

~~AMERICAN~~
~~APR 1 1970~~ 26
MAR 28 1966

SEP 04 2008
041408

ABSTRACT

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: A STUDY IN THE BASES AND PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS

by Walter Dale De Vries

Most studies of lobbying deal with the nature and power of the interest groups that lobbyists represent. The purpose of this study was to carry the analysis a bit further by focusing attention on the lobbyist as an individual agent of the group's interest.

The study was primarily concerned with a close examination of the individual lobbyist's skills, socio-economic background, career patterns, use of lobbying techniques, perceptions of role relationships to his organization and to the legislature, and his and other's perceptions of his effectiveness in the role of lobbyist.

This was a study in the perceptions and bases of effectiveness. Consequently, the theoretical frame of reference and the major hypotheses of the dissertation were stated in social psychological terms. A perceptual model of behavior and certain concepts of role theory were used throughout the thesis.

The major hypothesis of the dissertation was that: there would be a high degree of consensus among the perceptions of the participants in the study--thirty-three lobbyists (action-agents), sixteen legislative leaders (action-targets), and eleven news correspondents (action-observers)--as to which lobbyists were most effectively enacting their lobbying roles; and, further agreement would be present among the evaluating groups concerning the variables perceived as the basis of effective role enactment. The effectiveness of the role enactment (dependent variable) would be

related to these independent variables: lobbyists' role-taking ability, their use of role-associated techniques, and their role perceptions.]

Measurement of the perceptions of the individual lobbyist's role enactment resulted in high statistical correlations among the three evaluating groups concerning those lobbyists most effectively enacting their roles. Further agreement, based on significant statistical correlations, was also present in the perceptions of study participants regarding the bases of effectiveness of the most effective Michigan lobbyists.

An Index of Perceived Effectiveness, which rank ordered the lobbyists from most effective to least effective, was constructed from the data obtained in personal interviews. The Index of Perceived Effectiveness score achieved by each lobbyist was the dependent variable against which the independent variables were tested.

The first major independent variable, role-taking ability or potential, included socio-economic and career background variables and personality characteristics. Lobbyists with certain socio-political background and career characteristics, that is, those who had news reporting experience, previous Republican affiliation, extensive political party experience, high status governmental positions, lengthy governmental experience, and legislative experience, tended to be more effective lobbyists.

The second major independent variable believed related to lobbying effectiveness was the use of role-associated, group-approved lobbying techniques. Sixteen lobbying techniques were isolated and considered, and group consensus was present concerning which techniques were perceived as most effective. However, the hypothesis, that lobbyists who used these group-approved, effective lobbying techniques would be more effective than those who did not use them as much or not at all, was not verified statistically.

Copyright by
WALTER DALE DE VRIES
1960

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: A STUDY IN THE BASES
AND PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS

By

Walter Dale De Vries

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1960

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to the many people who contributed to the development, research, and writing of this thesis.

I wish to thank the Falk Foundation for the American Graduate Training Program Fellowships during the years 1957, 1958, and 1959. The fellowship program provided the necessary funds and motivation involved in the completion of the Ph. D. program, as well as providing the writer with the opportunity to become actively involved in political staff work.

I am especially grateful to Dr. Leroy C. Ferguson for his leadership and guidance during the planning, conducting, and writing of this study. His accessibility and willingness to help have been deeply appreciated.

To the other members of my thesis committee, Dr. Ralph M. Goldman, and Dr. Charles Adrian, for their thoughtful suggestions regarding the research design and text of this thesis, I am grateful.

A special note of "thanks" to the thirty-three lobbyists--who must remain anonymous--for their time, tolerance, and interest in this study. As personal friends and interested observers, they have awaited the results of my study with some impatience and a little apprehension. I apologize for the former, and hope that the latter will be relieved as they examine the results and conclusions of this work.

I want to express my appreciation to the Lieutenant Governor, the President of the Senate, the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, the House Majority and Minority Leaders, the Chairmen of all major Legislative Committees, and the rest of the sixteen legislators who participated in this study. I hope I have justified the candor and interest entrusted in me by these personal friends.

Former Speaker of the House of Representatives, George M. Van Peursem, and the incumbent Speaker, Don R. Pears, should be singled out for the unusual tolerance and encouragement proffered the writer by permitting him to conduct this research while acting as Assistant to the Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives.

I want to send a special vote of "thanks" down the hall to my eleven friends in the House Press Room who willingly participated and contributed to this academic venture with the earthy insights and gentle cynicism which seems to accompany the news reporting profession. I anxiously await their critical judgment and analysis of my first major scholarly enterprise.

To the panel judges, Fred I. Chase, Secretary of the State Senate; Norman B. Philleo, Clerk of the House of Representatives; and Hugh Brenneman, Public Relations Counsel for the State Bar of Michigan, the Michigan Medical Society, and the Michigan Society of Architects, I want to express my gratitude for the work they performed in the selection of the universe of this study.

Many of my friends, associated with the Michigan Legislature, helped me--in their spare time--with the typing and preparation of this dissertation. A few who should be publicly acknowledged are: Mrs. Eleanor Brown, Secretary to the Speaker; Miss Wanda Stewart, Mrs. Marjorie Ellis, and Miss June Cammack, all of the Legislative Service Bureau.

Finally, I hope this document serves as an answer to the persistent queries of my three sons, Mike, Bob, and Steve, regarding my mysterious activities in the inviolate sanctuary of my study and Lansing office during the past three years. To my wife, Lois, whose tolerance and patience have been limitless, I owe a deep debt of gratitude for providing the motivation necessary to conclude this work; and, it is to her that I dedicate this volume.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	Page
I. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: INTRODUCTION, DEFINITION, AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM. .	1
Introduction	1
Examination of the Literature	5
Theoretical Statement and Statement of the Problem . .	9
Definition of the Michigan Lobbyist	14
The Popular Stereotype	14
Michigan Statutory Definition	16
Definition of Lobbyist Used in This Study	18
Research Methodology.	23
Summary	25
II. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE EFFECTIVENESS	27
Introduction	27
Index of Perceived Effectiveness	28
Lobbyists' Self-Evaluations and Sense of Efficacy	34
Summary	40
III. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACK- GROUND, CAREER PATTERNS, AND LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS	42
Introduction	42
Socio-Economic Background	43
Age	43
Birthplace of Lobbyists	45
Place of Upbringing	47
Education	49
Father's Occupation	52
Religious Affiliation	52
Marital Status of Lobbyists and Number of Children .	54
Summary--Socio-Economic Background	54
Career Correlates	56
Source of Major Influences to Enter Public Affairs. .	56
Family Group Influence	56
Relatives in Politics	58

Cont'd

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

CHAPTER	Page
School as Source of Influence	59
Political Governmental Participation as Source of Influence	61
Politically-related Non-governmental Occupation as Source of Influence	61
Sense of Mission and Obligation as Source of Influence	62
Lobbying Activity as Source of Influence	62
Pre-Lobbying Occupational Career	63
Political Experience	66
Previous Republican Affiliation and Effectiveness	67
Years of Political Experience and Effectiveness	69
Present Political Affiliation and Effectiveness	69
Governmental Experience	71
Previous Governmental Experience and Effective- ness	71
Level of Governmental Experience and Effective- ness	72
Status of Governmental Experience and Effective- ness	75
Years of Governmental Experience and Effective- ness	75
Legislative Experience and Effectiveness	78
Summary--Career Correlates	78
Summary	80
 IV. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPTIONS OF RECRUIT- MENT, LOBBYING ROLES, AND JOB SATISFACTION	 83
Introduction	83
Recruitment	83
Selected and Asked by Organization	84
Applied for Position	87
"Grew into it" from other Organization Position	88
Recruitment through Friends and Contacts	88
Professional Relationship and Personal Commitment	89
Policy Position as Factor in Decision to Represent Interest Group	89
Personal Commitment to Organization Policy	92
Perceptions of Professional Relationships	94
Perceptions of Lobbying Role	95
Promoter-Strategist	97
Defender-Advocate	99

Cont'd

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

CHAPTER	Page
Liaison	102
Serviceman	103
Public Relations Man	103
Other Lobbyist Roles	104
"Like to Work with People" as Source of Motivation	137
Future Career Plans	138
Summary	139
 V. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES.	 142
Introduction	142
Description and Analysis of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques	151
Direct Personal Communication	151
Personal Presentation of Arguments	151
Presentation of Research Results	152
Testifying at Hearings	152
Communication Through Intermediaries	153
Public Relations Campaign	153
Collaboration with Other Groups	154
Contact by Constituent	158
Contact by Person with Special Access	160
Organization News Activities	162
Letter and Telegram Campaigns	164
Publicizing Voting Records	166
Achieving and Maintaining Access	167
Entertaining for an Evening	168
Giving a Party	172
Personal Favors and Assistance	175
Contributing Political Work	176
Contributing Political Money	176
Direct Bribery	178
Comparison of Washington and Lansing Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques	179
Relationship of the Use of Lobbying Techniques to Effectiveness	181
Lobbyists' Perceptions of Planning and Freedom in the Use of Tactics and Techniques	183
Lobbyists' Perceptions of Legislative Information Sources, Contacts, and Contact Development	188
Summary	207
	Cont'd

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

CHAPTER	Page
VI. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEIVED BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS	210
Introduction	210
Perceived Bases of Effectiveness for Top Sixteen	
Lobbyists.	211
Personality, Sociability Factors	219
Organizational Factors	220
Background and Experience	222
Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques	224
Knowledge of Subject	226
Knowledge of, Confidence in, and Acceptance by	
Legislators	228
Knowledge of Legislative Process.	230
Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance.	232
Ability to Communicate	235
Personal Integrity, Honesty and Sincerity	236
Hard Work	239
Political Party Factors	239
Kind and Acceptability of "Lobbying Product"	240
Summary	241
VII. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SOME VALUE JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	247
Introduction	247
Tolerance and Acceptance of Pressure Groups	247
By Lobbyists	249
By Legislators	251
By News Correspondents	253
Lobbyists' Perceptions of Solicitations of Views by Public	
Policy-Makers	255
Other Value and Opinion Considerations	257
Concern with Public Image and Social Status	257
Change in Lobbying Tactics and Personnel	259
Reporters as Lobbyists	261
Lobbying Regulation	261
Some Lobbying Regulation Recommendations	268
Summary	270

Cont'd

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- Continued

CHAPTER	Page
VIII. THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS . . .	273
Introduction	273
The Major Hypothesis	274
The Dependent Variable	275
The Major Independent Variables	276
Role-taking Ability or Potential	277
Role-associated Techniques	283
Role Perceptions	288
Value Considerations and Recommendations	293
BIBLIOGRAPHY	296
APPENDIXES	302

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	Page
1. Breakdown by Position of Michigan Legislative Agents .	19
2. Sociometric Matrix of Lobbyists Chosen as Effective by Other Lobbyists	29
3. Sociometric Matrix of Lobbyists Chosen as Effective by Legislative Leaders	30
4. Sociometric Matrix of Lobbyists Chosen as Effective by Correspondents	31
5. Comparison of the Combined Ratings of Lobbyists, Legislators, and Legislative Leaders in an Index of Perceived Effectiveness	33
6. Index of Perceived Effectiveness	35
7. Lobbyists' Self-evaluation of Role Effectiveness and Efficacy	37
8. Relationship of Lobbyists' Age to Effectiveness	44
9. Relationship of Lobbyists' Birthplace to Effectiveness .	46
10. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Place of Upbringing	48
11. Relationship of Amount of Education to Effectiveness . .	51
12. Relationship of Fathers' Occupation to Lobbying Effectiveness	53
13. Religious Affiliation of Lobbyists	54
14. Marital Status of Lobbyists and Number of Children . .	55
15. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Major Influences to Enter Public Affairs	57

Cont'd

LIST OF TABLES -- Continued

TABLE	Page
16. Relationship of Relatives in Politics to Lobbying Effectiveness	60
17. Pre-lobbying Occupations of Michigan Lobbyists	64
18. Relationship of Previous Political Affiliation to Lobbying Effectiveness	68
19. Relationship of Political Party Experience to Effectiveness	70
20. Relationship of Governmental Experience to Effectiveness	72
21. Level of Lobbyists' Previous Governmental Experience.	74
22. Relationship of Status of Governmental Position to Effectiveness	76
23. Relationship of Years of Governmental Experience to Effectiveness	77
24. Relationship of Those Lobbyists Who Had Served as Legislators to Effectiveness	79
25. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Methods of Recruitment . . .	85
26. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Importance of Organization Policy Position in Decision to Become Their Lobbyist .	90
27. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Personal Commitment to Organization Policy	93
28. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Professional Relationship to Organization	96
29. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Lobbying Roles	98
30. Relationship of "Promoter-Strategist" and "Defender-Advocate" Roles to Effectiveness	101

Cont'd

LIST OF TABLES -- Continued

TABLE	Page
31. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Differences in Lobbying Role as Viewed by Organization and Lobbyist	105
32. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Formulation of Organization Legislative Policy	111
33. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Time Spent in Lobbying-Related Activities	116
34. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Time Spent on Lobbying Legislators	120
35. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Methods of Reporting to Their Organizations	122
36. Cost of Financing Lobbying Operation	126
37. Lobbyists' Income	127
38. Lobbyists' Income as Related to Effectiveness	129
39. Relationship of Years of Lobbying Experience to Effectiveness	130
40. Lobbyists' Place of Residence as Related to Effectiveness	131
41. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Job Satisfaction	133
42. Perceptions of Motivations in Decision to Remain in Lobbying and Bases of Job Satisfaction	134
43. Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques	147
44. Legislators' Ratings of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques	148
45. News Correspondents Ratings of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques	149
46. Comparison of Lobbyists', Legislators, and News Correspondents' Median Ratings of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques	150

Cont'd

LIST OF TABLES -- Continued

TABLE	Page
47. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Collaboration with Other Groups	155
48. Comparison of Washington Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques with that of Lansing Lobbyists. .	180
49. Individual Breakdown of Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques in Relation to Their IPE Scores	182
50. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Planning of Lobbying Strategy	185
51. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Amount of Freedom in Use of Tactics	187
52. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Legislative Information Sources	189
53. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Legislative Contact Development and Maintenance	194
54. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Legislative Contacts	199
55. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Necessity for Bi-Partisan Lobbying Activity	203
56. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Importance of Number of Committee Contacts	205
57. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Those Committees Which Require Focus of Attention	206
58. Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale and Perceived and Evaluated by all Lobbyists . . .	213
59. Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top Sixteen Lobbyists in the IPE Scale as Perceived and Evaluated by News Correspondents	214
60. Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale as Perceived and Evaluated by Legislative Leaders	215

LIST OF TABLES -- Continued

TABLE	Page
61. Comparison of Frequency of Choice and Rank Order for the Bases of Effectiveness of the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale as Perceived and Evaluated by Lobbyists, Legislators and News Correspondents	216
62. Comparison of Rank Orders for Each Evaluating Group of the Perceived Bases of Effectiveness for the Top Sixteen Lobbyists on the IPE Scale	218
63. Attitudes of Lobbyists, Legislative Leaders, and News Correspondents Toward Pressure Groups	248
64. Lobbyists' Perceptions of Solicitations of Views by Public Policy-Makers	256

CHAPTER I

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: INTRODUCTION, DEFINITION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Introduction

A functional approach to the political process must take into account the interactions among the groups, interests, and governmental institutions that are part of decision-making.

The recognition by political scientists that a working conception of the political system must take into account organized interest groups is still relatively recent. Not only must interest groups be examined because they seek to exercise influence, but also because they are a part of the political system--as important as the political parties and governmental institutions they seek to influence.

Organized group interests are the energizing forces in our political process, and any understanding of American decision-making requires a knowledge of their interest, organization, methods, and role in public policy-making.

Perhaps the most singularly striking feature of American politics is the large proliferation of groups continuously pressing their demands on our governmental institutions.

As the new school of Twentieth Century group theorists point out, the "stuff" of public policy-making consists, in large measure, of advancing legitimate group goals, reconciling and mediating group objectives, and in restraining group tendencies judged to be socially unacceptable.

These organized interests who attempt to promote their interests in government are commonly called "pressure groups." Wider knowledge and greater attention to the study of these groups has been due in large

part to the work begun by Bentley and carried forward by Odegard, Herring, Schattschneider, Truman and Latham, among others.¹

The chief contribution of this new "realistic pluralism" school has been to focus attention on inter- and intra- group phenomena. It is operational research, that is, it deals neither with an individual abstracted from his social environment, nor with abstractions such as society, institutions, or state, which cannot be directly approached.

Earlier writers were concerned much more with the institutions of government and politics. Unlike these studies, group theorists explain the activities of government in terms of a set of external groups exerting pressure upon government. These external groups become the independent variables in the causal explanation of the political process.

The decision which results is the net effect of these countervailing pressures, that is, the group that can bring the greatest pressure to bear on the system has the greatest impact on the decision.

Further, group theorists suggest that all groups are inter-related in systems and sub-systems and are basically similar in internal organization and operation as well as external relationships with other groups.

Studies by American group theorists have tended to focus on large American associational groups, primarily those with an economic interest.²

¹Many writers on interest groups trace their interest to Arthur F. Bentley's pioneer work, The Process of Government (Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, 1908). Since 1908, other interest group studies considered "classics" in the "realistic pluralism" school are: Peter Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); Pendleton Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929); E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935); David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1953); and Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing Point Legislation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952).

²Some typical case studies are: Dayton D. McKean, Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), Oliver Garceau, The Political Life of the American Medical

The conclusions reached by these studies very seldom take into account the behavior of the individual or his interaction and role within the group. Most hypotheses of all group influence studies are stated in terms of activity (decision-making) by governmental institutions as the dependent variables and the activities, properties, and resources of the outside interest group as the independent variables.

In other words, most group-influence studies attempt to measure the influence of the outside pressure group on the legislative process by looking at the legislative decision-making product, that is, the number of bills killed, favorable or unfavorable legislative and administrative rulings, and so forth.

The independent variables that are cited as causal factors are generally related to the concept of access. David Truman in The Governmental Process¹ states the typical group-influence approach

Association (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941), Belle Zeller, Pressure Politics in New York (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), Roscoe Baker, The American Legion and American Foreign Policy (New York: Bookman Association, 1954), M. R. Dearing, Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G. A. R. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), Charles M. Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952), Louis C. Kesselman, The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study in Reform Pressure Movements (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), and others.

A host of articles can be found citing case studies on the history, organization and operation of pressure groups. Some typical studies of groups in Michigan are: James B. McKee, "An Analysis of the Power Structure of Organized Agriculture in Michigan" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Wayne University, Detroit, 1948); George A. Male, "The Michigan Education Association as an Interest Group" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1952); Lawrence W. Robertson, "The Power Structure of the UAW-CIO and Its Impact on Public Policy in Michigan" (PhD Dissertation in progress, Northwestern University, 1955); Lowell B. Van Antwerp, "The Forces Affecting the Passage and Attempted Repeal of the Sales Tax Diversion Amendment" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Michigan State University, 1950) and Roosevelt Wise, "The Michigan Township's Association: A Study of an Interest Group" (Master's Thesis, University of Detroit, Detroit, 1955).

²Op. cit., Chapter 1.

by suggesting that access to governmental decision-making by interest groups depends on structural factors (for example, apportionment structure, separation of power, legislative structure, and so forth), group properties and resources (for example, size and distribution of membership, lobbying techniques, money, leadership skills in maintaining cohesion, and so forth), and other variables not controlled directly by the interest group (for example, public opinion, hostility or support of other interest groups, and socio-economic background and attitudes of legislators and other decision-makers).

Hypotheses in these kinds of studies are usually stated as follows:

"The influence of the interest group is related to the amount of:

(1) money, (2) membership, (3) use of appropriate lobbying techniques, (4) overlapping group membership, (5) leadership ability, and so forth."

The understanding of political scientists has been greatly increased by the introduction of the group-influence approach as a significant factor in governmental decision-making. It is not the intention of this study to ignore or deny its utility, but rather to supplement it. Organizational structure, resources, leadership, are all important factors in the exercise of influence by the interest group in the decision-making process. However, this study was designed to carry the analysis a bit further by focusing on the lobbyist as an individual.

Harold D. Lasswell has said: "The study of politics is the study of influence and the influential."¹ To understand the political process we must look not only at the groups who attempt to exercise influence, but also at the agent of the group and his behavior within the decision-making process.

The lobbyist possesses power in the role that he occupies. It is he who represents the organized interest group. He helps formulate organization policies, directs the techniques and tactics for interpreting

¹Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 1.

this policy to decision-makers, mobilizes the resources of the group for action purposes; and, in short, represents the singularly most important agent of the organized group interest.

This study, then, is primarily concerned with a close examination of the lobbyist's skills, socio-economic background, career patterns, perceptions of role relationships to his organization and the legislature, and perceptions of effectiveness in the role as lobbyist.

This is not a study of the nature and power of the groups that these lobbyists represent--as is the case with most other studies of lobbying. This is a study of the perceived role of the individual lobbyist in the legislative process. It also is an attempt to isolate and correlate some of the independent variables which are related to and determine the personal differences in the effectiveness of Michigan lobbyists.

There is a need for a study of this kind. We need comprehensive understanding of who lobbyists are, what they are doing, why they are effective or ineffective, and how they are perceived by their peers and other participants in the legislative decision-making process.

Examination of the Literature

It is hoped that this study will fit in and supplement a similar but more comprehensive work on state legislators now being completed.¹ It is also designed to complement a study of similar focus on Washington lobbyists by Professor Milbrath of Northwestern University.²

¹A study being conducted by Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy Ferguson, John C. Wahlke on four American state legislatures. Financed by the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Research Council. See their article "American State Legislators' Role Orientations toward Pressure Groups," The Journal of Politics Vol. 22 (1960), pp. 203-227.

²Milbrath has not as yet published the complete results of his study. It focused on Washington lobbyists as a political skill group. He interviewed 101 lobbyists and 38 people in Congress, and he has written one article for the Journal of Politics, entitled "The Political Party Activity of Washington Lobbyists," in Vol. 20 (1948), pp. 339-352. He has also written an unpublished

Examination of the literature in this area reveals that very little systematic work (other than Professor Milbrath's) on individual lobbyists has been conducted. Most studies of lobbying have either been confined to group-influence and activities described earlier in this chapter, studies purely concerned with statutory controls and investigation of lobbying, and third, those of an exposé nature written in popular-news-paper style.

Most group influence studies do include at least one chapter on tactics and techniques and in the discussion of them refer to the individual lobbyist.¹ Very few, if any, generalizations are made about individual lobbyists. More often than not, folklore about the exploits of some outstanding lobbyist(s) is cited in most works.

A good deal has been written concerning governmental investigation of lobbying and recommendations needed for effective statutory controls. Periodic congressional and state legislative investigations of lobbying activities² have spurred the writing of many articles and books.³

paper from his data, "Analyzing Lobbying through Communication and Decision Making Models," given at the 1959 Conference of American Association for Public Opinion Research, Lake George, New York, May 14-17.

¹See, for example, Chapter 6 of V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 1958), or Truman, op. cit.

²For a guide to congressional investigations and other related materials, see D. C. Tompkins, Congressional Investigation of Lobbying (Berkeley: University of California Bureau of Public Administration, 1956).

³For an analysis of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, see Belle Zeller, "The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act," American Political Science Review, 42, (1948), pp. 239-271.

Other typical works on lobbying regulation are: Edgar Lane, "Statutory Regulation of Lobbying in the United States with Special Reference to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946" (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1949); W. B. Graves, Administration of the Lobby Registration Provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, (Government Printing Office, Washington

A good deal of the discussion and writing concerning organized interest groups and their lobbying activities is exposé in nature. That is, the journalists and political scientists reporting lobbying activity start with a series of popular premises which suggest that pressure groups are seeking indefensible special privileges, that their motives are generally evil ones and, more important, that they are undesirable growths on the body politic which if not removed or highly controlled will damage our democratic system beyond repair.¹

Autobiographies of former governmental officials and lobbyists can also provide source material on a few well-known or infamous lobbyists.² This material is hard to come by, perhaps because many lobbyists feel that their success is jeopardized by the glare of publicity and, so, many crave anonymity outside of legislative halls.

The suspicion and distrust in which lobbyists are generally held is reflected and reinforced by the press of America. Most daily press stories and magazine feature pieces about pressure groups and their loggyists are framed in the language of the exposé.

D. C., 1950); Belle Zeller, G. L. Schermerhorn, and H. Parkman, Jr., "Lobbies and Pressure Groups" (The Annals, January, 1938); Donald C. Blaisdell, Government Under Pressure (New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1942) and others.

For a list of typical articles on suggested reforms see the bibliography.

¹Some typical works in this vein are: T. B. Mechling, "Washington Lobbies Threaten Democracy" Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer, 1946); Robert A. Brady, Business As a System of Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943); Stuart Chase, Democracy Under Pressure (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945); Pendleton E. Herring, Group Representation Before Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929); Karl Schriftgiesser, The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951).

²See, for example, Glyndon G. Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1947).

The following are typical examples of the headlines and story leads used by a sample of Michigan newspapers during the years 1958 and 1959.

"Lobbyists Move In, " Lansing State Journal, January 9, 1958.

"Lobbyists Mobilize in Lansing, " Detroit Free Press, January 10, 1958.

"Lobbyists Hope for Defeat of Costly Bills They Sponsor, " Detroit News, February 2, 1958.

"The Lobbyists Go Ivy League, " Detroit Times, February 23, 1958.

"Doctors Kill State A-Bill, " Detroit Times, April 13, 1958.

"UM, MSU Suffer from '57 Lobbying, " Grand Rapids Press, April 26, 1958.

"Lobbyist Asks Job (at \$10,000) Guarding Hazel Park's Track Cut, " Royal Oak Daily Tribune, May 8, 1958.

"Both Parties Join to Blast Lobbyists, " Saginaw News, May 13, 1959.

"Legislators are Outnumbered, " Mason Ingham County News, August 21, 1959.

"Lobbyists Peddle Ideas to Uninformed Legislators, " Holly Herald-Advertiser, September 4, 1959.

"State Eyes Probe of Lobbying, " Detroit Free Press, September 20, 1959.

"Lobbies Spend Millions, " Lansing State Journal, October, 1959.

During 1958 and 1959, the writer collected 95 Michigan newspaper clippings regarding Michigan pressure groups and their lobbying activities. In a rather crude content analysis over this period, only two favorable headlines, leads, stories, or editorials written about lobbyists were uncovered. In a few remote instances, a lobbyist or pressure group was singled out for special praise for a stand taken on some issue, but generally it was made clear that the reporter or editor considered this lobbyist to be atypical of the whole group. This reportorial and editorial attitude is also reflected among the popular magazines of this country.¹

¹See, for example, Lester Velie, "The Secret Boss of California, " Collier's, (August 13 and 20, 1949).

13

Reporters in writing about pressure groups and their lobbyists seem to be fulfilling an expected role, that is, reinforcing a public image that lobbying in itself is bad for democracy. On the other hand, most state capitol reporters rely on lobbyists for a great deal of information, some entertainment, and in some cases, news. Many are close personal friends. Furthermore, as is pointed out in Chapter VII, most reporters perceive lobbyists as absolutely essential to the smooth operation of the legislative process.

Nevertheless, most reporting and editorializing about lobbying leaves the reader with the feeling that it is inherently bad, undemocratic, and something should be done about it. Content analysis of Michigan stories on lobbying revealed that in most instances the writer of the article did not suggest lobbying reforms, and if he did, the reporter tended to be ambiguous about such reforms.

Examination of the literature concerning lobbying, then, revealed: (1) most studies of lobbying are confined to group activities and influence; (2) a concern with statutory controls and investigation of lobbyists; and (3) it is most often dealt with in the popular language of the newspaper and magazine exposé. Clearly, it is time for another approach.

Theoretical Statement and Statement of the Problem

This study will attempt a close examination of the skills, socio-economic background, and career patterns of the typical Michigan lobbyist. The heart of the thesis, however, centers on the perceptions of the lobbyists' effectiveness, and his perceived role in the legislative process as well as toward his organization and others. Beyond a description of these perceptions and roles, attempts will be made to isolate and correlate some of the independent variables which are related to and determine the personal differences in the effectiveness of the role enactment of Michigan lobbyists.

To adopt one of the many psychological theories concerning human motivation and behavior would require a choice of one particular "school" over another (for example, stimulus-response theorists, Neo-Freudian psychoanalysis, or one of many others). And although each "school" offers substantial evidence in support of its theoretical model of behavior, there is little agreement within the discipline of psychology concerning a comprehensive broad-gage theory. Selection of a particular model would, then, be hazardous and the explanation fragmentary.

To pick a class or group model of social behavior offers the same hazards. More so because this study is interested primarily in the unique role that the individual lobbyist as actor plays in the legislative process.

For these reasons, the discipline that has a perceptual model which best explains the role of the actor in relationship to the society was used. The basic approach in this study was social psychological. An effort was made to not describe lobbyists' behavior in "group," that is, sociological, terms; neither were they looked at as individuals abstracted from their social environments, that is, with a psychological perspective.

The discipline of social psychology was drawn heavily upon; particularly the field theoretical, phenomenological, and role concepts of the contemporary social psychologists. The concepts of this discipline seemed to fit best the purposes of this dissertation, in that the individual behavior of the lobbyist in relation to the legislative process can best be explained in perceptual terms.

Social psychologists such as Lewin and Mead pioneered the perceptual approach, and a brief look at the professional journals reveals much concern, if not preoccupation, with the problems of perception. Political scientists early learned the value of perception as a useful model which avoided the pitfalls of group, individualistic, and other theoretical models.

Walter Lippman, about forty years ago, gained lasting fame as a public opinion analyst by pointing out the differences between "the world outside and the pictures in our heads."¹

Through a phenomenological approach it becomes possible to describe and analyze what the political actor "sees" as objective reality. What we are studying, then, are the perceptual constructs which are part of an individual's cognitive structure.

This thesis in no way attempts to measure, for example, the differences in perceived effectiveness of lobbyists in terms of what some consider to be "objective reality," that is, roll call votes on bills and resolutions, or committee actions.

Perhaps the most important theoretical assumption of the perceptual approach is that behavior is related to perceptions and not to what is often thought of as "objectively real." Although subjective perceptions may not always reflect objective reality, it is obvious that what political participants perceive to be reality does guide their role enactments in the political process.

The use of a perceptual model of behavior is closely allied with the concept of role. Concepts of self and role have been extensively employed by social psychologists in discussing interactional behavior. These concepts are important corollaries of the perceptual approach. For an important part of the cognitive structure of any political actor is his perception of himself in various roles. The actor perceives himself as standing in certain relationships to other persons and things, that is, in terms of certain roles.

Role, in this thesis, is defined as "the content common to the role expectations of the members of a social group."² In this case, the

¹Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p. 21.

²For the role theory concepts in this dissertation, the writer has drawn heavily from Theodore R. Sarbin and Donald S. Jones,

Michigan Legislature and the various interest group lobbyists who were the social universe of this study.

The people interviewed in this study perceived themselves, and other actors as well, in terms of a series of roles which they defined to themselves as a result of actions and attitudes toward other persons and things. The situation "is" what the political actor believes to be the roles he thinks himself and others do or should play.

Role theory, as employed in this dissertation, has these major theoretical components: role-enactment; role-taking ability or potential; role perception; and role-associated techniques. The ways in which each of these concepts will be used is discussed in more detail in the following section on dependent and independent variables, and in chapters which will be devoted entirely to the discussion and testing of each of these role components as they apply to Michigan lobbyists.

Through the use of role concepts it was empirically possible to determine and demonstrate the correlation between role relationships defined by the perceptions of role-takers (lobbyists) and the relationship of the role-expectations as perceived and defined by others in the legislative process, that is, by legislative leaders and news correspondents.

The major hypothesis of this dissertation was: there would be a high degree of consensus among the perceptions of the participants in this study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) as to which lobbyists were most effectively enacting their lobbying roles, and further agreement would be present among the evaluating groups concerning the variables involved in effective role enactment. The effectiveness of the role enactment of Michigan lobbyists would be related to their

"An Experimental Analysis of Role Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI, (1956), pp. 236-241; H. Bonner, Social Psychology, An Interdisciplinary Approach (New York: World Book Company, 1953); and T. Parson and E. Shils (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953).

role-taking ability, their use of role-associated techniques, and their role perceptions.

The perceived role enactment of the lobbyist, whether effective or ineffective, was the major dependent variable. How well a lobbyist is perceived as enacting his role can be determined in one of two ways. First, by recording and measuring the actual behavior of the persons acting the role (that is, the legislative end-product); or, secondly, by measuring the perceptions of some of the actors in the legislative process for a perceptual evaluation of effective or ineffective role enactment, and the bases of effective role enactment. The writer has chosen the latter course as the more significant and meaningful of the two.

Other hypotheses will follow from the major proposition. As Chapter II will demonstrate, study participants were agreed on their perceptions as to which lobbyists were enacting their roles effectively. Chapter VI demonstrates that study participants were also agreed concerning the important variables that tend to make some lobbyists more effective than others.

Once it was established that effective role enactment was perceived and could be measured, attempts were made to isolate the significant independent variables which affected role enactment. Independent variables affecting effective role enactment were:

1. Role-taking ability or potential: Role-taking ability or potential would be determined by socio-economic variables (for example, age, education, legislative experience, political participation, and so forth), other personal characteristics (for example, perceived personality and sociability factors), and organizational factors (for example, money available for lobbying purposes, extent of "grass roots" organization, public relations programs, and so forth). The relationships of these variables to role enactment will be discussed in Chapters III, IV, V, and VI.

2. Role-associated techniques: In Chapter V, the repertoire of role-associated, group-approved lobbying techniques and the way they are employed will be related to effective or ineffective role enactment.
3. Role perceptions: In Chapter IV, the lobbyist's perceptions of his role will be described, analyzed, and compared to the role consensus of other actors in the legislative process. Further, the relationships of various lobbying roles to effectiveness will be examined.

In addition to the major hypotheses cited, these three independent variables contain many minor propositions which will be tested and discussed in the chapters to follow.

Definition of Michigan Lobbyist

The Popular Stereotype

The Sigler grand jury investigation of Michigan lobbyists and legislators shortly after World War II resulted in the indictment of several lobbyists on bribery charges. This investigation did much to reinforce the popular image of the Lansing lobbyist.

Most of the lobbyists of that era have left the Lansing scene. Their replacements are from different educational backgrounds, use different techniques and tactics, and in many other ways are quite distinguishable from their predecessors.

Reporter Al Kaufman of the Detroit Times described the apparent transition this way:

Glamour boys and Ivy League suits and college degrees command the Lansing lobby heights today.

Under the new order, all-night poker parties, like their lusty, hard drinking hosts have vanished.

Guzzlers have been replaced by martini tipplers who prefer the Wall Street Journal to the racing form.

Like many of the lawmakers who often lean heavily on their advice, they are young, ambitious with social and economic status and a keen grasp of governmental affairs. They carry briefcases, peddle their wares like diplomatic couriers and call themselves 'legislative agents.'¹ A lobbyist, in their vocabulary, is a 'dirty name.'

Mr. Kaufman continued by contrasting the Lansing lobbyist of today with those of a decade or more ago.

All but forgotten are former 'agents' like Constantine 'Tea' Daniel, a short, dapper figure of the '30s who wore pinc nez glasses on a black ribbon, a flower in his lapel and peddled influence in Lansing to the highest bidders.

When a grand jury investigation of lobbyists started and a subpoena was issued for his appearance, 'Tea' carefully brushed the lint from his tailored coat, grabbed his hat and disappeared. He returned only after the grand jury ended and explained to his astonished colleagues he had been visiting a sick friend in Amherstburg, Ontario.

Floyd Fitzsimmons of Benton Harbor who lobbied for dog tracks and horse racing and made lawmakers his willing captives when he brought the fabulous Jack Dempsey to mingle with them in Lansing. Or William Green of Hillman, a representative of county road commissions and a powerful figure in the old Republican gang that hand-picked legislative committees and named the Speaker of the House.

John Lovett, the former Chicago newspaperman who came to Lansing and made the Michigan Manufacturers Association one of the most powerful voices in state government.

And Charles Gadd, the Detroit Board of Education lobbyist who gladly provided food, drinks and continuous poker games in exchange for more school books and better pay.²

While the image of the lobbyist may have changed among the direct participants in the political process (although many use the old stereotypes for personal or political advantage) there is little doubt that to the average Michigan citizen the typical Lansing lobbyist is the cigar-chewing, insidious, influence-peddling caricature of the past, ready to bribe unwilling legislators at the first opportunity.

¹Al Kaufman, "The Lobbyists Go Ivy League," Detroit Times, February 23, 1958.

²Ibid.

Confirmation of this stereotype became evident when the writer sampled Michigan newspaper and magazine articles during the past three years. Legislators' mail was also extensively sampled, and the writer participated in innumerable conversations regarding lobbyists with them and other public officials.

The existence of the stereotype is partially proven by the sensitivity of Michigan lobbyists to the term "lobbyist." Even for them it has a bad connotation, and they much prefer the title of "legislative agent."

Michigan Statutory Definition

Legally, there is no such thing as a lobbyist in Michigan. Michigan law provides for legislative agents. The Michigan law regulating lobbyists defines a legislative agent:

. . . to mean a person who is employed by a person, firm, association, or corporation; or by board, department, or agency of the state of Michigan, or any political subdivision thereof, to engage in promoting, advocating, or opposing any matter pending before either House of the Legislature or any committee thereof, or who is employed expressly for the purpose of promoting, advocating, or opposing any matter which might legally come before either House of the Legislature or any committee thereof.¹

Further clarification of the function of a lobbyist is found in Section two:

The terms 'advocating,' 'promoting,' and 'opposing' shall be construed to mean any act or acts, performed directly with a member of the Legislature, for the purpose of influencing him to vote or to use his influence for or against any matter pending before either House of the Legislature or any committee thereof.

The statute then defines what can and cannot be considered lobbying activity:

Any person who shall confine his activities in promoting, advocating or opposing any matter pending before either house of the legislature or any committee thereof, to written communications

¹Section 1, Act 214, (Michigan Public Acts, 1947), Sections 4.401-4.410 Incl., (Michigan Compiled Laws of 1948).

or to formal appearances before any legislative committee or committees to which such matter has been duly referred, and who in writing clearly identifies himself to the committee together with each and every person, firm, association, corporation, or other interest represented by him, shall not be deemed to be a legislative agent within the meaning of this act; neither shall such term include any person whose contact with the legislature is limited to furnishing information at the request of any legislator or legislative committee regarding any matter pending before either House of the Legislature or any committee thereof.¹

Other features of the act require lobbyists to register information regarding their employment with the office of the Secretary of State,² pay an annual filing fee of \$5.00³ keep a record of their expenses, and report any transaction with any member of the Legislature.⁴

Michigan law does not require lobbyists to reveal expenditures. They are required, however, to keep a record of them for six years. The only way these records can be obtained is by a court order or through a Legislative investigating committee authorized by joint action of the House and Senate.

Failure to register and follow the provisions of this act could result in a felony conviction, carrying a maximum fine of \$1,000 and jail sentence of one year.⁵ According to the State Attorney General, no person has ever been prosecuted under the 1947 act.

The definition of a lobbyist within this act is broad and ambiguous enough that many state department and agency personnel who function in the role as lobbyist do not bother to register. Either that, or they are in direct violation of the law.

¹Section 3, ibid.

²Section 4, ibid.

³Section 9, ibid., (See also Amendment in P. A. 187 to 1958).

⁴Section 7, ibid.

⁵Section 10, ibid.

Definition of Lobbyist Used in This Study

About 367 persons registered as Michigan legislative agents in 1958.

Table 1 reveals that there is a great variety of positions held by the people registered as legislative agents. One thing is certain, lobbyists generally do not call themselves legislative agents, either by choice or organizational directive. Only thirty-five (9%) of those registered are called legislative agents.

The majority represented themselves as Association executive secretaries or directors (18%), organization officers (20%), or employees (12%).

About 2% listed themselves as legislative relations staff members, 6% were attorneys representing organizations as legal counsels, 4% were members of public relations staffs, and 4% described themselves as organization members.

Twenty percent of those who registered were connected in some way, either as employees or officials, with a state or local governmental body. A good many (11%) of these were county road commissioners or employees.

Although a few municipalities have agents, it is interesting to note that the majority of persons in this category were librarians who had registered on behalf of the Michigan Library Association--from cities and villages all over the state.

State agencies and commissions account for about 1% of the total. Of the five who registered, four were affiliated with the State Waterways Commission, and one with Wayne State University. No other state agency, board of commission made any efforts to register any of its members or employees as legislative agents. This is significant in view of the fact that much of the lobbying this writer has observed was done by state governmental employees or appointees on behalf of their respective departments, agencies or educational institutions.

12

TABLE 1

BREAKDOWN BY POSITION OF MICHIGAN LEGISLATIVE AGENTS *

Position	Number	Percent
Private Interest Groups		
Association Executive Secretary or Director	66	18
Organization Officer	74	20
Legislative Relations Staff	9	2
Attorney (Legal Counsel)	21	6
Legislative Agent	35	9
Public Relations	14	4
Organization Legislative Committees	19	5
Organization Member	15	4
Association, Organization or Company	44	12
Employees		
Sub Total	297	80%
Governmental Employees and Officials		
Schools	7	2
County Road Commissioners	42	11
Boards of Supervisors	5	1
Municipalities	20	5
(includes libraries)		
State Agencies	5	1
Sub Total	79	20%
Grand Total	376	100%

* This breakdown was compiled as of April 1, 1958. The combined total of registered positions was 376. The actual number of registered legislative agents was 367; however, nine lobbyists registered in dual capacities for one or more organizations.

The majority of these "lobbyists" never made more than one or two trips to Lansing, if indeed, they made any at all. A sample of the total group of registered legislative agents would not have been an accurate one for the purposes of this study.

Out of this group, the writer had originally intended to use the Capitol Club of Lansing as his sample of Michigan lobbyists. This club consists of a group of full-time lobbyists who hold monthly luncheon meetings to discuss pending legislation, to pass on intelligence reports, and to make decisions regarding bills they will oppose or support.

Use of the Capitol Club as the universe for this study proved unworkable. The forty-member club has certain membership qualifications which prohibit some lobbyists from joining. Only lobbyists who work for an Association are eligible to join upon invitation. In addition, no more than one lobbyist per association is allowed in the club.¹

Therefore, a panel of three men was selected to determine which lobbyists should constitute the focus of this study.

The panel was instructed to pick out lobbyists for the study who could be considered as giving the majority of their time to lobbying activity.

The panel consisted of: Fred I. Chase, Secretary of the State Senate; Norman E. Phileo, Clerk of the House of Representatives, and Hugh W. Brenneman, Public Relations Counsel for the State Bar of Michigan, the Michigan Medical Society, and the Michigan Society of Architects.

Mr. Chase and Mr. Phileo were selected as panel members because of the frequent daily contacts with lobbyists over the many years they have been serving the Michigan Legislature.

Mr. Brenneman, a well-known lobbyist, was selected as a panel judge because he had served as President of the Capitol Club and had

¹Information taken from an interview with Hugh Brenneman, former President of the Lansing Capitol Club. The interview was conducted in October, 1958.

over the years become intimately acquainted with most of the full-time lobbyists working at the state capitol.

Each member of the panel was given the list of legislative agents published annually by the Secretary of State's office. This list contained the names, organizations, and positions of 367 people registered in 1958 as legislative agents.

Panel judges were asked to check the names of those people they knew spent most of their working time in lobbying activities and could be considered as full-time legislative agents.

There was a remarkable degree of unanimity among the panel judges. A total of ninety-six lobbyists were selected as meeting the requirements for full-time activity. There were twenty-four choices (mostly by Mr. Phileo) which received only one vote. All of the others received at least two votes and fifty-five lobbyists were picked by all three panel members.

These fifty-five lobbyists were the universe (N) for this study. They represented about 15% of the total group of 367 registered lobbyists.

Out of the fifty-five legislative agents considered as potential subjects (N) for the purpose of this study, thirty-three (60%) were actually interviewed (n). Of those who could not be interviewed; three were ill; seven had become inactive during the last few years; five were in associations or organizations that had another lobbyist who had already been interviewed; three had been interviewed in the pre-test; and four refused to cooperate or consistently broke interview appointments.

Of the thirty-three lobbyists interviewed, the majority were executive officers of trade associations. Thirteen (38%) were the chief hired staff person of the association. Typical titles were: Executive Vice-President, Executive Secretary, Assistant to the President, and Manager of the association. One of this group was an elected paid officer and his title was Secretary-Treasurer.

Eight (25%) listed themselves simply as employees of the company or association they represented. For purposes best known to the organization, these employees were not listed in the table of organization, as engaged in legislative or public relations work. In reality, however, these eight men were among the most active of the lobbyists.

Five (16%) of the group listed themselves as legal legislative counsels to the organization or association they represent. Some preferred the title, General Counsel, Legislative Counsel, or Consultant. In every case, however, they all were actual staff members of the organization or governmental agency. None were members of an outside law firm designated to handle legislative problems on behalf of the client.

Four (12%) registered as public relations specialists. Some preferred the title, public relations consultant, or director of public information. In three cases, they were part of the staff of a company or organization. In one instance, the lobbyist was a free lance public relations entrepreneur with a special clientele of associations and businesses.

Two (6%) of the registered lobbyists interviewed in this study were Chairmen of the Legislative Committees of their associations. In this capacity they received either a part-time salary plus expenses or a retainer from the organization, depending on the amount of time spent on the job.

Only one (3%) of the sample listed himself as a legislative representative.

This study is confronted by one serious limitation in its discussion of Michigan lobbyists. Only those persons and organizations who registered as legislative agents with the Secretary of State were considered in the sample. It is apparent that all private organized pressure groups in Michigan with a legislative interest have done so. However, state agencies, departments, commission, boards, educational institutions, and many

others of a similar nature had to be excluded from the purview of this study simply because they did not register their legislative interest with the Michigan Secretary of State.

Yet, many persons in these governmental and public institutions do lobby regularly. As a matter of fact, a good case could be made pointing out that their activities are as intense as those outside the formal governmental process. Inclusion of these "governmental lobbyists," however, would have presented serious problems of definition and could easily be the subject of another dissertation. Certainly, this is an area for profitable future research.

Research Methodology

After the panel of three judges had selected the lobbyists to be the universe of this study, interviews were conducted with thirty-three lobbyists during the year 1958 and the first few months of 1959.

The questionnaire (see Appendix I) consisted mostly of open-ended questions with a few structured questions interspersed throughout. The confidential interviews generally lasted anywhere from one-and-a-half to three hours, with two hours the average length. The respondent was asked to fill out two forms; one estimating the time spent in various activities, and the other a self-evaluation of lobbying techniques (see Appendices II and III). In the evaluation process respondents were given a two-page list of lobbyists (see Appendix IV) to pick out the five lobbyists they perceived as most effective only if they had difficulty in recalling the names. Only in five interviews was it necessary to aid in recall through the use of the lobbyist list.

Interviews were conducted with 11 state capitol correspondents (see Appendix V) covering the capitol beat, and sixteen legislative leaders (see Appendix VI) of both political parties in the House and Senate.

Correspondents from each of the major newspapers, wire services, news federations and chains, and radio and television stations were interviewed. The Legislative leaders interviewed included all of those holding major formal leadership posts as well as the major committee chairmanships in both Houses. In addition, a few typical legislators, not holding important leadership positions, were also interviewed.

Almost half of the interviews conducted with the lobbyists were held in an unobtrusive corner of the Law Library in the State Capitol. A good many others were conducted in the personal offices of the lobbyists or in the office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Other interviews were held in the City Club, a private club located in the Hotel Olds of Lansing; and a few were arranged in the committee rooms of the House and in various bars and restaurants in the city of Lansing.

The interviews with legislative leaders and the correspondents took place on the floor of the House of Representatives (press section), the capitol press room, or in bars and restaurants near the capitol building. Interviews with legislative leaders and correspondents averaged about one hour in length.

Interviews with all of the legislative leaders and reporters were very cordial; and, in no case did the interviewer get the impression that information was being deliberately withheld or distorted. Most of the legislative leaders and all of the correspondents were close personal friends and the writer had every reason to believe that they revealed a good deal more because of this friendship than they might have in another set of circumstances. The same was generally true of the lobbyists. Only in one or two instances did the writer get the distinct impression that the information was incorrect or a deliberate distortion. In only one case did a lobbyist refuse to answer a question on the amount of salary he earned.

The data gathered from these interviews were both of a qualitative and quantitative nature. A code was constructed and those data that were

susceptible to quantitative analysis were treated statistically, and organized into the chapters that follow.

Each of the participants in this study was sent a copy of the major summary findings of this dissertation.

Summary

In Chapter I, the relationship of this study to others conducted via the "group approach" was discussed. The need for a study of this kind--one which examines the individual lobbyist's skills, socio-economic background, career patterns, role perceptions and effectiveness--was cited and explained. An examination of the literature revealed that:

(1) most studies of lobbying are confined to group activities and influence; (2) there is a concern with statutory controls and investigation of lobbyists; and (3) lobbying is most often dealt with in the popular language of the newspaper and magazine exposé.

The theoretical frame of reference, and the subject-matter of this dissertation were stated in social psychological terms. A perceptual model of behavior, with a reliance primarily on concepts of role theory, was used in the design of the major hypotheses of this dissertation. The major hypothesis of this thesis was: there would be a high degree of consensus among the perceptions of the participants in this study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) as to which lobbyists were most effectively enacting their lobbying roles, and further agreement would be present among the evaluating groups concerning the variables involved in effective role enactment. The effectiveness of the role enactment of Michigan lobbyists would be related to their role-taking ability, their use of role-associated techniques, and their role perceptions.

Lobbyists were defined in terms of the popular stereotype and the Michigan statutes; and, an operational definition for the purposes of this

study was described and explained. The research methodology used in the selection of study participants and in the actual data gathering and processing was discussed in detail.

CHAPTER II

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPTIONS OF ROLE EFFECTIVENESS

Introduction

One of the important premises of this dissertation was that there would be a great deal of difference between lobbyists in their effectiveness in the legislative process. Further, that these differences in role enactment were perceived by the lobbyist himself, and his peers, as well as by legislative leaders and news correspondents, and these differences in role enactment could be quantitatively measured.

Although this approach has its limitations, in that subjective perceptions may not always reflect objective reality accurately, it is also true that what political role-players believe to be "reality" often does guide their behavior.

Data in this chapter will document the validity of the perceptual approach in that there was substantial agreement among the participants in the legislative process concerning their perceptions of lobbyists who were most effectively enacting their roles.

In question 32, all respondents (lobbyists, legislators, and correspondents) were asked:

Now, as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those doing the best job for their organizations?

If the respondent hesitated or had difficulty recalling names he was handed a two page list of the fifty-five lobbyists sampled for this study (see Appendix IV). In only five interviews was it necessary to submit this list. There were three different lists, which were varied, in order

to assure that placement on the lobbyist list would not affect the respondent's selection of lobbyists.

The respondent was asked to select five lobbyists and then give the interviewer the reasons why he felt these five lobbyists were more effective than the rest of the group.

Index of Perceived Effectiveness

In order to measure the perceived role effectiveness of the lobbyists, a sociometric device was employed which would quantify the data in a meaningful way.

Each of the respondents (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) was assigned a code letter to protect his anonymity. Then, his five choices of the most effective lobbyists were transferred to one of three sociometric matrices in Tables 2, 3, and 4.

The letters across the tops of these matrices represent the lobbyists selected. The vertical letters represent the code numbers of those lobbyists, legislators and correspondents doing the choosing.

At the bottom of each table the frequency of choices, as well as the preferences (from first choice through the fifth), are expressed by the evaluators. The total number of choices were then added. At the very bottom of each table is the Index of Perceived Effectiveness score. This score is obtained by adding the weighted choices of the respondents.

Each of the choices from one to five was assigned a weight as follows:

1st choice	=	5 points
2nd choice	=	4 points
3rd choice	=	3 points
4th choice	=	2 points
5th choice	=	1 point

The number of points that each lobbyist received from fellow lobbyists was totalled at the bottom of Tables 2, 3, and 4; and

Q.T. RT I am

29

CHOSEN

30

METRIC MATRIX OF LOBBYISTS CHOSEN AS EFFECTIVE BY CORRESPONDENTS

CHOSEN

	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	AA	BB	CC	DD	EE	FF	GG	HH	PP	UU	VV	WW	XX	YY	ZZ	AAA
1																																		
2																																		
3																																		
4																																		
5																																		
6																																		
7																																		
8																																		
9																																		
10																																		
11																																		
12																																		
13																																		
14																																		
15																																		
16																																		
17																																		
18																																		
19																																		
20																																		
21																																		
22																																		
23																																		
24																																		
25																																		
26																																		
27																																		
28																																		
29																																		
30																																		
31																																		

represents his IPE (index of perceived effectiveness) score for that particular group's evaluation. This was done for each group, that is, the lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents.

In order to achieve one IPE score which could be used in correlation attempts, the three scores given each lobbyist in Tables 2, 3, and 4 were combined in Table 5.

The rank orders that each lobbyist had received from the three groups of evaluators are also listed. The last column in Table 5 lists the rank order of the lobbyists participating in this study held in terms of the combined IPE scores.

The legitimacy of combining the three evaluations into a total score is the result of statistical application. Between given sets of evaluations, statistical significance at the 5% level resulted in every case. In two cases, statistical significance occurred at the 1% level.¹ The well-known formula, product-moment correlation, was used in the analysis to find the amount of relationship.² This was designated to be the appropriate technique because it assumes a mutual relationship between the variables rather than either being dependent on the other. Furthermore, the data do not seem to violate the parametric assumption one makes in selecting this technique.

These statistical tests indicate a variable other than chance operating in the evaluator's perceptions of effective lobbyists. The three

¹The product-moment correlations were:

Between lobbyists and legislators: $r = .496$

Between lobbyists and correspondents: $r = .817$

Between correspondents and legislative leaders: $r = .362$

The critical value for the coefficient at the .01 level is $r = .449$.

²The product-moment formula is:

$$\frac{N\epsilon XY - \epsilon X\epsilon Y}{\sqrt{N\epsilon X^2 - (\epsilon X)^2} \sqrt{N\epsilon Y^2 - (\epsilon Y)^2}}$$

TABLE 5

INDEX OF PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS
Combined Ratings of Lobbyists, Correspondents
and Legislative Leaders

Lobby- ist	Lobby- ists' evalu- ation	R/O	Corres- pondents' evalu- ation	R/O	Legis- lators' evalu- ation	R/O	IPE Combined Total Score	Rank Order
A	6	23.5	2	19	7	10.5	15	20
B	17	13	0	34.5	6	15	23	10
C	1	35	0	34.5	0	43	1	44.5
D	16	32	0	34.5	5	19	21	12
E	8	20	0	34.5	0	43	8	34
F	22	6	0	34.5	0	43	22	11
G	11	15.5	6	11	1	33	18	16.5
H	8	20	0	34.5	1	33	9	30
I	24	5	21	2	10	5.5	55	3.5
J	13	13	0	34.5	7	10.5	20	13.5
K	66	1	66	1	27	1	159	1
L	38	2	15	3	2	28	55	3.5
M	6	23.5	6	11	18	4	30	6
N	0	40.5	0	34.5	0	43	0	48.5
O	0	40.5	0	34.5	0	43	0	48.5
P	3	32	0	34.5	4	23.5	7	37
Q	14	13	0	34.5	0	43	14	22
R	9	17.5	7	8.5	22	3	38	5
S	19	3.5	0	34.5	1	33	20	13.5
T	1	35	0	34.5	7	10.5	8	34
U	1	35	0	34.5	0	43	1	44.5
V	0	40.5	0	34.5	1	33	1	44.5
W	0	40.5	0	34.5	0	43	0	48.5
X	25	3.5	10	5.5	26	2	61	2
Y	0	40.5	0	34.5	0	43	0	48.5
Z	0	40.5	0	34.5	8	7	8	34
AA	9	17.5	0	34.5	7	10.5	16	18
BB	7	22	0	34.5	6	15	13	24
CC	15	11.5	4	14.5	7	10.5	26	9
DD	20	7	4	14.5	3	25	27	8

participating groups (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and correspondents) were in substantial agreement on which lobbyists were most effective.

These data validated one of the major premises of this dissertation: that is, statistically significant correlations were present among the various legislative process participants in their perceptions of the effective or non-effective lobbyists.

The most significant IPE scores and rank orders were those in the last two columns of Table 5. Table 6 portrays this combined IPE score and rank order. Table 6 is the index of the degree of effective role enactment for each of the lobbyists in this study. It was, then, the dependent variable against which various independent variables were tested in other chapters.

Lobbyists' Self-Evaluations and Sense of Efficacy

In addition to the lobbyists' evaluations of the role effectiveness of their lobbying colleagues, lobbyists in this study were asked to make a self-evaluation of their own effectiveness. These data were not intensively analyzed because there were other social psychological variables which intervened; and, further, the data were not amenable to statistical application.

Each lobbyist was asked this question:

Question 34: How do you appraise the record of legislative success of your own organization, i. e., is your organization achieving its legislative goals?

It was anticipated that each lobbyist would evaluate his organization's effectiveness in personal terms. This turned out to be true. In almost every case, the lobbyist evaluated the legislative success of his organization in personal terms. Typical responses to this question began: "I am doing well"; "We have a good record"; or "My record is good."

TABLE 6

INDEX OF PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS

(N = 33 interviewed lobbyists)

Lobbyist	Rank Order	IPE Combined Total Point Score
K	1	159
X	2	61
I	3.5	55
L	3.5	55
R	5	38
M	6	30
DD	7	27
CC	8	26
B	9	23
F	10	22
D	11	21
J	12.5	20
S	12.5	20
EE	14.5	18
G	14.5	18
AA	16	16
A	17	15
Q	18	14
BB	19	13
GG	20	11
H	21.5	9
FF	21.5	9
E	24.5	8
T	24.5	8
Z	24.5	8
P	27	7
U	29.5	1
V	29.5	1
C	29.5	1
N	31.5	0
W	31.5	0
O	31.5	0
Y	31.5	0

To that extent, then, the question did measure self-perceptions of role effectiveness and efficacy.

Table 7 reveals that almost half (46%) of the lobbyists evaluated their effectiveness as "very good." However, in terms of the IPE score evaluations of other legislative participants, over half overestimated their effectiveness. Two of these lobbyists (lobbyists N and Y) were actually in last place in the IPE scale.

With but four exceptions, the top fifteen lobbyists on the IPE scale perceived their role effectiveness as either "very good" or "good." Lobbyists A and I judged their legislative success as "fair," while lobbyist C felt his organization was not successful. Lobbyist G was unable to make an evaluation, and said his organization "would live by whatever they [the Legislature] do."

Typical responses of those lobbyists who evaluated their organization's legislative success as "very good" were:

Lobbyist D: Our record has been very good. We are definitely achieving our legislative goals. When compared to other states, we have few punitive laws. When we count up our batting percentage at the end of the year, we usually do very good.

Lobbyist E: I have been successful. During the last four years we have got legislation I didn't think could pass. Under normal conditions, however, we are on the defensive.

Lobbyist K who ranked by far as the most effective Lansing lobbyist, reported:

I don't lose very often. The Legislature has been fair to our cause. I'm very rarely denied fair consideration.

Lobbyist L, who also ranks very high in the IPE rank order stated:

We have a wonderfully good record.

Lobbyist N, who ranked at the bottom of the IPE rank order index, confidently asserted:

TABLE 7

**LOBBYISTS' SELF-EVALUATION OF ROLE EFFECTIVENESS
AND EFFICACY**

Question 34: "How do you appraise the record of legislative success of your own organization, i. e., is your organization achieving its legislative goals?"

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Yes, Very Good	Yes, Good	Yes, Fair	No	Can't Say Don't know	NA
K	159	x					
X	61	x					
I	55			x			
L	55	x					
R	38			x			
M	30	x					
DD	27					x	
CC	26		x				
B	23		x				
F	22	x					
D	21	x					
J	20		x				
S	20				x		
EE	18	x					
G	18					x	
AA	16	x					
A	15			x			
Q	14	x					
BB	13	x					
GG	11			x			
H	9						x
FF	9					x	
E	8	x					
T	8		x				
Z	8	x					
P	7		x				
U	1		x				
V	1			x			
C	1				x		
N	0	x					
W	0	x					
O	0		x				
Y	0	x					
Totals							
Number and Percent		15(45%)	7(21%)	5(15%)	2(6%)	3(9%)	1(3%)

We haven't lost a thing in four and a half years. We have an excellent record.

Lobbyist W, who also ranks at the bottom of the IPE scale stated parenthetically that he didn't consider himself a "good lobbyist" nevertheless he claimed that he "never lost a bill in eight years."

Lobbyist X, who ranked second highest in the IPE rank order felt his organization was achieving all of its goals. He further stated:

Offensively, we've lost only one bill in twenty five years.
Defensively, we don't get our back up over everything.

Examination of these responses suggests that lobbyists evaluated their effectiveness almost wholly in defensive terms. Their legislative success was not determined by the number of bills passed, but in terms of the bills killed which would have jeopardized the interests of the organization. This role perception will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter IV. A few typical responses which best summarized this attitude were:

Lobbyist Y: We have not achieved our main legislative goal, that is, to remove the inequities in the law which hurt my organization people. Otherwise, we have done real well, no adverse legislation has been enacted, even though bills have been introduced. (Italics mine)

Lobbyist AA: We have a very good record. We must preserve the status quo; it has been attacked in the past, but never amended. (Italics mine)

Those lobbyists who rated their effectiveness as "good" (21%) were quite similar in their responses to the group that rated themselves as "very good." They, too, often stated their legislative success in negative terms. Lobbyist B, for example, evaluated it this way: "I haven't been defeated badly"; and lobbyist U who felt he has been successful because his opponents have made no headway with "derogatory legislation."

Those who perceived their legislative success as "fair" (15%) phrased their evaluations in this fashion:

(Lobbyist A) We have a fairly good record--no better than that. We have not achieved all of our goals.

(Lobbyist I) We are doing better in the legislature, but worse public-relations wise.

(Lobbyist R) I'm making slow progress. It's taking a long time. We are holding off attacks, but our job is very difficult because of the present composition of the Legislature. In legislation not interfering with my organization we have a good record, but in expansion we are making slow progress.

(Lobbyist V) I think we're doing all right. We've had very few real permanent setbacks, this is an indication that we are always right. On the limited number of things on which we get right down to the mat, we've been fairly successful.

The two lobbyists who felt they were not successful explained it this way:

(Lobbyist C) Our record is good only on one or two bills.

(Lobbyist S) The way we've been going, we're not too successful. In the long run, on adverse legislation to our interests, we've been successful. There are two ways of looking at it; anytime we've had legislation for our benefit we have to give more than we gain.

Of the three lobbyists (6%) who could not make an evaluation, lobbyist FF best summarizes their position when he stated: "I don't know how we have been successful, we haven't achieved what a lot of people in the program wanted."

It is possible to generalize from these data that 67% of the lobbyists interviewed perceived their organizations as either achieving very good or good success in the pursuit of their legislative goals. By contrast, only 15% believed they were not achieving the organization's legislative goals.

Comparison of these data with the point scores achieved by lobbyists on the IPE scale indicated that, with few exceptions, the top sixteen lobbyists' self-evaluations corresponded with the pooled perceptions of

other legislative process participants. In half the cases, however, it is apparent that the lobbyists on the lower half of the IPE scale have over-estimated the legislative success of their own organization and their own personal effectiveness.

The accuracy of the self-evaluations can certainly be questioned. They cannot be included in the over-all IPE rank order. Nevertheless, these self-perceptions of role effectiveness are of more than just parenthetical interest. For self-confidence on the part of the lobbyist in his past role enactment is probably a significant variable in his future performance.

As suggested earlier, legislative success may also be related to the role-playing perceptions of the lobbyist. If he perceives his role as primarily defensive, that is, killing bills, this is a considerably easier task than piloting legislation through both Houses. This relationship will be discussed in Chapter IV.

Summary

Chapter II is a crucial one in this dissertation. In it the writer has attempted to explain the development of the Index of Perceived Effectiveness and the rank ordering of lobbyists according to the compiled data in this index.

The data contained in the IPE table verify one of the major premises of this dissertation; that is, statistically significant correlations are found among the various legislative process participant groups (lobbyists, legislative leaders and news correspondents) in their perceptions of effective and non-effective lobbyists. The IPE rank order achieved by each lobbyist is the dependent variable against which independent variables will be tested in other chapters.

Finally, an analysis was made of lobbyists' self-perceptions of their role effectiveness. Sixty-seven per cent of the lobbyists perceived their organizations as either achieving very good or good success in the pursuit of their legislative goals; and 15% believed they were not achieving the organization's legislative goals. Comparison of these data with the point scores achieved by the lobbyists on the IPE scale indicated that, with few exceptions, the top sixteen lobbyists' self-evaluations corresponded with the perceptions of other legislative evaluators (other lobbyists, legislators, and news correspondents). For those lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, most over-estimated the legislative success and personal lobbying effectiveness. No attempt was made to relate self-perceptions to IPE scores.

CHAPTER III

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND, CAREER PATTERNS, AND LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS

Introduction

One of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was that effective or non-effective role enactment of the lobbyists was related to role-taking ability or potential. Role-taking ability would be determined by certain socio-economic, political and demographic independent variables such as age, education, governmental service, political participation, former occupation, place of upbringing and others.

This chapter describes and analyzes the relationships between these personal background and career characteristics of the lobbyists; and, further, attempts are made to correlate these variables to Index of Perceived Effectiveness scores.

Although a good deal of research has been done on the social background of political decision-makers and, in one case,¹ on their career patterns, little has been done concerning the occupational and career background of lobbyists. It was pointed out in the first chapter of this dissertation that the only studies that deal with career patterns are biographies or autobiographies of well-known or unusual lobbyists. Although these studies about individual lobbyists are valuable, they do not permit generalization about lobbying careers. To the writer's knowledge, no lobbying study, other than Professor Milbrath's uncompleted work cited earlier, exists which traces career patterns.

¹Unpublished legislative study by Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy Ferguson, John C. Wahlke, op. cit.

This chapter is closely related to the one that follows, particularly in its discussion of the recruitment of lobbyists. One of the hypotheses of this dissertation to be tested in this chapter was that there would be definite occupational and social characteristics and skills within the career patterns of lobbyists (for example, legal training, legislative experience, political participation, etc.) that added to their effectiveness and aided in their recruitment as lobbyists.

Chapter III will uncover these traits, skills and background similarities. In the pages to follow, socio-economic variables and career correlates are described and analyzed. Wherever possible, efforts to find statistical relationships between these variables and correlates with lobbying effectiveness were made.¹

Socio-economic Background

Age

The age distribution of the lobbyists is given in Table 8. The ages of the lobbyists ranged from 31 to 73 years. One of the lobbyists was in the 30 to 35 years classification; four in the 36 to 40 years; five in the

¹The statistical technique, point biserial correlation, was used to measure the amount of relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable of effectiveness and is the same throughout the rest of this dissertation. This technique has a range of -1.0 to +1.0, as does product moment r . In fact, it is a product moment r that can be so used in a multiple regression equation. The formula is:

$$r_{pb} = \frac{\bar{Y}_1 - \bar{Y}_0}{S_y} \sqrt{\frac{N_1 N_0}{N(N-1)}}$$

where: Y_1 = mean of sub-group

Y_0 = mean of sub-group

both distinguished by discrete variable X .

N_1 number in Y_1 sub-group.

N_0 number in Y_0 sub-group.

See Allen Edwards, Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Rinehard, 1955).

TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP OF LOBBYISTS' AGE AND EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Age
K	159	62
X	61	39
I	55	52
L	55	61
R	38	49
M	30	54
DD	27	59
CC	26	66
B	23	45
F	22	56
D	21	63
J	20	73
S	20	48
EE	18	47
G	18	65
AA	16	47
A	15	41
Q	14	40
BB	13	40
GG	11	60
H	9	53
FF	9	49
E	8	51
T	8	43
Z	8	53
P	7	31
U	1	61
V	1	37
C	1	60
N	0	36
W	0	68
O	0	38
Y	0	47

Point Bi-Serial Correlation Coefficient at .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .2210.$ *

* This figure represents the actual correlation present between the variables. In all tables to follow, the actual correlation is listed the same way after the correlation needed for significance at the 5% level.

41 to 45 years; six in the 46 to 50 years; five in the 51 to 55 years; four in the 56 to 60 years; five in the 61 to 65 years; two in the 66 to 70 years; and one was above 73. The median age was 50 years.

It was hypothesized that older lobbyists would tend to be more effective than lobbyists who were below the median age of 50 years. This was anticipated because the typical Michigan legislator is over 50 years of age; and it was felt that the older lobbyists would tend to have more of the career experiences and correlates (for example, legislative, political, and governmental experience) necessary for effective lobbying. Of the sixteen lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale, ten were above 50 years of age, and six were below 50. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale, only seven were 50 and above, and the other ten were below 50 years of age. This indicates some relationship between age and effectiveness. However, the point bi-serial correlation between age and lobbying effectiveness ($r. = .2210$) was below the 5% level of significance, indicating no statistical correlation between effectiveness and age.

Birthplace of lobbyists

The place of birth of the lobbyists is depicted in Table 9. Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists interviewed were born in Michigan, and 39% were born out-of-state. It was hypothesized that native-born lobbyists, who might be more familiar with Michigan and its problems would tend to be more effective than those born in other states or foreign countries. Of the top sixteen lobbyists, seven were born outside of Michigan, and none were born in-state. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale, six were born out-of-state and eleven were born in Michigan. The point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .1718$) was below the 5% level of significance, indicating no statistical relationship between birthplace and effectiveness.

TABLE 9

RELATIONSHIP OF LOBBYISTS' BIRTHPLACE
TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Michigan	Out-State
K	159		x
X	61	x	
I	55		x
L	55	x	
R	38	x	
M	30		x
DD	27		x
CC	26	x	
B	23		x
F	22	x	
D	21	x	
J	20	x	
S	20	x	
EE	18		x
G	18		x
AA	16	x	
A	15		x
Q	14		x
BB	13	x	
GG	11	x	
H	9	x	
FF	9	x	
E	8		x
T	8		x
Z	8	x	
P	7	x	
U	1	x	
V	1	x	
C	1		x
N	0	x	
W	0		x
O	0	x	
Y	0	x	
Totals and percent		20 (61%)	13 (39%)

Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .1718$

Place of Upbringing

Sixty-seven percent of the lobbyists interviewed were "brought up" in Michigan, and the remaining 33% were reared out of state. In that those "brought up" in Michigan were, with but five exceptions, the same as those born in the state, no table was constructed depicting the data or the anticipated relationship with effectiveness. It was hypothesized that those "brought up" in Michigan would tend to be more effective (for much the same reasons cited concerning lobbyists' birthplace) than those reared outside of Michigan. Generally, more of the lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale were raised in-state than those in the bottom half of the scale. A point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .1511$) was below the 5% level of significance, indicating no statistical relationship between place of upbringing and effectiveness.

Lobbyists were also questioned regarding their perceptions of the type of area (for example, metropolitan, small town, rural, and so forth) in which they were brought up. In that certain occupations (primarily white collar) in urban areas are often linked with upward social mobility, it was hypothesized that there might be a correlation between effectiveness and those lobbyists who had primarily metropolitan backgrounds. Table 10 was designed to test this relationship. Thirty-six percent of the lobbyists were raised in metropolitan areas. Of the sixteen lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale, nine had metropolitan backgrounds, and seven were raised in non-metropolitan areas. Sixty-four percent of the lobbyists perceived their place of upbringing as non-metropolitan. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, fourteen were raised in non-metropolitan areas, and three were raised in urban areas. These data tend to support the hypothesis; however, a point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .1718$) indicates no statistical correlation in that it fell below the 5% level of significance.

TABLE 10

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PLACE OF UPBRINGING

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Metropolitan Area	Non-Metropolitan Area
K	159		x
X	61	x	
I	55	x	
L	55		x
R	38	x	
M	30		x
DD	27		x
CC	26	x	
B	23	x	
F	22		x
D	21		x
J	20	x	
S	20	x	
EE	18	x	
G	18		x
AA	16	x	
A	15		x
Q	14		x
BB	13	x	
GG	11		x
H	9		x
FF	9		x
E	8		x
T	8		x
Z	8		x
P	7		x
U	1		x
V	1	x	
C	1		x
N	0		x
W	0		x
O	0		x
Y	0	x	
Totals and percent		12 (36%)	21 (64%)

Point Bi-Serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r_s = .3494$.
 $r_s = .0683$

Of those raised in non-metropolitan areas, 36% came from a "small town"; 9% from a combination of either "city and small town" or "small town and farm."

Education

The lobbyists in this study were a highly educated group when compared to the total American population. Only 6% had not completed their high school educations, and the remaining 94% were high school graduates, and all of these had attended college. Eighty-five percent of the lobbyists said they had received their high school education in Michigan public schools.

Forty-eight percent of the lobbyists have college degrees, while 46% have had at least two years of a college education. The majority of college degrees were received from Michigan colleges and universities.

The major fields of interest of the lobbyists while in college were highly varied. Twenty-one percent of the lobbyists had majored in business administration; 18% in political science; 9% in education; and 6% in agriculture. Other fields represented were: economics, law, pre-medicine, public administration, psychology, engineering, speech, hotel administration, and literature. Two lobbyists stated that their major interest in undergraduate school was football.

Twenty-four percent of the lobbyists had completed graduate or professional work. Of this group, 12% had law degrees; 12% had master's degrees, and one was a certified public accountant. Twelve percent of the lobbyists said they had started work toward a master's or Ph.D. degree, but had not completed the work. In every case, but one, this graduate work was done at a Michigan university or college.

The major fields of interest among the lobbyists in graduate school was law. Other fields represented were: accounting, education, psychology, business administration, and public administration.

In order to determine whether there was any relationship between the amount of education and lobbying effectiveness, the breaking-point in the data was put at the college graduate level. It was assumed that college graduates would be more effective lobbyists than those who had not received a degree. Table 11 was designed to test this relationship. Of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, seven were college graduates, and nine were not. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, nine were college graduates and eight were not. The point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .0842$) between education and effectiveness was below the 5% level of significance indicating no statistical correlation between the amount of college education and effectiveness.

Of the eight lobbyists who had completed graduate work, four were in the top half of the IPE scale; however, the other four were in the bottom half of the scale. These data suggest that there was no apparent relationship between effectiveness and graduate or professional degrees.

Although there is no statistical relationship between the amount of higher education and effectiveness, many of the participants in this study volunteered the opinion that education was becoming increasingly important for the successful lobbyist. Some stated that this was necessary because of the increasing complexity of the lobbyist's task, and then suggested that as the general level of education and social status of legislators moves up the same must be true of lobbyists.

Careful analysis of the education data also revealed that those lobbyists who are not college graduates--yet rate at the top of the IPE scale--were the lobbyists with the most legislative years of experience. As these lobbyists retire and leave the Lansing scene they will probably be replaced by lobbyists with college degrees. Also, there are different standards of educational achievement for different generations, that is, it is possible that the older lobbyists did not need as much education, nor was as much available then.

TABLE 11

RELATIONSHIP OF AMOUNT OF EDUCATION TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	College Graduate	Non-graduate
K	159		x
X	61	x	
I	55		x
L	55	x	
R	38	x	
M	30	x	
DD	27		x
CC	26		x
B	23	x	
F	22	x	
D	21		x
J	20		x
S	20		x
EE	18		x
G	18		x
AA	16	x	
A	15	x	
Q	14		x
BB	13	x	
GG	11		x
H	9		x
FF	9	x	
E	8	x	
T	8		x
Z	8	x	
P	7	x	
U	1	x	
V	1		x
C	1		x
N	0	x	
W	0		x
O	0	x	
Y	0		x
Totals and percent		16 (48%)	17 (52%)

Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r_s = .3494$
 $r_s = .0842$

Father's occupation

Lobbyists were asked their fathers' occupations because social mobility is often linked with certain occupations (primarily white collar). It was thought that those lobbyists whose fathers held non-white collar jobs would be less effective than those whose fathers were white collar persons. An attempt to depict the relationship between effectiveness and father's occupation was made in Table 12. Twenty-two (67%) of the lobbyists had fathers whose occupations were white collar. This included: insurance salesmen, real estate brokers, bankers, general business executives, retail clerks, and governmental officials. Of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale, thirteen had fathers with white collar occupations, and three were non-white collar. This lends support to the hypothesis that lobbyists whose fathers held white collar jobs tend to be more effective than those lobbyists whose fathers held non-white collar positions. Eleven (33%) of the lobbyists stated their fathers' occupations were non-white collar. This included: mining, farming, trades, and railroad workers. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, eight had fathers with non-white collar backgrounds and nine were white-collar. A point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .1718$) indicated that there was no statistical relationship between father's occupation and lobbying effectiveness at the 5% level.

Religious Affiliation

The religious affiliation of Michigan lobbyists is depicted in Table 13.

The majority of Michigan lobbyists (69%) are members of a Protestant church. Twenty-four percent said their affiliation was Episcopalian; 15% stated they were "Protestant"; 12% said they were Methodist; 12% Presbyterian; 3% Baptist and 3% said they were Lutheran.

TABLE 12

RELATIONSHIP OF FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS TO
LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	White Collar	Non-White Collar
K	159	x	
X	61	x	
I	55	x	
L	55		x
R	38	x	
M	30		x
DD	27	x	
CC	26	x	
B	23	x	
F	22	x	
D	21	x	
J	20	x	
S	20	x	
EE	18	x	
G	18		x
AA	16	x	
A	15	x	
Q	14		x
BB	13	x	
GG	11		x
H	9	x	
FF	9	x	
E	8		x
T	8		x
Z	8		x
P	7	x	
U	1		x
V	1	x	
C	1		x
N	0		x
W	0	x	
O	0	x	
Y	0	x	
Totals (Number and Percent)		22 (67%)	11 (33%)

Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .1718$

TABLE 13

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF LOBBYISTS

	Number	Percent
<u>Catholic</u>	4	12
<u>Protestant</u>		
Methodist	4	12
Presbyterian	4	12
Baptist	1	3
Episcopal	8	24
Lutheran	1	3
"Protestant"	5	15
<u>No Affiliation</u>	4	12
No Answer	2	6
Totals	33	100

Twelve percent claimed Roman Catholic affiliation; 12% said they were not affiliated with a church; and 6% declined to answer the question.

Marital Status of Lobbyists and Number of Children

The marital status and the number of children of Michigan lobbyists is summarized in Table 14.

The majority (84% of Michigan lobbyists are married and have children. Sixty-nine percent had two or more children. Two lobbyists were bachelors, and three were married but had no children.

Summary--Socio-economic Background

The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had these background characteristics in common: they were over fifty years of age; born and reared in Michigan; brought up in a metropolitan

TABLE 14

MARITAL STATUS OF LOBBYISTS AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN

	Number	Percent
Married, one child	5	15
Married, two children	12	36
Married, three children	8	24
Married, four children	2	6
Married, five or more children	1	3
Single	2	6
Married, no children	3	9
Total	33	100

area, did not complete their college educations; and had fathers with white collar occupations.

The majority of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale tended to have these background characteristics in common: they were under fifty years of age; were born and reared in Michigan; were raised in non-metropolitan areas; were college graduates; and had fathers with non-white collar occupations.

The majority of lobbyists claimed protestant church affiliation; and the majority also were married with up to four children.

Although no statistical correlations at the 5% level of significance were found between any of the socio-economic background characteristics and lobbying effectiveness, several trends were noted above.

Career Correlates

This section of the chapter is devoted to the career characteristics of lobbyists; such as the major influences in their decisions to enter semi-public or public life, occupational background, and political and governmental experience, as they might be related to lobbying effectiveness. The major hypothesis here was that the most effective lobbyists might be more likely to have similar career patterns, for example, certain occupational backgrounds, and more political and governmental experience.

Source of Major Influences to Enter Public Affairs

Lobbyists were asked to recall and explain why governmental affairs interested or attracted them.¹ How lobbyists perceived the development of their interest in public affairs is depicted in Table 15.

Family Group Influence. It was thought, at the time this dissertation was designed, that the majority of lobbyists would ascribe the development of their interest in public affairs to the political activity or awareness of their immediate families. Further, this awakening of interest during childhood and adolescence would have some bearing on their choice of lobbying as an occupational career. Also, being raised in a family environment where he had the opportunity to hear political discussion and to experience politics personally might have a strong influence on the lobbyist's awareness and interest in politics. Although

¹The interview question was: "Just what were the major influences that developed your interest in public affairs and legislation?" It should be noted that an open-ended question such as this concerning motivation and the development of political interests elicits a multitude of responses. This multiplicity of responses made it difficult to find satisfactory statistical relationships, and, is further complicated by the fact that many respondents gave more than one reason for their political interest. It is difficult to be definitive, therefore, and to single out one factor as the most important.

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF MAJOR INFLUENCES TO ENTER PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Lobby- ist	IPE Points	Family		School	Political/ Governmental		Politically-related		Sense of		From	
		Group	Influence		Participation	Non-governmental	Occupation	Mission and	Obligation	Lobbying	Activity	Can't Say/ Don't Know
K	159	x										
X	61	x	x									
I	55	x	x									
L	55				x							
R	38									x		
M	30									x		
DD	27					x						
CC	26				x							
B	23					x						
F	22											x
D	21					x						
J	20					x						
S	20											x
EE	18					x						
G	18				x							
AA	16				x							
A	15					x						
Q	14					x						
BB	13					x						
GG	11				x							
H	9							x				
FF	9					x						
E	8				x							
T	8							x				
Z	8					x						
P	7	x	x									
U	1		x			x						
V	1	x										
C	1											x
N	0		x									
W	0	x										x
O	0											
Y	0											x
Totals and Percent*		6(18%)	54(15%)		6(18%)	11(33%)		2(6%)		2(6%)		5(15%)

* Some respondents gave more than one reason, therefore the percentages exceed 100%.

family group influence was mentioned as one of the more important factors, only 18% of the lobbyists perceived it as a primary factor.

Typical comments in this regard were:

Politics was always discussed around the table. My dad was an active Republican until his death.

My family has been involved in politics in Pennsylvania for years. They would have gotten me a political job, but I didn't want to be tabbed.

My interest came from the family; they were interested in public affairs. I became politically active by peddling bills for Bryan in 1908.

I heard politics discussed at breakfast every day. It was a part of the home atmosphere.

The above group perceived political interest as a result of family tradition. One lobbyist said he had campaigned with his father, and "had heard politics talked since I was a kid."

The clear and often colorful recollections of these lobbyists attests to the important part played in their perceptions by the family in developing the lobbyists' interest in politics.

Relatives in Politics. Although only 18% of the lobbyists perceived family group influence as a major influence which developed their interest in politics, 58% of the lobbyists stated in another part of the interview that their relatives had been involved in political activity.

The hypothesis to be tested here was that those lobbyists who had relatives in politics (that is, relatives who had held political office, worked in a political party organization, or had been lobbyists) would be more effective than those lobbyists who had no record of political involvement in their family background.

Thirty-six percent of the lobbyists had one relative in politics; 18% had at least two; and one (the highest ranked lobbyist) had four relatives in politics. Of this group, 52% of these relatives were direct relatives, that is, a father, mother, brother, sister, wife or grandparents; while

9% of this group had politically-involved relatives who were second-order relatives, that is, uncles, aunts, or cousins. The positions held by these relatives were as follows: twenty-seven percent had held local executive positions; 9% local judicial positions, including public attorneys; 6% had held state executive posts; 6% state legislative posts; 12% had held lobbying jobs; and one was engaged in general political organization activity. Of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, eight had had relatives in politics, and eight had not.

Forty-two percent of the lobbyists said that none of their close relatives had ever been active in political activity. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, six had not had any relatives in politics and eleven had one or more involved in political activity.

Table 16 tested the relationship between lobbyists who had relatives in politics and effectiveness. A point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .1100$) below the 5% level of significance indicates there was no apparent relationship between relatives in politics and IPE scores.

School as Source of Influence. Fifteen percent of the lobbyists perceived their educational experience as an important part in stimulation of their political interest. Some attributed this to course work and others to "school politics." Typical comments from those who perceived their formal schooling as influential in their political interest were:

My political interests just started to develop when I was in college.

I was always interested in civics and government as a student--from grade school on up.

Two lobbyists pointed to "school politics" as the source of their political interest. Typical comments were:

I became interested because of college experiences when I became active in obliterating the Communist Party from the . . . campus.

My interest stemmed from high school and college politics; and running for various campus jobs.

TABLE 16

RELATIONSHIP OF RELATIVES IN POLITICS TO
LOBBYING EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Number of Relatives in Politics			
		One	Two	Four	None
K	159			x	
X	61		x		
I	55				x
L	55	x			
R	38				x
M	30	x			
DD	27				x
CC	26	x			
B	23				x
F	22	x			
D	21		x		
J	20				x
S	20		x		
EE	18				x
G	18				x
AA	16				x
A	15	x			
Q	14				x
BB	13				x
GG	11	x			
H	9	x			
FF	9	x			
E	8				x
T	8	x			
Z	8	x			
P	7	x			
U	1		x		
V	1		x		
C	1				x
N	0				x
W	0		x		
O	0	x			
Y	0				x

Totals (Number and
Percent) 12(36%) 6(18%) 1(36%) 14(42%)

Point Bi-Serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .1100$

It seems possible to generalize that formal learning experiences do little but reinforce previous political influences developed in the home. At any rate, it is not a significant influence in the development of political interests.

Political Governmental Participation as Source of Influence. Political and governmental work seems to be an important source of major influence in the decision to enter public affairs. Eighteen percent of the lobbyists, all in the top two-thirds of the IPE scale, cited this participation as important. Typical comments concerning governmental participation indicating this were:

When I worked for the Federal government, I worked on lobbying investigations. This got me interested.

I had always been active in anti-subversive activities during the 1930's in the legislative hearings and debates. This started getting me interested in the thing.

One lobbyist attributed his interest to his work for the Legislature as a young man:

I was a page in the Senate. My father and other legislative friends always talked these things. After college I got a job as financial clerk in the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives.

Another lobbyist stated that his interest in politics developed after he was "drafted" for the job of state legislator:

I got drafted into politics. The legislative candidate in my district was drafted into the Army. I wasn't too interested, but felt it my duty. Since then, my interest has grown.

Politically-Related Non-governmental Occupation as Source of Influence. Eleven (33%) of the lobbyists said they came to be politically aware by working at occupational tasks which are closely related to government, like news media work, public relations, law practice, or union activity. This was the one factor most frequently mentioned by the lobbyists.

Among the non-political forms of activity that acted as a source of influence, the one most often mentioned is news media work. Five of the eleven who cited this factor became interested through reporting.

Typical comments were:

Through radio newscasting I became interested in politics.

I became interested through newspaper reporting. I was a political reporter at city hall.

I was assigned to the state capitol beat for fourteen years. I liked it, and became interested in politics.

I became interested when I was a political writer and capitol correspondent covering the Legislature and state government.

One lobbyist said his interest developed through his law practice.

Two said their interest developed out of public relations jobs within their companies and the necessary legislative work that went with these jobs.

One lobbyist stated his political involvement developed when he was asked to "kill a bill for my union." Activity in occupational and professional groups was cited by two lobbyists as having stimulated their political interest. One said his group had suffered a "bad defeat" with some legislation in 1949, and he became interested in repealing the legislation.

Sense of Mission and Obligation as Source of Influence. Two of the lobbyists, both in the bottom half of the IPE scale, cited a sense of obligation to their professional and occupational group as the basis for their Political interest. One stated that another interest group was "curtailing the activities of his professional group, therefore he got interested in Politics purely as a "defensive mechanism." The other stated that because of the "basic inequalities in the laws pertaining to local government, " they had to do something to save his local government group from "second class citizenship."

Lobbying Activity as Source of Influence. Two lobbyists stated that their lobbying activity itself had developed their interest in politics. In both cases the jobs were assigned to the lobbyists, and as one put it:

This job was assigned to me. I hated it at first, but now I love it.

The other stated that lobbying was just a part of the activity assigned to him as director of his association, but, he had grown to like politics as a result of the assignment.

Fifteen percent of the lobbyists couldn't verbalize about the factors that had influenced their interest in public affairs. One said it was a "matter of circumstances"; and another alleged that there was no factor involved in this because, "I was elected to the job, and I have to like it."

The general impression concerning these perceptions of influence is that there are a great variety of factors and stimuli which cause political interest. However, most of the lobbyists (64%) stated that they became politically aware after their formal schooling and while in their pre-lobbying occupational careers.

Pre-Lobbying Occupational Career

Each lobbyist interviewed was asked to briefly summarize his occupational history.¹ These pre-lobbying, primary occupations are depicted in Table 17. Forty-five percent of the lobbyists listed one occupation as the primary, pre-lobbying occupation, and 55% listed two or more primary occupations.

The occupational backgrounds of Michigan lobbyists are so varied that it is difficult to generalize about them. It is commonly believed that lawyers and others with governmental backgrounds are those best suited and most often recruited for lobbying jobs. Yet, lawyers account for but 12% and those with some governmental experience are but 39% of the total. It had been hypothesized that governmental and political experience would

¹Questions were: "Are you engaged in any other work other than lobbying? Has lobbying been your main occupation all your working life? What other work have you done, and for how long?"

TABLE 17

PRE-LOBBYING OCCUPATIONS OF MICHIGAN LOBBYISTS

Lobby- ist	IPE Points	Law	Medical Arts	News Media	Public Relations	Business Administration	Govern- ment	Sales	Trans- portation	Farm	Total
K	159			x							1
X	61					x					1
I	55						x				2
L	55					x		x			3
R	38						x			x	1
M	30	x					x				2
DD	27			x			x				2
CC	26					x				x	2
B	23	x									2
F	22					x					1
D	21					x	x				2
J	20			x	x	x					3
S	20				x	x					2
EE	18			x			x				3
G	18					x		x			2
AA	16					x		x			2
A	15			x							2
Q	14					x			x		2
BB	13					x					1
GG	11										1
H	9						x				1
FF	9	x									1
E	8					x	x				2
T	8						x				1
Z	8					x					1
P	7				x						1
U	1	x			x						2
V	1					x					2
C	1										1
N	0							x			1
W	0							x			1
O	0				x						2
Y	0		x								1
Totals and Percent*		12(12%)	2(6%)	5(15%)	6(18%)	15(45%)	13(39%)	4(12%)	3(9%)	2(6%)	

* Some respondents gave more than one occupation; therefore, the percentages exceed 100%

be considered an essential attribute for the prospective lobbyist; however, those who employ lobbyists do not seem to be completely agreed on this.

The data in Table 17 did not lend themselves to the traditional methods of statistical correlation, but they are interpreted in the paragraphs to follow.

Only one lobbyist said that lobbying had been his main occupation all of his working life; and only one member of the group had actually taken his educational training with the fore-knowledge that lobbying was to be his life work. The others came into lobbying via various routes.

Almost half (45%) of the lobbyists listed some form of business administration as their primary pre-lobbying occupation. Most said they had been involved in general administrative work, personnel, administration or accounting. Examination of the data in terms of a possible relationship between a general business background and lobbying effectiveness reveals a scattering of lobbyists throughout the IPE scale indicating no apparent relationship.

It has been expected that there would be association between effective lobbying and governmental occupational background. As will be pointed out later, no statistical correlation exists between effectiveness and some governmental experience; but there is significant correlation between the length of governmental experience and effectiveness. This supports the hypothesis that lobbyists with many years of governmental experience are more effective than those with less experience, or none at all.

It was also anticipated that there would be a relationship between effective lobbying and the profession of law, because there are a large number of lawyers in the state legislature disproportionate to the total population. No apparent relationship between lawyer-lobbyists and effectiveness exists, in that two of the four lobbyists with law degrees rank among the top ten lobbyists and the other two rank in the bottom half.

Another proposition in regard to occupational background was that lobbyists with news media experience (daily newspapers, radio and television) would tend to be more effective because of public exposure and contacts with public officials. Particularly would this be true when the newsman had spent some time on the state capitol beat. All of the lobbyists with news media backgrounds were in the top half of the IPE scale. This is substantial evidence to support the proposition that lobbyists with news reporting backgrounds tend to be more effective lobbyists.

Public relations occupational backgrounds do not seem to be related to lobbying effectiveness. Eighteen percent of the lobbyists listed this as their primary occupation, but of this group of six, three fall in the middle range of the IPE scale and three in the bottom one-third of the scale.

No significant observation can be made about the remaining occupations in Table 17. They were medical arts¹ (6%), sales (12%), transportation (9%) and farm (6%). It is interesting to note that the two lobbyists who listed farming as primary occupations were among the top nine lobbyists on the IPE scale. Perhaps their farming background has helped them among Legislators, who, up until recent years, were primarily of rural out-state origin.

Political Experience

The data in the two tables to follow were gathered in order to support the hypothesis that there would be a relationship between the kind and amount of political experience and lobbying effectiveness. It was pointed out earlier in the chapter that there is no relationship between relatives in politics and effectiveness.

¹This includes osteopathy and chiropractory.

Previous Republican Affiliation and Effectiveness

Another sub-hypothesis in regard to political experience was that those lobbyists who had identified--prior to their lobbying position--with the Michigan Republican party, would be more effective with a predominantly Republican Legislature than those who did not identify with the Republican party. Table 18 tests the relationship between past political affiliation and lobbying effectiveness.

Well over half (58%) of the lobbyists had been affiliated with the Republican party prior to taking their lobbying jobs in Lansing. This tends to corroborate the proposition that membership and work in the dominant legislative political party may be an asset to the lobbyist in his legislative activities. Only one lobbyist stated that he had been affiliated and had done work in the Democratic party. One might well speculate that if the political composition of the Michigan Legislature were to change drastically, with the Democrats becoming the controlling party, that membership and active support of that party would be a valuable asset to some future lobbyists. One lobbyist said he had been active in both parties; 15% stated they had no previous political affiliation; and in 21% of the cases, it was impossible to determine the lobbyist's previous political affiliation.

Of the group that had participated in political activity; 12% had held positions or had been active on the precinct or ward level; 33% had held positions on the county level, as county committee members and delegates to the state convention; and 12% had held state-wide level political positions, usually as state central committee members.

Of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale, nine had been previously affiliated with the Republican party and seven had not. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, eleven had been actively affiliated with the Republican party, and six had not. A point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .0549$) between those lobbyists who had

RELATIONSHIP OF PREVIOUS POLITICAL AFFILIATION TO EFFECTIVENESS

IPE		Republican	Democrat	Both Parties	None	Undetermined
Lobbyist	Points					
K	159	x				
X	61	X				
I	55		x			
L	55	x				
R	38			x		
M	30	x				
DD	27					x
CC	26	x				
B	23				x	
F	22				x	
D	21	x				
J	20				x	
S	20				x	
EE	18					x
G	18	x				
AA	16	x				
A	15	x				
Q	14					
BB	13					x
GG	11					x
H	9	x				
FF	9	x				
E	8				x	
T	8	x				
Z	8					x
P	7	x				
U	1	x				
V	1	x				
C	1	x				
N	0	x				
W	0	x				
O	0					x
Y	0	x				
Totals (Number and Percent)		19(58%)	1(3%)	1(3%)	5(15%)	7(21%)
Point bi-serial correlation at .05 level: r. = .3494						
r. = .0549						

identified with the Republican party and their lobbying effectiveness was not statistically significant at the 5% level. A further correlation ($r. = .2181$) between lobbyists who had some political affiliation (either Republican or Democrat) and effectiveness proved statistically insignificant. These data indicated that there was no correlation between previous Republican affiliation and effectiveness; nor was there a statistical relationship between the any political affiliation and lobbying effectiveness.

Years of Political Experience and Effectiveness

Even though no statistical correlation was found between some previous political affiliation and lobbying effectiveness, it was felt that there might be a relationship between the number of years of political party experience and effectiveness.¹ In this case, the benefit of long years of political experience would provide the lobbyists with the background and contacts necessary for a successful lobbying career. Table 19 was designed to test the relationship between years of political experience and lobbying effectiveness. A highly significant statistical correlation ($r. = .4279$) at the 2% level was present. This verifies the proposition that the more years of political experience (in this case, within the Republican party) a lobbyist had in his background, the more effective he was perceived in his lobbying activities. As pointed out earlier, it is the writer's opinion that this proposition would only hold true as long as the Republicans controlled the Michigan legislative branch of government. Perhaps under Democratic control, the tables might be reversed.

Present Political Affiliation and Effectiveness

Lobbyists were also questioned as to their political affiliation and political party positions they held at the time of the interview. Only three

¹Previous political experience included: activity on the ward or precinct level, such as precinct delegate; positions or activity on the county level, such as delegates to the county and state conventions, and state positions, such as state central committee.

TABLE 19

RELATIONSHIP OF YEARS OF POLITICAL PARTY
EXPERIENCE TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Years Political Experience
K	159	25*
X	61	8*
I	55	10*
L	55	30*
R	38	5*
M	30	10*
DD	27	0
CC	26	25*
B	23	--
F	22	--
D	21	20*
J	20	--
S	20	--
EE	18	--
G	18	25*
AA	16	15*
A	15	6*
Q	14	--
BB	13	--
GG	11	--
H	9	15*
FF	9	15*
E	8	--
T	8	20*
Z	8	--
P	7	--
U	1	2*
V	1	5*
C	1	8
N	0	6*
W	0	10*
O	0	--
Y	0	6

* This is an estimate taken from other materials in the interview.
 Point bi-serial correlation at the .02 level: $r_s = .4093$
 $r_s = .4279$

(9%) of the lobbyists stated that they were actively affiliated with a political party (Republican); and of this group, one was a precinct delegate, and two served as delegates to the state convention. Ninety-one percent of the lobbyists claimed no political affiliation and no active role in either of the two political parties. It is the writer's impression, based on personal observations, that these statistics do not reflect the actual situation. That is, some of the lobbyists who claimed no present political affiliation are ardent partisans. Some are actively involved in state-wide and legislative campaigns in one capacity or another. Several are prominent in their attendance at the county and state conventions of the Republican and Democratic parties. Perhaps the claim of "no affiliation" is an attempt by individual lobbyists to appear bi-partisan or non-partisan in a legislative situation which is rapidly changing and becoming more of an even split between the two parties in the Legislature. In any event, the reader should be somewhat suspect and cautious concerning the lobbyists' responses to the question of present political affiliations.¹

Governmental Experience

One of the major hypotheses of this chapter was that lobbying effectiveness would be related to governmental experience; that is, lobbyists with prior governmental service would be more effective than those who had not seen governmental service. This section tests this general hypothesis.

Previous Governmental Experience and Effectiveness

Table 20 was designed to test the proposition that lobbyists with some governmental experience would tend to be more effective than those without any prior experience. The majority (67%) of Michigan lobbyists had some previous governmental experience (this includes both elective, appointive and civil service posts at the national, state and local levels).

¹Professor Milbrath, in his Journal of Politics article (op. cit.) on Washington lobbyists, concluded that "from the lobbyist's point of view,

TABLE 20

RELATIONSHIP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE
TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Governmental Experience	None
K	159	x	
X	61		x
I	55	x	
L	55	x	
R	38	x	
M	30	x	
DD	27	x	
CC	26	x	
B	23		x
F	22	x	
D	21	x	
J	20	x	
S	20		x
EE	18		x
G	18		x
AA	16	x	
A	15		x
Q	14	x	
BB	13		x
GG	11	x	
H	9		x
FF	9	x	
E	8	x	
T	8	x	
Z	8		x
P	7		x
U	1	x	
V	1	x	
C	1	x	
N	0	x	
W	0	x	
O	0		x
Y	0	x	
Totals and Percent		22 (67%)	11 (33%)

Point Bi-serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r = .3494$
 $r = .1022$

Of the sixteen lobbyists at the top of the IPE scale, eleven had previous governmental experience, and five did not. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, eleven had governmental experience in their backgrounds, and six did not. A point bi-serial correlation ($r = .1022$) between some governmental experience and effectiveness was not significant at the 5% level.

Level of Governmental Experience and Effectiveness

In connection with previous governmental experience, it was felt that there might be a relationship between the level of the lobbyists' previous governmental experience and their effectiveness. Specifically, if the lobbyist had his governmental experience on the state and local levels, he would tend to be more effective with the State Legislature than if his experience were confined to the national level or if he didn't have any governmental experience at all. Table 21 reveals that 24% of the lobbyists had local government experience, 33% on the state level; 9% on the national level; and one-third had no governmental experience at all. In an attempt to find a statistical correlation, the state and national categories were combined and compared to those lobbyists with local experience. With a universe of twenty-two, the point bi-serial correlation was not significant. ($r = .2077$).

Only a few (12%) of the lobbyists have had experience at the executive level of state and local government. This includes: Governor's staff, general city administrative work, and elective posts. Three (9%) indicated that they had served in the legislative branch of government. This included: State Legislature, City Council, County Board or Commission, or School Board. These lobbyists were widely distributed throughout the IPE scale, apparently indicating no statistical relationship between the kind of position held and effectiveness.

then, most of them deliberately choose not to become active in a political party, either because they feel that they cannot accomplish much by doing so and could better spend their time on other things, or because they actually fear that they will defeat their purposes if they become politically active."

TABLE 21

LEVEL OF LOBBYISTS' PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Local	State	National	None
K	159		x		
X	61				x
I	55		x		
L	55	x			
R	38		x		
M	30	x			
DD	27		x		
CC	26		x		
B	23				x
F	22			x	
D	21		x		
J	20	x			
S	20				x
EE	18				x
G	18				x
AA	16		x		
A	15				x
Q	14			x	
BB	13				x
GG	11		x		
H	9				x
FF	9		x		
E	8			x	
T	8	x			
Z	8				x
P	7				x
U	1	x			
V	1	x			
C	1	x			
N	0		x		
W	0		x		
O	0				x
Y	0	x			
Totals and Percent)		8 (24%)	11 (33%)	3 (9%)	11 (33%)

Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level with an N of 22:

$r_s = .4227$

$r_s = .2077$

Status of Governmental Position and Effectiveness

Another proposition in regard to governmental experience was that lobbyists who had held high status governmental posts would be more effective than those who held middle and low status positions. High status positions were defined as top political offices on a given level of government; middle status positions as lesser important political offices; and low status positions refers to paid employees of any governmental agency. Thirty-nine percent of the lobbyists had held high status positions, 18% had middle status positions, 6% had low status, and 3% had held a combination of middle and low status governmental positions. A correlation between status and lobbying effectiveness was computed in Table 22. Of the sixteen lobbyists at the top half of the IPE scale, five had held high status positions and four had held middle status positions. Of the seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, seven had held high status positions, two middle status positions and two low status positions. A point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .1612$) indicated no statistical relationship between the status of governmental positions and effectiveness of the 5% level.

Years of Governmental Experience and Effectiveness

Even though no correlation was found between governmental experience and effectiveness, it was felt that within the group that had had previous governmental experience, the number of years of experience might be related to effectiveness. Table 23 demonstrates that there was a significant statistical relationship between the years of experience and lobbying effectiveness; that is, the more years of governmental experience, the more effective the lobbyist tended to be. The point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .3913$) was significant at the 5% level. This statistical finding supports the hypothesis that the more years of governmental experience a lobbyist brings to his job, the more effective he will be as a spokesman

TABLE 22

RELATIONSHIP OF STATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL
POSITION TO EFFECTIVENESS
(N = 22)

Lobbyist	IPE Points	High	Middle	Low	Combination
K	159	x			
X	61				
I	55	x			
L	55	x			
R	38		x		
M	30				x
DD	27	x			
CC	26	x			
B	23				
F	22		x		
D	21		x		
J	20		x		
S	20				
EE	18				
G	18				
AA	16	x			
A	15				
Q	14		x		
BB	13				
GG	11	x			
H	9				
FF	9	x			
E	8		x		
T	8	x			
Z	8				
P	7				
U	1			x	
V	1	x			
C	1			x	
N	0	x			
W	0	x			
O	0				
Y	0	x			
Totals (Number and Percent)		13 (39%)	6 (18%)	2 (6%)	1 (3%)

Point bi-serial correlation at the .05 level for an N of 22: $r_s = .4227$
 $r_s = .1612$

TABLE 23

RELATIONSHIP OF YEARS OF GOVERNMENTAL
EXPERIENCE TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Years of Governmental Experience
K	159	20
X	61	--
I	55	18
L	55	12
R	38	9
M	30	11
DD	27	3*
CC	26	12
B	23	--
F	22	2
D	21	3
J	20	6
S	20	--
EE	18	--
G	18	--
AA	16	9
A	15	--
Q	14	2
BB	13	--
GG	11	32
H	9	--
FF	9	10
E	8	5
T	8	17
Z	8	--
P	7	--
U	1	2*
V	1	5
C	1	1
N	0	4
W	0	2*
O	0	--
Y	0	8

* This is an estimate which had to be taken from other materials in the interview.

Point Bi-serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .3913$

for his interest group. This finding will be further substantiated in Chapter VI by the lobbyists, as well as the other legislative participants who were questioned regarding the effectiveness of individual lobbyists.

Legislative Experience and Effectiveness

Further analysis of the data concerning previous governmental experience demonstrates that there was a statistically significant relationship between those lobbyists who had served any amount of time as legislators and lobbying effectiveness. Table 24 confirms the hypothesis that legislative service per se was related to effectiveness. A high point bi-serial correlation ($r. = .4318$) at the 2% level of significance was obtained. Only eight (24%) of the thirty-three lobbyists interviewed had the benefit of previous legislative experience. As will be pointed out in later chapters, lobbyists, as well as other legislative participants and observers view previous legislative experience as a decided advantage for the lobbyist. Some attribute the success of certain lobbyists almost solely to their legislative backgrounds.

Summary--Career Correlates

Analysis and interpretation of the factors that influenced the lobbyists' interests in political and governmental affairs revealed that 64% of the lobbyists recalled that their political awareness did not develop until after their formal schooling was over and they were well into their pre-lobbying occupational careers. Politically-related non-governmental occupations were cited most frequently by lobbyists as the major source of influence in their interest in political and governmental affairs. In addition, family influence, political and governmental work, and news reporting were the other important factors in the development of political interests. The general impression received from these data was that there are a great variety of factors and stimuli which caused political interest.

TABLE 24

RELATIONSHIP OF THOSE LOBBYISTS WHO HAD SERVED
AS LEGISLATORS TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Years Served in House of Representatives	Years Served in State Senate	Total Legislative Experience
K	159		2	2
X	61			0
I	55		6	6
L	55	2		2
R	38			
M	30			
DD	27			
CC	26	8	4	12
B	23			
F	22			
D	21			
J	20			
S	20			
EE	18			
G	18			
AA	16	8		8
A	15			
Q	14			
BB	13			
GG	11			
H	9			
FF	9	4	6	10
E	8			
T	8			
Z	8			
P	7			
U	1			
V	1			
C	1			
N	0	4		4
W	0			
O	0			
Y	0			

Point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .02 level: $r_s = .4093$
 $r_s = .4318$

Pre-lobbying occupational career patterns were heterogenous, but primarily white collar. The largest number of lobbyists came from business and governmental occupations. Evidence was found which supports the proposition that lobbyists with news media backgrounds tended to be more effective.

The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had these political and governmental background characteristics in common: previous affiliation with the Republican party; more years of political experience than the lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale; previous high status governmental positions at the state and local levels; and more years of governmental experience than lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale.

Summary

In Chapter III one of the major hypotheses of this dissertation, that effective or non-effective role-enactment would be related to certain variables which determine a lobbyist's role-taking ability, was tested. Role-taking ability was defined as composed of certain socio-economic, political, and demographic independent variables such as age, education, kind and amount of governmental and political service, former occupation, and place of upbringing. The chapter further described and analyzed the relationships between these personal background variables and career characteristics of the lobbyists in comparison and correlation with IPE scores.

The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had these socio-economic characteristics in common: they were over fifty years of age; had been born and reared in Michigan; brought up in a metropolitan area; did not complete their college educations; and had fathers with white collar occupations. The majority of the seventeen

lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale tended to have these background characteristics in common: they were under fifty years of age; born and reared in Michigan, raised in non-metropolitan areas; were college graduates; and had fathers with non-white collar occupations. The majority of lobbyists claimed Protestant church affiliation; and were married with up to four children. No statistical correlations at the 5% level of significance were found between any of the socio-economic background characteristics and lobbying effectiveness.

Analysis and interpretation of the factors that influenced the lobbyists' interests in political and governmental affairs revealed that 64% of the lobbyists perceived that their political awareness did not develop until after their formal schooling was over, and they were well into their pre-lobbying occupational careers. Politically-related non-governmental occupations were cited most frequently by lobbyists as the major source of influence in their interest in political and governmental affairs. In addition, family influence, political and governmental work, and news reporting were the other important factors in the development of political interests. The general impression received from these data was that there are a great variety of factors and stimuli which caused political interest.

Pre-lobbying occupational career patterns were heterogeneous, but primarily white collar. Forty-five percent of the lobbyists came from some sort of business administration background, and 39% had governmental occupational backgrounds. No relationship seemed to exist between effective lobbying and the profession of law, but there is substantial evidence to support the proposition that lobbyists with news reporting backgrounds tend to be more effective lobbyists.

The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had political and governmental background characteristics in common: they had previous affiliation with the Republican party; more years of

political experience than the lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale; previous high status governmental positions at the state and local levels; and more years of governmental experience than lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale. All of these political and governmental background variables in relationship to lobbying effectiveness were verified statistically at the 5% level of significance.

In summary, this chapter examined a series of variables that were thought to be related to lobbying effectiveness. By a process of elimination, certain variables were isolated that were statistically related to lobbying effectiveness.

CHAPTER IV

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEPTIONS OF RECRUITMENT, LOBBYING ROLES AND JOB SATISFACTION

One of the hypotheses of this dissertation was that lobbying effectiveness would be related to the type of role the lobbyist is expected, and compelled by circumstances, to play on behalf of his interest group. Lobbyists playing primarily defensive roles, (that is, to "kill" bills and preserve the status quo) would tend to be more effective because this role is less difficult to play than a role which calls for the active promotion and guidance of a bill through both legislative houses. Lobbyists clearly perceived their functions primarily in defensive and promotional terms. These, and other related roles are analyzed and discussed in this chapter.

Other aspects of the lobbyists' "job," such as recruitment for lobbying positions; formulation of legislative policy; the division of labor and time in the lobbying role; differences between lobbyists and employers in role perception; reporting and financing methods; are discussed and analyzed in relationship to lobbying effectiveness.

The last section of the chapter treats the lobbyists' perceptions of job satisfaction or dissatisfaction; the appealing and non-appealing aspects of the lobbying role; and their future career plans.

Recruitment

Chapter III examined the various socio-economic variables present in the lobbyists' backgrounds, and then went on to trace the pre-lobbying occupational backgrounds of the lobbyists in this study. It was concluded

that these career patterns reveal a heterogeneity of primarily white collar occupations. Forty-five percent of the lobbyists came from some form of business administration background, and 39% had governmental occupational backgrounds. No relationship seemed to exist between effective lobbying and the profession of law, but there is some evidence to support the proposition that lobbyists with news reporting backgrounds seem to be more effective lobbyists. The same seems to be true of farm occupational backgrounds. As the data suggested, the occupational backgrounds and the social strata from which lobbyists are recruited are anything but consistent, and are often haphazard. Although lobbyists tend to be recruited from white-collar occupations, it can be said that the social and occupational base from which they are recruited is almost as broad as the social stratification of the United States itself.

The question this section of the chapter addresses itself to is: just how do people get to become lobbyists?¹ As pointed out in Chapter III, only one person among those interviewed had actually planned his educational training with this objective in mind. All others had come into a lobbying career through another, often circuitous, route.

Table 25 depicts the lobbyists' perceptions of how it came about that they were recruited into their lobbying positions.

Selected and Asked by Organization

Twenty-three (70%) of those interviewed said that they had been selected and asked to be lobbyists by the organization. Of this group, nine were selected from within the organization itself, and, in most cases, the selection as lobbyist was an outgrowth of a related public relations or administrative position within the organization. Typical responses for the lobbyists recruited in this fashion were:

¹Lobbyists were asked: "Just how did it come about that you became a lobbyist?"

TABLE 25

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF METHODS OF RECRUITMENT

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Selected and Asked by Organization	Applied for Position	"Grew into it" from Other Organization Position	Through Friends and Contacts	Elected
K	159	x				
X	61	x				
I	55	x			x	
L	55	x				
R	38	x				
M	30	x				
DD	27	x				
CC	26	x			x	
B	23		x			
F	22	x			x	
D	21	x				
J	20	x				
S	20	x				
EE	18	x	x			
G	18	x				
AA	16	x				
A	15	x				
Q	14	x				
BB	13	x			x	
GG	11		x			
H	9		x			
FF	9					
E	8	x				
T	8			x		
Z	8	x				
P	7	x				
U	1			x		
V	1		x			
C	1					
N	0	x				x
W	0	x				
O	0		x			
Y	0			x		
Totals and Percent*		23 (70%)	6 (18%)	3 (9%)	4 (12%)	1 (3%)

*Totals exceed 100% because four lobbyists listed more than one factor in their recruitment.

I was tapped by the company at the time I was manager of their . . . public relations office.

. . . selected me. He knew of my background; that I was Chairman of the Legislative Committee of the American Legion. I had worked in Washington on the Taft-Hartley bill; and had done public relations work for the Legion on the GI bill. . . .

We've always had 'hale-well-met' fellows up here. If he was a veteran and knew some funny stories we sent him to Lansing. I knew a lot of people, and had been active in Republican politics, so . . . called me in and asked me to go to Lansing.

Because I had had success in killing a bill for the company, they sent me to Lansing.

I worked from one job to another inside the organization, and then was picked from the public relations department as legislative representative.

Fourteen (42%) of the lobbyists were selected from outside of the organization itself. Of this group, four were recruited while in the legislature.

Typical responses for this group were:

I was on the Senate taxation committee all the time I was in the Legislature. I formed a friendship with the . . . lobbyist. During the closing days of the session I was read out of the party for being too independent. Then I got married, and I couldn't live on three dollars a day. The . . . lobbyist resigned. I was recommended for the job; asked; then resigned my Senate seat and took it.

I was in the ad business in . . . , then elected to the State Senate. Manufacturing businesses had been hit by the depression, and the people in the . . . came to me to set up a public relations program (i.e., community relations, agricultural relations, and governmental relations).

Two lobbyists, both former legislators, had been interest group "contact men" while in the Legislature and had introduced legislation of benefit to the interest group that subsequently hired them. Their responses were:

They came after me. The . . . had been looking for a man for three years. While in the Legislature, I had introduced all the legislation for the . . . committee. I had to front for them, and I handled the stuff on the floor. I resigned from the House, and they came to me and hired me.

For eight years I was (House Leadership position) then I spent four years in the Senate. I served on the . . . committee and others. The Secretary-Treasurer of . . . came and asked me after he had had a stroke. I had put some legislation in for them.

Ten (30%) of the fourteen lobbyists selected from outside of the interest group were recruited in a variety of ways. Typical responses were:

I got a call from the Director of Publicity of the . . . He said they needed help. I took a job with them . . . rather than the . . . ; and it was largely a reporting job. After a couple of weeks, they held an annual meeting and fired everybody from the top to the bottom. Then, I was hired to work the legislative side.

When the . . . was organized, I was asked to be the Executive Director. Then, I was authorized by the board to lobby.

I was invited to take this lobbying job. It paid better than the one I had, so I took it.

Of the group of twenty-three (70%) lobbyists who were selected and asked by the organization to become lobbyists, nine (27%) came from within the interest group itself, ten (30%) from another organization, and four (12%) were legislators at the time of their recruitment. All but two of the sixteen lobbyists at the top of the IPE scale were primarily recruited for their jobs in this manner.

Applied for the Position

Eighteen percent of the lobbyists applied to the interest group for the position as lobbyist. Motives in applying for these jobs are varied and typical responses were:

I applied for the job. I knew the . . . who was the head of the job applications committee. At the time I was a junior law partner, and I needed the money.

I came into the new . . . to help them interview candidates for the Executive Secretary's job. I thought I would like the job so I applied.

There was a vacancy within the organization caused by death. . . . told me about it. I applied for the job, went after it, and got it.

I knew there was an opening, because there had been some discussion about it. I applied for it, and then it was offered to me.

Of the group that applied for their jobs, four out of the six are ranked in the bottom half of the IPE scale, and two in the top sixteen.

"Grew into it" from Other Organization Positions

Of the three (9%) lobbyists who felt they had just "grown" into a lobbying position, two were professional men who stated they felt a sense of obligation to protect and further the interests of their profession.

A typical response in this regard was:

As the importance of legislative representation became acknowledged by my group, it required more and more of my time. I just grew into the job, and the job grew like topsy.

The other lobbyist in this group stated that he had been "thrown into this job while trying to get my law degree." All three of these lobbyists are among the bottom ten lobbyists on the IPE scale.

Recruitment Through Friends and Contracts

Twelve percent of the lobbyists perceived their recruitment as having taken place as a result of contacts and friends who materially assisted them in securing their positions. Typical responses were:

The man who preceded me was my friend. He needed an understudy. Through contacts--while teaching at . . .--the association offered me the job.

I got my lobbying job through the job I held at the . . . The . . . had been holding their conventions there, and I got to be their friend and to know them. They asked me to work for them.

Of the four (12%) lobbyists who perceived their recruitment as a result of friends and contacts, three were in the top sixteen lobbyists in the IPE scale and one in the bottom half.

One lobbyist stated that he got his lobbying position as a result of an election held within his organization. He ranks fifth from the bottom in the IPE scale.

In summary, most (70%) of the lobbyists perceived their recruitment as the result of being selected and approached by the interest group; 18% said they applied for the position; 9% felt they had "grown" into the position from within the organization, 12% got their jobs through friends and contacts; and one was elected to his post.

Professional Relationship and Personal Commitment

Lobbyists were asked two questions to determine the extent of their personal commitment to the legislative policy of the interest groups they represented when they first considered becoming the group's representative. They were also asked how they felt about the policy position at the time of the interview. They were further probed on whether they felt their position as interest group representative to be a professional relationship much like that of a lawyer to a client, that is, representing the client but not necessarily being personally committed to his policy position.

Policy Position as Factor in Decision to Represent Interest Group

Table 26 indicates that 61% of the lobbyists recalled that the general policy position (often referred to by the lobbyists as "the product") of the interest group they were going to represent had played a very important part in their decision to represent the group. In other words, they believed that at the time they were recruited for the job they seriously considered the nature and merits of the cause they would be expected to communicate to the Michigan Legislature. The implication was that a lobbyist couldn't, as one stated, "sell a product I don't believe in."

Typical responses supporting this were:

This was definitely a factor, because my basic beliefs, i. e., my socio-political beliefs in the free enterprise system are the same as theirs. This is a forum for my beliefs.

TABLE 26

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATION
POLICY POSITION IN DECISION TO BECOME THEIR LOBBYIST

Question 15b: Was the policy position of your organization a very
important factor in your decision to represent it?

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Yes	No	No Answer
K	159		x	
X	61	x		
I	55		x	
L	55	x		
R	38		x	
M	30	x		
DD	27		x	
CC	26		x	
B	23		x	
F	22	x		
D	21	x		
J	20			x
S	20		x	
EE	18	x		
G	18			x
AA	16	x		
A	15		x	
Q	14	x		
BB	13		x	
GG	11	x		
H	9			x
FF	9			x
E	8	x		
T	8	x		
Z	8	x		
P	7	x		
U	1	x		
V	1	x		
C	1	x		
N	0	x		
W	0	x		
O	0	x		
Y	0	x		
Total and Percent		20 (61%)	9 (27%)	40 (12%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level for a universe
of 28: $r_s = .3606$
 $r_s = .3642$

It was a very important factor. For example in other situations such as . . . (a cooperative), I wouldn't have lobbied for them.

Yes, because I believe in what we're trying to do because of my background.

There's no question about the importance of this. I turned down jobs while holding this one.

Yes; I don't think there is any bill that the . . . industry would want which wouldn't have merit.

Generally, the position of those lobbyists who felt this was an important factor in their decision to work for the interest group related the group's policy position to their own socio-political beliefs, or as Lobbyist Y stated. "Their position is the same as mine."

Twenty-seven percent of the lobbyists stated that at the time they were considering taking a position as lobbyist, the policy position of the hiring interest group was not an important factor in their decision.

Typical responses from this group were:

It wasn't important at the time. At that time I wanted to go into the export business, and I needed the job because I was married.

It didn't enter into it at the time. Now it is a very important factor. They stand for the things I think they should stand for, i.e., what . . . should stand for.

It was not important; it was a matter of advancement within the company.

No, it wasn't at the time. I feel real strong about it now.

No, it was a damn good job. I was offered it because of my policies. The man who hired me had known me for years. I had a four-minute interview.

All of the lobbyists who stated the policy position was not important when they were first hired commented that they now thought, as Lobbyist M states, "that it is important now, and I'm strongly committed to it."

Interestingly enough, a statistically significant correlation was obtained between lobbying effectiveness and the policy position of the organization as a factor in the lobbyist's decision to represent it. All but

two of the nine lobbyists who stated that the policy position was not important in their decisions are among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale. A point bi-serial correlation ($r_s = .3642$) at the 5% level was obtained for this group. Thirteen out of twenty lobbyists who said the policies of their interest group had been important in their decision were in the bottom seventeen on the IPE scale.

The writer is at a loss in attempting to explain this correlation. Perhaps this is just an indication that those lobbyists who stated interest group policy was not important in their decision, are more secure in their positions and have no need to rationalize or distort this factor as a part of their decision--if, indeed, these things have occurred at all in the lobbyists' perceptions of their recruitment. An examination of those who said "no" to this question revealed no distinctive pattern. They represented a broad range of interest group organizations with various ideological commitments. It was thought that those lobbyists who represented "reform-oriented" groups might have given more consideration to this factor in their decision to work for the group. This did not prove true. Although this is an interesting correlation, further speculation would neither be fruitful nor justifiable.

Personal Commitment to Organization Policy

Lobbyists were further questioned regarding their personal commitment to their interest groups' policy at the time of the interview.¹ Table 2.1 shows that 85% of the lobbyists responded that their commitment was "strong." Typical responses in this category were:

I've never carried the ball for anything I didn't like, and probably wouldn't.

I have never done anything in my life which I have been more in agreement.

¹Lobbyists were asked: "Would you describe your commitment to your organization's policy as: strong, mild, or weak?"

TABLE 27

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PERSONAL COMMITMENT
TO ORGANIZATION POLICY

Question 15a: Would you describe your commitment to your organization's policy as: strong, mild, or weak?

Lobbyist	IPE		Strong	Mild	Weak	DK/NA
	Points					
K	159	x				
X	61	x				
I	55			x		
L	55	x				
R	38	x				
M	30	x				
DD	27	x				
CC	26	x				
B	23	x				
F	22	x				
D	21	x				
J	20					x
S	20	x				
EE	18	x				
G	18					x
AA	16	x				
A	15	x				
Q	14					x
BB	13	x				
GG	11	x				
H	9					x
FF	9	x				
E	8	x				
T	8	x				
Z	8	x				
P	7	x				
U	1	x				
V	1	x				
C	1	x				
N	0	x				
W	0	x				
O	0	x				
Y	0	x				
Total and Percent			28 (85%)	1 (3%)	0	4 (12%)

If I didn't feel strongly about it, I wouldn't do it. I wouldn't sell something I'm not in accord with. I have a personal interest in this area. I was offered a job with a . . . outfit in . . . at three times the money--I couldn't take it.

One of the lobbyists strongly committed to his organization's policy waxed sentimental, and responded that he was not only strongly committed to its policy but dedicated to building "togetherness":

I'm in love with the business. I love my people. I try to make it seem we are one big family.

All in all, the feeling among this group was, as Lobbyist O states, that "I am much more successful in those things I have strong convictions on." The vast majority of lobbyists felt that strong commitment to organization policy was a necessary prerequisite for lobbying effectiveness. All lobbyists but one--who said his commitment was "mild"--felt this way. Twelve percent of the lobbyists said they "didn't know" how to describe their personal commitment. One said that his commitment "depends on the policy." Another lobbyist, who represents one of the most powerful companies in the state, alleged in response to this question:

We never have any policies, we'll live by what the Legislature does.

Personal commitment by the lobbyists to the organizational policies was perceived by most Michigan lobbyists as necessary to effective role enactment, and lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale, as well as the rest, were agreed on this.

Perceptions of Professional Relationship

In connection with the questions regarding personal commitment, lobbyists were queried as to whether or not they perceived their position as interest group representative to be somewhat akin to that of a lawyer and his client. It is often alleged that the professional lobbyist is a "gun-for-hire" with services available to the highest bidder. Only three lobbyists in this study can be described as "free lance" legislative agents;

that is, having more than one client. All three perceived their relationship as a professional one and they did not feel they were personally committed to their client's position. Two of the three were in the top half of the IPE scale, and one was in the bottom half.

Table 28 depicts the range of answers in response to the question concerning professional relationships. Forty-two percent indicated they did not perceive their relationship to their organizations in professional lobbyist-client terms. Twelve percent thought this was "somewhat" true, and 33% perceived the relationship as a professional one. An effort to relate effectiveness to perceived professional relationships was attempted by combining the "somewhat" and "yes" categories and computing a point bi-serial correlation. The correlation ($r = .1064$) was not significant at the 5% level. However, there is evidence to indicate that those lobbyists who did not feel their relationship was a professional one--but rather a strong personal commitment--tended to be more effective than those who viewed their ties with the interest group as a strictly professional arrangement. For, of the fourteen lobbyists who did not view this as a professional relationship, eight (24%) were among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale and only six (18%) fell among the bottom seventeen on the scale.¹

Perceptions of Lobbying Roles

One of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was that lobbying effectiveness was related to the type of role the lobbyist is expected, and compelled by circumstances, to play on behalf of his interest group. It was hypothesized that lobbyists playing primarily defensive roles

¹The data and conclusions evident in Table 28 seem to cast doubt on the validity of the responses obtained in answer to the question regarding personal commitment in Table 27. Perhaps the wording of the question itself resulted in responses which no longer appear valid when compared with the findings in Table 28.

TABLE 28

**LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP
TO ORGANIZATION**

Question 15: Do you consider your relationship to the organization you represent to be like that of a lawyer to a client; that is, presenting your client's case in the best possible light without necessarily committing yourself to your client's position?

Lobbyist	IPE				DK/NA
	Points	No	Somewhat	Yes	
K	159			x	
X	61	x			
I	55			x	
L	55	x			
R	38			x	
M	30			x	
DD	27	x			
CC	26	x			
B	23	x			
F	22		x		
D	21	x			
J	20				x
S	20			x	
EE	18	x			
G	18				x
AA	16	x			
A	15		x		
Q	14			x	
BB	13			x	
GG	11	x			
H	9				x
FF	9	x			
E	8			x	
T	8			x	
Z	8		x		
P	7	x			
U	1			x	
V	1		x		
C	1	x			
N	0			x	
W	0				x
O	0	x			
Y	0	x			
Total and Percent		14 (42%)	4 (12%)	11 (33%)	4 (12%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r = .3494$
 $r = .1064$

(that is, to "kill" harmful legislation and preserve the status quo) would tend to be more effective; because this role is less difficult to play than a lobbying role which calls for the active promotion and strategical guidance of legislation through both legislative houses. As Table 29 demonstrates, Michigan lobbyists did perceive their role functions primarily in defensive and promotional terms.

Each lobbyist was asked what he thought his organization expected him, as their representative, to do. The responses were then coded, and five distinct roles became evident after analysis of the data. In most cases, it was possible to detect secondary roles as well as primary roles.

Promoter-Strategist

The first primary role which became evident was that of promoter-strategist. The lobbyists (24%) who perceived this function as their primary role were those whose organizations expected them to have beneficial legislation introduced to promote it; and to work out the strategy necessary to secure its passage. A lobbyist playing this role would be under constant pressure to "get" something from the legislature for his interest group. Typical responses from lobbyists who considered this their primary role were:

Policy execution is one of my major tasks. I've got to see that things get through the legislature. In order to execute policy, I get acquainted with as many legislators as possible. I help them with letters, speeches, bills, amendments, facts, and so forth--they make a chore boy out of you. I attend almost every meeting of the . . . committees in the House and Senate. I do my most effective work in committee; e.g., in working out substitute bills.

I get the introducers of the bill who are members of the committee to which it will go. Then, I have a syllabus on the bill in which I've detailed: (1) What the law is; (2) What the change is; and (3) Why? Further, I talk to the chairman over lunch or dinner.

Question 12a: First of all, just what does your organization expect you as its' representative to do?

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Promoter-strategist	Defender-advocate	Liaison	Serviceman	Public Relations Man
K	159					
X	61		1			1
I	55		1	2		2
L	55	2	1		3	
R	38	2		1		
M	30	1		2		
DD	27	2	1			
CC	26	2	1	3		
B	23		1			
F	22	3	1			2
D	21	2	1		3	
J	20	2	1			
S	20	2	1			
EE	18		1	2		3
G	18				1	
AA	16	2	1			
A	15	2	1			
Q	14	3	2	1		
BB	13	2	1			
GG	11	2	1			
H	9	2	1			
FF	9				1	2
E	8		1			
T	8	1	2			
Z	8	3	2	1		
P	7	2		1		
U	1	1	2			
V	1	1		2		
C	1	1				
N	0			1		
W	0	1				2
O	0	1			2	
Y	0	1	2			

My job is to secure passage of the legislation which they (i. e., the interest group) has introduced. I assist in the drafting of legislation.

My first job is to bring equality in the law for my group, and to increase the power of the . . .

I represent a group of . . . companies. We meet and discuss the legislation we want, and then take a position; and they leave it to me to carry it through.

Of all the roles to be discussed, the role of promoter-strategist is the most difficult to successfully enact. For the intricacies and pitfalls of the legislative process make it easy to "kill" or "pigeonhole" legislation in a multitude of ways. Examination of Table 29 substantiates this, for only one lobbyist, who perceived this as his primary role, is ranked among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, and the other seven are among the ten lobbyists lowest on the IPE scale.

Although only eight (24%) lobbyists picked the role of promoter-strategist as their primary role, thirteen (39%) chose it as a secondary role, with seven (21%) out of the thirteen in the top half of the IPE scale and six in the bottom.

Defender-Advocate

The lobbying role picked by the majority (52%) of the lobbyists as their primary function was the role of defender-advocate. This category includes those lobbyists who perceived their primary function as defensive; that is, protecting their interest group from "harmful" legislation and preserving legislative status quo as it refers to the particular interest group. In addition to defending the status quo, these lobbyists, as was the case with the promoter-strategists, were expected to actively advocate the interest group's position as part of their defensive function.

Typical responses from defender-advocate lobbyists were:

I am supposed to do all I can to kill legislation harmful to the company. Occasionally we have bills we want to pass--maybe one per session. However, it is largely defensive.

My job is to protect us from state government, that is, to get reasonable treatment from state government.

My outfit expects me to see that . . . maintains the full privileges it now has.

For the most part my job is to 'police' the legislature to see that no adverse legislation is passed, i. e., adverse to our interests in this state. Its mostly preventive. We have some ideas for legislation, but its mostly policing.

Primarily my job is to watch and see that no adverse legislation that would detract from or be injurious to our profession is passed. We also try to correct what we consider to be an inequity in the definition of what we do.

Of the seventeen (52%) lobbyists who picked the role of defender-advocate as their primary function, eleven (33%) picked the role of promoter-strategist as their secondary role. But there was no doubt among the defender-advocates that their first task was a defensive one, protecting the status quo and built-in privileges their interest groups had already obtained.

Examination of data concerning those lobbyists who picked, as their primary role, the role of defender-advocate revealed that twelve of the seventeen lobbyists are among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale and five are among the bottom seventeen. This supports the hypothesis that lobbyists in the role of defender-advocate tend to be more effective than those required to play the role of promoter-strategist. Additional statistical evidence to support this hypothesis demonstrated in Table 30, was achieved through a point bi-serial correlation between these two primary roles and effectiveness scores. A high statistical correlation ($r. = .5406$) at the 1% level confirmed the relationship between effectiveness and lobbyists playing the role of defender-advocate. No statistical correlation was attempted among the remaining roles because of the small number of cases classified under those roles.

One further generalization was possible from the data in Table 30. Almost without exception, those lobbyists playing the role of defender-advocate represented the older, established, high status, interest groups

TABLE 30

RELATIONSHIP OF "PROMOTER-STRATEGIST" AND "DEFENDER-ADVOCATE" ROLES TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Promoter-Strategist	Defender-Advocate
K	159		
X	61		1
I	55		1
L	55		1
R	38		
M	30	1	
DD	27		1
CC	26		1
B	23		1
F	22		1
D	21		1
J	20		1
S	20		1
EE	18		1
G	18		
AA	16		1
A	15		1
Q	14		
BB	13		1
GG	11		1
H	9		1
FF	9		
E	8		1
T	8	1	
Z	8		
P	7		
U	1	1	
V	1	1	
C	1	1	
N	0		
W	0	1	
O	0	1	
Y	0	1	
Total number and percent		8 (24%)	17 (52%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient for a universe of 25 at the .01 level: $r_s = .5368$
 $r_s = .5406$

such as manufacturers, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, and others who have achieved recognition and their legislative goals, and are now primarily interested in preserving their privileges and status. The lobbyists playing the role of promoter-strategist were, without exception, representatives of those interest groups which are still struggling for recognition and social change through legislation which will benefit them. This includes certain governmental units and their associations, labor unions, certain types of business, and a few professional groups(for example, chiropractors).

Liaison

Five (15%) of the lobbyists perceived their primary role as a liaison relationship between the Legislature and their interest group. They perceived themselves as listening posts for passing on information to legislators from the interest group. They also felt they were expected to have the necessary legislative contacts to be able to arrange conferences between legislators and interest group officials, and to arrange appearances by organization experts and/or officers before appropriate legislative committees.

Typical responses from lobbyists playing this role were:

I keep track of any bills introduced. I make resumes of bills, and do research on them. My organization expects me to take no stand either way; just present the pros and cons.

I'm supposed to give my people the facts on bills as they affect my group. I'm to tell them whether these bills will have a good or bad effect on . . .

The biggest thing is to do a good listening job--listening not only to legislators, but all people in government. Then I must determine what . . . does that they don't like.

Of the five lobbyists who selected the liaison role as their primary function, only one was among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, and four were in the bottom half of the scale. Four lobbyists perceived this role as a secondary one, and one listed it as a third choice.

Serviceman

This role is related to that of liaison. The two (6%) lobbyists who perceived the "serviceman" role as their primary one stated their function was to be "of service" to the legislature in doing research, providing information and personal favors and assistance. They felt they should be "available" if the legislators need them or their organization's services in any way. Their responses were:

My job is to be helpful to the legislature. We will live by their laws. They have questions--I get the answers. They make up their own minds--in this way you are successful.

My job is to present information and facts about . . . to all media and the legislature when asked.

Of the two lobbyists whose primary role was that of "serviceman," one was in the top half of the IPE scale, and the other was in the bottom. One lobbyist picked this role as a secondary one, and two chose it as a third choice.

Public Relations Man

One lobbyist (the top lobbyist on the IPE scale) perceived his primary function as that of a general public relations man interpreting the business of his clients to the society at large. His response was:

My job is public relations in its broader sense. You interpret the business of your principals into various segments of the public; and, in return, you interpret the thinking of the public to your principals. So people will know . . . and will understand the problems of public legislation and rule-making agencies and departments.

It was impossible to determine any relationship between this lobbyist's ranking at the top of the IPE scale and his role perception. No other lobbyist perceived this role as a primary role, although four (12%) in both halves of the IPE scale did suggest it was a secondary role. One lobbyist picked the role of public relations man as a third choice.

Other Lobbyist Roles

Two lobbyists cited their primary role as that of "administrator." They perceived their primary function as that of administration of the interest group association which they represented. Two other lobbyists cited the role of "rapport-builder" as their primary function, that is, as one stated, "to maintain rapport with legislators on a year-round basis."

In summary, the hypothesis that lobbyists playing the role of defender-advocate tended to be more effective than those required to play the role of promoter-strategist was supported. Confirmation of the statistical relationship between these primary roles and effectiveness was obtained with a high statistical correlation.

Differences in Perception of Role: Organization and Lobbyist

It was hypothesized that there might be important differences between what the lobbyist thought his role should be and the way his organization members might see it. Further, those lobbyists and their organizations which differed in their perception of the lobbying role would tend to be less effective than those lobbyists and their respective interest groups who were in agreement as to the nature of the role to be played. Table 31 was designed to test this relationship. Twenty-four (73%) of the lobbyists said no differences existed between themselves and the organization. Nine (27%) said there were important differences regarding role playing between themselves and their interest groups. A point biserial correlation ($r. = .3642$) at the 5% level indicated significant statistical correlation. This supported the hypothesis that differences between the employing group and the lobbyist tend to cut down on the lobbyist's effectiveness in the legislative process. Typical responses from those lobbyists who perceived differences were:

TABLE 31

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN LOBBYING ROLE
AS VIEWED BY ORGANIZATION AND LOBBYIST

Question 13: Are there any important differences between what you think this job is and the way your organization members see it?

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Yes	No
K	159		x
X	61		x
I	55		x
L	55		x
R	38		x
M	30		x
DD	27		x
CC	26		x
B	23		x
F	22		x
D	21		x
J	20		x
S	20	x	
EE	18		x
G	18		x
AA	16		x
A	15	x	
Q	14	x	
BB	13		x
GG	11	x	
H	9		x
FF	9		x
E	8	x	
T	8	x	
Z	8		x
P	7		x
U	1		x
V	1		x
C	1		x
N	0	x	
W	0	x	
O	0	x	
Y	0		x
Totals and Percent		9 (27%)	24 (73%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r = .3493$
 $r = .3642$

I doubt if they understand the legislative process. They are naive about the function of lobbyists in the legislature.

There are some of my organization members who have an awfully vague conception of this job. They think I have a desk on the floor of the House. Some even send my mail to the capitol.

Because of lack of communication its hard to inform them of what you're doing. They don't know what I'm doing. Board members are too busy with their own affairs, even though they are interested.

The common complaint by the lobbyists was that their organization members just don't understand the intricacies of the political process:

There is a naivete about the legislative process. They have no concept of proper lobbying. They have the stereotype of smoke-filled rooms, and so forth.

Organization people removed from the legislative scene tend to oversimplify it. The average individual doesn't understand the 'give-and-take' of the legislative process.

Our people just can't understand legislators; and they are naive as to the politics of the whole business. They can't understand why it takes the legislators so long to understand and see our side.

Almost all the lobbyists who perceived differences between themselves and their interest groups complained of organization naivete and myopia concerning the politics of the legislature. As one put it, his organization "thinks you get a bill through by just asking the legislators." Another stated with chagrin, that his co-workers back in the home office thought he had a "bloody pipe."

One lobbyist lamented that his group was the "least politically-minded" of any group and, he suggested, they should:

. . . yell about certain issues; tell their customers; keep them informed; and stand up and be counted. They should be politically active. We are just trying to educate them for a better understanding of how to make laws. They just don't understand the process.

Of the group who did not perceive any differences between their perception of the lobbying role to be played and the organizations' perception, typical responses were:

I have been given complete discretion to handle the job as I see fit. They rely on my judgment, and they haven't been disappointed yet.

There is no difference of opinion at all. They are my clients. I own the business. They have hired me to answer the questions.

We've got a perfect understanding. If they want a bartender, they can hire one.

I have the most wonderful outfit. They say you know how to do the job--do it! All the rules and limitations are self-imposed by me.

In summary, the data supported the hypothesis that differences in role perceptions between employer and lobbyist tend to reduce lobbying effectiveness. Lobbyists with few or no problems of communication and understanding over the appropriate lobbying role were more effective than those who had to deal with organization naivete and myopia concerning effective role playing in the legislative process.

Perceptions of Need to Make a Case for Continued Representation

Related to the differences in perception of role is the generalization that those lobbyists who perceived differences between the organization and themselves, concerning effective role playing, might have to keep "selling" their interest group on the merits of continued Lansing representation. Those lobbyists who had communication problems as a result of interest group naivete and myopia would, therefore, have to devote part of their time and labor in lobbying the interest group itself in order to retain their position as lobbyist.

Lobbyists were asked:

"Is there any need to make a case periodically for the continuation of representation in Lansing for your organization? In other words, does the organization occasionally consider withdrawing its legislative representative?"

All thirty-three lobbyists denied any need to ever "sell" their organizations on the need to keep a legislative representative in Lansing. Typical responses to this question were:

Not to my knowledge, at least not since I've been here.

No, they realize lobbying is a necessary thing.

No, I have them thoroughly sold. There is no question.

No, I've been with them five years, and I've never had any discussion with the members on this.

No, lobbying is one of their strongest activities; it never has to be justified. They consider it one of their more worthwhile activities.

No, they had a hell of a lot of problems before I went on the job. I tell them this operation must be like a volunteer fire department--they cost a lot to maintain but they must always be ready to go.

Some lobbyists stated that not only was it not necessary to make a case regarding their lobbying position, but that their organizations were thinking of increasing the size of the lobbying force. Typical responses were:

There is no need to make a case. As a matter of fact, they're considering giving me an assistant.

No, right now they are trying to edge me off the legislative work, and to train a new man and make this job for two people.

On the surface, then, it seems that none of the lobbyists interviewed in this study had to make a case for continued representation. However, it has been this writer's observation, while a legislative employee, that in fact some lobbyists devote a great deal of attention and effort to making themselves appear necessary, if not essential, to the effective operation of their interest group. The practice of "sandbagging," that is, introducing a bill for a constituent--allegedly working for its passage--but surreptitiously having a committee "pigeon-hole" the bill, is not only practiced by legislators but also by lobbyists. This writer knows of several instances in which lobbyists deliberately had a bill introduced

which in some way would have jeopardized the status of their interest groups. The typical procedure often followed is to have the lobbyist drum up considerable sentiment among his interest group members; call in various organization officials to testify against the proposed legislation; and, then, after considerable excitement and activity quietly have a friendly legislator kill the bill in committee. After the bill has been killed, the lobbyist, in a variety of ways, would claim credit for its demise. However, this is not a tactic indulged in by lobbyists who are secure in their positions; for it requires unusual cooperation on the part of legislators, and there is always the possibility it might backfire with the bill passing the legislature.

It has also been the writer's observation that some lobbyists ask legislators, particularly those in leadership positions, to "plug" them in appearances before their interest groups or in letters to their organization superiors. It is the writer's recollection that in four years in the Speaker's Office, at least ten requests of this kind have been made of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In several cases, lobbyists were having trouble with their executive board members and wanted letters of recommendation from the Speaker to the Board. In no case, was the request granted.

Although nothing in the data indicated that lobbyists felt it necessary to justify their positions to their employers it can be concluded that those who felt insecure in their lobbying role might resort to practices which were designed to strengthen their positions and enhance their personal security.

Perceptions of Formulation of Organization Legislative Policy

Lobbyists were questioned regarding the process by which legislative policy was made for their interest groups. Four basic processes became apparent after the responses to the open-end questions were

analyzed. Table 32 depicts the four basic ways in which legislative policy was crystallized for the Michigan interest groups studied in this dissertation.

By Lobbyist

Only two (16%) lobbyists stated that legislative policy was made directly by them. One of the lobbyists was at the top of the IPE scale, and the other was ranked in the eighteenth position on the scale. Their responses were:

I establish all legislative policies. It may be done in consultation with them, but its left entirely to me.

Frankly, I usually make legislative policy. We have a legislative committee, but it never meets. I have never consulted them.

By Organization Superiors with Lobbyist

Nine (27%) of the lobbyists stated that legislative policy was made by their organization superiors in direct consultation with them. Eight of the nine were in the top half of the IPE scale, and one in the bottom half. Typical responses describing the process by which legislative policy was formulated were:

The corporate official determines the policy in counsel with me and other corporation officials.

We arrive at policy by a meeting of minds. This is done by all the leaders within the business and by compromise with other leaders and people within the organization. I help make the decisions, and the company follows my recommendations.

Its determined largely by management--we have to determine it. Whenever we feel something is inconsistent or we have to compromise, we get Board action. This puts me between the board and management, and they take me right in.

Generally, we know the position on a bill from prior experience. We talk it over with the officers of the companies, and then we decide.

Question 18: How is legislative policy made for your organization?

By Lobbyist By Lobbyist By Lobbyist By "Grass Roots"

Lobbyist	IPE Points	By Lobbyist	By Lobbyist	By Lobbyist	By "Grass Roots"
K	159	x			
X	61		x		
I	55			x	
L	55				x
R	38			x	
M	30		x		
DD	27			x	
CC	26		x		
B	23		x		
F	22			x	
D	21			x	
J	20			x	
S	20		x		
EE	18		x		
G	18		x		
AA	16		x		
A	15			x	
Q	14	x			
BB	13			x	
GG	11			x	
H	9				x
FF	9			x	
E	8		x		
T	8			x	
Z	8			x	
P	7				x
U	1			x	
V	1				x
C	1				x
N	0			x	
W	0			x	
O	0				x
Y	0			x	

Policy is usually made by the President, the Assistant to the President (i.e., me) and the Secretary. We report to the Board-- they approve, never veto.

By Governing Board Or Its Legislative Committee

The third process by which legislative policy was distilled does not involve the lobbyist directly and decisions were made by the governing board of the interest group or its legislative committee. The majority (48%) of the lobbyists perceived this as the more typical policy-development process. Of the sixteen interest groups in this category, six of their lobbyists were in the top half of the PIE scale, and ten were in the bottom half. Typical responses in this category were:

The Executive Council of the Board of Directors makes policy once a year. The Executive Committee meets once a month and policy is made here. The Legislative Committee has the last word on what will be introduced then followed through by your office.

Legislative policy is determined by the Legislative Committee during the interim when the Board is not meeting. Otherwise, it is shaped by the Legislative Committee and approved by the Board.

A Legislative Committee makes the decisions. It recommends to the Board of Directors. They can recommend whether or not to take policy decisions to the annual convention.

Policy is made by the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors which meets four times a year. In an emergency, the Managing Director contacts the Board of Directors.

By "Grass Roots" Process Within the Organization

The fourth policy-development process was entitled a "grass roots" process within the organization. In other words, policy was developed among members and their committees on the local level and then passed on to a regional and/or state governing body without direct participation by the lobbyist. Eighteen percent of the interest groups in this study used such a process. Of the six interest groups who developed policy

in this manner, only one of their lobbyists was in the top half of the IPE scale, and the other five were in the bottom half. Typical responses outlining policy development in this fashion were:

The resolutions committees of our local groups discuss issues, and then pass resolutions in 'group-think' sessions. They are helped by our research people. These resolutions are then sent to our state resolutions committee. At our annual convention we argue and then adopt some of the resolutions. From there they go on to our national organization.

Policy is developed in three steps as part of a continuing document with the basic policy declaration and changes prepared by the Executive Committee. The final document is submitted to the Board of Directors. Then it is submitted by mail to the members, and it is made up of line-items to vote on. It is returned by mail (incidentally, an excellent return) to the Executive Committee. By then it is a combination of decisions, which we translate.

Long-range policy is made by the House of Delegates (from the 55 county organizations) at the annual September convention during which they adopt resolutions. In between these annual sessions, the Council meets monthly, and the Executive Committee of the Council has authority delegated to it to make decisions. Under the Council we have a Legislative Committee which does the 'legwork' on legislation and makes recommendations to the Executive Committee.

It was hypothesized that lobbyists who either made the legislative policy themselves or directly participated in its formulation would tend to be more effective than those who did not directly participate. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, lobbyists, at the bottom half of the IPE scale perceived significant differences between themselves and their interest groups in the definition of appropriate role playing. These same lobbyists, as a rule, did not directly participate in policy formulation. Perhaps their non-participation in policy decisions contributed to the perceived differences in role between themselves and their interest group. At any rate, the hypothesis that policy-development participation would be related to effectiveness was statistically verified. A point bi-serial correlation was obtained by combining the two categories of direct lobbyist

participation ("by lobbyist" and "by organization superiors and lobbyist") and the two categories of non-participation ("by governing board or its legislative committee and the grass roots process"), and correlating these with effectiveness scores. A statistically significant correlation ($r = .3443$) at the 5% level was obtained, indicating a relationship between participation in policy development and lobbying effectiveness.

In summary, forty-eight percent of the lobbyists perceived policy development as a function of the interest groups' governing boards or their legislative committees; 27% stated policy development was a result of combined effort of the lobbyist and his superiors; 18% saw it as a result of a "grass roots" process within the organization; and 6% stated policy was made by the lobbyist alone. Further, a correlation was found between lobbyists' participation in policy development and lobbying effectiveness. Generally, the more participation the more effective the lobbyist.

Organization Acceptance of Lobbyists' Personal Policy Recommendations

A further probe on the personal participation of the lobbyists in legislative policy development was also made.¹ The hypothesis was that those whose recommendations were not adopted frequently would tend to be less effective than the lobbyists whose policy recommendations were adopted frequently. Thirty-two (97%) of the lobbyists said their recommendations were adopted "frequently"; and of this group seven (21%) said they are adopted "100%" by their interest group. Only one lobbyist stated that his recommendations were adopted "occasionally," and he was fourth from the bottom of the IPE scale. There was no way to validate this relationship statistically.

¹The question was: "Are your personal recommendations on legislative policy adopted frequently, occasionally, seldom, or never?"

It does not seem that the responses to this question conflict with the data in the previous table regarding participation in policy-making. It would appear certain that interest groups would rely heavily on the recommendations of the lobbyists--even those who do not directly participate in the decisions of the governing board--when they felt it necessary to ask their opinions. Certainly, for the interest group not to ask the opinion of their legislative agent on a legislative policy matter would be foolhardy, and indicates a lack of confidence in their lobbyist's ability and experience on legislative matters.

Perceptions of Division of Labor and Time Spent in Lobbying Role

Lobbyists were questioned regarding the way they spent their time in lobbying-related activities.¹ The amount of time in various activities was estimated by each lobbyist and was recorded in Table 33. The average amount of time spent in each activity was computed for the entire group and is listed at the bottom of the table. Activities were grouped into three main categories: direct personal contact activities with legislators, organization office activities, and other miscellaneous activities.

One of the hypotheses of this dissertation was that lobbyists who spent more of their time in activities that brought them in direct personal contact with legislators would be more effective than those who did not spend as much time in these activities. In order to relate lobbying effectiveness to the division of time and labor in the lobbying role, an

¹The question was: "Speaking generally, about what percentage of your time do you spend in each of these various activities?" The respondent was then handed a card and asked to estimate the amount of time spent in nine activities. These categories are listed in Table 33. Some lobbyists did not estimate the time spent within 100%; so, in several cases the total amount of time either exceeds or is under the 100% total.

Legislators as Roots vel	Organization Office Activities			Other Activities		
	Working in Doing Own Office Research	Preparing Press Releases, etc.	Percent	Calling on Others	Calling on State Agencies	Calling on Exec. Of. Other
20	25	0	5	5	5	1
20	15	10	5	5	5	1
0	10	10	2	15	5	2
5	40	10	15	0	5	2
10	20	15	10	10	10	10
0	20	5	0	5	5	1
0	40	20	20	0	0	0
5	30	0	0	5	5	0
20	2	0	0	10	2	5
2	60	2	2	2	2	0
1	25	5	5	10	2	0
0	10	20	3	5	10	2
5	10	5	0	10	20	0
0	20	5	5	5	5	5
10	60	0	0	0	0	0
60	10	0	0	5	10	5
2	15	0	1	5	4	3
25	10	0	1	5	5	4
0	70	0	50	0	5	0
10	30	15	10	5	5	5
2	30	3	2	8	1	1
3	80	0	0	5	1	1
0	10	10	0	0	5	0
20	20	5	5	0	0	0
0	40	5	0	20	0	3
10	40	10	25	5	2	10
0	10	2	0	0	2	0
10	30	5	8	10	4	70
0	15	0	5	40	5	0
4	65	25	0	1	5	0
10	40	15	5	10	2	3
35	10	15	0	7	18	0
5	60	10	5	0	0	0
10	24	10	4	5	5	1
8	34	7	7	7	3	2
9	29	7	6	6	5	2

average amount of time was computed for the top sixteen and bottom seventeen lobbyists on the IPE scale. These percentages are shown at the bottom of Table 33. A brief summary of the differences and similarities between the lobbyists on the top and bottom half of the IPE scale follows.

Direct Personal Contact Activities With Legislators

Calling on Legislators. Lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent the majority (27%) of their time calling on legislators, while those in the bottom half devoted 24% of their time in this activity. The more effective lobbyists in this study spent more time calling on legislators during the session than the others. The group average was 25%.

Entertaining. The role of entertaining in lobbying is discussed fully in Chapter V. It appears that the more effective lobbyists at the top half of the IPE scale spend about twice as much time in entertaining legislators (12%). Lobbyists on the bottom half of the scale estimated only 6% of their time was allocated for entertainment. The group average was 9%.

"Grass Roots" Travel. As will be pointed out in Chapter V, it is commonplace among lobbyists to hear the statement that those lobbyists who are able to travel around the state during the Legislative Interim (that is, when the Legislature is not in session) have a greater chance to be effective because of the additional contacts and visits with legislators. This seems to be supported by the data in Table 33. Lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale estimated that 10% of their time was spent in "grass roots" travel and visits with legislators; compared to those in the bottom half of the scale who spent 8% of their time in this activity. The average amount of time spent in travel by the entire group was 9%.

In summary, lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale spent more of their time on direct personal contacts with legislators by calling on them more during the session; entertaining more, and in their "grass roots" travels around the state.

Organization Office Activities

Working in Own Office. Lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale estimated that 24% of their time was spent working in their own interest group office. Lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale, however, estimated that most (34%) of their time was spent in this activity. The more effective lobbyists, therefore, spent 10% less time in the routine of office activity. The total group time average was 29%.

Doing Research. Lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent more (10%) of their time in research activities than those lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale who estimated 7% of their time was allocated for this activity. The group average was 7%.

Preparing Press Releases, Speeches, etc. Interestingly enough, lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent less time (4%) in the preparation of public relations materials for the news media than those lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale (7%). The group time average was 6%.

In summary, lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent less time working in their offices than those in the bottom half of the scale; and the top sixteen lobbyists also spent more time doing research, but less time was allocated by them for the preparation and release of public relations materials.

Other Activities

Calling on Others. Generally, this category referred to the lobbyist calling on members of his own interest group organization and other

lobbyists. Lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent less time (5%) in this activity than those lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale (7%). The group time average was 6%.

Calling on State Agencies. It is apparent that lobbyists do not spend much time lobbying state agencies. Although those lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spend more time (5%) than those in the bottom half (3%), the time average for the whole group was low at 5%.

Calling on the Executive Office. From these data it appears that Michigan lobbyists did not perceive it a necessity to call on members of the Governor's staff, or the Governor himself. Again, this may have been a reflection on the fact that the Executive Office, at the time of this study, was controlled by Democrats, and the Legislature by Republicans. Two percent of the time of all the lobbyists was spent in this activity.

Other. Responses in the "other" category referred mostly to administrative duties in connection with the interest group organization. Lobbyist U said he spent 70% of his time "sitting around and observing." The group time average for this category was 2%.

In summary, lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent less time calling on others, and more time lobbying state agencies than lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale. Further, lobbyists devoted only 2% of their time to lobbying the Executive Office.

To further test the hypothesis that lobbyists who spend more of their time in activities that bring them in direct personal contact with legislators would, therefore, be more effective than those who did not spend as much time in these activities, Table 34 was constructed. In this table, the time spent in the three direct personal contact activities (that is, calling on legislators, entertaining, and grass roots travel) were combined and their percentages totalled. A point bi-serial correlation between time spent in direct personal contacts and lobbying

TABLE 34

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF TIME SPENT ON
LOBBYING LEGISLATORS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Time Spent in Direct Personal Contact With Legislators
		(Percent)
K	159	30
X	61	62
I	55	50
L	55	20
R	38	25
M	30	55
DD	27	30
CC	26	60
B	23	86
F	22	32
D	21	46
J	20	50
S	20	55
EE	18	50
G	18	40
AA	16	90
A	15	72
Q	14	76
BB	13	20
GG	11	45
H	9	55
FF	9	9
E	8	65
T	8	70
Z	8	32
P	7	23
U	1	20
V	1	40
C	1	20
N	0	7
W	0	25
O	0	47
Y	0	25

* This includes several categories cited in the previous table. They are: "calling on legislators, " "grass roots travel, " and "enter-taining. "

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r_s = .3494$.
 $r_s = .0122$

effectiveness was computed ($r. = .0122$). The correlation was below the 5% level of significance indicating no statistical correlation.

In summarizing this section on the perceptions of time spent in the lobbying role, it can be said that: lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale spent more time on direct personal contacts with legislators by calling on them more during the session; entertaining more, and spent more time in "grass roots" travel around the state; further, lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent less time working in their offices than those in the bottom half of the scale and they spent more time doing research, but less time than the bottom seventeen lobbyists in the preparation and release of public relations materials; finally, lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale spent less time calling on others and more time lobbying state agencies. All lobbyists spent only 2% of their time lobbying the Executive Office. Although no statistical evidence was present, the data did suggest that lobbyists who spent more time in direct personal contact with legislators tended to be more effective than the others.

Methods of Reporting by Lobbyists to Employers

Table 35 demonstrated the methods used by lobbyists to keep in touch with their interest groups.¹ Reporting methods varied greatly. Some lobbyists did very little formal reporting--what was done was accomplished in informal personal conferences. Others had elaborate reporting methods, including newsletters, special bulletins, legislative reports, and others. No hypothesis was formed regarding the relationship of reporting methods to lobbying effectiveness. A glance at the table reveals the skewing of responses among the categories. The various methods of reporting are briefly summarized below.

¹The question asked was: "How do you report back to the organization you represent?"

TABLE 35
LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF METHODS OF REPORTING TO THEIR ORGANIZATIONS*

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Periodic Newsletters and Bulletins to Members	Informal Personal Conferences with Superiors	Annual Legislative Report	Personal Oral Reports to Exec. Comm. and Org. Meetings	Annual Organization Meet.
K	159		x			
X	61		x			
I	55	x			x	
L	55	x		x	x	x
R	38	x			x	
M	30		x	x		
DD	27	x	x		x	
CC	26		x	x		
B	23		x			
F	22	x		x		x
D	21	x		x		x
J	28			x	x	
S	20		x		x	
EE	18				x	x
G	18	x	x			
AA	16			x	x	
A	15		x	x		
Q	14	x			x	
BB	13	x		x	x	
GG	11	x			x	
H	9	x		x		x
FF	9	x		x		x
E	8	x			x	x
T	8	x		x	x	x
Z	8				x	
P	7	x	x		x	
U	1					
V	1	x	x	x	x	x
C	1	x				
N	0	x				
W	0	x				
O	0	x				
Y	0	x		x	x	

Pe

one

of

pre

usi

the

wh

I ha

con

Inf

thr

Ma

the

me

per

var

An

int

Periodic Newsletters and Bulletins

Organization newsletters are also discussed in Chapter V. Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists write newsletters and bulletins to the members of their organizations. Often times this newsletter is released to the press as well as the interest group membership. Most of the lobbyists using this reporting device confined their newsletter writing to the time the legislature was in session. Some only wrote bulletins and newsletters when, as one put it, "the spirit moves me," or, as another stated, "when I have something to say." This reporting device was the one in most common usage among Michigan Lobbyists.

Informal Personal Conferences with Superiors

Thirty-six percent of the lobbyists said they reported back primarily through informal personal conferences with higher organization officials. Many of the lobbyists stated that this was, more often than not, done over the telephone. Typical responses for those who used this reporting method were:

I consult by telephone with my people who are interested in certain problems. There are no formal reports--not fifteen lines--and no formal records are required.

I never put anything in writing. I just call the boss.

My boss says if I don't hear from you then everything is all right. If we have serious legislative difficulties we have special committees, and I report to them by telephone.

Generally, those lobbyists who relied primarily on informal personal conferences as the primary reporting method are those who ranked at the top of the IPE scale.

Annual Legislative Report

Forty-two percent of the lobbyists wrote an annual report for their interest group. For the most part, this report was a "score sheet" of

legislation passed and defeated in which the interest group had a stake. Some reports are sketchy, others are as complete as the one filed each year by Lobbyist T:

At the annual convention I make a complete report of my activities. This includes the bills killed and passed; miles travelled; expenses; mail answered; and so forth.

Personal Oral Reports to Executive Committee and Organization Meetings

Fifty-five percent of the lobbyists stated that they reported regularly to executive committee meetings of the interest group's board of directors and to other organization meetings. Typical responses concerning this method of reporting were:

I give a personal oral report to the officers' and directors' meetings.

I give an oral report to my legislative committee which meets every two weeks during the session, and to the Board of Directors which meets three times a session.

Annual Organization Meetings

Twenty-seven percent of the lobbyists not only wrote a formal report, but actually gave it at the interest group's annual convention. Generally, this report consisted of the "batting average" of the group in terms of the legislation it was interested in during the legislative session that year.

In summary, reporting methods are highly varied in kind as well as implementation. Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists wrote periodic newsletters and bulletins; 59% made personal oral reports to their Executive Committees; 42% wrote an annual report; 36% reported through informal personal conferences with their superiors; and 27% gave oral reports to the annual convention of their interest group. Generally, those lobbyists who ranked at the top of the IPE scale tended to primarily use informal

reporting methods, and those in the bottom half of the scale tended to frequently use a greater number of reporting methods.

Other Aspects of the Lobbying Role

This section treats some of the aspects of the lobbying "job," such as the financing of lobbying; lobbyists' income; years of lobbying experience; and lobbyists' place of residence. Where appropriate, relationships between these variables and lobbying effectiveness were attempted.

Cost of Financing Lobbying Operation

Table 36 depicts the various methods used to finance the interest groups' lobbying operation in Lansing. Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists said their lobbying operation came from members' dues with a specific budget for lobbying costs provided by their association. Twenty-seven percent stated that their lobbying activities were financed in a regular company or governmental unit budget. Only one lobbyist received his lobbying expenses from client fees. No lobbyist suggested that the cost of lobbying operations was financed by an informal committee outside of the interest group organization. It is often alleged that some lobbyists have plenty of money to spend because such an ex-officio group can surreptitiously raise more money. One lobbyist charged, in the interview, that he "knew of at least twenty informal committees operating outside of the formal organization." He continued, "these committees consist of organization members who raise money on the side for lobbying." If committees of this kind exist, the writer has no knowledge of them, either from personal experience, or the data collected in this study.

Lobbyists' Income as Related to Effectiveness

Lobbyists were asked how they were paid for their services.¹

¹The question was: "How are you paid for your services, that is, do you have a contract, a fee, or a salary?"

TABLE 36

COST OF FINANCING OF LOBBYING OPERATION

Question 17: How is the cost of the lobbying operation financed by the organization?

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Association Members' Dues	Company or Governmental Budget	Client Fees	Other *	NA
K	159			x		
X	61		x			
I	55				x	
L	55	x				
R	38	x				
M	30		x **			
DD	27	x				
CC	26	x				
B	23		x			
F	22	x				
D	21	x			x	
J	20		x**			
S	20		x			
EE	18	x				
G	18		x			
AA	16		x			
A	15		x			
Q	14	x				
BB	13	x				
GG	11	x				
H	9	x				
FF	9					x
E	8					
T	8	x				
Z	8		x			
P	7	x				
U	1	x				
V	1	x				
C	1	x				
N	0	x				
W	0	x				
O	0	x				
Y	0	x				
Total and Percent		20 (61%)	9 (27%)	1 (3%)	2 (6%)	1 (3%)

* Dues levied on the basis of company's gross sales in Michigan.

** City and county governmental units.

Twelve percent were paid by contract, 9% through fees; and the majority (79%) by salary. Lobbyists were also asked the average yearly income paid them during the past three years.¹ Two lobbyists refused to answer the question. The incomes of the others are reported in Table 37.

TABLE 37
LOBBYISTS' INCOME

Income	Number
Refused to answer	2
Under \$5,000	1
\$6,000	1
\$7,000	0
\$8,000	0
\$9,000	4
\$10,000	4
\$11,000	3
\$12,000	3
\$13,000	1
\$14,000	3
\$15,000	1
\$16,000	1
\$17,000	1
\$18,000	1
\$20,000	4
\$24,000	1
\$25,000	1
\$55,000	1
	<hr/> 33

Forty-eight percent of the lobbyists earn \$12,000 and under per year; and 45% make \$13,000 or more. Whether or not the lobbyists included their expense accounts in this yearly income was undetermined. None mentioned it.

¹The question was: "About how much has your average yearly income been for the past three years?"

Table 38 was constructed to determine if there were any statistical relationship between the amount of money earned by lobbyists and their effectiveness scores. The purpose of this attempted correlation was to corroborate what appeared to be a simple hypothesis--that is, those lobbyists who have the highest incomes would tend to be the most effective. The difficulty lies not in finding the correlation, but in explaining the relationship. The point bi-serial correlation between lobbying effectiveness was highly significant at the one-tenth of 1% level ($r. = .8103$).

The question this correlation raises is similar to that of the chicken and the egg; that is, which comes first, the high income level or lobbying effectiveness. However, the writer is inclined to believe that lobbyists in the high income brackets received this compensation in recognition of their effective role performance as lobbyists. Certainly, it couldn't be denied that high incomes act as a motivational source of great importance. This is discussed further in a section of the chapter which follows.

Lobbying Experience as Related to Effectiveness

Table 39 depicts the number of years of lobbying experience in statistical relationship to lobbying effectiveness. The hypothesis was that the more years of experience, the more effective the lobbyist would be. A point bi-serial correlation between these two variables indicates a very high statistical correlation ($r. = .6132$) at the one-tenth of one percent level. This verifies the proposition that lobbying experience was related to lobbying effectiveness.

Lobbyists' Place of Residence as Related to Effectiveness

Lobbyists often suggested that residence in the city of Lansing, close to the legislative scene, had an important bearing on lobbying effectiveness. Table 40 was constructed to test this relationship. That is, the relationship between lobbyists who have year-round Lansing residences

TABLE 38

LOBBYISTS' INCOME AS RELATED TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Income*
K	159	\$55,000
X	61	12,000
I	55	25,000
L	55	11,000
R	38	16,000
M	30	17,000
DD	27	15,000
CC	26	14,000
B	23	20,000
F	22	24,000
D	21	20,000
J	20	6,000
S	20	10,000
EE	18	No answer
G	18	13,000
AA	16	10,000
A	15	18,000
Q	14	14,000
BB	13	20,000
GG	11	11,000
H	9	No answer
FF	9	5,000
E	8	20,000
T	8	9,000
Z	8	12,000
P	7	11,000
U	1	14,000
V	1	9,000
C	1	9,000
N	0	9,000
W	0	12,000
O	0	10,000
Y	0	10,000

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the one-tenth of 1% level: $r. = .5541$.
 $r. = .8103$

TABLE 39

RELATIONSHIP OF YEARS OF LOBBYING EXPERIENCE
TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Years of Lobbying Experience
K	159	27
X	61	7*
I	55	22
L	55	21
R	38	9*
M	30	13
DD	27	10*
CC	26	13*
B	23	11
F	22	10*
D	21	20*
J	20	18*
S	20	9*
EE	18	11
G	18	12
AA	16	7
A	15	4
Q	14	10
BB	13	11*
GG	11	5
H	9	8*
FF	9	8
E	8	4
T	8	5
Z	8	5*
P	7	3
U	1	20*
V	1	2
C	1	16
N	0	4
W	0	11*
O	0	4*
Y	0	7*

* An estimate of the lobbyist's years of experience taken from the data but not directly from any specific questions.

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the one tenth of 1% level: $r. = .5541$
 $r. = .6132$

TABLE 40

LOBBYISTS' PLACE OF RESIDENCE AS RELATED
TO EFFECTIVENESS

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Year-round Lansing Residence	Lansing Residence Only During Legislative Session
K	159	x	
X	61	x	
I	55	x	
L	55	x	
R	38		x
M	30		x
DD	27	x	
CC	26		x
B	23	x	
F	22	x	
D	21	x	
J	20		x
S	20	x	
EE	18	x	
G	18		x
AA	16		x
A	15		x
Q	14	x	
BB	13	x	
GG	11	x	
H	9		x
FF	9		x
E	8		x
T	8		x
Z	8		x
P	7	x	
U	1		x
V	1	x	
C	1		x
N	0	x	
W	0	x	
O	0	x	
Y	0	x	
Totals and Percent		19 (58%)	14 (42%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .2032$

and their lobbying effectiveness as compared to those who live in a Lansing hotel only during the legislative session. Nineteen lobbyists (58%) lived in Lansing year-round. Of this group, ten who were in the top half of the IPE scale maintained year-round Lansing residences; nevertheless, so did the other nine lobbyists who were in the bottom half of the scale. Forty-two percent lived in Lansing only during the legislative session; and they were scattered throughout the IPE scale. A point bi-serial correlation between effectiveness and place of residence was not significant at the .05 level ($r = .2032$). However, it is possible to generalize that the majority (ten out of sixteen) of the lobbyists at the top of the IPE scale did maintain year-round Lansing residences.

Lobbyists' Perceptions of Job Satisfaction and Future Career Plans

Job Satisfaction and Motivations to Remain in Lobbying

Lobbyists were questioned regarding their personal satisfactions with lobbying as a profession.¹ The hypothesis was that those who were basically dissatisfied with lobbying as a profession and did not want to continue in it would tend to be less effective than those lobbyists who were happier with their lot. Eighty-two percent of the lobbyists, as revealed in Table 41, stated they would like to continue in lobbying activity for the rest of their professional lives. All lobbyists, but one, among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale indicated they intended to remain lobbying the rest of their professional lives. Probes, as to why they wanted to continue, elicited various kinds of motivations involved in their decision to stay in lobbying. These responses were categorized from the open-end questions and are recorded in Table 42.

¹The question was: "Would you like to continue in this type of work for the rest of your professional life? Why?"

TABLE 41

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF JOB SATISFACTIONS

Question 9: Would you like to continue in this type of work for the rest of your professional life?					
Lobbyist	IPE Points	Yes	No	Perhaps	DK/NA
K	159	x			
X	61	x			
I	55	x			
L	55	x			
R	38		x		
M	30	x			
DD	27	x			
CC	26	x			
B	23	x			
F	22	x			
D	21	x			
J	20	x			
S	20	x			
EE	18	x			
G	18	x			
AA	16	x			
A	15		x		
Q	14	x			
BB	13	x			
GG	11				x
H	9	x			
FF	9	x			
E	8				x
T	8	x			
Z	8	x			
P	7	x			
U	1	x			
V	1	x			
C	1	x			
N	0			x	
W	0	x			
O	0		x		
Y	0	x			
Totals and Percent		27 (82%)	3 (9%)	1 (3%)	2 (6%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .1570$

TABLE 42

PERCEPTIONS OF MOTIVATIONS IN DECISION TO RETAIN LOBBYING AND BASES OF JOB SATISFACTION

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Money and Fringe Benefits		Ideals and Service to Be Achieved		Too Late to Change Stimuli, and Variety In Lobbying		The Challenge, Governmental Affairs		Interest in Like to Work with People	
K	159	x						x			
X	61								x		
I	55										
L	55			x							
R	38										
M	30	x				x		x			
DD	27					x					
CC	26					x		x			x
B	23					x		x			
F	22	x				x		x			
D	21			x				x			x
J	20					x		x			
S	20					x		x			
EE	18			x				x			x
G	18			x				x			x
AA	16					x		x			x
A	15										
Q	14					x		x			
BB	13					x		x			
GG	11										
H	9										
FF	9			x				x			
E	8										x
T	8			x				x			
Z	8			x							x
P	7			x				x			
U	1			x				x			
V	1										
C	1			x							x
N	0										
W	0										
O	0										
Y	0			x				x			x
Totals and Percent		3 (2%)		10 (30%)		6 (18%)		17 (52%)		4 (12%)	9 (27%)

Money and Fringe Benefits as Source of Motivation

Three (9%) of the lobbyists, in the top half of the IPE scale, stated they would remain in lobbying because of the money and fringe benefits connected with it. Typical responses were:

They have a good retirement plan. It would be pretty silly to cast about.

I haven't much choice. I like to eat, and I like to ride in a Cadillac.

Ideals and Service to Be Achieved as Source of Motivation

Ten (30%) of the lobbyists mentioned service and ideals as the source of their motivation to remain in lobbying. Some expressed "service" to their interest group as a goal; some typical responses were:

It is important to represent the forgotten people--the . . . people--and I have advanced them fifty years in the last fifteen.

The . . . industry is very important--it is the second largest, I'm dedicated to doing all I can for the industry.

It is a very important thing from the standpoint of the They are getting numerically less, while their operation is getting more complicated.

Others mentioned "causes" or "ideals" for which they were fighting as a source of motivation. Typical responses were:

I see us going socialist every year, and somebody must have the courage to stand up and speak their piece--I'm concerned.

This job is ministerial; that is, I'm doing good for somebody.

"Too Late to Change Jobs" as Source of Motivation

Six (18%) of the lobbyists said they would stay in lobbying because it was "too late to change jobs." All six were in the top half of the IPE scale. Typical responses were:

This job suits me all right. For one thing my age is a factor. I'm forty-four now and settled down. I don't want to move around. I don't like to make a change between jobs--I'm getting too old. I have put sixteen years of my life into this work--it's too late to change now.

Challenge, Stimuli, and Variety as Source of Motivation

The majority (52%) of the lobbyists mentioned the challenging, stimulating aspects, as well as the variety of experiences in lobbying as the source of their motivation to remain in lobbying. Typical responses in this category were:

I like this work. There is an endless variety and many interesting aspects to it.

There is a challenge in this kind of work--all of the political, governmental and legal aspects. I love the intrigue.

I find it a challenge to work things out. It's fascinating to work with and observe people's reactions to how legislation works. There are no precedents. You set your own. It's different than law, precedents are irrelevant.

The variety fascinates me. Everyday it's something new. You meet new people, and new problems. It's a challenge, because you never know when the lid will blow off.

It's the natural thing for me to do. I like it--the challenge. I have put sixteen years of my life into this kind of work. I'd be like a horse in the stable when the race is on, if I weren't in Lansing when the Legislature is in session.

Interest in Governmental Affairs as Source of Motivation

An intense interest in the governmental process was cited by 12% of the lobbyists as a source of their motivation to remain in lobbying. Typical responses for this group were:

I like lobbying because it keeps you close to government.

I like government, and I have a backlog of knowledge on legislative procedure, etc. Legislators have confidence in me, and I like to be with them.

"Like to Work With People" as a Source
of Motivation

Nine (27%) lobbyists perceived their motivation as related to the fact that they "like to work with people." A typical response from this group was:

I have a 'at home' feeling in this work because I like people. I like the people I work with; and the people I work with are good to me.

In summary, of the twenty-seven (82%) of the lobbyists who indicated a desire to remain in lobbying, 52% cited their motivation stemmed from the challenge, stimuli and variety of the work; 27% said it resulted because they liked to work with people; 30% attributed it to ideals and service yet to be achieved; 18% because it was too late to change jobs; 12% because of their interest in government; and 9% were going to stay in lobbying because of the money and fringe benefits attendant to it.

Three (9%) of the lobbyists stated they did not want to remain in lobbying. One of these was in the top half of the IPE scale, and he indicated:

I want something easy; this is hard work. It is interesting, but tough and frustrating. I want to go back to administration. I get impatient in this job. I want to get something done, e.g., surveys and research.

Another stated he wanted to get out of lobbying because "it's too punishing physically, and it locks you in on a certain level in the company." The other lobbyist said he didn't mind the work for two or three months, but he "would rather spend my time on my professional life."

In order to verify the hypothesis that lobbyists basically dissatisfied with lobbying would tend to be less effective than those lobbyists who were satisfied and didn't want to change was not borne out by statistical

calculation. A point bi-serial correlation between lobbyists who did not want to leave lobbying and those who did want to leave or were uncertain compared with effectiveness scores was not significant ($r. = .1570$). This indicated no apparent statistical relationship existed between effectiveness and job satisfaction. However, it was pointed out earlier that all lobbyists, but one, in the top half of the IPE scale were planning to remain in lobbying for the rest of their professional lives.

Future Career Plans

As stated above, 82% of the lobbyists planned to remain in lobbying activity the rest of their professional lives. The three lobbyists who indicated they wanted to leave lobbying had varying career plans. One said he wanted to move into his company's administration; another wanted to return to his professional life; and the other wanted to go into full-time research.

Lobbyists were asked if they ever planned to enter full-time government work. Eighty-two percent said "no"; 6% said they worked for a governmental unit at the time of the interview; 6% were undecided; and 6% indicated they would like to enter government service. Of these latter two, one indicated a willingness to be a United States Senator, and the other set his sights somewhat lower on a city council or state legislative post.

In connection with the question regarding their desire to enter government work, lobbyists were asked if they held any governmental positions at the time of the interview. Five (15%) said they did. Two were on the Advisory Committee on the Reorganization of State Government; one was on the State Fair Board; one on the MESC Advisory Board; and one on the Michigan Waterways Commission. Four out of five of these lobbyists were in the top half of the IPE scale.

Summary

Chapter IV discussed and analyzed the perceptions of recruitment, lobbying roles, job satisfaction, and future career plans as they related to lobbying effectiveness.

Most (70%) of the lobbyists perceived their recruitment as the result of being selected and approached by the interest group; 18% said they applied for the position; 9% felt they had "grown" into the position from within the organization; 12% got their jobs through friends and contacts; and one was elected to the post.

Personal commitment by the lobbyists to the organization's policies was perceived by most Michigan lobbyists as necessary to effective role enactment; and all lobbyists were agreed on this.

There was evidence to indicate that lobbyists who did not feel their relationship with their interest group to be a professional one--but rather a strong personal commitment--tended to be more effective than those who viewed their ties with the interest group as strictly a professional arrangement.

The hypothesis that lobbyists playing the role of defender-advocate would tend to be more effective than those required to play the role of promoter-strategist was supported. Confirmation of the statistical relationship between these primary roles and effectiveness was obtained with a high correlation.

The hypothesis that differences in role perceptions between employer and lobbyist tended to reduce lobbying effectiveness was also supported. Lobbyists with few or no problems of communication and understanding over the appropriate lobbying role were more effective than those who had to deal with organization naivete and myopia concerning effective role playing in the legislative process.

Although nothing in the data indicated that the lobbyists felt it necessary to justify their positions to their employers; it can be concluded that those who felt insecure in their lobbying role might resort to practices which were designed to strengthen their positions and enhance their personal security.

Forty-eight percent of the lobbyists perceived policy development as a function of the interest groups' governing boards or their legislative committees; 27% stated policy development was a result of the combined effort of the lobbyist and his superiors; 18% saw it as a result of a "grass roots" process within the organization; and 6% stated policy was made by the lobbyist alone. A correlation was found between lobbyists' participation in policy development and lobbying effectiveness. Generally, the more participation the more effective the lobbyist.

The hypothesis that lobbyists whose recommendations were not adopted frequently by the organization would tend to be less effective than lobbyists whose policy recommendations were adopted frequently was not substantiated.

Conclusions regarding the division of time and labor of the lobbyists as related to effectiveness were as follows: Lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale who spent more of their time calling on legislators; doing research; in "grass roots" travel; calling on state agencies; and entertainment, tend to be more effective than those lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale. Lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale spend more time working in their own offices; calling on others; and preparing press releases and speeches. Although no statistical evidence was present, the data did suggest that lobbyists who spent more time in direct personal contact with legislators tended to be more effective.

Reporting methods by lobbyists to their interest groups were highly varied in kind, as well as implementation. Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists wrote periodic newsletters and bulletins; 55% made personal

oral reports to their Executive Committees; 42% wrote an annual report; 36% reported through informal personal conferences with their superiors; and 27% gave oral reports to the annual convention of their interest groups. Generally, those lobbyists who ranked at the top of the IPE scale tended to primarily use informal reporting methods, and those at the bottom half of the scale tended to frequently use a greater number of reporting methods.

Various methods of financing the lobbying operations of interest groups were discussed and analyzed.

Lobbyists' incomes were related to effectiveness, with a high correlation present between high incomes and lobbying effectiveness. The majority of lobbyists were paid by salary, and the average salary was about \$12,000.

The years of lobbying experience was highly correlated with lobbying effectiveness. The more years of lobbying experience, the greater the lobbying effectiveness.

Year-round residence in Lansing was correlated with lobbying effectiveness. No statistical correlation was present, but it was generalized that the majority (ten out of sixteen) of the lobbyists at the top of the IPE scale did maintain year-round Lansing residences.

Of the twenty-seven (82%) of the lobbyists who indicated a professional desire to remain in lobbying, 52% cited their motivation stemmed from the challenge, stimuli and variety of the work; 27% said it resulted because they liked to work with people; 30% attributed it to ideals and service to be achieved; 18% said it was because it was too late to change jobs; 12% because of their interest in government; and 9% were going to stay in lobbying because of the money and fringe benefits. No statistical relationship was found between effectiveness and job satisfaction. However, all lobbyists, but one, in the top half of the IPE scale were planning to remain in lobbying for the rest of their professional lives.

CHAPTER V

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

One of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was that the skilled use of certain group-approved, role-associated lobbying tactics and techniques would be related to effective or non-effective role enactment. This chapter tested this proposition, and describes, as well, the various tactics and techniques used by Michigan lobbyists in performing their roles and in achieving access to legislators.

Access to legislative decision-makers is a fundamental prerequisite for any lobbyist in the implementation of his role, that is, to communicate the positions and desires of his interest group to legislative decision makers.

The lobbying process is basically one of communication; and the specialized job of the lobbyist is to ascertain and then implement the tactics and techniques which will most effectively influence the legislative decision maker. As will be noted in Chapter VII, most lobbyists conceive their role as one of communication.

The findings of this chapter substantiate Professor Lester W. Milbrath's conclusion that lobbyists try to communicate three kinds of information to decision makers: facts, arguments, and power.¹

¹The writer is indebted to Professor Milbrath for much of the methodology used in soliciting and coding the responses of Michigan lobbyists regarding their use of lobbying tactics and techniques. With the exception of two techniques (organization news activities and personal favors and assistance) all of the lobbying tactics described and analyzed in this chapter are modelled after those presented in an unpublished paper by Professor Milbrath entitled "Analyzing Lobbying Through Communication and Decision Making Models," presented at the 1959 Conference of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, May 14, 1959.

Every lobbyist has a set of facts and an ideological orientation about his interest group that he wants to impress upon legislators. Usually these are facts and normative assertions about some contemplated legislation action which will in some manner affect the organization he represents.

Lobbyists rely heavily on techniques which present facts and organization ideology to legislators. Later, it will be demonstrated that not only do lobbyists view these particular tactics and techniques as most effective, but the same evaluations held true for legislators and news correspondents.

Lobbying techniques which are designed to communicate facts, interest group orientation, and power are listed below and in the tables to follow. They are:

- personal presentation of arguments
- presenting research results
- testifying at hearings
- public relations campaign
- collaboration with other groups
- contact by constituent
- contact by person with special access
- organization news activities
- letter and telegram campaign
- publicizing voting records
- entertaining for an evening
- giving a party
- personal favors and assistance
- contributing political work
- contributing political money
- direct bribery

The lobbyist's task of communicating power is difficult and many times fraught with potential and unsuspected danger. This power can be economic as well as political. It is often alleged, and not without some basis in fact, that legislators and their relatives who are particularly amenable to some interest groups may, in some instances, indirectly receive economic benefits in the form of insurance contracts; the sale of bonds; construction awards; industrial and manufacturing contracts and

sub-contracts; increased business in one form or another; law clientele; municipal government jobs; directorships of banks and corporations, and so forth. This kind of economic pressure is extremely difficult to document, and it is often hard to separate fact from fiction. The writer in no way attempted to measure empirically this economic variable. However, in another part of this chapter, some impressionistic observations about economic pressure are recorded in the discussion of the personal favor and assistance technique.

Most lobbyists do their best to communicate political power. For many Michigan legislators, success is determined bi-annually at the polls. Now, re-election may not be the primary motivation of all legislators, but it certainly is an intense preoccupation. Consequently, legislators have great respect for organizations that can demonstrate political power as it may affect them. Very few interest groups have the necessary political power to defeat an incumbent if he ignores or works against their interests. Furthermore, attempting to defeat a legislator is not only a difficult and crude way to communicate, it is also very expensive and dangerous for if the legislator won re-election he might become highly antagonistic to the group's interest. Professor Milbrath also points out that an attempt to defeat an incumbent may well arouse some other competing group or coalition to press vigorously in opposition.¹

Political power is most often communicated in the most indirect and subtle manner possible. Particularly is this true of the older, established high status, interest groups such as the associations representing manufacturers, lawyers, doctors, businessmen, and others who are primarily interested in preserving the status quo. Those interest groups which are still struggling for recognition, and social change through legislation which will benefit them, tend to be more direct and more vocal about their actual and potential political power. Labor unions are a good example of the latter category.

¹Ibid., p. 6.

Generally, however, power is communicated by indirection and subtle reminders. Withholding or granting group support through campaign money and work is regarded by lobbyists as an ineffective lobbying technique. Legislators and correspondents, however, view it as more important.

Communication of power through the publicizing of voting records is regarded by all legislative participants as an ineffectual, often antagonistic, device resented by most legislators. Lobbyists tend rather to communicate power to legislators through constituent and friend contacts, letter writing campaigns, public relations campaigns, and collaboration with other groups.

Up to this point, political power has been discussed in punitive and negativistic terms; but it can also be described in a positive way. Legislators can be promised the support of an interest group as a reward for their efforts in behalf of the group.

Power is not only a type of information which can be communicated, but it is also a strong factor influencing decision makers to keep open channels of communication to groups which hold power.¹

Legislators keep channels of communication open for other reasons, but the primary reasons seems to be that of political power. Lobbyists spend much of their time attempting to achieve and then maintain their access to the decision maker. The techniques used to provide access to the legislator when and if the lobbyist may need it, are:

- entertaining for an evening
- giving a party
- personal favors and assistance
- contributing political work and money
- direct bribery

It will be demonstrated later that these techniques are very seldom used actually to present the interest group's position or program to legislators. They are a means to an end--the maintaining of access through

¹Ibid., p. 6.

the building of personal rapport and confidence of the legislator in the lobbyist.

The lobbyists, legislators, and news correspondents in this study were asked to evaluate a series of tactics and techniques for communicating with legislators. This was done in order to measure the perceptions of those groups most closely involved in the legislative process; the lobbyists as action-agents; the legislators as action-targets; and the news correspondents as action-observers.

Lobbyists were asked to evaluate the tactics and techniques as "they seem to work for you."¹ Legislators and news correspondents evaluated the techniques as "you think they work for lobbyists." All were asked to rate the sixteen techniques used in this study on an evaluative scale running from zero for not effective at all to ten for very effective (see Appendices 3 and 4). The scale, as represented in Table 43, was presented to the respondent in this form: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10, and the techniques to be evaluated were listed underneath it.

Tables 43, 44, and 45 indicate the evaluations made by each of the three groups. Generally, there was a high degree of consensus among the evaluators concerning effective and non-effective lobbying techniques. This can be seen in comparing the median scores for each technique in Table 46. These differences will be discussed in the pages to follow.

For analytical reasons, the tactics and techniques were divided into three categories: (1) direct personal communication techniques between lobbyist and legislator; (2) communication through intermediaries techniques; and (3) achieving and maintaining access techniques.

¹Lobbyists were handed a card on which all sixteen lobbying tactics and techniques were listed. They were asked to evaluate them in terms of how they worked for themselves. It is possible that some of the techniques listed (particularly in the "achieving and maintaining access" category) may not have been perceived as lobbying techniques by the individual lobbyist. This could have effected his evaluation. It was not possible to determine if this was the case with any of the lobbyists.

TABLE 43

LOBBYISTS' RATINGS OF TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Question 31: Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. Would you evaluate each of these techniques as they seem to work for you? It would be useful if you could rate them on a scale running from zero (0) for not effective at all to ten (10) for very effective.

Tactic or Technique	Lobbyists (N = 33)											Median ²
	(Number of choices in each category) ¹											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Direct Personal Communication												
Personal Presentation of Arguments	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	5	2	23	10.24
Presenting Research Results	1	0	2	2	0	7	3	1	4	1	12	8.12
Testifying at Hearings	1	2	1	0	1	10	2	2	2	1	11	6.75
Communication Through Intermediaries												
Public Relations Campaign	8	3	1	1	0	6	1	3	2	3	5	5.58
Collaboration With Other Groups	4	1	7	2	2	4	4	1	3	1	4	5.13
Contact by Constituent	7	1	8	3	0	4	3	0	3	1	3	3.17
Contact by Person with Special Access	10	5	5	5	0	2	1	0	3	0	2	2.30
Organization News Activities	17	0	2	3	2	3	2	0	2	0	2	.97
Letter and Telegram Campaigns	18	4	2	1	0	4	3	0	1	0	0	.92
Publicizing Voting Records	26	2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	.63
Achieving and Maintaining Access												
Entertaining for an Evening	10	6	5	3	0	6	2	0	0	0	1	2.10
Giving a Party	15	4	3	3	0	4	1	0	1	0	2	1.37
Personal Favors and Assistance	16	2	1	2	0	3	1	2	3	0	3	1.25
Contributing Political Work	22	0	6	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	.75
Contributing Political Money	23	2	4	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	.72
Direct Bribery	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.50

¹Although the respondents were asked to make their evaluations of the techniques on an eleven-point scale running from zero (0) to ten (10), it was necessary for analytical purposes in the presentation of these categories in this table and the ones which follow to renumber the categories from one (1) to eleven (11). This facilitated the computation of the medians and made it possible to compare Lansing lobbyists' medians with those of Washington lobbyists.

²In computing the median, 11 categories were used: 0-0.9, 1.0-1.9, 2.0-2.9, 3.0-3.9, 4.0-4.9, 50.0-5.9, 6.0-6.9, 7.0-7.9, 8.0-8.9, 9.0-9.9, 10.0+.

LEGISLATORS' RATINGS OF LOBBYING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Question 1: Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. Would you evaluate each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists. It would be helpful if you could rate them on a scale running from zero (0) for not effective at all to ten (10) for very effective.

Tactic or Technique	Legislators (N = 16) (number of choices in each category)											Median
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
Direct Personal Communication												
Personal Presentation of Arguments	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	12	10.67
Presenting Research Results	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	1	3	1	6	8.67
Testifying at Hearings	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	4	4	1	3	7.90
Communication Through Intermediaries												
Public Relations Campaign	0	0	4	0	2	4	2	2	0	1	1	5.50
Collaboration With Other Groups	2	1	0	2	4	5	1	0	1	0	0	4.75
Contact by Constituent	3	0	0	3	2	2	1	2	3	0	0	4.90
Contact by Person with Special Access	4	0	2	3	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	3.61
Organization News Activities	0	4	1	4	2	3	1	1	0	0	0	3.75
Letter and Telegram Campaigns	4	2	3	1	0	1	3	0	1	1	0	2.67
Publicizing Voting Records	8	2	1	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	.90
Achieving and Maintaining Access												
Entertaining for an Evening	7	2	1	4	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1.50
Giving a Party	7	2	1	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.50
Personal Favors and Assistance	7	2	1	1	0	3	1	0	0	0	1	1.50
Contributing Political Work	2	0	2	2	2	5	0	0	0	1	2	4.90
Contributing Political Money	4	1	2	2	0	4	0	0	2	0	1	3.50
Direct Bribery	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	.53

TABLE 45

NEWS CORRESPONDENTS' RATINGS OF LOBBYING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Question 1: Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. Would you evaluate each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists. It would be helpful if you could rate them on a scale running from zero (0) for not effective at all to ten (10) for very effective.

Tactic or Technique	News Correspondents (N = 11) (number of choices in each category)											Median
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
<u>Direct Personal Communication</u>												
Personal Presentation of Arguments	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	3	3	9.16
Presenting Research Results	0	0	0	2	0	1	3	1	3	1	0	6.83
Testifying at Hearings	0	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	6.50
<u>Communication Through Intermediaries</u>												
Public Relations Campaign	0	0	2	0	2	2	1	0	2	0	2	5.75
Collaboration With Other Groups	0	0	1	0	1	3	2	1	0	3	0	6.25
Contact by Constituent	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	3	1	3	8.50
Contact by Person with Special Access	0	0	0	0	1	5	2	1	0	1	1	5.90
Organization News Activities	0	3	2	2	2	0	1	0	0	1	0	3.25
Letter and Telegram Campaigns	1	0	1	5	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	3.70
Publicizing Voting Records	2	1	3	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	2.83
<u>Achieving and Maintaining Access</u>												
Entertaining for an Evening	0	0	2	3	2	1	2	0	1	0	0	4.25
Giving a Party	1	0	3	4	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	3.37
Personal Favors and Assistance	0	0	0	3	1	1	3	0	1	1	1	6.16
Contributing Political Work	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	1	2	1	1	6.83
Contributing Political Money	0	0	0	0	1	4	1	2	2	1	0	6.50
Direct Bribery	7	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.79

TABLE 46

COMPARISON OF LOBBYISTS', LEGISLATORS', AND NEWS CORRESPONDENTS'
MEDIAN RATINGS OF LOBBYING TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Tactic or Technique	Lobbyists' Median	Legislators' Median	Correspondents' Median
<u>Direct Personal Communication</u>			
Personal Presentation of Arguments	10.24	10.67	9.16
Presenting Research Results	8.12	8.67	6.83
Testifying at Hearings	6.75	7.90	6.50
<u>Communication Through Intermediaries</u>			
Public Relations Campaign	5.58	5.50	5.75
Collaboration With Other Groups	5.13	4.75	6.25
Contact by Constituent	3.17	4.90	8.50
Contact by Person with Special Access	2.30	3.61	5.90
Organization News Activities	.97	3.75	3.25
Letter and Telegram Campaigns	.92	2.67	3.70
Publicizing Voting Records	.63	.90	2.83
<u>Achieving and Maintaining Access</u>			
Entertaining for an Evening	2.10	1.50	4.25
Giving a Party	1.37	1.50	3.37
Personal Favors and Assistance	1.25	1.50	6.16
Contributing Political Work	.75	4.90	6.83
Contributing Political Money	.72	3.50	6.50
Direct Bribery	.50	.53	.79

Description and Analysis of Lobbying Tactics and Techniques

Direct Personal Communication

Chapter I pointed out that the most singularly striking feature of American politics is the large proliferation of interest groups and their lobbyists pressing their demands on our governmental institutions. Examination of the large number of registered lobbyists and the groups they represent before the Michigan Legislature confirms this fact. Registration of individual lobbyists and their presence on the legislative scene is affirmation of the premise that direct personal representation is more effective than any other method of gaining access to legislators. Some maintain permanent lobbyists because they suspect that their disappearance from the capitol would mean that, without a liaison, something might happen without their knowledge which might jeopardize the interests of the pressure group. At any rate, for the interest group, a lobbyist at the capitol insures some advantage over competitors who do not have personal representation.

Analysis of the data indicated that these assumptions regarding personal on-the-scene representation were more than justified. The three techniques of direct personal communication were rated by lobbyists and legislators as the most effective of all lobbying techniques. News correspondents rated three other techniques (contact by constituent; contributing political work, and contributing political money) higher than those in the direct personal communication category.

Personal Presentation of Arguments

All groups agreed that personal presentation of arguments is the most effective technique. Twenty-three of the thirty-three lobbyists picked this technique. The median for lobbyists was 10.24; legislators

a bit higher at 10.67; and correspondents at 9.16. These personal presentations generally are oral and contain both facts and normative arguments. Lobbyist K typically stated that this technique is "the biggest selling point and the best one to use."

Lobbyist DD felt that this technique "is perfect." "I may bring somebody in later, but I lay the groundwork." Lobbyist FF cautioned that "if you answer honestly, you will get their confidence."

Lobbyists often leave written statements with the legislators which summarize the main points of their oral arguments. Lobbyist F suggested "you must condense them, anything more than one page and they won't read it."

One of the correspondents stated:

I would rate highly this function for furnishing information, statistics, history, etc., to bolster a legislator's stand on a question. It's a service function--you might call it surrogate thinking.

The next direct personal communication technique was often perceived as inextricably linked with the first one. The presentation of research results is often the basis of the lobbyist's arguments and therefore is seldom used by itself. Some lobbyists do not bring research into their arguments; for example, Lobbyist DD who stated that "the less research the better, it's too difficult to follow." A correspondent made this interesting comment:

Use of research depends on the legislator. Ordinarily you can make an impression, but once a guy chooses up sides, research doesn't mean a thing.

The median rating for this technique among the lobbyists was 8.12, slightly higher for the legislators at 8.67, and lower for the correspondents at 6.83.

Testifying at hearings is lower than the above techniques. Only twelve out of thirty-three lobbyists gave it a rating of ten and the median was 6.75, considerably higher for legislators at 7.90, and lower for the correspondents at 6.50. Lobbyist DD, who felt this was a good technique

stated:

In a hearing, if I am informed on a bill, I can do a hell of a good job. Otherwise, we have nationally-known authorities, and I bring in experts.

Some lobbyists believe it to be effective to bring in high status experts to testify at hearings rather than for them to appear personally. One lobbyist used this device in hearings by bringing in high prestige governmental officials. Lobbyist GG stated:

We sell every bill on its merits, and insist we have a hearing. We get members of our group to testify to get the Members of the Legislature informed by testimony.

However, many lobbyists felt that hearings are unimportant in molding opinions. They know that committee members probably make up their minds long before the hearing, and testimony will have little bearing on the legislative decision. Most lobbyists, however, will always appear before a committee if invited; for as Lobbyist CC stated, "if you don't appear, they'll think you're not interested." In other words, lobbyists feel it's part of their role-playing, expected by legislators; and, perhaps more important, from the lobbyist's point of view, their organizations.

Communication Through Intermediaries

As suggested earlier, personal representation and presentation of the interest group's case is most important, but the lobbyist also performs the function of mobilizing communications from intermediaries. This has political power implications. Communications from intermediaries also present facts and ideology and often try to convey power implications to the legislator. What a lobbyist can't get done through his own personal presentation, he will often try to do through intermediaries he thinks have access to the legislator or can communicate power to him.

The technique rated as highest in this category by the lobbyists with a median of 5.58, is the public relations campaign. Generally, this technique is too expensive and considered too indirect in its application

for use by many interest groups. The premise upon which the public relations campaign is based is that enough members of the general public will become convinced of the needs, position, or program of the interest group and then, somehow communicate this to legislators. One lobbyist, with extensive organizational resources, stated that he "uses it a lot, for example in killing the Conlin tax report." Many lobbyists felt this to be a good technique; their only problem, they added was that they didn't have enough money to do it. A few lobbyists felt it to be a waste of time and money, because as Lobbyist DD stated, "the general public doesn't give a damn." The legislators' median for this technique was 5.50, with correspondents slightly higher at 5.75. Public relations-minded correspondents tended to view this technique as more important than either lobbyists or legislators. One stated that the 1955 Special Legislative Session on mental health was called simply as the result of an extensive public relations campaign. It is extremely difficult to assess the impact of public relations campaigns, and while most lobbyists professed they were desirable, almost all confessed their inability to measure their effectiveness.

Although this next technique was placed in the category of communication through intermediaries, it could also have been placed among direct personal communication techniques. Collaboration with other groups was a technique rated highly by both lobbyists with a media of 5.13, and by legislators at 4.75. Correspondents rated it much higher at 6.25. One of the minor propositions of this thesis was that group collaboration was one of the techniques which would be perceived as one of the most effective and most used techniques among the lobbyists. In order to further check this, an additional question was inserted in the schedule to come up in the interview before the lobbyists were asked to evaluate all of the techniques.¹ The data presented in Table 47 verified the proposition.

¹The question asked was: "How important is joint activity with other lobby organizations and their lobbyists on certain legislative problems?"

TABLE 47
 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF COLLABORATION WITH
 OTHER GROUPS

Question 28: How important is joint activity with other lobby organizations and their lobbyists on certain legislative problems?				
Lobbyist	IPE Points	Very Important	Important Sometimes	Not Important
K	159		x	
X	61			x
I	55	x		
L	55	x		
R	38			x
M	30			x
DD	27	x		
CC	26	x		
B	23	x		
F	22	x		
D	21	x		
J	20	x		
S	20			x
EE	18	x		
G	18	x		
AA	16	x		
A	15	x		
Q	14			x
BB	13	x		
GG	11	x		
H	9	x		
FF	9		x	
E	8			x
T	8	x		
Z	8		x	
P	7	x		
U	1		x	
V	1		x	
C	1	x		
N	0	x		
W	0	x		
O	0	x		
Y	0	x		
Totals--				
Number and Percent		22 (67%)	5 (15%)	6 (18%)

Twenty-two (67%) of the lobbyists perceived this technique as very important, five (15%) thought it important on certain occasions, and six (18%) did not feel it was important or of any practical use.

Some lobbyists perceived this technique as effective because it gave them a chance to reconcile their differences with other pressure groups and thereby present a united front to the legislators. Some typical comments were:

This is important because it helps to sound out other lobbyists and organizations prior to the session.

It is important because very often the effect of a bill is best discussed with other opposition lobbyists. This is done to determine what effect it might have on them, and then we can iron out our differences in advance.

It is very important. Our companion organization is. . . , and if he goes to the cleaners on an issue, I'm next. We are closely related and work with the insurance fraternity.

This last comment suggests that this technique was particularly effective for those lobbyists whose basic interests were similar, for example, insurance, business, labor, and so forth. Typical comments which supported this were:

This is extremely important. We have so many subjects which cross industry lines (for example, employment and taxation) that it would be disastrous not to cooperate. It would be a dissipation of legislative impact not to have a close working relationship with the

This is tremendously important, and we work very closely with the . . . because our principles and policies are identical.

It is important because so very often a bill comes up you don't have much time, so you have to get help from other lobbyists.

The combining of information, energy and resources means to many lobbyists the achieving of goals with a minimum of effort.

Some lobbyists perceived collaboration with other groups as a necessity from the standpoint of gathering intelligence about legislative activities. The Capitol Club of Lansing, consisting of full-time

association lobbyists, has attempted to institutionalize the cooperative efforts of the lobbyists. Purposes of the Club become clearer when examination is made of the following comments.

I'm one of the charter members of the Capitol Club. We understand each other. It's valuable, because it lets people know what's brewing.

I belong to the Capitol Club, and everybody helps each other. You learn a lot from the other fellows.

You can tell each other what you have learned. You need this-- it can't be provided as a service.

The Capitol Club holds monthly luncheon meetings to discuss pending legislation, to pass on intelligence reports, and to make decisions regarding bills they will oppose or support. One Capitol Club member told me that "if the Capitol Club decided to oppose a bill, it was as good as dead; and if they decided to back it, it was as good as passed." Perhaps this was an exaggeration; nevertheless, this technique was perceived as effective and, indeed, essential by over eighty percent of the lobbyists interviewed.

Typical comments of those lobbyists who did not feel collaboration with other groups was essential or effective were:

I haven't found this to work because my industry is a separate and distinct kind of industry.

This technique isn't worth a darn. I'm friends with other lobbyists, but I don't go out on a limb for them, that is, I wouldn't try to sell anything for them.

I don't find it very effective. The more guys you have talking on one subject often leads legislators to believe that we are saying different things about the same subject. Furthermore, our legislation is peculiar, we don't work in a combine.

These lobbyists express the feeling that because the nature of their organization or business was independent of other interest groups, this technique had no intrinsic value in their work. Other lobbyists expressed the opinion that they could best work by themselves. Typical comments were:

I'm a lone wolf. I sometimes work closely with other groups in my general field; even my competitors, as legislation will affect them as well as us.

I'm a lone wolf. If I had a lot of guys in my corner, it might hurt my case. I do know this, I was kicked out of the Capitol Club because I wouldn't go along when they wanted to make policy on so-called 'good' bills.

We go pretty much our own way. We take care of our own matters, and don't expect anybody to pull our chestnuts out of the fire for us. We lone wolf it.

While these lobbyists did not perceive collaboration as effective or adaptable to their own use, they all agreed later in the interview that "lobbying other lobbyists" and soliciting their views and information on legislative matters was important.

Legislators, who ranked this at 4.75, perceive the pooling of resources by lobbyists as effective because it saved work for them, and it also meant that the compromises between interest groups, that the legislator may have had to make, have already been done for him.

Correspondents also viewed this as an effective technique. Here are two typical responses:

Cross-lobbying is very effective; each lobbyist has a hard core of votes and he trades and adds to them.

This is a very effective technique. Lobbyists pick out certain legislators for 'snow jobs,' then pool their efforts.

If a lobbyist wants to communicate political power to an unresponsive legislator he often turns to contact by the legislator's constituents who may present his case for him. This technique had a median of 3.17 for the lobbyists; 4.90 for legislators; and a high 8.50 for the correspondents. The lobbyist's use of this technique varies. In one situation, he may ask the constituent to telephone the legislator, or to send a telegram or write a letter or postcard. Or, if necessary, he may suggest that the constituent either visit with the legislator when he is home or make a special trip to Lansing for the same purpose. Many lobbyists

think the technique is good, if, as Lobbyist BB stated, "you can only get your people to do it." Typical comments regarding constituent contacts were:

If you can get a constituent who personally knows the legislator; they are more influential than the lobbyist himself.

If this is done by a friend it is effective; but a stranger might do harm.

Legislators and correspondents tended to evaluate this technique higher than the lobbyists. Typical legislative comment about contacts from constituents was: "I've always got time to listen to my constituents, after all, they should come first." Both lobbyists and correspondents saw potential danger in this technique:

Lobbyist I: This is a pressure tactic based solely on the issues of the contact not on the merits of the issue.

Correspondents: Sometimes this tends to backfire, and the legislator throws up his hands and says to hell with everybody.

If you have a valid argument it's effective, but not on influence per se. Otherwise they could react negatively.

Repeated and injudicious use of this technique may, as these correspondents suggested, turn the legislator against the interest group. There are some legislators that lobbyists will never pressure through constituent contacts because of the intense and oft-times explosive reaction of the legislator. Occasionally, reaction to manipulated constituent contacts becomes general among legislators. For example, the following report by William Kulsea of the Booth Newspapers documents one interesting case:

. . . The power play against U of M and MSU began in 1957, when the schools' lobby apparatus put on a valiant and successful stand that brought more money but also earned the undying animosity of legislative leaders. The poison appeared to be directed more at MSU than U of M. The knives were out again this year and new to

the argument was the mushrooming belief that U of M and MSU are getting too big, a fear reflected in the budget requests of the two schools.

Year after year, more legislators are coming around to the idea that unfettered lobbying of the East Lansing and Ann Arbor institutions will dislocate future state revenues.

They no longer fear to speak ill of U of M and MSU. The onslaught of alumni on the lawmakers doesn't ring the bell as loudly as it did in previous years. (*italics mine*)

Says the holder of a key vote in the senate:

'I was for holding the line on spending, which meant I was against the increase. One day, over a 30-minute period, I received six telephone calls from nice people in my district. They are close friends of mine. They said I just had to vote for more money for the schools. I asked them how much they felt the schools needed in extra revenue, what they needed it for and what their budgets were this year. Of course, they didn't know anything about that. All they knew is what they were told--to call and get me to vote the right way. I resent that.' (*italics mine*)¹

Mr. Kulsea concluded his article by suggesting that this type of lobbying, that is, "pure constituent pressure without some knowledge of state finances," is not as effective as it once was. In this case, the university lobbyists were able to accomplish a short-range appropriation goal in 1957 by heavy constituent contacts, but they may have jeopardized future appropriations for their schools because of it.

The technique of "getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince, that is, contact by a person with special access, was rated lower by the lobbyists at 2.30, higher by legislators at 3.61, and much higher at 5.90 by correspondents. The "special access" friend to be influenced could be another legislator, lobbyist, a correspondent, legislative staff member, business associate, and so forth. Lobbyist X stated that this technique has "important aspects, that is, one friend to another." Lobbyist CC stated:

¹William Kulsea, "UM, MSU Suffer from '57 Lobbying," (Grand Rapids Press, April 26, 1958).

Many lobbyists have close friends among the legislators. They might be able to get to them when you can't.

What Lobbyist CC suggested was that lobbyists often spend time lobbying their colleagues. One of the correspondents believed that each lobbyist had a small coterie of legislators that he can usually depend on and who trusted him. Occasionally, he might intercede with his legislative friends on behalf of another lobbyist. However, most lobbyists felt this to be dangerous, as Lobbyist X stated, "poking your nose in business that doesn't directly affect you." Lobbyists, however, often ask or suggest to their reliable and personal legislative friends that "they get to" other legislators to present their point of view. This is often used as a last resort only when it is quite apparent to the lobbyist that--for personal or other reasons--it would be futile and perhaps damaging if the lobbyist were to try to make personal contact with the legislator.

From the writer's own experience as a legislative staff member, it is estimated this technique is much more effective than the 2.30 rating given it by the lobbyists. A legislator will accept the advice and opinions, whether solicited or not, of legislative staff members, be they committee clerks, stenographers, or other legislative personnel. Some lobbyists considered it very important to achieve access to staff members in a position to influence legislative leaders, such as the Speaker of the House, the Floor Leader and important committee Chairmen. Some lobbyists make daily rounds of legislative offices systematically courting the good will of legislative employees by paying attention to them; and, in some cases, entertaining them at lunch and dinner, or granting them personal favors. Long legislative experience with the Legislature, and knowledge of the lobbying corps places some staff members in a unique position to influence the opinions of legislators. The rating of this technique at 3.61 by the legislative leaders indicated that they perceived this. Correspondents rated this technique higher because as one put it,

"I know some legislative leaders (for example, committee chairmen) often consult their committee clerks when making a decision."

After designing this thesis, it became apparent that one area of further research might well be the impact of the correspondents themselves on legislative decision-making, that is, the correspondents as lobbyists. Such a study, conducted by Al Kaufman, Chief of the Detroit Times Capitol Bureau, was completed, and affirmed the proposition that reporters not only do lobby but have an important impact on legislative decision-making.¹

The technique of using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public officials of the interest group's position received a poor median rating of .97. Only two lobbyists out of thirty-three (two who used their newsletters with this purpose in mind) gave this technique a rating of ten, while seventeen lobbyists rated it at zero. Generally, those lobbyists who publish newsletters, bulletins, or other materials that are sent to legislators, as well as their interest group membership, perceived this as an effective technique.

¹Mr. Kaufman, prepared an unpublished paper, "The State Capitol Reporter As a Lobbyist," while on a Michigan State University credit field work assignment in the Office of the Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives. Mr. Kaufman concluded that every member of the state capitol press corps, with daily Lansing contact and more than three years of experience, supported the primary hypothesis of his study that reporters do lobby. There were opinion differences only in the extent of "influence" and how reporters perceived their role involvement. Mr. Kaufman also found that "many governmental figures, particularly in the Legislature, tended to view themselves as 'instruments' and some-time 'captives' of the press. They feel any antagonisms may result in a 'blackout' of publicity or a barrage of criticism which would effect their chances of re-election or programmatic support. In other words, they 'fear' the press." Kaufman also points out that legislators consult reporters for advice on news handouts and speeches; play the communications role of intelligence carriers; and act as confidants to legislators and lobbyists alike. Certainly, this is an area of research which could yield interesting and fruitful results.

Legislators rated this technique higher than lobbyists and correspondents at 3.75. Legislators may or may not read these publications-- it depends on the amount of time they have available when they receive the publication. Some legislators disregard interest groups' newsletters as "loaded" in the organizations favor and toss it, along with the mountains of other interest group literature, into their wastebaskets. A few stated they read these publications, if "they have nothing better to do" or if they want to see "what the other side is saying." Those interest group organizations which take a strong partisan stand in their publications (for example, a few business associations and labor unions) are read with interest by both partisan sides. Their actual impact is difficult to assess; perhaps their only major function is to reinforce biases.

Those lobbyists who rated this technique as favorable are often interested in the impact it makes on correspondents as well. A typical comment by a lobbyist was:

The value of this technique depends on the Press. It is difficult to evaluate its effectiveness, it depends on whether the Press thinks it is newsworthy.

Correspondents, with a median rating of 3.25, stated they may scan the innumerable interest group handouts, newsletters and other materials, but the vast majority of this was ignored by the various news media. Some correspondents thought that receiving this information was good in that it keeps them informed concerning the interest groups' positions and activities. As one correspondent stated:

As a whole, this technique is good, but it depends on the circulation. Further, it depends on how the newsletter is used. Newspapers and letters help undecided legislators decide. Some make the use of their newsletters a bad practice, like the

Generally, it would appear from the discussions in the interviews that those lobbyists who write their newsletters for the purpose of influencing public officials perceived this as a more effective technique, than those who wrote one primarily for their own interest group, or didn't publish anything at all.

The best known and most used lobbying technique--the stimulation of letter writing or telegram campaigns--received one of the lowest median ratings of all lobbying techniques. Lobbyists, themselves, rated it lowest at .92, while legislators rated it a bit higher at 2.67, and correspondents at 3.70. Eighteen lobbyists out of thirty-three perceived this technique as not effective and gave it a zero rating, and only one was willing to give it more than a six point rating at eight. The eight lobbyists who rated this technique at five points or more were the ones who had some confidence in it and had used it on occasion. One lobbyist, representing a business organization with widespread grass roots support among its members, said he "uses it a lot." A few lobbyists who thought the technique was effective sometimes suggested that legislators are quick to spot "inspired" letters and telegrams and may react negatively to this kind of pressure. Lobbyist P stated that this technique is effective, "if done right," that is, if the people writing are instructed to write each communication individually, speaking their own personal thoughts on the subject and, as Lobbyist CC suggested "if it is from somebody they know, it's good, otherwise, no."

Lobbyist H stated in this regard:

Legislators are tired of that pressure; this technique must be weighed very carefully.

This technique may generate a negative reaction, as Lobbyist FF stated:

This generally develops a negative reaction, unless the person sending the wire has a point that should be brought up that the Legislator missed.

The vast majority of lobbyists, as revealed in the following comments, believed this technique ineffective:

I never do this, it has no value at all.

I've never done it; I don't believe in pressure.

I've used it twice in twenty years.

This technique isn't worth a damn.

Confirmation of the negative reaction legislators can have to communications from lobbyists and their interest group members has already been cited in this chapter in the discussion of contacts from constituents. It might be of interest to cite an incident which occurred in the 1959 Michigan Legislative Session to document the adverse effect of telegrams on legislators. In this rather unusual circumstance, the lobbyist himself, as well as the organization's general manager, signed and sent all of the majority members of the State Senate a telegram complimenting the twenty-two Senators for their stand on taxes and went on to say the majority members of the Senate had the opposition party Governor "over the barrel for the first time in 10 years." The telegram stirred a real storm when it added: 'Keep him there until he screams, 'Uncle.''' The telegram brought down a barrage of criticism from members of both parties in the Senate; the Governor; and many editors throughout the State. Even the lobbyists were disturbed by this action as reported by William Kulsea of the Booth Newspapers:

Even some of the more than 200 lobbyists working at the state-house said privately . . . is hurting their venerable profession. 'He's so impulsive,' said one.
'Why doesn't he shut up,' said another.¹

Legislative reaction to the communication was quick and strong. The Senate majority leader issued a press release summarizing the position of his caucus:

Every citizen has a right to petition his government and his elected representatives. Sometimes the petitioning takes peculiar forms. Sometimes it is done in good taste, sometimes not. I take deep personal resentment at any lobbyist who attempts to say what the legislature will or will not do on legislation--or who makes it appear by his unfortunate expressions that the tax fight is simply a struggle to make the governor say 'uncle.' Such a lobbyist distorts fundamental philosophy and principles. He creates an untrue and sophomoric image of government. However, the right of any person to so address the legislature in any manner that he pleases

¹William Kulsea, "Again in Hot Water," (Grand Rapids Press, May 14, 1959).

cannot be denied. That he uses bad taste and bad judgment is, in my opinion, a reflection on him--not on us. It is his effectiveness and his usefulness which are at stake--not mine.¹

In this case, the injudicious use of telegrams may have partly impaired, as the Senator Caucus Chairman suggested, the effectiveness of the lobbyist--a difficult price to pay for the use of any technique.

The writer recalls one other case of interest which occurred in the 1960 legislative session. A letter was written by the President of the Michigan Council of Churches to all legislative leaders from both parties calling on Members of the State Legislature to "forwith resign as a body."² The letter was highly critical of the Legislature's performance during the 1959 legislative session. In every case, legislative leaders who received this communication reacted negatively, and one branded the suggestion to resign "an attitude of arrogant criticism." Informal talks by this writer with legislative leaders subsequently revealed that this organization had lost considerable prestige and may have jeopardized its access to the decision-makers because of the letters mailed to them.

The last in the communication through intermediaries techniques was publicizing voting records. Of all techniques, with the exception of direct bribery in the next category, this received the lowest rating from lobbyists at .63, legislators at 2.67, and correspondents at 2.83. One lobbyist, a union agent whose organization used this technique regularly, rated it at ten. Theoretically, this device will stimulate communications from the organization members to their representatives; however, it might also be perceived as a technique to generate political power. Publication of the legislator's voting record, indicating his position in regard to those of the interest group, is designed to either give or

¹"GOP, Democrats Join in Rapping Lobbyist," (Lansing State Journal, May 13, 1959).

²"Rips Criticism, Geerlings Calls Church Council's Resignation Bid Arrogant," (Grand Rapids Press, February 4, 1960).

withhold political support. A few lobbyists thought it might be a useful technique if something good could be said about the legislator. Typical comments were:

If the record is good, yes. I never chastise a guy for a bad record.

It works both ways; if you can say something favorable, say it-- otherwise not.

Most lobbyists, however, viewed this technique as a dangerous method since a legislator whose voting record was reported as "bad" would resent the interest group and close the door to further access. Further, legislators were suspect of those organizations who report legislators' voting records in "right" and "wrong" terms, because they felt the reports are misleading in that they often do not report final third reading votes but often votes on motions to discharge committees. Typical lobbyist reactions were:

Publication is wrong. A legislator has his own personal reasons for voting as he does.

This technique agitates legislators.

Legislators and correspondents agreed that this technique "antagonizes legislators" and seldom "gains any friends."

Achieving and Maintaining Access

It was suggested earlier in the chapter that it is important for the lobbyist to achieve and maintain access to legislators in order to be able to present his case whenever necessary. The development of personal rapport between lobbyist and legislator is a task to which lobbyists devote considerable attention. (See Chapter IV.) All of the techniques discussed in this section are designed to obtain this access and to keep the channels of communication open. In each of these techniques the lobbyist is doing something personally for the legislator. The implicit assumption is that the legislator will demonstrate his appreciation for

these favors by at least keeping the channels of communication open, and possibly he will take a positive interest in the positions and activities of the pressure group.

Contrary to a popular stereotype, lobbyists have little faith in entertainment as a lobbying technique per se. Of the achieving and maintaining access category, however, they rated entertainment at 2.10. Legislators perceived it as less important at 1.50; and the median for correspondents, who viewed this with some cynicism, was higher at 4.25.

Only Lobbyist D viewed entertainment as an actual lobbying technique when he stated:

I only entertain if I'm going to present arguments.

Most lobbyists perceived the technique as a way to gain access:

I entertain in order to create closer friendships.

I do a lot of it, but not promiscuously. If I like the person and he like me, I learn a lot of things.

I buy dinners to get them to know who I am.

This position is best summarized by Lobbyist B:

It gets down to having good relationships with people. With some people you have to be careful you don't spend any money on them, you 'dutch' it. You have to be careful when you take somebody out. You have to take time to talk to them--so your opposition will not have a chance.

All lobbyists, but one, when discussing entertainment, agreed with Lobbyist AA's statement that "from an influence standpoint, I don't figure it."

The popular misconception about entertainment is that the lobbyist buys luncheons and dinners in order to be able to present his case. As suggested earlier, in almost no case was this true. One of the Lansing Lobbyists' unofficial "rules of the game" was that no legislative business be discussed unless the legislator himself brought the subject up and insisted on its discussion. As Lobbyist CC stated, "it's not good policy to talk politics." Avoiding legislative shop-talk is necessary, lobbyists infer, because the legislators are extremely sensitive to the charge that

they are being "bought off" because the lobbyist has picked up the check. So sensitive are some to this charge that they will often go "dutch" when out with a lobbyist, and some will go to the extreme of occasionally picking up the lobbyist's check. More legislators, however, accept this hospitality as part of the fringe benefits of their job; and the only sense of obligation that might be built up results from the personal friendships involved--not because of the money spent. As one legislative leader stated:

Entertainment is the way to get the ear of an official and his friendship, so you can go into detail on something.

All legislators denied that the entertainment as such had any impact on them. Some felt that it may "have some effect on other members of the Legislature." (*italics mine*). It should be pointed out that all legislators interviewed in this study occupied positions of leadership; and, therefore, were entertained much more than the typical legislator. It is also possible to generalize that with the close membership, split (61-49) of the House of Representatives at the time this study was conducted, lobbyists tended to focus their attention more on the Senate where the majority party was in decisive control.¹ With lobbyists' attention focused primarily on the leadership, the average legislator receives seldom more than sporadic attention--in the form of entertainment--from the bulk of the lobbying corps.

It is difficult to assess the role of entertainment except to say that legislative participants did not regard it in itself as an effective lobbying

¹This was particularly true in the 1959-60 legislative sessions when the House control was split 55-55. More and more attention was paid by lobbyists to the members of the "minority" party, that is, those who, because of circumstances, did not organize the House of Representatives. It would be interesting speculation as to how much access many lobbyists will have if the now dominant party ever loses control of both Houses.

technique.¹ As one correspondent stated:

It has become custom, but it is not necessary to get a favorable response. It's a social more--you have to do it.

Some legislators follow the practice of securing, in legislative parlance, a "live one" for lunch or dinner, that is, a lobbyist to pick up the check. A few have made this something approaching an exact science; but, this writer would opine, that in most cases neither the lobbyist or the legislator is fooled by this ruse. A few legislators, in important leadership posts (for example, committee chairmen), might actively exploit their position by seeking out the lobbyists who must deal with his particular committee and request entertainment privileges. On one occasion this writer, along with a group of legislators, went to a private Lansing club for dinner. Ostensibly, the group was to be entertained by a lobbyist who regularly appears before the committee of the legislator who had invited us to dinner. When asked during the course of the dinner where our "host" was, the writer was told the lobbyist wouldn't be able to make it. Since bills are paid by signature on the check in this establishment, the writer was more than interested when the host legislator signed the lobbyist's name to a very substantial restaurant check at the end of the evening's festivities. This case was not typical, and the vast majority of legislators and lobbyists alike would not participate in this kind of activity.

The extremes to which legislators are willing to go, in order to avoid the charge that entertainment provided by lobbyists will affect their decision making, came to light in the 1960 Legislative Session, as reported in the following Detroit News story:

¹It should be noted again that lobbyists were asked to evaluate the 16 lobbying tactics and techniques in terms of how they worked for them. It is possible that some of the techniques listed in the "achieving and maintaining access" category may not have been perceived as actual techniques by the lobbyist. This could have affected the evaluation.

House Democrats have started holding monthly dinners, at which a lobbyist will be allowed to pay the bill but not make a speech.

"I don't see anything unethical in it," said Rep. Joseph J. Kowalski, of Detroit, Democratic floor leader, as he announced the plan.

"We're going to have the monthly dinners anyway. If a lobbyist wants to sponsor one, that's all right. He can be present, but I don't think he should make a speech."

Kowalski said racing interests were hosts at last night's opener. The AFL-CIO will pay for next month's dinner.

Rep. William Romano (D-Warren) said he would not attend the dinners. "I'm elected to represent all the people, not lobbyists, who buy me a dinner," he said.¹

Republican members of the House were quick to point out that they didn't approve of this, stating that they would not have any part in such a plan. However, it should be noted that they also had done something similar two years before, and had then been severely criticized by Democrats for their action.

Many other examples, cited by lobbyists and legislators, could be recounted about the role of entertainment in lobbying. Entertainment tends to be the most used by those lobbyists who like to entertain and have the resources to do it. Particularly was this true of those lobbyists who represent organizations with "tough" products to sell, that is, those which might meet with public disapproval, such as horse racing. The racing interests maintained a hotel suite with a place to play cards, watch television, and drink liquor. Several other lobbyists also maintained these suites which often become small "clubs" with a regular legislative membership during the session. Legislators gather in these rooms for relaxation and, in some cases, business. Sometimes these

meetings are bi-partisan in nature, but the general unstated rule--particularly in the State Senate--is that Republicans cluster around certain rooms by themselves with the same being true of the Democrats. Generally, most lobbyists attempt to avoid maintaining a suite because it is

¹"Speechless Lobbyists Entertain Democrats," Detroit News, February 4, 1960.

expensive and the hours are long; and many resent the role of "barkeeper" to which they might be relegated.

One other anecdote, cited by a lobbyist, concerning the entertainment activities of one of his colleagues will be used to suggest the role entertainment may play in lobbying. This lobbyist ingratiated himself with a state legislator by remembering his wedding anniversary. The lobbyist put on a party in his hotel room for the legislator and a few of his friends. He flew the legislator's wife in and, then, in the lobbyist's words, "added the crowning touch" by having a dozen roses sent in during the dinner for presentation to the legislator's wife. According to the lobbyist interviewed, this, and a series of other incidents like it, made the legislator extremely receptive to anything the lobbyist wanted or didn't want. The story continued that on one occasion this legislator had already pressed his voting button "aye" on a particular piece of legislation that he thought his lobbyist friend wanted, he was immediately informed by one of his legislative colleagues that the lobbyist didn't want it--whereupon he forthwith reversed his "aye" vote to "nay."

It will be pointed out later in the chapter that three out of the top five lobbyists said they did very little entertaining, yet they ranked at the very top of the scale.

Closely related to entertaining for an evening was the technique of giving a party or dinner. The difference between the two is that the former tends to be informal and on a small scale, while the latter is usually planned well in advance and often invitations are given to all Members of the Legislature. Al Kaufman of the Detroit Times reported that:

One a year banquets are provided by chiropractors, osteopaths, bar owners, radio and television stations, automobile dealers and bankers.¹

¹Al Kaufman, "Pressure Lobbying has Become Way of Life" (Detroit Times, March 15, 1960).

Lobbyists gave this technique a low median rating of 1.37. Legislators rated it about the same at 1.50, and correspondents gave it a 3.37.

Typical lobbyist comments were:

A dinner party of friends is very good, but a formal party is no good.

These dinner parties are only of value in that you are letting them know who you are.

They are good as long as you don't talk legislation. You can destroy your effectiveness by talking.

Lobbyists stated that this technique had been effective in the past, when there were less lobbyists to entertain and the formal dinner party provided opportunity for legislators to meet organization members. Today, the cost for these parties is considered prohibitive by most lobbyists for the return netted. Also, legislators tend to become bored by the programs presented by the interest group officers thereby cancelling out any good will the dinner was intended to build. As a result, formal dinner parties were still being given, but on a much smaller scale for committees or other selected groups of legislators.

Occasionally, lobbyists may jointly sponsor a special party for legislators. For example, when the Mackinac bridge was dedicated, lobbyists, in a joint enterprise, raised an estimated \$3,500 for a special party to be held in a community near the bridge site. This was reported in the following story from the Lansing State Journal:

A General Motors legislative agent has collected funds from fellow lobbyists to pay for a legislative Brag Day at the Mackinac Bridge dedication June 27, a lawmaker revealed Friday. 'This might not be the orthodox way to go about getting money, but it's too late to do anything about it now,' said Rep. Clayton Morrison (R-Pickford), chairman of the Legislature's dedication committee. Morrison said GM lobbyist Herman F. Luhrs was asked to raise \$4,100 to pay for entertainment and other expenses of the legislature's role in the dedication ceremonies. At least \$1,600 has been collected, Morrison said. Maybe this should have gone through the heads of the companies

instead of lobbyists,' Morrison said. He indicated the decision to contact Luhrs was made with the knowledge of House Speaker George M. Van Peursem (R-Zeeland). About 40 lobbyists were expected to contribute, he said.¹

Typical of the smaller dinner parties given by lobbyists, with an unexpected and undesirable result from the lobbyist's point of view, was related by one of the legislative leaders interviewed in this study. He used this example as an illustration of the fact that giving parties was not an effective technique. A bill was before the House of Representatives on third reading (final vote) and the lobbyist sponsoring the bill "took the whole legislature to Schulers Restaurant in Marshall, Michigan." The next day when the bill came up for final vote, "there were only two green lights (yes votes) on the board, with everybody else voting against it." Perhaps, in this case, legislators perceived this as a high-handed pressure technique and reacted negatively.

In an unusual display of sportsmanship, State Senators, during the 1958 session, reversed roles and sponsored a dinner party for lobbyists. In this case, the party got started when Senators wanted to demonstrate to a lobbyist that they still liked him even though they had just killed his bill. The account was reported in a Detroit News article:

Eleven senators shattered precedent by promoting a party for 75 lobbyists. 'This could be the start of a nice tradition,' said Senator Haskell L. Nichols (R-Jackson).

Protocol around Lansing, since the Capitol was moved here from Detroit in 1847, has dictated that lobbyists toss parties for legislators. It was not violated until this week.

'We thought it would be nice for Rudy Inman after he lost his salt bill,' said Nichols.

Inman, lobbyist for the Detroit Edison Company, was working for a bill to enable industries to get an injunction against brine extraction companies if the mining operation threatened surface property.

The bill was sent back to committee in the Senate, 16-13. . . . Nichols said the party started with 40 lobbyists invited and grew

¹"Lobbyists Contribute," Lansing State Journal, May 17, 1958.

to 75 before the first martini was hoisted. . . . Nichols said lobbyists, representing various points of view, 'are often of tremendous help in presenting us with information.' Some said this might start a new tradition for the victor on a bill to give the vanquished a party--a variation of the sporting gesture customary in some other fields, like tennis.

'A party is less exhausting than jumping over the net to shake hands anyway,' said one lawmaker.¹

In summary, it can be said that giving a party is less effective than informal, personal entertainment, and most lobbyists and legislators did not perceive it as an important technique for maintaining access with decision makers.

Offering personal favors and assistance as a technique for maintaining access was given a median of 1.25 by lobbyists, 1.50 by legislators, and rated quite high by correspondents as 6.16. Three lobbyists rated this technique at ten. Their comments were as follows:

I never do favors to convince anyone, but only to be friendly and helpful. I get them cars, and so forth.

I get their relatives jobs.

No, I never offer favors; but I do them.

As suggested earlier in the chapter there were many ways lobbyists could do personal favors for legislators; for example, getting them a car or appliance at cost price; seeing to it that business was directed their way; writing speeches and doing research for legislators; letting legislators use their cars and resort facilities; lending legislators hotel suites, and many others too numerous to cite. Outright gifts received by legislators are small and cost little. The following article by Jack Vandenberg, United Press Correspondent, was a good summary in this respect:

The gifts a legislator gets are apt to present a problem to the legislative wives. During a session a legislator is presented with a host of gadgets, trinkets and trivia designed largely to remind the lawmaker of the interests of the donor. These gifts become

¹"Protocol Reversed: Senators Toss Party for 74 Lobbyists," (Detroit News, March 29, 1958).

dust collectors around the homes of the lawmakers if they are taken home. But the lawmakers generally refuse all gifts which are not in the trinket class because they are wary of being accused of accepting a bribe.

Some of the gifts have practical value because they are gifts which can be consumed or used in some other way. But it is the gifts designed to serve as a constant reminder which eventually turn out to be dust collectors.

Some of the practical gifts the lawmakers received this year included apples, cellophane wrapping paper, aspirin, ice cream bars and dishes of ice cream, and dinners.

Western Michigan University, which was placed on an austerity budget by the legislature presented the lawmakers with a package of four soda crackers wrapped in cellophane, similar to those served with soup in a restaurant. But the list of 'dust collectors' received by the Legislators this year includes such things as toy cars, ash trays, tie clasps, rulers, mustache cups, a pot of flowers, and a hatchet.¹

A few lobbyists thought the personal favor technique built up a sense of obligation in the legislator and therefore was effective; but the majority believed "it's more trouble than it's worth." However, it is doubtful that any lobbyist would turn down a request for a personal favor or assistance from a legislator.

The technique of contributing work and money in a political campaign received a surprisingly low median rank of .75 and .72 from the lobbyists. Twenty-two lobbyists out of thirty-three perceived political work as a technique which was non-effective and gave it a zero rating, and only one rated it at ten. Twenty-three lobbyists viewed campaign contributions as totally ineffective. Generally, the evaluation of the lobbyists depended on whether or not their interest group had a wide membership base. The lobbyists for trade associations and other small groups thought less of these techniques than the lobbyists representing groups with a mass base. Lobbyists without political experience or without the backing of organizational resources at the polls tended to view these political tactics as

¹Jack Vandenberg, U.P. Release, "Presents to Legislators," (Lansing State Journal, March 27, 1958).

dangerous, especially when the giving of political money or work could be construed as an indirect bribe. Typical lobbyist comments about campaign money and work were:

I don't do it, neither does the organization. The members of my group do it; when they do, it's a good technique.

It depends on the amount and to whom given. If I could give \$250, I would be listened to--perhaps not liked.

One lobbyist, although ranking both of these techniques at zero, stated at another point in the interview that his success as a lobbyist depended exclusively on the election of Republicans to the Legislature and that his efforts were expended in this direction.

Some lobbyists drew a distinction between political work and money. Political work, for example, passing petitions; endorsing candidates; and otherwise helping in the campaign; was generally perceived as less susceptible to the indirect bribery charge. Nevertheless, the general opinion among lobbyists was best summarized by Lobbyist H who stated:

The use of these two political techniques can only mean trouble in the long run.

Legislators ranked the contribution of political work at 4.90 and political money at 3.50. No legislator in this study admitted that lobbyists had contributed money and work to his campaign; but legislators felt that for other legislators it might be very effective because "it builds obligations."

News correspondents perceived the contribution of political money as very effective and rated this technique at 6.83 and political work slightly lower at 6.50. It was their impression that a good many political contributions were being made to legislators, but not as much as in the past. One correspondent put it this way:

This technique [that is, contributing money] now only works one way and that is with the Democrats. It's a devious thing. It might work if the contribution is high enough.

The correspondents agreed with both legislators and lobbyists that contributing political work was a more effective technique than contributing money in that legislators are less likely to be open to the charge of bribery with the former technique than with the latter.

The role of political contributions in lobbying was difficult to assess. From the writer's personal legislative experience, it appeared that some of the lobbyists who denied making contributions were not telling the truth. The same can be said of some legislators who alleged they did not take political contributions from lobbyists. At any rate, the practice of making political contributions is not widespread, primarily because most organizations do not have the resources, and the close partisan balance in the Legislature is not conducive to an interest group "sticking out its neck" in partisan primary and general election contests.

Of the popular stereotypes concerning lobbyist behavior is that direct bribery is an oft-used device for achieving and maintaining access to legislative decision makers. Lobbyists, legislators and correspondents expressed no confidence whatsoever in this device as a lobbying technique. It received the lowest ratings from all groups among all of the techniques listed. Lobbyists rate it at a median of 50, because all thirty-three lobbyists in this study gave it a zero evaluation. All legislators, but one, gave it a zero evaluation for a median of .53. Correspondents rated it at .79. Lobbyist CC best summarized the lobbyist's position on this technique:

"I wouldn't use bribery; it wouldn't be any good anyway." Others stated that if you could bribe a legislator one way, what's to prevent another lobbyist from bribing him his way for a higher price? The fact that lobbyists will have nothing to do with bribery does not necessarily mean they would not use it if they felt it were an effective technique; but, rather, they seemed to recognize that this method was not practical or workable. Further, every lobbyist professed that he thought the

members of the legislature unbribeable, as did the legislators and correspondents. One correspondent stated:

To those who practice bribery it's very effective; but it's dangerous and foolish--98% wouldn't try it or accept it.

Bribery, for all practical purposes, can be eliminated as a technique to be seriously considered in the conceptual framework of this dissertation.

Comparison of Washington and Lansing Lobbyists' Ratings of Tactics and Techniques

With but two exceptions (organization news activities and personal favors) the lobbying techniques in this dissertation were similar to those used in a study of Washington lobbyists by Professor Milbrath. How lobbyists in the national capitol rated techniques in comparison with Lansing lobbyists proved quite interesting. Table 48 portrays the results of this comparison. Generally, the lobbyists in both capitols agreed on which techniques were most effective; however, there were some differences which should be noted.

As Professor Milbrath suggested, there has been a shift in the use of techniques in Washington from those in the direct personal communication category to communication through intermediaries.¹ This, he suggested, had come about because there are such a great number and variety of legislative agents competing for the limited time and attention of legislators.² National legislators just do not have the time to listen to lobbyists present their case in person; therefore, their lobbying efforts are diverted from direct personal communication toward communication through intermediaries.³ Professor Milbrath claimed that there were

¹Milbrath, op. cit., p. 7.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

TABLE 48

COMPARISON OF WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS' RATINGS OF TACTICS
AND TECHNIQUES WITH THAT OF LANSING LOBBYISTS

Tactic or Technique	Washington Lobbyists' Median	Lansing Lobbyists' Median
<u>Direct Personal Communication</u>		
Personal Presentation of Arguments	9.15	10.24
Presenting Research Results	7.91	8.12
Testifying at Hearings	5.83	6.75
<u>Communication Through Intermediaries</u>		
Public Relations Campaign	6.14	5.58
Collaboration With Other Groups	6.50	5.13
Contact by Constituent	5.79	3.17
Contact by Close Friend	2.77	2.30
Organization News Activities	(not included)	.97
Letter and Telegram Campaigns	4.29	.92
Publicizing Voting Records	1.00	.63
<u>Achieving and Maintaining Access</u> *		
Entertaining for An Evening	1.17	2.10
Giving a Party	.88	1.37
Personal Favors and Assistance	(not included)	1.25
Contributing Political Work	.92	.75
Contributing Political Money	.85	.72
Direct Bribery	.51	.50

* Professor Milbrath called this category "Opening Communication Channels. "

many successful lobbyists who have little or no direct contact with legislators. He estimated that seventy-five percent of the lobbyists spend less than 10% of their time calling on Members of Congress.¹

These factors on the national level accounted for the higher rating given by Washington lobbyists to the techniques cited in the communication through intermediaries category. Washington lobbyists still perceived the direct personal communication techniques as the most effective, even though they may not have used them as such.

Lansing lobbyists are not faced with the same problems as those encountered by their colleagues on the national level. Lansing lobbyists have almost unlimited access to legislators unless they take undue advantage of a legislator. They, therefore, rated direct personal communications higher than Washington lobbyists, and gave lower medians to the techniques in the category communication through intermediaries.

Relationship of the Use of Lobbying Techniques to Effectiveness

Earlier in the chapter it was stated that one of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was that the use of certain group-approved, role-associated lobbying techniques would be related to effective or non-effective role enactment. Table 49 portrays the individual lobbyist's evaluations of tactics and techniques related to their individual IPE scores. A statistical test was applied to determine if there was a relationship between the perceived use and evaluation of techniques and the effectiveness of lobbyists in this study.² The statistical correlations listed in Table 49 for each technique indicated that there was no statistical relationship between the perceived use of techniques and effectiveness.

¹Ibid.

²The statistical technique used was Product Moment Correlation.

182

$$:1 r_0 = 0.3494$$

receive a "0" rating.

In no case was there a correlation between the use and evaluation of a certain tactic or technique and the lobbyists' IPE score.

Generally, the highest amount of statistical correlation was found among the first group of lobbying techniques--direction personal communication. But, again, in no case could it be concluded that the use and evaluation of certain lobbying tactics or techniques was related to the effectiveness of any of the lobbyists studied in this dissertation. Perhaps, this indicates that the lobbyists sampled were in agreement on their evaluation of the techniques which were most effective in presenting their cases, but the degree to which they could perform as individuals in the use of these techniques was another matter. Intervening variables, discussed in other chapters--such as the individual lobbyist's role-taking ability and role perception--did make a difference in their role enactment.

In summary, lobbyists, as well as legislators and correspondents, demonstrated in Tables 43 and 46 of this chapter that they did agree on which techniques were most effective. The fact that there was such substantial agreement is important. The fact that there was no statistical relationship between their perceived personal use and evaluation of the appropriate techniques and their individual IPE scores indicated that lobbyists knew which techniques they should use and which were most effective; but they had remarkably different abilities, resources, and role perceptions which affected their capacities to utilize these group-approved techniques.

Lobbyists' Perceptions of Planning and Freedom in the Use of Tactics and Techniques

This section and the one to follow deal with the lobbyists' perceptions of the planning of lobbying strategy; the freedom to use techniques; and the focus of lobbying attention within the legislative arena. This section of the chapter, like the previous one, is to be descriptive as well as

analytical. That is, it will be possible to determine if there are any significant relationships between a lobbyist's planning of techniques; his freedom, in relationship to his organization, to use those tactics he deems necessary; and the legislators, committee members, and others that he uses as contacts or focuses for his lobbying activity. These variables are tested in relationship to lobbying effectiveness.

A series of questions was asked each lobbyist regarding his use of lobbying techniques. Table 50 shows the responses of the lobbyists when queried as to the way strategy on legislative techniques was mapped. Essentially, this was an attempt to determine if the lobbyist had to consult superior members or officers of his organization before outlining his legislative strategy. It was felt that those lobbyists who did not have to consult in advance with members of their organizations--removed from the legislative scene--would be more effective than those who had to check and plan strategy with persons who were not intimately acquainted with the legislative process.

The majority (67%) of the lobbyists stated that all legislative strategy was handled by themselves, independent of any organization direction. Typical responses were:

It's entirely up to my discretion. I don't even discuss it with anybody else, except other lobbyists. They (that is, the company) don't try to second guess me.

I handle it. I bring up the bill; find the best introducer, and follow it carefully and appear before the committee.

Twenty-four per cent of the lobbyists indicated that they consulted with superior members or officers of the organization on legislative strategy, and 9% said they consulted with either the executive committee or the entire controlling board of the organization.

In that only three of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale had to consult with others in the planning of strategy, and eight of the seventeen on the bottom of the IPE scale needed advance clearance, it was

TABLE 50

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF PLANNING OF
LOBBYING STRATEGY

Question 20: How is strategy on specific legislative problems affecting your organization mapped?				
Lobbyist	IPE Points	By Lobbyist Alone	By Lobbyist and Superior	By Lobbyist and Controlling Board
K	159	x		
X	61		x	
I	55	x		
L	55	x		
R	38	x		
M	30	x		
DD	27		x	
CC	26	x		
B	23	x		
F	22	x		
D	21	x		
J	20	x		
S	20	x		
EE	18	x		
G	18	x		
AA	16		x	
A	15		x	
Q	14	x		
BB	13	x		
GG	11	x		
H	9	x		
FF	9		x	
E	8	x		
T	8	x		
Z	8	x		
P	7			x
U	1		x	
V	1		x	
C	1	x		
N	0			x
W	0	x		
O	0			x
Y	0		x	
Totals--				
Number and Percent		22 (67%)	8 (24%)	3 (9%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r. = .3493$
 $r. = .2244$

hypothesized that there would be some statistical relationship between freedom of mapping of strategy and IPE scores. The two categories "By lobbyist and superior" and "By Lobbyist and controlling board" were combined. The point bi-serial correlation between the combined group and those who said they mapped their strategy alone was not significant at the 5% level ($r. = .2244$). This indicated that there was no statistical correlation between the way legislative strategy was mapped and lobbyists' effectiveness. However, it should be noted that only three (9%) of the top sixteen (48%) lobbyists did not have to consult in advance with other members of their organization in the planning of strategy.

Related to the mapping of strategy was the amount of freedom lobbyists had in the selection of techniques. Table 51 lists the lobbyists' responses when asked how much freedom they had in determining their legislative tactics.

Seventy-nine percent of the lobbyists said they had complete freedom in the determination of their lobbying tactics. Twenty-one percent perceived some limitation in their freedom. For this latter group, most said they checked occasionally with other organization officials and/or board members in the use of lobbying tactics. A typical response for this group was:

I go to them (that is, the organization) if I feel a need for it; or if I feel it might harm the organization; or if I want to get off the hook.

The hypothesis in this case was that those who felt personally insecure in their lobbying position would contact organization officials in order to "get off the hook" as the above lobbyist suggested. Further, it was assumed that there would be a relationship between freedom in the use of tactics and lobbying effectiveness. A cursory examination of Table 51 shows that only one of the top fifteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was limited, while six of those in the bottom eighteen of the scale were

TABLE 51

**LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF AMOUNT OF FREEDOM
IN USE OF TACTICS**

**Question 21: Do you have freedom to determine your tactics on
most legislative problems?**

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Complete Freedom	Limited Freedom	No Freedom
K	159	x		
X	61	x		
I	55	x		
L	55	x		
R	38	x		
M	30	x		
DD	27	x		
CC	26	x		
B	23	x		
F	22	x		
D	21	x		
J	20	x		
S	20		x	
EE	18	x		
G	18	x		
AA	16	x		
A	15		x	
Q	14	x		
BB	13	x		
GG	11	x		
H	9	x		
FF	9		x	
E	8	x		
T	8	x		
Z	8	x		
P	7		x	
U	1	x		
V	1	x		
C	1	x		
N	0		x	
W	0		x	
O	0		x	
Y	0	x		
Totals				
Number and Percent		26 (79%)	7 (21%)	0

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .2574$

limited. However, the point bi-serial correlation, ($r. = .2774$) was not at the 5% level.

Lobbyists' Perceptions of Legislative Information Sources, Contacts, and Contact Development

Lobbyists were questioned regarding the sources of their information within the Legislature, because it was hypothesized that there might be a relationship between their sources of information and their lobbying effectiveness. Accurate information regarding legislative activity was perceived by lobbyists as absolutely essential; for, much could be lost if the information the lobbyist received was wrong, or late in coming. The use of appropriate lobbying techniques often depends on the information the lobbyist receives; for the use of certain lobbying techniques (for example, letter and telegram campaigns, testifying at hearings) must be coordinated with the flow of legislation through both Houses.

Table 52 depicts the lobbyists' responses to the question how they kept in touch with what was going on in the Legislature. A brief explanation of each of the categories used follows.

Daily attendance and personal contact with legislators was perceived by 94% of the lobbyists as the best way to follow legislative activities. Lobbyists often use the morning hours and the time prior to normal legislative sessions at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon for personal contacts with Legislators who use the floor of the House of Representatives and Senate as their offices. Lobbyists are forbidden access to the floor and offices of both Houses thirty minutes prior to and following each session; consequently, most lobbying activity on the floor takes place in the morning or late afternoon. During these sessions, a good part of the balconies of both Houses are daily occupied by lobbyists. Personal observation of the sessions by lobbyists serves two functions: first, it provides them with

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION SOURCES

Question 22: How do you keep in touch with what's going on in the Legislature (for example, in committees, etc.)?									
Lobbyist	IPE Points	Daily Attendance and Read Statuses, Journals, and Bills			Professional Legislative Information Services			Personal Contact with Legislative Staff	
		With Legislators	Personal Contact	Legislative Infor-	News- papers	Legis- lative Staff	Other Lobbyists		
K	159	x	x						
X	61	x	x						
I	55	x							
L	55	x							
R	38	x							
M	30	x							
DD	27		x						
CC	26	x							
B	23	x							
F	22	x							
D	21	x							
J	20	x							
S	20	x							
EE	18	x							
G	18	x							
AA	16	x							
A	15	x							
Q	14	x							
BB	13	x							
GG	11	x							
H	9	x							
FF	9	x							
E	8	x							
T	8	x							
Z	8	x							
P	7	x							
U	1	x							
V	1	x							
C	1	x							
N	0	x							
W	0	x							
O	0								
Y	0	x							
Totals									
Number and Percent		31 (94%)	19 (58%)	10 (30%)	7 (21%)	6 (18%)	3 (9%)		

the best possible source for information on legislative activities by being personally present; second, it serves to remind legislators that the lobbyists present are watching their activities and are interested in legislative proceedings. Typical responses in this category were:

I keep in touch the only way; by talking to legislators and members who are friends daily. I do it through a personal relationship.

There's only one way to do it, by living here (that is, in the Legislature).

You keep in contact by being there. I tried an assistant once, but it didn't work.

Lobbyists agreed that the most effective way to keep in contact was by personal attendance. Some lobbyists had "contact" Legislators who provided them with information. Through lunches, dinners, and constant association with these Legislators they kept the channels of information open. Typical responses in this regard were:

Legislators come and tell me what is going on. Even after a caucus, they come to see me. As a matter of fact, I have Legislators come and ask me what I want. Some committees meet in my room.

Members of the committees keep me posted.

Fifty percent of the information comes to me from Legislators unsolicited.

I have some friends in key positions who tell me when something is popping.

I have a 'contact' Legislator, that is, the introducer of one of my bills.

The "contact" Legislator and/or committee chairman was an important source among the lobbyists, and most indicated that they had at least one such contact on a committee that they could turn to for information or other legislative services. In summary, personal attendance and daily legislative contact were perceived as the most effective way of following legislative activities.

The next category, the reading of the Status of Legislation and House and Senate Journals, was cited by 58% of the lobbyists as necessary to keep posted on legislative activities. Both Houses of the Michigan Legislature print a daily journal of the day's proceedings as well as a calendar for scheduled legislative activities. These materials, as well as all printed bills and resolutions, are available to lobbyists at both House and Senate document rooms. These document rooms also maintain materials boxes for all lobbyists who want them. Copies of bills, statuses, journals, and resolutions are provided free of charge, and all lobbyists must do is pick them up from their boxes every three days. Although this is a valuable service, the statuses and journals give an account of what the House or Senate has already done the day or week before, and therefore, from the lobbyists' point of view, it may be too late. Lobbyists, therefore, spend most of their available reading time, scanning the thousand or so bills that are introduced every session. Most lobbyists analyze the bills themselves, others have it done for them. One Lobbyist stated:

I have a man in the office who goes over every bill; this analysis goes to my desk, and from experience I recognize all the chest-nuts. A large percentage of the bills are unimportant.

In this case, the length of lobbying service was important because many of the same bills are introduced each session with very little likelihood of passage. Recognition of these is important, because it conserves valuable time and effort of the lobbyist.

Related to the above category was the third one, professional legislative information services. To the writer's knowledge, only one service existed. It has been operated by the same person, Mrs. Ina Lambert, a recently retired, long-time legislative employee, who has worked for the Legislature about twenty-five years.¹ Mrs. Lambert,

¹The information on the professional legislative information service was provided in an interview with Mrs. Margie Lee Galloway, Enrolling Clerk of the House of Representatives. Mrs. Lambert was not available for interviewing when this dissertation was written.

former Enrolling Clerk of the House of Representatives, provides a service for approximately thirty lobbyists at an estimated cost of thirty dollars a month per subscriber. She provides for subscribers a daily, early morning sheet on legislative days, outlining the bills introduced, their sponsors and short titles; the order of business for the day, including the bills to come up on General Orders and Third Reading, committee reports, messages from the other House, and, at the end of the session, a final status of the action on all bills. (See Appendix VIII.) Thirty percent of the lobbyists interviewed said they relied partly on this service for reliable information, although one said he thought it "was flimsy."

Newspapers as a source of legislative information were cited by 21% of the lobbyists. Although lobbyists stated they are avid newspaper readers, particularly the "state affairs" sections, they tended to feel the same way about legislative news which appears in the press as they did about house journals. The information that is reported was usually, as one put it, "after the fact."

The next category, personal contact with legislative staff members, was mentioned by 18% of the lobbyists as a source of legislative information. Some mentioned that it was important to develop contacts with every staff member because you might never know when they could be a good source of information. Lobbyist AA, said he had developed a system for maintaining these contacts:

I take every member and employee out to lunch during the session. I entertain in the . . . 99% of the time, and I treat everybody alike.

The last category in Table 52, contact with other lobbyists, was mentioned by only 9% of the lobbyists as a significant source of legislative information. The lobbyists who did cite this thought it highly important. A typical response was:

There's only one way to get information, and that's to be on the job. It's like a women's tea, you pick up a lot by ear on the third floor (that is, House and Senate balconies). The lobbyists clear among themselves. If you're away a week or so, you're out of step.

Another lobbyist who thought highly of this information-gathering method stated that "through our insurance fraternity, . . . we have a united front and our own grapevines."

An attempt to relate the kind and amount of information sources to the IPE scores of the individual lobbyists proved to be impossible. The widespread distribution of the perceptions of information sources throughout the entire IPE scale suggested that there was no relationship between them. However, it should be pointed out that all of the lobbyists, but two, perceived daily attendance and personal legislative contact to be the most effective and reliable information source.

In addition to being questioned about the source of legislative information, lobbyists were asked how they developed and maintained legislative contacts. The coded responses to this question are tabulated in Table 53.

Fifty-eight percent of the lobbyists mentioned personal daily legislative attendance and contact as the primary method of building legislative contacts. Of these many emphasized they didn't quite know how they had done it except they had "been around for so many years." One stated:

You don't have to work at building contacts if you stay here all the time. As a matter of fact, when the Senate met last December, they asked me to help them pick their committees and officers. I recommended . . . for . . . and they put him in. You gain their confidence over the long run by being fair and honest.

Other typical responses in this category were:

You make your contacts by just meeting and knowing legislators, and talking with people. You ride the storm; at the beginning of the session everybody is your friend, you get the enemies at the end of the session--it's all a matter of timing.

I made my contacts by having been here so many years. There's nothing systematic about it.

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF LEGISLATIVE CONTACT DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

Question 23: How do you develop and maintain a circle of legislative contacts?									
Lobbyist	IPE Points	Personal Daily Legis-		Build Personal		Calling On		Other	Don't Know
		lative Attendance and	Contact	Rapport Through	Entertainment	Legislators	During Interim		
K	159								
X	61	X				x			x
I	55	x		x					
L	55	x							
R	38	x						x	
M	30								x
DD	27			x		x			
CC	26	x		x					
B	23	x							
F	22	x		x					
D	21	x				x			
J	20	x				x		x	
S	20	x							
EE	18	x							
G	18	x						x	
AA	16			x		x			
A	15	x		x		x			
Q	14								x
BB	13			x					
GG	11	x		x		x			
H	9	x							
FF	9	x							
E	8			x		x			
T	8	x							
Z	8							x	
P	7	x		x		x			
U	1								x
V	1	x		x		x			
C	1			x					
N	0								x
W	0					x			
O	0					x			
Y	0								x
Totals--Number and Percent		19 (58%)		12 (36%)		11 (33%)		6 (18%)	4 (12%)

One lobbyist ascribed his legislative contacts to his previous occupation experience:

I came into this business with a backlog of friends through my job as a newspaperman. Many people were here then, and this gave me a nucleus.

Lobbyist V suggested that you develop legislative contacts "just like you would develop personal friends."

Inseparably linked with personal daily legislative contact was the building of personal rapport through entertainment. Thirty-six percent of the lobbyists cited this method as a way of developing and maintaining contacts and then went on to say, as was pointed out earlier in this chapter, that entertainment was only important in the establishment of friendship, not as a lobbying technique per se. Only two lobbyists said they relied on building rapport through entertainment alone. The connection between daily personal legislative contact and entertainment can be seen in this response:

I have a cardex file card on each legislator, and it has to be freshened each day. My contacts are strengthened at lunch and dinner. Sometimes I call committees to my office for lunch and hearings on a bill.

One other typical response regarding the building of rapport through entertainment was:

I belong to the City Club. I play pitch and chew the rag. I have a room at the Hotel . . . with That way we know what's going on.

Lobbyist I reported that he didn't "have a wide circle of contacts"; and only built his contacts "through social friendship" with "key people."

One technique that was highly regarded among lobbyists who had the time and money to do it, was calling on legislators during the interim period (usually June through December) when the Legislature is not in session. Thirty-three percent cited this as an important way of building legislative contacts. Typical responses describing this technique were:

The best way and best time to contact legislators is in the off season, when the heat isn't on the legislators. These are social visits to get their opinions. There is nothing a legislator likes more. It lays the groundwork for the session.

It's not as systematic as I would like it, but I call on Members in the summer on their homeground.

I lobby twelve months out of the year. I make it a habit to travel around the state to see legislators at home. It usually has nothing to do with legislation--I just want to know them, so that when the chips are down, I'll know them.

The best statement of the function of the interim visit by the lobbyist was made by Lobbyist AA:

I have made it a point to understand the Senators and Representatives at home, before I try to understand them here. I drive 30,000 miles a year to get to know them and their personal lives, that is, what makes them tick. I call on all of them during the interim. I work on these three questions: (1) Do you know . . . ? (2) Will you listen to him? and (3) Do you believe me?

The visit from the lobbyist often means, for the legislator and his family, a "night out on the town," and a welcome relief from the legislator's occupational chores. Equally important, the lobbyist often carries with him bits of political intelligence, legislative gossip and other news of interest to the legislator. For many legislators, in out-state Michigan, this is one of his important sources for this kind of information. A few lobbyists carry the purpose of the interim visit a bit further. Some have a vested interest in the primary campaign and general election in the legislator's district, and the visit takes on added meaning. Some typical responses in this regard were:

Before every election I try to call on every candidate to sound them out. We endorse candidates in the primary, based on my personal judgment. We support Republicans because they represent the thinking of our members.

I follow a procedure. During the legislative interim, I contact legislators and their wives at home. During the campaigns, I contact both sides, except in 'safe' districts.

During election years, that is, during the primaries, I get into as many districts as I can and I find out who is likely to win so when he is nominated he knows me. The legislative newcomers know me. I find their interests by seeing them at home, the shop or business.

All of the lobbyists that used this technique for building contacts perceived its value in terms of future access; and they expressed the opinion that legislators will not forget the interim contacts when they return to Lansing for the beginning of the session in January. Lobbyists who are precluded from using this technique, for reasons of lack of money or time, are generally agreed on its effectiveness and express regret over their inability to make these visits. Because so many lobbyists had expressed this opinion, an attempt was made to correlate interim visits with IPE scores; however, the wide distribution of IPE scores from the top to the bottom of the scale prevented any point bi-serial correlation of statistical significance ($r = .1529$).

None of the legislative leaders interviewed mentioned interim visits when queried about the effectiveness of a good lobbyist. Three reporters, however, suggested that these visits, particularly with the legislators' families, were of great value in establishing and maintaining access.

Nine percent of the lobbyists cited other methods of developing contacts. Generally they made a statement referring to the fact that they hoped to build these contacts by "being honest" and having "integrity." One said he did it by supplying "information and research" to legislators when they needed it.

Twelve percent of the lobbyists could not verbalize about the way they developed legislative contacts. Surprisingly enough, Lobbyist K, who ranked at the top of the IPE scale said:

I don't know how I do it. I've never done anything systematically. I like people and dislike people for what they are worth.

Two other typical responses in this category which described the lobbyist's inability to describe his methods were:

I have no formula, I just get to know them. I rarely take anybody out to dinner. I hope to build up confidence in my integrity.

It is hard to describe--it takes time. I have no system. I eat with . . . and I am more circumspect because I am spending public money.

In summary, the majority of the lobbyists attempted to develop and maintain legislative contacts by personal daily attendance at the sessions and by personal contact with the legislators. This is supplemented by entertainment and interim visits to the legislators. The wide distribution of choices among the contact-building techniques did not make it possible, or fruitful, to run a statistical analysis to determine if there were any relationships between place on the IPE scale and the use of certain techniques. In only one case, the technique of calling on legislators during the interim, was correlation attempted and it proved statistically non-significant.

Lobbyists were not only questioned as to how they received their information and built their legislative contacts, but with whom they tried to establish these contacts. Table 54 portrays a breakdown, by individual lobbyists, of the points at which they try to make contact. Two propositions were tested here: (1) the relationship between lobbyists' IPE scores and the amount and kinds of contacts that were made; for example, were lobbyists who made across-the-board contacts more effective than those who were very selective; and (2) were lobbyists who maintained contacts with minority leadership in both Houses more, or less, effective than those who did not. Examination of the data revealed that the number and kinds of contacts were not related to IPE scores; that is, lobbyists at the bottom and top of the scale tended to have the same contacts. Seventy-three percent of the lobbyists agreed that contacts must be established with select (that is, the ones that affect them)

Question 24: With whom do you generally try to establish contacts?

Lobby- ist	IPE Points	Select Chairmen and Committee Members		All Legislators		House Majority Leadership		Senate Majority Leadership		Lt. Governor and Senate Minor- ity Leadership		House Minority Leadership		Others	
K	159	x				x		x		x					
X	61	x						x		x					
I	55	x													
L	55	x		x											
R	38			x											
M	30			x											
DD	27	x				x		x							
CC	26	x						x							
B	23			x											
F	22	x		x											
D	21	x				x		x							
J	20	x		x											
S	20	x				x		x							
EE	18	x		x											
G	18	x				x		x							
AA	16			x											
A	15	x		x		x		x							
Q	14			x											
BB	13	x				x		x		x		x			
GG	11	x													
H	9	x													
FF	9	x													
E	8	x													
T	8														
Z	8			x											x
P	7	x		x		x									
U	1	x		x				x							x
V	1	x											x		
C	1					x									
N	0	x													x
W	0														
O	0	x				x				x					
Y	0	x						x							
Totals		24	(73%)	13	(39%)	11	(33%)	11	(33%)	4	(12%)	3	(9%)	3	(9%)

committee chairmen and their members. Typical responses which indicated this were:

I am selective. I contact the chairmen of the committees and the men on the committees.

I maintain contacts only with committees before whom we have bills.

Thirty-nine percent of the lobbyists stated they try to maintain contact with all one hundred and forty-four Michigan legislators.

A typical response in this regard was:

One person is just as important as another. Everybody is important. A lot of bills are passed by one vote.

It was hypothesized that the broad diffusion of lobbying focus among so many legislators might be related to effectiveness; however, the scattered distribution of responses indicated no apparent relationship.

Thirty-three percent of the lobbyists said they concentrated their attention on House and Senate majority leadership. A typical response in this category was:

I contact the leadership who talk on the floor of the House and Senate.

The data indicated a slight relationship between contacts with House and Senate majority leadership and IPE scores. Of the nineteen lobbyists in the top of the IPE scale, seven listed House majority leadership, and the same seven plus two more in the same group listed Senate majority leadership. This was compared to three out of fourteen in the bottom category for the House and two out of fourteen for the Senate. This suggests that those lobbyists who concentrated on House and Senate majority leadership tended to be more effective than those who do not.

Twelve percent of the lobbyists said they tried to establish contacts with the Lt. Governor and the Senate Minority leadership, and 9% made

contacts with House Minority Leadership.¹ The small number and distribution of responses did not make it possible to generalize about the relationship between lobbyists who maintained contacts with minority leadership in both houses and those who did not.

Of the responses listed in the "other" category (9%), one lobbyist said he did something the other lobbyists didn't do and that was "to take the Sergeant at Arms and other staff members to dinner and buy them drinks." Lobbyist T made this interesting comment:

I try to make contact and talk mostly with people 'on the fence' or who are opposed. The legislators who favor our approach understand this, and don't expect me to spend time with them.

Another lobbyist, whose response is also recorded in the "other" category, answered the question this way:

I make up my mind in advance as to whom I want to be seen with. There are some legislators I don't care to be with. Some of them I entertain in my home if I don't want to be seen in public with them.

Some of the lobbyists indicated they spent more of their time lobbying the Senate (a smaller body of thirty-four) than the House. Lobbyist K stated:

I divide up my time, with a little more spent in the Senate. Lobbyist CC indicated that a division of labor between his colleagues and himself was possible:

I work with the Senate more than the House. . . . take care of the House. I spend most of my time and money on the Senate.

A few lobbyists specified that legislators with certain political, personal, or demographic traits received their attention: Typical

¹It should be again noted that at the time the interviewing was conducted for this study in 1958 the House of Representatives was controlled 61-49 by Republicans. Since 1958, an even division of 55-55 has occurred. Since then, it has become necessary for lobbyists to focus increasing attention on the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives.

responses were:

I spend my time with Republicans. For the most part, Democrats do not vote for me.

I try to contact guys of long service, and a guy who has a circle of friends.

I have special friends, those guys with ability. I would rather have one man with a lot of ability than fifteen of no ability.

I contact all rural legislators.

In summary, lobbyists primarily attempted to establish contacts with select committee chairmen and members, the House and Senate majority leadership, and then, all legislators if possible. Nothing in the data substantiated the two hypotheses stated earlier in this section.

The data in Table 54 relative to the establishment of contacts with legislative leaders of the minority party are not corroborated in Table 55. Lobbyists were questioned as to the necessity of working both sides of the aisle on most issues. Table 54 demonstrates that only 3% of the lobbyists stated they tried to make contact with minority members, yet Table 56 shows that 82% of the lobbyists said they do find it necessary. Perhaps one answer to this apparent inconsistency is that most lobbyists felt it necessary to maintain the illusion that they were concerned with the activities of both political parties in the Legislature. At any rate, an attempt was made to statistically correlate the IPE scores of the individual lobbyists with their "yes" or "no" responses to the perceived necessity of bi-partisan lobbying activity. A low point bi-serial correlation ($r = .0783$) indicated that there was no significant correlation at the 5% level. It should be noted that four out of the five who said bi-partisan lobbying was not necessary were in the top half of the IPE scale. Typical responses for this group were:

I can't do it. Most of my bills are controversial.

We know what the left side of the aisle will do on 90% of the issues.

TABLE 55
 LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF NECESSITY FOR
 BI-PARTISAN LOBBYING ACTIVITY

Question 25: Do you find it necessary to work both sides of the aisle on most issues?

Lobbyist	IPE Points	Yes	No	Sometimes
K	159	x		
X	61	x		
I	55	x		
L	55	x		
R	38	x		
M	30	x		
DD	27		x	
CC	26	x		
B	23		x	
F	22		x	
D	21		x	
J	20	x		
S	20	x		
EE	18	x		
G	18	x		
AA	16	x		
A	15	x		
Q	14	x		
BB	13	x		
GG	11	x		
H	9	x		
FF	9	x		
E	8			x
T	8	x		
Z	8	x		
P	7	x		
U	1	x		
V	1	x		
C	1	x		
N	0	x		
W	0		x	
O	0	x		
Y	0	x		

Totals

Number and Percent	27 (82%)	5 (15%)	1 (3%)
--------------------	----------	---------	--------

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r. = .3494$
 $r. = .0783$

Typical responses for those who thought bi-partisan lobbying necessary were:

I try to keep white with both sides.

It's very necessary. My organization has social implications for most people.

I try to be nice to both sides.

My people (that is, organization) aren't interested in politics. They want bills passed.

It's very important. I get along pretty well even though it's known that I'm a third generation Republican.

Almost all who thought bi-partisan lobbying necessary emphasized the fact that it was becoming more necessary every day. This was more a recognition of political realities, rather than the implementation of personal desires.

Although no statistical relationship between effectiveness and bi-partisan lobbying was found, it is possible to suggest that all lobbyists, when confronted with this question, consider bi-partnership necessary to effective lobbying. Whether or not they actually lobby the minority party as much as they say they do cannot be substantiated; and, in comparison with other data obtained in this study, it is highly doubtful that they did.

The last section of this chapter deals with the legislative committees that lobbyists singled out for attention. Lobbyists were first asked if they thought it was important to work closely with many legislative committees. Three categories of responses appeared and they are recorded in Table 56. Forty-five percent of the lobbyists stated that it was only necessary to work with those committees that affected their group, 30% said it was necessary to work with a large number of committees, and 25% stated it was not necessary to work with many committees. It was felt that lobbyists who worked only with committees that affected their group would be more effective than others. This did not prove significant.

TABLE 56

**LOBBYIST'S PERCEPTIONS OF IMPORTANCE OF NUMBER
OF COMMITTEE CONTACTS**

Question 26: Do you think it is important to work closely with many legislative committees?				
Lobbyist	IPE Points	No, only those that affect my group	Yes	No
K	159	x		
X	61	x		
I	55	x		
L	55		x	
R	38		x	
M	30		x	
DD	27	x		
CC	26			x
B	23		x	
F	22		x	
D	21		x	
J	20	x		
S	20		x	
EE	18			x
G	18		x	
AA	16	x		
A	15	x		
Q	14		x	
BB	13			x
GG	11			x
H	9	x		
FF	9	x		
E	8			x
T	8	x		
Z	8			x
P	7			x
U	1	x		
V	1	x		
C	1		x	
N	0			x
W	0	x		
O	0	x		
Y	0	x		

206
TABLE 57

LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF THOSE COMMITTEES WHICH
REQUIRE FOCUS OF ATTENTION

Question 27: With which committees do you spend the most time?

Lobby- ist	IPE Points	Agriculture	Appropriations	Conservation	Corporations	Education	Health and Welfare	Highways	Insurance	Judiciary	Labor	Municipalities (towns and counties)	Public Utilities	Senate Business (Rules and Reso- lutions)	State Affairs	Taxation	Other	TOTAL
K	159														x	x		2
X	61		x							x	x		x		x	x		6
I	55			x						x			x		x	x		5
L	55	x				x	x	x				x			x			6
R	38											x						1
M	30											x			x	x		3
DD	27										x				x	x		3
CC	26								x	x	x					x		4
B	23		x		x						x		x	x	x	x		7
F	22				x					x								2
D	21									x	x				x	x		4
J	20		x				x			x		x					x	5
S	20														x			1
EE	18														x	x		2
G	18										x				x	x		3
AA	16								x						x	x		3
A	15										x				x	x		3
Q	14							x		x			x		x			4
BB	13							x		x					x	x		4
GG	11							x					x					2
H	9						x		x		x			x	x			5
FF	9										x							1
E	8							x		x			x		x			4
T	8											x						1
Z	8		x							x	x	x	x					5
P	7										x				x	x		3
U	1		x				x			x								3
V	1		x				x								x			3
C	1										x		x		x			3
N	0							x										1
W	0				x					x					x	x		4
O	0							x			x	x						3
Y	0								x						x			2
Totals		1	6	1	3	1	5	7	4	12	13	7	7	2	21	15	1	
		3%	18%	3%	9%	3%	15%	21%	12%	36%	39%	21%	21%	6%	64%	45%	3%	

For information and descriptive purposes, lobbyists were further asked to list the committees with which they spent the most time. The results are depicted in Table 57. The most lobbied committees were: State Affairs (64%), Taxation (45%), Labor (39%), Judiciary (36%), Highways and Municipalities (21%), with the rest falling below the 20% level.

Summary

Chapter V described and analyzed the tactics and techniques associated with the enactment of the lobbying role. One of the hypotheses of this dissertation--that there would be group consensus on which lobbying techniques were most effective--was corroborated. All of the study participants were agreed on which techniques were the most effective, that is, personal presentation of arguments, presenting research results, testifying at hearings, public relations campaigns, collaboration with other groups, contact by constituent and persons with special access. These techniques were given the same high ratings by lobbyists and legislators alike. The correspondents varied somewhat and rated three techniques (contact by constituent, contributing political work, and contributing political money) higher than did the lobbyists and legislators. The sixteen lobbying techniques were described, analyzed and compared in terms of three categories: (1) direct personal communication techniques between lobbyist and legislator; (2) communication through intermediaries techniques; and (3) achieving and maintaining access techniques.

A comparison between the perceptions of Washington and Lansing lobbyists regarding the effectiveness of lobbying techniques revealed that generally the lobbyists in both capitols agreed on which techniques were most effective. However, Washington lobbyists, who do not have the

direct access to legislators as do Lansing lobbyists, tended to rate higher the techniques described in the communication through intermediaries category. And, Lansing lobbyists, with more direct access, rated direct personal communication techniques higher than their Washington colleagues; consequently, the Lansing lobbyists gave lower ratings to communication through intermediaries techniques.

In this chapter, one of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was tested: that the use of certain group-approved, role-associated lobbying techniques would be related to effective or non-effective role enactment. No statistical relationship was found between the perceived use and evaluation of techniques and the effectiveness of lobbyists in this study. Generally, the highest amount of statistical correlation was found among the first group of lobbying techniques--direct personal communication, but in no case was it statistically significant. Perhaps this lack of statistical correlation indicates that the lobbyists were in agreement on their evaluation of the techniques which were most effective in presenting their cases, but the degree to which they could perform as individuals was another matter.

To summarize the section on lobbying techniques, it appears that there was general agreement among lobbyists, legislators, and correspondents on which techniques were most effective. The fact that there was such substantial agreement is important. The fact that there was no statistical relationship between their perceived personal use and evaluation of the appropriate techniques indicated that lobbyists knew which techniques they should use and were most effective; but they had remarkably different abilities, resources, and role perceptions which affected their capacities to utilize these group-approved techniques.

Lobbyists were questioned regarding the way in which strategy on legislative techniques was mapped. While there was no statistical correlation between the way in which strategy was planned and lobbyists'

effectiveness, it is important to note that only three (9%) of the top sixteen lobbyists did have to consult in advance with other members of their organization in the planning of lobbying strategy.

Related to the mapping of strategy was the amount of freedom lobbyists had in the selection of their lobbying techniques. Although no statistical correlation was found between the freedom to select techniques and lobbying effectiveness, only one out of the top fifteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was limited, while six of those in the bottom eighteen of the scale were limited.

It was learned that the majority of lobbyists attempted to develop and maintain legislative contacts by personal daily attendance at the sessions and by personal contact with legislators. The wide distribution of choices among the contact-building techniques did not make it possible, or fruitful, to run a statistical analysis to determine if there were any relationship between place on the IPE scale and the use of certain contacts and information sources.

Lobbyists primarily attempted to establish contacts with select committee chairmen and members, the House and Senate majority leadership; and, then, all legislators if possible. There was nothing in the data to substantiate the two hypotheses tested: (1) the relationship between lobbyists' IPE scores and the amount and kinds of contacts that were made; and (2) the relationship between lobbyists who maintained contacts with minority leadership and their lobbying effectiveness.

Although no statistical relationship between effectiveness and bi-partisan lobbying was found, it is possible to generalize that all lobbyists considered bi-partisanship necessary to effective lobbying.

Lobbyists were questioned regarding the committees on which they focused the most attention. The most lobbied committees were: state affairs, taxation, labor, judiciary, highways, and municipalities.

CHAPTER VI

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: PERCEIVED BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS

"An effective lobbyist has a sense of humor, an understanding wife, and a cast iron stomach."¹

Introduction

One of the hypotheses of this thesis was that there would be consensus among legislative participants and observers concerning the effective way to play the lobbying role. Further, it was expected that individual lobbyists most effectively enacting their roles would be known and recognized by people actively involved in the legislative process. Chapter II verified this hypothesis, in that statistically significant correlations were found among various legislative process participant groups (lobbyists, legislative leaders and news correspondents) in their perceptions of effective and non-effective lobbyists.

It was further hypothesized that not only would there be a high degree of agreement among study participants concerning who were the effective lobbyists, but that the evaluating groups would also be in agreement as to why certain lobbyists were more effective than others. One of the major purposes of this chapter, then, was to examine the variables that were perceived by lobbyists, legislators, and correspondents as the bases underlying the lobbying effectiveness of those lobbyists selected as most effective in Chapter II.

¹Attributed to Charles Hemans, a former Lansing lobbyist.

Perceived Bases of Effectiveness For
Top Sixteen Lobbyists

All of the participating groups in this study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) were asked to select five lobbyists as the most effective (see Chapter II). They were also asked to cite the reasons why they had picked these five men as most effective.¹ All of the respondents cited at least three or more variables that were involved in effective lobbyists role-enactment. In only a few cases did the respondents cite one reason as more important than the other, they typically responded that, "it is a combination of things."

All of the tables in this chapter include only the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale. It was impossible to include all thirty-three lobbyists in the evaluation of bases of effectiveness because most of them were not mentioned more than once or twice (some not at all) as effective lobbyists--hence, no perceived bases of effectiveness could be cited.

Coding of the data revealed that thirteen distinct bases of effectiveness were present among the responses of the study participants. These categories are listed in Table 58, and in the tables to follow.

The bases of effectiveness categories were:

- personal integrity, honesty, and sincerity
- personality and sociability factors
- knowledge of the subject
- knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legislators
- knowledge and use of lobbying techniques
- organizational factors
- ability to communicate
- entertainment, personal favors, and assistance
- kind and acceptability of lobbying "product"

¹The question asked was: "Now, as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best job for their organization? Please select out five men who are doing the best jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective."

political party factors
 background and experience
 knowledge of legislative process
 "hard work"

Table 58 depicts the frequency of choice and total rank order for the perceived bases of effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists as evaluated by all of the lobbyists in this study. For example, Lobbyist K's effectiveness was perceived by fellow lobbyists as primarily the result of his: background and experience, personality and sociability, knowledge of the legislative process, and the knowledge and use of lobbying techniques. In every case in Table 58--and as well as Tables 59 and 60--the highest number of choices in each of the bases of effectiveness categories represent for that particular lobbyist, the primary variables perceived contributing to his effectiveness. At the bottom of Table 58, the total number of choices for each bases of effectiveness category was totalled and a rank order computed for the total choices of the entire group. The evaluations of the total group regarding the bases of effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists are summarized by assigning rank order (based on the total frequency of choices) to each of the thirteen perceived bases of effectiveness. In other words, all of the lobbyists when evaluating their fellow lobbyists perceived personality and sociability factors as the most important variables in lobbying effectiveness, organizational factors as second most important, background and experience third, and so forth.

Tables 59 and 60 are identically arranged. In Table 59, the news correspondents' evaluations of the bases of effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists are presented. And, in Table 60, the evaluations of legislative leaders are depicted.

Table 61 summarizes the total number of choices and compares the rank orders for each of the evaluating groups found in Tables 58, 59 and 60. Table 61 was included only for the purpose of demonstrating

TABLE 58. FREQUENCY OF CHOICE AND RANK ORDER FOR THE BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOP SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS ON THE IPE SCALE AS PERCEIVED AND EVALUATED BY ALL LOBBYISTS

Bases of Effectiveness														
Lobby- ist	IPE Points	Personal Integrity, Honesty, Sincerity	Personality, Sociability	Knowledge of Subject	Knowledge of, Confidence in, and Acceptance by Legislators	Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques	Organizational Factors	Ability to Communicate	Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance	Kind and Acceptability of Lobbying "Products"	Political Party Factors	Background and Experience	Knowledge of Legislative Process	Hard Work
K	159	0	9	1	2	7	0	3	1	0	6	12	9	1
X	61	4	5	1	4	0	3	2	2	0	0	1	3	1
I	55	4	2	1	3	3	0	1	1	0	0	4	4	1
L	55	2	2	2	2	0	10	3	0	1	0	3	0	2
R	38	0	1	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
M	30	1	3	5	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	2
DD	27	0	00	0	0	1	4	1	1	0	1	3	2	1
CC	26	2	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	2	0
B	23	1	4	1	1	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1
F	22	1	0	1	1	3	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
D	21	1	2	1	0	1	6	2	0	0	1	2	1	0
J	20	1	0	3	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	2	0
S	20	3	8	3	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3
EE	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
G	18	0	4	0	0	1	3	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
AA	16	1	3	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1
Total Choices		21	43	20	19	22	34	19	12	1	9	33	26	13
Rank Order		6	1	7	8.5	5	2	8.5	11	13	12	3	4	10

TABLE 59. FREQUENCY OF CHOICE AND RANK ORDER FOR THE BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOP SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS IN THE IPE SCALE AS PERCEIVED AND EVALUATED BY NEWS CORRESPONDENTS

Lobby- ist	IPE Points	Bases of Effectiveness													Hard Work
		Personal Integrity, Honesty, Sincerity	Personality, Sociability	Knowledge of Subject	Knowledge of, Confidence in, and Acceptance by Legislators	Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques	Organizational Factors	Ability to Communicate	Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance	Kind and Acceptability of Lobbying "Products"	Political Party Factors	Background and Experience	Knowledge of Legislative Process		
K	159	0	5	1	4	5	0	1	5	0	2	8	5	0	0
X	61	1	4	2	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
I	55	0	1	1	1	4	1	2	1	0	0	2	1	0	0
L	55	0	0	2	0	0	6	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
R	38	1	2	3	0	1	5	2	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
M	30	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
DD	27	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
CC	26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
B	23	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
F	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EE	18	0	3	0	1	2	2	3	3	0	0	1	1	1	1
G	18	0	1	1	2	0	5	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0
AA	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Choices		2	17	11	10	17	23	9	15	0	7	16	9	2	
Rank Order		11.5	2.5	6	7	2.5	1	8.5	5	13	10	4	8.5	11.5	

TABLE 60. FREQUENCY OF CHOICE AND RANK ORDER FOR THE BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOP SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS ON THE IPE SCALE AS PERCEIVED AND EVALUATED BY LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Bases of Effectiveness														
Lobby- ist	IPE Points	Personal Integrity, Honesty, Sincerity,	Personality, Sociability Factors	Knowledge of Subject	Knowledge of, Confidence in, and Acceptance by Legislators	Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques	Organizational Factors	Ability to Communicate	Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance	Kind and Acceptability of Lobbying "Products"	Political Party Factors	Background and Experience	Knowledge of Legislative Process	Hard Work
K	159	2	3	2	3	6	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	0
X	61	0	1	2	1	1	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	0
I	55	2	1	3	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	2	0	0
L	55	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
R	38	4	3	3	0	0	4	2	2	0	1	0	0	0
M	30	0	2	3	0	1	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0
DD	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CC	26	2	2	1	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
B	23	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
F	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D	21	0	1	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
J	20	1	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
S	20	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
EE	18	1	3	2	1	3	0	0	4	0	0	1	1	1
G	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
AA	16	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
Total Choices		14	18	20	15	14	15	11	12	2	3	10	7	5
Rank Order		5.5	2	1	3.5	5.5	3.5	8	7	13	12	9	10	11

TABLE 61. COMPARISON OF FREQUENCY OF CHOICE AND RANK ORDER FOR THE BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOP SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS ON THE IPE SCALE AS PERCEIVED AND EVALUATED BY LOBBYISTS, LEGISLATORS AND NEWS CORRESPONDENTS

Bases of Effectiveness in Rank Order

Evaluating Group	Personality, Sociability	Factors	Organizational Factors	Background and Experience	Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques	Knowledge of Subject	Knowledge of, Confidence in, and Acceptance by Legislators	Knowledge of Legislative Process	Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance	Ability to Communicate	Personal Integrity, Honesty, Sincerity	Hard Work	Political Party Factors	Kind and Acceptability of Lobbying Product
Lobbyists														
Total Choices	43	34	33	22	20		19	26	12	19	21	13	9	1
Rank Order	(1)	(2)	(3)	(5)	(7)		(8.5)	(4)	(11)	(8.5)	(6)	(10)	(12)	(13)
Reporters														
Total Choices	17	23	16	17	11		10	9	15	9	2	2	7	0
Rank Order	(2.5)	(1)	(4)	(2.5)	(6)		(7)	(8.5)	(5)	(8.5)	(11.5)	(11.5)	(10)	(13)
Legislators														
Total Choices	18	15	10	14	20		15	7	12	11	14	5	3	2
Rank Order	(2)	(3.5)	(9)	(5.5)	(1)		(3.5)	(10)	(7)	(8)	(5.5)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Combined Total Choices	78	71	59	53	51		44	42	39	39	37	20	19	3
Combined Rank Order	1	2	3	4	5		6	7	8.5	8.5	10	11	12	13

how the final combined rank order for all three evaluating groups were derived. The combined rank orders of the three evaluating groups within each bases of effectiveness category represents the perceived importance of that particular variable in lobbying effectiveness. The combined rank orders at the bottom of Table 61 represent then, the way the total group of study participants evaluated all thirteen bases of effectiveness. For example, in their combined evaluation of the bases of effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists, personality and sociability factors were most important; organizational factors were second; background and experience third; and so forth.

Table 62 serves two functions. First, it offers a comparison of the rank orders given each of the bases of effectiveness by the three evaluating groups. These comparisons will be analyzed in the pages to follow when each one of the thirteen bases of effectiveness categories are examined. Secondly, the table depicts the statistical correlations present between the evaluations of lobbyists, legislators, and news correspondents.

It was stated earlier in this chapter that one of the hypotheses of this thesis was that there would be agreement between study participants concerning the variables underlying lobbying effectiveness. Table 62 gives significant statistical support for this hypothesis. Correlation of the rank orders given the thirteen bases of effectiveness by the lobbyists with those perceived by the reporters was statistically significant at the 1% level ($r. = .6835$). A statistical correlation between the evaluations of reporters and legislators yielded a significant correlation at the 2% level ($r. = .6339$). A similar statistical correlation was found between lobbyists and legislators at the 5% level ($r. = .5529$). These correlations are conclusive proof that all of the participants in this study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) were in agreement in their perceptions of the variables involved in the lobbying effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists.

TABLE 62. COMPARISON OF RANK ORDERS FOR EACH EVALUATING GROUP OF THE PERCEIVED BASES OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR THE TOP SIXTEEN LOBBYISTS ON THE IPE SCALE *

Evaluating Group	Bases of Effectiveness in Rank Order														
	Personality, Sociability	Organizational Factors	Background and Experience	Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques	Knowledge of Subject	Knowledge of, Confidence in, and Acceptance by Legislators	Knowledge of Legislative Process	Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance	Ability to Communicate	Personal Integrity, Honesty, Sincerity	Hard Work	Political Party Factors	Kind and Acceptability of Lobbying "Product"		
Lobbyists Rank Order	1	2	3	5	7	8.5	4	11	8.5	6	10	12	13		
Reporters Rank Order	2.5	1	4	2.5	6	7	8.5	5	8.5	11.5	11.5	10	13		
Legislators Rank Order	2	3.5	9	5.5	1	3.5	10	7	8	5.5	11	12	13		
Combined Rank Order for Group	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8.5	8.5	10	11	12	13		

* The correlations between the various evaluating groups were as follows:

Between lobbyists and reporters: $r = .7074$ (rank order correlation at the .01 level: $r = .6835$)
 Between lobbyists and legislators: $r = .57693$ (rank order correlation at the .05 level: $r = .5529$)
 Between reporters and legislators: $r = .65797$ (rank order correlation at the .02 level: $r = .6339$)

As stated earlier, coding of the responses to this question, "what makes a lobbyist effective?" resulted in thirteen distinct categories. What follows, now, is an examination of each category in rank order; and a comparison of the differences, if any, between the various evaluating groups concerning that particular effectiveness trait or characteristic.

Personality, Sociability Factors

Lobbyists, reporters, and legislators were in close agreement that "personality," that is, the ability to get along and socialize with one's fellows, was one of the primary factors in lobbyists' effectiveness. Lobbyists considered "personality" as most important. Few lobbyists articulated exactly what they meant when they said a fellow lobbyist was effective because he had "personality." For the most part, explanations of just what this meant suggested that: "he has a likeable personality"; "people like him"; he's a friendly fellow"; "he's easy to know"; "he's a hail-fellow-well-met"; "He's a good fellow"; he has an "out-going, genial personality," and "he's just one of the fellows--he talks their language." Typical responses from reporters, who ranked this factor at 2.5, follow pretty much the same vein. Legislators (with a rank order of 2) who perceived this as the second most important variable in lobbying effectiveness tended to make the same kind of comments as the others, except that several of them said that certain lobbyists had likeable personalities because "they didn't rub the fur the wrong way," or "he's a likeable guy because he never gets mad at anybody." In sum, the study participants were agreed that the ability to maintain congenial, positive, personal relationships with others a prime prerequisite for lobbying effectiveness.

Organizational Factors

A good many organizational factors were cited by all three groups as basic to effective lobbying. Generally, these dealt with organizational resources (particularly economic power) or the character and distribution of the membership. Typical responses from the lobbyists who perceived this as the second most important factor in effectiveness were:

He can call in the local bankers, and the legislators will listen.

He represents a powerful public utility, and anything that affects a public utility affects the public.

The 'big three' lobbyists are effective because they've got so damn much wealth and power behind them.

The above responses from the lobbyists emphasized the socio-economic power of the organization as playing an important part in the lobbyist's effectiveness. Others emphasized the character or "grass roots" strength of the interest group as important:

He has a tremendously effective organization. They are well-informed and interested in the subject matter and will respond.

He has a big organization with a membership that is alert and well-informed. He has marvelous results with citizen meetings around the state.

He has an effective grass roots organization which can give the legislators the 'back home' treatment.

Reporters, who perceived organization factors as number one in importance, also tended to perceive organization strength in economic and "grass roots" terms. Typical responses were:

He is tremendously effective because he represents an outfit that has 'dough', and they don't mind throwing it around. They are an important segment of the state's economy, and they don't mind telling you about it.

He proceeds from a position of strength because local government officials have a strong influence over legislators. Many were local government officials and he can use the officials back home as pressure on the legislators.

Legislators (with a rank order of 3.5) also viewed organizational factors as very important in lobbying effectiveness. In contrast to reporters and lobbyists, only one legislator mentioned the economic power of an organization as the basis of its strength, all others considered organizations strong because of their widespread "grass roots" organization and their ability, as one put it, "to put the screws on." A typical response from legislators in this regard was:

This guy is effective because of the organization he represents-- not himself. They are spread all over the state and they can make it hot for you.

In summary, all study participants agreed that organizational factors were very important in lobbying effectiveness (rank orders were: lobbyists, 2; reporters, 1; and legislators, 3.5). An examination of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale revealed that eleven out of the sixteen represented organizations that either had substantial amounts of economic power and/or widespread "grass roots" support throughout the state. The same could be said of only seven of the lobbyists among those seventeen in the bottom half of the effectiveness scale. Further, it can be generalized from these data that the lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale represented organizations that were well-established, had a good deal of social status and economic power, and/or had widespread "grass roots" strength throughout the state. As explained in Chapter IV, these organizations tend to be conservative, that is, more preoccupied with preserving their status quo than in further socio-economic change. In contrast, over half of the lobbyists in the bottom seventeen on the IPE scale represented organizations with narrow economic or professional interests; those seeking to change the status quo to better their own professional or occupational position; and those interested groups with small memberships and without much economic power. These data tend to support the traditional hypotheses of political scientists and observers to the effect that lobbying effectiveness

is related to the economic power an interest group has and to the "grass roots" strength it has in terms of an interested and widespread membership. However, it is significant that five out of the top sixteen lobbyists did not represent groups that had these characteristics. In the case of these five lobbyists, their lobbying effectiveness has to be primarily explained with other variables, such as personality, background and experience, and knowledge and use of lobbying techniques.

Background and Experience

Lobbyists (with a rank order of three) and reporters (rank order of four) perceived background and experience as an important variable in the effectiveness of lobbyists. Typical responses from the lobbyists which emphasized the kind and amount of experience necessary were as follows:

He's been around a long time--he has the experience that counts.

This guy has been around so long--so many years--that he knows where a lot of skeletons are buried.

He's effective because he's been a lobbyist more years than most legislators have been in the capitol. This experience and years of service are a tremendous asset.

The above responses by the lobbyists primarily singled out the number of years a lobbyist has been on the job. Other responses tended to suggest that the legislative or occupational background of the lobbyist was important in his effectiveness:

This fellow is a former state senator, and this former legislative experience gave him the 'in' and contacts necessary to be effective.

He's a former House member and he developed enough friends and contacts to carry him through today.

He was a strong Senator and former public official. This gives him an edge that the rest of us don't have.

Other response from the lobbyists emphasized certain occupational backgrounds as important in effectiveness:

This guy was a newspaperman and while covering the capitol beat he made many friends and contacts. This hasn't hurt him.

He was (high-level state official) for several years, and he made his contacts with the right people then.

Other comments along this line substantiated the hypothesis stated in Chapter IV that certain occupational backgrounds (e.g., reporting) and legislative experience are important in lobbying effectiveness. Lobbyists and reporters were agreed on the importance of background and experience; however, legislators (with a rank order of nine) did not see this effectiveness variable as too important. Six lobbyists were cited by the legislators as effective because of their background and experience. In every case they either referred to the lobbyists' previous occupational experience (reporter and former high state official) or his service in the legislature.

To summarize, lobbyists and reporters(with rank order of 3 and 4) perceived background and experience as an important variable in the effectiveness of lobbyists. Certain occupational backgrounds (reporting and high-level government work), previous legislative experience, and the length of the lobbying experience were cited over and over as the reasons for the effectiveness of many of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale. These perceptions corroborate earlier data and hypotheses examined in Chapter IV. Legislators (with a rank order of nine) did not perceive this variable as too important, although those who did mention it based their evaluations on the same reasons (previous occupation and legislative experience) as did the lobbyists and reporters.

Knowledge and Use of Lobbying Techniques

Reporters ranked this effectiveness factor very high (at 2.5). Lobbyists (rank order of 5) and legislators (rank order of 5.5) perceived this variable about the same. Generally, all respondents felt that those lobbyists who knew and used the more highly respected and group-approved lobbying techniques (see Chapter V) with appropriateness and discretion were more effective. Particularly was this true of those lobbyists who used the techniques of personal presentation of arguments, presentation of research results, testifying at hearings, public relations campaigns, collaboration with other groups, contact by constituent, and contact by persons with special access.

Typical responses from reporters, who perceived this variable as very important were:

This fellow is the best example of the service lobbyist. He has a staff to do research and he acts as a service bureau. He has the information ready for the legislators, on a personal basis, or for the committees. He knows when to present the stuff and how it should be done.

He is an expert technician at lobbying. He knows when to use certain techniques. For example, look what he did with the . . . bill last session. He built up 'bon-fires' among his people around the state, had them 'put the screws' on the legislators, had the bill drawn by experts, had the bill introduced at the right moment (end of the session), had the experts overwhelm them with evidence in committee, and then ran it right through the House and Senate during the congested time of the session--and the legislators were happy to do it! It was the damndest thing I've ever seen!

Responses from legislators also indicated that certain of the top sixteen lobbyists were perceived as effective primarily because they were "strategists" in the use of appropriate lobbying techniques.

Typical responses were:

He's effective because he makes a good pitch before the committees, and he knows just how much pressure to put on from his folks back home. He doesn't overdo it, he knows just how much the legislators can take.

He has a unified group behind him that respond, but he's careful. When he is before the committee he doesn't stamp his feet, he approaches us rationally and with the facts. He doesn't high pressure us, he knows how to service us.

Some legislators suggested that certain lobbyists were effective because "they knew where to lobby," that is, they did not spread their lobbying efforts over the whole legislative body but concentrated on a few powerful legislators or committees. Typical responses in this regard were:

He's effective because he knows where to lobby--the Senate side. He's got a few key senators on the right side of the aisle wired up tight, and he knows which techniques to use with them.

. . . effectiveness results from the way he handles the . . . committee in the House. He's in bed with them, and they do just about anything he wants. He gives them plenty of service and they appreciate it. Plus the fact that most of the members of that committee are in the same occupation as the organization he represents.

Lobbyists also perceived that the effectiveness of some of their colleagues was related to their ability to use effective, group-approved lobbying techniques. Typical responses were:

Although . . . has made some grave errors in the clamor for publicity, he's an effective strategist. He does a lot of "grass roots" work getting his people excited on various issues. He acts as a ghost writer for legislators; and his outfit does a lot of research that they make available to legislators.

He is effective because he has an alert organization that holds citizen meetings around the state. They do a good job, with their house organ, in the analysis of legislation. He does a tremendous job at committee hearings and he gives a clear-cut analysis as well as bringing in influential people to testify. But, he's very careful not to go too far.

In summary, reporters perceived the knowledge and use of lobbying techniques as an important factor in effectiveness (rank order of 2.5). Lobbyists (rank order of 5) and legislators (rank order of 5.5) perceived this variable about the same in importance. Generally, all respondents felt that those lobbyists who knew and used the more highly

respected, group-approved lobbying techniques (for example, personal presentation of arguments, testifying at hearings, public relations campaigns, contacts by constituents, and so forth) with strategic discretion were more effective lobbyists because of it.

Knowledge of Subject

Legislators perceived the most important basis of effectiveness among the top sixteen lobbyists (rank order of 1) to be knowledge of the subject central to the interest of the organized group that they represented. Among reporters, this variable was perceived as 6th in importance; and lobbyists saw it even less important with a rank order of 7. It will be pointed out in Chapter VII that legislators felt that the legislature would operate "much worse" without lobbyists; and, further, that legislators (as well as reporters and lobbyists) believe this to be true because the lobbyists primary function is to provide legislators with information services on interest group matters. Examinations of evaluations made by legislators of the top sixteen lobbyists indicated that not only do legislators feel this way (in a normative sense) and about a lobbyist's knowledge and expertise, but in their actual perceptions of the effectiveness of Michigan lobbyists this consideration was their first choice. Typical legislative responses which reflected this were:

. . . and . . . are effective lobbyists, because when they have problems they come into committee loaded with facts. They know what they're doing, and they always know what they are talking about. You get no double-talk, but good reliable, factual information.

In my book, this guy is effective because he knows what he is talking about. His knowledge of . . . is encyclopedic. I guess the reliability of his information is most important. If, for example, he inadvertently gave me and my committee a 'burn steer,' I'd get hanged for it on the floor of the House. This would only have to happen once, and we wouldn't trust his information and knowledge again. Of course, the reverse is also true,

I'll respect his information and his judgment, if his information is good and he always knows what he's talking about.

Legislators, then, place a high value on lobbyists' knowledge and expertise. They kept emphasizing over and over again that accurate information and facts were the best tools of the lobbyist and his most important basis of effectiveness.

Reporters (rank order of 6) perceived knowledge of the subject important not only for legislators but themselves. They, too, stated that accurate, reliable information in sufficient quantities was a necessary prerequisite for lobbying effectiveness. A typical response from this group was:

This fellow's main pitch is information and facts. He is a great help to legislators and reporters . . . He is dealing in a specialized and technical field (as most of them do) and he always knows what he is talking about. I know reporters respect him for this, and I'm sure the legislators must.

The lobbyists did not perceive and rank knowledge, ability, and expertise concerning lobbying subject matter as highly as the others. In their evaluations of the bases of effectiveness of their colleagues this variable was 7th in rank order. Typical responses from lobbyists who did consider it of prime importance:

. . . is effective because he is a perfectionist with his information and facts. He is a marvelous detail man who checks and counter-checks everything before he makes a presentation to legislators. This diligence has paid off, because legislators consider him as someone who knows what he is talking about.

He is effective because he is able to deal with legislators and committees in highly technical matters. He can analyze bills, provide the right information so legislators know how to act intelligently and effectively.

Perhaps one of the reasons lobbyists did not perceive and attach as much importance to knowledge of the subject as did the legislators can be attributed to the frequent practice of many lobbyists of calling in their own organizational experts to talk to legislators or to appear before their committees. A typical response which suggested this was as follows:

This lobbyist is very effective, but he seldom, if ever, testifies before legislative committees. His company has top-flight experts in many fields, and he brings them in to testify. Legislators are willing to listen to this lobbyist because they know he has the experts behind him, and they (the legislators) respect the information and facts they can bring to bear.

In summary, legislators perceived the most important (rank order of 1) variable in lobbying effectiveness to be knowledge of the subject central to the interest of the organized group the lobbyist represented. Legislators emphasized many times that accurate information and facts were the best tools of the lobbyist and his most important basis of effectiveness. Reporters (rank order of 6) perceived a lobbyist's knowledge of the subject important not only for legislators but themselves. Lobbyists (rank order of 7) did not perceive and rank knowledge ability and expertise as highly as the other groups. A few thought it was of prime importance, the majority did not. Perhaps this results from the frequent practice of many lobbyists of calling in their own organizational experts to testify on technical matters affecting the interest group.

Knowledge of, Confidence In, and Acceptance by Legislators

Many of the study participants suggested that certain lobbyists were effective because they felt that legislators knew them better than most lobbyists, or that they just had "confidence in them" and were "accepted" by legislators. Although this basis of effectiveness could be considered as related to "personality and sociability" factors, it stands alone because as one legislator put it:

A lobbyist could have a nice personality and be able to get along with people, but if I don't know him and don't know what he is doing or has done, I won't have confidence in him. You can't respect and accept an unknown quantity.

On the other hand, there were some lobbyists among those in the top half of the IPE scale that were not known for the socializing abilities, yet were known by legislators and had their confidence.

A typical response suggesting this was:

This guy doesn't have much money to spend, or time to play cards with the boys. He doesn't go the 'social route,' yet the majority of the legislators know him, respect his judgment, and in general have confidence in him.

These comments suggest that legislators would perceive this variable as quite important in lobbying effectiveness--and they did with a rank order of 3.5. However, it was difficult for many legislators (as well as other study participants) to articulate exactly what they meant when they ascribed this variable as a basis of effectiveness. They typically responded, "I have confidence in him," "as soon as you know him you have confidence in him"; and "once you know him, you just have to like him and believe in him."

Reporters perceived this variable as 7th in importance. Again, reporters, like legislators, gave very little explanation of what they meant when they said a lobbyist was effective because legislators had confidence in him and accepted him. A typical response from the reporters was:

This lobbyist is a gentleman who encourages confidence. He is quiet, unobtrusive, and unostentatious, so it takes awhile to get to know him; but when you do, you immediately have confidence in him and accept him at his word.

Lobbyists also perceived this as a distinct variable in effectiveness, although they didn't rank it as high as the other groups (rank order of 8.5). Typical responses from lobbyists were as follows:

He is known by many legislators, and they trust him and lean on him. He has been able to develop this confidence over the years, and the legislators almost accept him as one of their own.

He has the personal confidence of both sides of the House, even on unrelated problems. They like him and accept him.

One lobbyist suggested why he thought certain effective lobbyists did have the confidence and acceptance of legislators:

These fellows (legislators) are human. They have a right to be respected. Their opinions must be respected. You must treat them as decent, intelligent people (even though some aren't). If you do this over time, you will win their respect and confidence and will be accepted as part of the 'club.'

In summary, all study participants perceived knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legislators as a distinct (vis-a-vis personality and socialability factors) basis of lobbying effectiveness. Legislators ranked this highest (rank order of 3.5), reporters perceived this variable as 7th in importance, and the lobbyists' evaluations resulted in a rank order of 8.5. Generally, it was difficult for study participants to articulate exactly what they meant when they ascribed this variable as a basis of effectiveness. Typically, they thought that confidence in lobbyists was something developed over time by the lobbyists who, because of other reasons (for example, length of service, gentlemanly conduct, and so forth), were "just accepted" and were able to "hold the confidence" of legislators.

Knowledge of the Legislative Process

Knowledge of the legislative process--its circuitious, political, procedural pitfalls and its intricate, tricky courses--was perceived by the lobbyists as a variable of great importance (rank order of 4). Lobbyists, in their evaluations of their colleagues, emphasized repeatedly that unless a lobbyist was very familiar with the formal (and informal) procedures of the legislative process he stood little chance of being effective. Several lobbyists suggested that this variable was the sine qua non of effective lobbying. Some typical responses which pointed out the importance of this variable were:

He's effective because he's very 'savvy' on legislative processes. He knows every 'gimmick' that can be pulled on a bill in committee or on the floor.

He has accumulated a lot of legislative knowledge, and he has a 'knack' for discovering flaws in bills and straightening them out. He knows the process so well he has little trouble guiding a bill through or seeing to it that it is killed.

Reporters perceived knowledge of the legislative process as less important than did the lobbyists (rank order of 8.5). However, those who did mention it as the basis of effectiveness for lobbyists thought it quite important. Typical responses were:

He has a sharp mind for seeing what is in bills and where they will get into trouble in the legislative process. He is quick to ferret out loopholes and pitfalls that will face a bill as it goes through both houses.

His success is based on his encyclopedic knowledge of legislative procedure. The bills he wants to go through have a high batting average. He can get bills introduced by a wide circle of friends. He doesn't like running into strong opposition. He cloaks his goals in seemingly innocuous bills or resolutions and other legislative activity, so they are easily and well-concealed. He knows every nuance and every trick in the book when it comes to legislative procedure.

Legislators perceived this variable as 10th in importance. The few legislators who did mention knowledge of legislative process as a basis of effectiveness held strong opinions about it. Typical responses were:

This lobbyist is the most successful because he operates on all of the legislative angles. He knows the legislative process. He's a clever operator who knows how to take advantage of every loophole as a bill makes its way through the legislature. He builds up 'back-fires,' contriving something which drives people in the direction he wants them to go. His ability to do this breeds success; and success breeds further success.

He has watched legislation over the years. He is a source of information on legislative techniques for legislators. He knows legislative history and as a result has built himself a reputation as an authority on matters of legislation.

In summary, knowledge of the legislative process was perceived by the lobbyists as an effectiveness variable of great importance (rank order of 4). They stressed the fact repeatedly that unless a lobbyist

was very familiar with the formal (and informal) procedures of the legislative process, he stood little chance of being effective. Reporters (rank order of 8.5) and legislators (rank order of 10) did not cite knowledge of legislative process as often as lobbyists as a basis of effectiveness. However, those who did, felt strongly that this was a most important effectiveness variable.

Entertainment, Personal Favors and Assistance

When the writer was first categorizing the responses to the bases of effectiveness question, entertainment, personal favors and assistance was considered part of knowledge and use of lobbying techniques. However, enough respondents stated that the effectiveness of some lobbyists could be attributed almost solely to this variable that it seemed important enough to be considered an effectiveness variable by itself. (The same was true of "political factors" which will be considered later.)

Reporters (rank order of 5) considered this variable as quite important in lobbying effectiveness. It should be noted that they also placed a much higher value on this lobbying technique than did the others in Chapter V. Typical responses from the reporters which pointed out the importance of this variable:

This lobbyist can 'pay-off' with entertaining. He puts up legislators at his place at no expense in This makes them feel obligated.

He has more money to spend (and does) on entertaining than the ordinary run-of-the-mill lobbyist. This makes him plenty of friends.

Legislators perceived entertainment and personal favors as quite important in a lobbyist's effectiveness (rank order of 7). Many legislators opined that this had little, if any, effect on them--it was some of their colleagues in the legislature who were effected by this kind of lobbying. Typical responses:

The boys who entertain in room . . . in the . . . are effective. The fellows (legislators) who go there are not going to vote against them (interest group). I used to go there, but not anymore. You start to feel obligation to vote for them.

. . . is a rabid entertainer. Yet, he has never asked me to vote for or against an issue. As I think about it, however, I can't think of anything of his that I've voted against.

Several legislators mentioned that even though a certain lobbyist "had never spent a dime for dinner on me" or "he doesn't spend much of his time trying to wine and dine you" they were still effective lobbyists. Again, many legislators perceived entertainment and personal favors as something "that works on other legislators, but not on me."¹

Lobbyists perceived entertainment and personal favors as a relatively unimportant basis of effectiveness (rank order of 11). Chapter V pointed out that they also consider this a relatively ineffective lobbying technique. However, they were willing to ascribe the effectiveness of some of their colleagues to this variable--not to themselves. Typical responses were:

He has a lot of money to spend; more than anybody else. When you've got this kind of money and can take people to the Country Club, you can't help but make friends.

This lobbyist works like crazy. He will do anything for a legislator; drive them any place, or take them to dinner. He helps them, and he asks them to help him. He does fantastic things for. . . .

¹Attribution to others is an interesting and significant projective phenomenon. See, for example, an article by George S. Lewis, entitled "The Congressmen Look at the Polls," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. IV (June, 1940), pp. 229-231. Lewis found that 39% of the Congressmen said they were aided by polls in their decision-making; but when asked what part polls played in the decision-making of their colleague representatives, they said it was an important aid for 70% of the Congressmen. In other words, it was the other congressmen who were aided by polls--they were not as keen evaluators of opinion as the respondents themselves. This kind of projective thinking may suggest one possible explanation for some of the differences between reporters and the legislators and lobbyists.

The . . . boys run a 'saloon.' I think this helps them--it must, or they wouldn't bother.

He's effective because he works hard at entertaining and personal favors. He gets legislators cars, and so forth--and it pays off in his case.

The one labor union lobbyist in this study attributed the effectiveness of the five lobbyists he had selected exclusively to their ability to entertain:

The following lobbyists . . . are most effective because all of them have suites and entertain daily. This makes for closer contacts. All of them belong to the City Club. The most important things in effectiveness are the whiskey bottle, the suite, and the City Club. You've got to have money.

In summary, entertainment, personal favors and assistance were not considered part of "knowledge and use of lobbying techniques" because enough study participants stated that the effectiveness of lobbyists could be primarily attributed to this variable. Reporters (rank order of 5) considered this variable as quite important in effectiveness. Legislators perceived entertainment and personal favors as quite important (rank order of 7). Many lobbyists suggested that as far as they were concerned their effectiveness stemmed from some other variable, but they were quick to point out that the success of some of their lobbying colleagues was a result of entertainment and the rendering of personal favors and assistance. Legislators and reporters also pointed out that it was their opinion that recipients of extensive entertaining and personal favors would someday have to "pay-off" the lobbyist. Lobbyists (rank order of 11) perceived entertainment and personal favors as a relatively unimportant basis of effectiveness; but they knew of certain lobbyists whose effectiveness, they judged, was based almost solely on this variable.

Ability to Communicate

Many study participants evaluated the effectiveness of some lobbyists in terms of the lobbyist's "ability to communicate"; that is, "to get his point across" or "to talk the legislator's language." In a few instances, this ability was tied in with the lobbyist's knowledge of the subject; but enough respondents perceived this variable as a separate, distinct basis of effectiveness to warrant a special category.

All three evaluating groups rated this variable about the same: legislators at a rank order of 8, and reporters and lobbyists at 8.5. Typical responses from legislators about the communication skills of lobbyists were:

He does a good job of explaining and selling his program. He talks our language.

The general thought of legislators is that they are glad to talk with him on anything. He doesn't brow-beat you, he just gives you the old 'soft-sell.'

He's the type who stands around and very quietly gets your ear. He gives you short, concise facts and points. He's got the knack of saying it just right. He doesn't annoy legislators. He doesn't get mad at you, even if he's licked, he's back without being mad.

Responses from those reporters who perceived this variable as important in the effectiveness of certain lobbyists were:

He's mainly effective because he's the best prepared man when he goes into a hearing; and, more important, he knows how to communicate his message. He knows how to communicate-- he's a different kind of lobbyist, a 'cerebral lobbyist.'

He has a keen mind, sharpened in the academic and business world and in lobbying. He's a cynical . . . who would stop at nothing, and he has the ability to talk legislators out of their shirts. I don't know what is is, but he can sure get his message across.

Several lobbyists also mentioned this ability to communicate as important in the effectiveness of certain lobbyists. Typical responses were:

He has the gift of articulate expression. This helps him in his personal relationships with legislators.

He explains well in his presentation to the Members. He has the ability to 'cover ground' rapidly and impressively.

One lobbyist, when evaluating another, stated that "this fellow is effective because he can talk so well that he can convince legislators that the interest of his principal is equated with that of the broad public interest." And, he went on to say, "when you can do this, you know the guy is a good talker."

In summary, enough study participants evaluated the effectiveness of some lobbyists in terms of their ability to communicate that this category was considered important enough to be a distinct and separate basis of effectiveness. All three evaluating groups ranked this variable about the same (legislators at 8, and reporters and lobbyists at 8.5). All participants agreed that personal communication skills were important in the success of several Michigan lobbyists.

Personal Integrity, Honesty and Sincerity

Both legislators (rank order of 5.5) and lobbyists (rank order of 6) agreed that the personal integrity and sincerity of the lobbyist in the presentation of information, facts, and arguments to be a variable of importance in lobbying effectiveness. Typical responses of the legislators which indicated this were:

He is effective--even though bucking fearful odds--because he is ethical and truthful. His word is good--he is honest.

He is sincere, honest, and frank in laying out his cause before the members; and this is the basis of his effectiveness.

Many legislators (as did lobbyists) stated in strong terms that once a lobbyist had not been honest with a legislator, in the presentation of information or in relationships between the legislator and interest group members in the legislator's district, his effectiveness would be

severely curtailed. Typical responses in this regard were:

. . . double-crossed me once by giving me some grossly distorted information. Now, I wouldn't get near him with a ten-foot pole; and I tell other legislators about him.

If a lobbyist is straight forward with me and doesn't give me a 'bum steer,' I'm always willing to listen. But just let him cross me once--and he's had it. . . . of the . . . crossed me once by telling lies about me to his people in my district. This is lousy lobbying, and he'll pay for it in the end.

Legislators emphasized repeatedly that they had the utmost respect for lobbyists who, when asked, would give both sides of the story on legislation relating to their interest groups. Typical responses were:

This lobbyist is a high class individual in my book because he told me about bills which were bad even though presented by his own groups. This honesty pays off.

Sometimes. . . . has had to push bills he doesn't like, and he'll tell you. He seems to represent a broader interest than just his own people. I have respect and confidence in him.

He's effective, because he doesn't play both sides against the middle. He always presents both sides of the issue; and if you ask him what's wrong with a bill, he tells you.

A couple of legislators perceived two of the most effective lobbyists (K and I) as primarily effective because they presented their cases in a candid and objective manner; and, what's more, often demonstrated an ability to rise above the narrow interests of their organizations to take a broad view of the public interest. Two responses of interest in this regard were:

He is effective because he is beyond selfishness. He has the interest of all the people of the state over his own.

You ask this lobbyist a question, and you get the truth even though it doesn't benefit his organization. Legislators appreciate that. Further, he can rise above the narrow interests of the . . . and see the broad picture of the state's interest as a whole.

Lobbyists were also quite cognizant of the role of personal integrity and sincerity in their personal relationships with legislators. Typical responses, quite similar to those given by legislators, were:

He has an excellent reputation for laying the facts on the line. There is no double-talk. He's honest and they respect him for it.

If legislators ask . . . for facts, they get them, even though they may hurt the . . . Legislators know this, and they respect him for it.

This fellow is 'Mr. Integrity' himself. He wouldn't give people a 'bad steer,' and they trust and believe him. What's more, he takes a broad view, and has usually been a statesman in his attitudes.

Only two reporters (with a rank order of 11.5) mentioned personal integrity and sincerity as a basis of lobbying effectiveness. Their comments regarding two lobbyists were, "he's sincere and honest"; and "his word is good." However, reporters in their evaluation of knowledge of the subject stressed that the information must be reliable, objective, and completely accurate.

In summary, both legislators (rank order of 5.5) and lobbyists (rank order of 6) were closely agreed that personal integrity, honesty and sincerity in the presentation of information, facts, and arguments (as well as the use of lobbying techniques) to be a variable of importance in lobbying effectiveness. They both emphasized that once a lobbyist had not been honest with a legislator in the presentation of information or in relationships between the legislator and interest group members the effectiveness of that lobbyist would be severely curtailed. Legislators and lobbyists also stated that the lobbyists who, when asked, presented both sides of the story on legislation tended to be more effective. They also agreed that lobbyists who demonstrated ability to rise above the narrow interests of their pressure groups and took a broad view of the public interest were more effective lobbyists for it. Only two reporters perceived this variable as significantly contributing to lobbying effectiveness.

Hard Work

A good many lobbyists perceived the effectiveness of some of their colleagues as the result of "hard work." However, this variable was ranked 10th in importance by them as a basis of effectiveness. Typical responses were, "he's a hard worker," and "he works hard at it." Only 5 legislators (rank order of 11) mentioned "hard work" as an effectiveness variable, and only 2 reporters (rank order of 12) cited it. In no case did any of the respondents explain what they meant by "hard work." Perhaps, they felt this response was self-explanatory and required no further explanation.

Political Party Factors

Reporters perceived political factors as 10th in importance in lobbying effectiveness. This category primarily refers to political contributions, political work, and former and present political affiliation. Typical comments from the reporters were:

He does a lot of work and spends a lot of money in Republican campaigns. This doesn't hurt him--it obligates a lot of Members.

He's been connected with the Republican party for a long time. He sees to it that certain legislators get enough political money and work.

Legislators and lobbyists perceived political factors in lobbyist effectiveness the same (rank order of 12 for both). The three legislators who mentioned this variable spoke only in terms of the potential political organization strength, for example:

He is effective because he has a state-wide potent political force to back him up.

Lobbyists perceived the effectiveness of some of their colleagues as related to their ability to raise money for campaigns, the political potential of their interest groups, and their former and present

associations with a political party. Typical responses which confirmed this were:

Politically speaking, he's powerful. He can wave his hand and a \$5,000 check will appear at 400 North Capitol (Republican State Central Committee).

His political beliefs are Republican, and he pushes this philosophy among the hundreds of members of his association.

His former experience with the Republican party plus his active partisan participation in campaigns makes him effective.

In summary, reporters (rank order of 10) perceived this variable as more important than did legislators and lobbyists (rank order of 12). Generally, respondents evaluated political factors as effecting lobbying performance in terms of political money and work contributions, and the political potential (in terms of votes and money) of certain interest groups. All of the lobbyists who were perceived as having political factors as part of their effectiveness were identified with the Republican party.

Kind and Acceptability of Lobbying "Product"

All evaluating groups were agreed that of the effectiveness variables mentioned, the kind and acceptability of the lobbying "product," that is, whether the interest group's point of view and goals are generally accepted by the public as "good" and legitimate objectives (all ranked this last at 13) was least important. For example, it is commonly thought among legislators and legislative observers that interest groups representing, for example, gambling, liquor and small loan interests and similar groups, are handicapped in their efforts to push legislation because these "are tough products to sell." With certain qualifications, very few study participants considered this a handicap in the promotion of these groups' interests. Two legislators commented on this: one stated that the lobbyist was effective because of the "product" he had to sell:

. . . is effective because he has a good product to sell--its in the public interest. However, . . . by himself would fall flat on his face without the product.

The other legislator commented that he perceived the lobbyist as effective even though he didn't agree with what he was trying to do:

He represents an industry that I'm not in favor of, that is, gambling. When you get a fellow who represents something you're not in favor of, you're not apt to be sympathetic. However, . . . is a very friendly fellow, a top grade, highly moral individual. I have confidence in him.

One lobbyist suggested that even though a lobbyist "had some tough babies to sell" he still was very effective and managed to get his bills through. An examination of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale revealed that all but two of them represent well-established organizations that have socially-approved goals and objectives. The two, who did not represent organizations (by the legislator's and lobbyist's own definitions) with general socially recognized goals (racing and small loan companies), were defined as effective because of other effectiveness variables which overcame the kind of lobbying "product" they were representing.

Summary--Bases of Effectiveness

One of the major hypotheses of this thesis which was examined in this chapter was that there would be agreement among study participants concerning the variables underlying lobbying effectiveness. Table 62 gave significant statistical support for this hypothesis in that there were high correlations between legislators, lobbyists and news correspondents as to the bases of lobbying effectiveness. An examination of each of the thirteen categories, in rank order of perceived importance, resulted in the following findings.

Study participants were agreed that the ability of lobbyists to maintain congenial, positive, personal relationships with legislators a

prime prerequisite for lobbying effectiveness. Lobbyists considered personality and sociability factors as the most important basis of effectiveness; and reporters (with a rank order of 2.5) and legislators (with a rank order of 2) also considered these factors of great importance.

Study participants were also agreed that organizational factors were very important in lobbying effectiveness (rank orders were: lobbyist, 2; reporters, 1; and legislators, 3.5). An examination of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale revealed that eleven out of the sixteen represented organizations that either had substantial amounts of economic power and/or widespread "grass roots" support throughout the state. The same could be said of only seven of the lobbyists among those seventeen in the bottom half of the effectiveness scale. Further, it was generalized from the data that the lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale represented organizations that were well-established, had a good deal of social status and economic power, and/ or had widespread "grass roots" support throughout the state. In contrast, over half of the lobbyists in the bottom seventeen on the IPE scale represented organizations with narrow economic or professional interests; those seeking to change the status quo to better their own professional or occupational position; and interest groups with small memberships and without much economic power. It is significant, however, that five out of the top sixteen lobbyists did not represent groups that had these characteristics; and their lobbying effectiveness was perceived as the result of other variables such as personality, background and experience, and so forth.

Lobbyists and reporters (with rank orders of three and four) perceived background and experience as an important variable in lobbying effectiveness. Certain occupational backgrounds (reporting the high-level government work), previous legislative experience, and the length of lobbying experience were cited over and over as the reasons for the

effectiveness of many of the top sixteen lobbyists. Legislators (rank order of 9) did not perceive this variable as too important, although those who did mention it based their evaluations on the same reasons as did the lobbyists and reporters.

Reporters perceived the knowledge and use of lobbying techniques as an important factor in effectiveness (rank order of 2.5). Lobbyists (rank order of 5) and legislators (rank order of 5.5) perceived this variable about the same in importance. Generally, all respondents felt that those lobbyists who knew and used the more highly respected and group-approved lobbying techniques (for example, personal presentation of arguments, testifying at hearings, public relations campaigns, contacts by constituents, and so forth) with strategic discretion were more effective lobbyists because of it.

Legislators perceived the most important (rank order of 1) variable in lobbying effectiveness to be knowledge of the subject central to the interest of the organized group the lobbyist represented. Legislators emphasized many times that accurate information and facts were the best tools of the lobbyist and his most important basis of effectiveness. Reporters (rank order of 6) perceived knowledge of the subject important not only for legislators but themselves. Lobbyists (rank order of 7) did not perceive and rank knowledgeability and expertise as highly as the other groups. A few thought it was of prime importance, the majority did not. It was suggested that lobbyists did not consider this of such great importance because of the frequent practice of calling in organizational experts to testify on technical matters effecting the interest group.

All study participants perceived knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legislators as a distinct basis of lobbying effectiveness. Legislators ranked this highest (rank order of 3.5), reporters perceived this variable as 7th in importance, and the lobbyists' evaluations resulted

in a rank order of 8.5. Generally, it was difficult for study participants to articulate exactly what they meant when they ascribed this variable as a basis of effectiveness. Typically, they thought that confidence in lobbyists was something developed over time by lobbyists who, because of other reasons (for example, length of service, gentlemanly conduct, and so forth), were "just accepted" and were able to "hold the confidence" of legislators.

Knowledge of the legislative process was perceived by the lobbyists as an effectiveness variable of great importance (rank order of 4). They stressed the fact repeatedly that unless a lobbyist was very familiar with the formal (and informal) procedures of the legislative process, he stood little chance of success. Reporters (rank order of 8.5) and legislators (rank order of 10) did not cite knowledge of legislative process as often as lobbyists as a basis of effectiveness.

Reporters (rank order of 5) considered entertainment, personal favors and assistance as important in effectiveness. Legislators perceived this variable as quite important (rank order of 7). Many legislators suggested that entertainment and personal favors had little effect on them personally, but they suspected that this may have had quite an impact on their fellow legislators. Lobbyists also tended to view their own personal effectiveness as stemming from some other variable, but they were quick to point out that the success of some of their lobbying colleagues was a result of entertainment and the rendering of personal favors and assistance. Legislators and reporters also pointed out that it was their opinion that recipients of extensive entertaining and personal favors would someday have to "pay-off" the lobbyist. Lobbyists (rank order of 11) perceived entertainment and personal favors as a relatively unimportant basis of effectiveness, but they knew of certain lobbyists whose effectiveness, they judged, was based almost solely on this variable.

All three evaluating groups ranked ability to communicate about the same (legislators at 8, and reporters and lobbyists at 8.5). All participants agreed that personal communication skills were important in the success of several Michigan lobbyists.

Both legislators (rank order of 5.5) and lobbyists (rank order of 6) were closely agreed that personal integrity, honesty and sincerity in the presentation of information, facts and arguments (as well as the use of lobbying techniques) to be a variable of importance in lobbying effectiveness. They both emphasized that once a lobbyist had not been honest with a legislator, in the presentation of information or in relationships between the legislator and interest group members, the effectiveness of that lobbyist would be severely curtailed. Legislators and lobbyists also stated that the lobbyists who, when asked, presented both sides of the story on legislation tended to be more effective. They also agreed that those few lobbyists who demonstrated ability to rise above the narrow interests of their pressure groups and took a broad view of the public interest were more effective lobbyists. Only two reporters (rank order of 11.5) perceived this variable as significantly contributing to lobbying effectiveness.

A good many lobbyists (rank order of 10) perceived the effectiveness of their colleagues as the result of "hard work." Only five legislators (rank order of 11) cited this, and only two reporters (rank order of 11.5) mentioned it. In no case did any of the respondents explain exactly what they meant by "hard work."

Reporters (rank order of 10) perceived political party factors as more important than did legislators and lobbyists (rank orders of 12). Generally, respondents evaluated political factors as effecting lobbying performance in terms of political money and work contributions, and the political potential (in terms of votes and money) of certain interest groups.

All of the lobbyists who were perceived as having political factors as part of their effectiveness were identified with the Republican party.

All evaluating groups were agreed that of the effectiveness variables mentioned, the kind and acceptability of the lobbying "product, " that is, whether the interest groups' point of view and goals were generally accepted by the public as "good" and legitimate objectives, was least important.

CHAPTER VII

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SOME VALUE JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The writer has set this chapter aside in that it plainly represents the value judgments of the study participants, and himself, regarding the role of lobbyists in the legislative process. In this chapter the values and opinions of all study participants, as well as his own, are presented and discussed. Normative questions are asked regarding the value and necessity of lobbying in the legislative process, and recommendations are made concerning some possible changes in the present Michigan lobbying act.

Tolerance and Acceptance of Pressure Groups

There is a good deal of public disagreement among political scientists, legislators, journalists and other interested political observers and participants regarding the worth of pressure groups, normatively speaking. As pointed out earlier in this thesis (Chapter I), journalists and editorial writers often express much doubt and concern in the columns of their newspapers regarding the intrinsic value of pressure groups and their governmental activities. Legislators, too, are apt to publicly proclaim their distrust of special interest groups and often try to present a public image which suggests that they are aloof from pressure group influence and activities. Just how do legislators, news correspondents, and the lobbyists themselves privately feel about the necessity and value of pressure groups in the legislative process?

Each of the participants in this study was asked to make a personal value judgment concerning the role of interest groups in the legislative process. Their answers, placed on a friendly-hostile scale are depicted in Table 63.

TABLE 63¹

ATTITUDES OF LOBBYISTS, LEGISLATIVE LEADERS, AND NEWS
CORRESPONDENTS TOWARD PRESSURE GROUPS

Question 34. Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse, if there were no interest groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation?					
	Attitude				
	Friendly - - - - - Hostile				
	Much Worse	Some- what Worse	About Same	Some- what Better	Much Better
Lobbyists (N=33)	97%	3%			= 100%
Legislators (N=16)	63%	12%	18%		7% = 100%
News Correspondents (N=11)	37%	37%	26%		= 100%

¹The question used in this study was the same as the one administered in the legislative study by Wahlke, Buchanan, Eulau and Ferguson, *op. cit.* Legislators in that study gave the following responses to the question: "much worse" 41%; "somewhat worse" 34%; "about the same" 12%; "somewhat better" 7%; and "much better" 6%. Almost all legislators interviewed in this study were friendly toward pressure groups. Only legislative leaders were interviewed in this study, whereas all legislators were interviewed in the study by Wahlke, *et al.* It should be pointed out that in the latter study, legislative leaders tended to be more friendly toward pressure groups than other legislators.

The table reveals that all of the lobbyists interviewed felt the legislative process would not function well without interest groups and lobbyists. Seventy-five per cent of the legislative leaders interviewed felt the same way; although 18% said the legislature would work about

the same without lobbyists, and 7% said it would work much worse. Seventy-four percent of the news correspondents stated that lobbyists were essential to the smooth functioning of the legislative process, and the remainder (26%) said it wouldn't make much difference if there were no lobbyists trying to influence legislation.

After responding to the question (concerning the legislature's operating better or worse in the absence of pressure groups) study participants were asked to explain the reasons for their value judgments.

By Lobbyists

Lobbyists cited most often their role as information and research liaison as the reason why the legislature would work worse without their services. Typical responses were:

Many legislators are uninformed and need lobbyists to secure information.

I don't know how they could do an intelligent job without lobbyists. Out of one thousand bills--you can't have Solomons over there. Lobbyists give the benefit of their research and experience.

The Legislature would be lost if they didn't have the 'Third House.' For example, take a farmer just coming in, he doesn't know anything about industrial problems, and lobbyists provide the necessary information and research.

Some lobbyists emphasized that without their services the Legislature would need a large research staff and they (the lobbyists) fulfill this function.

Lobbyists are badly needed to provide information on technical subjects. It would take a massive state force to provide this information and there would be no personal incentive.

The Legislature wouldn't be as good because no research and information would be available. Now, they get it faster and better--they would be lost without us. They would have to set up research staffs without us.

Lobbyists furnish legislators with large amounts of information. They act as legislative staff--this function could be accomplished

if the state were willing to pay and furnish a staff. But, I question the value of a state staff--you know the lobbyist's prejudice when he presents the case, but you don't know about the state employee's.

A few lobbyists thought legislators too uninformed or lacking in understanding of the complex problems with which they have to grapple. So, lobbyists are necessary in order that legislators may have a better understanding of the problems and avoid unnecessary and foolish mistakes. Typical comments were:

Without lobbyists--the 'Third House'--the Legislature would be in real trouble. They have to have vital information on bills; and the legislators don't have the ability and capacity to understand and comprehend them.

I don't know how they would function without lobbyists. Government is too complex and getting more complicated--they need lobbyists, without them they couldn't legislate intelligently.

Legislators couldn't get along without lobbyists because of the mass of legislation. The laws would be terrible because of ignorance.

Several of the lobbyists cited the theme of public interest or public service as the primary reason for the justification of lobbying activity:

If there were no lobbyists, God help the public! How could any legislator inform himself on every question--its like a jury without lawyers.

Lobbyists act as a built-in check and balance system for the public interest. It is easy for articulate legislators to sway their peers; lobbyists can help balance this.

You would get some damn poor laws without lobbyists. The public wouldn't be made acquainted with the laws--the Association knows what to bring to the attention of the people, and they are the 'watchdog' for the people.

Only one lobbyist answered the question in terms of the self-interest of the group he represented when he stated:

It would be much worse without lobbyists, because the three categories of legislators (that is, the misinformed, the uninformed, and the prejudiced) would not understand our particular problems if we weren't represented.

In summary, all lobbyists felt the legislature would be in worse straits if lobbyists were not actively promoting their own special interests. However, the majority reasoned or rationalized that lobbying services are necessary in order that the legislature will have adequate information and research on complex problems and that the "public interest" may be preserved.

By Legislators

The majority of legislative leaders (57%) stated that the legislature would not function as well without lobbyists. Typical responses from these legislators most tolerant of group activity follow pretty much the reasons given by lobbyists earlier concerning the need for interest group representation:

Lobbyists serve an information purpose. They, in a sense, act as research people for legislators. We need them as long as we don't have coordinated research by agencies. Another one of the jobs of lobbyists is to focus attention on bills for the public--they are a good check and balance on the legislature.

Lobbyists are important. No legislator can possibly be well-informed on legislation--there are approximately 1500 bills a year. Just add up the number of committees; there are probably 70 different legislative areas. No person could have such broad insight into all of these areas; and, so, lobbyists provide a research and information service. They are also the balance wheels--all of the letters you get from home are stimulated by somebody else--they (the lobbyists) get them to do it, and this gives you both sides of the picture.

The Legislature would be tremendously ineffective without lobbyists. They serve to educate legislators, and we need their advice. Where would you learn it without lobbyists? They are absolutely essential to good government.

The most tolerant legislators, then, saw lobbying as an integral part of the legislative process, because lobbyists relate the interests of their principals to the legislature; provide information and research; and they help the legislature relate public policy to public wishes and aspirations.

A somewhat less tolerant view, but still generally favorable, expressed by several legislators can be seen in this response:

Some lobbyists are useful, and present viewpoints which have merit. The pressure artists don't last long. In our complex society, the 'Third House' has been generally accepted as a necessary adjunct to the legislative process, and in some respects it is desirable. But, their only proper function is to provide information. I consider it improper lobbying where lobbyists bring threat of political reprisal and bribery in order to buy votes.

Three legislators felt that the legislature would operate about the same if there were no lobbyists to represent special interests.

A typical response was:

I think the Legislature would operate about the same. My first two years here I was impressed with lobbyists, but as time went on, they had lesser effect on me. Over time I have gravitated to a certain few who are dependable and helpful--you can have the rest of them.

Only one legislator (a Democratic leader) viewed lobbyists with some intolerance and said that:

The Legislature would work much more effectively without lobbyists than with them. They take up too much time with their special interests. They control the length of the session. Although they do serve a purpose with their research and information, it is regretable that they are so influential. Legislators have become overdependent on them for social needs and information.

In summary, legislative leaders were generally tolerant of pressure groups and their lobbyists and felt that lobbyists play an important and worth-while part in the legislative process by providing information and research; they help the legislature understand complex socio-economic problems; and relate public policy to public wishes and aspirations. A few legislators felt the legislature would operate about the same without lobbyists and that the functions of lobbyists should be closely circumscribed. Only one legislator expressed hostility toward interest groups and felt that the legislature would be better off without lobbyists.

By News Correspondents

The majority (74%) of news correspondents interviewed in this study thought the legislature would be "worse off" without pressure groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation. Reporters cited similar reasons to those given by lobbyists and legislators for the need for pressure groups. Typical responses of those most tolerant of pressure group activities were:

The Legislature would operate much worse without interest groups because ill-advised pressures and bribery would move into the vacuum. Lobbyists, after all, do the thinking for many legislators--they must have some intelligence.

The Legislature is no good unless it has somebody to tell it what to do--that is, the sentiments of a lot of people. Legislators depend on lobbyists for information to support their (legislators') inclinations. Further, legislators look to seasoned veteran lobbyists for advice--lobbyists play the role of 'father confessor' and tell the legislators, for example, 'I know what happened back in '38 and so forth.' Lobbyists are pro's tutoring the amateurs, and they are recognized for their insights.

Perhaps the best articulated response from the news correspondents was the following:

We must remember that a pressure group represents one particular segment of the socio-economic life of this state. It is important that they have a voice to represent this segment because it may have a tremendous impact on the state. Oftentimes, many legislators who don't have the resources are not able to comprehend certain problems, and lobbyists serve the function of explaining them. All in all, other lobbyists cancel out the effect of the selfish lobbyist, and they become an opposition force because of their awareness and ability to oppose. They, then, serve as a 'check and balance' system.

One reporter considered lobbyists a "necessary evil"; because, without them, the Legislature "would have to take some other steps to get an equal amount of information--through the expansion of the Legislative Service Bureau."

A less tolerant view of lobbyists was held by the group of reporters who felt the legislature would operate about the same without lobbyists.

Typical responses were:

Lobbyists do some good and some harm. They are serving narrow interests. However, in one way or another influence is going to prevail either in its present fashion or some kind of replacement. There has to be professional competence--legislators are going to get it one way or another--either through agency heads or lobbyists.

I'm not convinced that a lot of the legislation wanted by the lobbyists is good legislation. On the plus side, however, they do present a position on a bill and bring the information and the position of their group before the Legislature. On the other side, however, sometimes legislators put too much weight on the organization's position. The two average out.

In summary, news correspondents demonstrated a surprising amount of tolerance concerning the role of pressure groups and lobbyists in the legislative process. This tolerance is "surprising" in view of the fact that so few reporters and editorial writers ever portray interest groups--their activities and goals--in a favorable light in their reporting and editorial enterprises. Generally, reporters privately perceived lobbying as an essential and desirable ingredient in the legislative process for the same reasons cited above by lobbyists and legislative leaders.

Responses to the question (concerning the legislature's operating better or worse in the absence of pressure groups), then, clearly indicated that lobbyists, and, more important, legislative leaders and news correspondents, had a high degree of tolerance for pressure groups in the legislative process. Generally, they see lobbying as an integral part of the legislative process because lobbyists serve to relate the socio-economic interests of their principals to the legislature; they provide necessary information and research on complex problems; and they help the legislature relate public policy to public wishes and aspirations.

Lobbyists' Perceptions of Solicitations of Views
By Public Policy-Makers

As pointed out in the section preceding this one, lobbyists and legislators were generally agreed that the legislature would not operate as effectively if it were not for the participation of interest groups and their agents in the legislative process. Legislators stated that they often drew on the research and information facilities of interest groups. The writer felt it would be of interest to actually ask lobbyists just how often legislators came to them for information and advice on policy matters. It was anticipated that the majority of lobbyists would state that the solicitation of their views on policy matters was an on-going, almost-daily, process. That this was the case can be seen by examining Table 64. Seventy-six percent of the lobbyists stated that such solicitation was an on-going activity. It was hypothesized that the lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale would have their views solicited more than those in the bottom half of the scale--this proved correct. Of the top sixteen lobbyists all but two who were asked frequently but not regularly, said that they were regularly asked their views on policy matters. Of those seventeen lobbyists in the bottom half of the scale, two were asked their opinions "11 to 25 times a year"; one was asked "8 to 10 times a year"; one was asked "once or twice a year"; and two said their opinions were never solicited by legislators. An attempt to find a point bi-serial correlation by relating the lobbyists in the "on-going activity" column with IPE points did not prove statistically significant ($r = .2202$).¹ Although legislators were not asked this question, it is apparent that they not only believed that lobbyists serve an important information, research, and advice function, but they actually solicited views on public policy matters, from those lobbyists

¹The categories "11 to 25 times a year, " "3 to 10 times a year, " "Once or twice a year, " and "never" were combined and run against the IPE scores.

TABLE 64

**LOBBYISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF SOLICITATIONS OF VIEWS
BY PUBLIC POLICY-MAKERS**

Question 29: Do public policy makers--by that I mean Members of the Legislature or State Agency heads--come to you very often to solicit your views on a policy matter?						
Lobby- ist	IPE Points	On-going Activity	11 to 25 times a year	3 to 10 times a year	Once or twice a year	Never
K	159	x				
X	61	x				
I	55	x				
L	55	x				
R	38	x				
M	30		x			
DD	27	x				
CC	26	x				
B	23	x				
F	22	x				
D	21	x				
J	20	x				
S	20			x		
EE	18	x				
G	18	x				
AA	16	x				
A	15			x		
Q	14	x				
BB	13	x				
GG	11	x				
H	9		x			
FF	9	x				
E	8					x
T	8	x				
Z	8	x				
P	7	x				
U	1	x				
V	1	x				
C	1					x
N	0	x				
W	0	x				
O	0		x			
Y	0				x	
(Totals and percent)		25 (76%)	3 (9%)	2 (6%)	1 (3%)	2 (6%)

The point bi-serial correlation coefficient at the .05 level: $r = .3494$
 $r. = .2202$

who rank high in the IPE scale. As explained in the previous chapter, legislators are wont to go for information and advice to those lobbyists that they perceive as being trustworthy and reliable. As one lobbyist, at the top of the IPE scale put it, "you can consider that you have arrived when legislators come to you for advice."

In summary, the findings of the table confirm that legislators who believe lobbyists serve a vital information and advice function actually do consult with and ask the advice of effective lobbyists on policy questions.

Other Value and Opinion Considerations

At the end of each interview, all of the participants in this study were asked if they had any observations, insights, or recommendations to make about lobbying.¹ The nature of this open-end question was such that study participants could respond in any matter about anything that might not have been covered in the interview.

Concern with Public Image and Social Status

The lobbyists responses to the question were, for the most part, standardized. The typical response from 70% of the lobbyists was that they thought "you have covered the subject pretty well." Twelve percent of the lobbyists said they were concerned with the apparent public misunderstanding and lack of respect for the lobbying profession. Two typical responses, in this regard, were:

It ought to be made clear that lobbying is a bona fide profession. It's a most misunderstood business, but, actually, there is not a segment of society that is not represented. Lobbyists are regarded as bad things--this is bad.

Lobbying should enjoy a better name, it's a bit soiled. It is a necessary branch of public endeavor, because the professional

¹The question asked was: "Is there anything else about lobbying that you think I ought to pay attention to in my study?"

lobbyist is an expert in his particular field--he helps legislators solve problems. It's too bad, but I don't believe that the citizenry has a knowledge of what lobbyists do.

From the writer's own legislative experience, it is obvious that lobbyists view the occupational and social status problems attached to lobbying with varying degrees of sensitivity. Some profess no concern, others are preoccupied with the status problem and the fact that their occupation seems to lack "professional" status. One lobbyist told the writer that at first he felt somewhat awkward and embarrassed when he had to explain his occupation as that of lobbyist but, now, he "had a good product to sell" and somebody "has to do the job." As pointed out in the first chapter of this dissertation, most lobbyists do not list themselves when they register with the Secretary of State as "legislative agents." During the interviews with the lobbyists and in subsequent conversations many expressed the hope that this dissertation would "clear the air" on Michigan lobbyists and help make lobbying "respectable."¹ One legislator also expressed concern in his response to this question that,

the average person back home has an evil impression of the lobbyist, that is, he does everything he can to corrupt the Legislature. This is wrong, I won't say it isn't ever done, but the instances are so rare.

For the most part, however, lobbyists as a group were concerned with their social and occupational status; and, as one asserted, "it's time we lose our marginal status, and lobbying becomes accepted as a legitimate and necessary provession."

¹The writer pointed out to these lobbyists that this dissertation was not intended to "whitewash" lobbying, but, as a social scientific enterprise, it was designed to increase the understanding of the role that the individual lobbyist plays in the legislative process. Suffice it to say, this dissertation was not undertaken to "whitewash" or "expose" lobbying, but to increase understanding. The judgment as to whether or not the writer has accomplished this must be left to his peers.

Change in Lobbying Tactics and Personnel

Many of the lobbyists, legislators and reporters commented that they had witnessed a definite shift in lobbying personnel and activities during the past fifteen or twenty years. All agreed that this trend had been for the good. Typical lobbyists' comments in this regard were:

The difference in lobbying between the old days and today is like day and night. For one thing, entertaining was done more in those days than today. Further, the lobbyists have improved over the years--today, they are better educated and know their subject matter better.

In bygone days, there was trouble with lobbying. For example, the money spent by lobbyists was investigated by the grand jury. We don't have this anymore.

Another lobbyist who felt "lobbying is more out in the open today" said he saw a definite change in lobbying within his own organization, for "in the old days before our association was organized we would pay a lawyer a fee to get a bill through--usually around fifteen hundred dollars--and we don't know how he did it, we didn't ask questions." Legislators, too, agreed that lobbying had changed and several of them related anecdotes which appropriately underscored their contention. One legislator recalled that in his first term in the legislature he introduced a bill which would give a state agency authority to regulate some amusement machines. He felt it was a good bill. It was assigned to a legislative committee, and subsequently reported out of committee. The legislator went on to say that what he didn't know was that the committee was "sandbagging" the bill. After an alleged pay-off of \$50,000, the bill was sent back to the committee to be killed. The respondent said he learned all of this later and that he had been "the unwilling accomplice to the whole deal." He further stated that he believes "this was a common practice back in the 1930's," but that "sandbagging for money and favors no longer existed." The respondent told one other anecdote to illustrate his point that "lobbying has changed."

Certain racing interests, for many years, were attempting to set up race tracks in two Michigan counties. The enabling legislation for these tracks was defeated on the floor of the Senate. The bill was highly lobbied and very controversial. The respondent voted against the bill, and it was placed on the table. While the bill rested on the table, this legislator was subjected to a good deal of pressure by the racing interests. They wanted him to contact a real estate agency in one of the counties in order to purchase several hundred of acres of land for the proposed track. For his role in the transaction, he was to receive 10% of the gross take of the track each year--he flatly turned the deal down. This legislator said he could recall other instances of similar deals and pressure, but that "this has all changed now."

Other legislators and reporters cited other examples of how lobbying had changed--for the better--during the past fifteen or twenty years. As one legislator put it, "the evil period in lobbying ended 15 years ago"; and he further asserted that lobbying in Michigan "is the cleanest of any state in the Union."

Most of the participants in this study, who responded to the question, agreed that lobbying tactics and personnel in Michigan have improved during the past few years. One legislator, however, cautioned that the increased amount of money being spent for entertainment constituted a danger legislators should be careful to avoid. His comment was:

There are dangers in today's lobbying. A lot of money can be spent in entertaining. Legislators being entertained could very well be led down a one-way path by being entertained too much--and all this happens without the legislator ever being aware of it. Further, some inexperienced legislators may be in danger with a friendly lobbyist. New legislators have got to approach lobbyists like they do bills--it's like a farmer going to the big city for the first time, he may lose his shirt.

One legislator felt that lobbying had changed for the worse. He related a story told him by an "old-time Senator" at a dinner party.

The former Senator recalled that in 1929 one of the members of the House of Representatives went out to dinner with a lobbyist, and, as a result, was socially ostracized by his colleagues. The Senator stated that "legislators exercised an internal discipline in this fashion--not like today." The respondent indicated that he regretted the same were not true today.

Reporters as Lobbyists

One lobbyist and one reporter responded to the question by stating that some of the most effective lobbyists were reporters assigned to cover the Michigan Legislature. His comment was:

The biggest lobbyists in the capitol are the reporters. They not only have unlimited access to the floor, but direct access to the Members during and after the sessions. I think reporters have more to do with legislation that passes than do the lobbyists.

One of the reporters also commented that "the newspaper guys are awfully effective," and further commented that he was "amazed at their power to get things done or killed." As was pointed out in Chapter 5, one of the capitol reporters who studied this phenomena concluded that the influence of reporters in legislative decision-making was substantial. None of the respondents in the study mentioned anything that should or could be done about this participation by reporters. Certainly it is a fruitful area for further research.

Lobbying Regulation

Only two of the lobbyists mentioned anything in their responses concerning the regulation of lobbyists. One volunteered that "the lobbyist law in Michigan is adequate coverage, because the Legislature can compel you to produce records." The other lobbyist said that the present lobbying act was sufficient, although "they might provide a penalty in cases where a lobbyist gave provably false information to a

legislator." Several legislators mentioned the need for strengthening the present lobbying act. A typical response was:

I understand that in Washington, D. C. they have a lobby control law which requires lobbyists to post with the Secretary of State the amount of money they spend and who they spent it on. I think such a law would be a good thing for Michigan.

Another legislator thought something should be written in the law regarding "legislative lawyers." He said:

I think some ethical practice should be spelled out regarding legislative-lawyers. They take retainers from organizations, then, they don't disqualify themselves from legislation pertaining to their interests. This is wrong.

Reporters were much more outspoken about the need for additional regulation of lobbyists. Almost all felt that additional regulation--particularly in the reporting of expenses--was needed. As one stated, "the people have a right to know who's spending how much on whom." While this dissertation was in progress, the writer conducted a crude content analysis of all Michigan newspapers (see Chapter I) in their reporting and editorializing about Michigan lobbyists. Although the general tenor of these articles and editorials is highly critical of lobbying per se, a few editors have recommended changes in the Michigan Lobbying Act of 1947. A typical editorial on lobbying reform directs the reader's attention to what has been done in other states. A good example of this was the following editorial from the Muskegon Chronicle:

Wisconsin's Law

Wisconsin has a new law to control lobbyists at its state capitol and its Governor, Vernon W. Thompson, calls the legislation 'the finest lobby control law to be found anywhere in the U. S.'

That should be endorsement enough to make other states want to take a look at it.

The new Wisconsin law makes it a crime for a licensed lobbyist to influence any legislator, state officer or employee of the state by gifts of food, lodging, beverage, transportation, money, campaign contribution or other things of value.

It has been called a 'drastic' law. Yet what it aims to do is effectively to limit lobbying in Wisconsin to the customary, every day means of persuasion, and to shut the door on the abuses that always come when gifts of any kind enter this persuasion picture.

As every legislator knows, that is what all lobby-control laws ought to do. If Wisconsin is the first state to do this, as its Governor claims, then it is somewhat amazing that all states should have waited until 1957 to have one state, Wisconsin, give legal force to this elementary rule of clean government.¹

Although the Muskegon Chronicle editorial goes somewhat farther in advocating lobbying reform than most daily newspapers, it was typical in that it advocated lobbying reform. Most newspapers, in their editorials, advocated tighter control over lobbying through the reporting of expenses. Some also advocated a tighter definition of what constitutes lobbying, particularly by state agencies.

A rash of editorials and newspaper articles suggesting lobbying reform or reporting the need for reform as seen by various state politicians appeared after the 1959 Michigan cash crisis which kept the Michigan Legislature deadlocked in a bitter partisan session for almost twelve months. For example, the Secretary of the State of Michigan, as reported in the following Detroit News article, planned to ask lobbyists to draw up a code of ethics:

Lansing, Dec. 15--Secretary of State James M. Hare today started a roundup of lobbyists for the 1960 legislative session, and asked them to draw up a code of ethics.

Hare said he averages two complaints a month about the tactics of lobbyists, and lacks power to enforce the state law.

'Other associations of this kind police themselves, and I wish the lobbyists would,' he said.

Hare is waiting for a reaction from four 'legislative agents' he recently asked to convey the suggestion to the rest of the 227 lobbyists who were registered for the Michigan's 1959 session.

'We set an informal deadline of Jan. 1 for renewing their annual licenses, for a \$5 fee.

'One new requirement will be included in the applications--the name of the lobbyist's superior.

¹"Wisconsin's Law," Muskegon Chronicle (Muskegon, November 19, 1957).

'We found three this year who registered as representing persons who didn't know they were being represented,' Hare said. 'Those lobbyists are no longer with us. I won't tell you their names.'¹

A few days later, the Attorney General of Michigan said he would ask the Governor to consider a stronger lobbying act. This was reported by Al Kaufman of the Detroit Times as follows:

Lansing, Dec. 21--Attorney General Adams said today he would urge Gov. Williams to seek a stronger anti-lobby law from the 1960 Legislature.

Adams said he was disturbed about reports of big spending during the 11 months of the 1959 session which ended last Friday. He declared:

'I have information about considerable sums of money being spent for rooms and entertainment by lobbyists.

Unfortunately, there is nothing that can be done about it under our present laws.'

Adams said the reports came to him from friends who visited Lansing during the longest session in Michigan's history.

He admitted he did not pursue the reports because, after checking Michigan laws, 'we discovered, nothing could be done anyway. However; 'I intend to discuss the matter with Gov. Williams and urge him to recommend legislation that will give the state a tighter rein on lobbying activities.'

Adams said he was particularly concerned about lobbyist expense accounts and entertainment of Michigan legislators. While Michigan has more than 300 registered lobbyists, less than 20 are active here the year-round.

They represent all facets of Michigan's economy, including business, industry, labor, and professions and education.

In the last month, representatives of the tobacco and alcoholic beverage industry converged on Lansing when it appeared their products were in line for tax boosts.

Their efforts were fruitless, however, because the lawmakers taxed smokers and drinkers an estimated 18 million a year.

It was part of the \$75 million tax package over the next 18 months which also included a \$26 million boost in corporate franchise fees.

¹"Code of Ethics Sought for Lansing Lobbyists," Detroit News (Detroit: December 15, 1959).

The new taxes become law Jan. 1.

Michigan lobbyists have been 'free from suspicion' since the state grand jury in the mid-40's conducted by the late Kim Sigler and Ingham County Circuit Judge Leland W. Carr.

After Sigler was elected governor in 1946, he demanded tough control of lobbyists. The Carr-Sigler grand jury had uncovered evidence of wholesale bribery of legislators.

But the lobbying law passed during Sigler's administration was a statute without strong teeth. It simply required lobbyists to register with the state. The lobbyists are not required to file expense accounts to show how much they spend or on whom.¹

A few weeks later, just prior to the beginning of the 1960 Michigan Legislative session, an article appeared in the Lansing State Journal in which the writer speculated that the Governor was considering "legislation to establish ways of punishing those who go to extremes in influencing lawmaking."² The article stated that preparations were being made to introduce a lobbying reform bill in the 1960 Legislature. On February 4 of 1960, such a bill was introduced by Rep. Joseph A. Gillis, a Detroit Democrat. The details of the bill were reported in an article by Richard L. Milliman of the Lansing State Journal as follows:

A stiffer law to regulate lobbying was proposed in the House Thursday by Rep. Joseph A. Gillis (D-Detroit).

Lobbyists would be required to submit annual financial statements detailing their expenditures and sources of income under the Gillis bill.

At present, lobbyists are required to keep such records but they must produce them only upon subpoena from a legislative committee or a grand jury. Gillis wants to put the same financial reporting features of the federal law into the Michigan law, which already requires annual registration of lobbyists. Gillis, who

¹Al Kaufman, "Ask State Crackdown on Lobbies," Detroit Times (Detroit, Dec. 21, 1959).

²"Stricter Lobbying Law Being Eyed by Williams," Lansing State Journal (Lansing: January 8, 1960).

attended a dinner financed by racetrack lobbyists Wednesday evening, said he thinks 'the public ought to know who spends money and how much is spent' in trying to influence legislation.

'Lobbyists serve a legitimate purpose, but I don't think the public is aware of the large amount of money that is being spent,' Gillis said. 'This bill would bring to public attention the amount of activity that goes on trying to influence legislation.'

For one example, he said, he didn't think most people knew that '250 people work here full time lobbying.'

The financial reporting would require lobbyists to list their salaries, the sources of their salaries, all expenditures of more than \$10 and the purposes of such expenditures.

Gillis said 17 other states have similar laws. He said 'he doesn't think his bill would 'change the operations here at all-- it would just bring them out in the open. . . .'¹

The bill introduced by Rep. Gillis was quietly killed in committee. Thus ended the second major attempt since 1947 to reform the lobbying act. The last time reform was attempted was in 1956 when a bill, which would have required lobbyists to file public expense accounts, was defeated by a close margin. In thirteen years, no major amendments have been made to the original act passed in 1947. The closest the Legislature has come to any changes in lobbying practices was an amendment to the Senate rules, passed at the beginning of the 1960 session which restricted somewhat the movement and activities of the lobbyists during legislative sessions. This action was reported by the Lansing State Journal as follows:

Lobbyists are going to have a little tougher time operating around the Senate this year.

Irrked by having to fight off some lobbyists, notably those representing major automobile manufacturers, last year when they were called to telephones, senators Wednesday decided to declare committee and supply rooms adjacent to the senate chamber off-limits to lobbyists this year.

'We had many complaints from senators last year that some lobbyists were constantly under foot and the situation seemed to be growing worse,' said Sen. Edward Hutchinson (R-Fennville).

¹Richard L. Milliman, "Detroit Democrat Asks for Financial Report of Annual Activities," Lansing State Journal (Lansing: February 4, 1960).

'So we decided we had better do something about it.'

The senate business committee, of which Hutchinson is chairman, voted to amend the senate rules 'to keep the lobbyists in the lobbies or in the galleries,' Hutchinson said.

Hereafter, for 30 minutes before a session and 10 minutes after session, lobbyists will be barred from all offices and committee rooms adjacent to the senate chamber.

The senate rules now only bars them from the chamber itself for that time period.

Late in the last session, several senators complained that when they wanted to use telephones in the senate post office adjacent to the senate chamber, they were unable to because all the telephone booths were occupied by lobbyists talking with their home offices.

Another complaint some senators voiced was that lobbyists often signaled to legislators from the adjoining rooms while the senate was in session.

The new change in rules, by keeping the lobbyists from those rooms, will supposedly end that practice.

Telephones are available for public use in the corridors outside the senate and house chambers.¹

A similar attempt to change the House rules during the 1960 Legislative Session failed.

In summary, although there has been a good deal of discussion concerning lobbying reform by newspapers and state administrative officials during the past few years, very few changes of any substance have actually been made. Only one lobbyist volunteered that lobbying reform might be desirable. A few legislators mentioned a need for "tightening up the law," but the majority did not mention the need for reform. Almost all of the reporters in this study felt that lobbying reform was a desirable legislative goal. An examination of editorials and articles regarding lobbying in state newspapers revealed that many journalists backed changes in the 1947 lobbying act, particularly in the reporting of lobbyists' expenses.

¹"Senators Get Tough," Lansing State Journal (Lansing, Jan. 21, 1960).

Some Lobbying Regulation Recommendations

For those readers of this dissertation--outside of academic halls with a pragmatic interest in the legislative process and in making it function more smoothly and democratically--the writer has some suggestions regarding possible changes in the present Michigan Lobbying Act. The recommendations and suggestions which follow are based on the writer's experiences while gathering the data for this thesis and while working as a staff member for the Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives.

The basic recommendation to be made here is that the Legislature appoint a special Joint Interim Committee (to function between legislative sessions) to study and make recommendations concerning the present lobbying act of 1947. This committee should have a large enough appropriation to enable it to hire a professional staff to conduct its research. The justification and need for such a study will be cited in the specific recommendations of areas to be investigated in the points below:

1. An examination of the present provisions of the lobbying act in regard to the filing and reporting of lobbying expenses should be made. Although the present statute is clear as to how a lobbyist must register and what must be recorded, the provisions regarding expenses are not widely understood. At present, the law requires a lobbyist's employer to keep records on his expense account for six years. These records are available only to a grand jury by subpoena or a legislative committee formed to investigate lobbying. Michigan legislators might well consider a better, and perhaps more responsible, method of reporting of lobbying expenses. Certainly, consideration should be given to adopting a system of reporting similar to that used by the Federal government or by the state of Ohio. Since the adoption of the 1957 Lobbying Act, two

six-year periods have elapsed without any attempt to investigate or create a body which can.

2. Specific provisions regarding the enforcement of the 1947 Lobbying Act should be considered. The Department of State, which is delegated the function of registering lobbyists, has no enforcement or investigative powers. The Department of State or the Attorney General should be able to investigate complaints about unregistered lobbyists and illegal lobbying activities.

It's interesting to note in this regard, that no lobbyist has ever been prosecuted under this thirteen-year old law. The writer leaves the conclusion, to more astute observers than himself, as to whether this lack of prosecution is the result of no illegal lobbying activities or lack of enforcement power on the part of an appropriate state official or agency. Certainly, this lack of enforcement power can stand legislative scrutiny.

3. A long, hard look should be taken at the present definition of a legislative agent. This writer has observed in his legislative experiences many persons functioning in the role of lobbyist who were not registered with the Secretary of State. One of the limitations of this thesis (imposed by the writer) was that a good many of the individuals representing state agencies or institutions as well as private interest groups had not registered as legislative agents and therefore were not considered in the scope of this study. Serious consideration should be given to a clarification of the term legislative agent (see Chapter I) so there would be no doubt as to who has to register.

There is no doubt in the writer's mind that a strengthening of the provisions regarding the reporting of lobbying expenses; the strengthening of enforcement power regarding the lobbying act; and the clarification

and re-definition of the legislative agent warrants, at least, an investigation and study of appropriate and responsible methods needed to keeping lobbying in a proper and democratic perspective. For, organized interests are important, if not yet legitimate, instruments of representative government. Their functions of representation are ill-appreciated and should be reconsidered by a study committee in light of well-known theories of representation. The time has come for a closer connection between the functions that lobbies are empirically compelled to perform and what the laws say they ought to be performing. Such connections, if clearly drawn (it is the writer's hope that this thesis has been a contribution in this direction), would suggest new techniques of control of lobbying excesses. For example, reports of salaries and expenses--in and of themselves--are not very effective as instruments of control, but improvement of means for helping the lobbies watch each other would certainly make for better controls.

Summary

In Chapter VII, normative questions asked and value judgments rendered concerning the role of lobbyists in the legislative process, on the part of study participants and the writer, were presented and discussed. In addition, the writer made some recommendations at the end of the chapter regarding possible changes in the present Michigan lobbying act.

Responses to the question concerning the legislature's operating better or worse in the absence of pressure groups clearly indicated that lobbyists and, more important, legislative leaders and news correspondents, have a high degree of tolerance for pressure group activity in the legislative process. Generally, they viewed lobbying as an integral and necessary part of the legislative process because lobbyists serve to relate the socio-economic interests of their principals to the legislature;

they provide necessary information and research on complex problems; and they help the legislature relate public policy to public wishes and aspirations.

Further, it was revealed that not only do legislators hold to the belief that lobbyists serve a vital information and advice function, but they actually do consult and ask the advice of effective lobbyists on policy questions. This activity was generally an on-going process.

An open-end question, intended to solicit value judgments from study participants, solicited several standardized responses concerning the profession of lobbying. Lobbyists were concerned with the public image of lobbying and their own social status in regard to this image. Most lobbyists stated that they wished public misunderstanding (and disparagement) of lobbying could be cleared up, and lobbying, as a profession, could achieve some social status and acceptance.

Many of the participants in this study also agreed that lobbying tactics and personnel had improved during the past several years. Several examples were cited to substantiate this trend of improvement.

A couple of the study participants stated that reporters were some of the most effective lobbyists around the legislature. None mentioned anything that could or should be done about this.

Although few lobbyists mentioned the need for lobbying reform, several legislative leaders did, and almost all of the reporters had strong views on this question. A few legislators, and almost all reporters, felt that additional regulation--particularly in the reporting of expenses--was needed. A brief survey of the editorials regarding lobbying reform was made, and the history of lobbying reform legislation was briefly traced. Although there has been a good deal of discussion concerning lobbying reform by newspapers and state administrative officials during the past few years, very few changes of any substance have actually been made.

In the last section, the writer made a recommendation that the Legislature appoint a special Joint Interim Committee to study and make recommendations concerning the Lobbying Act of 1947. It was concluded that the role of the lobbyist in the legislative process is important enough to warrant a full-scale study regarding the strengthening of provisions regarding the reporting of lobbying expenses; the strengthening of enforcement power regarding the lobbying act; and the clarification and re-definition of the legislative agent as presently defined in the Lobbying Act of 1947.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MICHIGAN LOBBYIST: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Introduction

Group influence studies conducted by political scientists during the past thirty years have contributed much to our understanding of the impact of organized interest groups on American political decision-making. These studies have focused on the organizational structure, resources, and leadership of organized pressure groups and the relationships of these interest groups to the process of government.

This was not a study of the nature and power of the interest groups that lobbyists represent--as is the case with most other studies of lobbying. An examination of the literature concerning pressure groups reveals that: (1) most studies of lobbying are confined to group activities and influence; (2) there is a concern with statutory controls and investigation of lobbyists; and (3) lobbying is most often dealt with in the popular language of the newspaper and magazine exposé.

These studies have been most valuable, but to understand the political decision-making process we must look not only at the groups who attempt to exercise influence, but also at the agent of the group and his behavior within the decision-making process. The purpose of this study was to carry the analysis of interest group behavior a bit further by focusing attention on the lobbyist as an individual.

The lobbyist, as agent of the organized interest group, possesses power in the role that he occupies. It is he who represents the interest group before the legislative branch of government. He helps formulate organization policies, directs the techniques and tactics for

interpreting this policy to decision-makers, mobilizes the resources of the group for action purposes; and, in short, represents the most important agent of the organized interest group. This study, then, was primarily concerned with a close examination of the individual lobbyist's skills, socio-economic background, career patterns, use of techniques, perceptions of role relationships to his organization and within the legislative process, and perceptions of effectiveness in the role of lobbyist.

There is a need for a study of this kind. We need comprehensive understanding of who lobbyists are, what they are doing, why they are effective or ineffective, and how they are perceived by other participants in the legislative decision-making process.

In short, this was a study in perceptions. Consequently, the theoretical frame of reference and the major hypothesis of this dissertation were stated in social psychological terms. A perceptual model of behavior, with a heavy reliance on certain concepts of role theory, was used through the thesis.

The Major Hypothesis

The major hypothesis of this dissertation was: there would be a high degree of consensus among the perceptions of the participants in this study (lobbyists, legislative leaders, and news correspondents) as to which lobbyists were most effectively enacting their lobbying roles; and, further agreement would be present among the evaluating groups concerning the variables involved in effective role enactment. The effectiveness of the role enactment of Michigan lobbyists would be related to their role-taking ability, their use of role-associated techniques, and their role perceptions.

The Dependent Variable

The perceived role enactment of the Michigan lobbyist, whether effective or ineffective, was the dependent variable. How well a lobbyist was enacting his role was determined by measuring the perceptions of legislators (action-targets), lobbyists (action-agents), and news correspondents (action-observers). In order to determine if each of these three evaluating groups were agreed in their perceptions of the effective role enactment of Michigan lobbyists, each study participant was asked to cite five lobbyists who they thought were most effective.

Chapter II portrayed these selections by each evaluating group in three sociometric matrices, and the lobbyists were then rank ordered on an Index of Perceived Effectiveness from most effective to most ineffective. High statistical correlations were then found among the various evaluating groups concerning those lobbyists most effectively enacting their roles; thereby verifying that part of the major hypothesis which stated that such agreement would be found. The Index of Perceived Effectiveness score achieved by each lobbyist was the dependent variable against which the independent variables (analyzed in Chapters III, IV, V, VI, and VII) were tested. An analysis was also made in Chapter II of the lobbyists' self-perceptions of their role effectiveness. Each lobbyist was asked how effective he thought he was in terms of accomplishing the goals of his interest group. Sixty-seven percent of the lobbyists perceived their organizations as either achieving "very good" or "good" success in the pursuit of their legislative goals; 15% believed they were not achieving the organization's legislative goals, and the rest could not make an evaluation. Comparison of these data with the point scores achieved by the lobbyists on the IPE (Index of Perceived Effectiveness) scale indicated that, with few exceptions, the top sixteen lobbyists' self-evaluations corresponded with the perceptions of other

group evaluators (other lobbyists, legislators, and news correspondents). For those lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale, most over-estimated their legislative success and personal lobbying effectiveness. It was not possible to statistically relate self-perceptions to IPE scores or to include them in the effectiveness evaluation.

The Major Independent Variables

Once it was established in Chapter II that effective role enactment was perceived by the study participants and could be measured, attempts were made throughout the rest of the dissertation to isolate the significant independent variables which were related to effective role enactment. It was hypothesized that three major independent variables would affect the role enactment of the lobbyist. They were: (1) role-taking ability or potential, (2) the use of role-associated techniques, and (3) role perceptions.

Each of these independent variables, as bases of effectiveness, was tested in Chapters III, IV, and V. In other words, Chapter III related the actual socio-economic and career background variables which affected role-taking ability and lobbying effectiveness; Chapter IV related the various lobbying roles of the lobbyists to effectiveness; and Chapter V described and related the role-associated techniques used by lobbyists with their effectiveness. In short, these chapters (III, IV and V) examined the relationships between what was considered the actual, empirically-measured bases of effectiveness and lobbying effectiveness. Chapter VI, on the other hand, described and analyzed the perceptions of the bases of lobbying effectiveness as they were perceived by all of the participants in this study. The findings of Chapter VI, therefore, were not kept separate in the summary. The writer attempted to relate the actual bases of effectiveness (found in Chapters III, IV, and V) with the perceived bases of effectiveness (Chapter VI) by combining the conclusions

and findings of all of these chapters in this summary chapter. Whenever this has been done, the writer has been careful to point out whether the conclusions reached were based on the actual or perceived bases of effectiveness.

Role-taking Ability or Potential: Certain socio-economic and career background variables, personality characteristics, and organizational factors were isolated and found to be related to the lobbyist's ability to play his role effectively.

All of Chapter III was devoted to an examination of socio-economic, occupational, and political variables in the lobbyists' background, and to the relationships that existed between these variables and lobbying effectiveness. The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale (the most effective lobbyists) had these socio-economic characteristics in common: they were over fifty years of age; had been born and reared in Michigan; brought up in a metropolitan area; did not complete their college educations; and had fathers with white collar occupations. The majority of the seventeen lobbyists (the lobbyists with low effectiveness scores) in the bottom half of the IPE scale tended to have these background characteristics in common: they were under fifty years of age; born and reared in Michigan; raised in non-metropolitan areas, were college graduates; and had fathers with non-white collar occupations. The majority of lobbyists claimed Protestant church affiliation; and were married with up to four children. No statistical correlations at the 5% level of significance were found between any of these socio-economic background characteristics and lobbying effectiveness.

Analysis and interpretation of the factors that influenced the lobbyist's interests in political and governmental affairs revealed that 64% of the lobbyists perceived that their political awareness did not develop until after their formal schooling was over and they were well

into their pre-lobbying occupational careers. Politically-related non-governmental occupations were cited most frequently by lobbyists as the major source of influence in their interest in political and governmental affairs. In addition, family influence, political and governmental work, and news reporting were important factors in the development of political interests. The general impression received from these data was that there were a great variety of factors and stimuli which caused political interest.

Pre-lobbying occupational career patterns were heterogeneous, but primarily white collar. Forty-five percent of the lobbyists came from some sort of business administration background, and 39% had governmental occupational backgrounds. No relationship seemed to exist between effective lobbying and the profession of law, but there was substantial evidence to support the proposition that lobbyists with news reporting backgrounds tended to be more effective lobbyists.

The majority of the sixteen lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale had certain political and governmental background characteristics in common: they had a previous affiliation with the Republican party; more years of political experience than the lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale; they were more likely to have held previous high status governmental positions at the state and local levels; and they had more years of governmental experience than lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale. All of these political and governmental background variables were statistically related to lobbying effectiveness, and this relationship was verified through significant correlations at the 5% level of significance.

The findings of Chapter VI were important to this study because they verified part of the major hypothesis that there would be agreement among study participants concerning the perceived bases of effectiveness.

Thirteen bases of effectiveness were perceived and they were, in order of their perceived importance, as follows: personality and sociability factors, organizational factors; background and experience; knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legislators; knowledge of the legislative process; entertainment, favors and assistance; ability to communicate; personal integrity, honesty and sincerity; "hard work"; political factors; and kind and acceptability of the lobbying "product". As explained earlier, certain findings concerning the perceptions of the bases of effectiveness in this chapter are cited at this point because they were related to actual background and personality variables that affected the lobbyists' role-taking ability and potential.

For example, one of the perceived bases of effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was background and experience. Other findings in Chapter VI also supported those already cited from Chapter III. Lobbyists and reporters (with rank orders of three and four)¹ perceived background and experience as an important variable in lobbying effectiveness. Certain occupational backgrounds (reporting and high-level government work), and previous legislative experience were cited over and over as the reasons for the effectiveness of many of the top sixteen lobbyists. Legislators did not perceive this variable as too important, although those who did mention it based their evaluations on the same reasons as did the lobbyists and reporters.

¹There were thirteen bases of effectiveness categories ranked in terms of the number of times each had been cited as the basis of effectiveness for each of the top sixteen lobbyists. A high degree of statistical correlation was obtained between each of the three evaluating groups indicating substantial agreement among all of the participants in this study as to why the top sixteen lobbyists were effective. A rank order of 1 by the lobbyists, for example, means that all lobbyists, when evaluating those lobbyists selected as the five most effective, perceived that basis of effectiveness as the most important one.

The bases of effectiveness of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was often perceived in terms of certain personal traits and characteristics of the lobbyists. Certain personality traits were perceived as a part of effective lobbying and therefore related to role-taking ability and potential. No attempt was made to empirically measure the actual personality traits of lobbyists, only the perceptions of these traits. For example, study participants were agreed that the ability of lobbyists to maintain congenial, positive, personal relationships with legislators to be a prime prerequisite for lobbying effectiveness. Lobbyists considered personality and sociability factors as the most important basis of lobbying effectiveness; and reporters (with a rank order of 2.5) and legislators (rank order of 2) also considered these factors to be of great importance in determining a lobbyist's effectiveness.

Another personal trait of lobbyists perceived by the respondents as important to effectiveness was knowledge of the subject central to the interest of the organized group that the lobbyist represented. Legislators perceived this trait to be the most important variable in lobbying effectiveness (rank order of 1). Legislators emphasized many times that possession of accurate information and facts was the most important personal trait a lobbyist should have. Reporters (rank order of 6) perceived knowledge of the subject important not only for a lobbyist to be effective among legislators, but among themselves as well. Lobbyists (rank order of 7) did not perceive and rank knowledgeability and expertise as highly as the other group. A few thought it was of prime importance, the majority did not.

Another personal characteristic perceived as important to lobbying effectiveness was knowledge of, confidence in, and acceptance by legislators. Legislators ranked this highest (rank order of 3.5), reporters perceived this variable as seventh in importance, and the lobbyists' evaluations resulted in a rank order of 8.5. Generally it was difficult

for study participants to articulate exactly what they meant when they selected this personal variable as a basis of lobbying effectiveness. Typically, they thought that confidence in lobbyists was something developed over time by lobbyists who, because of other personal and background variables (for example, sociability, gentlemanly conduct, length of service, and so forth), were "just accepted" and able to "hold the confidence" of legislators.

Knowledge of the legislative process, as a personal trait, was perceived by the lobbyists as an effectiveness variable of great importance (rank order of 4). They stressed the fact repeatedly that unless a lobbyist was personally familiar with the formal (and informal) procedures of the legislative process, he stood little chance of success. Reporters (rank order of 8.5) and legislators (rank order of 10) did not perceive knowledge of the legislative process as often as lobbyists as a basis of effectiveness.

All three evaluating groups ranked the lobbyist's ability to communicate as a personality skill of some importance (legislators at 8, and reporters and lobbyists at 8.5). All participants agreed that personal communication skills, that is, the ability to make an articulate, convincing presentation of the interest group message, were important in the lobbying successes of several Michigan lobbyists.

Both legislators (rank order of 5.5) and lobbyists (rank order of 6) were closely agreed in their perceptions that personal integrity, honesty and sincerity in the presentation by the lobbyist of information, facts and arguments (as well as in the use of lobbying techniques) to be a variable of importance in lobbying effectiveness. Legislators and lobbyists also perceived that lobbyists who presented both sides of the story on legislation tended to be more effective. They further agreed that those few lobbyists who demonstrated ability to rise above the narrow interests of their pressure groups and take a broad view of the public

interest were more effective lobbyists because of it. Only two reporters (rank order of 11.5) perceived this personal trait as a significant variable in lobbying effectiveness.

A good many lobbyists (rank order of 10) perceived the effectiveness of their colleagues as a result of their capacity for "hard work." Only five legislators (rank order of 11) cited this and only two reporters (rank order of 12) considered this trait to be of any importance in effectiveness.

No empirical attempt was made to isolate the organizational factors that might be related to the effectiveness of the lobbyists studied in this dissertation. Certainly, however, the kind of organization is an important variable in lobbying role performance. For, the role-taking ability of the lobbyist is greatly affected by whether or not he has to represent established, high status, interest groups such as manufacturers, businessmen, lawyers, doctors and others who have achieved recognition and their legislative goals and are now primarily interested in preserving their privileges and status; or whether he is representing interest groups still struggling for recognition and social change through legislation which will benefit them, such as labor unions, certain types of small business and a few new professional groups. Study participants perceived these differences as important to effective lobbying. All were agreed in their perceptions (rank orders were: lobbyist, 2; reporters, 1; and legislators, 3.5) that organizational factors were very important to role enactment. An examination of the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale revealed that eleven out of the sixteen represented organizations that either had substantial amounts of economic power and/or widespread "grass roots" support throughout the state. The same could be said of only seven of the lobbyists in the bottom half of the effectiveness scale. Further, it was generalized from these data that the lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale represented organizations that were

well-established, had a good deal of social status and economic power, and/or had widespread "grass roots" support throughout Michigan. In contrast, over half of the lobbyists among the bottom seventeen on the IPE scale represented organizations with narrow economic or professional interests; those seeking to change the status quo to better their own professional or occupation position; and those interest groups with small memberships, without much economic power. It is significant, however, that five out of the top sixteen lobbyists did represent groups in the latter category; and their lobbying effectiveness was perceived as the result of other intervening variables such as personality, background and experience, and others.

Role-associated Techniques: The second major independent variable believed related to lobbying effectiveness was the use of role-associated, group-approved lobbying techniques. Several hypotheses were tested concerning; the agreement on group-approved techniques; the relationship of their use to lobbying effectiveness; the relationships concerning how, and by whom, tactics were mapped as compared to lobbying effectiveness; and the amount of freedom lobbyists had in mapping tactical strategy as related to effectiveness; and the focus of lobbying tactics and strategy as related to lobbying effectiveness.

Chapter V described and analyzed the tactics and techniques associated with the enactment of the lobbying role. Sixteen tactics or techniques were considered. These sixteen lobbying techniques were described, analyzed and compared in terms of three operational categories as follows:

- (1) Direct personal communication
 - Personal Presentation of Arguments
 - Presenting Research Results
 - Testifying at Hearings
- (2) Communication Through Intermediaries
 - Public Relations Campaign
 - Collaboration With Other Groups
 - Contact by Constituent

Contact by Person with Special Access
 Organization News Activities
 Letter and Telegram Campaigns
 Publicizing Voting Records

(3) Achieving and Maintaining Access

Entertaining for an Evening
 Giving a Party
 Personal Favors and Assistance
 Contributing Political Work
 Contributing Political Money
 Direct Bribery

One of the hypotheses of Chapter V--that there would be group consensus as to which lobbying techniques were most effective--was corroborated. All of the study participations were agreed on which techniques were the most effective, and they were: personal presentation of arguments, presenting research results, testifying at public hearings, public relations campaigns, collaboration with other groups, contact by constituent, and contact by persons with special access. These lobbying techniques were given the same high ratings by legislators and lobbyists alike indicating that these techniques had group approval and were considered the most effective of all the sixteen techniques cited. The reporters varied somewhat and rated three techniques (contact by constituent, contributing political work, and contributing political money) higher than did the legislators and lobbyists. But, for the most part, there was substantial agreement among all respondents as to which lobbying techniques were group-approved and most effective.

In another part of this thesis (Chapter VI), the two lobbying techniques of entertainment and personal favors and assistance were perceived by the respondents as playing a part in the effectiveness of certain lobbyists. Reporters (rank order of 5) perceived these techniques as an important variable in effectiveness. Legislators perceived this variable as quite important (rank order of 7). Many legislators suggested that entertainment and personal favors had little effect on them personally,

but they suspected that this technique may have had quite an impact on their fellow legislators. Lobbyists also tended to view their own personal effectiveness as stemming from some other variable, but, they were quick to point out that the success of some of their lobbying colleagues was the result of entertaining and the rendering of personal favors and assistance. Therefore, lobbyists (rank order of 11) perceived entertainment and personal favors as relatively unimportant bases of effectiveness, but they knew of certain lobbyists whose effectiveness, they judged, was based almost solely on these techniques.

It was also discovered in Chapter VI that reporters (rank order of 10) perceived political party factors as more important bases of lobbying effectiveness than did legislators and lobbyists (rank orders of 12). Generally, respondents evaluated political factors as effecting lobbying performance in terms of political money and work contributions, and the political potential (in terms of votes and money) of certain interest groups. All of the lobbyists who were perceived as having political factors as part of their effectiveness were identified with the Republican party.

A comparison in Chapter V between the perceptions of Washington and Lansing lobbyists regarding the effectiveness of lobbying techniques revealed that, generally, the lobbyists in both capitols agreed on which techniques were more effective. However, Washington lobbyists, who do not have the direct access to legislators as do Lansing lobbyists, tended to rate the communication through intermediaries techniques category higher. And, Lansing lobbyists, with more direct access to legislators, rated direct personal communication techniques higher than their Washington colleagues; consequently, the Lansing lobbyists gave lower ratings to communication through intermediaries techniques.

Lobbyists were asked to evaluate each of the sixteen lobbying techniques in terms of how each technique worked for them. As stated

above, there was agreement concerning which techniques were most effective and group-approved. Once this had been ascertained, it was possible to test one of the hypotheses of this thesis: that the use of group-approved, role-associated lobbying techniques would be related to effective or non-effective role enactment. In other words, those lobbyists who used the group-approved, effective lobbying techniques would tend to be more effective than those who did not use them as much or not at all. The hypothesis was not verified because no statistical relationships were found between the perceived use and evaluation of techniques and the effectiveness of lobbyists in this study. Generally, the highest amount of statistical correlation was found among the first group of lobbying techniques (direct personal communication), but in no case were they statistically significant. Perhaps this lack of statistical correlation indicated that the lobbyists were in agreement on their evaluation of the techniques which were most effective in presenting their cases and achieving access, but the degree to which they could successfully utilize these techniques was another matter.

Certainly, the knowledge and use of lobbying techniques was an important variable in lobbying effectiveness. This was pointed out in Chapter VI when reporters perceived the use and knowledge of lobbying techniques a highly important (rank order of 2.5) variable in effectiveness. Lobbyists (rank order of 5) and legislators (rank order of 5.5) perceived this variable about the same in importance. Generally, all respondents felt that those lobbyists who knew and used the more highly respected and group-approved lobbying techniques (for example, personal presentation of arguments, testifying at public hearings, public relations campaigns, and so forth) with strategic discretion were perceived as more effective lobbyists because of it.

Lobbyists were questioned regarding the way in which strategy on lobbying techniques was mapped. It was hypothesized that those

lobbyists who had to consult with superiors in planning strategy would tend to be less effective than those who did not. While there was no statistical correlation between the way in which strategy was planned and lobbyists' effectiveness, it is important to note that only three of the top sixteen lobbyists did have to consult in advance with other members of their organization in the planning of lobbying strategy. This, therefore, lent some support to the hypothesis.

Related to the mapping of lobbying strategy was the amount of freedom lobbyists had in the selection of their lobbying techniques. It was hypothesized that the more freedom a lobbyist had in the selection of techniques the more effective he would tend to be. Although no statistical correlation was found between the amount of freedom in selecting techniques and lobbying effectiveness, only one out of the top fifteen lobbyists on the IPE scale was limited, while six of those in the bottom eighteen of the scale were limited in some way.

It was also learned in Chapter V that the majority of lobbyists attempted to develop and maintain legislative contacts by personal daily attendance at the legislative sessions, and by personal contacts with legislators. The wide distribution of choices among the contact-building techniques did not make it possible, or fruitful, to run a statistical analysis to determine if there were any relationships between place on the IPE scale and the use of certain contacts and information sources.

Lobbyists primarily attempted to establish contacts with select committee chairmen and members, and the House and Senate majority leadership. Then, if possible, they would try to make contacts with all legislators. There was nothing in the data to substantiate two hypotheses cited in Chapter V: (1) that there would be a relationship between lobbyists' IPE scores and the amount and kinds of contacts that were made; and (2) that there would be a relationship between lobbyists who

maintained contacts with the legislative minority leadership and lobbying effectiveness.

Although no statistical relationship between lobbying effectiveness and bi-partisan lobbying was found, it was possible to generalize that all lobbyists considered bi-partisanship necessary to effective lobbying.

Lobbyists were also questioned regarding the committees on which they focused the most attention. The most lobbied committees, in rank order, were state affairs, taxation, labor, judiciary, highways, and municipalities.

Role Perceptions: The third major independent believed related to lobbying effectiveness was role perceptions. The hypothesis was that the lobbyists' perceptions of their role and certain concomitants to that role (such as, recruitment for the role, personal commitment to organization policies, differences in role perceptions between lobbyists and employer, lobbyist's part in policy formation, division of time and labor within lobbying role, reporting methods by lobbyists to employers, income derived from role-playing, years of experience in lobbying role, role satisfactions, and future career expectations) would be related to lobbying effectiveness. The major hypothesis and all of the sub-hypotheses were tested in Chapter IV.

There was no way to relate lobbying effectiveness to recruitment into the lobbying role. Most (70%) of the lobbyists recalled their recruitment as the result of being selected and approached by the interest group; 18% said they applied for the position; 9% felt they had "grown" into the position from within the organization; 12% got their lobbying jobs through friends and contacts; and one was elected to the post.

One of the major hypotheses of this dissertation was that lobbying effectiveness was related to the type of role the lobbyist was expected, and compelled by circumstances, to play on behalf of his interest group.

It was hypothesized that lobbyists playing primarily defensive roles (that is, to "kill" harmful legislation and preserve the status quo) would tend to be more effective, because this role is less difficult to play than a lobbying role which calls for the active promotion and strategical guidance of legislation through both legislative houses. That data confirmed that Michigan lobbyists did perceive their role functions primarily in defensive and promotional terms. Each lobbyist was asked what he thought his organization expected him, as their representative, to do. After the responses were coded, five distinct lobbying roles became evident. In most cases, it was possible to detect secondary roles as well as primary roles. The first primary role which became evident was that of promoter-strategist. The lobbyists (24%) who perceived this function as their primary role were those whose organizations expected them to have beneficial legislation introduced to promote the interest group; and the lobbyist would then work out the strategy necessary to secure its passage. Of all five lobbying roles that were ascertained, the role of promoter-strategist was the most difficult to successfully enact. Only one lobbyist, who perceived this as his primary role was ranked among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale, and the other seven were among the ten lobbyists lowest on the effectiveness scale. The lobbying role perceived by the majority (52%) of the lobbyists as their primary function was the role of defender-advocate. This category included those lobbyists who perceived their primary function as defensive; that is, protecting their interest group from "harmful" legislation and preserving legislative status quo as it referred to the particular interest group. In addition to defending the status quo, these lobbyists were also expected to advocate the interest group's position as part of their defensive function. Seventeen of the lobbyists picked the role of defender-advocate as their primary function. Of these seventeen lobbyists, twelve were

among the top sixteen lobbyists on the IPE scale and five were among the bottom seventeen. The hypothesis that lobbyists in the role of defender-advocate tended to be more effective than those required to play the role of promoter-strategist was supported by a high statistical correlation. One other generalization was possible from these data. Almost without exception, those lobbyists playing the role of defender-advocate represented the older, established, high status, interest groups such as manufacturers, business men, lawyers, doctors, and others who had achieved recognition and their legislative goals, and were now primarily interested in preserving their privileges and status. The lobbyists playing the role of promoter-strategist were, without exception, representatives of those interest groups which were still struggling for recognition and social change through legislation which would benefit them. A few other minor lobbying roles were perceived by the lobbyists. Fifteen percent of the lobbyists perceived their primary role as a liaison relationship between the Legislators and their interest groups. Six percent of the lobbyists perceive their primary role to be that of "service" to the legislators and they were placed in a role category called "serviceman." One lobbyist (the top lobbyist on the IPE scale) perceived his primary function as that of a general public relations man interpreting the business of his clients to the society at large.

The hypothesis that differences in role perceptions between employer and lobbyist tended to reduce lobbying effectiveness was also supported. Lobbyists with few or no problems of communication and understanding over the appropriate lobbying role were more effective than those who had to deal with organization naivete and myopia concerning effective role-playing in the legislative process.

It was hypothesized that strong personal commitment by the lobbyist to his organization's policies would be related to effective lobbying

performance. Personal commitment by the lobbyists to the organization's policies was perceived by most Michigan lobbyists as necessary to effective role enactment; and lobbyists in the top half of the IPE scale, as well as the rest, were agreed on this. There also was evidence to indicate that lobbyists who did not feel their relationship with their interest group to be a professional one--but rather a strong personal commitment--tended to be more effective than those who viewed their ties with the interest group as a strictly professional arrangement.

In regard to the lobbyists' personal feelings of security in his role, nothing in the data indicated that most lobbyists felt it necessary to justify their positions to their employers. It was concluded that those who felt insecure in their lobbying role might resort to practices which were designed to strengthen their own positions and enhance their personal job security. Further, these practices might jeopardize their lobbying effectiveness.

Forty-eight percent of the lobbyists perceived policy development as a function of the interest groups' governing boards or their legislative committees; 27% stated policy development was the result of the combined effort of the lobbyist and his superiors; 18% saw it was a result of a "grass roots" process within the organization; and 6% stated policy was made by the lobbyist alone. A significant statistical correlation was found between lobbyists' participation in policy development and lobbying effectiveness. This verified the hypothesis that the more participation by the lobbyist in policy development the more effective he would be in his role enactment.

The hypothesis that lobbyists whose recommendations were not adopted frequently by the interest group organization would tend to be less effective than lobbyists whose policy recommendations were adopted frequently was not substantiated.

Conclusions regarding the division of time and labor of the lobbyists as related to effectiveness were as follows: lobbyists on the top half of the IPE scale who spent more of their time, calling on legislators; doing research; in "grass roots" travel; calling on state agencies; and entertainment, tended to be more effective than those lobbyists in the bottom half of the IPE scale who spent more time, working in their own offices; calling on others; and preparing press releases and speeches. Although no statistical correlations were present, the data did suggest that lobbyists who spent more time in direct personal contact activities with legislators tended to be more effective.

Reporting methods by lobbyists to their interest groups were highly varied in kind, as well as implementation. Sixty-one percent of the lobbyists wrote periodic news letters and bulletins; 55% made personal oral reports to their Executive Committees; 42% wrote an annual report; 36% reported through informal, personal conferences with their superiors; and 27% gave oral reports to the annual convention of their interest group. Generally, those lobbyists who ranked at the top of the IPE scale tended to primarily use informal reporting methods, and those in the bottom half of the scale tended to frequently use a greater number of reporting methods.

Lobbyists' incomes were related to lobbying effectiveness, with a high correlation present between high income and lobbying effectiveness. The majority of lobbyists were paid by salary, and the average salary was about \$12,000.

The years of lobbying experience were highly correlated with lobbying effectiveness. That is, the more years of lobbying experience, the greater the lobbyist's effectiveness.

Year-round residence in Lansing was correlated with lobbying effectiveness, but no statistical correlation was present. However, it was generalized that the majority (ten out of sixteen) of the lobbyists at the top of the IPE scale did maintain year-round Lansing residence.

Of the twenty-seven (82%) of the lobbyists who indicated a professional desire to remain in lobbying, 52% stated their motivation stemmed from the challenge, stimuli and variety of the lobbying role; 27% said they wanted to remain in lobbying because they liked to work with people; 30% attributed their motivation to ideals and service to be achieved; 18% said it was too late to change jobs; 12% because of their interest in government; and 9% were going to stay in lobbying because of the money and fringe benefits. No statistical relationship was found between effectiveness and job satisfaction. However, all lobbyists, but one, in the top half of the IPE scale were planning to remain in lobbying for the rest of their professional lives.

Value Considerations and Recommendations

In Chapter VII, normative questions asked and value judgments rendered concerning the role of lobbyists in the legislative process, on the part of study participants and the writer, were presented and discussed. In addition, the writer made some recommendations at the end of the chapter regarding possible changes in the present Michigan lobbying act.

Responses to the question concerning the legislature's operating "better" or "worse" in the absence of pressure groups clearly indicated that lobbyists and, more important, legislative leaders and news correspondents, had a high degree of tolerance for pressure group activity in the legislative process. Generally, they viewed lobbying as an integral and necessary part of the legislative process because lobbyists serve to relate the socio-economic interests of their principals to the legislature; they provide necessary information and research on complex problems; and they help the legislature relate public policy to public wishes and aspirations.

recommendations concerning the Lobbying Act of 1947. It was concluded that the role of the lobbyist in the legislative process is important enough to warrant a full-scale study regarding the strengthening of provisions regarding the reporting of lobbying expenses; the strengthening of enforcement power regarding the lobbying act; and the clarification and re-definition of the legislative agent as presently defined in the Lobbying Act of 1947.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

- Baker, Roscoe. The American Legion and American Foreign Policy. New York: Bookman Association, 1954.
- Bentley, Arthur F. The Process of Government. Bloomington, Indiana: The Principia Press, 1908.
- Blaisdell, Donald C. Government Under Pressure. New York: Public Affairs Committee, 1942.
- Bonner, H. Social Psychology, An Interdisciplinary Approach. New York: World Book Company, 1953.
- Brady, Robert A. Business as a System of Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.
- Chase, Stuart. Democracy Under Pressure. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1945.
- Dearing, M. R. Veterans in Politics: The Story of the G. A. R. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1952.
- Edwards, Allen. Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences. New York: Rinehard, 1955.
- Garceau, Oliver. The Political Life of the American Medical Association. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941.
- Hardin, Charles M. The Politics of Agriculture. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952.
- Herring, Pendleton E. Group Representation Before Congress. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1929.
- Kesselman, Louis C. The Social Politics of FEPC: A Study in Reform Pressure Movements. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1948.
- Key, V. O. Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups. New York: Crowell, 1958.

- Lasswell, Harold D. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936.
- Latham, Earl. The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing Point Legislation. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952.
- Lippman, Walter. Public Opinion. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- McKean, Dayton D. Pressures on the Legislature of New Jersey. Columbia University Press, 1938.
- Odegard, Peter. Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928.
- Parson, T. and Shils, E. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- Schattschneider, E. E. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1935.
- Schriftgieser, Karl. The Lobbyists: The Art and Business of Influencing Lawmakers. Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.
- Tompkins, D. C. Congressional Investigation of Lobbying. Berkley: University of California Bureau of Public Administration, 1956.
- Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf, 1953.
- Van Deusen, Glyndon G. Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby. Boston: Little, Brown, 1947.
- Zeller, Belle. Pressure Politics in New York. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937.

Articles and Periodicals

- Detroit Free Press. "Lobbyists Mobilize in Lansing," January 10, 1958.
- _____. "State Eyes Probe of Lobbying," September 20, 1959.
- Detroit News. "Lobbyists Hope for Defeat of Costly Bills They Sponsor," February 2, 1958.

Detroit News. "Protocol Reversed: Senators Toss Party for 74 Lobbyists," March 29, 1958.

_____. "Code of Ethics Sought for Lansing Lobbyists," December 15, 1959.

_____. "Speechless Lobbyists Entertain Democrats," February 4, 1960.

Detroit Times. Al Kaufman, "The Lobbyists Go Ivy League," February 23, 1958.

_____. "Doctors Kill State A-Bill," April 13, 1958.

_____. Al Kaufman, "Ask State Crackdown on Lobbies," December 21, 1959.

_____. "Pressure Lobbying has Become Way of Life," March 15, 1960.

Eulau, Heinz; Buchanan, William; Ferguson, Leroy; and Wahlke, John. "American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 22, (1960), 203-227.

Grand Rapids Press. "Rips Criticism, Geerlings Calls Church Council's Resignation Bid Arrogant," February 4, 1960.

_____. William Kulsea, "Again in Hot Water," May 14, 1959.

_____. William Kulsea, "UM, MSU Suffer from '57 Lobbying," April 26, 1958.

Holly Herald-Advertiser. "Lobbyists Peddle Ideas to Uninformed Legislators," September 4, 1959.

Lansing State Journal. "Lobbyists Move In," January 9, 1958.

_____. "Presents to Legislators," March 27, 1958.

_____. "Lobbyists Contribute," May 17, 1958.

_____. "GOP, Democrats Join in Rapping Lobbyist," May 13, 1959.

_____. "Lobbies Spend Millions," October, 1959.

Lansing State Journal. "Stricter Lobbying Law Being Eyed by Williams," January 8, 1960.

_____. "Senators Get Tough," January 21, 1960.

_____. Richard L. Milliman. "Detroit Democrat Asks for Financial Report of Annual Activities," February 4, 1960.

Lewis, George S. "The Congressmen Look at the Polls," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. IV (June, 1940), pp. 229-231.

Mason Ingham County News. "Legislator's are Outnumbered." August 21, 1959.

Mechling, T. B. "Washington Lobbies Threaten Democracy," Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer, 1946).

Milbrath, Lester W. "The Political Party Activity of Washington Lobbyists," Journal of Politics, Vol. XX (1958), pp. 339-352.

Muskegon Chronicle. "Wisconsin's Law," November 19, 1957.

Royal Oak Daily Tribune, "Lobbyist Asks Job (at \$10,000) Guarding Hazel Park's Track Cut," May 8, 1958.

Saginaw News. "Both Parties Join to Blast Lobbyists," May 13, 1959.

Sarbin, Theodore R., and Jones, Donald S. "An Experimental Analysis of Role Behavior," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LI, (1956), 236-241.

Velie, Lester. "The Secret Boss of California," Collier's, August 13 and 20, 1949.

Zeller, Belle. "The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act," American Political Science Review, Vol. 42, (1948), 239-271.

Zeller, Belle, Schermerhorn, G. L., and Parkman, H., Jr. Lobbies and Pressure Groups, "The Annals, (January, 1938).

Public Documents

Graves, W. G. Administration of the Lobbying Registration Provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office (1950).

Michigan Public Acts, Act 214, Section 1, 1947.

Michigan Compiled Laws of 1948, Sections 4.401 to 4.410 Inclusive.

Unpublished Material

Heinz, Eulau, William Buchanan, LeRoy Ferguson, John C. Wahlke.
Unpublished legislative study on four American state legislatures.
Financed by the Political Behavior Committee of the Social Science Research Council.

Kaufman, Al B. "The State Capitol Reporter As a Lobbyist."
Unpublished paper written for Michigan State University Department of Political Science. December, 1959.

Lane, Edgar. "Statutory Regulation of Lobbying in the United States with Special Reference to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1949.

Male, George A. "The Michigan Education Association as an Interest Group." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1952.

McKee, James B. "An Analysis of the Power Structure of Organized Agriculture in Michigan." Unpublished Master's Thesis, Wayne University, Detroit, 1948.

Milbrath, Lester W. "Analyzing Lobbying Through Communication and Decision Making Models," given at the 1959 Conference of American Association for Public Opinion Research, Lake George, New York, May 14-17.

Robertson, Lawrence W. "The Power Structure of the UAW-CIO and Its Impact on Public Policy in Michigan." Ph. D. dissertation in progress, Northwestern University, 1955.

Van Antwerp, Lowell B. "The Forces Affecting the Passage and Attempted Repeal of the Sales Tax Diversion Amendment." Unpublished Master's thesis, Michigan State University, 1950.

Wise, Roosevelt. "The Michigan Township's Association: A Study of an Interest Group." Master's thesis, University of Detroit, Detroit, 1955.

Other Sources

Personal Interview with Hugh Brenneman, former President, Lansing Capitol Club, Lansing, Michigan, October, 1958.

Personal Interview with Mrs. Margie Lee Galloway, Enrolling Clerk of the House of Representatives, Lansing, Michigan, April, 1960.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - MICHIGAN LOBBYISTS

Interview Number _____ Name _____
Date _____
Hour _____
Place _____ Length of interview _____

Preliminary Statement to Respondent:

I am doing a study of Michigan lobbyists to learn what they think of their jobs, how they go about their work, and what their backgrounds are. The information and opinions you give me will be tabulated along with material from about 40 other lobbyists. No names, either of individuals or organizations, will be used, and what you say will be off the record.

This study is one of a similar group of research projects being conducted on the national and state levels. In this study I am trying, in many instances, to duplicate that which has already been done in these previous studies.

I want to assure you at the outset that we are only interested in describing lobbyists, i.e., who they are, what they do and think. I am not interested in doing an expose' type of study. Let me emphasize again, that all information will be confidential. The original materials in this study will only be seen by me.

INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY OF STATE'S LEGISLATIVE AGENTS LIST:

Name _____ Card Number _____

Home address _____

Office address _____

If Different (*)

* Lansing Home address _____

* Lansing Office address _____

Capacity (in or with organization)

Representing:

Number _____

1. Where were you born? _____
(city) (state)

a. In what year? _____

2. Where were you brought up? _____
(city) (state)

3. Did you spend most of the years when you were growing up in a city, a small town,
or on a farm?

City.....()
Small Town.....()
Farm.....()
Combination (specify).....()
NA.....()

4. Now would you tell me a little bit about your education--where you went to school?

(a) High School _____ Incomplete.....()
Graduated.....()

(b) College _____ Incomplete.....()
Graduated.....()
Degree _____

(c) Graduate work _____ Incomplete.....()
Graduated.....()
Degrees _____

(d) Major field of interest in college _____

(e) Major field of interest in Graduate School (if different) _____

5. What is/was your father's job or occupation? _____

6. Are you engaged in any work other than lobbying? _____

(a) Has lobbying been your main occupation all your working life?

Yes.....()
No.....()
NA.....()

(b) If no:

What other work have you done, and for how long?

Job _____ Years _____

Job _____ Years _____

Job _____ Years _____

7. How did you become interested in lobbying?

FOR EXAMPLE:

(a) Just what were the major influences that developed your interests in public affairs and legislation?

(b) Just how did it come about that you became a lobbyist?

8. What other members of your family or close relatives have been connected with politics, that is holding political office, lobbying, or working for a political party?

Person and Relationship

Office or Position

9. Would you like to continue in this type of work for the rest of your professional life?

Yes.....()
No.....()
Perhaps.....()
DL/NA.....()

(a) Why?

10. What governmental positions--local, state or federal--had you held before becoming a lobbyist?

None.....()
NA.....()

Positions:

(a) Do you hold any such positions now?

None.....()
NA.....()

(b) Do you expect to ever return to some kind of government work?

Yes.....()
No.....()
NA/DK.....()

What kind?

11. What political party positions--local, state or federal--had you held before becoming a lobbyist?

None.....()
NA.....()

Positions:

(a) When? _____

(b) Do you hold any such positions now?

Yes.....()
No.....()
NA.....()

Positions:

12. Now, a couple of questions about your job as a lobbyist.

(a) First of all, just what does your organization expect you as its representative to do?

13. Are there any important differences between what you think this job is and the way your organization members see it?

Yes.....()

No.....()

DK/NA.....()

What are they?

14. How do you report back to the organization you represent? (Probe: newsletters, reports, etc.)

15. Do you consider your relationship to the organization you represent to be like that of a lawyer to a client; that is, presenting your client's case in the best possible light without necessarily committing yourself personally to your client's position?

- (a) Would you describe your commitment to your organization's policy position as:

strong.....()

mild.....()

weak.....()

- (b) Was the policy position of your organization a very important factor in your decision to represent it?

16. Is there any need to make a case periodically for the continuation of representation in Lansing for your organization? In other words, does the organization occasionally consider withdrawing its legislative representative?

17. How is the cost of the lobbying operation financed by the organization? (probes by informal, groups outside of organization, etc.)

18. How is legislative policy made for your organization?

19. Are your personal recommendations on legislative policy adopted frequently, occasionally, seldom or never?

Frequently.....()
Occasionally.....()
Seldom.....()
Never.....()
NA.....()

20. How is strategy on specific legislative problems affecting your organization mapped?

21. Do you have freedom to determine your tactics on most legislative problems?

22. How do you keep in touch with whats going on in the Legislature (e.g., in committees, etc.)?

23. How do you develop and maintain a circle of legislative contacts?

24. With whom do you generally try to establish contacts?

25.. Do you find it necessary to work both sides of the aisle on most issues?

26. Do you think it is important to work closely with many legislative committees?

27. With which committees do you spend the most time?

28. How important is joint activity with other lobby organizations and their lobbyists on certain legislative problems?

29. Do public policy makers--by that I mean Members of the Legislature or State Agency heads--come to you very often to solicit your views on a policy matter?

Less than once a year.....(_____
Once or twice a year.....(_____
3 to 10 times a year.....(_____
11 to 25 times a year.....(_____
On-going activity.....(_____

30. Speaking generally, about what percentage of your time do you spend in each of these various activities? (Hand card to Respondent)

Working in own office.....(_____
Calling on Members of the Legislature.....(_____
Calling on others.....(_____
Chatting with people in the Executive Office.....(_____
Doing research.....(_____
Preparing press releases, speeches, etc.....(_____
Travelling around on the grass roots level.....(_____
Calling on State Agency people.....(_____
Entertaining important people.....(_____
OTHER _____

31. Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card. Would you evaluate each of these techniques as they seem to work for you? It would be useful if you could rate them on a scale running from zero (0) for not effective at all to ten (10) for very effective.

Personal presentation of arguments.....()

Presenting research results.....()

Testifying at hearings.....()

Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official.....()

Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince.....()

Entertaining the official for an evening.....()

Giving a party or a dinner.....()

Contributing money to a political campaign.....()

Contributing work in a political campaign.....()

Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign.....()

Publicizing voting records.....()

Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's point of view.....()

Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public officials.....()

Direct bribery.....()

Offering personal favors and assistance to officials.....()

Obtaining assistance from other organizations.....()

Other _____ ()

_____ ()

32. Now, as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best job for their organizations?
In that it might be difficult to recall their names on the spur of the moment, here is a list of names of lobbyists now working in Lansing.
Please select out the five men who are doing the best jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective.

32. (cont'd)

33. Now, as you think back over your evaluation of these lobbyists, what would you say makes a man effective or ineffective as a lobbyist?

34. How do you appraise the record of legislative success of your own organization, i.e., is your organization achieving its legislative goals?

35. Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse, if there were no interest groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation?

Much better.....(☐)
Somewhat better.....(☐)
About the same.....(☐)
Somewhat worse.....(☐)
Much worse.....(☐)
DK/NA.....(☐)

Probe:

36. How are you paid for your services, i.e., do you have a contract, a fee or a salary?

37. About how much has your average yearly income been for the past three years?

38. Are you married? Yes (☐) No (☐) Divorced (☐) Widower (☐) NA (☐)

39. Do you have any children? Number_____.

40. What religious denomination do you belong to?_____

41. Is there anything else about lobbying that you think I ought to pay attention to in my study?

THANK YOU!

APPENDIX II

30. Speaking generally, about what PERCENTAGE of your time do you spend in each of these various activities?

Working in own office.....(_____
Calling on Members of the Legislature.....(_____
Calling on others.....(_____
Chatting with people in the Executive office.....(_____
Doing research.....(_____
Preparing press releases, speeches, etc.....(_____
Travelling around on the grass roots level.....(_____
Calling on State Agency people.....(_____
Entertaining important people.....(_____
OTHER _____(_____

APPENDIX III

31. Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card.

Would you EVALUATE each of these techniques as they seem to WORK FOR YOU.

It would be helpful if you could RATE THEM ON A SCALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL TO TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVE.

Personal presentation of arguments.....(_____)

Presenting research results.....(_____)

Testifying at hearings.....(_____)

Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official.....(_____)

Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince.....(_____)

Entertaining the official for an evening.....(_____)

Giving a party or a dinner.....(_____)

Contributing money to a political campaign.....(_____)

Contributing work to a political campaign.....(_____)

Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign.....(_____)

Publicizing legislators' voting records.....(_____)

Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's point of view.....(_____)

Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public officials.....(_____)

Direct bribery.....(_____)

Offering personal favors and assistance to public officials.....(_____)

Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyists.....(_____)

OTHER _____(_____)

_____ (_____)

LEGISLATIVE AGENTS

2

Grant H. Longenecker
Michigan Savings and Loan League

Robert Berry
Michigan Chiropody Association

Maurice J. Zickgraf
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Enginemen

Lloyd R. Winslow
The Pennsylvania Railroad Company

Dr. Louis Webber
Michigan Hospital Service

Dr. Edward A. Ward
Michigan Association of Osteopathic
Physicians and Surgeons

Dr. Louis Webber
Michigan Hospital Service

Dr. Edward A. Ward
Michigan Association of Osteopathic
Physicians

Rocco F. Ventrella
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees

Hiram P. Todd, Jr.
Chrysler Corporation

Wesley E. Thomas
Michigan Education Association

Ralph L. Stickle
Michigan Bankers Association

F.L. Spooner
Michigan Bell Telephone Company

Colin L. Smith
Mich. Employers' Unemployment Comp. Bureau

Harold W. Schumacher
Michigan Retail Hardware Association

Albert R. Saunders
Michigan Real Estate Association

Edward G. Rockwell
Auto Club of Michigan and
Detroit Auto Inter Insurance Exchange

Dr. Russell R. Robbins
Michigan State Chiropractic Society, Inc.

Audley Rawson
Insurance Companies

Stanley M. Powell
Michigan Farm Bureau

Robert E. Poll
City of Livonia

Richard N. Philleo
Michigan State Medical Society

Fred B. Perry, Jr.
Consumers Power Company

Joseph A. Parisi
Michigan Townships Association

William Palmer
Michigan Petroleum Industries Committee

Oscar G. Olander
Michigan Trucking Association

Dr. Hobart G. Moore
Michigan Association of Osteopathic
Physicians and Surgeons

Maurice J. Mayer
Michigan Auto Wholesalers Association
Michigan Optometric Association

R. W. Mason
Michigan Railroads Association

Herman F. Luhrs
General Motors Corporation

Richard J. Kowalski
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks

W.S. Koepke
Household Finance Corporation

Rudolph J. Inman
Detroit Edison Company

John H. Huss
Michigan Municipal League

Waldo O. Hildebrand
Michigan Association of Insurance Agents

Earl Hebert
Michigan Table Top Licensees Congress

Gus T. Hartman
Beneficial Finance Company of Michigan

Gilbert L. Haley
Mich. Auto Dealers Association

Don W. Gardner
Michigan Racing Association, Inc.

Harry R. Gaines
Michigan United Conservation Clubs

Charles F. Frieburger
Wayne County Board of Supervisors

Louis Freye
Michigan Medical Service

Francis B. Drolet
Associated Package Liquor Dealers

Wilfird F. Doyle
Michigan Chain Stores Bureau

John L. Denman
Ford Motor Company

J. H. Creighton
Michigan Manufacturer's Association

Otis F. Cook
Michigan Retailers Association

C. J. Carroll
Michigan Road Builders Association

Stephen J. Carey
City of Detroit

Leslie B. Butler
Michigan Life Association

Carl Buchanan
Michigan Ready Mixed Concrete Association

Hugh W. Brenneman
State Bar, Medical Society, & Architects

Joseph V. Brady
Insurance Companies

John H. Barr
County Road Association

Milton E. Bachman
State Bar of Michigan

Bernard Ansley
Michigan United Conservation Clubs

Murl K. Aten
Michigan Turnpike Authority

APPENDIX V

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - CAPITOL PRESS

Interview Number _____ Name _____

Preliminary Statement to Respondent:

I am doing a study of Michigan lobbyists to learn what they think of their jobs, how they go about their work, what their backgrounds are. The information and opinions you give me will be tabulated along with material from about 10 other reporters on the capitol beat. No names, either of individuals or papers, will be used, and what you say will be off the record.

This study is one of a similar group of research projects being conducted on the national as well as state level. In this study I am trying, in many instances, to duplicate that which has already been done in these previous studies.

I want to assure you at the outset that we are only interested in describing lobbyists--who they are, what they do and think. I am not interested in doing an expose type of study. Let me emphasize again, that all information will be confidential. The original materials in this study will only be seen by me.

1. Name of paper(s) or wire service _____

2. Number of years worked as reporter _____

3. Number of years on state capitol beat _____

4. During the session do you spend most of your time covering:

The Senate.....(_

The House.....(_

Both.....(_

Other _____(_

Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card.

Would you EVALUATE each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists.

It would be helpful if you could RATE THEM ON A SCALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR NOT EFFECTIV
AT ALL TO TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVE.

Personal presentation of arguments.....()

Presenting research results.....()

Testifying at hearings.....()

Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official.....()

Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to
convince.....()

Entertaining the official for an evening.....()

Giving a party or a dinner.....()

Contributing money to a political campaign.....()

Contributing work to a political campaign.....()

Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign.....()

Publicizing legislators' voting records.....()

Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's
point of view.....()

Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public
officials.....()

Direct bribery.....()

Offering personal favors and assistance to public officials.....()

Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyists.....()

OTHER _____()

_____()

5. Now, as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best job for their organizations?
- In that it might be difficult to recall their names on the spur of the moment, here is a list of names of lobbyists now working in Lansing.
- Please select out the five men who are doing the best jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective.

5. (cont'd)

6. Now, as you think over your evaluation of these lobbyists, what would you say makes a man effective or ineffective as a lobbyist?

7. Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse, if there were not interest groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation?

Much better.....(☐)
Somewhat better.....(☐)
About the same.....(☐)
Somewhat worse.....(☐)
Much worse.....(☐)
DK/NA.....(☐)

Probe:

8. Is there anything else about lobbying that you think I ought to pay attention to in my study?

APPENDIX VI

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - LEGISLATIVE LEADERS

Interview Number _____ Name _____

Preliminary Statement to Respondent

I am doing a study of Michigan lobbyists to learn what they think of their jobs, how they go about their work, what their backgrounds are. The information and opinions you give me will be tabulated along with material from about 15 other legislative leaders. No names will be used and what you say will be off the record.

This study is one of a similar group of research projects being conducted on the national as well as state level. In this study I am trying, in many instances, to duplicate that which has already been done in these previous studies.

I want to assure you at the outset that we are only interested in describing lobbyists--who they are, what they do and think. I am not interested in doing an expose type of study. Let me emphasize again, that all information will be confidential. The original materials in this study will only be seen by me.

1. Number of years served in Legislature (through Dec. 31, 1958):

a. In House.....()

b. In Senate.....()

2. Legislative leadership position in 1957-58 sessions _____

3. Committee memberships and offices held in 1957-58 session.

Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card.

Would you EVALUATE each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists.

It would be helpful if you could RATE THEM ON A SCALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL TO TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVE.

Personal presentation of arguments.....(____)

Presenting research results.....(____)

Testifying at hearings.....(____)

Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official.....(____)

Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince.....(____)

Entertaining the official for an evening.....(____)

Giving a party or a dinner.....(____)

Contributing money to a political campaign.....(____)

Contributing work to a political campaign.....(____)

Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign.....(____)

Publicizing legislators' voting records.....(____)

Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's point of view.....(____)

Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public officials.....(____)

Direct bribery.....(____)

Offering personal favors and assistance to public officials.....(____)

Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyists.....(____)

OTHER _____(____)

_____(____)

5. Now, as you think back over your experience, which lobbyists come to mind as those who are doing the best job for their organizations?
- In that it might be difficult to recall their names on the spur of the moment, here is a list of names of lobbyists now working in Lansing.
- Please select out the five men who are doing the best jobs for their organizations, and tell me something about why you think they are so effective.

5. (cont'd)

6. Now, as you think over your evaluation of these lobbyists, what would you say makes a man effective or ineffective as a lobbyist?

7. Would you say that, on the whole, the legislature would work much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse, if there were not interest groups and lobbyists trying to influence legislation?

Much better.....(_)
Somewhat better.....(_)
About the same.....(_)
Somewhat worse.....(_)
Much worse.....(_)
DK/NA.....(_)

Probe:

8. Is there anything else about lobbying that you think I ought to pay attention to in my study?

APPENDIX VII

Several possible techniques for bringing home a point to public officials are listed on this card.

Would you EVALUATE each of these techniques as you think they work for lobbyists.

It would be helpful if you could RATE THEM ON A SCALE RUNNING FROM ZERO (0) FOR NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL TO TEN (10) FOR VERY EFFECTIVE.

Personal presentation of arguments.....(_____

Presenting research results.....(_____

Testifying at hearings.....(_____

Getting an influential constituent(s) to contact the official.....(_____

Getting close to a person who has the ear of the public official one wants to convince.....(_____

Entertaining the official for an evening.....(_____

Giving a party or a dinner.....(_____

Contributing money to a political campaign.....(_____

Contributing work to a political campaign.....(_____

Inspiring a letter writing or telegram campaign.....(_____

Publicizing legislators' voting records.....(_____

Public relations campaign to convince the general public of the organization's point of view.....(_____

Using the organization's newsletter or newspaper to convince public officials.....(_____

Direct bribery.....(_____

Offering personal favors and assistance to public officials.....(_____

Obtaining assistance from other organizations and their lobbyists.....(_____

OTHER _____(_____

_____ (_____

APPENDIX VIII

March 25, 1959

SENATE BUSINESS

REPORTS OF STANDING COMMITTEES

HB 279 to G.O.
HB 227 to Appropriations
HB 228 to Appropriations
HB 229 to Appropriations
HB 442 to G.O.
HB 495 to G.O.
HB 285 to G.O.
HB 204* to G.O.
HB 527* to G.O.
HB 571* to G.O.
HB 572* to G.O.
HB 72 to G.O.
HB 236* to G.O.
HB 100 - 1 day extension granted

Adjourned to Wednesday at 2 p.m.

THIRD READING

HB 162 Passed T*
HB 13 Passed T* I.E.
HB 113 Passed T*
SB 1333 postponed to Thurs. Mar. 27
SB 1131 Not Passed - Vote recon.
postponed to Thurs. Mar. 27
HB 18* Passed T*
HB 146 Passed
HB 203 Passed I.E.

MOTIONS::

General Orders Pfd

MESSAGES FROM HOUSE

SB 1072 With H* - Laid over 1 day

HOUSE BUSINESS

INTRODUCTION OF BILLS:

HB 587 - Committee on Ways and Means, by Rep. Engstrom, Chairman - Ways and Means.
Appropriations; restricted funds for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1959 -
\$233,983,819.00

HB 588 - Committee on Ways and Means, by Rep. Engstrom, Chairman - Ways and Means.
Appropriations; state police and departments, agencies, commissions relating
to safety and defense, for fiscal year ending June 30, 1959 - \$22,018,251.00

REPORTS OF STANDING COMMITTEES

SB 1284 SB 1089 SB 1299
SB 1062* SB 1255* SB 1308*
SB 1083 SB 1258 SB 1120
SB 1301* all to G.O.

THIRD READING

SB 1072 Passed T*
SB 1152* Passed I.E.
SB 1011 S.O. on T.R. Thurs. Mar. 27
SB 1032 Re-ref. to Gen. Taxation
SB 1326*
SB 1127 Passed
SB 1208* Passed T*
SB 1242 Passed T*

GENERAL ORDERS

SB 1286* to T.R.
SB 1108* Ref. to Ways and Means
SB 1082 S.O. on G.O. Thurs. Mar. 27

MESSAGES FROM SENATE

HB 241 S* non-concurred in
HB 108 S* concurred in - Enrolled T*
HB 269 S* concurred in - Enrolled
HB 306 S* concurred in - Enrolled T*
HB 371 S* concurred in - Enrolled T*
HB 421 S* non-concurred in
HB 25 S* non-concurred in
HB 203 with S* - Laid over 1 day
HB 18 with S* - Laid over 1 day

Adjourned to Wed. at 2 p.m.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293201044397

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293201044397