A BSTRACT THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: A STUDY IN THE BASES AND PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS by Walter Dale De Vries Most studies of lobbying deal with the nature and power of the interest groups that lobbyists represent. The purpose of this study was to carry the analysis a bit further by focusing attention on the lobbyist as an individual agent of the group's interest. The study was primarily concerned with a close examination of the individual lobbyist's skills, socio-economic background, career patterns, use of lobbying techniques, perceptions of role relationships to his organization and to the legislature, and his and other's perceptions of his effectiveness in the role of lobbyist. This was a study in the perceptions and bases of effectiveness. Consequently, the theoretical frame of reference and the major hypotheses of the dissertation were stated in social psychological terms. A perceptual model of behavior and certain concepts of role theory were used throughout the thesis. The major hypothesis of the dissertation was that: there would be a high degree of consensus among the perceptions of the participants in the study--thirty-three lobbyists (action-agents), sixteen legislative leaders (action-targets), and eleven news correspondents (action-observers)-- as to which lobbyists were most effectively enacting their lobbying roles; and, further agreement would be present among the evaluating groups con- cerning the variables perceived as the basis of effective role enactment. The effectiveness of the role enactment (dependent variable) would be Walter Dale DeVries related to these independent variables: lobbyists' role—taking ability, their use of role-associated techniques, and their role perceptions? Measurement of the perceptions of the individual lobbyist's role enactment resulted in high statistical correlations among the three evaluating groups concerning those lobbyists most effectively enacting their roles. Further agreement, based on significant statistical corre- lations, was also present in the perceptions of study participants regarding the bases of effectiveness of the most effective Michigan lobbyists. An Index of Perceived Effectiveness, which rank ordered the lobby- ists from most effective to least effective, was constructed from the data obtained in personal interviews. The Index of Perceived Effective- ness score achieved by each lobbyist was the dependent variable against which the independent variables were tested. The first major independent variable, role-taking ability or potential, included socio-economic and career background variables and personality characteristics. Lobbyists with certain socio-political background and career characteristics, that is, those who had news reporting experience, previous Republican affiliation, extensive political party experience, high status governmental positions, lengthy governmental experience, and legislative experience, tended to be more effective lobbyists. The second major independent variable believed related to lobbying effectiveness was the use of role-associated, group-approved lobbying techniques. Sixteen lobbying techniques were isolated and considered, and group consensus was present concerning which techniques were perceived as most effective. However, the hypothesis, that lobbyists who used these group-approved, effective lobbying techniques would be more effective than those who did not use them as much or not at all, was not verified statistically. Copyright by WALTER DALE DE VRZES 1960 THE MICHIGAN ‘LOBBYIST: A STUDY IN THE BASES AND PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS BY Walter Dale De. Vries A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOC TOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science 1960 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer wishes to express his appreciation to the many people who contributed to the development, research, and writing of this thesis. I wish to thank the Falk Foundation for the American Graduate Training Program Fellowships during the years 1957, 1958, and 1959. The fellowship program provided the necessary funds and motivation involved in the completion of the Ph. D. program, as well as providing the writer with the Opportunity to become actively involved in political staff work. . I am especially grateful to Dr.. Leroy C. . Ferguson for his leader- ship and guidance during the planning, conducting, and writing of this study. . His accessibility and willingness to help have been deeply appreciated. . To the other members of my thesis committee, Dr. Ralph M. Goldman, and Dr. Charles Adrian, for their thoughtful suggestions regarding the research design and text of this thesis, I am grateful. A special note of "thanks" to the thirty-three lobbyists--who must remain anonymous--for their time, tolerance, and interest in this study. As personal friends and interested observers, they have awaited the results of my study with some impatience and a little apprehension. I apologize for the former, and hope that the latter will be relieved as they examine the results and conclusions of this work. - I want to express my appreciation to the Lieutenant Governor, the President of the Senate, the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, the House Majority and Minority Leaders, the Chairmen of all major Legislative Committees, and the rest of the sixteen legislators who _ participated in this study. - I hOpe I have justified the candor and interest entrusted in me by these personal friends. . Former Speaker of the House of Representatives, George M. Van Peursem, , and the incumbent Speaker, Don R. . Pears, should be singled out for the unusual tolerance and encouragement proffered the writer by permitting him to conduct this research while acting as Assistant to the Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives. ii I want to send a special vote of "thanks" down the hall to my eleven friends in the House Press Room who willingly participated and contributed to this academic venture with the earth y insights and gentle cynicism which seems to accompany the news reporting profession I anxiously await their critical judgment and analysis of my first major scholarly enterprise. To the panel judges, Fred I. C iase, Secretary of the State Senate: Norman B- Philleo, Clerk of the House of Representatives; and Hugh Brenneman, Public-Relations Counsel for the State Bar of Michigan, the Michigan Medical Society, and the Michigan Society of Architects, I want to express my gratitude for th e work they performed in the selection of the universe of this study. Many of my friends, associated with the Michigan Leg-..lat re, helped me--in their spare time—-with the typing and preparation of this dissertation. - A few who should be publicly acknowledged are: Mrs Eleanor Brown, Secretary to the Speaker; Miss Wanda Stewart, Mrs. Marjorie Ellis, and Miss June Cammack, all of the Legislative Service Bureau. . Finally, I hOpe this document serves as an answer to the persistent queries of my three sons, Mike,. Bob, and Steve, regarding my mySterious activities in the inviolate sanctuary of my study and Lansing office during the past three years. it To my wife, Lois, whose tolerance and patience ‘ have been limitless, I owe a deep deb-t of gratitude for providing the motivation necessary to conclude this work; and, it is to her that I dedicate this volume. - *****$$*sa** iii 3 CHAPTER I. II. III . TABLE OF CONTENTS iv . Page . THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: INTRODUCTION, DEFINITION, AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. . 1 Introduction ...... . ................. 1 Examination of the Literature ...... . ....... 5 ' Theoretical Statement and Statement of the Problem . 9 Definition of the Michigan Lobbyist . . . . . . ..... 14 The Popular Stereotype . . . ....... . . . . . . 14 Michigan Statutory Definition . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Definition of Lobbyist Used in This Study. . . . . . . 18 Research Methodology. . . ...... . . ........ 23 Summary.......................... 25 THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE EFFECTIVENESS..................... 27 Introduction....................... 27 Index of Perceived Effectiveness. . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Lobbyists' Self- Evaluations and Sense of Efficacy. . . . 34 Summary 40 THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SOCIO- ECONOMIC BACK- GROUND, CAREER PATTERNS, AND LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS...... ..... 42 Introduction . . . . . ................... 42 Socio-Economic Background ............... 43 Age......... ....... . .......... 43 Birthplace of Lobbyists ................ 45 Place of Upbringing .................. 47 Education . ...................... 49 Father's Occupation .................. 52 Religious Affiliation .................. 52 Marital Status of Lobbyists and Number of Children . 54 Summary--Socio-Economic Background ....... 54 Career Correlates . . . . . . .............. 56 ‘ Source of Major Influences to EnterPublic Affairs. . 56 Family Group Influence ............. 56 Relatives in Politics ............... 58 Cont'd TABLE OF CONTENTS ~~ Con-tinned CHAPTER Page School as Sou rce of 1:1qu ence . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Political Governmental Participation as Scarce of Influence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Politically-related l‘van-agovernrnental Occap atic c as Source of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Sense of Mission and Obligation as Source of Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Lobbying Activity as Source of Inf]. uence . . . . . . 62 Pre- Lobbying Occupational Career . . . . . . . . . .. 63 Political Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 66 Previous Republican Affiliation and .EI fectiveness . 67 Years of Political Experience and Effectiveness . . 69 Present Political Affiliation and Effectiveness . . . 69 Governmental Ex‘erience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Previous Governmental Experience and Effective- ness.......................71 Level of Governmental Experience and Effective- ness.......................72 Status of Governmental Experience and Effective- ness....................... Years of Governmental Experience and E ffe cti .e- ness....'...................75 Legislative Experience and Effectiveness. . . . . . 78 Summary-~Career Correlates . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4‘ Summary........................Bu “ \‘ m IV. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPTIONS OF RECRUIT- MENT, LOBBYING ROLES, AND JOB SATISFACTION . 83 Introduction........................83 Recrui...tment.....................83 Selected and Asked by Organization . . . . . . . . . . 84 AppliedforPosition.................. 87 "Grew into it" from other Organization Position . . . 88 Recruitment through Friends and Contacts . . . . . . 88 Professional Relationship and Personal Commitment . . 89 Policy Position as Factor in Decision to Represent InterestGroup.............'....... 89 Personal Commitment to Organization Policy. . . . . 92 Perceptions of Professional Relationships. . . . . . . 94 Perceptions of Lobbying Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Promoter-Strategist...................97 Defender-Advocate................... 99 TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued CHAPTER Page Liaison ...... ' .................... 102 Serviceman ..................... '. . . 103 Public Relations Man ...... , ............ 103 Other‘Lobbyist Roles ................... 104 "Like to Work with People“ as Source of Motivation .. 137 Future Career Plans . .................. 138 Summary............. .............. ‘139 V. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES. . 142 Introduction ..... . . . . . . . . ........ . . 142 Description and Analysis of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques........‘................151 Direct Personal Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Personal Presentation of Arguments. . . . . . . . . 151 Presentation of Research Results . . . . . . . . . . 152 Testifying at Hearings . ‘. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Communication Through Intermediaries . . . . . . . . 153 Public Relations Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Collaboration with Other Groups . . . . . . . . . . . 154 ‘Contact byConstituent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Contact by Person with Special Access. . . . . . . . 160 OrganizationNews Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 Letter and Telegram Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . 164 Publicizing Voting Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Achieving and Maintaining Access . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Entertaining for an Evening . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 GivingaParty................... 172 Personal Favors and Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Contributing Political Work . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 «Contributing Political Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 DirectBribery....................178 Comparison of Washington and La. -sing Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Relationship of the Use of Lobbying Techniques to Effectiveness.................. ..181 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Planning and Freedom in the -- Use of Tactics and Techniques. . . . . .'. . . . . . . . 183 ' Lobbyists" Perceptions of Legislative Information Sources, Contacts, and Contact DeveloPment ...... 188 Summary ................ . ...... . . 207 Cont'd vi TABLE OF CONTENTS -~ Continued CHAPTER VI. VII . Page THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEIVED BASES OF ’ EFFECTIVENESS ...................... 210 Introduction . . . ..................... 210 Perceived Bases of Effectiveness for Top Sixteen Lobbyists. . ...................... . '211 ‘Personality, Sociability Factors . V .......... . . 219 Organizational Factors ................... 220 Background and Experience ..... . ......... 222 ~- Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques ....... 224 Knowledge of Subject . ................. 226 Knowledge of, Confidence in,_ and Acceptance by Legislators......................228 Knowledge of Legislative Process. . . . ...... .1 230 I Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance. . . 232 Ability to Communicate . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 ' Personal Integrity, Honesty and Sincerity . . . . . . . .236 HardWork...........‘.'.‘.......'... 239 Political Party Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 239 'Kind and Acceptability of "Lobbying Product" . . . . . Z40 Summary...........................241 THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SOME VALUE JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 Introduction........................ 247 Tolerance and Acceptance of Pressure Groups ...... 24‘? _ByLobbyists.......................»249 ByLegislators......................251 By News Correspondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 ‘Lobbyists' Perceptions of Solicitations of Views by Public - Policy—Makers............. ........ ..255 Other Value and Opinion Considerations . . ....... . . 25-7 Concern with Public Image and Social Status ...... 2.57 ‘Change in Lobbying Tactics and Personnel . . . . . . . 259 ReportersasLobbyists........... . 261 Lobbying Regulation . . ...... . . . . . ..... 261 Some Lobbying Regulation Recommendations ...... 268 Summary..... ...... ........... 270 Cont'd vii TABLE OF CONTENTS 4-- Continued CHAPTER Page VIII. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . . 273 Introduction ...................... . . 27 3 The Major Hypothesis . . . . . .1 ............ . 274 The Dependent Variable ............... . ‘ 275 - The Major Independent Variables ......... . . 276 Role-taking Ability or Potential ......... . 277 Role-associated Techniques ........ . . . . . 283 Role Perceptions ........ _ ........... 288 Value Considerations and Recommendations ...... . 293 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................ . 296 APPENDIXES ............................ '. . . . 302 viii TABLE 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. LIST OF TA BLES ix Page Breakdown by Position of Michigan Legislative Agents . 19 Sociometric Matrix of Lobbyists Chosen as Effective by "Other Lobbyists . '. ............ . ....... Z9 - Sociometric Matrix of Lobbyists Chosen as Effective by Legislative Leaders ............. , . . . . .. . . 30 Sociometric Matrix of Lobbyists Chosen as Effective by Correspondents . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 31 - , Comparison of the Combined Ratings of Lobbyists, . Legislators, and Legislative Leaders in an Index of Perceived Effectiveness . . . . ..... . . . . . . . 33 Index of Perceived Effectiveness . . - ....... .. . . 35 Lobbyists' Self-evaluation of Role Effectiveness and Efficacy . ........ '. . . . . . . . ........ 37 Relationship of Lobbyists' Age to Effectiveness . . . . . 44 Relationship of Lobbyists' Birthplace to Effectiveness . 46 - Lobbyists' Perceptions of Place of Upbringing . . . . 48 Relationship of Amount of Education to Effectiveness . . 51 Relationship of Fathers' Occupation to Lobbying Effectiveness ....................... 53 Religious Affiliation of Lobbyists ............ 54 Marital Status of Lobbyists and Number of Children . 55 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Major Influences to Enter Public Affairs ........... . . . .. . . . . . 57 Cont'd LIST OF TABLES -- Continued TABLE 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. Page Relationship of Relatives in Politics to Lobbying Effectiveness................. ...... 60 Pre~1obbying Occupations of Michigan Lobbyists . . . . 64 Relationship of Previous Political Affiliation to Lobby- ing Effectiveness . . , ..... . . . .......... .. 68 Relationship of Political Party Experience to Effectiveness ......... . . . . .......... 70 Relationship of Governmental Experience to Effective- ness 0 O O O O O O O O O O O I O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O 72 - Level of Lobbyists' Previous Governmental Experience. 74 . Relationship of Status of Governmental Position to 'Effectiveness . . . . . . . . .7 . . . . .......... 76 . Relationship of Years of Governmental Experience to Effectiveness....................... 77 . Relationship of Those Lobbyists Who Had Served as 'Legislators to Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . ..... 79 - Lobbyists' Perceptions of Methods of Recruitment . . . 85 . Lobbyists' Perceptions of Importance of Organization Policy Position in Decision to Become Their Lobbyist . 9O .Lobbyists' Perceptions of Personal Commitment to OrganizationPolicy.................... 93 . Lobbyists' Perceptions of Professional Relationship to Organization.........., ....... 96 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Lobbying Roles . . ...... 98 - Relationship of "Promoter-Strategist" and "Defender- Advocate" Roles to Effectiveness . .- . . . . . . . 101 Cont'd LIST OF TABLES -- Continued TABLE 31.. .32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. Page Lobbyists' Perceptions of Differences in Lobbying Role as Viewed by Organization and Lobbyist ......... 105 A Lobbyists' Perceptions of Formulation of Organization . Legislative Policy . ....... . . . . ..... . . . 111 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Time Spent in Lobbying- Related Activities ......... . . . . . . . . . . . 116 .Lobbyists' Perceptions of Time Spent on Lobbying Legislators ..................... . . . 120 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Methods of Reporting to Their Organizations ................ . . . 122 Cost of Financing Lobbying Operation . . . ...... 126 Lobbyists' Income ............... . . . . . 127 Lobbyists' Income as Related to Effectiveness . . . . . 129 .Relationship of Years of Lobbying Experience to Effectiveness ........... . ........ . . . 130 Lobbyists' Place of Residence as Related to Effective- ness 0 o o o o o o o o ‘0 o o o o o o o o o o o o 0 o o o o 131 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Job Satisfactions . . . . . . . 133 Perceptions of Motivations in Decision to Remain in .Lobbying and Bases of Job Satisfaction ........ . 134 Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques . . . . . . 147 Legislators’ Ratings of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques 148 News Correspondents Ratings of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques ........................ 149 2 Comparison of Lobbyists', Legislators, and News ,. Corre3pondents' Median Ratings of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques ................... . . . 150 Cont'd xi LIST OF TABLES -— Continued TABLE- 47. 48. 49 . 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. Page Lobbyists'Perceptions of Collaboration with Other Group‘s .................. , ....... V. . 155 Comparison of Washington Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques with that of LansingLobbyists. . 180 Individual Breakdown of Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques in Relation to Their'IPE Scores ..... 182 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Planning of Lobbying Strategy 185 . Lobbyists' Perceptions of Amount of Freedom in Use of Tactics ......................... . 187 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Legislative Information Sources ................. ‘ ......... 189 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Legislative Contact Develop- ment and Maintenance ................. . 194 Lobbyists' Perceptionsof Legislative Contacts . ‘. . . . 199 Lobbyists' Perceptions of Necessity for Bi-Partisan Lobbying Activity ..................... 203 . Lobbyists' Perceptions of Ixnportance of Number of Committee Contacts ........ . ........... 205 . Lobbyists' Perceptions of Those Committees Which Require Focus of Attention. ...... . ........ 206 Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale and Perceived and Evaluated by all Lobbyists’ . . . 213 . Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top SixteenLobbyists in the IPE Scale as Perceived and Evaluated by News Correspond- ents ........................... _ . 214 . Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale as Perceived and Evaluated by Legislative Leaders .......................... 215 .. Cont'd x11 LIST OF TABLES -~ Continued. TABLE 61. 62. 63. 64. Comparison of Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale as Perceived and Evaluated by Lobby— ists, Legislators and News Correspondents . . . Comparison of Rank Orders for Each Evaluating Group of the Perceived Bases of Effectiveness for the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale . . . . . . . . Attitudes of Lobbyists, Legislative Leaders, and News CorreSpondents Toward Pressure Groups . . . . . . . Lobbyists' Perceptions of Solicitations of Views by PublicPolicy-Makers................... xiii Page [\ 1 P-J CD 248 256 CHAPTER I THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: INTRODUCTION, DEFINITION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM ' Introduction A functional approach to the political process must take into account the interactions among the groups, interests, and governmental institutions that are part of decision-making. The recognition by political scientists that a working conception Of the political system must take into account organized interest groups is still relatively recent. Not only must interest groups be examined because they seek to exercise influence, but also because they are a part of the political system-was important as the political parties and governmental institutions they seek to influence. Organized group interests are the energizing forces in our politi- cal process, and any understanding of American decision-making requires a knowledge Of their interest, organization, methods, and role in public policy-making. Perhaps the most singularly striking feature of American politics is the large proliferation of groups continuously pressing their demands on our governmental institutions. - As the new school of Twentieth Century group theorists point out, the "stuff" of public policy~making consists, in large measure, of advancing legitimate group goals, reconciliating and mediating group objectives, and in restraining group tendencies judged to be socially unacceptable. - 1 These organized interests who attempt to promote their interests in government are commonly called "pressure groups. " Wider knowledge and greater attention to the study of these groups has been due in large 2 part to the work begun by Bentley and carried forward by Odegard, Herring, Schattschneider, Truman and Latham, among others.1 The chief contribution of this new "realistic pluralism" school has been to focus attention on inter- and intra- group phenomena. It is operational research, that is, it deals neither with an individual ab- stracted from his social environment, nor with abstractions such as society, institutions, or state, which cannot be directly approached. Earlier writers were concerned much more with the institutions of government and politics. Unlike these studies, group theorists explain the activities of government in terms of a set of external groups exerting pressure upon government. These external groups become the independent variables in the causal explanation Of the political process. The decision which results is the net effect Of these countervailing pressures, that is, the group that can bring the greatest pressure to bear on the system has the greatest impact on the decision. Further, group theorists suggest that all groups are inter-related in systems and sub-systems and are basically similar in internal organi- zation and operation as well as external relationships with other groups. Studies by American group theorists have tended to focus ‘On large American associational groups, primarily those with an economic interest. 2 lMany writers on interest groups trace their interest to Arthur F. Bentley's pioneer work, The Process Of Government (Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, 1908). Since 1908, other interest group studies considered ”classics" in the "realistic pluralism" school are: Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti~Saloon League (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928):; Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: Johns HOpkins Press, 1929); E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, (New York: Prentice—Hall, 1935); David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1953); and Earl Latham, The Group Basis Of Politics: A Study in Basing Point Legislation (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952). ZSome typical case studies are: Dayton D. McKean, Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), Oliver Garceau, The Political Life of the American Medical 3 The conclusions reached by these studies very seldom take into account the behavior Of the individual or his interaction and role within the group. Most hypotheses of all group influence studies are stated in terms of activity (decision-making) by governmental institutions as the dependent variables and the activities, prOperties, and resources of the outside interest group as the independent variables. In other words, most group—influence studies attempt to measure the influence of the outside pressure group on the legislative process by looking at the legislative decision-making product, that is, the number of bills killed, favorable or unfavorable legislative and administrative rulings, and so forth. The independent variables that are cited as causal factors are generally related to the concept of access. David Truman in The Governmental Processl states the typical group-influence approach Association (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), Belle Zeller, Pressure Politics in New York (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), Roscoe Baker, The American Legion and American Foreign Policy (New York: Bookman Association, 1954), M. R. Dearing, Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G.A. R. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), Charles M.. Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952), Louis C. Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study in Reform Pressure Movements (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), and others. A host Of articles can be found citing case studies on the history, organization. and Operation of pressure groups. Some typical studies Of groups in Michigan are: James B. McKee, "An Analysis Of the Power Structure of Organized Agriculture in Michigan" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Wayne University, Detroit, 1948); George A. Male, "The Michigan . Education Association as an Interest Group“ (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1952); Lawrence W. Robertson, "The Power Structure of the UAW-CIO and Its Impact on Public Policy in Michigan" (PhD Dissertation in progress, Northwestern University, 1955); Lowell B. Van Antweep, "The Forces Affecting the Passage and Attempted Repeal of the Sales Tax Diversion Amendment" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Michigan State University, 1950) and Roosevelt Wise, ”The Michigan Township‘s Association: A Study of an Interest Group” (Master's Thesis, University of Detroit, Detroit, 1955). zOp. 9.1:"- Chapter 1. I, by suggesting that access to governmental decision-making by interest groups-'depends on structural factors (for example, apportionment struc- ture, separation of power, legislative structure, and so forth), group properties and resources (for example, size and distribution of member- ship, lobbying techniques, money, leadership skills in maintaining cohesion, and so forth), and other variables not controlled directly by the interest group (for example, public Opinion, hostility or support Of other interest groups, and socio-economic background and attitudes Of legislators and other decision-makers). Hypotheses in these kinds of studies are usually stated as follows: "The influence of the interest group is related to the amount of: (1) money, (2) membership, (3) use of appropriate lobbying techniques, (4) overlapping group membership, (5) leadership ability, and so forth. " The understanding of political scientists has been greatly increased by the introduction Of the group-influence approach as a significant factor in governmental decision-making. It is not the intention Of this study to ignore or deny its utility, but rather to supplement it. Organizational structure, recources, leadership, are all important factors in the exer- cise of influence by the interest group in the decision-making process. However, this study was designed to carry the analysis a bit further by focusing on the 10bbyist as an individual. Harold D. Lasswell has said: “The study of politics is the study Of influence and the influential. "1 To understand the political process we must look not only at the groups who attempt to exercise influence, but also at the agent of the group and his behavior within the decision-making process. The lobbyist possesses power in the role that he occupies. It is he who represents the organized interest group. He helps formulate organization policies, directs the techniques and tactics for interpreting 1Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 1. this-policy to decision-makers, mobilizesthe resources of the group for . actiOn purposes; and, in short, represents the singularly most important ' agent of the organized group interest. 1". This study, then, is primarily concerned with a close examination of the lobbyist's skills, Vsocio-economic background, career patterns, perceptions of role relationships to his organization and the legislature, and perceptions of effectiveness in the role as lobbyist. This is not a study of the nature and power of the groups that these lobbyists represent--as is the case with most other studies of lobbying. This is a study of the perceived role of the individual lobbyist in the legislative process. It also is an attempt to isolate and correlate some of the independent variables which are related to and determine the personal differences in the effectiveness of Michigan lobbyists. There is a need for a study of this kind. We need comprehensive understanding of who lobbyists are, what they are doing, why they are effective or ineffective, and how they are perceived by their peers and other participants in the legislative decision-making process. Examination of the Literature .It is hoped that this study will fit in and supplement “mint but more comprehensive work on state legislators now being completed.1 It is also designed to complement a study of similar focus on Washington lobbyists by. ProfessOr Milbrath of Northwestern UniVersity. z ’ . 1A study being Conducted by Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, LeROy Ferguson,j John C. Wahlke on four American state legislatures. Financed by the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Re— search Council. See their article "American State Legi slators' Role Orientations toward Pressure Groups, " The Journal of Politics Vol. 22 (1960), pp. 203-227. ’ zMilbrath has not as yet published the complete results of his study. ' It focused on Washington lobbyists' as a politicalskill group.- '- He inter- viewed '101 lobbyists and 38 people'in Congress, and he has. written .one'. . article for the Journal of Politics, entitled "The Political Party Activity of Washington Lobbyists, " in Vol. 20 (1948), pp. 339-352. He has also written an unpublished . . . . Examination of the literature in this area reveals that very little systematic work (other than Professor Milbrath' s) on individual lobbyists has been conducted. Most studies of lobbying have either been confined to group-influence and activities described earlier in this chapter, studies purely concerned with statutory controls and investigation of lobbying, and third, those of an exposé nature written in popular—news- paper style. Most group influence studies do include at least one chapter on tactics and techniques and in the discussion of them refer to the individual lobbyist.l Very few, if any, generalizations are made about individual lobbyists. More often than not, folklore about the exploits of some out- standing lobbyist(s) is cited in most works. A good deal has been written concerning governmental investigation of lobbying and recommendations needed for effective statutory controls. Periodic congressional and state legislative investigations of lobbying activitiesz have spurred the writing of many articles and books.3 paper from his data, "Analyzing Lobbying through Communication and Decision Making Models, " given at the 1959 Conference of American Association for Public Opinion Research, Lake George, New York, May 14-17. lSee, for example, Chapter 6 Of v. 0. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 1958), or Truman, pp. cit. zFor a guide to congressional investigations and other related materials, see D. C. Tompkins, Congressional Investigation of Lobbying (Berkely: University of California Bureau of Public Administration, 1956). 3For an analysis of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, see Belle Zeller, "The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, " American Political Science Review, 42, (1948), pp. 239-271. Other typical works on lobbying regulation are: Edgar Lane, "Statutory Regulation of Lobbying in the United States with Special Ref- erence to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1949); W. B. Graves, Administration of the Lobby Registration Provision of the Legis- lative Reorganization Act of 1946, (Government Printing Office, Washington A good deal of the discussion and writing concerning organized interest groups and their lobbying activities is exposé in nature. That is, the journalists and political scientists reporting lobbying activity start with a series of pOpular premises which suggest that pressure groups are seeking indefensible special privileges, that theirimotives are generally evil ones and, more important, that they are undesirable growths on the body politic which if not removed or highly controlled will damage our democratic system beyond repair.1 Autobiographies of former governmental officials and lobbyists can also provide source material on a few well-known or infamous lobbyists. 2 This material is hard to come by, perhaps because many lobbyists feel that their success is jeopardized by the glare of publicity and, so, many crave anonymity outside of legislative halls. The suspicion and distrust in which lobbyists are generally held is reflected and reinforced by the press of America. Most daily press stories and magazine feature pieces about pressure groups and their loggyists are framed in the language of the exposé. D. C., 1950); Belle Zeller, G. L. Schermerhorn, and H. Parkman, Jr., "Lobbies and Pressure Groups" (The Annals, January, 1938); Donald C. Blaisdell, Government'Under Pressure (New York: Public Affairs Com- mittee, 1942) and others. For a list of typical articles on suggested reforms see the bib- liography. 1Some typical works in this vein are: T. B. Mechling, "Washington Lobbies Threaten Democracy" Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer, 1946); Robert A. Brady, Business As a System Of Power (New York: - Columbia University Press, 1943); Stuart Chase, Democracy Under Pressure (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945); Pendleton E. Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: Johns HOpkins Press, 1929); Karl Schriftgieser, The Lobbyists: The Art and Business Of Influencing Lawmakers (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1951). zSee, for example, Glyndon G. Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. , 1947). The following are typical examples of the headlines and story leads used by a sample of Michigan neWSpapers during the years 1958 and 1959. "Lobbyists Move In, " Lansing State Journal, January 9,. 1958. “Lobbyists Mobilize in Lansing, " Detroit Free Press, January 10, 1958. "Lobbyists Hope for Defeat of Costly Bills They Sponsor, " Detroit News, February 2, 1958. "The Lobbyists GO Ivy League, “ Detroit Times, February 23, 1958. "Doctors Kill State A-Bill, " Detroit Times, .April. 13, 1958. "UM, MSU Suffer from '57 Lobbying, " Grand Rapids..P.ress, April 26, 1958. "Lobbyist Asks Job (at $10, 000) Guarding Hazel Park's Track Cut, " Royal Oak Daily Tribune, May 8, 1958. “Both Pa'rties Join to Blast Lobbyists, " Saginaw News, May 13, 1959. "Legislators are Outnumbered," Mason Ingham County News, August 21, 1959. "Lobbyists Peddle Ideas to Uninformed Legislators, " Holly Herald-Advertiser, September 4, 1959. "State Eyes Probe of Lobbying, “ Detroit Free Press, September 20, 1959. "Lobbies Spend Millions, " Lansing State Journal, October, 1959. During 1958 and 1959, the writer collected 95 Michigan newspaper clippings regarding Michigan pressure groups and their lobbying activities. In a rather crude content analysis over this period, only two favorable headlines, leads, stories, or editorials written about lobbyists were uncovered. In a few remote instances, a lobbyist or pressure group was singled out for special praise for a stand taken on some issue, but generally it was made clear that the reporter or editor considered this lobbyist to be atypical of the whole group. This reportorial and editorial attitude is also reflected among the popular magazines of this country.1 I 1See, for example, Lester Velie, "The Secret Boss Of California, " Collier's, (August 13 and 20, 1949). 9 Reporters in writing about pressure groups and their lobbyists seem to be fulfilling an expected role, that is, reinforcing a public image that lobbying in itself is bad for democracy. On the other hand, most state capitol reporters rely on lobbyists for a great deal of information, some entertainment, and in some cases, news. Many are closeqpersonal friends. Furthermore, as is pointed out in Chapter VII, most reporters perceive lobbyists as absolutely essential to the smooth Operation of the legislative process. , Nevertheless, most reporting and editorializing about lobbying leaves the reader with the feeling that it is inherently bad, undemocratic, and something should be done about it. Content analysis of Michigan stories 'on lobbying revealed that in most instances the writer of the article did not suggest lobbying reforms, and if he did, the reporter tended to be ambiguous about such reforms. , Examination of the literature concerning lobbying, then, revealed: (1) most studies of lobbying are confined to group activities and influence; (2) a concern with statutory controls and investigation of lobbyists; and (3) it is most often dealt with in the popular language of the newspaper and magazine expose. Clearly, it is time for another‘approach. Theoretical Statement and Statement of the Problem This study will attempt a close examination of the skills, socio- economic background, and career patterns of the typical Michigan lobby- ist. The heart of the thesis, however, centers on the perceptions of the lobbyists' effectiveness, and his perceived role in the legislative process as well as toward his organization and others. Beyond a .desgcription of these perceptions and roles, attempts will be made to isolate and correlate some of the independent variables which are related to and determine the personal differences in the effectiveness of the role enactment of Michigan lobbyists. 10 To adopt one of the many psychological theories concerning human motivation and behavior‘would require a choice of one particular "school" over‘another‘ (for example, stimulus-response theorists, Neo-Freudian psychoanalysis, or one of many others). - And although each. "school" offers substantial evidence in support of ,its. theoretical model of behavior, there is little agreement within the discipline,» of psychology concerning a comprehensive broad-gage theory. Selection of a particular model would, then, be hazardous and the explanation fragmentary. To pick a class or groupmodel of social behavior offers the same hazards. More so because this study is interested primarily inthe unique role that the individual lobbyist as actor plays in the legislative process. For these reasons, the discipline that has a perceptual model which best explains the role of the actor in relationship to the society was used. The basic approach in this study was social psychological. An effort—was made to not describe lobbyists' behavior in "group, ” that is, sociological,terms; neither were they looked .at as individuals abstracted from their social environments, that is, with a psychological perspective. The discipline of social psychology was drawn heavily upon; particularly the field theoretical, phenomenological, , and. role concepts of the contemporary social psychologists. The concepts of this discipline seemed to fit best. the purposes of this dissertation, in. that. the individual behavior ofthe lobbyist in relation to the legislative process can best be explained in perceptual terms. . Social psychologists such as Lewin and Mead pioneered the per- ckptual approach, and a brief look at the professional journals. reveals much concern, if not preoccupation, with the problems of perception. Political scientists early learned the value of perception as a useful model which avoided the pitfalls of group, individualistic, and other theoretical models . 11 Walter Lippman, about forty years ago, gained lasting fame as a public opinion analyst by pointing out the differences between “the world outside and the pictures in our heads. "‘ Through a phenomenological approach it becomes possible to describe and analyze‘what the political actor "sees" as objective reality. What we are studying, then, are the perceptual constructs which are part of an individual's cognitive structure. This thesis in no way attempts to measure, for example, the dif- ferences in perceived effectiveness of lobbyists in terms of what some consider to be "objective reality, " that is, roll call votes on bills and resolutions, or committee actions. Perhaps the most important theoretical assumption of the perceptual approach is that behavior is related to perceptions and notto what is often thought of as "objectively real. ." Although subjective perceptions may not always reflect objective reality, it is obvious that what political participants perceive to be reality does guide their role enactments in the political process. _ A i The use of a perceptual model of behavior is closely allied with the concept of role. Concepts of self and role have been extensively employed by social psyghologists in. discussing interactional behavior. . These concepts are important corollaries of the perceptual approach. . For an important part of the cognitive, structure-ofany political actor is his perception of himself invarious roles. . The actor. perceives him- self as standing in certain relationships to other‘persons and things, that is, in terms of certain roles. Role, in. this thesis, is defined as "the-content common to the role "3 expectations of the members of a social group. .In this case, the ‘ ‘Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 21. 3For the role theory concepts in this dissertation, the'writer has drawn heavily from Theodore R.. Sarbin and Donald S.. Jones, 12 Michigan Legislature and the various interest group lobbyists who were the social universe of this study. Thepeople interviewed inthis study perceived themselves, and other actors as well, in terms of a series of roles which they defined to themselves as a result of actions and attitudes toward other persons and things. The situation "is" what the political actor believesto be the roles he thinks himself and others: do or shouldpl'ay. Role theory, as employed in this dissertation, has these major theoretical components: role-enactment; role-taking ability or potential; role perception; and role-associated techniques. The ways in which each of these concepts will be used is discussed in more detail in the following section on dependent and independent variables, and-in chapters which will be devoted entirely to the discussion and testing of each of these role qhmponents as they apply to Michigan-lobbyists. Through the use of role concepts it was empirically possible to determine and demonstrate the correlation between role relationships defined by the perceptions of role-takers (lobbyists) and the relationship of the role-expectations as perceived and defined by others in the legis- lative process, that is, by legislative leaders and news correspondents. The major hypothesis of this dissertation was: there would be a high degree of consensus among the perceptions of ge participants in this study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and newsfcorrespondents) as to which lobbyists were most effectiVelEnacting, their lobbying roles, and further agreement would be present amozg the evaluatinuroups Concern- ing the variables involved, in effective role. enactment; The effectiveness Wfi' of the role enactment of Michigan- lobbyists would be related to; their f—v—‘ fifi Y ——v—~ "AntExperimental Analysis of Role Behavior, " Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, L1, (1956-), pp. 236-241; H. Bonner,. Social Psycholog_, . An Interdisciplinary Approach.(New York: World Book Company, 1953); and T.. Parson and EfShils (eds. ), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: ' Harvard University Press, 195‘). l3 role-taking ability, their use of role-associated techniques, and. their role perceptions. The perceived role enactment of the lobbyist, whether effective or, ineffective, was the major dependent variable. How well a lobbyist is perceived as enacting his role can be determinedin one of-two ways. First, by recording and measuring the actual behavior of the persons acting the role (that is, the legislative end-product); or, secondly, by measuring the perceptions of some of the actors in the legislative process for a perceptual revaluation of effective or ineffective role enact-ment, and the ba‘sesxof effective role enactment. The writer has chosen the latter course as the _more significant and meaningful of the two. Other hypotheses will follow from the major proposition. As Chapter II will demonstrate, study participantswere agreed on their perceptions as to which lobbyists were enacting their roles effectively. Chapter VI demonstrates that study participants were also agreed: concern- ing the important variables that tend to make some lobbyists more effective than others. Once it was established that effective role enactment was perceived and could be measured, attempts were made to isolate the significant independent variables which affected role enactment. Independent vari- ables affecting effective role enactment were: 1. Role-taking ability or potential: Role-taking ability or potential would be determined by socio-economic variables (for example, age, education, legislative experience, political participation, and so forth), other personal characteristics (for example, perceived personality and sociability factors), and organizational factors (for example, money available for lobbying purposes, extent of "grass roots" organization, public relations programs, and so forth). The relationships of these variables to role enactment will be discussed in Chapters’III, IV, V, and VI. llefiaufir I. in}! 14 2. Role-associated techniques: In Chapter V, the repertoire of role-associated, group-approved lobbying techniques and the way they are employed will be related to effective or ineffective role enactment. 3. Role perceptions: In Chapter IV, the lobbyist's perceptions of his role will be described, analyzed, and compared to the role consensus of other actors in the legislative process. Further, the relationships of various lobbying roles to effectiveness will be examined. In addition to the major hypotheses cited, these three independent variables contain many minor propositions which will be tested and dis- cussed in the chapters to follow. Definition of Michigan Lobbyist The Popular St e r eotype The Sigler grand jury investigation of Michigan lobbyists and legis- lators shortly after World War II resulted in the indictment of several lobbyists on bribery charges. This investigation did much to reinforce the pOpular image of the Lansing lobbyist. Most of the lobbyists of that era have left the Lansing scene. Their replacements are from different educational backgrounds, use different techniques and tactics, and in many other ways are quite distinguishable from their predecessors. Reporter Al Kaufman of the Detroit Times described the apparent transition this way: Glamour boys and Ivy League suits and college degrees command the Lansing lobby heights today. Under the new order, all—night poker parties, like their lusty, hard drinking hosts have vanished. Guzzlers have been replaced by martini tipplers who prefer the Wall Street Journal to the racing form. I 15 Like many of the lawmakers who often lean heavily on their advice, they are young, ambitious with social and economic status and a keen grasp of governmental affairs. . They carry briefcases, peddle their wares like diplomatic couriers and call themselves 'legislative agents. " A lobbyist, in their vocabulary, is a 'dirty name. '1 Mr.. Kaufman continued by contrasting the Lansing lobbyist of today with those of a decade or more ago. All but forgotten are former 'agents' like Constantine 'Tean' Daniel, a short, dapper figure of the '303 who wore pinc nez glasses on a black ribbon, a flower in his lapel and peddled influence in Lansing to the highest bidders. When a grand jury investigation of lobbyists started and a subpeona was issued for his appearance, 'Tean' carefully brushed the lint from his tailored coat, grabbed his hat and disappeared. He returned only after the grand jury ended and explained to his astonished colleagues he had been visiting a sick friend in Amherstburg, Ontario. Floyd Fitzsimmons of Benton Harbor who lobbied for dog tracks and horse racing and made lawmakers his willing captives when he brought the fabulous Jack Dempsey to mingle with them in Lansing. Or William Green of Hillman, a representative of county road commissions and a powerful figure in the old Republican gang that hand-picked legislative committees and named the Speaker of the House. ' John Lovett, the former Chicago newspaperman who came to Lansing and made the Michigan Manufacturers Association one of the most powerful voices in state government. And Charles Gadd, the Detroit Board of Education lobbyist who gladly provided food, drinks and continuous poker games in exchange for more school books and better pay.2 While the image of the lobbyist may have changed among the direct participants in the political process (although many use the old stereo- types for personal or political advantage) there is little doubt that to the average Michigan citizen the typical Lansing lobbyist is the cigar-chewing, insidious, influence-peddling caricature of the past, ready to bribe unwill- ing legislators at the first opportunity. fir lAl Kaufman, "The Lobbyists Go Ivy League, " Detroit Times, February 23, 1958. zIbid. 16 Confirmation of this stereotype became evident when the writer sampled Michigan newspaper and magazine articles during the. past three years. Legislators' mail was also extensively sampled, and the writer participated in innumerable conversations regarding lobbyists with them and other public officials. The existence Of the stereotype is partically proven by the sensitivity of Michigan lobbyists‘to the term ”lobbyist. ” Even for them it has a bad connotation, and they much prefer the title of "legislative agent. " Michigan Statutory Definition Legally, there is no such thing as a lobbyist in Michigan. Michigan law provides for legislative agents. The Michigan law regulating lobby- ists defines a legislative agent: . . .. to mean a person who is employed by a person, firm, associ- ation, or corporation; or by board, department, or agency of the state of Michigan, or any political subdivision thereof, to engage in promoting, advocating, or opposing any matter pending before either House of the Legislature or any committee thereof, or who is employed expressly for the purpose of promoting, advocating, or opposing any matter which might legally come before either House of the Legislature or any committee thereof.1 Further clarification Of the function of a lobbyist is found in Section two: The terms 'advocating,‘ 'promoting, ' and 'Opposing' shall be construed to mean any act or acts, performed directly with a member of the Legislature, for the purpose of influencing him to vote or to use his influence for or against any matter pending before either House Of the Legislature or any committee thereof. The statute then defines what can and cannot be considered lobbying activity: ' Any personvwho shall confine his activities in promoting, advocat- ing or Opposing any matter pending before either house of the legislature or any committee thereof, to written communications lSection 1,. Act 214,. (Michigan Public Acts, 1947),, Sections 4.401— 4.410 Incl. ,. ( Michigan Compiled Laws of 1948). 17 or to formal appearances before any legislative committee or committees to which such matter has been duly referred, and who in writing clearly identifies himself to the committee together with each and every person, firm, association, corporation, or other interest represented by him, shall not be deemed to be a legis-' lative agent within the meaning of this act; neither shall such term include any person whose contact with the legislature is limited to furnishing information at the request Of any legislator \Or legis- lative committee regarding any matter pending before either House Of the Legislature or any committee thereof.1 Other features of the act require lobbyists to register information regarding their employment with the office of the Secretary of State, 2 pay an annual filing fee of $5. 003 'keep a record of their expenses , and report any transaction with any member of the Legislature.4 Michigan law does not require lobbyists to reveal expenditures. They are required, however, to keep a record of them for six years. The only way these records can be obtained is by a court order or through a Legislative investigating committee authorized by joint action of the House and Senate. Failure tO register and follow the provisions of this act could. result in a felony conviction, carrying a maximum fine of $1, 000 and jail sentence of one year.5 According to the State Attorney General, no person has ever been prosecuted under the 1947 act. The definition of a lobbyist within this act is broad and-ambiguous enough that many state department and agency personnel who‘function in the role as lobbyist do not bother to register. Either that, or they are in direct violation of the law. lSection 3, ibid. .zSection 4, ibid. 3Section 9, ibid. , (See also Amendment in P. A. 187 to 1958). ‘section 7, ibid. SSection 1'0, ibid. 18 Definition of Lobbyist Used in This Study About 367 persons registered as Michigan legislative agents in 1958. Table 1 reveals that there is a great variety of positions held by the people registered as legislative agents. One thing is certain, lobby- ists generally do not call themselves legislative agents, either by choice or organizational directive. Only thirty-five (9%) of those registered are called legislative agents. The majority represented themselves as Association executive secretaries or directors (18%), organization Officers (20%), or employees (12%). . About 2% listed themselves as legislative relations staff members, 6% were attorneys representing organizations as legal counsels, 4% were members of public relations staffs, and 4% described themselves as organization members. ' Twenty percent of those who registered were connectedin some way, either as employees or officials, with a state or local governmental body. A good many (11%) Of these were county road commissioners or employees. Although a few municipalities have agents, it is interresting to note that the majority of persons in this category were librarians who had registered on behalf of the Michigan Library Association-~from,cities and villages all over the state. . State agencies and commissions account for about 1% of the total. Of the five who registered,. four were affiliated with the State Waterways Commission, and one with Wayne State University. No other state agency, board Of commission made any efforts to register any of its members or employees as legislative agents. This is significant in view Of the fact that muchlof the lobbying this writer has Observed was done by state governmental employees or appointees on behalf of their respective departments, agencies or educational institutions. 19 TABLE 1 at: BREAKDOWN BY POSITION OF MICHIGAN LEGISLATIVE AGENTS m Position Number Percent Private Interest Groups Association Executive Secretary or Director 66 18 Organization Officer 74 20 Legislative Relations Staff 9 2 Attorney (Legal Counsel) 21' , 6 Legislative Agent 35 9 Public Relations . l4 4 Organization Legislative Committees l9 5 Organization Member 15 4 Association, Organization or Company 44 ' 12 Employees Sub Total - 297 80% Governmental Employees and Officials Schools 7 . 2 County Road Commissioners 42 ll Boards of Supervisors 5 1 Municipalities 20 . (includes libraries) State Agencies 5 1 Sub Total 79 20% Grand Total 376 100% >°(This breakdown was compiled as of April 1, 1958. The combined total of registered positions was 376. The actual number of registered legislative agents was 367; however, nine lobbyists registered in dual capacities for one or more organizations. 20 The majority of these "lobbyists" never made'more than one or two trips to Lansing, if indeed, they. made any at all. A sample of the total group of registered legislative agents would not have been an accurate one for the purposes of this study. 1 Out of this group, the writer had originally intended to use the Capitol Club of Lansing as his sample of Michigan lobbyists. This club consists of a group ofvfull-time lobbyists who hold monthly luncheonmeet- ings to discuss pending legislation, to pass on intelligence reports, and to make decisions regarding bills they will Oppose or support. Use of the Capitol Club‘as the universe for this study proved.unwork- able. The forty-member club has certain membership qualifications. which prohibit some lobbyists from joining. Only lobbyists who work for an Association are eligible to join upon invitation. In addition, ,no more thanone lobbyist per association is allowed in the club.1 Therefore, a panel of three men was selected to determine which lobbyists should constitute the focus of. this study. The panel was instructed to pick out lobbyists for the study who could be considered'as giving the majority Of their time to lobbying activity. I The panel consisted of: Fred 1. Chase, Secretary of the State Senate; Norman E.. Phileo, Clerk of the House of Representatives, and Hugh W. Brenneman,. Public Relations Counsel for the State Bar Of Michigan, the Michigan Medical Society, and the Michigan Society Of Architects. Mr. Chase and Mr.. Phileo were selected as panel members because Of the frequent daily contacts with lobbyists over the many years they have been serving the Michigan Legislature. Mr. Brenneman, a well-known lobbyist, was selected as a panel judge because he had served as President of the Capitol Club and had anormation taken from an interview with Hugh Brenneman, former President of the Lansing Capitol Club. The interview was conducted in October, 1958. 21 over the years become intimately acquainted with most Of the full-time lobbyists working at the state capitol. - Each member of the panel was given the list of legislative agents published annually by the Secretary of State‘s Office. This list contained the names, organizations, and positions of 367 people registered in 1958 as legislative agents. Panel judges were asked to check the names of those people they knew spent most of their working time in lobbying activities and could be considered as full-time legislative agents. There‘was a remarkable degree Of unanimity among the panel judges. A total of ninety-six lobbyists were selected as meeting the requirements for full-time activity. There were twenty-four choices (mostly by Mr. Phileo) which received only one vote. All of the others received at least two votes and fifty-five lobbyists were picked by all three panel members. . These fifty-five lobbyists were the universe (N) for this study. They represented about 15% of the total group of 367' registered lobbyists. ‘ Out of the fifty-five legislative agents considered as potential sub- jects (N) for the purpose of this study, thirty-three (60%) were actually interviewed (11). Of those who could not be interviewed; three were ill; seven had become inactive during. the last few years; five were in associ- ations or organizations that had another lobbyist who had already been interviewed; three had been interviewed in the pre—test; and four refused to cooperate or consistently broke interview appointments. Of the thirty-three lobbyists interviewed, the majority were execu- tive officers of trade associations. Thirteen (38%) were the chief hired staff person of the association. Typical titles were: Executive Vice— President, Executive Secretary, Assistant to the President, and Manager of the association. One of this group was an elected paid Officer and his title was Secretary- Treasurer. 22 Eight (25%) listed themselves simply as employees Of the company orassOciation they represented. For purposes best known to the organi- zatiOn, these employees were not listed in the table Of organization, as engaged in legislative or public relations work. In reality, however, these eight men were among the most active of the lobbyists. Five (16%) of the group listed themselves as legal legislative counsels to the organization or association they represent. Some pre- ferred the title, General Counsel, Legislative Counsel, or Consultant. In every case, however; they all were actual staff members of the organization or governmental agency. None were members of an outside law firm designated to handle legislative problems on behalf Of the client. Four (12%) registered as public relations specialists. Some pre- ferred the title, public relations consultant, or director of public infor- mation. In three cases, they were part of the staff of a company or organization. In one instance, the lobbyist was a free lance public relations entrepreneur with a special clientele of associations and businesses. Two (6%) of the registered lobbyists interviewed in this study were Chairmen of the Legislative Committees of their associations. In this capacity they received either a part-time salary plus expenses or a retainer from the organization, depending on the amount Of time spent on the job. Only one (3%) of the sample listed himself as a legislative repre- sentative. ‘ ' This study is confronted by one serious limitation in its discussion Of Michigan lobbyists. Only those persons and organizations who registered as legislative agents with the Secretary of State were considered in the sample. . It is apparent that all private organized pressure groups in Michigan with a legislative interest have done so. However, state agencies, departments, commission, boards, educational institutions, and many 23 others of a similar nature had to be excluded from the purview of this study simply because they did not register their legislative interest with the Michigan Secretary of State. Yet, many persons in these governmental and public institutions do lobby regularly. . As a matter of fact, a good case could be made pointing out that their activities are as intense as those outside the formal governmental process. Inclusion of these ”governmental lobby- ists, " however, would have presented serious problems of definition and could easily be the subject Of another dissertation. Certainly, this is an area for profitable future research. Res earch Methodology After the panel of three judges had selected the lobbyists to be the universe of this study, interviews were conducted with thirty-three lobbyists during the year 1958 and the first few months of 1959. . The questionnaire (see Appendix 1) consisted mostly Of Open-ended questions with a few structured questions interpersed throughout. The confidential interviews generally lasted anywhere from one-and-a-half to three hours, with two hours the average length. The respondent was . asked to fill out two forms; one estimating the time spent in various activities, and the other a self-evaluation of lobbying techniques (see Appendices II and III). . In the evaluation process respondents were given a two-page list of lobbyists (see Appendix IV) to pick out the five lobby- ists they perceived as most effective only if they had difficulty in recall- ing the names. Only in five interviews was it necessary to aid in recall through the use of the lobbyist list. Interviews were conducted with 11 state capitol correspondents (see Appendix V) covering the capitol beat, and. sixteen legislative leaders (see Appendix VI) of both political parties in the House and Senate. 24 .Correspondents from each of the major newspapers, wire services, news federations and chains, and radio and television stations were inter- viewed. The-Legislative leaders interviewed included all of those, holding major formal leadership posts as well as the major committee chairman- ships in both Houses. » In addition, a few typical legislators, not holding important leadership positions, were also interviewed. Almost half of the interviews conducted with the lobbyists were held in an unobtrusive corner of the Law Library in the State Capitol. A good many others were conducted in the personal Offices of the lobbyists or in the Office of the Speaker of the House Of Representatives. Other interviews were held in the City Club, a private club located in the Hotel Olds of Lansing; and a few were arranged in the committee rooms Of the House and in various bars and restaurants in the city of Lansing. The interviews with legislative leaders and the correspondents took place on the floor of the House of Representatives (press sectiOn), the capitol press room, or in bars and restaurants near the capitol building. Interviews with legislative leaders and correSpondents averaged about one hour in length. 1 Interviews with all of the legislative leaders and reporters were very Cordial; and, in no case did the interviewer get the impression that information was being deliberately withheld or distorted. Most of the legislative leaders and all of the corre5pondents were close personal friends and the writer had every reason to believe that they revealed a good deal more because of this friendship than they might have inanother set of circumstances. The same was generally true of the lobbyists. Only in one or two instances did the writer get the distinct impression that the information was incorrect or a deliberate distortion. In only one case did a lobbyist refuse to answer a question on the amount Of salary he earned.) A The data gathered from these interviews were both Of a qualitative and quantitative nature. A code was constructed and those data that were 25 susceptible to quantitative analysis were treated statistically, and organized into the chapters that follow. Each bf the participants in this study was sent a copy of the major summary findings of this dissertation. Summary In Chapter I, the relationship of this study to others conducted via the "group approach" was discussed. The need for a study Of this.kind-- onewhich examines the individual lobbyist's skills, socio-economic background, career patterns, role perceptions and effectiveness--was . cited and explained. An examination of the literature revealed that: (1) most studies of lobbying are confined to group activities and influence; (2) there is a concern with statutory controls and investigation of lobbyists; and (3) lobbying is most often dealt with in the popular language Of the newspaper and magazine exposé. The theoretical frame of reference, and the subject-matter of this dissertation were stated in social psychological terms. A perceptual model of behavior, with a reliance primarily on concepts of role theory, was used in the design of the major hypotheses Of this dissertation. The major ' hypothesis of this thesis was: mere would be a high degree of consensus among the perceptions of the participants in thiL study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) as tO which lobbyists were most effectively enactinLtheir lobbyirgfiroles, and further agreement would be present among_ the evaluatinwoups concerningg the variables involved in effective role enactment. The effectiveness of the role enactment Of Michigan lobbyists would be related to their role-taking ability, their use Of rOle-associated techniqpes, and their role perceptions. Lobbyists were defined in terms of the popular stereotype and the .Michigan statutes; and, an Operational definition for the purposes of this 26 study was described and explained. The research methodology used in the selection of study participants and in the actual data. gathering and processing was discussed in detail. CHAPTER II THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE EFFECTIVENESS Introduction One of the important premises Of this dissertation was that there ~ would be a great deal Of difference between lobbyists in their effectiveness in the legislative process. Further, that these differences in role enact- ment were perceived by the lobbyist himself, and his peers, as well as by legislative leaders and news correspondents, and these differences in role enactment could be quantitatively measured. I Although this approach has its limitations, in that subjective per- ceptions may not always reflect objective reality accurately, it is also true that what political role—players believe to be "reality" Often does guide their behavior. Data in this chapter will document the validity of the perceptual approach in that there was substantial agreement among the participants in the legislative process concerning their perceptions of lobbyists who were most effectively enacting their roles. In question 32, all respondents (lobbyists, legislators, and corres-s pondents) were asked: Now, as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those doing the best job for their organizations? If the respondent hesitated or had difficulty recalling names he was handed a two page list of the fifty-five lobbyists sampled for this study (see Appendix IV). In only five interviews was it necessary to submit this list. There were three different lists, which were varied, in order 27 28 to assure that placement on the lobbyist list would not affect the respondent's selection of lobbyists. The respondent was asked tO select five lobbyists and then give the interviewer the reasons why he felt these five lobbyists were more effective than the rest of the group. Index of Perceived Effectiveness In order to measure the perceived role effectiveness Of the lobby- ists, a sociometric device was employed which would quantify the data in a meaningful way. Each of the respondents (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) was assigned a code'lett‘er to protect his anonymity. Then, his five choices of the most effective lobbyists were transferred to one of three sociometric matrices in Tables 2, 3, and 4. The letters across the tops of these matrices represent the lobby- ists selected. The vertical letters represent the code numbers of those lobbyists, legislators and correspondents doing the choosing. At the bottom of each table the frequency of choices, as well as the preferences (from first choice through the fifth), are expressed by the evaluators. The total number of choices were then added. At the very bottom Of each table is the Index of Perceived Effectiveness score. This score is obtained by adding the weighted choices of the respondents. — Each of the choices from one to five was assigned a weight as follows: lst choice = 5 points 2nd choice = 4 points 3rd choice = 3 points 4th choice = 2 points 5th choice = 1 point The number of points that each lobbyist received from fellow lobbyists was totalled at the bottom of Tables 2, 3, and 4; and IIVI ~I~I III AV.’ 2’. 2'). 29 2m Nm m m m n :HHs ONmHN a N HHmNaeHm e ems. smHNHNHNcmH mst a Hts: mH NcHn lHH HN N N HHeH H HN HHH H HH H H N NHH on H H NH HN H H HN HH NH H H HH H H e H N as NH H H H mHH N HNH m HN m _N H m s H m m N H H m m N m «H m m ea N s m m .H m... m a N N m e H m m... e m m Hm s m N m m s m H . N «H s a m H H H m H H N s H m N m m «H H m m H m. N a m N «H s m N m H mH _ m M s H . n N a. H s N H N am e H N .N m n .. M 58387222352:excommumoooonminu .Hsoau. we omozz .H .ZHOOEU nufitn4"ai Oil-ill I. l I! . w I t 1 1 lull-v.5: u‘, l'tli . D I l 30 HN HHNHHmHHH NmHNNmNchHe H H HH HH HHH HH H H HH HH H H HNHH N H N H H NN HH HH HH H n N nH m NH n N N m as N n we H m N m H «H m m H s n N s m N H e m mNH s H H m .. a Na m .c N . m HNHH HM MN HH d‘N H gammaeoommoodesnn:uncommuuneoomnfiuwx.3>eammo men: He Zamomo mamaa EHSmHUB Mn NEE a anomo mHmHfinm—OA ho NHMH§ UHMHM 31 m 5..”on o w :qq OH mm came 3.. HNNNHMN H mHH m «H mcon H H H N N HHH HH H H H HmH H HH H H N HH HH H N N HHH H m H HmH . n N eH m eH N m N mHe m m. eHN e N m mH N m mHs s m mHN e N m m H mN s MH m N s H NH m m e gNNgxxgngmmmmwommmmnaoommfinwx 3>DHmMOmOZZA M hH. Zamomo mHzszommMMmoo Mm m>HHomhhm m< ammomo mHmHMm—GOA mo xHMHSA UHMHME 32 represents his IPE (index of perceived effectiveness) score for that particular group's evaluation. This was done for each group, that is, the lobbyists, legislative leaders,‘ and news correspondents. In order to achieve one IPE score which could be used in correla- tion attempts, the three scores given each lobbyist in Tables 2, 3, and 4 were combined in Table 5. The rank orders that each lobbyist had received from the three groups of evaluators are also listed. The last column in Tab1e5 lists the rank order Of the lobbyists participating in this study held in terms of the combined IPE scores; The legitimacy of combining the three evaluations into a total score is the result of statistical application. Between given sets Of evaluations, statistical significance at the 5% level resulted in every case. , In two cases, statistical significance occurred at the 1% level.1 The well-known formula, product-moment correlation, was used in the analysis to find the amount of relationship. 2 This was designated to be the appropriate technique because it assumes a mutual relationship between the variables rather than either being dependent on the other. Furthermore, the data do not seem to violate the parametric assumption one makes in select- ing this technique. These statistical tests indicate a variable other than chance Operat- ing in the evaluator's perceptions of effective lobbyists. The three lThe product-moment correlations were: Between lobbyists and legislators: r. = .496 Between lobbyists and correSpondents: r. = . 817 Between correspondents and legislative leaders: 1'. = . 362 The critical value for the coefficient at the . 01 level is r. = . 449. ZThe product-moment formula is: NeXY - €X€Y - NI—NEXZ - (€Xff N/ N.€Yz—- (eY)z 33 TABLES INDEX OF PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS Combined Ratings of Lobbyists, CorreSpondents and Legislative Leaders Lobby- . Corres- Legis- ists' pondents' lators‘ Lobby- evalu- evalu- evalu- IPE Combined Rank ist ation R/O ation R/O ation R/O Total Score Order A 6 23.5 2 19 7 10. 5 15 20 B 17 13 0 34.5 6 15 23 10 C l 35 0 34. 5 0 43 1 44.5 D 16 32 0 34.5 5 19 21 12 E 8 20 0 34. 5 0 43 8 34 F 22 6 0 34.5 0 43 22 11 G 11 15.5 6 ll 1 33 18 16.5 H 8 20 0 34.5 1 33 9 30 I 24 5 21 2 10 5.5 55 3.5 J 13 13 0 34.5 7 10.5 20 13.5 K 66 l 66 l 27 1 159 1 L 38 2 15 3 2 28 55 3.5 M 6 23.5 . 6 ll 18 4 30 6 N 0 40.5 0 34.5 0 43 0 48.5 0 0 40.5 0 34.5 0 43 0 48. 5 P 3 32 0 34.5 4 23. 5 7 37 Q 14 13 0 34.5 0 43 14 - 22 R 9 17.5 7 8.5 22 3 38 . 5 S 19 3.5 0 34.5 1 33 20 13.5 T l 35 0 34.5 7 10. 5 8 34 U 1 35 0 34.5 0 43 1 44.5 V 0 40.5 0 34.5 1 33 1 44.5 W 0 40.5 0 34.5 0 43 0 48.5 X 25 3.5 10 5. 5 26 2 61 2 Y 0 40.5 0 34. 5 0 43 0 48. 5 Z 0 40.5 0 34.5 8 7 8 34 AA 9 17.5 0 34. 5 7 10.5 16 18 BB 7 22 0 34.5 6 15 13 24 CC 15 11.5 4 14.5 7 10.5 26 9 DD 20 7 4 5 3 25 27 8 14. an :- sn 1‘ C 34 participating groups (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and correspondents) were in substantial agreement on which lobbyists were most effective. . These data validated one of the major premises of this dissertation: that is, statistically significant correlations were present among the various legislative process participants in their perceptions of the effective or non-effective lobbyists. . (The most significant IPE scores and rank orders were those in the last two columns Of Table 5. Table 6 portrays this combined IPE score and rank order. Table 6 is the index Of the degree of effective role enact- ment for each of the lobbyists in this study. It was, then, the dependent variable against which various independent variables were tested in other chapters . Lobbyists' Self- Evaluations and Sense of Efficacy In addition to the lobbyists' evaluations of the role effectiveness of their lobbying colleagues, lobbyists in this study were asked to make . a self- evaluation Of their own effectiveness. . These data were-not in- tensively analyzed because there were other social psychological variables which intervened; and, further, the data were not amenable to statistical application. Each lobbyist was asked this question: Question 34: How do you appraise the record Of legislative success ' Of your own organization, i. e. , is your organization achieving its legislative goals? It was anticipated that each lobbyist would evaluate his organi- zation' s effectiveness in personal terms. This turned out to be true: In almost every case, the lobbyist evaluated the legislative success of his organization in persOnal terms. Typical responses to this question began: "I am doing well"; "We have a good record"; or "'My record is good. ". 35 TABLE 6 INDEX OF PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS (N = 33 interviewed lobbyists) IPE Combined Lobbyist Rank Order Total Point Score K 1 159 X 2 61 I 3.5 55 L 3.5 55 R 5 38 M 6 30 DD 7 27 CC 8 26 B 9 23 F 10 22 D 11 21 J 12.5 20 S 12.5 20 EE 14.5 18 G 14.5 18 AA 16 16 A 17 15 Q 18 14 BB 19 13 GG 20 11 H 21.5 9 FF 21.5 9 E 24.5 8 T 24.5 8 Z 24.5 8 P 27 7 U 29.5 1 V 29.5 1 C 29.5 1 N 31.5 0 W 31.5 0 O 31.5 0 Y 31.5 0 36 To that extent, then, the question did measureself—perceptions of role effectiveness and efficacy. Table 7 reveals that almost half (46%) of the lobbyists evaluated their effectiveness as "very good. "_ However, in terms of the IPE score evaluations Of other legislative participants, over half over- estimated their effectiveness. Two of these lobbyists (lobbyists N and Y) were actually in last place in the IPE scale. With but four exceptions, the top fifteen lobbyists on the IPE scale perceived their role effectiveness as eitherf'very good" or "good. " Lobbyists A and I judged their legislative success as "fair, " while lobbyist C felt his organization was not successful. Lobbyist G was unable to make an evaluation, and said his organization "would live by whatever they [the Legislature] do. " Typical responses Of those lobbyists who evaluated their organi- zation's legislative success as “very good" were: Lobbyist D: Our record has been very good. We are definitely achieving our legislative goals.- When compared to other states, we have few punitive laws. When we count up our batting per- centage at the end of the year, we usually do very good. , Lobbyist E: I have been successful. During the last four years we have got legislation I didn't think could pass. . Under normal conditions, however, we are on the defensive. . Lobbyist K who ranked by far as the most effective Lansing lobbyist, reported: I don't lose very often. The Legislature has been fair to our cause. I'm very rarely denied fair consideration. . Lobbyist L, who also ranks very high in the IPE rank order stated: A We have a wonderfully good record. Lobbyist N, who ranked at the bottom of the IPE rank order index, confidently as s erted: 37 TABLE 7 'LOBBYISTS' SELF-EVALUATION OF ROLE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICACY Question 34: ' "How do you appraise the record Of legislative success of your own organization, i. e. , is your organization achieving its legislative goals ?" Lobbyist IPE Yes, Yes, Yes, Can't Say Points Very Good Good Fair No Don't know NA K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 i x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x EE 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x GG 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U l x V ' 1 x C l x N 0 x W 0 x O 0 x Y O x Totals lumber and Percent 15(45%) 7(21%) 5(15%) 2(6%) 3(9%) 1(3%) 38 We haven't lost a thing in four and a half years. We have an excellent record. Lobbyist W, who also ranks at the bottom of the IPE scale stated parenthetically that he didn't consider himself a "good lobbyist" nevertheless he claimed that he "never lost a bill in eight years. " Lobbyist X, who ranked second highest in the IPE rank order felt his organization was achieving all of its goals. He further stated: Offensively, we've lost only one bill in twenty five years. Defensively, we don't get our back up over everything. Examination of these responses suggests that lobbyists evaluated their effectiveness almost wholly in defensive terms. Their legislative success was not determined by the number of bills passed, but in terms of the bills killed which would have jeopardized the interests of the organization. . This role perception will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter IV. A few typical responses which best summarized this attitude were: Lobbyist Y: We have not achieved our main legislative goal, that is, to remove the inequities in the law which hurt 'my organization people. Otherwise, we have done real well, no adverse legislation has been enacted, even though bills have been introduced. (Italics mine) Lobbyist AA: We have a very good record. We must preserve the status quo; it has been attacked in the past, but never amended. (Italics mine) Those lobbyists who rated their effectiveness as "good" (21%) Were quite similar in their responses to the group that rated themselves as "very good." They, too, Often stated their legislative success in negative terms. . Lobbyist B, for example, evaluated it this way: "I haven't been defeated badly"; and lobbyist U who felt he has been Successful because his Opponents have made no headway with "derogatory legislation. " Those who perceived their legislative success as "fair" (15%) phrased their evaluations in this fashion: 39 (Lobbyist A) We have a fairly good record--no better than that. We have not achieved all of our goals. (Lobbyist I) We are doing better in the legislature, but worse public-relations wise. (Lobbyist R) I'm making slow progress. It's taking a long time. We are holding Off attacks, but our job is very difficult because of the present composition of the Legislature. . In legislation not interfering with my organization we have a good record, but in expansion we are making slow progress. - (Lobbyist V) I think we're doing all right. We've had very few real permanent setbacks, this is an indication that we are always right. On the limited number of things on which we get right down to the mat, we've been fairly successful. The two lobbyists who felt they were not successful explained it this way: (Lobbyist C) Our record is good only on one or two bills. (Lobbyist S) The way we've been going, we're not too successful. In the long run, on adverse legislation to our interests, we've been successful. There are two ways of looking at it; anytime we've had legislation for our benefit we have to give more than we gain. Of the three lobbyists (6%) who could not make an evaluation, 1Obbyist FF best summarizes their position when he stated: "I don't know how we have been successful, we haven't achieved what a lot of People in the program wanted. " It is possible to generalize from these data that 67% Of the lobby- iSts interviewed perceived their organizations as either achieving very good or good success in the pursuit of their legislative goals. By con- trast, only 15% believed they were not achieving the organization's legislative goals. . Comparison of these data with the point scores achieved by lobby- ists on the IPE scale indicated that, with few exceptions, the top sixteen lobbyists' self— evaluations corresponded with the pooled perceptions of 40 other legislative process participants. - In half thecases, however, it is apparent that the lobbyists on the lower half of the IPE scale have over-estimated the legislative success of their own Organization and their ownpersonal effectiveness. . The accuracy of the self-evaluations can certainly be questioned. . They cannot be included in the over-all IPE rank order. . Nevertheless, these self-perceptions of role effectiveness are Of more than just parenthetical interest. For self-confidence on the part of the lobbyist in his past role enactment is probably a significant variable in his future performance. - As suggested earlier, legislative success may also be related to the role-playing perceptions of the lobbyist. . If he perceives his role as primarily defensive,that is, killing bills, this is a considerably easier task than piloting legislation through both Houses. This relationship will be discussed in Chapter IV. ‘ l Summary Chapter II is a crucial one in this dissertation. . In it the writer has attempted to explain the development of the Index Of Perceived Effectiveness and the rank ordering of lobbyists according to the com- piled data in this index. The data contained in theIPE table verify one Of the major premises of this dissertation; that is, statistically significant correla- tions are found among the various legislative process participant groups (lobbyists', legislative leaders and news correspondents) in their per- ceptions Of effective and non-effective lobbyists. . The IPE rank order achieved by each lobbyist is the dependent variable against which independent variables will be tested in other chapters. 41 Finally, an 'analysis was made of lobbyists' self-perceptions of their role effectiv‘eness.‘ Sixty-seven percent of the lobbyists‘perceived their organizations as either achieving very good or good success in the pursuit Of their legislative goals; and 15% believed they were not achieving the organization's legislative goals. . Comparison of these data with the point scores achieved by the lobbyists on the iPE scale indicated that, with few exceptions, the top sixteen lobbyists' self- evaluations corresponded with the perceptions Of other legislative evalu- ators (other lobbyists, legislators, and news correspondents). For those lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, most over-estimated the legislative success and personal lobbying effectiveness. . No attempt was made to relate self-perceptions to IPE scores. CHAPTER III THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, CAREER PATTERNS, AND LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS Introduction One of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was that effective or non-effective role enactment of the lobbyists was related to role-taking ability or potential. Role-taking ability would be determined by certain sociO-economic, political and demographic independent variables such as age, education, governmental service, political participation, former occupation, place of upbringing and others. i This chapter describes and analyzes the relationships between these personal background and career characteristics Of the lobbyists; and, further, attempts are made to correlate these variables to Index of Perceived Effectiveness scores. . Although a good deal of research has been done on the social back- ground Of political decision-makers and, in one case,‘ on their career Patterns, little has been done conferning the occupational and career background of lobbyists. It was pointed out in the first chapter of this dissertation that the only studies that deal with career patterns are biograph- ies or autobiographies of well-known or unusual lobbyists. Although these studies about individual lobbyists are valuable, they do not permit generali- z«Ettion about lobbying careers. To the writer's knowledge, no lobbying Study, other than Professor Milbrath' s uncompleted work cited earlier, elitists which traces career patterns. \ 1Unpublished legislative study by Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, Iwelioy Ferguson, John C. Wahlke, op; cit. 42 ll 43 This chapter is closely related to the one that follows, particularly in its discussion of the recruitment of lobbyists. One of the hypotheses of this dissertation to be tested in this chapter was that there would be definite occupational and social characteristics and skills within the career patterns of lobbyists (for example, legal training, legislative experience, political participation, etc.) that added to their effectiveness and aided in their recuirtment as lobbyists. , Chapter III will uncover these traits, skills and background similar.- ities. - In the pages to follow, socio-economic variables and career corre- lates are described and analyzed. Wherever possible, efforts to find statistical relationships between these variables and correlates with lobby- ing effectiveness were made. 1 Socio-economic Background fig The age distribution of the lobbyists is given in Table 8. The ages of the lobbyists ranged from 31 to 73 years. One of the lobbyists was in the 30 to 35 years classification; four in the 36 to 40 years; five in the \ 1The statistical technique, point biserial correlation, was used to I'neasure the amount of relationship between the'independent variah'es and the dependent variable of effectiveness and is the same throughout the rest of this dissertation. This technique has a range of -l. 0 to +1. 0, as does Product moment r. , In fact, it is a product moment r that can be so used in a. multiple regression equation. The formula is: r _ iffo ’NINO pb‘ "'sY N(N-1) mean of sub-group mean of sub-group both distinguished by discrete variable X. N, number in Y1 sub-group. ’ No number in Y0 sub-group. Where: Y1 Y0 ‘ See Allen Edwards, Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Rinehard, 1955). 44 TABLE 8 RELATIONSHIP or LOBBYISTS' AGE AND EFFECTIVENESS. M =, m _ IPE ' , - Lobbyist Points Age K 159 62 X 61 39 I 55 52 L 55 61 R 38 49 M 30 54 DD ' 27 59 , CC 26 66 B 23 45 F 22 56 D 21 63 J 20 73 S 20 48 EB 18 47 G 18 65 AA 16 . 47. A 15 41 Q 14 40 BB 13 40 C30 11 60 H 9 53 FF 9 49 E 8 51 T 8 43 Z 8 53 P 7 31 U 1 61 V l ‘ . 37 C l 60 N 0 36 W 0 68 O 0 38 Y ‘ o 47 \ P°int Bi-Serial Correlation Coefficient at . 05 level: r. = . 3494 *r- = .2210. * This figure represents the actual correlation present between the V3duables. In all tables to follow, the actual correlation is listed e Same way after the correlation needed for significance at the 5% level. 11,5 41 to 45 years; six in the 46 to 50 years; five in the 51 to 55 years; four in the 56 to 60 years; five in the6l to. 65 years; two in the 66 to 70 years; and one was above 73. The-median age was 50 years. It was hypothesized that older lobbyists would tend to be more effective than lobbyists who were below the median age of 50 years. This was anticipated because the typical Michigan legislator is over 50 years of age; and it was felt that the older lobbyists would tend to have more of the career experiences and correlates (for example, legislative, political, and governmental experience) necessary for effective lobbying. Of the sixteen lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale, ten were above 50 years ofage, and six were below 50. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale, only seven were 50 and above, and the other ten were below 50 years of age. This indicates some relationship between age and effectiveness. However, the point bi-serial correlation between age and lobbying effectiveness (r. = . 2210) was below the 54% level of significance, indicating no statistical correlation between effectiveness and age. Birthplace of lobbyists \ The place of birth of the lobbyists is depicted in Table 9. Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists interviewed were born in Michigan, and 39% were born out-of— state. It was hypothesized that native-born lobbyists, who might be more familiar with Michigan and its problems would tend to be more effective than those born in other states or foreign countries. Of the top sixteen lobbyists, seven were born outside of Michigan, and none were born in- state. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale, six were born out-of- state and eleven were born in Michigan. The point bi—serial correlation (r. = .1718) was below the 5% level of significance, indicating no statistical relationship between birthplace and effectivene s s . 146 TABLE 9 RELATIONSHLP OF LOBBYISTS' BIRTHPLACE TO EFFECTIVENESS IPE Lobbyist Points Michigan Out-State K 159 x ‘ X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 3'0 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x BE 18 x G 18 ' ' x AA 16 x , A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x (30 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N G x W 0 x O 0 x Y 0 x Totals and percent 20 (61%) 13 (39%) Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at . 05 level: r. = . 3494 1‘. = .1718 1P7 Plac e of Upb ringing Sixty-seven percent of the lobbyists interviewed were “brought up“ in Michigan, and the remaining 33% were reared out of state. In that those "brought up" in Michigan were, with but five exceptions, the same as those born in the state, no table wasconstructed depicting the data or the anticipated relationship with effectiveness. . It was hypothesized that those "brought up” in Michigan would tend to be more effective (for much the same reasons cited concerning lobbyists' birthplace) than those reared outside of Michigan. Generally, more of the lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale were raised in-state than those in the bottom half of the scale. A point bi-serial correlation (r. = .1511) was below the 5% level of significance, indicating no statistical relationship between place of up- bringing and effectiveness. Lobbyists were also questioned regarding their perceptions of the type of area (for example, metropolitan, small town, rural, and so forth) in which they were brought up. In that certain occupations (primarily white collar) in urban areas are often linked with upward social mobility, it was hypothesized th t there might be a correlation between effectiveness and those lobbyists who had primarily metropolitan backgrounds. Table 10 was designed to test this relationship. Thirty- six percent of the lobby- ists were raised in metropolitan areas. Of the sixteen lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale, nine had metropolitan backgrounds, and seven were raised in non-metropolitan areas. Sixty-four percent of the lobbyists perceived their place of upbringing as non-metropolitan. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, fourteen were raised in non- metropolitan areas, and three were raised in urban areas. These data tend to support the hypothesis; however, a point bi-serial correlation (r. = . 1718) indicates no statistical correlation in that it fell below the 5% level of significance. 48 TA BLE 10 LOBBYISTS? PERCEPTIONS OF PLACE OF UPBRINGING , IPE Metropolitan Non-Metr0politan LObbYISt Points Area Area K 159 x --X 61 x I 55 x L 55 . x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x - CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x BE 18 x G 18 x AA 1 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N O x W C x O 0 x Y 0 x Totals and percent 12 (36%) 21 (64%) Point Bi-Serial correlation coefficient at . 05 level: r. = . 3494. r. = .0683 49 Of those raised in nonnmetrOpolitan areas, 36% came from a "small town”; 9% from a combination of either "city and small town" or “small town and farm. " Education The lobbyists in this study were a highly educated group when com- pared to the total American population. Only 6% had not completed their high school educations, and the remaining 94% were high school graduates, and all of these had attended college. Eighty-five percent of the lobbyists said they had received their high school education in Michigan public schools. Forty-eight percent of the lobbyists have college degrees, while 46% have had at least two years of a college education. The majority of college degrees were received from Michigan colleges and universities. The major fields of interest of the lobbyists while in college were highly varied. Twenty-one percent of the lobbyists had majored in business administration; 18% in political science; 9% in education; and 6% in agri- culture. Other fields represented were: economics, law, pre-medicine, public administration, psychology, engineering, speech, hotel adminis- tration, and literature. Two lobbyists stated that their major interest in undergraduate school was football. Twenty-four percent of the lobbyists had completed graduate or professional work. Of this group, 12% had law degrees; 12% had master's degrees, and one was a certified public accountant. Twelve percent of the lobbyists said they had started work toward a master' 5 or Ph. D. degree, but had not completed the work. In every case, but one, this graduate work was done at a Michigan university or college. The major fields of interest among the lobbyists in graduate schOol was law. Other fields represented were: accounting, education, psy- chology, business administration, and public administration. In order to determine whether there was any relationship between the amount of education and lobbying effectiveness, the breaking-point in the data was put at the college graduate level. It was assumed that college graduates would be more effective lobbyists than those who had. not received a degree. Table 11 was designed to test this relationship. Of the tap sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, seven were college graduates, and nine were not. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE sacle, nine were college graduates and eight were not. The point bi- serial correlation (r. = . 0842) between education and effectiveness was below the 5% level of significance indicating no statistical correlation between the amount of college education and effectiveness. Of the eight lobbyists who had completed graduate work, four were in the top half of the IPE scale; however, the other four were in the bottom half of the scale. These data suggest that there was no apparent relation- ship between effectiveness and graduate or professional degrees. Although there is no statistical relationship between the amount of higher education and effectiveness, many of the participants in this study volunteered the opinion that education was becoming increasingly important for the successful lobbyist. Some stated that this was necessary because of the increasing complexity of the lobbyist' s task, and then suggested that as the general level of education and social status of legislators 'moves up the same must be true of lobbyists. Careful analysis of the education data also revealedthat those lobby- ists who are not college graduates--yet rate at the top of the IPE scale-- were the lobbyists with the most legislative years of experience. As these lobbyists retire and leave the Lansing scene they will probably be replaced by lobbyists with college degrees. Also, there are different standards of educational achievement for different generations, that is, it is possible that the older lobbyists did not need as much education, nor was as much available then. 5]. TABLE 11 RELATIONSHIP OF AMOUNT OF EDUCATION TO EFFECTIVENESS . IPE Colle e Lobbyist Points Gradfate Non-graduate K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD. 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x BE 18 x G 18 ‘ x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U l x V 1 x C 1 x N O x W 0 x O 0 x Y 0 x Totals and percent 16 (48%) 17 (52%) Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at . 05 level: r. = . 3494 T- = . 0842 52 Father' 8 occupation Lobbyists were asked their fathers' occupations because social mobility is often linked with certain occupations-(primarily white collar). It was thought that those lobbyists whose fathers held non-white collar jobs would be less effective than those whose fathers were white collar persons. An attempt to depict the relationship between effectiveness and father's occupation was made in Table 12. Twenty-two (67%) of the lobby- ists had fathers whose occupations were white collar. This included: insurance salesmen, real estate brokers, bankers, general business executives, retail clerks, and governmental officials. Of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale, thirteen had fathers'with white collar occupations, and three were non-white collar. This lends support to the hypothesis that lobbyists whose fathers held white collar jobs tend to be more effective than those lobbyists whose fathers held non-white collar positions. Eleven (33%) of the lobbyists stated their fathers' occupations were non-white collar. This included: mining, farming, trades, and railroad workers. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, eight had fathers with non-white collar backgrounds and nine were white-collar. , A point bi-serial correlation (r. = . 1718) indicated that there was no statistical relationship between father's occu- pation and lobbying effectiveness at the 5% level. Religious Affiliation The religious affiliation of Michigan lobbyists is depicted in Table 13. The majority of Michigan lobbyists (69%) are members of a Protestant church. Twenty-four percent said their affiliation was Episcopalian; 15% .stated they were ”Protestant"; 12% said they were Methodist; 12% Presbyterian; 3% Baptist and 3% said they were Lutheran. 53 TABLE 12 RELATIONSHIP OF FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS TO LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS IPE Lobbyist Points White Collar Non-White Collar- K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x EB 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC 11 . x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W C x O 0 x Y 0 x Totals (Number and Percent) 22 (67%) 11 (33%) Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at . 05 level: 1". == . 3494 I”. = . 1718 54 TABLE 13 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF LOBBYISTS Number Percent Catholic 4 12 Protestant Methodist 4 12 Presbyterian 4 12 Baptist 1 3 Episcopal 8 24 Lutheran 1 3 ”Protestant" 5 15 No Affiliation 4 12 No Answer 2 6 Totals 33 100 Twelve percent claimed Roman Catholic affiliation; 12% said they were not affiliated with a church; and 6% declined to answer the question. Marital Status of Lobbyists and Numb-er of Children The marital status and the number of children of Michigan lobby-A ists is summarized in Table 14. The majority (84% of Michigan lobbyists are married and have children. Sixtyunine percent had two or more children. Two lobbyists were bachelors, and three were married but had no children. Summary- — Socio- ec onomic Bac kground The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had these background characteristics in common: they were over fifty years of age; born and reared in Michigan; brought up in a metropolitan TABLE 14 MARITAL STATUS OF LOBBYISTS AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN Number * Percent Married, one child 5 15 Married, two children 12 36 Married, three children 8 24 Married, (four children 2 6 Married, five or more children 1 3 Single 2 6 Married, no children 3 9 Total 33 100 area, did not complete their college educations; and had fathers with white collar occupations. . The majority of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale tended to have these background characteristics in common: they were under fifty years of age; were born and reared in Michigan; were raised in non-metr0politan areas; were college graduates; and had fathers with non-white collar occupations. The majority of lobbyists claimed protestant church affiliation; and the majority also were married with up to four children. Although no statistical correlations at the 5% level of significance were found between any of the socio-economic background characteristics and lobbying effectiveness, several trends weremoted‘ above. 56 Career Correlates This section of the chapter is devoted to the career characteris- tics of lobbyists; such as the major influences in their decisions to enter semi-public or public life, occupational background, and political and governmental experience, as they might be related to lobbying effective- ness. The major hypothesis here was that the most effective lobbyists might be more likely to have similar career patterns, for example, certain occupational backgrounds, and more political and governmental experience. Source of Major Influences to Enter Public Affairs Lobbyists were asked to recall and explain why governmental affairs 1 interested or attracted them. How lobbyists perceived the development of their interest in public affairs is depicted in Table 15. Family Group Influence. It was thought, at the time this disser- tation was designed, that the majority of lobbyists would ascribe the development of their interest in public affairs to the political activity or awareness of their immediate families. Further, this awakening of interest during childhood and adolescence would have some bearing on their choice of lobbying as an occupational career. Also, being raised in a family environment where he had the opportunity to hear political discussion and to experience politics personally might have a strong influence on the lobbyist' s awareness and interest in politics. Although 1The interview question was: “Just what were the major influences that deveIOped your interest in public affairs and legislation?" It should be noted that an openuended question such as this concerning motivation and the development of political interests elicits a multitude of responses. This multiplicity of responses made it difficult to find satisfactory statis- tical relationships, and, is further complicated by the fact that many respondents gave more than one reason for their political interest. It is difficult to be definitive, therefore, and to single out one factor as the most important. 57 £833” v 7.3.1..» homtaccowem mi; wuoavgteu Home»: use :3; ”:05 ®>rw firmocogwow qum U”. Li) \0 \1 Quiz 33$: Memes mews? $33 ”1:3...th was fleece X. X 0 >4 O‘Choooooohv-dr-sv—‘OOO HM .mH «L ma 3 ma ma ON ON HN MN MN om 5N om mm. mm x mm x Ho X om: mewmo>ozi=o> £00 In <2 £1] 0 QDthhmMU<3>So< cofimwflflo cofimmflooo coflmnfiufiuwnm Moorom oudofiGCH macflonm mafiEboJ paw £03me Haasmguoteowucoz amocwgumxyoD 85pm wo omcom woufiopinzmuflflom kfimofiflofi 388mm @5050 Man: mm._. N x N a D H x P am H x m N H x w .H. N x x w H H x x a PM A N O m H x 2 00 a an MA mm N x N a; a N x x ma < N x X A: << N x x m: D m x x M: NH N x x ON m m x x x ON h N x x HN Q N x x NN .m A x MN m N x x ON 00 N x X 5N OD N x x Om 2 a x mm m m x x x mm 1H N N x mm H d. on He X a x ma: M #308 Epmh soflmtom mofimm have sofimtmflfiéxw mcofimfiwm mapeE mica icwonm “we urtcan. lake/OD mmmeimfim 033$ mBQZ $0.252 MANN txshoq .l g newswmmoq 73.0592 ho .E/anreafigUUO.Dz;mzmasatmayrH sam4m x. a D on N. Am . x m N x w e x m m x a mm x o m x Z 00 x 2 mm x E a 8 x 2 < 6 x 2 .2 x S o x 2 mm. x on m x om e x S. o x NM m x «N m on em 00 x S on x on 2 x mm m x mm A x mm H e s x. 5 . x m2 M l ~53 982 newton.“ Auom «MHUOEQQ l)! Goofindmom muGMOnH umTAQQOA //./(( an: {H mmmzmieomsmm Os ZOFEEhas 4403.125 mooseuei ho memmzoaealmm 59 identified with the Republican party and their lobbying effectiveness was not statistically significant at the 5% level. A further correlation (r. = . 2181) between lobbyists who had some political affiliation (either Republican or Democrat) and effectiveness proved statistically insignifi- cant. These data indicated that there was no correlation between previous Republican affiliation and effectiveness; nor was there a statistical relationship between the any political affiliation and lobbying effectiveness. Years of Political Experience and Effectiveness Even though no statistical correlation was found between some previous political affiliation and lobbying effectiveness, it was felt that there might be a relationship between the number of years of political party experience and effectiveness.1 In this case, the benefit of long years of political eXperience would provide the lobbyists with the background and contacts necessary for a successful lobbying career. Table 19 was designed to test the relationship between years of political experience and lobbying effective- ness. A highly significant statistical correlation (r. = .4279) at the 2% 1evel was present. This verifies the preposition that the more years of Political experience (in this case, within the Republican party) a lobbyist had in his background, the more effective he was perceived in his lobbying aetivities. . As pointed out earlier, it is the writer's Opinion that this Proposition would only hold true as long as the Republicans controlled the Michigan legislative branch of government. . Perhaps under Democratic C Ontrol, the tables might be reversed. ment Political Affiliation and Effectiveness Lobbyists were also questioned as to their political affiliation and political party positions they held at the time of the interview. Only three \ ‘ lPrevious political experience included: activity on the ward or pre- clnot level, such as precinct delegate; positions or activity on the county evel, such as delegates to the county and state conventions, and state positions, such as state central committee. 70 TABLE 1‘? RELATIONSHIP OF YEARS OF POLITICAL PARTY EXPERIENCE TO EFFECTIVENESS Years IPE Political Lobbyist Points Experience K 159 25* X 61 8* I 55 10* L 55 30* R 38 5* M 30 10* DD 27 0 CC 26 25* B 23 -— F 22 -- D 21 20>}: J 20 -- S 20 _- EB 18 -- G 18 25* AA 16 15* A 15 6* Q 14 -- BB 13 __ CC 11 a- H 9 15):: FF 9 15* E 8 -- T 8 20* Z 8 —- P 7 —- U 1 2* V 1 5):: C 1 8 N 0 6* W 0 10* O 0 -- Y O 6 \ 3k This is an estimate taken from other materials in the interview. oint bi-serial correlation at the . 02 level: r. = .4093 r» = .4279 71 _ (9%)‘of the lobbyists stated that they were actively affiliatedrwith a political party (Republican); and of this group, one was a precinct delegate, and A two served as delegates to the state convention. Ninety-one percent of the lobbyists claimed no political affiliation and no active role ineither of the two political parties. , It is the writer‘s impression, based on personal observations, that these statistics do not reflect, the actual situation. That is, some of the lobbyists who claimed no present political affiliation are ardent partisans. Some are actively involved in state-wide and legislative campaigns in one capacity or another. Several are ‘prominent in their attendance at the county and state conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties. Perhaps the claim of "no affiliation" is an attemptiby individual lobbyists to appear bi-partisan or non-partisan in a legislative situation which is rapidly changing and becoming more of an even split between the two parties in the Legislature. In any event, the reader should be somewhat suspect and cautious concerning the lobby- i sts' responses to the question of present political affiliations. l Governmental Experience One of the major hypotheses of this chapter was that lobbying effectiveness would be related to governmental experience; that is, lobby- 5- Sts with prior governmental service would be more effective than those who had not seen governmental service. This section tests this general hypothe sis . _P‘revious Governmental Experience and Effectiveness Table 20 was designed to test the prOpositionthat lobbyists with some SOVernmental experience would tend to be more effective than thosevwithfi- out any prior experience. The majority (67%) of Michigan lobbyists had- some previous governmental experience (this includes bothelective, appointive and civil service posts at the national, state and local levels). \ I , _ lProfessor Milbrath, in hisJournal of Politics article (op. cit.) on Washington lobbyists, concluded that "from the lobbyist' 5 point of view, 72 TABLE 20 RELATIONSHIP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE TO EFFECTIVENESS IPE Governrnentai Lobbyist Points Experience None K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x 5 20 x EE 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N O x W C x O 0 X Y 0 x \ Totals and Percent 22 (67%) 11 (33%; \ foint Bi-serial ccrrelation coefficient at . 05 level: r. = . 3494 ‘ = .1022 73 Of the sixteenlobbyists at the top of the IPE. scale, eleven had previous governmental experience, and five did not. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, eleven had governmental experience in their backgrounds, and six did not. A point bi-serial correlation ( r. - . 1022) between some governmental experience and effectiveness was not significant at the 5% level. Level of Governmental Experience and Effectiveness In connection with previous governmental experience, it was felt that there might be a relationship between the level of the lobbyists' previous governmental experience and their effectiveness. Specifically, if the lobbyist had his governmental experience on the state and local levels, he would tend to be more effective with the StateLegislature than if his experience were confined to the national level or if he didn't have any governmental experience at all. Table 21 reveals that 24% of the lobbyists had local government experience, 33% on the state level; 9% on the national level; and one-third had no governmental experience at all. In an attempt to find a statistical correlation, the state and national categories were combined and compared to those lobbyists with local experience. With a universe of twentyetwo, the point hie-serial correlation was not significant. (r. = .2077). i g . Only a few (12%) of the lobbyists have had experience at the executive level of state and local government. This includes: Governor's staff, general city administrative work, and elective posts. Three (9%) indicated that they had served in the legislative branch of government. This in- cluded: State Legislature, City Council, County Board or Commission, or School Board. These lobbyists were widely distributed throughout the IPE scale, apparently indicating no statistical relationship between the kind 'of position held and effectiveness. then, most of them deliberately choose not to become active in a political party, either because they feel that they cannot accomplish much by doing so and could better spend their time on other things, or because they actually fear that they will defeat their purposes if they become politically active. " 7L1 TABLE 21 LEVEL OF LOBBYISTS' PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE IPE Lobbyist Points Local State National None K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x EB 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x 66 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W O x O 0 x Y 0 x Totals and Percent) 8 (24%) 11 (33%) 3 (9%) 11 (33%) x Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the . 05 level with an N of 22: I‘- ~‘- .4227 r. = 02077 75 Status of Governmental Position and Effectiveness Another proposition in regard to governmental experience was that lobbyists who had held high status governmental posts would .be more effective than those who held middle and low status positions. High status positions were defined as top political offices on a given level ofiovern- . ment; middle status positions as lesser important political offices; and low status positions refers to paid employees of any govermrnental agency. Thirty-nine percent of the lobbyists had held high status positions, 18% had middle status positions, 6% had low status, and 3% had held a combi- nation of middle and low status governmental positions. A correlation between status and lobbying effectiveness was computed in Table 22. Of the sixteen lobbyists at the top half of the IPE scale, five had held high status positions and four had held middle status positions. Of the s eventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, seven had held high status positions, two middle status positions and two low status ‘ positions. A point bi-serial correlation (r. = .1612) indicatedno statis- tical relationship between the status of governmental positions and effectiveness of the 5% level. gears of Governmental Experience and Effectiveness Even though no correlation was found between governmental experi- ence and effectiveness, it was felt that within the group that had had previous governmental experience, the number of years of experience might be related to effectiveness. Table 23 demonstrates that there was a significant statistical relationship between the years of experience and lobbying effectiveness; that is, the more years of) governmental experience, the more effective the lobbyist tended to be. The point bi-serial corre- lation (r. = . 3913) was significant at the 5% level. This statistical finding supports the hypothesis that the more years of governmental experience a lobbyist brings to his job, the more effective he will be as a spokesman 76 TABLE 22 RELATIONSHIP OF STATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL POSITION TO EFFECTIVENESS (N = 22) IPE Lobbyist Points High Middle Low Combination K 159 x X 61 I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 2.6 x B 23 F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 BE 18 G 18 AA 16 x A 15 Q 14 x BB 13 CC 11 x H 9 FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 P 7 U 1 :x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W U x O O Y O x TOtals (Number and Percent) 13 (39%) 6 (18%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) Point hie-serial correlation at the .05 level for an N of 22: r. = .4227 1‘. = .1612 77 TABLE 23 RELATIONSHIP OF YEARS OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE TO EFFECTIVENESS IPE Years of Governmental Lobbyist Points Experience K 159 20 X 61 .. I 55 18 L 55 12 R 38 9 M 3 11 DD 27 3* CC 26 12 B 23 .. F 22 D 21 3 J 20 6 S 20 -- BE 18 -— G 18 -- AA 16 9 A 15 -- Q 14 2 BB 13 -- GG 11 32 H 9 -— FF 9 10 E 8 5 T 8 17 Z 8 -- P 7 -- U l 2* V 1 5 C 1 1 N 0 4 W O 2* O 0 -- Y 0 ¥ 3): This is an estimate which had to be taken from other materials in the interview. - Point Bi-serial correlation coefficient at . 05 level: r. = . 3494 r. = .3913 for his interest group. This finding will be further substantiated in Chapter VI by the lobbyists, as well as the other legislative participants who were questioned regarding the effectiveness of individual lobbyists. Legislative Experience and Effectiveness Further analysis of the data concerning previous governmental experience demonstrates that there was a statistically significant relation- ship between those lobbyiSts who had served any amount of time as legis- lators and lobbying effectiveness. Table 24 confirms the hypothesis that legislative service per se was related to effectiveness. A high point bi-serial correlation (r. = .4318) at the 2% level of significance was obtained. Only eight (24%) of the thirty-three lobbyists interviewed had the benefit of previous legislative experience. - As will be pointed out in later chapters, lobbyists, as well as other legislative participants and observers View previous Iegislative experience as a decided advantage for the lobbyist. Some attribute the success of certain lobbyists almost solely to their legislative backgrounds. Egmmary- -Career Correlates Analysis and interpretation of the factors that influenced the lobby- it‘lts' interests in political and governmental affairs revealed that 64% 0f the lobbyists recalled that their political awareness did not develop until after their formal schooling was over and they were well into their Dre-lobbying occupational careers. Politically-related non—governmental 0Ccupations were cited most frequently by lobbyists as the major source of itIfluence in their interest in political and governmental affairs. In addition, fEll‘nily influence, political and governmental work, and news reporting were the other important factors in the development of' political interests. The general impression received from these data was that there are a great Variety of factors and stimuli which caused political interest. 79 TABLE 24 RELATIONSHIP OF THOSE LOBBYISTS WHO HAD SERVED AS LEGISLATORS TO EFFECTIVENESS Years Served Years Served Total IPE in House of in State Legislative Lobbyist Points Representatives Senate Experience K 159 2 2 X 61 0 I 55 6 6 L 55 2 2 R 38 M 36 DD 27 CC 26 8 4 12 B 23 F 22 D 21 J 20 S 20 BE 18 G 18 AA 16 8 8 A 15 Q 14 BB 13 CC 11 H 9 FF 9 4 6 16 E 8 T 8 Z 8 P 7 U 1 V l C 1 N O 4 4 W O O 0 Y 0 POint bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .02 level: r. z .4093 I"- = .4318 Prealobbying occupational career patterns were heterogenous, but primarily white collar. The largest number of lobbyists came from business and governmental occupations. Evidence'was found (which supports the prOposition that lobbyists with news media backgrounds tended to be more effective. The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had these political and governmental background characteristics- in common: previous affiliation with the Republican party; more years of political experience than the lobbyists in the bottOm half of the IPE scale; previous high status governmental positions at the state and lo'cal levels; and more years of governmental experience than lobbyists in V I the bottom half of the IPE scale. Summary In Chapter 111 one of the major hypotheses of this dissertation, that effective or non-effective role-enactment would be related to certain variables which determine a lobbyist' s role-taking ability, was tested. Role-taking ability was defined as composed of certain socio-economic, political, and demographic independent variables such as age, education, kind and amount of governmental and political service, former occupation, and place of upbringing. The chapter further described and analyzed the relationships between these personal background variables and career characteristics of the lobbyists in comparison and correlation with IPE scores. The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had these socio—economic characteristics in common: they (were over fifty years of age; had been born and reared in Michigan; brought up in a metropolitan area; did not complete their college educations; and had fathers with white collar occupations. The majority of the seventeen 81 lobbyists in toe bottom half of the IPE scale tended to have these back» q ground characteristics in common: t11ey were under fifty years of age; born and reared in Michigan, raised in nonwmetropolitan areas; were , .college graduates; and had far -1ers withn white collar occupations. The majority of lobbyists claimed Protestant church affiliation; and were married with up to fair children. No statistical correlations at the 5% level of significance were found between any of the socio~economio back- ground characteri sti cs and lobbying eife otiveness. Analysis and interpretation of the factors that influenc ed the lobbya ists' interests in political and governmental affairs revealed that 64% of the lobbyists perceived that their political awareness did not develOp until after their formal so1 booling was over, and they were well into their prewlobbying occupational careers. Politically-relared nonmgovernmental occupations werecited most frequently by lobbyists as the major source of influence in their interest in p011 tioal and governmental affai ' s. In addition, family influence, political and governmental work, and news reporting were the other important factors in the deveIOpment of political interests. The general impression received from these data was that there are a great variety of factors and stimuli which caused political interest. Pro-lobbying occupational career patterns were heterogenous, but Primarily white collar. Forty-five percent of the lobbyists came from some sort of business administration ta .iokg 0:1nd, and 39% had govern-u mental occupational back-grounds. , No relationship seemed to exist between ('1‘ av 15 9Cti XE" 61.-0“";ng and Le profession of law, but there is substantial Evidence to support the propos1iti=ont1at lobb '15? s with news reporting Ckgrotindo tend to be more effective lob-b oyis ts (1') The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the to op half of the IPE so cal he . . ”d P011t1oal and governmental background characteri stios in common: ‘ t ‘ I 11 1 . hey mad prevmus aliillaTIOl‘l with th eRepublican parry; more years of 82 political experience than the lobbyists in the bottom. half of the IPE scale; previous high status governmental positions at the state and local levels; and more years of governmental experience than lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale. All of these political and governmental background variables in relationship to lobbying effectiveness were verified statis- tically at the 5% level of significance. In summary, this chapter examined a series of variables that were thought to be related to lobbying effectiveness. By a process of elimi- nation, certain variables were isolated that were statistically related to lobbying effectivene s s. CHAPTER lV THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPT1ONS OF RECRUITMENT, LOBBYING ROLES AND JOB SATISFACTION One of the hy potheses of this di ssert ation was tit at 10:1"; inge effec tive“ ness would be re1ated to the type of role the. lobbyist is expected, and compelled by circumstances, to p ay Lobbyists playing primarily defensive roles, {that i this role 1s i535 di promot Lon and giidance of a bi ll :ficult to play tnan 5 clearly perceived their functions primarily in def on behalf of his interest. group. U) a role which calls for th. tnrougho both legisl at motional terms. These, and other related roles are analy lobbying positions; formulation of legislative policy; and time in the lob in role perception: a: analyz. ed in 1'611Eith s of the lobbyists‘ Dying role; differ enc r eporting and finan nship to lobbying e The last section of the chapter a-.. -v. *zed: "-.and d. sc 1' seed , to M “3:115 more effective because ensive and pro~ ”job, “ S‘JLCh as recruitment. for ncing methods; are dis-cu- l4! . itecti'a/e ss . (T1 n tr eats the lobbyist ‘ 1 the d1111sion oi 1' ":20: es between lobbyists and employers ‘ per: eptions of 3033 sat-“stact -on or d: ssatisfa ctionj the appealing and nonsappe of. the. lobbying role; and their fa are Chapter III examined the various socio~eoonomio variabl e .r. fit/‘3' ,J. R e c rt‘iitrn oands of the lobby 83 carer—r plan ns Tint ists in this study. Te -1. W39 aiLng aspect - \13 present ’ okgrounds, and then went on to trace the p: e lot::1:,ing concluded 84 that tl-ese career patt-.:r.s reveal a heterogeneity of pr max: 1, wnite collar occupations. FortyufiV—Je percent. of the lob--b.yists came from some form of basiness admiaistration backgr-oi'nd, and 39% Trad governmental occam pational backgrounds. No relation :1" p seemed to exist between effecti';,r'e lobbying and the profession of law, but there is some evidence to eapport the propos- t _cn tnat loobfi sts wits. news reporting backgr oands seem to es. more effecive lobb'yi, stso The same seems to be true of is. rm oceq. pational backgm 0:1nds. As the data suggested, the 00:11 ational ba ckgro-“inds ts are recru: ted are an thing but U) ‘.rata from which lobbv i *1 ,3 01 ¢. ' r (T! 'I) O (‘l I A f“ ..d U) consistent, and are -vf'ten haphazard. Ali-conga lcbb‘yists tend to be re~ q, p: b- 0.. '—+ [r p) (P -+ :3 (D I O 0 b l H b J 0.1 . ‘ ~ ' 1 ‘ 4' - 1'» 1 rs .~ 1: A 'l cruitc-d :rcm w.-1-te-cc1‘1ar occ‘. pa tions, 1t can 11- -._ 1 1-- ,1 3:: 4 ‘ Tr .' . -- a ' _ the :cc-a.l S‘I-a’ cat-on of tne snlted States itself, how do people get to become lobbyists ? As pointed out in Chapter 1’11, only one person among tr ose interviewed Lad actzlpall‘y planned — ed11- cational training with this CD“C...-J in mind. All others had come into a n a lobbying career t rough another, often circuitous route, Tab e 25 der-iots tile lobbyists perceptions of how it came about that. the J were recruited into their lcbcying positions ‘oelectsd and Askedl “EOr an_::aion Twenty-4hr ee fit% of those interviewed said that they had been "lected anda sked to 1.6—. 10 yists by the organization, 01" this group, nine. were select-e :rcm wi thin the orga ni ation itself; and, in most cases, the selection as leb-fist was an ortgrowt-a of a related public relations or a(311711114.strati're position wit:.in the. organization, Typical responses for 10:371533 T‘ECI“ilff_-.d 1n ahLS IE‘FhLOD. WET‘EI l -. ~1 . g 1.,— '1‘- " “ .. LOL-Cr""1€-‘TS were asked: "1;... st thow did it come aaout that you became .Emgfismuop .205 E .833 mac :9: v.85 HEM—m: mumgobofi .33 mmsmomn 059: F588 3308* $2 H 3%: w 2?: m 3%: o 2%: mm £50on 28 .2809 N o Mr N o O N o 3 N o Z N H U N H > N H D N h nu N m N N w .H. N w m 0 mm N w m N 2 00 N N mH mm N 3 O N ma < N a: << mm; N ma 0 N N m: mm N on m N cm H N HM Q N N MN .m N MN m N N em 00 N hm QQ N on 2 N mm M N mm A N N mm H N Ho X N m2 M vmuomfiw 303550 Goflwwom now—macaw nomudufinmmwo 350nm umwwnnoq mnmfivflomnh comumuflcmmuO .3330 new >3 vvxmmw fin: A3958 So: .2 35 330.» . 339?. ES 3328 L} FZWEHHDMUHM (HO mgomhrmz ho WZOHHQHUMMQ .WHWHWQQOJ mN HJQ‘:-byist co: ldn’t, as one stated, "sell a produ ct i don't believe in. " 'Typical responses supporting this were: This was de finitelr a factor, because my basic beliefs, i. e., Iny soc: o poli ti cal beliefs in th free enterprise system are the same as theirs. This is a forum for my beliefs. 90 TABLE 26 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATION POLICY POSITION IN DECISION TO BECOME THEIR LOBBYIST Question 15b: Was the policy position of your organization a very important factor in your decision to represent it? IPE No Lobbyist Points Yes No... . Answer K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x .R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 2.1 x J 20 x S 20 x EE 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC: 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W O x O O x \ Y 0 A x lotal and Percent 20 (61%) 9 (27%) 4o (12%) The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the . 05 level for a. universe . 0f 28: r. = .3606 1‘ . = . 3642 91 ..t' was a ver 9' : rportent fector. For example in other sitestions cooperating, .L won dn t hive loh:ie for them; \ t-A Yes, because I 'celieve i1: wnst we" re trying to do becatise o 'T’ iit the importsnce of this, i turned down Yes_;Ir don t think there is any bill that Le . r . ind‘ostry would want which wouldn‘t . have rneriw Genera ly,t he position of those lobbvists who felt this was an important factor in their decision to work. for the interest group related tr -e group s policy po osition .0 their own soda-political “beliefs, or as Lobbyist Y stated. "Tin-fir position is tire same as mine. ” Twenty-seven percent of the lobbyists' stated that at th; time they were considering taking a position as lobbyist, the policy position of the hiring inter est gro :p was not. an important factor in their decision Typical responses from this group were: It wasn‘t important at the time. At that time I Wan’ ed to go in o the export business, and I needed the job because I was marr d It didr-Jt enter into it at. the time. Now it is a very important factor. They stand for the things I think they should stand for, i.e., what . . . should stand for. 1‘ ..t was. not important; it was a matter of advancement. with: n the it was a damn good ion, 1 W15 ofrered it. oec": ;::e or mtr rolicies. The man who hired me “ad known me for "years. hind H . a {oar-minite inter xie w. Ail of the lohbyists who 5 ..3 ed the pol: :1; position was not. important. whrn they were hrs 1 hired commented List they :10th ought as Lot“ Wis t M states, "that it is important now, and I‘m strongly committed to it; " Irrtere~t*ngrv enough, a statistically sign ificant correlation Wfi"? obtained between 102:": ‘y‘ing effectiveness 3 d the policy position of the n actor in nt'ne loopyist‘s decisio nto represent in All r H. organization asa t 92 two of the ninelo orbyistsw who stated hat the poii cy po osit ion was no: importa ant: in their decis one are among tr e top s: '..exte n lobbyists on the. IPE scale. A point hi- se erial correlation (r. 2 . 3642} atth e 5% level was obtained for this group, T--ir sen oat of twenty 2 lobbyists who said the policies of their interest. group had been important in their decision were in the bottom seventeen on the IPE scale. The writer is at a loss in attempting to explain this correlation. Perhaps this is just an indication that those lobbyists who stated interest: group policy was not important 1n their decision, are more secure. in their positions and have no need to rationalize or distort this factor as a part of their decision-”if, indeed, tr ese things have occur red at all in the lobcyist s' perceptions of their recruitment. An examination of those who said "no”I to this question revealed no distinctive pattern” They represented a broad range of interes t"gro p organizations with various ideological commitments. It was thought that those lobbyists who represented "reform-oriented“ gro aps mig t have given more consi der~2 ation to this factor in their decision to work for the. group. This did not prove true. Althoagh this is 31.1 interesting correlation. further specua lation would neither be fruitful nor justifiable. Personal Commitment to Organization Policy Lobbyists were farther quest ioned regarding their per son-11 commitu ment: to their inter est, groups' policy at. the time of the interview,1 Table. 4’ i shows that 85% of the lobbyists responded that their commitment was ‘strong. “ Typical responses in thisc category were: i ve never carried tne ball for any thing I didn't like, and probably wouldn‘t. v 3. h ave never done anxthing in my life which 7 have been more in agreement ., 1 L' _._ a . . . LCcr-2y1st: were Kissed"Wo*-\11d you describe your commitment to -Jr .1: our organize t _'on spolic y 3: strong, mild, or weak?” 93 TABLE 27 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO ORGANIZATION POLICY Question 15a: Would you describe your commitment to your organi- zation's policy as: strong, mild, or weak? IPE Lobbyist Points Strong Mild Weak DK/NA K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x BE 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x (30 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V l x C 1 x N O x W 0 x O 0 x Y 0 x \ Total and Percent 28 (85%) 1 (3%) 0 4 (12%) \ If 2'. didn't feel otro II‘ngl3I a; ’2. '.TI, I wooldn‘t do it. I wouldn't I 1.1 accord with. I ave a personal interest was offlered a job wif}. a . . . outfit in . . I at co lo III ' Take it . r u ['4 tIong‘I'y commLTZod to his organ: Lat onI s'pol cy waxed sentiment 11, and I espondod that he was not only strongly cornmitzed to its policy ”31:. t do d cated to building I‘togetnerness“: i love In," people. I tr 3: to make -‘m --1 love Witt: tne Titian-ass. ' a . - v . \ 4.. .' .’1., 1t zoom we 11’6- one : g -zITn..-I-Iy.. AI'I in all. the feeling among tnis group was, as Lobbyist O on es C’I—J " 1r 1..-- ‘ J l 1 I've strong con ions on. ads 9 q. I A. (ft ‘1 am In lC-El more 55. cos £6.11 in The vast maJorifIy of lobbyists felt tha’ strong commitment. to organi- 7‘ pzoro’“. '.:i e fOI lonTI'i'ing oifoc" ’ .:.no as "‘ v, 30.1. (‘1 zation polic y" was a ne-co. ‘1 All lobbyists but one-- wLIo said his commitment was "'mild"‘- fr—It tils way, Twelve percent of the lobbyists said they "dIdnit know" how to descIi'oe tnoir personal commitment. One said that his commifmen: “depends on “no: policy. "I Another lobbyist, who Iopr osents one 0 most powerful companies in the st... , We never nave any poll ci e. , we'll live by what the Log_.-I does. Personal commitment :3'1 :15 1c sfs to the OIga nix-‘....loni’ poll, was perceived by most Michi- gin oTC'I-gisti- as necessary to (if-<01 . nd lobbyists in the top half of the: IPE scale. as well as ’T‘ .1 LI, ‘3 (D :3 H 91 In connection with the questions regarding per sonal cornmitmont, were qt; ueIied as to w Ietnor or not they perceived t--o;I position '15 in forest group ro-Ip oso . ntativo to be somewhat akin to that of a lawyer and his client. It is often alleged that the professional 1. gqn for-1:1 Ie" with semi cos axailaole to Ike Li gho Obt‘yists in this 9* 'dy can be desorib ed as “treelanco“1og:sIaT_‘~.'o agent-.; klu¢ 95 that is, having more than one client. . All three perceived their relation- ship as a professional one and they did not feel they were personally committed to their client's position. Two of the three were in the top half of the IPE scale, and one was in the bottom half. . Table 28 depicts the range of answers in response to the question concerning professional relationships. Forty-two percent indicated they did not perceive their relationship to their organizations in professional lobbyist-client terms. Twelve percent thought this was "somewhat" true, and 33% perceived the relationship as a professional one. An effort to relate effectiveness to perceived professional relationships was attempted by combining the ”somewhat" and "yes" categories and comput- ing a point bi-serial correlation. The correlation (r. = . 1064) was not significant at the 5% level. However, there is evidence to indicate that those lobbyists who did not feel their relationship was a professional one--but rather a strong personal commitment--tended to be more effective than those who viewed their ties with the interest group as a strictly professional arrangement. For, of the fourteen lobbyists who did not view this as a professional relationship, eight (24%) were among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale and only six (18%) fell among the bottom seventeen on the scale.1 Perceptions of Lobbying Roles One of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was that lobbying effectiveness was related to the type of role the lobbyist is expected, and compelled by circumstances, to play on behalf of his interest group. It Was hypothesized that lobbyists playing primarily defensive roles \ o 1The data and conclusions evident in Table 28 seem to cast doubt 5. 1'1 the validity of the responses obtained in answer to the question regard- ?8 personal commitment in Table 27. Perhaps the wording of the ques- J‘Qh itself resulted in responses which no longer appear valid when compared with the findings in Table 2.8. 96 TABLE28 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP A TO. ORGANIZATION Question 15: Do you consider your relationship to the organization you represent to be like that of a lawyer to a client; that is, present- ing your client' 8 case in the best possible light without necessar- ily commiting yourself to your client's position? IPE Lobbyist Points No Somewhat Yes DK/NA K 159 x X 61 x 'I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 3 20 x EB 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 . x BB 13 x CC 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W O x O O x \ Y 0 x &otal and Percent 14.(42%) 4 (12%) 11 (33%) 4 (12%) The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the . 05 level: r. = . 3494 1‘. =.1064 97 lthatis, to"l*;ill" harmful legislation and preserve the status quo) would tend to be more effective; because this role is less difficult to play than a lobbying role which calls for the active promotion and strategical guidance of legislation through both legislative houses. As Table 29 demonstrates, Michigan lobbyists did perceive their role functions primarily in defensive and promotional terms. Each lobbyist was asked what he thought his organization expected _Iim, as their representative, to do. The responses were then coded, and five distinct roles became evident after analysis of the data. In most cases, it was possible to detect secondary roles as well as primary roles. Promoter~ Strategist The first primary role which became evident was that of promoter- strategist. The lobbyists (24%) who perceived this function as their primary role were those whose organizations expected them to have beneficial legislation introduced to promote it; and to work out the Strategy necessary to secure its passage. A lobbyist playing this role would be under constant pressure to "get” something from the legislature: for hi s interest group. Typical reaponses from lobbyists who considered this their primary role were: Policy execution is one of my major tasks. I've got to see. that things get through the legislature. In order to execute policy, I get acquainted with as many legislators as possible. I help them with letters, Speeches, bills, amendments, facts, and so 7 forthuthey make a chore boy out of you. i attend almost every meeting of the . . . committees in the House and Senate. I do my most effective work in committee; e. g. , in working out substitute bills. I get the introducers of the bill who are members of the committee to which it will go. Then, I have a syllabus on the bill in which I've detailed: (1) What the law is: (2) What the change is; and (3) Why? Further, I talk to the chairman over lunch or dinner. E Ch .1 r? F N H o .w N H o o N H o B H c 2 H H o N H H > N H H D H N s m H N N N N N H w .H. H w H N H a mm H N a H.H H N HH 00 H N NH mm 8. H N m E G 9 H N 2 .4. H N AeH 5. H NH 0 N N H NH mm H N ON m H N S n N H N HN Q N H N NN m . H NN m m H N N 00 H N N no N H om 2 H N wm m m H N mm A N H . mm N. N H H He x me M 53% cmfimogno :03de 31 .mu m ll onEmHmm 0395mm m nhWWCbMoHunM ..uouofluHOHHH mnHNHMHHnHUnH umwknnoq . «CU 0» 0>wumucwm®hnm0h .nufl mm 30% uUOnmNG COCNNMGMMO H59» mmomu «E3 umd... .20 MOJulmerR “NNN «NOUmOdQ t I" ‘ 99 My job i: +0 secure passage of the legislation which they (i. e. , do“ w the interest group) has introduced. I assist in the drafting of legislation. My first job is to bring equality in the law for my group, and to increase the power of the . . . I represent a group of . . . companies. We meet and discuss the legislation we want, and then take a position; and they leave it to me to carry it through. Of all the roles to be discussed, the role of promoter-strategist is the most difficult to successfully enact. For the intricacies and pitfalls of the legislative process make it easy to "kill" or “pigeonhole” legislation in a multitude of ways. Examination of Table 29 substantiates this, for only one lobbyist, who perceived this as his primary role, is ranked among the tOp sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, and the other seven are among the ten lobbyists lowest on the IPE scale. Although only eight (24%) lobbyists picked the role of promoter- strategis. as their primary role, thirteen (39%) chose it as a secondary V role, with seven (21%) out of the thirteen in the tOp half of the IPE scale and six in the bottom. Befender-Advocate The lobbying role picked by the majority (52%) of the lobbyists as their primary function was the role of defender-advocate. This category 1Ilcludes those lobbyists who perceived their primary function as defenswe; tflat is, protecting their interest group from "harmful" legislation and group. In addition to defending the status quo, these lobbyists, as was i . 1 . , "«is: case With tne promoter-strategists, were expected to actively advo~ Cate the interest group‘s position as part of their defensive function. TVpical responses from defender-advocate lobbyists were: I am supposed to do all I can to kill legislation harmful to the company. Occasionally we have bills we want to pass--maybe one per session. However, it is largely defensive. 100 My job is to protect us from state government, that is, to get reasonable treatment from state government. My outfit expects me to see that . . . maintains the full privileges it now has. For the most part my job iS'to 'police' the legislature to see that no adverse legislation is passed, i. e., adverse to our interests in this state. Its mostly preventive. We have some ideas for legislation, but its mostly policing. Primarily my job is to watch and see that no adverse legislation that would detract from or be injurious to our profession is passed. We also try to correct what we consider to be an inequity in the definition of what we do. Of the seventeen (52%) lobbyists who picked the role of defender- advocate as their primary function, eleven (33%) picked the role of promoter-strategist as their secondary role. But there was no doubt among the defender-advocates that their first task was a defensive one, protecting the status quo and built-in privileges their interest groups had already obtained. Examination of data concerning those lobbyists who picked, as their primary role, the role of defender-advocate revealed that twelve of the seventeen lobbyists are among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE Scale and five are among the bottom seventeen. This supports the hypothe- 813 that lobbyists in the role of defender-advocate tend to be more effective than those required to play the role of promoter-strategist. I Additional Statistical evidence to support this hypothesis demonstrated in Table 30, Was achieved through a point bi-serial correlation between these two Primary roles and effectiveness scores. A high statistical correlation (r, = . 5406) at the 1% level confirmed the relationship between effective- ness and lobbyists playing the role of defender-advocate. No statistical Correlation was attempted among the remaining roles because of the 8111all number of cases classified under those roles. One further generalization was possible from the data in Table 30. Almost without exception, those lobbyists playing the role of defender- C1Vocate represented the older, established, high status, interest groups 101 TABLE 30 RELATIONSHIP OF “PROMOTER-STRATEGIST" AND "DEFENDER- ADVOCATE" ROLES TO EFFECTIVENESS IPE Promoter- Defender- Lobbyist Points Strategist Advocate 159 61 55 55 38 30 l 27 2.6 23 22 21 20 20 18 18 16 15 1 14 13 1 11 meomwoogerxx no [‘1 [:1 H mmowo>>o '11 OH! > oooHHHNoooooooxo l l ~40220 U) m (1) \‘V 1‘?“ (D ’1 0 Ha l‘fi pl ’3 (‘f r e i S m ~< No, Ig“ now the}? are trying to edge me off the legislative work, t a new man and make this job for two peoPls-W On t-.-e surface, then, it seems _ at none of the lobb iss interviewed in this stigtdv had to make a case for con inaed represent)? on However, if: has been this writer" 3 obs ervation, while a legislative employee, that in fart ecme lobar-ists devote a great deal of attention and effort to making J ’1‘: themselves appear nece aI-“y‘, if not essential, to the effective Operation Of their interest group, The practice of “saltnd agging, “ that is, intro- ducing a bill for a constituentuwallegedly working for its passagewibat S'QI‘I'eptio1sly having a committee ”pigeon-whole" the bill, is not only Practice—fl by legi lat ors but ael —.o b" lol‘bmstso This writer knows of ”I: SE-Veral instances in which lobbyists deliberately had a bill int rod-seed 109 which in some way would have jeOpardized the status of their interest groups. The typical procedure often followed is to have the lobbyist drum up considerable sentiment among his interest group members; call in various organization officials to testify against the prOposed legis- lation; and, then, after considerable excitement and activity quietly have a friendly legislator kill the bill in committee. After the bill has been killed, the lobbyist, in a variety of ways, would claim credit for its demise. However, this is not a tactic indulged in by lobbyists who are secure in their positions; for it requires unusual c00peration on the part of legislators, and there is always the possibility it might backfire with the bill passing the legislature. It has also been the writer' 3 observation that some lobbyists ask legislators, particularly those in leadership positions, to "plug" them in appearances before their interest groups or in letters to their organi- zation superiors. It is the writer's recollection that in four years in the Speaker‘s Office, at least ten requests of this kind have been made of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In several cases, lobby- ists were having trouble with their executive board members and wanted letters of recommendation from the Speaker to the Board. In no case, was the request granted. Although nothing in the data indicated that lobbyists felt it necessary to justify their positions to their employers it can be concluded that those who felt insecure in their lobbying role might resort to practices which were designed to strengthen their positions and enhance their personal security. Perceptions of Formulation of Organization Legislative Policy Lobbyists were questioned regarding the process by which legis- 1ative policy was made for their interest groups. Four basic processes beCame apparent after the responses to the open-end questions were 110 analyzed. Table 32 depicts the four basic ways in which legislative policy was crystallized for the Michigan interest groups studied in this dissertation. By Lobbyist Only two (16%) lobbyists stated that legislative policy was made directly by them. One of the lobbyists was at the tOp of the IPE scale, and the other was ranked in the eighteenth position on the scale. Their reSponses were: I establish all legislative policies. It may be done in consulta- tion with them, but its left entirely to me. Frankly, I usually make legislative policy. We have a legislative committee, but it never meets. I have never consulted them. By Organization Superiors with Lobbyist Nine (27%) of the lobbyists stated that legislative policy was made by their organization superiors in direct consultation with them. Eight of the nine were in the top half of the IPE scale, and one in the bottom ‘nalf. Typical responses describing the process by which legislative policy was formulated were: The corporate official determines the policy in counsel with me and other corporation officials. We arrive at policy by a meeting of minds. This is done. by all the leaders within the business and by compromise with other leaders and people within the organization. I help make the decisions, and the company follows my recommendations. Its determined largely by management‘uwe have to determine it. Whenever we feel something is inconsistent or we have to compro- mise, we get Board action. This puts me between the board and management, and they take me right in. Generally, we know the position on a bill from prior experience. We talk it over with the officers of the companies, and then we decide. x o .H. x o o x o 3 x o z x H o x H > x H D um N. Am x m N x m .H. x m m x a EH x o m x HH 00 x 2 mm x 3 O n x mH < 1 x 3 << x H: 0 x H: mm x cm m x om H. x HN o x NM m x mm m x em 00, x S no x on 2 x mm m x mm .H x mm H x He x x Q: vH , \l HSESEHMHO 0828800 umrfnoq $39904 350nm amt»? 55H? mmmuounm miumHmHmmA m3 .3 :33 mnonomab km Mn: 11% ..muoom WQNHOZ 5m gm ”awakwxloo xfim ENWHO 5m Nnflmmko AS‘ 0% ®>wum~w~ .1! / «Sofia . ll/oxw MOM 0606 $03 .MQH *MJqJDL fl>fifi<40fllllOub no $530 so wGHHHdU GO WCHHHdU mofigflomw .3330 mwvhnm mfiwhdmmfunw. MGHOQ SH” WGCHHOB muoom mm momugmuo'.:=,r'f.-:~its d: not spend a... much time lobby’ng state agercies. Although those lobby-Lye in the top .3117 of the IPE scale spend more time {5 the time average for the whole group was low at 5%. Calling on the Executive Office. From these data it appears that Michigan lobbyists did not perceive it a necessity to call on’momeers of the Governorls staff, or the Governor himself. Again, this may have been a reflection on the fact that: the Exec-3:129; Office, at the time of this study, was controlled by Democrats, and the Legislature 3:7 Replblicans. Two percent of the time of all the lobbyists was spent in this acrivi‘j, Other. Responses in the 3Tether” category referred mostly to ”ed-a ministrati 1e deties in conrection with t1” e interest group or Lobbyist U said he Spent 70% of his time "sitting around The group time average for this cat eog ry was 220. In summary, lobovists in the top half of the IPE scale 5 rent less I .. time calling on others, and more time lobbying state agencies than lobby“ U) ists in the bottom half of the scale. Further, lobbyist. devoted only 2% of their time to lobbying the Exec :tiv eiOff ce. To further test the hypothe sis that lobbyists who sperd more. of their time in activities that bring them in direct personal €013.7in w: fir; legislators would, therefore, be more effective than those who did not spend as much time in the :e actiri ties, Table 34 was constructed. In this table, the time Spent in the three direct personal contastc.‘ acti.” (that is, calling or legislators, entertaining, and grass roots traael, were combined and their percentages totalled. . A point. biaserial corre~ lation between time Spent in direct personal contacts and lobbying 120 TABLE 34 LOBBYISTS‘ PERCEPTIONS OF TIME SPENT ON LOBBYING LEGISLATORS Time Spent in IPE Direct Personal Contact Lobbyist Points With Legislators {Percent} K 159 30 X 61 62 I 55 50 L 55 20 R 38 25 M 30 55 DD 27 30 CC 26 60 B 23 86 F 22 32 D 21 46 J 20 50 S 20 55 EB 18 50 G 18 40 AA 16 90 A 15 72 Q 14 76 BB 13 20 CC 11 45 H 9 55 FF 9 9‘ E 8 65 T 8 70 Z 8 32 P 7 2.3 U l 20 V 1 40 C 1 20 N O 7 W O 25 O 0 47 Y 0 25 ,‘(This includes several categories cited in the previous table. They are: "calling on legislators, " "grass roots travel, " and “enter“ taining. " The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the . 05 level: r. 2: 3494. r. = .0122 121 effectiveness was computed (r. = .0122). The correlation was below the 5% level of significance indicating no statistical correlation. In summarizing this section on t1 e perceptions of .ime spent 1n the lobbying role, it can be said that: lobbyists on the top half oft ne IPE scale Spent more time on direct personal contacts with legislators by calling on them more during the session; entertaining more, and spent more time in "grass roots" travel around the. state; further, lobbyists in :-+ {1" {D the tOp half of the IPE scale'Spent less time working in their ffic those in the bottom half of the scale and they spent more time doing research, but less time than the bottom seventeen lobbyists in the preparation and release of pr. blic relations materials; finally, lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale Spent less time calling on others and more time lobbying state agencies. All lobbyists Spent only 2% of their time lobbying the Executive Office. Although no statistical evidence was present, the data did suggest th at lobbyists who Spent more time in direct personal contact with legislators tended to be mor e effective than the other 5 . Methods of Reporting by Lobbyists to Employers Table 35 demonstrated the methods used by lobby its 5 to keep in touch with their interest groups.1 Reporting methods varied greatly. Some lobb‘ ists did vex little formal re ortin «awhat was done was accom P P lished in informal .ersonal conferences. Others ha ,ed elac rate renortin 1v methods, including newsletters, Special bulletins, legislative reports, and others. No hypoth sis was formed reg rdin (IQ H ’D y—a ,1) ;--'¢ 0 D U) 5.3" ”O 0 .fi reporting methods to lobbying effectiveness. A glanc e at the' table rex sale the skewing of responses among t -e categories The various methods of reporting are briefly summarized below. l'l‘I‘ e question asked was: "How do you report back to tne organi- zation you represent?" x x x o W x x o O x o 3 x 0 Z x x H D x x x x H > x H D x x N. nm x x m N X X on X m .H. x x x w H x on my .mh X on on mu m x N 2 OD x x x Ma mm X an N a; G x on ma 4 2 x on A: << R X ma 0 x X on ma MM x N ON m x on mm m. x on X MN Q X x X MN .m N MN m x on cm 00 N x x hm QQ x x 0m 2 x N mm m x x x x mm 1H x N mm H an ab X x om“ & 5002 :03 mmcfivog .wHO. uuomom muoflumflm P215802 mucwom umgnnod umuwcmmno van .8800 .uoxm oa m>3m~mmwow~ Jam? neoconomnonv Du mcfimfidm van Mn: Hanna‘s mupommm fimuO HmGOmuvnH Hmacnaw mMQOmHOnm ddgofium mhwfimfimk’mz 0:5“qu ll mamZOHHfi< K 159 $55, 001 X 61 12,011: I 55 25, GOO L 55 11,000 R 38 16, 000 M 30 17, 000 DD 27 15, 01:10 CC 26 14, 000 B 23 20, (2C0 F 22 24,001) D 21 20, 000 J 20 6, 0C0 S 20 10, 000 BE 18 No answer G l8 l3, COO AA 16 10, 000 A 15 18, 0C0 Q 14 14, 000 BB 13 20, 000 CC 11 11, 000 H 9 No answer FF 9 5, 000 E 8 20, 000 T 8 9, Oil? Z 8 12, 00C- P 7 11, 06C U 1 l4, DUO V 1 9, UGO C 1 9,003 N O 9, 000 W O 12., 000 O O 10, 000 Y 0 1C1 000 U The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the one-tenth of 1% level: r. = 1'. = .8103 .5541. 130 TABLE 39 RELATIONSHIP OF YEARS OF LOBBYING EXPERIENCE TO EFFECTIVENESS IPE Years of Lobbyist Points Lobbying Experience K 159 2'7 X 61 7* I 55 22. L 55 21 R 38 9* M 30 13 DD 27 10* CC 26 13>!< B 23 11 F 22 10*. D 21 20’:< J 20 18* S 20 9* EB 18 11 G 18 12 AA 16 7 A 15 4 Q 14 10 BB 13 11>:< CC 11 5 H 9 8* FF 9 8 E 8 4 T 8 5 Z 8 5):: P 7 3 U 1 20* V 1 2 C 1 16 N O 4 W O 11>?< O O 4* Y 0 7" T An estimate of the lobbyist's years of experience taken from the. data but not directly from any specific questions. The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the one tenth of 1% level: r. = .5541 r. = .6132 131 TABLE 40 LOBBYISTS' PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS RELATED TO EFFECTIVENESS Lansing Residence IPE Year-round Only During Lobbyist Points Lansing Residence Legislative Session K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x BE 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W 0 x O 0 x Y 0 x Totals and Percent 19 (58%) 14 (42%) The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the . 05 level: r. = . 3494 r. = . 2032 132 and their lobbying effectiveness as compared to those who live in a Lansing hotel only during the legislative session. Nineteen lobbyists (58%) lived in Lansing year—round. Of this group, ten who were in the top half of the IPE scale maintained year-round Lansing residences; nevertheless, so did the other nine lobbyists who were in the bottom half of the scale. Forty-two percent lived in Lansing only during the legis- lative session; and they were scattered throughout the IPE scale. A point bi-serial correlation between effectiveness and place of residence was not significant at the . 05 level (r. = . 2032). However, it is possible to generalize that the majority (ten out of sixteen) of the lobbyists at the top of the IPE scale did maintain year-round Lansing residences. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Job Satisfaction and Future Career Plans Job Satisfaction and Motivations to Remain in Lobbying_ Lobbyists were questioned regarding their personal satisfactions with lobbying as a profession. l The hypothesis was that those who were basically dissatisfied with lobbying as a profession and did not want to continue in it would tend to be less effective than those lobbyists who ,were happier with their lot. Eighty-two percent of the lobbyists, as revealed in Table 41, stated they would like to continue in lobbying activity for the rest of their professional lives. ~ All lobbyists, but one, among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale indicated they intended to remain lobbying the rest of their professional lives. Probes, as to why they wanted to continue, elicited various kinds of motivations in- volved in their decision to stay in lobbying. These responses were categorized from the Open-end questions and are recorded in Table 42. 1The question was: "Would you like to continue in this type of work for the rest of your professional life? Why?” 133 TABLE 41 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF JOB SATISFACTIONS Question 9: Would you like to continue in this type of work for the rest of your professional life ? IPE Lobbyist Points Yes No Perhaps DK/NA K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x EB 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x .. U 1 x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W 0 x O O x Y 0 x Totals and Percent 27 (82%) 3 (9%) l (3%) 2 (6%) The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the . 05 level: r. = . 3494 r. = .1570 383 a Lem: a 53V 2 Es: s 1.83.2 x X. .x. >4 xx 134 XXXXX >4 XX XX uh -llr- z. ANOT... M an O‘O‘wwaP-‘HI—‘OOOO : ma u: m: 3 ma m: ON ON HN NN MN on FM om mm mm mm #0 on: mewmo>ozBO> LL. $13114 mm D QOtht-rm Q 54>“..qu I’ll-Fla themsonm Ucm M. 7 EH. oaoonm whammjw $553304 5 whom po>oEo< om mfiwocom swath 350nm new >983 Mn: :33 0783 Hmuaoacuucroo rote> Ucm .Sdccflm mmcmnu 8. 3 mot/now 3 9:4 5 39:53 .manZmAU 93. 3nd ooh new Emma “messed WdHHU§oE ho mZOHemmommm NV MJQ££oH coumademg Ho omofia ~33, mcmHHooE .wuwCHanHOH wchamA summed—co ob oHnHHmmonH HH owned Hodm. 9:2an as: Ho :oflmfiomaoo out. pmumuHHHowH chHH. .3: Go>oHo OH H: moo Eouw moHHowmumU 9H» uofiadmon ou BoHHoH Jodi? mono 9.3 can 0.5.3 mHHH EH moHpom toads enema Ho GoHumuGomoHQ 0H» EH monomhdm HNUHH>Hmdm How >Hdmmoood mm? NH .83 do“. on HOV ohms 80.3 wdHfiGfiH onom oaHomodo>oHo am no modeSHoou on? wo mdoHumemsro HdeHu mvadQ 0o Hoovam who? mnamwcommop was Smwofifixwa 147 om. o o o o o o o o o o m... 333m nomad Nu. . o o o o a N o a e N MN 5.82 Quezon mgflfifléoo me. a o o a o A o N o o NN $8.3 Hsosfiom mcmssflficoo .mN .H m o m N H M o N H N @H oocmumHmmxw Head muo>mh HNCOmHonH S 4 N o a o a e e m m e 2 been a. waste. OH .N H o o o N o o m m 0 OH waaosnm Gm MOW wGHnHmupofiHmH mmooo< mGHCHmuGHmz Ham magmHfiod‘ S. a o o o a H o a a N .N 38qu was; meadouhnm No . o o H o m Hg 0 H N w H: mcmemEmU adhonoH. Hos.m nofiowH so . N o N o N m N m N o S . $3333. 362 eosmsaemwso on .N N o m o H N o m m m OH @8539 HmHommm 5H3 acmhonH >3 nomuaoO S .m m H m o m e o m w H s ecsfismcou .3 3880 2 .m a a m A a a N N .c. H e £330 850 fig? soflfionmdou mm .m m .N N m a e o a a m w emamafiso 8033mm manna moHumHHowEumfisH fiwdofiHH noHumoHCdEEoO ms .0 2 a N N N 3 a o a N a $55.5 as warfismme NH .w NH H H» H m b o N N o H .moHdbom flonmomom mafiaomoum vN .oH MN N m H H H o o o o o mpamgwuxa Ho aofimfisomonm HNGOmHonH GoHumoHddgoU Hedomuonm wooanH Names? .2 S o as a mem N a. HHbuommumU doom 5: mooHoHHU Ho Hmfigzv Hmm n 7S 3833304 oDUHGHoeP .Ho 020mm. seafloofim. an?) HoH 83 so» cu HHm um 9730630 you HoH 2: ohms 80pm mafia?” QHMUm .m do Soap sump HoHdoo dot» HH Hdwomd on. pHSOB HH «dos» MOM VHHOB Cu Soon acne mm moddmdfloou sweat. Ho Home 36.3.95 50% p30? 6th mflHu Go wouwHH ohm mHmHoHHHo oHHanm o» «dHonH .m onaH dewdHun. HON modvgoou oHnHHmmonH Hmuoaow ”Hm aoHumodd mmHDGHZHHOmHH. DZ< mUHHUQH .mO @025...me _mHmemmOA m¢ Mmqm0Eo< om. . o o o H o H o m H N m meuouom was; meHNHoHHaan S .N o H H o m H a H N N H. memHmafimo EssmoHoH. ens sored ms .m o o o H H N N H. H H. o 33332. maoz 533.885 3.... o o o H N N N m N c H. amuse... HmHumam HHH? 820m E 8380 so .H. o o N N H N N m o o m E08580 .3 3580 ms .H. o o H o H m H. N o H N 3.55 .880 fies eosfloanHoo om .m H H o N N H. N c H. o o :mHmaEso meoHHsHoHH oHHHHEH mwmhmmUGEHmwuflH SMHHOHHHH. COmuNUmGH—EEOU om N m H H. H. o N H H o o o maniacs s. 83339 S .m e H m H e H. o H o o o £38m esteemed 335.....an NO .0.” NA A A O H A O C O O O MHGOEMHAW MO GOquufiGmOHnH HMGOMHOAH COMHMUEEEOU HMQOmHOAH HUQHMQ 5.602 HH 3 H. w H. a m H. N N H H>H0w0umo H000 HHH m00HoHHU .Ho H0£FHHEV 3H n 75 mucumHmHM0A 05.61.3009 .Ho 0300M. .0>HH00HH0 >H0> MOM 3: a0» on HHM um 0>HH00HH0 Hon new 3*0H0N Eoum wag 018m 0 no 50%. 0u0H @300 00% HH HHHHHHH0HH on 283 HH .mHmH>HHHHoH .HOH VHHOB >0HHH VHHHHHHH «5.» m0 m0HHHvHHHHHo0H 002$ Ho £000 08.91.30 so.» @153 .pumo mHHHH no H.053 0.2m .nHmHoHHHo oHHnHHHH 3 «£09 0 085A wHHHwHHHHn .Hom m0HHHoHHHHHo0H 0HnHmmonH Hmu0>0m “H HHoHHm0HHO ¢¢ m4mmHmOaH ho wOZHHQm .mMHOBQJmHHUMHJ 149 A>how0u00 £000 Hum 000mg? mo H0353: :H H Zv mun0vfiomm0hhoo 0302 E. . o o o o o c c 0 H m p 52:5 325 cm .0 o H N N H H. H a o o 0 >282 HmuHHHHonH 33:03:00 N0 .0 H H N H m N o H o o 0 VHS? HmoHHHHonH 05032200 0A o© A A A O M A A M C O O OUGmumAmm< Aqu mhoxfimh AMCOmHQnH R .m o o o o H o N H. m o H .330 m 9:30 0N .0 o c H c N H N m N o o 0:830 S. .80 mnHaHSSEm 00000.0. mnmnmmucmmz Una w~i>030< 3 .N o o o c H. H H N m H N 3.88m was; 053335 E. .m o c o o H H N m H a H mamHmm§0 .5533. Him .533 mN .m o H o c H o N N N m a 03:303.. 9.32 :oHHSHamwuo co .m H H o H N m H c o c o 0880. HmHumHHm HHE; componH .3 003.80 00.0 m H m N o N o c , c a 0 0833280 .3 09350 0N .0 o m a H N m H a H c o m95.5 850 0:? 83080330 05.0 N o N o H N N c N c c $30800 280200 0:0an m0mhmmv0§0ucm HHMHHOHHE. 00300305800 cm .0 H H H N H H N c H H c 09580 0.. marcHHmoH. m0 .0 o H m H m H c N c c o 3330 .Huummmom waflaomuum H: .m. m m N o N o o a o o c muc0§HmH< mo HHoflmaHH0w0hnm AmnOmH0nm .COAHNUAGQEEOU ANCOmHOnH HUOHAQ 53002 H H H: o w H. 0 m H. m N H 0HHWE00H. .Ho 030.09 .0>300ww0 >H0> ham 8: :00 ca :0 am 0>mu00ww0 you new 25 OH0N 80.5 mm? 01000 .0 :0 80:0 00H: @150 50% um H393: 0a @303 an .muwfnfln—OHLOH v10? >25 Mai: 50% mm 00355300 000A» .«0 #000 039.90 «5.» @153 .0500 020 no @0003 0nd mudmoflwo ufinflm 0”. Human m 0E0: wfimnmhfi new m0fivm§~00u 03mmmom Hmu0>0w ”a :03008 WMDOHZIUMH. 32¢ mUHHUH0nwum 000.39 om .0 cm .m Np . >282 HmuHHHHom wcHHHfiHbaoo mm .o cm .0. mp . 0:03 H00330nm mnfldohnucoo H: .e Om .H mm .H 000003094. cam muo>0rm HOG0000nm pm .m cm .H pm .H punwnm m magmu mm .H. om .H A: .N mdwc0>m~ :0 no“ mnaflmuhgcm mm000< wnafimucmmz wad wGw>0E0< mm .N om . m0 . 3.88m was; waHNHuHHnPH Op .m pm .N No . mcwmmmamu Eme0H0B 0C0 H0301H mm .m mp .m pa . m0flm>fl0< 0302 :oflmficmmno ow .m 10 .m on .N mm000< H.0«00mm £33 :Omu0nm >3 uumuGoU cm .0 co .H. S .N 0533050 3 003.80 mN .0 mp é mH .m mmHHOHO H0300 £025 GomumHonmfioD mp .m cm .m mm .m :wwmmEmU 253.20% 029.3% m0mumwv0gu0ucH HHwHHoHnH. Gown—00355850 cm .0 cm. .p mp .o mwcflmflm um mcwpmflmpfi mm .0 pm .w NH .w 3160M £0000m0m wcfin0m0um H: .0 pox: ¢N .oH mHHH0FHHHmu< mo cofimuc0m0nnm ANGOmH0nH :ofimgcfiggoo HmCOmu0nm 0000mm 50602 503002 52002 .muu0vcomm0huoU .mhoummmmmmuam .mumfwnbod 2523008 no 03009 mHDOHZEUMH. QZ< mUHBU x on H D on an F AH x m N x on X x m .H. X on x m M x x o hum on x o H.H x x x HH OD x on on .mH mm on on x vH O X x N x mH < mm x x x 3 << 1 x x 3 0 x x mH mm x cm m x on x cm h x Hm Q on N x mm «H .x mm m x on x cm 00 x on em an x x cm SH x mm m x x mm 1H on x on on x mm H X on Haw X x x x 92 M mumfwnbod Humum 0>HumH summon moot/pom con—m5 mHHHmH muoumHmeoJ “Huts maGHOnm new Hoauo umeo‘H Hum? Home . ..mBoZ upOwcH o>HumHmHmowH Head .mHmchsoh 5.8500 1356qu HNHH lannod new? womuCOU ..GOU HNGOmHonH Hmcommmowounm .nomaaduw boom Head oocmvcouflc‘ >HHmQ N. A .96 Jason—«8800 5 .oHQmeo hOHvohdumHmHmoJ on: CH GO MCHOM mLmHHs? £33 “Honour CH QuovH 30> OHu->>OTH “NM. Gonflmmdd mHUMDOw ZOHH<2m0hZH M>HH on H D on on x N. nH on m N X m ..H. N on m H x a PM x o m on an on H H 00 on MH mm x E O x on on mH 4 M, x x 2 <4 1 x x m: o x wH mum on on om m x on cm H on N HN O x x mm W x mm m on on on 00 on on em QQ on om «)H x x mm M on mm 1H x x mm H N K Ho N N mmH M >90ch faofl hoHuO EHHoLCH moHufinH «GogHmuHoEm «63:00 muoHOnH “mm muoumHmHmoJ HmdohHH. anommmm Home commence?“ o>HumH man: lHnnHod. QO mGHHHmO HMCOmHonH HuHHde umHmoJ >HHNQ Hméomwhonm mrmuomHGOo ®>HumHmHmoiHEm £33:ng mead QOH®>®® «5% one 30m ”MN floflmoa HUZHQ 9.043.200 H>HH on X x H D N on on on H. mm X m N on m H. on w H on m anH x o D on x H H 00 X on on on x MH mm x .3 O N N on on mH < m x 3 5. on N on wH O X on wH mm X on on GM m on on GM H on x X HN D on X MN M on MN m on on em 00 on on on em DD on om H)H x mm m on x mm 1H on mm H X on on He X on X on on mmH vH muoflfiO QHHmhopmoiH QEmuopmowH enuH nHHHHmHoHomonH QHflmHopmowH maoumHmHmoiH muonHEoHe/H muoHOnH umH >LHHOCHHZ thong/H meadow Head ewuHaoflMv/H enumuowmz HH< oofiHEEoU was Mn: ILAQQOA omdom Hocuo>00 .uiH museum 06503 GQEHHMHU LooHom. «muomucoo anHfimHmo on aha >HHmHocow 30% OHo 80:3 HHHCS new GOHemoDO 200 committee chairmen and their'members. Typical responses which indicated this were: I am selective. - I contact the chairmen of the committees and the-men on the committees. - I maintain contacts only~ with committees before whom we have bills. ‘ . Thirty-nine percent of the lobbyists stated they try to maintain contact with all one hundred and forty-four Michigan legislators. A typical response in this regard was: One person is just as important as another. . Everybody is important. , A lot of bills are passed by one vote. . It was hypothesized that the broad diffusion of lobbying focus among so many legislators might be related to effectiveness; however, the scattered distribution of responses indicated no apparent relationship. Thirty-three percent of the lobbyists said they concentrated their attention on House and Senate majority leadership. . A typical response in this category was: I contact the leadership who talk on the floor of the House and Senate. The data indicated a slight relationship between contacts withHouse and Senate majority leadership and IPE scores. . Of the nineteen lobbyists in the top of the IPE scale, seven listed House majority leadership, and the same seven plus two more in the same group listed Senate majority leadership. , This was compared to three out of fourteen in the bottom category for the House and two out of fourteen for the Senate. This sug- gests that those lobbyists who concentrated onHouse and Senate majority leadership tended to be more effective than those who do not. Twelve percent of the lobbyists said they tried to establish contacts with the Lt. Governor and the Senate Minority leadership, and 9% made 201 contacts with House Minority Leadership.1 The small number and dis- tribution of responses did not make it possible to generalize about the relationship between lobbyists who maintained contacts with minority leadership in both houses and those who did not. Of the reaponses listed in the "other” category (9%), one lobbyist said he did something the other lobbyists didn't do and that was "to take the Sergeant at Arms and other staff members to dinner and buy them drinks. " "Lobbyist T made this interesting comment: I try to make contact and talk mostly with people 'on the fence' or who are opposed. The legislators'who favor our approach under- stand this, and don't expect me to spend time with them. Another lobbyist, whose response is also recorded in the ”other" category, answered the question thisway: ,1 make up my mind in advance as to whom I want to be seen with. There are some legislators I don't care to betwith. Some of them I entertain in my home if I don't want to be seen (in public with them. . Some of the lobbyists indicated they spent more of their time lobby- ing the Senate (a smaller body of thirty-four) than, the House. Lobbyist K stated: I divide up my time, with a little more spent in the Senate. . Lobbyist CC indicated that a division of labor between his colleagues and himself was possible: : I work with the Senate more than the House. . . . take care of the House. . I spend most of my time and money on the Senate. ‘ ~ A few lobbyists specified that legislators with certain political, personal, or demographis traits received their attention: Typical 1It should be again noted that at the time the interviewing was jcpn- ducted for this study in 1958 the House of Representatives was controlled 61-49'by Republicans. - Since 1958, an even division of 55-55 has occurred. Since then, it has become necessary for lobbyists to focus increasing attention on the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives. 202 responses were: I spend my time with Republicans. . For the most part, Democrats do not vote for me. I try to contact guys of long service, and a guy who has a circle of friends. I have special friends, those guys with ability. I would rather have one man with a lot of ability than fifteen of no ability. ' I contact all rural legislators. In summary, lobbyists primarily attempted to establish contacts with select committee chairmen and members, the House and Senate majority leadership, and then, all legislators if possible. Nothing in the data substantiated the two hypotheses stated earlier in this section. The data in Table 54 relative to the establishment of contacts with legislative leaders of the minority party are not corroborated in Table 55. Lobbyists were questioned as to the necessity of working both sides of the aisle on .most issues. Table 54 demonstrates that only 3% of the lobbyists stated they tried to make contact with minority members, yet Table 56 shows that 82% of the lobbyists said they do find it necessary. Perhaps one answer to this apparent inconsistency is that most lobbyists felt it necessary to maintain the illusion that they were concerned with the activities of both political parties in the Legislature. At any rate, an attempt was made to statistically correlate‘the IPE scores of the individual lobbyists with their "yes" or "no" responses to the perceived necessity of bi-partisan lobbying activity. A low point bi-serial corre- lation (r. = . 0783) indicated that there was no significant correlation at the 5% level. It should be noted that four out of the five who said bi-partisan lobbying was not necessary were in the top half of the IPE scale. Typical responses for this group were: I can't do it. Most of my bills are controversial. We know what the left side of the aisle will do on 90% of the issues. 203 TABLE 55 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NECESSITY FOR BI-PARTISAN LOBBYING ACTIVITY Question 25: Do you find it necessary to work both sides of the aisle on most issues ? IPE Lobbyist Points Yes No Sometimes K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x EB 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x CC 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U l x V 1 x C 1 x N 0 x W 0 x O 0 x Y 0 x Totals Number and Percent 27 (82%) 5 (15%) l (3%) The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the . 05 level: r. = . 3494 r. = . 0783 204 Typical responses for those who thought bi'-partisan lobbying necessary were: ~ I try to keep white with both sides. It's very necessary. My organization has social implications for most peOple. I try to be nice to both sides. My people (that is, organization) aren't interested in politics. ,They want bills passed. It's very important. - I get along pretty well even though it's known that I'm a third generation Republican. Almost all who thought bi-partisan lobbying necessary emphasized the fact that it was becoming more necessary everyday. This was more a recognition of political realities, rather than the implementationof personal desires. Although no statistical relationship between effectiveness and bi- partisan lobbying was found, it is possible to suggest that all lobbyists, when confronted with this question, consider bi-partnership necessary to effective lobbying; Whether or not they actually lobby the minority party as much as they say they do cannot be substantiated; and, in ' comparison with other data obtained in this study, it is highly doubteful that they did. ‘ The last section of this chapter deals with the legislative committees that lobbyists singled out for attention. Lobbyists were first asked if they thought it was important to work closely with many legislative committees. Three categories of responses appeared and they are recorded in Table 56. Forty-five percent ,,of the lobbyists stated that it was only necessary to work with those committees that affected their group,, 30% said it was necessary to work With a large number of commit- tees, and 25% stated'it was not necessary to work with many committees. It was felt that lobbyists who worked only with committees that affected their group would be more effective. than others. This did not prove significant . 205 TABLE 56 LOBBYIST'S PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE OF NUMBER OF COMMITTEE CONTACTS Question 26: . Do you think it is important to work closely with many legislative committees ? ‘ IPE No, only those that Lobbyist Points affect mwoup Yes No K 159 x X 61 x I 55 x L 55 x R 38 x M 30 x DD 27 x CC 26 x B 23 x F 22 x D 21 x J 20 x S 20 x EE 18 x G 18 x AA 16 x A 15 x Q 14 x BB 13 x GG 11 x H 9 x FF 9 x E 8 x T 8 x Z 8 x P 7 x U 1 x V l x C 1 x N 0 x W 0 x O 0 x Y 0 x 206 TABLE 57 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THOSE COMMITTEES WHICH REQUIRE FOCUS OF ATTENTION Question 27: With which committees do you spend the most time? 1HnoncoO mooHusHumounHmmw oufiquoHuw< Lobby- ist IPE Point 3 2656133472451233344251415.33331432 xxx xx xx xxx x x xx x .x x x x x 9155807 5655332 1 D KXILRMD x xx x xxxx x x xxxxxx x x x x xx x x x x xxx x x x x x xx .x x 6321 2222 C E A CBFDJSEGAAQ x x x x x x xx x x x x x x xx xx x x x x x x x X x X xx x x xx 1 15 21 13 12 ,3% 18% 3% 9% 3% 15%21%12%36%39%21%21% 6% 64% 45% 3% T otals 207' For information and descriptive purposes, lobbyists were further asked to list the committees with which they spent the most time. The results are depicted in Table 57. The most lobbied committees were: State Affairs (64%), Taxation (45%), Labor (39%),. Judiciary (36%), Highways and Municipalities (21%), with the rest falling below the 20% level. Summary Chapter V described and analyzed the tactics and techniques associated with the enactment of the lobbying role. One of the hypotheses of this dissertation--that there would be group consensus on which lobby- ing techniques were most effective--was corroborated. All of the study participants were agreed on which techniques were the most effective, that is, personal presentation of arguments, presenting research results, testifying at hearings, public relations campaigns, collaboration with other groups, contact by constituent and persons with special access. These techniques were given the same high ratings by lobbyists and legislators alike. The correspondents varied somewhat and rated three techniques (contact by constituent, contributing political work, and contributing political money) higher than did the lobbyists and) legislators. The sixteen lobbying techniques were described, analyzed and compared in termsof three categories: (1) direct personal communication techniques between lobbyist and legislator; (2) communication through intermediaries techniques; and (3) achieving and maintaining access techniques. ‘ A‘comparison between the perceptions of, Washington and Lansing lobbyists regarding the effectiveness of lobbying techniques revealed that generally the lobbyists in both capitols agreed on which techniques were most effective. However, Washington lobbyists, who do not have the 208 direct access to legislators as do Lansing lobbyists, tended to rate higher the techniques described in the communication through inter- mediaries category. -And,. Lansing lobbyists, withmore direct access, rated direct personal communication techniques higher than their Washington colleagues; consequently, the Lansing lobbyists gave lower .ratings to communication through intermediaries techniques. - In this chapter, one of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was tested: that the use of certain group-approved, role-associated lobbying techniques would be related to effective or non- effective role enactment. . No statistical relationshipfwas found between the perceived use and evaluation of techniques and the effectiveness of lobbyists in this study. Generally, the highest amount of statistical correlation was found among the first group of lobbying techniques--direct personal communication, but in no case was it statistically significant. . Perhaps this lack of statistical correlation indicates that the lobbyists were in agreement on their evaluation of the techniques which were most effective in presenting their cases, but the degree to which they could perform as individuals was another matter. To summarize the section on lobbying techniques, it appears that there was general agreement among lobbyists, legislators, and corres- pondents on which techniques were most effective. The fact that there was such substantial agreement is important. ' The fact that there was no statistical relationship between their perceived personal use and evaluation of the appropriate techniques indicated that lobbyists knew which techniques they should use and were most effective; but they had remarkably different abilities, resources, and role perceptions which affected their capacities to utilize these group-approved techniques. . Lobbyists were questioned regarding the way in which strategy on I legislative techniques was mapped. While there was no statistical corre- lation between the way in which strategy was planned and lobbyists' 209 effectiveness, it is important to note that only three (9%) of the top six- teen lobbyists did have to consult in advance with other members of their organization in the planning of lobbying strategy. Related to the mapping of strategy was the amount of freedom lobbyists had in the selection of their lobbying techniques. - Although no statistical correlation was found between the freedom to select techniques and lobbying effectiveness, only one out of the top fifteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was limited, while six of those in the bottom eighteen of the scale were limited. - It was learned that the majority of lobbyists attempted to develop and maintain legislative contacts by personal daily attendance at the sessions and by personal contact with legislators. , The wide distribution of choices among the contact-building techniques did not make it possible, or fruitful, to run a statistical analysis to determine if there were any relationship between place on the IPE scale and the use of certain con- tacts and information sources. - Lobbyists primarily attempted to establish contacts with select committee chairmen and members, the House and Senate majority leadership; and, then, all legislators if possible. There was nothing in the data to substantiate the two hypotheses tested: (1) the relationship between lobbyists' IPE scores and the amount and kinds of contacts that were made; and (2) the relationship between lobbyists who maintained contacts with minority leadership and their lobbying effectiveness. Although no statistical relationship between effectiveness and bi- partisan lobbying was found, it is possible to generalize that all lobby- ists considered bi-partisanship necessary to effective lobb‘yinb. Lobbyists were questioned regarding the committees on which they focused the most attention. . The most lobbied committees were: state affairs, taxation, labor, judiciary, highways, and municipalities. CHA PTER VI THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEIVED BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS "An effective lobbyist has a sense of humor, anunderw standing wife, and a cast iron stomach. "1 Introduction One of the hypotheses of this thesis was that there would be con- sensus among legislative participants and observers concerning the effective way to play the lobbying role. Further, it was expected that individual lobbyists most effectively enacting their roles would be known and recognized by people actively involved in the legislative process. Chapter II verified this hypot :1 ._sis, in that stat s tically significant correlations were found among .arious leg1s lative process participant groups (lob -.yis ts, legislative leaders and news corres~ pondents) in their perceptions of effecfi 1e and non- et: ective lobbyists. It was further hypothesized that not only would there be a high degree of agreement among study participants concerning who were the effective lobbyists, bu t that the evalu ng groups would also be in agreement as to m certain lobb ists wer e more effective than others. One of the major purposes of this chapter, then, was to examine the variables that were perceived by lobbyists, legislators, and corre- spondents as the bases underlying the lbo yin-g effectiveness of those lobbyists selected as moste .ffect’. ve in C3: pter II. 114'1tt111‘23‘.1t.e.d to Cl" iarle s Hemans, a former Lansing loczvlst vs ', r (21.1, £211 Perceived Base:- :-f Effectiveness For T 0p Si xt e en Lobbyi s t. s- All of the participating gr oups in this smdy «{lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) were "asked to select. five lobbyists as the most effective (see Chapter II). They were also asked to cite the reasons why they had picked these five men as most effective.‘ All of the respondents cited at least three or more variables that were involved in effective lobbyists role-enactment. In only a few cases did the respondents cite one reason as more important than the other, they typically responded that, "it is a combination of things. " All of the tables in this chapter include only the top sixteen lobby- ists on the IPE scale. It was impossible to include all thirty-three lobbyists in the evaluation of bases of effectiveness because most of them were not mentioned more than once or twice (some not at all) as effective lobbyists--hence, no perceived bases of effectiveness could be cited. Coding of the data revealed that thirteen distinct bases of effective- ness were present among the responses of the study participants. These categories are listed in Table 58, and in the tables to follow. The bases of effectiveness categories were: personal integrity, honesty, and sincerity personality and sociability factors knowledge of the subject knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legislators knowledge and use of lobbying techniques organizational factors ability to communicate entertainment, personal favors, and assistance kind and acceptability of lobbying "product" 1The question asked was: "Now, as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best job for their organization? Please select out five men who are doing the best jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective. ” 212 political party factors background and experience knowledge of legislative process "hard work" Table 58 depicts the frequency of choice and total rank order for the perceived bases of effectiveness of the tOp sixteen lobbyists as evalu- ated by all of the lobbyists in this study. For example, Lobbyist K's effectiveness was perceived by fellow lobbyists as primarily the result of his: background and experience, personality and sociability, knowl- edge of the legislative process, and the knowledge and use of lobbying techniques. In every case in TableSSnand as well as Tables 59 and 60-- the highest number of choices in each of the bases of effectiveness cate- gories represent for that particular lobbyist, the primary variables perceived contributing to his effectiveness. At the bottom of Table 58, the total number of choices for each bases of effectiveness category was totalled and a rank order computed for the total choices of the entire group. The evaluations of the total group regarding the bases of effective- ness of the tOp sixteen lobbyists are summarized by assigning rank order (based on the total frequency of choices} to each of the thirteen perceived bases of effectiveness. In other words, ll of the lobbyists when evaluat- ing their fellow lobbyists perceived personality and sociability factors as the most important variables in lobbying effectiveness, organizational factors as second most important, background and experience third, and so forth. Tables 59 and 60 are identically arranged. In Table 59, the news correspondents' evaluations of the bases of effectiveness of the. top six- teen lobbyists are presented. And, in Table 60, the evaluations of legis- lative leaders are. depicted. Table 61 summarizes the total number of choices and compares the rank orders for each of the evaluating groups found in Tables 58, 59 and 60. Table 61 was included only for the purpose of demonstrating Bases of Effectiveness FREQUENCY OF CHOICE AND RANK ORDER FOR THE BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOP SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS ON THE IPE SCALE AS PERCEIVED AND EVALUATED BY ALL LOBBYISTS TABLE 58. HJOM pJBH SSBOOJd aAtimstfiaq JO eBpatmouH sonathdxg pue pUHOJoneg 3.101393 fined {eotinod “Sionpoad” Buthqoq JO Kituqmdaoov pue putx saueistssv pue sac/nag {euo SJad ‘iuauruteiJaiug aieotunwmog 01 Kumv 8.1033831 {emotieztu 98.10 sanbwqosl fiutfiqqoq JO ssn pus aBannouH Sloietstfiaq Kq aoueidaoav pue— ‘ut sauapuuog ‘30 sfipatmoux 1331‘an JO aBpstmouy 3.10;: eg hymen-Os ‘Kin'EUOSJad Kitisouts ‘KisauoH ‘KirJBaiul IBUOSJad IP E Points Lobby- ist 213 00 159 61 55 55 38 3O 27 26 23 22 21 20 20 18 18 16 oo xxaamioommoe 13 10 33 26 34 19 12 .5 11 13 12 22 19 .5 20 43 21 EE AA Total Choices Rank Order FREQUENCY OF CHOICE AND RANK ORDER FOR THE BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOP Bases of Effectiveness SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS IN THE IPE SCALE AS PERCEIVED AND-EVAL UATED BY NEWS CORRESPONDENTS TABLE 59. mom b-IBH ssaaord 3111112131891 10 afipatmoux aoueusdxg pus punofixo'eg SJOIOBJ fined IBOI’LIIOCI usionpoadu Butfiqqoq JO KlIIIqdeODV pus pmx asueistssv pm; 5210ng Teuosmad ‘iuamuteiJaiug aieotunmmoz) 01 Kimqv 9.1013123 {suctieztu’efi .10 ssnbtuqaal Buquqoq J0 383 pins aBpatmou}; 310113191391 Aq soueidaoov pue ‘11! 391199111102) "10 afipapmoux 1331'an JO sBpsIMOU); $101399; Kl'IIIQE’IOOS ‘KiueIIOSJsd K111331113 ‘ Aisauo H ‘Kiufiaiul muosrad IPE Points Lobby- ist 159 H CO LG LG 214 LO L0 00 O") O O") b N (D N 0') N N N r-q N O N no MNHAmSQUmmos 8.5 11.5 16 15 13 1O 23 8.5 17 5 11 .10 2. 17 5 18 18 11.5 2. 20 16 AA Total Choices Rank Order FREQUENCY OF CHOICE AND RANK ORDER FOR THE BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE Bases of Effectiveness TOP SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS ON THE IPE SCALE AS PERCEIVED AND EVALUATED BY LESIGLATIVE LEADERS TABLE 60. HJOAA NEH ssaooad 911112191891 JO afipatmoux 901131.13 dxa pus punofixoeg 8.101023 Aired testified usmnpoadH Butfiqqoq 10 KlIIIQBJdGOOV pus pum soueistssv pus 9.101193 IBUOSJad 'iua 11111191191113 sieotumnuzog 0: £111th 8.101383: {euoti'eztuefi .10 aanbtuqoal, Butfiqqoq 10 sen pus afipatmoux 91012181831 Kq soueidaoov pus ‘ut aouapguog ‘10 afipstmoux 1031‘an 30 afipstmoux 8.101083 Knuqetoos ‘ Kineuo sxsd Kitasouts 'K1SGUOH ‘Auafiaiul Teuosaad Points 159 IPE Lobby- ist 215 HLDLDwOL‘CDOONv-‘O CDIDLDMOONNNNNN oo MNquzoommoe 20 18 18 16 EE AA ID 10 11 15 14 15 20 18 14 Total Choices 11 10 12 13 3.5 5.5 3.5 5.5 Rank Order Ma Na 2 A: m.w m.m N. b m .v m H HopuO . View 3:38..” m S o~ em. -mm. mm 2. E. 3 mm 83 2. 2. 308:0 H.308 “0083930 3: .3. :3 3.3. 3.. 2.. 3: 3.3. S. 3.3. 3. 3.3. 3. .. $20 View! N m m S - 2. NH 5 m. cm. 3 3 mg M: 339.0 133. macadamfimofl. .3: §.3.:.3.:. 3 ..m. 3. 3.3. E . 3. 3.3 3. S. 3.3.. “mahogany" o N. N N . o .03 .. a . A: Ha N; A: MN ha moomofiu aux—0H. . muouuavm IO .. u 3: 3: 8: 3. 3.8 .2. 3. 3.8 E 3. 3. 3. S... 830 scam H . m Ma fin a: Na @N A; on. mm mm vm mv mmowonU H.308 .. . . 33.334 - .1 _ . . .. . . . . .. _. Manchu 0 V t a. e D S n... 3 8 a. O J d . 1m uw m mu. ma. um“. mm imam/um .own a... a... as 35339“ 1w an 1 uz- n Pam fie 1 mo fo «0 av ma mu .0 on... p nu n. V”; cm av.m. am. m. ..s o co 0.9. 10 M sou. A in: I”,33.p9 ”.9 1M? 1.1 1m. 1U Qu as A .3.923 WP 10.99. .P u.P so 92 as “P. I 0 4n. 0 “.1 18 News 8 88.un W .H uv a w... Sm. a a... A9 93.9.. a is ”u ... a an .3- e t. . a w a 0 .4 t. . 0 0 a e P o . HA. 3 I u .3 .4 t 0 ad I. O u I. I. I. 3 u .. d s .4 a D . o a A W x u a ..u .. w. m e S 1 d A a a.“ a m .. . o a w. P I .o . - o 3 u. I. i a t. n . .- o P E 1. 1. 9 *0 9 I. n. m :A “A n 9 n a 9. .09 ..l B O m. n. _ a m. 1 A n. A hovquqmflafl meadocfiauumwm mo nomnm. oi mBZMQZOnHmMMMOU MBNZ Q24 mMOHijUHJ .meHWQmOJ Hm QMHQH—ihfl GiaEUfiflm m4 "Ha—<8 ”Mn—H mm? 20 mememOA ZNHHKHM “OH. ”NEH. .m0 8% um>fiHUm~hhM MO momma NEH. MOM MHQNO M2: Q24 HUHOEU .HO VUZHDOHMM ho ZOmH¢oHNo . 05 am noflmfiohuou Mocha an. ~6me . u . .u 6.33333 pan muoupomon nous—50m . gmmm . n .u “floured mo . 0A... ad nofldaouhou unpack—Han. .mmohm . n .9 3.33333 pamb~$>nno~ dooBuom . 218 Ammmc . ..u 3.4.53 do . 0A9 um acmumfiouhou hovho Junk. 2.2.. n-“ nonunion?" pg .maognaofi .5035m. . “uBOfloVud onus—womghw mafia—ago 351$ .25 nooBaon 2.0330930 23. . .w 2 2 2 S 3..» m.» a. o 3 v m. N H 9.053.320. . Maud 6338.00 2 .2 2 3.3 m a. S 3.3. a 3.3 a 3.3 N . “ounces; mucudummwofl 2 S 3.: 3.: 36. m 33 . p 3 3d .4 . m.~ 830 Mass mnouuomod m. N. o. o . m..w 2, v .- m6 5. m. m N a nopuO.§. . isms...— “ o - .. -- . 1 - ..l 1.1 -q- E 9.. - .. - ~85 ”..m. a a me ow mae.nm imam mm mm a as we . a TD. nu 1 u... H .1” 3.0 TPWO f. a. a ”8 D... GU EH 0 .n. p as n. v... .nm . v m on. ‘qx x. o... as a.“ 3 M “W .A to” I“. ”an.” 3”. mane.“ 1m. 1m 0.. e A “1.4 Om..mo. ‘p Fndmmp 4P p O 32 a? ..m. P I m - m. . o n. H! n. o a I I. c... I. n t W h v d X». s m. ,3 .4 J m u 0 '..“... O 0 0 Ta 9 u. M." Q4. .13 9. 1.4+ 3.- “to 0 ”11.0 o .01 .P m ”A no u... we a sun a... run? 1. an t. e - a- 1.... a .u- m... w. .. m. .m... .2 J W. n. I O nu 3. m. P a. e A ..A u .m u . . a n n m _ .. a . .u a. m. n... 0 -_ I W e ..u uA .1 . u. up. 5 O (A u 3 a .. sued. 3. 4. nuafiua 3.33 I’ L 1’ |D|.| [i DP 4 lil- l lult L. I I- [l '4? 4.11.! lb i Lil '4 a u- . .. Hide and Mme zo mewmemoq 233.wa now was mom. mmuzmfisommmm no mmmé‘ 0m>fiummfi may. mobsomodzfin moss mom mama—mo $25. so 28Hm In Chapter- VII, normative questions asked and value judgments rendered concerning the role of lobbyists in the legislative process, on the part of study participants and the, writer, were presented and discussed. ..In addition, the writer imade‘some recommendations at the end of the chapter regarding possible changes in the present Michigantlobbying act. Responses to the question concerning the legislature's operating better or worse in the absence of pressure groups clearly indicated that lobbyists and, more important, legislative leaders and news corres- pondents, have a high degree of tolerance, for pressure groupactivity in the legislative process. . Generally. they viewed lobbying as an integral and necessary part of the legislative process because lobbyists serve to relate the s,ocio- economic interests of their principals‘to theilegislature; 271 they provide necessary information and research on complex problems; and they help the legislature relate public policy to public wishes and aspirations. . Further, it was revealed that not only do legislators hold to the belief that lobbyists serve a vital informationand advice function, but they actually do consult and ask the advice of effective lobbyists on policy questions- This activity wasgenerallyan on-going process. An open- end question, intended to solicit value judgments from study participants, solicited several standardized responses concerning the profession of lobbying. - Lobbyists were concerned with the‘public image of lobbying and their own social status in regard to this image. . Most lobbyists stated that they wished public misunderstanding (and disparagment) of lobbying could be cleared up, and lobbying, as a profession, could achieve some social status and acceptance. . Many of the-participants in this studyalso agreed that lobbying tactics. and personnel had improved during the past several years. , Several examples were cited to substantiate this trend of impr0vement. A couple of the study participants stated that reporters were some of the most effective lobbyists around the legislature. ._ None mentioned anything that could or should be done about this. ~ Althoughfew lobbyists mentioned the need for lobbying reform, several legislative leaders did, and almost all of the reporters had strong views on this-question. . A few legislators, and almost all reporters, felt that additional regulationuparticularly in the reporting of expenses--was needed. - A brief survey of the editorials regarding lobbying reform was 'made, and the history of lobbying reform legis- lation was briefly traced. - Although there has been a good deal of discussion concerning lobbying reform by newspapers and state adminis- trative officials during the past few years, very few changes of any substance have actually been made. 272 In the last section, the writer made a recommendation that the Legislature appoint a special Joint Interim Committee to. study and make recommendations concerning the Lobbying Act of 1947. - It was concluded that the role of the lobbyist in the legislative process is important; enough to warrant a full—scale study regarding the strengthening of provisions regarding the reporting of lobbying expenses; the strengthening of enforcement power'regarding the lobbying act; and the clarification and re-definition of the legislative agent as presently defined in the‘Lobbying Act of 1947 . CHAPTER VIII THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS Introduction Group influence studies conducted by political scientists during the past thirty years have contributed much to our understanding of the impact of organized interest groups on American political decision- making. TheSe studies have focused on the organizational structure, resources, and leadership of organized pressure groups and the relationships of these interest groups to the process of government. This was not a study of the nature and power of the interest groups that lobbyists represent--as is the case with most other studies of lobbying. An examination of the literature concerning pressure groups reveals that: (1) most studies of lobbying are confined to group activi- ties and influence; (2) there is a concern with statutory controls and investigation of lobbyists; and (3) lobbying is most often dealt with in the popular language of the newspaper and magazine exposé. These studies have been most valuable, but to understand the political decision-making process we must look not only at the groups who attempt to exercise influence, but also at the agent of the group and his behavior within the decision—making process. The purpose of this study was to carry the analysis of interest group behavior a bit further by focusing attention on the lobbyist as an individual. -The lobbyist, as agent of the organized interest group, possesses power in the role that he occupies. it is he who represents the interest group before the legislative branch of government. , He helps formu- late organization policies, directs the techniques and tactics for 273 274 interpreting this policy to decision—makers, mobilizes the resources of the group foraction purposes; and, in short, represents the most important agent of the organized interest group. This study, then, was primarily concerned with a close examination of the individual lobbyist's skills, socio-economic background, career patterns, use of techniques, perceptions of role relationships to his organization and within the legislative process, and perceptions of effectiveness in the role of lobbyist. . There is a need for a study of this kind. We need comprehensive understanding of who lobbyists are, what they are doing, why they are effective or ineffective, and how they are perceived by other partici- pants in the legislative decision-making process. .In short, this was a study in perceptions. Consequently, the theoretical frame of reference and the major hypothesis of this dissertation were stated in social psychological terms. A perceptual - model of behavior, withta heavy reliance on certain concepts of role theory, was used through the thesis. The Major Hypothesis The major hypothesis of this dissertation was; there would be a high degree of consensus amongthe perceptions of the participants in this study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) as to which lobbyists were most effectively enacting their lobbying roles; and, further agreement would be present amonLthe evaluating groups concerning the variables involved in effective role enactment. The effectiveness of the role enactment of Michigan lobbyists would be related to their role-taking ability, their use of role-associated techniques, and their role perceptions. The Dependent Variable The perceived role enactment of the Michigan lobbyist, whether effective or ineffective, was the dependent variable. How well a lobby- ist was enacting his role was determined by measuring the perceptions of legislators (action-targets), lobbyists (action-agents), and news corre3pondents (action-observers). In order to determine if each of these three evaluating groups were agreed in their perceptions of the effective role enactment of Michigan lobbyists, each study participant was asked to cite five lobby1sts who they thought were most effective. Chapter II portrayed t‘: e-se sele ino ns ‘ry each eva ul1at ing group in three sociometric matrices, and the lobbyists were then rank ordered on an Index of PerceivedEffectiveness from most effective to most in- effective. High statistical correlations were then found among the various evaluating groups concerning those lobbyists most effectively enacting their roles; thereby verifying that part of the major hypothesis which stated that such agreement would be found. The Index of Per- ceived Effectiveness score achieved by each lobbyist was the dependent variable against which the independent variables (analyzed in Chapters III, IV, V, VI, and VIE) were tested. »An analysis was also made in (T (3 ('1‘ 3 .‘A \ (D I p \D U‘ U) .Chapter II of the lobbyists' self-perceptions of their role eff 1 Each lobbyist was asked how ef f.ective he thoulg -t he was in terms of accomplishing the goals of his interest group. Sixty-seven percent of the lobbyists perceived their organizations as either achiev ing "very good” or "good" success in the pursuit of their legislative goals; 15% believed they were not achieving t .e organization's legislative goals, and the rest could not make an evaluation. Comparison of these data with the point scores achieved by the lobbyists on the IPE (Index of Perceived Effectiveness) scale indicated that, with few exceptions, the top sixteen lobbyists' self— evaluations corresponded with the perceptions of other 276 group evaluators (other lobbyists, legislators, and news correspondents). . For those lobbyists in the bottom half of the'IPE scale, most over- estimated, their legislative success and personal lobbying effectiveness. - It was not possible to statistically relate self-perceptions to IPE scores or to include them in the effectiveness evaluation. . The Major Independent Variables \ Once it 'was established in Chapter II that effective role enactment was perceived by the study participants and could be measured, attempts ' were made throughout the rest of the dissertation to isolate the significant independent variables which were related to effective role enactment. . It was hypothesized that three major, independent variables would affect the role enactment of the lobbyist. . They were: . (”role-taking ability or‘potential, (2) the use of role-associated techniques,. and (3) role - perceptions. . Each of these independent variables, as bases of effectiveness, was tested inChapters 111,. IV, and V. -In other words, Chapter‘lll related the actual socio-economic and career background variables whichiaffected role-taking ability and lobbying effectiveness; Chapteer related the various lobbying roles of the lobbyists to effectiveness; and Chapter-V described and related the role-associated techniques used by lobbyists with their effectiveness. .In short, these chapters (111,. IV and 1V) examined the relationships between what was considered the actual, empirically- measured bases of effectiveness and lobbying effectiveness. . ChapterVI, on the other hand, described and analyzed the perceptions of the bases of lobbying effectiveness as they Were perceived by all of the participants in this study. .The findings of Chapter VI, therefore, were not kept separate in the summary. The writer attempted to relate the actual bases of effectiveness (found in Chapters III,. IV, and V) with the per- ceived bases of effectiveness (Chapter-1V1) by combining the conclusions and findings of all of ti“ ese chapters in this summary chapter. Whenever this has been done, the writer has been careful to point out whether the conclusions reached were based on the actual or perceived bases of effectiveness. Role- taking Ability or Potential: Certain socio-economic and career background variables, personality characteristics, and organi- zational factors were isolated and found to be related to the lobbyist's ability to play his role effectively. I) All of Chapter III was devoted to an examination of socio-economic, occupational, and political variables in the lobby is sts' background, and to the relationships that existed between these variables and lobbying effectiveness. The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the tOp half of the IPE scale (the most effective lobbyists) had these socio-eccnomic characteristics in common: they were over fifty years of age; had be born and reared in Michigan; broug- 1t up in a metrOpolitan area: did not complete their college educations; and hadf athers with White co11ar occupations. The majority of the seventeen lobbyist sithe lobbyists with low effectiveness scores) in the bottom half of the IPE scale tended to have these background characteristics in common: they were under fift years of age; born and reared in Michigan; raised in non-metropolitan areas, were college gradaates; and had fat--ers with non- white collar occupations. The majority of lobbyists claimed Protestant church affiliation; and were married with up to four children“ No es. atistical correlations at t :1e 5% level of s: gnifir. ance were found between anv of these socio—economic background characteristics and lobbying effective- ness. . Analysis and interpretation of the factors that influenced the lobbyist's interests in political and governmentala afaf irs revealed that 64% of the lobbyists perceived that their political awareness did not develop until after their formal schooling was over and they were well 278 into their pre-lobbying occupational careers. 1 Politically-related non- governmental occupations were cited most frequently byhlobbyists as the major source of influence in their interest in political and govern- mental affairs. - In addition, family influence, political and governmental work, and news reporting were important factors in the development of political interests. The general impression received from these data was that there were a great variety of factors and stimuli. which caused political interest. - Pre-lobbying occupational career patterns were heterogeneous, but primarily white collar. . Forty-five percent of the_1obbyists came from some sort of business administration background, and,39% had governmental occupational backgrounds. .No relationship seemed to exist between effective lobbying and the profession of law, but there was substantial evidence to support the proposition that lobbyists. with news reporting backgrounds tended to be more effective lobbyists. The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half. of the IPE scale had certain political and governmental background characteristics in common: they had a previous affiliation with the Republican party; more years of political experience than the lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale; they were more likely to have held previous high status governmental positions at the state and local levels; and they had more years of governmental experience than lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale. - All of these political and governmental background variables were statistically related to lobbying effectiveness, and this relationship was verified through significant correlations at the 5% level of significance. The findings of Chapter VI were important to this study because they verified part of the major hypothesis that there would be agreement among study participants concerning the perceived bases of effectiveness. Z79 Thirteen bases of effectiveness were perceived and they were, in order of their perceived importance, as follows: personality and sociability factors, organizational factors; background and experience; knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legislators; knowledge of the legislative process; entertainment, favors and assistance; ability to . communicate; personal integrity, honesty and sincerity; "hard work"; political factors; and kind and acceptability of the lobbying "product". As explained earlier, certain findings concerning the perceptions of the bases of effectiveness in this chapter are cited'at this point because , - they were related to actual background and personality variables that affected the lobbyists" role-taking ability and potential. . For example, one of the perceived bases of. effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was background and experience. Other findings inChapter VI also supported those already cited from . Chapter III. .Lobbyists and reporters (with rank orders of three and four)l perceived background and experience as an important variable in lobbying effectiveness. . Certain occupational backgrounds (reporting and high-level government work), and previous legislative experience were cited over and over as the reasons for the effectiveness of many of the top sixteen lobbyists. . Legislators did not perceive this variable as too important, although those who did mention it based their evalu- ations on the same reasons as did the lobbyists and reporters. 1There were thirteen bases of effectiveness categories ranked in terms of the number of times each had been cited as the basis of effectiveness for each of the top sixteen lobbyists. 1A high degree of statistical correlation was obtained between each of the three evaluat- ing groups indicating substantial agreement among all of the participants in this study as to why the top sixteen lobbyists were effective. «.A rank order of l by the lobbyists, for example, means that all lobbyists, when evaluating those lobbyists selected as the five most effective, perceived that basis of effectiveness as inimost important one. The bases of effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was often perceived in terms of certain personal traits and characteristics of the lobbyists. Certain personality traits were per- . ceived as a part of effective lobbying and therefore related to role- taking ability and potential. . No attempt was made toempirically measure the actual personality traits of lobbyists, only the perceptions of these traits. . For example, study participants were agreed that the ability of . lobbyists to maintain congenial, positive, personal relationships with legislators to be aprime prerequisite for lobbying effectiveness. Lobbyists considered personality and sociability factors as the most important basis of lobbying effectiveness; and reporters (with a rank order. of Z. 5) and legislators (rank order of 2) also considered these factors to be of great importance in determining a lobbyist's effectiveness. ' Another personal trait of lobbyists perceived by the respondents as important to effectiveness was knowledge of the subject central to the interest of the organized group that the lobbyist represented. 1 Legislators perceived this trait to be the most important variable in lobbying effective- ness (rank order of l). .Legislators emphasized many times that possession of accurate information and facts was the most important personal trait a lobbyist should have. . Reporters (rank order of 6) per- ceived knowledge of the subject important not only for a lobbyist to be effective among legislators, but among themselves as well. . Lobbyists (rank order of 7) did not perceive and rank knowledgeability and expertise as highly as the other group. . A few thought it was of prime importance, the majority did not. _ - Another personal characteristic perceived as important to lobbying effectiveness was knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legis- lators. - Legislators ranked this highest (rank order of 3. 5), reporters perceived this variable as seventh in importance, and the lobbyists' evaluations resulted in a rank order of 8. 5. 1. Generally it was difficult 281 for study participants to articulate exactly what they meant when they selected this personal variable as a basis of lobbying effectiveness. Typically, they thought that confidence in lobbyists was something developed over time by lobbyists who, because of other personal and back- ground variables (for example, sociability, gentlesnanly conduct, length of service, and so forth), were "just accepted" and able to "hold the confidence" of legislators. . Knowledge of the legislative process, as a personal trait, was perceived by theilobbyists as an‘effectiveness variable of great importance (rank order of 4). . They stressed the fact repeatedly that unless a lobby- ist was personally familiar with the formal. (and informal) procedures of the legislative process, he stood little chance of success. .Reporters (rank order of ,8. 5) and legislators (rank order. of 10) did not perceive knowledge of the legislative process as often as lobbyists as a basis of effectiveness. - All three evaluating groups ranked the lobbyist's ability to communi- cate as a personality skill of some importance (legislators at 8, and reporters and lobbyists at 8. 5). ‘All participants agreed that personal communication skills, that is, the ability tomake an articulate, con- vincing presentation of the interest group message, were important in the lobbying successes of several Michigan lobbyists. . Both legislators (rank order of 5. 5) and lobbyists (rank order of 6) were closely agreed in their perceptions that personal integrity, honesty and sincerity in the presentation by-the lobbyist of information, facts and arguments (as well as in the use of lobbying techniques) to be a variable of importance in lobbying effectiveness. . Legislators and lobby- ists also perceived that lobbyists who presented both sides of the story on legislation tended to be more effective. They further agreed that those few lobbyists who demonstrated ability to rise above the narrow interests of their pressure groups and take a broad view of the public 28?. interest weremore effective lobbyists because of it. . Only two reporters (rank order of 11. 5) perceived this personal trait as a significant variable in lobbying effectiveness. . A good many lobbyists (rank order of 10) perceived the effective- ness of their colleagues as a result of their capacity for- “hard work. " Only'five legislators (rank order of 11) cited this andonly two reporters (rank order of 12) considered this trait to be of any importance in , effectiveness. No empirical attempt was made to isolate the organizational factors that might be related to the effectiveness of the lobbyists (studied in this dissertation. 7 Certainly, however, the kind oforganization is an important ..variable in lobbying role performance. . For, the role-taking ability of the lobbyist is greatly affected by whether or not he has to represent established, high status, interest groups such as manufacturers, businessmen, lawyers, doctors and others whohave achieved recognition (and their legislative goals and are now primarily interested in preserving their privileges and status; 33; whether he is representing interest groups still struggling for recognition and social change through legislation which will benefit them, such as labor unions, certain types of small business and a few new professional groups. . Study participants perceived these differences as important to effective lobbying.~ All were agreed in their perceptions (rank orders were: - lobbyist‘, 2.; reporters, l; and legislators, 3. 5) that organizational factors were‘very important to role enactment. - An examination of the t0p sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale revealed that eleven out ‘of the sixteen represented organizations that either‘had substantial amounts of economic power and/or widespread “grass roots" support throughout the state. .The same could be said of only seven of the lobbyists in the bottom half of the effectiveness scale. . Further, it was generalized from these data that the lobbyistsin the tap half of the IPE scale represented organizations that were 283 well-established,. had a good deal of social status and economic power, and/or had widespread "grass roots" support throughout Michigan. 7 In contrast, over half of the lobbyists among the bottom seventeen on the IPE scale represented organizations with narrow economic or professional interests; those seeking to change the status quo to better their own professional or occupation position; and those interest groups‘ with small memberships, without much economic power. - It is significant, however, that five out of the t0p sixteen lobbyists did represent groups in the latter category; and their lobbying effectiveness was perceived as the result of other intervening variables such as personality, background and experience, and others. Role-associated Techniques: The second major independent variable believed related to lobbying effectiveness was the use of role-associated, group-approved lobbying techniques. . Several hypotheses were tested concerning; the agreement on group-approved techniques; the relationship of their use to lobbying effectiveness; the relationships concerning how, and by whom, tactics were mapped as compared to lobbying effectiveness; and the amount of freedom lobbyists. had in mapping tactical strategy as related to effectiveness; and the focus of lobbying tactics and strategy as related to lobbying effectiveness. . . Chapter V described and analyzed the tactics and techniques associated with the enactment of the lobbying role. Sixteen tactics or techniques were considered. These sixteen lobbying techniquesiyyere described, analyzed and compared in terms of three operational cate- gories as follows: (1) Direct personal communication Personal Presentation of Arguments Presenting Research Results Testifying at Hearings (2)‘ Communication Through Intermediaries Public Relations Campaign .Collaboration With Other Groups Contact by Constituent 284 Contact by‘Person with Special Access Organization News Activities Letter and Telegram Campaigns Publicizing Voting Records (3) Achieving and Maintairgng Access Entertaining for an Evening Giving a Party Personal Favors and Assistance Contributing Political Work Contributing Political Money ~ Direct Bribery One of the'hypotheses of Chapter; V--that there would be group consensus as to which lobbying techniques were most effective--was corroborated. . All of the study participations were agreed on which techniques were the most effective, and they were: personal presentation of arguments, presenting research results, testifying .at public hearings, public relations campaigns, collaboration with other groups, contact by constituent, and contact by persons with special access. These lobbying techniques were given the same high ratings-by legislators and lobbyists alike indicating that these techniques had group approval and were con- sidered the most effectiveof all the sixteen techniques cited. The reporters varied somewhat and rated three techniques (contact by constituent, contributing political work, and contributing political money) higher than did the legislatorsand lobbyists. But, for the most part, there was substantial agreement among all respondents as to which lobbying techniques were groug- approved and most effective. . In another part of this thesis (Chapter; VI), the two lobbying tech- niques of entertainment and personal favors and assistance were per- ceived by the respondents as playing a part in the effectiveness of certain lobbyists. Reporters (rank order of 5) perceived these techniques as an important variable in effectiveness. . Legislators perceived this variable as quite important (rank order of 7). Many legislators suggested that entertainment and personal favors had little effect on them personally, 285 but they suspected that- this technique may have had quite an impact on their fellow legislators. - Lobbyists. also tended to view their own personal effectiveness as stemming from some other variable, but, they were quick to point out that the success of some of their lobbying colleagues was the result of entertaining- and the rendering of personal favors and assistance. , Therefore, lobbyists (rank order of 11) per- ceived entertainment and personal favors as relatively unimportant bases of effectiveness, but they knew of certain lobbyists whose effectiveness, they judged, was based almost solely on these techniques. - It was also discoveredin Chapter. VI that reporters (rank order of 10) perceived political party factors as more important bases of lobby- ing effectiveness than did legislators and lobbyists (rank orders of 12). Generally, respondents evaluated political factors as effecting‘lobbying performance in terms of political money and work contributions, and the political potential (in terms of votes and money) of certain interest groups. 1 All of the lobbyists who were perceived as having political factors as part of their effectiveness were identified with the Republican party. 1 A comparison in Chapter V between the perceptions of Washington and Lansing lobbyists regarding the (effectiveness of, lobbying techniques revealed that, generally, the lobbyists in bothcapitols agreed on which techniques .were‘more effective. .However, Washington lobbyists, who do not have the direct access to legislators as do Lansing lobbyists, tended to rate the communication through intermediaries techniques category higher. - And, Lansing lobbyists, with more direct access to legislators, rated direct personal cominunication techniques higher than their Washington colleagues; consequently, the Lansing lobbyists gave lower ratings to communication through intermediaries techniques. Lobbyists were asked to evaluate each of the sixteen lobbying techniques in terms ofhow each technique worked for them. -As stated 286 above, there was agreement concerning which techniques were-most effective and group-approved. . Once this had been ascertained, it was possible to test one of the hypotheses of this thesis: that the use of group-approved, role-associated lobbying techniques would be related to effective or non-effective role enactment. . In other words,...those lobbyists who used the group-approved, effective lobbying techniques would tend to be more effective than those who did not use them as much or not at all. . The hypothesis was not verified because no statistical relationships were found between the perceived use and evaluation of techniques and the effectiveness of lobbyists in this study. Generally, the highest amount of statistical correlation was found among the first group of lobbying techniques (direct personal communication), but in no case were they statistically significant. . Perhaps this lack of statis- tical correlation indicated that the lobbyiSts were in agreement on their evaluation of the techniques which were most effective in presenting their cases and achieving access, but the degree‘to which they could successfullyuutilize these techniiques was another matter. . Certainly, the knowledge and use of lobbying techniques was an important variable in lobbying effectiveness. This Was pointed out in Chapter VI when reporters perceived the use and knowledge of lobbying techniques a highly. important (rank order of 2. 5) variable in effective- ness. .Lobbyists (rank order of 5) and legislators (rank order of 5. 5) perceived this variable about the same in importance. Generally, all respondents felt that those lobbyists who knew and used the more highly respected and group-approved lobbying techniques (for example, personal presentation of arguments, testifying at public hearings, public relations campaigns, and so forth) with strategic discretion were perceived as more effective lobbyists because of it. . Lobbyists were questioned regarding the way in which strategy on lobbying techniques was mapped. . It was hypothesized that those 287 lobbyists who had to consult with superiors inplanning strategy would tend to be less effective than those who did not. While there was no statistical correlation between the way in which strategy was planned and lobbyists' effectiveness, it is important to note that only three of the top sixteen lobbyists did have to consult in advancelwith other members of their organization in the planning of lobbying strategy. This, therefore, lent some support to the hypothesis. . Related to the mapping of lobbying strategy was .the amount of freedom lobbyists had in the selection of their lobbying-techniques. . It was hypothesized that the-more freedom a lobbyist had in the selection of techniques the‘imore effective he would tend to be. -Although no statis- tical correlation was found between the amount of freedom in selecting techniques and lobbying effectiveness, only one out of the top fifteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was. limited, while six of thosein the bottom eighteen of the scale were limited in some way. . It was also learned in. Chapter V that the majority of lobbyists attempted to develop andimaintain legislative contacts by personal daily attendance at the legislative sessions, and by personal contacts withlegislators. . The wide distribution of choices among the contact- building techniques did not make it possible, or fruitful, to run a statisg tical analysis to determine if there were any relationships between place on the IPE scale and. the use-of certain contacts and information sources. . Lobbyists primarily attempted to establish contacts with. select committee chairmen and members, and the House and Senatemajority leadership. . Then, if possible, they would try to make contacts with all legislators. There was nothing in the data to substantiate two hypotheses cited in. Chapter V:- (1) that there would be a relationshipbetween lobby- ists' IPE scores. and the amount and kinds of contacts that were made; and (2) that there would be a relationship between lobbyists who 288 i maintained contacts with the legislative minority. leadership and lobby- ing effectiveness. w Althoughno statistical relationshipbetweenlobbying effectiveness and bi-partisan lobbying was found, it was possible to generalize that all lobbyists considered bi-partisanship necessary to effective lobbying. Lobbyistswere'also questioned regarding the committees on which they focused the most attention. . The most lobbied committees, in rank order, were state affairs, taxation, labor, judiciary, highways, and municipalitie s . . Role Perceptions: . _The third majorindependent believed related ttolobbying”effectiveness was rolepercep’ti‘ons. The hypothesis was that the lobbyists' perceptions of their role and certain concommitants to that role (such as, recruitment for the role, personal commitment to organization policies, differences in role perceptions between lobby- ists-and employer, lobbyist's part in policy formation, division of time and labor within lobbying role, reporting methods by lobbyists to employers, income derived from role-playing, years of experience in lobbying role, role satisfactions, and future career expectations) would be related to lobbying effectiveness. . The major hypothesis and all of the sub- hypotheses were tested in Chapter IV. I . There was no way to relate lobbying effectiveness to recruitment into the lobbying role. Most (70%) of the lobbyists recalled their recruit- ment as the result of being selected and approached by the interest group; 18% said they applied for the position; 9% felt they had "grown" into the position. from within the organization; 12% got their'lobbying jobs through friends and contacts; and one was elected to the post. . One of the major'hypotheses of'this dissertation was that lobbying effectiveness was related to the type of role the lobbyist was expected, and compelled by circumstances, to play on. behalf of his interest group. 289 It was hypOthesized that lobbyists playing primarily defensive roles (that is, to "kill" harmful legislation and preserve the status quo) would tend to be more effective, because this role is less difficult to play than a lobbying role which calls for the active promotion and strategical guidance of legislation through both legislative houses. That data confirmed that Michigan lobbyists did perceive their role functions primarily in defensive and promotional terms. . Each lobbyist was asked what he thought his organization expected him, as their representative, to do. After the responses were coded, five distinct _ lobbying roles became evident. .In most cases, it was possible to detect secondary roles as well as primaryroles. The first primary role which became evident was that of promoter-strategist. The lobbyists (24%) who perceived this function as their primary role were those whose organizations expected them to have beneficial legislation introduced to promote the interest group; and the lobbyist would then work out the strategy necessary to secure its passage. Of all five lobbying roles that were ascertained, the role of promoter-strategist was the most difficult to successfully enact. . Only one lobbyist, who perceived this as his primary role was ranked among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, and the other seven were among the ten lobbyists lowest on the effectiveness scale. The lobbying role perceived by the majority (52%) of the lobbyists as their primary function was the role of defender-advocate. . This category included those lobbyists who perceived their primary function as defensive; that is, protecting their interest group from "harmful" legislation and preserving legis- lative status quo as it referred to the particular interest group. In addition to defending the status quo, these lobbyists were also expected to advocate the interest group's position as part of their defensive function. Seventeen of the lobbyists picked the role of defender-advocate as their primary function. Of these seventeen lobbyists, twelve were 290 among the top sixteenlobbyists on the IPE scale and‘five were among .the bottom. seventeen. The hypothesis that lobbyists in the. role of defender—advocate tended to be'more effective than those required to play the role of promoter-strategist was. supported by a high statisti- cal correlation. One other generalization was possible from these data. - Almost without exception, those lobbyists playing the role of defender-advocate represented the older, established, high status, interest groups suchas manufacturers, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, and others who had achieved recognitionand theirlegislative goals, and were now primarily interested in preserving their privileges and status. The lobbyists playing the role of promoter-strategist were, without exception, representatives of those interest groups which were still struggling~ for recognition and social change through legislation which would benefit them. A few otherminor'lobbying roles were . perceived by the lobbyists'. Fifteen percent of the lobbyists perceived their primary role as a liaison relationship between the Legislators and their interest groups. . Six percent of the lobbyists perceive their primary role to be that of "service" to the legislators and they were placed in a role category called "servicemen. " One lobbyist (the top lobbyist on the IPE scale) perceived his primary function as that of a general public relations man interpreting the business of his clients to the society at large. . The hypothesis that differences in role perceptions between employer and lobbyist tended to reduce lobbying effectiveness was also supported. . Lobbyists with few or no problems of communication and understanding over the appropriate lobbying role were more effective than those who had to deal with organization naivete and myopia concerning effective role-playing in the legislative process. ’ .. It was hypothesized that strong personal commitment by the lobby- ist to his organization's policies would be related to effective lobbying Z91 performance. . Personal commitment by the lobbyists to the organization's policies was perceived by most Michigan lobbyists as necessary to effec- tive role enactment; and lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale, as well as the rest, were agreed on this. . There also was evidence to indi- cate that lobbyists who did not feel their relationship with their interest group to be a professional one--but rather a strong personal commitment-- tended to be more effective than those who viewed their ties with the interest group as a strictly professional arrangement. . In regard to the lobbyists' personal feelings ofisecurity in his role, nothing in the data indicated that most lobbyists felt it necessary to justify their positions to their-employers. .It was concluded that those who felt insecure in their lobbying role might resort to practices which were designed to strengthen their own positions and enhance their personal job security. .Further, these practices might jeopardize their lobbying effectivene s s . Forty- eight percent of the lobbyists perceived policy development as a function of the interest groups' governing boards or their legislative committees; 27% stated policy development was the result of the combined effort of the lobbyist and his superiors; 18% saw it was a result of a "grass roots" process within the organization; and 6% stated policy was made by the lobbyist alone. - A significant statistical correlation was found between lobbyists' participation in policy develOpment and lobbying effectiveness. This verified the hypothesis that the more participation by the lobbyist in policy development the more effective he would be in his role enactment. . The hypothesis that lobbyists whose recommendations were not adopted frequently by the interest group organization would tend to be less effective than lobbyists whose policy recommendations were adOpted frequently was not substantiated. 292 . Conclusions regarding the division of time and labor of the lobby- ists as related to effectiveness were as follows: lobbyists .on the top half of the IPE sacle who spent more of their time, calling on legislators; doing research; in."grass roots" travel; calling on state agencies; and entertainment, tended to'be'more'effective than those lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale who spent more time, working in their own offices; calling on others; and preparing press releases and speeches. . Although no statistical correlations were present, the data did suggest that lobbyists who spent more time in direct personal contact activities with legislators tended to be more effective. . Reporting methods by lobbyists to their interest groups were highly varied in kind, as well as implementation. . Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists wrote periodic news letters and bulletins; 55% made personal oral reports to their Executive Committees; 42% wrote an annual report; 36% reported through informal, personal conferences with their superiors; and 27% gave oral reports to the annual convention of their interest group. Generally, those lobbyists who ranked at the top of the IPE scale tended to primarily use informal reportingmethods, and those in the bottom half of the scale tended to frequently use a greater number of reporting methods. 7 l . Lobbyists' incomes were related to lobbying effectiveness, with a high correlation present between high income and lobbying effectiveness. . The-majority of lobbyists were paid by salary, and the average salary was aboutle, 006. _ . The years, of lObbying experience were highly correlated with lobbying effectiveness. That is, the-more years of lobbying experience, the greater the lobbyist's effectiveness. Year-round residence in Lansing was correlated with lobbying effectiveness, but norstatistical correlation was present. However, it was generalized that the'majority (ten out of sixteen) of the lobbyists at the topof the IPE scale did maintain year-round Lansing residence. 293 Of the twenty-seven (82%) of the lobbyists who indicated a pro- fessional desire to remain in lobbying, 52% stated their motivation stemmed from the challenge, stimuli and variety of the lobbying role; 27% said they wanted to remain in lobbying because they liked to work with people; 30% attributed their motivation to ideals and service to be achieved; 18% said it was too late to change jobs; 12% because of their interest in government; and 9% were going to stay in lobbying because of the money and fringe benefits. . No statistical relationship was found between effectiveness and job satisfaction. However, all lobbyists, but one, in the t0p half of the IPE scale were planning to remain in lobbying for the rest of their professional lives. Value Considerations and Recommendations 7 In Chapter VII, normative questions asked and value judgments rendered concerning the role of lobbyists in the legislative process, on the part of study participants and the writer, were presented and dis- cussed. In addition, the writer made some recommendations at the end of the chapter regarding possible changes in the present Michigan lobby- ing act. . Responses to the question concerning the legislature's operating ”better" or "worse" in the absence of pressure groups clearly indicated that lobbyists and, more important, legislative leaders and news corres- pondents, had a high degree of tolerance for pressure group activity in the legislative process. Generally, they viewed lobbying as an integral and necessary part of the legislative process because lobbyists serve to relate the socio-economic interests of their principals to the legis- lature; they provide necessary information and research on complex problems; and they help the legislature relate public policy to public wishes and aspirations . 295 recommendations concerning the Lobbying Act of. 1947. . It was concluded that the role of the lobbyist in the legislative process is important enough to warrant a full-scale study regarding the strengthening offprovisions regarding the reporting of lobbying expenses; the strengthening of enforce- ment power regarding the lobbying act; and the clarification and re- definition of the legislative agent as, presently defined in the Lobbying Act of 1947. ' BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Baker, Roscoe. The American Legion and American Foreign Policy. New York: Bookrnan Association, 1954. ‘Bentley, Arthur F. The Process of Government. Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, 1908. Blaisdell, Donald C. . Govermnent Under Pressure. - New Yorlc Public Affairs Committee, 1942. Bonner, H. .Social Psychology, An Interdisciplinary Approach. New York: World Book Company, 1953. Brady, Robert A. Business as a System of Power. , New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. . Chase, Stuart. . DemocracyUnder Pressure. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945. Dearing, M. R. Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G.A. R. BatonRouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1952. Edwards, Allen. Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences. ,New York: Rinehard, 1955. . 'fi Garceau, Oliver. The Political Life of the American Medical Association. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941. . Hardin, Charles M. The Politics of Agriculture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952. Herring, Pendleton E. Group Representation Before Congress. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1929. Kesselman,. Louis C. The Social Politics of FEPC: , A Study in Reform Pressure Movements. . Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of- North Carolina Press, 1948. , Key,_V.. 0. .Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. . New York: Crewell, 1958. 2% 297 Lasswell, Harold D. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: MCGraw-Hill, 1936. Latham,. Earl. The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing Point Legislation. Ithaca, New York: Cornell UniversfiyPress, 1952. Lippman, Walter. Public Opinion. . New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. McKean, Dayton D. . Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey. Columbia University Press, 1938. Odegard, Peter. Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon - League. New York: Columbia Universitngrerss‘: 1928. Parson, T. and Shils, E. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. Schattschneider,. E. E. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935. Schriftgieser, Karl. . The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951. Tompkins, D. C. Congressional Investigation of Lobbying. . Berkley: University of California Bureau of Public Administration, 1956. Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. ,New York: Knopf, 1953. Van Deusen, Glyndon G. Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947. Zeller, Belle. Pressure Politics in New York. New York: Prentice- Hall, .1937. A rticles and Periodicals Detroit Free Press, "Lobbyists Mobilize in Lansing, "January 10, 1958. "State Eyes Probe of Lobbying, " September 20, 1959. Detroit News. "Lobbyists Hope for Defeat of Costly Bills They Sponsor, " February 2, 1958. 298 Detroit News. . "Protocol Reversed: Senators Toss Party for 74 Lobbyists, " March 29, 1958. _______ "Code of Ethics Sought for. Lansing Lobbyists, " December 15. 1959. . . "Speechless Lobbyists Entertain Democrats, " February 4, 1960. Detroit Times. -A1 Kaufman, "The Lobbyists Go Ivy League, " February P 23, 1958. . . "Doctors Kill State A-Bill, ” April 13, 1958. Al Kaufman, "Ask State Crackdown on Lobbies, " December 21. 1959.. . "Pressure Lobbying has Become Way of Life, " March 15, 1960. Eulau, Heinz; Buchanan, William; Ferguson, Leroy; and Wahlke, John. "American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups, " The Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, (1960), 203-227. '7. Grand Rapids Press. "Rips Criticism, Geerlings Calls Church Council's Resignation Bid Arrogant, " February 4, 1960. . William Kulsea, ”Again in Hot Water, " May 14, 1959. - William Kulsea, "UM, MSU Suffer from '57 Lobbying, " April 26, 1958. ‘ Holly Herald-Advertiser. "Lobbyists Peddle Ideas to Uninformed Legislators, " September 4, 1959. Lansifi State Journal. "Lobbyists Move In, " January 9, 1958. , "Presents to Legislators, " March 27, 1958. . "Lobbyists Contribute, " May 17, 1958. . "GOP, Democrats Join in Rapping Lobbyist, " May 13, 1959. "Lobbies Spend Millions, " October, 1959. 299 'LansingLState Journal. "Stricter Lobbying Law Being Eyed by Williams, " January 8, 1960. "Senators Get Tough, ” January 21, 1960. . Richard L. Milliman, ”Detroit Democrat Asks for Financial Report of Annual Activities, " February 4, 1960. Lewis, George S. ~ "The CongressmenLook at the Polls, " Public Ojinion Quarterly, VOL-IV (June, 1940), pp. 229-231. Mason lngham County News. "Legislator's are Outnumbered. ' August 21. 1959. Mechling,. T. . B. . “Washington Lobbies Threaten Democracy, " Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer, 1946). Milbrath, Lester w. . "The Political Party Activity of Washington ‘ Lobbyists," ‘Journal of Politics, Vol. XX (1958), pp. 339-352. Muskegon Chronicle. "Wisconsin's Law, " November 19, 1957. Royal Oak Daily Tribune, "Lobbyist Asks Job (at $10, 000) Guarding Hazel Park's Track Cut," May 8,1958. Saginaw News. . "Both-Parties Join to Blast Lobbyists, " May 13, 1959. Sarbin, Theodore R. , and Jones, Donald S. "An Experimental Analysis of Role Behavior, " Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, L1, (.1956), 236-241. Velie,. Lester. . "The Secret Boss of California, " Collier's, August 13 and 20, 1949. - Zeller, Belle. 1 "The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, " American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, (1948), 239-271. Zeller, Belle, Schermerhorn, G..L., and Parkman, H. , Jr. Lobbies and Pressure Groups, " The Annals, (January, 1938). 300 Public Documents Graves, W. G. Administration of the Lobbying Registration Provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Washington, D.. C.: Government Printing Office (1950). . Michtfln Public Acts, Act 214, Section 1, 1947. Michigan Compiled Laws of 1948, Sections 4.401 to 4.410 Inclusive. Unpublished Material Heinz, Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy Ferguson, John C. Wahlke. Unpublished legislative study on four American state legislatures. . Financed by the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Research Council. , Kaufman, Al B. ”The State Capitol Reporter As a Lobbyist. " Unpublished paper written for Michigan State University Department of Political Science. December, 1959. Lane, Edgar. "Statutory Regulation of Lobbying in the United States with Special Reference to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act - of 1946. " Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1949. Male, George A. "The Michigan Education Association as an Interest Group. " Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1952. McKee, James B. "An Analysis of the Power Structure of Organized Agriculture in Michigan. " Unpublished Master's Thesis, Wayne University, Detroit, 1948. - Milbrath,. Lester W. "Analyzing Lobbying Through Communication and Decision Making Models, " given at the 1959 Conference of American Association for Public Opinion Research, Lake George, New York, May 14-17. Robertson, Lawrence W. "The Power Structure of the UAW-CIO and Its Impact on Public Policy in Michigan. " Ph. D‘. dissertation in progress, Northwestern University, 1955. 301 Van Antwerp, Lowell B. . ”The Forces Affecting the Passage and Attempted Repeal of the Sales Tax Diversion Amendment. " Unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1950. Wise, Roosevelt. "The Michigan Township's Association: A Study of an Interest Group. " Master's thesis, University of Detroit, .Detroit, 1955. Other Sourc e s Personal Interview with Hugh Brenneman, former President, Lansing Capitol Club, Lansing, Michigan, October, 1958. ' Personal Interview with Mrs- Margie Lee Galloway, Enrolling Clerk of the House of Representatives, Lansing, Michigan, April, 1960. AP’PENDIXES 302 I“‘ 'fi “fir" I .‘i; a .1. ”Cum; INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - MICHIGAN LOBBYISTS Interview Number Name Date Hour Place Length of interview Preliminary gtatemegt to Respondent: I am doing a study of Michigan lobbyists to learn what they think of their Jobs, how they go about their work, and what their backgrounds are. The information and opinions you give me will be tabulated along with material from about be other lobbyists. No names, either of individuals or organizations, will be used, and what you say will be off the record. This study is one of a similar group of research projects being conducted on the national and state levels. In this study I am trying, in many instances, to duplicate that which has already been done in these previous studies. I want to assure you at the outset that we are only interested in describing lobbyists, i.e., who they are, what they do and think. I am not interested in doing an expose type of study. Let me emphasize again, that all information will be confidential. The original materials in this study will only be seen by me. INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY OF STATE°S LEGISLATIVE AGENTS LIST: Name Card Number Home address Office address If Different (*) * Lansing Home address * Lansing Office address Capacity (in or with organization) Representing: Number Where were you born? (city) (state) a. In what year? Where were you brought up? (city) (state) Did you spend most of the years when you were growing up in a city, a small townD or on a farm? CitYeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee< Small Towneeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee( Fameeeeeesseseseeseeseeeee< Combination (specify)......( NAOOOOOOO0.000000000COOOOOO( vvv'v Now would you tell me a little bit about your education--where you went to school? (a) High SChOOl , Incomplete. e e e e e e s e e (“r Graduatedoeeseeeeeee€__ (b) COllege Incompleteeeeeeeeese(___ Graduatedeeeeeeeeeee€__ Degree (c) Graduate work Incomplete..........£__ Graduatedoo........o(__ Degrees (d) Major field of interest in college (e) Major field of interest in Graduate School (if different) What is/was your father's Job or occupation? Are you engaged in any work other than lobbying? (3) Has lobbying been your main occupation all your working life? Y85esee..eee(____ NOOOOOOOOOOO(__ NAQOOIOOOO..(-_ (b) If no: What other work have you done, and for how long? Job Years Job ' Years Job Years 7. How did you become interested in lobbying? FOR EXAMPLE: (a) Just what were the major influences that developed your interests in public affairs and legislation? (b) Just how did it come about that you became a lobbyist? 8. What other members of your family or close relatives have been connected with politics9 that is holding political office, lobbying, or working for a political party? Person and Relationship Office or Position J ‘— 9. Would you like to continue in this type of work for the rest of your professional life? Yes.............£_m_2 NOooeoeo;eooeooo(m) parh8p80~cooeoon(—) ml/NAQOOOOOOOOIO(-__) (8) Why? “ 10. H ’..) 0 - 3 - What governmental positions-”local, state or federa1--had you held before becoming a lobbyist? ' Noneeoeeoooeo( ) -.- IqAxooooooooooo( ) --u. -C- (P) Do you hold any such positions now? Noneooooooeoo( .) NAooeoeouoeoo(. ) (5) Do you expect to ever return to some kind of government work? YESooooooooo( ) ~— No....o.ouo..(__n) NA/DK. . . . . . . . (___) What kind? What political party positions--local, state or federal--had you held before beconing a lobbyist? Noneooooooooo(___t) Positions° NA.........00( ) (a) When? (b) Do you hold any such positions new? Yes..........(‘h_) No...........(_w_) Positions: NA...........(___) How, a couple of questions about yeur job as a lobbyist. (a) First of all, Just what does your organization expect you as its representative to do? a h a 3. Are there any important differences between what you think this Job is and the way your organization members see it? YeSoaooooooooo(_u_) Nooooooooooouo( ) What are they? DKENAouoooooooC ) me How do you report back to the organization you represent? (Probe: newslettersd reportsg etCo) I 5. Do you consider your relationship to the organization you represent to be like that of a lawyer to a client; that 139 presenting your client°s case in the best possible light without necessarily committing yourself personally to your clientes position? (8) Would you describe your commitment to your organization°s policy pOSition ass Strongoooooooooooo( ,_) mildoooouooooooooo( ‘) 'Neak00000000000000(___) (b) Was the policy position of your organization a very important factor in your decision to represent it? he ‘0 .o. 19. 20. a 5 - Is there any need to make a case periodically for the continuation of representation in Lansing for your organization? In other wordsD does the organization occasionally conside withdrawing its legislative representative? How is the cost of the lobbying operation financed by the organization? (probeg by informala groups outside of organization9 etco) How is legislative policy made for your organization? Are your personal recommendations on legislative policy adopted frequentlyD occasionally9 seldom or never? Frequentlyoooooooooooooo°(___‘__ Occasionallyoooooo..ooooo( seldomooooooooooooooooooo(m___ — on— Y h3\’eroooooooooooooocooooo( '..-.— UVVVV NAoooocoooooooooooooooooo‘ How is strategy on specific legislative problems affecting your organization mapped? -5- 21. Do you have freedom to determine your tactics on most legislative problems? 22. How do you keep in touch with whats going on in the Legislature (e.g.D in committeeso etCo)? I 23. How do you develop and maintain a circle of legislative contacts? 2h. With whom do you generally try to establish contacts? 25., Do you find it necessary to work both sides of the aisle on most issues? 26. 27. 23. 29. 30. a 7 a Do you think it is important to work closely with many legislative committees? With which committees do you spend the most time? How important is Joint activity with other lobby organizations and their lobbyists on certain legislative problems? Do public policy makerSway that I mean Members of the Legislature or State Agency heads=ocome to you very often to solicit your views on a policy matter? Less than once a year................fi__ Once or twice a year.................(__ 3 to 10 times a year................o(__, 11 to 25 times a yegroooooooocooooooo( OEWQOing actIVityoooooooooooooooooooo(___ Speaking generally, about what percentage of Your time do you spend in each of these various activities? (Hand card to Respondent) Working in own Officeooooooocoooooooooooooooooooéu: Calling on Members of the Legislature..........o( calling on otherSooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo( Chatting with people in the Executive Office..oo( _- DOing reseprChOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0000(l Preparing press releasesv speechesO etCooooooooo( mm“ Travelling around on the grass roots levelo.ovou( Calling on State Agency peOple............oooooo( Entertaining important peopleoooooooooOOOoooooao< OTHER 31. Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. would you evaluate each of these techniques as they seem to work for you? It would be useful if you could rate them on a scale running from zero (0) for not effective at all to ten (10) for very effective. Personal presentation Of argumentSeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaoeeoooeoeeeeeoeo( ) Presenting researCh r88u1taeeeeeeooeeeeeeeeecooeeooeeeeeeeeeeeooeooooooeoeeo< ) Testifying at hear1n950000000000eeeeeeeeeoeeeee'eeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeoeeeoeeeee( ) Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official...............( ) Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince.................................................................(_____) Entertaining the official for an evening....................................(_____) Giving a party or a dinner..................................................(_____) Contributing money to a political campaign..................................(_____) Contributing work in a political campaign...................................(_____) Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign.............................(_____) Publicizing voting records..................................................( ) Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's point 01 V18Weeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeooooeee< ) Using the organization‘s newsletter or newspaper to convince public OftiCiaISeeeoeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee(____‘2 Direct bribery..............................................................(_____) Offering personal favors and assistance to officials........................£_____) Obtaining assistance from other organizations...............................(_____) Other ( ) ( ) -9- 32. Now9 as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best Job for their organizations? In that it might be difficult to recall their names on the spur of the momentS here is a list of names of lobbyists now working in Lansing. Please select out the five men who are doing the best jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective. 32. (cont°d) .911- 33. Ncwr as you think back over your evaluation of these lobbyists? what would you say makes a man effective or ineffective as a lobbyist? 3h. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. ho. hi. How do you appraise the record of legislative success of your own organization9 i.e.q is your organization achieving its legislative goals? Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work much better9 somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worseD if there were no interest groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation? Much better................o(___) Somewhat better.............(___) About the same..............( ) Somewhat worse..............( ) Much worse..................( ) DK/NA...................o...(___) Probe: How are you paid for your services, i.e., do you have a contract9 a fee or a salary? About how much has your average yearly income been for the past three years? Are you married? Yes (__) No {__) Divourced (__) Widower (__) NA (__) Do you have any children? Number . What religious denomination do you belong to? Is there anything else about lobbying that you think I ought to pay attention to in my study? THANK YOU! APPS DIX II 30. Speaking generallyo about what PERCENTAGE of your time do you spend in each of these various activities? Working in own Officeooeeoeeooeoooeeeooeeeeeeeeeeeg -mlu-—‘I I Calling on Members of the Legislature.............( CPlling 0n otherSoeooooeooooeoeeeooeoeeaeeeeoeoooo( Chatting with people in the Executive office......( DOing researChooooeoooooooooooeoeooeeoeeoeeooooeoo< Preparing press releaseso speeches: etc...........( W‘- Travelling around on the grass roots level........( Calling on State Agency peOple....o......o....oooo( Entertaining important people.....................( my. omen ( 31. Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. Would you EVALUATE each of these techniques as they seem to WORK FOR YOU. It would be helpful if you could RATE THEM'QE A SCALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR fig: EFFECTIVE AT ALL TO‘TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVQ. Personal presentation Of argumentS........................o.................o( Presenting researCh reSUItsooooeoeeoooeeeeooeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeooeeeoeeeeeooeooo( Testiinng at hearingsooao........................o..........oo..............( Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official................( Jim," I Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince.....................................................................( Entertaining the official for an evening.....................................( Giving a party or a dinner...................................................( Contributing money to a political campaign...........................o...o...( Contributing work to a political campaign.....o..............................( Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign..............................( Publicizing legislators' voting records......................................( Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the Organization's pOint Of VieWQOeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeoeooooeooooeeooeoee< Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public officialS....................................................................( Direct bribery..........................................................u....( Offering personal favors and assistance to public officials.................«( Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyistS........o...(_______ omen ( ( .n1,.i_t _rrPs‘J-“ LEGISLATIVE AGENTS Grant H. Longenecker Michigan Savings and Loan League Robert Berry Michigan Chiropody Association Maurice J. Zickgraf Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen Lloyd R. Winslow The Pennsylvania Railroad Company Dr. Louis Webber Michigan Hospital Service Dr. Edward A. Ward Michigan Association of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons Dr. Louis Webber Liohigan Hospital Service Dr. Edward A. Ward hichigan Association of Osteopathic Physicians Rocco F. Ventrella Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Hit-'31“ pe Tedd” Jr. Chrysler Corporation Wesley E. Thomas Michigan Education Association Ralph L. Stickle Michigan Bankers Association F.L. Spooner Michigan Bell Telephone Company C011n Le Smith Mich. Employers' Unemployment Comp. Bureau Harold W. Schumacher Michigan Retail Hardware Association Albert R. Saunders Michigan Real Estate Association Edward G. Rockwell Auto Club of Michigan and Detroit Auto Inter Insurance Exchange Dr. Russell R. Robbins Michigan State Chiropractic Society. Inc. Audley Rawson Insurance Companies Stanley M. Powell Michigan Farm Bureau Robert E. Poll City of Livonia Richard N. Philleo Michigan State Medical Society Fred B. Perry, Jr. Consumers Power Company Joseyh A, Parisi Michigan Townships Association William Palmer Michigan Petroleum Industries Committee Oscar G. Olander Michigan Trucking Association Dr. Hobart G. Moore Michigan Association of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons Maurice J. Mayer Michigan Auto Wholesalers Association Michigan Optometrio Association R. We M880“ ( Michigan Railroads Association Herman P. Luhrl General Motors Corporation Richard J. Kowalski Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks W.S. Koepke Household Finance Corporation Rudolph J. Inman Detroit Edison Company John H. Huss Michigan Municipal League Waldo O. Hildebrand Michigan Association of Insurance Agents Earl Hebert Michigan Table Top Licensees Congress Gus T. Hartman Jeneficial Finance Company of Michigan Gilberty L. Haley Mich. Auto Dealers Association Don W. Gardner Michigan Racing Association, Inc. Harry R. Gaines Michigan United Conservation Clubs Charles F. Frieburger Wayne County Board of Supervisors Louis Freye Michigan Medical Service Francis 8. Drolet Associated Package Liquor Dealers Wilfird F. Doyle Michigan Chain Stores Bureau John L. Denman Ford Motor Company J. H. Creighton Lichigon Manufacturer's Association Otis F. Cook Michigan Retailers Association C. J. Carroll Fichigan Road Builders Association Stephen J. Carey City of Detroit Leslie B. Butler Michigan Life Association Carl Buchanan Michigan Ready Mised Concrete Association Hugh W. Brennemsn State Bar, Medical Society, & Architects Joseph V. Brady Insurance Companies John H. Barr County Road Association Milton E. Bachman State Bar of Michigan Bernard Ansley Michigan United Conservation Clubs Murl K. Aten Michigan Turnpike Authority ‘v‘l “T ‘—.-_v f .‘...4. .L .L.)...‘.J.L.4L ' INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - CAPITOL PRESS Interview Number Name Preliminary Statement to Respondent: I am doing a study of Michigan lobbyists to learn what they think of their jobs9 how they go about their work, what their backgrounds are. The information and opinions you give me will be tabulated along with material from about 10 other reporters on the capitol beat. No names, either of individuals or paperso will be used9 and what you say will be off the record. This study is one of a similar group of research projects being conducted on the national as well as state level. In this study I am trying9 in many instanceso to duplicate that which has already been done in these previous studies. I want to assure you at the outset that we are only interested in describing lobbyists~ewho they are, what they do and think. I am not interested in doing an expose type of study. Let me emphasize again, that all information will be confidential. The original materials in this study will only be seen by me. Name of paper(s) or wire service Number of years worked as reporter Number of years on state capitol beat During the session do you spend most of your time covering: The senateooooeooeeoeooooo(__ The HOUSBoeooeeooooeoooooe(_ BothOOOOOOOO...OO0.0°O°°O°(_ Other ( Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. Would you EVALUATE each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists. It would be helpful if you COUId RATE THEM QE'A SCALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR NCT'EEEECTIV AT ALL TO TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVE. Personal presentation or arguments.................................................( ) presenting researCh reSUItSOOeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoe.oeeoeeeeeeoeo( n-) Testifying at hearings.............................................................( _) Getting an influential conStituent(8) t0 ContGCt the Off1018100eeeeeeeeeeeooeoeeeoe( ) Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince...........................................................................(__~___ ) Entertaining the official for an evening...........................................Q_______) Giving a party or a dinner.........................................................( ) Contributing money to a political campaign.........................................( ) Contributing work to a political campaign..........................................( ) Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign....................................( ) Publicizing legislators' voting records............................................( ) Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's POint Of VieW......................................................................( ) Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public officials..........................................................................( ) Dlrect bribery.....................................................................( ) Ottering personal favors and assistance to public officials........................( ) Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyists..................( ) OTHER ‘ ( ) ( ) 5. - 3 - Now, as you think back over your experience, whichlobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best Job for their organizations? In that it might be difficult to recall their names on the spur of the moment, here is a list of names of lobbyists now working in Lansing. Please select out the five men who are doing the best Jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective. 5. (cont'd) - 5 - 6. Now, as you think over your evaluation of these lobbyists, what would you say makes a man effective or ineffective as e lobbyist? 7. 8. Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse, if there were not interest groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation? Much better...................( Somewhat better...............( About the same................. Somewhat worse................( Much worse....................( Dw'NA...OIOOOOOOOOOOOOO90°00°°( Probes Is there anything else about lobbying that you think I ought to pay attention to in my study? K‘n‘l‘k‘klhl - ' ‘Y—lvj‘ 'T‘~"“‘" T tLé ; .S-I-‘A-JJ—hdh ‘II INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - LEGISLATIVE LEADERS Interview Number Name Preliminary Statement to Respondent I am doing a study of Michigan lobbyists to learn what they think of their Jobs, how they go about their work, what their backgrounds are. The information and opinions you give me will be tabulated along with material from about 15 other legislative leaders. No names will be used and what you say will be off the record. This study is one of a similar group of research projects being conducted on the national as well as state level. In this study I am trying, in many instances, to duplicate that which has already been done in these previous studies. I want to assure you at the outset that we are only interested in describing lobbyistSw-who they are, what they do and think. I am not interested in doing an expose type of study. Let me emphasize again, that all information will be confidential. The original materials in this study will only be seen by me. 1. Number of years served in Legislature (through Dec. 31. 1953)8 a. In HouseOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO( ) be In Senateeoeeeoeeoooeeooeoooeeoe( ) 2. Legislative leadership position in l957~58 sessions 3. Committee memberships and offices held in 1957-58 session. Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. Would you EVALUATE each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists. It would be helpful if you could RATE THEM‘Q§_A §§ALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR NOT.§§§§CTIV§ AT ALL T0 TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVE. Personal presentation or arguments................................................o( ) presenting researCh resultSOOeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoe.oeeeeeoeeeooo( _) TeStify1ng at hearings.............................................................( ) Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official......................( ) Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince...........................................................................( ) Entertaining the Official for an eveningeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee-oeeee0000000000( ) Giving a party or a dinner.........................................................( ) Contributing money to a political campaign.........................................( ) Contributing work to a political campaign..........................................( _) Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign....................................( ) PUbliCiZing legislators' vating recorda............................................( ) pUUliC relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's POint or ViewOeOOOOO00000000000000eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeO( ) Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public OffiCiBlSeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeeeoeeeeeeeee( ) DlreCt bribBTYOOOeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee< ) Offering personal favors and assistance to public officials........................(_______) Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyists..................( ) omen ( ) ( ) 5. -3... Now, as you think back over your experience, whichlobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best Job for their organizations? In that it might be difficult to recall their names on the spur of the moment, here is a list of names of lobbyists now working in Lansing. Please select out the five men who are doing the best Jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective. 5. (cont'd) - 5 - 6. Now, ee you think over your evaluation of these lobbyists, what would you say makes a men effective or ineffective as e lobbyist? 7. 8. Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse, if there were not interest groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation? Probes Much better...................(_ Somewhat better...............£_ About the same................’.__ Somewhat worse................fl_ Much worse....................£” _ DWNACCOOOCOOOOOOOOOOOO0......( I I l I V‘JVUVU Is there anything else about lobbying that you think I ought to pay attention to in my study? Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. . ‘Wbuld you EVALUATE each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists. It would be helpful if you could RATE THEM‘QN A §§ALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR NOT1§§FECTJ AT ALL TO TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVE. Personal presentation Of arguments.................................................( Presenting researCh reSUItSQeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeooe( Testifying at hearingS.............................................................( Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official......................( Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince...........................................................................( Entertaining the official for an evening...........................................( Giving a party or a dinner.........................................................( Contributing money to a political campaign.........................................( Contributing work to a political campaign..........................................( Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign....................................( PubliCizing legiSIGtorS' VOting records............................................( Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's point Of View........00.00.000.000...0.00.00...OOOOOOOOOOOOCOO0.0.0.0000...OOOOOOOC( '- Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public OffiCialseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee( — DlreCt briberYee...........o....................o..................................< _ orfering personal favors and assistance to public officials........................( Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyists..................( OTHER ( ( APPENDIX VIII March 25, 1959 SENATE BUSINESS REPORTS OF STANDING COMMITTEES THIRD READING HB 279 to G.O. HB 162 Passed T* HE 227 to ApprOpriations HB 13 Passed T* I.E. HB 228 to Appropriations HB 113 Passed T* HE 229 to Appropriations SB 1333 postponed to Thurs. Mar. 27 HB #42 to G.O. SB 1131 Not Passed — Vote recon. HB #95 to G.O. postponed to Thurs. Mar. 27 HB 285 to G.O. HB 18* Passed T* HB 20A* to G.O. HB 146 Passed HB 52?* to G.O. HB 203 Passed I.E. HB 571* to G.O. HB 572* to 0.0. MOTIONS:: HB 72 to G.O. General Orders Pfd HB 236* to G.O. HB 100 - 1 day extension granted MESSAGES FROM HOUSE SB 1072 With H* - Laid over 1 day Adjourned to Wednesday at 2 p.m. ***************************** HOUSE BUSINESS INTRODUCTION OF BILLS: HB 587 - Committee on ways and Means, by Rep. Engstrom, Chairman - ways and Means. Appropriations; restricted funds for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959 u $233,983,819.oo HB 588 - Committee on ways and Means, by Rep. Engstrom, Chairman -'Nays and Means. Appropriations; state police and departments, agencies, commissions relating to safety and defense, for fiscal year ending June 30, 1959 - $22,018,251.00 REPORTS OF STANDING COMMITTEES MESSAGES FROM SENATE SB 1284 SB 1089 SB 1299 HB 241 5* non-concurred in SB 1062* SB 1255* SB 1308* HB 108 3* concurred in — Enrolled T* SB 1083 SB 1258 SB 1120 HB 269 3* concurred in - Enrolled SB 1301* all to G.0. HB 306 8* concurred in — Enrolled T* HE 371 3* concurred in - Enrolled T* THIRD READING HB #21 8* non-concurred in SB 1072 Passed '1‘”I HB 25 8* non—concurred in SB 1152* Passed I.E. HB 203 with 5* - Laid over 1 day SB 1011 3.0. on T.R. Thurs. Mar. 27 HB 18 with 8* - Laid over 1 day SB 1032 Re—ref. to Gen. Taxation SB 1326"I SB 1127 Passed SB 1208"I Passed T* Adjourned to Wed. at 2 p.m. SB 1242 Passed T* GENERAL ORDERS SB 1286* to T.R. SB 1108* Ref. to Ways and Means SB 1082 5.0. on G.O. Thurs. Mar. 27 \‘x Ir— _I "IWINNIE "‘NNNNT