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
"Ujama Village Policy: A Case Study of
Musoma Vijijini District in Northern
Tanzania, 1974-87"

presented by

Lenny Bega Kasoga

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Doctoral degree in Humanities Doctoral
Interdisciplinary
Program


Major professor

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AN EVALUATION OF THE UJAMAA VILLAGE POLICY: A CASE STUDY
OF MUSOMA VIJIJINI DISTRICT IN TANZANIA, 1974-1987

Volume I

By

Lenin Bega Kasoga

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT


AN EVALUATION OF THE UJAMAA VILLAGE POLICY: A CASE STUDY OF MUSOMA VIJIJINI DISTRICT IN TANZANIA, 1974-1987

By

Lenin Bega Kasoga

This study provides a perspective on the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy in Tanzania. This policy, which resettled scattered peasants into collective villages, formed the basis of Tanzania's rural development policy in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The goal of this study was to determine whether or not the Ujamaa Village Policy was successful in bringing about economic development to rural Tanzania. This was accomplished in part by a field study of 16 villages in the Musoma Vijijini District. The measurement of success of the policy implementation was the presence of four factors believed to be essential to economic development. These factors were institutional facilities, trained human resources, capital, and appropriate levels of agricultural technology.

The results indicated that some villages achieved a reasonable measure of success in organizing collective activities, including the construction of schools and dispensaries and the establishment of village-government farms and shops. Two villages were able to



purchase tractors; some owned grinding machines, bars, and hotels; and one owned a bus.

However, institutional failure at the village level was noted, as the government failed to provide adequate agricultural, veterinary, health, education, and transportation infrastructure such as roads, transportation, and telecommunication. The inadequacy of capital, technology, and human resources continued in most villages, with the exception of Butiama, which managed to acquire the four factors essential for economic development.


The Ujamaa policy failed primarily due to a basic flaw in policy design and lack of a pilot project to test the effectiveness of new institutional arrangements. Also, misappropriations of village-government funds and reliance on a single cooperative marketing channel greatly reduced the chances of successful implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy.

Thus, Tanzania still awaits a practical rural program that can provide the necessary prerequisites to improve institutions, technology, human resources, and capital appropriate to enhance the peasants' lives. It is hoped this study will provide insights into how such a program can be developed.

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


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The late Dr. and Mrs. Lewis Zerby would have taken great pride in my completion of this program. Dr. Zerby was my first and most energetic advisor. Their untimely death shifted the job of advising me to Dr. Glenn Johnson and Dr. Albert Cafagna, who in Dr. Zerby's absence have done a remarkable job, for which I am most grateful. Drs. Stevens and Johnson devoted many hours to help. Drs. Anderson and Marcus both provided great assistance during the final writing of this dissertation. Dr. S. M. Kapunda from Dar-es-Salaam University reviewed the material and provided useful comments, and the Sokoine University Agricultural Economics faculty provided useful comments.

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



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


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
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Economic development is a many-sided process. For the individual, it implies the acquisition of knowledge, skills, creativity, and material well-being. For society, development occurs when its members increase their capacity for dealing with their environment by using those individual skills collectively. Government policies for developing these collective resources are extremely important for economic development. In this study the writer focused on the economic development policy adopted by Tanzania from 1974 to 1987 and examined its effect on village life in 16 villages in the Musoma Vijijini District.

Tanzania is one of the 25 least developed countries of the world. Since independence in 1961, the attention of Tanzanian policy makers has focused on the need to improve the standard of living of the country's citizens through the eradication of ignorance, poverty, and disease. The Arusha Declaration in 1967 represented a turning point in Tanzania's economic development. The Declaration was a call for equity, self-reliance, and community




ownership of resources.¹ The leaders of Tanzania in 1967 saw an opportunity to mobilize the population for the purpose of building a self-reliant economy, without relying on foreign investments.² Then-President Nyerere's motto was "we must run while they walk." The Ujamaa Village Policy was announced, emphasizing cooperative/collective effort in agriculture, and was seen as the engine for making the nation run in order to catch up with the developed nations. The colonial economic system, inherited from the British, was rejected on the basis that it would perpetuate economic dependence and insure that the country remained solely a source of raw materials.

In the two decades since the Arusha Declaration, many international and natural events beyond the control of the government occurred, such as the 1971 floods, the high oil prices caused by the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the 1975 and 1980 droughts, the 1979 border war with Uganda, and the worsening trade conditions for Third World countries. These events served to drain off scarce capital resources, which were most needed in the push for economic development. The performance of the agricultural sector and parastatals was also disappointing. This, coupled with weak domestic economic growth, resulted in a decline in real per capita income and a deteriorating infrastructure desperately in need of repair. By

¹Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 247.

²Ludwig Watzal, Ujamaa--The End of a Utopia? (Munich: 1982), pp. 1-18.



1986, the economy could not adequately support basic needs such as education, health care, and agricultural extension services.³

1.2 Objective of the Research

The objective of this research was to investigate and evaluate the Ujamaa Village Policy in order to understand the reasons why it was not successful or able to achieve the intended rural collectivization policy objectives and increase agricultural output. To accomplish this, this writer (1) examined the history of Tanzania before 1967 and the reasons for choosing the Arusha Declaration and the Ujamaa Village Policy, (2) reviewed Tanzania's economic and agricultural performance from 1967 to 1987 to understand what happened to the economy during the implementation of the Ujamaa Policy, and (3) presents the results of a survey of 16 villages from Musoma Vijijini district to understand the effect of Ujamaa policy at the village level.

The approach undertaken is historic and pragmatic, using both positive and normative value knowledge. The researcher examined the factors that influenced the choice of the Ujamaa policy, including the implementation process and ideological considerations. The roles of institutions, human resources, technology, and capital were also explored.

³Luther Tenteen et al., Tanzania-U.S. Roundtable on Development and Justice (Columbus: Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, April 1989), p. i.



1.3 Plan of the Study

The researcher's intention in this study was to evaluate the Ujamaa Village Policy. The theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the policy were compared to the actual level of action and implementation within the villages surveyed. This is a subject-matter study, which Johnson described as a multidisciplinary study. The subject of interest was the rural-transformation strategy of a group of decision makers dealing with a set of practical problems.⁴ By analyzing the problems faced in the process of translating the Ujamaa Village Policy into action, the writer hoped to contribute to the knowledge of public administration and agricultural development, which can aid in the design of future programs. By comparing the performance of villages that had high- and low-quality extension services, the writer hoped to shed light on the relationship between these services and how villages performed in various economic, social, political and institutional activities. The writer emphasized production, distribution, and consumption interrelationships, given the level of extension services available.

The impetus for this study arose from the desire to understand and help solve problems associated with policy implementation and rural development. This multidisciplinary research was intended to identify controllable factors, e.g., institutional, technological, capital, and human resources, that influence the outcome of policy

⁴Glenn Johnson, Research Methodology for Economists (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985), sec. 2-1.



implementation. The knowledge generated by this research should be of interest to policy and decision makers dealing with rural development. Although the knowledge generated by this study is not sufficient (or meant to be sufficient) to solve a particular problem, it will provide insight and therefore, it is hoped, be helpful to future rural development planners and researchers.

1.4 Interested Readers

Among those who are likely to find this research interesting are decision makers concerned with rural development and village policy. Policy makers and administrative personnel in various ministries of the Tanzanian government involved in policy planning and rural development include the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Local Governments, Marketing Boards and Cooperatives, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the Mara Regional Commissioners Office, the Musoma Vijijini District Area Commissioner's Office, and the village chairmen of the 16 villages surveyed. Besides these governmental agencies, international agencies and donors, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other non-government organizations (NGOs), provide aid and loans to Third World countries.

Other potentially interested groups and individuals are extension agents, researchers in universities, and other independent agencies interested in rural development problems. All the groups mentioned are likely to benefit from the findings of this study.



Additional knowledge about the Ujamaa experience can improve the quality of the planning, implementation, and decision-making processes and the effect of future rural development policies in Tanzania and other Third World countries.

1.5 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds by first reviewing the historical background of Tanzania (Chapter 2). Chapter 2 sets out the underlying change in government from the colonial structure to independence and the adoption of the Ujamaa Village Policy. Special attention is given to explaining the reasons for the decision to dismantle the colonial institutions following independence and the establishment of a new governing system following the adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, with Ujamaa as a central ideological guideline. It also shows that the process of dismantling the colonial institutional structure and the adoption of forced movement to Ujamaa villages led to social, economic, and political upheaval.

Chapter 3 provides both an analysis of Tanzania's economic performance for the period 1967-1987 and a review of Marxist and other literature about Tanzania's development during this period. It shows how the decline in cash and food crop production forced the country to import maize, the major food crop, resulting in a serious decline in badly needed foreign currency reserves. Cash crop production (crops such as sisal, coffee, cotton, and cashew nuts) was also seen to decline, further eroding the country's foreign currency reserves.



Chapter 4 contains an explanation of the research methods and some of the problems encountered during the survey. A description of the Mara region and Musoma Vijijini district is also provided.

The research findings from the survey of the 16 Ujamaa villages are presented in Chapter 5. The focus of this survey was on the availability of human resources, capital, and technology and the adequacy of the institutional structure at the village level. Special attention was given to the opinion of peasants in terms of their perception of the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy and how they as individuals were helped or harmed by it.




CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TANZANIA

2.1 The Geographical and Historical Background of Ujamaa, Tanzania, Before 1967

Present-day Tanzania consists of the former mainland country of Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. It is roughly the size of California, Texas, and Oklahoma combined. Tanzania comprises a land area of 363,708 square miles and is the largest country in East Africa. It lies between the Indian Ocean on the east and is bordered on the north by Kenya and Uganda; on the west by Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire; on the southwest by Zambia; and on the south by Malawi and Mozambique. Tanzania is located south of the equator between the 3rd and 12th degrees of latitude south. Longitudinally, it rests between the 29th and 40th degrees east.

Outstanding physical features of Tanzania include snow-capped Mount Kilimanjaro (19,340 feet above sea level), the highest mountain in Africa; Mount Meru; the Usambara highlands; and the great Rift Valley. Tanzania's rivers belong to two drainage basins --one oriented to the Indian Ocean, including Pangani, Wami, and Rufiji, and to the northwest Kagera, which empties into Lake Tanganyika, and to the south the Ruvuma, which forms the border with Mozambique and empties into the Indian Ocean. The main inland water



masses include Lake Victoria, the second largest fresh-water lake in the world; Lake Tanganyika, the second deepest in the world; and Lake Malawi to the south (see Figure 1).

2.2 Climate

Tanzania is subject to two important and distinct monsoon-ruled seasons. The northeast monsoon runs from October to February, whereas the southwest monsoon brings the major rains of February to May, with cooler temperatures in their wake. In the highlands, the major rainfall occurs between December and April and amounts to 750 to 1,250 mm annually. The plateau and southeastern coastal regions have an average rainfall of 250 to 750 mm, occurring primarily from December to April. Therefore, climatically and topographically, the country can be divided into four principal areas: (1) the hot, humid coastal lowlands of the 550-mile-long Indian Ocean shoreline; (2) the hot and arid zone of the broad central plateau; (3) the high inland mountain and lake region of the northern border; and (4) the temperate highlands of the northeast and southwest.

2.3 Demography

Tanzania has a population of about 23 million people. The people of Tanzania are of different racial and ethnic backgrounds, with divergent hues and customs, as well as variable economic, political, and geographic statuses. There are Africans, Asians of Indo-Pakistani origin, Goans, and a few Chinese. Arab and Afro-Shirazi who emanated from the Persian Gulf and the Arab Peninsula






Figure 1: Map of Tanzania.



are also present. The white population includes British, Greeks, and Americans. There are 120 indigenous ethnic groups; the Wasukuma is the largest, and the Sonjo is the smallest.

More than two-thirds of Tanzania's population lives along the nation's borders, which constitute the most fertile area. Over one-half of the country's land area is unproductive, because of lack of water and continuing infestation of tsetse flies. The most arable land lies in the northern and southern highlands. The average density is approximately 20 people per kilometer.⁵ The urban population is about 10 percent of the national total, half of whom live in Dar-es-Salaam. The major urban centers are Zanzibar, Mwanza, Arusha, Dodoma (the proposed capital city), and Tabora.

2.4 Historical Setting

To understand the present sociocultural and political environment in Tanzania, it is necessary to review her past history. Mainland Tanganyika and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba share a similar historical pattern. Available evidence from archaeological and historical records indicates that, from the fifth century B.C. to the first century A.D., the Greco-Roman-Phoenicians intruded into some of the territory that now constitutes Tanzania. They were followed by the Arab traders (800 A.D. to 1300 A.D.) and the Chinese (900 A.D. to 1500 A.D.). The Indians and Persians followed from

⁵Andrew Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy (London: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 10.



1000 A.D. to 1900 A.D. Portuguese intrusion along the coastline began in the late 15th century and continued through the middle of the 18th century. Arab colonization from the Arabian principalities of Muscat and Oman extended from the 18th through the 20th century A.D. The 19th century was dominated by European colonialism, beginning with explorers and traders such as Karl Peters of the mid-19th century and ending with independence from the British in 1961.⁶ Thus, the traditional African society did not evolve in a vacuum. It was a conglomeration of many ethnic and cultural groups.

2.5 Evolution of the Tanzanian Economy

Tanzania has the dubious historical distinction of being at the center of the notorious slave trade. From Zanzibar, Arab and European traders captured and marketed slaves from the mainland. The slave trade reached its peak in the early 19th century, about the same time that the Imam of Oman, Sayyid Said, moved his capital from Oman to Zanzibar in 1828. He used slave labor on clove plantations, a major cash crop that he is credited with introducing to Zanzibar.

2.6 The Pre-colonial Economy

Apart from the disruption of the slave trade, the interior of Tanzania developed independently of international influence until

⁶William Redman Duggan and John R. Civile, Tanzania and Nyerere: A Study of Ujamaa and Nationhood (New York: Orbis Books, 1976), p. 15.



the 18th century. The isolated areas developed distinct political, economic, and social systems, with farming as the primary economic activity. People consumed what they produced; any surplus was retained by the community to support nonagricultural activities.⁷

Besides farming, people kept livestock consisting of cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry. Crops cultivated were mainly millet, maize, bananas, and groundnuts in the 18th century. Hunting and fishing were also common practices among the members of a household. The economy was mainly one of subsistence. However, this structure of the traditional economy had been affected by the slave trade and other forms of external contact such as religion, foreign rule, trade, language, and culture.

2.7 The German Influence on the Economy (1884-1918)

German colonialism in the 19th century and the subsequent introduction of cash crops played a crucial role in the destruction of the pre-colonial economic structure. The Germans institutionalized their colonial economic structure of production and political control of mainland Tanzania in 1884. Cash crops introduced in the 1890s reoriented the traditional family subsistence economy to one marked by the exploitation of African labor by plantation owners. Germany's need for raw materials and their rationale that Tanzania's cash crops were a repayment for their colonizing efforts, influenced the introduction of this new

⁷John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) pp. 4, 169.



plantation system.⁸ Cash crops introduced by the Germans included sisal, cotton, coffee, tea, and rubber, crops that, except for rubber, are still grown today.

According to Rweyemamu, the Germans did not encourage individual peasant cash crop agriculture early in their administration.⁹ Imbued with racial prejudice, they deemed the traditional mode of production inferior and the peasants lazy. They therefore devoted most of their effort to the development of large plantations. Among the areas designated for plantation cash crop production were the coast and the fertile slopes of Kilimanjaro, Mount Meru, and the Usambara mountains. Sisal and coffee plantations were established in these areas because of their suitable climate for white settlers.

Returns from cotton plantation agriculture were much poorer than the Germans had anticipated. As a result of this low production, Governor Gotzen (1901) required the Africans to cultivate cotton on communal plots called dorfschambas, which bore a superficial resemblance to the traditional African structure except that labor was coerced. The dorfschambas were established at the headquarters of each local headman, and local administrators known as akidas forced all adults to work on the dorfschamba for 28 days a year. This form of peasant agriculture by conscription was a disastrous failure. Resistance to this policy led to the Maji Maji

⁸Justinian Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 15-16.

⁹Ibid., p. 15.




war, which broke out in the Rufiji Valley in 1905 and spread throughout the coast and southern Tanzania.

The Maji Maji war relied on religious mysticism, whereby a sprinkling of a compound composed of water, corn, and sorghum seed on every warrior was supposed to make the warrior immune to bullets while committing him to the fraternity of freedom fighters. Thus anointed, 8,000 warriors, armed with spears, attacked the German port at Mahenge and tried to capture the defenders' machine guns with bare hands. The outcome was a disastrous waste of lives. The Africans were defeated in 1906, and their leaders were executed. In the case of the dorfschamba system, adoption of the new structure without abiding by traditional patterns and local customs failed.¹⁰

Following the end of the Maji Maji war, the German colonial administration adopted a policy promoting individual peasant cultivation of cotton. Through seed distribution, African participation in cotton cultivation increased. By 1908, peasant cotton production accounted for 67 percent of cotton exports and by 1912 their share had reached 71 percent of total production.

Although the German policy was to promote white-owned coffee plantations, in 1904 Major Willibard Von Stuemer encouraged peasant production of coffee. Before then, coffee grown in the area was controlled by loyal clans and used by chiefs only for ceremonial purposes. The rise in world market prices provided an incentive for

¹⁰John Hatch, Tanzania: A Profile (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 79-81.



the peasant growers.¹¹ By 1905, the export value of coffee from Bukoba was 51,500 marks, and in 1909 it increased to 112,771 marks. Bukoba was producing roughly a third of the colony's total coffee exports, with an annual income of 749,079 marks in 1912.¹²

Coffee was introduced in Kilimanjaro in the 1890s by Roman Catholic missionaries. They persuaded friendly chiefs to plant their coffee among existing banana farms. By 1907, peasant production of coffee was competing with European plantation production. The Europeans argued that peasant cultivation increased the danger of coffee disease and threatened their labor supply.¹³

Sisal was introduced to the country by Richard Hindorf in 1893. Sisal fiber was used to manufacture cordage (i.e., ropes) for the German navy, and thus it became a strategic material. Through forced recruitment, sisal plantations introduced rural peasants into wage employment. By 1911, the sisal fiber exports were worth 4,532,000 marks.¹⁴ Rubber and tea plantations were structured along similar patterns as sisal. These estates were dominated by European settlers until they were nationalized in 1967.

¹¹Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press, 1980), pp. 44-45.

¹²Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, p. 169.

¹³Ibid., p. 108.

¹⁴Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania pp. 16-27.



2.7.1 The Mobilization of Labor

The German plantations and the dorfschamba system were influential in determining the organization of African labor. The German colonial administration effectively destroyed the traditional pre-colonial economy during their rule. Introduction of a three-rupee hut tax in 1897 forced peasants to become laborers on German-owned plantations. Africans were thus exposed to European commodities, requiring a new form of exchange. Labor was recruited from distant villages to ensure that family demands did not interfere with the plantation laborers' work. The aim was to uproot such laborers and proletarianize them, hence forming a class of workers who would be available to meet the demands of the growing capitalist sector. Recruitment was done by compulsion. Workers for the coastal plantations were recruited from western and southern areas of Tanzania and even from neighboring countries. Coercion and abuse were rampant, wages were low, living conditions were poor, and workers were often arbitrarily dismissed during economic slumps. Attempts to escape labor were a criminal offense, punishable by imprisonment.¹⁵

Whippings and other brutality by private employers and state officials caused Africans to resent the plantation and the dorfschamba system. Statistics reveal that 14,000 Africans were brought forcefully to the plantations annually, with the number

¹⁵Kaniki et al., Tanzania Under Colonial Rule (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1979) p. 135.



increasing from 32,000 in 1909 to about 92,000 in 1913. Wage-earning labor comprised 172,000 Africans or one-fifth of the able-bodied male population at that time.¹⁶

2.7.2 Transportation Facilities Under German Rule

The Germans constructed railways, first from Tanga (on the coast) inland to Moshi and Arusha in northeastern Tanzania. The roads constructed followed similar routes. Coffee grown on the rich slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, Mount Meru, and the Usambara mountains could be transported to the coast. Another rail line was built between 1904 and 1914 following the old slave trade route from Dar-es-Salaam to Tabora and Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika.¹⁷ By providing access to jobs, these facilities effectively incorporated peasants into the capitalist world system. The sisal, cotton, coffee, rubber, and tea that were produced could be transported to the coast for eventual shipment to Germany. During the last ten years of German rule (1905 to 1914), considerable investment was made on the construction of roads, exploration of minerals, establishment of towns, and construction of schools and hospitals.

2.7.3 Education Under German Rule

The German demand for a literate populace to act as civil servants resulted in the establishment of mission schools. These

¹⁶Ibid., p. 135.

¹⁷Ibid.



schools provided training for carpenters, construction and metal workers, shoemakers, and printers. The government later opened its own schools. By 1914, there were 60 primary schools, as well as nine post-primary establishments in which craft skills were taught. Tanga Secondary School had four German teachers on its staff and 500 students. It offered a course of study designed to produce African administrators.¹⁸ By the outbreak of World War I in 1914, 60,000 African children were being taught in 2,000 missionary and government schools.¹⁹

2.7.4 The End of German Rule

The outbreak of the First World War put an end to the German presence in East Africa. The economic progress established during the German occupation of the territory employing forced labor was disrupted, while many peasants were conscripted into the army. After 1918, the colonial economy was in disarray. All German property was seized by the British. Any progress that had been made in agriculture production and whatever gains the peasants had made during German rule were wiped out. It became necessary for future Tanzanians to adjust to new colonial masters, who employed a new form of indirect rule.

¹⁸Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy, pp. 40-41.

¹⁹Hatch, Tanzania: A Profile, p. 81.



2.8 The British Influence on the Economy


Of Germany's colonies in Africa, mainland Tanzania had been the most important.¹ In contrast, the British had only limited interest in Tanzania, which was declared a British Mandate by the League of Nations, based on Article 199 of the Treaty of Peace on June 28, 1919, following the end of World War I.²⁰ Out of concern that Germany's colonies would be returned, Britain was cautious about investing in Tanzania's economic development. Private investment was neither sought nor encouraged.

Initially, British governing priority was placed on the task of winning over local rulers. To accomplish this, a system of indirect rule of administering through local rulers was introduced. Most of the estates previously owned by Germans were taken over by the British or sold to Greeks, Indians, and Pakistanis. Of the plantation crops, sisal became the most important, followed by maize, coffee, tea, and sugar. Because Britain obtained enough cotton for industrial demand from the United States and elsewhere throughout the 1930s, very little emphasis was placed on its production. Most of Tanzania production was allowed to go to India.²¹

In the 1920s, the British increased capital investment in mechanization in order to overcome labor shortages and to produce

²⁰ Bernard Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 263.

²¹ Kaniki et al., Tanzania Under Colonial Rule, p. 167.



sisal more efficiently. Coffee production also expanded under the British. In the early 1920s, improvements in coffee-cultivation techniques and disease control were made. In the west Lake Region, production continued to rise even during the depression years. By 1935, robusta coffee exported from Bukoba reached 10,881 tons.²²

The British first introduced tobacco as a commercial crop in Urambo. Maize was cultivated in Ismani, located in Iringa, in the 1950s, and wheat was successfully grown in the northern highlands of west Kilimanjaro and Mbulu.²³

Until 1966, the British cash crop structure remained undisturbed. In the 1960s, tobacco increased from about 2,200 tons in 1963/64 to about 11,000 tons in 1969/70. Sisal was the largest export crop, accounting for about one-quarter of the country's foreign earnings. In 1964, Tanzania produced 230,000 tons of sisal, which averaged about 1,700 shillings per ton. However, the export price dropped in 1965 and continued to fall until 1968, when the average price received per ton of sisal was 765 shillings. The foreign exchange earned dropped from 434 million shillings to less than 187 million shillings in 1968.²⁴

2.8.1 Marketing Cooperatives Under British Rule

Joseph Merinyo started the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA) in Moshi in 1925 for the purpose of marketing

²²Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 49.

²³Coulson, Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania, pp. 82-83.

²⁴Nyerere, Socialism and Development, p. 357.



peasant-grown coffee. Merinyo was a civil servant in the Moshi District Office who viewed the cooperative movement as a vehicle for reforming racial discrimination and indirect rule policies of the colonial government. His KNPA was supported by the British, whose policy was to encourage all local growers to form their own association. However, some of the Wachagga peasants preferred to sell their coffee to whoever offered them the best price. They continued to sell outside the KNPA, and the association was unable to collect their 2 percent dues, essential for covering its overhead.

In 1931, the district commissioner recommended that the KNPA be registered as a cooperative society. In 1932, the colonial government passed a Cooperative Societies ordinance permitting Africans to form their cooperatives. From 1932 on, the KNPA was replaced by the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) and accepted a European manager.²⁵ This change coincided with a drop in the price of coffee in the world market. Consequently, many peasants became suspicious, attributing the price drop to the KNCU and government intervention. The suspicion led to a riot in 1936, as Wachagga peasants demanded the right to sell their coffee on a free market. The sentiment grew stronger as land shortage among the peasants became an issue. The colonial government established a commission to investigate the 1936 riots. It was recommended that the property belonging to the reinvested German settlers who were

²⁵Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 54.



expelled during the Second World War be returned to the Wachagga.²⁶ The recommendation, however, was never implemented.

A similar confrontation occurred in Arusha, where peasant farmers on the slope of Mount Meru were demanding that estates confiscated from German settlers who had left the country at the outbreak of the Second World War be returned to Africans. This confrontation led to the Meru Land Case, which served as a catalyst for anti-colonial sentiment in the area.

Cooperatives received continued support from the government. Therefore, Africans from other parts of the country formed their own cooperatives. Among the well-known cooperatives were the Bukoba Native Cooperative Union (BNCU), which marketed Bukoba's coffee, and the Victoria Federation Cooperative Unions (VFCU), founded in Mwanza in 1950 to market Sukumaland's cotton.

2.8.2 Credit Institutions

On December 13, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly agreed to change the status of mainland Tanzania from a British Mandate to a Trusteeship Territory.²⁷ This change in political status encouraged Britain to begin investing in the country. In 1947, the British established credit institutions for African farmers, known as the Local Development Loan Fund. Between 1949 and 1959, the country received more than 10 million pounds sterling in

²⁶Ibid, pp. 62-63.

²⁷Chidzero, Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, p. 263.



foreign grants under the United Kingdom Colonial Development Welfare Acts.²⁸

2.8.3 The Groundnut Scheme

Although lack of technology is considered to be a factor contributing to lack of rural development, the historical facts in Tanzania seem to indicate that the adoption of modern technology alone, unless that technology is relevant to the problem at hand, will not solve the agricultural-output problem. A glaring example of this is the "Groundnut Scheme." In 1947, vegetable oil was in short supply following the Second World War. To alleviate the shortage of cooking oil, large areas of land in central and southern Tanzania were dedicated to the cultivation of groundnuts. Expensive machinery and support personnel were imported to Kongwa, Urambo, and Nachingwea at a cost of 50 million pounds. Peasants were recruited as laborers in an elaborate system of mechanized production to produce revenues for the colony. Unfortunately, the scheme did not match the local conditions.

Poor planning, unstable soil conditions, and unpredictable weather caused the Groundnut Scheme to fail. Four years later, in 1951, it was officially abandoned.²⁹ However, despite this costly failure by the British, similar mistakes were to be repeated by the

²⁸Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 62.

²⁹P.H.C. Clarke, A Short History of Tanganyika (Bungay, Suffolk: Richard Clay and Co., Ltd., 1965), pp. 138-139.




nationalist leaders following independence, one of which was the Ujamaa village settlement policy, the subject of this dissertation.

2.8.4 The End of British Rule

Mainland Tanzania attained independence on December 9, 1961. By that time, the incorporation of peasants into the world capitalist system had been accomplished. Practically every peasant was involved in the cultivation of one type of cash crop or another. Economic dependence, established during seven decades of European colonial rule, was not altered by independence. The umbilical cord linking Tanzania as an exporter of cash crops and an importer of manufactured goods remained as an element of dependence to the former colonial powers. Other forms of dependence included finance, technology, and the adverse factorial terms of trade for Tanzania's products. Such links, in this writer's opinion, could not be altered without severe dislocations to Tanzania's internal economy. The new nationalist Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) government had no choice but to continue the agricultural policies and structure inherited from the departing colonial administration.

The effect of colonialism on the country could be seen in terms of class differences of income linked to capitalist exploitation of raw materials and cheap labor through cash crop production and the uneven economic development that had penetrated the country. A fairly prosperous peasantry existed in areas with plentiful rainfall, where they engaged in the cultivation of cash crops. A less prosperous peasantry lived in areas with moderate and



unreliable rainfall, where subsistence cultivation and a small cash crop production were the norm. Railways and roads existed mainly in prosperous areas, leading to the coast where cash crops were exported to the metropolitan capitalist countries.³⁰ This structure enhanced tribalism and a feeling of superiority among tribes from prosperous regions such as Kilimanjaro and the West Lake, which provided more social services than did less prosperous regions. The Nyerere government considered this system a poor colonial arrangement; thus the structure required reform.

The first step adopted by the new government was the Three-Year Development Plan, which emphasized agriculture. The basic premise behind the plan was that rapid economic development was hindered by the traditional methods of cultivation and peasant life style. It was argued that if hand-held hoes were replaced by plows and tractors, agricultural productivity would increase. The plan therefore called for the reorganization of peasants into groups who were required to combine resources and purchase plows or tractors and share their use. Once again, this plan was thwarted by inappropriate agricultural technology, nature, and poor planning. Widespread crop failures experienced in 1961-62 due to floods and insects resulted in one-half million people's dependence on famine-relief efforts for survival.³¹

³⁰Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, pp. 26-30.

³¹Julius K. Nyerere, Republic Day Broadcast "This is the way Forward", 9 December 1963, p. 4.



Faced with this crisis, the government had no choice but to adopt the pre-independence 1960 World Bank Mission Report, which recommended that Tanzania's economic development be based on more intensive use of land on a sustainable basis. The report proposed two types of changes: (1) the improvement approach and (2) the transformation approach. These became the basis for most of the planning that took place between 1963 and 1969. The improvement approach concentrated on the traditional system of agriculture, with additional extension services teaching modern methods of agriculture. The transformation approach required the establishment of new forms of production and peasant mobilization. This approach was adopted in 1963. The report noted:

Something more is required whether through intensive campaigns in settled areas, involving a variety of coordinating measures, or through planned and supervised settlement of areas which are at present uninhabited. In fact the mission judges that the second of these approaches is in general more promising in the present condition of Tanganyika.³²

Implementation of the World Bank approach began in 1963 with the establishment of the Village Settlement Agency. This agency was composed of a number of ex-colonial administrators, who occupied most of the senior positions. The Village Settlement Scheme was based on the transformation approach. The scheme advanced the necessity for developing and providing such villages with the necessary infrastructure for development, such as roads, clean water, schools, clinics, and agricultural machinery. People were


³²Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 74.

encouraged to increase cash crop production rather than depend solely on subsistence agriculture.

The first six years of implementation of the village settlement policy was a trial-and-error process. The government chose not to intervene in the traditional farming system as the British colonial administration had done; instead, the plan entailed the establishment of new farms and recruitment of willing peasants. The policy makers felt that by removing people from their traditional environment, they would be more open to change. The settlements were supervised and controlled by government-appointed managers. Settlers were recruited mainly from areas with land shortages, such as Kilimanjaro, Pare, and the Usambara mountains. A few settlers came from the ranks of the urban unemployed. The government provided these settlers with mechanized equipment and food. Agricultural production in the settlements was undertaken using machinery with which the settlers had no experience. The machinery was costly to purchase and operate, but settlers were expected eventually to repay the loans necessary to establish their farms.³³

Rather than increasing labor productivity, the settlements created a group of semi-privileged people who were under little pressure to perform. The results envisioned by the planners, of increasing agricultural output through increased acreage and improved technology, were not realized. Realizing that the scheme

³³Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, pp. 71, 74.



was not working, the government shifted the emphasis of rural development from the new settlements to the traditional villages.

The end of the World Bank Report transformation approach came scarcely two and one-half years after its adoption. Despite the administrative machinery and massive capitalization, these settlements proved to be too great a burden for the new government to handle. In this writer's opinion, the planners had forgotten the lessons of the 1947 Groundnuts Scheme, and they, too, were doomed to fail.

The end of the settlement policy gave way to a new emphasis expressed in then-Second Vice-President Rashid Kawawa's speech made in April, 1966:

In the future, it has been decided that, instead of establishing highly capitalized schemes and moving people to them, emphasis shall be on modernizing existing traditional villages, by injecting capital in order to raise the standard of living of the villagers. It is envisaged that such improvement might take the form of provision of water supply, better layout of villages, improved production methods, and reorganization of land holding.³⁴

The end of the village settlement policy resulted in a new approach, announced in the 1964 First Five-Year Plan, which concluded that the long-term future for agricultural development lay in the transformation approach. The government decided to pursue a policy of recruiting and resettling farmers on the most favorable soil, installing a system of private and collective ownership, and introducing supervised crop rotations and mixed farming to permit the maintenance of soil fertility. The second aspect of the

³⁴Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 74.



transformation approach was the reduction of agricultural underemployment in densely populated areas.³⁵

The Tanzanian economy had, at this stage, been affected by events largely determined by historical circumstances from outside forces. The German and British influences established in the country a modern economic infrastructure based on dependence. This post-colonial structure had not yet assimilated the use of agricultural machinery and extension services essential for further increasing output. Investments were lacking, and industries did not exist. Some thought a clean break from the past colonial era was needed.³⁶

2.9 Ujamaa: The Arusha Declaration

As early as 1962, President Julius Nyerere, under whose leadership the mainland had achieved independence the previous year, expressed interest in building a socialist state. In his pamphlet entitled "Ujamaa the Basis of Africa Socialism," he described the traditional African society as based on socialistic principles of working together and sharing. Nyerere, a charismatic leader who had the support of the masses, urged a young nation to maintain those principles.

Several events took place that led to Nyerere's adoption of the Ujamaa policy. Between 1962 and 1966, capitalist tendencies were

³⁵Coulson, Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania, p. 88.

³⁶Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 238.




gaining strength, especially among government and party leaders who had access to loans and were able to own shares in several companies. During this time, the peasants had benefited very little from any economic growth that had taken place since independence. The Arusha Declaration was designed, in part, to avoid disillusionment among the peasants, as well as to give the populace a new purpose.³⁷

Following the Zanzibar Revolution on January 12, 1964, which overthrew the Sultan and thus Arab dominance, the new Afro-Shiraz government headed by Sheik Karume declared a socialist state. Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed a united government shortly thereafter (April 26, 1964). With unification, the need arose to develop policies that expressed a single approach toward economic development.

A conflict ensued following the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, when West Germany threatened to withdraw all economic aid if the Tanganyikan government recognized East Germany by permitting it to have an embassy in Dar-es-Salaam. This conflict was intensified when Tanzania broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965-66 because of British support of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe). The result was a cessation of foreign aid from those two countries.³⁸

³⁷Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy, p. 180.

³⁸Cuthbert K. Omari, Politics and Rural Development in Tanzania (JAI Press Inc., 1987), p. 130.



On his return from a state visit to China in February 1965, President Nyerere spoke with praise about the economic progress achieved by the People's Republic. Most of all, he was impressed by their simplicity and frugality.

Nyerere, apparently freed from dependence on foreign aid from West Germany and Britain and with little foreign investment within his country, turned to socialism, which seemed to offer him hope at that desperate time. Nyerere's choice of socialism would have been much more difficult politically if local capitalism had been deeply entrenched and foreign investment had been at a high level. Nyerere also had a deep nationalistic spirit and a desire to initiate a liberation of the economy from what he believed was foreign domination by capitalist interests maintained through neo-colonialism (*wenye mirija*). In his mind, he fulfilled his desire with the Arusha Declaration of 1967.³⁹ The goal of Tanzania's socialism was aimed at developing a state in which all people were workers, a classless society in which the incomes derived from different types of work were not grossly divergent. These socialist goals were to be realized through collective ownership of resources and the provision of equal opportunity to all people.⁴⁰

In September 1967, Nyerere issued two pamphlets, entitled "Education for Self-reliance" and "Socialism and Rural Development." With the first pamphlet, Nyerere's intention was to orient teachers

³⁹Nyerere's speech, February 1967 Tape.

⁴⁰Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 232-233.


and educational administrators to the philosophy of the Arusha Declaration. The major focus was "to counteract the temptation for intellectual arrogance" which, he believed, led the well-educated to despise those whose abilities were nonacademic.⁴¹ In the second pamphlet "Socialism and Rural Development," Nyerere's focus was on rejecting capitalism. He illuminated the goals and objectives of the Ujamaa Village Policy as the reorganization of production along cooperative lines. He noted the fundamental objective of maintenance of traditional patterns of reciprocity, collective efforts, and commitment to a form of social change based on a socialist mode of production of sharing.

The Ujamaa Village Policy was expected to tackle the following problems: (1) curtail rural population dispersal by bringing together scattered peasants into cooperative villages; (2) stop the expansion of the privileged classes in the countryside; (3) increase basic services in the form of schools, health centers, roads, irrigation dams, clean pipe-borne water, animal dips, storage facilities, nursery schools, stores, good houses, small rural industries, and other basic essentials by providing necessary inputs.

2.10 Summary


Historical factors leading to the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, which placed Tanzania on the road to socialism and set

⁴¹Nyerere Freedom and Socialism, p. 273.



the stage for implementing the Ujamaa policy in rural areas were discussed in this chapter. The policies of the colonial era were traced, including German promotion of settler plantations and mobilization of labor under the plantation and dorfschamba structure, which set out to destroy the pre-colonial economy. During this period the introduction of cash crops was seen as the first step in the process of incorporating the Africans into the commercial sector. The succeeding British influence was also examined, covering their system of indirect rule, their encouragement of African marketing cooperatives, and the introduction of credit institutions for African farmers. Much of the discussion explored the institutional structures that were established and the economic activities undertaken. The problems of the Groundnut Scheme, undertaken by the British in 1947, provided evidence of how the adoption of modern technology must be relevant to the skills of the laborers and climatic conditions, if it is to be successful.

Also examined was the rural development policy in Tanzania. The policy was traced to the pre-independence 1960 World Bank Mission Report, which proposed two types of changes: (1) the improvement approach and (2) the transformation approach. These approaches became the basis of rural development planning between 1963 and 1969. The World Bank strategy required moving people from their traditional homes to new government-selected resettlement sites. This strategy proved to be not only expensive, but in fact the new settlements created a group of semi-privileged people who



became dependent on mechanization provided to them by the government. In 1966 these highly capitalized schemes were abandoned, and the Arusha Declaration was adopted in 1967.

CHAPTER 3

TANZANIA'S ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL PERFORMANCE: 1967 TO 1987

3.1 Introduction

Tanzania's economic performance since the adoption of the Ujamaa policy in 1967 has been, at best, poor. Mounting national debt, decline in agricultural production, and sinking industrial capacity are evident. To understand the relationship between institutions, human resources, capital, natural resources, and technology and this decline, it is useful to survey generally available quantitative information for the period 1967 through 1987. The basic premise of this dissertation is that much of the decline in Tanzania was caused by the frequency of poorly conceived and executed institutional changes, inadequate human resources, and shortages of capital and technology. Further, the adoption and implementation of the Ujamaa policy, given the inadequacy of these four factors, contributed to the wretched state of Tanzania's experience.

This chapter is divided into two parts: Part 1 reviews the macroeconomic performance with emphasis on agriculture, and implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy. Part 2 covers Tanzania's institutions, human resources, capital and natural



resources, and technology, with specific attention given to the role of marketing boards. The role of these four factors in the development of Tanzania is examined, paying attention to the governments' policy aimed at reducing foreign dependency through import substitution and self-reliance. A review of contending social and economic analyses of the Ujamaa policy, using the views of scholars of various persuasions concerning Tanzania's transition to socialism, is also presented.

3.2 Economic Status

To gauge the performance of the Tanzanian economy, it is essential to look at such key economic indicators as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment, balance of payments, inflation, and general economic activities. In 1986, the GDP total in Tanzania shillings (Tsh) was 25,486 million. In 1986, the agricultural sector (comprising food and cash crops, fishing, and forestry) contributed the largest share of GDP--39 percent of the total. The industrial sector (manufacturing and commerce) contributed less than 15 percent of the total. The remaining contribution to GDP was from the public sector.

Employment statistics for Tanzania remain rudimentary because an adequate database has not been established to track and bank data on urban and rural labor markets. However, according to the International Labor Office (ILO), between 1975 and 1985 the urban and rural labor force was estimated to increase by about 240,000 to 2 million. Wage employment in 1975 was only 470,000 compared to the

total labor force of 2.6 million. The trend of wage employment in different sectors indicated an increase of 3 percent per annum.⁴² Therefore, the majority of the estimated labor force of 9 million people was either engaged in nonwage activities, or was underemployed or unemployed. Industrial employment in the formal sector grew by 7 percent per annum between 1979 and 1982. It accounted for 16 percent of total employment, more than three times its share of output. Employment in small enterprises has grown rapidly as the formal sector satisfies less and less of the demand for manufactured goods. Labor productivity has deteriorated from the already low levels of the 1970s. By 1982, value added per employee was one-half of what it was in 1966.⁴³

Tanzania's current economic crisis can be gauged in terms of a balance-of-payment deficit and increasing indebtedness. Before 1967, the country maintained a current account surplus. Initially, the cause of the balance-of-payment deficit was the surge in government expenditure associated with the expansion of government in the economy following the Arusha Declaration. Other causes that aggravated the worsening balance-of-payment crisis were poor weather conditions (droughts and floods), the Arab oil embargo, and the war with Uganda. During the droughts and floods of the mid-1970s and 1980s, foreign exchange earnings were used to import food and oil,

⁴²JASPA-ILO, Towards Self-Reliance Tanzania (Addis Ababa: International Labour Office, 1978), p. 15.

⁴³World Bank, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum (Report No. 5019-TA) (Washington, D.C.: August 10, 1984), p. 33.

reinforcing a trend typical of Third World countries--where exports are dominated by primary products and major imports by capital equipment, which often results in an imbalance of trade in favor of capital equipment.

In addition to the preceding factors, the major internal factor was the inability of the export sector to generate sufficient foreign exchange to match the country's increasing demand. Since the early 1970s, export output has declined by more than 25 percent. The economy's poor export performance has been primarily the result of stagnation or decline in production of the major export crops, such as sisal, cotton, and coffee.

Inflation in Tanzania was augmented by several external and internal factors. The external factors include the quadrupled world oil prices induced by the 1973 Arab oil embargo and high crude oil prices set by OPEC, high prices for machinery and industrial goods (transport equipment, factory raw materials and spares), and high interest rates, which caused debt-servicing costs to soar. Internal factors included an active black market, which was induced by scarcity of essential goods. The rapid expansion in government social welfare programs, such as education and health, and increased government spending over and above the available government revenue further intensified inflationary pressure and forced excessive internal borrowing. Given the high level of hoarding caused by officially controlled prices, black-marketeers flourished. Many economic activities, such as the depositing of money in banks, were

avoided. Hence the government printed more money. Furthermore, the government's resistance to devaluing the currency kept the exchange rate overvalued and decreased agricultural exports. This resulted in a thriving black-market for foreign currency. The shortage of foreign currency fueled additional inflation because the demand for foreign goods was high. Finally, corruption in the government distribution system completed the cycle of inflation and shortages of consumer goods.

The rate of inflation averaged 2.1 percent per annum between 1961 and 1971.⁴⁴ In the 10 years between 1973 and 1983, the Tanzanian Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose from 100 to 594, an average rate of between 20 to 28 percent per annum.⁴⁵

For a decade, Tanzania's economy has been at the brink of bankruptcy, with industry operating at roughly 30 percent capacity and agricultural output declining. Economic performance since 1973 has been lamentable, as agriculture has grown at a rate 2.6 percent per year, less than the rate of population growth of 3.3 percent per year. Industry has grown at 0.2 percent per year, while export volumes have fallen at a rate of 4.6 percent per year. Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) sagged from 3.3 percent per capita in the 1960s to 1.5 in the 1970s and continued to decrease in the 1980s. Growth in domestic investment per capita, at 9.8 percent in the 1960s, declined to 3.0 percent during the same period. Poor

⁴⁴Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy, 1982, p. 186.

⁴⁵p. A. Lane, The State of the Tanzanian Economy: A Survey (Dar-es-Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, April 1984), p. 12.

performance in industry has been attributed to inability to obtain raw materials and machinery spare parts, caused in large part by the shortage of foreign exchange and exacerbated by increases in oil prices in 1974 following the Arab oil embargo and the high prices set by OPEC. Tanzania now spends 30 percent of her available foreign exchange for imports of oil. Eighty percent of the country's machinery is lying idle for want of spare parts, fuel, and raw materials.⁴⁶

Although manufactured exports accounted for 13 percent of the value of gross manufacturing output in 1977, by 1981 the proportion had dropped to only 7 percent. This sectors' share of total export earnings remained about 16 percent, rising briefly in 1980 as a result of barter deals with neighboring countries.

Tanzania is essentially a country of small peasant farmers; 80 percent of the population depend on agriculture for their living. At least 2.5 million or 83 percent of all households in 1986 were below two hectares; more than 97 percent were below five hectares. Only 5.1 percent of Tanzania's land area is used for crop production. The remainder consists primarily of rough grazing area (52 percent) and of woods and forest (43 percent). Small holders cultivate about 87 percent of the area under crop production. About 1.4 million hectares or 31 percent of the cultivated area is devoted to major export crops, with the remaining 3.1 million hectares (69

⁴⁶Manfred Bienefeld, Tanzania After Nyerere (Africa Events, May/June, 1986), p. 61.

percent) reserved for food crops. The area under irrigation is estimated at 127,000 hectares (less than 3 percent of the cultivated area), the bulk of which is used by smallholders. Much of the country's irrigation is for the sugar industry.

Per capita agricultural production kept pace with population growth until 1978, but it has since fallen off. National income statistics show average annual real rates of growth in agricultural production of 4.3 percent from 1970 to 1978, with subsistence agriculture growing at 5 percent per annum. Since 1978, output has declined by 2.9 percent per annum, with subsistence production declining the most--8 percent per annum.⁴⁷ (See Tables 1 and 2.)

Tanzania produces a variety of cash crops, of which the most important include sisal, coffee, cotton, pyrethrum, tea, tobacco, cashew nuts, and cloves. Major food crops include maize, paddy rice, sunflower, groundnuts, coconuts, sesame, sorghum, millet, finger millet, wheat, sugar cane, and cassava. Cash crop production, as discussed in Chapter 2, was influenced by the dynamics of colonialism as part of world capitalist development.

Coffee is produced mainly by smallholders and a few large estates. Tanzania produces both arabica and robusta coffee. Two-thirds of the total production is classified as mild arabica, which grows on the slopes of Mounts Kilimanjaro and Meru. Robusta coffee is produced mainly in the West Lake Region, off the shores of Lake

⁴⁷John W. Harbeson, Tanzanian Socialist Transition and Agricultural Policy (1983/No. 30 Africa JWH-1-'83)



Table 1.--Tanzanian cash crop production, 1961 through 1987
(thousands of metric tons).

Year	Coffee	Cotton	Sisal	Cashews	Tea	Tobacco	Pyrethrum
1961	24.9	30.2	200.9	40.0	3.2	.5	1.4
1962	25.7	33.0	219.5	59.0	4.0	.4	1.9
1963	28.7	48.6	214.4	41.5	4.0	.4	2.3
1964	33.8	45.2	203.9	56.7	4.5	.2	2.3
1965	34.2	56.2	210.2	64.6	4.3	1.7	3.7
1966	52.0	86.2	198.9	83.3	6.8	5.1	4.4
1967	40.3	60.8	204.4	84.3	7.2	7.8	6.7
1968	51.5	62.9	186.1	117.6	8.0	7.3	4.8
1969	46.1	56.8	171.9	113.5	8.8	11.6	3.9
1970	49.7	60.6	160.8	111.2	8.5	11.1	2.3
1971	46.7	54.5	133.1	107.3	9.2	12.0	2.7
1972	46.7	64.5	133.4	113.8	11.6	13.1	4.3
1973	52.4	60.0	93.6	125.4	13.3	12.7	4.0
1974	47.5	49.1	105.6	145.1	12.3	18.3	3.3
1975	42.3	39.1	91.5	119.0	13.9	14.2	4.7
1976	53.1	57.6	68.5	83.7	15.0	17.9	3.9
1977	54.2	40.4	68.5	97.6	15.2	18.3	1.3
1978	48.7	47.0	81.1	68.4	18.3	17.1	2.9
1979	49.6	60.5	77.7	57.1	17.5	17.3	1.6
1980	50.0	58.4	81.1	41.5	17.3	16.7	1.6
1981	66.4	53.8	88.0	60.0	16.3	15.9	2.0
1982	54.8	44.2	73.7	44.2	15.5	13.6	1.0
1983	53.8	42.9	60.0	32.5	17.5	13.6	1.6
1984	50.0	141.0	38.0	48.0	73.0	11.0	1.4
1985	49.0	155.0	32.0	33.0	77.0	13.3	1.5
1986	55.0	106.0	30.0	18.9	71.0	12.5	1.4
1987	—	213.10	—	16.50	—	—	1.20

Sources: The Marketing Development Beruau, Ministry of
Agriculture & Development. Dar-es-salaam 1987,
R/87 and
: Chama Cha Mapinduzi; Semina ya Wajumbe wa
Halmashauri Kuu ya Taifa: Dar-es- salaam
20 - 22 August 1984

Table 2.--Tanzanian food crop production, 1967 through 1987
(thousands of tons).

Year	Maize	Rice	Cassava	Millet	Sorghum	Beans
1967	112.9	23.5	--	--	--	--
1968	127.5	5.1	--	--	--	--
1969	127.5	4.2	--	--	--	--
1970	278.3	59.8	--	--	--	--
1971	186.4	60.8	6.1	--	--	--
1972	43.0	44.6	14.3	9.3	.6	--
1973	106.4	73.1	18.9	2.4	1.7	--
1974	73.8	59.7	17.8	2.5	2.0	--
1975	23.9	24.6	17.4	2.2	2.9	--
1976	91.1	11.7	19.4	6.4	3.0	7.5
1977	124.0	16.0	19.9	10.8	10.1	11.2
1978	213.0	24.6	36.9	39.2	33.6	30.7
1979	220.0	26.9	63.8	39.9	58.6	27.9
1980	161.5	44.8	44.0	16.8	21.7	35.2
1981	104.6	44.8	7.5	1.4	18.9	16.2
1982	90.0	23.0	9.9	.3	10.7	12.3
1983	83.3	32.1	18.6	.1	4.5	16.2
1984	70.90	33.90	30.70	.60	5.50	12.30
1985	90.0	18.7	19.9	.3	2.4	11.3
1986	178.5	15.5	12.9	--	14.7	--

Source: The Marketing Development Bureau, Ministry of
Agriculture & Livestock Development.
Dar-es-salaam 1987, R/87 and
: Chama Cha Mapinduzi; Semina ya Wajumbe wa
Halmashauri Kuu ya Taifa. Dar-es-salaam
20-22 August 1984

Victoria. Coffee is the major export crop, accounting for nearly 40 percent of total export earnings in 1982. It provides about 10 percent of the population with employment and the government with substantial taxation revenues. The volume of coffee has declined due to a quota reduction set at 41,000 tons for Tanzania by the International Coffee Agreement. Consequently, export unit values have declined by 50 percent since 1977.⁴⁸

Tanzania is the second largest producer of sisal in the world, accounting for one-fifth of world output. It is essentially an estate crop, of which 60 percent is produced on nationalized estates. The crop has been in decline worldwide since the mid-1960s. Domestic production has declined by 71 percent, from 204,400 tons in 1967 to 60,000 tons in 1983. (See Tables 3 and 4.)

Cotton is a smallholder crop grown in the West Lake, Mwanza, Mara, and Shinyanga regions. An estimated 400,000 families are engaged in growing cotton. The volume of cotton exports declined from 60,800 tons in 1967 to 42,900 tons in 1983. However, the increase in producer price increased output from 141,000 tons in 1984 to 213,100 tons in 1987. Export unit values for cotton had not changed since 1977.⁴⁹ The government attributed the decline in cotton production to the lack of technological changes, improved farm power, irrigation, and a more effective input distribution

⁴⁸World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum (No 541a-TA, December 10, 1974), pp. 6, 14, 20, 34.

⁴⁹World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984, p. 62.

Table 3.--Tanzanian cash crop annual percentage change in output, 1962 through 1987.

Year	Coffee Growth Rate	Cotton Growth Rate	Sisal Growth Rate	Cashews Growth Rate	Tea Growth Rate	Tobacc Growth Rate	Pyrethrum Growth Rate
1962	3.2	9.3	9.3	47.5	25.0	-20.0	35.7
1963	11.7	47.3	2.3	-29.7	.0	.0	21.1
1964	17.8	-7.0	-4.9	36.6	12.5	-50.0	.0
1965	1.2	24.3	3.1	13.9	-4.4	750.0	60.9
1966	52.0	53.4	-5.4	28.9	58.1	200.0	18.9
1967	-22.5	-29.5	2.8	1.2	5.9	52.9	52.3
1968	27.8	3.5	-9.0	39.5	11.1	-6.4	-28.4
1969	-10.5	-9.7	-7.6	-3.5	10.0	58.9	-18.8
1970	7.8	6.7	-6.5	-2.0	-3.4	-4.3	-41.0
1971	-6.0	-10.1	-17.2	-3.5	8.2	8.1	17.4
1972	.0	18.3	.2	6.1	26.1	9.2	59.3
1973	12.2	-7.0	-29.8	10.2	14.7	-3.1	-7.0
1974	-9.4	-18.2	12.8	15.7	-7.5	44.1	-17.5
1975	-10.9	-20.4	-13.4	-18.0	13.0	-22.4	42.4
1976	25.5	47.3	-25.1	-29.7	7.9	26.1	-17.0
1977	2.1	-29.9	.0	16.6	1.3	2.2	-66.7
1978	-10.1	16.3	18.4	-29.9	20.4	-6.6	123.1
1979	1.8	28.7	-4.2	-16.5	-4.4	1.2	-44.8
1980	.8	-3.5	4.4	-27.3	-1.1	-3.5	.0
1981	32.8	-7.9	8.5	44.6	-5.8	-4.8	25.0
1982	-17.5	-17.8	-16.2	-26.3	-4.9	-14.5	-50.0
1983	-1.8	-2.9	-18.6	-26.5	12.9	.0	60.0
1984	-7.1	228.7	-36.7	47.7	317.1	-19.1	-12.5
1985	-2.0	9.9	-15.8	-31.3	5.5	20.9	7.1
1986	12.2	-31.6	-6.3	-42.7	-7.8	-6.0	-6.7
1987	—	101.0	—	-12.7	—	—	-14.3

Source: Annual percentage rate calculations based on Table I

Table 4.--Tanzanian food crop annual percentage change in output,
1972 through 1987.

Year	Maize Growth Rate	Cassava Growth Rate	Millet Growth Rate	Sorghum Growth Rate	Beans Growth Rate
1972	8.3	16.1	--	66.7	--
1973	26.9	11.1	--	10.0	--
1974	51.5	25.0	--	36.4	--
1975	60.0	20.0	45.5	20.0	--
1976	.0	8.3	6.2	11.1	--
1977	6.2	.0	11.8	.0	75.0
1978	.0	.0	110.5	.0	.0
1979	17.6	.0	.0	.0	.0
1980	50.0	7.7	.0	.0	.0
1981	16.7	28.6	-25.0	60.0	.0
1982	25.7	33.3	.0	25.0	.0
1983	81.8	66.7	6.7	50.0	.0
1984	31.3	50.0	25.0	33.3	42.9
1985	20.0	.0	50.0	.0	60.0
1986	.0	20.0	33.3	20.0	50.0

Source: Annual change in output based on
Table II

program. Adverse weather conditions, combined with pest problems, were blamed for the decline in 1975-1978 production.⁵⁰ The evidence, however, points to low producer prices coupled with storage and transportation problems.

Tobacco is produced in the Tabora Region, Chunya District, and Iringa Region by both estates and smallholders, with the latter contributing the larger share. Tanzania produces two types of tobacco: flue-cured, which accounts for 75 percent of production, and fire-cured. Tobacco production increased from 7,800 tons in 1967 to 13,600 in 1983, but it declined slightly and stood at 12,500 tons in 1987.⁵¹ However, the shortage of fuel wood for curing tobacco has contributed to a 22 percent decline in production.⁵²

Tea is grown on private estates in the Southern Highlands of Mufindi, Tukuyu, and Njombe, in addition to Usambara. Tea production increased from 7,200 tons in 1967 to 17,500 tons in 1983, and it continued to increase, reaching 71,000 tons in 1987. Smallholder production contributed from about 13 to 22 percent over the same period.⁵³

⁵⁰Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania Agriculture and Livestock (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1981), p. 26-27.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 28.

⁵²World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984, p. 63.

⁵³World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study (No. 541a-TA) (Washington, D.C.: December 10, 1974), p. 10.

Cashew nut production is a smallholder enterprise, with 95 percent grown along the coastal belt, stretching from Mtwara in the south to Tanga in the north. Cashew nut production in 1967 was 84,300 tons. It continued to increase, reaching a peak in 1973 at 145,100 tons; it began declining in 1975 to 119,000 tons, and fell further to only 32,500 tons in 1983. This decline continued and stood at 16,500 tons in 1987. Among the causal factors for the decline was neglect due to the location of growers in Ujamaa villages far from their cashew groves. In addition, lack of a replanting program, low producer prices, and unattractive marketing facilities (since the abolition of private trading) all had a negative effect on cashew nut output.⁵⁴

Tanzania is the second largest producer in the world of pyrethrin, the small perennial herb grown for the production of a powerful insecticide. It is a smallholder enterprise that has declined steadily after reaching its peak in 1967--from 6,700 tons that year to only 1,600 tons in 1983. The two major producing areas are the Arusha and Kilimanjaro Regions in the North and Iringa, Njombe, and Mbeya Districts in the Southern Highlands. The decline is attributed to low producer prices.⁵⁵

Cloves constitute the dominant foreign exchange earner for Zanzibar and Pemba, accounting for 5 to 10 percent of Tanzania's

⁵⁴World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural Sector (No. 541a-TA) (Washington, D.C.: 1983), p. 24.

⁵⁵World Bank Report, Tanzania Agriculture and Rural Development Sector Study (No. 541a-TA), 1974, p. 15.

total export earnings. Clove husbandry is in the hands of peasant family steads, each of which owns about a hectare of clove trees. Clove production has declined from 7,200 tons in 1976 to about 5,000 in 1981. The two reasons identified for the decline are diseases and aging of clove trees.⁵⁶

3.3 Food Crop Production

Maize is produced by more than half of Tanzania's farming population, which makes it the most important staple food crop. Maize production has fluctuated from year to year. In 1971, for example, 186,400 tons were purchased by the National Milling Corporation (NMC). The following year purchases dropped to 43,000. In 1979, production reached a peak as 220,000 tons were purchased. It declined to only 85,300 tons in 1983, but rebounded again, reaching 178,000 tons in 1987. The National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) is involved in the production of maize on large-scale farms. The major maize-producing areas in the country are Arusha, Iringa, Mbeya, Rukwa, Ruvuma, Singida, Tabora, Morogoro, and Tanga.

According to a World Bank study, national average maize yields were estimated to have been in the order of 700 to 900 kg/ha. Yields in Ruvuma in 1981 were estimated to average 1,400 kg/ha, and similar average yields were quoted at Arusha. A number of farmers in the Mbeya and Rukwa Regions attained yields of 5,000 to 6,000 kg/ha, while the provision of adequate technical advice and

⁵⁶Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania and Livestock, 1981, p. 33.

production inputs could easily raise the average yields in significant areas of the Rukwa, Ruvuma, and Mbeya Regions to 2,500 to 3,000 kg/ha.⁵⁷ Since 1972, the national average yield of maize has varied between 700 and 900 kg/ha, whereas in neighboring Kenya the national average is about 2,000 kg/ha. This shows that the national average yield has been static over the last decade. Suggested causes of this static productivity are lack of technical inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers, low producer prices, inadequate storage, poor transportation, and markets that are influenced by rigidities that arise from a single marketing channel. Consequently, the increase in maize output has been largely the result of an expansion in hectares brought under cultivation, rather than an increase in productivity.

Data compiled by the World Food Organization (FAO) show a gradual but erratic increase in maize production since 1967, from 750,000 tons that year to 1.131 million tons in 1984. Nevertheless, it was necessary for the country to import large quantities of maize due to food preferences.⁵⁸ For example, in 1969, 47,900 tons were imported to offset the decline in domestic food production, and this trend has continued with the exception of 1978/1979. In 1984, the country imported 228,550 tons of maize, which has cost the country dearly in foreign exchange earnings.

⁵⁷World Bank Report, Tanzania--Food Production and Food Security Paper (Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1985), p. 8.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 5.

Rice constitutes the main food grain in Zanzibar and Pemba, as well as along much of the mainland coastal areas. Like maize, the production of rice has fluctuated annually. In 1971, marketed production stood at 60,800 tons and declined to 29,700 tons in 1982. The decline then continued further, reaching 15,500 tons in 1987. Harvested production in 1968/69 was 126,000 tons; it increased to 400,000 tons in 1984, according to FAO estimates, although the country's imports increased from 10,000 tons in 1970/71, reaching a peak in 1973/74 at 73,100 tons and declining to 58,800 tons in 1982/84. Rice is mainly grown by smallholders for home consumption; surpluses are sold. NAFCO and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government are also involved in large-scale production of rice. Yields average about 950 kg/ha and range from 500 to 1,200 kg/ha under rainfed conditions. According to World Bank projections, yields of up to 3,000 kg/ha may be obtained with irrigation. The main producing areas are the Tabora, Mbeya, Morogoro, Mwanza, and Shinyanga Regions and Zanzibar and Pemba.⁵⁹

Sorghum, bulrush, and finger millet are important drought-resistant food crops in drought-prone areas. According to FAO estimates, total sorghum production in 1971 was 150,300 tons, increasing to 450,000 tons in 1984. Purchases of sorghum by NMC have fluctuated, rising from 600 tons in 1972 to 58,000 tons in 1979, and falling to 4,500 tons in 1983. However, purchases

⁵⁹World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Study (No. 541a-TA), 1974, p. 21.

increased again, reaching 14,700 tons in 1987. The purchase of bulrush millet has also fluctuated; in 1972 it stood at 9,300 tons, rising to 39,900 tons in 1979 and then declining to only 100 tons. By 1987 the amount was insignificant--only 300 tons. Cassava purchases also fluctuated from 6,100 tons, rising to 63,800 tons in 1979, and then declining to 18,600 tons; they stood at 12,900 in 1987. In 1972, cassava production was 3,475 million tons, rising to 5,600 million tons according to FAO estimates. These drought-resistant crops are important alternatives to maize, although the majority of Tanzanians prefer maize for food.

Wheat is produced mainly on large-scale commercial state farms, whereas smallholders grow it mainly for domestic consumption. In the Arusha region, expatriate farmers produced 57,000 tons of wheat in 1971/72, but production then declined. FAO estimates show fluctuations in wheat production. Approximately 98,300 tons were produced in 1972, but only 80,000 tons in 1984.

Overall, as the data show, most crop production by peasants has been erratic, fluctuating with the prevailing producer prices. Production increased when producer prices were high and declined when they were low. Furthermore, production is sensitive to weather conditions, declining when there were floods or droughts and increasing when the weather was favorable. (See Figures 2 through 5.)

The macroeconomic environment was negatively affected by internal policies that failed to provide the appropriate incentives to small peasant farmers, who are often motivated by attractive




Figure 2: Cash crop production. (Source: See Table 1.)




Figure 3: Cash crop production. (Source: See Table 1.)




Figure 4: Cash crop producer price. (Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock Development, Marketing Development Bureau, Dar-es-Salaam, 1987. Note: Sisal converted from shs./metric ton.)




Figure 5: Cash crop producer price. (Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture & Livestock Development, Marketing Development Bureau, Dar-es Salaam, 1987.)

producer prices and adequate availability of consumer goods. The sequence of the Ujamaa policy implementation on a national scale is discussed in the following section. It is intended to show that there were frequent changes in the process of implementing the Ujamaa Village Policy.

3.4 Implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy

The Arusha Declaration committed the country to building a self-reliant socialist state based on an egalitarian, traditional way of life or Ujamaa. This commitment to building a socialist society was affirmed by the Arusha Resolution included in the Declaration, which stated that every leader must abandon the practice of capitalism or feudalism. The code of the resolution stated that party and government members could not own shares in any company, become directors of any privately owned enterprise, receive two or more salaries, or own houses for renting. These practices were considered unsocialistic and therefore were forbidden.⁶⁰ In February 1967, all private banks, the major food processors, and eight major foreign export trading companies were nationalized. The government also announced its intention of securing majority control of six major manufacturing companies and of the sisal industry. In 1970, through a presidential directive, all import and wholesale trade was brought under control of the State Trading Corporation, an exercise that was completed within a year. In the same year, the

⁶⁰Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, 1968, pp. 248-250.

government nationalized all residential and commercial buildings valued at more than 100,000 shillings and not occupied by their owners.⁶¹

Implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy has gone through several phases since 1967. These phases include the following:

1. Persuasion. In the beginning, Ujamaa villages were established voluntarily through persuasion and encouragement, with participation only by willing members. Party leaders and government officials were sent forth to explain the advantages of cooperation based on the attractiveness of the potential advantages that could accrue to participants. No threats or promises of government aid were used. The guidelines for action were based on the Five-Year Development Plan, which advocated the mobilization of government and political institutions behind the principles of Ujamaa. The Ujamaa program involved two principles: first, increasing rural development efforts, including extension of services directed toward groups of producers rather than individual farmers; and second, developing group activities, in particular production, to be promoted by government administrative agencies and the ruling party. This experiment lasted only five years, during which time the progress of peasant participation in the new Ujamaa villages was termed

⁶¹Mwansasu et al., Towards Socialism in Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1979), p. 12.



unsatisfactory. The leaders thought a new strategy of mobilization was needed.⁶²

2. Coercion. From 1972 onwards, coercive measures were undertaken by the government. Peasants were forcibly resettled in Ujamaa villages under massive resettlement operations. The reason for the change in strategy was simple: Despite government welfare policies of providing the rural water supply programs, expanding primary school education and health facilities, and abolishing the poll-tax introduced by the colonial government to generate funds for local authorities, peasant response to the Ujamaa village system was very limited.⁶³ Overly zealous leaders moved people in the midst of the farming season, thus causing a disruption of the country's agricultural production. More than two million peasants were settled in 5,000 villages by 1974.⁶⁴

3. Block farming. Block farmers are private farmers who have farm holdings next to each other. Each farmer works and harvests individually, but shares the use of tractors or spraying equipment.⁶⁵ The adoption of the block-farming strategy was motivated by an overall decline in agricultural production, combined

⁶²Michaela Von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, Analysis of a Social Experiment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. xii-xiii).

⁶³Coulson, Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1977, pp. 86-93.

⁶⁴Mwansasu et al., Towards Socialism in Tanzania, 1979, pp. 98-99.

⁶⁵Michaela Von Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, Analysis of a Social Experiment, 1979, pp. 109-111.

with the World Bank's resistance to communal farming. Those factors caused the government to de-emphasize communal production in Ujamaa villages. Therefore, in 1972, communal plots were divided among the villagers, and each farmer became responsible for his own block. Block farming, however, was not as widespread, because it was not pursued as aggressively as communal farming by the government. There are still villages which up to 1987 had not adopted block farming.

3.5 Causes of the Decline in Agricultural Output

Between 1964 and 1974, the agricultural sector's contribution to the economy was growing more slowly than that of the service sector. Although agriculture remained the backbone of the economy, all the major export commodities recorded significant declines. Tanzania also experienced declines in food production, which reached a crisis stage from 1973 through 1975 and in 1981. The shortfall in the supply of domestic grain compelled the government to import more than 400,000 tons of grain in 1974, along with nearly 300,000 tons of maize and a substantial amount of wheat and rice. In 1974, the trade balance deficit rose from 970.3 million to 2,515 million shillings. During the same period, the value of exports rose only 11 percent, whereas the value of imports increased by 55 percent.

Tanzania's foreign reserves were virtually exhausted at the end of 1974. The trade deficit continued to increase, reaching more than \$400 million. Tanzania's gross domestic product, which had

grown by 4.4 percent as late as 1973, rose only 2.2 percent in 1974. The population increased approximately 2.7 percent a year during the same period. In 1967, Tanzania's total external debt was \$802.8 million; 71 million shillings of this was owed to the World Bank. At the end of 1972, the debt to the World Bank alone had grown to 521.2 million shillings, and the total debt stood at 2460.4 million shillings.⁶⁶

The 1974-1976 drought hurt agricultural production, resulting in an increase in imports. This caused some observers to question whether Ujamaa Village Policies were causing reduction in agricultural production. The adverse effect on the economy led many observers to conclude that Tanzania's policy of rural collectivization failed to increase agricultural output. In an effort to alleviate the crisis, the government became increasingly dependent on western capitalist nations and their multilateral lending institutions--the very form of dependence Nyerere opposed and tried to eradicate by adopting socialist policies. The need to pay for grain imports and to keep the nation from defaulting on outstanding loans forced the government to overlook the English proverb, which says: "He who pays the piper calls the tune." As early as 1974, there was a mutual understanding among the lenders and the government that policies to restore a high level of agricultural production should take precedence over policies oriented toward the fulfillment of other social goals. Toward the

⁶⁶Henry Bernstein, "Notes on State and Peasantry: The Tanzania Case," African Political Economy (September 1981): 45.

end of 1974, collectivism as a goal of the forced village formation process was de-emphasized. Individual farming became a fundamental institution in the rural sector. In October 1977, Nyerere announced that the small-scale private business sector would be assigned a significant place in the national economy.

The Third Five-Year Plan (1977-1981), delayed for two years due to the balance-of-payment crisis, required a budget of \$3.4 billion, of which one-half was to be raised externally. Agriculture was budgeted at only 15 percent of the total, although cash crop production was still declining. Declines in both cash and food crop production resulted in a severe economic crisis beginning in 1979; that crisis continues today.

Tanzania's economy is faced with serious difficulties from the lack of foreign reserves. The country was forced to accept IMF restrictions, which emphasize private enterprise rather than collectivization. President Mwinyi's government accepted the IMF conditions because of continuous trade deficits of more than \$600 million.⁶⁷ These deficits resulted in a \$330 million backlog in Tanzania's payment to creditors in 1986. After decades of trying to reduce dependence on former colonial European nations and their international lending institutions, by adopting socialism and self-reliance as a strategy for economic development, the country appears to be drifting deeper and deeper into dependence on loans and foreign aid because of the chronic shortage of foreign exchange

⁶⁷Africa, no. 66, February 1977.

earnings. Although economic performance in 1986 was considerably better than that of the five preceding years, with the real growth in GDP of 3.8 percent, the 1986 Three-Year Economic Recovery Program (ERP) still has a long way to go.

The policy of socialism and self-reliance was intended to mobilize local resources in order to increase cash crop production and use foreign exchange earnings to construct import-substitution industries. The comparative advantage principle states that mutually beneficial trade may be possible between two countries whenever there are differences in the relative costs (prices) of goods in those countries. According to this theory, trade allows a country to specialize in the production of the goods for which it is a relatively low-cost producer and to import the products for which the country is a relatively high-cost producer. This specialization in production and trade permits higher real incomes in both nations than would be possible without trade.⁶⁸ In Tanzania, this theory was distorted by the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy, which had a negative effect on peasant cash crop production because of the time wasted in relocation and, on a general level, the low producer prices set by government. The concentration on rural development, while expanding traditional cash crop production, proved to be a failed policy.

⁶⁸Robert D. Stevens and Cathy L. Jabara, Agricultural Development Principles: Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1988), pp. 362-363.

3.6 Institutions

The role of institutions in economic development has long been recognized as essential. The purpose of this section is to discuss institutional arrangements relating to agriculture in Tanzania and to examine the role and level of efficiency in providing relevant services to the farmers, and its effect on development. According to Johnson:

Investments must be made in institutional arrangements to match and sustain those in human capital and new technologies. The solution for every problem in crop productivity involves an institutional dimension. . . . Policy, policy institutions, and processes all call for modification if research imperatives are to take advantage of opportunities to create a greater productive capacity, develop resource sparing technologies, assure dependability of production, establish food security, and meet the increased purchasing powers of people and their desires for dietary improvement and human health.⁶⁹

Many institutions in Tanzania were inherited from the British following independence. The institutional mechanism established by the colonizers was designed to serve a colony and not an independent state. Agricultural policy under colonialism emphasized the production of cash crops to provide the needed raw materials for British industries. From 1961, when independence was achieved, through 1966, the government managed the inherited structure without fundamentally restructuring it or making drastic institutional and agricultural policy changes. The Arusha Declaration in 1967 introduced the Ujamaa policy, which placed more emphasis on rural

⁶⁹Martin Gibbs and Carla Carlson, Crop Productivity Research Imperatives Revisited (An International Conference Held at Harbor Springs, Michigan, October 13-18, 1985, and at Airlie, Virginia, December 11-13, 1985), pp. 40-41.



development based on collective production, although the technical institutional arrangements established under colonialism were not transformed.

The role of the central government before 1967 was essentially similar to those in colonial times, consisting of maintaining law and order, collecting revenues, providing basic services such as roads and water supplies, and advancing exports of all types of commodities to obtain foreign exchange.⁷⁰ At the time of independence, more than two-thirds of the civil servants were British expatriates. The immediate task was to Africanize the civil service. Therefore, to replace the colonial administration after independence, most civil service posts were decided upon by patronage. Sensitive leadership positions were filled by political appointees. The heads of ministries (ministers) and of the colonial provinces and districts were replaced in 1962/63 by TANU appointees, referred to as regional and district commissioners, respectively. Regional and district commissioners also served as TANU secretaries to ensure that the party's policies would be implemented. This move helped merge the civil service with the party machinery and thus helped to develop popular support for formerly unpopular colonial administrators.

The major institutional change was the abolition of the traditional chiefs at the subdistrict level in 1963, and their replacement by the party-appointed divisional and ward executive officers,

⁷⁰Mukandala, "Bureaucracy and Socialism in Tanzania: The Case of Civil Service," The African Review (1986): 2.

later to become the divisional and ward secretaries, respectively. The aim was to dismantle tribalism and enable TANU to penetrate and mobilize the rural population, rather than relying on the British system of indirect rule.⁷¹

In 1974 the country was administratively divided into 25 regions, each containing four or five districts, a total of 66, which were further subdivided into towns and villages. The lowest administrative division is a unit or cell of 10 households. District authorities have the function of administering their jurisdiction and carrying out responsibilities from the regional commissioner. The district administration is in charge of the formation of Ujamaa villages, crop and livestock extension, veterinary services, construction and maintenance of district roads, smaller investment projects, and evaluation of progress. Regional authorities are responsible to the Prime Minister's office and have responsibilities for local planning and implementation in all areas of development within the region. The technical ministries have responsibility for sector planning and coordination of activities of interest at the national level. The Prime Minister's office provides overall policy direction, coordinates regional plans and budgets, and assists regions in preparing their development programs. The cooperative registration and audit is the responsibility of the Commission for Rural Development within the Prime Minister's office. It is responsible for the registration of primary societies, which are

⁷¹Munishi, "Organizational Perspectives and Issues in Tanzania's Development Administration," The African Review (1986): 25.

essentially the Ujamaa villages. Day-to-day inspections are undertaken by the district staff. The Commission is also responsible for guiding and monitoring the Ujamaa Village Program, and training cooperative (inspectors, cooperative employees, and members) and Ujamaa staff.

The Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of agricultural research, training of extension staff, price policy, seed multiplication, supervision of the agricultural parastatals, and monitoring the agricultural sector. The Ministry of Marketing Boards and Cooperatives is in charge of marketing domestically and exporting cash crops.

Apart from the central government and the party, there are other agencies whose activities directly affect rural development. These are cooperatives, marketing boards, and parastatals. The cooperative movement is important in the production and marketing of coffee, cotton, sisal, tea, and cashews. They are involved in finance, retail sales, and industrial transport. In the mid-1960s, 72 percent of the cooperatives were in regions producing the aforementioned crops, which accounted for more than 70 percent of total proceeds paid out to growers by the societies. The number of registered cooperative societies rose from 857 in 1960 to 1,533 in 1966; the produce handled increased from 145,000 tons to 496,000 during the same period. With the adoption of Ujamaa, the cooperatives were seen as an instrument of furthering income



disparities in the rural areas.⁷² Therefore, reforms that were introduced tended to increase government control in marketing, centering on the evolution of a single-channel marketing system for all important cash crops and essential food crops. Cooperatives were made to act as crop-collecting agents. They bought farmers' produce on behalf of the Regional Cooperative Union with which they were affiliated.⁷³ Their dissolution in 1976 following challenges to some of the fundamental Ujamaa policy principles by powerful cooperative leaders was part of the government's strategy to ensure their control. However, poor performance forced the government to reinstate them in 1982, although structured differently.

The Tanzanian cooperative movement has three tiers. The basic unit is the network of 1,300 marketing societies, which covers the entire country and is the legal channel for the marketing of all major agricultural commodities. All marketing societies are affiliated with a union, which is organized on a regional basis and provides the link between societies and the marketing parastatals. The unions are also involved in retail trade and transport and are affiliated with the apex organization, the Cooperatives Union of Tanganyika (CUT), which serves as a spokesman for the movement on various parastatal boards and negotiates with the government on matters such as commodity prices. Crop buying is financed by

⁷²J. Wagao, State Control Over Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania: 1961-1976 (Economic Research Bureau, August 3, 1982), pp. 24-25.

⁷³World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study Annex 5, December 10, 1974, p. 1.



overdrafts on the National Bank of Commerce and the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), which distributes and extends credit for agricultural inputs to cooperative societies. The State Trading Corporation (STC) sells fertilizers, insecticides, and agricultural implements on a cash basis.

3.6.1 Marketing Boards

Marketing boards, established by the British colonial administration to supervise crop production, continued to operate following independence. The 1962 Agricultural Products (Control and Marketing) Act granted regulatory authority to the ministers of agriculture and marketing boards over production and marketing of crops, if they viewed it to be in the national interest. Fifteen boards were created in the districts of Kahama, Rungwe, Tabora, Morogoro, Moshi, Bukoba, Mwanza, Pare, Lushoto, Musoma, and Arusha following this Act, dealing with export crops and major food crops. Among the major boards established were (1) The National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) to control and regulate the marketing of maize, paddy, rice, cashew nuts, sesame, and soy beans. (2) The Tanganyika Tobacco Board (TTB) was established in 1963 by order from the Minister of Agriculture, Food and Cooperatives to regulate and register tobacco growers, provide growing instructions, and control marketing by setting prices by grades. (3) The Lint and Seed Marketing Board (LSMB) was established to control cotton and pyrethrum. Also established were (4) The Tanganyika Coffee Board (TCB) to control agents and individuals licensed by the board to handle coffee, (5)



The National Wheat Board (NWB), (6) the National Sugar Board (NSB), (7) the Tanganyika Sisal Marketing Board (TSMB), (8) the Tanganyika Tea Board (TTB), (9) the Tanganyika Seeds Board (TSB), and (10) the Tanganyika Dairy Board (TDB). In the absence of a clearly defined marketing policy, there were frequently conflicting regulations between area boards and those established with a national mandate. The NAPB was dissolved in mid-1973, and in its place the National Milling Corporation (NMC) assumed control of the trade in cereals.

Presidential Circular No 2 of 1969 was responsible for the increase in the number of parastatals. The National Agricultural Food Corporation (NAFCO) was established in 1969, as a holding company of operating companies. It was empowered with task-supervisory functions. In 1972, the role of parastatals in the agricultural sector led to the establishment of crop authorities and corporations, hence the replacement of the former boards that had dealt with high valued export and food crops. This led to the establishment of (1) the Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA), (2) the Cashewnut Authority of Tanzania (CATA), (3) the Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT), (4) the Sugar Development Corporation (SUDECO), (5) the Livestock Development Authority (TLDA), (6) the Tanzania Fisheries Corporation (TFC), and (7) the National Agricultural Corporation (NACO), which is a subsidiary of TLDA. The Tanzania Agricultural Products Export Corporation (GAPEX) became a holding parastatal responsible mainly for export crops.⁷⁴

⁷⁴Wagao, State Control Over Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania: 1961-1976, 1982, pp. 27-29.



Despite these frequent institutional changes, the colonial structural legacy lingers on. The parastatals and marketing boards have failed to transform the export-crop structure inherited from the colonial period as part of the incorporation into the world capitalist system into a base for rapid industrialization. Poor performance has persisted, as the discussion on human resources will show. While the government has been forced to heavily subsidize the established parastatals which operate at a loss, the production of peasant-grown food and cash crops has continued to decline.

3.6.2 Marketing and Pricing Policy

The role of marketing in any economy is to facilitate the distribution of goods and services. The process works best when distribution is regulated through the pricing mechanism. This process determines income and resource allocation among different agents in the economy. With respect to farmers, the process has a direct effect on motivation and productivity. After the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the direct control of marketing and prices by the government was increased through a series of changes that culminated in the consolidation of virtually all activities related to crop marketing under the parastatal crop authorities in 1976. The government's motive was to curb the potential political opposition in the cooperative movement and to consolidate its grip over rural areas.⁷⁵ However, until 1973/74, price policy appeared

⁷⁵Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, pp. 33-34.



essentially as a passive by-product of institutional innovation, designed to create a more uniform structure of agricultural marketing. Prices were not viewed as an instrument of resource allocation and income determination. Prices were determined by the economic committee of the Cabinet after considering the recommendations of the Marketing Development Bureau (MDB), which is a World Bank/FAO technical assistance project under the Ministry of Agriculture. The MDB provides rough estimates of the monetary return to farmers based on a limited knowledge of cross-supply elasticities and costs and availability of inputs. Price is largely based on the residual after marketing costs. However, the MDB is not always consulted on pricing matters.

There is also an Agricultural Products Price Coordinating Committee (APPPC) consisting of representatives of the various ministries and parastatals concerned, but it has not been active for some time. This system of price setting has resulted in making pricing and marketing decisions on an ad hoc basis, without the benefit of a policy framework and with little information on likely costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. This procedure played an important part in the decline of producer prices for export crops.⁷⁶ Consequently, the prices offered by the NMC and cooperative societies to farmers, particularly for food crops, often were far below prices obtained on local markets for the small quantities of produce that can be marketed legally, or from private

⁷⁶World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984, p. 22.

traders buying illegally. This subsequently undermined the NMC's image in the eyes of farmers.⁷⁷ The Structural Adjustment Policy adopted in 1982 regarding producer prices influenced decisions undertaken in the most recent past. This new policy has consistently benefited producer interests and has stimulated agricultural productivity somewhat.

The principle of uniform producer pricing was applied to certain crops, such as maize, cotton, tobacco, cashew nuts, cassava, beans, sorghum, and finger millet. The choice for uniform producer pricing is based on the government's desire to provide equal opportunity to farmers in order to enhance the commercialization of agriculture in remote areas. It entails artificially high producer prices in combination with artificially low consumer prices. Given international price levels, the prices that farmers receive are determined by the operating efficiency of parastatals, which has deteriorated over the past years. The major factor affecting pricing has been the rise in overhead costs of administration of the parastatals. Uniform producer pricing may have benefited poorer regions, but it resulted in misallocation of resources and increased transportation costs almost everywhere else. This has resulted in more government controls over production and less market influence on commodity pricing.

⁷⁷World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study, 1974, Annex 10, p. 16.

Neighboring countries that did not follow uniform pricing policies tended to offer higher prices than Tanzania.⁷⁸ This encouraged smuggling and promoted illegal trade involving the flow of goods to Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi. Recent policy actions based on the recommendations set forth in the Structural Adjustment Program have sought to remove restrictions on inter-regional trade, abolish pan-territorial pricing for agricultural commodities, and increase producer prices for export crops by 40 percent and food crops by 80 percent. These steps have been taken to repair the damage experienced since 1970 as producer prices declined some 30 to 40 percent in real terms. The crop parastatals have been inefficient in delivering inputs on time and in the right quantities, and in promptly collecting the harvest and paying farmers.⁷⁹

3.7 Human Resources

One of the major causes of underdevelopment is lack of human capital. Human resources involves the training of people. Apart from general literacy, it means the presence of trained agricultural scientists and technicians, hence improving the human skills essential for increasing productivity and management performance in agriculture. It involves the ability to adopt new and better methods of production, better organization, and the acquisition of

⁷⁸World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study, Annex 12, p. 3.

⁷⁹World Bank, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984, p. 26.



additional capital resources. It also requires the social and institutional structure necessary for the extension of education so that technical improvement in the villages can occur.

There has been a general lack of balance between trained food-crops agricultural extension agents and local needs in rural areas in Tanzania, which has been a significant factor in low agricultural food production. Part of this problem has stemmed from the expansion of institutions without first providing adequately trained personnel to run them. This problem has its roots in the colonial governments, which emphasized cash crops and neglected food crops. Extension officials were trained to deal with cash crops, but none were trained to deal with food crops. This trend continued following independence, and even after the adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, when government emphasis remained on export-oriented cash crops. Following the initial policies of the government after 1967, a nationwide research and extension network was established; it was designed to bring about gradual improvement in traditional farming methods. The effort has achieved only limited success, despite the substantial numbers of trained extension agents employed (1 per 1,000 farm families). Extension work has suffered from deficiencies in research, marketing, input supply, and credit. It has also been difficult getting new technological ideas across to farmers, due to reliance on exhortation. Extension staff lack practical farming experience and the ability to demonstrate the proposed innovations convincingly. Extension agents have generally been unable to apply their



theoretical knowledge to varying conditions and problems in the field.⁸⁰

Lack of skilled management in various sectors of the economy, particularly cooperatives, marketing boards, and parastatals is chronic. Mismanagement of state property and abuse of power through corruption have led to frequent institutional changes. Why is this the case, considering the heavy investments made in education? Available evidence points to a lack of penalties for poor performance and rewards for better performance. In other words, the system appears to tolerate incompetence and reward dishonesty. Managers of parastatals, cooperatives, and marketing boards have not been forced to accept the principle of accountability due to lack of competition, because they run state-owned agencies, which are in essence monopolies. The consequence is inefficiency and accumulated large losses, even in cases in which the individuals in management positions are well trained. Very few crop authorities prepare quarterly or annual progress reports highlighting their results or seek guidance on problems and policy decisions. However, given a climate in which appointments are often political, some of the general managers and managerial staff do not possess the technical and professional skills that are required to run the complex operations of parastatals, cooperatives, and marketing boards. As noted in a World Bank study, although agriculture is predominant in

⁸⁰World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Agricultural Sector Study, No. 541a-TA, December 10, 1974, pp. 38-40, 50.

Tanzania, it is the sector that has been hardest hit by shortages of human resources. Despite the aid received from foreign donors in the form of technical assistance, the dependence on expatriates continues. This sector, due to lack of incentives, has been unable to retain even the few competent local individuals who have been trained to become managers.⁸¹

Another major factor that demoralized the performance of managers of parastatals and cooperatives was the TANU Guidelines (Mwongozo) of 1971, which forbade managers to treat subordinates in an arrogant manner. The responsibility of hiring and firing was removed from managers, which undermined their authority. This resulted in lockouts and work stoppages, while managers feared disciplining their employees, resulting in extremely loose supervision. The consequence was an adverse effect on productivity, resulting in a decline in output.⁸² Absenteeism continues to be rampant in all parastatals and cooperatives, and few effective procedures exist for penalizing employees who abstain from work.

3.8 Capital

Capital is another input factor of production. It is wealth used in the production of further wealth. However, for business purposes, capital generally is measured in terms of money. Capital

⁸¹Sengamalay, Tanzania: Causes for Poor Performance March 1982. Parastatal Accountability (Dar-es-Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, 1982), pp. 4, 10-11.

⁸²Tanganyika African National Union, Mwongozo Wa TANU [Party Guidelines] (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), pp. 1-16.



can be regarded as the monetary value of real assets. According to Marx, the function of money as capital presupposes the capital relation itself. In his view, the capital relation is the presence of free wage labor (dispossessed and alienated labor), and the existence of free wage labor allows money to function as a command on the labor power of individuals.⁸³ Marx believed that capital itself is not consumed but moves intact through the process of commodity production and circulation, as the socialized, abstract representation of commodities. The circuit of capital involves production and circulation. Therefore, Marx concluded that the production process involves capital as a function with the domination of labor in order to achieve exploitation. The distribution of surplus value involves ownership and the institutional claim upon surplus value already produced.⁸⁴ Hence, the factors of production have traditionally been classified both by Marx and western economists under labor, land, and capital. The process of capital formation in Tanzania has historically been tied to external sources. The reasons for this were discussed in previous chapters. The purpose of this section is to discuss capital formation in Tanzania within the context of agriculture.

The goal set by the Arusha Declaration was "Socialism and Self-reliance," which emphasized internal financing as opposed to

⁸³Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 32.

⁸⁴Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), p. 490.



reliance on foreign donors. Internally, the method chosen to achieve self-reliance was increased taxation and self-help schemes under collective farming as sources for financing economic development. Despite this noble goal, the structure of agricultural financing was not deeply altered by the Arusha Declaration. Various successions of Five-Year Economic Development Plans that were adopted emphasized industrialization over agriculture, large-scale over small-scale activities, and in later years food over export crops. The outcome was that more capital or money was invested in an effort to industrialize, rather than to improve agriculture.⁸⁵ In the Second Five-Year Development Plan, the target share of agricultural expenditures was set at 13 percent through 1982, a drop from 20 percent of the development budget in the mid-1960s. The total public sector investment in agriculture, which included other economic infrastructure items such as processing, storage, and marketing's share, in the second plan was only 23 percent of the national budget.

After the decentralization of government, each region was allotted its own development budget of 13 percent of the regional budget, with heavy emphasis placed on social investments (at least 68 percent in 1972/73, 53 percent in 1973/74) of the total amount budgeted for agriculture.⁸⁶ Therefore, the agricultural credit

⁸⁵World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984 p. 71.

⁸⁶World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984 p. 54.



institutions were at times incapable of covering seasonal inputs.⁸⁷ Furthermore, most of the government revenues directed toward rural development went for social services rather than for aiding agricultural production and development.

The history of agricultural credit in Tanzania has been shaped by the change in policy from individual to cooperative lending and by chronic difficulties in collecting repayments from borrowers. The Agricultural Credit Agency (ACA) was created in 1961 to meet the requirements of individual smallholders, but only 60 percent of the volume was recovered. In 1964, the ACA became the National Development Credit Agency (NDCA). The aim was to avoid dealing with individual smallholders by dealing directly with the cooperative societies. Collection from the cooperative societies proved more difficult than anticipated, and by the time the NDCA was abandoned in 1971, the bad debt provision amounted to about 40 percent of the portfolio.⁸⁸ This failure led to the establishment of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), coinciding with the Ujamaa Village Program. Seasonal inputs accounted for 56 percent of the total lending in 1972/73, the main borrowers being the cooperative movement (57 percent) and registered Ujamaa villages (20 percent). The arrears on total portfolio amounted to 26 percent in December 1972, 87 percent of which were inherited from NDCA. Through collection, write-offs, and rescheduling, the arrears was reduced to

⁸⁷Ibid., p. xiv.

⁸⁸World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984, p. 42.

9 percent in 1973.⁸⁹ Subsidy payments on food and fertilizer increased from Tshs. 110 million in fiscal year 1978 to Tshs. 600 million in fiscal year 1982. Nearly 50 percent of the investment program in agriculture, industry, and transport is financed out of parastatals' own funds, whereas investment in education, public works, and health are almost totally carried out through the development budget. In 1981, the government undertook a major program to increase the operating efficiency of parastatals in order to put them on a self-financing basis. Ninety percent of the budget went to parastatals to expand (as in sugar), replace equipment (sisal), and develop new activities (dairy farming).⁹⁰ Actual expenditures on agriculture have been stagnant in real terms since fiscal year 1976. The pattern of investment in agriculture was not directed toward raising agricultural productivity. Only 10 percent of the budget was spent on irrigation, seed production, land surveys, or research. The investment in cotton was focused on production, while milling and ginning capacity deteriorated. For tobacco, cashews, and pyrethrum, large processing facilities were installed, while production was neglected. Balance appears to have been maintained in coffee and tea.⁹¹ Investment in research and technology was not well financed; as a result, the dissemination of

⁸⁹World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study, 1974, p. 43.

⁹⁰World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984 pp. 53, 57.

⁹¹Ibid., pp. 53, 57.



information, fertilizer, and other inputs was neglected. The use of oxen as draft animals is constrained by insects such as the tsetse fly, as well as soil conditions and topography. Only a few farmers have access to improved seed and fertilizer, and their use per hectare of cultivable land is among the lowest in Eastern Africa.⁹²

3.9 Technology

Although technology is available in the developed nations, in Tanzania the process of adoption and dissemination has been rather slow. However, one cannot discuss the issue of technology without considering the availability of capital, human resources, and appropriate institutions, for they complement each other. Therefore, the issue facing Tanzania involves choices of the appropriate technology for local conditions, given the availability of human resources and capital. The ideological implication of the Ujamaa policy and institutions and the strategy for adopting technology emphasized a collective approach over free enterprise. The latter was rejected on the grounds that, in the absence of local capitalists, foreign capitalist investment would have been required as a catalyst for local capitalist enterprise. This was viewed as contrary to the policy of socialism and self-reliance because it would have perpetuated and strengthened dependence. Foreign owners would have secured a local political base to back up their economic power, hence continuing neo-colonialism. Consequently, Tanzania's

⁹²Ibid. p. 83.

goal was to use science and technology to achieve the economic, social, and political objectives of the society.

The purpose of this section is to examine the availability of technology, and how it has grown or deteriorated, and its impact on agriculture. The low productiveness of technology of farming has not improved much since the colonial era. Environmental conditions limit the use of oxen-drawn cultivation equipment, and technology has only in limited cases been adopted in the form of irrigation to contain the problem of inadequate or unreliable rainfall. Progress in smallholder production has been severely constrained by the absence of technological packages adaptable to local conditions.⁹³ It is against this background that technology is analyzed.

Tanzania ranks among the least industrialized of the world's low-income countries. The small manufacturing sector, built in the 1960s and 1970s, contributed only one-tenth of the total GDP at its peak. This share has now been halved, due to many of the economic problems discussed in this study. At the time independence in 1961, Tanzania had very few industries. They were mostly small-scale or handicraft enterprises. Their value added accounted for less than 5 percent of the GDP, and the sector employed no more than 20,000 people. Until 1967, the industrial strategy encouraged private investors (mainly foreigners) to develop import-substitution industries: sugar, beer, cigarettes, textiles, shoes, cement, fertilizer, tires, and oil refining.

⁹³World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984, p. 26.



With the Arusha Declaration, the government committed itself to expanding the public sector's role in industry and reducing dependence on foreign investment. Nationalization of large foreign-owned manufacturing plants took effect. In 1974, the government adopted the Basic Industrial Strategy (BIS), which gave industry priority over the primary sector. Self-reliance through the use of domestic resources to meet domestic needs was stressed.⁹⁴ The manufacturing sector absorbed a disproportionately large share of capital expenditure in the economy. For example, in 1976-1980, 35 percent of the country's total investment went to the manufacturing sector, which contributed only 10 percent to GDP.⁹⁵ Industrialization was thus taking place at the expense of agriculture. Only a very small percentage of the capital was directly invested in improving the agricultural technology that was essential for improving agricultural production. The effect on agriculture was alarming. Although peasant farmers could not be driven into bankruptcy, some were forced to withdraw from the cash crop economy to concentrate on subsistence. Biochemical innovations in the form of improved seeds and fertilizer remained minimal. Up to the end of 1979, the total area under small-scale irrigation was 112,505 hectares, whereas that under large-scale projects was 20,740 hectares.⁹⁶ The majority of the farmers in Tanzania continued to

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 28.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 32.

⁹⁶ Ministry of Development Planning, Tanzania Long Term Perspective Plan 1981-2000 (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, June 1980), p. 17.



rely on the hoe (jembe) and the axe (shoka) for cultivation and land clearing. Agricultural output was not likely to increase significantly. The major hindrance to the adoption of plows was the inadequate supply of equipment, particularly riders, planters, cultivators, and carts, caused by lack of imports and locally manufactured implements.

3.10 Economic Performance in the Nonagricultural Sector

The record since the country achieved independence is mixed. Among the significant strides associated with the Ujamaa Village Program is the expansion of public services to meet the basic needs of the rural population. Life expectancy has improved from 35 to 40 years in 1961 to around 51 years, largely due to the provision of social services, which occurred in the early 1970s and has uplifted the quality of life for the average Tanzanian. Forty percent of the villagers receive clean tap water, and there has been an increase of approximately 270 percent in the number of medical aides, dispensaries, and health centers.⁹⁷ The number of beds in hospitals, dispensaries, and rural health centers increased from 11,900 in 1962 to 32,300 in 1977, with most of the change coming after the Arusha Declaration. In 1978, about 72 out of 80 districts in mainland Tanzania had hospitals, and a total of 2,200 dispensaries and 198 rural health centers, or 65 percent and 55 percent, respectively, of the national target during the Second Five-Year Plan. The number of

⁹⁷Harry Anderson and Ray Wilkinson, "An Experiment That Failed," Newsweek, October 26, 1981.

outpatients treated in hospitals, dispensaries, and rural health centers was 97,340,000 compared with 22,056,000 in 1962. The number of inpatients admitted increased from 222,000 in 1962 to 1,228,000 in 1977.⁹⁸

There has been a tremendous increase, from 25 percent in 1961 to 95 percent today, in the number of children attending primary school because Ujamaa's goal is to provide universal primary education based on the policy of education for self-reliance. The number of primary schools increased from 3,100 to 4,705, and the number of primary school pupils rose from 486,000 in 1961 to 2,968,700 in 1978. The campaign for adult literacy resulted in 1.9 million people passing the literacy test at the 3rd and 4th level by 1975. Attainment of these levels meant that the peasants could read, write, and do simple arithmetic with ease. In 1978, the total number of adults attending literacy classes stood at 3,650,000. Enrollment in secondary and high school increased from 13,000 in 1961 to 46,000 in 1977.⁹⁹ In the words of Harbeson, "remarkable and pacesetting achievements in human resource development have in fact been recorded even as growth in monetary income has faltered."¹⁰⁰ Consequently, Tanzania has created a new awareness at the village

⁹⁸Kigoma Malima, The Economy of Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam: Reading Material No 13, Department of Economics University, 1979), pp. 1-2.

⁹⁹Julius K. Nyerere, Ten Years After Independence (Dar-es-Salaam: Dar Business Machine Service and Printing Works, 1980), pp. 32, 33, 34.

¹⁰⁰J. Harbeson, Tanzania Socialism in Transition: Agricultural Crisis and Policy Reform, 1983/No. 30.



level in terms of political and social awareness, and today the country probably has the highest literacy rate in Africa.¹⁰¹

The use of fertilizers increased from 7,000 tons in 1961 to 23,000 tons in 1970. The use of improved farming skills has also expanded slowly. Tractors are used primarily on state farms; a few are owned by the more advanced Ujamaa villages. Twenty-one oxen training centers have been established, and in 1971, about 12,000 oxen plows were sold in Tanzania, of which 2,300 were locally manufactured. The training of agricultural field officers both for arable farming and for the veterinary sector has been extended. Whereas in 1961 there were three training institutes, as of 1971 the total had increased to seven centers for the training of field assistants. There were 17 farmer training centers in 1971, which focused on training Ujamaa village members in special agriculture courses.¹⁰² Nevertheless, agriculture declined from around 43 percent of the total GDP in 1969 to 30 percent in 1977.¹⁰³ The average annual real rates of growth in agricultural production stood at 4.3 percent from 1970 to 1978, with subsistence agriculture growing at 5 percent per annum. For the years since 1978, total output has declined by 2.9 percent per annum; subsistence production has declined the most: 8 percent per annum.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹J. K. Nyerere, "North-South Dialogue," Third World Quarterly (1984): 829.

¹⁰²Nyerere, Ten Years After Independence, p. 38.

¹⁰³Malima, The Economy of Tanzania, p. 6.

¹⁰⁴World Bank Report, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 5019-TA, p. 20.

At Independence, mainland Tanzania's small industry accounted for 4.3 percent of GNP and only 0.4 percent of the labor force (20,000 people) employed in manufacturing. The bulk was tied to the processing of agricultural products such as sisal, cotton, and coffee. Between 1961 and 1966, industrial production rose at an average rate of 13 percent per year. In 1967, the government nationalized the import and export firms and the milling and food processing companies, and it acquired 60 percent of the shares in seven firms: Kilimanjaro Breweries, British American Tobacco, Bata Shoe Company, Tanganyika Metal Box Company, Tanganyika Extract Company, and Tanganyika Portland Cement Company. The sisal industry was also nationalized.¹⁰⁵

Following the Arusha Declaration, Tanzania's industrialization strategy sought to promote the expansion of import-substitution industries. Among the major new plants constructed in the early 1970s was the Friendship textile mill in Dar-es-Salaam, a radio assembly plant at Arusha, and a tire factory near Arusha.¹⁰⁶ Other textile industries that were built include Mwanza textile; Musoma textile around Lake Victoria; and sugar, fertilizer, and oil-refining industries for reducing dependence on foreign investments. In 1974, the government adopted the Basic Industry Strategy (BIS), which gave industry priority over the primary sector. From 1966 to 1973, manufacturing output grew by 7.8 percent per annum, and the

¹⁰⁵Kahama et al., The Challenge for Tanzania's Economy (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1986), pp. 28, 33.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 69.



sector's share in total GNP increased from 8 percent to 10 percent. The contribution came from the newly developed large-scale industries. Due to the rise in crude oil prices caused by the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the growth rate in manufacturing decreased by 16.6 percent per year, while the aggregate GDP grew by 0.4 percent annually between 1978 and 1982. The manufacturing sector's share of GDP fell from 10 percent to 5 percent of the total.¹⁰⁷

According to the Tanzanian government, there are numerous causes for the economic crisis in which Tanzania currently finds itself. The government assigns most of the blame to a combination of several adverse exogenous factors, namely:¹⁰⁸

1. Adverse weather conditions constituting drought and flood, which ravaged the country and cut deeply into agricultural output, especially in 1974, 1975, 1979, and 1980. The government was forced to exhaust its foreign exchange reserves to import food and concentrate attention on food production rather than cash crops.

2. The effort to topple the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin Dada cost the country about \$500 million, much of it in foreign currency reserves.

3. Sharp increases in oil prices since 1974, costing the country from 10 percent to more than 50 percent in foreign export earnings.

¹⁰⁷World Bank, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum, 1984, p. 3.

¹⁰⁸A Statement by the Government, Tanzania: Who Is Dreaming? (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1980), pp. 1-10.



4. The deteriorating terms of international trade between the developed and developing countries mean that, whereas in 1972 Tanzania had to sell 7 tons of cotton to buy a 7-ton truck, in 1980 an identical truck required 134 tons of cotton, a nineteenfold increase. This means that the cost of building new industries had gone up at the same time that the prices of all the country's major cash crops for export, such as sisal and coffee, had plunged on world markets. This unequal exchange retarded economic development because the cost of replacing primitive tools of production continued to remain beyond the reach of peasants.

5. In 1977, the breakup of the East African community forced the government to reorganize and rebuild its entire transportation and telecommunication systems, which cost the country dearly in foreign currency reserves.

The unstable world economy, with its rampant inflation and high interest rates, has forced the Tanzanian government to reschedule some foreign loans. This has also resulted in the huge and growing deficit in the country's balance of payments. Therefore, according to the government, the Ujamaa Village Policy was correct, but it was hampered by exogenous factors beyond their control. This, in the writer's view, is an effort to justify a policy that in the opinion of many observers failed to meet its stated/expected objectives.

This review of Tanzania's economic performance and theoretical and conceptual literature indicated how complex the subject of rural development is, particularly in the context of contending ideologies. Economic advancement by developing countries, as this

review indicated, requires institutional and technological change, in addition to the availability of capital and skilled human and natural resources.

Economic development is the advancement of the community through improved methods of production and management, subsequently raising the levels of output. The development of human skills and energy, better organization, and the acquisition of capital resources are essential for economic development. The results of economic development can be measured in the earning power of labor; the establishment of a modern transportation and communication system; and a rise in the standard of living through better health, education, increased life expectancy, and greater leisure as a result of the employment of technology, better institutions, a trained work force, a growing capital base, and enhanced natural resources.

3.11 Review of Contending Social and Economic Analyses of the Ujamaa Policy

This section contains a review of the literature concerning theoretical or conceptual issues, as well as the experience of rural development in Tanzania as it relates to and compares with that of other countries that have embarked on the noncapitalist path of development. This review combines secondary data and information from interviews with government and international agency officials, to produce a coherent overall picture of the Ujamaa experience in Tanzania.



There has long been widespread interest and research concerning Tanzania's social, political, and economic system. As early as 1967, scholars of various persuasions viewed Tanzania's transition to socialism differently. Some were critical of the various measures taken, others exhibited degrees of skepticism about the possibility of success, and still others expressed hope and praise for Tanzania's egalitarian policies. Writers from various schools of thought have presented the viewpoints discussed in the following section.

3.11.1 The Marxist and Neo-Marxist Scholars

1. According to Mwansasu's and Loxley and Saul's interpretation of the Marxist ideology, a successful transition to socialism requires that a dominant role be played by the vanguard party of an ideological elite. TANU, which merged with the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar on February 6, 1977, to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or Revolutionary Party, has remained an open party, with little unifying ideology other than the struggle for independence and participation in the Zanzibar Revolution. Hence, TANU was a liberation movement, which as an institution lacked a radicalized peasantry and intellectual group because the country gained independence with no radicalizing experience of guerrilla warfare or deep estrangement from either western capitalism or other major western powers.¹⁰⁹ In 1967, there were very few industries and as a

¹⁰⁹Mwansasu et al., Towards Socialism in Tanzania, p. 8.

result the proletariat class was very small. In the words of Loxley and Saul:

TANU has never developed the capacity continuously to concretize goals and in that way both guide the bureaucracy and hold it effectively to account. Similarly, while it has instincts and most genuine interest of the masses, the party has been less successful in developing the organizational capacity and methods of political work which would guarantee mobilization and self-expression of an active, highly conscious and militant mass base for Tanzanian socialism.¹¹⁰

Socialist theory contends that an elitist party organization must contribute to the "awakening of the working masses" to conscious life and conscious struggle. This "awakening" of the masses along with "revolutionary youth" is critical to the successful implementation of scientific socialism.¹¹¹ In Lenin's own words:

Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by antagonisms there can never be a non-class ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology.¹¹²

The creation of a third ideology involving mixed economies, or the middle ground between socialism and capitalism, continues to gain momentum in Third World nations. This movement, however,

¹¹⁰John Loxley and John Saul, "The Political Economy of Parastatals," Political Economic Review 5, nos. 1 & 2 (1972).

¹¹¹Paul Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, On the Transition to Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 53.

¹¹²V. I. Lenin, What Is to Be Done? Burning Questions of Our Movement (New York: International Publishers, 1969), p. 41.

constitutes a deviation from Marxism. Although his arguments may be considered more political than scientific, Marx was concerned about "scientific" investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and the establishment of the facts that could serve as the fundamental political starting point. In his writings, Marx treated the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not independent of human will, consciousness, and intelligence, but rather determining that will, consciousness, and intelligence. In other words, the material phenomenon alone can serve as a starting point.¹¹³ Therefore, Marx saw the socialist movement growing out of the womb of capitalism. He wrote:

Along the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation: but with this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the mechanism of capitalist production itself.¹¹⁴

Marxist scholars, entrenched in this camp of doctrinaire socialism, dismissed the whole socialist endeavor in Tanzania as being not really socialist at all. Issa Shivji, for example, argued that unless the state is under the leadership of the correct ideology and the policy implemented by a party of politically committed, ideologically sound, and trained cadre, there can be no socialism.¹¹⁵

¹¹³Marx, Capital. Vol. 1, p. 18.

¹¹⁴Ibid., p. 763.

¹¹⁵Issa Shivji, Class Struggle in Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), p. 108.

Mwansasu and Pratt pointed to some doctrinaire socialist writers, without stating their names, to whom the essential prerequisite was the abandonment of the market as a central mechanism in the economy. Furthermore, they claimed that those writers called for the destruction of the bourgeoisie state, and Shivji called for rule by the proletariat under the proletariat ideology as essential.¹¹⁶ This argument arose from the sense of class struggle in that the proletariat must recognize its interests as the interest of the whole society. To the contrary, Tanzania's socialism as described by Nyerere is more egalitarian and based on participatory lines, promoting cooperative and nonacquisitive motivations among the masses in their economic and other interrelationships.¹¹⁷

Traditional Marxists consider this a noncapitalist way of development, rather than true socialism. The argument of Marxist scholars gives the impression that the only condition under which success would be assured is by strictly following the ideological guidelines under the control of the proletariat. Babu, who served as a Minister of Economic Planning in Nyerere's government, wrote:

A glaring example is that of Tanzanian President Nyerere's Ujamaa experiment. While it is true that his ideas were motivated by the highest moral convictions on his part, theoretically and in practice they have proved to be limited and unworkable. . . . The policy does not in the least envisage the need to transform [the peasant] into a new person belonging to a new class--a need created by the development of the

¹¹⁶Ibid., pp. 34-39.

¹¹⁷Mwansasu et al., Towards Socialism in Tanzania, p. 5.



productive forces and new relations of production--with corresponding new social values.¹¹⁸

The concern is how to uplift the rural masses' standard of living within the shortest possible time. Is there any quick solution or formula?

2. A second Marxist view, according to Mwansasu and Pratt, took the position that the transition to socialism could not take place in Tanzania because the country was too poor. Its per capita annual income did not exceed 1,200 Tanzanian shillings. Its people were predominantly rural and only tenuously involved in the money economy, with subsistence farming as the basis of existence for a majority of the population. Although the existence of landlessness would have helped in the mobilization of the peasants in favor of socialism, there was, in fact, little landlessness in the rural areas, and little tension was attributable to rural stratification. Also, the country lacked an urban basis for a strong socialist movement because only a few workers were engaged in nonagricultural employment (in 1974 there were 383,000 workers), most of them first-generation urban dwellers, who were not easily organized into solid and enduring organizations. There was and is a weak African middle class, and a shortage of experienced Tanzanian personnel with skills and technology adequate for independent economic development.¹¹⁹ This argument assumed that socialism and collective farms require a

¹¹⁸A. R. M. Babu, African Socialism or Socialist Africa? (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1981), p. xv.

¹¹⁹Mwansasu et al., Towards Socialism in Tanzania, p. 7.

more rational use of political, administrative, and planning resources, which the country did not possess.

3. The third Marxist school of thought concluded that the country was unable to make a successful transition to socialism because Tanzania has few known natural endowments. Her main economic activity, beyond subsistence farming, involves the production and export of a small number of tropical agricultural products, largely cotton, sisal, pyrethrum, cashew nuts, tea, and tobacco, making it difficult for the country to embrace industrial-type socialism. Most of the literature indicated that the colonial mode of agricultural production or the socialistic system, which focuses on rural settlements and agricultural production for export, has not shown success in solving rural poverty.¹²⁰ This is a significant finding, especially for the time period in question, because there was a general economic slowdown in Africa, with the only exception being those countries in which oil or mineral resources have been available.¹²¹

3.11.2 The Soviet Scholars

4. Soviet theorists took another position. They welcomed the possibility of former colonial countries bypassing capitalism and supported the need for an alliance between the oppressed peoples and a "triumphant" socialist revolution, but they also were dubious

¹²⁰Ludwig Watzal, Ujamaa--The End of a Utopia ?, pp. 11-15.

¹²¹Assefa Mehretu and David Campbell, "Regional Planning for Small Communities in Rural Africa: A Critical Survey," Rural Africana, no. 12-13 (Winter-Spring 1981-82): 104.

about the possibility of a successful socialist transformation in poor developing countries such as Tanzania. According to Andreyev, while recognizing that it is possible to bypass capitalism, the national-historical prospect of transition to socialism as a universal regularity depends on the principles of approach to revolutionary change. He recognized that African countries have a low level of productive forces; inadequate division and socialization of labor; and a predominance of primitive, patriarchal, natural, and nontechnological economic relations, which serve to keep such countries under the grip of national capitalism. He and other Soviet theorists suggested that this condition could be overcome gradually through cooperation of small producers and a restructuring of the material and technical basis. This conversion is bound to take decades. They viewed the use of collectivism as a process of shaping transitional socioeconomic relations as a temporary measure, largely determined by socio-psychological rather than economic relations. In this way, traditions are gradually ousted or dissolved, although some aspects of the traditional consciousness are retained.¹²² Soviet theorists, according to Andreyev, recommended the curbing of private commerce and intensification of fighting unemployment, as well as restructuring the petty bourgeoisie and the lumpen or petit bourgeois element. They acknowledged that, in most developing countries, the economy is

¹²²I. Andreyev, The Non-Capitalist Way: Socialism and the Developing Countries (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), pp. 126, 163.

fragmented, archaic traditions are very much alive, and the population is psychologically unprepared to adopt the rhythms of modern production and modern management methods. Direct implantation of any element of the scientific and technical revolution in that "uncultivated soil," they warned, could produce fresh economic and social disproportions. They viewed this as an illusion because there is no possibility of an eclectic symbiosis between traditional structures and the latest scientific and technical achievements. They warned that it is a utopian hope to expect that, by leaving the traditional systems as they are and raising the productive forces to a modern level, it would be possible to arrive at socialism without any marked social upheavals.¹²³

3.11.3 The Western Economists

5. Many western economists sympathetic to African aspirations have criticized Ujamaa on the basis that communal/collective production cannot deliver the goods as well as peasant family farms. They have argued that the communal/collective approach cannot succeed, considering the inability on the part of the government to provide appropriate knowledge and skills among farmers. They also believed that self-interest, rather than coercion, is a motivating factor. The shortage of extension service officials and administrators makes it impossible for communal production to succeed.

¹²³Ibid., pp. 166-182.

In 1971, G. Helleiner stated that the Ujamaa sector had not done as well as the private-incentive sector, which had shown impressive results. According to Helleiner, socialist production was out of the reach of the Ujamaa villages because no managerial or planning capacity was available. Reginald Green attributed this failure of production to a lack of agronomic knowledge and skills. Dumont argued that it is not possible to omit, without major inconvenience, the stage of progressive farmers. He argued that a prerequisite for development is opportunity for people to become wealthy by hard work and generating economic surplus.¹²⁴ Johnson argued that a strategy for increasing the productive capacity of small farms and farmers in developing countries should have improvement in material basic human needs on a subsistence basis as a specific objective. He recommended education, credit, and land and price policy reforms as examples of institutional changes with direct effects.¹²⁵

6. Putterman's thesis was that reaping technically feasible economies of scale depends on overcoming the incentive frictions due to the individual team as opposed to the nature of collective farming. He argued that these incentive frictions are common to any form of large-scale production, whether the organizational mode is capitalist or collective. He was aware of the fact that the most effective strategy for overcoming incentive frictions may vary with

¹²⁴Mwansasu et al., Towards Socialism in Tanzania, pp. 100-102.

¹²⁵G. Johnson, "CETO Seminar on Increasing the Productive Capacity of Small Farmers," paper presented at Lahore, 1978, pp. 17-25.



the organizational form involved. For producers' cooperatives, the most effective strategy may require tying net product shares with inputs and a high level of internal democracy and self-determination. Ascertaining labor shares requires an element of community consensus and trust, as well as group support, through which the reward system is established.

The obstacles to the establishment of effective work-reward systems in cooperatives, according to Putterman, include the contradiction in retaining internal democracy and self-determination, as well as material incentive systems. They include external choice of major parameters such as the size of collective units and degree of collectivity within them, internal economic and political inequalities generating interests opposed to collectivism, imposed choice of collective leaders and other limits or discouragements to internal democracy, and policy or ideological forces limiting the choice of the distribution system.

Finally, Putterman concluded that political, social, and economic forces have tended to produce an opposition between material incentives and collectivism, which sustains the view that collectivism depends on overcoming self-interest. In the writer's opinion, opposition to incentives at the level of the distribution systems within the collective units and of the pricing, marketing, and cropping policies thwarts the necessary conditions for collective success that lie precisely in an effective incentive system.

Putterman rejected what he considered the "simplistic liberal" argument that collectivism is impossible because it runs directly

counter to the self-interest of peasants, or their human nature. Radicals similarly consider self-interest the enemy of socialism and believe that the transition to collectivism is predicated on the transformation of consciousness in such a manner as to increase the attraction or efficacy of moral incentives. Both liberals and radicals admit that collectives offer no significant individual incentives for their members to contribute effective and intelligent labor, or to forego the consumption of present incomes and of already accumulated capital. The difference is that liberals see failure as inevitable, whereas radicals believe that successful collectives and altered motivation depend on the overthrow of the bourgeoisie world and its world view.

According to Putterman, neoclassical analysis has shown that when payment is according to work output, collective production units can offer members adequate incentives and nonwork incentives (such as free rations or social service) as part of distribution to attain increased efficiency. Putterman added that institutional choices made democratically by groups of cooperators tend to be highly efficient with respect to income-distribution rules and the scale of cultivation.

The sociological argument claims that peasants' attachment to their land is an obstacle to collective formation because they do not want to forfeit private ownership. Putterman believed that although these ideas may have some merit, attachment to land does not in itself represent an obstacle to voluntary collective farming unless it is supposed that peasants would resist alternative forms

of organization that convincingly promise substantial and sustained material benefit over a long horizon, simply because they are inconsistent with peasant land rights. The sociological argument is based on the assertion that peasants resist any changes that threaten their welfare, security, and sense of justice. Indeed, one of the problems, as Putterman may be aware, is the fact that in Tanzania, for example, attitudinal friction may have been enhanced by lack of a successful demonstration of tangible and large benefits to peasants from collective farming due to lack of redistribution of the returns.¹²⁶

7. Hyden took a different position--that the effort to subordinate the peasantry takes time, but that in Africa the peasant has retained autonomy. In this writer's view, 90 years of colonization have not eradicated peasant autonomy. Hyden claimed that rural producers in Africa are still in the process of becoming peasants, that they are transcending the boundary between primitive cultivator and peasant. The number of those turning into capitalist farmers and into laborers is very small. Therefore, he asserted that as long as peasants find the means to secure their own reproduction, they will resist conquest by other classes. He concluded that the prevailing traditional peasant mode of production gives rise to an economy of affection. Therefore, peasants are not likely to engage in class action unless their chances of reproducing their own mode of production are in danger. Hyden's view was that the peasants

¹²⁶Putterman, The Journal of Development Studies 21 (January 1985).

have not been fully incorporated into a modern economy, either capitalist and socialist, and therefore they work in order to live, as African agriculture is essentially rain-fed and does not require the same kind of cooperation among producers as does irrigated agriculture. Hyden concluded that as long as the peasants are the owners of the means of production (or at least control their use more effectively than government officials), they can always seek security in withdrawal when the government tries to capture and control them. As long as labor rather than land is the real scarce resource, officials will have difficulty exercising power over the peasants. This was his rational explanation for the poor performance regarding the policy of Ujamaa and rural collectivization in Tanzania.¹²⁷

8. A 1988 report by a team of U.S. researchers, Luther Tweeten et al., entitled "Tanzania-U.S. Roundtable on Development and Justice," examined the development of Tanzanian agriculture. Included was the tracing of prices of maize/corn, coffee, and cotton from the smallholder producer in Tanzania to identify injustices in the pricing and marketing systems. The report also presented a model generalized as the "internal immiserization process." To summarize, this concerns nations that live beyond their means by spending in excess of revenues--deficit spending and mismanagement. State corporations and consumption subsidies drain the treasury. Borrowing at home and abroad to finance the deficit causes debt to

¹²⁷Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, pp. 10-25.

becomes burdensome. When taxes and borrowing become insufficient, the nation prints money, causing inflation. Inflation with a fixed exchange rate causes currency to become overvalued in the international markets. The overvalued currency taxes exports and subsidizes imports. Resulting ease of importing and difficulty in exporting causes a trade deficit and shortage of foreign exchange. The shortage of foreign exchange causes hard currency rationing by government, a process easily subverted by political favoritism and corruption. Eventually foreign exchange is inadequate to buy petrol and spare parts, causing transport and industry to shut down and the economy to collapse. This happened in Tanzania in the mid-1980s.¹²⁸

The report concluded that farmers frequently had no choice in the inputs they received or the price they paid for them. The report also concluded that external causes for Tanzania's economic problems, as spelled out by the government, were far outweighed by internal causes for Tanzania's financial collapse in the mid-1980s. The report cited the policies followed by the country as the principal cause of long-term economic deprivation and decline in Tanzania. It is the view of this writer that although some of the problems discussed in this report are consistent with what has been documented in this dissertation, such problems are not unique to Tanzania, but have also occurred in countries that did not pursue socialism. A good grasp on the internal economic factors would most likely have minimized Tanzania's misery and economic deprivation,

¹²⁸Tweeten et al., Tanzania-U.S. Roundtable on Development and Justice, pp. iii-vii, 8, 10, 12, 15, 21-25, 30, 45, 57, 70-119.

but it also should be noted that external factors helped set the stage for Tanzania's economic problems.

3.11.4 Empirical Studies of the Implementation from 1967 to the 1980's

The adoption of the Arusha Declaration policy received considerable attention from scholars and commentators from various parts of the world. Most of the early studies conducted in the late 1960s focused on Ujamaa's theoretical and ideological background. Observers sympathetic with Tanzania's brand of socialism (Ujamaa), such as Lionel Cliffe, were concerned about TANU's lack of organizational ability and resources for building socialism. Among the key questions Cliffe asked in his study were: What agency or agencies would be used as instruments to effect this bold transformation of society? Who would be responsible to see that the many public enterprises were run efficiently and employed socialist pricing and investment policies? Could the educational system be left entirely to the administrators and teachers who ran, and were themselves products of, the former colonial educational system? Could those party and government leaders who had been acquiring private property submit to the new socialist conditions of leadership, requiring divestiture of this property? Who would instruct them in a proper understanding of socialist principles? Finally, the critical issue was what governmental agency could persuade, encourage, and guide the rural, scattered population so

that they could revolutionize their modes of production and their way of living as they formed Ujamaa villages?¹²⁹

Of great interest during the late 1960s and early 1970s was the question of how Tanzania could progress from a pre-capitalist society directly to a socialist structure, and how a gradual and voluntary transformation of rural life from scattered family shambas toward cooperative forms of living and working together would occur. Most of the studies were mired in intellectual discussions of what would happen if certain techniques were employed as opposed to others. Cliffe believed that legitimacy of the leadership and a rate of growth sufficient for wide distribution of benefits to most areas and groups in the society, with immediate improvement in individuals' standards of living, was essential to the success of the socialist experiment.¹³⁰

International support for the Ujamaa Village Policy was widespread. According to Andrew Coulson, the Tanzanian emphasis on equality, rural development, and education conformed with some of views of Robert MacNamara, President of the World Bank, and of many of the Social Democrats in Europe. This enabled most western supporters to justify aid to Tanzania.¹³¹ A study by L. Kleemeir indicated that the government pursued a broader set of policies and objectives, generally referred to as "a basic needs strategy," which

¹²⁹Lionel Cliffe, "Tanzania--Socialist Transformation and Party Development," The African Review 1 (September 1971): 122.

¹³⁰Ibid.

¹³¹Andrew Coulson, "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania," p. 95.

meant the direct delivery of goods and services to the poor, without reliance on market mechanisms. Ujamaa village formation, rather than the collective farming policy, satisfied the "employment-oriented strategy," which stated that increasing the output and productivity of the poor would in turn raise their incomes because they would be the main consumers of their own goods and services. The "basic needs strategy," by contrast, argued that attempts to raise incomes, productivity, and output among the poor were insufficient without an effort to restructure the supply of consumption goods and services. This strategy emphasized the food, shelter, and social services necessary for bare survival. The 1972 government decentralization reform, which placed substantial responsibility for management to the regions, offered near ideal policy conditions for implementing the integrated projects for rural development favored by the World Bank. Robert MacNamara and Julius Nyerere met personally in 1972 and agreed that the Bank would appraise three new-style projects covering four regions of Kigoma, Tabora, Mwanza, and Shinyanga in Tanzania, which cost more than US \$40 million in International Development Aid (IDA) finance.¹³²

The Ujamaa Village Policy subsequently attracted assistance from the Swedish International Agency, for rural water supply schemes that went to three lake regions. The Netherlands built wells in Shinyanga, and the World Bank financed an integrated rural

¹³²L. Kleemeier, "Domestic Policies Versus Poverty-Oriented Foreign Assistance in Tanzania," Journal of Development Studies 20 (January 1984): 171, 175.

development project in Kigoma. The greatly increased foreign aid for agriculture (approximately 400 million shillings a year) lessened the short-term problems of production. This aid included gifts of food grains in 1974/5 from the U.S., Canada, various European countries, and even small contributions from North Korea and India. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was involved in producing and multiplying improved varieties of cereals and with the Masai pastoralists project; West Germany and Denmark also provided aid.¹³³

The basic needs strategy, however, differed from an employment-oriented strategy in that the former aimed at raising consumption of all the poor through public-sector investments, and not just farmers' consumption through higher market-derived incomes. Public investment required public revenues and, in the largely agrarian economy, that meant increasing agricultural output and productivity. In practice, the basic-needs strategy implied many of the same domestic policies as the employment-oriented approach--for example, macroeconomic policies to provide incentives and appropriate technology to the smallholders. Similarly, efficiency and effectiveness supposedly demanded administrative decentralization and popular participation. In addition to these basic policy premises, the basic-needs approach presumed a government commitment to equalize rural-urban income differentials through large rural social service investment programs.

¹³³Coulson, "Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania," p. 96.

This writer is in agreement with Kleemeir's views that Tanzania's policies in reality undermined the conditions necessary for successful implementation of poverty-oriented projects because the agricultural policy did not provide incentives for the small-holder to increase productivity or even production.¹³⁴ It is clear that early studies proceeded on the premise that peasants were unwilling to accept changes and therefore considered the coercive tactics adopted by the government in 1973 as necessary in order to ensure that peasants were being led to a better and more prosperous life.

The circumstances that caused political leaders to resort to quick measures in order to complete the resettlement exercise in a short time (1974 to 1976) were, according to Mwapachu, a result of the political necessity to succeed in the mobilization of the rural population. Juma Mwapachu gave an example of reports from Mara Region saying that officials there were about to complete their operations; these reports influenced Shinyanga officials to rush their implementation of the forced village-formation program. Another factor that has been cited is that some peasants moved to districts that had not yet been affected by the mobilization program, thereby causing a refugee problem. The result was an improperly executed program, eventually employing coercive tactics involving the burning of peasants' houses to discourage them from returning to their former houses. According to Mwapachu's article,

¹³⁴Kleemeier, "Domestic Policies Versus Poverty-Oriented Foreign Assistance in Tanzania," p. 176.

the sudden influx of people into new villages caused an immediate shortage of water and medical and educational services. Sufficient services could not be provided because of insufficient planning.¹³⁵

Mapolu and Philippson examined the premise that cooperation in agriculture was essential for overall development of the productive forces in African economies. They argued that cooperation introduced a higher form of division of labor, which could result in increased cultivated land; greater skills through specialization; pooling of resources to acquire machinery, implements, and other agricultural inputs; and the allocation of resources adequate eventually to eliminate underused labor.¹³⁶

Aware of the problems that existed in the Ujamaa villages, Mapolu and Philippson hoped that cooperation would enable progressive ideas to take root more firmly in all aspects of peasant life. They hoped that, through cooperative self-management and decision-making, peasants would control the state apparatus at the local level, thus enhancing their participation in running the economy at the national level. They thought, however, that the Ujamaa village process in Tanzania was facing major obstacles that could continue to thwart its success. They argued that the very underdevelopment of the productive forces created a considerable degree of opacity

¹³⁵Juma Volter Mwapachu, "Operation Planned Villages in Rural Tanzania: A Revolutionary Strategy for Development," The African Review 6,1 (1976): 5-9.

¹³⁶H. Mapolu and G. Philippson, "Agricultural Cooperation and the Productive Forces: Some Lessons From Tanzania," The African Review 6,2 (1976): 68.

between decisions. Hence they called for the socialization of production. In their words,

The process of collectivization is thus not a formal or "organizational" solution to the problems of the peasantry but a manifestation of the ever-present class contradictions in the society and the necessary way to solve them. It is first and foremost a political process.¹³⁷

Mapolu and Philippson believed that failure of the Ujamaa Village Policy was not the product of the villagers themselves but rather the plan of the bureaucracy. Therefore, they argued that the ignorance of local environmental conditions resulted in an unrealistic production target and in reduced agricultural output. This, in turn, increased the passivity of the peasants, who felt they were working for the government and put minimum effort into their communal production, saving all their energies for their individual plots.

The Mapolu and Philippson study was based on a survey conducted at Lushoto District and Sukumaland. The study blamed the Ujamaa village failure on lack of economic planning and organization, the shortage of government technical assistance, the dire need for political guidance, and the failure of the Ujamaa Village Policy to have a positive effect on rural agricultural production, through failure to address the fundamental problems of the social structure and economic integration. As they were writing in 1974, Mapolu and Philippson were doubtful that the Ujamaa Village Policy was going to last for a long time in concrete practice. They cited the shortage

¹³⁷Ibid., p. 71.



of foreign exchange reserves and foodstuffs, the stagnation of the agricultural sector, and the worsening terms of trade for agricultural produce in the world market as critical to the survival of the Ujamaa Village Policy.¹³⁸

Graham Thiele, who conducted his research at Dodoma, concluded that the Ujamaa Village Policy should be seen as part of a political project for gaining control of peasant production. The new institutions created within the settlements should be considered as extensions of the state apparatus.¹³⁹ However, Deborah Bryceson concluded that the element of communal production was forsaken because of large-scale relocation of peasants. The emphasis on communal production was dropped entirely and replaced by a policy that stressed block farming. She pointed out that although one of the aims of the Price Commission was to safeguard against declines in peasants' real income, it failed to do so because the prices of producer and consumer goods were institutionally separated, thereby restricting the coordinated planning of the two to ensure and safeguard peasants' real incomes. The net outcome of the structured features of price fixing was that prices of consumer goods purchased by peasants tended to rise faster than increases in agricultural producer prices, causing the peasants' terms of trade to fall. The decline in the peasants' terms of trade created a serious

¹³⁸Ibid., pp. 75-76, 96-97.

¹³⁹Graham Thiele, The State and Rural Development in Tanzania: The Village Administration as a Political Field," Journal of Development Studies 22 (April 1986): pp. 540-541.

disincentive for peasant commodity production, resulting in the tendency for peasants to revert to subsistence production.¹⁴⁰

Bryceson concluded that Tanzania exemplified the case of a bureaucracy that did not practice what it preached. Peasants' private accumulation of wealth was circumscribed. Yet peasants were exhorted to work hard, while bureaucrats who managed and oversaw the collective wealth were in a strategic position to drain that wealth in the form of privilege. More important, Bryceson found that bureaucrats failed to carry out their jobs thoroughly and effectively, thus appropriating for themselves leisure from a peasantry that was the source on which their salaried employment rested. Therefore, according to Bryceson, the administrative structure and the national development plans were undermined by the very people who planned and implemented them, and in this way surplus was dissipated, not accumulated.¹⁴¹

3.12 Concluding Summary

The most important conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that although the Ujamaa Village Policy was intended to improve economic performance, agricultural output declined by 2.9 percent per annum, with subsistence production declining the most. Such declines included food crops as the National Milling Corporation was forced in the 1970s and 1980s to import maize, which cost the

¹⁴⁰Deborah Fahy Bryceson, "Peasant Commodity Production Post-Colonial Tanzania," African Affairs 81 (October 1982): 553, 561.

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 566.

country dearly in foreign exchange earnings. The decline in cash crop production was attributed to lower producer prices, which were set by the government. The internal cause for the economic crisis is believed to have been the poor performance of the agricultural sector. Both the review of economic performance and the review of contending social-economic analyses of Ujamaa policy indicated that without the four driving forces for development--namely technical, institutional, and human improvements, along with growth in the stocks of physical and biological capital--economic development would be difficult to achieve. This shows that ideological considerations alone do not create sufficient conditions to stimulate economic development. It is also evident that self-interest does provide motivation for productivity.

To evaluate Tanzania's Ujamaa experiment, evidence of economic development since 1967 must be observed and the goals of the policy measured against the reality of village life. This writer attempts to do that in Chapters 4 and 5.

CHAPTER 4

FIELD RESEARCH METHODS AND DESCRIPTIVE BACKGROUND OF THE MUSOMA VIJIJINI DISTRICT AND VILLAGES

4.1 Part A: Field Research Methods

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part A describes the field research methods, and Part B provides a description of the background of the Mara Region, Musoma Vijijini district, and the villages studied. This material describes the geographic, demographic, economic, and social-economic environment of the survey area. To evaluate the effects of implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy in Tanzania, a case study of Musoma Vijijini district was undertaken. The goal of this case study was to determine whether or not the Ujamaa villages had institutional facilities, trained human resources, capital, and appropriate levels of technology. The Musoma Vijijini district was chosen because it was judged to be representative of Tanzania as a whole and of the development experience under the Ujamaa Village Policy. It was also chosen because the writer understood the local dialects, of which the major ones are Kijita, Kikurya, and Kizanaki. This knowledge of the language made it possible to conduct interviews with the peasants and to ascertain their views and concerns about government

policy. The field survey was conducted from January to June 1986, with follow-up in the fall of 1988.

Sixteen of the 95 villages in the Musoma district were selected for this survey. The selection of the 16 villages was based on a sampling of the district, which is divided into three divisions, namely:

1. Tarafa ya Nyanja, or the Lake Division, which is generally dry, with overused soil. This poor soil, along with lack of fertilizer and manure, has resulted in a decline in crop production.
2. Tarafa ya Kiagata, or the Eastern Division, is located near Lake Victoria. Although dry, the land is fertile and produces maize, sorghum, finger millet, millet, cassava, beans, bananas, and cotton.
3. Tarafa ya Makongoro, or the Southern Division, is evergreen throughout the year. The land is fertile and produces most crop varieties grown in Musoma Vijijini district (see Figure 6).

The three divisions are not equal in size and population. Therefore, the number of villages was selected in proportion to the size of the division to make a total of 16. The information concerning the 95 villages from which 16 were selected was obtained from a two-week preliminary survey of the district and from the Musoma Vijijini District Cooperative Union Office. From Kiagata, which is the smallest, three villages were selected. Also, to obtain representative data, distance, customs, culture, and soil fertility were also considered in the selection process. Two represented the availability of high extension services and one

DIVISION	WARD	VILLAGES CHOSEN	LEVEL OF EXTENSION	TYPE OF SOIL
Kiagata (11 villages total)	Buswahili (5 villages)	Wegero	Low	Good
	Nyamimange (6 villages)	Masurura Kyankoma	High High	Good Poor
Makongoro (40 villages total)	Buhemba (6 villages)	Biatika Matongo	High Low	Good Good
	Butiama (2 villages)	Butiama	High	Good
	Kukirango (7 villages)	Kiabakari	High	Good
	Etaru (9 villages)	Mmahare Nyasurura	Low Low	Poor Poor
	Nyankanga (5 villages)	Kirumi	Low	Good
	Butuguri (5 villages)	Kibubwa	Low	Good
Nyanja (27 villages total)	Tegeruka (4 villages)	Kwibara	High	Poor
	Suguti (6 villages)	Seka	Low	Poor
	Nyanbono (7 villages)	Saragana	High	Poor
	Bukima (4 villages)	Bukima	High	Poor
	Bukumi (6 villages)	Chitare	Low	Poor

Figure 6: Villages surveyed.

represented availability of low extension services. The divisions of Nyanja and Makongoro are both large. Therefore, six villages were selected from Nyanja and seven from Makongoro. Three villages from Nyanja represented high extension services and three represented low extension services. The intended comparison of Ujamaa collective and private farms was not possible due to the inadequacy of data concerning Ujamaa collective farms. In this study it was revealed that collective farms as envisioned in Nyerere's paper "Ujamaa and Rural Development" were never established. Thus, the comparison was not done.

The 16 villages were selected following a discussion with district and cooperative officials to obtain a sample of eight villages with high and eight with lower extension services. Both of the groups of eight were subdivided into two groups of four villages each, one of which had good and the other poor natural resources.

Within the sample of 16 selected villages, 128 farmers were chosen to be interviewed. Village officials helped to select the farmers who were interviewed. The farmers were selected as follows:

Level 1--A total of 128 farmers from the 16 villages were selected in consultation with village officials; 64 farmers belonged to low extension and 64 farmers belonged to high extension villages. In addition, the 16 village chairmen were interviewed.

Level 2--Each set of 64 farmers was divided into two groups of 32, representing the poorest and the wealthiest farmers.

Level 3--Each group of 32 farmers was divided into two groups of 16; one group consisted of farmers with farms with the best soil

and climate (natural resources), and the other of those with the poorest natural resources in their respective group (see Figure 7).

4.2 Interviews

In addition to the interviews with farmers, other sources of information included interviews with government officials. Two officials from the Prime Minister's office were interviewed, two from the Ministry of Agriculture, and one from the Ministry of Development Planning. Discussions were undertaken with two professors of economics from the Department of Economics at Dar-es-Salaam University and one law professor from the university. Similar discussions were held with six faculty members in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Sokoine University, Morogoro. The Mara Region agricultural development officer was interviewed; the Musoma Vijijini district veterinary officer, the cooperatives officer, and two officials in charge of coordinating Ujamaa village cooperative activities were also interviewed.

4.3 Secondary Sources of Data

Additional information was obtained from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition, interviews were undertaken with officials from those agencies. The final set of data was obtained from secondary sources, including government statistical abstracts from Tanzania and other general literature on Tanzania. Through this process, the theory and practice of the




Figure 7: Selection strategy.

Ujamaa policy was evaluated, and the level of action and implementation was analyzed.

Part of the study involved an analysis of institutions such as marketing boards and cooperatives. This analysis was undertaken to evaluate their role in policy implementation.

This evaluation proposed to show how various villages have performed under different economic, social, and technological conditions and levels of capital formation, as well as how human resources have contributed to the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy. The writer also examined the level of collective activities in those villages, as well as the effect of institutional changes on their economic development.

Both questionnaire and nonquestionnaire methods were employed in the interviewing process. Two sets of questionnaires were used, one for village government officials and the second for villagers. The questionnaires contained both open-ended and Likert-scale questions. (See Appendix A.)

4.4 Data Analysis

To establish conditions and determine the rate of change in the 16 Ujamaa villages surveyed, quantification of measurable variables was necessary. With respect to institutions, the focus was on quantifying the number of schools, rural health centers, dispensaries, vocational training facilities, animal dips, water facilities, party and government offices, village government shops,

village collective farms, public safety, and transportation facilities. The writer also examined the effect of various institutional changes on village economic development, and the political structure as it has affected behavior, particularly collective activities.

With human resources, the availability of the experts in the following areas was measured: (1) agricultural extension officer, (2) veterinary extension officer, (3) community development officer, (4) rural medical officers, (5) nurses, (6) midwives, and (7) teachers. Determination of the rate of change was based on the increase or decrease of experts in the villages. The perception of their contribution to village development was based on the 128 farmers interviewed from the questionnaire, as well as the writer's observations.

Given the complexity of rural capital formation, all types and source of capital were considered. Personal savings, government aid, self-help, foreign aid, gifts, and other traditional forms of capital such as livestock were surveyed. In terms of financial capital, the sources of funding and the policy affecting rural provision of loans were analyzed. The rate of change was considered based on whether or not rural financial institutions had been established, and how they served individuals versus the collective projects.

With respect to technology, the rate of change in the number of plows and tractors, versus reliance on hand hoes, was measured. Cotton and food crop production was evaluated in terms of

technological inputs, such as fertilizers and insecticides. Ownership and use of these technical inputs was considered an important indicator of village development.

4.5 Problems in Data Collection

The following problems were encountered in data collection:

1. Lack of documentation at all levels of government regarding the planning and implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy was encountered. Records were not adequately maintained at national, regional, district, or village levels. The implementation process was haphazard and undertaken without prior technical and logistical planning. This suggested an institutional weakness within Ujamaa Village Policy implementation.

2. Owing to the subsistence mode of production, farmers generally do not keep records of crop annual output or the cost of production. Neither do they keep records of their earnings, although they are partially incorporated in the cash economy. In view of this fact, the total farm acreage, output, and earnings were based on the most recent memory of the farmers themselves. Interview time had to be spent in the field to confirm certain data, which would not have been a problem in a modern-sector economy.

3. Given the rapid institutional changes, it was difficult to track the record of events and how they affected what was happening locally. This was observed with respect to the cooperatives and the collective farming structure. For instance, the plan initially was

to have voluntary collective farms, but this was hastily abandoned and replaced by village government collective farms and block farming. Therefore, it was not possible to compare collectivized versus noncollectivized farms.

4. Lack of good roads and petrol affected the operation of the survey, particularly during the rainy season. Lack of well-constructed bridges and muddy roads made traveling risky.

4.6 Computer Packages Used for Data Analysis

The data obtained through the survey were compiled, coded, and analyzed using statistical methods, namely correlations, means, and frequencies. The quality of data did not allow the use of other statistical methods, such as regression analysis, due to gaps in the data set. Most of the data were analyzed using descriptive techniques. The Systat data-management package was used for statistical analysis of the primary data. Questionnaire results were tabulated according to responses to each question by each individual in each respondent group. For answers to questions regarding opinions or practices that were either implemented or outcome objectives of the Ujamaa Village Policy, Systat provided tabulations in terms of the number or percentage of respondents in each group answering a certain way. The TSAM statistical package was used in analyzing time series crop production and price data. The Lotus 1-2-3 package was used for the preparation of tables and graphs. Special attention was given to the relationship between the availability of or lack of extension services, and to the responses

to each question provided by the 128 individuals interviewed regarding the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy and its effect on institutions, human resources, capital, and technology. The relationship between individual wealth and level of education was tested, to determine the level of productivity and support or lack of support for the Ujamaa Village Policy.

The statistical analysis results are discussed in Chapter 5. Many economic indicators were difficult to quantify due to lack of statistics based on monetary value, such as locally built houses, household commodities, land or farm sizes, yields, and income. Therefore, a micro-analysis of these economic indicators was not conducted due to lack of data. The category of wealthy farms versus poor farms was based on the total number of livestock owned by the head of a household, the area of land under cultivation, the type of crops grown, and other stated sources of regular income. The primary data involving historical crop output, prices of crops, rate of mechanization, and quality of housing were not analyzed due to inconsistency in the information gathered from the 128 respondents.

In general, in this writer's judgment, respondents to the questionnaire provided reliable information. However, with regard to data involving land or farm sizes, yields, and income, a successful approach for obtaining accurate information would have required long-term monitoring and recording of such information. Secondary data involving food crop production were also unreliable because the available data were based on annual total purchases by

the National Milling Corporation (NMC). Such purchases do not account for the total annual national production. These figures are more or less a reflection of a portion of the surplus produced within the country, excluding the amount that is stored by peasants for personal consumption, the amount that is traded among peasants, the amount that is smuggled out of the country into neighboring countries, and the unknown amount sold on the black-market. Other estimates that were considered reliable by the government were the annual consumption of food crops based on the 1976/77 Household Budget Survey of Mainland Tanzania. Even such data do not include food crops stored until the next year or storage losses. These data do, however, provide an indication of how much was produced and how much was marketed. Another source considered reliable by the government is production estimates from Kilimo's Early Warning and Crop Monitoring Bureau.

The secondary data of traditional cash crops are reliable, with the exception of the amount of loss due to storage and the amount that is smuggled to neighboring countries. The cash crop marketing boards, which are government parastatals, are responsible for exporting and inter-regional domestic marketing, while the cooperative unions purchase from the farmers almost all the cash crops produced. The secondary data on producer prices are also reliable because the government sets producer prices for all the major agricultural crops, except for the amount that is smuggled to neighboring countries. Proof that smuggling exists may be traced to neighboring countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, which export coffee,

while such crops are not known to be produced by those countries. However, the value or the quantity of cash and food crops smuggled out of the country was not determined.

Similarly, no particular methodology was undertaken to assess the condition of housing, tools, roads, transportation facilities, village clinics, schools, and the physical condition of livestock to determine the general level of improvement, other than through observation and the responses of the 128 farmers who were interviewed. The calculations for growth rates in crop production and prices relied on secondary data obtained from government reports published by the Marketing Development Bureau. The analysis of the rate of mechanization, availability of consumer goods, level of production, types of tools used for cultivation, level of efficiency, morale, incentives, institutional changes, availability of fertilizers, literacy rate, availability of health facilities, clean water, quality of housing, and level of extension services included the analysis of responses, the primary data collected, the secondary data gathered, analysis of interviews with government officials and international agency officials, and general observation by the writer.

The evaluation of improvement in quality as a measure of improvement was based on the physical appearance of the specific items under consideration. For example, a house with iron corrugated roofing and cement and the year the house was built helped to indicate the rate of increase of such houses in a given village, and

thus was considered as an improvement or lack of it, depending on the count. Improvement in the quality of services was measured in terms of an increase or decrease in numbers and in terms of the general response by respondents interviewed, in terms of whether the majority gave positive feedback or negative feedback and the reasons or factors they gave to support their views. Gains and losses were not determined or measured due to lack of documented records.

4.7 Part B: The Mara Region

This section contains a description of the Mara Region and the Musoma Vijijini district, the field study area. The history, general demographics, and economic and social environment of the area are discussed.

The Mara Region has a population of one million people and comprises a land area of 29,549 square kilometers, of which only 15,690 square kilometers are suitable for agricultural activities. Water comprise 35.1 percent or 10,380 kilometers, consisting largely of Lake Victoria and the Mara, Mori, and Grumeti rivers. Fishing and cultivation of food and cash crops constitute the main source of livelihood. Of the 200,000 hectares under cultivation, 165,000 hectares are dedicated to food crops and 31,000 hectares to cash crops. About 50 percent of cultivation in the Mara Region is carried out by hand hoe, whereas some 30 percent is by oxen-drawn plows.

The region has three geographical zones divided into four major districts: North Mara, Musoma Vijijini, Bunda, and Serengeti. A

fifth district is the District Council of Musoma Town. The three geographical zones in the Mara Region are:

1. The Highlands of Tarime. This zone varies in topography from 1,500 to 1,800 meters above sea level. Two rainy seasons dominate this zone's weather; September through December and February through May. There is an average of about 1,250 to 1,500 mm of rainfall per year. The land is suitable for coffee, maize, millet, sorghum, cassava, beans, and bananas.

2. The Central Plateau. This semi-dry topography ranges from 1,200 to 1,500 meters above sea level, with rainfall patterns similar to those noted above, ranging between 900 and 1,300 mm. The soil is fertile, and the crops grown include maize, sorghum, beans, cassava, millet, and cotton.

3. The Lowlands. The lowlands include the area along Lake Victoria, which ranges from 1,100 to 1,200 meters above sea level. Rainfall averages about 700 to 900 mm in patterns similar to those noted above. Crops grown include cotton, sorghum, millet, cassava, and oilseeds.

The major food crops in the Mara Region are cassava, sorghum, maize, millet, sweet potatoes, rice, and beans. Cash crops include cotton, coffee, sunflower, sesame, and groundnuts. As noted in Chapter 4, 85 percent of the fertilizer used in the region is used in cotton production, the dominant cash crop. The Mara Region has two agricultural training centers, at Kisangwa and Buhemba. The center at Buhemba serves farmers from Musoma and Tarime districts,

while the center at Kisangwa serves those from Bunda and Serengeti districts. The agricultural extension service in the Mara Region is chronically understaffed due to the shortage of trained human resources. Among the major problems faced are lack of transportation facilities, lack of appropriate technical packages for farmers, lack of extension agents, low motivation of staff, and the absence of effective research and extension linkage.

The Mara Region has four major irrigation projects. The largest is at Bugwema, covering 1,600 hectares. The second is Kyarano, covering 300 hectares. This project has been hampered by labor organizational problems and difficulties in water pumping. The third is the Tamau project, which covers 193 hectares. The Nyatwali project, covering 180 hectares, is still under construction. The Kisorya project, which covers 100 hectares, is in the planning stage but lacks funding. Finally, the 60-hectare Bakari Sisters Irrigation Farm is now operating.

The following section is devoted to the Musoma Vijijini district. The district has a total of 95 villages, out of which 16 villages were selected for the survey.

4.8 The Musoma Vijijini District

This section provides a background of Musoma Vijijini district, the area of study. Musoma Vijijini district covers an area of 4,910 square kilometers. Approximately 4,600 square kilometers of the district is land, and 300 square kilometers is water. Population, based on 1978 surveys, was 198,606 with 95 Ujamaa villages. In

Musoma Vijijini district, most of the Ujamaa villages were the result of the 1974 Operation Vijijini Policy, which resettled the peasants to Ujamaa villages. The district is divided into three divisions with 19 wards.

4.9 District Subdivision

The institutional structure at the district level, following the sub-decentralization policy adopted in 1972, resulted in redistricting and division of the large South Mara district. The subdivision, which aimed at bringing the government closer to the people, resulted in the abolition of the East Mara Council and the creation of Bunda or Serengeti district. In 1978, Serengeti District was formed, with its headquarters at Mugumu. Bunda became a district with its headquarters at Bunda. Musoma Rural or Musoma Vijijini, consisting of Makongoro, Nyanja, and Kiagata, also became a district. The purpose of this subdivision was to implement the policies of socialism and self-reliance by delegating the planning and control of programs to the local government. The Musoma Vijijini Area Commissioner serves both the District Council in Musoma Town and the Musoma Vijijini district, which has its headquarters in Musoma Town. The two authorities have separate budgets, economic plans, and councils. The Prime Minister's office coordinates all government functions, while the Regional Administration and the Area Administration serve as agents of the Prime Minister.

4.10 Institutions in Agriculture--The Mara Cooperative Union

The Mara Cooperative Union is the most important contributor to rural development in the region. It was formed on April 16, 1984, and started operating in 1985. In 1988, the cooperative had 370 members, consisting of primary societies, of which 77 member societies were from Musoma Vijijini district, 42 from Serengeti district, 38 from Musoma Town, and 136 from North Mara or Tarime district.

Mara Cooperative is responsible for (1) transporting cash and food crops from the primary societies and selling to government parastatals such as the National Milling Corporation (NMC), the Tanzania Cotton Authority, the Tanzania Coffee Authority, and other potential local customers; (2) providing agricultural and veterinary extension services to primary societies, as well as technological inputs including modern equipment to assist their members in productive activities for farming, animal husbandry, and fishing; and (3) providing primary societies with education designed to enhance cooperative activities, in order to further the spirit of cooperation among its members.

Many attribute the restoration of services in the area primarily to the Mara Cooperative. The cooperative increased the purchase of food crops, mainly maize, sorghum, millet, finger millet, and cassava, from 391.2 tons in 1985 to 3,933 tons in 1987. The purchase of cash crops increased from 7,147 tons in 1985 to

29,238 tons in 1987 for cotton and declined from 821 tons to 563 tons for coffee.

As of 1988, Mara Cooperative had only 27 vehicles, with an additional six small vehicles for distributing cash payments to its members. It also has several aging mills for processing cotton. The cooperative's activities have been hampered by the aging condition of equipment, especially its ginneries. These machines, which are used to remove cotton seeds, have a limited capacity. This condition has been further worsened by lack of spare parts, reducing operating capacity. A chronic shortage of electricity, especially at the Mugango ginery, has further reduced cotton-processing capability. Mara Cooperative continues to experience a shortage of vehicles and spare parts, which makes the transportation of goods from rural areas difficult. To make matters worse, the roads are in such poor condition that they can be used only during the dry season. Transporting of agricultural goods from villages is thus impossible during the rainy season. Storage facilities for agricultural goods are also scarce and in poor condition. This results in reduced cotton output due to lack of markets.

4.11 Human Capital in Musoma Vijijini District

Musoma Vijijini district's budget allocation for the 1987/88 period was Tshs 1,190,000 for education and Tshs 1,000,000 for health. Overall, the budget allocation for Musoma Vijijini district is inadequate, considering the level of deterioration of roads, schools, and health centers. The Musoma district shares one

agricultural training center, at Buhemba, with the North Mara district. Between 1983 and 1987, 99 farmers were trained from both Musoma Town and the Musoma Vijijini district. The district, like the rest of the country, suffers from a shortage of extension staff, lack of vehicles, and appropriate technical informational materials for farmers. Musoma Vijijini district has only 18 extension workers. The number of village-based extension services for agriculture and livestock is considered inadequate to provide effective services.¹⁴² Poor management of equipment and finances are testimony to the need to improve human capital, which is essential to the improvement of the district.

4.12 Technology in Musoma Vijijini District

Access to the modern technological inputs that are necessary to increase agricultural production and improve animal husbandry remains a major problem in Musoma Vijijini district. The only technology employed consists of oxen-drawn plows and the labor-intensive hand hoe (jembe la mkono). Whatever technological inputs are available to the district are confined to cash crop production. Although appropriate technology for increasing peasant production exists, it is not available to the peasants. These technological inputs, such as tractors or oxen-drawn plows and carts,

¹⁴²K. J. B. Keregero, "Improving Agriculture Productivity in Mara Region: Constraints and Possibilities," Paper presented at a World Food Day Workshop Held in Tarime District, October 14-15, 1988, pp. 9-11.

wheelbarrows, grain milling machines, and milk-processing facilities, are still not easily accessible to most rural families.

Fertilizer and insecticide used in the district are largely dedicated to cotton production; very little goes for other types of crops. Large increases in fertilizer price and use by peasants caused an increase in food prices. Irrigation is also almost nonexistent on small farms, with the exception of government-financed projects at Bugwema (1,600 hectares), Kyarano (366 hectares), Kisorya (100 hectares), and Butiama (200 hectares), which serve the village government farm and some local progressive farmers. The condition of animal dips for pest control is also poor. Most of the dips do not function during the rainy season and are limited by the availability of chemicals.¹⁴³

4.13 Capital in Musoma Vijijini District

Lack of credit constituted a hindrance to increasing peasant agricultural production in Musoma Vijijini district. The scarcity of capital impaired Musoma's institutions. Mara Cooperative Union, for example, was unable to process cotton adequately due to a shortage of spare parts. In terms of investment capital, the lack of available funds was profound. In 1987, Musoma Vijijini district had an allocation of Tshs 10,353,000 for development-oriented programs, out of which only Tshs 1,663,000 was allocated for

¹⁴³Asseny Muro, "Rural Women and Agriculture: A Situation Analysis," paper presented at the World Food Day Workshop in Tarime District, October 14-15, 1988, pp. 14-15.

agriculture. Only Tshs 601,000 was allocated for animal husbandry and was expended on those activities.

From this research it is evident that, among farmers, village chairmen and various district, regional, cooperative, and national leaders, a lack of credit for individual farmers is an important incentive linkage that is missing. Peasants in rural areas have limited access to credit. Providing credit to peasants, while making the terms of repayment clear and accommodative of the tradition and culture, could greatly improve agricultural production. The unavailability of capital inputs in the form of hybrid seeds, fertilizers, fuel, and insecticides resulted in an increase of the prices of these important commodities.

4.14 Perception of the Players

The problem of village life, according to top government officials, has been the peasants' inability to follow and implement government policy. According to interviews with government officials, instructions from above were often ignored by peasants. Furthermore, lack of management at the village level made maintenance of resources difficult. Tractors provided to villages were poorly used and maintained. However, some top government officials admitted that the infrastructure, incentives, technical inputs, and linkage to the industrial sector were poor, thereby leading to the current economic crisis.

The perception of regional and district officials gave insight into specific problems, indicating that the technical know-how of

the peasants was still primitive, and therefore peasants were unable to use modern methods and techniques of farming and animal husbandry. It was pointed out that most people rely on the hand hoe, which is not very productive or efficient. Soil fertility in some areas had been declining, accompanied by soil erosion due to the use of the same area repeatedly without using fertilizer. There were only 200 tractors in the Mara Region, and officials admitted that collective farms were not succeeding as earlier anticipated. It was explained that the dismantling of cooperatives in 1976 diminished the supply of modern farming equipment and other technical inputs. The region and the district continued to experience a shortage of agricultural and veterinary experts, and the few who were there did not have enough tools, such as vehicles and other essential supplies, to enable them to perform their work. These officials thought that implementation of the forced Ujamaa village formation was bad; although the policy and plan were good, they were not properly carried out.

The perception of village officials and peasants was that national leaders had let the villagers down by promising and not delivering. As the detailed discussion in Chapter 4 has indicated, village leaders and peasants expected the government to provide them with extension services, health services, and other essential services. They thought the government could make a difference by providing them with loans, medicines, and the appropriate infrastructure such as roads, transportation, and telecommunication.



Village leaders and peasants wanted the government to provide them with essential services and to combat black-marketing and corruption.

4.15 Livestock Production

Most of the livestock in the Mara Region are owned by individual families; the livestock farms are owned by parastatal and nongovernmental organizations. Of the 969,766 cattle in the region, most are indigenous, rather than the modern cattle found at government centers. Dipping as a husbandry practice has suffered due to the high cost of chemicals, lack of water in some of the dips during the dry season, and the malfunctioning of 72 percent of the dips. The level of livestock service is inadequate.¹⁴⁴

4.16 Fish Production

Fish production from Lake Victoria has fluctuated between 4,968.7 million tons in 1980 and 18,539.7 million tons in 1985, although it is believed that the production figures are much higher than the official statistical estimates due to poor record keeping. Fishing vessels in the region are trawlers (mashua) and canoes (mitumbwi).

¹⁴⁴Keregero, "Improving Agricultural Productivity."

4.17 Concluding Summary

This chapter contained a description of the research methods and the study area. In the first part, the sampling procedures for the survey the quantification techniques were described, and the problems encountered in data collection were elaborated. The absence of records of crop output, cost of production, yield, and farmers' earnings or income were some of the quantitative problems encountered. The computer software used for data analysis included Systat and Lotus 1-2-3. However, lack of needed quantitative data diminished the level of quantitative analysis undertaken. The second part of the chapter provided a description of the historical, demographic, geographic, and economic background of the Mara Region and Musoma Vijijini district, where the study was undertaken.

The implementation of collectivization and the movement of peasants to Ujamaa villages, as well as the effect on the economy and social fabric of village life, is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

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
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AN EVALUATION OF THE UJAMAA VILLAGE POLICY: A CASE STUDY
OF MUSOMA VIJIJINI DISTRICT IN TANZANIA, 1974-1987

Volume II

By

Lenin Bega Kasoga


A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Interdisciplinary Program, Department of Agricultural
Economics, History, and Philosophy, offered through
the Department of Arts and Letters

1990




CHAPTER 5

UJAMAA DEVELOPMENT IN MUSOMA VIJIJINI DISTRICT

5.1 Introduction

This chapter contains two parts, a review of the Ujamaa Village Policy and its implementation at the village level, and the results of primary and secondary data collection on factors affecting agricultural development in 16 Ujamaa villages in Musoma Vijijini District in northern Tanzania (see Figure 8). The field study represents more than six months of on-site survey and interviews of farmers and village government officials. The underlying hypothesis of the study was that the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy depended on the availability of four factors, in the absence of the satisfactory minimal conditions of which, economic development could not succeed. The factors are:

1. Institutions needed for economic development,
2. Human resources (essential trained work force for economic development programs),
3. Capital in the form of needed credit, and
4. Suitable technology.



Key to Villages:

- | | |
|--------------|---------------|
| 1. Chitare | 9. Masurura |
| 2. Bukima | 10. Kibubwa |
| 3. Seeka | 11. Butiama |
| 4. Saragana | 12. Biatika |
| 5. Kwibara | 13. Matongo |
| 6. Nyasurura | 14. Kyankoma |
| 7. Mmahare | 15. Kiabakari |
| 8. Kirumi | 16. Wegero |

Figure 8: Map of the Mara Region, Tanzania, East Africa.

Regional boundaries - - - - -

All-weather roads =

Dry-weather roads =====

District boundaries -'-'-'-'-






Figure 8



5.2 Review of Policy Objectives and Implementation at the Village Level

The Ujamaa Village Policy favored equality over efficiency because, in the minds of the policymakers, economic inequality was unacceptable. In Nyerere's words, "When the demands of 'efficiency' and 'production' override man's need for a full and good life then society is no longer serving man, it is using him."¹⁴⁵ Rejected was the effort to remold peasants in terms of their social habits, culture, and tradition, by adopting tactics similar to those employed in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, Cuba, or China. The goal of the policy was to eliminate the existence of classes in terms of masters and laborers. Violence was rejected as a means of institutionalizing socialism. Capitalism, as a driving force for development, was also rejected because, as a system, it was viewed as dangerous and capable of increasing the impoverishment of the peasants.

Given the complexity of what has occurred in the villages studied, the ensuing discussion will be presented in the following sequence: First, the institutional changes that were intended to bring about rural development since 1974 is reviewed. Second, the role and availability of human resources to the Ujamaa villages is explored. Third, the availability of capital for economic development is discussed. Finally, the accessibility of technology for development is discussed.

¹⁴⁵Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 16.



It is apparent that whether economic development projects are undertaken at the national or the village level, the availability of these four factors has a major influence on their success. Tanzania's development strategy is based on socialism and self-reliance. The government's objective has been to achieve balanced economic growth and equity in the distribution of economic opportunity and income. This study was undertaken to examine the entire question of rural development through the Ujamaa Village Policy and its effect on Tanzania's economy.

The Ujamaa Village Program was designed to move the scattered population into larger settlements to facilitate communal farming and the provision of basic services. Furthermore, the policy was intended to avoid the concentration of land in the hands of a few people. The use of hired labor was discouraged, and emphasis was placed on self-reliance and mutual help.¹⁴⁶ The Ujamaa villages were expected to develop into cooperatives based on traditional roots, which would have developed gradually from using hand hoes to oxen-drawn plows, and eventually reach mechanization. Improvement in production through technology was to be gradual. Instead of aiming at petroleum-powered lorries, these villages were expected to first acquire oxen-drawn carts, which could be produced within the country cheaply. Oxen-drawn carts were considered more appropriate

¹⁴⁶K. Odegaard, On Output Growth in Tanzanian Agriculture (Dar-es-Salaam: University of Dar-es-Salaam Economic Research Bureau, 1983), p. 29.



for the types of roads that currently exist in the rural areas. Moving along this path, step by step, was the aim of the Ujamaa Village Policy. The rationale for this approach was to use what was available at low cost and was affordable to the peasants, rather than to pursue a massive mechanization program that the peasants could not afford.¹⁴⁷

This initial policy-implementation strategy was not adhered to. The lack of a consistent implementation approach may be partly responsible for the decline in agricultural production. If Nyerere's original objective--to overcome poverty, ignorance, and disease through the exercise of skill, sweat and patience by the people in the construction of a socialist nation of free and equal citizens--is considered, it is clear that something was lost in the translation between policy and practice.¹⁴⁸ An analysis of the implementation process, based on the 16 Ujamaa villages surveyed, shows that Nyerere's initial plan as described in the September 1967 pamphlet, entitled "Socialism and Rural Development," was not followed in the implementation process. Voluntary movement to Ujamaa villages by scattered peasants as a consequence of government persuasion (except a few TANU Youth League Party cadres) did not occur. The envisioned sequence for reaching the desired goal based on a realistic appreciation of where the country was starting from,

¹⁴⁷Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 233-319.

¹⁴⁸Nyerere, Freedom and Work-TANU SOUVENIR (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanganyika Standard, Ltd., December 9, 1961), pp. 3-5.

was distorted by party and government planners. They thought that, to combat the cohesiveness of the traditional society, along with the capitalistic tendencies of individualism and acquisitiveness of the peasants, more government action was required. For instance, "Operation Rufiji" in 1969 moved the population in that district to Ujamaa villages on higher lands to avoid floods. This was followed by "Operation Dodoma" in 1970, which settled semi-nomadic Wagogo from the drought-prone Dodoma Region to Ujamaa villages. Further forced massive resettlement operations were launched in Kigoma Region in 1972.¹⁴⁹

Some people were skeptical about the viability of the Ujamaa Village Program altogether. Bakula had warned in 1971 that "Ujamaa villages could not be successfully launched until the people were educated to understand and appreciate fully the need to live together and work cooperatively for the good of all."¹⁵⁰ He recommended political socialization because he believed that most people had not felt obligated to cultivate together as a means of improving their economic prospects. Among the factors he cited as contributing to lack of response among the ordinary peasants was lack of adequate government resources committed to the establishment of Ujamaa villages. Problems associated with relocation were not adequately assessed by the Village Development Committees (VDCs)

¹⁴⁹Coulson, Agricultural Policies in Mainland Tanzania, pp. 86-93.

¹⁵⁰J. H. Proctor et al., Building Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania (Dar-es-salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1971), p. 23.



responsible for implementing voluntary participation by peasants. Consequently, people who were targeted to move to such villages were the landless, the unemployed, and those who were enticed by promises for a higher income if they moved to Ujamaa villages. Early pioneers were faced with many problems, most notably inadequate food supplies, clean water, and shelter.¹⁵¹

Early voluntary Ujamaa villages should have been treated as pilot projects by the government, rather than showcases. They also required continuous monitoring and evaluation by representatives of the government and TANU. However, those responsible for implementing voluntary participation did not take advantage of this crucial phase by experimenting, analyzing, and learning from their mistakes. They failed to adhere firmly to the principle of voluntary participation and mutual benefit. They failed to guide and help the peasants, and instead they resorted to coercion, while disregarding the interests of the individual peasants. The leaders assumed that Ujamaa was part of the tradition of the masses, and therefore the peasants would readily adopt it. As Nyerere stated:

Ujamaa, its literal meaning familyhood . . . brought to the mind of the people the idea of mutual involvement in the family as they knew it . . . building on the foundation of our past, . . . not importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania. . . . We want to grow out of our own roots emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization to embrace modern technology to meet the challenge of the twentieth century world.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹Ibid., pp. 22-30.

¹⁵²Nyerere, Socialism and Development, p. 2.



Preparatory work for implementing this policy was simply not done. No recruitment or training of political cadre specifically suited for this task was undertaken. The work of convincing the peasants of the advantages of socialist villages was entrusted to the administrators and field staff who had been in charge of the implementation of previous government policies. Seminars and party directives alone proved inadequate in transforming these administrators into cadres. They failed to become the auxiliary force, whose function should have been to guide and help, rather than to make policy decisions. They proved also to be unwilling to learn from the peasants they were supposed to help.¹⁵³

The major shortcoming of the government's implementation program was its underestimation of the individualistic tendencies of the Tanzanian peasants and the view that they were obstacles rather than assets. Over the course of seven decades of foreign occupation, the peasants' values had changed. The spread of a cash economy had altered the mode of production by inculcating acquisitiveness through the expansion of markets and the formation of central states on peasant society. Furthermore, the fact that peasants are generally skeptical of strangers who bear the idea of improving their lives untested in their setting was disregarded. Thus, those government officials were met with disbelief and mistrust. Consequently, despite the party and government propaganda, most peasants were suspicious. They waited to see what

¹⁵³Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. xiii.



would happen to those who volunteered. What they saw was not encouraging. Lack of properly managed programs for assisting early pioneers discouraged voluntary participation in the establishment of Ujamaa villages. According to Freyhold:

Neither class issues nor economic strategies were ever mentioned in the villages. Given the nature of the political system, most of those who grouped themselves into Ujamaa villages were not even sure why the government wanted them to do so and whether the policy would last.¹⁵⁴

Musoke revealed that lack of organization discouraged many peasants because of the hardships experienced by pioneers. The evidence he provided showed that some recruiters applied intimidation. For example, one regional commissioner from the East Lake Region stated, "I have started a war and anyone opposing it will find himself in a precarious position."¹⁵⁵ These types of statements were made at village meetings intended to persuade villagers to volunteer and join Ujamaa villages. This is an example of tactical errors in the early stages of implementation, in which coercion was employed, contrary to Nyerere's wishes.

Musoke pointed out that promises for food, shelter, and seeds often were not fulfilled by government officials. In some cases, the land in sites chosen by the authorities was not fertile. This occurred in regions with a high population density in Kilimanjaro and the East Lake. Very little planning was done before volunteers arrived at the places where the villages were to be situated.

¹⁵⁴Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, p. 82.

¹⁵⁵Proctor et al., Building Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, p. 4.



Preparations were not made to assure an adequate supply of food beyond the first few days or to provide sufficient skilled manpower to cope with the organizational problems on the spot.¹⁵⁶ Those who volunteered, believing that the promised government aid was a golden opportunity, a chance they could not let slip through their fingers, were disappointed. That did not provide good publicity or inducement to other peasants who were waiting to see the results before they could join. Those who moved during the rainy season faced misery because of poor housing conditions. Consequently, the Ujamaa Village Policy proved difficult to implement through mere persuasion, as some leaders had earlier anticipated. Sweet promises for a better life needed practical demonstration, which required patience, good management skills, and financial investments.

The success of the Ujamaa Village Policy depended on the villagers' willingness to sacrifice. No amount of planning and mechanization could have ensured success unless the peasants appreciated the importance of working together.¹⁵⁷ Mboya pointed out that the feasibility of the Ujamaa Village Policy in the Kilimanjaro region was limited because the people there already lived in villages comprising from 150 to 300 families. Each of these families had "kihamba," several acres or more of land belonging to each individual. The Chagga cultivated coffee for sale and bananas and vegetables for subsistence. Within these villages,

¹⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 2-14.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p. 62.



people carried on several activities on the basis of self-help and cooperation. Most of the people in this region adopted the capitalistic tendencies of acquisitiveness, and because the cash crop introduced in the area was coffee, a perennial crop, as in Bukoba and Mbeya, the pattern of individual plot cultivation took a different form in sharp contrast to that of other ethnic groups in the rest of the country. These individuals had developed a high regard for entrepreneurship and a tendency to engage in business. It became obvious that they were not very enthusiastic about the adoption of socialism. The peasants were cautious because of the significant risk of ending up with lower incomes due to collectivization.

Voluntary participation was therefore minimal among the Chagga. They came to regard Ujamaa villages as a place for the unwanted, hooligans, and thieves. The implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy in this region invited the resettlement of people who agreed to settle at Mwese, Mpanda, and Tabora. They registered for resettlement because coffee prices were declining while tobacco prices were increasing, making tobacco production more attractive. Many were interested in hiring local people as farm laborers for tobacco growing. These settlers lacked the ideological commitment to socialism and often complained about their living conditions because they were compelled to share housing facilities. The complaint that they were "sleeping as soldiers," with no privacy, was frequently heard. Those who gave up Ujamaa life and returned



home told their neighbors of their negative experiences. This further tarnished the image of the Ujamaa villages. More reluctance among others to volunteer followed.¹⁵⁸


In the Mara Region, most of the peasants were unwilling to adopt communal methods of production. Out of 95 villages within Musoma Vijijini district in 1970, only 25 were registered as Ujamaa villages. Out of those 25, only three villages had established communal Shamba.¹⁵⁹ Interviews revealed that Butiama Kiabakari and Kwibara were among the three that established voluntary communal farms. In view of this slow progress, the government embarked on what has been described as "the carrot approach to Ujamaa," a method that employed promises for donations and assistance by the government through the Regional Development Fund for financing small projects in Ujamaa villages. Hyden described this as the "patronage" approach:

In the absence of effective means to control the economic activities of the peasants, the petty bourgeois leaders are obliged to buy the support of the peasants with political currency, for example, schools, health dispensaries, and other such amenities that peasants value. They must offer a tangible benefit in order to get the peasant interested in their own schemes, but even so they cannot be sure that peasant support is forthcoming. The peasants may decide to ignore the policy demand if it is too controversial or too demanding.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 63-67.

¹⁵⁹Charles K. Magoti, Peasant Participation and Rural Productivity in Tanzania: The Case of Mara Cotton Producers 1955-1977 (Hamburg: Institut Fur Afrika-Kinde, 1984), p. 119.

¹⁶⁰Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, p. 30.



The "carrot" or "patronage" approach had an appeal to peasants all throughout Tanzania. In the Mara Region alone in 1971, 2,259 oxen and 500 plows were bought and distributed to 40 Ujamaa villages within the region. Poultry units were established in seven villages of Kiku, Ryamisanga, Kimugendi, Butiama, Makundusi, and Makoko.¹⁶¹ The Ministry of Education, the Cooperative Union, and the Ministry of Agriculture had all allocated some funds for the purchase of oxen and equipment and for the training of farmers. The Agricultural Department continued to allocate increasing amounts of capital to ox-mechanization until 1976, when the program was discontinued.¹⁶² This approach was short-lived, largely because of theft and corruption by village leaders, who used the plows for their personal use. According to Freyhold, all the animals that arrived died or were allocated to ranching schemes. most were sold before they reached the very peasants they were meant to serve.¹⁶³

Hence came the departure from the Ujamaa Village Policy described by Nyerere: "Ujamaa villages . . . will be created by the people themselves and maintained by them. It must be done by their own resources."¹⁶⁴ The lack of self-planning by the people, and the reliance on implementation by administrative rather than political

¹⁶¹Magoti, Peasant Participation and Rural Productivity in Tanzania, p. 119.

¹⁶²Freyhold, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania, p. 99.

¹⁶³Ibid.

¹⁶⁴Phillip L. Raikes, "Ujamaa and Rural Socialism," Journal of Modern African Studies 17 (1979): 38.



or voluntary initiatives, led to the use of coercion, which was approved by Nyerere himself in 1974. In November 1973, Nyerere commanded that the entire rural population of Tanzania be moved to Ujamaa villages by the end of 1976.¹⁶⁵ This order was based on a recommendation of the TANU biannual conference of September 1973. Resolutions 14 and 15 called for rapid villagization throughout Tanzania by the end of 1976.¹⁶⁶ The year 1974 saw an unprecedented number of "operations" in most districts. The word "Ujamaa" was dropped in most places in favor of "development" villages, and the initiative for true communal farming gave way to block farming.¹⁶⁷

The bureaucracy took over. Emphasis of government planners shifted to the bureaucrats' vision of order. Villages were built along roads, at high density and usually with the houses in straight lines. Peasants' homes were destroyed to ensure that they could not move back to their old houses.¹⁶⁸ Only Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, and Rungwe were immune to these coercive tactics because most of the bureaucratic elite originated from those areas.¹⁶⁹

Nyerere never explained the reason why he abandoned his earlier call for reliance on persuasion. Clearly, as Lofchie argued, the

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁶⁶Magoti, Peasant Participation and Rural Productivity in Tanzania, p. 119.

¹⁶⁷Raikes, "Ujamaa and Rural Socialism," p. 49.

¹⁶⁸Ibid.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 50.



Ujamaa Village Policy failed to gain ideological acceptance among the vast majority of the peasantry.

From the beginning most rural Tanzanians reacted with a set of attitudes that ranged from skepticism and mistrust to outright resentment and opposition; in the end, even the President tacitly acknowledged this reaction in accepting the use of coercion in moving peasants to new settlements.¹⁷⁰

Some suspect that the failure in implementing the policy fell mainly on the bureaucracy, who underestimated the peasants' resistance to change. They proceeded to implement the Ujamaa Village Policy as all-knowing and benevolent despots. They failed to impress upon the peasants the government's desire to increase their standard of living. This message was lost in the implementation stage of the policy. By being forced against their will, the peasants lost all enthusiasm for Ujamaa. In the absence of political consciousness as well as vision for individual gain, it was difficult for the peasants to embark on the road to socialism. The peasants are generally pragmatic and require demonstration and performance. If the peasants had seen a successful demonstration from earlier settlers, that would have been an incentive for participation. It is also unclear as to the level of political consciousness attained by the bureaucrats. Just how committed they were in wanting to see socialism succeed is unknown, but judging by the tactics employed in implementing the policy, it appears that they were headed for failure from the beginning.

¹⁷⁰Michael F. Lofchie, "Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalization in Tanzania," Journal of Modern African Studies 16,3 (1978): 451-75.

The Ujamaa Village Policy, aimed at promoting the development of agricultural cooperation, required a new set of property rights.

In 1962 Nyerere wrote:

Socialism like Democracy is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare.¹⁷¹

His intention, then, was not to define the institutions within which this attitude would prevail, but rather philosophically to show that it was the individual attitude that distinguished the socialist from the nonsocialist. The possession or nonpossession of wealth, he argued, was not a criterion for distinguishing a socialist from a capitalist. Nyerere said that even destitute people can be potential capitalists, exploiters of their fellow human beings. Depending on one's attitude, a millionaire could equally be a socialist--that is, if that individual used such acquired wealth in the service of fellow human beings. But Nyerere added that socialist millionaires were a rare phenomenon. His early thinking assumed that the organizational structure of the traditional African society and its distribution of wealth were based on socialist attitudes. Empirically, however, the only evidence was the absence of differential accumulation of wealth, the practice of employing others for wages, and the absence of ownership of property for renting. A significant level of stratification existed in

¹⁷¹ Julius K. Nyerere, "Ujamaa": The Basis of African Socialism (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanganyika Standard, Ltd., April 1962).




property rights during the precolonial epoch.¹⁷² However, internal communal production relations existed, and it was that type of traditional organization that Nyerere intended to restore at the national level.

The recognition that land ownership could preserve stratification of society into landlord and peasant classes led to nationalization of all land in 1962. Three types of land-ownership rights were established in 1975. The provisions of this land tenure law are as follows:

1. All land is government property. An individual can use land that is not being used or is vacant. "All leases, right of occupancy, etc., may have a land rent (payable to the Government) fixed in them or variable from time to time, in recognition of the national ownership and the nation's responsibility for national development."

2. Villages are allocated land virtually on the basis of permanency. They have the power to sublease any part of their land for 99 years. Each household has the right to a long-term sublease, which provide reasonable permanent occupancy of the house and the household plot or shamba, but the right to free sale is not included in the lease; if the family surrenders their sublease, they return it to the village government in return for compensation for the value of the house and other buildings, of any land improvements that have been made, and of any permanent crops. Family ownership

¹⁷²Magoti, Peasant Participation and Rural Productivity in Tanzania, p. 113.




at a block farm will also be surrendered to the village government and reallocated when no longer required by the user or his heir.

3. All land allocated to institutions, enterprises, or individuals for commercial farming will have leases of not less than (and usually more than) 33 years. The user will be entitled to a document setting out his boundaries and the conditions of his lease. He has the right to appeal before the implementation of the decision to acquire his land for public purposes or any other reason, and if the appeal is not upheld he will be paid compensation for any improvements made to the land, as well as for buildings, etc., erected.¹⁷³


The effect of the state land ownership law, although in effect since 1962, had never been felt until the 1975 Ujamaa Village Act was passed. The physical movement of peasants from their "mahame" or old dwellings made it clear in 1974 that traditional land tenure was no longer relevant. Ndulu and Msambichaka identified the land-tenure policy as a factor contributing to the poor economic performance associated with low productivity in agriculture. However, they provided no empirical evidence of a relationship between the changes in land tenure and low agricultural production.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³Ministry of Agriculture. The Tanzania Agricultural Policy of Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam: Printpak, Ltd., 1982), pp. 11-12.

¹⁷⁴Benno J. Ndulu and Lucian A. Msambichaka, The Agricultural Sector in Tanzania: An Overview of Performance and Major Constraints (Dar-es-Salaam: Economic Research Bureau, 1984), pp. 12-25.



In the survey of 16 villages, the researcher found that in some villages, peasants who moved far from their farms were unable to adequately care for the farms they left behind. They were constrained by distance and lack of time, because of the construction of new houses soon after they moved. Some complained that animals and birds destroyed their crop due to lack of care. This was a cause of low levels of agricultural output in 1974. It was also observed that some peasants had not yet accepted the fact that traditional land ownership was changing. They were still fighting to regain their lost land. Those who moved during the village programs were given farms that traditionally belonged to the people who lived there and occupied that land. Some peasants still consider the traditional land tenure as valid, although by law land belongs to the state. Of 128 household heads interviewed, 46.1 percent never moved, whereas 22.6 percent moved willingly and 31.3 percent said they were forced to move. The government lacked the capacity to manage the process because at the villages of Butiama, Bukima, Saragana, Seeka, Matongo, and Masurura, household heads interviewed complained about land squeeze, or the scarcity of farmland. Disputes over land were caused by inadequate or lack of surveys to determine population growth and the amount of land required to satisfy the increase of demand in the farmland. The consequence was that some peasants kept working on the same farm year after year until the soil lost fertility.



At Butiama, some peasants were allowed to move back to their original homes to resolve the problem associated with land shortage caused by compulsory village formation. At Kiabakari, the village government officials were reluctant to stop peasants from returning to their mahame because the country needed to increase the production of both food and cash crops. Yet at Biatika, those interviewed blamed land scarcity on the National Service or Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (JKT), which appropriated their land and left them with small farms. At Masurura, some peasants were forced to ask for farmland from neighboring villages.

Mapolu attributed the decline in agricultural production partially to the social dislocation that resulted from the resettlement process.¹⁷⁵ The new institutional arrangements were therefore a factor contributing to the decline in agricultural production.

Nyerere's objective was to establish institutions, property rights, and laws that could enhance and improve the welfare of the peasants. This strategy has not completely wiped out stratification within the rural society that developed before and during the colonial era. One would concur with Lofchie in observing that the Ujamaa Village Policy made only the barest headway in disseminating socialist practices in agriculture.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵Issa Shivji et al., The State and the Working People in Tanzania (Dakar: Codesria, 1985), p. 120.

¹⁷⁶Lofchie, Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalization in Tanzania, p. 451.



Abandonment of the step-by-step approach to Ujamaa Village Programs created problems that lowered crop output because the time devoted to the business of moving and construction diverted manpower resources from farming. Achievement in communal agricultural production has been minimal. The policy has succeeded in bringing the rural population closer together in these villages. However, coercive measures, as the experience of the U.S.S.R. and China proved, are not the best way to carry out agricultural policy. The interviews conducted in the 16 villages revealed that the peasants are individualistic and desire monetary and material incentives in order to increase agricultural production. Field data collected during the interview process indicated that when asked whether working together in collective farms discouraged laziness, 58.6 percent disagreed, while only 33.6 percent agreed. When asked if they received an adequate share from their labor for participating in collective activities, 89.8 percent disagreed, while only 10.2 percent agreed. There is an unquestionable trend that the peasants interviewed thought that incentives were necessary for maximum effort. Most people interviewed thought they were motivated by something that would benefit them personally. This opinion was expressed many times during the interviews.

The socialistic "attitude of mind" that Nyerere referred to in his 1962 "Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism" pamphlet did not materialize. What appeared obvious during the survey was that the concept of farming, living, and marketing together was not clearly



understood by the peasants or by government policymakers. The policy did not establish a common basis for government-peasant understanding. No blueprint for sequential implementation was established, nor was the program adapted to the many different ethnic, cultural, and local economic conditions. For example, the Chagga grew perennial crops and were experiencing a land shortage. A similar situation prevailed in the Bukoba area. Other areas grew annual cash crops and food crops and exhibited the typical conditions of peasants living scattered. Despite these differences, the same implementation plan was used. Experience has shown that this simply did not work.

5.3 Factors Affecting Agricultural Development

5.3.1 Institutional Changes Since 1974

Frequent institutional changes in Tanzania since 1974 have been identified as a factor contributing to the decline in agricultural productivity. Hanak pointed to the increasingly uncertain infrastructure services and limited material incentives as factors leading to negative growth rates in the once-dynamic export-crop sector.¹⁷⁷ The abolition of the Cooperative Unions in 1976 has been criticized as a major constraint to agricultural development, due to farmers' lack of confidence in the subsequent Cooperative Society. This criticism was acknowledged by Nyerere in 1984 when he

¹⁷⁷Ellen Hanak, The Politics of Agricultural Policy in Tanzania (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 1986), p. 20.



said that one of the major mistakes he would have liked to avoid was the abolition of the local government and the disbanding of the cooperatives.¹⁷⁸ Following the reorganization, the producer prices offered to farmers fell far below what they expected because such prices were determined based on the operating efficiency of the parastatals, which replaced the cooperatives. Therefore, the effect of the decreasing level of operating efficiency of the parastatals had to be borne by the farmers through lower prices and lower foreign-exchange earnings. Price administration and marketing decisions, critics have pointed out, tend to be made on an ad hoc basis, and with lack of information on the cost and benefits of optional courses of action. This leads to contradictions resulting in black-markets.¹⁷⁹ The crop parastatals were allowed to continue to operate for a long time, despite their financial losses and physical inefficiencies. These institutional changes undoubtedly had a significant and adverse effect on agricultural production.

There were two reasons for instituting these changes. First, the country inherited colonial structures that were not suitable for a nation embarking on a socialist path. Egalitarian objectives were not consistent with colonial-structured institutions. Nyerere wanted to liberate the economy from the colonial yoke by reforming and instituting structures that would allow people to develop

¹⁷⁸Nyerere, "North-South Dialogue," Third World Quarterly (April 1984), p. 828.

¹⁷⁹World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study Annex 5, pp. 16-26.



through the application of the principles of Ujamaa and self-reliance. Second, he wanted to open all the cooperative unions to members and nonmembers alike. This was a good idea in principal, but it weakened the incentives for support because the cooperative unions then had to serve members and nonmembers alike.

The role of an institution is to provide services (material, informational, and political) that facilitate societal goals--in this case, economic development. As Platt suggested, "[one can not] shape the behavior of another by response or reinforcement without the other shaping its behavior in return by the response it gives."¹⁸⁰ Nyerere was aware of this when he stated in May 1972 that decentralization implied putting trust in the people. He believed that the purpose was to develop people, not things, and that people could only develop themselves.¹⁸¹ He was thus concerned with establishing socialist institutions for collective control of property and rules of representation.

The government strategy, following the adoption of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, was to promote rural development step by step with small groups of people working cooperatively, rather than on a massive scale. As Nyerere explained:

The decision to start must be made by the people themselves and it must be made by each individual. For if a group of 20 people discuss the idea and only 7 decide to go ahead, then

¹⁸⁰John Platt, "Beyond Freedom and Dignity--The Revolutionary Manifesto," The Center Magazine 5 (March 1972): pp. 34-52.

¹⁸¹Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 67.




that Ujamaa village will consist of 7 people at the beginning. If 15 decide to start, then it will begin with 15. . . . There is no other way forward, because . . . 5 who come in unwillingly can destroy the efforts of 15 who want to work out a new pattern for themselves.¹⁸²

Few Ujamaa villages were started by TANU Youth League members in response to the President's call.¹⁸³ They were registered under the 1968 Law of Cooperative Unions, which were mainly consumer and marketing cooperatives. The role of cooperative societies under the 1968 law was to collect cash crops produced by farmers and divide any accrued benefits among all members of the cooperatives.

The established role, purpose, and structure of production within a village and cooperative marketing boards differed substantially. By 1974, 2.5 million peasants had moved into Ujamaa villages. The Village and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 was passed by Parliament to protect Ujamaa villages. The 1968 act was repealed because primary societies were few and based on individual membership, which provided benefits only to a few, contrary to the policy of socialism. Under the 1975 law, all villagers automatically became members of the primary society without a requirement for membership dues or enrollment. The cooperative unions were dissolved and replaced by parastatals and crop authorities. Each village became a primary society authorized to sell all produce from the village to parastatals and crop

¹⁸²Ibid., p.68.

¹⁸³Coulson, Tanzania: A Political Economy p. 263.



authorities. Under this law, property rights were changed. Peasants were permitted to continue ownership of their farms and livestock, but they were required to sell everything through the primary society, which is the village government. Of the 16 villages surveyed in this study, apart from the traditional cotton-producing villages, none had implemented the goal of marketing other types of agricultural produce through the primary society as prescribed under the law.¹⁸⁴ This law is credited for the fast increase of registered villages, although coercion was also employed in several areas. For example, "in some instances houses were burnt down when it was realized that some people, after having moved, returned to their former homes again after a few days."¹⁸⁵ By 1981 there were 8,180 registered villages in the country. The Cooperative Development Department and the Ujamaa and Cooperative Development Department within the Prime Minister's office were responsible for the implementation of the general policies for villages and cooperatives.¹⁸⁶


5.3.2 Village Administration

The Village Act stipulated that all registered villages were to have a village assembly and a village council selected by the

¹⁸⁴Tanzania Government, 1975 Registration of Villages Act (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1975).

¹⁸⁵Mwapachu, "Operation Planned Villages in Rural Tanzania," pp. 1-16.

¹⁸⁶Cooperative Development Department, Office of the Prime Minister, Report on Village Survey 1981 (Dodoma: August 1982), p. 1.



assembly. The councils received certificates of incorporation from the Registrar of Cooperatives, a national agency within the central government. After registration of the village council, the village is considered a body corporate, with all legal rights and liabilities and borrowing powers. Village councils are elected by the village assembly, which meets once a year as stipulated in the Village Act of 1975. The village councils are vested with the responsibility of governing all village activities and running the day-to-day activities of the village. Decisions involving the welfare of the village are subject to the final decision of the village assembly. In a registered village, every 18 year old is considered a member of the village assembly, which guarantees the right to vote and run for office.

Each family is allotted land for a homestead, kitchen garden, cattle, and poultry shed. A minimum of three acres are allotted each family, depending on the availability of land. According to the 1975 law, no village is qualified to be considered an Ujamaa village unless 75 percent of its production activities are undertaken collectively and there is joint ownership of property.¹⁸⁷ Based on the survey, none of the 16 villages met this criterion. The reason may be attributed to what Raikes described as a shift in emphasis following the adoption of coercive tactics in the

¹⁸⁷Tanzania Government, 1975 Registration of Villages Act, p. 30.




implementation process in 1974, from Ujamaa to development villages that abandoned the idea of collectivization.¹⁸⁸

These institutional changes in the government structure at the village level dismantled the colonial form, which had lingered on following independence. The villages are no longer under a headman, whose role during the colonial era was to collect taxes. A new democratic structure made the village the smallest administrative unit in Tanzania's system of decentralized government. The administrative hierarchy pyramids from the village to the ward (kata), division (tarafa), district (wilaya), region (mkoa), and central government.¹⁸⁹ Since 1975, villages have elected governments structured as primary societies with defined geographical boundaries and a recommended minimum population of 250 households. The new structure strengthened the CCM party, as the elected village party chairman automatically is the top governing official of the village government. Established were five committees with 25 members, including the chairman, secretary, and treasurer.

The village chairman is elected for a five-year term by the village CCM party members, who must be 18 years old to vote. There is no limit to the number of terms the chairman may serve. The role of the chairman is to implement party policy. The chain of command,


¹⁸⁸Phillip L. Raikes, Ujamaa and Rural Socialism, pp. 38-43.

¹⁸⁹Tanzania Government, Hansard Kawawa's speech in Parliament, 16/7/75 (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Government Printer, 1975).



from the bottom up, starts with the village chairman on up to the ward secretary (katibu kata), division secretary (katibu tarafa), area commissioner, regional commissioner, various ministries, and finally the Prime Minister's office. Within this structure are party officials who are both powerful and influential, with a single ruling party, the CCM, as supreme authority (see Figures 9 through 11).

Apart from electing the village chairman and council members, the village assembly also elects three members to attend the district party conference and one member to attend the regional party conference. Thus, the village governments are represented up the regional level by members of their choice. The problem most villages face is a lack of skilled human resources needed for managing the infant institutional structure at the village level. In the survey, it was observed that most village chairmen were older; they had low levels of education and little professional training. The success of individual villages tended to reflect the level of education and experience of village leaders, particularly the chairman, secretary, and treasurer. For example, Butiama's village chairman had completed the eleventh grade and had a rich background in public service. The village manager had a B.S. degree in engineering. Many educated people live in the village, including the CCM Chairman, former President Julius Nyerere. A livestock insemination center is located in the village, and the village is frequently visited by various party leaders. In other villages, the




I. VILLAGE/WARD LEVEL

Figure 9: Chart of the party structure at various levels.






Figure 10: Combined chart of the party organs and administrative set-ups at the village/ward, district, and regional levels.




IV. NATIONAL LEVEL


Figure 11: Chart of the party organs and administrative set-ups at the national level.



village chairmen had between a fourth- and an eighth-grade education.

The village government manages the village economy and plans activities to be undertaken collectively. Each village government has a village council with 25 members, including the chairman and secretary as ex-officio members. The council consists of five committees, each of which has five members who are responsible for the activities assigned to the committee. The committees are (1) Works and Transport; (2) Security and Defense; (3) Education, Culture, and Social Welfare; (4) Finance and Planning; and (5) Production and Marketing.

Village economic-development programs can be categorized as those that rely on village resources for implementation and those that require external aid. Generally speaking, the rural development bank and the district governments provide such outside aid. The village fiscal year starts in September or October. During this period, village councils, with the assistance of the government extension agents assigned to the ward, review guidelines received from the regional development director and prepare suitable projects subject to the approval of the village assembly. If the approved plan requires external financing material or technical expertise, it is sent to the district commissioner's office for approval. Otherwise, a plan that does not require external



assistance is executed locally, as part of the self-reliance policy.¹⁹⁰


Constitutionally, the structure of planning described herein was intended to be democratic and decentralized, requiring local participation by the village assembly. However, in practice, difficulties have surfaced, with strong evidence that ordinary peasants do not generally participate in the planning process and do not contribute their views to village project designs. Failure to hold regular village assembly meetings annually, as required by the party constitution, has been cited as a major problem in village participation. Magoti made a similar observation in 1977:

Village leadership is one of the main problems. In all the villages researched, very few of them called assembly meetings, which could not exceed three meetings a year. The various committees did not function and so the Chairman, Secretaries, and Treasurers did most of the work, helped by the Village Executive Committee Council.¹⁹¹

Mwalimu Nyerere acknowledged that failure to hold village assembly meetings was one of the existing institutional weaknesses, a tendency he thought was weakening the party. Interviews conducted during the survey revealed evidence of lack of village assemblies. As of April 1986, Butiama, for example, had not held a village assembly meeting in three years. Biatika, Chitare, Bukima, Matongo, and Mmahare had not held such meetings in two years. When asked why

¹⁹⁰Ministry of Agriculture, The Tanzania National Agricultural Policy (Dar-es-Salaam: Printpak, Ltd., October 1982), pp. 5-7.

¹⁹¹Magoti, Peasant Participation and Rural Productivity in Tanzania: The Case of Mara Cotton Producers 1955-1977, p. 129.



village assembly meetings were not held regularly as required by the constitution, most respondents pointed out that village leaders were afraid of being asked what they did with village collective funds. They wished to avoid answering allegations regarding theft of village collective property. In villages where such meetings were held, respondents complained about lack of implementation of party resolutions and policies that called for collective decisions.

5.3.3 Village Administrative Structure


The village population is divided into groups of 10 households. Each group of 10 households has an ambassador (balози), who serves as a leader or representative to whom all problems associated with or involving any member of the 10 households must be reported. If the balози fails to resolve any problem, he/she issues a letter that refers the matter to the chairman of the village. Any problem that cannot be resolved by the village chairman and the village council is referred to the katibu kata, who likewise can refer the issue to the katibu tarafa and on to the area commissioner, who is in charge of the district government. At the village level, the party controls and guides the decision-making process. The village chairman receives information from the balози and transmits village policy directives and decisions through them. This system has facilitated the communication and discussion of problems. It has also expedited the gathering of information. It represents a departure from the colonial structure, which relied on the village



headman (Mwinangwa) as a tax collector. There existed no democratic structure at the village level. Indirect rule under the British was through appointed tribal chiefs, through whom the colonial government administered villages.

During collective work projects, it is the responsibility of the balozi to make sure that each of the 10 households is represented by a family member. Households that fail to participate in collective work projects are required to pay cash fines or may have property such as livestock or other valuable commodities (nzagu) confiscated. Although every household belongs to a 10-cell unit under a balozi, not every adult in the villages is a member of the CCM. Party membership is open to every adult who is willing to abide by the CCM party philosophy and principles. Members of the party constitute a village party branch. The branch is required to hold a general meeting for all members to deliberate on party affairs and other affairs at least once a week, although this practice was not observed during the survey. The branch conference is the supreme organ at the village level, although no clear demarcation has been made to separate the privileges enjoyed by party members and nonparty members. Village assembly meetings include the participation of both. Some of the larger villages such as Butiama are further divided into subdivisions (kanda).

In practice, democracy at the village level encompasses voting, free speech, and movement. Evidence linking freedom of speech to voluntary participation in collective work is rather sketchy. Although 74.4 percent of the respondents interviewed thought they



had freedom of speech, their ability to influence what goes on in planning village development projects and policy is limited by the fact that in a one-party state, policy is formulated and initiated at levels above the village. The CCM relies on government bureaucrats to implement the formulated policy. As a consequence, there exists a top-down policy process that village members cannot oppose, without being perceived as enemies of the state.

When asked who benefited among village members from collective projects or government aid, 32.8 percent of the respondents thought it was the village leaders, whereas 35.2 percent thought that almost everyone in the village benefited. The 21.1 percent who did not know complained that their leaders did not make such information public. The chi-square test result of $p = .380$ showed that individual wealth was not a factor in benefiting from collective projects or government aid (see Table 5).

Village members' perceptions regarding who benefits depended on the type of project undertaken at the village level. In villages where the government provided aid in the form of construction materials for building schools, health dispensaries, and CCM party offices (apart from Bukima, where leaders were suspected of selling such materials), respondents thought that everyone in the village benefited. However, aid in the form of farm implements such as plows and oxen was considered by peasants as beneficial to village leaders. Loans provided by the government for purchasing a bus or a grinding machine were considered beneficial to all, whereas tractors



Table 5.--No relationship between peasant wealth and shares received for participating in government village collective farming was found.

		Received Shares		
		Frequencies:		
		No	Yes	Total
Peasant Wealth	Poor	56	8	64
	Wealthy	59	5	64
		115	13	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	.771	1	.380

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.



and lorries were not. The reason for the difference may be that items such as a grinding machine and bus service are available to all members within the village, whereas some cannot afford to rent a tractor or lorry.) Favoritism on the part of village leaders, and the attitude of monopolizing a tractor or a lorry for personal use, had the tendency to make peasants believe that their leaders benefited more than themselves. This was observed at Kyankoma, where respondents complained that the village chairman monopolized the village government tractor for his personal use.

Lack of adequate management and fiscal accountability, coupled with the absence of regularity in informing villagers how the funds were spent, caused collective work morale to decline. In Biatika, for example, the retired chairman reported that shs. 70,000 had been embezzled from the village government farm. The grinding machine allegedly had been stolen, and most villagers suspected that it had been sold by the leaders who succeeded him. Lack of accountability on the part of village leaders was the explanation repeatedly given by peasants when asked who benefited from collective work. Of the 16 villages surveyed, only Butiama and Kiabakari had in the past redistributed income to participants. However, all villages had abandoned the practice of redistributing, in favor of saving such funds for creating a village government budget following the end of voluntary participation in 1974. There was a significant distrust between the peasants and their leaders due to irregular financial reports, which were not being made available to village members. The average villager did not know where the money was going.

Although the government trained village managers in the techniques of bookkeeping and accounting through the Village Management Training Program (VMT) in 1977-78, nothing was done to instill confidence in the peasants that embezzlement of village funds was not occurring. Established accounting and office procedures were not followed. During the survey, it was observed that most of the village leaders did not keep office hours. They seemed to devote most of their time to the management of their personal economic activities. Inefficient or nonexistent leadership was the result.

The researcher noted inadequate leadership by the government and disillusionment among peasants as the major factors responsible for the general paralysis in collective work at the village level. In Bukima, for example, no collective farming took place in 1985. When discovered, corrupt leaders were discharged from their positions. However, they remained a source of trouble to the leaders who replaced them. From the survey, it was a common perception of the villages that village chairmen did very little, if anything, to stimulate development in their villages. However, this was not always the case. The villages of Masurura and Wegero provided examples of the type of leadership that inspired unity. The respondents expressed confidence in the management of their government funds. In 1985, Masurura, one of the "high extension" villages, had an annual budget of shs. 1,085,000, the equivalent of \$593,235 based on an exchange rate of 17 shillings to the dollar, in addition to a modern, well-constructed CCM office and a lorry.



These high extension villages seemed to be the same ones that exhibited adequate leadership. Most of the villages that fell under the "low extension" services category had very low budgets in 1985. Mmahare, the only village in the low extension category with a rural industry, had a budget of only shs. 60,581 (\$3,564) in 1985, although the village shop generated shs. 300,000 (\$17,647) annually. Seeka had the lowest total budget (shs. 13,800 or \$812). The largest portion of most village budgets was allocated to pay for allowance (posho) to visiting leaders and for local leaders to attend conferences or carry out official assignments. The purchase of tractors, buses, and grinding machines, which generate revenues, seemed to take a back seat to travel and subsistence of village leaders.

The most frequently stated purpose of Ujamaa was the promotion of collective farming, cooperative marketing, and the sharing of return for village community development work. Projects for the benefit of all villages were undertaken, including the construction of schools, health dispensaries, village shops, wells, and rural industries, as well as the purchase of lorries, buses, and grinding machines. Of the villages sampled, Butiama led the others in successfully undertaking collective projects. However, Masurura, Kyankoma, and Wegero had also undertaken successful projects.

5.3.4 Village Budgets

Village budgets depended on the size of the village collective farm, types of implements employed, such as tractors or plows, and



management. Each village surveyed had at least one government farm on which all village members were required to participate. The collective farm has become institutionalized as a village government revenue-generating tool. Unlike private farms, village government collective farms lack incentives for inducing continuous participation by village members.

The frequency of institutional changes related to the collective farms has created problems for village leaders. The 1975 Village Act required collective farmers to divide returns from their crop sale equally, and returns from the village shops were to be divided according to frequency of purchases.

In 1982, Act No. 14 called for the formation of Rural Primary Cooperative Societies. The National Executive Committee of the CCM passed a resolution in 1985 requiring every village to form Rural Cooperative Societies (Chama Cha Msingi). This made each village an independent producing unit. During the period when this research was taking place, nervousness on the part of some village chairmen was obvious. They were not sure about what the new changes meant and what effect, if any, those changes would have on village government assets.

The size of a village government budget depends on the collective activities undertaken at the village level and the quality of leadership. In the 16 villages surveyed, the researcher observed that village government budgets were very low. Apart from village government farms and shops, some villages owned tractors, guest houses, grinding machines, bars, and rural industries.



Butiama, in 1985, had the highest budget, followed by Wegero, a village in the low extension category, with shs. 1,600,690. In appearance, Wegero gives the impression of backwardness because 99 percent of the houses are mud huts; a few houses with corrugated iron roofing belong to some wealthy individuals. The village chairman complained that lack of construction materials such as cement, corrugated iron sheets, and nails was delaying the construction of modern homes.

5.4 Marketing

Marketing at the village level falls into two categories. Villagers sell through (1) cooperatives and (2) individual effort. The marketing channel for cotton growers in Musoma Vijijini district is provided by Mara Cooperative Union, which was formed in 1984. The cooperative movement (Vyama Vya Ushirika) in Tanzania started in 1932, when the Cooperative Act was passed by the Tanganyika Colonial Government. The major function of the cooperatives was agricultural marketing. After independence, the number of cooperatives increased, although they had few trained personnel.

After the Arusha Declaration, the government hoped that the cooperatives would become more efficient, profitable, and useful to the farmers, with much more competence and honesty. They were given a monopoly, which, as it turned out, facilitated many abuses.¹⁹² In


¹⁹²Dumont, Tanzanian Agriculture after the Arusha Declaration, p. 5.



1972, the government decided to merge the Cooperative Development Department with the Community Development Department, in order to curb the abuses resulting from management incompetence and dishonesty. The motive for this change was to improve the performance and reduce the influence of the cooperatives, which appeared in competition with TANU and the government, but the result was negative.

Another major change occurred through Village Act No. 21 of 1975, which made membership in local cooperative associations automatic for village residents. The village cooperatives were empowered to serve as multipurpose cooperatives. This change was intended to remove restrictions that provided the initial members with benefits and advantages that could not be enjoyed by nonmembers. Many villagers were reluctant to pay a membership fee, a requirement for membership. Therefore, membership and participation were limited. The government encouraged mass participation, eventually making membership automatic for all village residents. Before this law was passed, a minimum of 10 people were required to form a cooperative society. There were 45 such societies in Musoma Vijijini District when the 1975 Village Act was passed.

In May 1976, cooperative unions were officially dissolved by the government and replaced by cooperative authorities. Their assets and activities were distributed among parastatal organizations. The stated cause for their abolition was inefficiency and mismanagement of resources. Various crop



authorities were established, depending on the type of cash crop produced in a given area. Musoma Vijijini District, where the major cash crop is cotton, automatically came under the Tanzania Cotton Authority (TCA), locally known as Mamlaka ya Pamba. These institutional changes increased government control over marketing as they centered on a single channel empowered to buy all the farmer's produce. However, the peasants were unhappy with the resulting inefficiency and bureaucratic dishonesty that accompanied these changes. The peasants complained about the following problems:

1. delay of payments to farmers after crop delivery,
2. delay of farm implements and inputs,
3. misuse of resources, theft, inefficiency and irresponsibility,
4. harsh treatment of farmers by staff,
5. frequent supply of wrong inputs and equipment,
6. loss of jobs to former workers in cooperative societies, including committee men,
7. members lost their shares and deposits when cooperatives were disbanded.¹⁹³

These complaints led to the formation of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry, which recommended the reinstatement of the cooperative unions. In 1981, the government decided to dissolve the 1972 merger between the Cooperative Development Department and the Community Development Department. This decision was intended to stop the serious inefficiency that had developed within the

¹⁹³Majenga, Historical Development of Cooperative Movement in Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam: Prime Minister's Office, 1982), p. 5.



cooperative societies. This action was followed by the passage by Parliament of the 1982 Cooperative Act, which abolished the 1975 Village Act. It is the Cooperative Act that was responsible for the formation in 1984 of the Mara Cooperative Union, which replaced TCA, a return to the previous system.

Mara Cooperative has resolved some of the problems that were inherited from TCA, although much remains to be done. Transportation, for instance, is still an acute problem. Under the new structure, the 1982 Cooperative Societies Act provided for three levels of cooperative societies to be formed: (1) primary societies, (2) the cooperative unions, and (3) the federation of cooperative unions. Mara Cooperative falls under the second category. In 1986, the village-level governments were still debating the process of adopting the 1982 Cooperative and Primary Societies Act, which sought to transfer all village economic activities from the village government to primary societies.

The continuous changes in marketing have been confusing to peasants in the Mara District. There is a distinct disadvantage to the peasants who are incapable of interpreting the many legal and policy changes. Therefore, there is a time lag between when the law is enacted and when it becomes operational. In the meantime, the transaction costs involved in making the necessary adjustments can be horrendous, creating a sense of uncertainty among producers.

Cotton growers were the most negatively affected by frequent cooperative institutional changes. Crop authorities failed to pick



up cotton from storage facilities due to lack of transportation. Payments were sometimes not timely. Farmers had to wait from six months to two years to receive any payment. In the process, investments in transport, storage, and skilled manpower were ignored. This was reflected in the decline in total cotton produced.¹⁹⁴ Cash problems developed when the TCA's low credit worthiness with the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) led to difficulties in obtaining loan funds; this, combined with poor management, caused a cash shortage. From the survey, it was noted that 33.6 percent of those who grew cotton complained about low producer prices offered by the government. Nearly 22 percent reported that they were not paid immediately after marketing their cotton. Of the cotton-producing peasants who were interviewed, only 11.7 percent received cash payment on time. In five villages, respondents reported that cotton in village storage facilities often was not picked up at all for a year or two due to lack of transportation, mismanagement, and dishonesty. Because of low cotton prices, peasants thought the price for cotton did not compensate them for the labor they invested in growing it. During the period of this survey, in March 1986, Mara Cooperative still owed money to some peasants for the previous year's crop. The prices farmers receive are determined by the operating efficiency of

¹⁹⁴World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study, 1974, Annex 5, p. 16.



the parastatals, which had deteriorated over the past years, being dependent on given international price levels.¹⁹⁵

5.4.1 Marketing Through Individual Effort

Although Tanzania's policy objective is to promote marketing through cooperative societies and unions, success in this area has been achieved mainly for cash crops. The insistence on a single marketing channel has raised marketing costs.¹⁹⁶ The reliance on the National Milling Corporation (NMC) as the sole government parastatal for purchasing, transporting, storing, and marketing major food crops has been the major factor responsible for rising prices of food crops. During the survey, peasants complained that they had sold their food crops to the NMC at low prices. However, when they purchased food from the NMC, the prices were exorbitant. The NMC lacks a marketing program for procuring food crops such as maize, rice, sorghum, finger millet, and cassava from every village. This was reported by farmers at Biatika, Wegero, and Kyankoma, where maize, sorghum, and finger millet are produced in abundance.

Because of many problems associated with the marketing cooperatives, the broker or middlemen's (walanguzi) role was strengthened, rather than weakened or eliminated as Nyerere had hoped. Walanguzi are still operating and often visit peasants'

¹⁹⁵World Bank, Tanzania Country Economic Memorandum Report, No. 5019-TA. August 10, 1984, p. 26.

¹⁹⁶Ministry of Agriculture, Tanzania National Agricultural Policy, October 1982, p. 132.



homes to purchase crops. Few farmers brought their crops to towns like Musoma for sale, but the majority relied on walanguzi, who offered them higher prices than NMC. In 1986, for example, the government price for one sack (gunia) of maize was shs. 150, whereas it brought up to shs. 350 on the parallel market (black-market). Because of high transportation costs and bad roads, especially during the rainy season, very few peasants could afford to bring their crops to town. The promotion of multipurpose cooperative societies was intended as a government tool for neutralizing walanguzi following the abolition of voluntary cooperatives. The walanguzi have remained. Due to prevailing conditions, farmers were forced to resort to parallel (black-market) arrangements as an alternative from the official government single-marketing-channel structure.¹⁹⁷

In most villages surveyed, the researcher observed that storage for perishable crops such as fruits and vegetables posed a serious problem, often leading to inestimable waste. For example, at Majita, mangoes, oranges, tomatoes, and fish spoil on a regular basis due to lack of storage facilities and transportation. Therefore, access to the market was limited due to the unreliability and shortage of transport. The use of modern storage facilities requires rural electrification. The improvement of transport requires repair and construction of reliable roads, which, if well

¹⁹⁷Ibid., p. 57.

maintained, would greatly reduce uncertainty and stimulate production.

Most peasants, however, do not sell their food crops; they store them for domestic consumption. Some peasants sell their excess, but only when they are in dire need of cash. The Price Control Commission's established prices have, if anything, a negative effect in rural areas. Producer prices for food crops have declined by about 5.5 percent over the past decade. This decline is relatively less than that for cash crops, which declined by 36.5 percent over the same period.¹⁹⁸ Local village markets known as masoko or mitera provide a location where exchange takes place, but in some villages users are required to pay taxes. Food crops such as cassava, groundnuts, rice, sorghum, beans, a variety of vegetables, and other items such as used clothes from overseas (mitumba) are sold there. Most of these markets are open on Saturdays. However, most villages lack buildings, and therefore, whenever it rains, marketing activities are disrupted.

Several villages have invested in the construction of market buildings. Kyankoma's market, for example, was taken over by the District Council, which now collects a levy. Saragana allocated shs. 20,000 for building a village market, in order to provide residents with a place where they can exchange and trade goods. Very few peasants take the initiative to seek outside markets unless middlemen are involved. Villages in the high extension category,

¹⁹⁸Ibid., p. 58.



such as Butiama, Bukima, Biatika, Kiabakari, Kwibara, Kyankoma, and Saragana, have more local marketing activities than villages in the low extension category. Therefore, the government needs to take an active role in promoting the construction of village markets. This can help to increase cash transactions and to reduce the level of subsistence that still prevails. Of the 128 household heads who were interviewed, 52.3 percent said they were dissatisfied with the way the market operates, whereas 47.7 percent said they were satisfied.

5.4.2 Marketing Livestock

Government policy concerning livestock production and marketing is to meet the country's development goals, through the provision of more food, higher incomes for the owners, and more jobs. Livestock provide dung, which is used as fertilizer and fuel. Livestock also provide important raw materials such as wool, hair, hides, and skins. Other economic benefits include the provision of highly nutritious foods, such as meat, milk, and cheese. However, livestock also compete with crops for the use of land. Livestock marketing is highly problematic to the livestock owners and to those who would like the country to increase its revenue from livestock. The livestock markets, which were being run by the District Councils and the Department of Veterinary Services, are not all in good order.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹Ibid., pp. 222-25.



Most livestock owners in the Mara Region desire to own a large herd because of its prestigious value. Accordingly, they were reluctant to sell their livestock. Most peasant livestock owners sell their livestock only when they have individual problems or need cash. To facilitate the sale of livestock, the government has been trying to establish scales (mizani) so that livestock can be sold by weight. In the 16 villages surveyed, it was observed that, to date, scales had not been provided. Therefore, livestock were sold by auction or individual agreements, and the price was determined by supply and demand. However, the main obstacle to cattle marketing remains the desire of peasant livestock owners to build a large herd, which is based on traditional banking, ceremonial, security, and economic functions. Hence, the economic stimulation that could be created through the marketing of cattle, milk, meat, and hides, and the potential multiplier effect of the proceeds of those sales in the form of purchases of modern livestock, equipment, or housing, are not realized.

In most villages, meat is still consumed on special occasions such as weddings and feasts, or when a cow is ill or too old. A few villages in the high extension category, such as Butiama, Biatika, Kiabakari, and Kyankoma, had butchers, whereas villages in the low extension category did not. Meat is not a regular part of the daily diet in most villages. The distribution or ownership of livestock still depends on the value attached to the ownership of a large herd for ceremonial or celebration purposes, and as a store or symbol of



wealth. This does not mean that livestock marketing is nonexistent. What it does mean is that the economic capacity and potential inherent in livestock marketing are not adequately and fully realized.

There are two sources for the livestock market:

1. The traders, generally middlemen (walanguzi), purchase livestock from peasant livestock owners. These businessmen are required to have a license, which authorizes them to sell in a certain territory. Some are restricted by their licenses to sell within the district, and others within the region; some are permitted to export.

2. Peasant livestock owners sell because they have individual problems and therefore need cash.

Thus far, the government has failed to enforce price controls for the livestock market. There are two reasons for this failure: (1) low prices set by the government and (2) lack of weighing equipment (mizani) upon which government prices are based. Therefore, livestock sales are often undertaken at the owner's premises, or at an auctioning location (mnada). The price for livestock is based on supply and demand. High prices serve as an incentive to attract livestock owners to sell their cattle. Price has not served as a direct incentive for livestock owners to build a large herd. In Kenya, a neighboring country, mizani is used to determine livestock price. Therefore, livestock owners near the border, as is the case with some residents of the villages surveyed in Musoma Vijijini District, find Kenya's price much more



attractive. As a result, some people smuggle livestock to Kenya to obtain the higher price.

In the absence of mizani, livestock prices in the villages studied were determined on the basis of the cattle's appearance. The black-market prevailed because livestock owners were not satisfied with the offered government prices. When the Price Control Commission in Mara Region tried to enforce low government livestock prices, the butchers refused to slaughter. The government was forced to let the prices rise, based on the black-market price. The official government price for cattle (maksai) in 1986 was shs. 2,000 maximum, whereas on the black-market the range was shs 3,000 to shs. 15,000. The difference explains why it is difficult for the government to enforce the official price without encouraging the black-market. Livestock owners who took advantage of the high prices for cattle and milk earned much more money than farmers who used the government rates.

There is a need to educate livestock owners beyond the level of extension services provided by mabwana shamba and mabwana mifugo. Most of the wealthy livestock owners still sleep in traditional mud huts because they are not willing to sell their cattle and use their earnings to construct modern houses. Insofar as the measure of development in the second half of the 20th century is concerned, a wealthy person is one who uses such wealth to improve his/her standard of living. The traditional value of using cattle as a symbol of wealth must now give way to real material development that



can make a difference in people's standard of living and lead to an increase in economic activity within the country. For example, the sale of livestock provides meat and hides, while improved care increases the production of milk, all of which would contribute to an increase in the livestock owner's income. In peasant agriculture, child labor is useful and yields higher returns than alternative uses of funds. But as children spend more time in school, they are less useful as a source of labor than in the past. Therefore, it is necessary to educate the peasants regarding the long-term value of primary education.

5.5 Human Resources at the Village Level

5.5.1 Provision of Welfare Services

A number of writers have criticized the emphasis placed on the provision of welfare services by the government as a factor contributing to the prevailing economic crisis in Tanzania. These critics have claimed that the government's economic program failed because it emphasized distribution rather than production of wealth.²⁰⁰ The objective of this section is to provide an up-to-date assessment of Tanzania's experience based on the 16 villages studied.

The data show that in nine villages, seven of which belong to the high extension category, schools were built during the colonial

²⁰⁰Fili Karashani, "Nyerere's Mission," African Concord, 19 November 1987, p. 25.



era, long before the Ujamaa Village Policy was introduced. Four of these villages had dispensaries, whereas extension and veterinary agents were provided by the district authorities, based on locations that historically produced cash crops or had many livestock owners. The trend continued from the colonial era, whereby institutions that were designed to provide services to those areas have prevailed. Insecticides and fertilizers, for example, are available mainly for cotton farmers. For diseases and insects that destroy food crops, the government has no special provisions for fertilizers, herbicides, or pesticides. This observation was confirmed by the Mara Agricultural Development Officer, who acknowledged that lack of funds, shortage of oil, lack of adequate incentives, shortage of experts, and other factors were common throughout the region and the country. There are important economic questions about how beneficial fertilizer and pesticides for food crops would be, if they were to be provided.

The Ujamaa Village Policy, however, did bring about an increase in the construction of schools, dispensaries, and rural industries through the villagers' own initiatives and provision of construction materials by the district government. Of the 16 villages surveyed, each had a primary school, and three villages had more than one school. Dispensaries are scarce. Nine villages had a dispensary, five villages had extension agents living there, and three village had two veterinary agents; four villages had one agent each (see Tables 6 and 7).



Table 6.--Schools, teachers, and ratio per population from 16 villages, Musoma Vijijini District, 1986.

Village	Schools		Population	Change	Teachers	Ratio of	Percent
	1974 Number	1986 Number	1986 Number	1888 Percent	1986 Number	Popul to Teachers 1986	Change 1888
Biatika	2	4	8000	100	40	2000	200
Bukima	1	1	5500	0	13	5500	423
Butiama	1	3	10000	200	35	3333	286
Chitare	0	1	1800	100	10	1800	180
Matongo	0	1	1629	100	10	1629	163
Masurura	1	2	4904	100	13	2452	377
Mmahare	1	1	1117	0	7	1117	160
Nyasurura	1	1	1440	0	9	1440	160
Kiabakari	1	2	6000	100	45	3000	133
Kibubwa	0	1	1112	100	11	1112	101
Kirumi	0	1	1211	100	8	1211	151
Kwibara	1	2	4000	100	21	2000	190
Kyankoma	2	3	5706	50	30	1902	190
Saragana	1	1	4700	0	13	4700	362
Seeka	1	1	1800	0	8	1800	225
Wegero	1	1	2119	0	11	2119	193
Total	14	26	61038	86	284	2348	215

Averages Per Villages in Each Category

8 High Ext.	1.25	2.25	6101.25	81.25	26.25	3110.92	270.20
8 Low Ext.	.50	1.00	1528.50	50.00	9.25	1528.50	166.57
8 Good Soil	.75	1.88	4371.88	100.00	21.63	2107.04	200.54
8 Poor Soil	1.00	1.38	3257.88	31.25	13.88	2532.38	236.23
4 HE & GS	1.25	2.75	7226.00	125.00	33.25	2696.33	249.07
4 HE & PS	1.25	1.75	4976.50	37.50	19.25	3525.50	291.32
4 LE & GS	.25	1.00	1517.75	75.00	10.00	1517.75	152.00
4 LE & PS	.75	1.00	1539.25	25.00	8.50	1539.25	181.14

Source: Table prepared for the Musoma Vijijini District Survey

**Table 7.--Health care infrastructure, Musoma Vijijini District,
1974 and 1986.**

Village	Dispensaries		Population 1986. Number	Medical Officers 1986. Number	Ratio of Md Officers to Pop 1986 Percent	Ratio of Nurses to pop 1986 Percent	Nurses 1986. Number
	1974 Number	1986. Number					
Biatika	1.	1.	8,000	2.	4,000	4,000	2.
Bukima	1.	1.	5,500	1.	5,500	5,500	1.
Butiama	1.	1.	10,000	3.	3,333	3,333	3.
Chitare	0.	0.	1,800	0.	0.	0.	0.
Matongo	0.	0.	1,629	0.	0.	0.	0.
Masurura	0.	1.	4,904	0.	0.	0.	0.
Mmahare	0.	0.	1,117	0.	0.	0.	0.
Nyasurura	0.	1.	1,440	1.	1,440	0.	0.
Kiabakari	1.	1.	6,000	3.	2,000	0.	0.
Kibubwa	0.	1.	1,112	1.	1,112	371.	3.
Kirumi	0.	0.	1,211	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kwibara	0.	0.	4,000	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kyankoma	1.	1.	5,706	1.	5,706	1,141	5.
Saragana	1.	1.	4,700	1.	4,700	4,700	1.
Seeka	0.	0.	1,800	0.	0.	0.	0.
Wegero	0.	0.	2,119	0.	0.	0.	0.
Total	6.	9.	61,038	13.	27,791	19,045	15.

Averages Per Villages in Each Category

8 High Ext.	.75	.88	6101.25	1.38	3154.92	2334.32	1.50
8 Low Ext.	.00	.25	1528.50	.25	319.00	46.33	.38
8 Good Soil	.38	.63	4371.88	1.13	1305.67	963.00	1.00
8 Poor Soil	.38	.50	3257.88	.50	2168.25	1417.65	.88
4 HE & GS	.75	1.00	7226.00	2.00	2333.00	1833.00	1.25
4 HE & PS	.75	.75	4976.50	.75	3976.50	2835.30	1.75
4 LE & GS	.00	.25	1517.75	.25	278.00	92.67	.75
4 LE & PS	.00	.25	1539.25	.25	360.00	.00	.00

Source: Table prepared from the Musoma Vijijini District Survey



5.6 Education for Self-Reliance

Nyerere's desire, as expressed in his essay "Education for Self-Reliance," was for every village to have at least one primary school to prepare the majority of the children for rural life. He explained that, given the economic facts of life in Tanzania and the practical meaning of poverty, it was impossible to emphasize individual interest within the educational system. Nyerere wanted the educational system to prepare pupils to live in a rural environment because that is where the majority of the population live and work. He had hoped that this emphasis would improve rural areas and enable children, as they became adults, to find their material well-being and satisfaction in rural areas instead of going to towns or cities. He believed that starting of school at six years of age was too early because children who were not selected to attend secondary school would complete the seventh grade at age 14 or 15, which is still very young.

Nyerere understood that the colonists' mentality, to train the local population so as to have civil servants, was still prevalent. Most people in the society, depending on the education they received, expected wage employment in offices. This colonial form of education, Nyerere argued, was not related to the needs of rural society. Therefore, he called for a major change in the content of primary education and recommended raising the primary-school entry age from 6 to 13 so that the children would be older when they left school. Starting school at an older age, according to Nyerere, who



himself began school when he was 12, would enable children to learn more quickly while in school. He institutionalized the provision of universal education for seven years instead of eight.²⁰¹ However, in the 16 villages under study, it was observed that children still started school at age six or seven. Nyerere's program was never implemented.

From a political standpoint, Nyerere's ideas and policy directives were timely. Following independence, the masses had aspirations for advanced education for their children. The desire was to have their children obtain the salaried positions vacated by the colonists. But, as Nyerere pointed out, only about 13 percent of primary school children would get a place in secondary school, and a much smaller percentage would go to college. Therefore, reorganizing the curriculum, he believed, was necessary. This effectively reduced the demand for the construction of more secondary schools and emphasized the reality that the economy was not expanding at a rate adequate to satisfy the aspirations of the masses. Nyerere recommended that the selection of pupils to enter secondary schools be based on an assessment of the work pupils had done for the school and community. He argued that such a system was more appropriate for selecting entrants for secondary schools, universities, teacher training colleges, technical and business schools, and so on, than the purely academic procedure. He said:

²⁰¹Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 280-89.

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For the majority of our people the thing which matters is that they should have an ability to do arithmetic; and that they should know something of the history, values, and workings of their government; and they should acquire the skills necessary to earn their living. (It is important to stress that in Tanzania most people will earn their living by working on their own or on a communal shamba, and only a few will do so by working for wages which they have to spend on buying things the farmer produces. . . .) Things like health, science, geography, and the beginning of English are so important, especially so that those who wish may be able to learn more by themselves in later life. But most important of all is that our primary school graduates should be able to fit into, and to serve, the community from which they come.²⁰²

Nyerere believed that if the nation was unable to provide the majority a higher level of education, they should at least be entitled to minimum literacy. The survey of the 16 villages showed that the quality of education suffered as a result of the rapid expansion. This was reflected in the appearance of classrooms and the complaints expressed by respondents in every village. Not all of Nyerere's revolutionary recommendations were implemented, as the following discussion will show.

5.6.1 Universal Primary Education

Toward the end of 1977, the government, to meet the demand for teachers necessitated by the increased number of primary schools in the villages, started training seventh-grade graduates to become teachers. They did this to meet the target of Universal Primary Education (UPE) for the entire country. Although 90 percent of school-aged children are now able to attend school, the question

²⁰²Ibid., p. 289.



most villagers asked in 1985 was how teachers who had failed the national competitive examination and were unable to enter secondary school could teach other students to pass the examination they themselves had failed. In the village of Nyasurura, with nine teachers, only four completed Form IV (twelfth grade), and five were UPE (seventh grade) graduates. In the village of Matongo, 8 out of 11 teachers had only completed seventh grade. This ratio prevailed in almost all the villages surveyed. Without doubt, the most educated teachers in these schools teach the upper classes. Nevertheless, when no students from a given village were selected for two or three years to attend secondary school, parents blamed UPE teachers.

In 1980, UPE was phased out by the government, although earlier UPE teachers remained employed. From the village of Nyasurura, no student had been selected for advancement in two years. Respondents complained that students spent too much time working on school farms, instead of learning in their classrooms. At Kwibara and Kiabakari it was alleged that teachers used students to do their private work, such as fetching water and firewood. The practice of hiring students, with the consent of their teachers, to work on other villagers' farms was reported at the villages of Matongo and Wegero. This was in violation of Tanzanian law. In most villages, officials reported that teachers' morale was low due to low pay. As a result, they spent more time farming to earn extra money to boost their lower incomes, in order to feed their families. As evidence



that the quality of education had deteriorated, respondents explained that some students complete seventh grade without knowing how to read or write. Comparing the present quality of education with that of the past, one resident of Kyankoma said, "In the past the quality of education was better; a third or fourth grader could read and write. But now they can't read or write well after completing the seventh grade."

There is no doubt that the government invested heavily in education in order to fight ignorance. Despite the zealous effort, there were still problems. For example, it was observed in some villages, such as Matongo, that there was inadequate space for classrooms. At villages such as Kwibara and Biatika, teachers had no tables in their classrooms. Lack of construction material made it difficult for village governments to build houses for teachers, forcing several villages to use local clay to construct classroom buildings and thatch houses for their teachers. The burning of bricks to make such buildings more durable was not done, due to lack of resources.

A major problem confronting most rural schools is lack of desks. It was observed that some children brought their own chairs, sat on the floor, or sat on stones and bricks. Some of the schools at Biatika, Kirumi, and Kyankoma had lost their roofs due to poor construction. These classrooms were muddy, causing students discomfort.

Overall, the deficiencies in rural primary schools may be summarized as follows:



1. Lack of teaching materials such as books and papers.
2. Lack of housing for teachers due to lack of construction material.
3. Inadequate classroom space in schools due to lack of construction material.
4. Inadequate school budgets.
5. Lack of regular educational supervision from the central government.
6. Low teachers pay, resulting in low morale and high teacher absenteeism.
7. A shortage of qualified teachers in some districts.

Parents' desire to have their children attend secondary school has not subsided. Complaints were heard from most of the villagers interviewed, particularly those in Saragana, where in seven years, according to the village chairman, not a single student had been selected to attend secondary school. Parents attributed their children's failure to be selected for further education to the teachers' ineptitude. Often parents seek vacancies for their children to repeat the seventh grade in order to improve their scores for admission to attend secondary school. Some children change their names, and in some instances, parents pay head-teachers to enroll repeating students. In so doing, however, other children are denied a fair opportunity for selection.

The deterioration in the quality of education in rural primary schools is apparent. They are clearly not providing villagers with the type of basic quality education that Nyerere envisioned. Respondents to the survey explained that the majority of seventh-

grade graduates are assimilated back into the village without making significant contributions to village life. This is in contrast to those individuals who receive other types of training, such as carpentry, mechanics, bookkeeping, or driving tractors, who were felt to be making a contribution to the community, as observed at Butiama.

Although there are substantial problems associated with the rapid expansion of the primary school system, some strides had been made. One of the benefits associated with the compulsory village formation program is the fact that now schools are closer, and children can return home for their meals. This makes school attendance possible for some and more convenient for others. Second, 90 percent of all school-age children were able to enroll and attend school, and more girls than boys were attending school. Universal primary education has become a reality. In the 16 villages surveyed, a .67 positive correlation was found between the number of schools and the population; there was also a high, positive correlation of .87 between the number of primary schools and the level of extension services. More government aid for constructing new schools was provided to villages in the low extension category, whereas in the high extension villages such aid went toward the expansion of classrooms, and additional schools were built to accommodate the population. Collective work was instrumental in the construction of most of the new schools.

Based on the Pareto optimality criterion, it can be concluded that education for self-reliance through the compulsory village

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formation program made more people better off. Villages that had no schools before 1974 now have schools, despite some decline in the quality of education. The foundation was established, and in the future it might pay off if the national economy improves and the Ministry of Education takes the necessary steps to correct the problems discussed above.

Nyerere was aware that there was tremendous outcry for secondary education. Secondary education, he believed, could not be expanded because the government had no funds. However, according to Nyerere, "this outcry for secondary education tends to ignore the need to improve the seven years of education that every adult receives. Of those who finish primary education, 98 percent do not get secondary school education." Education for self-reliance in Nyerere's vision had to fit the majority of the population. Secondary education did not fit this scheme.

For the most part, Tanzanians are not able to take advantage of education past the primary level. Advanced education is simply not available. Balance in primary and secondary education is needed. Although Nyerere recognized the problem, he did not seem to have a solution. He said:

. . . It is here that I say we have not succeeded. There is a tremendous outcry for secondary education. But very few have access to secondary education. A vast majority of those who are left out feel frustrated. What starts as education ends in alienation.²⁰³

²⁰³Nyerere, "North-South Dialogue," pp. 829-30.



The war against ignorance is protracted in nature. It takes a long time to realize a return. Opportunities for an educated citizenry become necessary once people's minds are opened to new ideas. Also, the influence of the world capitalist system on Third World countries goes beyond the nation states because once people are exposed to modern life-styles, subsistence living becomes much less desirable. The flight of young men and women from rural areas to towns and cities will continue as long as towns and cities are perceived as offering a better opportunity to achieve a higher standard of living.

Likewise, a brain drain of some of the country's best-educated citizens seeking residence overseas in metropolitan countries will persist if Third World countries fail to offer such individuals incentives and facilities adequate to enable a reasonable standard of living. Flexibility is needed to facilitate the type of education that will help increase productivity.

5.6.2 Adult Education

Adult education has been instrumental in raising the level of literacy in Tanzania. The Ujamaa Village Policy was instrumental in making adult education possible. Some Ujamaa villages had active adult education programs that helped people learn to read, write, and do simple arithmetic. Adult education is also a vehicle to acquaint people with the principles of socialism and their relevance to development. Classes are conducted with the help of local primary-school teachers. These teachers are sometimes assisted by



local members of the community who have had some training. Adult education classes are seasonal, allowing peasants to tend to their work.

During the survey, it was observed that the level of intensity and commitment on the part of villagers and government officials to adult education had declined by 1986. Most villages held no classes during the farming season. In most villages, the duration of these classes ranged from three to six months a year, from May to September or October. Nine of the 16 villages surveyed no longer held adult education classes every year. In the seven villages where classes were still meeting, students were allowed to repeat classes until they demonstrated literacy. Consequently, a number of elders who before 1974 could not read nor write can now do so. Of 128 household heads who were interviewed, 86.7 percent said they could read and write; only 13.5 percent were illiterate. Adult education instruction is in Swahili. Beyond basic literacy, the classes offered vary from village to village. They may include modern farming techniques, politics, basic quantitative skills, fishing, health, child care, better foods and cooking techniques, carpentry, animal husbandry, cooperatives, and English.

The reasons classes were no longer held in many villages also varied from village to village. In Bukima, the CCM village secretary explained that teachers had not been receiving their pay on time, and therefore, in 1985, classes were canceled. The village chairman of Saragana admitted that people there had lost interest



due to personal problems. In villages where classes were still being held, the program was credited with bringing literacy to the general population.

Nationally, the enthusiasm toward adult education has declined, as compared with the early 1970s. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Nyerere took personal interest in and visited adult education centers during graduation ceremonies. Positive publicity through Radio Tanzania and the press made adult education appealing. Nyerere's persuasive skills provided motivation to elders and increased their participation. In 1977, 3,650,000 adult men and women were attending classes nationwide. However, lack of financial resources has eroded motivation for both teachers and students. In 1986, out of 128 respondents interviewed, only 4.7 percent said they attended formal schools, 40.6 percent said they had attended adult education classes, and 54.7 percent had not been to school at all.

5.6.3 Vocational Training

The basic dilemma facing Tanzania is that although primary schools provide basic literacy, they do not teach students practical skills. This was supposed to be a cornerstone of Ujamaa policy. Vocational training was to offer an opportunity to seventh-grade primary school graduates as well as adults in rural areas to acquire technical skills essential for community development. However, of 16 villages surveyed, only four (Mmahare, Masurura, Seeka, and Kyankoma) offered vocational training programs. These programs are described below:



Mmahare. Of the 16 villages surveyed, Mmahare had the most impressive vocational training center. The village obtained a loan from the Tanzania National Bank of Commerce (TNBC) in 1977 for shs. 20,000 (\$1,176) and in 1980 for shs. 69,000 (\$4,059). This loan was provided to a group of villagers who formed a small rural industry that manufactures buckets, beds, trash containers, boxes, bicycle carriers, knives, matches, cooking stoves, chicken incubators, and other household items. In 1986, the group's balance on the loan was shs. 26,000 (\$1,529), which indicates that the program was profitable enough to repay two-thirds of the aggregate loan. In 1986, the Mmahare industry faced shortages of raw material, which resulted in underuse of the capacity. Given the seriousness of shortages of essential goods that prevailed in the country at that time, the Mmahare rural industry served as a positive model for facing the economic crisis through local production. The industry offered training to youths, in addition to offering some employment.

Masurura. The village of Masurura obtained carpentry tools from the district government. These tools enabled the village to open a carpentry vocational center. The chairman reported that many students who completed the program were able to obtain employment upon graduation.

Seeka. Seeka, like Masurura, received carpentry tools from the district government. With these tools the village government started a vocational training center for carpentry. However, the center has been plagued by inadequate supplies of raw materials,

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which, according to the village chairman, forced the center to sell whatever they made to purchase supplies.

Kyankoma. The vocational training school at Kyankoma belonged to the district government, although funds for its operation came from the village government. It was open to all applicants within the district. According to the CCM village secretary, there were plans to raise funds for upgrading the center to a secondary school.

Kiabakari. At Kiabakari, students were taught theory but received no hands-on experience; according to the village chairman, the lack of practical experience was a result of lack of equipment and materials.

Butiama. Butiama, with four small industries, had plans to build a vocational center, according to the village chairman. The construction of such a center would help reduce rural unemployment and underemployment.

5.7 Health Care

The level of availability of rural medical facilities is directly related to the population of the villages. The researcher sought to determine whether there was a relationship between the availability of medical facilities and the level of extension services, and how that was related to the Ujamaa Village Policy. The results indicated that there was a positive simple correlation of .87 between dispensaries and villages in the high extension category and a chi-square p-value of .000 (see Table 8). This means that villages in the high extension category had more dispensaries

Table 8.--A positive relationship between the availability of dispensaries as perceived by peasants from high and low extension services category villages was found.

		Dispensaries		
		Frequencies:		
		Not Available	Available	Total
Extension Services	Low	48	16	64
	High	9	55	64
		57	71	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	48.107	1	.000

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.



than those in the low extension category. Health centers are built to be shared by residents in a ward (kata), which may consist of six villages. The villages Bukima and Saragana, falling in the high extension category, had dispensaries built during the colonial era (at Bukima by the Germans). There are two health centers; the one at Kyankoma was built in 1974, and the one at Butiama was built in 1972. The health center at Butiama serves 50,000 inhabitants, and according to the village chairman, there were plans to upgrade it to a hospital.

As of 1986, the Butiama health center had an assistant medical officer, two medical assistants, six RNA nursing officers, an ambulance, and a laboratory. In March 1986, while this research was being conducted, an outbreak of cholera in the village claimed 11 lives, due primarily to lack of medicines. The local medical response was a quarantine, which included giving people cooking instructions and advising them not to shake hands. Medical supplies were flown in from Dar-es-Salaam on an emergency basis.

During the interviews, Butiama respondents said they were satisfied with the quality of medical services provided at the Health Center. When asked to compare the quality of services provided then to that of the early 1970s, they praised the present level of improvement in manpower and medical equipment. However, they complained about the inadequate supply of medicines. Six respondents claimed that medicines were sold on the black-market. One respondent suggested that dispensaries would run more efficiently if they were left under private ownership. He believed



that lack of competition and low wages paid to medical personnel led to their selling drugs on black-market.

Kyankoma's health center was built by the government in 1974, with some financial contribution from villagers. With five medical assistants, five nurses, and five medical aids, the major problem reported was lack of drugs and medicines. Respondents complained that although medical services were supposed to be free, they were sold to patients. Unless patients paid, they were told that there were no supplies of drugs or medicines.

Kiabakari's dispensary, built in 1974 to serve a population of 6,000 people, exemplified the problems faced by other rural medical facilities. Respondents said that, without money, a patient could not receive treatment. Patients were required to carry cash to purchase kerosene with which to heat-treat needles. Residents complained that medical officers wrote prescriptions for them, but never gave them any medicines. In rural areas, if a patient is not provided medicine at the dispensary, there is no possibility of getting a prescription filled. The acute shortage of medicines caused what one respondent described as "bribery." He said:

If you bribe, you will receive treatment. In the early 70's there was no shortage of medicines and drugs, but now medical officers are so dishonest, they demand bribes, and this is prevalent everywhere. The small supply doesn't reach the people, hence worsening the scarcity.

According to most household heads interviewed, the deterioration started in 1979, during the Uganda war to remove dictator Idi Amin.

The dispensary at Biatika, for example, was built in 1966, before the Arusha Declaration of 1967. But, like other rural dispensaries, its services had deteriorated. Respondents said that because of the scarcity of medicines, patients were forced to travel to Musoma, a regional capital 45 km away, to receive treatment, or else resort to traditional medicines. Those with enough money went to private but expensive dispensaries at Musoma. Some villagers relied on the National Service or Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa (JKT) Center for treatment.

Saragana's dispensary was built in 1954 and had a medical officer and one midwife. The dispensary lacked beds, mattresses and a stove for boiling water, a method still widely employed to sterilize of needles. Lack of transportation to Musoma created a problem in obtaining medical supplies. Most respondents said that, without bribing, it was difficult for them to receive any treatment whatsoever.

Bukima's dispensary, built by the Germans in the 1800s, had one rural medical officer and one midwife. The situation was found to be similar to that of the other villages described above. Although most respondents described the medical officer as kind, they still complained about corruption and medicines being sold on the black-market.

Among the villages in the high extension category, Kwibara and Masurura had no dispensary. Kwibara depended on a dispensary in a neighboring village, whereas Masurura had completed the construction of a dispensary building and was waiting for the district government



to provide medical personnel and a supply of equipment and medicines.

Nyasurura and Kibubwa were the only villages in the low extension category with a dispensary. Both provide medical services to the ward to which they belong. Deterioration in the supply of medicines was reported by respondents, who were aware that it was a national problem.

5.7.1 Villages Without Dispensaries

Nine of the 16 villages surveyed had no dispensaries; six of these were in the low extension category. The government plan to provide each ward with a dispensary that can be shared by all ward villages resulted in spotty medical care. Some villages were located near missionary dispensaries, which provide more modern medical care due to better supplies of medicines. However, villagers using the missing dispensaries are required to pay for services, whereas government dispensaries offer free medical care. An example of villages in the sample that depend on mission dispensaries is Chitare, where those who could afford to pay went to Bwasi Mission dispensary. Other villages, such as Mmahare and Kiabakari, are located near military bases. Because military dispensaries are well supplied with medicines and drugs, villagers preferred going there.

The rural medical facilities observed in this study were clearly in need of improvement. In villages depending on ward



dispensaries, patients traveled long distances, sometimes only to find that no medicines were available. Respondents complained that unless patients were very ill, the waiting period was very long before they could receive medical attention. Second, there were no ambulances, and transportation was inadequate. One respondent said, "If someone gets sick at night, it is difficult to get a patient to the dispensary until the next day." Some of the people in rural areas had resorted to local traditional medicines. Those who could afford to pay had turned to private and missionary dispensaries for medical care.

When asked if they were satisfied with the services they received from the rural government dispensaries in the form of drugs and attendance, 37.5 percent of 128 respondents said that they needed improvement, and 60.9 percent said they were dissatisfied. Only .8 percent said they were satisfied, whereas another .8 percent did not know. Although the quality of health care had deteriorated, based on the Pareto optimality criterion, people were better off, due to the presence of medical personnel in areas where they had not been before, which raised the consciousness of the peasants to the usefulness of latrines, inoculation, and other preventive measures. However, the hopes of most peasants for receiving better care had not materialized. Respondents thought that although there had been few rural dispensaries in the past, the medical personnel had been motivated and not corrupt. Respondents stated that, in the 1980s, some of the medical staff were corrupt. It was claimed that they sold medicines and drugs on the black-market to boost their incomes.

It was alleged that inadequate dosages were often prescribed for patients. Hence, rather than meeting the egalitarian health care goals, expansion of rural health care facilities had exacerbated the discrepancy between medical care available to the poor and the private care available to the rich.

As stated earlier, lack of medicines is a national problem that goes beyond the increase in rural medical facilities. Given the prevailing economic crisis and the increase in the number of people who seek modern medical care, the provision of free medical care for all had indeed become a difficult goal to achieve. This was reflected in the level of frustration expressed in towns and cities alike. Part of the problem involved a lack of foreign currency adequate for importing enough medicines and drugs to satisfy the national demand. Lack of foreign currency was caused by the Uganda War and the low level of agricultural productivity. Allowing free enterprise might help, but it would not necessarily solve the problem. It might provide an alternative for those who find government dispensaries inefficient.

Furthermore, not enough doctors choose to practice in low-income rural areas rather than in towns and cities. Apart from bribes and the sale of medicines on the black-market, the government policy regarding the provision of rural medical care was appropriate. What is needed is to improve management, in order to hold rural medical officials and nurses accountable for how they provide prescriptions. The first step would be to require a



substantial increase in their wages, and then to ensure that the supply of medicines and drugs is adequate.

5.7.2 Clinical Services for Women

One measure of the quality of society is the care of children and the level of clinical services available to women. One of the major problems confronting the Third World, and Africa in particular, is the high infant and female mortality rate. In rural areas, many women and infants die during delivery. As part of a program to reduce this mortality rate, the government has dispatched midwives and nurses to rural health centers and dispensaries, to provide clinical services to rural women and children. To gain insight into the provision of care to women and children, the researcher asked villagers whether women received modern family planning advice from the clinics.

The focal point of this investigation was on determining the role of traditional midwives and how prevalent the practice of midwifery was. Despite the economic crisis, villagers perceive the government to be performing very well. Of 128 households sampled, 43.8 percent said modern family planning was better, meaning that more clinical services were available now than during the period before 1974. However, 19.5 percent of the respondents said that things had remained the same, while 14.8 percent said that clinical services were worse, and 21.9 percent did not know. Those who believed that conditions were better explained that traditional midwifery was used by a substantial number of women who lacked



transportation to hospitals. However, when they experienced complications, they went to dispensaries or hospitals. In villages with health centers and dispensaries, respondents said that nurses advised women on nutrition for their children and themselves. Rural women were given family planning advice. Some were advised to begin taking birth-control pills. Abstinence from sex was also encouraged by advising women to return to their parents' home until babies were old enough to stop breast feeding.

According to the respondents, birth control in all forms is resisted for traditional and religious reasons. Children are considered an asset because they provide labor and are considered insurance for taking care of their parents when they get old. Tanzania, like most Third World countries, does not provide welfare or social security payments for the elderly. Therefore, peasants consider their well-behaved children an investment for their future, when they are no longer able to provide for themselves. There are no nursing homes in the rural areas. It is for these reasons that birth control is opposed. The Chairman of Nyasurura said, "If you explain to women about family planning they become suspicious. They are not interested in spacing children; they haven't been informed adequately."

On religious grounds, some respondents explained that the Bible ordered Adam to fill the world. Why disobey God's commandment? The Chairman of Masurura argued that the population was still small, so



birth control was not necessary. Of the 16 villages surveyed, only two reported the use of birth-control pills.

Newborn babies' health, it was observed, depended on the local diet and the traditional values of a given ethnic group. The Kurya and other semi-pastoral groups such as the Zanaki, for example, maintained their newborn babies well because they had access to cow's milk. In other groups, such as the Jita, which depended on fishing and agriculture, some newborn babies were subjected to a poor diet of cassava porridge (uji) and leftovers (kiporo). In the absence of milk, their children developed malnutrition and severe cases of kwashakoo, the symptoms of which are bloated bellies and loss of hair.

Nutritional deficiencies have their origin in such factors as poor understanding of nutritional requirements, low productivity in subsistence farming, and insufficient purchasing power. In 1972, a national food balance sheet estimated that the average caloric intake was about 2,000 calories as opposed to the adopted norm of 2,300 calories, and the protein intake was about 50 grams compared with the recommended level of 60 grams. Symptoms of vitamin shortage are also frequently observed among the population in Tanzania due to inadequate diet.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁴World Bank Report, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study No. 541a-TA 10, 1974, p. 19.



5.8 Provision of Extension Services

Village government structures have not yet developed to the operational level of the district governments. Their bureaucratic structure is still emerging, as the concept of government at the village level changes from a personal to an institutional level. The traditional African perception of a chief as government cannot easily be transferred to the concept of buildings and bureaucrats. To visualize and accept buildings and their anonymous occupants as a center of power at the rural level is difficult. Emerging government structure at the village level involves the outreach of central government to the rural areas through agents. Thus this researcher used extension agents as an indicator of government efficiency. For this reason, extension services are discussed here.

The villagers' perception of how extension and veterinary agents fit into the local structure in fulfilling the role of increasing livestock care and agricultural production and the effect of their services on productivity were sought. Analysis of the provision of extension services at the village level provided useful insights into the interactions and the effect of rural extension agents in the implementation of the village formation policy. The following discussion also explores the preconditions that influence effectiveness of future rural development strategies.

It is important to note that there was a shortage of extension and veterinary agents in most villages. Furthermore, the system adopted for training extension agents was inherited from the British



colonial system, and had not been altered very much in substance. As pointed out earlier, cash crops historically had a higher priority than food crops because of the linkage with needs in the metropolitan countries, rather than those of local people. The colonists' aim was to incorporate the African peasants into the world capitalist system by stimulating their desire to acquire manufactured goods such as clothes, radios, and bicycles that required currency, rather than traditional barter exchange and self-reliance.

In 1986, food crop production was still the focus of technical inputs as offered through government policy. This does not mean that the focus on cash crop production should be dropped, because it is important for foreign exchange earnings; rather, there is a need for a balance with food crops. It makes no sense for the government to neglect food crop production and to end up spending the hard-earned foreign-exchange earnings to import food grains. The neglect of food crops in the mid-1970s and 1980s caused shortages of food grains, which had to be imported. The consequence was a threat of starvation to areas affected by low production of food crops.

5.9 Technology

What new technology should be generated and transferred to help small, poor farmers? and, how should such technology be generated? . . . The answers are not general; instead, they are quite specific to each country's labour, skill, institutional and resource endowment.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵Glenn Johnson, CENTO Seminar on Increasing the Productive Capacity of Small Farms, p. 24.



Technology implies the application of industrial, applied science, and systematic knowledge of the industrial arts. In all schools of economic thought, it is assumed that technology leads to a shift in the production function. That is, it enables an increase in production of goods for given resources, or else it involves the production of the same amount of goods by a reduction in the factors of production.²⁰⁶ Technology can be developed so as to facilitate a substitution of relatively abundant (hence cheap) factors for relatively scarce (hence expensive) factors in the economy. The employment of technology is dependent on the relative scarcity of resources. For instance, the use of oxen plows or tractors facilitates the substitution of capital for labor, making it easier for a worker to command more power and cultivate a larger land area. Techniques such as new husbandry practices or use of new seed varieties substitute for land. They are catalysts that facilitate the use of the relatively abundant factors of production like labor, and ultimately increase output.

Hence, in agriculture, there are two types of technology: (1) mechanical technology, which is often labor-saving; and (2) biological and chemical technology, which is often land-saving. As indicated above, power and machinery substitute capital for labor and enable higher output per worker, usually requiring a larger land area cultivated per worker. Biological technology facilitates the

²⁰⁶Romesh K. Diwan and Dennis Livingston, Alternative Development Strategies and Appropriate Technology Science Policy for an Equitable World Order (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1979), pp. 41-42.



use of more labor input on land. It may involve recycling of soil fertility by more labor-intensive conservation systems; use of chemical fertilizers; through husbandry practices, management systems, and inputs (i.e., insecticides) that permit an optimum-yield response.²⁰⁷

One of the purposes of the questionnaire used in this study was to determine the level of technological change in the 16 villages and the effect of such change on agricultural production. The Ujamaa policy was intended to help the peasants modernize their level of technology, employing the collective approach to farming as a labor-intensive technique. The survey results indicated that problems of agricultural production in Tanzania's villages are not only a matter of the scarcity of capital, shortage of trained human resources, and frequency of institutional changes, but also the striking lack of more productive technology. Most rural households depend on human muscles, using primitive hand tools such as the hoe (jembe), butcher knives (panga), and axes (shoka), which limits the amount of acreage that can be cultivated. When asked what types of tools they employed in their farming activities in 1985, 49.2 percent of the 128 household heads interviewed said jembe, 45.3 percent said plows, and only 5.5 percent mentioned tractors. When comparing the increase in ownership of plows by individual peasants, the data show that in 1974 there were 463 plows; the number

²⁰⁷Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1917), pp. 43-44.



increased to 1,212 in 1985. There was a decline in village government ownership of plows from 44 in 1974 to 42 in 1985. Villages in the high extension category had adopted the use of tractors and plows more than villages in the low extension category. This was evidenced by the positive .052 p-value in the chi-square test of significance (see Table 9). In the following discussion, technology in each of the 16 Ujamaa villages surveyed is examined.

Butiama. The policy objective of collective farming was to provide the base for capital formation. It was intended to enable village governments to purchase modern agricultural implements, such as tractors and farm machinery. This was realized in some of the villages surveyed. Butiama, with six village tractors in 1986, had successfully demonstrated the benefit of owning tractors by releasing village members from providing farm labor, other than plowing, thereby enabling them to devote more time to their private farms. The Butiama experience further demonstrated that tractors could not easily be used on traditional local private farms without further land clearance. The most efficient use of tractors was on the village collective farms and the village block farms, where land clearance had taken place. Lack of spare parts and shortages of diesel and petrol reduced tractor efficiency, although Butiama manufactured some spare parts locally. To avoid tractor damage, individual village members were required to meet certain land-clearance standards, such as the removal of stones and trees, before they could hire services. Block farms were more suited to tractor



Table 9.--A positive relationship between extension services and availability of modern farming technology was found.

		Farming Technology		
		Frequencies:		
		Not Available	Available	Total
Extension Services	Low	37	27	64
	High	26	38	64
		63	65	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	3.782	1	.052

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.



cultivation because such farms were located close together and therefore allowed for economic efficiency.

New varieties of improved maize, cotton, and millet seeds were available from the Ukiriguru Agricultural Laboratory, known as the "Ukiriguru Composite." Of the 128 household heads interviewed from the 16 villages surveyed, 46.1 percent were growing the new variety of seeds. The Butiama government village farm had a furrow irrigation canal and a dam. Located within the village is the Butiama Artificial Insemination Center, which has modern livestock. The center belongs to the national government, although local people benefit from its proximity. The village has access to electricity from diesel generators. With the increase in the cost of diesel fuel, the village residents were faced with power outages from time to time. Those who have access to electricity, however, constitute a small minority. Tap water was made available in 1975. However, its delivery depends on diesel generation, with a similar consequence to electricity. The majority of residents depend on local wells and rainfall. The village has telephone services for those who can afford it. There were four animal dips. The one that belongs to the village government was built in 1972, and it is available for use by all residents. The second dip was built for the village government livestock. The other two were privately owned.

Kyankoma. Kyankoma purchased a tractor in 1985, but due to fuel shortages, it was often forced to lie idle. In April 1986,



when this survey was taking place, the tractor was still new and had not developed any serious mechanical problems, apart from the breakdown of an injection pump. Unlike Butiama, the village had no repair shop. The tractor was mainly used on the village collective farm and the village chairman's farm, although other villagers could rent it for shs. 700 per acre. The problem associated with land clearance remained a major constraint, apart from the rental fee, which some villagers could not afford.

Although the village obtained modern livestock bulls (a mabaki and freasian breed), because of lack of expertise and equipment, no artificial insemination had taken place. The village dip was not being used in 1986 because of a malfunctioning pipe. There was no electricity, telephone, tap water, or biological technical inputs, such as fertilizer and insecticides.

Kiabakari. In 1969, some Kiabakari residents formed a voluntary cooperative in the spirit of the Arusha Declaration and undertook collective farming. The district government rewarded them with oxen plows, a tractor, and other farming implements. However, in 1974, following forced village formation, the voluntary cooperative was disbanded and their assets transferred to the village government ownership. Due to the changes in leadership, the current village chairman did not know what happened to the assets. Kiabakari had electricity and tap water, although residents complained about frequent shut off of services due to the shortage of diesel fuel. The village has enormous economic potential because of a gold mine and a military base. There was a post office and a



dip that was not working in 1986 because the pipe was filled with mud. Apart from the traditional inputs provided by the Mara Cooperative Union for cotton growers, such as fertilizer, improved seeds, insecticides, and pumps, the peasants interviewed were not aware of any other technology available to help them improve their productive capacity.

Masurura. Masurura purchased a lorry and received ten plows from the Regional Development Fund (RDF). The village had a dip that was not operating because the water container was damaged, as well as a dam that was also damaged and required repair. The village government obtained modern cattle from the district government but had no artificial insemination or a natural mating program.

A Masurura resident and retired police officer had a pond, from which he applied surface flooding to irrigate rice, groundnuts, and maize during the dry season. Whenever necessary, the stored water could be released from the pond through a self-constructed canal.

In addition to the villages discussed above, others that belong to the high extension category were Bukima, Biatika, Kwibara, and Saragana, which, apart from the traditional cotton farmers who received fertilizer, insecticides, seeds and pumps, had not adopted modern technology. The government had not succeeded in its effort to influence peasants in those areas to increase village government ownership of oxen plows. Kwibara received nine oxen plows from the district government in 1969. Eight oxen died, and the village



government rented out the plows to residents who had their own oxen. The village had a dip, which was built in 1976, but it had no artificial insemination program.

Of the 128 respondents interviewed from the 16 villages surveyed, 53.9 percent complained about the shortage of batteries and pumps for spraying insecticides. However, villages in the high extension category tended to obtain more farm inputs than those in the low extension category. This was confirmed by the Pearson chi-square value of 19.65 (see Table 10). Apart from the plows owned by individuals, there was no indication that the Ujamaa Village Policy had succeeded in promoting the use of collective plows and oxen-drawn carts (mikokoteni).

Wegero. Of the villages in the low extension services category, due to the traditional ownership of livestock, Wegero had the highest population ratio of peasants who owned private plows (see Table 11). As a result, the total acreage cultivated for the village government farm was more than that of the other villages, including those that had tractors. As a result, the village had managed to purchase a bus to provide transportation to villagers. However, because the crops grown were sorghum and finger millet, inputs such as fertilizer, insecticides, and pumps were not available. The village had a dip, and the villagers had adopted well the instructions from mabwana mifugo on how to care for their livestock; they could even administer injections without asking for help.



Table 10.--A positive relationship between the villages in the high extension services category and their ability to obtain farming inputs was found.

		Obtain Farming Inputs		
		Frequencies:		
		No	Yes	Total
Extension Services	Low	47	17	64
	High	22	42	64
		69	59	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	19.651	1	.000

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.




Table 11.--Agricultural implements and use, Musoma Vijijini District, 1974 and 1986.

Village	Govt. Plough 1974	Govt. Plough 1986	Private Plough 1974	Acres Farmed Priv./plough 1974	Private Plough 1986	Acres Farmed Priv/plough 1986	Govt. Tractor 1974	Govt. Tractor 1986	Private Tractor 1974	Private Tractor 1986	Bwana Shamba 1986
Biatika	0.	4.	150.	8.	230.	9.	0.	0.	0.	0.	1.
Bukima	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Butiama	0.	10.	20.	32.	52.	33.	4.	4.	0.	8.	1.
Chitane	0.	0.	0.	2.	2.	6.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Matongo	0.	0.	30.	26.	66.	27.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Masurura	10.	10.	54.	13.	170.	318.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Mmahare	0.	0.	0.	10.	2.	13.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Nyasurura	0.	0.	10.	43.	15.	48.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kiabakari	0.	3.	10.	46.	110.	47.	1.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kibubwa	6.	7.	36.	40.	39.	41.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kirumi	0.	0.	60.	27.	70.	28.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kwibara	8.	9.	20.	105.	30.	105.	0.	0.	0.	0.	1.
Kyankoma	0.	0.	100.	28.	120.	28.	0.	1.	0.	0.	1.
Saragana	10.	8.	25.	78.	30.	79.	0.	0.	2.	2.	1.
Seeka	0.	0.	28.	27.	48.	27.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Wegero	0.	0.	150.	2.	208.	226.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Total	34.	51.	693.	487.	1,192	1035.	5.	5.	2.	10.	5.

Averages Per Villages in Each Category

8 High Ext.	3.50	5.50	47.38	38.75	92.75	77.38	.63	.63	.25	1.25	.63
8 Low Ext.	.75	.88	39.25	22.13	56.25	52.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
8 Good Soil	2.00	4.25	63.75	24.25	118.13	91.13	.63	.50	.00	1.00	.25
8 Poor Soil	2.25	2.13	22.88	36.63	30.88	38.25	.00	.13	.25	.25	.38
4 HE & GS	2.50	6.75	58.50	24.75	140.50	101.75	1.25	1.00	.00	2.00	.50
4 HE & PS	4.50	4.25	36.25	52.75	45.00	53.00	.00	.25	.50	.50	.75
4 LE & GS	1.50	1.75	69.00	23.75	95.75	80.50	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
4 LE & PS	.00	.00	9.50	20.50	16.75	23.50	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00

Source: Table prepared from the Musoma Vijijini District Survey



Mmahare. As discussed under capital formation, Mmahare had a small rural industry that manufactured buckets, trash containers, boxes, bicycle carriers, knives, cooking stoves, and chicken incubators. However, the shortage of raw materials constituted a major hindrance to the industry. Other villages in the low extension category, such as Kibubwa, Seeka, Chitare, Nyasurura, Kirumi, and Matongo, apart from the plows owned by individuals, had not increased the village government ownership and use of oxen plows. All of the cotton-producing peasants in the Majita area received the traditional cotton inputs, such as fertilizer, insecticides, pumps, and batteries, although inadequately. Nyasurura has a dip that serves the ward.

The Ujamaa approach to the dissemination of technology is through cooperatives. However, with the abolition of the traditional cooperative unions, the new approach of promoting the dissemination of technology through village government farms was not effective. This may be attributed to the fact that the management of village-government-owned oxen and plows was inadequate. Furthermore, although 2 of the 16 villages surveyed purchased tractors, their efficient use was not realized, particularly on private farms, which were not properly cleared of stones, trees, and other items that could damage tractor blades.

Maintenance of government-built facilities, such as dips, in rural areas was inadequate due to lack of technicians. Villages lacked the communication facilities essential for establishing links



with other areas. Therefore, villages in the high extension category had acquired more modern technology than villages in the low extension category. Respondents indicated a tendency to acquire the type of technology they could afford, such as plows, if they had oxen. Loaning peasants inputs such as fertilizer, insecticides, pumps, and batteries has proven effective in the cotton-producing areas, although labor-saving technology such as the use of plows has not been adopted. Survey results indicated that tractor technology at the moment appears inefficient due to lack of spare parts, maintenance facilities, and inadequate land clearance.

5.10 Transportation

It is not known what level of economic growth Tanzania would have achieved since 1974 if an amount of money equal to that invested in providing free social services had been allocated for the construction of roads. Lack of good roads has created a barrier to economic development because, as revealed in this section, peasants are often unable to bring their surplus crops to the town markets. The NMC is faced with the same predicament and is therefore unable to purchase the surplus crop from many villages where the road infrastructure is poor.

Good roads would reduce the wear and tear on vehicles that discourages many truck and bus drivers from going to villages that have poor roads, particularly during the rainy season. The condition of most roads in Tanzania is frightening, especially those leading to rural areas. During the rainy season, bridges break



down, floods cause potholes, and vehicles get stuck on muddy roads, thus rendering the roads impassable. As a consequence, business transactions are delayed. Farmers become discouraged when they find the cost of transporting their crops to the market is too high to make it profitable, or when, due to lack of transportation, perishable crops spoil before they are sold. The shortage of good roads was compounded by lack of vehicles, spare parts, petrol, and diesel fuel, induced by the shortage of foreign-exchange reserves. The outcome has been an inestimable adverse effect on trade, which has caused delays, high transportation costs, and waste due to spoilage of fruits, vegetables, and other perishable goods.

If Tanzania was to learn from the experience of developed nations in Europe and North America, the railroad had a major influence on economic growth during the take-off period because it lowered internal transport costs and brought new areas and products into commercial markets. The result was an enlargement of the export sector, which helped to generate capital for internal economic development.²⁰⁸

Not only did lack of transportation inhibit commercial activities, but it had an adverse effect on the provision of social services as well. It became difficult to supply rural areas with textbooks, medicines, spare parts for repairing animal dips, dams, and construction materials for schools and party offices. Lack of

²⁰⁸W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: The University Press, 1960), p. 55.



transportation also reduced the level of communication between towns and villages. During the rainy season, those traveling by bus were often forced to walk or to abandon their trips due to lack of vehicles caused by bad road conditions. These conditions were observed in most of the 16 villages surveyed, particularly those that were not located near the main roads linking major towns.

The findings based on the 16 villages surveyed show that the proximity of a village to a good road was a positive factor for the residents of that village, insofar as the availability of transportation was concerned. For such villages, the ownership of vehicles for transportation was not as critical as it was for villages located far from major roads linking large towns. Such roads were repaired more regularly, whereas most of the roads leading to remote villages were not. The village of Butiama, for example, is on a major road from Mwanza to Musoma and Arusha. Therefore, even if the village government did not own a bus or a lorry, villagers could obtain such services by waiting on the roadside. Most villagers could not afford to rent a village lorry for transporting their individual crops to towns.

For villagers who specialized in the cultivation of vegetable crops, such as tomatoes, cabbage, and onions, the unreliability of transportation was not only an irritant, but also a disincentive. The proximity to the road, however, was not a sufficient criterion or an incentive for increasing agricultural productivity. Kirumi is located on a key road that links Musoma and Mwanza on to Rwanda and Tarime, which is near the boundary with Kenya. The villagers who



were interviewed complained that some drivers were not willing to stop, or they did so only when their vehicles were not full. Villagers felt that they were at the mercy of these drivers, especially when there was an emergency, such as a patient needing to get to a major hospital. Transporting crops on this basis, waiting on the roadside, was a disincentive because the cost was set by the driver, regardless of the distance.

Following the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the government began fuel rationing. Therefore, private transportation owners were provided a specified amount of petrol or diesel fuel per week. Given the high cost of fuel and spare parts, which were often obtained on the black-market, transportation owners passed these costs on to consumers. The demand for vehicles was higher than their availability. Villagers in Wegero, who tried to solve the transportation problem by purchasing their own bus, were still compelled to walk eight miles because of bad road conditions. The shortage of transportation was reported in all villages surveyed. Of the 128 respondents interviewed, 79.7 percent said that transportation was inadequate. Wegero had a bus, Masurura had one lorry, and Butiama had four lorries, whereas the other villages had none. Most rural people relied for transportation on their heads, mikokoteni, bicycles, and, for those near the lake, canoes. The shortage of bicycles in village shops has increased the severity of the transportation problem.



5.10.1 Agricultural Extension Agents

The role of agricultural extension agents (mabwana shamba) is to educate the peasants about modern farming techniques through on-site demonstrations. Respondents in the 16 villages surveyed were asked if they had a mabwana shamba living in their village and, if so, to explain his most important activities since 1974. Village chairmen were asked to explain any problems the agents experienced that might have hindered their activities. In the 16 villages surveyed, no female agent was present. It was observed, however, that the majority of those who did the farming in rural areas were women. Most villages in the high extension category had a mabwana shamba in residence. These mabwana shamba were assigned to villages on the basis of population density (correlation of .68). Activities undertaken by mabwana shamba varied greatly from village to village. The most common activities were to:

1. educate peasants in modern farming techniques, which entails the use of fertilizer and insecticides and weeding;
2. attend village meetings and listen to problems. Advise peasants to irrigate if they live near a lake, plant trees to avoid soil erosion, grow drought-resistant crops, and uproot infected crops;
3. estimate damage when there was a dispute in the village involving one villager's livestock grazing on another villager's farm, destroying crops;



4. determine land allocation--measuring the size of farms and determining the total square acres farmed in villages; and

5. collect data on crop production, preparing reports and serving as a liaison between the district government and the villages in a ward assigned to him.

The functions discussed above were similar to those established before the village formation policy was introduced. The major difference was the emphasis placed on collective farms. Historically, essential support services for the agricultural sector embraced three main areas of activity:

1. research, extension and training;
2. the provision of agricultural inputs, including seed, fertilizer, pesticides, farm equipment, and credit; and
3. primary marketing, payment, and transport.

Before 1974, mabwana shamba were required to visit private farms to demonstrate to them how to use fertilizer and insecticides, to teach them how to plant in lines and space seeds, and to disseminate other relevant innovations and information. It was the so-called progressive farmers or kulak (wakulima bora) whose farms were most often visited.

With village formation, the national policy placed more emphasis on encouraging collective farming. Most peasants, however, preferred the old system. This was reflected in the responses to a question concerning the mabwana shamba's performance. Of 128 household heads sampled, 55.5 percent said they received no service from mabwana shamba, although they did show up during work on



government collective farms. Only 14.1 percent thought they received good service because, although mabwana shamba were instructed to concentrate on group approaches, they continued to make contact with individual farmers. Only 21.1 percent considered the services satisfactory, and 9.4 percent the service was poor.

From the mabwana shamba's standpoint, working on the collective was easier than working with an individual peasant. Butiama's mabwana shamba expressed the opinion shared by the majority who preferred the change. He said:

To educate a peasant is a complex problem. I use demonstrations in order to prove my point. Talk alone is not sufficient. It is not easy to get a peasant to adopt modern farming techniques. My work is succeeding more at collective farms because everyone is usually present, and peasants can listen to you. The difference between what is on a collective farm and a private farm demonstrates to the peasant the need to adopt modern farming techniques. With respect to block farming, attendance is not regular. Children may represent the head of the household, but it is still easier to transmit information than on private farms. It is difficult to reach every villager's farm.

In the 16 villages studied, it was observed that, due to the shortage of trained extension staff in the country, mabwana shamba were assigned from two to nine villages, depending on the population density. Lack of transportation made visits and inspection of private household farms difficult. This may explain why mabwana shamba favor giving demonstrations on government collective farms. Significantly, apart from Butiama, Matongo, Masurura, and Kyankoma, the quality of most village-government collective farms did not appear superior to that of private farms. Therefore, peasants in

villages with poorly maintained collective farms were less likely to adopt modern farming techniques.

Although the government's goal is to provide every large village with a qualified mabwana shamba, and one between two smaller and nearby villages, this has not been achieved. What the peasants said they needed most were demonstrations, not lectures. In the 16 villages studied, it was reported that mabwana shamba attended village meetings and gave speeches on modern farming techniques. Demonstrations were given only during the preparation of the village-government collective farms. In the villages of Saragana and Seeka, the mabwana shamba had not visited in a year. The village of Kirumi was visited twice a week, while Chitare was visited four times a month.

In villages where cotton had been grown since the colonial era, such as Kiabakari, Chitare, Seeka, Bukima, Butiama, Nyasurura, Kwibara, and Mmahare, peasants were more knowledgeable. Most had adopted modern farming techniques, which they applied to the cultivation of cotton. However, in areas where people grew maize, advice from mabwana shamba was not available. Early or late planting often led to low yields, or sometimes crop failure. Crop planting was not timed for rainfall. This required coordination between agricultural extension agents and the meteorological units and was not accepted.

Although educating and motivating the peasants may improve marketing systems, prices, technology, policies, and credit, placing emphasis on one area while neglecting others resulted in the waste



of resources.²⁰⁹ Delays in the delivery of seeds, insecticides, or fertilizers can hinder the work undertaken by the mabwana shamba, even though the cause may be lack of adequate transportation or other administrative snags beyond their control. However, individual performance by energetic, motivated staff was found to be a crucial factor in the success of extension programs. The peasants are brought fundamental information that they are free to adopt or reject because there is no supervision mechanism to encourage the peasants to practice what they are taught.

Lack of funding and transportation, inadequate housing, and low pay were noted by village chairmen as the major problems that hindered progress in the performance of mabwana shamba. It was also noted that they, like the teachers, spent most of their time on their own farms. Pointing out the weaknesses of Tanzania's extension system, Uma Lele wrote:

. . . Because of the low level of training, these field innovations have often been of dubious quality and relevance. These problems are compounded by the national extension strategy, which is directed towards sociopolitical as well as productive goals. Ideological agents and the deficiency in research support, the considerations impinge on extension effectiveness by leaning towards exclusive concentration on cooperative agricultural production and by causing extension agents to spend more time raising political consciousness and less time spreading technical advice.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹J. De Vries, Ujamaa Villages and Problems of Institutional Change, With Emphasis on Agricultural Extension and Development (Morogoro: Department of Rural Economy, January 1977), p. 12.

²¹⁰Uma Lele, The Design of Rural Development: Lessons From Africa (Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, June 1975), pp. 73-74.



Some of the inhibiting factors discussed above were also pointed out by respondents during the interviews. With the removal of subsidies (ruzuku) on fertilizer and insecticides, peasants complained about high prices of fertilizer in the cotton-producing areas and an inadequate supply of pumps, which made the spraying of insecticides difficult. Of 128 household heads interviewed, 53.9 percent said they used fertilizer, whereas 46.1 percent said they did not. When asked how easy it was to obtain agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and insecticides, 41.4 percent said it was easy, and 57.8 percent disagreed. In villages that do not cultivate cotton, some peasants use cow manure, whereas in cotton-producing areas modern fertilizer is used. The chi-square test showed a significant probability (.003) that villages in the high extension category had easier access to fertilizer than villages in the low extension category. However, the chi-square test probability of .859 confirmed that the use of fertilizer was independent of wealth. In other words, wealth was not a determining factor (see Tables 12 and 13).

Ten villages had animal dips (see Table 14). Three villages had two mabwana mifugo living there, namely Biatika, Kyankoma, and Kwibara, while three villages, Butiama, Saragana, and Wegero, had one each. Wegero, in the low extension category, with a large population of livestock owners, had a mabwana mifugo in residence. Other villages, such as Kiabakari, were visited by mabwana mifugo once a month. Chitare had four visits a month, and Bukima, Kirumi,



Table 12.--A positive relationship between the extension services and fertilizer use was found.

		Use of Fertilizer		
		Frequencies:		
		No	Yes	Total
Extension Services	Low	38	26	64
	High	21	43	64
		59	69	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	9.087	1	.003

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.



Table 13.--No relationship between peasant wealth and the level of fertilizer use was found.

		Use of Fertilizer		
		Frequencies:		
		No	Yes	Total
Peasant Wealth	Poor	30	34	64
	Wealthy	29	35	64
		59	69	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	.031	1	.859

Source: Musoma Vijijini District



Table 14.--Animal dips and extension agents per population, Musoma Vijijini District, 1986.

Village	Population 1986.	Govt. Dips 1974	Private Dips 1974.	Private Dips 1986.	Govt Dips 1986	Bwana Shamba 1986	Ratio of Anim Dips Percent 1986	Ratio of Bwa Mifugo Percent 1986
Biatika	8,000	1.	0.	0.	1.	2.	8,000	4,000
Bukima	5,500	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Butiama	10,000	1.	0.	2.	1.	1.	10,000	10,000
Chitare	1,800	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Matongo	1,629	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Masurura	4,904	1.	0.	0.	1.	1.	4,904	4,904
Mmahare	1,117	0.	0.	0.	1.	0.	1,117	0.
Nyasurura	1,440	0.	0.	0.	1.	0.	1,440	0.
Kiabakari	6,000	1.	0.	0.	1.	0.	6,000	0.
Kibubwa	1,112	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kirumi	1,211	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Kwibara	4,000	1.	0.	0.	1.	2.	4,000	2,000
Kyankoma	5,706	1.	0.	0.	1.	2.	5,706	2,853
Saragana	4,700	1.	0.	0.	1.	1.	4,700	4,700
Seeka	1,800	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.	0.
Wegero	2,119	1.	0.	0.	1.	1.	2,119	2,119
Total	61,038	8.	0.	2.	10.	10.	47,986	30,576

Averages Per Villages in Each Category

8 High Ext.	6101.25	.88	0	.25	.88	1.13	5413.75	3557.13
8 Low Ext.	1528.50	.13	.00	.00	.38	.13	584.50	264.88
8 Good Soil	4371.88	.63	.00	.25	.63	.63	3877.88	2627.88
8 Poor Soil	3257.88	.38	.00	.00	.63	.63	2121.38	1194.13
4 HE & GS	7226.00	1.00	.00	.50	1.00	1.00	7226.00	4726.00
4 HE & PS	4976.00	.75	.00	.00	.75	1.25	3688.25	2388.25
4 LE & GS	1517.75	.25	.00	.00	.25	.25	529.75	529.75
4 LE & PS	1539.00	.00	.00	.00	.50	.00	639.25	.00

Source: Table prepared from the Musoma Vijijini District Survey

and Matongo were visited twice a month. Mmahare was visited daily. Nyasurura and Masurura each had a dip attendant. Villages in the high extension category had more access to animal dips than villages in the low extension category. Despite the frequency of dip breakdowns, the data showed significance by a likelihood ratio chi-square of 24.72, indicating that villages in the high extension category had more dips (see Table 15).

As expected, the presence of mabwana mifugo was related to both the total number of livestock and the total population of livestock owners in villages. Villages with large herds were assigned mabwana mifugo. This was confirmed by a simple positive correlation of .58 between the livestock population and the number of mabwana mifugo. This arrangement does not, however, mean that all livestock owners are able to receive the same level of services, since each mabwana mifugo tends to all villages in a ward. Furthermore, the shortage of recurrent funds, staff, transport, and drugs limited the ability of mabwana mifugo to attend to everyone. The relationship between wealth and access was positive, with a chi-square value of 10.9 (see Table 16).

5.11 Livestock Management

In Musoma Vijijini District, most rural people raise livestock and engage in crop production. However, customs and traditional values attached to the ownership of livestock, particularly cattle, differ among tribes. The social and cultural value attached to



Table 15.--A positive relationship between the high and low level extension service category villages and the availability of animal dips was found.

		Animal Dip Available		
		Frequencies:		
		No	Yes	Total
Extension Services	Low	39	25	64
	High	12	52	64
		51	77	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	23.762	1	.000

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.



Table 16.--A positive relationship between peasant wealth and receiving services from veterinary agents was found.

		Veterinary Services Available		
		Frequencies:		
		No	Yes	Total
Extension Services	Low	50	14	64
	High	32	32	64
		82	46	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	10.995	1	.001

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.



livestock ownership was illustrated in most tribes by the fact that if an individual did not possess cattle, sheep, and goats, that person could not marry. Livestock as a dowry presented a powerful means of exchange, whereby in a traditional society the more livestock a family owned, the easier it was to obtain wives. Therefore, in a subsistence rural environment where children represent manpower, the value of livestock ownership meant means wealth. To a large extent, not much has changed. Those villagers who own a large herd of livestock are still considered wealthy.

The importance of cattle ownership also differs among tribes. Traditionally, the Kurya attached a very high premium to livestock ownership, to the extent that some indulged in cattle theft. In the Kurya ethnic group, ownership of a large herd is prestigious. These traditional values have hindered "modernization." For example, when the Kurya were advised by mabwana mifugo to sell their livestock and purchase modern cattle, which produce more milk, most refused. The few who followed the advice realized some gain. But the practice never received widespread acceptance.

Besides the livestock given as a government-incentive reward to the villages of Butiama, Masurura, Kyankoma, and Kiabakari, voluntary collective ownership of livestock is not evident. None of the 16 villages had collective herds. Nyerere's vision of how livestock could be merged to create a community herd during implementation of the Ujamaa Village Programs was as follows:

Each farmer would, at this stage, also keep his own herd. But gradually the improvement of the community herd, and the visible experience of the communal benefits from it will



probably lead them to build up the community herd and reduce the size of their cattle ownership. The participants would, of course, use their income from the community herd as they pleased. They may decide to use the milk for school feeding; they may decide that the income from the herd should be used to build a cattle dip, or a dam which will provide regular water for people and cattle alike; or they may decide to spend the income on improving the village or helping those members of their community who are in some kind of trouble.²¹¹

Why were rural livestock owners not willing to merge their herds? One reason may be the distinct separation between family and community. Generally speaking, wealth sharing existed within the extended family--not to the extent where all members of the extended family had equal management authority, but rather in terms of identifying with the herd's owner, based on blood kinship. The concept of sharing beyond blood relatives, as Nyerere suggested, was new because it required vesting decisions regarding livestock management with the community. This most livestock owners were not prepared to do. Traditionally, people did share their labor in construction projects and in the fields, much like the barn-raising tradition of rural America. However, in the traditional African rural society, there simply were no communal herds. The rural society, according to Dumont, was very hierarchical.²¹² In the depths of the livestock owners' minds, merging their herds was totally unacceptable. Thus, although the intentions of Ujamaa were sound, in perpetuating and expanding the tradition of mutual help,

²¹¹Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 363.

²¹²Rene Dumont, Tanzanian Agriculture After the Arusha Declaration (Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Government Printer, 1969), p. 36.



the implementation of merging herds was not successful. Peasants were not convinced that a community herd was viable. The government had not produced any demonstrations of a successful productive collective community herd. Consequently, the majority of the population resisted the cooperative ownership of livestock. Unlike cooperative farming, which involved giving up labor time, livestock ownership was a symbol of wealth that could not, in the minds of the villagers, be merged.

5.12 The Provision of Veterinary Services

Animal husbandry is an important aspect of the Tanzanian agricultural economy. Therefore, one objective of this study was to ascertain the level of veterinary services available to the villages. Village chairmen were asked to explain the various activities and programs undertaken by veterinary extension field agents (mabwana mifugo) and to explain what problems they faced. Also, since the village formation policy expected livestock owners to merge their herds, it was important to determine the level of joint ownership occurring as a result of the Ujamaa policy.

The level and availability of veterinary extension services in the 16 villages surveyed increased in terms of the number of both animal dips and mabwana mifugo. Seven villages had mabwana mifugo in residence. When the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock allocates medicines and drugs to the district, they are sold to livestock owners who can afford to pay for it. Consequently, it is



only when a livestock owner has particular problems involving illness of livestock that the mabwana mifugo is contacted. He is expected to bring back to the district the amount of money paid for drugs and medicines.

5.12.1 The Role of Mabwana Mifugo

The services provided in villages by mabwana mifugo consist of performing castrations, giving advice on animal dips, reducing tick-borne diseases, inspecting butchers, and inoculating livestock, including domesticated animals such as dogs and cats. The mabwana mifugo treat sick livestock, serve as liaison officers between village and district governments, encourage livestock owners to use better animal feed, e.g. cottonseed cakes, and purchase modern hybrid cattle for greater milk production. In Butiama, only four progressive livestock owners used cottonseed cakes for animal feed. Mabwana mifugo also encourage owners to improve livestock care and market their herds. In some villages they encourage participation in artificial-insemination programs.

5.12.2 Artificial Insemination

Artificial-insemination programs to improve cattle breeding are one way to increase production. The findings revealed that such a program has never been introduced in most villages. In two villages where modern cattle are available (Butiama and Biatika), it was reported that peasants resisted artificial insemination because they feared that once conception took place, the birth would be



difficult. Experiments were conducted at Butiama, and the results showed two successful artificial-insemination births; the number of failures was not reported. Butiama's mabwana mifugo reported that:

There is an artificial insemination program at Butiama. Two farms practice artificial insemination, Mwalimu Nyerere and the village government livestock farm. Most of the villagers still depend on local bulls for natural mating for breeding due to ignorance. They are opposed to artificial insemination because they fear that once the conception takes place, the birth will be difficult. Peasants believe that if a natural process is followed, through the bull, the process can be successful. However, artificial insemination was performed on local cattle, which has given birth at least twice, and such experiments, whether using modern bull or artificial insemination, have been successful.

Livestock development involves a complex interaction of technical, economic, and sociocultural factors, leading to considerable uncertainty as to the response to innovations, a phenomenon well illustrated by the preceding quotation. The Musoma District veterinary officer explained that artificial insemination and cross-breeding were not dangerous, as some peasants believed. Mabwana mifugo responsible for insemination were trained to consider the animal sizes when such a project was undertaken. In the past, livestock owners were advised to purchase a cross-breed improved bull. Semen from modern bulls is available from the Butiama Artificial Insemination Center to local farmers if they contact the technicians concerned.

5.12.3 Animal Dips

The number of times livestock owners in a particular village use the dip depends on three factors: (1) the availability of



water, (2) the availability of medicines, and (3) whether or not the dip is functioning. The construction of animal dips is related to the size of the village population; this was confirmed by a positive correlation of .65. In seven villages, Butiama, Biatika, Kyankoma, Masurura, Wegero, Kwibara, and Saragana, all in the high extension category, livestock owners were advised to use the dip twice a week. At Kiabakari, Nyasurura, and Mmahare they were advised to use the dip once a week when medicine and water were available. In the six villages with no dips in the Majita area, there were few cattle, and recommended use was once a month. However, of 128 interviewees, 27.3 percent said they used the dip quarterly, 5.5 percent said they used the dip semiannually, 3.1 percent said they used the dip annually, and 64.1 percent used the dip rarely. The simple correlation between the availability of a dip and dip use was $-.49$. There were more dips in villages in the high extension category than in villages in the low extension category; this was confirmed by a Pearson chi-square value of 23.76 (see Table 15). Because of the amount of money charged for using the dip, few livestock owners preferred to use the dip regularly, regardless of availability. The economics of using animal dips is complex. More study is needed to determine the marginal benefits of regular or irregular use.

The shortage of water is a critical problem for villages located far from rivers and lakes because, with the exception of Butiama, they have no pipe water. During the rainy season they do not experience water shortages, but mud slides plug the dip pipes,



causing malfunctioning of some dips. The Kiabakari village chairman reported that their dip had not been working for a year. The reason for this problem was lack of attention to the construction of dams. Some villages also reported difficulties draining water from the dips to refill them with clean water. In most villages far from rivers and Lake Victoria, villagers, through collective labor, are required to carry water on their heads to refill the dips. It was observed that most dips were in a state of disrepair due to lack of acaricide, water, and/or dip attendants.

The villages of Matongo, Kirumi, and Kibubwa have many livestock owners, but they have no animal dips. Livestock owners walked 12 miles to get to a ward dip. They became discouraged since they regularly found the dip closed due to lack of water or medicines. Another factor reported by livestock owners as a deterrent to using the dips was the fee. This fee was usually shs. 5 per cattle and shs. 2.50 per sheep or goat. However, most livestock owners were aware of the benefits associated with the regular use of a dip. The relationship between wealth and dip use was confirmed by a positive chi-square test p-value of .001 (see Table 17). When asked what positive or negative changes were attributed to the use of animal dips, livestock owners said that tick-borne diseases disappeared, and cows were able to produce more milk. They explained that they needed to use the dip more regularly because when they stopped, tick-borne diseases increased. They perceived a decline in the livestock mortality rate, although no statistics could be provided.



Table 17.--A positive relationship between peasant wealth
and animal dip usage was found.

		Use Animal Dip		
		Frequencies:		
		No	Yes	Total
Extension Services	Low	52	12	64
	High	34	30	64
		86	42	128

TEST STATISTIC	VALUE	DEG. OF FREEDOM	PROB.
Pearson chi-square	11.482	1	.001

Source: Musoma Vijijini District.

5.12.4 The Most Common Livestock Diseases

The most common diseases afflicting cattle in Musoma Vijijini District are tick borne. The availability of well-managed animal dips, with dip attendants to supervise usage habits while providing an adequate supply of medicines, can prevent most of the diseases. Therefore, livestock owners must at least be required to comply with a specified minimum dip visitation per year which may provide dip services free of charge. The list of tick-borne diseases, according to the Musoma District veterinary officer, is as follows:

1. Anaplasmosis
2. Babecios
3. East Coast fever (ECF), known locally as Kizunguzungu
4. Heart water
5. Mange

The shortage of medicine for livestock was mentioned in every village surveyed. Mabwana mifugo who were interviewed complained about lack of supplies of medicine and transportation. However, during the interview with the district veterinary officer, he denied the charges concerning the shortage of drugs and medicine. He pointed out that every ward that had a mabwana mifugo was required to report the most serious cases of diseases for reference, but the mabwana mifugo were empowered to treat only ordinary cases. They were provided drugs and given the responsibility for distributing them and treating livestock.

Livestock diseases caused by tapeworms and roundworms were described as being in the category of Helminthiasis. They are:

1. Liver flukes, known as fascioliasis
2. Nematodiasis, which causes strongylidiasis and ascaridiasis

The third category are bacterial and virus diseases. They include:

1. Anthrax, known locally as kimeta
2. Blackquarter, known locally as nyebhoko
3. Brucellosis
4. Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD)
5. Haemorrhagic septicaemia
6. Mastitis
7. Milk scour
8. Pasteurellosis
9. Rinderpest, known locally as sotoka

Some diseases are caused by typhus (tsetse fly as a vector), known as trypanosomiasis. The disease most livestock owners complained about was East Coast fever (kizunguzungu).

It was observed that traditional values and illiteracy contribute to the persistence of livestock illnesses. Some livestock owners with large herds complained of being unable to afford medicines and drugs, and, as a consequence, their livestock fell ill and died. Logically, such owners could sell a few livestock and pay for dip charges or for mabwana mifugo to come and treat their ill animals.



Villagers seemed very interested in veterinary-care programs because livestock are still a symbol of wealth. However, unless proper procedures are established and followed, the problems discussed above will likely continue. In a report issued by Dumont in 1969, he recommended increased research to determine animal nutrition and fodder production. He considered the improvement of livestock hygiene critical because, without such measures, the introduction of improved varieties like dairy breeds would be a waste of money. He recommended improved feeding and regularity in dipping. Implementing those ideas will lead to increased wealth for livestock owners and increased production of milk and meat.²¹³

5.13 Lack of Incentives

The objective of the Ujamaa Village Policy was not to remove incentives, but rather to restructure them in order to avoid excessive and undue inequalities of income among the people, and ultimately to establish an egalitarian society. Among the steps taken in 1973 was the establishment of village shops (maduka). In the 16 villages surveyed, the process adopted to establish the village government shops was to assess a tax (mchango) of shs. 10 or shs. 20 on each household head in the village. Therefore, village government shops became part of the cooperative multipurpose activities in each village. Village members were not treated as shareholders entitled to receiving dividends.

²¹³Dumont, Tanzania Agriculture After the Arusha Declaration, pp. 37-38.

Of the 16 villages studied, 13 had one shop and 3 villages had two, whereas Kirumi's had gone bankrupt. Butiama, Kyankoma, Bukima, and Wegero had salt, soap, kerosene, and construction material available. In most village government shops, shelves were empty. Most private shops faced a similar predicament, although they were better supplied than government shops. The lack of essential consumer goods constituted a widespread problem. In some villages, due to the acute scarcity of essential consumer goods, when supplies arrived from the Regional Trading Corporation (RTC), a government parastatal responsible for the distribution of consumer goods, village members who contributed more during collective work were given preference as the first to receive such goods.

Lack of consumer goods such as soap, sugar, kerosene, cooking oil, bicycles, radios, clothes, shoes, and construction material is considered a national problem. The major cause for shortages of essential consumer goods is the deficiency in foreign-exchange earnings. Industries in the country that produce these goods are at half capacity, and the government continues to export some to earn foreign currency. The inadequate supply of raw materials for industrial production has made matters worse. The price for consumer goods was very high in government shops, whereas on the black-market identical items cost ten times as much. As a consequence, people lost the incentive produce cash crops due to lower producer prices, and they turned to food production. Consequently, people became poorer in appearance due to the scarcity

of essential goods such as clothes. Items such as sugar, salt, soap, cooking oil, radio, kerosene, shoes, and bicycles acquired the status of luxury goods. The price of a pair of shoes ranged from shs. 1,800 to shs. 2,000 (\$90 to \$100) a pair. Similar shoes would have cost \$25 to \$45 in the United States in 1986.

These shortages fueled more corruption and black-market activity because of the high prices. The RTC became unpopular for failing to meet its mandated obligation of eliminating the petit capitalist shopkeepers, particularly the Asians, by providing efficient services. Respondents charged that a class of corrupt RTC officials had emerged. They colluded with the black-marketeers by exploiting national scarcities through the high prices charged for essential goods. Hoarding of goods was reported to be common, so that black-marketeers could charge eight to ten times the official price (*bei ya kuruka*). Villages near the border have grown dependent on receiving their supplies from Kenya. People rely on used clothes (*mitumba*) imported from western countries. Biatika respondents complained that RTC brought two bicycles to the village, which has a population of 6,000 people, and they were purchased by the village chairman and secretary before others were given a chance.

Lack of construction materials, such as corrugated iron sheets and cement, was mentioned in all 16 villages surveyed as a serious impediment. Lack of materials delayed those interested in constructing modern houses.



Although no quantifiable data were available, judging from the interviews with village officials, it was apparent that, with the exception of Butiama, Kyankoma, Mmahare and Wegero, 15 village shops had failed to maintain profitability. When asked to compare the availability of essential consumer goods in 1974 with that in 1986, 93 percent of the respondents said that salt was seldom found in their villages, whereas only 3.1 percent said it was always available. With regard to the availability of soap, 89.8 percent of the respondents said it was seldom found in their villages, whereas only 3.9 percent said it was always available. The scarcity of sugar was more critical; 97.7 percent of the respondents said they seldom found it in their villages, and only .8 percent said it was always available.

The scarcity of clothes was confirmed by 92.2 percent of the respondents, who said that clothes were seldom found in their villages; only 4.7 percent said they were always available. In terms of shoes, it was observed that more people wore sandals made from automobile tires than wore shoes. Scarcity of shoes was reflected by 95.3 percent of the respondents, who noted that shoes were seldom found in their villages; only 2.3 percent said they were always available. Bicycles, which are essential for transportation, are very scarce. This was reflected by 99.2 percent of the respondents, who said that bicycles were seldom found in their villages.

Government collective farms also had failed to provide peasants with direct incentives, apart from the purchase of grinding machines



and the construction of schools and dispensaries. Low producer prices, for example, had caused peasants to shift from the cultivation of cash to food crops, and in most cases they grew only enough for subsistence. In the past, consumer goods such as radios, bicycles, clothes, and construction materials served as a catalyst for competition in rural areas. If one household owned a radio, the neighbor strove to acquire one by increasing the cultivation of cotton acreage. In the absence of these incentives, it became difficult for peasants to pursue self-interest, while promoting public interest. As Sweezy and Bettelheim suggested:

The notion of a direct and immediate abolition of market relations is a utopia and dangerous as the notion of the immediate abolition of the state, and is similar in nature: it disregards the specific characteristics (i.e., the specific contradictions) of the period of transition which constitutes the period of the building of socialism.²¹⁴

The preceding quotation suggests that monetary incentives and nonmonetary incentives cannot be ignored by the government if economic growth is needed. In attempting to avoid excessive and undue inequalities of income and wealth among people, market prices cannot be ignored because they provide incentives for peasants to produce more as they pursue individual interests. But in so doing, peasants would also promote the public good. Government should remove the bias associated with producer prices and provide all relevant incentives that can help individual peasants become more productive.

²¹⁴Paul M. Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, On the Transition to Socialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), p. 19.

5.14 Human Capital

The questions asked during the survey were intended to investigate the level of increase in human resources at the village level since the Ujamaa Village Policy was implemented in 1974. Some of the findings were already discussed above. The war against illiteracy has achieved a level of success unparalleled compared to other Third World countries. Unquestionably, Nyerere raised the political and social consciousness of the masses in Tanzania to a level surpassing any in Africa. Yet peasants in villages, as the survey undertaken in the 16 villages showed, are still at a disadvantage economically because of a lack of trained technical manpower.

Very few well-educated people live in the villages, apart from the government employees who are stationed there. Primary school teachers, rural medical officials, nurses, agricultural and veterinary extension agents, and, in some villages, retired military personnel, police officers, teachers, and a few low-level government employees constituted the educated group in the villages surveyed. Another army of the educated comprised the seventh-grade primary school graduates. This may be attributed to a great extent to migration of educated people from rural areas to towns and cities. Acknowledging this problem, Nyerere said:

Every year a number of young men and women leave their homes and become a kind of exile in their own country. Most of the elite you find in Dar-es-Salaam are rural people. All education has done for them is bring them to the cities and leave them there. It is a kind of punishment to be to go back to the villages. Now this is a real failure and it is much



more painful because we understood the problem but we went the wrong way. The Tanzanian phenomenon of the educated leaving the rural areas and moving to the urban areas has its own Third World counterpart, where you see the educated leaving their own country because these countries are basically rural countries and going to towns and cities of the north.²¹⁵

This migration of the educated leaves the villages with the older generation and the very young, hence denying them the infusion of new ideas and energy. Because most people learn to change their old habits through imitation and competition, the retention of the educated young could help solve the scarcity of technical manpower in rural areas.

Of the 16 villages researched, only two had individuals with college education living there, Butiama and Kiabakari. The importance of the availability of human resources at the rural or village level to economic planning, growth, and development was exemplified by the achievements of Butiama, whose management of village affairs is unparalleled in the other 15 villages surveyed. Much of Butiama's success can be attributed to its Chairman, Joseph Nyerere, who, besides completing secondary school, had a wide experience in national government, having served in various high posts as a Regional Commissioner, as General Secretary of the Tanganyika African Youth League (TYL), and as a member of the now-defunct East African Assembly. With the help of the village manager, who holds an B.Sc. degree in engineering, they have been able to guide various economic activities in their village, thereby

²¹⁵Nyerere, "North-South Dialogue," p. 830.

enabling Butiama to own more assets than any other of the 15 villages surveyed.

Overall, villages lacked sufficient numbers of trained and qualified extension, veterinary and medical personnel, development officers, and teachers. These officials were assigned large areas and, due to lack of transportation and recurrent expenditures, were unable to cover their assigned areas and offer their services efficiently. Due to the prevailing economic crisis in the country, consisting of runaway inflation and scarcity of essential goods, most of the trained manpower assigned to villages spent less time at work. They spent more time tending to their private business, something that hurt efficiency and diminished the public or peasants' confidence in the quality of services these officials were assigned to provide.

However, the problem of inadequate services provided to peasants was blamed on the government, as most of the officials who were interviewed complained about low pay, delays in receiving pay, and lack of various inputs essential for them to fulfill their assignments. Examples mentioned were lack of medicines, textbooks, and desks; inadequate housing and transportation; and slow or lack of response from their superiors. The result became what peasants described as corruption, while officials justified their actions as merely trying to offset their low incomes with other alternatives, in order to make ends meet. The type of corruption that was observed was not an explicit request for bribes but an implicit expectation to receive something for providing their services.

Hence, they delayed providing what the peasants needed until they were offered something. One official explained during the interview that it was cultural and not corruption or bribery. Yet no matter what name it is given, it breeds inefficiency, lack of accountability, and corruption. Commenting on corruption in Tanzania, Mazrui wrote: "Almost every Tanzanian will admit that their country is more corrupt today than it was at the time when the Arusha Declaration declared war against privilege and self-aggrandizement in 1967."²¹⁶

During the interview, a resident of Kiabakarisa said that, in the early 1970s, medical, veterinary, and agricultural officials were honest. He said that now government officials, particularly those who provide essential services, such as medical and veterinary officials, were dishonest and corrupt. A resident of Seeka, describing the widespread level of corruption of such officials, said that villagers were accustomed to a local Swahili proverb that says, "If you want a dog to smell, drop some gravy" ("Ukitaka mbwa anuse weka mchuzi").

It was apparent that the 16 villages surveyed lacked training facilities for the youths, who, upon completing the seventh grade or primary school, could be very productive if they were offered job opportunities within their villages, apart from farming. Villages lack carpenters, bookkeepers, trained construction workers, masons,

²¹⁶Ali A. Mazrui, Tanzania, A Case of Heroic Failure: Socialist Effort and Moral Decline (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1985), p. 2.



and mechanics, who could repair vehicles owned by village governments. Lack of managerial experts and record keepers has provided the opportunity for corrupt officials to embezzle village government funds, which in turn has caused discontent. The government's ability to help villages is limited by the inadequacy of human resources, particularly technicians who can repair animal dips and provide villages with ideas which can help villages develop and adopt modern technology and put it to use.

5.15 Capital Formation

Two types of capital formation existed at the village level during the time this survey was undertaken: the village government and the individuals. The village government had more potential and capacity than the individuals because of its coercive powers, ability to mobilize voluntary participation by village members, and the option to apply for loans from the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) or the National Bank of Commerce branch. With respect to the individuals, although they could obtain loans from the TRDB or any other national bank, none pursued that route due to lack of collateral. Therefore, individuals could only obtain loans from other wealthy peasants.

The Ujamaa Village Policy sought to avoid individual commercial agriculture in rural areas because it was argued that this would displace peasants. Therefore, as early as 1969, it was made clear in Presidential Circular No. 1 that Tanzania was going to become a

nation of cooperative farmers. The circular encouraged the growth of cooperative production, marketing and distribution, and communal rather than private expenditure. It urged an attempt to dampen the urge for private expenditure on consumer and farm durable goods in favor of communal expenditure on things like cooperatively owned farm implements, stores, water supplies, good houses, dispensaries, nursery schools, roads, and community centers.²¹⁷ With the Ujamaa Village Policy and the formation of village governments, the conditions were right for implementing the guidelines contained in Presidential Circular No. 1. In most villages, collective farms provided the first step for capital formation. Village members, as discussed above, were required to contribute their labor, and those who failed to do so were fined (nzagu). Revenues generated after the sale of the crop from the collective farm were used as collateral security for obtaining loans from the TRDB or any national bank.

In most of the villages surveyed, it was observed that the initial level of motivation had declined. However, the two villages of Butiama and Kyankoma, which invested in tractors, relied on them for cultivating the communal farm rather than collective effort from village members' voluntary participation. Wegero, with a large population of peasants who owned plows, maintained higher morale because they felt better off than those who had to depend on hoes (majembe). In the following pages, the writer presents a review of

²¹⁷John S. Saul et al., Rural Cooperation in Tanzania (Dar-es-salaam: Tanzania Publishing House 1975), p. 27.



capital formation in each of the Ujamaa villages studied. The first eight are in the high extension, and the other eight are in the low extension category.

Butiama. In 1969, Butiama obtained loans from Mara Cooperative Union and TRDB valued at shs. 2.5 million. Such loans helped the village purchase a bus and five tractors. The bus is no longer present, but the tractors were used for cultivating 400 acres of the village collective farms. From that base, in 1986 Butiama had managed to start four small rural industries, one workshop for manufacturing spare parts, a second workshop for carpentry, a third for producing eight tons of animal feed per shift, and a fourth for manufacturing small farming implements. The village government owns Matongo hotel, a modern facility with a bar and self-contained rooms. The village government has two modern buildings that are used as offices, and a large building used as a community center. In 1986, there were seven working tractors, six trucks, and two land-rovers. The village has 1,000 acres for village government livestock. The village government owns a shop, a grinding machine, and a gasoline and kerosene station. The net worth of the village was estimated to be shs. 45 million.

Kyankoma. Kyankoma's capital-formation potential is limited by lack of human resources, particularly the planning and management talent needed for village collective activities. The village purchased a tractor and a grinding machine in 1984, after obtaining a loan from TRDB. The tractor is used for cultivating the



government village collective farm, and it is available for rent to village members at a fee of shs. 700 per acre. The grinding machine serves village members, while at the same time generating revenues. The village owns a shop that generates revenues, although the scarcity of consumer goods creates problems.

Kiabakari. Kiabakari has potential that has not been used. Some well-educated people live in the village, but they are not actively involved in village government activities. According to the village chairman, frequent institutional changes have demoralized participants. In 1967, in response to Nyerere's call, a group of villagers formed a cooperative and began farming collectively. They redistributed the return from the crop sale according to labor time contributed. The government rewarded the group with five plows and five oxen. The group applied for and received a loan from Mara Cooperative Union of shs. 64,000, which was used to expand their agricultural project. However, in 1974, following the forced village formation and the 1975 law recognizing the village governments, the group was disbanded, and their assets were confiscated by the Kiabakari village government. Subsequently, three oxen died, and the other two were sold. Since then, collective activities in Kiabakari have been minimal. In 1986, the village government farm was worth shs. 14,000. In addition, the government owns a six-room club where local beer can be purchased. By 1986, the government had collected shs. 50,000 with which to purchase a grinding machine.

Masurura. Masurura received 10 plows and 24 oxen from the Regional Development Fund (RDF). Combined with local initiative, these resources were employed on the collective farm. As of 1986, the village had three collective shops, one belonging to the village government, the second to the elders, and the third to the youths. The village government applied for a loan from TRDB and was able to purchase a lorry for shs. 333,000 and a grinding machine for shs. 24,000 and started a village government shop that required an initial investment of shs. 18,000. This village, like Butiama, has received substantial help from the government. It was noted that the CCM regional chairman comes from the village, which may help to explain the high level of government support.

Biatika. Biatika started well, but due to managerial problems associated with the change in the leadership, it has failed to maintain its initial progress. The Village Secretary explained that, in 1983, Biatika was awarded a certificate and shs. 3,000 for exemplifying the highest standard of farming, when compared to other villages in the Mara Region. The village has enormous potential because of its soil fertility, particularly for growing maize, sorghum, millet, and finger millet. However, production has not met expectations. The village obtained a loan from TRDB and purchased a grinding machine, which was stolen. Other activities for generating revenues include a club selling local beer, a collective shop, and a hotel.

Saragana. The Saragana village government purchased a grinding machine in 1981. The revenue was obtained from the village



collective farm, after selling their crops. However, at the time of this study, the grinding machine was no longer working because there were no spare parts. The village had saved shs. 200,000 in 1986, with which they planned to purchase a bus if the requested loan from TRDB was approved.

Kwibara. At Kwibara, collective farming activities were started in 1969 by a group of peasants voluntarily demonstrating support for Nyerere. This group complained to the district government that they lacked farming implements, which, if available, could boost their production. The district government provided them with a gift of nine oxen and plows. However, following the adoption of the 1975 Village Act, their assets were confiscated by the village government. Peasant discontent was reflected in 1977's low earnings from the village government collective farm of only shs. 200. Despite the low earnings, in 1983 the village government applied for a loan from TRDB to purchase a lorry. A shs. 600,000 loan was approved and the lorry was purchased, only to be resold a year later because of failure to keep up with payments on the bank note. In 1984, the village government earned shs. 54,000, part of which was invested in the construction of a village market and a butcher shop. No information was provided concerning the oxen, but the nine plows are rented out to village members for shs. 300 for two to three months.

Bukima. Bukima, plagued by leadership problems, has five stores that were started based on the old cooperative system and do



not belong to the village government. The village applied for a loan from TRDB to purchase fishing equipment worth shs. 80,000, but the loan had not been approved in 1986. The Muungano shop located in the village is jointly owned by 20 villages, which raised money from all their members to start it.

The eight villages discussed thus far are in the high extension category. The following eight belong to the low extension category.

Wegero. The rate of success in capital formation demonstrated by the village of Wegero can be credited to two major reasons: (1) the quality of leadership and (2) the number of village members who own plows. The village collective farm, 226 acres of sorghum, provided the village with enough money for a down-payment on a village bus in 1983. The bus has proved to be a lucrative business in itself, which generates revenues for the village government. The village also has a shop that generates income.

Kibubwa. Kibubwa has a grinding machine, a small shop, and a collective farm. These constitute the only sources of revenue for the village government.

Mmahare. Mmahare has a small industry, which manufactures buckets, beds, and other goods; a small hotel; and an 18-acre village government collective farm, which generated shs. 4,995 in 1984. The village expanded their farm to 36 acres in 1986. The village generated about shs. 25,000 per month, according to the village chairman. The industry's production capacity was limited by lack of supplies of raw materials.



Kirumi. Kirumi has been cultivating cotton since 1977, but the returns have been meager. This was reflected in the 1985 earnings, nine years after the village government cotton collective farm was started. Only shs. 2,000 were earned from 60 acres, despite receiving advice from mabwana shamba. The village government shop went bankrupt, and the grinding machine was sold because the village was unable to pay back shs. 55,000 borrowed from TRDB. The major problem facing the village government is lack of managerial skills and ideas for improving the village by learning from mistakes. Historically, cotton was not grown in the area; whether there were problems associated with the soil type or something else is not known.

Nyasurura. Nyasurura relies on the village-government collective farm and shop. In 1982 the government earned shs. 12,000, in 1984 shs. 15,760, and in 1985 shs. 25,000 from the farm.

Seeka. The village government purchased a grinding machine in 1974, and it has a small shop. A carpentry shop could become a good source of capital, but because of inadequate financing and lack of raw materials, that possibility appeared very unlikely in the short run.

Chitare. The main source of capital is the 22-acre village-government cotton collective farm, which generated shs. 24,000 in 1984. Because of the low rate of return, the village government was forced to shift to the cultivation of potatoes in 1986, although no provision was made for transportation to the nearest market, at least 50 miles away. The village government introduced village

taxation in 1985, which generated shs. 27,000 and remains the only revenue-raising alternative.

Matongo. Matongo has a government collective farm and a small shop, but the amount of money generated is limited, primarily because of inadequate transportation to markets.

In this analysis, capital was defined as those goods resulting from economic activity that are used for the future production of other goods. Hence, the stock of capital can be increased by human effort. Therefore, in the villages, governments rely on farms to generate cash or to establish saving accounts. As the results showed, the TRDB has provided more loans to villages in the high extension category than to those in the low extension category. However, when village governments fail to repay loans, they are forced to sell whatever was financed in order to repay them.

5.15.1 Capital Formation by Individuals

The promotion of self-reliance following the Ujamaa Village Policy placed more emphasis on communal production. It was considered less risky to loan money to the village governments than to individuals. The history of loaning money to small-scale farmers in Tanzania shows that lending institutions were dissolved when they were, in fact, already insolvent.²¹⁸ It is likely that the TRDB will not perform any better because the peasants perceive that the

²¹⁸World Bank, Tanzania Agricultural and Rural Development Sector Study Report No. 541a-TA, Annex 6, p. 6.



government does not take any action against those who fail to repay loans. Although the government's plan was to minimize risk associated with individual loans, loans to village governments, as the preceding discussion showed, have proven equally risky. What increases this risk is the tendency to provide loans based on political rather than economic criteria.

The government emphasized a collective approach to agricultural production, while employing a labor-intensive structure over small-scale private agriculture. The Regional Development Fund (RDF) was established in 1967, following a TANU National Executive Committee meeting in Mwanza. The RDF was allocated shs. 1.3 million a year for small, village-initiated projects. Between 1967 and 1972, RDF's budgetary allocation totaled shs. 100 million for financing schemes that benefited groups rather than individuals throughout Tanzania. The types of projects financed were agricultural projects, seeds and stores, mechanization, roads and bridges, water, veterinary, animal dips, and veterinary centers.²¹⁹

Lack of collateral or security and government loan administrators' inability to recover the money borrowed by peasants, who considered such loans a gift, was instrumental in causing the government to stop allocating funds for individual borrowing. Ujamaa's objective, according to Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969, was:

²¹⁹A. H. Rweyemamu and B. U. Mwansasu, Planning in Tanzania: Background to Decentralization (Dar-es-Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1974), pp. 93, 94, 95.



. . . to encourage the growth of cooperative production, cooperative marketing and distribution, and communal rather than private expenditure patterns. All government policies, and activities and decisions of all government officials, must therefore be geared towards emphasizing the advantages of working together for the good of all; they should be angled at discouraging the continuation of private individual farming; and should attempt to dampen down the urge for private expenditure on consumer and farm durable in favor communal expenditure on things like cooperatively owned farm implements, stores, water supplies, good houses, dispensaries, nursery schools, roads, community centers, and so on.²²⁰

Loans available to peasants are in the form of fertilizer, insecticides, and pumps in the areas that grow cotton. Farmers receive these inputs in advance from the Mara Cooperative Union, which upon harvest deducts their money. When asked for what purpose the government provided loans, 59.4 percent said to purchase fertilizer and other inputs such as insecticides and pumps. A substantial number, 36.7 percent, were not aware that such a loan package existed because it was provided only to cash crop producers. The Regional Agricultural Development Officer (RADO) explained that the damage and financial loss would not be as intense if food crops were destroyed by disease, as would be the case for cotton. Such loans had been provided by the cooperative unions since the 1950s because they were a source of foreign-currency earnings. Based on the experience of 1973 through 1982, the government was forced to import food crops such as preferred cereals, namely maize, wheat, and rice, rather than to depend on international charity. Net food imports reached 447,4000 tons during the worst drought in 1973/74,


²²⁰Saul, Rural Cooperation in Tanzania, p. 27.

receded to 81,000 tons in 1976/77, and climbed back to 388,900 tons in 1981/82, costing millions in foreign-exchange earnings.²²¹ In view of this experience, the government can no longer ignore the importance of providing a loan package for fertilizer, insecticides, and pumps for food crops. However, peasants were unable to receive loans for starting private shops, purchasing tractors, buses, lorries, grinding machines, or boat engines.

Of 128 respondents interviewed from the 16 villages surveyed, only one individual from Butiama admitted having received a loan from the Tanzania Bank of Commerce for shs. 37,000 while still employed by the government. The absence of banks in rural areas reduces the peasants' ability to develop a habit of opening private saving accounts. In the 16 villages surveyed, not a single village had a banking branch located there. Lack of banking institutions in rural areas perpetuates the habit of hoarding money or hiding it under mattresses. Although the government established the Cooperative and Rural Development Bank (CRDB), it had opened branches in only a few towns, such as Mwanza and Mbeya, apart from Dar-es-Salaam, and it did not have branches in rural areas.

If peasants wanted to apply for loans, they had to travel to towns. For peasants to obtain a loan, they had to provide proof that they had property and demonstrate their ability to repay it. Items such as houses are consumer goods, rather than capital.

²²¹ World Bank, Report No. 4052--Tanzania Country Memo, pp. 14-15.



During the interviews, most peasants expressed a desire for modern houses. Therefore, they were more likely to spend loan money on constructing houses first, before investing it in purchasing production capital goods.²²²

5.15.2 Individual Investments

In the absence of loans for individual farmers, individual investments declined in rural areas between 1974 and 1986. When asked what types of investments they had made over the past 10 years, 70.3 percent mentioned increased farm acreage, and 29.7 percent mentioned purchasing plows, hand hoes, fertilizer, insecticides, pumps, and constructing personal homes as investments. Some individuals invested in hiring tractor services at Butiama and Kyankoma, at the rate of shs. 600 to shs. 700 per acre. Some respondents reported hiring plow services and farm labor at shs. 600 per acre for cultivating and shs. 300 for plowing. Livestock owners considered selling milk their method of generating capital. Of the 16 villages surveyed, Butiama appeared to have been the major attraction for farm laborers. Other activities consisted of brick laying, selling traditional medicines, bicycle repair shop, retail shops, photography, brewing local alcohol, purchasing canoes for fishing, fishing nets, rural restaurants, and preparing charcoal. However, the amount of money invested in these activities was small, ranging from shs. 1,650 to shs. 1,066,000.

²²²Rweyemamu and Mwansasu, Planning in Tanzania: Background to Decentralization 1974 p. 95.



Lack of capital is therefore related to the peasants' inability to save, which is in turn related to their low level of income. Of the 128 households surveyed, it was found that the average total acres cultivated including food crops in 1974 was 6.6, which increased to 8.4 in 1985. Of the 6.6 acres cultivated in 1974, an average of 1.4 acres had cash crops; this was virtually the same average acreage cultivated 11 years later in 1985. The average 1985 earning from cash crops was shs. 5,109 per year. The average livestock owned was 28 in 1985, whereas average earning from livestock culture was shs. 5,304. The average earning of a peasant based on this survey was shs. 10,399 or about \$400 annually, using the 1985 official foreign-exchange rate. Given this low level of rural earnings, lack of banking facilities, lack of capital goods, lack of individual loans, and low producer prices, capital formation at the level necessary to stimulate and increase agricultural production was simply not present.

In the past, the rise in cotton production was related to an increase in acreage, achieved through the provision of cooperative loans and tractor schemes.²²³

In Mara, normal acreage was between one and two acres for every family. Between 1960 and 1966, however, most progressive farmers managed to care for their big cotton farms through the casual employment of poorer peasants in their farms and in most cases, these big farmers had many wives and children who provided an available labour force.²²⁴

²²³Magoti, Peasant Participation and Rural Productivity in Tanzania: The Case of Mara Cotton Producers, 1955-1977, p.105.

²²⁴Ibid., p. 106.



The Ujamaa policy clearly was opposed to the hiring of poorer peasants by wealthier peasants because it encouraged differentiation and class formation, which were perceived as exploitation. The emphasis was on encouraging peasants to farm collectively, as previously discussed.

5.16 The Reality of Ujamaa in Musoma Vijijini District

Ujamaa and self-reliance were conceived as a vehicle or path to rapid economic development with equity. Two decades have passed since the adoption of the Ujamaa Village Policy at the village level. Based on the survey in 16 villages and general field experience, the Ujamaa Policy objectives were not achieved in the villages surveyed.

The institutional framework at the village level remains weak. This weakness in the organizational structure arose because the leaders assumed that Ujamaa was a traditional way of life, to which peasants could easily readapt and with which they could identify. However, since pre-colonial traditional structures had been destroyed by colonialism, the new institutions that were established were not patterned according to tradition. Therefore, they were not clearly understood by the administrators or the peasants. This was reflected in the answers given by survey respondents, most of whom recounted the modern version of Ujamaa as defined in the Arusha Declaration.



When 128 household heads were asked what was the meaning of Ujamaa, 30.5 percent said collective work, whereas 37.5 percent included in their answer sharing the returns of their labor and the absence of exploitation of man by man. The 16 village chairmen who were interviewed described Ujamaa as people living, working, and selling crops together and sharing or keeping the money for community work. When asked if they were living as socialists, 82.9 percent of the household heads interviewed agreed, and only 16.4 percent disagreed. When asked if they were content with the life they were living, 79.7 percent agreed; only 9.5 percent disagreed. The absence of sharing was a major factor responsible for low morale because it led peasants to think that collective work was not beneficial due to lack of redistribution.

Therefore, sharing took two forms: redistribution of earnings or purchases, and building construction that would benefit all members of the community. Schools, dispensaries, CCM office buildings, butcher shops, market buildings, hotels, bars, lorries, and a bus were obtained, by some villages (see Table 6). The 16 villages surveyed failed to redistribute their earnings after 1974, with the exception of Butiama, which distributed earnings in 1981. Village-government farms never generated enough money to pay all costs. With the shift in the policy emphasis from voluntary to coercive tactics in getting villagers to resettle in the Ujamaa villages, sharing of earnings was no longer a priority. Of the 128 household heads who were interviewed, 91.4 percent said that they



had never received any money in return for participating in collective farming. At Butiama in 1981, the village-government tractors cultivated for all village household heads in a block-farming scheme. The program was not continued after that year.

Therefore, for most villagers living together meant the physical aspect, which provided security. They could go on safari and leave their wives, children, and belongings behind, feeling safe because their neighbors were close. However, in terms of production, distribution, sharing, and acquiring modern technology, as discussed above, the performance was minimal and was adopted by very few villages. Peasants expected material improvement, but to the contrary, their standard of living declined. They blamed their leaders for squandering funds that were earned after the sale of crops harvested from the village-government farms, as was the case at Biatika, Bukima, and Kiabakari.

5.17 Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Village Selection

The results of the 1986 survey generally confirm the judgment made about (1) the level of extension and services available and (2) soil qualities when the villages were selected for the study. The classification of the 16 villages into high and low extension categories was indeed correct (refer to Chapter 4). Table 11 showed that agricultural extension agents, veterinary agents, animal dips, and tractors were more available in the high extension villages than in the low extension villages. Finally, Table 12 showed that more



agricultural implements such as plows and tractors were available in high extension villages than in low extension villages. The total number of acres cultivated in the 16 villages under study is shown in Table 18.

With respect to the identification of services available in the villages chosen from the study, the data confirmed the judgment made. Table 6, for example, indicated that the eight villages with high extension services did, in fact, possess more of the services such as schools and teachers than did the low extension villages. Table 9 confirmed that the eight high extension villages had more nurses, rural medical officers, and dispensaries than the eight low extension villages. Tables 6 through 12 showed that implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy was not based on soil differentiation. On the average, based on the results from the 16 villages selected, the government did not provide more extension services to villages with good soil at the expense of those with poor soil. As the data showed, the number of farm implements provided to villages on poor soil was only slightly less than the number provided to those located on good soil.

These tables provide evidence that the Ujamaa policy implementation program did not take into account the natural resources of a particular village, at least as far as soil fertility is concerned. The availability of extension services seemed to be based on social or political factors, which were discussed earlier in this chapter.



Table 18.--Total acres cultivated in 16 villages, Musoma Vijijini District, 1985.

Village	Population 1986. Number	Crop Grown 1985	Acres 1985. Number	Govt. Farms 1985	Govt. Farm cultivated 1985	Private Farms 1985	Block Farms 1985
Biatika	8,000	Maize	2,010	1.	100.	1,910	0.
Bukima	5,500		1,812	1.	0.	1,812	0.
Butiama	10,000	Maize	2,076	1.	100.	1,976	0.
Chitare	1,800		1,952	1.	0.	1,952	0.
Matongo	1,629	Maize	1,761	1.	20.	1,741	0.
Masurura	4,904	Maize	2,385	1.	110.	2,275	0.
Mmahare	1,117	Cotton	635.	1.	36.	599.	0.
Nyasurura	1,440	Cotton	725.	1.	75.	650.	0.
Kiabakari	6,000	Cot & Cass	5,288	2.	78.	5,210	1.
Kibubwa	1,112	Cotton	1,876	1.	52.	1,824	0.
Kirumi	1,211	Cotton	1,953	1.	60.	1,893	0.
Kwibara	4,000		4,107	1.	0.	4,107	0.
Kyankoma	5,706	Sorghum	3,403	1.	100.	3,303	0.
Saragana	4,700		3,020	1.	0.	3,020	0.
Seeka	1,800		1,280	1.	0.	1,280	0.
Wegero	2,119	Sorghum	722.	1.	226.	496.	0.
Total	61,038		35,005	17.	957.	34,048	1.

Averages Per Villages in Each Category

8 High Ext.	6101.25		3012.63	1.13	61.00	2951.63	.13
8 Low Ext.	1528.50		1363.00	1.00	58.63	1304.38	.00
8 Good Soil	4371.88		2258.88	1.13	93.25	2165.63	.13
8 Poor Soil	3257.88		2116.75	1.00	26.38	2090.38	.00
4 HE & GS	7226.00		2939.75	1.25	97.00	2842.75	.25
4 HE & PS	4976.50		3085.50	1.00	25.00	3060.50	.00
4 LE & GS	1517.75		1578.00	1.00	89.50	1488.50	.00
4 LE & PS	1539.25		1148.00	1.00	27.75	1120.25	.00

Source: Table prepared from the Musoma Vijijini District Survey



5.18 Ranking of Village Performance Through Empirical Observations

Ranking the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy by the 16 villages surveyed indicates that some villages achieved a reasonable measure of success in organizing collective activities. As Table 7 showed, Butiama ranked first for undertaking community activities; these activities will continue to benefit the community in the future. Butiama constructed two schools, thereby increasing its number of schools by 200 percent. This on its own guaranteed the increase in the number of primary school pupils. Through collective effort, the Butiama village government in 1986 owned seven tractors, six trucks, two land-rovers, a grinding machine, a village shop, a workshop for carpenters, a rural factory for producing animal feed, a 100-acre collective farm that produced maize, a modern hotel, and a gasoline and service station.

In second place were two villages, Masurura and Kyankoma. The latter built one school, thereby increasing its number of schools by 100 percent; it also purchased a village-government tractor, had a small hotel and a shop, and maintained a 100-acre collective farm that produced sorghum. Masurura constructed a CCM office building and a dispensary, purchased a truck, and maintained a 110-acre collective farm that produced maize. In third place were three villages: Wegero, which purchased a bus through collective effort and maintained a 226-acre collective farm that produced sorghum; Kibubwa, which constructed a dispensary, purchased a grinding machine, and maintained a 52-acre collective farm that produced



cotton; and Mmahare, which started a small industry for manufacturing buckets, built a small hotel, and maintained a 36-acre collective farm that produced cotton. Biatika was in fourth place for constructing two schools and a hotel, purchasing a grinding machine, and maintaining a 100-acre collective farm that produced maize. However, problems of mismanagement, theft, and corruption within the village leadership distorted and reduced these achievements, as already discussed. In fifth place were Chitare, Kirumi, Kwibara, and Kiabakari. Villages in this category benefited from the Ujamaa Village Policy in that the district government constructed schools, and therefore there was an increase of 100 percent in these facilities.

As already discussed, when the policy came into effect, there was an inadequate supply of human capital. There were not enough trained personnel in the fields of accounting, economics, engineering, health, and political science who could effectively implement the program at the village level. Lack of human capital made the formation of government institutions at the village level weak, leading to inefficiency and lack of accountability. Programs at the village level were often undertaken in a haphazard way. This diminished peasants' enthusiasm for participating in collective work.

Moreover, the educational system was not geared toward the preparation of manpower to serve rural areas, which was a part of the British colonial heritage. The peasants, on the other hand,



were limited by their low level of literacy, making it difficult for them to understand the intricacies of the new program. Yet despite the lack of human resources, the politicians were determined to forge ahead, no matter what happened.

Capital was excluded from Nyerere's development equation because he emphasized four prerequisites for development, namely (1) people, (2) land, (3) good policies, and (4) good leadership.²²⁵ Without satisfactory minimal capital, the village governments lacked the base upon which to establish a viable economic structure. This can be attributed to the national policy, which, as indicated above, ignored the importance of capital in economic development. The policy created conditions that were unfavorable to inducing both foreign and domestic capital formation.

Just as capital received less emphasis in the development equation, technology could not find fertile soil because of the villages' interdependence. Therefore, village governments were unable to attract or adopt modern technology. Stagnation of the level of technology in agriculture will in the long run cause an imbalance between rural and urban areas. The reason for this is that in urban areas, the adoption of production technology will lead to more sophistication in terms of labor efficiency, output, and wages, whereas the rural areas will be required for the production of needed commodities.

²²⁵Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 243.

The results of the study indicated that the original hypothesis was correct in that implementation of Ujamaa Village Policy was unable to achieve the intended policy objectives because of problems in the design, implementation, and availability of four prerequisite inputs.

Furthermore, the findings confirmed that the cohesiveness of the traditional African society constituted a barrier to the implementation of the policy, which aimed at a collective approach to production. Nyerere's strategy to skip the Marxist stage of social consolidation of class divisions brought about by the traditional European sequence was not successful. He thought that if modern technical know-how could be wedded to the still-intact social cohesiveness of the African village, Ujamaa would arrive at the level of scientific socialism that Europe has rarely achieved--a productive, yet cohesive society. The Ujamaa policy goal of trying to develop an economy without encountering the destructive stage of destabilization proved to be precarious. Agricultural output declined, and the labor-intensive form of production through collectivization or communal production was not achieved.

5.19 Concluding Summary

The new administrative structure that made the village the smallest administrative unit in Tanzania's system of government failed to implement the stated Ujamaa policy objectives at the village level. Villages continued to face managerial problems



because they lacked adequate human resources. That was despite the 1977-78 Village Management Training Program (VMT), which trained village managers in bookkeeping and accounting techniques. Apart from the villages of Butiama, Kyankoma, and Masurura, the other 13 villages surveyed exhibited inadequate written records.

The Ujamaa Village Policy was responsible for the construction of three schools and two dispensaries, as well as the establishment of four rural industries in 2 of the 16 villages surveyed. However, lack of desks and books and low pay for teachers reduced the quality of education provided. Health centers and dispensaries suffered from lack of medicines and medical equipment, and low pay for rural medical personnel created conditions for a black-market, as medicines were made available to those who were able to bribe.

The shortage of extension agents for agricultural and veterinary services remained a problem, worsened by lack of adequate training and inadequate supplies of fertilizer, insecticides, modern farm equipment, livestock medicines, and credit for farmers. However, by placing emphasis on collective farms, the demonstration work for agricultural agents was made easier because they could reach more people in one location without setting up individual appointments. Village infrastructure, such as animal dips, were constructed without consideration for local conditions, and therefore most did not operate during the rainy season because pipes became clogged with mud. Lack of veterinary medicines left some veterinary units unusable for most of the year.



Villages lacked well-constructed markets to facilitate local exchange of goods. Lack of good roads and transport was responsible for rural stagnation because village members failed to transport fresh vegetables and fruits to larger towns where they could be easily marketed. Lack of incentives in the form of consumer goods such as soap, sugar, kerosene, cooking oil, bicycles, radios, clothes, shoes, and construction material reduced morale for cash crop production and surplus production of food crops. When peasants earned money, they felt they had nothing to spend it on or that they could not keep pace with the inflated prices of such consumer goods available at black-market prices. Hence, a decline in the standard of living was widely experienced.

Institutional failure was felt at the village level by the local officials and peasants who were interviewed. They thought that national leaders had let the villages down by promising and not delivering. As the detailed discussion in Chapter IV indicated, village leaders and peasants expected the government to provide them with adequate agricultural, veterinary, health, education, and transportation infrastructure such as roads, transportation, and telecommunication. The need was for the government to provide the essential services, while combating black-marketeering and corruption, which were identified as the major causes for institutional failure.

The inadequacy of capital continued in most villages, with the exception of Butiama, which was blessed with the four factors essential for economic development. For most villages, capital was

difficult to acquire, and the Ujamaa village approach had not provided a solution. The inability of village governments to generate capital made them totally dependent on the district government for aid. Only 3 of the 16 villages surveyed had managed to purchase a tractor, bus, or lorry. The level of technology available was found to be insignificant.




CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary

The process of evaluating economic growth and development in Third World countries is complex. Cultural, social, political, and economic conditions and the country's traditions must be understood in order to evaluate its progress toward stated goals. This study attempted to analyze economic growth and development in Tanzania following the Arusha Declaration, a post-colonial strategy that proposed the Ujamaa Village Policy as a form of socialism that was to provide the most direct path to rapid rural economic development. The Arusha Declaration stressed a policy of socialism for rural development based on the assumption that strengthening the pre-colonial African traditional system of familyhood offered what was believed to be the only alternative to neocolonial dependency. This researcher examined the premise upon which this strategy was based and explored the limitations of ideology as a tool for rural economic development. The empirical investigation was based on a survey of 16 villages from the Musoma Vijijini District in northern Tanzania in 1986.

This study identified four factors that are important for economic development. These are improvements in institutions, human



resources, capital, and technology. The development or lack of development in post-colonial Tanzania is a consequence of the absence of appropriate contributions of these factors, particularly inadequate institutions to effectively implement the Ujamaa Village Policy.

To summarize, Chapter 1 presented the objectives of this study and explained the plan and the need for the research. In Chapter 2, the historical development of Tanzania was discussed. The policies of the colonial era were traced, including German promotion of settler plantations and mobilization of labor under the plantation and the *dorfschamba* structure, which set out to supplant the traditional pre-colonial economy. During this period the introduction of cash crops was seen as the first step in the process of incorporating the Africans into the commercial sector. The succeeding British influence was also examined, covering their system of indirect rule, their encouragement of African marketing cooperatives, and the introduction of credit institutions for African farmers. Much of the discussion explored the institutional structures that were established and the economic activities undertaken. The problems of the Groundnut Scheme undertaken by the British in 1947 provided evidence of how modern technology must be relevant to the skills of the laborers and climatic conditions if it is to be successful. The importance of trained human resources, capital, institutions, and technology was identified in their historical context, to underscore the importance of those factors in the process of economic development.

Chapter 2 also examined the rural development policy in Tanzania up to the pre-independence 1960 World Bank Mission Report, which proposed two types of changes: (1) the improvement approach and (2) the transformation approach. These approaches became the basis of rural development planning between 1963 and 1969. The World Bank strategy required relocation of peasants from their traditional homes to new government-selected resettlement sites. This move, however, not only proved to be expensive, but, in fact, created a group of semi-privileged people who became dependent on mechanized technology provided to them by the government. In 1967, these highly capitalized schemes were abandoned with the adoption of the Arusha Declaration. The World Bank's improvement and transformation program was then replaced by the voluntary Ujamaa villages formation program, which adopted the collective farming approach based on President Nyerere's pamphlet entitled "Socialism and Rural Development." Overall, Chapter 2 explained the historical factors leading to the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, which placed Tanzania on the road to socialism and set the stage for implementing the Ujamaa Village Policy in rural areas.

Chapter 3 reviewed Tanzania's economic performance since the adoption of the Ujamaa policy in 1967. The chapter was divided into two parts. Part 1 focused on macroeconomic conditions, particularly changes in the agricultural sector and the production of both cash and food crops. Part 2 examined the implementation of the Ujamaa Village Policy and the subsequent changes in this policy, including persuasion, coercion, and block farming.



Policy implementation was envisioned by the government to follow a distinct pattern:

1. The gradual development of agricultural cooperatives using labor-intensive tools such as hand hoes, before turning to oxen plows and later tractors.
2. For crop transportation, acquire oxen-drawn carts and then lorries.
3. Voluntary movement to Ujamaa villages.
4. Increasing crop production.
5. Voluntary collective farms and collective ownership of livestock.

The slow implementation of the voluntary Ujamaa village collective farming led to the adoption of coercive tactics in 1972, and subsequently a presidential order requiring this forced village-formation process to be completed by 1976. With the 1974-1976 drought, this collectivization approach to agricultural production gave way to the block farming approach. Part 3 of the chapter explained the causes for the decline in agricultural output, leading to a discussion of the four driving factors for economic development: institutions, human resources, capital, and technology. Further discussion was devoted to the role of cooperatives, producer prices, and governmental policies designed to reduce dependency through self-reliance and the import-substitution approach.

It became evident from the analysis presented in Chapter 3 that although Tanzania's total GDP in Tanzanian shillings appeared large,



output growth had been declining. Between 1978 and 1986, agricultural output declined by 2.9 percent per annum, with subsistence production declining the most. The declines included food crops, forcing the National Milling Corporation in the 1970s and 1980s to import maize, which cost the country dearly in foreign-exchange earnings. The decline in cash and food crop production was attributed to lower producer prices, which were set by the government.

The discussion of institutions indicated that the frequent changes hurt economic performance, particularly the abolition of both the local governments and the voluntary cooperative movement. Although the government's strategy was to effect centralized control for development, the initiated changes failed to improve efficiency and increase productivity. Poor economic performance caused by frequent institutional changes forced the government to reinstate local governments and cooperatives in 1982. However, the economy declined, reaching a critical stage that was further complicated by the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which led to a balance-of-payments crisis.

Part 4 of this chapter provided a review of the range of social and economic analysis of the Ujamaa Village Policy. This review of various schools of thought led the writer to conclude that the Marxists never took the Ujamaa village approach seriously because they believed it lacked the needed "class struggle." Considering the lack of basic economic essentials for raising the productive forces to a modern level, western economists were also skeptical

about the rural collective approach to agriculture. They believed education, credit, and land and price reforms were essential to increasing productive capacity. However, this literature review showed that some positive social gains were realized through the Ujamaa Village Policy, such as an improvement in health, education, and life expectancy.

Other events that influenced the present economic crisis in Tanzania were identified in this review. They include:

1. Adverse weather conditions, for example, drought and floods, ravaged the country and cut deeply into agricultural output, especially in 1974, 1975, 1979, and 1980. These conditions caused the government to exhaust its foreign-exchange reserves by importing food and concentrating on food production rather than cash crops.

2. The Uganda War cost more than \$500 million, much of it in foreign currency reserves.

3. The sharp increase in oil prices in 1974 cost the country from 10 percent to over 50 percent increase in net foreign export earnings.

4. The deteriorating terms of international trade between Tanzania and the developed countries reduced the effectiveness of increased agricultural output and foreign reserves.

5. The 1977 break-up of the East African Community for joint airline, railway, and postal telecommunication services forced the country to spend scarce foreign-currency reserves to set up a new national system.



6. The unstable world economy of the 1970s and 1980s, with its rampant stagflation, forced the government to reschedule some foreign loans. The effect was negative, resulting in huge deficits that further hampered the country's balance of payments.

Chapter 4 was divided into two parts. Part 1 explained the survey methods, and Part 2 described the Mara Region and the Musoma Vijijini District, where the survey was undertaken. In Part 1, the research methods used in the survey were explained. These include sampling procedures for the survey, the quantification techniques, and the problems encountered. The absence of records of crop output, cost of production, yield, and farmers' earnings or income were some of the quantitative problems encountered. The computer software used for data analysis included Systat and Lotus 1-2-3. However, lack of needed data diminished the level of quantitative analysis undertaken. Part 2 of this chapter provided a description of the historical, demographic, geographic, and economic background of Mara Region and the Musoma Vijijini District, where the study was undertaken.

Findings of the field research were discussed in Chapter 5. The underlying hypothesis was that in the absence of appropriate improvements of institutions, human resources, capital, and technology, the Ujamaa Village Policy as it was implemented could not achieve the intended policy objectives. The results of the analysis showed that, while each of these four factors was vital to the success of the policy implementation, some were more important to Tanzania's rural development than others. Human and



institutional improvements were found to be more deficient than investment capital and technology. The data also revealed certain qualitative factors, suggesting that the cohesiveness of the traditional African society constituted a barrier to the implementation of the Ujamaa policy as a collective approach to production. Nyerere's strategy was an attempt to use Marxist theory to skip the stage of social consolidation and class division, which is supposed to precede the development of socialism. He thought that if modern technical know-how could be wedded to the underlying social mores of the African village, Ujamaa would arrive at a level of "scientific socialism" that European socialist states had not yet achieved.

In Nyerere's views, capitalism was closely equated with colonialism and all its negative connotations. However, the goal of reestablishing an economy based on traditional society, which was functionally and ideologically compatible with a socialistic national economy, proved unachievable. Ujamaa became a classic case of the failure of a simplistic world view to solve a very complicated problem. Reality prevailed.

Based on the findings from the 16 villages surveyed in 1986, the social ownership of plows, for example, remained insignificant; only 51 belonged to four village governments, whereas 1,192 belonged to private individuals. Voluntary movement to Ujamaa was so slow that government took coercive measures. Crop production declined as a result of lack of care for fields, which were far removed from the



farmers and thus left unattended, eventually to be destroyed by pests and animals. Each village government maintained a farm on which all villagers were required to participate. Participation was enforced through collection of "nzagu," a fine that was levied on those who failed to show up for collective work. The field study supported the conclusion that with the exception of Butiama, Masurura, Kyankoma, and Wegero, other government village collective farms failed to produce a profit. The forced formation of Ujamaa villages thus reduced agricultural production.

The Ujamaa Village Policy was responsible for the construction of three schools and two dispensaries, as well as the establishment of four rural industries in 2 of the 16 villages surveyed. However, lack of desks and books and low pay for teachers reduced the quality of education that was provided. Health centers and dispensaries suffered from lack of medicines and medical equipment. Low pay for rural medical personnel created conditions for a black-market, as medicines were only available to those who were able to pay extra.

Institutional failure was felt at the village level, as indicated by local officials and peasants who were interviewed. They felt that national leaders had let the villages down by promising and not delivering. The new administrative structure, which made the village the smallest administrative unit in Tanzania's system of government, failed to implement the stated Ujamaa Village Policy objectives at the village level. Villages continued to face managerial problems due to lack of adequate human resources. That was despite the 1977-78 Village Management Training



Program (VMT), which trained village managers in bookkeeping and accounting techniques. Apart from the villages of Butiama, Kyankoma and Masurura, the other 13 villages surveyed exhibited inadequate written records.

The shortage of extension agents for agriculture and veterinary services remained a problem, worsened by lack of adequate training and inadequate supplies for fertilizer, insecticides, modern farm equipment, livestock medicines, and credit for farmers. However, by placing emphasis on collective farms, the demonstration work for agricultural agents was made easier because they could reach more people in one location without setting up individual appointments. Village infrastructures, such as animal dips, were constructed without consideration for local conditions, and therefore most did not operate during the rainy season because pipes became clogged with mud. Lack of veterinary medicines left some veterinary units unusable for most of the year.

Villages lacked well-constructed markets to facilitate local exchange of goods. Lack of good roads and transport was responsible for rural stagnation because village members could not transport fresh vegetables and fruits to larger towns where they could be easily marketed. Lack of incentives in the form of consumer goods such as soap, sugar, kerosene, cooking oil, bicycles, radios, clothes, shoes, and construction material reduced morale for cash crop production and surplus production of food crops. When peasants earned money, they felt they had nothing to spend it on or that they



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The shortage of extension agents for agriculture and veterinary services remained a problem, worsened by lack of adequate training and inadequate supplies for fertilizer, insecticides, modern farm equipment, livestock medicines, and credit for farmers. However, by placing emphasis on collective farms, the demonstration work for agricultural agents was made easier because they could reach more people in one location without setting up individual appointments. Village infrastructures, such as animal dips, were constructed without consideration for local conditions, and therefore most did not operate during the rainy season because pipes became clogged with mud. Lack of veterinary medicines left some veterinary units unusable for most of the year.

Villages lacked well-constructed markets to facilitate local exchange of goods. Lack of good roads and transport was responsible for rural stagnation because village members could not transport fresh vegetables and fruits to larger towns where they could be easily marketed. Lack of income in the form of consumer goods such as soap, kerosene, cooking oil, bicycles, radios, clothes, shoes, and construction material reduced morale for cash crop production. The surplus production of food crops. When peasants earned money, they were reluctant to spend it on or that they

could not keep pace with the inflated prices of such consumer goods available at black-market prices. Hence, a decline in the standard of living was widely experienced.

Institutional failure at the village level was caused by the government's inability to provide peasants with adequate agricultural, veterinary, health, education, and transportation services. Peasants needed loans, medicines, and the appropriate infrastructure such as roads, transportation, and telecommunication. The government's inability to provide essential services, while combating black-marketeering and corruption, was identified as the major cause for institutional failure.

The inadequacy of capital continued in most villages, with the exception of Butiama, which was blessed with the four factors essential for economic development. For most villages, capital was difficult to acquire, and the Ujamaa village approach had not provided a solution. The inability of village governments to generate capital made them totally dependent on the district government for aid. Only 3 of the 16 villages surveyed had managed to purchase a tractor, bus, or lorry.

6.2 Conclusion

History is a great teacher, but its lessons must be remembered by those guiding future development. In Tanzania, some lessons were lost. All humans are faced with the problem of survival. Although they may not know it at the time, all people depend on human resources, capital, institutions, and technological advances to make



their lives better and increase their standard of living. Policymakers in Tanzania did learn this from their own and others' experiences. The pre-and post-Arusha Declaration wholesale importation of foreign ideas without relating them to local conditions was doomed to fail, and it did just that.

Two decades have passed since Tanzania achieved independence. Although the country has exhibited a high degree of political stability compared to other African nations, the economy's performance has not matched the existing level of political stability. Tanzania under Nyerere's leadership is among the very few African countries that has to a large extent removed tribalism and its associated tensions. In some countries these tribal tensions have resulted in civil war. Despite the high degree of political stability, with much of the credit owed to Nyerere, part of the failure to achieve success in the economic arena may be traced to a cadre of politicians and civil servants who often lacked formal training, but whose prominence in government was a result of their participation in the nationalist or independence movement, rather than talent in planning, policy making, and administering a government and the economy.²²⁶

There is no longer a need to blame colonialism or capitalist nations for all of the economic and political problems currently facing the country. There is a need, however, to learn from the

²²⁶Gabriel A. Almond, Comparative Politics Today: A World View (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 406.

experiences of other nations, insofar as such knowledge can be integrated into the local environment and put to productive use.

The Ujamaa Village Policy suffered stagnation due to a flaw in its design, which caused agricultural production to decline. Low agricultural production contributed to low income generation for purchasing the inputs necessary to provide sufficient incentives to the peasants to encourage honest participation in cash crop production. The difficulties experienced in implementing the Ujamaa policy were numerous. They seemed to stem from a multitude of sources, one of which was the scarcity of foreign-exchange earnings. If the \$500 million spent on the Uganda War had been spent on implementing the Ujamaa Village Policy, it would have had positive results. Misappropriation of village funds and resources was also rampant, as described in Chapter 5. However, it is important to note that some measure of accomplishment was achieved, such as an increase in the number of schools, dispensaries, and roads; government-owned village tractors at Butiama and Kyankoma; and a bus at Wegero.

The flaw in policy design and lack of pilot projects to test the effectiveness of new institutional arrangements led to misappropriations of village-government funds because there was no established system of accounting, despite the government's effort to establish a Village Management Training Program for training village managers. Furthermore, the role of competition in marketing as a mechanism for inducing efficiency was neglected due to reliance on a single marketing channel, as discussed in Chapter 5. The



monopolistic powers associated with a single marketing channel contributed to an increase in corruption because government parastatals had total control over the distribution of essential goods and services. These problems contributed to the low level of prices to farmers and hence a decline in agricultural production. The consequence was a noticeable decline in the level of living for the rural population.

Lack of income at the village level caused by low production led to a failure to maintain roads, which had a negative effect on internal trade as well as the export of cash crops. Villagers became more isolated due to lack of transportation facilities. The increase in the cost of transportation, apart from external factors discussed above, also was due to lack of spare parts and gasoline, in addition to poor road conditions, which discouraged vehicle owners from risking their equipment.

The top-down approach developed by the centralized state caused increased isolation at the top as the bureaucracy imposed its will on the rural population, instead of responding to their needs. Without feedback from below, there was increased reliance on rigid ideology, which in the long run would not change reality. Individual enterprise at the local level with government support could ultimately improve production and increase individual well-being. Socialist equality of opportunity, a noble goal of the Ujamaa policy, was not achieved. The forced village formation policy did not encourage and motivate those who were ready to work



hard for self-improvement. Policy constraints to self-improvement must be eliminated for widespread progress to be made. Stimulating competition among cooperatives, government parastatals, and individuals will increase productivity and provide the incentive necessary for economic development.

Tanzania needs to continue to invest in the agricultural sector and to make agricultural progress the backbone of the country's development plan. Feeding the populace and improving export crops to raise foreign-exchange earnings is essential, in order to generate capital for industrial development. Ignoring farmers through low producer prices is a form of slow suicide, as the experience of the 1970s and the 1980s has shown. Indeed, there is no quick path to economic development.

Learning from the experience of those who have embarked on that path and succeeded, as well as those who have failed, will show the way. There is a need for government leaders and policymakers to make development decisions based on thorough and careful review of all factors, rather than on particular ideological or political motives. The Tanzanian people have the potential for great social and economic gain as members of the world economic system. If the necessary adjustments are not made, the likelihood for continued stagnation and poverty is great.

Finally, the role of human resources or improved human skills and capacity is essential for rural transformation to occur. The capacity for work must be accompanied by diligence, frugality, and the keen desire to improve materially through arrangements that

enable increased individual savings and the accumulation of capital. Without the spirit of entrepreneurship, ambition, and the competitive desire to convert savings into productive investments, economic growth and development in rural areas will be difficult to achieve. Government initiatives and programs, as the experience in Tanzania shows, can achieve minimal results or can turn into a waste of resources unless accompanied by the importation and local development of the appropriate technology and its transfer by extension agents to rural people for a more productive agriculture.

The comparison of high extension villages and low extension villages confirmed the importance of the availability of the four factors to economic development. It is critical for policymakers to emphasize the production rather than the distribution of wealth. The emphasis on production requires incentives that motivate peasants through higher producer prices and the provision of essential inputs.

The failure in the country's economic growth is measured by the decline in supply of diverse economic goods to its population. The technological, institutional, and ideological adjustments carried out from 1967 to 1987 did not produce the intended results of the Ujamaa Village Policy, a self-sustaining economy. Modern technology and institutions compatible with the rural mode of life were not introduced. Agricultural production, a prime indicator of the effect of the Ujamaa Village Policy, declined due to institutional failure. Thus Tanzania awaits practical rural policies and programs

that can provide the necessary prerequisites to improve technology, human resources, and capital formation.



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE



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ANALYSIS OF UJAMAA VILLAGES
IN
MUSOMA DISTRICT IN TANZANIA 1972-1982

PART 1 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VILLAGE OFFICIALS

1. General Information

- 1.1 Date of Interview _____ 19____
- 1.2 Questionnaire No. _____
- 1.3 Name of Interviewer _____
- 1.4 Name of Village _____
- 1.5 Name of Official _____
- 1.6 Age _____ Sex _____
- 1.7 What is the land under annual and perennial crops cultivated in this village in 1985?

Number of acres

1. Annual _____
2. Perennial _____
3. Total _____

- 1.8 What types of cash and food crops do people grown in this village? (List in terms of order of importance) _____

Cash Crops

Food Crops

- | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|-------|
| 1.8.1 First: _____ | 1.8.5 First: _____ | _____ |
| 1.8.2 Second: _____ | 1.8.6 Second: _____ | _____ |
| 1.8.3 Third: _____ | 1.8.7 Third: _____ | _____ |
| 1.8.4 Fourth: _____ | 1.8.8 Fourth: _____ | _____ |

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II. Now let's discuss Human Capital

2.1 Does this village receive services from the following experts?

		Experts	Live in Village	If not, Frequency of service No. per month	
2.1.1	Agricultural Extension Officer				_____
2.1.2	Veterinary Officer				_____
2.1.3	Community Develop- ment Officer				_____
2.1.4	Rural Medical or Midwife (or both)				_____
2.1.5	Teachers				_____
2.1.6	Others, specify . . .				_____

Code for Live in Village

1 = Yes or No = 0

2.2 What would you consider to be two of the most important inputs/activities contributed by the following experts?
(List in order of importance)

		Experts	1st	2nd	Other (specify)	
2.2.1.	Agricultural Extension officer					_____



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2.2.2. Veterinary
Officer

2.2.3. Community Develop-
ment Officer

2.2.4. Rural Medical
Officer or Midwife

2.2.5. Teachers

2.3 Of the various programs undertaken by each of these officials,
list the one you think is going best?

2.3.1 Agricultural Extension Officer

Which?

Why?

2.3.2 Veterinary Officer

Which?

Why?



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2.3.3 Community Development Officer

Which? _____

Why? _____

2.3.4 Rural Medical Officer or Midwife

Which? _____

Why? _____

2.3.5 Teacher

Which? _____



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Why? _____

2.4 Since 1972, what new training program have the following experts performed in this village? (specify)

	EXPERT	TYPE OF PROGRAM	SINCE WHEN	FREQUENCY (times/mo./year)
2.4.1	Agricultural Extension Officer			
	1.	_____	_____	_____
	2.	_____	_____	_____
	3.	_____	_____	_____
	4.	_____	_____	_____
	5.	_____	_____	_____
2.4.2	Veterinary Officer			
	1.	_____	_____	_____
	2.	_____	_____	_____
	3.	_____	_____	_____
	4.	_____	_____	_____
	5.	_____	_____	_____
2.4.3	Community Development Officer			
	1.	_____	_____	_____
	2.	_____	_____	_____

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3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

2.4.4 Rural Medical
Officer or Midwife

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

2.4.5 Teacher

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

2.5 Do you have an ongoing adult education program in this
village? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes to 2.5., what are the three most important emphases of
your adult education program?

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____



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Code

1. Literacy _____
2. Basic Quantitative skills _____
3. Political Education _____
4. Vocational training _____
5. Other (specify) _____

2.5.1 How many times has the adult education group met in 1985? _____

Explain: _____

2.6 Vocational Training:

2.6.1 Do the officers have sufficient funds to work with? If no, _____
how are you able to conduct the various programs undertaken?

Explain: _____

2.6.2 What family planning techniques does the midwife utilize? _____

Explain: _____

2.6.3 How much of the traditional system of midwife is still _____
practiced?

Explain: _____



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Code

- 1 = Widely Practiced
2 = Rarely
3 = No longer

2.6.4 Does the village dispensary have drugs/medicine? _____

Explain: _____

Code

- 1 = Always
2 = Sometimes
3 = Never

2.7 Do experts have any of the following problems? _____

Code

- 1 = Yes 2 = No

Expert	Problems	
Agricultural	1. Inadequate funding	_____
Extension Officer	2. Lack of transportation	_____
	3. Lack of supplies	

Specify:

a. _____

b. _____



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c. _____

4. Low morale due to low pay _____

5. Lack of cooperation from
superiors _____

6. Other (specify) _____

2.7.1 Rank the three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

2.7.2 Veterinary officer _____

1. Inadequate funding _____

2. Lack of supplies e.g. _____

a. Medicine

b. _____

c. _____

3. Low morale due to low
pay _____

4. Lack of cooperation
from superiors _____

5. Lack of interest to
take advantage of
veterinary services by
villagers _____

6. Other (specify) _____

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2.7.3 Rank three most important problems: _____

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

2.7.4 Community Development Officer

1. Inadequate funding _____

2. Lack of transportation _____

3. Low morale due to low pay _____

4. Lack of cooperation
from superiors _____

5. Low level of participa-
tion _____

6. Other (specify) _____

2.7.5 Rank the three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

2.7.6 Rural Medical Officer or Midwife

1. Inadequate funding _____

2. Lack of drugs and
other supplies _____

3. Low morale due to low pay _____

4. Lack of cooperation
from superiors _____

5. Understaffed _____



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6. Other (specify) _____

2.7.7 Rank the three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

2.7.8 Teachers

1. Inadequate funding _____

2. Low morale due to low pay _____

3. Lack of supplies

a. Text books _____

b. Pencils and paper _____

c. Other (specify) _____

2.7.9 Rank the three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____



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III. Now let's discuss Technology:

3.1 How many tractors does this village have presently working?

	Number of tractors working now	Number of oxen ploughs now
Collective	_____	_____
Private	_____	_____

3.2 Before 1972

	Number of tractors before 1972	Number of oxen ploughs before 1972
Collective	_____	_____
Private	_____	_____

3.3 How many peasants still use hand-hoes for the cultivation of food/cash crops?

Code: C = Collective P = Private -- indicate which one you prefer

	Before 1972 specify type of crop	Since 1972 specify type of crop
1. Almost everyone 1 = All to 3/4	_____	_____
2. Few 2 = 3/4 to 1/2	_____	_____
3. None 3 = 1/2 to 1/4	_____	_____
4. Other (Specify) 4 = less than 1/4	_____	_____



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3.4 Only if the village has a tractor; if not applicable, skip.

Did this village obtain a loan in order to purchase the tractor?

Code: 1 = yes 0 = No

3.4.1 If yes: How much money? \$ _____

3.4.2 Date of loan _____

3.4.3 Value of loan _____

3.4.4 If no: How much it obtained?

Explain: _____

3.4.5 If gift: What was the value of the gift? & _____

3.5 Since 1972, how easy has it been for this village to obtain the following?

1. Petrol? _____

Explain: _____

2. Spare parts? _____

Explain: _____

3. Mechanical parts? _____

Explain: _____

Code:

1 = Impossible

2 = Always

3 = Some Years



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- 3.6 How does this village assign priority to the farms when scheduling cultivation by the village tractor? _____

Explain: _____

- 3.7 How much do you charge per acre for tractor services?

shs. _____ per _____ _____

- 3.8 Who repairs the tractor? _____

Explain: _____

- 3.9 Can a private individual set up a business repairing tractors in this village? _____

Explain: _____

Code: 1 = Yes 0 = No



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Only if the village has oxen ploughs, if not, skip.

3.10 Did this village obtain any loan in order to purchase oxen ploughs? _____

3.10.1 How much money? shs. _____

3.10.2 Year of loan? _____

3.10.3 If not, was it a gift? _____

3.10.4 From whom? _____

3.10.5 How does this village assign priority to the farms when scheduling cultivation by the village oxen ploughs? _____

Explain: _____

3.10.6 How much do you charge per acre for the use of oxen ploughs?

shs. _____ per _____

(1 acre = _____ (local units))

3.10.7 Was any training provided for the use of oxen ploughs? _____

Explain: _____



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IV. Now let's discuss programs Programs:

4.1 Does this village have any irrigation schemes? _____

Explain: _____

4.1.1 Did this village have any form of irrigation scheme before 1972? _____

What type? Explain: (i.e., how many, area, where?) _____

Code: 1 = Yes 0 = No

4.1.2 Does this village have any animal dips functioning? _____

Explain: _____

Code: 1 = Yes 0 = No



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4.2.1 If yes, how many before 1972? _____

4.2.2 Total after 1972 _____

Explain: _____

4.3 Does this village have any artificial insemination programs?

Location	Year cen- ter was started	Fre- quency in 1985	Number of cattle in- seminated annually (1985)	Number of household participa- tion (1985)	Conception rate (1985)
----------	---------------------------------	---------------------------	--	---	---------------------------

-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

Comments: Success rate _____

4.3.1 Which two major problems associated with artificial insemination program does the program face? (Rank in order)

1. Most important: _____

2. Next important: _____

3. Others, explain _____



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- 4.4 What are the top three diseases which afflict cattle in this area and what steps have been taken to prevent these diseases? (Rank according to order of importance.)

Explain:

1. Disease: _____

Prevention: _____

2. Disease: _____

Prevention: _____

3. Disease: _____

Prevention: _____



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V. Now let's discuss Institutions:

5.1 Since 1974, what types of changes has the village undergone in terms of:

1. Local government structure? _____

Explain type: _____

Explain success: _____

Explain problem: _____

2. School System? _____

Explain problem: _____

3. Marketing System? _____

Explain problem: _____



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- 5.2 What types of projects have been undertaken in this village as a result of village initiative and collective effort since 1974? (see table)

	Name of Institution	Total in 1974	Total in 1985	Explanation ((whether good or bad))
5.2.1	<u>Schools</u>			
5.2.2	<u>Dispensary</u>			
5.2.3	<u>Water facilities</u>			
5.2.4	<u>Cooperative Shops</u>			
5.2.5	<u>Transport:</u>			
	<u>1. Roads</u>			
	<u>2. Buses</u> <u>(pass daily)</u>			
	<u>3. Lorries</u> <u>(pass daily)</u>			
	<u>4. Pick ups (owned)</u>			
5.2.6	<u>Farming Equipment</u>			
	<u>1. Tractor</u>			
	<u>2. Oxen Plough</u>			
	<u>3. Most important</u> <u>Livestock</u> <u>type</u>			
	<u>4. Fishing Equipment</u> <u>type</u>			



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VI. Now let's discuss Development Planning: _____

6.1 Do you have a village development plan? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

Total yearly budget 1985 shs. _____

1972 1975 1985

_____ | _____ | _____

_____ | _____ | _____

6.1.1 In drawing out the village development plan, what have been
your major considerations in terms of shs. allocations since
1974? (Rank in order of importance)

1. Human Capital has been allocated shs. _____

Explain: _____

2. Government services have been allocated: shs. _____

Explain: _____

3. Entrepreneurial training has been allocated: shs. _____

Explain: _____



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4. Development of marketing structures has been allocated:

shs. _____

Explain: _____

5. Purchase of technological inputs has been allocated:

shs. _____

Explain: _____

6. Other _____

Explain: _____

6.2 What are the notable changes which have been brought to this village as a result of the village development plan since 1974?

Explain: _____

6.3 How has the national government village policy effected what went on in your village before 1974?

Explain: _____



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- 6.4 Since 1974, how has the national government village policy effected what goes on in your village today?

Explain: _____

- 6.5 What types of local innovative activities for stimulating the village economy have been taking place in this village since 1974?

Give two examples:

1. Type: _____

Impact: _____

2. Type: _____

Impact: _____



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6.6 Do you consider any of the following as problems:

6.6.1 Can you list three of the most serious economic problems faced by this village? (Rank in order of importance)

Rank three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

Code

1 = Lack of essential commodities, e.g. salt, soap, etc.

2 = Inadequate transportation for crops and people.

3 = Poor prices for our crops and people.

4 = Unavailability of technical tools for farming, etc.

5 = Unavailability of instruction material.

6 = Increase of black market.

7 = Offer bookkeeping

8 = Other _____



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- 6.7 Can you list three of the most serious social problems faced by this village? (Rank in order of importance)

Rank three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

- 6.8 Can you list three of the most serious social problems faced by this village? (Rank in order of importance)

Rank three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

Code

1 = Influx of youth to towns and cities.

2 = Theft

3 = Erosion of respect for traditional customs.

4 = Decline of marriages for youths due to economic crush.

5 = Increase in divorce rate

6 = Other _____



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- 6.9 Can you list three of the most serious political problems faced by this village? (Rank in order of importance)

Rank three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

Code

1 = Leaders are more susceptible to taking bribes.

2 = Village members are less eager in participating in political activities (Apathy for alienation).

3 = There is less democratic discussions than before 1974.

4 = Village leadership is more accountable to the national leaders than the village members.

5 = There is a noticeable decline in voluntary collective work.

6 = Other _____

7 = Lower level of education for village leadership.

- 6.10 Can you list three of the most serious technological problems faced by this village?

Rank three most important problems:

First: _____

Second: _____

Third: _____

Code

1 = It is difficult to obtain loans for purchasing tools and equipment.

2 = The village is unable to obtain fertilizers, etc. pumps, insecticides, on time.

3 = There is a lack of technical experts.

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4 = Communication links with other parts of the country is inadequate.

5 = Inadequate training to enable villagers to assimilate and adopt modern technological inputs.

6 = Other

6.11 What has been the rate of adoption in this village of the advice provided by extension officers and how has it contributed to crop output?

Successful Type of advice	Crop	When Year	Impact	Reason for adoption
1.				
2.				
3.				

6.11.1 What in your opinion are the reasons which inhibit the adoption of modern inputs and assistance provided by extension service officers in this village:

1. Crops

Reason: _____

2. Livestock program

Reason: _____

3 Other

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Explain: _____

6.11.2 What help do you receive from the government in solving the problems you have described?

1. Problem type _____

Explain: _____

2. Problem type _____

Explain: _____

3. Problem type _____

Explain: _____

6.12 Apart from the Cotton Authority, the National Bank of Commerce Tanzania Rural Development Bank, Cooperative societies, are there other sources of credit available to this village? _____

Code: 0 = No 1 = Yes

Name them:

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____



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- 6.13 What do you consider as the major contribution made by Tanzanian Agricultural Research stations?

Name three:

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

- 6.14 How does the central government work with the village government in making decisions effecting this village?

Explain: _____



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VII. Now let's discuss the role of Women:

7.1 What function do women undertake which in your views contribute to the development of this village?

Explain: _____

7.2 What has been the effect of the Ujamaa village policy on female participation in this village since 1972?

Role of Women	Number of Women Participating		
	In 1974	In 1975	Explain
Members of Village			_____
Farming			_____
Teaching			_____
Health Care			_____
Other			_____



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PART 2 QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VILLAGERS

I. General Information

1.1 Date of Interview _____ 19 ____

1.2 Questionnaire No. _____

1.3 Name of Interviewer _____

1.4 Name of Village _____

1.5 Name of Household Head _____

1.6 Age _____

1.7 Sex _____

Code

0 = Female 1 = Male

1.8 How many years have you lived in the village? _____

1.9 How many years did you attend school? _____

1.10 Why did you come to this village? _____

Explain _____


Code

1. The government forced me.

2. I wanted to work collectively with other villagers.

3. I felt insecure where I was living before.

4. Other, Explain _____



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1.10.1 How far did you move from? (Specify miles) _____

1.10.2 When you moved from your previous village to this one, _____
what did you do with your house/houses?

Code

1 = It was demolished

2 = It is still there.

3 = Other _____

1.10.3 What did you do with the rest of your property?

Explain _____

Code

1 = Brought it here

2 = Sold it

3 = Other _____

1.11 What is the total land in your farming operation in 1985?

1. Acres owned _____

2. Leased/rented in _____

3. Leased/rented out _____

1.12 What was the total land in your farming operation before 1974

1. Acres owned _____

2. Leased/rented in _____



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3. Leased/rented out _____

1.13 What crops did you harvest this year, 1985 (Specify and list in order of importance)

Cash Crops	Number of			Food Crops	Number of		
	acres	Yield	Price		acres	Yield	Price
1.				1.			
2.				2.			
3.				3.			
4.				4.			
5. Other				5.			

1.14 Comparing the period before 1984, and after, when was your agricultural production capacity greater?

Explain _____

1.15 Do you (household) own any livestock? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes please describe your stock.

Type	Total number of	Livestock sold	Price/ Animal
	Livestock	since 1 Year	
1.15.1 Cattle			
1.15.2 Sheep			
1.15.3 Goat			
1.15.4 Other _____			



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1.15.5 Does the village have any cattle dips? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

1.15.6 If yes, how often does your cattle utilize the facility? _____

Explain _____

Code

1 = Quarterly

2 = Semi-annually

3 = Annually

4 = Other _____

1.15.7 What positive or negative changes can you attribute to the utilization of animal dips? _____

Explain _____

Code

1 =

2 =

3 =

4 =

1.15.8 Does this village have collective owned livestock? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes, how well looked after are the village livestock? _____

Explain _____



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Code

- 1 = Very Well
2 = Fairly Well
3 = Poorly

1.15.9 What are the major animal diseases prevalent in this village?
(List in order of importance)

DISEASE (NAME)	CENTRAL TECHNIQUES	
1. _____		_____
2. _____		_____
3. _____		_____
4. Other _____		_____

Disease Code

- 1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =



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11. Now let's discuss Irrigation:

2.1 Do you irrigate your crops? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes, what crops?

Crop Code

1 = _____

2 = _____

3 = _____

2.2 If yes, what type of irrigation do you utilize? _____

Explain _____

Irrigation Code

1 = Bucket

2 = Canal

3 = Other _____



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2.3 What benefits do you get from irrigation? _____

Explain _____

Code

1 = Increase yield

2 = There is less reliance on rainfall or (less risk)

3 = New crops

4 = Crop intensity

5 = Other _____

2.4 In what years was rainfall inadequate and yield since 1972? _____

Explain _____

2.5 How good is the soil fertility on the land within your farming operation, compared to other farmer's land in this village? _____

Explain _____

Code

1 = Better

2 = Some

3 = Poorer

4 = Don't know

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III. Now let's discuss Capital:

- 3.1 In this village, where did the capital for reconstruction come from in 1972 and after? (Applicable only to peasants that moved to new location) _____

Explain _____

Code

- 1 = Savings
2 = Government
3 = Self-help
4 = Foreign aid
5 = None
6 = Don't know
7 = Other _____

- 3.2 How did you benefit from this aid? _____

Explain _____

Code

- 1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
6 =

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- 3.3 In your opinion, among all the village members who benefit more as a result of governmental aid and collective projects?

Explain _____

Code

1 = Village officials

2 = Almost everyone in this village equally

3 = I don't know

4 = Other _____

Explain _____

- 3.4 What are the purposes for which the government gives loans to farmers in this village?

Explain _____

Code

1 = Purchase fertilizer and other inputs

2 = Purchase equipment

3 = Build houses

4 = I don't know

5 = Other _____



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- 3.5 Why do you think the government gives loans to some farmers and not to others? _____

Explain _____

Code

- 1 = Because those who are well off are less risk, while the poor are not.
- 2 = Because they have connections (relatives) in high offices, while others do not.
- 3 = Because they are influenced in this village.
- 4 = Because they know how to read and write and can apply for loans.
- 5 = All get loans
- 6 = Other _____

- 3.6 What things must a farmer do in this village to get a government loan? _____

Explain _____

Code

- 1 = Apply for it only
- 2 = Have collateral
- 3 = I don't know
- 4 = Someone sign for you

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- 3.7 If a farmer receives a loan for shs. 1,000 how much money will the government require the farmer to pay back/when?

Explain _____

- 3.8 What is the longest period of time the farmer is given, to pay the loan back?

Explain _____

Code

- 1 = If it depends on the amount of the loan (specify)

- 2 = One year

- 3 = The government is flexible until the loan is paid off

- 4 = Other _____

- 3.9 Will anything happen if a farmer refuses or is unable to pay when the government requires it of him?

Code

- 1 = Yes 0 = No



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3.9.1 If yes, when?

Explain _____

Code

1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
6 =

3.10 Do some types of government loans require the farmer to pay
back more money than others who may be considered high risk? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes, which ones? _____

Explain _____

Code

1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
6 =



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computer
codes only

3.11 Have you received a government loan? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes, how much did you receive - which year?

Purpose Source 1972 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 Amount
Paid
back

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____

Purpose Code

1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
6 =

Source Code

1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
6 =



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IV. Now let's discuss Technology:

4.1 During your farming activities this past year, did you use any of the following?

- 4.1.1 Tractor _____
- 4.1.2 Oxen - plough _____
- 4.1.3 Hand-hoe _____
- 4.1.4 Other _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

4.2 Since 1972, have you purchased any farm equipment? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes, what type of equipment did you purchase?

- 4.2.1 Tractor _____
- 4.2.2 Oxen - plough _____
- 4.2.3 Hand-hoe _____
- 4.2.4 Other _____

(If not applicable, skip the next question)



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codes only

4.3 If it is a tractor, how easy has it been for you to obtain the following?

4.3.1 Petrol/Diesel Explain: _____

4.3.2 Spare parts and other accessories Explain: _____

4.3.3 Mechanical repairs Explain: _____

4.3.4 Other (specify) Explain: _____

Code

1 = easy 2 = difficult 3 = impossible

4.4 If it is a plough, who provided you with the oxen? _____

Code

0 = Not applicable

1 = I already owned them

2 = I bought them

3 = I rent from a neighbor

4 = Government

5 = Other _____

4.4.1 Did you receive training in oxen plough utilization? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

4.4.2 If yes, who trained you? _____

Explain _____

Code 0 = Not applicable 1 = Self 2 = Course

3 = Other _____



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computer
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V. Now let's discuss Agricultural Extension Services

5.1 How has the Agricultural Extension officer performed?

Explain _____

Code

0 = No service

1 = Good

2 = Okay

3 = Poor

5.2 My family is receiving adequate scientific information and techniques which have improved crop yield and productivity.

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

1 = Strongly agree

2 = Agree

3 = Disagree

4 = Strongly Disagree

5 = Don't know



Use for
computer
codes only

- 5.2.1 My family's basic food needs are met on a daily basis
since I moved to this village. _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Strongly Disagree
5 = Don't know


- 5.2.2 Of the following, which ones do you utilize?

Type	Beginning year of Utilization 19__	Results:

1. Fertilizer _____
2. Hybrid seed _____
3. Insecticides _____
4. Pumps _____
5. Other _____

Results Code

- 1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
6 =
7 =
8 =



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5.2.3 Since 1972, how easy has it been for you to obtain the following?

TYPE	SOURCE	EXPLAIN
------	--------	---------

1. Fertilizer _____

2. Hybrid seed _____

3. Insecticides _____

4. Pumps _____

5. Other _____

Code 0 = Not applicable

1 = Easy

2 = Not easy

5.2.4 How much do you spend on the purchase of agricultural inputs?

shs. _____

Explain: _____

5.3 Community Development Officer: _____

5.3.1 There is no longer reliance on superstition and witchcraft because village members have become more aware and knowledgeable about modern science and technology.

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

1 = Strongly agree

2 = Agree

3 = Disagree

4 = Strongly Disagree

5 = Don't know

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computer
codes only

5.4 Rural Medical Officer or Midwife:

5.4.1 My family receives adequate medical care in this village. ____

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly agree
- 2 = Agree
- 3 = Disagree
- 4 = Strongly Disagree
- 5 = Don't know

5.5 Teachers:

5.5.1 My children are receiving adequate education in this village. ____

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly agree
- 2 = Agree
- 3 = Disagree
- 4 = Strongly Disagree
- 5 = Don't know

5.5.2 My family has improved since I learned how to read and write.
(Ask if he reads/writes) ____

Explain _____

Use for
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Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly agree
- 2 = Agree
- 3 = Disagree
- 4 = No Opinion
- 5 = Don't know
- 6 = Don't read and write

Any further comments on experts (Specify)

Explain _____

5.6 Veterinary Officer:

5.6.1 My animals receive adequate veterinary care in this village. _____

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly agree
- 2 = Agree
- 3 = Disagree
- 4 = Strongly Disagree
- 5 = Don't know

5.7 What are the notable changes which have been brought to this village as a result of the village development plan since 1972? _____

Explain _____



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- 5.7.1 How has the national government village policy affected what
went on in you village before 1972?

Explain _____

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VI. Now let's discuss Institutions:

6.1 Do you have the following facilities in this village?

Facilities	Year Contracted 19__	Status
------------	----------------------------	--------

6.1.1	Well	_____
6.1.2	Pipe Water	_____
6.1.3	Dispensary	_____
6.1.4	Cooperative Shop	_____
6.1.5	Public Safety	_____
6.1.6	Schools	_____
6.1.7	Buses & Lorries	_____
6.1.8	Other _____	_____

Code

0 = No or year

Code

0 = No working

1 = Working/okay

2 = Very good



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- 6.2 I am satisfied with the services I receive from the dispensary in the form of drugs and attendance. _____

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Satisfied
2 = Deserve Improvement
3 = Dissatisfied
4 = Don't know

- 6.3 In comparison to early 1970's do you think the health services have improved or deteriorated? _____

Explain _____

Code

- 1 = Improved
2 = Remained the same
3 = Deteriorated
4 = Don't know

- 6.4 Does you wife get any modern family planning advice from the clinic? _____

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Better 3 = Worse
2 = Same 4 = Don't know



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computer
codes only

- 6.5 Do you think the institutions listed below have changed over the past 10 years? What type of changes have you noticed occurred and why?

	<u>Institution</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Comments</u>	
6.5.1	Government	_____	_____	_____
6.5.2	Health dispensary	_____	_____	_____
6.5.3	Public Safety (Police)	_____	_____	_____
6.5.4	Schools Education	_____	_____	_____
6.5.5	Transportation Roads, buses lorries	_____	_____	_____
6.5.6	Agricultural Extension	_____	_____	_____
6.5.7	Parastatals	_____	_____	_____
6.5.8	Other _____	_____	_____	_____

Comment Code

0 = NA
1 = Better
2 = Same
3 = Worse
4 = No opinion
5 = Don't know

Change Code

0 = No
1 = Yes



Use for
computer
codes only

- 6.6 Looking at the condition of the institutions listed below, do you think they are run better now than the period before 1972? If no, would they have been running more efficiently if they were privately owned, why?

	Institution	Comment	
6.6.1	Schools	_____	_____
6.6.2	Dispensary	_____	_____
6.6.3	Water facilities	_____	_____
6.6.4	Cooperative Shops	_____	_____
6.6.5	Transportation Facilities	_____	_____
6.6.6	Other _____	_____	_____

Comment Code

0 = NA

1 = Better

2 = Same

3 = Worse

4 = No opinion

5 = Don't know



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- 6.7 I think that government has become impersonal and an individual is unable to make one's own decisions.

Explain _____

- 6.8 I spend too much time waiting for others to decide what to do next, as a result of collective work.

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Don't know

- 6.9 In the collective farms laziness is discouraged and as a result, people are working harder and producing more.

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Don't know



Use for
computer
codes only

- 6.10 What do you know about Ujamaa Policy? Explain the three most important meanings of what you understand by Ujamaa policy.

Explain _____

Code

- 1 = Collective work
2 = Sharing the returns of labor
3 = Absence of exploitation of man by man
4 = Other _____
5 = All three
6 = 1st two
7 = 1st only
8 = Number 2 and 3
9 = Only number 3

- 6.11 I'm living as a (Mjamaa) socialist peasant right now. _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = No Opinion
5 = Don't know

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computer
codes only

- 6.12 Can you describe the Ujamaa way of life and how it is different to the way of life prior to 1972?

Explain _____

Use Leckert scale below

- 6.13 I'm content with the way I'm living now. _____

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Don't know

- 6.14 Farmers have adequate freedom to express their views in the village council. _____

Explain _____

Leckert Scale

- 1 = Strongly Agree
2 = Agree
3 = Disagree
4 = Don't know



Use for
computer
codes only

6.15 What public safety institutions are in this village?

		Available	Quality	
6.15.1	Police Post	_____	_____	_____
6.15.2	Militia	_____	_____	_____
6.15.3	Other	_____	_____	_____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

Quality Code

1 =

2 =

3 =

4 =

5 =

Use for
computer
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VII. Now let's discuss Adult Education:

7.1 Have you attended adult education classes? _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes, where and how have you been able to apply your
knowledge acquired from adult education classes? _____

7.1.1 1. Farming _____

2. Animal Husbandry _____

3. Health _____

4. Ujamaa and Cooperatives _____

5. Politics _____

6. Management and bookkeeping _____

7. Other, Explain _____

Code

1 = I am able to read and write

2 = I am able to apply fertilizers and insecticides on my farm.

3 = I am able to follow extension officer's guidelines and
recommendations.

4 = I am able to vote without being instructed by others what to
do.

5 = Other _____

Use for
computer
codes only

VIII. Now let's discuss Collective Work:

- 8.1 Do you think this village is currently implementing the objectives of Ujamaa of working together and sharing the yield?

Explain _____

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

- 8.2 What projects have been undertaken in this village as a result of village initiative and collective effort since 1972 until now?

	Project	# In 1974	# Since 1985	
1.	Schools	_____	_____	_____
2.	Dispensary	_____	_____	_____
3.	Water facilities	_____	_____	_____
4.	Cooperative Shops	_____	_____	_____
5.	Transportation:			
	a. New road built	_____	_____	_____
	b. Lorry	_____	_____	_____
	c. Bus	_____	_____	_____
6.	Farming Equipment	_____	_____	_____
	a. Tractor	_____	_____	_____
	b. Oxen plough	_____	_____	_____
	c. Livestock	_____	_____	_____
	d. Fishing equipment	_____	_____	_____

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e. Other _____

(Skip if not applicable)

- 8.3 Do you feel that you receive adequate share from your labor as a result of your participation in village collective activities? Code 0 = No 1 = Yes _____

If not, Explain: _____

Code

1 =

2 =

3 =

4 =

5 =

6 =

- 8.3.1 If yes, how does the distribution system work? _____

Explain _____

Code

1 =

2 =

3 =

4 =

5 =

6 =

7 =

8 =

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IX. Now let's discuss Marketing:

9.1 Where do you market your crops?

Type of Crop	Type of Market	Importance of Market
1. Cotton	_____	_____
2. Maize	_____	_____
3. Cassava	_____	_____
4. Fruits	_____	_____
5. Vegetables	_____	_____
6. Livestock	_____	_____
7. Other	_____	_____

Major Market

Importance Code

0 = Don't know

1 = All

1 = Don't sell

2 = Some

2 = Cooperative

3 = None

3 = Middlemen

4 = Black market

5 = Other _____

9.2 What type of problems do you face in marketing your crops?

Type of Crop	Problems
1. Cotton	_____
2. Maize	_____
3. Cassava	_____
4. Fruits	_____
5. Vegetables	_____
6. Livestock	_____

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7. Other _____

Code

0 = Don't Grow

1 = Don't market

2 = Lack of Transport

3 = Inadequate roads

4 = Lack of storage facilities

5 = Low prices

6 = Have to wait a long time for payment after marketing

7 = Other _____

9.3 How far away do you market your major crops? _____

9.3.1 Type of Crops Distance in Miles

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

9.4 Are you satisfied with the way the market operates? _____

Explain _____

Satisfaction Code

1 =

2 =

3 =

4 =

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9.5 What is the pricing mechanism for your crops?

Crop	Mechanism
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

9.6 In your opinion, what are the advantages and disadvantages of governmental parastatals? (Do they offer good services?)

Advantages:

Explain _____

First _____

Second _____

Disadvantages:

Explain _____

First _____

Second _____

Code for Advantages

1 =

2 =

3 =

4 =

Code for Disadvantages

1 =

2 =

3 =

4 =



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- 9.7 What do you think about the prices offered by the government or cooperative for your major crops?

Explain _____

- 9.8 What do you think about the prices offered by the government or cooperative for your major food crops?

Explain _____

- 9.9 Do you have any problems in transporting your crops to market?

Code

1 = Yes 0 = No

If yes, what are your problems?

Explain _____

Code

1 = 4 =

2 = 5 =

3 = 6 =



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9.10 What do you consider as essential consumer goods you need?

Item	Available today compared to before 1972	
1. Salt		
2. Soap		
3. Sugar		
4. Clothes		
5. Shoes		
6. Bicycle		
7. Other		

Code

1 = Always 2 = Seldom 3 = Usually

9.11 What is your feeling about the prices of essential consumer goods?

Explain _____

9.12 Do you feel that the price of livestock encourages you to build a large herd?

Explain _____

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computer
codes only

- 9.13 Do you feel that your tradition and culture is well preserved since you moved to this village?

Explain _____

- 9.14 What are the three major investments you have made over the past ten years?

Item	Cost	
First: _____	_____	_____
Second: _____	_____	_____
Third: _____	_____	_____

- 9.15 Today, are the items listed available for purchase if a village collective or a farmer wants to buy either of the following?

Equipment

1. Tractor _____
2. Bus _____
3. Tractor _____
4. Oxen plough _____
5. Boats _____
6. Boat engines _____
7. Fishing nets and other accessories _____
8. Other _____

Code

0 = Don't know 3 = Seldom

1 = Always 4 = Never

2 = Usually

APPENDIX B

CHI-SQUARE CORRELATIONS

Appendix B -- Correlations from the 16 Villages, Musoma
Vijijini District Survey 1986

Relationship between	Correlations
Schools and Pupulation	.67
Animal Dips and Population	.65
Animal Dip and Usage *	-.49
Schools and Extension Services	.87
Dispensary and Extension Services	.87

Source: Musoma Vijijini District Survey

* Negative relation due to many dip breakdowns.



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