caoss CULTURAL COMMUNICATION poweRLFSSNFssf-gé 557- """ SALIENCE AND OBEISANCE OF PROFESSIONAL ' CHM c5:- ’16:!de 75553535 Z. I B R A R Y Michiga n S Cate University This is to certify that the thesis entitled CROSS—CULTURAL COMMUNICATION, POWERLESSNBSS, SALIENCE AND OBEISANCE OF PROFESSIONAL CHANGE AGENTS presented by Norman B. Cleary has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for Communication l Ph'—D' degree in Mzfior professor Date July 2?, 1966 0469 u»ummmrflmflwjgmmmigwu m use om . WW?! Warm; Li”), :‘1 ;,,\ 1‘37 ’ 1903-3; 0&311701E98 CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION, POWERLESSNESS, SALIENCE AND OBEISANCE OF PROFESSIONAL CHANGE AGENTS By Norman BSDCleary A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fUlfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Communication 1966 ABSTRACT CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION, POWERLESSNESS, SALIENCE AND OBEISANCE OF PROFESSIONAL CHANGE AGENTS by Norman B. Cleary This research is designed to determine the conditions under which four variables in two institutional settings are likely to make a person attempt to change his organization. The subjects are all fereign nationals who have Spent some time in the United States observing how the same job they are engaged in at home is done here. The four variables are: (1) change type -- i.e., does the subject have a program of change that he wishes to initiate in his occupational organization? By program of change is meant a set of goals and/or means that he wishes to substitute for already existing goals and/or means, (2) obeisance to status superiors, (3) powerlessness with reSpect to change activity, and (u) salience of the particular in- stitution to the subject. The two institutional settings are the political and the economic. Since subjects were all government employed, these two settings were felt to be apprOpriate. The variables are analyzed twice, one in each in- stitutional setting. The only first order interaction that was significant was be- tween powerlessness and change-type and that was in the predicted direction. —————_fil Norman E. Cleary Political Institution As predicted low powerlessness subjects were more likely to change things than high powerlessness subjects. As predicted low salience subjects were more likely to participate in change activity than high salient subjects. Contrary to prediction non—change types were more likely to engage in change activity than change-types. Con- trary to prediction obeisance made no significant difference. The only first order interaction that was significant was be— tween change type vs. non-change type and salience. This interaction p l ' < was in the predicted direction. The research suggests that whether a subject has a change program in mind or not, and whether the change program is economic or political are both significant factors but the effect is significant in opposite directions. If the subject has an economic change program in mind then his feelings of powerlessness are important. If the subject has a political change program in mind then his feelings of salience are important. The concept of change — non—change type results from an analysis of the theoretical thinking of Robert K. Merton, Richard A. Cloward, and Robert Dubin on forms of adaptation to societal goals, norms and means. The concept of obeisance results from the research of L. I. Pearlin on alienation and work. This research indicated a significant relation- Ship between status obeisance and work alienation. The concept of powerlessness is the same as has been used and found most productive in a large number of alienation studies. The theoretical implications of these studies has been reported by Melvin Seeman. Norman B . Cleary The concept of salience results from the work of Kuhn and McPartland with the "who am I" instrument. It is used here only to indicate salience and economic and/or political institution in the lives of the s ubjects. The dependent variable is change activity. The subjects were classed by the preceeding variables and combinations of them and their relative anticipated change activity was measured by their responses to several change opportunity situations, both political and economic. 1‘ ,' Economic Institution As predicted, low powerlessness subjects were more likely to t ‘ change things than high powerlessness subjects. As predicted low ‘ \ salience subjects and change types Were more likely to participate in change activity than high salience or non-change types. Contrary " to prediction low obeisant subjects did not differ from high obeisant subjects. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The planning and completion of this study would have been impossible without the patient guidance and assistance of many people. I wish to thank all of those people at Michigan State University who served on my committee. Dr. Hideya Kumata, chairman of my guidance committee, Department of Communication. Dr. Malcolm S. MacLean, Jr., Gallup Professor, Department of Journalism, University of Iowa. Dr. Paul J. Deutschmann, deceased, Head, Communications Research Center. Dr. Verling Troldahl, Department of Communication. Dr. Walter Emery, Department of Radio 8 Television. Dr. Mason Miller, Director, Extension Personnel Development. In addition to the committee, Dr. David K. Berlo, Chairman, Department of Communication was of great help through his constant support and encouragement. Much of this research was indirectly supported by the Seminars on Communication administered by the Department of Communication for the Agency for International Development, U. S. government. Mr. Albert Talbott and Mr. Thomas Danbury were of great assistance to me in the analysis of data. Most of all, hOWever, thanks must go to the chairman of my committee, Dr. Hideya Kumata, whose patience, forbearance, and intelligent guidance were far beyond what anyone could expect. ii 4. TABLE OF CONTENTS P CHAPTER .353 I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II THEORY AND LITERATURE' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Sources of Variance and Deviance . . . . . . . . . l7 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Theoretical Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 III METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2a Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2” Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Powerlessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Cultural Change Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Saliency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Cu Obeisance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 ” Change Types and Non-Change Types . . . . . . . . . 33 , A Administration .-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Final Data Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 IV FINDINGS .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Economic Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Low Obeisance vs. High Obeisance . . . . . . . . . . 41 Low Salience vs. High Salience . . . . . . . . #2 Low Powerlessness vs. High Powerlessness . . . . . . H2 Merton-Dubin Types by Obeisance . . . . . . . . . . 43 Merton—Dubin Types by Salience . . . . . . . . . . . an Merton—Dubin Types by Powerlessness . . . . . . . . nu Merton-Dubin Types by Obeisance by Powerlessness . . 45 Merton-Dubin Types by Obeisance by Salience . . . . 46 Merton-Dubin Types by Obeisance by Powerlessness by Salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . #6 Political Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . #7 Change Types vs. Non-change Types . . . . . . . . . #8 Low Obeisance vs. High Obeisance . . . . . . . . . . #9 Low Powerlessness vs. High Powerlessness . . . . . . 49 Low Salience vs. High Salience . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Change Types by Obeisance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Change Types by Salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Merton—Dubin Change Types by Obeisance by Powerlessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . 53 Merton—Dubin Change Types by Obeisance by Salience . 53 Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a 56 V IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Change Types vs. Non—Change Types . . . . . . . . . 56 Obeisance . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Powerlessness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Salience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 o o o o u o o u o o VI VII Theoretical Implications Practical Implications . REFERENCES . APPENDICES APPENDIX A APPENDIX B 0 iv Page 63 65 68 70 88 TABLE 10 ll l2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2O 21 A Typology of Modes of Individual Adaptation . . . . . A Typology of Deviant Adaptation in Social Actions According to Dubin . . LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES o o o o o o o o o a e o Page 9 Typology of Modes of Variant Adaptation in Social Action 20 Change Activity Scale . . . . Merton—Dubin Typology . . . . Analysis of Variance, Economic Mean Change MmCMWe Mwnfimy Mean Change MmCM%e Activity Activity Activity Activity Activity Merton—Dubin Types MmCMme Activity Merton-Dubin Types Mm0m%e Activity Merton-Dubin Types MmCMwe Activity Scores by Scores by Scores by Scores by Scores by Scores by Scores by Institution . L . . Merton—Dubin Change Obeisance . . . . . Salience . . . . . Powerlessness . . . Obeisance, by 0 o o o a o o o Salience, by Powerlessness, by e o o u o a e Scores by Obeisance by Powerlessness by Merton-Dubin Types . . . . . . Mean Change Activity Scores by Obeisance, by Salience by Merton-Dubin Types . . . . . . . . . Mean Change Activity Scores by Obeisance, by Powerlessness by Salience by Merton-Dubin Types Analysis of Variance, political Institution . . . MmCMweMfifiWSwmbymmmwmhcm%eWms Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance . . . . Mean Change Activity Scores by Powerlessness . Mean Change Activity Score by Salience . . . . . V Types 30 3% no #1 #1 42 1+3 43 an an “5 1+6 in #8 N9 ”9 50 50 . . . n - . . . . s . . up. . TABLE Page 22 Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance by Merton-Dubin Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 23 Mean Change Activity Score by Salience by Merton-Dubin Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 2” Mean Change Activity Score by POWerlessness, by Merton-Dubin Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 25 Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance by Salience by Merton-Dubin Type . . . . . . . . . 53 26 Mean Change Activity Scores by Salience by ‘ 57 Merton-Dubin Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ‘ 1 vi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Thousands of people each year travel to other countries for their organizations or countries in search of ways and means of improving their organizations or their countries. Some of these people return home and carry on extensive change activity -- attempting to get changes accepted. Others return and do little. This research is designed to sort out the effects of four variables on how much change activity results from such sojourns. The four variables are called (1) change type, (2) obeisance, (3) powerlessness, and (4) salience. Whether or not a subject is a change type depends on how many goals and/or means currently used by his organization he rejects in favor of substitutes for those goals and/or means. Whether or not a subject is obeisant depends upon where he is on a continuum of deferential behavior toward status superiors. Whether or not a subject is power- less depends on how capable he feels he is to alter his environment. Whether or not a subject is high or low in salience depends upon how important an area of life activity, political or economic, is to him and his life. It is suggested that a change type person is one who has a program of change. He has something in mind that he would like to see changed. A non-change type does not have such a program of change. Obeisance, powerlessness, and salience are feelings a man may have which might prevent him from carrying out changes even if he has a program of change. The research is designed to determine if the above suggestions } are borne out by the data. Is a man with a program of change more F likely to participate in change activity than one who has no such program? Is a man who is low in obeisance, powerlessness, or salience more likely to participate in change activity than one who is high on any of these variables? Since most of these cross-cultural change agents work for their governments but are essentially interested in economic development, two institutional settings will be explored, i.e., the political and the economic. To do this the study is carried out with the same subjects responding to two institutional contexts. CHAPTER II THEORY AND LITERATURE Several theories have been involved in the generation of this research. The principal interest is that of spEiElVEhange. Out of the context of social change literature the focus is upon the phenomenon called "cultural borrowing." This phenomenon is the inter-cultural or inter—societal explanation of social and cultural change. The emphasis is upon the inter-societal sojourner as a vehicle of the borrowing operation. The particular interest is in the relation between the types of adaptation manifested by the sojourner and his change- oriented behavior upon return to his society. Two Conceptions of Change Orientation One explanation of how individuals may become agents of change is through the concept of,£lientationf The alienated is one who does v,/"“ m..- "saw not espouse the norms and goals of a society and yet lives in that society. Two broad classes of the alienated may be conceptualized. One includes people who have been socialized in one society and have moved to another. The second includes people who have been socialized in the society in which they remain, but who, because of their perceptions of conditions which exist in that society, define themselves as alien to it, i,e., do not espouse the culture. This thesis attempts an adaptation of alienation theory for a possible explanation of change behavior. queiiihefiton (23, PP. 121-19”) has created a typology of adaptation which ensuesfrom differential attachment to societal means and goals. For him, alienation occurs as.a result of a condition in society known as anomie. Anomie is defined by Merton as follows: No society lacks norms governing conduct. But societies do differ in the degree to which the folkways, mores and institutional controls are effectively integrated with the goals which stand high in the hierarchy of cultural values. The culture may be such as to lead individuals to center their emotional convictions upon the complex of culturally acclaimed ends, with far less emotional support for prescribed methods of reaching out for these ends. With such differential emphasis upon goals and institutional procedures, the latter may be so vitiated by the stress on goals as to have the behavior of many individuals limited only by considerations of technical expediency. In this context, the sole significant question becomes: Which of the available procedures is more efficient in netting the culturally approved value? The technically most effective procedure, whether culturally legitimate or not, becomes typically preferred to institutionally prescribed con- duct. As this process of attenuation continues, the society becomes unstable and there developes what Durkheim called 'anomie' (or normlessness). (23, pp 134-135). In a second chapter Merton again discusses anomie: The sociological concept of anomie, as developed in the preceeding page, presupposes that the salient environment of individuals can be usefully thought of as involving the cultural structure, on the one hand, and the social~§tggcture, on the other. It assumes that, however intimately connected these in fact are, they must be kept separate for purposes of analysis before they are brought together again. In this connection, cultural structure may be defined as that organized set of normative values governing behavior which is common to members of a designated society or group. And by social structure is meant that organized set of social relationships in which members of the society or group are variously im- plicated. Anomie is then conceived as a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them. In this conception, cultural values may help to produce behavior which is at odds with the mandates of the values themselves. On this view, the social structure strains the cultural values, making action in accord with them readily possible for those occupying certain statues within the society and difficult or impossible for others. The social structure acts as a barrier or as an open door to the acting out of cultural mandates. When the cultural and the social structure are malintegrated, the first calling for behavior and attitudes which the second precludes, there is a strain toward the breakdown of the norms, toward normlessness. It does not follow, of course, that this is the sole process making for the social condition of anomie, further theory and research are directed toward searching out other patterned sources of a high degree of anomie. (23, pp 162-163) In short, anomie is a condition of the culture in which there is "disruption of the normative system", "breakdown of the cultural structure," and "normlessness." It is seen as resulting from deviant behavior, behavior not in accordance with the norms of the culture. This behavior results because the social system, on the one hand, teaches the members of the society to accept the goals of the culture, but, on the other hand, develops social mechanisms which restrict some members from using the approved methods of reaching these goals. Merton does not explain the mechanism which permits means to be judged as legitimate or non-legitimate and at the same time result in \, ~-....___._...__._.____ __ a culture that is normless. Perhaps this reconciliation might be made by inserting a time dimension through introduction of successive generations of members. Merton hints at this when citing examples but does not include it in his theory. Apparently once the social system develops restrictive societal forms, resulting in what the members of that society judge to be non—legitimate means, then the next generation is faced with an ambiguity. The next generation is taught the goals and the legitimate means for achieving these goals but it also witnesses .. .n—v'fir‘.. .._. the successful achievement of these goals by the use of non-legitimate - f-.. amn.‘ means. It is apparently this ambiguityflthat Merton refers to when he says that the cultural system is édisrupted" or when he says that the cultural structure is broken down. The“duestion is; How does the Durkheimian concept of "normlessness" then come about? Conflicting norms, perhaps; conflict between preachment and practice, certainly; but lack of norms---—why? Merton further complicates his definition of anomie by suggesting that it may also result when cultural goals are differentially distributed as appropriate to some members of the society and not to others, but where the social system provides social forms through which the latter class of members do, in fact, achieve the restricted cultural goals. (23, pp 191-192) He does not expand this theoretical implication, yet, it is easy to see that the implications would involve a great amount of reconciliation with the concept of anomie. Merton establishes categories of adaptive responses to anomie. This typology is presented in Table l, where (+) signifies "acceptance," (-) signifies "rejection" and (I) signifies "rejection of prevailing values and substitution of new values." (23, pp 139-1H0) Table l. A Typology of Modes of Individual Adaptation Modes of Adaptation Cultural Goals Institutional Means I Conformity + + II Innovation + ' III Ritualism ‘ + IV Retreatism - ‘ V Rebellion 1+ |+ As Robert Dubin (9, p. 1u7-1u8) points out, Merton's table and his discussion are at variance. If the table is to reflect his examples, the definition of innovation should be +, :9 indicating that the respondent accepts the cultural goals and rejects the prevailing in— stitutionalized means, and substitutes some non-legitimate means. Now we are faced with a problem. Does Merton intend that these types of response occur in a society that is already objectively describable as anomic, or occur as a result of a disparateness between cultural goals and the restrictive quality of some societal forms, and leads to the creation of a society objectively describable as anomie? The above quoted statement says that this typology is a categorization of responses to anomie. Merton's examples all seem to indicate that these response types (excepting conformity) leads to anomie. If it is both, then the theory is circular. If it is the former, then we have individuals rejecting means that exist in a "normless" culture, which is contradictory. If it is the latter, then only types I 8 II are apprOpriate because the other three types are characterized by rejection of the cultural goals, and the theory clearly states that it is when the cultural goals are widely accepted and strongly held that deviant behavior obtains due to restrictive societal forms. Clearly, the best way out of this problem is to drop the notion of . . . . , anomie entirely. In this research 1t 15 irrelevant whether the $030urner s society is anomie or not. Robert Dubin (9) has taken Merton's basic forms of adaptation, refined the types and added ten more. He achieves this expansion by bringing into the category scheme the notion of institutional norms as constituting a range of means for achievement of a goal. In Dubin's words, "we can define institutional norms as the boundaries between prescribed behaviors and proscribed behaviors in a particular in- stitutional setting." (9, p lug) Twenty seven types emerge by this procedure, however, Dubin rules out all but In as vacuous or subjective precursors of these fourteen types. Dubin cites examples of these fourteen types to demonstrate the utility of his enlarged paradigm. He is not concerned about any theoretical rationale for the existence of such adaptation as Merton was. In fact, he goes to some length to demonstrate that neither he nor Merton have presented a theory predicting or explaining "how" or "why" deviant behavior occurs. Dubin's typology is given in Table 2. Both Merton and Dubin began their work with an interest in "deviant" behavior. Yet in both typologies there are many types which are mixtures of deviance and conformity. Some kind of continuum seems to be suggested. However, when Dubin adds into the paradigm the criteria of support or rejection of normative ranges of behavior, then, clearly he has left room for some degree of means improvision which might still be conformity. As Merton points out, Dubin has created the beginnings of a much more general theory. (22) Dubin opens up the possibility of creating a typology of human response to any society, Whether it is anomic or not. All that is necessary is the assumption that the society is undergoing changes in its cultural structure. Table 2. A Typology of Deviant Adaptations in Social Action According to Dubin Type of Deviant Cultural Institutional Adaptation Goals Norms Means Behavioral Innovation Institutional Invention + I. ‘1 Normative Invention + :_ + Operating Invention + + 1 Value Innovation Intellectual Invention :_ + + Organizational Invention :_ :_ + Social Movement :_ + ‘1 Behavioral Ritualism Levelling of Aspirations Institutional Moralist - + Organization Automation - - + I + Value Ritualism Demagogue + - ‘ Normative Opportunist + - Means Opportunist + + ‘ Retreatism - ~ ‘ Rebellion + + + = acceptance = rejection |+ l + rejection and substitution (active rejection) 10 Merton, in his commentary on the Dubin article, outlines his own commentary in the following five points: First, that Dubin's program for methodically identifying numerous kinds of deviant adaptation is sound in principle and productive in result. By 'sound in principle', I mean that be systematically combines a limited number of attributes in order to identify similarities and differences between types of socially deviant behavior that, on the surface, seem entirely unrelated. The political demagogue and the thief, the overly—zealous patriot and the frightened routineer, are methodically located in some of their sociological dimensions. His program has the merit of consolidating a typology of deviant adaptations with the distinction between attitudes toward social norms and actual behavior. Second, in extending the typology, Dubin has in fact accomplished more than he expressly set out to do. His implicit program raises more problems and provides more clues to their solution than he indicates; among these is the beginning of a typology of conformity. Third, temporary patches of ambiguity result from his implicit introduction of more distinctions in his sub- stantive account of specimens of deviant behavior than are expressly recorded in his formal typology. Fourth, these instructive ambiguities are registered in his system of formal notations, which occasionally uses the same symbol for different referents. Fifth, and finally, I shall try to show that Dubin's explicit program contributessignally to our understanding of sociological relations between diverse types of deviant adaptation and that the discrepancies between his explicit and his implicit program, although they make for temporary ambiguity, have the value of indicating directions for useful inquiry into the relations between conforming and nonconforming behavior. (22, pp 177-178) Under point one we have already discussed Dubin's expanded typology. Merton also points out that Dubin's criteria of institutional ll norms taps an attitudinal characteristic not a behavioral one. Though neither Merton or Dubin point it out, the cultural goal criteria used by both authors is also an attitudinal characteristic. Only the criteria of institutional means is behavioral in nature and it, too, could be tapped as attitudinal. Merton's second point has already been commented upon. Merton's third point requires further attention. When Dubin was exemplifying the types of adaptation in his paradigm he described cases which stimulate Merton in several directions. Merton sees the necessity of distinguishing between privately held attitudes and publicaly expressed attitudes toward the norm. (This same distinction needs to be made for the cultural goal.) Merton is able to fill both categories by example; and suggests that some more elaborate system of notation is needed to indicate those different typological aspects. Again, Merton focusses on one of Dubin's examples to indicate the necessity for some distinction between new creative means that are within the norms of the institution. It seems that this is already provided in the type (+, +, i), however, Dubin exemplifies this type as the creation of fads, fashion, occupational jargon and craft secrets. Merton does not like this confusion of scientific innovation with fad creation etc., and suggests that there are important differences that should permit a distinction. It seems, however, that such a distinction has already been made in that this typology is clearly stated by both Merton and Dubin to be institutionally oriented. Clearly the faddish» and the scientist are operating in different institutional contexts 12 with different institutional norms and sub-cultural goals.* Next Merton suggests that some of Dubin's examples confound simple conformity with "over-conformity" on the one hand and "under—conformity" on the other. In order that the typology reflect those differences he suggested again, a more complex notational scheme. Merton has given cues to the development of a much more complex matrix of adaptation, one that clearly has moved away from a central concern with only deviant behavior and toward a concern with a wide range of conforming, and non-conforming adaptations to social and cultural structures. I L Richard A. glowa d (5, pp 16H—176) makes a further contribution to the Merton typology: Cloward examines the research in criminology through the theoretical writings of Clifford R. Shaw, Henry D. McKay and Edwin H. Sutherland. Cloward characterizes the approach of these men as (chltural transhission" and differential association) i.e., what happens to a person when all he learns about his culture is determined by some particular group in the society. In essence this approach is sub-cultural and sub—societal. The individual participates in gfib‘societal groups which restricts him to means that the SHP§POrdinate \ L. I“ ”m ... M,‘ ,, A _ “‘— *The suggested distinction which Merton makes is one of degree of transitoriness -- scientific innovation being more permanent. There are two difficulties with this criterion. First, duration is a relative concept-~transitory relative to what standards. We would 2 need some cultural or social constant such as C in the formula E + MC . Second, Merton, himself, in a paper he read at Monteith College documented the increasing transitory nature of scientific innovations. (Baconian celebration at Monteith College, 1961-62) "singletons 8 Multiples in Scientific Discovery." 13 elements in a society define as illegitimate. Any criteria for dividing society into sub-societal units wherein association patterns exist will structure the kind of legitimate and illegitimate means available to the members. Cloward analyzes this phenomena by examining differences in "learning and opportunity structures" in neighborhoods, classes, ethnic groups, etc. Even the demographic criteria of age, sex, race, etc. are suggested as useful. Cloward is much more concerned with the "why" and "how" of dev1ance than is Dubin. Whereas Dubin, by focussing on the typology opened up the theoretical implications, Cloward narrows down again to Merton's earlier concern with deviance. Cloward attempts confluence of Durkheim-Mertin anomie theory with the Sutherland, et. al. theory. The result of this effort is a splitting of the institutional means into legitimate and idlegitdmate, the latter implying that the institutional normative range has been exceeded.' However since the institutional norm variable t// alggg‘ 1-- is an attitudinal one, an individual may still accept the norms, yet égh;;;;illeg1timately. The question now becomes how to handle this new theoretical consideration notationally in the paradigm. Merton and Dubin used the symbol :_to stand for a rejection of legitimate means and an acceptance of illegitimate means. But, now it becomes possible for the individual to reject the means and substitute either other legitimate means or illegitimate means. Likewise it becomes possible to reject illegitimate means and accept other illegitimate means or legitimate means. Cloward has broadened the typology even though his theoretical interests appeared to be narrower. In order to utilize the concept oleeg1t1macy in a typology it is most important that we understand the phenomena involved. Cloward (5) 1n writes in a footnote: "Illegitimate means" are those proscribed by the mores. The concept therefore includes illegal means as a special case but is not coterminous with illegal behavior, which refers only to the violation of legal norms. In using the term "mores" Cloward suggests that means may be prescribed and proscribed by any sub-society. The present research is not focussed on deviant behavior as such. It is focussed on the actor's behavior in a changing society. Con- sequently, it has not stressed the Durkheimian theoretical underpinning of this typology. The main concern is with the generation of those aspects of the paradigm which would broaden its implications to include not only deviant behavior in response to a society, but variant behavior in a society that was changing though not necessarily abruptly enough to be characterized as anomie. The concept of legitimation applies to overt responses only. But, verbalisms are overt responses. Insofar as some individuals express verbally their attitudes toward their own perception of what the institutional norms are, they provide differential norm structures which may be accepted or rejected. There is a population of normative ranges of behavior which is public through verbalization. Dubin's typology implicitly recognizes this by employing the notation for substitution under the heading institutional norm. It may well be that in any sub-society, e.g., the slum neighborhood, that this range of norms is identified as legitimate or illegitimate. What Cloward refers to as illegitimate means can well be subsumed under reinterpretation of the Merton-Dubin typology. Some notational changes need to be made to incorporate Merton's suggestion that norms is and goals have an attitidinal dimension as well as a behavioral one. Since verbalization is a behavior, a man can have a favorable attitude toward a goal or a normative range of means, but he may act verbally as if he does not have such a favorable attitude. As far as the means themselves are concerned, we are concerned only about the behavioral act. An attitudinal dimension of means is not included in the following revised table of modes of adaptation. NM.._...., .-"‘ Goals will be reSponded to under the following conditions: <:) = favorable attitudinally [:1 = favorable behaviorally (verbally) If (:1, then C:) is assumed. If G), then .may or may not be true, therefore |lig1 = favorable attitudinally with verbal expression (:) = favorable attitudinally without verbal expression. The logical possibility of and not Q constitutes a lie by the subject. It also throws question on the usual assumption that attitudes are the necessary percursors of action. The same reasoning and notational forms apply to negative attitudes, and to normative ranges of means. Thus, goals may be responded to in the following ways: 1. Q 5. 2. Q 3. g 7. ’+.- 8. No. l is a person who attitudinally accepts the goals of a social unit, but does not support them verbally. 16 No. 2 is a person who attitudinally rejects the goals of a social unit, but does not express this rejection verbally. No. 3 is a person who attitudinally rejects the goals of a social unit and attitudinally accepts other goals in regard to that social unit, but who does not express this substitution verbally. No. 4, 5 and 6 are people just like 1, 2, and 3 respectively, but who do express their attitudes verbally. No. 7, 8, and 9 are people who express, verbally, either acceptance, rejection or substitution but who do not hold the attitudes consonant with their expressive behavior. The same types of people may occur with regard to normative ranges of means. People may attitudinally accept, reject, or substitute norms without expressing their attitudes verbally. They may attitudinally and behaviorally accept, reject, or substitute norms. Or they may say they accept, reject, or substitute norms without consonant attitude structure. As far as goals and norms are concerned, then, there is a possible 81 types of people. Means are viewed by Merton, Dubin and Cloward as acts carried out, consequently there is no need for an attitudinal dimension. Con- sequently, an embedded means, the one currently being used by the organization, is either accepted (+), rejected (-), or substituted (i). This yields a revised table of types of adaptation to society of 3 times 81 or 2u3 types. Merton further suggests that the verbal expression of support, rejection, or substitution of goals and/or norms may be over-expressed or under expressed. Thus, wherever expression is indicated some notational scheme is needed to indicate this variable. A plus for over l7 expression and a minus for under expression can be used to one side of the presently allocated symbol. Thus, a No. l4-becomes either (I + or- -). Likewise for Nos. 5 through 9. This increases the goal and norm reSponse categories to 15 each making the total matrix of types lSXlSXS or 675. This matrix adequately takes care of Cloward's concern for legitimacy and illegitimacy. Any type which rejects or substitutes the norms of the social unit involved and substitutes for the embedded means of achieving a goal is behaving illegitimately from the standpoint of the social unit. Such behavior i from Merton or Dubin‘s point of view would be called deviant behavior. Any type which accepts the norms of the social unit involved, whether it accepts, rejects or substitutes for the embedded means is either conforming or participating in variant behavior. All of the above delineated types are categorized with respect to any particular social unit, e.g., a family, a neighborhood, gang, community, club, school, hospital, industrial company, etc. Social change is frequently instituted from within the confines of such a limited culture, but far more frequently it is borrowed from some other culture through participation in some other social unit. Sgurces of Variance and Deviance A man may participate in an organization and conform to the expected ways of achieving goals. On the other hand, he may practice some variant behavior. From what sources might be have been informed about this variation? If it is variant and not deviant, his own organization might have been the source. If it is deviant, the history of his organization may have been the source. Other organizations :HIHIIJ .l)e..n..l.q.h.l.... Jflluflnrt. .ufiflfifu. I y a 18 in the same institutional area may have been the source. Other organizations in other institutional areas in his society may have been the source. Finally, other organizations in other societies may have been the source. These five categories of sources of information about variant or deviant goals, norms and/or means could multiply the types of adaptation developed so far to several thousand. Clearly, this con- stitutes a prodigious typology. Many types could be eliminated as vacuous; however, as with a periodic chart, any cell that can possibly be filled becomes a prediction that it will be filled. In that sense, if in no other, these many types constitute just so many hypotheses of a theory. This research studies the value of this theory in predicting certain kinds of social change behavior. Methodological practicalities limit the information that can be gathered. Consequently, a sub- typology of this grand one will be abstracted for the purposes of the study. Only the goals and the means will be used for two reasons. First, normative standards are by their nature sub-rose operants inwthe behavior of most actors. The actor, out of awareness, operates within them. If he operates outside of them he isflpressured in some way, but he seldom understands what has happened in terms of norms. Even if he does, he usually is unable to imagine the consequences a_priori. A researcher would have to gather such data by particimgugtbservation. Second, norms are abstracted margins which a social entity puts on 19 means, behaviors, actions available for the efforts of an actor when reaching for a goal. They are defined by the actions of the actors in that social entity. Consequently, it is justifiable to focus on the means themselves. Since in this study, all commitments by respondents must at least be manifested verbally, the attitudinal types may be dropped out of consideration. Since the subjects in the research design have all been to another society and the research interest is in what action they will engage in as a consequence of that experience, only societally borrowing types need to be considered. Due to the methodological difficulties in determining over or under expression of conformity types, this dimension will be eliminated. This leaves us with the following types to be considered in the study. The table is titled variant rather than deviant because it is aSsumed that most respondents were selected to come to the United States in part because they displayed conformity to the norm structure of their organizations. The table includes four types, I, II, III, and IV which are conforming or passive rejection. It contains five types V, VI, VII, VIII, and IX which involve some kind of rejection plus substitution. These types have a program of change. The typology suggests some degree of social action on the part of the last five types. They all contain what is called societal substitution, i.e., they had sufficient objectivity with regard to their own society that they could locate and accept either goals or means or both in another society and value them more highly than goals and/or means in their own society. 20 Table 3. Typology of Modes of Variant Adaptation in Social Action Types of Variant Cultural Institutionalized Adaptation Goals Means I accepts accepts II accepts rejects III rejects accepts IV rejects rejects V accepts societal substitutes VI societal accepts substitutes VII societal societal substitutes substitutes VIII societal rejects substitutes IX rejects societal substitutes Assumptions The respondents used in this research all come from non—peasant sub-groups. They are literate in both their OWn society and that of the United States. Presumably they have all participated in organizations both at home and in the states. The assumption is made that they have become conscious of different goals and/or means of achieving goals as a result of their experience in the states. Evidence that such learning has occurred is found in the numerous 21 comments on the culture shock and Subsequent adjustments made during the stay in the United States. For almost all of these respondents the stay is so long that the tourist type of adjustment does not suffice. There is considerable evidence to indicate that those who cannot make a reality adjustment, cut short their contracted sojourn, and returned home. This suggests implications for the nature of the sample. It must be skewed toward the more change oriented end of the continuum. In fact, there is some evidence to indicate that the selection of these sojourners originally, which took place in their home societies, also contributes to skewing in the same direction. It is assumed that the subjects are basically conformists within their home organizations. The methods of selection for participation in the program and the nature of the social systems within which most of them work, both indicate that these subjects are not social deviants. Even though they have learned of substitute goals and/or means and have, therefore, a change program, the strength of their motives to conform to the status quo may be sufficient to offset any tendency to action. The strength of these motives to conform to the status quo must be measured. If a man has changes he thinks ought to be made in therorgani- zation for which he works, and does nothing to encourage the acceptance of those changes, then his lack of action indicates something about his relationship to that organization. When change is suggested the status quo is threatened. If the status quo is threatened, those who have an investment in the status quo are threatened. If the status holding leaders of the organization are threatened, those followers who are 22 subservient, "boot-lickers" are not likely to suggest change, and those followers who are insecure in their jobs, i.e., to whom their jobs are the most important institution in their life, are not likely to upset the status quo. Finally, there are followers who though not obsequious or insecure will not try to carry out changes because they feel powerless to affect change successfully. These three variables, obeisance, salience of the institution, and powerlessness are all seen as potential sources of motivation to conform to organizational practices regardless of the subject being a change i type or a non—change type in our typology. The following eleven hypotheses are deduced from the theoretical position stated. The first four hypotheses involve no interaction. Theypredict how change activity will vary with each of the independent ‘ variables. The remaining hypotheses involve interaction between variables. The principle variable is change type vs. non-change type. Each of the hypotheses involving interaction with the Merton—Dubin type and either obeisance, salience, or pOWerlessness, or with combinations of these are designed to test the effects of these latter three independent variables on the principle hypothesis, hypothesis number one (1). Theoretical Hypotheses 1. Change types (types V-IX, Table 3) will be more active in seeking changes in their scene of operations than non—change types (types I—IV, Table 3) 23 2. Change activity will vary inversely with degree of obeisance. 3. Change activity will vary inversely with degree of salience. u. Change activity will vary inversely with degree of powerlessness. 5. Change activity will be higher among change types than among non-change types, but this relationship will be relatively stronger among persons with low obeisance scores. 6. Change activity will be higher among change types than among non-change types, but this relationship will be relatively stronger among persons with low salience. 7. Change activity will be higher among change types than among non-change'types, but this relationship will be relatively stronger among persons with low powerlessness. CHAPTER III METHODOLOGY Operations There are a number of concepts involved in the theoretical hypotheses which must be operationalized to permit data collection and hypotheses testing. These include: 1. goals 2. means 3. powerlessness H. culture change activity 5. salience 6. obeisance Goals By goals Merton referred to cultural goals of great pervasiveness in a society. His example was the American striving for wealth. Goals of this order are difficult to discover for several different societies. In addition to this difficulty, actors do not think of their behavior as tending in the direction of such pervasive goals. Whether as rationalizations or as restricted frames of reference, actors respond much more readily to institutional goals than they do to cultural goals. In a Dre-study partly designed to discover cultural goals, very few subjects displayed the type of pervasiveness described by Merton. If, however, institutional goals are used, then the problem of . . ve goals becoming means and means becoming goals eXists. To sol 24 25 this problem a psychological set was created in the item, structuring the response categories as goals or means. A list of goals was made within the context of two institutions, economic and political. These two institutions were chosen because the prime employer of the subjects is their own government and the central interest of most of the occupations is economic. The list of economic goals was as follows: A. ATTRACTING CAPITAL (MONEY) B. INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY C. INCREASE TRADE D. DEVELOP RESOURCES E. IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION F. DEVELOP NEW PRODUCTS G. REDUCE UN-EMPLOYMENT H. DISTRIBUTE WEALTH EQUALLY I. RAISE STANDARDS OF LIVING J. PROMOTE INDUSTRIALIZATION The subjects were requested to rate these goals from O to 10, (the higher the rating the more important the goal) according to four different psychological sets; 1. How they perceive that their own country as a whole rated them in importance. 2. How they perceived the U.S.A. as a whole rated them in importance. 3. How they thought the goals should be rated in importance by their home country and u. How they thought the goals should be rated in importance by the U.S.A. Each of the four sets of ratings of economic goals were totalled so that each, subject had four totals for economic goals. ,These totals could vary 26 from 0 to 100. Two disparity scores were determined from these four totals. The total rating of how he thought these goals should be rated in his home society was subtracted from his total rating of how he thought these goals were rated by his home society. If the difference was large he was given a (-) for goals indicating that he rejected the economic goals of his home society as he saw them. If the difference was small he was given a (+) for goals indicating that he accepted the economic goals of his home society as he saw them. The second score was arrived at in the same manner but by calculating differences between his total rating of these goals as he saw the U.S.A. rating them and as he thought the U.S.A. should rate them. If the difference was large, then he rejected (-) the U.S.A. goals structure. If the difference was small, then he accepted (+) the U.S.A. goals structure. List of political goals was as follows: A. IMPROVE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION B. REDUCE THE COST OF GOVERNMENT C. PROMOTE A MORE STABLE GOVERNMENT D. DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY E. BEING NEUTRAL F. BEING DEMOCRATIC G. GIVING PEOPLE FREEDOM H. HAVING PEACE I. PROVIDING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL J. BEING A DOMINANT WORLD POWER 27 The same scoring procedure was followed with regard to the determination of acceptance or rejection of home society or visited society (U.S.A.) political goals. In order to set the subjects psychologically to thinking of means to achieve a goal, the goal was always mentioned in these items. The overall economic goal was ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. The overall political goal was BETTER GOVERNMENT. Thirteen economic means were rated and eleven political means were rated. Here are the two lists: ECONOMIC: A. HAVING FOREIGN INVESTMENT B. HAVING HEAVY INDUSTRY C. HAVING PRIVATE INTERNAL INVESTMENT D. HAVING ROADS AND RAILROADS E. HAVING TRAINING PROGRAMS F. HAVING LABOR PAID ON AN INCENTIVE BASIS G. HAVING ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES H. HAVING LOW TAXES I. HAVING LAND REFORM J. HAVING PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS K. HAVING LABOR UNION AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS L. HAVING SOURCES OF ELECTRICAL POWER M. HAVING IDEAS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES 28 POLITICAL: A. HAVING AN OFFICE OF THE BUDGET B. HAVING A POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM C. HAVING A STRONG JUDICIAL COURT SYSTEM D. HAVING A CONSTITUTION E. HAVING TREATIES AND ALLIANCES E. HAVING MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATION G. HAVING A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM H. HAVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE I. HAVING A STRONG MILITARY FORCE J. HAVING NO CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS K. HAVING DE-CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTAL POWER Precisely the same calculations were made for means acceptance and rejection as for goals. Each subject ended up with a (+) or a (-) for his home societies means and a (+) or a (-) for the visited societies means. (U.S.A.) Powerlessness w Powerlessness is operationalized by scoring responses to two items. The scoring for each answer alternative is indicated. The total score over the two items constituted a powerlessness score. The two items were: Sometimes I have the feeling that other people are using me. YES yes ? no NO 5 U 3 2 l g__ 29 There is little chance to get ahead in this life unless a man knows the right people. YES yes ? no N0 5 LI. 3 2 1 Cultural Change Activity The dependent variable in this thesis is how much overt action the subjects will engage in when they return to their scene of operations in their own country. A series of economic and political items placed into four situational contexts was created. This was done because almost all of the participants available for this study were government employees whose main interests were in the economic institutions of their countries. These items are listed in Table A. Each of the items was weighted to indicate relative amount of social action represented by the item. The weightings are indicated in the response blanks. A weighting of one (1) was given to any item suggesting no action to be taken. A weighting of three (3) was given for responses suggesting verbal action. A weighting of four (u) was given for responses suggesting physical actions with the single exception of response item four in situation two where revolutionary acts are suggested. This item was given five (5). A weighting of two (2) was given if they said they would leave the country or a three (3) for looking for another job, which was construed as a stronger indication of willingness to change their society than is leaving the country. 30 Table A. Change Activity Scale 1. When you return home, if your report or plans are not accepted or carried out, will you 1 l. FORGET THEM 4 2. CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS TO GAIN THEIR ACCEPTANCE 3 3. LOOK FOR ANOTHER JOB 2 H. LEAVE THE COUNTRY 2. When you return home, if you are not satisfied with your government, 1. SPEAK FREELY ABOUT YOUR OPPOSITION 2. BECOME ACTIVE IN THE OPPOSITE POLITICAL PARTY 3. SAY NOTHING BUT HOPE FOR A BETTER DAY u. PARTICIPATE IN A REVOLUTIONARY ACTION 5. LEAVE THE COUNTRY 3. When you return home will you 1. SUGGEST NEW METHODS OF DOING OLD JOBS 2. SUGGEST THE PURCHASE OF ANY NEW EQUIPMENT 3. SUGGEST THAT NEW JOBS BE UNDERTAKEN u. SUGGEST THAT SOME OLD JOBS BE ELIMINATED 5. LEAVE THE COUNTRY |~ I“ iw lw i“ a. When you return home will you be 1. VERY ACTIVE IN SEEKING GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 2. SOMEWHAT ACTIVE IN SEEKING GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 3. GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRONGLY AGAINST ANY GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 4: in k, I. I... 3l Tabulation of the data on these items revealed that many were non- discriminating, i.e., almost every subject responded in a like manner to the item. When non-discriminating items Were removed, two governmental situations and one economic situation remained with the following items and weights.* 1. When you return home, if you are not satisfied with your government, will you 3 l. SPEAK FREELY ABOUT YOUR OPPOSITION l 2. SAY NOTHING, BUT HOPE FOR A BETTER DAY 2. When you return home will you 3 l. SUGGEST THE PURCHASE OF NEW EQUIPMENT 3 2. SUGGEST THAT NEW JOBS BE UNDERTAKEN 3 3. SUGGEST THAT SOME OLD JOBS BE ELIMINATED 3. When you return home will you be u l. VERY ACTIVE IN SEEKING GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 3 2. SOMEWHAT ACTIVE IN SEEKING GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 2 3. GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT IS l 4. STRONGLY AGAINST ANY GOVERNMENTAL REFORM The total score on these items constituted the cultural change activity score for each subject. Saliency To determine how salient the political and economic institutions “Item two (2) permitted multiple responses and all were totaled. Items one (1) and three (3) only permitted one response that con- tributed to the total. 32 were to the subjects they were asked to reSpond to the "who am I?" question. This operation requires the subject to respond to the question Who am I? by answering with ten or more simple sentence responses. A content analysis of these statements reveals those areas of greatest saliency to the subject. Their responses were coded as to the institutional orientation they seemed to have in the view of the author. Only the first three responses were so coded. If in these first three responses none could be classified as political or economic, a zero (0) was given. A first choice received a three (3), a second choice received a two (2), a third choice received a one (I). The highest possible score was a five (5) for first and second place. Next, a four (4) for a first and a third place. Next, a three (3) either for a first and no place or for a second and third place. Next, a two (2) for second and no place. Next, a one (1) for third and no place and finally, a zero (0) for no place. Obeisance ______.___ Obeisance is operationalized by an adaptation of a set of Guttman scale items. The total of the chosen responses is the obeisance score. The four items are: Do you ever feel like disagreeing with WHAT (your superior) wants to do or HOW he (or she) wants you to do 1t? 1 often I sometimes 2 rarely 2 never I think my supervisor knows better than I what's good for my office, or else he would not be a supervisor. 2 agree I disagree The best way to get along on my job is to mind your own bu31ness and just do as you are told disagree agree 33 I like the idea of having people in our office stand up when the manager comes in. __2__agree I disagree Change Types and Non-Change Types There are nine Merton-Dubin types of adaptation used in this study. They are listed in Table 5. These nine types are divided into two groups of four and five. The first four are called non-change types and the second five are called.change types. A respondent is given a plus or a minus for: 1. his own societies' goals; 2. his own societies' means; 3. the U.S.A.'s goals; a. the U.S.A.'s means yielding sixteen possible combinations. Each combination has four elements. A typical combination follows: Goals Means USA + + ITOME + - In this case, the subject accepts his home country's goals but rejects its means, while he accepts both the goals and the means of the United States. There are sixteen possible types. These may-be reduced to the nine Merton-Dubin types according to the following table. If the subject accepts his home goals and means, or if he rejects either or both but also rejects the comparable USA means and/or goals, he is classed as a non-change type. All others are change types. Table 5. Merton-Dubin Typology Merton-Dubin Operatigpal Types Theoretical Types Goals Means l. U.S.A. + + Home + + 2. U.S.A. + - I Home + + 3. U.S.A. ' + Home + + ’4‘. U.S.A. ' " Home + + NON 5. U.S.A. " ‘ CHANGE Home + — II TYPES 6. U.S.A. + - Home + - 7- U.S.A. - " Home - + III 8. U.S.A. - + Home - + 9. U.S.A. - " Home - - IV 10. U.S.A. + + Home + - V ll. U-SoA. " + Home + - 12. U.S.A. + + Home - + VI 130 U.S.A. + “ CHANGE Home — + TYPES 11+. UlS-A. + + Home - - VII 15' UISQA. + " Home - - VIII 16. U.S.A. - + Home - — IX 35 Administration The subjects used in the data collection for testing the hypotheses of this research were participants in the Agency for International Development program. The AID is an arm of the Department of State of the United States Government. It is charged with the responsibility of administration of the United States foreign aid programs. One of the AID's many tasks involves bringing people from "developing" nations to the United States to study and observe. These people are referred to as participants. AID participants come mostly from Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and Southeast Asia. Additionally participants come from Spain, Yugoslavia and Korea. The participants are full time employees of government agencies, bureaus or departments, or in private industry. They are not students. Most of them are married and have children. They occupy positions of management ranging from the lowest to the highest level of management and administration.* The participants are selected by a complex process. Some apply for the program. Some are assigned by superiors. Some are recommended for the program by advisors from the U.S. The participants must meet certain requirements set up by their own government as well as by AID personnel in each participating country. The participants are flown to the 0.8. and assigned to a project manager, who is a man qualified to work out a program of study and/or observation in the U.S. The participant attends a brief orientation and language seminar in Washington, D.C. His program may last any length of time from six M o ' . . “See Appendix B for demographic description of sample. -.-.— «w H—«~ 36 months to two years, although no definite limit is set by law or rule. Most participants speak English and travel through their program by themselves. Occasionally participants from a single country and in the same occupational area travel through their program together. Occasionally they travel in country groups because they can't under- stand English well and so must have interpreters. The participant usually spends some period of time in one part of the U.S. where he studies in an organized program, usually at a university, an academy or a military institute. After such study the participant travels to several different parts of the U.S. to visit operating organizations where he observes how the task he performs in his home society is carried out in the U.S. Some participants only go through this observation part of the usual program. At the end of a participant's program - usually one or two weeks before he leaves the U.S. to return home - he attends a one week seminar on human communications. It was during this week that the data for this research were collected. Final Data Schedule Three hundred and sixty subjects responded to the questionnaire voluntarily over a six month period from January 1963 through June 1963. The schedule was administered to groups of from nineteen to fifty—nine in size. The administration always took place on either Tuesday or Wednesday afternoon. This permitted a sufficient amount of rapport to develop between the interviewer and the subjects, who had met each other on the previous Sunday afternoon. 37 Before the schedules were passed out, the interviewer discussed in general the value of social science research, and in particular the value of doing research in a cross-cultural setting. The confidential nature of the information gathered was stressed. No names Were taken. The subjects all volunteered to answer. They were encouraged to leave the session if they had any reservations about completing the schedule. During the six months, 13 subjects availed themselves of the opportunity. Seven other participants left without completing the questionnaire. The subjects were strongly encouraged to answer every item, but were told that if there were some items they preferred not to answer that it would be alright. They were encouraged not to answer any item which they felt might reveal their identity. The instructions to each of the several parts of the schedule were read aloud and questions were invited. There were always questions. The Subjects were strongly encouraged, several times before the schedules were distributed and several times during the period for responding to raise their hands if they had any questions at all. Particularly, if they had any question of the interpretation of items, they were encouraged to ask questions. They were asked to read the instructions at the tOp of each page carefully before proceeding. They were asked to read each item carefully and thoroughly, but to answer as quickly as possible. They were instructed that in no case were there any 'right‘ answers - that the author was interested in their personal opinion or evaluation of an item. They were cautioned several times about the importance of understanding the perceptual stance each item required. Particularly was this important for answering the first twelve pages on goals and means. 38 The subjects required from thirty-five minutes to two hours to complete the schedule. Most of this variation was due to language difficulty. The author was constantly answering questions by moving about the room and responding to raised hands by speaking privately to each hand raiser. It is this aSpect of the schedule administration that is referred to as a group interview technique. The author's challenge here was to answer all questions by trying to cast the intention of the item or instructions into the vocabulary of the Subject. Any technique was used - examples - analogies — similes - asking questions back to the subject and using his answers as cues to other structures, which might clarify for the subject the author's intention in the item or instruction. Consequently, this research schedule is in no sense the same written schedule for each subject. It is hoped, and every effort was made to assure that it served as a stimulus to elicit the same meaning structures on the part of each subject as the author intended. The frequent question-and- answer exchanges gave the administrator an opportunity to achieve this goal. CHAPTER IV FINDINGS Each respondent was classed as a change type or a non-change type in both the economic and political institutional areas. Each respondent was classed as either high or low in (1) Obeisance, (2) Powerlessness and (3) Salience. The score each respondent got on the change activity scale was used as the criterion variable in an analysis of variance design. The error term was calculated from a generalized formulation of the equation listed in Walker and Lev for unequal but proportional cell sizes. (33, pp 381-382) The generalized formula was used to account for non-proportional N cell sizes. The hypotheses will be reported as listed in the last chapter within the economic Sphere and within the political sphere. Three hundred and ten (310) respondents completed the questionnaires well enough to be used in the analysis of the economic institutional setting. Eighty nine (89) of these were classed as economic change types, two hundred and twenty one (221) were classed as economic non-change types. 39 40 Ho>mH Ho. season uamUHMHamHm aa Ho>oH mo. daemon udmowmwstm % aaam.o aom.o H som.o mama H Sod H wmoé 8m «saa.om aa~.e H Nam.s Qua sawm.HH Ham.H H Hwn.H am< atom.m Ham.H H Ham.H mm N~.m aeq.o H ass.o no 0H.H ‘ NoH.o H NeH.o o< sass.om ssw.~ H ssw.~ amass amemsu ansmusOuuozv Q s«mm.H~ amo.m H amo.m AooawHHsmv o «roo.qH mno.w H mNo.N AmmocmmoHuoBomv m H Hoo.o H Hoo.o Amosmmwonov 4 msHm> m ouwovm Eowooum moumsvw aowumwum> awe: mo moouwom we saw mo mounom soHusuHumsH owsoaoum .oosufinm> mo mwmmHmu< .o oHan 41 Hypothesis 1. Change types will have higher change activity scores than non-change types. Table 7. Mean Change Activity Scores by Merton-Dubin Change Types change type non-change type Mean Change Activity 6.61 5.75 N 89 221 F = 20.46; p (1.01 The difference is significant and the hypothesis is confirmed. Those respondents with substitute goals and or means are more likely to participate in change activity than those who do not have substitute goals and means. Low Obeisance vs. High Obeisance Of the 310 respondents, 157 were classed as low in obeisance and 153 as high in obeisance. The range of obeisance scores were from 0 - 7. The mean was 2.7. Those above the mean were classed as high in obeisance. Table 8. Mean Change Activity Scores by Obeisance Low Hi h Mean Average Change Activity Score 5.9 6.0 N 157 153 F = 0.0074; p>.05 The difference is not significant. The hypothesis is not confirmed. 42 Those respondents who are low in obeisance do not have higher change activity scores than those who are high in obeisance. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Low Salience vs. High Salience 0f the 310 respondents 179 were classed as low in salience and 131 as high in salience. The saliaxce scores ranged from 0 - 6. The mean was 3.4. Those above the mean were high in salience. Hypothesis 3: Change activity scores vary inversely with salience. Table 9. Mean Change Activity Scores by Salience Low High Mean Average Change Activity Score 6.6 5.7 N 179 131 F = 21.99; p<.01 The difference is significant and the hypothesis is confirmed. Those respondents who are low in salience have higher change activity scores than those who are high in salience. Low Powerlessness vs. High Powerlessness Of the 310 respondents 161 were classed as low in powerlessness and 149 were classed as high in powerlessness. The range of powerless- ness scores was 1 - 5. The mean was 3.2. Those above the mean were high in powerlessness. 43 Hypothesis 4: Change activity scores vary inversely with powerlessness. Table 10. Mean Change Activity Scores by Powerlessness Low High Mean Average Change Activity Score 6.6 5.8 N 161 149 F = 14.96; p 41.01 The difference is significant. The hypothesis is confirmed. Merton-Dubin Types of Obeisance Hypothesis 5: Change types will have higher change activity scores than non-change types, but this relationship will be stronger among those with relatively low obeisance scores. Read table vertically. Table 11. Mean Change Activity Scores by Obeisance, by Merton-Dubin Types Obeisance Low Hi h M D E U Change 6.5 6-3 R B T I N 43 46 O N N Non-change 5.8 5.9 TYPES N 114 107 F = 1.16; p>.05 The differences are not significant. The hypothesis is not confirmed. I 44 Merton-Dubin Types by Salience Hypothesis 6: Change types will have higher change activity scores than non-change types, but this relationship will be stronger among those with relatively low salience scores. Table 12. Mean Change Activity Scores by Saligpce, by Merton-Dubin Types Salience Low Hi h M D Change 6.7 6.0 E U R B N 51 38 T I O N N Non-change 6.4 5.1 ‘ TYPES N 128 93 1 F = 3.22; p>.05 The differences are not significant. The hypothesis is not confirmed. Merton—Dubin Types by Powerlessness Hypothesis 7: Change types will have higher change activity scores than non-change types, but this relationship Will be stronger among those with relatively low powerlessness scores. Table 13. Mean Change Activity Score by Powerlessness, by Merton-Dubin Types Powerlessness M D Low Hi h E U R B Change 7.3 6.0 T I 0 N N 49 40 N TYPES Non-change 5.8 5-8 N 112 109 F = 9.86;;><:.01 45 The differences are significant. The hypothesis is confirmed. Change types with low powerlessness have higher change activity scores than non-change types with low powerlessness. Low powerlessness change types have higher change activity scores than high powerlessness. Low powerlessness change types have higher change activity scores than high powerlessness change types. Merton-Dubin Types by Obeisance by Powerlessness No hypotheses were made about higher order interactions, however, where such higher order interactions proved to be significant the data are reported. Table 14. Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance by Powerlessness by Merton-Dubin Types Obeisance M D Low P High P Low P High P E U R B Change 6.6 6.9 7.9 5.1 T I O N N 27 16 22 24 N TYPES Non—change 5.6 5.8 6.1 5.6 N 58 56 54 53 F = 11.38; p<.01 The interaction is significant. The non-change subjects have very similar mean change activity scores, but they are significantly lower than the change subjects. Among the change type subjects those with high obeisance and low powerlessness are significantly higher than the others and those with high obeisance and high powerlessness are significantly lower than the other classes. 46 Merton-Dubin Types by Obeisance by Salience No hypothesis was made with regard to this interaction, but since the interaction was Significant, the data are reported. Table 15. Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance and Salience by Merton-Dubin Types Obeisance 1 M D Low Sal. High Sal. Low Sal. High Sal. E U R B Change 6.2 7.2 7.6 5.4 T I O N N 31 12 20 26 N TYPES Non-change 6.5 4.8 6.2 5.5 N 63 51 65 52 F = 30.77; p<.01 The interaction is significant. The low obeisance high salience and the high obeisance low salience change types have significantly higher means change activity scores than any other class of Subject. The low obeisance, high salience non-change type have Significantly lower mean change activity scores than any other class of subjects. Merton-Dubin Types by Obeisance by Powerlessness by Salience No hypothesis was made with regard to this interaction, but Since the interaction was Significant the data are reported. 47 Table 16. Mean Change Activity Scores by Obeisance and Powerlessness and Salience by Merton-Dubin Types Obeisance Low P High P Low P High P Low 8. High S. Low S. High S. Low S. High S. Low S. High S. M D E U Change 6.4 6.7 5.9 ’ 7.8 8.9 7.0 6.3 3.8 R B T I N 20 7 ll 5 9 13 11 13 O N N Non-Change 6.2 409 6.8 4.8 6.7 5.4 5.7 5.5 TYPES N 33 25 30 26 31 23 34 19 F = 6.97; p“:.01 The interaction is significant. The high obeisant, low power- lessness, low salience change-type Subjects have significantly higher mean change activity scores than any other class of subjects. Those subjects who are high in obeisance, powerlessness and salience, and who are change types are significanly lower in mean change activity scores than any other class of subjects. Political Institution Table seventeen contains the analysis of variance with resultant F-values for main effects and all interactions for the palitical institutional context. 48 Table 17. Analysis of Variance; Political Institution Source of Sum of Degree of Mean Variation §gp§ges Freegphi 4§qugg F Value A (obeisance 0.432 1 0.432 2.73 B (powerlessness) 1.137 1 1.137 7.20** C (salience) 6.687 1 6.687 42.32** D (Merton-Dubin type) 0.638 1 0.638 4.04* AD 0.130 1 0.130 (1 CD 1.545 1 1.545 9.78** BD 0.001 1 0.001 41 ABD 0.340 1 0.340 2.15 ACD 0.919 1 0.919 5.82* 1300 0.000 1 0.000 < 1 ABCD 0.032 1 0.032 .<:l * significant beyond .05 level ** significant beyond .01 level Change Types vs. Non-change Types Three hundred and one (301) respondents completed the questionnaire well enough to be used in the analysis of the political setting. Eighty seven (87) of these were classed as political change types. Two hundred and fourteen (214) were classed as political non-change types. Hypothesis I: Change types will have higher change activity scores than non-change types. 49 Table 18. Mean Change Activity Score by Merton-Dubin Change Types Change Non-change Change 5.6 6.6 N 87 214 F = 4.04; p<.os The difference is significant, but in the wrong direction. The hypothesis is not confirmed. Non-change types have higher average change activity scores than change types. Low Obeisance vs. High Obeisance Hypothesis 2: Change activity scores vary inversely with obeisance scores. Table 19. Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance £23 High Change 5.8 6.1 N 153 148 F = 2.73; p):>».05 The difference is non significant. The hypothesis is not confirmed. Change activity scores do not vary inversely with obeisance. Low Powerlessness vs. High Powerlessness Hypothesis 3: Change activity scores vary inversely with powerlessness scores. 50 Table 20. Mean Change Activity Score by Powerlessness £01 m Change 6.1 5.5 N 149 152 F = 7.199; p-<;.01 The difference is significant. The hypothesis is confirmed. Change activity scores do vary inversely with powerlessness scores. Low Salience vs. High Salience Hypothesis 4: Change activity scores vary inversely with salience scores 0 Table 21. Mean Change Activity Score by Salience 193 High Change 6.5 5.2 N 125 176 F = 42.32; p<.01 The difference is significant. The hypothesis is confirmed. Change activity scores vary inversely with salience scores. Change Type by Obeisance Hypothesis 5: Change types will have higher average change activity scores than non-change types, but this relationship will be made stronger among people with relatively low obeisance scores. 51 Table 22. Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance by Merton-Dubin Types M D Obeisance E U pol High R B T I Change 5.7 5.7 O N N N 38 49 TYPES Non-change 5.8 6.3 N 115 99 F = 0.820; p>—.05 The differences are not significant. The hypothesis is not confirmed. Change Type by Salience Hypothesis 6: Change types will have higher change activity scores than non-change types, but this relationship will be stronger among those with relatively low salience scores. Table 23. Mean Change Activity Score by Salience by Merton-Dubin Types M D Salience E U 1.6a Lisa R B T I Change 6.6 4.6 O N N N 47 40 TYPES Non-change 6.4 5.7 N 135 89 F = 9.779; p<.01 The differences are significant. The hypothesis is confirmed. 52 Among low salience respondents change types have higher change activity scores than non-change types. Among high salience respondents change types have lower change activity scores than non-change types. Among change types and non-change types low saliencerespondents have higher change activity scores than high salient respondents. Merton-Dubin Change Type by Powerlessness Hypothesis 7: Change types will have higher change activity scores than non-change types, but this relationship will be stronger among those with relatively low powerlessness scores. Table 24. Mean Change Activity Score by Powerlessness by Merton-Dubin Types M D Powerlessness E U hpy High R B T I Change 5.7 5.5 O N N N 47 40 TYPES Non-change 6.3 58 N . 110 104 F = 0.008; p>.05 The differences are not significant. The hypothesis is not confirmed. Change activity scores are not higher for change types than for non- change types when powerlessness is considered. 53 Merton-Dubin Change Type by Obeisgpce by Powerlessness No hypotheses were constructed concerning higher order inter- actions. where they produced significant differences the data are given. Merton-Dubin Change Type by Obeisance by Salience No hypotheses were constructed concerning higher order inter- actions. Where they produced significant differences, the data are given. Table 25. Mean Change Activity Score by Obeisance and Salience by Merton-Dubin Type Obeisance 193 High M D Low S. High S. Low S. High S. E U R B Change 6.1 5.0 7.0 4.4 T I O N N 23 15 24 25 N TYPES Non-change 6.2 5.3 6.5 6.0 N 69 46 56 43 F = 5.821; p<:.05 The interaction is significant. The high obeisance, low salience change-type Subjects have significantly higher mean change activity scores than any other class. The high obeisance, high salience change-type subjects have a significantly lower mean change activity score than any other class of subjects. 54 Summary of Findings 1. In the economic institutional setting change types, i.e., those respondents who have substitute goals and/or means that they have learned about in the United States, say they will participate in change activity to a significantly greater degree than non—change types. However, in the political institutional setting change types say they will participate in change activity to a significantly lesser degree than non-change types. 2. In both political and economic institutions high and low obeisance, i.e., the willingness of the respondent to, or feeling of respondent that he umst comply to wishes of superiors, does not differentiate significantly between high and low change activity scores. 3. In both political and economic institutions high and low salience, i.e., the degree to which the respondent identifies with the institutional values, does differentiate, significantly, between high and low change activity scores. ReSpondents who have low salience have higher change activity scores. 4. In both political and economic institutions high and low powerlessness, i.e., the degree to which the respondents feel alienated from the institution, does differentiate, significantly, between high and low change activity scores. Respondents who have low powerlessness have higher change activity scores. 5. In both political and economic institutions, when low and high obeisance respondents are divided into change types and non-change types, there are no significant differences in change activity scores. ‘ll'l‘J 55 6. In the economic institution, when low and high salience respondents are divided into change types and non-change types, there are no significant differences in change activity scores. However, in the political institution, when low and high salience respondents are divided into change types and non-change types, there are significant differences in change activity scores. Low salience change types have the highest change activity scores. 0n the other hand, high salience change types have the lowest mean change activity score. 7. In the economic institution when low and high powerlessness are divided into change types and non-change types, there are significant differences in change activity scores. Low powerlessness change types have the highest change activity scores. However, in the political institution, there are no significant differences in change activity scores when high and low powerlessness respondents are divided by change types and non-change types. 8. Among higher order interactions, which were not involved in the hypotheses, those interactions which were significant were reported. ilI'J CHAPTER IV IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION Change Types vs. Non-change Types The Merton-Dubin theory suggests that change types, those subjects who have substitute goals and/or means, are more likely to engage in change activity than those who are non-change types. The present study indicates that when the goals and means concerned relate to the economic aspects of their jobs, they do conform to the Merton-Dubin hypothesis. However, when the goals and means are related to the political aspects of their jobs, just the reverse of the Merton-Dubin hypothesis obtains. The only explanation for this findings seems to lie in the peculiar nature of the jobs most of the subjects in this re- search have. These subjects work for their governments. The hirings, firings, promotions, statuses, etc. are all determined by a political context. However, their function is, for the most part, economic. They are employed in bringing about economic development in their countries. It is not difficult to understand that the Merton-Dubin change types when economic goals and means are used to define change type would participate in change activity, whereas the change types defined EXHBQliEEEQlHHQ§l§m§nd means may not participate in change activity. Those who are change types economically have a sanction to produce change. The economic changes they attempt are a function of their job. No such sanction exists for change activity on the part of those who are change types defined by political goals and means. They 56 r______’ 1 57 have indicated that they want to change things politically but they have no sanction to do so and since their structural position relies upon the preservation of the present condition they are not likely to actually attempt such change activity. The difficult group of subjects to explain are those who were defined by their attitude toward political goals and means as non-change types, yet, who have higher mean change activity scores than those who were classed as political change-types. The data does indicate that a disproportionately large number of these political non-change types have low salience for the political institution as indicated in Table 23. One possible explanation for the findings could involve this disproportionality of salience. The data follows: Table 26. Mean Change Activity Scores by Salience by Merton-Dubin Types Salience M D Ipy High E U R B Change 6.56 4.65 T I O N N 47 40 N TYPES Non-change 6.35 5.67 N 135 89 The highest mean change activity score is for low salient change types, which is what we would expect for not only low salient types but for change types. The fact that non-change types with low salience far exceeds change types with high salience indicates the importance of salience 58 in change activity in the political institution. The high non-change type who have high salience suggests that some undetermined variable is operating that needs isolation and consideration in some further study. Obeisance The Pearlin theory suggests that subjects with low obeisance will be most likely to engage in change activity. Among both the economic and political change types this hypothesis is not supported. Even when obeisance and change type are permitted to interact, obeisance does not produce significant differences in change activity scores. While we cannot say anything meaningful about higher order interactions, it does seem that when obeisance, salience and change type interact, obeisance does seem to have a significant effect on change activity scores. To isolate this effect and measure it will have to be left to further research. Powerlessness One of the most useful index of alienation is the concept of powerlessness. Alienation may produce a strong desire to change the System but if powerlessness results, the actual amount of change activity should go down. In both the economic and the political institutional contexts low powerlessness subjects said they would participate in significantly more change activity than did high powerlessness subjects. Within the economic sphere there were 161 subjects with low powerlessness. Their mean change activity score was 6.6. When these were divided into 59 change types and non-change types, only 49 were change types. These 49 had programs of change that they wanted to carry out, and were low in powerlessness. They did have significantly higher mean change activity scores. Their score was 7.3, significantly higher than those who, (1) were low in powerlessness but had no programs of change, (2) were high in powerlessness and had a program of change, and (3) those who had programs of change but who were high in powerlessness. In the political sphere the same tendency was indicated although the inter~ action between change type and powerlessness was not significant. What tended to happen was that those who had the highest change activity scores, i.e., the non-change types, those who did not have programs of change, and who did feel less powerlessness had the highest mean change activity scores. However, these differences were not significant and further research will have to be done in order to sort out the relationship between change types and powerlessness in the political areas. Salience The theory suggests that those subjects who have high salience for an institution will be less interested in changing it than those who have less salience for that institution. Further, it Suggests that those who have programs of change and low salience will be most highly motivated to engage in change activity. In the economic institution low salience subjects had significantly higher mean change activity scores than those with high salience. When salience and change type interact, change types with low salience do indeed have higher mean change activity scores but the 1||l . {IiJ 60 differences are not significant because salience appears to have a greater effect on non-change types than on change types. The split in mean change activity scores for change types when salience is considered yields 0.7 points, while for non-change types, the difference is 1.3 points. There is interaction but it is not statistically significant. In the political institution salience makes a significant difference in the predicted direction. When salience and change type interact, the interaction is significant and in the predicted direction. This is most noteworthy considering that in the political institution change type produced significant differences but in the wrong direction. Apparently, when subjects have programs of change and have low salience for the political institution, they have high change activity potential. Subjects who do not have programs of change and who have low salience for the political institution also have a high change activity potential. Apparently the influence of Subjects with low salience is high in the political institution. In general, change type interacting with powerlessness is the best predictor tested in this research when the changes are economic in nature. Change type interacting with salience is the best predictor tested in this research when the changes are political in nature. Research in any field is analogous to communication. The theory becomes the researcher's context of meaning. The hypotheses become his specific thOughts about a particular topic. His overt behavior, both verbal and non-verbal, become the operationalizations IlchJ 61 of these hypotheses. His questionnaire schedule, interview items, etc., become the message. The respondents are his receivers. The data becomes feedback. If the feedback is positive, his hypotheses are confirmed. If the feedback is negative, his hypotheses are questioned. If the feedback is negative, the researcher must estimate the nature of the information contained in the feedback and apply it to the appropriate part of the research process so as to correct for error. In behavioral research the researcher has to contend with receivers who also have theories about the world. Consequently, the researcher may be 1) wrong-headed in his theory about the world; 2) wrong-headed in his translation of opinions into operations; or 3) wrong~headed about the nature of his respondents. These three parts of the process are the major targets at which negative feedback may be aimed. In this study there was sufficient, positive feedback to indicate that there is value in a continued pursuit of the process. The Merton—Dubin typology Suggests that change activity should be related to the presence or absence of a change program, i.e., does the agent wish to change anything? The conclusions indicate that in the economic institution this hypothesis is supported, but in the political institution it is not supported. There was a hidden assumption about the respondents, which may account for the conflicting results. The assumption that the respondents bore the same relationship to and meaning for the two in- stitutional areas is highly questionable in light of the information Supplied by the differences in feedback. 62 The respondents work for governmental agencies, but their primary concern is with economic matters. All over the world there is more and more of this type of split. The individual's structural ties of position, status, job security, job description, day to day inter- action with others is found more in the political institution, but his functional ties of examining means-end relationships, efficiency of operation to reach Specified goals, the design of change programs is found more in the economic institution. In other instances, the functional ties may be in the military, the educational, the health, the recreational, etc. institutions. This division of allegiance between structural and functional ties and affiliations could account for some of the variation in the data. A respondent who has changes in mind for his structurally relevant organization may not be willing to be active in carrying out these changes because such activity may be viewed by him as inviting threats to his position, status and/or job security. A reapondent who does not have changes in mind for his structurally relevant organization, on the other hand, may indicate that he would be willing to participate in change activity in that organizational setting knowing that he will not have to because he has no change program. Thus non-change types have higher change activity Scores than change types when the or- ganizational setting is more structurally relevant than functionally relevant. A respondent who has changes in mind for his functionally relevant organization will not be reluctant to participate in change activity because he perceives no threat to his position, status, or 63 job security from his functionally relevant organization. 0n the other hand, a respondent, who has no changes in mind for his functionally relevant organization will not be any more likely to participate in change activity in his functionally relevant organi- zation than in his structurally relevant organization given no change program there either. When the measures of obeisance and salience that were used in this study are examined it turns out that there is a structural- functional bias built into these measurements. The instrument used to measure obeisance contained items that consistantly referred the subject to his position and that of his superior. He is referred to the organi- zational structure not function. However, the measurement of salience avoided specific mention of structural or functional elements and tapped both institutions equally by the "Who am I" question. This may partially explain why the data supported the salience hypotheses and failed to support the obeisance hypotheses. This structure-function analysis of an individual's relationship to his organization and to change activity deserves further research consideration. Theoretical Implications Merton and Dubin suggest that people who reject and substitute goals and or means within their own organization and society are more likely to participate in change activity than those who accept the goals and or means of their own organization and society. This im- plication is made by the examples they use and the names they use to IIIJ illustrate and identify the different patterns of adjustment, e.g., innovators, rebels, etc. ‘This study suggests that the above relation- ship may hold in the context of some institutions and not in others. “al-“.- Although no data are available to teSt the hypothesis, the present research suggests the possibility that when the institutional context is functionally relevant to the Subject, but not structurally relevant, the Merton-Dubin theory will be confirmed. However, it also indicates that when the institutional context is structurally relevant to the subject, but not functionally relevant, the Merton-Dubin theory might not be confirmed. These variables need to be systematically controlled and tested for relationship to change activity. Pearlin suggests that powerlessness and obeisance are related to communication behavior in a social system. While this hypothesis is not directly related to change activity, it was felt that highly obeisant subjects would be less likely to participate in change activity even if they had a program of change, than those who were low in obeisance. The findings did not indicate that obeisance was a significant variable in predicting change activity. In the higher order interactions, obeisance displays some differentiating behavior which needs further investigation. In alienation studies, powerlessness stands out as the most useful index of alienation research. But nothing is said about the relationship of powerlessness and actual participation in change activity. The present research indicates that while high powerless- ness may motivate the search for a program of change it definitely curbs the amount of actual change activity. The implication for .5 alienation theory is that powerlessness is not sufficient to produce change activity, whether of an evolutionary or revolutionary form. The final theory involved is a derivative of Meadion self theory. The ”Who am I" question reveals relevant institutional and group identification with a subject's sense of who he is. If these are important to him he does not want them to be threatened by change. Consequently, when a subject has high salience for an organization or institution he will not participate in change activity. The research supports this thesis consistently. Practical Implications This research has certain practical implications for the selection of cross cultural change agents. 1. A selection device should be developed to indicate those most likely to develop programs of change in the economic institution. 2. A selection device should be developed to indicate degree of feelings of powerlessness. 3. A selection device should be developed to indicate degree of feelings of salience to the political institution. 4. If change is to be sought in the economic institution, agents who are likely to develop programs of change and who are low in feelings of powerlessness are more likely to participate in change activity. . .7 5. If change is to be sought in the political institution, } agents who are likely to develop programs of change and who \ have low salience for the political institution are more likely \ to participate in change activity. \ \ illllIJ REFERENCES Bell, Daniel, Work and Its Discontents, Beacon Press, Boston, 1956. Bennett, J. W., Passin, H., McKnight, R. K., In Search of Identity University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1958. Browning, C. J., et. al., "On the Meaning of Alienation," ASR, 26, Oct., 1961, 780-781. Clark, John P., "Measuring Alienation within a Social System," ASR, 2”, Aug. 1959, 899-852. ‘3 Cloward, Richard A., Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and Deviant Behavior ASR, 24, 1959, 64-176. Davids, Anthony, "Alienation, Social Apperception, and Ego Structure," J. of Consult. Psych., 19, Feb. 1955, 21-27. Dean, Dwight G., "Alienation: and Political Apathy," Social Forces, 38, March 1960, 185-189. Dean, Dwight G., "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement," ASR 26 Oct., 1961, 753-758. fljDubin, Robert, "Deviant Behavior and Social Structure; Continuities in Social Theory," ASR 29, 1959, 147—176. Faunce, William A., Occupational Involvement and Selective Testing of Self Esteem, Paper read at the ASA meeting, September, 1959. Goldrich, Daniel, "Legitimacy and Politicization: A Conceptual Scheme for the Analysis of Political Change in Latin America," mimeo, Aug., 1962. Haja, Jan, "Alienation and Integration of Student Intellectuals," ASR, 26, Oct., 1961, 758-777. Josephson, Eric (ed.) Man Alone, Alienation in Modern Society, Dell Productions, 1962, N. Y. Kecskemeti, Paul, The Unexpected Revolution. Kelman, Herbert G., Processes of Opinion Change, Public Opin, Quart., Vol. 25, Spring, 1961. Kirchheimer, 0., ”The Party in Mass Society," World Politics, 10 Jan., 1958, 289—294. Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society. Lerner, Daniel, The Passing of Traditional Sociegy. Levin, Murray 8., The Alienated Voter, Politics in Boston. 66 21 22 23 29. 25. 30. 31. 32 67 Martindale, Don, American Society McDill, E.L., "Anomie, authoritarianism, prejudice, and socio- economic status," Social Forces, 39, March, 1961. Merton, Robert K., Social Conformity, Deviation, and Opportunity- structure; A comment on the contribution of Dubin and Cloward, ASR 29, 1959, 177-189. Merton, Robert K., Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, 111., Free Press, 1999. Morris, Richard T., The Two Way Mirror, Univ. of Minn. Press, Minneapolis, 1960. Neal, Arthur, "Stratification Concomitants of Powerlessness and Normlessness: A Study in Political and Economic Alienation," Ph.D., 1959. Neal, Arthur G., and Salomon Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-Manual Workers," ASR, 28 Aug., 1963, 599-608. Nettler, Gwynn, "A Measure of Alienation," ASR, 22, Dec., 1957, 670—677. Nisbet, Robert A., Community and Power, Oxford University Press. Pappenheim, Fritz, The Alienation of Modern Man, Monthly Review Press, 1959. Pearlin, L. I., "Alienation from Work," ASR, 27, June, 1962, 31u-326. Runciman, W. G., Social Science and Political Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965. Seeman, Melvin, "Alienation and Social Learning in a Reformitory," ASR, 29, Nov., 1963, 270-284. Walker, H. and Lev, J., Statistical Inference, N. Y., Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1953. APPENDIX A 69 1. Here is a list of goals that any country might have. I want to know how YOUR COUNTRY rates these goals in degree of importance. I do not want your opinion on the importance of these goals. I want to know how important your country as a whole considers them. Rate each goal from O-lO, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. You do not have to use every rate. country feels the following goals are rated in importance ATTRACTING CAPITAL (MONEY) INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY INCREASE TRADE DEVELOPE RESOURCES IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPE NEW PRODUCTS REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT DISTRIBUTE WEALTH EQUALLY RAISE STANDARDS OF LIVING PROMOTE INDUSTRIALIZATICN OTHER country feels the following goals are rated in importance IMPROVE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION REDUCE THE COST OF GOVERNMENT /\ ’\ I‘ r'\ r\ I\ IN /\ C. PROMOTE A MORE STABLE GOVERNMENT ( D. DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY ( E. BEING NEUTRAL ( F. BEING DEMOCRATIC ( G. GIVING PEOPLE FREEDOM ( H. HAVING PEACE ( I. PROVIDING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL ( J. BEING A DOMINANT WORLD POWEP ( K. OTHER ( . . , . .._ .. ., . . .. _. . . . . ' _ I u . _. ‘ . . " - . . --—.—- _ . _ . _ _ _ . ,. '. 'u' ‘- f ’ -. . ‘. ... ' A ' . _ _ _ a . ._ . ...... -. . .-.-..-. A .7“ _ I . . . . g . '.-.- - ~- ~ ,- 1 . . .' . ... I. . . . . h+nn . . .. . . - I . .. ....-._... . . .. .. .. . . - . ...... .. . . . . ... .. .. . ' I .. .---...__.......... . ...- ...“-.- .. ~ I - I .. . . ._-..__-...-,__.__..——___ ——~------—--.-h - ~----- -' I l ‘ . . . . . .._.........-..- ... -..---~__-. .-..-.. ——---— h - I . --1_1____-__--__.1 -1 _ - ”' ” . n h ' . . --_----1--~---__--L_1.----- ' "‘ ‘ -_-~.-------.n-u.. . I .. I . u-.-——s-- —-—-~—— - ‘1‘ -G. .~-.. n. . I ' . .-..-.....-......__-..-_-----..._._..- -... .. ...-.._.-.....- .....-.. . -- -...-.... .._-.. .. . T . ‘ \ . , . . . - .-..-._._.. .....-..Q -—.~. ~- —..-—. I - " . — ——— ... A-u—up. ... n . v ' . .----—---- .-_. --_. . l '- .-.- -.—- .... .1. " .---_-..-.-._-.. . T 1 —.--—._.—_-—~—--..— . . I -. ‘ ....--_.--... .. .- ‘ . . -._....... ..-..- -..... -.._. ... 70 Here is a list of goals that any country might have. I want to know how the U.S.A. rates these goals in degree of importance. I do 223 want your opinion on the importance of these goals. I want to know how important the U.S.A. as a whole considers them. Rate each goal frofi‘5:I5:“E§IEE_?EE higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. You do not have to use every rate. U.S.A. feels the following goals are rated in importance ATTRACTING CAPITAL (MONEY) r" v INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY f'\ V INCREASE TRADE DEVELOPE RESOURCES /\ zx IMPROVE TRANSPORTATI,N \ v DEVELOPE NEW PRODUCTS IN v REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT /\ v DISTRIBUTE WEALTH EQUALLY (N v RAISE STANDARDS OF LIVING r\ v PROMOTE INDUSTRIALIZATION ( ) OTHER IN v U.S.A. feels the following goals are rated in importance IMPROVE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION IN v REDUCE THE COST OF GOVERNMENT ( ) PROMOTE A MORE STABLE GOVERNMENT xx v DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY BEING NEUTRAL /\ (K v BEING DEMOCRATIC N v GIVING PEOPLE FREEDOM ( ) HAVING PEACE f‘ v PROVIDING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL ( ) BEING A DOMINANT WORLD POWER ’ ) OTHEP (K V o . ., . . u: ‘ . - r -' . I. . v . n . I . , . ~.,.-.. , ‘ ._J . _. ‘ . ._ .. ' ,. . I . . . - '_._—...~——..-....... -.-. ....._.. ... .... .-.- ' -. -....._..-........_ ...—“.._..-“ .-..-U. .... . . ..--.-.- .-.... .. w. ..-. . -.-. . ...... -e . l ' '-...—-.. l ‘. n l . I ' n - n . v . . 1 0‘ o- ' , _. .- _ . a . . 1 ‘ . .. . .,_ _.-. m “I.,... ... . .. . . , . .. -.. —. .._- - . - u ‘ “'“---- --. .-.._,.-..-..... ... 1. Here is a list of goals that any country might have. I want to know how YOU think your country SHOULD rate these goals in degree of impogfgnce. I am not interested in how your countrv does rate them but I'm interested in how YOU think your country SHOULD rate them. 2. Rate each goal from 0—10, EEIhg the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. H. You do not have to use every rate. I think my country SHOULD rank these goals as follows A. ATTRACTING CAPITAL (MONEY) w r\ v . INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY /\ V C. INCREASE TRADE U I‘ v . DEVELOPE RESOURCES LT} 25 v . IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION . DEVELOPE NEW PRODUCTS "'1 [K IN V G. REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT ( ) H. DISTRIBUTE WEALTH EQUALLY /\ v I. RAISE STANDARDS OF LIVING IK v J. PROMOTE INDUSTRIALIZATION IN v K. OTHEP ( ) I_think my country SHOULD rank these goals as follows A. IMPROVE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 1" v B. REDUCE THE COST OF GOVERNMENT /\ V C. PROMOTE A MORE STABLE GOVERNMENT ( ) D. DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY ( ) E. BEING NEUTRAL ( ) "1 . BEING DEMOCRATIC IN V G. GIVING PEOPLE FREEDOM ( ) H. HAVING PEACE ( ) I. PROVIDING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL ( ) J. BEING A DOMINANT WORLD PONEP ( ) K. OTHEP ( ) i l -.IIIIILII‘ITIIIIJ ........ _ ._ u . u . . n L 1 a . .... . .. u _ . . u n w u 1 w .. . . . ~ .. L . . . n 1 .... . _ .... 72 1. Here is a list of goals that any country might have. I want to know how YOU think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate these goals in degree of impor- tanczr- I am not interested in how the U.S.A. does rate them, but I am interested in how YOU think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate them. 2. Rate each goal from 0:IO, using the higher nufiEers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. H. You do not have to use every rate. think the U.S.A. SHOULD rank these goals as follows A. ATTRACTING CAPITAL (MONEY) IH f‘ v B. INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY ( ) C. INCREASE TRADE ( ) D. DEVELOPE RESOURCES ( ) E. IMPROVE TRANSPORTATION /\ V F. DEVELOPE NEW PRODUCTS G. REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT a\ v I‘ V H. DISTRIBUTE WEALTH EQUALLY IN V I. RAISE STANDARDS OF LIVING /\ V J. PROMOTE INDUSTRIALIZATION K. OTHEP A ‘1 think the U.S.A. SHOULD rank these goals as follows IN I\ V A. IMPROVE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION f\ V B. REDUCE THE COST OF GOVERNMENT r\ V C. PROMOTE A MORE STABLE GOVERNMENT /\ v D. DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY ' ( ) E. BEING NEUTRAL ( ) F. BEING DEMOCRATIC /\ v G. GIVING PEOPLE FREEDOM r'\ v H. HAVING PEACE ( ) I. PROVIDING EQUAL RIGHTS FOR ALL f'\ v J. BEING A DOMINANT WORLD POWER /\ v K. onmR () 73 1. Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of BETTER GOVERNMENT. I want to know how YOUR COUNTRY ranks these "ways" in degree of importance. I want to know how important YOUR COUNTRY AS A WHOLE considers them. 2. Rate each "way" from 0-10, using the higher number to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. 9. You do not have to use every rate. My country rates these "ways" as follows A. HAVING AN OFFICE OF THE BUDGET ( ) B. HAVING A POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM ( ) C. HAVING A STRONG JUDICIAL COURT SYSTEM ( ) D. HAVING A CONSTITUTION ( ) E. HAVING TREATIES AND ALLIANCES ( ) F. HAVING MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS ( ) G. HAVING A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM ( ) H. HAVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE ( ) I. HAVING A STRONG MILITARY FORCE ( ) J. HAVING NO CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS 1‘ V K. HAVING DE-CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTAL POWEP r'\ V 7h 1. Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of BETTER GOVERNMENT. I want to know how the U.S.A. rates these "ways" in degree of importance. I want to know how important the U.S.A. AS A WHOLE considers them. 2. Rate each "way" from 0-10, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. a. You do not have to use every rate. ‘ The U.S.A. rates these "ways" as follows A. HAVING AN OFFICE OF THE BUDGET IN v B. HAVING A POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM IN v C. HAVING A STRONG JUDICIAL COURT SYSTEM /\ V D. HAVING A CONSTITUTION ( ) E. HAVING TREATIES AND ALLIANCES ( ) F. HAVING MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS ( ) G. HAVING A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM ( ) H. HAVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE ( ) I. HAVING A STRONG MILITARY FORCE (K V J. HAVING NO CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS I'\ v K. HAVING DE-CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTAL POWER IN v 75 Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. I want to know how the U.S.A. rates those "ways" in degree of importance. I want to know how important the U.S.A. AS A WHOLE considers them. 2. Rate each "way" from 0-10, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. H. You do not have to use every rate. The U.S.A. rates these "ways" as follows A. HAVING FOREIGN INVESTMENT B. HAVING HEAVY INDUSTRY C. HAVING PRIVATE INTERNAL INVESTMENT D. HAVING ROADS AND RAILROADS E. HAVING TRAINING PROGRAMS F. HAVING LABOR PAID ON AN INCENTIVE BASIS IN 1‘ l‘ [K 1" G. HAVING ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ------- ---------( H. HAVING LOW TAXES I. HAVING LAND REFORM J. HAVING PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS K. HAVING LABOR UNION AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS L. HAVING SOURCES OF ELECTRICAL POWER M. HAVING IDEAS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES I \ f \ /\ r\ IN ’\ 76 1. Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of BETTER GOVERNMENT. I want to know how YOU think your country SHOULD rate these "ways". I am not intereSTEE in how your country does rate them, but I am interested in how YOU think your country SHOULD rate them. -__ 2. Rate each "way" from 0-10, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. H. You do not have to use every rate. I_think my country SHOULD rate these "ways as follows A. HAVING AN OFFICE OF THE BUDGET IN v B. HAVING A POLITICAL PARTY SYS EM ( ) C. HAVING A STRONG JUDICIAL COURT SYSTEM ( ) D. HAVING A CONSTITUTION ( ) E. HAVING TREATIES AND ALLIANCES ( ) F. HAVING MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS ( ) G. HAVING A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM ( ) H. HAVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE ( ) I. HAVING A STRONG MILITARY FORCE ( ) J. HAVING NO CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS ( ) K. HAVING DE-CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTAL POWER r-\ v 77, 1. Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. I want to know how YOUR COUNTRY rates these "ways" in degree of importance. I want to know how important YOUR COUNTRY AS A WHOLE considers them. 2. Rate each "way" from 0-10, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. H. You do not have to use every rate. My country rates these ways as follows A. HAVING FOREIGN INVESTMENT ( ) B. HAVING HEAVY INDUSTRY ( ) C. HAVING PRIVATE INTERNAL INVESTMENT ( ) D. HAVING ROADS AND RAILROADc ( ) E. HAVING TRAINING PROGRAMC IN v F. HAVING LABOR PAID ON AN INCENTIVE BASIS r\ v G. HAVING ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES-- ------ --------( ) H. HAVING LOW TAXES (K v I. HAVING LAND REFORM ( ) J. HAVING PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS ( ) K. HAVING LABOR UNION AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS ( ) L. HAVING SOURCES OF ELECTRICAL POWEP ( ) M. HAVING IDEAS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES ’\ V 78 1. Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. I want to know how YOU think your country SHOULD rate these "ways". I am not interested in how your country does rate them, but I am interested in how YOU think your country SHOULD rate them. 2. Rate each "way" from 0-10, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. H. You do not have to use every rate. ‘I think my country SHOULD rate theSe "ways" as follows A. HAVING FOREIGN INVESTMENT [K V B. HAVING HEAVY INDUSTRY 1‘ v C. HAVING PRIVATE INTERNAL INVESTMENT ’ ) D. HAVING ROADS AND RAILROADS IN V E. HAVING TRAINING PRDPDAMQ IN V F. HAVING LABOR PAID ON INCENTIVE BASIS /\ V G. HAVING ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES----------------( ) H. HAVING LOW TAXES r\ v I. HAVING LAND REFOPM (K V J. HAVING PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS /'\ V K. HAVING LABOR UNION AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS IN V L. HAVING SOURCES OF ELECTRICAL POWEP r ) M. HAVING IDEAS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES ( ) 79 1. Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of BETTER GOVERNMENT. I want to know how YOU think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate these goals in degrees of importance. I am not interested in how the U.S.A. does rate them, but I am interested in how YOU think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate them. 2. Rate each "way" from 0—10, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. H. You do not have to use every rate. I think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate these "ways" as follows: A. HAVING AN OFFICE OF THE BUDGET IN v B. HAVING A POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM ( ) C. HAVING A STRONG JUDICIAL COURT SYSTEM ( ) D. HAVING A CONSTITUTION ( ) E. HAVING TREATIES AND ALLIANCES ( ) F. HAVING MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS ( ) G. HAVING A CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM ( ) H. HAVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE ( ) I. HAVING A STRONG MILITARY FORCE ( ) J. HAVING NO CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS f‘ v K. HAVING DE-CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTAL POWER t‘ V 80 1. Here is a list of "ways" (methods, means) that any country might use to achieve the goal of ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT. I want to know how YOU think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate these goals in degree of importance. I am not interested in how the U.S.A. does rate them, but I am interested in how YOU think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate them. 2. Rate each "way" from 0-10, using the higher numbers to indicate greatest importance and lower numbers to indicate less importance. 3. You may use any rate as many times as you wish. 4. You do not have to use every rate. I think the U.S.A. SHOULD rate these "ways" as follows: A. HAVING B. HAVING C. HAVING D. HAVING E. HAVING F. HAVING G. HAVING H. HAVING I. HAVING J. HAVING K. HAVING L. HAVING M. HAVING FOREIGN INVESTMENT HEAVY INDUSTRY PRIVATE INTERNAL INVESTMENT I\ v ROADS AND RAILROADS IN v TRAINING PROGRAMS /\ v LABOR PAID ON AN INCENTIVE BASIS ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES—"- ------------ ( ) F ‘ LOW TAXES ’\ v f‘ v LAND REFORM PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS IN v IN IN LABOR UNION AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS SOURCES OF ELECTRICAL POWER IDEAS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES /\ v 81 I would like you to tell me if you agree or disagree with the statements below; that is tell me if you think the statement is right or wrong. If you agree strongly, then mark YES; if you agree slightly, then mark X33; if you don't know, then markii? if you disagree slightly then mark 225 if you disagree strongly, then mark N9. 1. Sometimes I have the feeling that other people are using me. YES yes ? no NO There is little chance to get ahead in this life unless a man knows the right people. YES yes ? no NO 1. Place an X before the appropriate answer to the following questions. 82 2. You may use more than one X in answering each question 1, 2 and 3 When I return home, if my report or my plans are not accepted or carried out I will 1. FORGET THEM. ___.__2. CONTINUE MY EFFORTS TO GAIN THEIR ACCEPTANCE ______3. LOOK FOR ANOTHER JOB __‘_J+. LEAVE THE COUNTRY When I return home, if I am not satisfied with our government, I will 1. SPEAK FREELY ABOUT MY OPPOSITION BECOME ACTIVE IN THE OPPOSITE POLITICAL PARTY SAY NOTHING, BUT HOPE FOR A BETTER DAY PARTICIPATE IN A REVOLUTIONARY ACTION LEAVE THE COUNTRY When I return home I will SUGGEST NEW METHODS OF DOING OLD JOBS SUGGEST THE PURCHASE OF NEW EQUIPMENT SUGGEST THAT NEW JOBS BE UNDERTAKEN SUGGEST THAT SOME OLD JOBS BE ELIMINATED NOT MAKE ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE VERY ACTIVE IN SEEKING GOVERNMENTAL REFORM SOMEWHAT ACTIVE IN SEEKING GOVERNMENTAL REFORM GENERALLY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT IS STRONGLY AGAINST ANY GOVERNMENTAL REFORM 83 Do you ever feel like disagreeing with WHAT (your superior) wants you to do or HOW he (or she) wants you to do it? often sometimes rarely never I think my supervisor knows better than I what's good for my office, or else he would not be a supervisor. agree disagree The best way to get along on my job is to mind your own business and just do as you are told. agree disagree I like the idea of having people in our office stand up when the manager comes in. agree disagree 8“ Now, ask yourself this question, "WHO AM I?" Give me as many answers to this question as possible. Make these statements as if you were giving them to yourself in the order they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or importance. Begin now, then make as many statements as you can in answer to the question, "WHO AM I"? l. 10. 85 Please answer the following questions about yourself. Age Sex Position/Occupation Is your position with government? or with a private organization What country are you from? How many years of formal education have you had? 1 2 3 u 5 6 7 (CIRCLE ONE) 8 9 10 ll l2 l3 1” 15 l6 17 18 19 20 Length of visit to the U.S.A. in months? 1-6 6-12 12-18 lB-over (CIRCLE ONE) When do you leave for home? (in weeks) 1 2 3 u 5 6 7 8 (CIRCLE ONE) longer Did you grow up in/on a farm small rural town ______small city _____large city How much travelling have you done in your country? (CHECK ONE) _____yery much _____§ome _____very little How many different places have you lived for over six months in your country? (CHECK ONE) 1 2 3 u 5 6 7 8 9 10 or more How many times have you been out of your country? (CHECK ONE) 1 2 3 u 5 6 7 8 9 10 or more . . 9 In which countries have you spent over Six months time. ..... APPENDIX B Bib fffii EEEEEE EEEEI° XSEEEE EEEEI' 21 2 36 29 22 5 A 37 13 23 13 38 16 2a 8 39 7 25 14 no 16 26 9 41 6 27 10 42 6 23 11 H3 9 29 19 4” 5 30 15 us 7 3 31 13 46 u 32 23 ”7 6 E 33 22 ”8 3 31+ 12 ’49 l 35 1a 50 1 No response 22 1 Mean 33.6 Total suo Male Female No response Total 88 SEX 293 24 23 340 Employed by Private Organization or Public Organization Private Public No response Total 16 289 35 3H0 U... 1 Afghanistan Antigua — West Indies Argentina Bolivia Brazil British Guiana Burma Ceylon Chile China Columbia Costa Rica Cyprus Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt Ethiopia India Indonesia Iran Iraq Jamaica Jordan Kenya 89 Home Country of Subjects 13 Korea Lebanon Libya Nepal Nicaragua Nigeria Northern Rhodesia Pakistan Paraguay Peru Philippines Somali Republic Spain Sudan Surinam Syria Tanganyika Thailand Turkey Viet Nam West Indies Yugoslavia Liberia E. Africa No response Total 13 20 2O 27 90 Years of Education 2231.13 W 6 1 7 l 8 3 9 l 10 13 11 7 12 29 13 18 14 31 15 51 16 42 17 no 18 32 19 20 2O 22 21 3 22 l 23 2 1+1 1 Mean 1505 Total 91 Length of Stay in U.S.A. 1 - 6 months 125 6’- 12 months 130 12 - 18 months 18 18 or more #8 No response 19 Mean 6 - 12 months Total . 3M0 Time Left in the U.S.A. Mean 3.2 weeks m Frequency 1 82 2 123 3 an i u 8 j 5 8 1 6 10 1 7 5 8 10 9 or more 39 No response 21 Total 340 Illrlllllllll'.‘ 92 Where Did You Grow UP? Farm 29 Small rural town an Small city 85 Large city 127 Two or more of above 18 No response 37 Total 340 Mean small city How Much Traveling Have You Done? Very little 15 Some Very much No reSponse Total Mean some - very much 117 172 36 340 93 Obeisance Scores Scores Frequency 0 110 3 86 u 79 5 us 6 1H 7 6 Total 3H0 Mean 2.7 Salience Scores W Scores Frequency 0 2 l O 2 120 f 3 29 1 5 81 ; 6 ll 1 No response 38 1 J Total 3H0 Mean 3.” 9a Powerlessness Scores Scores Frequency 1.0 18 1.5 21 2.0 27 2.5 35 3.0 75 3.5 38 ”.0 56 u.5 35 5.0 an No response 1 1 Mean 3.2 Cultural Change Activity Score Mean 6.3 Scores Frequency 1 37 3 56 u 39 6 53a 7 30 i 9 HO 7 10 28 i 12 31 i 13 10 4 No response 16 ‘ 1 1 p. " 2 u qu z n Hmw r0 oomwmmsom :m.mm :w ovmwmmdom :0.;: boa mozodemmsmmm :w wozmuHmmmdmmm hos wozmdwmmmammw m» wozmdwmmmdmmm ro: :w b0 2M b0 mw b0 _ 3w mmpwmsom mmpwmsom mmpwmsom mmwwmdom mmwwmdom mmwwmsom mmwwmsom mmwwmsom z Mx mo wa q ch PH mm m we 0 mo Hm 0H HH 00 H0 m0 moosoawo oamsmm awpmm W mw.mq % I w x Mx 0.3m .30 0.3.: 0mm m.000 mmH 4.0 w.m 0.000 95 «.000 400. mimqn me 0.95 0mm 2 Mx mu mom Pm 50 mo wow mm H»: 8. wow mm Hum 0... How 5 How :m.wm moosoawo zonuormsmm a