MSU RETURNING MATERIALS: PTace in book drop to remove this checkout from _‘—n"Ar ~' WW7“ Jal‘ffin 1994. LIBRARIES . _ , w. your recor'a. 'rINES W111 be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. £3:ny 1“ “half . AN EMPIRICAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS VARIOUS "STATES" BY Ronald J. Pekala A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Psychology 1980 ABSTRACT AN EMPIRICAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR MAPPING CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS VARIOUS "STATES" By Ronald J. Pekala Although there are several theories of consciousness and its various "states", there is little research that attempts to Operationalize the concept of "state" of con- sciousness and "altered" states of consciousness, in par- ticular. For this purpose a questionnaire, the Phenomenol- ogy of Consciousness Questionnaire (PCQ), was developed to retrospectively assess the nature and dimensions of subjec- tive conscious experience (phenomenological experience) and to compare that experience in differing conditions, so as to determine the particular phenomenological "state" associ- ated with these conditions. Two hundred and forty-nine Ss, averaging about 35 Ss to a group, participated in two sessions spaced a week a- part. In each session the Ss experienced two four—minute conditions, and then completed the PCQ immediately after- wards, in reference to these conditions. Conditions for the first session consisted of sitting quietly with eyes opened (first baseline) and reading mildly-arousing erotic mater- ial. Conditions for the second session consisted of sitting quietly with eyes opened (second baseline) followed by pro- gressive relaxation to which a four minute meditational interlude had been added. A personality inventory was also given at the end of the first session. It was hypothesized that (1) subjective conscious experience can be accurately and reliably assessed via nomothetically-procured self-report data, (2) such exper- ience is composed of certain dimensions or structures that are stable over time, and (3) identical conditions (the base- line conditions) are characterized by the same intensities of phenomenological experience, while the treatment condi- tions (erotica and relaxation) are characterized by inten- sities of subjective eXperience significantly different from that of baseline. It was also hypothesized that (4) the baseline conditions would not differ from each other in re- gard to the pattern of the dimensions of consciousness, while the two treatment conditions would differ from base: line in regard to pattern, and (5) Personality variables would correlate with specific dimensions of consciousness. The reliability results indicated that Ss could be adequately reliable and accurate at retrospection into their subjective experience. Such retrospection yielded nine di- mensions of consciousness that were found to be stable ac- cording to several criteria across all four conditions. These included: internal dialogue, awareness, imagery, positive affect, control, altered experience, attention, negative affect, and memory. Unexpectedly, small but significant differences between the two baseline conditions were found for several of the dimensions of consciousness. However, a lack of pattern differences, as measured by correlation coefficients be— tween the dimensions that was statistically supported by the Box test, was evident between the two baseline condi- tions. These results suggested that the two baseline condi- tions were associated with a particular "state" of con- sciousness, similar, although not identical, to each other, that may serve as an adequate baseline for assessing wak- ing conscious experience. As hypothesized, significant intensity differences were found for the dimensions of consciousness between the baseline and treatment conditions, almost all in the expect— ed direction. Significant pattern differences, as measured by very large differences in the correlation coefficients between the dimensions of consciousness, were also found between each of the treatment conditions and their respec- tive baselines, that was corroborated by the Box test. The relaxation condition was also associated with the perception of being in an altered state, while the erotica condition was not. According to the theorizing of Tartl, the previous results suggested that the relaxation condi- tion was associated with an "altered" state, and the eroti- ca condition, an "identity" state of consciousness. Few and low correlations between the personality measures and the dimensions implied that the personality traits assessed had little moderating effect upon phenomeno- logical experience. In summary, the results indicated that a "state" of consciousness can be operationally defined by phenomenolog- ical parameters that appear reliable, valid, and stable under several conditions. "Baseline", "identity", and "altered" states of consciousness that are associated with specific stimulus conditions appear capable of phenomenolog— ical definition in terms of intensity variations within, and pattern effects amongst, the dimensions of conscious experience. 1Tart, C.T. States 2; Consciousness. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, rnc., 1975. (9 Copyright by RONALD JAMES PEKALA 1980 Dedicated To Mom and Dad, whose past and present love suggests that much better parents there may not be: And to Michelle or Michael, for whom our love beckons Deb and I as good as parents us to be. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The thrill of discovery is but the second most excit- ing part of science. The first is the creation of meaning that allows for the discovery to be created. For making this creation possible, practical, and a scientific suc- cess, I wish to thank all of the following: Dr. Ralph Levine, whose gentle practical guidance and statistical expertise allowed me the freedom and the methodological discipline to make this dream a reality. Dr. Al Rabin, whose helpful suggestions and fatherly wis- dom helped temper this endeavor into one of scholarly success. Dr. Lawrence 0' Kelly, whose advice and suggestions helped beget and resurrect a way of understanding mind that has laid fallow for decades.. Dr. John Schneider, whose enthusiasm and excitement over the fruits of these labors made for a plentiful and gratifying personal harvest. Also thanks to Dr. Andrew Barclay, who helped initiate this undertaking but was unable to see it through to completion; Dr. Joseph Reyher, who initiated me into the art of scientific psychology; and to Kathy, Bruce, and Scott, whose work made this Herculean task less than a labor. And most of all, to all my professors, colleagues, and friends, who helped me to begin to awaken to myself and others. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction II 0 III. IV. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. Introspection Consciousness Current phenomenological approaches to the study of consciousness "Altered" states of consciousness The question of "states" of consciousness Theories of consciousness The purpose of the present investigation Assessment, Design, and Hypotheses A. B. C. Assessment of phenomenological experience Design Hypotheses Method A. B. C. Subjects, experimenter, and experimental setting Materials 1. The Phenomenology of Consciousness Ques- tionnaire (PCQ) 2. The Differential Personality Questionnaire (DPQ) 3. Other materials Procedure Results A. B. C. D. E. F. G. Reliability and accuracy of introspection The possible dimensions of consciousness The stability of the dimensions of consciou- ness An analysis of subjective experience in identical conditions Dimensional intensity differences across treat- ment and baseline conditions Correlation matrix pattern differences between conditions Individual, personality, and sex differences 'iv HH U'ti-‘(IDOKA PH 18 18 23 29 34 34 35 35 #0 #2 #7 47 #8 55 58 62 66 71 'TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd.) V. Discussion VI. VII. VIII. A. B. C. D. E. F. G. Retrospective introspection Mapping the dimensions of consciousness The baseline conditions and "states" of consciousness The treatment conditions and differing "states" of consciousness Personality and sex differences Demand characteristics Summary and conclusions Reference Notes and References Appendix of Tables Appendices A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. Phenomenology of Consciousness Question- naire, Forms 0 and 2 Differential Personality Questionnaire Progressive relaxation/meditation instruc- tions Exerpt from "The Veiled Woman" Debriefing questionnaires Consent form State of consciousness instruction sheet Practice questionnaire Early twentieth century and contemporary apprbaches to introspection and conscious- ness: A review Page 7A 7A 76 82 84 92 100 105 113 158 158 170 178 183 186 188 189 190 191 Table 1. 2. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. LIST OF TABLES Graph of the Experimental Design Pearson r Correlations for the Five Relia- bility Pairs Across All Four Conditions Percentage of Ss Having a Given Deviation Score for the Five Reliability Pairs Across All Four Conditions (N=996) Percentage of Ss Having a Given Average Deviation Score Summed Across All Five Item Pairs for All Four Conditions Dimensions of Consciousness and Correspond— ing Alphas for the First Cluster Analysis on the First Baseline Condition Dimensions of Consciousness and Correspond- ing Cluster Loadings for the First Cluster Analysis for the First Baseline Condition Dimensions of Consciousness and Correspond- ing Alphas for the Final Cluster Analysis on the First Baseline Condition Dimensions of Consciousness and Correspond- ing Cluster Loadings for the Final Cluster Analysis for the First Baseline Condition Exploratory Factor Analysis for the First Baseline Condition Across All Items Dimensions of Consciousness and Correspond- ing Alphas for Each of the Four Conditions Dimensions of Consciousness and Correspond- ing Cluster Loadings Across All Four Conditions Exploratory Factor Analysis for the First Baseline Condition Using Only 39 Items vi Page 30 113 11# 115 116 117 118 119 120 122 123 125 Table 13. 1A. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. LIST OF TABLES (cont'd.) Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Second Baseline Condition Using Only 39 Items Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Erotica Condition Using Only 39 Items Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Relaxa- tion Condition Using Only 39 Items Correlation Matrix for the First Baseline Condition Corrected for Attenuation Correlation Matrix for the Second Baseline Condition Corrected for Attenuation Correlation Matrix for the Erotica Condition Corrected for Attenuation Correlation Matrix for the Relaxation Condi- tion Corrected for Attenuation Test-Retest Reliabilities for the Dimensions of Consciousness ' Comparisons for the Dimensions of Conscious- ness Between the Baseline Conditions Comparisons for the Dimensions of Conscious- ness Between the First Baseline and the Erotica Conditions Comparisons for the Dimensions of Conscious- ness Between the Second Baseline and the Relaxation Conditions Comparisons for the Dimensions of Conscious- ness Between the Erotica and the Relaxation Conditions Comparative Distances in Euclidean Nine- Space Between the Differing Conditions Correlation Matrix for the First Baseline Condition Correlation Matrix for the Second Baseline Condition vii 'Page 126 127 128 129 129 130 130 131 132 134 136 138 1h0 141 191 Table 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33- 34. 35- 36. 37- 38. 40. 41. LIST OF TABLES (cont'd.) Difference Correlation Matrix Between the First and Second Baseline Conditions Covariance Matrices for the Four Conditions Box Test Comparisons Between the Covariance Matrices for the Different Conditions Correlation Matrix for the Erotica Condi- tion Correlation Matrix for the Relaxation Condition Difference Correlation Matrix Between the First Baseline and the Erotica Conditions Difference Correlation Matrix Between the Second Baseline and the Relaxation Condi- tions Correlation of Absorption with the Dimen- sions of Consciousness Across All Four ' Conditions Correlation of Extraversion with the Dimen- sions of Consciousness Across All Four Conditions Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Con- sciousness for the First Baseline Condition Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Con- sciousness for the Second Baseline Condi- tion Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Con- sciousness for the Erotica Condition Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Con- sciousness for the Relaxation Condition Sex Differences for the Personality Measures and the Deviation Scores viii Page 142 143 144 145 145 146 146 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 LIST OF FIGURES Comparisons Between the Phenomenological Nature of the Two Baseline Conditions Comparisons Between the Phenomenological Nature of the First Baseline and the Erotica Conditions Comparisons Between the Phenomenological Nature of the Second Baseline and the Relaxation Conditions Comparisons Between the Phenomenological Nature of Consciousness for All Four Conditions Percentage of Ss Having a Given Phenomeno- logical Intensity Score for the Various Dimensions of Consciousness as a Function of Conditions -ix Page 133 135 137 139 147 INTRODUCTION1 The last twenty years have seen a tremendous growth in the theorizing and research on the nature of conscious— ness and its various "altered states" as induced by medita- tion (Naranjo and Ornstein, 1972), drugs (Pahnke, 19723; Harman, et. al., 1972), hypnosis (Weitzenhoffer, 1978), biofeedback (Brown, 1974), and many other induction proce- dures. There are now books on the nature of human con- sciousness (Ornstein, 1973); the psychology of consciousness (Ornstein, 1972); states (Tart, 1975). altered states (Tart, 1972), and alternate states (Zinberg, 1977) of conscious- ness; the highest state of consciousness (White, 1972); the spectrum of consciousness (Wilber, 1977); expanding dimen- sions of consciousness (Sugerman and Tarter, 1978); the stream of consciousness (Pope and Singer, 1978); and the science of consciousness (Pelletier, 1978). This resurgence of interest in consciousness within the last two decades is in stark contrast to the "behavior- istic" years of American psychology, during whflzh even men- tion of the word consciousness was, at least, tacitly for- bidden (Boring, 1953). Nevertheless, this current interest 1For a more in-depth introduction to early twentieth century and contemporary approaches to introspection and consciousness, see Appendix I (page 191 ). ,1 in consciousness is a return to the beliefs of the found- ing fathers of psychology, who, at the turn of the twentieth century, asserted that psychology was, first and foremost, the study of mental processes. It was the father of exper- imental psychology and the founder of the first psychologi- cal laboratory, Wilhelm Wundt, who defined the problem of psychology as the problem of consciousness: determining the nature of the elements that made up conscious experience and how these elements were connected (Boring, 1929/50). Introspection Introspection, the process of engaging in and examin- ing ones own thought processes and stream of consciousness was the method par excellence of these psychologists for ferreting the nature of subjective experience. Yet due to differences in methods of introspection (Boring, 1953). con- troversies such as that concerning imageless thought (Titchener, 1912), and the seemingly pedantic and sterile results that such intrOSpection was yielding (Watson, 1913), the interest in consciousness and its methodology of intro- Spection faded from the scenes of American psychology. In 1913 J.B. Watson proclaimed that psychology's goal was the "prediction and control of behavior (of which) introspection forms no essential part" (p.158). With these words introspection began to be banished from the American scene of psychology, although under the guise of phenomeno- logical observation, it continued to survive in Europe (Husserl, 1913/72; Kohler, 1929). Despite the return of interest in consciousness during the past twenty years, spawned, in part, by studies in per- ' ception and attention (Kahneman, 1973), the emergence of cognitive psychology (Holt, 1964), and the tremendous strides in neuropsychology and psychophysiology (Lindsley, 1960; John and Schwartz, 1978), the use of introspection and phenomenological observation has been slow to gain accep- tance (Lieberman, 1979). This is due, in part, to introspection's failure at the turn of the century to provide for a functional psychol- ogy of behavior. But it has also been due to behaviorism's hegemony during the twentieth century (Robinson, 1979); a hegemony that has eschewed introspection and the examination of subjective processes. Even though contemporary psycholo- gy has largely abandoned the language of the classical behav- iorists, behaviorism continues to exert its influence through the acceptance by psychologists of its philos0phical and methodological assumptions. According to these assumptions, the mind is, at least, of dubious epistemological status and introspection is seen as an inherently flawed tool for the investigation of mind (Lieberman, 1979). Added to this are the modern behavior- ist's polemics against introspection (Skinner, 1974; Rachlin, 1974) and much ego strength is needed to go against fifty years of American psychology and argue that introspection can be useful and reliable. But such a stance has already been taken. D.A. Lieberman (1979) has argued for a limited return to intro- Spection for the simple reason that introspective data can help us understand behavior. In his article, Lieberman showed the inadequacies of the arguments of methodological and radical behaviorists against introspection. He also cited evidence that introspection can, at times, be very accurate (Kroll and Kellicut, 1972). He summarized by suggesting: Instead of trying to force our behavior into the procrustean bed prescribed by (behavior) theory, I believe it would be far less taxing, as well as more honest, to acce t overtly what we so clearly believe in covertly p.330). Consciousness This tendency to deny the use of introspection in psychology has clearly hurt the development of theories and research on consciousness, deve10pment that should be tied to empirical, phenomenological data. After all, if conscious- ness is "awareness, especially of something within oneself" (Webster, 1970, p.177). how else can one determine the nature of awareness and consciousness, except by introspection or phenomenological observation upon that awareness? It has been suggested that neurophysiology can help map the nature of consciousness (Hilgard, 1969; Kamiya, 1968). But recent evidence on the lack of a relationship between the occurrence of the "alpha experience" (Kamiya, 1972), and the strength or density of the EEG alpha activity, "calls into question the entire enterprise of 'mapping consciousness' neurophysiologically" (Plotkin, 1979). If these findings replicate in other areas of consciousness research, this can only mean that phenomenological approaches to conscious- ness must be the fundamental means for exploring and mapping subjective experience. But phenomenological approaches to assessing consciousness have been slow to materialize, al- though they have been increasing. errent Phenomenological Approaches $2.IQE,§EBQX.2£ Consciousness There are currently two general approaches to con— sciousness for which introspection can be, and is being, used. These approaches parallel the two approaches to con- sciousness exploration evident at the turn of the century, i.e. functionalism and structuralism. Functionalism, in the tradition of W. James (1890/1950) and J. Angell (1907), sought to "discern and portray the typical operations of consciousness under actual life con- ditions" (Angell, 1907, p.63). A similar approach to con- sciousness is found in the research and theorizing of Singer (1966, 1974, 1977, 1978), Klinger (1978), POpe (1978), and their colleagues on daydreaming, imagination, and the stream of consciousness experience. Here the stream of conscious- ness and its Operations are being assessed by retrospective self-report inventories (Singer and Antrobus, 1963, 1972), thought-sampling procedures (Klinger, 1978), and thinking out loud (Pope, 1978). Paralleling the structuralists, who, in the tradition of Wundt (1897) and Titchener (1898), sought to determine the structure of consciousness by reducing it to its elemen- tal units, are those scientists concerned with theorizing and research into "states" and "altered states" of con- sciousness. These theories of consciousness hypothesize that the intensities or patterning of the different elements, structures, or subsystems of consciousness are thought to be different in differing altered (Tart, 1972, 1975, 1977) or alternate (Zinberg, 1977) states of consciousness. "Altered" States sf Consciousnsss In spite of a great deal of theorizing on the enumera- tion (Krippner, 1972; Ludwig, 1972), nature (Zinberg, 1977b; Marsh, 1978; Singer. 1977). and organization of altered states of consciousness (Tart, 1972, 1975, 1977; Fischer, 1971, 1978; Silverman, 1968: Fishkin and Jones, 1978), with the exception of a few studies (Vogel, et. al., 1972: Hunt and Chefurka, 1976), there has been relatively little em- pirical, phenomenological investigation into the nature of altered states of consciousness as they compare with ordinary states. Such ordinary states must serve as a baseline against which to compare altered or alternate states of conscious- ness. The phenomenological work done on those states of awareness produced by meditation (Maupin, 1972; Deikman, 1966: Greenfield, Note 1), drugs (Pahnke, 1972), EEG biofeed- back (Kamiya, 1972; Plotkin, 1979), any many other means, hypothesize these procedures to produce "altered" states of consciousness. Yet without an adequate and empirical base- line with which to compare them, their "altered" or "alter- nate" status is questionable. This is even more salient since a relatively simple task such as sitting immobily for ten minutes can evoke significant alterations in subjective experience that re- semble altered states produced by drugs, meditation, etc. (Hunt and Chefurka, 1976). Hunt and Chefurka's results call into question the uniqueness of the "altered state" effects of meditation, biofeedback, etc., and the extent to which their results depend on the purported agents or are caused by nonspecific variables. In short, meditation, biofeedback, and many other altered state induction procedures are espoused to cause alternate states of consciousness. But this presupposes a baseline with which to compare these altered states, and also presupposes that this baseline state is significantly different from these altered states. Moreover, since a "state of consciousness" is something subjectively experienced, such evaluation of differences in state of consciousness should be subjectively or phenomenologically based. Since there is little hard, empirical, phenomenological research to substantiate the above presuppositions, the statement that meditation, biofeedback, etc. produce altered states of consciousness (from a baseline state) is without scientif— ic validation. Indeed, the same objections and controver- sies that, for decades, have surrounded the question of hypnosis as a trance state (Barber, 1969; Sarbin and Coe, 1972) are applicable to the notion of "altered" states of consciousness, in general. Egg Question.sf "States" 93 Consciousness Besides the question of the validity of the notion of altered or alternate states of consciousness for certain induced alterations in phenomenological experience, there is a more fundamental question. This concerns the question as to whether the concept of "states" of consciousness is a legitimate and valid one, and one that can be operationa- 1ized. This is a question that goes back, at least, to the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the several controversies that erupted between the structuralists and the functionalists at the turn of the 1900's concerned the structuralist's use of the term "states of consciousness." According to Angell (1907), the "more extreme and ingenuous conceptions of structural psychology . . . (grew) out of an unchastened indulgence in what we may call the 'state of consciousness' doctrine" (p.64). Angell argued that when the structuralists used the "moment of consciousness" as their unit of analysis, not only was the particular state of consciousness assessed, arbitrary and stimulus-dependent, since it was "dependent upon the par- ticular exigencies and conditions which call(ed) them forth" (p.67), but this analysis destroyed the most fundamental property of consciousness, its evanescent and fleeting qual- ity. Since consciousness is never the same but always in flux, the "state of consciousness" doctrine, was, according to Angell, an artificial and basically erroneous perception of the nature of consciousness that could only lead to con- fusion and controversy. Even though modern researchers are using the term "state of consciousness" in a different sense from that of the structuralists, Angell's argument still holds. If con— sciousness is in continual flux and never the same, it may make no sense to talk about a particular "state" of con- sciousness, for the simple reason that the nature of the stream of consciousness may preclude that term having any useful meaning. As an example, one may pass through differ- ent states of consciousness so quickly, that every moment is a new state of consciousness, making it impossible to assess a particular state of consciousness with any degree of reliability. Or a state of consciousness may be so nebu- lous and hard to observe, that the mere act of observing it, alters it, just as in quantum mechanics, the act of determin- ing the precise poSition of an electron will change its mo- mentum and hence, its position (Heisenberg, 1962). 10 Nevertheless, the term "state of consciousness" is currently used with the implied meaning that a particular state of consciousness has a certain recognizable pattern or form to it that is somewhat durable over time (Tart, 1975; Zinberg, 1977: Singer, 1977). But the statement that con- sciousness has a pattern or form to it, such that the con— cept of "state of consciousness" applies, is not a fact, but only an assumption that needs to be empirically investigated and confirmed or refuted. Thus the notion of consciousness having "states" that can be empirically verified, is only an assumption that depends on (1) ones definition of "state" and (2) evidence that "states" of consciousness, so defined, can be operationalized such that it is a valid and useful scientific concept. Webster (1970) defines the concept of "state" as "a mode or condition of being" (p.855) in which water in its solid, liquid, and gaseous states are prime examples. But surely, states of consciousness are not like states of water? A more precise definition of "state"; drawn from a field quite appropriate for our inquiry, cybernetics, is ' that a state is "any well-defined condition or property that can be recognized if it occurs again" (Ashby, 1963, p.17). If the stream and structure of consciousness is so fluid so as to preclude definition, or so nebulous or changeable that its parameters in one condition cannot be assessed to be the same or similar in a later, but identical 11 condition, the phrase "state of consciousness", as applied to a given condition, has no Operational meaning. The only profitable way of testing this notion of "states" of consciousness, and the validity of the "altered" state of consciousness concept, must be via intrOSpection, during which the phenomenological parameters of conscious- ness are observed and assessed. As mentioned, since con— sciousness is the subjective awareness of the objects with- in and without the observer (Webster, 1970), and the mapping of consciousness by a neurophysiological approach has been called into question (Plotkin, 1979), only by introspection or phenomenological observation, can the subjective nature of consciousness be known and hence communicated. In essence then, any science sf consciousnsss sag 13s various "states" msst ps gpounded is sn empirical phenomenglsgy 2; consciousness, although it can and should be supported by psychological, electrophysiological, and neurochemical data. Such an empirical phenomenology would then allow for an adequate testing of the validity of the "states" of con- sciousness notion and particular current theories of (states of) consciousness. Although there have been several theo- ries of consciousness put forward, there has been less than adequate data to validate or refute them. Theories sf Consciousness R. Fischer (1971, 1978) has developed a cartography of conscious states based upon the arousal level of the 12 organism. According to Fischer's paradigm, conscious states vary from hypo- to hyperaroused states, depending on the trophotropic or ergotropic activation of the nervous system. Whereas meditative states are due to trophotropic arousal, hyperphrenic and cataleptic states are due to ergo- tropic activation of the nervous system. In contrast to arousal, J. Silverman (1968) has hypothesized a system for explaining states of consciousness based upon attention. For Silverman, the deployment of attention and the degree to which it is intensive, extensive, and selective, will determine the degree to which an altered state of consciousness is experienced. Another model for understanding consciousness and its various states that puts attention in a prominent position is that proposed by Fishkin and Jones (1978). They suggest that a particular state of consciousness (SC) can be characterized by a set of eight parameters, four of which deal with attentional control, and two each with those phenomena "potentially available to consciousness" (PAC) and the energy status of the system. In contradistinction to the previous models, the "psychedelic model of altered states" asserts that in the formal sense there are no altered states of consciousness, rather there are only "states of consciousness typically subordinated within conduct and consciousness atypically manifested" (Hunt and Chefurka, 1976, p.876). In their approach, altered states reduce to "subjective reflections" 13 or "by-products of general mental activity" due to con- sciousness becoming aware of its own subjective processes. Tart's systems approach is consoisusness By far the most rigorous and systematic theory of consciousness is the “systems approach" to consciousness as espoused by C.T. Tart (1972, 1975, 1977). For Tart, ordi- nary consciousness is a semi-arbitrary construction due to the physiological, psychological, and cultural needs of the organism. It, and any other states of consciousness, are made up of "awareness/attention", the basic theoretical and experiential given of consciousness, and ten subsystems or structures, which include: exteroceptors, interoceptors, input processing, memory, sense of identity, evaluation and decision making, motor output, subconscious, emotion, and the space/time sense (Tart, 1975). These subsystems combine to form a "discrete state of consciousness" (d-SoC): a unique configuration or system of psychological structures or subsystems, a configuration that maintains its integrity or identity as a recogniz- able system in spite of variations in in ut from the environment and it spite of various small) changes in the subsystems (1975, p.62). For Tart, it is the pattern or organization between these different elements that determines the particular discrete state of consciousness experienced, and not the intensity of the particular psychological subsystems evident. In Tart's system, and that of others (Ludwig, 1972; 14 Krippner, 1972), the recognition of being in an altered state of consciousness is a phenomenological one: the observer notes a qualitative alteration in the overall pattern of mental functioning, such that the experiencer feels his consciousness is radically different from the 'normal' way it functions (Tart, 1972, p.95). , Because of individual differences between peOple, Tart also believes that the mapping of discrete states of consciousness must first be done on an individual basis. Only then, and only if great similarities are found to exist across individuals, can common names be applied across in- dividuals for those states of consciousness that are found to be similar in similar individuals. The elegance of Tart's systems approach makes it especially amendable to empirical testing, provided, of course, there are structures or subsystems of consciousness that tend to remain stable in a variety of conditions. In that case, altered states of consciousness should be dis- tinguishable from a normal, baseline state, by an altera- tion in pattern among the structures of consciousness, con- comitant with the perception that one is in a qualitatively different state of consciousness than normally. If there are only alterations in intensities among the subsystems of consciousness, instead of changes in patterning, one might then help resolve one of the contro- versies over states of consciousness theory, i.e. whether 15 altered states of consciousness are merely differences in degree over baseline and other states of consciousness, as Singer suggests (Zinberg, 1977b), or are discrete states, states formed by a patterning of subsystems, whose patterns are different in different states, as Tart (1975, 1977) insists. The Purpose pf the Present Investigation The following study will determine whether it makes any sense to talk about "states" and "altered states" of consciousness, i.e. whether these terms have meaning that can be operationally defined and empirically investigated via a phenomenological methodology. This will be done by determining: (1) if consciousness can be accurately and re- liably assessed via a phenomenological, retro- spective approach. If subjective data cannot be accurately and reliably assess— ed, a phenomenological exploration of consciousness can go no further. Such an introspective approach has been sug- gested by Lieberman (1979) as credible, although behavior- ists like Skinner (1974) and Rachlin (1974) have argued that introspection is inaccurate and superfluous. Although Tart (1975) insists that the mapping of con- sciousness must first be done on an individual basis, since there is consensual validation for such states as dreaming, sleeping, and daydreaming, etc. (Zinberg, 1977b), this 16 suggests (2) that the phenomenological mapping of conscious- ness can be nomothetic instead of idiographic. If each of these prOpositions turns out to be empir- ically supported, then such an approach can be used to (3) determine the possible structures, subsystems, or dimensions of consciousness, and (4) determine if these dimensions of consciousness are stable in a variety of differing or altered conditions. Positive results would support Tart's (1975) theorizing on the stability of the subsystems of consciousness and suggest that altered states of consciousness may be composed of the same dimensions of consciousness as ordinary states, al- though possibly intensified or organized in different ways. With stable dimensions of consciousness, then a com- parison of these various dimensions in two successive, identical conditions will be able to determine (5) if the intensities and/or the patterns amongst the dimensions remain the same or vary significantly in identical, yet successive con- ditions. If it turns out that identical conditions are associated with phenomenological experiences that are the same or very similar, one can then talk about a particular condi- tion as being associated with a particular "state of 17 consciousness", since such a state can now be operationally defined in terms of phenomenological parameters, and is found to be the same or similar in identical stimulus con- ditions. By comparing such a "baseline" condition with con- ditions hypothesized to produce alterations in conscious- ness, it will be possible to determine (6) if such conditions are characterized by dimensions of consciousness different in intensity from the same dimensions in the baseline state, and/or (7) if such conditions are characterized by differences in pattern among the dimensions of consciousness. This would then help to determine if altered states are characterized by intensity changes, or rather, by pattern changes, or both. Also, because of possibly large individual and personality differences among the subjects, by means of personality inventories, one could determine if (8) different personality characteristics are associated with differing subjective experiences across the various dimensions of consciousness. for the Ss. ASSESSMENT, DESIGN, AND HYPOTHESES Assessment pf Phenomenological Experience In order to determine an assessment procedure ade- quate for mapping phenomenological consciousness, such a procedure would have to be able to assess the great variety of subjective experiences. Tart (1977) has mentioned ten different psychological subsystems excluding awareness/ attention that comprise what we call conscious experience and Krippner (1972) has described twenty different altered states of consciousness worthy of study. In order to com- prehensively determine the nature of consciousness, any phenomenological mapping of subjective experience would have to include these categories of subjective experience, provided they can be phenomenologically assessed, and any other pertinent areas of subjective experience. Possible methodologies Klinger (1978) suggests that there are roughly five procedures currently in use for assessing the phenomenology of experience. A self-report questionnaire, like the Imaginal Process Inventory (IPI) (Singer and Antrobus, 1972), in which the subject assesses his inner experience via retro- spection, is an example of the first. Several modern ima- gery questionnaires, such as the modified Betts QMI (Sheehan, 1972, 1974), and the Richardson Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ) (Richardson, 1977) are also examples of ~ 18 19 approaches to map subjective experience of imagery via introspective self-report that use a questionnaire. Another method consists of the subject thinking out loud and reporting via speech what he is experiencing. It requires the subject to speak continuously as he is think- ing and has been used since the 1950's (Bloom and Brider, 1950; DeGroot, 1965; Klinger, 1971). This approach, however, may be obtrusive and influence or distort the nature of the phenomenological experience, especially since thinking out loud is not the same as thinking to oneself. Moreover, it may tend to "fit" phenomenological experience into the semantic-syntactic language of verbal discourse. A third method consists of the participant going about his everyday business and then being interrupted inter- mittently and asked of his subjective experience just before the interruption. This procedure is called thought sampling and can be epitomized by the work of Aserinsky and Kleitman (1953) in which Ss were awakened during periods of rapid eye movements (REMs) and non-rapid eye movements (NREMs) and asked for their subjective experience. This procedure has the virtue of being a highly flexible procedure that is relatively unobtrusive (Klinger, 1978). A fourth method consists of thought sampling, but instead of being asked to narrate their experience, Ss are to rate their experience according to particular agreed- upon scales. This procedure allows for flexibility and 20 and unobtrusiveness of the previous method and yet allows as many aSpects of subjective experience to be assessed as there are items. The fifth method consists of having the subject re- port the number of times subjective events occur during a particular time period. Studies done at the University of Minnesota (Klinger, 1978) have utilized the last four methodologies in the study of the stream of consciousness with a good deal of success. Other methods for assessing phenomenological experience less directly include the use of drawings to tap the nature of ones phenomenological experience, as with Achterberg and Lawlis's (1977) work on the use of imagery with cancer pa- tients, and Kagen's interpersonal process recall (Kagan and Krathwohl, 1967). In attempting to directly map the phenomenology of subjective experience, a content analysis of the subject's verbalizations of his stream of consciousness either during thinking out loud or verbalized thought sampling, may not yield data comprehensive enough to cover the many dimen- sions of phenomenological eXperience. As mentioned, it may also exclude those areas of experience that cannot be ade- quately put into semantic-syntactic speech. Having the Ss report the number of times a given subjective event occurred may be tedious, eSpecially if there are many subjective events of which to keep track. This leaves only the 21 self-report questionnaire and thought sampling using rat- ings as viable alternatives for directly mapping the nature of subjective experience. RetQOSpective phenomenological observstion Since the Imaginal Process Inventory (Singer and Antrobus, 1972) has been found to be reliable and valid, as were the various imagery questionnaires previously men- tioned, it was thought that a self-report inventory could yield an uncumbersome and possibly reliable assessment of phenomenological experience. If one could combine a ques- tionnaire on consciousness with the thought sampling method using ratings, such a questionnaire would allow the obser- ver to rate his subjective experience of consciousness according to the items listed. The questionnaire could be given immediately after the period of time during which consciousness is to be assessed. Such a procedure would then involved retrospection by the observer upon the period of time for which conscious- ness is to be rated. This would mean, for an accurate assessment of subjective experience, that the S must remem- ber the nature of his experience during the criterion time interval and accurately rate it according to the items of the questionnaire. Klinger (1978) reported that most Ss are very accurate at remembering their stream of conscious- ness if they are asked immediately afterwards about it. If retrospection upon a criterion time period is used, 22 in order for any "state" properties of consciousness to demonstrate themselves without interference from the fluidity of the stream of thought, it was thought that a period of time of approximately several minutes would be long enough to demonstrate such "state" properties without being greatly influenced by the randomness of thought at any particular moment. This procedure, however, means that the S would have to remember the nature of the immediately preceding several minute period. Although probably not difficult, memory loss may somewhat preclude an accurate remembering of this experience, especially for the begin- ning or middle section of this short period of time. Nevertheless, if it can be shown that Ss can do such retrospection reliably, this would mean that such a proce- dure has merit, and its possible lack of high accuracy would be more than compensated by its benefits. These would include (1) the fact that such a time period would not disrupt or "freeze" one stream of consciousness. This was one of the big arguments that the functionalists (Angell, 1907) leveled against the structuralists, i.e. that an assessment period of several seconds, as used by the structuralists, was so short that it eliminated the most essential nature of consciousness, its process nature. As mentioned, a several minute period of time would also (2) tend to eliminate assessment of transient and ran- dom events and thus make it easier for any "state" prOper- ties of consciousness to become evident. .And finally. (3) 23 _such a short period of time should not be severely affected by memory decrements, although some memory loss would proba- bly occur. A questionnaire, completed in reference to the period of subjective experience to be assessed, if reliable, should be able to determine if consciousness can be defined in terms of the state concept, i.e. having a "well-defined condition or property that can be recognized if it occurs again" (Ashby, 1963, p.17). This would then allow for an empirical testing of the validity of those theories of con- sciousness, hotly discussed in the literature (Zinberg, 1977), that have little empirical, phenomenological data to support them. Desigp Since the initial mapping of subjective experience via such a questionnaire should be representative of a usual, ordinary “state" of consciousness, a baseline period of time was needed that would be similar to ones ordinary waking state of consciousness. Ones ordinary waking state has been described as that in which a person is alert and conscious, engaged in the perception of external or internal events, involved in some verbal thinking, and maintaining a satisfactory self-image (Fishkin and Jones, 1978). In deciding upon a baseline measure, a time period was needed which would be similar to the above definition of ordinary waking consciousness. 24 Baseline conditions Sitting quietly with ones eyes opened (the SQ or baseline condition) was chosen as the baseline activity to be assessed. Ordinary experience usually consists of hav- ing ones eyes Opened in which one is interacting with the surround or others or is engaged in some type of self- activity (be this daydreaming, talking to oneself, problem solving, etc.). Sitting quietly with eyes Opened seemed to tap such ordinary experience yet it also was compatible with Fishkin and Jones's definition. Since it was decided that structuringjthe session to engage in some specific type of activity would bias the state of consciousness assessed in terms of that activity, only a more open-ended setting would allow for a less bias- ed and possibly more general assessment of conscious exper— ience. For this reason, sitting quietly with eyes closed was not chosen as the baseline measure. It was thought such an assessment procedure might bias the nature of phenom— enological experience towards more imagery, increased inward attention, and possibly alterations in conscious experience due to sensory deprivation. An initial pilot study also indicated that sitting quietly with ones eyes opened was a simple procedure that everyone could do without arousing anxiety or concern that did not involve a lot of instructions that also might bias the setting of the experiment. It allowed for a setting in 25 which individual differences in phenomenological exper- ience might more easily show themselves, as Opposed to a structured activity which would surely have cut down on the variance amongst Ss. Several following pilot studies indi- cated that this Open-ended stimulus situation did allow for a lot of individual variation, yet was structured enough so that a constant, stimulus environment was pres- end to all Ss. The use of such unstructured, ongoing thought as a baseline from which to compare altered states of conscious- ness also has the support of J.L. Singer. As mentioned, he has done a great deal of experimentation on daydreaming (Singer, 1966, 1974) and the stream Of consciousness (Singer, 1978). Singer (1977) suggests using the "stream of consciousness" as a baseline for altered states of con- sciousness research. Eyes opened sitting quietly is thus a baseline measure that is in the mainstream of contempor- ary consciousness research. By having the 83 return a week later and experience the same, identical condition with an identical assessment procedure, one can assess for differences in intensity and patterning of subjective experience between the two baseline conditions and also determine test-retest reliability for the assessment instrument. 26 Treatment condition: pslsxatlonlmeditation Besides mapping the parameters of phenomenological experience in an ordinary, waking state of consciousness, the author also wanted to determine if procedures which would be thought to induce subjective experiences differ- ent from sitting quietly, would yield significant differ- ences on one or more of the possible parameters of phenom- enological experience that characterize the baseline con- dition. Silverman (1968) has mentioned that an alteration in conscious state is produced by a change in attentional intensiveness, extensiveness, and selectivity. Both med- itation and progressive relaxation involve such changes in attentional activity. Meditation usually involves a closing Of the eyes, an erect yet rigid but relaxed, body posture, and the de- ployment of attention so as to concentrate attention upon a single object or impression (Naranjo and Ornstein, 1972). Progressive relaxation, likewise, involves a closing of the eyes, a nonmoving body posture that becomes very relaxed, and the deployment of attention upon the body so as to pro- duce deep muscle relaxation throughout the body (Bernstein and Borkovec, 1973). Both states also involve a lowering of arousal or level of consciousness (Goleman, 1971) over more ordinary, nonaltered states of consciousness. By combining progressive relaxation with a short med- itational procedure one has a condition that would be 27 purported to produce an alteration in conscious experience. By comparing such a relaxation/meditation (RM) condition with a baseline condition, one could then assess for sig- nificant differences in intensity and patterning of sub- jective experience between the two conditions. Tpeatment condltion: readipg erotlss Whereas relaxation/meditation would supposedly involve a lowering of arousal, an inward turning of attention, and a decrease in cognitive and imagoic processes over the sit- ting quietly condition, a condition was also wanted that would involve an increase in arousal, a greater absorption of attention, and an increase in rational and imagoic processes. In order to tap such a state of awareness, it was decided that the reading of some mildly arousing erotic material should evince a more aroused, excited state of awareness, with increased cognitive and imagoic activity than either the RM or the SQ conditions. All three conditions seemed eminently suitable for tap- ping dimensions of consciousness that one would expect to be different from each other in such parameters as arousal, awareness, attention, imagery, cognition, rationality, and affect. Thus the three conditions compared in this study were: eyes opened sitting quietly (the SQ or baseline condi- tion), relaxation/meditation (RM), and reading erotica (RE). 28 Assessment pf personality differences With possible large individual differences between Ss for the different parameters of phenomenological ex- perience (Tart, 1975), one might hypothesize that such individual differences will be related to differing per- sonality characteristics among the Ss. Such personality traits like introversion/extraversion (Eysenck, 1953) or absorption, a trait highly correlated with hypnotic sus- ceptibility (r=.38) (Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974), may be related to the intensity of a person's awareness and atten- tion levels, imagery vividness, etc. Just as meditators differ on the intensity of their phenomenological experience during meditation (Greenfield, Note 1), introverts and ex— traverts, or those of low or high absorption, may differ as to their experience of consciousness. Personality measures to map individual differences on these two traits were thus included to determine if the nature of subjective experience might be moderated by such individual differ- ences. Experimental paradigm The experimental design for this experiment included, in an initial session, four minutes of sitting quietly with eyes opened, followed by four minutes of reading erotic material. Immediately after each of these two conditions, the Ss completed an instrument that assessed their subjec- tive experience during that time period (the Phenomenology 29 of Consciousness Questionnaire (PCQ)). The first session ended with the Ss completing a personality inventory (a shortened version of the Differential Personality Question: naire (DPQ)). During a second session, held a week later, the Ss again experienced four minutes of eyes Opened sitting quiet- ly, followed by progressive relaxation instructions and four minutes of relaxation/meditation with eyes closed. Each of these two conditions were also immediately followed by com- pletion of the consciousness inventory in reference to that condition. Table 1 on the following page illustrates this design graphically. By means of this design one is able to determine if consciousness can be accurately and reliably assessed via a retrospective questionnaire, the possible dimensions of consciousness found to be stable in a variety of conditions, and the changes in intensity and patterning among these di- mensions in two identical "baseline" conditions and two con- ditions thought to produce alterations in consciousness from this baseline condition. Selected personality char- acteristics as they relate to differences in phenomenologi- cal experience among the Ss for the different dimensions of consciousness can also be monitored. Hypotheses Based upon the material reviewed in the introduction and the design characteristics of this investigation that 3O A.Qas :v SHPOHSU mcflppfim pesomo mohm Go>wm OOSHHOPQH no>flw N Show HOGOHPMpflpos 0 show A.:fis :v .A.vsooom com com mdoaposppmcH Cowpflpsoo Soapmxmaom oCHHommm uncoom V .‘ savanna mcfippnm A.:fle av pocomo mohm Co>flw Go>wm Qo>flw 95 N :50.“ 0 Show Add: 3 .AI: pmhfim All com soapflpsoo com weapoom endgame soapnecoo ocflaommm Pmsflm mCOMPflusoo wGoammom swwmon Hapsmsflhogxm esp H manna ho guano 31 have just been reviewed, the following hypotheses are pre- sented: Hypothesis 1: Judgments regarding the phenomenology of - consciousness can be reliably and accurately as- sessed via nomothetically-procured, retrospective, self-report data. Hypothesis 2: The subjective experience of conscious- ness is characterized by specific structures or dimensions of consciousness that are stable over time. These dimensions will include: body integ- rity (image), time, altered awareness, attention, control (volition), ego (self) awareness, percep- tion, affect, imagery, internal dialogue, rational- ity, memory, meaning, and alertness (arousal). Hypothesis 3A: A baseline condition, characterized by certain intensities of phenomenal experience, is associated with the same intensities of phenomenal experience when repeated. Hypothesis 3B: Alternatively, conditions purported to produce alterations in consciousness from the a- bove baseline, are characterized by intensities of phenomenal experience significantly different from that of baseline. (1) Specifically, a condition in which 85 read mildly arousing erotica is associa— ted with significantly greater alertness 32 (arousal), absorbed attention, control, affect, imagery amount and vividness, rationality, and less internal dialogue than the corresponding baseline condi- tion Of sitting quietly with eyes closed. (2) A condition, characterized by deep muscle relaxation and attention to ones breathing, is associated with signifi- cantly greater altered awareness, inward and absorbed attention, and imagery viv- idness, but lesser alertness (arousal), ego (self) awareness, body integrity, control, affect, imagery, rationality, and internal dialogue than the baseline condition. Hypothesis 4A: A baseline condition, characterized by certain patterns or relationships amongst the die mensions of consciousness that compose it, is associated with the same patterns when this base- line session is repeated under identical condi- tions. Hypothesis 4B: Conversely, conditions, characterized to produce alterations in phenomenological con- sciousness from the baseline period, are associa— ted with patterns of subjective experience signif- icantly different in organization from that of the baseline condition. Hypothesis 5: There will be much individual differences amongst the Ss for intensity of phenomenological experience for the various dimensions of conscious- ness, and the intensities of these experiences will be associated with certain personality traits. 33 (1) Specifically, the trait of absorp- tion (increased absorption) will corre- late positively with altered awareness: inward and absorbed attention: loss of body integrity, self awareness, and con- trol: and decreases in rationality. (2) Extraversion (greater extraversion) will correlate positively with an out- ward, distractible attention: little experience of imagery: yet a great deal of control, body integrity, and self awareness. METHOD Sub'ects, Experimentep, spg Experimental Setting Two hundred and seventy Ss took part in the first of two sessions of an experiment entitled "You and Your Mind". All Ss were introductory psychology students recruited ac— cording to the Human Subjects Pool procedures and they were given credits towards their final grade for participation. Twenty-one Ss either failed to return for the second ses- 'sion or had incomplete data. Two hundred and forty-nine Ss made up the final data pool. Of these, one hundred and seventy-nine were females, and seventy, males. Their mean age was 18.6 years. The experimenter was the author, a fourth year graduate student, who knew Of the experimental hypotheses. A11 Ss were run from 6 to 8 PM in October of 1979 in a classroom containing 65 regular classroom seats. These seats were arranged in nine rows, approximately seven seats to a row. All seats faced towards the front of the room. Besides the seats, the room contained a large desk,at the front of the room, a door, seven large windows, and a black- board, also at the front of the room. The blackboard was blank except for information on the study that the Ss need- ed in order to complete the consent forms. 34 Materials pf Consciousness Questionnaire (PCQ) Construction.p£ the Questionnaire The Phenomenolpgy A questionnaire, used to assess the S's phenomeno— logical experience, was constructed. The author first de- termined the dimensions or content areas of subjective, con- scious experience upon which consciousness might vary. Based upon Battista's (1978) eight elements of phenomeno- logical experience, Tart's (1972, 1977) eleven subsystems of consciousness, Ludwig's (1972) and Krippner's (1972) altered states of consciousness, Silverman's (1968) dimen- sions of attention, and the author's own knowledge of the phenomenology and psychology of consciousness, possible con- tent,areas of conscious experience were enumerated, differen- tiated, and integrated. The following dimensions of consciousness were thought relatively distinct, yet comprehensive enough, to map the nature of subjective experience: ego awareness, body integ- rity, state of awareness, arousal, attention, control or vo- lition, time, perception, affect or emotion, imagery, cogni- tion, rationality, meaning and paranormal experience, and a general information category. Items dealing with consciousness, according to the above content areas, were then constructed. These items were pat- terned after the Post-Session Questionnaire (PSQ) developed by Osis, et. a1. (1973) to assess the phenomenological -35 36 experience of meditation. The items were bipolar, each con- sisting of extreme statements between which lay a seven- point Likert scale. They were randomly arranged to produce an initial questionnaire, called the Phenomenology of Con- sciousness Questionnaire (PCQ), consisting of sixty items. Several pilot studies were completed on this initial ques- tionnaire before it reached its final format. MMM During the first pilot study, the PCQ was given to a group of about twenty Ss and these Ss were queried about the way they completed the PCQ and were asked to give suggestions to improve the questionnaire. Based on their feedback, many of the items were modified to make them more understandable and the questionnaire was expanded to seventyitems to more adequately tap all possible dimensions of consciousness. Second pilot study A second pilot study was then done on about fifteen Ss. After this second pilot study it was decided that the Ss needed some initial practice in learning how to introspect (since that's what the completion of the PCQ entailed). The first two pilot studies did not tell the Ss what to ex- pect while they sat quietly. Several Ss feared the E would not return or got mad at not being told exactly what was hap- pening. Both pilot studies gave no initial practice at introspecting. Because of the above and the inconsistent 37 reSponses some of the Ss seemed to be giving, a third pilot study was run which instituted a short practice period at the beginning of the experiment. Mfllflm For this pilot study the Ss sat for one minute with their eyes closed and then completed a short ten-item ques- tionnaire just like the seventy-item PCQ. This gave them practice at what they were expected to do, seemed to allevi- ate alot of their anxiety, and did not seem to affect or bias the subsequent sitting quietly period. In order to assess how accurate and consistent the Ss were at completing the PCQ, five items of the PCQ (those dealing with awareness, attention, affect, internal cogni- tions, and imagery) were duplicated with synonyms substituted for a few of the words in each of the items. Thus there were two sets of items with nearly identical wording. Five items Of the previous seventy-item questionnaire were elimi- nated. One of the items of each of the five pairs was ran— domly placed near the beginning of the questionnaire and the second item of each pair, near the end. These items would allow for a check of the reliability and accuracy of the Ss at completing the questionnaire. Twenty-seven Ss were run through this pilot study using the modified PCQ. Reliabilities were computed be- tween the five pairs of items, summing across two periods of sitting quietly and one period of relaxation/meditation that 38 each S experienced. Reliabilities, as computed by the Pearson product moment correlation, were: .47, .62, .68, .83, and .87, which were deemed quite satisfactory except for the pair with the correlation of .47. Inspection of this pair revealed it was diffuse and vague and so another pair of items was substituted to replace it. Since a relaxation/meditation condition was run along with the two sitting quietly conditions, analysis of the data revealed that many of the items differentiated sig- nificantly between the two conditions of sitting quietly and relaxation/meditation. This pilot study indicated that Ss could be consistent at introspecting while also reveal- ing that their subjective experience was different in these two differing conditions. Fourth pilot study A fourth pilot study was run. The Ss experienced three conditions during this pilot study: eyes opened, sitting quietly, a condition in which the Ss read mildly arousing erotica, and the relaXation/meditation condition. The re— sults indicated that most Ss could become somewhat sexually aroused to the mildly erotic material and yet no one ob- jected to this material. Devslopment pf the final Questionnaire A cluster analysis of the items of the 70-item PCQ for the third pilot study was undertaken to determine the 39 final composition of the questionnaire. Certain items were a priori hypothesized to load highest on a particular di- mension or content area, and a multiple groups oblique cluster analysis using Hunter's PACKAGE (Hunter, Note 2) was employed to determine those items that did in fact have their highest loadings in a given content area. Items that loaded higher on a different cluster from what they were assigned, were eliminated and reassigned to the cluster on which they loaded higher, or were put in a residual clus- ter. Reclustering then occurred until the items making up the final clusters all had their highest cluster loadings on their assigned cluster. Based on the initial a priori categories that were hypothesized to accurately map the phenomenology of con- sciousness, and the previous multiple groups cluster analy- sis to purify those clusters of nonhomogeneous items, the PCQ in its final form consisted of sixty items, drawn from fifteen different content areas or dimensions. The content areas and the number of items in each content area were the following: (1) state of awareness (3 items): (2) time (3 items): (3) bOdy image (or integrity) (3 items): (4) attention (6 items, 2 each for direction, absorption, and ‘ selectivity): (5) control (or volition) (5 items, three for attentiOn and two for volition): (6) ego (or self) awareness (3 for awareness and 3 for integrity): (7) PerceptiOn (3 itemS): (8) affect (7 items, 4 for positive and 3 for 40 negative affect): (9) imagery (4 items, 2 for amount and 2 for vividness): (10) internal dialogue (3 items): (11) rationality (3 items): (12) memory (2 items): (13) meaning (3 items): (14) alertness (or arousal) (4 items): and (15) other (6 items). These were the items used in the final form of the PCQ. Two forms, labeled Form 0 and Form 2, were construct- ed. Both forms had the same items, although the items were arranged differently, by random selection, in each form. (See Appendix A, p. 158.) These final forms also included the five pair of duplicate items previously mentioned. Differential Personality Questionpaips (DPQ) In order to determine and assess for possible indi- vidual personality differences, a portion of the Differ- ential Personality Questionnaire (DPQ) (Tellegan, Note 3) was used. The DPQ is a 300-item personality inventory developed to possess a discriminant multidimensional struc- ture. The DPQ scales represent a number of distinct and major personality dimensions that include the traits of introversion/extraversion, absorption, and other dimensions represented by the taxanomies of Eysenck, Cattell, and Guilford. For the purpose of this study only four of the scales of the DPQ were used, these being: social closeness, social potency, impulsiveness, and absorption. All have coef- ficient alphas Of between .86 and .89 and adequate 41 test-retest reliabilities. The scales of social closeness, social potency, and impulsiveness were collapsed to produce a scale that tapped introversion/entraversion (Eysenck, 1953), while the absorption scale tapped "openness to ab- sorbing and selffaltering experiences" (Tellegan and Atkinson, 1974). These four scales were combined into a personality questionnaire consisting of one hundred and six items. (See Appendix B, p. 170.) Other Mateplsls The progressive relaxation/meditation instructions consisted of standard progressive relaxation instructions to which a short four minute meditational interlude had been added. This short interlude, enacted after the pro- gressive relaxation instructions, consisted of having the Ss become aware of their breathing while they let themselves become more and more relaxed with each breath that they took. During this four minute period the experimenter did not talk and at the end of that time, the 88 were told to open their eyes. (See Appendix C, p. 178.) The mildly erotic material which the Ss read consisted of a short passage of about 1000 words that took the average reader about four minutes to read. The passage was a slightly modified version of an exerpt from a short story called "The Veiled Woman" which was taken from.2slps pf Vspps, Erotica by Anasis Nin (1977). (See Appendix D, p. 183.) 42 Two debriefing questionnaires were completed by each S at the end of each session. These questionnaires asked the Ss to summarize their subjective experience during each of the conditions. (See Appendix E, p. 186.) A Consent Form, which explained the S's rights, was completed by each S at the beginning of each session. (See Appendix F, p. 188.) A state of Consciousness Instruction Sheet was used to acquaint the Ss with the nature of their task (See Appendix G, p. 189.) and a Practice Questionnaire was used by the Ss in the beginning of the first session to acquaint them with the task of introspection. (See Appendix H, p. 190.) Procedure Ss were run in groups of about '30 to 40 Ss per group. At the beginning of the session the E greeted the Ss and told them the following: In this study I am interested in learning about your stream of consciousness, your subjective experience of yourself and the world around you. During this study I will be asking you to engage in different short activities and then will ask you to write about your experience. I will ask about the sensations, perceptions, emotions, thoughts, images, and awareness levels that you experience during these short time in- tervals. In order for you to have some idea of what you will be asked about, I want to pass out a sheet of instructions that will tell you what you will be asked to do. 43 The E then passed out the State of Consciousness Instruction Sheet and read it to the Ss. The E asked if there were any questions and then said the following: Now that you know a little about the study I'd like you to complete this consent form which is the department consent form for everyone par- ticipating in research. The E passed out the consent form. After the Ss had completed it, the E said the following: Before we begin I'd like you to practice a little so you have an idea of what I will be asking you to do. SO for the next minute I'd like you to sit quietly with your eyes closed and think about anything you like. Then after the minute is over I'll ask you to open your eyes and write about your experience. Any ques- tions? O.K. Please close your eyes and think about whatever you like. In a minute I'll tell you to Open your eyes. After the minute was over the E had the Ss open their eyes and they then completed the Practice Questionnaire. This questionnaire consisted of ten dipole items, with three item pairs of approximately similar content. The E then reviewed the practice questionnaire with the Ss and called their attention to the three item pairs, telling them that by comparing their responses to the three item pairs, they could determine how consistent they were at completing the questionnaire. The E then said the follow- ing: For this experiment I'll be asking you to intro- spect into your experience, just like you did' with this short questionnaire. Since introspec- tion is not something you normally do, it may be difficult. Please take your time and try to be as consistent as you can when asked to do this 44 again. For those of you who were very consistent on the practice questionnaire, please try to con- tinue to do so, and for those of you who were not very consistent, please take your time and try to do your best. Any questions? After this the E said the following: O.K. For the next few minutes I'd like you to sit quietly and think about whatever you like. How- ever, I'd like you not to read, write, talk, or close your eyes, and this includes utting your head down on the desk, like this. E mimics the behavior.) I'll be sitting outside the room during this time and after it passes, I'll be back in and ask you to write about your exper— ience just like you did for the practice session. Any questions? The E repeated the instructions and left the room. After four minutes the E returned and had the Ss complete the PCQ, form 0, in reference to the four minute period during which the E was outside the room. After the Ss were finished and the questionnaire and answer sheets were col— lected, the E said the following: During the next part of the experiment I have some reading material I would like you to read. I'm going to pass out the material and I'd like you to read it over, but please do not start to read it until I tell you to do so. The E passed out the material face down so the 88 could not see the material. The E then said: In a moment I want you to turn over the materi- al and start reading. When you are done, please turn the material over like it is now, so I know you have finished reading it. Are there any questions? O.K. Please begin reading the mate— rial. The E left the room. After four minutes, he returned and had the Ss stop reading. The PCQ, form 2, was passed out and the Ss were told to complete it in reference to the 45 period of time in which they sat reading the erotic material. After completing this they were given the personality ques— tionnaire, the DPQ, to complete. When finished, they com- pleted a short debriefing form and were told to return in a week at the same time and place to take part in an experi- ment called "Relaxation and You". At the beginning of the second session, the Ss again completed the consent form. They were then given the same identical instructions as they received for the first half of the first session, i.e. they were told to sit quietly and not read, write, talk, or close their eyes. The E left the room and after four minutes, returned. He gave the Ss the PCQ, form 0 to complete, telling the Ss to complete it reference to the period of time during which they were sitting quietly. After completing and collecting all questionnaires, the Ss experienced the relaxation/meditation condition. It began with the E telling the Ss that he would like to teach them progressive relaxation. The E asked if anyone had heard of this method before and then said the following: Progressive relaxation is a procedure by which you learn to relax deeply and fully. It is done by having you tense and then relax deeply and fully each of your different muscle groups of the body. During the next few minutes I would like to run through this procedure with you. The ac- tual instructions for the procedure will be read to you by me. But before you actually experience it, I would like to run through the different muscle groups of the body with you to give you some idea of what to expect. 46 The E turned off the lights in the back of the room but left on the lights in the front of the room. He then had the Ss tense and relax the muscles of their fists, arms, face, neck, shoulders, back, chest, abdomen, thighs, and feet. He then said the following: Since you will be asked to close your eyes at the beginning of the relaxation instructions, if any- one is wearing contacts and cannot keep them in for approximately twenty minutes, you'd probably be best to take them out. Does anyone have to do this? I will now go through each of the different mus- cle groups of the body with you. After you have relaxed all the muscles of your body, I will stop talking for a few minutes and you will be able to practice relaxing on your own. I will then start talking and ask you to open your eyes. DO you have any questions? The E then read the progressive relaxation instructions to the Ss, and paused for four minutes near the end, dur- ing which time the Ss were to relax on their own while be- ing aware of their breathing. After this was over, the E had the Ss complete the PCQ, form 2, in reference to the time period in which they sat quietly, relaxing to their breathing. After: the Ss had completed the PCQ, they were given a short debriefing form to complete that asked them about their subjective experience. The Ss were thanked for their participation, the general nature of the study was explain- ed to them, and their phone number was taken if they wanted to be notified as to their results. They were also given their extra credit points for participation in the study. RESULTS Reliability and Accuracy pf Introspection Hypothesis #1 suggested that consciousness can be reliably and accurately assessed via nomothetically-procur- ed, self-report data. The reliability results supported this hypothesis. Pearson r product-moment correlations were computed for the five pairs of duplicate items for each condition. (See Table 2, page 113.) Correlations ranged from a low of .39 to a high of .84. The average correlation across all five item pairs for the two baseline conditions was .70, and across all four conditions, .65. Only one of the item pairs had items that were exactly the same (internal dia- logue) and here correlations averaged .76. These relia- bility results, although not extremely high, suggest that $8 can be reliable at retrospective introspection, especially when assessed in reference to items of exactly the same con- tent. The accuracy of the S's responses was also assessed. By taking the absolute difference between the S's responses to the two items of each duplicate pair, one has a measure of how accurate the Ss were at retrospection, at least as measured by these five item pairs. Table 3 (page 114) lists the percentages of Ss having a given deviation score for each of the item pairs when collapsing across all four 48 conditions. Whereas a deviation score of zero indicates a direct hit, a deviation score of three or more indicates an inaccurate response, since the S missed checking the same space for both items by three or more units. (The maximum deviation score possible was 6 for the 7-point Likert scale.) Fifty-two percent of all responses were direct hits, 81% of all responses were within one unit and only 10% of the responses were off by three or more units. The average deviation score across all item pairs was less than one unit (X=.84). By averaging the five item pairs for each S in each condition, one has a measure of how accurate each S was at retrOspecting in that condition. As before, a zero score represents perfect accuracy, while a deviation score of 3, a chance response. Over all four conditions, the mean de- viation score was .46. Fifty-nine percent of all Ss were within one half of a unit deviation, 95% were within one and one half unit deviations, and only 5 out of 996 cases, or approximately .5%, averaged a score of around chance. (See Table 4, page 115.) These and the previous results strongly suggest that $8 can be both consistent and accurate when retrospecting, at least as assessed by the five item pairs of the PCQ. The Possible Dimensions pf Consciopsness Initial s priori cluster analysis In order to determine the possible structures or 49 dimensions of consciousness, the 60 item PCQ was submitted to an Oblique multiple groups cluster analysis, based on the a priori analysis previously discussed in the methods section. Cluster analysis is a synthesis of the theories of factor analysis and reliability, and is the "most appro- priate technique in almost every substantive area in which construct validity and error of measurement are primary considerations" (Hunter, Note 2, p.1). As an efficient way to do multitrait, multimethod analysis, it is "the pre- ferred form of factor analysis in almost all situations" (Hunter, Note 2, p.1). Since the number of clusters and the composition of the clusters was Specified in advance, an Oblique multiple groups cluster analysis was eminently suitable for confirm- ing or disproving the parameters of this model, while fac— tor analysis was not. For these reasons the cluster anal- ysis method was used, instead of factor analysis, although exploratory factor analysis was used afterwards to double check on the results of the cluster analysis. To do the cluster analysis Hunter's PACKAGE program (Hunter and Cohen, Note 4) was utilized. This program enacted an oblique multiple groups analysis on the matrix of correlations between each pair of items on the question- naire. It allowed for an estimation of the cluster score or the "trait" associated with a given group of items and the correlations between the traits. 50 Communalities were used in the diagonals of the corre- lation matrix. The use of communalities corrected for attenuation and eliminated the effects of error measurement for the estimated correlations between the items and the clusters. The resulting cluster loadings and the correla- tions between the items of the questionnaire and the clus- ters were then based on the cluster "true" scores, or the underlying traits or dimensions of consciousness that the questionnaire purports to measure, instead of merely the correlations between the items and the observed cluster scores. An oblique multiple groups analysis with communalities was executed, using the 15 a priori dimensions Of conscious- ness that formed the final categories of the PCQ. As men- tioned, these were the dimensions of consciousness arrived at by inductive reasoning and checked for homogeneity of content by a cluster analysis on the data of the third pilot study. These a priori dimensions included: body integrity, state of awareness, attention, control, self awareness, time, perception, positive and negative affect, imagery, alertness, memory, meaning, internal dialogue, and rational- ity. This analysis was done for the data of the PCQ for the first baseline condition using all 270 Ss. It was also completed for the first baseline condition for only those Ss whom data was available for all four conditions (N=249). 51 Since there were negligible differences between the results, the results reported for this and all subsequent cluster analyses were based on the data from Ss who experienced all four conditions. Tables 5 and 6 (pages 116-117) list the coefficient alphas (a measure of internal consistency or reliability) for each of the hypothesized dimensions and the individ- ual item's cluster loading for that dimension (using form 0 of the PCQ). The analyses indicated that most of the di- mensions were fairly reliable, but contained items that were heterogenous and loaded higher on a dimension other than that assigned to them. Because of this, each cluster was tested for unidimensionality, the extent to which the items of which it was composed "share a common core - the attribute which is to be measured" (Nunnally, 1978). Confirmatory cluster analysis This was done by an analysis of the items of each cluster for (1) homogeneity of content, the extent to which the items of a given cluster had the same meaning: (2) in- ternal consistency, the degree to which the cluster load- ings of the items within each cluster had the same general pattern, and (3) Parallelism, or external consistency, the extent to which items within each cluster paralleled, in terms of cluster loadings, the items outside that particu- lar cluster (Hunter, Note 2). Those items that loaded higher on a dimension other 52 than their assigned dimension were visually checked to see if they did not meet the above three criteria. If so, they were put in a residual cluster, and the remaining items of that cluster were reclustered with another multiple groups analysis. If coefficient alpha increased for the recluster- ed cluster, this was evidence that the deleted item(s) was heterogeneous and the new cluster,.more homogeneous in con- tent. Almost invariably, this is what happened. In some cases, a given cluster was found to be composed of two smaller clusters. Such was the case for the imagery cluster, which was composed of an imagery vividness and an imagery amount cluster. In these cases, the two smaller clusters were analyzed separately, yet were also subsets of a larger cluster than was also analyzed., Similarly, since several of the resulting clusters or dimensions of consciousness were highly correlated with one another, those clusters correlating highly were also com— bined with each other to see if the resulting supracluster was internally consistent, i.e. had an equal or higher co- efficient alpha. This resulted in several clusters being subclusters of more general and inclusive clusters or di- mensions of consciousness. Thus the initial model of fifteen dimensions of con- sciousness was modified by rearrangi and deleting items and repeating the processn%of multiple groups clus- ter analysis) until a set of unidimensional scgles (were) obtained (Hunter and Gerbing, 1979, p. O 53 As a check on this process, the resulting coefficient alphas had to be equal or higher, for the resulting clus- ters to be considered valid and homogeneous.2 Flpsl cluster analysis This process of confirmatory cluster analysis (Hunter, Note 2) resulted in ten major clusters or dimen- sions of consciousness. Of these ten, four clusters were composed Of two or more subclusters. Of the fifteen pre- viously hypothesized dimensions of consciousness, only the rationality dimension failed to find empirical support as a cluster or subcluster of phenomenological experience, and was dropped from all subsequent analyses. Table 7 (page 118) lists the resulting dimensions of consciousness, their corresponding subdimenSions, the num- ber of items in each (sub)dimension, and their coefficient alphas. Nine major dimensions had coefficient alphas of .61 or above, for an average alpha of .76. These included: internal dialogue, awareness, imagery, positive affect, control, altered eXperience, attention, negative affect, 2This was true for all the resulting clusters and supraclusters except one. The attention cluster had a coefficient alpha (.72) less than one of its subclusters, direction of attention (.76). Since this seemed to be the result of a much lower alpha for the absorption subcluster (.58), both subclusters were still combined, especially since the correlation between sub- clusters was very high (r=.63) and both clus- ters had similar content. 54 and memory. Only one major dimension, alertness, had an alpha below .60 (a1pha=.50). Table 8 (page 119) lists the item number (based on form 0 of the PCQ) belonging to each dimension and its correSponding cluster loading. Check pp the s priori approach: eXploratory factor analysis As a check upon the above dimensions, that were arrived at by a basically a priori approach, and confirmed by con- firmatory cluster analysis, an exploratory factor analysis was also performed on the data. .The exploratory factor anal- ysis consisted of a principal components factor analysis that was followed by Varimax rotations. Orthogonal factors were extracted for factors with eigenvalues of greater than one. The last Varimax rotation was then subject to a cluster anal- ysis, with "each cluster consisting of the set of variables which have their largest factor loading on a given Varimax factor" (Hunter, Note 2, p.1-2). Although this type of anal— ysis tends to blur the distinctions between clusters arrived at via the multiple groups cluster analysis approach, it "will usually find those dimensions which are completely outside the investigator's frame of reference" (Hunter and Gerbing, 1979, p.35). This eXploratory factor analysis was done on all the items of the PCQ for the first baseline condition and is shown in Table 9 (page 120). Nine factors were generated, accounting for 44% of the variance. Based on the content of 55 the items in each of these factors, the nine factors were the following: altered experience, awareness, imagery, atten- tion/memory, negative affect, alertness, positive affect, control, and internal dialogue. Except for the collapsing of the attention and memory clusters, the clusters arrived at by this blind empirical approach mirror the clusters arrived at by the a priori approach. This suggests that there are probably no other dimensions of consciousness tapped by the PCQ besides those previously enumerated. The Stabillpy pf the Dimensions pf Consciousness Ih§.§ priori cluster analytic approach Hypothesis #2 suggested that consciousness would be characterized by specific dimensions of consciousness that were stable over time. To check this hypothesis, the 39 items of the PCQ that made up the ten dimensions of con— sciousness in the final cluster analysis of the first base- line condition, were subjected to an Oblique multiple groups analysis for each of the three subsequent conditions: the second baseline condition, the reading erotica condi- tion, and the relaxation/meditation condition. Coefficient alphas for each of the ten dimensions of consciousness and their subdimensions were computed for each Of the conditions. Table 10 (page 122) lists these coefficients and their averages. It was hypothesized that the stable dimensions would include: body integrity, time, state of awareness, attention, control, self awareness, 56 perception, positive and negative affect, imagery, inter- nal dialogue, rationality, memory, meaning, and alertness. This was supported for all of the above, except rationality, which, as mentioned, failed to qualify as a legitimate di- mension (or subdimension) of consciousness. Although two dimensions or subdimensions had average alphas of below .55, indicating some lack of internal con- sistency or stability, all of the major dimensions except alertness and negative affect had coefficient alphas of .64 or higher. Coefficient alphas for six of the ten dimen- sions averaged .75 or higher and nine of the ten (except for alertness) had an overall mean alpha of .74. Internal dialogue, imagery, and awareness were found to be most stable and internally consistent: followed by positive af- fect, control, altered experience, and attention. Memory and negative affect were moderately reliable and consistent, and only alertness had an average reliability of below .50. Coefficient alphas for the dimensions and subdimen- sions of consciousness for the second baseline condition tended to be slightly higher than those in the first base- line condition. Although the alphas in the erotica and relaxation conditions tended to be lower than the baseline conditions, the drop across these two sets of conditions was only slight, i.e. about six hundreds of a point. Cluster loadings for each item of its given dimension across all four conditions also indicated the relative 57 stability and consistency of these dimensions. As Table 11 (page 123) shows, almost all of the items making up a given dimension continued to load highest on its assigned dimen- sion, even though the loadings tended to be a little lower in the erotica and relaxation conditions. Exploratory facts; analytic approach The previous results were also supported by explora- tory factor analyses. Principal component analyses using the 39 items of the ten dimensions of consciousness, fol- lowed by Varimax rotations, were done for each of the four conditions and are listed in Tables 12 through 15 (pages 125-128). Although the items tended to cluster together somewhat differently in each of these four conditions, eSpecially the erotica and relaxation conditions, most of the time, those items making up a given cluster were located in empirically-derived clusters composed of the items of the a priori clusters to which they belonged. All the previous results tend to strongly support the conclusion that the ten major dimensions of conscious- ness, as mapped by the PCQ, with the possible exception of alertness, are dimensions or structures of phenomenological experience that tend to be relatively stable and coherent structures in several differing conditions. These a priori dimensions, and their subdimensions, were the dimensions used in all subsequent analyses. 58 Interdimensional correlation matrices is; pps different conditions Because cluster analysis does not force orthogonality like factor analysis does (Levine, Note 5), the resulting dimensions of consciousness, corrected for attenuation, represent the dimensions Of consciousness thought to under- lie the nature Of phenomenological consciousness as mapped by the PCQ. The correlations between these dimensions, then represent the degree of relationship between the dif- ferent dimensions of consciousness. Tables 16 through 19 (pages 129-130) list the inter- dimensional correlation matrices, Corrected for attenuation. for each of the four conditions. A perusal of these tables indicates the relationships between the various dimensions of consciousness and the extent to which the baseline con- ditions are more similar to each other than they are to the two treatment (erotica and relaxation) conditions. (Sta- tistical tests to evaluate the degree of similarity/dis- similarity between the patterns Of correlations between the different conditions will be presented later.) AB Analysis pf Subjective Experlence lp,ldentical Conditions By having the Ss enact the same behavior, i.e. sitting quietly with eyes Opened, in an identical stimulus environ— ment on two different occaSions,, it was thought possible to determine the extent to which their subjective 59 experiences would be the same or similar. To determine this, cluster or dimension scores were computed for each S in each condition for each of the dimensions and subdimen— sions of consciousness arrived at by the previous analyses. Scores for each dimension and subdimension for each S were computed by averaging the S's responses to those items that made up a particular dimension, as per the recommendations of Hunter and Gerbing (1979). Since each item consisted of dipoles separated by a 7-point Likert scale, a S received a score of O to 6 per item depending on the nature of his response to that item. A zero score always represented a response that was nonal- tered and thought to be common with eyes Opened, while a 6 score indicated great alteration in normal experience or unusual experience. By averaging the S's responses to items of a particular dimension, one has a score that indicates his level of response in reference to that dimension. As an example, the internal dialogue dimension was made up of two items, #24 and #64. A S's internal dialogue score was simply the average of the two responses to these items, and could range from a zero score, indicating a great deal of verbal thought, to a score of six, which indicated little or no internal dialogue. Test-retest reliability Scores of each S were computed for all ten dimensions and their subdimensions in each of the four conditions. By 6O comparing each S's dimension score across the two baseline conditions, by means of the Pearson r correlation coeffi- cient, one has a measure of the test-retest reliabilities for each of the dimensions of consciousness. Table 20 (page 131) lists these reliabilities for the two baseline conditions and also compares reliabilities between the first baseline condition and the erotica condition, both experienced during the first experimental session, and the second baseline condition and the relaxation condition, both experienced during the second experimental session. Test-retest reliabilities between the two baseline conditions ranged from .56 for altered experience to .16 for alertness. Except for alertness, all reliabilities for the major dimensions of consciousness for the two base- line conditions were .34 Or higher. In comparing the re- liabilities between the two baseline conditions against those between the two conditions eXperienced the same ses- sion (first baseline and erotica conditions, and second baseline and relaxation conditions), reliabilities for all but two major dimensions (alertness and negative affect) were higher in the baseline conditions than the others. Because of the much lower test-retest reliability for alertness as compared to the other dimensions, its consis- tently lower coefficient alphas across all conditions, and possible differences in meaning between its two items, it, as a dimension of consciousness, was drOpped from 61 subsequent analyses. This left nine dimensions of conscious- ness, with their corresponding subdimensions, and these were the dimensions used in all the following analyses. Dimensional intensity glfferences between the baseline conditions Hypothesis #3 suggested that there would be no intensity differences for the hypothesized dimensions of consciousness between the two baseline conditions. Paired t-tests were computed between the two baseline conditions for the nine dimensions of consciousness and their subdimensions. Table 21 (page 132) lists the computed means and standard deviations for the dimensions of con- sciousness across the two baseline conditions, along with corresponding differences scores, t-values, and omega squared, the concept denoting the percentage of variance accounted for by the differences in treatment conditions. Significant, and unexpected, differences were found for the dimensions of awareness, imagery, positive affect, and altered experience, and their subdimensions. A.mean omega squared of about 4% indicated that these were very small effects. Figure 1 (page 133) gives a graph of the nature of the subjective experience across all dimensions and sub- dimensions Of consciousness for the two baseline conditions. All the significant differences were in the direction of lesser alteration in awareness or experience and less imagery, vivid imagery, and positive affect, in the second, 62 as Opposed to the first, baseline condition. In collapsing across both baseline conditions, the average phenomenolog- ical experience associated with this condition can be characterized by the following intensity parameters: a moderate predominance of internal dialogue: a moderate amount of vivid, visual imagery: a perception of having a good deal of control over ones thought processes: an attention Span midway between distracted and absorbed that is attentive to both inner and outer events equal- ly: little negative affect and some positive affect: a relatively intact memory: mild altera- tions in ones state of consciousness: mild loss of self-awareness: a slight alteration in perception and meaning or significance: and mild distortions in time and body image. Dimensional lntensity Differences Across Treatment and Baseline Conditions Hypothesis #3 suggested that the erotica condition would be characterized by intensities of subjective expe— rience different from that of the baseline condition for specific dimensions of consciousness. Paired t-tests were computed between the first base- line condition and the erotica condition, testing for sig- nificant differences between the means. The results are shown in Table 22 (page 134). As hypothesized, the erotica condition was associated with greater imagery vividness and more imagery, more absorbed attention, more positive affect, and lesser internal dialogue than the baseline condition, but was associated with less control, instead of more, as 63 hypothesized. (See Figure 2 (page 135).) It was also associated with significantly greater in— ward attention and a slight loss in self-awareness over the baseline condition. Omega squared ranged to a high of .4 for internal dialogue and averaged about .11, which are considered moderate treatment effects. There were no significant alterations in state of awareness, altered ex- perience, and negative affect or memory, over the baseline condition. The nature of this condition can be characterized by the following average phenomenological intensities: a small amount of internal dialogue: a lot of imagery that tends to be fairly vivid: moderate perceived control over ones stream Of thought: moderate inward, absorbed focusing of attention: very little negative affect and a moderate amount of positive affect: a relatively good memory: mild alteration in ones state of awareness: mild loss of self-awareness: a slight alteration in perception and memory: and mild distortions in time and body image. The relssation spg second baseline conditions compared It was also hypothesized that the relaxation/ meditation condition would be associated with greater alteration in state of awareness, more inward and absorbed attention, and more vivid imagery: but less self-awareness and body integrity, less imagery and internal dialogue, and less affect that the baseline condition. Paired t-tests were computed between the relaxation 64 condition and the second baseline condition. All compari- sons between all dimensions and subdimensions were signifi- cant, as Table 23 (page 136) shows. As hypothesized, all comparisons between conditions were in the expected direc— tion except for imagery vividness (imagery in the relaxation condition was less vivid than that of baseline). (See Figure 3 (page 137).) One of the most amazing outcomes of these comparisons concerned the huge values of omega squared obtained.‘ Omega squared ranged from a high of .67 for the state of aware- ness subdimension to a low of .02 for positive affect, and averaged a huge 28% across all dimensions and subdimensions of consciousness. The phenomenological nature of the relaxation/medita- tion condition, averaged across all Ss, can be characterized by the following: only a modest amount of internal dialogue: a small amount of imagery that is not very vivid: little control over ones stream of conscious- ness: attention that is very much inwardly- directed and concentrated: very little negative affect and little positive affect: strong decre- ments in memory: a very strong perception of being in an altered state of awareness: moderate alterations in meaning and perception: fairly strong alterations in the perception Of time: and a very noticeable loss of body image. The erotica and relaxation conditions compared In order to determine if the two treatment conditions may have been significantly different from the baseline conditions, yet similar to each other on many of the 65 dimensions of consciousness, paired t-tests were also computed comparing the dimension means between the relaxa- tion and the erotica conditions. As Table 24 (page 138) indicates, all comparisons were extremely significant. Omega squared ranged from one percent to 56% and averaged 26.5% across all dimensions, indicating very large treat- ment effects between conditions. Figure 4 (page 139) com- pares the intensity means of all nine dimensions of con- sciousness across all four conditions. Euclidean distances between conditions Another means of assessing the intensity differences between the conditions is to compute the Euclidean distance, in 9—space (based on the nine dimensions of consciousness), between the four conditions, as if each condition is associated with a particular location in this hyperspace. This was done by computing the square root of the sum of the squared differences between the means of each of the dimensions of the two conditions being compared, according to the formula: Z=((X1-Y1)2+(X2-Y2)2+ . . . +(X9-Y9)2)% where Z is equal to the Euclidean distance in 9-space, X1 through X9, the means Of the dimensions of conscious- ness in one condition, and Y1 through Y9, the means of the dimensions of consciousness in the other condition. As Table 25 (page 140) demonstrates, the relaxation condition was the most different from the others, followed by the 66 erotica condition, while the two baseline conditions were the most similar. Pattern Differences Between the Conditions Comparisons between the baseline conditions Hypothesis #4 suggested that there would be no dif- ferences in the patterns between the dimensions of con- sciousness for the two baseline conditions. This hypothe— sis was supported. 1 Correlational matrices were computed between the nine dimensions of consciousness for the two baseline conditions. These, and all subsequent correlational matrices, were not corrected for attenuation, since such correction may have lead to possible violations of statistical assumptions (Levine, Note 5). (The subdimensions of consciousness were not included since they were subsumed under the more inclu— sive major dimensions.) V Tables 26 and 27 (page 141) show the correlations between the dimensions, and Table 28 (page 142), the matrix expressing the differences between the correlational matri- ces. Since the correlational matrices represent the pat- tern Of relationships between the two baseline conditions, the difference matrix represents differences in patterns between the dimensions. Of the 36 difference correlations, only four were significant, and only at the .05 level. This suggests only small differences, if any, between the patterns of dimensions in the two baseline conditions. 67 In order to arrive at a more precise test for dif- ferences between the patterns of consciousness for the two conditions, the Box (1950) test was used. The Box test is a multivariate analog of Bartlett's test of the homogeneity of variance for a univariate case (Winer, 1971). It is a statistical procedure to test the hypothesis that two covariance matrices are random samples from a population whose covariance matrices are the same. By converting the above correlational matrices into covariance matrices, one has a statistical procedure to determine if the two correlational matrices are random samples from the same population, i.e. are not significant- ly different from each other. To do this the determinants of the covariance matrices were computed for each condition and the loge of the deter- minants calculated. The loge of the determinants of the co- variance matrices was then subtracted from the loge of the determinant of the pooled covariance matrix (Winer, 1971) to arrive at Mi' i.e. Mi=Nln(S )-£niln (Si)' Since pooled the X2 statistic is equal to (l-Ci)Mi (where Ciis an al- gorithm that is a function of the number of groups and measures), it is "approximated by a Chi-square distribution having fi degrees of freedom" (Winer, 1971). The use of these formulas allowed one to determine if the covariance matrices were significantly different from each other. This would then allow one to infer if the 68 patterns of correlations between the different dimensions of consciousness between the two conditions were signifi- cantly different.3 Table 29 (page 143) lists the covariance matrices for the two baseline conditions, and Table 30 (page 144), X2 comparisons between the different conditions. As can be seen from the table, the logs Of the determinants of the two baseline conditions were very similar, i.e. 4.0 as compared to 4.13. These values yielded a X2 value of 3The Box test was devised for two independent groups for which there were repeated measures on a given factor. Although the covariance matrices used herein are from correlational matrices from Ss on two different days, the Ss from which the matrices were computed are the same. Thus the two groups are not independent of each other. Using the Box test in this sit- uation then means, that if significant differ- ences between the matrices are found, the re- sults are truly significant, for differences found between conditions which are somewhat cor- related are statistically harder to find than between conditions assumed to be independent. However, if significant differences between ma- trices are not found, this does not mean that the matrices are not significantly different, but only that they may not be (Schmitt, Note 6). They may still be significantly different, al- though the greater the significance value, i.e. greater than .05, the less chance there is that the matrices are significantly different. Also, by comparing omega squared between matrices found to be different from those not found different, one has a means of evaluating for similarity or differences between the matrices. (The author knows of no test like the Box test devised Specifically for repeated measures, and thus the Box test was used as the next best statis- tical procedure.) 69 37.1 with 45 degrees of freedom. This was not significant and had a corresponding omega squared of zero. These statistical results strongly suggest that the patterns of the correlations between the dimensions of con- sciousness in the two baseline conditions were very similar to each other. Comparisons between the treatment spa baseline conditions In contrast to the lack of significant differences between the two baseline conditions, hypothesis #4 suggest- ed that there would be significant pattern differences be- tween the baseline conditions and the other two conditions, i.e. the erotica and relaxation conditions. The correlational matrices indicatingthe patterns amongst the nine dimensions of consciousness for the erotica and relaxation conditions are shown in Tables 31 and 32 (page 145), respectively. Table 33 (page 146) shows the differences matrix between the erotica condition and the first baseline condition, and Table 34 (page 146), the dif- ferences matrix between the relaxation condition and the second baseline condition. Whereas the differences correlation matrix between the two baseline conditions had only five correlations signifi- cantly different at only the .05 level, the correlation matrix between the erotica and the first baseline condition had fourteen significant difference correlations, nine of 70 which were significant at least at the .001 level. The dif- ferences correlation matrix between the relaxation and second baseline condition had 15 out of 36 correlations that were significantly different at least at the .001 level and 6 others significant at .05 or .01. These results strongly suggest that the patterns be- tween the dimensions of consciousness in the erotica and relaxation conditions were much different from their cor- responding baseline conditions, and much more different than the baseline conditions were from each other. TO further substantiate this, the correlational matrices of the erotica and relaxation conditions were con- verted to covariance matrices (See Table 29 (page 143).) and these covariance matrices were compared to their cor- responding baseline covariance matrices, testing for signif- icant differences in pattern between the‘dimensions of con— sciousness via the Box test. (See Table 30 (page 144).) The comparison between the first baseline condition 2 of 146.4 with 45 df, and the erotica condition yielded a X significant at less than .000. Ten percent of the variance between conditions was attributable to the differences in treatment effects between these conditions. In comparing 2 of the relaxation and second baseline conditions, a ‘X 355.7 with 45 df was found. With a significance level of less than .000, omega squared was 37%, indicating huge treatment effect differences between conditions. 71 TO test the question of whether the erotica and relaxa- tion conditions, although significantly different from baseline, were yet similar to each other, the Box test was also performed, comparing their covariance matrices to each other. A X2 of 313 with 45 df, significant at .000 and accounting for 33% of the variance was found. These results indicated very significant pattern dif- ferences between the erotica and relaxation conditions and their respective baselines, and also significant pattern differences between the erotica and relaxation conditions. Comparatively, the two baseline conditions were very simi- lar in pattern, the erotica and first baseline conditions were moderately different, and the relaxation and baseline conditions and the erotica and relaxation conditions, huge- ly different in structure. Individual, Personalit , apg Sag Qlfferences Individual gafferences Hypothesis #5 suggested that there would be large individual differences across Ss for the various dimensions of consciousness. This was supported. The graphs of Figure 5 (pages 147-150) illustrate the large variances and the skewed distributions for the dimensions and subdimensions of consciousness across each of the four conditions. Individuals do differ greatly in response to their phenomenological eXperience of conscious- ness. 72 Personality differences It was also hypothesized that individual differences in response to the intensity of subjective experience for specific dimensions Of consciousness would correlate with the personality traits of absorption and extraversion. Specifically, absorption (increased absorption) was hypothesized to correlate positively with alteration in awareness, increased and absorbed attention, and losses in body integrity, self awareness, and control. Table 35 (page 151) lists the correlations between absorption and each of the dimensions and subdimensions of consciousness across each of the four conditions. Of the hypothesized correlations, only awareness, and its subdimension, state of awareness, showed positive cor— relations across three of the four conditions, and these correlations were small, i.e. .15 to .21. This suggests that ones states of awareness in a given situation may be a function of that person's ability to enter into "absorbed" engagement with the environment or himself, although only a small portion of the variance is accountable by such a trait. Significant, but low, correlations were also found for all the altered eXperience subdimensions in the first baseline condition and the relaxation condition, but not the other two conditions. NO other consistent correlations were found. 73 It was also hypothesized that increased extraversion would positively correlate with an outward, distractible attention: little eXperience of vivid imagery: control: and an intact body integrity and self awareness. As Table 36 (page 152) indicates, none of these hypotheses held up consistently across two or more of the four conditions. §s§.glfferences In order to determine if there might be sex differences, t-tests (for independent groups) were computed for all the dimensions and subdimensions of consciousness across all four conditions for males and females and are shown in Tables 37 through 40 (pages 153-156). Only with the percep- tion subdimension of altered eXperience were significant differences between males and females found for three of the four conditions. Sex differences were also assessed for the absorption and extraversion personality dimensions for each of the four conditions. (See Table 41 (page 157).) Although the males were slightly more extraverted than the females, all other comparisons were nonsignificant. DISCUSSION Retrospective lppgospection Any methodology attempting to map phenomenological experience must be found reliable and accurate. The re- liability results Obtained from the five item pairs demon- strated that Ss can be fairly reliable at retrospection. An average Pearson r of .65 across all five pairs, although at the lower criterion level for adequate reliability, was felt sufficient, especially since only one of the pairs was identical (and this pair averaged a Pearson r of .76). The other measure of reliability used in the study, coef- ficient alpha, averaged .74 for the nine major dimensions of consciousness, and five of these dimensions were composed of only two or three items. This showed that Ss were fair- ly consistent at responding to the items within each dimen- sion in the same general way. The accuracy results, as measured by the deviation scores, also demonstrated that most Ss were accurate at responding to the item pairs. Eighty-one percent of all responses were direct hits or within one unit of a direct hit (on a 7-point scale) and Ss averaged a deviation score of only .46 across all five item pairs for a given condi- tion (in which zero indicated perfect accuracy, and three, complete randomness). These results strongly suggest that Ss can be accurate 74 75 and consistent at retrospection into their subjective ex- perience, provided it follows upon the period to be assess- ed and that period is of relatively short duration. The extent to which these reliabilities may increase with trained observers or decrease if done in response to a long- er period of subjective experience, can only be determined accurately with future research. Nevertheless, the relia- bilities found in this study and the very significant re- sults obtained, strongly indicate that retrospection of ones subjective experience, via a questionnaire using rat- ings, may be an effective technique at mapping phenomeno- logical experience. Rsactive effects pi introspection The debriefing questionnaires administered at the end of each session also indicated that this retrospection did not seem to be very reactive. Even though the Ss thought they would have to retrospect upon the assessment period, no S indicated that this knowledge interferred with their experience of the assessment period. Nevertheless, Ss were sensitized to the fact that they would be involved in intro- spection into their stream of consciousness and such self- observation may have altered the nature of their subjective experience more than if they had not been sensitized to it. If so, one might hypothesize that such sensitization would lead to greater alteration in experience than might other- wise have been the case. 76 The dimensional intensity results for the first baseline condition did indicate Ella alterations in self awareness, state of awareness, imagery, time, body image, and perception and meaning. Moreso, several Ss reported ,ggsap alterations in the above dimensions for the first baseline condition. These results agree with the findings of Hunt and Chefurka (1976) who found that merely having Ss sit immobily for ten minutes, while they observed their subjective experience, led to greater anomalous subjective experiences to the extent to which they were "sensitized" to that experience. Although Hunt and Chefurka did not take their Ss through a second identical session, to see if their results would replicate, the present study did. The second baseline condition found significantly less alterations in awareness, imagery, and experience than the first condition, although there were several Ss who still reported great alterations in these dimensions. These results suggest, that for most Ss, it may not be sen- sitization to subjective experience but the novelty of the situation, or both, that led to alterations in awareness, imagery, and experience. More research is needed to deter- mine the proportion Of variance attributable to both. Mapping the Dimensions pi Consciousness The items of the PCQ were based on an exhaustive search of the literature for possible dimensions of con- sciousness that could be operationalized via a questionnaire. 77 Nevertheless, there were only 60 items, and these 60 items could not possibly tap all the nuances of subjective expe- rience. Thus the nine major dimensions of consciousness, and their subdimensions, as arrived at by this study, are ppp the pply dimensions of consciousness, but rather possi- ble dimensions of consciousness and dimensions found relia- ble for the items of this questionnaire. Since, when using factor or cluster analysis, one only receives what one gives, a different questionnaire could well have come up with different dimensions of conscious- ness, especially if items of different content were used. Although the nine dimensions of consciousness found relia- ble in this study were arrived at and replicated by both an a priori and an empirical approach, this is not to say that another experimenter might have come up with similar, but not identical, dimensions, given the same data. The criteria for the admission of any particular dimension was unidimensionality, i.e. the extent to which the items of a particular cluster shared a common core - "the attribute which is to be measured" (Nunnally, 1978, p.274). This was operationalized by making sure that the items composing a given cluster had homogeneity of content, internal consistency, and parallelism (Hunter and Gerbing, 1979). and was checked by making sure that the measure of internal consistency (coefficient alpha) for a given dimen- sion, increased with a deletion or admission of additional 78 items. Although this procedure allowed the items of a given dimension to be unidimensional, several dimensions were nevertheless collapsed because of very high correla- tions between the dimensions and a common meaning, to arrive at major dimensions of consciousness, which, except for one case, had higher coefficient alphas than their subdimen- sions. The previous strongly suggests that although the dimensions arrived at by this study were not absolute, they were dimensions that seemed to fit best with both the a priori and empirical analyses. Regardless of the final dimensions used, as long as these are the same dimensions assessed across all the con- ditions, the conditions can be compared amongst themselves, as to changes in phenomenological intensity and patterning. Since the major question that this experiment hoped to answer was not "What are the fundamental dimensions of con- sciousness?", but rather "Can the concept of 'state of con- sciousness' be operationalized?", and "Are the parameters of such states different in differing conditions?", the nonabsolute nature of the dimensions is not critical. Dimension stability To operationalize the 'state of consciousness' con- cept, the dimensions of consciousness utilized would have to be stable and reliable. The nine major dimensions that made up the final model were dimensions that were fairly stable and reasonably consistent across a variety of 79 conditions. The stability of these dimensions is even more striking considering the huge individual differences that were reported across Ss. This can only mean that regard- less of whether the Ss expressed having very vivid imagery or none at all: or had huge alterations in awareness or very little: the constructs being measured by these items seem to be relatively stable structures of phenomenological experience. These results are supportive of Tart's (1975, 1977) theorizing on the nature of consciousness. In his "systems approach" he suggests that consciousness is composed of certain structures that are dynamic and interacting struc- tures whose stability is necessary for these structures to be arranged in configurations necessary for the organism to function properly. Consciousness, as phenomenologically assessed, does appear to be composed of such structures. Although several of the major dimensions of consciousness used in this study do not correspond with the dimensions hypothesized by Tart, this was more a function of being un- able to operationalize such psychological systems as sub— consciousness, or input processing, via a self-report ques- tionnaire, than their nonexistence as psychological struc- tures. Individual differences Contrary to Tart's (1975. 1977) belief that the map- ping of consciousness must first be done on an individual 80 basis first, before being done across groups of people, the stability of the dimensions of consciousness across great individual differences, along with the results of intensity and pattern similarities and differences in sim- ilar and dissimilar conditions, strongly suggests that con- sciousness can be mapped nomothetically, i.e. across groups of people. Individuals can vary greatly in terms of the inten- sity of their phenomenological experience and "state of consciousness" and yet comparisons can be made across in- dividuals as to the reliability, stability, and nature Of phenomenological experience and state of consciousness in different conditions. Just as individual differences do not preclude research in personality, or psychophysiology, it need not impede phenomenological research on the nature of consciousness. uantif in a "state pf conscippsness" Since the dimensions were relatively stable, cluster or dimension scores were computed for each condition for each S. The dimension scores allowed for the dimensions of consciousness to be quantified as to intensity: whereas the correlation coefficients amongst the dimensions allowed for quantification of the relationships of patterning amongst the dimensions. These two parameters were then eminently suitable for quantifying the "state of conscious- ness" that was associated with a particular set of stimulus 81 conditions via a phenomenological perspective. Thus this research has shown that phenomenological consciousness can be empirically quantified and that an average "state of consciousness" for a group of Ss, can be defined and hence "recognized if it occurs again" in terms of the mean cluster or dimension scores and their correla— tions amongst each other. Test-retest reliabilities is; pps dimensions For the nine major dimensions of consciousness, test- retest reliabilities for the two baseline conditions, ranged from a high‘of .56 to a low of .34, and averaged .43. This indicates that ones subjective experience varies a great deal, even when experiencing the same stimulus conditions, although a possible novelty effect for the first baseline condition may have reduced these correlations somewhat. Even with slightly higher correlations, however, these re- sults suggest that replication of the stimulus environment and specific instructions, does not dictate that the inten- sity of ones subjective experience will be identical in identical stimulus environments. Skinner (1957, 1974) and Rachlin (1974) notwithstand- ing, an understanding of mental events is not superfluous, and an understanding of only environmental variables cannot lead to an accurate prediction of behavior, at least the motor’ behavior associated with the covert events tapped by the PCQ. But this, of course, is consistent with common 82 sense. The same environmental variables can generate different subjective experiences in the same individual, that does not seem predictable from environmental varia- bles alone. Although the test-retest reliabilities were not as high as one would expect in assessing traits like extra- version or absorption, nevertheless, one would ppp expect the reliabilities to be this high, since, in the present situation, states and not traits were being assessed. When considering this, an average correlation of .43 is still impressive, especially since the correlations between the baseline conditions and the erotica and relaxation condi- tions, averaged, .26 and .18, respectively. 222 Baseline Conditions app flStates" pf Conscicpsnsss Several of the dimensions of consciousness were found to consistently vary within the two baseline conditions, with the second baseline condition having less alterations of consciousness and experience and less imagery and posi- tive affect. Although unexpected, these differences are explainable in terms of the first session involving a novel- ty effect, or the second, a practice or boredom effect, as suggested earlier in this discussion. This interpretation is supported by the Ss's responses to the debriefing form at the end of the session. Many Ss indicated that they were more bored and less enthusiastic during the second baseline condition than the first. 83 Future research is needed to determine if these differences were due to such an effect, or were caused by other means. "States" pf consciousness Although there were mild intensity changes for several of the dimensions of consciousness in the baseline condi- tions, the patterns between these dimensions, as measured by the correlation coefficients, remained very, very simi- lar in the two conditions. This is strong support for the conclusion that the subjective experience of consciousness in these two identical conditions, is characterized by sim- ilar patterns of subjective experience, in spite of the above intensity differences. The intensity results preclude any final decision as to whether the two baseline conditions were associated with an identical "state" of consciousness. But the intensity and patterning differences between the two baseline condi- tions, were, relatively speaking, very much less than the huge intensity and patterning effects found between the baseline and treatment conditions. This, in turn, allows one to talk about this particu- lar stimulus condition as being associated with a state of cOnsciousness having similar intensity and pattern quanti- fiers when repeated. It suggests that a particular state of consciousness may be replicated, given the requisite stimulus conditions, at least as concerns the "average" state across a group of individuals. This finding is 84 crucial, since only if a particular stimulus condition, when repeated, is associated with identical or similar phenomenological parameters, can elusive states of conscious- ness be tied to observable, environmental and crganismic stimuli. The results that the two baseline conditions were associated with very similar states of consciousness, also suggests the use of eyes Opened sitting quietly as an ideal baseline condition. Such a condition allows for a lot of individual variation and is based on the unstructured on- going stream Of thought advocated by Singer (1978) as the baseline from which to compare altered states. gag Tpeatment Congltions app Differing States pf Consciousness Both the erotica and relaxation/meditation conditions were found to be characterized by changes in intensity from the baseline conditions for certain of the dimensions of consciousness. These hypothesized changes were based on a priori reasoning and previous research done during the pilot studies. The fact that, by and large, these changes did occur, suggests that the questionnaire has construct validity, i.e. it appears to be able to validly discrimi- nate between conditions according to certain constructs or dimensions of consciousness hypothesized to be different in these conditions. 85 Differing states pf ppnsciousness Besides the predicted changes in intensity between the baseline and treatment conditions, there were also very significant differences in pattern between dimensions for the erotica and relaxation conditions from that of baseline and also each other. The relaxation condition was also found to be much more different from baseline than the erotica condition, based on omega squared. The states of consciousness associated with the erotica and relaxation conditions can be characterized as states of consciousness different from that of baseline qualitatively and quanti- tatively, i.e. differences in pattern and intensities. The phenomenological experience associated with papa experimental conditions does not, however, fit the defini- tion of altered or alternate states of consciousness as espoused by Krippner (1972), Ludwig (1972), or Tart (1972, 1975, 1977). These authors defined an altered state as a state characterized as being subjectivity and radically different from ones ordinary or normal state Of conscious- ness. Of all the dimensions and subdimensions of conscious- ness, that dimension that was the most significantly differ- ent between the relaxation and the baseline condition, i.e. evinced the greatest proportion of variance attributable to the treatment differences between conditions, was the state of awareness subdimension. Here omega squared was a huge 86 67%. No significant differences were found between the first baseline and erotica conditions for this subdimension. The two baseline conditions, however, did have significant differences in intensity for this subdimension, for omega squared equalled 6%. There were no significant pattern differences in phenomenological state, as measured by the Box test, between these conditions. Relaxation/meditation.as ap "altered" state pi consciousness The previous results suggest that the relaxation con- dition, but not the erotica or baseline conditions, can be characterized as being associated with an altered state of consciousness if one uses the two criteria hypothesized by Tart (1977) to differentiate altered states of conscious- ness from other states, i.e. (1) changes in patterning among the structures of consciousness, and (2) the subjective sspss of (being in) an altered spaps (SSAS). The relaxation/meditation condition was associated with not.only a significant pattern change between the dimensions of consciousness, but a very significant perceived altera- tion of consciousness. The erotica condition, on the other hand, was associated with patterning changes, but no SSAS, whereas the first baseline condition, in comparison to the second, was associated with a mild SSAS but no patterning differences. The relaxation/meditation condition, but not the others 87 as being associated with an altered state of consciousness, is also consistent with common sense. Although the relaxa- tion condition would be looked upon as fostering signifi- cant alterations in consciousness, neither the erotica nor the baseline conditions would. Remarks p_ alterea states pi consciousness The use of the PCQ and its method of administration thus gives the researcher a means to operationalize the concept of "altered states of consciousness" that is in accordance with common sense and theoretical conceptualiza- tions. This then allows for a vehicle by which to compare the state of consciousness produced by such means as hypno- sis, biofeedback, meditation, etc. to determine the extent to which these procedures do indeed produce such phenomena as a "trance state" (Weitzenhoffer, 1978) or an "alpha high" (Kamiya, 1972) that are significantly different from that of states of consciousness not associated with such induc- tion procedures. The use of Tart's formulation does not, however, mean that differing states of consciousness are characterized mainly by changes in patterning and that changes in inten- sities for the dimensions of consciousness are not impor— tant. Since it cannot be determined if the changes in patterning between the experimental and baseline conditions were a function of changes in intensities, vice versa, or neither, the extent to which states of consciousness are 88 characterized by changes in patterning as opposed to changes in intensity of subjective experience, is moot. This controversy must wait for future research to be fully explored. However, it may be that patterning generally deter- mines the state of consciousness, and intensity values, the "depth" or intensity of the state. But since patterning and intensity do not appear to be uncorrelated, the rela- tionships between them and corresponding states of aware- ness, are probably much more complex. Reading erotica as ap "identi y" spaps pf consciousness If the relaxation/meditation condition is associated with phenomenological experience that can be labeled an altered state of consciousness, the phenomenological expe4 rience associated with the second baseline condition may be characterized as a less intense but similar state of consciousness as the first baseline condition, and the sub- jective experience of the erotica condition can be labeled an "identity" state of consciousness. An identity state of consciousness is Tart's (1975, 1977) term for a specialized version of an ordinary state of consciousness that has an overall pattern of functioning that distinguishes it from other identity states. It is composed of psychological structures that possess unique properties not present in other identity states, but it is not perceived as a radically different state of consciousness 89 subjectively. The structure of phenomenological experience during the erotica condition was much different from the baseline state, but there was no significant differences in SSAS, subjective sense of altered state. This would tend to im- ,plicate the subjective experience associated with the erotica condition with what Tart has labeled as an identi- ty state, since the overall pattern of phenomenological experience is different from that of baseline, yet the per- son does not experience himself in an altered state of consciousness. Further remarks The previous methodology strongly suggests that "states" of consciousness are phenomena that can be empiri- cally assessed via a phenomenological approach, although the replicability of altered states in identical stimulus conditions has yet to be ascertained. The extent to which such differing states are a function of qualitative or quan- titative differences and are discrete, to use Tart's (1975) terminology, or continuous, has yet to be decided, although the initial results suggest that both quantitative changes in the intensities of subjective experience, and qualitative changes amongst the dimensions of that experience, are both involved. The previous discussed results can be seen in Opposi- tion to the conclusions of Hunt and Chefurka (1976). They 9O concluded that "there is no such thing as 'altered states of consciousness'" (p.876) since consciousness is made up of "microgenetically early stages of normal functioning" (p.876) that is normally masked by the intentional nature of consciousness. They based their conclusions on the finding that introspective sensitization leads to altera- tions in awareness. However, just because introspective sensitization can lead to altered states, does not mean that altered states are just a function of introspective sensitization, for the converse of a true statement is not necessarily true. The fact that the relaxation/meditation condition was associated with huge intensity and pattern differences over the base- line conditions, may be traced, not only to introspective sensitization, but to several possibilities which may in- clude the effects of deep muscle relaxation, a restriction and absorption of attention during the meditational inter- lude, sensory isolation, and/or demand characteristics. Although more in-depth research is needed to determine the extent to which each of these variables was operating, the present research does not support Hunt and Chefurka's conclusion that there are no "altered states" of conscious- ness. The results obtained suggest that the dimensions of phenomenal experience in these conditions were organized in significantly different ways that do not seem to be the mere operation of microgenetically prior modes of 91 consciousness, but seemed to be related to specific manip- ulations, i.e. reading erotica, relaxation and absorption in ones breathing, that did much more than just sensitize the S to his immediate subjective experience. The success of the PCQ at mapping phenomenological experience and differentiating that experience in terms of intensity and pattern changes in reference to Specific stimulus conditions, also strongly implies that other (yet to be develcped) phenomenological questionnaires may be equally effective at mapping different or more specific nuances of subjective experience. iThat is, provided, of course, such questionnaires employ duplicate and similar items to tap the particular aspects of subjective experience to be monitored: and are utilized in a retrospective pro- cedure similar to that delineated here. The fact that such a procedure allows phenomenological consciousness to be quantified does not, however, justify the indiscriminant construction of such questionnaires, nor their indiscriminant use, for much research yet needs to be done to replicate and support the results reported here, and determine the generalizability of such a procedure with Ss besides college students, conditions besides relaxation and reading, etc. Another word of caution is also in order. Not all Ss experienced the same intensities of subjective experience in each of the conditions, and the patterning of p 92 of phenomenological experience was arrived at by correla— tion coefficients computed across all Ss. Although a given condition may be associated with a certain average phenomenological experience, there is yet much individual variation among Ss for a given condition, and one S‘s in- dividual subjective experience may be extremely different from that of another. This is where individual and per- sonality differences may express themselves. Personality and Say Differences Only a few of the hypothesized correlations between the traits of absorption and extraversion and the dimen- sions of consciousness were found, and these were quite modest. The strongest and most consistent correlation was between the trait of absorption and the (altered) state of awareness subdimension of consciousness. It was hypothe- sized that absorption, defined as the "openness to absorbing and self—altering experiences" (Tellegan and Atkinson, 1974, p.268) would be related to the state of awareness sub- dimension Of consciousness. Just as Greenfield (Note 1) found that individuals who scored high on absorption, were found to experience greater alteration and change in consciousness during medi- tation, high absorption Ss were also found to experience greater alteration in SSAS as measured by the state of awareness subdimension of the PCQ. This suggests that SS scoring high or low on the absorption scale may be 93 characterized as eXperiencing different intensities and possibly, states of consciousness, in differing conditions. The relatively low correlations, however, suggest that the extent of this relationship is very small. All four subdimensions of the altered eXperience dimension also correlated positively with the absorption trait, but only during the first baseline and the relaxa— tion conditions. These results may relate to the fact that both of these conditions were subjectively felt to produce more alteration in consciousness than the second baseline or the erotica conditions, and so were more likely to dif- ferentiate between persons having higher or lower absorp- tion scores. The low absorption correlations, the lack of more salient correlations, and few significant correlations be- tween the trait of extraversion and the dimensions may re- late to several reasons. There may have been a lack of correspondence between trait scores and covert behavior in the specific conditions, which is always a problem when us- ing paper and pencil measures of traits or attitudes to de- termine actual behavior (McGuire, 1969). The trait mea- sures may also have been tapping different constructs than what the dimensions of consciousness were. This seems to have been the case for the extraversion trait, which assess- ed, in contrast to the absorption trait, more behavioral, as opposed to, phenomenological experiences. 94 Another reason may have concerned the fact that a four minute period was too Short of a time for trait characteris- tics to demonstrate themselves consistently. Finally, since only a few items made up most of the dimensions of consciousness, random error may have reduced differences that might have been (more) significant if more items per dimension had been used. (Adding more items to each of the dimensions of the PCQ should help to reduce the salience of this shortcoming.) 1 Most likely, however, the low and nonexistent corre- lations between the traits and the dimensions of conscious—« ness may simply be related to the fact that these traits and dimensions are little correlated with each other, especially since correlating traits and states may not allow for high correlations to show themselves. No sex differences were hypothesized and except for significant altered perception differences between males and females for three out of the four conditions, no con- sistent sex differences were found. These results suggest that sex does not appear to be a moderating variable for any of the dimensions of consciousness, with the possible exception of the subdimension perception. Demand Characteristics An issue that always arises, especially in this type of research, is the extent to which demand characteristics, subtle stimuli that give Ss information about how they are 95 to behave, are responsible for the results obtained (Orne, 1970). This is closely associated with saperimenter expectancy effects, the situation in which the experimenter gets what he expects to find, by expecting to find it and conveying this, in covert ways, to the Ss. Since the experimenter for this study was the author, who knew of the hypotheses, there were most likely some experimenter expectancy effects and subtle demand char— acteristics working. But the experiment was set up to off- set these characteristics. During both baseline conditions the Ss were given a bare minimum of information, i.e. "sit quietly and think about whatever you like . . . " Any of the S's questions were answered as noncommittantly as possible in these and the other conditions. If any of the hypotheses were nonverbally communicated to the Ss, the Ss may have had a hard time giving the E what he expected. This was because the instrument used to assess their subjective experience was a 60—item inven- tory. The number of items may have made it extremely hard for the SS to remember exactly how they responded to the items of the same questionnaire (unless they actually com- pared items), let alone items from the different conditions, in order for them to skew their responses appropriately. For example, if the Ss "perceived" that the E ex- pected them to answer the PCQ exactly the same way for the two baseline conditions, it would be extremely hard, if not 96 impossible, for the Ss to remember how they responded to each of the items of the questionnaire a week earlier and answer appropriately. Since much of the data analysis in- volved comparisons between items and dimensions across conditions, such long-term retrospection would tend to pre- clude responses between conditions being based on demand characteristics. Nevertheless, with a condition like relaxation/medita- tion, which is patently different from the baseline condi- tions, the Ss probably thought that the experimenter ex- pected differences and could have skewed their responses accordingly. This is very possible and likely. However, the comparisons made concerning the relaxation condition involved different predictions for the different dimensions of consciousness, i.e. less imagery and internal dialogue, more altered awareness and distorted body image but less self awareness, etc. in comparison to the second baseline condition. Thus instead of trying to guess which dimensions might be expected to be different, the Ss were probably more like- ly to complete the questionnaire based on their perception of what they experienced, although a general bias towards more unusual or different experiences from baseline could be expected for those dimensions in the relaxation and erot- ica conditions patently and obviously related to the dimen— sions such experiences would be expected to alter. If the Ss were responding in terms of such demand 97 characteristics, a debriefing afterwards may be able to indicate the extent to which the Ss were trying to please the experimenter and the extent to which the experiences that the Ss had were due to the actual experimental pro- cedures. The Ss were not briefed beforehand as to what the relaxation/meditation session would subjectively feel like. Since the relaxation instructions consisted of only stan- dard progressive relaxation instructions, during which the muscles were tensed and relaxed, and a meditational inter- lude, during which the SS were told to relax to their breath- ing, the Ss's written responses reflect only what they ex- perienced, what they thought they experienced, and/or what they expected the eXperimenter wanted to hear. The following verbatim responses were typical of the Ss who felt alterations and changes in their experience dur- ing the relaxation/meditation condition: a condition in which demand characteristics would be most prominent, due to the patently obvious nature of the relaxation instruc- tions for suggesting a deeply relaxed and nontense state. (The numbers in parentheses refer to the month and day of the session.) (10/8) No thoughts at all, I was very sleepy. (10/8) It was like being in limbo . . . like floating . . . like being in the womb. (10/9) I'm not sure what I was experiencing. I was extremely relaxed. . . . I felt like my mind and my body were separate. (10/9) (io/10)‘ (10/10) (10/11) (lo/11) (10/22) (10/22) (lo/23) (10/23) (10/24) (10/24) (IO/25) (10/25) 98 I felt really weird . . . like I was really out of it. I was totally gone . . . my mind would jump back into consciousness and I'd vaguely think what happened. At this time, I wasn't aware of my presence . . . I didn't know where I was when we were awakened . . . I was very relaxed and off in a dream world. I was extremely relaxed . . . like in the stage of limbo right before you fall asleep. I couldn't believe how relaxed I was. A state of suspended animation. Light-headedness, a floating sensa- tion. . . No physical body, just as active mind. I loved it. I have never felt so total- ly relaxed. It was like being asleep. For a while there I lost all perception of where I was at or what I was doing. I was very relaxed and almost fell a- sleep. . . . In a dream-like state. I felt very elevated - kind of a natural high . . . My head frequently would drocp toward my chest. It was really something . . . It was like my body and mind were completely separated. I was aware of a tingling throughout my body. That was very strange, because I didn't fall asleep, but I can hardly remember what I was thinking about . . . My thoughts were dream-like. 99 As the previous verbatim responses demonstrated, many Ss experienced phenomena which were not mentioned in the eXperimenter's introductory comments. Thus there were comments about dissociation, amnesia, tingling through- out the S's body, the head drooping towards the chest, etc. Such responses, common during the experience of a hypnot- ic trance state, would be highly unlikely for Ss, who were mostly college freshman and probably not familiar with the effects of hypnosis or deep muscle relaxation, to "think up" in order to please the experimenter. Mention of being confused and feeling very strange are also not comments that a S might make if trying to please the eXperimenter. The extent to which the Ss's comments were'based upon the physical sensations produced by the experimental pro- cedures or were "contaminated" with the Ss's cognitive evaluation of the experience is impossible to determine from these data. But the previous data seemed to indicate that the Ss really and actually experienced what they wrote about. The subjective experiences did not seem contrived or written just to please the experimenter. Rather, the comments of the Ss tended to indicate that the experiences they had were subjectively genuine, veridical, and, at times, confusing and strange. Regardless of the extent to which their expectations of relaxation may have added to their experience of relaxation, their 100 experiences were subjectively felt, per their comments, to be based upon their experience of relaxation and their evaluation of that experience, and did not seem to be writ- ten, to any great extent, to please the experimenter. More- so, Ss who were little affected by the relaxation instruc- tions, commented likewise, i.e. they wrote it was a bore, they were not relaxed, etc. In summary, then, although more research is needed to tease out the extent of demand characteristics, the major experimental results do not seem to be the result of extensive demand characteristics. Summary and Conclusipns The results of this study suggest that the following conclusions are warranted: 1. Phenomenological or subjective experience can be fairly accurately and reliably assessed via a self- report questionnaire. This is true if the ques- tionnaire is given after the period of subjective experience to be assessed and is completed via retrospection in reference to that subjective ex- perience. Ss can learn to do this with a minimum of practice. 2. Phenomenological consciousness, as mapped by the PCQ, can be characterized by the following dimen- sions (and subdimensions): internal dialogue: awareness (self awareness, state of awareness): 101 imagery (imagery amount, imagery vividness): positive affect: control or volition: altered experience (alterations in meaning, perception, time, and body integrity): attention (direction of attention, absorption): negative affect: and memory. These dimensions are not all the pos- sible, nor the only, dimensions of conscious- ness, but those dimensions found to be reliably assessed and relatively stable in three differing types of conditions: sitting quietly with eyes Opened, reading mildly arousing erotica, and relaxation/meditation. In comparing the two conditions of sitting quietly with eyes opened (spaced one week apart), the nine major dimensions of consciousness have test-re- test reliabilities ranging from a high of .56 to a low of .34, with an average reliability of .43. These figures indicate only a moderate test-retest reliability in identical conditions. Although the baseline conditions were found to differ significantly in intensity for the dimen- sions of awareness, imagery, positive affect, and altered experience, the patterns or correlations amongst the dimensions were not significantly different (as measured by the Box test). This suggeststhat changes in intensity among several 102 dimensions of consciousness does not necessarily affect the patterning or correlations of these dimensions amongst themselves. These results also suggest that the "state of consciousness" concept may be Operationalized by being based on the pat- terning of dimensions of consciousness with each other and the intensities of these dimensions. The nature of conscious experience associated with sitting quietly with ones eyes opened may be labeled a state of consciousness that is associated with particular correlational parameters and intensities of phenomenological experience that are similarly reproduced, when the stimulus condition is repeat- ed. Moresc, it may serve as an effective baseline condition from which to compare alterations in subjective experience associated with other con- ditions. The condition of reading mildly arousing erotica was found to differ from the first baseline condi— tion in terms of: increased and more vivid imag- ery, inward and absorbed attention, decreases in control and internal dialogue, and greater positive affect. The dimensions of consciousness in the erotica condition were also found to be characterized by a significantly different pattern of organization from that of the first baseline 103 condition. This, along with the fact that there was no subjective sense of being in an altered state, suggests that this state may be character- ized as an "identity" state of consciousness. The condition of relaxation/meditation was found to differ from the baseline condition in terms of all the dimensions of consciousness. It included decreases in internal dialogue, imagery, control, self awareness, positive and negative affect, and memory: and increases in inward, absorbed atten- tion, sense of altered state, and increases in altered meaning, perception, time, and body in- tegrity. It was also found to be characterized by very significant pattern differences from the baseline condition. The pattern differences and the huge differences for the state of awareness subdimension between this condition and baseline, suggest that the relaxation/meditation condition may be characterized as an "alternate" or "alter- ed" state of consciousness. Significant positive correlations found between the trait of absorption and the dimensions of al- tered state of awareness and altered experience suggest that this trait moderates the extent to which Ss will perceive an alteration in their awareness and phenomenological experience of them- selves, but only slightly. No consistent 9. 10. 11. 104 differences for extraversion or sex suggest that these variables do not moderate the nature of phenomenological experience. The previous conclusions indicate that retro- spective introspection may be an important methodolOgical tool for empirically mapping and exploring the nature and structure of phenomeno- logical consciousness during such subjective ex- periences as daydreaming, meditation, relaxation, hypnosis, guided imagery, drug intoxication, and any other conditions whose phenomenological param- eters may be worth exploring. Other phenomenological questionnaires, employing similar types of items, and utilized in a procedure similar to that described here, may be developed to map specific nuances of subjective experience not mapped by the PCQ. Such questionnaires may be found reliable and valid instruments for map- ping such experience. The study of the "black box" of the mind need not be ignored for it can yield intriguing and pro- vocative, empirical data on the nature of con- sciousness. 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Internal 8 8 8 6 6 6 Dialogue . 3 . 3 ._5 . 9 . 7 .Z_ (#21: a. #61:) Average .67 .73 .29 .62 .59 .65 Note: All correlations are significant at p l .0001. N = 996 114 Table 3 Percentage of Ss Having a Given Deviation Score for the Five Reliability Pairs Across All Four Conditions (N=996) Deviation .Reliability Pairs Amount State. Dir. Imag. Pos. Int. 1 Ave. Aware. Att. Amt. Aff. Dial. Zero (0) ~ - * Deviation 45% 47% 46% 67% 56% 52% Within :1 Unit Deviation 75% 81% 77% 88% 84% 81% Within :2 Unit Deviations 87% 91% 88% 94% 92% 99% 3 or More Unit Deviations 13% 9% 12% 6% 8% 10% Mean Unit Deviation 1.02 .90 .98 .58 .74 .84 Standard Deviation 1.26 1.20 1.29 1.10 1.14 115 Table 4 Percentage of Ss Having a Given Average Deviation Score Summed Across All Five Item Pairs for All Four Conditions Average Unit Deviations 0-05 0-105 0-205 205 & up %Ss 59% 95% 99.5% 0.5% Note: N = 996 116 Table 5 Dimensions of Consciousness and CorreSponding Alphas for the First Cluster Analysis on the First Baseline Condition Coefficient Dimensions Alphas 1. Body Integrity .53 2. Time .29 3. State of Awareness .79 4. Attention .70 5. Control (Volition) .74 6. Ego (Self) Awareness .71 7. Perception .53 8. Positive Affect .77 9. Negative Affect .65 10. Imagery .84 11. Internal Dialogue .80 12. Rationality .39 13. Memory .61 14. Meaning .63 15. Arousal (Alertness) .47 117 Table 6 Dimensions of Consciousness and Corresponding Cluster Loadings for the First Cluster Analysis for the First Baseline Condition Dimensions Clusger . Loa . 1. Body Integrity #15 .59* #29 .39* #54 .23 #55 -35 #67 .61 2. Time #16 .37 #53 .oo #61 .87* 3. State of Awareness #17 .63 #52 .85* #57 .77* 4. Attention #18 .62* #25 .28 #44 .43 #51 .56* #58 .64* #65 .67* 5. Control #19 .60 #28 -53* #42 .76* #50 .72* 6. Self (Ego) Awareness #20 .46 #40 .46* #49 .82* #60 .74* 7. Perception #21 .52* #48 .38 #66 .69* Dimensions Cluster Load. 8. Positive Affect #22 .81* #47 .65* #62 .44 #72 .81* 9. Negative Affect #31 .68* #38 .78* #69 .43* 10. Imagery #23 .73* #36 .69* #46 .80* #63 .79* 11. Internal Dialogue #24 .86* #45 .51 #64 .94* 12. Rationality #26 .57* #43 .21 #56 .35 #73 ~39 13. Memory #27 .67* #41 .67* 14. Meaning #39 .66* #39 .49 #68 .68* 15. Alertness #32 .69* #37 .47* #70 .30 Note: An asterisk (*) means the item (#) loaded highest on its assigned dimension. 118 Table 7 Dimensions of Consciousness and Corresponding Alphas for the Final Cluster Analysis on the First Baseline Condition ‘Number of 'Coefficient Dimensions 'Items Alphas .1. Internal Dialogue _(2) .91 2. Awareness (4) .86 a. Self Awareness (2) .81 b. State of Awareness (2) .79 3. Imagery (4) .84 a. Imagery Amount (2) .78 b. Imagery Vividness (2) .77 4. Positive Affect (3) .77 5. Control (Volition) (4) .74 6. Altered Experience (9) .73 a. Meaning (3) .63 b. Perception (2) .54 c. Time (2) .53 d. Body Integrity (2) .49 7. Attention (4) .72 a. Dir. of Attention (2) .76 b. Absorption (2) .58 8. Negative Affect (3) .65 9- Memory (2) .61 10. Alertness (Arousal) (2) .50 Average coefficient alpha for all ten major dimensions .73 Average coefficient alpha for nine major dimensions (excluding alertness) .76 119 Table 8 Dimensions of Consciousness and CorreSponding Cluster Loadings for the Final Cluster Analysis for the First Baseline Condition Cluster Cluster Dimensions Load. Dimensions Load. 1. Altered Experience a. Self Awareness #30 .50 #49 .83 #39 .49 #60 .83 #68 .54 b. State of Awareness #21 .55 #17 .63 #66 .41 #52 .85 #61 .47 4. Imagery #15 .45 #23 .73 #29 .44 #63 .79 a. Body Integrity #36 .69 #15 .59 #46 .80 #29 ~59 a. Imagery Vividness b. Time #36 .80 #16 .62 #46 .80 #61 .62 b. Imagery Amount c. Perception #23 .81 #21 .62 #63 .81 #66 .62 5. Control (Volition) d. Meaning #19 .60 #30 .66 #28 .53 #39 .49 #42 .76 #68 .68 #50 .72 2. Attention 6. Internal Dialogue #18 .68 #24 .92 #65 .72 #64 .92 #51 .49 7. Positive Affect #58 .60 #22 .81 a. Dir. of Attention #47 .65 #65 .79 #72 .81 b. Absorption 8. Negative Affect #51 .65 #31 .68 #58 .65 #38 .78 3. Awareness #69 .43 #49 .71 9. Memory #60 .60 #27 .60 #17 .52 #41 .60 #52 .82 10. Alertness #57 .75 #32 .67 #37 .67 Note: Item numbers (#‘s) are from Form 0 of the PCQ. 120 Table 9 Exploratory Factor Analysis for the First Baseline Condition Across All Items Factor Item Factor Cluster 'Number Content .Load. Load. 1. Altered Experience (a1pha=.80: Variance=7%) #30 religious, spiritual experience .55 .51 #55 change in body perspective .52 .48 #67 dizzy and disoriented .51 .56 #70 strange and dream-like state .50 .67 #68 sacredness or deep meaning .49 .53 #56 ineffability .47 .47 #66 objects in world change .44 .43 #39 profound and enlightening ideas .44 .43 #61 change in perception of time .43 .50 #48 change in perception of Space .39 .48 #15 body eXpanded into world .39 .42 #21 extraordinary sensory changes .37 .44 #29 separation between self/environ. .35 .38 #73 transcendence of opposites .35 .38 #33 fantastic thoughts and images .29 .29 #74 questionnaire easy to complete .24 .25 2. Awareness (a1pha=.80: Variance=7%) #60 self-awareness .73 .71 #49 conscious and aware of self .72 .77 #52 certain of unus. state of conscio. .67 .76 #57 unusual state of consciousness .60 .71 #54 aware of body sensations .54 . .54 #17 nonordinary state of awareness .47 .48 #40 aware of ego and personality .36 .34 #53 change in passage of time .34 .31 3. Imagery (a1pha=.80: Variance=7%) #23 amount of imagery .73 .77 #63 amount of imagery .72 .81 #46 vividness of imagery .70 .75 #36 distinctness of imagery .67 .70 #45 imagery versus thought .55 .56 #34 mind and extent of thoughts -.42 .38 #25 attention to field of conscious. .24 .25 121 Table 9 (cont'd.) Factor Item Factor Cluster Number .Content Load. Load. 4. Attention/Memory (a1pha=.76: Variance=5%) #44 focus of attention .70 .65 #43 thoughts: logical or illogical -.68 .58 #51 distraction/absorption .50 .55 #58 involved/detached in experience .46 .57 #65 attention's direction .46 .42 #27 remembering experience -.44 .52 #19 control over attention -.36 .36 #41 memory -.36 .47 #26 understanding experience -.34 .46 5. Negative Affect (a1pha=.70: Variance=4%) #38 feelings of irritation .69 .77 #31 anger .62 .60 #71 pleasure/unpleasure .58 .62 #69 shame and guilt .54 .48 #59 peacefulness/excitement .44 .38 6. Alertness (Arousal) (a1pha=.57: Variance=3%) #32 awareness intensity .55 .73 #37 perceptual sensitivity/intensity .53 .43 #18 direction of attention .49 .44 #29 alertness/drowsiness .43 .42 7. Positive Affect (a1pha=.75: Variance=4%) #22 sexual feelings .82 .79 #72 sexual feelings .81 .77 #47 feelings of love .56 .68 #62 feelings of joy and bliss .34 .46 #35 suggestibility .34 .37 8. Control (Volition) (a1pha=.56: Variance=3%) #42 control .56 .73 #28 actively involved/letting go .50 .61 #50 control of thoughts and images .47 .66 #16 sense of time -.41 .06 9. Internal Dialogue (a1pha=.91: Variance=4%) #24 silently talking to oneself .89 .92 #64 silently talking to oneself .89 .92 122 Table 10 Dimensions of Consciousness and Corresponding Alphas for Each of the Four Conditions Dimensions Conditions 1st 2nd Base. Base. »Erot. Relx. Ave. -1. Internal Dialogue .91 .90 .81 .80 .86 2. Awareness .86 .86 .81 .75 .82 a. Self Awareness .81 .81 .68 .56 .76 b. State of Awareness .79 .83 .80 .77 .80 3. Imagery .84 .85 .86 .79 .84 a. Imagery Amount .78 .83 .80 .76 .79 b. Imagery Vividness .77 .84 .76 .73 .78 4. Positive Affect .77 .81 .80 .74 .78 . Control (Volition) .74 .86 .67 .72 .75 6. Altered Experience .73 .80 .76 .72 .78 a. Meaning .63 .68 .66 .73 .68 b. Perception .54 .45 .37 .54 .48 C. Time 053 073 061 061 .62 d. Body Integrity .49 .66 .45 .64 .56 7. Attention .72 .80 .64 .57 .68 3. Dire Of Attention 076 081 068 056 070 b. Absorption .58 .69 .36 .43 .52 8. Negative Affect .65 .62 .50 .46 .56 9. Memory .61 .57 .64 .75 .64 10. Alertness (Arousal) .50 .47 .40 .49 .47 Average (across all ten dimensions) .73 .75 .69 .68 .72 2; Average (for nine dimensions exc. alertness) .76 .79 .72 .70 .74 123 Table 11 Dimensions of Consciousness and Corresponding Cluster .Loadings Across All Four Conditions A_ Dimensions Cluster Loadings (item #‘s 'Ist ' 2nd from Form 0) Base. Base. Erot. Relx. 1. Internal Dialogue #24 .92* .91* .84* .82* #64 .92* .91* .84* .82* 2. Awareness #49 .71* ~75* .69* -73* #60 .60* .69* .59 .37 #17 .52* .65 .81* .76* #52 .82* .83* .71* .63* #57 .75* .79* .62* .60* a. Self Awareness #49 083* 083* 076* 07“.“. #60 .83* .83* .76* .74* b. State of Awareness #17 .63* .72 .88* .90* #52 .85* .82* .74* .63* #57 .77* .84* .64* .65* 3. Imagery #23 .73* .74* .82* .66* #63 ~79* .78* .77* .75* #36 . 69* - 75* - 75* . 63* #46 .80* .79* .76* .75* a. Imagery Amount #23 .81* .85* .82* .79* #63 .81* .85* .82* .79* b. Imagery Vividness #36 .80* .86* .79* .77* #46 .80* .86* .79* .77* 4. Positive Affect #22 .81* .81* .84* .81* #47 .65* .58* .63* .65* #62 0%.”. 059* 069* 040 #72 .81* .90* .68* .75* 5. Control (Volition) #19 .60* .76* .39 .71* #28 .53* .79* .74* .61* #42 076* 087* 057 0514;} #50 .72* .72* .64* .67* Note: An asterisk (*) means the item loaded highest on its assigned dimension. 124 Table 11 (cont'd.) 1st 2nd Dimensions Base. Base. Erot. Relx. 6. Altered Experience #30 .50* .52 .50 .58* #39 .49* .50* .60 .52* #68 0514* 061* 055 059* #21 .55* .62* .56 .43 #66 .41* .38 .47 .49* #16 .48* .60* .43 .44* #61 .47 .50* .57 .36 #15 .45* .70* .52 .51* #29 .44* .58 .69* .35 an Meaning #30 .66* .62* .59 .66* #39 .49* .62* .60 .60* #68 .68* .71* .69* .80* b. Perception #21 .62* .56 .50 .62* #66 .62* .56 .50* .62* c. Time #16 .62* .77* .68* .68* #61 .62* .77* .68* .68* d. Body Integrity #15 .59* .71* .56 .70* #29. .59* .71* .56* .70* 7. Attention #18 .68* .67* .67* .56* #65 0 72* 0 85* 0 67* 0 55* #51 0I+9* 063* 031* 054* #58 .60* .67* .56* .35* a. Direct. of Attention #18 .79* .83* .73* .64* #65 .79* .83* .73* .64* b. Absorption #51 .65* .73* .49* .54* #58 .65* .73* .49 .54* 8. Negative Affect #31 .68* .83* .67* .49* #38 .78* .67* .64* .62* #69 .43* .33* .24 .33* 9. Memory #27 .60* .65* .70* .78* #41 .60* .65* .70* .78* 10. Alertness (Arousal) #32 .67* -57* -52* .59* #37 .67* .57* .52* ~59* Exploratory Factor Analysis for the First Baseline 125 Table 12 Condition Using Only 39 Items Factor A Priori Factor Cluster Coeff. Variance Item Dimension Load. Load. Alpha 1. (10%) #57 state of awareness .72 .66 .81 #52 state of awareness .72 .67 #17 state of awareness .64 .57 #61 time 051 052 #21 ‘perception .50 .54 #16 time 049 014’9 #68 meaning .45 .52 #30 meaning .41 .46 #29 body integrity .38 .42 #66 perception .37 .37 #15 body integrity .36 .45 #39 meaning .35 .44 2. (10%) #46 imagery vividness .72 .73 .82 #36 imagery vividness .72 .70 #63 imagery amount .65 .65 #23 imagery amount .63 .65 #58 absorption .62 .67 #65 dir. of attention -.49 .43 #27 memory -.42 .39 #51 absorption .42 .47 #Ll'l memory "' 014'0 01"0 #62 positive affect .39 .48 30 (7%) #50 contrOl 071 061 079 #42 control .70 .70 #19 control .56 .58 #28 control .55 .50 #49 self awareness .50 .69 #60 self awareness .48 .62 4. (4%) #18 dir. of attention .56 .43 .53 #32 alertness .54 .54 #37 alertness .45 .44 5. (6%) #22 positive affect .85 .88 .80 #72 positive affect .84 .88 #47 positive affect .55 .53 6. (4%) #38 negative affect .70 .78 .65 #31 negative affect .69 .68 #69 negative affect .45 .43 7. (5%) #24 internal dialogue .90 .92 .91 #64 internal dialogue .90 .92 126 Table 13 Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Second Baseline Condition Using Only 39'Items Factor Cluster Coeff. Factor A Priori Variance Item Dimension Load. Load. Alpha 1. (14%) #57 state of awareness .75 .82 .87 #17 state of awareness .72 .76 #52 state of awareness. .67 .72 #15 body integrity .66 .68 #21 perception .63 .63 #29 body integrity .58 .61 #16 time 057 057 #68 meaning .53 .56 #61 time 052 052 #49 self awareness .49 .53 #30 meaning .47 .46 #39 meaning .44 .43 #66 perception .43 .41 2. (9%) #42 control .72 .71 .79 #28 control .71 .74 #19 control .71 .69 #50 control .68 .68 #60 self awareness .52 .57 #32 alertness .49 .47 #27 memory .36 .40 #37 alertness .34 .31 #41 memory .34 .34 3. (7%) #46 imagery vividness .78 .79 .85 #36 imagery vividness .72 .75 #63 imagery amount .70 .78 #23 imagery amount .64 .74 4. (6%) #65 dir. of attention .73 .85 .80 #18 dir. of attention .64 .67 #51 absorption .56 .63 #58 absorption .48 .67 5. (6%) #72 positive affect .86 .90 .81 #22 positive affect .83 .81 #47 positive affect .55 .58 #62 positive affect .48 .59 6. (4%) #38 negative affect .68 .67 .62 #31 negative affect .67 .83 #69 negative affect .36 .33 7. (4%) #64 internal dialogue .88 .91 .90 #24 internal dialogue .88 .91 127 Table 14 Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Erotica Condition L. Using Only 39 Items Factor A Priori Factor Cluster Coeff. Variance Item Dimension Load. Load. Alpha 1. (12%) #49 self awareness .72 .73 .84 #60 self awareness .70 .61 #17 state of awareness .64 .75 #42 control .60 .57 #52 state of awareness .60 .68 #28 control .59 .60 #57 state of awareness .53 .6O #16 time 049 053 #19 control .48 .52 #50 control .43 .49 #29 body integrity .36 .41 #66 perception .31 .37 #69 negative affect -.16 .17 2. (10%) #47 positive affect .69 .69 .81 #39 mearling 0 61 0 62 #62 positive affect .59 .68 #68 meaning .57 .57 #22 positive affect .55 .69 #21 perception .54 .58 #61 time 0u'6 0 57 #72 positive affect .46 .58 #30 meaning .40 .36 #37 alertness .31 .23 #32 alertness .26 .21 3. (6%) #41 memory .60 .63 .68 #38 negative affect .50 .56 #27 memory .47 .51 ‘#65 dir. of attention -.41 .47 #58 absorption -.40 .50 #31 negative affect .40 .34 #51 absorption -.36 .38 4. (7%) #23 imagery amount .77 .80 .82 #63 imagery amount .76 .78 #36 imagery vividness .71 .76 #46 imagery vividness .69 .77 #18 dir. of attention .37 .39 5. (4%) #24 internal dialogue .83 .84 .81 #64 internal dialogue .80 .84 128 Table 15 Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Relaxation Condition Using 39 Items Factor A Priori Factor Cluster Coeff. Variance Item Dimensions Load. Load. Alpha 1. (12%) #49 self awareness .70 .71 .86 #19 control .68 .64 #60 self awareness .63 .54 #28 control .57 .61 #50 control .56 .54 #27 memory .56 .49 #52 state of awareness .48 .60 #17 state of awareness .48 .62 #37 alertness .46 .40 #57 state of awareness .44 .59 #32 alertness .44 .38 #41 memory .43 .35 #42 control .43 .50 #61 time .40 .44 #16 time 038 039 #15 body integrity .33 .41 2. (6%) #51 absorption .48 .57 .63 #38 negative affect -.47 .55 #18 dir. of attention .44 .50 #65 dir. of attention .42 .39 #29 body integrity .40 .33 #58 absorption .38 .33 #31 negative affect -.33 .41 #69 negative affect -.31 .26 3. (7%) #30 meaning .63 .64 .73 #39 meaning .63 .68 #68 meaning .63 .72 #21 perception .51 .51 #66 perception .44 .39 #62 positive affect .38 .41 4. (6%) #63 imagery amount .75 .75 .79 #23 imagery amount .70 .66 #46 imagery vividness .67 .75 #36 imagery vividness .63 .63 5. (5%) #22 positive affect .75 .86 .78 #72 positive affect .71 .75 #47 positive affect .55 .60 6. (4%) #24 internal dialogue .65 .82 .80 #64 internal dialogue .60 .82 Correlation Matrix for the First Baseline Condition Corrected for Attenuation* 129 Table 16 Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. Dial0 1000 '005 .05 008 003 -018 -007 -011 -001 Awar. 1.00 .13 .27 .49 .68 .29 .02 .29 Imag0 1000 052 003 025 065 ‘021 -041 Pos. Aff0 1000 006 031‘" 014'0 -008 -011" Cont0 1000 03# ”003 007 03? Alt. Exp. 1.00 .33 .15 .00 Att0 1000 ‘012 "0h’3 Neg. Aff. 1.00 .13 Mem. 1.00 Table 17 Correlation Matrix for the Second Baseline Condition Corrected for Attenuation* Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. Dial 1000 “001 001 -006 013 -010 -015 -019 020 Awar. 1.00 .22 .39 .56 .80 .28 .05 .19 Imag. 1.00 .41 .12 .30 .63 -.20 -.31 Pos. Aff. 1.00 .08 .48 .43 .O6 -.26 Gont0 1000 036 007 '01“ 0&3 Alt Exp. 1.00 .21 .27 .OO Att0 1000 -017 -039 Neg. Aff. 1.00 .06 Mem. 1.00 *Note: Because Alertness was later excluded as a dimension of consciousness, it is not listed here. 130 Table 18 Correlation Matrix for the Erotica Condition Corrected for Attenuation* dimension of consciousness, it is not listed here. Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. 1313.10 1000 ’019 '003 000 '020 “0114' 029 ’012 -006 Awar. 1.00 .26 .53 .89 .80 .45 .06 .02 Imag0 1000 0’47 023 0314' 066 ‘029 ‘0“0 Pos. Aff0 1000 053 072 060 -026 -031 Con-t0 1 000 067 0414’ -002 000 Alt Exp. 1000 034 006 "006 Att0 1000 -03“ “059 Neg. Aff. 1.00 .41 . Mem. 1.00 Table 19 Correlation Matrix for the Relaxation Condition Corrected for Attenuation* Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. A D1810 1000 026 -019 “032 033 “0014' 024 -035 027 Awar0 1000 “016 002 08"" 055 036 -036 0’43 Imag0 1000 04“ -001 001+ “018 017 -012 Pos. Aff0 1000 002 035 -006 037 "009 cont0 1 000 0&8 019 '030 056 Alt Exp. 1000 027 -015 011 Att0 1000 ‘060 ‘007 Neg. Aff. 1.00 .00 Mem. 1.00 *Note: Because Alertness was later excluded as a 131 Table 20 Test-Retest Reliabilities for the Dimensions of Consciousness Dimensions Comparisons ’ lst & 2nd .1st Base. 2nd Base. Baseline & Erot. & Relx. Conditions Conditions 1. Internal Dialogue ..50 .26 ..17 2. Awareness .44 .ho .19 a. Self Awareness .43 .3h .13 b. State of Awareness .#3 .35 .15 3. Imagery .hl .21 .02* a. Imagery Amount .38 .21 .0#* b. Imagery Vividness .40 .23 .08* #. Positive Affect .43 .27 .31 . Control (Volition) .hh .18 .17 . Altered Experience .56 . .41 .38 a. Meaning .58 .h0 .h1 b. Perception .29 .30 .16 C0 Time 038 024 023 d. Body Integrity .4# .24 .23 7. Attention .39 .05* .03* a. Dir. of Attention .28 -.01* .ou* b. Absorption .39 .02* .02* 8. Negative Affect .34 .38 .32 9. Memory .3# .18 .06* 10. Alertness (Arousal) .16 .22 .07* Average (across all ten dimensions) .40 .26 .17 Average (across all di- mensions exc. Alert.) .42 .26 .18 Note: All correlations are significant at p l .05 except those marked with an asterisk (*). 132 ' Table 21 Comparisons for the Dimensions of Consciousness Between the Baseline Conditions Dimensions Statistics 7 Conditions f lst Base.. 2nd Base. . . . . .t* Omega' Mean 'S.D. Mean S.D. Diff. Value Squ. 1. Int. Dial. 2.13 1.95 2.38 2.12 -0.25 -1.94 L 2. Aware. 2.02 1.29 1.60 1.33 0.43 4.890 .04 Self Aware. 1.97 1.55 1.71 1.52 0.26 2.51a .01 State Aware. 2.07 1.45 1.52 1.44 0.54 5.52C .06 3. Imagery 3.47 1.57 3.08 1.70 0.40 3.51b .02 Imag. Amt. 3.30 1.75 2.98 1.90 0.32 2.49a .01 Imag. Viv. 3.65 1.71 3.18 1.90 0.47 3.750 .03 4. Pos. Affect 2.60 1.56 1.81 1.50 ’0.79 7.630 .10 0 ContrOI 2029 1039 2025 1060 0001+ 001+2 " . Alt. Exp. 1.91 1.00 1.47 1.07 0.44 7.13C .09 Meaning 1.46 1.32 1.22 1.33 0.24 3.17: .02 Percept. 1.44 1.44 0.90 1.16 0.53 5.380 .05 Time 2.50 1.58 1.90 1.66 0.60 5.22c .05 Body Int. 2.45 1.41 1.98 1.37 0.47 4.72 .04 7. Attention 3.74 1.28 3.65 1.38 0.08 0.88 - Dir0 Of Att0 3065 1061 3058 1067 O00“ O03“ ‘- Absorption 3.85 1.42 3.75 1.46 0.12 1.21 - 80 Neg0 AffeCt 0099 102“ 0089 1017 0011 1022 ' 90 Memory 1033 1015 1035 1005 -0002 ”0025 " a .04 bp = ‘ .05 *df = 248 cp = l .01 p = L 0001 1. 2. 7. 8. 9. Much internal dialogue No alteration in general awareness a. Complete self awareness b. No alteration in awareness No imagery nor vivid imagery a. No imagery b. No vivid imagery No positive affect Complete control No alteration in experience a. No alteration in meaning b. No alteration in perception c. No alteration in time d. No alteration in body image P 2. 3. 7. 8. 9. No internal dialogue Great alteration in gen. awareness a. No self awareness b. Great altera- tion in awareness Much vivid imagery a. Much imagery b. Very vivid imagery Much positive affect No control Great alteration in experience a. Great altera- tion in meaning b. Great altera- tion in perception c. Great altera- tion in time d. Great altera- tion in body image Inward/absorbed attention a. Inward attention b. Absorbed attention Much negative affect Very poor memory 4 Outward/distract. attention a. Outward attention b. Distractible attention No negative affect Excellent memory 1 Rating 0 1""-'K.= * = 6’ First Baseline Condition Second Baseline Condition significant at least at p - .05 Figure 1 Cbmparisons Between the Phenomenological Nature of the Two Baseline Conditions Table 22 134 Comparisons for the Dimensions of Consciousness Between the First Baseline and the Erotica Conditions Dimensions Statistics Conditions lst Base. Erot. t* Omega Mean. S.D. Mean S.D. Diff. Value Squ. 1. Int. Dial. 2.13 1.95 4.63 1.61 -2.50 -18.110 .40 20 Awareness 2002 1029 2018 1038 “0016 -1068 '- Self. Aware. 1.97 1.55 2.24 1.63 -0.27 -2.32a .009 State Aware0 2007 1045 2014 1053 “0008 ’0076 ‘- 3. Imagery 3.47 1.57 4.59 1.27 -1.11 -9.710 .16 Imag0 Amt0 3030 1075 “’06“ 1048 “1031* -10014’12 018 Imag. Viv. 3.65 1.71 4.53 1.27 -0.88 7.36 .10 4. Pos. Affect 2.60 1.56 3.27 1.49 40.68 -5.820 .06 . Control 2.29 1.39 2.76 1.35 -0.48 -4.290 .03 0 Alt0 Exp. 1091 1000 1096 1002 “0005 -0078 - Meaning 10146 1032 1052 1029 “0006 -0068 ‘- Percept. 1.43 1044 1057 1028 -0014 “1036 - Time 2059 1058 2035 1066 0015 1015 '- BOdy Int0 20l+5 1.41 2061 1037 “0016 -1014'8 " 70 Attention 307“ 1028 “01"3 1002 -0070 "60540 008 Dir. of Att. 3.63 1.61 4.37 1.26 -0.74 -5.69g .06 Absorption 3.85 1.42 4.49 1.17 -0.65 -5.62 .06 8. Neg Affect 0.99 1.24 0.92 1.08 0.07 0.85 - 90 Memory 1033 1015 1033 1007 0000 ”0004 " .11 :p = c .05 *df = 248 GP = ‘ 001 p = ‘ .001 1. Much internal 1. No internal dialogue dialogue 2. No alteration in 12. Great alteration general awareness in gen. awareness a. Complete self a. No self awareness awareness b. No alteration b. Great altera- in awareness tion in awareness 3. No imagery nor 3. Much vivid imagery vivid imagery a. No imagery a. Much imagery b. No vivid b. Very vivid imagery imagery 4. No positive 4. Much positive affect affect 5. Complete control . No control 6. No alteration in . Great alteration experience in experience a. No alteration a. Great altera- in meaning tion in meaning b. No alteration b. Great altera- in perception tion in perception c. No alteration c. Great altera- in time tion in time d. No alteration d. Great altera- in body image tion in body image 7. Outward/distract. 7. Inward/absorbed attention attention a. Outward a. Inward attention attention b. Distractible b. Absorbed attention attention 8. No negative 8. Much negative affect affect 9. Excellent memory 9. Very poor memory Rating 0 6 v——- = First baseline condition *-'-* = Reading erotica condition * = significant at least at p>¢ .05 Figure 2 Comparisons Between the Phenomenological Nature of Erotica Conditions the First Baseline and the Table 23 136 Comparisons for the Dimensions of Consciousness Between the Second Baseline and the Relaxation Conditions Dimensions Statistics Conditions 2nd Base. Relaxation t* Omega Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff. Value Squ. 1. Int. Dial. 2.38 2.11 4.30 1.65 -1.92 -12.38° .23 2. Awareness 1.60 1.33 4.56 1/10 -2.97 ~30.150 .657 Self Aware. 1.71 1.52 4.09 1.65 -2.38 -17.943 .39 State Aware. 1.52 1.44 4.88 1.11 -3.36 —31.49 .67 3. Imagery 3.08 1.70 2.03 1.49 1.05 7. 41° .10 Imag. Amt. 2.98 1.90 2.28 1.83 0.69 4. 23: .03 Imag. Viv. 3.18 1.91 1.77 1.56 1.41 9. 39° .15 4. Pos. Affect 1.81 1.50 1.47 1.24 '0.34 3.27° .02 5. Control 2.25 1.61 4.35 1.27 -2.09 -17.94° .39 6. Alt. Exp. 1.47 1.07 3.10 1.08 -1.63 -21. 46° .48 Meaning 1.22 1.33 2.21 1.63 0.99 —9. 69: .16 Percept. 0090 1016 2039 1061+ ‘10“9 -120 67: 021‘" Time 1.90 1.66 4.07 1.59 -2.17 —17. .01c .37 Body Int. 1.98 1.37 4.16 1.58 42.19 -17. 68 .39 7. Attention 3.65 1.38 5 4 0.86 -1.39 -13. 66° .27 Dir0 Of Att0 3058 1067 50 1007 ’1054 “120145: 021+ Absorption 3.75 1.46 4.97 1.08 -1.24 -10. 83c .19 8. Neg. Affect 0.89 1.17 0.41 0.75 0.47 6.34° .07 9. Memory 1.35 1.06 3.16 1.73 -1.81 -14.47° .30 .28 %p = L .05 *df = 248 p = 4 .01 CD = 4 0001 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. 137 1. No internal dialogue , 2. Great alteration in gen. awareness a. No self awareness b. Great altera— tion in awareness 3. Much vivid imagery Much internal dialogue No alteration in general awareness a. Complete self awareness b. No alteration in awareness No imagery nor vivid imagery a. No imagery a. Much imagery b. No vivid b. Very vivid imagery imagery No positive 4. Much positive affect affect Complete control 5. No control 6. Great alteration in experience a. Great altera- tion in meaning b. Great altera- tion in perception c. Great altera- tion in time d. Great altera- tion in body image No alteration in experience a. No alteration in meaning b. No alteration in perception c. No alteration in time d. No alteration in body image 7. Outward/distract. 7. Inward/absorbed attention attention a. Outward a. Inward attention attention b. Distractible b. Absorbed attention attention 8. No negative 8. Much negative affect affect 9. Excellent memory 9. Very poor memory Rating 0 6 -—-—~ = Second baseline condition *---* = Relaxation/meditation condition *9: significant at least at p i .05 Figure 3 Comparisons Between the Phenomenological Nature of the Second Baseline and the Relaxation Conditions 138 Table 24 Comparisons for the Dimensions of Consciousness Between the Erotica and the Relaxation Conditions Dimensions Statistics Conditions Erotica Relaxation t* yOmega Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff. Value Squ. 1. Int. Dial. 4.63 1.61 4.30 1.65 0.33 2.74b .01 2. Aware. 2.18 1.38 4.56 1.10 -2.38 -22. 95° .51 Self Aware0 202“ 1063 [+069 1065 "1085 -130 “'3: 027 State Aware0 201“ 1053 4088 1011 '20?“ -24. 750 056 3. Imagery 4.59 1.27 2.03 1.49 2.56 20. 87c .47 Imag. Amt. 4.64 1.48 2.29 1.83 2.36 16. 20: .34 Imag. Viv. 4.53 1.27 1.77 1.56 2.76 21. 78c .49 4. POS. Affect 3.27 1.49 1.47 1.24 1.80 15.92c .34 5. Control 2.77 1.35 4.34 1.27 -1.58 -14.06° .28 6. Alt. Exp. 1.96 1.02 3.10 1.08 -1.14 -15. 57° .33 Meaning 1052 1029 2021 1063 -0069 '60 85c 008 Percept. 1.57 1.28 2.39 1.64 -0.82 -7. 18 .09 Time 2.35 1.66 4.07 1.59 -1.72 -13. 34° .26 Body Int. 2.61 1.37 4.16 1.58 -1.56 -13. 62° .27 70 Attention “014'3 1002 5.04 0086 ‘0061 “‘80 27C 012 Dir0 Of Att0 4037 1026 5012 1007 -0075 '70 7Ll'c 011 Absorption 4.50 1.17 4.96 1.08 -0.47 -5.100 .05 8. Neg. Affect 0.92 1.08 0.41 0.75 0.51 6.37c .07 9. Memory 1.33 1.07 3.16 1.73 -1.83 -15.14° .38 ‘ .26 bp = 4 .01 *df = 248 °p = 4 .001 139 mCoHPHocoo hsom HH¢ pow mmofimSoaomCoo ho ohsvmz HmoflMoHocoEocosm on» newswom mcomflnmmsoo : ohsmfim scavmxmaom.¢l.llo «capohm ol 1.6 ocfiaommn udooom,x:::zx ocflaommn pmhflm . CE . 9a GE. . 33 .52 .moz 3:2 . pg .28 zoom .moeH . 983. . EH Apomvcfiv AocvAymac\PsovAoCVAoPonEoOVAocV aocv Acouopamv .Aocv.ll.mcfiPMH ohoN _ P p r . e . AOmhv » a < J J . 4 _ . - o .1 H .. N .v m zpflm Inoch .1 3 .. a ,. o 140 Table 25 Comparative Distances in Euclidean Nine-Space Between the Differing Conditions Conditions jFirst ~Second Reading Relaxation/ Baseline Baseline Erotica Meditation ~First Baseline 0.00 1.12 2.95 5.08 'Second Baseline 0.00 3.31 5.17 Reading Erotica 0.00 4.83 Relaxation/ Meditation 0.00 141 Table 26 Correlation Matrix for the First Baseline Condition* Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. a 1313.10 1000 “0014' 004 006 006 -015 ‘006 -010 000 Awar. 1.00 .11 .22° .38° .53° .22° .01 .13a Imag. 1.00 .42° .02 .20c .500 -.17b -.30° Pos. c c Aff0 1000 002 026 030 "008 -010 Cont0 1 000 0246 -002 001‘" 026C Alt. c Exp. 1.00 .24 .10 .00 Att. a 1.00 -.09 -.28c Neg. bp = 4 .05 Aff. p = 4 .01 1.00 .08 0p = ‘ .001 Mem. 1.00 Table 27 Correlation Matrix for the Second Baseline Condition* Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. a a a Dial. 1000 '001 001 '005 012 “009 -013 I'01’+ 015 Awar. 1.00 .19b .32° .49° .66° .23° .02 .13 Imag0 1 000 034C 011 026c 051e ’016a “0220 Pos. b Aff0 1 000 007 0390 035C 003 -018 Cont. 1.00 .31° .06 -.11 .22° Alt. b b Exp. 1000 017 017 -001 Att. a 1.00 -.14a -.26° Neg. bp = 4 .05 Aff0 p = t 001 1000 0014' 0p = l .001 Mem. 1.00 * Note: Matrices were not corrected for attenuation. 142 Table 28 Difference Correlation Matrix Between the First and Second Baseline Conditions* .Int. -Dial. Awar 0 Imag. Pos. Aff. Cont. Alt. Exp. Att. Neg. Aff. Mem. Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp.‘ Att. Aff.‘ Mem. .00 .03 .03 .11 .06 .06 .07 .04 .15a ..00 .08 .10 .11 .13a .01 .01 .00 .00 .08 .09 .06 .01 .01 .08 .00 .05 .13a .05 .11 .08 .00 .07 .08 .15a .04 .00 .07 .07 .01 .00 .05 .02 ap = L '05 .00 .04 .00 ’ *Note: Matrix was not corrected for attenuation. 143 Table 29 Covariance Matrices for the Four Conditions First Baseline Condition 1.00; ‘ .31 1.64 . 069 037 1066 ‘ 03“ -.04 068 1092 . 032 1001 022 005 2.48 ' —'30 ”015 “011 015 013 3080 ' 'u1 059 .40 00“ 1003 019 2.43 ' .12 -.14 .00 .06 -.32 -.23 --15 1-51 - 000 “042 020 .41 “054 “001 “018 '12 1032 Second Baseline Condition .25 1.90 .94 .43 1.77 .53 .14 1.04 2.58 0“? 1020 .43 029 2089 “019 '03? “004 039 005 4.47 .62 .72 .64 .16 .86 -.16 2.23 022 “022 00“ “020 “032 “036 006 1'38 -.02 -.38 .19 .37 -.40 .34 -.29 .06 1.11 Erotica Condition .28 1.05 089 .48 1.91 .67 .43 1.22 1.82 036 065 ’038 030 1061 “016 012 “03“ “032 -.04 2059 088 068 087 078 072 “001 2021 002 '02“ 000 -.04' “028 -.14 -029 1016 -.07 --43 .02 -.01 -.40 -.08 -.36 .29 1.15 Relaxation Conditlon 1.17 017 074 '53 016 1021 .47 .10 .87 1.60 -06 -.15 -.15 .02 2.22 “006 021 038 052 -037 2'72 .38 .00 .04 .04 .62 -.g; 1.33 57 -'08 -01 “018 “017 012 “0 I ‘0 '17 ’003 067 09“ “021 062 “015 “001 2098 144 Table 30 Box Test Comparisons Between the Covariance Matrices for the Different Conditions Conditions Det. 1n Det. M1 f X2 p £1’2 First Baseline 50.64 0.00 . . 37.82 #5 37.1 5 .00 - Second Baseline 61.96 4.13 First Baseline 5h.6h 4.00 149.20 #5 146.# 4 .000 .10 Reading Erotica 3.69 1.31 Second Baseline 61.96 n.13 ‘ 362-57 45 355-7 ‘ .000 .37 Relax. / Meditat. 5.06 1.62 Reading Erotica 3.69 1.31 . 319.07 45 313.0 l .000 .33 Relax./ Meditat. 5.06 1.62 145 Table 31 Correlation Matrix for the Erotica Condition* Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. a a c 1313.10 1000 “015 “002 000 “015 “010 027 “008 “006 Awar. 1.00 .22C .uzc .66° .6u° .3u° .oo .01 Imag. 1.00 .38C .18b .28C .50C -.20C —.29c POS' c c c b c Aff0 1000 039 058 014'14‘ “018 “023 Cont. 1.00 .49° .31° -.03 .00 Alt. c EXp. 1.00 .27 .01 -.06 Att. a 1.00 -.22° -.39° Neg. bp = l .05 c Aff. Cp = t .01 1.00 .25 p = 4 .001 Mem. 1.00 Table 32 Correlation Matrix for the Relaxation Condition* Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. _Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int.‘r c a c c a c c Dial0 1000 021 “015 “025‘ 025 “003 015 “022 022 Awar. 1.00 -.09 .03 .62° .usc .17b -.22c .35° Imag. 1.00 .34° .01 .o# -.12 .10 -.08 P080 C C Aff0 1000 002 028 000 022 “007 Cont. 1.00 .3#° .09 -.17° .u3° Alt. b Exp. 1000 018 “009 009 Att. a_ 1.00 ..30° -.06 Neg. bp = l .05 Aff. p = 4 .01 1.00 .00 ° = 4 .001 Mem. 1.00 * Note: Matrices were not corrected for attenuation. 146 Table 33 Baseline and the Erotica Conditions* Difference Correlation Matrix Between the First Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. Exp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. c c D1310 000 011 006 006 021 005 033 002 005 Awar. .oo .11 .20° .28° .11 .12 .01 .12 Imag. .oo .ou .16a .08 .oo .03 .01 Pos. Aff. .00 .37° .32° .1ua .10 .13a Cont. .00 .25c .33° .07 .26° Alt. Exp. .00 .03 .09 .06 Att. .00 .13a .11 Neg0 :p = ‘ 005 b Aff0 p = ‘ 001 000 017 cp = t .001 M91110 000 Table 34 Difference Correlation Matrix Between the Second Baseline and the Relaxation Conditions* Int. Pos. Alt. Neg. Dial. Awar. Imag. Aff. Cont. EXp. Att. Aff. Mem. Int. " Dial. .00 .22° .16a .2o° .13a .06 .280 .08 .07 Awar. .00 .28° .29° .13a .21° .06 .zuc .22° Imag. .oo .oo .10 .22° .63° .26° .1ua Pos. Aff. .oo .05 .11 .35° .19b .11 Cont. .oo .03 .03 .06 .21° Alt. Exp. .00 .01 .26° .10 Att. a .00 .16a .20c Neg0 bp 2' ll 005 Aff0 p = l .01 000 001‘" 0p = ‘ .001 Mem. .00 * Note: Matrices were not corrected for attenuation. 1h? 30 %8s 20 Internal Dialogue 10 much internal ?’ '. . - . . r no internal dialogue dialogue 30 -.1“” %Ss 20 -0 Awareness - 10 - no alteration in awareness great alteration in awareness 30 -‘ %Ss 20 -° Self - Awareness 10 - ‘complete self no self awareness awareness %Ss 20 -° 3 State of - K ~ Awareness 10 - Rw~"f§#. - no alteration 0"“9'"'9" . great alteration in state of aware. in state of awareness First Baseline . . Second Baseline .Erotica .———-o x...——-~-~x o----o . Relaxation 4r---—n Figure 5 Percentage of Ss Having a Given Phenomenological Intensity Score for the Various Dimensions of Consciousness as a Function of Conditions 1#8 ‘ much imagery/ dim imagery ' vivid imagery 30 - /,¢_ —b\. /.- _- %Ss 20 - Imagery -xnn. Amount 10 - 0 0 -0--_.'-—-0" little 1magery . . . . . . . much imagery 30 %Ss 20 Imagery Vividness 10 . - —-—--'°—""°/ ‘0‘ ~b—--¢- .. . ‘ dim imagery ? . . . . . . v1v1d imagery 30 ‘ %Ss 20 - Positive - Affect 10 - 'no positive - . - much positive affect affect 30‘ '%SS'20 Control (Volition) '10. complete no control 'control First Baseline Second Baseline Erotica *___‘ X" .........." 0" - .1, Relaxation r—-‘—'b “Pi—‘7 Figure 5 (cont'd.) 30 %Ss 20 Altered Experience 10 no alteration in experience great alteration in experience 30 . %Ss 20 Mean1ng 10 no alteration . in meaning great alteration in meaning 30 %Ss 20 Perception 10 no alteration in perception great alteration in perception 30 -"~.. - . %Ss 20 Tlme 10 no alteration great alteration in time in time 30 : ‘.’* [1“ “ 7088 20 - 0. Body — - Integrity 10 -° - -0-._d’. no alteration .. in body integrity great alteration in body integ- O O ‘ O O rity First Baseline Second Baseline Erotica in . x..l..._........‘ o--—--o Relaxation k——”-——A Figure 5 (cont'd.) 30 %Ss 20 Attention 10 - outer/unfocused inner/absorbed attention attention %Ss Direction of Attention outer- inner-directed directed attention attention %Ss Absorption unfocused focused attention attention 30 - . %Ss 20 - Negative - Affect 10 - no negative . - ' - ' much negative affect . _ affect %Ss Memory excellent no memory of memory events First Baseline Second Baseline Erotica -———— p.-~------x o——-——-c Relaxation u—--—--—¢ Figure 5 (cont‘d.) 151 Table 35 Correlation of Absorption with the Dimensions of Consciousness Across All Four Conditions Dimensions -Conditions 1st 2nd Base. Base. Erot. Relx. Internal Dialogue “007 “002 “006 009 2. Awareness .16a .15a .09 .15a a. Self Awareness .09b .10a .05 .01-lc b. State of Awareness .17 .16 .09 .21 30 Imagery 023c 015a 004 “011 a. Imagery Amount .21: .18b .10 -.01 b. Imagery Vividness .16 .07 -.02 -.O7 4. Positive Affect .09 .12 .10 -.02 . Control (Volition) .0h .09 .03 .11 . Altered Experience .260 .10 .10 .21c a. Meaning .23: .10 .11 .16: b. Perception .13a .08 .09 .13a c. Time .16b .04 .02 .15a d. Body Integrity .19 .08 .05 .13 7. Attention .1ua .11 .04 .15a a. Direction of a Attention .14 .12 .0# .12 b. Absorption .08 .07 .O# .11 8. Negative Affect .01 -.06 .09 -.12 9. Memory .08 .01 .01 .05 a bp = l .05 cp = 4 .01 p = 4 .001 152 Table 36 Correlation of Extraversion with the Dimensions of Consciousness Across All Four Conditions Dimensions Conditions lst 2nd Base. Base. Erot. Relx. 1. Internal Dialogue .06 .05 -.O9 -.03 2. Awareness .03 .03 .03 .02 a. Self Awareness -.01 .-.01 .04 .02 b. State of Awareness .05 .04 -.O6 .11 3. Imagery -.O# .06 -.O3 .00 a. Imagery Amount -.05 -.0b ‘ .14a .04 b. Imagery Vividness -.11 -.03 -.01 -.06 A. Positive Affect .03 .14a .oo -.01 5. Control (Volition) .13a .08 .03 .07 6. Altered Experience .03 .12 .05 .02 a. Meaning .13a .15a .02 .05 b0 Perception “012 008 “005 “002 C0 Time 001 005 008 003 d0 BOdy Integrity 005 006 009 “001'" 7. Attention .08 .15a .03 .05 a. Direction of a Attention 005 016 000 007 b. Absorption .09 .11 .05 .01 8. Negative Affect -.11 -.O7 —.05 -.06 90 Memory 008 “001 “004 005 153 Table 37 Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Consciousness for the First Baseline Condition Dimensions . Females Males t Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value 1. Internal Dialogue 2.21 2.0 1.92 1.7 1.05 2. Awareness 2.01 1.3 2.06 1.2 -.30 a. Self Awareness 1.98 1.6 1.93 1.5 .21 b. State of Awareness 2.03 1.5 2.15 1.4 -.59 30 Imagery 3045 106 305“ 105 “038. a. Imagery Amount 3.28 1.8 3.36 1.7 -.31 b. Imagery Vividness 3.63 1.8 3.72 1.6 -.38 4. Positive Affect 2.55 1.6 2.70 1.5 -.67 5. Control (Volition) 2.30 1.4 2.25 1.4 .27 . Alt. Experience 1.82 1.0 2.13 1.0 --2.15a a0 Meaning 10ll'2 103 1057 103 “084a b. Perception . 1.30 1.3 1.80 1.7 -2.49 C0 Time 2039 106 2079 105 “1079 d. Body Integrity 2.38 1.3 2.62 1.6 -1.16 7. Attention 3.82 1.3 3.53 1.2 1.56 a. Direction of Attention 3.74 1.6 3.34 1.7 1.74 b. Absorption 3.89 1.4 3.74 1.3 .85 8.Negative Affect .98 1.3 1.02 1.2 —.24 90 Memory 1027 101 1.49 103 “1037 N = 179 females, 70 males, df=247 ap z .05 . 154 Table 38 Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Consciousness for the Second Baseline Condition Dimensions Females Males ' t Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Internal Dialogue 2.46 2.2 2.12 2.0 .88 Awareness 1.47 1.3 1.91 1.4 -2.32a a0 Self Awareness 1059 105 1099 106 '1086a b0 State Of Awareness 1039 10"" 108)“‘ 10"" -2025 Imagery 2.93 1.8 3.35 1.5 -2.15a 2083 7 -1091 a. Imagery Amount 2.0 1. 3006 200 3.49 107 ’1062 b. Imagery Vividness 2.13 1.6 -2.12a Positive Affect 1.69 1.4 Control (Volition) 2.19 1.6 2.39 1.6 -.88 Alt. Experience 1.40 1.1 1.65 1.1 -1.70 a. Meaning 1.22 1.4 1.21 1.3 .03a b0 Perception 079 101 1018 103 ‘2042a C0 Time 197“ 106 2033 108 -2056 d. Body Integrity 1.93 1.6 2.10 1.5 -.78 Attention 3063 104 3072 102 -.45 a. Direction of Attention 3.56 1.7 3.64 1.5 -.35 b. Absorption 3.70 1.5 3.79 1.4 .46 Negative Affect .86 1.2 .96 1.1 -.59 Memory 1.37 1.0 1.29 1.1 .55 N = 179 females, 70 males, df=247 ap ‘ .05 155 Table 39 Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Consciousness for the Erotica Condition 2. 3. Dimensions Females Males t Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Internal Dialogue 4.71 1.6 4.42 1.7 1.30 Awareness 2013 101'" 2031 104 -091 a. Self Awareness 2.21 1.7 2.30 1.6 -.38 b. State of Awareness 2.08 1.5 2.31 1.6 -1.11 Imagery 4.49 . 1.4 4.83 0.8 -1.88 a. Imagery Amount 4.56 1.6 4.88 1.0 -1.54 b. Imagery Vividness 4.43 1.4 4.78 1.0 -1.90 Positive Affect 3.01 1.5 3.94 1.3 -4.63b Control (Volition) 2.69 1.4 2.95 1.3 -1.38 Alt. Experience 1.88 1.0 2.16 1.0 -1.98 a. Meaning 1.51 1.3 1.57 1.2 -.33 b. Perception 1.47 1.2 1.84 1.4 -2.09a C0 Time 2018 106 2079 107 ”2061+ d0 BOdy Integrity 2055 103 2075 105 '1002 70 Attention “039 101 “055 009 '1010 a. Direction of Attention “036 103 4039 102 -013 b. Absorption 4.41 1.2 4.70 1.1 -1.79 8. Negative Affect .97 1.1 .81 1.0 1.00 90 Memory 1037 100 1026 103 072 N = 179 females. 70 males. df=247 :1) = l .05 p = 4 .01 156 Table 40 Sex Differences in the Dimensions of Consciousness for the Relaxation Condition Dimensions Females Males t Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value 1. Internal Dialogue 4.42 1.6 3.96 1.8 1.97 2. Awareness 4.59 1.0 4.48 1.2 .73 a. Self Awareness 4.13 1. 3.96 1.7 .71 b. State of Awareness 4.90 1. 4.83 1.3 .49 30 Imagery 1091+ . 105 2025 105 "104’6 a. Imagery Amount 2.15 1. 2.64 1.8 -1.89 b. Imagery Vividness 1.71 1. 1.91 1.5 -.89 4. Positive Affect 1.40 1.2 1.68 1.3 —1.56 5. Control (Volition) 4.41 1.7 4.21 1.5 1.08 6. Alt. Experience 3.15 1.0 2.98 1.2 1.10 a. Meaning 2.34 1.6 2.18 1.6 .26 b. Perception 2.47 1.6 2.22 1.6 1.06 C. Time 4.09 1.6 4.04 1.6 .22 d. Body Integrity 4.27 1.5 3.89 1.7 .69 7. Attention 5.09 .9 4.93 .8 1.31 a. Direction of Attention 5.16 1.1 5.00 1.1 1.04 b. Absorption 5.01 1.1 4.85 1.0 1.06 8. Negative Affect .34 .7 .62 .7 -2.66a 90 Memory 3012 107 3025 109 -053 N = 179 females, 70 males, df=247 ap = l .05 - Table 41 157 Sex Differences for the Personality Measures and the Deviation Scores Personality Measures Females Males t Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value Absorption 21.31 6.06 20.48 6.54 .95 Extraversion 38.68 10.80 41.90 11.10 -2.09a Deviation Scores Conditions kFemales Males . . . . 1; Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Value First Baseline .80 .5 .79 .6 .20 Second Baseline .76 .6 .76 .6 -.04 ErOtica 091 05 1005 07 -1062 . Relaxation .89 .6 .85 .6 .48 ap: l. .05 APPENDICES APPENDIX A 158 PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS QUESTIONNAIRE 1-6. Student number 7. Form: 0_ 8. Sex: (0) female (1) male 9.-10. Your age 11-12. Today's date 13-14. Today's code PLEASE READ EACH STATEMENT SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY AND ANSWER AS ACCURATELY AS YOU CAN BY PUTTING THE NUMBER THAT BEST CORRESPONDS TO YOUR STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS (DURING THE TIME IN QUESTION) ON THE ANSWER SHEET. DO THIS FOR EACH STATEMENT. 15. My body ended '._Q_'_1__'__2_'_3_'__4_'_5_‘_6_' I felt my body at the boundary between greatly expanded be- my skin and the world. yond the boundaries ' of my skin. 16. I felt no sense'_0_'_1_'_2'_3_'_4_'_5_' 6 ' Time stood still; of timelessness; time there was no move- flowed as I usually ' ment of time at all. eXperience it. 17. My state of '4134L'Jg'41'11f41'4i' I felt in an extra- awareness was not un- ordinary unusual usual or different from and nonordinary what it ordinarily is. state of awareness. 18. My attention fillfljLflJLfl41fljLflgi'Ji' My attention was was totally directed totally directed toward the environment towards my own in- around me. ternal subjective experience. 19. I had complete '_0_'i'_2_'_3_' 4'_§_' 6 ' I had no control control over what I was over what I was pay- paying attention to. ing attention to. 20. I was alert 'Jl'4LflJ1141'JLflJiflji' I was very, very and wide awake. drowsy and sleepy. 21. Objects appear-fijlfljgflgi'41'11'gifli' My experience did ed to take on extra- not involve any ordinary sensory qual- changes in my sen— ities, such as un- sory perception. usual brilliance, vi- brancy, clarity, etc. 22. I was not a- flJLflJL'JLfglfljLflJiflji' I experienced very ware of any strong strong sexual feel- sexual feelings. ings. 23. I experienced very little or no imagery. 24. I did not en- gage in any silent talking to myself. 25. I was equally It: H |°: '__Q_._]_-_'_2__'_l_' attentive to everything in my field of con— sciousness. 26. I could not 0&0—1-0—g-0-1—0i0-5—0-é—0 understand what I was experiencing. 27. I cannot remem- 0i0i0l0i0i0i0é—0 ber what I experienced. 28. I was actively 0£0i0£010i0i0£0 involved in determining what was happening to me. 29. I continually maintained a very 000102030405060 strong sense of sepa— ration between myself and the environment 30. I had an expe- 0£0i0£0l0i0i0£0 rience which I would label as very reli- gious, spiritual, or transcendental. 31. I experienced no strong feelings of anger. 32. My awareness was very greatly 0£0i0£0l0i0i0£0 1111323 reduced or diminished. 33. My thoughts or 0£0i0£020i0i0£0 images were very fan- tastic and quite un- realistic. My experience con- sisted almost com- pletely of imagery. I was silently talk- ing to myself a great deal. My attention was fo- cused upon a very restricted set of impressions in my field of conscious- ness. I could completely understand what I was experiencing. I can remember just about everything that I experienced. I was able to "let go" and passively experience what was happening to me. I experienced an in- tense unity with the world: the boundaries between me and the environment dissolved away. I did not have any experience which I would label as re- ligious, spiritual, or transcendental. I experienced very strong feelings of anger. My awareness was very greatly en- phanced or increased. [My thoughts or images were not fantastic nor were they un- realistic. 34. My mind was en- tirely free of any and all thoughts, 160 'fi'i'i'l'i'i'fi' feelings, sensations, images, and perceptions. 35. I felt in a ' o '._1_'_§_'_l'_‘L'_i'_6_' very suggestible mood: 36. The imagery I 0-9—0i0i0—3-0i0i0i0 experienced was very detailed and quite distinct. 37. I experienced afljl'iL'ji'41flltflJiflji' greatly heightened sense of perceptual sensitivity. 38. I experienced I? 'i‘ I“: '9 L: L12 '0: very strong feelings of irritation or annoyance. 39. I experienced 0£0i0i0l0i0i0£0 very profound and en- lightening insights of certain ideas or issues. 40. I was very a- ware of myself as having an ego or per- sonality. 41. My memory of what I experienced was greatly impaired. 42. I relinquished control and became 0£0i0i0l0i0i0£0 receptive and passive to what I was ex- periencing. 43. My thoughts were logically and coherently related. 44. My attention jumped from one im- pression to another 0£0i0£0l0i0i0£0 0001020301505060 My mind was contin- ually occupied with thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, and perceptions. I did not feel in a suggestible mood. The imagery I expe- rienced was not very detailed, nor was it very distinct. My perception of the world was great- ly diminished. I was not aware of any feelings of ir- ritation or annoy- ance. I experienced no profound insights besides my usual cognitive understand- ing of things. I felt depersonal- ized: I no longer had an ego or sense of personality. My memory of what I experienced was greatly enhanced. I was willfully controlling what I was experiencing. My thoughts were randomly connected. I was able to keep my attention com- pletely focused upon a single impression. 45. I experienced almost all imagery with very little verbal thoughts. 161 00102030405060 46. My imagery was 'i'i'i'l'i' 5 '_§.' very vague and dim. 47. I experienced very strong feelings of love. 48. My perception of space was normal and three-dimensional. 49. I was contin— ually conscious and well aware of myself. 50. Images and thoughts popped into my mind without my control. 51. I was contin- ually distracted by extraneous impressions or events. 52. I am reason- ably certain I was in my usual state of con— sciousness. 53. Time passed very much slower than it normally does. aware of my body and its sensations. £0i0£0l0i0i0£0 £'_.1_'_?_'_3_'_‘i'_5_'_6_' £0i0—a0l0i0—20é—0 £0i0£0l0i0i0£0 £0i0£0l0i0i0£0 £0i0£020i0i0£0 £0i0£020i020£0 _i'i'l'i'i'f.‘ 10 20301.10 50 60 ed to change in size, shape, or weight. I experienced almost all verbal thought with very little imagery. My imagery was as clear and vivid as objects in the real world. I experienced no strong feelings of love. My perception of space was distorted. I lost consciousness of myself. The thoughts and im- ages I had were un- der my control: I decided what I im- aged or thought. I was not distracted, but was able to be- come completely ab- sorbed in what I was experiencing. I am reasonably certain I was in an extremely altered state of conscious- ness. ' Time passed very much faster than it normally does. I lost all awareness of my body and its sensations. My body did not ap- pear to change in size, shape, or weight. 56. Words cannot begin to express what I experienced. 57. I felt in an extremely different and unusual state of consciousness. 58. I felt very ' involved and immerse in my experience. 59. I felt in an extraordinarily re- laxed and peaceful state. 0£0i0i0i0i0i0£0 60. I maintained.a '0 '1 '2 '3 '4 '5 '6 ' very strong sense of self-awareness the whole time. 61. My perception of the flow of time changed drastically. 0001020301.].05060 62. Ifelt extreme '0'1'2-3'4'5'6' joy and bliss. 63. I experienced 64. I did not en- gage in any silent talking to myself. 65. My attention was completely di- internal subjective experience. 0£0i0£0l0i0 no or very few images. 0_O—0_1-0—2_0_3—0i0 t. 010i0-g-0l0i0i0-é-0 rected towards my own 66. Objects in the 'ijjLTjL'QLTiL'Jiifii' world around me changed in size, shape, or perspective. I can express what I experienced quite adequately in words. My state of con- sciousness was not any different or un- usual from what it ordinarily is. I felt very detach- ed and distant from what I was experi- encing. I felt extremely excited and aroused. I did not maintain a very strong sense of self-awareness at all. I noticed no changes in my perception of the flow of time. I experienced no joy or bliss beyond my usual feelings. My experience was made up almost com- pletely of images. I was silently talking to myself a great deal. My attention was completely directed towards the world around me. I noticed no changes in the size, shape, or persepctive of the objects in the world around me. 163 67. I felt dizzy '11};ij;fjlijfJi'£i' I did not feel diz- or disoriented. zy nor did I feel disoriented. 68. I experienced 'jLfljgflijgijLfii'ji' Existence became no sense of sacred- deeply sacred or ness or deep meaning meaningful. in existence beyond my usual feelings. 69. I felt ashamed 'jL'jL'jlféiijfgi'ji' I felt no feelings or guilty. of shame or guilt. 70. I felt in a 'ijJijL'jL'ij;i'ji' I did not feel in a very strange and very strange and dream-like state. dream-like state. 71. My experience '1L'1.{ijJijL'Jifji' My experience was was very pleasurable. very unpleasant. LL Ji 72. I became aware 'jL'jgfljL' 'jL' 'ji' I experienced no of very intense sex- ' intense sexual ual feelings. feelings. 73. I experienced' 'jL'j;fljL}jL'jL'Ji'jL' I did not experience a complete transcen- a transcendence of dence of opposites: opposites: contrary contrary ideas or qual- ideas or qualities ities (like good or bad, (like good or bad, high or low) became high or low) re- equivalent. mained contraries. 74. I found this 'jlnggjgjgifjtfigi'jifi I found this ques- questionnaire very tionnaire very dif- easy to do. ficult to do. Note: The Phenomenology of Consciousness Questionnaire (PCQ) has since been expanded and revised into the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) which has excellent psychometric properties and both a long and short form. Research with it has repli- cated the results reported within this dissertation. - author - 8/12/80 164 PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS QUESTIONNAIRE 1-6. Student number 7. Form: g, 8. Sex: (0) female (1) male 9.-10. Your age 11-12. Today's date 13-14. Today's code PLEASE READ EACH STATEMENT SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY AND ANSWER AS ACCURATELY AS YOU CAN BY PUTTING THE NUMBER THAT BEST CORRESPONDS TO YOUR STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS (DURING THE TIME IN QUESTION) ON THE ANSWER SHEET. DO THIS FOR EACH STATEMENT. 15. My awareness ' 'JlfgLfg;f;1fiijJi'ji' My awareness was was very greatly re- very greatly en- duced or diminished. hanced or increased. 16. My thoughts 'JL'jL'jLIJijL'Jifji' My thoughts were were logically and randomly connected. coherently related. 17. I felt in an 'Jlfgijiflgi'jL'Ji'jif My state of con- extremely different sciousness was not and unusual state of any different or un- consciousness. usual from what it ordinarily is. 18. My attention ' 0 ' 1 ' 2 ' 3 ' ’4 ' 5 ' 6 ' My attention was was completely direct- completely directed ed towards my own in- towards the world ternal subjective ex- around me. perience. 19. My body ended 'jlfgijifglijfJi'ji' I felt my body at the boundary be— greatly expanded tween my skin and the beyond the bounda- world. ries of my skin. 20. My experience '11};ijg'jl'jt';i'ji' My experience was was very pleasurable. very unpleasant. 21. My perception fljLfljgfljLflgijLfiiflji' My perception of of space was normal space was distorted. and three-dimensional. 22. I became aware ‘jL'1.flij;L'jLfljiflji' I experienced no in- of very intense sex- tense sexual feel- ual feelings. ings. 23. I experienced ' 0 ' 1 ' 2 ' 3 ' ‘1' ' 5 ' 6 ' My experience was no or very few images. made up almost com- pletely of images. 165 24. I did not en- {5123;233';1'Ji\;zr;i' I was silently talk- gage in any silent ing to myself a talking to myself. great deal. 25. I cannot remem—‘i'i'i'l'i'i'fi‘ I can remember just ber what I experi— about everything enced. that I experienced. 26. Time passed 'JlfgL'ji';i'lL';i'Ji' Time passed very very much slower than much faster than it it normally does. normally does. 27. I experienced {jlfliL'ji'41'li'Ji'Ji' Existence became no sense of sacred- deeply sacred or ness or deep meaning meaningful. in existence beyond my usual feelings. 28. I relinguished fljlflgijgflgl'Jiflgi'Ji' I was willfully control and became controlling what I receptive and passive was experiencing. to what I was experi— ‘ encing. 29. The imagery I '_Qf_lf_§f_2j_flf_2f_§} The imagery I ex- experienced was very perienced was not detailed and quite very detailed, nor distinct. was it very distinct. 30. I maintained a 'Jlf4Lfié'41'Jifljiflji' I did not maintain very strong sense of a very strong sense self-awareness the of self-awareness whole time. at all. 31. I was alert 'Jlfiijiflél'liflJiflji' I was very, very and wide awake. drowsy and sleepy. 32. I experienced. '_Qf_$f_§f_2f;flf_§f_éf I did not experi— a complete transcen- ence a transcendence dence of Opposites: of Opposites: con- contrary ideas or qual- trary ideas or qual— ities (like good or bad, ities (like good or high or low) became bad, high or low) equivalent. remained contraries. 33. I was continu- 'JlflgL'JéflgifljLfljiflji' I was not distract- ally distracted by ed, but was able to extraneous impres- become completely sions or events. absorbed in what I was experiencing. 34. My thoughts or"_Qf_$f_§f_2f_flf_5f_éf My thoughts or images images were very fan- were not fantastic tastic and quite unreal- nor were they unreal- istic. . istic. 35. I experienced almost all imagery '_9_'_L'_Z_._l._li.._i' 166 with very little ver- bal thought. 36. I felt dizzy and disoriented. 37. I had an expe- '(D'JL'JQ'41flltfijifiji‘ 0—(10-1—02-‘0-20i0i0—é-0 rience which I would—- label as very reli- gious, spiritual, or transcendental. 38. I experienced very profound and en- lightening insights of certain ideas or issues. 39. I experienced very strong feelings of love. 40. I was equally attentive to every- thing in my field of consciousness. 41. I felt no sense' of timelessness; time flowed as I usually experience it. 42. I felt in a very strange and dream-like state. ed to change in size, shape, or weight. 44. I felt in an extraordinarily re- laxed and peaceful state. 0£0i0£010i0i0£0 0£0i0£0l0i0i0£0 0-(2-0—1-L0—g-0—2-0i0—é-0-‘6—0 _O_.._1_'_2_'_2_'_LL’_5_._.6_' 0i0i0£0l0i0i0£0 ___2_'_3_'_‘L'2'_§.' 'i'i'£.__3_'i'_i'_.6_' _-6-0 I experienced almost all verbal thought with very little imagery. I did not feel diz- zy nor did I feel disoriented. I did not have any experience which I would label as re- ligious, spiritual, or transcendental. I experienced no profound insights besides my usual cognitive under- standing of things. I experienced no strong feelings of love. My attention was fo- cused upon a very restricted set of impressions in my field of conscious- ness. Time stood still: there was no move- ment of time at all. I did not feel in a very strange and dream-like state. My body did not ap- pear to change in size, shape, or weight. I felt extremely aroused and ex- cited. 45. I continually maintained a very strong sense of sepa- ration between my- self and the environ- ment. 46. I felt in a very suggestible mood—— 47.1 aware of my body and— its sensations. 48. I felt extreme ' joy and bliss. 49. I experienced no strong feelings of anger. was extremely"_ 0' 1' 2 '_2]_ O O 167 '__O_'_1_'2 200-1-10—5-0-6-0 00:101.,‘5—060 0i0—60 _L'i'l._li'_i._6_' 0£0i0i0l0i0i0£0 certain I was in my usual state of con- sciousness. 51. My memory of what I experienced was greatly impair- ed. 52. Images and thoughts popped into my mind without my control. 53. My perception of the flow of time changed drastically. 54. I experienced a greatly heightened sense of perceptual sensitivity. 09—0—1—0-‘3—0 11.;L.JLT;1'1L' 0001020301105060 "f "f M '2‘ LJ: |°: 0£0i0i0l0i0i0£0 or guilty. I experienced an in- tense unity with the world: the bounda- ries between me and the environment dis- solved away. I did not feel in a suggestible mood. I lost all aware- ness of my body and its sensations. I experienced no joy or bliss beyond my usual feelings. I experienced very strong feelings of anger. I am reasonably certain I was in an extremely altered state of conscious- ness. My memory of what I experienced was greatly enhanced. The thoughts and images I had were under my control: I decided what I thought or imaged. I noticed no changes in my perception of the flow of time. My perception of the world was great- ly diminished. I felt no feelings of shame or guilt. 168 1y conscious and well aware of myself. "3 57. My state of .'_Qf;Lf_§f awareness was not un- usual or different from what it ordi- narily is. 58. Words cannot begin to express what I experienced. 59. I was very a— KJ;'_ '_';1'_ ware of myself as having an ego or per- sonality. 60. My attention 'JQKJL' _Cji'_ jumped from one im- pression to another. volved and immersed in my experience. world around me changed in size, shape, or per- spective. 63. I experienced very little or no imagery. 64. I did not en- gage in any silent talking to myself. 65. My attention was totally directed towards the environ- ment around me. control over what I was paying attention to. ._O.._L._§.'_3.'_li.'_i'._6_. 40-i060 110-2060 0204-0—2-0-20-110-20—6-0 I lost conscious- ness of myself. I felt in an extra- ordinarily unusual and nonordinary state of awareness. I can express what I experienced quite accurately in words. I felt depersonal-~ ized: I no longer had an ego or sense of personality. I was able to keep my attention con- tinually focused upon a single im- pression. I felt very detach- ed and distant from what I was experi- encing. I noticed no changes in the size, shape, or perspective of the objects in the world around me. My experience con- sisted almost com- pletely of imagery. I was silently talking to myself a great deal. My attention was totally directed towards my own in- ternal subjective experience. I had no control over what I was paying attention to. 169 67- My imagery was '_Q_'_l_'2_'3_'i+_'.fz_'.§_' very vague and dim. 68. Objects appear-'_O__'_L'_?_'2_'_4_'_5_,'_§_' ed to take on extra- ordinary sensory qual- ities, such as unus- ual brilliance, vi— brancy, clarity, etc. 69. My mind was entirely free of any and all thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, and percep- tions. 70. I could not understand what I was experiencing. 71. I was actively {2_{£_'2 involved in determin- ing what was happening to me. 72. I was not a- ware of any strong sexual feelings. 73. I experienced very strong feelings of irritation or annoyance. 74. I found this questionnaire very easy to do. '3 w ulcl—cg—ciciuicio '2..._1__._2_..l_.i+_.'i.._6_.. civic My imagery was as clear and vivid as objects in the real world. My experience did not involve any changes in my sensory perception. My mind was contin- ually occupied with thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, and perceptions. I could completely understand what I was experiencing. I was able to "let go" and passively experience what was happening to me. I experienced very strong sexual feel- ings. I was not aware of any feelings of ir- ritation or annoy- ance. "I found this ques- tionnaire very dif- ficult to do. APPENDIX B 170 PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE* In this booklet you will find a series of statements a person might use to describe her/his attitudes, opinions, interests, and other characteristics. Each statement is followed by two choices, numbered (0) and (1) in the booklet. Please read the statement and decide which choice best describes you. Then mark your answer on the answer sheet. In marking your answers on the answer sheet, be sure that the number of the statement in the booklet is the same as the number on the answer sheet. Please answer every'statement, even if you are not completely sure of the answer. Read each statement carefully, but don't spend too much time deciding on the answer. In spaces numbered one through six of the answer sheet darken in the numbers that correspond to your student number, darkening the number of line one that corresponds to the first digit of your student number, darkening the number of line two that corresponds to the second digit of your student number, etc. If you have any questions when going through the ques- tionnaire, please feel free to ask about them. Thank-you. PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BOOKLET! *Note: Taken with permission from Tellegan, Note 3. 171 1.-6. Your student number. 7. When I work on a committee, I like to take charge of things. (0) True, (1) False. 8. I keep close track of where my money goes. (0) True, (1) False. 9. I usually prefer to spend my leisure time with friends rather than alone. (0) True, (1) False. 10. Sometimes I feel and experience things as I did when I was a child. (0) True, (1) False. 11. I often stop in the middle of one activity to start something else. (0) True, (1) False. 12. I can be greatly moved by eloquent or poetic language. (0) True, (1) False. 13. I don't like having to tell people what to do. (0) True, (1) False. ' 1#. I could be happy living all alone in a cabin in the woods or mountains. (0) True, (1) False. 15. While watching a movie, a T.V. show, or a play, I may become so involved that I forget about myself and my surroundings and experience the story as if it were real and as if I were taking part in it. (0) True, (1) False. 16. I like to be in the spotlight. (0) True, (1) False. 17. When faced with a decision, I usually take time to consider and weigh all aspects. (0) True, (1) False. 18. When I am unhappy about something, (0) I tend to seek the company of a friend, (1) I prefer to be alone. 19. If I stare at a picture and then look away from it, I can sometimes "see" an image of the picture, almost as if I were still looking at it. (0) True, (1) False. 20. I perform in public whenever I have the opportunity. (0) True, (1) False. 21. Sometimes I feel as if my mind could envelop the whole world. (0) True, (1) False. 22. I often act without thinking. (0) True, (1) False. 23. I prefer not to "open up" too much, not even to friends. (0) True, (1) False. 172 2#. I usually prefer to let someone else take the lead on social occasions. (0) True, (1) False. 25. I like to watch cloud shapes change in the sky. (0) True, (1) False. 26. I like to stop and think things over before I do them. (0) True, (1) False. 27. If I wish, I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that they hold m attention as a good movie or story does. (0) True, (1 False. 28. I often monopolize a conversation. (0) True, (1) False. 29. I am a warm person rather than cool and detached. (0) True, (1) False. 30. I often prefer to "play things by ear" rather than to plan ahead. (0) True, (1) False. 31. I think I really know what some people mean when they talk about mystical experiences. (0) True, (1) False. 32. I am (or could be) a very effective sales person. (0) True, (1) False. 33. I am usually happier when I am alone. (0) True, (1) False. 3h. I sometimes "step outside" my usual self and experience an entirely different state of being. (0) True, (1) False. 35. I don't like to start a roject until I know exactly how to proceed. (0) True, (1 False. 36. I would not enjoy being a politician. (0) True, (1) False. ' 37. Textures - such as wool, sand, wood - sometimes remind me of colors or music. (0) True, (1) False. 38. I prefer working with people to working with things. (0) True, (1) False. 39. I am very level-headed and always like to keep my feet on the ground. (0) True, (1) False. #0. Sometimes I experience things as if they were doubly real.(0) True, (1) False. #1. I am quite effective at talking people into things. (0) True, (1) False. 173 #2. I have few or no close friends. (0) True, (1) False. #3. When I listen to music, I can get so caught up in it that I don't notice anything else. (0) True, (1) False. ##. I am more likely to be fast and careless than to be slow and plodding. (0) True, (1) False. #5. I have a natural talent for influencing people. (0) True, (1) False. #6. If I wish, I can imagine that my body is so heavy that I could not move it if I wanted to. (0) True, (1) False. #7. I am more of a "loner" than most people. (0) True, (1) False. #8. Rarely, if ever, do I do anything reckless. (0) True, U)Fws& #9. I am not interested in obtaining positions of leader- ship. (0) True, (1) False. 50. I can often somehow sense the presence of another person before I actually see or hear her/him. (0) True, (1) False. 51. It is very important to me that some people are con- cerned about me. (0) True, (1) False. 52. When I need one thing at the store, I et it without thinking about what else I may need soon. 0) True, (1) False. 53. Pe0ple consider me forceful. (0) True, (1) False. 5#. The crackle and flames of a wood fire stimulate my imagination. (0) True, (1) False. 55. It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and to feel as if my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily altered. (0) True, (1) False. 56. I tend to value and follow a rational, "sensible" approach to things. (0) True, (1) False. 57. I can often go a whole morning without wanting to speak to anyone. (0) True, (1) False. 58. With a little effort, I can "wrap most people around my little finger." (0) True, (1) False. 17# 59. Different colors have distinctive and special meanings for me. (0) True, (1) False. 60. I do not like to be the center of attention on a social occasion. (0) True, (1) False. 61. I often do things on the spur of the moment. (0) True, (1) False. 62. For me one of the most satisfying experiences is the warm feeling of being in a group of good friends. (0) True, (1) False. 63. I am able to wander off into my own thoughts while do- ing a routine task and actually forget that I am doing the task, and then find a few minutes later that I have com- pleted it. (0) True, (1) False. 6#. I generally rely on careful reasoning when making up my mind. (0) True, (1) False. 65. I usually do not like to be a "follower." (0) True, (1) False. 66. I can sometimes recollect certain past experiences in my life with such clarity and vividness that it is like living them again or almost so. (0) True, (1) False. 67. I prefer to work alone. (0) True, (1) False. 68. Things that mi ht seem meaningless to others often make sense to me. %0) True, (1) False. 69. When I am with someone else, I do most of the decision making. (0) True, (1) False. 70. I am often not as cautious as I should be. (0) True, (1) False. ' 71. I would rather have a house (0) in a friendly suburb, (1) alone in a deep woods. 72. While acting in a play, I think I could really feel the emotions of the character and "become" her/him for the time being, forgetting both myself and the audience. (0) True, 1 False. 73. I do not like to organize other people's activities. (0) True, (1) False. 7#. My work is planned and organized in detail before it is begun. (0) True, (1) False. 175 75. My thoughts often don't occur as words but as visual images. (0) True, (1) False. 76. If I have a problem, I like to work it out alone. (0) True, (1) False. 77. I am a better talker than a listener. (0) True, (1) False. 78. I often take delight in small things (like the five- pointed star shape that appears when you cut an ap le across the core or the colors in soap bubbles). (0 True, (1) False. 79. I often start projects with only a vague idea of what the end result will be. (0) True, (1) False. 80. I often take it upon myself to liven up a dull party. (0) True, (1) False. 81. When listening to organ music or other powerful music, I sometimes feel as if I am being lifted into the air. (0) True, (1) False. 82. It is easy for me to feel affection for a person. (0) True, (1) False. 83. People say that I am methodical (that I do things in a systematic manner). (0) True, (1) False. 8#. Sometimes I can change noise into music by the way I listen to it. (0) True, (1) False. 85. On social occasions I usually allow others to dominate the conversation. (0) True, (1) False. 86. I am rather aloof and maintain distance between myself and others. (0) True, (1) False. 87. Some of my most vivid memories are called up by scents and smells. (0) True, (1) False. 88. I am a cautious person. (0) True, (1) False. 89. I am quite ood at convincing others to see things my way. (0) True, %1) False. 90. Certain pieces of music remind me of pictures or moving patterns of color. (0) True, (1) False. 91. I am happiest when I see people most of the time. (0) True, (1) False. 176 92. enerally do not like to have detailed plans. (0) True, I%1) False. 93. I often know what someone is going to say before he or she says it. (0) True, (1) False. 9#. I would enjoy being a powerful executive or politician. (0) True, (1) False. 95. I tend to keep my problems to myself. (0) True, (1) False. ' 96. I often have "physical memories," for example, after I've been swimmin I may still feel as if I'm in the water. (0) True, %1) False. 97. Whenever I go out to have fun, I like to have a pretty good idea of what I'm going to do. (0) True, (1) False. 98. I don't enjoy trying to convince people of something. (0) True, (1) False. 99. The sound of a voice can be so fascinating to me that I can just go on listening to it. (0) True, (1) False. 100. I often prefer not to have people around me. (0) True, (1) False. 101. People consider me a rather freewheeling and spontane- ous person. (0) True, (1) False. 102. I would describe myself as a pretty "strong" personal- ity. (0) True, (1) False. 103. At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there. (0) True, (1) False. 10#. Before I get into a new situation, I like to find out what I can expect from it. (0) True, (1) False. 105. Without close relationshi s with others my life would not be nearly as enjoyable. (O , True, (1) False. 106. People seem naturally to turn to me when decisions have to be made. (0) True, (1) False. 10?. Sometimes thoughts and ima es come to me without the slightest effort on my part. (0 True, (1) False. 108. On social occasions I don't particularly care to "run the show." (0) True, (1) False. 177 109. I find that different odors have different colors. (0) True, (1) False. 110. I often like to do the first thing that comes to my mind. (0) True, (1) False. 111. I could pull up my roots, leave my home, my parents, and my friends without suffering great regrets. (0) True, (1) False. 112. I can get lost in looking at a sunset. (0) True, (1) False. 113. I am a (0) female, (1) male. 11#.-115. Darken in the two digits, one on each line, that corresponds to your age in years now. APPENDIX C 178 Progressive Relaxation/Meditation Instructions Settle back as comfortably as you can. Please close your eyes and keep them closed until I tell you to open them. Let yourself relax to the best of your ability. Now, as you relax like that, clench your right fist. Just clench your fist tighter and tighter and study the tension as you do so. Keep it clenched and feel the tension in your right fist, hand, and forearm . . . and now relax. Let the fing— ers of your right hand become loose, and observe the con- trast in your feelings. Let all the tension and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles of your right hand become more and more relaxed, more and more deeply re- laxed. Once more now, clench your right fist really tight . . . hold it, and notice the tension again . . . Now let go and relax, let your fingers straighten out and notice the difference once again. Notice the relaxation spread- ing fully and deeply throughout your right hand. Now repeat that with your-left fist. Clench your left fist while the rest of your body relaxes; clench that fist tighter and tighter and feel the tension, feel how tense and tight it is, and now relax. Feel the relaxation spread- ing fully and deeply throughout your left hand as the mus- cles there become more and more deeply relaxed, very deeply relaxed. Let go and feel the relaxation spreading more and more. Clench both fists now. Clench both fists tighter and tighter and feel the tension in the forearms and hands. Study the tension . . . and now relax. Straighten out your fingers and feel the relaxation spreading fully and com- pletely throughout your arms. Continue relaxing your hands and forearms more and more deeply, more and more fully with every word that I say. Now bend your elbows slightly and tense the muscles of your upper arms. Bend both your elbows slightly and tense the muscles of your upper arms. Feel the tension and tight- ness . . . and now relax. Straighten out your arms, let them relax and feel the difference again. Let all the ten- sion and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles of both your arms are relaxing more and more deeply and fully. Just let go and feel the relaxation as it envelops your muscles of your arms. Once more now, bend your arms slightly and feel the tension and tightness in the muscles of your upper arms, and now relax. Relax to the best of your ability. Get your arms in a comfortable position and let the relaxation proceed on its own. Let all the ten- sion and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles of your hands and arms are now very deeply and fully relax- ed. Continue relaxing your arms even further. Even when your arms seem fully relaxed, try to go that extra bit 179 further: try to achieve deeper and deeper levels of relaxa- tion. Let all your muscles go loose and heavy. Just settle back quietly and comfortably. Wrinkle up your forehead now; wrinkle it tighter and tighter and feel the tension and tightness there . . . and now relax. Stop wrinkling your forehead muscles and let them relax. Let them relax fully and completely. Feel the relaxation spread throughout the muscles of your forehead and scalp and let the tension fade and vanish away. Now frown and crease your brows and study the tension and tightness. Study the tension and tightness there . . . and now relax. Let go of all tension and tightness and just relax, relaxing more and more deeply with every word that I say. With your eyes closed, make the muscles around your eyes very tight and tense and study the tension and tightness . . . feel the tension and tightness and now re- lax. Let all the tension and tightness around the muscles of your eyes just fade and vanish away as the muscles around your eyes and cheeks become very fully and deeply relaxed. Let all tension and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles around your eyes become deeply and fully relax- ed. Please keep your eyes closed and just let your eyes become fully and completely relaxed so there is no trace of tension and tightness there at all. Now clench your jaws, bite your teeth together, study the tension and tightness throughout your jaws and notice the difference . . . and now relax. Relax your jaws and let all tension and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles of your teeth and jaws become more and more fully and deeply relaxed, more deeply and fully relaxed than they've ever been before. Let your lips part slightly. Appreciate the relaxation and let all tension and tight- ness just fade and vanish away. Now press your tongue hard against the roof of your mouth. Look for the tension and tightness and now relax. Let the muscles of your mouth and tongue become fully and deeply relaxed, very fully and deep- ly relaxed with every word that I say. Just let the ten- sion and tightness fade and vanish away as the muscles of your face and head become fully and deeply relaxed, deeply and fully relaxed. Now attend to the muscles of your neck. Press your head back as far as it can go and feel the tension in the neck; roll it to the right and feel the tension shift; now roll it to the left. Straighten you head now and bring it forward, press your chin against your chest. Let your head return to a comfortable position now and study the relaxa- tion. Let the relaxation develop and let all tension and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles of your 180 neck become fully and deeply relaxed. Shrug your shoulders forward now. Shrug your shoulders forward and feel the tension in your shoulders and upper back. Feel the tension and tightness there and now relax. Let the muscles of your shoulders and upper back just relax fully and deeply and feel the tensions fade and vanish away. Let all the ten- sion and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles of the shoulders and upper back become more and more deeply relaxed. A Now attend to the muscles of your lower back. Tense the muscles of your lower back and feel the tension and tightness there. And now relax and let that tension and tightness just fade and vanish away as all the muscles of your back become fully and deeply relaxed, more and more fully and deeply relaxed with every word that I say. Let the relaxation spread throughout the muscles of your back as they become more and more fully relaxed with every word that I say. Relax your entire body to the best of your ability. Feel the comfortableness that accompanies the re- laxation. Feel how deeply and fully relaxed you are. Breathe easily and freely in and out. Notice how the relaxation increases as you exhale . . . as you breathe out just feel the relaxation and how much more deeply relaxed you feel. Now breathe right in and fill your lungs: inhale deeply and hold your breath. Study the tension and tight- ness, and now exhale and relax. Let the walls of your chest grow loose and push the air out automatically. Con- tinue relaxing and breathe freely and gently. Feel the relaxation and enjoy it. With the rest of your body as relaxed as possible,,fill your lungs again. Breathe in deeply and hold it again. That's fine, breathe out and appreciate the relief. Just breathe normally now. Con- tinue relaxing your chest and let the relaxation spread to your entire body. Continue to breathe normally now and with each breath that you take, let the relaxation spread throughout your body. Now I'd like you to pay attention to the muscles of your abdomen, your stomach muscles. Tighten your stomach muscles and make your abdomen hard. Notice the tension and tightness there and now relax. Let all the tension and tightness in the muscles of your stomach and abdomen just fade and vanish away as the muscles of your stomach and abdomen become more and more fully and deeply relaxed with every word that I say. Let all the tension and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles of your stomach and abdomen become more and more fully and deeply relaxed with every word that I say, letting all the tension and tightness just fade and vanish away. Let go of all tensions and tightness and just relax. 181 Now I'd like you to tense the muscles of your buttocks and thighs. Tense the muscles of your buttocks and thighs and feel the tension and tightness there. Study it. And now relax. Let all the tension in the muscles of your buttocks and thighs just fade and vanish away as the mus- cles there become more and more fully and deeply relaxed. Fully and deeply relaxed. More and more deeply relaxed. Now tense the muscles of your lower legs and feet by bend- ing your toes and straightening your legs slightly and feel the tension and tightness that develops. Feel the tension and tightness in the muscles of your lower legs and feet . . . and now relax. Let all that tension and tightness just fade and vanish away as the muscles there become more and more fully and deeply relaxed. Feel the relaxation all over. Let the relaxation spread throughout your entire body. Let it proceed to your thighs and abdomen, your low- er and upper back, your stomach and chest, your shoulders, neck, and face. Let the relaxation envelop your body. Make sure that no tension has crept in anywhere. Just let your body relax fully and deeply, fully and deeply. Now you can become twice as relaxed as you are now by merely taking in a really deep breath and slowly ex- haling. That's right, take in a really slow and deep breath and then exhale, breathing out slowly and deeply and feel how deeply and fully relaxed you are becoming. More and more deeply and fully relaxed than you've ever been before. Just feel the relaxation becoming more and more deeper as you continue to relax more and more. More and more deeply. You are now very relaxed, but you are going to relax more, much more. I'm going to count from three to one, and with each number that I say you will become ten times more relaxed than you are now. I'm going to count from three to one and with each number that I say you will become ten times more relaxed than you are now. Here we go. Three. You are becoming more and more deeply and fully relaxed.. More and more deeply relaxed. Fully and deeply relaxed. Two. You are relaxing more and more deeply and fully with every word that I say. Your whole body is now deeply and fully relaxed and yet you will relax more, much more, be- coming more and more deeply and fully relaxed. Very, very relaxed. One. You are now deeply and fully relaxed. Just go on relaxing more and more deeply on your own. For the next few minutes I'd like you to relax on your own, becoming more and more deeply relaxed with each breath that you take. I'm going to stop talking and for the next few min- utes I'd like you to see how relaxed you can become on your own. That's right, for the next several minutes I want you to relax on your own. I want you to become aware of 182 ‘your breathing and become more and more deeply relaxed with every breath that you take. I will stop talking and I want you to relax as deeply as you can on your own. I want you to do this by being aware of your breathing, and becoming more and more deeply relaxed with every breath that you take. Do this on your own now and after several minutes I will interrupt you and start talking again and then we will stop. Please begin now and with each breath that you take become more and more deeply and fully relaxed. In several minutes I will start talking again. (PAUSE # MINUTES.) O.K. I want you to stop relaxing. I'm going to count from one to five and as I do you will open your eyes. I'm going to count from one to five and as I do you will open your eyes. By the time I say five, your eyes will be com— pletely opened, and you will feel alert, refreshed, and re- laxed. Here we go. One . . . two . . . you're starting to open your eyes slightly. Three . . . four . . . your eyes are more and more open and you will open your eyes at five and feel refreshed, alert, and relaxed. Five. Your eyes are now opened and you are awake, alert, and relaxed. APPENDIX D 183 Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. from DELTA OF VENUS: EROTICA by Anais Nin, Copyright ©1969 by Anais Nin: copyright © 1977 by The Anais Nin Trust. "But everybody likes the unknown," said George, think- ing immediately of voyages, unexpected encounters, novel situations. "No, not in the way she does. She is interested only in a man she has never seen before and never will see again. And for this man she will do anything." George flushed with pleasure. They left the bar to- gether. The man hailed a taxi. In the taxi he gave George fifty dollars. Then he said he was obliged to blindfold him, that George must not see the house he was going to, nor the street, as he was never to repeat this experience. The ride was not very long. He submitted amiably to all the mystery. The blindfold was taken off his eyes be- fore he came out of the taxi so as not to attract the atten- tion of the taxi driver or doorman, but the stranger had counted wisely on the glare of the entrance lights to blind George completely. He could see nothing but brilliant lights and mirrors. He was ushered into one of the most.sumptuous interiors he had ever seen — all white and mirrored, with exotic plants, exquisite furniture covered in damask and such a soft rug that their footsteps were not heard. He was lead through one room after another, each in different shades, all mirrored, so that he lost all sense of perspective. Finally, they came to the last. He gasped slightly. He was in a bedroom with a canopied bed set on a dais. There were furs on the floor and vaporous white curtains at the windows, and mirrors, more mirrors. He was glad that he could bear these repetitions himself, infinite re- productions of a handsome man, to whom the mystery of the situation had given a glow of expectation and alertness he had never known. What could this mean? He did not have time to ask himself. The woman who had been at the bar entered the room, and just as she entered, the man who had brought him to the place vanished. She had changed her dress. She wore a striking satin gown that left her shoulders bare and was held in place by a ruffle. George had the feeling that the dress would fall from her at one gesture, strip from her like a glistening sheath, and that underneath would appear her glistening 18# skin, which shone like satin and was equally smooth to the fingers. He had to hold himself in check. He could not believe that this beautiful woman was offering herself to him, a complete stranger. He felt shy, too. What did she expect of him? What was her quest? Did she have an unfulfilled desire? He had only one night to give all his lover's gifts. He was never to see her again. Could it be he might find the secret of her nature and possess her more than once? He wondered how many men had come to this room. She was extraordinarily lovely, with something of both satin and velvet in her. Her eyes were dark and moist, her mouth glowed, her skin reflected the light. Her body was perfectly balanced. She had the incisive lines of a slen- der woman together with a provocative ripeness. Her waist was very slim, which gave her breasts even greater prominence. Her back was like a dancer's, and every undulation set off the richness of her hips. She smiled at him. Her mouth was soft and full and half-open. George approached her and laid his mouth on her bare shoul- ders. Nothing could be softer than her skin. What a temp- tation to push the fragile dress from her shoulders and expose the breasts that distended the satin. What a temp- tation to undress her immediately. But George felt that this woman could not be treated so summarily, that she required subtlety and adroitness. Never had he given to his every gesture so much thought and artistry. He seemed determined to make a long seige of it, and as she gave no sign of hurry, he lingered over her bare shoulders, inhaling the faint and marvelous odor that came from her body. He could have taken her then and there, so potent was the charm she cast, but first he wanted her to make a sign, he wanted her to be stirred, not soft and pliant like wax under his fingers. She seemed amazingly cool, obedient but without feel- ing. Never a ripple on her skin, and though her mouth was parted for kissing, it was not responsive. They stood near the bed, without speaking. He passed his hands along the satin curves of her body, as if to be- come familiar with it. She was unmoved. He slipped slowly to his knees and caressed her body. His fingers felt that under her dress she was naked. He lead her to the edge of 185 the bed and she sat down. He took off her slippers. He held her feet in his hands. She smiled at him, gently and invitingly. He kissed her feet, and his hands ran under the folds of the long dress, feeling the smooth legs up to the thighs. She abandoned her feet to his hands, held them pressed against his chest now, while his hands ran up and down her legs under her dress. If her skin was so soft along the legs, what would it be where it was always the softest? Her thighs were pressed together so he could not continue to explore. He stood and leaned over her to kiss her into a reclining position. As she lay back, her legs opened slightly. APPENDIX E 187 DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRE Your student number: Today's date: Today's code: PLEASE WRITE A SHORT SUMMARY OF WHAT YOU EXPERIENCED IN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING SESSIONS: 1. The short time period in which you sat quietly with your eyes opened. 2. The short time period after the relaxation instructions in which you sat quietly while being aware of your breathing: 3. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS ABOUT THE STUDY YOU JUST EXPERIENCED, PLEASE MAKE THEM HERE: APPENDIX F 188 'MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY Department of Psychology DEPARTMENTAL RESEARCH CONSENT FORM I have freely consented to take part in a scientific study being conducted by: under the supervision of: Academic Title: The study has been explained to me and I understand the explanation that has been given and what my par- ticipation will involve. I understand that I am free to discontinue my par- ticipation in the study at any time without penalty. I understand that the results of the study will be treated in strict confidence and that I will remain anonymous. Within these restrictions, results of the study will be made available to me at my request. I understand that my participation in the study does not guarantee any beneficial results to me. ' I understand that at my request, I can receive addi- tional explanation of the study after my participation in completed. Signed: Dated: APPENDIX G 189 STATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS INSTRUCTION SHEET During this study you will be asked to rate your ex- perience of yourself and the environment during certain short time periods by means of statements like the one shown below. You will be asked to evaluate your state of con- sciousness by rating your subjective experience of yourself to statements listed like the one below. You are to do this by marking the number on the answer sheet that best corresponds to your subjective feeling dur- ing the time mentioned to you by the examiner. As an example, if during the time period in question, you would rate your mood as "very calm and tranquil" and not at all "very anxious" you would darken in the number "0" on the answer sheet that corresponds to statement number ten. 10. I felt very '1;';ij;';1'ltfi;ifli' I felt very anxious. calm and tranquil. Thus you are to choose the number of the answer on the answer sheet for each question that best corresponds to your state of consciousness at the time mentioned by the examiner. Please do this for each of the following dipole statements, trying to be as accurate as you can. In order to best determine your mood or state of con- sciousness, some definitions have been provided for some of the key words used in the questionnaire you will complete. 1. SENSATIONS: are internal bodily impressions that you become aware of. Itches, pressure, pain, warmth, and coldness are examples of such sensations. 2. PERCEPTIONS: are impressions that you feel you receive from the external world. Perceptions come from the environment through sights, sounds, smells, etc. 3. FEELINGS OR EMOTIONS: are those internal impressions or moods such as happiness, joy, anger, excitement, etc. #. nTHOUGHTS: are internal words, statements, and verbal- izations that you are saying to yourself. 5. IMAGES OR IMAGERY: are internal visual (si hts), auditory (sounds), kinesthetic (bodily), olfactory smells), tac- tual (touch), or gustatory (tastes) impressions or pic- tures which pass before your mind, no matter how vague or dim they may be. They originate within you-instead of coming from the environment. 6. IMPRESSIONS OR EVENTS: are any of the above, i.e. sensa- tions, perceptions, feelings, thoughts, or images. APPENDIX H 190 PRACTICE SESSION QUESTIONNAIRE Your student number: Today's date: Please evaluate your subjective experience of the pre- vious time period by checking the line between the two state- ments of the following items that best corresponds to how you felt during that time period. 1. My mind was con-'__ tinually occupied with random thoughts. 2. The imagery I ' had was very vivid. 3. I experienced ' very pleasant emotions #. I was astutely ' aware of everything around me. 5. My body felt ' very light. 6. I do not remem- ' ber anything of what I experienced. 7. I had no ' thoughts running through my mind. 8. The images I had'__ were not in the least bit vivid. 9. I felt I was ' out of control. 10. The feelings I ' had were very un- pleasurable. My mind was free of any and all thoughts. The imagery I had was not vivid at all. I experienced very unpleasant emo- tions. I was unaware of everything around me. ,My body felt very heavy. I remember every— thing of what I experienced. Different thoughts repeatedly popped into my mind. The images I expe- rienced were as vivid as real ob- jects in the world. I felt in control of my experience. The feelings I had were very pleasurable. APPENDIX I Early Twentieth Century and Contemporary Approaches to Introspection and Consciousness: A Review by Ronald J. Pekala I. II. III. Early VieWpoints A. Consciousness B. Consciousness 1. Structural 2. Functional OUTLINE Upon Consciousness and philOSOphy and psychology psychology psychology 3. Phenomenological approaches #. The rise of behaviorism A Modern Return to Consciousness A. For and against introspection B. Interim summary Contemporary Perspectives Upon Consciousness A. The phenomenology of consciousness B. The nature of the stream of consciousness C. States of consciousness 1. An Eastern enumeration of states of consciousness 2. A Western enumeration of states of consciousness 3. Theories (of states) of consciousness #. Tart's theoretical approach to states of consciousness D. Experimental studies in the phenomenology of states of consciousness E. Interim conclusions 192 In 1879 the father of experimental psychology, Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), founded the first psychological laboratory of the world. This laboratory was established to investigate Erfahrungswissenschaften, the science of experience. Since the data of such a science were anschau- ligh, or phenomenal, the methodology of psychology was introspection, the process of engaging in and examining ones own thought processes and sensory experience. Such a methodology sought, in short, to understand consciousness and its component processes. As outlined by Wundt, the problems of psychology as the science of experience were (1) the anal sis of conscious processes into elementsT—(EIUtHe determination of the manner of connection of these elements, and (3) the determination of their laws of connection (In Boring. 1929/50. p.333). It is now over a century since the founding of Wundt's psychological laboratory, dedicated to exploring the structure and nature of consciousness. One hundred years later, it can justifiably be said that the scientists of the 1980's are not much further ahead than Wilhelm Wundt was at the turn of the century in explaining and under- standing the nature and operations of consciousness. The number of neurons in the brain, over ten billion, is similar to the number of stars in the Milky Way, our .193 19# home galaxy (Wilson, 1978), and yet the science of con- sciousness is at about the same place as astronomy was in the sixteenth century before Galileo turned his telescope on the moons of Jupiter. Whereas modern psychology began its existence with the study of consciousness under such brilliant scientists as Wundt, Titchener, and James, after a few short decades, the interest in consciousness waned. By 1930 it was hard to find even a reference to the word consciousness in the popular textbooks and journals of America, for conscious- ness and introspection had been exorcized from the main- stream of American psychology. But just as what has been repressed continues to haunt the repressor, ever remaining beneath the surface ready to erupt when the defenses have weakened, consciousness and the study of its processes are beginning to gain in scientific importance, as the bulwarks of behaviorism and its tacit presuppositions, are being dissolved in the light of scientific evidence. It will be the purpose of this paper to explore the rise and fall and resurrection of consciousness as a legit- imate area of psychological research. The emergence of psychology from philosophy as a separate scientific disci- pline in the late 1800's, its rise to prominence as the science of consciousness, and its slide into oblivion only a few short decades later will form the first half of the following paper. 195 The second half of this exposition will then focus upon the resurrection of the study of consciousness that began in the second half of the twentieth century, and will explore what modern and contemporary psychologists have to say about consciousness and its nature and functions from a phenomenological perspective. We will begin with a def- inition of consciousness and then follow its development from the beginnings of modern philosophy to the present. EARLY VIEWPOINTS UPON CONSCIOUSNESS Consciousness and Philosophy The word consciousness comes from the Latin compound con-scius, which means to know with, or know together (Webster, 1970). It was first used in the English—speaking world by Francis Bacon (1561-1629) in the early seventeenth century (Marsh, 1978), although its primacy in experience can be traced back at least to Descartes's (1596-1650) Co ito, eggg gum, I think, therefore, I am. In attempting to break away from medieval scholasticism, Descartes wanted to find something of which he would be in- dubitably certain. Such a certainty would serve as a founda- tion for erecting a theory of knowledge divorced from theo- logical speculations. In attempting to doubt everything conceivable, in hopes of finding something of which he could not doubt, Descartes realized that his awareness of himself was indubitable. Even if God were an evil genius deceiving him, this evil genius could not deceive Descartes as to his 196 existence. Descartes realized that awareness is necessarily experienced as part of the experience of existence, and being deceived, presupposes an existent being who is aware of the possibility of deception. Hence one is aware of his own existence, since the possibility of the experience of deception presupposes an awareness of that possibility, which, in turn, presupposes a being who is aware of that awareness: Doubtless then, I exist, since I am deceived: and let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must, in fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by me, or con- ceived in my mind (Descartes, l6#1el959, p.126-127). Descartes's I think, therefore, I am, implicates thinkin , however, and not consciousness, as the indubitable basis of knowledge. But he later defines thought as all that we are conscious as operating in us. And that is why not only understanding, willing, and imagining, but also feeling are here the same thing as thought (Descartes, l6##, In Copleston, 1963, p.102). Thus thinking for Descartes corresponds to what we would today characterize as consciousness. The cogito thus brought thinking, and hence consciousness, to the center of philosophy and it was to remain there ever since. Descartes's Meditations (1641/1959) marks a turning point in Western philosophy and science. Besides finding 197 an indubitable basis for man's knowledge, Descartes went on in his Meditations to separate the spiritual and mental domains from that of the material. Since Descartes defined mind in terms of an immaterial, unextended substance, and body, in terms of a material, extended thing, each substance now had its own characteristics and separate domains: one amendable to the spiritual/religious, and one to the em- pirical, spheres of influence. Philosophy and science were now free to explore and understand the nature of mate- rial reality without irking the wrath of religious digni- taries in the process. This, in turn, helped set the stage for the split between man's mind and his body, and his science and his religion, for the coming centuries. The British empiricists of Locke (1632-170#), Berkeley (1685-1753), and Hume (1711-1776) took up where Descartes left off. They continued the dualism advocated by Descartes but they also became interested in how the mind attempts to bridge the gulf between mind and body when coming to know the external world. Locke, the father of British empiricism, held that all ideas, which he defined as "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed abOut in thinking" (Locke, 1660/1968, p.8), were either simple or complex and were grounded in experience. In his system, the mind was a tableau rgsa or blank tablet upon which the ideas were impressed. He defined conscious- ness as "the perception of what passes in a man's own mind" 198 (Locke, 1660/1968, p.138) and it included the changing panorama of ideas of the mind. Hume, like Locke, derived all mental events from experience, but did so by using the word "perceptions" for Locke's "ideas." He also divided perceptions into impres— sions and ideas. Impressions were the immediate data of experience, or what we would today call sensations, while ideas were the faint images of impressions used in thinking and reasoning. Ideas came from impressions and were less vivid and lively. Another Englishman, David Hartley (1705-1755) took Locke's ideas on association and came up with the doctrine or principle of association. Hartley hypothesized that man's complex mental life is constructed by simple ideas becoming associated, via contiguity, with other ideas, so that complex mental ideas were produced from and ultimately traceable to, simpler ideas. Consciousness and Psychology Structural psychology The work of these Englishmen was used by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) to inaugerate scientific psychology in Germany. Drawing upon the British empiricist's ideas on sensation, thinking, and association, Wundt attempted to make psychology as scientific as physics. Physics, for Wundt, dealt with experience mediately, for its elements, i.e. force, gravity, etc., were inferred and not given 199' immediately in experience. Psychology, on the other hand, dealt with experience immediately, as subjectively per— ceived. For Wundt, then, both physics and psychology dealt with experience. But the difference between them lay in the point of view with which experience was to be re- garded. To inaugerate psychology as a scientific discipline dealing with immediate experience, Wundt turned to chemis- try for his model. Wundt looked for the psychological atoms of experience and used the principle of association to build up the molecules, compounds, and higher order levels of mental activity. Sensations, and perhaps feel- ings and images, were the psychological atoms that could be combined to form perceptions, ideas, and higher mental processes. To deal with the fact that the mind is in con- stant flux, Wundt emphasixed that an element, such as a sensation, was a "mental process", that was not substantial and thus not an "element" in the traditional sense of chemistry. The fact that later psychological introspectionists tended to treat mental processes, such as sensations, images, and feelings, as static bits of consciousness, was a per- version of the meaning intended by Wundt. Nevertheless, Wundt is not completely innocent for to hold that an ele- ment is also a process is to invite ambiguity as to exactly what meaning is to be attached to the structural approach 200 to consciousness that Wundt advocated. At the heart of Wundt's structural approach to psy- chology was his methodology, now termed classical intro- spection. Wundt distinguished between inner perception and introspection. Inner perception was basically introspection by untrained observers. In contrast, introspection, per se, was introspection by trained observers. These obser— vers were so trained that it is said that an introspector had to perform 10,000 introspective judgments before he could provide data for a publishable report from Wundt's laboratory (Boring, 1953). This introspection consisted, after having been trained as to the nature of the elements and their sensory nature, of being aware of what was occur- ring in consciousness during a given interval of time, and then retrospectively reporting upon that awareness. A student of Wundt's, B.B. Titchener (1867-1927), brought the structural approach of introspection to America. Titchener regarded structural psychology as analogous to the discipline of anatomy in biology. Just as an anatomi- cal description of the structures of the organism are nec- essary before an adequate understanding of the functioning of the organism can be grasped; so likewise, an analysis of the structure or morphology of consciousness was necessary before one could truly begin to understand its nature and operations. In his classic paper of 1898, Titchener defined the 201 "structural elements of mind," their number, and their nature. Sensations were designated the elementary men- tal processes, as were the affective processes, and they only, were the elemental processes of mind: It seems safe, then, to conclude that the ulti- mate processes are two, and two only, sensation and affections, though we must not forget that the first class, that of sensations, includes the two well-defined subspecies, 'sensation' and 'idea! (p.#59). Whereas sensation referred to percepts from the external world, ideas referred to internal processes less clear and vivid than that derived from sensations. . Any mental element for Titchener had at least two attributes or determinants, these being: quality and in— tensity. Quality made an element specific and individual, as a red or yellow, sweet or sour, or pleasant or,unpleas- ant sensation: whereas intensity referred to the gradient of intenseness with which the sensation or affection was experienced. Along with these attributes affective elements also had a duration, and sense elements, duration, clear- ness, and in some instances, extent. Titchener came to these conclusions, as did Wundt, via introspection on himself, and as done by others who worked as students in his laboratory. However, Titchener placed much greater restraints upon introspection than did Wundt or other introspectionists. Titchener maintained the requirement that the description of conscious experience should exclude statements of meaning. Titchener originally 202 coined the concept of stimulus-£322; as the reporting of meanings about the independent existence of stimulus ob- jects, something an introspectionist should not do. When Kulpe claimed to find imageless thought in "the conscious- ness of judgment, action, and other thought processes" (Boring, 1953, p.173), Titchener broadened his definition to include any meanings at all in the data of introspection. He felt that such stimulus-error inferences about conscious data did not exist in the same way as did the elemental processes of sensation and affection. Titchener's methodology, although purporting to ex- clude meaning, yet seemed to let it in by the back door, for introspection, as practiced under Titchener, was great- ly dependent upon retrospection. As an example, an observa- tion that took only a second or two to complete might take twenty minutes to describe completely, during which time "the introspector racked his brain to recall what happened 1000 seconds ago" (Boring, 1953, p.17#). Such retrospection would seem to undoubtedly have to rely heavily on the role of memory and inference. As a reaction against such rigid and pedantic con- straints upon introspection, Kulpe (1862-1915) develped systematic experimental introspectipp, also known as the Wurzburg school of introspection. Whereas Wundt had said that thoughts could not be studied experimentally, Kulpe thought they could and set out to do just that. He had 203 observers think under specific controlled conditions and then let the observers introspect about the thought processes taking place. He and his studentxs results indicated that observers could not determine how a particular solution to a cognitive problem was found, i.e. how thought was di- rected towards a particular goal. To address the question of what the observers were experiencing when problem solving that were not images or sensations, one of Kulpe's students, Ach, coined the term, pnanschauliche Bewusstheiten, or impalpable awarenesses, to describe the vague and evanescent contents of consciousness evident during problem solving. Whereas the Wurzburgers thought they had discovered a new kind of mental element, Titchener suggested that this was nothing but "vague evanescent patterns of sensations and images, and in part, meanings and inferences which ought to be kept out of psychology" (Boring, 1953, p.17#). Thus began the controversy over imageless thought, that helped to initiate the downfall of structuralism. Functional psychology Besides this controversy and others, another reason why structuralism never really caught on in America was due to the practical nature of Americans, who looked for practi- cal and functional solutions to problems. Those Americans, besides Titchener, who were interested in introspection, espoused a functional, instead of a structural approach, to consciousness. 20# The two most famous proponents of functionalism in America were William James (18#2-1910) and James Angell (l869-l9#9). William James, the father of American psy- chology, can be said to be the main American proponent of functionalism. He enunciated his position in his momen— tous pppp.g§ force, The Principlgg pf Psycholpgy (1890/ 1950). James began his book by defining the scope of psy- chology: Psychology is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and their connections. The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like (p.1). Like the Wundtians, psychology, for James, was concerned with the nature of mental life or subjective experience. But whereas the structuralists attempted to "freeze" a single moment of consciousness and then analyze that moment for its elemental structures and contents, James conceived the study of consciousness in terms of process. It is he who is credited with popularizing the term, the stream of consciousness (or the stream of thought), to refer to the fleeting and changing character of consciousness over time. James characterized consciousness by five attribues, these being that consciousness is personal, always in flux, continuous, intentional, and selectional. Every thought is part of a personal consciousness and thought is always changing and never the same. As with Heraclitus's stream, 205 one cannot step into the stream of thought twice, for each moment it changes and varies. Similarly, like a stream or river, the stream of consciousness,is continuous, and "with- out breach, crack, or division." The fourth characteristic of thought, its intentionality, refers to the fact that consciousness deals with objects independent of itself, consciousness is always consciousness of something. Lastly, consCiousness is always interested in more than one part of its object than in another, and welcomes and rejects, or chooses, all the while it thinks (p.28#). These last two characteristics of thought deal with atten- tion, the fact that attention is always an aSpect of con- sciousness that is directed towards something, and that attention is selectional. choosing a particular object to be aware of at a particular moment. These five characteristics of consciousness, as es- poused by James, epitomize the functionalistic approach to consciousness and are contrasted with the elementary proc- esses of sensations and affections and their corresponding attributes of intensity, quality, etc. of the structuralists. In a paper by the other major American functionalist, James Angell (1907), the opposition between structuralism and functionalism was more fully delineated. Angell wrote that functional psychology was concerned with the effect to discern and portray the typical operations of consciousness under actual life conditions, as over against the 206 attempt to analyze and describe its elementary and complex contents (p.63). Whereas a structural psychology of sensation would undertake to determine the number and attributes of the elements of the various sensory modalities, a functional psychology of sensation would concentrate on determining the characteris- tics of the various sensory capabilities and how they differ from one another. Angell suggested that because mental events are so evanescent, fleeting, and at times, vague, to characterize them as elements, as an anatomist would the organs of a body, is to give to such mental contents a durability which they do not possess. According to Angell, In the measure in which consciousness is imma- nently unstable and variable, one might antic- ipate that a functional classification would.be more significant and penetrating than one based upon any su posedly structural foundation . . . (1907: P-75 . Angell also objected to the structuralist's use of the "state of consciousness" concept. When analyzing any particular "state of consciousness" for the elements which make it up, what the observer notices depends upon the par- ticular stimulus setting and conditions that call them forth. Since one cannot get a fixed and specific color sensation without keeping constant the internal and exter- nal conditions in which it appears, the particular sensation experienced is a function of the multitude of variables which may have influenced consciousness at the particular moment of observation. Thus the structural approach, in 207 analyzing the elements of consciousness, may yield differ- ent results in different environments, and moreso, whatever it does find may be more a function of the method used than the actual state of consciousness experienced. Angell argued that functionalism, on the other hand, is not liable to the above criticism when investigating the psychology of mental operations, since the function and not the content of consciousness is being investigated. A functionalistic approach also addresses itself to how the mind mediates between the environment and the needs of the organism. This allows for the determination of the func- tional utility of consciousness. Angell suggested that it is thus more appropriate to the process nature of conscious- ness and can yield much more reliable and useful results than the structural approach. Phenomenolpgical approaches Besides the structuralist and functionalist approaches to consciousness, another approach to consciousness, much more evident in Europe than America, was the phenomenologi- cal approach as taken up and espoused by the Gestalt psy- chologists. When Wundt in 187# was busy completing his handbook, Brentano wrote his Psychplggie vom Empirischen Standpunkt (187#/1925). Thus while Wundt was busy analyzing consciousness in terms of content, Brentano was busy de- fining consciousness in terms of apps. Brentano thought that psychical acts, in contrast to 208 physical phenomena, possess, immanent objectivity. Psychi- cal acts are directed towards an object and "have that ob- ject 'inexisting intentionally' within them" (Boring, 1929/ 1950, p.360). An act of consciousness always implies an object or refers to a content, whereas physical phenomena are self-contained, and do not refer beyond themselves. This doctrine of intentionalipy was taken up by Brentano's pupil, Husserl, and became the foundation for his philo- sophical system of pure phenomenology. For Husserl, consciousness is "consciousness of some- thing" (1913/72, p.223) and phenomenology is the methodology used to elucidate consciousness. Through the e oche, a suspension of judgment, the existence of the external world is "bracketed" or suspended, and the phenomenologist is now free to describe the basic data of experience as they pre- sent themselves. By means of the epoche and the phenomeno— logical method the psychologist now has at his disposal "the only secure basis upon which a strong empirical psychology can be built" (1913/72, p.62). It is from this phenomenological foundation that the Gestaltists came to speak of the data of direct experience as phenomena. According to Boring (1929/50) "this Magna Carta of phenomenology presently released a great deal of good research" (p.177) via Gestalt approaches to perception. Gestalt psychology became a legitimate school of psychology with the works of Katz, Wertheimer, and Kohler. 209 In contrast to the elementalism of the structuralists, the Gestaltists asserted that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts and protested against the analysis of an experience into a predetermined list of elements. They argued that since a person can see a whole object without knowing what conscious elements it is composed of, or can see movement without being able to specify the "quality" of the movement, such enumeration of elements is futile and not necessary for an understanding of the phenomena being studied. They were also not afraid to include mean— ings in their analyses, something that a classical intro- spectionist like Titchener, would never do. In 1929 Kohler published his Gestalt Psychology and with the death of Titchener two years earlier, "phenomenological observa- tion had won out over classical introspection" (Boring, 1929/50. p.177). Th; pigg pi behaviorism In America, however, it was behaviorism that dealt the final blow to classical introspection, and with it, the study of consciousness. The beginning of the end was fore- shadowed in J.B. Watson's (1878-1958) classic paper of 1913, entitled "Psychology as the behaviorist views it." With this paper, not only did Watson derogate introspection and its disciplines of structuralism and functionalism, but Watson also founded behaviorism as the new psychology, a psychological paradigm that is still much in influence 210 today. The first paragraph of this seminal paper sums up Watson's attitude and approach to psychology: Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its method, nor is the scientif- ic value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness (p.158). Watson suggested that by making consciousness the primary subject matter of psychology, behavioral data were reduced to having no value. Since 50 years of experimental introspection had failed to make psychology an undisputed natural science, it was time for psychology to discard all references to consciousness. Watson argued that the pres- ence or absence of consciousness anywhere in the phylogenetic scale had made no effect upon the problems of behavior. He suggested that neither structural nor functional psychology had allowed for adequate experimental treatment of the facts. These disciplines had rather enmeshed themselves in a series of speculative questions not amendable to experimental veri- fication. Behaviorism, on the other hand, allowed for the adequate testing of psychological problems. In support, Watson re- viewed those fields of psychological endeavor where the be- havioristic approach was already yielding promising results. In such an approach, introspection had no place, except perhaps to the extent of using verbal report to assess "thought processes (that) are really motor habits in the 211 larnyx" (Watson, 1913, p.17#). Watson's protest against consciousness fit well with America's Zeitgeist. America's practical spirit was well suited for a functional and practical approach to psychology and behaviorism offered the American psychologist a paradigm that was both functional and extremely practical. According to Boring (1929/50), by "the 1920's it seemed as if all America had gone behaviorist" (p.6#5). During the behavior- istic hegemony, Watson was not the only proponent of behav- iorism, although he was probably the most polemic. Between 1915 and 1950, many psychologists carried on the torch of behaviorism, lighting the way for a functional and behavior- istic psychology that shunned consciousness. With men like E.B. Holt (1873-19#6), A.P. Weiss (1879-1931), E.C. Tolman (1886-1961), and B.F. Skinner (1904-), behaviorism retained its hold over American experimental psychology, and did not deviate much from Watson's initial ostracism of consciousness. Although Tolman was one of the few behaviorists to even attempt a definition of conscious- ness (Tolman, 1927), his behavioristic approach gave con- sciousness little more than nominal status. He did, never- theless, espouse a system called purposive pehaviorismI in which purpose, if not consciousness, was given a prominent place in his theoretical account of behavior. By far the current leader and philosopher of behavior- ism is B.F. Skinner. In clarifying his current views about the relationship between behaviorism and consciousness, 212 Skinner (197#) neither denies the existence of mental events (as Watson did at one time), nor does he hold to their in- accessibility to scientific analysis, because they are pri- vate: Radical behaviorism . . . does not call these (private) events unobservable, and it does not dismiss them as subjective (p.116) Rather, Skinner regards mental events, such as seeing an apple, as just another form of behavior, i.e. a particu- lar class of responses governed by the same behavioral prin- ciples as overt events. He does not, however, hold to the view that they should be used in explaining other behavior. According to him, mental events are not necessary for a functional analysis of behavior and can, for all practical purposes, be ignored. Fifty years of behaviorism, in contrast to the previous fifty years of introspection, have allowed psychology to make tremendous strides in becoming a scientific and legitimate science with voluminous applications. Behavior- ism was a necessary and needed change to the pedantic and controversial researches of the introspectionists. It has also produced much of the desired results that Watson so prophesized. However, just as introspection was superceded after 50 years by behaviorism, so behaviorism is now being superceded by cognitive psychology. 213 ‘A MODERN RETURN $9 CONSCIOUSNESS An already classic paper published just 51 years after Watson's paper on behaviorism, was the essay by R.R. Holt (196#) entitled "Imagery: The return of the ostracized." In this paper Holt explored the banishment of imagery by psychology at the hands of the behaviorists and its return via interest in sensory deprivation, attention, dreaming, etc. to the laboratories of psychologists. Whereas the controversy over imageless thought became a death struggle of introspectionism, and imagery was one of the main foci of Watson's attack in theépolemic that founded behaviorism (196#, P-2 3 it was the recent interest in imagery that brought con- sciousness, introspection, and subjective experience back to the scientific forum. Holt suggested that the study of imagery could help psychologists understand behavior. Be- sides helping to construct a "detailed working model of the behaving organism," such an approach could take into account the Operations inside the famous black box of the mind. Whereas Holt's article reviewed how imagery was making a comeback since the turn of the century, a contemporary theoretical article that defends the use of introspection in psychology has appeared in the granddaddy of psychologi- cal publications, the American Psychologist. Entitled "Behaviorism and the mind: A (limited) call for a return to introspection" by D.A. Lieberman (1979), this brilliant 21# article cites evidence for the return of introspection as a legitimate adjunctive methodology for use with behavior- al observation. Lieberman argues that although many experimental psychologists have abandoned the language of behaviorism, many still continue to be influenced by its methodological and philosophical assumptions and constraints. Yet the dangers of introspection are not nearly quite so detrimen- tal as has been painted by the behaviorists. Lieberman systematically explores these dangers and then determines why they are somewhat, although not completely, unfounded, provided the requisite restraints are used. The following several paragraphs will review Lieberman's polemics. E2£,§QQ Against Introspectipp Three general arguments have been advanced by the behaviorists against the use of introspection as a scientif- ic technique. The first concerns the argument that mental events do not exist, an argument that was once used by Watson himself (Watson and McDougall, 1929). Lieberman dismisses this argument without discussion since virtually no contemporary psychologist, in his right mind, has chosen to attack mental events by denying their existence. A more subtle argument consists in saying that the mind exists but denies that it is involved in the causality of behavior. Such an epiphenomenal version of mind suggests that consciousness is but an "incidental by-product" of 215 the electrical activity of the neural elements and so does not play a causal role in influencing behavior. Besides suggesting that such an epiphenomenalist position is empirically untestable and hence no scientific position at all, Lieberman argues that since mental events and neural states are correlated, an analysis of mental events can lead to an understanding, and possibly prediction, of neural events. The ultimate argument of whether or not introspective data are useful in psychology is the extent to which such data can help lead to the "prediction and control of behav- ior" (Watson, 1913). Whether the mind is or is not causal for behavior is not a valid argument against introspection, especially since the evidence suggests "that mental and neural states are, at least, correlated" (Lieberman, 1979, p.321). A third argument, the most persuasive, is that intro— spection, by its very nature, is the observation of internal events that are not accessible to outside observation. Without a means of confirming observations, arguments over the reliability and validity of such observation will doom introspective accounts to futile and needless controversy, just as it did to the early structural and functional intro- spectionists. Lieberman acknowledges that there is some validity to this argument, but also suggests that reports from 216 others are not the only means of validating introspective data. The repeatability or reliability of an observation is one measure of its validity and the methods and data of modern psychophysics show that scientific, empirical data can be procured from introspective reports that are reliable and valid. Moreover, subjective events reported by intro- spection can be correlated with other data, such as neuro- logical events like EEG potentials, etc., to check on the validity of the self—report. Although there is room for error while confirming subjective reports, the lack of per- fect accuracy must be weighed against the empirical useful- ness of such reports in predicting and controlling behavior. Lieberman then addresses the objections of the behav- iorist B.F. Skinner (l97#) against using introspection. Skinner's main objection is that introspective reports are "inherently inaccurate." Lieberman admits that much of our internal world is inaccessible and the correlation between verbal reports and these states that are accessible is unlikely to be.perfect (p.323). Nevertheless, as long as some correlation exists, intro- spective reports can be useful, especially when the correlations are very high, as is the case in some experi- ments (Kroll and Kellicut, 1972). A second objection of Skinner is that mental events are not necessary in a functional analysis of behavior. Lieberman argues that if behavior were fully predictable from observable environmental events, there would be no 21? need to bother with the murkiness of mental events. ~But all behavior cannot be predicted by behaviorists by the cur- rent conditions of the environment and the individual's past behavior. Moreover, sometimes merely asking the S his intentions can yield better results than an exhaustive analysis of environmental and history variables., As an example, public opinion polls can now usually predict election results to within one to two percent by merely asking voters of their intentions. Would a knowledge of environmental conditions and historical variables that presumably lead to voter be- havior do the same? A final main objection raised by Skinner is that introspection can too easily lead to such a preoccupation of mind so as to ultimately neglect environmental factors that control behavior. But Lieberman contends that just because a methodology may lead to dangers is not sufficient reason for not studying and using it. Lieberman summarizes by suggesting that instead of trying to force behavior and methodology into the procrustean bed prescribed by (behavior) theory, . . . it would be far less taxing, as well as more honest, to accept what we so clearly be- lieve in covertly (p.330). The arguments of the behaviorists against introspection, although somewhat valid, are not valid enough so as to pre— clude introspection asva viable methodology in helping to understand behavior. 218 Interim Summary The previous pages have reviewed the rise and fall of introspection in the beginnings of psychology, and its gradual reemergence in the sixties and seventies. Scien- tists are now looking more closely at the nature of imagery and cognition and their theoretical models underlying their approaches to behavior, introspection, and conscious- ness. These approaches, along with the great strides being made (and having been made) in attention (Kahneman, 1973) and neuropsychology (Lindsley, 1961: John and Schwartz, 1978), are allowing the study of consciousness to again, become a legitimate area of research for psychologists. The following pages will review the modern phenomenological approaches to consciousness that are currently being theorized and researched. CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES UPON CONSCIOUSNESS The contemporary literature reflects two general trends in the study of consciousness: trends that parallel the structuralist-functionalist camps of introspection during the early twentieth century. Like the functionalists, one approach to consciousness attempts to investigate the stream of consciousness and its relationship to personality measures and related variables. The other approach, paral- leling that of the structuralists, attempts to investigate the structure of states of consciousness: states that are hypothesized to be of different intensities or patterns 219 than other states of consciousness. The following paragraphs will review the theorizing and empirical research into each of these two major approach- es to studying the phenomenological nature of human conscious- ness; but first, a contemporary introduction to the phenom- enology of consciousness. The Phenomenolpgy pf Consciousness According to Battista (1978) phenomenological obser- vation about the nature of human consciousness is fraught with difficulty, owing to the nature of consciousness and the problems in observing it. Nevertheless, there are three essential points of agreement that tend to show up again and again across a variety of investigations on conscious- ness. These three points consist of the facts that con- scious experience is primary, it is a field, and it is a stream in continuous flux. The observation that conscious experience is primary refers to the fact that consciousness forms the basis of all knowledge by transcending the split between knower and known and uniting both in the experience of consciousness. It is consciousness's intentional nature that allows this unity of experience to take place. Battista's second point of agreement, that conscious- ness is a field, refers to the fact that consciousness is a Gestalt experience. The field of consciousness consists of a multitude of perceptions, emotions, thoughts, etc. 220 which are unified into the fabric of experience such that the contents of consciousness are continuous and nondis- junctive with each other. Battista's third point, that consciousness is in continuous flux, refers to the fluid and changeable nature of consciousness, whose flow can be analogized to the flow of a stream. Battista also distinguishes eight main content areas of conscious experience. These include "sensation, per— ception, emotion, affect, cognition, intuition, self-aware— ness, and unition - 'the experience of oneness or unifica- tion with everything'" (1978, p.59). These content areas are defined as the following: Sensations are the physiological reactions to stimuli that impinge upon the nervous system. They are the "raw, physical" experiences that form the foundation for per- ceptions. Perceptions, in turn, are our experiences of sensations, and can occur as sights, sounds, touches, smells, etc. Emotions, for Battista, are the internal experiences that arise in response to sensations and consist of such experiences as hunger, grief, sexual feelings, etc. Affects are the positive and negative reactions that are experienced in reference to emotions and refer to the pleasant and un— pleasant nature of emotions. Cognition, on the other hand, is that complex "state of consciousness" that is the con- ceptualization, abstraction, and reflection upon experience in a logical, sequential manner. 221 Intuition is that means of understanding experience that is holistic and simultaneous and may correspond to the "aha" experience as when multifarious data are seen as a whole or organized unity. Self-awareness is that unique property of consciousness that allows it to reflect upon itself. Finally, unition is the term used to denote a transcendence of subject-object dichotomies in which one is merged with the universe or surround. According to Battista, ones phenomenological experience is composed of these contents in a unity that is ever-flowing and con— tinuous. In a somewhat different perspective for describing the phenomenological attributes of consciousness, Marsh (1978) talks about understanding consciousness in terms of four categories, these being: focus, structure, attributes, and flow. Focus, for Marsh, means the direction of atten- ' tion, whether inward or outward, its intensity, and its breadth. All three can be thought of as the different as- pects of attention. Structure refers to the field of awareness as fore- ground, backround, and aerial. The foreground of awareness is the current ideas, memories, impressions, etc. that cap- ture ones attention at a particular moment. The backround of awareness refers to the "more general, persistent aware- ness of time, place, social reality, and personal identity" (p.126) that forms the basis for the foreground of aware- ness. 222 And finally, the aerial or overview perspective refers to ones self-awareness, that quality of being aware that one is aware. Marsh's third category, attributes, are the qualities or characteristics that describe and delimit images, per- ceptions, feelings, etc. as to their quality, form, and structure. Some attributes are clear/blurred, real/imagined, and like/dislike. The last of Marsh's categories, that of flow, refers to the fact that the experience of conscious- ness is subjectively felt as in flux and never the same. Marsh's perspective thus describes the framework of consciousness in which the contents of consciousness, as enumerated by Battista, are organized. Both Marsh and Battista characterize consciousness as always in flux, or an unending stream of thought. One of the two major con- temporary perspectives for understanding phenomenological consciousness consists of tapping and assessing ones on- going stream of thought. T_p Nature pf_the Stream pf Consciousnegp Investigations into the stream of consciousness as phenomenologically experienced can be traced, in a large part, to the work of Jerome Singer and his colleagues. Singer's approach to studying the stream of consciousness has been through daydreaming. Since daydreaming is one manifestation of an ongoing stream of relatively self-activated cognitive responses which characterize consciousness, 223 further knowledge of its dimensions and func- tional implications for personality seems de- sirable (Singer and Antrobus, 1963, p.187). Thus began an exploration into the stream of conscious- ness that has yielded a tremendous amount of data on the nature of daydreaming (Singer, 1966, 1975): its relation- ship to the ongoing stream of thought (Singer, 1977): a variety of personality variables (Singer and Schonbar, 1961; Rabinowitz, 1975): psychopathology (Starker and Singer, 1975; Giabra and Traynor, 1977); affect and stress (Singer and Rowe, l96#); fantasy (Singer and Singer, 1966); and many, many other areas. Singer's approach to the study of daydreaming has been primarily through the use of a retrospective self-report questionnaire, that in its final form consists of #00 self- descriptions. It is called the Singer-Antrobus Imaginal Process Inventory (IPI) (Singer and Antrobus, 1972) and has been shown to be a reliable and valid questionnaire for assessing subjective daydreaming experience. This ques- tionnaire has succeeded in showing that daydreaming pat- terns can be understood as an assortment of independent factors. Three major factors have been found to char- acterize ongoing thought during daydreaming. These in- clude a Positive-Vivid daydreaming scale, a Guilty-Dysphoric daydreaming scale, and a Mindwandering-Distractible scale characterized "by fleeting thoughts and an inability to focus on extended fantasy" (Singer, 1978, p.196). 22# One of the many results that the IPI has uncovered that has been supported by interview data is the discovery that most, if not all, of us carry on complex processing of imagery sequences and fairly elaborate chains of thought that are often unrelated to some specific task or social situation in which we find ourselves (Singer, l97#, p.182). In other words, ones stream of thought is continually oc- cupied with looking into the future and the past, and planning and fantasizing possible outcomes of events, all the while with concomitant imagery and affect. Indeed, Singer (1978) suggests that the function of the stream of consciousness may be to provide us with the possibilities of action that we can choose from, so as to determine the most appropriate short and long—term goals and behaviors to enact. ' Another approach to studying the stream of thought that utilizes direct assessment, is the research being done by E. Klinger at the University of Minnesota. In one particular experiment Ss were trained to become aware of their inner experience and then participated in in-the- laboratory and out-of—the-laboratory assessment sessions. During these sessions, at each sound of a buzzer, the Ss completed a thought-sampling questionnaire on the nature of their stream of consciousness. The questionnaire measured such phenomenological contents as duration of thought, vagueness of imagery, amount of direct thought, visualness 225 of imagery, etc. Among the many results that were found, some of the following were: The five dimensions of thought: operant (direct- ed) versus respondent (nondirected), stimulus- independent versus stimulus-bound, fancifulness, degenerateness, and relation of ego to imagery - are functionally separate even though they may be statistically related . . . Most thought in college student participants is specific, detailed, predominantly visual, unfanciful, controlled, present tense, related to the imme- diate situation, and recallable within a few seconds with at least moderate confidence (Klinger, 1978, p.255-56). These results indicate that the thought-sampling method can yield intriguing and valuable data about the nature of the stream of consciousness. In a different, but related, type of study (Pope, 1978) the effects of gender, solitude, and posture upon the stream of consciousness were assessed. Subjects re- ported on their stream of consciousness by thinking aloud into a cassette recorder. The results indicated that al- though the flow of consciousness is exceedingly rich and varied, it can be reliably categorized and varies with the type of stimulus condition. Pope suggested that to the ex- tent that his particular study tapped "normal thinking," "people seem to spend a great deal of time in fantasy and long-term memory" (1978, p.288). 226 States pf Consciousness In contrast to the above studies which attempt to investigate the nature of the stream of consciousness, are those studies and theories which investigate the nature of "states" of consciousness. In recent times there has been an increased interest in trying to experience, cate- gorize, and understand "states" of consciousness and "alter- ed" (Tart, 1972, 1975, 1977) or "alternate" (Zinberg, 1978) states of consciousness in particular. These terms refer to the belief that besides waking consciousness, there are also other, altered or alternate states of consciousness which people experience. Altered states of consciousness have received much more attention than ones ordinary, waking state of consciousness, for obvious reasons. An interest in the scientific study and exploration of altered states of consciousness is not new to American psychology, however. Williameames, the father of American psychology, wrote in 1902: Some years ago I myself made some observations on this aspect of nitrous oxide intoxication. . . . One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time and my impression of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking consciousness, rational con- sciousness, as we call it, is but one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without suspecting their existence, but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all completeness, definite types 227 of mentality which probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question - for they are so discontinuous with ordinary consciousness. Yet they may determine attitudes though they cannot furnish formulas and open a region though they fail to give a map (1902/58, p.298). By definition, altered states of consciousness would be experienced differently from a waking, baseline state. Several slightly different definitions have been provided to clarify exactly what an altered state of consciousness is. According to Krippner (1972) an altered conscious state can be defined as a mental state which can be subjectively recog- nized by an individual (or by an objective ob- server of the individual) as representing a difference in psychological functioning from that individual's 'normal, alert, waking State. (1301) o Ludwig (1972) in a slightly different definition defines an altered state of consciousness as any mental state(s), induced by various physio- logical, psychological, or pharmacological man- euvers or agents, which can be recognized sub- jectively by the individual himself (or by an objective observer of the individual) as rep- resenting a sufficient deviation in subjective experience or psychological functioning from certain general norms for that individual dur- ing alert, waking consciousness (p.11). And finally, the father of altered states of con- sciousness (ASC) theorizing, C.T. Tart (19720), defines an ASC as a qualitative alteration in the overall pattern of of mental functioning, such that the experiencer feels his consciousness is radically different from the 'normal' way it functions (p.95). 228 Ag Eastern enumeration.p§ states pf consciousness Although we in the West are just beginning to define and map states of consciousness and theorize about them, some of the Eastern philosophies and religions have very elaborate maps and theories about consciousness and its multifarious states (Tart, 1977). According to Coleman (1977), the Buddhist classic entitled the Abhidhamma, "is probably the broadest and most detailed traditional psy— chology of states of consciousness" (p.1) in written exis- tence. The Abhidhamma represents an encyclopedic compilation of the discourses of the Buddha. In the fifth century A.D. that portion of the Abhidhamma dealing with meditation was summarized by Buddhaghosa and entitled, the Visuddhimagga, or "the path of purification." The Visuddhimagga is really a recipe book for meditation, and lists, among other things, the states of consciousness attainable by meditation. These states of consciousness are enumerated according to two general classification systems, one based on concen- tration, and the other, based on insight. The path of concentration lists the states of conscious- ness the mind can experience based on the degree to which one-pointed concentration or absorption are developed. When there is full absorption, or jpapa, upon the object of meditation, there is a total break with normal conscious- ness and here begins the first of eight different jhanas, each concerned with specific, yet higher levels of 229 consciousness. The following are the main characteristics of the first through eighth jhanas: (1) cessation of hindering thoughts, sustained attention to the object of concentra- tion, and feelings of rapture and bliss; (2) no primary object of concentration, feelings of rapture, bliss, and one-pointedness: (3) cessation of rapture, feelings of bliss, one-pointedness, and equanimity: (#) cessation of bodily pleasures; feelings of equanimity, one-pointedness, and bliss: (5) consciousness of infinite space, equanimity, and one-pointedness: (6) objectless infinite consciousness, equanimity, and one-pointedness: (7) awareness of nothing- ness, equanimity, and one-pointedness, and (8) neither perception nor nonperception, equanimity, and one-pointed- ness. Paralleling the path of concentration is the path of insight. The Visuddhimagga‘ enumerates the different levels of mindfulness (of consciousness) attainable, based on the degree of insight, or the ability to "see things as they are." These stages include, from the least to the greatest insight: bare insight, mindfulness, the stage of reflections, pseudonirvana, realization, effortless insight, nirvana, and nirodh. Like the stages of concentration, each stage of insight has corresponding cognitive, affective, and noetic concomitants. According to Goleman, at the higher stages, the paths of concentration and insight tend to merge, although subtle 230 differences remain, based on the fact that each path uses a different methodology to achieve alteration of state. Whereas the concentration method uses absorption in the object of meditation, the insight method uses attention to, yet detachment from, the object of meditation, which may be the meditator's own stream of consciousness. A Western enumeration.pf states pf consciousness The West has also come up with several articles re- viewing and delineating states of consciousness distinct enough from each other so as to merit enumeration. Two such reviews are those of Krippner (1972) and Ludwig (1972). Krippner lists twenty states of consciousness that need to be further mapped. These include the states of dreaming and sleeping, the hypnagogic and hypnapompic.states, states of hyperalertness and lethergy, states of rapture, hysteria, fragmentation, and regression, meditative and trance states, reverie, the daydreaming state, internal scanning, stupor, coma, stored memory, "expanded" conscious states, and last, but not least, the normal, everyday state of consciousness. Ludwig, in a seminal article on altered states, has conceptualized altered states of consciousness as having several common denominations and dimensions in contrast to ordinary, everyday waking consciousness. Most of the follow- ing features, according to Ludwig, to a greater or lesser extent, tend to characterize most ASCs: alterations in 231 thinking, disturbed time sense, loss of control, changes in emotional expression, body image changes, perceptual distortions, changes in meaning or significance, a sense of the ineffable, feelings of rejuvenation, and hypersugges- tibility. Besides merely enumerating states of consciousness is a Western interest in how they come about. Several theories have been presented that attempt to determine the theoreti- cal foundations and functions that make altered states of consciousness possible. The following paragraphs will re- view the contemporary major Western theories that attempt to account for the ability of consciousness to change and yet stabilize itself in various and sundry states. Theories pf states pf consciousnegp R. Fischer (1978) has developed a cartography of con- scious states based upon the level of arousal of the organ- ism. According to his mapping of consciousness, levels of arousal can be mapped along a continuum that extends from ordinary perception to hyperaroused states, and in the opposite direction, from perception to hypoaroused activity levels. According to him, one half of the consciousness continuum is along the perception-hallucination continuum of increasing ergotropic arousal - an inner ex- citation, called sympathetic or hyperarousal; and the second along the perception-meditation continuum of increasing trophotropic arousal.- a tranquil relaxation, or central hypoarousal. A voyage along the path of hyperarousal is 232 experienced by Western travelers as normal, creative, hyperphrenic (including manic and schizo hrenic as well as cataleptic and ecstatic states : the voyage aIOng the path of hypoarousal is a succession of meditative experiences re- ferred by Eastern travelers as zazen, dharna, dhyan, savichar and nirvichar samadhi (Fischer, 1978. p-255- In accordance with Fischer's paradigm, the "perception hallucination continuum of increasing ergotropic arousal is characterized by diffuse cortical excitation, as in awakening (Gellhorn and Liely, 1972): EEG-desynchronization- hypersynchronization (Winters, et. al., 1972)" (Fischer, 1978, p.30), and an augmentation in sympathetic discharge that originates from the locus coerulus. High levels of arousal lead to hallucinatory experience, high S/M ratios (of inner sensation versus motor actions), and a (usually) de- synchronized EEG. The perception-meditation continuum of increasing trophotropic arousal is characterized by an acti- vation of the parasympathetic nervous system, a synchronized EEG, and deep, non-active meditational states, such as are achieved from Zen, vipassana or insight meditation, or any number of other meditational disciplines. Fischer's cartography is a blend of Eastern and West- ern psychology that is based on a neurophysiological anal- ysis of arousal and concomitant phenomenological experiences. States of consciousness are defined and divided according to the arousal level of the organism. This arousal level seems, in turn, to be based upon neurophysiological inter— actions between the reticular activating system of the 233 brain (Lindsley, 1960), the thalamus (Andersen and Andersson, 1968), limbic structures (Thatcher and John, 1978), and cortical structures (Diamond, 1976; Pribram and McGuiness, 1975). Fischer does not discuss the exact nature of the phenomenology of these states of consciousness, but rather uses the Eastern and Western labels (such as zazen, dhrana, etc.) and correlates such labels with neurological sub- strates. A somewhat different paradigm has been put forward by J. Silverman (1968) for understanding altered states of con- sciousness that is based upon attention instead of arousal. According to Silverman, individuals in altered states evince behaviors which have the following characteristics: (1) Subjective disturbances in concentration, attention and also memor and judgment, (2) disturbed time sense, (3 difficulty in con- trol, (#) changes in emotional tone, (5) bodily image changes, 96) perceptual distortions, (7) and changes in meaning or significance (PP. 1201-1202). Such altered states are typically preceded, accord- ing to Silverman, by sensory overload or sensory under— load, hyper- or hypoattentiveness to sensory or ideational stimuli, and changes in the biochemistry or neurophysiology of the body. Silverman suggests that recent advances in attention and perceptual behavior have suggested a new framework for understanding altered states of consciousness. This framework is based on the analysis of attention and its three related component factors, derived from factor analytic studies, which regulate and monitor the "reception 23# and utilization of environmental and internal stimuli" (Silverman, 1968, p.1202-1203). These three factors are: attention intensiveness, extensiveness (scanning) and selectiveness (field-articulation). Attention intensiveness refers to the S's sensitivity to stimuli and how absorbed or involved he becomes in those stimuli. Whereas an ordinary state of consciousness in- volves a "midrange" sensitivity to stimuli, according to Silverman, "unusual hypersensitivity appears to be a pre- condition for an altered state of consciousness experience" (Silverman, 1968, p.1208). Extensiveness of attention re- fers to the degree of sampling of the elements in the stim— ulus field. Whereas a person in an ordinary waking state is in a balanced state of scanning the environment, in an altered state of consciousness there is restricted scanning of the environment for the person is preoccupied with a very narrow circle of internal or external stimuli. Silverman's third variable, the selectiveness of at- tention, "refers to responses which determine which elements in a stimulus field exert a dominant influence on the per- ceiver" (p.1203). Thus whether the subject responds to the discrete elements of the field, or takes a more holistic and global perspective represent differences in selectivity of attention. A person in a normal waking state of con- sciousness generally has articulative control that is active, analytical and segmentalizing, whereas a person in an al- tered state has a passive, global-relational set of attention 235 selectivity. Silverman cites Deikman (1966) in support: The active, intellectual style is replaced by a receptive, perceptual mode . . , the undoing of automatic, perceptual and cognitive structures permits a gain in sensory intensity and richness at the expense of abstract categorization and differentiation (pp.329-331). Thus the deployment of attention and the degree to which it is intensive, extensive, and selective will help deter- mine the degree to which an altered state of consciousness is experienced. Fishkin and Jones (1978) also present a model for the understanding of consciousness and altered states that likewise has attention in a very prominent position. In their approach the contents of consciousness at any moment are determined by what is being attended to and how it is being attended to. Certain phenomena are potentially- available pp consciousnesg (PAC) and attention towards the PAC determines what will gain access to consciousness. According to their model attention is represented as a movable "window" between the potentially conscious and what gets into consciousness. The size of the window deter- mines the breadth of attention, the rate of window movement determines the rate of shifts in attention, and the pattern of window movement determines the temporal sequence of at- tentional shifts. Besides these parameters, four other parameters are necessary to determine a particular state of consciousness. The fluidity of the PAC and its structure determine the 236 amount of material to enter into consciousness and the specifics of that material, respectively. The last two parameters deal with the energy state of the organism. The distribution of available energy will help to determine the intensity of consciousness, the rate of attention shifts, and the rigidity of the PAC contents: while the amount of available energy determines the total energy accessible for trade-offs in distribution of available energy. According to Fishkin and Jones "on the basis of these parameters a state of consciousness (SC) may be defined. Each SC is characterized by a particular set of values and/ or attitudes of the eight parameters" (1978, p.278). In terms of this conceptualization, they define the ordinary state of consciousness into the following values of the pre- vious parameters: The location of the window tends to be located upon perception of external or body events or ver- bal thinking. The rate of window movement is fast while the pattern of window movement is sufficient to maintain contact with the external environment and maintain a satis- factory self—concept. Talking to oneself (or others) and shifts between internal verbal thinking and the perception of external events and bodily events also characterize the pattern of window movement. The size of the window tends to fluctuate about midpoint. The fluidity of the PAC tends to be low to moderate while its structure is such that new associations form at a moderate rate. Both the distribution 237 and amount of available energy tends to be low to moderate. Altered states of consciousness involve modulations in these eight parameters. Drug-induced altered states are characterized as involving the following characteris- tics: shifts from external to internal focus, alterations of moods or feelings, changes in breadth of attention and intensity of experience, time distortions, occurrences of strengthening of new associations, persistent or enhanced internal imagery, loss of memory, shifts from verbal to nonverbal thinking, increased availability of deep—lying memories or unconscious material, alteration of complex psychological phenomena, loss of self-concept, and the ex- perience of unity, oneness, or connectedness. A much different perspective upon the nature of altered states is the "psychedelic model of altered states of con- sciousness" (Hunt and Chefurka, 1976). Hunt and Chefurka argue that since the nature of consciousness is intentional, i.e. pointing "beyond itself (into the world of everyday conduct)" (p.867) then any direct awareness of experience of ones immediate subjectivity "could be experienced as anomalous, and would be dysfunctional in terms of adapta-. tion" (p.867). They suggest that a psychedelic model of altered states would view altered states as the subjective re- flections or by-products of general mental activ- ity, resulting when the 'known object' of focal awareness is replaced by features of the 'knowing medium' (1976, p.867). 238 In order to test this hypothesis, Ss, after being placed in one of four groups, sat immobily for ten minutes in a bare well-lit room. Different instructions were given to each group. Group 1 was a baseline group who were given instructions that were not to sensitize them to their subjective experience. Group 2 received instructions to pay attention to their "subjective experience." Group 3 received instructions similar to that given observers of the classic introspectionists in the tradition of Titchener (l92#), James (1890/1950), and Cattell (1930). Group # received instructions in imaginative role-playing. The results, according to the authors, confirmed the psychedelic model for the different conditions evoken dif- fering degrees of unusual experiences. The main results indicated that the sensitization instruction group was as- sociated with greater altered state reports than the base- line or subjective experience groups. Unexpectedly, however, were the findings that the group instructed to just sit (the baseline group) reported greater alterations in expe- rience than the group told to be aware of their subjective experience. These and other results suggested that spontaneous altered state reports can be elicited in very short periods of time without recourse to elaborate experimental manipula- tions. The authors concluded by suggesting that altered states are always present, but "backwardly masked" because 239 they are microgenetically primitive processes prior to the conscious experience of perceptions, feelings, cognitions, etc. As such they suggest that in a formal sense, there is no such thing as 'altered states of consciousness,‘ rather we find states of consciousness typically sub- ordinated within conduct and consciousness, atypically manifested (1976, p.876). In contrast to Hunt and Chefurka, a consciousness theorist who firmly believes in the existence of altered states of consciousness and who was the original popularizer of the concept with his classic, Altered States pf Con- sciousness (1972) is C.T. Tart. He is, by far, the most rigorous and systematic researcher and theorist to approach the study of altered states of consciousness, and his ap- proach will be discussed in detail. Tart's theoratapal approach pp states pf consciousness For Tart, ones ordinary state of consciousness is a "semi-arbitray construction," dependent upon the belief systems of the culture and the personal psychological make- up of the person. As amply demonstrated by research, the act of perception is a "highly complex, automated con- struction" that is dependent upon the physiological, psy- chological, and cultural needs of the organism (Tart, 1975). The emotions a person feels and the thoughts he thinks are also dependent upon his enculturation by the society, the process by which a particular culture selects certain human potentialities for use. Such a viewpoint is also 2#0 supported by others. The work of J. Bruner (1957) has emphasized how perception is conditioned by the categories of conceptuali- zation that we employ, and G. Kelly (1955) has concluded that each person tends to create his own world by means of "personal constructs" or categories. From a completely different cultural perspective, an Islamic mystic organiza— tion, the Sufis, have always maintained that ordinary con- sciousness is but a construction: The Sufis emphasize the constantly changing bias- es that constitute our normal awareness. 'What a piece of bread looks like depends on whether you are hungry,‘ says a Sufi poet, Jallaudin Rami. (They) quite explicitly consider the effects of our limited category system on awareness. The Sufis and other traditions contend that the se- lective and restricted nature of awareness is an obstacle to be overcome and that the process of meditation, among other exercises, is a way of , turning down the restrictions that normally limit our awareness (Ornstein, 1972, p.191). This belief is also paralleled by the Eastern tradi- tion of labeling ordinary consciousness as one of illusion or maya (Ram Dass, l97#g Singh, 1973). (Thus Tart's con- tention that ordinary consciousness is a construction is supported by contemporary research and millenia of mystic tradition. But how then is it constructed? Like Silverman and Fishkin and Jones, Tart makes aware- ness/attention the basic theoretical and experiential given in the construction of consciousness. Awareness, for Tart, "refers to the basic knowledge that something is happening to perceiving or feeling or cognizing in its simpliest 2#1 form" (Tart, 1975, p.27). Consciousness, on the other hand, is awareness as modulated and regulated by psychological structures which are those relatively stable organizations or component processes which perform one or more related psychological functions. Whereas awareness/attention constitutes the major energy source of consciousness, the structures are the mechanisms by which consciousness is experienced. Perma- nent structures, such as the nervous system, are the "hard- ware" of the mental system, to analogize from computer programing, whereas structures created by learning, condi- tioning, and enculturation are software or less permanent structures. The interaction of awareness/attention with psycho- logical structures determines the discrete atapa pf_ppp- sciousneaa (d-SoC), to use Tart's terminology, of the indi— vidual at the moment. A d-SoC is defined as a specific pattern of functioning of consciousness, and although it may show a range of variations in its specifics, the pattern still retains the same overall pattern. Thus within a d-SoC, particular parts of the pattern, particular psychological functions, may function faster or slower, more or less efficiently, or show a change in a particular content they are working with, but the overall pattern remains the same (Tart, 1977, p.1#). In contrast, a discrete altered state pf cppaciousne_§ (d-ASC) is a radical modification of the overall patterning and functioning of consciousness, compared to a baseline 2#2 state, such as ones ordinary state of consciousness. In summary, the experiencer of the altered state "can tell that different laws are functioning and that a new, overall pattern is superimposed on this existence" (1977, p.1#). The observer thus notices a qualitative difference in his state of consciousness in which it appears there are new patterns of functioning set up between the different psy- chological structures. Ten subsystems are hypothesized to make up a particular state of consciousness, besides awareness/attention. These are: exteroceptors, interoceptors, input processing, memory, sense of identity, evaluation and decision making, motor output, subconscious, emotion, and space/time. An altered state of consciousness will demonstrate changes in these subsystems such that the patterning of activity between sub- systems is different from that of ones ordinary state of consciousness. This is a point that Tart finds crucial for d-SoCs and d-ASCs, since pattern differences are the essential defining element of different d-SoCs. Particular psy- chological functions may be identical for sever- al d—SoCs, but the overall system functioning is quite different (Tart, 1975, p.57). In order to stabilize a particular state of conscious- ness, Tart hypothesized four stabilizing systems. These include: loading stabilization, negative and positive feed- back stabilization, and limiting stabilization. These four stabilization processes keep a particular state of 243 consciousness generally in the same overall pattern, and thus maintain that state of consciousness. Experimental Studies ip the Phenomenplpgy pf States pf Consciousness As can be seen, there has been a great deal of theorizing on the nature of consciousness and the organiza- tion of its different subsystems to form particular states of consciousness. Research into the phenomenology of states' of consciousness, although less than adequate, is increas- ing and has now been undertaken in such areas as psychedelic drugs (Pahnke, 1972): meditation (Deikman, 1972: Maupin, 1972: Osis, et. al., 1973; Greenfield, Note 1); alpha EEG biofeedback training (Kamiya, 1972; Plotkin, 1979): the smoking of cannabis (Tart, 1971): hypnosis (Aaronson,-l972: Tart, 1972b) and other areas. The following paragraphs will briefly review several of the more prominent studies. In a drug study by Pahnke (1972), twenty theological students listened to a religious ceremony. Half of the students were given psilocybin one and one half hours before the ceremony, and the other half, received a placebo, nicotinic acid. A double-bind technique for the administra- tion was employed. Data collection afterwards consisted of questionnaires and interviews. The treatment and control groups were compared, among other things, on nine dimensions thought to be related to mystical experience, these being: unity, transcendence of 2## space and time, deeply felt positive mood, sacredness, objectivity and reality, paradoxicality, alleged ineffabil- ity, transiency, and persisting positive change in attitude and behavior. For seven of the nine categories, the Ss re- ceiving the psilocybin evinced phenomenological experiences significantly different from the controls. A study by Osis, et. a1.(l973) investigated the phe- nomenological dimensions of the meditative experience. Self-selected meditators met once a week for a two-hour session over a period of six to eight months. After each meditation session they then completed a thirty-item post- session questionnaire. The items were then factor analyzed trying to determine the dimensions of the meditative expe- rience that might emerge. Six factors were found. One referred to the pre-meditative state that the Ss brought to the meditative session while the others differentiated five different phenomenological dimensions of the meditative experience. These included: selfatranscendence and openness, in- tensification and change of consciousness, a meaning dimen- sion, forceful exclusion of images, and general success in meditation. Five of these six factors were replicated thrice and were fairly stable, having core items that were the same over a period of a few years during which pilot studies were also done. The authors concluded that the di- mensions that emerged did "seem not to express everyday 245 states of consciousness" and that meditation "leads to altered states of consciousness" (Osis, et. al., 1973, p.130). Their data collection, however, did not allow for an adequate defining nor mapping of the ordinary state of consciousness. In a very involved and elegant study, Greenfield (Note 1) has investigated individual subjective responses to three types of meditation. Forty-five females experienced meditations involving the use of a mantra, visualization, and bare attention over a ten week period. Their subjec- tive experiences were assessed by questionnaires and indi- vidual personality variables were also monitored. The results indicated several significant differences in subjective experience across the three meditational techniques, although mystical experience as assessed by the mystical experience dimension of the post—meditational questionnaire was not significantly different across the three techniques. This mystical experience dimension in- dicated, however, that meditators were consistent in rating their experience along phenomenological domains that included high ratings for "unity, noetic feelings of reality and truth, sense of sacredness, deeply felt positive mood, paradoxicality, transcendence of time and space, transiency, and to a leeser extent, ineffability" (Greenfield, Note 1). Individual differences across meditators were also monitored and related to depth of meditation and level of 2#6 mystical consciousness experienced. Individuals who scored high in a paper and pencil test of absorption, a measure empirically correlated with hypnotic susceptibility, were found to experience a greater alteration and change of con- sciousness than meditators who scored low on this measure. 85 who were highly tolerant of ambiguity were also better able to relax during meditation. In two other meditation studies, Maupin (1972) demon- strated that strong subjective feelings could be evoked in Ss who had very little meditation training and a study by Deikman (1972) found that Ss who meditated on a blue vase experienced subjective changes in perception which Deikman traced to a "deautomatization" of cognitive and perceptual processes. An area of research that may be tapping similar types of phenomenological experience as meditation is that of alpha electroencephalographic (EEG) biofeedback training. In such training the S is given feedback as to when he is experiencing rhythmic alpha activity in certain areas of his cerebral cortex. Ss who have undergone such training report a configuration of phenomenological experiences that have been labeled the "high alpha state" (Kamiya, 1972). Subjective experiences include such things as a general pleasantness, a relaxation of the mental apparatus, and a lack of criticalness or cognitive skepticism about the nature of the experience. 247 In a more recent review of the relationship between the alpha experience and EEG physiological activity (Plotkin, 1979), the alpha experience was characterized as a "pleasant, relaxed, and serene state, characterized by a loss of body and time awareness, an absense or diminuition of thought, and a feeling of egolessness" (p.1132). Besides the above, the phenomenological experience during a profound hypnotic trance state (Tart, 1972b) has also been investigated, as has the subjective experience of the hypnagogic state just before sleep (Vogel, et. al., 1972), to yield intriguing information about phenomenal eXperience during such anomalous stimulus conditions. Interim Conclusions The previous are just some of the studies that are being done to explore and map the nature of altered states of consciousness from a phenomenological perspective. Al- though there has been a good deal of theorizing on the nature of consciousness and its various states, the re- search is just beginning to scratch the Surface of uncover- ing the phenomenological workings of consciousness in ones ordinary and altered states. Since the "consciousness revolution" has hit America the cultivation of altered states of consciousness via drugs, meditation, biofeedback, hypnosis, and many other methods is becoming big business. Yet the empirical re- search to support these induction procedures for producing 2#8 altered states of consciousness significantly different from nonaltered states is much less than adequate. A be- ginning has been made but future research is a must in order to understand the structure and functions of phenomenologi- cal consciousness in altered and nonaltered states and the extent to which nonspecific, placebo, and expectancy effects are involved in the production and maintainence of altered states of awareness. The previous pages has hopefully reviewed for the reader how consciousness, once the basic interest of late nineteenth century psychologists, is again becoming an area to which many are turning. Studies on cognition, imagery, the stream of consciousness, and states of con- sciousness are increasing and becoming much more sophis- ticated. Just as behaviorism replaced introspective psy- chology, and cognitive psychology is now replacing behavior- ism, it may be that the scientific study of consciousness and its various dimensions will be the new frontier to which many psychologists will turn when the approach of cognitive psychologists have been found wanting. An empirical methodology which brings together phenomenological observation with psychplpgical research and theorizing must form the basis for such an endeavor, since consciousness, as subjectively experienced, can be best known, not through neurophysiology, but through introspection or phenomenological observation that is 2#9 coupled with and related to a psychoneurophysiological data base. Although electrophysiological, neurochemical, and neuroanatomical data can help, a science of consciousness ‘ppap pa gpounded in an appirical psychophenomenology pf consciousness by which the phenomenological attributes of -subjective, conscious experience are empirically observed, assessed, and evaluated in conjunction with biological, psychological, and personological variables. Such a paychophenomenology, if found reliable and valid, would investigate consciousness through empirical, phenomenolog- ical methodologies and relate such observation to more tra- ditional psychological, physiological, and biochemical approaches. As such, the study of consciousness, of which the _psychpphenomenology of consciousness might play a crucial part, may then be understood to be the possible missing link between the environmental stimuli of the behaviorists and the unconscious motivatiOns of the dynamic clinicians. Its future importance for a complete and comprehensive psychology of man may be impressive. REFERENCE NOTES 1Greenfield, T.K. Individual differences and mystical experience in response to three forms of meditation, Unpublished dissertation, University of Michigan, 1977. 250 REFERENCES Aaronson, B.S. Hypnosis, depth perception, and psychedelic experience, In C.T. Tart (Ed.), Altered State§_p§ Con- sciousness. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972, 268-275. 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