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I '0» ' I J J L} b P, __. .J b .- ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ANTINUCLEAR ACTIVISM By Diane Michele Darland A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Psychology 1985 ABSTRACT ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND ANTINUCLEAR ACTIVISM By Diane Michele Darland An exploratory study was conducted to investigate attitudes which might differentiate peOple who protest in favor of nuclear disarmament from those who do not. Subjects of both types completed a questionnaire designed to measure attitudes specifically related to the nuclear issue and related political attitudes. Activists differed significantly from nonactivistscnnll scales, and these scales were significantly correlated with a continuous measure of protest behavior. Compared to nonactivists, activists scored higher on scales measuring expressed concern, perceived likelihood, perceived severity, and emotional reponses toward the possibility of a nuclear war. They also disagreed more with current nuclear arms policies, expressed greater feelings of political efficacy and personal responsibility for the problem, and reported more conventional as well as unconventional political action. While it would be useful to replicate this study with a larger, more randomly selected sample, results do suggest that activists and nonactivists differ in the hypothesized ways. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, I would like to thank my advisor, Charles Wrigley, and the other members of my committee, Jack Condon and Andy Barclay, for their encouragement and patience over the years it has taken me to complete this thesis. Thanks is also due to my "other advisor," Herb Mirels, for his encouragement and, ultimately, for his impatience. Next, I wish to thank Dennis Fox, who introduced me to activism on this issue, and the members of Mobilization for Survival, particularly Bob Meyerhoff and Jack Pedersen, for their advice, friendship, and support in dealing with the dread that accompanies thinking about the threat of nuclear war. Special thanks are due the peOple who have been my friends while I was completing this thesis: Gary Goldberg, Hilary Godard, Marty Rice, and Jane Schodorf. I couldn't have done it without them. Thanks also to Marty and Hilary for their technical assistance with computers and printers. Finally, I want to thank my parents for their love and support throughout the years. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS page LIST OF TABLESOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOIOOOOOOOj-v Chapter I. Introduction...................................... Background...................................... Nature of the Present Study..................... Nuclear-related attitudes..................... Feelings Of Efficacy.coco-0.0000000000000000.o TrUSt and relatEd attitudES................... Perceived responsibility for action........... Emotional reactions to nuclear issues......... vaIUESooooooocoococo.00000000coco-0000000000010 Other social and political attitudes.........1l mNGUIwwNi-a II. MethOdOOOOOOCOOOOOOIOOOOIOOOOIOOOO0.0.00.0000000013 SUbjeCtSooooooooooooooooooncocoon-000.000.000.013 InStrumentS0.0..0...0.00......OOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOOIS NUClear ACtiVism Measureoooo00000000000000.0.15 AttitUde MeasurESoooooo0.0000000000000000000016 Preliminary Analyses on Scales.................22 Nuclear Activism Measures....................22 Attitudes Measures...........................23 III. Results..........................................33 Group Differences..............................33 Correlational AnalyseSoococo.00000000000000.00033 Secondary Analyses.............................36 IV. DiSCUSSiOnooooooo00o0000000000.00000000000000000043 Group DifferenceSOOOCOCCO0.0.0.0...00000000.0.043 AttitUde-behaVior conSiStenCyooooooooooooo0000045 Limitations of the Present Study...............46 Recommendations for Activists..................47 REFERENCE NOTEOOOOO.0.00......OOOOOOOOOOOOOCOOOOO0.0.051 LIST OF REFERENCESOOOOOO OOO.O00....0.0.0.000000000000052 APPENDIXOOOOOOOOOI000.000.0000..0.00.00.00.0000000000056 iii 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. LIST OF TABLES Page Pairs of Items Reflecting Opposing Positions on Nuclear Policy Issues........................18 Items in Disagreement Scale.....................27 Items in the Severity Scale.....................28 Items in the Efficacy Scale.....................29 Items in the Awareness Scale....................30 Items in the Activist World View Scale..........3O Items in the Tendermindedness Scale.............32 Mean Differences between Activists and Nonactivists for 12 Scales..................34 Reliabilities of 12 Scales and their Correlations with the Nuclear Activism Scale....35 Intercorrelations among 11 Scales...............37 Mean Differences between Groups on Ratings of Individual Emotions...............38 Mean Differences between Answers to Pairs of Items Reflecting Opposing Positions on NUCIear POlicy.O.O.0....OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOAO Mean Differences between Groups on Items Of the Citizen R018 scaleOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO..041 Mean Differences between Groups on Ratings Of valueSOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.42 iv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On June 12, 1982, an estimated three-quarters of a million people demonstrated their support for nuclear disarmament by marching through the streets of New York City past the UJL Building, where delegates were due to begin meeting in a special session on the issue. The marchers had come together from all parts of the U.Sq some had even traveled from other countries to express their convictions by being a part of the demonstration, which remains the largest nuclear disarmament demonstration ever held. Yet the attendance represents perhaps one-third of one percent of the population of the U. S. Polls from that time tell us that a large percentage of the populace were concerned about the possibility of a nuclear war. But only a small fraction of these express their concern nationally and locally, through such activities as protest demonstrations, peace vigils, petition drives, and educational activities. This research was aimed primarily at discovering what attitudes, beliefs, and emotional responses differentiate nuclear activists from nonactivists, and secondarily, at gaining insights into what motivates some people to act on their concerns while 1 others do not. Background Activism is generally construed to consist of activities designed to influence government action and public policy which go beyond conventional political participation such as voting and involvement with political parties. It may also be aimed at influencing public opinion and educating others, so that they, in turn will be supportive of change. Activists are seen to be dissatisfied with both the current state of affairs and conventional means of redress. Activism is therefore alternately referred to as "protest behavior" or "unorthodox political behavior," (Marsh, 1977). A fair amount of research has been devoted to activism in the past. Many studies looked at campus activists of the 1960H3and early'70's,focusingcnitheir personality attributes, family backgrounds, and political ideologies (e.g”,Block, Hann, & Smith, 1969; Morse & Peele, 1971). More recent research has examined personality traits and attitudes of pro- and anti-abortion activists (Werner, 1978) and attitudes of environmental activists (Kronus, 1977; Tucker, 1978). Marsh (1977) studied factors which related to "protest potential," 8 term which referred to a person's avowed willingness to use unorthodox political action in the event that he or she came to feel strongly about an issue. He found that high protest potential was related to a number of personal and political beliefs, including a sense of political efficacy, distrust of current government actions,easophisticated political ideology, and non-materialistic values. Nature of the Present Study In this study, I decided to look at the types of political and social attitudes studied by Marsh. Here, however, we can see if these and other attitudes relate to willingness to take action on this issue in particular, as opposed to a general potential for protest. A variety of measures were chosen, based on both past research and personal experience with members of nuclear activist groups. These relate to several general topics: beliefs specifically involving nuclear war or nuclear arms policy, feelings of efficacy, political trust, perceived responsibility for action, emotional responses, values, level of conventional participation, and attitudes toward related issues such as conventional war and the Soviet Union. Nuclear-related attitudes. Clearly, beliefs about the likelihood and probable severity of a nuclear war could interact to move peOple to take action they feel might prevent such a war. Activists might thus be found to have more extreme views on such topics. However, one can be concerned about the possibility of war and yet not favor disarmament; in fact, many people feel that maintaining deterrence is the best way to prevent such a war. Therefore, it was also felt to be important to measure 4 agreement or disagreement with various policy views on such issues as the need for more weapons, the logic of maintaining deterrence, or the need to plan for a limited nuclear exchange. These were intended to discern not only which side people believed, but also, how much confusion they experienced over which side to believe. Properly stated, opposing views can both sound quite attractive. It's difficult to know which position to take, because the issues are so complex and ambiguous. On the one hand, it may seem that we do need more arms so that we can bargain with the Soviets from a position of strength. Yet it may be equally plausible to look at the build—up in another way and say that it merely encourages the Soviets to do likewise, leading to a never-ending spiral. Attitudes and beliefs about the nuclear issue are most likely not sufficient to predict activism. The literature on attitude-behavior consistency has shown that the degree of correspondence between evaluative attitudes or cognitive beliefs about an issue and behaviors performed with regard to that issue is not necessarily very great (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Wicker (1971) suggested that prediction might be improved by measuring "other variables" which relate to a person's tendency to act on a belief. This approach has proven fruitful (e.g” Frideres, 1971; Werner, 1978). Werner predicted degree of activism from strength of attitudes on the abortion issue and found that personality traits predicted additional variance in activism. In this study, it was hypothesized that the following variables would prove to bear on a person's propensity to act. Feelings of efficacy. People are unlikely to protest unless they feel their efforts will be of some use. Previous attempts to measure such beliefs about action in the political sphere fall under the rubric "political efficacy, defined as "the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this changefl'(Campbe11, Gurin, ll Miller, 1954). Campbell et al. found that political efficacy predicted level of involvement in conventional political activities. Others have linked it to activism. Fbr example,Blocken:al.(1969)found that students involved in social and political issues believed in their ability to have an impact on society. Werner -found that externality on the political factor of Rotter's (1966) I—E scale (Mirels, 1970) correlated negatively and significantly with amount of abortion activism, while the total I-E score did not. Further support for this idea is found in Marsh (1977). He found that high protest potential was predicted not by efficacy alone, but by a combination of high efficacy and low political trust. These people distrusted the actions taken by existing political structures in dealing with issues but also felt that action they themselves might take could have an effect on the issues and on subsequent actions by authorities. Persons with lmnv political 6 efficacy were, in general, unwilling to attempt any sort of action, and persons with high efficacy and high trust were also unwilling, since they were content with current handling of problems. However, although the political efficacy scale used by Marsh is intended to measure a general belief that change is possible, it mostly asked about the percieved efficacy of such conventional political behaviors as voting in influencing the actions of government. Nuclear activists use unorthodox strategies and may have broader goals. Therefore, a parallel scale was constructed for this study to measure "social efficacy," which asked about one's belief in one's ability to do something about social problems or affect what happens in society at large. Finally, beliefs about the efficacy of specific protest behaviors were considered important. This is in accordance with the findings of Ajzen and Fishbein (1977), who have demonstrated that greater attitude-belief consistency is found if attitudes toward the behavior in question are measured, instead of attitudes toward the issue with which the behavior is concerned. Trust and related attitudes. As pointed out by Marsh, degree of trust in the political system to do what is right may be a determinant of activism. Similarly, trust in the current administration's ability to handle this particular issue may be important. Trust is important in another sense, too. Those who support the need for a strong nuclear deterrent may harbor great distrust of the Soviet Union and its sincerity in negotiations for arms treaties. Those who protest in support of disarmament may be more trusting of the Soviets. Perceived responsibility for action. Perhaps activists take action not only because they perceive a problem and believe theya number of different attitudes toward the nuclear issue, including the estimated likelihood of a nuclear war enul its probable severity, positions on various nuclear policies, and emotional reactions. Related attitudes, such as a sense of political and social efficacy, perceived responsibility for action, concern for 12 future hazards, distrust of government, and certain values, may also be important. CHAPTER II METHOD Subjects Subjects included 34 activists (19 males and 15 females) and 59 nonactivists (28 males and 31 females). Activists were recruited from among members of several antinuclear groups in East Lansing, Michigan. These groups and the methods of recruitment are described below. All groups cooperated to some extent in an umbrella organization, the East Lansing Peace Education Center. Physicians for Social Responsibility is a national organization with local chapters whose membership consists mainly of physicians and medical students, although anyone is eligible to join. Members strive to educate people about the medical effects of nuclear war, by showing films and giving talkstx>community groups. They believe that nuclear war would result in horrible deaths and injuries, exceeding the coping capabilities of the U. 8. medical profession, which itself would be decimated by the explosions. Therefore, they feel it is their duty as experts and citizens to inform otherssn>that.the danger might be averted. Active members of the local group were sent surveys by mails. Nine out of 15 surveys were returned, also by mail. 13 14 The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, founded “11915, supports disarmament.along with a wide variety of national and international causes such as civil rights, women's rights, education, environmental quality, and economic development. Surveys were passed out at a meeting of the group, and eight of 10 were returned by mail. Members were generally well—educated, middle-aged women; a few men also attended. Mobilization for Survival is also a: national organization and was one of the sponsors of the June 12th march. It focuses on educating people at a community level and emphasizes the need to spend less on the military and more to meet basic human needs. Surveys were passed out at a meeting and were collected in the group's mailbox at the Peace Center. Members were mostly college student or recent graduates. Five members completed surveys. Additional surveys were given to individuals known to the authorin>be activeixxdemonstrations(H‘the nuclear freeze petition drive. They included members ofEIlocal church group, board members of the Peace Center, and some students, accounting for seven more subjects. Nonactivists were also recruited from a variety of sources. The largest group was comprised of 39 students in.an upper level psychology course on social movements. Virtually all of these returned their surveys. Three also handed in surveys completed by family members. Eight graduate students in psychology were prevailed upon to 15 complete questionnaires. Three respondents were employees of a local business. Finally, six subjects were older adults. This is, of course, not a random sample by any means, but it does provide a comparison group for this exploratory investigation. Since most of the activists were well educated, graduate students and older, educated adults were sought an; subjects in order to have nonactivists of comparable age and education. The greatest systematic bias probably exists in the use of the social movements class. These participants were, on the average, younger and less educated than the majority of activists. However, students who would take such a class might be presumed to be more interested in the anti- nuclear social movement that the average person, and this would serve to attenuate differences between groups. In fact, two students were transferred to the activists group when their surveys revealed they had participated in a wide variety of anti-nuclear activities. Overall, the average age of the activists was 37.7 years and their average level of education was 17.2 years. The average age of the nonactivists was 28.9 years, and their average level of education was 15.3 years. Instruments Nuclear Activism Measure Although subjects were divided into two groups, a continuous measure of amount of activism was also 16 obtained. The scale assessed both willingness to perform and actual performance of two types of behaviors: (a) behaviors vfldxfli would increase or express one's own awareness of the issue, and (b) unorthodox political behavior (H1 behalf of the anti-nuclear issue. This multiple act criterion was used since it was more likely to produce higher correlations with dependent variables than a single act criterion (Weigel & Newman, 1976). The measure used here was modelled after that of Kerpelman (1972). Subjects checked responses in a grid format. Responses were scored from O to 5 and included 0 (have not performed this behavior and would never do it), 1 (have not but might do it), 2 (have not but would be willing to do it),13(have done at least once),li(have done several times), and 5 (have done regularly) (see Appendix, p. 62). Attitude Measures Nuclear-related items . Perceived likelihood was assessed by three items asking for judgements of the probability that there will be a nuclear war within the next five years, within the next 20 years, and within your lifetime. Responses provided from 0 almost impossible to 6 almost inevitable, with 3(50-50 chance)au3a midpoint (see Appendix,1h 61). Perceived severity was assessed in two ways. First, six items asked subjects to select from among alternatives the extent of destruction they thought would result from a nuclear war. Items asked about such things as what types 17 of targets would be damaged, how long radiation would be a problems, and how long it would take to restore the current U. S. standard of living. Possible responses were scored from O to 4 and included days, weeks, months, a few years,or many years(see Appendix,1n 64) Second, subjects were askedtx>indicate agree ment or disagreement with six Likert-type items about the severity of the aftermath of a nuclear war (e.gu "A nuclear war could destroy the Earth's capacity to sustain lifeJU. All Likert items described here and in the following pages can be found in pp. 65-68 of the Appendix. Twenty-one additional items with the same Likert format assessed attitudes toward other aspects of the nuclear issue, including viewscninuclear arms policy.Twelve of these were constructed in pairs, such that each pair reflected what was felt to be opposing sides on an issue (see Table 1). One additional question asked subjects to endorse one of three positions on disarmament: lack of support for disarmament, support for negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at bilateral disarmament, and support for unilateral disarmament by thelL S.(see Appendix, p. 60). A final group of items asked in a variety of ways about the degree to which subjects were concerned about the nuclear issue. The first asked subjects to name the most important problem facing the UAL Then, they were asked to count this as a 10 and to rate on a scale from the 1-10 18 TABLE 1 Pairs of Items Reflecting Opposing Positions on Nuclear Policy Issues 1. The $180 billion currently projected for spending on nuclear arms and delivery systems over the next 5 years is necessary for defense. 38. The $180 billion projected to be spent on nuclear weapons over the next 5 years is needed more urgently in other areas. 15. Currently proposed increases in nuclear arms will allow the UJL to negotiate for disarmament from a position of strength. 50. The currently proposed increase in nuclear weapons fuels the never-ending spiral of the arms race and encourages the Soviets to respond in kind. 22. More new nuclear weapons and delivery systems make the U.S. safer. 44. More nuclear weapons systems make the U.S. less safe. 25. Nuclear war is an awful prospect. But that's exactly why deterrence works. Neither side dares to start a war. 76. Deterrence is based on mutual fear--fear which grows ever greater, leading to suspicion and irrationality which could trigger a nuclear war. 32. We must devise nuclear strategies that will allow the [LS to emerge as the winner in the unfortunate event of nuclear war. After all, the Soviets are trying to do the same. 60. There can be no "winner" in a nuclear war; nuclear weapons areeuifar beyond conventional weapons in destructive capacity that a nuclear exchange cannot properly be called a war. 46. The U.S. can survive a nuclear war through adequate civil defense and contingency planning to handle circumstances after the war. 65. Our civilization.and the values we believe in could very well be destroyed by the nuclear war we fight to protect them. 19 nuclear disarmament. Two (Hflun' items simply asked subjects to indicate how concerned they were,cnia.scale from 0 (not at all concerned) to 4 (extremely concerned), about both national security and the possibility of nuclear war. Finally, one item asked how much this latter concern was on their minds, ranging from 0 (almost never) to 6 (more than once a day) see Appendix, pp. 60-61). Feelings pf efficacy. Political efficacy was measured by the six-item scale devised by Campbell, Gurin, and Miller of the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan (see Robinson, Rusk, and Head, 1969.) 'The items were originally used as a Guttman scale. Marsh, using an Anglicized version of the scale did not find that the scale conformed to Guttman scale criteria, but he did find a coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) of .76. In this study, items were simply presented in a Likert format, and subjects indicated strength of agreement or disagreement with each. However, as already noted, these items ask onlylabout how efficacious a person feels in attempting to influence government (e.g., "People like me have no say in what the government doesJO. To measure social efficacy, six items were constructed to be somewhat parallel to the political items, except that they asked about ability to have an impact on social problems or influence in society at large (e.g”."People like me can have little influence in what happens in society at largeJU. Finally, efficacy with regardtx>the nuclear issue in 20 particular was measured with three Likert items and four additional items asking subjects to rate the effectiveness of specific strategies used by people in pressing for disarmament. Responses here ranged from 0 (not at all effective) to 3 (very effective) (see Appendix, p. 62). Perceived responsibility. First, six Likert items were constructed which tapped various elements of a person's propensity to feel responsible to act. Paradoxically, perhaps, some of these items also pertained to feelings of efficacy while acting, while others alluded to the responsibility to take action even iftfluaprobability of success is small. Second, items were selected from the National Role Scale used by Morse and Peele, who adapted it from an unpublished study by Delameter, Katz, and Kelman (cited in Morse & Peele, 1971). These asked subjects to indicate how important they thought it was to perform each of 10 behaviors in order to fulfill their roles as U.S. citizens. Some of these behaviors aim at supporting the stnatus quo (e.g., "suppnnrt <2urrerH: pold42ies of government") while others emphasize taking responsibility for creating change (e49, "work within the political system to change policies with which you disagree"). Responses ranged from 0 (not at all necessary to do to be a good citizen) to 6 (absolutely necessary to do to be a good citizen)(see Appendix,1u 58). 21 Igpgg. The four-item Political Trust Scale developed by the Institute for Social Research (see Robinson et a1" 1969) and adapted by Marsh was used here. Three items asked subjects to indicate how often they trust government officials to do what is right, to tell the truth, and to put the needs of the country ahead of the needs of their own party. Responses ranged from 0 (almost never) to 3 (almost always). A fourth item asked subjects to indicate whether they thought the country was:run for the benefit of all (scored 3) of for the benefit of a few big interests (scored 0). Marsh reported a coefficient alpha of .76 for this scale (see Appendix,1L 59). In addition, fourldkert.items were used,relating to trust or distrust of the Soviet Union. Finally, two Likert items tested for trust in the Reagan administrathnfls ability to handle specific issues, including arms negotiations. Values, The format here was the same as that used by Rokeach, i.e” subjects were given a list of values and were asked to rank them in order of importance from 1 (most important) on down. However, the list of values was altered. Values seen to be likely either to motivate (A World at Peace) or inhibit (National Security) action were included as well as others seen as generally relevant to political issue (Freedom, Equality). Values added for the purposes of this study included Concern for Other People, Job or Economic Security, Personal Safety, and Preservation of tin: Environment (see Appendix, p. 59). 22 Other variables. A scale of conventional political participation was included, which asked subjects to rate how frequently they performed various behaviors relating to awareness of and involvement in the political process. Responses ranged from 0 (never) to 4 (regularly). This scale was adapted from Marsh (see Appendix, p. 58). Twenty-two additional Likert items were included which pertained to other social issues related to protest and the nuclear issue (see Appendix, pp. 65-68). In the final questionnaire, all 76 Likert items were mixed together and presented as the final group of items. Subjects were asked to indicate agreement or disagreement with each on a scale from +3 to -3. In analyses, responses to these items were transformed to a 1 to 7 format. Items were reflected as necessary such that a higher score was always in the direction in which activists were predicted to score, except for a few ambiguous items where no predictions were made. The questionnaire also contained items asking for demographic information, such as age, education, religious preference, marital status, and occupation or major. Subjects reported taking about an hour to complete the survey. Preliminary Analyses pp Scales Nuclear Activism Measures The full 15-item scale was found to have a coefficient alpha of .96. Two subscales were also examined. The six items relating only to awareness and information seeking and discussion with others resulted in a coefficient alpha 23 of .90. 'The remaining IUJH3 items represented a conceptually purer measure of protest behavior, with a coefficient alpha of .94. However, the two scales were so highly correlated (£3.76) that the full scale was used as the continuous criterion measure. Activists averaged 57.35 on this scale, and nonactivists averaged 25.85. The difference between the two was highly significant (t=14.84,.df=91, p<.OOOl). Attitude Measures Some scales were acceptable for use as devised, others were not. Some of these proved to have one or more items which did not correlate with the rest, others had unacceptable reliabilities. The Likelihood of Nuclear War scale had an average interitem correlation of .84, so the items were summed to form a single scale, producing a coefficient alpha of .92. The items measuring concern about the nuclear issue (concern for national security was not included here) had an average interitem correlation of .59. Since these items had different response formats, scores on each were standardized and then summed. Coefficient alpha was found to be .81. The six items (H? the Extent of Destruction Scale correlated, on the average, .37, and when summed, yielded a coefficient alpha of .76. The seven items of the Conventional Political Participation Scale yielded an average intercorrelation of .48 and when summed into a 24 scale, a coefficient alpha of .87. One item oftflqumotional Responses Scale,that which asked about feelings (Hf depression cn‘ helplessness, displayed an anomolous pattern of correlation with the rest of the items. Since it was also felt to be conceptually different, it was dropped from the scale. The remaining four items, with an average intercorrelation of .57, were added to form a scale, with a coefficient alpha of .85. The remaining scales presented problems. First, the four items of the Efficacy of Protest Strategies scale had an average interitem correlation of.32. When added to produce a single scale, they yielded a coefficient alpha of only .60. This scale was examined in some analysies. The Political Trust Scale was discarded altogether, since it seemed to cause difficulties for a number of subjects. Some subjects omitted one item or another, particularly the first, which asked for a choice between whether government is run for the benefit of all or for the benefit of a few big interests. Several subjects wrote in that this was not a realistic dichotomy. Answers to other items were sometimes qualified. For example, one subject answered that government officials almost always tell the truth, but wrote in, "as they see it." This destroyed the nature of the question and created suspicion that other subjects were performing similar reinterpretations. Further problems were presented by the scales composed 25 of Likert items. Many of these failed to yield adequate reliabilities, for example, the perceived responsibility and political and social efficacy scales. The reliabilities of these were .70, .54, and .66, respectively. Since these three ‘were scales of considerable interest lJl this investigation, it was decided to see if the items could be salvaged by performingzafactor analysiscflfall 76 Likert items. If other items were found to cluster with the scales listed above, the additional length might contribute to a more respectable reliability. Accordingly, a factor analysis was performed using a principal factors method with squared multiple Rig as estimates of communalities. Six, eight,zuulten factor solutions were rotated with varimax rotation. Six groups of items which remained relatively stable in all of these were selected as potential scales. The factors turned out to be quite easy to interpret, for the most part, and actually made more conceptual sense than the a priori scheme. This was seen to support the use of the procedure as an analytic aid in this situation, even though there were too few subjects to really justify the factor analysis. The first factor was labelled "Disagreement." Items in this scale are listed in Table 2. Most of the anti- nuclear policy statements loaded positively here, and most pro-deterrence, need-for-nuclear-weapons policy items 26 loaded negatively. In addition, items involving trusting the Soviets loaded here, supporting the interpretation of this factor as reflecting disagreement with the policies of the Reagan administration. Using the 14 items as a scale produced a coefficient alpha of .90. The items aimed at testing subjects' perceptions of the severity of the nuclear threat loaded together on a second factor, together with some other nuclear items (see Table 3). Although the factor can in general be thought of as "Severityfl' it must be noted that there is :3 strong emotional content implicit in most of these items. Coefficient alpha for these 12 items considered as a scale was 90. Many of the efficacy items loaded together on a third factor, including those expressing a sense of political efficacy, an understanding of the:issues,anuithe belief that something could be done about the nuclear issue in particular (see Table 4). The 13 items of this scale, labelled "Efficacy," produced a coefficient alpha of .84. The items in a fourth factor suggested the sort of vigilant awareness postulated by the construct of "longsightednessfl' Several of these items leaded here, along with others suggesting21broad.scope of awareness and a tendency, perhaps, to worry about things (see Table 5). This scale (Hf six items, labelled "Awarenessfl' yielded a coefficient alpha of .73. A fifth factor was somewhat more difficult to interpret. It seemed to reflect a particular type of 27 TABLE 2 Items in Disagreement Scale Positively scored items 38. 44. 43. 50. 18. 60. 72. The $180 billion projected to be spent on nuclear weapons ever the next 5 years is needed more urgently in other areas. More new nuclear weapons make the U.S. less safe. Human services programs supported by the federal government in areas such as education, job training, health care, and the alleviation of poverty have suffered under the current administration. The currently proposed increase in nuclear weapons fuels the never-ending spiral of the arms race and encourage the Soviets to respond in kind. If enough people demonstrate their concern, we can bring a halt to the arms race. There can be no "winner" in a nuclear war; nuclear weapons are so far beyond conventional weapons in destructive capacity that a nuclear exchange cannot properly be called a war. We should believe the Soviets when they say they're interested in disarmament. Negatively scored items 54. 24. 32. 30. 22. 15. We can't trust the Russians at all. Communism is :1 threat to democratic nations everywhere. We must devise nuclear strategies that will allow the U.S. to emerge as the winner in the unfortunate event of nuclear war. After all, the Soviets are trying to do the same. The U.S should maintain missile bases close to the Soviet border. I trust the Reagan Administration1u>take the right steps in negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding nuclear disarmament. More nuclear weapons and delivery systems make the U.S. safer. Currently proposed increases in nuclear arms will allow the UJL to negotiate for disarmament from a position of strength. The $180 billion currently projected for spending on nuclear arms and delivery systems over the next 5 years is necessary for national defense. 28 TABLE 3 Items in the Severity Scale Positively scored items 35. 9. 17. 65. 52. 26. 6].. 76. 69. Nuclear war could mean the end of the human race. A nuclear war could very likely destroy the earth's capacity to sustain life. The aftermath of a nuclear war will be utter chaos. Our civilization and the values we believe in could very well be destroyed by the nuclear war we fight to protect them. I get angry when I hear talk of a "winnable" nuclear war. After a nuclear war, the survivors will envy the dead. The existence of nuclear weapons is offensive to some of my deepest moral beliefs. Deterrence is based on mutual fear—~fear which grows ever greater, leading to suspicion and irrationality which could trigger a nuclear war. I believe the existence of nuclear weapons threatens the future of the children of the world. Negatively scored items 46. 58. 49. The U.S can survive a nuclear war through adequate civil defense and contingency planning to handle circumstances after the war. Nuclear war is not as great a threat as some say. Nuclear war would.cause onlyaitemporary setback in the progress of Western civilization. 29 TABLE 4 Items in the Efficacy Scale Positively scored items 42. 71. 10. 73. There are things I can do to have an influence in current affairs. It feels good to publicly express what I believe in. I follow what's goingcniin government most of the time. I understand the important national and international issues facing the U.S. pretty well. Negatively scored items 59. 20. 3. 27. 68. 55. 47. 6. 40. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me cannot really understand what's going on. ' People like me can have little influence in what happens in society at large. People like me have no say in what government does. There is not much I can do about most of the important problems that we face today. When I have a problem or a worry, I try not to think about it, but to keep busy with something else. Nuclear war is probably inevitable. The international situation is so complex that it is difficult to think clearly about many issues. The nuclear arms race is mostly a response to the difficult and dangerous world we live in. There's very little we can do to bring about a lasting world peace. 30 TABLE 5 Items in the Awareness Scale Positively scored items 45. 66. 21. I think it is important to avoid addictions to things like caffeine, cigarettes, and alcohol. It makes sense to avoid the things scientists have declared to be carcinogenic. Sometimes I feel I ought to take action to support a cause, even if the probability of success is small. Negatively scored items 53. 70. 19. Children under 12 are too young to be worried about injustice in society. I don't worry much about people in other parts of the world. National and international happenings just don't seem relevant to my life. TABLE 6 Items in the Activist World View Scale Positively scored items 31. 23. 57. 16. 29. 5. By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can control world events. I am concerned about the future hazard posed by radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants. The nuclear arms race is mostly a result of conscious militaristic choices by U.S. decision makers. I consider myself a citizen of the world. With the type of weapons available now and the uncertainty in international affairs, it would be relatively easy for a nuclear war to start by mistake. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative. Negatively scored items. 13. 25. It's easy to avoid thinking about nuclear war. Nuclear war is an awful prospect. But that's exactly why deterrence works. Neither side dares to start a war. 31 world view, including an appreciation of the nuclear threat and the value of group cooperation in working to end it (see Table 6). This scale of items, labelled "Activist World View," produced a coefficient alpha of .77. A sixth factor was quite easy to interpret. This factor seemed to reflect tender v. toughmindedness. It included items relating to militarism and pacifism (which loaded in opposite directions) as well as the item: "If I were President and I knew the Soviets had launched a nuclear attack, I would immediately order our missiles fired in retaliation," (see Table 7). The eight—item scale was labelled "Tendermindedness" and produced a coefficient alpha of .77. Nunnally (1978) has written that reliability ought to exceed.7O for preliminary work with a scale and should preferably' exceed .80 for research applications. According to these criteria, almost all the scales just discussed display adequate reliabilities, with the exception of the Efficacy of Protest Strategies scale. 32 TABLE 7 Items in the Tendermindedness Scale Positively scored items 34. Sending food and other badly needed supplies to other nations will do more to maintain stable world relations than will the policy of increasing our military strength. Negatively scored items 41. People will generally take advantage ofynniif they can get away with it. We should plan for a limited nuclear war. Pacifism is simply not a practical philosophy for the world today. It is more important to solve current UJL economic problems than to try to bring about world peace. U.S. arms sales to 3rd world countries provide those countries with a strong defense, so they can develop without harassment by greedy neighbors. If I were President, and I knew the Soviets had launched a nuclear attack, I would immediately order our missiles fired in retaliation. CHAPTER III RESULTS Group Differences 1 tests were performed to test for significant differences between activists and nonactivists on the scales now defined: Likelihood, Emotional Responses, Concern, Destructiveness, Conventional Political Participation, Severity, Disagreement, Efficacy, Awareness, World View, Tendermindedness, and Efficacy of Protest. Simple t tests were used since there were a priori predictions that the two groups would differ on these items, although some of the items have been rearranged into different scales. For each variable, the groups were tested to see in the variances if each were equal. In the case that they were not, Satterthwaite's (1946) approximation for computing aj;statistic and its degrees of freedom was used (see Steele & Torrie, 1980.) Results are presented in Table 8. All differences are highly significant, all but one at the pfi.0001 level. Correlational Analyses These 12 variables were correlated with the continuous activism scale. Results are presented in Table 9. All correlations are significant, most at the pfi.0001 level. 33 34 TABLE 8 Mean Differences between Activists and Nonactivists for 12 Scales Scale Likelihood Emotionsa Concern Destructiveness Conventional Participation Disagreementa Severitya Efficacy Awarenessa World View Tenderminded Efficacy of Protest Activists 12.1 11.8 166.2 21.5 19.9 92.3 75.5 67.1 36.5 43.5 43.5 7.0 Nonactivists 7.6 11.8 139.0 18.7 13.1 70.1 63.7 56.9 31.3 35.3 32.9 5.8 86 87 91 88 91 91 91 In 5.60** 5.78** 5.59** 4.54** 6.14** 8.75** 5.40** 4.54** 5.30** 5.34** 7.35** 3.73* aSatterthwaite's *p<.001. **p<.0001. approximation was used to statistic and its degrees of freedom compute t 35 TABLE 9 Reliabilities of 12 Scales and their Correlations with the Nuclear Activism Scale Scale Coefficient Alpha Correlation Likelihood .84 .66** Emotions .85 .61** Concern .81 .73** Destructiveness .76 .34* Conventional .87 .65** Disagreement .90 .74** Severity .90 .57** Efficacy .84 .50** Awareness .73 .47** World View .77 .66** Tenderminded .77 .69** Efficacy of .60 .50** Protest *R<.ooo1. **R<.0001. 36 Omitting the Efficacy of Protest scale, which had an unacceptably low reliability, the remaining eleven variables were moderately to highly intercorrelated, the average correlation being .48 (see Table 10). A factor analysis of scale scores for these 11 produced only one factor, accounting for 84.1% of the shared variance. This suggests the presence of an underlying, unifying dimension. A summary variable was created from the summed standardized scores for each individual scale. Scores on this scale correlated .84 (pfi.0001) with the nuclear activism scale. In addition, activists and nonactivists differed significantly on this variable (£=8.48, d£=91, p<.0001). Secondary Analyses These included tests of certain other hypotheses. It was predicted that activists would have different emotional responses than nonactivists. On the item asking about feelings of depression and helplessness, activists and nonactivists did not differ. But activists were significantly higher on all other emotional responses (see Table 11). It was predicted that activists would have more clearly differentiated opinions on opposing viewpoints about the nuclear issue. This was tested by performing analyses on responses to the paired items. Only subjects whose answers to the anti-nuclear item was greater than or equal to the pro-nuclear item were included here. This involved .HOO.VN*** .HO.VN** .mO.Vd* .uchMWchwm cocum: "unmoxm .Hooo. N um ucmoflwwcwwm mum mcofiumfimuuou HH< mm. OH mm. we. no. cm. 00. ***om. as. om. om. cm. oq. Ho. No. **om. ***mm. mm. mm. mo. ow. mm. Om. ow. me. am. as. ***mm. *om. ***nm. wq. mcmfi. **Hm. mcwfi. mccfi. 00. Na. om. Hm. mo. mm. we. we. no. am. mm. mcmfi. «q. me. ***mm. mcmfl. mm. ***mm. «0. mo. 00. w m o n q m N H mmmcvoe:HEuovcmH 3mfi> efitoz mmmcmum3< sumuflwem zufiom>mm acmemmnwmmwn :ofiummflUfiuomm HmcoHucm>coo mmmcm>fluuanumoa cumucoo mcofiuoem eooeefimst HH OH mmfimum HH wcoe< mcoflumfimuuoupmucH OH m4m compute t statistic and its degrees of freedom. *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. ****p<.OOOl. 42 TABLE 13 Mean Differences between Groups on Ratings of Values Value Activists Nonactivists g; p A Comfortable 8.7 7.4 89 2.61* Life8 A World at 2.9 4.5 90 2.73** Peace Job or Economic 6.8 5.7 90 2.19* Security National 9.1 6.8 90 5.12*** Securitya aSatterthwaite's approximation was used to compute 3 statistic and its degrees of freedom *p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.0001. CHAPTER IV DISCUSSION Group Differences The activists in this study seemed to differ in a number of ways from the nonactivists. They have greater feelingscnfefficacy,as foundiJiprevious studies(e.g” Marsh, 1977). While the moderating role of trust was not tested here, simple disagreement with current handling of affairs proved to be important. Actually, there are conceptual similarities between these two. Both imply that a person does not approve of government actions. The political trust scale can possibly be reinterpreted as representing disagreement with the way things are run, Indeed, the respondent who wrote in that politicians tell the truth as they see it seems to have been expressing disagreement with what the truth is seen to be, rather than distrust in politicians' truthfulness. Many items originally planned for a trust-related scale loaded on the Disagreement factor, including those expressing the belief that we ought to trust that the Soviets do wish to negotiate for disarmament. Also included here was the item "I trust the Reagan Administration to take the proper steps in negotiating for disarmament." Again, the issue of trust may not be as 43 44 important as the disagreement over what is proper. Finally, the straightforward policy items as well as "Communism is a threat to democratic nations everywherefl' loaded