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ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES-TAIWAN RELATIONS: A STUDY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICIES TOWARD TAIWAN IN THE 1950s

By

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When Truman left the White House in 1953, Taiwan's legal status was not settled. Because of considerations of domestic politics and the international situation in Asia, Eisenhower and Dulles used Taiwan as a deterrent to Chinese "Communist expansion." But Eisenhower found himself in a dilemma when the offshore island crisis occurred. He was not able to solve the contradiction between using Chiang's forces to deter the PRC and discouraging him from attempting to recover the mainland by force. The study of U.S. State Department primary sources and other U.S. government documents, as well as important secondary studies on U.S. China policy, reveals that Eisenhower was very hesitant and indecisive in the crisis. His advisers had different views, and the European allies raised strong opposition. Most importantly, Eisenhower was determined to avoid risk of war. He finally took the initiative to drop brinkmanship and started a policy of maintaining a de facto two Chinas.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

It is generally accepted that the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 was the turning point in U.S.-Taiwan relations. President Harry Truman's decision to neutralize the Taiwan Straits prevented the fall of the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. After that, although the future legal status of Taiwan was unsettled during the remaining time of Truman's presidency, the objective of his administration with respect to Taiwan was to deny the People's Republic of China (PRC) the control of that island. It was during the time of Eisenhower's presidency that the de facto two Chinas was perpetuated under the assumption that China would be divided just like Germany, Korea and Vietnam, and neither the Nationalist Government in Taiwan, nor the Communist government in the mainland would conquer the other by force.

There is no doubt that either Truman's policy toward the Taiwan area, or that of Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was to pursue U.S. interests. Scholars who have studied Sino-American relations in the 1950s have different views, however, about how Truman and Eisenhower perceived American interests and how their perceptions influenced the policies of both administrations. One group including Warren I. Cohen, J.H. Kalicki, Charles Alexander, and Louis Gerson among others, hold the view that the Eisenhower Administration pursued a two Chinas policy which was essentially the same as that of Truman's. They point out Dulles's argument that the reality of the

existence of two Chinas had the same nature as that of two Germanys, two Koreas and two Vietnams. They emphasize the fact that no one in the Eisenhower Administration favored Chiang Kai-shek's plan of recovering the mainland. Alexander argues that the rhetoric of "rolling back Communist tide" was used only to appease anti-Communist militants in Congress and create the appearance of a sharp break with previous Democratic policy. In essence Eisenhower and Dulles's policy toward the Taiwan Straits continued that of the Truman Administration.

Differing from this group, some scholars see change in Eisenhower and Dulles's policy. William Bueler argues that Eisenhower and Dulles's perception of the PRC's aggressiveness in Asia was an important factor that brought about the change. Alexander George and Richard Smoke see the development of the deterrence commitment in Eisenhower and Dulles's policy. They think that the Eisenhower Administration's shift toward a stronger commitment to the Nationalist Chinese was a logical result of its perception of the Chinese Communists as irrational and aggressive.

As U.S.-PRC relations improved in the 1970s, some American scholars started systematic research on the policies of the PRC toward the United States. Thomas Stolper and Kalicki have the view that the offshore island crises were an effort of the PRC to sabotage the U.S. attempt to perpetuate a de facto two Chinas. The PRC had no intention at all during the crises to take the offshore islands. In their writings the image of the Chinese leaders was portrayed as rational and restrained, and the Chinese responses to U.S. policies as defensive.

Most of these scholars studied U.S.-Taiwan relations within the

context of the whole issue of Sino-American relations, since the developments of the bilateral relations were, to a large degree, decided by the relationship between the United States and the PRC. This thesis, however, focuses narrowly on U.S.-Taiwan relations. It argues that in the first year and a half the Eisenhower Administration did not pursue a two Chinas policy vigorously. During that period Secretary of State Dulles never mentioned the example of two Germanys, two Koreas and two Vietnams on any occasion. He perceived the PRC as aggressive and tried to make Taiwan play a good role in his deterrence strategy of driving back "Communist expansion." If the Eisenhower Administration seriously pursued the two Chinas policy right from the beginning as some scholars argued, it would be very difficult to understand its decision of supporting Chiang's forces to raid China's commerce and territories because that could help cause conflict and war rather than maintain a status quo of two Chinas.

It was the first offshore island crisis that made the Eisenhower Administration shift back to the two Chinas policy. During the crisis the United States gave up its support for raiding the PRC and took one step after another to put Chiang back into its tight control. Not until the later stage of the crisis did Dulles begin to persuade Taiwan to follow the example of Germany, Korea and Vietnam.

This thesis begins with a brief study of the impact of the Korean War. It focuses on the Eisenhower Administration with examination of the shift of U.S. policy from using Nationalist forces as a threat to China to purporting to end hostility in the Taiwan Straits. To better understand the shift of policy it discusses in detail the related factors that helped bring about this shift: the differences among Eisenhower's advisers with regard to Dulles's deterrence policy, the

European allies' opposition to Dulles's brinkmanship, and Eisenhower's determination to avoid a general war with China.

CHAPTER I

THE IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

By 1949 the downfall of Chiang's Nationalist Government in China was inevitable. Early that year the United States began to reconsider seriously its relations with the Nationalist Government and the future status of Taiwan. Facing the reality that the Chinese Communists would control the country with a population of 500 milion, the Truman Administration now based its policy toward Chiang's government largely upon the possibility of whether normal relations could be worked out with the Communist government.

As early as March 1949, the Truman Administration had ruled out any further military and economic aid to Chiang. It saw the futility of giving more aid to turn the tide of the Chinese civil war. When the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was discussing $1.5 billion additional aid to Chiang, the Secretary of State Dean Acheson raised strong opposition. In his letter to the Committee Acheson argued that Chiang's defeat was not because his forces lacked military equipment. "There is no evidence that this furnishing of additional military material would alter the pattern of current developments in China."[1] At his appearance at the hearings before the Committee, Acheson tried to dissuade the senators from approving further aid by reading them a letter from China written by some American businessmen who opposed the aid.[2] Their severe criticism of the decadent and ineffective Nationalist Government had obviously no small influence on Acheson.

When the State Department published its "White Paper", ascribing

the loss of China to the corruption and incompetence of Chiang's government, the relationship between the United States and Chiang was almost over, although the "White Paper" was mainly an effort by the Truman Administration to shift its responsibility for another Communist victory and to protect itself from the increasing domestic criticism of its China policy. Truman and Acheson had to accept the reality that sooner or later the United States would deal with the Chinese Communist government. Since the Communists were consolidating their control over China, it was not in America's interest to push China toward the Soviet Union. The normalization of relations with the Communist government would leave the possibility open of driving a wedge between the two Communist countries. Another Titoist state within the Communist world would serve U.S. interest.

As China was surely lost to the Communists, Taiwan became strategically important. It linked the defense line between Okinawa and the Philippines and proved to be of great military value in the Pacific War when the Japanese used it as a base to attack the Philippines. In March 1949, some senators on the Foreign Relations Committee asked some legal questions concerning the trusteeship for Taiwan. They were particularly interested in keeping Taiwan under U.S. control. Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah frankly expressed his view that Taiwan should have a U.S. trusteeship, rather than a U.N. trusteeship.[3] After the "White Paper" was published, the State Department urged the National Security Council (NSC) to review U.S. policy for Taiwan and

> "requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) furnish the NSC their present estimate of the strategic importance to the United States of Formosa, particularly in light of the very real possibility that it will ultimately pass under Chinese Communist control in the absence of active intervention on the part of the United States."4

Within the U.S. government there was a general agreement that it would be in the U.S. interest to keep Taiwan away from Communist Control.[5] The JCS recommended direct military intervention mainly out of military consideration. The Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk favored U.S. taking over Taiwan as a neutral place.[6] Chief of Policy Planning Staff George Kennan even suggested a plan of using American forces to overthrow Chiang's regime on Taiwan and let Taiwan be independent.[7] However, by early 1950 the Truman Administration had decided not do anything to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking over Taiwan. On January 5, 1950, Truman formally announced that

> "the United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The U.S. Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the Civil conflict in China. Similarly, the U.S. Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa."8

On the same day in the afternoon Acheson held a special press conference. He confirmed U.S. recognition of China's legal right to Taiwan and reaffirmed that the United States would not get involved militarily in Taiwan.[9]

The non-involvement policy reflected Acheson's conception of U.S. interests. Acheson had more concern for Europe than Asia. He was rigorously implementing the containment policy in Europe. He thought military involvement in the Chinese civil war would tied down American forces in China. That could jeopardize American interests in Europe. He believed that an accommodation with Communist China would benefit U.S. interests more than hostility. Although the Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung had declared leaning to the Soviet Union in the struggle

between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp, Acheson still wanted to keep the possibility open of a rivalry between the two Communist countries. He did not want to make ideological similarity a criterion for recognizing a new government. As long as that government exercised effective control, recognized its international obligations and governed with the consent of the people, Acheson had no objection to recongnizing it. In the case of China in early 1950 he did not feel it very difficult to normalize relations with the PRC if it had proper respect for its international obligations.[10]

The U.S. government's inaction to the imminent fall of Taiwan to the PRC before the Korean War was self-evident. On May 11, 1950, the CIA presented a report predicting that "the Chinese Communists are capable of seizing Taiwan before the end of 1950, and will probably do so." There had been no "substantial improvement of political and military situation on Taiwan."[11] Two weeks later the Acting Secretary of State Department James Webb instructed the American Embassy in Taipei to prepare the evacuation plan for U.S. personnel in Taiwan. The American government had contacted the Philippine government about a place of refuge for Chiang Kai-shek in the Philippines, but the Philippines refused Chiang.[12] When Karl Rankin went to take charge of the American Embassy in August of 1950, he found it was almost "in the last stages of decay". Good office and household equipment had been moved out; most files had been destroyed and "operations were virtually limited to keeping evacuation plans up-to-date."[13]

The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 put an end to American non-involvement in the Chinese civil war. Two days later Truman sent the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to prevent the PRC from seizing Taiwan. Although Truman declared that the step for the

neutralization of the Taiwan Straits was mainly out of military consideration, it was obvious that political consequences of the simultaneous fall of Taiwan weighed heavily with him. Domestically, he needed the support for his war effort in Korea from those Congressmen who also wanted Truman to do something for Taiwan. Internationally, he should show himself as not being soft to "Communist expansion."

Although Truman's preliminary measure of neutralizing Taiwan was a temporary make-shift as he announced on June 27, 1950, this dramatic policy change would hardly be reversed even if the North Korean military action could be quickly frustrated by American military intervention. A month after Truman's announcement, Chairman of the JCS General Omar Bradley submitted to the NSC the recommendation of the JCS on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The JCS stressed the strategic importance of Taiwan to U.S. security and strongly recommended that, irrespective of the situation in Korea, the United States should continue to deny Taiwan to the PRC, or at least until the future status of Taiwan had been determined in accordance with Truman's announcement of June 27. The JCS also recommended that the United States should retain freedom of action with respect to Taiwan. On the following day the 62nd meeting of the NSC presided over by Truman approved the JCS's recommendations.[14] Thus, the long-term plan to separate Taiwan from China was made before China joined the Korean War. Arms shipments to Taiwan were renewed in August 1950. In March, 1951 the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Taipei and the first 100 American military advisers were sent there. American military aid was dramatically increased with the first allocation of 300 million dollars recommended by the MAAG.[15]

Truman's neutralization of the Taiwan Straits is often criticized as not really neutral. Nationalist forces frequently made hit-and-run

raids on the mainland. The 7th Fleet was instructed not to protect the PRC. However, within the circle of policymakers the immediate and long-term U.S. objectives with respect to Taiwan were clearly to deny its control to the PRC, while at the same time not to support Chiang's attempt to recover the mainland by force. The State Department called to the attention of the Department of Defense that American aid was "designed to contribute to the defense of Formosa, and not to develop the Nationalist military potential for possible mainland invasion."[16] As for the future U.S. policy toward Taiwan, Acheson was very careful not to make any definite commitments to the Nationalists. It was not in the interest of the United States to restrict its freedom of action.[17] When the Nationalist ambassador V.K. Wellington Koo explored the possibility of including Taiwan in a similar pact as the tripartite pact of Australia-New Zealand-U.S. (ANZUS) in July 1951, Acheson refused, because the Nationalist government's objectives went beyond the defense of Taiwan and embraced reconquest of the mainland.[18]

After American unilateral military action neutralized the Taiwan Straits, the United States again explored the legal possibility of putting Taiwan in trusteeship, or allowing it to get independence. The decision to return Taiwan to China was made in 1943 in Cairo and confirmed in August 1945 at Potsdam. In October 1950 the Consultant to the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, suggested the United States should state at the United Nations General Assembly that the assumption at the time of Cairo and Potsdam about the willingness of the people of Taiwan for returning to China might not be valid now since the intervening changes were so great. More emphasis should be put on the self-determination of the Taiwanese.[19] The United States knew clearly the real obstacle to the independence of Taiwan was Chiang Kai-shek.

Therefore, a study of the possibility of removing him was under way in late 1950. On February 9, 1951, the Office of Chinese Affairs presented its study report on this matter. It stated that the removal of Chiang by the United States was almost impossible. Since the Korean War had strengthened his position, Chiang would not voluntarily resign. Any effort of the U.S. government to remove him by force would inevitably bring about disorder which would benefit the PRC.[20] Thus, this plan was dropped.

Throughout the remaining period of his administration, Truman did not change his policy announced on June 27, 1950. The objective was still to deny Taiwan to the PRC, but the United States did not make long-term commitments to Chiang about continued recognition of his regime as the government of China, and gave no encouragement about the reconquest of the mainland. Any changes had to wait until the Eisenhower Administration took office.

NOTES--CHAPTER I

[1] U.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1949, Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949-1950, 81st Congress, p. 8.

[2] ibid, March 18, 1949, pp. 20-21.

[3] ibid, March 22, 1949, pp. 61-67.

[4] Webb Memorandum for Souers, August 19, 1949, NSC Progress Report, NSC 37/6, Documents of the NSC, first supplement, (University Publication of America, Inc., 1981), Roll 1.

[5] Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 7.

[6] Rusk to the Secretary of State, May 30, 1950, FR, 1950, 6:349-50.

[7] Warren I. Cohen, "Acheson and China", in Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, eds., Uncertain Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 27-28.

[8] DSB, January 16, 1950, p. 79.

[9] Acheson's Address to Special Press Conference, January 5, 1950, AFP 1950-55, 2:2451.

[10] William M. Bueler, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971), pp. 5-6.

[11] CIA Research Report, May 11, 1950, China 1946-1976, (University Publications of America, Inc., 1982), Microfilm 189721.

[12] Webb to the Embassy in Taipei, May 26, 1950, FR, 1950, 6:334-6.

[13] Karl L. Rankin, China Assignment (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 124.

[14] Bradley Memorandum, July 27, 1950, Declassified Documents Reference System (86) 2035; Memorandum of the 62nd meeting of the NSC, DDRS, (86) 2036.

[15] Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China 1949-1969 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972), p. 120.

[16] Memorandum of Department of State to Department of Defense, September 15, 1950, FR, 1950, 6:501.

[17] Acheson to Rankin, August 14, 1950, FR, 1950, 6:434-8.

[18] Rankin to Acheson, July 23, 1951, FR, 1951, 7:1762; Acheson to the Embassy in Taipei, July 28, 1951, FR, 1951, 7:1764.

[19] Memorandum of conversation between Acheson, Dulles, Battle and Allison, October 23, 1950, FR, 1950, 6:534-6.

[20] Memorandum of Department of State by Clubb and Stuart, February 9, 1951, FR, 1951, 7:1576.

CHAPTER II

TAIWAN'S ROLE IN DULLES'S DETERRENCE POLICY 1953-1955

The Eisenhower Administration ended the neutralization of the Taiwan Straits. Two weeks after his inauguration Eisenhower announced the "unleashing" of Chiang Kai-shek to attack mainland China. Now Chiang's forces could attack the mainland and get away with it under American military protection. The policy of "unleashing" Chiang was part of Secretary of State Dulles's new dynamic foreign policy of "rolling back Communist expansion." Dulles abandoned Truman's passive containment policy and launched a campaign of liberating the "captive peoples" from Communist rule. He thought it best resisted "Communist expansion" by constantly threatening those countries where Communists had taken power. Taiwan could be used to play a positive role in this campaign.

There were two major reasons for the Eisenhower Administration's decision to abandon Truman's passive containment policy and adopt a policy of massive retaliation against "Communist expansion." One of them was Eisenhower's domestic political considerations. In the early 1950s American hostility toward the PRC was obvious. Although most Americans were indifferent to the fate of Chiang Kai-shek before the Korean War, the fighting between American soldiers and the Chinese Communists in Korea had changed the attitude of most Americans who came to regard the PRC as the most dangerous enemy. That American soldiers were being killed always had a dramatic effect on American sentiment. Throughout 1953 public hostility toward the PRC remained

intense. The Gallup Poll showed that in February 1953 sixty-five percent of voters approved the Eisenhower Administration's plan to permit Chiang's forces to make raids on the PRC. Only fourteen percent of voters disapproved and the other twenty-one percent had no opinion.[1] Repeated polls also showed the American public opposed PRC's admission into the United Nations even if the PRC agreed to end the Korean War.[2]

If public hostility only had an indirect influence on the Eisenhower Administration's policy toward the PRC and Taiwan, the influence of the "China Lobby" was more direct. Although Chiang's supporters failed to persuade the Truman Administration to interfere in the Chinese civil war in late 1949 and early 1950, their propaganda about the loss of China to the Communists through folly and treason had no small effect on American politics after the outbreak of the Korean War. Senator Joseph McCarthy was notorious for using the propaganda of the "loss of China" to create horrible political scandals. As a matter of fact, the influence of the "China Lobby" grew hand in hand with the rise of McCarthyism. Eisenhower also picked up the "loss of China" in the 1952 presidential campaign to attack the Democratic administration's policy as being too soft to "Communist expansion."

The 83rd Congress in 1953 had the nickname of "Senator from Formosa" had become the Senate Majority Leader after Senator Robert A. Taft's death in July 1953. Republican Senators like H. Alexander Smith and John W. Bricker, and Republican Representatives like Walter H. Judd, John M. Vorys and James G. Fulton were all influential persons who were strong supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. Eisenhower would have great difficulty in getting cooperation from Congress if his China policy could not satisfy those pro-Chiang Senators and Representatives.

Ross Y. Koen, the author of The China Lobby in American Politics, asserted that the Republicans were willing to make concessions to appease the "China Lobby" and its supporters in Congress by cooperating fully with Chiang in military and training operations for the recovery of mainland China. The "unleashing" of Chiang was the first step.[3]

However, Eisenhower's domestic political considerations could not be the only reason for the Eisenhower Administration's policy toward the PRC and Taiwan. "Communist expansion" was not a major issue in the 1952 presidential campaign. (As a matter of fact, American foreign policy, as in most presidential campaigns, was not the most important issue in 1952.) The theme of "rolling back the Communist tide" and "liberating the captive people" had little to do with Eisenhower's victory. Eisenhower found its limitation and dropped it in September because it could bring about the Democrats' charge that "liberation" would lead to nuclear war.[4] In late 1953 and early 1953 most Americans thought the most important problem facing the United States was the Korean War, and they believed Eisenhower was the person who could handle the problem well.[5] In these circumstances, it was possible that considerations of the situation in Southeast Asia and Eisenhower and Dulles's perceptions of the PRC also contributed to the need for change of policy.

Eisenhower and Dulles believed the PRC conceived a tremendous hostility toward the United States. They regarded Chinese Communists as aggressive, treacherous and responsible for human sufferings. Even before the Korean War had ended, the Vietnamese independence revolution was on its way. Dulles had no doubt that the PRC was providing aid to the Vietnamese nationalists and Communists. A picture of Chinese aggressiveness was made easily: Chinese soldiers were still fighting in

Korea, while their leaders already planned to expand in Southeast Asia. With this picture in his mind Dulles developed his concept of deterrence. He thought that the only effective way to stop "Communist aggressors" was to convince them in advance that if they committed aggression, they could not get away with it and would be subjected to costly retaliatory blows.[6] Although Dulles's concept was intended for "Communist expansion" in general, his deterrence policy in 1953 was clearly aimed at the PRC. The undertone was that the United States would not tolerate the Chinese "expansion" in Southeast Asia. It could use Chiang's forces for retaliation.

Within a short time after he was unleashed, Chiang did enjoy great freedom in taking military actions against the mainland. Actually the United States was eager to encourage him to do something. On February 5, 1953, the Chief of the MAAG General William Chase wrote a letter to the Nationalist Chief of General Staff Chou Ch'i-jou, suggesting that the Nationalist forces increase the frequency of raids, "not only from the offshore islands, but also from Formosa and the Pescadores," and blockade the mainland coast from Swatow to Dachen. For any military actions, the Nationalists just had to keep the Americans informed, but they were not obliged to get American approval.[7] At the same time the United States put great pressure on Chiang to reinforce the offshore islands. Chiang bitterly resisted the pressure because he knew the offshore islands did not have military value.[8] The reinforcement was only used as a threat to the mainland. As for the value of the offshore islands to the defense of Taiwan, the JCS had reached the conclusion in August 1953 that they were not essential. These islands, if taken by the PRC, could not be used to launch an offensive attack on Taiwan. But they were more useful to the Nationalists.[9] The policy of using Taiwan

as a deterrent was clearly defined in NSC 146/2 concerning U.S. objectives and courses of action with respect to Taiwan. The United States would increase the effectiveness of Chiang's forces in defense of Taiwan, for raids against the mainland and the blockade of China's seaborne commerce. Besides, the United States would encourage and assist Taiwan to defend the offshore islands and raid the mainland from those islands.[10]

For the future status of Taiwan, the Eisenhower Administration abandoned the Truman Administration's diplomatic attempt of neutralizing it, or making it independent, or putting it in a kind of trusteeship. The Administration took steps to make long-range commitments to the continued recognition of Chiang's regime as the government of China and made efforts to retain its representation in the United Nations. In April 1953 Eisenhower elevated the rank of his representative in Taipei. The elevation of Rankin to ambassador indicated that the possibility of recognizing the PRC in the foreseeable future was very remote. It also indicated the end of U.S. attempt for a trusteeship for Taiwan. On April 9, the New York Times's editor Anthony Leviero wrote an article regarding an American plan for a U.N. trusteeship for Taiwan. That caused concern among Chiang's friends in the Senate. On April 17, at the executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dulles flatly denied the question of trusteeship was ever discussed within the Administration. He assured the Committee that the headline in the New York Times had nothing to do with the U.S. government policy.[11]

From the military point of view, mere neutralization of Taiwan would no longer meet U.S. strategic needs. According to an NSC Staff Study finished in November 1953, neutralization would considerably improve the PRC's strategic position in the Taiwan Straits and reduce

U.S. strategic position there by reducing American freedom of action.[12] This situation would not accord with the U.S. general policy of deterrence of "Communist expansion." Besides, the study pointed out that U.S. interest in the Nationalist government should not be confined to the strategic importance of Taiwan. The United States should use Taiwan as an essential weapon in the continuing political struggle with the Communist world.[13] Therefore, Taiwan's political stability and economic improvement could offset Communist influence and infiltration in Asia. Thus, large amount of American economic aid was granted to Taiwan.

Although Eisenhower's cabinet members generally agreed to the shift in policy since Eisenhower took office, there were disagreements about some courses of action. The deterrence policy was no doubt the master piece of Dulles. During the first year and a half Eisenhower was more or less of the same mind as Dulles. No evidence showed that there existed any serious disagreements between them. The most outspoken opponent was Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. At the 169th meeting of the NSC on November 5, 1953, Wilson pointed out the unrealistic policy of regarding Chiang Kai-shek as the potential ruler of mainland China. He argued that Chiang "was very much like the Pretenders to various vacant thrones in Europe and no more likely than these ever to recover his lost power and position in China." Wilson also expressed his strong opposition to the increased rate in building up Chiang's forces. The expenditure would have no end. But Eisenhower argued that the United States at present could not afford to restrict the recognition of Chiang to the mere leadership of Taiwan. The build-up of Chiang's forces would be over a long term so that Taiwan could be a substantial threat to mainland China.[14]

On the lower level of policy study the Regional Planning Advisor

for Far Eastern Affairs Charlton Ogburn also questioned the unrealistic aspect regarding the recognition of Chiang's government as the government of China. In his memorandum to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs Walter McConaughy, Ogburn pointed out that with the armed forces of Taiwan becoming more Taiwanese, the Nationalist Government would gradually become more and more interested in Taiwan affairs and less and less interested in a return to the mainland. If that change was inevitable, why should the United States spend so heavily on Taiwan while some other areas like Thailand, Burma and Indonesia also needed help to resist "Communists' capture"? Taiwan was much easier to defend than these countries. Ogburn's reasoning was rejected by Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson.[15]

However, Dulles's deterrence policy did not mean Dulles wanted to see a general war with the PRC. He was as unwilling as Eisenhower and any other cabinet members were to involve the United States in a war. Dulles had only a stronger will to take a risk. The principle of his policy---brinkmanship---was based upon taking a risk to a certain degree that it could deter the Communists. But in exercising brinkmanship Dulles wanted to be sure that the possibility of successful deterrence would be greater than the risk of war. If the risk of war was greater, he would not take the chance. In using Chiang's forces to threaten the PRC Dulles wanted the United States to have effective control over the course of deterrence. Therefore, at the 139th meeting of the NSC on April 8, 1953, Dulles discussed his worry about the jet bombers delivered to Taiwan. He suggested stopping delivery until Chiang gave the United States his commitment that he would not use the bombers "recklessly and in a fashion to embarrass United States policy."[16]

In response to Taiwan's proposal for a mutual defense treaty Dulles

was very cautious not to make any commitment that might tie the United States to the Chinese civil war. In a conversation with the Nationalist ambassador Koo in March 1953, Dulles refused Taiwan's proposal for a U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty. He frankly told Koo that the United States could not make a treaty that would commit the United States to go to war against the PRC. At the same time Chiang would not like to accept a treaty that only included Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (Pescadores).[17] It was not yet the right time to conclude a treaty with Taiwan in 1953. During the discussion of the proposed treaty within the State Department one year later Dulles still urged delay. In April 1954 Koo felt very frustrated that Robertson often evaded the topic of the treaty whenever he asked about it.[18]

Dulles's lack of interest in a treaty with Taiwan had another reason that related to his general policy of deterrence. A defense treaty including only Taiwan and the Penghus would not only be distasteful to Chiang, but also not desirable to Dulles in 1953 and 1954. Dulles knew very well that the success of his brinkmanship in dealing with "Communist expansion" depended, to a large degree, on the concealment of the real motive of the United States. Deterrence would lose its effect if the United States was believed to be bluffing. A defense treaty, if covering only Taiwan and the Penghus, would weaken the effectiveness of his deterrence policy.

The United States policy toward Taiwan underwent a subtle change when the first offshore island crisis arose in September 1954. Dulles's rigorous deterrence policy gradually came to a halt when the brinkmanship seemed to push the United States toward war. Differences over American Taiwan policy, especially the policy toward the offshore islands held by the Nationalists, became more apparent among Eisenhower's

cabinet members. Eisenhower himself was determined to avoid a war with the PRC. Thus, the Eisenhower Administration's Taiwan policy entered the second stage, in which its main objective was to bring about a status quo of two Chinas.

NOTES--CHAPTER II

[1] George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 1119.

[2] ibid., pp. 1153, 1169.

[3] Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), pp. 208-9.

[4] Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1952-1960 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), p. 84.

[5] ibid., Gallup, pp. 1108, 1118, 1087.

[6] J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interaction in the 1950s (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 80.

[7] Chase to Chou, February 5, 1953, FR, 1952-1954,14:144.

[8] Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States"in The Western Political Quarterly, 12:4 (1959), P. 1078; Alexander George, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 270

[9] Memorandum of Johnson to the Acting Secretary of State, August 3, 1953, FR, 1952-1954, 14:240-1.

[10] Statement of Policy by the NSC,NSC 146/2, November 6, 1953, FR, 1952-1954, 14:307-8.

[11] U.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign Relations, April 17, 1953, Vol. V, 83rd Congress, pp. 317-8.

[12] NSC Staff Study on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government, November 6, 1953, FR, 1952-1954, 14:318.

[13] ibid, p. 311.

[14] Memorandum of the 169th Meeting of the NSC, November 5, 1953, FR, 1952-1954, 14:274-5.

[15] Ogburn Memorandum to McConaughy, October 30, 1953, FR, 1952-1954, 14:257-8.

[16] Memorandum of the 139th Meeting of the NSC, April 8, 1953, FR, 1952-1954, 14:181.

[17] Allison Memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Koo, March 19, 1953, FR, 1952-1954, 14:158.

[18] Koo Diary, entry for April 7, 1954, box 191, (Notes from Koo Diary made by Warren I. Cohen).

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST OFFSHORE ISLAND CRISIS, 1954-55

On September 3, 1954, the PRC started heavy bombardment of the Jinmen (Quemoy)islands. For the first time the Eisenhower Administration faced the test of Dulles's deterrence policy in the Taiwan area. It had to decide whether the United States should continue the course of "unleashing" Chiang to engage his forces in provocative activities against the mainland and help defend Jinmen and Mazu (Matsu), thus, risking a direct military confrontation with China, or it should give up the deterrence policy and just keep Taiwan from the PRC's control and maintain it as an integral part of the coastal defense line in the Western Pacific.

The first step the United States took in handling the crisis was through New Zealand to ask the United Nations to impose a cease-fire between the PRC and the Nationalists in the offshore island areas. Later historians tend to see the New Zealand Resolution as one of the U.S. efforts to create a status quo of two Chinas. Eisenhower himself wrote in his memoir that Dulles's suggestion for taking the case to the United Nations was "to maintain the status quo and institute a cease fire in the Formosa Strait."[1] However, the original purpose of Dulles's proposal was something different. Among the cabinet members Dulles was one of the strong exponents for defending Jinmen and Mazu during the crisis. Although in dealing with Chiang Dulles was very cautious not to commit the United States to the defense of the offshore islands and wanted the United States to have complete freedom of

action concerning these islands, within the circle of policy makers Dulles always emphasized the importance of retention by the Nationalists. Dulles put forward his proposal at the 214th meeting of the NSC on September 12, 1954 in Denver. He explained that the United States would benefit from a U.N. cease-fire resolution with or without the Soviet veto. If the Soviet Union vetoed it, the United States would win world opinion and the support from its allies for the American policy of defending the offshore islands. If the Soviet Union did not veto it, the islands would still remain in Nationalist hands. Besides, the Administration would also benefit domestically. Any actions of the Administration without Congress would have no support from the American people. But, Dulles argued, action under the United Nations could give the Administration such authorization, which it could not get otherwise.[2] Dulles was very sure that the Chinese would not accept the New Zealand Resolution. He said at the next NSC meeting that "the odds are overwhelmingly against acceptance by the Chinese Communists of any U.N. solution neutralizing the offshore islands. Refusal to accept the U.N. verdict would put the Chinese Communists in a very bad light before the rest of the world."[3] It is clear that Dulles was ready to benefit from a veto by the Soviet Union so that U.S. defense of the offshore islands could be justified.

Eisenhower had great interest in Dulles's proposal and readily approved it. It is not clear whether Eisenhower's consideration of a U.N. cease-fire was of the same as Dulles's. It was probable that Eisenhower preferred to benefit from a cease-fire accepted by the PRC. At the Denver meeting Eisenhower disagreed with JCS's suggestion of committing the United States to defend the offshore islands and helping the Nationalists bomb the mainland. He was very worried about a

general war that might start from this area. Throughout the crisis Eisenhower remained hesitant to make a decision concerning Jinmen and Mazu. Therefore, a U.N. cease-fire was the best alternative he could have at the time.

Another step the Eisenhower Administration took to reduce the tension in the Taiwan Straits was to curtail Chiang's raids upon China's seaborne commerce. Within the Eisenhower Administration Secretary of Defense Wilson again disagreed with the current policies. In his memorandum of October 5, 1954 to Robert Cutler, the Special Assistant to the President, Wilson pointed out that paragraph 10 of NSC 146/2[4] was out of date and should be suspended. He argued that the support of the Nationalist raids upon Chinese Communist territory and commerce was likely to lead to a war. He also proposed putting Taiwan and the Penghus "under the mandate of the United Nations or setting them up as an independent, autonomous state."[5] Wilson was the strongest exponent of a two-Chinas policy and of the withdrawal from the offshore islands by the Nationalists. Eisenhower immediately agreed to suspend paragraph 10 of NSC 146/2 temporarily. This was a big shift from the former dynamic policy of deterrence, a step closer to a policy of maintaining the status quo of two Chinas. However, this shift did not receive unanimous consent among the cabinet members. The JCS and Wilson differed as to how long the suspension of raids should be. The JCS opposed permanent suspension, but Wilson favored it. Dulles surely did not like suspension at all. At the 229th meeting of the NSC on December 21, 1954 Dulles suggested ending the suspension.[6]

These two steps of the United States were extremely frustrating to Chiang Kai-shek. They were easily understood as a change of policy by the United States, which would lead to a status quo of two Chinas. On

October 12, 1954, Robertson suddenly arrived in Taipei to persuade Chiang to accept a cease-fire proposal for the offshore island areas through the United Nations. Chiang saw it as a preliminary step of a plan designed to a U.N. trusteeship for Taiwan. In the conversation with Robertson Chiang showed his great reluctance to accept a cease-fire discussion in the United Nations.[7] He was very sensitive to any policy change by the United States and viewed American efforts to reduce tensions in the Taiwan Straits with great suspicion. The interesting thing was Chiang and his foreign policy advisers suspected that the New Zealand Resolution was maneuvered by the British; that the United States accepted the idea of two Chinas as a concession to the British for a more harmonious Anglo-American policy in the Far East.[8] The hard bargaining during the Chiang-Robertson conversation resulted in a cpmpromise that Taiwan would not boycott the presentation of the cease-fire proposal by New Zealand and the United States would announce the beginning of the negotiation with Taiwan for a mutual defense treaty.[9]

Actually the United States had already got prepared to start the negotiation. With the tension around the offshore islands rising, the State Department's interest in such a treaty greatly increased. In late August 1954, Chiang for the first time made the promise that he would not undertake major military actions without U.S. approval. During Dulles's short visit to Taiwan on September 9, Chiang confirmed his promise if the treaty was made.[10] Chiang's promise removed Dulles's worry that a treaty might commit the United States to a war with the PRC without U.S. control over Chiang's military actions against the PRC. To exercise effective control Dulles insisted on three conditions: first the treaty would cover only Taiwan and the Penghus; second, the Nationalists would not use military forces without the agreement of the United States; and third, the

Nationalists would not transfer military forces from Taiwan and the Penghus to the offshore islands without the approval of the United States. These three conditions were embodied in the final version of the treaty signed by Dulles and Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh on December 2, 1954 with a little compromise on both sides. Although the treaty stated that only Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were covered, the Article VI had an ambiguous statement that the treaty might be extended "to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement."[11] The other two Nationalist's promises were not put in the formal part of the treaty.

After the United States took action to prevent the fall of Taiwan, Chiang hoped to have a treaty that would guarantee U.S. support to his regime. When the United States had signed treaties one after another with Australia and New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, and Korea, Chiang's desire to have a similar treaty became more urgent. However, the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 could hardly be said a great diplomatic victory for Chiang. If the time were in the early 1950 when survival was the most important issue to Chiang, a treaty like this one was no doubt most welcome. But in 1954 Chiang had already recovered from his defeat in the mainland and the conquest of Taiwan by the PRC was not likely. The Treaty did not benefit him a great deal. The Nationalists lived with the illusion of recovering the mainland in the 1950s. They could not possibly admit to outsiders, or even to themselves, that they would be forever confined to Taiwan. For Chiang Kai-shek, mainland recovery was his ultimate goal, which would be achieved in the near future.[12] But the Treaty actually deprived him of his freedom of action to a great degree. The United States through its treaty obligation, only guaranteed the survival of his regime in Taiwan. The price Chiang

paid was the loss of chance to provoke a military confrontation between the United States and the PRC. Now the United States exercised a strict control to prevent him from playing this trick.

There is not adequate evidence to prove that Dulles favored the Treaty as a means of maintaining a status quo of two Chinas. Dulles desired a treaty of dual nature: to control Chiang's military actions and to achieve a deterrence effect. In the 1950s, if Taiwan was attacked, the United States would defend it with or without the Treaty. The possibility that Chiang could provoke a war in the Taiwan area did exist before the Treaty was signed although the United States had certain control over his actions. The State Department was aware of this situation. In his memorandum to Dulles in August 1954, Robertson stated that a treaty with Chiang's promise to acquire U.S. approval for his military actions would provide the United States with greater control than it had had over the circumstances under which U.S. armed forces might become involved in major conflict in the Taiwan area.[13] Robertson's argument reflected the State Department's concern in this respect. Dulles was aware of this, too. In answering questions during the Senate hearings for the treaty approval Dulles admitted that Chiang had the power to attack the mainland. The Treaty had some limited control over Chiang's freedom of action, but its purpose was not to confine Chiang to Taiwan simply because he would never make a treaty with the United States that had that effect.[14]

The Treaty's deterrence effect was self-evident. It completed the Western Pacific defense line from Korea through Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and to Australia and New Zealand. This line had an effect of a permanent threat to the PRC. Besides, the Mutual Defense Treaty was ambiguous about the offshore islands. Robertson once recommended

that the Treaty should keep the PRC guessing as to U.S. intention respecting the defense of these islands.[15] The ambiguity of the Treaty area reflected Dulles's position concerning the dual nature of the Treaty.

The Eisenhower Administration's policy toward the offshore islands during and after the first crisis provided some revealing evidence that the United States had backed down from brinkmanship and begun to promote a de facto two Chinas. Within the Administration quite a few of Eisenhower's advisers now questioned the validity of keeping the offshore islands in Nationalist hands. Among them Wilson was the most vocal and persistent advocate of U.S. disengagement from those islands. Soon after the offshore crisis started in early September 1954, Wilson expressed his opposition to defending these "doggoned little islands". He argued at the 213th meeting of the NSC on September 4, that it would not just a partial war over these islands. It would be a general war with the PRC, if the United States committed itself to their defense. It was neither the right place, nor the right time for the United States to have a general war.[16] Wilson's view was shared by the Secretary of Treasury, George Humphrey, Special Assistant to the President for National Affairs Robert Cutler and Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department Robert Bowie.[17] From a purely military point of view, Chief of Staff of the Army General Matthew Ridgway argued that the offshore islands lacked sufficient military importance for the United States to defend them. although the majority of the JCS, especially their Chairman, Admiral Arthur Radford, emphasized the political and psychological importance of these islands and wanted to commit U.S. forces to their defense.[18]

However, the chief foreign policy maker Dulles was not ready to

back down from his brinkmanship. From late 1954 to early 1955, Dulles was more concerned about the consequences of a withdrawal from his former deterrence policy. First of all, he was worried about the morale of Chiang's forces. If the United States forced Chiang to give up the offshore islands, the morale of the Nationalist forces might be so weakened that they would cease to be a threat to the mainland. Dulles was also concerned about the repercussions among the U.S.'s Asian allies. They might doubt U.S. determination in fighting against "Communist expansion." Lastly, Dulles hated to appear soft to the PRC. He was willing to take the risk of war to hold Jinmen, which he thought was necessary for the defense of Taiwan. But Dulles was also cautious not to let Chiang have the initiative in the offshore island crisis. He was aware that Chiang wished to provoke a war over these islands. Therefore, Dulles had to be very sure that the United States should exercise some control over the development of the situation. He made it clear to Taiwan at the very beginning that the United States did not have obligation to defend Jinmen and Mazu. The promise that the United States would do so was purely a voluntary action.

In late January 1955, the fall of the Tachen Islands became imminent after the forces of the PRC conquered the island of Ichiang, which lay seven miles north of the Tachens. The Tachen Islands, about 300 miles north of Taiwan, were held by 10,000 Nationalist troops. Dulles did not want the United States to fight over the Tachens. Militarily they were difficult to defend, and strategically they did not have any value. On January 19, Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that the United States should force Chiang to evacuate the Tachens, and the evacuation should be offset by an announcement that the United States would defend Jinmen and Mazu. Eisenhower agreed to the suggestion in principle.[19]

Dulles immediately informed George Yeh of the U.S. plan before it was approved by the NSC. However, Dulles received strong opposition from Wilson, Humphrey and Cutler at the NSC meeting the next day. All three of them pointed out the danger if the United States was to commit itself militarily to the defense of Jinmen. They urged a complete Nationalist evacuation from all the offshore islands to avoid a war with the PRC.[20] As president Eisenhower was in favor of Dulles's plan, it was finally decided that the United States would protect and help the evacuation of the Nationalist forces from the Tachens; President Eisenhower would request the authority from Congress to use U.S. armed forces to defend Taiwan and the Penghus and the related offshore islands if the President judged their defense was vital to the defense of Taiwan; the United States would still promise Chiang to defend Jinmen and Mazu to offset the evacuation of the Tachens, but the promise would not be open to the public.[21] The decision caused Dulles the embarrassment of taking back the promise he had given Yeh that the United States would announce the decision of defending Jinmen and Mazu in exchange for Chiang's agrement to the evacuation of the Tachens.

For the next two weeks U.S.-Taiwan relations were the most unpleasant since the Eisenhower Administration took office. Chiang had great doubts as to the intentions of Dulles's proposal for the evacuation of the Tachens. He thought either it was out of British pressure on the United States for promoting the status quo of two Chinas, or it was a secret deal between the United States and the PRC for the release of eleven American airmen imprisoned in China.[22] Since he knew that without U.S. military aid the Tachens were vulnerable to PRC's conquest, Chiang very reluctantly accepted Dulles's proposal, but he showed unprecedented insistence on a public statement of U.S. defense of

Jinmen and Mazu. When this condition was repeatedly refused by the United States, Chiang threatened to make a unilateral statement about the U.S. promise. His purpose for the public statement was not, as he declared, to sustain the morale of the Nationalists suffering from the Tachen evacuation. His doubt about the intention of Dulles's proposal revealed his concern about a possible de facto separation of two Chinas and his distrust of the United States. He had the reason to suspect that Jinmen and Mazu would be the next after the Tachens were forced to be evacuated. Dulles did not make the concession with respect to the public commitment of the United States to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu. He and Robertson warned Yeh and Koo repeatedly that the public statement by Taiwan concerning the U.S. promise of defending Jinmen and Mazu would have to be formally denied by the United States. The Tachen evacuation was finally undertaken along the line set by the United States, but it increased Chiang's suspicion about the intentions of the U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

When the plan for the Tachen evacuation was under way, the Formosa Resolution was also being debated in Congress. This was typical of Dulles's way of handling the offshore island crisis. On the one hand he backed down a little to avoid the real danger of war. On the other hand he wanted to warn the PRC that the U.S. retreat would be limited. Dulles advised Eisenhower to obtain congressional authority for the United States to defend Jinmen and Mazu when Eisenhower thought their defense was related to the defense of Taiwan and the Penghus. There was no evidence that Dulles really believed the use of American forces was inevitable. It was more likely that Dulles wanted the Formosa Resolution for the effect of brinkmanship. He perceived the PRC's actions in the offshore island areas as primarily a probing operation

to see how far the United States would go, and when, if ever, a point of resistance was reached.[23] The Resolution was not a U.S. commitment. It avoided mentioning the specific offshore islands that the United States would be willing to defend. It stated,

> "The President of the United States...is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."24

Obviously, the Resolution gave the President a blank check for using U.S. forces in the Taiwan area. This left the PRC in the dark as to how far it could go in conquering the offshore islands. As the Mutual Defense Treaty had already been ambiguous about the offshore islands, the statement in the Formosa Resolution reminded the PRC that the ambiguity meant something.

The most important figure who backed down further and worked toward a de facto two Chinas was President Eisenhower. It used to be argued that Eisenhower played an inactive role in foreign policy making. In several recent studies scholars have rejected this view. In the case of the offshore island crisis Eisenhower personally made sure that the Administration would pursue a policy of restraint.[25]

During the crisis Eisenhower was certain of only two things: he did not want a war with the PRC and he would not let Taiwan fall into the hands of the mainland Chinese. He thought that the American policy toward the crisis should achieve both of them. On the one hand, he should make sure that the loss of the offshore islands would not weaken the defense of Taiwan. On the other hand, he was determined not to

fight a war merely for the sake of some small offshore islands. On the surface his attitude toward Jinmen and Mazu was clearcut. He said the United States must make a distinction between an attack that had only as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that was primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Taiwan.[26] Whether the United States would help defend the offshore islands depended on which objectives the PRC wanted to achieve through an attack. But it was easy to say, while extremely difficult to do. First of all, Eisenhower simply had no way to make the distinction. During the Senate debate about the Formosa Resolution, Dulles said:

> "Now of course we have to answer the question as to whether these activities are merely what you might call mopping up operations directed against the islands themselves, or whether they are the beginning of an operation which is designed against Formosa and the Pescadores. One can never be sure of that, but what one can say is that by everything that they have said, this is designed to be an attack, buildup into an attack against Formosa and the Pescadores, and that there seems to be evidence at least of determination on the part of the Chinese Communists to capture Formosa and the Pescadores."27

According to Dulles's analysis he would make the distinction by what the Chinese Communists said. But Chinese propaganda could never possibly say that they just wanted Jinmen or Mazu, not Taiwan. Actually they did not want these islands without finally taking over Taiwan. In a recent study Thomas Stolper argues that the offshore island crisis was the PRC's effort to prevent the United States from detaching Taiwan from China.[28] The mainland Chinese knew that a status quo of two Chinas was more likely to be maintained if China just took over Jinmen and Mazu. Therefore, it was impossible for the PRC to say that Taiwan could remain out of its control if Chiang agreed to give up the offshore islands.

The difficulty of making the distinction between the two Chinese objectives in an attack on Jinmen and Mazu made Eisenhower feel great hesitation in deciding American involvement or non-involvement. At the Denver meeting of the NSC, the JCS except General Ridgway urged commitment of U.S. forces to the defense of Jinmen and Mazu and help to the Nationalists' bombing attacks on the mainland. Eisenhower did not agree. He repeatedly reminded the Council that they were talking about a possible general war. It was not a limited skirmish for some small islands. If the United States had to fight a general war, it would fight it with the Soviet Union, not with the PRC.[29] Therefore, Dulles's suggestion for U.N. intervention in the crisis was particularly attractive to Eisenhower. Eisenhower's reluctance to fight a war with the PRC over these offshore islands was also clearly expressed in his conversation on January 30, 1955 with Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. and some other State Department officials. Eisenhower emphasized that the United States should not tie its forces down in the Taiwan area. The NATO and what it was trying to do in Europe was vital to U.S. security.[30] It is not difficult to see that even if Eisenhower had decided to obtain the authority from Congress to use American forces in the Taiwan area through the Formosa Resolution, he was determined to use it cautiously.

Eisenhower's letter of February 1, 1955 to the Supreme Allied Commander, Alexander Gruenther, provides a revealing insight into Eisenhower's hesitation in handling the Jinmen-Mazu crisis. He told Gruenther of his dilemma. Politically and geographically, the offshore islands were a part of the Chinese mainland. Militarily they were not essential to the defense of Taiwan. There was no reason for the United States to intervene in the struggle for controlling these islands.

Non-intervention would please the European allies, please the pacifists at home and reduce the risk of a general war with the PRC. However, the United States had to consider the problem of defending Taiwan, in which the morale of Chiang's forces played a very important role. The offshore islands sustained Nationalists' hope that one day they could go back home. Therefore, to force Chiang to give up these islands would weaken their morale, which could endanger the defense of Taiwan. Eisenhower told Gruenther that he had to be very cautious in making a decision. "Whatever is now to happen, I know that nothing could be worse than global war."[31]

In this same letter Eisenhower wrote two paragraphs about his role in handling the crisis. He said:

> "...having gotten the issue well defined in my mind, I try in the next step to determine what answer would best serve the long term advantage and welfare of the United States and the free world. I then consider the immediate problem and what solution can we get that will best conform to the long term interests of the country and at same time can command a sufficient approval in this country so as to secure the necessary Congressional action.
>
> When I get a problem solved on this rough basis, I merely stick to the essential answer and let associates have a field day on words and terminology. (I suppose that many of those around me would protest that even in this field I am sometimes something of an autocrat and insist upon the employment of my own phraseology when I consider the issue important.) However, I really do try to stay out of this particular job as much as my own characteristics, particularly my ego, will permit."32

These two paragraphs of Eisenhower's writing at the time of crisis suggest that Eisenhower's role in making foreign policy was not merely accepting the recommendations of his advisers. Between the Tachen evacuation and the end of crisis in late April 1955, the Administration's attitude toward the value of holding Jinmen and Mazu changed

dramatically. The documents recently published reveal that it was Eisenhower who in fact initiated the changes.[33]

It should be pointed out that in many cases Eisenhower and Dulles did have the same views. Eisenhower agreed in general to Dulles's aggressive policies in Asia before the offshore island crisis. He approved the terms Dulles put down for the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, accepted Dulles's ideas of the U.N. move for cease-fire, of obtaining Congressional authority of the use of forces and forcing Chiang to evacuate from the Tachens. The difference between these two persons lay in the fact that Eisenhower was more cautious and Dulles was more willing to risk a war. Since late February 1955, after Dulles attended the first SEATO meeting and visited several Asian countries and Taiwan, he seemed more convinced that the PRC was determined to capture Taiwan. The capture of Jinmen and Mazu was not its objective, but a preliminary action.[34] Right after he was back from his Asian trip, Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that the United States could not sit idly and watch Chiang's forces on Jinmen and Mazu be crushed by the PRC. Otherwise, the reaction on Taiwan and in other Asian countries would be "dangerously" bad. Besides, Dulles suggested that atomic missiles be used in the defense these two islands. According to Dulles's memorandum of his conversation with Eisenhower, the President agreed to Dulles's suggestions.[35] However, around that time Eisenhower had already become increasingly concerned about the attitude of the European allies toward American Taiwan policy and actually began to favor a withdrawal from Jinmen and Mazu.

On March 11, 1955, the Washington Post published a story about the difference between Eisenhower and Dulles over the policy toward the offshore islands. In the morning of that day Dulles talked with

Eisenhower to see whether the story was true. Dulles repeated his view that in the Taiwan area the United States could not retreat further. Although both of them agreed that the story in the Washington Post was a fabrication and Eisenhower shared Dulles's conclusion that the United States should not allow the islands to be overrun by the PRC, Eisenhower still had something different in mind. According to Dulles's memorandum, Eisenhower "recognized that we probably could not now get the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate..." This statement shows that Eisenhower was thinking of the withdrawal from the islands in the future if not at that moment.[36] The subtle difference between Eisenhower and Dulles was more clearly presented at the special meeting attended by Eisenhower, Dulles and the JCS that afternoon. Eisenhower told the attendants that "he called this meeting because he wanted to discuss how to avoid a direct U.S. intervention as much as possible at that time "while the Western European Treaties were pending."[37] It is clear from the record that Eisenhower favored a policy of restraint.

During the crisis the European allies' opposition to the U.S. policy toward the offshore islands did influence Eisenhower and Dulles to a certain degree. Among the allies Britain was the strongest opponent. Because of its interests in Hong Kong and its historical contemptuous attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek, Britain recognized the PRC in January 1950. Although Britain agreed to U.S. defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, it repeatedly urged the United States to force Chiang to withdraw from the offshore islands. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden saw Chiang as a trouble-maker who wanted to realize his dream of recovering the mainland by involving the United States in a general war with the PRC. Churchill wrote several letters to Eisenhower, expressing Britain's firm stand that Jinmen and Mazu

should be given up to the PRC.[38] At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in May 1955, Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak representing European countries asserted their different views on two points: 1) Europeans saw the difference between the defense of Taiwan and the defense of Jinmen and Mazu. 2) They concluded the role of Chiang Kai-shek in Asia was over. The recognition of the PRC was inevitable.[39] Eisenhower was aware of European attitudes and realized the importance of Europe. He told Dulles and the JCS that "we are confronted with an extremely delicate situation, because we could not afford to be isolated from our allies in the world."[40]

Eisenhower first revealed his changed views on Jinmen and Mazu in his letter to Churchill on March 29, 1955. In defending U.S. policy Eisenhower confided his dilemma to Churchill. He said he would be very happy "to see Chiang voluntarily and in accordance with what he believed to be his own best interests, withdraw from Quemoy and the Matsus." But Eisenhower was unwilling to put too much pressure on Chiang, fearing that he might give up the entire struggle. The defense of Taiwan needed Chiang's ground forces.[41] Within three days Eisenhower found a solution to his dilemma. At the White House meeting on April 1, Eisenhower told his cabinet that he wanted neither to see the collapse of the Nationalist morale, nor to involve the United States in a war for Jinmen and Mazu. A desirable solution would be to convince Chiang that he should voluntarily evacuate these islands. To offset one bad effect, the United States would send a division of U.S. marines to Taiwan and increase the U.S. air force there.[42] There is evidence to prove that this dramatic change of Eisenhower's view on Jinmen and Mazu was not the work of Dulles. Eisenhower personally initiated the change. In his long memorandum to Dulles, Eisenhower analysed the Taiwan situation in great

detail and discussed the measures he wanted to take. He thought that in order to win Chiang's cooperation, the United States should not push him too hard at first. Efforts should be made to convince Chiang to regard the offshore islands as outposts and to reduce the forces on those islands according to the needs of outpost garrisons. The second step was to decide whether the islands should be evacuated or defended in face of a PRC's attack.[43] Eisenhower knew very well that Chiang would never accept immediate complete evacuation from the offshore islands, but it was still possible to trick him into reducing his stakes in these islands.

In the next two weeks the Administration undertook a thorough study of the validity of Eisenhower's proposed change of policy. The CIA presented an estimate of the morale on Taiwan. It stated that the loss of the offshore islands would be a severe blow to Nationalist morale. Nevertheless, the morale would not totally collapse so long as the United States was still firmly committed to the defense of Taiwan. Besides, the loss of the islands as a result of the PRC's attack would cause much greater damage to Nationalist morale than a voluntary, or U.S. forced, evacuation.[44] This intelligence estimate apparently favored an early evacuation of Jinmen and Mazu. Bowie, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff who had been consistently opposed to Dulles's off-shore island policy, now suggested a harder line position to Chiang. He advised that unless the United States very clearly told him that it was not in the interest of the United States to participate in the defense of the offshore islands and the United States would not do so, Chiang would not accept the idea of regarding the offshore islands as expendable outposts. Therefore, the United States should convince him not to have any hope for U.S. involvement in the defense of Jinmen and

Mazu.[45]

It is interesting that now Dulles and Radford disagreed in another way with Eisenhower about his idea of reducing Jinmen and Mazu into outposts. They held the view that if the United States would not allow Chiang to attack the build-up on the mainland across from Jinmen and Mazu, it would be better to encourage a clean break and evacuate these islands. Eisenhower was hesitant about giving up his idea. He agreed that it would be best to leave up to Chiang to decide whether he would accept evacuation, or the idea of outpost. But in the final version of the Statement of Position with Reference to the Defense of Formosa, Eisenhower's idea of outposts was left out. It directly suggested that the United States favored the evacuation of Jinmen and Mazu.[46]

On April 20, Robertson and Radford left for Taipei to accomplish the mission of persuading Chiang to accept the changed policy of the United States concerning Jinmen and Mazu. Eisenhower still had no confidence in the success of their mission. After their departure Eisenhower asked Hoover to send a message to them, reminding them that "politically and psychologically we should lead the Generalissimo into making a proposition that will neither commit the United States to war in defense of the offshore islands nor will constitute an implied repudiation of the Generalissimo by the government." "These are the reasons," the message stated, "that the President has so much favored an outpost conception for the offshore island."[47] The Robertson-Radford mission failed. Chiang refused outright any retreat from Jinmen and Mazu. For some inexplicable reasons, Robertson and Radford did not present the outpost concept that Eisenhower favored. Eisenhower expressed his great disappiontment with Robertson and Radford in his letter to Dulles on April 26. He attributed the failure of the mission to Robertson and Radford's

failure to grasp the outpost concept.[48] Eisenhower did not inquire further into their failure. The whole plan was put aside. Robertson and Radford did not wrote any memorandums to explain why they did not discuss the outpost concept with Chiang. After 25 years in 1980, Bowie speculated that both Robertson and Radford had sympathy for the Nationalists. Their sympathy "made them reluctant to argue forcefully for reducing troop levels on the islands."[49] Without further evidence it is hard to accept Bowie's speculation because it did not explain why their sympathy could make them argue forcefully for a complete evacuation. Maybe Eisenhower was right that they simply did not grasp the subtle meaning of the outpost concept.

The first offshore island crisis was brought to an end by the voluntary restraint of the PRC. At the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in late April, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) expressed the willingness of the PRC to relax the tension in the Taiwan Straits. Eisenhower and Dulles readily welcomed the Chinese initiative. Thus, the United States temporarily got off the horns of the dilemma.

NOTES--CHAPTER III

[1] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 555.

[2] Memorandum of the 214th Meeting of the NSC, September 12, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:620-1.

[3] Memorandum of the 216th Meeting of the NSC, October 6, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:693-4.

[4] NSC 146/2: United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Formosa and the Chinese National Government, November 6, 1953. Paragraph 10: Without committing U.S. forces, unless Formosa or the Pescadores are attacked, encourage and assist the Chinese National Government to defend the Nationalist-held offshore islands against Communist attack and to raid Chinese Communist territory and commerce. FR, 1952-1954, 14:308.

[5] Wilson to Cutler, October 5, 1954, DDRS, (86) 1836.

[6] Memorandum of the 229th Meeting of the NSC, December 21, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:1045.

[7] McConaughy Memorandum of conversation among Chiang, Robertson, Rankin and other Nationalist officials, October 13, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:728-53.

[8] Koo Diary, entry for October 16, 1954, box 220,(Notes from Koo Diary made by Warren I. Cohen).

[9] ibid., McConaughy Memorandum.

[10] Robertson Memorandum to Dulles, August 25, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:548-50; Dulles Report (NSC 5429/1[2?]), September 12, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:614.

[11] Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), p.55.

[12] William M. Bueler, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971), p. 103.

[13] ibid., Robertson Memorandum.

[14] U.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign Relations, February 7, 1955, Vol. VII, 84th Congress, p. 323.

[15] ibid., Robertson Memorandum.

[16] Memorandum of the 213th Meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:588.

[17] Memorandum of the 232nd Meeting of the NSC, January 20, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:69-82.

[18] Memorandum of the 213th Meeting of the NSC, September 9, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:583-94.

[19] Dulles Memorandum of a conversation, January 19, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:41-3.

[20] Memorandum of the 232nd Meeting of the NSC, January 20, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:75-9.

[21] Memorandum of the 233rd Meeting of the NSC, January 21, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:89-95.

[22] Koo Diary, Entry for January 22, 1955, box 220, (Notes from Koo Diary made by Warren I. Cohen).

[23] U.S. Senate, Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 24, 1955, Vol. VII, 84th Congress, p. 68.

[24] DSB, February 7, 1955, Vol. XXXII, No. 815, p. 213.

[25] Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955", in Political Science Quarterly, 1981, 96(3):465-80.

[26] Eisenhower letter to Gruenther, February 1, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:192.

[27] U.S. Senate,Executive Session of the Committee on Foreign Relations, January 24, 1955, Vol. VII, 84th Congress, p. 68.

[28] ibid., Stolper, p. 3.

[29] Dulles Report (NSC 5429/1[2?]), September 12, 1954, FR, 1952-1954, 14:617-24.

[30] Memorandum of a conversation, January 30, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:175.

[31] ibid., Eisenhower letter to Gruenther, 2:189-93.

[32] ibid.

[33] ibid., Rushkoff.

[34] ibid., Rushkoff; Memorandum of the 240th Meeting of the NSC, March 10, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:346.

[35] Dulles memorandum of conversation with Eisenhower, March 6, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:336-7.

[36] Dulles memorandum of conversation with Eisenhower, March 11, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:353-5.

[37] Cutler memorandum for the meeting in President's Office, March 11, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:357-60.

[38] Eisenhower letter to Churchill, January 25, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:128-9; Churchill message to Eisenhower, undated, ibid., 2:270-3; Eden message to Dulles, March 28, 1955, ibid., 2:416-7.

[39] NATO Secret Verbatim Records (C-VR (55)20 and 21), FR, 1955-1957, 2:560.

[40] ibid., Cutler memorandum, 2:360.

[41] Eisenhower letter to Churchill, March 29, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:420.

[42] Hoover memorandum of a conversation, April 1, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:440.

[43] Eisenhower memorandum to Dulles, April 5, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:448-9.

[44] National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 100-4/1-55, April 16, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:479-89.

[45] Bowie memorandum to Dulles, April 9, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:473-5.

[46] Dulles memorandum of a conversation with Eisenhower, April 17, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:491-5.

[47] Hoover message to Robertson and Radford, April 22, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:501-2.

[48] Eisenhower letter to Dulles, April 26, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 2:522-3.

[49] ibid., Rushkoff, p. 479.

CHAPTER IV

FROM MID-1955 TO THE SECOND OFFSHORE ISLAND CRISIS

From the end of April 1955 to August 1958, when the second offshore island crisis occurred, a period of relative peace prevailed in the Taiwan Straits. The Eisenhower Administration had abandoned the aggressive policy of "rolling back Communist tide". The interests of the United States in the Taiwan area now lay in maintaining a status quo of two Chinas. The United States exercised stricter control over Chiang's actions and constantly discouraged his hope of going back to the mainland. With time passing, the possibility of recovering the mainland could only become slimmer and slimmer. As the interests of the United States and Taiwan diverged, the gradual deterioration of U.S.-Taiwan relations seemed inevitable.

Since the end of the crisis, the Eisenhower Administration was increasingly interested in bringing about a de facto two Chinas. As Chiang had categorically refused to evacuate Jinmen and Mazu, the United States had to find diplomatic means through which to prevent an attack from the PRC. It tried to build up a world opinion which would compel the PRC to accept the status quo and not seek to change it by force. One of the reasons the United States conceived of the direct talks with the PRC in Geneva was to achieve this purpose.[1]

Facing the possibility of a de facto two Chinas, Chiang reacted within his limited power to sabotage U.S. effort. He gradually increased the number of his troops on Jinmen and Mazu. By 1958 there were 100,000 troops on these islands, nearly one-third of his total military forces, while there were only 50,000 in 1954-1955. This step "was undoubtedly

one of Chiang's boldest political gambles in his adventurous career."[2] After the Robertson-Radford mission Chiang was more suspicious of U.S. intention and doubted U.S. promises. The promise Dulles confirmed in exchange for the Tachen evacuation could mean nothing. To put one-third of his troops on Jinmen and Mazu was to make the United States realize that it could not afford the loss of the islands in a future crisis. At the same time, the Nationalists secretly engaged in provocative actions. They made a number of raids on the mainland, opened artillery fire around Amoy and harassed mainland Chinese shipping. They did all this without the approval of the MAAG.[3]

Chiang also aimed to disrupt the relatively peaceful atmosphere in the Taiwan Straits after the end of the crisis. He stepped up provocative propaganda about his mainland recovery, which would make the PRC doubt the sincerity of the United States in the Geneva talks. In February 1956, Robertson used very strong words to express U.S. disapproval of Chiang's propaganda. He frankly told Koo that he wished to put Taiwan on notice that the United States did not intend to break off the Geneva talks.[4] Once Dulles almost lost his patience when Yeh and Koo tried to dissuade the United States from continuing talks with the PRC. Dulles told them the United States did not have any independent interest in Jinmen and Mazu. "But we know how you feel about them. So we are trying desperately through diplomacy to enable you to hold these islands. We are aware of your objections to the Geneva talks. If you told us that you considered it more important to break off the talks than to retain Quemoy and Matsu, we would arrange to terminate the talks as soon as you were prepared to evacuate the islands."[5]

Chiang's other tactic to sabotage U.S. effort for a de facto two Chinas was to remind the United States that Taiwan would be ready at any

time to end the status quo of two Chinas. In the first half of 1956 Taiwan repeatedly requested U.S. approval for military actions to recover the mainland. In April Chiang wrote a long personal letter to Eisenhower. By talking highsoundingly of the anti-Communist cause, he asked for Eisenhower's approval of Taiwan's plan to recover the mainland by its own force. The United States need not give any except logistic support to the actions.[6] Judging from the international situation as well as the local situation in the Taiwan Straits, Chiang should have been certain of the refusal by the United States. It was also doubtful that he really thought his forces were able to take a major military risk. But at the time when it was beyond his power to break down the status quo of two Chinas, Chiang might think his requests for taking military action could serve the purpose of reminding the United States that he would never acquiesce in U.S. effort to maintain two Chinas.

As the interests of the United States and Taiwan diverged, their relations were bound to deteriorate. In October 1955, American Ambassador in Taipei Rankin presented a report to the State Department about the status of U.S.-Taiwan relations. He pointed out that in the past year, the relations had deteriorated as more and more Nationalists came to realize that the United States was not going to assist them in their objective of returning to the mainland. The deterioration would continue if the United States continued its participation in the Geneva talks, insisted on the renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan Straits and promoted the "two Chinas" theory.[7] In May 1957, an anti-American riot triggered by the acquittal of an American sergeant who killed a Chinese indicated the serious trouble in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Although there was no evidence that the Nationalist Government manipulated the riot, its failure to stop the sacking of the U.S. Embassy

proved its acquiescence in anti-Americanism among the Chinese in Taiwan. The incident partly reflected Taiwan's frustration over U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Straits.

On August 23, 1958, the PRC started a heavy bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu, thus creating the second offshore island crisis. Why the PRC chose that time to start the crisis was unclear to the world. It might have been a response to the breaking-off of the Geneva talks by the United States, or because of domestic political problems. Despite its effort to minimize the importance of the offshore islands in the past, the United States publically took a hardline position toward the PRC. In his public statement on September 4, Eisenhower again related the defense of Jinmen and Mazu to the defense of Taiwan.[8] In a news conference Dulles strongly implied that the United States would defend Jinmen and Mazu, and it might use nuclear weapons for their defense.[9] On September 7,the U.S. navy began to escort Nationalist convoys up to three miles from the offshore islands.

Judging from the limited information available today, Eisenhower seemed to be in favor of U.S. intervention at the risk of war with the PRC. According to his own memoir Eisenhower refused the suggestion of the JCS that Jinmen and Mazu should be evacuated.[10] In his television speech on September 11, Eisenhower appeared very firm that the United States would not retreat before the demonstration of force. He picked up the reasoning of the Cold War that appeasement would more likely lead to a major war. In appearance Eisenhower's hardline position seemed to be a shift from his former attitude of not going to war for these small offshore islands. But Eisenhower's thinking was more complicated than it appeared to be.

Eisenhower was always concerned about Nationalist morale. He

knew that the offshore islands were not essential to the defense of Taiwan, but he believed the Nationalist morale was very important. To retreat from the offshore islands at the time of crisis would greatly hurt the fighting spirit of Chiang's forces. He knew he should not totally destroy the Nationalists' hope for a return to the mainland. That was why in 1957 Eisenhower expressed strong opposition to the proposal of the Bureau of the Budget that the future U.S. military and economic assistance programs would not be premised on the assumption of the Nationalist return to power on the mainland.[11] At the time of the last crisis, especially at the most critical moment, Eisenhower did not favor a retreat as he saw the need to maintain Nationalist morale. Not until the crisis reached its last phase that Eisenhower thought of voluntary evacuation of Jinmen and Mazu by Chiang. Therefore, it was logical of Eisenhower to take a hardline position again in respect to the offshore islands when the PRC initiated the crisis the second time.

Eisenhower's non-appeasement policy in 1958 did not mean he became more willing to take the risk of a war. The simple reason was the intelligence information he received did not indicate that the PRC was ready for major military actions to take Jinmen and Mazu. Besides the blockade of supplies by the bombardment, the PRC did not take any other military actions against the islands. The early intelligence information from Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) indicated that both the PRC and Taiwan were uncertain of U.S. actions in event of an attack on the offshore islands, and that the PRC was probing in an effort to provoke U.S. action so that it could achieve some propaganda benefit. In late September, the intelligence report again indicated that the PRC wanted to avoid war with the United States and would not fire on U.S. ships or aircraft in Jinmen territorial waters.[12] Besides, the PRC's

domestic political instability in 1958 also made it unlikely that it would risk a major war for these small islands. Since the possibility of war was not great, a hardline position could have psychological benefit for the United States. It could partly solve Nationalist morale problems and leave no doubt among East and Southeast Asian countries about the U.S. determination to drive back "Communist expansion."

During the interval between the two crises, the United States made use of world opinion that favored a peaceful solution to the offshore island dispute. It benefited from U.N. intervention which was rejected by the PRC. Its effort to maintain the status quo of two Chinas by appealing for the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Straits won the approval of U.S. allies. That was why in the 1958 crisis the United States did not have so much opposition to its policy as it had in the 1954-1955 crisis. Britain, which was the most vocal opponent of American Taiwan policy in 1954, supported Eisenhower's hardline position. British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan stated in September that Britain strongly supported the United States in opposing any attempt to settle the dispute by force.[13]

The 1958 crisis did not last long. On October 6, the PRC announced a cease-fire of one week. Immediately Eisenhower tried to grasp the cease-fire opportunity to reduce tensions. On October 7, Eisenhower wrote in his memorandum to Dulles that the United States should persuade Chiang to remove his garrisons from the offshore islands. He thought the cease-fire was a good chance for the Nationalists to pull out so that they would not seem to be retreating under fire.[14] Eisenhower's memorandum proved the sincerity of U.S. proposal for a peaceful solution first hinted by Dulles's speech at a news conference on September 30. Dulles stated that the United States would favor reducing Chinese

Nationalist forces on the offshore islands if the PRC would agree to a cease-fire. He pointed out that a renunciation of force should apply to both Nationalists and Communists. It is not difficult to see that Eisenhower actually did not change his position that Chiang should stop using the offshore islands to make trouble.

It was Chiang Kai-shek who made a dramatic change in his policy. On October 2, in response to Dulles's speech of September 30, Chiang said he opposed any reduction of his forces on the offshore islands as the price of a cease-fire. He paid a personal visit to Jinmen on October 10 and still confirmed his campaign for the recovery of the mainland. However, under U.S. pressure, Chiang had to make some concessions. After three days of talks between Dulles and Chiang, Chiang finally agreed to the renunciation of force in his mission of returning to the mainland. He also promised that he might reduce his forces on Jinmen and Mazu. The 1958 crisis thus ended. Why in 1958 did Chiang finally agree to do what he refused three years ago? Why did he accept the renunciation of force, which would help maintain the status quo of two Chinas? Did he really mean what he agreed to, or was he using his tactics at that time? All these questions cannot possibly be answered without the Nationalist documents. But it might be speculated that time played an important role in shattering Chiang's dream. After his failure to break down a de facto two Chinas in his struggle with U.S. policy in the past three years and after his failure to get U.S. support for military actions to recover the mainland for eight years, Chiang had to face reality. He was a master politician. He should have grasped reality much easier. The United States no doubt most welcomed the shift of Chiang's policy. Since the first offshore island crisis in 1955 it had abandoned Dulles's formerly aggressive foreign policy. In 1958, Taiwan was useful for

the purpose of containing, not rolling back, "Communist expansion." It had lost its value of being a deterrent force. The United States would be most satisfied so long as Taiwan remained in Nationalist hands and stopped making trouble. This kind of relationship between the United States and Taiwan continued until Nixon's time.

NOTES--CHAPTER IV

[1] Dulles memorandum of a conversation with Eisenhower, August 5, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 3:15-7; Hoover to the Embassy in Taipei, Novermber 25, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 3:186.

[2] Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the United States", in the Western Political Quarterly, 12:4 (1959), p. 1078.

[3] Bowie memorandum to Dulles, August 19, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 3:51.

[4] McConaughy memorandum of a conversation between Koo, Robertson and McConaughy, February 1, 1956, FR, 1955-1957, 3:295-302.

[5] McConaughy memorandum of a conversation among Yeh, Koo, Dulles and McConaughy, October 4, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 3:111.

[6] Chiang letter to Eisenhower, April 16, 1956, FR, 1955-1957, 3:341-8.

[7] Rankin to the Department of State, October 21, 1955, FR, 1955-1957, 3:139-43.

[8] Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 299.

[9] Alexander L. George, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 364.

[10] ibid., Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 300-1.

[11] Memorandum of the 338th Meeting of the NSC, October 2, 1957, FR, 1955-1957, 3:614.

[12] CINCPAC, Message No. 6481/6483, to the JCS, August 26, 1958, DDRS, (81) 431C; CINCPAC, Message No. 5705, to the JCS, September 22. 1958, DDRS, (81) 432B.

[13] China and U.S. Far East Policy 1945-1967 (A Publication of Congressional Quarterly Service, 1967), p. 87.

[14] Eisenhower memorandum for Dulles, October 7, 1958, DDRS, (83) 2889.

CONCLUSIONS

The Eisenhower Administration's policy toward Taiwan was multiple and complex. Its complexity was reflected in the contradiction between the words and the deeds of the Administration, the ambiguity of its objective with respect to the Taiwan area and its indecisiveness and inconsistency in face of the offshore island crisis. These characteristics of Eisenhower's policy derived from domestic political problems, international reality in Asia and Eisenhower and Dulles's own perceptions of the PRC.

When Eisenhower took office, anti-Communist feelings ran very high. The existence of McCarthyism, together with the frustration about the protracted Korean War among Americans,suggested that the Eisenhower Administration take a hardline toward the PRC. Dulles's "rolling back Communist tide" rhetoric was, to a certain degree, to meet this domestic political need. At the same time when the Korean War had not ended, the Communist and nationalist forces in Vietnam were crippling the French colonialist rule. Influenced by the domestic anti-Communist sentiments, Eisenhower and Dulles easily reached the conclusion that this was another case of Chinese Communist expansion. As the PRC was directly involved in the Korean War, it supported the Vietnamese independence revolution and it launched strong anti-American imperialist propaganda, Eisenhower and Dulles's perception of Communists naturally led them to regard the leaders of the PRC as irresponsible, dangerous and irrational.

"Rolling back Communist tide" had its problems from the very

beginning. It was no doubt rhetoric, not the objective of Dulles's policy. Neither Eisenhower, nor Dulles, wanted to have a general war to overthrow the Communist rule in China. But Dulles had to do something to make his rhetoric look like the objective of U.S. policy. His policy in 1953 and 1954 was his effort to back up his rhetoric. However, since Dulles lacked adequate means to support his rhetoric, the contradiction between his words and deeds was bound to appear. Successful brinkmanship required the United States to be willing to risk war, while the PRC was not. Dulles's brinkmanship in the Taiwan Straits failed because this condition did not exist. When the crisis came, Eisenhower was not willing to take the risk of war and he suspected that the PRC would.

Eisenhower had more difficulties than Truman did in handling Chiang Kai-shek. In the early 1950s survival was the primary interest of Chiang's regime. Therefore, Chiang did not cause much trouble for Truman's neutralization of the Taiwan Straits. But after three years in Taiwan under the U.S. military protection Chiang's regime had recovered and was waiting for the opportunity to recover the mainland. Once unleashed, Chiang proved to be a trouble-maker. He tried to take advantage of Dulles's deterrence policy to involve the United States in a conflict with the PRC. A military conflict between the United States and the PRC in the Taiwan Straits seemed to be the only chance for him to overthrow the Communist rule in the mainland. For a time Eisenhower and Dulles were caught in a dilemma. They could afford neither a decline in Nationalist morale, nor allowing Chiang to involve the United States in a war with the PRC. Finally, Eisenhower, who was less willing than Dulles to take the risk of war and more determined to avoid it, decided to back down from brinkmanship in the Taiwan area.

Some of the developments of U.S.-Taiwan relations at the time of the first crisis, like the signing of the MDT, the New Zealand Resolution and the Tachen evacuation, were often seen as U.S. efforts of forcing Taiwan to accept a de facto two Chinas. However, they were more complex than they appeared to be. They all had a dual nature. The MDT served to better control Chiang's freedom of action, but some of its ambiguous terms also fit the need of Dulles's deterrence policy. The New Zealand Resolution, if accepted by the PRC, could greatly help enforce a de facto two Chinas, but actually Dulles did not expect the PRC's acceptance when he first put forward the proposal. He expected the PRC's rejection so that the United States could justify its policy of brinkmanship before world opinion which had already become unfavorable to the United States in late 1954. The Tachen evacuation was also originally planned by Dulles, but his suggestion was more out of military consideration than a perception of two Chinas. His original plan was to evacuate Tachen and start to defend Jinmen simultaneously, which made no difference in implementing a de facto two Chinas. However, these policies did have some effect in the end when Eisenhower decided to replace the deterrence policy with a policy of perpetuating the de facto two Chinas.

By 1955 McCarthyism had died down. The anti-Chinese Communist sentiments had declined after the frustration about the Korean War was over. The issue of "Communist expansion" in Vietnam was temporarily solved. The urgent need to threaten the PRC ceased to exist. Most important of all, the offshore island crisis made Eisenhower realize that only in name brinkmanship would not involve the United States in a war. In practice it could push the United States over the brink into a war. Only then was the complexity of the Eisenhower

Administration's policy toward Taiwan simplified and those elements of contradiction, ambiguity, indecisiveness and inconsistency removed. In its place was a policy with a clearcut and realistic objective: the maintaince of a de facto two Chinas. It was carried out throughout the rest of Eisenhower's presidency, and its consequences far outlived his administration.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

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The research for this thesis depended upon the sources available at Michigan State University. Primary sources proved most useful in the study of U.S. policies toward the PRC and Taiwan. The volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) are the most valuable source. The recently published Volumes II and III of the "China Area 1955-1957" are indispensable for the study of the Eisenhower Administration's policy during and after the first offshore island crisis. Declassified Documents Reference System available in microfiche was systematically studied. It includes important documents of the CIA, Department of Defense, Department of State, the National Security Council and the White House. Although many of them have been compiled in FR, there are still a lot of useful documents that are not available in FR. Volumes of Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) proved helpful, but they have limitations for this thesis. National Security Council Papers 1947-1977 (University Publications of America, Inc., 1981) was selectively used for the study of U.S. policy before 1955. It does not have much use for the time after 1955. CIA Research Reports, China 1946-1976 (University Publications of America, Inc., 1982) has some valuable information about CIA's estimations of Chiang's regime in Taiwan.

Memoirs and biographies have various degrees of usefulness for the study of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday, 1963) and Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965), which have already been widely studied by scholars, are still very important for understanding Eisenhower's perceptions of the situation in the Taiwan Straits. Koo Diary is the only source for examing Taiwan's views, purposes, plans and reactions to U.S. policies. There are numerous memoirs and biographies of key figures in the U.S. government, including Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: the Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), Warren I. Cohen, Dean Rusk (Totowa, NJ: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), Robert Donovan, Eisenhower: the Inside Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles: the Last Year (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1963), Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1967), Richard Good-Adams, Time of Power: A Reappraisal of John Foster Dulles (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962) and Karl Lott Rankin, China Assignment (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964). They all provide useful information and analyses.

General sources on U.S.-China relations offer an overview of the developments in the Taiwan area. They include Charles C. Alexander, Holding the Line, the Eisenhower Era 1952-1961 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrich, eds., Uncertain Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), Warren I. Cohen,

America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2nd ed, 1980), Foster Rhea Dulles, American Policy toward Communist China, 1947-1969 (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1972), J.H. Kalicki, The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interaction in the 1950s (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), and William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981). Warren I. Cohen's essay "Acheson and China" in Uncertain Years and Nancy Tucker, Patterns in the Dust (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) provide excellent analyses of the U.S.-China relations before the Korean War. Cohen's essay "The United States and China since 1945" in Warren I. Cohen, ed., New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) is the best bibliographical study of the works on U.S.-China relations of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s.

Secondary works on U.S. policy toward Taiwan are numerous. Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985) discusses how the PRC and the U.S. responded to to each other's policies concerning Taiwan. Its analysis of the PRC's policy is one of the best. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) contains two chapters dealing with the two offshore island crises respectively. It focuses on the deterrent effect of the U.S. policy in the Taiwan Straits. Both Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978) and William M. Bueler, U.S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (Boulder, CO: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971) are important studies of U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1950s. Bueler also made a detailed analysis of Taiwan's domestic politics and the importance of the myth of the mainland recovery for Chiang's rule in Taiwan. For Chiang Kai-shek's purposes and intentions of involving the United States in a war with the PRC, Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio: Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S." in the Western Political Quarterly (12:4, 1959, p. 1075-91) gives the best analysis. O. Edmund Clubb, "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-1955" in Political Science Quarterly (74:4, 1959, pp. 517-31) and John W. Lewis, "Quemoy and American China Policy" in Asian Survey (2:1, 1962, pp. 12-19) have good discussions of the offshore islands. Although their studies are not comprehensive, both essays shed light on American policies toward the offshore islands.

The role of American domestic politics in U.S. policies toward the PRC and Taiwan is presented in Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics (New York: Octagon Books, 1974) and Stanley D. Backrack, The Committee of One Million: The "China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). Both provide considerable evidence and good analyses, but Koen seems to overemphasize the power of the China Lobby in American politics. Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1952-1960 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974) has four chapters discussing presidential candidates' views of foreign policy in the 1952 and 1956 presidential campaigns. The work has discussions of Eisenhower's views of foreign policy in general, and of the policy toward the PRC and Taiwan in particular. It provides some clues to the relationship of domestic politics and foreign policies in the 1950s. For public opinion, George H Gallup, The Gallup Poll Public Opinion 1935-1971 (New York: Random House, 1972) provides first-rate

information.

Recently, scholars tend to emphasize Eisenhower's initiative in foreign policy-making. Some examples are Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955" in Political Science Quarterly (96:3, 1981, pp. 465-80),, Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who made the Decisions?" in Political Psychology (1:1, 1979, pp.21-38) and Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as An Activist President: A Look at New Evidence" in Political Science Quarterly (94:4, 1979-1980, pp.575-99). Rushkoff's discussion of Eisenhower's positive role in dealing with the first offshore island crisis is particularly useful for the understanding of the Eisenhower Administration's policies at the time of the crisis.

As secondary works have already done a lot of studies on American public opinion, periodicals and newspapers were not thoroughly examed in the research for this thesis.