

SUBJECT TO THE NATION: OFFICIAL NATIONALISM, THE MYTH OF THE ISLAND  
NATION AND THE LITERATURE OF EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

English

2012

## ABSTRACT

### SUBJECT TO THE NATION: OFFICIAL NATIONALISM, THE MYTH OF THE ISLAND NATION AND THE LITERATURE OF EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

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This dissertation argues that the early modern English crown and state deployed an official nationalist program during the reigns of Elizabeth I and James I. The purpose of this ideological campaign was to mask the governmental weaknesses plaguing the Elizabethan and Jacobean monarchies. Suffering under the weight of a failing imperial project to bring the archipelago together under the English crown, a fledgling state infrastructure and a rhetoric of absolutism that was losing its potency, the English government promoted a form of official nationalism that imagined a homogenous English populace unified by their allegiance to the monarch, whose imperial might was borne out by England's genealogical record.

The official ideology demanded by the above circumstances was composed, either implicitly or explicitly, by authors and cartographers working under the aegis of the crown. Historians like William Camden and mapmaker John Speed produced reconstructed histories and cartographic allegories that attempted to naturalize or lend credibility to England's fabricated genealogical right to the archipelago, in the process barbarizing the contemporary Scots, Welsh and Irish and their ancient forebearers. Work of official writers and mapmakers likewise attempted to resuscitate the mystical person of the sovereign, whose authority was absolute across all regions of her kingdom, including the colonies and borderlands.

The guiding trope of early modern official nationalism was the "myth of the island nation" that cast the English as a unified community bound together by a deep history of ancient descent, shared national identity, their obedience to the crown and its policies, and most



importantly, the island territory that naturally marked out their unique geography as a nation separate from the rest of the world. Troublesomely delineating the ancient Scots and Picts as invaders of the genealogically English Isle, the writers of the English nation carefully constructed a national and imperial narrative that repurposed and revised ancient and cartographic materials in support of state and crown initiatives. Recurrent in myriad texts of the period, the “myth of the English island nation” provided the ideological foundation for justifications of imperial domination of the archipelago and a “natural” national character generated and preserved in a geographically insular oceanic space.

Popular literature of the early modern period put great pressure upon this official nationalist story telling. The works included here, Thomas More’s *Utopia*, William Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline*, John Fletcher and Philip Massinger’s *Sea Voyage*, Edmund Spenser’s *Faerie Queene* and Christopher Marlowe’s *Jew of Malta*, undid the threads of this body of nationalist works, drawing uncomfortable attention to the flaws and aporias in this official discourse. Directly or indirectly, these literary texts punctured the official myth-making of the period and revealed the essentially manufactured nature of the island mythos and all that it sustained. The chapters of my dissertation are composed of two parts. The first analyzes the attempts of official authors to rhetorically construct the English nation and indicates the ideological and discursive ruptures in these problematic narratives. The second demonstrates how popular works dismantle the precepts of the crown’s official nationalist productions.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project would not have been possible without the guidance and support of my committee.

Thank you to Professors Jyotsna Singh, Stephen Deng, Scott Michaelson and Zarena Aslami. I

am especially grateful to my director Professor Sandra Logan whose inspiration was the

foundation of my overall work and who will continue to inspire me far into the future. I would

also like to thank my graduate student community with whom I shared the best and most difficult

of times. Finally, thank you to Michigan State University's Department of English for your

dedication to and support of the graduate students under your wing.

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## INTRODUCTION

### Subject to the Nation: Official Nationalism, the Myth of the Island Nation and the Literature of Early Modern England

My dissertation examines the early modern crown's representations of the English nation and the ways in which popular literature of the period put pressure upon the discourse of official or governmental nationhood. I argue that historians, chorographers and mapmakers linked to the crown constructed a nation that imagined the English as a homogenous people commanding the British archipelago, who were united by a deep genealogical history, uniform allegiance to the state and monarchy, and importantly, the nation's island geography. Official nationalist rhetoric was thus dependent upon three related threads, that of absolutism, England's imperial right to the lands of the archipelago, and claims to the nation's natural unity, which were based on the fabricated notion of "the English island". Popular literature of various genres and critical perspectives challenged these official constructions of the nation by reasserting the island's multinational character, by casting doubt upon England's dominance of the British Isles and by drawing attention to the gap between the official rhetoric of absolutism and the political realities of early modern England.

I argue in the following chapters that "the island nation" as a political abstract and ideological paradigm was deployed to mask the territorial disputes and crises of governmental authority that plagued the Elizabethan and Stuart regimes. The crown also employed nationalist discourse to rhetorically bind together a heterogeneous people supposedly united by England's island geography. The nation, as described by the crown's authors, was the means to graft upon the culturally distinct regions of the island the veneer of homogeneity and to envelop into a single political and social structure the several and sometimes competing sites of political authority: the crown, the state, and the many local governments that were often at odds with state

and crown initiatives. In this sense, the nation as a political construct was intended to textually repair the ideological aporias in English governance. Discursively collapsing absolutist rhetoric, narratives of state authority, and the various regional and national publics of the isle under the crown's supposed control, "the island nation" did the ideological work of projecting a unified body politic in submission to royal and state authority.

My dissertation examines the rhetorical formulations of the early modern nation, state, and monarchy. The nation, as defined in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> early modern discourse, is a territory shaped by political borders, occupied by a people who are bound geographically and governmentally through the person of the sovereign. The subjects of the nation share a common culture and often an ethnic genealogy that unites them as homogenous people occupying a sovereign state. The monarch who reigns over the national territory is the single, utmost figure of authority, considered God's representative on earth. Monarchical representation was central to the mystical status of the sovereign, which ideologically buttressed the monarch's claims to absolute authority. The primary strains of monarchical representation consisted of a rhetorical body of carefully composed narratives surrounding the person of the sovereign, which were intended to command the loyalty and allegiance of the nation's subjects. Monarchical representation formed the ideological basis of the hierarchical social order, descending from the crown to the lowliest subjects of the kingdom. Among the most foundational components of the rhetoric of absolutism were the notion of the monarch's divinity, the equation of the crown's physical body with the territorial body of the nation, and the assertion that the monarch was the central source and figure of all political authority. This ideological apparatus was produced and disseminated via several forms of media, including royal proclamations and propaganda, chronicle histories, pageants, masques, sermons, pamphlets, paintings, coins, and political tracts.



The state was the governmental infrastructure of the nation, composing and administering its laws, punishing its offenders, collecting taxes, mustering troops, and generally assuring social order across a nation's lands through the regulation of its subjects. In the early modern period, the state was closely tied to the crown, who granted political authority to its representatives. In this sense, the state as a regulatory body was itself, at least ostensibly, regulated by the sovereign to insure that state agents acted in accordance with its commands. The state was made up of several smaller governmental bodies, including the Parliament, Privy Council, the Courts, justices of the peace, itinerant judges and local governments who enforced the monarch's laws in the localities. Though the monarch and the state were two distinct entities, each with its own ideological rhetoric justifying its authority, the two political forces were designed to act in tandem to govern the realm's national and imperial territories.

Richard Helgerson's seminal work on English nationalism, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England*, opened up the field of early modern cultural studies to examinations of English nationalism and considered the role of authors in the production of popular national sentiment.<sup>1</sup> I expand upon the study of the early modern nation introduced by Helgerson to explore an area of early modern political and literary culture left largely unexamined in his study: official nationalism and its attempts to impose a state-sponsored and state-approved version of nationalism upon the English public. Helgerson's work examines a type of nationalist sentiment born of a shared desire of a body of Elizabethan authors to create "a Kingdom of their own language", to quote Edmund Spenser.<sup>2</sup> Helgerson maintains that popular nationalism in early modern England was divorced from the crown, springing from a sense of

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<sup>1</sup> Helgerson maintains that, though "the monarch was unquestionably the single most powerful unifying force in the English state", authors like Harrison, Shakespeare and Spenser explored

<sup>2</sup> Quoted from Helgerson, 1.

national belonging attributable to factors like the land, the law, language and aristocratic community.

Though the popular nationalist sentiment that Helgerson traces in Spenser, Shakespeare, John Speed and others undoubtedly existed in the minds of certain members of the Elizabethan body politic, it is essential that we recognize the other, contrary forms of nationalism that were also circulating in the English imaginary. Official nationalism differs in intention and production from the kinds of nationalist ideals described by Helgerson; whereas popular nationalism has its roots in the people—a kind of shared national pride or patriotism that informs a people’s sense of communal identity—official nationalism as manufactured by those cultural producers aligned with the state is a top-down vision necessary to the crown’s project of state, nation and empire building. The expansive reach of official nationalism through juridical systems, royal propaganda, national histories, cartography and other media meant that official nationalist texts were a means of governmental centralization that could be felt not just in the proliferating official rhetoric of the period but also in the social lives of England’s subjects as the state entered the homes of the populace.

It is essential when examining the early modern nation to differentiate it from modern conceptions of nationhood. Traditional theories of the nation emphasize popular self-determination as the foundation of nationalism. For instance, Ernest Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism* contends that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent”, meaning that the needs, desires and values of a people should be represented and protected by that people’s political system. In this sense, nationalism for Gellner is a matter of “political legitimacy” that provides the people of a nation

with the ideological grounds for creating an independent state.<sup>3</sup> Likewise, Eric Hobsbawm maintains that, after the French Revolution (the starting point for several studies of nationalism), the nation “was the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them a state which was their political expression”.<sup>4</sup> Again, in Hobsbawm’s estimation, the nation is born of the collective will of the people desiring a sovereign state in which their values and needs are safeguarded by a representative government. Lastly, Benedict Anderson posits in *Imagined Communities* that the creation of a shared national identity or national consciousness was, in part, a popular phenomenon developed through the circulation of printed works and the engendering of reading publics.<sup>5</sup>

As the title of my dissertation indicates, I contend that “the English nation” as imagined by the crown was imposed upon the majority of its subjects. Allegiance to this nation—a nation that was inextricably tied to the state and crown—was not necessarily a matter of communal feeling or patriotic pride, but was instead a state project requiring authors of the “official nation” to produce this political mirage. In other words, this concept of the nation was much more reliant upon governmentality than ‘natio’, the people whose national identification was based upon their shared culture and commitment to their native land. The land, ideologically disconnected from the people who occupied it, was itself made a tool of state-sponsored nationalist ideology. As my dissertation explains, the myth of the island nation was central to this fabricated official vision; for this reason, England is unlike the nations of the European early modern continent, for it drew

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<sup>3</sup> Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1983) 1. Print.

<sup>4</sup> Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) 19. Print.

<sup>5</sup> Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* Rev. ed (London: Verso, 2006) 44. Print.

upon its territorial uniqueness as among the most essential characteristics binding the English into a singular body politic. Because official nationalism is a body of historical, cartographic, and literary works functioning on the level of rhetoric, rather than the lived experience of the populace, this project focuses on the materials of this official discourse: most prominently, the use of the island territory as a means of constructed national identity.

However, it would be a mistake to let the official representation speak for the early modern nation as a historical reality. Several “forms of nationalism” coexisted during the reigns of Elizabeth and James. Official nationalism is a political production acting at different levels of government and for different purposes, and though we cannot know the material effects of this ideology, the large body of official texts created during this period attests to its importance to the crown and state. It is possible that official nationalist constructions were intended to combat the kind of aristocratic nationalism identified by Helgerson. One might also conjecture that official nationalism was deployed to ideologically combat internal English rebellions and the violence in Scotland and Ireland that evidenced England’s imperial weakness, as I explore throughout. Though we cannot know with certainty the effect of these manufactured ideologies on the people of early modern England, it is nonetheless important that we examine this body of texts to consider these strains of official nationalism as part of the complex historical narrative of the nation, a trajectory that reaches into the present. As I will argue in the coda to this dissertation, the reverberations of early modern official nationalism can be felt even today in monarchical societies.

As Helgerson rightly asserts, one cannot conceive of the early modern nation without placing the monarch at the center of its definition. As explained above, monarchical rhetoric held that the body of the monarch was the body of the nation; in this respect, the sovereign was

“political expression” embodied. Any form of “political legitimacy” emanated from this divine personage; therefore, the state, which derived its authority from the crown, could not be ideologically disconnected from the throne. As my dissertation will demonstrate, these official notions of monarchical nationhood were constructed of faulty and insubstantial materials. However, to fully understand the formation of national bodies, we must consider the contentious political arena in which monarchical ideology and the potential for national self-identification collided.

Official nationalism was integral to monarchical representation, state authority, imperial narratives and the concept of the nation as a geographically and politically defined territory. A set of ideological precepts deeply embedded in the fabric of the early modern the body politic, official nationalism was designed to support and maintain state and monarchical authority, and more generally, to buttress state interests. Domestically, official nationalism posits a body politic of homogenous subjects loyal to the sovereign and the representations of the monarch that bestowed divine status upon the king or queen. The subjects of the official nation are a harmonious people bound not only by a politically demarcated territory but also to the monarch’s will and the idea of shared nationhood. Official nationalist sentiment was produced and promulgated by historians, mapmakers and authors of literary texts either implicitly or explicitly working under the aegis of the crown. In some instances, these cultural producers were agents of the crown, such as the case of William Camden, the crown’s Clarenceux King of Arms or John Speed, who displayed his maps to the queen and whose religious tracts were appended to King James Bible. In other cases, the creators of the official nation were vying for crown patronage and therefore constructed texts that strongly adhered to crown ideology. These official texts were central to early modern nation-building, for they provided the textual infrastructure of the

sovereign's largely manufactured body politic; deploying cartography, historiography and celebratory poetics, these official authors created the crown's nation, one that greatly jarred with political reality during the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods. The myth of the English island was at the heart of this imagined nation.

Hugh Seton-Watson was among the first political historians to define official nationalism in 1977. In his discussion of the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire, he considers the ideological conflict between dynastic devotion and a growing popular nationalist sentiment in Russia. To counter the dissolution of the empire and the disintegration of imperial loyalties that followed, the leaders of the most powerful nations considered it their task, and indeed their moral duty, to impose their nationality on all their subjects—of whatever religion, language or culture. As they saw it, by drawing these people upwards into their own superior culture, they were conferring benefits on them; while at the same time they were strengthening their state by creating within it a single homogenous nation.<sup>6</sup>

He also cites 19<sup>th</sup> century “Russification”, which was a “policy” underscored by “the claim that all subjects of the empire should consider themselves Russians, and should owe allegiance not only to the monarch but also to the Russian nation”. This governmental program demanded that “[the subjects] put Russia first, and [that] they preferred Russian culture to their own original culture”.<sup>7</sup>

Though the historical and political conditions of Seton-Watson's official nationalism differ from Elizabethan and Jacobean England, one can also detect significant similarities. The

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<sup>6</sup> Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder: Westview, 1977) 148. Print.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 85.

form of nationalist feeling in this definition is inextricably linked to the state and constructed to preserve state or monarchical power. National sentiment is not a naturally occurring feeling rising from the populous—it was intended, in fact, to combat popular nationalism—but rather a set of manufactured state ideals “impose[d]” upon the people. Individual linguistic, cultural and religious allegiances were secondary to nationalist identification, though nationalism was at times defined through these categories. Under the guise of conferring advantages upon their subjects, the ultimate goal of proponents of official nationalism was the homogenization of the people and their uncontested allegiance to the state.

England of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries was likewise struggling with a multinational and multicultural archipelagic territory rejecting a uniform national identity that was monarchical in character. Like the dissemination of authority that accompanied the break-up of the Hapsburg Empire, England was likewise suffering from the decentering of sovereign authority precipitated by the consolidation of the state, a development I address in chapter three. The crown’s nationalism attempted to envelope in a set of official precepts the myriad subjects whose identifications were dispersed across cultural, national and religious borders and regions. Cloaking official propaganda in the robes of patriotic duty, particularly in times of war or social dissent, the “English island nation” was deployed as a kind of patriotic feeling born of geographic, cultural and monarchical loyalty. This was particularly significant in the supposed imperial territories: by surrendering up their political autonomy, Wales, Scotland and Ireland would reap the benefits of subjugating themselves to the English crown.

Anderson takes up Seton-Watson’s definition of official nationalism in *Imagined Communities*. Of the “‘naturalizations’ of Europe’s dynasties” Anderson argues that “‘official nationalism’ can best be understood as a means for combining naturalization with retention of

dynastic power, in particular over the huge polyglot domains accumulated since the Middle Ages, or, to put it another way, for stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire”.<sup>8</sup> The “willed merger of nation and dynastic empire”, Anderson asserts, “developed *after*, and *in reaction to*, the popular movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s”.<sup>9</sup> However, like Seton-Watson’s analysis of official nationalism, Anderson’s definition can readily be cast back into early modern England. The project of official nationalism during the Elizabethan and Jacobean period was an investment in “stretching the short, tight, skin” of the English nation over the British archipelago, to make Britain speak as English politically, linguistically and culturally. In other words, English official nationalism sought to subdue Scotland, Wales and Ireland to the sovereign at Whitehall and transform these autonomous regions into English territories. Also, as I discuss below, early modern official nationalism was very much an attempt to quash popular nationalist identities that emerged in antagonism to crown control. The assertions of Anderson and others, like Hobsbawm, that establish nationalism as a phenomenon occurring only after the 18<sup>th</sup> century curtails a broader reading of nationalism’s emergence in early periods and thus limits our understanding of nationalism’s more expansive historical trajectory.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Anderson, 86.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Hobsbawm’s title *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* attests to his contention that nationalism “belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period” (9). Though he allows that “in the case of Tudor England” there may have existed “something close to modern patriotism”, his distinction between patriotism and official nationalism remains unclear, with the former often producing a national sentiment, and the later, which often had the same goal, comprising a fervent attachment to the nation and the state the government that upholds it. See Hobsbawm, 75.



Anthony D. Smith contests the notion that the nation emerged only after the French revolution. Rather than provide a specific date for the birth of the nation (and thus nullify any communities that came before), Smith provides the following, more inclusive, definition of the nation: “we may define the nation as a named and self-defined human community whose members cultivate common myths, memories and symbols, possess a distinctive public culture, occupy a historic homeland, and observe common laws and shared customs”. Though I contend that some elements of the early modern nation were “defined” by the crown, my dissertation will demonstrate that “common myths, memories and symbols” were collected and narrativized to illustrate the national story along official lines. Likewise, the notion of a “historical homeland” was of utmost importance to English nation and imperial discourse.<sup>11</sup> Claire McEachern also directly confronts prevailing notions of nationalism’s historical origins, maintaining that

English nationhood is a sixteenth-century phenomenon, and not, contrary to the claims of many political theorists and historians, a nineteenth-century one [ ... ] The Tudor-Stuart nation is not necessarily democratic in sentiment or political institution; nor is it produced by means of any practical homogeneity of social existence. It is a performative ideal of social unity founded in the ideological affiliation of crown, church and land, imagined not in opposition to state power, but rather as a projection of the state’s own ideality”.<sup>12</sup>

Refuting the notion that nationalism must spring from a democratic system and thus from the people, McEachern rightly identifies the elements of fantasy and artificiality that inform official nationalist discourses, the “projection” of a “performative ideal”. The performative aspect of

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<sup>11</sup> Smith, *The Antiquity of Nations* (Malden: Polity, 2004) 17. Print.

<sup>12</sup> McEachern, *The Poetics of English Nationhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 5-7. Print.

official nationalism lies in the utterances of oaths asserting one's devotion to the monarch and his or her nation. It can also apply to the utterances of historians that seek to rewrite English history, performing feats of rhetoric that misrepresent the archipelago to the advantage of the English. Likewise seeing in the conjoined forces of crown, state and official discourse an important brand of nationalism, McEachern argues that "to deny a Tudor-Stuart moment of the English nation is to obscure the very moment of its invention [ ... ] monarchy is a necessary condition of the nation bequeathed to later English state formations".<sup>13</sup>

E.D. Marcu also argues for early modern English nationalism, calling it "noisy, fanciful, and plainly fashionable".<sup>14</sup> She identifies that this sentiment jarred with the violent Anglo-Scottish relations that were plaguing the English government:

The second half-century, a time that was to become one of the country's great periods, naturally gave patriots enough material to demonstrate their worth [ ... ] Yet there was a foreign, hostile land, Scotland, with which England shared her own island, a playground for blunt and effective French intervention, a constant danger and a powerful occasion for xenophobia, if not direct and cold-blooded intervention.<sup>15</sup>

Marcu's observation about territorial and governmental Anglo-Scottish conflicts deeply informs my project, for it is the bi-nationality of the island and the possibility of foreign incursion that most necessitates official nationalist sentiment to patch over these governmental crises. John Breuilly takes issue with Marcu, claiming she "has achieved a great deal in the way of

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>14</sup> Marcu, *Sixteenth Century Nationalism* (New York: Abaris, 1976) 74. Print.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 74.

identifying and describing certain sorts of national consciousness in sixteenth-century Europe but this should not be confused with nationalism”.<sup>16</sup> However, Breuilly then goes on to describe what one might identify as early modern official nationalism:

in the political rhetoric of the period the idea of the nation, if it appeared at all, was subordinated to religious and monarchical principles. The English cause at the time of the Spanish Armada was symbolized by the person of Elizabeth I and the Protestant religion [ ... ] National historiography of the sort promoted by the Tudor, Valois and Bourbon dynasties, when it was not simply boosting the monarchy, extolled the nation in terms of its landscapes and resources rather than the character of its inhabitants.<sup>17</sup>

As my primary texts demonstrate, the language of nationhood was very much in circulation in Elizabeth’s England, and, as explained, it was closely tied to monarchical representation. To determine that the nation, nationalism and the monarchy cannot coexist is to eliminate from critical discussions of nationhood an entire body of work that might allow us to better understand modern nationalism’s beginnings, as well as its contemporary existence within modern monarchies. Breuilly is correct in asserting that early modern nationalist texts also took as their focus the land and the island’s resources; these were central tenets of English nationalist illustration. However, to say that “the character of the inhabitants” was absent from these national narratives is inaccurate. Breuilly is right in asserting that the contemporary people of the nation took a backseat to the nation as territory; however, early modern histories and descriptions were deeply invested in describing not only the nation’s ancient inhabitants but also the physical

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<sup>16</sup> Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1993). 4-5. Print.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 76.

bodies and characteristics of the nation's populace as a means of constructing an official genealogy supporting English right to and rule of the island.

My project takes as a starting point the above definitions of official and early modern nationalism and refines their focus to consider the combination of these ideological forces in the reigns of Elizabeth and James. I contend also that this official rhetoric served the dual purpose of buttressing national and imperial rhetoric, that they were conjoined projects requiring the support of a single ideological platform, among other strictly imperial discourses. The "English island nation" was the primary trope of this nationalist program, thus shifting the rhetorical emphasis to territorial definitions of the nation and largely erasing the people from the fundamental precepts of nationhood. This is particularly significant because the people were a disunited body in terms of class, religion and local custom and governance. The people, when they do appear, are ethnographic specimens included in official discourse to trace a genealogical line back to the English and thus establish their historical right to the island. Finally, as discussed above, I maintain that popular literature responded, either directly or indirectly, to the multimedia body of official texts and thus dismantled the infrastructure of crown and state rhetoric.

It is important to recognize that the "official island nation" was an ideological cloak in which the national, imperial and governmental failures of the state were masked under palimpsestic layerings of state-sanctioned discourse. England's supposed island-ness was the factor that produced its vulnerability; geographically isolated and cut off from the major trading routes of emergent global trade, England sat precariously "on the edge of the world".<sup>18</sup> England as a land disconnected and bordered by the sea invited foreign invasion. The expansive and

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<sup>18</sup> I borrow this term from the title of Kathy Lavezzo's *Angels on the Edge of the World: Geography, Literature, and English Community, 1000-1534* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006). Print.

largely unmanned coastlines of the island further contributed to England's insecurity. Lacking the money and men to adequately defend the archipelago against attack, England sat in the northern reaches of the ocean like an unprotected target. Amplifying this geographic and militaristic vulnerability was England's failed effort to force its imperial claims upon the other nations of the archipelago. Hemmed in on the northern and western regions by nations that refused to bend to imperial rule, England was engaged in continual warfare with the Scottish and Irish. The Scottish borderlands were sites of constant violence and repeated invasions on both sides of the volatile political boundary. Ireland presented a separate problem in which English control over the island to the west was even less tenable due, in part, to the oceanic waterway separating the two nations. The monetary and governmental output necessary for the construction and maintenance of the England's failing colonies in Ireland was a pronounced drain on crown resources and thus further opened up the possibility that England would be unable to defend its territories against foreign attack. Compounding this conjoined threat of internal and external incursion was the relationships of Ireland to Spain and Scotland to France. England's inability to control the archipelago attracted England's longtime enemies and sometimes allies to come to the aid of these autonomous nations for their own political gain.

Even Wales, the oft-idealized imperial success of the English government, was only partially and ineffectually subjugated by English rule. Though Wales was annexed to England in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Welsh people maintained and preserved their autonomous culture, and violent disputes with the English persevered, despite the ostensible union. The condition of Wales typified England's own internal heterogeneity, which was ethnic, cultural, legal and social in nature, and disproved official claims to English unity. Derived of various ancient cultures that colonized the British Isles over a long historical trajectory, "English" identity was difficult to

trace in a troubling genealogical narrative of foreign conquest and British subjugation to imperial rule. The ethnic melding of the ancient Britons, Picts, Scots, Romans, Danes, Saxons, Jutes and Normans could be traced in Britain's discombobulated cultural institutions in the early modern period, manifesting themselves in regionally specific systems of law, linguistic difference and architecture. Nascent state-formation only exacerbated these fissures in English culture.

As explained above, the monarchical person—the divinely ordained sovereign robed in the discourse of mysticism and otherworldliness—was the source and singular figure of authority. However, not only was the nation itself disparate and disunified in its subjects' sense of identity, the structures of the state that were associated with it similarly existed in multiplicity and disunity. Official nationalism in the form of absolutist monarchical representation came into rhetorical and pragmatic conflict with the distribution of monarchical power to agents of the state. The crown's attempts at centralization and the dispersal of sovereign authority into the localities and imperial territories brought out in boldface the multivalent political communities occupying the national space. Regional differences in matters of justice and law and the resistance to crown mandates in favor of local custom made plain the rejection of the monarchical project of governmental uniformity. Furthermore, early modern state-formation produced an ideological and governmental crisis for the English. The dispersal of power to the state necessarily contradicted the notion of the indivisibility of sovereign authority so central to absolutist ideology. The decentering of sovereign power mandatory to state building further destabilized the Elizabethan and Jacobean governments already weakened by unsuccessful imperial wars within the archipelago and governmental failures abroad.

The “myth of the island nation” constructed and obsessively reproduced by official authors textually glossed over England's enfeebled state and geographical vulnerability to

domestic and foreign attack. It was also a tool of genealogical restructuring, allowing historians to revise a damning past of imperial subjugation around the notion of “natural” geographic nationhood. The discourse of English “island-ness” recast geographic vulnerability as positive insularity, a kind of blessed geographical uniqueness created by God for his people. England’s “otherworldliness” was a marker of God’s divine favor; protected by the sea and adorned with Nature’s beauty and bounty, England’s isolation set it apart as a “another world” inhabited by a people united by God, nation and monarch.<sup>19</sup> The monarchical body was reflected in the Lord’s island creation, the island’s geographical body signaling the singular-ness and divine power of the English monarch. The singular nature of the island sovereign was also a mirror of singular and harmonious genealogically and geographically bound English body politic, whose shared national identity was born of their natural oceanic borders and their sequestration apart from the contaminating continent.

The myths of English island nation, like so much political propaganda, were undermined by the unrealities embedded within their narratives. First and foremost, England is not an island but one nation contained within a multinational isle. The supposed union of the crown effected

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<sup>19</sup> Knapp contends that the English “loved to highlight” their isolation, turning “its littleness, its circumscription by enemies, its female monarch” into a sign of the nation’s “abjuration of material or worldly means to power and its extraordinary reliance on God”. See Knapp, *An Empire Nowhere: England, America, and Literature from Utopia to The Tempest* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1992) 4. Print. Lavezzo also examines England’s claims to otherworldliness from the perspective of medieval geography and national identity. She maintains that “the English were not simply self-conscious of their marginality during the Middle Ages; English writers and cartographers actively participated in the construction of England as a global borderland.” Lavezzo explains that in the Medieval English imaginary, “not only geographic centers but also geographic margins had a certain social authority [ ... ] the power of medieval English marginality paradoxically resembles the might of modern English centrality”. See Lavezzo, 7. Print. Camden in his opening pages of the *Britannia* quotes Caesar as calling England “another world”. Camden, *Britannia* Ed. Robert Mayhew (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003) 1. Print.

by James's ascension to the English throne did not create a unified Britain; Scotland remained politically and culturally an autonomous nation, as evinced by the border wars that persisted after the propagandistic "union". Nor was Wales a willing participant in the rhetorical union of the isle under the English crown. Marcher disputes and the Welsh preservation of their culture denounced the supposed assimilation and incorporation of Wales into the English national body. England attempted to claim the entirety of the main island for the English crown using a pastiche of manipulated chronicles that were riddled with contradictions and xenophobic rhetoric intended to picture the Scottish as savages requiring the civilizing hand of their neighbors to the south.

The imperial aims of the English government as depicted in official narratives consistently drew attention to the slippage between "Britain" and "England", a persistent rhetorical hurdle for writers of the "English island nation". In their attempts to construct the notion of the island nation, English historians and map-makers were forced to contend with a history that was essentially British in nature; the genealogy of the archipelago and of England itself was multinational and multiethnic, making impossible the expulsion of Scotland, Wales and Ireland from what was intended as a singular national narrative. Problematically sidestepping this stubborn historiography of "British-ness", English authors sought not only to vilify their neighboring nations but to delegitimize them as peoples whose right to the archipelagic territory was undermined by their supposed status as alien occupants who had unjustifiably taken root in English territory. However, this attempt at casting the Scots, Welsh and Irish as archipelagic others drew uncomfortable attention to England's own populace, whose identity was built upon multiple imperial incursions. In other words, the people that eventually became the "English" were as foreign to the territory as their British brethren. Complicating this



already messy genealogical line were the ancient Britons, who were often categorized as a brutish tribe eventually civilized by the Romans. They too were pushed to the margins of English history to maintain a pure nation of innately superior people in contrast to the archipelagic communities surrounding the English nation.

Even claims to imperial superiority could not elide the ethnic differences that characterized a patchwork archipelago of autonomous political or cultural units. To flatten out these differences, official authors walked an impossible line between casting Scots, Irish and Welsh as, on the one hand, inextricably other and thusly subject to English rule, and on the other, as fundamentally English (with the exception of the Irish, whose geographic separation naturally excluded them from the island nation). As I explore in chapter one, English writers depicted the more civil Scottish Low-landers as derived from English stock, while characterizing the High-landers as savage foreigners whose extermination or expulsion would restore the island to its natural English-ness. Other nationalist discourses posited a narrative of evolution in which the inherent English character of the island would civilize the occupiers, who would happily be brought into the English family. As Krishan Kumar explains,

If a sense of Englishness was developing in England in the medieval and early modern period, it was not so much the result of internal developments in the direction of a common culture as of a common consciousness in relations to England's nearest neighbors [ ... ] It was not in the first instance a matter of popular feeling. Royal and dynastic ambitions led the way, as so often in the early development of national feeling in Europe. But by the sixteenth century England's intentions towards its neighbors stood starkly revealed. Their fate was to be part of Greater England. In recognition of this, English kings and their spokesmen

appropriated the ancient name of Britain: a cruel irony, given that the destiny of the original British was for them to be obliterated and absorbed by the English invaders of their land. England got its identity by asserting its primacy, first in Britain, later in the world.<sup>20</sup>

Kumar's assessment points to the conjoined yet often contradictory relationship in early modern England between nation and empire building. Though the "ancient name of Britain" was often invoked, it was also often replaced altogether with "England" as the myth of the island nation was recuperated and entered the nationalist discourse of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century.

The borders politically and culturally marking out England as a partially landlocked nation among nations and incapable of making good on its imperial claims were unalterable evidence of the untruths betraying England's official rhetoric. Likewise, the persistent anxiety regarding the national defense of the island belied the disingenuousness of claims to positive insularity; in truth England's "insularity" was a kind of dangerous isolation. The monarchical body was similarly divided due to in part to the splintered authority that attended state formation and also the failure to incorporate the surrounding national bodies into its terrain. Therefore, the dismembered sovereign body did truly reflect that of the island body: inharmoniously conjoined territorially, lacking a uniform governmental structure to bind the body politic, and without ethnic or cultural likeness across the English realm and archipelago, the isles were broken into autonomous limbs clumsily sutured by ideological discourse.

To demonstrate the significance of official nationalist discourse in early modern England and its reliance upon the myth of the island nation, my dissertation pulls back the layers of the

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<sup>20</sup> Kumar, *The Making of English National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003) 62-3. Print.

palimpsestic discourses of the nation composed to textually patch over England's weaknesses. The chronicle histories of authors like William Camden and John Speed compiled and formed layers of national narratives composed as early as the 6<sup>th</sup> centuries. Woven together with ideologically charged emendations, these historians reconstructed British history along nationalist lines, making Britain read as England. Similarly, John Speed in his role as mapmaker overlaid upon the cartographic works of Christopher Saxton his nationalist and imperial visual poetics to project the English as the imperial masters of the isle. In the words of Eric Hobsbawm, these official texts made

use of ancient materials to construct invented traditions [ ... ] A large store of such materials is accumulated in the past of any society, and an elaborate language of symbolic practice and communication is always available. Sometimes new traditions could be readily grafted on old ones, sometimes they could be devised by borrowing from the well-supplied warehouses of official ritual, symbolism and moral exhortation.<sup>21</sup>

As Sandra Logan explains, “‘topicality’ is not exclusively aimed at specific political policies or actions, but often involves the roles of interpretation, writing, reading, and reinterpretation”. The rewriting and “reinterpretation[s]” of national histories “can more subtly and insidiously shape the ideological and material conditions within such policy and action is formulated and implemented”.<sup>22</sup> Undoing these textual patchworks to unveil the nationalist “policies” undergirding their production, I analyze the linguistic and visual rhetorics to discover the actual

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<sup>21</sup> Hobsbawm, Eric. “Introduction: Inventing Traditions.” *The Invention of Tradition* Eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2008) 6. Print.

<sup>22</sup> Logan, *Text/Events in Early Modern England: Poetics of History* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 7 Print.

England beneath and to consider why these official nationalist narratives were so necessary to English nation, state and empire building.

Secondly, I consider popular texts of the period that seem to be responding implicitly or explicitly to the discourses that make up the foundation of this fabricated England. Because works like Camden's *Britannia* and Speed's conjoined *History of Great Britain* and cartographic *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* were in broad circulation, it is likely that popular authors like Thomas More, Edmund Spenser and William Shakespeare came into contact with these nationalist texts. Though it is impossible to know with certainty whether the popular texts analyzed in my dissertation were responding directly or indirectly to official works, it appears that these authors are taking up strands of these official rhetorics and holding them up to criticism. By taking aim at the nationalist fantasies of the crown, popular works expose the faultiness and intrinsic flimsiness of official discourse. In the chapter descriptions below, I elaborate on the individual threads of official nationalist discourse in the period and their relationship to popular literature.

My methodology in this project is to read chronicle histories, chorographies and cartographic works through the strategies of literary analysis. "Literature", as defined in this project, extends beyond conventional literary genres—poems, plays, prose narrative, novels, etc.—to include more strictly historical works, like chronicles, chorographies, official speeches, and royal correspondence. The above historical materials are often literary in nature, employing literary devices such as allegory, poetics, and mythological story-telling that often verges on epic. When placed side by side, "literary" and "historical" texts often merge into one another because of their shared poetic qualities. Consider for instance Camden's depiction of the sea in his *Britannia*:

*BRITAINE is incompassed round about with the vast and open maine Ocean, which ebbeth and floweth so violently with maine tides that [ ... ] Saint Basile hath tearmed it [ ... ] The great Sea and dreadfull to Sailers; yea and Saint Ambrose wrote thus of it: The great Sea not adventured on by sailers, nor attempted by mariners is that, which with a roaring and surging current environeth Britaine, and reacheth into farre remote parts and so hidden out of sight, as that the very fables have not yet come thither. Certes, this sea sometimes overfloweth the fields adjoining, otherwhiles again it retireth and leaveth all bare [ ... ] by reason of this open largenesse it feeleth more effectually the force and influence of the Moone, exercising her powre thereupon, without impeachment: And it floweth alwaies up within the land with such violence that it doth not onely drive backe the streames of rivers, but also either overtaketh and surpriseth beasts of the land, or else leaveth behind it those of the sea. For there have bin seene in every age, to the great astonishment of the beholders, so many and so huge Sea-monsters left on drie land upon our shore that Horace sang this note not without good cause:*

.....

*The Ocean, of Sea-monsters freight with store,*

*Upon the Britans farre remote doth rore.*

*And Juvenall in the like tune:*

.....

*As much as Whales full huge, that use to breede*

*In British Sea, the Dolphins doe exceede.*<sup>23</sup>

Focusing on Camden's particular language choices, tone and deployment of specific tropes reveals the essential literary-ness of his "historical" depiction of the sea. The island is "encompassed", rather than surrounded or encircled. His language of the sea's violence is affective, illustrating how the sea ravages the land and rivers with a kind of movement produced through language to mirror the sea's motion; the sea "ebbeth and floweth", it "overfloweth", it "drive backe the streames of rivers, but also either overtaketh and surpriseth beasts of the land". The sense of motion produced by these terms emphasizes the sea's threatening and violent movement. The female moon, which so often appears in early modern poetry, ruthlessly directs the ocean's destructive forces, heaving the beasts of the sea onto the shore. Here, Camden turns to the mythological, employing tales of mysterious sea creatures, akin to those found in classical works like *The Odyssey* and early modern cartography, which is itself a mythmaking venture, as I explain later. Finally, the historian relies upon ancient poets to lend credence to his dramatic illustration.

Consider now John Fletcher and Philip Massinger's opening lines to *The Sea Voyage*, delivered by the Master of the ship that carry Albert and Aminta to the unnamed deserted island.

Lay her aloof, the sea grows dangerous:  
How it spits against the clouds, how it capers,  
And how the fiery element frights it back!  
There be devils dancing in the air I think.

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<sup>23</sup> Camden, Vol 3, 57.

I saw a dolphin hang i' th' horns o' th' moon,

Shot from a wave. (I.i.1-6) <sup>24</sup>

Again, Fletcher and Massinger's affective language viscerally conveys the sea's violence: the water "spits" in the face of its passengers, flaunting its power over the vulnerable bodies afloat in the storm. The ocean "capers" under the "fiery element", creating a hellish oceanic landscape that terrifies the ship's crew, and perhaps the audience to the play. Mythical devils of the epic conduct the violent surges and animals are "shot" to the skies in this world turned upside down.

The literary similarities between these two seemingly opposed texts—the "factuality" of historical works in contrast to the "imaginative" qualities of the literary text—are indicative of historians' deployment of the mechanisms of literature to affectively draw their audiences into their nationalist narratives. Because official nationalism is, in its basest form, an attempt by politicians to rhetorically coerce the nation's subjects to pledge their allegiance to the crown, state and its mandates, official narratives are often cloaked in the language of romance, poetry and mythology to mask the hegemonic nature of official discourse.

Likewise, consider Geoffrey of Monmouth's depiction of Brutus's fated discovery of England in his 12<sup>th</sup> century work *The History of the Kings of Britain*. Importantly, the Brutus myth explicitly connected England's national destiny to its island geography; according to the legend, Diana informed Brutus that "beyond the setting of the sun, past the realms of Gaul, there lies an island in the sea, once occupied by giants [ ... ] A race of kings will be born there from

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<sup>24</sup> John Fletcher and Philip Massinger, *The Sea Voyage Three Renaissance Travel Plays* Ed. Anthony Parr (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1995) 137. Print.

your stock and the round circle of the whole earth will be subject to them”.<sup>25</sup> The repeatedly recycled (and eventually refuted) Brutus myth was cited not only as a foundational narrative of English national identity, but also as justification of England’s rule over Ireland, Scotland and Wales; Brutus ruled the English territories while his subordinates were granted the other nations under the condition of their submission to the “English” King.<sup>26</sup> The ideological message of English superiority is decorated in the language of poetry and classical myth. Illustrated here is the Renaissance adoration and emulation of classical texts; a prophetic tale of a mortal’s encounter with an ancient deity forms the basis of England’s mythical founding. The English island is placed in a mystical world “beyond the setting of the sun”, a fantastic land unlike the continent from which Brutus must flee with the progenitors of the English nation. The giants that once populated the island are mythic creatures often deployed in classical epics to allow the hero to prove his bravery and strength against a barbarous enemy. The language here is not of standard historiography but borrows heavily from classical motifs and poetic turns of phrase.

Lastly, the Britain illustrated in the introduction of Camden’s *Britannia* is cast as a fantastic Eden whose very nature defies simple, unadorned prose.

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<sup>25</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain* Trans. Lewis Thorpe (London: Penguin, 1966) 65. Print.

<sup>26</sup> According to David Armitage, “proponents of the English cause in the Anglo-Scottish wars of 1543-46 and 1547-50 located the origins of the British Empire in the early history of Britain as it had been told by Geoffrey of Monmouth in the twelfth century. That empire was ‘British’ because it had been founded by Brutus, a refugee from the Trojan wars; it was an empire because it became a composite monarchy after Brutus’s death, when it was ruled by his three sons, Lochrine, Albanact and Camber. Geoffrey’s *Historia Regum Britanniae* (1136) enshrined a vision of English dominance over Britain within his legendary history. Brutus’s eldest son, Lochrine, ruled England; the younger sons paid homage to him on account of his seniority, just as their respective kingdoms of Scotland and Wales were held to owe homage to England: seniority implied superiority within the post-Brutan feudal composite monarchy”. See Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 37. Print.



Britaine, or Britannie, which also is Albion [ ... ] the most famous island, without comparison, of the whole world; severed from the continent of Europe [ ... ] Disjoined from those neighbour-countries all about by a convenient distance every way, fitted with commodious and open havens, for traffique with the universall world, and to the generall good, as it were, of mankind, thrusting itself forward with great desire from all parts into the sea.<sup>27</sup>

Linking Britain to the classical world through its several names, some reaching back into the supposed time of Brutus's landing, the island is not simply disconnected from the continent but "severed" and "disjoined", bodily terms that picture the island as a human frame willfully existing independent of Europe. Granting this island a kind of agency, Camden writes that it "thrust[s] itself forward with great desire from all parts into the sea". Personifying the island and lending to the isle its own will, Camden makes the inert landmass into a literalized body politic. I examine this passage in more detail in chapter one to explain how this poetic discourse masks England's geographical susceptibility to attack and its damaging isolation from "the whole world".

As chapter two explores, even English cartography of the period is overwritten with nationalist narratives, sometimes in the form of text but also visually. The images surrounding the British territories are ideologically marked to support English notions of imperial claims and positive isolation. Sea monsters lurk in the waterways between England and Ireland and haunt the northern regions of Scotland, lands most often described as dangerously savage and "un-English". Massive royal seals carefully placed as to endorse England's superiority over the unruly archipelago indicate England's historic right to multinational space. In some instances,

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<sup>27</sup> Camden, 1.

damning ethnographic depictions of the “wilde” Irish contrast with illustrations of the neat and orderly English. Because these cartographic poetics depend almost entirely upon visual media, textual explanation for their politicized treatment of the land and its subjects is unnecessary; the cartographic language speaks for itself.

Because of the literary content of these nationalist works, “properly” literary texts can harmoniously be read against them. The poetics of Monmouth’s *History* mirror those of Spenser’s *Faerie Queene*, which likewise sought to lend a classical veneer to the telling of England. The poetic nature of Camden’s *Britannia* can be likened to the dialogue of Shakespeare, whose emboldened and sometimes hyperbolic language likewise seeks to describe the nation in glorified terms (though to radically different effect, as I argue in chapter two). Finally, More’s literary prose borrows from the chronicle histories that circulated at court and in literary circles of his time; his satirical treatment of these nationalist texts makes up a substantial portion of his *Utopia*.

My approach in each chapter is to unpack the literary language of official texts of the English nation to first demonstrate their centrality to the myth of the island nation and to nationalist narratives more generally. Next, I examine the inherent historical lapses and rhetorical manipulations that undermine these official discourses. Lastly, I consider the relationship of popular literature to these propagandistic narratives. Arguing that popular literary works counter the primary claims of official textual and visual poetics, I contend that popular literature disallows the nationalist visions constructed by authors like Camden, Speed, earlier chroniclers like Gildas and Bede and early modern political philosophers who sought to build the ideological foundations of English governance. My primary conclusion is that official constructions of the English island nation were built upon unsteady foundations and rhetorical misrepresentations.

The literature of the early modern period exposed these detrimental flaws. With the destruction of the myth of the island nation—the foundational myth flimsily sustaining the majority of official rhetorics—the overall infrastructure of the fabricated English nation crumbles. This dismantling radically destabilized notions of the English body politic, its geographical identity and governmental institutions, thus excavating from layers of inflated and compendious rhetoric the actual England that suffered under governmental crises and an untenable geographic position on the northern oceanic frontier.

### Chapter Descriptions

My first chapter “A World Divided from the World” uses the work of Camden and Speed to define the myth of the English island nation and to determine its significance to official nationalist discourse in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Tracing the history of this myth from the 6<sup>th</sup> century, I consider its importance to English self-identity, particularly in regard to Anglo-Scottish relations. Contending that the island mythos was mandatory to England’s imperial claims to the archipelago as a whole, I examine the attempts of Camden and Speed to ideologically expunge the Scottish from British history. Depicting the Scots as barbarous invaders, Camden and Speed insist upon the essential foreign-ness of the Scots that continued in the reigns of Elizabeth and James. In the process of vilifying the vast majority of the Scottish nation, the main island is rhetorically renamed and transformed into an English, rather than British, territory. The rhetoric of the Scots’ illegitimate claims to the northern portion of the isle supported the myth of the genealogically English island nation and its inherent right to the island territory.

More’s *Utopia* casts doubt upon this severing gesture that attempts a purely English characterization of the island. Emphasizing the geographic artificiality of More’s fictional island

and the Utopians' dependence upon the continent, I argue against the self-sufficiency and insularity boasted of by Camden, Speed and others in regard to England. The founder of Utopia unnaturally disconnected his island from the surrounding lands; his idealized community was reliant upon this false geographic severing, allowing the Utopians to produce a culture wholly independent of the outside world. However, the Utopian claims to positive insularity and self-sufficiency are proved false by the details of More's text. The Utopians must depend upon the continent for essential resources, such as colonies to house their people in times of overpopulation, mercenaries to fight their wars and the iron necessary to the production of weaponry. The pretended insularity of the Utopians and supposed refusal to interact with contaminating foreign cultures implies a homogenous island people entirely uniform in character and untouched by outside influence. In this regard, *Utopia* represents an English fantasy built upon falsified principles, not unlike the English feigned histories that expel the Scottish from their self-sustaining national body. This opening chapter of the dissertation demonstrates the ideological necessity of the myth of the English island nation and the fissures and misrepresentations that undermine it at every turn. Official nationalist texts that proclaim England's self-sufficiency, positive insularity and national unity born of the island territory are plagued by the sort of idealized—and radically manufactured— island world we experience in More's work.

The second chapter of my dissertation, "Maps and Legends: Nationalist Allegories, Empire and Cartography", considers the integral role of official cartography in the manufacture of nationalist self-identity and the conjoined projects to subjugate Ireland, Scotland and Wales to the English crown. The profusion of cartographic texts in the early modern period was of particular importance to the visualization of national identity and territorial sovereignty;

importantly, like More's island, the representation of the supposedly natural national space could be artificially amended to encourage a "re-reading" of the land that conformed with and supported official nationalist agendas. Speed's cartographic allegories, which combined ethnographic imagery, ideologically-charged illustrations and symbols of British might, manipulated the science of cartography to project an image of the English as a culturally and politically uniform people reigning over the archipelago. Taking up the work of Aristotle, Sir Philip Sydney, Christopher Saxton and Speed's own *History of Great Britain* I demonstrate how Speed attempted to amend nature to suit his nationalist program by visually effacing the evidence of England's failed colonial project and internal disunity.

However, the maps of Speed's *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* are so overlaid and overburdened with illustrations that his works unintentionally betray the ideological burdens undermining his cartographic narratives. Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* and Fletcher and Massinger's *Sea Voyage* appear to probe these imperial and national anxieties. Using the same materials deployed in Speed's visual allegories, Shakespeare, Fletcher and Massinger critique the genealogical rendering of Britain favored by Speed in which the Irish, Welsh and Scottish are portrayed as naturally subservient to the English. The plays' emphasis on geographic conditions strengthens the connection to Speed's cartographic texts, citing geography as an inadequate source of national and imperial identity, particularly when this geographical foundation is weakened by ideological mistruths.

Such mistruths resonate with the notion of a unified monarchically-grounded national body in my third chapter, "'In th' Almightyes Place': State-Building and the Division of Absolute Authority in Spenser's *Faerie Queen*". Here I examine the problematic contradictions between crown rhetoric of indivisible monarchical power and parsing out of political authority to agents

of the state. Identifying an ideological rift in English political philosophers and their continental counterparts between absolute sovereign power and the necessity of a state infrastructure, I consider how the clashing of the rhetoric behind state and monarchical power created an unsurpassable gulf between absolutist discourse and the carrying out of governmental regulation across the realms. For instance, widely known political treatises like those penned by Jean Bodin in his 1576 *Six livres de la république*, Sir Thomas Elyot's 16<sup>th</sup> century *Boke Named the Governour*, and Sir Thomas Smith's *De Republica Anglorum*. Published around the same time, all acknowledge (oftentimes obliquely) the ideological disparities between absolutism and the dispersal of power to the state. Early modern state building caused a splintering of supposedly indivisible monarchical power, thus destabilizing the notion of a singular divine figure in which governmental authority is centered.

This radical upset of the discourse of monarchical representation produced a refraction of sovereignty that can be traced in Spenser's *Faerie Queen*. In Spenser's fantastic through obviously politicized landscape, sovereign power is decentered, doled out to the poem's myriad queens. Though most are literary representation of Elizabeth, these multiple monarchs do not form a single sovereign body. Rather, they appear at narrative intervals and are most always in a position of governmental or militaristic weakness. It is here that the state, in the form of Spenser's knights, enters the poem. Their authority to wield governmental power in the realm of Faerie Land often is derived from an unknown source. Though loyal to the poem's titular monarch, their power to govern does not necessarily emanate from her divine person. The Faerie Queene herself is an absent center "visible" in the work only as a product of chivalric rhetoric very closely mirroring the glowing language surrounding Spenser's queen. Without a sovereign center, authority exists in an ethereal and fragmented form, much like the territory made

discontinuous by disconnected kingdoms and geographical fissures. The Elizabethan government's inability to build a centralized state that would enveloped the various communities of the island—who often functioned according to their own local culture—indicated that the state at this period was a conglomerate of dispersed and unevenly distributed modes of authority.

The ambiguous source of political authority is a primary tenet of my final chapter “The Staging of the English Island Nation”, which focuses almost entirely on Christopher Marlowe's *Jew of Malta* and serves as the conclusion of the dissertation. In Marlowe's play, the primary tenets of English official nationalism are mercilessly undone. The island dystopia imagined by Marlowe adamantly refuses the geographical, genealogical and governmental foundations so central to the English nation as envisioned in official texts. An island space devoid of cultural or ethnic sameness, an indigenous population, a centralized government and defense from invasion, Marlowe's Malta is England shorn of nationalist rhetoric.

Geographically, the island is entirely vulnerable to attack and continually under siege. Without a monarchical center and lacking a state infrastructure, sovereign authority is radically ambiguous and the island and its populous are defenseless. Peopled by Christians, Turks, Italians, Jews and characters of indeterminate origin, Malta is an island territory of others with no allegiance to community or government. Because it is a site continually overwritten by its imperial conquerors, Malta does not achieve any form of autonomous identity or communal history. Marlowe's is an island without the mystifying bonds of sovereignty or nationhood. As such, Marlowe's Malta bespeaks the insubstantial nature of nationalist discourse. Marlowe's play explodes the notion of island geography as the basis of natural unity, imperial or national, and thus speaks to the inability of English authors to impose this veneer of nationalist homogeneity and allegiance. Even the maps of Malta project not a vision of national identity, but one of

repeated imperial conquest, an alarming lack of national autonomy and a people wholly dominated by outside forces. Malta's vulnerability lies in its island nature; isolated by the sea and placed directly in the center of Mediterranean trade routes, Malta's strategic importance invited repeated imperial wars for this highly sought island. The Maltese are defenseless, leading to their takeover by myriad imperial forces. Marlowe's Malta—and the historical Malta the play draws heavily upon—echoes Britain's history, a uncomfortable reminder of Britain's own past, which was written by the island's conquerors. Finally, the seeming lack of a locus of governmental authority and an apparent indifference to sovereign authority marks Marlowe's play as a nightmare of English governance, in which authority is dislocated and dispersed without rhyme or reason.

My exploration of official nationalism in the early modern period is important not just to studies of Elizabethan and Jacobean England. Bringing into critical conversation the phenomenon of official nationalism will help us to better understand nationalism's legacy and its continual—and often destructive—presence in modern culture. Monarchical governments remain part of our historical present and state-led nationalist sentiment is still a potent ideology with repercussions in the global political arena. By examining the historical trajectory of official nationalism and the manufactured ideologies that sustain these movements, we might more fully comprehend nationalism's mechanisms and its impact on those peoples who are subjected, rather than allegiant, to the nation.



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## Chapter One: A World Divided from the World

Reiterated in myriad forms and for varying ideological purposes in early modern official, literary and cartographic texts is the myth of the English “island nation”. This island stands apart from the known world, resting peaceably in the ocean’s arms at the edge of the globe. Celebrated by the ancients as a land of natural plentitude, Julius Caesar himself sought to gain the island for his empire, only be repulsed by the hardy Britons, bred with a militancy born of the island soil. The geographic insularity of the land housing these early English was a mark of the island’s divine status; the pagan gods intended the English isle as their refuge from the debased earthly realm, and the singular God of the Christian faith created England as a new Eden, a blessed land in an otherwise fallen world. The singular divinity of this world beyond the world finds human form in the singular person of the English sovereign, who reigns as God’s earthly counterpart in this second heaven. The mythic island body, its perimeters drawn by nature and the hand of God, finds its compliment in the monarchical body politic. As the divinely instated borders of the island figure the wholeness and completeness of the deistic monarchical person, so to does the body politic enclose within its skin all the blessed people of the sovereign’s England.

The strains of this mythology can be discovered in texts as disparate as William Camden’s *Britannia*, John Speed’s *History of Great Britain*, Shakespeare’s *Richard II*, Michael Drayton’s *Poly Olbion* and Spenser’s *Faerie Queene*. In the works that were used, obliquely or otherwise, in support of the sovereign’s official nationalist project, the myth of the English island nation was deployed for several interrelated political purposes. The contained-ness and insularity of the island’s geography invited claims to the natural unity and coherence of the English people, inculcating notions of social, ethnic, cultural and political concord within the oceanic boundaries. The mystique of a nature-made nation lent itself to assertions of the island’s self-sufficiency;

exalted as God's creation, the isle was cast as wholly independent of the world beyond the sea. The ocean did not sever the English isle from the world's resources and the political benefits of the international community. Rather, the watery borders encircling the island shielded sovereign and subjects from invasion and war, inoculating the isle from the inherent dangers of unprotected or unclear political boundaries. The island geography itself invited the coming together of once culturally, socially and politically differentiated groups; enveloped by the ocean and naturally joined by the shared soil of a cloistered land, the people of Cornwall and Wales surrendered their national identifications to unite the island kingdom of England.

The myth of the island nation, then, provided the ideological apparatus and geographical trope necessary to project an image of the English body politic as largely homogenous in character, bound together by their apart-ness from the world beyond the water, their blessed state in a land uniquely designed by God and their allegiance to the sovereign who reigned in God's stead over his island paradise. These characteristics were central to England's nationalist identifications; a sovereign entity defined by indisputable territorial borders that marked out the island nation as separate and distinct, the English were a people whose near-mythic existence on the earth's margins, its historical longevity, divinely entrenched system of government and shared cultural and linguistic community exemplified the term 'nation'.

The problems with such a mythology are obvious and, in most cases, insurmountable. First, and most importantly, England is not an island. The land mass so celebrated for its otherworldliness and divine status in official English rhetoric is also home to Scotland, an obstinate geographical fact that cannot be dispelled with tricks of cartographic mathematics or a poetically crafted nationalist mythos. Only slightly smaller in size than its English counterpart, Scotland dominates the northern half of the properly termed British island. Perhaps even more

significant than Scotland's pronounced territorial ownership of the island is the long-standing history of political conflict between the two sovereign states that consistently refuted claims of English suzerainty on the British island. Medieval land disputes and early modern border skirmishes, the Anglo-Scottish Wars, which persisted into the early years of Tudor rule, Scotland's allied ties to France and the repeated failures of English overlordship evince that Scotland was a persistent and undeniable presence both in the English political psyche and in terms of territorial might. Though the ascension of James to the English throne ostensibly brought the two nations into a single "British" nation, Scotland remained (and remains) an independent nation oftentimes uncomfortably sharing the island with its neighbors to the south. To imagine England as an island was, in the context of Anglo-Scottish relations, an imperial fantasy that impossibly denied the political reality of Scotland as a sovereign state.

Wales was also subject to this imperial myth-making. Encompassing a substantial portion of the island's southwestern region, Wales occupied a liminal space in the maps, atlases and chorographies of the period, despite its annexation by England in 1537. The chorographic marking out of the Welsh landscape from the English attests to the cultural, legal and linguistic preservation of Welsh identity that, like the Scottish occupation of the isle, greatly complicates England's island narrative.<sup>28</sup> Though Wales adopted English law and pledged its allegiance to

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<sup>28</sup> In Camden's *Britannia*, the historian speaks of his narrative of Wales as a "digression" from his considerably larger and more important narrative of England (615). The mapped shires of Wales are devoted their own section within the much more compendious English history; therefore this "digression" works to consume Wales within the English territory, for the section devoted to Wales is embedded within the English historical and cartographic narrative. Nevertheless, Wales is subtly but separately delineated (it is provided its own section) complicating the notion that Wales was entirely subsumed by the English and thus supporting the notion that it occupies a separate geographic and cultural space on the "English" island. Speed's *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* likewise provides Wales a separate set of maps and a comparatively minuscule 30 pages of narrative. However, he is careful to mark out the Welsh territory as English by beginning this section with "A Catalog of such Princes Sprong from the

the English sovereign, the nation was not wholly subsumed by England and thus retained a cultural and genealogical identity that resisted imperial assimilation. The notion that the English island housed a single nation of largely homogenous subjects is upset, if not altogether undone, by the Welsh and Scottish populations that hemmed in the English territory. Ireland, England's neighbor to the west and its most glaring imperial failure, more closely resembled the image of island unity so carefully crafted in English official rhetoric. A nation of ethnically, socially and culturally alike people with a single system of law and an unwavering fealty to their shared character and independence, Ireland's island boundaries defined its nationhood and rejected any encroachments upon this communal identity. Ireland, England's governmental bugbear, encapsulated the very qualities that official rhetoric sought to attach to the English, thus especially complicating England's colonial discourse that defined civilized Englishness against Irish barbarity. Approximately equal in size to England and an "island nation" by definition, the English "island" of official texts unsuccessfully emulated its supposedly savage geographical counterpart. Surrounded by cultural and political entities that denied it island status, England itself was markedly heterogeneous due to regional differentiations in culture, ethnicity and law. Once one dismantles the official rhetoric sustained by the trope of the English island, one discovers that England was not a naturally bounded island nation, but one of several entities making up the contentious grouping of ethnicities and political bodies that was problematically termed the "empire of Britain".

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Royal Stemme of the English Kings, as have been Entitled, Prince of Wales, since the time of that Countries last Conquest, and first Voluntary subjection under KING EDWARD THE FIRST" (96). Yet, like Camden, Speed's indexical delineation of Wales indicates a Welsh territory that culturally stands apart from England. Camden, William. *Britannia* Ed. Robert Mayhew. Vol 3. (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003) 3. Print. All future citations of Camden's *Britannia* are from this three volume set edited by Mayhew.

The mythological singularity of the English island nation was ideologically associated with the singular person of the monarch; this relationship between nation and sovereign likewise breaks down when the myth of the island nation is debunked. The multiple states and communities making up the British archipelago functioned under multiple governments, institutions and leaders. The partitioning of the main island into two kingdoms meant that two sovereign rulers reigned over a divided land. Even with the ascension of James VI of Scotland to the English throne and the supposed union of the two nations, there were clear anxieties on both sides of the marches regarding the preservation of cultural and governmental institutions and national identity. The union of two political bodies in a single monarchical body was, arguably, a failure until well after the Stuart era, and only pointed up the separateness and desired autonomy of the two populations. The attempt to subject Ireland to the English sovereign was an even greater defeat; powerful chieftans and local magnates rejected English authority and asserted a cultural and political independence that was geographically reinforced by the sea separating the two nations. The English body politic was itself a dismembered entity sutured by a fledgling state. Like Ireland and Scotland, regions of England were ruled not by the monarch but by landowning gentry and local figures. The crown attempted to assert its absolute authority through the creation of a centralized state, but England's feudal heritage continued to assert itself in the form of localized governments that challenged official claims to absolutist rule. Because political authority was splintered and dispersed across the archipelago—like the various communities populating Britain's many islands—the conceit of the singular island body ruled by the singular sovereign was the insubstantial stuff of myth, rather than political reality.

In this chapter, I will define the “myth of the English island nation” and demonstrate its uses in official national discourse. Camden's *Britannia* and Speed's *History of Great Britain*



either directly or indirectly buttressed a vision of England that was in keeping with the crown's attempts to forge a commonwealth of allegiant subjects mindful of their role within a national community that was shaped by the monarch's hand. This nationalist project was coincident with England's imperial aims and the attempt to subsume under the English flag the other nations of the archipelago. As illustrated in chapter two, the English nationalist and imperial projects were often at ideological cross purposes. In order to construct and sustain the myth of the island nation, the genealogy of Britain must be rewritten to assert the island's historical Englishness. This rhetorical project posed an insurmountable problem: first, Scotland could not be simply erased from the historical record, nor could the autonomous nation be overwritten as English, especially if authors of the crown were attempting to assert England's imperial domination of the isle. The Scottish must somehow be fundamentally other and fundamentally the same (i.e. English). Official authors clumsily "solved" this intractable difficulty by separating the Lowland and Highland Scots into two radically distinct groups: the first, a civilized people whose history cast them as genealogically akin to the English. The second Highland Scots, on the other hand, were barbarous invaders of the English island who had illegitimately planted themselves on English soil. As foreigners, their continued presence on the island was an affront to English national boundaries, which were naturally carved out by the ocean.

The second and equally problematic purpose of this myth was to recast England's geographic vulnerability as positive insularity; rewriting England's severing from the continent, the myth of the island nation ineffectually disguised the isolation and sequestration caused by the disconnectedness of England from the continent. Early modern England was not a self-sufficient, insular nation without need of the world outside its borders. Rather, the English nation was handicapped by its inability to produce certain necessary resources, such as iron, and was

therefore dependent upon the continent. Likewise, in a period of nascent global trade and exploration, England was in competition with its continental neighbors for lucrative trade routes and New World lands and resources. Lagging behind its rival Spain, England struggled for a place on the emerging global stage and a means to mask its outlander geographic status.

Secondly, English interventions in the Low Countries and its engagement in the political wars of the Reformation placed England firmly in the messy arena of international politics. The threat of continental invasion was made more palpable by England's vulnerable geographic position and character; set within an archipelago of nations that refused to bend to its rule, the English crown feared both the joining of Scottish and French forces and Spanish aid to the rebellious Irish. The sea, in this context, was mutable and threatening, potentially carrying and concealing dangers from abroad that could steal upon the largely unguarded coasts of the islands. The ocean did not enclose England in its protective embrace, guaranteeing national security and the clear demarcation of territorial borders; rather it invited those invading forces that sought to redraw the borders of England's sovereign territory to the detriment of the crown.

In Camden and Speed's texts, the nations of Britain are elided by the island of England and the subjects of these very different realms collapse into a single category under the weight of this overdetermined island mythology. However, the untenable claims in these texts that undergird the myth of the island nation persistently lurk beneath the ideological surface, drawing attention to the very need for a fabricated narrative to gloss over England's political and geographic vulnerabilities. My reading of these works will explore the narratological and ideological failures that inevitably attend these invented geographical, historical and political constructions. The dismantling of England's island myth effectively undoes a major strain of its

nationalist and imperial narration, and strips from the nation's history the mythos of "a world divided from the world".<sup>29</sup>

In the second half of this chapter, I will consider how popular literary texts of the period exposed the flaws and inconsistencies embedded in this island mythology. The notion of the English island had a far-reaching historical trajectory and was therefore a recognizable trope of the nation's cultural milieu. Authors of popular texts, such as William Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, Michael Drayton, Edmund Spenser and Thomas More, among others, employed this island fiction to radically different effect than official works. Intentionally or otherwise, these popular texts punctured the island myth by overturning the very tenets of this island rhetoric that were of ideological import to the crown. Refusing the geographical and political manipulations necessary to the official rendering of the English island, these works force back into the cultural imaginary England's troubled history as a nation on the world's margins, unable to sustain or defend itself against invasion and its own deficiencies. The likening of the singular island body to that of the singularly divine monarch likewise breaks down when subjected to the dramatist or poet's pen. With the acknowledgement of the several cultures and nationalities sharing the archipelagic space and the recognition of the English island's essential falsity and forced construction, the site of political authority is splintered and the manufactured-ness of this monarchical mythology is exposed.

The culmination of this literary and historical analysis is a reading of More's *Utopia*. I argue that More's fabricated island explicitly demonstrates the ideological weaknesses and mistruths of the historiographic narratives deployed to buttress the myth of the island nation. The geopolitics of More's pretended island nationalism resonate strongly with the ideological

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<sup>29</sup> Ben Jonson: *The Complete Masques* Ed Stephen Orgel (New Haven: Yale UP, 1969): 56 Print.

shaping of medieval and early modern England, particularly in their treatment of Scotland. The expansive and autonomous Scottish territory and the Scots' refusal to become part of the English domestic empire posed serious difficulties to writers of the English "island nation". I argue that the imperial discourses so prevalent in More's text extend not just to the New World but to the nation bordering England, whose very presence demanded an ideological severing of the Scots from the English, the supposedly "true" possessors of the island. Because the English island mythos was in broad circulation during the period of *Utopia*'s composition, it is safe to say that More—the historian, humanist and statesman—was aware of this nationalist construction; there is even evidence that More himself had a hand in perpetuating this myth, as I will explain later. However, More's satirical fantasy of English insularity, imperial might and governmentally ordered national space detrimentally punctures the very precepts upon which this fantasy is built. Therefore, one can discover on More's island the ideological necessity of this myth to English self-writing and the very precariousness that threatens to undo these foundational narratives of English nationhood.

### The Island Authorized

The geographical and ideological manipulations necessary to imagine England as an island required literary sleights of hand that made slippery use of history and cartography. As I discuss in chapter two, elaborate ornamentation and cartographic misrepresentations allowed historian and mapmaker John Speed to imaginatively build England's island empire, despite his nation's domestic and imperial failures. By crowding the English landmass with ideologically charged illustrations carefully positioned to lend artificial borders to the English nation, Speed gave visual credence to the myth of the English island. In this chapter, I will examine the body of literary constructions that removed England from the sphere of geographic factuality and

elevated it to a kind of mythic island status. The first authors I will examine had varying degrees of association with the crown; I contend that their illustrations of the English “island” thusly correspond with state interests. The literary, in this respect, functions as a means of explicating the realm of political mythology and nation building. Serving political causes as pressing and far-reaching as governmental centralization, allegiance to the crown, imperial claims to England’s rule over the British archipelago, and nationalist genealogy, the myth of the island nation was an ideological construction that unstably upheld a host of official narratives.

Among the destabilizing elements of this island mythology was the recurrent slippage between “Britain” and “England”, between empire and nation, in which the “British myth” came into conflict with the English national mythos. Wily Maley accounts for this ideological disconnect:

The British myth constructs a history in which the threat from its neighbors, north and west, is a barrier to English aspirations. The subordination of the non-English nations of the emerging British state is posited as an essential prerequisite to Empire rather than an act of Empire itself. The British Empire is first and foremost the British state, which represents the political subjection of the British Isles under English supremacy [ ... ]

England is substituted for the British state...<sup>30</sup>

Here, the borders between empire and nation are unclear. The imposition of “The British Empire” upon Scotland, Ireland and Wales is obviously a project to submit these autonomous regions to imperial English rule. Yet the “subordination” Maley indicates is likewise a project of making the isles English in governance, an English archipelagic body, if not in name than in political intent.

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<sup>30</sup> Maley, *Nation, State and Empire in English Renaissance Literature: Shakespeare to Milton* (Gordonville: Palgrave, 2003) 26. Print.

As John Kerrigan explains in his examination of Britain's archipelagic literatures of the period, "Englishness was a contested resource as much for writers engaging with readers as for leaders mustering armies [ ... ] 'England' was a shifting entity, open to reconceptualization, defined against and meshed with its neighbors".<sup>31</sup> For this reason, England had to be rhetorically stabilized both politically and literarily in order to sustain state and propagandistic projects. "British history", David J. Baker likewise asserts, "is a history of chronic instability, and it puts 'national' identity on the islands profoundly in question—so profoundly that it must be answered with a fervent and compensatory Englishness".<sup>32</sup> Britain and its history, placed in the hands of English writers, was transformed into an overdetermined construction of English governmental and territorial might. From the early modern period to the present, "the pattern of 'British history' entails the steadily increasing dominance of England as a political and cultural entity," in the words of J. G. A. Pocock.<sup>33</sup>

As this chapter explores, ancient British history further complicated attempts during the early modern period to positively distinguish the English from the ambiguous British family. The confusing ethnographic admixture of peoples populating the ancient British Isles made the search for Englishness a deeply complicated project of English nation and empire building. Andrew Escobedo details this perplexing historical stumbling block in *Nationalism and Historical Loss in Renaissance England*:

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<sup>31</sup> Kerrigan, *Archipelagic English: Literature, History, and Politics, 1603-1707* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008) 12. Print.

<sup>32</sup> Baker, "Spenser and the Uses of British History." *Worldmaking Spenser: Explorations in the Early Modern Age* Eds. Patrick Cheney and Lauren Silberman (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 2000), 201. Print.

<sup>33</sup> Pocock, "British history: a plea for a new subject." *The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005) 33. Print.

Tudor and Stuart writers in ‘England’ commonly refer to themselves as ‘British’. Depending on context, ‘British’ in this period could comprise England, Scotland, and Wales; or it could designate the pre-Saxon identity persisting in England, especially through the modern Welsh; or, more rarely, it appears simply to be synonymous with ‘English’. This ambiguity in contemporary usage pointed to a persistent historical problem: was the national past an English or British one?<sup>34</sup>

Imperial discourse demanded that the English be differentiated from the isle’s others and thus outside the “British” family of the Scottish, the Welsh and the Irish, as well as their ancient forebearers. Though Wales as the preserve of ancient Britishness provided some reprieve from this genealogical difficulty—particularly for the Tudors, who depended upon the mythos of Arthurian legend and Welsh heritage to ideologically sustain their royal image—Wales was also a separate cultural entity that continued, at least in part, to resist English rule. Various texts preserved the notion of Wales’s backwardness in order to justify English control over the Welsh territories. The ancient Briton likewise presented ideological difficulties; often portrayed as a brutish, pre-evolutionary race dominated by its many imperial conquerors, English writers could not turn to this ancient figure for a model of contemporary English civility and power.

For the English nation to exist as a legitimate historical entity, England must be provided a historical genealogy that rooted Englishness in the land, thus marking out the whole of the isle territories as inherently English in nature. The myth of the English island nation filled the “historical discontinuity” and “troubling breach in history”, cited by Escobedo.<sup>35</sup> As the work of Speed and Camden demonstrate, English histories were rewritten around the island trope to

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<sup>34</sup> Escobedo, *Nationalism and Historical Loss in Renaissance England: Foxe, Dee, Spenser, Milton* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004) 18. Print.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 3-4.

inscribe the isle as historically English and to cast those troublesome non-English entities, particularly the Scots, as foreign to the English island. Britain, because it could not be altogether abolished from the historical record or contemporary politics of empire, was overwritten as English. The English themselves, as John Morrill explains, absented themselves from Britain when ideologically necessary: “the one group who most resolutely and consistently refused to regard themselves as Britons,” he explains, “were the English in England. If they use it all it is without any sense that it other than a synonym for English”.<sup>36</sup>

In the work of even the earliest “British” historians, the island being celebrated for its people, its natural plentitude and its cooperative relationship to the sea is England, not its neighbor to the north. Scotland, though recognized, is subtly but effectively characterized as marginal to the isle called Britain. For example, Camden’s introductory material to his *Britannia* and his description of ancient Britain takes up approximately 163 pages of his 822 page first volume.<sup>37</sup> Following the history are his illustrations of “The States and Degrees of England” and his “Law Courts of England”. The entirety of the rest of the volume (approximately 700 pages) is devoted to detailed depictions of England’s counties, including an accompanying map of each. His record of Scotland is drastically smaller in size (despite its geographic proportion) and strangely relegated to a separate volume with its own page numbers. Indexically bracketed off from the main volume of British (read English) history, all of Scotland is allowed only a 54 page

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<sup>36</sup> Morrill, “The British Problem, c. 1534-1707.” *The British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* Eds. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996) 10. Print.

<sup>37</sup> Camden’s work is not broken into volumes, per se. Rather, the numbered pages 1-822 end with his description of his final English country. As explained above, he rennumbers his work when he begins his illustration of Scotland and Ireland. Therefore, the second “volume”, as I describe it, is an approximately 233 pages given over to “Scotland” and “Ireland and the Smaller Islands in the British Ocean”, according to his titles.



narration. The Scottish lands are likewise diminished; of this sizable territory we are provided one map of the nation as a whole, the separate counties barely delineated and their descriptions scant in comparison to those of England, some no more substantial than a single paragraph in length. Cartographically, chorographically, and organizationally, Scotland is reduced to footnote to the history of Britain proper: that is, England.

The genealogical complications of figuring the island as anciently English are prominent in both Camden and Speed's histories of Britain. The English were themselves non-native, in the sense that they were a people of conglomerate cultures, including the Saxons, Angles, Normans and Jutes, who all arrived on the island from elsewhere. However, Camden and Speed are determined to link the ancient Britons to what was later conceived as the "English nation". For example, Camden in his *Britannia* seeks to harmoniously join together the ancient Britons and the conquering Saxons: Following the Saxon victory over the Britons, he reports:

In a short space, [the Saxon's] State, for number, for good customes and ordinances, for lands and territories grew to that height, that it became most wealthy and puissant, yea, and their conquest in some sort full and absolute. For all the conquered, except some few, whom in the Westerne tract the roughnesse of the country defended and kept safe, became one nation, used the same lawes, tooke their name, and spake one and the selfsame language, with the conquerors.<sup>38</sup>

Camden's narrative of a united British / English nation places the ancient Britons as the true proprietors of the island; their continued existence on the isle and their willing subjection to the "English-Saxons", as Camden terms them, combines the Britons and the English into one

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<sup>38</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 132-33.

family, in which England's British roots reach back into the time of the island nation's first founding. The problems with Camden's narrative melding of the Britons and the Saxons cannot be so easily elided, however. As Camden himself betrays, there remained resistance to this blending of cultures, presumably in the Welsh territories, where British culture remained preserved, isolated and untainted. In truth, the Britons had little choice but to fold to Saxon rule; the joining of the nations was not a matter of contract or agreement, but of British subjugation.

The ideological project to make the island historically English is also clumsily "achieved" by finding in texts like Bede's *Ecclesiastic History of the English Nation* indirect connections between ancient tribes like Cimbri, whose arrival on the island preceded that of the Britons. I discuss these historical constructions in more detail below and in the final chapter of this dissertation. The importance of these narrative manipulations is to ideologically disconnect Scotland from England and to claim the isle as historically English in nature. Throughout his depiction of England's northern neighbor, Camden consistently undercuts Scotland's membership in the British family. In his introduction to his description of Scotland, Camden acknowledges the necessity of including Scotland within his celebration of Britain:

Seeing Scotland also joineth in the name of BRITAINE, let it be lawfull for mee  
(reserving the due honour to the Scottish) according to my purpose, having, boldly  
undertaken to illustrate BRITAN, to proceed with their good favour, leave and  
license, and by withdrawing a side in some sort the curtaine of obscure antiquity,  
to point out with my finger, if I shalbe able, some places of ancient note, and  
memorie.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Camden, Vol. 3, 3.

The conventional early modern trope of the humble and unknowing historian allows Camden to rhetorically shy away from the task of giving Scotland its due in his mammoth history. Yet Camden's language here, in conjunction with his narratological and cartographical minimization of Scotland, pictures Scotland as an after-thought, and afterword to Britain. Because Scotland is territorially a part of Britain and because Britain is his project, Camden must append to his masterwork a glance toward Britain's northern territories. Or, as Camden himself avers, he will "but [ ... ] lightly passe over" the whole of the Scottish nation.<sup>40</sup>

Yet Camden's breezy gesture toward Scotland is not without ideological weight. Peppered throughout his description of Scotland's lands and peoples is a series of damning portraits that serve to differentiate the northern nation from Camden's England. Speaking in the earliest pages of this volume, Camden delineates Scottish "Highland-men and "Lawland-men"; unsurprisingly, the further one travels from England, the greater the decline in civility and even humanity. Outside the geographical sphere of English influence is a sinister land of beasts and criminals who throw into sharp relief the geopolitical ends of Camden's depiction of England's Britain. "According to the habitation of the people, Scotland is now divided into *High-landmen* and *Lawland-men*: These being more civil use the English language and apparail: the other which are rude & unruly, speake Irish, & go apparailed Irishlike".<sup>41</sup> Camden's ethnographic linking of the Northern Scottish to the Irish neatly performs a multivalent colonial gesture. Collapsing Englishness and civility and letting Irishness signify as degenerate and barbarous, Camden ousts Northern Scotland and Ireland from the field of British progress and archipelagic

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, vol 3, 5.

unity, thus returning the readers attention to the true center and subject of his volume: England *cum* Britiain.

The reader travelling north in Camden's chorography meets with an increasingly villainous citizenry and a sometimes hellish terrain, culminating in a highland region inhabited by witches and deadly beasts.<sup>42</sup> In the section entitled "Nidisdall", Camden describes the "warlike kind of men" that people the western borderlands between England and Scotland at Solway Firth. "Infamous for robberies and depredations" this criminal clan has "made many times outrodes into England for to fetch in booties".<sup>43</sup> Pictured in opposition to and violation of his English brethren, this brand of Scotsman, living in close proximity to the Irish coast, is more akin to the thieving Irishman than the civilized English who must repel his malicious attacks. Moving northward into the west-central portion of Scotland, the landscape is depicted as violently deformed and is again linked to Ireland. Of "Argathelia or Argile", Camden translates this place name into "*Neere unto the Irish; or, as old writings have it, The Edge or border of Ireland*". Here the land itself is cast as degenerate and malicious: "the country runneth out in length and breadth, all mangled with fishfull pooles" writes Camden, "along the shore it is more unpleasant in sight, what with rockes, and what with blacklish baraine mountaines." According

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<sup>42</sup> Atholl in central Scotland "is infamous for witches and wicked women; the country, otherwise fertile enough, hath valleies bespred with forests: namely where that WOOD CALEDONIA dreadfull to see to for the sundry turnings and windings in and our therein, for the hideous horror of darke shades, for the Burrowes and dennes of wilde bulles with thicke manes [ ... ] extended it selfe in old time farre and wide every way in these parts" (vol 3, 40). In "Strathnavern", which Camden refers to as "the utmost and farthest coast of all Britaine", "the country it selfe is for the soile nothing fertile, and by reason of the sharpe and cold aire lesse inhabited: and thereupon fore haunted and annoied by most cruel wolves. Which in such violent rage not only set upon cattaille to the exceeding great dammage of the inhabitants, but also assaile men with great danger, and not in this tract onely, but in many other parts likewise of Scotland" (Camden, vol 3, 54).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, Vol 3, 17.

to Camden, this debased territory is the original homeland of the ancient Scot. He continues, “In this part, as *Bede* writeth,

*Britaine received after the Britans and Picts, a third nation of Scots in that country where the Picts inhabited: who comming out of Ireland [ ... ] either through friendshippe or by dint of sword planted heere their seat amongst them, which they still hold [ ... ] Ireland (saith hee) is the proper Country of the Scots; for, beeing departed out of it they added unto the Britans and Picts a third nation in Britaine. And there is a verie great Bay or arme of the Sea: that in old time severed the Nation of the Britans from the Picts: which from the West breaketh a great way into the land [ ... ] In the North part of which Bay, the Scots aforesaid when they came, gotte themselves a place to inhabite.*<sup>44</sup>

The Scots, imagined here as latecomers to Britain, invaders who unnaturally planted themselves in the British Isles, are actually Irish, further entrenching the notion of the Scots’ thieving and criminal ways. Usurpers of the land, neither the Scots nor the Irish belong to the family line that binds the people of the island in an ancient British unity. Camden’s repetition of Bede’s claim that the treasonous Scots “still hold” this stolen land has damning implications for the Scots’ early modern progeny; Camden’s contemporary Scot is portrayed not as a rightful subject, but as a recalcitrant Irish invader who remains outside Bede and Camden’s genealogical rendering of Britain.

Bede’s geographical illustration of the Scots’ invasion enforces not only a genealogical severing of the Scots from the British but also a geopolitical division between the English and those inhabiting the island’s northern region. Bede’s “verie great Bay” is presumably the long

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid, Vol 3, 37.

stretch of the western English coast, running from Anglesey in the south to Dumfries (approximately) in the north. The point at which the Irish Sea most severely juts into the western coast is Solway Firth, which meets with Hadrian's Wall, the ancient border between England and Scotland, and marks the current political border between the two nations. According to Bede's explanation, this bay likewise marked the border of the Pict and British "nations". "*The nation of the Picts came in long ships*", states Bede, "*and those not many, out of Scythia, (as the report goeth) into Ireland: and of the Scots whom they found there, requested (but in vaine) a place of habitation: by whose perswasion they went into Britaine, and inhabited the Northerne parts thereof*".<sup>45</sup> The ancient Picts are also distinguished from the Britains proper; Camden maintains, both "Antiquitie and "the Historiographers have accounted [the Picts] second" to the British.<sup>46</sup> Both ancient and contemporary Scotland, then, is the land of the "other British", geographically and ethnically distinct from England.

Though Camden debates Bede's claims regarding the Picts' Scythian heritage, his explanation of their inhabitation of northern Britain likewise enacts a complicated geographic and ethnic separation that is perhaps more startling in its rearrangement of Britain's geopolitical history. Citing Tacitus, Camden considers the Picts' refusal to bend to Roman rule.

Were it not that in this point the authoritie of venerable Bede, did over-weigh all the conjectures of all others, I would thinke that the Picts came from no other place at all, but were verie naturall Britans themselves, even the right progenie of the most ancient Britains: those Britans, I meane, and none other, who before the comming in of the Romans, were seated in the North part of the Island, and of

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, Vol 1, 114.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

those who afterwards, casting off the yoke of bondage (as they are a nation most impatient of servilitie) repaired unto these in the North [ ... ] Where being armed not so much with weapons as with a sharpe aire and climate of their owne, they grew up together with the native Inhabitants whom there they found, unto a mightie and populous nation. For Tacitus reporteth, that the enemies of the Romans were [ ... ] driven into this part, as it were, into another Island: and no man doubteth, but Britans they were which inhabited these remotest parts of the Island.<sup>47</sup>

In a slippery attempt to both cast the Picts as a separate ethnic category, distinct from the proper “Britains” and interloping Scots, and to weave a narrative that imagines the originary Britons/English as the ancestral possessors of the whole of the island, Camden grants the Picts an ambiguous lineage. At first glance, it would seem that Camden considers the Picts as native to the British Isles, considering his assertion that they were “verie naturall Britans”. But, he quickly backs away from this claim to the Picts’ indigenous right to the island by re-casting them as ancestors of “those Britains” who first occupied Scotland (“the North part of the Island”). Neither the Picts nor the Scots (whose status as Irishmen is again reiterated by Bede) can rightly be called “the most ancient Britains”, a title and territorial claim preserved for those peoples who are not sprung from non-native ethnic groups: presumably, the English. The Picts, Camden insists, are only “progeny” or secondary, to these indigenous British. Camden reinforces this unstable hierarchy by distinguishing the Picts from the unnamed “native inhabitants” with whom they grew into “a mightie and populous nation”; the Picts, by Camden’s contradictory logic, are non-native, and more importantly, non-English. By placing these ancient British/Englishmen in

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 115.

Northern Britain, Camden makes them the claimants of not only of “these remotest part of the island” but historically of the island proper. With the Scots pushed to the Irish margins and the Picts contradictorily presented as both non-native and secondary to the ancient British, the “verie naturall Britans” of the English line take command of the whole of the British Isles.

The tenuousness of Camden’s narrative attests to the historiographical difficulties that the Scots and Picts presented to the English. Unable to wipe them from the records of British antiquity, Camden must instead so diminish their ancestral footprint from the island’s territorial history that the Picts and Scots—and the contemporary Scottish and Irish—appear as either foreigners to the archipelago or nothing other than peoples of an ancient English stock. A second and perhaps less complicated narratological gesture also deployed by Camden is to subsume Scotland altogether. Whereas his indexical and rhetorical separation of the Scottish from the British accomplished Scotland’s diminishment in the first instance, Camden then uses the language of national unity to strip Scotland of its autonomy and territorial might. “A divine and heavenly opportunity is now fallen into our laps, which wee hardly ever hoped, and our Ancestours so often and so earnestly wished”, Camden intones, “Namely, that Britaine [ ... ] should all throughout like one uniforme City, under one most sacred and happie Monarch, the founder of perpetuall peace, by a blessed Union bee conjoynd in one entire bodie”.<sup>48</sup> The ascension of King James that accomplished this “blessed Union” was hardly a happy accident, and, on both sides of the border, anxieties mounted regarding this “divine and heavenly opportunity”. Specifically, both the English and the Scottish feared the loss of national identity that could come of this merger of distinct sovereign kingdoms. Camden’s notion that “wee all one nation are this day” is not a celebration of two autonomous cultures and governments

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid, Vol 3, 3.



binding themselves in an equal union.<sup>49</sup> Considered as a whole, *Britannia*'s slender narrative devoted to Scotland and its single cartographic representation of the Scottish nation figure Scotland as a newly annexed English territory affixed to the island of England. Fittingly, the nation of Scotland is quickly reduced to "The Republicke or Common-wealth of the Scots" only a few pages later.<sup>50</sup>

Camden's ancient history of the Scots is likewise designed to reinforce England's suzerainty over the main British island. Camden tells the story of two breeds of Scot: "the old, true, and naturall Scots [ ... ] whose of-spring are those Scots speaking Irish, which inhabite all the West part of the kingdome of Scotland, now so called, and the Islands adjoining thereto, and who now adaies be termed *High-land men*" and "the rest which are of civill behaviour, and bee seated in the East part therof, albeit they beare now the name of Scottish-men, yet are they nothing lesse than Scots, but descended from the very same Germane originall, that we English men are".<sup>51</sup> Here, Camden conflates several strains of the above narratives; the Scots as barbaric Irish, the inherent difference between the peoples of the Highlands and Lowlands, a politicized renaming of Scottish territories, etc. But in this formulation, it is both the inhabitants and the land itself that is subject Camden's re-signification. Per Bede's history, the "true, naturall" Scots are foreign to the British soil, interlopers whose non-native seeds have unnaturally taken root on the island. Their ethnic separateness from the British is signaled even in Camden's time by their linguistic difference and uncivil character. In contrast to the above historical reformulations, Camden here brackets off western Scotland as a separate "kingdom" of un-English invaders.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, Vol 3, 7.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, Vol 1, 119.

Whereas those ancient inhabitants of the northeastern portion of the British island were in actually not Scots at all but Englishmen, sprung from “the very same Germane originall”, the eastern Scots are a kingdom unto themselves, unnaturally occupying a stolen [English] land. It is significant that Camden depicts this separate and foreign nation of Highland-men not simply as some vestige of Britain antiquity but as a current feature of Britain’s geopolitical landscape. The region of the British island that houses this foreign contingent is, “now so called”, the Kingdom of Scotland, and “now adaies” these unsavory peoples fall under their own distinct designation that geographically and ethnically distinguishes them from the rest of the British. In Camden’s geopolitical reconfiguration, the English are the ancestral proprietors of the British island; the ancient Scots who invaded its shores maintain a rogue existence in a land that they do not rightly occupy.

As if to lend further visual evidence to this point, Camden situates his map of England in the *Britannia* such that it interrupts the telling of the ancient Scot’s narrative. In the final pages of the “Scots” section of his ancient history, Camden again repeats the now well-worn story of the Highland-man’s Irish heritage and the constitutional Englishness of the Lowlanders:

All they which inhabite the East part of Scotland, and be called *Lowlandmen*, as one would say, of the *Lower-countrie*, are the very offspring of the English-Saxons, and doe speake English. But they that dwell in the West coast, named *Highlandmen*, as it were, of the upper countrie, be meere Scots, and speake Irish, as I have said before: and so none are deadly enemies, as they be unto the *Lowlandmen*, which use the English tongue as we doe.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, Vol 1, 126-27.

Narratively, there is little variation to this xenophobic tale of English superiority and territorial ownership, with the exception of “deadly” violence inflicted by the Highlanders on the “English” lowlanders. Once again, Camden’s southeastern Scotland is actually English, and the western portion of the island is literally “Scot-land”, a region captured by a marauding band from Ireland who have illegally taken root in English territory. The difference here is that Camden underscores this troublesome assertion cartographically: placed such that it visually reinforces England’s claim to Scotland and its ancestral ownership of the island at large, Camden’s map of England obstructs the Scots’ narrative fulfillment of their place in Britain’s history. Just prior to the final page of Camden’s description of the ancient Scots, the chorographer inserts his map entitled “Englond Anglia Anglosaxonum Heptarchia”, an intricate cartographic depiction of the English territories in which Scotland and Ireland are emptied of any geographic or political detail. The map intrudes upon the Scots’ narrative between the above cited passages: “But they that dwell in the West coast, named Highlandmen, as it were, of the upper country, be mere Scots and speake Irish, as I have said before: and so none are deadly enemies, as they be...” and “unto the Lowlandmen, which use the English tongue as we doe”.<sup>53</sup> The page break, like Camden’s ideologically-charged bifurcation of Scotland, divides the highland Scots from the “English” lowlander.<sup>54</sup> The map likewise enacts a kind of textual break, interrupting the written narrative of the Scot by inserting within this textual history a map of England, as though England’s claim to ancestral ownership and contemporary suzerainty disallows the very entrance and position of the Scot in British (i.e. English) history.

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, Vol 1, 126-27.

<sup>54</sup> Though one must consider as a factor in this placement the needs of the early modern printer, who likely needed to fit as many words as possible onto the page, it is uncanny that even Camden’s accidental organization reinforces the persistently reiterated distinction between the Scottish highlands and “English” lowlands”.

Speed, Camden's contemporary and a fellow member of the Society of Antiquarians, likewise contributed to the myth of the English island nation by displacing Scotland from his "Ile of Great Britaine".<sup>55</sup> Driven to compile his massive narrative companion to his *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* by "the ardent affection and love to [his] native Countrey", Speed's patriotic fervor for England infects his illustration of the bi-national island, rendering Scotland and the native Scots historically obsolete. The absence of Scotland from Speed's narrative is signaled in both the work's title and the illustrative frontispiece that ushers the reader into the work. The title, *The History of Great Britaine Under the Conquests of ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans* is given visual representation by the five figures that surround the title plate (fig 1). On the lower tiers stand the Dane and the Norman in their supposed respective dress; above them are placed "A Romane" and "A Saxon". The representative Saxon gazes fondly at the title plate; in Speed's genealogy the English are sprung from his ancient line. Hierarchically situated in the top center position of this archway is the "Britaine", whose prominence on the page and exaggerated size indicate his dominance over the lesser tribes making up this genealogical portrait. Because of the careful positioning of these ethnographic specimens on the tiered archway, and because of the looming presence and size of the "Britaine" atop the arch, one's eye is drawn from the bottom of the illustration to the top, implying a kind of historical evolution culminating in the birth of the Briton. The lesser ethnic groups peopling Britain's history contributed to the making of the national prototype and are thusly granted a place in Speed's genealogy.

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<sup>55</sup> Speed, John. *History of Great Britaine Under the Conquests of ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans; Their Originals, Manners, Warres, Coines, & Seales with ye Successions, Lives, acts & Issues of the English Monarchs from Julius Caesar to our most gracious Soverainge King James. EEBO*. Web. Michigan State University Lib. 11 Jan 2010. 115. All future citations of Speed's *History* are from this document.

Conspicuously absent from this ethnographic catalog is the Scot. Like Camden, Speed relegates the Scot to a genealogical position *outside* Britain proper; whereas the Dane, Norman, Roman and Saxon all went into the making of the *natio* “The Britaine” and his nation “Great Britaine”, the ancient Scot has neither a role in the genealogical make-up of the Britaine nor a rightful territory on his island. Nor does the Scot register in Speed’s “Ancient Nations Inhabiting this Iland of Great Britaine Before the Conquest Thereof by the Romanes” or “The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Britaines”, except in very minor instances.<sup>56</sup> Whereas Camden fleetingly glances at the “third nation of Scots”, Speed virtually expunges from ancient Britain the forefathers of the kingdom to England’s north. Only in his “Portraiture of the Ancient Britaines, of their Nakednesse, Painting and Figuring their Bodies [...] &c.” does Speed acknowledge the presence of the Scot on the ancient isle and only as a foreign tribe to be differentiated from the “*British Pictes*”.<sup>57</sup> Speed repeats the hypothesis posited by Camden that the Picts were actually “untractable Britaines” driven into the north by the Roman invasion. To further this notion, Speed cites the “British Resemblance” demonstrated by the Picts in “their *language*, their *manners*, their kind of *Government*” as evidence “that these Picts were no other then that multiplied offspring of those *Britaines*”.<sup>58</sup> The Scots are cast by Speed as a foreign tribe that eventually came to be aligned with the native British Picts against the Roman invaders; later, Speed will complicate this narrative to imagine the Scots as traitors to these ancestral

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<sup>56</sup> In “The Ancient Nations”, Speed references the Scot not as a member of these ancient British communities, but as a contemporary people who should give up their belief in “*their Scotia*”, as England should surrender the myth of Brutus to unreliable storytelling (166). The Scot appears in “Manners and Customs” first in a brief reference to the complexions of the “Caledonians in the Northene Promontories” and a second time when Speed glances toward the Caledonians’ town organization. Speed, 167.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 181.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

British, as discussed below. To place in boldface the Scots' difference from the indigenous British, Speed draws upon the historiographic narrative also deployed by Camden linking the Scots to Ireland: it is the "Irish-Scots" who arrive on Speed's Great Britain from elsewhere. Speed's unexplained and uncritical collapsing of the Irish and Scots, and his assumption of the Picts' British identity effectively depicts the ancient island as purely "British", the "Irish-Scots" making up a non-native contingent foreign to the British shores.

In a manner more direct than his contemporaries, Speed asserts England's dominant genealogical position within the ancient British family. Taking up the origin myth that imagines the British as descendents of Noah and his son Japheth, Speed makes the following claim regarding the essential Englishness of all Britons:

*Gomer*, then, the eldest sonne of *Japeth*, gave name to the *Gomerians*, who filled almost this part of the world, leading (as *Villichius* saith) in the tenth yeere of *Nimrod*, a *Colonie* out of *Armenia* into *Italie*, which of *Gomer* were called *Combri*, and afterwards *Cimbri*: whence such as departed Italy went into the *North* parts and gave name to *Cimbrica Chersonesus*: from whence it is certaine we the *English* proceede, and of whom also it is likely the *Britaines* came.<sup>59</sup>

In this biblical genealogy, the English take precedence over the Britons as descendents of the originary northern Europeans; in Speed's estimation, it is "certaine" that the English sprung from the Cimbri, the original inhabitants of Britain and the northern territories, whereas the Britons' relationship to the Cimbris is less easily determined. Speed's calculation reverses the traditional historiographic telling of the British peoples. In most cases, we are first told of the ancient Britons and their probable ancestors. Only after establishing this ancestral lineage do the English

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 161.

enter the picture, usually as descendents of the Saxons. Here, the English precede the Britains; the English independently arose from the ancient Cimbri rather than from the mixed pool of British ethnicities that came later in the long British history. Following the logic of Speed's narrative, it seems probable that *the British*—the people of uncertain origin—sprung from *the English*, whose ties to the Cimbri mark them out as originary inhabitants of the island.

In his proem to *The History*, Speed repeatedly enacts the severing of Scotland from the island, making England stand for Britain. Like the frontispiece that ushers us into Great Britain's past, Speed's proem removes from his portrait of the celebrated island the multi-ethnic character of the oceanic territory. Again referencing the "naturall *love* and true *affection* to [his] *native Countrey*" that compels a man to a greater knowledge of his origins, Speed writes the following paean to England:

That this our *Countrey* and *subject* of *History* deserveth the *love* of her *inhabitants*, is witnessed even by *forraine writers* themselves, who have termed it the *Court of Queene Ceres*, the *Granary of the Westerne world*, the *fortunate Island*, the *Paradise of pleasure* and *Garden of God*; whose *Typographicall descriptions* for the whole *Island*, and *Geographical surveyes* for the severall *parts*, exceed any other *kingdome* under the cope of *Heaven*; that onely excepted which was *conquered* and *divided* by *Josuah*; And for *fruitfulnes* and *temperature* may be accounted another *Canaan*; watered with *rivers that doe cleave the earth*, as the *Prophet* speaketh, and make the land as rich and *beautiful*, as was that of *Aegypt*. Our *Kings* for *valour* and *Sanctity*, ranked with the *worthiest* in the *world*, and our *Nations originals*, *conquests*, and *continuance*, tried by the *touch* of best *humane* testimonies, leave as faire a *Lustre* upon the same *stone*, as doeth any

other, and with any *nation* may easily contend (saith *Lanquet*) both for *antiquity*, and *continuell inhabitants, from the first time that any of them can claime their originals.*<sup>60</sup>

According to Speed's own language, the "subject" of *The History of Great Britaine* is not the multinational archipelago, not a multilateral territory of separate kingdoms, but a singular "countrey", "nation", "island" and "kingdome" seated alone in the northern seas and celebrated by writers of antiquity. Each of his descriptors and comparisons—"granary", "garden", "paradise", Canaan—points to a single, uniform or contained land with a singular history of "originals" reaching back to antiquity, whose "continuance" into the present day marks them out as a blessed people. Embedded in the usual grouping of tropes and metaphorical descriptions that imagine England as a land of plenty is Speed's political reconfiguration of the British Isles: the language of "court", "nation" "country" and "kingdome" are part of a governmental register that pointedly overlooks that geopolitical complexity of the bi-national island. Likewise, Speed's "nations originals" and "continuell inhabitants" are of a single hereditary line unmatched by history and unmixed by ethnic difference. They are Speed's countrymen: the English who are the island's rightful inhabitants and the true subject of Great Britain's History.

Further divesting Scotland of its territorial and governmental autonomy is the imperial rhetoric that runs through Speed's narrative of the English island. Despite his dedication to his monarch, King James, Speed inextricably links the main British Isle with the body of England's recently deceased queen. Speed collapses the deeply revered body of Elizabeth with the English island body. Despite the death of her physical person, Elizabeth remains "the body [ ... ] the

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 152.



heart and stomach of a king and of a king of England too”.<sup>61</sup> In recuperating the Queen’s body in the form of the English island, Speed diminishes the Scottish king’s monarchical presence while calling up the imperial discourse that rhetorically placed Scotland under English submission. In his “Site and Circuit of Great Brittaines Monarchie”, Speed gives praise to the most prominent of the British Isles:

Besides those fruitfull *Islands* that dispersedly are scattered about the *Mayne*, like to beautifull *pearls* that incompasse a *Diademe*, the Ile of GREAT BRITAIN doth raise it self first to our sight, as the *Bodie* of that most famous & mighty *Empire*, whereof many other *Kingdomes* and *Countries* are *parcels* and *members*. Being by the *Almighty* so set in the maine *Ocean*, as that shee is thereby the *High Admirall* of the *Seas*, and in the terrestriall *Globe* so seated, as that she is worthily reputed both *The Garden of Pleasure*, and *The Storehouse of Profit*, opening her *Havens* every way, fit to receive all forraine trafficke, and to utter her owne into all other parts: and therefore as the Sovereaine *Lady* and *Empresse* of the rest, deserves our description in the first place.<sup>62</sup>

The first image employed by Speed to glorify the largest of the British Isles draws its material from the catalog of Elizabethan portraiture. In almost every representation of England’s queen, pearls are attached to the royal body; William Scrots’ 1546 portrait of Princess Elizabeth and the Darnley (1575), Pelican (1575), Phoenix (1575), Sieve (1583), Ermine (1585), Armada (1588), Ditchley (1592), Hardwick (1599), Rainbow (1600) and Coronation (1600) portraits all drape

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<sup>61</sup> Elizabeth I, “Queen Elizabeth’s Armada Speech to the Troops at Tilbury, August 9, 1588.” *Elizabeth I: Collected Works* Eds. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000): 325-26. Print.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 155.

Elizabeth in pearls, sometimes to the point of encasing the monarchical person, and pearls oftentimes are sewn into the monarch's clothing. Significantly, pearls also feature prominently on the royal diadem. In the Ermine Portrait, for instance, several strands of pearls heavily ensconce the queen's upper body, complimenting the many pearls overlaying her bodice, implying a kind of virginal breastplate. Sitting above a pair of pearl earrings, the perimeter of Elizabeth's diadem is a row of oversized pearls, sending off an otherworldly glow from her divine person. In Speed's visual formulation, one that would likely resonate with a learned Renaissance audience familiar with these official portraits, the smaller islands encircling "the Mayne" are jewels adorning the body of the queen; the "Mayne" island is the Queen's person and that person is England embodied.

This Elizabethan island body, this "Sovereigne Lady and Empresse" wears the many islands of Scotland, Ireland and "the rest" in her crown. Scotland, wholly subsumed by this imperial body, is reduced to little more than one among the several "*parcels* and *members*" that make up England's sovereign territories. The person of the Scottish king all but disappears from Speed's formulation of the feminine English island and the monarchical body that is its human counterpart, who during her reign fashioned herself Scotland's sovereign ruler.

Speed's treatment of Scotland in his cartographic *Theatre* achieves to an even greater degree than his *History* the diminution of Scotland and the Scottish as historically relevant members of the British family and an autonomous people of the British Isles. Apportioned only seven to eight pages of Speed's compendious visual and textual history, Scotland barely flits across the stage of the *Theatre*, its people appearing first and foremost as enemies to England. Of the roughly eight pages allotted to Scotland in the first edition, appearing in 1612, one page is given to the title, one to a chart depicting Scotland's counties, one to the British seal, and two to

the work's single map of the Scottish territories. England is depicted in 45 separate maps and 107 total pages.<sup>63</sup> The whole of Scotland's historical narrative and its approximate 30,400 square miles is allotted two pages of text. Speed explains his scanty representation of Scotland by referencing "a learned Gentlemen of that Nation" who has begun a description of the Scottish landscape and whose "industrious labours" shall contribute "another *Scene* [ ... ] to the perfecting of the *Theatre of Britaine's Glory*".<sup>64</sup> This intended expansion of Scotland's national story never materializes; the 1616, 1632, 1650 and 1676 editions all repeat this same promise and include the same language and roughly the same number of pages. The 1627 edition shrinks the Scottish narrative to a mere four pages, Speed's map of the country disappearing altogether.<sup>65</sup>

That Scotland's "scene" never makes it into production in Speed's *Theatre of Great Britain* is unsurprising, considering his seeming attempt to co-opt Scottish history for English purposes in his "generall description". In his introduction to "this third, though short booke" devoted to Scotland, Speed lists the primary goals of his narrative:

Lest I should seeme too defective in my intendments, let mee without offense [ ... ] give onely a generall view of that Kingdome [ ... ] knowing the Iland furnished with many worthy remembrances appertaining both unto them and us, whom God now hath set under one Crowne: and the rather, for that their more Southern people are from the same Original with us the *English*, being both alike the *Saxon*

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<sup>63</sup> In Speed's *Theatre*, Wales is allotted 14 maps and Ireland five.

<sup>64</sup> This quote appears in the 1616 edition of Speed's *Theatre*, 131.

<sup>65</sup> It is important to note that Speed did publish a separate volume devoted to Scotland, though I am unable to locate it. Nonetheless, it is significant that Scotland is indexically delineated from England by the separateness of this volume, which only emphasizes the essential difference between the two nations occupying this bi-national island.

branches: as also, that the *Picts*, anciently inhabiting part of that kingdom, were the in-borne *Britaines*...<sup>66</sup>

Speed's narrative relies upon a binary of ethnic sameness and difference. Here, Scottish history is also English history, the land a celebratory British space "furnished" with shared monuments to the two cultures. But Speed quickly erases the distinction between "them and us" and this "glorious" Britain is reclaimed for England. Repeating the overdetermined history that casts the southern Scottish as English and the Picts as originary Britons, Speed naturalizes and gives religious weight to what was actually a maneuver of high politics: the joining of the two kingdoms "under one Crowne".

Speed then turns the tables to assert the essential difference of "the *Highland-men* (the naturall *Scot*, indeed)". These true Scottish "are supposed to descend from the *Scythians* who with the *Gettes* infesting Ireland, left both their Issue there, and their maners, apparant in the *Wild-Irish* even to this day".<sup>67</sup> The Scythians, the progenitors of the Irish and the Scot, were once inhabitants of England's other enemy, Spain, and left their barbarous mark on "the modern wild-Irish", who are alike to the Scythians in "Manners" and "garments".<sup>68</sup> Speed's neat collapsing of the island's non-English into a historical body of people antithetical and enemy to England imagines the Scottish as an infestation, an invading tribe that "burst into *Britaine*" during the period of the Roman occupation.<sup>69</sup> These Scythian Scots, according to Speed, first allied themselves with the Picts or "Northern Britaines" only to later turn on these ancient British inhabitants, leading to Picts' extinction. "Fortune crowning the Scots with victory, [they]

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<sup>66</sup> Speed, 131.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

advanced their Kingdome unto such fame and strength, that the same hath long continued without any absolute conquest or surprise, against the assaults of whatsoever enemies” Speed writes, thus aligning the modern-day Scots with their violent and treacherous forebearers who continue to wrongfully inhabit the northern portion of the island.

The cultural geography of early modern Scotland in Speed’s narrative corresponds to the northern/southern distinction so central to his English writing of Scotland. “The *South* whereof is the more populous and more beautiful in manners, riches, and civilitie: the *North* more rude, retaining the customes of the *Wild Irish*, the ancient *Scot*”, Speed maintains.<sup>70</sup> Like the “modern wild-Irish” cited above, his descendent in northern Britain has stalled out in the narrative of English evolution, due to his barbaric genealogy, which stubbornly persists as part of his ethnic make-up. Akin to the natives of the New World or the indigenous people encountered in uncivilized lands, the Scots are a people beyond improvement and are thusly hedged out of the British/English story. The lands they occupy, especially those islands that skirt the main island like pearls in Elizabeth’s crown, are also subjected to a particular strain of colonial narration: the discourse of improvement. Of the “Hebrides, Skie, Mula, Ila, and Arran” islands Speed writes, “all of them [are] plentifull of corn, woods, Salmons and Herrings, as others of Conies, Deere, Horses, and Sheepe, where in some they are wilde, and in others without any owners”.<sup>71</sup> Reading like an advertisement for lucrative colonial investment, this Scotland is a land bountiful with free, untapped resources awaiting the improving hand of the English empire.

The Scot, like his Native American counterpart, is squandering this “plentiful” territory, suspended as he is in a state of inefficiency and irreligion; “the people”, Speed explains to his

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, 132.

likely English reader, “[are] uncivill, and lacking religion, they rather live rudely in state of necessity, then as Lords of these portions which God hath allotted them [ ... ] Religion not knowne among them, these penurious vertues are rather the curses of *Cham*, then the followings of Christ, who forbids us *to be too careful for the morrow*”.<sup>72</sup> Like other early modern writers of colonial literature, Speed draws upon the Bible for his condemnation of the Scots and the wastefulness and lack of productive work that attends their treatment of the land. Shunning God’s generosity and unwilling to make good use of the resources provided them, the Scots occupying these northern islands have cursed themselves through their negligence and have thusly placed themselves in a state of servitude. The natural “Lords” of such uncultivated territory. it would seem, are the English to the south, whose cultivation of island have transformed it into “*the Court of Queene Ceres, the Granary of the Westerne world, the fortunate Island, the Paradise of pleasure and Garden of God*”.

The islands authored by Camden and Speed came under the authorization, either directly or indirectly, of the crown. Camden’s association with Tudor government began early in his career at Westminster. His position first as Second master from 1575-93 and Head master from 1593-97 brought him into “an intellectual and political community closely associated with William Cecil, Baron Burghley, who was steward of Westminster and maintained a residence there”.<sup>73</sup>

Burghley’s career is unmatched in early modern political culture; a statesman integral to the reigns of three Tudor monarchs, Burghley served in Henry VIII’s Parliament, his son Edward

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Herendeen, Wyman H. “Camden, William (1551–1623).” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed. Ed. Lawrence Goldman. Jan. 2008. 18 June 2012 <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4431>>. Web.

VI's Privy Council (under whose reign Burghley was knighted), and acted as Elizabeth's principle and "private secretary". As an invaluable member of the queen's government, Burghley also achieved the titles of Lord Treasurer and Master of the Court of Wards.<sup>74</sup> Camden's association with this most celebrated of Elizabethan career politicians is signaled by his dedication of *Britannia* to Burghley. During the years devoted to the revision and expansion of *Britannia* (1586-1607), Camden was made Clarenceux, King of Arms by Elizabeth's government. Among the Clarenceux's many official duties was "representation of the monarch" and "the marshalling of tournaments and royal and noble processions".<sup>75</sup> The highly regulated and ideologically crucial task of representing the monarch in print resulted in Camden's 1615 *Annales rerum Anglicarum, et Hibernicarum, regnante Elizabetha*, or *The History of Elizabeth*, a projected spurred on by Burghley, "who supplied him with private documents for the purpose", and supported by King James.<sup>76</sup> Though *Britannia* was originally conceived before his appointment to this official position, one can reasonably assume that Camden's relationship with Burghley and his nationalist representation of the realm in the *Britannia* proved his potential worth to the crown as a writer of England, thus influencing his rise in the Elizabethan and Jacobean courts.

Speed likewise fell under the patronage of a well established Elizabethan politician, Sir Fulke Greville, and was admitted into the privileged sphere of monarchical influence. Under Greville's patronage, Speed gained governmental access to the land: "he received official passes

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<sup>74</sup> Herendeen, Wyman H.. "Camden, William (1551–1623)." *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed. Ed. Lawrence Goldman. Jan. 2008. 18 June 2012 <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/4431>>. Web.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

[ ... ] to facilitate his country mapping, and [ ... ] he was rewarded with land and with official positions.<sup>77</sup> Speed met personally with Elizabeth in 1598 to present her with his maps of the realm, after which Greville “found him a post in the Customs, and with Queen Elizabeth’s support subsidized his map-making”.<sup>78</sup> The mapmaker and historian was also servant to Elizabeth’s successor, for “in 1605 and 1608 he was paid for making maps for the king, and about 1606 he was granted a coat of arms”.<sup>79</sup> Speed’s reach into the official world of nation-building extended even to James’s most spectacular project as king: the production of the *King James Bible*. Speed’s 1592 religious tract, *Genealogies Recorded in the Sacred Scriptures* appeared “in every copy of the Authorized Version of the Bible for ten years,” beginning in 1610.<sup>80</sup>

The English island composed by Speed and Camden—both authors who won the approval and support of the crown for their deeply nationalist texts—was very much in keeping with state interests. The myth of the English island nation served two conjoined political purposes: the nationalist demand that England be perceived as a self-sufficient, self-sustaining island nation, and the imperial necessity of an England capable of subduing and controlling its archipelagic neighbors. Both threads of this constructed island ideology were needed to combat glaring governmental failures and England’s inescapable geographic vulnerability. Stripped of its

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<sup>77</sup> Barber, Peter. “England II: Monarchs, Ministers, and Maps, 1550-1625.” *Monarchs, Ministers and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe* Ed. David Buisseret (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1992): 82-83. Print.

<sup>78</sup> Bendall, Sarah. “Speed, John (1551/2–1629).” *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: OUP, 2004. Online ed. Ed. Lawrence Goldman. Jan. 2008. 18 June 2012 <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/26093>>. Web and Nigel Nicolson, “Introduction” *The Counties of Britain: A Tudor Atlas by John Speed* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1989): 10. Print.

<sup>79</sup> Bendall, “Speed”, no pg.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.



mythological veneer, early modern England was a nation hemmed in by volatile borderlands by land and highly susceptible to foreign incursions by sea. The violence and lawlessness that characterized the Welsh and Scottish marches were unmistakable signs of England's inability to regulate its imperial territories. Distressing reports of bloody conflicts and governmental mismanagement in Ireland provided continual and irrefutable evidence of England's colonial failures. The persistent threat that these unwilling inhabitants of England's Britain might seek independence by aligning themselves with foreign factions, such as France or Catholic Spain, made the unprotected coastlines of both England and its imperial territories a seemingly endless site of potential invasion. The English nation-space was itself a land of governmental and cultural disunity. The attempt to develop and maintain a state infrastructure to bring uniform law and order to England's national territory threw into stark relief the regional differences and local allegiances that disproved governmental claims to national homogeneity. Despite claims to the contrary, the English land did not provide in abundance all that was necessary to early modern civilization; rather, a paucity of certain necessary resources made English dependence upon the continent an absolute necessity.

Texts fabricating the myth of the English island nation were constructed and deployed to literally paper over England's nationalist and imperial weaknesses. In these productions, the English island stands as a divine model of insularity, abundance, autonomy and strength, bred of the land itself.<sup>81</sup> The opening lines of Michael Drayton's *Poly-Olbion* demonstrate this widely circulated and oft-repeated language:

Through a *Triumphant Arch*, see *Albion* plas't,

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<sup>81</sup> As explained in the introduction, Jeffrey Knapp also claims that England turned its "littleness" into a sentiment of pride regarding the island's "other-worldly"-ness (4). Knapp, *An Empire Nowhere: England, America, and Literature from Utopia to The Tempest* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1992): 4. Print.

In *Happy* site, in *Neptunes* armes embras't,  
 In *Power* and *Plenty*, on hir *Cleevy* Throne  
 Circled with *Natures Gharlands*, being alone  
 Stil'd th'*Oceans Island*.<sup>82</sup>

The above lines from Drayton's "Upon the Frontispice" are intended to provide us a reading of the detailed illustration that opens his sprawling topographic poem (fig. 2). In this representation of Great Britain embodied, Albion sits contentedly beneath an arch decorated by her mythological and historical suitors: Brute, Caesar, the Saxon Hengist, and William the Conqueror. Beyond the arch is the industrious sea, scattered with boats and expanding infinitely to the horizon. The female figure Albion is draped in a map of England or Wales, recognizable by its similarity to Saxton's 1574-1579 cartographic works in its signs and markers. She cradles a cornucopia bursting with vegetables, fruits and grains in one arm and a sceptre in the other, this sceptre bearing resemblance to the one held in the same hand by Elizabeth in *The Coronation Portrait* (1600). Her neck strung with pearls, she is being crowned with a laurel wreath by a pair of angels, a third angel hovering above them trumpeting her divinity.<sup>83</sup>

Albion's looming figure, in comparison to the men on the arch who sought to subdue her, and her solitary position in the sea align her body with the main island of Great Britain. The mythological Brute and the historical figures surrounding Albion invaded and inhabited the

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<sup>82</sup> Drayton, "Upon the Frontispice." *Poly-Oblion* London: Printed by Humphrey Lownes for M Lownes. I Browne. I Helme. I Busbie, (1612). EEBO Michigan State University Lib 19 June 2012. Web.

<sup>83</sup> Helgerson argues that the text of *Poly-Olbion* disputes the vision that I read in the frontispiece, arguing that "not king, but country dominates his vision [ ... ] Through all the dynastic changes that have occurred [ ... ] the land has kept its integrity. Various streams and woods and mountains have become partisan supporters of the different peoples that have lived near them". Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992): 140. Print.

English territories of the island; Scotland and Ireland were less impacted by their incursions. The above details of Albion's dress and props clearly associate this representation of Albion with Elizabeth, Drayton's reference to the former queen perhaps owing to his strained relationship her successor. Combining the markers of Elizabeth's royal person in his portraiture with the likely map of England draping this territorial figure and the historical narrative of England's conquest personified around the arch, Drayton unmistakably casts Albion as England.

This England reigns "triumphant" over a land and sea that have joined with each other harmoniously; England, divinely "plas't" in her oceanic realm, is enclosed in the "armes" of a loving Neptune. The sea is her "throne", situated under the arch that, like the proscenium arch of the early modern masque, glorifies her singular monarchical body and the nation that is equated with it. Her ships travel this oceanic stage, exporting her copious natural resources to trade on the global marketplace (the ships appear to be heading away from Albion, rather than toward her ports). Her power is signified by Albion's confident gaze at the viewer, the exaggerated sceptre, the physical diminishment of her conquerors and her oversized figure that visually overpowers the sea. Albion is in a pose of domination. Her island insularity is a necessary component of her strength; her cooperative relationship with the sea, which ferries her goods to other lands and holds her in a protective "embrace", confers on Albion a large measure of her power. The sea provides the fertile ground and makes her a showcase to the world "being alone" on the vast ocean on "hir Cleevy Throne". Drayton's enjambment of "alone" in line 4 lends pointed emphasis to England's uniqueness and singularity as an island nation, "a world divided from the world" by not just the sea but by its natural "Plenty", its divine placement "on the edge of the world", and its singular monarch, the female sovereign that brought England its national and

imperial glory.<sup>84</sup> It is England “alone” that is blessed with “Natures Gharland” and it is England that is “alone / Stil’d th’Oceans Island”, as though the Ocean herself is enamored of the small island nation that sits apart from the known world.

Lurking beneath Drayton’s ode to English Albion is a set of nationalist and imperial anxieties that cannot be dispelled by pretty poetics. The rhetorical tension between Albion as Great Britain and Albion as England remains, despite Drayton’s cloaking of the island in the cartographic language of England. The Celtic name for Scotland, after all, is Albany, which has its linguistic roots in this supposedly English signifier. In fact, these very gestures—posing Albion in the guise of Elizabethan portraiture, the over-emphasis on her singular monarchical and national body, the repeated notion that England triumphantly stands alone—all point to the tedious machinations necessary to expel Scotland and Ireland from this mythic island. As noted above, the multinational archipelago and England in particular were not protected by the sea; rather, the oceanic border seriously jeopardized Great Britain’s national security, as the Spanish invasion of Ireland in 1588 bore out. The possibility of collusion between James VI of Scotland and his French brethren during Elizabeth’s reign meant that both the northern and southern seas invited foreign invasion of the English body politic and the dismantling of England’s already tenuous imperial hold over the several political bodies that made up Albion. For, in spite of her personification’s dominant figure and dauntless expression, the Elizabethan and Jacobean governments were hardly so self-assured regarding their faltering colonial and imperial projects. The currents of English mistrust and xenophobia toward the Scottish that attended James’s ascension promised not a harmonious joining of states but a continued cultural and political division made worse by England’s unsuccessful attempts to quash Scotland’s autonomy. Ireland,

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<sup>84</sup> I borrow this term from Kathy Lavezzo’s *Angels on the Edge of the World: Geography, Literature, and English Community, 1000-1534* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006) Print.

the most obvious example of England's colonial mismanagement and imperial infirmity, violently and successfully refused to bend to Albion's will. Nor was England's position in the global market particularly strong. Scrambling after its more successful competitors—namely, Spain, whose colonial wealth far exceed that of the English—Elizabeth's government resorted to piracy, thusly reinforcing England's marginal position on the global stage.<sup>85</sup>

England's marginality was the very quality that writers like Camden, Speed and Drayton sought to mask. "A World Divided from the World" might also be read as an England cut off from the World, an England alone, an England that suffered at God's hands by its geographic vulnerability and precarious position outside or other to the continent. Dubious rhetorical reversals were needed to combat this damning portrait: England was not isolated but insular. Its very insularity was a central tenet of England's glorious history and future fate as a people, nation and monarchy. The very nature of the island and its position apart from the continent imbued the English with a natural nationhood. A people harmoniously bound together by the

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<sup>85</sup> Richard Armitage considers the "myth" surrounding the English "empire of the seas" that sought to overcome Spanish dominance of global trade in the Elizabethan Era: "the conventional chronology of the Empire's origins, which located them in the reign of Elizabeth I, nourished that belief and anchored it in a particular maritime history. The originating agents of empire were the Elizabethan sea-dogs, Gloriana's sailor-heroes who had circumnavigated the globe, singed the King of Spain's beard, swept the oceans of pirates and Catholics, and thereby opened up the sea-routes across which English migrants would travel, and English trade would flow, until Britannia majestically ruled the waves. The myth was persistent not least because it enshrined an inescapable truth: the British Empire was an empire of the seas, and without the Royal Navy's mastery of the oceans, it could never have become the global empire upon which the sun never set". Yet, as Armitage explains, this mythical narrative "derives in large part from the nineteenth-century celebration of an oceanic hegemony whose origins were traced back to the exploits of Drake, Hawkins and Raleigh". This myth, like so many others of the period, was based upon England's island status. "The geographic fact of Britain's insularity implied that it would naturally become a maritime power", he contends. "Because Britain's maritime destiny seemed compelled by nature, it was by definition beyond historical analysis". Under the scope of analysis, however, this myth patches over a "complacent amnesia" regarding England's actual power in the world of global trade. Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006): 100-01. Print.

ocean's embrace, England's national narrative and genealogy was embedded in the island's soil, its geographical uniqueness that positively sequestered the English from contaminating influences from abroad. England's alone-ness was not a weakness, but a sign of God's divine blessing. It stood on the world's edge like an attainable heaven.

Concluding the general description of Britain that opens his massive chorography, Camden instructs his readers that they can now explore his textual island assured in the knowledge of Britain's inherent greatness. "For Nature tooke a pleasure in the framing thereof," he intones,

and seemeth to have made it a second world, sequestered from the other, to delight mankinde withall, yea and curiously depainted it of purpose as it were a certaine portraict, to represent a singular beautie, and for the ornament of the universall world, with so gallant and glittering varietie, with so pleasant a shew are the beholders eyes delighted, which way so ever they glace.<sup>86</sup>

Awed by his description of this jewel in the sea, the reader is poised to examine Britain's territories through the dazzling lens of Camden's rhetoric. Nature, Camden contends, is the author of Britain's "singular beautie", abundant resources and unique geographical character. England—for, as we have seen, Scotland barely registers as Britain in Camden's work—is the favorite of both God and Nature herself.

Yet, the very rhetorical machinations necessary to render England's isolation as positive insularity are here in Camden's description very much on display. Not Nature but the author has "framed" this glowing "portraict" of a vibrant and heavenly England, a fantastic "second world" to replace the actual English realm, fraught as it was with internal conflict and external threat.

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<sup>86</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 4.

The “shew” that Camden puts on in this introductory salvo is sophisticated but compromisingly instrumental; to transform England into a land of natural autonomy, heavenly charm and the world’s wonder, he must cloak the island’s sequestration in so many poetic devices. Camden has “depainted it of a purpose”: to overwrite England’s dangerous isolation as a divinely appointed strength.

The entirety of *Britannia*’s introduction betrays the impossibility of plastering over England’s geographic weakness. No matter Camden’s compendious accumulation of classical sources or his rhetorical maneuvers, the ideological scaffolding maintaining England’s Britain is inevitably exposed as rickety and unstable. Britain, “the most famous Iland, without comparison, of the whole world”, is imbued by Camden with a kind of independent life.<sup>87</sup> “Thrusting it selfe forward with great desire from all parts into the sea” and “so advance[ing] it selfe” onto the world’s stage, the island makes its entrance in Camden’s text as a land destined by God and Nature to claim the world’s attention and to win its place in history.<sup>88</sup> The blessedness of the isle—its quasi-edenic landscape and climate, its fruitfulness, its openness to the sea and to all the world—are all attributable to its island status. Its location “in Neptune’s armes” accounts for its divine nature:

Britaine is seated, aswell for aire as soile, in a right fruitfull and most milde place, the aire so kinde and temperate that not only the Summers be not excessive hote, by reason of continuall gentle windes that abate their heat (which as they refresh the fruits of the earth, so they yeeld a most wholesome and pleasing contentment both to man and beast), but the Winters also are passing milde. For, the raine

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<sup>87</sup> Camden, Vol.1, 1.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

falling often with still showers [ ... ] dissolveth the rigour of the cold so; and  
withal the sea which compasseth it with moderate warmth doth comfort the land  
in such wise as that the cold with us is much more remisse than in some parts of  
France and Italie.<sup>89</sup>

Here the land and sea conjoin to produce this idyllic space so unlike the continent that its geographic separateness defines it as a divine otherworld. The “gentle windes” stirred up by the sea protect the island from severe temperatures, making the land itself a source of “pleasing contentment” unmatched by the rest of the world’s, particularly England’s European rivals. The sea, here, has a kind of affection for the land it surrounds, lending it “comfort”, cradling and providing for its inhabitants.

Yet, Camden’s very language when describing the island’s disconnected nature is unfaithful to this rhetorical marriage of land and sea. When illustrating Britain’s geographic position in regard to Europe, Camden cannot contain the sea’s violence and the destructive force that was the cause of England’s isolation. “Severed from the continent [ ... ] by interflowing of the Ocean” the island suffers “the most vast and wide Hyperborean sea beating upon it” in the north and “on the East [...] enforced sore it is with the Germane sea”.<sup>90</sup> The island described here is not the sea’s partner but its victim. Wrecking its violence upon the island body, the sea relentlessly batters the land, so penetrating the coastal skin that “some thinke the land [ ... ] was pierced thorow, and received the seas into it”.<sup>91</sup> Attempting to sidestep the dangerous contention that Britain is among “certein Ilands [that] have been violently broken off from the firme land”—

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<sup>89</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 3.

<sup>90</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 1.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.



for to acquiesce to such a notion would deny England its inherent island-ness and all that is attached to it, Camden withdraws himself from this historical debate. “That the providence of God hath ordained divers things to one and the same end, who knoweth not?” he questions. “And verily, that parcels of the earth dispersed here and there within the sea serve no lesse to adorne the world, than lakes spred upon the earth and hilles raised aloft, aswell Divines as Philosophers have alwaies held”. But this appeal to Heaven’s will and the now well-worn image of Britain as a jewel in the ocean cannot dispel the image conjured up by Camden of the rent island body subjected on all sides and at all time to the brutal sea.

The reiterated discourse of England as “another world” is, in Camden, evidence of the island’s fame in the classical age. Reports of Britain’s discovery served not only to grant the island a place in classical history, but also to divert attention away from Britain’s comparatively small territory and geographic insecurity.<sup>92</sup> “So large, and of such exceeding greatnesse in circuit”, Camden writes,

they in olde time tooke it to be that Caesar, he who first of all the Romans discovered it, wrote, *How he had found out another world; supposing the same so great, as that it semmed to conteine within it the Ocean, and not to be compassed about there with*; and Julius Solinus Polyhistor hath left it in writing that for the largenesse thereof it deserveth well neere the name of a second world.<sup>93</sup>

A world unto itself, Britain’s autonomy is a built-in characteristic, evinced by its very geography. The glowing illustrations of the ancients confer on the island a classical greatness;

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<sup>92</sup> As explain above in footnote 54, Knapp makes a similar point in *Empire Nowhere*.

<sup>93</sup> Camden, Vol 1, 2.

Camden even goes so far as cite ancient authors who believed Great Britain to be the Fortunate Islands of classical legend.<sup>94</sup>

By the time of Camden's writing, early modern cartographic science had disproved the notion of Britain's "exceeding" size, such that the author is able to provide the island's measurements in his description. More damaging to the above depiction of this British second world is Camden's choice of sources. In his attempt to lend to his nation a classical veneer, Camden draws unwanted attention to a dark period in British history: its colonization by Rome. Unwittingly, Camden strips Britain of the very autonomy that is conferred by the title "a second world" by calling upon its Roman conquerors. In this context, Caesar's "another world" has uncomfortable resonances with "the new world", an "undiscovered" land of savages and untapped resources rife for colonization. Caesar's depiction of the ancient Britons in his *Gallic Wars* supports this uncomfortable comparison: surviving on "milk and flesh" and "clad with skins", the uncivilized Britons "wear their hair long" and share their wives.<sup>95</sup> Camden also makes use of Tacitus's description of the island's peculiar shape, presumably to demonstrate that Britain registers in the works of the most famous ancient writers. But, as in Caesar's writings, Britain's fame in Tacitus is not on account of its autonomy but its placid subjection to Roman rule. Tacitus writes in his *Life of Cnaeus Julius Agricola* that Britain at that time was "thoroughly subdued".<sup>96</sup> These British "barbarians" do not reject the Roman occupation but "bear cheerfully the conscription, the taxes, and the other burdens imposed on them by the

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<sup>94</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 4-5.

<sup>95</sup> Caesar, Julius. *The Gallic Wars*. Trans. W.A. McDevitte and W.S. Bohn. Book 5, Chap 14. *The Internet Classics Archive*. <http://classics.mit.edu/Caesar/gallic.5.5.html>. Web.

<sup>96</sup> Tacitus, *Life of Cnaeus Julius Agricola*. Trans Alfred John Church and William Jackson Brodribb. Para 10. *Ancient History Sourcebook*. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/tacitus-agricola.asp>. Web.

Empire, if there be no oppression”.<sup>97</sup> Camden himself points to Britain’s past as a colonized nation when he references Orpheus, who saw in the island “the stately halls / Of Ceres Queen”.<sup>98</sup> The mythical status attributed to Britain by this classical poet is quickly undone when Camden explains that Ceres’ British palace was “the very barne, garner, and storehouse for victuals of the West empire; from whence the Romans were wont yeerely to transport into Germanie”.<sup>99</sup> Through his own admission, Camden reduces Britain to a warehouse that stored plundered resources for its Roman conquerors.

When returned to their original contexts, several of Camden’s ancient citations regarding this island “other world” and its inhabitants are outright damning. For instance, Camden’s very first use of an outside source to describe Britain is a quotation from Virgil’s *Eclogues*: “Britans people”, according to Camden’s translation of Virgil’s renowned work, are “quite disjoin’d from all the world besides”.<sup>100</sup> Set apart from the main body of Camden’s text and placed in the middle of *Britannia*’s first page, this recognition of Britain by among the most revered of classical authors is likely intended to confer a kind of fame on Camden’s island. However, Britain in Virgil’s text is a place of hellish banishment. In “Eclogue I”, Meliboeus is forced from his land and sorrowfully considers the site of his unjust exile: to Tityrus he moans, “But we far hence, to burning Libya some, / Some to the Scythian steppes, or thy swift flood, / Cretan Oaxes, now must wend our way, / Or Britain, from the whole world sundered far”.<sup>101</sup> Britain’s fame in

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid, para 11 and 13.

<sup>98</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 3.

<sup>99</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 3.

<sup>100</sup> Camden, Vol 1,1.

<sup>101</sup> Virgil, *The Bucolics and Eclogues*. Project Gutenberg.  
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/230/230-h/230-h.htm>. Web.

Virgil's work resides in its inhospitable nature, like the "burning" deserts of the Middle East, and its abominable sequestration from the known world. Cicero, another of Camden's classical authorities, echoes Virgil in calling the island and its people "barbarous" and urging in his letters the hasty return of his brother Quintus and the jurist Trebatius Testa from the remote island. Cicero's quote used by Camden to depict the temperate British seas is not, in fact, in reference to Britain but to the nature of oceans more generally.<sup>102</sup>

Speed in his *History* repeats almost verbatim the language and sources deployed by Camden in his introductory description, therefore laying himself bare to the same critique. As in Camden, the beleaguered geographical body and falsified discourse cannot sustain the ideological burden of the myth of the insular and self-sustaining island nation. When returned to the troubling realm of fact, the British archipelago was in the early modern period a geographically, culturally and politically broken territory. Like the disjointed pieces of land making up the scattered kingdom of Britain, the multiple states contained within the archipelago were linked only by a tenuous discursive thread that sought to bind these contentious bodies into singular sovereign unit under the banner of Englishness. In truth, England was a small, internally incoherent nation without a dependable state infrastructure to regulate its peoples and lands. Dangerously surrounded by volatile nations who repeatedly reinstated their cultural, social and political boundaries, oftentimes through violence, England was held hostage by its own imperial posturing. Riven by a sea that invited foreign incursion and suffering both internal and external discord, England was a site of immeasurable vulnerability.

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<sup>102</sup> Cicero, *Of the Nature of the Gods. In Three Books* (Oxford: D.A. Talboys, 1829) Print. See also *The Letters of Cicero: The Whole Extant Correspondence in Chronological Order* Trans. Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1920) 272-89. Print.

## A Very Pleasant Tale

This royal throne of kings, this sceptred isle,  
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars,  
This other Eden, demi-paradise,  
This fortress built by Nature for herself  
Against infection and the hand of war,  
This happy breed of men, this little world,  
This precious stone set in the silver sea,  
Which serves it in the office of a wall,  
Or as [a] mote defensive to a house,  
Against the envy of less happier lands;  
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,  
This nurse, this teeming womb of royal kings,  
Fear'd by their breed, and famous by their birth,  
Renowned for their deeds as far from home,  
For Christian service and true chivalry,  
As is the sepulchre in stubborn Jewry  
Of the world's ransom, blessed Mary's Son;  
This land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land,  
Dear for her reputation through the world,  
Is now leas'd out—I die pronouncing it—  
Like to a tenement or pelting farm.  
England, bound in with the triumphant sea,

Whose rocky shore beats back the envious siege  
Of wat'ry Neptune, is now bound in with shame,  
With inky blots and rotten parchment bonds;  
That England, that was wont to conquer others,  
Hath made a shameful conquest of itself.<sup>103</sup>

This most famous of Shakespearean speeches celebrating the English nation is often only partially quoted, leaving off before the sudden and painful turn in meaning at line 59.<sup>104</sup> Prior to this alarming shift in emphasis, Gaunt's speech brings together the strains of official discourse found in Camden and Speed to compose a kind of nationalist devotional to the English island. His ringing chorus defines the isle as inherently monarchical: like Drayton, Gaunt pictures the island as a throne rising from the sea that is crowned with divine glory. England's "earth of majesty" is itself shot through with sovereign awe, a soil that figuratively engenders kings and queens. Taking the early modern definition of "earth", in which earth is "the material of the human body, considered as derived from the ground", the land is not just a "teeming womb of royal kings" but the body of the monarch incarnate.<sup>105</sup> Gaunt's collapse of the island body and the monarchical body seated and "sceptered" on his oceanic throne extends also to the "happy breed of men" sprung from the sovereign person and occupying Nature's "little world". The literal island people are protected by the sea "wall" from foreign invasion and "infection". For

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<sup>103</sup> Shakespeare, *Richard II. The Riverside Shakespeare* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997): II.i.40-68. Print.

<sup>104</sup> As Sandra Logan asserts, Gaunt's abrupt turn signals "the threat of the fall from paradise" caused by that which "has been lost through Richard's abuses, incapacities, and failings". Logan, *Text/Events in Early Modern England: Poetics of History* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007): 279. Print.

<sup>105</sup> "Earth, n.1". *OED Online*. June 2012. *Oxford University Press*. 18 June 2012  
<<http://www.oed.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/59023?rskey=KlesXT&result=1>>. Web.

England is Nature's preserve from a sinful world, "a fortress built by Nature for herself", a prelapsarian "paradise" altogether separate from the fallen world that encroaches and is repulsed by the sea. The island deserves a place in classical and Christian mythology as the home of "Mars" and the one true God whose hand crafted it as a second "Eden" on earth.<sup>106</sup>

Gaunt's speech tells the tale of the nation's evolution: the island is first Nature's inspired creation ("this earth"), then a naturally bounded space governed by divine government ("this realm") and finally "this England", a nationally demarcated territory recognized and "renowned" on an international stage. This evolution, however, is violently halted by the actions of a corrupt monarch. "This England" is transformed into "that England", a nation of the past destroyed and fallen into a state of obsolescence. With the obliteration of the idealized island—it's degeneration into a "leas'd" space, a space stripped of its autonomy—the literary and ideological scaffolding buttressing Gaunt's England crumbles. The English island so celebrated by Gaunt in the first 59 lines is indeed a "plot": "a map, a plan, a scheme", a "production" poetically staged to be torn down when the political realities of the English state are brought to bear on this construction.<sup>107</sup> When this plotted-ness is exposed, so too are the dangers and weaknesses facing Shakespeare's England. The nation is a "pelting farm", a site where hides are removed, and also a "paltry, petty" territory subject to "persistent striking or beating" from both internal and

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<sup>106</sup> Subtitle quoted from Thomas More's *Utopia. Three Early Modern Utopias*. Trans. Ralph Robinson Ed. Susan Bruce (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999) 72. Print. All future citations from *Utopia* refer to this edition.

<sup>107</sup> "Plot, n.". *OED Online*. June 2012. *Oxford University Press*. 18 June 2012  
<<http://www.oed.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/145915?rskey=ojp2IN&result=1&isAdvanced=false>>. Web.

external forces.<sup>108</sup> The sea which once shielded England from these blows now entraps and “triumph[s]” over the island space. “Bound in” by the ocean and “bound in” by its in-born shame, England is repeatedly cast by Gaunt in this second characterization as vulnerable to an abusive and imprisoning sea. The once-embracing Neptune’s turns its “envious siege” on the nation as a form of punishment for the country’s self-inflicted fall from God’s grace.

The “inky blots” and “rotten parchment” cited here by Gaunt obviously reference the play’s plot, in which Richard II has sold off England to the highest bidders for his own personal gain. But, these tattered papers can also refer to the debunked materials deployed by official writers like Camden and Speed to decorate the “English Island” in a nationalist mythos of positive insularity. Thomas More’s “perfect tale” of an island Utopia likewise takes up the flimsy treaties clumsily articulated by Camden and Speed to disastrous effect. More’s island is plotted in the most literal of senses: a nationalist fantasy acutely aware of its own impossibility.

The mythos of the English island was in broad circulation during the period of *Utopia*’s composition and publication. Present in the nation’s earliest printed chronicles and reiterated thereafter in literary, historical and cartographic productions, this fabrication’s long historical trajectory attests to its ideological import across English history. An essential fiction, the paradigm of the island nation formed the unsteady foundation of long-standing nationalist narratives and intermingled claims to England’s imperial destiny.

The work of 6<sup>th</sup> century cleric Gildas, likely published in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century in England, is perhaps a starting point for the fabrication of the textual island we encounter in Camden, Speed and many others in the early modern period. His portrait of the island is typical

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<sup>108</sup> "Pelting, n.". *OED Online*. June 2012. *Oxford University Press*. 18 June 2012  
<<http://www.oed.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/139942?rskey=0tmerg&result=1&isAdvanced=false>>. Web.



of later texts in which the landscape is described in edenic terms with an emphasis on the land's promise of bountiful production. "Adorned with her large spreading fields, pleasant seated hills, even trained for good husbandry [ ... ] and mountaines most convenient for the changeable Pastures of cattell" this fruitful terrain also offers pleasures of sight and sound that mark the island out as an earthly Elysian Field. "Whole flowers of sundry collours [ ... ] imprint no unseemely picture" on Gildas's literary landscape.<sup>109</sup> The fields are imagined to be the rightful "spouse" of the mountains, which are "decked with diverse jewels" like a decorated bride. The soil is "watered with cleere Fountaines and sundry Brookes, beating on the snow white sands together with soft sounding noise, and leaving a pledge of sweet favours on their bordering bankes, and lakes gushing out abundantly cold running Rivers".<sup>110</sup> The idealized mating of the land's topographical features, the resulting fecundity of the land, the vow promising sensory pleasures to those who experience England's landscape: all combine to produce an otherworldly paradise.

Like the island Edens of Renaissance authors, England's natural sublimity is attributable to its island status. The epistle to Gilda's history opens with the following celebration of England's geographical uniqueness: "the island of *Britaine* [is] placed in the balance of the divine poising hand (as they call it) which weighth the whole world, almost the uttermost bound of this earth towards the South and West".<sup>111</sup> Taking into account the process of translation, "poise" in the 16<sup>th</sup> century denoted "to weigh or balance (one thing *against*, *by*, *to*, *with* another,

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<sup>109</sup> Gildas, "The Epistle of Gildas." *Description of the State of Great Brittain* 1652 EEBO Michigan State University Lib. 17 June 2012. 4 Web.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 1.

or two things against each other); to bring into or hold in mutual equilibrium".<sup>112</sup> In this sense, England was positioned by God as the earth's fulcrum, ensuring the world's geographic stability and granting "equilibrium" to His creation. Crafted and cradled by the hand of the Christian God, the island is not marginal to rest of the world, despite it's location on the earth's "uttermost bound"; instead, it is absolutely central to the earth's geographical organization. The island is likewise the offspring of a protective mother: it is "embraced by the embowed bosomes of the Ocean Sea; with whose most spacious, and on every side [ ... ] unpassable enclosure (as I may call it) shee is strongly defended".<sup>113</sup> The child of God and Nature, of land and water, is a site of divine harmony serving the world at large.

Lest one mistakenly believe that Gildas is describing the whole of Great Britain, the author makes plain that this heavenly territory is bound by the political borderlines delineating the English nation. Early in his history he marks out a predestined English national space by asserting the cultural and political boundaries that delineate the Scots and Picts as fundamentally foreign and violently destructive. Following hard upon the tyrannical rule of Britain by Magnus Maximus in the 4<sup>th</sup> century, Britain was militarily weak and thus susceptible to threats from abroad: "and now absolutely ignorant of all practice of warre, [the Britons were] astonished, and lamentably groaned, as trampled many yeares under the feete of especially two very fierce outlandish Nations, the Scots from the South, and the Pictes from the North".<sup>114</sup> Forced to

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<sup>112</sup> "Poise, v.". *OED Online*. June 2012. *Oxford University Press*. 18 June 2012  
<<http://www.oed.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/146666?rskey=BTiUry&result=3&isAdvanced=false>>. Web.

<sup>113</sup> Gildas, 2.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, 25.

request Rome's aid and pledge its "everlasting subjection" to the empire, Briton was a second time victim to these foreign armies after Rome's departure:

their accustomed foes not unlike devouring Wolves, that ravening with extreame hunger, and greedy jawes, leape over the fold, in the Shepheards absence, being futhered and furnished with the wings of Oares, and the strength of Rowers, and Sailes filled with too prosperous winds, breake downe all bounds [and] commit all murthers.<sup>115</sup>

Gildas's depiction of this unthinking violence casts the Scots and Picts not as an invading people, like the Romans, but two barbaric tribes stealing upon the island from the sea. Unprotected by their Christ-like saviors, the Britons are imagined as helpless Christian lambs persecuted by murderous foreign tribes.

The Romans, no longer willing to send troops and resources to defend their colony, trained the Britons in the art of defense and fortified Hadrain's Wall at the now border between England and Scotland. Left at the mercy of "the reproachfull despights of forraigne Nations", the Britons were once again the victims of the Scots and Picts:

As the brownish bands of wormes and eamots, which in the height of Sommer, and encreasing heate, doe swarming breake out of their most straight and darkesome dens, the dreadfull routes of *Scots* and *Pictes*, partly dissenting in manners, but consenting in one and the selfe same greedy thirst of shedding blood, and shadowing rather their terrible face, with shagging glibes, then hiding the secrets and shame of their bodies with comely garments, doe runne in throngs

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid, 28.

and mustering troopes, a land out of their Ships, wherein they were transported  
over the *Scithian* vale.<sup>116</sup>

Reduced to maggot-like creatures that multiply in the “heate” like an infestation, the Scots and Picts burst from their cowardly “dens” below ground and overrun the Britons’ lands. Largely collapsing their ethnic differences, the two nations become a single enemy contamination. Gildas conceals from view their human qualities, and marks their bodies and faces as inherently savage and ungodly. Their inhumane violence is part and parcel with their geographical departure point; as indicated in the marginal notes, the Scythian Vale is “the Sea betweene *England* and *Ireland*”. Taking from the tradition that imagined the Scots as ancestors of this ancient Middle Eastern nomad culture and gesturing toward the notion that the Scots and Irish are of a single Scythian heritage, Gildas delineates the ocean space that separates England from Ireland as dangerously foreign. He later terms the Scots “impudent Irish wasters”.<sup>117</sup> To breach the outer limits of England, is to enter a world of otherness that constantly threatens to assail English shores.

Despite Gildas’s depiction of the sea as a loving mother, it is this very sea that invites destruction upon the beleaguered English nation. In their pleas to the Romans following these repeated invasions of what would become the English national space, the Britons’ appealed to their Roman conquerors that “the Barbarous beate us to the Seas, the Seas drive us back on the Barbarous, between these two dreadfull kindes of death, we are either slain or drowned”.<sup>118</sup> The “wings of Oares” carry death into England and the sea-locked land offers not security but is

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid, 29, 34-5.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, 41.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, 39.

instead a kind of inescapable prison.<sup>119</sup> The “Southerne shore of the Ocean” in particular was a site of vulnerability, “where [the Scots and Picts’] Shippes lay in Harbour (because the landing of the barbarous savage sort, was there most to be feared)”.<sup>120</sup> According to Gildas’s contradictory discourse, the dangerous waters that trapped England in a state of persistent vulnerability carried elements that could throw England into a state of degeneration. The foreign tribes entering the island from the sea, “heapeth slaughters on slaughters [ ... ] and as Lambs by butchers, so our pitifull Countrymen are by their foes hewed in pieces, insomuch as their habitation was like a wilderness of salvage beasts”.<sup>121</sup>

That Gildas’s “countrymen” are the English is made apparent by the geographical designations of the island that he claims resulted from these foreign invasions. “It hath beene still a custome with our Country (as still alas it remaineth) that she hath been weake to represss the power of their enemies”, Gildas laments. These enemies are decidedly of Irish and Scottish origin, both in the past and the present. The geopolitical divisions of the island that we see in Camden and Speed are here grafted onto the British territories. “The impudent *Irish* wasters”—the Scots being transformed into the Irish and both collapsed into a symbol of foreignness—“departed home, as they who not long after determined to returne againe”, Gildas reports. “First the *Pictes* seated themselves (where afterwards they continued) in the furthest part of the Iland, breaking every while forth in spoyling and defacing our Country”.<sup>122</sup> The northern territories and the island to the west denominated as alien and savage, the English lands (“our Country”) are historiographically carved out as the site of true Britain and indigenous Englishness.

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid, 28.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, 34.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, 37.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, 41.

The slipperiness of British and English designations is elided by rhetorical maneuvers that mark out the English national space even prior to the arrival of the Saxons, who are most often considered the original English. For instance, though Bede in his 8<sup>th</sup> century *Ecclesiastical History of England* cites the Saxons as the true English, his intricate mapping of the eventual English territories implies a kind of nationalist predestination in which the British space becomes an English one. Repeating the narrative that sees the Scots as the ancient inhabitants of Ireland, he contends that the Scythian Picts traveled to the Irish Isle and were instructed by the Scottish to plant themselves in the island “to the eastward”: “The Picts, accordingly, sailing over into Britain, began to inhabit the northern parts thereof, for the Britons had possessed themselves of the southern”.<sup>123</sup> Bede then reiterates, sometimes verbatim, the xenophobic tale of the Scots and Picts attacks upon “the natives” of the island.<sup>124</sup> Three times the victims of these vicious invasions and eventually abandoned by their Roman colonizers, the Picts and Scots settle in those territories demarcated in the early modern period as hostile to the English. “The bold Irish robbers thereupon returned home”, Bede narrates, “intending to come again before long. The Picts then settled down in the farthest part of the island and afterwards remained there, but they did not fail to plunder and harass the Britons from time to time”.<sup>125</sup> The native inhabitants of Britain, the rightful inhabitants of the island as a whole and the people who later evolve into the English nation, are sequestered by foreign tribes from afar.

But Bede goes a step further in his narrative cartography by assigning the topographical features of the island nationalist import. In this introductory remarks regarding the three

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<sup>123</sup> Bede, *Ecclesiastical History of England* Trans. A.M. Sellar (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1912) 7-8 *HathiTrust Digital Library* Michigan State University Lib 16 June 2012. Web.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid, 28.

“nation[s] that eventually inhabited the isle, he explains that “there is a very large gulf of the sea, which formerly divided the nation of the Britons from the Picts; it runs from the west far into the land, where, to this day, stands a strong city of the Britons, called the Alcuith. The Scots, arriving on the north side of this bay, settled themselves there”.<sup>126</sup> Bede provides more detailed geographical detail when depicting “the two very savage nations from beyond the sea” that first ravaged the unprepared Britons:

We call these nations from beyond the sea, not on account of their being seated out of Britain, but because they were separated from that part of it which was possessed by the Britons, two broad and long inlets of the sea lying between them, one of which runs into the interior of Britain, from the Eastern Sea, and the other from the Western, though they do not reach as far as to touch one another. The eastern has in the midst of it the city Giudi. On the Western Sea, that is on its right shore, stands the city of Alcluith, which in their language signifies the Rock Cluith, for it is close by the river of that name.<sup>127</sup>

Having first established the essential foreignness of the Scots and Picts, Bede must account for their continued presence in the territory of the indigenous British. The “two broad inlets” cited above serve as political boundaries corresponding to Camden and Speed’s cultural borderlines differentiating the highland Scots from the lowlanders, who resemble the English moreso than their savage brethren to the north. The eastern waterway described here is likely the Firth of Forth that juts into the Scottish territories, ending at Glasgow. Alcluith is the ancient designation for Dumbarton, which lies upon the eastern most end of the Firth of Clyde on Scotland’s

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, 23-4.

Western shore.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, these two waterways cut across central Scotland, dividing the Southern Uplands from the barbaric regions once settled and still occupied by non-native populations.

The nationalist narratives of Gildas and Bede embedded in the geographical landscape of ancient Britain the territorial borders and imperial conflicts that were unresolved in medieval and early modern England. The historiographical trajectory that projected England onto the lands of the Britons and marked the Scottish lands as usurped territory was entrenched in the English cultural imaginary by More's time. *The Chronicle of John Hardyng*, which appeared in manuscript form in 1436, attests not only to the continuation of this imperial myth-making but also to the active participation of early modern authors to subject Scotland to English rule and claim the island for England's king. Hardyng, according to his 19<sup>th</sup> century biographer, Henry Ellis, was integral to Henry V's "reclaiming" of Scotland, following Mortimer's relinquishing of Scottish lands and fealty to Robert the Bruce. As part of the King's "secret service" in Scotland, Hardyng spent three years in that country attempting to regain deeds of English suzerainty.<sup>129</sup> For his efforts, Hardyng was handsomely rewarded by the English sovereign. His *Chronicle*, which repeatedly asserts England's title to Scotland, was presented to King Edward IV.<sup>130</sup>

Richard Grafton took up and continued Hardyng's work with a kind of xenophobic fervor in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Edward VI's printer during a period of intensified military action against the Scots, Grafton's *Continuation of Hardyng's Chronicle* adds to the history the reigns of Edward

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<sup>128</sup> This information regarding Alcluith is provided in Bede's marginal notes, 24.

<sup>129</sup> Hardyng, John. *The Chronicle of John Hardyng [ ... ] Together with the Continuation by Richard Grafton* Ed. Henry Ellis (London: F.C. and J Rivington, etc., 1812) iv. *HathiTrust Digital Library*. Michigan State University Lib. 16 June 2012. Web.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, xi-xiii.



IV, Edward V, Richard III, Henry VII and Henry VIII's, whose own campaign against Scotland in 1542 preceded his son's "Rough Wooing" of 1547, which left 10,000 Scots dead.<sup>131</sup> Grafton dedicates his *Continuation* to Lord Thomas Duke of Norfolk, who fought at the Battle of Flodden, where King James IV of Scotland was killed. The very first stanza of the dedication cites "Englandes querele" with Scotland; the dedication then proceeds with a vitriolic rhetorical attack upon the Scots and a celebration of Hardyng as "a true herted Englysheman".<sup>132</sup> Hardyng, Grafton maintains, was "not unlearned, as the time was than, / Searched out of chronicles, both late and olde, / All that ever by the same hath bee told: / How fro the begynnyng, Scotlade dooeth reigne / Under kynges of Englande, as their sovereign".<sup>133</sup> Both Grafton and Hardyng are deeply invested in denigrating the Scots and firmly establishing the historical grounds of Scotland's submission to England. From Hardyng's proem: "Nowe be ye knowe", addressing Henry V, "of your title to Englande, / By consequens to Wales and Scotlande, / For they perteyne, as ye maye understande, / Of auncient tyme, to the crowne of Englande".<sup>134</sup> Grafton's marginal note slightly shifts the emphasis of Hardyng's claim, placing this justification of English rule in the realm of 16<sup>th</sup> century politics. Of this stanza he provides the following summary: "The tytyle of the kinges of Englade, to Scotland and Ireland".<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> MacLeod, Morag. "Rough Wooing." *The Oxford Companion to Scottish History*. Michael Lynch. Oxford University Press, 2007. *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. Michigan State University Library. 19 June 2012 <http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t246.e255>. Web.

<sup>132</sup> Hardyng, 1.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

Hardyng's "proof" of England's suzerainty over the island and the foreign inhabitants to the north rests upon the oft-repeated but highly dubious Brutus myth, propagated by Geoffrey of Monmouth in the 12<sup>th</sup> century (discussed in detail in my introduction). Brutus, great grandson of Aeneas, was sent by Diana to "This ysle, enbrased with this sea".<sup>136</sup> Having established "peace and law", "Brute departed Britaine in thre partes to his thre sonnes, the two yonger to holde of the elder; so that Wales and Scotlande shulde do homage to Englande, by hys ordynaunce, by the lawe of Troye".<sup>137</sup> The following two chapters of Hardyng's *Chronicle* attempt to lend further credence to England's ancient claim to the island, first explaining "Howe, by lawe Troyane, the souerayntue belongeth to the eldest brother or syster"; the oldest son of Brutus, Lochrine, was granted what became the English territories after his father's death. The ascension of this "British" (read English) sovereign over the archipelago is the subject of Hardyng's next chapter. According to Grafton, it is Hardyng's knowledge of this suspect mythology that proves his reliability as the narrator of "the first begynnyng of Englande".<sup>138</sup> "Neyther anye Chronicler that euer was, / Eyther dooth or can more largely declare, / Euen from Brutus, howe it came to passe / That kynges of Englande the soueraines are, / And ouer Scotlande outghte rule to beare", Grafton intones. "Hymselfe is wytnes of their subjection, / And homage vnder Englandes protection", referencing Hardyng's campaigns under Henry V in Scotland.<sup>139</sup>

In no uncertain terms, Grafton ups the ante by painting the ancient and contemporary Scots as vicious and distrustful. Scottish subjection to England is his primary theme:

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, 41-2.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, title page.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, 11.

And Hardynges owne self hath the partie bee,  
That from Scotlande, oft tymes, hath brought  
Their seales of homage and fealtee,  
Vnto the kyng of Englande, as he ought :  
Vnto whom the Scottes then sued and sought,  
Yeldyng to liue in humble subieccion,  
Of Englandes gouernaunce and proteccion.

But that people of their propre nature  
Hath, euen from the first, been so uvtowarde,  
So vnstedfast, inconstaunte, and vnure,  
That nothyng maie possibly bee more frowarde,  
So haue thei continued from thens foorthwarde,  
Neuer gladde to bee in quiet and rest,  
But to defeccion aye readie and prest.

.....

And in deede Englad hath oft been constreigned,  
The Scottes slacknesse in dooyng their homage,  
To pricke forewarde, whe thei would haue refreined,  
With y sharpe spurre of marciall forceage ;  
And to abate their watonnesse of courage,  
With the iron rodde of due correccion,  
As oft as thei attempted defeccion.

For Scottes will aye bee bostyng & crakyng ;  
Euer sekyng causes of rebellion ;  
Spoyles, booties, and preades euer takyng ;  
Euer sowyng quereles of dissension ;  
To burne and steale is all their intencion ;  
And yet, as people whom God dooeth hate & curse,  
Thei always begynne, and euer haue the woorse.

Englande hitherto hath neuer lacked power,  
And oft as need wer, the Scottes to compell  
Their duetie to dooe ; and menne of honour  
Englande hath had, as stories dooe tell,  
Whiche, whensoever the Scottes did rebell,  
Wer hable, at all tymes, them to subdue,  
And their obedience to England renue.<sup>140</sup>

Beginning by addressing Hardyng's first person experience of the Scottish and his hand in bringing the Scots to their knees, Grafton illustrates the inborn characteristics of the Scottish, who are inherently wild and not to be trusted in their supposedly willing subjection to England, neither then nor now. Because of their sometimes refusal to pay homage to their English overlords and their unwarranted rebellions against the same, the violence of "due correction" must be applied against these criminal people, whose "nature" it is to "burn and steele". Because

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid, 2-3.

God himself despises the people to the north, the English are divinely justified in their use of the “iron rodde” to quell their viciousness and return them to their right subjection. With God’s blessing, England has, across history, put down the heathen Scots and established Scottish obedience to the English throne. “If Ihon Hardyng bee a trew man, / And in this behalf inspyred with prophecie”, Grafton intones in the *Continuation’s* prefatory material, “[the Scottish] wyll neuer bee but as thei were than, / False to England, suttile, and craftie, / Entendyng myschiefe when thei shew contrary”. Incapable of being reformed, England must instead contain the “spoylers and robbers that amende wyll neuer, / Tyll our kyng shall haue made them Englyshe for euer”.<sup>141</sup> Only by returning the isle of Britain to its proper state—where the island is wholly English—will the Scottish problem be wholly eradicated, along with the Scots themselves.

Grafton’s *Continuation* was published in 1543; he claimed it to be “gathered out of diuerse and soundreie autours, of moste certain knowelage and substanciall credit [ ... ] have writen of the affaires of Englande”.<sup>142</sup> Among these authors, it is contended, is Thomas More. In his preface to the 1812 edition, Ellis states that the histories of Edward V and Richard III were composed by the author of *Utopia*, the account of Richard III also appearing in “‘the History of Richard the Third,’ in the great body of sir Thomas More’s works, by [John] Rastell, in 1557, who says [ ... ] that he printed from a copy in sir Thomas More’s own hand”. More’s works printed in Latin also includes these histories of the English kings cited above. Finally, Sir John Harrington, early modern author and godson to Elizabeth I, attested in his 1596 *Metamorphosis of Ajax* that “the best, and best written part of al our Chronicles, in al men’s opinions, is that of Richard the Thirde, written [ ... ] as most suppose, by that worthy, and uncorrupt magistrate, sir

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid, title page.

Thomas More, sometime lorde chancellor of Englande”. Though Ellis argues against More’s possible authorship of these added histories, he does contend that Hardyng’s manuscript made it “into [More’s] hands”.<sup>143</sup>

More’s investment in historiography and likely participation in this collaborative chronicle strongly indicate that he was aware of the above histories and their attempt to claim the whole of the island for England. His monarch’s campaigns against the Scottish also make apparent that the subjection of Scotland held prominence in the political consciousness of Henry VIII’s government. More’s *Utopia* is heavily inflected with the discourse of early modern geopolitics and the myth of the English island nation that sustained the state’s assertions of imperial dominance. However, as I will argue in the remainder of this chapter, More destabilizes the foundational structures of the island myth; Utopia is an artificial isle unnatural in its very geography. With the debunking of the nation’s supposed island status comes the disintegration of all elements of the national mythos, namely, its autonomy, positive insularity, geographic uniqueness, cultural and ethnic homogeneity and governmental regulation of the national space. Despite the Utopians’ isolationist politics and forcible assertions of their geographic and cultural independence, they are inextricably bound to the continent to which it was once connected. The island’s artificial geographic detachment from the continent is reiterated by its disingenuous claims to its nationalist insularity. The sameness of the Utopian citizenry and their strict adherence to the cultural and governmental politics of the state is not the result of a willed homogeneity but the violent conquest of a foreign civilization and the forced severing of the indigenous peoples from the rest of the world. Finally, the oppressive regulation and defense of

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid, xix-xx.

the island territory speaks to a deep fear of foreign-ness and contamination that is coincident with the Utopians' failure to isolate themselves from the world outside.

Read as a satirical fantasy—an idealized realm conscious of its own impossibility—More's *Utopia* disallows the falsified histories and geopolitical distortions necessary to the island myth propagated by English authors from the 6<sup>th</sup> century to the 17<sup>th</sup>. More takes up the primary threads of England's island nationalism—the notions of a divinely created island space, protected from foreign incursion and abounding in natural resources, of the essential Englishness of the island, of its otherworldly independence from the world at large—and stretches them to the point of absurdity. He also embeds in the text subtle details that undo Utopia's most fundamental assertions of its self-sufficiency and positive isolation: the fabricated island is lacking in certain necessary resources, which it must import from outside. As I discuss in more detail below, Utopia cannot produce iron, a metal essential in matters of defense. Utopia's dependence upon the continent and its colonial interactions link it inextricably to the mainland, thus complicating its claims to insularity and self-sustaining autonomy. By detrimentally casting doubt upon the myths that make up Utopia's national identity, More effectively annuls the ideological foundations of England's island nationalism.

Utopia and England do not, of course, share a one-to-one relationship. However, More's text is clearly concerned with the state of England as a commonwealth in need of reform. As Jeffrey Knapp explains, the connection between Utopia and England is, unsurprisingly forged through their shared island-ness: the Utopians' constructed island identity “defines their national identity as surely as [ ... ] England's geography defines the English”.<sup>144</sup> Linking the text to both England and More's position as a member of the state, John Freeman contends that “*Utopia*

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<sup>144</sup> Knapp, 31.

corresponds very closely to the world in which More had to find his place; in fact, Book I represents both England and More's historical and biographical situations, and Book II offers an allegorization of those terms".<sup>145</sup> Important for this argument, Simon Morgan-Russell sees in More's text a response to the topographical descriptions of England and Britain spanning from Gildas to William Harrison in the 16<sup>th</sup> century: "More's *Utopia* needs to be considered in relation to the genre of the description of Britain beyond the footnoted correspondences of Utopia and Britain. In some ways the correspondence of factual information is of secondary importance: More's use of the chronicle-writer's rhetorical structure is enough to forge a link between *Utopia* and other examples of the description genre".<sup>146</sup>

That *Utopia* resembles early modern descriptive histories speaks to More's possible intention to mimic the genre, thus lending to his work the aura credibility and placing it within the body of nationalist texts that topographically illustrated the English body politic. However, as Richard Helgerson and Stephen Greenblatt reveal, More's satiric representation of England in *Utopia* is deeply unsettling. Unlike the descriptions, histories and maps that sought to rhetorically and visually concretize the crown's island, *Utopia* forefronts and leaves exposed the debilities of the island nation, thus presenting to English audiences a fragile and brittle representation of itself. "Utopian life", in Greenblatt's opinion, is riddled with "half-hidden ruptures, ruptures betrayed by subtle inconsistencies and contradictions in topography, economic exchange, the exercise of power, concepts of criminality, and the uses of violence", all topics

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<sup>145</sup> Freeman, "More's Place in 'No Place': The Self-Fashioning Transaction in *Utopia*." *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 34.2 (1992): 197-217. Print.

<sup>146</sup> Morgan-Russell, "St. Thomas More's *Utopia* and the *Description of Britain*." *Cahiers Elisabethains: Late Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 61 (2002): 1-11. Print.



which gesture back to More's England.<sup>147</sup> Helgerson, in "Inventing Noplace" considers how More's text takes on the rhetoric of negation and theories regarding the perfection of society inspired by the discovery of the New World. Whereas other perfecting narratives of the period imagined a "Golden Age" in which the imagined new world would replace the flaws of the old, "Utopia denies (systematically, it would seem) all that the usual images of the Golden Age affirm [ ... ] [the Utopians] are, in short, imperfect men in an imperfect world". In other words, More's *Utopia* is not Utopic in the modern sense of the word; it is shot through with the very societal and governmental fissures that idealized realms seek to eliminate. In Greenblatt's words, More's island is located "in a post-lapsarian world, in a world of Iron Age men", not in the elysian fields of romanticized nationalist fantasy.<sup>148</sup>

In this regard, *Utopia* plays upon fantasies of English nationalism and imperialism while simultaneously demonstrating their impossibility and unattainable-ness. For instance, Louis Marin shows that More makes fictionally possible the kind of homogenous national culture that official texts repeatedly—and untruthfully—illustrated. Marin compares More's Utopia to "the deep-rooted American will, fantasy, dream or utopian drive, of a completely homogenized world, a world without differences through a generalized entropy, unbound [ ... ] from any exteriority through a natural, 'spontaneous' assimilation".<sup>149</sup> The spontaneity and naturalness of Utopia's extinction of difference is, of course, neither spontaneous nor natural; at its core, it is constructed, due to the means in which the Utopians' disconnect from the continent is achieved.

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<sup>147</sup> Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago: U of C Press, 1980) 23. Print.

<sup>148</sup> Helgerson, Richard. "Inventing Noplace, or the Power of Negative Thinking." *Genre: Forms of Discourse and Culture* 15.2-3. (1982): 105. Print.

<sup>149</sup> Marin, "Frontiers of Utopia: Past and Present." *Critical Inquiry* 19.3 (1993): 403. *JSTOR*. Web. 20 May 2011.

Greenblatt also comments upon this homogenizing gesture, focusing on the “radical” nature of “More’s vision of national uniformity”. Of More’s overdetermined organization and regulation of the national space, Greenblatt observes, “More dreams here of sweeping away the centuries-old accumulation of local and particular culture, marked seemingly indelibly in all the varieties of dress, speech, architecture, behavior”.<sup>150</sup> If one considers the markings of cultural, ethnic and linguistic difference engraved in England’s national landscape, More’s vision amounts to an impossible fantasia of erasure of the non-English.

As if to discredit the possibility of making real this fantasy of English homogeneity, More persistently insists upon the artificial nature of Utopia’s island-ness; he does so, in part, by refusing the characteristics of the fictional island that so link it to England. Most potently, *Utopia* denies insistently repeated claims found in Camden, Speed and their predecessors to the island’s insularity and singular autonomy. First, the island itself—which is absolutely central to every aspect of Utopia’s government and its supposedly isolationist culture—is both manufactured and geographically impossible. As discussed above, More mirrors early descriptions of Britain. The opening illustration of the island echoes Gildas, Bede and others in laying out its geographical dimensions. Gildas begins his epistle with the following description: ‘The Iland of *Britaine* [ ... reaches ] toward the *South* and *West*; extending it selfe from the *South West* out towards the *North* Pole, eight hundred miles in length, and containing two hundred in bredth, besides the farre outreached Forelands of sundry Promontaries”.<sup>151</sup> Bede opens his *Ecclesiastical History of England* by largely repeating Bede’s illustration. I include here a large portion of More’s introductory paragraph to Book Two in order to demonstrate his replication of prior

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<sup>150</sup> Greenblatt, 41.

<sup>151</sup> Gildas, 1-2.

historiographic texts and the geographical discrepancies that make More's island a place of impossible fantasy.

The island of Utopia containeth in breadth in the middle part of it (for there it is broadest) 200 miles. Which breadth continueth through the most part of the land. Saving that by little and little it cometh in and waxeth narrower towards both the ends. Which fetching about a circuit or compass of 500 miles, do fashion the whole island like to the new moon. Between these two corners the sea runneth in, dividing them asunder by the distance of eleven miles or thereabouts, and there surmounteth into a large and wide sea, which by reason that the land on every side compasseth it about and sheltereth it from the winds, is not rough nor mounteth not with great waves, but almost floweth quietly, not much unlike a great standing pool, and maketh wellnigh all the space within the belly of the land in manner of a haven, and, to the great commodity of the inhabitants, receiveth in ships towards every part of the land (49).

If one pictures this island according to More's dimensions, the isle cannot be shaped like a "new moon", for a new moon is either invisible or visible only as a very thin crescent. Therefore, the body of the island cannot be 200 miles across and continue at this length until the land is parted at a harbor, which is measured at approximately 11 miles across. This island would appear as a nearly complete circle with a very small portion of its circumference removed, as the first woodcut map of Utopia from 1516 indicates (fig. 3). As Peter Barber notes, "the measurements [More] gave for the island of Utopia defied the rules of mathematics and thus the possibility of accurate cartographic representation". Barber contends that "More undoubtedly realized" the

geographic discrepancies of his island territory.<sup>152</sup> In this sense, the author of *Utopia* sought to emphasize not just the impossibility of such an island space, but also the inherent artificiality of his construction.

A second map of Utopia drawn by Ambrosius Holbein appears in the 1518 edition of More's text (fig. 4). The differences between these two cartographic illustrations are striking and speak to my arguments regarding defense, colonial projects and the vexed relationship between artifice and nature discussed in this chapter. The 1516 map includes the bay, which is visually overwhelmed by the large tower and garrison intended to defend the islanders from uninvited foreign visitors; this looming symbol of defense undercuts the Utopian notion of the natural security of their island nation. The bay itself is proportionately small and thusly does not coincide with the faulty geographic calculations offered by More. In the background of both illustrations, the land beyond Utopia appears largely unpopulated; in the 1516 version, the lands in the northwest corner of the map are emptied of the signs of civilization and appear poised for Utopian colonization. Holbein's map includes two buildings in this space, allowing for the possibility of a small and possibly undefended territory. The northeastern portion of the 1516 depiction includes several structures, implying the presence of a nearby town; the 1518 text minimizes these buildings. In both cases, the proximity of these cities or states discredits the repeatedly touted claim by the Utopians that they occupy an oceanic space disconnected from the outside world. The banner decorating Holbein's portrait also undoes this notion of positive insularity; the banner announcing the titles of Utopia's cities literally ties the island to the continent.

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<sup>152</sup> Barber, "England I: Pageantry, Defense, and Government: Maps at Court to 1550." *Monarchs, Minsters and Maps: The Emergence of Cartography as a Tool of Government in Early Modern Europe* Ed. David Buisseret (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992) 29. Print.

The 1516 island landscape is emptied of people, with the minor exception of a sailor manning a large ship in the foreground, thus speaking to the strict regulation of movement and text's reduction of the populace to an undefined laboring force; their importance lies in their instrumentalization, not in any individualized activity that might warrant their appearance on the map. The absent citizenry of both maps puts into boldface the forefronted and disproportionate figures of Hythloday, More and Giles in the Holbein map, standing on the continent's shore, gesturing toward the island. The impossible bay has disappeared from the illustration, and this space is now occupied by the men who have brought the island into the known world:

Hythloday, the storyteller; Giles and Morus, who introduce the island to the cultural and literary landscape of Tudor England and beyond; and More himself, whose idealized construction of his fantastic island flies in the face of Tudor society and geographic truth. The fictionality of these characters and the presence of the author in the dual guise as character and author completes the vision of the fabricated island by placing its inventors within the portrait. *Utopia* is not a chronicle history or a "description" of an island belonging to the genre of Camden, Speed and their predecessors. What is at stake in *Utopia* is the revelation of the manipulations and untruths, so obvious in More's text, that also undermine official narratives.

Hythloday's untrustworthy description of Utopia, coming so early in Book Two, throws into doubt the rest of his illustration of the island commonwealth. Particularly dubious is his assertion that the land controls the sea, a contention he later contradicts. The chronicles above describe nature's particular care when creating her idyllic island, an argument that posits a cooperative relationship between land and water. More's description of the "large wide sea [ ... ] not much unlike a great standing pool" reiterates the harmonious bond between land and sea construed by Gildas, Bede and Hardyng and reiterated by Camden and Speed. Because the

separation between the two points of land is only 11 miles in length, this sea can be neither “large” nor “wide. Even if we accept Hythlodæus’s improbable illustration, the notion that the sea and land are perpetually at peace is difficult to swallow when we later encounter details annulling this idealized relationship. For instance, we learn only a few pages later that the winds batter the homes of the Utopians with enough force that they must fortify their dwellings and streets. To fend off the allegedly non-existent winds,

the outsides of the walls be made either of hard flint or of plaster, or else of brick, and the inner sides be strengthened with timber work [ ... ] They keep the wind out of their windows with glass, for it is there much used, and somewhere also with fine linen cloth dipped in oil or amber, and that for two commodities, for by this means more light cometh in, and the wind is better kept out (55).

The islanders, rather than feeling the loving embrace of nature must instead “withstandeth the violence of the weather”; they are not protected by nature, but must protect themselves from her (55). Neither is the land a sign of nature’s affection for the island. Confusingly following the marginal title “the gifts of nature”, the body of the text explains that “their soil be not very fruitful, nor their air very wholesome” The work required of the Utopians to remedy nature’s mistakes requires much vigilance in order to ward off disease and a shortage of food: “against the air they so defend them with temperate diet, and so order and husband their ground with diligent travail” as so train their bodies into perfect condition, in spite of nature’s flawed hand when constructing the island (85).

Like the nationalist narratives penned by official authors of the early modern period, More’s work is both factual and pretend. In Morgan-Russell’s terms: “More’s Utopia is neither Britain nor the fictional island described by Hythlodæus”, he contends, “it is the ‘no-place’

between the real and the fictive”.<sup>153</sup> Drawing from the actual—the geographical, the historical, the natural—16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century historians built pretend national worlds to suit the crown’s ideological purposes. The cruelty of More’s *Utopia* lies in its refusal to mask both the pretendedness of his fictional island and the official discourse that informs it. Holding out an absurdist blueprint, More reveals to his English and European audience the faulty infrastructure that supposedly sustains the English “island”.

### “A Thing Very Beastly”

Because English nation-building during the early modern period was closely tied to its imperial aims, the state’s inability to contain and bring under English control the other nations housed on the island likewise informs More’s work. When Hythloday recounts his time in England to the character More, he hits upon the social and governmental ills that severely destabilized Henry VIII’s England: state violence, vagrant or idle subjects, enclosure and the wool trade. Hythloday’s criticism of English policy extends beyond the domestic; as Book Two bears out, More through his narrator is acutely attentive to imperial politics and the potential social and governmental disasters that attend imperial ventures. Hythloday, in his first direct reference to More’s England, recalls the Cornish Rebellion of 1497 in which tin miners of Cornwall rejected one of England’s imposed taxes and turned on its overlords. Importantly, this tax was intended to help fund one of England’s many offensives against Scotland, one of three nations on the island that refused to buckle completely to English rule.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Morgan-Russell, 10.

<sup>154</sup> “Cornwall.” *The Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages*. Ed Robert E. Bjork. Oxford University Press, 2010. Michigan State University Library. 19 June 2012 <http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t303.e1558>. Web. Subtitle quote is from page 97 of *Utopia*.

The Portuguese Hythloday is so attuned to English political culture that during Hythloday's pronouncements More "[thought] himself to be [ ... ] at home in [his] own country" (33). Quickly following upon this acknowledgement of Hythloday's intimate knowledge of England is a discussion of the tenuous Anglo-Scottish relations that so preoccupied our above historians. Upon More's suggestion that Hythloday enter the political sphere as a philosophical counselor to kings, Hythloday claims that such a move would be pointless, for monarchs are "infected and corrupt with perverse and evil opinions" (34). He cites as evidence the political machinations that attend Anglo-French relations and the position of the Scottish in France and England's continual skirmish for land. Imagining a scenario in which the French king is advised on "what to do [...] with England", Hythloday engineers a supposedly imaginary plan that would pit the English against their Scottish neighbors as a means for France to secure the island nation. First, France would offer a false "bond" to England "to bind that weak and feeble friendship, so that they must be called friends, and had in suspicion of enemies". The Scots would then be called to duty to their French brethren and poised to attack at the least provocation by the nation to south (a likely possibility in this volatile period of imperial ambition). During this time of war, the French would then dig up some pretending "inheritor" to the English crown and place him on the throne (35). As the result of these stratagems, the French would have this pretended monarch in their pocket and thus take over the island.

Hythloday's scenario, of course, was not the stuff of literary imagination; it had its historical referent in the political maneuvers of various French monarchs.<sup>155</sup> More's narrator is here citing a very real threat to England from abroad, thus unmooring the notion that England's

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<sup>155</sup> As the editor to this edition, Susan Bruce, explains in the endnotes, this discussion of early modern France "refers to the empire-building of the French kings such as Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I, and more generally to the attempts of various European magnates to annex for themselves the choicest possessions of their peers" (219).



insularity and sea-bounded-ness protected the nation from insurrection. Next, Hythloday uses the cautionary tale of the Achorians to warn against monarchical attempts to seize lands and rule two nations concurrently. “These Achorians once made war in their king’s quarrel for to get him another kingdom which he laid claim unto and advanced himself right inheritor to the crown thereof by the title of an old alliance”, Hythloday explains. “Their new conquered subjects” understandably rejected the Achorians’ rule and threw their nation into a state of violent insecurity, where they were plagued with “daily insurrections”. Their political and military weakness invited the invasion of “other countries [who] were continually with divers inroads and foragings invading them”. The financial and political strain of attempting to contain two kingdoms overwhelmed the nation, and continual war had implanted in their people “corrupt and wicked manners, that they had taken a delight and pleasure in robbing and stealing; that through manslaughter they had gathered boldness to mischief; that their laws were had in contempt” (36).

Coming on the heels of Hythloday’s reference to Anglo-Scottish relations, his tale of the Achorians’ near downfall resonates strongly with England’s failed rule of Scotland. Despite Grafton’s claim that “whensoever the Scottes did rebell, / [The English] Wer hable, at all tymes, theim to subdue, / And their obedience to England renue”, England repeatedly fell to their Scottish “subjects” and were never able to conquer the northern territories. Britain remains a bi-national island to this day. The imperial angle of *Utopia* is oft commented upon, but rarely is the Utopian imperial project connected to England’s quest to subdue Scotland. Only with the conquest of Scotland can the crown and English writers lay claim to the island as a whole and substantiate the myth of the island nation. The manufacture of Utopia’s island-ness may reflect this attempted but unsuccessful imperial state initiative; only in the fantastic and troubling world of More’s *Utopia* can England’s goal of a homogenous English island be realized. But, as

explained above, More's text denies even this imperial fantasy by embedding in the work the ideological slippages that point to the impossibility of such a mythic island. The Utopians insist upon their autonomy, yet they are in constant and mostly violent conflict with their neighbors, not unlike England's continual wars with their Scottish enemies.

Most often, discussion of the Utopians' colonialism is placed in the context of the New World. As Knapp contends, "the odd truth about More's [ ... ] meditation on America is that it contains perhaps the first Tudor attempt to elaborate a theory of colonization".<sup>156</sup> Citing Knapp, Hui-chuan Chang argues that "one striking way to approach *Utopia* would be to read it as an apology for British imperialism. The utopian practice in hiring mercenaries, waging war with neighboring countries and colonizing them all suggests some rapport with the upsurging British power".<sup>157</sup> This "British power" is redirected to England's domestic empire by Nina Chordas, who examines the role of dialogue in More's work. Comparing *Utopia* to Spenser's *View of the Present State of Ireland*, Chordas solidly places the colonial discourse of *Utopia* in the British Isles. Like the neighboring nations of Utopia, who are depicted as savage and uncivilized, Chordas removes this colonial characterization to More's fictionalized territories by borrowing More's language and applying it to the island to the west of England:

The Ireland of *A Vewe* may [ ... ] be read as destined to be subdued by the civilizing forces of English law and custom, in the process bringing the 'rude and

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<sup>156</sup> Knapp, 21.

<sup>157</sup> Chang, Hui-chuan, "Subverting Utopia: Utopia and *Utopia* Reconsidered." *Studies in Language and Literature* 8 (1998): 33-43. Print.

uncouth' Irish (the ones who survive the transformation) to 'the high level of culture and humanity represented here by England.'<sup>158</sup>

Freeman likewise considers the language of improvement that was so often deployed in English colonial discourses in regard to Ireland. Arguing that "the 'problem' the text of *Utopia* seeks to solve is that of enclosure", a major topic of Book I, Freeman sees a direct link between the severing of *Utopia* from the continent to the social disorder in England occasioned by the enclosure of the island's territories:

The myth of *Utopia*'s founding is not at all divorced from the problems of English history; in fact, the king's conquering of the Abraxians is simply the telling and enactment of that history over again, its characters disguised in myth [ ... ] The improver, *Utopus* is not merely conducting a raid upon a fictional people; he is, in essence, raiding history, for his conquering of the Abraxians allows him to redefine and reshape English history for his own ends. This reworking of history begins with a forcible expropriation of people from their land.<sup>159</sup>

Though Chordas and Freeman's arguments are convincing, one can also detect in both their critical analyses and More's text links to the colonial rhetoric applied to Scotland. As explained above, the Scots posed some very thorny problems for English nationalist narratives, particularly because the Scottish people and territories occupied an island that English writers so vehemently wanted to claim for England. The Scots in these narratives were also "wasters" of the land and, like the Native Americans, therefore unjustified in their occupation. The "rude and

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<sup>158</sup> Chordas, "Dialogue, *Utopia*, and the Agencies of Fiction." *Printed Voices: The Renaissance Culture of Dialogue* Eds. Dorothea Heitsch and Jean-François Vallée (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 2004) 38. Print.

<sup>159</sup> Freeman, 202.

uncouth” Highland Scots appear beyond moral and civil improvement; the Lowland Scots, on the other hand, “have reached the high level culture and humanity”, mainly due to the forced genealogical links to the English constructed by Speed and Camden. Utopus’s raid on history cited by Freeman can also be considered More’s cynical response to English writers’ attempts to physically carve away the Scots from the English island.

The isle itself is an affront to nature and is inextricably tied to nationalism and imperialism. Refusing nature’s design. Utopus “caused fifteen miles space of uplandish ground, where the sea had no passage, to be cut and digged up. And so brought the sea round the land” (50). Presumably, the reason for this unnatural alteration of the land was to manufacture the nation’s insularity and to cut it off from the contamination of the surrounding peoples. For, as is repeatedly asserted, it is the island’s insularity that allowed the Utopians to inculcate their ideal culture. According to Hythloday, Utopus also transformed the indigenous people of his newly-acquired territory: “Utopus, whose name as conqueror the island beareth [ ... ] also brought the rude and wild people to that excellent perfection in all good fashions, humanity, and civil gentleness, wherein they now go beyond all the people of the world” (50). The description of the island’s engineering follows upon this assessment (it appears in the same sentence), therefore implying that the detachment of the land from the continent was concomitant with the introduction of civility to the people. Oppositely, one must assume that had the land remained in its natural state, the savage inhabitants would have as well. The celebrated sophistication of the Utopians is as artificial as the isle.

Interestingly, Edmund Spenser in *The Faerie Queene* makes the same claim in respect to the English nation. Prior to Brutus’s arrival,

The land, which warlike Britons now possesse,

And therein have their mighty empire raysd,  
 In antique times was salvage wilderness,  
 Unpeopled, unmannurd, unproud, unpraysd,  
 Ne was it Island then, ne was it paysd  
 Amid the *Ocean* waves, ne was it sought  
 Of merchaunts farre, for profits therein praysd,  
 But was all desolate, and of some thought

By sea to have bene from the *Celticke* mayn-land brought.<sup>160</sup>

The English territory was then inhabited by “a salvage nation [ ... ] / Of hideous Giaunts, and halfe beastly men, / That never tasted grace, nor goodness felt” (II.x. 7.1-3). In both Spenser’s England and More’s Utopia, the “uplandish” territory (meaning “rustic, rude, uncultivated, boorish”, according to the *OED*) and native population must be brought into a state of idealized civility by the hand of a conquering people.<sup>161</sup> Without the reformation of the barbarous inhabitants and the untamed land, the nation would never have entered the historical record and found fame for its thriving trade and unsurpassed “excellent perfection”. Without its geographical status as an island, the territory was so lacking in grace that “ne did it then deserve a name to have” (II.x.6.1).

It is significant in both More and Spenser’s texts that ridding the land of its “desolate”, “savage” and “wild” character and enacting its unnatural separation is an imperial project. In both cases, the “rude” indigenous peoples and the land itself are forcibly transformed by an

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<sup>160</sup> Spenser, Edmund *The Faerie Queene* Ed. A.C. Hamilton Rev. 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. (Harlowe: Pearson Longman, 2007) II.x.5. Print.

<sup>161</sup> "Up'landish, adj. and n.". *OED Online*. June 2012. Oxford University Press. 19 June 2012<<http://www.oed.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/219987?redirectedFrom=uplandish>>. Web.

invading empire. “Obtaining the victory” over the Abraxan people (Abraxa was the nation’s former name), Utopus made forced laborers of the conquered peoples and set them to work on the trench that would separate Utopia from the mainland. He also enlisted his own soldiers for the task, so that his new subjects “should not think it done in contumely and despite” (50). This parenthetical note seems intended to head off claims of colonial ruthlessness and negative isolation; like assertions of the Native Americans’ happy willingness to subject themselves to European Christianity, the indigenous Abraxans, according to this likely disingenuous comment, are amenable to disconnecting themselves from the rest of the world because the work is shared with their conquerors.

The relationship of the Utopians to the “borderers” is wholly imperial in design. “marvel[ing] at the success” of the Utopians in the construction of their now sequestered land, the borderers are thrown into a state of unexplained “fear” (50). The borderlands are later co-opted by the Utopians and the colonized space is used to house those Utopians who have exceeded their strictly regulated population. The Utopians methods of population control and the force with which the Utopians colonize the borderers’ territory is glossed over; the notion that the borderers simply accept Utopian rule and civilization is, in the typical construction of colonial rhetoric, unbelievable at best. Deploying the oft-used discourse of waste and improvement, Hythloday describes the Utopian conquest of the borderer’s national space:

If so be that the multitude throughout the whole island pass and exceed the due number, then they choose out of every city certain citizens, and build up a town under their own laws in the next land where the inhabitants have much waste and unoccupied ground, receiving also of the same country people to them, if they will join and dwell with them. They thus joining and dwelling together do easily

agree in one fashion of living, and that to the great wealth of both the peoples. For they so bring the matter about by their laws, that the ground which before was neither good nor profitable for the one nor for the other is now sufficient and fruitful enough for them both. But if the inhabitants of that land will not dwell with them to be ordered by their laws, then they drive them out of those bounds which they have limited and appointed out for themselves. And if they resist and rebel, then they make just war against them. For they count this the most just cause of war, when any people holdeth a piece of ground void and vacant to no good nor profitable use, keeping others from the use and possession of it which notwithstanding by the law of nature ought thereof to be nourished and relieved (63).

Because the borderers of this unnamed “next land” are incapable or unwilling to cultivate their own territory, they no longer possess the right to their once-sovereign ground. Preceding the sentiments of John Locke and his notion of rightful property, and echoing the colonial discourse of improvement used to justify England’s theft of New World and Irish territories, More’s Utopians unjustifiably seize the borderers’ lands. Spenser *View of the State of Ireland* advocates a similar policy; because the Irish are wasting valuable territory “all the lands will [ be given ] unto Englishmen”. The Irish may serve as the Englishmen’s tenants until they learn to make better use of their own country.<sup>162</sup>

Supposedly to the benefit of the borderers, the Utopians impose their law and culture upon their less civilized neighbors and lead them by the hand into the history of progress. However, if the borderers do not “easily agree” to their colonization, then the Utopians wage war

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<sup>162</sup> Spenser, Edmund. *A View of the State of Ireland*. Eds. Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley (Malden: Blackwell, 1997) 120. Print.

upon their now enemies. The islanders force the borderers from their own territory and redraw the boundaries of the land, without legitimate right to rule or legal claim to the territory. Turning the discourse of waste and improvement into a moral imperative, the Utopian government rhetorically recasts colonial violence as a “law of nature”. Even those borderers who bend to Utopian rule are left vulnerable when the imperial project no longer serves the Utopians’ interests; when the Utopian population begins to drop, the islanders “make up the number with citizens fetched out of their own foreign towns; for they had rather suffer their foreign towns to decay and perish than any city of their own island to be diminished” (63). The Utopians’ investment in the Other’s “great wealth” and their loyalty to their colonies extends only so far as Utopian state interests.

The above account of the Utopians’ interactions with the borderers casts serious doubt upon the supposedly altruistic relationship of the islanders to their neighbors. Hythloday, after letting slip the Utopians’ essentially mercenary stance toward their subjugated “foreign towns”, spins a second unbelievable tale of imperialism, this time in regard to the borderers’ desire for Utopian governance. Discussing the Utopians’ self-regulating society of “very few laws” (94), Utopia’s narrator describes the desire of the borderers to place themselves under Utopian rule:

These virtues of the Utopians have caused their next neighbors and borderers, which live free and under no subjection (for the Utopians long ago have delivered many of them from tyranny), to take magistrates of them, some for a year and some for five years’ space. Which, when the time of their office is expired, they bring home again with honour and praise, and take new again with them into their country. These nations have undoubtedly very well and wholesomely provided for their commonwealths. For seeing that both the making and marring of the weal-



public doth depend and hang upon the manners of the rulers and magistrates, what officers could they more wisely have chosen than those which cannot be led from honesty by bribes [ ... ] These peoples which fetch their officers and rulers from them, the Utopians call their fellows. And others to whom they have been beneficial, they call their friends (95).

In the manner of contemporary colonial discourse, Hythloday reinscribes the Utopians' colonial project as noble and humane, an imperialism to benefit the uncivilized. To dispel the notion that the borderers are forced to abide under Utopian law, Hythloday contends that the borderers freely give themselves over to their imperial neighbors, who in an unspecified past, "delivered [ ... ] them" from their own government. Inviting the Utopian state into their territories and thus acknowledging the islanders' superiority, "these nations" amend their lacking commonwealths by embracing their betters and letting themselves be ruled by a foreign power. Hythloday commends the borderers for making themselves willing subjects of their imperial "friends". However, when these "fellows" to the Utopians wear out their usefulness, they become colonial chattel to be either abandoned or forfeited.

Utopia's many references to "the borderers" and other neighboring nations echoes, sometimes word for word, the depictions of the Scottish in medieval and early modern chronicles. The unnamed "borderers" of *Utopia* are constantly marked as inelegant and uncivilized people of use to the Utopians but themselves wholly lacking in autonomy or value. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Utopians' stance on war. According to Hythloday, the Utopians avoid entering into military conflict with foreign nations and therefore practice certain tactics that may offend the reader. Specifically, the Utopians offer monetary rewards to those in enemy territory willing to kill off or capture their own sovereign and other leaders of state. If the

leaders of their enemies surrender themselves to the Utopians in order to avoid slaughter by their own people, the Utopians “proffer the same great rewards with pardon and surety of their lives” to these members of the disbanded government. “Therefore it quickly cometh to pass that their enemies have all other men in suspicion, and be unfaithful and mistrusting among themselves one to another, living in great fear and in no less jeopardy” (100). Hythloday concedes that “this custom of buying and selling adversaries among other people is disallowed as a cruel act of a base and a cowardly mind. But they in this behalf think themselves much praiseworthy”. Nor are the Utopians above other “base” gestures, such as seating a controversial candidate on their enemy’s throne in order to further destabilize the foreign state. If this stratagem fails, then the anonymous borderers are called to the front lines and manipulated into believing that they are serving their own state, rather than being sacrificed to the Utopian cause. The pretended islanders

raise up the people that be next neighbors and borderers to their enemies, and then they set in their necks under the colour of some old title of right, such as kings do never lack. To them they promise their help and aid in their war. And as for money, they give them abundance. But of their own citizens they send to them few or none. Whom they make so much of and love so entirely, that they would not be willing to change any of them for their adversaries’ prince (100-01).

Relying upon the borderers’ lack of political sophistication and their mindless obsession with regaining allegedly lost territory, the Utopians protect their own commonwealth from war’s destruction while potentially ridding themselves of future enemies to their state.

The most startling of the Utopians’ wartime policies is their use of borderer mercenaries. The Zapoletes are their primary choice of mercenary soldiers and one of the few borderer nations allowed a name in More’s text. The Zapolete nation is located only “500 miles from Utopia

eastward”, but the cultural distance between the two countries is far more pronounced. The “hideous, savage, and fierce” Zapoletes inhabit a landscape of “wild woods and high mountains”, which contributes to their “hard nature, able to abide and sustain heat, cold, and labour” (101). Hythloday’s account of their barbarous nature seems to excuse the Utopians’ use of this nation as hired soldiery. So too does his account of the Zapoletes’ wasteful land practices, which we have learned is an affront to “the law of nature”, according to the Utopians. “Occupying no husbandry nor tillage of the ground, homely and rude both in building of their houses and in their apparel, given unto no goodness, but only to the breeding and bringing up of cattle”, the Zapoletes are both savage and criminal, depending primarily upon “hunting and stealing” to sustain their culture. The other source of national income is mercenary ventures, which is part and parcel of their barbarity: as Hythloday explains, “they be born only to war, which they diligently and earnestly seek for”. Seemingly intended by God to serve the Utopians and, in any case, underserving of the land they occupy and the lives they criminally sustain, the Zapoletes are not to be trusted. For the proper pay, their greed and generally blood-thirsty nature would prompt them to turn on even their own people, “forgetting both kindred and friendship” (102). Their caginess is driven by monetary gain: “they enter into bonds, that the next day they will take part with the other side for greater wages, and the next day after that they will be ready to come back again for a little more money” (101).

The Zapoletes are literally expendable to the Utopians because they are an undeserving people. In a passage reminiscent of colonial tracts citing the worthlessness of the conquered as a justification for their slaughter, Hythloday elucidates the Utopians’ stance toward the death of savage cultures.

The Utopians, like as they seek good men to use well, so they seek these evil and vicious men to abuse. Whom, when need requireth, with promises of great rewards they put forth into great jeopardies. From whence the most part of them never cometh again to ask their rewards [ ... ] Nor the Utopians pass not how many of them they bring to destruction, for they believe that they should do a very good deed for all mankind if they could rid out of the world all that foul stinking den of that most wicked and cursed people (102).

Such a merciless stance towards the killing of foreign peoples cripples the notion of the Utopians' humanist quest to save other cultures from themselves by introducing civilization to these backwards nations. So too does it seriously problematize Hythloday's contention that the Utopians are welcomed into borderer cultures. The borderers, whether "good men" or "evil and vicious", are either fundamentally unimportant or criminal contaminants. In both cases, the Utopians have rhetorically and geographically effected their distance from them on account of the borderers' inherent otherness and incivility.

More satirically mimics the rhetoric of imperial England that imagined colonists grateful for the imposing hand of their superiors and the forced transformation of their indigenous culture. For Grafton, the Scots ought to "[yield] to live in humble subieccion / Of Englandes gouernaunce and protection", much like More's borderers adopt the culture and laws of the colonial conquerors with a happy thankfulness true only of colonial fantasies. According to Speed, the Scots "live rather rudely in state of necessity, then as Lords of these portions which God hath allotted them"; the Scots' wasteful practices and disregard for husbandry are the very qualities that allegedly justify the Utopians' seizure of foreign lands. The rudeness of these border cultures is, for Camden, what links them to the Irish and makes them suited to their

territory of “blacklish and baraine mountain”. “Rude and unruly” they are inherently a “warlike kind of men” whose primary means of profit is “robberies and depredations”, in Camden’s words, or “spolyes, booties and preades”, in Grafton’s. It is also significant to note that the Gallowglass, Scottish mercenaries “imported from Argyle and the Western Isles of Scotland” were hired by Irish kings “where they played a significant role in stiffening Irish resistance to the extension of English settlements”. The historical span of the Gallowglass coincides with the production of the above chronicles; they were active from the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries to the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> when they served “Irish and Anglo-Irish lords in Munster and Leinster”.<sup>163</sup> That the Scottish mercenaries joined with the Irish against English imperialism seems a likely cause of their vilification in early modern texts.

Like their fictional counterparts in More’s text, the Scottish are essentially untrustworthy; “so vnstedfast, inconstaunte, and unsure”, Grafton asserts, so “suttle, and craftie”, according to Hardyng, as to be counted criminals and degenerates, interested only in blood-shed and criminal gain. In Gildas’s language, which replicates More’s in its description of the mercenaries’ habitation, the Scottish “devouring Wolves” and contaminating “bands of wormes and eamots” slink out of their “darksome dens” only to wage war for profit. Because of their disease-like nature and unthinking violence, the Zapoletes, “whom God dooeth hate and curse”, should be eradicated, excised from the land.

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<sup>163</sup> Katharine Simms “Gallowglass.” *The Oxford Companion to Irish History*. S. J. Connolly. Oxford University Press, 2007. *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. Michigan State University Library. 19 June 2012 <<http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t245.e758>>. Web.

A land in which the borderers are exterminated—or, in Grafton’s words, “made [ ... ] Englyshe for euer”, was, of course, an English imperialist and nationalist fantasy. The island would return to its “natural” state, in which the original and rightful Britons would reclaim their land. The term “borderers” and all the otherness it connotes would become obsolete, for the island nation would be of a homogenous character, sharing a common culture and thusly free from costly and violent wars waged between ethnicities. As in Speed’s illustrative arch celebrating the genealogy of the true British, the Scots would disappear from the historical record; an unblemished narrative of English progress, like that of the Utopians which span “the history of 1,760 years even, from the first conquest of the island”, would celebrate the nation’s unity and longevity (55). The English state would be immeasurably strengthened, for its people would be united under a uniform banner of Englishness, allegiant to a common set of laws and ruled under a single monarch. Gaunt’s “happy breed of men” would rule over their land of plentitude and the land would be put to its proper use as a “Garden of God”. Wearing a single “sceptre” the island would be reclaim its status as “royal throne of kings” and “another world” of national harmony.

Because the obliteration of the “borderers” is a thing of fantasy—not even More’s utopian fiction can eliminate difference altogether—this national unity and insularity can be achieved only through artificial geographic separation. Sealing their nation off from contaminating or uncooperative cultures, the Utopians make real the English dream of severing themselves from a people that violently refuse England’s assertions of territorial right and imperial domination. Bede’s allegedly historical “arme of the sea” that once separated Scotland from England is realized in More’s text, allowing the Utopians to inculcate in a contained space a nearly identical people with an unwavering fealty to the state. Their geographic breaking-away

from the mainland likewise grants the Utopians the mythical “otherworldly status” attached to England in early modern national narratives. The Utopians, we learn, call the Europeans “ultra-equinoctials”, a term likely intended to mark out the islanders as geographically singular. “Equinoctial” is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as “pertaining to [ ... ] the celestial or terrestrial equator” or “pertaining to the regions adjacent to the terrestrial equator”.<sup>164</sup> Therefore, one can surmise that by referring to the European continent as “ultra-equinoctial”, the Utopians imagine Europe to be situated near the equator, at least in comparison to the Utopians sitting “on the edge of the world” and functioning altogether independently from other less progressive nations.

However, like the English nation painted by Gildas, Bede, Grafton, Camden and Speed, More’s construction is shot through with contradiction and narrative lapses. For instance, the Utopians’ claims to autonomy and self-sufficiency are greatly undermined by their preoccupation with defense and their reliance upon other cultures for materials necessary for the maintenance of their culture. Hythloday contends that the Utopian coastline is protected from attack by fences and the island landscape, such that “by nature and what by workmanship of man’s hand, that a few defenders may drive back many armies” (50). The surveillance of England’s extensive coasts was also a source of anxiety for English monarchs; Henry VIII, presumably because his army could not man the vulnerable coast, called upon his subjects to map the English coastlines and to identify those coastal areas requiring fortification.<sup>165</sup> As mentioned above, invasions by Spain and France in defense of their respective Irish and Scottish allies posed particular threats by sea. The ancient Scots themselves used the seas to invade the

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<sup>164</sup> “Equinoctial, adj. and n.”. *OED Online*. June 2012. Oxford University Press. 19 June 2012 <<http://www.oed.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/view/Entry/63771?redirectedFrom=Equinoctial>>. Web.

<sup>165</sup> Barber, “England I”, 34. Print.

island from afar. The great bay of Utopia is likewise provided by nature with defensive mechanisms harmful to foreign travelers:

The forefronts or frontiers of the two corners [of the bay], what with fords and shelves and what with rocks, be very jeopardous and dangerous. In the middle distance between them both standeth up above the water a great rock, which therefore is nothing perilous because it is in sight. Upon the top of this rock is a fair and a strong tower builded, which they hold with a garrison of men. Other rocks there be lying hid under the water, which therefore be dangerous. The channels be known only to themselves. And therefore it seldom chanceth that any stranger unless be he guided by an Utopian, can come into this haven. Insomuch that they themselves could scarcely enter without jeopardy, but that their way is directed and ruled by certain landmarks standing on the shore. By turning, translating, and removing these marks into other places they may destroy their enemies' navies, be they never so many (49-50).

According with Hythloday's depiction of the cooperative relationship between man and nature, the bay is equipped with those defenses necessary to the protection of Utopia's most important waterway. But, the description of the Utopian's defensive measures points to an anxiety that belies their claims to a peaceful existence secure in "Neptune's arms". First, the garrison constructed atop the "great rock" is a manifest symbol of the Utopians' attempt to defend their oceanic borders. Rather than mark the island's natural defenses, it signals to foreigners that they are entering a militarized space closely guarded against attack. The rocks hiding beneath the water's surface also speak to nature's hand in protecting the Utopians, yet their measures to keep secret from all the world the "channels" around these rocks betrays a pronounced fear of



uninvited foreign-ness on their shores. That the Utopians themselves are often at risk when entering their own national boundaries, a risk created in part by their own maneuvering of the bay's "landmarks", evinces an overinvestment in defense verging on paranoia.

Even the inland waterways are jealously, and perhaps irrationally, defended against foreign contamination and attack. Amaurote, "the chief city in Utopia" (53) is "compassed about with a high and thick stone wall full of turrets and bulwarks" and "a dry ditch, but deep and broad and overgrown with bushes, briars and thorns, [that] goeth about three sides or quarters of the city" (54). It would seem that these structures, a second defensive perimeter built around every city, would provide satisfactory protection for the island state. Still, the Utopians nervously guard against the contamination of their inland water system. Describing the Anyder River, which More compares to the Thames, Hythloday explains that

they have also another river [ ... ] it riseth even out of the same hill that the city standeth upon, and runneth down a slope through the midst of the city into Anyder. And because it riseth a little without the city, the Amaurotians have enclosed the head spring of it, with strong fences and bulwarks, and so have joined it to the city. This is done to the intent that the water should not be stopped nor turned away or poisoned if their enemies should chance to come upon them (53).

Manipulating nature and artificially trapping the river's spring in a kind of fortress, the Utopians ensure against the spoiling of their water by extraordinary measures. Despite the several and intricate lines of defense—the sea, the "perilous" bay, the "high and thick stone wall", the Utopians still fear for their security both on the shore and inland.

The Utopians' excessive preoccupation with defense undermines the insistence on the island's geographic security, not unlike England's unconvincing proclamations regarding nature's protection of the isle. Also, the Utopian claim of uncontested imperial rule over the borderers is suspect when one considers their disproportionate investment in national security; it would seem that physically removing themselves from foreign nations only intensifies the threat of invasion, for the waterways appear their most vulnerable sites. More's text imagines an exclusively English island space in which the troublesome Scottish borderlands are uprooted and removed. This impossible geographic excavation resonates with the historical works cited above, narrative constructions in which Scotland is rhetorically excised from England's British chronicles. However, More's work does not allow this fantasy; "the borderers" stubbornly persist on the Utopian horizon and in the governmental consciousness of the state as either rebellious colonies or potential insurgents.

Regardless of the Utopians' assertions of their self-sufficiency, the pretended islanders are reliant upon the very people they seek to expel from their nation, particularly in times of war. As noted, the Utopians hire mercenary soldiers because they "detest and abhor" the bloodshed that inevitably attends military conflict (97). Their own military is voluntary, for "they thrust no man forth into war against his will" (102). This voluntary force enters battle only when all other avenues are exhausted, including sending their "friends" to fight (whom we might presume to be those nations who so willingly bent to Utopian rule) (102). One might assume, then, that the Utopians are without a standing army. Even if one does not accept this possibility, the fact nevertheless remains that the Utopians are dependent militarily upon soldiers occupying other lands.

More striking still is the Utopians' lack of an essential wartime resource of the period: iron. A necessary metal for the production of armor and weaponry, as well as more pedestrian necessities like agricultural instruments, a lack of iron or the inability to process it would have amounted to a serious national deficiency in the early modern period. Such was the case in England in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, where iron production was very limited, despite the country's many iron ore deposits throughout the territory. Harry Scrivenor explains that, following the renewed emphasis on iron production after the Anglo-Saxon invasion, manufactured iron was in so short supply during the reign of Edward III, an act was passed stating that "no iron manufactured in England, and also no iron imported and sold, could be carried out of the country, under penalty of forfeiting double quantity to the king".<sup>166</sup> England depended upon foreign imports; because the nation's iron production was underdeveloped, England was forced to rely upon countries like Spain and Germany for manufactured iron goods. According to W. R. Childs, this "heavy dependence on foreign iron" extended from the thirteenth century until at least the time of *Utopia's* publication.<sup>167</sup> *The Statutes of the Realm* dating from Edward IV's reign make apparent that England was nervously protective of the few manufactured iron goods that it was capable of producing. Among the commodities that Edward IV prohibited from entering the English shores, the statutes list "Aundirons, Gridirons, any manner of Locks, Hammers, Pinsons, Fire Tongs [ ... ] Harness for Girdles of Iron [ ... ] Knives, Daggers, Wood-Knives [ ... ] Sheers for Taylors, Scissors, Razors [ ... and ] blanch Iron Thread, commonly called White Wire".

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<sup>166</sup> Scrivenor, *History of the Iron Trade: From the Earliest Records to the Present Period*. (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1854) 33. Print.

<sup>167</sup> According to Childs, "the heavy dependence on foreign iron known to the sixteenth century was present in the second half of the fifteenth century, and undoubtedly earlier. The amount imported probably trebled in the late fifteenth century". See "England's Iron Trade in the Fifteenth Century." *The Economic History Review* 34.1 (1981): 46. Print.

These same items are repeated in Richard III's catalog of prohibited imports, with the addition of "nayles [with] Iron Shankes" and "Iron Candelstikk (of Iron [plate])".<sup>168</sup> Conspicuously absent from this list of everyday commodities are those most necessary for the defense of the state, weaponry and armor. One might reasonably conclude from these state records that England was, at least in part, reliant upon foreign nations for its own defense.

Neither Utopia nor England function as a self-contained, self-sustainable island nation, despite its nationalist rhetoric. Economically, militarily and imperially tied to the continent, these cultures are ideologically sustained by a flawed national narrative that posits geographic and material autonomy and insularity as their defining traits. Utopus's trench is an ineffaceable symbol of this rhetorical falsity; the very attempt to remove the troublesome borderlands and to identify with a pretended geographical space only reinforces the impossibility of such a plot.

### Conclusion

Like Camden's historiographical approach to writing England, Utopia is dependent upon plotted-ness, both in terms of space and nationalist story-telling. *Utopia* itself is a text of masterful literary framing. To lend an aura of authenticity to his fabulous account, More places the narrative within an autobiographical framing linking him with his ambassadorial duties as one of Henry VIII's statesmen. This mechanism lends credibility to the tale embedded within the historical frame. He also places his narrator in the world outside the text, as if Hythloday could be called upon by the reader to account for More's report. In the work's supplemental material, which seems intended almost entirely to give real-world validation to Hythloday's otherworldly narrative, More includes a letter to Peter Giles, appealing to his friend to locate Hythloday so that More can protect his retelling against "anything [ ... ] found which is untrue, neither anything be

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<sup>168</sup> *Statues of the Realm. British History Online.* <http://www.british-history.ac.uk/catalogue.aspx?gid=83> . Web.

lacking which is true” (7). More even suggests that Hythloday serve as his editor before the volume goes to print. More’s intricate framing mechanisms are satirical; his myriad frames are not actually intended to lend factual credence to the chronicle of Utopia, but to further signal the fiction’s fictionality. Utopia is a textual island, existing “no place” except, perhaps, in the imagination of the official historians like Gildas and Bede, Hardyng and Grafton, and Camden and Speed.

The territory of this textual island is also framed and plotted. Unnaturally bordered by the ocean, every inch of Utopia is mapped, measured and put to productive use. Every movement by the citizenry is likewise mapped and measured, assuring that the allegedly self-sufficient and self-regulating population is serving the interests of the state and the supposedly self-contained culture. But, the panoptical measures taken by the state to ensure this homogeneity logically undermines the notion that the Utopians’ willingly give themselves up to this system. The identical sameness of the cities, stripped of cultural and ethnic difference; the overdetermined urban organization; the state-sanctioned travel of the citizenry within the island boundaries; the isle; the uniformity and homogeneity is as unnatural and fantastic as the island itself. A simulacrum of a non-existent England, Utopia expels from its falsified borders the ethnic and cultural difference that was so vexing to medieval and early modern historians. The Scots’ violent refusal to bend to English imperial rule and their stubborn insistence upon their national autonomy invalidated the notion of an English isle “agreeing all together in one tongue, in like manners, institutions, and laws” (50). That Camden and Speed continued in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries to promulgate the myth of the England island nation attests to this “perfect tale’s” absolute and impossibly plotted necessity.




Figure 1: Speed, John. "Frontispiece." *The History of Great Britaine Under the Conquests of ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.





Figure 2: Drayton, Michael. "Frontispiece." *Poly-Olbion*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. By courtesy of the Department of Special Collections, Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission. For interpretation of the references to color in this and all other figures, the reader is referred to the electronic version electronic of this dissertation.





Figure 3: "Woodcut from the first edition of *Utopia* (Louvain 1516)." *Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, New Atlantis, The Isle of Pines*. Ed. Susan Bruce. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999.130.





Ambrosius Holbein's\* woodcut of Utopia, as it appeared in the 1518 Basel edition of the text

Figure 4: Holbein, Ambrosius. "Woodcut of Utopia, as it appeared in the 1518 Basel edition of the text." *Three Early Modern Utopias: Utopia, New Atlantis, The Isle of Pines*. Ed. Susan Bruce. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. 131.

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## Chapter 2: Maps and Legends: Nationalist Allegories, Empire and Cartography

*“Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures; that is a reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one. Those who are its historical agents know not what they do, but that is another matter.”*

The above quote from Ernest Gellner announces what is now a widely-accepted acknowledgment of the constructed-ness of nations and nationhood: that nations are invented entities, carved out of natural landscapes, ethnic and cultural identities and a rhetoric of shared political and religious values. The unnaturalness of nations recognized by theorists like Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm and Benedict Anderson is most explicitly asserted in maps.<sup>169</sup> Maps literally illustrate the manufactured boundaries that distinguish one nation from another, laying bare the geographic superficiality of national differentiations across continuous territories. Theorists of cartography and international relations have long recognized that the visually uninteresting and seemingly innocuous lines of the map carry an ideological charge that arbitrates social and political relationships and silently underscores the violence often endemic to nation building.

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<sup>169</sup> In *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Hobsbawm expands upon Gellner’s assertion of the artificiality of nations, concluding that “nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round”. Anderson also cites Gellner’s work on the essential invented-ness of the nation but diverges from Gellner’s implied claim that nationalism is akin to the “fabrication” of the national political body “under false pretences”. Rather, Anderson draws attention to “the large cultural systems”, such as the 18<sup>th</sup> century Western European turn to secularism and the development of print culture, that undergirded the development of shared “national imaginings”. For Anderson, nations as communities “are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined”. Finally, Imre Szeman considers the problem of the nation’s conceptual artificiality from the perspective of postcolonial studies. He argues that, despite the critical move toward post-national conceptions of post-imperial political bodies, the nation continues to assert itself as an undeniable, if theoretically troubling, presence in postcolonial literatures. See Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1983) 48-9. Print.; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) 10, 1-13. Print.; Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised edition (London: Verso, 2006) 6, 9, 12. Print.; and Szeman, *Zones of Instability: Literature, Postcolonialism, and the Nation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2003) esp. 22-31. Print.



The instrumental destinies and fabricated identifications that make up the constructed nation according to Gellner are sublimated in the modern map; absent on the surface of the represented territory, they function silently below, undergirding the nation's claim to historical endurance and political autonomy. In contrast, the cartographic representations of nationhood from the early modern period seem to wear the symbols of nationalist mythology on their sleeve; oftentimes, the landmasses represented in these maps are flanked by symbols of royal authority, emblems of the country's national narrative and elaborate ethnographic illustrations. The natural, geographic space sometimes feels like the passive template for the mapmaker's politically determined visual allegory. Gellner contends that "nations are not inscribed into the nature of things, they do not constitute a political version of the doctrine of natural kinds". This chapter supports Gellner's diametric opposition between the natural and the national by examining early modern cartography and its literal and ideological inscription of the artificial nation onto representations of "natural" geographic space.

In *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England*, Richard Helgerson contends that early modern maps made possible for the English public a sense of national identity that sprung from the land, rather than from the person of the monarch. Though he acknowledges that Christopher Saxton's maps were commissioned by the Elizabethan state, he maintains that Saxton's atlas, the first major cartographic work to illustrate England and Wales, "strengthened the sense of both local and national identity at the expense of an identity based on dynastic loyalty". By relegating the royal seal to the maps' periphery, Saxton and John Speed's cartographic representations of England "showed royal authority—or at least its insignia—to be

a merely ornamental adjunct to that country”.<sup>170</sup> Helgerson argues that the placement of these royal “ornaments” on the margins of the map produced in the body politic the recognition that the land was itself a source of national pride, unhinged from the authority of the state and crown.

However, the land that Helgerson claims allowed for a kind of popular nationalism was very much inscribed with the symbols of crown authority. The natural English lands were not permitted to speak for themselves in early modern cartography; rather, the territory illustrated in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century maps was authorized by the state and authored by mapmakers working under the aegis of the crown. As Richard L. Kagan and Benjamin Schmidt argue, “official cartography” was an integral tool in nation and empire building: “royal mapmakers did more than simply outline existing realms [ ... ] They further endeavored to chart a state’s designs for future expansion and to enunciate, in cartographic form, hopeful programs of state building”.<sup>171</sup>

Though Kagan and Schmidt refer here to court cartographers in the state’s direct hire, one could reasonably argue that mapmakers like Speed, who were commissioned and funded by powerful members of the Elizabethan and Stuart government, could also be considered official cartographers because they served the ideological needs of the state and crown by producing their propagandistic texts. Peter Barber also argues along these lines, taking issue with one of Helgerson’s primary claims regarding the diminishment of the royal seals on Saxton’s texts. “Although Helgerson has argued that the relative insignificance of the royal arms on Saxton’s maps [ ... ] gave users an impression that the land was more important than the monarch”, he contends, “there can be little doubt that at the time the imagery was intended to associate the

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<sup>170</sup> Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992) 114. Print.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

queen with all parts of her realm”.<sup>172</sup> Saxton’s maps may have had unintentional consequences, producing a form of popular nationalism rooted in the land, as Helgerson asserts, but it’s apparent from the maps’ production and content that the Elizabethan and Jacobean government attempted to control the production of nationalist sentiment according to its own carefully scripted rhetoric. The intervention of the crown in the production of Saxton’s atlas makes apparent that the Elizabethan government sought to not only make use of Saxton’s cartography to enforce its prerogative across the realm, but that it attempted to control the ornamental language that gave the land its nationhood. Receiving lands in Suffolk from his royal patrons, Saxton was rewarded for his contribution to the manufacture of the official nation.<sup>173</sup>

As Helgerson rightly asserts, cartographic ornamentation is as meaningful in early modern maps as the landmass being depicted; it is this marginal lexicon that gives the land its national signification. However, the visual language of the English map was that of state centralization and imperial fantasy. For instance, the royal insignia in Saxton’s map of England is of such pronounced size that it looms over the island in a manner that is more authoritative—in both senses of the word—than peripheral; one cannot “read” England without acknowledging the crown’s overarching authority and its role in the nation’s authorship or conception. 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century English maps were integral to the crown’s project to manufacture and promote a state authorized vision of the nation. Imagining the English as an ethnically superior people united under the figure of the king or queen, the maps of Speed and his predecessor Saxton visually and ideologically supported “the myth of the island nation”. The English body politic in

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<sup>172</sup> See Barber, “Mapmaking in England, ca. 1470-1650,” *The History of Cartography*, 6 vols. ed. David Woodward (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2007) vol.3, part 2, 1629-30. Print.

<sup>173</sup> See Barber 1624 and Laurence Worms, “The London Map Trade to 1640,” *The History of Cartography*, 6 vols. ed. David Woodward (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2007) vol.3 part 2, 1693-1721. Print.

these representations appears as an ordered and homogenous nation of people allegiant to the royal will and poised for imperial rule over the territories of the archipelago. Some mapmakers, such as John Speed so manipulated the natural territory of the largest of the British isles as to make England appear as an island; the entirety of the Scotland is whited out and made visually insignificant.

The state-endorsed and commissioned images constructed in early modern maps did not reflect the political realities of the Elizabethan and Stuart period; efforts at centralization were thwarted by regional differences in law and custom; the English government was unable to control its territories in Ireland and the borderlands between England, Scotland and Wales; and the state was facing its own internal crises of authority, as the following chapters demonstrate. The official nationalist lexicon of emblems, insignias and cartographic embellishments is intended to guide the map-viewers' reading of the early modern English landscape and to ideologically mask the obstacles to nation building faced by the Elizabethan and Stuart regimes. By glossing over England's regional distinctiveness, erasing evidence of the violent ethnic clashes within the archipelago and enveloping the British Isles in the symbols of unification, the symbolic allegories literally over-wrote the land, projecting "the island" as a stable political space. Ironically, in the case of Speed's maps, the landmasses—the supposedly intended object of the map-reader's gaze—are visually overpowered by the illustrations and symbols that make up Speed's nationalist allegory. Indeed, rather than supplementing nature and subtly shaping the reader's perceptions of England along the lines of national identity, Speed's overanxious ornamentation instead draws the viewer's attention to the artificiality of Speed's island England and of constructed nationhood more generally.

This chapter will examine the role of Speed's cartographic texts in the production of official nationalist and imperial discourse during the reign of James I. I will consider how the anxieties of the state regarding nation and empire building register in Speed's symbolic narratives. Specifically, I will examine how Speed's cartographic landscapes underscore the rhetorical incongruities present in the state's conjoined discourses of nation and empire. Imperial rhetoric of the period was reliant upon the notion of a deeply historical British character that enveloped the people of the archipelago. According to this official narrative, Britain's geographic uniqueness and insularity contributed to the shared ethnicity and genealogy of the British people. English nationalist rhetoric, on the other hand, often deployed the myth of the island nation to buttress claims to England's political, cultural and geographic centrality and superiority within this archipelagic unit. Such nationalist mythologies necessarily depended upon the denigration and essential ethnic difference of England's British neighbors, as chapter one demonstrated. These two strands of official discourse—the imperial thread that was predicated upon the notion of a fundamental British-ness shared by the archipelagic body politic, and the nationalist tenor, which presupposed the essential ethnic difference between the people of the “English island” and their British brethren—are both at work in Speed's maps and coexist incongruously in the pages of his *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*. Speed's maps were among the products of the crown's official nationalist program; as such, his maps register the anxieties of the state. By grafting onto the British Isles an overdetermined and sometimes contradictory rhetoric of nationhood and empire, Speed's maps betray both the crises of English governance and the flimsiness and instability of the manufactured nation.

Popular literature of the early modern period often put into boldface the weaknesses and contradictions of official discourse. In part two of this chapter, I provide an analysis of

Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* and John Fletcher and Philip Massinger's *The Sea Voyage* to consider how these texts expose the incongruities of the nationalist and imperial mythologies visually narrated in Speed's maps. Both works are invested in matters of geography and consider how geographic location imbues subjects of particular territories with qualities that supposedly spring from the land itself. The topic of the land's effect on subjects traversing or inhabiting alien regions was a preoccupation of early modern writers, particularly when hierarchically ordering the lands of the British archipelago. Colonial discourses, such as those illustrated in Speed's representation of Ireland, imagined the people of Wales and Ireland as inherently uncivil and thus in need of the regulating hand of the English state. English travelers to Ireland were routinely warned of the island's contaminating influence. Such discourses supported notions of English superiority but put great pressure on the notion of an ancient and enduring British-ness that spanned the archipelago's disconnected territories.

*Cymbeline* and *The Sea Voyage* appear to critique imperial rhetoric based upon geographic distinctions by refusing the abstracted and ideologically suspect characterizations of England, Ireland and Wales found in official texts like Speed's *Theatre*. Both plays make use of the same materials deployed by Speed to construct his problematic representations of the Isles. For instance, one can trace in Speed's maps Spenser's damning portrayal of the Irish in his *View of the Present State of Ireland*. Likewise, the mythological rendering of *Cymbeline* in Geoffrey of Monmouth's *History of the Kings of Britain*, Raphael Holinshed's *Chronicles* and Speed's own *History of Great Britaine* is employed by Speed in his "Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland" to lend a veneer of celebrated antiquity to his visual narration of contemporary Britain. Taking up these same materials of nationalist and imperial rhetoric, Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* and Fletcher and Massinger's *Sea Voyage* render these official narratives problematic, putting

pressure upon claims to a celebrated British genealogy and dismantling the notion, supported by official cartography, that geography forms the basis of ethnic and cultural superiority. In the process, these two plays betray the rhetorical contradictions underpinning Speed's maps and expose the tenuousness of English nationalist and imperial discourse.

By reading cartographic and literary texts side by side, the aporias and intentional misconstructions of the early modern map rise to the surface of the overwritten visual document. Whereas the claims or narratives of histories and literary texts demand rhetorical or textual justification and explanation, cartographic works produce silent stories, unsubstantiated by evidence. J.B. Harley argues in *The New Nature of Maps* that the cartographic silencing of political, cultural and imperial disputes is central to the map's ideological rhetoric. He specifically cites 17<sup>th</sup> century maps of Ireland as instances of meaningful silences: he contends that "maps—just as much as examples of literature or the spoken word—exert a social influence through their omissions as much as by the features they depict and emphasize [ ... ] So forceful are the political undercurrents in these silences that it is sometimes difficult to explain them solely by recourse to other historical or technical factors".<sup>174</sup> As I argue in the second half of this chapter, Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* and Fletcher and Massinger's *Sea Voyage* give voice to the historiographical, geographical and governmental crises suppressed by the early modern map.

#### Perfecting Nature: Early Modern Cartographic Allegories

The poet's process of bringing form and correctness to nature is not unlike the mapmaker's project: the cartographer's mechanisms are brought to bear upon what was once an

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<sup>174</sup> Harley, "Maps, Knowledge, and Power," *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, ed. Paul Laxton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2001) 67. Print.

imperfectly understood natural landscape. The rewriting of historical records and the re-presentation of the nation were often necessary tasks to produce an ideologically successful rhetorical or visual narrative. Contemporary theories of poetics, such as those asserted by Philip Sidney and George Puttenham, drew upon Aristotle, who advocated a kind of poetic license that permitted revisions to history. According to Aristotle, the historical record when subject to the poet's pen could be manipulated for the sake of a coherent plot. Because the plot is the chief "end" of a poetic or dramatic work, "it is the function of a poet to relate not things that have happened, but things that may happen; i.e. that are possible in accordance with probability or necessity".<sup>175</sup> "Necessity" for both Aristotle and his 16<sup>th</sup> century inheritors is not simply a matter of artistry or plot, but of social necessity as well; poetic texts are instructional and therefore the poet may alter history's raw material to reflect "things as they should be". The application of these poetic principles allowed Speed and Saxton to build into their scientific representations of the natural landscape an allegorical language that rewrote English history and plotted an unlikely imperial future. Their maps pictorially imagine a historically expansive English nation with genealogical roots in Roman Britain. The unified territorial body of Saxton and Speed's England, in which the separate counties are barely delineated, visually suggests a consolidated body politic joined in a single identity under the subjects' allegiance to the crown and unique "island" character.<sup>176</sup> In his creative manipulation of unshaped material, like

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<sup>175</sup> Aristotle, Poetics. *The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism*, trans. Richard Janko, ed. Vincent B. Leitch. (New York: Norton, 2001) 95 and 97. Print.

<sup>176</sup> My analysis takes as its focus early modern representations of the English, Scottish and Irish nations, and the more encompassing maps of the isles as a political unit. The rationale for this emphasis on country and archipelagic maps, rather than the many county and estate maps in circulation during the period, is as follows: it is my contention that the primary ideological message of these atlases and collections is one of national or imperial unity and coherence. This message is achieved, in part, through the introductory cartographic image of the archipelago,



unmapped land or unformed language, the mapmaker oftentimes occupied the position of poet, altering the raw material of the archipelago's conflictive history to present a sense of unity, coherence and concord.

Nature is also subordinate to the poet, according to Sidney; relegating nature to the malleable material of the poet's craft, the poet "doth grow in effect another nature [ ... ] or quite, anew, forms such as never were in nature".<sup>177</sup> Nature left alone fails to delineate the nation: the signposts of nationhood—emblems of national identity, like flags and crests, country and county borderlines and scriptural pronouncements of possessed territories—are absent from natural landscapes, leaving no impressions of royal or state ownership and authority. Like the monarch who subjects his or her peoples and the lands they occupy to the royal will, the poet wrests history and nature from the staid and problematic realm of factuality to invent new, often politicized, worlds. The mapmaker reins in the land, enclosing within the map's geometrically perfect borders the rugged natural terrain. In this process, the mapmaker, most importantly, gives ideologically charged meaning to the landscape, inventing a newly conceived natural body by applying a carefully constructed allegorical language to the land itself. In the case of early modern maps, the language that supplements and gives form to the land is a nationalist lexicon of unnatural borders, symbols of history and "decorative" elements that create nature anew.

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artistically projected as a harmonious and unified political unit through the use of decorative borders, which contain the various geographical, political and ethnic bodies within a single frame. The impression of British unity under the English crown is also formally or textually enforced by binding in a single nationalist volume the counties, annexed territories and oftentimes disharmonious nations of the archipelago. The ideological containment of the isles within a nationalist or imperial frame, which is arguably the purpose of such cartographic and historiographic texts, is reproduced in the atlases' aesthetic and formal qualities. For a detailed discussion of William Camden and Michael Drayton's county maps and their contribution to a kind of aristocratic nationalist sentiment, see Helgersson's chapter "The Land Speaks" in *Forms of Nationhood* (cited above).

<sup>177</sup> Sidney, Philip. *An Apology for Poetry and Astrophil and Stella* Ed. Peter C. Herman (Glen Allen: College Publishing, 2001) 64. Print.

The mapmaker must impose form and meaning upon nature through cartographic allegory, like the poet imposes his or her will upon language, history and nature, and like the monarchy imposes its prerogative upon its subjects and lands. My use of the term “cartographic allegory” is influenced by the work of Jess Edwards, who contends in his essay “How to Read an Early Modern Map”, that cartographic texts of this period are distinctly literary in their modes of representing and giving meaning to the land. He argues that the metaphors and allegories that undergird cartographic representations are what give the mathematical or scientific content of the map its “meaning, value and currency”. Thus, he maintains, “geography is itself a poetic art”.<sup>178</sup>

The nation is forged and maintained through the inscription of law, authority and the necessary, if forced, allegiance of the social body to the national or monarchical will; but it is also visually

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<sup>178</sup> Edwards demonstrates that the rhetoric of “waste” and “improvement” that was applied to common lands in England during the enclosure movements was also used to justify the seizure of lands in the New World. According to this discourse, “defective” or misused nature was made economically viable, in part, through cartography’s mathematical ordering of the land. Edwards’s focus on the dependent relationship between visual representation and the politically driven rhetorical strategies that undergird these representations is akin to my argument regarding the mapmaker’s perfection of nature. Like the relationship between legal discourses that allowed the English to “make use” of English and American wastelands, cartographic poetics silently informed one’s reading of the supposedly mathematical representations of the natural landscape. See Edwards, “‘Nature in Defect’: Yielding Landscapes in Early Modern Discourses of Enclosure and Colonisation.” *Studies in Travel Writing: Papers from the Essex Symposium on ‘Writing Travels’* 4 (2000): 1-28. Print. Jeffrey N. Peters also examines the meeting of cartography and the poetic arts; in his research on the allegorical maps of 17<sup>th</sup> century France, he asserts that the map’s “meaning is created through a tension between scientific and figural language”. Peters considers the more literal forms of cartographic allegory, in which, for instance, the emotional life of a literary character is rendered cartographically, as in the case of Madeleine de Scudéry’s 1654 *Carte de Tendre*. My use of the term cartographic allegory refers to the way ideological meanings are grafted onto scientific representations of the land through the use of “ornaments” or “embellishments”, such as decorative borders, illustrations, seals and other demarcations of state power. See Edwards “How to Read an Early Modern Map: Between the Particular and the General, the Material and the Abstract, Words and Mathematics.” *Early Modern Literary Studies* 9.1 (2003):1-58, *Academic One File*. Web. 5 Jan. 2010 and Peters, *Mapping Discord: Allegorical Cartography in Early Modern French Writing*. (Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 2004) 38. Print.

constructed and enforced through the mapmaker's emendations to nature. Early modern cartographic allegories make use of poetic principles of creation and manipulation to both rework the symbols of history in order to give nationalist purpose to England's historical record and to shape the natural landscape to meet the geopolitical demands of state and nation-building. Artifice penetrates the natural realm to give it particular significations, making the natural landscape speak as a political one.

“Industria Naturam Ornat”

Saxton, long regarded as the first cartographer of the English nation, literally built the foundations of Speed's *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*; Speed not only carried on Saxton's tradition of ornamenting the British landscape, he also used Saxton's maps as his master narrative, embellishing Saxton's maps to construct his visual history of English nationhood. To understand Speed's cartographic allegories, one must first attend to Saxton's method of supplementing the natural landmasses of the isles with a specifically nationalist vocabulary. Saxton's map of England that introduces his *Atlas of the Counties of England and Wales* provides the modern reader of the early map with some sense of the relationship between nature, artifice and nationhood. In the bottom right corner of Saxton's representation of “Anglia” one discovers the crest of his patron, Thomas Seckford, who served the Elizabethan government first as master of the Requests, then as “surveyor of the Court of Wards and Liveries” (fig. 5).<sup>179</sup> Seckford's crest bears the Latin phrase “Industria naturam ornat”, roughly translated as “industry, nature, ornament”.<sup>180</sup> In the context of Saxton's arduous task of surveying and

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<sup>179</sup> Helgerson, 109.

<sup>180</sup> In an article on Saxton, J. B. Harley translates Seckford's motto as “hardwork improves things”. However, taken individually, these terms in reference to the maps upon which they appear point to the meeting of industry, nature and ornament that is integral to the art of early

mapping the whole of England and Wales, Seckford's motto likely refers to the advancement of English cartographic practices. Saxton's industry made possible a kind of cartographic knowledge of the English nation that was much needed in matters of national defense and English identity.

However, one can detect in the root words of Seckford's motto and in the elaborate decorations of Saxton's maps another manner of improvement that does not speak directly to the scientific precision of Saxton's cartographic representation. The English territory in Saxton's map is hemmed in by illustrations and ornamental seals; busy ships man the English waters, seemingly protecting the vulnerable coastlines; an overlarge crest announcing the territory as "Anglia" is nearly larger in size than the regions of Ireland and Scotland that border the English "island"; this looming crest is, of course, topped by the English royal seal, and Ireland is obscured by an index of the English counties to be depicted in the following pages. These instances in which the map-maker ornaments geography speaks to a kind of nationalist industry, a careful and deliberate placement of images and symbols through which the natural territory becomes literally imprinted with the signifiers of nationhood, effectively (and affectively) transforming land into territory, nature into nation.

Accordingly, the visual lexicons of early modern maps—the crests, plans and decorative features that are oftentimes considered "ornamentation"—should not be regarded as mere marginalia to fill the empty spaces surrounding the territories. What Harley terms the "value-laden images" that give nationalist articulation to the land, are part of map-making's long history, a history in which cartographic representations cannot be linked to a single biography.

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modern map-making. See Harley, "Christopher Saxton and the first Atlas of England and Wales, 1579-1997," *The Map Collector* (1 September 1979) 11 January 2010 Note to illustration above paragraph 6. Web.

He claims that “deliberate distortions of map content for political purposes can be traced throughout the history of maps, and the cartographer has never been an independent artist, craftsman, or technician”. By identifying the “rules” or language that provides signification to the map, one can locate the state’s imprint upon the represented territory and thus tease out from map the “set of power relations” that undergird the map’s production.<sup>181</sup> In the case of early modern cartography, the crown imposes itself upon the land in such a manner that the cartographer and the immediate patron sometimes barely register in the language of the map. The overbearing symbols of royal authority in these maps make plain the crown’s control of both the land itself and the cartographic language that gives this land its meaning.

Saxton’s maps were central to the crown and state project to fashion the official English nation; Saxton’s exaggerated markers of English ownership and his visual colonization of Ireland ideologically contributed to statist notions of English identity and superiority. As Barber explains, the commission of Saxton’s maps by Lord Burghley was for the purposes of “national defense” and, perhaps, for the administration of the territories. Though Saxton’s atlas was by no means consistent in its content, “spasmodic attempts were made on some of the maps to enhance their value as aids to government by showing internal divisions, enumerating the number of parishes and market towns and, more consistently, by showing the parks and indicating noble houses [ ... ] All of this information would have assisted administrators in assessing taxes,

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<sup>181</sup> See Harley, “Maps, Knowledge, and Power”, 53 and 63. In his chapter “The Land Speaks” from *Forms of Nationhood*, Helgerson argues that the eventual disappearance of Seckford’s arms marks “a momentous transfer of cultural authority from the patron and the royal system of government of which patronage was an integral part to the individual maker” (111). One of my contentions is that the reappearance of and strong visual emphasis on the royal seals in Speed’s maps implies, at least in some respects, the return of the royal authorizing hand to the cartographic representations of nation and empire in early modern cartography.

raising musters, and elucidating local problems”.<sup>182</sup> Evidence also indicates that Burghley and even Elizabeth herself had a hand in the development of the ornamental language that gave national meaning to the representation of the land. Barber explains that Saxton’s maps likely lacked ornamentation prior to their engraving. He suggests that the decoration so central to the maps’ statist intentions was inserted by state itself:

The choice of arms and mottoes on the printed maps were presumably stipulated by Seckford, in consultation with Burghley and possibly the queen herself. She is said to have taken exception to the unflattering depiction of her robes on the first state of the frontispiece to the atlas, leading to their more naturalistic portrayal on the second state.<sup>183</sup>

As explained above, the Elizabethan government needed the assistance of cultural producers like Saxton to build and disseminate an officially authorized vision of the English nation. Official nationalism—a state project to impose a homogenous national identity upon an ethnically, culturally and spiritually disunited people—is a phenomenon that aptly applies to Elizabethan and Stuart England. The British archipelago was as fragmented as its geographically disjointed territories. The ongoing perseverance of ethnic differences and identities across the islands loudly disclaimed the state’s rhetoric of British unification. Distinctions between local cultures and customs within England, let alone between England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, were made manifest in legal suits and in the localities’ sometimes refusal to adhere to royal policy, thus disallowing the state’s attempts at centralization. The Reformation and counter-Reformation exacerbated these fissures and created further tears in an already fragile social fabric.

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<sup>183</sup> Barber, 1629.

The state's deployment of the language of empire further compounded these ideological discontinuities. Though Henry VIII's declaration of 1533 claimed for England the status of "empire", the state's measures to consolidate the British archipelago seem more akin to the construction of a unified English state across the island territories. For instance, the enforcement of English language, law and custom in Wales and the eventual annexation of the Welsh nation to England produced the impression that the incorporation of this once autonomous region was really an expansion of England into newly appropriated territory. The rhetoric of annexation that made Wales part of the English island could not be applied to Scotland, an independent kingdom; instead, the discourse of British-ness was deployed to politically suture Scotland to England. Arguably, this envelopment of the Scottish and English territories under the banner of British unification was, in political reality, another attempt over a long historical trajectory to enforce claims of English suzerainty over Scotland. Neither the language of annexation nor of unification could be smoothly applied to Ireland, due to the island's geographic separation from the English center and its fierce resistance to English rule. The colonial rhetoric used to describe the Irish put pressure on the discourse of British-ness by casting the Irish as both genealogically British and therefore a part the unified British archipelago and a savage people under the rule of the English. In each case, "British-ness" was often a codeword for Englishness; thus, the English imperial project was also a process of expanding the English state infrastructure across the archipelagic territories.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> As referenced in chapter one, John Morrill also comments upon the English's refusal to call themselves British. As he explains, "If they use it at all it is without any sense that it is other than a synonym for English." See his introduction to *The British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* eds. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill. (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996) 10. Print. Willy Maley has also taken up this question in his examination of canonical early modern literature, arguing that "even as [Spenser, Shakespeare, Milton and others] forge a new British identity [they are] producing the very English culture that is

The simultaneous and conjoined state projects to construct both the English island nation and the British archipelagic empire resulted in certain inescapable rhetorical incongruities. English imperial rhetoric often depended upon the notion of a shared and ancient British-ness that bound together the people of the isles. Geographic proximity and archipelagic uniqueness were also ideas that were frequently called upon to support British imperial ideologies; Britain's "otherworldly" character (to borrow Jeffrey Knapp's term) as a set of islands disconnected from the rest of the world implied a "naturally" ubiquitous British identity across the territories that defined the peoples of the archipelago as essentially alike in constitution, manner and genealogy.<sup>185</sup> Because the English state was the biggest investor in the manufacture of this "British identity", Britishness and Englishness were often elided, as described above; thus, the production of the British character meant the promotion of English values, customs, law, etc. over the disjointed British Isles. However, these state claims to essential British sameness necessarily ran contrary to a second strand of English state rhetoric. The subjugation of the Irish, Scottish and Welsh to the English center demanded that these members of British family be cast as essentially different and inherently inferior to the English, who sought to control their territories and institute their laws and language throughout the archipelago. Even in the very texts that sought to evince a deep history of British unity within the archipelagic unit, there contradictorily exists alongside these rhetoric strains the contention that the Irish, Scottish and Welsh, in both their ancient and contemporary form, are fundamentally "other" and essentially

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threatened by this enlarged polity." See Maley, *Nation, State and Empire in English Renaissance Literature: Shakespeare to Milton* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 3. Print. Krishan Kumar takes a somewhat opposing view of the conflation of English-ness and British-ness, contending that the construction of a properly English national identity was interrupted or subsumed by the process of empire building. See Kumar, *The Making of English National Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003). esp 1-17. Print.

<sup>185</sup> Knapp, *An Empire Nowhere: England, America, and Literature from Utopia to The Tempest*. (Berkeley: U of California P, 1992) 4. Print.



inferior and therefore demand the civilizing influence of the English. Such claims to English superiority were reinforced through English mapmaking, particularly through the visual depiction of the “English island” as the cultural, social and governmental heart of this empire. By manipulating geography’s raw material and intricately embellishing the British landmasses, some English maps, especially Speed’s, relegate the Irish, Welsh and Scottish territories to an imagined periphery, and imbue England with a pretended island-ness that visually and ideologically endorses the idea of English centrality.

The production of the British domestic empire, which necessitated the grafting of a single identity upon heterogeneous and often contentious social bodies, and the simultaneous and contradictory project to differentiate England from its inferior British brethren was an impossible yet fundamental task in the project of English nation-building during the early modern period. The careful construction of the English (and sometimes British) national character via literary, cartographic and historical works that spanned the regions of the disunited archipelago would aesthetically achieve that which frustrated and eluded the English state: English control of the British territories and the allegiance of the archipelagic subjects to the English crown and state. By “stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the [ ... ] body of the empire”, in Benedict Anderson’s words, English official nationalism attempted to envelop under a single imperial banner the Welsh, Irish and Scottish, as well as the various ethnicities that peopled the English mainland, while concurrently securing England’s status as the sovereign nation ruling over its imperial territories.<sup>186</sup>

In this respect, Saxton’s ornamentation in “Anglia” encourages a specific reading of the British Isles, one that aligned with statist interests (fig. 6). For instance, Saxton’s obfuscated

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<sup>186</sup> Anderson, 86.

Ireland is hardly without ideological import. That Ireland is nearly covered over with a list of the English territories to be included in the atlas visually implies that Ireland can be counted among these English territories. Literally overwritten, Ireland appears in Saxton's "Anglia" as a blank slate, poised for English rule. The effect of this dual overlay is to deemphasize Ireland as a separate and autonomous national body, making it instead a placemaker for inscriptions of English national identity. Engraving England (its counties, its distinct forms of cartographic embellishment) onto the Irish Isle "perfects" Ireland by visually negating Ireland's political autonomy and allegorically fulfilling England's imperial "destiny" to rule the British Isles.

Reinforcing the imperial mythology that sees Ireland rewritten as English is a pair of intertwined figures positioned between the coasts of the two nations, just east of Dublin. The naked female figure, aligned with Ireland because of her comparative nearness to Hibernia, is clasped in the arms of a trident-wielding male figure. Aside from the mythological associations that can be read into this image (the Aphrodite-like female sits in what appears to be a shell, and the trident, of course, reminds one of Poseidon), the image also recalls the gendered myths of empire that imagine a fertile female national body or territory, awaiting a colonizing male hand. That this imperial hand is English is made clear by the overlarge crest dominating the top right corner of the map. The crest announcing the land as "Anglia" is roughly a third the size of the English territory depicted and, as mentioned above, is nearly bigger in size than both "Scotie Pars" and Hiberniæ Pars". This piece of ornamentation includes not just an announcement of the represented landmass, but also the English royal crest, a celebration of Elizabeth and a greatly ornamented border that threatens to intrude upon the English land itself, nearly touching the coast of Robin Hood's Bay. Below the crest sits Seckford's coat of arms; the two cartographic embellishments are surrounded by the presumably English ships that crowdedly circle the

English coast. Lastly, the scale line that sits in the Irish Sea, just west of the Bristol Channel, is exaggerated in size. The scale line itself—the only scientific tool provided the reader in order to correctly understand the mathematics behind this representation—is dwarfed by elaborated decorations that appear to celebrate English cartography and the artists whose hands created the work.

Saxton's cartographic embellishments depict the meeting of nature and ornament in a project of visual and allegorical nation building through map-making. The writing of "Anglia" as an autonomous nation with an imperial destiny takes place not only within the borders of the England cartographically represented by Saxton, but also outside the archipelago's natural coastlines in the symbols, seals and illustrations that "decorate" the map. These illustrations are not innocuous marginal commentary; rather, they inflect one's "reading" of the territory, mystifying this landscape through the distorting and unnatural lens of official nationalist discourse. Grafting onto the English geographic landscape a visual narrative of "what ought to be the case" according to the state, Saxton alters nature to produce the official nation.

#### Speed's Imperfect Nation

As Saxton's successor, Speed took Saxton's embellishments to new extremes; Speed's ornaments sit atop the natural environment of the Isles, calling attention to their incongruity within the cartographic landscape. Unlike Saxton, who managed to blend his loud pronouncements of English nationalism into the map's overall language, Speed overwhelms his England with illustrations, Roman coins, cherubs wielding cartographic instruments and ethnographic catalogs of isle's inhabitants. In so doing, Speed's maps unwittingly demonstrate the resounding chasm between the natural land and the nationalist inscriptions that attempt to overwrite it. The conceptual gap between natural territory and the conscripted national and

political body unintentionally betrays the artificiality of the official nation and the flimsiness of such nationalist constructions. Thus, Speed's anxious and overwrought ornamentation belies state and monarchical anxieties regarding the impassable evidence of British disunity that consistently undermines and threatens to undo such official representations of English nationalism.

Speed rose to prominence through the intervention of the Elizabethan and Stuart statesman Fulke Greville. Greville's celebrated career as an agent of the state is made evident by his many titles and positions within early modern political culture; as "secretary to the principality of Wales, treasurer of the navy, and chancellor of the exchequer", Greville was later made Baron Brooke under James I.<sup>187</sup> As the mapmaker's patron, Greville secured the funding of the queen for Speed's cartographic work and provided him a state position in the Customs. Speed's work for the state and crown also awarded him official passes and subsidies to survey the countryside, as well as access to state documents. He was personally rewarded by the crown for his effort to construct the nation, receiving lands from the crown's hands.<sup>188</sup> Speed also included on the back of his maps information central to the administration of the realm, making his collections tools of not just ideology but of governance as well. As Nigel Nicolson notes, such detailed catalogs of the British landscape read like "prospectus[es] for an American colony", in which the land's greatest features are played up to encourage British investment.<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> "Greville, Sir Fulke, first Baron Brooke" *The Oxford Companion to English Literature* ed. Dinah Birch. Oxford U P *Oxford Reference Online*. Oxford University Press. Ed. Dinah Birch. *Oxford Reference Online*. Web. 12 April 2010.

<sup>188</sup> See Nigel Nicolson's introduction to his *The Counties of Britain: A Tudor Atlas by John Speed* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1988) 7-19. Print. Also, Barber 1636 and Worms 1717. Print.

<sup>189</sup> Nicolson, 12.

Such celebrations of Ireland or Scotland's resources would serve the same purpose for the more wealthy Londoners who were most likely to encounter Speed's vision of the English empire in his cartographic texts. Englishmen willing to enter the Irish colonies were, of course, of great value to an English crown with too little manpower to effectively achieve conquest. In this regard, Speed's maps directly served state interests by visually supporting English hegemony over the isles and by promoting imperial ventures.

As Nicolson explains, "Speed considered himself primarily an historian". The maps of his *Theatre* were intended as "supplements" to his *History of Great Britaine Under the Conquests of ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans*, which was also published in 1611.<sup>190</sup> Speed's royalist *History* is similar in organization and content to William Camden's *Britannia*, from which he borrowed material; seeking to provide a fluid nationalist narrative "from Julius Caesar to our Most Gracious Sovereign King James", as the frontispiece announces, Speed's *History* constructs a British genealogy, beginning with the pre-Roman ancient Britons and concluding with the creation of James's unified Great Britain.<sup>191</sup> The reader of the *History* is ushered into the narrative through an archway in which an ancient and slightly larger "Britaine" stands on the platform above the Saxon and Norman to his left and the "Romane" and Dane to his right (see fig. 1). In the center of this illustration is the title "Britannia", flanked by two Roman coins contained within the *History* that bear her mythological figure; this coin reappears in Speed's map of "The Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland". In introducing his *History*

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<sup>190</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>191</sup> Speed, *The History of Great Britaine Under the Conquests of Ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans* (1611) EEBO. Web. 20 March 2010. Frontispiece. Speed was also a silent collaborator in the creation of Holinshed's *Chronicles*, which similarly attempted a cohesive and coherent nationalist history. Unless otherwise noted, all future citations of this work refer to this edition.

with this ethnographic catalog of England's forefathers, Speed brings into a pretended historical unity the various ethnicities of early modern England and advocates an English nationalism founded in a shared ancient past.<sup>192</sup>

Speed's frontispiece speaks to the *History's* larger project, to compose a testament to Britain's historical and political endurance, its genealogical roots in ancient Rome and his king's crowning achievement, the unification of Great Britain. The Roman coins that appear in both the *History* and its companion piece, Speed's cartographic *Theatre*, provide these complementary narratives of the isles with a classical veneer, in keeping with the myths of British origin propagated by historians like Geoffrey of Monmouth in his 12<sup>th</sup> century *Historia Regum Britanniae*. Such originary myths are fundamental to the construction and promotion of a sense of shared national identity and imperial purpose. As Anthony B. Smith explains, nation-building is dependent upon these myths and their symbols in order to sustain a people's political identity: the "myths, symbols, memories and values of ethnic communities and nations" are, in Smith's view, "the main elements of collective continuity and cultural distinctiveness".<sup>193</sup> Speed's organizational strategy in his *History* implies that this narrative of collective identity fittingly concludes with James's reign, in which the king "in this last age of the World held the Scepter of the whole Iland in his royall hand, so to unite the two stiles under the same of one entire

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<sup>192</sup> Speed's frontispiece to his *History* also appears as the title page of his *Theatre*. Helgerson has argued that this representation of British genealogical history underscored for contemporary historians like Samuel Daniels the fundamental "discontinuity" in the British narrative. An equally viable interpretation, however, is that Speed's hierarchical placement of these representative figures and their regal appearance marks an attempt to bring order to the historical record and to imagine an idealized and mythological "Britaine" destined to rule the Isles. Helgerson, 121-22.

<sup>193</sup> Smith, *The Antiquity of Nations* (Cambridge: Pearson, 2004) 19. Print.

Empire”.<sup>194</sup> To reinforce the closed nature of this historical narrative, Speed reminds his readers that James’s title of “King of great Britaine” accords with “the ancient name of this Isle before the Saxons Conquest, the restoring of which name againe, many fore-dooming spirits had anciently presaged, as now we see effected”.<sup>195</sup>

The silent hierarchical ordering of these representative figures on the *History*’s frontispiece, in which the overlarge ancient Britaine pronounces the destined rule of the Britaines over the Isles, achieved during James’s reign, exemplifies what Eric Hobsbawm terms an “invented tradition”. Speed draws “ancient materials” from the “well-supplied warehouses of official ritual [... and] symbolism” to reinforce an often artificial history through the repetition of nationalist narratives. As Hobsbawm explains, recuperated symbols can be recycled into a new context and “normally attempt to establish continuity with a *suitable* historic past” (emphasis added).<sup>196</sup> Speed himself attests to the fragility of his historical materials; however, he reconciles possible untruths in his narrative by turning to the type of historical license promoted by Aristotle and Sidney. Acknowledging that “the Records of Great Britaine are eaten up with Time’s teeth”, he appeals to the reader by citing Jean Bodin, asking the reader to

give leave to Antiquity, who sometimes minglenth falshoods with truth, to make the beginnings of Policies seeme more honourable; And whose power is farre served into the worlds conceit, that with Hierome we may say, Antiquity is

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<sup>194</sup> Speed, *The History of Great Britaine*, 916.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid.

<sup>196</sup> See Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s “Introduction” to *The Invention of Tradition*. Eds. Hobsbawm and Ranger. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983) 6, 1. Print. It is important to note that Hobsbawm locates this national myth-making in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, this argument regarding the use—and misuse—of “ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes” seems particularly relevant here.

allowed with such generall applause, that knowne untruths many times are  
pleasing unto many.<sup>197</sup>

Among the “knowne untruths” of Speed’s genealogical history is the notion that the contesting ethnicities represented in the frontispiece progressively culminated in the crowning Britaine that stands atop this hierarchy. Such a harmonious visual allegory of course erases the violent meeting of these groups and the successive conquests of the isles that put obvious pressure on Speed’s romanticized image of James’s autonomous and culturally homogenous British empire. Likewise, Speed’s problematic rendering of Britain’s ancient past and his contention that “the English Empire [was] peaceably established, both by, and unto this peaceable Monarch” evacuates from the contemporary historical record the ethnic violence that characterized 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Britain under English rule.<sup>198</sup>

As visual compliments to this royalist history, the maps of Speed’s *Theatre* bear the markings of a statist agenda invested in remaking English history through cartographic allegory. The act of historical invention that we witness in his multivolume *History* also underpins his visual *Theatre*. The state’s yet unachieved projects of national unity and imperial conquest are narrated on Speed’s maps as though they are a matter of national record, rather than longed-for but elusive accomplishments. In Speed’s visual history, the Irish are conquered and relegated to the margins of their own land, the borderlands between Wales and England have disappeared,

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<sup>197</sup> Speed, 153-154.

<sup>198</sup> Speed (1650), 911. Speed does record the rebellions against James, including The Gunpowder Plot; however, he ends his narrative of James’s rule lamenting “this last foule blot of infamy” and anticipating a glorious future under the “raigne of this mighty Monarch, our learned and wise Sovereigne”.



and the English “island” is an undivided canvas of national unity. In this sense, Speed alters the English national narrative to reflect statist and crown initiatives as historical givens.

The map which opens Speed’s *Theatre*, “The Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland” brings into an ordered and visually harmonious display what was in political reality a contentious grouping of ethnicities. Speed rubs out the Welsh border, and there is no clear demarcation between Scotland and England (fig. 7).<sup>199</sup> Despite the 1536 Act of Union that led to the assimilation of the Welsh into English political culture, social and institutional differences between the two regions persisted into James’s reign. For instance, the Council of the Marches, the governmental and judicial body planted by the English in the late 15<sup>th</sup> century that oversaw cases on the Welsh border, was a point of contestation during James’s rule. The controversy and political wrangling regarding Welsh jurisdiction over the English border shires reinscribed the political boundaries that Speed’s maps attempt to abolish.<sup>200</sup> As Peter Roberts notes, James himself was invested in remarking the geographic and political boundaries between Wales and his united British kingdom; seeking to preserve the custom of treating Wales as the training ground for future Kings, James revived the title of principality for Wales.<sup>201</sup> Such debates about the status of Wales as an incorporated yet semi-autonomous body politic cast doubt upon

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<sup>199</sup> Speed, *The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* (1612) EEBO Michigan State Univesity Lib. 25 July 2012. Web. All future citations refer to this edition.

<sup>200</sup> For a discussion of the debates surrounding the Council and its jurisdiction during James’s reign, see Peter Roberts “The English Crown, the Principality of Wales and the Council in the Marches, 1534-1641,” *The British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State-Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago* Eds. Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996) 118-147. Print.

<sup>201</sup> Roberts, 143.

Speed's cartographically and politically undifferentiated "British" landscape.<sup>202</sup> Speed's erasure of the Anglo-Scottish border is also ideologically suspect and speaks to the state's imperial fantasies, rather than British political reality under Stuart rule. In spite of the official rhetoric surrounding the 1603 Union of the Crowns and James's 1604 declaration to the English parliament that he was "the Head" of the joined Anglo-Scottish body politic, both the English and Scottish governments were decidedly hostile to the reforms necessary to unite the realms. James's attempt to fashion himself "King of Great Britain" met with the refusal of his English parliament due to anxieties regarding the potential loss of English identity and pretenses of superiority in the face of James's intended unification of the Isles. Parliament's unwillingness to extend English common law and rights to its northern neighbors and its squashing of James's attempts to free up trade relations between the two nations evinces that the British king's rhetoric of a united body remained part of the political ether, rather than a pragmatic or achievable political program. According to Steven Ellis, these parliamentary refusals and both Scottish and English desires to retain their autonomy meant that "James's various efforts to unite his British kingdoms had been soundly defeated: only the king himself clung to the belief that the union of the crowns had effected anything other than one king ruling two independent kingdoms".<sup>203</sup>

Ellis contends that some of England's borderlands were sites of such "endemic insecurity" that they may rightly be termed "war zones". The monarchy's "limited financial

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<sup>202</sup> Garrett Sullivan also notes the persistence of cultural difference between the English and the Welsh after the Act of Union, specifically in relation to matters of geography. In his discussion of Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* and the play's treatment of Welsh difference, he argues that Welsh resistance to Roman road-building in ancient Britain and to English standards of measurement during the early modern period points to Wales's status as "unassimilable" to the cultures of conquering forces. See Sullivan "Civilizing Wales: *Cymbeline*, Roads and the Landscapes of Early Modern Britain," *Early Modern Literary Studies* 4.2 (1998): n. pag. Web. 2/23/2010.

<sup>203</sup> See Ellis, *The Making of the British Isles: The State of Britain and Ireland 1450-1660* (London: Pearson, 2007) 289-306. Print.

resources and the sheer length of the frontiers” made monitoring these borderlands impossible; thus, the great instability of the marches was a pronounced concern of the Crown.<sup>204</sup> Speed’s map of “Great Britaine and Ireland” silences these anxieties by erasing these borderlands from his portrait of the “kingdome”. Ireland’s geographical position is also altered in Speed’s rendering; it appears nearly to be joined to Scotland. Note the proximity of Scotland’s Kintyre peninsula (here spelled “Cantyr”) to Ireland’s most northeast border. Speed’s strategy of representation in practically conjoining these separate land masses gives the viewer the impression that Ireland and the neighboring island of “Britain” naturally make up a single homogenous region. Because Speed’s map of the Kingdom fuses England and Scotland geographically, the “British” island appears to wrap around and visually overpower the smaller Irish Isle. This hierarchical positioning illustrates that even the supposedly trustworthy mathematics or science of cartography is often manipulated to suit the mapmaker or historian’s purposes.

To combat the geographical disconnectedness of the isles, a physical fact of the archipelago that made possible the preservation of ethnic and cultural differences, allowed for pockets of resistance outside the reach of English rule and invited invasion from foreign nations, Speed deploys a number of visual techniques to compress and contain the isles into a single ideological frame of British unity. Aside from the decorative borders that hem in the separate landmasses into a single visual narrative, Speed also makes dual use of his illustrations and embellishments to both thoroughly stamp the archipelagic landscape with an iconography of British-ness and to lend the visual impression of unity, symmetry and coherence to his representations that speaks to the larger project of enforcing notions of shared geographic,

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<sup>204</sup> Ellis, “The Tudor Borderlands 1485-1603” *The Oxford Illustrated History of Tudor and Stuart Britain*, ed. John Morrill (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996) 56. Print.

cultural, social and political identity. For instance, the intricately bordered inset illustrations of London and Edinburgh pose like sentinels on either side of main British isle. Each capital is paired with two other illustrations. The image of London is supported by a Roman coin representing Imperial Britannia below it while the royal crest sits above the celebrated city. Along with the obvious association of England's capital with royal and ancient imperial might, the visual impact of this three-tiered illustration is one of unity and security from outside sources, particularly when read with its mirror set of images on the eastern side of the isle. Speed's illustration of Edinburgh is likewise joined with a Roman coin; the face of Cunobelin, or Cymbeline, directs his gaze toward the conjoined British empire, as though the supposed uniter of ancient Britain and Rome were approving the union of the contemporary British isles, brought about by the Scottish king of both capital cities. Sitting above the Scottish capital is an inset of the Orkney Islands. Positioning them in the territorially empty space to the east of the English coast is, in one sense, pragmatic. Because Speed's northern-most landmass is the border of the Northwest Highlands, the Orkneys exist outside the frame and therefore must be displaced to a marginal territory. However, the alignment of this inset with the image of the capital and the coin of Cymbeline lends to this illustrative grouping a column-like impression. The two sets of illustrations that flank the British coastlines function as both framing mechanisms to contain the British territories and to imply a kind of protection from the contaminating influence of foreign nations. As the columns pictorially block the isles from invading forces, the Scottish unicorn, Irish griffin and English lion, each carrying their representative flags in their mouths, collectively man the threatening and legally fluid waterways surrounding the isles, symbolically signally British possession.

The illustrations decorating the bottom portion of Speed's "Kingdome of Great Britaine" achieve a similar unifying effect. Off the southwestern coast of Ireland sits the map scale, also elaborately framed in a style similar to the inset illustrations of the capitals. Resting upon this frame are a pair of angels who appear to be giving their blessing to the tools of cartography used in this representation of Britain. Similar sets of angels appear in the top corners of the map; the royal coat of arms is graced by two angels with quills, as if they just finished penning this divine image of Britain. Another pair sit atop the illustration of Edinburg. The ubiquity of the angels speaks, perhaps, to the blessing of Speed's overall project; each angel is clasping or touching instruments necessary to map-making. However, one can also read the careful placement of these angels in three corners of the map as both a framing technique and divine visual lexicon that lends a kind of holiness to the union of these once politically and socially disconnected peoples. In the bottom right-hand corner appears the portions of Holland and France necessary to place the archipelago in the northern European sphere. Situating a fourth set of angels in these foreign territories could muddle the overall impression of the isle's divine union by extending these holy images to foreign lands. Instead, Speed completes his framing of the territories with a framed plate that provides information about the map's production and directing viewers to the location in London where this map can be purchased. Though this is standard and necessary information included on any map, Speed's placement of this information atop of France and Holland effectively overwrites these foreign territories with a narrative map of London, guiding the reader to the business of "I. Sudbury and George Humble in Pope's head Alley in London" and thus relegating these foreign spaces to empty space to be re-inscribed with the language of British-ness. As discussed above, the "reader" of Speed's kingdom is visually encouraged to read the map's representation of the land through the document's symbolic lexicon, a language that,

in the case of Speed's "Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland" celebrates James's divine achievement of bringing unity to the isles.

The placement and ordering of Speed's embellishments produce his imperial poetic of British unity and sameness. However, this cartographic rhetoric is complicated by maps' subtle reinforcement of English difference and superiority. As discussed, London, the seat of the monarchy, is situated beneath the royal arms. Rather than positioning this illustration of English authority in close proximity to the English Isle, London sits above the unruly Irish; therefore, England as both land mass and the seat of the monarchy presses upon Ireland from both its western and its eastern coastline. Linked vertically with the royal arms and the inset of London is Speed's Roman coin illustrating Britannia's imperial rule, which nearly touches Ireland's eastern seaboard. These insignias of British sovereignty over the map's national spaces loom visually and symbolically over the Irish island. Rather than include rebellious Ireland as part of the "kingdome" of his title, Speed separates Ireland from the English nation not to indicate that Ireland is capable of sustaining some sort of national autonomy, but rather to symbolically enforce English claims to the region in part through the Roman mythology manufactured in his *History*. Likewise, Speed's "Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland" also visually reinforces England's efforts at centralization, which were essential to English control over the British territories. Significantly, the illustrations of the two sites of British governmental authority, the capital cities, with their accompanying seals and insets are placed on either side of the Scottish Highlands, a region of resistance to English rule. The arrangement of these capitals that surround and bear down upon areas of potential rebellion imply that these seats of government not only repel foreign incursions from outside the isles, but also monitor and police internal dissent from within.

The effect of the map's more indirect ideological content supporting English rule over the isles jars in important ways with the overall visual message of British sameness and unity and betrays the fact the Britishness is often code for Englishness in early modern official rhetoric. The incongruities between the imperial language of shared British-ness and English national superiority become considerably more pronounced in Speed's maps of England, Scotland and Ireland where ethnographic catalogs, geographic manipulations and other politically-motivated "embellishments" construct a narrative of English might and "natural" supremacy. The success of this nationalist narrative comes, in part, from the contrived visual impression of England's island-ness. Where England was formerly projected as part of the conjoined "British" archipelagic landscape in "The Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland", in Speed's "Kingdome of England" this land is transformed into an island-like landmass somehow separate from Scotland and only in tangential relationship to Ireland. By recasting England as an island, Speed reinforces the notion of English centrality and separateness from the inferior cultures supposedly under "the island's" control. As discussed throughout, the rhetoric of "otherworldly" island-ness was central to English nationalist discourse; in Speed's theater this pretended island identity is supported visually and is troublesomely deployed as evidence of England's geographic, political and cultural centrality in the isles.

Speed's "Kingdome of England" is the first of his maps in the *Theatre* to feature ethnographic depictions of the isle's inhabitants (fig. 8). Illustrations of the various classes of Englishmen and women, all neatly dressed and hierarchically ordered on either side of their territory, stand like columns flanking the national space. The neat placement and immaculate appearance of Speed's representative English populace imply an easily classified and ethnically identifiable English race. Because this is the first in a series of illustrations featuring national

specimens, one naturally judges the coming images of the British populace from this ordered and elegant classification of the English body politic. In this representation, Scotland and Ireland are distinct and separate geographical units, emptied of detail and instead appearing as vacant landmasses with only a few villages and cities skirting their shores. These lands appear poised for colonization by Speed's Englishmen and women; in fact, Ireland is artistically occupied by the English figures who are presented on the Western border of the map and who largely obscure the Irish territory. Scotland, on the other hand, is symbolically stamped with Speed's seal of his English Kingdom. The table of "all the Shires, Cities, Bishopricks, Market Townes, Castles, Parishes, Rivers, Bridges, Chases, Forrests, and Parkes, conteyned in every particuler shire of the Kingdome of England" reinforces the naturalness of the English colonizing mission by its implication of a burgeoning and industrious English populace in need of more land.

In marked contrast, Speed's "Kingdome of Irland" pushes his ethnographic catalog of the Irish to the far left side of the map, and classifies the island's inhabitants as either gentle, "civill" or "wilde" (as opposed to the English designations "noble", "gentle", "citizen" or "countryman" or woman). Deploying the popular colonial ideology that imagined the Irish as barbarous, thieving and animal-like, Speed dresses all of his representative Irishmen and women in cloaks (fig. 9). As Michael Neill explains, the cloak or "Irish mantle" was often invoked as a visual signifier of Irish shiftiness and criminal concealment, as well as their refusal to be incorporated into civilized England.<sup>205</sup> Speed directs the gazes of the Irish recorded in his *Theatre* in a

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<sup>205</sup> Speed also provides his "Wilde Irish man" what was termed a "glib" or "shaggy forelock". According to Neill, "mantles and glibs were read as powerful statements of a wandering people's disorderly resistance to placement [ ... ] This effect was enormously and sinisterly enhanced by the way in which they seemed to grant their wearers the invisibility of an almost impenetrable disguise" (25). Neill, "Broken English and Broken Irish: Nation, Language, and the Optic of Power in Shakespeare's Histories," *Shakespeare Quarterly* 45.1 (1994): 1-32. Print.



manner that amplifies the implied untrustworthiness indicated by their dress. Rather than submitting to the cataloging gaze of the reader, Speed's Irishmen and women either look towards each other or avert their gaze away from the reader; only the "Gentlewoman of Ireland" looks directly at the viewer. Also, each Irish specimen, with the exception of the almost entirely-cloaked "civill woman", wears clothing fringed with a hair-like material, making them appear animalistic. Like the Englishmen and women in his "Kingdome of England", and the ancient line of British inhabitants on the frontispiece to his *History*, these illustrations are meant to represent the natural inhabitants of the national space. By depicting the Irish in accordance with colonial ideology, and by visually distancing them from the very land they inhabit, Speed's nationalist poetics advocate for English *imperium* over Ireland.

Cultural distance between the English and the Irish in Speed's "Kingome of England" is visually suggested through Speed's misrepresentation of England as an island geographically separate from the contaminating Irish and Scottish. The above-mentioned chart of English development, industry, progress and order serves a second ideological purpose: to reinforce the several borders that hem in the English land. A series of bordering mechanisms contain the "English island" and lend to the represented land a sense of insularity even from the neighboring British territories. Jutting inward into the seas, the illustrations of the English inhabitants are the second frame surrounding the English land (the first being the overall frame of the map). This illustrative frame is extended into Holland with the grafting of Speed's scale and the informational plate in the lower right-hand corner, thus re-writing this space in an English nationalist vocabulary by deemphasizing non-English territory and implying an inaccurate sense of insularity from the continent.

Further compressing the English national space is the “Catalogue of all the shires, Cities, Bishopricks” etc., which is balanced symmetrically by the segment of Ireland on the Western coast and is largely emptied of national detail, like Scotland above it. Adding further balance and rounding out the northern-most portion of England are the royal seal between the “catalog” and the eastern shore and the title plate announcing “The Kingdome of England”. The overall effect of these reiterated borders and symmetrical arrangement of symbols is to visually focus one’s attention on the English territory as autonomous and isolated, as an island nation unto itself. By overwriting the already emptied Scottish landscape with the title plate, the southern-most portion of Scotland appears as a placemaker for Speed’s celebration of England. Also, the placement of this title plate atop the Scottish lands infers that England possesses or asserts some measure of imperial control over this region. The same effect is achieved by placing the representative English figures atop of the whited-out Irish land, as discussed above; in fact, Ireland’s very island-ness is unrepresented here, instead deflecting this geographic character onto England. Even the titles of the seas surrounding England add a visual sense of roundness and territorial completeness to the English landscape in the sense that they emphasize the distance between England and the lands that surround it by framing the regions around Norwich, Suffolk and Essex on the southeastern coast and the contentious Irish Sea separating England and Ireland. The overall effect of these decorative manipulations to the British landscape is to denote England’s geographic, cultural and political centrality and to support the myth of the English island so central to nationalist mythologies, while deemphasizing the autonomy of England’s British neighbors in order to buttress England’s imperial claims.

Speed’s maps of Ireland and Scotland are in keeping with the above nationalist and imperial ideology. The other nations of the British Isles are pointedly lacking the symbols of

autonomy, might and centrality that make up Speed's English lexicon. For instance, Speed's depiction of Scotland is one of disconnectedness and a clear lack of territorially unity; the Scottish landmasses appear dispersed across the map's plane and thus do not give the impression of a unified body politic (fig. 10). Though this disconnected-ness is due largely to Scotland's many island territories, this effect is enhanced because Speed does not employ the framing strategies that we saw in his representation of England. The images of the royal family (discussed in greater detail below), the title plate and the inset map of the Isles of Orkney do not exhibit the same attention to symmetry and balance that contained in a single political unit the lands of the English maps. Similarly, the minor illustrations—the sea monsters, ships and the work's compass rose—only exacerbate the map's impression of Scottish disunity. Pictured between the Isle of Lewis and the northwestern coast of Scotland is a pair of warring battleships; in addition to the image's inference of Scotland's lawlessness and violence, this illustration, in conjunction with the scattered sea monsters and the floating compass rose in the bottom left-hand corner contribute to Speed's overall impression of a sundered and detached land. Because Speed's cartographic language across his visual narrative of the British Isles seeks to tell a particular story of nation and empire, his representation of Scotland's dissevered territories implies a nation that is socially and politically splintered as well and therefore in need of English imperial governance.

The *Theatre's* imagining of Ireland is, unsurprisingly, even more pronounced in its visual diminishment of Celtic autonomy and authority. Whereas in Speed's map of England, the surrounding non-English territories either serve as decorative templates for markers of English possession or are otherwise reduced to framing mechanisms, the portions of Scotland and England that appear in Speed's map of Ireland are more detailed in their geographic character.

By including these geographic details, rather than largely emptying the land of place-names or identifying marks as we saw in the English map, Speed lends to the English landscape in particular a sense of a national identity independent of the rest of the isles. The portion of Scotland that appears off the northeastern coast of Ireland is lacking in England's appearance of autonomy, for it is prominently stamped with the royal seal. Ireland, the supposed object of the mapmaker's gaze, is closely bracketed by the English and Scottish territories on the east and the overlarge title plate and ethnographic catalog on the west. These cartographic embellishments, unlike the map of England, do not serve to provide a containing frame to the Irish landscape because these borders are asymmetrical; the title plate and the royal seal, for instance, are not horizontal and are disproportionate in size. Likewise, the ethnographic images of the native Irish are not deployed as framing mechanisms; rather, they sit only on the left-hand margin of the map. Ireland, in Speed's representation appears not as an independent landmass because it lacks these borders and because the land itself is visually overwhelmed by the ideologically troubling illustrations surrounding it. Finally, we are not encouraged to read Ireland as independent of England because of the pronounced size of the English territories that encroach upon Ireland's eastern shore.

Speed's *Theatre* makes use—and misuse—of cartographic practices to support England's official national and imperial agendas. His visual lexicon composes a narrative in which the English “island” asserts its suzerainty over a British Isles that is culturally, socially and genealogically linked through an ancient past of shared history and ethnicity. Nature, like subjugated lands and peoples, is made pliant under the cartographer's pen, thus allowing Speed to shape the land into nation and its people into willing subjects of the crown. However, despite his cartographic and historical maneuvering, Speed's project ultimately underscores the artistic

manipulations necessary to this form of visual nation and empire building. The land itself appears secondary to the ornaments designed by Speed to force his nationalist rendering of English history and identity; by overpowering the natural landmass with illustrations, Speed redirects the map reader's attention from the land to the items that make up Speed's lexicon. These items, however, particularly those that speak to Speed's antiquarian and imperial significations, tell an unintentionally contradictory story.

### Speed's Imperfect Archipelago

The Roman coins that appear in both Speed's *Theatre* and his *History* are presumably intended to symbolize England's Roman genealogy and to symbolically imbue the rulers of the archipelagic empire with the aura of the classical world. However, coins impressed with the faces of England's former conquerors are also uneasy reminders of the nation's past as a colonized territory. In this regard, Speed's nod to British antiquity has the effect of diminishing nationalist claims of a deep history of autonomy and sovereignty. Likewise, Speed's choice of Cymbeline as his representative figure of ancient Britain is problematic. As audiences of Shakespeare's play of the same name would have known, Cymbeline, even after defeating the Roman army that invaded his shores, decided against English independence from its colonial rulers, declaring in Shakespeare's work, "Let / A Roman and a British ensign wave / Friendly together".<sup>206</sup> As I discuss in part two of this chapter, the historical Cymbeline's position in regard to his Roman overlords was an ambiguous one; because he was said to often glory in his past as a member of Augustus Caesar's court and because he seems to have been favored by Rome, Cymbeline can hardly serve as a model of British independence from its colonizers. In

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<sup>206</sup> Shakespeare, William. *Cymbeline. The Riverside Shakespeare*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997) V.v.479-481. Print. All references to the play throughout this chapter are from the Riverside edition.

this respect, Speed's map of Great Britain accidentally reveals that myths of English imperium and enduring autonomy are often constructed of unreliable materials. Like the fanciful narrative of Brutus's mythical discovery of England according to Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia Regum Britanne*, the fantastical race of giants that once inhabited the island, or the sea monsters that threaten English sailors off the shores of Ireland in Speed's Irish Sea, Speed's maps underscore that official nationalist narratives often come to rest on insubstantial myths and chimerical stories.

Speed's ethnographic spectacles that sit in the margins of England and Ireland are also ideologically problematic; rather than serving the ostensible purpose of illustrating the superiority of English customs, dress and bodies in contrast to those of the rugged and uncivilized Irish, these catalogs instead demonstrate the superficial nature of Speed's colonial representations. Aside from the very different manner of dress between the English and the Irish in Speed's catalog—the English are impeccably attired in quality fabrics and contemporary fashions, whereas the Irish are cloaked in their “native” rugged garb—the bodily features of the English and Irish national specimens are largely the same. Barring some darkening of the Irish's eyes, perhaps to again underscore the inherent untrustworthiness of the native Irish, the bodies and faces of the Irish are differentiated only minimally. One possible reason for this surprising sameness is the limited engravings available to the early modern mapmaker. Like 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century woodcuts that were recycled and only slightly altered to suit different narratives, these cartographic figures were likely redressed and recycled with modest, but ideologically meaningful, emendations. Speed's Irishmen and women are re-costumed Englishmen; one imagines that, when stripped of Speed's material markers of English superiority and Irish incivility, the bodies of the colonized are not unlike those of the colonizers. Such similarities

undermine the imperial agenda of Speed's cartographic representation by putting pressure upon on the theories of Irish degeneracy that undergirded English claims to suzerainty over the neighboring island by exposing as superficial and insubstantial English justifications for colonial rule.<sup>207</sup>

Speed's "Kingdome of Scotland" also unintentionally subverts his royalist national narrative by calling attention to the troubling political tensions that characterized James I's ascension to the throne. His dedication of the *Theatre* to James is a celebration of the Scottish king as the "inlarger and uniter of the British Empire; Restorer of the British Name" and "Establisher of Perpetual Peace, in Church, and Commonwealth". The illustration that accompanies Speed's dedication of his work to "the Most High, and Most Potent Monarch" reflects in historical and visual detail the official rhetoric that posited James as the "Husband" and "head" of the now conjoined body politic (fig. 11).<sup>208</sup> From behind the curtains of a canopy-like stage is revealed the royal crest of a united Britain, exaggerated in size. The stage from which this symbol of royal might emerges is too small to contain the royal seal, even with the divine intervention of the cherubs who hold back the curtains. Thus, the seal of the combined

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<sup>207</sup> Speed's illustration of the Irish unwittingly draws attention to the fundamental contradiction underpinning colonial discourse in the early modern period. The Irish must be portrayed as degenerate, wild or animalistic in order to support English claims to ethnic superiority and cultural difference. Yet, at the same time, the Irish must not appear so degenerate as to imply that they could not benefit from the civilizing hand of the English. The discourse of the colonial civilizing mission was necessary to mask the more base motive of territorial acquisition and the subjugation of an autonomous people; to sustain this rhetorical justification, the Irish had to appear similar enough to the English to imply both an essentially British likeness between the two peoples and to indicate that the Irish could, in fact, be cultivated to a degree of English civility. The paradoxical demand that the Irish be both fundamentally barbaric *and* unrealized civil Britons, that they be both profoundly non-English *and* constitutionally British, is made plain in Speed's representative Irish figures who occupy the impossible ideological position of radical difference and essential sameness.

<sup>208</sup> Ellis, 290.

unicorn and lion appears to burst from these humble confines, emphasizing to the reader of Speed's *Theatre* the monarchical dynamism of the first king of Great Britain. The border containing this dramatic presentation of the royal seal is made up of the several crests of Britain's ancient kings. Whereas James's royal seal sees the harmonious joining of several ethnic groups that people the archipelago, the individual crests of the Normans, Saxons, Angles, Danish, Cornish, Andegavion and Roman kings sit isolated from one another on the periphery, speaking to the inability of these ancient monarchs to produce a united Britain. The crest of the Welsh, Irish, Scottish and French kings are also set individually in the borderlands of the royal emblem, classifying these once sovereign states as existing in the same ancient record as "Heathen Britaines", "First Saxon Kings" and "East Angles". The effect of this categorizing is to imply that these nations—who preserved their autonomy as late as 1707—are of the same ancient history of a heterogeneous Britain and are now subsumed as part of what Speed terms "the Achievement of our Sovereigne King James", namely the creation of Great Britain.

However, Speed's "Kingdom of Scotland", which appears near the close of his *Theatre* and is the only map devoted to the Scottish territories, radically dismantles the dedication's glorification of Great Britain's founder. The natural territory is flanked by the royal family; King James, Queen Anne and their two sons stand like pillars on either side of Scotland, their various titles pronouncing their claims to territorial sovereignty and imperial rule. Surprisingly, Britain's King is stripped of the markers of his monarchical and imperial "potency". He stands in the margins of his northern kingdom not in kingly regalia but in what appears to be hunting or fencing garb. In fact, James most closely resembles Speed's illustration of an English gentleman; James and Speed's representative English gentleman wear complementary capes and hats of apparently similar quality materials and stand in like postures. That King James is aligned in



appearance with a gentleman, rather than even the English nobleman (who is draped in lush and ornamented fabrics), is startling in its evacuation from the kingly person the official rhetoric that clothed him as the divine commander of the Isles. Perhaps more surprising is the absence of the royal seal that dominates the dedication's illustration and so many of the maps in Speed's collection; our only evidence that this figure is the king of England, Scotland, Ireland and France is the small title that sits beneath his image. In Speed's map, Scotland appears as a rather large estate under the ownership of the family who stand on either side of the landmass, their bodies benignly turned in the direction of their territory.

This strange de-ranking of the monarch can perhaps be explained by the political turmoil and social anxiety that undermined James's ascension to the English throne. To curtail English fears of the loss of autonomy that could result from the melding of English territory, law and custom with that of the Scottish, Scotland was sometimes envisioned as an annexed territory that expands English sovereignty over the isles. Such a misrepresentation of the union of crowns would assuage the anxieties of those Englishmen most likely to peruse Speed's *Theatre*, which was sold in London. However, that Speed's map seems to take part in this deliberate misrepresentation is both surprising, considering his overt royalism, and strangely telling of the inability of official rhetoric to buttress or gloss over state failures. To support the notion of the unified Britain illustrated in his opening map, Speed must make Scotland appear as an empty territory poised for annexation by the English. Note that Speed does not provide us ethnographic samples of the "Gentle" or "Wilde" Scot. To do so might draw uncomfortable parallels between the barbarous Scot that appears in texts like Spenser's *View of the State of Ireland* and England's new king. However, this catering to anxious English readers of his maps results in the delegitimization of Britain's king; James is necessarily reduced to the status of gentlemanly

landlord. Such flimsy and contradictory narratives as Speed's map of Scotland speak to the often unsuccessful manipulations of the historical record that are sometimes necessary to nationalist myth-making.

Finally, Speed is unable to overcome the discursive incongruities that inevitably arise in English imperial discourse. The symbolic unity that Speed achieves in his map of "The Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland" is undone in his individual maps of England, Ireland and Scotland. The illustrations and embellishments that were originally woven together to denote a body politic unified in ethnicity, culture and history in his representation of Britain are problematically re-deployed when this Britain is broken up into individual "kingdoms". To tell a story of English imperial might and superiority, Speed must revise his visual lexicon to rewrite England as an island surrounded by inferior territories and peoples that can be brought to British civility only with the imposition of English governance and culture. Such a re-picturing of the Isles puts great pressure upon both the notion of a culturally and political harmonious British archipelago and Speed's ostensible support of the Scottish king of the Isles. The rhetorical impossibility of promoting notions of British sameness to support an imperial ideology of shared British genealogy and culture, while simultaneously proclaiming the essential ethnic difference of the Irish and Scottish to advance a nationalist agenda of English superiority, is baldly and unintentionally demonstrated in Speed's *Theatre*. Unable to reconcile these incongruous strains of English official discourse, Speed's cartographic narrative betrays the slippages and contradictions underpinning England's claims to centrality and imperial achievement. Thus, the political failures of the English state manifest themselves on the fragmented and dissonant stages of Speed's *Theatre*.

#### Conclusion to Part One: Nationalist Theatrics

According to Harley, Speed's maps saw the bringing together of celebrated antiquity and England's political present. Speed's "visual metaphors" were effective on two levels by first "connect[ing] the world of historical ideas with the contemporary landscape, linking the concrete and the abstract", and secondly by "manifesting the Renaissance discovery of England's past and conveying its sense of history, [giving] support to the geo-political doctrines of his day".<sup>209</sup> Speed's strange collage of materials when grafted upon the English landscape imbued his representation of the country with a sense of "an inherent though long-delayed political destiny", in Gellner's words. The Roman coins indicate that ancient Britain is the historical period in which to excavate England's myth of origin and to find in their Roman ancestors the models for England's own imperial destiny. The signposts of national identity and historical endurance sit atop of Speed's Britain, demanding our acknowledgement of his nationalist narrative.

However, what Speed's maps most loudly pronounce is the constructed-ness of this nation, unintentionally emphasizing the ideological distance between "what ought to be the case" according to the Elizabethan and Stuart regimes and the political reality on the ground. In Speed, nature does not yield to the mapmaker's quest for nationalist identification; rather, the natural landscape becomes contingent or tributary to the mapmaker's nationalist myth-making. As a consequence, it is the invented-ness of this nation that is most apparent in Speed; the land is engulfed by Speed's symbolic lexicon such that the mapmaker's ornament is foregrounded and the land meant to absorb or become perfected through this artistry seems only a backdrop. Speed's privileging of the ornamental over the natural is not just a matter of aesthetics; rather it signals the anxious construction of English nationhood in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Faced with

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<sup>209</sup> Harley, "Meaning and Ambiguity in Tudor Cartography," *English Map-Making 1500-1650*, ed. Sarah Tyacke (London: The British Library, 1983) 37. Print.

the intractable difficulties of uniting a disunited people under the banner of Englishness and promoting an image of the English as conquerors of the British Isles, despite strong evidence to the contrary, Speed's maps only point up the artificial manufacture of such nationalist and imperial destinies. Gellner's notion that the nation's cultural producers "know not what they do" is especially poignant here: unwittingly, Speed's maps undermined the state project to construct the official nation by calling uncomfortable attention to the flimsy and insubstantial materials that make up the illusion of national and imperial identity.

In part two, I consider how Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* and Fletcher and Massinger's *Sea Voyage* take up the materials of Speed's official lexicon only to empty these symbols of their ideological weight. By wresting Speed's cartographic narrative from the pages of his *Theatre* and submitting this official rhetoric to theatrical representation, these dramatic texts expose the insubstantiality of the language of English nationalist and imperialist mythologies.

## Part Two: The Nation Staged

Where cartographic texts silently project the mapmaker's carefully visualized story—be it one of nation or empire, or in the cases of Speed, both—the theatrical work announces itself upon the stage textually, vocally and visually. Narratives must be plotted, characters built from words and dress and worlds must be rendered visible through language, art and imagination. There is nothing passive about the theatre; even its silences are loud in meaning and intent. And in the theatre, like in the written text more generally, the audience must be convinced. The actions of characters or historical figures must be justified or defended, their words and intentions literally spelled out. The theatrical land also must speak; it must "state" its relationship to the characters traversing its imaginary territory and it must give evidence of its changeableness, its ability to erect its own borders and transform itself into a new world altogether. In other

cases, the dialogue must speak for it, explaining that we have followed Tamburlaine across his vast imperial realms, or crossed into Lear's cave or found ourselves alone in Juliet's tomb.

As explored in part one, cartographic allegories are composed out of a visual lexicon of illustrations, borders, embellishments, etc. Linguistic narratives when they appear on the map, often in the form of celebrative tale of a national trait or a description of a landmark, are simply signposts intended to compliment the map's visual elements.<sup>210</sup> Aside from these descriptive postings, cartographic texts do not explain themselves "verbally", nor do they justify or defend the narrative visually fabricated by the mapmaker. In colonial maps, the indigenous, often naked and unarmed, flee their own land and the men in national garb who have come to conquer it. Or, the conquered people, often naked and unarmed, stand in the margins of the land that was once theirs, happily offering up to the Europeans their natural resources and welcoming their civilizing influence. In neither case are we offered any explanation. Who are these native people who occupy these new worlds? What right have these men from afar to violently seize these lands and empty them of their indigenous inhabitants? In most cases, the only justifying "narrative" of colonial conquest offered by these maps lies in the nakedness of the colonized, which illustratively offers evidence of their inherent savagery and animal-like nature.

The maps of John Speed examined in part one are, on the surface, more innocuous, offering the "reader" a patriotic tale of the English nation and a celebratory history of Great Britain. However, when the maps were made to speak their stories—when the narratives that

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<sup>210</sup> As I discuss in my final chapter, Speed's 17<sup>th</sup> "Invasion map" is nearly buried in marginal commentary, detailing the domestic and foreign battles that plagued England and Ireland. Included in his marginal narrative is a paean to Elizabeth, celebrating her divine ability to bring peace to the archipelago. In the case of this cartographic document, written narrative is necessary to illustrate the individual battles and their beginnings; it is also needed to rhetorically amend this image of a vulnerable island nation besieged from within and without. See my final chapter, "The Staged Island Nation Debunked".

overwrote them were put into language—Speed’s cartographic texts were revealed as xenophobic, historically inaccurate and rhetorically messy. Using the poetic license offered to the early modern author of history, Speed constructed a false and unsubstantiated history of the “island nation” in which Englishness replaced British-ness. Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline* and Fletcher and Massinger’s *Sea Voyage* give voice to the discursive incongruities discovered in Speed’s maps, demonstrating how early modern popular literature often put pressure upon official nationalist agendas and materials. As a result, the silent but ideologically dangerous plotted-ness of the early modern map is exposed. Making textually and theatrically visible the invented storylines of Speed’s genealogies, Shakespeare’s play deeply problematizes the mythologizing of ancient Britain that was often the stuff of nationalist and imperial propaganda in texts like Speed’s cartographic *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* and his chronology of British monarchs, *The History of Great Britain*. In both *Cymbeline* and *The Sea Voyage*, the audience is privy to the colonial narratives that sit silently on the surface of Speed’s cartographic works. When these narratives are translated to the theatre, the audience can “read” the problematic and unjustifiable imperial narratives that are en-scripted on the land. In the case of both plays, the theatrical texts make the maps speak their untruths.

As we have seen, Speed’s maps betrayed particular tensions regarding the use of Roman Britain as a celebrated site of England’s domestic imperial conquest of the isles. His embellished cartographic representations harken back to England’s Roman roots to make manifest the inherent imperial character of the English people, thereby reinforcing the official line of British unification under the English crown. British-ness in Speed, as in other nationalist texts of the period, was often a code for Englishness, and therefore Speed’s reminders of Britain’s Roman ancestry served to depict the English as a naturally, culturally and politically superior people

based, in part, upon this classical genealogy. However, among the unintentional effects of deploying symbols of Roman Britain in this nationalist narrative is the inexorable reminder of Britain's past as a subjugated people yoked to a distant and powerful empire. Such a reminder of this blight on the national record puts great pressure upon notions of Britain and England's celebrated archipelagic autonomy and of England's "natural" propensity for imperial domestic rule.

The nationalist thread that runs through both Speed's cartographic and historical works is likewise under rhetorical and ideological strain. The apparent constructed-ness and overanxious embellishment of England, Britain, Scotland and Ireland in his maps speaks to a desire to build from a hodge-podge of sometimes incongruous materials an "invented tradition" of English imperial might, historical sovereignty, and "natural" autonomy, based upon the isles' geographic distinctiveness. The constructed-ness of Speed's visual narrative is perhaps most apparent in his attempt to illustratively define England as an island in and of itself. As discussed, the myth of the English island nation is a repeated trope in official nationalist literature and was often called up to buttress claims to English autonomy and its geographically "natural" homogenous character. According to this myth, England is "a world divided from the world", an "otherworldly" national space without dependence upon the resources and influence of the continent.<sup>211</sup> The need to depict England as an island, in order to sustain this nationalist thread, *and* to visually imagine Britain as a conjoined body of islands, in order to promote imperial notions of a shared archipelagic character, are at obvious odds and therefore draw attention to the slippage between British-ness and Englishness that is often prevalent in English texts that turn to geography as the potential marker of national and imperial character.

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<sup>211</sup> Jonson, Ben. "The Queenes Masques. The First, Of Blackness." *Ben Jonson*. Ed. C. H. Herford Percy and Evelyn Simpson. Vol. VII. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1941) 177. Print.

Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* articulates the tensions and ideological ruptures that are betrayed in Speed's visual and textual illustrations of England and Great Britain. Critiquing the English production of British-ness, the play lays bare the manipulations of the British historical record necessary to construct Speed's nationalist and imperial narrative. Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* demonstrates how national mythologies like Speed's that draw upon Britain's Roman heritage must be radically amended to suit the geopolitical, imperial and nationalist agendas of their makers. In so doing, the play calls attention to the ideological fabrications demanded of nationalist histories more generally. The work undoes the official nationalist narrative constructed by Speed in his texts by exploding the celebrated notion that Britain is "a world by itself", as Cloten declares in act 3 scene 1 (III.i.11-12). This declaration of British (read English) autonomy and sovereignty is loudly questioned throughout the play, particularly through the character of Cymbeline himself, who ends the work by surrendering up the very sovereignty that Speed's maps seek to articulate. Speed conjures up the person of Cunobelinus or Cymbeline in both his map of "Kingdome of Great Britain and Ireland" and in his prose work *The History of Great Britain*, using the figure of the ancient king to celebrate the foundation of the early British state and its peaceable relations with Rome. In Speed's *Theatre*, the image of Cunobelinus links Britain to the center of the civilized Western world and provides 17<sup>th</sup> century Britain with a classical genealogy. Shakespeare's play, on the other hand, calls attention to the historical and ideological unease that inevitably attends such recollections of Britain's Roman past. In Shakespeare's Roman Britain, the relationship between the conquering Romans and the subjugated Britons is an ambiguous one; the Romans are political enemies who deny the Britons their autonomy, yet the Britons also maintain cultural and political ties with Rome as the well-spring of the Britons' government and civilization. In this sense, Britain is dependent upon their



Roman conquerors, despite claims to the newly awakened British “national” character that seeks to extricate itself from the Roman yoke. By significantly altering the story of Cymbeline’s rule and by drawing attention to ancient Britain’s complex relationship to their Roman colonizers, Shakespeare puts into boldface the ideological and textual manipulations demanded of the historical record when filtered through an official nationalist lens.<sup>212</sup>

Shakespeare’s depiction of Roman Britain also dismantles the English imperial narrative that sees England as the heart and destined sovereign of the British Isles. Shakespeare divides the primary action of his play between an ambiguous “Britain”, the site of Cymbeline’s palace and of the battles between the Romans and the British army, and Wales, the peripheral territory inhabited by the secret princes, the banished Belarius, the disguised Cloten and Imogen, the invading Roman army and an unspecified band of savage “mountaineers”. The play’s ahistorical division of ancient Britain serves to problematize myths of English centrality within the isles. Wales exists in Shakespeare’s play in a form more closely aligned with 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century Britain than with the period of Augustus Caesar’s invasion of the Isles in 43 AD. Though there existed in Roman Britain specified Cambrian tribes that ruled the territory that is now Wales, the political boundary between England and Wales was, arguably, not established until the construction of Offa’s Dyke probably in the 8<sup>th</sup> century (the exact date of the Wall’s erection is unclear). Yet Wales in *Cymbeline* exists as a “discrete political entity”, in the words of Ronald J. Boling, separated from “Britain” geographically, politically and culturally. Likening Rome’s envelopment of Britain into its “political orbit” to England’s imperial annexation and absorption of Wales, Boling argues that the play’s treatment of the Welsh landscape must be read through

contemporaneous Anglo-Welsh politics.<sup>213</sup> The effect of this anachronistic parsing of southern Britain is multifaceted. First, it draws attention to the contemporary rifts between England and Wales that the official English line of unification sought to mask.<sup>214</sup> Inserting into this play of Roman Britain the contemporary crisis of English imperial governance problematizes the notion

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<sup>213</sup> Boling, "Anglo-Welsh Relations in *Cymbeline*." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 51.1 (2000): 33-66. *JSTOR*. Web. 01 Nov. 2010. Several critics have made this observation about Shakespeare's ahistorical partitioning of Wales during the Roman occupation. Huw Griffiths also considers Wales's ambiguous presence in the work, arguing that "Britain manages both to include and to exclude the location of 'Wales'" in the play's geography, thus pointing to Jacobean political rhetoric that also took an ambiguous position in regard to England's neighbor. Griffiths also examines Speed's *Theatre*, recognizing how the atlas's contending visions of the nation correspond to England's shifting need to define itself as either empire or nation: of Wales in Speed's maps he maintains, "Wales is both included and marginal in this imaginary empire. This inclusion or exclusion seems largely dependent on perspective—whether you are looking at Wales from within or from England. It depends on whether you want to concentrate on English dominance or on England's ability to enclose the several nations under its imperial wing". Griffiths, "The Geographies of Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*." *English Literary Renaissance* 34.3 (2004): 343. *Wiley Online Library*. Web. 01 Nov. 2010.

<sup>214</sup> Many critics contend that Shakespeare's play comments upon James's rule, particularly his Union project. Leah Marcus argues for an overtly topical reading of the play in which the characters and action of the work bear directly upon the politics of Jacobean England and James's attempt to "write" Great Britain. However, she contends, *Cymbeline* counteracts James's agenda, despite the influence of Stuart politics on the drama by "reproduc[ing] some of the incongruities in the actual working of Stuart policy that undermined royal claims about the mystical organic 'union' of all of James's subjects—like members of a single animate body—under his authority as head" (159). See Marcus, "*Cymbeline* and the Unease of Topicality." *Shakespeare: The Last Plays*. Ed. Kiernan Ryan (London: Longman, 1999) 134-68. Print. Penny McCarthy, on the other hand, argues that the play was originally written prior to James's ascension to the throne and that the work is both "anti-Tudor in sentiment" and "opposed to James as a prospective king" (43). She bases this claim upon the work's generic qualities and on what she reads as the play's "covert" critique of the Scottish king. McCarthy, "*Cymbeline*: 'The first Essay of a new Brytish Poet'?" *Critical Survey*. 21.2 (2009): 56. Print. Glenn Clark considers the play's attention to geographical parsing in relationship to Stuart investments in Britain's domestic empire. He argues that *Cymbeline* responds to James's unification project by exposing the "rhetorics of hostile alterity and geopolitical artifice" behind the division of the isles. Clark claims that Shakespeare's work proposes a "rhetoric of geopolitical naturalism in which social order is determined by a natural spatial order", rather than the "strange" and unnatural borders erected by geopolitical doctrines. Clark, "The 'Strange' Geographies of *Cymbeline*." *Playing the Globe: Genre and Geography in English Renaissance Drama*. Eds. John Gillies and Virginia Mason Vaughan. (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 1998) 230-31. Print.

depicted in Speed of a deeply historical British-ness that unites the peoples of the archipelago. Secondly, by carving up the British Isles into Britain and Wales, Shakespeare's play effectively absents England from this imperial and nationalist mythology. England is nowhere mentioned in Shakespeare's play, thus deflating the contemporary notions of long-standing English suzerainty and imperial power depicted in Speed's maps. Finally, Wales, as it is delineated in this play, is the transformative and foundational site that makes possible the work's most fundamental action, despite its marginal territorial status on the outskirts of the kingdom; it is in Wales that Cymbeline's sons and the future kings of Britain develop their princely characteristics; it is the site of Imogen's recovered agency, and it is in Wales, not England, where authentic "British-ness" is discovered and refined.

#### A World by Itself?

The contemporary myths of Cymbeline or Cunobelinus are various and largely inconsistent regarding the payment of tribute money to ancient Rome and the overall relationship between the Empire and Britain. According to Geoffrey of Monmouth, Cymbeline was a favorite of Augustus Caesar, who "reared" the British king and "equipped [him] with weapons". Because of his "friendly" relations with the Roman emperor, Cymbeline "might well have kept back" the tribute owed to Rome "but he paid it of his own free will".<sup>215</sup> Holinshed also has Cymbeline willingly paying tribute to Britain's Roman conquerors. His Kymbelyne or Cimbeline was "brought up at Rome and there made Knight by Augustus Cesar, under whome hee served in the warres, and was in suche fauour with him, that he was at libertie to pay his tribute or not". Holinshed disputes Roman histories that record Cymbeline's refusal to pay the tribute, citing as

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<sup>215</sup> Geoffrey of Monmouth. *The History of the Kings of Britain*. Trans. Lewis Thorpe. (London: Penguin, 1966). 119. Print.

evidence the British king's abiding appreciation of and loyalty to Roman culture and government, particularly as a means of bringing civilization to Roman Britain:

Kymbelyne being brought vp in Rome, and made Knighte in the Court of Auguftus, euer fhewed himfelfe a friēd to the Romanes, and chiefly was loth to breake with them, bycaufe the youth of the Britayne nation fhoulde not bee depriued of the benefite to bee trayned and broughte vp among the Ro|maynes, whereby they mighte learne both to be|haue themfelues lyke ciuill men, and to attayne to the knowledge of feates of warre. But whe|ther for this refpect, or for that it pleaſed the Al|mightie God ſo to diſpoſe the myndes of men at that preſent, not only the Britaynes, but in mā|ner all other nations were contented to be obe|dient to the Romaine Empire.<sup>216</sup>

Speed in his *History* also references Cymbeline's deep allegiance and love for ancient Rome, emphasizing the king's willingness to maintain peaceful relations with the Romans. In Speed's estimation, the several coins produced during Cymbeline's reign are a tribute to the British monarch's "wealth, [ ... ] fame, and his civil respect" which allowed not only for Cymbeline's peace with the Isles' conquerors "without the paiment of their Tribute", but also "peace with the rest of the world".<sup>217</sup> For Speed, Cunobelinus as he appears in both his *History* and in his map "The Kingdome of Great Britain and Ireland", provides an enduring link between 17<sup>th</sup> century Britain and the classical world that lends his nation their imperial character and a nationalist genealogy reaching back to Roman civilization. As explained in part one, the coin of

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<sup>216</sup> Holinshed, Raphael. *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland* (1577) Vol. 1. Section 5.46. *The Holinshed Project*. Web. 5 Jan. 2010.

<sup>217</sup> Speed, *History*, 174.

Cunobelinus that appears in Speed's "Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland" serves to symbolically align James's 17<sup>th</sup> century England with imperial Rome; like their classical forbearers, early modern England has subjugated outlying territories and brought order and governance to the less civilized people of the peripheries.

Shakespeare's representation of the British king derivates from the above portraits of Cymbeline in strategic ways, demonstrating how contemporary depictions of Roman Britain are often at cross purposes. On the one hand, Roman Britain is called up to link early modern England with the classical world and to use this genealogy to buttress claims to England's own imperial character, as illustrated in Speed's maps. On the other, England's resistance to Roman rule, as depicted in Shakespeare's play and other contemporary sources, is cited as proof of British autonomy and archipelagic independence under the English crown. Shakespeare's historically inaccurate portrait of the British monarch emphasizes the way in which ancient figures such as Cymbeline are at the service of incongruous mythologies. In order to support official imperial narratives, Cymbeline figures as a symbol of England's inherent imperial potential as the heart of a British domestic empire. Problematically, this same mythic king is called upon to illustrate Britain's break from Rome and its refusal of colonial rule, thusly characterizing Cymbeline as a nationalist figure who achieved British autonomy from its Roman conquerors. Britain's eventual independence from Rome became in the early modern period the stuff of English nationalist sentiment, imagining this strongly felt need for autonomy as part and parcel of the English national character. As evidenced by the above accounts of the historical Cymbeline in Geoffrey of Monmouth, Holinshed and even Speed himself, this British monarch was largely at odds with both the imperial and nationalist strains of early modern historical narratives.

The contrary forces of Shakespeare's invocation of Roman Britain are the source of much critical inquiry. Willy Maley's postcolonial reading of the play asserts that Stuart imperial aspirations contradictorily led the English to copy their Roman conquerors: in *Cymbeline* he detects the throne's "mimetic desire, a desire to emulate a Roman achievement about which there is deep ambivalence [ ... ] Britain was made in Rome." Maley reads in this "ambivalence" England's fear of "being consumed by an enlarged state", i.e. James's unified Great Britain.<sup>218</sup> Andrew Escobedo instead attends to the genealogical ruptures that inevitably occur when the play reaches back into British history. Escobedo argues that the 'British nation' as imagined in James's reign accepts the heterogeneity that inevitably results in the search for a nation's genealogical roots and in the project of nation-building more generally. He maintains that this 'British' model allows for the linking of Britain to Rome; like the Romans whose empire demanded a certain admixture, so must early modern Britain accept into its genealogical record a heterogeneous joining of its populace across place and history. The English nation, on the other hand, is based upon notions of modernity, national differentiation and internal purity. Rather than use the ancient world as proof of national belonging and identity, the "English" national model sometimes turned to the country's "Saxon roots" as the genealogical site of origin for the English.<sup>219</sup> Escobedo argues that the confusing nature of *Cymbeline* is the result of the

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<sup>218</sup> Maley, "Postcolonial Shakespeare: British Identity Formation and *Cymbeline*." *Shakespeare's Late Plays: New Readings*. Eds. Jennifer Richards and James Knowles. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh, 1999) 74. Print.

<sup>219</sup> Escobedo, "From Britannia to England: *Cymbeline* and the Beginning of Nations." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 59.1 (2008): 60-87. *Project Muse*. Web. 18 Oct. 2010.

unresolved negotiation between these two nations, the English and the British, with their contending views of nationalism and history.<sup>220</sup>

Mary Floyd-Wilson likewise considers the play in light of the turn toward England's Saxon heritage as a convenient site for excavating national identity, especially in the time of James's Union project, when Englishness was under the threat of being swallowed up by Britishness. In her compelling essay, she demonstrates the possibility that *Cymbeline* takes part in the early modern debate surrounding "England's Anglo-Saxon history" and the need for the English to distance themselves from the barbarous ancient Scots.<sup>221</sup> Casting characters like Cloten and Posthumus as Scots in various stages of civility, and the Princes as the "innately civil" (113) Saxon progenitors of the English nation, Floyd-Wilson claims that

Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* helps establish the exclusivity of English history. By locating Britain's future growth in the English people's untainted ancestry and native soil, *Cymbeline* anticipates some of the ethnographic myths that will give shape to succeeding chapters in Anglocentric historiography.<sup>222</sup>

The multiple genealogical "worlds" of Britain's past (the ancient, the Roman, the Saxon, etc.) cannot be neatly unified by a historical, cartographic or literary frame. In *Cymbeline*, Shakespeare doesn't allow history to be silently and gracefully amended along lines of imperial or nationalist propaganda. Rather, he preserves the messiness and contradiction of British and

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<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> Floyd-Wilson, "Delving to the root: *Cymbeline*, Scotland, and the English race." *British Identities and English Renaissance Literature*. Eds. David J. Baker and Willy Maley. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002): 102. Print.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, 113.

English history and the incongruities that arise when attempting to narratively separate the

two.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Other critical perspectives on Shakespeare's use of Roman history include the work of Robert S. Miola, who asserts that *Cymbeline* is Shakespeare's "final critique of Rome" (61), in which the Roman program of "self-assertion, revenge, and bloodshed" are tempered by celebrated British "forgiveness and mercy" (59). See Miola, "Cymbeline: Shakespeare's Valediction to Rome." *Roman Images*. Ed. Annabel Patterson (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1984) 51-62. Print. Avraham Oz, takes a positive stance on the Romans' influence on *Cymbeline*'s construction of Britain, claiming that Cymbeline's Britain achieves "a national identity [ ... ] extracted from the Romans and conferred upon his subjects" through his reconciliation with Augustus at the play's conclusion. See "Extending Within: Placing Self and Nation in the Epic of *Cymbeline*." *JTD: Journal of Theatre and Drama* 4 (1998): 81-97. Print. Thomas Olsen argues that Rome is imagined through a dual and contradictory lens in the play. He identifies two opposing Roman worlds in *Cymbeline*, the first being the celebrated ancient seat of civility and imperial inspiration, and the second being the early modern view of Rome as a place of vice and immorality, as described in Asham's *Schoolmaster*. According to Olsen, these contending visions of Rome are resolved in the character of Jachimo, who represents the "residue of the anti-Roman historiographical tradition" (283). See Olsen, "Jachimo's 'Drug-Dam'd Italy' and the Problem of British National Character in *Cymbeline*." *Shakespeare Yearbook* 10 (1999): 269-296. Print. D. E. Landry also contends that Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* draws attention to the historiographic manipulations necessary to compose a cohesive dramatic and nationalist narrative. Landry takes a psychoanalytic approach to the play, arguing that an analysis of the characters' dream-like states reveals a latent unity that brings nation, individual identity and dramatic aesthetics into harmony. He states that the play's analogies "between the logic of events of chronicle-history and the logic of dreams point up the disorder and illogic of unreconstructed historical facts, and the essentially fictive structure the historian, like the dramatist, must impose to give shape to his narrative. It is not that the sanctity of national history is being deliberately undermined, but that Shakespeare makes us aware that history is constructed, that both our personal and national myths must of necessity scaffold truth with an artificial, purposive design" (77). See Landry, "Dreams as History: The Strange Unity of *Cymbeline*." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 33.1 (1982): 68-79. *JSTOR*. Web. 22 Nov. 2010. Clinton J. Crumley likewise claims that *Cymbeline* makes apparent the "storytelling inherent to any telling of history" (312). He bases this claim on the relationship between the play's investment in questions of historiography and the work's ambiguous generic position as both a romance and a history play. See Crumley, "Questioning History in *Cymbeline*." *SEL: Studies in English Literature 1500-1900* 41.2 (2001): 297-315. *Project Muse*. Web. 01 Nov. 2010. Like Crumley, Andrew King explores the relationship between the play's use of the romance's "fictional narratives", which are performed sometimes unwittingly by Shakespeare's characters, and the fictional but culturally significant Galfridian myth of British origins (157). Arguing that *Cymbeline* calls upon its audience's awareness of this nationalist mythology, King contends that "Shakespeare's setting and subject matter derived from the British History in *Cymbeline* fuels much of the play's interest in the power and simultaneous decrepitude of romance narrative structures. Performance, as something both contrived and also potentially all-encompassing, is



According to Peter Salway, Roman Britain during Cymbeline's reign was bound both politically and economically to the imperial center. The Roman army, which was positioned on The Rhine in preparation for the conquest of Germany and Holland, was dependent upon Britain for needed supplies. During Cymbeline's rule,

British aristocrats were enjoying the imports from the empire, while the list of exports [received by Rome] shows that the Britons were not only paying for these supplies important to the army: by sending gold, silver, slaves, and hunting dogs they had also become a source of commodities of direct interest to the emperor himself and to the rich at Rome.

The economic negotiations between the Roman center and the British periphery allowed for political stability between the empire and Cymbeline's British tribe, the Catuvellauni.<sup>224</sup> Yet, despite the mutually beneficial trade relations that helped to preserve peace between conqueror and conquered, Britain nevertheless remained under the yoke of Roman imperial rule and was periodically subjected to the violence of their Roman overlords. Cymbeline's Roman Britain, unlike the "warlike people" (III.i.52) of the fictionalized kingdom of Shakespeare's play, was largely comfortable as a colonized nation and showed little desire for autonomy from their Roman rulers until the death of Cymbeline and the takeover of Britain by Cymbeline's sons.

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the keystone of both the Jacobean response to the Galfridian tradition and the Shakespearean reception of romance"(162). See King, "'Howso' er 'tis strange ... Yet is it true': The British History, Fiction and Performance in *Cymbeline*." *Shakespeare and Wales: From the Marches to the Assembly*. Eds. Willy Maley and Philip Schwyzer. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010): 157-75. Print. Finally, Irving Ribner also comments upon Shakespeare's deliberate alterations to history, claiming that Shakespeare "used events of the past as Elizabethan historical theory held that they should be used: to teach political lessons of value to the present [ ... ] He did not hesitate, moreover, to change his source material as he pleased in order to better effect his didactic purposes" (47). See Ribner, "Shakespeare and Legendary History: *Lear* and *Cymbeline*." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 7.1 (1956): 47-52. JSTOR. Web. 22 Nov. 2010.

<sup>224</sup> Salway, *Roman Britain: A Very Short Introduction*. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000): 8-14. Print.

That the historical Cymbeline's Britain was most certainly not "a world by itself", as Cloten purports, demonstrates the unreliability of constructed national myths and histories, such as those illustrated in Speed's *Theatre*.<sup>225</sup>

Cloten's declaration of Britain's autonomy is repeatedly undermined and finally negated all together when Cymbeline announces at the conclusion of the play that he and his subjects willingly "submit to Caesar, / And to the Roman empire, promising / To pay our wonted tribute" (V.v.460-62). Despite the Britons' victory over their colonizers and reiterated assertions of the nation's improved strength and order since the time of Julius Caesar's invasion (II.iv.20-26), the prospect of British sovereignty is always elusive, owing to Britain's ties to Rome and the king's ambiguous relationship to the empire. Significantly, the most overtly nationalist speech of the play is uttered by Cymbeline's "wicked queen", whom he eventually blames for his temporary disloyalty to his Roman overlords (V.v.463). Instructing her king to recall his ancestors who defended the isle against the Roman's incursions and praising the "natural bravery of the isle, which stands / As Neptune's park, ribb'd and pal'd in / With oaks unscalable and roaring waters", Cymbeline's queen deploys two of the most powerful and common tenets of nationalist ideologies: a historical record of heroic forefathers and a deep appreciation for the nation's

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<sup>225</sup> Paul Innes also remarks upon the play's uneasy stance on English or British nationalism. "Cymbeline's treatment of national identity is messy at best," he maintains, "inflected with gender, it slips from notions of Englishness to alternative, perhaps competing ideas of Britishness. It attempts to negotiate a whole range of contradictory elements even as it brings them together with the need for some kind of formal, artistic closure". I contend that this movement between Englishness and British-ness in the play is a symptom of this very slippage in early modern official discourse. See Innes, "Cymbeline and Empire." *Critical Survey* 19.2 (2007): 6. *WilsonWeb*. Web. 01 November 2010. Valerie Wayne identifies in *Cymbeline's* attention to nationalist identification the play's appropriateness as a vehicle of not only patriotic sentiment, but also for postcolonial explorations and parodic send-ups of patriotic fervor. See Wayne's "Cymbeline: Patriotism and Performance." *A Companion to Shakespeare's Works, Vol IV: The Poems, Problem Comedies, Late Plays*. Eds. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard. *Blackwell Reference Online*. Web. 05 December 2010.

territorial character (II.v.18-20).<sup>226</sup> However, it is the dissembling queen and her hot-headed son who declare Britain's independence from Rome. Though Cymbeline eventually joins in the queen's nationalist chorus, conjuring up Mulmutius as the legitimate homegrown source of British law and acclaiming the "warlike" nature of the British people, his proclamation of British autonomy falls flat when he soon thereafter admits that it is the recent rebellions against Rome and the desire of his people for freedom—not his nation's inherent sovereign character—that has

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<sup>226</sup> According to Philip Schwyzer, *Cymbeline* attends to British politics, specifically James's program for Union, but that the work adamantly refuses the tenets of British nationalism developed during the reign of the Tudors. Speaking particularly of the Queen's nationalist speech, Schwyzer maintains that "the key figures of British nationalism [ ... ] are made the matter of often grotesque parody" (170). See Schwyzer, *Literature, Nationalism, and Memory in Early Modern England and Wales* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004) 151-74. Print. Many critics have attempted to explain why Shakespeare would give the villainous queen the play's most nationalist language. Ros King maintains that readers of the play ought to pay attention to the language and form of the Queen's speech, rather than the fact that this nationalist sentiment is uttered by a "fairy-tale, wicked stepmother". She places the Queen's speech in conversation with James I's first address to Parliament, in which he points to Britain's natural geographic defenses, and John of Gaunt's "scepter'd isle" speech in *Richard II*. "The Queen", according to King, "turns the coastline from defensive bastion to aggressive engine of war. She claims that the treacherous sands that actually do surround the coast have actively colluded with the Britons' political and military objectives and have refused to bear Caesar's ships [ ... ] Being, as it were, the very embodiment of true British grit, they must inevitably behave that way again to give future victory over the Romans" (77). See King, *Cymbeline: Constructions of Britain* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 47-91. Print. Patricia Parker likens Cymbeline's Queen to the "narrowly nationalistic Italian queen, Amata" in the *Aeneid*, citing the parallels between Shakespeare's play and the Roman text as a means of explaining the work's anachronism and its emphasis on imperial "westerling" (196, 205). David Bergeron instead sees in the Queen a "real-life analogue", Augustus Caesar's Livia. See Parker, "Romance and Empire: Anachronistic *Cymbeline*." *Unfolded Tales: Essays on Renaissance Romance*. Eds. George M. Logan and Gordon Teskey (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1989). Print and Bergeron, "*Cymbeline*: Shakespeare's Last Roman Play." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 31.1 (1980): 31-41. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Nov. 2010. Lastly, G. Wilson Knight observes that the Queen in this scene "has powerfully expressed precisely the sentiments many Elizabethan Englishmen must have felt after the failure of the Spanish Armada" (135). To explain why the immoral queen is chosen to express this nationalist sentiment that would likely resonate with Shakespeare's audience, he contends that "neither [the Queen nor Cloten] speak out of character: the Queen merely finds an occasion for the blameless exercise of her fierce and active temperament [ ... ] the national situation serving, as often in real life, to render violent instincts respectable" (136). Knight, "*Cymbeline*: Themes and Persons." *The Crown of Life: Essays in Interpretation of Shakespeare's Final Plays*. (London: Methuen, 1965): 129-67. Print.

impelled him to refuse to pay the tribute. Moments after denying Caius Lucius the unpaid tribute, Cymbeline reminisces about his past in Julius Caesar's court and his training under Britain's first conqueror, thus reinforcing the very bond he purportedly seeks to undo. He admits in this moment that it is his need not to appear "cold" ( II.v.75) or unmoved by the several rebellions launched against Rome that compels his rebellion, and later, during Caius departure from the British court, he explains that "Our subjects [ ... ] / Will not endure [Augustus's] yoke; and for ourself / To show less sovereignty than they, must needs / Appear unkinglike" (III.v.4-7). Shakespeare's Cymbeline, it seems, is neither the stalwart defender of British freedom nor a loyal adherent to Roman culture and governance; rather, this manifestation of Cymbeline waffles somewhere in between, occupying the ambiguous position of a leader driven by the actions of his unjust queen and the fear of a tarnished reputation to break ties with the empire.<sup>227</sup> Such a

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<sup>227</sup> Cymbeline himself is a figure of much critical attention. Alexander Leggatt observes that "though the play is named for him, he has been for most of its length an unimpressive figure, passive where he is not cantankerous" (207). See Leggatt, "The Island of Miracles: An Approach to *Cymbeline*." *Shakespeare Studies: An Annual Gathering of Research, Criticism, and Reviews* 10 (1977) 191-209. Print. Likewise, Innes, drawing upon remarks regarding Cymbeline's emptiness by J. M. Nosworthy and E. M. W. Tillyard, claims that "by the logic of identification of the king with the state, if Cymbeline is a nonentity, then so is his Britain" (5). See Innes "Cymbeline and Empire", cited above. John E. Alvis believes that *Cymbeline* sounds a warning about absolutist rule. He considers early modern England's conflict between a concentration on domestic governance and the desire for imperial conquest. Of Shakespeare's king he argues, "Cymbeline shows himself not a particle less absolute than Shakespeare's only other pre-Conquest monarch, but he is considerably less intelligent than Shakespeare's Lear [ ... ] *Cymbeline* anticipates doubts regarding Tudor absolutism apparent in Shakespeare's final dramatic work, a play in which an autocratic Henry VIII, like his pre-Conquest semblant, makes state policy serve royal personal caprice" (41). Alvis, "Cymbeline in Context: The Regime Issue." *Shakespeare's Last Plays: Essays in Literature and Politics*. Eds. Stephen W. Smith and Travis Curtright. (Lanham: Lexington, 2002): 35-51. Print. Emrys Jones argues that one must read *Cymbeline* through the rhetoric of Stuart kingship, particularly in the royal language that equated James with Augustus Caesar as a kingly peacemaker. He explains the work's artistic failure and incongruities as owing to the play's anchoring of Cymbeline to James. Of Cymbeline's "unsatisfactory nature", he claims "he is largely neutral and passive while the Queen is alive but comes to no harm, for the author officiously protects him from the consequences of his weak nature and ill-judged actions. The Queen and Cloten are used as

portrait effectively displays the tensions and complications of drawing upon an ideologically strained classical genealogy like Speed's to support early modern English claims to imperial rule.

#### The Seat of British-ness

Like the queen's intimation that Britain's geography is a source of "national" character, Belarius also cites the British landscape as imbuing in its subjects a strength of body and mind closely associated with place. Instructing the disguised princes in their "mountain sport" (III.iii.10), Belarius explains that the evils of courtly life are best understood from the distance of Britain's marginal territories: describing the cave in which they have made their home, Belarius declares,

Stoop, boys, this gate  
Instructs you how t'adore the heavens, and bows you  
To a morning's holy office. The gates of monarchs  
Are arch'd so high that giants may jet through  
And keep their impious turbans on without  
Good morrow to the sun. Hail, thou fair heaven!  
We house i' th' rock, yet use thee not so hardly  
As prouder livers do (III.iii.2-9).

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scapegoats: they take most of the blame and are killed off" (97). Landry makes a similar claim about the play's sacrifice of the Queen and her son: "[Cloten] is from our first sight of him a marked man, and he serves, as in a quieter way his mother does, as a scapegoat for the purging of the whole community" (72). See Landry, cited above, and Jones, "Stuart *Cymbeline*." *Essays in Criticism* 11 (1961): 84-99. Print. Finally, Maurice Hunt also sees Cloten's necessary sacrifice as "a first step in the reconstitution of the British body politic" (418). Hunt considers how Shakespeare's play seeks to depict a fractured political body that is ultimately rebuilt in the image of "the Pauline body of Christ" (405). See Hunt, "Dismemberment, Corporal Reconstitution, and the Body Politic in *Cymbeline*." *Studies in Philology* 99.4 (2002): 404-431. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Nov. 2010.

Like the Welsh rock that teaches its inhabitants humility and appreciation for God's work, the Cambrian mountains also allow for a site of contemplation of abused power and courtly corruption from the safety of the periphery: "Consider", Belarius instructs, "When you above perceive me like a crow, / That it is place which lessens and sets off / And you may then revolve what tales I have told you / Of courts, of princes, of the tricks of war" (III.ii.11-15). Belarius implies here and elsewhere that it is the Welsh landscape—its perspectives, its mountain ruggedness, its hidden-ness—that embeds in the princes that "nobler" sentiment that is everywhere absent in the centers of government. Significantly, Shakespeare ahistorically situates this training ground of princes in an annexed territory sometimes characterized by resistance to English rule. As explained above, Wales as a politically defined national space arguably did not exist during Cymbeline's reign. However, Shakespeare's Wales in *Cymbeline* is shot through with early modern associations, among them the potential for violence, lawlessness and rebellion in this peripheral land. For instance, the reputed Welsh "mountaineers" (IV.ii.71), who never appear in the play, are variously characterized as "rustic" (IV.ii.100), villainous and criminal and the land and its inhabitants referred to as "savage" (III.vi.18) and "beastly" (III.ii.40). In a passage recalling early modern English anxieties regarding the security of Wales, Belarius imagines that he and the princes have been included among the Welsh outlaws that "cave here, hunt here [ ... ] and in time / May make some stronger head" against their governors (IV.ii.138-39).

*Cymbeline*'s incongruous depiction of Wales as both the ideal school ground for the training of princes because of its distance from the court *and* a site of possible savagery and disorder, also because of its ambiguous distance from "Britain" and Cymbeline's stronghold there, speaks to the early modern English tensions regarding the imperial governance of Wales,

tensions that are symbolically erased in Speed's "Kingdome". As explained above, Speed rubs out the border between England and Wales, illustratively depicting the imperial center and its annexed marginal territory as a cohesive political unit. Shakespeare's play denies this vision of a conjoined body politic by re-infusing the Welsh landscape with these colonial anxieties and by absenting England altogether from his play about British "nationalism" and imperialism.<sup>228</sup>

Speed's texts, both cartographic and historical, allow Englishness to stand in for British-ness: though he purports to represent Great Britain in his maps and in his *History*, both works place England firmly at the center of their ideological portraits of the isles. As described above, the elaborate ornamentation and strategic framing techniques of Speed's maps project an image of England as the heart and "natural" sovereign of the kingdom. Likewise, Speed's *History of Great Britain* is clearly invested in writing an English history of British-ness; Speed's chronology of British kings consists of England's Roman, Saxon, Danish, Norman and English monarchs who reigned primarily over English lands and annexed territories. His "description of the whole Kingdome in generall" is a catalog of English counties, with a handful of Irish territories included in a separate section. Significantly, the Welsh counties are grouped within the English territories as if they are unproblematically sutured to England. Shakespeare's representation of Wales in *Cymbeline* refuses the notion of England's smooth incorporation of Wales by reinstating the Welsh-Anglo border, injecting the work with contemporary colonial anxieties and

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<sup>228</sup> Terence Hawkes also comments upon the play's refusal of British unity. According to his analysis, "what the play finally, helplessly hints at is the extent to which the 'two worlds' that England and Wales comprise remain two, not one. [ ... ] *Cymbeline* cannot resolve the contradiction that the notion of a British 'nation' embodies: a single, unified and coherent political entity perhaps, but one that is also simultaneously multiple". Hawkes, *Shakespeare in the Present*. (London: Routledge, 2002): 61. Print.

absenting England from a play that gestures toward England's own imperial intentions inspired by its Roman past.<sup>229</sup>

Furthermore, Shakespeare's anachronistic Wales in *Cymbeline* serves as a kind of extra-national space, an ambiguously defined territory that sits outside Britain and repeatedly challenges claims to British control over the isle. Aligned with contemporary imperial representations of Wales, the Welsh landscape in *Cymbeline* is a site of potential rebellion,

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<sup>229</sup> Critics have reached various conclusions about Shakespeare's use of Wales in *Cymbeline*. In Laura Di Michele's estimation, Wales is a site of "infiltrating relationships" (158), where a hybrid Roman-British-ness is achieved through "the Roman and British characters' going and coming to and from Rome, and perhaps more importantly, through a full immersion of the exiled Britons [in Wales]" (164). See Di Michele, "Shakespeare's Writing of Rome in *Cymbeline*." *Identity, Otherness and Empire in Shakespeare's Rome* Ed. Maria Del Sapio Garbero (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009) 157-173. Print. Atsuhiko Hirota argues for the "instability" of the relationship between center and periphery in regard to the play's three locations. Wales, he maintains, is neither in *Cymbeline*'s Britain nor without it, thus complicating contemporary perceptions of the early modern domestic empire. He likewise maintains that Britain itself is cast as marginal while the Roman center appears to lack its former qualities as an imperial stronghold, due to the empire's multinational states. He reads the "dissipated" imperial center as a warning to Jacobean England. See Hirota, "Forms of Empires: Rome and its Peripheries in *Cymbeline*." *The Shakespearean International Yearbook 4: Shakespeare Studies Today*. Eds. Graham Bradshaw, Tom Bishop and Mark Turner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 279-293. Print. Garrett Sullivan instead describes *Cymbeline*'s Wales as a "shadow" nation that serves only to illuminate London as the center of the court and of Englishness more generally (146). Through an examination of early modern notions of landscape and geography, Sullivan contends that Wales occupied a contradictory place in the English imagination. Because discourses about Wales marked the nation as both similar to and fundamentally different from England, neither the language of assimilation nor of annexation was entirely applicable to the Welsh nation. Envisioning a "shadow-Wales" or an indistinctly defined territory hedged the difficulties posed by England's takeover of the country by making this landscape an emptied template for the formulation of English identity. See Sullivan 146, cited above. Marisa R. Cull examines the play's Welsh setting through a consideration of Henry Frederick's 1610 investiture. Putting *Cymbeline* in relation to *The Valiant Welshman* and *Prince Henry's Barriers*, Cull argues that the meaning of Shakespeare's play is illuminated when reconsidered as a lesson in British identity and history meaningfully staged in the Welsh territories. Cull contends that, in both *Cymbeline* and *The Valiant Welshman*, "a distinctive version of Welsh heroism emerges as a means for exploring the ancient past and its usefulness as a model for the present day heir to the throne" (131). See Cull, "Contextualizing 1610: *Cymbeline*, *The Valiant Welshman*, and The Princes of Wales." *Shakespeare and Wales: From the Marches to the Assembly*. Eds. Willy Maley and Philip Schwyzer. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) 127-142. Print.



resistance and invasion that allows those housed within its territories a political position outside the realm of British governance. For instance, Milford-Haven is not only the entry point for the invading Roman army; it is also a site in which escapees of Cymbeline's rule, such as Imogen, Posthumus and Belarius enact their destinies in direct denial of the sovereign's will. To become reunited with her banished husband, Pisanio instructs Imogen that "not in Britain must you abide", before directing her to Wales (III.iv.134). Though her final destination is Rome, where she will at least reside in proximity to her husband, it is Wales that will allow her the opportunity and departure point for her life outside the rule of her father. Likewise, the Welsh territory is the site of the banished Belarius's revenge against his unjust king, harboring Cymbeline's secret sons just outside the monarch's purview.

As mentioned above, the most significant transformations and determining action of *Cymbeline* take place in the Welsh territories; it is in Wales that Britain's future monarchs are trained, where Imogen discovers the means to recover her banished husband, and the place in which the Roman army enters Britain. Apposite to English imperial discourse, Wales is the landscape in which the play's celebrated British-ness is developed; whereas Britain is a site of social and political unease from the play's beginning, a nation of unhappy subjects, ruled by a monarch under the sway of his corrupt queen and step-son, Wales is the terrain where unvarnished British-ness is formed and preserved in the person of the princes and the virtuous action of the monarch's daughter. As Jodi Mikalachki contends, Wales in *Cymbeline* is "the last preserve and final retreat of pure Britishness".<sup>230</sup> Cymbeline himself, after his reunion with

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<sup>230</sup> Mikalachki analyzes the play's treatment of gender, arguing that the work's exorcism of the feminine allows for "the masculine embrace of Roman Britain [ ... ] producing a civil masculine foundation for early modern nationalism" (322). See Mikalachki, "The Masculine Romance of Roman Britain: *Cymbeline* and Early Modern English Nationalism." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 46.3 (1995): 301-322. *JSTOR*. Web. 21 Nov. 2010. Lisa Hopkins also identifies Wales as the preserve

Guiderius and Arviragus, remarks that his Welsh-bred sons and their guardian are “the liver, heart and brain of Britain” (V.v.14).<sup>231</sup> Likewise, the extra-national territory allows for the largely unquestioned murder of the unjust Cloten, whose villainy coupled with that of his mother’s, is the source of the infection of the British court that leads to the war with Rome.

*Cymbeline*’s fundamental action in Wales can be attributed, in part, to the play’s refusal to give geopolitical definition to the territory labeled as “Welsh”. Though the region is anachronistically described as “Wales” throughout the work (by both characters like Imogen and in the stage directions), the play consistently casts the region as socially and politically ambiguous, particularly in its relationship to Britain.<sup>232</sup> As indicated above, Wales is territorially defined as “not in Britain” by Pisanio. Cymbeline also gestures toward a border between his nation and Wales when he commands his soldiers to escort Caius “till he have cross’d the Severn” in response to the Roman ambassador’s request for “overland” passage to Milford-Haven (III.v.8-17). Because of the significant distance between the River Severn and the

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of ancient British identity, claiming that “Wales is seen in the play as the one remaining home of true British valour; indeed the Britons, in the shape of the Welsh, are markedly more Roman than the Romans” (143). See Hopkins, “*Cymbeline*, the *translatio imperii*, and the matter of Britain.” *Shakespeare and Wales: From the Marches to the Assembly*. Eds. Willy Maley and Philip Schwyzer. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010): 143-55. Print.

<sup>231</sup> Gavin Paul’s reads Cymbeline’s bodily metaphor in this scene as a commentary on Wales’s “submersion” into early modern England. In his interpretation, Guiderius and Arviragus’s metaphorical incorporation into their father’s Britain amounts to the instrumental “absorption” of both “the distinct Welsh geography” and “the princes’ latent nationalistic fervour” into the British political landscape (182). See Paul, “Theatrical and National Spaces in *Cymbeline*.” *Comitatus: A Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 37 (2006): 169-192. Print.

<sup>232</sup> The Welsh territory is also referred to as “Cambria” in act III scene ii. However, Shakespeare is careful to pair this reference to Wales’s ancient designation with a very contemporary signifier of Wales. Imogen, learning of Posthumus’s belief that she has been unfaithful through his letter to Pisanio, quotes the following lines: “ ‘Take notice that I am in Cambria, / at Milford Haven” (III.ii.43-4). By coupling “Cambria” with a well-circulated referent to Tudor mythology, any audience members unaware of Wales’ former name would immediately associate this space with contemporary Wales.

coastal city, one may safely assume that Cymbeline's comment serves to delineate the border between his kingdom and Wales. Most important, however, are the moments in the play that speak to the unclear political status of the vaguely-defined Welsh periphery. For example, the Welsh territory is the designated site in which Pisanio is to carry out the murder of Imogen, according to Posthumus's instructions; it is also, as mentioned above, the place of Cloten's killing. In these instances, it seems that the Welsh periphery allows for a type of criminal, even murderous, activity outlawed in Cymbeline's state. More telling perhaps is the unclear status of the laws of the kingdom in Wales. In response to Belarius's anxieties regarding the murder of Cloten by Guiderius, the disguised prince signals that Cymbeline's British law does not reach into marginal Wales: "The law / Protects not us," explains the heir to the kingdom, "then why should we be tender / To let an arrogant piece of flesh threat us / Play judge and executioner all himself, / For we do fear the law?" (IV.ii.124-29). Such an explanation of the limit of British law, especially in the mouth of Britain's future king, testifies to both the impotency of British governance in a territory within its supposed isle and to the extra-national character of this apparently lawless region.

The question of allegiance to neighboring Britain again arises when the princes consider their roles in the war; bound to neither Britain nor to Rome, yet drawn into the battle due to their inherent princely identities, Guiderius makes plain their seemingly nation-less status. Responding to Belarius's suggestion that they take to the Welsh mountains, Guiderius asks "what hope / Have we in hiding us? This way, the Romans / Must or for Britains slay us or receive us / For barbarous and unnatural revolts" (V.iii.3-6). Due to their politically untenable position in the ungoverned periphery, the princes could be taken as enemies by either army; however, this political ambiguity also allows the princes to choose their allegiances, rather than

be put to the service of their governmental overlords. Significantly, the sons of Cymbeline and future leaders of Britain choose to fight for the British not in allegiance to their father or because of some nationalist sentiment that urges them to defend Britain. The “country wars” (IV.iv.51) as Belarius terms them are for the sons of Cymbeline less a matter of “country” or British pride, but one of natural militaristic prowess and a desire for life experience.<sup>233</sup>

Contradictorily, Shakespeare’s Wales in *Cymbeline* is simultaneously the site of authentic British-ness *and* not territorially or politically British. The geopolitically and ideologically ambiguous portrait of Wales in Shakespeare’s play draws uncomfortable attention to the ability of the Welsh peripheries to confound official notions of Englishness and British-ness. The extra-national character of Shakespeare’s Wales in *Cymbeline* resonates with contemporary anxieties regarding English imperial governance and control over Wales. Areas of potential lawlessness, unclear allegiances and unmonitored spaces were pronounced concerns for the English. The play’s treatment of Wales also forces a recognition of the sometimes crude handling of historical materials appropriated to support official nationalist and imperial agendas. Shakespeare sets the primary action of the play in a non-English territory that highlights the state’s weaknesses, problematizing both England’s imperial character and official claims to a united Britain. This same territory, however, is one of great ideological import to the crown. The Galfridian

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<sup>233</sup> John E. Curran, Jr. reads the play’s treatment of the princes as evidence of shifting historiographic trends in the early modern period. Taking its cue from “the new humanist history” (277), Shakespeare’s work gestures toward the fallibility and weakness of a British identity drawn from Galfridian history, with its emphasis on “title and lineage” (299). The invalidation of Galfridian historiography meant that the early moderns were forced to discover a kind of honor in their savage British ancestors (like those illustrated in Speed’s *History*), who found legitimacy in their submission to Rome. Curran sees in the play’s representation of the princes the historiographical turn toward humanist history and the need to discover a celebrated identity in the wilds of ancient Britain. See Curran, “Royalty Unlearned, Honor Untaught: British Savages and Historiographical Change in *Cymbeline*.” *Comparative Drama* 31.2 (1997): 277-303. Print.

historiography that undergirded the rule of the Tudors and the Stuarts, was, at the time of the play's production, losing its validity. Therefore, the play's repeated references to Milford-Haven would not, as it may first appear, serve to celebrate those official mythologies intended to bolster nationalist and royalist sentiment. Rather, placing his characters in this landmark of English royalty and British myths of origin instead points to a growing awareness of the insubstantiality of such official legends. Locating much of the action of the play in the scene of a then out-moded Galfridian historiography while puncturing the narrative of England's ties to ancient Rome, Shakespeare's play deflates the imperial and nationalist rhetoric illustratively projected in Speed's "Kingdome of Great Britain and Ireland". Thusly, Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* demonstrates the power of popular literature to question the ideologically charged mythologies of official nationalist narratives. As if to lend further punctuation to the emptiness of constructed nationalist mythologies, Shakespeare's conclusion to the play empties Cymbeline of the ideological might that he possessed in Speed's maps: "Let / A Roman and a British ensign wave / Friendly together", he declares, effectively surrendering up his nation's claims to national autonomy and imperial destiny (V.v.480-81).

### Genealogical Mapping

Upon Imogen's arrival in the Welsh peripheries, she is moved to condemn the colonial discourse that imagines this territory and its inhabitants as barbarous and wild: "These are kind creatures", she exclaims of her unknown brothers, "Gods / what lies have I heard! / Our courtiers say all's savage but at court. / Experience, O thou disprov'st report! / Th' imperious seas breeds monsters; for the dish, / Poor tributary rivers as sweet fish" (IV.ii.31-36). Like the beastly sea creatures that swarm around the Irish and Welsh coastlines in Speed's maps, threatening harm to the unwary traveler to these out-regions, the imperial discourse emanating from the English

courts was intended to draw in monstrous hues the conquered peoples of the British margins. One of several colonial models designed to ideologically cast the Irish, Welsh and portions of the Scottish population as unevolved and uncivilized and therefore in need of English imperial rule, this imperial or colonial strategy was also a matter of English state-building, as discussed above. For instance, because the Irish isle was populated with “wilde” Irish, as we see illustrated in Speed’s maps, the very nature of the island and its people demands the expansion of a state infrastructure into these savage territories to bring order and law.

If one considers, however, the genealogical model of a shared and ancient British-ness set up by Speed and others and critiqued by Shakespeare in *Cymbeline*, one detects a certain ideological rupture. As we have seen, early modern English colonial rhetoric was dependent on a discourse of British sameness that imagined the people of the archipelago sharing a common genealogy and ethnicity. Speed’s maps reinforced this notion of shared British-ness by containing the regions of the archipelago in a single frame and embellishing these artificially close landmasses in a singular vision of British identity. However, English colonial discourse during this period was simultaneously reliant upon a language of essential difference: the Welsh, Irish and the Scots betrayed fundamental inferiorities when contrasted with their English brethren and were therefore rightly subjected to English rule. Speed’s maps exemplify this contradictory position. Despite his attempts to visually narrate a myth of shared British-ness across the isles, he is nevertheless at pains to distinguish the English from the Irish along ethnic and sociocultural lines.

As discussed in chapter one, the construction of a British genealogy centered on English ethnicity and culture brought with it the problem of differentiating the ancient Briton from his less civilized counterparts, the Picts and the Scots. In my analysis of *Utopia*, I argued that Speed

and William Camden sought to describe the Picts and Scots as invaders to an essentially English isle. When the Picts and Scots are considered in the light of a British genealogy that still must separate the English as ethnically superior, the writers of the nation had to overcome a different set of ideological ruptures. During the reign of a Scottish king, the rhetorical maneuvers required in these illustrations of ancient Britain and the naturalness of an English isle had to be very delicately constructed. In contemporary English discourse, the Picts and Scots are the savage ancestors of the Irish and Scottish, who, even in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries bear the markings and behaviors of this ancestral barbarity. William Camden, though he contends that the Picts were in fact Britons, nevertheless refers to this ancient group as “barbarous” and likens these ancestors to the present-day “wilde Irish”.<sup>234</sup> Of the Scots, Camden very cautiously and problematically parts the family tree, identifying the ancestors of James’s Scots as English speakers “from the very same Germane originall, that we English men are”; the other Scots who inhabit the highlands and outlying islands, those whose resistance to British law and order posed significant difficulties to the British state, sprung from “those Scots speaking Irish”. More concretely linking the wild Scots with Ireland is Camden’s contention that “certainley knowen it is, that out of Ireland, an Ile inhabited in old times by Britans [ ... ] [the Scots] passed into Britain, and what time as they were first known unto writers by this name, seated they were in Ireland”.<sup>235</sup> Edmund Spenser’s Irenæus in *A View of the State of Ireland* more strictly and radically collapses the ancestors of the Irish and Scottish. While arguing that the Irish are descended from the Scythians, whose expanse reached into both Ireland and Scotland, Eudoxus questions whether his interlocutor’s focus hasn’t shifted away from their main topic of interest.

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<sup>234</sup> Camden, *Britannia*. Ed. Robert Mayhew. Vol. 1 (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003): 117-18. Print.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid, 119 and 120.

“I wonder [ ... ] whether you runne so farre astray; for whilest wee talke of Ireland, mee thinks you rippe up the originall of Scotland, but what is that to this?” he asks. “Surely very much,” Irenæus replies, “for Scotland and Ireland are all one and the same”. Though, like Camden, Spenser is very careful in parsing the ancient Scottish population into the “Irish Scots” and the “Albin-Scots”, Spenser’s scathing characterization of the Irish in both their ancient and contemporary form here expands to segments of the Scottish population.<sup>236</sup> Camden and Spenser’s ideological maneuvers that meld the ancient Scots and Irish into a single ethnicity are clearly intended to succinctly differentiate the ancestors of the English from the taint of barbarity purportedly still evident in the English’s less civilized neighbors.

However, the difficulty of ferreting out from a history of conquest and ethnic mixing the origin of contemporary British (English) identity made inevitable the potential genealogical linking of the Picts and the British. The need to provide England or Britain with a deeply historical genealogy demanded that preserved British-ness be traced through the many invasions of the archipelago and distinguished from Saxon, Norman and other foreign cultures. But, to strip away the contaminating influence and genealogy of the many invading peoples over the course of British history could lead to the ideologically troubling notion that no “true Britons” could be excavated from the British historical record of conquest and intermixture.<sup>237</sup> A solution

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<sup>236</sup> Spenser, *A View of the State of Ireland* Eds. Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) 45 Print.

<sup>237</sup> Sam Smiles makes a similar point concerning the slipperiness of ancestral identification of the British and the English. Speaking of the overthrow of Galfridian myths of British origin, he considers the untenable position presented to the Englishman when imagining the ancient Briton as his national forefather: “Once the Galfridian history of Britain was supplanted, there was considerable uncertainty about who the ancestors of the present-day inhabitants of Britain actually were. The reputation and identity of the Britons recorded in classical texts, for all their hardihood and martial valour, did not offer a secure point of reference for an Elizabethan reader. Those who had received civilization—the Britons south of the Roman wall—had also been



to this problem lay in the notion that the Picts and the Scots, ancient peoples who survived alongside England's ancestors were, in fact, uncivilized Britons, who had yet to come into the civil and ethically-minded form achieved by the English. Such a constructed history would serve a dual purpose: to give "the British" a more expansive and traceable history, to provide an imperial narrative of superior Englishness, and to project the idea of a deep British-ness that enveloped even disparate ethnic groups across the archipelago.

However, the evolutionary model of British-ness that would simultaneously support colonial discourses tracing the Picts and Scots to the modern Irish and Scottish still maintained essential and unchangeable difference as the primary motor behind the subjection of these "peripheral" peoples to English law and culture. For instance, Harrison's *Description of Britain* from the 1577 version of Holinshed's *Chronicles* discounts the historical records of England's ancestors: "although their histories do carry great countenance of their antiquity and continuance in this Island: yet (to say freely what I think) I judge them rather to have stole in hither, not much before the Saxons". Because, he argues, the histories of the Picts and Scots cannot be trusted, Harrison maintains that "it shall suffice to give notice that they are but strangers, and such as by

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defeated by waves of invaders and, it was presumed, had been supplanted by the Saxons. Seen from a metropolitan point of view, those who had never succumbed to the Romans—the inhabitants of what were now the Celtic fringes—had remained reluctant converts to civilization even in modern times. Neither seemed to have much to do with contemporary England, increasingly identified with the Saxon settlement, and many educated Englishmen would not wish to claim descent from the aboriginal inhabitants of Britain". I would add to Smiles' assessment that this attempt to find a suitable progenitor of the British race was complicated by the need, on the part of the English, to differentiate themselves from the present-day Scottish, Welsh and Irish. To "locate" an originary Briton could open up more problems than ideological solutions because this "Briton" needed to be somehow English and emphatically not of Pict or Scot lineage. Smiles, "John White and British Antiquity: Savage Origins in the Context of Tudor Historiography." *European Visions: American Voices*. British Museum Records Publication 172. Web 9 April 2010.

obscure invasion have nestled in this Island”.<sup>238</sup> By reducing the ancient Picts and Scots to history-less “strangers” who have lawlessly “stolen” into Britain, Harrison casts the Picts and Scots as troublesome invaders separate from British history and British stock. His 1587 account of the Picts and Scots is much more severe in its derogatory description of Britain’s sometimes ancestors. The Scots are “of Scithian and Spanish blood” who “arrive [d] here out of Ireland”. Placing the Scots in Ireland, of course, links these strangers to the contemporary Irish and creates an important ideological distance between the early modern “Britains” or Englishmen and their Irish and Scottish neighbors. Again, the Scots have “stolen” into Britain who, in this version, did often adventure hither to rob and steal out of Ireland, and were finally called in by the Meats or Picts (as the Romans named them because they painted their bodies) to help against the Britains, after the which they so planted themselves in these parts, that unto our time that portion of the land cannot be cleansed of them.<sup>239</sup>

Harrison’s depiction of the Scots and the Picts here achieves several rhetorical goals: the first, to criminalize the Scots; second, to imagine a Scottish and Pictish people as separate from and hostile to the “Britains”; and third, to posit a modern and ambiguous “Britain” that still suffers from the contaminating effects of their savage and essential difference. Harrison also seeks to distinguish the “natural Britans” of antiquity from the Picts, using their differences in body painting as evidence. The Picts figure less in Harrison’s account; he focuses rather on his contention that the “Scots and Irish are all one people” and providing illustrations of the barbarity of this collapsed ethnic group. Such a linking, of course, serves to indict the early

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<sup>238</sup> Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland* (1577) Vol. 1. Section 1.4.

<sup>239</sup> Holinshed, *Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland* (1587) Vol. 1. Section 1.4. *The Holinshed Project*. Web. 10 April 2009.

modern Irish and Scottish population of Britain who are derived from this savage stock and who have yet to be “cleansed” from the presumably English landscape. It is significant that when Harrison ends his section on the Picts and Scots in British antiquity he does so by anachronistically invoking “Roman” England and explaining that the criminal Scots were expelled from the island to Ireland, “the out Iles, and the north part of the main”, hence instating in his history of British antiquity the very political borders that this nationalist and imperial narrative seeks to endorse.

Harrison’s severing of the Scots from the British family tree—a move that problematically runs contrary to the notion of a shared British genealogy—is also a project of Spenser’s in *A View of the State of Ireland*. In their conversation about the origins of the Irish in Britain, Eudoxus explains to Irenæus that the Irish and the Scottish are one people; he makes this assertion based upon the notion that the ancient Scots were in fact Scythians who came to inhabit both Ireland and Scotland. Eudoxus contends that there are “but two kindes of Scots [ ... ] the one Irin, or Irish Scots, the other Albin-Scots; for those Scots are Scythians, arrived (as I said ) in the North parts of Ireland, where some of them after passed into the next coast of Albine, now called Scotland, which (after much trouble) they possessed, and of themselves named Scotland”.<sup>240</sup> Spenser’s narrative of the ancient Irish and Scottish serves a similar purpose to Harrison’s rhetoric about the Picts and Scots, discussed above; by drawing up this history, Spenser manages to expunge the Scottish and the Irish from “British” history by imagining their ancestors as an invasive tribe whose savage characteristics and foreign origins culturally and ethnically separate them from the ancient Britons. Also, by collapsing the Scots and Irish, Spenser subtly promotes the notion of a combined foreign otherness at cultural and social odds

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<sup>240</sup> Spenser, 45.

with the ancient and rightful inhabitants of the archipelago, the British or, by deduction, the English. One can register certain echoes of Harrison's nationalist and imperial narrative that had the combined forces of the Picts and Scots warring against the "natural" Britons.

Such politically driven myths of "British" history seek not to provide a holistic view of the archipelago in ancient times, but to construct a seemingly historical narrative that repeatedly excavates the contemporary Scottish and Irish from the British family. The "natural" Britons are the English in these manufactured histories who must contend with the invasive cultures that have "planted" or "creeped" into their territory. This writing of British history clashes, of course, with the notion of an all-encompassing archipelagic genealogy born of an ancient and shared British-ness. Likewise, the evolutionary model also fails in this problematic trimming of the family tree. The contemporary Scottish and Irish, descendants of the uncivilized Scots and Picts, possess an essential ethnic difference as invading strangers to the British lands, an unchangeable difference that demands their "cleansing" from this land or a brand of wholesale violence, as endorsed by Spenser, that smacks of extermination, rather than reform through the enforcement of English law and custom.

Speed in his *History of Great Britain* attempts to skirt the issue of contemporary claims to this essential difference in order to support the genealogical legacy of ancient British-ness depicted in his cartographic and historiographic texts. Unlike the discussion of Speed's illustrations of the ancient Picts in chapter one, where Speed attempted to equate the Picts and Native Americans as existing on the same evolutionary chain, here Speed draws upon Thomas Hariot's depictions of the Picts in his *Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia* to ambiguously position the Picts as the uncivilized ancestors of the Britons while simultaneously distancing this savage group from the ancient British line. Whereas Hariot claims

that the Picts illustrated by Theodor de Bry in his *True Report* were “as savage as those [inhabitants] of Virginia”, Speed alters both the effect of these illustrations and the narrative surrounding these potential British ancestors (figs. 12 and 13). Though Speed uses illustrations in the same style as de Bry—one does not immediately detect the difference between those assembled in Speed’s chronicle and those used by Hariot—he re-titles these like images. The first set, which depicts a Pictish man and woman naked and covered in the animal and flower motifs described by Harrison, Speed and Hariot, is entitled “portraits and paintings of the ancient Britains”. In the second grouping, the man and woman stand in similar positions and carry similar weapons but are clothed; they bear the title “The portraits and habits of the more civil Britains”. One would assume from the renaming of Hariot’s Picts that Speed is invested in bringing these figures into the history of British identity and culture, thus lending historical credence to the claim that British-ness has a deep genealogical lineage in the isles, reaching back before the conquests of the Romans, Saxons and Normans and stretching forward in time in some preserved form. However, even in the title of this section of the history, Speed is at pains to differentiate the Picts illustrated in both his and Hariot’s texts from their British inheritors: he entitles this chapter, “The Portraits of the Ancient Britains, of their Nakedness, Painting and Figuring their Bodies, of their Personages, Habits, and Habiliments, both in Peace and War: As also of the Picts, their Original and Habits, &c.” (fig. 14). Though Speed seems interested in promoting the evolution model of civil British-ness, in which savage and ancient inhabitants of the island eventually achieve the civility and order of the contemporary English (as his two sets of illustrations imply), Speed immediately disrupts this narrative by distinguishing the ‘Ancient Britains’ of his illustrations and the Picts who are the subject of the latter half of his chapter.

Throughout this section on ancient Britain, Speed repeatedly and anxiously returns to this distinction. Claiming the genealogical connection between the ancient Britons and the Picts is “a question not yet decided”, Speed cites ancient sources that position the Picts variously as foreigners from Germany, France and Scythia, repeating the myth that the Picts came into Britain from Ireland. Conceding ancient accounts that the Picts were, in fact, “the remains of those ancient Britaines” that survived the Roman invasion and acknowledging the similarity in “language”, “manners” and “government”, Speed subtly discounts this lineage by explaining that the Romans and even the ancient British themselves used the term “Picts” to distinguish the painted people from the Britons proper.<sup>241</sup> Similarly, Speed interrupts the narrative of his sources to draw his readers’ attention to the fundamental difference underlying the relationship between these ancient peoples who populated the archipelago. Discussing potential reasons for the Picts’ reported nakedness, Speed cites Solinus, but not without his own ideologically motivated interjection: “of the *Britaines*, Solinus thus delivereth: *The Countrey is in part* (note that he makes it not generall) *inhabited by People barbarous, who by artificiall formes of incision have from their Childhood sundry shapes of Beasts depourtrayed in their bodies*”. Speed a second time brackets off the wild Picts from the ancestors of the English, explaining that reports of the nakedness that sometimes characterizes the ancient people of the island should not be applied to “the *Britaines* in generall, but the most barbarous of them [that] used to goe naked”. Attempting to separate the savage Picts from the ancient British stock through careful revisions to the materials of British history, Speed wavers between a nationalist narrative dependent upon a myth of shared ancient British-ness that has bound historically the people of

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<sup>241</sup> Speed, *History* (1611) 181.

the archipelago and a contemporary imperial narrative reliant upon Scottish and Irish difference.<sup>242</sup>

### A Faltering Geography

The messiness of a British history that seeks to posit a nationalist narrative of British or English sameness while simultaneously insisting upon fundamental ethnic difference as the underpinning of imperial discourses is somewhat alleviated in the transition from textual discourse to cartographic representation. Whereas textual reproductions of history must contend with the multiplicity of written works that sometimes betray certain ideological pitfalls, as evidenced in the contending and troubling accounts of ancient Britain discussed above, maps empty the field of inscribed narratives and rework them into silent but message-laden images. The visual narratives “spoken” by maps are not often made to enter into the arena of historical debate, unlike the written texts of Camden, Speed, Harrison and Holinshed, where various and conflicting sources are deployed to combat previous representations of history. Rather, the mapmaker may concoct a visual story made up of illustrations, crests and even manipulated landmasses without the immediate need to defend the map’s overall narrative and the materials that went into building it. It is for these reasons that maps like Speed’s could do a similar kind of nationalist and imperial work akin to the above histories with less attention shone on the rhetorical contradictions and irreconcilabilities embedded in those written works that sought to depict the “British” national character while maintaining the ethnic otherness essential to imperial discourses. In cartographic texts, geography becomes the silent basis for national sameness and the justification for English imperial rule over the isles.

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid, 182.

However, like the genealogical model that falters under the sorts of literary pressure applied by works like Shakespeare's *Cymbeline*, the geographic model of nation and empire that seeks to posit both archipelagic sameness and ethnic difference is similarly weakened when made the object of popular literary depictions. Fletcher and Massinger's *Sea Voyage*, for instance, draws upon the ideologically charged depictions of savage and contaminating Ireland and ordered and naturally abundant England. Such illustrations are the stuff of English imperial discourse in Spenser's *View* and Camden's *Britannia*, texts that support the official line of English rule over Ireland. As discussed above, Speed's map of Ireland is the visual compliment to these imperial discourses. Because of his cartographic medium, Speed's illustrative texts quietly sidestep the textual difficulties encountered in English imperial rhetoric that seeks to paint a damning portrait of Ireland while simultaneously imagining the island nation as part of the British archipelagic family. In Spenser and Camden, these ideological incongruities are present in the geographic depictions of the Irish land, which inconsistently depict Ireland and its people as both savage, barren and beyond reform *and* as potentially civil, fruitful and capable of achieving an Irish commonwealth akin to its English neighbor. The success of such colonial discourses depends, in part, on this fundamental incongruity; to justify the imperial takeover of Ireland by the English, the island and its inhabitants must be portrayed as without order and thus in need of English governance. On the other hand, to draw English colonizers into the colonial effort in Ireland and to sustain the geographic model of archipelagic unity and insularity, Ireland must be described as a land of plenty and promise. Much like the genealogical model that balances precariously on claims of ancient British sameness and contentions that the Picts, Celts and their early modern forefathers are fundamentally ethnically different, the geographic model walks an unsteady rhetorical line between archipelagic unity and English assertions of the



essential territorial and ethnic difference of its British neighbors. English nationalist sentiment and justifications for empire seem to run contrary to one another: Ireland must be painted as savage and inhospitable in contrast to England's civility and fruitfulness, yet Ireland must not be so savage as to contaminate or pose a threat to the ethnic British-ness that binds the archipelagic empire into a single autonomous unit.

The two islands of Fletcher and Massinger's *Sea Voyage* seem to mimic the colonial portraiture of England and Ireland found in texts like Spenser's *View* and Camden's *Britannia*. The "Irish" island is barren and unprofitable, save for a pile of gold acquired through imperial conquest. Across a tempestuous sea lies the "English" island, an "Elizian field" inhabited by an all-female commonwealth.<sup>243</sup> On the surface of this colonial narrative, the "Irish" island is a place of savagery and dangerous contamination, where desperation and greed produce in the characters the kind of barbarity often associated with Ireland in English imperial discourse. The English island, in contrast, is a place of order and natural abundance; the female subjects and their island queen protect their "commonwealth" and its resources by adhering to a system of law and governance (II.ii.17). However, the play's obviously drawn differences between island savagery and civility do not hold up under the play's action. The violence that erupts on the "Irish" isle is not ultimately caused by the island's geographic characteristics or its "native" inhabitants. On the positively drawn English island, rebellion and resistance to rule undercut the commonwealth's claims to social and political order. At the play's conclusion, both islands are abandoned because both ultimately fail as sites of potential nationhood or archipelagic rule. The failure of these island commonwealths is not finally owing to geography or to the "natural" character of the islands' inhabitants. Instead, the characters of the play point to colonial greed as

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<sup>243</sup> See footnote 71.

the true cause of their social and political undoing. The play's surprising critique of colonialism forces the audience to rethink the contemporary colonial portraiture that casts the "Irish" and the "English" islands in their hierarchical roles. By playing upon and exaggerating the colonial portraits of England and Ireland drawn in texts like Spenser and Harrison's, the drama betrays these portraits as ideological constructions of geographic entities, much like the maps that visually manipulate landmasses for imperial purposes. The play's overt condemnation of imperial ventures likewise speaks to the way colonial vocabularies overwrite both geographic and cultural depictions. Importantly, the play not only draws attention to the effects of colonial discourse, it also exposes the essential emptiness of such rhetoric; like Imogen in *Cymbeline* who denounces colonial renderings of the "savage" Welsh as "lies" conjured up over "imperious seas", *The Sea Voyage* ultimately reveals that it is colonial discourse, not the inherent traits of the land or of a people, that forms the basis of some early modern geographic and ethnographic depictions.

#### "The Very Genius of the Soil"

Much like Speed's maps of the Irish and English kingdoms that make use of symbolically charged illustrations and embellishments to portray the territories, Fletcher and Massinger's play constructs abstracted portraits of the neighboring islands using the materials of colonial ideology. The play opens on a wild and stormy waterway that is described in terms very similar to those applied to the Irish Sea; "Lay her aloof!" commands the Master of the ship carrying the French to the play's unnamed pair of islands, "the sea grows dangerous, / How it spits against the clouds, how it capers, / And how the fiery element frights it back! / There be devils dancing in

the air” (1.1.1-4).<sup>244</sup> Camden and Speed echo this damning illustration of the waters surrounding Ireland. *Britannia* characterizes the Irish Sea as “troublous and tempestuous”, first implying that this is the sea’s constant condition and natural state then citing “ancient writers [who] have recorded that it rageth all the yeere long with surging billowes and counter seas, and never is at rest, nor navigable unlesse it be in some few Summer daies”.<sup>245</sup> The map of Ireland in Camden’s work reinforces this notion of the inherent danger facing the travelers of the hazardous waterways surrounding the island by strategically placing on the southern and northwestern coasts threatening sea monsters that appear to be patrolling the coastlines. Likewise, Speed positions directly in the center of the Irish Sea a sea monster facing the English coast, visually indicating that the dangers posed by this sea are directed towards those attempting to cross the Irish waterway from the east. Similarly, an oversized serpent-like sea creature mans the Irish waters just south of the Hebrides in a sea-space particularly infamous in English histories as a channel connecting the barbarous Irish to their Scottish counterparts in Northwestern Scotland. The sea’s “frights”, “terrors” and “thousand several shapes death triumphs in” imagined by Aminta during the storm are in Camden and Speed’s visual illustrations specifically tied to Ireland through a colonial discourse that sees Ireland and its surrounding waterways as inherently damned and perpetually dangerous to the foreign traveler (I.ii.57-8).

The island upon which the French pirates find themselves stranded is variously described as a “desert” (I.iii.139) and a muddy bog of “rotten trunks of trees” (III.i.20). Sebastian and

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<sup>244</sup> All references to *The Sea Voyage* (unless otherwise noted) are taken from Anthony Parr’s Revels edition of the text in his *Three Renaissance travel plays* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1995). Print.

<sup>245</sup> Camden, 61, Vol. 3, and 60, Vol. 3.

Nicusa, the Portuguese who fled their colonies for fear of the French, lament the inhospitableness of their new island home:

Here's nothing but rocks and barrenness,  
Hunger and cold to eat. Here's no vineyards  
To cheer the heart of man, no crystal rivers  
After his labour to refresh his body  
If he be feeble. Nothing to restore him  
But heavenly hopes. Nature that made those remedies  
Dares not come here, nor look on our distresses,  
For fear she turn wild like the place and barren (I.iii.24-31).

Like the negative abstractions of the Irish landscape deployed by early modern writers, this island space is one of uncultivated wilderness and disease-ridden waters that threaten to contaminate those who cross its coastlines. Citing Cambrensis, Camden reports that Ireland's territory repels cultivation because it is "uneven, full of hils softe, waterish and boggy, wilde and overgrown with woods, lying open to the Winds, and mountains. The aire is nothing favourable for ripening of corne". Though Camden praises some aspects of the Irish soil and climate, he warns that the Irish "aire [ ... and] the ground is excessive moist, whence it is that very many there be sore troubled with loosenesse and rheumes, but strangers especially".<sup>246</sup> Spenser's Irenæus also deplores the Irish wasteland, positing the possibility that some divine power has damned the very soil. Though "there have bin divers good plottes devised"

They say it is the fatall destiny of that land, that no purposes whatsoever

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<sup>246</sup> Camden, 63, Vol. 3.

which are meant for her good, will prosper or take good effect, which whether it proceed from the very genius of the soyle, or influence of the stares, or that Almighty God hath not yet appointed the time of her reformation, or that hee reserveth her in this unquiet state still for some secret scourge, which shall by her come unto England, it is hard to be knowne, but yet much to be feared.<sup>247</sup>

Spenser, imagining that God and Nature have themselves turned their back on England's island neighbor, imbues the land and, presumably, the waterway between the two islands with the devastating power to infect England.

Fynes Moryson in his 1617 *Itinerary* likewise imbues the Irish land, its waters and coasts with a kind of inherent evil and danger that pose a significant threat to travelling Englishmen. "The land of Ireland" he maintains "is uneven, mountanous, soft, watry, woody, and open to windes and flouds of raine, and so fenny, as it hath Bogges upon the very tops of Mountaines, not bearing man or beast, but dangerous to passe, and such Bogs are frequent over all Ireland". In Moryson's depiction, like Spenser's, the land itself is rife with danger for the Englishman traversing its mysterious and alien landscape. The sea passage to Ireland from the English coast is likewise perilous and threatens unexpected disaster even once the waterway itself has been broached:

Our Marriners observe the sayling into Ireland to be more dangerous, not only because many tides meeting makes the sea apt to swell upon any storme, but

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<sup>247</sup> Spenser, 1.

especially because they ever find the coast of Ireland covered with mists, whereas the coast of England is commonly cleare, and to be seene farre off.<sup>248</sup>

Ireland, as it appears in Moryson's description, seems to everywhere present the potential for harm, especially to the Englishman unused to this violent and unknowable landscape obscured by mists and bogs. More dangerous perhaps are the unseen effects of this abstracted Ireland on the English constitution. As Jean Feerick has noted, Moryson is particularly invested in the notion of colonial degeneracy stemming from English plantation on this contaminating terrain. Likening English transports to animals raised in a foreign environment, Moryson claims that

As horses, cows, and sheep transported out of England into Ireland do each race and breeding decline worse and worse, till in few years they nothing differ from the races and breeds of the Irish horses and cattle, so the posterities of the English planted in Ireland do each descent grow more and more Irish, in nature, manners and customs...<sup>249</sup>

Stories of Ireland's contaminating influence are played out on the shores of Fletcher and Massinger's anonymous island. Upon their arrival to the first unnamed island, the French are confronted with the animal-appearing Portuguese, who bear on their persons the effects of the island's barrenness and contagion. "What things are these? Are they / Human creatures?" Aminta inquires at the sight of Sebastian and Nicusa (I.iii.93-4). As though taking cues from Speed's representations of the Irish on his maps, or from Spenser's illustration of the Irish as animalistic in nature and appearance, the French comment upon the "sunk eyes" and "horse-tails" falling

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<sup>248</sup> Moryson, *An Itinerary written by Fynes Moryson Gent* (1617). EEBO. Web. 8 Jan. 2011. Part 3 Chap. 5 159.

<sup>249</sup> Quoted from Jean Ferrick's "'Divided in Soyle': Plantation and Degeneracy in *The Tempest* and *The Sea Voyage*." *Renaissance Drama* 35 (2006): 27-54. *ProQuest Direct Complete*. 30 Nov. 2010. Web.

from the Portuguese's heads, which appear so barely human that Aminta is compelled to ask, "are they men's faces"? (I.iii.97-100).<sup>250</sup> Sebastian, in response to queries as to their state, explains that it is the "miseries" of life on the island that have engendered in them this inhuman aspect (I.iii.114). Grown "degenerate" and "out of kinde", as Camden says of those English in Ireland who are infected with Irish customs, Sebastian and Nicusa have unwillingly turned "wild" (I.iii.121) as the result of inhabiting this "poisoned" isle (I.iii.137.).<sup>251</sup>

Anthony Parr and Feerick also consider the play's treatment of contemporary anxieties regarding degeneration stemming from colonial venturing and plantation. According to Parr, "*The Sea Voyage* leaves the impression that, at best, colonisation exports the undesirable elements of a country to new lands where they will probably not survive; at worst, the colonists are likely to fall into depravity and barbarism". Feerick maintains that fears of the degeneration and contamination of Englishmen living on foreign soil centered primarily on blood as the carrier of English identity and nobility.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> The equine appearance of Sebastian and Nicusa is strongly reminiscent of Irenæus's assertion that to civilize the Irish is to "break a colte" only to have it "straight runne loose at randome". Spenser, 15.

<sup>251</sup> Camden, 148, Vol. 3.

<sup>252</sup> See Parr, Introduction. *Three Renaissance travel plays*. 28. Feerick argues that blood infected during the process of colonization led to the disorder of not just the individual but of complex systems of landownership and social hierarchies. Anxieties about colonial reproduction figured in this discourse as more women were shipped to the colonies in order to plant lasting communities in foreign soil. Feerick argues that *The Sea Voyage* explicitly takes up this matter of colonial degeneracy and advocates for a regime of temperance that would alleviate fears of both a degenerate physical and social body: "In looking to temperance as a safeguard against degeneration," he contends, "the play produces a new narrative of blood. Rooted not in title, land, or wealth, blood is measured by temperance, which serves as its own sign of nobility, its own estate" (41). See Feerick, cited above. Claire Jowitt likewise links the female characters of Fletcher and Massinger's play to the women transported to the colonies. Examining *The Sea Voyage* through the dual lenses of gender and colonial politics, she argues that both *The Sea Voyage* and Massinger's *The City Madam* comment upon the need for controlled masculine

The French soon fall under the island's contaminating influence. Violence breaks out among the travelers almost immediately once they set foot on the island's coast; accusing the ship's crew of "maliciously" (I.iii.28) stripping them of their ill-gotten riches, Franville, La-mure and Morillat turn on Tibalt and Albert, and are prevented from shedding blood only by Aminta's supplications and the startling appearance of Sebastian and Nicusa. This peace is fleeting, for only moments later, the pile of gold and the greed it generates rekindles the violence and provokes a near riot between the pirates and the artificial noblemen, allowing Sebastian and Nicusa to flee the island in the Frenchmen's ship. Quickly following the mutiny, the now injured and remediless French realize the likeliness of their starvation on the "wretched island" (I.iii.122). Desperation, hunger and, importantly, the lawlessness of the island that seems to engender in these characters their criminal and barbarous behavior, incite Franville, La-Mure,

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appetites in New World ventures. She envisions the women of both plays as reproductive commodities necessary to the promulgation of a lasting colonial settlement. According to Jowitt's argument, *The Sea Voyage* reinscribes patriarchal gender relations while promoting the colonial fantasy of a native-less land to be developed by exploring colonials. Jowitt, "'Her flesh must serve you': Gender, Commerce and the New World in Fletcher's and Massinger's *The Sea Voyage* and Massinger's *The City Madam*." *Parergon: Bulletin of the Australian and New Zealand Association for Medieval and Early Modern Studies*. 18.3 (2001): 93-117. Print. Patricia Akhimie likewise considers the role of women in colonial narratives, asserting that the work of women in the colonies is often erased from the story of plantation. The travel drama and *The Sea Voyage* in particular refuses this erasure. *The Sea Voyage*, she maintains, "ends with wives restored to husbands, marriageable daughters matched, and Amazons turned to pious huswives skilled in cookery and physic. This surprising turn is in direct contrast to the common practice in first-hand accounts of travel and plantation, which most often present a homo-social world in which the role of women is either deemphasized or occluded altogether" (154). See Akhimie, "Travel, drama, and domesticity: colonial huswifery in John Fletcher and Philip Massinger's *The Sea Voyage*." *Studies in Travel Writing* 13.2 (2009) 154. Print. William W. E. Slights and Shelley Woloshyn also analyze the intersection of gender, colonialism and merchantilism in the text. Examining the play from the perspective of a body politic both contending with and profiting from the ambiguity of laws regarding piracy, they contend that plays like *The Sea Voyage* and *Pericles* imagine a "fantasy" in which "the emotional power and purity of virtuous women" brings order to a legally unstable world of sea-faring. Slights and Woloshyn "English Bess, English Pirates, English Drama: Feminism and Imperialism on the High Seas." *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 33.2 (2007): 269. Print.



Morillat and the Surgeon to cannibalism. Finding in Aminta the source of their current miseries, La-Mure suggests that her body provide them “restoring meats”: “We have examples,” he explains, “Thousand examples and allowed for excellent. / Women that have eat their children, Men their slaves; / Nay, their brothers. But these are nothing: / Husbands devoured their wives (they are their chattels,) / And of a schoolmaster that in a time of famine / Powdered up all his scholars” (III.i.94-100). As they descend upon Aminta, she signals their descent into irreligious animal behavior with little effect: “Hear me, ye barbarous men [ ... ] Are ye not Christians?” (III.i.136-40) Her appeals to their former selves as religious men in name, if not in action—there are indications of Franville, La-Mure and Morillat’s less than ethical business practices—falls on deaf ears in this ungoverned and state-less island space. Aminta is saved only by the arrival of Tibalt and the ship’s Master.

Tales of cannibalism in Ireland were also the stuff of English imperial legend, particularly in regard to ingesting a member of one’s family. Spenser’s *Irenæus*, in an attempt to draw genealogical links between the contemporary Irish and the Gaules, points to the shared practice of cannibalism as proof of ancient Irish barbarity. To lend a more damning aspect to this supposed Irish practice, *Irenæus* graphically describes a reported instance of Irish blood-drinking:

At the execution of a notable traytor at Limericke, called Murrough O-Brien, I saw an old woman, which was his foster mother, take up his head, whilst he was quartered, and sucked up all the blood that runne thereout, saying, that the earth was not worthy to drinke it, and therewith also steeped her face and breast, and tore her haire, crying out and shrieking most terribly.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>253</sup> Spenser, 66.

Spenser likely cites this event as evidence of Irish resistance to English rule and proof of Ireland's inherently savage customs and character, rather than an instance of cannibalism spurred by starvation as we witness in *The Sea Voyage*. However, as cited above, Spenser begins *A View* with the possibility that it is something in the soil and geographic make-up of the Irish island that accounts for Irish barbarous-ness and resistance to civility; though the Irish are themselves savage in Spenser's account and elsewhere, the land exerts a particular barbaric influence that strikes the Irish and strangers alike, prompting scenes of blood-letting and cannibalism like the one described here. Thus, like the unbridled violence that grips the Frenchmen upon setting foot on this infectious island, the desire to consume one of their own arises, perhaps, as a reaction to the island's contaminating influence.

Like contemporary political tracts that conjure up ideas of Irish barbarity through contrast with England's ordered and cultivated civilization, the savagery of *The Sea Voyage's* "barren" isle is put into boldface when Albert reaches the shore of the play's second island space. To "achieve / That hazard" of crossing the waterway separating the two islands is a dangerous feat, for "a river, / Deep, slow, and dangerous, fenced with high rocks" (I.iii.153-55) prevents safe passage. Until Albert's successful voyage, men and animals alike avoided the waterway "so dreadful, / Birds that with their pinions cleave the air / Dare not fly over it"; just "the sight of the black lake" (II.ii.3-10) with "torrent's cruelly interposed" (II.i.70) between the islands repels those seeking to cross between the territories. When Albert miraculously lands on this second island, it is radically unlike play's first island space and likewise unlike Irenæus's Ireland, where the very ground is itself somehow damned; rather, the second island of *The Sea Voyage* is described as divinely blest and thus ideal for human habitation. Upon Albert's first viewing of the second island from across the dangerous waterway separating the two land masses, he

pronounces this second isle as “questionless / The seat of fortunate men” (II.i.67-8), implying that even from a distance this space emanates a kind of blessedness. The island’s aura of divinity is again commented upon by Albert when he arrives on the second island and is almost immediately associated with the territory’s female population and governance. “What place is this?”, he questions, “Sure something more than human keeps residence here, / For I have passed the Stygian gulf and touch / Upon the blessed shore! Tis so: This is / The Elizian shade; these, happy spirits that here / Enjoy all pleasures” (II.ii.74-78).<sup>254</sup> The “happy spirits” to which Albert refers are two women of the all-female commonwealth that has built its state on the island. Charged by their queen “on pain of death” to deny “the sight and use of men” (II.ii.22), Crocale, Juletta and Hippolita stand at the ready to capture this rogue male entering their territory. Likening them to “nymphs of Dian’s train”, Albert appeals to their pity and sense of female camaraderie by drawing attention to his wounds and explaining that his dangerous voyage across the waterway to their nation was “for a virgin [that] comes as near yourselves / In all perfection, as what’s mortal may / Resemble things divine” (II.ii.83-93).

The inherent divinity of the island and the several references to the Dian-like rulers of this nation closely and immediately associates this island territory with Elizabeth’s England. Even the variation of spelling in this “Elizian”, rather than Elysian shade asks the reader to equate this island with England under the rule of its celebrated and recently deceased female monarch. This classical descriptor of the island reinforces the notion that we are placed in Britain when one recalls Harrison’s *Description of Britain*, where he cites Plutarch’s assessment of the Isles: “we must needs confess that the situation of our island (for benefit of the heavens) is

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<sup>254</sup> Parr revises the original spelling from the 1647 *Comedies and Tragedies* of Beaumont and Fletcher, changing “Elizian” to the more conventional “Elysian”. See Beaumont and Fletcher, *Comedies and Tragedies* (1647): 6 (of play in volume) EEBO. Web. 2 Jan. 2010.

nothing inferior to that of any country of the main [ ... ] And this Plutarch knew full well, who affirmeth a part of the Elysian Fields to be found in Britain and the isles that are situate about it in the ocean”.<sup>255</sup> Like John of Gaunt’s christening of “blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England” (II.i.50) and Camden’s claim of “the singular love and motherly affection of Nature to this island”, this other England radiates a kind of natural blessedness in stark contrast with its “wretched” island neighbor (I.iii.122).<sup>256</sup> Abundant in resources and game, the island’s natural plenty is matched by its careful governance and system of justice. Inherited from the race of Amazon women who once inhabited the isle, the female subjects, under the rule of Rosellia, practice a form of statecraft that wrests away “the sovereignty [of] / Proud and imperious men”. This power to rule, Rosellia explains to her subjects “we conferre on our selves” and like other commonwealths contending with unexpected challenges to constitutional matters of statecraft, questions of justice and law confront this nation of women, particularly with the arrival of the Frenchmen within their territory (II.ii.189-91). The stranded French are permitted to enter their shores only after Clarissa’s impassioned appeals to her mother for mercy (echoing Elizabethan political rhetoric) and Rosellia’s consequent “resolution”, allowing the men temporary reprieve within their borders and the commonwealth the possibility of growth and survival through procreation with the strangers (II.ii.230). Fleeing an “Irish” isle of savagery and contamination, and having braved a waterway described in terms not dissimilar to those applied to the Irish Sea, Albert has entered an “English” island of order and abundance.

Critics disagree on the location of Fletcher and Massinger’s islands. Parr in his introduction to the play contends that the geographic ambiguity of the play’s islands is central to

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<sup>255</sup> Harrison, *Description of Britain*. Ed. Georges Edelen. (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1968) 429. Print.  
<sup>256</sup> Camden, 3, Vol. 1.

the text's project of working through contemporary anxieties regarding colonial voyaging and plantation.

We seem to catch glimpses in *The Sea Voyage* of numerous places and situations that seventeenth-century readers would find in the voyage literature: the hot swampy coastline of Guinea with its Portuguese outcasts, the great river estuaries of Brazil, the island chains of Cape Verde and the Canaries; and see reflected in the motley castaways and their dialogue some of the tensions and ambitions running through the English colonial effort in North America. But the very abundance of analogy tends to suggest that, like *The Tempest*, the play refutes any attempt to tie it exclusively to a particular place or venture".<sup>257</sup>

According to Feerick, the geographic position of the paired isles is intentionally unclear; of Shakespeare's *Tempest* and *The Sea Voyage* he argues that "both plays are set on islands distant

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<sup>257</sup> See Parr, "Introduction". *Three Renaissance Travel Plays*. Ed. Anthony Parr. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1999. 22. Print. Michael Hattaway similarly associates the unnamed islands with the New World. In his essay " 'Seeing things' ", he considers the unreliability of colonial perspectives on the people and places of newly discovered territories. Like Claire Jowitt, cited above, Hattaway contends that the island lands should be considered "romantic space", territory supposedly "emptied" of natives and thus rife for colonial conquest and plantation (184). Though he argues that this representation of colonial spaces is made possible through the romance's generic qualities, Hattaway repeatedly places these islands in a New World context. Hattaway " 'Seeing things': Amazons and cannibals." *Travel and Drama in Shakespeare's Time*. Eds. Jean-Pierre Maquerlot and Michèle Willems. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996) 184. Print. Zachary Lesser also imagines the play's isles to be positioned in a New World theater, representing them as "recognizably 'Indian' islands" that are "probably but not certainly located off the South American coast" (883). Lesser asserts that Fletcher and Massinger are participating in early modern debates regarding emergent globalization, the valuation of English currency, and theories concerning the natural law of economics, which threatened to erode the monarch's power in determining the nation's fiscal and monetary policy. Lesser, "Tragical-Comical-Pastoral-Colonial: Economic Sovereignty, Globalization, and the Form of Tragicomedy." *ELH*. 74.4 (2007): 883. *Project Muse*. Web. 10 Dec. 2010. Gordon McMullan firmly locates the islands in the Americas, maintaining that "Fletcher places his island near Guyana". He bases this claim to geographical specificity on contemporaneous colonial reports that, McMullen contends, are recognizable in the work itself. McMullan, *The Politics of Unease in the Plays of John Fletcher*. (Amherst: The U of Massachusetts P, 1994) 244. Print.

from Europe, and likewise both plays avoid precisely identifying the geography of their setting". The reason for this ambiguity is that the plays are invested broadly in the "problematic of surviving not in any one specific place but rather in a place far from 'home'".<sup>258</sup> Though Feerick imagines these islands as non-European, his argument about *The Sea Voyage* calls up the very discourses surrounding English plantation in Ireland. "Taking up the conceptual problems posed by the colonist project and the questions that forging a sustainable settlement newly raised", he writes, "Fletcher and Massinger fix our attention on what it means not merely to sojourn for a time in a distant place [ ... ] but what it might mean to take root in an alien soil".<sup>259</sup> One could argue that the "foreign soil" foremost in the minds of the writers of English empire may be that of the New World; however, the anxieties regarding degeneracy and imperial governance in Ireland were ever-present during the Tudor and Stuart reign. Furthermore, as discussed above, it is the very soil of Ireland in the writings of Spenser and others that threatened the English constitution and sowed seeds of violent rebellion and lawlessness in the land's inhabitants. Although Ireland is, of course, in close geographic proximity and thus cannot be described as "far from home", the Irish isle in English imperial tracts is described as vastly ideologically distant to England (in terms of law, custom, dress, diet, land, etc). In fact, it is claims to Ireland's foreign-ness that both support and greatly complicate England's domestic imperial designs, as I argue throughout this chapter.

Despite the appearance of a functioning governmental state, the "English" island in Fletcher and Massinger's play is verging on political and social disintegration. The subjects of Rosellia's island are secretly resistant to the laws governing their commonwealth, as evidenced

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<sup>258</sup> Feerick, 29.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid, 31.

immediately in our first introduction to the island's inhabitants. "Being alone, / Allow me freedom but to speak my thoughts", urges Crocale to her fellow female subjects,

The strictness of our governess that forbids us  
On pain of death the sight and use of men  
Is more than tyranny! For herself, she's past  
Those youthful heats, and feels not the want  
Of that which young maids long for; and her daughter  
The fair Clarinda, though in few years  
Improved in height and large proportion,  
Came here so young  
That scarce rememb' ring that she had a father  
She never dreams of man. And should she see one,  
In my opinion, ' a would appear  
A strange beast to her (II.ii.19-32).

That the first utterances of the isle's subjects are, by definition of early modern English law, treasonous speaks to the political unease circulating within this island space. In contrast to Crocale's prediction, Clarinda's response to her first sight of man is likewise rebellious; moments after encountering Albert, Clarinda, who seems poised to become the island's next ruler, suddenly becomes her mother's most vocal critic and thus her most dangerous subject. Questioning the logic behind Crocale, Juletta and Hippolita's attack on Albert, which, Crocale reminds her, follows the letter of Rosellia's royal decree, Clarinda chides the women for following what she considers a wrongheaded law: "if [Rosellia] command unjust and cruel things," explains the daughter of the Queen, moved to mercy by the sight of Albert's

unconscious frame, “We are not to obey it” (II.ii.130-31). Upon Rosellia’s appearance on the scene, Clarinda moves her fellow subjects to outright rebellion, treasonously exclaiming to the governess, “Should all women use this obstinate / Abstinence you would force upon us, in / A few years the whole world would be peopled / Only with beasts” (II.ii.207-209). Stirred to reject the foremost decree of the island commonwealth, Hippolita declares to her queen that “we must and will have men!”. Crocale, also incited to sedition, threatens the overthrow of Dian’s court: “Ay, or we’ll shake off all obedience” (II.ii.210-211).

In these scenes of political upheaval, the over-neat distinction between the disordered “Irish” island and the lawful “English” island break down; though the self-titled “commonwealth” has put in place a system a governance, the ruler’s most foundational of decrees, and thus the rule of law itself, cannot withstand challenges from outside and within the state’s realm.<sup>260</sup> Likewise, one soon discovers that the subjects of the “English” island participate in a brand of violence that is little different from that witnessed in barbarous “Ireland”. Upon discovering the relationship between Albert and Aminta, Clarissa abandons the reasoning that persuaded her mother to amend the island’s laws and quickly descends into the kind of violence that, until this point, disassociated the play’s “English” space from its “Irish” counterpart. As punishment for disabusing Clarissa of the notion that Aminta and Albert are siblings, the governess’s daughter demands that the Frenchmen be starved: “How am I fool’d! / Away with ’em, Juletta, and feed ’em-- / But hark ye, with such food as they have given me. / New misery! [ ... ] Make ’em more wretched. / O I could burst! Curse and kill now, / Kill

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<sup>260</sup> Lesser also recognizes the surprising similarity between these seemingly differentiated islands, though he comes to this conclusion through an examination of their failed economic practices, rather than the island’s shared governmental weaknesses. He contends that “the ‘pleasant’ and the ‘barraine’ islands are [ ... ] more alike than first appeared: they suffer from a lack of natural commerce, in both the sexual and economic meanings of that word”. See Lesser, 899.



anything I meet” (IV.iii.134-139). Albert and Aminta are also subjected to Clarissa’s rage; warning the strangers to now “expect [her] utmost anger”, she orders Albert’s starvation. The corporeal punishment she designs for Aminta smacks of kind of barbarity and vengefulness usually associated with a lawless wilderness: “Tie that false witch / Unto that tree. There let the savage beasts / Gnaw off her sweetness, and snakes embrace her beauties. Tie her, and watch that none relieve her” (IV.iv.15-19). Clarissa’s unbridled anger, like the violence witnessed on the other isle, is not based upon an appeal to law or to the kind of justice she herself advocated when she first encountered Albert, thus rendering superficial the language and appearance of statehood that formerly characterized the island.

Further complicating and thus refusing the politicized abstractions of the British Isles that circulated in early modern imperial rhetoric is the play’s overt condemnation of colonialism and the greed it engenders. With the arrival of Raymond, Aminta’s brother, the play’s ideological landscape is recast; where the play’s violence was earlier explained as owing to the characters’ desperation or desire for revenge, in the final acts of *The Sea Voyage*, the play’s violent action is explicitly linked to the history of imperial ventures that led to the characters’ exile to this archipelagic space. Following the reunion of Aminta and her brother and moved by “a soft religious tenderness”, Raymond provides this explanation for the “long difference” between himself and Albert:

Though we have many faults to answer for  
Upon our own account, our father’s crimes  
Are in us punished. O Albert, the course  
They took to leave us rich was not honest,  
Nor can that friendship last which virtue joins not,

When first they forced the industrious Portugals  
From their plantations in the happy islands  
.....  
And did omit no tyranny which men  
Inured to spoil and mischief could inflict  
On the grieved sufferers. When by lawless rapine  
They reaped the harvest which their labours sowed,  
And not content to force 'em from their dwelling  
But laid for 'em at sea, to ravish from 'em  
The last remainder of their wealth--then, then,  
After a long pursuit, each doubting other  
As guilty of the Portugals' escape,  
They did begin to quarrel like ill men  
(Forgive me, piety, that I call 'em so)  
No longer love or correspondence holds  
Then it is cemented with prey or profit.  
Then did they turn those swords they oft had bloodied  
With innocent gore upon their wretched selves,  
And paid the forfeit of their cruelty  
Shown to Sebastian and his colony  
By being fatal enemies to each other.  
Thence grew Aminta's rape, and my desire  
To be revenged (V.ii.78-109).

I quote this passage at length because such a detailed and damning narrative historicizes the play's violence and fundamentally alters the narrative undergirding *The Sea Voyage*, thus recasting the play as colonial critique and forcing a rereading of the play's action. Raymond's narrative of their "father's crimes" reveals that the contaminating influence that circulates in the play and prompts the work's violence, particular on the "Irish" isle, is not a matter of an cursed geographic space, but is instead the result of a reprehensible history of colonial violence that continues to infect the play's characters. The lawless and savage behavior of the French in the first half of the play stems not from their forced inhabitation on the "Irish" island, but from a deeper history of unlawful practices. It is the thrice-repeated attempt to possess the Portuguese's ill-gotten colonial gold—not some mysterious effect of the "wretched isle" that spurs the characters' irreligious and violent acts. The Portuguese wealth, which was presumably gained through their colonial "labours" on the "plantations in the happy islands" was seized by the French, leading to their self-slaughter as they turned on each other for possession of this colonial fortune. The remainder of the Portugal's colonial wealth, which they carried with them in flight from the French to the play's first island, leads to the violent death of Sebastian's men once they reached the island's shores. "This gold was the overthrow of my happiness", he explains. "I had command too, when I landed here, / And led young, high and noble spirits under me. / This cursèd gold enticing 'em, they set / Upon their captain" (I.iii.175-79). According to Sebastian's account, the greed and violence undergirding the Portugal's unlawful mutiny then inspired his men to turn their once "civil swords" against each other, leading to the mass slaughter of these formerly "noble spirits". Finally, disregarding Sebastian's warning that his men destroyed "their lives by heaps" to possess these colonial remnants, the supposed gentlemen traveling aboard

Albert's ship demand this gold as recompense for the goods lost on their voyage, leading to the play's first instance of violent infighting (I.iii.182-86).

Ultimately, the gold, which in *The Sea Voyage* comes to symbolize colonial greed and the violence that comes of imperial endeavors, is abandoned. The recantation of imperial violence and the rhetoric that undergirds colonial characterizations invites social and political order back into the play in the form of the characters' "lawful wishes" that according to Sebastian can now be granted under this new state of reconciliation and peace (V.iv.110).<sup>261</sup> With the disavowal of colonial discourse, the islands of *The Sea Voyage* are thus emptied of their ideological charge, like Speed's Ireland and England as simple geographic entities with the embellishments, ethnographic depictions and ideologically-laden symbols erased from the cartographic landscape. As revealed at the play's conclusion, it is the overwriting of geographic spaces with the empty language of imperial discourse—like the early modern colonial abstractions of savage Ireland

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<sup>261</sup> Surprisingly, Feerick contends that Albert's reconstitution in a "nondegenerate form" (owing to his investment in temperance and the nurturing of Aminta) "marks him as a man worthy of his plantation, worthy, that is, of the plantation that the play's end celebrates as '[home]' (5.4.112)". Feerick, 46. Though this characterization of Albert supports Feerick's argument regarding the work's intervention in debates about colonial degeneracy, his reading of the play's conclusion strangely neglects the fact that the former planters and accidental visitors to the island vacate the island spaces at the play's end. As I argue above, neither island becomes "home" for the characters; the "plantations" of *The Sea Voyage* are abruptly abandoned, hence pointing to the emptiness of the types of imperial rhetoric that painted the "Irish" isle as barbaric and the English as "civil". See Feerick, cited above. Jowitt, on the other hand, contends that *The Sea Voyage* is "deeply uncertain about colonial futures". Pointing specifically to the play's ambiguous end, she argues that "the unsettled nature of the text's conclusion is [ ... ] shown by the fact that the final lines are not concerned with the future of the islands on which these colonists have been shipwrecked [ ... ] It becomes clear that there is, in fact, no future for this embryonic Portuguese and French colony", Jowitt, 115. Parr points to the work's overall "dispiriting view of colonial enterprise", arguing that "the play creates a vision of wandering and displacement, and [the play's] Europeans are seen as descendants of Cain, preying on each other in alien lands and driven to lawlessness and cruelty by the primitive conditions imposed on them" Parr, 25. As I maintain above, the abandonment of these islands speaks not only to the failure of this particular colony to survive, but to the insubstantial and therefore destructive ideological discourses undergirding all colonial geographic representations. See Jowitt, cited above.

and ordered England—that gave the island landscapes their ideological charge, not the land itself or the people who occupy it. Like Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline*, Fletcher and Massinger’s *Sea Voyage* disallows the use of colonial vocabularies as the only means to read the national and imperial spaces of early modern Britain.

### Conclusion

John Speed’s translations of nature into nation, of archipelago into empire call attention to the very manufactured-ness of these cartographic and political constructions. Seeking to offer his king an official portrait of a unified Great Britain united through a shared history, ethnicity and culture, Speed instead exposed the cartographic manipulations and, importantly, the political machinations undergirding the state’s vision of England’s Britain. In Speed’s *Theatre*, England is both an island and the seat of an archipelagic empire; his Irish men and women are both members of the British family and savage outlanders; his King both a powerful monarch and a mere Scottish landowner. Overwhelmed by illustrations, borders and ornaments—the necessary symbols of his nationalist lexicon—the land speaks in the discordant tongues of the English state, whose governmental crises unintentionally interrupt Speed’s visual narrative. Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline* and Fletcher and Massinger’s *Sea Voyage* co-opt the materials of Speed’s nationalist myth-making and in the process dismantle both the genealogical and geographic models of empire. By submitting Speed’s materials to literary critique, *Cymbeline* and *The Sea Voyage* expose the theatrics behind official nationalist rhetoric.




Figure 5: "Detail from Saxton's Anglia." *Atlas of the Counties of England and Wales*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.




Figure 6: Saxton, Christopher. "Anglia." *Atlas of the Countries of England and Wales*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.




Figure 7: Speed, John. "The Kingdome of Great Britaine and Ireland." *The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.






Figure 8: Speed, John. "The Kingdome of England." *The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.





Figure 9: Speed, John. "The Kingdome of Irland." *The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.



TO  
THE MOST HIGH  
AND MOST POTENT  
MONARCH,

JAMES,

OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE,  
AND IRELAND KING; THE MOST  
CONSTANT AND MOST LEARNED  
DEFENDER OF THE FAITH;  
INLARGER AND VNITER OF  
THE BRITISH EMPIRE; RESTORER  
OF THE BRITISH NAME; ESTABLISHER  
OF PERPETVALL PEACE, IN  
CHVRCH, AND COMMONWEALTH;  
PRESIDENT OF ALL PRINCIPALLY  
VERTUES AND NOBLE ARTS;

JOHN SPEED,  
HIS MAIESTIES MOST  
lowly and most loyall Subject  
and Seruant, consecrateth these his labours, though  
vnworthy the aspect of so high an  
*Imperiall Maiestie.*

Figure 10: Speed, John. "Dedication." *Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.




Figure 11: Speed, John. "The Kingdome of Scotland." *The Theatre of the Empire of Great Britaine*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.



Figure 12: "Male Pict." *A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.





Figure 13: Harriot, Thomas. "Female Pict." *A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.



themselves voluntarily depave their Bodies of this Protection against the Aires offence, to procure pity of others. And what speake we of these? seeing even children for Custom, and Women for pride, will suffer their Breasts, and most tender parts of their Body, to be exposed not only to offence of weather, but of modesty also? yea generally, the *haukes*, and *fiers*, being of most subtil fence, yet by custome are enabled now to endure that, which by the like custome the old *Brittaines* endured in their whole Bodies; whereby *Plutarch* thinks they *of fully lived so long even to the top of their face, the extreme could keeping in and augmenting their internal heat.*

(6) As ability to endure colde, so *ignorance* (in many) means to prevent it, may become another occasion of these *Brittaines* nakednes. The *Romans* (it seems) in their old *Confusions*, and after, had not the skill nor use of *Hats*, *Breeches*, &c. That *Brittaines* abounded with *Wool* and other materials for clothing, is past all doubt, for which cause, by one in a *Thousand* it is named *Pictish* in *Scythians*, which by another is thus explicated, that therein was an *insigne* multitude of same castell both with *Pictish* full of *Wool*, and loaded with *Wool* to the ground. So then *Wool* was not wanting, but *Will* or *Skill* the later in most likelihood-for, as *Strabo* saith, that though those *Strait* *Pictish* yielded great store of *Wool* yet some of them had not skill to make thereof, and having to rich grounds, yet had not the art of *Wool*, so to their sheep might have such heavy fleeces, yet some of their Owners so cunning to keepe themselves warme therewith. Some of them, I say, for other will, as *Pliny* touching *Tibet*, gives light to *Strabo*, windeing, that others of them were so good *Husbands* as to manure their grounds with *Manure*, as likewise doth *Disfortes*, saying they had skill to make drinke of *Barley*: so probable is it, that those other who were by *Caesar* and *Tacitus* said to be so like the *Picts* in conditions, had also some part of their Art in tusing the Burthen of their *Sittees* backs to cover their owne.

(7) The last reason of such their going naked sometimes, was out of an opinion that no clothing so adorned them, as their painting and damasking of their Bodies, for which cause (saith *Herodian*) they would not cover themselves, lest their gay painting should not be seene: but *Pomponius Mela* makes doubt, whether their thus painting themselves were for ornament or for some other use, which doubt *Caesar* seems to resolve, as if the men did it because it made them look more terrible in warre.

(8) And thus we are now orderly fallen on the second of those three notes appropriated by *Caesar* to our *Brittaines*, which is their painting and staining of their Bodies, which appears by *Caesar* to have become more vntersitally yet then going naked, for all the *Brittaines* (saith he) *die their bodies with painting*. As Authors differ in the reason of this their painting, (as we shewed) so in the name, perchance also in the substance of that wherewith they stained themselves, and somewhat also in the colour it selfe. The substance *Caesar* calls *luteum*, which yet in vulgar acceptation is thought to be some yellow substance, as *Pliny* calculate out, the yule of the *Figge*; *Pliny* himselfe faith the *Francia* call it *glaphum*, describing it to be an herbe like *Plantagaine*, which *Orisipus* (as learned *Camden* sheweth) doth terme *Stramon*, in which sense *Mela* is understood to say that they were stained *Vitruvius* (and not *Picta*) it being generally taken to be *stramon* from those ancient times hitherto used for the furreth flame. But for the colour which is made, *Caesar* and the rest agree, it was *Ceruleus*, *bleu* or *azur*, which colour the *Cambr*-*Brittaines* doe yet call *glace*, whence our *glasse* for windowes (called also *vitruv*) seemeth by reason of the colour, to have taken name. Onely *Pliny* leaueh some scruple, in saying, that the naked painted women imitated the *Aethiopian* colour, which must be understood either *comparatively*, in respect of People white and unpainted, or because *bleu* a faire of *bluish* the appearance of *bleu*.

(9) That the *Brittaines* tooke their Name from this

Pictish

Herodian

Mela

Caesar

The second

note of the

Brittaines

painting

Caesar

Caesar

Pliny

Camden

Pliny

Caesar

Pliny

Caesar

Pliny

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this painting, hath beene already shewed out of *Plutarch*, who writes, that they had that name from a word of their owne language, wherein *breith* significeth as much as painted or stained; but whether those other Inhabitants of the more Northerne parts of this Island, called also *Picti* or painted, had their name vpon the same ground, & whether they were some branch of the *British* stocke, or of some transmarine Colony, it is a question not yet decided. *Pomponius Mela*, and some other, deriue them from *Germanus*, some from the *Picti* in *France*; but *Beda*, from *Scythia*, whence (saith he) they are reported to haue come into Ireland in a few long boats, and finding no fearing there, to haue entered into *Britaine*. Though *Beda* his authority be venerable, yet the learned find reasons to induce them rather to beleue, that they were the remanents of those ancient *Brittaines* which either inhabited the North-part of this Land, before the *Romans* entrance, or which (vpon their Conquest) fled thither to avoid the *Romish* yoke, where the difficulties of the aire & soile protected them from the *Romans* ambition and insatiation. Whereto *Tacitus* well accometh, saying, that *Agrippa* droue the *Romans* Enemie into those parts, as it were into another Land. And it is thought incredible, that those *Enemies* of the *Romans*, who sent forth against *Agrippa* an Army of thirty thousand strong, & who so vexed *Seneca*, that in one Expedition he lost twenty thousand of his *Romans*, & their *Aiders* were so vnterly extinct, as that none of them remained; but that rather they wonderfully multiplied, being that rather they wonderfully multiplied, and overran the *Romane* *France*, and to whom (not vntil) some other, such as *Beda* mentioneth, did afterward ioyne themselves.

(10) If we would adde reason vnto *Authorities*, to proue that these *Picti* were no other then that multiplied offspring of those *Brittaines*, we could produce their Language, their manners, their kind of Government (all bearing *British* resemblance) to con-

firm the same. But what neede? since the selfe-manner of painting is an vndoubted marke in the Children representing of what Parents they were borne. That they were painted, *Caesarian* sheweth, calling them, the *Picti*, so truly named, which sheweth well enough, that the *Picti* & *Briti* had their name from their bodies, painted with the iute of an herbe growing amongst them. When therefore the *Romans* excluded them from their other *Provinciall* *Brittaines*, this name (*Picti*) for distinction sake was in use amongst them; before which times, yea and long after, they were knowne to *writers* by no other name than *Brittaines*, and the *Romane* Emperors, *Commodus*, *Seuerus*, *Maximus*, *Geta*, & vpon the Conquests of them, iustified themselves *Britannic*, *British* (not *Pictish*) Conquerors. But after the *Romane* tongue had prevailed with the *Romans* speech, the *Brittaines* themselves vied to name any thing painted by the name of *Picti*, as may be gathered out of *Agrippa*, who saith, that the *Brittaines* called certaine *Salopes*, *Picti*, because their *saltes*, *tablets*, and *Mariners* apparel, were coloured *bleu*, & very colour, wherewith these *British* *Picti* (as I haue where they are truly called) vied to stain themselves. When afterward the *Picti* had confederated themselves with these against the *Romans*, they all began by degrees to be more ciuillized: the more southerly of them being by *Ninias* the *Britaine* conquered vnto *Christ*, about the yeere of *Grace* 450. those other more Northerly, by *Columbanus* Anno 565, by which time, it is likely, that *Civilitie* increasing, their painting and other like ruder Customs were well nigh forgotten, both amongst them, and also amongst those other *Brittaines* vnder the *Romane* Government, in which regard we haue besides those prefixed *Leones*, and Patterns of their first and most fauoured times, here added also their *Habits*, when they began to put on with conditions, a little better clothing all.

(11) Neither may we think that formerly they retained such Apparel, onely to shew this staining and colouring

Caesarian

Why the Picti

were so called

Agrippa

The second

note of the

Brittaines

painting

Caesar

Pliny

Caesar

Pliny

Caesar

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Figure 14: Speed, John. "Speed's 'ancient' and 'more ciuill' Brittaines." *The History of Great Britaine vnder the Conquests of ye Romans, Saxons, Danes and Normans*. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. 17 July 2012. Web. Images published with the permission of ProQuest. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission.

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Chapter three: 'In th' Almighties place': State Building and the Division of Absolute Authority in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*

“The prince is duty bound toward the estates or the people only to the extent of fulfilling his promise in the interest of the people; he is not so bound under conditions of urgent necessity [ ... ] This is what is truly impressive in his definition of sovereignty; by considering sovereignty to be indivisible, he finally settled the question of power in the state”.<sup>262</sup>

In his 1922 work *Political Theology*, Carl Schmitt turned to 16<sup>th</sup> century political philosopher Jean Bodin to articulate his theory of sovereignty. Sovereignty, according to Schmitt, is the ability of a singular leader to suspend the laws governing his or her state in order to protect and preserve that state. The “exception” or instance in which law is subject to the will of the sovereign leader is of utmost importance to Schmitt’s theory because for Schmitt “it is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty”.<sup>263</sup> Bodin offered Schmitt a solution to the intractable problem of locating and delineating the authority of a nation’s leader, whose political power is granted by the citizenry yet is defined by the sovereign’s ability to supersede the rights and privileges of this citizenry. By declaring sovereignty indivisible, Bodin extracts political authority from the body politic, consolidates this authority into an abstract form and places it undivided into the hands of the sovereign. For Schmitt, Bodin’s rhetorical maneuver allows the sovereign to act in the name of his people while abolishing the right of the populace to contest the sovereign decision.

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<sup>262</sup> Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005) 8. Print.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid, 6.



The notion of indivisible, absolute power was of potent political currency in the early modern period, due in part to Bodin's well-circulated theories of monarchical governance. However, to say that Bodin "finally settled the question of power in the state" is an untenable assertion, for early modern theorists like Bodin were grappling with the very problems of political authority that underwrite Schmitt's treatise. Attempts by 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> century political philosophers to locate supreme authority solely in the person of the monarch were thwarted by the actual practice of Elizabethan governance, in which the monarch's counselors and the Parliament clearly intervened in the process of policy making, thus granting them a measure of authority. Theories of republicanism from the continent infiltrated Elizabeth's court, putting great pressure upon already fragile notions of the queen's authoritarian rule. Likewise, the spectre of feudalism continued to assert itself in the Elizabethan localities; land-owning noblemen ruled over their own spheres of localized governance. Yet the political ideology of the Elizabethan court imagined a prince whose power over the nation's subjects was incontrovertible, absolute and undivided. The indivisible power of the monarch was made manifest in the singular body of the prince, who functioned on earth as God's divine representative. The singularity of this deistic persona reflected the singular unity of the English nation bound together under the sovereign's otherworldly authority and protection.

The disparities between early modern politics on the ground and the ideological apparatus that sustained the conceptualization of Tudor absolutism crystallized with the creation of the Elizabethan state. State-formation necessitated the division and distribution of sovereign authority to crown's agents. Those imbued by the crown with political authority—justices of the peace, wardens, constables, itinerant judges, etc.—were fundamental in the distribution of justice and the mechanisms of social order in the localities. Acting in the crown's name, state agents

were the representative bodies of the monarch, proclaiming the sovereign's prerogative and putting her policies into action. Yet, functioning at a physical and ideological distance from the monarchical centers of power, the early modern state took on a power of its own, separate from the monarch, the supposed fount of sovereign authority. The geographic remove of the monarch from her subjects made ambiguous an identifiable source of political power; agents of the state were clearly servants of the crown, but without direct experience of the monarch's might and control over her realm, her agents instead came to embody governmental authority. Though the monarch's image was consistently circulated in symbolic forms, such as coins, paintings and literary representations, the sovereign's spectral presence sharply contrasted with the lived experience of the forms of political authority practiced by the state in the localities. With the division and diffusion of sovereign authority, the propagandistic image of a unified England reflected in the singular person the monarch was unsettled. A conglomeration of localized governments was antithetical to the crown's attempt at centralization; rather than serve as the limbs of a consolidated body politic under the aegis of the crown, the creation of the state in this period instead amplified the regionalism that undermined official claims to a homogenous political unit bodied forth by the sovereign.

The decentering of sovereign authority that inadvertently accompanied the process of state building in Elizabeth's England is at the heart of Spenser's epic poem *The Faerie Queene*. In Spenser's work, political power is radically dispersed across a discontinuous landscape. As one travels from forest to seashore, from island to desert, from England to Belgium to France to Ireland and back to Faerie Land, one encounters both refracted semblances of the virgin queen and her guardians of realm, the politically empowered members of a nascent Elizabethan state. The Knights of Maidenhead, though ostensibly deployed as pedagogical examples "to fashion a

gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline”, also bear a considerable measure of authority, correcting injustices and bringing order to heterogeneous territories at a distance from the imperial center.<sup>264</sup> In this sense, the state as embodied in the knights “intervenes everywhere” in Spenser’s political landscape, but at a cost to the divine singularity of the sovereign.<sup>265</sup> The splintering of Elizabeth into Medina, Alma, Belphebe, Britomart, Mercilla and others and the perpetually-deferred introduction of the Faerie Queene into the poem produces a sense of the disintegration of the sovereign. The monarch is also everywhere in traces, but nowhere in the poem is she “but one body naturally considered, though by His permission a body politic to govern”, in Elizabeth’s words.<sup>266</sup> The effect of this fragmentation of the monarch is a severing of divine sovereign power from the person of queen and the dispersal of this authority to a disunited body of knights who act on behalf of one or more of her dismembered personas. I intend to examine Spenser’s work within the context of the anxieties that inevitably arise when the ideological essence of the sovereign is instrumentalized and apportioned to the agents of an emergent state apparatus and to consider more broadly the problem of power in a monarchical state.

#### Tudor Authoritarianism

Ostensibly, the early modern state served as the crown’s tool of centralization and the consolidation of authority across the monarch’s realms. Emanating from the monarchical center,

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<sup>264</sup> Spenser, Edmund. “Letter to Raleigh.” *The Faerie Queene* Ed. A.C. Hamilton. 2<sup>nd</sup> rev. edition (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007) 715. Print. All citations from *The Faerie Queene* are from this edition.

<sup>265</sup> Schmitt, 36.

<sup>266</sup> Elizabeth I, “Queen Elizabeth’s first speech, Hatfield, November 20, 1558,” *Elizabeth I: Collected Works* Eds. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000) 52. Print.

the royal writ would declare itself and enforce social and political order in even the furthest reaches of the crown's kingdoms, including England's colonial territories. State agents would act as instruments of the crown, carrying the monarch's authoritative might into the localities and thus enveloping the crown's disparate communities into a single political body known as the nation. For the nation was also included among the crown's tools of centralization and consolidation; acting in concert, the official nation and the monarchical state fixed the crown's subjects in a shared identity and posture of obedience. Allegiant to the monarchical will, as expressed by the laws, proclamations, and social apparatuses introduced into the community by state agents, and loyal to the crown's nation made possible in part by a state infrastructure that brought uniformity to the monarch's disconnected territories, the subjects of the Elizabethan and Stuart regimes were bound into an ideological and political apparatus that imagined them as unified and singular.

However, the construction of the Elizabethan state often had the opposite effect than the official ideology that undergirded it. Rather than acting as a political engine that broadcast and put into action the monarch's will, the state instead brought to center stage debates regarding the nature of sovereign authority. Disputes over the exact character of English monarchy and governance had been a feature of political discourse since Henry VIII's break with Rome and the consequent declaration of his authority as *rex imperator*. Despite the absolutist strains of Henry's proclamation—strains that resounded in the official language of his daughter Elizabeth—the actual practice of early modern governance in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries made apparent that political authority was not centered in monarch alone. The Privy Council and the Parliament, governmental constellations that circled the monarch and aided her in matters of policy were endowed with a significant measure of political power, notwithstanding official rhetoric

regarding these political bodies as simply helpmeets to the king or queen whose council could either be taken up or disregarded. The quasi-representative nature of parliament likewise put pressure upon notions of the sovereign's absolutist rule and the social and political might of local land-owning magnates loudly disputed authoritarian claims by the crown. English and Continental political theorists were meanwhile debating the most effective form of rule and the place of the monarch within these governmental schemas; discursive contests concerning the merits of absolutism, mixed or constitutional monarchy and republicanism played out on both sides of the channel and infiltrated the Tudor court. These disputations about the true nature of English government challenged the ideological belief-structures that sustained monarchical rule. Foundational concepts like the divine right of kings and the indivisible authority of the sovereign were put to the test as competing forms of governance, some already in practice, entered the realm of political discourse.

Early modern state building only exacerbated the tensions between official ideology and the praxis of Elizabethan governance. Delivering and enforcing the royal writ in the localities necessitated the dispensation of the sovereign's authority to agents of state, as explained above. Like the debates regarding absolutist rule, in which the political power wielded by the Privy Council, Parliament and local officials belied crown claims to authoritarianism, the "lending" of crown authority to state agents amounted to a repudiation of claims to indivisible monarchical authority. The state as an instrument of monarchical centralization contained within it the seeds of troublesome political autonomy. By placing the crown's sovereignty in the hands of authorities performing their governmental duties at a distance from the crown, the monarch inadvertently empowered these local officials with the capacity to defy the sovereign and institute localized forms of government that ran contrary to royal writ. As a result, the crown's

attempts at centralization and consolidation actually had a *decentering* effect; by dividing and diffusing national sovereignty, early modern state building made unclear the fount and channels of political power and partially disengaged political power from the throne. The state became the object of anxious crown regulation and control, rather than an instrument trumpeting the monarch's prerogative and absolute reign over his or her kingdoms. The nation—the ideological mechanism that supported this monarchical tool of social and political order—likewise took on a refracted character. By emphasizing and lending further authority to localized sites of power, the state acted not as a unifying force that lent credence to nationalist ideologies but as an apparatus that pointed up the severed and disconnected character of the British territories.

Debates regarding the extent of monarchical authority uneasily intersected with the foundation of the state. The erection of a state infrastructure to administer the realm necessarily implied that the monarch's mystical persona that commanded the allegiance of her subjects was, in truth, an inadequate force to ensure the people's subjection to the *regnum* and her policies of social control. As discussed above, the monarch was never sole source of political authority; the local magnates, Parliament, Privy Council and other political bodies were ever-present in the government of the realm. However, the state constituted a different kind of governmental apparatus. Functioning at a distance from the monarch and designed to execute the royal will through its various mechanisms, state formation in the early modern period institutionalized political authority, giving the state a kind of agency that was not always clearly tethered to the monarch. The demand for this semi-autonomous apparatus to accomplish social order ran contrary to official ideologies that imagined the divine office of the monarch as the only fount of political rule.

John Guy neatly summarizes the official line on the person of the monarch, particularly after Henry VIII's Act of Appeals and Supremacy, which granted the English monarch a monopoly of secular and spiritual authority:

The most spectacular assets of the monarchy were the person and image of the ruler [ ... ] The king was at the centre of the polity. Power was concentrated around him [ ... ] Furthermore, the king's power was 'whole' and 'entire'. (The term 'sovereignty' is found by the 1530s, and was used colloquially by the 1560s). [ ... ] It was universally held that monarchy was instituted by God. The king ruled 'by the grace of God', but did so for the benefit of the community. Justice, in its broadest sense, was the purpose of his government. The king governed for the common good, providing the single will necessary for the formulation of common policy. His duties were threefold: to keep the peace and defend the realm; to maintain the law and administer justice impartially; and to uphold the Church, especially against heresy [ ... ] The king's 'absolute' prerogative was his emergency power.<sup>267</sup>

As God's earthly representative, authority emanated from the royal person, staying intimately tied in perfect, undivided form to the monarchical body. The singularity of this divine personage ensured that peace, justice and the safety of the realm could be made possible through the sovereign's "single will".

As Guy explains, the above official rhetoric regarding kingship was especially prevalent after Henry VIII's break with Rome. By granting himself spiritual as well as secular supremacy, "Henry VIII had reinvented the theocratic model of kingship. His *imperium* was ordained by

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<sup>267</sup> Guy, "Tudor monarchy and its critiques: From the Wars of the Roses to the death of Henry VIII," *The Tudor Monarchy* Ed. John Guy (London: Arnold, 1997) 78-9. Print.

God and embraced both ‘temporal’ and ‘spiritual’ government. The kings of England were invested with an imperial’ sovereignty, part of which had been ‘lent’ to the priesthood by previous English monarchs”.<sup>268</sup> Deploying, in no uncertain terms, the language of absolutist rule, Henry declared that his subjects “be bounden and owe to bear next to God a natural and humble obedience; [the king] being also institute and furnished by the goodness and sufferance of Almighty God with plenary, whole and entire power, preeminence, authority, prerogative and jurisdiction”.<sup>269</sup> God’s consummate authority is transferred in inviolate form to England’s supreme ruler.

Henry’s claim to supreme, indivisible authority had the support of English and Continental political theorists. Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria (ca 1485-1546), for instance, was careful to delineate sovereign power (*potestas*) from the authority of the commonwealth (*auctoritas*) in order to locate the source of sovereignty in God alone, and by proxy, his earthly representative.

*Royal power is not from the commonwealth, but from God himself[ ... ]* The power of the sovereign clearly comes immediately from God himself, even though kings are created by the commonwealth. That is to say, the commonwealth does not transfer to the sovereign its power (*potestas*), but simply its own authority (*auctoritas*); there is no question of two separate powers, one belonging to the sovereign and the other to the community.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> Ibid, 83.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid, 83.

<sup>270</sup> Vitoria, “On Civil Power,” *Political Writings* Eds. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991) 16. Print.



By evacuating sovereign authority from commonwealth, thus creating a divine monarchical sphere separate from the populace, Vitoria ensures that political power resides only in the separate and untouchable realm of absolute rule. French theorist Jean Bodin (1529/30-1596) likewise maintains that “he is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after God, that is greater than himself”.<sup>271</sup> Like Vitoria, Bodin is invested in disassociating political power from the commonwealth. When crowning a “sovereign monarch”, “the people [have] here dispossessed and stripped itself of its sovereign power in order to put him in possession of it and to vest it in him. It has transferred all of its power, authority, prerogatives, and sovereign rights to him and [placed them] in him”.<sup>272</sup> Again, sovereignty is conceived as “whole”, undivided and personified in the deistic body of the monarch.

Across the channel, Sir Thomas Elyot in his *Boke Named the Governour* (1531) likens the sovereign’s rule of the nation to that of the “heven and erthe [ ... ] governed by one god, by one perpetuall ordre, by one providence”, thus emphasizing the singularity of the monarch and his inherently divine character.<sup>273</sup> Himself a servant of the crown and counselor to Henry VIII, Elyot moved within the gambit of royal power and was therefore witness to his monarch’s ascent from secular to supreme ruler. Elizabethan historian William Camden in his *Britannia* (1586) echoes the sentiments of Bodin and Vitoria, asserting that the king “hath soveraigne power and absolute command” over his people and that the monarch need not “acknowledgeth any

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<sup>271</sup> Bodin, *On Sovereignty* Ed. Julian Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge: UP, 1992) 4. Print.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid, 6-7.

<sup>273</sup> Elyot, *The Boke Named the Governour* Ed. Henry Herbert Stephen Croft. 1531. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967) 11-2. Print.

superiour but God alone”.<sup>274</sup> Elizabeth’s language of absolutism was, of course, tempered by the gender politics that were so integral to her monarchical representation. As David Dean explains,

Elizabeth was both a woman and a monarch. In a society which often described political authority through the image of the body, with the monarch as its head and the lowest orders, peasants and artificers, as the feet, this fact was not unproblematic. At the heart of government was the royal household and the bedrock of Elizabethan society was the household. However, while authority in the household was male, in the royal household between 1558-1603 it was female and Elizabeth’s councilors certainly struggled intellectually and practically with the queen’s often-exercised right to refuse their council.<sup>275</sup>

Aside from ignoring the advice of her male counselors, Elizabeth’s other strategies for walking the delicate line between femininity and authoritarianism included stacking her Privy Council with commoners, thus pushing land-owning nobles to the outskirts of government.<sup>276</sup> Yet she played to her feminine characteristics through a calculated rhetoric that repeatedly positioned the female ruler as defender and protector of the nation’s peace, justice and security. As Dean describes, Elizabeth drew upon a storehouse of “scriptural and classical references” to shore up her mystical persona, in which she was variously depicted as “the English Deborah, as Astraea, Minerva and Diana”. Through these positively-gendered monarchical representations, Elizabeth built an image that differentiated her from the agents and counselors acting in her behalf; “The ship of state might endure perilous seas,” Dean states of this official vision of the female

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<sup>274</sup> Camden, *Britannia* Ed. Robert Mayhew (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003) 163. Print.

<sup>275</sup> Dean, “Elizabethan Government and Politics.” *A Companion to Tudor Britain* Ed. Robert Tittler (Malden: Blackwell, 2004) 57. Print.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid*, 47.

monarch, “but God’s faith in his Elizabeth, the leader of the English nation, was a message repeated time and time again in music, word and image”.<sup>277</sup>

Despite her careful construction and maneuvering of this female persona, it is important to decipher between political theatrics and Elizabeth’s inherited authoritarian take on monarchical sovereignty. While drawing upon the powerful rhetoric of maternity by casting herself as mother of the nation to Parliament, perhaps to appease her male advisors, Elizabeth took the practical step of curtailing the power of this political body by calling only 13 parliamentary sessions over her long reign, occasionally taking this meeting of her lords as an opportunity to remind them of their severely delimited power.<sup>278</sup> In response to her Parliament’s strenuous and sometimes overzealous council that the Queen find a husband and thus guarantee a successor, the monarch admonishes her counselors: “When I call to mind how far from dutiful care, yea, rather how nigh a traitorous trick this tumbling cast did spring, I muse how men of wit can so hardly use that gift they hold. I marvel not much that bridleless colts do not know their rider’s hand, whom bit of kingly rein did never snaffle yet”.<sup>279</sup> Reducing this political body to the status of working animals, Elizabeth informs her Parliament of the lords’ appointed place in the sphere of government, for “it is monstrous that the feet should direct the head” in Elizabeth’s authoritarian regime.<sup>280</sup>

Elizabeth introduced herself as England’s sovereign by deploying a set of rhetorical devices that variously characterized her as divinely appointed ruler, singular and sole sovereign and as a woman in need of her lords’ council:

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<sup>277</sup> Ibid, 57.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid, 57 and 50.

<sup>279</sup> Elizabeth I, cited above, 93.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid, 98.

My lords, the law of nature moveth me to sorrow for my sister; the burden that is fallen upon me maketh me amazed; and yet, considering I am God's creature, ordained to obey His appointment, I will thereto yield, desiring from the bottom of my heart that I may have assistance of His grace to be the minister of His heavenly will in this office now committed to me. And as I am but one body naturally considered, though by His permission a body politic to govern, so I shall desire you all, my lords (chiefly you of the nobility, everyone in his degree and power), to be assistant to me, that I with my ruling and you with your service may make a good account to almighty God and leave some comfort to our posterity in earth. I mean to direct all my actions by good advice and counsel.<sup>281</sup>

Elizabeth's first speech and address to her lords makes plain the rhetorical maneuvering necessary to a female ruler asserting her sovereign authority over a nation and her appointed male governors. First drawing upon the language of obedience, Elizabeth casts herself as the yielding female reluctant but duty-bound to bend to the will of her Lord. Such language would signal Elizabeth's seeming recognition of her female self as subservient to a male overlord. However, as she repeatedly reminds her audience, her master is no earthly lord, but God himself who has made her "the minister of His heavenly will". In this "office", the female queen alone acts in the capacity of God's representative. Interestingly, this declaration of her divine power is an embedded clause within an appeal to her lords to lend her counsel; by inserting this all-important utterance into a professed solicitation of her lords' guidance, Elizabeth appeases her anxious male governors while asserting her singular power as monarch.

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<sup>281</sup> Ibid, 51-2.

After appealing to the very nobles whose power she curbed by replacing them with commoners on her Privy Council, Elizabeth then gently admonishes the lords to remember their place in her government, reiterating that their position is one of servitude to the Queen and to God, whose blessing they will receive, provided that they perform their prescribed duties accordingly. Moments after ensuring the lords of her devotion to their counsel, Elizabeth subtly reminds the lords that, because their counsel may be acted upon or disregarded, the real requirement of their service is obedience and faithfulness to her as sovereign: emphasizing the lords' limited and temporary power, Elizabeth assures her servants that "my meaning is to require of you all nothing more but faithful hearts in such service as from time to time shall be in your powers towards the preservation of me and this commonwealth".<sup>282</sup> The Queen's "one body naturally considered", a female body but one divinely appointed to rule and personify the nation, is a singular political body poised and capable of sovereign rule, with or without the counsel of her servants.<sup>283</sup>

The dual notions of the divine right of monarchical rule and the necessary surrender of the people's *potestas* to the sovereign culminated in a form of authoritarianism that strongly extolled the otherworldly virtues of the monarch at the expense of her counselors. According to Quentin Skinner, the theories of natural-law absolutism that helped to undergird authoritarian

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<sup>282</sup> Ibid, 52.

<sup>283</sup> Louis Montrose comments upon the socially and politically established relationship between the body politic and the body monarchical: "During the second half of the sixteenth century, the monarchical claim to supreme authority within its territories was already securely established both in theory and practice, while formulations of the modern conception of the state as a corporate abstraction had only just begun. At this historical juncture, the body politic inhered in the body of the prince" (307). The aim of this chapter is to somewhat complicate Montrose's formulation by considering the ideological collision between royal absolutism and state formation. Montrose, "The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text," *Literary Theory / Renaissance Texts* Eds. Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986) 307. Print.

politics in the early modern period claimed that “the ends of civil or political association made it indispensable to establish a single and supreme sovereign authority whose power remains distinct not merely from the people who originally instituted it, but also from whatever office-holders may be said to have the right to wield its power at any particular time”.<sup>284</sup> In this sense, it is the office of the sovereign, not the person seated on the throne, that must be revered and respected. It would seem that such a tenet of political philosophy, one that neatly intersected with the notion of the king’s two bodies, would have served the female monarch well by calling attention to the sovereign as political body, rather than a gendered one. Elizabeth herself followed the political philosophies expounded by Bodin, and Vitoria, who most rigorously defended the assertion that the sovereign was accountable to God alone. “Absolute princes ought not to be accountable for their actions to any other than to God alone”, she declared, closely echoing the language of these continental theorists.<sup>285</sup>

Yet, debates regarding conciliarism and Republicanism continued to circulate in Elizabethan political culture, despite the monarch’s measured, though stalwart claims to her absolutist authority. The ideological and practical rift that divided the monarch from her advisors was also present in discussions of constitutional government, in which political theorists attempted to curb the monarch’s power by calling upon England’s common law heritage. As Guy explains, the character of English governance in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries was always already shot through with a measure of conciliarism, regardless of the monarch’s claims to supreme, singular and independent authority. Discussing the two forms of counsel prevalent in early

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<sup>284</sup> Skinner, Quentin. “The State.” *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* Eds. Terence Ball, James Farr and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989. 116. Print.

<sup>285</sup> Quoted from Guy’s “Tudor monarchy and its critiques”, 97. Print.

modern political philosophy (which he terms “humanist-classical” and “feudal-baronial”) and the myriad associations connected to the term, Guy states that “within the metaphor of ‘counsel’, where there is *imperium* there is also *consilium*; or as Bacon put it, sovereignty is ‘married’ to counsel”.<sup>286</sup> Counsel, whether proffered by the Privy Council or Parliament, whether taken up or ignored, consistently injected a contradictory element into English claims to authoritarian rule.

Patrick Collinson succinctly defines the contradiction inherent to an Elizabethan politics that impossibly tried to quash the republican character of political culture under a rhetoric of absolutism: “Elizabethan England was a republic which happened also to be a monarchy: or vice versa”.<sup>287</sup> Speaking of Elizabeth’s possible penchant for “a high-handed autocracy which councillors found unacceptable and which limited their capacity to be useful”, Collinson describes the ramifications of such a policy:

Elizabethan government was often government without counsel, or with unorthodox or irregular counsel. But [the above scenario] also suggests that the Privy Council, with whatever futile consequences on some occasions, was in a position to contemplate the world and its affairs with some independent detachment, by means of its own collective wisdom and with the Queen absent: headless conciliar government [ ... ] At times there were two governments uneasily co-existing in Elizabethan England: the Queen and her Council, the

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<sup>286</sup> Guy, “The Rhetoric of counsel in early modern England,” *Tudor Political Culture* Ed. Dale Hoak (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995) 294-301. Print.

<sup>287</sup> Collinson, “The monarchical republic of Queen Elizabeth I,” *The Tudor Monarchy* Ed. John Guy (London: Arnold, 1997) 119. Print.

copulative now serving to distance rather than unite two somewhat distinct poles of authority.<sup>288</sup>

The monstrous political entity illustrated above lends visual clarity to the contradictory nature of the Elizabethan political machine. Rhetorically a nation personified by the singular person of its absolute ruler, but in actuality a disjointed body politic at war with itself, sovereign authority was a site of contestation and contradistinction.

Guy locates this moment of ideological disconnect, unsurprisingly, in the reign of Henry VIII, asserting that this originary break between rhetoric and politics on the ground later carried into the government of his daughter.

The effect of the reign of Henry VIII was [ ... ] to create a latent ambiguity, or binary opposition, within the theory of monarchy. On the one hand, ‘official’ pronouncements maintained that the king was endowed with secular and ecclesiastical *imperium*. On the other, the ‘unofficial’ exponents of conciliarism and common-law doctrine stressed the role of councils, counsellors, and representative institutions if ‘limited’ or ‘constitutional’ government were to be preserved. The extent of this contradiction should not be exaggerated.<sup>289</sup>

The incongruity of these official and unofficial representations of English governance is not simply ideological or rhetorical but rather signaled a potentially destructive infirmity that later disabled the very functioning of government and ushered in the Civil War. Guy demonstrates that the contradictory elements attending Henry’s revamping of the English political system resonate in Elizabeth’s reign because she made use of her father’s authoritarian principles. He

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<sup>288</sup> Ibid, 118.

<sup>289</sup> Guy, ‘Tudor monarchy’, 88-9.



maintains that this disjuncture most fervently came to the fore during the Elizabethan Settlement, when anxieties regarding the nation's spiritual welfare were at their height.

The binary opposition which was latent in the theory of monarchy since the reign of Henry VIII [ ... ] was played out [in the reign of Elizabeth]: the tension between Elizabeth's view of her 'imperial' monarchy—the idea that sovereignty was vested in her alone—and the conviction of Cecil and the Privy Council that sovereignty lay in the 'queen-in-Parliament' if the Protestant state was to be preserved, and most especially when the ruler declined to be counselled.<sup>290</sup>

In the case of the Settlement, ironically, Elizabeth's counselors feared that the earthy representative of God's will might put the nation at risk by mismanaging the spiritual end of her duties as God's "minister". That the rhetoric of divine and absolute monarchy breaks down over matters of religion is demonstrative of the breach between official narratives of sovereign might and the real-world concerns regarding the monarch's ability to rightly rule the nation alone.

As Collinson indicates, there existed in Elizabeth's court two incontrovertible mechanisms of government. Though the ideological representations of English governance cast these two branches as working in harmony for the peace, justice and the preservation of a nation embodied by its monarch, the actual picture of Elizabethan politics is one of a mangled political body with little cooperation among its limbs. The "independent detachment" of the Privy Council implies a kind of dangerous autonomy practiced by both the sovereign and her counselors, one that seriously jeopardized the effective governance of the realm and punctured the official rhetoric of the crown. The early modern state posed a very similar threat to the singular and supreme rule of the monarch and greatly exacerbated the rift between ideology and

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<sup>290</sup> Ibid, 99.

practical governance. Early modern state-building produced further ideological strains on the rhetoric of monarchical sovereignty; by laying bare the need for a state infrastructure to administer the realm and by further decentering political authority from the person of the monarch, the creation of the early modern state necessarily dismantled notions of the monarch's "whole and entire power, preeminence, authority, prerogative and jurisdiction" and ruptured the one "body politic to govern".

### A Monarchical State

Despite their insistence upon the monarch's supreme right to rule, and despite the reliance upon these theorists by the Tudors to shore up authoritarian claims, one can detect in the work of Bodin, Vitoria and even the 'official' texts of Henry and Elizabeth's political philosophers the need for a state to administer the monarch's will. In their discussions of the role of the state, one can detect a certain anxiety about this distribution of power under the auspices of monarchical rule. For instance, Bodin's foundational assertion that "he is absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after God, that is greater than himself" is undermined by his depiction of Elizabeth's court. "[The Estates] seem to be empowered to command, resolve and decide in the great affairs of state [ however... ] the entire sovereignty belongs undivided to the kings of England and [ ... ] the sovereignty of the monarchy is in no way altered by the presence of the Estates".<sup>291</sup> Bodin's need to somehow reconcile Elizabeth's authoritarian rhetoric with the tradition and practice of conciliar government results in a slippery untruth; as we have seen, the presence of the Parliament and Privy Council was hardly insignificant. Elizabeth's attempt to delimit the authority of her counselors in itself attests to the fact that these political constellations circling her court could not simply be cast outside the sphere of legitimate governance. Though

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<sup>291</sup> Bodin, 22.

Bodin's travels to Elizabeth's court and the ubiquitous presence of Bodin's work in English universities attests to a intimate knowledge of Elizabethan politics, one can nonetheless detect in Bodin's work a kind of murkiness when it comes to aligning the ideological desire to locate in the person of the sovereign consummate authority and the political clout attached to the court.<sup>292</sup>

Vitoria, like Bodin, grapples with the contradictory notions of a body politic imbued with political autonomy and a monarch whose authority both exists within and supersedes that of the commonwealth. As explained above, Vitoria baldly asserts that "the power of the sovereign clearly comes immediately from God himself, even though kings are created by the commonwealth".<sup>293</sup> However, to conjoin a kind of republican ethic, in which the office of the monarchy is anchored to the body politic, to his notion of the monarch's God-given political might, Vitoria must delicately and somewhat problematically deny *potestas* and *auctoritas* to the king's subjects. Though he maintains that "there is no question of two separate powers, one belonging to the sovereign and the other to the community", Vitoria's recognition of the commonwealth's authority and power as gifted to the monarch actually underscores the fact that

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<sup>292</sup> David J. Baker illustrates the great popularity of Bodin in Elizabethan political circles: "A man of affairs as well as a scholar, this prolific and controversial French theorist had a considerable following in England. Harvey claimed that alongside the copies of Machiavelli's works that could be found on every scholar's table at Cambridge, there lay Bodin's *Six Books of a Commonweal* (1576) [ ... ] Bodin was respected in court circles and visited England at least once, possibly in 1579 and then quite certainly in 1581. Both times he would have accompanied Alençon, to whom he had been appointed *maître des requêtes et conseiller*. As his master wooed Elizabeth I, Bodin and the queen spoke often; she 'enjoyed his conversation concerning forms of government and his theory of climate.'". Bodin lost popularity with Elizabeth when Alençon's courting of the queen ended and he voiced his support for Mary, Queen of Scots (53-4). Baker, "Historical contexts: Britain and Europe." *The Cambridge Companion to Spenser* Ed. Andrew Hadfield (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) 37-59. Print.

<sup>293</sup> Vitoria, 16.

the polity does indeed possess a sort of agency in the face of a divine leader.<sup>294</sup> In the process of denying the commonwealth its political potency, Vitoria at the same time demonstrates the existence of this very authority as a potential stumbling block of authoritarian political philosophy.

Even after severing political authority from the commonwealth, Vitoria betrays the practical difficulties that necessarily arise when the political agency of a nation is contained within a solitary individual: “the commonwealth as such cannot frame laws, propose policies, judge disputes, punish transgressors, or generally impose its laws on the individual, and so it must necessarily entrust all this business to a single man”.<sup>295</sup> Unintentionally, Vitoria here lists the very duties assigned to the early modern state because “all this business” could not be achieved by the monarch without a system of agents imbued with a measure of sovereign authority. With the expansion of the realm, a proliferating legal culture and a need to secure social order among the heterogeneous cultures of the British archipelago, the “business” of the monarch became the business of the state. Neither the office nor the person of the monarch was efficient to guarantee the nation’s peaceful preservation without the aid of a state infrastructure, thus demonstrating the practical failures of the ideology of divine kingship.

Across the channel, English political theorists wrestled with the same problem: how to preserve the ideologically crucial belief in the divine and indissoluble power of the monarch while acknowledging the need for a state system. William Camden in his *Britannia* echoes the sentiments of Bodin and Vitoria, asserting that the king “hath sovereign power and absolute command” over his people and that the monarch need not “acknowledgeth any superiour but

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<sup>294</sup> Ibid.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid, 14.

God alone”.<sup>296</sup> However, in his description of the “law courts of England”, he maintains that Parliament as the legislative arm of the government “hath sovereign and sacred authority in making, confirming, repealing and expounding Lawes [ ... ] in all causes which may concerne either the saftie of the State, or any private person whatsoever”.<sup>297</sup> Though he explains that Parliament may be summoned and dismissed at the monarch’s pleasure, Camden does not tend to the slippery usage of terms that sanctifies the authority of Parliament in the same language applied to the sovereign prince. Because divinity is the primary characteristic that separates the monarch from his subjects and allows him to act in a sphere removed from the body politic and its laws, imbuing Parliament—the mere servants of the king or queen, according to official rhetoric—with divine status radically dismantles the ideological infrastructure supporting absolutist governance.

Likewise, Sir Thomas Smith avers that “the most high and absolute power of the realme of Englande, is in the Parliament” in his *De Republica Anglorum*, but he simultaneously states that “the prince is the life, the head, and the authoritie of all thinges that be doone in the realme of England”.<sup>298</sup> As Secretary of State to both Protector Somerset and Elizabeth, it would seem that Smith would feel compelled to construct a vision of Elizabeth’s England that firmly and unquestionably placed the monarch at the center of the political sphere. Instead, Smith posits both the monarch and the Parliament as the singular engine of English governance. Smith does not resolve this fundamental contradiction; instead, he compounds these ideological difficulties by deploying a confusing image of the body politic. Calling Parliament “the whole head and

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<sup>296</sup> Camden, 163.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid, 177.

<sup>298</sup> Smith, *De Republica Anglorum* Ed. Mary Dewar (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982) 78 and 88. Print.

bodie of the realme of England”, Smith then refers to the sovereign as “the head, life and governor of this common wealth”.<sup>299</sup> By essentially subsuming the person of the monarch into the body of the Parliament, Smith undoes the work of Bodin, who sought to relegate the estates to the status of mere “witnesses” to the monarch’s power.

Finally, Sir Thomas Elyot in *The Boke Named the Governour* recognizes the necessity of the state, acknowledging that “one mortall man can nat have knowlege of all thynges done in a realme or large dominion”; thusly, “it is expedient and also nedefull that under the capitall gouernour be sondry meane authorities” to attend to matters of law and justice.<sup>300</sup> Yet even the author of the early modern training manual for magistrates cannot work outside the paradigm of the singular, divine monarch. Contending that “undoubtedly the best and most sure gouernance is by one kygne or prince”, Elyot likens the sovereign’s rule of the nation to that of the “heven and erthe [ ... ] gouerned by one god, by one perpetuall ordre, by one providence”.<sup>301</sup> Though Elyot does not force the governmental bodies of early modern England into the monstrous body politic depicted by Smith and referenced by Collinson, Elyot nonetheless fails to attend to the ideological difficulties of monarchical singularity and the necessity of an early modern state. That the author of the handbook for state agents cannot resolve this troublesome contradiction speaks to the problematic elision of this foundational weakness in Tudor political philosophy.

As Skinner explains in his discussion of how best to define the early modern state, “even when *status* and *stato* are employed by [early modern political theorists] to denote an apparatus of government, the power structure in question is not in fact viewed as independent of those who

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<sup>299</sup> Ibid, 88.

<sup>300</sup> Elyot, 25.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid, 12.

have charge of it”.<sup>302</sup> In order to anchor the state to the monarch, the writers of the early modern state claimed that “the ruler or chief magistrate, so far from being distinguishable from the institutions of the state, is said to possess and even embody those institutions himself”.<sup>303</sup> Agents of the early modern state were “lent” the power of the monarch to enforce his or her will, according to official rhetoric. In Bodin’s estimation,

Just as those who lend someone else their goods always remain its owners and possessors, so also those who give power and authority to judge or to command, either for some limited and definite period of time or for as much and as long a time as it shall please them. They still remain lawfully possessed of power and jurisdiction, which the others exercise in the manner of a loan or grant on sufferance.<sup>304</sup>

Smith is also careful to differentiate the power granted to members of the state from the all-encompassing sovereignty of the monarch, reminding his audience that “all writtes, executions and commaundementes be done in the princes name”.<sup>305</sup> Focusing on the execution of justice in the realm and taking pains to distinguish his nation from those on the continent, Smith claims “we doe say in England the life and member of the kinges subjectes are the kings onely, that is to say no man hath *hault* [high court] nor *moyenne* [justice] but the king [ ... ] The supreme justice is done in the kinges name, and by his authoritie onely”.<sup>306</sup> Although the mechanisms of justice, peace and law are placed in the hands of the monarch’s servants, the authority that turns these

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<sup>302</sup> Skinner, 102-3.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid, 103.

<sup>304</sup> Bodin, 2.

<sup>305</sup> Smith, 87.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid, 87.

mechanisms and ensures their effectiveness is inextricably bound to the monarch. According to this ideology, the monarch is not just the prime mover and originator of justice, peace and law, the sovereign him or herself makes possible these qualities necessary for nationhood, containing within the monarchical person the supreme and divine authority of God and commonwealth.

In spite of the ideologically necessary moves to keep the state affixed to the monarchical body, the state as an autonomous entity eventually unmoored itself from the monarchical center and developed a localized political agency that often challenged rather than supported the crown. One of the sources of this separation of the state from Whitehall was internal and spoke to the debates already destabilizing the Elizabethan government. The division of authority denied by official rhetoric but clearly present in the Tudor court and the discourse on republicanism that began in Italy and migrated to England contributed to the crown's loss of control over its own instrument of centralization. Similarly, the unmanageable authority afforded to local magnates and noble land-owners that Elizabeth attempted to limit was greatly increased and reified by the creation of the state. Placing sovereign authority in the hands of local officials did not have the effect of bending the populace to the royal will; on the contrary, as political authority became further localized, the sovereign's authority became more indistinct and amorphous.

Skinner examines the political disjuncture in which "natural law absolutism" and republicanism collided in early modern political discourse. Speaking of the desire of political philosophers like Bodin and others to reconcile the strictures of authoritarian rule with the need to define and protect the commonwealth, Skinner states that "a number of these theorists began to resolve their difficulties by speaking instead of the *state*, while making it clear at the same time that they were consciously using the term to express their master concept of an impersonal



form of political authority distinct from both rulers and ruled”.<sup>307</sup> The turn toward the *civitas* as a defined and distinct body politic instigated a turn away from absolutist ideology. Within the bounds of Tudor political ideology, monarchical rule was intensely personal; one need only think of the Cult of Elizabeth that functioned in a purely personal, if sometimes disingenuous manner, to tout the absolute and divine rule of England’s virgin queen. To disengage sovereignty from the person of the sovereign and from the subjects whose national identity flowed from their divine leader amounted to an upheaval in early modern political philosophy that had profound consequences for the crown and his or her governmental and ideological command over the body politic. Bodin, the very theorist who attended the English queen and whose notions of the English monarch’s unlimited power were broadly circulating in Elizabethan universities, spoke of the state as a form of authority characterized by its “indivisible and incommunicable sovereignty”.<sup>308</sup> That Bodin’s language describing the state so succinctly echoes the terms applied to the monarch underscores the ideological impasse created by the monarchical state.

Italian discourses on republicanism, which found their way into England and France in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, propounded a form of governance that imagined the body politic—not the body monarchical—as its center and fount of sovereignty. “It is within this tradition of thought”, Skinner explains of continental republicanism, “that we encounter, for the first time, a vindication of the idea that there is a distinct form of ‘civil’ or ‘political’ authority which is wholly autonomous, which exists to regulate the public affairs of an independent community, and which brooks no rival as a source of coercive power within its own *civitas* or *respublica*”.<sup>309</sup>

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<sup>307</sup> Skinner, 119-20.

<sup>308</sup> Ibid, 120.

<sup>309</sup> Ibid, 107.

This autonomous political force is at odds with monarchical power; rather than binding a people together through their shared awe and fear of a divinely-appointed sovereign, the republican state as a self-regulating mechanism produces its own instruments of social order from inside the “independent community”. Such communities in these formulations were often civic or regional, as opposed to kingdoms that drew under their banner people of often differing ethnicities and customs. Within the self-regulating locality, the state provided the legal, social and political mechanisms necessary for a smoothly functioning commonwealth. Fear of corruption drew theorists of republicanism to assert that “the only way to ensure that the laws promote the common good must be to leave the whole body of citizens in charge of their own public affairs”, explains Skinner. “If their government is instead controlled by an authority external to the community itself, that authority will be sure to subordinate the good of the community to its own purposes thereby interfering with the liberty of individual citizens to attain their chosen goals”.<sup>310</sup> As Skinner explains, this spirit of “civil government” was the force undergirding Henry VIII’s Act of Appeals and his break from Rome; it is one of the ironies of early modern governance that the republican ideals that gave sanction to Henry to free himself from Rome and to establish his authoritarian regime were the very same principles that allowed early modern English communities to function autonomously without the overbearing hand of monarchical authority.<sup>311</sup>

For the majority of Elizabethan subjects, especially those living in communities at a distance from the monarchical center, the crown, despite all the pageantry and ideological maneuvering, likely seemed “an authority external to the community itself”. Available to these

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<sup>310</sup> Ibid, 104.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid, 107.

subjects only in propagandistic renderings, royal proclamations, and other manifestations of monarchical might, the crown was an absent presence in much of the Tudor kingdom. The state, ostensibly designed to make present throughout the kingdom the word and authority of the crown, in many ways only amplified an already existent gap between the efficacy of the royal writ and the politics that actually governed the individual, localized communities of the body politic. State agents, such as justices of the peace, wardens, sheriffs and other officials imbued with a measure of the sovereign's authority, governed the localities in the name of the absent crown; but, without palpable links to the monarchical fount of authority or to the person of the king or queen, the state as personified in these figures of localized authority seemingly acted as their own self-determining governmental units. As Steve Hindle has asserted, laws and policies disseminated to the localities from Whitehall often underwent a process of revision and adjustment before becoming codified. Modified to align with the needs and customs of particular communities, the royal writ when it left London was not preserved in the form drawn up by the Elizabethan court. "Parliamentary legislation, conciliar order or royal proclamation were not the end of the law-making process but merely its beginning," Hindle writes:

The structures of authority were elastic, multi-lateral and had both geographical extent and social depth, and the negotiation of authority at highly localized levels was therefore inherent in the process of state formation [ ... ] State formation is less a matter of centralisation than of the social dynamics consequent upon the localisation of state power. That power could be legitimated only if the injection of public authority into the localities guaranteed social stability on the basis of a widely accepted moral ethos. In this sense, an understanding of the state only as an instrument of power, however deeply embedded in the social order, is

insufficient. State agents (magistrates and constables, churchwardens and jurors) were able to appeal to the state itself as a symbol of their instrumental authority, justifying and legitimating their activity in political and moral terms.<sup>312</sup>

Citing the unwillingness of Elizabethan localities to enact the crown's Poor Laws, policies designed to combat vagrancy, and the trial juries' use of discretionary measures to either lessen the severity of criminal indictments or to throw them out altogether, Hindle illustrates that the monarch's word was sometimes perceived as that of an outsider, whose declarations of its authority must be tempered to meet the needs of the localities.

The elasticity of authority demonstrated by Hindle is, of course, at great odds with official rhetoric regarding centralization and the state. The authoritarian command of the sovereign was not subject to negotiation, according to this rhetoric, because the word of the monarch was the word of God spoken through his chosen mouthpiece. Likewise, the subjects of the crown's kingdoms spoke in one shared voice, one that echoed the monarch and thus bound the realms into a single social and political entity. That the local authorities used their "loaned" power to manipulate royal policy according to regionally specific systems of ethical and social order forcefully dismantles official claims to Tudor absolutism and demonstrates that the state itself became the object of anxious crown surveillance and management as it became disengaged from the sovereign. Michael J. Braddick explains that the empowerment of state officials to execute a revised and locally specific form of monarchical law also allowed these individuals to affect their own policies independent of the crown's mandates. "Once an initiative had legal form it became, to an extent, a matter of policy, sanctioned by the executive. This 'governmental will' operated through local officeholders who were, in this sense 'intermediaries', mediating

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<sup>312</sup> Hindle, *The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, 1550-1640* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002) 23. Print.

policy in the light of local interests,” he comments. The more pronounced affront to the monarch came when members of the state took matters of policy into their own hands. “In addition to mediating governmental will, however, groups in the localities sought legal validity for their own political innovations—there were local initiatives alongside central initiatives”.<sup>313</sup>

As Braddick attests, the “face-to-face” exchanges that governed social interactions on the ground removed “the state” from the political ether, in which it was imagined as instrumentally a piece with absolutist power. Because the state as a localized system of order was “deeply embedded in the social fabric”, the role of the state agent was never static: “when asked to act *qua* governor, officeholders frequently chose to act as neighbours instead [ ... ] The activities of many of the agents of the early modern state were constrained by wider social expectations—their offices were envisioned as broader social roles, in which particular patterns of behaviour were expected, in conformity with wider cultural values”.<sup>314</sup> These regional investments were often at cross-purposes with the intentions of the crown. As Dean explains, those members of the commonwealth who were marked as a threat to the body politic by the Elizabethan government were often freed from the monarch’s more severe measures because local officials refused the mandates of the crown. “It seems clear that those for whom punitive laws were designed—vagabonds, beggars, prostitutes, demobilized yet armed soldiers, Catholic recusants—had some ability to negotiate their treatment by strategies which involved kinship and neighbourhood, household and community”.<sup>315</sup> Even in the event of monarchical intervention, state agents still protected local interests at the expense of the crown. “Justices might as easily turn a blind eye to

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<sup>313</sup> Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 27. Print.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid, 76-7.

<sup>315</sup> Dean, 56.

a regular offender they knew well in the interest of community peace or in response to a notion of fairness held by the community, no matter how often they might receive a letter from the privy council admonishing them to enforce the laws more strictly. Local solutions were found without reference to central authority”.<sup>316</sup> The physical distance of these regions from the center of sovereign authority seems proportionate to the ideological distance between the rhetoric of Whitehall and the business of governance in the localities; harnessing the sovereign authority transmitted to them from distant London and disengaging that political power from the site of “central authority”, Elizabethan state agents acted more or less autonomously, privileging the local over the monarchical, the republican over the authoritarian.

Significantly, these state agents were not necessarily men whose social or economic status qualified them for positions of power, according to the strict hierarchies that organized most aspects of Elizabethan social life. The belief that all men are intended for a particular position within the social cosmos was of particular importance in regard to the doling out of political power. Fears of social disintegration stemming from misplaced authority pervade the opening pages of Elyot’s *Boke Named the Governour*, where he spells out in no uncertain terms the disintegration that follows when social order is disrupted. After dismissing usage of the term “commonweal” to describe England because such a designation implies communal or shared skills and social positions, Elyot distinguishes between the *plebs* or “communalitie”, “wherin be containyd the base and vulgare inhabitantes not auanced to any honour or dignite” and the “gentilite”, locating in the latter the only possible candidates to wield political power. To upset the “discrepance of degrees” demonstrated in this division that undergirds all social relations is to invite destruction, for “take away ordre from all thynges what shulde than remayne? Certes

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<sup>316</sup> Ibid, 56-7.

nothyng finally, except some man wolde imagine eftsones *Chaos*".<sup>317</sup> Likening the men suited to political office to "the angels whiche be most feruent in contemplation be highest exalted in glorie", Elyot describes governors as "they whiche excelle other in this influence of understandynge, and do imploye it to the detaynyng of other within the boundes of reason, and shewe them howe to prouyde for theyr necessarye lyuynge".<sup>318</sup> Naturally imbued with a kind of intelligence and skill born of their noble position, governors acts as guides and protectors who "oughte to be set in a more highe place than the residue where they may se and also be sene: that by the beames of theyr excellent witte, shewed throughe the glasse of auctorite, other of inferiour understandynge may be directed to the way of vertue and commodious liuynge".<sup>319</sup>

However, as Hindle and Andy Wood attest, the state agents who were revising and sometimes even hampering the royal will were not Elyot's angels but men of middling social status.<sup>320</sup> "The 'middling' male householder was much more than just another object of governance", Wood contends,

He played a dynamic role in the administration, expression, mediation and extension of authority: in his capacity as a member of a village court, a vestryman, an elector, a juryman or a constable, the early modern state came increasingly to depend upon him. This variety of roles gave him the potential to

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<sup>317</sup> Elyot, 2-3.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid.

<sup>320</sup> Hindle also comments upon this contradiction in Elyot's political program. Considering the "tradition of active political participation" that invited all classes of men into the governmental sphere, Hindle remarks that "even in the formal tradition of political thought [as demonstrated by Elyot's work], the widespread participation of men of middling status was recognised as a significant structural characteristic of the state". Hindle, 24-5.

represent personal or collective grievances to those in authority, and even on occasion to organise resistance to lords, magistrates and gentlemen.<sup>321</sup>

Collinson echoes this view, pointing our attention to “the vitality in early modern England of traditions of localized self-government, involving men of very humble status. This was a salient feature of its political culture”.<sup>322</sup> The crown’s dependence upon ordinary subjects of the realm to enforce its policies was an ideological pitfall; sovereign authority was no longer personified in the otherworldly monarchical person nor in his gentle subjects who were viewed as guardians of the commonality, but in a neighbor whose localized political investments trumped those of the crown.

More damaging still to the sovereign and the fragile hierarchy that underpinned monarchical rule was the divine status incidentally granted these local officials. We find pronounced traces of this mystification of the state in Elyot’s language: because of their angelic character, Elyot’s governors cast the divine light of their noble bearing onto the barbarous commonality through their “glass of authority”, in which the majesty of the monarch is reflected in her gentle servants’ command and protection over the lower orders. Elyot, however, was not referring to the middling man so central to localized authority in the early modern period; the middling man was the very sort, in Eliot’s estimation, who demanded the blessed intervention of the governor to best understand his place in the Elizabethan social structure. Nevertheless, with the distribution of royal power demanded by early modern state building, the divine aura of political authority promoted by the crown could be attached to even the middling sorts who were the actual practitioners of this authority. As Hindle asserts,

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<sup>321</sup> Wood, Andy. *Riot, Rebellion and Popular Politics in Early Modern England* (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2002) 48 Print.

<sup>322</sup> Collinson, 112.



the other-worldly status of rulership was not simply confined to the ruler himself, since charisma might be inherited by all those who wielded the sword of God's justice. The logic of descending authority ensured that the rhetoric of mystical politics was transferred from the prince to his judicial subordinates.<sup>323</sup>

The distribution and transfer of divine political authority during the period of Elizabethan state building is significant: it reveals that the crown was unable to manage not only the state agents that used her authority to act against royal writ, but also, importantly, that the sovereign was likewise losing control of the ideological apparatus that was deployed to justify an authoritarian regime. The widening gap between official rhetoric of divine and absolute kingship and the politics on the ground in which sovereign authority became defuse and decentered is at the disjointed heart of Spenser's *Faerie Queene*.

'In this fayre mirrhour maist behold thy face': Refracted Elizabeth

To explain his use of the term "theology" to describe the mechanisms of the modern state, Carl Schmitt maintains that "the state intervenes everywhere. At times it does so as a *deus ex machina* [ ... ] at other times it does so as the graceful and merciful lord who proves by pardons and amnesties his supremacy over his own laws". The state that Schmitt illustrates in his 1922 work *Political Theology* is one in which the concept of the divine that in the early modern period attended notions of sovereignty, justice and law is subjected to the logic of secularism, where "the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver".<sup>324</sup> One finds in Schmitt's depiction of the modern state surprisingly strong resonances with the Elizabethan state of the 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. Through his or her divine providence, the monarch as the head of

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<sup>323</sup> Hindle, 33.

<sup>324</sup> Schmitt, 36-8.

state acts as “the god from the machine” whose manipulations of the earthly realm make peace and justice possible in a fallen world. The servants of the monarch are the limbs of this machine of state, carrying out the practical demands of effective governance in the monarch’s name. The monarch’s absolute sovereignty is defined by his or her permanent exception to the laws governing the realm; by inhabiting a divine sphere apart from her subjects and the laws that bind them to both sovereign and nation, the monarch dispenses justice and mercy from a place outside the confines of law.

Yet, as discussed above, the demarcations separating the monarch’s indivisible and otherworldly authority from the political power granted to the state are fuzzy at best during Elizabeth’s reign. Despite attempts to define state agents as servants of a divine ruler trusted, temporarily, with the capacity to govern the queen’s subjects and deal justice throughout the realm in her name, these figures necessarily took on a kind of political authority that questioned the monarch’s very divinity. If the monarch’s otherworldly power could be separated from her divine person, divided and parsed out among her governmental agents, then the ideological power of singular absolutist authority is diluted and severely thrown into question. The “god from the machine” becomes subject to the machine itself as the monarch struggles to maintain control over the state and harness political authority to the royal person. It is “the state [that] intervenes everywhere”, entering regional communities and reaching into the corners of the realm in a ubiquitous fashion, disconnected from the monarch seated on the throne in Whitehall Palace.

The collision of absolutism and state-formation in early modern England can inform our reading of Spenser’s poem. That Spenser was invested in Elizabethan political culture is evidenced by his overtly political treatise, *A View on the Present State of Ireland* and by his

vocation as an agent of the state serving in Elizabeth's Ireland.<sup>325</sup> Appointed to a location that was both physically and ideologically distant from his queen, Spenser experienced first hand the dangers of decentered authority. The English sovereign who proclaimed her right to rule Ireland never set foot on the Irish isle. Her authority was that of an absent-presence; physically absent from the territory she claimed to govern, her presence was felt only through her colonial representatives, such as Spenser's employer, Lord Gray. As often discussed in histories of early modern Ireland, those agents invested with her authority were sometimes wont to use their

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<sup>325</sup> David J. Baker considers Spenser's knowledge of contemporary political theorists, specifically the work of Bodin and his examination of absolutism. Because of Bodin's widespread influence in England, "we can also be certain that Spenser knew of the thought of Jean Bodin", he maintains (53). Though there are no direct references to Bodin in Spenser's writing, Baker argues that this absence is resulting from Bodin's eventual support of Mary, Queen of Scots. According to Baker, the "internal discrepancies" that problematize Bodin's theory of absolutism "may have especially caught Spenser's attention [ ... ] While Bodin was, at least according to his own insistence, entirely committed in his support for monarchical absolutism, he did not posit a monarchy without any restraints on it at all. He set his face against armed resistance to kings, arguing that anyone who even thought of violating his king was worthy of execution. But he also allowed that a *tyrannical* king who was a usurper could be legitimately killed, and even that he could be forcibly deposed by a foreign prince. That he was willing to countenance the death of a prince, Elizabeth I, was perhaps then not so surprising. Bodin was committed to a particularly rigorous form of royal absolutism and stated it, as Skinner says, with 'an epoch-making lack of equivocation', but Elizabeth was a Protestant ruler, and he had moreover declared in the *Six Books* that 'the rule and government of women is directly against the law of nature'. And his 'lack of equivocation', it could be argued, was in part an attempt to clarify out of existence a deeper contradiction between the earlier and later versions of his own thought. The *Six Books*, the work of Bodin's that was perused so widely at Cambridge, was a piece of self-revision. It may have asserted the claims of the absolute sovereign with analytic clarity, but it contained within itself the remnants of counter-arguments Bodin himself had once professed and traces of the resistance theory that it was directed against. It was this ambivalence within Bodin *oeuvre*, perhaps, that Spenser responded to. By taking up Bodin, Spenser was making use of a thinker who had both dallied with his queen and urged her assassination, an interesting tension given his own equivocal relation with her" I am less interested in how Bodin's work may have influenced Spenser's personal relationship to the queen. Rather, this chapter considers how Spenser's poem takes up the problematic nature of absolutist rhetoric—as evidenced in Bodin—in a period of Tudor state formation. Baker, David J. "Historical contexts: Britain and Europe." *The Cambridge Companion to Spenser* Ed. Andrew Hadfield. 37-59. Print.

political clout in Ireland to their own advantage, serving not the queen as the fount of this authority, but themselves as the practitioners and enforcers of Elizabethan rule in a land ultimately disconnected from the center of power. In Ireland, not unlike regions in England, the site from which political authority emanated was profoundly unclear. Outside the rhetoric of absolutism, in the queen's territories, where practical matters of governance were played out, the face of authority was not easily recognizable. It was multiple and shifting as the early modern state infrastructure came into being and new positions of power allowed subjects to ascend into the realm of political authority. In *The Faerie Queene*, the sovereign's visage is spectral at best. The faces most sharply defined are those of her servants, for it is in the knights of Faerie Land that political authority most clearly resides.

Spenser in the proem to Book II of *The Faerie Queene* calls upon the notion of the singular body of the monarch in whose visage, drawn by the hand of the poet, can be seen the territories that make up her kingdom and the celebrated genealogy that brought her to England's throne:

And thou, O fairest Princesse under sky,  
In this fayre mirrhour maist behold thy face  
And thine owne realmes in lond of Faery,  
And in this antique ymage thy great auncestry. (II. Proem.4.6-9)

Praising her earthly uniqueness, Spenser draws from three major tenets of Tudor authoritarian ideology. First, the notion of a unified nation reflected in the physical person of the sovereign. Enclosed within the literary boundaries of the poem, or within the frame of Spenser's "mirrhour", Elizabeth's face reflects back to the sovereign a vision of her realms incorporated into a bounded landscape. Also contained within the borders of the queen's face is the

genealogical record of English kingship that buttresses Elizabeth's claim to the throne, the ancestral registry that reaches back into Tudor mythology to locate in Arthurian legend the root of the queen's mystical legacy. Finally, Spenser's threefold vision of Elizabeth's physical, territorial and genealogical right to rule imparts to the sovereign a kind of divine essence; like the triple yet singular character of the trinity, the Queen's divine person collapses into a single deistic persona the several traits that define sovereign power in the earthly realm.<sup>326</sup>

However, the singular-ness that Spenser attributes to the Queen is troubled by the demands of representation. His evocation of Elizabeth abounds with representational frames and mechanisms that fracture the queen and distance us from the monarchical body evoked by the poet. Spenser's "fayre mirrhour", the first of his representational reflections draws pointed attention to the monarch's inaccessibility; present to the readers only in spectral duplicate, the authentic monarchical person remains outside the confines of the poetic frame and is therefore untouched and unreachable, much like the Faerie Queene herself (a point I shall return to later). The territories of this insubstantial queen are likewise illusory. Spenser seeks not to reflect back a geographical replica of Elizabeth's territories; rather the poet constructs a fantastical landscape that's very literariness puts into boldface its representational quality. Spenser's "antique image" has two possible referents. First, Elizabeth's face produced in the poet's mirror may be the very representation of antiquity in the sense that her visage holds the venerable Tudor genealogy from which Elizabeth's mythical qualities are derived. On the other hand, Spenser's poem is itself an

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<sup>326</sup> David Norbrook comments upon the singular-ness conferred upon the queen in royal pageants and the possible echoes of this singular royal persona in Spenser's epic poem. "Spenser probably knew of the pageants which greeted Elizabeth's entry to London in 1559, of which his schoolmaster Mulcaster had written a description; at one point the figure of Protestant Truth had presented the queen with a Bible. Her personal motto was 'semper eadem' so that it was appropriate to praise her for her unity and singleness. Gabriel Harvey and Thomas Drant had already praised her as Una". Norbrook, *Poetry and Politics in the English Renaissance* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) 121-22. Print.

“antique image”. The poet’s archaisms and evocations of Ovid and Virgil evince Spenser’s intention to counterfeit classical models. Lastly, *The Faerie Queene*, both the queenly stand-in and the work itself as a literary rendering of her England, is the ultimate representation that enfolds these myriad refractions into a single frame.

At several representational removes from both the reader and the poet who erected these frames and reflections, the monarch is not only obfuscated but also riven into several disparate forms: Elizabeth as the sovereign of Faerie Land, as the object of Spenser’s mirrored reflection, as the face of celebrated Tudor rule, and as the medium through which Spenser creates his ode to literary antiquity. The poem itself consistently reiterates the splintering of Elizabeth witnessed in the poem. Cracking the reflective plane that imagines the queen as the singular “fairest Princess under sky”, the work introduces in quick succession a series of monarchical representations: Una, Belphebe, Medina, Alma, Britomart, Mercilla and, of course, the Faerie Queene herself are all synecdochial personifications of England’s sovereign queen. The effect of this refracted monarchical representation is the radical upset of the notion of the singular divine ruler that was so central to Tudor authoritarian political ideology. When looking into Spenser’s “glass of auctorite”, we discover not the solitary figure of sovereign power but a severed and disjointed queen and, importantly, the disunited “Knights of Maidenhead”.

In her discussion of Elizabeth’s deft management of gender politics and the poet’s relationship to his queen, Linda Gregerson makes a similar point regarding the myriad and spectral representations of England’s sovereign in the work. “The lineaments of the English queen are rendered in shadows and light throughout *The Faerie Queene*”, she writes,

in the poem’s presiding monarch, who is everywhere implicit and everywhere withheld; in Britomart, her mythic ancestor; in the virgin Belphebe and her twin

the married Amoret; in ‘Dread’ Astraea and ‘Angel-like’ Mercilla, whose overlapping spheres are the domains of Justice; in every patron virtue and in virtue’s grounding anti-types, the female figures of pride and lust and nature-deforming power”.<sup>327</sup>

Where Gregerson places this fragmentation of this queen within a larger discourse regarding female rule within a culturally patriarchal nation, I contend that the dismemberment of the sovereign and the division of authority supposedly contained within that singular position is the result of a very different ideological crisis: the jarring meeting of authoritarian political rhetoric and the formation of the Elizabethan state. Hadfield includes Astrea and Irena to the list of Elizabethan representations in the work, and comments how Spenser’s letter to Raleigh downplays the multiplicity of queenly personas in the poem.

Irena stands as one of the many manifestations of Gloriana; the letter to Raleigh declares that the Faerie Queene herself could be doubly shadowed as ‘glory in my generall intention’ and as Elizabeth, who herself was represented as two bodies, the one ‘a most royall Queene or Empresse, the other of a most vertuous and beautifull Lady’, represented by Belpheobe and fashioned after Raleigh’s own figuration of Elizabeth as Cynthia (Diana) (*FQ*, p. 757). Given that both Diana and Cynthia appear in the poem [ ... ] clear comparisons are made between Britomart and Elizabeth. Given too, that Una, as the symbol of the English church who marries St. George, can also be regarded as a type of the queen, it can be seen that the representations of Elizabeth are multiple, going beyond the figures

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<sup>327</sup> Gregerson, Linda. “Sexual politics.” *The Cambridge Companion to Spenser* Ed. Andrew Hadfield (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) 195. Print.

signalled in the letter. After Henry VIII's declaration, on 18 June 1541 in the Irish Parliament, that he was king of Ireland, the English monarch claimed rights to Ireland, so Irena must stand as a figure of Elizabeth.<sup>328</sup>

If Irena is, in fact, another refraction of the English sovereign, then the argument made here—that the splintering of the monarch into myriad representations marks the dispersal of sovereign authority concomitant with state building—could take on a colonial dimension. As historians and critics like Hadfield have noted, Elizabeth's already unsatisfactory domestic resources of governance were especially stretched thin in colonial Ireland. Spenser's Irena is symptomatic of these failing powers of colonial government; a powerless sovereign whose right to rule has been taken from her by a foreign usurper, Irena must call upon outside authority to reclaim her sovereign title. Like Alma, Medina and Mercilla, Irena is yet another Elizabeth who cannot maintain her territories, domestic or imperial. Finally, in her deconstructionist reading of Spenser's epic, Elizabeth J. Bellamy maintains that England's queen is "unreadable" in the poem because she remains unnamed. The multiplicity of sovereign representations signals Spenser's inability to directly "call forth her image":

the drive toward Elizabeth as unmediated Pure Name stalls in the succession of aberrant references that delay the coincidence of meaning and being, and the unreadability of her Proper Name is narrated through a chain of merely figurative

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<sup>328</sup> Hadfield, "The Spoiling of Princes" Artegall Thwarted, Calidore Confused." *Edmund Spenser's Irish Experience: Wilde Fruit and Salvage Soyl* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) 151-52. Print.



substitutions indefinitely deferred from an ultimate convergence with pure signification”.<sup>329</sup>

Louis Montrose instead sees the queen in Spenser’s epic as essentially textual. Considering the queen’s own modes of self-production and the poet’s power to make the monarch a “textual product”, Montrose asserts that the many Elizabeths of the poem constitute “complementary persons [that] are equally aspects of the queen’s body politic and her body natural; she is always already a cultural corpus, a body of texts”.<sup>330</sup>

Both Hadfield and Wofford remark upon the Faerie Queene’s spectral quality in Spenser’s epic. Turning to Arthur’s brief glimpse of Gloriana in his dream, Hadfield contends that

the bodies of the queen reflected in the variety of female figures scattered throughout the narrative constitute the manifestations of Gloriana, who only appears fleetingly to Arthur. Arthur is unsure if what he saw was real [ ... ] The queen’s presence is shown to be a ghostly one at two removes from reality, a fiction within a fiction. Arthur’s comment, ‘So faire a creature yet saw neuer sunny day’ (13), appears, if taken at face value, to be hyperbolic praise of the sovereign; equally, it could be taken to mean either that such a creature does not really exist, or that she hides herself away in the dark.<sup>331</sup>

Wofford likewise refers to the Faerie Queene as an “absent centre”, a reference I invoke when speaking of Spenser’s queen as an “absent presence”. Wofford identifies two reasons for this

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<sup>329</sup> Bellamy, “The Vocative and the Vocational: The Unreadability of Elizabeth in *The Faerie Queene*.” *ELH* 54.1 (1987) 1-3. Print.

<sup>330</sup> Montrose, “The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text”, 151-52.

<sup>331</sup> Hadfield, 152-53.

absent center: the ‘national prophetic destiny’ of the epic, promised by the unaccomplished union of Arthur and Gloriana and the “unrepresentable nature of the divine” as embodied in the sovereign.<sup>332</sup> Prompted by C. S. Lewis’s contention that the poem’s “centre, the seat of its highest life, is missing”, Willy Maley echoes Wofford’s sentiment, calling “the vacuum at the heart of the *Faerie Queene*” an “absent center”. Maley attributes this absentness to “royal absenteeism in Ireland”. According to his analysis, Spenser’s commentary on Ireland in the work is a response to the lack of a strong vice regent in Ireland and Elizabeth’s absence from her Irish colony. “What haunts the pages of *The Faerie Queene*”, he states, “is the spectre of sovereignty without the presence of a sovereign”.<sup>333</sup>

Rather than refer to the poem’s “absent center”, I instead deploy the term “absent presence” in reference to the Faerie Queene because, despite her absence, she exists in the work as a kind of spectral figure of sovereign rule to which the knights owe a tenuous form of allegiance. I contend that this absent presence of “singular” political authority is central to the poem’s perhaps unintended commentary on the displacement of governmental might from the sovereign to the state. According to this argument, the sovereign must be “present” as a somewhat depleted figure of outdated authoritarian ideology. For it is Spenser’s knights that embody governmental authority, thusly depleting the once-singular body of the queen and the monarch’s absolute sovereignty reiterated in official rhetoric.

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<sup>332</sup> Wofford, “*The Faerie Queene*, Books I-III.” *The Cambridge Companion to Spenser* Ed. Andrew Hadfield (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) 108-09. Print.

<sup>333</sup> Maley, “‘And nought but pressed gras where she had lyen’: Royal Absenteeism and Viceregal Verses.” *Salvaging Spenser: Colonialism, Culture and Identity* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997) 99-122. Print.

Spenser's knights do the work of the state, bringing law and order to bear upon a set of lawless territories. Though their quests are either in service to the queen or intended to gain entrance into the monarch's unreachable court, the knights do not necessarily receive their political authority from her hands. For example, Arthur, the well-worn figure of Tudor mythology that repeatedly appears in the poem as a kind of savior, is unassociated with the Faerie Queene. In Book II Canto IX, he expresses to Guyon his fervent desire to come into her "faithfull service, and meete amenaunce" (II.ix.5.7), but the authority and power that he wields throughout the work is not granted him by the poem's reigning sovereign. Likewise, Guyon, though a servant to the Faerie Queene, received the authority of knighthood not from the faery sovereign but from "good Sir Huons hand, / When the king Oberon he came to Fary land" (II.1.6.7-9). Although the knights have vowed allegiance to the poem's supreme monarch, the well-spring and nature of their authority is uncertain. In the case of Guyon, Arthur and Artegall (who was trained in matters of justice by his mythological foster mother, Astraea), these knight are already imbued with the power to correct social and political wrongs prior to their stated allegiance to the queen; their authority is not "in the manner of loan or grant on sufferance", in Bodin's language. For all the poem's evocations of the queen in her many manifestations, sovereignty does not reside in her mystifying literary personas; rather, sovereignty is diffuse and ubiquitous, existing outside the realm of monarchical power.<sup>334</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Wofford also comments upon the knights' seeming disassociation from a centralized figure and fount of authority. "Instead of royal or divine or metropolitan centre" she writes, "the poem consistently presents a periphery, with knights wandering almost as if in exile in forests and plains, far from the civic and religious centre of the plot or its symbols". Though I agree with her claim that the knights appear disconnected from a singular sovereign, I do not agree that they meander the poem's landscape as near-exiles, particularly because they act with a significant measure of authority in their several quests. The knight's distance from a sovereign center, according to my argument, actually imbues the knights with a kind of unregulated power, similar to state agents acting in behalf of the queen but out of her governmental reach. Wofford, 107.

The decentering and dispersal of authority in the poem allows the knights a troubling degree of political autonomy. Imbued with the power to intercede in matters of social disorder and to mete out justice where and when they see fit, the knights repeatedly stray from the quests assigned to them by their queen. The Red Cross Knight, for instance, not only recurrently defers his duty to the Faerie Queene to slay the dragon that has imprisoned Una's parents, he even enters the court of Lucifera, bowing and "making obeysaunce" (I.iv.13.7) to one of Spenser's many inverse representations of Elizabeth. Likewise, Artegall and Calidore are admonished, sometimes by the speaker himself, for neglecting the very quests that bind them to the Faerie Queene. In both cases, the knights' prescribed duties are left only partially fulfilled; Artegall departs Ireland in a state of incomplete reformation, and Calidore merely suppresses the Blatant Beast temporarily.<sup>335</sup> As the work draws to a close, the object of Calidore's quest "raungeth through the world againe, / And rageth sore in each degree and state", and we exit Spenser's unfinished epic with a nod toward the lawlessness that still reigns in Faerie Land and its mirror, Elizabeth's England.

A sense of lawlessness and rebellion pervades Spenser's poetic landscape from the first book to its unsettling conclusion. Lucifera, who reigns in the territory of Book I, is a self-made monarch, lacking "rightfull kingdome" and "heritage of natie soueraintie, / But did vsurpe with wrong and tyrannie" (I.iv.12.3-5). Antithetical to Spenser's several Elizabeths in the poem,

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<sup>335</sup> Tobias Gregory considers Artegall's unfinished work in Ireland in light of Spenser's "interventionist Protestant perspective" (366). Including Spenser among those members of Elizabethan political culture who desired that their monarch show more commitment to Protestant communities abroad, Gregory sees in *The Faerie Queene* a critique of Elizabeth's reluctance to more fully involve England in international Protestant causes. Linking Artgell's defense of Irena with Lord Grey's deployment and eventual "recall" from Ireland, Gregory sees in Book five's incomplete Ireland episode Spenser's depiction of "the evils of a policy of half measures" (381). Gregory, "Shadowing Intervention: On the Politics of *The Faerie Queene* Book 5 Cantos 10-12." *ELH* 67.2 (2000): 366. *Project Muse*. Web. 20 Sept. 2011.

Lucifera “ne ruld her Realme with lawes, but pollicie” (I.iv.12. 7). Figures of lawlessness akin to Lucifera abound in *The Faerie Queene*; Acrasia, Radigund, Adicia, Munera and Pollente, and Grantorto all exercise a kind of localized power that radically challenges the supposedly omnipresent authority of the Faerie Queene and the political might of Spenser’s several legitimate female rulers. The “lawless multitude” that surround the “mighty Gyant” of Book V Canto II (V.ii.52.1), the “thousand villeins” that besiege the House of Temperance (II.ix.13.2) and the cannibalistic “savage nation” of borderers in Book VI (VI.viii.35.2) signal that the refusal of law is not just the purview of those with power, but also of significant segments of the populace who riot against both local law and the overarching rule of the queen.

One can perhaps explain the many instances of lawless figures and territories by considering the conventions of chivalric romance; Spenser’s use of this genre demands that itinerant knights discover treacherous elements and villainous characters to battle and suppress during their travels. However, Spenser’s landscape is so persistently shot through with contemporary events that took place during Elizabeth’s reign—the assassination of Mary Queen of Scots, the several governmental crises in Ireland, the queen’s involvement in the Low Countries and her on-going battle with Spain, etc—that it seems likely that these rebel states in Faerie Land have relevance beyond the strictures of generic convention. In several respects, the presence of rogue elements in the Faerie kingdom seems to gesture toward the pockets of governmental resistance and insubordinate localized authority that made necessary the development of the Elizabethan state. And, like the very real need for a state to maintain her kingdoms, Spenser’s Faerie Land likewise emphasizes the failure of monarchical ideology to enforce upon the realm the obedience to the sovereign and subjection to the law necessary to stave off social disorder. The splintering of the sovereign into myriad forms and personas and the

disconnectedness of the knights themselves only exacerbates the sense of governmental disarray. The absent-presence of the overarching figure of sovereign authority and the ubiquity of Elizabethan representations makes exceedingly unclear the source of political might and the relationship between the sovereign(s) and her supposed servants, who often act on their own seemingly autonomous authority.<sup>336</sup>

The governmental disunity that is betrayed in Spenser's work is reflected in Faery Land's territorial disunity; like the many sovereigns of the poem and the several figures who challenge their claims to territorial and governmental authority, the land is likewise disjointed and disunified. Within the Faerie Queene's discontinuous realm, as evidenced by the sharp and unexplained shifts in landscape mentioned above, are multiple islands, disconnected bodies of land that are usually marked out as clandestine sites of rebellion and anarchy. Acrasia's island Bower of Bliss (which I will return to in more detail), Argante's "secret Ile" (III.vii.50.6) and the "savage island" of Ireland (VI.i.9.1) are each contained within the monarch's realm, but like the territories ruled by Lucifera and others, they appear as autonomous units within the kingdom

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<sup>336</sup> Hadfield identifies in Spenser's Mutability cantos a pronounced fear of political change, arguing that the cantos "seem to represent the threat of Mutabilitie as a legitimate—though patently undesirable—challenge to the rule of Cynthia / Elizabeth". Whereas Hadfield locates this threat to the monarch in the Stuart ascension to the throne, it is my contention that the formation of the state and the consequent dispersal of political authority could likewise be perceived as a potentially dangerous upheaval of monarchical authority. It is this fear of political mutability that I trace out in Spenser's work. Hadfield, "Introduction: the relevance of Edmund Spenser." *Cambridge Companion to Spenser* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) 6. Print. Of Gloriana's elusive presence in the work, Jeffrey P. Fruen accounts for the sovereign's absence by pointing to Spenser's use of "biblical typology", arguing that "Gloriana should be seen as focal to the poem's disjointed narratives in much the same sense in which Christ was seen as the unifying focus of the Bible". Maintaining that the semblages of Elizabeth throughout the poem are actually abstract personification of Glory that culminate in the continually deferred person of Gloriana, Fruen attempts to resolve the narrative disjointed-ness of Spenser's work by likening the many queens of the Faerie Queene to the characters of the Bible who prefigure Christ. Fruen, " 'True Glorious Type': The Place of Gloriana in *The Faerie Queene*." *Spenser Studies: A Renaissance Poetry Annual* 7 (1986): 148. Print.

functioning under their own systems of law that contrast sharply with the laws of the kingdom. The existence of such sites territorially within the bounds of the kingdom but acting outside the law of the realm makes impossible the notion of a Faery Land unified under the rule of its queen. Like Elizabeth's England, where attempts at centralization incidentally brought into boldface the local and cultural differences that loudly denied official claims to unification, Spenser's Faerie realms betrays the rent body politic that refuses to be modeled upon the singular body of the monarch.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore episodes from Books II and V of *The Faerie Queene* to consider how Spenser's epic work reflects contemporary debates regarding the nature of sovereign rule and the role of the state in the governance of a monarchical realm that problematically fashions itself absolutist.

'In th' Almightyes place'

Books II and V of Spenser's epic most overtly place his readers in the realm of Elizabethan political culture by charging Knights Guyon and Artegall with the governmental maintenance of the poet's fictional Britain. Faerie Land as it stands at the beginning of these two books is a failed state. The reigning monarch cannot hold the body politic together, her spectral quality too insubstantial to hold her subjects in an ideological bounded-ness to her rule. The other queens of Spenser's disconnected realm momentarily appear and then quickly recede into the poem's narrative backdrop, their very multiplicity throwing into question the unity of this sovereign territory. The discontinuous kingdoms of Faerie Land are held by several autonomous rulers, some criminal, some legitimate, yet all unsuccessful in the governance of their land and peoples. Finally, the territory lacks a system of law yoking the subjects to the "nation" and its sovereign. Knights Guyon, Artegall and sometimes Arthur come to the aid of the land's faltering

monarchs, temporarily instituting law and order and bringing to bear upon the territory the virtues of temperance and justice.<sup>337</sup>

The representative virtues of Books II and V were of obvious significance to nascent Elizabethan state formation. Temperance was a matter that extended beyond the physical body to the body political. “Goodly governance” of the realm often demanded the tempering of the law and of its agents to build a state capable of rightly and justly applying the law in accordance with royal decree and local custom, two forces that were often at social and political odds (II.i.29.8). Abuses of power by those entrusted to rule in the sovereign’s name made this body politic susceptible to infection and disease; thusly, the crown had to monitor closely the limbs of state that were animated by its divine authority. Guyon and Artegall embody the qualities of temperance and justice not only in the allegorical realm, but also in a kind of political testing-ground created by the poet. Each knight, imperfectly capable of asserting political authority, traverses the landscape of the poem righting social and political wrongs and bringing temporary order to the Faerie Queene’s territories. In this respect, Guyon and Artegall serve the interests of the monarch by correcting governmental failures of justice and law. But, in the process of carrying law into the realm, the knights expose the weaknesses of monarchical ideology and draw attention to the threats to the crown produced as a consequence of early modern state formation. The myriad queens of the poem, including the titular sovereign, are clearly incapable of enforcing social and political order; as discussed below, the kingdoms of Faerie Land are shot through with lawless elements that override and make inconsequential the supposed authority of the various monarchs. The knights are themselves dangerous to the crown, acting upon their own authority and disregarding the mandates of the sovereign; in this scenario, the limbs of state

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<sup>337</sup> Subtitle, *Faerie Queene*, Book V Proem.



propel the body politic at the expense of the monarchical head. In any case, in Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, the state—its knightly representatives, its power to govern, its power to disobey—eclipses the monarch.

Though the quest assigned to Sir Guyon by the Faerie Queen is to capture Acrasia and end her “grievous mischiefes” (II.ii.43.3), the ruler's mandate is twice deferred: first, when Guyon visits the court of Medina, and secondly when he and Arthur defend Alma's House of Temperance from Maleger and his “thousand villeins” (II.ix.13.2). The knights' intervention at Alma's castle not only puts off the queen's command, it also results in a protracted break in Guyon's narrative.<sup>338</sup> Following the defeat of Maleger's ghostly troops, Guyon and Arthur are given a lengthy tour through the House's allegorical map of the temperate body. The conclusion of this bodily progress is the discovery of *Briton moniments* and the “*Antiquitee of Faery lond*” housed in Eumnestes's library (II.ix.59-60). The following canto is devoted in full to Spenser's fabulous nationalist history, to be discussed in more detail below. The beginning of Canto VI sees the departure of Guyon and the Palmer to the Bower of Bliss, yet the reader is disallowed from following our hero to his decreed site of action. “But let them pas, whiles winde and wether

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<sup>338</sup> Kate Wheeler also recognizes in Guyon's narrative a “curious narrative loop or glitch” regarding Guyon's quest that puts significant pressure on the notion of the knight's allegiance to his queen. Though we learn in Canto ii that Guyon is assigned by his sovereign to root out the evils perpetrated by Acrasia, it is his coming upon Mordant and Amavia in canto i, “which occurs outside the context of Gloriana's court” that impels his quest (8). Wheeler argues that this narrative “disjunction” is not simply a narrative slip up on Spenser's part. Instead, she maintains, this episode points to a tension in Book II between the knight's “visceral sympathy” and “the service of an ideal or of a sovereign”; Guyon's emotions, not his allegiance to his monarch, compels him to act. Wheeler claims that “Guyon's response, and the narrative resolution of the tableau, emphasize independent knightly agency” above and beyond his obedience to the queen. This “independent knightly agency”, I would argue, is also the result of placing in the servants of the state the sovereign authority that was once the purview only of the monarch. Wheeler, “‘They heard a ruefull voice’: Guyon's Agency and the Gloriana Framework in Book II of *The Faerie Queene*.” *Proceedings of the Eight Annual Northern Plains Conference on Earlier British Literature* (Sioux Center: Dordt College, 2001) 7-11. Print.

right”, states the narrator, “Doe serve their turnes: here I a while must stay, / To see a cruell fight doen by the prince this day” (II.xi.4.7-9). The battle that ensues between Arthur and Maleger prevents our departure from Alma’s palace, and it is not until both Arthur and “the goodly frame of Temperance” are “fayrely to rise” that we are returned to Guyon and the only canto devoted to the destruction of the Bower and the apprehension of Acrasia (II.xii.1.1-2).

From a strictly allegorical standpoint, the poem’s lengthy attention to the House of Temperance makes poetic sense; the knight embodying this celebrated Elizabethan virtue, with the aid of England’s most eminent prince, must restore Alma’s House to its “firm foundation of true bountyhed” before razing its antithesis to the ground (II.xii.1.5). However, the poem’s prolonged lingering at the House of Temperance has implications beyond the demands of allegorical reasoning. As critics have noted, the House of Temperance has deep resonances with imaginings of the early modern body politic.<sup>339</sup> Composed of interactive organs that are governed by a reasoning brain, the ostensible temperate body is also a self-sufficient and singular organic structure that mirrors the political nation with the monarch at its head. Embedded within this representation of the body politic is Spenser’s most overt intervention into England’s productions of nationalist myth-making; the poet’s fantastic history of England’s beginnings to the reign of Elizabeth’s mythological forefather is not a replica of the English monarchical genealogies of Spenser’s contemporaries. Rather, Spenser makes use of the “canker holes” and “worm-eaten” historical aporias that characterize the scrolls of Eumnestes national library to

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<sup>339</sup> Walter R. Davis similarly likens the House to Temperance to the Elizabethan body politic in his examination of Book II’s preoccupation with mortality. Davis, “The Houses of Mortality in Book II of *The Faerie Queene*.” *Spenser Studies: A Renaissance Poetry Annual* 2 (1981): 121-40, Print.

rewrite Britain's history as a unified narrative of national might and English glory (II.ix.57.9).<sup>340</sup> Bookending his tale with celebrations of England's queen, Spenser literally contains the history of Britain within an English frame. By marking the Romans as vicious invaders continually beaten back by the Britons and by seriously diminishing the Anglo-Saxon's presence in British genealogical records, Spenser's reworkings imagine an ancient Britain that seamlessly progresses into Englishness without the contaminating influences of foreign cultures. Slipping from British-ness to Englishness by eliding these conquering forces and narratively melding the British history read by Arthur (Elizabeth's forefather) and the "English" faerie history consumed by Guyon, Spenser sidesteps "the British problem" by constructing one more or less continuous history (though, the clunky narrative mechanics necessary to this maneuver betray the difficulties of such a historical construction). Spenser's body politic begins and ends with Englishness. By placing his site of national narration within Alma's castle, Spenser marks this body politic out as specifically English, rather than some sort of poetic abstraction of the nation.

Significantly, Spenser's monarchical representations – Alma and the Faerie Queene—seem to skirt the margins of Spenser's body politic. Alma's court at the heart of this body, the semi-private "Parlour", decked with "royall arras richly dight", is the site of queenly entertaining and "modest" courting, a scene that for Elizabeth had as much to do with politics as romance (II.ix.33.6-7). Yet her rule of the body politic as represented in Book II does not seem to extend beyond the "goodly government" of the passions (II.xi.2.4); in fact, she appears as little more

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<sup>340</sup> Jennifer Summit reads this scene in Eumnestes's library as a reflection of Post-Reformation "bibliographical salvage" in which book collectors sought to amend or purge texts from England's monastic libraries. She argues that two featured books in the library, *Briton monuments* and *Antiquittie of Faerie lond*, gesture toward the system by which book collectors "reinvented the library itself from an ecclesiastical receptacle of written tradition to a state-sponsored center of national history". Summit, "Monuments and Ruins: Spenser and the Problem of the English Library." *ELH* 70.1 (2003): 3-4. *Project Muse*. Print.

than a tour guide in her castle.<sup>341</sup> Though she is the allegorical rational soul that governs the body's limbs and organs, the House seems to function self-sufficiently through the combined efforts of the many bodily departments and their various governors (Diet, Appetite, Concoction and the like). At a distance from Alma's court in the heart, it is the head with its three sages that commands the interconnected mechanisms of the body. Importantly, Alma requires the aid of the sages to reign over the house. "These three in these three rowmes did sondry dwell", explains the narrator of the sages, "and counselled faire Alma, how to governe well" (II.ix.48.8-9). In the room of the unnamed sage that presides over the present, the knights discover a place

.....whose wals  
 Were painted faire with memorable gestes,  
 Of famous Wisards, and with picturals  
 Of Magistrates, of courts, of tribunals,  
 Of commen wealthes, of states, of policy,  
 Of lawes, of judgements, and of decretals (II.ix.53.2-7).

Housed in this chamber of the brain are the engines of a composite government. Advised by her counselors who oversee the functioning of the house and supported by a state infrastructure that heads up the judicial, legal and governmental workings of the body politic, Alma's ostensible role as monarch is diminished by her limited intervention in the ordering of this political body.

That the most overt depiction of Tudor political culture is not associated with the Faerie Queene is also significant. The body politic as represented by the House of Temperance appears

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<sup>341</sup> As Catherine Bates also notes, references to the "goodly government" (of the passions, of the body, of space, etc) abound in Book II. Though self-governance is obviously linked to the virtue of temperance, Spenser's repeated iterations of this term and the book's preoccupation with matters of state point to a more compendious notion of Elizabethan governmentality. Bates, "Images of Government in *The Faerie Queene*, Book II." *Notes and Queries* 3 (1989): 314-15, Print.

at a distance from the (absent) monarchical center of the epic. Spenser's separation of the body politic from the body monarchical severs his many queens from the engines of governance, subtly casting doubt upon the notions of authoritarian power that undergirded Tudor rule. Furthermore, situating the store-house and production of national history and myth-making in Alma's castle, rather than in the court of the poem's ultimate authority carries the uneasy implication that the construction of the textual nation is the purview of the body politic and therefore somewhat out of the monarch's control. Guyon and Arthur's inventions at the House of Temperance, Medina's castle and the Bower of Bliss all indicate a startling lack of monarchical power. Lawlessness enfeebles Medina's realm, personified by Sansloy and evidenced by the "daily warre" taking place within her castle. Though she embodies Elizabeth's deft mediation in matters of politics, Medina's "treaty" to end the violence in her house is only achieved after the arrival and somewhat clumsy intervention of Guyon. The meeting of the knight's "wonderous great prowess and heroick worth" (II.ii.25.3) with Medina's "pithy words and counsel sad" (II.ii.28.5) makes way for Medina's "law for ever [that] should endure; / Which to observe in word of knights they did assure" (II.ii.32.8-9).

Likewise, Alma's "sober government" (II.ix.1.4) of the House of Temperance is thrown into question by the seven year "siege" (II.ix.12.7) of Maleger's "troublous rout" (II.ix.17.1), who perpetually wage war upon the temperate body politic and effectually imprison her subjects within the castle walls. Denied entrance to this microcosm of the Elizabethan political body, the "vile caitive wretches, ragged, rude, [and] deformed", armed with the "unwieldy" and "rusty" weapons of a disenfranchised peasant class pose as the ungovernable elements that threaten Alma's—and Elizabeth's—sovereign state. Only with the aid of the itinerant Guyon and Arthur

are Maleger and his spectral army dispersed.<sup>342</sup> Acting autonomously and in seeming defiance of the Faerie Queene's command, Guyon and Arthur bring their independent authority to bear upon the pockets of disorder in Faerie Land that have slipped out of both the overarching monarch and her lesser representations' control.

Taken as mirror that reflects back to Elizabeth her own kingdom, Book II of the Faerie Queene casts in a faltering light the monarch's command over her territory, her people and even those imbued with the sovereign's divine authority to manage the realm. Though Guyon eventually captures Acrasia and destroys the Bower, and despite the fact that Spenser is often at pains to re-center the epic's focus on England's queen (the knights' arrival at the House of Temperance begins with a lengthy celebration of the Faerie Queene, discussed below), the poem consistently reminds us that the Faerie Queene's kingdom (and that of her real life referent) is shot through with ungoverned elements that feel the hand of authority only when the knights intervene in matters of the realm. Medina, the personification of "lovely concord" and "most sacred peace" (II.ii.31.1) and Alma, who projects "mildnesse virginall" and a "wise and liberall" judgment (II.ix.20. 4-5), are piecemeal representations of England's sovereign. To reinforce the mirrored relationship between these lesser monarchs, the Faerie Queene and Elizabeth, Spenser pairs his illustrations of Medina and Alma with moving pronouncements of the Faerie Queene's greatness. Quickly following the drawing of Medina's treaty, Spenser has her inquire into

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<sup>342</sup> According to Joan Fitzpatrick, the siege on Alma's House betrays that "the landscape of Fairyland—its rocks and caves, as well as its woodland—harbors those who wish to attack the virtuous" (366). Whereas Fitzpatrick attributes these threatening and eventually evacuated elements of the poem's setting to the work's colonial politics, in which one can detect "an almost neurotic desire to cleanse the landscape" of Catholicism (375), I maintain that the lawlessness that everywhere inflects Spenser's narrative indicates the growing need for a state infrastructure to bring order to the realm. Fitzpatrick, "Spenser and Land: Political Conflict Resolved in Physical Topography." *Ben Jonson Journal: Literary Contexts in the Age of Elizabeth, James and Charles* 7 (2000): 366 and 375. Print.

Guyon's reasons for his travels, prompting him to exclaim his monarch's glory in terms applied to both Medina and England's sovereign: "Great and most glorious virgin Queene alive, / That with her souveraine power, and scepter shene / All Faery lond does peaceably sustene" (II.ii.40.3-5). Likewise, our introduction to Alma is prefaced by Guyon and Arthur's paeon to the female ruler of the kingdom. Responding to Arthur's question regarding the face on his shield, Guyon explains,

Shee is the mighty Queene of *Faery*,  
Whose faire retraits I in my shield do beare:  
Shee is the flowre of grace and chastity,  
Throughout the world renowned far and neare,  
My life, my liege, my Souveraine, my dear,  
Whose glory shineth as the morning starre,  
And with her light the earth enlumines cleare;  
Far reach her mercies, and her praises farre,  
As well in state of peace, as puissance in warre (II.ix.4).

Resounding with keywords often attached to England's queen, Spenser borrows from this catalog of descriptors to construct Alma, Medina and the work's other women rulers; in so doing, he breaks up this composite of Elizabeth into similar but disconnected queenly manifestations. For this reason, it is alarming to realize that neither Elizabeth's mirror image, the ruler of Faery Land, nor her many literarily embodied characteristics (mercy, temperance, moderation, etc) can maintain an authoritative hold over their territories.

The falsity of Guyon's claim that the Faerie Queene's "soveraine power" and omnipresent "light" can alone "peaceably sustene[s]" her kingdom is made most apparent in

Book V. Lamenting “the world [ ... ] runne quite out of square” in the proem (V.proem.1.7), Spenser abruptly removes us from Faerie Land and places us in a contemporary Elizabethan landscape, “present dayes, which are corrupted sore” (V.proem.3.4) in which the world is overturned and injustice reigns. In the modern state, Spenser implies, justice is obscured, made unreachable because of a system that values self-interest and profit over truth.<sup>343</sup> Imagining a “golden age” (V.proem.2.1) when “justice was not for most meed outhyred” (V.proem.3.8), the poet allegorically presents justice as a woman who once “sate high ador’d” (V.proem.9.8) in the world’s mythical hierarchy. Next, in language that strongly resounds with that of the Elizabethan political theorists cited above, Spenser describes how this divine quality comes to reside in kings.

Most sacred vertue she of all the rest,  
Resembling God in his imperiall might;  
Whose soveraine power is herein most exprest,  
That both to good and bad he dealeth right,  
And all his workes with Justice hath bedight.  
That power he also doth to Princes lend,  
And makes them like himself in glorious sight,  
To sit in his owne seate, his cause to end,  
And rule his people right, as he doth recommend (V.proem.10).

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<sup>343</sup> Hadfield examines this portion of the proem in the context of England’s colonial project in Ireland and the slipperiness of the concept of justice when accusations of savagery may be applied to both colonizer and colonized. He argues that stanza three of the proem “effectively acknowledges that ‘ciuill uses’ of the notion of justice have become inextricably mixed with their implied opposites, savage uses, suggesting that the savagery of Artegall and the quite opposite savagery of Ireland may not be as far apart as they should be. The threat Ireland poses to Englishness is that the two nations may end up being variations on the same theme”. Hadfield, “The Spoiling of Princes”, 147-8 Print.



By first equating justice with God, Spenser places the mythological feminine figure of justice into a recognizably Christian context in keeping with Elizabethan political cosmology. Justice here becomes the vehicle through which “soveraine powre” is defined and made manifest. Entering the earthly realm, this justice and the divine power it carries is transferred to “princes”, thus enshrining the monarch in a theistic light and empowering the king or queen to act in God’s stead. Closing this discourse on the monarch’s God-given authority to dispense the most important of sovereign virtues is Spenser’s direct address to his queen, his “Dread Soverayne Goddesses, that doest highest sit / In seate of judgement, in th’ Almighties place” (V.proem.11.1-2). Positioning Elizabeth in Justice’s “high ador’d” throne and God’s “owne seate”, Spenser completes his allegorical portrait of sovereign power.<sup>344</sup>

Yet, Spenser’s rendering of the passage of Justice’s supreme authority to God’s earthly representative is surprisingly disquieting. Although the poet concludes the proem by reminding his audience of Elizabeth’s divine power to bring correctness to the world, the radically disordered realm, which Spenser equates with her England, is left an unfixed planet of “ruinous decay” (V.proem.6.9). The world in which the sun is “miscarried with the other Spheres” and the stars “range, and do at randon rove / Out of their proper places farre away” is not a depiction of the kingdom prior to Elizabeth’s donning of the crown, but an alarming illustration of the current state of her realm, according to the narrative chronology of the proem. Spenser breaks off the

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<sup>344</sup> In *Icons of Justice*, Jane Aptekar makes a similar point, demonstrating how Spenser applies the early modern language of iconography to depict “the monarch’s closeness to God”. Aptekar contends that Spenser’s portrait of Mercilla is his “central and most formally elaborate icon of monarchy”, particularly when “performing the same act as his Dread Soverayne Goddesses, the act of executing justice”. As I argue, however, Mercilla does not act alone in casting her final judgment against Duessa; the fact that she enlists the aid of Artegall and Arthur speaks to a dispersal of the sovereign power of justice to agents of the Elizabethan state (see below). Aptekar, *Icons of Justice: Iconography & Thematic Imagery in Book V of The Faerie Queene* (New York: Columbia UP, 1969) 14-15. Print.

proem with this fallen world frozen in narrative time with Elizabeth at the helm thus implying that all is not aright regarding the system of Elizabethan governance and the ideology that sustains it.

Furthermore, it is not the queens of Book V who meet out justice, but Artegall, the “instrument” (V.proem.11.9) of the sovereign who traverses the realm like an itinerant judge, hearing cases and handing out verdicts and punishments.<sup>345</sup> In fact, Book V’s queens, particularly Mercilla, are either in desperate need of Artegall’s intervention to expel rogue elements from the realm or are dependent upon his judgment to make decisions regarding the welfare of the state. The reliance of the sovereign upon Artegall marks him out as more than a mere mechanism of the crown; rather, he is justice incarnate acting in “th’ Almightye’s place”. Displacing the monarch in the political cosmos illustrated in the proem, Artegall dispenses justice with the power supposedly preserved for kings.

Artegall’s circuit of justice begins in Canto i when he judges the case of Sanglier and the Squire in which the honest attendant is awarded with his stolen lady and the murderous Sanglier is condemned to carry the head of his former lover. For rightly perceiving the love of the *squire* for his violated lady and enforcing just punishment upon Sanglier, “much did that Squire Sir

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<sup>345</sup> In *Mirror and Veil*, Michael O’Connell likens Artegall to “a judge of the assizes who rides in circuit with an iron sherriff to hear difficult cases”. Paola Baseotto instead sees in Artegall the characteristics of the Lord Chancellor, due to his training by Astraea that blended “the letter of the law” with the equitable application of justice. One notes that in both analyses that Artegall betrays recognizable qualities of the Elizabethan state agent imbued with the queen’s authority. Aptekar also acknowledges that Artegall as “princely ‘instrument’ of Elizabeth and of justice not only performs in his own person the king’s function of judging but also has at his command the monarch’s two executive instruments of power and law”. She does not, however, address in detail the potential danger of this disengagement of sovereign might from the person of the king or queen. Aptekar, 23-4, Baseotto, *Fighting for God, Queen and Country: Spenser and the Morality of Violence* (Milano: Arcipelago Edizioni, 2004) 98. Print, O’Connell, *Mirror and Veil: The Historical Dimesion of Spenser’s Faerie Queene* (Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1977) I33. Print.

Artegall adore, / For his great justice, held in high regard” (V.i.30.1-2). The neat picture of justice served is complicated in canto two where Spenser’s chivalric romance again veers into the territory of Elizabethan society and politics. Informed of Pollente’s tyrannous control over the bridge leading to “the Castle of the strond” (V.ii.4.2), Artégall defers his appointed quest in order to confront Pollente and Munera. Pollente captures in miniature Elizabethan fears of an overpowerful upper class; disallowing free passage across the land and taxing the citizenry for their use of his bridge, Pollente upends customary rights and common law.<sup>346</sup> “Having great Lordships got and goodly farmes, / Through strong oppression of his powre exort”, Pollente and Munera rule their rogue state as pretended sovereigns, making use of kingly prerogatives (taxation, land-ownership, control of passage) to line their coffers and consolidate their localized power. Munera has, in fact, accumulated such wealth that “many Princes she in wealth exceeds, / And purchast all the countrey lying ny” (V.ii.9.6-7). For a cash-strapped monarchy unable to fund its ventures without financial aid, the presence of overmighty subjects of great wealth who rivaled the territorial and social power of the queen underscored the notion that authority and power were not strictly the purview of the crown. That Spenser chose to include in his landscape this freely-functioning state that abides only by “the custome of their law” (V.ii.11.7) speaks to a

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<sup>346</sup> Aptekar claims Pollente “exemplifies the problem of the ‘over-mighty subject’ which, understandably, much troubled the Tudor kings. Pollente, like the great English noblemen who retained their own armies, has assumed for himself rights and privileges which—to the Tudor monarch’s mind—only the king should have”. While I agree with her overall characterization of Pollente, I believe that Artégall himself might be viewed as “a usurper of proper authority”, particularly when he uses the power entrusted to him by the Faerie Queene to intercede in quests that thwart or delay his sworn duty to the monarch. Aptekar, 33.

kind of social and political disorder that slips from the poetic realm of the proem into the contemporary world of Elizabethan culture.<sup>347</sup>

Though Artegall succeeds in ridding the land of Pollente, Munera and their henchman Guizor, justice is meted out in a hasty and unthinking fashion. Having removed Munera's hands and feet, Talus throws her from the castle wall where she drowns in the river below. The plentiful stores of money contained within Munera's castle walls are destroyed and the castle is razed "that there mote be no hope of reparation" (V.ii.28.4). Desiring that no "memory [ . . . ] to any nation" remain of Pollente's tyranny, Artegall and Talus destroy the traces of Pollente and Munera's realm, thus evacuating from the historical and political landscape of Faerie Land any evidence of the lawless community aside from Pollente's piked head (and Munera's feet and hands). Disallowing the possibility of exemplary justice so central to Elizabethan social policy and obliterating circulating monies of the kingdom, Artegall's form of justice is not attentive to the broader governmental matters of the state. Instead, his reckless justice underscores his own autonomous action as a figure imbued with divine power.<sup>348</sup> At the moment of Pollente's death,

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<sup>347</sup> Jacqueline T. Miller asserts that world of Elizabethan political reality impinges upon the fictional realm that Spenser sought to create in *The Faerie Queene*. The slippage of the "fallen" contemporary world into the idealized kingdom of Faery Land marks the failure of the fiction to produce this "ideal". This recognition of fiction's shortcomings, she argues, is especially apparent in the latter books of the poem: in these books, "the poet does not simply come to terms with the state of the world—something he has always been aware of—but comes to terms with the status of his own fiction, which subscribes to the actual, betrays his lack of autonomy, and reveals his inability to fashion and authorize ideal resolutions" (41). Miller, "The Status of Faeryland: Spenser's 'Vnjust Possession'." *Spenser Studies: A Renaissance Poetry Annual* 15 (1985): 40, Print.

<sup>348</sup> Judith H. Anderson also remarks upon the "perfunctory, robotistic, and inhuman element in Artegall's justice", identifying in his thoughtless behavior the failure of the Elizabethan government to live up to this unattainable "absolute ideal". I would add to Anderson's analysis the possibility that the poem offers up a critique of the infrastructural process of state building requisite for practically implementing this "ideal". Anderson, "'Nor Man It Is': The Knight of Justice in Book V of Spenser's 'Faerie Queene'". *PMLA* 85.1 (1970): 65-8. Print.

the villain “gnashed with his teeth, as if he band / High God, whose goodnesse he despaired quight, / Or curst the hand, which did that vengeance on him dight” (V.ii.18.7-9). Troublesomely collapsing Artegall and God, whose “goodnesse” Artegall dispenses with his hand of justice, the death of Pollente signals not a victory of the state or sovereign, but of God’s instrument who acts “in th’ Almightyes place”.

Artegall’s self-determining mode of justice again comes into question in the second half of the canto. Encountering the “great assembly” of the unnamed Giant’s followers (V.ii.29.6), Artegall engages the Giant in a debate regarding egalitarian politics. As A. C. Hamilton remarks in his marginal notes to his edition, the Giant’s argument for fiscal and social equality runs directly counter to Elizabethan notions of the divinely appointed hierarchies that underpinned early modern social life.<sup>349</sup> As explained above, this strict adherence to the hierarchical ordering of the universe was also called up as the infrastructure of Elizabethan governance. Elyot, for instance, argues that the term “publike weale”, rather than commonweal, best describes the English body politic; whereas commonweal implies communal or shared skills, “publike weale” instead acknowledges the hierarchical order that organizes and stabilizes society.<sup>350</sup> Maintaining that God has endowed man with varying “degrees and astates in his glorious warkes”, Elyot explains

in every thyng is ordre, and without ordre may be nothing stable or permanent;  
and it may nat be called ordre, excepte it do contayne in it degrees, high and base,  
accordynge to the merite or estimation of the thyng that is ordred [ ... ] And

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<sup>349</sup> See footnote 29-54 on page 520.

<sup>350</sup> Elyot, 1.

therefore hit appereth that god gyveth nat to every man lke gyftes of grace, or of nature, but to some more, some lesses, as it liketh his divine majestie.<sup>351</sup>

Applying this logic to the appointment of government officials, Elyot argues that he who possesses the most understanding is “next to the similitude of his maker” and should thus be “advanced in degree or place where understandynge may profite: whiche is also distributed in to sondry uses, faculties, and offices, necessary for the lyving and governance of mankynde”.<sup>352</sup>

The world proposed by the Giant, in which “all the wealth of rich men to the poore will draw” (V.ii.38.9) threatens not only the fragile social order propped up by an ideological apparatus based upon social and financial inequality, but also the systems of governance that have placed Artegall in his position of near-deistic power. Echoing Elyot, Artegall rebuts the Giant’s argument by citing God’s mysteries and the objects of his world “in goodly measure, by their Makers might, / And weighed out in ballaunces so nere, / That not a dram was missing of their right” (V.ii.35.2-4). Of God’s creatures Artegall maintains,

They live, they die, like as he doth ordaine,  
Ne ever any asketh reason why.  
The hils doe not the lowly dales disdain;  
The dales doe not the lofty hils envy.  
He maketh Kings to sit in soverainty;  
He maketh subjects to their power obey;  
He pulleth downe, he setteth up on hy;  
He gives to this, from that he takes way.

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<sup>351</sup> Ibid, 4-5.

<sup>352</sup> Ibid, 6.

For all we have is what: ehst he list doe, he may (V.ii.41).

To question this hierarchical ordering of the world and its inhabitants, according to Artegall (and to Elyot, presumably), is to deny God's "soveraine power" (V.ii.42.3). Upholding the model of social organization and governance that justifies in spiritual terms the endowment of social and political authority to the prince and her agents—those "setteth up on hy", seated in proximity to the monarch according to God's design—Artegall articulates the very political theories that underpinned the formation of the state.

Yet, like the unresolved conclusion of Book II and the discomfiting illustration of the Elizabethan world in the proem, Spenser's allusion to contemporary political theory in Canto ii does not bring resolution to the questions of egalitarianism proposed by the Giant. As Hadfield has noted, "it is by no means obvious that Artegall has the better of the argument at every turn. The giant's assertion that he will curb the excesses of over-mighty subjects is not dissimilar to Artegall's desire to punish Pollente and Munera harshly for their abuse of the commons"<sup>353</sup> In his disputation with Artegall, the Giant's condemnation of the modern world and his intention to rid the realm of tyrants are strangely in keeping with both Artegall's persecution of Pollente and Spenser's address in the proem. Appealing to the "vulgar" mass that "did about him flock", the Giant asserts that the inequality that separates men has caused "realmes and nations [to] run awry" (V.ii.32.6). He again cites a disordered world when countering Artegall's claim that "all change is perillous, and all chaunce unsound" because the results of alterations to the system as it stands would be unclear and therefore dangerous (V.ii.36.7). "Thou foolishe Elfe", admonishes the Giant, "Seest not, now badly all things present bee, / And each estate quite out of order goth?" (V.ii.37.1-3). Loudly echoing Spenser's claim in the proem that "the world is runne quite

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<sup>353</sup> Hadfield, "The Faerie Queene, Books IV-VII", 131.

out of square” (V.proem.1.7) and that the constellations “so now all range, and doe at random rove / Out of their proper places farre away” (V.proem.6.5-7), the Giant seemingly mouths the very lament voiced in the proem for a lost Elizabethan state. The fall of a world of justice and rightness, as implied in the proem and in the beginning of Canto ii, is the result of the greed and self-interest that motivates Pollente and Munera and provokes Artegall to end their lives.

“Tyrants that make men subject to their law”, the Giant declares, “I will suppresse, that they no more may raine; / And Lordings curbe, that commons over-aw” (V.ii.38.6-8). Describing in shorthand the very designs of Pollente and Munera’s rogue state, the Giant expresses a desire to protect the realm against tyrannical forces with scant regard for the welfare of the state and marks them as rogue elements that must be rooted out.

The undue violence inflicted upon the Giant by Talus and presumably approved by Artegall ostensibly ends the canto’s debate regarding egalitarian social theory; intuiting that the Giant was not seeking to uphold “the right” during the challenge of the scales, Talus flings the Giant from the cliff where he drowns in the sea (V.ii.49.1). Confronted then with the “lawlwsse multitude” (V.ii.52.1) who have “gather[ed] in tumultuous rout” (V.ii.51.3) to avenge their leader, Artegall hesitates to combat the riot directly, fearing that “the base blood of such a rascall crew” would sully “his noble hands” (V.ii.4-5). Talus again steps in. “At them he with his flaile gan lay” (V.ii.53.5), instilling terror in the crowd and effecting an abrupt end to their quest for “uncontrolled freedome” under the Giant’s new order (V.ii.33.5). Without further comment, Artegall and Talus depart, and the canto concludes. Yet, the lingering spectre of egalitarianism is never squelched; rather, the Giant’s arguments questioning the hierarchy of sovereign power remain in the air, particularly because the Giant’s declarations appear to align with the virtues of Book II set out in the proem and the early cantos. The Giant’s followers are not converted to the



ideology of power that consolidates authority in the hands of the queen and her servants; instead they are driven into “holes and bushes” to hide themselves from his attack (V.ii.52.9). Present but obscured from view, the Giant’s “raskall rout”—and their challenge to Elizabethan social and political hierarchy—remain within the landscape of the poem. His claim that “Ne ever any asketh reason why” political and social authority is allotted in a descending hierarchy from God, to sovereign to agent is disproved by the very inclusion of this unresolved episode in a poem that is supposedly a paean to monarchical rule. The “realmes and nations run awry” are not corrected by the queen’s instrument in Canto ii; instead, Artegall’s own “uncontrolled freedom” to act under the queen’s authority and his unblinking mode of justice appear a contributing factor to this political world upended.

Closely following the Giant’s challenge to the Elizabethan dispensation of power that sees Artegall placed in a position of God-like authority, the knight’s circuit of justice is severely curtailed and his quest to aid Irena largely ignored. After resolving the property dispute between Bracidas and Amidas in Canto iv, Artegall allows himself to become a captive of Radigund, falling prey to the Amazonian queen’s beauty. Stripped of the emblems of his knightly authority, Artegall is made to dress in “womans weedes” (V.v.20.7) and is “left to [Radigund’s] will by his owne wilfull blame” (V.v.20.2). Significantly, the sword given to him by Astrea and authorized by the Faerie Queene to deal justice in her realms is broken “for feare of further harmes” (V.v.21.8) and the knight is rendered powerless and inert until the arrival of Britomart. The quick diminution of Artegall from a figure of divine justice to helpless captive has disturbing implications for the larger structure of governmentality that brought him to this position of power in the first place. Charged by the sovereign to expunge from the land the injustices wrought by

figures like Radigund, Artegall instead invites the removal of his authority and casts off his duty to the queen in a moment of weakness and self-interest.<sup>354</sup>

According to Elyot, Artegall's actions in Radegone would fall under one of the governor's most egregious errors in social policy: "vain pity" (V.iv.35.9). Speaking of the poor laws that were sometimes ignored by state agents sympathetic to those vagrants and vagabonds who so troubled the Elizabethan state, Elyot writes,

Howe many proclamations therof have been divulgate and nat obeyed? Howe many commissions directed and nat executed? (Marke well here, that disobedient subjects and negligent governours do frustrate good laws) [...] ye and this is nat only done by the vulgare or commune people, but moche rather by them whiche have authoritie to them committed concerning the efectuell execution of lawes [ ... ] this may well be called vayne pitie; wherein is contayned neither justice not yet commendable charitie, but rather therby ensueth negligence, contempte, disobedience, and finally all mischiefe and incurable misery.<sup>355</sup>

The willful disregard of Artegall towards Radigund's lawless practices provokes the very disorder that the queen's servants are charged to remedy. The knight's negligence is doubly damnable not only because he is a servant of the state, but because he is countenancing the

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<sup>354</sup> Brian C. Lockey contends that it is Artegall's failure to apply the "legal principle" of equity in the case of Radigund that leads to his imprisonment. Lockey considers this scene in the light of contemporary debates regarding equity, the appeal to "conscience" or the "individual understanding of natural law", and English common law, which was viewed by some legal theorists as too "rigid" in its application (54). Britomart's intervention introduces a kind of equitable justice aligning her with England's queen, whereas Artegall's violent rule of law throughout Book V recalls the arguments by legal philosophers who upheld natural or common law as the cornerstone of English governance. Lockey, "'Equitie to Measure': The Perils of Imperial Imitation in Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*." *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 10.1 (2010): 54. *Project Muse*. Web.

<sup>355</sup> Elyot, 85-7.

practices of a local ruler that could rightly be labeled as treasonous in Elizabeth's England.

Radigund, like Pollente, operates her "goodly citty and a mighty one" within Faerie Land yet with no regard for the laws of the realm, imprisoning wandering knights and forcing them into a life of womanly servitude (V.iv.35.9). And, of course, the "contempte, disobedience, [ ...] mischief and incurable misery" that the knight of justice ushers in is not the result of charitable feeling toward the poor but by Radigund's "signes of feature excellent" (V.v.12.7). Importantly, it is Britomart, another refraction of both the Faerie Queen and Elizabeth, who must free the errant knight, defeat Radigund and "[change] all that forme of common weale", "restoring [the women] / To mens subjection" through "true Justice" (V.vii.42.4-7).<sup>356</sup> Like the monarch who

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<sup>356</sup> Pamela Joseph Benson examines the Radigund episode in the context of Renaissance debates regarding female rule. Whereas Anglican proponents of female sovereignty "argued that women were intellectually, morally and physically equal to men" and therefore capable of ruling the commonwealth, Calvinists were unwilling to grant women this social equality, maintaining "a queen is a divinely imposed exception to the general rule of inferior status for women". Benson reads Spenser's dethroning of Radigund and Britomart's relinquishing of her authority as "clearly Calvinist in orientation" and in keeping with Spenser's vexed ode to England's woman king. Mary R. Bowman also identifies in this episode the contentious discourse of female authority during the reign of Elizabeth. Analyzing Britomart's surrendering of political authority in terms of her relationship to Artegall, Bowman contends that "by reversing Radigund's social hierarchy Britomart asserts her difference from Radigund [ ... ] Britomart employs the power gained in her victory at arms ostentatiously in his service, the very paradox of her action emphasizing her submission to him". Bowman links the poem's contrasting relationship of Britomart to Radigund to the broader field of Elizabethan politics and the self-fashioning of England's virgin queen. Akin to Britomart's need to differentiate herself from the power-hungry queen of Rade gone, Elizabeth's "figuring herself in opposition to the sexually predatory Amazon served in part to insulate Elizabeth from against disloyalty born of fear by diffusing the anxiety her peculiar situation necessarily bred, suggesting that *this* powerful woman was somehow different from the ones that really represented a threat to men". Finally, Katherine Eggert identifies the pronounced shift in Book V toward historical allegory as signaling a deep cultural discomfort with the contemporary state of female rule. Contending that poetic closure in the *Faerie Queene* seems achievable only with the reinstatement of masculine authority, Eggert genders the two literary forms at work in Book V. With the decapitation of Radigund and the abrupt disconstinuation of the romance structure in which this episode is narrated, "book 5 castrates the castrators, proposing a thoroughgoing revision of literary construction that ought for good and all to sever the poem from female influence. Feminine rule and feminized politics are repealed in favor of the most straightforward mode that *The Faerie Queene* will ever achieve,

must intervene when her servants fail to carry out her commands, Britomart temporarily serves as Radegone's reigning "Princess" until Artegall's missteps are corrected (V.vii.42.3).

Finally, it is Artegall's intervention into Mercilla's civic woes that most clearly emphasizes both the demand for state agents to secure the realm and Artegall's inability to weed out the corruption that inevitably attends state building. Coming upon Samient in the territory surrounding Mercilla's palace, Artegall is made aware of Adicia, his antithesis, and her bribery of the queen's knights. Donning a "roiall pompe [ ... ] purchast through lawlesse power" (V.viii.51.5-6), Adicia has bought off the allegiance of "nigh an hundred knights of name" (V.viii.50.6) through her criminal practices, thereby "subvert[ing] [Mercilla's] Crowne and dignity" (V.viii.18.4). Unable to secure peace with this rebel ruler, Mercilla and her court shut their doors to the "guile, and malice, and despight" that reigns outside the outside the castle walls. (V.ix.22.7), "dealing just judgements, that mote not be broken / For any brybes, or threatens of any to be wroken" (V.ix.24.9). Though Adicia and Mercilla are clearly meant to define the other through allegorical opposition, one must also consider the contemporary significance of a realm whose territorial and political security is threatened by a lawless magnate that traffics in bribery and treason, thereby bringing under her localized authority the queen's politically empowered servants. Mercilla, perhaps the poem's most overt refraction of Elizabeth, willfully isolates herself and her court from the malfeasance operating in quarters dangerously close to the center of government, thus creating a dangerously insular government that is woefully

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historical allegory. At this point the poem assumes a new literary mode as a way of galvanizing the sense of an ending, the *doome* that Artegall's adventures first promised before his digression into serving a queen" (278). Benson, "Rule, Virginia: Protestant Theories of Female Regiment in *The Faerie Queene*." *English Literary Renaissance* 15.3 (1985) 278-9, Print. Bowman, "'she there as Princess rained': Spenser's Figure of Elizabeth." *Renaissance Quarterly* 43.3 (1990) 512 and 522. Print. Eggert, "'Changing all the forme of common weale': Genre and the Repeal of Queenship in *The Faerie Queene*, Book 5." *English Literary Renaissance* 26.2 (1996) 278. Print.

ineffectual at attending to the ills of the kingdom. This is not to imply that Elizabeth simply hid her head in the sand when it came to matters of political corruption in the localities; in fact, as Elyot and others make clear, the hazard of overmighty subjects wielding the crown's authority was a pronounced concern of the court. It is in this context that we might consider this particular scenario in Spenser's work: a moment in which the ideology of the monarch's "Angel-like" (V.ix.29.7) "soveraine grace" (V.viii.17.4) is not potent enough to enforce allegiance or quell political misconduct outside the confines of a self-perpetuating discourse of authoritarianism. Ushered into the monarch's "stately pallace" (V.ix.21.4) the knights "were guyded by degree / Unto the presence of that gracious Queene: / Who sate on high, that she might all men see, / And might of all men royally be seene" (V.ix.27.1-4). This illustration of the monarch's all-seeing, all-knowing power is strongly disproved by this canto, in which the sovereign shuts her eyes to the subversion of her own authority while maintaining "ioyous peace and quietnesse alway" only within the guarded walls of her palace (V.ix.24.7).

Unlike Elyot's public weal in which order reigns in every corner of the kingdom, Spenser's personification of Order is housed exclusively within Mercilla's court, leaving the surrounding territory in a state of criminality and misrule; only with the entrance of Artegall and Arthur is Mercilla's kingdom partially recovered. Spenser's queen is reliant upon the knights not only for their attacks on Adicia and the Souldan, but also for counsel in regard to Duessa's execution. In a scene that largely recreates, with some ideological emendations, Elizabeth's negotiations with her Privy Council and Parliament concerning the fate of Mary, Queen of Scots, Spenser places the final decision in the hands of the "two stranger knights" (V.ix.36.2). The inclusion of Artegall and Arthur in this momentous adjudication concerning state security might appear peculiar had not the knights of *The Faerie Queene* repeatedly served in the capacity of

officers to the work's myriad queens.<sup>357</sup> However, like Artegall's earlier intercessions into matters of state, the knight's service to the kingdom is inadequate and outside the Faerie Queene's mandate. Rather than destroying Injustice, Spenser's knight allows Adicia to roam free in Mercilla and the Faerie Queene's realms; like the Giant's followers, Adicia in the form of a rabid tiger, lives "mongst wyld beasts and salvage woods to dwell" (V.ix.1.5), "run[ning] at randon" throughout the territories. Similarly, Malengin, personifying "guile", "deceit" or "fraud", is physically ruined at Talus's hands and "left a carrion outcast" (V.ix.19.8).<sup>358</sup>

However, the poet provides us no evidence of his ultimate demise and expulsion from the kingdom. The self-appointed guardian of the canto's several cities and kingdoms has merely

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<sup>357</sup> In *The Politicke Courtier: Spenser's The Faerie Queene as a Rhetoric of Justice*, Michael F. N. Dixon applies rhetorical analysis to Spenser's epic work, revealing interconnected systems of meaning that have their origin in early modern investments in rhetorical strategy. Of Duessa's trial Dixon asserts, "this tribunal, however egalitarian it may appear, is actually an hierarchical triad with Mercilla at the apex, a structure distinguishing the subordinated power to judge guilt and innocence, which she delegates, from the sovereign power to punish or pardon which she retains absolutely". Jonathan Goldberg considers the contradictory nature of the trial and of Mercilla herself, who simultaneously represents both justice and mercy. Because Duessa's trial reveals the "sustaining contradictions by which power is represented and by which it presents itself", "throughout Book V it is no easy matter to decide where justice resides or to make judgments". I would argue that this ambiguity is heightened by the presence of the knights in Mercilla's "courtroom" and Artegall's unchecked authority to deal justice as the Faerie Queene's "instrument". Goldberg, "The Poet's Authority: Spenser, Jonson, and James VI and I." *Genre: Forms of Discourse and Culture* 15.2-3 (1982): 85, Print and Dixon, *The Politicke Courtier: Spenser's The Faerie Queene as a Rhetoric of Justice*: Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1996. 145. Print.

<sup>358</sup> Elizabeth Heale likens Spenser's depiction of Malengin to the discourse surrounding the Roman Catholic missionary priests who covertly traveled Elizabeth's kingdom during her reign. Finding in the terms describing Malengin's deceptive appearance and practices, his underground home and the episode of his capture the language often applied to missionaries, Heale contends that "through Malengine Spenser is alluding to what was felt to be the growing menace within England and Ireland of secret Roman Catholic missionary priests" (171-2). Heale, "Spenser's Maengine, Missionary Priests, and the Means of Justice." *The Review of English Studies* 41.162 (1990): 171-84, Print. See footnote 2 for stanza 5 on page 569 of Hamilton's *Faerie Queene* for the definitional derivations of Malengin.

displaced or driven underground the social ills that trouble both the security of the realm and the integrity of the state.

### Conclusion: A Wandering Island

With political authority and the maintenance of the realm placed in the hands of a semi-autonomous body of knights; and with a decided lack of structure or system of accountability linking the knights to the supreme monarch or any of her refracted personas, Spenser's *Faerie Queene* demonstrates for an Elizabethan audience the threat posed to a body politic with a deflated ideology of absolutist rule and a growing state infrastructure that has co-opted sovereign authority. Furthermore, the poem gestures toward the inadequacies of this nascent Elizabethan state, produced in part, by the ideological disconnect between the official governmental rhetoric of the "body monarchical" and the more expansive and elusive political body created in the process of early modern state formation. The body monarchical—the divine person whose very being and singular authority carries the ideological weight to command and bind a nation—is absent from the poem. Her mirrored and incomplete refractions are personifications of Elizabeth's most celebrated virtues, but they are also and equally betrayals of the sovereign's inadequacies. Mercy, Temperance, Mediation, etc alone cannot combat the dangers posed to Elizabeth's government during a period of both external and internal threats to national security. Spenser's *Faerie Land* is a territory largely ungoverned, despite or perhaps even because of the myriad queens inhabiting isolated pockets of governmentality; in the several realms illustrated in Spenser's poem, the supposedly singular authority of the monarch or ruler fails to command a society of law and allegiance.

The collapse of an ideology of authoritarian monarchical rule and the distribution of the sovereign's authority to a disunited body of knights produces a fractured political landscape.

Taking his cue from official nationalist rhetoric, Spenser repeatedly equates the political and territorial cohesiveness of Elizabeth's island nation with the singular, divine body of his queen. In his invocation of his sovereign in the proem to book one, Spenser repeats the official line of authoritarian command that imagines Elizabeth as otherworldly, all-powerful and appointed by God to rule England:

... O Goddess heavenly bright,  
Mirrour of grace and Majestie divine,  
Great Ladie of the greatest Isle, whose light  
Like *Phæbus* lampe throughout the world doth shine,  
Shed thy faire beames into my feeble eyne,  
And raise my thoughtes too humble and too vile,  
To thinke of that true glorious type of thine,  
The argument of mine afflicted style:  
The which to heare, vouchsafe, O dearest dread a while (I.proem.4)

The poet places this same language in the mouth of Guyon as he describes to Medina, one of Elizabeth's refracted personas, the virtues of the Faerie Queene. Responding to Medina's inquires into his knightly adventures, Guyon replies

This thy demand, O Lady, doth revive  
Fresh memory in me of that great Queene,  
Great and most glorious virgin Queene alive,  
That with her souveraine power, and sceptre shene  
All Faery lond does peaceably sustene.  
In widest Ocean she her throne does reare,



That over all the earth it may be seene;  
As morning Sunne her beames dispredden cleare,  
And in her face faire peace, and mercy doth appear (II.ii.40).

In both evocations, we are asked to dwell upon the monarch's divine status; Elizabeth is the reflection of God's might and dignity, whereas the Faerie Queene's Christ-like quality, captured in her very countenance, can dispel metaphorical storms and usher in peacefulness. This sense of otherworldliness is also attached to Elizabeth, whose "beames" enter the mind of the poet and inspire his literary reproduction of her queenly person. The sovereigns of each passage cast their sovereign gazes beyond their isolated realms into the world at large and are likewise gazed upon by the earth's inhabitants as earth-bound deities. Finally, and importantly, the authority of both sovereign rulers and the grandeur of their realms are closely associated with their island territories. In the first passage, Spenser's "Great Ladie" is hinged to "the greatest Isle", as though the glory of the monarch and the glory of the land are mutually constitutive; each makes the other great in their bounded-ness to the other. Such language, of course, is the stuff of Elizabethan political rhetoric. In the second, the Faerie Queene did "reare" her island kingdom "In widest Ocean", an image that sees the sovereign raising from the depths of the sea an isolated, mythical and oceanic realm. In both occasions, the sovereign and the island singularity of her territory are indelibly linked.<sup>359</sup>

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<sup>359</sup> Montrose also remarks upon the relationship between the body monarchical and the island body of the nation. In his consideration of Tudor portraiture, Montrose sees in "the queen's virginal self-containment" in the Armada portraits a royal promise of territorial security (314). "The inviolability of the island realm, the secure boundary of the English nation, is thus made to seem mystically dependent upon the inviolability of the English sovereign, upon the intact condition of the queen's body natural". Montrose, "The Elizabethan Subject and the Spenserian Text," 315.

But, even in Spenser's proem to Book I where he first celebrates his deistic queen in whom sovereign authority is singularly vested, we can already detect the splintering and undoing of this monarchical persona. The representational crisis that plagues his rendering of Elizabeth in the proem to Book II (discussed above) here again prevents the poet from capturing the monarch's radical singularity. Gesturing toward the poem's refraction of the sovereign into myriad reproductions, we witness the Queen only as a mirrored reflection of God and a "glorious type" or abstracted paragon of monarchical virtue. And, of course, Spenser's very depiction of the Queen necessarily reduces her to a literary facsimile conjured up by the poet's pen. Like the Faerie Queene, whose many invocations in the poem only remind us of her problematic absence from the work, Spenser's Elizabeth in the proem is an absent-presence, existent only in unsatisfactory reflections and fragmented representations. Spenser's illustration of England's queen in the second passage even more strongly refuses the notion of a singular queenly body as the uniquely identifiable source of sovereign authority. By this stage in Spenser's narrative, the singular persona celebrated in the proem to Book I has been all but obliterated by the introduction of Spenser's Elizabethan abstractions. Spenser's attempt to create a one-to-one relationship between England's monarch and the poem's "great and most glorious virgin Queene" is therefore vexed. This particular description of the Faerie Queene, which seeks to equate Elizabeth and Spenser's literary replica, is brought about by Medina's inquiries into Guyon's travels. Because Medina herself is a duplicate of Elizabeth, we are confronted with a three-fold adumbration of the monarch in which Medina, the Faerie Queene and Elizabeth separately share the supposedly irreducible qualities of divine political might.

Spenser's self-proclaimed purpose behind his epic poem is to celebrate England's sovereign; Spenser claims in his letter to Raleigh that in his Faerie Queene he "conceives the

most excellent and glorious person of our souveraine the Queene” and that “in some places els, I doe otherwise shadow her” (716). Yet his persistent doubling and redoubling of the queen puts great pressure upon the claim that the solitary monarchical body “with her souveraine power, and sceptre shene / All Faery lond does peaceably sustene”. Spread thin across Spenser’s poetic territory, his apportioned personifications of sovereign rule are fragmented and disassociated, effectively disassembling the monarchical body so celebrated in official rhetoric. Furthermore, Faery Land is not one of peace under the queen’s divine grace; neither the Faerie Queene, Elizabeth’s composite, nor her lesser representations are able to quell the lawlessness that disorders the realm. Only with the intervention of the knights does the land achieve a kind of untenable harmony.

With this political disunity comes a sense of geographic discontinuity. The Faerie Queene’s territory is a broken political landscape, where each realm, governed by its separate and disconnected ruler, appears to function autonomously, suffering the many challenges to law and order in isolated contexts without the guidance of an overarching ruler. Not only do Medina, Alma and Mercilla govern their own faltering realms in self-sustaining, though unsuccessful fashion, none of these monarchical refractions appear to be aware of the Faerie Queene as the land’s supreme monarch; in each case, it is the knights who inform them of the Faerie Queene’s supposedly omnipresent power throughout the realm. Furthermore, the several rogue states and territorial pockets of lawlessness discussed above imply a sovereign territory with little regard for a centralized figure of authority, whose very person is said to bind the land into a single national frame. The absence of this figure and the disassociated nature of the several rulers to each other, to the Faerie Queene and to the Knights of Maidenhead who are empowered by this absent-presence essentially demolishes the formula of the above passages, which equates the

singularity of the monarch with the singularity of her island kingdom. Our experience of Faerie Land is very much unlike that of Speed's maps, for instance, which project a politically, geographically and culturally homogenous island space of subjects allegiant to the sovereign. Instead, we are confronted with a disjointed territory that mirrors in its fractured-ness the dismembered monarchical body.

Spenser makes plain early on that his poetic landscape is a confounding one; Una, her dwarf and the Red Cross Knight are beguiled by the poem's changeable territory only moments into the narrative. Having shielded themselves from the storm, the three attempt to resume their journey, but "when weening to returne, whence they did stray, / They cannot finde that path, which first was showne, / But wander too and fro in waies unknowne" (I.i.10.3-5). This misleading land is, of course, allegorical; unsure of their footing as fledgling representations of virtue in an unjust world, the characters (Red Cross Knight in particular), must master the poem's ethical training ground to completely personify their representative quality. However, when the poem's landscape becomes politicized—in other words, once we recognize the political contours of the poem and its shrouded commentary on Elizabethan political commentary—the territorial shifts from idyllic woods to coastline to "desert wilderness" (II.vii.2.9), from Elizabeth's Faerie Land to Ireland, Belgium and France become indicators of a land profoundly fragmented by the kind of governmental inconsistency feared by Elizabeth's court. Significantly, islands feature prominently in this distorting territory and are often the home of rogue elements that function outside the realm of law. For instance, the giantess Argante of Book III imprisons her captive knights in "a secret Ile, / Where in eternall bondage dye he must, / Or be the vasall of her pleasures vile" (III.vii.50.6-8). Likewise, Spenser's Brigants of book six, a cannibalistic "lawlesse people" (VI.x.39.3) and "salvage nation" (VI.viii.35.2) who abduct Serena, Pastorella

and Coridon live on an island in a dangerous border region, “covered with shrubby woods, in which no way / Appeard for people in nor out to pas, / No any footing fynde for overgrown gras” (VI.x.41.7-9).<sup>360</sup> Literally and legally disconnected from the Faerie Queene’s kingdom, the islands of Faerie Land are akin to extra-national spaces in which official law and custom are irrelevant.<sup>361</sup>

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<sup>360</sup> Benjamin P. Myers maintains that the Brigands’ “little island” is a piece of “imaginary geography” that seeks to differentiate “Gaelic Ireland from the emerging civilization in Munster” (476). According to Myers’s reading, the “green and golden world” of Book VI is an idealized portrait of the Munster plantation emended by the poet’s power of pastoral imagining, whereas the Brigands’ borderland criminality stands in for those segments of the Irish population that rejected the English plan for “agrarian reform” founded upon the Virgilian principles of “stewardship and [ ... ] improvement” (475). Myers, “The Green and Golden World: Spenser’s Rewriting of the Munster Plantation.” *ELH* 76.2 (2009): 473-490 *Project Muse*. Print. Richard A. McCabe also makes this connection between ungoverned peoples and marginalized territories. Like Myers, he casts this relationship between lawless lands and populations in the light of Spenser’s “colonial romance” (61). Examining the complex and oftentimes unsatisfactory self / other dichotomy that underpinned colonial discourse on Ireland, McCabe argues that in the *Faerie Queene* “the need to ‘fashion’ a ‘salvage’ was no less pressing than the need to fashion a ‘gentleman’ [ ... ] As both poet and politician, he needed a ‘salvage’ island—such as might be ‘salvaged’ by reformers like himself” (61-2). Citing Spenser’s Irish landscape and the Brigands of Book VI, McCabe maintains that Spenser’s *Faerie Queene* “suggests an almost symbiotic relationship between outlaws and outlands, between geographical and social marginality” (62). McCabe, “Ireland: policy, poetics and parody.” *Cambridge Companion to Spenser* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001) 6-78. Print.

<sup>361</sup> In his discussion of *Colin Clouts Come Home Againe* and Book VI of *The Faerie Queene*, Swen Voekel detects in Spenser’s works “the manner in which elite sixteenth-century Englishmen looked to the consolidation of England as a model for the incorporation of peripheral areas of the Tudor polity”. He contends that “the most violent thrust of the English state formation process was aimed at these peripheries; there, older forms of ‘good lordship’ arising from the delegation of state authority to local magnates came to be viewed as inimical to the goals of political, legal and territorial uniformity”. Though Voekel’s focus is on Ireland, one can also apply his reading of Spenser to the Queen’s English territories, where local magnates, invested by the queen with her authority, also made claims to governmental unity and centralization untenable. Voekel, “From Irish Countries to English Counties: State Sovereignty and Territorial Reorganization in Early Modern Ireland,” *Archipelagic Identities: Literature and Identity in the Atlantic Archipelago, 1550-1800* Eds. Philip Schwyzer and Simon Meador (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 95. Print.

The broken body monarchical is most succinctly depicted geographically by the Bower of Bliss. A “wandering island, that doth ronne / And stray”, the isle housing the Bower is a unruly territory that cannot be charted or governed due to its movable geography. Poised as a counter to the Faerie Queene’s island seat where all the world can view her from a fixed point, the Bower island refuses to be part of a regulated territory and contains no ruler. Though the Bower is the home of Acrasia, she is depicted as a seductress who shuttles her lovers away to this secret site, as opposed to a figure like Lucifera or Alma, who clearly preside over a delineated realm. The isle is described as “an Island, waste and voyd”; as Greenblatt and other have noted the language of barrenness applied here is similar to the terms deployed to describe the New World, where “waste and voyd” signifies a land uninhabited or not put to use and thusly ripe for colonial enterprise. In the case of the Bower, however, which is illustrated as a lush, artificial Eden, the wasted-ness of the island territory refers not to its use-value or its distance from the civilized world, but its resistance to law and morality. Afloat in Idle Lake’s “wide Inland sea”, the Bower island is unhinged from the body politic; it is literally, geographically and governmentally decentralized. The Bower island is part of a larger archipelago of “many Islandes [ ... ] floting the floodes emong” (II.xii.10.6-7), “wandering Islands” “which to and fro doe ronne / In the wide waters” (II.xii.11.5-7). Like the disjointed realms that make up the Faerie Queene’s patchwork kingdom, the Bower archipelago visually signifies a disparate and shifting territory unbound by the kingdom’s claim to a sovereign and centralized state reaching across a delineated (national) territory.

Akin to the poem’s other island spaces, the Bower archipelago is characterized by lawlessness and danger both to the individual and the realm. The seas surrounding the isles are perilous and the geography deathly and unknowable. Having weathered the sea’s “raging surges”

(II.xii.2.8) and “hideous hoast” (II.xii.22.8) of monstrous sea-creatures and braved the allegorical traps intended for his moral and physical demise, Guyon reaches the Bower and, through his temperate will, captures Acrasia with her “chaines of lust and lewde desyres ybownd” (II.i.54.3) and destroys her artificial paradise. Yet, similar to Artegall’s “unreformed Ireland”, another island space of unstopped rebellion, the “floating” archipelago remains unmoored; the isles “range, and do at randon rove / Out of their proper places”, like the stars in the disordered world conjured up by Spenser in the proem to Book V (V.Proem.6.5-6). Spenser again returns to this imagery of an up-ended world as Guyon and the Palmer are ferried to the Bower. Suddenly mystified by “a grosse fog”, the world becomes such “That all things one, and one as nothing was, / And this great Universe seemd one confused mas” (II.xii.34.5-9). This “world [ ... ] runne quite out of square” is in keeping with the allegorical narrative in which Guyon’s temperate nature is challenge by a series of attacks on his senses and passions (Book V, proem, vii). However, the repeated refrains of “goodly governance” in *The Faerie Queene* refer not only to the soul, but to the ailing body politic as well. The dispersal of sovereign authority; the ideological breakdown of the official rhetoric of authoritarian rule; and the resultant ambiguity regarding the source of political power all contributed to a political world that seemed as “one confused mas”. Spenser’s Bower archipelago depicts geographically the effect of this governmental confusion on England’s political body. Dissipating like the official rhetoric that could no longer uphold claims to authoritarian rule, Spenser’s “realmes and nations run awry” as sovereign authority is unhinged from the monarchical body and becomes radically decentered.

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## Chapter 4: Staging the Debunked Island Nation

### Part one: “And now I see the situation”

This dissertation has taken as its primary theme the production of official nationalist rhetoric in England during the early modern period. It demonstrates how historians, cartographers and authors were central to this production. Penning their works either in an official capacity or with an eye towards crown patronage, these cultural producers created texts that helped generate or preserve crown and state ideology. I also contend that popular authors—playwrights, poets and authors of narrative prose—were acutely aware of these nationalist ideologies and that their texts, either implicitly or explicitly, critiqued these manufactured narratives. Multiple forms of nationalism coexisted in the early modern period; to fully grasp the concept of “the nation”, both in the early modern period and in ours, it is essential that we consider the purposes, intentions and flaws of a nationalism that was born of the government, not of the people.<sup>362</sup>

In the case of the literary works examined in my earlier chapters—More’s *Utopia*, Shakespeare’s *Cymbeline*, Fletcher and Massinger’s *Sea Voyage* and Spenser’s *Faerie Queene*—each piece embedded in its textual fabric vestiges of the official sentiments in broad circulation during the period. More’s satiric work took up the threads of the English island mythos produced by the chroniclers Gildas, Bede, Hardyng, Grafton, Camden and Speed, stretching them to their absurdist limits, and thereby pointing to the unreliability of early modern geopolitical discourse. The ideological reframing of cartographic Britain and the archipelago’s complex genealogy formed the subject of the second chapter. There, the work of two early modern playwrights responded to the imperial and nationalist discourse of the Elizabethan and Jacobean court, a

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<sup>362</sup> Subtitle from V.iii.6.

rhetoric that found its visual representation in the maps of John Speed. Spenser, as a member of Elizabeth's colonial government, was witness to the breakdown of England's nascent state infrastructure while serving in Ireland. The ideological disconnect between the absolutist rhetoric emanating from Whitehall and state building on the ground rendered the source of political authority radically ambiguous. This decentering of sovereign power, I have revealed, is evidenced in Spenser's refracted queen and the dis-unified band of agents that traverse Faerie Land's discontinuous politicized landscape.

The play analyzed in my final chapter, Christopher Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*, seems to address—and radically destabilize—every element of the official nationalist discourse discussed in my previous chapters. The precepts of the English island mythos—the notions of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, the claim to England's genealogical right to Scotland's territories, the chimerical tales of the island's mythical otherworldliness, the untenable assertion of the island's security, insularity and self-sufficiency—all are nullified on Marlowe's island. Malta's is a population of others; among the many nationalities inhabiting the island, there is no clear majority. Every citizen is non-native, having arrived on the island as conqueror, invader, supposed ally, slave, criminal or merchant, taking advantage of the island's ideal location in the Mediterranean to ply their trades. The Maltese do not exist on Malta. For this reason, Marlowe's Malta is without a traceable genealogy, a tenet of historical construction so central to authors like Gildas, Bede, Speed and Camden.

Because the island is in continual cultural and political flux and because Marlowe offers his audience no insight into the island's past, Malta appears history-less, at least in terms of national record. The contrived historical narratives discussed throughout my work indicate that an identifiable English origin is difficult to locate in the repeatedly overwritten narratives of

imperial conquest that characterized the British Isles. Likewise, no single nation or people appear to have a legitimate or clear-cut claim to Marlowe's island. Territorially, Malta is of the Mediterranean world, but this locational identity only exacerbates its lack of independent autonomy. Positioned at the oceanic intersection of multinational trade routes, Malta experienced firsthand emergent globalization and the confluence of differing cultures. Of undoubted strategic importance, Malta's identity is defined in the play not by its island sequestration and positive insularity but by its palimpsestic nature; even within the space of Marlowe's play, it is continually and unevenly rewritten in the language of its conquerors. The nations and empires surrounding Malta swallow up the isle and make inconsequential (or impossible) any claims to autonomous status. Though England had achieved its national sovereignty, the construction of English nationhood and its historical longevity were similarly thrown in question by its colonized past and the contemporary internal warfare in the borderlands surrounding England that made it a victim of its own imperial aims.

The very geographic central-ness of Marlowe's island within the Mediterranean market made it a site of continual siege. Marlowe's Malta is at the mercy of the Turks, the Spanish and the Christian knights. Historical Malta was subjected to the Turks, Spanish, Christians, Sicilians, Italians, and the Berber and Turkish pirates, who sought the island as a place of trade or military advantage.<sup>363</sup> Like England, Malta's island-ness promised not security but inalterable vulnerability. The porousness of the island boundaries resounds in the extraordinary fluidity and indeterminate nature of the Maltese population. Further, the play's island is a market writ large. Both goods and people are imported to Malta's shores to be commodified and sold. Barabas lists

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<sup>363</sup> See Kenneth Meyer Setton's "France, Venice and the Porte: The Turkish Siege of Malta." *The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571, Vol IV: The Sixteenth Century from Julius III to Pius V* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984): 829-881. Print and Charles Owen's "The Coveted Island." *The Maltese Islands* (New York: Fredrick A Praeger, 1969): 25-42. Print.

an influx of commodities that enter the island for global trade, yet the island itself cannot be said to produce anything: it is bereft of domestically produced goods. The island is wholly reliant upon the outside world that persistently encroaches upon it. A temporary resting place for both products and peoples, Malta is akin to More's "no place" in terms of national identity. As More's text revealed, Utopia's real-life English counterpart was also inextricably linked to the continent in terms of political interventions and reliance upon the outside world for necessary resources, despite protestations to the contrary in official rhetoric.

Lastly, political authority and sovereignty more generally are a matter of confounding ambivalence in Marlowe's play. The source of legitimate authority is unidentifiable; it exists somewhere outside the island space and is as fluid and indeterminate as the citizenry. The island is ostensibly governed by the Christian Knights of Malta. The Knights were "granted" this island by Charles V when the then Knights of Rhodes were ousted from this space by the Ottoman Turks in 1522.<sup>364</sup> The Turks also lay claim to the island, demanding tribute of the Christians, which prompts the action of the play. However, we later learn that Spain "hath title" to Malta, when the son of the Spanish king offers to aid the Christians against the heathen Turks (II.iii.28). In this radically indeterminate political landscape, sovereignty and political authority are emptied of meaning. No one and everyone rules Malta. The discourse of legitimate authority or a system for the distribution of power is conspicuously absent in the work, though this is undoubtedly a play preoccupied with power and its transference. Rather, the aura of governmental authority flits from character to character in an almost meaningless pattern, sometimes alighting on the Christians, then the Turks or the Spanish, and most fleeting, on Malta's titular Jew. Power, not absolute authority, is the goal of Marlowe's characters; government is simply a tool of self-

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<sup>364</sup> Bevington, David. *The Jew of Malta* Revels Student Ed. (Manchester: Manchester UP, Palgrave) 1997. Note 31-3, 48. Print. All future references to the play cite this edition.



interest. As in Spenser's *Faerie Land*, the source of political power is indefinable, reflecting back on Spenser's England the ideological confusion resulting from the collision of absolutist rhetoric and the necessities of state building. With the distribution of sovereign power came the potential misuse of governmental authority as the rhetoric of power was applied not just to the figure embodying the nation—the monarch—but also to her servants, ostensibly appointed to carry out her will.

In brief, Malta is nation-less in the terms of early modern political discourse. Its territory is not shaped by political borders, for the island boundaries are continually penetrated by foreign forces. Nor are these borders established according to claims of national sovereignty. The political borders are made and remade according to various policies and leagues strategically drawn up by foreign forces, only to be almost invariably violated. In this sense, “national” boundaries are meaningless. The people housed within this space do not share a common culture or ethnic makeup. The population is a heterogeneous conglomerate of non-native peoples residing in a foreign place; therefore they are without a historical narrative binding them as a people. They are without a sovereign and without a state; there is little discussion of law and no means of establishing the centers or channels of legitimate political authority.

For English audiences likely steeped in the discourse of English nationalism, Marlowe's Malta could present a frightening spectacle. Here is an island shorn of nationalist ideology, an island space where the failures and mistruths of English national sentiment are on full display. Without this ideological veneer, Marlowe's island exposes in exaggerated form the tears in the national narrative that official works like Camden and Speed's were meant to textually patch over: a body of manipulated chronicles that imagined the largest of the British isles as historically English; a similarly manipulated cartographic record that visibly supported this

narrative and drew the English as rightful imperial rulers over the archipelago; a disingenuous rhetoric of absolutism that ideologically jarred with the construction of a state infrastructure; and most importantly, the notion of a island destined by its geography to attain a kind of national character unavailable to nations hinged to the rest of the world. More frightening still is the possible implication in Marlowe's work that these faulty and oftentimes disingenuous nationalist narratives are of absolute necessity to ideologically sustain the English body politic.

The goal of this final chapter is to demonstrate how popular theatrical texts of the period are capable of tearing down the pillars of nationalist mythology. Marlowe's *Jew of Malta* is unique in this regard. Whereas the above-cited literary works seem to take aim at particular tenants of early modern political philosophy, Marlowe's work responds to and obliterates the body of constructions so carefully plotted in official rhetoric. The playwright's intimate knowledge and active participation in the mechanisms of Elizabethan *real politik* granted him unique access to these nationalist ideologies and the uses to which they were put both in his nation's territory and on the continent. Using Marlowe's play and drawing upon the historical and theoretical foundations laid in the previous chapters, I will demonstrate the unique power of Marlowe's theatre to visually and rhetorically dismantle the nationalist narratives so crucial to the nation's fabricated identity. In doing so, Marlowe's work scathingly critiques the very notion of nationhood.

Secondly, I will consider the fragility of nationalist constructions and the detrimental effects of exposing these fabrications as essentially illegitimate or unfounded. Once the ideology of the early modern nation is stripped away, the subjects, the government and the territory they occupy are emptied of geographic and political identification. Though the geography remains as product of natural forces, it can no longer hold political signification.

My methodology in this concluding chapter differs from those that came before. Beginning with an analysis of Marlowe's play, I demonstrate how this text effectively undoes the intricately manufactured nationalist, historiographical, governmental and geopolitical ideologies produced and disseminated by the official authors of the English nation. In this regard, I take on *The Jew of Malta* with a more strictly literary approach than my previous chapters. The second part of the chapter more explicitly links Marlowe's text to the nationalist ideologies considered in chapters one through three. Finally, I consider the overall effect of Marlowe's play on these fabricated discourses, contending that Marlowe has imagined in this play a dystopic vision of England stripped of its nationalist rhetoric.

#### "A Scattered Nation"

Barabas, celebrating his "infinite riches in a little room" (I.i.37) and the incoming fleet that will bring him more gold, attributes the prosperity of Jewish merchants to the fact that they are a disconnected or "scattered nation" (I.i.120). Referencing the successes of well-known Jews in Greece, "Bairseth", Portugal, Italy and France, Barabas casts Jewish nationless-ness as a distinct advantage in the emergent world of growing trade (I.i.124). The expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290 was followed by the forced removal of the Jewish communities in Catholic Spain and Portugal in 1492 and 1497, respectively. According to Ania Loomba, England, Spain and Portugal are only a few of the nations that demanded the flight of the Jews from their borders. She writes,

Jews had, at different points of time, been expelled and readmitted, and sometimes expelled again, from various other places in Europe including Naples, Genoa, and Florence. Partly as a result, European Jews travelled to far-flung

places; Samuel Purchas commented that ‘dispersions of the Jewish nations’  
extended far beyond Europe to Africa, and especially Asia.<sup>365</sup>

The term “nation” used by Barabas and Purchas here likely designates the diaspora, or “a group of people having a single ethnic, tribal, or religious affiliation, but without a separate or politically independent territory”.<sup>366</sup> However, the signifier “nation”, as delineating a geographically and politically bounded space, as well as a grouping of people along ethnic, cultural or political lines, was essential to the potent political currency of the island nation mythos circulating during the time of the play. Camden, whose intent in his *Britannia* was to discover “the first originalls of [the] nations” making up the British Isles, was also very invested in succinctly mapping out the space of the English nation and differentiating it from England’s archipelagic neighbors.<sup>367</sup> The addition to his chorography of the maps of Christopher Saxton and John Norton allowed, in Camden’s words, that “the light of learning [ be ] adjoined to the speechlesse delineation” of “ [his] native Country”. One might argue as I have here that Camden’s “geographic studies” as he terms them are as important to his nationalist work as the written text itself; it is the island territory that at once invites the trope of the island nation as a unifying force and expels those “invaders” who are foreign to the island shores.<sup>368</sup> Therefore, nation and geography are deeply interrelated terms in much of early modern nationalist literature.

Speed was likewise compelled “historically to lay downe the originals of those *Nations* and successions of those *Monarchs*, which either by birth or conquest have aspired to the

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<sup>365</sup> Loomba, *Shakespeare, Race, and Colonialism* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002) 144. Print.

<sup>366</sup> “Nation.” *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) Web. 3 May 2012.

<sup>367</sup> Camden, *Britannia* Vol. 1 Ed. Robert Mayhew (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2003) 4. Print.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid, “To the Reader”, 7.

*Imperiall Crowne*".<sup>369</sup> One might reasonably assume that Speed speaks here of "nation" in the sense of "natio", a people bound by race, blood and birth. However, Speed's cartographic picturing of the English nation and its domestic "empire" is the visual infrastructure to his *History*, in which the clearly delineated English nation rules over the supposedly conquered and textually marginalized countries of the archipelago. Though both authors are clearly preoccupied with matters of genealogy, the right to the island territory is at the core of Speed and Camden's English nations. This dependence upon geography to define the nation may result from the intractable difficulty of English historians to trace "English" bloodlines in a historical record made up of heterogeneous imperial forefathers.

Marlowe's play too is deeply invested in geographic and territorial status. It is the island's strategic geographic position that draws the many national and imperial communities to Malta in the hope of securing the island and best benefiting from the Mediterranean's lucrative markets. Historical Malta was not a nation during the time of the play's production. Historical Malta suffered a long history of imperial conquest, falling under the rule of the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs and Normans. As Charles Owen explains,

rule of the islands passed from the Normans to the Suabians and on to the Angevins by inheritance and then to the Spanish by conquest. Whatever the nationality of the ruler, he tended to regard Malta as an inanimate piece of property to be pawned or disposed of at will [ ... ] While masters, royal or otherwise, were exercising their absentee prerogative and raiding the islands' meagre resources, Malta was being harassed from the sea by pirates. Berbers, Turks, even at one stage fellow Christians, brought terror to the poorly defended

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<sup>369</sup> Speed, *The History of Great Britain*. 1611. EEBO. Michigan State University Lib. Web. 3 May 2012.

islands. In one classic raid [ ... ] Barbary corsairs carried off four hundred inhabitants, including a complete wedding party.<sup>370</sup>

As Owen points out, Malta was even “mortgaged to two noblemen in turn” when the King Alphonso “need[ed] some ready cash”.<sup>371</sup> Bandied around from one colonial power to the next, eventually landing in the hands of the Sicilians, and in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the French, Malta was wholly lacking in nationhood, in either the early modern or contemporary sense of the word: there was no unified population, no centralized governmental infrastructure, no sovereign to cast the mold of the body politic and no possibility of independent autonomy. This “inanimate piece of property” became a republic only in 1974.

Though historical Malta lacked nation-status at the time of the play, I contend that Marlowe’s Malta would nonetheless resonate with an English audience, due to the physical and historical similarities between the islands and the public’s familiarity with the language of nationhood emanating from both official and popular sources. Like England, Malta is part of an archipelago; however, the second island of Goza is never directly referenced in the play, much like English official discourses that seek to overlook England’s colonial failure to the west. Necessary to the myth of the island nation is the marginalization of Ireland, which is often pictured not as an autonomous isle but as England’s savage other. In both cases, the archipelagic nature of the English and Maltese islands is elided. As discussed throughout chapters one and two, authors of the official English nation were forced to contend with Britain’s messy genealogical record, which was composed largely by the isle’s many imperial conquerors. Drawing from disparate and often contending sources, historians like Camden and Speed tried to

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<sup>370</sup> Owen, 28-9.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid.

answer the all-important question, “who are the English”? The patchwork nature of their chronicles and the obvious misconstructions revealed tears in the seams of these histories and attests to the difficult, but necessary, quest to write Britain as England. Of Marlowe’s play, one must likewise ask the question, who are the Maltese? As I discuss in more detail below, Marlowe’s evacuation of the Maltese from the play is one of the many strategies employed by the playwright to dismantle official nationalist rhetoric.

Finally, as explored in chapter three, Elizabethan and Stuart England were suffering a crisis of governmental authority, stemming from the decentering of power from the monarch and the dispersal of this supposedly indivisible authority to members of the state administering the monarch’s will in the localities. Also discussed in this chapter were the various political bodies serving in closer proximity to the sovereign, such as the Privy Council and Parliament, who were vying for their own measure of authority that sometimes competed with the monarch’s “absolute rule”. Though Malta is not a monarchy, both Marlowe’s island and historical Malta were sites of violent struggles for power, inhabited by independent national, imperial and religious bodies claiming territorial rule.

Like a number of early modern texts that appear to transfer English anxieties to foreign island spaces—*Othello*’s Cyprus, *The Tempest*’s ambiguous island, Fletcher and Massinger’s set of isles in *The Sea Voyage*, More’s *Utopia*—Marlowe’s Malta is an island doppelganger, a site in which sovereignty, in terms of both the nation and its leadership, is either absent or invisible, where its island-ness poses a perpetual threat from outside, and the isle’s natural geographic boundaries fail to signify nationhood. What Marlowe’s island seems to suggest is that geography—the bounded oceanic space of the island—cannot be looked to as a trope of nationhood; it cannot be imagined as the natural geographic frame for a national body. Because

island-ness is the foundational national mythos, Marlowe's play sees the crumbling of England's official ideological structure.<sup>372</sup>

Marlowe's "scattered [ island ] nation" denies at every turn the precepts of official nationalism precisely because English national mythology was so closely tied to its geographic status. Even the *dramatis persona* demonstrates a geographic and ethnic scattering of characters. Barabas, "the Jew of Malta" is only of the island in the sense that he resides there to make his fortune at an important oceanic crossroads. The Jews of the island have no defined point of origin. Barabas fashions himself a multinational; in his vicious autobiographical account to Ithamore in act 2 scene 3, Barabas claims to have studied in Italy and to have served Charles V "in the wars 'twixt France and Germany" (II.iii.190). Yet, we have no knowledge of the nation of his birth or the other locations in which his life was spent prior to his arrival on Malta; the same is thus true of Abigail, whose motherless status denies the audience any clues to her

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<sup>372</sup> Emily Bartels also identifies links between England and Marlowe's Malta. In her postcolonial analysis of the play, Bartels considers how English confrontations with the other in the New World and elsewhere cast back on the English their anxiety regarding national identity. "Continued encounters with the "other", she explains " [ ... ] necessitated a concomitant confrontation with the self, provoking a re-evaluation of the known in relation to the newly discovered unknown. Significantly, and ironically [ ... ] England's preoccupation with strangers and strange lands intensified the culture's re-examination of its own estranged others [ ... ] England recognized the other within itself. This recognition could only be a threat to a society whose self-definition depended upon continued assertions of a ruling and stabilizing orthodoxy, assertions so prevalent and persuasive that critics even in our era have held up the myth of a singular and stable 'Elizabethan World Picture'" (1). As I argue later in this chapter and throughout this project, anxieties surrounding otherness were also embedded in English genealogies, in which invading "other" cultures undeniably went into the making of "Englishness". Marlowe's work forefronts this genealogical and national anxiety. Bartels, "Malta, the Jew, and the Fictions of Difference: Colonial Discourse in Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*." *English Literary Renaissance* 20.1 (1990): 1-16. *Gale Cengage Learning*. Michigan State University Lib. June 13 2012. Web.



birthplace.<sup>373</sup> Barabas's Jewish brethren, listed as "three Jews", are even more ambiguous in their place of origin, given only a religious moniker and little dialogue.

The slaves transported to Malta are likewise a mixed body, stripped of national protections and community. Upon Del Bosco's arrival on the island, he requests that Spain's newly-captured slaves be sold in Malta's marketplace: "our freight is Grecians, Turks and Afric Moors", he explains, listing his multinational human inventory. Among this group is Ithamore, "slave to Barabas", whose country of origin is comparatively indistinct; in response to Barabas's inquiry into his birth, Ithamore explains that he was born "in Thrace; brought up in Arabia" (II.iii.131). Though the slave is one of the few characters who can offer up a place of origin, Ithamore's answer is geographically vague. A land overtaken by the Illyrians, Macedonians, Greeks, Romans, Bulgarians and Ottomans, Thracian territory encompassed present-day Bulgaria, Greece and part of Turkey. Ithamore appears to hail from a region more so than a politically delineated nation. Like Barabas, Ithamore is a transient subject, even prior to his life

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<sup>373</sup> According to Bevington in *From Mankind to Marlowe*, Barabas's military action in the wars between France and Germany "does not correspond realistically with what we know of Barabas' life". He includes this claim by Barabas as part of the Jew's list of self alleged crimes, which he recites to Ithamore in act two scene three. Barabas's collection of presumably invented identities is characterized by Greenblatt as "a catalog of outrageous blatantly fictional misdeeds"; he argues that Barabas is himself "a falsehood, a fiction composed of the sleaziest materials in his culture" (52). Janet Clare concurs with these assessments, claiming that "there is nothing that we see or hear elsewhere in the play which corroborates Barabas' enumerated acts of vengeful cruelty"; she characterizes Barabas's articulation in this scene as "dramatically redundant, but highly significant theatricality as contributing to the overarching brutality" of the work. Though I largely agree with the above critics in their evaluation of Barabas's theatricality in this scene, I believe one can also consider this list of violent deeds, whose locations span from Malta to the continent, as an indication of his multinational character; as I will argue later in this chapter, it is Barabas's refusal to align himself with a particular group or national body that allows for his violent agency and thus makes him such a threatening character when placed beside the official rhetoric of national identity. See Bevington, *From Mankind to Marlowe: Growth of Structure in the Popular Drama of Tudor England* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1962): 218-233. Print; Greenblatt, *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1992): 40-58. Print. And Clare, "Marlowe's 'theatre of cruelty'." *Constructing Christopher Marlowe* Eds J.A. Downie and J.T. Parnell (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001): 74-87. Print.

as a slave; it was in Turkish Arabia that he was likely captured and removed to Malta. Ithamore's indeterminate national status is of particular interest to Barabas; in reply to Ithamore's answer regarding his unclear origins, Barabas states, "so much the better; thou art for my turn" (II.iii.132). Both lacking a nation status linking them to a specific territory, Ithamore and Barabas are allegiant to no one, a point I shall return to later.<sup>374</sup>

Though the rest of the characters seem on the surface to be marked regionally, their names and titles betray significant ambiguities as to their nationalist signification. Malta's Christians are more or less bound together as a community, based primarily upon their hatred for the heathen Jews and Turks. However, this joining together is not based on nationalist identifications. Ferneze "the Governor of Malta" has no ethnic or cultural associations to the island. He and his Knights were transplanted to the isle after their ouster from Rhodes, as explained above. The Knights of Malta, formerly the Knights of St John, were a multinational conglomerate of Christian soldiers, hailing from "Aragon, Auvergne, Castille (including Portugal), England, France, Germany, Italy and Provence".<sup>375</sup> Connected through a pledge to militant Christianity, they appear to have surrendered up a national identity to a religious one. The name Ferneze signals this national dislocated-ness. "Ferneze" can be of either French or Spanish derivation; the same is true of the Friars Jacomo and Bernardine and the courtesan Bellamira. Ferneze's potential French lineage is also supported by history; when Malta was granted to the Knights, it was placed under the leadership of Philippe de Villiers d'Isle Adam,

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<sup>374</sup> Mark Hutchings also makes this point, contending that "Barabas is drawn particularly to Ithamore because of his identity, which his statement that he was born in '[i] Thrace; brought up in Arabia' reveals. Barabas recognizes in Ithamore a kindred (though unequal) spirit: both are displaced and stateless, their very identity subject to confusion and (mis)fortune" (429). Hutchings, "In Thrace; Brought up in Arabia: *The Jew of Malta*, II.iii.131. *Notes and Queries* (December, 2000) 428-30. Print.

<sup>375</sup> Owen, 29.

who was later replaced by Jean Parisot de la Valette, the Frenchman who put down the Ottoman's invasion of Malta in 1565.<sup>376</sup> Though Ferneze is likely French, the name of his son, Lodowick, has English resonances. However, the prefix "Don" is decidedly Spanish. Lodowick's friend Don Mathias is also inexplicably granted this Spanish title, despite the fact that "Mathias" is more reminiscent of Nordic culture than the countries of the Mediterranean. Mathias is fatherless and his mother's name, Katherine, is largely generic; therefore, like Abigail, we are without clues into his place of birth. So disparate and ambiguous are the characters' locational identifications that the Maltese "nation" is impossible to locate, particularly because the Maltese themselves are absent from their own indigenous territory. Instead, what we are presented with is a palimpsest of nations and identities.

The Turks are overtly marked out in the *dramatis personae* to signify their damning foreignness, though "foreigner" means little on an island of migrant others. Pilla-Borza, whose name is an Italian translation, is similarly condemned by the name that links him to his national origin. Likely, his Italian-ness is meant as an indicator of his criminality, considering the many English tracts blasting the licentious Italian culture.<sup>377</sup> Martin Del Bosco, "Vice-Admiral of Spain", must be delineated nationally in order to explicate the several political maneuvers by those in power to gain control over the island. However, the remainder of the characters listed in the *dramatis personae* are wholly unidentified in terms of nationality. The "Abbess", "two

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<sup>376</sup> Ibid, 31.

<sup>377</sup> Roger Ascham is perhaps the most vehement of early modern authors when it comes to English travel to Italy. Of the Englishmen contaminated by Italian culture he writes, "commonly they come home common contemners of marriage and ready persuaders of all others to the same; not because they love virginity, nor yet because they hate pretty young virgins, but, being free in Italy to go whithersoever lust will carry them, they do not like that law and honesty should be such a bar to their like liberty at home in England". Ascham, *The Schoolmaster* (1570; London: Cassell and Company, 1909) 90 Print.

merchants”, “three Jews”, “a Nun”, “Officers”, “Slaves”, “Messenger” and “Carpenter”, exist in the play as nationless placeholders, minor characters necessary to further the action. I would argue, however, that their nameless-ness is more significant than the convention of assigning generic titles to lesser characters. In the political landscape of Marlowe’s work, this body of anonymous men and women indicates the pointless-ness of nationalist identification on an island that cannot rightly be called a nation. Their names signify nothing except generic roles because the play places no value on nation, as evidenced by the ambiguity of the major players’ unknown national status. Regional or cultural identification is important to distinguish the “good guys” from the bad, but even this seemingly simple designation is wildly complicated. Though the language of nation is threaded throughout the play, “the nation” as an ideology binding a group of people into a united body politic is made all but obsolete.<sup>378</sup>

Most perplexing is Marlowe’s moniker “Citizens of Malta”, who appear in a single scene and are never heard of again. If one tries to imagine this body of citizens, based upon the catalog of characters presented in the *dramatis personae*, one must envision an inconsistent and random grouping of various nationalities, ethnicities and religious persuasions, a people with no uniting characteristic, no national culture. One must assume that this disunited body must also be linguistically scattered. Because Spanish, French, Italian, Turkish and Jewish characters intermingle and negotiate the island’s marketplace and political landscape, one can assume a mixed pool of languages that would seem to deeply complicate these relations. Even within the

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<sup>378</sup> Bartels also inquires into “what it means to be ‘of Malta’”. In Barabas’s case, she concludes, to be of Malta “means [ ... ] domination. Calling Barabas “a capitalizing victim of imperialism”, Bartels sees Barabas as “exploit[ed]” by the more powerful communities occupying the island. I disagree with this assessment. As I argue later in this chapter, Barabas rejects the possibility of domination by drawing upon his keen sense of Malta’s political atmosphere and his ability to make use of the Christians and Turks, as well as the rest of the islanders, to his advantage. See Bartels, *Spectacles of Strangeness: Imperialism, Alienation and Marlowe* (Philadelphia: U of Philadelphia P, 1993) 83. Print.

play's specified ethnic groups, some were multilingual; Ottoman Turkish, for instance, was a conglomerate of Turkish, Arabic and Persian. Of course, the play must be in English for the sake of the audience, but Marlowe is careful to inject the work with linguistic difference. This point is borne out by Barabas's deployment of multiple languages, which, at times, seem to be uttered only for purposes of linguistic confusion. Speaking at various times Latin, Italian, Spanish and French, the majority of the instances of his linguistic mutability are spoken in soliloquies or asides. Barabas curses the seizure of his wealth in the presence of Ferneze in Italian and dons the French language as part of his disguise as a French musician. Otherwise, Barabas's use of foreign tongues is not plot-driven or significant to the particular scene, other than to demonstrate his global knowledge gained in the marketplace. More importantly, the multiple languages of the play indicate a lack of linguistic unity on multivalent Malta. The "citizens" of Malta are altogether silent, indicating that Marlowe's play does not recognize the only possible "national" body on the island.

#### "Every One's Price is Written on his Back"

As discussed in my introduction, early modern official nationalism is not necessarily about the people of the nation; *natio* is subject to the nation as defined by the crown, whose emphasis is on allegiance to the monarch, not the land or the popular cultures that function sometimes independently of the sovereign. Whereas popular nationalism has its seat and source in the people, official nationalism imposes its vision of the nation from above, supposedly providing the crown the means of gaining and preserving power. In this respect, the sovereign and the state are partnered in this governmental project. However, as explained in chapter three, the state and monarchy were not always in league and crown policy was often disregarded in devotion to local custom. In his repeated language of league and policy, Marlowe demonstrates

what happens when power is unhinged from government and circulates independently of a locus of centralized authority. The notion of allegiance so central to official nationalism—allegiance to the crown, the state and to the nation as a unified body of subjects—is altogether absent in *The Jew of Malta*, thus casting into doubt those very precepts as they were applied in official rhetoric to early modern England. Barabas, though he appears as among the play's most socially and politically marginalized figures because of his status as a Jew, is keenly aware of the sinister political landscape of Marlowe's island; always cognizant of the machinations that mask as governance, Barabas cuts through the disingenuous rhetoric of Malta's rulers and exposes the often empty nature of political discourse.

The absence of a Maltese populace removes from the play's island any trace of the governmental protections implied by nationhood. Designating the population as citizenry seems to indicate the governmental structure of the island, but only in the vaguest of terms. The people are not subjects of a sovereign monarch; this much is clear. However, Marlowe offers us very little else in the way of explanation of the island's leadership. A plausible reason for this ambiguity is the fact that the foreign "rulers" of Marlowe's play are only interested in gaining power over the territory. This power is not governmental—no foreign force entering Marlowe's Malta seems particularly interested in achieving sovereign authority over the isle. The power exercised in the play has no obvious connection to the "citizens of Malta" or to the nation more generally. Law is rarely invoked; when questions of law do surface, it is only applied to serve the interests of those in power, not to protect Malta's ambiguous citizenry. Power in Marlowe's play resides in achieving possession of the strategic isle and controlling the terms of its global marketplace. In this sense, government, if we may call it that, is a tool that is wholly self-serving and without relation to the people. Marlowe's representation of government on his island undoes

yet another thread of English official rhetoric, revealing a world ruled not by the inadequate precepts of early modern political philosophers (with the exception of Machiavelli), but by backhanded policy and strategy.

This disconnection of government from the people—both conceptually and in practice—is wholly contrary to early modern political philosophies and to notions of nationhood more generally. In his discussion of the city as a precursor to the formation of the commonwealth, Francisco de Vitoria maintains that a city without a government protecting its interests is likely to self-destruct. “If assemblies and associations of men are necessary to the safety of mankind,” he conjectures,

it is equally true that such partnerships cannot exist without some overseeing power or governing force [ ... ] If all members of society were equal and subject to no higher power, each man would pull in his own direction as opinion or whim directed, and the commonwealth would necessarily be torn apart. The civil community (*ciuitas*) would be sundered unless there were some overseeing providence to guard public property and look after the common good [ ... ] Just as the human body cannot remain healthy unless some ordering force (*uis ordinatrix*) directs the single limbs to act in concert with the others to the greatest good of the whole, so it is with a city in which each individual strives against the other citizens for his own advantage to the neglect of the common good.<sup>379</sup>

Likewise, Sir Thomas Smith defends monarchy by citing its governmental protection of the nation’s subjects: “Where one person beareth the rule they define a king, who by succession or

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<sup>379</sup> Vitoria, *Political Writings*. Eds Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991). 9-10. Print.

election commeth with the good will of the people to that government [ ... ] and doth seeke the profit of the people as much as his owne”.<sup>380</sup> The governance of Malta refutes the above political formulas. There is no “overseeing force” or “high power” commanding the limbs of the Maltese body politic. The “ordering force” of government is reduced to simple brute force practiced by the invading cultures who do not regard the citizenry, let alone protect the “common good”. The “whim[s]” of the Knights, Turks and Spanish—command of the island’s lucrative market and the concomitant wealth that comes with such domination—subjugate the citizenry, putting into boldface the citizen’s nation-less status.

Rather than following the circuits of authority provided by governmental structures, power circulates on Marlowe’s Malta in a haphazard and indeterminate manner, replicating the political atmosphere of historical Malta. The island’s many shifts in leadership and the underlying ambiguity surrounding Malta’s ownership in Marlowe’s play make the revolving titles of governance practically meaningless. As explained above, Del Bosco declares to Ferneze in negotiations regarding the sale of his slaves that “My lord and king hath title to this isle, / And he means quickly to expel [the Turks] hence; [ ... ] I’ll write unto his majesty for aid, / And not depart until I see you free” (II.iii.37-41). We are made aware of the territorial and trade disputes between the Turks, Spanish and the Knights that envelope the island and its surrounding seas in the earliest moments of the play. In act one scene one when Barabas inquires into the status of his ships “loaden with spice and silks” (I.i.45), the unnamed “Second Merchant” explains that they “were wafted by a Spanish fleet / That never left us till within a league, / That had the galleys of the Turks in chase” (I.i.95-7). The merchants of Malta, it seems, are under the protection of the Spanish, which implies some kind of allied relationship between the islanders

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<sup>380</sup> Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*. Ed. Mary Dewar (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982) 53. Print.



and the Spanish nation. However, the collusion of the Knights and the Spanish later in the play nullifies this relation. This retraction of politicized arrangements is relentlessly repeated in the work, echoing the chaotic struggle for power that characterized Malta in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

Historically, the isle was handed over to the Knights by Spanish emperor Charles V, as explained above, but this was not simply a gesture of generosity. The former Knights of St John had largely shed their religious character by the time of their migration: in the words of Sir T. Zammit, “their monastic vows were usually regarded as mere form, and they were remarkable for their haughty bearing and worldly aspirations”.<sup>381</sup> Charles V’s decision to “present” Malta to the Knights was one of policy. “Charles V was not without some ulterior motive in [ ... ] giving to the Order (in return for the annual token payment of a falcon) these islands from his kingdom”, explains Ernle Bradford, the translator of Francisco Balbi di Correggio’s 1565 *Siege of Malta*; “he undoubtedly saw that the militant Order of St John would be an excellent outer bastion beyond his more important dominions, Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples”.<sup>382</sup> The Knights of Malta, then, were little more than mercenaries aiding the Spanish in their economic project in the Mediterranean. Largely stripped of their reputation and authority, the Knights “had no option but to accept Charles V’s gift, for they had canvassed all the other rulers of Europe and had everywhere met with indifference, prevarication, or a blunt refusal when they came to ask for a new base and home”.<sup>383</sup>

Though historical Malta maintained its own governmental unit, prior and following the invasion of the Knights, this body, the *Università*, is never acknowledged in Marlowe’s play.

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<sup>381</sup> As quoted in Francisco Balbi di Correggio, *The Siege of Malta* (1565). Trans Ernle Bradford. (London: Butler and Tanner, 1965) 8. Print.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid.

According to the *National Archives of Malta*,

this municipal body was founded around 1350 as a corporation defending local interests – at a time when Malta and Gozo were ruled by the Aragonese from Sicily. It was broadly similar to many town councils throughout the Mediterranean regions of the Latin West [ ... ] Its Council dealt with numerous items of local business: it was responsible for the fortifications, the markets, and the hygiene of the town. It could elect its own officials, raise taxes, and petition the Crown.<sup>384</sup>

This indigenous political body appears to have maintained some measure of power on the island; however, the Knights limited their authority by setting up their own *Università* in the mid 1600's. Established by Grand Master Homedes and relocated to Valletta, "its purpose was to curtail the authority of [the Maltese nobles] and to ensure that the four Harbour Jurats [Maltese magistrates] would come under the direct jurisdiction of the Knights Hospitaller".<sup>385</sup> By removing the *Università* from the play's political landscape, Marlowe further de-nationalizes his island, putting emphasis on the point that the absent Maltese are wholly at the will of non-native forces whose interest in the island is based on monetary gain, not governmental order.

Though we cannot know for certain, it is likely that Marlowe was aware of the untenable political situation of the Knights in Malta, for the potential Turkish invasion of the island was broadly feared in England and Europe more generally. Elizabeth herself is quoted as saying "if the Turks should prevail against the Isle of Malta, it is uncertain what further peril might follow

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<sup>384</sup> *National Archive of Malta*.

[https://secure2.gov.mt/nationalarchives/Default.aspx?page\\_info\\_id=151](https://secure2.gov.mt/nationalarchives/Default.aspx?page_info_id=151). Web 14 June 2012.

<sup>385</sup> Montalo, John. *The Nobles of Malta, 1530-1800* (Valletta: Midsea Books, 1980) 119. Print.

to the rest of Christendom”.<sup>386</sup> Because the Turkish threat to Malta was a topic circulating in the European imagination, particularly after the Great Siege of 1565, we can assume with relative certainty that Marlowe was drawing upon actual accounts of the Mediterranean conflict when composing his late 16<sup>th</sup> century work. Perhaps playing upon the English fears of governmental disorder in both England and the British archipelagic territories that refused English rule, Marlowe constructs a Maltese “nation” that amplifies the crises of authority that preoccupied the Elizabethan crown, where the governmental authority of the state in the localities or the Irish colonies could not be managed by Whitehall. Imagining a world without a centralized national government and without the ideological rhetoric that located divine power in the person of the monarch, Marlowe’s Malta presents a frightening theatrical spectacle in which base power is negotiated through the terms of “policy” without the protection of governmental regulation.

Despite the political arrangement that appeared to place the Knights in political authority, Marlowe’s Knights of Malta are obviously under the thumb of the Ottomans, who likewise claim territorial rule over the isle and its shores. Though ostensibly “in league” with the Knights (I.i.158), that the Turks claim tribute indicates by definition the Knights’ inability to free themselves from the empire’s yoke. Tribute meant into the 19<sup>th</sup> century “A tax or impost paid by one prince or state to another in acknowledgement of submission or as the price of peace, security, and protection; rent or homage paid in money or an equivalent by a subject to his sovereign or a vassal to his lord”.<sup>387</sup> Already under the protection of their European brethren and considering the persistent warring over territory that characterizes the play, it would seem

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<sup>386</sup> Owen, 33.

<sup>387</sup> “Tribute.” *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) Web. 3 May 2012.

that the powerful Ottoman Empire has laid claim in some respect to the strategically valuable isle.

The Turks' militant command over the seas and their aggressive stance when demanding their tribute money points to a kind of agreement between the two peoples that is underscored by submission. "A fleet of warlike galleys, Barabas / Are come from Turkey, and lie in our road", laments the "First Jew" in act one, his report revealing the power of the Turks to interfere in Maltese trade by blocking the import of goods (I.i.145-46). Barabas's response similarly makes apparent the military intentions of the Turks and the historical conditions of the Knights' tribute to this foreign force:

Long to the Turk did Malta contribute,  
Which tribute—all in policy, I fear—  
The Turks have let increase to such a sum  
As all the wealth of Malta cannot pay,  
And now by that advantage thinks, belike,  
To seize upon the town: ay, that he seeks (I.i.179-84)

Barabas, of course, is correct in his prediction; in the senate house of the next scene, the Turkish Calymath and his Bashaws demand that the tribute be paid in full. They perform this injunction in a kind of Machiavellian theatre. Once the Turks agree to a one month reprieve to allow the Christians to collect the necessary funds, Calymath intones that "'tis more kingly to obtain by peace / Than to enforce conditions by constraint" (I.ii.25-6). The disingenuous nature of this claim has already been revealed in the opening lines of the scene when the First Bashaw reminds the Christians of the loss of their last island habitation: "Know, Knights of Malta", he declares, "that we came from Rhodes, / From Cyprus, Candy, and those other isles / That lie betwixt the

Mediterranean seas—” (I.ii.2-4). This opening to the meeting between the imperial Turks and the subjugated Christians seems intended to rhetorically reinforce the might of the Ottomans and their ownership or control over various Mediterranean territories. As mentioned, the Ottomans had forced the evacuation of the Christians from Rhodes, taking possession of the island in 1522. Cyprus was likewise an Ottoman colony, captured by the Turks in 1570. Though Ferneze attempts to ignore the implications of this hostile greeting—he replies, “What’s Cyprus, Candy and those other isles / To us, or Malta?”—the Bashaw’s meaning is clear: Malta, like these conquered isles, is in danger of folding altogether to Turkish rule (I.ii.5-6).

Because Malta lacks a national governmental infrastructure or a clear source or program for the distribution of power, governmental titles are traded and exchanged like commodities through negotiations based on broken leagues and “policy”, an obsessively reoccurring term in the play. At various points in the work, Ferneze, the body of Knights and Barabas are granted the title of governor. Presumably, governor would in this context be defined as “one who governs, or exercises authoritative control over, subjects or inferiors; a ruler”.<sup>388</sup> Based upon the island’s history linking it to Spain, one can assume that the governorship was granted to Ferneze by the emperor Charles V when he handed over the isle to the then Knights of Rhodes.

But, the play itself does not provide an explanation for this transference of power. Nor are there any representational shows that clothe Ferneze in the robes of authority. Rather, this figure of governance seems no more than a common politician of ambiguous power, rather than “a ruler” in any practical sense. Importantly, the title of governor is bandied around in the play in such a manner as to drain it of any ideological import. There is no system of assigning the title of

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<sup>388</sup> “Governor.” *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) Web. 3 May 2012.

governor or ceremony in which this great authority is conferred; rather, positions of power are awarded through simple utterance. “Bosco”, Ferneze announces after the newly drawn up league between the Knights and the Spanish against the Turks, “thou shalt be Malta’s general; / We and our warlike knights will follow thee” (II.iii.44-5). Likewise, when Barabas offers his aid to the Turks in act five, allowing them to besiege the town, Calymath hands over governorship to the Jew based only on Barabas’s power to deceive. Barabas surrenders up this title following the Turkish takeover of Malta, and instead deals with the imprisoned Ferneze for the opportunity to regain his wealth. In the bargain, Ferneze will be reinstated in his governmental post: “Governor, I enlarge thee”, Barabas pronounces to the jailed Knight, who only moments ago had lost his kingdom and thusly any claim to political power.

The ease with which positions of power are donned and cast-off is replicated in the characters’ persistent play-acting performed with the intention to grasp at the unmoored authority circulating the island. Abigail acts the convert to rescue her father’s money; Barabas plays the friend to the Christians and Turk for his own gain; Barabas feigns allegiances with Lodowick, Mathias, and the friars, even promising to convert during his scripted dialogue; he plays the part of the French musician to kill off those who could implicate him in the deaths of Lodowick and Mathias, etc. The roles performed in Malta’s political theatre seem to have little more authenticity or legitimacy. The island’s political landscape is in perpetual flux; the Turks, Christians and Spanish all claim political authority, yet these very assertions are undone by the constant warring between the groups for uncontested power over the isle. Because Malta’s ownership is unclear and because there is no discernable source or center of sovereign power on the island—making authority as scattered and disunited as its populace—political titles are as meaningless as those dispensed in the theatre to lowly actors strutting the stage as kings.

In a nation-less territory where the state, if one exists at all, is vulnerable to abrupt and unregulated transferences of power, political culture is driven by self-interest and self-promotion, rather than an allegiance to a governmental body or to the ideology of nationhood. On Marlowe's Malta, "policy", in its most pejorative sense, is at the heart of political dealings. The work's fore-mentioned obsession with "policy" implies that the term had a kind of cultural currency during the period. The term "policy", in both the play and contemporary political treatises, is characterized by its inherent slipperiness, its ability to slide from an expression of virtue or ingenuity to malicious and unethical trickery. In Elyot's *Boke Called the Governour*, for instance, the philosopher argues that "the education or fourme of bringing up of the childe of a gentilman, which is to have authorities in a public weale" should be approached using "the policie of a wyse and connyng gardener". The virtuous policy of intricate care and moral instruction of this young plant will produce a likewise virtuous man "made propise or apte to the goverance of a publicke weal".<sup>389</sup> The lawyer's education, Elyot asserts, demands dedication to "the moste noble studie of morall philosophie, whiche teacheth both vertues, maners, and civile policie"; such an understanding of policy will allow England's "yonge men" to "serve honourably theyr prince, and the publike weale of theyr countray".<sup>390</sup>

Policy in this context likely refers to "the art, study, or practice of government or administration; the conduct of public affairs; political science."<sup>391</sup> However, Elyot is wary of policy's second connotation. In his chapter entitled "Of fraude and disceyte, which be agayne

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<sup>389</sup> Elyot, *The Boke Named the Governour* (1531) Ed. Henry Herbert Stephen Croft. Vol 1 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967): 28. Print.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid, 161-62.

<sup>391</sup> "Policy." *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) Web. 3 May 2012.

Justyce”, Elyot considers the ease with which policy may be translated into vice; he even places “policy”, a term so revered in his earlier quotations, as a practice that may be wrongly perceived as honorable and just. He historically locates this slippage as a present day degradation of the virtue: “That maner of injurie, whiche is done with fraude and disceyte, is at this present tyme so communely practised, that if it be but a litle, it is called policie, and if it be moche and with a visage of gravitie, it is than named and accounted for wisdom”.<sup>392</sup> In the same period and in the same entry in the *Oxford English Dictionary*, “policy” is also defined as “a device, a contrivance, an expedient; a stratagem, a trick”.<sup>393</sup> Public policy, it seems, takes up either of these definitions depending upon the needs of the contending parties and the necessary means to achieve political outcomes.

Machiavelli, who appears in vilified abstract form to introduce the play, is one of the most astute readers and, perhaps, proponents of early modern political policy. Hated for his unyielding honesty regarding the most successful (and oftentimes most unforgiving) means of capturing and sustaining political rule, policy for Machiavelli was a cornerstone of his philosophy. In his discussion on “how a ruler should act in order to gain reputation”, Machiavelli warns against political neutrality in regard to his relations with warring nations; “a ruler is [ ... ] highly regarded if he is either a true ally or an outright enemy [ ... ] This policy is always better than remaining neutral”, he instructs, for “since if two powerful rulers near you come to blows, either the eventual victor will become a threat to you, or he will not. In either situation, it will

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<sup>392</sup> Elyot, Vol 2, 214-15.

<sup>393</sup> “Policy.” Ibid.



always be wiser to intervene in favour of one side and fight strongly”.<sup>394</sup> Machiavelli’s strategy here is largely innocuous and straightforward, the stuff of military invention and national self-preservation.

However, the political philosopher also subtly advocates for a more sinister form of statecraft, one that proves a leader’s worth through overtly violent means. Of King Ferdinand of Spain, Machiavelli writes that “he has become the most famous and glorious king in Christendom” through less than savory methods:

This man attacked Granada at the beginning of his reign, and this campaign laid the foundations of his state. First of all, he began this campaign when things were quiet and when he was not afraid of being opposed: he kept the minds of the barons of Castile occupied with that war, so that they would not plan any revolts. And he meanwhile was acquiring prestige, and increasing his hold over them before they were even aware of the fact [ ... ] In order to undertake even greater campaigns, he continued to make use of religion, resorting to a cruel and apparently pious policy of unexampled wretchedness: that of hunting down the Moors and driving them out of his Kingdom. Using this same cloak, he attacked Africa; he invaded Italy; and recently he has attacked France. Thus he has always plotted and achieved great things...”.<sup>395</sup>

The formation of this great king’s reputation and of his celebrated state was generated by his policy of violence and the manipulation of his people. Collecting the money of “the Church and [ ... ] his subjects” to build his newly made “powerful army”, Ferdinand instrumentalized

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<sup>394</sup> Machiavelli, *The Prince*. Ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001): 77. Print.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid, 76-7.

religious belief for the sake of warfare and the accumulation of territory.<sup>396</sup> Machiavelli ambivalently makes plain that Ferdinand's kingly reputation was built upon "contrivance" and "stratagem"; under the "cloak" of righteousness, he disenfranchised his subjects for imperial purposes and the ethnic cleansing of his nation.

Machiavelli here indicates the Janus-faced nature of policy: Ferdinand's strategy is both "cruel" and "apparently pious", both the stuff of "achievement" and of base "plot[ting]". Marlowe is likewise aware of policy's multivalent meaning, for each of his political players is "cloaked" in pretended allegiances and apparently well-versed in the type of policy articulated in *The Prince*. Without a body of national law or a system of governmental contracts between nations and between rulers and their subjects, the governmental ordering of Malta is entirely—and untenably—reliant upon flimsy leagues, policy and feigned alliance.<sup>397</sup>

"League" was also a term of especial significance in early modern political culture in England. The first cited instance of "league" in the *OED* is in reference to a letter written by Sir James Douglas, a 14<sup>th</sup> century Scotsman who led several successful attacks against the English during the Wars of Independence, often invading the nation to the south.<sup>398</sup> In Douglas's epistle of 1452 addressed to King James II of Scotland, he vows to defend the borderlands and promises

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<sup>396</sup> Ibid, 77.

<sup>397</sup> Howard S. Babb also recognizes the play's preoccupation with the term "policy", placing it within the historical context of Elizabethan England. "In both its best and earliest sense [ ... ] the word refers to a righteous ordering by the government of public affairs for the good of the people as a whole. In its alternative sense, *policy* designates the servicing of one's private ends by cunning or deceit: the normal Elizabethan version of Machiavellianism. This conflict must have been close to the surface of the word during the 1590's when pseudo-Machiavellian doctrine was making its first impact on England—so close that I would guess the word hardly needed conscious manipulation to reverberate with ironies". Babb, "Policy in Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*." *ELH* 24.2 (1957) 85-94. *JSTOR*. Michigan State University Lib. 16 June 2012. Web.

<sup>398</sup> "Douglas, Sir James." *A Dictionary of British History*. Ed. John Cannon. *Oxford Reference Online* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012). Michigan State University Lib. 28 April 2012. Web.

his fealty to his sovereign. In it, he also swears to abandon any leagues that might run contrary to his king's interests:

I bind and oblige me to our said soverayne lord to revock [ ... ] all leagues and bands, if any hes been made be me in any tyme by gane, contrare to our said soverayne lord; and binds me and obliss me, that I shall make na band, na ligg in tyme coming, quhilk sall be contrar til his hienes.<sup>399</sup>

The first recorded usage of this term was in the political ether of early modern Anglo-Scottish relations. Leagues, in the context of Douglas's letters, are unstable entities, subject to revocation if the political need arises. Douglas's promise that he will make "no ligg" that goes against the king's interest implies that contracts outside the king's knowledge have, in fact, been drawn up and may prove threatening to the sovereign, such that a legal document is necessary to attempt to preclude this possibility.

A second and more contemporary example of the shiftiness of leagues is the reference by Marlowe in the opening lines of Machiavelli's introduction. "Albeit the world think Machiavel is dead", the play begins, "Yet was his soul but flown beyond the Alps, / And, now the Guise is dead, is come from France / To view this land and frolic with his friends" (I.i.1-4). Significantly, Marlowe here cites "The League", a program designed by the Catholic House of Guise to prevent Protestant Henry IV from becoming France's sovereign. Following Henry's ascension to the throne, the leader of the Huguenots converted to Catholicism, and is reported to have claimed

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<sup>399</sup> Tytler, Patrick Fraser. "Appoyntement betwixt James II and James Earle Douglas." *History of Scotland from the Accession of Alexander III, to the Union* (Edinburgh: William P. Nimmo, 1864): 387. Web.

that “Paris is well worth a mass”.<sup>400</sup> “The Guise” referred to above is likely the Cardinal of Guise, whose daughter married James V of Scotland and gave birth to Mary Queen of Scots. James V leagued himself with France against Henry VIII, his uncle. The “land” of “his friends” to which Machiavel refers in the prologue, the “here in Britany” where he presents Marlowe’s play is, of course, England; thus Marlowe links nefarious or politically suspect leagues to his own nation (prologue, 4 and 29). As discussed in part two of this chapter, Elizabeth was herself accused of breaking leagues and acting on policies both honest and otherwise.

Therefore, in the context of early modern European political machinations, the terms “league” and “policy” were likely shot through with suspicion and mistrust, as Marlowe’s play repeatedly bears out. As referenced above, the action of *The Jew of Malta* is propelled by a broken league between the Knights and the Turks. Following the First Jew’s wary observation that the “warlike manner” of the Turkish ambassadors undermines the notion that they’ve come “for confirmation of a league”, Barabas disingenuously chides his brethren, saying “Fond men, what dream you of their multitudes? / What need they treat of peace that are in league? / The Turks and those of Malta are in league” (I.i.153-58). Barabas’s repetition of the term is ironic, for he clearly perceives the “policy” of the Turks to demand a sum that the Knights cannot pay “and [ ... ] by that advantage [ ... ] to seize upon the town”, thus dissolving the league and nullifying the peace agreement. To counter the Turks’ strategy, the Knights league themselves with the Spanish Del Bosco, vowing the destruction of their former allies. “Proud-daring Calymath,” declares Ferneze, now emboldened with Spanish promises of military aid, “instead of gold, / We’ll send thee bullets wrapped in smoke and fire. / Claim tribute where thou wilt, we are resolved; / Honour is bought with blood, and not with gold” (II.iii.53-6). Ferneze’s

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<sup>400</sup> “Henry IV.” *World Encyclopedia. Oxford Reference Online* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) Michigan State University Lib. 28 April 2012. Web.

pronouncement of their revised policy—here couched in the language of august political philosophy—lays bare the often fraudulent nature of leagues and the hypocrisy that attends the characters’ self-serving shifts in political allegiance. As Machiavelli warns his readers in *The Prince*, “no government should ever believe that it is always possible to follow safe policies [ ... ] prudence consists in the knowing how to assess the dangers, and to choose the least bad course of action as being the right one to follow”.<sup>401</sup> “Right”, of course, should not be confused with ethical, but instead best serving the present political purpose.

By aborting the league with the Turks, Ferneze willingly invites the destruction of his own city. When the Bashaw returns to Malta to collect the tribute, Ferneze offers him the following address:

Bashaw, in brief, shalt have no tribute here,  
Nor shall the heathens live upon our spoil.  
First will we raze the city walls ourselves,  
Lay waste the island, hew the temples down,  
And, shipping off our goods to Sicily,  
Open an entrance for the wasteful sea,  
Whose billows, beating the resistless banks,  
Shall overflow it with their reflux (III.v.11-7).

Threatening no less than the violent disfigurement of the island and the implied massacre of the citizens, Ferneze, the governor “hast broke the league” not as a means of achieving political autonomy (the Knights will now be beholden to the Spanish) but as a momentary release from paying the Turks their promised tribute. Unflinchingly and without regard for Malta’s future,

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<sup>401</sup> Machiavelli, 79.

Ferneze announces at the end of the scene, “by this answer, broken is the league, / And naught is to be looked for now but wars, / And naught to us more welcome is than wars” (III.vi. 34-6).

The language of policy so proliferates Marlowe’s work as to discredit the very notion of allegiance and to cast all policy as insidious. Without a social or governmental infrastructure binding the disunited citizenry into an allied body politic, the isolated communities—the Knights, the Turks, the Jews, the criminals, the Catholics—all function as centrifugal forces, spinning outward from a destabilized center. The characters of Marlowe’s play pretend allegiances only to shrug them off in the service of self interest or when politically expedient. As one of Ferneze’s officers says of the Christians’ newly purchased slaves, “every one’s price is written on his back” (II.iii.3).

A series of betrayals follows the Knights’ broken treaty; the Knights renege on their agreement with the Jews allowing them to trade on Malta and instead confiscate their wealth; during the scene of the Jews’ disenfranchisement, the Knights determine to take the whole of Barabas’s wealth based on a slippery technicality; the Friars take Abigail into the nunnery based not on her pretended desire for Christian rebirth but in the hope of her promiscuity; the Knights align themselves with the Spanish; Abigail feigns her affection for Lodowick at her father’s command; Barabas makes Ithamore his “only heir” (III.iv.43) following Abigail’s second conversion, then promptly states that he will “pay [the slave] with a vengeance” (III.v.118 ); Ithamore blackmails his master as part of a plot hatched by Bellamira and Pilia-Borza, revealing to them Barabas’s role in the murders of Lodowick and Don Mathias; and Ithamore announces Barabas’s criminal acts to the governor in a public forum. On an island of “strangers”, transients and politicians with no investment in social order or the protection of the citizenry, leagues among characters or allegiances to community are hollow and theatrical. That the play is

permeated with political reversals, pretended social contracts, and disloyal communities indicates a level of social disorder attributable, in part, to the nationless-ness of the island.

Barabas, of course, is the character most attuned to and practiced in policy; for this reason, he is also wholly without allegiance to community. Marlowe's Jew is keenly aware of his socially marginalized status on the island and, in contrast, his great wealth that grants him a kind of power superseding that of his Christian governors. Like a local magnate with coffers exceeding those of the monarch, Barabas boasts that a single jewel in his possession is enough "to ransom great kings from captivity" (I.i.32). The knights are likewise aware of the Jew's monetary supremacy; lacking sufficient funds to pay off the Turkish tribute, the Christian governors must rely upon the Jews' confiscated wealth. The speed with which Barabas regains his fortune casts doubt upon the Christians' ability to strip Barabas of his monetary power. Unlike his Jewish brethren, Barabas is immediately alert to the Christians' policy when the Jews are called to the senate house in act one scene one. Following the theft of his wealth, Barabas brings to the audience's attention the multiplicity of meanings behind the term "policy". Responding to the First Knight's assertion that to "break the league" with the Turks would "prove but simple policy", Barabas reveals the true nature of policy as it applies in the play:

Ay, policy, that's their profession,

And not simplicity as they suggest.

The plagues of Egypt and the curse of heaven,

Earth's barrenness, and all men's hatred,

Inflict upon them, thou great Primus Motor!

And here upon my knees striking the earth

I ban their souls to everlasting pains

And extreme tortures of the fiery deep

That thus have dealt with me in my distress (I.ii.160-69).

In both usages of the word, policy refers to “trickery, duplicity”, rather than legitimate political dealing.<sup>402</sup> Barabas rightly concludes that the political atmosphere generated by the Knights is one of treachery and misdealings, citing this particular scene of betrayal not as an isolated instance, but a political program, a “profession” practiced by the supposed authorities of Malta, who retain only limited power over the isle. This recognition by the play’s titular character and the curse that follows sets in motion a series of acts so violent that they threaten the very island itself.

In his first act of vengeful scheming, Barabas instructs Abigail to pretend conversion in order to retrieve his cache of jewels and money from the now-nunnery. “Be ruled by me,” he instructs his daughter following the seizure of his wealth, “for in extremity / We ought to make bar of no policy” (I.ii.272-73). The boundless and unregulated strategizing advocated here by Barabas is reliant upon Abigail’s willingness to “dissemble”, another term used with unusual frequency in Marlowe’s work. A practice linked in the play with the broken leagues and dishonest policies that characterize the political landscape, dissembling unmoors Marlowe’s characters from the limits imposed by their politicized identities and allows them to act out in a deceptive theatre the roles most suited to enacting revenge.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>402</sup> Bevington, act one, footnote 161.

<sup>403</sup> Several critics have pointed to Barabas’s perpetual dissembling as a sign of his empty inner self. Bevington, for instance, posits Barabas’s unsatisfactory interior motivations as owing to his close affiliation with the Vice character of Medieval morality plays and Marlowe’s use of homiletic drama as the structural model for *The Jew of Malta*. Stephen Greenblatt refers to Barabas as “the Jewish Knight of Non-Being”, examining Barabas’s scanty interiority in light of his electric “playfulness”. Bartels similarly remarks that Barabas “consist[s] more of what he is not than of what he is”. She describes Barabas’s elaborate set in act five as a mirror of his



The act of dissembling is an essentially theatrical practice. To dissemble —“to alter or disguise the semblance of (one's character, a feeling, design, or action) so as to conceal, or deceive as to, its real nature; to give a false or feigned semblance to; to cloak or disguise by a feigned appearance”—is a quality of not only Marlowe's characters but even of the physical environment and materials of the play.<sup>404</sup> The Jew's home is altered and transformed into a nunnery; poison is masked by porridge and posies; the protective walls of the city are turned to channels to usher in the Turkish invaders; and, finally, Barabas's set intended for the death of Calymath instead proves “a deep pit past recovery” (V.v.36) and the site of Barabas's demise. In this respect, not only the characters but the physical environment is shifty and untrustworthy. Because Barabas possesses a special knowledge of policy's mechanisms and illusions, he is able to direct the characters of Marlowe's work in a manner that either takes advantage of these political manipulations or the ignorance of particular characters regarding the destabilized environment that surrounds them.<sup>405</sup> The majority of the cast of Barabas's theatre fail to

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character, demonstrating the way in which he builds “one self after another without the substance underneath”. I would argue that Barabas's shifting character speaks not to his lack of interiority, though his interior self is certainly difficult to determine. Rather, I place his dissembling in the realm of the play's politics. Barabas appears to lack an inner self because he has no allegiance to other members of the play or to any particular community. He negotiates the play as an autonomous force, motivated only by survival and self-gain. We are not made aware of his inner self because it is unrevealed to the other characters, with whom he shares no trust or inward emotion. It is Barabas's very lack of conscience and his savvy knowledge of the play's political landscape that gives him his unlikely power on Marlowe's island. See Bevington, *Mankind*, 218-33, Greenblatt, “Marlowe, Marx, and Anti-Semitism,” *Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1992) 40-58 Print and Bartels, 82-108.

<sup>404</sup> “Dissemble.” *The Oxford English Dictionary Online* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012) Web. 3 May 2012.

<sup>405</sup> Sara Munson Deats and Lisa S. Starks consider Barabas a “surrogate playwright”, characterizing him as the “playwright-director-stage manager-actor” of Marlowe's work. It is this spectacular agency to direct the actors of Malta that makes him a threatening character in this nation-less, state-less space; he has a kind of power over the actions of the characters that greatly supersedes that of its ostensible governors. See Munson Deats and Stark, “So neatly

negotiate this unsettled landscape. Abigail, Don Mathias, Don Lodowick, Pilia-Borza, Bellamira, and the Friars all meet their deaths as part of Barabas's politicized scene-writing. Even Ithamore, Barabas's pupil and accessory to his master's many murders, falls prey to Barabas's machinations. "Oh, my master has the bravest policy," Ithamore exclaims after the deaths of Mathias and Lodowick; little does the slave know that he will be the victim of this murderous policy following his betrayal of his mentor (III.iii.13.)

Only Barabas refuses to league himself with the multiple and contentious communities inhabiting the island. His pretended alliances take place within the realm of his theatre and are thus performances of political dissembling. Barabas's fundamental theatricality is signaled by his repeated use of asides, which serve to articulate his true intentions that radically contrast with his performed utterances. From the first report of the Turkish fleet's arrival on Malta, Barabas feigns a commitment to the Jewish community who appear to rely upon his leadership. "Why, let 'em come, so they come not to war; / Or let 'em war, so we be conquerors. / [*Aside*] Nay, let 'em combat, conquer and kill all, / So they spare me, my daughter, and my wealth" (I.i.149-52).

Wholly disinterested in the fellow members of his "scattered nation"—"these base slaves", as he refers to them, and cognizant of the impossibility of Jewish rule on Malta, Barabas cares only about the contents of his coffers and Abigail. Barabas's allegiance to his daughter is fleeting, however; with her conversion, Barabas has his daughter killed (I.ii.216).

In contrast to the Christians of the play, Barabas announces to the audience the unmaking of his feigned promises at the moment of their utterance. Aware of Lodowick's desire to possess Abigail and the advantages this scenario may offer him to avenge himself on Ferneze, Barabas engages in the following performed exchange with the governor's son:

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plotted, and so well perform'd': Villain as Playwright in Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*." *Theatre Journal* 44.3 (1992): 375-89. Print.

*Lodowick [To himself]:*

I hear the wealthy Jew walked this way;

I'll seek him out, and so insinuate

That I may have a sight of Abigail,

For Don Mathias tells me she is fair.

*Barabas [Aside]: Now will I show myself to have more of the  
serpent than the dove; that is, more knave than fool.*

*Lodowick:* Yond walks the Jew; now for fair Abigail.

*Barabas [Aside]: Ay, ay, no doubt but she's at your command.*

.....

*Lodowick:* Well, Barabas, canst help me to a diamond?

*Barabas:* Oh, sir, your father had my diamonds

Yet I have one left that will serve your turn.

*(Aside) I mean my daughter—but e'er he shall have her,*

*I'll sacrifice her on a pile of wood.*

*I ha' the poison of the city for him,*

*And the white leprosy (II.iii.32-55).*

Echoing his earlier claim that “we Jews can fawn like spaniels when we please, / And when we grin, we bite”, Barabas points to the changeable or “cloaked” nature of performances in sites of political warfare; to avenge the Christians’ politicized disenfranchisement of the Jews, Barabas levels the field by prompting the death of the governor’s son and heir (II.iii.20-1). Bent only on self-interest, Barabas likens his daughter to the murdered Iphigenia with no compunction.

Barabas engages in this double-sided dialogue repeatedly, betraying the slipperiness of

rhetorical gestures, particularly when deployed in the name of political maneuvering. Yet another unstable element of Marlowe's island setting, the mutability and manipulation of language proves the most potent weapon of dissembling and policy. Among Barabas's rhetorical gymnastics is his almost schizophrenic address to Abigail, in which he simultaneously performs the role of an enraged father while instructing his daughter in the recovery of his jewels. Responding to Jacomo's accusation of Abigail's political blindness, Barabas responds:

*Barabas:* Blind, friar? I reckon not thy persuasions.

*The board is marked thus that covers it.*

*[He makes a sign of the cross.]*

For I had rather die than see her thus.—

Wilt thou forsake me too in my distress,

Seducèd daughter? *(Aside to her)* Go, forget not—

Becomes it Jews to be so credulous?

*(Aside to her)* Tomorrow early I'll be at the door.

No, come not at me! If thou wilt be damned,

Forget me, see me not, and so be gone.

*(Aside)* Farewell, remember tomorrow morning.

Out, out, thou wretch! (I.ii.353-63).

Speaking in double tongues—prevaricating while cueing the audience into the intent that drives his performance—Barabas enacts the dual sided nature of policy and displays its dissembling

mechanisms.<sup>406</sup> Each manifest expression is coupled with its latent meaning (“forget me, see me

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<sup>406</sup> I would add to Deats and Starks's discussion above regarding Barabas as director of the play an examination of Barabas's internal scripting of the stage directions, how he uses embedded asides to place characters in the play space and order up the play's action according to his

not, and so be gone” in performance, “*go, forget not*” in aside). Policy in the play, and in the political arena more generally, is usual masked in carefully crafted declarations of pretended political philosophy. Consider, for instance, Ferneze’s pronouncement at the end of the play, following Barabas’s death, the massacre of the Turkish soldiers and the capture of Calymath: “let due praise be given / Neither to fate nor fortune, but to heaven” (V.v.122-23). The governor’s banal nod to the Christian god smacks of hypocrisy, for it cannot conceal the fact that treachery, murderous deceit, and treason were the actual causes for the Knights’ return to a limited form of power. Barabas’s repeated asides in which he speaks from both sides of his mouth denies this “cloaking” of intent, laying bare the rhetorical manipulations that are the linguistic currency of the play of politics.

With the title of governor bestowed upon him by the Turks, Barabas delivers the following soliloquy:

Thus hast thou gotten, by thy policy,  
No simple place, no small authority:  
I now am governor of Malta. True,  
But Malta hates me, and, in hating me,  
My life’s in danger; and what boots it thee,  
Poor Barabas, to be the governor,

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designs. Because the stage directions are made self-evident in the dialogue, *The Jew of Malta* assuages the ‘struggle for the text’ as articulated by Margaret Jane Kidnie. Kidnie holds suspect both the editorial interventions of contemporary editors and a pedagogy that authenticates through teaching these perhaps unsound additions to early modern works. Barbara Hodgdon refers to moments in dramatic texts where the material of the play practically writes its own stage directions as “verbal scene painting”. Kidnie, “Text, Performance, and the Editors: Staging Shakespeare’s Drama.” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 51.4 (2000) 456-73. JSTOR Michigan State University Lib, 29 May 2012. Web. Hodgdon, “*Anthony and Cleopatra* in the theatre.” *The Cambridge Companion to Shakespearean Tragedy* Ed Claire McEachern (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002) 241-63. Print.

Whenas thy life shall be at their command?  
 No, Barabas, this must be looked into;  
 And since by wrong thou got'st authority,  
 Maintain it bravely by firm policy,  
 At least unprofitably lose it not.  
 For he that liveth in authority,  
 And neither gets him friends nor fills his bags,  
 Lives like the ass that Aesop speaketh of,  
 That labours with a load of bread and wine  
 And leaves it off to snap on thistle tops.  
 But Barabas will be more circumspect.  
 Begin betimes; Occasion's bald behind;  
 Slip not thine opportunity, for fear too late  
 Thou seek'st for much but canst not compass it.— (V.ii.27-46).

Authority, as propounded upon in this passage, is not a tangible, stable entity emanating in ceremonious fashion from a divine source. Rather, it is without guarantee and without honor. Unapologetically attributing his garnering of authority to political and personal manipulation, Barabas recognizes the futility of authority on the island. Possessing the robes of governorship does not ensure the protection of his person, for authority does not cast any sort of reverence or semblance of divinity on the wearer, particularly in the Jew's case. Because authority is not tethered to a single source or granted any meaningful significance on Malta, Barabas's life "shall be at [the] command of either the Knights, the Spanish or the Turks; "their command" is exceptionally ambiguous here, for who rules Malta at this point? A governor at the mercy of

those not imbued with political authority is no governor at all, as Barabas realizes. Barabas's "circumspect[ion]"—a knowledge of the workings of politics not demonstrated by those who ostensibly rule Malta—reminds him that when one examines the back of Opportunity's bald head, one discovers that "every one's price is written on his back" (II.iii.3).

Marlowe's Malta is an ever shifting, center-less landscape of political plotting. Without a sovereign and without a state, empty leagues and devious policy-making make up the contrivances of Marlowe's Machiavellian theatre. In this island playhouse, cultural, ethnic or political allegiance is altogether absent, for there is no nation binding the ambiguous "citizens of Malta". Machiavel's philosophy stated in the prologue to "weigh not men, and therefore not men's words", is particularly relevant here: the men of Malta wield only the semblance of legitimate authority and their words—the language that makes up the political rhetoric and professions of policy—are mutable and without substance. The formlessness of sovereign authority and the body politic more generally has detrimental effects on the island's geopolitical positioning, placing the island itself in a state of acute vulnerability.

"Within this Isle, In Malta Here"

As the prologue suggests, "this isle", this "here" of the play is both Malta and England, territories that are likewise vulnerable because of their geographic position. Marlowe immediately establishes the position of the Mediterranean island as pivotal site of the global commerce, which envelopes the isle in the potential for invasion. In act one scene one, Barabas revels in the myriad imports that fill his already overflowing coffers:

So that of thus much that return was made,  
And, of the third part of the Persian ships,  
There was the venture summed and satisfied.

As for those Samnites and the men of Uz  
That brought my Spanish oils and wines of Greece,  
Here have I pursed their paltry silverings (I.i.1-6).

Also cited are Barabas's goods imported from Egypt and Cairo, thus pointing to the far-expanse of his reach into global commerce. The Jew's profits have so accumulated that he can barely keep count of the monies filling his private coffers, and, as we learn after his disenfranchisement by the Christians, these imported commodities are to him so readily available that he can almost immediately replenish his accounts. In contrast, the Knights have so depleted their coffers "by reason of the wars, that robbed our store" that they are dependent upon the Jews to make up the money owed to the Turks (I.i.47). The implications here are two-fold: one, the burgeoning trade on Malta brings immense wealth to those able to harness its forces, and two, this extraordinary wealth does not serve the populace of the island of the whole or the Knights who purport to govern the isle.<sup>407</sup>

The capital of individuals and isolated communities far outreaches that of the supposed state. Based upon the influx of goods entering the island shores, the failure of Malta to produce and export domestic products and the trade wars between the Jews, Turks and Spanish, it is safe to assume that the island is wholly unregulated in regard to trade and commerce. Lacking a governmental structure to design and implement restrictions to trade and the individuals profiting in this unregulated space, capital circulates in a haphazard fashion; the vast wealth achieved by the Jews is seized by the Christians, the league with the Turks is broken so that Del Bosco's slaves can be sold on Malta and the Turks allow the Knights' debt to grow to such an extent that it is unpayable. Like all other aspects of this culture constructed by Marlowe, trade is at the

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<sup>407</sup> The subtitle quote is from (V.ii.67-8).



mercy of policy in its most pejorative sense. The wealth of the island does not fall within the purview of the “government”. No taxes are levied, and without some sort of “state” collection of wealth, the island is at extreme risk of collapse. Lacking sovereign autonomy as a political body, there is no investment, monetarily or ideologically, in the interests of the native population.

Without justifiable claims to independent autonomy and no control of the monies coming into Malta, the island is lacking any means of defense. Exacerbating this vulnerable position is the absence of political community; on an island populated by others serving their own interests rather than those of a non-existent state, and several “governments” all making claims to power, it is difficult to imagine a successful mustering of the disunited communities to defend the island. Who, exactly, are the invaders when there is no indigenous population? Conversely, what group can claim the status of Malta’s defenders when the rulers of the island are impossible to determine? Because Malta is a site of constant warfare, un-national in its always fluctuating rulers, its disembodied body politic and its lack of investment in defense, Malta is immeasurably vulnerable as an island territory subject to the several forces invading the isle from the surrounding seas.

The great volatility of Malta’s geopolitical status is due in part to its ideal position at the crossroads of emergent globalization. Isolated by the sea but encircled by lucrative trade routes reaching from Spain to Turkey, Malta is repeatedly besieged by foreign forces; its geopolitical advantage was the very cause of its vulnerability. Niccolo Nelli’s 1565 map “Il Porto Di Malta” bears this out, depicting the flood of Turkish ships penetrating the island’s waterways and territory (fig. 15). Illustrating in graphic detail the Great Siege in 1565, Nelli’s map depicts the Turkish attack on Malta, which had been fortified by the island’s conquerors. A wall of Turkish soldiers flood the western border of the map, spilling from ships docked in the bay west of what

is now Vallette, near the island of Manoel. At the bottom of the map, we see the violent clashing of Turkish and soldiers of the Knighthood. Victory against the Ottomans was largely due to the injection of troops sent to the island by Pius IV, the Vice-Roy of Sicily, Don Garcia de Toledo and Alfonso Il d'Este, Duke of Ferrara.<sup>408</sup> In the bottom right is pictured Jean Parisot de la Valette, the Grand Master of the Order of Malta considered the leader of the Siege. The current capital of Malta bears his name.

The Maltese are depicted as naked generic figures fighting under the flag of the Knights. During the Siege, the Knights were backed by “three thousand Maltese out of the whole of the island”, according to Bradford’s translation of Correggio.<sup>409</sup> Most of the Ottomans are reduced to literal stick figures with no discernable characteristics aside from their Turbans, whereas the Knights are decked in sophisticated war gear. Like most colonial portraits, the supposedly barbaric Maltese—the indigenous peoples underserving of their own lands—serve their conquerors. Their only discernable quality is their nakedness, signally both their incivility and their lack of national signification; they are unmarked nationally or culturally. The focus of the cartographic image is the savage battle for territory fought between the Christian Knights and Ottoman Turks on a foreign island. In the forefront of the image of the Siege is a Turk who lies dead on the battlefield, his leg removed. To the left of this figure is another Turk held by the neck of a European soldier who is in the process of running him through with his sword; another Turk lies prostrate on the ground as the European’s sword hangs menacingly above him. A decapitated Turk lies above this image of savage violence, his head and Turban lying separately at a distance from the dismembered body. Above this scene flies the flag of the Knights carried

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<sup>408</sup> Setton, 858-59.

<sup>409</sup> Bradford, 41.

by an unclothed Maltese, visually underscoring the fact that the indigenous people of the island were little more than an unimportant, undifferentiated collection of bodies sacrificed to a foreign culture that has seized their territory.

Marlowe's play captures the Siege in miniature. The Spanish and the Knights league together and defeat the Ottomans on Malta's shores. The joining together of European forces indicates the strategic and economic value of the island. This is also a religious battle, and therefore this economic value is coded in the language of spirituality. However, the Maltese are nowhere to be found. The total absence of the Maltese in Marlowe's play demonstrates that the history and culture of the native population is wiped clean from the colonial narrative composed by the dominant imperial cultures. By evacuating the Maltese from the Siege, Marlowe underscores the people's nationless-ness, for the protection of national territory is among the most pressing demands of a nation's government and a precept of nationalist sentiment necessary to muster troops. As both the play and Nelli's cartographic portrait of the Siege make plain, it is Malta's island-ness and its geopolitical position at the crossroads of global trade that creates its vulnerability and the native people's subjugation to outside forces. Malta's isolated island location and, in Marlowe's play, its lack of an indigenous army funded through some sort of state infrastructure make it rife for colonial conquest; the seas usher in foreign bodies and the waterways that jut into the isle allow for easy access to the inner-most portions of the island where the cities or colonial centers are often located.

Ithamore and Bellamira are among the citizens forced to reside in Malta under the rule of foreign powers, she to ply her trade and Ithamore as a slave transported and sold on the island. In a parody of one of Marlowe's most famous poems, Ithamore woos Bellarmira by fantasizing the flight of these two non-native citizens from the embattled island to an idealized Greece:

... we will leave this paltry land  
 And sail from hence to Greece, to lovely Greece.  
 I'll be thy Jason, thou my golden fleece.  
 Where painted carpets o'er the meads are hurled  
 And Bacchus' vineyards overspread the world,  
 Where woods and forests go in goodly green,  
 I'll be Adonis, thou shalt be Love's Queen.  
 The meads, the orchards, and the primrose lanes,  
 Instead of sedge and reed, bear sugar-canes.  
 Thou in those groves, by Dis above,  
 Shalt live with me and be my love (IV.ii.96-107).

Ithamore imagines the escape of he and his lover from Malta into a classical narrative, where each would inhabit the form of mythological figures. Imaginatively leaving behind the displeasing terrain of “sedge and reeds” born of the wet island soil, Ithamore constructs a land brimming with luxurious resources and “overspread” with Nature’s bounty. Malta is, in contrast, a site of shorn of these expressions of Nature’s beauty, Gaunt’s “paltry” island of disorder, subject to “envious siege” from the oceans, a “tenement” for foreign nations “bound in with shame” (II.i.60-4).<sup>410</sup>

If the slave’s Malta is a site of subjection—subject to the sea that transported him into

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<sup>410</sup> Marlowe’s play predates Shakespeare’s *Richard II*, so Marlowe was clearly not drawing on Shakespeare’s language. It would dangerous to speculate that Shakespeare was gesturing toward Marlowe’s characterization of Malta in *The Jew*. I think it is significant, however, that both playwrights deploy this term in describing early modern islands, pointing perhaps to the island’s comparatively diminutive geographical size in contrast to the continent. Shakespeare, *Richard II*. *The Riverside Shakespeare* 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997): 847-83. Print.

slavery, subject to the sea that entraps him in this state of subservience—then the conqueror’s Malta is a place valued only for its monetary and military gain. Because the Knights, Turks and Spanish have no national identification with the island, no allegiance to the non-native territory, it can be obliterated when policy demands it. As quoted above, Ferneze announces to the Turkish Bashaw that before the Knights would pay the tribute they would “raze the city walls [ . . . ] lay waste the island” and “open an entrance for the wasteful sea / Whose billows, beating the resistless banks [ would] overflow it with their refluence” (III.v.13-18). Ferneze’s threat to give the island over to the destructive sea is based only on economics: having closed off trade to the Turks, Ferneze would redirect the flow of wealth to Sicily and their European partners. By inviting the sea into the land and breaking down all the island’s fortifications against Nature’s violent “refluence”, the water would swallow up the geographically minute and wholly disconnected island landmass. Calymath answers this assertion by threatening to transform “proud Malta to a wilderness” (III.vi. 25). At the mercy of its multiple colonial overlords, the physical territory of the island is valued not as a gift of Nature, but as a body rent by non-native forces.

Outside the island’s boundaries, the sea offers little relief from the violence erupting on the isolated territory. The first scene of the play announces the contest over oceanic territory that underpins Malta’s colonial politics. Barabas first chides the Second Merchant for travelling the “Malta road” with such a rich store without the protection of the Turks (I.i.86). The Merchant’s reassurance to Barabas that his “ships are safe [ . . . ] and all the merchants / With all their merchandise are safe arrived” (I.i.50-1) is belied by the Second Merchant’s illustration of the sea as a unregulated playground of battling Spanish and Turkish ships “in chase” (I.i.97). Just the Merchant’s seemingly anxious repetition of the merchandise’s safety betrays the fact that the waterways surrounding Malta are oceanic sites of danger and piracy without law and without

acknowledgment of imperial rights, if such exist. Twice are the various forces accused of “vail[ing] not” to the opposing ships (II.ii.11).

Nelli’s cartographic narration of Malta visually evinces the hazards wrought by Malta’s untenable sea-locked position; the entirety of the channel to the west is overrun with invading ships. In the northwest corner of the map, foreign ships are anchored virtually on top of one another, obscuring the sea itself off the island coast. Antonio Lafreri’s 1565 map, “Nuouo disegno dell’Isola di Malta et suoi forti”, likewise marks out the ocean space as a warzone of competing colonial powers (fig. 16). Surrounded on three sides by Ottoman ships, the solitary island is defenseless against the forces entering its ocean space. The imperial ships are wildly out of proportion, some as large as the Knights’ fort constructed in the near-center of the island at the end of the long channels of the Marsamxett and Grand Harbors that cut into the island from the eastern shore. These oversized ships appear to so bear down on the island that conquest seems inevitable.

Significantly, it is Malta’s channels that allow for the Turks’ invasion of Marlowe’s island. Upon the Turks’ landing after the broken league and declaration of war, Barabas informs Calymath that

... here, against the sluice,  
The rock is hollow, and of purpose digged  
To make a passage for the running streams  
And common channels of the city.  
Now whilst you give assault unto the walls,  
I’ll lead five hundred soldiers through the vault  
And rise with them i’ the middle of the town,

Open the gates for you to enter in,

And by this means the city is your own (V.ii.86-94).

Presumably, the city here referred to is Valetta, the site of the Ottoman attack during the Siege.

Valetta is located at the far end point of the peninsula on Malta's eastern coast, which is surrounded by the Marsamxett Harbor on the north and the Grand on the south. Entirely surrounded by the sea, is it safe to assume that the city was permeated with water, thus demanding some sort of infrastructure to protect it from the destructive ocean. Conversely, here the very channels intended to control "the running streams" instead invites the flow of Turks into the surprised city. Valetta's defenses—the city walls and gates, its "passage[s]"—are useless against the sea and that which it carries.

Having successfully entered and captured the city, Calymath delivers the following speech celebrating the island's geopolitical uniqueness:

Thus have we viewed the city, seen the sack,

And caused the ruins to be new repaired,

Which with our bombards' shot and basilisks'

We rent in sunder at our entry,

Two lofty turrets that command the town.

And now I see the situation,

And how secure this conquered island stands—

Environed with the Mediterranean sea,

Strong countertermured with other petty isles,

And toward Calabria backed by Sicily,

Where Syracusian Dionysius reigned—

I wonder how it could be conquered thus (V.iv.1-12).

Calymath's ode to Malta buckles under the weight of the following scenes; with Barabas's aid, the island is recaptured by the Christians. But even prior to this revelation, the Turk's speech is shot through with contradiction, thus undoing the very sentiments it sets out to record, including the Turks' supposed victory. Only after reducing the island city to "ruins", then reconstructing the fortifications intended to stave off such destruction can Calymath "see" the island as the Turks' imperial stronghold. In Calymath's flawed vision of Malta, the island is both "secure" and "conquered". The "two lofty turrets"—broken symbols of the Christian's imperial might—are raised a second time by an imperial force that will suffer its own downfall in the very next scenes. Calymath's reference to Sicily is likewise strange, for Sicily, that land beyond the protective sea, historically "backed" the Christians against the Turks to protect their monetary interests. Weirdly, Calymath seems as unaware of the Christian leagues surrounding him as he does of Barabas's vicious trap. Erecting imperial fortifications on Malta's shifting ground, Calymath's ironic paean to the island—"I wonder how it could be conquered thus"—seems only to reinforce the play's take on the untrustworthy nature of rhetoric.

The boundaries of the island, the boundaries of the sea, the boundaries of the citizen body and the boundaries of political language are fluid, readily penetrated or altogether uncertain. As if to give visual credence to the volatility of unstable borders, Marlowe has "the Jew's body, throw[n] [ ... ] o'er the walls" of the city (V.i.58). Barabas's foundational marginality and his ability to seize upon the opportunities that this marginality allows on Malta is here illustrated by his half dead body: unconscious but alive, his liminal person is physically cast outside the perimeters of the play's only city, the living center of Malta. Made a literal outlander, Barabas's person is here visually represented in the abstract social space that he has occupied since the



play's beginning: a space of both persecution and alarming power. For Barabas's ability to negotiate the island's unsteady terrain and to move seamlessly across Malta's shifting borders is his utter lack of loyalty and complete indifference to community. His first declaration following his revival is, "My name is Barabas; I am a Jew" (V.ii.71). Barabas's announcement is not a statement of allegiance to the Jewish people of Malta; in the moments following Barabas's disenfranchisement in act one scene two, Barabas pointedly severs himself from his Jewish community, calling his supposed brethren "earth-mettled villains [ ... ] no Hebrews born" (I.ii.79) and "base slaves" (I.ii.216). What Barabas proclaims in this pivotal scene is his otherness, his essential difference. It is this difference and his willingness to make use of it that eventually earns him the governorship. For Barabas presents to writers of the English nation perhaps the most frightening of prospects: a subject who casts off the nation, who derives his very power from his nationless-ness, a subject who "is always nearest to [him]self".<sup>411</sup>

## Part Two: Dystopia Insulae

### Introduction

"Thus trolls our fortune in by land and sea," Barabas ruminates contentedly in act one scene one, after the arrival of his commodities from afar. "And thus we are on every side enriched [ ... ] What more may heaven do for earthly men / Than thus to pour out plenty in their laps, [ ... ] Making the sea their servant and the winds / To drive their substance with successful blasts?", he asks, considering the divine blessings casts upon the people of Malta (I.i.101-10).

Being by the *Almighty* so set in the maine *Ocean*, as that shee is thereby the *High Admirall* of the *Seas*, and in the terrestriall *Globe* so seated, as that she is worthily reputed both *The Garden of Pleasure*, and *The Storehouse of Profit*, opening her

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<sup>411</sup> This is Bevington's translation of Barabas's "*Ego mihimet sum semper proximus*", which he attributes to Terence. Bevington, footnote 188, act 1.

*Havens* every way, fit to receive all forraine trafficke, and to utter her owne into  
all other parts.<sup>412</sup>

Speed's English island, the "Sovereigne *Lady* and *Empresse* of the rest", bears a striking rhetorical resemblance to Barabas's Mediterranean isle described above. Both islands are gifts from a generous God, who has made the island overflow with resources. The sea is the islands' benefactress, allowing the ocean roads of the global market to flow around them; the seas' naturally boundary-less waters invite the commodities to the island and make possible the easy transport of exports. It is the island itself that bestows this divine state upon its inhabitants.<sup>413</sup>

In both cases, these idealized projections of the island are dismantled, the rhetoric of the island's utopic character revealed as just that, carefully crafted language undone by stubborn geographic, governmental and cultural reality. For Barabas, the island that promises him such wealth almost immediately strips him of both his store and his social power, at least temporarily. The juridical ambiguity surrounding the governance of the isle, which makes possible the disenfranchisement of the Jews' wealth, is due in part to Malta's geography. Disconnected from the nations that surround it and of great economic value to nations and empires alike, Malta is at the mercy of the most militarily powerful force seeking to plant itself in the center of the Mediterranean global crossroads. "On every side" is a nation bent on commanding the island and depriving the citizens of their autonomy. Governance of the island population itself, if it exists at all, is indeterminate, for the island is constantly changing hands. The governmental organization

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<sup>412</sup> Speed, John. *History of Great Britaine*. EEBO. Web. Michigan State University Lib. 11 Jan 2010. 155.

<sup>413</sup> The subtitle quote is from Drayton's *Poly-Olbion*, "Upon the Frontispiece." (London: Printed for Iohn Marriott, Iohn Grismand, and Thomas Dewe, 1622) EEBO Michigan State University Lib, 30 June 2012. Web.

of the citizenry appears an afterthought in contrast to the mutable rules of trade. Likewise, though the ocean provides the convenient means of receiving and exporting goods, it is also an oceanic warzone, where these goods might be seized because of a lack of effective regulation. The sea is “the servant” of trade, but not of those who impossibly seek to harness its power.

Speed’s island narrative is similarly disingenuous and meticulously constructed out of flimsy materials. England does not “command the seas”; like Marlowe’s Malta and More’s *Utopia*, the island is exposed to the seas’ force and the foreign nations that circle its shores. The “open havens” of Speed’s description make accessible military invasion; the arms of the sea that jut into England, like the Bristol Channel and The Wash south of Nottingham invite outside troops inland, penetrating the largely unregulated island borders. Nature’s “storehouse” does not provide the materials necessary to defend these oceanic boundaries; without domestic access to iron, England was forced to depend on foreign sources to arm the soldiers of their garrisons. In contrast to Malta, England was at a distinct geographical disadvantage in regard to access to the global marketplace. Speed’s image of the “forraine trafficke” travelling to one of Europe’s northernmost islands is belied by the discourse of England’s otherworldliness, which celebrates its isolated position “on the edge” of the map.<sup>414</sup> Though foreign commodities reached England’s shores, the nation was hardly a global powerhouse, nor did it enjoy Malta’s geographic prominence in the midst of these burgeoning markets.

The visual and rhetorical narratives propagated by Speed and Camden depended almost entirely upon the notion of England’s island-ness, as my earlier chapters demonstrated. England’s supposed island geography provided these multimedia constructions a seemingly ready-made delineation of the national space and an over-neat philosophy of cultural,

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<sup>414</sup> I borrow this term from the title of Kathy Lavezzo’s *Angels on the Edge of the World: Geography, Literature, and English Community, 1000-1534* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006). Print.

governmental and territorial unity. Marlowe's play explodes these notions. Natural nationhood is rendered a politically absurd concept; Malta's geography traps within the contested island space a disharmonious grouping of ethnicities and religious communities. The shared presence of these transient and non-native groups is based entirely upon economic opportunity, and therefore allegiances are broken as quickly as they're made. Impossible to easily categorize among national lines, Malta's citizens are radically heterogeneous, lacking a common language, a shared historical narrative or a governmental infrastructure. Absent also is an ideological infrastructure, an official rhetoric to bind together this un-national territory and people.

Genealogy: "The Curtaine of Obscure Antiquity"

Despite Speed's visual lexicon on his map of the "Kingdome of England", which so easily homogenizes and generically catalogs the various classes of the English, Marlowe's Malta more fittingly pictures the island population. The playwright's *dramatis personae*, which immediately makes apparent the separate nations or groupings that populate the island, can likewise be applied to the myriad nationalities and historical genealogies that make up the "English" isle. Multinational and multilingual, the many languages spoke on the island (English, Scottish, Irish, Cornish) make Spenser's despairing notion of "kingdom of [England's] language" an unrealistic projection of English unity.<sup>415</sup> Whereas Speed and Camden attempt to suppress Britain's multinational character in the service of English nationalism, their rhetorical manipulations betray this rewriting of the national theatre. Speed and Camden both used manipulated cartography to sever Wales and Scotland from the island, and thus to eradicate national difference from the isle they claimed as historically English. The rhetorical re-visions required of these official authors to push Wales and Scotland to the margins of the British

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<sup>415</sup> Quoted from Helgerson, *Forms of Nationhood: The Elizabethan Writing of England* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1992) 1. Print.

genealogical index belied the impossibility of wiping the island tableau clean of non-English bodies. Despite Wales' incorporation and the supposed joining of the English and Scottish crowns, both Wales and Scotland stubbornly persisted as culturally and governmentally autonomous body politics occupying the "English" island.<sup>416</sup>

As discussed in chapter one, Speed's genealogical arch that introduced both his *History* and his *Theatre* was intended to celebrate the British as the crowning culmination of the island's historical narrative. However, when placed in the context of Marlowe's play and its dismemberment of the official nation, Speed's arch more realistically bespeaks the vexed genealogical family of the British Isles. A collection of national or ethnic figures—the Dane, Roman, Norman, Saxon and the "Britaine"—stand segregated in their own compartments, artistically contained but independently marked out and separated by their difference. The visual implication that these several and distinct ethnicities went into the harmonious formation of "the Britaine" (or, the Englishman, as Speed's rhetorical manipulations try to make clear), is challenged by Speed's troubling attempt to erase the ancient Briton from the genealogical maps (see fig. 1).

Chapter one established that the rhetorical maneuvers necessary to cast the island as anciently English required a falsified link between the Britons and the contemporary English. Deeply troubling this forced genealogical kinship were tales from ancient writers of the Britons' barbarity and incivility. Extinguishing England's native peoples from the historical record was a potentially damaging gesture for the writers of the nation's history. Without a genealogical line tracing the ancient inhabitants of the isle to the current English population, the intricately manipulated record that established the English as the historical possessors of the island would

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<sup>416</sup> Subtitle quote from Camden, Vol 3, 3. Print.

be seriously compromised. Therefore, Speed and Camden were forced into a precarious rhetorical plane; the ancient British must retain some sort of resemblance to the early modern English, but those similarities had to appear inherent to the English genealogical record. This attempt largely failed. The civilized British, like the civilized Maltese and More's pre-invasion Utopians, are the product of foreign forces that brought progress and refinement to the island backwater.

Evolutionally different from "the Britaine" of the arch and the intricately drawn portrait of the English standing in the margins of Speed's "Kingdome" map, the ancient Britons—those who were subjugated to Britain's many conquerors—presented an ideological stumbling block to early modern English historiographers. Rude, wild and physically reminiscent of the savages of Ireland, the Highlands and the New World, the ancient Britons are sometimes cast as the progenitors of the English, and at others as the uncivilized original inhabitants of the isle whose vestiges can barely be discovered in contemporary Englishmen and women. In Thomas Hariot's *A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia*, he concludes his ethnographic tour of the New World with "Some Picture, of The Pictes Which in the Olde tyme dyd habite one part of the great Britainne" in order to demonstrate "how that the Inhabitants of the great Bretannie have bin in times past as savage as those of Virginia".<sup>417</sup> The seeming intent of Hariot's inclusion of these descriptions and portraits of the ancient Britons is to demonstrate that the New World barbarians can be transformed by the civilizing influence of the English, like the once "savage" inhabitants of the British Isles progressed into their present from through invasions and the remaking of their indigenous culture (see figs. 12 and 13).

Speed and Camden, as discussed in chapter one, are less comfortable with collapsing the

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<sup>417</sup> Hariot, *A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia: The Complete 1590 Theodor De Bry Edition* (New York: Dover, 1972) 75.

Picts and the ancient British. Because both authors strive, problematically, to claim the entirety of the British isle for England's ancestors, Camden and Speed walk a delicate line between casting the savage Picts as ancient Britons and assigning them to the later Scottish family, whose barbarity delineates them from the civilized English and whose arrival on the island denotes them as foreign invaders to the English land. First citing Bede, who calls the Picts "second" to the British, Camden then delicately retracts this characterization, calling the Picts "verie naturall Britans themselves, even the right progenie of the most ancient Britains: those Britans, I meane, and none other, who before the comming in of the Romans, were seated in the North part of the Island".<sup>418</sup> Speed in his *History's* "Portraitsures of the Ancient *Britaines*" is more ambiguous regarding the position of the Picts in England's genealogical scrolls. First referring to the history surrounding ancient Britain as "shadowed and enwrapped in manifold uncertainties and contrarieties", he then likens "those Originals of Particular Nations" as "not unlike that first beginning of the universall prosemiation of Mankind, when our first Parents innocencie and walked in naked simplicity".<sup>419</sup> The unclothed ancestors referred to here are the ancient Britons, of whom he provides engravings. The man stands calmly on rural ground with a severed head and spear in one hand his shield in the other; a second severed head lies at his feet. The woman poses naked, clutching a spear. Both are covered in intricate paintings and bodily markings (see fig. 14). Due largely to their pictured bodies, Speed cautiously genealogically connects the Picts and Britains, though he is careful to point out that "whether those other Inhabitants of the more Northerne parts of this Island, called also *Picti* or *painted*, had their name upon the same ground & whether they were some branch of the *British stocke*, or of some transmarine *Colonie*, it is a

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<sup>418</sup> Camden, Vol 1, 114-15.

<sup>419</sup> Speed, 179.

questions not yet decided”.<sup>420</sup>

Significantly, the images used by Hariot to illustrate the Picts are almost identical to those “portraits and paintings of the ancient Britains” in Speed’s *History*. Both men stand in similar poses, carry the same props and occupy the same landscape. Both illustrations announce the men’s savagery with the aforementioned severed heads. The women are also very alike in appearance; the only immediately noticeable difference in both the ethnographic sketches of the men and women is the direction of their gazes. Despite the obvious contradictions and problematic overlap of these multiple histories, each author is careful to distinguish the English from these savage inhabitants, though this distinction is less clear in Hariot’s text. One may infer, however, that it was the English—the conquerors of the New World and the bringers of civilization to this wasted territory—that evolved into a people capable of colonizing this savage landscape.

Marlowe’s play does away with these complicated genealogical negotiations, sidestepping the issue of an indigenous population altogether by absenting the Maltese from their island. The nightmare scenario offered up to the English by Marlowe’s island is the notion that the English, like the Maltese, have no genealogical legacy, that their land and history are actually the property of conquerors from other lands and cultures. For Camden, Speed and Hariot, along with our other historians, cannot escape the fact that civilization was imported to England by the men depicted in Speed’s arch: the Romans, the Danes, the Saxons and the Normans. Similarly, the Knights imagined themselves as importing their Christian civility to the Mediterranean isle. On historical Malta, the Knights discover, “a defenseless barren waste”, a “dry, dreary island”

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<sup>420</sup> Speed, 181.



without fortifications.<sup>421</sup> The Maltese, according to Vallette, were “a people of little courage and with little love for the faith”.<sup>422</sup> These colonial depictions of the Maltese islanders differ little from illustrations of the ancient Britons. For instance, Camden apologetically describes the “first inhabitants” of Britain thus:

Who were the most ancient and the very first Inhabitants of this Ile, as also, from whence this word *Britaine* had the original derivation, sundry opinions one after another have risen [ ... ] Neither can we hope to atteine unto any certenetie herein, more than all other nations, which [ ... ] as well as wee, touching their point, abide in great darknesse, errour and ignorance. And how, to speak truly, can it otherwise be? considering that the trueth, after so many revolutions of ages and times, could not chuse but be deeply hidden. For the first inhabitours of countreys had other cares and thoughts to busie and trouble their heads, than to deliver their beginnings unto posteritiie. And say, they had been most willing so to do, yet possibly could they not, seeing their life was so uncivill, so rude, so full of warres, and therefore void of all literature; which keeping companie with a civill life, by peace and repose, is only able to preserve the memorie of things, and to make over the same to the succeeding ages.<sup>423</sup>

Described in purely generic terms, these “first inhabitants”, whose unruly and barbaric lives must be accounted for, cannot but include the Britons themselves. Though Camden attempts to ascribe this problem of an empty ancient record to all nations and turns to the easy and familiar

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<sup>421</sup> Setton, 854.

<sup>422</sup> Crowley, Roger. *Empires of the Sea: The Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the Contest for the Center of the World* (New York: Random House, 2009) 101. Print.

<sup>423</sup> Camden, 4.

rhetorical device of a past shrouded in “darknesse, errour and ignorance”, he can imaginatively label as “truth” the notion that all early inhabitants were “too busie” to ready their progenitors for the civilized world.

Of the many troublesome issues raised by Camden and Speed’s history-making is the need to both retain and abolish the ancient Britons. They must be preserved in the annals of British history and made English in order to cast the island space as England, yet the many characterizations of these barbaric British originals casts an ugly light on the “first inhabitours” of the English nation. These ideological difficulties are compounded by the imperial discourse applied to the marginalized Irish, Welsh and Scottish by the English, which is uncomfortably cast back on the center; the forefathers of England themselves required civilizing by an outside force, be it the Romans, Saxons, Normans, etc. What Marlowe’s play uncomfortably reminds us is that the importation of the civilized world has the potential to entirely wipe out the indigenous culture; the Britons are not unlike the spectral “citizens of Malta” who exist but only in “darknesse”, in an undefined space. The Britons likewise occupy a shadowy space in history; necessary but problematic, they are palimpsestic ghosts called up to be overwritten.

More troubling still is the implication in Marlowe’s work that without the ideological trappings of official nationalism or the rhetorical frame of imperial conquest and its concomitant implications of improvement and civility, national or empire-making is not a gesture of solidifying community or of territorial expansion, but of base power. On Malta, imperial conquest and the repeated shifts in government culminate in nothing; at the conclusion of the play, Malta is not a nation, nor is it a stabilized governmental space. The Knights have regained power, but the violent and unethical means in which this authority is recaptured does not imply a promising future for “the citizens of Malta”. Monetary gain—“the other cares and thoughts to

busie and trouble their heads”—are the true cause of the Knights’ continued presence on the island and the purpose of their wars with the Turks. Ferneze cloaks this final victory in the rhetoric of religion as he intones “let due praise be [ ... ] to heaven”, but this declaration of God’s grace refers not to the preservation of the island, for in the lines proceeding he promises Malta’s destruction were the Turks to return. After informing Calymath of his imprisonment on Malta, Ferneze announces, “for come all the world / To rescue thee, so will we guard us now / As sooner shall they drink the ocean dry / Than conquer Malta or endanger us” (V.v.118-32). Willing to deprive Malta of its island status, that which provides the territory its greatest value, Ferneze prioritizes the Knights’ power over the preservation of the Maltese “nation”.

Returning to Marlowe’s England in the context of his island play, one might assume that the playwright saw English official nationalism as a necessary evil required to pull “the curtaine” over England’s troublesome genealogical theatre that betrayed its colonized history and barbaric beginnings. Official rhetoric also functioned to cloak the motivations, so obvious in his play, behind imperial endeavors; purporting to improve the archipelago by exporting and extending the English nation, like all colonial projects, England’s actual motivation laid in land acquisition and the grasp for power. In the following section, I will consider the damning repercussions resulting from the deflation of geographically based nationalism. Ancient Britain was, during the Roman occupation, little more than a colonial outpost serving the needs of an invading culture. It was England’s island-ness and proximity to the continent that invited the many foreign incursions that inalterably transformed English culture. Furthermore, internal rebellion rent the English political body and refuted the fundamental notion posited in official texts that England’s island geography naturally bound the people to each other as a insular national culture unattached from the continent and its contaminating influences. In truth, England mirrors

Marlowe's theatrical island space: a territory overrun by imperial forces in which the absencing of the people and geographical vulnerability denied the island the possibility of nationhood.

Geography: "Being Alone Stil'd *th'Oceans Island*"

In some accounts of ancient Britain, the island is "otherworldly" only in the sense of its separation from the civilized world; its barbarity is the result of its geographic separation, which has preserved the Britons in a backwards state of heathenism. For instance, Camden cites "Aegisippus [ who ] saith thus of Claudius, *Witnesse hereof is Britaine, which living without the world, is by the might of Romans reduced unto the world*".<sup>424</sup> Reversing the claims made by characters like Cloten in *Cymbeline* and Johnson in *The Masque of Blackness*, England is not "a world by itself" (II.v.13-4) or "a world divided from the world", a nation whose national pride is reliant upon its segregation from the continent.<sup>425</sup> Rather, the island must be "reduced" or absorbed into Roman culture to evolve into a state of civility, law and religion.<sup>426</sup> Like Valette's account of the Maltese, the "rude" lives of these ancient Britons extends to their heathen religious beliefs. In Gildas's florid illustration, "the ugly spectres of Britaine [ ... ] were meere Diabolical, exceeding well neere in number those of Aegypt: whereof some wee doe see within or without desert wals, with deformed lineaments still, carrying sterne and grim lookes after their wonted maner".<sup>427</sup> A spiritual desert, ancient Britain was the home of ghostly, insubstantial beings "with little love for the faith", whose monstrous outward forms reflected their inward emptiness. With the foreign importation of Christianity also came law. "This yoke of the

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<sup>424</sup> Camden, Vol. 1, 45.

<sup>425</sup> Jonson, *The Masque of Blackness*. *Ben Jonson: The Complete Masques* Ed Stephen Orgel (New Haven: Yale UP, 1969) 56. Print.

<sup>426</sup> Camden, Vol 1, 45.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid, Vol 1, 31.

Romanes although it were grievous, yet comfortable it proved and having a saving health unto them,” Camden claims, “for that healthsome light of Jesus Christ shone withal upon the Britans, whereof more hereafter, and the brightnesse of that most glorious Empire, chased away all savage barbarisme from the Britans minds”.<sup>428</sup> Only with the coming of Christian invaders were the ancient Britons taught to amend their “diabolical” lifestyles, cast off their ruggedness and enter the civilized world. Quoting Rutilius, Camden explains that with religion came law to the unregulated territory. “For Rome, as saith, Rutilius, ‘Compassed the world with triumphs bringing lawes; / And all to live in common league doth cause’”.<sup>429</sup> Once a “wild world”, according to Rutilius, “the lawless folke” of Britain “were tamed”, forced by its imperial masters to join the nations of the continent who had come under Roman rule.<sup>430</sup>

As discussed above, the pre-Roman, ancient Briton—savage, uncivilized and unable to defend his territory from invading tribes—is a figure that must be rhetorically abolished through generic description or fundamentally redesigned in Camden and Speed, lest their English genealogies of Britain be undermined by their savage ancestors. However, without an ancestral line reaching back to the ancient Britons, England appears a land of others whose historical intermixing and difference in culture, law and ethnicity make impossible the identification of a people that may be exclusively named “Britaines” or, worse yet, “English”. The cultures that reformed the savage Britons were foreign; the narrative of their reform smacks of colonial rhetoric in the New World, and, significantly, 16<sup>th</sup> century Malta. During the time of Marlowe’s play, the stubborn persistence of Welsh, Scottish and Irish cultures in the early modern

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<sup>428</sup> Ibid, Vol 1, 63.

<sup>429</sup> Ibid.

<sup>430</sup> Ibid.

archipelago evinces that this dis-united archipelago had its basis in a heterogeneous conglomerate of nations whose differences in cultures and background refused the notion of an island of national or historical uniformity.

Britain was not bestowed upon God's people as an "other Eden", but was a colony valued for its economic and militaristic advantages.<sup>431</sup> Though certainly not as geographically central in contrast to Malta in terms of global trade, England nonetheless offered the Romans and its many other conquerors a store of natural resources, which were often shipped from the island. The Romans, for instance, stripped the Britons of their crops and silver to accommodate their military efforts in Germany and Holland. Though the population was primarily British and Roman, foreign merchants and slaves entered Rome's Britain to trade their wares on this newly conquered isle. Town walls and Roman architecture, including fortifications, made the landscape speak a foreign tongue, and announced the island as a Roman stronghold.<sup>432</sup> A multilingual and multi-religious territory, Britain was an outpost valued by the Romans in their wars fought against the northern Europeans and rife with natural resources to be plundered. It was little more than a small archipelago included within Rome's vast imperial territories.

The overtaking of the British island and the remaking of the culture along Roman imperial lines also created a dependence of the colonized on their foreign overlords in time of further incursions suffered by the Britons. As explained in chapter one, following the departure of the Romans from the island, the ancient Britons repeatedly called upon the Romans to aid them in the defense of the isle from the Picts and Scots' attacks upon their territories. The

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<sup>431</sup> Shakespeare, *Richard II* (II.i.42).

<sup>432</sup> Salway, *Roman Britain: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000) 11, 20, 27-8, 36. Print.

primary reason for these incursions, one may argue, is Britain's geographic vulnerability, especially after the departure of the Roman garrisons. Largely "defenseless" against the Picts and Scots, the Britons lacked the military training and expertise to expel these foreign troops from their shores, as illustrated by the Romans' attempts to train the Britons in the means of defensive warfare. Obviously, this strategy failed, and the Scots and Picts took possession of the island's northern territories.

Drayton's "*Triumphant Arch*", which positions Britain "in *Happy* site, in *Neptunes* armes embras't", is echoed by Calymath's quickly refuted observation of "how secure this conquered island stands—Environed with the Mediterranean sea". Both depictions assert their island's geographic strengths: isles preserved and protected by their sea-locked states. In a single dramatic gesture, Marlowe dismantles a body of poetic and historical declarations of England's positive oceanic insularity; coming at the end of the play, after this claim to Malta's security is repeatedly denounced by invasions and conquests, *The Jew of Malta* ends with a disturbing reminder of England's own vulnerabilities and subjugations.

Whereas Malta's threatened state is the consequence of its geographic placement in the heart of Mediterranean trade, England's can be accounted for by its isolation and the state's inability to fund its wars and muster troops. The Elizabethan and Jacobean governments were forced to rely upon the generosity of its wealthy gentry and the ability of local governments to call men to arms. Even the crown's responsibility to secure England's many miles of coastline was placed in the hands of its subjects; as mentioned in chapter one, Henry VIII called upon those subjects living on the water to map the coasts as a defensive measure against possible Spanish, French and other foreign attacks. Marlowe's island is likewise defenseless, in part because the ships circling its territory are manned by non-native groups bent on conquering the

isle. By point of comparison, one might place side by side the cartographic depictions of Malta described above with John Speed's "Invasions of England and Ireland with All Their Civil Warrs Since the Conquest" (for a link to this image, see

[http://eebo.chadwyck.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/search/full\\_rec?SOURCE=pgthumbs.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=22575158&FILE=../session/1344199333\\_15992&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&SEARCHCONFIG=var\\_spell.cfg&DISPLAY=AUTHOR&ECCO=default](http://eebo.chadwyck.com.proxy1.cl.msu.edu/search/full_rec?SOURCE=pgthumbs.cfg&ACTION=ByID&ID=22575158&FILE=../session/1344199333_15992&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&SEARCHCONFIG=var_spell.cfg&DISPLAY=AUTHOR&ECCO=default)).

Commissioned by "certain Martial Gentlemen professors of Armes" and made possible "by the good allowance of her Maiestie to whose sacred person it was commended", Speed's map illustrates an England under siege, often by its own subjects.<sup>433</sup>

Visual representations of the many incursions against the isle swamp Speed's England, the signs of foreign and domestic wars that overpowered England often obscuring the territory itself. The overall map depicts the visually and politically fragmented nations, doubly disfigured by the rebellions that imploded within the domestic space and again by the invasions from abroad that carved the territories in such a manner as to break up the national spaces. Also, these locational signposts indelibly mark England and Ireland as isolated lands repeated besieged.

The margins of the map literally wrap the two nations in the language of conquest. Corresponding to the numbered locations on the territorial body that indicate the sites of civil and foreign battles, the marginalia tells a story of internal dissension and outside incursion. Beginning with the Norman Conquest, an enormous cultural shift that brought France onto England's shores and into the island's most fundamental institutions, Speed next describes the destruction of York at the hands of the Normans and Danes. Then, trying to recapture the

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<sup>433</sup> Speed, John. "Invasions of England and Ireland with All Their Civil Warrs Since the Conquest." *A Description of the Civill Warres of England*. EEBO Michigan State University Lib. 18 May 2012. Web.



nationalist line that Speed claimed as the ostensible reason for the map's production, he describes the vicious attack by Malcome "King of Scots" who "charg[ed] his Souldiers to spare neither sexe for age of the English nation".<sup>434</sup> Malcome was later forced to "doe homage" to England's King. Further vilifying the Scots and demonstrating England's might against the British strangers is Speed's depiction of the Scottish King David's invasion of Northumberland, where he "made his spoile as far as [ ... ] Yorkshire"; the English repelled the invaders and "ten thousand Scots [were] slaine".<sup>435</sup> To reinforce England's imperial reign over the archipelago, Speed also records England's takeover of Wales in 1090.

But here's where the story of England's control over the isles ends. Scotland, one of England's more glaring imperial failures, is largely left blank, visually negating the many battles England waged—and lost—against the nation to the north. The illustrations and marginalia that surround the east coast of England tell of the Danish invasion of the isle in 1069, the French Dauphin's 1126 attack on King John's England and a long narrative devoted to England's repelling of the Spanish fleet. Though the inserted tale tells of England's victory against Spain, Speed's visual narrative works against it this nationalist portrayal. Speed's two illustrations of the Spanish fleet very much resemble Nelli's engraving of the Turkish ships docked at Malta that visually overpower portions of the ocean and speak to the immense power of these foreign armies. In both cartographic narratives, the Christian and English ships are considerably smaller in size. As is well known, England's defeat of the Spanish was due not entirely to English military might, but to the strong winds that dispersed the enemy fleet.

The following chapters in this cartographic story are even more damaging to the

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<sup>434</sup> Ibid.

<sup>435</sup> Ibid.

nationalist characterization of positive insularity posited in official rhetoric for they betray the violent domestic fragmentation that disproves official narratives of national and governmental unity. Beginning in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, Speed's historical catalog is a damning record of internal rebellion and imperial failure. Speed lists seven Scottish rebellions between 1296 and 1346, all on English soil and in the Berwick borderlands. This record of Anglo-Scottish relations shows badly for the English, proving that England was both unable to subdue Scotland and to keep their ancient enemies from invading English territory; England appears defenseless against this northern nation. Speed's story betraying England's imperial weakness is followed by an extensive tale of domestic rebellion. Beginning with the Barron's Rebellion against Henry III in 1265, the catalog of domestic rebellions against the English state is as follows: the 1381 "insurrection of the commons under the leading of Jack Straw, Wat Tiler, and others"; a second rebellion of the commons in 1381, involving over 50,000 men from Suffolk; a 1382 uprising of the commons in Essex; the slaying of Englishmen in Wales at the hands of Owen Glendower in 1402, who was later aided by the French in 1405; the rebellion of the earls of March and Warwick against Henry VI in 1459; the 1461 slaying of as many as 36,776 Englishmen during the rebellion against Henry VI, which lead to Edward IV's ascension; the 1470 rebellion against Edward IV; the Cornish Rebellion in 1500, which left 1,000 Cornish killed and 1,500 imprisoned; the 1549 rebellions in Cornwall and Devonshire, where "4000 of them [ were ] slain"; Wyatt's rebellion in 1554 and the rebellion of the Northern Earls in 1572.<sup>436</sup>

This long chronology of domestic warfare is alarmingly ended in the middle of Elizabeth's reign; there is no resolution to this jarring narrative. The English island appears as a violently imploding political space, defenseless against not only the foreign ships that circle their

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<sup>436</sup> Ibid.

shores and the other British nations that invade their borders, but likewise unable to control their own home-born insurrections against an ever-changing government. With this information in mind, Speed's England now appears as an isolated target in the middle of the sea, an image visually supported by the lines used by Speed to connect his marginal explanations of the battles to their physical locations throughout England.

Speed's ineffectual conclusion to his cartographic narrative heaps praise upon Elizabeth for creating a nation where her subject now enjoy a life of "calme security"; the English state has learned from its tumultuous past and is a better nation for its challenges. Of the benefits reaped from this long period of internal bloodshed, Speed lists "the blessing of God poured upon us, in preserving our Countrey and Nation against the several invasions of forraine enemies, notwithstanding their severall and many attempts".<sup>437</sup> Like Ferneze in the final lines of Marlowe's play, the newly-appointed governor cites God as the true cause of Malta's return to a Christian culture: "let due praise be given", he intones, "neither to fate nor fortune, but to heaven" (V.v.23-4); it is heaven, not policy, violence and manipulation that brought Malta to peace. Speed likewise elides the bloody tactics that returned England to a place of "security", policies that remained in place long after the production of Speed's map. For instance, he pointedly overlooks in this pronouncement the continual blood spilled in the borderlands, a Scottish territory still labeled as "forraine" in tracks like Camden and Speed's. Likewise, Speed's own map contradicts the notion that England is now freed of foreign threat: perhaps the most prominent battle depicted on the map, the Spanish Invasion, took place only 12 years before the publication of Speed's map. The second benefit, Speed concludes is "the fall and ruine of

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<sup>437</sup> Ibid.

rebellious Subjects taking armes against their anointed Kings, Princes and Governors”.<sup>438</sup>

Speed’s statement of the peaceable relationship between archipelagic subjects and the state is pure rhetoric: aside from the border wars between Wales and England and Scotland and England, the refusal of the Scottish to kneel to the English crown was a glaring affront to England’s “Kings, Princes, and Governors”. Also, as my chapter on Elizabethan absolutist rhetoric discussed, the confrontations between local governments and state officials disclosed the misdeeds of “rebellious subjects” who chose local custom over the crown. Rather than confront the governmental fissures that accounted for this domestic turmoil, Speed again returns to God, calling this widespread social and cultural dissension

his heavy punishments inflicted upon us for our sinnes, in making the one party the scourge or maule of the other, with revenging murder by murder, working the depopulation of our fruitful Country, and ruining of our Cities at home, with losse and revolting of the territories in subjection unto us by just title of inheritance and conquest abroad.<sup>439</sup>

Recasting governmental disaster as the consequence of sinful behavior on all sides, Speed compounds this deep history of bloodshed into an eliding discourse of God’s lessons to his earthly subjects. Yet, Speed is careful to lay the blame for this violence on England’s imperial territories, as opposed to “our fruitful Country” that suffered such destruction at their bloody hands. Delineating the “revolting [ ... ] territories” from “our Country” and “our Cities at home”, Speed rhetorically reworks his map and narrative of rebellion.<sup>440</sup> It is the “territories in

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<sup>438</sup> Ibid.

<sup>439</sup> Ibid.

<sup>440</sup> Ibid.

subjection”, not the internal quarrels of the English or their mismanagement and illegitimate seizure of lands that create the blots on England’s otherwise pristine historical record.

Finally, like the Utopian government, whose idealized society is the envy of neighboring lands who seek their counsel and intervention, the Elizabethan state is instrumental in the amelioration of the social and political challenges faced by continental nations. In a period when

all hostility and outrage of civill warres, broiles and dissentions, have seemed by the power of the Almighty hand of God stretched forth in our defence, to have been transported out of this Island over the Seas into other Countryes, insomuch as notwithstanding this calme security of our owne at home, our neighbouring Nations of all sides abroad, either thorow the licentious tyranny of ungodly Princes, that have laid persecution upon their Subjects, or the mutinous dissentions of disobedient people that have raised Rebellions against their Princes [ ... ] as they have been pitifully enforced to pray and seeke adye at her Maiesties hands, and to submit themselves under the protection of her, whom with us they acknowledge to be the defendresse of the Christian Faith and Peace, and the most natural Nurse of the true Church of GOD.<sup>441</sup>

Speed is likely referring here to Elizabeth’s military interventions in the Netherlands and the attempt to put down Catholic Spain’s bloody resistance to Dutch Protestantism. However, Speed’s contention that the peace emanating from the English island and the Queen’s willing protection of failing foreign nations is an ideological reworking of English support of foreign nations. Elizabeth’s interest in the Low Countries was, in part, driven by policy. Attempting, unsuccessfully, to avoid war with Spain, Elizabeth’s involvement in the Dutch Protestant cause

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<sup>441</sup> Ibid.

was reluctant, self-interested and sometimes duplicitous. In her negotiations with France, Elizabeth dissembled, turning the joint effort to defend the Low Countries from Catholic Spain to a battle for French territory. Refusing to call back her troops from La Havre, Elizabeth demanded the French return Calais, over which she claimed ownership.<sup>442</sup> This move complicated the Queen's marriage negotiations to Anjou in 1574, which was intended to bind England and France against Spain. Playing both sides, she consulted with the Spanish Duke of Parma for a peaceful end to the conflict in the Low Countries.<sup>443</sup> Unwilling to intervene directly in a war that would eventually lead to the Spanish Armada's attack on her island, Elizabeth would only lend money to Anjou to defend her Protestant brethren until she was forced, by political necessity, to enter into the war. The 1585 Treaty of Nonesuch did little to further the Netherland's Protestant cause; after serious governmental and militaristic failures, England broke the league with the Low Countries and departed the Netherlands in 1587.

Much like the neighbors to the Utopians, Elizabeth's allies were often pawns in a slippery game of political manipulations; to be held in "her Maiesties hands, and to submit themselves under the protection of her" might also to be crushed under the weight of policy. For, as Barabas advises us "making a profit of [ ... ] policy" is oftentimes a guiding principle of early modern governance (V.iii.112). The policy of historical narrative is likewise essential to nation building, as Speed cartographically and narratively demonstrates. However, not even his strategy to produce a palimpsestic cartographic work—heaping marginal text upon text to explain away England internal instability and foreign invasions—can mask island England's vulnerability. Speed's map and arch also presents an narrative challenge to the discourse of English imperial

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<sup>442</sup> Levin, Carol. *The Reign of Elizabeth I* (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2002) 43. Print.

<sup>443</sup> MacCaffrey, Wallace T. *Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603* (Princeton: Princeton, UP, 1992) 4. Print.

right and genealogical history, which is intended to graft the English onto the vast territory of the isles, even those functioning as autonomous nations. Like Marlowe's Malta, this island of others, children of conquerors and strangers to each other, makes impossible any notion of national or imperial homogeneity, historical or otherwise. And, when geography, a shared history and cultural heritage cannot bind a people, it is often the ideological work of government to produce and cement allegiance to the sovereign and to the sovereign nation. Again, Marlowe thwarts this possibility, particularly because the source of sovereign power is undetermined and unseen (V.iii.112).

Governmentality: "By His permission a body politic to govern"

Marlowe's play takes to the extreme England's very real governmental crises; particularly the decentering of monarchical authority resulting from early modern state formation examined in chapter three; the incongruity between absolutist rhetoric and monarchical representation and the distribution of sovereign authority to agents of the state; the unclear source of authority, which was attributed to the divine hand of God and the troubling cultural and social rifts in England and the archipelagic landscapes that made official claims to national or imperial homogeneity politically unrealistic. Britain's erratic geopolitical state is at the heart of these many political impasses. Unable to bring into alignment and uniformity the many governmental bodies functioning independently within the archipelago, the monarchy—the supposed source and body of sovereign power—was dependent upon mystical representation rather than a clear consolidation of authority located at Whitehall.<sup>444</sup>

As explained above, Malta is wholly lacking a center of authority; absent from the island

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<sup>444</sup> Subtitle from Elizabeth I, "Queen Elizabeth's first speech, Hatfield, November 20, 1558," *Elizabeth I: Collected Works* Eds. Leah S. Marcus, Janel Mueller, and Mary Beth Rose (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000) 52. Print.

is a monarch or a centralized state. Without a single body or body of persons to which authority is attached, political authority is ephemeral and can be illegitimately wrested from the ether strictly through force or policy. The state, if it exists at all in Marlowe's text, is mutable and abstract because of the many transfers of power that subject the islanders to a lawless state without citizens' access to justice. Following Barabas and Ithamore's successful plot to frame Giacomo for Bernadine's murder, Ithamore states that the supposed criminal must be "born to the magistrates" to be punished for the murder (IV.ii.186). Upon Giacomo's plea to Barabas to let him flee, Barabas insists that "the law must have his course", assuring him that "the law shall touch you; we'll but lead you, we. / 'Las, I could weep at your calamity. [ ... ] Law wills that each particular be known" (IV.ii.205-08). The law, of course, fails Bernadine due to Barabas's manipulations. We can assume that "the magistrates" are the Knights, but their only direct connection to the law comes as a result of personal interest: the persecution of Barabas for the deaths of Lodowick and Mathias. Aside from the final scenes of the play, law is nearly absent from island's political landscape. Questioning the validity of his accusers after Ithamore, Bellamira and Pilia-Borza reveal the Jew's part in their poisoning and the murders of the nuns and Abigail, Barabas exclaims "Let me have law; / For none of this can prejudice my life" (V.i.38-9). Ferneze's response to Katherine's plea for justice and her inquiries into Barabas's whereabouts is to explain that the Jew is "In prison, till the law be passed on him" (V.i.49). The final solution to Barabas's criminal acts is to cast the seemingly dead Barabas into the lawless space outside the city walls.

Barabas—who has largely controlled the law by his political machinations, his ability to make Calymath governor, and his reassignment of this position to Ferneze—is the victim (admittedly deservedly) of an ambiguous system of law handed from ruler to ruler and based



primarily upon policy. The movement of ships on the seas of Malta, as explained above, does not appear to be regulated by any kind of law; rather piracy and unclear sea rights make the ocean space one of violence and criminality. Likewise, Malta contains territories in which law of any sort does not apply. For instance, the land outside the city walls where Barabas's body is left "prey to vultures and wild beasts" appears a space of wilderness outside legal surveillance, for it is here that Barabas invites the invasion of the Turks and the temporary change in government that ousts the Christians, the ostensible "magistrates" of the isle from power (V.i.59). Akin to Spenser's Faerie Land, in which pockets of lawlessness deny the possibility of uniform regulation and the omnipresent power of the supreme monarch, Malta's shifting governance and multiple figures of ambiguous power question the very possibility of a nation without a state. Like Spenser's Lucifera, the self-made ruler who reigns over the territory of Book I, the authorities of Malta are without a "rightfull kingdome and "ne ruld [their] Realme with laws but pollicie" (I.iv.12.7).<sup>445</sup> Unlike Spenser's politicized representation of his native land, law and its components in the *Faerie Queene*—justice and temperance—are without a place on Marlowe's island.

In Marlowe's England, the emergent state was a means of disseminating the word of the monarch and enacting the force of the law. As we have seen, the somewhat unsuccessful attempt at governmental centralization resulted in an uneven application of the sovereign's prerogative across the realm. Local governments in England and particularly in the empire's peripheral territories often trumped the edicts of state officials sent into the localities by the monarch and her governmental bodies. Therefore, the living counterparts to Spenser's villain Lucifera were capable of building post-feudal kingdoms within the monarch's realm, amassing wealth, lands

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<sup>445</sup> Spenser, Edmund. *The Faerie Queene* 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Ed. A.C. Hamilton (Harlowe: Pearson Longman, 2007). Print.

and power to rival that of the crown. Like Spenser's Munera, who "many Princes she in wealth exceeds, / And purchast all the countrey lying ny" (V.ii.9.6-7), local magnates commanded a kind of monetary and territorial power unavailable to the crown. Though competing systems of law were most certainly in place in England, further complicating the juridical system that supposedly regulated the body politic as a whole, the differences in legal code and its application across England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales exposed the notion of a centralized legal system a political fantasy.

The head of the body politic of England, at least in terms of official rhetoric, was undoubtedly the monarch. However, the resultant dismemberment of the political nation into the various and sometimes disconnected arms of the state disfigured the body politic and threw into question the singular-ness and indivisibility of sovereign authority. The teetering foundation on which the rhetoric of absolutist authority balanced was a compendious textual body of carefully fabricated monarchical representations, composed of political philosophies and mythical stories culled from contemporary political theorists and the compilation of often questionable "ancient" materials. The monarch was the supreme religious and political figure of the nation, whose power was granted to the earthy person of the king or queen by the hand of God. The proliferation of texts celebrating the monarchy—the masques, the pageants, the paeans to the king or queen that prefaced historical and literary works—almost all called upon the sovereign's divine right to rule the nation and the archipelago. More overtly political treatises likewise strongly supported the divine right of kings, though the need for a state infrastructure and the "loan or grant on sufferance" of divine power to state agents seriously compromised this rhetoric.<sup>446</sup>

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<sup>446</sup> Bodin, *On Sovereignty* Ed. Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007) 2. Print.

The representational aura of divinity enshrining the monarch served multiple purposes, not least the subjects' awe of their God appointed king or queen. Inciting fear of social and political disorder, Sir Thomas Elyot warned of the ultimate destruction wrecked upon a country if the monarch's rule of the nation is not perceived as "heven and erthe [ ... ] governed by one god, by one perpetuall ordre, by one providence".<sup>447</sup> Without "ordre", Elyot warns, "what shulde then remayne? Certes nothyng finally, except some man wolde imagine eftsones Chaos [ ... ] where there is any lacke of ordre nedes must be perpetuall conflicte".<sup>448</sup> The ideologically necessary worship of the sovereign of course was translated into poetic adoration of the sacred mistress of the realm. Spenser's "flowre of grace and chastity, / Throughout the world renowned far and neare [ ... ] Whose glory shineth as the morning starre, / And with her light the earth enlumines cleare" is a divine object of poetry, but this type of rhetoric was undoubtedly of the political text that made up "The Virgin Queen" (II.ix.4). This poetic body reached far beyond the page into the world of policy and political strategy, both internationally and domestically. The physical person of the sovereign was the island itself, the singular human body that mirrored back to the nation the singular national body. The "great and most glorious virgin Queene alive, / That with her souveraine power, and sceptre shene [ ... ] In widest Ocean she her throne does reare, / That over all the earth it may be seene," intones Spenser: her island nation is her sovereignty embodied (II.ii.40). These compounded rhetorics of the divine sovereign were designed to command allegiance in her subjects: to deny the monarch was to deny God. To deny the sovereign was to deny the nation, which was built by God and placed in the hands of his earthly representative.

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<sup>447</sup> Elyot, *The Booke Named the Governour* Ed. Henry Herbert Stephen Croft. 1531. (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967) 11-2. Print.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid, 3.

What Marlowe's play alarmingly presents to an English audience is an island in which law, authority and its source are so unattached to Malta that the territory can barely be called a body politic. Without a sovereign and the body of ideological rhetoric that makes up this national and divine figure, there can be no justification for sovereign leadership. The authority to rule is not granted by God. In fact, God plays little role on Marlowe's Malta, except when hypocritically invoked by the Christians to lend a veneer of legitimacy to their illegal seizures of wealth and power. Nor is sovereignty cloaked in a kind of well-crafted mysticism or an intricate weaving of genealogical histories tinged with mythical elements. On Malta, there is no ideological apparatus for understanding the attribution and circulation of sovereign power; there is no legitimate means to attain it and no justification for its residing in one set of hands rather than another. The knights who are seemingly the governing body of the island derive their authority from an unknown source. Though granted the island by the distant Charles V, we know that the historic Knights of Malta were an international force built of several nations without any one country claiming control over their actions. Unassociated with an overriding political figure or governmental body, the actions of the Knights are determined not by some kind of overseeing regulation or even an ideological narrative shaping their behaviors and public personas. The Knights of Malta rule a rogue state without a direct line to a legitimate source of political sovereignty or even an ideological semblance of justifiable force.

Marlowe's dystopia demonstrates that, without the ideological veneer attached to sovereign authority, political power is revealed in its most base form—policy, strategy and brute force. English audiences likely would have been at least somewhat aware of the political machinations that undermined the Virgin Queen's polished monarchical representation, such as her politicized reluctance to enter into the conflict in the Netherlands, her studied considerations

and refusals of potential marriages, and her official approval of the pillaging of Spanish ships returning from the New World, to name only a few of Elizabeth's less than laudatory governmental maneuvers. Shorn of ideology, the fabrications surrounding the artificial or theatrical nature of power are revealed as insubstantial. This possibility, of course, was a nightmare of English politics, which was ultimately reliant upon the fashioning of monarchs to sustain the societal order. With the collapse of the ideological structure of monarchical sovereignty and the revelation of the true machinery of government might come the undoing of the entire social structure of the island, the divine order of being upon which English society was built. This nightmare was realized only 50 years later.

Conclusion: "Leave nothing loose, all levelled to my mind"

Barabas utters this line in the final moments of Marlowe's play. Having controlled the straw figures of authority that sought to subjugate him, Barabas is now constructing a physical symbol of his deceptive plotting, a killing monument to policy, stateless-ness and the kind of self-interest that adamantly refuses community or alliance. The set he constructs for the final act of his Machiavellian production is intended to murder the Ottoman Calymath, but this plot is wrested from the Jew by the Christian governor, who sees in this deadly trap the means to kill off his enemies and retain his power. For power is the only medium of exchange on Malta, the only thing valued. "A ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary", advises Machiavelli in *The Prince*, an adage followed to the letter by Marlowe's characters, who grasp at ethereal forms of authority on this lawless island.<sup>449</sup>

"Many will talk of title to a crown; / What right had Caesar to the empery?" asks Marlowe's Machiavel, introducing in the play's earliest moments the notion that power, not nationhood, not

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<sup>449</sup> Machiavelli, 55.

an ideological system of governance or the discourse of legitimacy rule in this text. “Might first made kings”, Machiavel asserts in his introductory salvo; might in Malta flies in the face of state and monarchical authority, exploding the very tenets of the Elizabethan and Jacobean political apparatus. Furthermore, might is not the monopoly of kings on Malta, for no sovereign exists to which power is bound. The sovereignty of Malta itself is perpetually in question. Lacking autonomy on the global stage, Malta is a geographical anomaly, a literally unruly territory whose boundaries are purely physical and politically without signification.<sup>450</sup>

Barabas’s plotting, his adherence to Machiavelli’s precepts of power, ends in his violent expulsion from the play. Disappearing from the visible theatrical space as he falls into the cauldron, but still remaining an absent presence, Barabas’s spectre represents a possibility so alarming to the writers of the nation that he must be hidden, buried in “a deep pit past discovery” (V.v.36). Marlowe’s Jew is nationless-ness personified; admitting no allegiances, tying himself to no delineated group, garnering an identity not from the land but from gains from overseas and functioning outside an already tenuous system of law, Barabas must be expelled, removed from sight. Yet he lingers as a nightmarish possibility of subjecthood without nationhood.

The nation in early modern England is the product of meticulous plotting—“all leveled” to the minds of its official authors. Spatially, the English nation was artificially carved into the island space, a process of geographic and political plotting that attempted to violently suture Wales to the English body through the abolishment of cultural, legal and governmental systems. In an opposite gesture of the island’s disfigurement, the writers of England sought to sever the Scottish lands from “the English Island”, ideologically separating the civilized Saxon lowlands

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<sup>450</sup> Subtitle, (V.v.3).

from the barbaric Highlands in order to protect the immensely fragile genealogical plot that claimed England as the island's true progenitors.

Assigning hierarchical designations to the nations of the archipelago, geographical plotting made possible the nationalist and imperial projects unsuccessfully pursued during the reigns of Elizabeth and James. Cartographic plotting and the visual poetics that so often accompanied these visual narratives were essential to the imperial plot constructed by the crown and its producers. Manipulated borders, ideologically charged illustrations, and ethnographic specimens of the multinational archipelago told a story of English conquest and imperial right, one that aligned with early modern historiography. Perhaps the most intricately plotted of nationalist materials, England's historical record was cobbled together from often illegitimate materials, historical mistruths and exaggerated narratives of English superiority that patched over historical aporias and were almost always the stuff of fantasy. Finally, the plotted-ness of monarchical representation was itself an industry of glorified images, poetry and politics, a theatrics built upon mystifying notions of divine right.

However, despite the minute constructions of the nation—the myriad plots that uneasily erected the teetering foundation of official nationalism in early modern England—geography cannot be ideologically or textually amended. The “English Island” is a mythical construction that failed to subject the English to the crown's official nation.