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PATTERNS OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN THE RURAL  
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS - THE CASE OF THE OFY  
(OPERATION FEED YOURSELF) PROGRAM IN THE  
ASHANTI REGION OF GHANA (1972-1978)

presented by

K. Agyemang-Mensah

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J. Allan Beebe  
Major professor

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PATTERNS OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT  
PROCESS - THE CASE OF THE OFY (OPERATION FEED  
YOURSELF) PROGRAM IN THE ASHANTI REGION  
OF GHANA (1972-1978)

By

K. Agyemang-Mensah

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## ABSTRACT

### PATTERNS OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS - THE CASE OF THE OFY (OPERATION FEED YOURSELF) PROGRAM IN THE ASHANTI REGION OF GHANA (1972-1978)

By

K. Agyemang-Mensah

With the advent of the '70s, international donors and Third World governments have directed development efforts toward the poor majority. Based on experience, a consensus has evolved that participation is a necessary condition for rural people to manage their affairs, control their environment, and enhance their own well-being. However, there is no conclusive evidence relating to the "beneficiary participation--program success" equation.

The research objective is to analyze participation in two districts which are broadly similar and yet achieved different agricultural output during the implementation of the Ghanaian O.F.Y. (Operation Feed Yourself) agricultural program (1972-78). The two districts are compared with respect to (1) the nature and extent of participation and (2) the association between client participation and program success.

Data were collected from selected official documents and statistical bulletins, and was supplemented by open-ended

interviews of 25 farmers in each district. From the documents it was possible to secure information including baseline data on the districts, market survey reports, acreage cultivated, information on social amenities as well as administrative resources.

The data are presented in a series of tables in which the levels of participation in the various phases of the development process are presented and compared for the two districts having contrasting production levels. Participation levels ranging from "more," "same," "less" and "none" are assigned to the three dimensions of participation.

The study shows that there was no difference between the two districts with respect to client participation in decision-making and implementation. At the same time, no single aspect of participation was found that appeared to affect program success. However, the study reveals that the district that performed better in agricultural output far surpassed the other district with regard to the availability of social amenities and administrative resources. Thus, support is found for the thesis of the study that the extent to which participation contributes to rural development success depends to a large extent upon the socio-economic infrastructure and the administrative arrangements that have an impact upon them. Conclusions drawn from the study are used to suggest a framework for organizing participatory rural development

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## CHAPTER I

### THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING

#### INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM SETTING

"Participation is a basic need by itself of men and women, and must be included as a critical consideration in any development strategy. The objective of development cannot be merely to meet the material needs of the people by any system, irrespective of whether or not the people's reflections are a fundamental input in the designing and operation of the system.

It is through the integration of reflection and action that men and women give expression to their creative faculties and develop them, and a process of self-transformation is generated through which they develop as human beings. It is for this reason that participation is a basic human need." (Md Anisur Rahman, 1981:3)

It is now fashionable in development circles to regard participation as an important element in implementing any worthwhile rural development strategy (Cohen et al., 1978). The emphasis upon agriculture or the rural sector focus, as well as the concern with decentralization and integration, all imply some form of participation of groups that have been bypassed by the development mainstream and/or different means of involvement for those already participating. Six affirmations summarize the significance of participation in the development process. They are:

1. The growing awareness among many developing nations that their greatest resource in the development process is the very people themselves.

2. People organize best around problems they consider most important.
3. Local people make rational economic decisions in the context of their own environment and circumstances.
4. The increasing realization by varied governmental delivery systems, eg. agricultural extension and health workers among others, that the ready consumption of delivered entities is actually dependent upon demand.
5. Voluntary local commitment of labour, time, material and money to a project is a necessary condition for breaking patterns of development paternalism which reinforce local passivity and dependency.
6. Centralized patterns of development decision-making have generally been unable to accommodate local socio-cultural variations or to mobilize needed local resources. In general, highly centralized strategies have often resulted in the marginal mobilization of local economic resources, little improvement in local planning and management skills, and limited incorporation of indigenous experiences and knowledge into development programming.

These affirmations reflect the fact that meaningful participation implies a systematic local autonomy, in which communities discover the possibilities of exercising choice, thereby becoming capable of managing their own development. Thus, participation has major implications not only for local populations but for governmental and other personnel involved in the planning and implementation of

development programs as well. Genuine community participation will require new attitudes and behavior among the staff of agencies that deal with the rural poor. It may also lead to new patterns of distributing power and controlling resources.

Even though popular participation seems to be a goal of most rural development projects, it is rarely achieved. According to Lele: "the most ambitious efforts to foster popular involvement can be thwarted by subtle forms of paternalism" (Lele, 1975:162). It has been observed that in a few instances where participation was achieved, local leaders and community representatives were directly involved in major project activities from an early stage. For example, the evaluators of the Lilongwe Project in Malawi noted that a primary factor contributing to the success of the project was the ability of project management to involve both tribal units and their chiefs in the project's operations. Managers of the project encouraged the chiefs to serve as members of the land board overseeing implementation of one of the project's vital activities (Rondinelli, 1978).

In terms of Ghana, the researcher has observed that since the late '60s, the successive Ghanaian governments have embraced the call for more emphasis on rural development; yet the results in the main have been disappointing. Although the approaches of these governments have differed, their integrated rural development policies have been remarkably similar in basic thrust. They have attempted to coordinate a package of investments and services that would accomplish the following:

1. Increase agricultural output and productivity in order to meet the basic food needs and to raise the income of the rural poor.

2. Stimulate agro-processing, agri-business, and related industries to enhance diversification of the economy, employment opportunities and to generate internal demand for domestically produced goods, and
3. Increase access of the rural poor to the Social Services' facilities and infrastructure needed to improve health, nutrition, literacy and family planning (1970/71 Budget, Government of Ghana).

The study is focused on the period 1972 - 1978 when the Ghanaian Military Administration at that time launched a nationwide agricultural program code named "Operation Feed Yourself" (OFY). There we see a bold attempt on the part of the Government to ensure food self-sufficiency and grass roots rural development. A useful indicator of the Government's actual performance is the national consumer price index (1963 = 100) which stood at 226.1 in 1972 and the local food index at 259.4. By August of 1977, the national consumer index had risen to 1,729.2 with the largest increase in local food 2,677.8. The rural price index of local food shot up from 241.9 in 1971 to 263.0, 313.8 and 358.7 in 1972, 1973 and 1974, respectively (Central Bureau of Statistics: Economic Survey 1978).

With regard to the feasibility of OFY policy, on the face of it, Operation Feed Yourself appeared to be a feasible solution to the food shortage problem in Ghana. Why then the disappointing results? The answer cannot be quickly isolated, but apparently the feasibility of the food self-sufficiency program was impaired by poor implementation.

A recent field study of 36 rural development projects in Africa and Latin America found that 49 percent of the variation in overall project success was explained by client involvement and resource commitment (DAI, 1975). Thus, participation merits consideration in any attempt to unravel the mystery surrounding the unimpressive performance of the OFY program. This study is focused on the client involvement and resource commitment aspects, as well as in the sharing of benefits of the program. The primary focus will, therefore, be on the development processes and not only on the final outcomes or products of OFY program activities.

#### EVOLUTION OF PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT MODELS

Despite the attentions of a large body of theorists and practitioners over the past thirty years, self-sustaining and dynamic national development has proved to be an elusive target. Buoyed with the successes of the Marshall Plan in reconstructing postwar Europe, economists as well as planners who turned their attention to the newly independent Third World nations concentrated upon economic growth (Adelman et al., 1973). Growth, defined in aggregate terms as Gross National Product, meant the provision of increased quantities of goods and services to a nation as a whole. Development meant rising incomes per capita accompanying structural shifts in national economies from predominantly rural-agricultural to urban-industrial. The requirement was for a continual incorporation of productivity-raising technological innovations, and an increasing ability to exploit natural resources and transform the environment (Roemer, 1979). Following this conception of development, it was

assumed that certain industrialized countries identified as "developed" constituted models for the newly emerging nations of the Third World.

Again, it assumed

"with many differences of timing and emphasis, that initial phases of income concentration in the hands of entrepreneurs or the state, restraint in consumption, and social services concentrated on the upgrading of 'human resources' would lead to phases of increasingly equitable distribution, rising and diversifying consumption for all, and the building up of collective services and subsidies designed to equalize opportunities and place a floor under levels of living--in other terms to a 'welfare state'" (Owens et al., 1974).

National states, therefore, ought to guide and stimulate development through proper planning.

What then was the role of the majority of the people under this growth model? It envisaged the initial participation of the majority of the population mainly as taxpayers' and producers for export through the acquisition of skills and the internalization of the work ethic of industrial societies. It also envisaged limiting consumption and generating savings. It foresaw, however, that the very process of development would increase the likelihood of the involvement of the masses not only as producers and consumers, but also as citizens capable of reconciling their narrower interests and controlling the developmental activities of the state through democratic political procedures. Thus, in the process of developing, nations were assumed to become more participatory, meaning generally more politically democratic, the closer they came to modernity (Almond et al., 1963).

In the mid-'60s, the emphasis upon economic growth as the primary development objective came under severe criticisms as it became clear that for the vast majority of the rural population of the Third

World, general conditions of living were no better than before the advent of the development process. It is worth mentioning five of these criticisms (Wolfe, 1982).

First, granted that some developing countries managed to achieve creditable rates of increase in their national incomes, distribution remained highly unequal and popular resignation to poverty was fast waning.

Second, the concomitants of industrialization and agricultural modernization were proving quite disruptive, with the prospect that major parts of the population would lose their hold on traditional ways of livelihood and sources of security without finding a place in the new order.

Third, international economic and political relationships made developmental achievements precarious. Governments were just no more capable than before of foreseeing and controlling the key factors that determine the feasibility of policies, in the face of unstable export commodity markets, constantly rising debt burdens, recurrent balance of payments crises, the penetration of multinational corporations, and the distribution of public resources done on the basis of strength of competing claimants (the military, trade unions etc.) rather than of development needs. (Is it a wonder then that "planning" in the shape of preparation of development plans at least fell into discredit?)

Fourth, enormous urban agglomerations were taking shape as a result of over concentration of development resources in the cities.

Fifth, the more developed countries were beginning to lose their plausibility as models because of the spread of internal

disillusionment with the consequences of their technological and cultural transformations, as well as chronic stagflation in their economies.

By the early 1970s the realization that growth-oriented policy had paid scant attention to income distribution resulted in a reassessment of the meaning of development (Seers, 1969). At the initial stage, the growth model proponents argued that the pursuit of development through redistribution would likely result in diminished growth, meaning that the two objectives were in conflict. Later, as the lessons of experience began to unearth questions about who saved and invested and about economies of scale, the equitable income distribution and the economic growth objectives converged in an emphasis on development in the rural sector. Development specialists strongly argued that by maximizing the productivity of the rural areas, both agricultural and small-scale enterprise, growth with equity could be accommodated (Chenery et al., 1975). Along with the expansion of the concept of development, the definition of capital was modified to include "human capital" (Schultz, 1961). As the causes and consequences of unemployment and under employment were subjected to analysis, the notion of development was further expounded to incorporate increased access by the rural majority to education, health, water, shelter, and other services, and increased use of appropriate technologies (Schumacher, 1973). Governments in developing countries were urged to broaden their base by encouraging popular participation as a means to implement their development programs and to reduce the chances of social unrest and political instability (Hapgood, 1969). Evidence began to accumulate supporting the oft-repeated suggestion that successful



development efforts were related to popular participation (Lance et al., 1975).

The World Bank, as well as other international aid agencies, began to modify their policies to accommodate the changed development concept. The World Bank made known its intention of targeting the impacts of its lending programs on the poorest of the poor--the 40 percent of the citizenry in LDCs previously excluded from having a share in the benefits of modernization (World Bank, 1975).

The agencies of the United Nations, not to be left out, have adopted a policy of rural transformation through the fulfillment of "Basic Human Needs" (ILO, 1977). This Basic Human Needs policy, simply put, proposes the setting of a series of minimum living standards, eg. adequate food, shelter, sanitation, health and educational facilities, and of some criteria for the implementation strategies needed to achieve these standards--employment opportunities, participation of people in decisions affecting them, and income redistribution.

#### PARTICIPATION: PAST APPROACHES

It must be noted that participation is by no means a new idea in rural development. It has existed under different names since the late forties. What is new, perhaps, is the increasing emphasis being placed in participation by Third World governments and international donors alike. The three most well-known approaches will be examined briefly. They are rural cooperatives, animation rurale and community development.

### Rural Cooperatives

A common form of member participation has been the rural cooperative, an organization controlled by its members. However, a 1975 study of rural cooperatives, undertaken by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, concluded that:

....rural cooperatives in developing areas today bring little benefit to the masses of poorer inhabitants of those areas and cannot be generally regarded as agents of change and development for such groups. It is the better-off rural inhabitants who mainly take advantage of the cooperative services and facilities such as government supported credit and technical assistance channelled through cooperatives (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1975:IX).

The failure of rural cooperatives can be attributed to the fact that they have often been the creation of government or other external agencies, intended to promote government policies and provide government control over markets. As exemplified by the Ghanaian experience, the Nkrumah Government (1957-66) made the United Ghana Farmers Cooperatives Council (U.G.F.C.C.) a wing of the ruling party and used its control over the U.G.F.C.C. to force it to "voluntarily" reduce the price of cocoa.

### Animation Rurale

This Animation Rurale movement was popular in the colonies belonging to France. This French movement followed a more rigid, pre-determined strategy. The central government selected areas that demonstrated potential for self-help and encouraged local villagers to select one of their number, usually a young, respected, progressive farmer to send to a regional training centre. His training there as an animateur emphasized the practical, technical skills and

how to plan and implement local development projects. On his return to the village, he would put his new knowledge into practice and involve the entire community in decisions concerning local development activities (Goussault, 1971).

Animation rurale has also had its share of problems:

....Emphasis on "self-help" techniques limited to the local community indicates that the regime either attaches little value to rural development or believes that symbolic and truncated mobilization can take pressure for performance off the bureaucracy.... Meaningful self-help activities, however, imply both dynamic local organization and increasing demands on government services, which are often not appreciated (Charlick, 1980:6).

### Community Development

This movement started after World War II in India and the Philippines and spread throughout Asia and much of Africa. This approach was based on the fact that no government could afford to place teams of technicians in every village. The solution, therefore, was to create the multipurpose, village-level worker. This worker, a person from outside the village and with at least a high-school education, lived and worked with the villagers. He was expected to gain their confidence, organize village groups, and help them identify their felt needs. In this process, he was aided by funds from the national government, which often came from international donors (Holdcroft, 1978). Summing up:

The local community is the site of C.D. action and the major concern is with local projects--all the better if they are locally initiated and executed.... This is linked to an interest in the development of grass-roots democracy and cooperation as means and goals of C.D., along with the aim of increasing self-sufficiency and a desire not so much to change fundamentally a culture as to help the members of a community realize

their potential in terms of their own culture (Schwartz, 1978:238).

Thus, the C.D. movement, while contributing to conceptual understandings of grassroots participation, was not successful in following up local mobilization with effective action. In general, community ideas and initiatives were not effectively linked to the broader administrative structure whose support was essential.

This brief discussion of past participatory approaches will not be complete without a look at some of the serious problems that severely curtailed their effectiveness. Among the more serious were the following:

1. Excessive emphasis was placed on the expansion of social services relative to new economic production initiatives. Of course, this was not the original intent of participatory approaches but resulted from bureaucratic jealousies. As Uphoff et al. demonstrated in their 1979 study, technical ministries would not tolerate a Department of Cooperatives or Community Development trespassing on what they regarded as their turf. Hence, these ministries had a bureaucratic interest in keeping such departments out of agricultural programs or public works construction (Uphoff et al., 1979:23-24).
2. The new initiatives proposed were not sound from a technological standpoint. Technical resources are in short supply in developing countries and are likely to cluster under certain line ministries. These ministries are unlikely to make their best people available to assist with participatory

approaches unless advocates of these approaches are willing to adopt ministry programs,

3. The pressure for quick results led to reliance on the local elites and consequently to undesirable patterns of benefit distribution (Charlick, 1980:6).
4. Even though they were originally conceived of as bottom-up approaches, they soon become vehicles for the promotion of existing government programs (Ghana 1957-66). This resulted from pressures exerted by the line ministries of central governments. These pressures transformed the village-level worker from a coordinator into a salesman for line-ministry programs.
5. The basic focus of these approaches was inward, not outward--the reconstruction of an individual village rather than the reconstruction of rural society. This was particularly true of community development. In the case of both cooperatives and animation rurale, there was often a hierarchy of institutions from the village to the national capital, which was rarely effectively integrated (Uphoff et al., 1979:25).

These are some of the principal lessons learned from certain past programs with a participatory approach. In the section that follows, we discuss current issues and concerns with participatory approaches.

## PARTICIPATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND CONCERNS

Any discussion of conceptual issues must, among other things, attempt to find answers to the following underlying questions:

1. How do styles of development emerge and whose interests do they serve?
2. To what extent does the state have the right and capacity to interpret participation as mobilization for the ends its dominant ideology defines as urgent?
3. Does popular participation include a popular right of self-defense against the style of development?
4. To what extent does the state have the duty to protect or tolerate participatory movements it does not control?

(Wolfe, 1982)

## Consumption Versus Accumulation

It is a fact that development, assessed by the conventional indicator of rising product per capita, has been accompanied by widening gaps between the levels of consumption of different strata. Thus, access to the fruits of development in the form of services provided by the state as well as incomes have been determined mainly by the initial distribution of power. The private sector as well as the state have consistently displayed the lack of ability and will to make developmental use of the resources withheld from mass consumption. Viewed in this context, it is not surprising that participatory struggles have focused on distribution, and to the extent that the majority of the population has been able to enter into them, they have proved incompatible with the accumulation of capital needed

for economic growth--especially within economies in which recipients of the lion's share of resources devote a high proportion to ends that are irrelevant or inimical to development.

### Social Classes: Conflict or Consensus in Societal Change?

Societies are divided into classes with different relations to the means of production, and in most politics other sources of self-identification complicate or cross-cut these divisions: language, religion, family, tribe, locality, political affiliation, etc. Policy-oriented perceptions of these divisions can be divided into four major categories with very different consequences for the role of participation. At the same time, within the real processes of national policy formulation, one can find the four categories of perceptions entering in different combinations (UNRISD, 1982).

#### Model 1 - Sharing of Common Interests by All Groups

First of all, it is assumed that all classes and interest groups share a common interest in development within which the possibility of reconciliation of conflicts of immediate interests exists. It is, therefore, the duty of the political leadership to formulate development objectives that are in the interest of the whole population, and convince the population that this in fact is the case. Participation thus becomes predominantly harmonious and cooperative, designed to enable each group to make a maximum contribution to the general welfare.

#### Model 2 - Conflictive Participation with the State as Arbiter

Secondly, it is assumed by many that the common interest in development does not preclude conflicts of interests in which each

group has a right to organized defense of its perceived needs. In this sense, conflictive participation is a legitimate part of development insuring against undue concentration of its fruits. This right to self-defensive participation extends not only to wage earners and peasants but also to ethnic, cultural, or tribal minorities that are otherwise likely to be disrupted or exploited in the course of economic growth, and women striving to overcome their traditional disadvantages. It supposes that the state can act and be accepted as final arbiter of most conflicts, keeping them within limits and defining the rules of the game. The state, therefore, has the duty to help the weaker groups in the community by promoting their organization and by legal or administrative guarantees of rights. But, it ought to be noted that the reliance on the leading role of the state is conditional: the state can function for the general welfare only if the different classes and groups are able to call it to account and defend themselves against bureaucratic arrogance, corruption, and bungling.

### Model 3 - Equitable Distribution of Resources Through Revolutionary Transformation

Thirdly, some assume that conflicts of interests between classes within a capitalist order are irreconcilable, whatever the degree of economic growth possible within this order. The path to authentic development, according to this reasoning, lies through a revolution bringing to power a class or alliance of classes capable of transforming social relationships and using the forces of production that modern technology makes available for the benefit of all. In this regard, significant participation will consist of organized struggles



leading to the transformation. This position, of course, has been consistently challenged by another that emphasizes the post-revolutionary danger of excessive state power manipulated by a new class of functionaries, and therefore, calls for the strengthening of autonomous popular organizations and local self-government as indispensable safeguards.

#### Model 4 - Participation for Higher Productivity in a Free Market

The viewpoint here is that participation should be positive, directed to higher productivity, but individual choices guided by the market can be relied on to generate it. Combinations for self-help are legitimate, but on the other hand, combinations for self-defense are, at best, suspect. The only duty of the state is simply to keep combinations from accumulating enough power to hinder the functioning of the market.

#### Participation, Community and Other Forces of Group Solidarity

It is worth noting at this stage that conceptions of the role of participation and strategies to popularize participation depend on theories and empirical observation concerning the ways in which different classes within nations organize themselves and the implications of overall economic, cultural and political change for spontaneous or induced changes in such organizational forms. For example, one can easily envisage "plebiscitary participation" through a populist movement given shape by charismatic leadership with the masses of the population exhorted and instructed on how to participate through mass communication media, and with localized formal organization

rudimentary or absent. This kind of participation, the writer submits, has more shortcomings than virtues in relation to the quest for acceptable and viable styles of development. During the 1950s the community development movement assumed the presence of internally harmonious local communities with sufficient autonomy to be able to act collectively in pursuit of their own interests, with a certain amount of technical and material aid and guidance from outside. The most general shortcoming, however, seems to have been a failure to recognize the divisions of interests within communities and the constraints imposed on their autonomous action by local and national power structures (Holdcroft, 1978). Thus, supposedly egalitarian initiatives ended by increasing the differential advantages of the richer and more progressive community members at the expense of the unpaid labour of the weaker members; brought into the open latent conflicts that rendered the program inoperable; or alarmed the landlords, money lenders or other power holders sufficiently to motivate them to sabotage the program (Wolfe, 1982). One can only conclude that policy approaches to participation, whether by the state or by voluntary agencies professing participatory values, should base their actions on a thorough understanding of the changing forms and consequences of participation in settings of scarcity and group conflict. This leads us to a consideration of the agents of the state in relation to participation.

#### Participation, Bureaucrats, and Technocrats

In the Western experience, bureaucratization was a function of industrialization or modernization. In the developing nations, on

the other hand, bureaucratization preceded the major spurt to modernization. Bureaucratization came first in the colonial period, reflecting the transplantability of at least the formal structure across national and cultural boundaries and into a wide range of substantive fields. Today in these developing nations, previously established bureaucracies are being used to stimulate development (Ness, 1967). The bureaucracy may be efficient, goal-oriented and honest. However, one has to contend with some unavoidable tensions between the bureaucracy and participation. In fact, it is unrealistic to expect the tensions to be resolved in favor of one side or the other. The state cannot help relying on uniform norms and procedures in the quest for equity and efficiency in the distribution of its resources and in combating the arbitrary violation of human rights by local power holders (Wolfe, 1982). The locals cannot help resenting and resisting the resulting restrictions on its initiative, the time-consuming and baffling efforts that are necessary to cope with requirements that do not take local conditions into consideration. It ought to be noted that even programs whose main overt justification is the stimulation of local participatory initiatives are as susceptible to bureaucratization and standardization as any others, as evident from the experience of many community development programs (Korten, 1980; Holdcroft, 1978). In the present world of complex societies, it seems preferable, by all accounts, to accept the tension and to propose creative resistance as a conceptual framework for the conflictive interplay of bureaucracy and participation (Leonard, 1982).

Techno-bureaucracy poses somewhat different problems for participation. The main tension between professional planners and a wide

range of "experts" and participation lies in the confidence of the technocrat that his professional tools qualify him to find the one right answer to development problems. In this regard, participation by other forces in the society must consist of learning the implications of the answer and acting accordingly. In sum, as in the case of bureaucracy, one must view the tension between participation and technocracy as a legitimate and permanent aspect of the evolution of development policy.

### Summary

The underlying proposition for a conceptual framework that seems to emerge from this section sets forth the unavoidability and permanence of tensions. First of all, there is the state, with its political decision-makers and bargainers, its planners, technocrats, bureaucrats, social specialists, etc. In conformity with international declarations exhorting it to do so, the state may "choose" a participatory style of development, but generally, its role will be ambivalent and contradictory. Some of its activities will favor participation while others hamper or repress it. Second, there are the sectors of the population already able to participate in an organized way and to influence the choices made by the state in line with their perceived interests. There is no doubt that most of them have some propensity to envisage participation in terms of democratic procedures and social solidarity, but that the overall scarcity of resources, along with the lures of the consumer society, continually spur them to competitive and exclusionary tactics, implying the manipulation of any participatory machinery to their own advantage.

Third, the masses are heterogeneous and lacking effective control over resources and regulative institutions. The operational implications of this framework, therefore, emphasize tensions and adjustments between the expectations and tactics of different actors.

#### PARTICIPATION AS CONCEIVED IN THIS STUDY

One's conception of participation can be broad or narrow, active or passive. It is also recognized that participation is a multifaceted phenomenon, for participation may take place as a consequence of many forces. For instance, it may occur voluntarily as a result of reasoned enthusiasm for a development project or it may result from many kinds of ulterior motives or coercive pressures. The customary positive view that participation is always good and done for the right reasons must be scrutinized.

Four basic views or perspectives are reflected in the literature on development participation. They are the economic, the community development, the political, and the administrative. The economic perspective sees participation in terms of resource transfers. In Mellor's 1976 work on a rural employment oriented program for development, participation was seen mainly as sharing in the benefits. Saunders too, in his 1977 review of rural development projects, cited examples of participation in terms of contributions of labour, materials or cash. Such contributions were also viewed by the DAI team in their 1975 study of small farmer development projects, as part of the local action variable. From the community development perspective, participation is considered as the process by which a community's felt needs are elicited and responded to. With the help of village-level

workers, the villagers participate in identifying their needs and the means to fulfill them (Holdcroft, 1978).

Participation from the political perspective refers to the access and use of demand-making channels to governmental bodies. The focus usually has been on voting patterns and political party membership. However, later works have included a wide variety of activities designed to influence the working of government (Esman, M.J. et al., 1971).

Within the United Nations' arena, participation from the administrative perspective refers to "active and meaningful involvement of the masses of people" at different levels: (a) in the decision-making process for the determination of societal goals and the allocation of resources to achieve them; and (b) in the voluntary execution of resulting programs and projects (UN, 1975). The element of control is critical according to this concept of participation. Some hold that true development is impossible unless there is widespread participation in setting and implementing development policy (Cunningham, 1972).

These different conceptualizations of participation clearly suggest the great diversity subsumed under the participation concept. For the purposes of this study, participation is conceived in terms of an overarching framework composed of three dimensions, rather than to treat participation as any single phenomenon, clearly definable and existing in various quantities. Our multi-dimensional framework enables one to be specific about participation in development projects by permitting answers to the following questions: what kind of participation took place? Who were the participants? How did participation take place? Depending on one's interest, the answer to one of these

questions may be more relevant than others. However, when taken together, the answers to these "what," "who," and "how" questions provide a relatively comprehensive picture of rural development participation in a project.

### The "What" Dimension

Three kinds of participation are encompassed in the proposed research (Uphoff and Cohen, 1974). These are:

1. Participation in project decision-making:
  - a. project planning decisions involving the identification of needs, establishing priorities, devising potential action, and assessing feasibility,
  - b. project operating decisions entailing choices related to the implementation process, eg. where to locate activities, how to organize, staff, finance and monitor these activities, and who will be involved.
2. Participation in implementation contains three classes of activity:
  - a. contribution of resources--labour, materials, cash, or information,
  - b. enlistment in programs, eg. planting high yield seeds,
  - c. inclusion in project administration--membership in a project advisory committee or project cooperative, serving as a "model" farmer.
3. Participation in project benefits can be divided into three types:
  - a. material benefits include acquisition of increased

income or assets, such as land or savings, and increased security in income or assets,

- b. social benefits refer to increased access to quality of and consumption of services and amenities, eg. education, health care, transportation, roads and water supply,
- c. personal benefits refer to such issues as increase in self-esteem, sense of efficacy, commitment to modernizing values and political power.

#### The "Who" Dimension

Here we differentiate among two groups of people. These are (1) ordinary local residents and (2) local elite.

#### The "How" Dimension

Apart from the identification of who participates in project decision-making, implementation, and benefits, one needs to examine how that participation takes place. The usual approach to ascertaining the how of participation is to distribute project activities along a continuum stretching from passive to active involvement (UN, 1970).

An example will suffice. Residents of Yamoussoukro (birthplace of the Ivorian president) who simply share in the benefits of the town's development program, say social amenities, illustrates participation at its most passive level.

The following additional dimensions may contribute to the investigation of how project participation takes place (Cohen et al., 1977).

These are:

- 1. the impetus to participate, top down, or bottom up;



2. incentives for participation, coerced or voluntary, rewarded or induced;
3. the form of participation, direct or indirect, individual or group;
4. the number and range of activities open for participation, few or many, narrow or wide;
5. the time required and opportunities for participation, eg. many or few, complex or simple.

When you plot the characteristics of participation on each of these dimensions for those involved in decision-making, implementation and receipt of benefits provides a fairly complete picture of the manner in which project participation can take place.

## THE STUDY SITE, OBJECTIVES AND GUIDING HYPOTHESES

### Study Site: Socio-Cultural Background and Agriculture

"Generally, the Ashanti people are very industrious. Their innate desire to live independent lives makes them a most hard-working people. They are .... ambitious and determined to succeed in every venture they undertake" (Tufuo et al., 1969:11).

Essentially the same view is echoed by McLeod (1981). The two districts studied share the same cultural traits quoted above. As seen on the map, the Ashantis live in the central region of the country, some one hundred and eighty miles from the coast. The vast territory they occupy in this location is mostly densely forested. And because of the richness of forest lands in soil, mineral and vegetable products, the region is known to be the richest in the country. Consequently, the main occupation of the residents is agriculture.




Figure 1. Political Map of Ghana

Nearly all the farms in the region are mixed, not specialized. Cash crops may be grown both for domestic consumption and cash. Crops for home consumption are produced for the local markets only and their cultivation seems to take up the greater part of the time of the people. When soil fertility on the usually big farm does not permit growing short-term seasonal crops (plantain, cassava, cocoyam, etc.) together with the longer term crops (cocoa, cola, etc.), Ashanti farmers resort to cultivating food-crops as well. They make the most of this to maintain the food supply in their territory. Ashanti farmers are usually craftsmen as well. When the rains come and the weather is bad for farming, they engage in craftsmanship as a hobby. It is no exaggeration to say that "as gold and silversmiths, as cloth weavers (especially of the rich Kente), as basket-weavers and wood-carvers, the Ashantis tend to excel" (Donkor et al., 1969:12). These craftsmen have been encouraged and in fact have been supported by the institution of chieftancy.

The average Ashanti farmer is very conversant with the seasons. He knows the right time to clear the forest, the time it must take to dry and thus become ready for burning, and when to sow or plant or do both together. Lessons on nature and agriculture begin as early as a child learns to talk. Boys will go to the farm with their father in the early morning while girls help their mother to put the house in order before going to the fields.

The shifting cultivation pattern of agricultural production makes good use of the shallow forest soils which become exhausted after a few seasons' cultivation. The farmer will carefully probe to find the best places for planting his crops. Plots are usually

run on a cycle of three to four years. If plantain and cocoyam are planted in the first year, their broad leaves shelter other growing crops from the sun and heavy rainfall and they are harvested in the following years. After a few seasons' cropping, the farm is shifted and the land allowed to lie fallow. Cassava is usually planted when the soil is becoming exhausted. The Ashanti farmer usually depends on his own physical strength and that of his family and friends, as well as such hired labour as he can afford. He uses no plough-drawn animals. Neither does he use any form of machinery for tilling or for any agricultural operation. His main farming implements are the hoe and the cutlass.

Each family group has a right to a parcel of land around its village. This is usually divided into two main areas: one under cultivation and one lying fallow. A group retains some rather vague rights in land it has once used but which is now reverting to thick forest, a process that can take more than seventy years (McLeod, 1981). The whole land is vested in the stools of the chiefs and the Ashanti farmer can choose where to farm with little or no restriction. However, he must not trespass on someone else's fallow land. He must not cultivate the forest land immediately in front of other people's farms without permission. Complaints about, and questions of, ownership of lands and all disputes are settled mostly by the traditional tribunals.

#### Objectives and Guiding Hypotheses

The primary focus of this study is to analyze rural development participation in two districts--Nkawie and Bekwai--in the Ashanti

Region during the Operation Feed Yourself era (1972-'78). The two districts are similar in many important respects. The study is based on secondary sources and the two districts will be compared with respect to: (1) the nature and extent of participation; and (2) the association between client participation and program success.

The thesis of the study is that while the relative success of O.F.Y. was positively related to participation, the extent to which participation contributes to rural development success depends to a large extent upon the administrative arrangements as well as the local area's socio-economic infrastructure. Based on the analysis of the study, suggestions will be made to guide future design and implementation of participatory rural development programs in Ghana.

In carrying out this analysis and evaluation, this study seeks to answer the following research questions for the two districts in the region:

1. What kind of participation took place?
2. Who were the participants?
3. How did participation take place?
4. Did client participation make a difference in the achievement of an agricultural program?

Two working hypotheses are implicit in this study. First, the more the target group participates in decision-making, the greater the achievement of program goals. Second, the more the target group participates in program implementation, the greater the achievement of program goals.


## DATA SOURCES, METHODS AND ANALYSIS

This study employs the case study method in the analysis of participation dimensions of the O.F.Y. agricultural program from 1972 to 1978. The Cornell University Rural Development Committee's analytical framework for analyzing participation in rural development projects is utilized. The cases are based on documents dealing with Nkawie and Bekwai districts in the Ashanti Region of Ghana. Data were collected by the researcher between July and August of 1983. These two districts are equi-distant from Kumasi, the regional capital. They have equal access to the Regional Office of the Ministry of Agriculture for agricultural inputs. As already noted, the people in these two districts are ethnically homogeneous, and have the same cultural practices and customs. They are all food farmers as well as cocoa producers, with farm sizes ranging between three and four acres. These two districts have been exposed to urbanization and modern facilities. In short, they are broadly similar and share a common boundary as shown below.(fig. 2).

Two reasons account for the choice to employ documentary analysis instead of survey research or other alternatives. First, many official documents and articles are available for analysis of the problem of this study. These data sources may be classified into the following four categories:

1. The field research and/or evaluation reports published by researchers in the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development.
2. The Central Bank and Agricultural Development Bank reports.

Figure 2. Map of Ashanti Region



3. Selected official documents.
4. Official statistical bulletins.

Based on these documents, the researcher was able to secure information including baseline data on the districts, market survey reports, acreage cultivated, information on social amenities as well as administrative resources.

Second, from the researcher's experience in working with the Ministry of Rural Development, it would be difficult to design and carry out fully objective research. Further, many of the incumbent officials would be unwilling to answer a questionnaire.

The documentary analysis was supplemented by the following open-ended interviews:

- (a) The Chief of Nkawie (the Chief of Bekwai was in police custody in Kumasi at the time of the study, July - August 1983).
- (b) The District Chief Executive.
- (c) The District Agricultural Officer.
- (d) The Secretary, Youth Association.
- (e) The Chairman, Farmers Association.
- (f) The Secretary, "Nnoboaa" or Cooperative group.
- (g) A selection of 25 farmers from 5 villages in each district (5 farmers from each village--the leading farmer, a prominent female farmer, and any three ordinary farmers). Please refer to Appendix C.

The data will be tabulated and presented in a series of tables in which the levels of participation in the various phases of the development process will be compared for the two districts.



Participation levels will be assigned to the three dimensions of participation, namely, project planning, project operating and contribution of resources. The assigned participation levels will be based on informant interviews and available documents.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The second chapter presents the various dimensions of participation. It identifies the different ways in which the concept has been operationalized in the field of development. A survey of what has been said in the literature about participation is also reviewed and provides a theoretical background for discussion in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 is devoted to the Ghanaian political economy context. A survey of rural development programs from Colonial to the present is presented.

The next chapter presents the analysis of the study. Participation levels, agricultural production levels (plantain and cassava), and macro indicators of socio-economic infrastructure and administrative resources are compared for the two districts.

The final chapter is devoted to a discussion of the study's findings, and recommendations for organizing future participatory rural development projects or programs.

## CHAPTER II

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

#### INTRODUCTION

The proposition that authentic development requires popular participation has become current in planning circles as well as in political movements and the press. An examination of references to the term, however, suggests that the users have divergent ideas as to what is implied, or else have taken popular participation up as a slogan with no clear views as to how it can become a reality.

The primary objective of this chapter is to survey how participation has been defined differently by development experts and practitioners (Gow et al., 1983; Rahman, 1981; UN, 1980; Kindervatta, 1980; Pearse et al., 1979; Nyerere, 1977 etc.); the potential contribution of participation (White, 1981; Rondinelli et al., 1977; Ollawa, 1977; and Ahmad, 1975); and empirical studies to demonstrate how participation can contribute to program success (DAI, 1975; Lele, 1975; Uphoff et al., 1974).

In the midst of this confusion as to what is popular participation, it is essential that research in this area be carefully defined. Five different approaches are discussed near the end of this chapter (Pearse and Stieffel, 1980).

## REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE

Local participation in project planning and implementation is almost universally identified as an essential input for rural development. However, there is ample evidence that participation means different things to different people and that it can be manifested in a variety of forms. Rahman, for example, sees participation as a basic human need. He argues that "it is through the integration of reflection and action that men and women give expression to their creative faculties and develop them, and a process of self-transformation is generated through which they develop as human beings" (Rahman, 1981:3).

The President of the Republic of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, sees rural development participation in terms of people in a mutual learning experience involving themselves, their local resources, external change agents, and outside resources. People cannot be developed, he continues, they can develop themselves by participation in decisions and cooperative activities which affect their well-being (Nyerere, 1977).

In a document entitled Inquiry into Participation, Pearse and Stiefel state that the central issue of popular participation has to do with power, exercised by some people over other people, and by some classes over other classes. The kinds of participation considered in this inquiry are organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given local situations on the part of or on behalf of groups and movements of those hitherto largely excluded from such control (Pearse and Stiefel, 1979). The same view is echoed in Gow et al. in Beyond the Rhetoric of Rural Development Participation: How Can It Be Done? as well as Florez's Participacion - Si! Examining

reasons for the failure of past participatory attempts, they conclude that for participation to succeed, redistributing power must be accompanied by the simultaneous building of local capabilities (Gow et al., 1983; Florez, 1979).

To the International Labour Organization, popular involvement is necessary to effective decentralization and integration. The organization, therefore, advocates a basic needs-oriented policy which implies the participation of the people in making the decisions which affect them (I.L.O., 1977). This view is shared by Colletta who sees participation as "a process whereby community members come together to identify problems, mobilize resources and seek solutions among themselves" (Colletta, 1979:15).

Why participation? Local participation is seen as increasing the probability that local problems and needs will be expressed in the design and administration of rural development projects, and for facilitating wider dissemination and use of project results (Rondinelli and Ruddle, 1977).

The rural sector is an amalgam of subsystems, eg., health and nutrition, agriculture, education, employment, each of which must be activated in order to generate development. This is the position taken by Yosuf Ahmad in his comments on integrated rural development. Feedback mechanisms to a central authority are required in order to integrate this process. Arguing by assertion, Ahmad goes on to state that successful activation of the subsystems is both contingent upon and leads to broad-based participation by rural residents in administrative, financial and technical areas. Popular participation, he continues, serves to neutralize the resistance of the local power

structure, and serves to counter the indifference of the local administration and to encourage owner-user identification (Ahmad, 1975).

Alastair White, commenting on participation and development, defines it as "the involvement of local populations in the decision making concerning development projects or in their implementation" (White, 1981:1). From this point of view, with reference particularly to the planning and implementation of community water supply and sanitation schemes, he lists ten of the reasons which have been advanced in favour of participation. These are: (1) more will be accomplished; (2) services can be provided at a lower cost; (3) participation has an intrinsic value for population groups; (4) it can be a catalyst for further development efforts; (5) participation leads to a sense of responsibility for a project; (6) participation guarantees that a felt need is involved; (7) participation ensures things are done the right way; (8) it uses indigenous knowledge and expertise; (9) it frees populations from dependence on professionals; (10) it is a starting point for conscientization (White, 1981).

Patrick Ollawa, expressing his views on participation, stresses its importance in establishing linkages between local populations and national decision-making structures. Induced participation, he claims, can harness the potential of the rural populace by mobilizing and manipulating features of traditional life and encouraging self-reliance and responsibility (Ollawa, 1977).

In his book Meeting the Basic Needs of the Rural Poor, Coombs argues that participation acquires meaning only when it is considered in a specific context. He discusses different types of community

participation: local specialists in a community-based program; local contributions of money or labor and materials; the creation or strengthening of self-run, local institutions and mechanisms; the creation of broader community-wide mechanisms for selecting priorities and for planning and implementation of local development projects; and the formation of local pressure groups (Coombs, 1980).

Uphoff et al., (1974) try to resolve some of the conceptual issues surrounding the notion of participation by examining kinds of participation (in decision-making, implementation, benefits and evaluation, who participates, and how participation is taking place). They consider these aspects of participation to be affected by the nature of the task at hand and the task environment and discuss related issues and concepts in some detail. In their study of sixteen Asian nations, they define participation in terms of voting, control over local bureaucrats, influence upon rural development policy, and influence upon resource allocation. A correlation analysis which they did among these variables and various macro indicators of rural welfare, agricultural productivity and level of organization revealed the following:

1. little association was found between participation and agricultural productivity;
2. participation accounted for about 33 percent of the variance in rural welfare; and
3. networks linking participatory local organizations and national centers were strongly correlated with high scores on the macro indicators.

The point to note here is that it is possible that because their study excluded from the definition of participation the sharing of development benefits, agricultural productivity and participation were not found to be significantly related. The writer need not overemphasize that correlations do not constitute a basis for statements of causality. Uphoff et al. are, therefore, cautious in interpreting the data, considering them more suggestive than definitive.

Another operationally oriented investigation that treats questions of participation and rural development strategy effectiveness is shown by Uma Lele's study of seventeen rural development projects in sub-Saharan Africa. She examined the relationship between a large number of factors and the capacity of projects to carry out rural development. Lele discovered many different mixes of participation in the rural development projects surveyed and came to the following general conclusion:

"Local participation may mean involvement in planning, including assessment of local needs. Even if local people do not participate in planning, at the very minimum they should be informed of the plans designed for their areas if they are expected to consent to and to cooperate with program implementation. Participation in planning and implementation of programs can develop the self-reliance necessary among rural people for accelerated development" (Lele, 1975:162).

Lele's analysis touches on many issues relevant to assessing participation empirically. However, the writer contends that the lack of clarity regarding what participation is and how it was manifested in each project limits the value of the study. The above quoted passage clearly shows that the author, generalizing from her data, relies on what are basically normative assertions about the effects of participation.

In Encouraging Popular Participation: UN Recommendations (The Urban Edge, Vol. 4, 7, 1980), participation is viewed as three modes: local elite decision-making; people as advisors; and people controlling or sharing in the control of decisions. A different interpretation is offered by Kindervatter. She views participation as one of several empowering processes and argues that participation can enable individuals to exercise some control over planned change. She suggests the only levels of real participation are partnership, delegated power, and control and views "informing, consulting and placation" as degrees of tokenism, and therapy and manipulation as non-participation (Kindervatter, 1980).

The Development Alternatives, Inc. (D.A.I.) study of thirty-six small farmer development projects, represents perhaps the most specific and operational end of the spectrum of orientations toward participation. A measure of project success composed of four dimensions was formulated by D.A.I. These are:

1. the ratio of income gained by beneficiaries to costs paid by project sponsors;
2. an index of new agricultural practices adopted by farmers;
3. project contribution to farmer's capacity for self-help;  
and
4. an index of the probability that project benefits will become self-sustaining (D.A.I., 1975).

In assessing the determinants of project effectiveness, D.A.I. found that the best predictor of success was the amount of local action present in a given project. The assessment was based on questionnaire



and case study data. The D.A.I. team scored each project on the four success criteria and the components of local action. The local action was composed of four elements:

1. small farmer involvement in project decision-making during the design stage;
2. small farmer involvement in project decision-making during the implementation stage;
3. small farmer labor commitment to the development project;  
and
4. small farmer money commitment to the development project.

The comprehensive local action factor accounted for 49 percent of the variation in the overall project success rankings. It ought to be noted that within the components of the local action variables there exists much room for variation, especially in the two components of involvement in project decision-making. Although the study represents a large step forward, the writer is of the opinion that the results just cannot be regarded as the definitive statement on participation. What we have been discussing so far serves to illustrate the range of perspectives on participant's relationship to the implementation of the rural development strategy (Goldsmith et al., 1979). This discussion also shows some of the problems with the participation concept.

## PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION

In view of the many perspectives or dimensions of participation, Pearse and Stiefel (1980), distinguish five of them. It is useful here to outline and describe each one briefly in the following paragraphs.

### Participation as Encounter

It is widely accepted in development circles that participatory action implies a new sharing of decision-making power, and thus it may be seen as encounter between social categories, classes, interest groups, confrontations between villagers and urban interests. Participation as an encounter then draws attention to the way institutional change takes place and shows the frequently anti-participatory nature of established institutions as well as the transformation or modification of power structures as indicators of successful participatory action.

### Participatory Movements and Groups

The approach to participation in this perspective is through the analysis of the structure, modus operandi and context of organized groups and emergent movements of those who lack power and influence and who seek increased participation through the pursuit of specific social, economic, and political goals. In this regard, special attention is focused on some fundamental factors making for strength. One of these factors is the structure and internal organization of the movement or group. Another critical factor is the form and character of leadership and the relation between the leaders and the followers of the movement. It is paradoxical that leadership in participatory

movements is often embodied in a single individual who may have acquired this role on the basis of traditional social status, of democratic elections, or most frequently of his personal charisma. The leader may command the necessary authority but as the Comilla, Pakistan project experience shows, the fate of the movement is often closely linked to his personal fate (Khan, 1977). A major factor worth studying is the extent of alliances with other organized movements such as traditional parties and unions and with middle-strata elements. The nature of this alliance will in all likelihood influence in an important way the extent to which the movement can defend the interests of the social groups it represents.

#### Participation as Individual Experience

Participation refers to group action, yet decisions to involve oneself in such action are individual ones which can best be explained by examining the life-experience of the individual. In this regard, one can talk about a biographical approach to understanding participation. An approach like this is very useful, since important concepts like "decision-making" and "motivation" are functions of or imply an element of individuality.

#### Participation as Program or Project

In international organizations and governmental circles, participation usually refers to individual programs or projects designed to promote development in specific sectors of the economy and supposed to involve or lead to some degree of involvement by the targeted population. Such programs and projects may be analyzed as movements or as

encounters, but the approach to programs and project here is derived from the fact that they have often been initiated by the powers that be, that the initial "motor" of participation lies outside the powerless. The assumption here is that, there exists a concept of what ought to be done about the poor and underprivileged and a belief that the participation of the latter can be secured, provided the right approach is identified and followed.

There are a number of issues the researcher has to consider, in any attempt to evaluate and explain the apparent successes and failures of such sponsored movements as well as the authenticity of the participation. For example:

What are the dynamic impulses, the system of motivation that direct the actions of the officials, field workers, or cadres in the forefront of the promotion campaigns at the local level?;

How does the extension worker, the change agent, relate to the program's target group and to what extent is he/she able to transfer initiatives to the intended beneficiaries of the project?;

What level of participation actually has been achieved? Which sectors of the target group participated most effectively at what stage of the project, and which benefited most?; what aspects of the program were most successful in promoting what kinds of participation?

In studying such development programs, it is absolutely essential that one keeps in mind the fact that these development programs reflect the interests and the relative strengths of special social forces or of a combination of such forces. Such programs must, therefore, be studied as part and expression of the ongoing societal process with its diverse and often conflicting social forces which may favor or oppose such initiatives to promote popular participation. Finally, a line worth following is to judge the program through the

eyes of the intended beneficiaries: how do the rank-and-file participants assess their gains from membership and participatory action?

### Participation as Policy Contributing to National Development

Some national governments in the developing countries have adopted the principle of popular or mass participation as an explicit and central feature of policy expressed in new institutions, programs, laws and public ideology, as for example, the Ujamaa program in Tanzania. Seeking support from popular classes, they have attempted to undertake mobilization for development. Special attempts should be made to assess these experiences and analyze their achievements and failures. Many nations have introduced new types of democratic institutions, combining mass participation with central guidance and discipline. Unfortunately, such attempts at introducing procedures of direct democratic participation often fall prey to new constraints and generate new forms of power monopolization. In any case, when studying participation as a declared national policy, it is important that the researcher keeps in mind that a declared policy represents the official and temporary resolution of conflicts and contradictions among different forces.

Finally, it is important for the researcher to analyze what elements support which part of the policy to obtain a better understanding of the possibilities and the limits of popular participation.

## CHAPTER III

### INTERVENTION IN AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

#### INTRODUCTION

Attempts to become self-sufficient in food by successive Ghanaian Governments have not been a success as evidenced by constantly rising food prices from the early 1950s to the present. The aim of this chapter then is to briefly review the attempts to intervene directly in the agricultural and rural development sectors. The first nationalist government (1957-66) opted for a socialist approach, using state farms to spearhead the government's agricultural efforts. From 1966 to 1972 the National Liberation Council and the Busia Administration adopted far reaching liberal policies as well as pumping a lot of funds into rural infrastructural projects as a way of attracting people into the rural sector for agricultural production. The Supreme Military Council which came into office in 1972 used a combination of state capital and private entrepreneurship as the engines of agricultural production and growth.

Suffice it to say, all these attempts have failed to improve the agricultural situation. Would the participation of the peasants have made a difference? This question is elaborated in Chapter 4. A summary is provided at the end of the present chapter.

## POST COLONIAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast) gained its independence from British colonial rule on the 6th of March 1957. In 1960, it became a Republic within the Commonwealth with Dr. Kwame Nkrumah as its first President. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party was declared the only recognized party and all the opposition parties were proscribed. On the 24th of February 1966, the Ghana Armed Forces led by the late General Kotoka overthrew the C.P.P. government. The constitution was suspended and the C.P.P. banned. A National Liberation Council was appointed as a cabinet by the Armed Forces who ran the country by decree. It was the determination of the National Liberation Council led by General Ankrah to rid Ghana of the excesses of Nkrumah. The N.L.C. immediately established a constitutional commission under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice to provide for a new constitution under civilian leadership. The Commission formed an 150-member Constitutional Assembly to help draft a constitution which was subsequently signed by the members and submitted to the N.L.C. who then empowered the Assembly to enact the new constitution, which came into force on the 22nd of August 1969. A three-man Presidential Commission headed by the late General Afrifa acted as a caretaker government while the ban on political parties was lifted and preparations made for elections.

At the elections of August 1969, Dr. K. A. Busia, who had been the chief political adviser to the National Liberation Council, led the Progress Party to a landslide victory, winning 105 out of 140 parliamentary seats. Mr. K. A. Gbedemah's National Alliance of

Liberals won the second largest number of seats, 29. The Progress Party Government adopted rural development as its main development objective. Among other measures, a National Development Levy was instituted as a way of making more funds available for rural infra-structural projects. The cocoa price fell, and import costs rose and after the rainy season of 1971, draconian economic measures had to be introduced including a devaluation of the cedi by 45 percent. Against this background, the army struck on the 13th of January 1972.

A National Redemption Council was formed with the late Mr. Acheampong (shortly before he was executed by a firing squad in 1979, the ruling Armed Forces Revolutionary Council stripped him of his general's rank) as the chairman. Once again political parties were banned and the new 1969 constitution was suspended. In 1976 on the insistence of force commanders, the National Redemption Council was replaced by the Supreme Military Council with Acheampong as chairman. the S.M.C. consisted of The Chief of Defense Staff, The Army, Navy and Air Force Commanders, the Commander of the Border Guards, and the Inspector General of Police.

During the summer of 1977, the professional classes (urban elites, chiefly lawyers, doctors and nurses, engineers, teachers and university lecturers), together with students and some sections of the commercial and trading interests (notably the market mammies controlling the informal trading networks in domestic foodstuffs, who had been angered by government attempts to regulate and otherwise intervene in the distribution of basic foodstuffs), presented the government with a series of demands, including an end to arbitrary arrests and corruption, more effective management of the economy, and a firm



date for the return to civilian rule. Acheampong and the S.M.C. made a few concessions, designating a deadline in the spring of 1979 for the return to civilian government and establishment of a Constitutional Commission chaired by Justice Gustav Koranteng-Addo to assist in formulating an appropriate constitution for Ghana.

In June 1979, some young Army officers overthrew the S.M.C. administration. The new Armed Forces Revolutionary Council set up military tribunals which tried and found guilty members of the S.M.C. They were subsequently executed by firing squads. The A.F.R.C. honored its promise to hand over power to Limann's Peoples National Party in three months which they did in September of 1979.

The Limann's Administration never "found its feet" in the wake of mounting overseas debts, charges of corruption and inefficient management of the nation's economy. On the 31st of December 1981 Air Force Captain Jerry John Rawlings overthrew the P.N.P. government and set up a Peoples National Defense Committee Administration.

#### THE DECOLONIZATION PERIOD 1951-60

Immediately after World War II, the British colonial administration tried to create a large-scale mechanized agricultural project in the northern savannah of Ghana. The Gonja Development Company was formed in 1950 by a newly established Agricultural Development Corporation (Agricultural Development Corporation Report 1952). The Gonja project represented one of several British-sponsored projects to augment foodstuff and raw material output in Africa (Wood, 1950).

The aim of the Gonja project was as follows:

"The world problem of rapidly increasing populations unaccompanied by a rise in basic food production

assumes particularly serious proportions in areas, such as exist in the Gold Coast, where intensive cultivation and soil erosion have resulted in a marked decrease in soil fertility. In such areas, the necessity for finding means to increase food supplies is vital. An increase in food production may be achieved in various ways, one of which is the introduction of mechanized agriculture into previously underdeveloped land" (A.D.C. Report, 1952:6).

Initially, the project was to encompass 32,000 acres. By 1953, only 4,000 acres had been cultivated. By 1955, the acreage was further reduced to 1,500 (A.D.C. Report, 1956). By 1957, a fact-finding committee had recommended the voluntary liquidation of the Gonja project and the continuation only of the tobacco scheme based on fallow rotation and the use of light equipment (A.D.C. Report, 1957).

There appears to be several reasons for the failure of the Gonja project (A.D.C. Report, 1957). Among the reasons are:

1. The company initiated an extensive and expensive infra-structural program;
2. The company relied for management on a British staff, each paid \$6,000 a year, plus passage home;
3. It was difficult to attract settlers. By the end of the first year, only 11 families were settled. The ultimate goal was to resettle 450 families. The exact relationship between the company and the families remained undecided, but tentatively, two-thirds of the returns were scheduled to go to the company, one-third to the farmers;
4. Frequent breakdowns of machinery and prolonged periods of waiting for spare parts;
5. The project apparently attempted to experiment with crops which were not suitable to the local situation (Miracle and Seidman, 1968).

The Agricultural Development Corporation was not a profitable organization. Few of its supposedly productive projects were reported to be producing significant profits. The Corporation's development fund had allegedly accumulated a net deficit from 1955 to 1958 of almost \$400,000 (A.D.C. Report, 1958). In sum, the Agricultural Development Corporation, in its endeavors to establish estate farms, encountered serious managerial, technical and financial problems (Miracle et al., 1968).

#### Extension and Food Production

According to Dickson (1969), extension efforts were started by the Department of Agriculture which had become frustrated by food imports and constant dumping of cheap food, including rice from the Far East. Despite the increases in food imports, domestic demand was yet to be satisfied. By 1948 and 1949 food prices contributed a 45 percent increase to the overall consumer price index. Between 1950 and 1951 there was a further 25 percent increase in the index (Johnston, 1948:56). This, despite the exhortations by the Director of Agriculture to farmers to pay attention to food crop cultivation as far back as 1912.

In the Annual Report for 1949-50, the Department of Agriculture indicated that within four years, imports of wheat flour, which provided a quarter of urban supplies, rose from 5,053 tons valued at £G173,000 in 1946 to 21,387 tons valued at £G272,400 in 1950. In the case of rice and maize, 10,000 tons and 23,000 tons, respectively, were imported and that excluded 1,170 tons which crossed the border from Togo. Even then, the Department indicated that some 70,000

tons of cereal equivalents were still needed to feed the population. This situation further worsened in 1950 when maize crop production fell by about 50 percent as a result of an attack by a virulent epidemic maize rust (Annual Report, 1949-50).

The Department of Agriculture responded to the situation by appointing a food production commissioner whose main function was to coordinate an extension campaign in order to ensure the country's self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. In addition, twenty-five Agricultural Committees were formed with local farmer representatives and chiefs. It was the duty of these committees to appoint and direct food advisors who were to maintain liaison with farmers through organizing demonstrations and extension education. To accelerate food production, there was to be mass propaganda in the villages and towns as well as subsidies from the Government. From 1949 to 1957 food crop extension was based on these food advisors. Attempts were also made by the Department to develop extension programs related to maize production. For example, in 1956 improved varieties of maize (Mexican varieties) were distributed to farmers in the Ashanti as well as in the Coastal savannah regions (Dumor, 1979). The Kpong Agricultural Research Station was also experimenting with upland rice cultivation and holding farmer demonstration programs. The Department of Agriculture did very little by way of a systematic approach to food crop extension work even though 70 percent of all those in the agricultural sector were food farmers. The emphasis on cash crop production (as shown in Table I) will continue to plague incoming national governments.

Table 1. Development Expenditures on Agriculture

Focus of Expenditures	Project Total	Expenditure to 31st Dec. 1955
Agricultural Stations	903,000	661,200
Cocoa Industry	592,000	318,000
Soil Conservation and Land Planning	837,000	407,500
Reserve for Investment in Large Scale Production	1,546,000	1,046,000
Cocoa Rehabilitation	821,000	170,000
Feeder Roads, Machinery and Other Agricultural Development	483,000	89,000
Total	5,182,000	£ 2,691,700

Source: Gold Coast Economic Survey, 1955, p. 21

#### SOCIALIST-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT, 1961-66

Much attention had been paid by the state to the problems of the cocoa economy. Food production, on the other hand, had received far less concern. Extension services had programs primarily focused on the requirements of the export crops. It remains to be seen what the first nationalist government would do about it.

Since Ghana has basically been an agricultural country, the question naturally arises as to the place of agriculture in Nkrumah's development plan for the country. Nkrumah identified development with industrialization and consistently viewed agriculture as an inferior form of activity. For example, the 1965 foreign exchange budget, allocated only £2 million for agriculture, compared with £114 million for manufacturing out of a total import program of £312 million (\$1 = £1.15 cedis, 1960). He firmly believed that

those who criticized a strategy of industrialization did so for sinister motives:

"industry rather than agriculture is the means by which rapid improvement in Africa's living standards is possible. There are, however, imperial specialists and apologists who urge the less developed countries to concentrate on agriculture and leave industrialization for some later time when their populations shall be well fed. The world's economic development, however, shows that it is only with advanced industrialization that it has been possible to raise the nutritional level of the people by raising their levels of income" (Nkrumah, 1965:7).

He did not deny the desirability of raising agricultural productivity. He simply believed the notion that industrialization should be the prime mover of development. In fact, he believed that the best thing to do with agriculture was to industrialize that too. He, therefore, advocated a "total break with primitive methods" and "gigantic agricultural schemes" (Nkrumah 1961:28).

Thus, his idea of agricultural development was primarily identified with mechanization and large-scale farming. Several reasons can be cited to explain the mechanization option.

Nkrumah personally had little faith in the modernizing capabilities of the millions of small-scale peasant farmers. "Small-scale private farming," he was to write later, "is an obstacle to the spread of socialist ideas. It makes for conservatism and acquisitiveness and the development of a bourgeois mentality" (Nkrumah, 1970:79).

He also had political reasons for providing little assistance to the peasant farmers and for discouraging the rise of an indigenous class of private industrialists. What is more, agriculturists had consistently urged mechanization. A report by the Deputy Food and

Agricultural Officer in 1960 concluded that farmers' living standards could not be improved by traditional methods (Uphoff, 1970: 602). Also, J.H. Mensah, Nkrumah's chief planner, was advocating mechanization (Mensah, 1962 5th April Ghanaian Times).

The rapid growth of the non-agricultural population and the need to control imports placed increased pressure on the supply of local food crops. Food prices rose and led the inflationary upsurge which marked the later years of the Nkrumah administration. The state intervened directly in production in order to fight the growing shortage. The strategy adopted was in essence one of mechanization. This despite considerable evidence accumulating elsewhere in Africa that mechanization was generally unsuccessful (Dumont 1962: 56-9).

Nevertheless, that was the policy and some organizations were made responsible for executing it. The "production fronts" as these state agricultural organizations were called, assumed a pivotal position. First, they were to implement large extensions to acreage through mechanization and were expected to increase food production and expand agricultural exports. They were, however, entirely new forms of economic activity in the country and were most likely to run into difficulties because of inadequate resources and mismanagement.

Agricultural stations, previously used as experimental farms and nurseries, were transformed into State Farms. The State Farms Corporation established in 1963 was expected to concentrate on the production of cereals and basic crops whose demand in the urban centres had expanded phenomenally. The agricultural activities of

the Workers' Brigade--(established by an Act of Parliament in 1957 was in part meant to solve unemployment and at the same time boost food production)--were similarly extended. The Workers' Brigade was to provide adequate machinery for agricultural mechanization, provide raw materials and operate production enterprises, but its key function remained one of educating and training the young in various rural trades like carpentry, motor mechanics and repair, tractor operation and animal husbandry.

The Government imported large quantities of agricultural equipment and machinery for both the state farms and for the cooperative program of the United Ghana Farmers' Council, the farmers' wing of the ruling party. By offering mechanized services for land clearing and harvesting, the Council sought to encourage farmers to join production cooperatives. In 1962, responsibility for extension work was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the United Ghana Farmers' Council. Many of the Ministry of Agriculture's extension staff were transferred to government farms and the remainder were absorbed by the United Ghana Farmers' Council. Surveys indicate that little success was achieved by the U.G.F.C.C. The production cooperatives were small and scattered and the mechanized services had to be heavily subsidized. The cooperative character was often fictitious (Beckman, 1976:5). According to Dadson (1971), the U.G.F.C. misappropriated \$100 million between 1961 and 1965.

Nkrumah's agricultural strategy depended on the performance of government farms. Although these farms were supposed to operate on a commercial basis, the State Farms absorbed c19.8 million in subventions in 1963-5 but their failure in terms of physical output



was even more apparent as Table 2 shows.

Table 2. Comparative Performance of Peasants and State Farms

Selected Measures	Peasants	State Farms
No. of workers ('000s)	1791	18
Area cultivated (000 acres)	6161	49
Output (000 acres)	5960	10.6
Yield (tons per acre)	0.94	0.21
Labor productivity (tons per worker)	3.33	0.59
Yields of specific food crops (tons per acre)		
Maize	0.49	0.26
Rice	0.49	0.13
Yams	2.63	1.68
Groundnuts	0.40	0.18

Source: Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action,  
St. Martins Press, 1978. *which page?*

In explaining the food shortage, emphasis was increasingly laid on the inadequacy of distribution rather than production. Thus, according to the Minister for Agriculture:

"There is adequate food in the country. The problem has been the failure of food agencies to get them to the market. I intend setting up a separate body within the Ministry of Agriculture to take up the distribution of food" (Ghanaian Times 13th July 1965).

With regards to the cocoa economy, state intervention during this period was far from positive. The once powerful Cocoa Division of the Ministry of Agriculture was dissolved, and most of its functions were passed on to the United Ghana Farmers' Council. The supply of insecticides was cut back and subsidies withdrawn. Relaxed control

measures similarly led to the spread of swollen shoot. Consequences for output of this decline in maintenance became apparent in the second half of the decade (World Bank: Ghana Cocoa Sector Study, 1980).

In a broadcast after the overthrow of the Nkrumah Government, the Military Government claimed that:

"the country's reserves had dwindled to a level of £40,000 but this has been pledged against funds borrowed which were overdue. In practice, therefore, Ghana had virtually no reserves. The country was consequently threatened with a breakdown of the commercial system" (N.L.C. First One Hundred Days, 1966:2).

#### STABILIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION, 1966-'71

The military, which overthrew the Nkrumah government on the 24th of February 1966, led the partial retreat of the state sector from the advanced positions in the economy which it had been pushed by the C.P.P. regime. The trade deficit and the balance-of-payment difficulties as well as the budget deficits of the central government were greatly magnified in 1965, partly as a result of the bumper cocoa crop and the catastrophic fall in prices. There was a crisis of public management. The retreat of the N.L.C. Administration was partly an attempt to stabilize the economy. But at the same time it was also a move in a liberal or anti-socialist direction. The stabilization program was to reduce government deficits through a cut in appropriations for government institutions. It further implied a reduction in taxation, thereby giving incentives to the private sector to invest in the local economy. The Governor of the Central Bank, Frimpong suggests that under the circumstances there was a gradual liberalization of import and exchange controls. It was a policy designed to provide

incentives for export as a means of stimulating domestic production. It was hoped that this strategy would increase the availability of foreign exchange and diversify the commodity structure of exports and the economy itself (One Year Plan, 1969:37).

This liberal tendency was continued by the Progress Party Government which was brought to power in the 1969 elections, under the leadership of the late Dr. K. A. Busia. At the ideological level, the role of the state was moderated and several pledges were made to encourage the growth of a private-enterprise economy.

#### Rural Development Program

The Progress Party's approach to rural development places emphasis on the provision to the rural communities of social services and amenities in the form of good drinking water, better housing, hospital facilities, health centres and posts, schools etc. The Progress Party's concern with equity focused on the large disparities between rural and urban living standards. According to J. H. Mensah (1971), the then Finance Minister in Busia's Administration,:

"The principal task that has to be accomplished in the search for social justice in Ghana is to raise the levels of rural income as a whole vis-a-vis the levels in urban income as a whole, rather than to make adjustment within the structure of urban incomes" (One-Year Plan 1970-71:11).

Dr. Busia's Government had only a little more than two years in office before another coup swept the National Redemption Council into power early in 1972. In discussing the strategy adopted for dealing with socio-economic problems, Killick (1978), identifies four main imperatives:

1. Substantially, to raise domestic investment and saving rates.
2. To expand export earnings and attract more external assistance.
3. To accelerate the Ghanaianization of economic activities.
4. To place special emphasis on rural development.

These objectives were taken to entail greater public investment especially in agriculture and other rural programs. During the 1970-71 financial year the general policy for rural development was to encourage increased agricultural production, to expand certain basic amenities to the rural areas and to strengthen the technical staff at the district and regional levels so as to facilitate the availability of planning data and the efficient execution of projects in the rural areas. Power was returned to the Ministry of Agriculture, the extension services were to be improved, and research was to be intensified. In the 1970-71 financial year the government planned to expand its agricultural credit to the rural areas by opening new Farm Credit Service offices in several towns.

A provision of N¢2.2 million was made as a way of increasing small loan facilities to small farmers for the production of local food stuffs. Other policies directed specifically towards rural development were:

1. An expanded program of feeder road construction and maintenance;
2. An enlarged program for rural water supplies to be operated by the Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation with an increased subsidy from the government;

3. In the field of health, the Government continued its policy of laying emphasis on preventive medicine and of extending medical care to the rural population; and
4. N¢2.2 million was allocated for preliminary studies on rural electrification. (One Year Development Plan 1970-71).

According to the Government, the emphasis on rural development was justified because of the great imbalance in the distribution of incomes as well as of employment opportunities between rural and urban communities. Again, since over 60 percent of the population resides in the rural areas, "a development strategy which takes no cognizance of this fact runs the risk of being irrelevant" (Ibid, P. 20). Thus, any program designed to raise the national standard of living cannot succeed unless it improves the productivity, living conditions and welfare of the rural communities. What then was the organization put in place for the implementation of the Busia's program for rural development? It was the Ministry of Youth and Rural Development. The various departments were to share responsibility for community development, rural industries, rural water supply, feeder roads, rural electrification, emergency relief, resettlement, adult education and mass literacy. The Ministry was to plan joint policies with all other Ministries, Departments and Organizations which were connected with youth and rural development. The Ministry was to have four main departments, namely the Department of Planning and Programming, the Department of Rural Industries, the Department of Youth and the Department of Rural Development. The structure is depicted in Figure 3.




Fig. 3. Organizational Structure of the Ministry of Rural Development

What is obvious is the curious structure of the Ministry. The Chief Planning and Programming Officer became the main channel of communication between the Minister and his Principal Secretary on one hand, and the other heads of departments on the other. As coordinator of the activities of the Ministry, he was accorded a higher status than his colleagues. Again, the Department of Planning and Programming was assigned the responsibility for the creation of standards of work and criteria for evaluating the activities of the other development agencies of the Ministry.

#### General Assessment of Busia's Regime

It is very difficult to assess the Busia program because of the limited time period. Available evidence indicates that it was not very successful. One has to note, though, that it did seem that the stress on rural development was beginning to effect a real transfer

of resources. Progress was being recorded in the production of dry rice in the northern region of the country and the feeder road system was improved and extended.

The 1970/71 program involved expenditures by the Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation of N¢4,873,000 on on-going projects and N¢4,747,000 on new projects. The construction program in the cities was estimated to cost N¢1,868,000 (about 22 percent) and that in the rural areas N¢5,613,000 (about 58 percent). The number of bore holes increased from 356 in 1969 to 449 in 1970 and rose further to 457 in 1971 showing an increase of 26 percent in 1970 and a marginal rise of 107 percent in 1971. This shows that the number of wells increased by 110 in 1971 compared with the increase of 54 in 1970 and 34 in 1969.

The feeder roads program was seen by the Busia Administration as crucial to rural development and increased agricultural production. The program was to be coordinated by the Ministry of Youth and Rural Development. The program was a two-pronged attack on the secondary roads construction program carried on under the supervision of the Public Works Department, and the rural feeder road program under the Department of Community Development. From July 1968 to June 1970, the size of the total investment in the feeder roads program was N¢10 million with annual expenditure of N¢5 million. Despite this moderate investment the P.W.D. which received a substantial portion of the investment funds could only perform as shown in the following data.

		Mileage Constructed <u>P.W.D. Feeder Road Program</u>
July 1, 1969 to March 31, 1970	-	285 miles
July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970	-	325 miles
Approved Program 1970/71	-	397 miles

(Source: 1970/71 One Year Dev. Plan)

It should be noted that whereas in the eighteen months prior to July 1, 1968, only 185 miles of feeder roads were completed, 285 miles were completed in the twelve months covering the 1968/69 financial year and over 326 miles are estimated to have been completed in 1969/70. A careful observation of the rural roads program reveals some reasons underlying the inability of the P.W.D. to do a better job than it did during the period. Construction standards were set too high for the requirements of the traffic and costs. Again the overall physical program was not well defined to enable the Public Works Department to exercise adequate control over costs and construction progress. Another problem arises from the lack of a comprehensive feeder roads master plan which could have helped the erstwhile Feeder Roads Board to phase expenditure, coordinate the roads program with agricultural and other rural development programs and to evaluate annual performance against total needs.

#### Agricultural Production

Agriculture, defined here to include primarily the production of food crops, was given high priority by the Progress Party Government in the country's Two-Year Development Plan, 1968/69 - 1969/70 and the Development Budget of 1970/71 (Refer to Appendix A). It was the stated intention of the government to improve the extension



services, credit facilities and to intensify research in the agricultural sector. Yet inevitably the reality fell some way short of the intentions. For example, a survey in 1970-71 of two farming districts known in advance to have received special attention from government agricultural agencies revealed that 62 percent of the farmers surveyed had never received help from the Ministry of Agriculture and half the remainder said that help was hard to get, especially when most needed (Brown, 1972).

The Agricultural Development Bank which is the chief source of agricultural credit received 982 loan applications in 1969/70 with request for loans amounting to N£12.9 million. The Bank approved 524 of these applications and made loans totaling N£3.2 million.

Busia's program did not lead to any major agricultural breakthrough. During 1970 alone, total imports for food and materials for food, drink and tobacco processing industries stood at £87.3 million or 20.8 percent of total imports during that period. The overall rural consumer price index increased from 172.9 in 1968 to 185.0, 192.4 and 209.6 in 1969, 1970 and 1971. This shows an increase of 8.9 percent in the overall rural consumer price index in 1971 and 1970 compared with a rise of 4.0 percent in 1970 and 7.0 percent in 1969 over the previous year's level. Local food was responsible for the largest share of the increase in the overall consumer price index. Out of the total increase of 8.9 percent in the overall index of rural consumer prices, local food group was responsible for 6.2 percent rise (Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Surveys 1972).

With regards to cocoa production, the overall index of production and marketing (with 1968 = 100) was 106.1 in 1969, 115.2 in

1970, 117.2 in 1971 and 123.2 in 1972. Clearly, as table 3 shows, it was advantageous on the part of farmers to divert attention to the production of local foods and yet the government couldn't get them to produce more food due to input-output marketing problems such as poor organization, lack of credit and farming implements, and inadequate distribution system.

Table 3. Indices of Incomes and Prices 1968-71

<u>Retail Prices</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
Local foods	201	218	228	256
Other items	173	186	184	194
<u>Real Income</u>				
Industrial earnings	88	89	94	-
Cocoa incomes	48	62	60	61
<u>Other</u>				
Terms of trade of food farmers	116	117	124	132
Index of relative attractiveness of food farming over cocoa	242	189	207	216

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics: Economic Surveys 1972

Food shortages and rising prices, although partly relieved by imports and foreign aid shipments, continued to be a major worry. Much was blamed on the inefficiency of the private marketing system. The state made new attempts with guaranteed prices for certain staple crops and state purchases but failed to make any inroad on the private market. A highly ambitious scheme of intervention, the Task Force was planned in 1971 but did not mature before the new military coup

of January 1972 ("Feeding the Nation." A Comprehensive Report of the Task Force -- Food Distribution, Accra, Ministry of Agriculture, 1971).

#### THE PERIOD OF SELF-RELIANCE

The immediate background of the January 1972 military coup was the forty percent devaluation of the currency - cedi (¢) undertaken by the Busia administration (1972 U.S. \$1 = ¢2.75). The devaluation had been prompted by an acute foreign-payment crisis, which in its turn was largely the result of the unfortunate coincidence of a decline in export earnings and an effort to liberalize the import-control system. Devaluation and expectations of new restrictions on imports caused a sharp rise in prices. The problem of prices had been the chief concern of the wage-earning and salaried classes for quite some time. The shortages and high prices of local food items were their strongest grievance. It was imperative that the new regime pay special attention to the nation's food production and supply. The Ghana Economic Review, 1971-1972 reported that, "There is no evidence now to suggest that agricultural production is sufficient to cope with rapidly rising demand for food." Thus in early February of 1972, the Military regime launched its "Operation Feed Yourself" (OFY). The O.F.Y. was at an early point projected as the cornerstone of Ghana's new policy of self-reliance. Eradicating the food shortages was not the only goal of O.F.Y. The Military government hoped that the success of O.F.Y. would contribute to the growth of the general economy by increasing income and employment and easing the balance of payment problems. The period 1972 to 1974 was declared "the agricultural war years." In 1972, custom duties on agricultural machinery

and spare parts were waived. Also ₦39.3 million was given to O.F.Y. in addition to the ₦25 million from the banking system. Certain crops were selected for intensive cultivation in specific areas--cassava, maize, rice, plantain, yams, ground nuts and vegetables. Maize production appeared to be the most popular food crop under the O.F.Y. program. It was expected to be 496,000 tons in 1972 as compared with 378,000 tons in 1971, an increase of 31 percent (West Africa Magazine, 1974 July edition).

In the Five Year Development Plan 1975-80, a 6 percent annual economic growth rate in the agricultural sector was projected by the Military administration. When one considers that between 1969 and 1972 the rate of growth in the agricultural sector was only about 2.6 percent, the 6 percent projection was clearly ambitious.

Two agencies critical to the successful implementation of the O.F.Y. program were the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), which was solely owned by the State, and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Agricultural Development Bank operates three types of loans.

1. Short-term loans (to help borrowers meet production costs of their crops);
2. Medium term loans (for the purchase of farm equipment and livestock; and
3. Long term loans (for new and extensive schemes or the improvement of existing ones).

All loans were processed by the branch banks but had to be submitted to the central office for final approval. It usually took two to six months from application to disbursement of funds. Prior to 1975, a 6 percent interest rate was charged to farmers on loans.

In 1975 this was raised to 8.5 percent due to lack of working capital primarily because of these low interest rates and the loan defaults made on loans to state corporations. This increase in the interest rates understandably caused problems for many small farmers who were not able to pay the higher interest payments.

The Ministry of Agriculture was expected to coordinate the activities of the three state corporations and the one development board in the area of food production and marketing. These corporations are:

1. Food Production Corporation.
2. State Farms Corporation.
3. Food Distribution Corporation.
4. Grains and Legumes Development Board.

These units relied partially on loans from the A.D.B., however, the majority of their inputs were supplied from the Ministry of Agriculture.

Annual production targets were set for the Food Production and State Farms Corporation by the Government. Food Distribution Corporation was to market the output of these two organizations. The Grains and Legumes Board was to conduct research and promote certain crops to the farmers. The Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture was to take the most active role in the O.F.Y. implementation. It provided agricultural information and related services to the farmers. As the diagram below shows, the Extension Service was administered on a regional basis, and each of the nine regional offices (10 since 1981 with the creation of the Upper West Region) was headed by a Regional Agricultural Officer. Each region was subdivided into districts headed by District Agricultural Officers who although assisted by Technical Officers handled the largest share of the extension

duties. The chain of command and flow of information thus proceeded downward from one officer to the next. Distribution of inputs from the Ministry of Agriculture was handled mainly by the District Agricultural Officer. The important task of communicating the food policy of Ghana to the farmer, rested almost entirely on the District Agricultural Officer and his technical assistants. See Figure 4.




Figure 4. Implementation Structure

### Overall Assessment of the Program

A useful indicator of the Government's actual performance is the national consumer price index (1963 = 100) which stood at 226.7 in 1972 and the local food index at 259.4. By August of 1977, the national consumer index had risen to 1729.2, with the largest increases in local food, 2677.8. Inflation on local food prices soared in a three-year period from 1975-1978 to 190.4 percent (Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Surveys 1972-1979).

With regard to the rural areas, local food largely accounted for the overall rise in the rural consumer prices. The rural index of local food shot up from 241.9 in 1971 to 263.0, 313.8 and 358.7 in 1972, 1973 and 1974 respectively, showing an increase of 8.7 percent in 1972 compared with the rise of 19.3 percent in 1973 and 14.3 percent in 1974. In 1972 and 1973 the share of local food was 4.4 and 9.8 percent, respectively, out of the increase of 9.2 and 17.3 percent. In 1974, for example, out of the total increase of 17.7 percent in the overall rural index, local food was responsible for 7.2 percent rise (Ibid., 1969-74).

It is worth noting that several problems hamper the efforts of the Extension Service to assist the farmer. In addition to the limited availability of small farm research results, there is no mechanism for evaluation of the Extension Service.

The lack of feedback to the administrators at the top from those executing the Extension Services hinders adjustment, service effectiveness, and the achievement of declared goals. The government's method of giving orders and issuing decrees without adequate plans for implementation has created scepticism among the population. Governmental

actions have not brought sufficient amenities to the rural sector to keep rural youth there and to attract others from urban areas. Good drinking water and electricity are almost non-existent in most rural areas. Roads are poor and often impassable during the rainy season. Even though some of the problems encountered by the O.F.Y. implementors had no doubt been due to inadequate feeder roads, inefficient modes of transportation, inadequate machinery, and adverse weather conditions, the historical reasons for declining food production in Ghana is clear. The critical factor has been a public policy which has given a preferential position to export crop production. We have to admit that export crops such as cocoa are heavily taxed by the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, and yet marketing boards are supposed to protect the interests of the producer, offering the cocoa farmers price stability for their crops. The Legon Observer of June 1979 has documented the failures of marketing boards in the country. In view of this, one can argue that in reality, government favoritism towards cocoa farmers is not as pronounced as one might expect. See Table 4 which shows profitability of cocoa and competing crops. Cocoa production, for example, increased by 5.2 percent in 1972 but successively declined in 1973 and 1974 (Ghana Survey 1969-'74). On the face of it, Operation Feed Yourself appeared to be a feasible solution to the food shortage problem in Ghana. All the components necessary for success seemed to be present. Apparently the feasibility of the food self-sufficiency program was impaired by poor implementation (Ghana Commercial Bank Report, 1975).



Table 4. Indexes of Profitability of Cocoa and Competing Crops in Ghana

	1970 (Base) All Crops	1975			
		Cocoa	Maize	Cassava	Plantain
1. Average Yield	100	93	97	124	95
2. Output Price	100	200	476	462	358
3. Gross Returns (1 x 2 ÷ 100)	100	186	462	573	340
4. Labor Use	100	93	97	124	95
5. Wage Rate	100	286	286	286	286
6. Total Costs (4 x 5 ÷ 100)	100	266	277	355	272
7. Profit Index (3 ÷ 6 x 100)	100	70	169	161	125

Source: The World Bank: Ghana-Cocoa Sector Report, Dec. 1980, p. 29.

### Summary

One can characterize the four phases of state intervention in agriculture and rural development in terms of the shifting relationship between private and state capital and entrepreneurship. In the decolonization period of the '50s, the state was primarily concerned with making the surplus of the agricultural export economy available for public development. Intervention in production was aimed to ensure the growth of the existing peasant-capitalist system of production.

In the socialist-oriented phase (1961-66), the state, partly in response to falling export prices, sought to overcome its dependence on the colonial export prices by way of rapid industrialization,

including the mechanization of agriculture and the promotion of an agro-based processing industry. State capital and state entrepreneurship were assigned a leading role in this exercise.

The stabilization phase (1966-71) was a reaction on the financial crisis of the late Nkrumah years. Direct state participation was scaled down. For the first time, steps were taken to encourage private enterprise in food crops and other non-cocoa products. The period saw an appropriation of a large portion of a much reduced surplus (from the cocoa sector) for the maintenance of the public sector. Persistent food shortage and foreign payment difficulties led to the military takeover in 1972. The fourth phase ushered in a resurgence of state enterprise in close cooperation with an emerging class of private entrepreneurs. Provisional results released in 1973 showed disappointing results in some really basic food stuffs--plantains, yams, cocoyams, etc. In all these cases, the results showed a decline from 1971. The heaviest decline was in plantains--down from 3.23 million tons to 1.63 million tons; while guinea corn declined by 13 percent from 170,000 tons to 150,000 (West Africa, 1973).

Overall, the attempts at food self-sufficiency have not been remarkably successful. Writing in 1954, for instance, F. J. Pedler remarked on the wide seasonal variations in the prices of individual food stuffs commanded in Ghana's cities and concluded that such sharp variations could only be "an indication that too little food is produced to meet the needs of the people through the year. Traders know this, and they buy food at harvest time to hold it until prices rise. They are often blamed for high prices and scarcity, but their action

is the result of shortage, not the cause of it" (Pedler, 1954:51).

Imports of food and live animals were generally 15 to 20 percent of total imports throughout the sixties and seventies (Killick, 1978). While deficiencies in transportation and storage facilities might have contributed to the food price inflation, arguments by Nyanteng et al. (1971), that they were solely responsible must be rejected as much too strong. The writer agrees with Pedler (1954) and Killick (1978), that the core of the problem was one of inadequate output. As shown in Appendix B, the heavy public expenditures on defense, internal and foreign affairs and fiscal and financial services leaves all too little for investments in agriculture and rural development, and feeder roads. These expenditures by function represent a triumph of incrementalism over comprehensive planning. Thus, despite all the promises involved in Operation Feed Yourself, the commitment to agriculture remained little affected in the period 1970-1975 and that for rural development and transportation declined significantly.

Not until the marketing infrastructure is improved, not until seeds, tools and information reach the small-scale farmers who grow the food crops necessary to feed the nation, any program of food self-sufficiency will likely be ineffective. These then are some of the conditions that can make a difference in peasant participation--goal achievement equation.

## CHAPTER IV

### ANALYSIS OF DATA

#### INTRODUCTION

The intent of this chapter is to present data to evaluate the thesis of this study that while the relative success of the O.F.Y. agricultural program is positively related to participation, the extent to which participation contributes to rural development success depends to a large extent upon the "administrative arrangements" that impact participants. The chapter is divided into six parts. The first section briefly examines how at the national level, administration at that time tried to get various institutions and organizations to participate. It will be argued that mere exhortations alone do not ensure that organizations will perform creditably. Part 2 is devoted to an examination of the patterns of participation in the two districts. In the third section we look at the state of agricultural production in the two districts as reflected by the market prices of the two major food crops--plantain and cassava. In the absence of credible production figures, the market survey prices provided by the Ashanti Regional Office of the Central Bureau of Statistics is used to gauge the agricultural situation in the two districts. Section four presents the results of the survey of farmers' reaction to the planning and implementation of the O.F.Y. agricultural program. The fifth section is devoted to an account of the

state of socio-economic and administrative infrastructure in the two districts. The last section is devoted to an evaluation of the hypotheses based upon the research evidence.

#### NATIONAL LEVEL PARTICIPATION

To the Military Administration (1972-78), the Operation Feed Yourself (O.F.Y.) agricultural program represented a declaration of war against inadequate food production. In order to promote O.F.Y., the Commissioner for Agriculture met with several different groups. For example, at a meeting with the Brong-Ahafo House of Chiefs, the Commissioner, General Addo, assured the chiefs of the regime's determination to involve them in the agricultural revolution. He, therefore, appealed to the chiefs, in the interests of national welfare, to give their unflinching support to the government and to assist O.F.Y. program vigorously (Legon Observer Vol. 5, 1972).

Students from the nation's three universities showed their support by continually offering free labor on Okyereko and Dahwenya irrigation schemes as well as cutting sugarcane for the Asutsuare and Komenda sugar factories. (Did the students participate in order to get the Military Administration to cancel the student loan scheme introduced by the ousted civilian government?)

To attain the goal of the agricultural revolution, the Government needed the support of the people, especially the farmers. In order to facilitate acceptance, the Government initiated several measures to make O.F.Y. a household word throughout the length and breadth of the country.

The O.F.Y. program was frequently covered in the Government's

controlled newspapers. Their editorials consistently exhorted the people to cooperate and stand firm behind the Government. For example, The Ghanaian Times and The Daily Graphic devoted much of their space to explaining the purpose, goals and accomplishments of O.F.Y. Even the two privately owned newspapers, The Legon Observer and The Pioneer, gave the program heavy coverage. Billboards in the principal cities urged Ghanaians to go back to the land. The Government owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation and GBC-TV propagandized the O.F.Y. program. A weekly television program dealt with the virtues of increased agricultural production.

With regard to implementation, the regime relied on a number of institutions to execute the O.F.Y. program. They were the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Economic Planning, the Agricultural Development Bank (A.D.B.), and the Research Sections of the three universities. It is interesting to note that no separate organization or institution was created solely in order to execute O.F.Y. However, the Ministry of Agriculture did provide the majority of extension services and physical inputs to the farmers.

The Research Institutes in the country (Animal Research, Crops Research, Food Research, Soil Research, Water Resources and Fisheries Research Units) were expected to participate fully by releasing information as well as new discoveries they have in their arsenals that farmers can utilize.

How did the Government make food production attractive to farmers? Presumably, the Government offered attractive subsidies and price policies. The three areas in which subsidies were featured were:

1. farm inputs and agricultural investment;
2. guaranteed minimum producer prices; and
3. guaranteed maximum consumer prices.

(Perspective Study of Agricultural Development  
for Ghana, F.A.O. of the United Nations, 1976:27)

A substantial portion of the subsidies for farm inputs were to have been spent on fertilizers, cutlasses, and improved seeds--inputs considered critical for the success of the agricultural revolution. The aim of the price policy package was to ensure that farmers received a high enough price for their crops while still keeping a check on food prices for the urban consumers. Credit facilities were to be made available to make it possible for all farmers to get loans. In this regard, the Agricultural Development Bank was expected to provide the bulk of agricultural loans. What is more, commercial banks (Barclays, Ghana Commercial, Social Security, and Standard) provided credit facilities to the farmers.

The results of the O.F.Y. program, as already noted in Chapter 3, clearly show that the creation of an institution for the purpose of carrying out specific goals should not lead one to assume that the institution performed the task it set out to do.

Decision-making was affectively in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture. The implementation exercise was also carried out by the Ministry. Others too participated at the implementation stage: chiefs by promising to give land to those interested in farming; high schools and universities by establishing their own farms and donating labor at irrigation sites, as well as cutting sugarcane for the country's sugar factories; financial institutions, by making loans available

to farmers; farmers by engaging in food crop production; and the media by propangandizing the O.F.Y. program. Suffice it to note that all these activities were concentrated in the urban centres. As already noted (Fig. 4, page 70), the link between the farmers in the rural areas (who were expected to ensure the success of the program) and the O.F.Y. program was the District Agricultural Officer and his technical assistants who could be equally unaware of what was going on or could lack the physical inputs that were supposed to be distributed. The next section which deals with participation patterns in the two districts will help further elucidate this issue.

#### PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION: NKAWIE DISTRICT

##### Decision-Making

For an agricultural revolution geared towards food self-sufficiency and grassroots rural development, one is amazed to find that there was no serious attempt to solicit information about sites to plant, what to plant, and other related issues. From mid-'71 to early '75 when the agricultural revolution was supposed to be in top gear, several durbars (meetings involving Government officials, chiefs and people) were organized at Nkawie, the district capital, during which the Regional Commissioner would explain to the chiefs and people assembled, of the aims of the agricultural program and the need for the people to embrace the program to ensure its success. The Chiefs would pledge their allegiance to the Government and their support for the program. The Chiefs would then appeal to the Government through the Regional Commissioner for infrastructural projects like roads, water, health posts, electricity, etc. The Commissioner



would promise to do something about it and the durbar would come to a close. At no time did the Commissioner and the Regional Agricultural Officer invite the chiefs (custodians of the land) and office holders for a round table talk in order to discuss the specifics of bringing the agricultural revolution to a successful conclusion. Thus, identification of needs, establishment of priorities, devising potential action and feasibility assessment--all these activities were firmly in the hands of the Regional Agricultural Officer who presumably deals with farmers through his District officers. Was this genuine decision-making participation? According to Lele (1975), commenting on rural water supply projects in Kenya, this was a form of participation since the Chiefs and people were told what was expected of them and the aims of the program were explained. Of course, this is not an active form of participation usually expected by most researchers and rural development practitioners.

Once every four months, from 1972 to 1975, the focus of the writer's attention since the "revolution" evaporated after 1975, agricultural shows were organized at the district capital during which farmers could display their food stuffs to the "admiration" of the crowd. Special prizes were distributed to the best farmers. At these functions the Regional Commissioner or his representative would exhort farmers to redouble their efforts to ensure the success of the agricultural revolution. Sometimes agricultural implements like cutlasses and other essential commodities were distributed. Suffice it to note that very few farmers were successful in getting their supplies since the items were grossly unavailable.

With regard to activities such as staffing and financing of the

District office of the Ministry of Agriculture, this was the exclusive preserve of the headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture. The local people, therefore, had no control or ability to influence the operations of the District office. In sum, their participation in decision-making consisted of making their demands known to the Commissioner and his Regional Agricultural Officer and their being told what was expected from them. It ought to be noted that other government departments represented in the district took no part in the decision-making process.

### Implementation

The discussion of participation in implementation will cover resource contributions--labour, materials, cash, information, etc., enlistment in programs, and involvement in program administration. We begin with a consideration of resource contributions. Provision of information, labour, materials and money, all of which are important aspects of implementation participation. It has already been pointed out that no information was solicited from the local residents regarding where, what and how they want to plant. Therefore, we are left with a discussion of contributions of labour and money. Provision of labour by local residents, leaders and other government personnel were obvious forms of implementation participation in the agricultural program. Chiefs donated lands (10,000 acres by the chief of Nkawie), and in some cases agricultural implements were donated. Various government departments established communal farms. Schools and colleges too established school farms. I need not stress that the impetus to participate was clearly from the top down. Essential

commodities were being distributed through Regional and District Administrations. Even though in theory distribution of these commodities (milk, sugar, mackerel, soap, cutlasses) were not made contingent on participation in the agricultural program, in practice it turned out to be that those organizations vocal with their projected harvest or land cultivated received more commodities.

Funding for the operations of the District Agricultural Office came from the Ministry of Agriculture Headquarters. On many of the communal farms was labour donated during the weekends. On the Council farms, some of the labourers of the District Council were assigned to the farms whereas the other members donated their labour on the weekends. For young people, opportunities for participation in the program were available through youth clubs, ie. The Ghana Youth Association, and as members of elementary or high schools. Their labour was at times rewarded by receipt of World Food Program's products, such as wheat, oil, dry skimmed milk. In fact, the Youth Association had always been a recipient of these products.

Where did this leave the farmer? His enlistment in the program was through cultivating or planting his food crop as usual. He is a member of his ward's development committee and joins in selecting a representative to the district council. It is this ward representative who is expected to collect the essential items or commodities for the ward distribution. Since these items were grossly inadequate, and for lack of transportation, the farmer remained innocent of the happenings at the district capital. A majority of the farmers never received the pre-set radios to listen to agricultural programs nor the farming implements promised by the Government. The same story was

obtained at the District Agricultural Office. For lack of sufficient agricultural inputs, such as seedlings, plantain suckers, and transportation, the district officer was unable to reach the peasant farmer (Leonard, 1977). Thus as already stated, the O.F.Y. program seemed to have been designed for the cities and the urban centers and not for the rural dwellers. They remained untouched. Some farmers holding offices in farmers associations somehow managed to acquire loans for agricultural purposes in the regional capital on their own terms as farmers and not necessarily as office holders--(conversation with Opanin Yaw Asante, National President, Farmers Federation, July 1983). Some essential items as cutlasses, mackerel, sugar, soap and grinding stones, passed through the association for onward distribution to the rank and file. Conversations with a lot of the farmers in the rural areas revealed that most of the farmers did not receive them.

#### Participation in Program Benefits

Because of lack of data it is very difficult to show that farmers increased their incomes or assets. However, one cannot deny that some executive members of farmers associations did reap some social benefits. At durbars and agricultural shows, they were the people who were usually introduced to visiting dignitaries, thus opening the way for further contacts. The only benefit which the average rural dweller obtained was probably the consumption of the few services and amenities available within the district, such as elementary school, health care, roads and water supply.

## PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION: BEKWAI DISTRICT

Decision-Making

Bekwai is a major cocoa and food producing district (Pioneer, 1983:1). It can boast of a larger population than Nkawie and a variety of social amenities as well as a reasonable level of administrative infrastructure. Hence, her status is Grade 1 as opposed to Nkawie which has a rating of Grade 2. The first question we wish to ask is what was the level of decision-making participation by the local residents in Bekwai? As far as the District Agricultural Officer and the residents can remember, their participation was nil, or at best, minimal. The O.F.Y. program effectively became a thing of the past after 1975 and, therefore, the period that the residents consider important is the period from 1971-'74. The residents saw very few durbars and agricultural shows during the period under consideration. They do, however, remember that the Regional Commissioner attended one or two durbars a year organized in his honour during which the Commissioner and his Regional Agricultural Officer would stress the importance of the district as a major cocoa and food producing area and that they should strive to maintain their status. As usual, the chiefs in the district would make demands for construction of new infrastructural projects and improvement of old ones. The residents, therefore, had nothing to do regarding program planning decisions involving the identification of needs, establishment of priorities as to which crops should be focused upon, and whether in fact those activities can be carried out under the prevailing conditions. Additionally, questions as to how to organize the district, the agricultural office, staffing, finance and who would be responsible for

monitoring the agricultural operations within the district. All these issues were the exclusive preserve of the Ministry of Agriculture Headquarters.

### Implementation

It must be pointed out that data availability sharply limits the analysis of specifics as to who was involved in implementing the agricultural program in the District. Our discussion, therefore, will in general focus on resource contributions, enlistment in programs, and involvement in program administration. Local residents will, therefore, refer to people residing in the district at the time of the implementation of the program--chiefs, office holders, other government personnel, youth and rural dwellers.

The District Council, the traditional councils, the secondary schools, training colleges, elementary schools and Seventh Day Adventist Organization all established their own communal farms as their contribution towards the success of the revolution. The Seventh Day Adventist secondary school at Bekwai, for example, established a 100 acre school farm for maize, cassava, plantain and vegetables. Paramount chiefs in the district made available land to the tune of more than 8,000 acres.

Since Bekwai is a grade one district, the District Chief Executive is always a senior public servant with the minimum rank of a Principal Assistant Secretary. It is, therefore, to be expected that more essential commodities being distributed through the Regional Administration will get to the District Administration for onward distribution to the residents in the district. The District

Agricultural Officer with the rank of Assistant Chief Technical Officer commanded an office which was relatively better equipped than Nkawie in terms of personnel, transportation, office equipment, inputs such as cutlasses, hoes and seedlings. These enabled him to reach a larger clientele than his counterpart at Nkawie.

Labour on communal farms that were established by the various institutions was donated. In some cases, those who contributed labour received products like wheat, cooking oil, fish etc. donated by the World Food Program and distributed in the district by the district office of the Department of Rural Development, Department of Social Welfare, and the National Youth Council.

The rural farmer who is a member of one of the producer associations such as the Cooperative Union or the Farmers Union received his supply of essential commodities as well as some agricultural inputs, especially cutlasses. Additionally, he may receive some of his agricultural inputs from the District agricultural office as well as the District Administration. The evidence here is that, since these organizations were relatively better supplied with agricultural inputs as well as essential commodities, a larger proportion of the rural dwellers received their supplies. The researcher was unable to collect data from the banks in the district regarding the number of people who did receive credit and the amount loaned. But the presence of four financial institutions in the district (Table 18) lead one to assume that the rural dwellers in this district had better access to financial credit since these institutions were instructed by the Government to give as much help to the farmers as they could. The Government pegged interest on agricultural loans at 6 percent. During

the period under investigation, agricultural labour was quite expensive and those with loans could expand their farms with the credit received.

### Participation in Program Benefits

Consumers in the Bekwai district paid a lower price for foodstuffs because the supply of foodstuffs in the markets was better than the supply situation in Nkawie markets. Certainly people living in this district (Bekwai) were better off than those in Nkawie district with respect to the number, variety and availability of amenities--schools, health centres, transportation, and water supply. Thus we can safely assume that rural residents, the poor and less poor alike, benefited from the social amenities and the administrative infrastructure available, although we lack precise information that directly relates to the distribution of participation in social benefits. Most certainly the better-off residents benefitted more than the less well-off.

### DISTRICT COMPARISONS OF PARTICIPATION

#### Decision-Making

The two districts in general share a common characteristic with regard to participation in decision-making. The locus of involvement with regard to program planning and operating decisions was the exclusive realm of the regional office of the Ministry of Agriculture. Was it because the technocratic and elitist staff of the Ministry are not oriented to a participatory style of operation, even though the Government had clearly stated that the program was aimed at grass root rural development? One would have expected the program officials to



handle this situation by making initial contacts and negotiations with national authorities, through the process of trying to forge alliances with other organizations, to interactions with client and interest groups at the local level as the program sought to achieve its goals.

One cannot deny the existence of different sets of actors in the districts with diverse and often competing interests. When given the chance, these actors might attempt to influence the distribution of whatever resources a program has at its disposal (eg. loan funds, seedlings, fertilizers, building materials, jobs that will be created, influence etc.). It is very tempting for one to argue that since participation in decision-making represents an opportunity to gain access to these resources by having a say as to who will receive them and/or how they are delivered and utilized, the restriction of decision-making participation to program personnel serves to shield the program's resources from the competing demands made upon them. No matter how one sees it, program planners will continue to face the basic problem of achieving a balance that on one hand keeps a program from becoming a prisoner of the status quo where involvement in decisions reflects existing power distributions and that on the other ensures the program enough grass roots support and access to resources from the district to allow it to achieve its development goals. In sum, neither districts played any significant role in both program planning and program operating decisions. As shown in Table 5 A, and B, there was no difference between districts insofar as decision-making participation was concerned. Neither played a part in the identification of crops, in establishing priorities and goal setting, in decisions as to where to locate activities, or in organizing and staffing of the

District's office of the Ministry of Agriculture etc.

### Implementation

Our framework for the analysis of participation in implementation revolves around three main issues: 1) contribution of resources--information, money, materials, labour, etc.; 2) enlistment in programs; and 3) inclusion in program administration.

For the purpose of implementation effectiveness, information on farming practices, land holdings, consumption patterns, health practices and loan histories represent the kind of data considered vital and sought by program planners. Evidence on patterns of participation in the two districts shows that these data were never sought. What is more, there was no attempt to seek directly information on the wants and needs of farmers' associations. However, common to the two districts was the contribution of labour, land and farming implements (Table 5C). Chiefs in the two districts made land available. In the Bekwai district it amounted to about 8,000 acres whereas in Nkawie it was about 10,000 according to the linguists (spoke persons) of the chiefs concerned.

In sum, for both districts, available evidence indicates that local organizations--youth associations, farmers associations, producer cooperatives--failed to carry out certain important functions due to the administrative mechanisms created by the program planners. Functions such as provision of a vehicle for shared decision-making, creation of a communications network among farmer participants and between farmers and project staff, expansion and facilitation of service delivery, and mobilization of local resources, are within the capabilities of well organized local organizations. Local organizations

in the two districts were simply not encouraged to play those roles considered vital to the success of any worthwhile rural program for change and development (Refer to Table 5 A, B, C, for summary of participation levels).

#### Participation in Program Benefits

In terms of participation benefits, the residents in Bekwai district enjoyed more benefits than residents in the Nkwie district. They enjoyed a lower price in foodstuffs (figures 5 and 6, pages 95 and 96) and because of the availability of a wide variety of social amenities as well as administrative infrastructure (Table 19), one can conclude that Bekwai residents benefited more during the period.

Table 5. Summary of Participation Levels in Phases of Program Planning, Program Operating and Contribution of Resources

<u>A. Program Planning</u>	<u>Nkwie</u>	<u>Bekwai</u>
1. Identification of crops	None	None
2. Design and feasibility questions	None	Less
3. Establishing priorities and goal setting	None	None
<u>B. Program Operating</u>		
4. Where to locate activities	None	None
5. Organizing and staffing	None	None
6. Membership, choice of leaders	Same	Same
7. Financial decisions	None	None
<u>C. Contribution of Resources</u>		
8. Labor	Less	More
9. Money	Less	More
10. Materials (cutlass, hoe, fertilizer, seedlings)	Less	More
11. Information	None	None
12. Land	More	Less

# AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (SELECTED FOODSTUFFS)

"The Accra launching of the 'Harvest Week' was performed by General Addo, Commissioner for Agriculture, at the Continental Hotel (in the capital city of Accra), of all places! It was reportedly organized by some National Committee of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, and most of the people invited were diplomats, V.I.P.s and press-men." (Culled from The Legon Observer Notebook, September issue, 1972:8).

"It was widely reported in the newspapers that the students of the University of Ghana had put over 200 acres of land under cultivation in response to the campaign. Would someone suggest to those who matter to find out how many bags of corn the Legonites have harvested. I have no doubt that anyone who undertakes this study will discover the difference between 'saying' and 'doing' in Ghana. Did our military launch Operation Feed Yourself for all except themselves?" (Manu, O., 1972:45)

The first quotation summarizes the approach of the then Administration to the whole planning and implementation process of the agricultural program. It was definitely bound to affect production. As already stated, the whole program seemed to have been designed for the cities rather than the rural areas where production actually takes place.

The second quotation aptly summarizes the feelings of many observers of the agricultural scene at that time. Organizations and institutions were all engaged in the exercise of "cooking up" production figures that were clearly not in tune with reality. If their figures were partially correct, the impact could have been felt in the markets. In 1977, Girdner et al. undertook a survey of the agricultural situation and found to their dismay that the Ghana Food Production Corporation couldn't provide yield figures for 1972 through 1975. Yet this is a Corporation set up specifically to engage in food production at a time when the banner of food production was on high.


The conclusion here is that the O.F.Y. agricultural program didn't make the impact that was expected due to several reasons already discussed in Chapter 3. The program certainly didn't make any appreciable inroads in the two districts as the market price of selected food stuffs show, simply because, among other things, the program planners failed to "reach the peasant farmers" (Leonard, 1977) (See Figures 5 and 6). In the absence of credible production figures, a useful indicator of the level of production at that time is the market prices of the two major food crops, plantain and cassava. The market surveys were conducted weekly throughout the period 1971-78 by the Kumasi Regional Office of the Central Bureau of Statistics. The surveys were conducted at many "market towns" within each district. Since these marketing centres are many and are within reach (by road or by foot), one can argue that lack of transportation did not seriously prevent farmers from selling their food stuffs. In these "market towns" unlike regional capitals, prices of food stuffs are not set by any outside body but determined through haggling. Hence, when there are more food stuffs available, consumers pay a lower price since these perishable food stuffs brought to the market must be disposed of whatever the price. Figures 5 and 6 show that, among other things, the prices per kilo for plantain and cassava got out of hand beginning in 1973, a time when the agricultural revolution was supposed to be in top gear. For example, the (¢) cedi value per kilo for plantain in Nkawie averaged ¢1.8 for 1971 and 1972 but shot up to ¢3.32 for 1973 to 1975. For Bekwai, plantain price per kilo shot up from ¢1.8 to ¢2.7 for the same period, an increase of 50 percent for Bekwai and 84 percent for Nkawie. (US \$1 = ¢cedi 2.75, 1972)

Secondly, the difference in prices of the two commodities in the two districts was not significant for the period 1971-72. The average price of plantain for the period was ₦1.8 in Nkawie and ₦1.8 in Bekwai; for cassava it was ₦1.3 in Nkawie and ₦0.50 in Bekwai. But the price differential began to widen after 1973. From 1973 to 1975 Nkawie residents were paying on the average ₦0.62 more for the same kilo of plantain and ₦0.97 more for cassava.

My explanation is that during the administration of the Busia's Government (1969-1971), rural development was given top priority and farm inputs were imported in appreciable quantities as well as small loans (₦300-₦1000) being made available to farmers in areas designated as food crop production areas. These two districts qualified for the small loans and, therefore, when Busia was overthrown on the 13th of January 1972, farmers' enthusiasm for food crop production was still at a high level.


In essence, figures 5 and 6 show that, in terms of food crop production, Bekwai did better than Nkawie for reasons other than simply differentials in participation. According to the Extension offices in both districts, as at 1978, 184,985 acres out of Nkawie's total land area of 273,237 acres was under food stuffs/cocoa cultivation compared with Bekwai's 190,793 acres out of the total land area of 300,095 acres. What tipped the scale in Bekwai's favor is the presence of a wide variety of social amenities as well as the district's administrative infrastructure which impacted on the district's participation (Liebenow, 1982; Brinkerhoff, 1980). The next two sections, therefore, are devoted to an account of the farmers'

Figure 5. Average Annual Price/Kg for Cassava:  
Nkawie and Bekwai Districts (1971-78)



Source: Compiled from Central Bureau of Statistics (Kumasi), Weekly Market Surveys 1971-78.

Figure 6. Average Annual Price/Kg for Plantain:  
Nkawie and Bekwai Districts (1971-78)



Source: Compiled from Central Bureau of Statistics (Kumasi), Weekly Market Surveys 1971-78.



assessment of the program, and then a look at the administrative as well as the socio-economic infrastructure in the two districts.

#### FARMERS' ASSESSMENT OF O.F.Y. PROGRAM

What was the reaction of the peasant farmer to the planning and implementation of the O.F.Y. program? A useful indicator of the success or failure of the regime's grass root agriculture and rural development program can be derived from the response of the farmers toward that policy.

On the whole, the peasant farmers perception of the O.F.Y. agricultural program was negative. Twenty-five farmers in each of the two districts were randomly selected from 5 villages and interviewed. In informal sessions these farmers reported that the whole program was badly planned and managed and blamed the policy planners (the Military Administration at that time) and the policy executors (the bureaucrats) for the unimpressive results of the program. Of the 50 respondents, 46 or 92 percent said they were not satisfied with the way the program was implemented (Table 6). Did they have confidence in the ability of the program to achieve the goals set? To this question, 42 respondents, or 84 percent said no. According to these informants, based on the way the program was planned and implemented, they knew it wasn't going to make any difference to their lives or the output of the agricultural sector (Table 7).

#### Information About O.F.Y.

The impression one gets when talking with local farmers is that they wouldn't notice if the District Agricultural Office were to disappear. For example, 23 out of 25 respondents or 92 percent

Table 6. Satisfaction with Program Implementation

District	Satisfied	Not Satisfied	No Comment	Total
Bekwai	1	22	2	25
Nkawie	1	24	-	25

Table 7. Confidence in Program's Ability to Achieve Goals

District	Yes	No	Total
Bekwai	6	19	25
Nkawie	2	23	25

in the Nkawie district had no contact whatsoever with the office during and after the implementation of the agricultural program (Table 8). Yet, it was this very office which the Government was counting on to "reach" the peasant farmer with inputs as well as information.

Table 8. Contact with District Agricultural Office

District	Frequently	Occasional	No Contact	Total
Bekwai	1	6	18	25
Nkawie	1	2	23	25

What then were the sources of information about the agricultural program? Of the respondents in Nkawie district, the majority (15 or 60 percent) heard from friends. For Bekwai, the majority (10 or 40 percent) heard from the radio. All these show the ineffectiveness of the District office of the Ministry of Agriculture at a time when agriculture was supposed to be a top priority. Overall, within the two districts, friends were a major source of information, followed

by the radio. Of the 50 respondents, 21 or 42 percent got the information from friends, 17 or 34 percent got the information from the radio, whereas only 3 or 6 percent got the information about the aims and programs of the O.F.Y. from the District office of the Ministry of Agriculture (See Table 9).

Table 9. Sources of Information about O.F.Y. Program

District	Radio	Newspapers	Friends	District Agricultural Office	Total
Bekwai	10	7	6	2	25
Nkawie	7	2	15	1	25

### Promises

A common feature of agricultural program implementation in the country has been for the Government officials to make numerous speeches and promises, with exhortations addressed to the farmers to have faith in the Government and the agricultural program. It was, therefore, fitting to ask the respondents what promises were made, and the extent to which the promises were fulfilled. The farmers lamented that the Government couldn't live up to its promises of inputs and loans. Those in the Nkawie area complained bitterly about their inability to get the necessary inputs such as cutlasses, credit, and seedlings. As Table 10 shows, 37 or 74 percent of the respondents from the two districts said that the Government promised inputs and loans. How many of these promises were honored? Table 11 shows that 10 (or 20 percent of the 50 respondents) felt that some of the promises had been fulfilled. On the other hand, 38 (or 76 percent) felt that none of the promises had

been fulfilled. Of the 25 respondents in Nkawie district, 22 (or 88 percent) felt that none of the promises had been fulfilled, compared with 16 (or 64 percent) in Bekwai district.

Table 10. Types of Promises Made by the Government

District	Inputs	Loans	Both inputs and loans	Total
Bekwai	5	3	17	25
Nkawie	3	2	20	25

Table 11. Extent of Fulfillment of the Promises

District	Most	Some	None	No response	Total
Bekwai	0	8	16	1	25
Nkawie	0	2	22	1	25

### Assistance

For farmers to embrace and respond to any agricultural program, they need to have some form of assistance from the Extension Service run by the Ministry of Agriculture, loans and credit from the local banks or from the agency set up by the Government to ensure loans disbursement to farmers and lastly, some assistance from the Farmers' Association or other local organization so set up to provide information, incentives (essential commodities like cutlasses, sugar, soap, mackerel etc.). The respondents, therefore, were asked to state what assistance they might have received from either the District office of the Ministry of Agriculture, local banks or the local farmers' association. Tables 12 through 14 reveal that 7 (28 percent) Bekwai respondents received assistance in the form of inputs (seedlings,

cutlasses) from the District office of the Ministry of Agriculture, compared with 2 (8 percent) from Nkawie. Few farmers constituting 6 (24 percent) of the Bekwai respondents said that they received credit which enabled them to hire labourers as well as purchase some inputs in order to expand their farms, compared with 1 (4 percent) from Nkawie district.

In sum, of the 50 respondents from both districts, 37 (74 percent) received no form of assistance from the District Agricultural office (Table 12), 43 (86 percent) received no form of assistance from local banks (Table 13), and what is more, 46 (92 percent) received no form of assistance whether in the form of information, farm implements, credits and loans from the local farmers' association (Table 14).

Table 12. Assistance Received from District Agricultural Office

District	Inputs (seedlings, cutlasses, etc.)	Information	None	Total
Bekwai	7	3	15	25
Nkawie	2	1	22	25

Table 13. Assistance from Local Banks

District	Credit	Credit (inputs)	None	Total
Bekwai	6	-	19	25
Nkawie	1	-	24	25

Table 14. Assistance from Farmers' Association

District	Some	None	Total
Bekwai	3	22	25
Nkawie	1	24	25

Based on the interviews with the respondents, farmers were disappointed with past agricultural policies and yet willing to do their best to feed themselves and their families. The average Ashanti takes pride in his ability to take care of himself and to be seen as self-reliant. Therefore, it was shocking to this researcher when 23 of the 25 respondents in the district of Nkawie, without hesitation, said that they were unable to feed themselves and their families well. The figure was slightly lower in Bekwai district--21 or 84 percent. Overall, as table 15 shows, 44 or about 88 percent of the farmers interviewed declared their inability to feed themselves and their families as they used to be able to do.

Table 15. Ability to Feed One's Family

District	Yes	No	Total
Bekwai	4	21	25
Nkawie	2	23	25

It ought to be noted that the residents in the two districts did, however, agree that the Operation Feed Yourself program had helped Ghana by creating an awareness of the vital need for agricultural development. The respondents were asked to describe the food situation during the period of O.F.Y. (1972-78). Of the 25 respondents from Bekwai, 6, or about one-fourth, described it as being somewhat adequate; for Nkawie it was only 2 or about one-twelfth. Overall, 42 or 84 percent of the farmers interviewed described the food situation as inadequate--a very telling commentary on the performance of the policy planners and executors (Table 16).

Table 16. Description of Food Production

District	Plentiful	Inadequate	Somewhat Adequate	Adequate	Total
Bekwai	-	19	6	-	25
Nkawie	-	23	2	-	25

Finally, the respondents were asked to reflect on past agricultural programs and indicate what it would take to increase food production in the country. They cited land, market price, farm implements, credit, and good transportation to marketing centres. They were then asked to pick one which they deemed a top priority. Table 17 reflects the responses they gave. Of the 50 respondents from both districts, 23 or 46 percent chose farm implements; 12 or 24 percent chose credit; 9 or 18 percent chose a good market price; 4 or 8 percent chose land and finally 2 or 4 percent selected transportation to marketing centres.

Table 17. Requirements for Increased Production

District	Farm Implements	Credit	Market Price	Land	Transportation	Total
Bekwai	10	7	5	2	1	25
Nkawie	13	5	4	2	1	25

Next we take a close look at the state of administrative and socio-economic infrastructure in the two districts in an attempt to unravel the mystery surrounding the relatively better agricultural performance of Bekwai vis a vis Nkawie. In the second section, we noted that there was no basic difference in their participation

patterns. What then might have accounted for the differences in their agricultural performances discussed earlier?

## ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE

### Administrative Infrastructure

A casual glance at the information presented in Table 18 reveals that Bekwai surpasses Nkawie. Nkawie can count only seven out of the eighteen Government departments and financial institutions represented in the Bekwai district. For farmers to respond to the call for more agricultural production, they will need the necessary inputs such as cutlasses, seedlings, credit to purchase inputs and/or to hire additional hands, transportation of products to markets, access to clinics when they are sick, good water to drink to ensure that they are always fit to do the hard work on the farm. At the time of the implementation of the O.F.Y. agricultural program, four major financial institutions were located in the Bekwai District, namely, Ghana Commercial Bank, Agricultural Development Bank, Social Security and National Insurance Trust, and Rural Bank. It must be noted that these institutions were competing to get as much credit to the farmer as possible as a way of demonstrating their support of the agricultural program. Even though the researcher was unable to obtain the exact amount of funding of agricultural projects in the district from these financial institutions, the survey revealed that more farmers in this district received loans from these institutions as compared to those in the Nkawie district. Table 13 shows that of the 25 farmers surveyed in each district, 6 or about one-fourth of the farmers in the Bekwai district received credit from the



financial institutions as compared with only 1 in the Nkawie district.

The state-owned Food Distribution Corporation charged with the responsibility of purchasing and distributing the purchased food stuffs in the urban centres was operating in the district of Bekwai. There was no such facility in Nkawie district. A more telling feature is the condition of the District Extension office in the two districts. The Bekwai Extension office can boast of a Land-Rover for transporting the farming inputs to the farmers in the district. The researcher observed at the time of the survey (July-August 1983) that the Extension office had all the required personnel in place whereas the office in Nkawie had not yet filled the vacancies needed to bring its staff to the required thirty-five. In my conversation with Mr. P. N. Amponsah, the Nkawie District Extension officer, he indicated that the office lacked the necessary office equipment, farming inputs, especially adequate seedlings for distribution to farmers. One thing he stressed was the lack of a vehicle, preventing him from visiting farmers and getting to know their problems. I need not point out that this gentleman is of the rank of a principal technical officer which is below the rank of the Bekwai Extension Officer. Mr. Adu Acheampong's (Bekwai) rank of Assistant Chief Technical Officer puts him more or less on equal footing with the Regional Agricultural Officer in Kumasi (the regional capital), thus assuring him a better access to the few agricultural inputs available at the Regional Office. The same case may be argued for the District Administration. The Chief Executive of the Bekwai District (Mr. J. K. Bonsu) is of the rank of Principal Assistant Secretary compared with Senior Assistant Secretary's rank of the Nkawie Chief

Executive (Mr. Dan Forson). Thus, the Bekwai's Chief Executive is second only to the Regional Administrative Officer in terms of rank, putting him in a better position to lay claims on the few agricultural inputs and/or essential commodities such as salt, sugar, mackerel, cutlasses, soap, and milk distributed through the Regional Administration.

Table 18. Presence or Absence of Administrative Infrastructure in the Two Districts

Infrastructural Items	Bekwai	Nkawie
1. District Administration's office	x	x
2. Ghana Education Service	x	-
3. Department of Animal Husbandry	x	x
4. Department of Forestry	x	x
5. Information Services Department	x	x
6. Department of Social Welfare	x	-
7. District Treasury	x	-
8. Agricultural Extension Office	x	x
9. Produce Inspection Division	x	x
10. Town/Country Planning	x	x
11. Meteorological Station	x	-
12. Ministry of Health	x	-
13. Water and Sewage Corporation	x	-
14. Food Distribution Corporation	x	-
15. Ghana Commercial Bank	x	-
16. Agricultural Development Bank	x	-
17. Social Security and National Insurance Trust	x	-
18. Rural Bank	x	-

Key: x - Presence of  
- - Absence of

(Source: Office of the District's Chief Executive - Bekwai and Nkawie)

### Socio-Economic Infrastructure

The crucial role of administrative/socio-economic infrastructure has been well documented in the literature on agriculture and rural development (Crouch, 1983; Liebenow, 1982; Brinkerhoff, 1980; Montgomery, 1979; Cornell's Rural Development Project, 1977; Lele, 1975; The World Bank, 1975 etc.). This section is, therefore, devoted to a comparison of the level and variety of social amenities available in the two districts at the time of the implementation of the O.F.Y. agricultural program. As Table 19A through C shows, Bekwai district can boast of a relatively well developed socio-economic infrastructure. Nkawie's population of nearly 134,580 (Table 19A) has access to only three clinics. There are 119 health institutions in the Ashanti Region, out of which 6 are Government Hospitals, 62 private hospitals, 12 health centres, 7 health posts, 12 Government maternity homes and 19 health institutions under construction.

Of the 119 institutions, 54 are located in the Kumasi City Council area, 6 in Adanse district, 8 in Offinso, 9 in Asante Akim, 10 in Sekyere, 5 in Agona Kwabere, 6 in Ahafo Ano, 6 in Ejisu Bosumtwi, 3 in Nkawie and 11 in Bekwai district (Table 19B).

In the 1972/73 financial year, the Government introduced the Low Cost Housing Scheme with the aim of housing a number of people within the low income group in the urban centres. The low cost housing scheme was terminated in 1977. But at that time, twenty units had been completed in Bekwai. Nkawie received nothing out of the scheme (Table 19C).

Based on the 1970 population census, about 600,000 people are enjoying good drinking water from 26 systems (supply units) being

run by the Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation. This means 40 percent of the total population of 1,481,698 have access to treated water. Of the 26 systems in the 10 administrative districts in the region, Bekwai alone has 4 compared with only 1 in Nkawie (Table 19C). But it must be emphasized that of late the Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation is making strenuous efforts to get the water projects in the Nkawie district moving. For example, in the 1981/82 financial year, about ₵1 million was released for the following: 1) purchase and laying of 8" mains from Afari-Nkawie-Toase Project; 2) Barikese staff quarters; 3) extension to Dabaa; and 4) construction of public stand pipes at Mim, Bodwesango and Sepaase.

The Electricity Corporation of Ghana has plans for extension of power from Kumasi to Atwima area up to Nkawie and through Hwidiem to Kwadaso. Ten towns are to benefit from the project which will take from 2 to 4 years to complete. Hitherto, only 2 towns (Nkawie and Abuakwa) enjoyed this facility. According to Table 19C, four towns in Bekwai district have electricity. There are plans for extension of power from Kumasi through Kuntense to Kokofu, which will benefit eight more towns in the district within the Plan period.

The operation of the Department of Feeder Roads has been plagued by the lack of sufficient and timely release of funds, inadequate road construction machinery, and the requisite manpower. The Regional Engineer, Mr. K. Nuro, disclosed that, despite the difficulties, his department has managed to maintain 2,600 kilometers of the feeder road network in the Region. Of this, 315 kilometers are to be found in the Bekwai district as compared with 289 kilometers in the Nkawie district (See Table 19C).

The rural housing programs have not only had a chequered history but have also had limited scope of operation considering the size of the rural population being catered for (7.2 million rural dwellers making up 68 percent of the total population - African Business, Feb. 1984, p. 10). The oldest programs, the Roof Loans Scheme and the Wall Protection Loans Scheme have since their inception (1956 and 1972 respectively) catered to only 13,900 and 100 people respectively, nationwide. Furthermore, a total of 400 houses were completed by 1972 and additional 600 houses were planned for 1974/75 nationwide by Rural Cooperative Housing Scheme. The number of houses constructed under this scheme is relatively small owing to the low capacity of the Department of Rural Development in terms of manpower, organization, plant, equipment, vehicles etc. By 1975, 4 rural housing projects (1 project consists of 10 houses) had been completed at Essumeja, Pakyi No. 2, Kokoben, Akyeremade, all located in the Bekwai district. For Nkawie, it was only one rural housing project completed (Asuofua Resettlement Project).

Table 19. District Comparisons of Infrastructure, 1972-78

Index	Bekwai District	Nkwie District
<b>A. Population<sup>1</sup></b>		
1970 population	147,613	106,161
1980 population (estimated)	187,130	134,580
Annual growth rate	2.4%	2.4%
Percent males	48.6%	50.6%
Percent females	51.4%	49.4%
Children aged 6-14 in elementary school	28.6%	26.8%
Percent potential taxable population, 18-65 years	43.6%	44.6%
<b>B. Health Facilities<sup>2</sup></b>		
Number of Government Hospitals	1	-
Number of private hospitals	3	-
Number of health centres	1	1
Number of Government maternity homes	1	1
Health centres/posts under construction	4 (poly-clinics)	1
Hospitals under construction	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total of all health facilities	11	<del>4</del>
<b>C. Other Amenities/Measures</b>		
Low cost houses, 1977 <sup>3</sup>	20 units	-
Water supply systems <sup>4</sup>	4	1
Towns with electricity <sup>5</sup>	4	2
Feeder road construction/maintenance <sup>6</sup>	315 km	289 km
Elementary school enrollment, 1978 <sup>7</sup>		
primary	256,385	NA
middle	106,078	NA
Rural housing projects completed <sup>8</sup>	4	1

Sources: <sup>1</sup>Five Year Development Plan, 1981/82 - 1985/86, Ashanti Region, Ministry of Economic Planning, p. 10; <sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 28; <sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 32; <sup>4</sup>Office of Regional Engineer, Ghana Water and Sewage Corporation, Kumasi; <sup>5</sup>Five Year Development Plan, op. cit., p. 15; <sup>6</sup>Mr. K. Nuro, Regional Engineer, Department of Feeder Roads, Kumasi; <sup>7</sup>Five Year Development Plan, op. cit., p. 25; <sup>8</sup>Office of Regional Director, Department of Rural Development, Kumasi

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In the problem statement, it was stated that the Development Alternatives Inc. field study of 36 rural development projects in Africa and Latin America found that 49 percent of the variation in overall project success was due to client participation (specifically to involvement in project decision-making during the implementation stage; labor commitment to the development project; and money commitment to the development project). The basic question raised in this study is whether or not client participation is crucial to success or failure. Our two hypotheses were:

1. The more the target group participates in decision-making, the greater the achievement of program goals.
2. The more the target group participates in program implementation, the greater the achievement of program goals.

The data on patterns of participation presented in this study show that there was no difference between the two districts (Bekwai and Nkawie) with respect to client participation in decision-making and in implementation. Our evidence shows that the differences in production as reflected by the differences in the market prices of food stuffs (Fig. 5 and 6) cannot be attributed to client participation and hence, there is little or no support for the two hypotheses as explanations of relative program success. No single aspect of participation was found that appeared to affect program success.

The O.F.Y. agricultural program seemed to have been designed for the cities and the urban centres and not for the rural dwellers.

Overall, the implementation exercise was carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture-Headquarters. Even though participation was widespread, the degree of involvement was minimal. Chiefs promised to make land available to those interested in farming; high schools and universities established their own farms and weekends were assigned for farm work; students donated labour during the weekends at irrigation sites, as well as cutting sugar cane for the country's sugar factories; financial institutions promised to make more credits available to prospective farmers; farmers went about their usual farming activities while the media went about propangandizing the O.F.Y. program.

He who pays the piper calls the tune. With regard to activities such as organizing, staffing and financing of the district agricultural office, this was the exclusive preserve of the Ministry of Agriculture-Headquarters. The local residents, therefore, had no control or ability to influence the operations of the District office, nor was there a mechanism whereby residents could make their feelings known to the Regional Office of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Table 18 and 19 summarize the data on administrative and socio-economic infrastructure. Out of the eighteen Government departments and financial institutions represented in the district of Bekwai, Nkwie district can only boast of seven. Table 19 reveals that Bekwai again surpasses Nkwie in every aspect, whether it is health facilities, low cost houses, water supply, electricity supply, kilometers of well-maintained feeder roads, and/or number of completed rural housing projects. Farmers cannot respond to the call for more agricultural production when they don't have the necessary



inputs such as cutlasses, seedlings, credit to purchase inputs and/or to hire additional hands, transportation of products to markets, access to clinics when they are sick, good drinking water to ensure that they are always fit to do the hard work on the farm. For example, of the twenty-five farmers surveyed in each district, 7 or 28 percent of those in Bekwai did receive agricultural inputs from the district's agricultural office (which was relatively better-equipped in terms of manpower, equipment, and agricultural inputs) compared with 2 or 8 percent in the Nkawie district. Again, 6 or 24 percent of the Bekwai farmers received credit from one of the four financial institutions in the district. For Nkawie, it was only one farmer who received credit.

In sum, while the relative success of the O.F.Y. agricultural program was positively related to participation, the extent to which participation contributes to rural development success depends to a large extent upon the socio-economic infrastructure as well as the administrative arrangements in the local area.

## CHAPTER V

### DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This chapter is organized into three parts. One part is devoted to a general discussion of studies on rural development participation and program success, in terms of agreement and disagreement with the findings of this study. Empirical studies by Crouch 1983; Liebenow, 1982; Brinkerhoff, 1980; Montgomery, 1979; Cornell's Rural Development Committee, 1974; and Vepa, 1974 essentially support the findings of this study. That is, while the relative success of the O.F.Y. agricultural program was positively related to participation, the extent to which participation contributes to rural development success depends to a large extent upon the socioeconomic infrastructure as well as the administrative arrangements that have an impact upon them. On the other hand, the D.A.I. 1975 study as well as Guran's 1983 study do not support this finding. The second part of this chapter presents conclusions and inferences drawn from the study whereas the last section is devoted to a framework for organizing participatory rural development.

#### DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Is client participation crucial in program success? There is yet to be a definitive statement on this issue. Evidence from this study, however, indicates that beneficiary participation is not a

critical factor. This finds support in the Uphoff et al. study, which concluded on the basis of their data "that participation does not appear to be a necessary or sufficient condition for agricultural improvement" (p. 58). Studies by Brinkerhoff (1980) on rural development participation and program success in Taiwan, Peru, Pakistan and Ethiopia; Vepa (1974) in his review of case studies on development programs dealing with housing problems of Hong Kong and Singapore, paddy production programs of Nepal and Philippines, rural industrial estates in India, land consolidation schemes in Sri Lanka and Malaysia,--all support the findings of this study.

One of the most penetrating studies on rural development participation and program success is provided by Montgomery's 1979 study on Administration of Rural Development Projects. The author's conclusion ties in with this study's findings and in fact went further to argue that general propositions about participation's role as the key to development success are simple-minded, and that their application has not served to benefit the rural poor.

While this study as well as Brinkerhoff (1980), Montgomery (1979), Uphoff et al. (1974) found that client participation was not critical in program success, no evidence was presented to suggest that the impact was negative.

Thus, the findings of this study as well as that of Brinkerhoff (1980), Montgomery (1979), Uphoff et al. (1974) and Vepa (1974) are in disagreement with that of the DAI (1975) which attributed 49 percent of the variation in overall project success to client participation. Also in disagreement is Guran's 1983 study of U.S.A.I.D.'s

programs in Zaire which concluded that the only way to ensure the success of the programs is to have the target population take part in the planning and implementation of the programs.

Evidence from this study indicates that one of the key strategies to smallholder involvement in economic growth must be a commitment to improve the mechanisms whereby the food and other commodities that farmers produce actually enter domestic and foreign markets. This, of course, requires at a minimum an improvement in transportation as well as the introduction of marketing arrangements to facilitate the purchase and sale of commodities. The study reveals that these arrangements were not properly handled, hence the unimpressive performance of the O.F.Y. agricultural program. A similar picture is painted by Crouch (1983), in her article on Tanzania entitled Ujaama on Trial. She noted that Tanzanian agriculture suffered from over a decade of "insufficient resources, weak institutions, and disastrous policies" (p. 38). For example, as similarly noted in the O.F.Y. program implementation, the Tanzanian Government continuously failed to provide agriculture with the finance and manpower promised in successive policy documents and speeches, even though there have been series of "ujaama meetings, reports, speeches--but no production" (Ibid).

This thesis is supported in Liebenow's article on Malawian agriculture in which it is argued that the extent to which participation contributes to program success is a function of a host of factors. As one looks at the spectacular achievements of Malawian agriculture as reported by Liebenow, one sees a fairly well developed input-output marketing infrastructure coupled with a firm commitment

to agricultural development on the part of the central government. Liebenow, reflecting on the achievements of Malawian agriculture, argued that: "much of the increase in agricultural production has occurred since independence (1964) and (is) a response to the new roads, marketing facilities of the Agricultural Development Marketing Corporation (A.D.M.A.R.C.), the provision of fertilizers, extension of government credit and other actions of the Banda government" (Liebenow 1982:4). These then are policies which future program planners in Ghana must ponder in an attempt to ensure food self-sufficiency. Admittedly, this is a view not fully shared by many Third World leaders. For example, while welcoming a 16-man delegation of farmers from the Ivory Coast to the Castle-Osu, Ghana (office of the President), the chairman of the Peoples National Defense Committee, Flt-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings remarked that "the false claims that development is dependent on infrastructure alone posed a big problem to developing countries" and urged farmers of the two countries "to forge ahead and produce more food to feed their people" (Ghana News Vol. 12, No. 11 p. 11, Dec. 1983).

Evidence from the study indicates that beneficiary participation is not critical or a sufficient condition for program success. If this is so, should the idea of beneficiary participation be discarded from the rural development literature? If rural participation is viewed as an objective of rural development, rather than as a means of achieving it, the perspective changes considerably. For example, the Cornell study in 1974 concluded that participation may be an effective means of promoting rural development in the more participatory cases (Israel, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Japan, Taiwan

and China). Lack of participation, the researchers presumed, seemed to limit the satisfaction which rural residents in Egypt or Korea, for example, can take from the achievements of their rural sector. This, therefore, makes the analysis of participation rather inexact inasmuch as it remains in some contexts a means as well as an end. Nutrition or good health which may be treated as dependent variables can reasonably be viewed as contributing to agricultural productivity through the strength and morale of rural labour force. But, all said and done, the instrumental as well as consummatory nature of participation need not obscure our interest in it as a factor in rural development. It is in this sense then that we proceed to the next section to outline some essentials in participatory rural development programs.

#### CONCLUSIONS AND INFERENCES

Without question, creating effective participation is no easy matter, for there is no simple blueprint. It must be borne in mind that any intervention must be tailored to the specific environment in which it is to be implemented. Reflecting on this study, the following are proposed as essential in creating effective participation.

1. Targeted beneficiaries in all probability should make a resource commitment to the proposed project. This is desirable for the following reasons. First, Third World governments do not have the resources to support all worthwhile development programs. Requiring an initial resource commitment indicates that this is not going to be another government "give away" program. Second, if a contribution is made, the contributors will be more concerned for the success of the development initiative than they otherwise might be. Finally, such a beneficiary commitment will provide a concrete indication of

how interested the community members are in the project.

2. It would seem that a project should start with small, relatively simple activities which respond to local needs and produce results quickly (Lele, 1975). If a project is highly complex, it is less likely that donor agencies or national governments will encourage beneficiaries to become actively involved in project implementation. Activities may start with such elements as small irrigation schemes, provision of focused credit, and training programs which permit meaningful local involvement.

3. A process approach seems essential in implementing rural development projects. Creating effective participation is a gradual, evolutionary process in which both project staff and potential beneficiaries are willing to try various alternatives, discard them when they prove unworkable, and try others. The O.F.Y. program was a mass, crash, agricultural program geared towards food/self-sufficiency in a matter of three years. The period 1972 through to 1974 was declared the "agricultural war years." Regional agricultural officers had to follow the regulations laid down by the Ministry of Agriculture-Headquarters located in the capital city of Accra. In the opinion of this researcher, the process approach appears to have more strength and potential compared with the blueprint approach. It is based on learning and capacity building and thus it is well suited to the promotion of self-sustaining development dynamics. It also transfers "ownership" of the program to implementers and thus creates an environment supportive of innovative problem-solving rather than routine application of predetermined solutions. Further, it avoids negative

side effects by eliminating design components that are deemed inappropriate and allows variation in bureaucratic structures. Thus, beneficiaries are more likely to adapt to political, social, economic and physical changes that occur during implementation (Korten and Uphoff, 1981:19-22).

4. A two-way information flow (both formal and informal) between project implementers and targeted beneficiaries is essential. There are two reasons for this. First, it is necessary in order to generate useful information for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating project activities; and second, it helps to guarantee information flow between project personnel and project beneficiaries. Thus, information serves not only a functional role in supporting effective management but also a process role in facilitating local involvement in project decisions and actions. Information is certainly a necessary ingredient in building such local involvement. Relevant, timely information is crucial for the success of any intervention strategy which embraces a process approach. The participation of the local population in data collection, analysis and decision-making must, therefore, be encouraged. Not only does such involvement increase the willingness of local people to take risks, but it supplies the necessary feedback information for developing initiatives to local conditions.

5. Organizational capacity must be built. In many developing regions, there may be a lack of organizational skills, especially those required for organizing meetings, reaching consensus, choosing capable leaders, keeping records or handling organizational funds



(Korten, 1981). Capacity-building efforts constitute an obvious way to address such constraints. The usual approach is to send selected community leaders and/or government staff to training programs. Although these programs may teach basic skills and provide useful information, they are certainly not without severe limitations. Among them are: (1) a tendency to segregate the people chosen for training from the rest of the community, making the development of a broader leadership base more difficult; (2) the removal of key people from local project management to attend training programs often leaves fatal administrative gaps, and (3) there is a tendency to separate learning from doing. Therefore, one has to bear in mind that while special training programs have their role, greater emphasis must be placed on on-the-job training and organizational development activities that are rooted in the actual institutional context of the project. As Lele pointed out in her 1975 study entitled, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons from Africa, institutional development takes time even if commitment to its realization exists and the necessary decisions for its development are made. More often than not, the time required for institutional development or the changes in the distribution of political and administrative power that such development implies, deter policy-makers from taking the necessary steps despite the attention that institutional building may receive in policy pronouncements. What does this suggest? In simple terms, this suggests the need for ensuring a strong base of commitment to institutional change before investing in activities that are dependent on such changes. While considerable commitment to capacity building may be evident in the rhetoric of higher level project leaders,

staff in the field may be responding to project success criteria of a more traditional nature. A key task is, therefore, to establish a consistent set of incentives to support targeted behavior at all levels of the project management structure. For example, compensation and promotion systems for local project staff that reward efforts to work with local organizations and strengthen their capacity to address community needs will help generate that kind of behavior.

6. Evidence from the study indicates the highly centralized nature of the planning and implementation process during the period under review--1972-78 (Fig. 4). Even though Colonel Agbo, the then Commissioner for Labour, Social Welfare and Cooperatives, admitted that the O.F.Y. program was a grass roots rural development strategy, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation were carried out from the nation's capital Accra (Fig. 1). Decentralization should be at the heart of any attempt to stimulate effective local participation. It refers to more than the transfer to local authorities of certain powers and functions such as control over policy, resources and people (Moris, 1981). Meaningful decentralization also requires what Korten et al. (1981) call "bureaucratic reorientation" to improve the fit between the structures and modes of operation of development agencies and the requirements of authentic self-reliant development. Such reorientation requires in-depth changes in the values, structures and operating systems of development bureaucracies, and affects both project staff and project beneficiaries. When the former feel that they have some control, rather than feeling forced to follow the dictates of some central authority, then it is more likely they will be willing and able to encourage beneficiary participation.

It must be recognized that the problem lies only partially in the extent to which the central government is willing to devolve authority to lower levels. To be sure, unless there is the political will at the national level, there is very little chance that meaningful decentralization will actually occur. But even when the political will exists, effective implementation may be extremely difficult if the government has to deal with powerful line ministries or if it exercises only nominal control in rural areas. What is more, the administrative demands of decentralized management often overwhelm available resources.

In operational terms, decentralization suggests an appropriate degree of local influence over the three principal development inputs: policy, resources and personnel. With regards to policy, decisions are made at various levels. A process approach incorporates the views and opinions expressed at all levels, particularly by those who will be most actively involved--the target population and local-level government officials. Should their views be taken seriously and incorporated into policy decisions concerning development priorities and allocation of resources, there will be a greater likelihood of creating effective participation, and thereby improving project performance. This sort of flexibility is not easily achieved and will definitely require a process of hard negotiations.

In the area of resources, one has to distinguish between resource commitment and income-generating activities. Resource commitment is usually some sort of contribution--either in cash or in kind--made at the time of project start-up. On the other hand, income-generating activities produce income on a regular basis to cover operating costs

of ongoing activities and to finance new ones. Such income-generating activities range from charging a fee for services provided to establishing some enterprise specifically devoted to raising funds for the local organization and its activities (such as a store, a communal farm, money-lending, hiring out labour). The important point here is that the local population, through their local organization, control how these generated resources are allocated and utilized. The central government can make resources available to local organizations in several ways, such as revenue-sharing or block grants. In revenue-sharing, a percentage of the local taxes are returned to the local government to be used for development activities. In the latter, the central government makes a grant directly to the local authorities for financing such activities. One can hardly disagree with Chambers when he argues persuasively that the only way to help project staff realize their potential is by giving them adequate autonomy and resources, particularly in the form of a block grant system to be used at their discretion on projects which fall within jointly negotiated boundaries. In this way, local officials will have an opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities (Chambers, 1978:215).

Should potential beneficiaries have some control over hiring and firing of project personnel? For effective decentralization, potential beneficiaries ought to have some control over hiring and firing. One way in which this can be operationalized is accountability of both organizational leaders and project staff to the rank-and-file membership. Because accountability of project staff works up, not down, as revealed in the study, beneficiaries often have very little control over either the quality or the quantity of the services

offered. Thus their most effective tactic may be non-participation. If accountability to beneficiaries is to be accepted as the operating norm, it must be built into the project design and reflect a willingness of both planners and implementers to accept some responsibility for their actions. A common fear expressed about decentralization is that both government employees and local leaders will get more than their fair share of scarce development resources. Suffice it to note that there is yet to be evidence that decentralized administration and decision-making result in more corruption than do centralized approaches. Perhaps, if decentralization is accompanied by greater openness in local budgetary and other transactions, opportunities for corruption may be reduced.

A key intervening variable linking decentralization and effective local participation is the adoption of a participatory management style. An identifying characteristic of such a style is the degree to which project staff has some control over policy, resources and personnel instead of always waiting to get clearance from the Headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture in Accra.

The foregoing observations indicate that any attempt to initiate a participatory rural development program is not going to be an easy matter. What is recommended is that planners take these essential elements into consideration when planning rural development programs, noting well the kind of environment they are dealing with. The next section outlines a framework for organizing participatory rural development in Ghana.

## ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PARTICIPATORY RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Even though some attention has been paid to the rural problem by successive Ghanaian governments, rural development efforts have not as yet had the desired impact on the rural population (See Chapter 3). In the first place, there has not been a national policy for rural development with a consistent strategy and commitment. Secondly, rural development planning has been sectoral in approach. In addition, there seems to be too many agencies dealing with various aspects of rural development without any appreciable coordination of efforts. Furthermore, local participation in the conception, planning and implementation of rural development projects has been quite minimal. Finally, the existing organizational structure with the Ministries, headquartered in the capital and their regional offices, each pursuing its own line of action dictated invariably by its central body in Accra, does not encourage efficient rural development planning. Indeed, there has been an absence of a satisfactory conceptual framework within which to organize a comprehensive participatory rural development program.

In our search for a framework, the questions to be posed are these: How can rural development in Ghana be accelerated in ways that will meet the following criteria?:

First, that rural development be responsive to the needs of rural people; that, rural development be compatible with local conditions in the physical environment, as well as with the long-term future of communities whose livelihood depends on the sustained yield management of the land, water and energy resources in their environment; and third, that rural development ensure an even spread of benefits among the people (Friedman, 1981).

### Participation: Bringing the People into the System

There remains the problem of how one can best involve the people in offering a development service. One standard answer is to create a representative committee. This may be simply an advisory group subsidiary to the organization, e.g., the District Tea Grower's Committee of the Kenya Tea Development Authority, which decides on the allocation of production quotas and thus the trade-off between expanding membership or expanding acreages. The KTDA Committee is preferred by technical agencies, as it has no life of its own and can act only on issues presented to it by the Tea Authority. For the same reason, its value as a representative organ, making the authority responsive to growers, is minimal.

More commonly, it will be a village council linked to the administrative hierarchy, e.g., the Panchayati Raj in India. The Panchayati Raj structure in India is much the best documented attempt to unify development and representational functions within a single hierarchy of territorially-based councils. But the program has become highly political, and it seems that elite groups at the local level have captured the Panchayats (Franda 1979:144). Relying on elected representatives presumes there is an articulation of a common interest within local communities--a view, far from the reality. In actual fact, the nurturance of common interest may be defective and the committee may represent instead the special interests of their members. Again and again, supposedly representative institutions are captured by local elites and distorted to serve private needs.

The distinction between structures and effects applies to representative institutions. Structures can acquire ideological

legitimacy that is not matched by their actual achievements. Alternatively, the bureaucracy may impose procedural restrictions which insulate national agencies from local pressures. "Capture" can occur in multiple directions. Hyden (1979) points out that in Kenya the bureaucracy has become captured by members' private interests, while in Tanzania it has become subservient to the party's views. More recently (1980), he analyzes how the Tanzanian administration has failed to capture the peasantry, even though structures which are supposed to link villages to the nation do exist.

What we have been discussing so far serves to illustrate the difficulty in bringing about a participatory rural development system. Our aim is not to argue that a popular front of elected village representatives can substitute for the usual bureaucratic hierarchy of development agencies. The framework to be outlined is to make it possible or create a mechanism whereby the planning base is broadened to incorporate the views of the districts. Again, shifting the planning centre from the nation's capital to the ten regions of the country, whereby the implementation of rural development programs will not be done in Accra (the capital) but in the regions, is an example. Representatives of the district council, divisional chiefs, local groups such as voluntary organizations and self-help associations, youth and women organizations, cooperative or nnoboa groups, and technical officers working at the district level will serve on the rural development coordinating committee at that level, with the District Chief Executive as the chairman. (The District Chief Executive represents the Government and is the most senior civil servant who supervises the operations of government departments at that level.)




The chief is the custodian of the land. Should the central government desire to acquire the land, this is done by purchase from the chief, hence his inclusion is important in terms of access to land for public projects. At the same time, the chief still commands respect and influence (though slightly diminished since independence) and, therefore, for mobilization of citizens around a public project his contribution is important. The cooperative or nnoboa group draws support from the unemployed and small farmers whereas the youth organization handles youth affairs in the district.

The activities of the peoples' defense committees in towns and villages lead one to hope that giving the necessary governmental support, the rank-and-file can live up to expectation. Today, in Ghana, local defense committees (grass root committees dominated by the youth) are calling to account those holding offices. (For example, the paramount chief of Bekwai Traditional Area was in police custody in August 1983 on charges brought against him by the local committee). However, one should not view the rural elite as always working against the interest of the rural poor. As Leonard (1982) pointed out, there are definitely some rural elite who will favor the improvement of the lot of the rural poor. The challenge is to seek such people out. Perhaps it will be better to identify and/or emphasize projects that are not vulnerable to inequality. (For instance, communal stand pipes instead of private house connections when delivering treated water to towns and villages; and group credit instead of granting loans and credits to individuals). In the end, the extent to which the rural elite can capture the resources in the district will depend to a large extent on the lack of commitment of the central government to

push for participatory rural development, and also the extent to which the government can get the bureaucracy to accept the proposed participatory framework for organizing rural development. As Johnston points out, "an organization is a central element of successful strategy: attempts to change what things are done must be accompanied by appropriate changes in how things are done" (Johnston, 1982:155). A proposed organizational scheme, a three-tiered structure is outlined in the following paragraphs.

### Organizational Structure



#### National Level

At the apex of the structure is a National Rural Development Coordinating Committee. The committee is made up of representatives of the various ministries, departments and agencies that deal with rural development matters. In addition, there will be representatives from the ten regional committees as well as experts nominated by the President. The Vice-President will be the chairman of this committee. Central coordination requires a high degree of leadership skills since it is not an easy task to link up and unify so many complex agencies and specialized activities. There are Development Ministries such as Agriculture, Works and Housing, Health and Education. Each of the regions have specific characteristics and problems. Financial and Training Institutions as well as Service Ministries like Finance

and Economic Planning, Social Welfare and Labor etc. are intimately involved in rural development. Finally, there are numerous international agencies interested in contributing to the rural development effort.

This committee, under the leadership of the Vice President, will be expected to issue Planning Guidelines after obtaining appropriate inputs from Development Ministries. The Committee will undertake a thorough review of the state of the national economy and each region. The Committee will have to establish liaison with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning for a block amount for each of the Region's Development budgets. In this regard, the Vice-President's office can and should exert influence on the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning as well as the Cabinet in the pattern of allocation between regions, ministries and public bodies in the country. The guidelines will contain, among other things ceilings for each region, with less well-off regions receiving more than well-off regions. Availability of manpower for new projects such as schools, clinics, etc. will be included and priority will be given to on-going projects. To enhance the performance of this committee, a multidisciplinary rural development research and training institute should be established. The Institute will collect and store data on rural development, disseminate them to potential users at all levels of the rural development system.

#### Regional Level

A Regional Coordinating Committee should be created and should be composed of representatives of the Regional Administration and the various ministries, departments and agencies that deal with rural

development matters as well as a number of private individuals appointed by the Regional Minister on the basis of professional expertise. In addition, there will be representatives from the District Committees. The Regional Minister will be the Chairman, with the Regional Planning Officer as the Executive Secretary. It is the responsibility of this body to determine rural development policy and to plan and reconcile the various district plans into a regional plan which will be submitted to the National Committee for funding. The committee will be charged with the responsibility of reviewing project proposals submitted by the districts, as well as providing expert assistance to the District Committees in project identification and in appraisal and formulation of district development plans. Additionally, the Committee will identify and assign priority to those projects that would be financed from the Regional Development fund to be created. Finally, the Regional Committee will be charged with the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating program and project implementation.

To ensure the effectiveness of this Regional Committee, it must be given sufficient administrative authority and a budget. This is important, for experience has shown that the Regional Planning Committees introduced in this country in 1968 to handle regional planning and development failed mainly because they lacked sufficient authority to deal with local development issues that transcend sectoral lines. According to Opoku-Afriyie, "their mandate was weak and blurred. They had no legal status, nor a significant budget... They lacked purposeful direction from the Central Planning Agency" (Opoku-Afriyie, 1974:31).

The Regional Committees will have research units attached to enable them to deal effectively with information passed to them from the district and local levels. Decisions vital for rural development are delayed because of red tape. It is my belief that by giving funds to the regions, it will be possible for the regions to plan and coordinate development more effectively than the central ministries are now doing.

Additionally, the following are proposed:

1. The existing Regional Development Corporations should come under the supervision of the Regional Rural Development Coordinating Committees. Funds generated by the operations of these corporations could be used to finance some of the rural projects.

2. A new Regional Rural Development Fund should be created. This will be a grant assistance program to be financed by allocations from Accra to the regions on the basis of their population size. Projects not included in the regional plan could be submitted for financing through the Fund. A certain percentage of revenues accruing from Traditional Councils' Land could also be paid into this Fund.

3. Rural banks operating in the regions should come under the regional committees instead of the Central Bank of Ghana under the present arrangement. A select committee of the regional committee plus representatives of the regional branches of the Ghana Commercial Bank, Central Bank, and Agricultural Development Bank, should be able to oversee in order to guarantee the smooth operations of the rural banks in the regions.

### District Level


The district committee will coordinate district priorities with regional and national guidelines. Additionally, the committee will coordinate local plans and ensure their internal consistency and their technical and economic feasibility.

The District Chief Executive will be the chairman of the committee. There will be representatives from the various district agencies and departments of the central government. Paramount chiefs and traditional authorities should have representation on the committee. It is my belief that together the members could make a critical appraisal of the resources and factor endowment of the district and work out the best way to achieve an overall development of the district within the parameters of the overall regional rural development plan. Again, as a way of improving the quality of rural statistical reporting services and to provide relevant data at the district level for the overall rural development program, a district planning and research unit would be established as an operative wing of the district development committee. Development from below of this type will undoubtedly add new dimensions to the accuracy and capability of the overall planning process in that the needs and aspirations of the local people could be taken into consideration in the regional plan. Rural training and animation centers will be established at this level so that personnel from the village and local levels could meet and discuss their common problems. The center is expected to provide training for the field staff as well as the local population in their particular field of endeavor. The rural youth in particular can be taught a variety of skills in such a way as to be immediate and practical use to

their towns and villages. The main objective should be to encourage young farmers and school leavers to stay in their villages to become agents of change and improvement both in agriculture and in community life.

### Putting the Plan to Work

As outlined below, planning is conceived as a two-way process: the final plan is drawn up only after the original drafts have gone up and down the hierarchy. This means that consultation with the lower levels is not just a pure formality. At the beginning of the planning process, the Economic Planning Committee of the Cabinet will issue policy guidelines regarding economic policies and rural strategies (ie., the kinds of projects that must be emphasized--social or economic infrastructure etc.). Apart from this the Cabinet Committee will indicate the amount of funding that will be allocated to the regions. The local committees will then send up information on projects, and the amount of funding available in the local area for pet projects. This will enable the regional committee to determine what to include, and how much is available for the regional plan.



The starting point is the District Committee. The District Committee will assess preliminary costs and combine projects judged to be feasible into a preliminary district plan. When there is a consensus, the approved plan will then be sent to the Regional Committee. At this stage, the Regional Committee will reconcile the various district plans into a regional plan. The regional plan is then sent to the National Committee for assessment and funding. The funded plan will be sent back to the regions for implementation.

It is my view that the most effective solution to the rural problem is nothing short of comprehensive regional planning as envisaged in the proposed framework. It ought to be noted that planning of this nature has been felt in Ghana for some time. It has been seen as the best means of correcting existing disparities in regional development--a situation which in Ghana nurtures inter-ethnic conflicts and is, therefore, of considerable governmental concern. In fact, as early as 1968, regional planning committees were established in all nine administrative regions of the country. If rural development today has not experienced a "take off," it is not a question of policy, but of the regional planning committees functioning badly. An example will suffice. After regional programs for water supplies, road construction and crop production have been coordinated, parts of the program for road construction and water supplies may be abandoned for lack of budgetary support while the crop production program proceeds because the Ministry of Agriculture has proved more influential in securing funds or has cut other parts of its program. In plain terms, these efforts at agricultural expansion may be thwarted from the outset because the necessary supporting facilities are not



forthcoming. Regional plans may, therefore, fail before implementation even begins.

I believe that in order to promote a more effective policy, resources should be allocated on a regional basis and the regional coordinating committees should be provided with a realistic picture of the resources to be placed at their disposal by the National Committee during the plan period. This, in my mind, will ensure the formulation of meaningful development strategies at the regional level, on the basis of which similar financial guidelines could be channeled to the district committees. Thus, having guidelines as to regional priorities and knowing more clearly the resources at their disposal, district committees will be in a position to formulate local development plans relating, for example, to the construction of feeder roads, the provision of local storage facilities, or the establishment of a primary school.

What are the chances of success? Some obstacles may be cited against the adoption of the proposed framework, namely, the shortage of personnel, devolution of powers, interaction between bureaucrats and local people, and finance. With regard to devolution of powers, it is bound to precipitate conflicts with the sectoral ministries. This is inevitable if the objectives of rural development are to be achieved. One way is to abolish ministries that adamantly refuse to cooperate as President Nimeiry did in Sudan or to transfer top administrative personnel to lower status jobs. It is expected that the National Rural Development Training and Research Unit in collaboration with Management Development and Productivity Institute, Institute of Social, Scientific and Economic Research and Foreign Technical

Assistance will constantly organize courses and training procedures for committee members in the rural development system so that they get the necessary exposure in project identification, planning and implementation. Ultimately, the success of the proposed framework rests upon the government's commitment to introduce an effective machinery for regional planning and to arm it with the necessary instruments with which to achieve the national objectives of rural development.

As outlined, the structure will have the advantage of placing the emphasis on the rural system itself rather than on planning documents. This should help the planners in the identification of the relevant information channels and levels on the one hand, and the necessary data collection on the other. Again, the structure which is a form of rural development from below should make it possible to increase coordination of activities of the various government departments and non-governmental change agencies. On the horizontal level, the activities of different change agencies are coordinated both at the national level and at the local level, and in a vertical sense, communication links between the local and national levels are established and made more effective. The result is that the objectives of all the different agencies do not conflict and all inputs for a specific development are provided by the various agencies involved at the right time and place. Furthermore, the organizational arrangement as outlined above ensures that representatives of the various government agencies and departments do not appear as an arm of the central government. The system ensures that they become identified with the local community and their progress and recognition in the local community will be the result of their success in meeting

self-determined local needs and in helping to solve local problems (Hewes, 1974).

Finally, the organizational structure ensures that the local people are involved at the outset, in the conception, preparation, formulation and implementation of the programs and projects designed to better their working and living conditions. The proposed framework does not itself ensure results for accelerated rural development. But as Friedman remarked:

A framework provides the context within which development occurs; it is not itself that development. The framework, of course, should be facilitative, and it should direct the stream of development activities in the desired direction. But how well it does its work will depend on other circumstances, not least on the commitment of the central government to the goal of development (Friedman, 1981:260).

## CONCLUSION

Rural development is not susceptible to easy solutions by any formula of political organization or administrative structure. Every government in the Third World must struggle with it and whether the approach taken is that of ideological mobilization, forced draft experimentation (Kenya's S.R.D.P.), laissez-faire provision of infrastructure or one of the many combinations and variations on these and other themes, no assurance of rapid success can ever be given.

Looking at attempts at rural development in Ghana, there seems to have been little tendency to innovate in organizing services and little willingness to delegate responsibility to rural people. Paternalism of program administrators is definitely one of the severe constraints to development of strong viable local organizations and yet participation of the rural folk is important for the successful

implementation of programs. One must bear in mind that the choice of appropriate policy measures necessary to bring about rural transformation is fraught with far-reaching socio-economic and political implications for the power relationships that may exist between the various social groups in the society. Public servants must be so trained that their values and attitudes are consistent with the aspirations of the rural masses. The Ghanaian government must be willing to create the decentralized institutional structure that seems essential to meet the needs of the rural poor. Unless control is decentralized, functions are devolved, and strong institutional networks created within rural areas to deliver services and elicit participation, there is little hope of sustaining rural reform. The political mood and the economic expectations of rural areas are slowly changing. Industrialization is not providing the anticipated returns in terms of employment, and it becomes increasingly necessary to provide incentives aimed at forestalling population movement away from the rural areas, particularly in the face of the high rates of population growth. I can hardly disagree with Cowan when he says that "the decades of 1970 and 1980 may be Africa's rural springtime. Whether the seeds that are planted will grow to transform the lives of the rural masses or whether they will wither in the arid winds of political indecision and administrative friction and confusion, will depend on decisions made by today's leaders and executed by the present generation of civil servants. The decisions will be hard and the time short" (Cowan, 1970:112).

## APPENDIX A

## APPENDIX A

Summary of Capital Budgets  
1969/70 & 1970/71 (Ncmillions)

	1969/70		1970/71		1969/70	1970/71
<u>Sectors</u>		<u>Budget</u>	<u>Below</u> <u>Line</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Share</u>
Economic	66.6	73.0	14.3	37.3	56.8	54.8
Social	29.6	36.5	7.6	44.1	25.3	27.7
Administrative	18.6	26.0	-	26.0	15.8	16.3
Unallocated	<u>2.5</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2.0</u>	<u>2.1</u>	<u>1.2</u>
Total	117.3	137.5	21.9	159.4	100.0	100.0

Allocation of Govt. Capital Budget  
Estimates by Sector (Ncmillion)  
1970-71

<u>Sectors</u>	<u>1969/70</u>	<u>Above</u> <u>the</u> <u>Line</u>	<u>Below</u> <u>the</u> <u>Line</u>	<u>Total</u>
Education	10.2	11.9	-	11.9
Culture & Sports	0.6	0.7	-	0.7
Health	4.2	9.5	-	9.5
Water & Sewage	7.5	8.3	-	8.3
Housing	5.9	0.2	7.0	7.2
Local Govt.	0.8	1.0	0.6	1.6
Labor & Coops	0.4	0.2	-	0.2
Nat'l Service Corps	-	2.0	-	2.0
Youth & Rural Dev.	<u>-</u>	<u>2.7</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>2.7</u>
Social Sector Total	<u>29.6</u>	<u>36.5</u>	<u>7.6</u>	<u>44.1</u>

Economic Sector

Agriculture	12.3	12.0	2.1	14.1
Agricultural Dev. Bank	<u>1.5</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>1.2</u>	<u>5.2</u>
	66.6	73.0	14.3	87.3

Source: 2 Yr. Development Plan 1969/70-1970/71 Government of Ghana  
p. 75

## APPENDIX B

## APPENDIX B

Expenditure of Ghana Government by Function  
(figures in percentages)

	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>1971-72</u>	<u>1972-73</u>	<u>1973-74</u> <u>(est)</u>	<u>1974-75</u> <u>(est)</u>
Agriculture	5	6	7	5	5
Lands and Mineral Resources	2	1	2	1	2
Trade and Tourism	0	0	0	1	1
Industries	0	0	0	0	0
Construction	10	8	11	10	9
Transport and Communications	3	4	1	1	1
Education, Culture, and Sports	15	15	19	14	13
Health	7	6	8	8	8
Labor and Cooperatives	0	0	0	3	2
Youth, Rural Development, and Social Welfare	2	3	2	0	0
Internal Affairs	6	6	4	6	7
General Administration	14	13	7	10	9
Administration of Justice	1	1	1	1	1
Foreign Affairs	3	2	2	2	2
Fiscal Administration	4	4	9	11	13
Defense	9	8	7	9	9
Financial Services	19	23	21	18	17
Total Percentage	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>99</u>
Total Expenditure (,000)	¢486,691	¢534,530	¢545,114	¢649,232	¢960,649

Source: Compiled from Bank of Ghana, Report of the Board of Directors for the Financial Year Ended 30 June, 1971 (Accra, Ghana Publishing Corp., 1975), p. 60



## APPENDIX C

## APPENDIX C

The rural population we are dealing with is not a homogeneous one. For the purposes of this study, three broad categories stand out. They are:

1. Small-scale farmers whose farm size averages no more than four acres.
2. Large-scale farmers whose farm size averages more than four acres.
3. Female food-crop growers (in the two districts studied, cultivation of food crops is the specialty of women).

I was accompanied in the field by two assistants who were high school graduates. In each village, I sought an audience with the local chief and his elders, and with their assistants, one selected the discussion group. Next I went to the homes of the members of the group; the time and place of the group meeting would then be set. At the agreed place and time, I first briefed the members regarding the purpose of the survey and promised them not to reveal their names. Thus assured, members felt free to enter into the discussion. To reassure them, no notes were taken and no tape recording machine was used.

I would introduce the question and concentrate on the responses of the three "ordinary" farmers while the two assistants focused on the responses of the prominent female farmer as well as the leading male farmer. After the session I would go to my lodging with my assistants and write down the responses of the group. I would read my record to

them for their comments, and in turn comment on what they recorded.

I had a total of three sessions per village discussion group. At each session, four questions were introduced. At times I would repeat a question raised at a previous session to assure myself that the responses recorded were correct and also to cross check the group's earlier responses.

#### QUESTIONS RAISED FOR DISCUSSION

1. What can you say about the implementation of the agricultural program?
2. Did you have confidence in the ability of the program to achieve the goals set?
3. What contact did you have with the District Agricultural office?
4. What was your main source of information about the agricultural program?
5. What things did the Government promise to provide for food production?
6. How many of these promises were realized?
7. What assistance did you receive from the District Agricultural Office?
8. What assistance did you receive from the local banks?
9. What assistance did you receive from the local farmers' association?
10. Did you feel that today you can feed yourself and your family?
11. How would you describe the food production in the country today?
12. What should be done to step up food production in the country?

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