La

 

 

 

fit: ’11.} “hymn in

M

This is to certify that the

.THESIg.

 

thesis entitled
WHY DIVERSIFICATION OF PROGRAMS?

A STUDY ON THE IMPORTANCE AND THE LEVEL
OF DIVERSITY IN THE ITALIAN TELEVISION
presented by

Paolo Mefalopoulos

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Master of Artfiegree in Telecommunication

/\

Muor professor

Date 11-4-1985

 

0-7639 MSU it all W Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

 

MSU

LIBRARIES
.—_—_

 

 

 

RETURNING MATERIALS:
Place in book drop to
remove this checkout from
your record. FINES will
be charged if book is
returned after the date
stamped below.

 

 

‘23 ‘ 133
l" $8,,” ’16}
l

g
R

amen

¢::.t7 * '{J

W

 

 

 

A

c‘

Why Diversification of Programs?
A study on the importance and the level
'of diversity in the Italian television

BY

Paolo Mefalopoulos

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Telecommunication

1985

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of
Telecommunication. College of Communication Arts and
Sciences, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree.

A

 

 

D ct r of Thesis

ABSTRACT

WHY DIVERSIEICATION OF PROGRAMS?
A STUDY ON THE IMPORTANCE AND THE LEVEL
OF DIVERSITY IN THE ITALIAN TELEVISION

BY

Paolo Mefalopoulos

This thesis focuses on the implications of
diversification of programs in the television system of a
democratic society. such as the Italian. The main intent is
to analyze different patterns of ownership in television and
to consider how they relate to program diversity.

After providing a theoretical framework to illustrate
the importance of diversity in television. a basic
historical picture of the Italian broadcasting system, from
the beginnning to the present. is given.

The data examined in the last part of the thesis appear
to support the hypothesis that single ownership of a number
of networks is more likely to result in higher program
diversity than separately-owned networks. These findings
apply both for public and private television, even though
the former has been shown to have always enjoyed a higher

level of diversification.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Joseph
Straubhaar, whose intellectual friendship have enriched me
far behind the work of this project, and to Dr. Marylin
Fife, for her constructive criticisms on my study. I give
special thanks to Dr. Barry Litman for his helpful
suggestions. Finally I would like to thank Carlo Puscagni.
Associate Director of RAI 1, because without his help, the
completition of this study would have been far more

difficult.

ii

LIST OF TABLES.

Chapter

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. IMPORTANCE OF PROGRAM DIVERSITY.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE ITALIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM.

III.
TELEVISION .

IV. CONCLUSIONS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

iii

LEVEL OF DIVERSITY IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

34

7O

83

LIST OF TABLES

Broadcasting time for program types on RAIi.
1962-1982. (8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Broadcasting time for program types on RAIZ.
1962-1982. (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Broadcasting time for program types on public
and private television, 1980-1983. (3)

Broadcasting time for program types on five
networks. 1983. (M) . . . . . . . . . . . .

Herfindahl index of five networks during prime
time. January 1983 - May 1985 . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the fifth
time belt, January 1983. . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the sixth
time belt. January 1983 . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the fifth
time belt. February 1984 . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the sixth
time belt. February 1984. . . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the fifth
time belt. May 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the sixth
time belt, May 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the fifth
time belt. February 1985. . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the sixth
time belt, February 1985. . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the fifth
time belt, May 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Percentages of program types during the sixth
time belt. May 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

54

56

58

60

60

61

61

62

62

63

63

64

64

CHAPTER 1

IMPORTANCE OF PROGRAM DIVERSITY

Until a few years ago nobody could have foreseen that a
talking box, showing images of real and fictional events.
would have played such a primary role as the one we are
experiencing today in our society. Television sets are
present in the living rooms of most families in the Western
World. Even though the amount of time spent on the average
in front of a television set varies from country to country,
in the most developed countries people spend a considerable
part of their lives watching television. For instance
according to a research study conducted by Gerbner and
other researchers of the Annenberg School of Communications,
during the years 1975-1980, 75 percent of Americans were
watching two or three hours of television on an average day.
and 30 percent of them were watching more than four hours.1
In Japan. in 1980. a male adult on the average was spending
more than three hours per day watching television. that is
about 70 percent of his free time, while a female adult was
spending almost four hours per day watching television. that
is 90 percent of her free time.2 In Italy in 1983 an average
person was estimated to watch about four hours of television
per day.3 I

The effects of this powerful medium have been

discussed and analyzed in hundreds of studies. which
considered the influence of television in all its possible
implications. on society as well as on a personal level. The
results of these studies are quite often contradictory. and
they do not appear to provide definite answers to what
extent television affects or controls our lives. Television
has been defined in many ways by communication scholars: a
marketing medium, an entertaining medium. a cultural force.
a social force and so on. None of these definitions by
themselves would be enough to explain the multi-dimensional
functions of television. The latent implications of this
medium may be more far reaching than what is currently
believed. The enormous interest of political groups and
business corporations in the control of the broadcasting
media, especially television. is a clear indicator of their
importance. Television is commonly considered to be a poor
agent of change, although its function as an agent of
reinforcement of existing values and attitudes is widely
recognised.‘

The broadcasting system of each country is a direct
reflection of its economical and political system. In this
study we will be concerned with the Italian television
model. which operates clearly within the values of Western
democracies. Our focus will be directed at the level of
diversification of programs5 which is currently to be found

in the Italian television, related to the recent appearance

of private broadcasters. In this chapter we will discuss the

importance of diversity in television. and later on we will
analyze it with current data from the Italian television
programming. Before explaining why diversification of
programs is to be considered a crucial issue for our
broadcasting systems. we should make clear that our applied
and theoretical framework will be rooted in the value
system of Western democracies.

All parts of the system in our democracies are supposed
to operate in such a way so as to respect and protect
citizens' basic rights. The most important of these rights.
as well as the central value of Western democracies. is
freedom. We are free to travel. to express our opinions. but
most of all free to choose. The concept of "freedom of
choice" is very important. especially for the broadcasting
media where. due to the large amount of financial resources
needed and to the limited availability of frequencies. only
a few persons or groups are able to directly control them.
Because of these restricted opportunities to have a
significantly large representation of different ownership.
especially at a national level. diversity of programs and
opinions in television is an explicit concern of Western
democracies.

In the United States the Federal Communication
Commission. the agency responsible for the broadcasting
regulation. supports the principle. set by the Communication
Act. that diversification of ownership guarantees

6
diversification of content. Therefore the FCC tries to

allocate broadcasting licensees to different owners. Other
countries. such as France. prefer to have only a national
public television. so that the State would be the ultimate
guarantor for fair and balanced programming.7 In Italy a
recent law on broadcastinga explicitly mentioned that one of
the fundamental principles that was to be provided by RAI.
Italian Radio-Television. was to guarantee the plurality of
political. and cultural expressions present in society.
However. a year after this law. the Italian Constitutional
Court allowed the broadcasting of local private stations.
one of the reasons being to reinforce that plurality of
voices.

For whatever purpose television may be used. the viewer
should have the right to choose from different programs. he
should be able to have a "real option". This means that as
far as diversity is concerned if viewer A is able to choose
among ten channels. he would not be necessarily better off
than viewer 8. who. let us suppose. could only choose
between two channels. Provided that these two channels would
provide alternative programs from each other (i.e. a film
and a documentary). while the ten channels would all provide
similar programs (i.e. various soap operas). it could be
said that viewer B has a more diversified choice than viewer
A. This of course is an extreme example. but it serves to
illustrate. our doubts on the too often taken-for-granted

belief that more television stations mean more programs

diversification. The issue of diversity. and its

operationalization. will be discussed in an analytical way
in the third chapter.

Is monopoly a better way to achieve diversification
of programs? Or an open system could be expected to provide
more diversity since it provides more sources? This dilemma
does not have a definite answer. There is wide support for
each of the two positions. with similar criticisms for both.
Economist Steiner.9 for instance. indicates that under
limited channels a monopoly would have more diversified
programs than various networks competing with each other. On
the contrary Owen.10 another well-known economist. believes
that competition is the best structure to ensure programs'
diversity and viewers' satisfaction. Our working hypothesis
for this study is that. contrary to what it is often
believed. a single ownership of more networks could lead to
more diversification of programs than having each network
owned independently. The rationale behind our assumption is
that if a single entity. person or group. owns more
networks. it will be able to differentiate its programs.
since it will not have to compete for the same audience at
the same time. Recent studies on the diversification level
on the three American networks. conducted by Dominick and
Pearce (1978). Litman (1979). Wakshlag and Adams (1983).
tend to indicate that the level of program diversity among
networks is relatively low.11that is "more and more programs

appear in fewer categories. "

On the other end. in their book Broadcasting in

Mexico. Noriega and Leach illustrate how a joint venture
approach enables Televisa. owning four national networks.
to use an audience segmentation model. so as to satisfy more
parts of the public.12 The same approach is found in Great
Britain. 'where a committee originally appointed by the
government to consider the best way to establish a national
broadcasting system rejected the idea of a plurality of
"free" commercial stations and recommended a public
monopoly. believed to be more suitable to the interests of
the public.13 Hundreds of local television stations and a
few national private networks recently appeared in Italy.
competing with RAI. the national public television. We
intend to consider if this dramatic increase in the
availability of television stations for the viewers has
also resulted in a similar increase in the program
diversity available to the audience.

In order to have a more accurate frame of reference
for our study we will now briefly mention some of the
theories about the ability of the audience to influence
television programming in the Western broadcasting systems.
The most well-known communication theories considering the
relationship between the audience and its power to determine
television programs are three. as defined by Cantor:1‘ the
demand perspective. the Marxist and neo-Marxist perspective.
and the sociological perspective.

Theorists supporting the demand model consider

television to be a marketing medium. which has to show

programs appealing to the largest possible audience.
Therefore viewers have the power to select what will succeed
and what will not. through their preferences. as reflected
by ratings. One of the major supporter of this view. Seiden.
argues that "the sensitivity of television programming to
popular tastes is most apparent in the (turnover of
television programming.15" By giving-their preference to
certain productions rather than others. viewers are able to
determine which programs will be shown. The demand model
definetely provides accurate insights on the way many
broadcasting systems operate. Nevertheless this theory has
been strongly criticized.

Two of the most recurrent criticisms include the
fact that the demand perspective practically defines the
audience as those who will buy the advertisers products.
thus limiting the creativity of the creators.16 and that it
ignores the needs and wants of parts of the public other
than the mass audience. thus denying the essence of the
pluralistic reality of a democracy. The supporters of the
demand perspective respond to these criticisms arguing that
the market determines the content. ratings being like votes.
In other words. according to them. television programming is
chosen in a democratic process. as for the one in the
political elections. with the audience having the power to
choose among various programs. and therefore voting through

ratings.

In the above discussion we often used the terms

"pubblic" and "mass audience". These two terms are used to
imply two different concepts. The public is the totality of
the potential audience. composed by various segments with
different tastes. The mass audience is the largest part of
the public. sharing common tastes. or at least perceived to
have common tastes by the television industry. Television
then appears capable not just to attract a mass audience but
to create it. This may cause some problems. as Seldes
explaines:17 "They (the programs aimed at the mass
audience) lie. so to speak. within a single. fairly narrow.
zone of interest. The amount of attention. the background of
knowledge and experience. the degree of emotional
understanding required to appreciate one kind of program are
substantially the same as for another. That is why the mass
media can be used to create homogeneity. even under a
competitive system".

As we just saw. demand model theorists consider the
audience to be a powerful factor in the determination of
television programs. The radical thinkers on the contrary.
including Marxist. neo-Marxist. and thinkers of the
Frankfurt School. consider the audience to be powerless.
They see the content of television programs as another means
of reinforcing the values of the capitalistic system.
Thinkers of the Frankfurt School consider the audience as
passive and manipulated. and the programs' contgnt is

believed to suggest escape rather than action. The

audience then is a passive recipient of programs' content

that is decided by a restricted elite. following
considerations which take into account the viewers only as
far as they coincide with the largest profit advantage.
Program diversification for them would not be a relevant
issue. since all of the programs are ultimately considered
to serve the same function: the preservation of the
capitalistic system.

The .sociological perspective. supported by scholars
such as De Sola Pool. Shulman and Bauer. takes a position
somewhere in between the previous two. Proponents of this
theory believe that the audience plays more than a passive
role. The viewers have indeed the ability to select what
they are shown on television and through their feedback.
provided by ratings and other kind of surveys. they are
able. if not to determine. at least to influence the
programming. In this way a relationship between the viewers
and the creators of the programs is established. although
the extent of such relationship is difficult to determine.
as it is difficult to determine the extent of the feedback
provided by the audience on the various programs. An
additional problem is due to the fact that writers and
producers of television programs must target their works to
please first the networks and the distributors. then
eventually the audience. This often means renouncing to any
controversial or political issue. which may cause any shift
of viewers to another network or that may awaken advertisers

fears of alienating parts of the audience to their products.

10

That is usually why writers and producers must carefully

conform to the norms and policies of the industry and. as

Cantor puts it. "they know that the audience they must

ultimately please (the industry) is different from the
' 19

audience they would like to please (the public). " To

conclude we could say that the sociological theory consider
the audience not to have a definite power to determine
program modes and contents. but the audience has the power
to determine which programs will succeed among those
broadcast.

The theories we just discussed are mainly focusing on
the relationship between program content and the audience
role. This is an aspect that needed to be considered in our
study. since we intend to discuss and analyze the importance
of a significant diversification of programs for the
audience. In considering diversity it is necessary to
understand how the viewers can. and do. influence the
program offering. through their response. Diversity should
not be something imposed on the public. but demanded by the
public. Once again it should be remembered that our
theoretical framework is directly derived by the system of
values of the Western World. which considers a plurality of
sources always highly desiderable. as it is the case for the
print media or for the political representation of the
community.

In Italy. as everywhere else. one of the main problem

of a study on diversification of programs is in the way we

11

define it. The level of diversity in television can not be
operationalized in absolute terms; rather it is to be
considered in relationship to the number of networks
operating. and to the numbers of categories into which
television programs are divided. The more program
categories we use. the more our results would be likely to
show a higher degree of diversification. Studies on
diversity used different number of program types. Dominick
and Pearce used 14 categories.20 Litman 9 categories.21
Wakshlag and Adams 37 categories.22 Nevertheless the results
of their studies have been consistent with one another. This
indicates that the difference in the number of categories
established in these kind of studies is not a major
impediment for a reliable methodology. Whenever we discuss
diversification of programs. the reader should keep in mind
that we are referring to a relative concept. which lower or
higher level will be analyzed at the end of the study. after
having presented the available data. It is our intent not to
set any "a priori" level of measurement on diversity. which
at the moment would be quite unreliable and strongly
subjective.

In the third chapter the issue of diversification of
programs. its implications and how it has been dealt with in
previous studies. will be discussed more accurately. This
issue however cannot be fully understood without a knowledge

of the broadcasting system itself. The next chapter presents

a basic picture of the Italian broadcasting system and its

12

recent developments. Diversification of programs is not
going to be directly discussed in the second chapter. but
it will be debated later. Throughout the analysis on the
historical development of the Italian broadcasting system.
the reader should keep in mind the importance of a balanced
and diversified programming. as discussed so far. and how
such programming can be affected not' only by economical

considerations. but by legal and political events as well.

13

ENDNOTES

1. G. Gerbner. L. Gross. M. Morgan and N. Signorielli.
"Charting the Mainstream: Television's Contributions to
Political Orientations". Journal 9; Communication. Spring
1982.

2. N. Nakanishi. A report on the "How Do People Spend
Their Time Survey” in 1980. Studies of Broadcasting. No. 18.
1982. NHK pp. 95- 96.

3. M. Bruzzone. Piccolo Grande Schermo. p.170.
4. C. R. Wright. Lg Communicazione g; Massa. p.28.

5. By a "significant level of diversification of
programs" we do not mean any absolute value. but rather a
relative standard of programs choices offered by the
national networks. to be finally compared among each other.

6. E. 8. Krasnow. L. D. Langley and H. A. Terry. The
politics of Broadcast Regglation. p. 21.

7. A. Smith. The Shadow in the Cave: the Broadcaster.

8. The Reform Law n. 103. April the 14th. 1975.

9. B. M. Owen. Television Economics.

10. Ibid.

11. M. C. Pearce and J. R. Dominick. "Trends in
Network Prime Time". Journal g; Communication. Winter 1979.
p.79.

12. L. A. Noriega and F. Leach. Broadcasting in
Mexico.

13. W. 2. Mc Cavitt. Broadcasting Around the World.
14. M. G. Cantor. Prime-Time Television. p.97.

15. M. H. Seiden. Who Controls the Mass Media. p.161.

14

16. M. G. Cantor. Prime-Time Television. p.102.

17. G. Seldes. gap 353 Mpgg Mpgig.

18. M. G. Cantor. Prime-Time Television. p.109.

19. Ibid. p.112.

20. J. R. Dominick. and M. C. Pearce. "Trends in
Network Prime-Time Programming". Journal 9; Communication.

26:1.

21. B. R. Litman. "The Television Networks. Competition
and Program Diversity". Journal pg Communication. 23:4.

22. J. Wakshlag. and W. J. Adams "Variation in Program
Variety on Prime Time Network Television". ICA paper.

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THE ITALIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM

For over thirty years RAI. Italian Radio-Television.
was the only broadcasting organization that was allowed to
operate in Italy. Then. .in 1976 things started to change
dramatically. RAI was challenged first by many disorganized
and low-quality local private stations. and then by powerful
national private networks. grown through the loopholes of
the current "unregulated" situation in the broadcasting
system. Since RAI played. and still plays. such a major role
in the broadcasting system. we shall start to illustrate
briefly RAI's structural organization. and then discuss the
legal and historical development of private stations.

By definition RAI is a shareholding company. with total
public participation. The Italian government defined radio
and television broadcasting as a public service. and
gave to RAI the responsibility to provide this
service. This explains why RAI is considered "a
shareholding of national interest.1" The origin of RAI dates
back to 1924. when URI (Italian Radio Union) was formed and
established the first radio broadcasting service in Italy.

The State then gave an exclusive six years concession for

radio services to URI. In 1929 the name was changed to EIAR

15

16

(Italian Radio Listening Corporation). In 1944 the name was
changed again to RAI-Radio Listening Italy. EIAR had the
concession from the State to provide radio services until
1952. which naturally remained valid when EIAR changed name.
At the convention of 1952 the State gave the concession of
the broadcasting monopoly to RAI for another twenty years.

It was also decided that "the absolute majority of RAI

shares had to be transferred to IRI". a government
2
corporation. That same year IRI acquired 75.45 percent of
3

the total share of capital of RAI. In 1954. as a result of
the appearance of television. the name of the company was
changed to RAI-Italian Radio Television. Finally in 1964 the
movement towards a total public control of RAI was
completed. The acquisition of the last privately held shares
gave to IRI 99.55 percent of the total share capital.

Even though it was supposed to be an independent
organization. RAI had always been subject to political
influences. Until the Reform Law. passed in 1975. RAI was
under the control of the government. that for all those
years had been headed by the Christian Democratic party. The
government had the authority to appoint persons to RAI most
crucial positions. thus having a direct control over what
was supposed to be an autonomous public company. Cavazza
indicated that values such as freedom of opinion. personal
independence. efficiency and professionalism were considered
of secondary importance. What it counted was the political

4
or ideological affiliation.

17

As we are going to see later. things started to change
in the 70's.- With the nearing of the expiration day of the
exclusive concession given to RAI many political and social
forces challenged the government predominant position in the
broadcasting system. Moreover. a few private stations
challenged in court the concession of exclusive broadcasting
privileges to RAI. At this point the majority of the
political forces. that was left out by an effective access
to the broadcasting media. and the majority of the public.
that was not satisfied by RAI programming and demanded
alternative programs.5 prepared the necessary ground on
which private stations could finally emerge. However. the
emergence of private broadcasting was part of a painful
process. that was often marked by long legal
conflicts in court. There are four fundamental rulings of
the Constitutional Court regarding broadcasting. Before the
last of these rulings the Italian Parliament passed a new
law on broadcasting. the Reform Law n. 103. which we will
consider as well.

Sentence n. 59 of the year 1960 was the first ruling
on broadcasting by the Constitutional Court. The case was
brought by a television group. "11 Tempo-TV". owner also of
a major newspaper in Rome. that was denied permission to
broadcast by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. 11
Tempo-TV claimed that this denial was unconstitutional. The
Court stated that the decision of the Ministry was

6
constitutional since:

18

a) there is an actual scarcity of the available

frequencies. so that television can be defined.

without any doubt. as an activity

predetermined. in a free market situation. at

its best to be an oligopoly;

b) television services therefore are to be

placed among those categories of firms to be

considered under monopolistic situations;

c) its activity of general interest and of

general utility are sufficient to justify the

exclusive concession of such services to the

State;

d) the Constitution has not been violated.

since due to the actual limitations of the

television use. the State monopoly is the

best institutional solution to guarantee an

objective use of television. which would ensure

that everybody could express his/her opinion

by any means. as stated by the Constitution.

Sentence n. 225 of the year 1974 reinforced the
arguments of the previous ruling. but it did not limit
itself to the proscriptive part of the issue. The Court
clarified a series of guarantees. that were to be respected
by RAI. which derived from the public character of the
service. and it restated that without State monopoly
television would at its best be in an oligopolistic
situation. and this would not be less dangerous than a
monopoly. In the current historical context. television
satisfies fundamental needs and wants of the community.
therefore the Court consider it an essential public service.
As a result. the public monopoly can and must ensure that
the maximum possible access would be guaranteed. if not to
the single citizen. at least to all the relevant groups
through which the social plurality is expressed. This meant

that RAI had to provide equal access to its channels to

19

every social or political group that is part of the
community.

In the final part of sentence n. 225 the Constitutional
Court. aware of the fact that RAI was quite politicized.
legislative power for a law that would regulate broadcasting
in a more democratic way. Such law should at least provide

7
that:

a) the management and the control of RAI would

not belong exclusively or predominantly to the

executive power;

b) some basic guidelines should be announced so

that informational and cultural programs would

be broadcast following impartial criteria;

c) to achieve the proposed aims the Parliament
should be given adequate powers;

d) access to television should be open. within

the available limits. to all political.

religious and cultural groups present in

society at large.
It should be noted that with this sentence the Court' also
explicitly allowed the broadcasting of foreign stations in
Italy. The rationale behind this decision was that the State
monopoly is allowed on the principle of the scarcity of
available ,frequencies. assigned to Italy by the
international regulatory agency. such as ITU (International
Telecommunication Union). Hence the Court stated that
banning foreign trasmissions in Italy not only would not
have any legal or technical justification. but it would also
jeopardise the free flow of ideas among countries. achieving

nothing else than a sort of national autarchy in the

electronic media.

20

Sentence n. 226 of the year 1974 was a landmark for the
history of Italian broadcasting. In those years a small
private cable television. TeleBiella. openly challenged the
RAI and started to operate without the permission of the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. RAI tried to stop
Telebiella. arguing that its exclusive concession for
broadcasting services extended to cable too. However
TeleBiella. that was owned by a private citizen of the town
of Biella. in northern Italy. went to Court and finally won
the constitutional right to broadcast. This eventually
"unleashed a decade of frenetic private station and network
activity that finally broke the RAI monopoly and forever
changed the shape of Italian broadcasting.a" In sentence
n. 226 the Constitutional Court. reversing the decision
of the lower court. allowed private cable operations. as
long as they were on a local scale and did not cause signal
interference. The above decision was taken considering that
local cable systems could be easily substained by the
private sector. without necessarily leading to a monopoly or
an oligopoly. The financial resources needed to own and
operate a local cable system are relatively small. so that a
considerable number of citizens. or groups. could equally
decide to set up their own cable system.

Implicitly this ruling gave the right to exist to
private broadcast stations as well.9 and cable was

eventually abandoned for the more economically viable

regular broadcasting. It should be noted that the new law on

21

broadcasting. that was passed in 1975. was based on
sentences n. 59. n. 225 and n. 226. The Reform Law n. 103 of
April 14th. 1975. was the result of pressures put on the
legislature by private groups. as well as by political and
social forces. This law permitted private cable operations
on a local scale. but the RAI retained the exclusive
prerogative of national broadcasting. since radio and
television are still considered to be an essential public
service. The broadcast and distribution of foreign programs
by relays were also permitted. eventhough the advertisments
included in such programs were to be eliminated. The most
important task that the new law tried to accomplish was to
restructure RAI's internal organization. following more
democratic and pluralistic considerations than those
followed in the past.

The basic feature of this law is the repeal of- the
traditional relationship between the Government and RAI. in
favor of a new. supposedly more democratic. relationship
between the Parliament and RAI. As we saw earlier. RAI was
directly controlled by the government. which was dominated
by the Christian Democratic party. The tight relationship
between the government and RAI was considered to be an
impediment for a democratic and impartial use of the
broadcasting media. The legislative power tried to correct
this flaw by shifting the control of RAI from the Government
to the Parliament. In fact. the Parliament represents the

community in its totality. especially in the Italian

22

situation where a rather large number of parties are
represented. whereas the government represents only part of
that community. Law n. 103 is to be considered as a further
step towards a more democratic and impartial use of the
Italian broadcasting media.

Nevertheless this law presented several drawbacks.
and quite often the noble intentions of the legislators
were to be compromised with the power games of Italian
political reality. As Cavazza pointed out. the Reform Law
was first the result of an agreement among the various
relevant parties. and only then was presented to the
scrutiny of the Parliament.10 The law established a
commission composed of forty members. to be selected among
the representatives of the parliamentary forces. This
commission was to serve the functions of general policy-
making and supervision of the broadcasting service. To be
sure Law n. 103 guarantees a wider political participation
to RAI's activities. but it also set a dangerous precedent:
“it amounts to a derogation from the authority of
Parliament. and it means that the forty parliamentarians
will act more as party yes-men and less as officers of the
legislative power.11"

The Parliamentary Commission for the General
Orientation and Surveillance of Radio and Television
Programs not only has specific functions. such as the power

to elect ten members. out of sixteen. of the Board of

Directors. but it has also broader responsibilities. such as

23

the regulation of political programs broadcast. approval of
short and long term planning of programs. formulation of the
general orientations to be observed in providing productions
in the public interest. and the scrutiny of the content of
programs and advertising messages broadcast on radio and
television.12

The Board of Directors we mentioned above is one of the
three statutory organs of RAI; the others are the General
Assembly of Shareholders and the Auditors. The sixteen
members of the Board of Directors appoint a chairman. who
has the responsibility to ensure that RAI's management is
achieving its goals. a vice chairman or vice chairmen. and a
director general. who sit at the Board's meetings as a non
voting member and whose basic function is to supervise the
Board's decisions. and assure that they are carried out in
accordance with the orientation of the Parliamentary
Commission: The task to ensure the control of the company is
performed by five Auditors. two of which are appointed by
the Commission and three by the General Assembly of
shareholders.

The rulings of the Constitutional Court that we
discussed so far were clearly urging the political forces to
reorganize RAI along more decentralized lines. so to take
into account a wider plurality of expressions of the social
reality. The Reform Law followed the guidelines indicated by
the Court. RAI's organizational structure was reordered

following the two basic principles of "decentralization" and

24

"pluralism". so that the electronic media would be a better
reflection of the political system on which Italian society
is based. As a result of this. in 1979 the RAI. which
already had two national networks. RAIi and RAI2. put in
operation a third network. RAIS. that was capable to provide
national coverage. but could also especially be used
for regional broadcasting; in order to present those
different and decentralized realities that were indicated in
the new law. Another focal point in the Reform Law is
concerned with the norms announced by the Parliamentary
Commission. that should take into special consideration the
following guidelinesr the requirements to ensure plurality
of opinion and of political and cultural orientation:
importance of the social. cultural and informative
interests; need for a variety in the programming.13

To conclude this brief look at RAI's structure as it
was shaped by Law n. 103. we should mention that the amount
of advertisement allowed on RAI's networks was kept quite
low. it could not be more than 5 percent of the broadcast
time. The main source of income remained the licensee fees.
that are a logical consequence of the conception of
broadcasting as a public service. as for the case of most
public television systems (i.e. BBC in Great Britain. NHK in
Japan). The final outcome of law n. 103 might have been the
result of political compromises. but it was also the result
of a dynamic cooperation between two of the highest

constitutional institutions in the Italian democracy: the

25

Parliament and the Constitutional Court. Despite its various
drawbacks. 'the Reform Law could be definetely considered to
have brought some progress in the movement towards an always
more democratic use of radio and television.

As mentioned earlier. the new law confirmed that RAI
was to remain the only source of nationwide broadcasting.
the rationale behind this was that State monopoly is
preferable to private oligopoly. Only private cable
operators were allowed on a local scale. Nevertheless
private "on-the-air" broadcasters continued their operations
in always increasing numbers. The national press encouraged
this trend in the name of freedom of expression and right to
communicate.14 Major Italian newspapers and magazines were
usually portraying the private stations as dynamic and
innovative. while the RAI was considered to be quite static
and incapable of any innovation.15 In June 1976 the
Constitutional Court made another ruling regarding
broadcasting. and local private stations were finally
permitted to broadcast legally.

Sentence n. 202 of the year 1976 stated that some
articles of Law n. 103 were unconstitutional. since the
Court reached the conclusion that. in limited geographical
areas. it is possible to have a plurality of stations. This
was different from the situation for national broadcasting.
In sentence n. 59 and n. 225 it was clearly stated that the

concession of the broadcasting monopoly was due to the

limited availability of frequencies on a national level. the

26

Court. basing its decision on technical grounds. ruled that
private stations had the constitutional right to broadcast
on a local radius. Moreover the Court gave some suggestions
that the legislative power should eventually put into
practice. These included a control on the credentials of the
owner and the management of the station. on the technical
characteristics of the station equipment. definite

limitations for the amount of advertising time to be

allowed. elimination of any possible interference of
signals. and a precise definition of what is to be
considered as local radius. So far no law regarding

broadcasting has been passed and none of the suggestion
given by the Court have been implemented.

As it can be easily guessed. following sentence n. 202
the number of private stations increased sharply. In
December 1977 it has been estimated that 1750 private radio
stations and 244 private television stations were operating
in Italy.16 The high ratio of radio to television stations
should be considered mainly in economical terms. Besides
being financially more viable. radio allowed greater room
for creativity. The relatively low cost for installing and
maintaining a station convinced many radio amateurs to build
and operate their own stations. At this early stage. local
private radio is characterised by a strong participation of
young people. and by a new formlgf broadcasting. such as the

so called "controinformazione" . This meant politically

alternative information usually provided by students or

27

radical groups. The innovative and dynamic use of local
radio seemed to justify the efforts of those forces which
have pushed towards an open broadcast system.

On the other hand the early days of private television
were rather dull. The high costs of television software and
hardware constrained most of the stations to operate on a
limited broadcast power and with La poor quality of
programming. By 1977 the new phenomenon of local
advertising. that had already appeared in radio. started to
enter local television as well. When the advertisers
realized the immense potential of private televisions as
advertising media. the stations were gradually able to put
aside the bad quality programming of the early days.
This in many cases was characterised by the broadcast of
porno or erotic productions. since those kind of programs
were quite cheap and able to attract a certain audience.
However the turning point for private televisions happened
when some advertising groups. which were already operating
in the publishing media. organized themselves into
"concessionaires".18

It is not easy to give an exact definitions of the
concessionaires. Even though they were associations of
agencies in charge of the organization and distribution of
advertising spots in the new private broadcasting media.
they could be somehow compared to commercial networks. since
they provide the stations not just with the commercials. but

also with quality programs into which those commercials must

28

be shown. In this way the concessionaires came to have a
large influence over the programming of many stations.
In order to be effective advertisment needed an audience.
and most of the stations at that ’time did not have
significant viewership. This was one of the main factors
that convinced the concessionaires to provide not only the
commercial spots. but the main programs as well.

Advertisers then were not only providing advertising
revenues to the private stations. they were also providing
the programs. and in the last analysis they were providing
an audience. This led to a definite control of the stations'
scheduling by the advertising agencies. Some of them became
shareholders of television stations. causing a more rational
organizational structure and the beginning of the first
concentrations of private stations. that would later result
in the creation of national networks.

The transformation of private televisions from a
limited local phenomenon to a national one was marked by a
sharp increase in the amount of advertising revenues.
Private stations soon began to compete seriously with RAI.
Their growth was steady. In 1979 the audience share for
private stations was 8.3 percent. in 1980 it was 20.9
percent.19 and recent data showed that in 1983 private
stations had 31 million daily viewers against the 36
millions of RAI.2°

By 1981 a few well developed concentrations of stations

were operating essentially as national networks. taking

29

advantage of the loopholes present in the broadcasting
regulatory system. The most important of these network was.
and still is. Canale 5. , owned by Silvio Berlusconi. a
publisher and building contractor. He understood that in
order to. emerge and to be profitable private television
needed to have quality programs. capable to attract a large
audience.. He began to buy popular foreign programs. usually
from the American market. and then he acted as a distributor
to many stations. thus establishing closer ties with them.
His clear vision about the potential of private television
and his huge availability of capital made him the toughest
competitor to RAI from the very beginning. In 1981
Berlusconi even requested officially the permission to use
satellites. That had always been a prerogative of RAI.

The other private stations were operating either in
isolation. on a local scale. or associating themselves
according to two different models: circuits and networks.
The former implied the simultaneneous transmission of tapes
previously distributed by the agency in charge. usually a
concessionaire. to the various affiliates. The network on
the other hand consisted of a main station broadcasting on a
larger level and this station was the one to provide the
affiliates with the programs. Furthermore the networks have
a similar schedule for the whole broadcast day. while the
circuits usually would be provided with common programs only
for a part of the programming schedule.21

By 1983 the concentration of private stations into the

30

hands of few persons or groups. as it was feared by some of
the critics of the private system. was evident. Some of the
most influencial publishers. with large financial resources,
entered private television creating powerful television
networks. Most local stations were not capable to compete
with those networks. so they affiliated themselves or
disappeared. The open free system is now slowly turning into
an oligopolistic system. Berlusconi, with a clever move.
became the owner of another network. Italia 1. buying 62
percent of the shares from Rusconi. In the summer of 1984
Berlusconi also bought 50 percent of the shares of the other
major network. Rete 4. practically achieving a monopoly in
the private national television. The competition between the
three networks of RAI on one hand. and the three networks of
Berlusconi on the other hand did not leave much space for
the other stations. Some data from Istel. the semi-official
Italian TV audience research institute. demonstrate clearly
this point. In 1983 between the peak hours of 8.30 p.m. to
11.30 p.m. RAI networks had 10,230,000 viewers. the three
major private networks. Canale 5. Italia 1 and Rete 4. had
12,770,000 viewers. .and the rest of the statiOns had the
remaining three million viewers.22

Currently in Italy there are three public national
channels. four private national networks. the biggest three
being owned by ggrlusconi. a few national circuits, tens of

local stations, and many viewers are also able to receive

the programs of at least one foreign stations. This may

appear to
which is
television
only two
television

choice for

31

be the heaven of the Italian television viewer.
now able to choose from a large number of
stations. while only a few years ago there were
channels to choose from. Did this increase in
stations bring a similar increase in the program

the viewers? In the next chapter we are going to

consider if viewers are really much better off as a result

of this sharp increase in their stations availability. or if

more stations simply brought more programs of the same kind.

32

ENDNOTES

1. E. Bocchini. RAI, p.21.

2. W. E. Mc Cavitt, groadcasting Around the World.
p.276.

3. Ibid.

4. F.L. Cavazza, "From Party Occupation to Party
Partition". in A. Smith, Television and Political Life.

5. S. W. Head. World Broadcasting Systems.

6. Quotation taken from sentence N. 59 of the year
1960.

7. Quotation taken from sentence N. 225 Of the year
1960.

8. S. W. Head, World Broadcasting Systems, p.137.

9. In Italy, as in most of Western Europe, cable
operations are considered to be broadcasting.

10. F.L. Cavazza. "From Party Occupation to Party
Partition", in A. Smith. Television and Political Life.
p.105.

11. Ibid.

12. W. E. Mc Cavitt, Broadcasting Around the World.
p.280.

13. Here we have the most direct reference to the
issue of diversification of programs in Italy.

14. Most probably it is not a coincidence that some of
the well-known Italian publishers later will be directly
involved in private broadcasting.

15. G. Richeri. "Italy: Public Service and Private
Interest". Variety, p.72.

33

16. R. Venturini, "TV: Verso un Sistema Misto". Studi
Sociali. p.104.

17. This term was used by those which believed that the
media. supported by the political establishment, were
providing a biased representation of reality. Alternative
information was not supposed to be merely a different way of
looking at the news. but of "doing the news".

18. R. Venturini, "TV: Verso un Sistema Misto", Studi
Sociali. p.105.

19. Servizio Opinioni. as appeared in M. Bruzzone.
Piccolo Grande Scherpp. p.137.

20. Dati Istel. as appeared in R. Venturini, "TV: Verso
un Sistema Misto". Studi Sociali. p122.

21. M. G. Medi. "I Network in Italia". Informazione
Radio 12. p.72.

22. Dati Istel. as appeared in J. Humi, "Possibl Merger
of Big Commercial Italian TV Broadcasters Spells Even More
Trouble for RAI". TelevisioniRadio Age International. p.26.

23. At the beginning of 1983 there were more than 4,000
private radio stations end around 700 television stations
opereting in Italy (R. Venturini, "TV: Verso un Sistema
Misto". Studi Sociali. p.104).

Chapter 3

LEVEL OF DIVERSITY IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TELEVISION

In the first chapter we discussed the importance of
diversification of programs in Italy and in the television
systems of the Western World in general. Now we are going to
analyze the level of diversity in the Italian television
programs at a national level. In so doing we will also draw
comparisons between the public and the private system. .Due
to the fact that private stations appeared only a few years
ago, so that there are not complete data for many of them.
we will restrict our analysis on the most important national
networks: RAI 1. RAI 2. which are public,1 Canale 5. Rete 4,
Italia 1, which are private.2 Unfortunately. even in
considering the most important private networks exhaustive
data are not always available. Our efforts then will be
concentrated in giving reliable measures of diversity for
particular period of times. since we do not have the
necessary data to perform a satisfactory trend analysis for
private stations.

Despite the fact that Italian viewers are able to
choose among several channels. our suspicion is that they

may still have limited options as far as program types are

concerned. In other words. the sharp increase in television

34

35

stations may not have brought a similar increase in the
level of program diversification available to the viewer.
The rationale behind this consists in the fact that private
stations. especially the networks. compete for the same
largest possible audience. and therefore they are likely to
show the same kind of mass appeal program at the same time.
This could be expected to be different if more networks were
owned by a single entity. which would be more likely to
diversify programs among-its networks, in order to reach
more segments of the audience. The hypothesis we are going
to test in our study is that a single ownership of more
networks is more likely to result in a higher
diversification of programs than having each network owned
separately.

In relation to our main hypothesis we will also
consider two subordinate research questions. The first is to
see if the two public networks have a more vertically
diversified programming schedule (e.g. differences in
program types within each network) than the three private
networks. as we would expect to be the case. since RAI
programming strategy is not shaped merely by economic
considerations. but also by its nature as a public service.
The second subordinate research question we will discuss,
even if in more. general terms. considers if private
television, having caused a sharp increase in the
broadcasting channels. has brought a similar increase in the

program types available to the viewer. This will not be

36

analyzed in specific terms, since due to the limited data
available we are considering in detail only the major
national networks. Nevertheless data from these private
networks and some other data for all the other private
stations .taken as a group will allow us to draw some
conclusions about the level of diversity in the private
television. system. leaving the task of a more accurate
analysis on the subject to future studies (e.g. by diversity
we mean the difference in program types broadcast).

Diversification of programs is not a concept to be
measured in absolute terms. Previous studies on this subject
present different points of view on the importance of
diversity and how to measure it. There is however a general
agreement on the fact that it is not possible to give an
absolute index of diversity. Even the way diversity should
be defined is a controversial issue. Each researcher relates
this concept to particular factors. or variables, as we are
going to see. At this point we shall refer to the works of
Steiner and Owen, two economists which have considered the
issue of diversity as it relates to the economical structure
of the industry. Then we will present the applied frameworks
of studies on diversification of programs done by Dominique
and Pierce. Wakshlag and Adams. and Litman. Our methodology
for the study of vertical and horizontal diversification
derives from the works of the above researchers.

Our hypothesis, that a consolidated ownership of more

networks will provide the audience with higher program

37

diversity. appears to be supported by Steiner's model. He
stated that-under limited channels monopoly will provide a
more diversified programming schedule. which will satisfy a
greater number of viewers.3 His assumptions rest on the fact
that the monopolist is interested in maximizing the total
audience of his channels, so that he will use different
channels to broadcast programs aimed at different tastes of
the audience. 0n the other hand competing networks are
interested in maximizing the audience of their own networks:
as a consequence they compete for the same mass audience.
neglecting programs for the minority parts of the audience.
Another well known economist. Owen, disagrees with the
above conclusions, since he considers Steiner's assumptions.
that viewers will watch only their first choice, to be quite
unrealistic. Owen argues that under limited channels and
more general preferences. it is not so easy to determine
which structure. monopoly or competition, provide superior
program diversity and viewer satisfaction.4

Steiner's model. which is based on a simulation
methodology,5 assumes exclusive preferences of the audience.
That is. if viewers can not watch the program of their
choice. they will not watch television at all. Owen
disagrees with these assumptions. and he claims that viewers
are more flexible and they will tend to watch less-preferred
programs if their first choice is not available. Owen also

argues that in an advertiser-supported television system.

under a monopolistic structure, the only way viewers can get

38

the programs they prefer is by not watching the less-
preferred programs. This is the only alternative for the
viewers to hurt the interests of the monopolist. and to
force him to diversify the programming on his networks.
Meanwhile in a competitive system viewers can switch to
network 8, in order to show dissatisfaction with the
programs of network A or network C. His logic appears to
underestimate an important aspect of the problem: what if
the programming schedule of the competing networks A, B. and
C are all similar? What alternative would then be available
to the viewers? Owen does not consider this part of the
problem and he concludes by stating that in general monopoly
will not provide more diversity or satisfy a greater number
of viewers. as Steiner claims. In a commercial system.
competition among separately owned networks is considered by
Owen the best structure to satisfy viewers' preferences.
Their arguments provide some useful references for our
thesis. The models presented by Steiner and Owen are .
concerned with the difference in the outcome regarding
diversification of programs that will result from the two
different structures, monopoly and competition. in a
commercial broadcasting system. We have to take into account
an additional variable. We are considering not only two
different structures. but also two different systems. public
and private. The assumption of the two economists. that
television aims its programs to achieve maximum profits, is

not necessarily true in the case of a public system. which

39

is not substained primarily by adverting revenues.

The complexity of the issue is reflected in the concept
of diversity. Because of the multidimensionality of this
notion we will abstain from giving a single working
definition of diversity. Rather we will specify four kind of
diversification, which we have identified from previous
literature on this subject and from the insights gained
through our study. The four categories. into which we have
divided the concept of diversity. are not mutually
exclusive. First they will be presented schematically and
then described more extensively.

Vertical diversity: differences in program types offered by
each network during the broadcast day. It indicates how
balanced each network schedule is. in terms of different
progam types broadcast daily.

Horizontal diversity: differences in program types available
to the viewer across all networks at a specific time. It
indicates the choice of program types across different
channels.

External diversity: measurement of diversity according to
the program format. both at a vertical and horizontal level.
Internal diversity: measurement of political diversity.
within informational, cultural, educational and even
entertainment programs dealing with social and controversial
issues. This is not considered here because of limited
available data.

The objective of this project is the measurement of

40

external diversity, at the vertical and horizontal level.
Diversity will be measured by analyzing it within each
network according to the number of program categories
developed. This procedure, that measures the vertical level
of diversity, indicates how balanced each network schedule
is. in terms of different program types broadcast daily.
This however does not allow to know if. to a balanced
shedule within each network correspond a diversified
schedule across the various networks at specific points in
time. We are also interested to know if, at any particular
time during the day. the viewers could choose among various
program types offered by the networks, or if. due to
competition over the same audience. they could only choose
different channels showing programs of the same type. The
answer to this aspect of the issue is given by the
measurament of the horizontal level of diversification.
which is the analysis of diversity for the program types
across the various networks during the same time period.

In considering vertical and horizontal diversity. our
categories reflect the common trend of dividing programs
according to their apparent content. rather than to their
ultimate functions. or purposes. Program categories divided
according to their format give an indication of what we
called external diversification. This is an important aspect
of the issue. since external diversity is supposed to
satisfy the different tastes of the audience and it is one

of the conditions necessary for a democratic use of the

41

broadcasting media. However there is another equally
important aspect of this issue. an aspect that does not
directly refer to the diversity among program types. but
with the diversity of the political approach of such
programs. This is what we called internal diversity.

If our hypothesis will be supported by the results of
this study. we could state that a single ownership of more
networks tend to provide the viewers with more external
diversity. thus enforcing the freedom of choice principle.
At the same time a single ownership of more networks
provides a single source of internal diversity, so that. for
instance. the programs with the function to inform.
broadcast on the various networks owned by a single entity.
will all be likely to reflect the same approach to the
events.

News can hardly. if ever. be totally value-free. As a
consequence. a concentration of networks into a single
ownership. while leading to a higher degree of external
diversity. could result in an impediment for an impartial
representation of the political and social plurality that
the Constitutional Court openly declared to be one of the
fundamental principles to be guaranteed in the Italian
broadcasting system.

The concept of internal diversity would be crucial in
news, but it could also be relevant for any other program
dealing with a political or social issue, at a manifest or

latent level. Because of the limited intent of our study.

42

and because there are very scarce data for most private
6

stations. we will not perform any analysis on internal
diversification.7 We brought up the issue because, in case
that a single ownership of more networks would be shown to
be the best answer for a higher level of external diversity,
we want the reader to keep in mind that there are other
aspects to be considered before taking a policy decision.

The first step in measuring diversification of programs
is to divide them into categories. according to their
content and format. Some of the researchers that have dealt
with diversification in television programs have developed
different numbers of categories. Dominick and Pierce divided
television programs into fourteen categories.8 Litman
nine.9 Wakshlag and Adams thirty seven.10 There is no
definite rationale behind the nature and the number of these
categories. except the researcher's own judgement of what
would be the most appropiate way to break up television
programs. This however does not constitute a major
impediment for studies on diversification. In fact, despite
the wide differences in the number of program categories.
the three studies mentioned above follow similar
methodologies and their findings are consistent with one
another.

The studies of Dominick and Pierce. Litman. and
Wakshlag and Adams indicate that an oligopolistic structure

in a commercial television system. such as that of the

United States. tends to provide few program types, which

43

dominate the market. Dominick and Pierce believe that this
is due to the mutual interdependence of the networks. so
that when one produces new and successful programs. it is
immediately imitated by the others. The studies by Litman,
and Wakshlag and Adams basically ereached the same
conclusions: that the three networks were concentrating
their programs among a few popular types. Litman however
indicated that occasionally the diversity level can increase
substantially. This happens when the system is subjected to
"external shocks,"11 which threatens the ordinary existence
of the networks. forcing them to take new directions.

For our study we have developed thirteen categories,
which are directly derived by the way RAI divided program
types. One of the problems encountered consists exactly in
the fact that most of the available data are already coded
into program types. The insufficient availability of primary
data does not allow much space for our own selection of
categories. other than those derived by RAI, impeding
precise measurements of diversity at the horizontal level.
In this study diversity will be analyzed mainly at the
vertical level. We will perform four vertical measurements.
done through the Herfindahl index. Three of those will
consider the whole broadcasting day and one, more recent.
will consider only the time included in the two evening time
belts, as defined by RAI.12 We will also perform one

horizontal measurement, done through a mere calculation of

program percentages within each of the two evening time-

44

belts considered. Here the use of percentages to measure
horizontal diversity is a constrain deriving from the
scarcity of primary data available.

The four vertical measurements will be done through
the Herfindhal index of concentration. This is an index
commonly used to measure the level of concentration in the
industry. but it has been proved to be very accurate to
measure program diversity as well. It is calculated by
summing up the squared share of each program type. therefore
it is very sensitive to variations within a single category.
The .Herfindahl index can range from a value close to zero.
indicating a perfectly balanced programming (i.e. ten
different program types. of one hour each. for a broadcast
day of ten hours). to almost one, indicating a high
concentration of few program types broadcast. The Herfindhal
index does not provide an absolute measure of diversity, but
it gives very accurate indications when used in comparative
terms. Since it declines with the increase in the number and
time of program types broadcast, and vice versa. a smaller
coefficient for the Herfindahl index will indicate a more
diversified programming schedule than a larger one.

The measurements on vertical diversity we intend to
perform are the following:
1) from the year 1962 to 1982. The Herfindhal index will be
performed for RAI 1 and RAI 2.
2) from the year 1980 to 1983. The Herfindahl index will be

performed for RAI networks on one hand. and for all private

45

stations, grouped together, on the other.
3) for a sample week in January 1983. The Herfindhal index
will be performed for RAI 1. RAI 2. Canale 5. Rete 4, and
Italia 1.
4) for five sample weeks in January 1983, February and May
1984. February and May 1985. The Herfindahl index will be
performed for RAI 1. RAI 2. Canale 5. Rete 4, and Italia 1,
for the evening programs included in the 5th and 6th time-
' belts. as divided by RAI.13

We will now proceed to describe the thirteen categories
designed to study diversity.1‘ Although the number of these
categories remains the same throughout this study, a minor
change occurs to adjust for the emergence of a new format
type. namely cartoons. Due to its sharp decrease during
recent years, classical music will be included in the
category "others". and cartoons. that in our first
measurement are included in the category "telefilms", will
have their own category. due to their increasing popularity.
especially in private television. Hence, the number of
categories used in this study will remain the same. what we
did was a substitution of categories to adjust for the
emergence of a new format type, namely cartoons. This minor
adjustment should not affect the result and the reliability
of our study. The thirteen categories designed to measure
the level of program diversity are:

1) Films.

2) Telefilms; including series and films made for

46

television. and cartoons. which, as noted. will be in a
separate category in the following measurement. 1
3) News; including newsreels. news comments and weather
forecasts.
4) Informative programs; including editorials. special
reports and documentaries.
5) Sports.
6) Classical Music; including concerts and ballet. As noted,
from the next measurement these programs will be included in
the category Others.
7) Variety; including vaudeville and musical shows.
8) Children programs; including also family programs.
9) Cultural programs; including programs related to social
religious and political costums.
10) Serials; including soap operas and theatrical plays for
television.
11) Educational programs; including adult education and
scholastic programs.
12) Advertisement; including commercials. announcements and
intervals.
13) Others; including political debates, parliamentary
reports and access programs.

In the next page we will show our first measurement on
RAI 1, Table 1. and RAI 2. Table 2, for the years 1962-1982.
Here the scope is to analyze the level of diversification
experienced by RAI over a long period of time. and to see

if, by having two national networks. RAI was able to

47

diversify significantly its programming. Comparing Table 1
and Table 2 to later tables would also allow us to consider
if the appearance of private television had any influence on

RAI programming.

48

Table 1 - BROADCASTING TIME FOR PROGRAM TYPES ON RAI 1

1962-1968 (in percentages)
Program types 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Films 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.2 2.7 2.6
Telefilms 1.5 1.4 1.5 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.4
News 10.8 11.7 11.5 11.5 13.1 14.6 19.9
Inform. 3.0 4.7 4.9 4.3 3.9 5.0 5.6
Sports 8.6 8.9 11.4 10.1 12.4 12.9 12.8
Classic mus. 1.8 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.6 1.2 0.7
Variety 6.3 4.9 5.1 4.4 5.3 5.7 5.9
Children 9.4 10.3 10.1 9.8 9.9 12.6 12.5
Cultural 11.0 11.1 9.9 9.9 10.0 8.9 9.4
Serials 5.7 4.4 4.5 4.1 3.8 4.4 4.4
Educational 29.0 28.2 25.8 28.6 25.0 16.9 12.0
Adv. 7.6 7.8 8.5 9.1 9.8 9.7 9.4
Others 2.8 2.1 2.8 2.9 2.5 4.1 3.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Herfindahl .139 .139 .129 .140 .132 .110 .114
index
Table 2 - BROADCASTING TIME FOR PROGRAM TYPES ON RAI 2
1962-1968 (in percentages)

Program types 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968
Films 7.7 8.8 9.5 9.2 8.8 7.9 7.0
Telefilms 3.2 6.1 6.2 4.3 6.5 5.6 2.7
News 15.0 6.9 8.0 8.9 9.6 6.3 6.1
Inform. 3.2 5.7 6.1 6.6 5.8 3.8 3.8
Sports 15.1 15.9 14.7 10.1 9.8 10.9 12.4
Classic mus. 7.5 6.1 5.5 8.2 13.8 7.9 5.3
Variety 13.1 12.8 15.7 21.5 14.8 12.4 14.0
Children 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.6
Cultural 12.6 10.7 10.2 10.0 10.5 14.3 13.9
Serials 13.7 17.8 15.5 11.6 10.0 8.9 10.6
Educational 0 0 0 0 O 10.4 11.3
Adv. 6.6 8.1 7.6 7.5 8.1 7.9 8.4
Others 2.3 1.1 1.0 2.1 2.4 3.2 3.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Herfindahl . .116 .115 .113 115 103 .095 .101

index

49

1969-1975

"Table 1 (cont'd.)".

Program types 1969

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

1970

0.9”0.30.7931760.nw

3126mAmO450410.4.
211 11

696050.6.13.6.4.Aw3

2134514.”.33uqu4.

4.4.29.9mo.2309u4.qwqm

2133314.303nQ“9m

16.0J5Qw1337qu217fiw

L1u.310.4.”m3319.2.
1 2

233096136.0.9u10”

3015105.5.0.4.30.3
2 1

2106052022753

313410..0.439470.3

7267360171933

02.1759052957au9m
1 1

1

8 .1

u a

8 m n

m n1 O

.1 . .cv.e.as.i
.1 msitrrlt 8
8f rtseduaa r
mesorsiltlc.e
11Wfoar11FUVh
ieenplahueddt
ETNISCVCCSEAO

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

100.0

Total

.118 .120 .127 .129 .128 .121

.116

Herfindahl

index

1969-1975

"Table 2 (cont'd.)".

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

1970

Program types 1969

129422197u2353

5293361357290
1

3447774.330620

4.391350.5.36302

6.2935537u6.0.4.6.4.

.6.291740.4.0.0..6.0.5
1

315073637u336.3

16.33164123QH29.5
1

1379039917763

7291553301205
111

9.145235091367u

.5.171635220994.
1

5309039934401

6372352022994
1 1 11

mus.
Educational

Telefilms
Adv.

News
Cultural

Films
Inform.
Sports
Classic
Variety
Children
Serials
Others

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

100.0

Total

.108 .101 .129 .100 .120 .125

.098

Herfindahl

index

"Table 1 (cont'd.)".

Program types 1976

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Classic mus.
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.

Others

3...

p
“DQOQQNO‘OOCOQQ
O OQQMQNONNONDU

Total

5.3
O
O

Herfindahl
index

.108

"Table 2 (cont'd.)".

Program types 1976

Films

Telefilms

News 1
Inform.

Sports 2
Classic mus.
Variety
Children
Cultural 1
Serials
Educational
Adv.

Others

4.6

HQHQHQONHQO

Total

Herfindahl
index

1976-1982.
1977 1978
4.5 4.6
5.9 5.5
18.0 18.5
12.0 12.1
8.0 8.8
1.2 1.7
12.6 9.1
7.8 9.5
7.3 7.1
5.0 5.2
7.1 6.5
7.6 8.6
3.0 2.8
100.0 100.0
.100 .099
1976-1982
1977 1978
5.5 4.3
6.4 6.3
17.4 19.2
9.8 9.6
14.9 15.3
1.8 1.2
9.6 9.1
6.2 6.8
5.8 5.5
6.8 6.7
6.0 5.7
7.7 8.2
2.1 2.1
100.0 100.0
.101 .106

50

HH H
‘D

e e e e4
0

QQQOQCDDHQHNIOIUI

NOMO‘QQODH‘CDN

3.4
O
O

.0

.096

1980

Med
(I

O O

H

MNGQGDOHONON

ummunmuebhmw

p
O
O
O

.097

Hid H
NNIOOOD‘OHQHOSQO g
H

O OOOHQOQOOGIFNH

5...
O
O

.095

1981

hAH
0905000
0000000

Pei H
ta~IQ<DC>m¢mNDO

NINOOIOO‘DHO

p
O
O
O

.096

1982

0)
0|

NhlbOU'ONO-‘NNUN
NNGQO‘DO'JNHwO

Hid

p

g..-

5.4
O
O
O

.093

g...
h
0

5.3

p
HNUONDOHOU

O QQQOOONOOO

H

p.-
O
O

.094

51

The data presented indicate that after the years 1975-
1976. which were characterized by the Reform Law on
broadcasting and by the appearance of private stations, the
programming of RAI 1 becomes increasingly diversified.
Educational and cultural programs, that during the 60's used
to have a rather large representation, were gradually
decreased. while at the same time the percentage of more
popular programs. such as serials, variety and films. has
been increased. RAI 2 instead does not appear to present a
similar pattern. Probably the main cause resides in the fact
that after the Reform Law of 1975 the control of RAI shifted
from the government to the parliament. This practically
meant a "partition of RAI networks."15 with the Christian
Democratics retaining the control of RAI 1. while the laic
forces. mainly the Socialists. gained control of RAI 2.16
Because of this partition among political parties, we will
divide our analysis into two periods: the first includes the
years 1962-1975, when both networks were under the control
of the government. always headed by Christian Democratics.
the second includes the years 1976-1982. when. as a result
of the Reform Law of 1975, the programming orientation of
RAI 1 and RAI 2 were decided independently from. each
other.17

For the time period 1962-1975 the Herfindhal index
of RAI 1 tend to show a higher concentration than that of
RAI 2, and even of that of RAI 1 itself for the period 1975-

1976. We can assume that this was due to the fact that

52

during the years 1962-1975 the programming schedule was
decided on a complementary basis with RAI 2. That is why we
see that program types with a high percentage in RAI 1, such
as news and educational programs, have a much lower
percentage in RAI 2. Likewise RAI. 2 has a highly
concentrated percentage of programs, such as classical
music, serials. films and sports, which have a much lower
representation in RAI 1. From the data presented, the
complementary function of RAI 2, in relation to RAI 1. for
the time period 1962-1975, appears to be quite evident.
RAI 1 tends to be more "public service" oriented. with many
hours of news and educational programs, while RAI 2 is more
entertainment oriented. In this respect the public can be
said to benefit since. ‘by establishing another network. RAI
monopoly brought a more diversified balance in its
programming. rather than a mere duplication of the same
receipt.

During the second time period. 1976-1982, we notice
that RAI 1 shows an increasingly diversified program
schedule. with the Herfindahl index shifting from .108 in
1976 to .093 in 1982. During these years RAI 1 gradually
decreased news. educational and cultural programs, while at
the same time it increased variety shows, serials. films and
telefilms. This seems to indicate a stronger concern of the
management of RAI 1 not just for the needs of the public.
but for the wants as well. The increase in the percentage of

entertainment programs could be partly attributed to RAI

53

partition. as described above. but it is surely caused also
by the appearance of a new broadcasting system. Private
television. by showing entertainment programs capable of
attracting a large audience, threatened the traditional
hegemonic position that RAI had enjoyed for thirty years.

The same considerations apply for RAI 2, which had to
take into account the appearance of private television.
while at' the same time it was trying to improve its
traditionally secondary role. in respect to RAI 1. The
programming of RAI 2 was already quite entertainment
oriented since, practically. it has been used as a
complementary channel of the "more serious" RAI 1. The data
in Table 2 show that RAI 2 kept a high percentage of
popular, entertainment program types, while at the same time
increased informative programs and the news, which almost
doubled. Until then the news on RAI 2 were rather neglected.
RAI 1 having always been the main source of news for‘ the
audience. in terms of ratings and credibility.

The next measurement, Table 3. considers the public and
the private systems as two homogeneous blocks. By analysing
these two blocks from the year 1980, when some of the
private stations operated already as networks or circuits.
to 1983 we should have a general indication of the level of
diversity of the two systems and if it changed during this

time period.

54

Table 3 - BROADCASTING TIME FOR PROGRAM TYPES ON PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE TELEVISION (18) 1980-1983 (in percentages)

1980 1981 1982 1983
Program types RAI Private RAI Private RAI Private RAI Private
Films 5 39 6 35 7 31 5 32
Telefilms 6 18 7 21 6 26 6 29
News 12 6 15 3 12 2 12 1
Inform. 16 8 11 2 10 3 11 1
Sports 13 2 11 4 12 5 13 3
Cartoons 1 9 1 13 1 14 2 15
Variety 9 10 9 7 12 4 15 4
Children 7 2 6 1 '7 O 4 0
Cultural 6 4 8 4 8 2 10 2
Serials 8 2 9 2 9 4 6 3
Educationa 6 0 5 0 5 0 5 0
Adv. 7 6 7 9 7 9 4 8
Others 4 0 5 O 4 O 5 2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Herfindahl .096 .219 .091 .202 .090 .199 .095 .220
index

55

The data in Table 3 show a sharp difference for the
level of program diversification between public and private
systems. The networks of RAI offer programs that are fairly
representative of the the whole range of program types. On
the other hand private stations rely primarily on three or
four program types. mainly films. telefilms and cartoons.
that amount to 75 percent of the total programming. These
data tend to support our belief that private television did
not bring more diversity. but rather more programs of the
same type.

The data we are going to present in Table 4 are taken
during a sample week in January 1983. We will consider the
programming of RAI 1. RAI 2. Canale 5, Rete 4, and Italia 1.
The purpose of this table is to provide a more specific
picture of the diversity level on the most important
networks, so that we could compare individual programming
policies at the vertical level. Table 4 will also be useful
as a frame of reference when we will measure the vertical
and horizontal level of program diversification during

Italian prime time for the same networks.

56

Table 4 - BROADCASTING TIME FOR PROGRAM TYPES ON FIVE
NETWORKS 1983 (in percentages)

Program types RAIi RAIZ Canale5 Rete4 Italiai
Films 4.1 3.7 19.0 22.7 35.1
Telefilms 6.4 9.1 21.5 35.7 28.1
News 10.5 12.9 0 1.3 1.8
Inform. 13.5 13.3 0.7 2.0 0.7
Sports 11.4 4.9 5.2 2.9 4.1
Cartoons 4.1 1.5 9.7 12.8 9.6
Variety 16.9 11.7 9.3 4.3 6.4
Children 3.6 7.3 0 0.5 0.2
Cultural 9.3 13.2 2.6 2.1 1.6
Serials 5.6 6.9 13.4 0 0.6
Educational 5.1 7.5 0 O 0

Adv. 4.4 4.5 15.6 13.6 9.6
Others 5.1 3.5 3.0 2.1 2.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Herfindahl .098 .097 147 .218 .228

index

57

The results of the Herfindhal index, in Table 4, are
compatible with the previous findings. RAI programs are the
most diversified. with an index below .1. while among the
private networks Canale 5 is the one with the most
diversified programming schedule. D

At this point we will perform five vertical and
horizontal measurements that will consider only a specific
period of the broadcasting day. This period . from 7.45 p.m.
to 10. p.m.. could be roughly considered to be the prime
time of Italian television.19 RAI considers the broadcasting
day as divided into seven time belts. We will analyze the
fifth. from 7.45 to 8.45. and the sixth time belt. from 8.45
to 10.00.

To measure horizontal diversity we will keep the
distinction between the two time belts. To measure vertical
diversity instead. we will consider them as a single time
period. Therefore we will perform the Herfindhal index
within the time period from 7.45 to 10.00. Our measurements
are taken for five sample weeks, during the time period of
three years:20 January 1983, February 1984. May 1984.
February 1985, May 1985. Here we will give only the
Herfindahl index for each measurement, since the percentages

for program types within each time belt will be dealt with

analytically in the horizontal measurements.

58

Table 5 - HERFINDHAL INDEX OF 5 NETWORKS DURING PRIME TIME
(19). January 1983- May 1985

RAIl RAI2 Canale5 Rete4 Italial
Jan. 1983 .128 .160 .309 .348 .371
Feb. 1984 .179 .170 .232 .271 .180
May 1984 . .226 .195 .310 .304 .265
Feb. 1985 .165 .174 .281 .288 .234
May 1985 5 .179 .207 .365 .287 .207

By considering the prime time of the five networks.
Table 5 gives an indication of the fundamental programming
strategy of each network. Once more. we see that, on
the average. the two networks of RAI are by far more
diversified than each of the other private network. However,
it should be noted that there was a the sharp increase in
the level of diversity of Italia 1, which index went from
.371 in January 1983 to .180 in February 1984. rose again to
.265 in May 1984. and then decreased steadily in February
and May 1985. This is an interesting case because in
December 1982 Berlusconi. the owner of Canale 5, acquired
Italia 1. Owning a second network seems to have allowed him
an increasingly diversified schedule on this network. This
could be a further element in support of our hypothesis.
However before discussing this issue. we should analyze the
horizontal .level of diversity across these networks. If
Berlusconi. owning first two networks and then three (in

the Summer of 1984 he also bought Rete 4). used a strategy

59

of diversification of programs among his networks. it should
be evident during prime time. when television enjoys the
largest audience.

We will now perform the horizontal measurements of
diversity. considering the percentages of each of the
thirteen program types, for each of the two evening time
belts. The fifth time belt lasts sixty minutes. from 7.45
p.m. to 8.45 p.m.. The sixth time belt starts at 8.45 p.m..
immediatly after the news on the public networks, and ends
at 10.00 p.m.. for a total of seventyfive minutes. The
measurements will be performed for the same five sample
weeks as above.21 Table 6 will include the program

percentages within the fifth time belt, and table 7 will

include the prcentages within the sixth time belt.

60

Table 6 - PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE FIFTH TIME

BELT January 1983
Program types RAI1 RAIZ Canale5 Rete4 Italiai
Films 2.1 1.7 7.4 O 18.6
Telefilms 1.9 1.7 65.5 61.2 59.3
News 47.2 64.2 0 4.8 0
Inform. 1.9 2.6 O O 0
Sports 0.7 6.2 0 O 0
Cartoons 0 O 0 O 0
Variety 4.7 6.0 3.8 5.1 0
Children 0 0 0 O 0
Cultural 15.0 1.7 O O 0
Serials 1.9 2.6 0 O 0
Educational 0 O 0 O 0
Adv. 13.3 9.3 21.6 27.2 18.8
Others 11.3 4.0 1.7 1.7 3.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 7 - PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE SIXTH TIME
BELT January 1983

Program types

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

RAIl

16.8
18.3
3.2
12.2
3.4

O

22.9

00

10.3

0

3.0
9.9

100.0

RAI2

14.3
13.5
1.5

Canale5

46.7
24.6

Rete4

19.9
45.1

15

0000' 0000

18.2
1.3

100.0

Italiai

75.8
6.5

OOOOOOOOO

13.7
4.0

100.0

61

Table 6.a-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE FIFTH TIME
BELT February 1984

Program types RAIi RAIZ Canale5 Rete4 Italiai
Films 3.1 6.6 3.8 16.7 7.6
Telefilms O 3.3 21.0 17.6 14.8
News 48.3 60.7 0 O 0
Inform. 0 3.6 0 O 15.7
Sports 0 6.4 0 0 0
Cartoons 0 0 O -O 35.2
Variety 11.4 6.4 50.2 38.6 7.6
Children 0 0 O O 0
Cultural 14.3 0 0 0 0
Serials 6.2 3.3 3.3 O 0
Educational 0 0 O 0 0
Adv. 13.6 9.3 21.6 27.1 19.0
Others 3.1 O 0 0 0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Table 7. a-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE SIXTH TIME

BELT

February 1984

Program types RAIi

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

RAI2

28.0
17.7

0

7.2

23 8

00° 00

20.7

0

2.7

0

100.0

Canale5

26.9
9. 5

0000

'0
fi
.

24.0

000

5.3
0

Ce
N

100.0

Rete4

46.9
11.6

M
(n)
OOOOkOOOO

p
0

Ce
(4)

100.0

Italiai

36.9
18.9

N
00
0000200000

.1
h

0'
0

100.0

Table 6.b-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE FIFTH TIME

BELT

Program types

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

May 1984
RAIl RAI2
12.4 9.8

0 0
43.8 61.2

0 3.3

8.3 6.4

0 0

9.3 6.6

0 0
14.0 0

0 3.3

0 0
13.1 9.3

0 0

100.0 100.0

Canale5

1.9

1.9.

0000

61.4

13 1

0° 00

21.6

0

100.0

Rete4

3.6
12.1

27 1

0- 0000-

100.0

Table 7.b-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE

BELT

Program types

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

May 1984
RAIi RAIz
54.1 39.8

0 0

1.9 2.4

O 7.2
12.9 9.7

0 O
28.0' 18.5

0 O

0 0

O 17.5

0 0

3.0 3.0

0 0

100.0 100.0

Canale5

17.7
6.5

0

(a)
0)
00° 0000

24.0

H
00
0'0
[0

100.0

Rete4

23.6
14.1

p
b
0000230000

.4
m

Os
(4)

100.0

Italiai

14.3
17.6

SIXTH TIME

Italiai

24.6
3.0

(l
O
00

0000- 0000

5.1
(A)

0'
‘0

100.0

Table 6.0-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE FIFTH TIME

BELT

February 1985

Program types RAI1

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

6.2
0
48.3
6.2
0
0
8.3

100.0

RAI2

Canale5

N10)
090

N
0
0000° 0000°

5.4

N

H
Os

0»

100.0

Rete4

8.0
10.0

'0 0|
°~l 0
0° 000050000

0

100.0

Table 7.0-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE

BELT

Program types

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

February 1985

RAIl

100.0

RAIZ

43.4

19

00° 0°

12.0

13

0° 00

3.0

0

100.0

Canale5

24.0
48.6

4.4
N
0000° 0000

0

5.4
00

Os
0

100.0

Rete4

46.7
11.6

l0
(4)
0000;0000

H
Q

Os
0

100.0

Italial

11.0
11.0

000

56.7

0000°

19.0

0

100.0

SIXTH TIME

Italiai

49.1
24.8

4.3
N
0000;,0000

H
0

0°
0

100.0

Table 6.d-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE FIFTH TIME
May 1985

BELT

Program types RAIl

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

9.5
0

~10me
HHNHH

100.0

RAI2

100.0

Canale5

°~l

0 HUI
0000° 0000°°

.°~l 0'4

N

4.4
o.

at

100.0

Rete4

7.8
10.0

00
0
000000000

N

NI
Os

0

100.0

Italiai

6.0
24.3
0
0
O
41.7
9 0

0000°

19.0

0

100.0

Table 7.d-PERCENTAGES OF PROGRAM TYPES DURING THE SIXTH TIME

BELT

Program types

Films
Telefilms
News
Inform.
Sports
Cartoons
Variety
Children
Cultural
Serials
Educational
Adv.
Others

Total

May 1985
RAI1 RAI2
42.3 42.1

5.7 6.6
22.4 0
8.0 8.9
9.9 O
1.7 0
27.6 39.2

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

2.9 3.0

0 0

100.0 100.0

Canale5

40.9
7.4

u w
u a
o- c>o<3c>b<oc>o<3

b

100.0

Rete4

46.7
11.6

N
u
oooo;oooo

4.4
G

De
0)

100.0

Italiai

24.6
24.6

(A)
-1
0000°°0000

H
(A,

Os
‘0

100.0

65

To analyze more effectively the data of Tables 6 and 7
we will first consider the two public networks, and then the
three private networks. RAI 1 and RAI 2 appear to follow a
similar pattern. Both devote a large amount of time. in the
fifth time belt. to news. During the same time belt they
also have a similar increase for films. The most noticeable
difference is the steady presence of cultural programs for
RAI 1, while there are none in RAI 2. and the higher
percentage of sport programs for RAI 2. During the sixth
time belt both networks increased considerably the
percentage of films broadcast. In 1985 RAI 1 has also
devoted a significant amount of time to informative
programs. The two public networks do not show any other
significant trend. What should be pointed out is that their
programming. even during a limited period of the daily
schedule, remains fairly balanced. with a representation of
more than half of the thirteen program types.

The private networks. on the other hand. show a
different picture. We will first consider Canale 5 and
Italia 1. Since by December 1982 they are owned by the same
person. we would expect an eventual change in the
programming orientation to take place not before the
measurement of February 1984. The available data tend indeed
to show that, from February 1984. the programs of Canale 5
and Rete 4 are more diversified from each other. compared to
those of January 1983. In the two time belts the programs of

both networks are not any longer concentrated heavily in the

66

two categories of films and telefilms. as for January 1983.
In the fifth time belt Canale 5 relies heavily on variety
shows. while Italia 1 broadcasts a considerable amount of
cartoons. program type not usually shown on the other
networks. In the sixth time belt the programs of these two
networks are marked by a similar presence of variety shows,
and by an interchangeable presence of films and telefilms.
Meaning that when one of the two networks have a higher
percentage of films. the other will have a higher percentage
of telefilms. and vice versa.

.The programming of Rete 4 needs to be considered
separately. Rete 4 was operated independently until Summer
1984. when it was acquired by Berlusconi. Probably this has
been too recent of a development to have a profound effect
on Rete 4. which programming appears to be quite static.
During the fifth time belt Rete 4 relies mainly on variety
shows. and for the sixth time belt its programming includes
mainly films. telefilms and variety shows again.

At this point it is quite evident that so far the
private networks, either owned independently or jointly, are
not offering a large variety of program types to the
audience. Even when. as in the case of Canale 5 and
Italia 1. they diversify their programs, this
diversification is limited to a few popular entertainment
program types. So that when one network will show a film.
the other will show a variety program or a telefilm. and

this appears to be all the diversity that the viewer can

67

experience across these private networks. This may suggest
that. to guarantee a real diversified programming schedule.
the choice of the system. public or private. is more

important than the choice of the structure, monopoly or

competition.

68

ENDNOTES

1. RAIa is not included because is partially regional
oriented and because its relevance is definetely lower than
that of the other national networks.

2. To be remembered that by the Summer of 1984
Berlusconi owns the three private networks. For more
references see chapter 2 of this study.

3. B. M. Owen, Television Economics. p.89.
'4. Ibid.

5. A simulation methodology, as defined by Owen
(Television Economics. p.50), is one "that stipulates a
variety of alternative assumptions and uses a consistent set
of rules to generate outcomes under each of the
assumptions".

6. There are not even precise data on the exact number
of stations broadcasting in the early years. and all of the
private stations do not have any national newsreel. because
they are explicitly prohibited by the current legislation.

7. A way to measure internal diversification could be
through content analysis of the programs. and a political-
economical study on the patterns of ownership and control of
each station.

8. J. R. Dominick and M. C. Pearce, "Trends in Network
Prime-Time Programming". Journal pf Communication. 26:1.

9. B. R. Litman. "The Television Networks. Competition
and Program Diversity". Journal pg Communication. 23:4.

10. J. Wakshlag and W. J. Adams, "Variation in Program
Variety on Prime Time Television". ICA paper.

11. Litman divides external shocks into two types:
endogenous' shocks. that are those coming from within the
system (i.e. a shift in the ratings balance of the
networks). and exogenous shocks. which are caused by factors
outside the system (i.e. new technologies. or new
regulations).

69

12. RAI has divided the broadcasting day into seven
time belts. _We will be concerned with the fifth. from 7.45
p.m. to 8.45 p.m.. and the sixth. from 8.45 p.m. to 10.00
p.m., which is the prime-time on Italian television.

13. Ibid

14. The categories developed in this study and all
the data used for the measurements have been derived by data
from Qpcpmentazione g Studi RAI, with the exception of the
last four horizontal and vertical measurements. whose data
have been taken by Sorrisi p Canzoni gy. Febbraio 1984,
N.8. Maggio 1984, n.21. Febbraio 1985, N.7. Maggio 1985
N.20.

15. F. L. Cavazza. "From Party Occupation to Party
Partition". in Smith, Television and Political Life.

16. Here the shift of political control in RAI networks
can be compared to a change of ownership. since the result
in both case is similar: the programming strategies are
decided separately.

17. From the end of 1979 a third public network, RAI3,
begun its operations. mainly at a regional level.

18. Data on RAI for the years 1980, 1981. and 1982.
have been calculated for the whole year; all the other data
have been calculated for sample weeks representative of the
year.

19. The actual prime time in the Italian television is
the one included in the sixth time belt, from 8.45 p.m. to
10.00 p.m., but, because this is a very limited period,
prime time here will be considered to be from 7.45 p.m. to
10.00 p.m..

20. The measurements for January 1983 are based on
data. already coded. from Documentazione g Studi RAI. The
data for the other measurements are taken from Sorrisi p
Canzoni pg. these are primary data. As a result there may be
some minor discrepancies in the coding of the data from the
two sources. Also to be noted that our primary sources do
not report the amount of time devoted to commercials.
Therefore the level of advertisment has been assumed to
remain the same as that of January 1983.

21. Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

In presenting data on the level of diversity in Italy
we intended to make the reader aware of the results caused
by the unique Italian broadcasting system. where the heavily
regulated public television coexists with the totally
unregulated private television. Some of the main factors
that have led to the present situation have been discussed
in the previous chapters. Here we will analyze the effects
of this mixed system on what is available to the viewer. Did
the appearance of private stations bring a higher level of
diversity and satisfaction to the viewer? And what was the
response of RAI to the threat of private television?

From the data presented we can state that. before
the appearance of private broadcasting. the programming of
RAI 1 and RAI 2 was already fairly diversified. During the
years 1962-1975, Table 1 and Table 2 indicate that each of
the two public channels had a significant representation of
productions for most of the thirteen program types. By
comparing the vertical diversity level of the two channels.
the complementary role of one in relation to the other is
quite evident. RAI 1 had twice as much news than RAI 2. The

latter devoted a significant percentage of time to films.

70

71

while the former paid little attention to them. This
complementary role was true for other program types. as
serials. variety. sports. children and educational programs.
After the appearance of private television, during the years
1976-1982. both RAI networks show a certain tendency to
broadcast a higher percentage of entertainment programs.
such as films and telefilms. and to reduce the percentage of
more "serious" programs. such as classical music and
educational programs.

An analysis of the data in Table 3 indicates clearly
the lower diversity level of private stations. as a whole.
compared with RAI networks. The Herfindahl index of private
stations, during the years 1980-1983 (Table 3). ..was
consistently more than double of that of public television.
Data from the other measurements (Tables 4. 5. 6. and 7).
show this difference between the programming of private and
public television. These last tables are especially related
to our main research question: is a single ownership of a
number of networks more likely to result in higher
diversification of programs compared to separately owned
networks?

Let us consider this question first for public
television and then for the private one. The fact that. for
a long period of time. RAI was the only broadcasting source
in Italy may have resulted in a severe impediment in the
level of television diversity. If Owen theory was to be

applied for RAI monopoly we would expect public networks to

72

broadcast a concentration of programs without much regard
for diversity.1 This however did not happen, most probably
because of the public nature of the service. that is to
provide a balanced programming taking into consideration the
needs of the audience. as well as the wants. Despite various
drawbacks mentioned in the previous chapters. RAI
programming appears to be fairly balanced and to take into
considerations the needs of the public at large. The high
percentage of news, educational. cultural and informative
programs indicate that RAI took seriously its role of an
"essential public service". Actually. it may have taken it
even too seriously. not devoting enough time to lighter
entertainment programs. This led to an increasing frustation
from part of the audience, who saluted with great enthusiasm

l

the appearance of mass entertainment programs on private
television.2

RAI 1 and RAI 2 appear to have changed their
programming policies after 1975. By considering the
Herfindahl index of Tables 1 and 2 we can see that each of
the two channels has an increasingly diversified schedule.
This however does not necessarily mean that the audience has
more program diversification. Actually the opposite could be
true. In 1975 the Reform Law practically assigned the
control of RAI 1 to the Christian Democratic Party, and the
control of RAI 2 to the Socialist Party.3 As a consequence.

the programming of the two television channels may be

assumed to be decided independently from each other. Their

73

programming. may even be decided on competitive basis. as
Curti and Connell suggest.4 By comparing the percentages of
each program type on RAI 1 and RAI 2, rather than just
considering the Herfindahl index. it can be noticed that,
after 1975. the amount of time devoted to the same category
tends to be similar in both networks. Previously a program
type with a high percentage in one of the two channels
usually had a lower percentage in the other channel. This
suggests that the viewer had a selection of different
program types between the two networks. Now. despite the
increase in vertical diversity, the two public networks are
likely to provide less horizontal diversity than in the
past. The latter is the kind of diversity that affects the
viewer the most. If the two networks are vertically
diversified, but they broadcast the same programs during the
same time periods the viewer does not have a more
diversified horizontal choice. but a duplication of the same
program type.

The implications of the above discussion support our
hypothesis. Under a single source of control RAI networks
appear to have balanced and complementary programming.
Then the control of the two networks was split. At this
point their programming was still balanced. but competition
between the two networks have transformed what was a
complementary programming into a duplicative one, as Tables
1 and 2 suggest.

Differently from RAI, private stations are

74

characterized by a relatively high Herfindahl index.
indicating that their programming was concentrated in a few
categories. Table 3 shows the vertical level of program
diversity for public and private television. each taken as
a whole. for the years 1980—1983. Table 4 considers the
same issue. but for each of the two public channels and for
each. of the three most important private networks. These
data. taken in January 1983. show that Rete 4 and Italia 1
have an higher Herfindahl index, similar to that of private
televisions taken as a group in Table 3. Canale 5 instead
has a lower Herfindhal index. which is in between those of
RAI and the other private networks. Up to this point private
networks had been owned separately. and the result of their
competing with each other was a highly concentrated
programming. characterized by films. telefilms. and
cartoons. that with advertisements amounted to 80 percent
of the total programs.

The next measurements consider the vertical and
horizontal level of diversity during the fifth and the sixth
time belt. as divided by RAI. Since most of the audience
watch television during those time periods, the level of
program diversity should provide accurate indications on the
programming strategy of each network. Table 5 indicates that
private networks have by far less program diversity than
RAI. It should be noted that Italia 1, after being
acquired by Berlusconi, enjoyed a greater program

diversity at the vertical level. that resulted also in more

75

differentiation between its programs and those of Canale 5.
In January 1983. one month after Berlusconi became its
owner. Italia 1 had a very concentrated programming. 96
percent of which was composed by films telefilms and
advertisments for each of the two time belts. A year later.
February 1984. during the fifth time belt Italia 1 devoted a
considerable amount of time to cartoons, and also introduced
some variety and informative programs. Films and telefilms
now constitute only 23 percent of the total time. In
February 1984, during the sixth time belt, the dependency of
Italia 1 on films and telefilms is still large. 56 percent.
but variety shows had a high percentage too, 29 percent. The
same programming strategy is consistently found in the other
measurements. The programs of Canale 5 and Italia 1 appear
to experience a noticeable decrease in duplication during
each of the two time belt. Rete 4 on the other hand does not
show any sensible difference after being acquired by
Berlusconi. Probably because it is still too early to
experience any major effect of this transaction on Rete 4
programming.5 In a recent interview Berlusconi himself
explained how he intended to differentiate the programming
of his networks: "Canale 5 - all encompassing, TV for
everyone, more or less on the same wavelenght as RAI; Italia
1 - popular and young audience oriented; Rete 4 - the
television of 6your heart. we are thinking of a heavily

female target."

All the data presented, even without giving conclusive

76

evidence. tend to support our hypothesis. When RAI
programming was decided by a single source. their two
channels had not only a balanced and vertically diversified
schedule, but also a complementary programming. So the
viewer could watch different program types within each
channel, as well as between the two channels. When. after
the Reform Law. the control of each channel of RAI was
divided among parties. the level of diversity within each
network remained high. but their programming, that used to
be on a complementary basis now seems to operate on
competitive basis. leading to program duplication.7

Private networks suggest a similar pattern. While owned
separately their programming was very concentrated 'and
highly duplicative, in respect to one another. Once
Berlusconi acquired a second network the duplication of
programs between Canale 5 and Italia 1 has decreased. Rete 4
is expected to follow soon. However, even if the two
systems. public and private, tend to follow the same
pattern. namely more diversity under a single source of
control, there is still a basic difference between them. The
programs of RAI. even when in competition with each other.
are still characterized by a higher vertical level of
diversity. That is. RAI networks devote a significant
percentage of time to many program types. On the contrary,
private station tend to concentrate their programming into
few popular types. Even when Italia 1 is shown to

differentiate its programs from Canale 5. this

77

differentiation is limited to a few program categories.
namely films, telefilms. and variety shows, with the only
variable of cartoons for Italia 1.

Having discussed how the available data support
the main hypothesis. we should consider our subordinate
research questions. The first was to see if public networks
have a more vertically diversified programming schedule than
the private ones. This question has been already answered in
the previous discussion. ,where we indicated how the public
programming is more balanced and diversified than that of
private televisions. The second subordinate research
question was to examine if private television brought a
significant increase in the program types available to the
viewer. This aspect will be discussed in more general terms,
since complete data for most of the private stations are not
available.

As already mentioned. before the appearance of the
private stations. RAI television programs were accused of
being too serious and not paying sufficient attention to
popular entertainment. After a few years from their
appearance, private stations can be definitely said to
provide more mass entertainment programs. such as films.
telefilms, serials and variety shows. This caused an
increase of these programs also in the public networks.
Therefore, it could be said that private television caused
an increase of certain types of programs. This is true only

for what we called mass entertainment programs, meanwhile

78

educational, informational and cultural programs do not have
a significant presence in the private networks. Competition
between public and private television could result in a
decrease of such programs also in RAI 1 and RAI 2. as it has
already been partially happening.

If ..the competition between public and private
television caused RAI to increase.the percentage of its
entertainment-oriented programs,8 it can be assumed that, in
a similar way. competition could decrease the percentage of
less popular program types. In this way the apparent bigger
choice by the viewer can actually result in a more
restricted choice of program types. That is. the viewer may
be able to choose among thirty channels broadcasting thirty
different films or telefilms, but the viewer may not be
equally free to choose among different program types, such
as, for example, documentaries.

From the data presented we can infer that there is
consistent evidence for the following considerations:

1) our hypothesis, that a single source of a number of
networks will provide a higher external diversification.
tend to be confirmed for both public and private television.
This appears to be especially true for horizontal diversity.
2) RAI programming is more diversified than that of private
stations, offering a more balanced schedule to the viewer,
especially at the vertical level. Hence, RAI programs can be
assumed to satisfy more segments of the audience. even if

not necessarily the larger part of it.

79

3) In general. private networks tend to broadcast less
vertical diversified programs than RAI. Their programming
strategy relies heavily on a few entertainment program types
with a mass appeal (i.e. films, telefilms, variety shows).

Since the conclusions of our research tend to
demonstrate that more private stations do not necessarily
mean more diversity. we shall briefly discuss how some
aspects of the new proposed law on broadcasting can affect
diversification of programs. The new law. which is expected
to be examined soon by the Italian Parliament, recognizes
private stations and divides broadcasting into three
categories: national public service; private local
broadcasting: and national private broadcasting. The
frequency allocation plan included in this law states that
there are three basic objectives to be considered: 1)
nationwide coverage of public networks must be ensured; 2)
proper definitions of broadcasting areas for local stations
should be implemented. so that a plurality of stations would
be economically allowed to broadcast. avoiding the
possibility of an oligopolistic situation; 3) national
frequencies for private networks should be assigned taking
into consideration point 1 and 2. and avoiding the
possibility of a national oligopolistic situation.9

By dividing broadcasting into three areas. the proposed
law may just appear to allow a "de facto" situation.
legalizing the existing system. On the other hand. it

appears also to recognize that television output can be

8O

shaped by the ultimate functions of a broadcasting system.
In this context, public broadcasting is expected to have
different objectives than private broacasting. which in its
turn is differentiated in local and national. The
differences in the aims of each system are likely to result
in different programming strategies, since every system has
different functions and targets.

The proposed law also specifies in detail regulations
on the economical. political.10 and technical control of
each of three broadcasting systems. However, the crucial
point of this law is the recognition of broadcasting as
divided into three systems. These three complementary
systems could provide an exhaustive programming schedule to
.the viewer, if they will operate as they have been designed
to by the new law. National private television can provide
the mass entertainment programs. which are highly demanded
by a considerable part of the audience. Local private
television can serve the wants and the needs of the local
community, often ignored by the other two systems. Finally.
public television can. and must. operate on different basis.
maintaining its traditionally diversified programming. which
includes types of programs that would be very unlikely to
appear in a commercial system. If these premises will be
kept, the Italian mixed system could become a new
broadcasting model. However. economical and political
considerations could very easily change the outcome of the

proposed law. So far we can only say that this law appears

81

to be highly encouraging in term of program diversity
available to the viewer.

In this study. we have not just discussed the
importance of program diversity and analyzed its level in
the Italian television. We have also pointed out possible
drawbacks and limitations of our work. so that future
studies on this subject may bring more evidence on this
issue. Our findings, if taken into consideration by policy
makers. should not be considered in absolute terms, but they
should be understood within the limitations deriving from
the limited focus of the project. the scarcity of available
data and from the recentness of the appearance of private

television.

82

ENDNOTES

1. B. M. Owen. Television Economics.

2. F. L. Cavazza, "From Party Occupation to Party
Partition". in A. Smith. Television and Political Life.
3. Ibid.

4. L. Curti and I. Connell, "Switching On in Britain
and Italy", Anglistica. XXVI, 3/1983. p.54.

5. Berlusconi acquired Rete4 in September 1984.

6. Berlusconi. as quoted by S. Dembner. "Focus on
Italy". TV World, p.36.

7. W. Veltroni, as quoted on L'Espresso. September 9.
1984 p.11.

8. L. Curti and I. Connell. "Switching On in Britain
and Italy."

9. Buongiorno-TV. "Tutta la Legge che Cambia la Storia
d'Italia della Televisions," Gennaio/Febbraio 1985.

10. It should be noted that the new law proposes the
institution of a separate Commission for the control and
regulation of private broadcasting.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, T.W. and Horkheimer. M. (1972). Dialectic pg
Enlightment. New York: Herder and Herder.

Backe. J. D. "Size and Competition: the Danger of Negative
Thinking". Journal pg Communication. Spring 1978. Vol.
28:2.

Bartolomei, A. and Bernabei P. (1983). L; Emittenza Private
ip Italia dal 1956 pg Oggi. Torino: ERI.

Benjamin. W. (1966). L; Opera 9; Arte nell' Epoca della sua
Riproducibilita' Tecnica. Torino: Einaudi.

Bocchini. E. (1983). RAI. Napoli: Liguori Editore.

Bogi, G. "Towards a freer market place in Italy: public
interest forces government's hand", Variety. October
19. 1984.

Bower, R. T. (1973). Television and the Public. U.S.A.:
Holt. Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

Bruzzone. M. (1984), Piccolo Grande Schermo. Bari: Edizioni
Dedalo.

Cantor, M. G. (1980). Prime-Time Television. London: Sage
Publications.

Cater. D. and Adler. R. (1975). Television pg 3 Social
Force. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Cavazza, F. L. (1979). "From Party Occupation to Party
Partition", in A. Smith. Television and Political
Life. New York: St. Martin Press.

Coppa. F. J. ed. (1979), Screen and Society. Chicago:
Nelson-Hall Inc.

Credazzi, G. "Piu' Spazio ma piu' Controlli ai Network e
alle TV Locali". Corriere della Sera. 28 Gennaio 1985.

83

84

Curti L. and Connell I. "Switching on in Britain and in

Italy. Some issues in Popular Television." Estratto da
Anglistica. XXVI. 3/1983. Istituto Universitario di
Napoli.

\ Dell'Acqua, C. e Arena. G. "Problemi Giuridici Connessi al
Decentramento Territoriale e Funzionale della RAI."
Informazione Radio 1!. Rai. 1978-2/3/4.

Dembner. 8. "Focus on Italy", 1y World. October 1984.

De Sola Pool, I. (1973). Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and
Cable Technology. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dominick. J. R. and Pearce. M. 0. "Trends in Network Prime-
Time Programming. 1953-1974," Journal pg Communication.
Winter 1976, Vol. 26:1.

Dominick. J.R. (1983). Dynamics pf Mass Communication.
U.S.A.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Gerbner, G. ed. (1977), Mass Media Policies 1p Changing
Cultures. NewYork: John Wiley and Sons.

Gerbner, G.. Gross. L.. Morgan. M. and Signorielli. N.
"Charting the Mainstream: Television's Contributions to
Political Orientations". Journal 93 Communication.
Spring 1982. Vol.32:2.

Glasser. L. G. "Competition and Diversity Among Radio
Formats: Legal and Structural Issues". Journal pf
Broadcasting. Spring 1984. Vol. 28:2.

Head, S. W. (1985). World Broadcasting Systems. Belmont. CA:
Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Hirsch. P. M.. Miller. P. and Kline, F.G. (1978), Strategies
for Mass Communication Research. Beverly Hills: Sage
Pub.

Humi.J. "Possible merger of big commercial Italian TV
broadcasters spells even more trouble for RAI".
Television[ Radio Age International. February 1984.

Humi. J. "After Long Fight Private TV in Italy to Gain Legal

Status". Televisioanadio Age International. March
1985.
Jacklin. P. "Representative Diversity". Journal pf

Communication. Spring 1978, Vol. 28:2.

Krasnow. E. G.. Longley, L. D. and Terry, H. A. (1982). The
Politics pg Broadcast Regplation. New York: St. Martin
Press.

85

Le Duc. R. L. "Deregulation and the Dream of Diversity",
Journal of Communication. Autumn 1982. Vol 32: 4.

Levin. H. J. (1980). Fact and Fancy 19 Television
Regplation. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Litman. B. R. "Is Network Ownership in the Public
Interest?". Journal pf Communication. Spring 1978. Vol.
28:2.

Litman. B. R. "The Television Networks. Competition and
Program Diversity". Journal 9; Broadcasting. Fall 1979.
Vol. 23:4.

Litman, B. R. (1979). The Vertical Structure pg the
Television Broadcast Industry. East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University.

Livolsi. M. ed. (1981). Lg Communicazioni g; Massa. Milano:
Franco Angeli Editore.

Mc Cavitt, W. E. (1981), Broadcasting Around the World. Blue
Ridge Summit. PA. Tab Books.

Medi. M. G. "I Network in Italia". Informazione Radio gy.
RAI. 1981-1/6.

Mendelsohn. H. "Social Need or Sacred Cow? -A Sociological
Perspective" Journal 9; Communication. Spring 1978.
Vol. 28:2.

Nakanishi. N. A report on the "How Do People Spend Their
Time Survey" in 1980. Studies 9; Broadcasting. NHK, No.
18. 1982.

Noriega, L. A. and F. Leach, (1979). Broadcasting 1p Mexico.
London: International Institute of Communication.

Owen. B. M. (1974). Television Economics. Lexington:
Lexington Books.

Owen. B. M. "The Economic View of Programming," Journal pf
Communication. Spring 1978. Vol. 28:2.

RAI-Radio Televisione Italiana. "30 Anni di Televisione e
Radio. Ore di trasmissions RAI 1953-1982.".
Documentazione p Studi. AZP. Dicembre 1983.

RAI-Radio Televisione Italiana. "Programmazione Televisiva e
Radiofonica. Ore di trasmissions 1983.". Documentazione
p Studi. AZP, Giugno 1984.

86

Richeri. G. "Italy: Public Service and Private Interests".
Variety. April 19, 1978.

Seiden. M. N. (1974). Who Controls the Mass Media? Popular

_m—_

Myths and Economic Realities. New York: Basic Books.

Seldes, G. (1968). The New Mass Media Washington,D.C.:
Public Affair Press. _.

$113, A. "Italy's First Few Years of Private Television
Broadcasting". Intermedia. September 1981. Vol. 9:5.

Smith, A. (1973), The Shadow $3 the Cave: the Broadcaster,

His Audience and the State. Chicago: University of
Illinois Press.

Sorrisi g Canzoni 2y. Programmi Televisivi. N.8 - Febbraio
1984. N.2i - Maggio 1984, N.7 - Febbraio 1985, N.2O -
Maggio 1985.

"Tutta La Legge Che Cambia La Storia D'Italia Della
Televisione". Buongiorno-TV. Gennaio/Febbraio 1985.

Vallini, B. a cura di, "Analisi e Contronto di Palinsesti
RAI e di Alcune Emittenti Private." Documentazione g
Studi RAI. Gennaio 1983.

Venturini, R. "TV: Verso un Sistema Misto". Studi Sociali.
No.1-2. 1983. '

Wakshlag, J. and Adams, W. J. "Variation in Program Variety
on Prime Time Network Television", ICA paper, 1983.

Wright. C. R. (1976). fig Comunicazione g; Massa. "Ritorme
Italiane." Introduzione e Appendice di G. Gamaleri.
Roma: Bditore Armando.