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UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF U.S.'
FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE 19505

presented by
Yiming Wang

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UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE l950s

By

Yiming Wang

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1987

ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF U.S.
FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE l9SOS

By

Yiming Wang

When Truman left the White House in l953, Taiwan's legal status
was not settled. Because of considerations of domestic politics and
the international situation in Asia, Eisenhower and Dulles used Taiwan
as a deterrent to Chinese "Communist expansion." But Eisenhower found
himself in a dilemma when the offshore island crisis occurred. He was
not able to solve the contradiction between using Chiang's forces to
deter the PRC and discouraging him from attempting to recover the main-
land by force. The study of U.S. State Department primary sources and
other U.S. government documents, as well as important secondary studies
on U.S. China policy, reveals that Eisenhower was very hesitant and
indecisive in the crisis. His advisers had different views, and the
European allies raised strong opposition. Most importantly, Eisenhower
was determined to avoid risk of war. He finally took the initiative
to drop brinkmanship and started a policy of maintaining a de facto

two Chinas.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express here my sincere thanks to Dr. Warren 1. Cohen
and Dr. Lewis H. Siegelbaum, who read and gave valuable criticism of
this thesis. To Dr. Cohen, I am especially indebted for his guidance,
advice, encouragement and warm friendship. I also very much appreciate
his generous help of allowing me to use his notes from V.K. Wellington
Koo‘s diaries, which proved to be very useful. To Dr. Siegelbaum, I am
very grateful for his helpful suggestions and comments.

I am deeply grateful for the Fulbright Scholarship and the finan-
cial help from the Department of History and the Asian Studies Center

of Michigan State University. They made my graduate study possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTRODUCTION .................................................... l
Chapter
I. THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR .............................. 5
II. TAIWAN'S ROLE IN DULLES'S DETERRENCE POLICY l953-l955 ..... l4
III. THE FIRST OFFSHORE ISLAND CRISIS 1954-l955 ................ 25
IV. FROM MID-1955 TO THE SECOND OFFSHORE ISLAND CRISIS ........ 48
CONCLUSIONS ..................................................... 57

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . .......................................... 6l

INTRODUCTION

It is generally accepted that the outbreak of the Korean War in
June of 1950 was the turning point in U.S.-Taiwan relations. President
Harry Truman's decision to neutralize the Taiwan Straits prevented the
fall of the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. After that, although the
future legal status of Taiwan was unsettled during the remaining time of
Truman's presidency, the objective of his administration with respect
to Taiwan was to deny the People's Republic of China (PRC) the control
of that island. It was during the time of Eisenhower's presidency that
the de facto two Chinas was perpetuated under the assumption that China
would be divided just like Germany, Korea and Vietnam, and neither the
Nationalist Government in Taiwan, nor the Communist government in the
mainland would conquer the other by force.

There is no doubt that either Truman's policy toward the Taiwan
area, or that of Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, was to pursue U.S. interests. Scholars who have studied Sino-
American relations in the 19505 have different views, however, about
how Truman and Eisenhower perceived American interests and how their
perceptions influenced the policies of both administrations. One
group including Warren I. Cohen, J.H. Kalicki, Charles Alexander, and
Louis Gerson among others, hold the view that the Eisenhower Administra-
tion pursued a two Chinas policy which was essentially the same as that

of Truman's. They point out Dulles's argument that the reality of the

2

existence of two Chinas had the same nature as that of two Germanys,
two Koreas and two Vietnams. They emphasize the fact that no one in
the Eisenhower Administration favored Chianq Kai-shek's plan of recover-
ing the mainland. Alexander argues that the rhetoric of ”rolling back
Communist tide" was used only to appease anti-Communist militants in
Congress and create the appearance of a sharp break with previous
Democratic policy. In essence Eisenhower and Dulles's policy toward
the Taiwan Straits continued that of the Truman Administration.

Differing from this group, some scholars see change in Eisenhower
and Dulles's policy. William Bueler argues that Eisenhower and Dulles's
perception of the PRC's aggressiveness in Asia was an important factor
that brought about the change. Alexander George and Richard Smoke see
the development of the deterrence commitment in Eisenhower and Dulles's
policy. They think that the Eisenhower Administration's shift toward
a stronger commitment to the Nationalist Chinese was a logical result
of its perception of the Chinese Communists as irrational and aggres-
sive,

As U.S.-PRC relations improved in the T9705, some American
scholars started systematic research on the policies of the PRC
toward the United States. Thomas Stolper and Kalicki have the view
that the offshore island crises were an effort of the PRC to sabotage
the U.S. attempt to perpetuate a de facto two Chinas. The PRC had no
intention at all during the crises to take the offshore islands. In
their writings the image of the Chinese leaders was portrayed as
rational and restrained,.and the Chinese responses to U.S. policies
as defensive.

Most of these scholars studied U.S.—Taiwan relations within the

3
context of the whole issue of Sing-American relations, since the deve—
lopments of the bilateral relations were, to a large degree, decided by
the relationship between the United States and the PRC. This thesis,
however, focuses narrowly on U.S.-Taiwan relations. It argues that in
the first year and a half the Eisenhower Administration did not pursue
a two Chinas policy vigorously. During that period Secretary of State
Dulles never mentioned the example of two Germanys, two Koreas and two
Vietnams on any occasion. He perceived the PRC as aggressive and tried
to make Taiwan play a good role in his deterrence strategy of driving
back "Communist expansion." If the Eisenhower Administration seriously
pursued the two Chinas policy right from the beginning as some scholars
argued, it would be very difficult to understand its decision of
supporting Chiang's forces to raid China's commerce and territories
because that could help cause conflict and war rather than maintain a
status guo of two Chinas.

It was the first offshore island crisis that made the Eisenhower
Administration shift back to the two Chinas policy. During the crisis
the United States gave up its support for raiding the PRC and took one
step after another to put Chiang back into its tight control. Not
until the later stage of the crisis did Dulles begin to persuade Taiwan
to follow the example of Germany, Korea and Vietnam.

This thesis begins with a brief study of the impact of the Korean
War. It focuses on the Eisenhower Administration with examination of
the shift of U.S. policy from using Nationalist forces as a threat to
China to purporting to end hostility in the Taiwan Straits. To better
understand the shift of policy it discusses in detail the related
factors that helped bring about this shift: the differences among

Eisenhower's advisers with regard to Dulles's deterrence policy, the

4
European allies' opposition to Dulles's brinkmanship, and Eisenhower's

determination to avoid a general war with China.

CHAPTER I

THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

By l949 the downfall of Chiang's Nationalist Government in China
was inevitable. Early that year the United States began to reconsider
seriously its relations with the Nationalist Government and the future
status of Taiwan. Facing the reality that the Chinese Communists would
control the country with a population of 500 milion, the Truman Admini-
stration now based its policy toward Chiang's government largely upon
the possibility of whether normal relations could be worked out with
the Communist government.

As early as March T949, the Truman Administration had ruled out
any further military and economic aid to Chiang. It saw the futility
of giving more aid to turn the tide of the Chinese civil war. When the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was discussing Sl.5 billion
additional aid to Chiang, the Secretary of State Dean Acheson raised
strong opposition. In his letter to the Committee Acheson argued that
Chiang's defeat was not because his forces lacked military equipment.
"There is no evidence that this furnishing of additional military
material would alter the pattern of current devel0pments in China."1
At his appearance at the hearings before the Committee, Acheson tried to
dissuade the senators from approving further aid by reading them a
letter from China written by some American businessmen who opposed the
aid.2 Their severe criticism of the decadent and ineffective National-
ist Government had obviously no small influence on Acheson.

When the State Department published its "White Paper", ascribing

5

6
the loss of China to the corruption and incompetence of Chiang's
government, the relationship between the United States and Chiang was
almost over, although the "White Paper" was mainly an effort by the
Truman Administration to shift its responsibility for another Communist
victory and to protect itself from the increasing domestic criticism of
its China policy. Truman and Acheson had to accept the reality that
sooner or later the United States would deal with the Chinese Communist
government. Since the Communists were consolidating their control over
China, it was not in America's interest to push China toward the Soviet
Union. The normalization of relations with the Communist government
would leave the possibility open of driving a wedge between the two
Communist countries. Another Titoist state within the Communist world
would serve U.S. interest.

As China was surely lost to the Communists, Taiwan became strate-
gically important. It linked the defense line between Okinawa and the
Philippines and proved to be of great military value in the Pacific War
when the Japanese used it as a base to attack the Philippines. In March
1949, some senators on the Foreign Relations Committee asked some legal
questions concerning the trusteeship for Taiwan. They were particularly
interested in keeping Taiwan under U.S. control. Senator Elbert Thomas
of Utah frankly expressed his view that Taiwan should have a U.S.

3

trusteeship, rather than a U.N. trusteeship. After the "White Paper“

was published, the State Department urged the National Security
Council (NSC) to review U.S. policy for Taiwan and

"requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) furnish
the NSC their present estimate of the strategic
importance to the United States of Formosa, particularly
in light of the very real possibility that it will
ultimately pass under Chinese Communist control in the
absence of active intervention on the part of the

United States."4

7
Within the U.S. government there was a general agreement that it

would be in the U.S. interest to keep Taiwan away from Communist Control.5
The JCS recommended direct military intervention mainly out of military
consideration. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Dean Rusk favored U.S. taking over Taiwan as a neutral place.6 Chief
of Policy Planning Staff George Kennan even suggested a plan of using
American forces to overthrow Chiang's regime on Taiwan and let Taiwan
be independent.7 However, by early 1950 the Truman Administration had
decided not do anything to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking
over Taiwan. On January 5, l950, Truman formally announced that

"the United States has no predatory designs on Formosa

or on any other Chinese territory. The United States

has no desire to obtain Special rights or privileges,

or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time.

Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed

forces to interfere in the present situation. The U.S.

Government will not pursue a course which will lead to

involvement in the Civil conflict in China. Similarly,

the U.S. Government will not provide military aid or

advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."8
On the same day in the afternoon Acheson held a special press conference.
He confirmed U.S. recognition of China's legal right to Taiwan and
reaffirmed that the United States would not get involved militarily in

Taiwan.9

The non-involvement policy reflected Acheson's conception of U.S.
interests. Acheson had more concern for Europe than Asia. He was
rigorously implementing the containment policy in Europe. He thought
military involvement in the Chinese civil war would tied down American
forces in China. That could jeopardize American interests in Europe.
He believed that an accommodation with Communist China would benefit
U.S. interests more than hostility. Although the Chinese leader Mao

Tse-tung had declared leaning to the Soviet Union in the struggle

8

between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp, Acheson still
wanted to keep the possibility Open of a rivalry between the two
Communist countries. He did not want to make ideological similarity a
criterion for recognizing a new government. As long as that government
exercised effective control, recognized its international obligations
and governed with the consent of the people, Acheson had no objection to
recongnizing it. In the case of China in early l950 he did not feel it
very difficult to normalize relations with the PRC if it had proper
respect for its international obligations.10

The U.S. government's inaction to the imminent fall of Taiwan to
the PRC before the Korean War was self-evident. On May ll, l950, the
CIA presented a report predicting that "the Chinese Communists are
capable of seizing Taiwan before the end of l950, and will probably do

so. There had been no "substantial improvement of political and

military situation on Taiwan."11 Two weeks later the Acting Secretary
of State Department James Webb instructed the American Embassy in

Taipei to prepare the evacuation plan for U.S. personnel in Taiwan. The
American government had contacted the Philippine government about a
place of refuge for Chiang Kai-shek in the Philippines, but the

Philippines refused Chiang.12

When Karl Rankin went to take charge of
the American Embassy in August of l950, he found it was almost "in the
last stages of decay". Good office and household equipment had been
moved out; most files had been destroyed and "operations were virtually
limited to keeping evacuation plans up-to-date."13
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 put an end to
American non-involvement in the Chinese civil war. Two days later
Truman sent the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to prevent the PRC from

seizing Taiwan. Although Truman declared that the step for the

9
neutralization of the Taiwan Straits was mainly out of military considera-
tion, it was obvious that political consequences of the simultaneous fall
of Taiwan weighed heavily with him. Domestically, he needed the support
for his war effort in Korea from those Congressmen who also wanted Truman
to do something for Taiwan. Internationally, he should show himself as
not being soft to "Communist expansion."

Although Truman's preliminary measure of neutralizing Taiwan was a
temporary make-shift as he announced on June 27, l950, this dramatic
policy change would hardly be reversed even if the North Korean military
action could be quickly frustrated by American military intervention.

A month after Truman's announcement, Chairman of the JCS General Omar
Bradley submitted to the NSC the recommendation of the JCS on U.S.
policy toward Taiwan. The JCS stressed the strategic importance of
Taiwan to U.S. security and strongly recommended that, irrespective of
the situation in Korea, the United States should continue to deny Taiwan
to the PRC, or at least until the future status of Taiwan had been
determined in accordance with Truman's announcement of June 27. The JCS
also recommended that the United States should retain freedom of action
with respect to Taiwan. On the following day the 62nd meeting of the
NSC presided over by Truman approved the JCS's recommendations.14 Thus,
the long-term plan to separate Taiwan from China was made before China
joined the Korean War. Arms shipments to Taiwan were renewed in August
l950. In March, l95l the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was
established in Taipei and the first 100 American military advisers were
sent there. American military aid was dramatically increased with the
first allocation of 300 million dollars recommended by the MAAG.15

Truman's neutralization of the Taiwan Straits is often criticized

as not really neutral. Nationalist forces frequently made hit-and-run

lO

raids on the mainland. The 7th Fleet was instructed not to protect the
PRC. However, within the circle of policymakers the immediate and
long-term.U.S. objectives with respect to Taiwan were clearly to deny
its control to the PRC, while at the same time not to support Chiang's
attempt to recover the mainland by force. The State Department called
to the attention of the Department of Defense that American aid was
"designed to contribute to the defense of Formosa, and not to develop
the Nationalist military potential for possible mainland invasion."16
As for the future U.S. policy toward Taiwan, Acheson was very careful
not to make any definite commitments to the Nationalists. It was not in
the interest of the United States to restrict its freedom of action.17
When the Nationalist ambassador V.K. Wellington Koo explored the possi-
bility of including Taiwan in a similar pact as the tripartite pact of
Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) in July l95l, Acheson refused,
because the Nationalist government's objectives went beyond the defense
of Taiwan and embraced reconguest of the mainland.18

After American unilateral military action neutralized the Taiwan
Straits, the United States again explored the legal possibility of
putting Taiwan in trusteeship, or allowing it to get independence. The
decision to return Taiwan to China was made in l943 in Cairo and confirmed
in August 1945 at Potsdam. In October 1950 the Consultant to the
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, suggested the United States
should state at the United Nations General Assembly that the assumption
at the time of Cairo and Potsdam about the willingness of the people of
Taiwan for returning to China might not be valid now since the interven-
ing changes were so great. More emphasis should be put on the self-

l9

determination of the Taiwanese. The United States knew clearly the

real obstacle to the independence of Taiwan was Chiang Kai-shek.

ll
Therefore, a study of the possibility of removing him was under way in
late l950. On February 9, l95l, the Office of Chinese Affairs presented
its study report on this matter. It stated that the removal of Chiang
by the United States was almost impossible. Since the Korean War had
strengthened his position, Chiang would not voluntarily resign. Any
effort of the U.S. government to remove him by force would inevitably
bring about disorder which would benefit the PRC.20 Thus, this plan was
dropped.

Throughout the remaining period of his administration, Truman did
not change his policy announced on June 27, 1950. The objective was
still to deny Taiwan to the PRC, but the United States did not make
long-term commitments to Chiang about continued recognition of his
regime as the government of China, and gave no encouragement about the
reconguest of the mainland. Any changes had to wait until the Eisenhower

Administration took office.

NOTES--CHAPTER I

1 U.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, March 15, 1949, Economic Assistance to China and Korea:
1949-1950, Blst Congress, p. 8.

2 ibid, March 18, 1949, pp. 20-21.

3 ibid, March 22, 1949, pp. 61-67.

4 Webb Memorandum for Souers, August 19, 1949, NSC Progress
Report, NSC 37/6, Documents of the NSC, first supplement, (University

Publication of America, Inc., 1981),TR011 1.

5 Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1978), p. 7.

6

 

Rusk to the Secretary of State, May 30, 1950, EB, 1950, 6:349—50.

7 Warren I. Cohen, "Acheson and China", in Dorothy Borg and Waldo
Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years (New York: Columbia University Press,
1980), pp. 27-28.

8

 

95B, January 16, 1950, p. 79.

9 Acheson's Address to Special Press Conference, January 5, 1950,
Aff_1950-55, 2:2451.

10 William M. Bueler, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan
(Boulder, CO: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971)} pp. 5161

1' CIA Research Report, May 11, 1950, China 1946-1976, (University
Publications of America, Inc., 1982), Micro l m .

'2 Webb to the Embassy in Taipei, May 26, 1950, 53, 1950, 6:334-6.

13 Karl L. Rankin, China Assignment (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1964), p. 124.

14 Bradley Memorandum, July 27, 1950, Declassified Documents
Reference S stem (86) 2035; Memorandum of the 62nd meeting of the NSC,
DDRS, (SE) E033. .

15 Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China
1949-1969 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowe11 Company, 1972), p. 120.

16 Memorandum of Department of State to Department of Defense,
September 15, 1950, ER) 1950, 6:501.

 

12

13

'7 Acheson to Rankin, August 14, 1950, 53, 1950, 6:434-8.

'8 Rankin to Acheson, July 23, 1951, FR, 1951, 7:1762: Acheson to
the Embassy in Taipei, July 28, 1951, EB; T961, 7:1764.

19 Memorandum of conversation between Acheson, Dulles, Battle and
Allison, October 23, 1950, EB, 1950, 6:534-6.

20 Memorandum of Department of State by Clubb and Stuart, February 9,
1951, EB, 1951, 7:1576.

CHAPTER II
TAIWAN'S ROLE IN DULLES'S DETERRENCE POLICY
1953-1955
The Eisenhower Administration ended the neutralization of the
Taiwan Straits. Two weeks after his inauguration Eisenhower announced
the "unleashing“ of Chiang Kai-shek to attack mainland China. Now
Chiang's forces could attack the mainland and get away with it under
American military protection. The policy of "unleashing" Chiang was
part of Secretary of State Dulles's new dynamic foreign policy of
"rolling back Communist expansion." Dulles abandoned Truman's passive
containment policy and launched a campaign of liberating the "captive
peoples" from Communist rule. He thought it best resisted "Communist
expansion" by constantly threatening those countries where Communists
had taken power. Taiwan could be used to play a positive role in this
campaign.

There were two major reasons for the Eisenhower Administration's
decision to abandon Truman's passive containment policy and adopt a
policy of massive retaliation against "Communist expansion." One of
them was Eisenhower's domestic political considerations. In the early
19505 American hostility toward the PRC was obvious. Although most
Americans were indifferent to the fate of Chiang Kai-shek before the
Korean War, the fighting between American soldiers and the Chinese
Communists in Korea had changed the attitude of most Americans who
came to regard the PRC as the most dangerous enemy. That American
soldiers were being killed always had a dramatic effect on American
sentiment. Throughout 1953 public hostility toward the PRC remained

14

15

intense. The Gallup Poll showed that in February 1953 sixty-five percent
of voters approved the Eisenhower Administration's plan to permit
Chiang's forces to make raids on the PRC. Only fourteen percent of
voters disapproved and the other twenty-one percent had no opinion.1
Repeated polls also showed the American public opposed PRC's admission
into the United Nations even if the PRC agreed to end the Korean War.2

If public hostility only had an indirect influence on the
Eisenhower Administration's policy toward the PRC and Taiwan, the
influence of the "China Lobby" was more direct. Although Chiang's
supporters failed to persuade the Truman Administration to interfere in
the Chinese civil war in late 1949 and early 1950, their propaganda
about the loss of China to the Communists through folly and treason had
no small effect on American politics after the outbreak of the Korean
War. Senator Joseph McCarthy was notorious for using the propaganda of
the "loss of China" to create horrible political scandals. As a matter
of fact, the influence of the "China Lobby" grew hand in hand with the
rise of McCarthyism. Eisenhower also picked up the ”loss of China" in
the 1952 presidential campaign to attack the Democratic administra-
tion's policy as being too soft to "Communist expansion."

The 83rd Congress in 1953 had the nickname of "Senator from
Formosa" had become the Senate Majority Leader after Senator Robert A.
Taft's death in July 1953. Republican Senators like H. Alexander Smith
and John W. Bricker, and Republican Representatives like Walter H. Judd,
John M. Vorys and James G. Fulton were all influential persons who were
astrong supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. Eisenhower would have great
difficulty in getting cooperation from Congress if his China policy

could not satisfy those pro-Chiang Senators and Representatives.

16

Ross Y. Koen, the author of The China Lobby in American Politics, asserted
that the Republicans were willing to make concessions to appease the
"China Lobby" and its supporters in Congress by cooperating fully with
Chiang in military and training operations for the recovery of mainland
China. The "unleashing" of Chiang was the first step.3

However, Eisenhower's domestic political considerations could not
be the only reason for the Eisenhower Administration's policy toward
the PRC and Taiwan. "Communist expansion" was not a major issue in the
1952 presidential campaign. (As a matter of fact, American foreign
policy, as in most presidential campaigns, was not the most important
issue in 1952.) The theme of "rolling back the Communist tide" and
"liberating the captive people" had little to do with Eisenhower's
victory. Eisenhower found its limitation and dropped it in September
because it could bring about the Democrats' charge that "liberation"
would lead to nuclear war.4 In late 1953 and early 1953 most Americans
thought the most important problem facing the United States was the
Korean War, and they believed Eisenhower was the person who could handle
the problem well.5 In these circumstances, it was possible that con-
siderations of the situation in Southeast Asia and Eisenhower and
Dulles's perceptions of the PRC also contributed to the need for change
of policy.

Eisenhower and Dulles believed the PRC conceived a tremendous
hostility toward the United States. They regarded Chinese Communists
as aggressive, treacherous and responsible for human sufferings. Even
before the Korean War had ended, the Vietnamese independence revolution
was on its way. Dulles had no doubt that the PRC was providing aid to
the Vietnamese nationalists and Communists. A picture of Chinese

aggressiveness was made easily: Chinese soldiers were still fighting in

17
Korea, while their leaders already planned to expand in Southeast Asia.
With this picture in his mind Dulles developed his concept of deterrence.
He thought that the only effective way to stop "Communist aggressors"
was to convince them in advance that if they committed aggression, they
could not get away with it and would be subjected to costly retaliatory

blows.6

Although Dulles's concept was intended for "Communist expansion"
in general, his deterrence policy in 1953 was clearly aimed at the PRC.
The undertone was that the United States would not tolerate the Chinese
"expansion" in Southeast Asia. It could use Chiang's forces for retalia-
tion.

Within a short time after he was unleashed, Chiang did enjoy great
freedom in taking military actions against the mainland. Actually the
United States was eager to encourage him to do something. On February 5,
1953, the Chief of the MAAG General William Chase wrote a letter to the
Nationalist Chief of General Staff Chou Ch'i-jou, suggesting that the
Nationalist forces increase the frequency of raids, "not only from the
offshore islands, but also from Formosa and the Pescadores," and
blockade the mainland coast from Swatow to Dachen. For any military
actions, the Nationalists just had to keep the Americans informed, but
they were not obliged to get American approval.7 At the same time the
United States put great pressure on Chiang to reinforce the offshore
islands. Chiang bitterly resisted the pressure because he knew the

8

offshore islands did not have military value. The reinforcement was

only used as a threat to the mainland. As for the value of the offshore
islands to the defense of Taiwan, the JCS had reached the conclusion in
August 1953 that they were not essential. These islands, if taken by
the PRC, could not be used to launch an offensive attack on Taiwan. But

9

they were more useful to the Nationalists. The policy of using Taiwan

18

as a deterrent was clearly defined in NSC 146/2 concerning U.S.
objectives and courses of action with respect to Taiwan. The United
States would increase the effectiveness of Chiang's forces in defense
of Taiwan, for raids against the mainland and the blockade of China's
seaborne commerce. Besides, the United States would encourage and
assist Taiwan to defend the offshore islands and raid the mainland from
those islands.10
For the future status of Taiwan, the Eisenhower Administration
abandoned the Truman Administration's diplomatic attempt of neutralizing
it, or making it independent, or putting it in a kind of trusteeship.
The Administration took steps to make long-range commitments to the
continued recognition of Chiang's regime as the government of China and
made efforts to retain its representation in the United Nations. In
April 1953 Eisenhower elevated the rank of his representative in Taipei.
The elevation of Rankin to ambassador indicated that the possibility
of recognizing the PRC in the foreseeable future was very remote. It

also indicated the end of U.S. attempt for a trusteeship for Taiwan.

On April 9, the New York Times's editor Anthony Leviero wrote an

 

article regarding an American plan for a U.N. trusteeship for Taiwan.
That caused concern among Chiang's friends in the Senate. On April 17,
at the executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dulles flatly denied the question of trusteeship was ever discussed
within the Administration. He assured the Committee that the headline

in the New York Times had nothing to do with the U.S. government policy.11

 

From the military point of view, mere neutralization of Taiwan
would no longer meet U.S. strategic needs. According to an NSC Staff
Study finished in November 1953, neutralization would considerably

improve the PRC's strategic position in the Taiwan Straits and reduce

l9

U.S. strategic position there by reducing American freedom of action.]2
This situation would not accord with the U.S. general policy of deterrence
of "Communist expansion." Besides, the study pointed out that U.S.
interest in the Nationalist government should not be confined to the
strategic importance of Taiwan. The United States should use Taiwan as

an essential weapon in the continuing political struggle with the

Communist world.13

Therefore, Taiwan's political stability and economic
improvement could offset Communist influence and infiltration in Asia.
Thus, large amount of American economic aid was granted to Taiwan.
Although Eisenhower's cabinet members generally agreed to the
shift in policy since Eisenhower took office, there were disagreements
about some courses of action. The deterrence policy was no doubt the
master piece of Dulles. During the first year and a half Eisenhower
was more or less of the same mind as Dulles. No evidence showed that
there existed any serious disagreements between them. The most out-
spoken opponent was Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. At the 169th
meeting of the NSC on November 5, 1953, Wilson pointed out the un-
realistic policy of regarding Chiang Kai-shek as the potential ruler
of mainland China. He argued that Chiang "was very much like the
Pretenders to various vacant thrones in Europe and no more likely than
these ever to recover his lost power and position in China." Wilson
also expressed his strong opposition to the increased rate in building
Up Chiang's forces. The expenditure would have no end. But Eisenhower
argued that the United States at present could not afford to restrict
The recognition of Chiang to the mere leadership of Taiwan. The build-
Up of Chiang's forces would be over a long term so that Taiwan could be

a substantial threat to mainland China.14

On the lower level of policy study the Regional Planning Advisor

20

for Far Eastern Affairs Charlton Ogburn also questioned the unrealistic
aspect regarding the recognition of Chiang's government as the govern-
ment of China. In his memorandum to the Director of the Office of
Chinese Affairs Walter McConaughy, Ogburn pointed out that with the
armed forces of Taiwan becoming more Taiwanese, the Nationalist Govern-
ment would gradually become more and more interested in Taiwan affairs
and less and less interested in a return to the mainland. If that
change was inevitable, why should the United States spend so heavily on
Taiwan while some other areas like Thailand, Burma and Indonesia also
needed help to resist "Communists' capture"? Taiwan was much easier to
defend than these countries. Ogburn's reasoning was rejected by
Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson.‘5

However, Dulles's deterrence policy did not mean Dulles wanted to
see a general war with the PRC. He was as unwilling as Eisenhower and
any other cabinet members were to involve the United States in a war.
Dulles had only a stronger will to take a risk. The principle of his
p01icy---brinkmanship---was based upon taking a risk to a certain
degree that it could deter the Communists. But in exercising brinkman-
ship Dulles wanted to be sure that the possibility of successful
deterrence would be greater than the risk of war. If the risk of war
was greater, he would not take the chance. In using Chiang's forces to
threaten the PRC Dulles wanted the United States to have effective
control over the course of deterrence. Therefore, at the 139th meeting
of the NSC on April 8, 1953, Dulles discussed his worry about the jet
bombers delivered to Taiwan. He suggested stopping delivery until Chiang
gave the United States his commitment that he would not use the bombers
n16

"recklessly and in a fashion to embarrass United States policy.

In response to Taiwan's proposal for a mutual defense treaty Dulles

21
was very cautious not to make any commitment that might tie the United
States to the Chinese civil war. In a conversation with the Nationalist
ambassador Koo in March 1953, Dulles refused Taiwan's proposal for a
U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty. He frankly told Koo that the United States
could not make a treaty that would commit the United States to go to
war against the PRC. At the same time Chiang would not like to accept a
treaty that only included Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (Pescadores).17
It was not yet the right time to conclude a treaty with Taiwan in 1953.
During the discussion of the proposed treaty within the State Department
one year later Dulles still urged delay. In April 1954 Koo felt very
frustrated that Robertson often evaded the topic of the treaty whenever
he asked about it.18

Dulles's lack of interest in a treaty with Taiwan had another
reason that related to his general policy of deterrence. A defense
treaty including only Taiwan and the Penghus would not only be distaste-
ful to Chiang, but also not desirable to Dulles in 1953 and 1954.

Dulles knew very well that the success of his brinkmanship in dealing
with "Communist expansion" depended, to a large degree, on the conceal-
ment of the real motive of the United States. Deterrence would lose its
effect if the United States was believed to be bluffing. A defense
treaty, if covering only Taiwan and the Penghus, would weaken the
effectiveness of his deterrence policy.

The United States policy toward Taiwan underwent a subtle change
when the first offshore island crisis arose in September 1954. Dulles's
rigorous deterrence policy gradually came to a halt when the brinkman-
ship seemed to push the United States toward war. Differences over
American Taiwan policy, especially the policy toward the offshore

islands held by the Nationalists, became more apparent among Eisenhower's

22
cabinet members. Eisenhower himself was determined to avoid a war with
the PRC. Thus, the Eisenhower Administration's Taiwan policy entered
the second stage, in which its main objective was to bring about a

status guo of two Chinas.

NOTES--CHAPTER II

1 George H. Gallup, The Gallup P011 Public Opinion 1935-1971
(New York: Random House, 1972), p. 1119.

2

 

ibid.. DP. 1153, 1169.

3 Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York:
Octagon Books, 1974), pp. 208-9.

4 Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential
Elections 1952-1960 (New York: New VieprTnts, 1974), p. 84.

5

 

ibid., Gallup, pp. 1108, 1118, 1087.

. . 6 J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-
Mllltary Interaction inlfhe 19505 (London: Cambridge University Press,
1975), p. 80.

 

7 Chase to Chou, February 5, 1953, EB, 1952-1954,14 144.

8 Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy lmbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the
United States"in The Western Political Quarterly, 12:4 (1959), P. 1078;
Alexander George, Deterrence in American Foreign Poli§y_(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 270

9 Memorandum of Johnson to the Acting Secretary of State, August 3,
1953, EB, 1952-1954. 14:240-1.

'0 Statement of Policy by the NSC,NSC 146/2, November 6, 1953, EB,
1952-1954, 14:307-8.

nU.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, April 17,11953, Vol. V, 83rd Congress, pp. 317-8.

‘2 NSC Staff Study on United States Objectives and Courses of
Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government,
November 6, 1953, EB, 1952-1954, 14:318.

13

 

 

 

ibid, p. 311.

14 Memorandum of the 169th Meeting of the NSC, November 5, 1953,
53, 1952-1954, 14:274-5.

‘5 Ogburn Memorandum to McConaughy, October 30, 1953, EB, 1952-
1954, 14:257-8.

23

24

'5 Memorandum of the 139th Meeting of the NSC, April 8, 1953,
53, 1952-1954, 14:181.

17 Allison Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Koo,
March 19, 1953, EB, 1952-1954, 14:158.

18 Koo Diary, entry for April 7, 1954, box 191, (Notes from Kgg_
Diary made by Warren I. Cohen .

CHAPTER III
THE FIRST OFFSHORE ISLAND CRISIS, 1954-55

On September 3, 1954, the PRC started heavy bombardment of the
Jinmen (Quemoy)islands. For the first time the Eisenhower Administra-
tion faced the test of Dulles's deterrence policy in the Taiwan area.
It had to decide whether the United States should continue the course
of "unleashing" Chiang to engage his forces in provocative activities
against the mainland and help defend Jinmen and Mazu (Matsu), thus,
risking a direct military confrontation with China, or it should give
up the deterrence policy and just keep Taiwan from the PRC's control
and maintain it as an integral part of the coastal defense line in the
Western Pacific.

The first step the United States took in handling the crisis was
through New Zealand to ask the United Nations to impose a cease-fire
between the PRC and the Nationalists in the offshore island areas.
Later historians tend to see the New Zealand Resolution as one of the
U.S. efforts to create a status guo of two Chinas. Eisenhower himself
wrote in his memoir that Dulles's suggestion for taking the case to
the United Nations was ”to maintain the status guo and institute a

cease fire in the Formosa Strait."1

However, the original purpose of
Dulles's proposal was something different. Among the cabinet members
Dulles was one of the strong exponents for defending Jinmen and Mazu
during the crisis. Although in dealing with Chiang Dulles was very
cautious not to commit the United States to the defense of the offshore

islands and wanted the United States to have complete freedom of

25

26
action concerning these islands, within the circle of policy makers
Dulles always emphasized the importance of retention by the Nationalists.
Dulles put forward his proposal at the 214th meeting of the NSC on
September 12, 1954 in Denver. He explained that the United States would
benefit from a U.N. cease-fire resolution with or without the Soviet
veto. If the Soviet Union vetoed it, the United States would win world
Opinion and the support from its allies for the American policy of
defending the offshore islands. If the Soviet Union did not veto it,
the islands would still remain in Nationalist hands. Besides, the
Administration would also benefit domestically. Any actions of the
Administration without Congress would have no support from the American
people. But, Dulles argued, action under the United Nations could give
the Administration such authorization, which it could not get otherwise.
Dulles was very sure that the Chinese would not accept the New Zealand
Resolution. He said at the next NSC meeting that "the odds are over-
whelmingly against acceptance by the Chinese Communists of any U.N.
solution neutralizing the offshore islands. Refusal to accept the U.N.
verdict would put the Chinese Communists in a very bad light before the

rest of the world."3

It is clear that Dulles was ready to benefit from
a veto by the Soviet Union so that U.S. defense of the offshore islands
could be justified.

Eisenhower had great interest in Dulles's proposal and readily
approved it. It is not clear whether Eisenhower's consideration of a
U.N. cease-fire was of the same as Dulles's. It was probable that
Eisenhower preferred to benefit from a cease-fire accepted by the PRC.
At the Denver meeting Eisenhower disagreed with JCS's suggestion of

committing the United States to defend the offshore islands and helping

the Nationalists bomb the mainland. He was very worried about a

27
general war that might start from this area. Throughout the crisis
Eisenhower remained hesitant to make a decision concerning Jinmen and
Mazu. Therefore, a U.N. cease-fire was the best alternative he could
have at the time.

Another step the Eisenhower Administration took to reduce the
tension in the Taiwan Straits was to curtail Chiang's raids upon China's
seaborne commerce. Within the Eisenhower Administration Secretary of
Defense Wilson again disagreed with the current policies. In his
memorandum of October 5, 1954 to Robert Cutler, the Special Assistant to
the President, Wilson pointed out that paragraph 10 of NSC 146/24 was
out of date and should be suspended. He argued that the support of the
Nationalist raids upon Chinese Communist territory and commerce was
likely to lead to a war. He also proposed putting Taiwan and the Penghus
"under the mandate of the United Nations or setting them up as an

independent, autonomous state."5

Wilson was the strongest exponent of
a two-Chinas policy and of the withdrawal from the offshore islands by
the Nationalists. Eisenhower immediately agreed to suspend paragraph 10
of NSC 146/2 temporarily. This was a big shift from the former dynamic
policy of deterrence, a step closer to a policy of maintaining the
status quo of two Chinas. However, this shift did not receive unanimous
consent among the cabinet members. The JCS and Wilson differed as to
how long the suspension of raids should be. The JCS opposed permanent
suspension, but Wilson favored it. Dulles surely did not like suspension
at all. At the 229th meeting of the NSC on December 21, 1954 Dulles
suggested ending the suspension.6

These two steps of the United States were extremely frustrating to
Chiang Kai-shek. They were easily understood as a change of policy by

the United States, which would lead to a status guo of two Chinas. On

28
October 12, 1954, Robertson suddenly arrived in Taipei to persuade
Chiang to accept a cease-fire proposal for the offshore island areas
through the United Nations. Chiang saw it as a preliminary step of a
plan designed to a U.N. trusteeship for Taiwan. In the conversation
with Robertson Chiang showed his great reluctance to accept a cease-fire
discussion in the United Nations.7 He was very sensitive to any policy
change by the United States and viewed American efforts to reduce ten-
sions in the Taiwan Straits with great suspicion. The interesting thing
was Chiang and his foreign policy advisers suspected that the New
Zealand Resolution was maneuvered by the British; that the United
States accepted the idea of two Chinas as a concession to the British

for a more harmonious Anglo-American policy in the Far East.8

The hard
bargaining during the Chiang-Robertson conversation resulted in a
cpmpromise that Taiwan would not boycott the presentation of the cease-
fire proposal by New Zealand and the United States would announce the
beginning of the negotiation with Taiwan for a mutual defense treaty.9
Actually the United States had already got prepared to start the
negotiation. With the tension around the offshore islands rising, the
State Department's interest in such a treaty greatly increased. In late
August 1954, Chiang for the first time made the promise that he would not
undertake major military actions without U.S. approval. During Dulles's
short visit to Taiwan on September 9, Chiang confirmed his promise if the

treaty was made.10

Chiang's promise removed Dulles's worry that a treaty
might commit the United States to a war with the PRC without U.S. control
over.Chiang's military actions against the PRC. To exercise effective con-
trol Dulles insisted on three conditions: first the treaty would cover only
Taiwan and the Penghus; second, the Nationalists would not use military

forces without the agreement of the United States; and third, the

29
Nationalists would not transfer military forces from Taiwan and the
Penghus to the offshore islands without the approval of the United
States. These three conditions were embodied in the final version of
the treaty signed by Dulles and Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh
on December 2, 1954 with a little compromise on both sides. Although
the treaty stated that only Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were covered,
the Article VI had an ambiguous statement that the treaty might be
extended "to such other territories as may be determined by mutual

agreement."H

The other two Nationalist's promises were not put in the
formal part of the treaty.

After the United States took action to prevent the fall of Taiwan,
Chiang hoped to have a treaty that would guarantee U.S. support to his
regime. When the United States had signed treaties one after another
with Australia and New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, and Korea,
Chiang's desire to have a similar treaty became more urgent. However,
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 could hardly be said a great diplomatic
victory for Chiang. If the time were in the early 1950 when survival
was the most important issue to Chiang, a treaty like this one was no
doubt most welcome. But in 1954 Chiang had already recovered from his
defeat in the mainland and the conquest of Taiwan by the PRC was not
likely. The Treaty did not benefit him a great deal. The Nationalists
lived with the illusion of recovering the mainland in the 19505. They
could not possibly admit to outsiders, or even to themselves, that they
would be forever confined to Taiwan. For Chiang Kai-shek, mainland
recovery was his ultimate goal, which would be achieved in the near
future.12 But the Treaty actually deprived him of his freedom of action

to a great degree. The United States through its treaty obligation,

only guaranteed the survival of his regime in Taiwan. The price Chiang

30
paid was the loss of chance to provoke a military confrontation between
the United States and the PRC. Now the United States exercised a strict
control to prevent him from playing this trick.

There is not adequate evidence to prove that Dulles favored the
Treaty as a means of maintaining a status guo of two Chinas. Dulles
desired a treaty of dual nature: to control Chiang's military actions
and to achieve a deterrence effect. In the l950s, if Taiwan was attack-
ed, the United States would defend it with or without the Treaty. The
possibility that Chiang could provoke a war in the Taiwan area did
exist before the Treaty was signed although the United States had
certain control over his actions. The State Department was aware of
this situation. In his memorandum to Dulles in August 1954, Robertson
stated that a treaty with Chiang's promise to acquire U.S. approval for
his military actions would provide the United States with greater control
than it had had over the circumstances under which U.S. armed forces
might become involved in major conflict in the Taiwan area.13
Robertson's argument reflected the State Department's concern in this
respect. Dulles was aware of this, too. In answering questions during
the Senate hearings for the treaty approval Dulles admitted that Chiang
had the power to attack the mainland. The Treaty had some limited
control over Chiang's freedom of action, but its purpose was not to
confine Chiang to Taiwan simply because he would never make a treaty
with the United States that had that effect.14

The Treaty's deterrence effect was self-evident. It completed the
Western Pacific defense line from Korea through Japan, Taiwan, the
Philippines and to Australia and New Zealand. This line had an effect

of a permanent threat to the PRC. Besides, the Mutual Defense Treaty

was ambiguous about the offshore islands. Robertson once recommended

31
that the Treaty should keep the PRC guessing as to U.S. intention
respecting the defense of these islands.15 The ambiguity of the Treaty
area reflected Dulles's position concerning the dual nature of the
Treaty.

The Eisenhower Administration's policy toward the offshore islands
during and after the first crisis provided some revealing evidence that
the United States had backed down from brinkmanship and begun to promote
a de facto two Chinas. Within the Administration quite a few of
Eisenhower's advisers now questioned the validity of keeping the offshore
islands in Nationalist hands. Among them Wilson was the most vocal and
persistent advocate of U.S. disengagement from those islands. Soon
after the offshore crisis started in early September 1954, Wilson express-
ed his opposition to defending these "doggoned little islands". He
argued at the 213th meeting of the NSC on September 4, that it would not
just a partial war over these islands. It would be a general war with
the PRC, if the United States committed itself to their defense. It
was neither the right place, nor the right time for the United States to

have a general war.16

Wilson's view was shared by the Secretary of
Treasury, George Humphrey, Special Assistant to the President for
National Affairs Robert Cutler and Director of the Policy Planning

Staff of the State Department Robert Bowie.17

From a purely military
point of view, Chief of Staff of the Army General Matthew Ridgway argued
that the offshore islands lacked sufficient military importance for the
United States to defend them. although the majority of the JCS,
especially their Chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford, emphasized the
political and psychological importance of these islands and wanted to
commit U.S. forces to their defense.18

However, the chief foreign policy maker Dulles was not ready to

32
back down from his brinkmanship. From late 1954 to early 1955, Dulles
was more concerned about the consequences of a withdrawal from his
former deterrence policy. First of all, he was worried about the morale
of Chiang's forces. If the United States forced Chiang to give up the
offshore islands, the morale of the Nationalist forces might be so
weakened that they would cease to be a threat to the mainland. Dulles
was also concerned about the repercussions among the U.S.‘s Asian allies.
They might doubt U.S. determination in fighting against "Communist
expansion." Lastly, Dulles hated to appear soft to the PRC. He was
willing to take the risk of war to hold Jinmen, which he thought was
necessary for the defense of Taiwan. But Dulles was also cautious not
to let Chiang have the initiative in the offshore island crisis. He was
aware that Chiang wished to provoke a war over these islands. Therefore,
Dulles had to be very sure that the United States should exercise some
control over the development of the situation. He made it clear to
Taiwan at the very beginning that the United States did not have obliga-
tion to defend Jinmen and Mazu. The promise that the United States
would do so was purely a voluntary action.

In late January 1955, the fall of the Tachen Islands became immi-
nent after the forces of the PRC conquered the island of Ichiang, which
lay seven miles north of the Tachens. The Tachen Islands, about 300
miles north of Taiwan, were held by 10,000 Nationalist troops. Dulles
did not want the United States to fight over the Tachens. Militarily
they were difficult to defend, and strategically they did not have any
value. On January 19, Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that the United
States should force Chiang to evacuate the Tachens, and the evacuation
should be offset by an announcement that the United States would defend

Jinmen and Mazu. Eisenhower agreed to the suggestion in principle.19

33
Dulles immediately informed George Yeh of the U.S. plan before it was
approved by the NSC. However, Dulles received strong opposition from
Wilson, Humphrey and Cutler at the NSC meeting the next day. All three
of them pointed out the danger if the United States was to commit itself
militarily to the defense of Jinmen. They urged a complete Nationalist
evacuation from all the offshore islands to avoid a war with the PRC.20
AS president Eisenhower was in favor of Dulles's plan, it was finally
decided that the United States would protect and help the evacuation of
the Nationalist forces from the Tachens; President Eisenhower would
request the authority from Congress to use U.S. armed forces to defend
Taiwan and the Penghus and the related offshore islands if the President
judged their.defense was vital to the defense of Taiwan; the United
States would still promise Chiang to defend Jinmen and Mazu to offset
the evacuation of the Tachens, but the promise would not be open to the

public.21

The decision caused Dulles the embarrassment of taking back
the promise he had given Yeh that the United States would announce the
decision of defending Jinmen and Mazu in exchange for Chiang's agrement
to the evacuation of the Tachens.

For the next two weeks U.S.-Taiwan relations were the most un-
pleasant since the Eisenhower Administration took office. Chiang had
great doubts as to the intentions of Dulles's proposal for the evacua-
tion of the Tachens. He thought either it was out of British pressure
on the United States for promoting the status guo of two Chinas, or it
was a secret deal between the United States and the PRC for the release

22. Since he knew that

of eleven American airmen imprisoned in China.
without U.S. military aid the Tachens were vulnerable to PRC's conquest,
Chiang very reluctantly accepted Dulles's proposal, but he showed

unprecedented insistence on a public statement of U.S. defense of

 

34
Jinmen and Mazu. When this condition was repeatedly refused by the
United States, Chiang threatened to make a unilateral statement about
the U.S. promise. His purpose for the public statement was not, as he
declared, to sustain the morale of the Nationalists suffering from the
Tachen evacuation. His doubt about the intention of Dulles's proposal
revealed his concern about a possible de facto separation of two Chinas
and his distrust of the United States. He had the reason to su5pect
that Jinmen and Mazu would be the next after the Tachens were forced to
be evacuated. Dulles did not make the concession with respect to the
public commitment of the United States to the defense of Jinmen and
Mazu. He and Robertson warned Yeh and Koo repeatedly that the public
statement by Taiwan concerning the U.S. promise of defending Jinmen and
Mazu would have to be formally denied by the United States. The Tachen
evacuation was finally undertaken along the line set by the United
States, but it increased Chiang's suspicion about the intentions of the
U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

When the plan for the Tachen evacuation was under way, the Formosa
Resolution was also being debated in Congress. This was typical of
Dulles's way of handling the offshore island crisis. On the one hand
he backed down a little to avoid the real danger of war. On the other
hand he wanted to warn the PRC that the U.S. retreat would be limited.
Dulles advised Eisenhower to obtain congressional authority for the
United States to defend Jinmen and Mazu when Eisenhower thought their
defense was related to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus. There
was no evidence that Dulles really believed the use of American forces
was inevitable. It was more likely that Dulles wanted the Formosa
Resolution for the effect of brinkmanship. He perceived the PRC's

actions in the offshore island areas as primarily a probing operation

35

to see how far the United States would go, and when, if ever, a point

23 The Resolution was not a U.S. commitment.

of resistance was reached.
It avoided mentioning the specific offshore islands that the United
States would be willing to defend. It stated,

"The President of the United States...is authorized to

employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems

necessary for the specific purpose of securing and

protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed

~ attack, this authority to include the securing and

protection of such related positions and territories of

that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such

other measures as he judges to be required or

appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the

Pescadores."24
Obviously, the Resolution gave the President a blank check for using
U.S. forces in the Taiwan area. This left the PRC in the dark as to
how far 'it could go in conquering the offshore islands. As the
Mutual Defense Treaty had already been ambiguous about the offshore
islands, the Statement in the Formosa Resolution reminded the PRC that
the ambiguity meant something.

The most important figure who backed down further and worked
toward a de facto two Chinas was President Eisenhower. It used to be
argued that Eisenhower played an inactive role in foreign policy making.
In several recent studies scholars have rejected this view. In the
case of the offshore island crisis Eisenhower personally made sure that
the Administration would pursue a policy of restraint.25

During the crisis Eisenhower was certain of only two things: he did ~
not want a war with the PRC and he would not let Taiwan fall into the
hands of the mainland Chinese. He thought that the American policy
toward the crisis should achieve both of them. On the one hand, he
should make sure that the loss of the offshore islands would not weaken

the defense of Taiwan. On the other hand, he was determined not to

36

fight a war merely for the sake of some small offshore islands. On
the surface his attitude toward Jinmen and Mazu was clearcut. He said
the United States must make a distinction between an attack that had
only aS its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that was
primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Taiwan.26
Whether the United States would help defend the offshore islands depend-
ed on which objectives the PRC wanted to achieve through an attack.
But it was easy to say, while extremely difficult to do. First of all,
Eisenhower simply had no way to make the distinction. During the
Senate debate about the Formosa Resolution, Dulles said:

"Now of course we have to answer the question as to

whether these activities are merely what you might call

mopping up operations directed against the islands

themselves, or whether they are the beginning of an

operation which is designed against Formosa and the

Pescadores. One can never be Sure of that, but what one

can say is that by everything that they have said, this

is designed to be an attack, buildup into an attack

against Formosa and the Pescadores, and that there seems

to be evidence at least of determination on the part of

the Chinese Communists to capture Formosa and the

Pescadores."27
According to Dulles's analysis he would make the distinction by what
the Chinese Communists said. But Chinese propaganda could never
possibly say that they just wanted Jinmen or Mazu, not Taiwan. Actually
they did not want these islands without finally taking over Taiwan. In
a recent study Thomas Stolper argues that the offshore island crisis
was the PRC'S effort to prevent the United States from detaching Taiwan

from China.28

The mainland Chinese knew that a status guo of two
Chinas was more likely to be maintained if China just took over Jinmen
and Mazu. Therefore, it was impossible for the PRC to say that Taiwan
could remain out of its control if Chiang agreed to give up the offshore

islands.

37

The difficulty of making the distinction between the two Chinese
objectives in an attack on Jinmen and Mazu made Eisenhower feel great
hesitation in deciding American involvement or non-involvement. At the
Denver meeting of the NSC, the JCS except General Ridgway urged commit-
ment of U.S. forces to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu and help to the
Nationalists' bombing attacks on the mainland. Eisenhower did not agree.
He repeatedly reminded the Council that they were talking about a
possible general war. It was not a limited Skirmish for some small
islands. If the United States had to fight a general war, it would
fight it with the Soviet Union, not with the PRC.29 Therefore, Dulles's
suggestion for U.N. intervention in the crisis was particularly attrac-
tive to Eisenhower. Eisenhower's reluctance to fight a war with the
PRC over these offshore islands was also clearly expressed in his con-
versation on January 30, 1955 with Under Secretary of State Herbert
Hoover, Jr. and some other State Department officials. Eisenhower
emphasized that the United States should not tie its forces down in
the Taiwan area. The NATO and what it was trying to do in Europe was

30 It is not difficult to see that even if

vital to U.S. security.
Eisenhower had decided to obtain the authority from Congress to use
American forces in the Taiwan area through the Formosa Resolution, he
was determined to use it cautiously.

Eisenhower's letter of February 1, 1955 to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Alexander Gruenther, provides a revealing insight into
Eisenhower's hesitation in handling the Jinmen-Mazu crisis. He told
Gruenther of his dilemma. Politically and geographically, the offshore
islands were a part of the Chinese mainland. Militarily they were not

essential to the defense of Taiwan. There was no reason for the United

States to intervene in the struggle for controlling these islands.

38
Non-intervention would please the European allies, please the pacifists
at home and reduce the risk of a general war with the PRC. However, the
United States had to consider the problem of defending Taiwan, in which
the morale of Chiang's forces played a very important role. The offshore
islands sustained Nationalists' hope that one day they could go back
home. Therefore, to force Chiang to give up these islands would weaken
their morale, which could endanger the defense of Taiwan. Eisenhower
told Gruenther that he had to be very cautious in making a decision.

"Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than

global war."31

In this same letter Eisenhower wrote two paragraphs about his
role in handling the crisis. He said:

"...having gotten the issue well defined in my mind, I
try in the next step to determine what answer would best
serve the long term advantage and welfare of the United
States and the free world. I then consider the immediate
problem and what solution can we get that will best
conform to the long term interests of the country and

at same time can command a sufficient approval in this
country so as to secure the necessary Congressional
action.

When I get a problem solved on this rough basis,
I merely stick to the essential answer and let
associates have a field day on words and terminology.
(I suppose that many of those around me would protest
that even in this field I am sometimes something of
an autocrat and insist upon the employment of my own
phraseology when I consider the issue important.)
However, I really do try to stay out of this particular
job as much as my own characteristics, particularly my
ego, will permit."32

These two paragraphs of Eisenhower's writing at the time of crisis
suggest that Eisenhower's role in making foreign policy was not merely
accepting the recommendations of his advisers. Between the Tachen
evacuation and the end of crisis in late April 1955, the Administra-

tion's attitude toward the value of holding Jinmen and Mazu changed

39

dramatically. The documents recently published reveal that it was
Eisenhower who in fact initiated the changes.33
It should be pointed out that in many cases Eisenhower and Dulles
did have the same views. Eisenhower agreed in general to Dulles's
aggressive policies in Asia before the offshore island crisis. He
approved the terms Dulles put down for the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan, accepted Dulles's ideas of the U.N. move for cease-fire, of
obtaining Congressional authority of the use of forces and forcing Chiang
to evacuate from the Tachens. The difference between these two persons
lay in the fact that Eisenhower was more cautious and Dulles was more
willing to risk a war. Since late February 1955, after Dulles attended
the first SEATO meeting and visited several Asian countries and Taiwan,
he seemed more convinced that the PRC was determined to capture Taiwan.
The capture of Jinmen and Mazu was not its objective, but a preliminary
action.34 Right after he was back from his Asian trip, Dulles suggested
to Eisenhower that the United States could not sit idly and watch
Chiang's forces on Jinmen and Mazu be crushed by the PRC. Otherwise,
the reaction on Taiwan and in other Asian countries would be "dangerous-
ly" bad. Besides, Dulles suggested that atomic missiles be used in the
defense these two islands. According to Dulles's memorandum of his
conversation with Eisenhower, the President agreed to Dulles's sugges-

tions.35

However, around that time Eisenhower had already become
increasingly concerned about the attitude of the European allies toward
American Taiwan policy and actually began to favor a withdrawal from
Jinmen and Mazu.

On March 11, 1955, the Washington Post published a story about the

 

difference between Eisenhower and Dulles over the policy toward the

offshore islands. In the morning of that day Dulles talked with

4O
Eisenhower to see whether the Story was true. Dulles repeated his view
that in the Taiwan area the United States could not retreat further.

Although both of them agreed that the story in the Washington Post was

 

a fabrication and Eisenhower shared Dulles's conclusion that the United
States Should not allow the islands to be overrun by the PRC, Eisenhower
still had something different in mind. According to Dulles's memorandum,
Eisenhower "recognized that we probably could not now get the Chinese
Nationalists to evacuate..." This statement shows that Eisenhower was
thinking of the withdrawal from the islands in the future if not at that
moment.36 The subtle difference between Eisenhower and Dulles was more
clearly presented at the special meeting attended by Eisenhower, Dulles
and the JCS that afternoon. Eisenhower told the attendants that "he
called this meeting because he wanted to discuss how to avoid a direct
U.S. intervention as much as possible at that time "while the Western

"37 It is clear from the record that

European Treaties were pending.
Eisenhower favored a policy of restraint.

During the crisis the European allies' opposition to the U.S.
policy toward the offshore islands did influence Eisenhower and Dulles
to a certain degree. Among the allies Britain was the strongest opponent.
Because of its interests in Hong Kong and its historical contemptuous
attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek, Britain recognized the PRC in January
1950. Although Britain agreed to U.S. defense of Taiwan and the Penghus,
it repeatedly urged the United States to force Chiang to withdraw from
the offshore islands. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign
-Secretary Anthony Eden saw Chiang as a trouble-maker who wanted to
realize his dream of recovering the mainland by involving the United

States in a general war with the PRC. Churchill wrote several letters

to Eisenhower, expressing Britain's firm stand that Jinmen and Mazu

41
should be given up to the PM,38 At the ministerial meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in May 1955, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-
Henri Spaak representing European countries asserted their different
views on two points: 1) Europeans saw the difference between the defense
of Taiwan and the defense of Jinmen and Mazu. 2) They concluded the
role of Chiang Kai-shek in Asia was over. The recognition of the PRC

was inevitable.39

Eisenhower was aware of European attitudes and
realized the importance of Europe. He told Dulles and the JCS that "we
are confronted with an extremely delicate situation, because we could
not afford to be isolated from our allies in the world."40

Eisenhower first revealed his changed views on Jinmen and Mazu in
his letter to Churchill on March 29, 1955. In defending U.S. policy
Eisenhower confided his dilemma to Churchill. He said he would be very
happy "to see Chiang voluntarily and in accordance with what he believed
to be his own best interests, withdraw from Quemoy and the Matsus." But
EiSenhower was unwilling to put too much pressure on Chiang, fearing that
he might give up the entire struggle. The defense of Taiwan needed

Chiang's ground forces.41

Within three days Eisenhower found a solution
to his dilemma. At the White House meeting on April 1, Eisenhower told
his cabinet that he wanted neither to see the collapse of the National-
ist morale, nor to involve the United States in a war for Jinmen and
Mazu. A desirable solution would be to convince Chiang that he should
voluntarily evacuate these islands. To offset one bad effect, the United
States would send a division of U.S. marines to Taiwan and increase the
- U.S. air force there.42 There is evidence to prove that this dramatic
change of Eisenhower's view on Jinmen and Mazu was not the work of

Dulles. Eisenhower personally initiated the change. In his long memo-

randum to Dulles, Eisenhower analysed the Taiwan situation in great

42
detail and discussed the measures he wanted to take. He thought that

in order to win Chiang's cooperation, the United States should not

push him too hard at first. Efforts should be made to convince Chiang
to regard the offshore islands as outposts and to reduce the forces on
those islands according to the needs of outpost garrisons. The second
step was to decide whether the islands should be evacuated or defended

in face of a PRC's attack.43

Eisenhower knew very well that Chiang
would never accept immediate complete evacuation from the offshore
islands, but it was still possible to trick him into reducing his stakes
in these islands.

In the next two weeks the Administration undertook a thorough
study of the validity of Eisenhower's proposed change of policy. The
CIA presented an estimate of the morale on Taiwan. It stated that the
loss of the offshore islands would be a severe blow to Nationalist
morale. Nevertheless, the morale would not totally collapse so long as
the United States was still firmly committed to the defense of Taiwan.
Besides, the loss of the islands as a result of the PRC'S attack would
cause much greater damage to Nationalist morale than a voluntary, or

U.S. forced, evacuation.44

This intelligence estimate apparently favored
an early evacuation of Jinmen and Mazu. Bowie, the Director of the
Policy Planning Staff who had been consistently opposed to Dulles's off-
shore island policy, now suggested a harder line position to Chiang.

He advised that unless the United States very clearly told him that it
was not in the interest of the United States to participate in the
defense of the offshore islands and the United States would not do so,
Chiang would not accept the idea of regarding the offshore islands as

expendable outposts. Therefore, the United States should convince him

not to have any hope for U.S. involvement in the defense of Jinmen and

43

Mazu.45

It is interesting that now Dulles and Radford disagreed in another
way with Eisenhower about his idea of reducing Jinmen and Mazu into
outposts. They held the view that if the United States would not allow
Chiang to attack the build—up on the mainland across from Jinmen and
Mazu, it would be better to encourage a clean break and evacuate these
islands. Eisenhower was hesitant about giving up his idea. He agreed
that it would be best to leave up to Chiang to decide whether he would
accept evacuation, or the idea of outpost. But in the final version of
the Statement of Position with Reference to the Defense of Formosa,
Eisenhower's idea of outposts was left out. It directly suggested that
the United States favored the evacuation of Jinmen and Mazu.46

On April 20, Robertson and Radford left for Taipei to accomplish
the mission of persuading Chiang to accept the changed policy of the
United States concerning Jinmen and Mazu. Eisenhower still had no con-
fidence in the success of their mission. After their departure Eisenhower
asked Hoover to send a message to them, reminding them that "politically
and psychologically we should lead the Generalissimo into making a
proposition that will neither commit the United States to war in defense
of the offshore islands nor will constitute an implied repudiation of
the Generalissimo by the government." "These are the reasons," the
message stated, "that the President has 501nuch favored an outpost con-

47 The Robertson-Radford mission failed.

ception for the offshore island."
Chiang refused outright any retreat from Jinmen and Mazu. For some
inexplicable reasons, Robertson and Radford did not present the outpost
concept that Eisenhower favored. Eisenhower expressed his great dis-
appiontment with Robertson and Radford in his letter to Dulles on April 26.

He attributed the failure of the mission to Robertson and Radford's

44
failure to grasp the outpost concept.48 Eisenhower did not inquire
further into their failure. The whole plan was put aside. Robertson and
Radford did not wrote any memorandums to explain why they did not dis-
cuss the outpost concept with Chiang. After 25 years in 1980, Bowie
speculated that both Robertson and Radford had sympathy for the National-
ists. Their sympathy "made them reluctant to argue forcefully for

49 without further evidence it is

reducing troop levels on the islands."
hard to accept Bowie's Speculation because it did not explain why their
sympathy could make them argue forcefully for a complete evacuation.
Maybe Eisenhower was right that they simply did not grasp the subtle
meaning of the outpost concept.

The first offshore island crisis was brought to an end by the
voluntary restraint of the PRC. At the Asian-African Conference in
Bandung in late April, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) expressed
the willingness of the PRC to relax the tension in the Taiwan Straits.

Eisenhower and Dulles readily welcomed the Chinese initiative. Thus,

the United States temporarily got off the horns of the dilemma.

NOTES--CHAPTER III

] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (New York:
Doubleday, 1963), p. 555.

2 Memorandum of the 214th Meeting of the NSC, September 12, 1954,
55, 1952-1954, 14:620-1.

3 Memorandum of the 216th Meeting of the NSC, October 6, 1954,
FR, 1952-1954, 14:693-4.

4 NSC 146/2: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with
Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government, November 6, 1953.
Paragraph 10: Without committing U.S. forces, unless Formosa or the
Pescadores are attacked, encourage and assist the Chinese National Govern-
ment to defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands against Communist
attack and to raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce. [3, 1952-
1954, 14:308.

5

6 Memorandum of the 229th Meeting of the NSC, December 21, 1954,
53, 1952-1954, 14 1045.

 

‘Wilson to Cutler, October 5, 1954, DDRS, (86) 1836.

7 McConaughy Memorandum of conversation among Chiang, Robertson,
Rankin and other Nationalist officials, October 13, 1954, ER, 1952-1954,
14:728-53.

8 K00 Diar , entry for October 16, 1954, box 220,(Notes from
Koo Diary made 5y Warren I. Cohen).

9 ibid., McConaughy Memorandum.

‘0 Robertson Memorandum to Dulles, August 25, 1954, FR, 1952-1954,
14:548-50; Dulles Report (NSC 5429/1[2?]), September 12, T954, FR, 1952-
1954, 14:614.

1] Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (New
York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), p.55.

12 William M. Bueler, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan
(Boulder, CO: Colorado Associated’University Press,"l971), p. 103.

13 ibid., Robertson Memorandum.

14 U.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, February 7.11955, Vol. VII, 84thTCongress, p. 323.

15 ibid., Robertson Memorandum.

45

46

‘6 Memorandum of the 213th Meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954,
53, 1952-1954, 14:588.

‘7 Memorandum of the 232nd Meeting of the NSC, January 20, 1955,
EB, 1955-1957, 2:69-82.

18 Memorandum of the 213th Meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954,
53, 1952-1954, 14:583-94.

19 Dulles Memorandum of a conversation, January 19, 1955, ER, 1955-
1957, 2:41-3.

2° Memorandum of the 232nd Meeting of the NSC, January 20, 1955, 53,
1955-1957, 2:75-9.

2' Memorandum of the 233rd Meeting of the NSC, January 21, 1955,
‘53, 1955-1957, 2:89-95.

22599_gig§y, Entry for January 22, 1955, box 220, (Notes from 599.
Diary made y arren I. Cohen).

23 U.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, January 24, 1955, Vol. VII, 84th Congress, p. 68.
24

25 Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu
Crisis, 1954-1955", in Political Science Quarterly, 1981, 96(3):465-80.

26
2:192.

27 U.S. Senate,Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, January 24, 1955, Vol. VII, 84th Congress, p. 68.

28

QSB, February 7, 1955, Vol. XXXII, No. 815, p. 213.

 

Eisenhower letter to Gruenther, February 1, 1955, {3, 1955-1957,

ibid., Stolper, p. 3.

29 Dulles Report (NSC 5429/1[2?]), September 12, 1954, 53, 1952-1954,
14:617-24.

30
2:175.

31

Memorandum of a conversation, January 30, 1955, [3, 1955-1957,

ibid., Eisenhower letter to Gruenther, 2:189-93.
32 ibid.

33 ibid., Rushkoff.

34 ibid., Rushkoff; Memorandum of the 240th Meeting of the NSC,
March 10, 1955, 53, 1955-1957, 2:346.

35 Dulles memorandum of conversation with Eisenhower, March 6,
1955, 53, 1955-1957, 2:336-7.

47

36 Dulles memorandum of conversation with Eisenhower, March 11,
1955, [3, 1955-1957, 2:353-5.

37 Cutler memorandum for the meeting in President's Office,
March 11, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:357-60.

38 Eisenhower letter to Churchill, January 25, 1955, 53, 1955-1957,
2:128-9; Churchill message to Eisenhower, undated, ibid., 2:270-3;
Eden message to Dulles, March 28, 1955, ibid., 2:416-7.

39
2:560.
40

NATO Secret Verbatim Records (C-VR (55)20 and 21), [3, 1955-1957,

ibid., Cutler memorandum, 2:360.

41
2:420.

42 Hoover memorandum of a conversation, April 1, 1955, FR,
1955-1957, 2:440.

43 '
2:448-9.

44 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE lOO-4/1-55, April 16, 1955,
[3, 1955-1957, 2:479-89.

45
2:473-5.

46 Dulles memorandum of a conversation with Eisenhower, April 17,
1955, EB, 1955-1957, 2:491-5.

47 Hoover message to Robertson and Radford, April 22, 1955, [3,
1955-1957, 2:501-2.

48
2:522-3.

49

Eisenhower letter to Churchill, March 29, 1955, [3, 1955-1957,

Eisenhower memorandum to Dulles, April 5, 1955, 55, 1955-1957,

Bowie memorandum to Dulles, April 9, 1955, [3, 1955-1957,

Eisenhower letter to Dulles, April 26, 1955, [3, 1955-1957,

ibid., Rushkoff, p. 479.

CHAPTER IV
FROM MID-1955 TO THE SECOND OFFSHORE ISLAND CRISIS

From the end of April 1955 to August 1958, when the second offshore
island crisis occurred, a period of relative peace prevailed in the
Taiwan Straits. The Eisenhower Administration had abandoned the aggres-
sive policy of "rolling back Communist tide". The interests of the
United States in the Taiwan area now lay in maintaining a status quo of
two Chinas. The United States exercised stricter control over Chiang's
actions and constantly discouraged his hope of going back to the mainland.
With time passing, the possibility of recovering the mainland could only
become slimmer and Slimmer. As the interests of the United States and
Taiwan diverged, the gradual deterioration of U.S.-Taiwan relations seemed
inevitable.

Since the end of the crisis, the Eisenhower Administration was
increasingly interested in bringing about a de facto two Chinas. As
Chiang had categorically refused to evacuate Jinmen and Mazu, the United
States had to find diplomatic means through which to prevent an attack
from the PRC. It tried to build up a world opinion which would compel
the PRC to accept the status quo and not seek to change it by force.

One of the reasons the United States conceived of the direct talks with
the PRC in Geneva was to achieve this purpose.1
Facing the possibility of a de facto two Chinas, Chiang reacted
within his limited power to sabotage U.S. effort. He gradually increased
the number of his troops on Jinmen and Mazu. By 1958 there were 100,000

troops on these islands, nearly one-third of his total military forces,

while there were only 50,000 in 1954-1955. This step "was undoubtedly

48

49

one of Chiang's boldest political gambles in his adventurous career."2

After the Robertson-Radford mission Chiang was more suspicious of U.S.
intention and doubted U.S. promises. The promise Dulles confirmed in
exchange for the Tachen evacuation could mean nothing. To put one-
third of his troops on Jinmen and Mazu was to make the United States
realize that it could not afford the loss of the islands in a future
crisis. At the same time, the Nationalists secretly engaged in provoca-
tive actions. They made a number of raids on the mainland, opened
artillery fire around Amoy and harassed mainland Chinese shipping.
They did all this without the approval of the MAAG.3
Chiang also aimed to disrupt the relatively peaceful atmosphere in
the Taiwan Straits after the end of the crisis. He stepped up provoca-
tive propaganda about his mainland recovery, which would make the PRC
doubt the sincerity of the United States in the Geneva talks. In
February 1956, Robertson used very strong words to express U.S. dis-
approval of Chiang's propaganda. He frankly told Koo that he wished to
put Taiwan on notice that the United States did not intend to break off

the Genevatalks.4

Once Dulles almost lost his patience when Yeh and
Koo tried to dissuade the United States from continuing talks with the
PRC. Dulles told them the United States did not have any independent
interest in Jinmen and Mazu. ”But we know how you feel about them. So
we are trying desperately through diplomacy to enable you to hold these
islands. We are aware of your objections to the Geneva talks. cIf you
told us that you considered it more important to break off the talks
than to retain Quemoy and Matsu, we would arrange to terminate the talks
as soon as you were prepared to evacuate the islands."5

Chiang's other tactic to sabotage U.S. effort for a de facto two

Chinas was to remind the United States that Taiwan would be ready at any

50
time to end the status quo of two Chinas. In the first half of 1956
Taiwan repeatedly requested U.S. approval for military actions to
recover the mainland. In April Chiang wrote a long personal letter to
Eisenhower. By talking highsoundingly of the anti-Communist cause, he
asked for Eisenhower's approval of Taiwan's plan to recover the mainland
by its own force. The United States need not give any except logistic

support to the actions.6

Judging from the international situation as
well as the local situation in the Taiwan Straits, Chiang Should have
been certain of the refusal by the United States. It was also doubtful
that he really thought his forces were able to take a major military
risk. But at the time when it was beyond his power to break down the
status quo of two Chinas, Chiang might think his requests for taking
military action could serve the purpose of reminding the United States
that he would never acquiesce in U.S. effort to maintain two Chinas.

As the interests of the United States and Taiwan diverged, their
relations were bound to deteriorate. In October 1955, American
Ambassador in Taipei Rankin presented a report to the State Department
about the status of U.S.-Taiwan relations. He pointed out that in the
past year, the relations had deteriorated as more and more Nationalists
came to realize that the United States was not going to assist them in
their objective of returning to the mainland. The deterioration would
continue if the United States continued its participation in the Geneva
talks, insisted on the renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan

Straits and promoted the "two Chinas" theory.7

In May 1957, an anti-
American riot triggered by the acquittal of an American sergeant who
killed a Chinese indicated the serious trouble in U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Although there was no evidence that the Nationalist Government manipu-

lated the riot, its failure to stop the sacking of the U.S. Embassy

51
proved its acquiescence in anti-Americanism among the Chinese in Taiwan.
The incident partly reflected Taiwan's frustration over U.S. policy
toward the Taiwan Straits.

On August 23, 1958, the PRC started a heavy bombardment of Jinmen
and Mazu, thus creating the second offshore island crisis. Why the PRC
chose that time to start the crisis was unclear to the world. It might
have been a response to the breaking-off of the Geneva talks by the
United States, or because of domestic political problems. Despite its
effort to minimize the importance of the offshore islands in the past,
the United States publically took a hardline position toward the PRC.
In his public statement on September 4, Eisenhower again related the
defense of Jinmen and Mazu to the defense of Taiwan.8 In a news con-
ference Dulles strongly implied that the United States would defend
Jinmen and Mazu, and it might use nuclear weapons for their defense.9
On September 7,the U.S. navy began to escort Nationalist convoys up
to three miles from the offshore islands.

Judging from the limited information available today, Eisenhower
seemed to be in favor of U.S. intervention at the risk of war with the
PRC. According to his own memoir Eisenhower refused the suggestion of

the JCS that Jinmen and Mazu should be evacuated.10

In his television
Speech on September 11, Eisenhower appeared very firm that the United
States would not retreat before the demonstration of force. He picked
up the reasoning of the Cold War that appeasement would more likely
lead to a major war. In appearance Eisenhower's hardline position
seemed to be a shift from his former attitude of not going to war for
these small offshore islands. But Eisenhower's thinking was more com-

plicated than it appeared to be.

Eisenhower was always concerned about Nationalist morale. He

52

knew that the offshore islands were not essential to the defense of
Taiwan, but he believed the Nationalist morale was very important. To
retreat from the offshore islands at the time of crisis would greatly
hurt the fighting spirit of Chiang's forces. He knew he should not
totally destroy the Nationalists' hope for a return to the mainland.
That was why in 1957 Eisenhower expressed strong opposition to the pro-
posal of the Bureau of the Budget that the future U.S. military and
economic assistance programs would not be premised on the assumption of

the Nationalist return to power on the mainland.‘1

At the time of the
last crisis, especially at the most critical moment, Eisenhower did not
favor a retreat as he saw the need to maintain Nationalist morale. Not
until the crisis reached its last phase that Eisenhower thought of
voluntary evacuation of Jinmen and Mazu by Chiang. Therefore, it was
logical of Eisenhower to take a hardline position again in respect to
the offshore islands when the PRC initiated the crisis the second time.
Eisenhower's non-appeasement policy in 1958 did not mean he became
more willing to take the risk of a war. The Simple reason was the
intelligence information he received did not indicate that the PRC was
ready for major military actions to take Jinmen and Mazu. Besides the
blockade of supplies by the bombardment, the PRC did not take any other
military actions against the islands. The early intelligence informa-
tion from Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) indicated that both the
PRC and Taiwan were uncertain of U.S. actions in event of an attack on
the offshore islands, and that the PRC was probing in an effort to pro—
voke U.S. action so that it could achieve some propaganda benefit. In
late September, the intelligence report again indicated that the PRC
wanted to avoid war with the United States and would not fire on U.S.

12

ships or aircraft in Jinmen territorial waters. Besides, the PRC's

53
domestic political instability in 1958 also made it unlikely that it
would risk a major war for these small islands. Since the possibility
of war was not great, a hardline position could have psychological
benefit for the United States. It could partly solve Nationalist morale
problems and leave no doubt among East and Southeast Asian countries
about the U.S. determination to drive back "Communist expansion."

During the interval between the two crises, the United States made
use of world opinion that favored a peaceful solution to the offshore
island dispute. It benefited from U.N. intervention which was rejected
by the PRC. Its effort to maintain the status guo of two Chinas by
appealing for the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits won the
approval of U.S. allies. That was why in the 1958 crisis the United
States did not have so much opposition to its policy as it had in the
1954-1955 crisis. Britain, which was the most vocal opponent of
American Taiwan policy in 1954, supported Eisenhower's hardline position.
British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan stated in September that Britain
strongly supported the United States in opposing any attempt to settle
the dispute by force.13

The 1958 crisis did not last long. On October 6, the PRC announced
a cease-fire of one week. Immediately Eisenhower tried to graSp the
cease-fire opportunity to reduce tensions. On October 7, Eisenhower
wrote in his memorandum to Dulles that the United States should persuade
Chiang to remove his garrisons from the offshore islands. He thought
the cease-fire was a good chance for the Nationalists to pull out so

14 Eisenhower's

that they would not seem to be retreating under fire.
memorandum proved the sincerity of U.S. proposal for a peaceful solution
first hinted by Dulles's speech at a news conference on September 30.

Dulles stated that the United States would favor reducing Chinese

54

Nationalist forces on the offshore islands if the PRC would agree to a
cease—fire. He pointed out that a renunciation of force Should apply
to both Nationalists and Communists. It is not difficult to see that
Eisenhower actually did not change his position that Chiang Should stop
using the offshore islands to make trouble.

It was Chiang Kai-shek who made a dramatic change in his policy.
On October 2, in response to Dulles's speech of September 30, Chiang said
he opposed any reduction of his forces on the offshore islands as the
price of a cease-fire. He paid a personal visit to Jinmen on October 10
and still confirmed his campaign for the recovery of the mainland.
However, under U.S. pressure, Chiang had to make some concessions. After
three days of talks between Dulles and Chiang, Chiang finally agreed to
the renunciation of force in his mission of returning to the mainland.
He also promised that he might reduce his forces on Jinmen and Mazu.
The 1958 crisis thus ended. Why in 1958 did Chiang finally agree to do
what he refused three years ago? Why did he accept the renunciation of
force, which would help maintain the status quo of two Chinas? Did he
really mean what he agreed to, or was he using his tactics at that time?
All these questions cannot possibly be answered without the Nationalist
documents. But it might be speculated that time played an important role
in shattering Chiang's dream. After his failure to break down a de
facto two Chinas in his struggle with U.S. policy in the past three
years and after his failure to get U.S. support for military actions to
recover the mainland for eight years, Chiang had to face reality. He
was a master politician. He should have grasped reality much easier.
The United States no doubt most welcomed the Shift of Chiang's policy.
Since the first offshore island crisis in 1955 it had abandoned Dulles's

formerly aggressive foreign policy. In 1958, Taiwan was useful for

55
the purpose of containing, not rolling back, "Communist expansion." It
had lost its value of being a deterrent force. The United States would
be most satisfied so long as Taiwan remained in Nationalist hands and
stopped making trouble. This kind of relationship between the United

States and Taiwan continued until Nixon's time.

NOTES-~CHAPTER IV

1 Dulles memorandum of a conversation with Eisenhower, August 5,
1955, [3, 1955-1957, 3:15-7; Hoover to the Embassy in Taipei, Novermber 25,
1955, EB, 1955-1957, 3:186.

2 Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy lmbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United
States", in the Western Political Quarterly, 12:4 (1959), p. 1078.

3 Bowie memorandum to Dulles, August 19, 1955, 53, 1955-1957, 3:51.

4 McConaughy memorandum of a conversation between Koo, Robertson
and McConaughy, February 1, 1956, 55, 1955-1957, 3:295-302.

5 McConaughy memorandum of a conversation among Yeh, Koo, Dulles
and McConaughy, October 4, 1955, [3, 1955-1957, 3:111.

6
3:341-8.

7 Rankin to the Department of State, October 21, 1955, FR, 1955-
1957, 3:139-43.

8 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1965), p. 299.

9 Alexander L. George, Deterrence in American Foreign Poligy_(New
York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 364.

10

Chiang letter to Eisenhower, April 16, 1956, [3, 1955-1957,

ibid., Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 300-1.

 

1' Memorandum of the 338th Meeting of the NSC, October 2, 1957, 53,
1955-1957, 3:614.

'2 CINCPAC, Message No.6481/6483, to the JCS, August 26, 1958,
DDRS, (81) 431C; CINCPAC, Message No. 5705, to the JCS, September 22.
‘1958, DDRS, (81) 432B.

‘3 China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1967 (A Publication of
Congressional Quarterly ServTCe, 1967), p. 87.

14 Eisenhower memorandum for Dulles, October 7, 1958, DDRS,
(83) 2889.

56

CONCLUSIONS

The Eisenhower Administration's policy toward Taiwan was multiple
and complex. Its complexity was reflected in the contradiction between
the words and the deeds of the Administration, the ambiguity of its
objective with respect to the Taiwan area and its indecisiveness and
inconsistency in face of the offshore island crisis. These characteris-
tics of Eisenhower's policy derived from domestic political problems,
international reality in Asia and Eisenhower and Dulles's own percep-
tions of the PRC.

When Eisenhower took office, anti-Communist feelings ran very high.
The existence of McCarthyism, together with the frustration about the
protracted Korean War among Americans,suggested that the Eisenhower
Administration take a hardline toward the PRC. Dulles's "rolling back
Communist tide" rhetoric was, to a certain degree, to meet this domestic
political nEed. At the same time when the Korean War had not ended, the
Communist and nationalist forces in Vietnam were crippling the French
colonialist rule. Influenced by the domestic anti-Communist sentiments,
Eisenhower and Dulles easily reached the conclusion that this was another
case of Chinese Communist expansion. As the PRC was directly involved
in the Korean War, it supported the Vietnamese independence revolution
and it launched strong anti-American imperialist propaganda, Eisenhower
and DulleS's perception of Communists naturally led them to regard the
leaders of the PRC as irresponsible, dangerous and irrational.

"Rolling back Communist tide" had its problems from the very

57

58
beginning. It was no doubt rhetoric, not the objective of Dulles's
policy. Neither Eisenhower, nor Dulles, wanted to have a general war
to overthrow the Communist rule in China. But Dulles had to do some-
thing to make his rhetoric look like the objective of U.S. policy. His
policy in 1953 and 1954 was his effort to back up his rhetoric.
However, Since Dulles lacked adequate means to support his rhetoric, the
contradiction between his words and deeds was bound to appear. Success-
ful brinkmanship required the United States to be willing to risk war,
while the PRC was not. Dulles's brinkmanship in the Taiwan Straits
failed because this condition did not exist. When the crisis came,
Eisenhower was not willing to take the risk of war and he suspected
that the PRC would.

Eisenhower had more difficulties than Truman did in handling Chiang
Kai-shek. In the early 19505 survival was the primary interest of
Chiang's regime. Therefore, Chiang did not cause much trouble for
Truman's neutralization of the Taiwan Straits. But after three years in
Taiwan under the U.S. military protection Chiang's regime had recovered
and was waiting for the opportunity to recover the mainland. Once
unleashed, Chiang proved to be a trouble-maker. He tried to take
advantage of Dulles's deterrence policy to involve the United States in
a conflict with the PRC. A military conflict between the United States
and the PRC in the Taiwan Straits seemed to be the only chance for him
to overthrow the Communist rule in the mainland. For a time Eisenhower
and Dulles were caught in a dilemma. They could afford neither a
decline in Nationalist morale, nor allowing Chiang to involve the United
States in a war with the PRC. Finally, Eisenhower, who was less willing
than Dulles to take the risk of war and more determined to avoid it,

decided to back down from brinkmanship in the Taiwan area.

59

Some of the developments of U.S.-Taiwan relations at the time of
the first crisis, like the Signing of the MDT, the New Zealand Resolu-
tion and the Tachen evacuation, were often seen as U.S. efforts of
forcing Taiwan to accept a de facto two Chinas. However, they were more
complex than they appeared to be. They all had a dual nature. The MDT
served to better control Chiang's freedom of action, but some of its
ambiguous terms also fit the need of Dulles's deterrence policy. The
New Zealand Resolution, if accepted by the PRC, could greatly help
enforce a de facto two Chinas, but actually Dulles did not expect the
PRC's acceptance when he first put forward the proposal. He expected
the PRC's rejection so that the United States could justify its policy
of brinkmanship before world opinion which had already become unfavorable
to the United States in late 1954. The Tachen evacuation was also
originally planned by Dulles, but his suggestion was more out of military
consideration than a perception of two Chinas. His original plan was
to evacuate Tachen and start to defend Jinmen simultaneously, which made
no difference in implementing a de facto two Chinas. However, these
policies did have some effect in the end when Eisenhower decided to
replace the deterrence policy with a policy of perpetuating the de
facto two Chinas.

By 1955 McCarthyism had died down. The anti-Chinese Communist
sentiments had declined after the frustration about the Korean War was
over. The issue of "Communist expansion" in Vietnam was temporarily
solved. The urgent need to threaten the PRC ceased to exist. Most
important of all, the offshore island crisis made Eisenhower realize
that only in name brinkmanship would not involve the United States
in a war. In practice it could push the United States over the brink

into a war. Only then was the complexity of the Eisenhower

6O
Administration's policy toward Taiwan simplified and those elements of
contradiction, ambiguity, indecisiveness and inconsistency removed. In
its place was a policy with a clearcut and realistic objective: the
maintaince of a de facto two Chinas. It was carried out throughout the
rest of Eisenhower's presidency, and its consequences far outlived his

administration.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

The research for this thesis depended upon the sources available
at Michigan State University. Primary sources proved most useful in
the study of U. S. policies toward the PRC and Taiwan. The volumes of
Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing OffiEE) are the most vaTuable source. The recently published
Volumes II and III of the "China Area 1955-1957" are indispensable for
the study of the Eisenhower Administration's policy during and after
the first offshore island crisis. Declassified Documents Reference
S stem available in microfiche was systematicale studied. It inCludes
1mportant documents of the CIA, Department of Defense, Department of
State, the National Security Council and the White House. Although
many of them have been compiled in FR, there are still a lot of useful
documents that are not available inTFR. Volumes of Executive Session
of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm1ttee (Washington: U.S. Government
PFinting Office) proved helprl, but they have limitations for this
thesis. National Security Council Papers 1947-1977 (University Publi-
cations of America, Inc., 1981) was selectiVETy used for the study of
U.S. policy before 1955. It does not have much use for the time after
1955. CIA Research Reports, China 1946-1976 (University Publications
of America, Inc., 1982) has some vaanble information about CIA'S
estimations of Chiang's regime in Taiwan.

 

 

 

Memoirs and biographies have various degrees of usefulness for
the study of U. S. -Taiwan relations. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for
Chan e 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963) and Waging Peace (New York:

Dougleday, 1965), which have already been widely studied by scholars,
are Still very important for understanding Eisenhower's perceptions of
the situation in the Taiwan Straits. Koo Diary is the only source for
examing Taiwan's views, purposes, plans and reactions to U.S. policies.
There are numerous memoirs and biographies of key figures in the U.S.
government, including Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report. the Story of
the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper and Brathers, 1961),
Warren I. Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, NJ: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980),
Robert Donovan, Eisenhower: the Inside Story (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1956), Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles: the Last
Year (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, ‘T963), Louis L. Gerson,

John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc. , 1967),
RiEhard Good-Adams, Time of Power: A Regpp_aisa1 of John Foster Dulles
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson ,T1962) andTKarT Lott Rankin,TCh1na
Assignment (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964). They all
provide useful information and analyses.

 

 

 

General sources on U.S.-China relations offer an overview of the
developments in the Taiwan area. They include Charles C. Alexander,
Holding the Line, the Eisenhower Era 1952- 1961 (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1975), Dorothy Borg and WaTdo Heinrich, eds. , Uncertain
Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), Warren I. Cohen,

61

62

America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American
ReTationsTTNew York: John Wiley and Sons, 2nd ed,TT980), Foster Rhea
DUlles, American Policy toward Communist China, 1947-1969 (New York: T.
Y. CrowelTTCo., 1972), J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern ofTSino-American Crises:
Political-Military Interaction in theTT9SOs (Eondon: Cambridge University
Press, 1975), and WilTiam Whitney StueCk, Jr., The Road to Confronta-
tion (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981). Warren
1. Cohen's essay "Acheson and China" in Uncertain Years and Nancy Tucker,
Patterns in the Dust (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) provide
excellent analyses of the U.S.-China relations before the Korean War.
Cohen's essay "The United States and China since 1945" in Warren 1. Cohen,
ed., New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983) is the best biBliographicaT study of the works

on U.S.-China relations of the 19405, 19505 and 19605.

 

 

Secondary works on U.S. policy toward Taiwan are numerous. Thomas
E. Stolper, China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe, Inc., 1985)T3iscu5585 how the PRC and—the U.S. responded to
to each other'S policies concerning Taiwan. Its analysis of the PRC's
policy is one of the best. Alexander George and Richard Smoke,
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1974) contains two chapters dealing with
the two offshore island crises respectively. It focuses on the deterrent
effect of the U.S. policy in the Taiwan Straits. Both Ralph N. Clough,
Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978) and William
M. BueTér, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (Boulder, CO:
Colorado Associated University Phess, 1971) are important studies of
U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 19505. Bueler also made a detailed analysis
of Taiwan's domestic politics and the importance of the myth of the
mainland recovery for Chiang's rule in Taiwan. For Chiang Kai-shek's
purposes and intentions of involving the United States in a war with the
PRC, Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy lmbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S." in
the Western Political Quarterly (12:4, 1959, p. 1075-91) gives the
best analySis. O. Edmund Cluhh, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in
American Policy, 1950-1955" in Political Science Quarterly(74:4, 1959,
pp. 517-31) and John W. Lewis, "Quemoy and American China Policy" in
Asian Survey (2:1, 1962, pp. 12-19) have good discussions of the offshore
iSlands. Although their studies are not comprehensive, both essays
shed light on American policies toward the offshore islands.

The role of American domestic politics in U.S. policies toward the
PRC and Taiwan is presented in Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American
Politics (New York: Octagon Books, 1974) and StahleyTDZ Backrack, The
Committee of One Million: The "China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971 (NEWTYork:
Columbia University Press, T976). Both provide considerable evidence
and good analyses, but Koen seems to overemphasize the power of the
China Lobby in American politics. Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and
U.S. Presidential Elections 1952-1960 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974)—
has four chapters discussing presidential candidates' views of foreign
policy in the 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. The work has dis-
cussions of Eisenhower's views of foreign policy in general, and of the
policy toward the PRC and Taiwan in particular. It provides some clues
to the relationship of domestic politics and foreign policies in the
19505. For public opinion, George H Gallup, The Gallgp Poll Public
Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972) provides first-rate

 

 

 

63
information.

Recently, scholars tend to emphasize Eisenhower's initiative in
foreign policy-making. Some examples are Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower,
Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955" in Political Science
Quarterly (96:3, 1981, pp. 465-80),, Richard H. Immerman, 1'Eisenhower
and Du es: Who made the Decisions?" in Political Psyghology (1:1, 1979,
pp.21-38) and Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as An ACtivist President:
A Look at New Evidence" in Political Science Quarterly (94:4, 1979-1980,
pp.575-99). Rushkoff's discussion of Eisenhower‘s positive role in
dealing with the first offshore island crisis is particularly useful
for the understanding of the Eisenhower Administration's policies at
the time of the crisis.

 

 

 

As secondary works have already done a lot of studies on American
public opinion, periodicals and newspapers were not thoroughly examed
in the research for this thesis.

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