields which are concerned
by designing the built—environment such as architecture

and city planning have done a little contribution to

34

35

the study of behavior-built-environment relation. The way
most of our built-environment is designed, reflects the
designers traditional environmental determinism attitude.
Moreover,
. . . the traditional focus of architectural theory
has been on the relationship of the architect to the
artifact he produces and thus on the ideologies and
testements of individual designers, rather than on
the relationship between people (either as individuals,
or in general) and the built-environment. It has not
focused on understanding how the environment is
perceived, the meaning it has for different people
in either concrete or symbolic terms, or the
opportunities that different people perceive in it.
(Lang et al., 74:p8).

Therefore, there is a need to reorient the whole
architectural and urban design theory toward an assumption
based on the understanding of the nature of the relation—
ship between human behavior and the built-environment.

In other words, in order to make sense of the whole study
of behavior-built environment relation both researchers
(behavior scientists) and designers (architects and
planners) should cooperate by at least coming together
under common basic assumptions and theories.

This chapter will focus on the architectural
and design theory concerning the behavior—built environment
issue, in order to find a way to reorient the environ-
mental deterministic attitude toward a human ecological

one. This attempt will commence by looking at the

meaning of rationality in the design process. This will

36

be followed by a discussion of the architectural design
fallacies and bias both at the theoretical and the
professional level. Finally, an attempt to redefine
architecture, using the suggestions of previous discussions,

will conclude this chapter.

The Meaning of the Rational Design Process
The term rationality does not only apply to the
design process, rather it represents, to a certain extent,
the major thrust of our contemporary culture. However,
this term has created a range of arguments which has
resulted a general distrust of whatever is rational
design.
There is a growing belief that the worst excesses
of the past few decades in both architecture and
town planning have been due to 'too much rationality'.
(Abel, 80:p293).
There is a fundamental link between the notion of "ration-
ality" and the notion of "consciousness". The question
is, then, consciousness or awareness of what? and how?
In other words in order to call the design process
"rational," one should question: Toward what this
rationality, awareness, or consciousness is directed?
In a philosophical context, rationality has two
basic aspects, one is based on a "logic sense“ and the

other on a "critical sense" (Abel, 80:p305). By discussing

37

these two aspects, Abel, in his paper, Meaning and
Rationality in Design, has introduced the dimension of
architecture as a means of communication compared to
language. His question was; can the architect or the
designer,
. . . through taking the attitudes of others involved
in the act of building, adjust his own behavior as a
designer in the light of a critical awareness of the
meaning his designs have for other persons? (Ibid.,
80:p305).

Many others considered architecture as a non-
verbal communication. However, Abel's analogy and View
of architecture was more critical in analyzing what is
verbal. He used a late experimental finding on the
human brain, which concluded that the left half of the
human brain is functioning to comprehend and deal with
the language while the other half is only capable of
dealing with "nouns." Moreover, the right half can
handle "shapes and spatial relationships and visual
patterns a little better" (80:p295). For this reason
the left half is assumed to be superior or "major" and
the right half of the brain remains minor——if we agree
on regarding language as the highest achievement of
human evolution. Abel, then, elaborated on the signif—
icance of nouns and verbs as distinct functions in
understanding the language. Accordingly, he used

Foerster's differentiation;

38

. . between cognitive process used to discriminate
and identify forms and shapes as compared to those
which are used to discriminate and identify change
and movement. (Ibid., 80:p297).

The first process is identified by ascending
hierarchical structure of nouns (Figure 5). The second
process is a closed hierarchical structure defining
verbs (Figure 6). The two processes together contain
the definite semantic structures which represents the
two fundamental kinds of phenomena,

. namely definite nouns for things distinct

in form and of shape, and verbs for change and
motion. (80: pp297- 298).

In order then to understand and analyze behavior
(verbs), the element of time should be clearly repre-
sented.

Going back to the rational design process, which
could only, in the most successful examples, analyze
forms but never could relate them to behavior. In this
case, the awareness is limited to the previously discussed,
ultimate object of design. The traditional programming
in planning and architecture used to ascend hierarchies
of elements such as residential, recreation, etc.
However, the closed hierarchial structure that explains
the relationship between different elements of the

design considering change and movement (behavior), is

not a concern of the design process.

39

Figure 5.—-Ascending Hierarchical Definition
Structure for Nouns

SOURCE: Abel, 80:p297

 

 

 

Figure 6.--Closed Hierarchical Definition
Structure for Verbs

SOURCE: Abel, 80:p297

4O

Awareness about behavior, is in fact, awareness
about the other partner in the design (communication)
process which are the users. According tO Mead's criteria
of rationality, this critical awareness is strongly
equated with rationality, and hence, "the buildings Of
the modernists were, far from being the products Of
rational design, wholly irrational in intention and
content" (Ibid., 80:p308). This critical awareness should
be transformed into critical control if a designer takes
the role of the others, he then becomes an Object to
himself, bringing his own social experience into con-
sciousness. Only through this critical sense the design
process can assume the critical aspect of rationality
(mobilizing self in the process).

The other aspect of the term rational is one which
is based on the premises of the logical sense. Classically,
the term rational can apply tO any process that is modeled
on the method Of reasoning of early Greek geometers. This
method of reasoning assumes a set Of given unquestioned
and unquestionable propositions which are used as a
starting point for an argument (80:p301). This argument
then is deduced from the basic premises (propositions),
similar to the pure mathematics deduction with the
difference in sense which is that while the mathematics

deals with abstracts the rational philosophy deals with

41

truth. The criticism, usually, confronting the rational
philosopher is that he does not weigh his arguments
"against any kind Of empirical evidences" (Ibid., 80:p302).
The Modern Movement in Architecture, similarly, rationally
philosophized it's theories and product (form) as "logically
deduced, Of a natural unfolding of the historical process"
(Ibid., 80:p302). Again the same argument and criticism
could take place in a form of questioning these claimed
theories which did not consider the existing built-
environment as a base Of investigation and empirical
analysis. However, in the philOSOphical context, the
architectural theory still holds the claim of being
"accurately described as the product Of rational argumentf'
Therefore the claim that the contemporary design process
is rational, can only be valid if we are considering
architecture and design as a sub—discipline of philosophy--
which, unfortunately, is not true. It is even more than
just a discipline as it involves every aspect Of our life
and interferes in everyone's activity. It lies within the
whole notion Of physical manifestation of culture; a means
to give meaning to space, and a strong communication pattern.

The metaphor Of architecture as a language is a

powerful one and at the same time frought with

difficulty. (Ibid., 80:p308).

Perhaps one Of the great difficulties of architec-

ture is its compatibility with the industrial revolution

in general and with the 20th century very fast pace Of

42

the modern technology. Because we are not sure, we want
empirical evidences before making decisions in order to
bring everything under control. While this techno—
scientific development was taking place with the drastic
economic way Of thinking dominating, the whole field Of
architecture, both the academic and the professional,
has tried to cope with change. As Le Crobusier

wrote,

A great epoch has begun.

There exists a new spirit.

There exists a mass Of work conceived in the new
spirit; it is to be met with particularly in
industrial production.

Architecture is stifled by custom.

The ‘styles' are a lie.

Style is a unity Of principle animating all the
result of a state of mind which has its own
special character.

Our own epoch is determining, day by day,
its own style.

Our eyes, unhappily, are unable yet to discern it.

(Le Crobusier, 27zp82).

The Architectural Design Bias

In the light Of questioning the design "rationality"
suggested in the last section, a closer look at the architec-
tural dilemma is addressing itself, in this section.

The discussion will have two dimensions; one is
the theoretical and the second is the professional stream
of architecture. The differentiation between these two
dimensions (theoretical and professional) is quite

important, simply because what is in the theory is what

goes into the minds Of the architects and students,

43

and as a result the professional application extends the
same rules and orientations—-in the design itself. Another
point is that the different limitations within each stream
needs different attention and different treatment.

Cloris Heimsath (77) in his book, Behavioral
Architecture, discussed six fallacies concerning architec-
ture. While two of his fallacies are broad and can briefly
be termed as the social fallacy Of our contemporary urban
system, four of these fallacies, on the other hand, could
be called the design and planning fallacies and they can
be quoted as follows:

(1) . . . essentially it is the fallacy of the
architectural determinism which Operates as if
architecture directly determines behavior through
design (with no influence from the social names
directing behavior). (Heimsath, 77:pp36-37);

(2) . . . the 'Genius Fallacy' is more common outside
the design profession than in it. As a part of
America's art-myth syndrome, the American public
is generally uncritical of an architect who clearly
has shown ability considerably beyond the ordinary.
(Ibid., 77:p40).

(3) Those espousing this Manipulation Fallacy point
to the rigid regimentation of Fascist architecture
or the endless repetition of housing blocks in the

Soviet Union. (They overlook the equally rigid
regimentation and endless repitition of housing
in Queens, New York.). (Ibid., 77:p44). and;

(4) Finally the Know-Nothing Fallacy is held by
pragmatic administrators who were once idealistic
and have had their fond dreams shattered by
frustration. The premise of this fallacy is
simply that it is all too complicated! Yes, there
is merit to the basic thesis, some would say, but
it is hard enough to get a building in on budget
now, much less waste time contemplating whether
or not there should ever be a building.

(Ibid., 77:p46).

44

These four fallacies are basically representing both the

theoretical and professional limitations Of architecture.

The Theoretical Limitations
The theoretical premises of any applied field Of

science are the assumptions made through the process Of
practicing and reexamining the theory itself. This can be
basically done if the theory itself is oriented toward
some testable or measurable criteria. The architectural
theory, in general, assumed that the dependent variable is
people's behavior and the independent is the building form.
In other words the assumption that it is only the built-
environment that determines behavior. This very fundamental
assumption has never changed, simply, because it was never
tested--at least by the architects. The roots of this
theoretical attitude can be traced back to the philosophical
development Of architecture as "art" and the architect as
"artist" and "genius." The genius fallacy, for example,
has its roots in the "Romantic Theory" in which the genius
does not conform to,

. . . rules with more than average skill and efficiency

but instead with the discovery of new rules and with

effecting a breakthrough which would be accepted by

subsequent generations of artists as the source of

new avenues Of exploration or modified rules.

(Quantrill, 74:p20).

A genius, then, should be an original man as

Quantrill, quoted Kant's famous statement: "Fine art is

only possible as a product Of genius; originality must be

45

its primary property" (Ibid., 74:p20). By the transformation
of science and technology, in the beginning Of the 20th
Century, the conflict between this Romantic spirit and the
academic tradition had taken place. The Academic tradition
argues for the function, and its masters called themselves
genius-~as they innovated already this shift. In other
words, they held the Romantic myth of being always genius
with slight transformation in the purpose of architecture
toward function. By doing this they did not introduce any—
thing as to how can they test this function, therefore, they
became rather contradictory to themselves. The evidence of
this biased situation is the arising of different schools of
architecture based primarily on a "genius" architect.
Another basic bias representing a theoretical
limitation of architecture is the architects extraordinary
reluctance to embrace the modern notion Of humanity that
considers the human values and applies scientific methodol—
ogies to the problems Of mankind (Land et al., 74:p8).
This attitude seems as if they do not realize that they
are in the very heart of dealing with these problems.
Finally, above all, the cause Of the architect's
and designer’s bias is the extremely deterministic View they
hold, implicitly, with very little attention to any theoret—
ical shifts in other, strongly linked, discipline such as
anthropology, psychology, and the emerging behavioral

science.

46

In the realm Of architecture determinism, Heimsath
(77:p35) collapsed the contemporary theoretical orientations
into three main trends. First, is the traditional "Modern
Movement," extended from the "First Machine Age" to what
Banham (70) called the "Second Machine Age," as the
"Modern Architecture." This movement, as founded by
Le Corbusier in the early years Of the 20th century, is
based in the first place on aethetic premises. The second
trend is what can be called the banal or the commercial
architecture, that is what is shaping most of our cities
particularly along the commercial strips. The third
direction Of architecture is marked by the utobian thinking
and its tendency toward what Banham (76) called "Mega-
structure."

The Modern Architecture, based on the aethetic
primacy, is in fact the main body Of the state-of—the-art
of the architectural determinism. This orientation as
well as others, is receiving the largest share of criticism
and attack.

To describe the attack of sociologiSts on the planning
professions as warfare would be inaccurate since,

at the moment, all the shooting is coming from one
side. Designers and planners do not seem to be
shooting back and it may be that they are not aware
that they are under attack. If this is the case it

is regrettable. Although some Of these assults only
demonstrate that behavioral scientists are as capable
of being obtuse as anyone else, their main claim--that
the planning professions have subordinated vital human

values to somewhat arbitrary professional values—-
is well documented. The professions would serve the

47
public better by giving these charges very careful
consideration. (Deasy, 74:p8-9).

By even leaving out the area of aethetic theory
and establishment, which is rather questionable, the
criteria Of being critically rational was not considered,
and as a result,

. . . happily, we can date the death of modern
architecture to a precise moment in time. . . .
Modern Architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri

on July 15, 1972 at 3:32 p.m. (or thereabouts)
when the infamous Pruit-Igoe scheme, or rather
several of its slab blocks, were given the final
'coup de grace' by dynamite. . . . Previously it
had been vandalised, multilated and defaced by its
black inhabitants, and although millions of dollars
were pumped back, trying to keep it alive (fixing
the broken elevators, reparing smashed windows,
repainting), it was finally put out Of its misery.
(Jencks, 77:p9).

This was (Figure 7 ) an inevitable consequence of
the determinist attitude which believed to change the
people's behavior by, simply, changing the physical
environment. The dramatical dimension of this accident
is that "Pruitt-Igoe was constructed according to the most
progressive ideals of CIAM (the Congress of International
Modern Architects) and it won an award from the American
Institute of Architects when it was designed in 1951"
(Ibid., 77:p9).

The lay out Of all the designed elements, in that
scheme, did not succeed in determining a new, safer,

environment. Fourteen stories high, separated pedestrian

from vehicle traffic, "sun space and greenery," were not

48

manna .mxoame sauna "momDOm

whoa cw do GBOHm mEonom mcwmoom oomHIoDflDHmll.n whomflm

 

49

enough to bring about a significant change in people's
behavior.

Newman (72), in his book Defensible Space,
attributed the unsafe environment of that scheme to;
long, double or single loaded corridors, anonymity, and
the lack of controlled "semi-private space." However, a
major factor is that the design did not allow for any change
or in other words there was a lack Of adaptability in the
design elements in such a way pertaining to the uSers
behavioral patterns and needs.

The idea behind Pruitt—Igoe housing was to house
a black community using the most of the "architectural
determinism" that is "taken over from philosophic doctrines
of Rationalism, Behaviorism and pragmatism—-" (Jencks,
77:p10). The scheme's style, then (based on Le Corbusier's
principles) and its clean "salbrious hospital metaphor,"
were meant to instill by good example, corresponding
virtues in the inhabitants (Ibid., 77:p9). It did not
work!

The second trend of architecture is what Heimsath
(77:p35) called "the direction marked with preocupation
with the banal." This is the case for places like
Las Figas (as an extreme of this direction), where the
visual signs, although important, represent a kind of
artificial reality. This type of architecture in the

shape of commercial supergraphics is now extending to

50

every city. Figure 19 shows how the misuse of this type
of visual supergraphics adds more confusion to our urban
life. On the other hand, it does not even fulfill its
basic premise which is aethetics. At any measure, this
trend is completely leaving out the issue of design theory
in question at best. It is growing and getting stronger
to the extent that it occupies all the elevations or the
facades of the American cities.
The third direction is a Utopian one.

There has always been an architecture Of utopia and

it fulfills a particular niche in the theory by

exploring alternative constrained only by the

creative imagination. (Ibid., 77:p9).
This direction is seen in the early work of Goodman (47)
"Communitas," the ideals of Soleri (69) "Archology," and
in the imagination of Dantzig and Saaty (73) "Compact
City." These attempts are, although taking different
directions, representing an alternative solution to the
problems of our cities. They all share a good intention
and strong insight regarding the quality of life deteriora—
ting by the excessive use of automobile and the isolation
of individuals and groups within the urban setting.
However, they all based their solution on the same
deterministic approach. That is the new forms of huge,
compact, and total environments they thought of, can
easily determine the pattern of human behavior. This is

to, great extent questionable, if not completely rejected

 

51

.Uré§h3fét:

,1. ‘%\EW Pfff .3: ”73
, vamp

g) mum §}~

 

Figure 8.-—Confusion and Ugliness, Long Island

SOURCE: After a Publication by the American
Institute of Architects titled NO Time
For Ugliness, An Appraisal of the
American City. (unknown date).

52

assumption according to the latest trends in behavioral
science. An example of these imagined environments is
Soleri's "archology hexahedron" (Figure 9) in which a
population of 170,000 can live and be under a total
control (Soleri, 69:p115).

The first general argument that faces the utopian
thinking is that they claim that the future is predictable,
if so, what is the theory articulated in a testable
fashion to make one asserts such claim. Jarvie (68),
criticizing the utopians wrote,

It is far too fanciful, too up-in-the air. Neither
the feasibility nor the likelihood of the plans is
known. But one thing surely is known: utopia will
cost a lot, take a long time, and cause much social
upheaval. (Jarvie, 68:p15).
Another argument is that how do the utopians expect every-
one to conform to their ideal, imposed, dreams? Moreover,
the rigid organization of their schemes allows no room for
innovation and change, and with little breakdown in energy
supply the result will be a disaster.

On the other hand, in answering the question of
whether Soleri is practical or crazy, Blake wrote in his
forward to Soleri's book (69);

In View of what has been happening on this planet in
recent years, it is safe to say that those in charge
are neither practical nor sane. This does not mean,
of course, that any visionary profoundly critical of
the present order Of things is necessarily more
practical or more sane. All it does mean is that
anyone committed to the present way of building

buildings, cities, or societies should disqualify
himself as a critic of Soleri's proposal. (Blake, 69).

53

     

   
  
 

.; Es‘if‘ or I}: (I! :11"; i
53"“.- ‘\\ \\N‘ (I)
n m i’

x
,.-.

I \
_._r_.-—.—-.".‘

 
 

J

       
    

 

OAKING
*3
I u.
mousn us .I , an
/ / ' n ‘ l
/- 3,1" ‘ ' |_ ________
.n. Lsa~-—--_uv I
Tom 1 " E
.-l- - - - _ - I.

Figure 9.-—Archology Hexahedron, A Scheme to
House 170,000 Persons.

SOURCE: Soleri, 69:p115.

54

Perhaps one partial realization of the utopians dreams

is the "megastructures."
This, of course, was exactly the line that Le Corbusier
had taken forty—seven years before in introducing his
'Ville contemporaine pour trois millions d'habitants'
in 1922, insisting that it was indeed a contemporary
city that could be built at once, mistaking purely
technical feasibility (though even that may be doubted)
for political and fiscal possibility. (Banham, 76:
p196).

In this extent the term megastructure goes back to
the origin of both the "Modern Architecture" and the
"modern town planning" itself. Therefore, Banham (76)
analysis of megastructure indicated that it is not more
than going back to the recent past in the shadow of the
same deterministic assumption. The utopian architect and
planner then share the same fallacies, bias, and limita-
tions with any other non-utopian counterpart. The only
thing the utopian architect is redfly doing is that he
escapes from the professional dilemma and limitations.

He goes by his imagination beyond the economic, political,
and legal limitations imposed on the profession. In doing
this, he does not even give the alternative to these
limitations except in the realm of an "off-the—wall,"
"visonary," or "ideal" society. It could then be put this
way: instead of facing our existing problems, utopians
structure, an imaginary comprehensive scheme of more

complex unknown problems. This leads the discussion to

the reality of the architectural profession and its limitations.

55

The Professional Limitations

 

The professional limitations of architecture and
design are to a large extent, similar to those of the
planning in general. They stem from the indirect relation-
ship between the architect and his real, although informal,
client (the users). The architect is, like any other
professional, bound traditionally, financially, emotionally,
and legally to a client. However, in most cases, this
client does not fully represent neither the users, nor
their needs. Even if one assumes a good intention from
the architect in viewing the behavioral patterns and trying
to serve the needs of his "informal clients," he will be,
then, committing a failure of serving the expressed needs
of the formal client. If this happens he would probably
starve to death (Deasy, 74:p12).

Robert Goodman (71), in his book After the Planners,
layed out a strong, "bitter" vision of the professional
dilemma of architecture and planning. Although his
analysis blame in the first place the architects, it
underlies even more their limitation within a political
context. Whether the architect or the planner has good
intention or not, he is often used to manipulate the
resources and wealth for the benefit Of a small segment
of people. The nature of the planning and architecture
professional is a very critical one. They often exist in

the heart of the power structure and political decision

 

56

making. Unfortunately, these professionals are powerless,
all they can do is translate in a physical term what their
formal clients want. The client whether it is a public
agency or private developer usually does not view the
importance of knowing about behavior-environment research
as much as he will be looking forward to achieve his own
goals whether they are economic or political ones.

These limitations, added to the deterministic
approach, make the architectural and design dilemma even
greater. Goodman, quoted Minoru Yamasaki (the architect
for the Pruitt—Igoe Public Housing Project in St. Louis),
expressing these limitations in these words,

As an architect, if I had no economic or social
limitations, I'd solve all my problems with one—
story buildings. Imagine how pleasant it would be
to always work and plan in spaces overlooking
lovely gardens filled with flowers.

Yet, we know that within the framework of our
present cities this is impossible to achieve. Why?
Because we must recognize social and economic
limitations and requirements. A solution without
such recognition would be meaningless. (Yamasaki,
as quoted by Goodman, 7lzp92).

These words were said at the peak of the failure

of his project that disproved his determinism, even with a

one-story building.

Architecture as Cultural Adaptation
The term architecture embodies two notions. One
is the process of design and the other is the product

build-objects, spaces or environment. The whole notion of

57

architecture as a product is linked to culture. It is

in fact a manifestation form of culture. Like the arts,
architecture reflects certain qualities and characteristics
of a specific culture.

Chapter I added another suggestion to the linkage
between architecture and culture. This is that culture
as it can be seen in terms of manifestation should also
be viewed as adaptation--both complement each other as
two dimensions of culture. As such, the notion of
architecture as a cultural product (manifestation) and
tool (adaptation) can serve as a basis for bringing
another dimension to the theory of architecture. This

will be the attempt shaping this section.

Redefining Architecture

 

One of the basic steps toward a new orientation
in the theory Of architecture (different from the deter-
minism) is to define it in such a way, so that two crucial
points should be considered. First, is that the design
process should be explained in terms of clear articulations
of the inter-relationships between the behavior and the
built-environment, viewed in evolution. The second point
is the importance of identifying the context of this
relationship. The built—environment in other words should

not be, in any case, defined as a static complex of forms

58

and space, rather it should be viewed as a dynamic
relationship to human behavior and activities.

By using these two broad principles, one can
achieve a generative device for, different, and new
methods of design. This will be achieved by transforming
the traditional descriptive principles of design into
rather prescriptive or analytical ones through scientific
interpretations.

In contrast to this proposed scientific framework
for defining architecture, the typical definitions used
to be abstract statements expressing philosophical outlooks
which lack any practical implications. Some examples of
these typical definitions are;

Architecture, as a phase of art, is an expression in
building of that idealism which is capable of trans-
lation into structural terms; that idealism which
may be realized in an interpretation of the laws
governing structure; an idealism which may find in
terms of structural force a deep symbolism of its
own true essence. (Pond, 18:p23).

Architecture, sculpture and painting are, by
definition, dependent on space, tied down to the
necessity to come to terms with space, each by
its own means . . . the key to aethetic emotion
is a function of space. (Le Corbusier, 54zp33).

The business of Architecture is to establish emotional
relationships by means of raw materials. Architecture
goes beyond utilitarian needs.

Architecture is a plastic thing . . .

Architecture is a thing of art, a phenomenon of the
emotions, lying outside questions of construction

and beyond them . . .

Architecture is the masterly, correct and

magnificient play of masses brought together

in light . . . (Le Corbusier, 27:p10).

59

Architecture is the will of an epoch translated

into space. (Mis Van der Rohe, as quoted by

Banham, 60:p272).
All these statements and more about architecture are not
expressing wrong ideas, but they can by no means help
the purpose of usefully defining architecture. Although
they bear particular aspects and attributes of architec-
ture, such as space, light, emotions, they are too broad
to be useful. They do not express any relationship
between these broad aspects and attributes, and people.
Moreover, they distinguish between architecture and
construction by referring to architecture as a "thing of
art." Above all, they express, by being broad, a sense
of uncertainty and fear resulting from being confronted
to the technological advancements of our age without enough
scientific tools to cope with it. This was best admitted
by these words;

If a single word was needed to sum up the mood of

the last fifty years, that word, in my opinion,

would be 'uncertainty'. There is not a single

system of values which has not been undermined,

and this is particularly obvious in the sphere of

aesthetics. The proponents of the great revolution

in architecture known as the 'modern movement'

positively denigrated aethetic value, claiming it

was inconsistent with the requirements of the

machine age. (Smith, 79:pvii).

This uncertainty, unfortunately, is not a scientific

one, if so, the problem would have been limited to revising

the finding and choosing the alternatives based on the

strongest evidence. It is merely philosophical.

60

Until very recently, the statements Of architectural
philosophy has been centered around the concept of form
and its relation to function and structure. It was a
question of what comes first?; but what kind of variables
or attributes these three concepts have in relation to
the human behavior? This philosophical confusion created
by great Masters can be summarized as,

— Form follows function (Sullivan)

— Function follows form (Soleri)

- Form/function is one (Wright)

- Form follows desire (Kahn)

— Form is a process (McHarg). (Banham, 60).

This philosophical exercise, as it seems, is fully
understood and expected from the Modern Movement and its
consequences, since "form" was inherited from the 19th
century notion of morphology (biology and geology).
Although, and perhaps due to the death of the Modern
Architecture (Jencks, 77:p9), the post—modern architects
and planners in general rarely talk about form, function
and structure, they implicitly keep them in mind as their
central theme. The new language of these contemporary
architects is, rather, looking at "architecture as a
language," "architecture as energy," or "architecture as
geometry."

In general cultural context,architecture used to
be viewed as a style of life or as a manifestation of
culture. In order to balance this View is to consider

architecture as an adaptive tool or in other words, as

61

adaptation. If we consider that the architects and urban
designers assertion that the built—environment is deter-
mining the pattern of behavior, that means that the people
will have to adapt themselves to this built—environment.
This notion of adaptation is a dynamic process that
involves time. There is no doubt in many cases, some
groups of people fail to adapt to a certain designed
environment, and in other cases they do to a certain
extent. The point, here, is that why should only people
adapt and not this physical environment, or why should
it be only one way adaptation? The root of this question
is the question of what is the goal of the city.
The definition given by Aristotle, who said
that the goal of the city is to make Man (Anthropos),
the citizen, happy and safe. (Doxiadis, 74:p21l).
This is a basic definition of the goal of the

city, although criticized by being narrow. Most people
agree about some definition of the term "safe" but they
do not agree about those of the term "happy." The
problem is that the term happy has more association with
the variabilities among different individuals. While the
term "safe" can be understood by eliminating the unsafe
situations that may lead to loss of mpppy, property, or
1i£§-—things we can measure. The term happy, unfortunately
can not be measured by these reverse attributes. However,

a general description of it may be "the state of balance

62

between ones inner system and the immediate spatial and
temporal variation of the environmental interactions
preceived by him." The key point in this View is this
balance between man and his environment as the most
important characteristic of happiness.

As many did, Doxiadis realized that "Aristotle
was also probably not concerned about the notion of
where we go from here?" (Ibid., 74:p211). In other
words, being happy and safe is not quite enough as
goals if we consider the future. In this extent he
added "that the goal of the city is to make Man (Anthropos)
happy and safe and also to help his human development."
He then, based on this definition, introduced his
fundamental eighteen hypotheses. The central theme of
his hypothesis was that the five environmental elements
(Nature, Man [Anthropos], Society, Sells, Networks),
are guided by five principles as follows:

(1) Maximization of Man's potential contact,
(2) Minimization of energy. Not only man, actually,
a donkey going uphill, tries to discover the
best possible path for minimization of energy.
Optimization of protective space. When we talk
together, when we sleep in bed with the other
sex, when we move away from something that
annoys us; each time we seek an optimum
dimension.
(4) Balancing the five contextual elements (Nature,
Man, Society, Shells, Networks).
(5) Optimumizing the synthesis of the previous four
principles - based on time and space, on actual

condition, and on man ability to create his own
synthesis. (Ibid., 74:pp212-213).

(3

v

63

These five principles can be very useful for the
purpose of supporting the proposed view of architecture as
a cultural tool of adaptation. They are articulated in a
very analytical manner. They also touch on one underlying
theme of this thesis which is the interplay between the
constant and the variable elements of the built—environment.
The constant elements are assumed traditionally, by the
architects and planners as to be the buildings while they
are content to claim that the variable elements are people's
behavior. Therefore they generalize these behaviors and
assume that they can, by particular designs, control,
predict, and change these behaviors. This View is no
longer valid, and there is a need to a different attitude,
one that considers that the built-environment is also a
variable that interact with people's behavior in an
ecological context. Thus, a safe way to carefully design
such environment is by considering the notion of adaptation
of both people's behavior and this built-environment.

The task, hence, in order to arrive to such
attitude of an ecological human nature, is to define
architecture in such a way that make distinction between
two fundamental variables: the purposive or the objective
variables, and the contextual or the ecological variables.
Doxiadis's above principles number one, two and three are
describing these purposive or objective variables, which

can be summarized as efficiency and freedom of human

64

activities. On the other hand, principles four and five
are referring to the contextual variables and their key
criteria which is balance.

Moreover, a total equilibrium is achieved when
these two variables (objective and ecological) are well
synthesized.

In the light of such variables, architecture and
design, thus, can be defined as: the art-science of
desigp-constructing adaptive spaces and structures that
meximize the efficiency and freedom of humen activitiee
in a human ecological context that is defined by the

perticular environment, in teree of social, technological,

 

and political and economical organization of that
environmept and its linkage to other local, regional,
state, national or international levels of interactions.
This definition allows to avoid the philosophical
conflict arising when defining beauty or aethetics.
Architecture is aethetically sound when simple balance
of the human activities is achieved in their ecological
context. The fitness will be of man's evolutionary purpose
into man's ecological context. This can be measured by
the two variables: freedom and efficiency of human
activities, as of their evolutionary nature that governs
the process of adaptation biologically, culturally, and

psychologically, also over time.

65

The View of architecture as adaptive tools is
similar to that of culture as adaptation since architecture
itself, as building and structure, is one component of
culture. This does not contradict the traditional View
of architecture as a manifestation of values and way of
life, rather, both views complement each other. In other
words while a building is expressing and reflecting a
particular style of life (culture as manifestation), it
also works as adaptive tool for the users to cope with
their environment (culture as adaptation). This definition
approaches also the notion of rationality (as discussed
early in this chapter), in that the designer of the built-
environment (whether he is an architect, or urban designer)
will base his work on a definition by which he seeks the
awareness of the users needs and position (purposive
position, and contextual position). By using this definition
the designer of the built-environment will be contributing
to the study of the relationship between behavior and the
physical environment. This contribution will, at one hand,
be by considering the importance of using behavioral
attributes in the design, which, on the other hand will
open an avenue of communication between designers and
researchers dealing with behavior-physical environment
relation. This will provide, then a possibilities to
close a theoretical gap between designers and researchers.

The next chapter will attempt to discuss these possibilities.

66

Summation

This chapter, by laying out a scheme for recon-
sidering the architectural and design theory, has provided
the following conclusions:

(1) A “rational design process" is the one that
considers the human behavior and values as basis for its
criteria. Its goal should be the fitness of man and his
needs into the context of the designed form, and its means
are scientific or critical (analytical) methods of under—
standing both the human behavior and its context.

(2) In order for this process to operate, a
theoretical reorientation of the architectural determinist
theory is needed.

(3) This orientation, therefore, can start by
redefining architecture in terms of cultural adaptation.

(4) By doing this, a common ground between the
designers in the architecture and planning fields, and the
researchers in the social and behavior science fields
(particularly those who are working on the behavior/
environment study), can be found.

Chapter III will concentrate on a synthesis between
architecture and urban design viewed in cultural adaptation
perspective and some general and specific concepts of
behavioral science. The aim of this synthesis is to
discuss the possibility for a human ecological theory of

architecture and urban design.

CHAPTER III

TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN ECOLOGICAL
ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN DESIGN

The architecture and the urban design theory, as
pointed out earlier, is in need of a philosophical reorien-
tation, toward considering human behavior and the physical
environment, relation. It was suggested in the last
chapter to redefine architecture as a cultural function--
primary as adaptation. Two purposive or objective
variables were generated from this definition, freedom
and efficiency of human activities. In this chapter a
conceptual synthesis addresses itself as a means to bridge
the theoretical gap between the fields of environmental
design such as architecture and urban design and the
emerging behavioral science fields. This conceptual
synthesis will be at two different levels. First is the
general theoretical level, in other words the view and
assumptions that consider the behavior built-environment
relations, as a whole. The second level is a specific
conceptual one in which different specific concepts and
aspects of behavior will be used. The variables freedom
and efficiency of human activities, based on defining
architecture as cultural adaptation will be used in the

synthesis of both, the theoretical and conceptual levels.

67

68

Finally, a discussion of theories and model will
be presented as to be a base of constructing two models
one is a conceptual model and the second is a design model.
The purpose of these models is to lay out possibilities of

application of the previous ideas.

General Theoretical Reorientation

In order for the suggested philosophical reorienta-
tion of the architecture and urban design theory to be
achieved, concerning the relationship between behavior
and the built-environment, the definition of architecture
as adaptation should be synthesized in the emerging
theory of behavior science--that is the ecological/cultural
approach discussed in Chapter I.

The concept of architecture as adaptation is, to
a great extent, function oriented since, "adaptability is
a functional necessity" (Allsopp, 74:p86). The very over-
looked, by architect, aspect of function is the dynamics
and variability of human behavior. This is due to the
unchanging deterministic approach, which assumes that the
physical aspects of function only determine behavior.
Within this deterministic approach, function is used to
be presumed and the question becomes whether it comes
before, after, or between form/structure. Unlike such,
function as it is linked to adaptability, will be the

question of how function/form/structure as a whole are

69

adaptable and useful to both the human needs and behavior.
In other words, instead of seeking the internal organiza—
tion of the parts of the built-environment into a built,
coherent, whole, the view should extend to encompass the
whole context, including people, into the design process.
Such a process is similar to what Russell Ackoff called
"humanization" and "environmentalization" (Ackoff, 74).
Architecture is not for architects; it is for people,
and whatever architects may think and whatever
theories they may have, it is through the senses
that people appreciate, that people feel architecture.
(Allsopp, 74:p3).

Moreover, architecture is not abstract forms and
spaces isolated from behavior. The objective, and purpose
of the design process should be to maximize the efficiency
and freedom of the human activities. These two fundamental
variables bear, by nature, both the cultural and biological
variability of the human evolutionary interactions with
his environment. For this reason they are, hence, fitting
in Berry's ecological-cultural-behavioral model and
concept (discussed in Chapter I). These two variables
are, indeed, existing in all levels of human behaviors
and activities (individual, group, community, etc.).

J. Douglas Porteous commenced his book, Environment
and Behavior, by a synthesis between environment, behavior,
and planning (77:pp13-l4). He proposed a diagram that

links these elements, which should be taken as a general

70

conceptual framework, see Figure 10. This framework of
concepts calls for considering that,

the city was built for man, and not man for the city.

Before we change the world we should first understand

it. The study of human behavior in the urban environ—

ment may thus be of value for both the design of new

urban environments and for the 'better' management

of the old . . . To achieve this we may need more,

or less, or better planning, but it is clear that

such ends will never be realized unless we design

with people (Porteous, 1971), and plan with man

in mind (Perin, 1970).
His framework suggests an important point, is that planning
and design themselves are representing an important
feature of behavior that lead to change the environment.
In the same time there are two way interactions between
behavior and the environment, one in terms of environmental
stimulus (to behavior) and the second is in terms of
behavioral response (to the environment). Therefore,
these two interactions should be viewed whenever designing
(changing) the environment (although his framework refers
to the environment in general,it, also, applies to the
built-environment).

While one's spatial behavior is seeking orientation,
it is, also, enjoying or suffering, thus, experiencing the
route. In other words, the human behavior is guided by a
process of seeking goal and experiencing means. This
process Operates, generally by one concept known as

"perception." It was suggested in Chapter I, that there

are three different meanings of perception. In brief,

 

 

 

 

 

 

71

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
   
   
 

 

 

t 1
PLANNING
K CONTROL \
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INT TI
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mom mmu LUS mom mom
\1 L__ b)
Figure lO.--Environment and Behavior
SOURCE: Porteous, 77:p15

72

they are environmental perception, environmental cognition,
and environmental evaluation.

Environmental cognition, as was shown in Rapoport's
continuum (the perception continuum, Figure 2), is in the
center of this continuum as it relates to how people
organize the environment, know it, and comprehend it,
thus giving it a meaning. Cognition then is a goal seeking
tool that guides the human behavior. Since, goal achieve—
ment, in a general sense, is linked to efficiency, hence,
cognition as a concept follows this linkage to efficiency.
How well people can comprehend their environment then will
be reflected in how efficient their activities and behavior
are.

Perception and evaluation on the other hand, are
related to freedom in two different ways. Environmental
perception, as defined earlier, is the way in which
information about the environment is gathered and inter—
preted. In other words, it is through this process, of
perceiving the environment, that the environment is
experienced. While cognition is to clarify the environment,
the perceptual experience on the other hand, through the
senses, is one of richness and complexity (Ibid., 77:p207L
Freedom of the human activity is related to the more
possibilities to explore and experience. In this respect,
environmental perception can be, with many of its qualities,

linked to the freedom of the situation—contingent

73

(experience) aspect of the human behavior. Freedom of
choice and selection, can, then, be connected to the
notion Of evaluation.

The synthesis illustrated in Figure 11 shows
how the two purposive variables of freedom and efficiency
are related to the three meanings of perception as they
exist on a continuum. This was done by using the concept
of continuum, as used by Rapoport (77:p31) to illustrate
the three different meanings of perception. Two other
continuums can be paralleled to the perception one.
First is the nature of human behavior with its two
meanings, goal and means; and second is the purpose of
the human activities with its two variables, efficiency
and freedom. The figure, then, shows that environmental
cognition relates more to the goal of behavior as they
both relate more to efficiency. On the other hand,
both environmental perception and evaluation relate
more to the means of behavior as they all relate more
to freedom of the human activities. In other words the
parallel concepts relate more vertically.

Again, the important theme of this View is the
variability Of human behavior, both culturally and
biologically. This variability is not determined by
the physical or the social environment. Therefore it

should be noted that the probabilistic View of these

74

continuum

fijfmcaunm

BEHAv IO
NATURE
continuum

Freedom

 

HUMAN
i ACTIVITIESi
Continuum

Figure ll.——Behavior/Perception Continuums

SOURCE: Adapted from Rapoport, 77:p31

75

variabilities, and mutual interaction between behavior
and the environment, particularly the built-environment,
is the one that should be supported in the architectural
and urban design theory. The built-environment, in

this view, is interacting with human behavior in terms
of not to determine or generate activities, rather in
terms of a setting of human activities (Ibid., 77:p2).
In other words, it works as a "catalyst" that is

"releasing latent behavior,’ and facilitator, by
providing possibilities for choices, but that some
choices are more than others in given physical
settings.
Human behavior in relation to physical setting
reveals diversity over space at any given moment
and continuous variability in any given space
over time. (Proshansky et al., 70:p27).

In response to this variability, the concept of
open-ended design, process and product addresses itself
to the central principle of the architectural theory.

The notion of open-ended design is a principle for
allowing two fundamental aspects. These are flexibility,
and diversity. Flexibility of the design will cope with
the desired efficiency both of human activity and of the
whole physical setting. On the other hand, diversity

as a desired aspect of the design is by nature a percep-

tual quality, and is called by RapOport (77) "Environmental

Complexity," in essence a freedom of choice. Of course,

76

there is an optimum level of this diversity or complexity
(see Rapoport, 77:Chapter II). The important point

about this concept of complexity is that it is not an
ultimate static aspect, rather it is dynamic and changing
over time, so that the criteria for a desired optimum
level of complexity in the design of a physical setting
will be multidimensional. The thing that fits to the
very nature of the open—ended concept of the design
process.

Another quite important point to add is that the
design process by being open-ended will not terminate at
the implementation of the project, rather will be starting
its continual stages of adjustment and design. This also
should be done so that the users can do these adjustments
as to fit to their changing behavioral patterns. By doing
this, the design process will be achieving its ultimate
goal of providing the possibilities for maximum efficiency
and freedom of human activities. The basic guidelines for
this design process will be the contextual indicators.
These are the social, economic, climate, and political
considerations.

Finally, in the light of this suggestion, a bridge
can be built between the design and planning disciplines
and the whole range of disciplines integrating in the

emerging behavior science. The following section,

77

therefore, will try to discuss possibilities of some,
more specific concepts contributed by the current views

of the behavior science.

Specific Conceptual Reorientation

 

The last section was dealing with an attempt to
synthesize, conceptually, the definition Of architecture
as adaptation with some behavioral aspects at the general
theoretical level. This section, however, will focus on
some specific concepts. The different meanings of
perception, as it is the central concept of the current
trend (information based theories) of environmental
psychology and behavioral science in general, were
discussed. These are as Rapoport classifies them;
environmental cognition, environmental perception, and
environmental evaluation. These are involved in almost
any process of interaction between man and his environment,
with different degrees. A good example of these processes
that include all types of meanings of perception is the

concept of image.

Environmental Image

To Boulding (56zpp5—6), the concept of image is
this subjective knowledge, which one believes to be true.
It is also this image which "largely governs my behavior"
(56:p6). The image of man is this knowledge that has

always something, even for the most intelligent person,

78

“beyond what words can utter" (56:p47). It is important
to base our discussion, in this subsection, on Boulding's
ten basic classifications of image.

We have first the spatial image, the picture of the
individual‘s location in the space around him. We
have next the temporal image, his picture of the
stream of time and his place in it. Third, we have
the relational image, the picture of the universe
around him as a system of regularities. Perhaps as
a part of this we have, fourth the personal image,
the picture of the individual in the midst of the
universe of persons, roles, and organizations around
him. Fifth, we have the value image which consists
Of the ordering on the scale of better or worse of
the various parts of the whole image. Sixth, we have
the affectional image, or emotional image, by which
various items in the rest of the image are imbued
with feeling or affect. Seventh, we have the
division of the image into conscious, unconscious,
and subconscious areas. Eighth, we have a dimension
of certainty or uncertainpy, clarity or vagueness.
Ninth, we have a dimension of reality or unreality,
that is, an image of the correspondence of the image
itself with some 'Outside' reality. Tenth, closely
related to this but not identical with it, we have

a public, private scale according to whether the
image is shared by others or is peculiar to the
individual. (56:pp47-48).

 

 

 

From these classifications, Rapoport asserts that
the concept of image is one that is consisting of the
three meanings of perception (cognition, perception, and
evaluation). "Images can be understood as involving mainly
affective and symbolic aspects" (Rapoport, 76:p227). The
spatial, temporal, relational and personal images can be
grouped as factual knowledge images (or cognition). On
the other hand, affectional and value images can be called
value images (perception/evaluation) (Rapoport, 77:p44).

The rest of types of images are, in fact, different

"I—

79

dimensions that help to identify any of the former type,
or group. For example, the dimension of subconscious and
unconscious are related to value more than the conscious
one, which relates to the factual knowledge image. They
both, however, influence the strength by which images are
held (77:p44).

To Lynch, in his classic contribution to both

urban design and behavioral science, his book The Image

 

of the City, the concept of image is a crucial one. He

 

defined environmental image as "the generalized mental
picture Of the exterior physical world that is held by an
individual," and these environmental images
are the result of a two-way process between the
observer and his environment. The environment
suggests distinctions and relations, and the
Observer--with great adaptability and in the light
of his own purposes-~selects, organizes, and endows
with meaning what he sees. The image so developed
now limits and emphasizes what is seen, while the
image itself is being tested against the filtered
perceptual input in a constant interacting process.
Thus the image of a given reality may vary signifi-
cantly between different observers. (Lynch, 68:p46).
This process of constructing the environmental image is
also "the product of both immediate sensation and of the
memory of past experience, and is used to interpret
information and guide action" (Ibid., 60:p4). Lynch, then,
analyzed image into three components: identity, structure,
and meaning. Identy is also related to Rapoport's notion

of "noticeable difference" (Rapoport, 77) as the quality

by which the object is identified. Structure is the order

80

and the spatial pattern of the object to other objects

and to the observer. And finally, this object must have

a meaning for the observer. Accordingly, since the focus
is on the image of the built-environment as the independent
variable, the most crucial qualities and conditions of this
variable are "vividness" and "coherence"--if the Objective
is the enjoyment of the city.

Image then, by its different types and dimensions,
is a very useful concept for urban design, especially through
the concept of architecture as adaptation. Imaging is a
dynamic process, naturally evolved, that is both adaptive
and creative. It is the process by which we see, perceive,
know, and evaluate the environment. As one, consciously
or not, relate this whole environment to his own existance,
he actually grasps the environment to his very conscious-
ness. He adapts himself accordingly, and pays also a part
of his life (psychological and physiological) in doing
that. In this respect man can efficiently organize his
world through Optimum, "coherent," and "vivid" images
(Lynch, 60:p118). By doing this he will be freeing his
physiological and psychological efforts from being over-
loaded. On the other hand, people image the environment
differently and what can be "coherent," and vivid images
for one may not be for another. Therefore, the built-
environment itself does not mean anything unless it is

imaged by people (determined), differently.

81

Mental Mapping, Orientation
and Meaning

 

 

To Rapoport "mental maps" are the subjective
spacial representations by people of the environment
(Rapoport, 76:p227). Mental mapping is, hence, a funda-
mental cognitive "process by which spatial information is
acquired, coded, stored, decoded, and applied to the
comprehension of the everyday physical environment"

(Stea, 74:p150). The mental map is, in other words, an
internal model of a portion of the environment, which
"can play a centeral role in the interpretation of real
environments and thus in the resulting behavior" (Kaplan,
76:p33). Although "we cannot observe a mental map,"
however, "if a subject behaves as if such a map existed,
it is sufficient justification for the model" (Stea, 69:
P14).

Thus, mental and cognitive maps are tools that
enable man to cope with his environment. They vary between
people and between cultural groups (Rapoport, 76), as they
depend in their initial construction, on specific
psychological and biological factors, beside prior
experience (culture) of specific individual (moore, 76:
p141). In this extent, mental maps are used as adaptive
tool, therefore, they are linked to the functional aspects
Of adaptation; freedom and efficiency. As they help

individuals "comprehend and use the environment" (Rapoport,

82

77:pl20), hence, they help increasing their behavioral
efficiency in terms of the use of physiological, and
psychological energy. In the same time, with more compre-
hension of the environment, one can acquire certain degree
of control, which in turn, is a sort of freedom of
activity.

Environmental knowing or cognition is, in general,
also relating to the notion of order and orientation.
People seek not only to understand their environment but
also to orient themselves through an "order" gained by
or elicited from this comprehension. These two aspects or
requirements of comprehending the environment are some
tools to "economize" behavior. The need for order and
orientation, hence, is a need for efficiency of human
energy. As this process also involves the prior experience
and culture, one can assert that this process is the
central process of all our activities.

Meaning is an underlying purpose of the process of
mental maps and images (cognition and perception). "The
Object of perception is meaning. Whenever we say we
recognize an Object, we are actually grasping a meaning"
(Moore, 76:pl43). Whether this happens by "grasping" a
meaning or "giving" a meaning to the object, it is clear
that meaning is the result Of the relationship between man
and his environment. Life is a meaningful event. Whether

one "elicits" or "assigns" meaning from or to things or

83

events, he actually is placing them in his mental, cogni-
tive, and perceptual process. Without doing that, these
processes themselves will lose their purpose, thus their
meaning. The meaning of architecture, therefore, is then
elicited or assigned through the same process.
Our central problem of the modern architecture,

as pointed out earlier, is that designers are dealing with
a sort of formal aethetic criteria that is beyond any
"eliciteable" or "assignable" meaning. From them became
an abstract entity split from meaning, as a result,

beauty is lost . . . This results, on one hand, in

playing with formal relationships or pure 'composition,‘

which carries no message or contradicts meaning. On

the other hand, it leads to the misnamed 'literary'

approach, which limits meaning to what the observer

knows about the subject matter and therefore offers

chaotic, visually incomprehensible form. The tragic

consequence of this split in our time has been that

so many peOple have become blind to the meaning of

form and that they believe they 'see' when they

absorb meaning without form. (Arnheim, 7l:p206).

Therefore, meaning as a process of environmental

knowing should be a central criteria for aethetics. In
this View, Rapoport (77) suggested a balance between two
criteria; clarity and complexity, of this meaning; because
clarity deals directly with understanding (symbolic
aethetics), while complexity deals more with experiencing

and enjoying (formal aethetics). Aethetics then will be

resulting both symbolically and formally.

84

Spatial Behavior
Spatial behavior has several concepts in the

literature. These can be grouped as: privacy, personal
space, crowding, territoriality, and the emerging notion
of defensible space. In general, all these concepts relate
strongly to the notion of adaptation as they represent and
relate to Kaplan's "COping Strategies: choice and control"
(Kaplan and Kaplan, 78:p263), and Holahan's "Environmental
Coping" (Holahan, 78:pl9l).

The ways in which people learn to cope with the

depersonalizing and socially isolating character of

so many of the environmental setting . . . are

familiar features of modern life. While this type

of COping is more subtle than dealing with the

physical demands of the environment, it represents

a fundamental aspect of the environmental coping

process because too Often even the best of contem—

porary design is out of step with human needs at

the level of social and psychological functioning.

(Holahan, 78:pl9l).
The underlying adaptive notions of all these coping
strategiesaue freedom of choice, and the strive for
control "sometimes of the environment, sometimes of the
behavior of others, and sometimes of the flow of infor-

mation" (Kaplan and Kaplan, 78:p265). Achieving control,

in general, is related also to efficieney.

 

Privacy is a domain where one can do what one
wishes, free from the influence of others. The basic
example cu? privacy is the visual one, where it is a

freedom from visual intrusion. Privacy is also an

85

inherited need for human evolution and growth. It allows
one to communicate with himself at a deeper and more
intensive level. It is also, by having it, a freedom of
choice. Privacy is one of the basic human coping
strategies used in man-environment interaction. Losing
privacy will mean losing a fundamental freedom of choice.
Schwartz made a point that privacy has important positive
functions in personality development and that the chance
to withdraw from the group also makes the individual more

effective when he returns to active participation in group

 

life (Schwartz, 72:p155). Privacy as a freedom of choice,
conflicts, however, sometimes with bearing social respon—
sibility at a larger level. This is like the case of army
or any large institution. In this case a great deal of
privacy is sacrificed for the efficiency of the whole.

The trade-Off becomes between the individual freedom of
choice (which may relate to individual efficiency) and the
institution goals and strategies. In any case, privacy is
strongly related to the notion of adaptation and coping,

especially to freedom and efficiency.

Personal space is "the emotionally charged zone

 

around each person, . . . which helps to regulate the
spacing of individuals," and it is also "the processes by
which peOple mark out and personalize the spaces they

inhabit" (Sommer, 69:pviii). It is "a small protective

86

Sphere or bubble that an organism maintains between itself
and others” (Hall, 66:p112). The term "protective sphere,"
indicate the adaptative aspect of this tool or strategy.
Personal space or distance vary from one person to another
and from culture to culture. It depends, to a large extent,
on all the behavioral and cultural in addition to the
psychological and biological characteristics of a person's
environment. As an adaptive tool, it is used tO define
the boundaries of contact with different people. Within
the defined personal space, one may acquire freedom of
body movement, of emotional stress, and of choice. In
other words, it is a subcategory of privacy—-in this case
it can be called "public privacy." By acquiring this
freedom within a "personal space" one is expected to

operate efficiently. However, in many cases this freedom

 

is lost for the sake of other kinds Of efficiency, like

transportation (in rush hour trains).

Crowding is not only defined in this above obvious

case, it also

arises from a breakdown in self—other boundary
regulation. Crowding effects are predicted to arise
whenever the individual's 'desired level of privacy'
is greater than the achieved level. This presumably
occurs when privacy regulation mechanisms such as
territories, non verbal gestures, etc., fail to
provide the desired level of social interaction.
When this occurs, no matter how ample the space or
few the stimuli in absolute terms, the 'person' or
'group‘ will experience crowding. (Baron and Rodin,
78:p183).

87

In this View privacy and personal space, in terms
of attaining freedom and control, are central goals in
regarding the crowding effects (this model is called by
Baron and Rodin, "Altman's Privacy Model"). Crowding prime
effect, then, is the loss of freedom and privacy. It is
a relative term that involves a perceptual quality that
differs from one person to another. In one context,
crowding is viewed as stressful, and loss of freedom,
while on the other hand, can be viewed as a way to get
more interactions (theaters, sport stadiums, etc.), or to
get economic allocation of resources (public housing).
Again, the concept of crowding viewed from these different
points, reveals the diversity and conflict between freedom

and control (efficiency) interchanging at the individual,

 

group, and social levels of concern. Regarding the physical
environment, a balance should be achieved between these
diverse goals, by considering the individual freedom and

efficiency to be achieved in an optimum crowded Situation

 

that allow also for a control of resources and social

mobility-~at all levels.

Territoriality is another form of social privacy.

 

It is an evolved regulating-adaptive—mechanism and "to
many it represents the reaching of maturity and the

achievement of success and potency" (Newman, 72:p51).

88

Territory is the space which a person as an

individual, or as a member of a close knit group

(e.g., family, gang), in joint tenancy, claims

as his or their own, and will 'defend'. (Parr,

70:p12).
Like personal space is, territory within it freedom is
seeked and it is, itself, a control of an individual or
group over a certain property (their property).

Territoriality also relate to the social and
cultural differentiation between different individuals
and groups. It reflects one's social status or hierarchy.
Its importance as a basic need at the individual level is
a matter of argument. The reality of most of the world
is the economic decline and lack of resources, above all
is crowding. For this reason, the question becomes of the
hierarchy of needs particularly at the contextual levels
(economical, political, and social). As was quoted from
Newman, that many see territoriality as success, one may
argue that to many others (the poor majority all over the
world) its picture is different. Their primary need is
food and then shelter that is considered territory at only
the collective level of ownership.
The only territoriality they really experience is

the national one, particularly when they have to defend
it by their lives. It is important,this feeling of
belonging, but when it comes to be a basic individual need

the question will be: What comes first? Territoriality,

nevertheless, is connected to economy (efficiency) and freedom.

89

Defensible space is Newman's contribution and
represents a step toward an architectural awareness of
the area of spatial behavior. He defined "defensible
space" as

a model for residential environment which inhabits
crime by creating the physical expression of a

social fabric that defends itself . . . a surrogate
term for the range of mechanisms--real and symbolic
barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and
improved opportunities for surveillance-~that combine
to bring an environment under the control Of its
residents. (Newman, 72:p3).

He based his idea on four basic physical design elements.

(1) The territorial definition of space in develop-
ments reflecting the areas of influence of the
inhabitants.

(2) Placing the apartment windows so that residents
can survey the exterior and interior public
areas from their living environment.

(3) The adoption of building forms and idioms which
reduces perceiving the vulnerability and isolation
of the inhabitants.

(4) Locating residential developments in functionally
sympathetic urban areas immediately adjacent to
activities that do not provide continued threat.

(Ibid., 73:p9).

His studies found that the lack of territorial articulation
not only decreases the use of outdoor space but also reduces
social interaction among residents. The thing that results
inefficient use of resources, disintegration of community,
increase in crime rates, and loss of valuable physical
structures. For this reason his proposed "defensible

space" concept seeked to balance individual free-

dom and privacy with the sense and economy of the

90

community. Newman was not the first one to attempt to
base design criteria on concepts of spatial behavior.
Alexander (63) introduced in his book, Community and
Privacy, a prospect of basing housing design on privacy
criteria to the extent of using computer programming.

Behavioral Units (Structured
Behavior)

 

Unlike the spatial behavior (unstructured), is the
concepts of "behavioral setting" and "behavioral circuit."
These two concepts provide the possibility for even stronger
implications of design criteria that are based on the View

Of architecture as adaptation.

Behavioral setting, as a concept discussed in

 

Chapter I of this thesis, was first developed by Barker
(68). This concept, in brief, is that behavior exist in
some patterns can be viewed in terms of units of organism
(human behavior) interaction with its milieu (environment).
These units then consist not only of behavior but also of
its surrounding-~at once. This concept addresses a valuable
suggestion to the design process; that is: instead of
looking at abstract, usually meaningless, "space" as a
design unit, designers should consider behavior setting as
the primary design unit. By doing this, the physical
setting will be designed as a collection of linked behavioral

settings. The design criteria in the light of this view

91

will be people's performance and behavioral pattern within
a specific context. This context may extend to their
different culture, surroundings, status, etc. In this
case, by using a specific behavioral setting, the designer
can get rid of the stereotyped ideals about what every
family should live like. He will be able to draw specific
conceptual understanding in terms of a set of various
behavioral settings. Accordingly, his design will be
aiming to fit these behavioral units into its proper milieu.
This fitness, in turn, will reflect the efficiency of the
individual behavior within its unit (behavior setting).

The concept of behavior settings also helps
designers to draw some generalities about the behavior
patterns, as they represent the persistent and character-
istic ones within a specific physical setting. The
differences between one behavior setting and another are
generally attributed to the variabilities of both the
environment and people's culture, status, personality, and
needs. Thus the human variables interplay with the other
environmental variables (geometric, color, etc.) in order
to identify a behavioral setting. Hence, if one knows
about the characteristic of the behavior setting in general
and information about the people's culture and behavior, he
can draw a sketch of the appropriate physical milieu that

can achieve this behavior setting. In this approach the

 

92

designer's image about the physical setting will be primary

in terms of behavior setting.

Behavior circuits, on the other hand, as presented

 

by Constance Perin (70) in her book, With Man In Mind, are

 

a quite different concept of behavioral units or patterns.
Behavior circuits are "routines" when they recur frequently
at the individual level; they are "collaborations" when
they involve other persons, and they are events when "the
maintenance of various kinds of group relations occur, at
any level of frequency" (Perin, 70:pp98-99).
Recreation for the same person can be a routine, as
in the morning jog; a collaboration, as in the weekly
game of touch football; and an event, as in attending
the World Series. Recreation for different age groups
may show chiefly one kind Of behavior circuit: morning
jogging is routine for those over thirty-five; playing
touch football is routine for fifteen-year-old boys;
and attending night games an event for elderly men.
(Ibid., 70:p99).
Behavior circuit should also be distinguished from the
"circulation diagrams" drawn often by designers. Although
they, similarly, involve movement, but they differ in that
"circulation diagrams" is not concerned with more than
movement and orientation. The concept of behavior circuit
implies the aspects of quality of experiencing the trips
through the specific personal or group behavior. It is by
definition a behavioral unit (Perin, 70:p77). Behavior
circuit, then, goes beyond orientation and movement, it

delineates a human dimension that can be of greater help to

designers.

93

Both the behavior setting and the behavior circuit,
as units of structured behavior, are linked to the notion
of adaptation. In many cases when these units of behavior
occur in a physical setting that does not have a room for
their size, dimension, or intensity, peOple use their
imagination to adopt the space to fit to their behavior.
If they succeed they make a remarkable change in the
original design (which may become in conflict with other
things). And if they fail, a destructive print of their
attempt is often left over. In addition, they may also
experience some sort of frustration. Examples of these
adaptation aspects are when,

people change settings to better support activities:
to facilitate and sustain them. They may remove
inappropriate prOps, such as built-in lights that
are unadjustable, or add new ones, such as a back—

yard barbecue pit to make eating out easier. For
the same ends, they can alter the relations among

settings — creating both new connections and
separations, such as windows and walls. (Zeisel,
81:p103).

Both behavior units relate more to efficiency as they
already occur in a structured manner, particularly when a
group is involved in them. However, when they happen at
an individual level they relate both to freedom and
efficiency of one's activity. Therefore, a design con-
cerned with achieving efficiency and freedom at both
individuals and groups must be flexible, in order to com-
promise both levels. The term flexible, here, means to be
adaptable to variability of freedom and efficiency at both

the group and individual level.

 

94

Conceptual Framework for Human
Ecological Design

 

In the course of proposing a step toward human
ecological approach of urban design and architecture, a
synthesis addressed itself in this chapter. The previous
sections have been attempting to do so both at the general
and specific conceptual levels between architecture defined
as adaptation and the current views of behavioral science.
This section will sketch a framework toward a design
process model within which the prospected theory of human
ecological architecture can operate. This will be done by
using the previous discussions.

The section will start by a brief discussion of the
importance of theories and models in general and for design
in particular. The discussion will attempt to develOp an
overall synthesis implicit in conceptual model. A set of
conclusive recommendations for designers (implicit and
explicit in the model) will end this section as it ends
this chapter in the mean time. Finally, although the
purpose of this section is not to develOp a particular
methodology for the design process, it will however, provide

a conceptual framework that can be useful for that purpose.

Theories and Models
In order for an ecological human theory of architec-
ture to exist, it should then have the minimum requirements

that define a theory. Basically, a theory: "can be defined

95

as any kind of generalization or prOposition that asserts
that two or more things, activities or events vary in a
complementary fashion under specified conditions" (Steiss,
74:p3). According to this definition, the general relation-
ship proposed between man and his built-environment as
based mainly on adaptation within a considered context,
can be a theory. However, "theories are cheap: they cost
only the time and effort of the theorists and these can be
quite inexpensively" (Ibid., 74:p3). Therefore, the focus
of attention should always be toward two basic questions:
How the theory is articulated? and How this articulation
can help utilizing the theory itself? The first question
calls for a quick look at the meaning from which the world
theory came from.

'Theory' is related to the world 'theorm', i.e., a

proposition that is logically derived from other

propositions, established through the application

of deductive techniques. (Ibid., 74:p3).
This definition applies to, mainly, the field of mathematics.
It also refers to one type of theory which is the "normative
theory" that is based on mathematically derived propositions
(theories that deal with what "ought to be" rather than
"what is") (Ibid., 74:p4).

Theories, on the other hand, that are derived

through an inductive process from empirical data or facts

(more directly from Observation and experimentation) are

called "empirical theories" (Ibid., 74:p4). The reason for

 

96

distinguishing these two types of theories (one is concerned
with facts and the other by empirical knowledge) is not to
support one type over another. As Steiss (74), in his book

Urban Systems Dynamics, indicated, it is important for the

 

social scientist to consider both types of theories.
To be 'scientific' is to be very much concerned with
both theory and fact. Theory identifies the major
orientation of a science by defining the kinds of
data to be abstracted. It offers a conceptual scheme
by which relevant phenomena are systematized, classi-
fied, and interrelated. Theory summarizes facts into
empirical generalizations and systems of generaliza-
tions, and serves to identify gaps in the present
state of knowledge. (Ibid., 74:p4).

Therefore, the proposed theoretical reorientation
of architecture and design toward a human ecological theory
of architecture should be articulated on both considerations
(facts and theory). In other words, while using the logic
of involving human criteria in designing human environment
a considerable empirical theory should continuously take
place through inductive process of research and experimen-
tation. As such, the application of this theory will have
two faces. One is the consideration of human and ecological
factors in the design, and the second is the testing and
adjustments to the theory itself, by adding new indications
or developing new hypotheses.

At this point, it should be noted that this theory
will face the same dilemma of the social science in general

which is the nature of variables it will be dealing with.

The question of quantitative and qualitative data and data

97

analysis. This dilemma can hardly find room in this thesis
to be discussed, however, it should not be viewed as an
Obstacle for developing theories as techniques of better
understanding our environment. This dilemma is merely a
methodological one. For example, the purposive variables
proposed in this thesis, which are freedom and efficiency
of human activities, can be measured (quantified or
qualified) in a whole range of different ways. In essence,
this will depend upon the nature of the project and the
dynamics and purpose of the research and design themselves.
While a theory, in general, stands between being a
"law" (confirmed), and being a hypothesis (unconfirmed),
a model can be used to refer at any of them. Furthermore,
a model may mean a structural idea, a role, a relation,
an equation, or as a synthesis of data (Echenique, 74:pl64).

All of these other meanings of a "model,' on the other
hand, are linked to the process of building or testing a
theory. Therefore, a "theory" and a "model" are linked to
each other as they are means for understanding and presenting
reality. In doing this, "only by being unfaithful in some
respect can a model represent its original" because: "if it
were not 'unfaithful' the model would be reality itself
and not a representation" (Ibid., 72:pl65).

According to Echenique (72), in making a model,

three classification questions arise: (1) What it is made

for?; (2) What it is made of?; and (3) How the time factor

98

is treated? The answer to these basic questions are
illustrated by Figure 12. The first aspect, is the
intention the model is made for, classifies the models
into four main types: descriptive model, predictive model,
explorative model, and planning model. The descriptive
model is aimed to understand and explain "reality."

This type of model is logically essential to any

other type, because it is not possible to predict,

explore or plan without a previous description of

the reality under study. (Ibid., 72:pl70).

While the main intention with the predictive model
is to forecast the future, the predictive model is based
on the assumption that the model represents the way reality
is changing. With the planning model, however, "a measure
Of obtimisation is introduced in terms of chosen criteria
in order to determine means of achieving stated planning
goals" (Ibid., 72:pl70). The four types of models are linked
to each other as they are all through the process of model-
making relate to reality. These linkages and relation to
reality are shown in Figure 13.
The second aspect of model-making is the "material"

used to make the model. These can be classified as:
materials (icons or analogues) and concepts (words or

mathematical functions). The third aspect is the time

treatment: either statically or dynamically.

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The above discussion has already provided a frame-
work within which a model of synthesis of ideas develOped

earlier in this chapter can be sketched.

A Conceptual Descriptive Model

A theory of human ecolOgical architecture, in it's
infancy, needs a basic synthesis at different conceptual
levels. This was the aim of the early discussion of this
chapter. The central concept that was used in this
synthesis was the proposed human adaptive (purposive)
variables emerged from defining architecture as adaptation
--efficiency and freedom. This was done throughout a range
of different behavioral concepts both at the general and

specific level of analysis. In order to sum up all these

101

concepts as they interrelate to each other in a "synthesis"
fashion, a descriptive model will be develOped. This model

by nature is a conceptual one, thus it will be made of

 

words, and it will treat time statically.

The idea of the model is to use the definition of
the term "continuum," used previously in this thesis (the
meaning of perception in Chapter III, and again early in
this section) to illustrate several concepts. The term
"continuum" refers at "something in which no part can be
distinguished from neighboring parts except by arbitrary
division" (according to the American Heritage Dictionary,
P. Davies, 77). The concept of a "continuum" can be useful
to draw some generalities, since, it is difficult to obtain
a good fit between model and reality,

especially in the social science, because each fact
or value presupposes a considerable amount of data
which is either not available or requires very large
resource to obtain. On the other hand, the accuracy
of the model itself in a particular situation is
likely to be in contradiction to generality, a
property that any theory must have. (Echenique,
72:p170).
The model, as shown in Figures 14, 15, 16, and 17, is based
on the following key:

1. The model has four different phases, these are:
contextual, sociO/economic, behavioral, and cultural design
phase.

2. Each horizontal continuum represents three

different, although inseperable and related, meanings of

102

one concept.

3. These horizontal continuums are parallel to
each other and they are related in such a way that:

4. The vertical linkages are thought to be the
primary relations between the different concepts and
elements.

5. The diagonal linkages are assigned for the
secondary relations.

6. The right and left side of each continuum
relate to each other more than they relate to the central
element or concept.

7. The central continuum used in the different
schemes of the model is the efficiency/freedom of human
activity as the two purposive variables based on the View
of architecture as adaptation.

8. Each circle represent one concept with its
different aspects.

9. The first two schemes of the model deals with
a human ecological perspective.

10. The third and fourth schemes are dealing with
behavior/culture/design perspective.

11. This model should be looked at as an attempt to
synthesize a conceptual framework between a whole range of
concepts of human context, behavior, culture, and shelter
or design with two evolutionary variables, in the course

of steping toward a theory of human ecological architecture

Scheme.

SOURCE:

103

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107

and design.

12. Therefore, this model is aimed primarily toward
two purposes. One is to set a pool of concepts from which
hypotheses and continual research can extend. Second, is
to serve as a frame of reference for architects and planners
who want to develop design criteria in the light of human
ecological perspective.

13. If these two purposes are achieved a closing
of the gap between social scientists, and architects and
planners, will result as they both espouse a common
theoretical ground.

This model then serves as a descriptive tool of the
conceptual synthesis which is geared toward the suggested
reorientation toward a human ecological theory of architec-
ture. By using the same descriptive mechanism a design

process model can be, also, developed.

A Design Process Model

The above discussion has already suggested a
closing of the gap between researcher (behavioral scientist)
and the designer (architect or planner). This can happen
by integrating the information and finding of the research
into the design process itself. By doing this, the designer
can scientifically develOp hypothesis and witnesses then
tested throughout the process. This suggestion is based

on assuming that the design process is already a continual

108

one (open-ended). The researcher on the other hand, can
use the design process to "empirically" examine his
hypothesis and theories. This can happen if the actual
design problems and questions are made explicit by the
designers. Unless designers have interest in assuming

and considering the importance of the relationship between
behavior and the built-environment, they will be reluctant
to provide researchers with useful research questions and
problems. For this reason, this thesis has focused on

the possibility for designers to reorient their view of

the built-environment behavior relations, as a basic step
toward possible cooperation with researchers from behavior
science. This is the first fundamental step toward the
development of a design process that can be the operational
framework of the human ecological perspective which is
shown in Figure 18 as suggested by Zeisel (81). This first
scheme of the design process, in the form of cooperation
between researchers and designers, is one which allows for
the development of empirical knowledge about man in his
built-environment.

The means to achieve this scheme require that both
designers and behavior scientist understand each other's
problems and professional nature and characteristics.

On one hand the design process traditionally has three
elementary activities, these are: imaging, presenting,

and testing (Zeisel, 81:p6).

109

Imaging is similar to the concept of image that
everyone experiences, but in this case the designer image
a solution to his problem in terms of mental picture of
both the context and the form. At this point the researcher
should be able to supply the designer with the type of
information about human behavior that can be useful for the
designer's images. This design activity (imaging) is the
key one, that if changed and shifted to be "human
activities" and "behavior" oriented instead of "geometric
forms" and "space" oriented, the processes of representation
and testing will accordingly follow these criteria. This
can be done by developing behavioral units and criteria in
an image form. By doing this the designer will be able to
image the activities within the space, instead of using
stereotyped images, like land use and building categories
and names. They could then create a new system of images
that view the design elements in terms of what actually
"it is people do in the environment" (Perin, 70:p97).

This can be the responsibility of the researchers to be
able to provide their findings and information in such a
way that designers can use for their imaging process.

The major problem that actually can maintain the
gap between researchers and designers is their clients and
the problems of who pays for the service? and why? This
problem, although, varies from one situation to another,

it stems from the political, economic, and social

 

110

environment within which both researchers and designers
operate. However, the key solution to this problem is in
the hand of both professions, in terms of how much they
commit themselves to this approach.

Another professional dilemma still faces both the
designers and researchers; that is the gap between them
and the real users of the built-environment. A "citizen
participation" concept, then, addresses itself to close
this gap. However, this is not quite enough, because,

every design decision has political implications.
Middle class home-owners are in favor of public
housing - somewhere else. They believe there should
be a place where teen-agers can obtain help for drug
problems as long as it is located - somewhere else.
A new factory in town will be good for business but
it is going to take over the last unused bit of
river bank. A new city hall will help give the town
a better image but it may not be worth those extra
taxes. (Sommer, 72:pl33).
Therefore, what Sommer (72) has called "design awareness,"
should extend beyond the designers and researchers to the
users. This can be done by informing people about the
latest research findings and about the different steps
of the design process as it develops different options and
alternatives. This basic step is what Sommer (72) called
"environmental workshops." The professional limitations
facing architects and designers can be overcome if this
kind of awareness among the users is promoted. By this

"awareness," the process of getting peOple involved in the

design process (citizen participation) can be meaningful,

111

and useful. This step can also be represented in a model
shown in Figure 19.

The realization of the above two schemes of the
design process (shown in both Figure 18 and Figure 19),
hence, can be "rational." On one hand, it can attain the
analytical, critical sense of rationality by integrating
a research process into its cycle, and on the other hand
by facing the users and their real needs by having them

aware and involved in the design process.

Summation

This final chapter of this thesis has developed a
possibility for steps toward a theory of human ecological
architecture. The following points describe these
possibilities:

(1) In a general conceptual level, the concept of
architecture as adaptation with its developed two "purposive"
variables--freedom and efficiency of the human activity
relate to behavior, especially viewed by the current trends
of the behavioral science.

(2) Also a synthesis between the concept of
architecture and design as adaptation and behavior at a
specific conceptual level was possible to make. This
involved two main categories of behavior; structured
behavior (units) such as behavioral setting and behavioral

circuit; and unstructured behavior (spatial) such as

112

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114

personal space, privacy, crowding, territoriality, and
defensible space.

(3) This synthesis has revealed a diversity
between efficiency and freedom (of human activity) if
viewed at different contextual levels (individual, group,
society).

(4) A conceptual descriptive model was then intro-
duced in an attempt to show this diversity between
efficiency and freedom as purposive variables and a range
of different concepts and ideas. Basically, contextual
synthesis was represented by two schemes of the model and
behavior/culture/design synthesis was represented by two
other schemes. This conceptual model, by indicating how
different concepts relate to each other, can be a bases
for closing the theoretical gap between the designers in
the environmental design fields and researchers in the
behavior science fields.

(5) In the light of this approach, a proposed model
of the design process was introduced. This model, indicates
two consequences or implications of the human ecological
design approach, represented in two schemes. First scheme
is a possibility for occasions of cooperation between
designers and researchers in the design process, as proposed
by Zeisel (81). Second scheme is indicating the importance

of the users participation in the design process.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The impetus for this thesis was a concern of our
urban environment, particularly the built-environment and
how it relates to people. This concern is emerging in a
variety of academic disciplines in corresponding to the
fast technological and social change shaping the contem—
porary world. This thesis, therefore, has lent itself
toward searching for steps to take in order to bring a
desired and crucial awareness to the milieu of design,
planning and architecture. This awareness was thought of
to be a revision of the theoretical premises of the deter-
ministic approach, often, used by urban designers and
architects. This has, thus, called for the research to
go beyond the boundaries of these fields into the realm
of the emerging behavior science that, already, includes
psychology, anthropology, sociology and philosophy. The
discussions that were presented focused on the theoretical
gap between the environmental design fields and the
behavior science fields in View of the relationship between
human behavior and the built—environment. This focus has

two main topics.

115

116

The first topic was the human behavior built-
environmental relations, in which an extensive review of
the current related theoretical attitudes and concepts
toward it is laid out. This allowed for providing a
reason to reconsider the architectural determinism. The
second topic was steps toward a formulation of a new
theoretical attitude in architecture and design that is
parallel to the current view of behavioral science; that
is human ecological.

These steps were not in themselves methodologies
or practical tools, rather they were conceptual synthesis
on different levels of analysis that can lead to further
methodological development in the design process. There-
fore, the work that has been completed up to this point
should be considered as a conceptual framework model of how
the planner, the designer and the architect may View man
in his built-environment. Moreover, this conceptual frame-
work is aimed to bridge the theoretical gap between
designers and researchers (as indicated). Finally, it
should be noted that bridging this theoretical gap between
the two fields (design and behavior science) is only one
side of the problem of the lack of cooperation between them.
The other side of this problem is a professional gap which
can be bridged, maybe by a different approach that will
deal with the social, political and economic factors of

this problem.

117

The first chapter of the thesis has lent itself to
the question of how the environment in general and the
built-environment in particular relates to people? By
doing so, it has raised and concluded the following points.

(1) There are three major philosophical/theoretical
attitudes toward man—environment interactions. One is that
the environment controls and determines man's behavior;
the second is that behavior determines and constructs the
environment; and the third is that both environment and
human behavior are mutually interrelated.

(2) The third attitude is representing the current
trend in the emerging behavior science. However, the
limitation facing this trend is the narrow scope of
analysis that does not go beyond the individual level.

(3) Therefore, the ecological approach that calls
for multi-level analysis is gaining a larger creditability
in that it tries to remove the persisting theoretical
limitations. This can be achieved by the use of the
concept of behavioral settings developed by Barker (69).

(4) Culture is also a major factor to consider
within this View, the thing that calls for the need for
cross-cultural analysis at all the different levels.

(5) Culture has three dimensions to look at.

These are as manifestation, as systems, or as adaptation.
The important point is that these dimensions complement

each others and without considering their importance

118

a cultural-ecological approach will have a short
coming.

Finally, this section has developed an overview
of the possible relations between man and his built-
environment. The underlying message this overview has
developed was the need for a corresponding response and
reorientation of the architectural and design theory.

In response to this message developed above, the
second chapter has concentrated on reconsidering the
architectural and urban design theory. In doing this the
following conclusions were arrived at.

(1) In order for a "rational design process" to
cope with the scientific rationality, and as it delivers
means of communication (non-verbal communication) it
should be based on considering people's behavior and
interactions as its basic criteria. Its goal should be
the fitness of man and his needs into the context of the
design form, and its means are scientific or critical
(analytical) methods of understanding both the human
behavior and its context.

(2) The deterministic approach of the design and
architectural theory has resulted theoretical and profes—
sional limitations.

(3) The theoretical limitations stem from the
reluctance of architects to question what they are doing.

This has resulted no advances in their theory. Also, by

119

not getting involved in research activities they isolated
themselves from the social and behavioral scientists.

(4) The professional limitations are best
described by the gap between the designer and the user.

(5) Therefore, in order for the architectural
limitations to be removed, and the design process to be
"rational," a reorientation in its theory is inevitable.
This reorientation can start by redefining architecture
in terms of cultural adaptation.

(6) By doing this, a bridge between the architect,
designer, and planner and the social scientist could be
built which also will result advances in the theoretical
and technical knowledge of the two fields. It will, also,
result a better built-environment.

(7) For this reorientation in the theory of
architecture, chapter four has suggested a synthesis between
architecture defined as: art-science of design-constructing
adaptive spaces and structures that maximize the efficiency
and freedom of human activities in a human ecological
context! that is defined by the particular environment,
in terms of social, technological, and political and
economical organization of that environment and its linkage
to other local, regional, state, national or international

levels of interactions, and the different theoretical

 

premises of the ecological approach developed in the field

120

of behavioral science. This can be done by using the two
"purposive variables" freedom and efficiency of human
activities.

The third chapter of the thesis has, thus,
attempted to draw this synthesis at two different levels.
The first is at the general theoretical level and the
second is the specific conceptual one. The following are
the findings of this chapter:

(1) There is a possibility of a conceptual
synthesis between architecture as cultural adaptive tool
using the two "purposive" variables freedom and efficiency,
and behavioral science at two levels; general and specific.

(2) A conceptual descriptive model was possible
to develop in order to lay out this synthesis in four
schemes. The first and second schemes indicated a contex-
tual synthesis while the third and fourth schemes demon-
strated behavior/culture/design synthesis.

(3) According to these possibilities of a
synthesis and also according to the recommendations derived
from the meaning of rationality, a design process model
was developed to illustrate the possibility to apply these
concepts in a practical way. This was not a methodology
of design, rather it was descriptive mechanism of the
cooperation between designers and the social scientists

at one scheme and people at another.

121

The chapter can then be a proposed solution to
the problem of the increasing unbalance between man and
his built-environment that is resulted from the lack of
architectural theory that consider human behavior and needs
as its basic criteria. This solution can also contribute
to our body of knowledge (technical/theoretical) about
man-built-environment relations.

Finally, it should be again noted that this thesis
is a step toward more awareness of not only our environment
but also our knowledge about the environment that should
be enhanced and increased for this awareness to exist.

This awareness can start with not only the architecture
design or planning students it should be at a larger scale
to include everyone in a way that C. Allexander (77) called

"A Pattern Language."

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