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Ph.D. degree in **Sociology**

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THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: CORPORATE CAPITALISM, PROGRESSIVE POLITICS, AND THE NATURE/NURTURE DEBATE

Volume I

By

Gil Musolf

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1989

6041167

ABSTRACT

THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:
CORPORATE CAPITALISM, PROGRESSIVE POLITICS,
AND THE NATURE/NURTURE DEBATE

BY

GIL RICHARD MUSOLF

A dialectical sociology of knowledge model is employed to research the social origins of symbolic interactionism. The thesis is that symbolic interactionism emerged out of the nature/nurture debate and was influenced by the social context of the times and Progressive politics. In post-1865 United States, industrialization, immigration, urbanization, and the rise of graduate research universities were the major social forces transforming America. Along with these transformations arose arguments over the nature of human nature. Social Darwinism, an ideology that justified laissez-faire capitalism, arose. This ideology began to decline in the 1880s when challenged by Lamarckian social thinkers and by the rise of corporate capitalism which sanctioned social intervention directed at achieving social order. Biological and psychological hereditarianism then arose. Many hereditarians had political commitments to the eugenics movement which favored restrictionist immigration and involuntary sterilization. Biological hereditarianism declined when cultural anthropologists and comparative ethnologists separated culture from biology and argued for the cultural interpretation of behavior and when geneticists undermined the claims

of the hereditarians by showing the plasticity of heredity to the environment. Psychological hereditarianism continued into the early 1930s with the invention of the IQ test. Psychological hereditarians later recanted their biological interpretation of IQ scores when numerous and persistent anomalies undermined their perspective. Also, by the mid 1930s, the social times had changed in favor of egalitarianism with the rise of the New Deal and federal commitments to equality of opportunity, social security, and social insurance legislation. Beginning with William James and advancing in the work of James Mark Baldwin, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, W.I. Thomas, and George Herbert Mead, anti-determinist arguments against a biological interpretation of human nature and behavior were advanced. Their emphasis on socialization and education was influenced by their Progressive politics. In order to theoretically ground social intervention, a new view of human nature was conceptualized which argued that human beings could determine their environment rather than be determined by either biology or social environment. Self and society became indivisible and social intervention, theoretically justified; for, by changing institutions of socialization and education, one could improve the human condition.

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GIL RICHARD MUSOLF

1989

TO THE REMEMBRANCE OF GULLEK O. ESPING

FARMER, STEWARD, AND CULTIVATOR OF MORE THAN THE LAND

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all of my committee members, Dr. William Ewens, Dr. James McKee, Dr. Donald Olmsted, and Dr. Richard Peterson for guiding me through the process of completing this dissertation. A special note of thanks goes to Donald Olmsted who came in on short notice after the retirement of an earlier committee member. A special note of appreciation is also due Dr. Richard Peterson who spent considerable time reading various drafts of the dissertation. Dr. Peterson showed persevering concern that certain basic issues be resolved in order to develop a more coherent and consistent theoretical understanding of the relationship between knowledge and social context. The work is better for his critique. Above all, a great deal of appreciation is owed to my dissertation chair, Dr. James McKee. Dr. McKee not only contributed his time and effort (as others did) but also proved to be an excellent mentor. It seems to me that a mentor must be able to do (at least) two things: one is to critique a young scholar. But critique is the easier task, especially for a senior scholar who has spent his scholarly life involved in the general area of study that encompasses the dissertation. The harder task is to guide the student to a better understanding of the research project undertaken. In this second task, Dr. McKee proved

to be an exemplar. He pointed out implicit themes, themes that needed exploration or that had been ignored, directions that one needed to turn away from and directions that one needed to turn toward. This is, I believe, the harder and more time-consuming task. Dr. McKee's influence on my thinking and this dissertation is significant. In a work that centers on nature versus nurture, it was Dr. McKee's nature to nurture me along, and for that I will always be grateful. I would also like to thank my wife, Pat Neahr. She knows how great my debts are.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation's task is to trace the development of the perspective within sociology known as symbolic interactionism and the social context within which that sociological perspective arose. The dissertation's thesis is that symbolic interactionism arose from a historically particular social setting, the Progressive politics of the early interactionists, and a struggle over the conceptualization of human nature in what has come to be known as the nature/nurture debate. This first chapter will briefly introduce the major tenets of symbolic interactionism, the development of early interactionism, the statement of the problem, the method of study, the social context of early symbolic interactionism, and an outline of the dissertation's chapters.

Symbolic Interactionism as a Perspective

The term symbolic interactionism originated from Herbert Blumer, who used the term to characterize the works of William James, James Mark Baldwin, Charles Horton Cooley, W.I. Thomas, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. Since these scholars are regarded as the originators of this school of thought by contemporary symbolic interactionists

(Rose, 1962; Manis and Meltzer, 1967; 1972; 1975; Gordon and Gergen, 1968; Blumer, 1969; Stone and Farberman, 1970; Meltzer, Petras, and Reynolds 1975; Hewitt, 1976; Charon, 1979; Karp and Yoels, 1979; Rock, 1979; Lewis and Smith, 1980; and Stryker, 1980;), we are provided with a generally recognized consensus as to whom and what symbolic interactionists define as symbolic interactionism. It also provides us with a reason to limit this analysis to the contributions that these particular thinkers made to the emergence of symbolic interactionism and to the reconceptualization of the sociological view of human nature and behavior.

I postulate symbolic interactionism to be a unique perspective, which is a set of interrelated assumptions and concepts that explain or offer generalizations about social life, or some aspect of social life. Social life is a broad and general term for the patterns of human interaction. It may cover anything from the simplest interpersonal exchange, to the relationship between social institutions, to the relationship between nations. Those who share a perspective share certain assumptions about social life, focus their attention on explaining particular problems, and share a set of concepts for explaining those problems. Symbolic interactionists concentrate on how people define social reality and the consequences of those definitions for everyday behavior. Symbolic interactionists, at least within early interactionism, shared similar assumptions, concepts, and focused their attention on solving a specific set of

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In what way do these early symbolic interactionists represent a perspective? First and foremost, I have used the term perspective because symbolic interactionists themselves conceive of their work as a perspective (in a fashion similar to the definition described above) rather than a theory.

> ... [S]ymbolic interactionism is a sociological social psychological orientation or perspective, i.e., a broad set of interrelated concepts, ideas, findings, and assumptions about the two-way relationship between man and the socio-cultural system, rather than a theory ... (Schmitt, 1974: 453).

Social theory explains the relationship between two or more social phenomena. It must have logical propositions, be empirical, and be testable. Whether symbolic interactionism has testable propositions has been the subject of much debate (Huber, 1973).

What are the characteristics of symbolic interactionism? Three scholars have defined what is common among most adherents, thereby providing an answer to what unifies the works of James, Baldwin, Cooley, Thomas, Dewey, and Mead.

> ... [T]he perspective known as symbolic interactionism comprises the following basic ideas: The influence that stimuli have upon human behavior is shaped by the context of symbolic meanings within which human behavior occurs. These meanings emerge from the shared interaction of individuals in human society. Society itself is constructed out of the behavior of humans, who actively play a role in developing the social limits that will be placed upon their behavior. Thus, human behavior is not a unilinear unfolding toward a predetermined end, but an active constructing process whereby humans endeavor to 'make sense' of their social and physical environments (Meltzer et al., 1975: vii).

More simply put, symbolic interactionism is a perspective which offers generalizations about how the individual develops a self and mind, and the relationship of the individual who possesses a self and mind to the society in which he/she lives.

In analyzing the symbolic interactionist perspective I will focus exclusively on the emergence of the so-called "Chicago school" of symbolic interactionism, ignoring the "Iowa school" of symbolic interactionism (Meltzer et al., 1975: 53-82). Time, space, theoretical coherence, consistency, and logic are the primary reasons for this decision. I propose to analyze the emergence of a unique perspective by tracing its social and theoretical origins, not the many varieties of this perspective which have been argued to exist (Meltzer et al., 1975: 53-82). The "Iowa school" of symbolic interactionism differs in its methods of research. More important, this school of thought emerges much later, during the post-World War II period, placing it out of the periodization of this dissertation, 1890-1934.

Mead as the Culmination of Early Interactionism

The early symbolic interactionists are unified by the development of their concepts which culminated with the publication of Mead's works "... in which most of the germinating ideas had been [developed]" (Kuhn, 1972: 58). Early interactionism had several distinguishing features, "... there tends to be much ... repetition; there is a

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strain to 'get it right,' that is, to be correct; there is much debate over orthodoxy ..." (Kuhn, 1972: 58). Thus, early symbolic interactionism is characterized by the development of the basic concepts and assumptions which ended with the posthumous publication of Mead's Mind, Self, and Society in 1934. I will be focusing exclusively on early interactionism, which, as Manford Kuhn argues, culminated in the works of Mead who articulated and systematized the basic concepts in his lectures and publications.

The Historical Development of Early Interactionism

In the almost fifty years spanning from 1890 to 1934, American sociology was formed. Much of this development was centered at the then new University of Chicago. During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, many of the works of sociologists were influenced by the evolutionary writings of Herbert Spencer. Spencer's evolutionary thesis has been explained by Lewis and Smith.

> This doctrine, as applied to the field of sociology, conceives of social structures as the product of the interactions of individuals acting out of a desire to satisfy universal human needs of an organic or quasi-organic nature. Societies and individuals not socially organized in ways functionally compatible with these needs will eventually perish when forced to compete for resources with those more harmoniously adapted, thus providing the evolutionary thrust to human social history (Lewis and Smith, 1980: 4)

Early American sociologists accepted Spencer's evolutionary thesis and his individualism but they did not accept (except for Sumner) his Social Darwinism.

Social Darwinism, an ideology to justify the social

inequality of the period, particularly class stratification and the system of laissez-faire capitalism that perpetuated it, flourished in America in the 1880s and 1890s. Social Darwinists argued that social inequality was the result of natural selection and that philanthropic or state interventionism to help the less fit would only do more damage to society than good. Arguments were advanced that "natural" inequalities among people inevitably lead to a "natural" system of social stratification. Philanthropic and state interventionism was therefore interfering with the "natural" order of events, threatening the survival of the species. William Graham Sumner, a diehard Social Darwinist, expressed these beliefs in his book What Social Classes Owe to Each Other, (1883) and in the article, "The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over" (1894). However, Social Darwinism was short-lived; even in the 1880s it was challenged by American scholars who were influenced by European theorists who placed a great emphasis on cooperation as the source of social evolution and adaptation rather than competition. It was challenged by Lamarckians of the American Social Science Association who called for social intervention. It was challenged by Progressive reformers who also called for social reconstruction. But the most important downfall of Social Darwinism was the advent of corporate capitalism which undermined the need for an ideology to justify laissez-faire capitalism. It was corporate capitalists who saw the need for social responsibility and the need for a

regulated, interventionist, liberal state to create social order (Weinstein, 1968: x). The concept of social evolution would remain, though it, too, came under attack in the early decades of the twentieth century with the advent of comparative ethnography.

Among those reformers who called for social reconstruction were the pragmatists. Beginning in 1890 with the writings of William James and continuing into the first three decades of the twentieth century with the writings of James M. Baldwin, W.I. Thomas, Charles H. Cooley, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, there was a perspective, among many others, that would challenge biological determinism: symbolic interactionism. Through their Progressive politics they rejected the Social Darwinist notion of anti-interventionism and through their reconceptualization of the nature of human nature they rejected biological determinism.

> ... Spencer's philosophy of history was too materialistic to appeal unqualifiedly to American sociologists, many of whom had deep humanistic commitments stemming from earlier careers as ministers. They preferred a philosophy that preserved the naturalistic and individualistic overtones while nevertheless admitting the possibility of and, indeed, necessity for intelligently guided melioristic social reform. Pragmatism, especially the pragmatism of James and Dewey, offered precisely this philosophical combination (Lewis and Smith, 1980: 5).

The early symbolic interactionists came from the disciplines of philosophy and sociology. The American philosophy of pragmatism is closely associated with symbolic interactionism; indeed, William James, John Dewey, and George H. Mead are considered pragmatists. I am solely concerned with

the elements of their thought that contributed to the development of symbolic interactionism. Thus, the pragmatists (or early interactionists, I use these terms interchangeably) opposed Spencer's philosophy on three fronts: they were against the laissez-faire doctrine of economic individualism; rather than antivolitional in their conception of human beings, they conceptualized human beings as volitional; and, rather than accepting biological determinism they set out to reconceptualize the nature of human nature, postulating that human beings developed through selves and minds. Symbolic interactionists accepted and helped in developing what the Hinkles have called voluntaristic nominalism (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: v). What the symbolic interactionists added was that the human being was a social animal, a creature made social through socialization. Socialization gave human beings a self and a mind. With a self and mind, human beings could think, formulate plans-of-action, define the situation, and act. Human beings had choice in their behavior and were more determining than determined. It is the mature development of this thought in the works of George Herbert Mead that led to the challenging of biological determinism; it also contributed to the reconceptualization of human nature and behavior and thereby to the development of sociology. The symbolic interactionists were not alone in the fight against Social Darwinism or biological determinism, but their conceptualizations and the social context of that conceptualization process are the

primary focus of this dissertation.

Yet, even though Social Darwinism declined, biological determinism was far from dead. Hereditarianism arose. Biological hereditarianism arose with the development of experimental biology in the works of August Weismann, Gregor Mendel, Hugo DeVries, Charles B. Davenport and other experimental biologists. Psychological hereditarianism arose with the new psychology in the works of H.H. Goddard, Lewis Terman, Robert M. Yerkes and many others. Psychological hereditarianism led to the invention of the IQ test as the measure of the innate self-worth of human beings. Within the disciplines of biology and psychology, it was argued that the human beings were biologically determined and that their intelligence was fixed, unalterable, and that there was great variance in the intelligence of races.

The hereditarian biologists and psychologists also gave impetus to the eugenics movement. In general, the eugenists exploited the perspective of hereditarianism as scientific ammunition to justify programs such as restrictionist immigration, especially of Eastern European immigration, and involuntary sterilization of those whom they argued were "less fit." In the early twentieth century there also arose Jim Crow legislation. State legislatures had their laws tested up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court, which constitutionalized segregation and disenfranchisement. The most crucial cases were Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 which constitutionalized the separate but equal doctrine and the

Williams v. Mississippi case which constitutionalized the Louisiana concept of the so-called "grandfather clause."

Hereditarianism would be challenged by symbolic interactionists through their reconceptualization of the nature of human nature and behavior (Hinkle, 1954: 30). The hereditarianism of the early psychologists and biologists would be challenged by two other developments: the work of Franz Boas who fostered the rise of cultural anthropology and the work of the new geneticists in the second and third decade of the twentieth century. However, it was the work of the geneticists who could attack the basic assumptions of hereditarianism from within biology that finally undermined it. In the dissertation, I will briefly review the contributions of the cultural anthropologists and the new genetics to the rise of a new conceptualization of human nature and behavior; however, my main focus will be on the work of symbolic interactionists as they came to redefine the nature of human nature, personality, and social behavior.

Thus, I have discussed what is a perspective; what characterizes symbolic interactionism as a perspective; why I will be focusing on the particular thinkers that I do; why the emergence of early symbolic interactionism culminated in the works of George Herbert Mead; and, a brief outline of the development of early symbolic interactionism. This leads us to a statement of the problem.

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The Statement of the Problem

Why did symbolic interactionism emerge when it did? Why did it take the particular conceptual direction that it did? What were the significant factors in the social context that contributed to its development? It is part of this dissertation's thesis that the early interactionists' interpretation of the social conditions and social changes transforming America--industrialization, immigration, and urbanization--led to their Progressive politics and the call for social reconstruction. Their call for social reconstruction primarily entailed education and socialization, which would guide the ability of human intelligence to adapt to a changing environment. However, the notion that human intelligence guided by education and socialization is an active instrument in remaking the self and the world, presupposes that individuals can make and remake themselves. This assumption was in stark contrast to biological determinism and instinct theory, the prevailing perspective on the nature of human nature in the early decades of the twentieth century, which implied passivity, fatalism, and resignation to people's lot in life and their ability to change their life for the better. If human behavior and achievements were limited by biology and instincts, if human intelligence did not have the capacity to adapt to a changing environment, then social intervention through reform, education, and socialization to socially reconstruct society was scientifically unsound and politically bankrupt. Therefore,

in order to theoretically ground social reconstruction, a new perspective on the nature of human nature was needed. The early interactionists were a subset of social reformers oriented to a task that characterized sociologists generally; for, the new knowledge generated by the study of society was oriented to, and indeed, provided justifications for, social reconstruction.

> Sociology in general and theory in particular developed justifications which demanded that the field be consciously oriented to the social problems phenomena associated especially with the conditions of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration around the turn of the twentieth century (Hinkle, 1980: 53). This knowledge would permit social progress to become a conscious objective and would facilitate amelioration of those social conditions construed to be 'social problems' (Hinkle, 1980: 23).

It is this dissertation's thesis that the symbolic interactionist perspective emerged directly out of the nature/nurture debate, and that that conceptualization process was influenced by interactionists' interpretation of the social context of their times and their Progressive beliefs. Some who were progressives, such as E.A. Ross and John Commons, were more interested in social control and were as well hereditarians. But the symbolic interactionists were not hereditarians. It is also argued that this development of a new perspective of human nature was complex and emerged slowly, at first in the works of William James, who had concepts of free will and indeterminacy, but who also adhered to instinct theory and only late in life came to advocate for social reform. The emerging perspective advanced with the work of Baldwin, Cooley, and Thomas; then,

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advanced much more profoundly, in the works of Dewey and Mead. Their efforts were to develop a perspective that thoroughly demonstrated the social basis and indeterminant nature of behavior, personality, and human nature.

Revolting against formalism and any fixed structures of the mind or any abstract, static concept of human nature, it was primarily Dewey and Mead who set out to show that behavior was socially not just biologically influenced, that people became human beings through having selves and minds, that people were more determining than determined, that the self has free will, creativity, choice, possibility, spontaneity, and novelty opposed to being biologically determined, that people create their own social worlds, that social control is largely self control, that individuals can solve problems in living through minded behavior, that people are malleable, that human beings have the potential to remake themselves, and that truth is measured by successful completion of intended action, i.e., ideas are tested by their ability as instruments to achieve intended action such as the social reconstruction of society.

Through the above assumptions and the development of a whole host of concepts to be explored in this dissertation, the interactionists argued for the social basis of human nature and behavior. Society, socialization, and the unique human abilities to both symbolize objects and events expressed through language, and empathize with others were the constitutive basis of human nature. Influenced by

Darwin's and Spencer's notion of adaptation and evolution, people adapt to the situation through action (adjustive responses) guided by a definition of the situation and the meaning that social objects have for them. Defining the situation and the meaning that social objects have for people are both socially embedded in their social relationships and an emergent of the social situation. Thus, one's situation-in-the-world continuously evolves or is an emergent process. Our ability to define the situation and make an adjustive response based on that definition is the contribution of intelligence to the adaptive capacity of the species. One is always in the process of becoming; for, one's self and mind are continuously evolving through one's interaction with the environment and with others.

The above interactionist argument presented a diametrically opposite view of human nature than the passive, inevitable, biological, and instinct perspective that had hegemony in the early years of the twentieth century. The interactionist emphasis on the emergent and indeterminant quality of social behavior is an argument against the instinct argument of invariant behavior. In the early twentieth century it was argued that human beings had instincts such as the "herding" instinct or the "acquisitive" instinct or the "aggressive" instinct or the "self-preservation" instinct. In 1924 L.L. Bernard, after an exhaustive review of the literature, published as Instincts: A Study in Social Psychology, had identified 15,789

instincts attributed to human beings. But instinct behavior is invariant behavior that denies the possibilities of choice. If we have an instinct to behave in a certain way, then it is inevitable that we will behave that way.

Instinct theory presented a stimulus-response model of behavior. The interactionists argued that between the stimulus and the response was the ability of human consciousness to think, to define the situation, and then to act. Human consciousness gave human beings the adaptive capacity to define the situation and thereby social behavior was emergent and indeterminant, not invariant. A human being's behavior was learned behavior. We cannot learn or unlearn an instinct. Since human behavior is learned behavior and not biologically determined, then what human beings will become depends primarily on socialization and education. That line of reasoning was the interactionist argument for the social basis of human nature and personality. If we are to improve the social condition of humanity, then the institutions of learning are paramount. This is the connection between the interactionist Progressive and liberal program of social reconstruction and their process of conceptualization. Since a human being's situation-in-world was always in the process of becoming, the world itself was always in the process of becoming. Through improving the institutions through which people learn, and through which they acquire a self, mind, personality, and human nature, then we simultaneously improve humanity's potentiality as we improve

society.

Social intervention, combined with massive public efforts to educate and socialize immigrants and the victims of inequality would give human intelligence and its adaptive capacity the opportunity and tools to work as an instrument for self and social reconstruction. A socially destructive environment and ineffective institutions of education and socialization to guide human intelligence were the constraints limiting humanity's potentiality, not biology. If human beings had the potential for self-change, if human beings' situation-in-the-world could continuously evolve and was an emergent process, then advocating for social intervention and new institutions of education and socialization to guide human intelligence toward social reconstruction was scientifically justified and politically feasible. Thus, this dissertation sheds light on the dialectical relationship among social context, political commitments, and conceptualization. It argues that the meta-theoretical origins of symbolic interactionism are to be found in a particular historical social context and in Progressive political commitments that called for social reconstruction, and that the theoretical origins are to be found in the nature/nurture debate.

I concentrate on the social context of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration because the hereditarians' argument that it was nature that was dominant in determining the quality of a person's life was a dialectical

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outgrowth among their interpretation of those social conditions, their political commitment to eugenics, and their conceptualizations. Beginning with James but with strong statements in Baldwin, Cooley, Thomas, and especially by Dewey and Mead, it was argued that it was nurture, socialization, education, the primary group, peer groups, and the generalized other, etc., that were dominant in the emergence of a person's self and mind. This perspective was also a dialectical outgrowth of their interpretation of that same social context, their political commitment to social reconstruction, and their conceptualizations. The social context of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration is thus fundamental, for it was the interpretation of those social changes, along with opposing political commitments, that affected the conceptualization of human nature that led to the nature/nurture debate. Therefore, to understand how those interpretations emerged and developed we must understand the social context in which they were embedded and from which they cannot be extricated.

The nature/nurture debate is crucial to discuss because it is this dissertation's thesis that the concepts of symbolic interactionism were formulated in this debate. The nature/nurture debate came out of a <u>struggle over interpreting the social processes</u> transforming the United States--industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. This means that there was a strong political component to the nature/nurture debate. There were social policy

consequences, for example. Thus, the nature/nurture debate was more than an academic debate; it was a debate over the type of society the United States was to become, more egalitarian and democratic or more class stratified and undemocratic. The major thrust of the symbolic interactionists' response to hereditarian, determinant, and instinct reasoning was concepts that formulated a socialization perspective. Socialization was, at one time, a very political perspective. The symbolic interactionists' arguments were that all people were capable of learning, that all people could become citizens, that all people could participate in democracy, that all people can be socialized to the prevailing culture. Socialization assumed that there was a universal human nature and that all people develop selves and minds through the process of socialization. Today we take this for granted, but in the early decades of the twentieth century, to assume that eastern and southern Europeans had the same human nature as Anglo-Americans, that they could become human through the very same processes that everyone else did, was a political and fiercely contested notion. Thus, socialization had (and has) political overtones that we have forgotten about, especially when not informed of the social origins that contributed to such conceptualization.

If we assume that the environment, nurturing, socialization, and education are phenomena which affect the self (as the interactionists did), and we want to intervene to change the environment, patterns of nurturing,

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socialization, and education so that human beings can remake themselves and the world around them (as the interactionists did), then that demands a perspective on human nature that downplays biology and emphasizes people's creativity, intelligence, voluntarism, and determining qualities and abilities. The interactionist argument was that there is an indissoluble connection between society and self. Society makes or constitutes human beings as human beings make or constitute society; one does not exist in independence of the other. For the interactionists, even if one is a hermit, one takes society with one mentally, for action will always be based on a conversation of significant gestures with others, i.e., thinking, deliberating, and forming plans of action with reference to significant others or the generalized other, that is inescapable and the defining character of the human being.

Thus, through a sociology of knowledge model that reviews the dialectical interplay among social context, Progressive politics, the particular intersection of biography and history for the interactionists, and the conceptualization process, one is able to understand why interactionism emerged when it did, why it took one direction and not another, why it developed the set of concepts that it did. Directly out of the nature/nurture debate, the interactionists constructed an image of people's situation-in-the-world as continuously evolving through adaptation by adjustive responses to the environment and others, which led to the

emergent perspective on self and mind--a new perspective on human nature. Neither biology nor the situation determined action or behavior for there is a dialectical relationship among the situation, our definition of the situation, and our adjustive response or social behavior. This ability to define the situation embeds indeterminacy into all social action and allows for novelty. One's social behavior in a situation, because one can take the role of many significant others as well as the generalized other, is probabilistic rather than determined by either biology or social structure. The challenge the interactionists took was to establish the indissoluble connection between human beings and their social surround, that human beings are primarily social beings with an emergent self and mind that empowers them to transcend the determinist claims of biology and instincts. In a dialectical relationship, a human being's self and mind are social emergents and people, through action, constitute the world around them just as they are constituted by that same world. Thus, nurturing, socialization, and education in primary groups and other larger institutions were crucial in the formation of human nature and must be continuously improved in order to emancipate human beings from a contemporary environment destructive to self-esteem and human potentiality, thereby providing a theoretical justification for the effectiveness of social intervention.

To summarize: it was the interactionists'

interpretation of the social changes transforming America that led to their Progressive views. Their Progressive views led to their call for social reconstruction through education and socialization. Influenced by the social context background and Progressive politics, symbolic interactionism emerged directly out of the nature/nurture debate with a perspective on human nature that would support melioristic intervention, and offer an alternative to biological determinism and instinct theory. The social conditions and the Progressive politics of the times--both working in dialectical fashion--led interactionists to reassess the nature of human nature and formulate a socialization perspective that is generally accepted in social science today. The concepts of symbolic interactionism are tied in, embedded directly, in the social and political context of that time. Without understanding this connection we cannot understand why symbolic interactionism emerged when it did and took the particular conceptual direction that it did.

This dissertation will attempt to demonstrate that a sociology of knowledge model is one way to delineate the relationships among social context, political commitments, and the conceptualization process. Robert K. Merton has issued a charge to those who specialize in the sociology of knowledge.

> ... [T]he sociology of knowledge remains largely a subject for meditation rather than a field of sustained and methodical investigation. This has resulted in the curious condition that more monographs and papers are devoted to discussions of what the sociology of knowledge is and what it ought to be

> than to detailed inquiries into specific problems (Merton, 1970: 172).

Roscoe C. Hinkle has charged that "... our knowledge of the general or composite nature of theory from the early decades of the discipline is scandalously inadequate" (Hinkle, 1980: 12). I will take up these challenges by attempting a "sustained and methodical investigation" into the social origins of symbolic interactionism by outlining the dialectical relationship among social context, Progressive politics, and conceptualization.

The Method of Study

In attempting to answer the dissertation's statement of the problem, I will use a sociology of knowledge method. But what precisely is the sociology of knowledge in general and what particular model of the sociology of knowledge will I use as this dissertation's research method? In order to define the method I will use I will solely review those statements and insights that have led me to develop a method which I choose to use. This is neither an exhaustive review of the literature on the sociology of knowledge nor an attempt to assess the major debates within the sociology of knowledge. It is merely a review of those thinkers whom I will use to formulate a model to use as a method.

The General Orientation of a Sociology of Knowledge

The sociology of knowledge postulates that phenomena such as social structure, culture, social interaction, the

nature of social institutions, and the period of history have a contributing effect on fostering and sustaining the rise of interpretations of the natural and social world. The sociology of knowledge's major tenet is that the way people theorize about the natural and social world is enveloped and nurtured within the social and political context within which people are embedded. Knowledge is enveloped and nurtured within a specific socio-historical setting. The social setting of knowledge may be as all-encompassing as Western society or a nation-state; or as confined and esoteric as the beliefs and practices of a cult of snake-charmers. As Mannheim stated, knowledge in a meaningful sense cannot be understood if the social origins of that knowledge are obscured or ignored (Mannheim, 1936: 2).

The social origins of knowledge are related to social processes specific to particular societies.

> [It is social processes] ... characteristic of, and exclusive to, a definite society, which inhere, as it were, in its life-structure and life-process, which make the total picture of reality dominating that society its very own, an expression of its very self, which cannot, in consequence, be easily transferred to other societies ... (Stark, 1958: 55).

Thought, then, is contextually rooted in specific social settings. Numerous sociologists have argued that revealing the social context of knowledge leads to a more profound understanding of cultural phenomena.

> It claims that, if we want to comprehend the full meaning of any cultural phenomenon, we must go beyond it and study the social circumstances with which it is genetically connected; or, to be even more careful and to avoid all possible overstatement, that it is fruitful for the understanding of cultural phenomena

> to explore the social setting within which they have been conceived and born. Its ultimate aim is both doctrine and a method; a doctrine or theory which will show exactly what the interrelations of social substructure and intellectual superstructure are; whether they are close or loose, one-sided or mutual, etc.; and a method or mode of procedure which will enable us to uncover the social--the 'existential'--roots of any concrete mental structure or artistic achievement and thereby to gain more insight into its making and meaning, its essence and existence, then we should have or could have otherwise (Stark, 1958: 12).

What is necessary for comprehending the full meaning of knowledge is, a fortiori, necessary for comprehending the full meaning of social theory.

Remmling argues that a major research issue of the sociology of knowledge is the connection between social structure and social theory.

> For the social scientist's universe of discourse the sociology of knowledge provides insights into the connections between social theory and social structure. The optic of the sociology of knowledge reveals social theories as reflections or emanations of a substratum of social forces and reality factors which possess--in comparison to thought products--a greater degree of optic reality in the sense of constituting ens realissimum. The sociologist of knowledge offers and augments material evidence for the assumption that specific reality factors and their interplay affect the production, distribution, and consumption of social theories which appear as concretizations of the striving generated by reality factors or as reaction formations against a particular movement of social forces. Reality factors may be identified variously as confluences of forces in the direction of military dominance, political hegemony, economic power, and the psycho-physical affirmation of repressive senescence or youthful vitality (Remmling, 1973: xvi-xvii).

These two statements are general descriptions of what a sociology of knowledge tries to do. Stark argues that it is "fruitful for the understanding of cultural phenomena" to

know the social context of that phenomena. The argument that cultural phenomena (social theory is a part of culture) are "interrelated" with social context implies a dialectical relationship. Understanding the social context of knowledge is vital because it helps us "... to gain more insight into its making and meaning, its essence and existence, then we should have or could have otherwise." Remmling's statement that "social theories ... [are] reflections or emanations of a substratum of social forces and reality factors ..." is a causative force which is more than what I will argue for. It implicitly denies the notion that ideas have consequences. But it correctly points out that knowledge envelopes and is nurtured in a specific historical social context, that knowledge does not arise or change in a vacuum. Both of these statements assert that there is a relationship between social context and social theory and that the latter cannot be adequately understood (agreeing with Mannheim) if the former is ignored or obscured.

I think it is important to confront this issue and specify what type of relationship between social context and social theory will be employed as a model in this dissertation. In order to do this I will undertake a brief review of insights from the sociology of knowledge. I will then present the particular sociology of knowledge model that I will use as a method in this dissertation.

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Relevant Insights from the Sociology of Knowledge

There have been three general approaches to conceptualizing the origins of knowledge: 1) that social practices are primary, 2) that cultural practices are primary, and 3) that social and cultural practices dialectically shape the framework within which knowledge is constructed.

Insights from Marx

Williams (1977) traces the origins of an economic reductionism to those who misinterpreted Marx. The misinterpretation is attributable to the following passages.

> Social relations are intimately connected with the forces of production. In acquiring new forces of production, men change their mode of production, their way of earning their living; they change all their social relations. The hand mill will give you a society with the feudal lord, the steam mill a society with the industrial capitalist (Marx, 1964: 95).

Economic transformations will engender changes in the superstructure.

> At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or--what is but a legal expression of the same thing--with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then occurs a period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed (Marx, 1964: 51-52).

Marx, of course, meant by superstructure, culture in the broadest sense, which included social and political institutions.

Williams does not see anything wrong with those

statements if they are understood as Marx had intended them to be. Williams argues that those who followed Marx, not Marx himself, relied too heavily on technological determinism ("a hand mill engenders feudalism, a steam mill engenders capitalism") and on economic determinism ("with the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed"). The concepts of causality, temporal priority, and the separation of social activities from theoretical activities emerged from presenting a sequential theory of the relationship between base and superstructure. The concept of "base" was presented as a primary, determining activity and the concept of "superstructure" was presented as a secondary, determined activity. Marx left his theory vulnerable to this interpretation by the implications within the above passage. A positivistic conceptualization emerged emphasizing the base as an independent variable and the superstructure as a dependent variable, reducing culture to a function of the economy, depriving culture of its constitutive power, and abandoning the dialectical relationship between the two, i.e., that material activity and culture are "directly interwoven" with and constitute each other. The separation and sequential ordering of dialectically constitutive social processes is an error of reductionistic and dualistic thinking that Marx wanted to overcome.

Williams reminds us that Marx's whole argument in the <u>German Ideology</u> centers on the constitutive (not just

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reproductive) power that the ruling ideas have in perpetuating the capitalist mode of production. The reason Marx critiqued bourgeois thought as ideological is that it presented itself as independent of material activity rather than "directly interwoven" with it. Mechanical materialism and idealism are both reductionistic in this sense; they fail to recognize the dialectical connection between social and cultural formations. It is the tension between these two, coupled with human consciousness, our ability to think, that leads to conflict and social change. An important point is that the relationship between knowledge and social structure is not one of dependency, i.e., that culture, knowledge, or theory is a determined, mechanical, or passive reflection of social practices. It is not that first there is a social practice and then there emerges a cultural practice that reflects, like a mirror, that social practice. Williams argues that culture does not represent "real" life analogous to the way aesthetic criticism argues, at times, that art, literature, or music represents or reflects "real" life. That argument entails a passive concept of culture: that real life is somehow "out there" and that cultural forms reflect, though do not constitute, real life. Rather, culture is a way of life that is as much a constitutive and productive force in life as is any social practice. The most important point to remember is that within this dialectical interplay it is the human being who is essential to social and cultural development.

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Insights from Mannheim

A unilateral mode of analysis was further advanced by Mannheim. Mannheim made the distinction between a critique of ideology and the sociology of knowledge that engendered broader and more profound research questions about the relationship between social context and knowledge. But Mannheim appropriated the base-superstructure sequential equation and substituted social structure for base and knowledge for superstructure. The conceptualization of a one-way relationship remained: social structure, social relationships, or social context was primary; consciousness, thinking, or culture was secondary.

> It points rather to a research interest which leads to the raising of the question when and where social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions, and in what sense the former concretely determines the latter (Mannheim, 1936: 266; emphasis G.M.).
>
> ... [I]t is a purely empirical investigation through description and structural analysis of the ways in which social relationships, in fact, influence thought (Mannheim, 1936: 266-267; emphasis G.M.).
>
> ... [W]e will present the sociology of knowledge as a theory of the social or existential determination of actual thinking (Mannheim, 1936: 267; emphasis G.M.)

So far as they go, these statements are not so much inaccurate as they are incomplete: social consciousness, knowledge, and culture are impotent. It is not that social structures do not condition thought but rather that thought also acts back upon and conditions social structures. Ideas not only have social causes but also social consequences (Williams, 1971).

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Insights from Stark

Stark argues that if culture is seen as determining social life then this is a form of idealism.

> It has inspired some of the most imposing systems of culture-analysis and culture-interpretation, for instance those of Hegel and Comte, Spengler and Spann, and more recently, Sorokin in America and Alfred Weber in Germany. Perhaps one can best characterize this particular outlook by saying that it regards all concrete cultural phenomena, whether they be works of the discerning mind or works of artistic creativity, as emanations of some basic mental attitude or philosophy of life, or, more metaphysically, of some indwelling cultural-soul ... (Stark, 1960: 225).

This one-sided approach is as limited and reductionistic as is mechanical materialism.

To begin his analysis, Stark advances a dialectical conceptualization of the relationship between social structure and knowledge. His sociology of knowledge explores this relationship without exerting causation. For Stark, to argue that social theory is primarily determined by either social practices or a larger cultural tradition is at best an artificial construction distortive of the complexities of everyday reality. The concept of primary determination entails the separation of social wholes so as to introduce causality, temporal priority, and the sequential ordering of social life. Any sociology of knowledge that employs a causal analysis is doomed to dogmatism because any specific examination finds both social structure and culture already there. To separate the dialectical activities of social wholes introduces the insuperable problem of determining which came first, a moot speculation reminiscent of the

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chicken versus the egg dilemma. Thus, the theory that economic activity produces cultural formations or that culture determines social practices is abandoned here. Rather, both are seen as productive forces that dialectically set limits to and exert pressures on ways of life and ways of thinking. The essential point for Stark is that social theory is created by individuals within this social and cultural context. A non-reductionistic sociology of knowledge thus abandons the search for the causes of social theory and, rather, seeks to illuminate the nature of the relationship between the social and cultural context and the concepts of a theorist or theoretical tradition.

> ... [T]he sociology of knowledge, as we see it, is essentially a hermeneutic or explanatory method, not a dogmatic ontology. It does not involve any specious metaphysical assumptions concerning the relationship of substructure and superstructure, thought and being--least of all assumptions of a deterministic kind in the strict or technical sense of the word. All it takes for granted is that in man thought and being--individual thought and social being--form an indissoluble unity. But if he who lives in society and he who thinks in private are essentially one person, if there is no divorce between man's social existence and man's mental processes, then the former may and must be able to throw light on the latter, and consideration of the latter in the light of the former must be a help towards the understanding of human thoughts and feelings. The task of the sociology of knowledge is merely to explore--and explore by way of realistic research, by the accumulation of analytical case-histories as it were--how close the connection between social substructure and mental superstructure in fact is, and consequently how great is the contribution which the sociological study of mental phenomena can make to the understanding of culture and its development (Stark, 1960: 142-143).

The social and cultural context of the times sets the stage, for human beings construct theoretical positions out

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of the circumstances they encounter, which shows contextual rootedness, but not determinism. Human beings will construct theoretical positions by their own reading of those circumstances, i.e., their interpretation of those circumstances is not stenciled out for them. One cannot separate a thinker from the society in which he/she thinks; that does not mean that what a person thinks is determined, but merely rooted in the circumstances of the day, for there are many ways to interpret everyday life. Stark understands this relationship well.

> What such a being feels, what he thinks, and, indeed, what he becomes conscious of, must, or at any rate may, depend on the shape which his mind has acquired in the process of social living. In other words, according to the sociology of knowledge, it is illegitimate and even absurd to divorce man qua perceiver and knower of the external world from man qua member of a concrete society. Nobody can acquire knowledge without being alive; but to be alive means, in the case of man, to be part and parcel of ongoing social processes--processes which are not just a background of his personal consciousness, but, in a very definite sense of the word, operative within it, and constitutive of it (Stark, 1960: 14).

Thus, for Stark, the most significant ongoing social process in human beings is their ability to think. "Extra-mental factors may throw light on the act of mental creativity without in the least attaining to the spontaneity, mysteriousness, and majesty of that act" (Stark, 1960: 215).

One might argue that merely to portray the contextual rootedness of knowledge without asserting a causal relationship between the social and cultural dimensions of life is too limited. Stark does not agree.

The question, of course, arises: what has the

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> sociology of knowledge to offer if not a causal explanation of the origin of ideas? --and to this query the plain answer is: a method for the <u>understanding</u> of human thought both in its origins and in its content (Stark, 1960: 141).

But to reject a causal approach does not mean that one rejects the argument that a social and political context helps to shape the development of ideas. Causal analysis means that if necessary and sufficient conditions are present, an event must occur, that it cannot be prevented from occurring. A causality model would claim that social and political context cause a definite pattern of ideas to emerge, that everywhere one had a particular social and political context (X), a predictable set of ideas (Y) would emerge. Everyone within a particular social and political context would share a similar perspective. This approach which gives appropriate attention to the social context of knowledge can, if not careful, ignore the power of human consciousness, the ability of the human being to interpret the circumstances of the day and to come to one's own conclusions based on one's own interpretation of events. The contextual rootedness of knowledge helps to shape the framework within which human beings construct knowledge. This is what I mean by knowledge being contextually rooted, though not determined. This approach enhances the dignity of the human being and avoids reductionism.

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A Sociological Understanding of Conceptualization

I have asserted that the method of the sociology of knowledge that I am developing will provide the reader with a deeper understanding of the process of conceptualization, in this case symbolic interactionism. But what does that mean? What precisely is it that one will understand better by using a sociology of knowledge approach in the study of ideas and concept formation?

The sociology of knowledge should help in furthering our sociological understanding of conceptualization in two ways: by helping us understand the development of conceptualization we enrich our understanding of the meaning those concepts had to the scholars who developed them in relation to the problems they were focusing on; and, understanding the rise of works by locating them within social and political processes we understand why particular problems were seen as important by scholars at the time, why their perspective took one direction and not other, why they developed the concepts that they did and not others.

The internal logic of a text or its concepts can be more fully understood by referring to or exploring extra-textual material. The argument that extra-textual analysis gives no further insight into cultural productions such as music, literature, and art has been made by Cleanth Brooks and Robert Pen Warren in their work, Understanding Poetry (1960). They, as well as Allen Tate, were following the doctrine of their teacher, John Crowe Ransom. This approach

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is known as formalism or New Criticism. Its keystone is that most of what is needed to understand a cultural product is in the form of the work itself, how it says what it says. According to formalists, extra-textual insights contribute nothing to the conceptual understanding of literature as an art form. This argument has been extended, mutatis mutandis, to the point of arguing that other cultural works besides literature, e.g., social theories, can reveal their internal logic and concepts to the careful reader without the necessity of relying on extra-textual material.

However, the argument of the New Critics totally deprecates a sociology of literature or art or the sociology of knowledge, generally. A textual analysis does not provide a reader with a sense of why a particular writer may have conceptualized his or her problem the way he/she did, for there are many ways to conceptualize a problem. Understanding the process of conceptualization is seen as the promise of a sociology of knowledge; for, through it we understand in a richer way the meaning those concepts had to the scholars in relationship to the problems they were addressing.

The sociology of knowledge also provides insights into the relationship between conceptualization and other social and political processes. Conceptualization is an act in which the human being has choices, and, because there is choice in conceptualization, it is an inherently value-laden and political act.

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> vocabulary. The decisions that underlie the development of a particular set of concepts--and the grammatical framework within which they are articulated--are, in point of fact, commitments that are made prior to those that are involved in focusing upon a particular area of concern, for they are necessary to the very formulation and expression of the problem in question (Friedrichs, 1970: 142).

The very choice of concepts to explain human behavior and the reliance on a social theory has consequences for social policy. How one conceptualizes a social problem will influence the range of options that one considers in formulating a social policy to respond to that problem. It is logical then to expect that how we conceptualize our social problems will affect the type of society in which we will live.

> ... [E]very social theory facilitates the pursuit of some but not of all courses of <u>action</u>, and thus encourages us to change or to accept the world as it is, to say yea or nay to it. In a way, every theory is a discreet obituary or celebration for some social system (Gouldner, 1970: 47).

Thus, knowing the social context of symbolic interactionism, and that interactionists made their own interpretation of those circumstances which led to Progressive politics and the call for social reconstruction through education and socialization, leads to a deeper understanding of their conceptualization process in developing a perspective on the nature of human nature. It helps us to understand why the perspective took one direction and not another.

A contextual analysis leads to a better understanding of the process of conceptualization by focusing on why certain intellectual issues or problems arose when they did.

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Let me illustrate this assertion by an example. How could a contextual analysis lead to a better understanding of the rise of theories of racial superiority or the racial interpretation of history by locating them within their social and political context? A contextual analysis would reveal that such ideas (i.e., ideas, simplistic or complex, that argued that Western peoples were superior to others) as those that emerged along with the enslavement of foreign peoples--colonialism--served as an ideological justification for the Western social practice (or institution) of slavery.

A contextual analysis can also help us to understand why those theories are still extant, i.e., why they are still espoused in complex formulations by such thinkers as E.O. Wilson and Arthur Jensen. The reason is that the social and political conditions that gave rise to those theories are still present, albeit in vastly different forms, i.e., Western society does not practice slavery but it does practice institutional discrimination. A contextual analysis can reveal how racist ideas are still contextually rooted within the social and political conditions of America, thereby providing us with a better understanding of the persistence of these pernicious theories.

Contextually rooting racist theories within the social practice of slavery leads to a better understanding of the origins of such ideas; one begins to see how racist theories arose as an ideological justification of the institution of slavery. This does not mean that such conditions determined

that everyone would think this way, for clearly the human being makes a difference; not all those whose lives have been or are contextually rooted within a racist environment produce or agree with racist conceptualizations. Slavery provided a context for the rise of racist theories. Slavery provides us with an example that the relationship between social context and social theory is not a simple-minded cause and effect relationship.

The dialectical relationship between social context, political commitments, and conceptualization is evident in this study. There were Progressives who believed in biological determinism and in favor of social eugenics; other progressives were opposed to biological determinism and in favor of social reform. There were hereditarians who were eugenists and those who were not; some hereditarians favored social reform. The variety of positions only underscores the dialectical interplay among social context, political commitments, and conceptualization. Trying to predict a correspondence between social context and political ideology or between political ideology and conceptualization is too simplistic. The complexity of the dialectical model always focuses attention on the interplay between biography and history and on the individual's ability to interpret the circumstances of the times and come to one's own political commitments and conceptualization.

By exploring a contextual analysis one acquires an understanding of the process of conceptualization, an

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understanding of why a theory took one direction and not others. This does not mean that the sociology of knowledge is unrelated to political critique or critical sociology.

> The study of ideologies has made it its task to unmask the more or less conscious deceptions and disguises of human interest groups, particularly of political parties. The sociology of knowledge is concerned not so much with distortions due to a deliberate effort to deceive as with the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social settings (Mannheim, 1936: 265).

In other words, a political critique that would unmask ideological reasons for the persistence of racism is related to, but somewhat different from, a sociology of knowledge that focuses on researching the social context of the conceptualization of racist theories. In this dissertation I am limiting the analysis to showing how the dialectical interplay among social context, political commitments, and conceptualization led scholars to define the nature of human nature. The method of the sociology of knowledge that I am trying to develop has understanding rather than political critique as its major aim.

Knowing the social and political setting of a theory will help us as we come to understand why the object appeared to the thinker as it did, why a social thinker highlighted certain concerns and let others remain unfocused, why they developed their particular perspective on reality. According to Mannheim's notion of the particularization of perspectives, all thought is a particular perspective on reality, highlighting some features while other

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features are left in the background. This is vital to understanding the process of conceptualization. Knowing the dialectical interplay among social context, political commitments, and conceptualization will enrich our understanding of why biological determinists will ask questions concerning natural inferiority and devise instruments (intelligence tests) to answer their questions. Sociologists will ask questions concerning social inequality and devise instruments (surveys, social structural analysis, and participant observation) to answer their questions.

Other Limitations

Some other limitations of my study need to be addressed. Before we go any further, let us clearly differentiate among the particularization of perspectives, the genetic fallacy, and the analysis of the truth-value of statements. The sociologist of knowledge is not trying to debunk, unmask or assess the truth-value of a society's assertions; he/she is trying to discover the social origin of ideas, trying to delineate the relationship between knowledge and social context. The sociologist of knowledge does not postulate that by solely delineating the social origin of ideas he/she has vitiated the validity of those ideas; to suggest so would be to commit the genetic fallacy. Why is this so? To dwell on the validity of a statement solely by ascertaining who stated it is more in the line of the ideological determination of thought. One might suspect the person of fallacious reasoning, for example, argumentum

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ad personam (self-interest) or argumentum ad crumenam (appeal to the purse). However, to determine truth-value, statements must be judged as to their soundness of reasoning alone--to do otherwise is an argumentum ad hominem. One must not confuse examining the motive for expressing a belief with a test of the soundness of the belief itself, which is what one does when one commits the genetic fallacy.

Gouldner has also expressed the rationale for seeking this type of understanding, namely, a sociological understanding of conceptualization that does not commit the genetic fallacy.

> But if neither the truth nor the falsity of this, or of any other, work can be judged by understanding its rooting in the lives and times of those who produced it, why bother to locate a work in this manner? The answer, of course, is that we do not want only to appraise the truth-value of any work, but we also wish to <u>understand</u> it. That is, we seek to understand why it has taken one direction rather than another, pursued one problem and ignored others, accented certain parts of social life but neglected others, and been formulated in this but not in other ways (Gouldner, 1970: 482-483).

But this does not mean that the sociology of knowledge lacks a critical function. Clearly, the sociologist of knowledge wants to avoid committing the genetic fallacy. To demonstrate that a system of thought is socially grounded does not discredit such a system, since all systems are so grounded.

> Every analytical step undertaken in the spirit of the sociology of knowledge becomes more than a sociological description of the facts which tell us how certain views have been derived from a certain <u>milieu</u>. Rather it reaches a point where it also becomes a critique by redefining the scope and the limits of the perspective implicit in given assertions

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(Mannheim, 1936: 285).

Understanding and critique are thus not mutually exclusive but our method of the sociology of knowledge will be a focus on understanding.

In summary of this section, then, a dialectical relationship between knowledge and social context means refraining from positing either one as possessing causal, temporally prior, or exclusive constitutive qualities. This dissertation assumes the existence of that dialectical relationship between knowledge and social context that is based on the notion that social practices and cultural constructions are both elements that constitute ways of life. The debate between mechanical materialism and idealism has centered on the dualistic presupposition that one has causality in constituting and sustaining our everyday ways of life. To be fair, this section has not been an exhaustive review of all of the types of causal approaches to the sociology of knowledge available, nor have I examined all the debates in the sociology of knowledge. I have presented solely those insights that I have relied upon in developing a sociology of knowledge that I will use as a method.

Thus, I have shown that there are three general approaches to the conceptualization of the relationship between social context and knowledge. First, vulgar Marxists advocate a model of economic determinism in which social context determines knowledge. Second, the idealistic approach represents another one-way model, but in this

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conceptualization, culture determines social context. The third approach, articulated by Stark and Marx, is that of a dialectical conceptualization between social context and knowledge.

I have focused on outlining a non-causal and dialectical model of a sociology of knowledge that will be used in this dissertation. This model stresses the dialectical relationship between social and political context and knowledge that results when human beings engage in an active dialogue with their world. It is acknowledged that any model is merely a heuristic device designed to simplify the process of understanding the relationship between social context and knowledge; that any model is a construct and that care should be taken in one's arguments to avoid reification. Models are not perfect. They are a priori and heuristic guides which facilitate research.

Two Components of This Study

There are two components to our method of study, one is analyzing the concepts of the perspective of symbolic interactionism, the other illuminating the contextual rootedness of the perspective. These are not mutually exclusive but mutually complementary. Each is necessary: "... scholarship cannot do without them, and a total comprehension of any cultural phenomenon ... demands consideration ab extra as well as ab intra" (Stark, 1958: 214). This dissertation intends to follow Stark's dicta by presenting a thorough and balanced analysis of the concepts of early symbolic

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interactionism and to assess its contribution to a sociological reconceptualization of human nature and behavior as well as provide a deeper understanding of the perspective by placing it within its social context.

Even more important is to draw the connections between social context and concepts. It is this dissertation's thesis that that connection centers on symbolic interactionists' interpreting the social conditions of the times which led them to Progressive politics and a call for social reconstruction, their particular call for social reconstruction was through education and socialization that would give human beings the opportunity to remake themselves and the world. Human beings remaking themselves and the world through education and socialization was problematic given the current perspective on the nature of human nature: biological determinism and instinct theory. This led the pragmatists to focus on the nature of human nature as a problem. They reconceptualized the nature of human nature as participants in the nature/nurture debate. These connections and relationships provide us with insight into the dialectical interplay among social context, political commitments, and conceptualization.

The Social Context of Symbolic Interactionism

George Stocking has stated that the nature/nurture debate established a social science view of human beings and their relationship to the social environment and culture.

By the middle of the twentieth century, it was

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> commonplace for educated Americans to refer to human differences in cultural terms, and to say that "modern science has shown that all human races are equal." In fact, what science had shown was better put negatively than positively: there was no scientific basis for assuming that one race was inferior or superior to another. That assumption--part and parcel, if you will, of a different paradigm for viewing human differences--was not supported by the evidence. The data of human difference could be interpreted more satisfactorily, within another paradigm, as the product of cultural conditioning (Stocking, 1968: 306-307).

George Stocking goes on to argue that it was writers within the social sciences:

> ... rather than the racialist writers associated with the eugenics movement which [were] able to speak to Americans as the voice of science on all matters of race, culture, and evolution--a fact whose significance for the recent history of the United States doubtless merits further exploration (Stocking, 1968: 307).

Stocking outlines the contributions of Franz Boaz to the development of the culture concept and an anthropological perspective. From Stocking's argument, it is implied that vast changes in the social and political context of American life were being undergone at the time of this reconceptualization of human nature. Such a major change, both within social science and in the popular culture, needs to be placed within a social and political context if a sociological understanding of this intellectual transformation is to be better understood. A sociology of knowledge model can help us to understand how this new conceptualization came about.

The reconceptualization of human nature and behavior, to which symbolic interactionists greatly contributed, took

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place within the larger social and political context of American life. Some of the large-scale features that were part and parcel of the social and political context were the growth of industrialization, immigration, urbanization, the Progressive movement, the reorganization of graduate education, the rise of the middle class and its culture of professionalism, and the reaction against formalism.

After the Civil War the United States went through a rapid period of industrialization and Westward expansion. The government came to play a large role in this industrialization, for example, in the development of the railroad industry. Industry became concentrated and centralized. The United States was moving from laissez-faire to corporate capitalism. Finance capitalism became the new center of power.

Immigration provided the massive number of workers to labor for starvation wages during this period. The most important development in immigration for the shaping of the social and political context of America was the shift from northern and western European immigrants to eastern and southern European immigrants after 1890. These immigrants came not as farmers but as city dwellers to labor in the massive factory systems developing in American cities.

The immigrants who came swelled the cities. Urbanization and industrialization grew together. At the turn of the century America was no longer the America of the independent farmer, but the America of the city dweller. The

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city formed the social context for much of sociological theory, for it was the slums and the social problems associated with them that led sociologists to a moral response that was an argument for social reform.

These social changes in American life led to the formation of an industrial working class and the rise of a new middle class and its culture of professionalism as numerous occupations came into existence. This led to a reorganization of graduate education, for these new professions required college diplomas and graduate degrees.

Capitalism and industrialization grew, but it was an unregulated growth. Captains of industry ruled the era. Eventually this unregulated growth, the power of the captains of industry, and the social problems associated with industrialization, urbanization, and immigration led to the rise of the Social-Gospel movement, Populism, muckrakers, and above all, the Progressive movement, a movement of social reform and governmental regulation. Social work--Jane Addams at Hull House in Chicago was its epitome--became an ever-growing profession advocating on behalf of the poor and disenfranchised. It was the beginning of the decline of the philosophy of laissez-faire which had argued that government, the courts, and laborers had no right to any say in the affairs of business or the market. The tenet that the government which governs best governs least, was being challenged. But it was also corporate capitalists who wanted social order that led to the growth of state

interventionism. This is a brief outline of the social context of symbolic interactionism.

Periodization of the Rise of Early Interactionism

The publication of Mind, Self, and Society has provided us with a significant date for periodization which separates Mead and the others who developed the basic concepts and assumptions from those who wrote after them. This has provided us with an end-date, 1934, for the periodization of the dissertation, but what about a starting date? First and foremost, I am in agreement with Thomas Kuhn that the process of dating is arbitrary for the following reasons:

> ... [W]e so readily assume that discovering, like seeing or touching, should be unequivocally attributable to an individual and to a moment in time. But the latter attribution is always impossible, and the former often is as well .... [A]ny attempt to date the discovery must inevitably be arbitrary because discovering a new sort of phenomenon is necessarily a complex event, one which involves recognizing both that something is and what it is (Kuhn, 1970: 55).

I am trying to establish a time frame that encompassed the "discovery" of a new sociological conceptualization of human nature. I have chose to focus on the contributions of a very few to that discovery and have therefore selected 1890 as a starting date. That choice is not made, however, without deliberation. It reflects an informed reading of many who have studied the development of sociology. Therefore, arbitrary should not be taken to mean haphazard or merely personal, but as a recognition that one has to start somewhere, realizing that all thought has intellectual

precursors, and that such a starting date should be historically and theoretically informed.

In the periodization of a theory, or (in this case) perspective, what is important are the premises or assumptions, both social ontological and social epistemological-methodological, that unite scholars; therefore, that choice is not so arbitrary (Hinkle, 1980: 10). Furthermore: "A 'period' is established by comparing--and thus generalizing from--a series of statements extracted from publications of a number of theorists whose professional careers intersect or coincide and thus form a relatively unbroken continuum through time" (Hinkle, 1980: 9). What unites early symbolic interactionists is that their social ontology expressed a concern with phenomena such as the nature of human nature, the emergence of self, mind, and personality, the indeterminacy of social behavior, and the indissoluble connection (nominalist position) between society and self. Their social epistemology-methodology expressed a concern with a subjective understanding of the symbolic interaction of human beings, especially the interrelationship between society and self. This subjective understanding of others began in James and Baldwin but becomes more explicit in Cooley (sympathetic introspection), Thomas (definition of the situation), Dewey (deliberation), and Mead (taking the role or attitude of the other). Hinkle in his 1967 study of Cooley and his 1980 study of the founding theory of American sociology, describes Cooley's social

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epistemology-methodology, which can be attributed to early symbolic interactionists, generally.

> Personal, social knowledge concerns minds, consciousness, imaginations, and feelings--the internal and the subjective. It is a form of knowledge requiring that the researcher engage in interpretation using the unique technique of sympathetic introspection. Less precise, verifiable, cumulative, and susceptible to measurement, quantification, and statistical manipulation, its data are to be treated emergentistically, synthetically, and typologically (Hinkle, 1980: 100).

Eventually this social epistemological-methodological position led to the engaged social research of participant observation, one hallmark of the Chicago school. W.I. Thomas was the outstanding practitioner of the group under study.

With these social ontological and social epistemological-methodological considerations, I have grouped together six early symbolic interactionists who contributed most to the development of a unique sociological perspective. I trace the development of symbolic interactionism to William James, for it was in 1890 that James published his most important contribution to symbolic interactionism, Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (New York: Henry Holt, 1890). That publication then demarcates my beginning date.

Periodization of the Social Context And an Outline of the Chapters

While it is true that the periodization demarcating the beginning of the social context and the accompanying intellectual debates is somewhat arbitrary, some such beginning and ending dates are necessary. Periodization is, however,

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based on an in-depth study of the social context and its relationship to intellectual debates. I have demarcated the rise of symbolic interactionism with the beginning date of 1890, the publication of William James's work, Principles of Psychology, and an end date of 1934, the posthumous publication of Mead's Mind, Self, and Society by his students. But the relevant social context and the intellectual debates really begin before 1890 and there are major shifts within that social context before 1934. The problem of a prior background of social context is a problem in periodization that has to be addressed directly whenever grappling with the relationship between social context and social theory. Each period of sociological theory, or (in this case) perspective, is "... in part explained by its current social and intellectual situation or context and in part by the prior past or historical background setting" (Hinkle, 1980: 11). The prior social context needs to be described first; for, "[t]heory becomes meaningful or makes sense only in relation to the context or contexts... which must be delineated and understood prior to the analysis of the theory itself" (Hinkle, 1980: 15). Therefore, there needs to be a scheme that offers precision in the periodization of the social context and intellectual debates that began before the rise of symbolic interactionism and that accounts for major shifts within social context and intellectual debate that occurs during the rise of symbolic interactionism.

The social context of laissez-faire capitalism along

with urbanization, industrialization, and immigration from the end of the Civil War in 1865 to the beginning of the decline of laissez-faire capitalism in 1897 is the crucial context that provided the backdrop to scholars who developed the ideas of evolutionary science and the social evolutionary theory of social change (Morris and Greenberg, 1969; Degler, 1970; Peel, 1971; Krout, 1975; and Hinkle, 1980). This social context must be understood before we proceed to the analysis of any theory, perspective, and intellectual debate. Within the social context of laissez-faire capitalism there emerged the ideas of social evolution. From social evolution there emerged Social Darwinism to justify laissez-faire capitalism, and later, around 1880, the idea that it was cooperation rather than competition that led societies to evolve and adapt. Social Darwinism also incorporated the notion of biological determinism, the idea that certain people or classes were superior to others. But biological determinism was a fundamental aspect of American thought and had been since its beginning. In fact, Lieberman traces the notion of biological superiority and the conceptualization of race as a scientific taxonomy to the seventeenth century with the rise of European colonialism, slavery, nationalism, and imperialism (Lieberman, 1970: 388). With the incorporation of the American Social Science Association in 1865 and the American Economic Association in 1885 there also emerged the idea that the environment was crucial in the development of the human being. Thus within

the social context of laissez-faire capitalism there already was a debate ongoing over the type of society America was to become and how one would conceptualize human beings and the nature of human nature.

According to Harold Faulkner's study, The Decline of Laissez Faire 1897-1917 (1951) one can date the decline of laissez-faire capitalism from 1897. Thus our first period of social context is from 1865-1897. This is illuminating and helps our understanding of the rise and fall of ideas, for the decline in intellectual thought that justified laissez-faire capitalism occurs at this time. Hofstadter dates the decline of Social Darwinism in the first decade of the twentieth century (Hofstadter, 1969). Hinkle dates the decline of social evolutionary theory as occurring during 1915-1918 (Hinkle, 1980: 300). From 1897 to 1917 a new social context emerges, the rise of corporate capitalism and the creation of the liberal state (Kolko, 1967; Weinstein, 1968; Morris and Greenberg, 1969; Degler, 1970; and Krout, 1975). Thus 1897 to 1917 provides us with our second period.

The social context of corporate capitalism provided the backdrop for the continuing intellectual debate between hereditarians and environmentalists. This intellectual debate continued with the rise of Progressivism, the eugenics movement, Jim Crow legislation, both biological and psychological hereditarianism, the new genetics, the rise of cultural anthropology and comparative ethnography, and the rise of

pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. Thus within the social context of corporate capitalism there continued an intellectual struggle and debate over the type of society America was to become, either committed to egalitarianism, social mobility, and democracy or committed to inequality, rigid class stratification, (racial and sexual stratification were largely ignored at this time, even by Progressive reformers) and plutocracy.

Which road America was to follow found a political and theoretical expression in the nature/nurture debate, a major focus of this dissertation. In the early twentieth century, the hereditarians held the majority and even many who were for social reconstruction were hereditarians. But the symbolic interactionists were opposed to hereditarian arguments and in favor of social reconstruction. The biological hereditarian position based on unit characteristics held sway until it was undermined by genetics in the second decade of the twentieth century. Cultural anthropologists and comparative ethnologists were also establishing the basis for the separation of culture from biology and attacking the eugenics movement which was based on biological hereditarianism. But then began the rise of psychological hereditarianism based on the IQ test. Thus a third period of debate continues after WWI between the psychological hereditarians on one side and psychologists themselves who began to use control variables in their examination of the relationship between IQ, race, and class, showing that the relationship

disappeared when one controlled for variables such as education or residence. The interactionists were also developing their indeterminacy argument and revealing the effects socialization and education had on social behavior. This debate also took place within the solidifying of the corporate capitalist state (though the corporate capitalist state does not fully take shape till the rise of the New Deal and the emergence of the military-industrial complex after World War II). The rise of early interactionism within this social context and these debates ended with the publication of Mead's major work in 1934. But Mead died in 1931 so where to precisely end this is a problem in periodization. I have accepted Manford Kuhn's periodization as the end of the emergence of early interactionism. But whether we end the rise of early interactionism with Mead's death or the publication of all of his major works by his students seven years later is not crucial. The crucial periodization is the demarcation between the beginning of the end of laissez-faire capitalism and the consequent decline in the intellectual debates of that period and the beginning of the rise of corporate capitalism and the continuing intellectual debate between hereditarians and environmentalists in new forms.

Based on the above periodization I have demarcated two periods of social context and intellectual debate, 1865 to 1897 and 1897 to 1917, and a third period which continues the debate within the same social context of corporate capitalism, 1917 to 1934. I will present the social context and

the accompanying intellectual debates as a processual one, beginning with the rise of industrial capitalism after the Civil War in 1865 to the establishment of the corporate capitalist liberal state in 1917. As I move forward I will highlight significant changes in the relevant social context and the accompanying intellectual debates. I will briefly outline the chapters to provide the reader with my organizational scheme.

In Chapter II I will present a survey of the social context of evolutionary science and the social evolutionary theory of social change, beginning with a brief overview of laissez-faire capitalism. I will introduce some large-scale features and processes which transformed the fabric of American society after the Civil War; primarily, industrialization, immigration, urbanization, the modern university, the growing influence of higher education, the rise of the middle class, and the development of a culture of professionalism. I will then review the ideas of Social Darwinism, Reform Darwinism, and the movement toward social reform in the countryside--Populism--that eventually became the precursor to the Progressive Movement. I will review the attack on laissez-faire capitalism and how sociology contributed to social reform.

Chapter III will begin with the social context of corporate capitalism and the ideas of the Progressive era. Within the social context of corporate capitalism there emerged a subset of Progressive reformers who were concerned

with reconceptualizing the nature of human nature, the early symbolic interactionists. Since the early interactionists were born at a somewhat different time and place, they confronted similar but not identical social and political environments. I think it is arguable that the early symbolic interactionists discussed in this dissertation shared a similar enough social and political background that one might make generalizations about the social and political environment of the group as a whole. It is granted that such generalizations distort the unique social and political context of the individual, but my aim is not the analysis of the social and political context of any one individual; but, rather, the social and political context of a group of individuals living and writing in approximately the same time period. But we should not be looking for any fixed attributes of context anyway, for context is always changing; therefore, I will emphasize the processual nature of events demarcating the major changes in context that periodize the study.

Not only Mead's, but also Cooley's, Baldwin's, W.I. Thomas', and much of Dewey's works were written during the 1897 to 1917 period. Though Thomas' and Dewey's life-span exceed the time frame of the rise of the corporate capitalist state and the Progressive Movement, many of their major ideas were written during that period. In fact, this period is critical even for Dewey (who lived longer than any of the others) since, as Morton White has argued, "Dewey's basic

ideas had appeared before World War I..." (White, 1957: 129). The major text that developed Dewey's contribution to symbolic interaction and the reconceptualization of human nature was his work, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology, written in 1922. This book was a systematic attack on the hereditarian thesis and laid the foundation for Dewey's notion of human nature and conduct, his basic conception of social behavior which was a social psychology. Thus, because of the time period in which Dewey and Thomas developed their major ideas relevant to symbolic interactionism, I have included them as scholars who shared a social and political background with the other early symbolic interactionists.

Chapter III surveys the major themes and assumptions of early symbolic interactionism and the social roots of the early symbolic interactionists. The main aim of Chapter III will be to describe the nature of the dialectical relationship between the social context of corporate capitalism, the Progressive politics of the social reconstructionists, and the conceptualization process of a subset of those Progressive reformers, the pragmatists or early symbolic interactionists.

Chapter IV will then take a closer look at the nature/nurture debate of the early twentieth century which took place within the rising corporate capitalist liberal state. That debate became based on a new experimental biology of unit characteristics which I call biological

hereditarianism and the new psychology of IQ testing which I call psychological hereditarianism. That was the nature side of the debate. I then outline the rise and fall of the eugenics movement that was based on the biology of unit-characteristics. I then briefly look at the downfall of biological hereditarianism in the separation of culture from biology and in the advances in the science of genetics which dealt the death blow to biological hereditarianism. I then outline the rise of psychological hereditarianism and its decline by those who began to use social and class analysis, especially correlating IQ to education, city location, geographic region, years of residency within the U.S., and other social correlates of IQ scores to challenge psychological hereditarianism. This was done largely by psychologists themselves. I briefly review the rise of a sociology independent of biology by the mid and late 1930s. I conclude with a few comments on the relationship between social context and social theory.

Chapter V then introduces the specific concepts of the nurture side of the debate from the symbolic interactionist perspective. It is argued that beginning with William James there was an attempt to challenge the notion of biological determinism and the instinct theory of invariant behavior with the indeterminacy argument of social behavior. Though William James had contradictory notions of human behavior, I argue that it is with his works that there begins an attempt to point out the social basis of behavior, the self and

mind, personality, and the nature of human nature. It is within this perspective that the notion that society constitutes humanity through socialization just as humanity constitutes society through an active self and mind (the indissoluble connection of society and self) begins. I describe those concepts of James, Baldwin, Cooley, Thomas, and Dewey that are important to this reconceptualization of the nature of human nature.

Chapter VI consists of the major concepts of George Herbert Mead that contributed to the development of symbolic interactionism and the reconceptualization of human nature and behavior; and, the importance of socialization to the social conceptualization of human beings. Mead is presented as the one whose ideas form the foundation of symbolic interactionism.

Chapter VII consists of the conclusion, which is a summation and a defense of the thesis. It assesses what the dissertation has contributed to knowledge and makes some suggestions for further research.

Representativeness in the Selection of Literature

The method of scrutinizing these thinkers is to read their works and present an analysis of the concepts they use that are considered relevant to symbolic interactionism. But for many of these thinkers only a few of their works are relevant. Therefore, as a methodological tool, I plan to use anthologies which have selected those works of James,

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Baldwin, Cooley, Thomas, Dewey, and Mead which have been deemed significant by symbolic interactionists as fundamental to the understanding of symbolic interactionism. Anthologies such as Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology (Manis and Meltzer, 1967; 1972; 1975), The Self in Social Interaction (Gordon and Gergen, 1968), Human Behavior and Social Processes (Rose, 1962), and Social Psychology through Symbolic Interactionism (Stone and Farberman, 1970) are ones which have attempted to collect the primary works of James, Baldwin, Cooley, Thomas, Dewey, and Mead that are relevant to symbolic interactionism. For Mead I also plan to analyze his major work, Mind, Self and Society. It is in this book (posthumously edited by his students) that the major ideas of symbolic interactionism were formulated.

This will not give us a complete selection of every article ever written by early symbolic interactionists but a fairly representative sample of those considered vital by authorities in the field. I will examine not only those works included in the anthologies but also many of those recommended in the bibliographies. Such a selection process, it is hoped, will not so much distort the scope of analysis as limit it by excluding works which are theoretically repetitive.

A concern over representativeness comes not from the selection and analysis of concepts but from the material selected to illustrate the social and political context of

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the emergence of symbolic interactionism. Since one doesn't have time to read all of the material on a subject, one has to select some sources and leave others unread. One must use "authoritative sources." However, authoritative sources as a concept is an academic tinder box. It is in the social sciences that an ideological conflagration has spread to every issue which no army of academic firefighters ever has or ever will be able to douse. Value-irreconcilability, as Weber knew, is for all time.

One modus operandi is to read those sources which "seem to be" the most authoritative, but, of course, the compass by which one navigates here (one's first books and articles) may just sail one to the island of single interpretation. What the criteria of authoritative sources are seems intangible. Rather than looking for the criteria of authoritative sources, one way to resolve the dilemma is to admit that there are other ways to gain a deeper understanding of social theory. "Today, there are too many points of view of equal value and prestige, each showing the relativity of the other, to permit us to take any one position and to regard it as impregnable and absolute" (Mannheim, 1936: 84).

Given the subjective nature of interpretive research, neither the analysis of symbolic interactionism nor the model that I will use to conceptualize the emergence of that theory will prove exhaustive. All interpretation excludes something. That is why history is seen differently by different generations and within those generations it is seen

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differently by different persons. Every theoretical interpretation offers maps to understanding social reality as well as sets up roadblocks to insights. Interpretive research generates a representative interpretation, one that tries to be scholarly and accurate. Whether one has made a representative adjudication of the historical record is always left to the judgment of one's colleagues.

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF EARLY SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM

In Chapter II I will present a survey of the social context of evolutionary science and the social evolutionary theory of social change, beginning with a brief overview of laissez-faire capitalism. I will introduce some large-scale features and processes which transformed the fabric of American society after the Civil War; primarily, industrialization, immigration, and urbanization. This review of the social context will continue with an examination of the social origins of the modern university, the growing influence of higher education, the rise of the middle class, and the development of a culture of professionalism--all of which were brought about by the changing occupational structure of the United States.

Urbanization led to the rise of the metropolitan city. The city was the social context of the new occupational structure and Eastern European immigration after 1880. It was in the city where the immigrants, the new professions of social work, and, as I shall show in Chapter III, the Progressive movement came together.

I will then outline some important ideas that emerged during the rise of laissez-faire capitalism, some of which were ideologies to support the current capitalist system. I

begin with the ideas of evolution, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and natural selection and the profound transformation in the intellectual world that the writings of Lamarck and, especially, Darwin brought about. I will introduce the work of Herbert Spencer and his notions of social evolution and the organic analogy. The notion of social evolution became widely accepted within sociology. But also, Spencer's writings, along with others, led to the rise of Social Darwinism which was not widely accepted by sociologists. I will briefly examine this doctrine and its rise as an ideology to justify laissez-faire capitalism and its fall with the advent of corporate capitalism which incorporated economic and political reforms and accepted social interventionism in order to achieve social order.

I will then examine the social origins of social reform, beginning with the attack on laissez-faire capitalism by a number of leading American intellectuals. I will briefly review Populism and the movement for reform in the countryside. With the influx of immigration and the industrialization and urbanization of America I will then review how the reform movement began to take shape in the city. The tenement slum, along with a number of social problems such as crime, juvenile delinquency, mental illness, prostitution, became the focal point of social reform. Social problems were beginning to be viewed as socially produced. I will conclude by arguing that sociology was a particular expression of the general reform movement, and that, as I

will develop the argument in later chapters, their desire for social reform was one influence on them to develop a perspective on human nature that would justify social reform.[1]

Laissez-Faire Capitalism

Industrialization

As Don Martindale suggests, after the Civil War there were many social and economic changes, but at heart was the change to industrial capitalism.

> The machine was replacing the hand tool; the factory was replacing the craftsman's workplace; science was replacing traditional lore; industrialists were replacing merchant princes and plantation aristocrats; the city was replacing the town and village--in short, capitalism was replacing the handicraft industry and traditional agrarianism (Martindale, 1976: 3).

Industrialization transformed the United States from a rural agricultural society to the most advanced and powerful economy in the world. Between 1860 and 1914 the American population tripled, workers involved in manufacturing multiplied five and one half times, the value created by

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[1]This social context section relies on many works but I am especially indebted to the work of the following historians: Richard B. Morris and William Greenleaf's massive 1,200 page history of post-1865 Unites States, USA: The Birth of a Nation, (1969); John A. Krout's (seventeenth edition) of United States since 1865, (1975); Carl N. Degler's Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Modern America, (1970). Information on farmers is drawn from Gilbert C. Fite's American Farmers, (1984). The portrait of a typical immigrant is drawn from Oscar Handlin's Pulitzer-Prize study of The Uprooted, (1973; orig. 1951). That general portrait is also drawn from the reading of numerous articles on the American experience of immigration in the 1975 and 1982 editions of the valuable reader, Majority and Minority, edited by Norman R. Yetman and C. Hoy Steele.

manufacturing multiplied by a factor of twelve and, capital invested in industry rose a staggering twenty-two times. The gross national product (GNP) of the United States economy surged from $6.7 billion in 1869 to more than $40 billion in 1914. The infrastructure that was the foundation of this growth had been somewhat developed before the Civil War. After the war, the government of the United States continued its interventionist role in the development of industry that had begun because of the exigency of the war itself. During the war the significant government intervention included the creation of a national banking system, the protective tariff to help develop fledgling enterprises, federal land grants to railroads to develop transcontinental lines, to states in the Morrill Act of 1862 to develop institutions of higher learning, to farmers in the Homestead Act of 1862 to "prove up" 160 acres, and the purchase of war materiel put millions in the pockets of rising captains of industry. After the war the military establishment was vastly reduced, which meant it did not absorb a large percentage of GNP. With the South defeated, new areas of conquest were born. The trans-Mississippi westward migration of people and industry, the almost manic drive to open the great Western frontier, awaited exploitation of its natural resources and the genocide of Native Americans in the development of a national market.

The railroads were the engine of economic development. The total mileage of national track in 1865 was 35,000

miles, concentrated mainly in the northeast. The development of railroads, telegraph lines, people, and industry went West and, somewhat later, South. In 1900 193,000 miles of railroad track crisscrossed the nation. By 1914 the mileage had doubled to 387,000. A multiplier effect in other industries was created; for, the railroads consumed natural resources almost as fast as they consumed the lifeblood of the Chinese and Irish immigrants who built them. The industries of iron, steel, timber, and coal developed in large part as a response to railroad expansion. The development of the telegraph lines went hand in hand with the railroads. Without telegraphic communication the railroads could not have operated. Within six years after the end of the Civil War the wires tripled in use. The standardization of track gauge allowed competing lines to link up and the switch from iron to steel track made roads solid. The country had a national transportation and communication system which created a national market; and, when in 1866 Cyrus W. Field completed the trans-Atlantic cable, the era of worldwide communication was born. As Vernon Louis Parrington has succinctly stated: "New masters, new ways. The rule of the captain of industry had come. ... Capitalism was master of the country and though for the present it was content to use the political machinery of democracy it was driving towards an objective that was the negation of democracy" (Parrington, 1927: 404-405).

The magnates of railroad enterprises acquired the

disparaging shibboleth of robber barons (along with others in other industries) as they did whatever was necessary in their propulsion of the nation toward a national market. Cornelius Vanderbilt, Daniel Drew, Jim Fisk, Jay Gould, J. Edgar Thomson, Thomas A. Scott, Leland Stanford, Collis Potter Huntington, and Mark Hopkins were the major magnates whose exploits, merger battles, lawsuits, political payoffs, and conspicuous consumption were reported on as are the lifestyles of movie stars and celebrities of today. They were the American originators of the lifestyles of the rich and famous, which Thorstein Veblen so aptly characterized in The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899). Pecuniary, predatory, and barbarian were adjectives that Veblen attributed to those who were making the economic development of the United States a marvel of and a drawing card for the European continent.

Along with industrialization a culture of economic individualism was prevalent, which included a concept of human beings and human relationships that were predominantly based on treating one another as means to ends. Economic individualism had arisen with the rise of capitalism and the industrial revolution in England. In the industrial revolution of America after 1865 it found a new home. Economic individualism included a political philosophy of laissez-faire which kept government's hands off the market. Economic individualism incorporated the ideology of Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism was the ideology of the

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self-reliant, competitive, and self-made tycoon who triumphed in the struggle of the business jungle and thereby justified his wealth and power. Social Darwinism even justified government from offering help to human beings who suffered greatly due to market conditions, business cycles, and social disadvantages. The political fear was that anything one does to help human beings may harm the market, and the market was thought of as far more important than human beings. The popular saying of the time was: "The government of business is no part of the business of government." According to the laissez-faire apologists, the country's resources and any enterprise that could be made into a business belonged in private hands. One of the best summaries of the beliefs of laissez-faire capitalists that stimulated a moral and reformist response that I will survey at the end of this chapter, is Charles Beard's account in Contemporary American History, published in 1914.

> They believed in the widest possible extension of the principle of private property, and the narrowest possible restriction of state interference, except to aid private property to increase its gains. They held that all of the natural resources of the country should be transferred to private hands as speedily as possible, at a nominal charge, or no charge at all, and developed with dashing rapidity. They also believed that the great intangible social property created by community life, such as franchises for street railways, gas, and electricity, should be transformed into private property. They supplemented their philosophy of property by a philosophy of law and politics, which looked upon state interference, except to preserve order, and aid railways and manufacturers in their enterprises, as an intrinsic evil to be resisted at every point; and they developed a system of jurisprudence which, as Senators having the confirming power in appointments and as counsel for corporations before the courts of the United States, they succeeded in transforming into judicial

decisions (Beard, 1914: 53-54).

The construction of the transcontinental railroad symbolizes the economic development, governmental support, exploitation of the immigrants, and corruption of the period. The largesse of government subsidies made it appear that the government of laissez-faire was almost a government of socialism for the rich. Capital accumulation was necessary and before the advent of finance capitalism only the government as a single source had such vast capital to risk huge loans on a transcontinental venture. Besides the government other financial sources were needed. Private American and European investment swelled. For every $3.00 invested from private funds the government advanced an additional $2.00.

Two companies were offered charters to build the first transcontinental line. The government offered Union Pacific Company loan subsidies of $16,000 for each mile of track constructed in the plains, $32,000 for each mile in the foot-hills, and $48,000 for each mile in the mountains. They were to build a line from Omaha, Nebraska toward the Pacific. In addition the railroads would receive (originally ten) twenty square miles of land for every mile of track built, along with a right of way and free usage of timber and minerals on public lands. Similar terms were offered to Central Pacific to start a line in Sacramento, California and go east, linking up with the Union Pacific Company. By 1867 Congress had given land grants to the

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railroads amounting to 184 million acres. As one historian has remarked, this amounted to about 14 percent of the public domain, or land equal to the New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia combined (Krout, 1975: 20). Federal land grants continued unabated and the states themselves tossed in another 55 million acres. Working the immigrants like slaves and with Yankee ingenuity in overcoming engineering problems, the transcontinental task was completed on May 10, 1869 by joining the two tracks with gold and silver spikes at Promontory Point, five miles west of Ogden, Utah.

Graft and political corruption began before a mile of track had been built. The shareholders of the Union Pacific formed a construction company, Crédit Mobilier, to build its lines. They paid themselves well. A congressional investigation (1873) revealed that Crédit Mobilier charged $73 million for work that had actually cost $50 million. At one time Crédit Mobilier had declared dividends as high as 515 percent. The political scandal erupted on the Hill when it transpired that Oakes Ames, a Republican member of the House of Representatives from Massachusetts had distributed to government officials shares of Crédit Mobilier stock in order to advance legislation favorable to Union Pacific. Oliver Ames, Oakes' brother, was president of Union Pacific. The scandal went as high as the Vice-President of the United States, when Schuyler Colfax had to retire from public life, dishonored. The Central Pacific also had its own

construction firm, Contract and Finance Company. Profits were over 50 percent as the Contract and Finance Company earned $63 million on an investment of $121 million. The majority of the money went to and made multimillionaires out of Leland Stanford, Charles Crocker, Mark Hopkins, and Collis P. Huntington.

Even with the vast public and private investment, the railroads had to sell off their land to insure a healthy cash flow to keep their lines going. The railroads sent agents to Europe and the Orient to either encourage peasants to buy land in the United States and/or to recruit workers for the railroads. Immigrants fled from the Old World because their oppression was immense and their chance of improving their lives in their native lands was slim. America offered the hope of social mobility to replace rigid class stratification (even conditions that resembled serfdom), and democracy to replace oppression. For those who would be farmers they had to battle semiarid and arid farmland, blizzards, prairie fires, tornadoes, unbearable loneliness, cattle ranchers, no amenities, a lack of law and order, backbreaking drudgery, and Native Americans who bravely fought against their genocidal expropriation. With sheer will-power and endurance, barbed wire in 1874 to combat cattlemen, and the US Calvary to expropriate Native Americans, the farmers came in droves. One of the largest mass migrations of people in world history, the settlement of the West was so rapid that by 1890 the Superintendent of

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the Census officially declared the frontier closed.

The immigrants who took up the challenge before 1890 were primarily Germans and Scandinavians. They settled in the states of Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, the Dakotas, Kansas, and Nebraska. However, the majority of people settling the plains and prairies had moved West from the older Eastern states. The immigrants and those who left the East contributed to the settlement of the West with new towns, territories, and states. The closing of the frontier is important for that is one reason southern and eastern Europeans who came after 1890 had to settle in the cities; uprooted, their Old World traits were transplanted in an alien and hostile environment. The closing of the frontier (there was still land that would be settled) was also one reason America began looking for new markets with expansionist and imperialist policies of overseas conquest.

With the railroad system extending to the far corners of the country, a national market was created that provided the soil from which industries could grow. Raw materials from Western mines and Midwestern wheat and corn farms could be shipped back east. Manufactured goods could be shipped from east to west. Businesses boomed. The new sources of raw materials and new markets in which to sell them stimulated the drive toward mass production and the foreign export of commodities. American industries were still protected by tariffs enacted in the Civil War.

But the Western farmer became embittered against the

railroads and their protest through the organization of the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry (commonly known as the Grange) was the first significant organized effort against the principles of laissez-faire capitalism that was a model to the city-centered Progressive movement decades later. The farmers were trapped, for the only way they could get their grain to market was through the railroads, and with only one line in the small towns of the Midwest and West, the railroad held the advantage of supply and demand, charging what the traffic would bear.

The protest was over freight rates. The railroads had set up pooling agreements to prevent the cutthroat competition of rate wars. Pools, which were no more than gentlemen's agreements, were established to divide the territory and market share in order to insure all a handsome profit. The merchants and manufacturers of the East also felt the sting of discriminatory rates. Discriminatory rates came through the practice of the "long-and-short-haul." In larger towns or cities where there were multiple lines and thus competition the rates were low. In small, one-line towns the rates were high. The above phrase came from the fact that one could ship long, say from New York to Chicago at a cheaper rate then one could ship short, say from Rochester, New York to Toledo, Ohio. Another major abuse was the secret rebate, a rate charged lower than the published one to those who were repeat and volume customers and thereby had power of their own to wield.

There were other railroad abuses. The fraudulent sale of securities such as the sale of bonds that went directly into the pockets of the owners. The manipulation of the stock market erupted into numerous scandals. Stock watering, which meant that a company declared stock dividends instead of income dividends when profits were high, and the profits were pocketed by the owners. The magnates then charged rate increases when profits were low so as to pay reasonable income dividends to the shareholders. But the public discerned that they were paying exorbitant rates in order to insure income dividends on stock that represented no real capital investment (Krout, 1975: 50-51).

The first significant regulatory legislation of business enterprise resulted from the protest, the Granger laws. These were state laws and the center of their greatest success was in the Midwest. The model of a public commission to watchdog public utilities and regulate prices had arisen as early as 1869 when Massachusetts established the first railroad commission. Illinois led the fight enacting maximum railroad rates and maximum elevator charges for the storage of agricultural commodities. The battle transferred to the courts where the laws were tested by state Supreme Courts and found unconstitutional; though, continuing the battle, the U.S. Supreme Court found that state legislatures did have the authority to regulate public utilities. The most significant case was the 1877 U.S. Supreme Court case of Munn v. Illinois in which the court decided in favor of

state legislatures to set maximum fees charged by grain elevators. Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, delivering the opinion of the court, expressed a new concern of American constitutional law, articulating the concept of a public interest that justified public regulation.

> Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created (Waite quoted in Morris and Greeleaf, 1969: 249).

Two other U.S. Supreme Court Granger cases were important at the time. The 1877 the cases of Peik v. The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad established the right of states to regulate intrastate commerce. And the 1877 case of Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa established that state regulation of rates did not deprive a person of his right to property and thereby violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A decade later, after a few key changes in court membership, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1886 Illinois v. Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railroad case limited state regulation to intrastate commerce. But even more important, the 1886 case of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad established the concept of the corporation as a "person" and therefore a corporation just as a person could not be deprived of property without due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Any state regulation of

business enterprise was therefore subject to judicial review to interpret whether property had been deprived without due process of law. It appeared for the time being that interstate commerce might go unregulated. But in 1885 Congress under Senator Shelby M. Cullom of Illinois had already been investigating railroad abuses and the possibility of federal regulation. The two-thousand page Cullom Committee report brought forth Congressional action in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It was the premiere national attempt at public regulation of laissez-faire capitalism in the public interest. The act prohibited railroads from devising secret rebates, drawbacks, the long and short haul rate discrimination, cheaper rates for volume shippers, and forming pooling agreements. An Interstate Commerce Commission was created to hear abuses and insure that the Attorney General prosecute violations. President Grover Cleveland appointed a twenty-one year veteran of the Michigan Supreme Court as the Chair of the Commission, the Republican Thomas M. Cooley, Charles Horton Cooley's father. The Interstate Commerce Commission was the first federal agency to watchdog capitalism and signaled the birth of an administrative structure or bureaucracy as a solution to the search for order.

Industrialization and the national market also engendered rapid capital accumulation. Gold, silver, lead, copper, iron ore, lumber, and oil were natural resources exploited from the earth all justified by America's dualistic mentality (really Western culture through Christianity) that human

beings and nature were/are separate (White, 1967). Each natural resource spawned the growth of an industry.

But natural resources had always been there. After the Civil War a host of inventions contributed to the mining, manufacturing, and processing of natural resources. The combination of natural resources, a national market, and patented (and therefore protected with a legal monopoly) inventions forged new industries.

Henry Bessemer received a United States patent in 1857 (it was subject to a law suit) on a process of blasting hot air through molten pig iron which removed most of the impurities and led to the manufacture of steel. The Bessemer process skyrocketed the production of steel. In 1867 total United States production of steel was 2,600 tons. By 1874 it was 275,000 tons. Then the Siemens-Martin or open-hearth process of producing steel gradually began to overtake the Bessemer method. Steel went down in price like electronic calculators and computers of today. In 1880 steel cost $300 a ton; by 1910 it cost $35 a ton. Adrew Carnegie, a Scottish immigrant, became the foremost steel tycoon and rivaled the railroad magnates for power and prestige.

The first commercial oil well in the United States gushed forth in 1859. By 1872 the domestic production of oil reached 40 million barrels. In 1870 John D. Rockefeller, along with two shrewd associates, Henry M. Flagler and Stephen V. Harkness, started the Standard Oil Company. Rockefeller's power was so strong that he received the best

railroad rebates in the business. With this economic advantage, along with emphasizing economies of scale, marketing strategy, general technological improvements in his industry, and cutthroat competition, Rockefeller drove his rivals out of business so that by 1879 (a mere nine years) he controlled ninety percent of the oil industry.

Meat-packing and flour-milling were other major industries that grew because of new processing ideas. In 1879 Thomas Alva Edison invented the electric incandescent lamp. And in 1886 George Westinghouse applied the principle of alternating current and advocated for electric light systems. And in 1887 Westinghouse perfected the air brake to be used on railroad engines. The telephone (Alexander Graham Bell 1876) and typewriter (Christopher L. Sholes 1868) created a communications revolution parallel to the transportation revolution. The adding machine (William S. Burroughs 1891) and the cash register (James Ritty 1897) simplified retail trade and monotonous business operations. The chilled plow (James Oliver 1868), the self-binding harvester (John F. Appleby), the corn husker and shredder (J.F. Hurd 1890), and the steam-propelled combined harvester and thresher (Benjamin Holt 1881), led to the rise of large-scale commercial agriculture and made a surplus population of farmers who packed up their belongings and headed for that most unholy of places, the city. But an important point: the agricultural inventions were mainly technological improvements, which along with horse drawn machinery,

eliminated much drudgery; it would not be before the 1920s when the industrialization and the 1950s when the chemicalization of agriculture began. But the late nineteenth century technological improvements were substantial, enabling farmers to not only feed the swarming city population but also the entire world.

The era of the invention catapulting a person and his/her industry to monopoly was not long. From the beginning of the nation to 1860 36,000 patents had been issued. By 1890 440,000, and by 1911 the one millionth patent had been registered. Thomas Alva Edison was the epitome of the American inventor. But by 1876 the beginning of the end of the era of the individual inventor was at hand with the construction of the Edison laboratory at Menlo Park, New Jersey. The first industrial research laboratory in the world set the pattern for corporate research, whereby inventions were created by salaried scientists and engineers organized into research teams and project work with the patents registered in the name of the corporation.

It was the time of the anarchic business cycle, of widely fluctuating boom and bust. A hands off policy especially hurt those who would suffer from the business cycle. The fortunes of the railroad industry affected the business cycle in late nineteenth century United States. When construction was booming then the country boomed, when construction contracted the bust cycle began. The most severe economic depression was the 1873-1897 period. By the end of

the period, captains of industry realized that a new era of business management and economic regulation was required to insure social order.

By the 1880s industrialization and cutthroat competition was moving laissez-faire capitalism toward bigness and consolidation, and the inevitable regulatory reform that such a move entailed. The trust movement began. Standard Oil became the first major trust in 1882. A trust was a legal device whereby stockholders in various related industries transferred their voting and policy control to a board of trustees in exchange for trust certificates from which they would receive dividends on the earnings of the trust. Related industries in other areas quickly followed suit and America had the Beef Trust, the Sugar Trust, the Steel trust, and eventually the Money trust, among others. It was the trust that would engender much of the reformist zeal of the Progressive movement.

The largest industries had grown beyond the capacity of self-financing and needed the help of investment bankers. A significant event in the social context of laissez-faire capitalism was the rise of finance capitalism, epitomized by the House of Morgan, named after the finance mogul James Pierpont Morgan. By 1900 twelve investment backing firms dominated the control of the money markets, among them the relationship of Standard Oil, E.H. Harriman, and the City Bank of New York. Other major firms were Kuhn, Loeb and Company; Lee, Higginson and Company; and Kidder, Peabody and

Company. The money trust became nearly omnipotent. Investment backing was involved in insurance companies, savings and loans, expansions, mergers, and reorganizations. The goal of the finance capitalist was market stability, consolidation, elimination of competition, and economic and social order. Morgan, the so-called Doctor of Wall Street, strove for a "community of interest" among competitors, first in railroads then in all industries needing reorganization (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 97-99). After the panic of 1893 even the powerful business magnate had to negotiate with the finance capitalist in hopes of saving his business through reorganization, usually through the floating of new stocks and bonds. In 1900 the House of Morgan was able to underwrite America's first billion dollar corporation, United States Steel. Applying the community of interest principle, the House of Morgan helped to consolidate competitors and underwrite International Harvester and General Electric, among many others.

The finance capitalist received more than a huge commission, he demanded to have his personal representative on the board of directors or in a high position in management. Corporate policy could now be influenced by the investment banker. The concept of the interlocking directorate was pioneered by Morgan. Economic power concentrated as corporate firms, investment banks, savings and loans, and insurance companies formed alliances and interlocking board directorates. The centralization and consolidation of

business enterprise was influenced by the need to obtain massive financing to expand and/or reorganize and the abdication of autonomy by the self-made tycoon that was its price. Morgan applied his community of interest principle to the investment banking firms themselves, creating the "money trust."

Finance capitalism was dangerous for democracy because of the "... aggregation of wealth and economic power [into] relatively few hands..." (Degler, 1970: 252). This aggregation of economic power, combined with the industrialists' call for minimal political interference with the exercise of that power, threatened the rights and welfare of the farmers, the old middle class of merchants and small businessmen who felt overwhelmed and could not compete with the emerging corporations, and the working class who had to pay high prices for commodities. Consumers were also paying high prices for commodities because the protective tariff that had been enacted in the Civil War was still in effect.

The rise of the trusts, especially the "money trust," was part of what evoked the moral and reformist response from farmers, merchants, muckrakers, and later, progressives and sociologists. The groundswell of popular resentment against the trusts was so great that the federal government responded with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The essence of the Sherman Act was to outlaw any combination, trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade. But the law was not vigorously enforced, unless it was against labor

organizations. Labor organizations, it was argued, were conspiracies in restraint of trade. According to a contemporary Senator, Orville Platt, the Sherman Act was passed primarily to appease a public hostile to the trusts.

> The conduct of the Senate ... has not been in the line of the honest preparation of a bill to prohibit and punish trusts. It has been in the line of getting some bill with that title that we might go to the country with. The questions of whether the bill would be operative, of how it would operate ... have been whistled down the wind in this Senate as idle talk, and the whole effort has been to get some bill headed: "A Bill to Punish Trusts" with which to go to the country (Platt quoted in Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 191).

The money trust was not seriously challenged until the Progressive era when in 1913 the Pujo Committee under Representative Arsène Pujo made public the need for banking and currency reform and tougher legislation followed.

Industrialization also provided the social origins of progress and optimism. Hinkle argues that this optimism and progress is a key to understanding the values of American sociologists; it led to a belief in human perfectibility and that through reform the state could intervene in order to benefit society as a whole (Hinkle, 1980: 32). The belief in progress through state interventionism provided a popular culture of optimism that was a counter to the notions of Social Darwinism.

> In the period after the Civil War, the idea of progress acquired a broad popular support.... Americans were encouraged by comparisons of the present with the past and they assumed that the future would bring continued improvement. Progress became an intrinsic part of Americans' image of themselves.... For perhaps the great mass of Americans, the fundamental criterion of progress was a generally rising standard of living as evidenced especially in enhanced material comforts (Hinkle,

1980: 30-31).

The rising standard of living that Hinkle refers to as the source of progress and optimism can be seen in rising wages.

> The expanding economy provided opportunities for all, no matter how meager they might appear or actually be at times. Though the rich certainly seemed to get richer at a prodigious rate, the poor, at least, did not get poorer--and often got richer. Studies of real wages between 1865 and 1900 bear this out (Degler, 1970: 271).

It was not only rising wages but also the material comfort that became part of the American dream, especially when contrasted with the possibilities open to the working class of European society. Most Americans did not accumulate capital, but they did manage to acquire real-estate and savings. According to one study of workers between 1850 and 1880:

> ... [T]he great majority of workers, regardless of their level of skill, were able to accumulate property, whether in real-estate or in savings.... ... [A]fter twenty years at least two-thirds of the workers owned property, with the medium amount being $600 or at least a year's wages. It was this property mobility that ... really sustained the belief in the promise of America (Degler, 1970: 258).

Chances for rising wages and some property was the social context that stimulated a belief in progress and optimism.

Industrialization also stimulated a belief in self-improvement and success, a notion that through education one could improve the self and one's chances in life or at least for one's children.

> Though Americans since at least the days of Benjamin Franklin had talked of how to get ahead in a world organized around money-making, it was not until the industrial age that the teaching of the secrets of material success became a thriving business itself. The publication of handbooks in the art of success became

> very popular; of the success books printed before 1900, four-fifths of them appeared after 1865, and 80 percent of them were published in the northeastern section of the country where industry and commerce--and the opportunities for success--were centered (Degler, 1970: 257).

Thus, industrialization led to slightly rising wages, and as I will review shortly, a new middle class; and mobility provided a context for popular beliefs in progress, self-improvement and success, but above all, everyday proof that biology was not destiny. And the belief in progress and self-improvement is an extremely important political belief, for as we shall shortly see, there was another group of people arguing that self-improvement was suspect, that progress through state interventionism was dangerous, that human beings were condemned to live a wretched life if they inherited a poor genetic makeup. The political concepts of progress, social equality, social mobility, and self-improvement were rooted, in part, in the process of industrialization. Such concepts were at the heart of the liberal argument for social reconstruction.

But industrialization was not the only social force transforming America. Urbanization and immigration were equally powerful. Let us look at immigration first.

Immigration

The complex, varied, and diverse American experience of immigrants suggests that generalizations may do violence to the particular experience of an ethnic group or even the intragroup experience of a specific ethnic group. Even though the historical American experience is rich and

diverse, a few generalizations or portrait of the immigrant experience is necessary, especially for post-1890 immigration. I have thus drawn a brief portrait from Oscar Handlin's work, The Uprooted (1973; orig. 1951). Even here there are exceptions to this ideal-typical view, for example, Rudolph J. Vecoli's 1964 criticism of The Uprooted in his study of the peasant southern Italian Contadini of Chicago. I have also deliberately stayed away from framing this American experience within any sociological model. I am aware of them, such as the assimilationist, structural assimilationist (including primary and secondary structural assimilation), internal colonial, and the dual economy/society models among others. The one consensus among historians and sociologists is that white/Native American contact fits the classic colonial model. To digress by seeking a model would only unfocus the social context section, since the main emphasis here is solely to outline the American experience of immigration and its geographical shift after 1880 which was the social context for much intellectual debate, specifically with an argument that this dissertation is concerned with, the nature/nurture debate.

Two significant factors of immigration occurred during the social context of laissez-faire capitalism which transformed the social and political context of America. Immigration shaped the political debate for the next three decades in America. The concepts of Mead, Cooley, Dewey, and Thomas, were rooted, in part, in the political issues

on by immigration. For example, (as I will explore in later chapters) their concept of adjustment through socialization and education, which had conceptual ties with acculturation and assimilation, has its social origins here. Thomas' writings on social disorganization arose from his study of immigrant life.

The first significant factor was the large numbers of immigrants coming to America. Between 1820 and 1920, 38 million people came to the United States. Thus, industrialization was growing not only because of "... the warm, reassuring attitude of sympathy in which government in America bathed business enterprise ..." but also the "... rapid and successful expansion of the industrial machine was ... encouraged by the great influx of immigrants in the postwar era" (Degler, 1970: 242). Just as slave labor had built the plantation system in the South, cheap immigrant labor built the industrial system of the United States.

The second significant factor was the change in the geographical origins of immigrants. This factor had enormous influence on the political debates concerning human nature, race, culture versus biology, and social interventionism. The first waves of emigrants had come from northern and western Europe, from Ireland, England, Scotland, Wales, France, Germany, and Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden and Denmark). These immigrants were primarily Protestant (the one exception is Irish Catholics). They were pulled by the promise of social mobility and especially the promise of

owning land. They were also pushed by economic dislocation in their countries of origins: the second wave of the English enclosure movements in agriculture when sheep farming replaced traditional agriculture as textile manufacturing became a major part of England's industrial revolution; that agricultural displacement also led to a rural to urban migration whereby a surplus population swarmed the cities. England's industrial revolution had also displaced handicraft and cottage industry. There were relatively huge population increases, and the Irish potato famine cannot be ignored. Except for the Irish, northern and western European immigrants became farmers, settling in rural areas. After 1890 the geographical location of European immigration began to change dramatically. Now came peasants from eastern and southern Europe: Italy, Greece, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. These new immigrants were primarily Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Jewish. They came in search of social mobility; this time due to the post-Civil War industrialization of America, which means they had to settle in the city.

One can perhaps better grasp this by a review of some immigration statistics. Between 1890 and 1917, 17,991,486 immigrants came to the United States. In that period 3,328,000 or 18.5 percent came from eastern Europe and 4,369,000 or 24.3 percent came from southern Europe. Eastern and southern Europe thus accounted for 42.8 percent of the emigrants during this period. During that same period

another 4,879,000 or 27.1 percent came from Central Europe. By 1891 the government had to open the famous immigration depot at Ellis Island in New York bay. By 1896 the new immigration outnumbered the old. In the year 1907, 81 percent of 1,285,000 emigrants came from southern and eastern Europe.

American attitudes and behavior toward the immigrant have been both positive and negative, though toward the southern and eastern European immigrant attitudes and behavior were primarily negative. In 1886 the Statue of Liberty was dedicated and the famous poem by Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, celebrated America as the home of the oppressed. Expressed in this poem are the twin attitudes of both valuing and disparaging the immigrant. The "Mother of Exiles" who held "her beacon-hand" and "glow[ed] with world-wide welcome" also asked for "the wretched refuse" of Europe. Xenophobia was already stalking the land. A fear of the foreigner had a long history as part of the American experience, for example, the anti-Catholicism against the Irish in the Know-Nothing Party before the Civil War. The renewed fear of strangers was now to be seen in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, in the 1882 imposition of a head tax of 50 cents on each immigrant, in Henry F. Bowers' formation of the anti-Catholic American Protective Association in 1887, in the 1891 transfer of immigration policy from state to federal supervision so that social control could be more effective, in the formation of the Boston-based Immigration

Restriction League in 1894, in the sponsorship of that organization's desires for a literacy test introduced as a bill by Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge in 1896 which passed both Houses of Congress but was vetoed by President Cleveland, and in William Z. Ripley's The Races of Europe (1899), to cite just a few examples.

Oscar Handlin has studied the typical uprooting process of immigrants (Handlin, 1973). After 1890 the typical emigrant from eastern or southern Europe was uprooted from a peasant background, his Old World traits transplanted to an alien city environment. The traditional immigrant came from a village life where serfdom had recently disintegrated. Economic and demographic conditions were limiting the opportunity for peasant sons to continue in a traditional way of life. There was a falling death rate which increased the competition for land; fathers could not provide all of their sons with land or if they did the amount of land would be insufficient to support a family. Commodities manufactured in the new factories undermined the peasant's self-sufficient way of life. With the commodification of land, the peasant could either mortgage or sell his land. This provided an opportunity for economic gain that was not available under serfdom, so long as crops were good and prices adequate. But mortgaging land in order to gain operating cash also provided the opportunity for destitution, if crops were poor, destroyed by pests or insects or prices bad. Not being able to meet the mortgage meant the end of

one's life as a peasant (Brody, 1969: 96-97).

Fleeing poverty, political oppression, military conscription, and (for the Jews) religious persecution, America was to be the promised land. Many who were propertyless came with the intention of saving enough money to return home and acquire land. With that intention in mind, immigrants arrived alone and penniless in a strange and inhospitable city where there was no opportunity to apply traditional skills as a peasant. The eastern and southern immigrant became an unskilled laborer, usually becoming employed in a factory or mine, performing the most degrading, dehumanizing, and menial work available. The American experience was one of alienation, estrangement, a loss of belonging, isolation, loneliness, and social disorganization, for village life could not be transplanted to America. The system of patriarchy was also an Old World trait that was hard to transplant to America with its democratic ethos; thus, parental social roles were subject to change. The only guide in this strange land was the political boss who helped though exploited the immigrant (though the relationship with a political machine really begins with the second generation). And for southern Italians, they were exploited in their job-seeking efforts by the short-lived padrone system. The immigrant not only supplied the cheap labor for the industrialization of America but also contributed to the upward mobility of Americans already here.

But the immigrant stayed.

> Many forces turned the immigrant away from his homeland. He saw little enough of the new country, but he was nevertheless influenced by it. He at once discarded his peasant garb, and he sensed, despite the hard life and the hostility of Americans, the disappearance of clear lines of class and status. Nothing revealed more of the American influence than the complaints of the gentry that immigrants, when they returned, were disrespectful. Migration weakened the familial solidarity of peasant society, clouded the purposes and inherited values of the immigrant, and, particularly after the wife arrived, dimmed the image of the home village. Moreover, the presence of friends and relatives and the developing social institutions began to meet the needs of the immigrants. They in time regarded their jobs, not as temporary chances, but as their careers, and their goal became promotion rather than property at home (Brody, 1969: 106-107).

Urbanization

Urbanization was reshaping America during the 1880s. People went to the city for economic opportunity, and the 1880s were a relatively good time to go. America was rapidly recovering from the economic depression of the 1870s, there was increasing agricultural production to support city dwellers, a system of railroads to transport agricultural products to the city, increased mechanization on the farm from hand to animal power which resulted in a surplus rural population, a factory system which could absorb this rural population, and the "lure" of the city as a place of bright lights and gregariousness in stark contrast to the isolation experienced on the farm (Degler, 1970: 306-307). Immigration, as I have already shown, provided millions of people for the urbanization of America. In 1860 22 percent of the population was urban; by 1900 the figure was 39 percent; by 1910 46 percent and by 1920 51.4 percent of Americans were

classified as urban. In 1860 New York City had 1.2 million people but by 1910 had 4.7 million. Chicago increased its population from 109,260 in 1860 to 2.2 million by 1910. In the decade of the 1880s Chicago alone increased 118 percent. One of the "... most dramatic manifestations of urbanization is the great city--urban centers which counted 100,000 or more in population ..." (Degler, 1970: 309).

As the urbanization of America increased it meant that the composition of the labor force changed as well. In 1860 farmers constituted 60 percent of the labor force; by 1890 they constituted 42.7 percent and by 1910 only 30.5 percent (Fite, 1984: 8). The nation's wealth and income correspondingly shifted. In 1799 farming had produced 40 percent of the nation's income, in 1859 31 percent and by 1900 only 20 percent of the nation's income (Fite, 1984 8-9). In 1880 the value of farm property and urban real estate were equal at a level of $10 billion but by 1890 farm property values had increased to only $13 billion whereas urban real estate had soared to $26 billion (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 142). The 1890 census also showed that the production of industrial commodities exceeded the wealth produced by the production of agricultural commodities (Fite, 1984: 9). Immigration is so closely interwoven with the social process of urbanization that it is hard to separate the two. As Degler states, the immigrant was not just a city dweller but a "dweller in a big city" (Degler, 1970: 290). The combination of immigration and urbanization led to slum housing and

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was a ghastly sight. Unplanned, unorganized, the helter-skelter growth of the city impeded the administration of public services. Rapid immigration and urbanization created the problems of sanitation, garbage and waste disposal, the lack of rapid transportation, unpaved streets, wretched tenement housing, and a lack of recreation space. Jane Addams, the leading social worker of the period, lamented about West Chicago's dilapidation, which is representative of other cities at the time.

> The streets are inexpressibly dirty, the number of schools inadequate, sanitary legislation unenforced, the street lighting bad, the paving miserable and altogether lacking in the alleys and smaller streets, and the stables foul beyond description. Hundreds of houses are unconnected with the street sewer. The older and richer inhabitants seem anxious to move away as rapidly as they can afford it. They make room for newly arrived immigrants who are densely ignorant of civic duties (Addams quoted in Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 144).

The tenement can be singled out as a major cause of the slum. The tenement was a way for the landlord to reap extraordinary returns on capital investment, up to thirty percent (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 145). Large-scale tenement housing first came into construction in New York City in 1850. Morris and Greenleaf offer a definition of the tenement and its revision for the worse in the 1880s.

> Constructed on a deep lot with a narrow frontage, the tenement was generally from four to six stories high, had a central stairway, dark and airless corridors, and was honeycombed with small, poorly ventilated, and sunless rooms. The 'dumbbell' tenement, designed in 1879 and widely introduced in the 1880's as a standardized type, was supposedly an improvement because an airshaft gave each room some exposure to the sun. Actually, by concentrating a minimum of twenty-four families in a six-story building on a narrow lot of 25 x 90 feet without a yard, the dumbbell multiple dwelling, which

> sometimes housed as many as thirty-six families, worsened congestion, clutter, and dirt (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 145).

The social problems of poverty, crime, marital discord, and mental illness can almost be seen in the number of inhabitants per dwelling in the cities. In 1890 the average inhabitant per dwelling in the United States was 5.45, but for New York City it was 18.52 (Degler, 1970: 312). Such congestion contributed to communicable diseases which spread like wildfire in the tenement districts and cut short the life expectancy of slum dwellers. The disease and decay characteristic of tenement life led to the popular phrase "Tenement House Rot."

From an outdoor peasant life to a city life perhaps inside a cellar tenement the immigrant brought his dreams and hopes for a better life. In some years with over a million immigrants a year streaming in, immigrant colonies arose, making those "undesirable" eastern and southern European immigrants highly visible. So concentrated was the immigrants' settlement within the city that the adjective "little" followed by the appropriate nationality became the conventional way to describe their location. Within these enclaves the immigrants made attempts to socially construct solidarity and cultural identity by maintaining their language through (short-lived) foreign-language newspapers, for instance, or by constructing their own church, celebrating folk festivals, and establishing their own fraternal, benevolent or mutual aid societies. The immigrants' settling

patterns provided "a haven in a heartless world." For the immigrant generation, religion helped to preserve a cultural heritage with the Old World and gave a cultural identity to immigrants in America, especially for Catholics, who developed a wide range of institutions that helped preserve ethnic identity. For the children of immigrants, religion helped toward acculturation and assimilation as the churches became Americanized. The school also contributed to the acculturation of the children of immigrants, but it did so in a way that devalued and disparaged the cultural heritage of those children. As Handlin notes, the model American presented to school children (who are always particularly sensitive and whose self-esteem can be easily destroyed) was not eastern or southern European, but was from a rural rather than a city background (Hanlin, 1973: 220-221). Many immigrants suffered a grieving process as they watched their customs ridiculed by the larger society and become unappreciated by their children in their hurried aspirations to become Americanized. Estranged by city life, immigrant parents and children faced familial estrangement as a ridiculed culture added psychological scares to the traditional generation gap between fathers and sons and mothers and daughters.

The clustering of immigrants in slum enclaves provided the social origins of nativist prejudice. Nativist prejudice argued that the eastern and southern immigrant was not as easily assimilable into American society. The

distinction between Old and New immigrants was made early. In 1870, when the geographical shift was just beginning, Francis A. Walker, Director of the Census and later president of MIT, expressed the typical perception of the "new" immigrant.

> They are beaten men from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence. Centuries are against them, as centuries were on the side of those who formerly came to us. They have none of the ideas and aptitudes which fit men to government (Walker quoted in Yetman and Steele, 1975: 167-168).

Sociologist Edward A. Ross later picked up on this terminology and referred to eastern and southern Europeans as "the beaten members of beaten breeds" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 137-139). Settling in inner-city slum enclaves, possessing a different culture, bringing religions unfamiliar to Protestant Americans (Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Jewish), many immigrants' illiteracy and connection to the political bosses and machines (the Boss Tweed Ring in New York City was the most notorious), and the popular myth that the immigrant was a radical subversive and a bomb-throwing anarchist, evoked a nativist prejudice against the immigrant which included the rural notion that the city was the location of sin and corruption.

> This conjunction of the city and the foreigner aroused sinister thoughts in the minds of Americans still wedded to the farm--and most natives in the early years of the twentieth century still lived in a rural environment. Always suspicious of the city anyway, the rural man became more so as he saw tenement piles and ramshackle company towns crowded with people whose customs, religions, and looks differed from his own (Degler, 1970: 290).

Many early sociologists, including early symbolic

interactionists, came from this rural environment. And coming from this rural environment helped shape how early American sociologists viewed social problems. As I will argue at the end of this chapter, the rural background of sociologists provided a stimulus to advocate for social reform to alleviate the degradation of human beings caused by the city.

It was not just the immigration from eastern and southern Europe but its conjunction with the massive rural to urban migration that was part of the social origins of nativist prejudice. The migrants from rural areas had an image of themselves as God's chosen people.

> The idea that farmers were God's chosen people and that farming was man's most useful occupation continued strong in American thinking. This agrarianism or agriculture fundamentalism held that farm life produced better people and that citizens close to the soil were more democratic, honest, independent, virtuous, self-reliant, and politically stable than were city dwellers. In farming, it was said, man worked hand in hand with the Creator to supply people's physical needs (Fite, 1984: 4).

The farmers were (are) the only American majority to become a minority and that impending loss of a way of life, clearly felt by the farmers themselves, fueled their anger as they also moved to the alien cities, leaving the farms for the factories, degrading occupations in a strange land. This decline in the prestige and power of farming as a way of life created a prejudice against city life.

> To many Americans the cityward movement represented growing national degeneracy and a weakening of the Republic. If young citizens would not respond to the idea that farming was the best way to make a living and the most pleasant life, agricultural fundamentalists

> sought to discourage migration by picturing growing urban centers as skinkholes of sin, crime, and corruption (Fite, 1984: 10).

Yet farmers came in droves to the city. Why? Because the idyllic picture of farming was only rhetoric. Farming suffered low social status; the "hick" and "hayseed" image of farming was common; farming was known to be backbreaking work filled with "drudgery" and "monotony"; there was a lack of educational, social, and cultural engagement; it was risky business: weather unpredictability, animal and plant diseases, pests that wiped-out entire crops, uncertain crop prices and gouging railroad freight rates meant incessant stress; and finally, the incomes were just too low compared with what could be gained in factory work (Fite, 1984: 10-15). Competition for factory jobs in the city between native-born rural-to-urban migrants and eastern and southern European immigrants was one source of the social origins of nativist prejudice and ethnic stratification.

The city also provided the social context of upward mobility. Political debates were to accompany the struggle for mobility, especially during the Progressive movement, but it was the city, the process of urbanization along with industrialization and immigration, in which those political debates were rooted. The city provided the social origins for Progressive reform that would incorporate many of the earlier ideas of the rural Populist movement. The city was the market for the new middle class educated professionals, especially the new practice of social work. That leads us

education, for the university provided the education of the new professionals who would locate in the city and advocate for social reform.

The Social Origins of the Modern University

The educational landmarks that provided an opportunity for an increase in public and college education in the U.S. are crucial for the rise of the urban middle class and for the later development of graduate research education. They can be briefly summarized. C.W. Mills has made one of the most thorough studies of the events that led to the emergence of the modern university (Mills, 1964: 35-59).

The most important legislative act was the Morill Act of 1862. States were given thousands of acres of land to set up industrial and mechanical colleges. With this act came the rise of the State University system contributing to the secularization of the university and the subjects available for study. With the decline in religious studies, education became scientific, utilitarian, and professional. Also contributing to the secularization of the modern university was the increasing number of European trained scholars. With more choice in the fields of study came the institutionalization of the elective system.

The elective system was a direct response to industrial and business occupational needs. Capitalists saw the need for research universities. On September 6, 1890 Rockefeller gave one million to the University of Chicago, and by 1919,

he had given over thirty-four and one-half million. The University of Chicago is, of course, the major institution where the pragmatists were housed, thus the appropriate appellation, the "Chicago School". Johns Hopkins, Cornell, Stanford, and Vanderbilt Universities all have their benefactors as namesakes. But reliance on generous benefactors could have devastating consequences as well. Clark University, based on the fortune of Jonas C. Clark, opened in 1889 as the first exclusively graduate school in the United States. Its status fell when Clark lost interest and dropped his financial support. The reliance on industrialists and businessmen for financial support, rather than religious sects, also helped to increase the secularization of the university. The board of trustees were increasingly from business rather than religious backgrounds.

Another source of both secularization and the rising number of college students, came from the rapid growth of the public school system. Universal manhood suffrage also influenced the desire for public education. Hinkle suggests that a college degree became a status symbol for the socially mobile who wanted to "... distinguish themselves from those who were below them (i.e., the more recent immigrants)" (Hinkle, 1980: 37).

The University was also a status symbol to the new presidents. The modern university led to the rise of a new type of person: the "educator." He was an administrative president, organizing and promoting "his" university and

insuring that funds were abundant (Mills, 1964: 57).

Religious censorship, which had limited intellectual pursuits, was dying, though there still was not a great deal of academic freedom. The philosopher and scientist had been granted his/her investiture. As for the sociologists: "They rode the initial wave of modern university development relatively unencumbered by ancient academic traditions. Their status as members of an independent discipline was rapidly institutionalized within the academy (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1974: 445). In summary, the rise of the modern university led to graduate education, and graduate education was an important context for the rise of sociology.

> Undeniably, a certain congruence exists between enlarged undergraduate enrollments, the elective system, departmental and curricular differentiation, specialized schools, on the one hand, and graduate study and research on the other (Hinkle, 1980: 39-40). [And]... the emergence of the research-oriented university with graduate education as a context for sociology was of signal importance (Hinkle, 1980: 41).

I will now take a closer look at the rise of higher education and its importance for a new middle class and the establishment of their professional careers in the city. The confluence of the new middle class and the new southern and eastern European immigrants, all locating in the rapidly industrializing and urbanizing city, was the source for social reform.

Higher Education, the Rise of the Middle Class And the Culture of Professionalism

C.W. Mills has argued that the transition from a rural agricultural economy to an urban industrial economy profoundly altered the occupational and educational structure of the United States. The rapid and massive growth of industry and business after the Civil War (the Gilded Age) generated a new division of labor and increased occupational stratification and specialization (Mills, 1964: 50). The students who were enrolling in college were of a new breed: they were coming from families with class mobility (Mills, 1964: 60). This meant that opportunities for a new and larger middle class were appearing. The sons of doctors and lawyers had always gone to college, but now there was a chance for those parents who were socially mobile but did not have a college education to send their children to college. The capitalistic expansion created occupational frontiers which accelerated social mobility. As Mills states, the university's "... first public was drawn from those on the make ..." (Mills, 1964: 60).

In response to the industrialists' need for scientists, engineers, and professionals of all sorts, and to their censorial philanthropy which redirected educational goals and purposes, a large part of the educational structure of America's universities was transformed to generate knowledge applicable to business and industry. A consequence of capitalistic expansion after the Civil War, this reorganization of university education--specifically, the creation of

graduate education--provided the institutional structures through which natural and social scientists were to differentiate themselves from one another. Social scientists claimed areas of knowledge as their domain and sought legitimation through making signal contributions to these areas. Psychology, sociology, and anthropology sought legitimation and professionalization as distinct disciplines of study through the establishment of autonomous graduate programs within the expanding university curriculum. The professionalization and institutionalization of sociology was a Midwestern phenomenon.

As I have argued, urbanization and industrialization created both a working class and a new middle class. The working class was based on the factory system. The new middle-class grew from the professionalization of occupations in the 1880s and 1890s: medicine, law, economics, administration, social work, and architecture. By the 1890s it has been estimated that one-third of the population was middle-class (Bledstein, 1976: 35). In the 1870s and 1880s at least 200 professional societies and associations were formed (Bledstein, 1976: 86). Those working in these fields began to identify themselves as professionals with an expertise derived from training. "Almost every group within the new class experienced its formative growth toward self-consciousness in roughly the ten years from 1895-1905" (Wiebe, 1967: 127).

The rise of this middle-class was tied in directly with

the development of higher education in America, which in turn was a response to the new occupational structure that industrialization brought about.

> The creation of higher education made a difference in American history at a crucial moment when aspiring middle-class persons were struggling to define new career patterns, establish new institutions, pursue new occupations, and forge a new self-identity. The American University was basic to this struggle. It became a central institution in the competitive, status-conscious political economy of America. It held before society the image of the modern professional person, who committed himself to an ethic of service, was trained in scientific knowledge, and moved his career relentlessly upward (Bledstein, 1976: 333).

Enrollment in institutions of higher learning in America surged from 52,000 in 1870 to 238,000 in 1900 to 1,101,000 in 1930; institutions grew from 563 in 1870 to 977 in 1900 to 1,409 in 1930 (Bledstein, 1976: 297).

According to Burton J. Bledstein, the university created a "culture of professionalism" that was a powerful force at the end of the nineteenth century; that force was authority and success through credentials.

> By and large the American university came into existence to serve and promote professional authority in society. More than in any other Western country in the last century, the development of higher education in America made possible a social faith in merit, competence, discipline, and control that were basic to accepted conceptions of achievement and success (Bledstein, 1976: x).

Authority through competence, that is the reason government and businesses began courting the special and esoteric knowledge of professionals.

Business, grown complex and centralized, with its own division of labor into departments of finance, law, sales, research and development, marketing, etc., needed the

services of the professionally trained.

> As their interests grew more refined and their need for technical services increased, big businessmen also leaned more and more upon expert assistants. The first to profit from this trend had been a few specialists in corporate and financial law. Then by 1900 they were joined by a great variety of experts (Wiebe, 1967: 181-182).

Industrialization and higher education had created a new middle class and it was to them that government also looked to solve the problems of the new century. Legislative bodies broke up into committees and committees relied on those who devoted their careers to specific problems.

> The fundamental changes, however, came after 1900 with the flood of broad, new issues requiring national attention. The premium on speed, efficiency, and technical competence mounted sharply. Powerful, important groups would no longer wait for a decade's deliberation. Far heavier responsibilities passed to the committees: the committees in turn relied increasingly upon experts (Wiebe, 1967: 188-189).

This did not mean that the expert was in charge; he or she was simply an administrator of other people's policies. As Wiebe states, "... the specialist who attempted to move beyond his sphere almost always fell from grace" (Wiebe, 1967: 197).

Bledstein argues that a middle-class culture of professionalism provided an excellent context for the conceptualization of a creative, determining human nature. "Professional ambition liberated the creativity of the self, thereby encouraging the ego to explore the world and discover knowledge" (Bledstein, 1976: x-xi). The new middle-class person, reinforcing Wiebe's argument, was a service provider. It was a service acquired after college and

perhaps professional schooling. It was a service that enhanced his/her creativity and self-esteem. The middle-class person did not:

> ... view his "ability" as a commodity, an external resource, like the means of production or manual labor. His `ability' is a human capacity--an internal resource--as unlimited in its potential expansion and its powers to enrich him financially and spiritually as the enlarging volume of his own intelligence, imagination, aspirations, and acquisitiveness (Bledstein, 1976: 4).

Middle-class professionalism required a flexible behavior, manipulative office politics, and the goal of upward mobility through careerism, all undermining the argument that people were determined and doomed by an innate intelligence or behavior.

> ...[T]he middle-class person was competitive, active, bold, brave, and even reckless. He mercilessly combated those who hated innovation. He agitated against complacency, he destroyed prescription, he invented means, he subverted monopoly, he opened doors of opportunity, and he multiplied the avenues for wholesome rivalry. The middle-class person was not merely self-reliant, he was absorbed in his own egotism (Bledstein, 1976: 27).

> Their language emphasized perseverance, aiming at a goal, and the willingness to take risks. Persons "on the make" sought a "clear swing" or good opportunity to "make a move" and "make one's mark" (Bledstein, 1976: 22).

This confluence of a middle-class, higher education, and ever-new services created the culture of professionalism that provided a context for the creative person, a person who is not determined but who is determining.

> The culture of professionalism emancipated the active ego of a sovereign person as he performed organized activities within comprehensive spaces. The culture of professionalism incarnated the radical idea of the independent democrat, a liberated person seeking to free the power of nature within every worldly sphere, a self-governing individual exercising his trained judgment in

> an open society. ...[A] professional person strove to achieve a level of autonomous individualism, a position of unchallenged authority heretofore unknown in American life (Bledstein, 1976: 87-88).
>
> The culture of professionalism released the creative energies of the free person who was usually accountable only to himself and his personal interpretation of the ethical standards of his profession (Bledstein, 1976: 92).

Social science's and philosophy's reconceptualization of human nature (with their new view of human beings as creative, volitional, ambitious, active, and determining) certainly was contextually rooted in the emergence of a middle-class of college-trained professionals. The pragmatists and symbolic interactionists were themselves middle-class university professionals. Thus, the university and the rising middle-class provide another social context (not a cause and effect relationship) for the emergence of a reconceptualization of human nature to which the symbolic interactionists would pay heed.

Much of the support for social reconstruction came from these urban-industrial professionals. "The professional transformed public administration into an instrument of opportunity for the middle class and an instrument of regulation for the society" (Bledstein, 1976: 122). As we shall shortly see, they provided the expertise for the interventionist approach to social problems.

The social context just reviewed provided the backdrop for those intellectual debates that concern this dissertation, ones that considered the nature of human nature and the type of society America was to become. These debates

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drew from the new evolutionary science of the period; therefore, it is appropriate to gain an understanding of this evolutionary science and the social evolutionary theory of social change that was adopted by early sociologists. From the social evolutionary theory of social change contrasting views were drawn as to the nature of human nature. They also had political implications for what type of society America was to become. Social Darwinism supported laissez-faire capitalism but an environmental view began to take shape that suggested social reform and state interventionism.

Evolutionary Science: Lamarck and Darwin

One aspect of what progressives, pragmatists, and symbolic interactionists were reacting to in the development of their concepts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century can be understood from a brief review of one of the most far-reaching developments in 19th century thought, evolutionary science. Evolution as a concept has been traced back to ancient Indian and Chinese thought and the pre-Socratic philosophers (Morris, 1983: 29). But in the nineteenth century, evolution became a central concept in the natural and social sciences. As one scholar on the period has remarked, "... all in all the influence of evolutionary theory on ideas about man constituted the great achievement of the nineteenth century in explanations of human nature" (Curti, 1980: 248). Another has stated that: "The history of the doctrine of evolution in the United States is a vital

chapter in the development of the American mind.... Evolutionism germinated ideas wherever it penetrated, and it penetrated everywhere" (Loewenberg, 1941: 339).

One of the most important evolutionary thinkers was the French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck. Lamarck did not believe that "... all living creatures had a common ancestor. On the contrary, he thought that life would arise from nonliving matter by a process known as spontaneous generation. In Lamarck's theory, life had arisen, not once, but many times" (Morris, 1983: 30). Lower forms of life would advance to higher ones because they had an inborn drive to rise on the evolutionary scale. Once advances in species development were achieved they were passed on through the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

> According to this theory, the reason that giraffes have long necks is that their ancestors were always stretching theirs in order to eat foliage from trees. Similarly, a man or woman who spent a lot of time lifting heavy weights would be likely to have unusually strong offspring (Morris, 1983: 30).

The idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was widely accepted as the basis for species development and was used to analyze social evolution as well, particularly by Spencer.

When in 1859, Charles Darwin's The Origins of Species was published, natural science changed forever as evolution through natural selection became part of the understanding of all natural science.

> Darwinism was posited upon two primary inductions. All life developed from preexisting life and the normal ratio of increase of any one variety, if unchecked,

> exceeded the physical capacity of the earth to support it. Evidence for the unity and overproduction of life supported other contentions. Plants and animals, despite resemblances to the parent stock, were inherently different. Given variation, those with differences favorable in a given set of circumstances displayed a tendency to survive, while those without them perished. As a consequence of the universality of variation and the elimination of the unadapted, new species appeared. Darwin stressed slow, cumulative modifications and the negative action of the environment (Loewenberg, 1941: 349).

Darwin's theory is further explained by another scholar.

> If the differences between individuals were inheritable, Darwin reasoned, then it followed that certain advantageous hereditary characteristics would be passed on to subsequent generations more often than others. The best-adapted individuals would have the largest number of progeny. Therefore the characteristics possessed by the best-adapted would be most likely to appear in successive generations. This would ensure that, over long periods of time, species would evolve (Morris, 1983: 32).

When the principles of evolutionism were applied to social life and human beings, it was notions such as "best-adapted," "elimination of the unadapted," "advantageous hereditary characteristics," "universality of variation," "species survival," and the "overproduction of life" which were incorporated into Social Darwinism. Social Darwinism, which had its intellectual roots in social evolution, was an ideology for laissez-faire capitalism. But that does not mean that those who believed in social evolution also believed in Social Darwinism, for most sociologists did not.

Religious fundamentalism was (and would always be) in uncompromising opposition to natural selection for it violated the notion of special creation or divine intervention.

> Science, freed from centuries of bondage to metaphysics and theology, knocked boldly at the gates guarded by its

> former masters. The suggestion of an evolution of species invited speculation as to the origin of life.... ... [D]octrines grounded in reason and experiment, and supported by compelling testimony, shattered conventional cosmologies (Loewenberg, 1941: 346-347).

But religion would change. "Biological evolutionism supplied a naturalistic interpretation of life-forms and prepared the way for a naturalistic interpretation of religious development" (Loewenberg, 1941: 347). As Hofstadter argues, by the 1880s "... the reconciliation of science and religion had become clear. Religion had been forced to share its traditional authority with science, and American thought had been greatly secularized" (Hofstadter, 1969: 30).

As Loewenberg suggests, this secularization of American thought gave new purpose to life here on earth. "The ascent of man was substituted for the fall, and the duty to improve mankind was regarded as an injunction of natural law certified by evolution" (Loewenberg, 1941: 352). The duty to improve mankind was the issue, but how to do so became the burning question of the day. There emerged a struggle over the type of society America was to become. Some argued for sterilization and restrictions placed on immigration, others, including symbolic interactionists, argued for social reconstruction--the liberal transformation of America's social and political institutions.

Not only was American thought secularized but, as Merle Curti points out, evolutionary theory challenged the mind/body dualism, which was considered another assault on religion. Human nature was now viewed in evolutionary

terms. Human beings' mental development was seen as just another aspect of evolution (Curti, 1980: 193-194). Mental development and the worthiness of human beings became topics of grave concern to early evolutionary thinkers. "The inheritance of characteristics, basic to variation and charged with social potential, generated a new interest in heredity" (Loewenberg, 1941: 361).

Herbert Spencer and Social Evolution

Even before Darwin, but increasingly popular after the Civil War in the United States, evolutionary theory was applied to all types of disciplines that dealt with development. The principal discipline that incorporated evolutionary thought was sociology. Herbert Spencer argued that society evolved through adaptation, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and competition. Spencer would later be attacked by American sociologists, but at first, he had enormous influence on the founding fathers of American sociology. His influence was very broad, both in and out of academia. Spencer's ideas were rooted in early industrial capitalist society, "... a system conceived in and dedicated to an age of steel and steam engines, competition, exploitation, and struggle" (Hofstadter, 1969: 35). This struggle for existence is reflected in Spencer's own background, for he came from a lower-middle-class family that had to struggle to survive (Hofstadter, 1969: 35).

Spencer developed the organic analogy by applying evolutionary theory to society, and he coined the phrase

"survival of the fittest," not Darwin. Analogies have always had a place in social theory, as borne witness to by such familiar notions as society is analogous to a machine, the State is like the family, social classes or estates each have rights, duties, status, functions, and mutual obligations that reflect the great chain of being, the invisible hand that was Adam Smith's metaphor for the market, and the like (Peel, 1971: 170). Spencer argued that society was a social organism analogous to a biological organism. Let me be precise about what analogy meant for Spencer. The analogy was a useful heuristic device, it allowed Spencer to make comparisons in the evolution--the social changes--in society with the evolution of a biological organism. It was a limited comparison.

Spencer was a believer in evolutionary theory (as were many nineteenth century scholars) before Darwin's theory was published, for Spencer adhered to Lamarckian evolutionary concepts such as the inheritance of acquired characteristics. However, after the publication of Darwin's book, Spencer's writings were influenced by Darwin's theory of natural selection.

Spencer, using his organic analogy, argued that societies were struggling for existence, that there was a survival of the fittest, and that surviving and, therefore, evolving societies were comprised of a fitter people, thanks to their social and technological adaptation and to competition. Competition weeded out the deficient and defective;

the best thrived through adaptation. As Hofstadter states, when natural selection and the organic analogy were applied to society "... it [gave] the force of a natural law to the idea of competitive struggle" (Hofstadter, 1969: 6). It also supported the idea that social evolution is slow, that societies evolve slowly, and that interference with competition, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest could only bring disastrous results. Conservative social theory, which had argued for a laissez-faire government, found new ammunition in evolutionary science, for to interfere with society became anti-evolutionary, anti-scientific, and anti-nature. The political doctrine that the government which governs least governs best seemed to have scientific support. That new ammunition was Social Darwinism, which I will discuss shortly, but even at the outset one distinction is crucial. Most of those who adhered to evolutionary science did not accept Social Darwinism, the belief that there were human beings who were "biologically unfit" and that to intervene in order to help them would only cause grave social harm. As I shall point out, other scholars argued that social evolution advanced by cooperation and social intervention. Therefore, one must clearly distinguish between social evolution, which many scholars accepted, and Social Darwinism, which was based on social evolution, but argued that the best way to achieve adaptation and survivability was to refrain from social intervention, thereby, justifying laissez-faire capitalism.

Let us briefly review some points of Spencer's argument in his own words. Spencer's theory begins with his ubiquitous views on evolution. His evolutionism was a teleological perspective; he believed in progress; he also believed in natural causation, that everything evolved from the simple to the complex, and that differentiation was achieved as things evolved from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. In 1857, two years before Darwin's historic book, Spencer summarized the central tenets of his evolutionism, in an article entitled "Progress: Its Law and Cause."

> We believe we have shown beyond question, that that which the German physiologists have found to be the law of organic development, is the law of all development. The advance from the simple to the complex, through a process of successive differentiations, is seen alike in the earliest changes of the Universe to which we can reason our way back; and in the earliest changes which we can inductively establish; it is seen in the geologic and climatic evolution of the Earth, and of every single organism on its surface; it is seen in the evolution of Humanity, whether contemplated in the civilized individual, or in the aggregation of races; it is seen in the evolution of Society in respect alike of its political, its religious, and its economical organization; and it is seen in the evolution of all those endless concrete and abstract products of human activity which constitute the environment of our daily life. From the remotest past which Science can fathom, up to the novelties of yesterday, that in which Progress essentially consists, is the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous (Spencer quoted in Peel, 1971: 137).

What moves society from the simple to the complex, what brings about social differentiation, what leads everything on a predestined unilinear path from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous? Borrowing from Adam Smith and T.R. Malthus to answer those questions, the conservative implications of Spencer's theory became starkly apparent. In an essay

entitled "A Theory of Population, deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility," published in 1852, Spencer coined the phrase "survival of the fittest." He argued that population pressure was the prime mover in animal evolution, since animals had to compete for food in order to say alive. They had to compete because the population of any species sooner or later becomes so large that the available food supply becomes insufficient. Those that survived were more adaptable, more intelligent; they evolved into higher, more complex species. Spencer argued that the same holds true for human societies. People overbreed, primarily the poor, and they cannot feed themselves; thus, those not clever enough to adapt with social or technological inventions die out as a result of their overbreeding; the intelligent among them will survive and the population in general will be better off.

Society will advance--become more complex--because it must seek adaptations to counter the tendency of the population to outstrip the food supply. "From the beginning pressure of population has been the proximate cause of progress.... It forced men into the social state; made social organization inevitable; and has developed the social sentiments...." (Spencer quoted in Peel, 1971: 138-139). Society adapts with social inventions: the division of labor, laws, institutions, and the State; thus, as is true for plants and animals, society also grows from the simple to the complex, which leads to greater functional interdependence.

In summary, Spencer's theory of social evolution and his organic analogy conceived society as a process of growth, not of human manufacture. As a heuristic device the organic analogy helped one to understand social change and societal adaptation, that society grows to maturity and seeks to achieve homeostasis or equilibrium. As society grows and adapts, becoming more complex, there is differentiation as the homogeneous evolves into the heterogeneous. Every part of society has its structure and function. Society becomes functionally interdependent. Both structures and functions become specialized.

The above is the heart of Spencer's evolutionary theory which had enormous influence on sociologists and other social scientists. But Spencer went farther than this; he argued not only that societies evolve in a way analogous with biological organisms but also that society would have a better chance of adapting if one did not intervene to help those who are biologically unfit. It is here where the separation of social evolution from Social Darwinism takes place within Spencer's own work. Sociologists would use Spencer's social evolutionism but only a few, notably William Graham Sumner, would also incorporate Social Darwinism into their writings.

Herbert Spencer and Social Darwinism

If the struggle for existence has the benefit of evolving society and its members to better forms and people, then society has a self-correcting mechanism and need not be

interfered with, for therein lies disaster. Spencer saw State interference and reform of any sort as a moral travesty since it preserved those who were unfit and would perish--if not for the meddling of irresponsible philanthropists and bleeding-heart politicians.

> Besides an habitual neglect of the fact that the quality of a society is physically lowered by the artificial preservation of its feeblest members, there is an habitual neglect of the fact that the quality of a society is lowered morally and intellectually by the artificial preservation of those who are least able to take care of themselves.... Fostering the good-for-nothing at the expense of the good, is an extreme cruelty. It is a deliberate storing-up of miseries for future generations. There is no greater curse to prosperity than that of bequeathing them an increasing population of imbeciles and idlers and criminals. To aid the bad in multiplying is, in effect, the same as maliciously providing for our descendants a multitude of enemies. It may be doubted whether the maudlin philanthropy which, looking only at direct mitigations, persistently ignores indirect mischiefs, does not inflict a greater total of misery than the extremest [sic] selfishness inflicts. Refusing to consider the remote influences of his incontinent generosity, the thoughtless giver stands but a degree above the drunkard who thinks only of today's pleasure and ignores tomorrow's pain, or the spendthrift who seeks immediate delights at the cost of ultimate poverty (Spencer quoted in Peel, 1971: 149).

Spencer published these thoughts in his The Study of Sociology in 1873. A scientific study of society, rather than formulating social policy to remedy a social problem, should instead argue that leaving everything alone is the best course.

> Is it not probable that as in Biology so in Sociology, the accumulation of more facts, the more critical comparison of them, and the drawing of conclusions on scientific methods, will be accompanied by increasing doubt about the benefits to be secured, and increasing fear of the mischiefs to be worked [by intervention] (Spencer quoted in Peel, 1971: 175-176)?

Motivated by the struggle to survive, the fittest will adapt

through technological or social invention and improve society. For those that cannot adapt, society is better off without them, for they offer no improvement and are a burden on everyone else.

Evolution through adaptation, a Lamarckian notion extended to society, had been a useful heuristic device for understanding social change, but it led Spencer to argue against anything that would artificially influence people's or society's ability to adapt. Societies adapt slowly, and slow growth must not be interfered with; therefore, any rapid social change is destructive, especially the meddling work of government intervention. Anticipating Merton, Spencer felt that intervention had unanticipated consequences: "... the social organism cannot be dealt with in any one part, without all other parts being influenced in ways that cannot be foreseen" (Spencer quoted in Peel, 1971: 175).

Spencer produced three arguments for the refutation of interventionistic government: it preserves the unfit who should perish; it interferes with the natural growth of society thereby inhibiting social and technological adaptation; and, people cannot know how by changing one part of society it will affect another aspect of society. The effect of such intervention will result in destructive, unanticipated consequences. With such an elaborate justification Spencer had laid the basis for Social Darwinism, from which others would draw.

Social Darwinism Continues

The Social Darwinist ideology of the late nineteenth century had its roots in the organic analogy and the social evolutionary theory of social change. As an ideology it continued to grow after Spencer. Thomas F. Gossett argues that the ideology of Social Darwinism went an additional step unnecessary to the social evolutionary theory of social change by translating the notion of adaptability through natural selection into that of teleological class stratification, thereby justifying inequality.

> The idea of natural selection was translated to a struggle between individual members of a society, between members of classes of a society, between different nations, and between races. This conflict, far from being an evil thing, was nature's indispensable method for producing superior men, superior nations, and superior races (Gossett, 1969: 145).

Cravens argues that there were three fundamental assumptions of Social Darwinism.

> ... [F]irst, the assumption that man is an animal who has evolved in the same fashion as the animals. An obvious corollary is that man was as subject to the dictates of natural law and phenomena as the animals. A third point is that human nature and conduct were determined ural forces beyond the control of the individual. And indeed most, if not all, of the Social Darwinist intellectuals in late nineteenth century America accepted these assumptions (Cravens, 1978: 7).

Laissez-faire capitalism was the social context for Social Darwinism, for now a scientific case could be made to justify non-interference in the economy.

> With its rapid expansion, its exploitative methods, its desperate competition, and its pre-emptory rejection of failure, post-bellum America was like a vast human caricature of the Darwinian struggle for existence and survival of the fittest. Successful business entrepreneurs apparently accepted almost by instinct the Darwinian

> terminology which seemed to portray the conditions of their existence (Hofstadter, 1969: 44).

As Merle Curti argues, the captains of industry used the notion of teleological class stratification and the survival of the fittest metaphor as apologies for ruthlessness and exploitation.

> Social Darwinism lent support to classical economics and common sense realism by arguing that an innate selfishness explained motives and behavior and somehow worked for the public good. Andrew Carnegie attributed the accumulation of his fabulous fortune to the strength of his instinct to survive in the struggle with his kind. (Curti, 1980: 221).

As Peel points out in his work (1971: 2), Andrew Carnegie and Herbert Spencer were friends, and Carnegie gave financial support to Spencer.

Social Darwinism provided an excellent ideological argument to justify laissez-faire capitalism and reject social interventionism. In fact, according to Social Darwinists, poverty worked for the betterment of human beings and society.

> According to this frame of thought, individual endowment explained success or failure. Poverty had nothing to do with the prevailing order of laissez-faire. It resulted rather from the deficient native talents and character of those who experienced such degradation. Moreover, poverty served as a beneficial stimulus to effort. It warned everyone of the penalty for sloth, failure of will, inebriation, and other violations of the middle-class Christian code. On the other hand, the successful man owed everything to his superior endowment, including character, to his superior effort, or to both (Curti, 1980: 219).

Most sociologists rejected Social Darwinism but there was one who was in the forefront of developing Social Darwinist ideas. "The most vigorous and influential Social Darwinist

in America was William Graham Sumner of Yale" (Hofstadter, 1969: 51). And, if the ability to compete is the determinant of the quality of a human being's existence, then reform, public and private intervention, and social protection are not only useless, but, in addition, harmful. Such was Sumner's contention: "During the 1870's, 1880's, and early 1890's, in the columns of popular journals and from the lecture platform, he waged a holy war against reformism, protectionism, socialism, and government interventionism" (Hofstadter, 1969: 54). Sumner "... argue[d] by analogy from natural selection of fitter organisms to social selection of fitter men, from organic forms with superior adaptability to citizens with a greater store of economic virtues" (Hofstadter, 1969: 57). It was either the survival of the fittest or survival of the unfittest, and democracy was doing its best to contribute to the latter (Hofstadter, 1969: 57-62). For Sumner democracy and civilization were incongruous. The weak and worthless were being coddled, and this was a drain on our most precious resource: capital.

Endowment, effort, and merit were what made people succeed; a lack of them made people fail. The capitalist system was not responsible for poverty. The laissez-faire system was the natural order achieved through evolution and any "... interference with the natural order by social planning and sentimental reform was irrational, pernicious, and in the end fruitless, except for penalizing the hard-working and the frugal by burdening them with the support of the

meritless unfit and the drones (Curti, 1980: 222).

Another eminent sociologist who drew from the theory of social evolution Social Darwinist implications, was Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia University. Throughout his professional life he:

> ... had been devoted to the competitive principle, and he believed with Spencer that its permanence in the economic process could be deduced from the conservation of energy and the facts of heredity. He drew upon biology to support the ancient doctrine of a natural aristocracy, and accordingly argued for a modification of pure democracy (Hofstadter, 1969: 157).

The notion that the etiology of poverty inhered within the biology of the individual, that somehow feeble-mindedness and/or mental disorder were biological characteristics which led those with inferior constitutions to poverty, had been expressed as early as 1855 by E. Jarvis in his study Insanity and Idiocy in Massachusetts: report of the Commission on Lunacy.

> Men of unbalanced mind and uncertain judgment do not see the true nature and relation of things, and they manifest this in mismanagement of their common affairs. They do not adapt the means which they possess or use to the ends which they desire to produce. Hence they are unsuccessful in life; their plans of obtaining subsistence for themselves or their families, or of accumulating property, often fail; and they are consequently poor and often paupers.... [T]he cause of... their mental derangement lies behind, and is anterior to, their outward poverty (Jarvis, 1971: 55-56; orig. 1855).

Thus American culture was already receptive to the notion of biological inferiority and that poverty itself was a biological manifestation of an inferior constitution within a competitive economic order. Works in Social Darwinism would make these notions much more popular.

One of the works (there were many) that popularized both the notion of biological inferiority and innate criminality was Richard L. Dugdale's, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease and Heredity (1877). Dugdale was not a Social Darwinist or biologist, but a reform-minded American concerned over the social problems of his time, but his study was widely used by Social Darwinists. His study, which identified 709 persons "... in the Jukes' clan stretching back to the era of the American Revolution" (the majority of which had been convicted for criminal offences) made a sensation (Cravens, 1978: 4). For middle-class Americans the book "... offered support to the common view that disease, pauperism, and immorality are largely controlled by inheritance" (Hofstadter, 1969: 161). Dugdale himself was a reform-minded Lamarckian, he believed that improving the environment could help improve the inheritance of acquired habits, for the

> ... environment tends to produce habits which may become hereditary, especially in pauperism and licentiousness if it should be sufficiently constant to produce modifications of cerebral tissue. If these conclusions be correct, then the whole question of the control of crime and pauperism becomes possible, within wide limits, if the necessary training can be made to reach over two or three generations (Dugdale quoted in Curti, 1980: 276).

In spite of the mass appeal of the book to Americans, it needed "scientific" proof to establish academic credibility, and in 1877 there was scarcely any available. But after the discovery of Mendel's laws in 1900 a number of arguments would be advanced by the new biologists and psychologists

which seemed at the time to give "scientific" credibility to the hereditarianism embedded in Dugdale's work. In a later chapter we will turn to these new biologists and psychologists who developed the theory of hereditarianism, as the Social Darwinists slid from favor. Even through Social Darwinism was fading, the nature/nurture controversy was just beginning to heat up.

The Decline of Social Darwinism

Merle Curti has argued that a number of ideas that challenged the anti-environmental and anti-interventionist philosophy of Social Darwinism grew out of the American Social Science Association, which was organized in 1865 (Curti, 1980: 223). Views stressing the importance of environment on human nature were being formulated. "Thus, having the power to shape environment and institutions, men could modify, indeed change, the expressions of human nature" (Curti, 1980: 226).

Another challenge to Social Darwinism was that scholars were beginning to argue that cooperation could have as much to do with social evolution and adaptability as competition.

> The refutation of Social Darwinism received its first impetus in the 1880's, when American scholars gave increasing attention to European social critics who maintained that cooperation was more important than conflict as a factor in human survival. American students of social institutions were among the first followers of a view that challenged the conservative effort to make Darwinism a prop of the existing order. By the mid-1890's sociologists were discrediting the parallel that social Darwinists had drawn between the "repulsive dog-eat-dog practice of current business and politics with that 'struggle for existence' which evoked the higher forms of life (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 312).

Many of those American scholars influenced by European social critics were involved in the formation of the American Economic Association in 1885. Richard T. Ely, John R. Commons, Simon N. Patten, John Bates Clark, and Edward Bemis dealt a blow to Social Darwinism when they declared in their mission statement: "We regard the state as an agency whose positive assistance is one of the indispensable conditions of human progress [and that] the doctrine of laissez-faire is unsafe in politics and unsound in morals" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 314).

Curti (1980: 223-231) describes in detail a counter movement to Social Darwinism. Papers and books began to appear on how to set up a civil service system, the potential rehabilitation of the criminal, the salutary effects of a public health system, the benefits of foster homes for orphaned or abandoned children, and the public park's ability to instill the virtues of country living. Agencies for moral development such as the YMCA and the public library began to appear. The importance of self-improvement through vocational education and job training was emphasized and model programs were developed. These publications and programs began to shift the debate in favor of the argument that the improvement of humanity's condition necessitated access to opportunities. Though the argument and its appeal were inchoate, people were beginning to realize that success was not so much due to one's biological inheritance as it was due to one's social inheritance, the advantages one

acquired by being born into a middle-class lifestyle. As Curti argues, even before the Progressive Movement, the American Social Science Association's "... members raised serious doubts about a view of human nature that ignored or downgraded social factors in behavior and in the possibility of its substantial improvement" (Curti, 1980: 231). But as Curti also notes, these early arguments attesting to environmental influences on human nature, especially by the American Social Science Association, were made from "... the Lamarckian concession to improvability under favorable conditions or degeneration under adverse ones" (Curti, 1980: 276). Thus environmental arguments were to play a role in the decline of Social Darwinism, but not necessarily in the downfall of Lamarckianism.

> The men who established the social sciences as academic disciplines in the United States around the turn of the century were for the most part environmentalists, and many of them were in fact reacting against the biological determinist and conservative implications of Spencerian Social Darwinism. But in rejecting Spencer, they did not reject the Lamarckian elements of his thought. On the contrary, these continued to play various important roles in their own thinking, and even in their critique of Spencerian assumptions (Stocking, 1968: 255-256).

As the Hinkles also report, by the latter part of the nineteenth century sociologists were rejecting Spencer. "American sociologists accepted Spencer's individualism but--aside from a few exceptions, notably Sumner--rejected his antivolitional biological determinism and laissez-faire doctrine" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 7).

A counter ideology to Social Darwinism was growing.

But it also found its roots in social evolution. According to Loewenberg, one could draw either Social Darwinist or social interventionist arguments from the theory of social evolution. It was one's political commitments that led one to favor Social Darwinism or social intervention.

> Phrases such as "the struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest" were gayly ripped from the mosaic of evolution and made to serve the wishful thinking of aristocratic theorists. While evolution gave comfort to thinkers of this stripe, it also inspired collectivist dreamers with scientific hope. Advocates of laissez-faire, mindful of vested interests under attack by proletarian philosophies, pointed to the immutable sway of natural law, but reformers preached social sermons based on identical texts. Pleaders for universal peace and the brotherhood of man were stirred by instructions found in evolutionary monographs, but militarists studied the same manuals with opposite results (Loewenberg, 1941: 363).

Eric F. Goldman has called this development of a counter ideology based on the social evolutionary theory of social change, Reform Darwinism.

> Why not, in short, work out a Reform Darwinism that would dissolve away conservatism's steel chain of ideas while leaving Darwinism itself intact? Why not--if you were a Darwinian who disliked Conservative Darwinism, if you wanted to replace dreary inevitabilities with a philosophy of flux that justified experiment and change? The attraction of Reform Darwinism was the greater because it could use all the cosmetics of science by which Conservative Darwinism made itself so alluring. As a matter of fact, Reform Darwinism could claim to be, and was claimed to be, a good deal more scientific than Conservative Darwinism because it related more things more continuously to environment (Goldman, 1955: 73).

Wanting to replace dreary inevitabilities with a philosophy of flux that justified experiment and change was the reason that symbolic interactionists developed a new perspective on the nature of human nature. According to the early interactionists, a human being's situation-in-the-world, his/her

very self was constantly evolving and becoming. And if a noxious environment was detrimental to this self then that was reason enough to justify changing the environment so that one could better the life chances of human beings. I will introduce the early interactionists and their relationship to the Progressive movement in the next chapter; but, even here, let me quickly add that Goldman argues that it was the pragmatists, especially Dewey, who constructed their philosophy and perspective influenced by Reform Darwinism. The interactionist perspective on the nature of human nature was anti-determinist; biology was not destiny and neither was the environment; for, the creative and manipulative abilities of the human being meant that one could change the environment to meet one's own needs (Goldman, 1955: 122-123). Thus the very nature of human nature, a person's ability to change the world around him/her challenged the notion that one's lot in life was inevitable or that the social order was "natural," thereby justifying social reconstruction. Armed with the perspective of Reform Darwinism sociologists adhering to the social evolutionary theory of social change could call for the social reconstruction of society.

That was what began to happen. A number of respected social scientists began to differ with the Social Darwinist parts of Spencer's system. Lester Ward was one of those, for as Hofstadter reports: "While Ward formally accepted the Spencerian method, his social system, taking its shape from

an entirely different pragmatic bias, was radically different in both structure and practical content" (Hofstadter, 1969: 68). Ward's "... aim was to destroy the tradition of biological sociology," a tradition practiced by both Spencer and Sumner (Hofstadter, 1969: 78). Ward clearly recognized the influence of the environment on human development, especially education. Even those who had been born into low positions, such as Ward himself, could improve their social status through education. As Hofstadter points out, for Ward education was a:

> ... leveling instrument, a means of bringing opportunity to humble people and enabling them to use their talents. Greatly impressed from his childhood by the vast difference between the educated and uneducated, Ward was never able to believe that this chasm, which he himself had bridged, could be attributed to differences in native capacities (Hofstadter, 1969: 76).

As the Hinkles report, Ward, like the early symbolic interactionists we will cover in great detail, argued that human beings had a self and mind. But what greatly differentiated Ward's theory of self and mind from that of, say, Mead's social theory of self and mind, was Ward's Lamarckian belief that self and mind were due to the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

> Ward agreed that man has evolved from the lower forms of life and is to that extent governed by natural laws, but he insisted that in the process of evolution man has acquired intellect and rationality with which he can attain a way of life above and apart from the natural world. In employing reason, man can acquire knowledge of the laws of human behavior; he can even learn to guide and direct the process of history and to create a better existence for himself (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 9).

In Ward's notion of acquired intellect we see the influence

of Lamarck's notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.

Curti has argued that Ward was "... a transitional figure in the interpretation of human nature from the standpoint of cultural evolution" (Curti, 1980: 248). This is because Ward included "... institutions such as marriage, law, the state and ethical codes, all of which curbed the selfish egoism of tooth-and-claw struggle that had once exclusively governed behavior in the fight for survival" (Curti, 1980: 250). This also had to do with Ward's Lamarckianism. "In Ward's view the transmission of acquired characteristics included social ethics" (Curti, 1980: 249). Ward also rejected the biological argument for inequality, recognizing that "... enormous inequalities in the distribution of wealth ... are founded in accidents of birth or strokes of low cunning rather than superior intelligence or industry" (Hofstadter, 1969: 73).

Ward was a student of social evolution, but rather than developing from social evolution Social Darwinist implications (as did Sumner and Giddings) Ward found that culture was an important element in social evolution. He also favored social intervention from a Lamarckian standpoint as did the members of the American Social Science Association.

What Ward did was pave the way for a cultural emphasis on human nature. One might ask: why did so many nineteenth century social scientists begin to reject the biological determinism of Social Darwinism but hold on to

Lamarckianism? George Stocking provides an answer.

> In a milieu of ascendant biological evolutionism, Lamarckianism helped to explain the evolution of races and the mental evolution of man in terms which gave what we would now call "culture" a crucially determining role. It helped to explain and to validate the cultural progress of mankind in biological terms, at the same time it freed man from the conservative implications of biological evolutionism. Rejecting the Spencerian extension of "biotic evolution to the realm of mankind," Ward and Powell had sought to show that, after the achievement of his distinctly human capacities, man's development had been governed by his capacity for invention and cooperation rather than by forces of competition, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest. Lamarckianism was the mechanism by which man's conscious social activities affected and effected his further physical evolution. In the absence of a concept of culture severed from all biological connections, to abandon Lamarck ... would be to yield up the social sciences to an unrestricted biological determinism. One way to defend the efficacy of cultural causation was to argue that it was in effect biological, and at the same time to interpret biological changes in cultural terms. Lamarckianism enabled one to do this; and therefore Ward and others clung to it ... (Stocking, 1968: 256).

But the strongest blow to Social Darwinism was the advent of corporate capitalism which undermined the need for an ideology to justify laissez-faire capitalism.

> The original impetus for many reforms came from those at or near the bottom of the American social structure, from those who benefited least from the rapid increase in the productivity of the industrial plant of the United States and from expansion at home and abroad. But in the current century, particularly on the federal level, few reforms were enacted without the tacit approval, if not the guidance, of the large corporate interests. And, much more important, businessmen were able to harness to their own ends the desire of intellectuals and middle class reformers to bring together "thoughtful men of all classes" in a "vanguard for the building of the good community." These ends were the stabilization, rationalization, and continued expansion of the existing political economy, and, subsumed under that, the circumscription of the Socialist movement with its ill-formed, but nevertheless dangerous ideas for an alternative form of social organization (Weinstein, 1968: ix-x).

Thus by the first decade of the twentieth century Social Darwinism was replaced when "... the strong moral disapproval which progressive reformers heaped upon irresponsible business enterprise" helped to justify the new ideology, politics, and policies of corporate capitalism (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 313).

The concept of social and cultural evolution would not be challenged until Franz Boas formulated anti-evolutionary arguments and asserted that culture is distinct from biology. Lamarckianism would be discredited with the rise of the new biology of unit characteristics. I will explore this decline in Chapter IV.

The Social Origins of Social Reform

With the rise of industrialization, immigration, urbanization, the new middle class (especially the profession of social work), and the modern university, along with the new perspective of Reform Darwinism, the social origins of the reform movement were in place. The center of this social context was the city and the war on the slum, but the movement for reform is traced to the countryside. I will briefly introduce that movement now along with the development of sociology as a moral and reform response.

The Attack on Laissez-faire Capitalism

Progressivism would grow and expand from earlier though more limited attempts at political change and social intervention: Populism; a new church, the Salvation Army; the

preaching of the "social gospel" by many American denominations and the establishing of the so-called institutional church which performed social services for its members, especially in the transformation of American Protestantism; the settlement house concept which was an outgrowth of the institutional church; and the entrance of reform-minded women and their organizations, epitomized by the Women's Christian Temperance Union (W.C.T.U.) which advocated for many political reforms (Degler, 1970: 340-350). The general political flavor of the arguments was that laissez-faire capitalism was outmoded and in its place where arguments ranging from reform to revolution (though, of course, those who argued for revolution were more than reformers).

Four very strong voices for reform were Henry George, Edward Bellamy, W.T. Stead, and Henry Demarest Lloyd. George's book Progress and Poverty, was published in 1879 and read by millions. It has had over one hundred editions. It argued that America was divided between the producing classes and the nonproducing ones, and that the former were being led to starvation and ruin by the latter. Bellamy's novel, Looking Backward (1888) sold over five million copies within a decade of its publication. Its themes were anti-competition, collectivism, and democracy. The novel was so popular that 127 Bellamy or Nationalist clubs were formed in twenty-seven states. In the 1880's Lloyd began a series of trenchant editorials in the Chicago Tribune against monopoly capitalism. In March, 1881, the Atlantic Monthly published

his article, "The Story of a Great Monopoly," which sounded the clarion call for the nation to awake to the noxious effect monopolies were having on the economy. Lloyd later published a treatise against monopolies in his book Wealth Against Commonwealth, (1894). Lloyd's solution for reform was prescient: he argued that the only way to control monopolies or the trusts was through federal regulation. W.T. Stead revealed political corruption and graft in his book, If Christ Came to Chicago (1894) (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 188 and 318-471). These books are representative of the political tone of the arguments against laissez-faire capitalism. Henry George, Edward Bellamy, W.T. Stead, and Henry Demarest Lloyd were only four of a number of utopian thinkers who were appealing for social reform.

> These men, representing a wide range of Social Gospellers, Christian socialists, and romantic Marxists, addressed themselves to what was widely regarded as the crisis of a moral civilization. Repelled by the dominant characteristics of their day, they gravitated naturally back toward the life of the town, and sometimes in strange disguises, they sought to preserve that world in modern America (Wiebe, 1967: 139).

But before reform was to be centered on the city slum tenement, it began in the countryside with the farmers' anger at the railroads that went back to the Granger movement.

Populism

Probably no movement to preserve rural life, the family farm, and the small town was as prominent as the Populist movement. It was the immediate predecessor to Progressivism. Populism was an agrarian reform movement that made

popular some ideas that would forever be a part of the American political debate: the notion that government should regulate the economy and engage in social intervention, that policies should be implemented to ameliorate the negative effects of the market upon human beings. But probably more important than any other change, Populism helped to change the philosophy of the Democratic party from one of laissez-faire to one of government interventionism--in which government would regulate businesses and the affairs of American citizens to protect the public interest (Degler, 1970: 337).

The main leaders of the Populist movement were 'Sockless Jerry' Simpson, Senator William A. Peffer, Mary Ellen Lease, James Weaver, the governor of Colorado, Davis H. Waite, and the editor of the weekly journal Anti-Monopolist, Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota. They argued that Eastern money interests and the railroads had "... devised a conspiracy to pauperize and enslave the common man" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 261). The struggle of the Populists was over human rights versus property rights. The peak of the movement came with the drafting of the Omaha Platform on Independence Day, 1892 and the forming of the People's Party. At the convention they nominated James B. Weaver for President and James G. Field for Vice-President. In the election Weaver received over one million votes which was eight percent of the popular vote.

The Southern Populists made brief attempts to bring black and white farmers together to challenge the racist

code of white supremacy. The white Southen Farmers' Alliance united with the black Colored Farmers' National Alliance and Cooperative Union. But economic hard times led whites to scapegoat blacks for their troubles instead of staying united against the white Southern plutocracy. Southern Populists capitulated to white supremacy and many of their programs were coopted by both the Republican and Democratic parties. But even more significantly, the black vote was no longer needed when the segregation and disenfranchisement movement began. Segregation and disenfranchisement were constitutionalized with the Supreme Court decisions of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896 and of Williams v. Mississippi in 1898, respectively.

The Populist movement had brought to light the sufferings of farmers associated with the transformation from a rural, agrarian economy to an industrialized, urban one. It had argued forcibly that farmers needed federal policies and programs to ensure their survival. One reason that the Populist movement did not gain significant appeal was that it was too narrow. If reform was to succeed, a broader movement was needed so as to take into account the social problems of urban America as well. As Gilbert Fite, America's leading farm historian, points out, America was changing its economic foundations, and that meant a change in the location of political power as well.

> McKinley's victory in 1896 was important because for the first time in American history it became clear that the shift in economic power away from agriculture had been confirmed at the ballot box. Thus nearly a generation

> before farmers and rural residents became a minority of the population, they had lost out both economically and politically (Fite, 1984: 16).

A movement for reform needed the support of urban professionals and the middle-class. Dramatizing the despair, poverty, and misery of the urban underclass with the beginning of the tradition of the "march on Washington," was Coxey's army. Jacob S. Coxey of Massillion, Ohio was a prosperous businessman and reformer. He felt that government was totally ignoring the homeless and hungry in the cities. He proposed a federally financed public works program to build a strong infrastructure in the United States. But Congress did not share his vision. Coxey set out to deliver a petition by a march on Washington. It was a disappointment; only 500 joined the march, far less than Coxey's expected 100,000.

At least significant insights were achieved. The solution that the Populists and Coxey's army had pointed to--the expanded role of the national government in the affairs of the people to solve social problems--was a solution that corporate capitalists and progressive reformers took to heart. The nation had been awakened that rural and urban America was suffering. A rural-urban crest of discontent was the harbinger to the Progressive era.

The Slum as the New Epicenter Of Social Reform

The confluence of industrialization, immigration, and urbanization led to the inter-city slum tenements and that

ignited a reform movement to socially reconstruct the city. Rural values were important, for the slum was the antithesis of the reformers' image of the good life which to them was farming. Jacob Riis, who was a Danish immigrant and a police reporter for the New York Tribune, probably did more than any one to arouse the condemnation of the slum and its devastating effects on immigrants, especially their children, with the publication of How the Other Half Lives in 1890. This book aroused such concern that federal government responded with a United States Commissioner of Labor report in 1894 entitled The Slums of Baltimore, Chicago, New York and Philadelphia. The National Municipal League was formed in 1894 to advocate for urban, civil service, and municipal reforms, especially the problem of political bosses and machines. New York Governor Theodore Roosevelt also felt compelled to respond to the tenement problem. He appointed the State Tenement Housing Commission which published its report in 1903 as The Tenement House Problem. Thus the city created pell-mell with rapid industrialization, immigration, and urbanization was the social origins of the movement that would lead to Progressivism (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 144-147).

The Rise of Sociology as Social Reform

The social context which I have reviewed in this chapter also constituted the social origins of sociology.

> Sociology in the United States arose against a background of social change associated with industrialization and urbanization, which, half a century after

> de Tocqueville, was completely transforming the social and economic landscape which he had surveyed. A wave of social problems, some of them quite new, followed after the settlement of the West and the building of the railroads, the influx of immigrants, the rise of the factory system and the concentration of people in big cities. These comprised the now familiar catalogue of crime, delinquency, divorce, poverty, suicide, alcoholism, minority problems and slums. From many American sociologists these problems evoked a moral response (Bramson, 1961: 75).

The above social changes and their concomitant social problems evoked more than a moral response; it stimulated the political debate toward regulative reform. "American sociology was born into an atmosphere, a climate of opinion, heavily infused with the spirit of reform" (Bramson, 1961: 76). The day of laissez-faire capitalism was declining in William James's time. Government intervention would not only promote industry but, in the coming century, would also regulate it. "The social need for some control over the concentration of economic power became so glaring and insistent by the end of the 1880's that all the major political parties in the country included antitrust planks of one sort of another in their platforms" (Degler, 1970: 252). The beginning of the decline of laissez-faire is perhaps best symbolized by the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 which created the Interstate Commerce Commission and the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. However, it would not be until the passage of the Clayton Act of 1914 which provided punitive and criminal penalties for corporations violating the rules of competition that regulative reform could be seriously enforced.

Sociologists were at the heart of this reform movement "... the professional organization of sociologists is a lineal descendent of a general intellectual movement committed to betterment of urban social conditions" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 4). Another indication of the acceptance of this spirit of reform was that at the universities "... the general social science courses were being transformed into sociology courses (1885-1895) [and] they were predominantly oriented to social problems" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 4). A changing social context also constituted the social origins of the ascending intellectual debates, which were relevant in the formation of the concepts of the early symbolic interactionists: the nature of intelligence, the nature versus nurture debate, the debate over the effectiveness of social interventionism, the importance of education in the development and improvement of the self, the debate over race, the attack on social evolution, and the development of liberalism as a dominant American political view.

The belief in a liberal creed of progress through social reconstruction, coupled with a belief in the power of the culture and environment to do good or harm to the individual, was at the heart of the sociological response. That is why socialization was such an important concept in the development of the self for the early symbolic interactionists. Socialization also meant that people's behavior could be socialized to the normative order and culture and thereby people could be integrated into society. The individual was

seen more as a product of his environment and culture rather than of heredity and biology. Leon Bramson draws a relationship between the movement toward social reform, the rise of sociology, and the importance attributed to the self, i.e., the individual.

> If they sometimes wrote as if a collectivist society were the answer to American social problems, they did not often write as revolutionaries or even as Socialists. They were engaged in a search for community ... but they were the products of a liberal milieu. Though their key concepts were often expressions of a demand for a new social order, the individual was often the vehicle for their reform idealism ... (Bramson, 1961: 78).

The concern for the individual is at the heart of the symbolic interactionist perspective, for their key concept is the self. I should also be precise here by what is meant as a liberal reformist response. Liberalism is defined as a concerted effort to reform the harsher aspects of capitalism through state and philanthropic intervention to benefit those who were/are at a disadvantage due to their social origins.

Within sociology this liberal reformist response had its own social origins in the background of the reformers. The conspicuous consumption and exploitation of their workers by the captains of industry along with a decline in the power and prestige of the old middle class evoked a reform response, in part, due to the fact that "[t]he vast majority of eminent sociologists prior to 1920 came from rural and religious environments" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 3).

> If they did not view the gradual eclipse of the small businessman by the "big interests" as evidence of moral

> progress, if they attacked the robber barons for their lack of concern for the general welfare, for commercialism, greed, and the introduction of false values of conspicuous consumption, they did so from the standpoint of the frontier values of rural simplicity and neighborliness and of a religious concern for the individual (Bramson, 1961: 75).

The approach towards solving social problems through social reform was known as social pathology. Biological metaphors were used in these writings. A reliance on this model dominated the sociological approach to social problems during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The social pathologists opposed:

> ... those human actions which ran counter to ideals of residential stability, property ownership, sobriety, thrift, habituation to work, small business enterprise, sexual discretion, family solidarity, neighborliness, and discipline of the will. In effect, social problems were considered to be any forms of behavior violating the mores from which these ideals were projected. The mores behind the ideals, for the most part, were those of rural, small-town, and middle-class America ... (Lemert, 1951: 1).

The combination of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration from eastern and southern Europe in which peasants' Old World traits were transplanted in an alien city environment, which created a number of social problems, was the social origins of the reform movement and sociology. The colossal discrepancy between the fortunes and conspicuous consumption of the capitalists and the squalor and misery of the industrial working class congested in tenement slums sparked a need for a new social order. The need for a regulative reform of the economy to eliminate cutthroat price competition was one that capitalists themselves recognized was necessary. Thus even before the rise of the

Progressive era, there had emerged an intellectual debate over the future direction of American society that had begun within the social context of laissez-faire capitalism.

Chapter two reviewed the social context that transformed America after the Civil War: industrialization, immigration, and urbanization. I argued that these social changes led to class formation; primarily, a working class and a middle class that led to the reorganization of higher education and the culture of professionalism. This social context provided the backdrop for scholars who would incorporate the evolutionary science of Lamarck and Darwin. We reviewed Herbert Spencer's writings, which drew an organic analogy between biology and society and led to the social evolutionary theory of social change. I also showed that within Spencer's writings was the foundation for Social Darwinism. The rise and fall of the social theory of Social Darwinism was outlined. New economic and political developments along with new social theories and perspectives were rising. The movement toward reform culminating in Progressive politics, a liberal social reform movement that was to replace the Social Darwinist and laissez-faire doctrine, arose with the advent of corporate capitalism. With the rise of corporate capitalism the ideology of Social Darwinism had served its purpose and was now a hindrance to capitalist development, since the capitalists themselves now argued for the need of regulative reform. As Merle Curti phrases it in his book on human nature, "the

professionalization of concern with social issues" that the Progressive movement represented was diametrically opposed to the Social Darwinist anti-environmental and anti-interventionist philosophy (Curti, 1980: 217). A movement toward social reform was reviewed which included the development of sociology itself as a reform response. We now move on to new developments in social thought that emphasized the social basis of behavior, personality, and human nature. Pragmatism/symbolic interactionism emerged as a perspective that would emphasize the notion that society constitutes human beings just as human beings constitute society. In the next chapter I will attempt a description of corporate capitalism and the construction of a liberal state which was the social context for Progressive politics and pragmatic conceptualization.

CHAPTER III

CORPORATE CAPITALISM, PROGRESSIVE POLITICS, AND PRAGMATISM

Corporate Capitalism: A Brief Definition

In the time period that this chapter covers, 1897-1917, the United States had emerged as a corporate economy and the emergence of the corporate capitalist state was fully ongoing. Perhaps a brief definition of what a corporate economy is, based on what a corporation is, can serve to differentiate this period from the period of laissez-faire capitalism that I just covered in the last chapter. This period is distinguished not only by a new type of state which sanctioned governmental intervention in the economy and a host of regulatory reforms, which I shall shortly cover, but also by a new type of business enterprise, the corporation. The definition offered here is based on Alfred D. Chandler Jr.'s work Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise (1962), particularly pages 19-36.

The railroads had created a national market, and consequently that called for vast changes in the administration and management of a business enterprise, of which the railroads themselves were a model. Before the Civil War the management of a business enterprise was usually handled by two or three people, perhaps all from the same family.

There was no need for an administrative division of labor, those in charge of a business enterprise performed the few functions that a firm required. But as a business expanded from a local concern to a national one, an administrative structure was necessary to manage the overwhelming number of departments that grew to take care of specific functions, such as manufacturing, finance, marketing, personnel management, research and development etc. These were new functions to businesses that had previously only manufactured and then sold their products to middle-men such as wholesalers or commission agents. Each task or function became so time-consuming that a separate office operated by a separate staff appeared, the phenomenon of departmentalization. As a business enterprise grew there also arose the necessity for field offices to coordinate and manage the affairs of the corporation away from the main office.

With the rise of a number of new departments and field offices scattered all over the country, an additional and higher level administrative structure arose to coordinate activity among the departments and to direct the activity of the field offices. The new administrative structure was housed in a central office where each department head, usually as a vice-president, worked with the president to manage the geographical dispersion and vertical integration of the business as a national concern. The business could no longer be managed by family members alone; the large-scale enterprise now required professional managers who were

graduating from the new universities that I covered in the last chapter.

As a national enterprise, a business's production rose sharply which usually meant the replacement of old machinery with machinery that could produce a far greater output. As new machinery was introduced that served as a further catalyst to increase output. Corporations grew larger and economies of scale destroyed local competition. Standardization of products, administrative procedures, and manufacturing processes made efficient and highly profitable corporations and further increased their economies of scale; all of which led to oligopolistic concentration and centralization of wealth.

I will now survey the social context of reform in which the early symbolic interactionists emerged, a context that helped to shape the direction of sociology and differentiate it from the biological and psychological reductionism prevalent in the first decade of the twentieth century. However, the process of untwining sociology from biology would not be complete until the mid-1930s.

The Progressive Era: 1900-1917

I want to survey some of the general features of the Progressive movement which helped to shape the political commitments of the early sociologists and anthropologists.[1]

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[1]The interpretation relies primarily on the works of Woodward, 1966; Kolko, 1967; Wiebe, 1967; Weinstein, 1968; Hofstadter, 1969; Morris and Greenleaf, 1969; Degler, 1970; Krout, 1974; Kluger, 1975; and Szymanski, 1978.

This movement formed the political context which confronted early symbolic interactionists and their contribution to this movement helps us to understand the conceptual development of their perspective. The Progressive movement was for social reform and the construction of a liberal state to achieve social order. It was also a belief, especially by the pragmatists, that education and socialization could improve the lives of people and help them reconstruct their selves and their world. Such beliefs imply fundamental assumptions about human nature.

The Economic Context

Hofstadter argues that a troubled American economy was the social context of the new dissent.

> From the disorders and discontents that plagued America in the seventies, eighties, and nineties, there arose a steam of dissenting opinion on the merits of the free competitive order. Two panics followed by long and harrowing depressions racked the economic life of the nation in the first and last of these decades; and in the intervening one, hardly a period of uninterrupted prosperity, labor uprisings of unprecedented scope and violence took place. The growth of the Knights of Labor and the strikes of the eighties, climaxed by the eight-hour movement and the Haymarket affair, gave to labor strife a central place in public attention. In the depression of the nineties, agricultural protest combined with labor unrest to create the national political upheaval of 1896 (Hofstadter, 1969: 105).

The early twentieth century historian Charles Beard also locates the Progressive movement in the social context of a counter movement against the excesses of capitalism.

> ...[T]he accumulation of vast fortunes, many of which were gained either by fraudulent manipulations, or shady transactions within the limits of the law but condemned by elementary morals, and the massing of millions of the proletariat in the great industrial cities were bound in

> the long run to bring forth political cleavages as deep as the corresponding social cleavage. The domination of the federal government by the captains of machinery and capital was destined to draw out a counter movement on the part of the small farmers, the middle class, and the laborers (Beard, 1914: 143-144).

A contemporary historian, leaving out Beard's critique of capitalism, has argued that Progressivism was a response to urbanization and industrialization.

> That hurricane of reform called Progressivism, which blew through all levels of American political and social life in the years between 1900 and 1917, was many things, but above all it was a response to the challenge of the city and the factory, an attempt to bring to heel the untamed forces which had almost reduced the American Dream to a mockery (Degler, 1970: 362).

As Degler suggests, Progressivism was rooted in the social processes of industrialization, immigration, urbanization, and the concentration and centralization of business enterprises. These social changes finally produced not only a moral rebellion but also a political one.

But what has been left out so far is that reforms may have started from grassroots and academic efforts but it was the corporate capitalist class that instituted Progressive reforms so as to achieve social efficiency and social order. The liberal state "... was the product, consciously created, of the leaders of the giant corporations and financial institutions that emerged astride American society in the last years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth" (Weinstein, 1968: xv). Progressivism was a reform movement not only of the urban middle-class but also of the most enlightened members of the new corporate order, especially by finance capitalists. "Progressivism was sup-

ported by so many rich men that it was sometimes called 'the millionaires' reform movement" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 448). It was the enlightened members of the capitalist class themselves who no longer saw the merits of a free competitive order. They were not so much concerned with labor strife as they were to end internecine competition through trusts. But the strategy of the trust only led to more severe competition and a regulative reform was finally accepted in their search for social order.

The Muckrakers

Though the muckrakers came before the Progressive Era with exposés on wealth and corruption in the Grant administration and the "yellow journalism" of Pulitzer and Hearst in the 1890s, it gathered steam in the twentieth century with the advent of large-circulation magazines and promoters such as S.S. McClure, who realized that a fortune could be made exposing the social injustice of capitalism and the corruption of municipal governments.

The term "muckraking" cam from Theodore Roosevelt who was worried that these journalists would stir up social discontent and political revolt. Roosevelt was referring to a character in John Bunyan's novel Pilgrim's Progress who was offered a celestial crown but decided to keep on muckraking. Roosevelt's criticism was that muckrakers were journalists who only reported on social injustice and corruption rather than on what was good and wholesome about America.

In 1902 McClure's Magazine made muckraking popular.

Lincoln Steffens published an article on municipal corruption and Ida M. Tarbell continued the work of Henry Demarest Lloyd with her article, "History of the Standard Oil Company." The circulation of McClure's Magazine soared. Other magazines followed: American Magazine, Everybody's, Cosmopolitan, Collier's, Pearson's, and Hampton's. The country was yearning for exposés. David Graham Phillips wrote how the capitalists controlled the Senate in "The Treason of the Senate;" Burton J. Hendrick exposed the mismanagement of the New York insurance trust in "The Story of Life Insurance;" Charles Edward Russell revealed the horrors of the meatpacking industry in his article, "The Greatest Trust in the World;" Thomas W. Lawson enlightened the U.S. public about Wall Street in his article, "Frenzied Finance;" Ray Stannard Baker made the railroad magnates livid with his article, "The Railroads on Trial;" Samuel Hopkins Adams frightened the American middle class with his article on harmful medicines and false advertising when he published, "The Great American Fraud;" George Kibbe Turner revealed to the American public the pathos of prostitution and liquor traffic in a series of articles. Novelists developing the perspective of critical realism became muckrakers: Upton Sinclair's The Jungle (1906) on Chicago slaughterhouses and meatpacking plants; Frank Norris' The Octopus (1901) on the corruption of railroads and his The Pit (1903) on the corruption of the Chicago wheat exchange were just a few of the more famous. Novelists Jack London, Robert Herrick, Brand Whitlock, and

David Graham Phillips were also severe social critics.

State Intervention And Academia

Robert H. Wiebe, a historian of ideas, has argued that social intervention by government received support from most social thinkers of the time. "A strikingly different conception of government arrived with the new century, a conception that received at least some support from almost every prominent theorist of the time" (Wiebe, 1967: 159). Government not only would intervene, but also intervene with professionals who would be "... broadly and continuously involved in society's operations" (Wiebe, 1967: 160). These social thinkers were urban, professional, and middle-class. They were able to adapt much of the ideas of the Populist movement and express it in a language acceptable to average Americans.

Probably no sociologist set forth the new moral and political response of the Progressive movement better than E. A. Ross in a book published in 1907 entitled, Sin and Society (President Theodore Roosevelt had written the introduction). Ross's moral and political strategy was based on the belief that society was interdependent and that we all were responsible for the "sins" of others. The best agency to take care of the sins produced by the interdependence of urbanization, industrialization, and modern society was government (Degler, 1970: 363-364). The government became the agency to solve social problems. But the government of the nineteenth century did not have the capacity to attack the

social problems or to administer the political solutions to those problems. "At the center of ... [the reformers'] discontent lay a fairly simple condition. A patchwork of government could no longer manage the range of urban problems with the expertise and economy that articulate citizens now believed they must have" (Wiebe, 1967: 167). Urban professionals wanted a professionally run government. "Scientific government, the urban reformers believed, would bring opportunity, progress, order, and community" (Wiebe, 1967: 170).

Eventually theorists came to confront the realities of modern society by presenting arguments that were not reactionary but that accepted the present and looked toward the future. Eventually the longing to return to the small town was abandoned and the new social context of the city was accepted. "Where their predecessors would have destroyed many of urban-industrial America's outstanding characteristics, the new reformers wanted to adapt an existing order to their ends" (Wiebe, 1967: 165).

Other Progressive scholars and intellectuals of the period who made significant contributions with their works were Walter Lippman, A Preface to Politics (1913), and Drift and Mastery (1914); Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (1909); and Walter Weyl, The New Democracy (1912). Lippman, Croly, and Weyl also were founding editors (1914) of the Progressive journal, The New Republic. Louis D. Brandeis also made an indictment against finance capitalism in Other People's Money (1914).

The basic approach in all of these writings was "... a common belief in the promise of democracy, reform, education, enlightenment, science, and technology used intelligently for social purposes represented the mood of progressivism at its best" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 457).

Progressive Legislation

There was a renewed effort to increase direct democracy. Some of the most significant political reforms were the direct primary. This political innovation came from Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin in 1903. The attempt was to break the stranglehold party bosses had on local primaries and thereby have the public select the best and brightest available for the job. The direct election of United States senators was ratified as the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1913. The initiative and referendum, first enacted by South Dakota in 1898, were to get "the people's" voice heard at the state legislatures. The initiative allowed the people to bring a petition for a law before the state legislature and if the legislature failed to enact it, the people could directly vote on its merits. The referendum was to allow the people to vote acceptance or rejection of laws the state legislature passed. The recall allowed the people to remove from office an elected or appointed official before their term of office expired. These political reforms reveal that much of Progressive enlightenment was at the state level. These reforms didn't change the balance of power between capital and labor. As

two historians note, it was an over-optimistic approach that assumed that "... mechanical changes in the institutions of government" could change the balance of power (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 462).

At the national level Progressive reforms were enacted by Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson. But they were reluctant reformers; primarily, they rode the crest of a wave of discontent at big business, the money trust, and municipal corruption (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969; Krout, 1971). To be sure, their programs were defined by compromise and political expediency; yet, working cooperatively with the most powerful and enlightened members of the capitalist class, primarily finance capitalists, their administrations produced significant legislation in a search for social order. According to charismatic Roosevelt, who exploited the hunger for reform, it was time for a "square deal" for labor, capital, and the public. From the Square Deal of Roosevelt to the New Freedom of Wilson, reform was the issue that would expand Presidential power and make the executive the leader in public policy.

One of the fist crises of the Roosevelt era resulted in a landmark redefinition of the relations between capital and labor: federal intervention in the coal strike of 1902. Roosevelt had the mineowners and John Mitchell, president of the United Mine Workers, meet at the Whitehouse. Roosevelt's attempts to mediate the dispute failed. He countered with the threat of federal troops. But Roosevelt's success

in solving the crisis was in enlisting the power of finance capitalist, J.P. Morgan, who pressured the mineowners to accept the decisions of an arbitration commission. The commission voted to give the workers a ten percent wage increase, a nine hour day, but rejected collective bargaining.

Another area of reform came from "trustbusting." Here again, Roosevelt won an undiscriminating popularity; for, as historians tell us, Roosevelt was not against wealth nor combinations which he felt were natural economic results of competition but merely against "misconduct" (Morris and Greenleaf: 1969: 489). The biggest trustbusting cases came against Northern Securities Company and the Beef Trust, both in 1902; in 1906-7 suits were filed against the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, the American Tobacco Company and the New Haven Railroad. Standard Oil and American Tobacco lost their cases and were dissolved.

Memorable reform legislation was enacted in the Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson administrations. The Expedition Act of 1903 gave preference to federal cases on the court dockets that came under the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act. The Elkins Act of 1903 forbade secret rebates, a common practice of the railroads. The Hepburn Act of 1906 extended the government's regulation of the railroads by empowering the Interstate Commerce Commission to reduce unreasonable and discriminatory rates. The Meat Inspection Act of 1906 empowered the federal government to

inspect all companies selling meat in interstate commerce as well as institute sanitary regulations in packinghouses. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 "... outlawed the manufacture, sale, or transportation of adulterated, misbranded, or harmful foods and drugs in interstate commerce" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 498). The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 extended the federal government's role in setting rates for telephone, telegraph, wireless, and cable companies. The Physical Valuation Act of 1913 empowered the Interstate Commerce Commission to assess the physical valuation of the railroads in order that the Commission could establish a "... reasonable return on actual investment" (Krout: 1971: 107). The Passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution authorizing a federal income tax was ratified in 1913. The Underwood-Simons Tariff Act in 1913 undermined protectionism by enacting a downward revision of the tariff rates. And since there would be a decrease in revenue to the federal government (since custom rates were lowered) the tariff act also incorporated a graduated federal income tax. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 insured that there would be an elastic money supply and provided for short-term agricultural credits to farmers. Workers also benefited by these modest reforms in the Newlands Act of 1913 which "... set up a government mediation and conciliation board to settle disputes between railroad management and workers" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 543). In 1914 the Congress created the Federal Trade Commission Act to "... promote equitable trade

practices between competitive enterprises" (Krout, 1971: 126-127). The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 empowered the federal government to decide what were unlawful methods of business competition; it prohibited interlocking directorates and shareholding, and allowed labor to strike, picket, and boycott; though, labor was still subjected to the injunction. The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 provided education for farmers through extension courses conducted by state agricultural colleges. The Rural Post Roads Act of 1916 was, according to Woodrow Wilson, to give farmers and rural residents "... a fuller and more attractive rural life" (Wilson quoted in Fite, 1984: 18). The Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 gave farmers and rural residents long-term credit at reasonable rates. Twelve regional Federal Land Banks were established to loan money to cooperative farm loan associations, composed solely of farmers. The problem of short-term credit was addressed in the Warehouse Act of 1916, which allowed wharehouses to issue receipts to farmers for their stored commodities. These receipts could then be used to secure loans. The Smith-Hughes Act of 1916 "... distributed federal funds to encourage instruction in vocational agriculture and home economics in the nation's secondary schools" (Fite, 1984: 19). The Federal Highway Act of 1916 provided matching funds for any state that wanted to improve its rural roads. And again capitalists allowed labor a few benefits with the La Follette Seamen's Act of 1915 which set minimum wages, and outlined guidelines for

food and accommodations that should be provided seamen on merchant vessels. The Kern-McGillicuddy Compensation Act of 1916 provided workingmen's compensation for federal civil service employees. In 1914 the National Child Labor Committee, an organization that had been formed in 1904 to protect the health and safety of children was able to get Congressional sponsorship of a national child labor law. The result was the Keating-Owen Act of 1916 which forbade the interstate shipment of products made by child labor. However, two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hammer vs. Dagenhart case declared the law unconstitutional "both as an unauthorized use of the commerce power to regulate conditions of labor and as an invasion of the police powers of the states" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 467). The Adamson Act of 1916 established the eight-hour day for workers of common carriers involved in interstate commerce. These were the major legislative reforms that were to provide a measure of social justice. But it was a social justice that the capitalists wanted in order to bring stability and rationalization to the economy. What Progressive politics achieved was the beginning of the liberal capitalist state.

The Development of a Corporate Capitalist Liberal State

We have already seen how the most powerful and socially responsible of the capitalist class, the finance capitalist J.P. Morgan, helped Roosevelt intervene in the anthracite coal strike of 1902. Corporate capitalists also had a hand

in the social legislation of the Progressive Era from the beginning. If Roosevelt was to enact socially responsible legislation then he had to be re-elected, and the enlightened capitalist class was in favor of Roosevelt, rather than Mark Hanna, a U.S. Senator from Ohio who represented the Old Guard of laissez-faire capitalism. Roosevelt secured the cooperation of J.P. Morgan and E.H. Harriman by allowing them to review proposed fiscal legislation (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 493). The finance capitalists responded with millions in campaign contributions. These "... generous donations made by financiers and industrialists such as Morgan, Harriman, and the Rockefellers simply attested that big business had confidence in Roosevelt" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 493). The struggle was between the Old Guard of the Republican party and the progressives who knew that limited change could take the wind out of the sails of seething social and political discontent. In the first Roosevelt administration the Old Guard went along with the progressive capitalists, deciding "... to make limited concessions, granting the shadow but not the substance of a reform program" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 495). But in Roosevelt's second administration, his popularity had emboldened him to propose serious economic and social reform. By 1905 Roosevelt was declaring the general theme of his second administration: "The great development of industrialism means that there must be an increase in the supervision exercised by the Government over business enterprise" (Roosevelt quoted

quoted in Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 494).

There are many examples of corporate capitalists shaping legislation and having easy access to the Whitehouse. Judge Elbert H. Gary, Henry C. Frick, and members of the House of Morgan came to the Whitehouse in 1907 to get Roosevelt's assurances that no antitrust case would be filed if they bought control of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. Roosevelt gave those assurances. When the Taft administration decided to file suit against U.S. Steel, Roosevelt was so angered that he severed his friendship with Taft and decided to return to politics. The Progressive Party, more popularly known as the Bull Moose, was formed when Roosevelt failed to win the Republican nomination over Taft. Roosevelt's party had the most enlightened members of the nation as "... intellectuals, educators, professionals, reformers, social workers, and farmers, as well as businessmen [came] who preferred Roosevelt's policy of regulating giant corporations to Taft's policy of breaking them up" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 514). Campaign contributions by the leaders of finance capitalism went to the Bull Moose party. Roosevelt's New Nationalism lost to Wilson's New Freedom, primarily because Republicans were split between Taft and Roosevelt. But the corporate capitalists guided Wilson's Progressive legislation so that the "... New Freedom resembled Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 523). The corporate control of legislation was recognized by an astute contemporary, Senator James A.

Reed of Missouri. The Clayton Antitrust Act was popularly considered to be the most inimical to big business, and even had the trade unionist leader Samuel Gompers singing its praises. But as Senator Reed stated:

> When the Clayton bill was first written, it was a raging lion with a mouth full of teeth. It has degenerated to a tabby cat with soft gums, a plaintive mew, and an anemic appearance. It is a sort of legislative apology to the trusts, delivered hat in hand, and accompanied by assurances that no discourtesy is intended (Reed quoted in Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 540).

The Federal Trade Commission also "... became virtually an adjunct of the business community" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 541).

The corporate capitalists set the agenda by their formation of think tanks, the most important of which was the National Civic Federation, formed in 1901. Its mission was social order and promoting a new relation between capital and labor. Its leadership was a coalition of capitalists, labor, and public members such as J.P. Morgan, Mark Hanna, Samuel Gompers, George W. Perkins, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., John Mitchell, and Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard. The basic premise was to recognize the need for unionization and collective bargaining. Many capitalists were also interested in social problems. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., George F. Peabody, and Jacob H. Schiff were members of the Committee of Fifteen, an organization formed in New York in 1906 to investigate slum housing, prostitution, and public health.

However, many corporate capitalists as members of these

"enlightened" organizations only grudgingly consented to a new order; for, many tried to defeat as effectively as possible labor unionization within their own corporations (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 548). An example of how hostile capital yet was to labor was tragically exemplified in the Ludlow Massacre of April 1914 when the "... state militia attacked a strikers' tent colony at Ludlow and set it afire, killing eleven children, two women, and six men" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 545). The workers were striking the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, owned by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Many of the enlightened ideas of the New Civic Federation would have to await the New Deal administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Also significant is that more radical labor leaders such as Eugene V. Debs, and organizations such as the International Workers of the World (IWW) and the Socialist Labor Party, headed by Daniel DeLeon, felt that leaders such as Gompers with his policy of craft unionism, which created a labor aristocracy, had merely unionized a small percentage of workers, and left the unskilled (who were primarily eastern and southern Europeans) unorganized and unrepresented.

In summary of the Progressive Era, the economic context of the Progressive movement was the shift from laissez-faire capitalism to corporate capitalism as well as the shift in power within capitalism from industrial to finance capitalism or the "money trust" as it was then called. But the most important event was the rise of the corporation as the

dominant form of business organization. Part of the new corporate order was the new form of mass production in the factory. Henry Ford had developed this technique with his Model-T assembly line. Also making life more miserable in the factory was Frederick Winslow Taylor with his time studies and Frank Gilbreth with his motion studies. The separation of conception from execution led to the deskilling of craft labor, undermined wages, and instituted piecework and speed-ups (Braverman, 1974). Inside the factory, power was in the hands of those who planned, managed, and engineered. Outside the factory, the centralization of power was in the hands of an oligarchy of bankers and industrialists who strove for the elimination of competition through market control and ever-increasing market share. The era of finance capitalism, of mergers, trusts, and combinations had as its hallmark the creation of United States Steel in 1901. "The word 'plutocracy', signifying the tyranny of the arrogant rich, became an incitement to public feeling and a battle cry of the progressive era" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 450). Yet it must be remembered that:

> ... the ideal of a liberal corporate social order was formulated and developed under the aegis and supervision of those who then, as now, enjoyed ideological and political hegemony in the United States: the more sophisticated leaders of America's largest corporations and financial institutions (Weinstein, 1968: ix).

Weinstein's thesis (1969) argues, correctly, that the corporate capitalists made deliberate efforts to control the economic and social policies of the national government and the state legislatures through various organizations such as

the National Civic Federation that brought together grass-roots and academic reformers, business and political leaders, all in an effort to stabilize, rationalize, and expand corporate capitalism while at the same time providing social responsibility so that the working class could achieve a better standard of living and the underprivileged could have some measure of philanthropic and state help.

The new liberal state emphasized cooperation, social responsibility, and state intervention to regulate corporate affairs. The goal was to achieve social order and take the wind out of the sails of socialism; therefore, the Progressive movement and the construction of a liberal state should not be viewed as anti-business though business leaders may themselves favor that popular conception. The industrial engineering and efficiency of a Taylor or a Gilbreth was to be complemented by a national effort at social engineering and efficiency. Power to carry out these reforms would also lead to centralization in the expanding powers of the executive branch and the lessening of the powers of Congress. Weinstein's argument thus allows us to characterize the Progressive Era, not as traditionally viewed as anticapitalist, but as a movement that was coopted by the most enlightened and powerful elements of the capitalist class who knew how to turn the hunger for reform into a more stable social order in which cooperation among capitalists was seen as more effective than ruthless competition.

And it was a new order. Captains of industry,

cutthroat competition, and robber barons: the imagery of the period as well as the methods of operation were bankrupt. Capitalists needed a new public image and modus operandi for the twentieth century. Corporations desperately needed a way to avoid competition. The trust had come about as a way to avoid competition. But that particular road to monopoly capitalism was too excessive. The economic historian Robert Heilbroner has set the anti-trust movement in proper perspective. The anti-trust movement was never an anti-monopoly movement, thus it was never an anti-big business or anti-capitalist movement. However, associating the anti-trust movement with anti-capitalism has been an association that capitalists have enjoyed perpetuating. By allowing this myth to be perpetuated, capitalists have been able to persuade the public that the new industrial order was sufficiently anti-capitalist. The capitalists received a new public image of social responsibility while at the same time monopoly capitalism accelerated unabated in its concentration and centralization of wealth. Remember the legislation: it was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Clayton Anti-trust Act; nowhere does it mention limitation to monopoly. Antitrust only limited in one way (and sometimes not even very strongly) the road to monopoly capitalism. And it also must be remembered that Roosevelt didn't even favor breaking up the trusts as much as he did regulating them. Taft's policy of breaking trusts up is what brought Roosevelt back into politics. As Robert Heilbroner sums up the inevitable

road to monopoly capitalism:

> ... [A]ntitrust legislation could pose a deterrent only insofar as the monopolization process resulted from the outright combination of erstwhile competitors. Against a much more fundamental condition--the ability of large businesses to enjoy decisive advantages over small businesses in finance, merchandising, and research--it could offer no remedy. While antitrust effort concentrated its fire against collusion or amalgamation, it was powerless against the fact of spontaneous internal growth (Heilbroner, 1980: 118).

Trusts yes, but monopoly controlling the interests of the country posed no problem to Woodrow Wilson. "... [M]onopoly will always sit at the helm of government. I do not expect to see monopoly restrain itself. If there are men in this country big enough to own the government of the United States, they are going to own it" (Wilson quoted in Heilbroner, 1980: 116).

The trust as a way to avoid competition was grudgingly abandoned but corporate capitalists found a new remedy that has never been seriously challenged. Price competition was eliminated in favor of price setting, the administered prices among competitors (Heilbroner, 1980: 126). Albert Szymanski, in his book on the development of the capitalist state, has offered one of the best summary statements of this period.

> After a period of mergers and corporate formation, by 1900 it became apparent that the new corporate interests required the elimination of the cutthroat competition among themselves, the control of the erratic fluctuations in the economy, and the ability to plan for the future. The inability of the corporations and banks to rationalize and stabilize the corporate economy led them to turn to the state for assistance. Only state regulation could solve their problems. A number of regulatory agencies were set up to control the sectors of the economy that the corporations wanted regulated. Each of

> these regulatory commissions was essentially controlled by the "regulated" industries themselves. The expansion of state activities not only provided for the self-regulation of business and ensured economic stability and predictability for the corporations, but it also served as a safety valve for democratic and radical ferment. For example, popular demands for nationalization of the railways and banks such as those put forth by the Populists in the 1890s were defused as the corporations were able to claim that federal "control" had ended the abuses of the system (Szymanski, 1978: 160-161).

The Search for Social Order

The expansion of federal power was the beginning of the bureaucratization of America (Degler, 370-376). It was an answer to the search for order. The reforms also represented a political recognition of the influence of the social environment on the individual, and the interdependent nature of modern society, a position sociology did much to advance. This political recognition of the effects of the social environment on the quality of life acknowledged the social environment as a social fact influencing one's life chances and, hence, is extremely important for it shaped the type of society America was to become in the twentieth century.

For Robert H. Wiebe, the key is the "search for order." Wiebe argues that the Progressive movement was an attempt to bring order out of the chaos of the 1900s. Affairs of State or business, or the professions themselves were to be administered by the appropriate agency (Wiebe, 1967: 185). Thus, the reform movement provided the impetus for a bureaucratic order that became increasingly dominant as the twentieth century progressed. In this new bureaucratic order, "[t]he

executive beyond a doubt was now the focus of national government" (Wiebe, 1967: 221). The country's problems were to be administered from above, by executive direction. "From the President's office radiated departments supervising matters that ranged from the cutting of trees to the slaughtering of cattle and supplying expert services for a host of organized citizens" (Wiebe, 1967: 222). Citizens would look to the Federal government to solve their problems and as a result, the government would become more and more involved in people's lives and in the regulation of events deemed relevant. "The people still existed, it was assumed, giving the nation its mystic coherence, but day by day administrators would deal with them in rational subdivisions" (Wiebe, 1967: 222).

This does not mean that the bureaucratic answer to the search for order was successful in achieving the solutions sought. Wiebe has suggested that the bureaucratic order made its progressive proponents susceptible to the illusion of fulfillment. "They had carried an approach rather than a solution to their labors, and in the end they constructed just an approach to reform, mistaking it for a finished product" (Wiebe, 1967: 223).

In general, the reforms of the Progressive Era can be seen as "... America's initial experiment in bureaucratic order, an experiment that was still in process as the nation passed through the First World War" (Wiebe, 1967: xiv).

Social Justice Denied: The New Oppression of Black America

Even a short history of the Progressive Era cannot go without comment on the relationship between the movement for social reconstruction and the denial of civil liberties and rights to black Americans. As race relations historians C. Vann Woodward (1966) and Richard Kluger (1975) have brilliantly detailed, with the exception of slavery, the Progressive Era was the most oppressive era for blacks in American history. It was the history of Jim Crow legislation and the dominance of the reign of terror by the Ku Klux Klan. Between 1890 and 1920 the majority of Jim Crow laws were passed in state legislatures and tested through judicial review up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court. The Jim Crow laws succeeded in segregating and disenfranchising black America. The Ku Klux Klan was at the height of its power; lynchings, rapes, beatings, and burning of fields, barns, and homes were commonplace. But the anonymity of white hoods was not needed. Lynchings had even become a form of entertainment for sadistic whites; tickets were sold at one lynching to shoot at a swaying black man. Interaction between blacks and whites in the South at its best was dominated by what sociologists have called "caste etiquette." The great irony of the Progressive movement is that at the time the above laws were being instituted to give some measure of social justice to white Americans, those same people were developing racist policies of segregation and disenfranchisement. As Woodward's research has

shown, "... the association of the two movements [Progressive and Jim Crow] was the fact that their leaders were often identical. In fact, the typical progressive reformer rode to power in the South on a disfranchising or white-supremacy movement" (Woodward, 1966: 91). The result was that "... the black man had reason to lament his ever having been freed, for by 1915 he was despised and ridiculed as he had never been in slavery" (Kluger, 1975: 104). Though it did not have the elaborate religious justification that defined the Hindu system, the making of the Southern caste system through legislation, violence, intimidation, and the normative order of caste etiquette successfully segregated and disenfranchised southern black Americans. The oppressiveness of the system was surely enough to destroy the hearts, minds, and souls of blacks. But those hearts, minds, and souls were only smoldering; they would later ignite.

The social context that provided impetus for the North's surrender to racist thinking and states' rights was America's desire for conquest, the period of imperialism. America began to oppress foreign peoples in the Pacific and Carribean--Phillippines, Hawaii, and Cuba--and an ideology to justify imperialism was needed and found. Thus, many progressive reformers were also anti-immigrant. As two scholars report:

> To the progressive urban reformer, the immigrant usually loomed as a boss-dominated bulwark of municipal corruption completely lacking in civic spirit and principle. In many cases, the viewpoint of otherwise humane and

> tolerant progressives was warped by nativism and racism. ... [N]o group was as outspoken as the reformers on the need to protect American life and institutions from the 'undesirable foreigner'(Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 453).

The one shinning light among the progressives was Ray Stannard Baker whose articles on racism in the South were published in book form in 1908, Following the Color Line. But Baker was vociferously attacked by his fellow progressives, in the North as well as the South.

Woodward and Kluger both date the beginning of the "capitulation" to racism with the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877, also known as the Redemption (from the Southern definition of the situation). Blacks had already been cut adrift from public attempts at fostering economic self-determination and education with the closing of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedman, and Abandoned Lands (1865-1872). Federal troops, which had been sent South when Southern legislatures tried to nullify the civil liberties and rights of blacks by enacting the Black Codes soon after the war, were withdrawn. Blacks were no longer considered a ward of the nation; there would no longer be any attempt to guarantee blacks civil and political equality, and, most important, the American public decided to bow to the South's demand to handle its own problems and devise its own solutions, the home rule or states' rights argument (Woodward, 1966: 7). The result was the Jim Crow system: a system of de jure segregation where churches, schools, housing, jobs, eating and drinking establishments, public transportation,

playgrounds, parks, sports, recreation, hospitals, orphanages, prisons, asylums, funeral homes, morgues, and cemeteries became legally segregated (Woodward, 1966: 7). From the cradle to the grave white and black Americans were to be separated from one other. The mention of hospitals may be misleading; for, there were largely no black hospitals; a life and death emergency provided no grounds for entrance to a white hospital. A severe injury meant death for blacks engaged in America's most dangerous occupation, farming. Southern labor unions were closed to blacks. The public libraries were prohibited to blacks. Whites definitely knew that knowledge is power and institutionalized practices to waste the minds of blacks. As Woodward and Kluger point out, the irony is that segregation was mostly a post-slavery phenomenon (Woodward, 1966: 12; Kluger, 1975: 62-103). It would never have worked in the plantation system of production.

The Jim Crow system began in the North and moved South (Woodward, 1966: 17). What made it particularly oppressive and retrograde was that many political and civil liberties had been won for blacks during the period of Reconstruction, 1865-1877. Even after Reconstruction, until 1901 every U.S. Congress had at least one black Representative from the South. State legislatures and state administrations also had many black representatives before the disenfranchisement movement began (Woodward, 1966: 54). Woodward (1966: 31-65) argues that the liberal, conservative, and Populist programs

had alternatives to a system of Jim Crow, but eventually, instead of trying to vie for black votes and then scapegoating blacks if they didn't win an election, a capitulation to the "forces of extremism" resulted in the segregation and disenfranchisement of blacks (Woodward, 1966: 69).

State legislation came first. But as these laws were tested through judicial review up to and including the U.S. Supreme Court, the favorable rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court provided the legal precedents for a whole host of additional state legislative Jim Crow laws. The U.S. Supreme Court, as the final arbiter, had provided the constitutionality of segregation and disenfranchisement.

A few of these cases are worth a brief review. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution were to be the safeguards of civil liberties and rights to blacks but they ended up safeguarding the rights and due process of law to corporations. The U.S. Supreme Court was in a period of strict rather than broad constructionism and the adherence to implied powers. Under the 1875 Civil Rights Act the U.S. Attorney's office began to prosecute violations of blacks' civil rights. But our system of judicial review meant that the courts had the last say on any grievance. In 1875 the case of United States v. Reese established that the burden of proof of being denied the right to vote on account of race must be proven. But if a black man was denied the right to vote, what could it be but because of race? "That there could have been no other conceivable reason was not a

factor the Court felt it proper to consider" (Kluger, 1975: 74). The 1875 case of United States v. Cruikshank was even more foreboding. A mob had attacked a group of blacks at a political rally. The Supreme Court ruled that this did not infringe upon any rights blacks had because "... only state action--that is, action by the state itself in the form of a law or the person of a public official--was covered by the Fourteenth Amendment" (Kluger, 1975: 74-75). In 1877 the Hall v. de Cuir case, the Supreme Court argued that a state could not prohibit segregation on a common carrier. In 1879 in the Virginia v. Rives case, the Supreme Court argued that an all-white jury that tried blacks was not necessarily discriminatory. The burden of proof was on the defendant to established a discriminatory jury-selection process. The rights of mobs to violate the civil rights of blacks was not a federal concern according to the 1883 ruling in the United States v. Harris case. A mob had lynched a black man. But again the Court argued, this was state action and; therefore, did not come under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was up to the state to prosecute, and if the state didn't care, it surely was no business of the federal government's. "And so [blacks] kept being seized and beaten and killed and could not turn to protection to the Fourteenth Amendment" (Kluger, 1975: 79). In 1890 the Louisville, New Orleans, and Texas Railroad v. Mississippi case, the Supreme Court argued that a state had constitutional rights to require segregation on common carriers within its

own borders. The most pernicious ruling came in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson, in which the Supreme Court delivered its famous separate but equal ruling for the justification of segregation. In the Court's mind, segregation and discrimination were mutually exclusive. The last vestige of a voting right was violated in the 1898 case of Williams v. Mississippi in which the Louisiana concept of the so-called "grandfather clause," or "good character clause," or "understanding clause," was sanctioned constitutional. If you had forefathers who had voted prior to January 1, 1867 then one could be exempt from both property and literary qualifications that the Mississippi state law required in order to vote. And a case that made the South an apartheid system, the 1908 Berea College v. Kentucky ruling "... endorsed a far more lethal idea: all contact, whether obligatory and indiscriminate as it would be in biracial public schools or voluntary and discriminate as it would be in biracial private schools, could be outlawed by the state" (Kluger, 1975: 107). Other oppressions, the Poll Tax and the white primary, would take a long time to be tested, but the crucial legal precedents set by the U.S. Supreme Court now provided the general rulings and constitutionality for the flood of Jim Crow state legislation during the 1900-1920 period. The only significant reversal during this period was the U.S. Supreme Court case of Guinn v. United States in 1915 which outlawed the grandfather clause as unconstitutional based on the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution which prohibited

the abridging of the right to vote on account of race.

As Woodward points out, the social thought that justified Jim Crow legislation was embedded in irony, contradiction, and hypocrisy (Woodward, 1966: 103-105). Many of the Southern arguments were based on William Graham Sumner's book, Folkways (1907) in which Sumner argued that "legislation cannot make mores and stateways cannot change folkways," and Franklin Henry Giddings' concept of "consciousness of kind." Legislation could not change patterns of "natural" social interaction. Therefore, they used Sumner's arguments to refute the futility of laws passed during Reconstruction to provide civil liberties and rights. Yet Southern strategists turned right around and argued the need for laws to enforce segregation. As Woodward argues, if segregation was a natural system and Reconstruction legislation could not change folkways or mores, then why the need for laws to enforce a system of segregation that was supposedly natural (Woodward, 1966: 103-107)?

The social context and oppression of the times made it dangerous to be militant. It was a period of race riots and lynchings. Theodore Roosevelt easily committed an injustice against blacks when he learned that some black soldiers from Fort Brown had been involved in a race riot in Brownsville, Texas.

> On the basis of dubious evidence and unproved charges, President Theodore Roosevelt ordered 160 members of three companies dishonorably discharged and permanently barred from reenlistment with forfeiture of pensions and other benefits. Six of those dismissed were Congressional Medal of Honor winners (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969:

554).

This social context helps us to understand the passivity of Booker T. Washington who advocated manual labor, vocational education, freehold subsistence farming, and who abandoned social equality as a goal for contemporary blacks in his so-called Atlanta Compromise speech delivered to the Atlanta Cotton States and International Exposition on September 18, 1895. Roosevelt also approved of the all-white Southern delegations to his Progressive party of New Nationalism. Woodrow Wilson also favored segregation. "The same Congress which enacted New Freedom legislation received more anti-Negro discriminatory measures than any other Congress in American history" (Morris and Greenleaf, 1969: 556).

There were few bright spots. William E. B. DuBois, who was the first black to receive a Ph.D from Harvard and studied under the pragmatist William James, criticized Washington and advocated for militancy in his The Souls of Black Folk (1903). A few years later DuBois and other militants formed the Niagara movement calling for the abolition of Jim Crow laws and restoring suffrage. After a vicious riot in Springfield, Illinois, in 1908, the birthplace of Abraham Lincoln, where two blacks were lynched, four whites murdered, 5,000 militiamen came to town and 2,000 blacks fled in terror; there was a call by William English Walling in the monthly, Independent to form an organization to fight racism. Members of the Niagara movement got together with other white progressives to present a militant case for

social equality. They formed the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, (NAACP) in 1910. John Dewey, Franz Boas, and Clarence Darrow were there. One of the main topics was the challenging of the notion of biological determinism, especially the arguments supporting black inferiority. "Leading scientists presented detailed evidence contradicting the widely purveyed belief that Negroes were inherently inferior to whites because their brains were structured differently" (Kluger, 1975: 121). The irony is that among the first officers, DuBois was the only black. The NAACP lawyers filed an amicus curiae legal brief with the U.S. Supreme Court to outlaw the grandfather clause in the Guinn v. U.S. case, "... the first time in forty-five years since its adoption that the Fifteenth Amendment had been used by the Court to overturn a state law" (Kluger, 1975: 129). The National Urban League was formed in 1911. Apart from these stars of hope, the conclusion one comes to is the unconscionable ease with which the Progressives could advocate for social justice while at the same time denying it to black Americans. But as Gunnar Myrdal explained so well, that has always been An American Dilemma. Woodward and Kluger agree that in the Progressive period blacks suffered a new oppression that did not begin to ease until the First World War when blacks abandoned their life of peonage as sharecroppers under the "furnish" system whereby they always ended up poorer then when they began. Earlier in the twentieth century blacks had migrated to Southern cities,

now they left the South altogether in large numbers, migrating to Northern industrial cities. Northern whites who had accepted the biological determinist notion that blacks were passive were in for a culture shock when returning blacks from World War I, who had been given medals, respect, and friendship by French men and women, could no longer endure the oppression they found waiting for them back home. They had not given their lives to make America safe for Jim Crow.

The Progressive position that society can change through education fostering attitude change is especially impotent when juxtaposed against the simultaneous Jim Crow movement in the South. If the interactionists and the Progressives in general had taken into account black America, then their conceptualization process might have been similarly effected. As the Progressives defined the situation, "... conflict itself rather than injustice or inequality, was the evil to be eradicated" (Lasch, 1965: 162).

This political position, Progressive politics, helps us to understand the conceptualization process of interactionists better by noting its meta-theoretical origins. As I will explore shortly, the interactionists saw human beings as free from biological determinism which meant that behavior was learned behavior and that self and social change could take place through education. But their conceptualization process is also understood by what they ignored. A focus on the inequality and injustice oppressing black America might have lead to a different approach to social

reconstruction and an even stronger emphasis on the constraints of social structure and social organization. Focusing on black America might have also lead them to ask what effect inequality and injustice might have on the development of human potentiality and human nature.

Progressive Politics and Pragmatic Domain Assumptions

In the rest of this chapter I will explore the domain assumptions of pragmatism, the social roots of the symbolic interactionists, and explain the nature of the relationship between Progressive politics and pragmatism. I will show how the conceptualizations that I will review in Chapters V and VI emerged not only as a reaction to the instinct theory of invariant behavior but also that these new conceptualizations were consistent with the social policy interests of symbolic interactionists, namely that reform could be accomplished through education and socialization.

Before we analyze the individual contributions that James, Baldwin, Cooley, Thomas, Dewey, and Mead made to the study of the social basis of behavior and human nature within sociology in general and symbolic interactionism in particular, it may prove helpful to that analysis if we present some of the general themes of pragmatism. James, Dewey, and Mead were the three most prominent pragmatists of this group; Baldwin was considered primarily a social psychologist, and Cooley and Thomas were considered primarily sociologists. These latter three contributed to the

development of symbolic interactionism rather than to the development of pragmatism. Besides being a leading pragmatist, Mead is so much associated with the development of symbolic interactionism--its founding father--that I have devoted a chapter exclusively to his concepts.

Domain Assumptions of Pragmatism

The etymology of pragmatism is from the Greek word pragma meaning "things, facts, deeds, affairs" (Thayer, 1968: 7). And it is with things, facts, deeds, and affairs that pragmatism is largely concerned. Before we go on to any specifics it will be worthwhile to explore some basic assumptions of pragmatism.

Again we must remember that symbolic interactionism emerged from the writings of the pragmatists; therefore, those domain assumptions that characterize pragmatism are by and large the domain assumptions of symbolic interactionism as well. This will be apparent when we analyze the particular concepts of these writers.

Howard Selsam has identified a number of assumptions of pragmatism (Selsam in Wells, 1971: 8): the denial of an objective reality that exists independent of any and all human experience; the perception of reality is subjective, reflected in our minds through the medium of the senses; the consequent denial of any objective necessity, any causality; the denial of any objective knowledge or truth; therefore, social science should focus on the indeterminacy of social behavior rather than prediction or control. The assertion

was made that the successful fulfillment of given aims, purposes, and intentions is the only test of the validity of any ideas or principles and constitutes the sole meaning of their truth.

Harry Wells identified the following assumptions as integral to pragmatism: a reliance on empiricism and a an argument that theory (at least theory as the formalists conceived it) is a pejorative; facts speak for themselves (Wells, 1971: 187). A focus on spontaneity and an argument that knowledge is gained through experience, and experience is individual and unique. People are not guided by theory but "can only meet each situation as it arises" (Wells, 1971: 190). A strong belief in individualism so that it appears as through there is an exclusion of social structure and social organization (Wells, 1971: 190-192). The grasping for expedient opportunism: "The taking advantage of opportunities or circumstances with little or no regard for principles or ultimate consequences" (Wells, 1971: 192). However, I find no support for this last assumption; at least from the interactionists that I am studying there certainly was a regard for the consequences of social action and social policy.

From the work of Henry P. Aiken, we are also able to cull some key tenets of pragmatism. "That the knower fundamentally conditions the things he knows" (Aiken, 1962: 53). This assumption will be clearly borne out in many of the concepts that I will explore in later chapters. Aiken also

expresses the notion that for the pragmatists there is no objective reality; reality is merely "reality-as-known" by the individual perceiver (Aiken, 1962: 54). The human mind structures the world it encounters, thus the mind is an "ordering faculty." This accounts for the order we perceive in the world (Aiken, 1962: 54). Since human beings have an innate sense to order and to categorize, we construct our own social worlds. For the pragmatists one cannot know the things/objects one categorizes in any objective sense. Simply said, as it was for Kant, one cannot know the thing-in-itself or as we shall shortly see, the thing-in-itself is perceived differently by different people. The human mind is an instrument: "mind is conceived as a doer rather than a contemplator" (Aiken, 1962: 55). The universe is not static but dynamic. Process and change are incessant. Chance and unpredictability are inescapable facts of social existence (Aiken, 1962: 55). Thought is a form of activity. Thought is historically rooted; "ideas are not static, timeless "meanings" or essences...." (Aiken, 1962: 55). The metaphor movement of thought is apt, for thought is dynamic. Thought is also purposive, as are all forms of activity (Aiken, 1962: 55-56). Human beings are part of the natural order of things and are biological and social beings. He is conceived in terms of a material organism rather than an immaterial spirit (Aiken, 1962: 56).

Studying the work of Israel Scheffler, one finds the following themes of pragmatism. Throughout the writings of

the pragmatists Scheffler found that there is "An emphasis on action, practice, society, a concern with what works" (Scheffler, 1974: 1). "An effort to assimilate modern science with philosophy, and to criticize traditional scientific outlooks in light of new scientific developments" (Scheffler, 1974: 1-2). We clearly see this in Dewey's writings. Another argument is that thought is indissolubly connected with action. This is certainly apparent in the concepts of the definition of the situation and taking the role of others and the generalized other. Self and mind are also socially grounded, they develop in association with others and the environment which provides as basis for social order (Scheffler, 1974: 8). The symbolic or representative nature of thinking "... which is always dependent upon networks of sign-processes, and hence incapable of absolute fixity or absolute certainty" (Scheffler, 1962: 8). "The rejection of Cartesian thought in which the mind is conceived as a substance utterly discrete from the physical world" (Scheffler, 1962: 8). Thought is always functional, thereby the cognitive aspects of behavior is directly related "to the biological, social, and purposive life of the organism" (Scheffler, 1962: 8). The pragmatists argued for a "fallibilistic view of knowledge" whereby knowledge was always provisional, that hypotheses that "tested" reality and came up with "theory" were best understood as probabilities which distort the complexity of social life (Scheffler, 1962: 8). Pragmatists also argued that science

should be experimental and socially useful, that science is performed by a community of scholars rather than the individual, and that it is dedicated to the improvement of humanity and society (Scheffler, 1962: 8).

Dmitri Shalin argues that there are four fundamental assumptions that are shared by pragmatists and early symbolic interactionists. The argument that reality is always in a state of flux, that society is an emergent from social interaction, that a "logic of inquiry" to studying reality must take into account the indeterminacy of behavior, and that philosophy or sociology must be committed to social reconstruction (Shalin, 1986: 10).

These are some of the more general assumptions of pragmatism. From reading the above scholars' work on pragmatism, we discern consistently the themes of 1) the relativity and flux of the social word, 2) the necessity to follow norms of utility in guiding everyday interaction and scientific work, 3) an inductive approach to the world where human beings are doers first and thinkers second, and 4) that truth is defined by success in social action and scientific work, irrespective of conformity to established truths or generalized principles.

Thelma Herman has argued that the three major assumptions of pragmatism center on the nature of human nature, instrumental truth and morality, and the relationship between means and ends (Herman, 1943: 405-410). I will explore these assumptions in some detail.

The Nature of Human Nature

The nature of human nature for the pragmatists is that human beings are active, volitional, and creative; people are able to direct their lives undetermined by instincts and that society and self are indissolubly connected, which means that social facts, in the Durkheimian sense as things which exist independently of the individual and constrain human behavior, are rejected. Destiny resides within the individual, not with biology or anatomy or social class. Almost nothing internal or external is an inhibiting factor in human behavior (Petras, 1975: 2). Creativity, spontaneity, novelty, and a human beings's ability to construct the world that is in flux is constantly emphasized. A representative quotation from James illustrates these assumptions.

> But the whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends upon our sense that in it things are really being decided from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago (James quoted in Herman, 1944: 406).

For the pragmatists the chains of biological determinism and the limited horizons for human beings that such determinism implied were repulsive. James's conceptualization here underscores the theme of voluntaristic nominalism.

Thelma Herman has revealed that the "political correlate" of the pragmatic conception of human nature was reformism. And a particular kind of reformism, i.e., educational reform. If human beings have the potential for

controlling their environments, then all they need is the proper tools. Education is the tool; it is the pragmatists' and early interactionists' panacea for all social ills, especially poverty. Listen to Cooley's remedy for poverty.

> The fundamental remedy for poverty is, of course, rational organization.... The most radical measures are educational and protective ... the humanization of the primary school system, industrial education ... (Cooley quoted in Herman, 1944: 407).

Or as George Herbert Mead would state on the need for education:

> Industrial training in this century should aim to give to the laborer not only professional efficiency but the meaning of his vocation, its historical import, and some comprehension of his position in the democratic society.... Out of this will arise an interest in the whole product which may lay the foundation for that intelligence which can in some measure resist the narrowing influence of the specialized labor in the factory.... American industrial education must be a liberal education (Mead quoted in Shalin, 1988: 934).

Education was viewed as a cure-all for social problems. Pragmatists argued that through education human beings could shape their destiny, that those who argued the dictates of biology were mistaken and politically conservative i.e., not in favor of social reconstruction.

> The concern for the influence of the educational system was not limited to the nature of its influence in shaping the individuals' personality. It was closely tied in with the Pragmatist's faith in the ability of man to shape his own destiny (Petras, 1968: 24).

The faith in education also underscores the pragmatists' argument that the environment can cause harm or good. As Shalin reports, quoting passages from George Herbert Mead:

> Schools have a vital part to play in humanizing American

> society. Progressive education, mandatory and free for all children, could at least partially offset "social restrictions which limit the development of children of poorer classes," and it could aid the progressive cause by bringing cultural goods to the poor and thereby "freeing ... culture of its class connotation" (Shalin, 1988: 934).

The pragmatists' image of human beings as unshackled, free to pursue their destiny, came from their effort to rid sociology of the Spencerian notion of Social Darwinism. They argued not only against biological determinants but also against social determinants, even ones that sociologists today would accept, such as class, race, and sex. Human beings were free to accomplish what they could, all that was needed was the proper guidance-control mechanism, education, to insure that one's full potential was realized. Human beings were not manipulated by the environment, but, rather, manipulated the environment; and education provided the proper instrument for human beings to achieve their goals, whatever they may be. The system was perfectible through education and social reform. Thus, as Dmitri Shalin has argued, underscoring this theme: "... the world confronting pragmatists was crying out for reform; it had to be transformed, and not just by the impersonal forces of evolution but by human intelligence" (Shalin, 1988: 936). Pragmatists had developed a social perspective that was contextually rooted in the reformist times. "... [T]he pragmatist vision of the world-in-the-making--the world that is perennially indeterminate, continuously emergent, and wonderfully malleable--is a metaphysics tailor-made for the age of

reform" (Shalin, 1988: 936).

Pragmatism was a radical theory when one places it within the social context of the times, when one realizes that they were arguing against the theories of Spencer, Sumner, Galton, and other biological determinists. It is also important to remember that the emergence of corporate capitalism with its reformist ethos provided a social context in which education could have been easily compatible with perfecting the parts of capitalism. There was no need to change a system if the system was perfectible, especially if one knew the mechanism that would bring about that perfection. However, the pragmatists were arguing for social reconstruction, and that was a radical idea to the likes of those who argued that to tamper with a social system is futile and dangerous. The pragmatists did not want to tinker with human beings but with the social system by setting up social services such as the juvenile court system, homes for unwed mothers, houses for the homeless, better educational opportunities for working men, adult education in general, and an institutional framework that would provide equality of opportunity for men (as I have shown blacks (and women, too) were notably missing from pragmatists' reform writings) as well as set up institutional regulations that would socially control the most pernicious parts of capitalism. But as I shall show in the chapter on Mead, social change was for the pragmatist primarily self-change. "If mind, self, and society belong to one continuum and are

indeed aspects of the same social intercourse, then the reconstruction of society is largely a matter of reconstructing the human mind" (Shalin, 1988: 941).

Instrumental Truth And Morality

The pragmatists enunciated a theory of truth, which is at once an admixture of the correspondence and coherence theory of truth, and in a sense agrees with neither. According to Novack, pragmatic truth does not have to correspond with a reality that is largely unknowable as a thing-in-itself, nor is it based upon internal consistency, nor that an idea, belief, or statement must cohere with what others observe (Novack, 1975: 176-77). Truth is what satisfies our needs and wants. As Gertrude Ezorsky has stated in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Volume VI, "According to James the function of thought is not to copy or image reality but to form ideas in order to satisfy the individual's needs and interests. What practical difference does it make if an idea is true?" (Ezorsky, 1972: 427). Or as she states later, "James wrote, in Pragmatism, that our truths 'have only this quality in common, that they pay'" (Ezorsky, 1972: 428). Or as Novack has stated, "The pragmatists set up two criteria of truth other than correspondence with the real state of affairs. One is what people come to believe; the other is the advantages such beliefs bring" (Novack, 1975: 177). Don Martindale in his study of William James has argued that: "The meaning of an idea, whether scientific, religious, philosophical,

political-social, or personal, was to be found only in the experiential consequences to which it leads. Truth and error are identical with these consequences" (Martindale, 1960: 300). Ezorsky quotes an example from James: "On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is 'true'" (Ezorsky, 1972: 428).

What is true is what works. If an action is motivated by what someone believes is true, and the action succeeds in its purpose, then the motivating idea was true. It is true because the action resulting from the idea is successful, i.e., it satisfied our needs or interests. Whether this is coincidental is not as important as is the criterion for the pragmatist: did it work? If it did, then it must be true; i.e., it must be working to satisfy our needs or interests. Shalin explains why pragmatists focused their concern on the phenomenological aspects of the thing-in-itself.

> The problem for pragmatists is not so much that the thing in itself is unknowable in principle, but that it can be known in so many ways: one thing can function as many different objects, and one object can be represented by many different things: which role a thing assumes in a given situation, which determinate object it is made to impersonate, depends not only on its inherent qualities, but also on the interests, assumptions, and practical skills of the actor (Shalin, 1986: 11).

Thought is an instrument which guides successful completion of desired ends. Thought is the means to successful ends. Again, the theme of voluntaristic nominalism is implicit in the pragmatic conception of truth. The individual has the ability to achieve, to accomplish, and those guides that

work are true guides. "That which guides us truly is true--demonstrated capacity for such guidance is precisely what is meant by truth" (Dewey quoted in Novack, 1975: 179).

Earlier we had mentioned that a norm of utility and a norm of success were fundamental to pragmatism. The following quotation should make that manifest.

> If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems, are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to the removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they fail to clear up confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon, then they are false (Dewey quoted in Herman, 1944: 407).

All ideas must be tested through experience. If an idea is able to guide purposive action it, has utility and is successful; it becomes a true idea. "Knowing does not exist for its own sake, but for the sake of doing" (Shalin, 1986: 11). Action leads to ideas and ideas are used as instruments to guide human intelligence to social action in which the truth of an idea is tested. In this sense, Pragmatism and Marxism share certain aspects in their epistemology and ontology. They both place the primary emphasis on action but both have solid commitments (epistemological and ontological) to the dialectical relationship between action and ideas.

The concern then is with action, a concern that is the epitome of early symbolic interactionism, a concern that human beings can achieve and are not pinned down by heredity. As Werner Stark informs:

Pragmatism preaches a consistently activistic doctrine

> of man: man, even when he fancies himself to be wrapped up in pure contemplation, for instance in the pursuit of truth for truth's sake, is yet in reality bound to his habitual modes of action. For the propositions which appear to him as true are simply those which have in practice proved themselves workable, effective, successful. Even mental life is a struggle for survival in which the purposive, the practicable, the pragmatic is selected, and the not so purposive, the impracticable, the pragmatically useless is detected and discarded. Thoughts are thus essentially instruments for the control of the objective world, not ideas about it ... (Stark, 1960: 19).

Practice is primary. If one's ideas do not correspond to reality by guiding purposive social action then they must be discarded. Such a perspective is radical considering that it may be applied to dogmatic thinkers like Herbert Spencer, and the other formalist writers the pragmatists were revolting against. The pragmatists were arguing that something must work in the empirical world, not just be believed or asserted to be true due the force of argument. This is why Dewey especially was considered an anti-formalist. Such a view contributed to the shift from Spencer's nineteenth century social philosophy to twentieth century social science.

Means And Ends

For the pragmatist ends are primary; means are sought that will lead to desired ends. Ends are goals and one must select the proper means--meaning successful--to achieve one's goals. The goal is all-important, the means to achieving the goal is only pragmatically considered, i.e., a means that will work. This means-ends theory had direct consequences for a pragmatic perspective on social change. "... [C]ooperation and intelligence were the desirable

means for bringing about needed change rather than the violence of dogmatic class conflict and revolution" (Herman, 1944: 408). Social change was to be guided by the principle of gradualism. As Cooley stated: "... the naive views that ignore the solidity of the present order, which ensures that any change must be gradual and make its way by reason ..." (Cooly quoted in Herman, 1944: 408). Or as William James stated: "[t]he evil of the parts is undeniable, but the whole can't be evil" (James quoted in Herman, 1944: 408). Or as George Herbert Mead would question, how can one bring about orderly social change?

> That is the problem of society, is it not? How can you present order and structure in society and yet bring about the changes that need to take place, are taking place? How can you bring those changes about in orderly fashion and yet preserve order? To bring about change is seemingly to destroy the given order, and yet society does and must change. That is the problem, to incorporate the methods of change into the order of society itself (Mead, 1972: 21).

As Dmitri Shalin reports, pragmatists, particularly Mead, wanted to institutionalize revolution or social change and thereby bring it under orderly control.

> ... Mead's theory of the reform process stems from his belief, widely shared by the progressive reformers of his time, that a terrible gap separates contemporary American society from the Jeffersonian ideal of popular democracy, that capitalism and democracy are currently working at cross purposes, and that, unless a way is found to humanize laissez-faire capitalism, the future of democracy in America will be imperiled. One road to a more humane and equitable society lies in the institutionalization of revolution--the term by which Mead meant that radical reforms can be carried out within the constitutional framework of democracy and that social reconstruction must be an ongoing concern rather than an all-out, one-time effort to set up a perfect society (Shalin, 1988: 935).

The concern was to bring about social change but insure the framework of democracy and civil liberties.

The association of reason with gradualism, progress with order, indicates not only the perspective of the pragmatists, but also their political agenda. They wanted to reform the pernicious part of capitalism. Intelligence is defined as gradual change, revolutionary change is defined as unintelligent. The whole is good/perfectible; it is just those evil parts that need to be eradicated. As Dewey argued:

> But radicalism also means, in the minds of many, both supporters and opponents, dependence upon use of violence as the main method of affecting drastic changes. Here the liberal parts company. For he is committed to the organization of intelligent action as the chief method (Dewey quoted in Herman, 1944: 408).

But what is intelligent action? The pragmatists failed to formulate any guidelines. "What was wanted but never forthcoming from pragmatists practicing intelligence was a social program, something more concrete and pragmatically meaningful than 'growth' or 'intelligence'" (Thayer, 1973: 242). Though Dewey may have advocated for the principle of social telesis (Petras, 1968: 18), his proposals emphasized a program of class mobility through self-improvement and equality of opportunity within a framework of a reformed corporate capitalist order, i.e., liberalism. "Progressives endorsed socialism's emancipatory goals but rejected its revolutionary means" (Shalin, 1988: 943). Dewey (and others) reasoned from action to ideas, but called for solutions to social problems on an ideas-to-action format. Attacking

the conservative notion of permanence, lending credibility to a program of social telesis, and branding the radical approach as unnecessary and unscientific was the essential components of liberalism. Summarizing the tension within the early symbolic interactionists, particularly Mead, one writer has noted:

> Its adherents extolled the virtues of entrepreneurial individualism and at the same time stressed the need for public control; they longed for a socialism of opportunity yet defended the capitalism of property; they urged a radical break with the present and reached deep into the past for an ideal of the future; above all, they were determined to escape the twin dangers of radicalism and conservatism (Shalin, 1988: 942).

Besides the norms of utility and success, the assumptions that the world is always in a state of plasticity and flux, that knowledge is provisional, that the world is what you make it or perceive it to be, that social structure or objective reality is non-constraining, that the approach to truth is through trial-and-error experiment unguided by theory, that all things are relative and that prediction is futile, that the defining characteristics of human beings are spontaneity, individualism, voluntarism; such a reformulation of human nature was certainly a revolution in sociology when contrasted with the earlier theories of Social Darwinism, hereditarianism, instincts, behaviorist psychology, and eugenics. Pragmatism/symbolic interactionism was contextually rooted in the egalitarian aspects of early twentieth century culture whereas hereditarianism was rooted in the elitist aspects of that same culture.

... [I]t would seem that symbolic interaction theory is

> a worthy attempt to create a unique philosophic rationale for the finer aspects of American society--for what is known at the more colloquial level as the American way of life, characterized as it is by respect for the individual and a belief in gradual change to meet society's fluctuating needs. Intrinsic to the theory is the sense of fluidity and its accent (part of its social psychology heritage) on flexible interpersonal relationships as a basis for an understanding of the working of society (Shaskolsky, 1970: 20).

Social Context, Progressive Politics And Pragmatic Conceptualization

I now want to concentrate on showing the relationship between social context, Progressive politics, and pragmatic conceptualization. The Progressive scholars of the early twentieth century would concentrate on progress, flux, change, indeterminacy, and probability. Emphasis on these concerns were characteristic of early symbolic interactionists such as James, Cooley, Thomas, Baldwin, Dewey, and Mead.

> The ideas that filtered through and eventually took the fort were ... peculiarly suited to the fluidity and impersonality of an urban-industrial order. They pictured a society of ceaselessly interacting members and concentrated upon adjustments within it. Although they included rules and principles of human behavior, these necessarily had an indeterminate quality because perpetual interaction was itself indeterminate. No matter how clear the evidence of the present, a society in flux always contained that irreducible element of contingency, and predictability really meant probability (Wiebe, 1967: 145).

Leon Shaskolsky has concurred with Wiebe's generalizations on early twentieth century social theorists, and argues that those generalizations are particularly applicable to the perspective of early symbolic interactionism.

> The writings of the symbolic interactionists are permeated with an exhilarating optimism expressing itself,

> on the personal level, in the belief in the uniqueness of each member of society and in his freedom to plan and perform his everyday actions in interrelationship with others unencumbered by either the impinging rules of a structural society or the automatic responses of an uncontrolled personality; and expressing itself on the societal level, in the belief in an evolutionary process of change built into the system (Shaskolsky, 1970: 17).

The Progressive concern for children thoroughly makes its mark in symbolic interactionist conceptualization, especially in the works of Cooley, Dewey, and Mead. In fact, the early symbolic interactionists made the most important contributions to the socialization perspective than any other sociologists. It is their perspective on socialization that every introductory textbook still uses to introduce students to the sociological perspective on socialization. The early interactionists' perspective on socialization emphasized the effect of the social environment and nurturing upon the quality and potential of an individual's life. Their concepts were a dialectical outgrowth of their interpretation of the toxic effects urbanization and industrialization were having on children, their Progressive politics to reform the situation, and their argument that childhood socialization, education, and nurturing were fundamental to the development of human nature.

> If humanitarian progressivism had a central theme, it was the child. He united the campaigns of health, education, and a richer city government, and he dominated much of the interest in labor legislation. Female wage earners--mothers in absentia--received far closer attention than male, movements for industrial safety and workmen's compensation invariably raised the specter of the unprotected young, and child labor laws drew the progressives' unanimous support. The most popular versions of legal and penal reform also emphasized the needs of youth (Wiebe, 1967: 169).

The early interactionists' concern for childhood socialization placed their conceptual development squarely within the Progressive tradition of a humanitarian concern for childhood development. One can clearly see this relationship between the Progressive concern for children and reform and Dewey's writings on childhood development.

Dewey's concern with the development of habits in childhood is representative of the interactionist argument of the social basis of learned behavior, the plasticity and emergent character of human nature, the adaptive capacity of human intelligence, the belief that human beings' situation-in-the-world is continuously evolving leading to a growth of human potentiality, and that through education one improves selves and minds; that is, education cultivates intelligent habits, which are the means for human beings to grow, to increase their adaptive capacity relative to the environment surrounding them.

> Power to grow depends upon need for others and plasticity. Both of these conditions are at their height in childhood and youth. Plasticity or the power to learn from experience means the formation of habits. Habits give control over the environment, power to utilize it for human purposes. Habits take the form both of habituation, or a general and persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings, and of active capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions. The former furnishes the background of growth; the latter constitute growing. Active habits involve thought, invention, and initiative in applying capacities to new aims. They are opposed to routine which marks an arrest of growth. Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself (Dewey, 1961: 62).

This quotation is saturated with the notion of human

creativity, growth, learning, adjustment, and adaptability. The instinct theory of invariant behavior is totally inapplicable to the human being. Rather than determined by biology, human beings, through learning and socialization develops intelligent habits, and is thereby provided with the capacity for endless growth. The purpose of education is to further human growth or potentiality by continuously increasing humanity's adaptive capacity to handle problematic situations through the formation of intelligent habits.

The plasticity of human nature leads to the adaptive capacity of learning through which human beings forms habits. Human beings are empowered, not determined.

> [Plasticity] is essentially the ability to learn from experience; the power to retain from one experience something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation. This means power to modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences, the power to develop dispositions. Without it, the acquisition of habits is impossible (Dewey, 1961: 52-53).

In these passages in Democracy and Education (1961), one sees how diametrically opposed is Dewey's concept of the social basis of behavior and human nature compared to instinct theory and biological determinism.

But this perspective was not developed through arguments with the biological determinists alone. It had metatheoretical origins as well. And those origins were precisely Dewey's concern to reconstruct society. Education and socialization were the means to bring about social change; for, if one started with children and socialized them properly, then, according to Dewey, social evils such

as the lust for money and power could be deracinated. It was the Progressive or liberal notion that a national attitude change through childhood education and socialization could humanize capitalism.

> Men have long had some intimation of the extent to which education may be consciously used to eliminate obvious social evils through starting the young on paths which shall not produce these ills, and some idea of the extent in which education may be made an instrument of realizing the potential efficacy of education as a constructive agency of improving society (Dewey, 1961: 79).

At the time there was enormous hope in the ability of education to bring about social change. Hindsight, of course, has proven these hopes overoptimistic. Even tens of thousands of sociologists educating American youth on the social evils of capitalism for eighty years have not fostered much attitude change in terms of a rapacious lust to acquire a rich and famous lifestyle. As we have seen, what the interactionists and Progressives accomplished here, along with the New Deal, was a program of social reform that created the Welfare State.

The concern for children did have the effect of inventing the category of juvenile delinquency. The first juvenile court was created in 1899 in Cook County, Illinois. As Anthony M. Platt has argued in his book The Child Savers (1969), the Progressives saw urbanism and concomitant social disorganization as the precipitating influence leading children to a life of crime. The city led to children becoming beyond parental control. This led directly to the rural reformatory movement. Delinquents could be reformed if they

were removed from a corrupting city environment and adult offenders, given indeterminate sentencing, placed in a rural reformatory school or cottage, given training (which usually was remedial industrial or agricultural training), and kept busy through military drill and some form of manual labor. The guiding tenet was that education, socialization, and training could help the juvenile overcome the cultural disadvantages of a poverty-stricken home and a corrupting city environment. With better education and socialization the juvenile would be able to adjust to the competitive struggle ahead. Since the intention was on removing the juvenile for his own good, for reform and not punishment, due process of law was seen as unnecessary and trials were viewed as stigmatizing status-degradation ceremonies to be bypassed.

Making the student an active participant in his/her learning and adjustment to life through creative self-directed inquiry, came directly from the educational philosophy of John Dewey. However, both the concept of adjustment to life and an active participant in learning were perverted in the reformatories where juveniles were taught to adjust to their lower-class position in life and to refrain from any aspirations that might lead to a middle-class lifestyle as well as to do all types of manual labor as a self-learning exercise. Acceptance of drudgery and monotony as the routine of life was the goal of the rural reformatories. However, one cannot blame Dewey for a philosophy that was perverted by technocrats and administrators who quickly came

to have other goals.

The Revolt Against Formalism

Another connection between Progressive politics and pragmatism can be seen in the pragmatist revolt against formalism. The ideas of the Progressive movement, of social reconstruction, of government interventionism, of a bureaucratic solution to the problem of order, were also a reaction against formalism. As Morton White explains the revolt, American intellectuals in the 1890s had been "... convinced that logic, abstraction, deduction, mathematics, and mechanics were inadequate to social research and incapable of containing the rich, moving, living current of social life" (White, 1957: 11). Morton White attributes this revolt against formalism primarily to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in law, to John Dewey in philosophy, to Thorstein Veblen in economics, and to James Harvey Robinson and Charles A. Beard in history and political science, respectively.

It was a movement in social thought that was important to symbolic interactionism, not only because the movement contained Dewey, but also because its influence on American politics and liberal thinking was profound; and, its influence on the symbolic interactionist methodology of participant observation cannot be overrated. As Morton White argues, these anti-formalists "... were united in an attempt to destroy what they conceived of as three fictions--the logical, legal, and economic man" (White, 1957: 27). According to Morton White, these thinkers emerging in the

Progressive Era represented the "leaders of liberal thought" and their writings represent "the golden age of liberalism in America" (White, 1957: 238). Their liberalism was expressed with an "... interest in the economic aspect of society [which] cannot be underestimated as a component of the American ideology which began to form in the nineties" (White, 1957: 77). They were liberals and not radicals, for they were interested in the type of changes Wiebe has discussed above, changes that led to a bureaucratic order. As Morton White argues: "They criticized some of the more glaring evils of capitalism, but their political affiliations were never revolutionary" (White, 1957: 46). They postulated a "new history" and a "new ethics." "History ceased to be a tale of regal insanity and political intrigue, and ethics was no longer a dreary catalogue of the virtues, having no connection with trusts, imperialism, and the labor movement" (White, 1957: 48). They were interested in how history could explain current affairs, how citizens could understand the newspaper, how economic institutions affected political ones, and how the Constitution was an economic document.

The revolt benefited sociology, for: "The great virtue of the American revolt against formalism was its fostering of a flexible and lenient conception of the relation among the social sciences" (White, 1957: 240). Their texts "... showed great respect for science, historical method, economic interpretation, and cultural analysis" (White, 1957:

237). Dewey especially benefited sociology with his "... undaunted conviction that the solution of our social problems lies in the application of science to human affairs" (White, 1957: 204). Dewey felt that philosophy could also be applied to social problems, that philosophy could help in the real world. As Morton White argues, "... Dewey regarded traditional philosophy as a leisure-class occupation and strenuously urged philosophers to leave the business of metaphysics for the industrial science of social engineering" (White, 1957: 146). "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men" (Dewey quoted in White, 1957: 128). As Morton White argues, Dewey's concern with applying philosophy to social problems made him "... the most forthright critic of American society ..." among the anti-formalists (White, 1957: 101).

One trenchant argument Dewey made was the anti-formalist argument distinguishing between formal and real freedom, which corresponded to the distinction between political and economic democracy. Morton White argues that this distinction was "... fundamental in the literature of socialism and social reform of the nineteenth century" (White, 1957: 101). It is worth quoting Dewey's distinction, both to get a flavor of his liberalism and of his anti-formalism.

> In its external aspect, freedom is negative and formal. It signifies freedom <u>from</u> subjection to the will and

> control of others; exemption from bondage; release from servitude; capacity to act without being exposed to direct obstructions or interferences from others. It means a clear road, cleared of impediments, for action. It contrasts with the limitations of prisoner, slave, and serf, who have to carry out the will of others (Dewey quoted in White, 1957: 101).
>
> The freedom of an agent who is merely released from direct external obstructions is formal and empty. If he is without resources of personal skill, without control of the tools of achievement, he must inevitably lend himself to carrying out the directions and ideas of others (Dewey quoted in White, 1957: 102).

One can catch the influence of Hegel and the quotation is vaguely reminiscent in theme to Marx's arguments in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.

For Dewey the school became the central institution of modern society and the means by which we could eliminate the social problems of modern society. Dewey felt that socialization in the schools was important, that schools and learning reflected class privilege, and that by changing the school environment we could go a long way to changing social attitudes. As Morton White argues: "Dewey's school was to be socially minded, imbued with the values of community life, rather than with the values of individual acquisitiveness; it was to reject the traditional school's concern with accumulation and invidious competition" (White, 1957: 97).

This brief review of Dewey's anti-formalism gives us a general flavor of the liberal politics and the new directions this group set forth for American social thought. The movement toward social reconstruction and government interventionism that was argued for by sociologists during the Progressive movement was a liberal response that led to a

bureaucratic order. It did not seek to overthrow market relationships, but rather, to repair (manage, administer) the damage that market relationships caused to human beings.

Taking insights from Morton White Jr., Dmitri N. Shalin makes the argument that the symbolic interactionist methodology of participant observation is a direct result of the pragmatists revolt against formalism.

> Studying society-in-the-making meant more than describing it in scientific terms; it also meant understanding--better still--experiencing it, if possible by direct immersion in the mundane world of everyday life where it is routinely generated by the participants in social intercourse. To accomplish this feat, interactionists had to assume a role markedly different from that of a classical scientific observer--they had to become participant observers (Shalin, 1986: 18).

Shalin argues that the interactionists rejected five aspects of a rationalist/formalist epistemology. They rejected the notion that one must remain aloof from or "outside of" the object of knowledge; secondly, they rejected the notion that one can approach the object of knowledge without "preconceptions and biases;" thirdly, they argued that both "ideas and facts are flexible;" fourthly, that abstraction of social life vitiates the richness and complexity of social life; and fifthly, the interactionists "... blurr[ed] the borderline between scientific and common sense knowledge..." (Shalin, 1986: 18).

These epistemological arguments directly influenced how interactionists came to study their subjects. We see this clearly in Cooley's sympathetic introspection, Thomas's definition of the situation, Mead's taking the role of the

other. The interactionist methodological dictum is that one must get to know others in an intimate sense to know (in the everyday language) where others "are coming from." In this way one can come to know the meaning objects have for people, for meaning is not only assessed by behavior, by how one responds to an object, but also by the subject's definition of the situation. This does not mean that the interactionist accepts this definition uncritically. Subjects must be studied in their richness and complexity rather than through methods which abstract the individual. There is a dilemma. Shalin argues that the interactionists strove to maximize validity (a more rich and complex understanding of a subject) even though this entails a sacrifice of reliability (abstracting the subject so as to get the same results on subsequent studies) (Shalin, 1986: 20). This is basically the textbook problem introduced to students in their first methodology courses. Case studies provide rich detail but they are not generalizable nor reliable. Statistical studies, such as surveys, provide generalizations but only at the expense of reducing the human being to an abstraction. "... [T]he familiar pragmatist reluctance to see a rich phenomenon reduced to a taxon" thus led them to participant observation as their preferred methodology (Shalin, 1986: 21). It was also based on their anti-determinist stance, both against biology and social structure. "Interactionists sociologists took seriously the objective indeterminacy of the social world to which they sought to adjust

their research practice" (Shalin, 1986: 22). The Progressive concern for flux and indeterminacy clearly appears in early interactionist methodology.

Biography and History: The Social Roots Of The Early Symbolic Interactionists

Before we look at the conceptual contributions that James, Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Thomas, and Mead made in taking the study of human behavior from biology to psychology, and from psychology to sociology, a few background comments may prove helpful. The early interactionists' interpretation of the social changes transforming America which lead to their Progressive politics has its roots in their particular rural, religious, and intellectual upbringing. The social position of James, Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Thomas, and Mead was middle to upper-middle class families.

William James (1842-1910)

James's father was independently wealthy and took the family travelling throughout Europe. As one writer comments, James had wealth and "... without qualms of conscience [decided] to live on it ..." (Knight quoted in Scheffler, 1974: 95). He spent a great deal of this life as a student of various pursuits. He first studied art, then after losing interest in the artistic life, made the surprising shift into the disciplines of chemistry and anatomy, entering the Lawrence Scientific School of Harvard University. He then decided to become a physician and entered Harvard Medical School. James interrupted his studies to

travel with Louis Agassiz in an exploration of the Amazon. Suffering a failure of health he returned to Harvard to study medicine but left after a term to study physiology in Germany under Hermann Helmholtz and Claude Bernard, and pathology under Rudolf Virchow.

It was while he was in Germany that an incident occurred that provided the origins for James's anti-determinism. Noting the relationship among biography, history, and conceptualization, Don Martindale catches the significance of James's traumatic experience.

> While in Germany he suffered a nervous breakdown, during which he entertained thoughts of suicide. He returned home in 1868, took the M.D. degree, and lived in a state of semi-invalidism, experiencing a prolonged period of phobic panic relieved only when he read Renouvier on free will. The materialistic determinism of nineteenth-century science overwhelmed James with a sense of psychic oppression, and he resolved to make the first act of free will the abandonment of all determinism (Martindale, 1960: 299).

By 1872 James was well enough to work again and obtained an instructorship in physiology at Harvard. But his interests shifted again, this time to psychology. He began research in psychology in 1880 that led to the publication in 1890 of his Principles of Psychology. His interest here did not remain long either: "With the completion of this work, he lost interest in psychology, and began to teach and write in ethics and religion, occupying himself with the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, free will and determinism, and the value of life" (Martindale, 1960: 300). It is with writings on these subjects that James had his influence on the larger movement of pragmatism in American philosophy.

Those particular writings have no concern in this study which selected solely those concepts of James that led to the emergence of symbolic interactionism.

James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934)

Baldwin was born on January 12, 1861 in Columbia, South Carolina. Baldwin was reared in what would have been regarded at the times as a middle class family. He went to a Salem, New Jersey preparatory school at the age of 18 and after three years of study entered Princeton University where he primarily studied philosophy. Baldwin graduated from Princeton with an A.B. in 1884 and then went to Europe on a fellowship. In Europe he studied under Wilhelm Wunt at Leipzig and Friedrich Paulsen at Berlin. When Baldwin returned from Europe he was hired by Princeton to teach French and German. Religion had been a major influence in James Mark Baldwin's life. And while he was at Princeton he decided to enter Princeton Theological Seminary. However he found the dogmatism stultifying and made a decision to devote his studies to psychology instead. He obtained a position as professor of philosophy at Lake Forest from 1887 to 1889 and while there completed his doctoral dissertation for Princeton, which was a refutation of materialism under the influence of Princeton President James McCosh, a Presbyterian. Baldwin left Lake Forest to become a professor of psychology at the University of Toronto but came back to Princeton in 1893 as Stuart professor of psychology. In 1903 Baldwin went to Johns Hopkins and from 1909 to 1913 he

was at the National University of Mexico. Baldwin then moved to Paris where he spent the rest of his life.

Charles Horton Cooley (1864-1929)

Charles Horton Cooley came from an upper-middle class family, but Charles' father, Thomas, had been born poor. Thomas McIntyre Cooley was a person who rose from humble beginnings and achieved a great deal of upward mobility. Thomas Cooley was one of the three charter faculty members of the University of Michigan Law School. Later, Thomas Cooley was elected to the Supreme Court of Michigan, and also became Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, an organization of liberal social reform. Charles' father was recognized as the "leading constitutional lawyer of his time" (Jandy, 1942: 1-13). When Charles Cooley went away to college, he didn't have to go far; the University of Michigan was right across the street.

John Dewey (1859-1952)

Dewey's roots were those of a New England farming community. "Three generations of his forebears were Vermont farmers and each of his parents was born and raised on a farm in Vermont" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 1). Dewey's parents belonged to "... the middle class, neither exceptionally rich nor unusually poor" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 2). Dewey's mother took an exceptional interest in the plight of the poor, perhaps a source of his liberal and social reconstructionist thought. She was not only a person who believed in

helping the poor, but also put those beliefs into action with "... work among the poor and underprivileged of Burlington" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 2). John Dewey grew up playing with immigrants. As Dykhuizen states, "Such association with boys and girls of cultural and income groups quite different from his own undoubtedly provided liberalizing influences" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 3).

Dewey's mother had strict religious norms and morals that almost made Dewey abandon religion.

> That Dewey did not abandon all religion at this time in reaction to his mother's narrow pietism and excessive religious emotionalism is due in large measure to the liberal evangelicalism he was finding in church and college, a form of Christianity more palatable to his developing intellect than was his mother's religion (Dykhuizen, 1973: 7).

This evangelical religious influence remained with Dewey, for "... during most of the time that he occupied the chair of philosophy at the University of Michigan, he expressed his religious thinking in terms of the evangelicalism he had learned in his youth" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 8). It was not until much later "... when Dewey developed his instrumentalism [that] ... all vestiges of evangelicalism disappear[ed]" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 8).

Dewey went to the University of Vermont where he became interested in moral and social philosophy. In the university's library he read on the current issues of the day and was greatly influenced by the "... radical Fortnightly Review [which] had made him aware that a rapidly developing industrialism required new controls and new organizations to

safeguard the rights of those being victimized" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 13-14). After Dewey graduated, he taught high school for two years in Oil City, Pennsylvania which "... provided a superb opportunity for him to observe the social problems arising from raw, uncontrolled industrialism ..." (Dykhuizen, 1973: 22). He left Oil City and taught high school for a winter term at Charlotte Vermont, after which he entered Johns Hopkins University for graduate study in philosophy.

At Johns Hopkins, Dewey also took courses in psychology under G. Stanley Hall, whose views on human nature we will explore in the next chapter. But his views were primarily shaped by readings of Hegel under the instructorship of professor George Sylvester Morris. After graduating in 1884 Dewey began his career as a professional philosopher at the University of Michigan, where Morris also taught. In 1894 Dewey left the University of Michigan for the University of Chicago.

At Chicago, Dewey would further develop into a leader in the liberal movement for social reconstruction. "Dewey had close relations with Hull House, founded in 1889 by Jane Addams.... He was on its first board of trustees.... Dewey conducted courses, gave talks, led discussions ..." (Dykhuizen, 1973: 104). Dewey lectured so much to everyone at Hull House because he believed that education was "the primary and most effective instrument of social progress and reform, [and that] through education society can formulate

its own purposes, can organize its own means and resources, and thus shape itself into definiteness and economy in the direction in which it wishes to move" (Dewey quoted in Dykhuizen, 1973: 104).

Hull House was definitely the meeting ground of those engaged in social reconstruction, and even for those of a more radical politics.

> Jane Addams and her staff, which included such outstanding women as Ellen G. Starr, Julia Lathrop, Florence Kelley, and Alice Hamilton, were militant social workers who did not hesitate to enter the arena of local politics. They spoke at neighborhood political rallies, marched in parades, and vigorously supported candidates committed to social reform. They made studies of the evils that infected slum neighborhoods and publicized their findings (Dykhuizen, 1973: 104-105).
>
> Hull House was a popular meeting place for people of diverse social views. Here, in the evenings and on Sundays, liberals, socialists, communists, anarchists, and others met to exchange ideas (Dykhuizen, 1973: 105).

Dewey met not only with those who were engaging in some form of praxis at Hull House, but also joined a group of liberal thinkers at the University of Chicago. With "... men such as Albion Small and W.I. Thomas of the Department of Sociology; Edward W. Bemis and Thorstein Veblen of the Department of Political Economy; Frederick Starr in Anthropology; and Tufts, Mead, and Moore, and Angell of Dewey's own department" they discussed social reconstruction--that is--ways to make capitalism more socially responsible (Dykhuizen, 1973: 103).

> The Chicago group did not believe in drastic cures for society's ills. They were not extremists of the Marxist, Lassallian, or anarchist type. They believed in the existing capitalist order, but taught that it should be controlled or modified so as to eliminate or lessen

> the evils and abuses which attend an unrestricted laissez-faire economy. They recognized the danger of giant monopolies, urging their regulation by government. They supported labor unions because these gave the working masses a stronger voice in determining the conditions under which they worked. They favored, under certain conditions municipal ownership of such public utilities as street railways, gas, water, and electricity. They were opposed to violence and lawlessness in the settling of labor disputes and to strikes that forced others to be idle, declaring that anyone who defended these practices 'would find no sympathy with such views in any department of the University of Chicago' (Dykhuizen, 1973: 103-104)

But University parlor talk was not always Dewey's response; he could be a person of praxis, too. "The fighting qualities in Jane Addams and her coworkers undoubtedly sparked the same qualities in Dewey's nature so that as the years passed he increasingly left the classroom and study to enter the world of practical affairs to fight for the causes he judged important" (Dykhuizen, 1973: 105). Dewey supported his brand of social reconstruction with articles on industrial education and industrial democracy; however, those works will not be considered here, for I am primarily interested in the relationship between his political commitments, and his contributions to the reconceptualization of human nature, and to symbolic interactionism.

In briefly reviewing Dewey's social roots and professional career, we can see that it provided a context from which Dewey formulated a liberal position and became an advocate of social reconstruction.

W.I. Thomas (1863-1947)

W.I. Thomas' social background was somewhat more modest but a great deal more obscure. As Morris Janowitz has stated: "It appears to the intellectual historian as if there may have been an effort to obliterate the record of W.I. Thomas as a man" (Janowitz, 1966: ix). Thomas had a rural and religious background and upbringing, similar to the other pioneer sociologists (Janowitz, 1966: xi). W.I.'s father, Thaddeus Peter Thomas, "... combined preaching with farming in order to make a living" (Janowitz, 1966: xi). But that is about all that is known about the Thomas' family. "Except for the fact that his father was affiliated with the Holston Methodist Church Conference, there are no materials about his family" (Janowitz, 1966: xi).

George Herbert Mead (1863-1931)

Mead's father was a university professor at Oberlin Theological Seminary (Scheffler, 1974: 149). Hiram Mead was also a minister at the local Congregational church (Shalin, 1988: 918). "Mead's mother, Elizabeth Storrs Billings, was a strong-willed, dignified, very religious woman; for a number of years, she served as president of Mount Holyoke College and later taught at Oberlin College" (Shalin, 1988: 919).

George Herbert Mead obtained his undergraduate education at Oberlin. This is significant for it was there that Mead was introduced to the themes of Christian socialism, many of those themes being adopted by progressives.

> Throughout the country, evangelical establishments, such as Mead's alma mater, Oberlin College, were spreading the word that shaping man in the image of God meant not only purifying his soul through the gospel of Jesus but also changing the environment that corrupted his spirit and bred social ills (Shalin, 1988: 915).

These influences would follow Mead in his graduate education at Harvard and his stay abroad in Germany.

> In the fall of 1888, after successfully completing a year at Harvard, Mead won a scholarship and went to Germany, ostensibly to continue his studies toward a doctoral degree. Yet his mind would soon turn to politics, stimulated by the burgeoning reform movement in Germany. The extent of government involvement in the issues of social security, the popularity of the Social Democratic party, and particularly the respect socialism commanded in academic circles deeply impressed Mead ... (Shalin, 1988: 921-922).

As Shalin concludes about such a social background: "With a background like this it was logical to expect that Mead--a rather shy, serious, well-behaved boy--would take up the ministry" (Shalin, 1988: 919). These early influences remained with Mead even during his academic life: "By 1910, Mead was generally recognized as one of the leaders of the Progressive movement in the city of Chicago" (Shalin, 1988: 924).

From middle-class, rural, religious, and highly educated families merged the association of James, Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Thomas, and Mead. It was partly through the thinking of these men that sociology reformulated the basic thinking on human nature and human behavior. Through their work sociologists incorporated a social conceptualization of human beings, self, mind, and personality. Their work helped to contribute to the disintegration of biological

determinism and to the reconceptualization in the thinking about human beings and their relationship to society. Through their work the basic concepts of symbolic interactionism were formulated.

Christopher Lasch in his study of this time period and these men has drawn a connection between biography and history and politics and conceptualization. He argues that the social origins of the interactionists' interpretation of the social changes taking place around them, their concern with Progressive politics as a way to socially reconstruct society, their conceptualization process emphasizing the social basis of behavior and human nature, and that through education human beings can learn to eradicate social evils, had a great deal to do with their class background and their contemporary class interests.

> The intellectuals... having no resources of their own to throw into the social struggle--no resources, as a class, except argument and exposition--had a class interest in nonviolence for its own sake. In a struggle of force against force the intellectuals, possessing neither property nor the force of numbers, had everything to lose. Hence their insistence that the way of progress was necessarily the way of peace. Their confidence [was grounded in the belief] that "education" could take the place of force... (Lasch, 1965: 169).

The Relationship between Progressive Politics and Pragmatism

I think I have shown a strong dialectical relationship among social context, Progressive politics, and pragmatic conceptualization. I will be exploring the major concepts that contributed to the study of the social basis of behavior and human nature in Chapters V and VI. Those concepts

are consistent with the major assumptions of pragmatism that I explored in this chapter.

George Novack has stated that the Progressives and pragmatists were rooted within a unique social context that embedded and nurtured their conceptualization. Making the United States a unique social context were the lack of pre-capitalist institutions with their ascribed social positions, except for the position of blacks in slavery and the Jim Crow South after slavery, a lack of traditionalism, a spirit of initiative and "Yankee" inventiveness, experimentalism, mobile social relations, and rapid technological developments (Novack, 1975: 19-31). The symbolic interactionists' concepts such as evolution, progress, indeterminacy, flux, plasticity, interventionism, self-control, process, change, and the belief that the environment is more determining in the development of the self than biology, heredity, or nature, are rooted, in part, in this general social and political context of America.

A student of pragmatism and a student of symbolic interactionism sum up the relationship among the social context, the particular interpretation of that social context that led to Progressive politics, and the conceptualizations that led to a unique perspective on social behavior and human nature.

> The pragmatic viewpoint emerged organically from the special conditions of American historical development. It came to flourish as a normal mode of approaching the world and reacting to its problems because the same social environment that shaped the American people likewise created an atmosphere favoring the growth of

pragmatism (Novack, 1975: 19).

> It is doubtful whether a theory such as symbolic interactionism could have arisen in any social and political context other than a society such as America's, with its egalitarian ethos and its mobile class structure. The basic thesis on which it rests is clearly inapplicable to a class-structured society steeped in the formalistic, often fossilized, modes of behavior handed down from previous generations (Shaskolsky, 1970: 18).

Thus, the social context of America combined with the particular interpretation that symbolic interactionists gave to that context, led to a perspective that was anti-deterministic and pro-individualistic. It represented the development of a sociological social psychology. It took into account environment and culture. A person's ability to think (a mind with the function of intelligent action and adaptation to the environment) meant that the stimulus-response model of behavior was not applicable to human beings. The individual, either through deliberation, taking the role of others, or defining the situation, was able to set forth his/her own plan-of-action, to make unique adjustments to culture and environment, to place a check on his/her emotions, to be more determining than determined.

> Symbolic interactionism has its roots deeply embedded in the cultural environment of American life and its interpretation of society is, in a sense, a 'looking glass' image of what that society purports to be. As a theory it was conceived, nourished, and matured in the new continent and represents some of the highest ideals of that society ... (Shaskolsky, 1970: 16).

This review of the relationship between Progressive politics and pragmatism has provided insight into the meta-theoretical origins of symbolic interactionism. But the concepts of symbolic interactionism emerged from more than

the social and political origins that we have explored, they emerged as a challenge to the biological determinists, the instinct theorists of invariant behavior, and the psychological hereditarians with their IQ test.

We now move on to the intellectual debate that helped shape the reconceptualization of human nature. This involved new developments in biology and psychology that led to hereditarianism. The intellectual history of the eugenics' movement and the rise of IQ testing are reviewed. We will then examine the reaction to the above intellectual developments in the second and third decade of the twentieth century. We will do this by surveying the development of the new anthropology, the new genetics, and a sociology that finally became divorced from biology. These led to the demise of hereditarianism and a new conception of human nature and behavior, one that presented a social perspective on behavior and human nature.

CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGENCE OF HEREDITARIANISM: THE CONTINUATION OF THE NATURE VERSUS NURTURE DEBATE

I now will focus on a specific debate which confronted both natural and social scientists, the nature/nurture debate. This debate significantly engaged early symbolic interactionists, and from their participation a social conception of human nature and behavior emerged. From an analysis of this debate we can better understand the conceptual development of symbolic interactionism.

The nature/nurture debate was also known as the heredity/environment controversy and the debate between biological determinism and environmental or cultural determinism; it was associated with the eugenics movement, the racial interpretation of history, Social Darwinism, the nature of human nature, instinct theory, mental testing, behaviorist psychology, innate criminality, genetics, inherited intelligence, evolutionism, and the distinction between natural and social science. This debate pulled into its orbit grand-scale arguments over a human being's limitations and potentialities, the value and purpose of education, social and governmental intervention, immigration policy, the nature of the self and self-change, and the viability or even desirability of democracy. I will argue that the debate was

responsible, in part, for major changes in anthropology and sociology at the end of the nineteenth and the first three decades of the twentieth century. Changes emerged in these disciplines that contributed to a new interpretation of human behavior. These changes in anthropology and sociology centered on their ability to interpret human nature and behavior without reducing human nature and behavior solely to biological explanations; that human beings (through culture, socialization, and the development of a self and mind) were unique, and that a unique perspective and method of inquiry to interpret human behavior was needed. In general, as sociologists responded to this debate they carved themselves a discipline. But the debate was fueled by more than academic disciplines in the making: the heredity/environment debate was rooted in the social and political processes that we just covered: industrialization, immigration, and urbanization; as well as the concomitant social problems: poverty, crime, delinquency, mental illness, and alcoholism, etc., and the moral and reformist response made to those problems by sociologists, among others.

When there is a debate over whether there are biological or social causes of poverty, crime, prostitution, delinquency, and mental illness, there are enormous political and social policy consequences. The stature of these consequences was recognized by the participants in the debate. Thus, as I stated in the introduction, the nature/nurture debate was more than an academic debate; it

was a debate over the type of society the United States was to become. The notion that all people could be socialized to the prevailing culture, that all people could become citizens and participate in democracy, that better institutions of socialization and education could improve the human condition and go a long way toward solving social problems, made the socialization perspective political. Both the hereditarian and socialization perspectives were political; they emerged as interpretations over the social processes transforming America.

In Chapter II, I traced the decline of Social Darwinism and the rise of a Reform Darwinism based on the social evolutionary theory of social change. I also traced how Social Darwinism was no longer needed as corporate capitalism arose, bringing about a new ideology, Reform Darwinism. In Chapter III, I traced the solidifying of the corporate capitalist state along with the rise of the liberal reform movement of Progressivism and a revolt against formalism, which led to pragmatism or early interactionism. Social Darwinism, based on a theory of social evolution, declined, but biological evolutionary theory did not. The new evolutionary scientists were biologists and psychologists of the twentieth century. One cannot understand the emergence of symbolic interactionism if one does not outline this new mode of thought, for out of symbolic interactionists' participation in this debate, their conceptualization of the nature of human nature and social behavior emerged. These

new evolutionary thinkers did not formulate organic analogies but applied scientific analysis to advance biological determinism or hereditarianism, and especially in psychology tried to prove innate inferiority through the development of IQ tests. Hamilton Cravens points out the distinction between the decline of Social Darwinism and the rise of a more scientific evolutionary theory in the biologists and psychologists of the twentieth century.

> Most historians have estimated the impact of evolution in American culture to be the Social Darwinist movement of the later nineteenth century. Yet the history of the sciences of man in the twentieth century ... suggests that the influence of evolution became more pronounced in America with the demise of the Social Darwinist movement in the early twentieth century and its replacement by the new disciplines concerned with human nature and behavior (Cravens, 1978: 270-271).

> Because the new, post-1900 professors of evolutionary science used experimental methods, not the loose analogies between nature and society of the Social Darwinists, it was easy for this new professoriate to supplant and displace the Social Darwinists and persuade far many more Americans, especially those who were educated and who were situated in positions of power and authority, that man was an animal whose behavior could be studied by the most precise methods known to modern science (Cravens, 1978: 271).

The Perspective of Hereditarianism

Charles Darwin regretted in 1859 that the laws governing biological inheritance were unknown.

> The laws governing inheritance are for the most part unknown. No one can say why the same peculiarity in different individuals of the same species, or in different species, is sometimes inherited and sometimes not so; why the child often reverts in certain characters to its grandfather or grandmother or more remote ancestor; why a peculiarity is often transmitted from one sex to both sexes, or to one sex alone, more commonly but not exclusively to the like sex (Darwin, 1859: 19).

The scientific attempt to uncover these perplexing questions erupted into new controversy with the emergence of an experimental biology and psychology housed within the new graduate research universities. Experimental biologists argued that heredity was more determinant than the environment in the development of human nature and behavior. Thus, hereditarianism was not an ideology of pseudoscientific quacks trying to justify laissez-faire capitalism, which was already moribund, but a theory of the best and brightest of those in the field of experimental and evolutionary biology and psychology.

> The controversy's origins may be traced back to the 1890's, with the sudden rise of experimental biology and psychology. Starting in that decade, the advances in the new experimental work made it possible for the first time for natural scientists to disentangle heredity from environment in their descriptions and explanations of evolutionary phenomena. Within a few years, experimental natural scientists were able to create a very different model of heredity and environment than scientists had traditionally employed since the mid-nineteenth century--a conception in which nature and nurture were clearly separated and defined as distinct, independent variables (Cravens, 1978: x).

Since the natural scientists believed that nature was an independent variable determining the quality of a human being, it did not take long before such an idea was applied to the problems of human beings. The eugenists used the new experimental biology as scientific validation of their own social policy aims; namely, that poverty, crime, prostitution, and alcoholism etc., were biological problems, i.e., deficiencies in race or breeding. Therefore, as I shall shortly turn to, they argued for social policies of

immigration restriction and involuntary sterilization. Many American biologists, such as Charles B. Davenport of Harvard and his coworkers at the Eugenics Records Office, were eugenists. Other esteemed scientists, such as the paleontologist Henry Fairchild Osborn, were supporters of eugenics. Fairchild had studied anatomy under Thomas Huxley in England and in 1908 became president of the American Museum of Natural History, a position he would hold for the next twenty-five years.

In terms of social policy, the eugenists wanted the state to intervene in the elimination of the unfit from society. The eugenists were not of the laissez-faire school. The "new collectivism," that is, the belief that the state should intervene in the affairs of society, was "... one of the outstanding characteristics of the shift in the dominant pattern of thought" (Hofstadter, 1969: 167). What distinguishes the hereditarians is that they wanted to achieve social control by intervening in the reproductive capacity of citizens and restrict immigration; the Progressives wanted to achieve social control through social reconstruction by altering the political, educational, and economic institutions of society, but also by heavily relying on education and socialization.

But early on the issue was a tangled web, since many progressives accepted the biological theories of their day. As I have shown, the progressives were not progressive on the racial issue; it was the worst time period for blacks

outside of slavery. Also, as I pointed out in Chapter II, E.A. Ross picked up on the "beaten members of beaten breeds" theme in his descriptions of southern and eastern Europeans. John Commons, a progressive social reformer, who was a member of the 1915 Industrial Relations Commission that was established by President Wilson to investigate the causes of the Ludlow Massacre, accepted hereditarianism. Howard W. Odum, who later became a Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina, issued the conviction that blacks' social, cultural, and mental traits were inferior to whites in the 1910 publication of his doctoral dissertation entitled, Social and Mental Traits of the Negro. Another progressive, Henry Pratt Fairchild, was president of both the American Sociological Society and the American Eugenics Society. Most of the early environmentalists accepted eugenics because they accepted the biological theories of their day. Thus, early on, eugenics and environmentalism were far from mutually exclusive. Eugenics entailed projects to improve the future quality of human beings such as by sterilizing those who were considered unfit to reproduce or restricting immigrants who, eugenists argued, might lower the quality of American intelligence. Environmentalists added projects to improve society. Many early environmentalists, accepting the biological theories of their day, advocated for both improving the future quality of the human being and improving society. Even those environmentalists who did not accept biological determinism still accepted the

eugenics' program of sterilization, for they believed in a "social eugenics."

> The environmentalists ... nevertheless lent their support to sterilization proposals, for they saw benefits in sterilization independent of any biological theories. In limiting the procreation of socially undesirable elements, society would be reducing the numbers of children born to and raised in socioeconomically unfit homes which generated criminals and antisocial behavior. According to environmentalist theory, this would in turn lead to a reduction in crime and delinquency. ... Philosophically, therefore, social eugenics hinges upon any substandard socioeconomic condition that might cause an individual's children to be burdensome or dangerous to society (Kittrie, 1971: 312).

What I infer Kittrie to mean is that, if one advocated sterilization based on socioeconomic conditions, then that is a position of social eugenics. It in no way implies that by focusing on improving socioeconomic conditions that one is a social eugenist; that is the position environmentalists and sociologists gravitated toward as they divorced themselves from biology.

Hereditarianism arose from biology and psychology, but for analytical purposes I will separate them into biological hereditarianism and psychological hereditarianism. The reason for doing this is that they arose and declined at somewhat different times. Biological hereditarianism declined with the new genetics and the separation of culture from biology. But psychological hereditarianism continued somewhat longer, as IQ testing became the last scientific effort to demonstrate class, ethnic, and racial superiority. Psychological hereditarianism began to decline when cultural anthropologists such as Franz Boas and A.L. Kroeber argued

for the separation of culture from biology, thereby developing a cultural interpretation of intelligence, and when after much contemporary criticism, most of the psychological hereditarians themselves reversed their position.

Biological Hereditarianism

One of the first to separate heredity from environment was August Weismann. This led to a further discrediting of Lamarckianism and the notion of progressive social evolution. It did, however, greatly strengthen the argument of biological determinism.

> In 1882 August Weismann's Studies of the Theory of Descent reached the English-speaking world. He persuasively argued that characteristics were transmitted entirely independently of environment through a biochemical carrier in an immutable germ plasm. Though able neo-Lamarckians insisted on the speculative character of the theory, it won general acceptance in America as it did abroad. Its implications for the discussion of human nature were far-reaching. In view of the independence of heredity and environment, the Weismann position brought into question the assumption that evolutionary process was generally, if not necessarily, "progressive." By raising doubts about the variability of organisms, the theory also implied the reality of universal and immutable human nature that did not change as groups adjusted themselves to different environments. (Curti, 1980: 282).

Thus, at the end of the century Lamarckian biology faded with the rise of a new experimental biology. Even though "... Spencer was the father of neo-Lamarckian biology, and defended the inheritance of acquired characteristics in [a] long-winded controversy with August Weismann in 1893 ..." it was "... obsolescence which overtook Spencer's ideas at the end of the century ..." (Peel, 1971: 224). The coup de grâce of Lamarckianism to sociology and anthropology would

be delivered shortly by Franz Boas's declaration of independence of culture from biology, thus extricating social analysis from biology.

Another argument to support biological hereditarianism occurred when "[i]n 1900 three European biologists independently discovered the work of an Austrian monk, Gregor Mendel" (Curti, 1980: 283). Biologists began to undertake experiments to test Mendel's so-called laws. The conclusions were grim to the few environmentalists who were also anti-hereditarian, for it seemed that "... every conceivable trait was transmitted according to the Mendelian ratios" (Curti, 1980: 284).

Providing additional support was the Mendelian breeding experiments conducted by Hugo De Vries, a Dutch botanist. De Vries advanced an argument that became known as the "mutation theory" of evolution. "New species of plants and animals often arose ... from sudden "leaps" or mutations. Appearing at any time, these might be continued from generation to generation" (Curti, 1980: 284).

Taking the work of August Weismann, Gregor Mendel, and Hugo De Vries into account, pre-eminent biologists such as Charles B. Davenport of Harvard University "... revived the idea of breeding a better race" (Cravens, 1978: 17). Charles Davenport argued that "... the criminal was a criminal, the prostitute a prostitute, because their genetic makeup had provided them with the neurological or physiological brutish urges" (Freeman, 1983: 36).

> As director of the Cold Spring Harbor Station for Experimental Evolution and later of the Eugenics Records Office, Davenport and his coworkers published findings on heredity in the eyes, skin, and hair color of human beings. Davenport concluded that virtually every human trait was recessive or dominant and governed by a single gene influenced by other genes or by internal physical conditions in the organism. The presence or absence of one or more genes, he held, determined not only physical traits but behavior. People, in other words, reacted to a given stimulus largely in terms of genetic antecedents (Curti, 1980: 284).

It is the argument that people react to a given stimulus largely in terms of genetic antecedents that the symbolic interactionists countered with arguments on the indeterminacy of human behavior, i.e., that people are creative, volitional actors; that between any stimulus and response is the conscious individual who defines the situation, then acts. Whether it was August Weismann and his "germ plasm theory of heredity," or Hugo de Vries' "mutation theory of evolution", the new biologists "... skewed the scientific discussion of the nature/nurture problem toward the conclusion that heredity was all powerful and environment was of little consequence" (Cravens, 1978: 45).

Psychological Hereditarianism

As Merle Curti argues, "[t]he prestige of the hereditarian thesis also owed a good deal to a developing movement in psychology" (Curti, 1980: 286). Probably no one made as clear a statement as to the essence and purpose of psychological hereditarianism than H.H. Goddard did in 1920.

> Stated in its boldest form, our thesis is that the chief determiner of human conduct is a unitary mental process which we call intelligence: that this process is conditioned by a nervous mechanism which is inborn: that the

> degree of efficiency to be attained by that nervous mechanism and the consequent grade of intellectual or mental level for each individual is determined by the kind of chromosomes that come together with the union of the germ cells: that it is but little affected by any later influences except such serious accidents as may destroy part of the mechanism (Goddard quoted in Gould, 1981: 160).

To differentiate among those of lower intelligence Goddard developed the classification system of imbecile, idiot, and moron, the last term one he coined himself.

In the early decades of this century debates centered on whether America should be a democracy and whether Americans should engage in changing people or society or both. For people like H.H. Goddard, the pathway could not be more clear. Intelligence tests have shown "... that there is a fundamental reason for many of the social conditions that we find in human society and further that much of our effort to change conditions is unintelligent" (Goddard quoted in Gould, 1981: 223). Supporting Goddard was G. C. Cutten who made a typical academic statement on the issue in an inaugural address as president of Colgate University in 1922: "[w]e cannot conceive of any worse form of chaos than a real democracy in a population of average intelligence of a little over 13 years" (Cutten quoted in Cravens 1978: 224). Thus the debate over nature or nurture in determining human behavior quickly advanced to debates over democracy, and what was the real concern of the hereditarians, social equality. "How can there be such a thing as social equality with this wide range of mental capacity" (Goddard quoted in Gould, 1981: 161). Goddard and Cutten wanted a democracy of

philosopher-kings and they knew who should solely fulfill that role. In fact, in 1922 in an article entitled "The Reconstruction of Democracy," published in School and Society, Cutten made the argument that democracy no longer worked and would have to be reconstructed anew. Thus, coming out of both biological and psychological hereditarianism were advocates who wanted a social policy of race betterment through sterilization and immigration restriction.

The Eugenics Movement

The social context of industrialization, immigration, and urbanization that I earlier explored was the social origins of the eugenics movement. The large numbers of immigrants who were coming from southern and eastern Europe who had to settle in inner-city slum tenements and the concomitant social problems of crime, delinquency, prostitution, mental illness, and vice aroused a popular fear that there must be something inherent within those particular immigrants that lead to such deplorable conditions. The popular fear was that the cause of such social problems was somehow in "the blood" of the groups in question and thus it could be transferred to the rest of America through "race mixture," leading to the "mongrelization" of the Anglo-Saxon "race" and the downfall of American civilization. Basing their thinking on such assumptions, those who had a sincere concern for the future of American democracy and civilization wanted social policies to preserve Anglo-Saxon culture and the high standards of American intelligence. The social

policies that emerged were sterilization and immigration restriction.

It seems to me that the metaphors that arose are somewhat analogous to how metaphors have been socially constructed in the contemporary AIDS crisis (though, of course, AIDS does spread through the blood), that somehow America was being invaded and that the enemy was clearly identifiable. Already suffering from alienation, a loss of belonging, and social disorganization, the immigrant was now to be a socially constructed pariah. The fear of the downfall of American civilization is a fear that Susan Sontag has currently commented on in the AIDS disease (AIDS and its Metaphors, 1989) and one that seems to be a recurring American nightmare. The social origins of eugenics was xenophobia or fear of the foreigner. It was a fear that was irrational and incongruous when one takes into account the rising power of the United States.

> ...[T]he psychology of the American people between 1898 and 1917 was surprisingly nervous and defensive for a nation that was rapidly rising in stature as a world power. Encouraged by the eugenics movement, men talked of racial degeneracy, of race suicide, of the decline of western civilization, of the effeteness of the western people, of the Yellow Peril (Hofstadter, 1969: 185).

Most middle-class Americans were also receptive to the idea that heredity determines the quality of a human being and that the source of social problems might be inherent in the blood of the new immigrants. Nowhere was this receptivity more clearly apparent than in the notion of race betterment or eugenics. The eugenics movement had started before the

twentieth century. A brief history of its intellectual development is presented.

English Origins

The eugenics movement was spearheaded in England by Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, for whom "... such race improvement, to which in 1883 he gave the name eugenics, was the grandest of all objects, and from 1901 onward, during the last ten years of his long life, he succeeded in arousing in numerous others something closely akin to a perfect enthusiasm for his utopian schemes" (Freeman, 1983: 10). Galton was also responsible for the first attempt at measuring intelligence. The viability and desirability of democracy was certainly on Galton's mind, for this "... right-minded member of the secure and wealthy upper middle class of Victorian England ... [was] interested in the cultivation, by selective breeding, of natural nobility" (Freeman, 1983: 21).

> Galton attempted to apply Darwin's theory of biological evolution to the evolution of human society and its stratification into higher and lower classes, as well as into what he considered to be superior and inferior races. As a "Social Darwinist," Galton believed that the eminent families of Great Britain had been selected in the societal struggle for survival of the fittest because of biologically superior traits. As a consequence of this belief, Galton became the founder of eugenics, the attempt to improve the quality of "the race" by biological methods and to prevent "inferior races and classes" from bringing down the quality of the human race as a whole (Lawler, 1978: 39-40).

Eugenics in the United States

In the twentieth century, proponents of eugenics advanced their arguments with material selectively taken from the work of biologists and psychologists to support their own social policy designs. They relied on unit-character biology as scientific validation for their projects. Many in the eugenics movement were not scientists. "Rather quickly these scientific doctrines were seized upon by men in public life who possessed a direct stake in their application to American society. These ideas became the justification for the assertion of ideas of racial superiority and inferiority" (Cravens, 1978: 86). But biologists, such as Charles Davenport, were also eugenists who felt that the white, Nordic race was in danger. Though by and large American eugenists

> [were] ... more extreme than the professional biologists .... [They] commonly insisted that all human traits, mental and physical, were Mendelian unit-characters in the germ plasm, were transmitted as independent, non-reductible characters, and constituted the basis for all traits, desirable and undesirable, in man (Cravens, 1978: 46).

The eugenics movement attracted people from all political positions. Its social policy arguments depended on whether one was for "positive eugenics" which meant breeding a better race or "negative eugenics" which meant "... preventing the unfit from reproducing their own kind" (Cravens, 1978: 47).

The eugenists' fears centered on the "dangerous classes," who were usually taken to be southern and eastern

Europeans.

> They focused their attention on the poor, the criminal, the feeble-minded, or the delinquent members of society whose anti-social behavior they believed constituted a threat to the stability of the urban industrial social order--and perhaps an affront to traditional American values of hard work, sobriety, and discipline (Cravens, 1978: 48).

The eugenists argued that "... the Nordic races were superior to all others and should be the basis of the American nation" (Cravens, 1978: 49).

Some of the best and brightest in American science were involved in supporting eugenics. Michail F. Guyer of the University of Wisconsin and William E. Kellicott of Goucher College could declare that the way to produce better classes of human beings was to reproduce the germ plasm of the upper classes and eliminate the germ plasm of the lower class (Cravens, 1978: 52). G. Stanly Hall who in 1878 received the first Ph.D. in psychology from Harvard, argued that "... primitive races ... were in an early evolutionary stage ... (Gossett, 1969: 154). Hall felt that "... pity for the failures of society was dangerous, because by aiding defectives we might well be interfering with the processes of wholesome natural selection. Sterilization and segregation of the unfit were the only reform measures about which he could feel any degree of enthusiasm" (Gossett, 1969: 159-160). William McDougall, the social psychologist whose Introduction to Social Psychology (1908) went through twenty-five editions, had as his great theme "... the superiority of the Nordics; [and in 1921] ... he published a series

of his lectures at the Lowell Institute under the title Is America Safe For Democracy?, a warning to the nation of the perils of race intermixture" (Gossett, 1969: 378).

Presidents of great Universities joined the throngs who preached racial purity and eugenics. David Starr Jordan of Stanford University could declare "poverty, dirt, and crime ... are due to poor human material" (Gossett, 1969: 159). President A. Laurence Lowell of Harvard became so fearful of race intermixture that he "... instituted a ban on Negroes' living in freshman dormitories ..." (Gossett, 1963: 72). But segregation for some was not strong enough. "G.H. Parker of Harvard, in the influential journal Science, pointed in 1915 to the elimination of the strikingly defective members of society as a reasonable and humane possibility, and advocated enforced sterilization" (Freeman, 1983: 37). Also, educators such as Edward Lee Thorndike argued that races are so dissimilar that education cannot bridge the gap; therefore, the "scientific" view "... demanded the development of the intellectual faculties of the few who have outstanding abilities, and giving limited vocational training to the mediocre" (Hofstadter, 1969: 165). Alleyne Ireland argued that since the inferior could not be educated, they could not be citizens and that democracy should be abandoned (Hofstadter, 1969: 166). And Rosewill Hill Johnson and Paul Popenoe wrote Applied Eugenics, a eugenists' wish-list for state interventionism that would help eliminate the inferior from society (Hofstadter, 1969: 165).

It is quite obvious "... that quite a large number of people eminent in the sciences and the social sciences were then genuinely convinced that races vary greatly in innate intelligence and temperament" (Gossett, 1969: 373). College courses were offered in eugenics. But more important, and more dangerous to democratic values (as I will review at the end of this section), the eugenics movement influenced public policy.

That there was a pervasive fear and perceived threat, in both professional circles and the public which supported these measures, can be deduced from the number of organizations that sprang up devoted to restricting immigrants and/or promoting genetic engineering. Among them were: the Immigration Restriction League, formed in Boston in 1894, the Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, founded in 1910; the American Genetic Association, formed in 1913; the National Conference on Race Betterment, formed in 1914; and, the Galton Society, formed in 1918. There were many more. As Hofstadter states, these organizations show "... how thoroughly the eugenic ideal had made its way into the medical profession, the colleges, social work, and charitable organizations" (Hofstadter, 1969: 162).

Eugenics and Popular Culture

The eugenics movement was also fueled by popular culture. One book that was widely read that made the case for restricting immigration in order to protect Anglo-Saxon culture was Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race,

(1916). Madison Grant was a wealthy son of a prominent American family going all the way back to colonial America. Simply put, "Grant believed that the superior races in the United States were in danger of being overwhelmed by inferior immigrants" (Gossett, 1969: 354). He was a twenty-five year vice-president of The Immigration Restriction League.

But probably the most influential person to arouse people's fears to the threat to Anglo-Saxon culture and affect social policy was Theodore Lothrop Stoddard with the 1920 publication of his book The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy. In a number of publications, "Stoddard's central theme was that the white races--particularly the Nordics--were in danger of being inundated by the "inferior" races who had a much higher birthrate" (Gossett, 1969: 391). But it was not just a fear of a threat to Anglo-Saxon culture; these writers were anti-democratic and anti-egalitarian. In Stoddard's follow-up book Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under-Man, published in 1922, he plainly makes his case against the myth of equality.

> The idea of "Natural Equality" is one of the most pernicious delusions that has ever afflicted mankind. It is a figment of the human imagination. Nature knows no equality. The most cursory examination of natural phenomena reveals the presence of a Law of Inequality as universal and inflexible as the Law of Gravitation (Stoddard, 1962: 171).

And, of course, religion was appealed to to justify inequality, oppression, and neglect. Alfred E. Wiggan in two extremely popular books, The New Decalogue of Science

(1922), and The Fruit of the Family Tree (1924), advocated the same themes as Stoddard. Wiggan argued that preventing the morally unfit and inferior races from breeding was "... wholly in line with the truths taught by Jesus. Jesus did not subscribe to the facile doctrine that all men were created equal" (Gossett, 1969: 403).

The popularity of eugenics even went into the White House. Calvin Coolidge "... in a popular article written in 1922, when he was Vice-President, ... argued that biological laws show us that Nordics deteriorate when mixed with other races" (Gossett, 1969: 405). This was an expression of the popular idea that intermarriage would lead to what was then called race mixture, blood poisoning, or the "mongrelization" of the races. The fear of the mongrelization of the races was widely preached by Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard. It assumed that there was such a thing as race purity, something that contemporary critics clearly labeled unscientific and a myth.

Eugenics and the New Psychology

The eugenics movement not only garnered support from the new biology, but also from the "new psychology". According to Cravens, the psychology of late nineteenth and early twentieth century America concentrated on "... the psychology of conduct, or the study of instincts, and the psychology of capacity, or the comparative measurement of intelligence" (Cravens, 1978: 58).

The "new psychology" arguing that human beings had

instincts that determined behavior was widely accepted and, at least early on, it was accepted by American sociologists as well.

> Between 1900 and 1920 at least six hundred books and articles published in America and England advanced instinct theory.... Eminent American sociologists such as Charles H. Cooley of the University of Michigan and Charles A. Ellwood of the University of Missouri propounded instinct theory (Cravens, 1978: 77).

But probably no psychologist articulated the new instinct theory better than William James. In his The Principles of Psychology (1890), James developed his instinct theory. Basically, instinct theory argued that there were human instincts determining the behavior of children and adults. But James's theory was replete with contradictions, for James interwove concepts of plasticity, free-will, habit, and indeterminism which undercut his own theory of human behavior through instincts (Cravens, 1978: 74). As Merle Curti comments on this:

> William James was both an effective champion of the New Psychology and a trenchant critic. His ambivalent and contradictory positions did not greatly trouble him. He preferred to leave paradoxes dangling rather than to resolve them in misleading oversimplifications (Curti, 1980: 203).

That paradox centered on the idea that if one possessed instincts which made one's behavior permanent and predictable, then how could one have free-choice and indeterminism, which made one's behavior impermanent and unpredictable? It is James's concepts of habit, free-will, indeterminism, plasticity, and self that were highly influential to a later generation of social psychologists, namely James Baldwin,

W.I. Thomas, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead. It is because of these concepts, not his instinct theory, that one can list James as one of the early symbolic interactionists; free-will, plasticity, and an unpredictable, or as it would be said today, probabilistic behavior, is at the heart of symbolic interactionism.

Victory: Restrictionist Immigration And Sterilization

The pressure to restrict immigration did not come from eugenists alone; in fact, probably the strongest advocate against immigration was organized craft unionism. Those adhering to craft unionism felt that wages would be lowered if there were too many unskilled laborers competing for jobs, even the wages of skilled workers who were organized in craft unions. Because of this fear, the American Federation of Labor, which was a federation of craft unions, left low-wage, unskilled eastern and southern immigrants unorganized, at least before the breakdown of craft unionism and the deskilling of industrial labor. The International Workers of the World did try to organize the unskilled immigrants, but one reason their efforts failed, according to one scholar, was "the stubborn conservatism of the immigrants" (Handlin, 1973: 258). If Handlin's claim of the conservatism of southern and eastern Europeans is accurate, then it points out how absurd was the popular myth that the eastern or southern immigrant was a radical subversive or a bomb-throwing anarchist, an image that stuck after the

Haymarket Riot in 1886.

Two other sources for restrictionist immigration need brief mention. One was the war in Europe beginning in 1914. Nationalism and xenophobia rose, though one can be nationalistic without being xenophobic. The other, which I will cover in detail in another section, was the great fear in the lowering of American intelligence that arose from Robert M. Yerkes's Army Intelligence Tests that began in 1917.

The movement to restrict the kinds of immigrants coming to the United States had began in 1882 with the federal prohibition against convicts, lunatics, idiots, and those likely to become paupers. Legislation in 1901 and 1903 extended the list of undesirables to paupers, professional beggars, prostitutes, polygamists, epileptics, and anarchists or anyone believing in violent revolution. Thus the movement was becoming somewhat more restrictionist. Earlier, in 1882 the federal government began to exclude the Chinese with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. However, the number of immigrants coming to the United States was still largely unrestricted.

Restricting the number and types of immigrants was a long struggle that began with the literacy test that had been first introduced in 1896. It was felt that this would be just the right test to restrict the southern and eastern Europeans who were now coming into the United States. Northern and western Europeans had better educational systems and would be able to pass the test.

One can catch the "paradox of progressive thought" in the progressive opposition to immigration. Certainly Theodore Roosevelt was a leading progressive. His thinking was typical of progressive thinking on the immigration question. On December 7, 1903, in his message to the second session of the 58th Congress, he expressed the progressive position.

> We can not have too much immigration of the right kind, and we should have none at all of the wrong kind. The need is to devise some system by which undesirable immigrants shall be kept out entirely, while desirable immigrants are properly distributed throughout the country (Roosevelt quoted in Hutchinson, 1981: 134).

Roosevelt was also concerned about the lowering of wages. In the third session of the 58th Congress, on December 6, 1904, he stated:

> ... the citizenship of this country should not be debased. It is vital that we should keep high the standard of well-being among our wage-workers, and therefore we should not admit masses of men whose standards of living and whose personal customs and habits are such that they tend to lower the level of the American wage-worker (Roosevelt quoted in Hutchinson, 1981: 135).

The argument that the metaphor of "invasion" is an accurate characterization of the temper of the times gains support with Roosevelt continuing to express his concern over immigration at the beginning of the 59th session of Congress.

> There should be an increase in the stringency of the laws to keep out insane, idiotic, epileptic and pauper immigrants. But this is by no means enough. Not merely the anarchist, but every man of anarchistic tendencies, all violent and disorderly people, all people of bad character, the incompetent, the lazy, the vicious, and physically unfit, defective, or degenerate should be kept out (Roosevelt quoted in Hutchinson, 1981: 136).

The literacy test was one measure which was sought to keep

out the undesirables.[1] The literacy test had been vetoed by Cleveland in 1897 and in 1913 by Taft. Beginning in 1914, because of the war in Europe, the number of immigrants coming into the United States were substantially reduced. But by 1917, the year the United States entered World War I, the old fears had sufficiently reawakened, and this time the literary test finally became law in 1917 over Wilson's second veto. The effects of the 1917 law were not as expected; the volume of immigration was not substantially reduced. The eastern and southern peasant simply failed to conform to the nativist assumptions of eugenists. "Peasants, who until then had no incentive to do so, now set themselves the task of learning to read, and succeeded" (Handlin, 1973: 259-260). A more restrictive measure was sought.

Proponents of the eugenics movement had their argument against immigration strengthened after the report of the United States Commission of Immigration (the so-called Dillingham Commission, named after its chairperson, William P. Dillingham, a Republican United States Senator from Vermont), which was created by Congress in 1907 to study the problem of immigration. Eugenists now increasingly sought

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[1]The notion of undesirable immigrants was precisely what the symbolic interactionists and others advocating socialization were to respond to. As I shall later explain, by arguing that everyone becomes human in the same way, by arguing that there is a universal human nature, the interactionists argued that those who were labeled "undesirable" could be made desirable through socialization and education, and fully able to participate in democracy. No one was innately different and therefore unassimilable. That is why the socialization concept was so political, i.e., it challenged the hereditarian assumptions of eugenics.

restrictionist policies to protect America and its Anglo-Saxon culture. The Dillingham Commission report had as its basic theme the differences between the old and new immigration. The southern and eastern Europeans were labeled with all kinds of invidious distinctions in comparison with Western European immigrants. Basically, the southern and eastern Europeans were thought of as culturally, socially, and economically backward, unassimilable, and radical. In forty-one volumes they were defamed. Thus in 1911 there was a broader call for the restriction of immigrants, for the Dillingham Commission so defamed the new immigrants that surely, according to the eugenists, anyone judging the multivolume evidence would demand restriction on moral, social, economic, and political grounds.

The idea of a quota system was conceived in 1911 by United States' Senator William P. Dillingham as a more reliable measure to restrict immigration. The first time a numerical quota system became federal policy was with the Immigration Act of 1921. This act restricted the number of people from any nationality who would be admissible to the United States to three percent of the number of foreign-born people from that nationality who were residents of the United States in 1910. The act succeeded and greatly reduced southern and eastern European immigration which was its intent even though it was worded in language that appeared nondiscriminatory. But for the eugenists, the number of eastern and southern immigrants coming to the United

States was still too high. A more restrictive measure was sought.

The most effective restrictionist legislation was the Immigration Act of 1924 which eventually limited immigration to around 150,000 immigrants per year. The absolute number of immigrants admissible was not the problem; again, the issue centered on who would be let in. The act was set up to insure that an even smaller number would come from eastern and southern Europe. The number from any nationality again depended on the percentage of immigrants from that nationality already here; but the percentage was reduced from three to two percent and the Census year was rolled back from 1910 to 1890. The Census year of 1890 was used to calculate the proportion of a nationality, since it was a year when the percentage of "new" or eastern and southern immigrants residing in the United States was very small. With this legislation the eugenists had won their political victory. The "epic story of the great migration" had its southern and eastern European chapters slammed shut by the eugenists, organized labor, and the Dillingham Commission.

The eugenists also triumphed by getting involuntary sterilization laws enacted to preserve American civilization from being sapped by the feeble-minded and dangerous classes. Involuntary sterilization had been in practice in state institutions even before it was enacted into law (Kittrie, 1973: 312). In 1897 the state legislature of Michigan defeated the first involuntary sterilization bill in the

country and the governor of Pennsylvania vetoed a similar bill in 1905. Indiana passed the first involuntary sterilization law in 1907 and later so did a number of other states. But the Indiana law was declared unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court as a violation of due process. Sterilization laws met an uncertain fate until the Unites States Supreme Court established the constitutionality of the sterilization laws. In 1927 America's pre-eminent U.S. Supreme Court theoretician on law and order, Oliver Wendell Holmes, gave his opinion on eugenics in the Buck versus Bell case.

> It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian Tubes.... Three generations of imbeciles are enough (Holmes quoted in Kittrie, 1971: 318-319).

Twenty states enacted sterilization laws after this decision so that by 1931 thirty states had sterilization laws. This famous quotation by Holmes is all the more remarkable when it is remembered that in 1905 Holmes made an equally famous declaration in his dissent in the Lochner case. As Morton White has argued, Holmes' dissent in the Lochner case made him the "... comrade-in-arms of the liberal, progressive, and professorial movement for reform [and that] overnight he became the idol of labor lawyers and social workers" (White, 1957: 103-104). Holmes had declared

that: "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" (Holmes quoted in White, 1957: 103). But in these two cases we have what was so characteristic and paradoxical about the progressives, many were hereditarians and eugenists as well as social reformers. With Holmes' 1927 opinion upholding the constitutionality of sterilization, biology had become a social weapon and eugenics would prevent those who were argued to be unfit from sapping the strength of the state.

Thus, the nature/nurture controversy involved more than which view was more accurate at explaining human behavior, it was based on what type of society America was to become. For the leaders of the eugenics movement who were mainly upper class, white, natives, and Anglo-Saxon Protestants, the influx of southern and eastern European immigrants threatened their values and desires for a white, Anglo-Saxon America. But the eugenists' arguments did not go unchallenged. Leading the scholarly attack on eugenics was Franz Boas and his students at Columbia University.

Franz Boas: the Cultural Interpretation of Human Behavior

Boas's Critique of Racial Formalism

First and foremost in leading the fight against scientific racism and eugenics was Franz Boas and the discipline of anthropology. Boas contributed to the reconceptualization of human nature by showing that even the physical shape of human beings could change. But noticing that the

physical shape of human beings could change due to environmental influences was made early by Cooley. Cooley had made his case against hereditarianism in an article "Genius, Fame, and the Comparison of Races," published in 1897 in volume IX of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. "[U]sing Galton's own material, Charles H. Cooley ... showed that in each case of genius, opportunity for education played a part in the fulfillment of its promise" (Curti, 1980: 279). This study was also a comparison of poor East End and well-to-do West End Jews in London. There were physical differences between the two groups, for example, the West End Jews were three inches taller. Thus, Cooley made one of the first studies on the plasticity of heredity to the environment. Cooley made that argument explicit in 1918 in Social Process wherein he pointed out the fallacy of the eugenics in their failure to conceive society as something more than organic. It was an attack on the eugenists similar to Alfred Kroeber's (which I shall shortly review), except that for Cooley society was conceived of as a psychological organism, i.e., "... society was seen as existing in the minds of the particular individuals constituting the social unit..." (Meltzer et al., 1975: 9). In referring to the eugenists, Cooley makes the case for plasticity and adaptation. "They have thought of human heredity as a tendency to definite modes of conduct, and of environment as something that may aid or hinder, not remembering what they might have learned even from Darwin, that

heredity takes on a distinctively human character only by renouncing, as it were, the function of predetermined adaptation and becoming plastic to the environment" (Cooley, 1918: 206).

In 1910 Boas began research that supported the plasticity of heredity to the environment.

> Using biometric methods, he investigated immigrants and their American-born children as part of the program of the United States Commission on Immigration, set up to make recommendations on admission policy. Boas found various changes, particularly in head forms, in American-born children of immigrants. The changes were the more marked the longer the migrant had lived in the United States. Such changes might be attributed in some part to differences in infant care in an urban environment. ... [Boas] felt that physical changes argued against a conception of an absolute, fixed ethnic type and gave a place to cultural factors in physical changes (Curti, 1980: 269).

Boas was rejecting the notion of formal, abstract, ideal types. Boas argued that his results were "... so definite that, while heretofore we had the right to assume that human types are stable, all the evidence is now in favor of a great plasticity of human types, and permanence of types in new surroundings appears rather as the exception than as the rule" (Boas quoted in Stocking, 1968: 178). The word "plasticity" used by Boas stands out, for if ever one could say that a word sums up the reconceptualization of human nature that was taking place, this one word goes far in doing so.

Boas's study on immigration had public policy implications, but they went unheeded. As I earlier reported on the Dillingham Commission, it was largely a forty-one volume defamation of eastern and southern European immigrants. To

counter eugenic arguments against immigration, Boas argued that "... all fear of an unfavorable influence of South European immigration upon the body of our people should be dismissed" (Boas quoted in Stocking, 1968: 179-180).

According to George W. Stocking, Boas's argument against formalism came from this work in physical anthropology. "When [Boas] ... turned to the problems of race, he was "shocked by the formalism" that he found" (Stocking, 1968: 165). Boas had always been "... extremely sensitive to the problem of arbitrary classification ... [and argued] that one must not mistake a purely statistical relationship for a biological one" (Stocking, 1968: 169). Boas's critique "... had called into question a fundamental dogma of physical anthropology: the stability of the headform" (Stocking, 1968: 180). This critique of racial formalism also "... undercut many of the traditional hierarchical assumptions of racial thinking in its broader and more popular forms" (Stocking, 1968: 189). In celebrating Boas's achievement, Stocking concludes that it marked "... the passing of a romantic conception of race--of the ideas of racial 'essence,' of racial 'genius,' of racial 'soul,'..." (Stocking, 1968: 194). "Protagonists of environment and of racial equality could now quote science on their side" (Stocking, 1968: 194). Boas went on to make his case with the strongly anti-racist publication in 1911 entitled, The Mind of Primitive Man.

The Attack on Cultural Evolutionism

The next step Boas took was the development of his anti-evolutionary stance that grew out of the work of comparative ethnology. One of the central tenets of social evolution, against which Franz Boas argued, was cultural evolution. According to Stocking, much of what is now considered classical anthropological theory on culture was either advanced or implicit in Boas's work (Stocking, 1968: 195-233). Boas's work was responsible for such concepts as cultural relativism, cultural diffusion, cultural invention, cultural plurality, ethnocentrism, and anti-evolutionary arguments. Boas was anti-evolutionary in the sense that he argued for "... a plurality of historically conditioned cultures in place of a single sequence of evolutionary stages" (Stocking, 1968: 213). Boas was against the making of broad generalizations and cultural laws; rather, he inculcated his students to make thorough and detailed ethnographic studies. Boas preferred the gathering of a large body of empirical data from which over time inductions could be made. The problem with generalizations was that they tore cultural data out of their historical context (Kroeber, 1952: 146).

Boas's argument of anti-evolutionism was tied in directly with his arguments against racial mental differences. One reason that he was against the evolutionary model was that of its implicit racism. Before Boas, anthropologists had examined various cultures using a comparative method and the evolutionary model that had been adopted from

Spencer. These anthropologists "... attempted to arrange the coexisting manifestations of human culture in temporal sequences of progressive development which were ordered in a single cultural hierarchy at whose peak stood western European civilization" (Stocking, 1968: 228). Those following this method viewed European culture at the apex and also argued that such a culture was produced by a superior race. Boas found this particular interpretation of cultural evolution to be misleading.

> Thus he attacked the prevailing museum custom of displaying culture artifacts in progressive sequence to illustrate the historical development of human traits. He insisted, instead, on arranging these in terms of geographic provinces or culture areas. Such an arrangement might imply both the diffusion of culture traits and some measure of independent development (Curti, 1980: 267).

And as Merle Curti points out, Boas felt that such a notion of cultural evolution and superiority "... could also justify the colonial conquests of less-advanced overseas peoples" (Curti, 1980: 264).

The theory of cultural evolution would not hold up to comparative ethnographic studies. "As Boas never tired of pointing out, the theory of cultural evolution rested in part on deductive methods and in part on unproven generalization" (Curti, 1980: 268). In his social research "... Boas found that sequential developments of the components of culture did not always move from the simple to the complex. Instead, they appeared to develop as a totality in large part as the result of their own distinctive histories" (Curti, 1980: 268). Boas's intimate contact with life and

cross-cultural experiences through his anthropological research was a source for his anti-evolutionism, since his research constantly provided evidence against formalistic abstractions.

Also, Boas believed that there was a common human nature. "In rejecting cultural evolutionism and in insisting on the distinctive history of every culture group, Boas did not suppose that the characteristic differences in each culture group wiped out a commonly shared humanity" (Curti, 1980: 267). With Boas's arguments the notion that there was a European culture that stood at the apex of civilization was challenged: to order every cultural form from low to high was misleading from Boas's perspective; it served only to make the case that northern European culture was the apex of civilization.

The Separation of Culture from Biology

The establishing of the social science discipline and the professionalization of anthropology within university education were the twin goals of the Boasians. The leading students of Boas were Alfred Kroeber, Robert H. Lowie, Leslie Spier, Alexander Goldenweiser, John Swanton, Paul Radin, Elsie Clews Parsons, Ruth Bunzel, Edward Sapir, Melville Herskovits, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and the social psychologist Otto Klineberg. Klineberg's work will be taken up later, for he was a psychologist whose work significantly challenged the innate inferiority interpretation of the IQ testers.

Boas's development of the culture concept separate from biology was the necessary and sufficient advance to dismiss the Lamarckian notion of culture as an acquired characteristic passed on through inheritance.

> The totality of learned behavior, or culture, seemed to him to reflect a good deal of independence from biology, in the sense that it was doubtful whether complex traits could have been transmitted through germ plasm. A culture, then was the environment of both biological and behavioral life. Heredity by family strain might be influential. But the members of the group, being plastic organisms, realized some of their potentialities in unconscious ways as specified by the particular culture that gave them identity as human beings (Curti, 1980: 268).

The divorce of culture from a Lamarckian notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was anthropology's declaration of independence from biology. Culture was no longer to be linked with biology and that called for a separate mode of analysis that had to be taken into account when describing human nature and behavior. Thus, Boas's leading argument in the attack on hereditarianism was the idea of culture, significant because it was <u>a culture separated from biology</u>.

> Cultural development in man, therefore, was an entirely different order of phenomena than biological or psychological evolution. A given culture operated autonomously from the determinants of the natural sciences; it was not subject to the dictates of psychology's individual mind, biology's heredity, variation, and evolution, or physical geography's physical environment. Human cultures could be explained by cultural antecedents such as language, myth, religion, social institution, values, and attitudes, not by the unlike antecedents of the natural sciences, such as instincts, genes, and landforms (Cravens, 1978: 90).

Nowhere was this declaration of independence more loudly sounded than in 1917 when Alfred L. Kroeber published

"The Superorganic" in the American Anthropologist. Robert Lowie also strongly asserted the independence of culture from biology in his Culture and Ethnology, also published in 1917.

Rejecting Lamarckianism, Kroeber discredited the notion that habits were learned in a human beings' adaptation to the environment and then transmitted through inheritance as instincts. This belief then lent support to the notion that races adapted differently to the environment and that thereby racial traits were inherited. Thus, one could then use Lamarckian theory to provide a sociobiological interpretation of the difference between the behavior of racial groups, including the difference between mental abilities. But Kroeber in his 1917 article discredited this Lamarckian view of racial differences, one he believed was the "final argument" that prevented a fully cultural interpretation of behavior from gaining ascendency.

> The final argument, that one can actually see such national peculiarities born into each generation, and that it is unnecessary to verify the assumption because its truth is obvious to every one, has the least weight of all. Most ethnologists ... are convinced that the overwhelming mass of historical and miscalled racial facts that are now attributed to obscure organic causes ... will ultimately be viewed by everyone as social and as best intelligible in their social relations. ...[A] complete and consistent explanation can be given, for so-called racial differences, on a basis of purely civilizational and non-organic causes.... [Therefore], it does seem justifiable to stand unhesitatingly on the proposition that civilization and heredity are two things that operate in separate ways; that therefore any outright substitution of one for the other in the explanation of human group phenomena is crass ... (Kroeber, 1952: 34-35).

It was specifically Lester Wards's Lamarckian notion of

culture intertwined with biology which Kroeber was taking on in order to free culture from biology. "... Ward's formulation ... reveals the tenacity, the insistence, with which many conscientious intellects of the day will not and can not see the social except through the glass of the organic" (Kroeber, 1952: 37). With this final argument now challenged sociology and anthropology could develop cultural analyses independent of biology.

The confounding of the biological with the cultural, the organic with the superorganic, not only called for a new mode of analysis divorced from biology, but, in addition, the confounding of the two was the principal error of the eugenists. It was Kroeber's argument that biology and culture were hopelessly confounded and that if one unconfounded the two, the eugenics movement would have no theoretical basis. The separation of culture from biology, of the superorganic from the organic, is, then, not only the coup de grâce to the Lamarckian notion of the inheritance of acquired habits or culture, but also a challenge to the eugenics' theoretical basis. It is important to note that Kroeber meant by social the cultural. Those terms are now distinguished in contemporary social science taxonomy and they need to be: for example, primates have social structure (hierarchically arranged social positions) as well as highly structured societies; only human beings have culture.

> Of all the comminglings of the cultural with the vital, that which has crystallized under the name of the eugenics movement is the most widely known and of directest appeal. As a constructive program for national

> progress, eugenics is a confusion of the purposes to breed better men and to give men better ideals; an organic device to attain the social; a biological short cut to a moral end. It contains the inherent impossibility of all short cuts. Eugenics, so far as it is more than an endeavor at social hygiene in a new field, is a fallacy; a mirage like the philosopher's stone, the elixir of life, the ring of Solomon, or the material efficacy of prayer. There is little to argue about it. If social phenomena are only or mainly organic, eugenics is right, and there is nothing more to be said. If the social is something more than the organic, eugenics is an error of unclear thought (Kroeber, 1952: 38).

One other point is necessary to make in reviewing this crucial separation of culture from biology, and that is that Kroeber refrained from cultural determinism. The individual had a strong place in Kroeber's analysis. "...[T]hat a social environment may somewhat affect the fortunes and career of the individual as measured against other individuals, does not prove that the individual is wholly the product of circumstances outside of himself...." (Kroeber, 1952: 48).

The influence of Boas and his students was immediately felt in the work of two sociologists. W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki published in 1918 the first two volumes of the six volume study, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. Their research clearly called for rejecting sociology's ties to biology and asserting the independence of culture. The two argued that the social could be explained by the social and the cultural could be explained by the cultural; there was no longer any need or desire to revert back to biological or racial interpretations for manifestations of human behavior that were clearly social

and cultural. The other early interactionists contributed to the independence of culture from biology as well, especially beginning with Baldwin and his notion of "social heredity" which was a name for culture before that term became conventional; Cooley had by now clearly indicated that human nature develops in primary groups; and Mead was developing his notions that the individual develops through taking the roles of others. Clearly a social and cultural interpretation of human behavior was emerging.

As the Boasians carved out a territory exclusive to social scientists and forged a discipline in the process, they challenged the validity and scientific credibility of the hereditarians' pronouncements on human behavior. The Boasians did not attack psychologists' assertions about individual minds or their interpretations of individual behavior, nor were they opposed to mental measurement; rather, their concern was on the biological interpretation of intelligence testing. Also, the Boasians "... never embraced a single-minded cultural environmentalist position that denied man's animal ancestry, or rejected the power of heredity" (Cravens, 1978: 181). The Boasians' "... critique of racism centered on the misapplication of individual psychology to the cultural group ..." (Cravens, 1978: 234). Their conclusion was that "... the cultural and the biological were separable levels of human reality that nevertheless interacted in development" (Cravens, 1978: 181). Succinctly put, the Boasians stressed the interaction between the two

and therefore that the physical makeup of the human being was a result of the interaction of biological inheritance and the environmental and cultural surround.

Boas applied his concepts such as cultural relativity and cultural plurality to argue that one culture could not be used to judge another. And within each culture, mental capacities of similar quality were expressed, i.e., "... that the mind of the dark-skinned primitive shared with that of the white-skinned European all of the characteristic human mental powers: abstraction, inhibition, and choice" (Stocking, 1968: 222).

The conceptualization that human beings were plastic creatures, that they could change and be assimilated to society through socialization and education as well as remake the environment around them in terms of their own choice, would be dominant themes in the works of symbolic interactionists. Boas's work on immigrant children and intelligence testing itself revealed that plasticity by the fact that the longer one was in the United States, the better one did on an intelligence test, thus making the case both for assimilation and the cultural interpretation of intelligence. The effects of culture were used to discredit the notion of a fixed, innate intelligence. The eugenists were now seriously challenged, but until their unit-character biology was undermined, they could still cling to that as scientific validation as a case for poverty, crime, and mental illness. But they could not cling for long,

unit-character biology was about to slip into an abyss. With the coming of the new genetics, science became even a stronger weapon against hereditarianism and the eugenics movement. Biological determinism, at last, received its coup de grâce.

The New Genetics

The nature/nurture controversy would not be easily undermined. That is why Merle Curti offers the cautionary statement to those who might too easily see the controversy as ending once contradictory evidence begins to emerge: "... research in genetics only slowly undermined the misleading view that heredity operated independently as an inexorable force without reference to environment" (Curti, 1980: 290). Cravens also argues that the new genetics took several decades to develop, "... from about 1910 to the early 1930s..." (Cravens, 1978: 159). But by the early 1920s the geneticists were arguing against the claims of eugenists and did so throughout the decade. The person most responsible for the early developments in the new genetics was Thomas Hunt Morgan.

> The famous fruit-fly experiments of Thomas Hunt Morgan and his students showed that only a specific combination of genes under specific conditions of humidity and temperature produced abnormalities, and equally significant, that any one genetic factor operated differently under varied environmental conditions. Heredity and environment, while distinct factors, constantly interacted in the development of individuals and species. It will also be recalled that Morgan's work suggested that individual determiners for each trait did not exist in the germ plasm. All this weakened the strictly hereditarian interpretations of Mendelian laws that early geneticists fostered (Curti, 1980: 290).

The scientific discovery that any one genetic factor operated differently under varied environmental conditions made the case for the plasticity of heredity to the environment and undermined biological determinism. These experiments on the fruit-fly, Drosophila melanogaster, led to the "chromosomal theory of heredity" (Cravens, 1978: 159). Thus, in "... the two decades following 1910 [there were] major changes in both genetics and evolutionary theory" (Cravens, 1978: 159).

Genetics as a profession grew rapidly. After World War I, the discipline of genetics was established at many universities across the United States. These "second generation" geneticists, as Cravens calls them, also expressed different commitments. "Many of the new workers did not share the early Mendelians' enthusiasm for eugenics, or their excitement over supposedly magical prospects of experimental biology" (Cravens, 1978: 160). As the work of the new geneticists gained credibility, Davenport's "... scientific reputation diminished" (Cravens. 1978: 161). Morgan began a training and research program at Columbia University. From there graduates went to the major universities in the United States. Their research in the next twenty years thoroughly discredited the earlier unit-character biology that had spawned the hereditarian perspective. The concept of the gene replaced the concept of unit-characters. And when they felt political pressure, it was not so much from eugenists as it was from "... farmers, farm groups, and

college officials to produce economically viable agricultural varieties" (Cravens, 1978: 166). They were more interested in the betterment of corn, wheat, and soybeans, than in the betterment of races. Thus, as Cravens reports, the new genetics had damaging consequences for the eugenics movement. "The complexities of Mendelism, which the Morgan group and others had conclusively demonstrated ... made inheritance far more contingent and complex [than the unit-character biology] the eugenists fondly recited. Furthermore, eugenics suddenly became highly impractical; biological engineering involved far more than the elimination or the encouragement of particular 'unit-characters'" (Cravens, 1978: 171). All this led to a new theory of evolution as well as heredity.

There is one more notion of the eugenists that the new genetics thoroughly discredited, and that was the notion of race mixture leading to the mongrelization of the Nordics. H.J. Jennings, in his book The Biological Basis of Human Nature (1930), established such notions as nonsense and even provided evidence for "hybrid vigor" which was a concept borrowed from plant and animal biology.

> In view of the immense number of genes carried by individuals of each race, and their separate history up to the time of the cross, the relatively few defects that have arisen are almost certain to affect genes of different pairs in the two. Hence when the races cross, the individuals produced will receive a normal gene from one parent or the other in most of their gene pairs; and since the normal gene usually manifests its effect, the offspring of the cross will have fewer gene defects than either of the parents (Jennings, 1930: 280).

In the 1920s and 1930s a new theory of evolution arose:

"the synthetic theory of evolution". It was developed by Sewall Wright and "... two British scientists, Sir Ronald A. Fisher and J.B.S. Haldane (Cravens, 1978: 171). These new population geneticists, "... by insisting that mutation and selection were interdependent yet distinct factors in evolution ... left open the door for an eventual synthesis of natural and social science and a resolution of the nature-nurture controversy" (Cravens, 1978: 172). Thus, there was not only a new theory of genetics, but also a new theory of evolution. This new model "... seriously eroded the scientific justification for extreme hereditarian interpretations of human nature and culture" (Cravens, 1978: 172). Eugenics was out of fashion; by "... the late 1920s the gap between eugenics' champions such as Grant and Laughlin and most reputable geneticists was ineluctably widening" (Cravens, 1978: 179).

Let us take a closer look at how psychological hereditarianism, through the development of the intelligence test, tried to make the last scientific case for the biological inferiority of blacks, the lower class, and eastern and southern Europeans.

The Development of the Intelligence Test: The Final Struggle of Hereditarianism

Even after instinct theory had been challenged, other aspects of the new psychology generated immeasurable social damage, especially in the contribution intelligence tests made to restrictionist immigration, sterilization, and

(later) educational tracking policy. Refinements in intelligence testing were a later development of the new psychology. William James died in 1910; it wasn't until the second decade of the twentieth century when the "orgy of tabulation" began (Cravens, 1978: 78). But, attempts to measure intelligence really began much earlier than with the refinements of the new psychologists; it began with the beginning of the perspective of biological determinism.

Francis Galton Designs a Test

Intelligence testing was from the very beginning a research project designed to prove the thesis of biological determinism, to prove that intelligence was innate and that the upper class was superior. Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin and author of Hereditary Genius (1869), initiated the measurement of intelligence. From the very beginning the tests were designed with the a priori assumption that intelligence is innate and fixed.

> Galton devised a number of tests designed to measure intelligence by testing the sensory reactions of people. ... Galton thought that intelligence would be reflected in physical abilities--in "physical intelligence." The ideas that intelligence is a biologically innate capacity would be more plausible to common sense if it could be shown that seemingly unlearned physical responses were directly related to differences in intelligence (Lawler, 1978: 40-41).

Galton failed to get the results he wanted. The lower class had as good as sensory reactions as the upper class. Therefore, since this test would not distinguish between upper and lower class people or those whom Galton knew to be superior and inferior races on a comparative basis, he

believed the test must be imprecise and in need of refinement. "The results of the tests had to fit his presuppositions and they failed to do so. Consequently, it was the test and not the presuppositions that had to be changed" (Lawler, 1978: 41). At this stage the failure to measure intelligence was seen as a counterinstance, a failure that the process of instrumentation would solve, i.e., the construction of a more refined test.

Alfred Binet and Special Education

With Alfred Binet, a French experimental psychologist, the first attempt (1905) was made to measure intelligence by testing mental abilities. Before Binet developed his mental test of IQ, he had for years tried to distinguish between bright and dull students by following the works of his countryman, Paul Broca. Binet was engaged in craniometry, that popular branch of nineteenth century "natural science" that measured skull size to determine superiority and inferiority or, as in the case of Italian criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, innate criminality. The larger the skull size the more superior or brilliant the student, that was the major tenet of craniology (Gould, 1981: 146). Finally, when study after study revealed that there was no correlation between skull size and intelligence, Binet abandoned craniology and switched from craniometry to psychometry.

Working for the minister of education in 1904 to design a way to identify school children who may need special education, Binet next tried to develop a test that would have

intellectual tasks that would identify those students who were so below average that they could not perform adequately in school. After a few years of research, the Binet-Simon Scale was devised. A crucial point is noted: Binet's intelligence test was for beneficial purposes, to help children who were doing poorly in school work; therefore, the test would identify those who may need some sort of special education to advance.

Binet developed the concept of mental age by the level of difficulty of the task which a child could complete successfully. Binet then developed the concept of "backward children" needing special education if their mental age was lower than their chronological age. To test for "backwardness," one subtracted mental age from chronological age. Backward children had lower mental ages than chronological ages and bright children had higher mental ages than chronological ages.

Binet's research on intelligence testing made advances from Galton.

> ... Binet broke significantly from the approach developed by Galton by rejecting the narrow focus on sensorymotor functions. Binet argued that intelligence, however vaguely defined, should be regarded as involving those complex developed abilities which people normally associate with intelligence. Moreover, intelligence was something that evolved over time (Lawler, 1978: 43).

It is important to note that Binet's intent was to identify those who needed help and not to label and sort, so that children could be "... trained according to their inheritance and channeled into professions appropriate for

their biology" (Gould, 1981: 153). Binet's goal was to "... emphasize the power of creative education to increase the achievements of all children ..." (Gould, 1981: 153). Binet did not believe his test measured inborn intelligence and was cognizant and critical of its misuse by educators and teachers who saw through measurement an easy way to dismiss the unruly child as unintelligent and thus ineducable (Gould, 1981: 152-153). Writing in France in 1909 in his book Les idées modernes sur les enfants, Binet cautioned his fellow psychologists against the misinterpretation of his test and thus the mismeasure of human beings.

> Some recent thinkers seem to have given their moral support to these deplorable verdicts by affirming that an individual's intelligence is a fixed quantity, a quantity that cannot be increased. We must protest and react against this brutal pessimism; we must try to demonstrate that it is founded upon nothing (Binet quoted in Gould, 1981: 153-154).

A reconceptualization of the difference between mental age and chronological age was made by German psychologist William Stern in 1912 who argued that "... mental age should be divided by chronological age, not subtracted from it, and the intelligence quotient, or IQ was born" (Gould, 1981: 150). The most important thing to remember about Binet is that he was an anti-hereditarian but his tests were given an hereditarian interpretation in the United States.

H.H. Goddard: The Invention of the Moron

Across the Atlantic ocean, brought by H.H. Goddard, came Binet's intelligence test to America. Goddard translated the work of Binet into English, but he gave an

hereditarian interpretation of intelligence as he called for the wide use of the test in the United States. Psychologists who gave an hereditarian interpretation to the test asserted that intelligence was innate, fixed, and genetically determined; they committed the fallacies of reductionism, reification, and inevitability. Their argument was for inherited intelligence by race, national origins, and social class. There were many psychological hereditarians; William McDougall, E.L. Thorndike, G.O. Fergusson, and Nathaniel Hirsh were major figures. Goddard's work provides a representative account of the development of the hereditarian perspective within psychology.

The beginning of Goddard's hereditarian perspective can be traced to The Kallikak Family, (1911) and The Criminal Imbecile, (1915). In the Kallikak Family Goddard was not concerned about southern and eastern Europeans but about lower-class natives whose degeneracy was traced back through their generations. According to Goddard, "... the only solution was to segregate the subnormal from society" (Cravens, 1978: 81). Goddard believed that social policies to improve the human condition would not work because people were born to their fate (Cravens, 1978: 83). With the fear that had arisen in the federal government with the United States Immigration Commission report (the Dillingham Commission) in 1911, the United States Public Health Service commissioned Goddard in 1912 to administer mental tests to the immigrants arriving at Ellis Island. The results of

Goddard's testing found strong correlations between national origins and intelligence tests, lending further support to a biological or hereditarian interpretation of intelligence. "Goddard did not hesitate to claim that 83% of the Jews, 80% of the Hungarians, 79% of the Italians and 87% of the Russians were 'feeble-minded'" (Lawler, 1978: 47). Goddard's study of morons, a term he invented, was done by selecting "morons" on sight. He used "intuitive women," since Goddard believed women had greater intuitive powers, to select morons off the boats landing at Ellis Island. Those that were selected had low IQ scores; therefore, Goddard inferred from his sampling procedures that all immigrants had low IQs. The tests were used to deport a number of people classified as "feeble-minded." The Binet-Simon test, one that had been normed on a number of ethnocultural groups, was used only a short time by Goddard and other American psychologists.

Lewis Terman: A New American Test

Lewis Terman in 1916 revised the Binet-Simon test, which became known as the Stanford-Binet test. It was normed using school children in Palo Alto from middle-class, native-born, Protestant Anglo-Saxon homes (Cravens, 1978: 82). The tests were then given to immigrants, members of the lower-class, and non-white children. They had lower scores. It was then argued that immigrants, the lower-class, Mexican-Americans, and blacks had lower innate mental capacity. According to Terman, there was now strong support

for the biological interpretation of intelligence.

Lewis Terman's scientific research at Stanford University to advance the intelligence test added something that Alfred Binet had tried to eliminate from any interpretation of the tests, hereditarianism. Writing in 1916, Lewis Terman condemned immigrants, blacks, laboring men, and servant girls to lives of custodial care. Based on data coupled with a biological interpretation of intelligence, Lewis Terman made one of the strongest social policy statements of the day, arguing that the results of the tests logically lead to the necessity of segregating children to different educational tracts, thus denying them equal opportunity at educational pursuits.

> Among laboring men and servant girls there are thousands like them.... The tests have told the truth. These boys are ineducable beyond the merest rudiments of training. No amount of school instruction will ever make them intelligent voters or capable citizens.... They represent the level of intelligence which is very, very common among Spanish-Indian and Mexican families of the Southwest and also among negroes. Their dullness seems to be racial, or at least inherent in the family stocks from which they came. The fact that one meets this type with such extraordinary frequency among Indians, Mexicans, and negroes suggests quite forcibly that the whole question of racial differences in mental traits will have to be taken up anew and by experimental methods. The writer predicts that when this is done there will be discovered enormously significant racial differences in general intelligence, differences which cannot be wiped out by any scheme of mental culture. Children of this group should be segregated in special classes and be given instruction which is concrete and practical. They cannot master abstractions, but they can often be made effective workers, able to look out for themselves. There is no possibility at present of convincing society that they should not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding (Terman quoted in Gould, 1981: 190-191).

Terman wanted the State to intervene in order to protect society. He sincerely felt that these people were a danger to society; therefore, his reasoning and concern was logical, based on his hereditarian assumptions.

> It is safe to predict that in the near future intelligence tests will bring tens of thousands of these high-grade defectives under the surveillance and protection of society. This will ultimately result in curtailing the reproduction of feeble-mindedness and in the elimination of an enormous amount of crime, pauperism, and industrial inefficiency. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that the high-grade cases, of the type now so frequently overlooked, are precisely the ones whose guardianship is most important for the State to assume (Terman quoted in Gould, 1981: 179).

But this did not happen. The primary reason was that the biological interpretation of intelligence was receiving contemporary criticism, both scholarly and popular. Walter Lippman, the famous political columnist and social commentator, harshly criticized Terman and Lothrop Stoddard. Lippman and Terman engaged in a two year debate in 1922-1923 in the pages of the New Republic. Scholarly criticism was coming from Franz Boas and A.L. Kroeber (among others), who were arguing for the separation of culture from biology and therefore for a cultural interpretation of intelligence. The symbolic interactionists were arguing against the instinct theorists and their invariant behavior model, developing instead a social perspective on human nature and behavior.

Terman not only wanted the State to intervene to eliminate social problems through custodial care and sterilization, but also to intervene in order to channel people into

the proper occupation. Through his hereditarian interpretation of the intelligence test, Terman was able to determine that those with an IQ of 75 and lower should be solely relegated to unskilled labor; those with an IQ of 75-85 could perform semi-skilled labor; and those who would succeed needed an IQ of around 115 to 120 (Gould, 1981: 182). In fact Terman could state categorically that those in the 75-85 IQ class became either "... anti-social or join the army of Bolshevik discontents" (Terman quoted in Gould, 1981: 182). The goal for Terman was not social reconstruction but state interventionism to prevent the unfit from breeding and thereby reproducing all social problems.

In fact, so confidant was Terman in his intelligence testing abilities that history's greats could be given intelligence tests, too. "Terman and his colleagues tried to reconstruct the IQ of past notables, and published a thick book that must rank as a primary curiosity within a literature already studded with absurdity ..." (Gould, 1981: 183-184). Francis Galton was given an IQ test and passed it with "... a staggering IQ of 200 ..." (Gould, 1981: 184).

With the Stanford-Binet test, Terman strongly advanced the perspective of psychological hereditarianism. One reason is that he gave his test a statistical rigor that it had previously lacked.

> Terman built into his test a more precise statistical requirement. The rank order of the children at any particular age should approximate the "normal curve." [Also] [w]hereas Binet used the rough estimate of teachers, in a relatively small sampling of the school population, as to what an average performance consisted in,

> Terman corrected the impreciseness of this method by using more exact statistical definitions and by improving the method of selecting and scoring items as well as of administering the tests. It is these features probably more than anything else that lend to the IQ test its appearance of being a rigorous scientific instrument (Lawler, 1978: 48).

But in the precision there was also a loss. The test had been originally designed by Binet in order to identify and help people improve their educational performance. Binet believed intelligence was improvable, that people are educable, and that it was environment and cultural factors that had to be taken into account when interpreting scores. These important insights were lost in the new perspective.

> The founder of the most important test, the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (1917), thus shared the main ideas of Galton. Gone is the purely pragmatic approach of Binet, who saw his tests as practical instruments for identifying children who needed special attention in order to overcome their educational deficiencies. Instead there is the identification of permanently defective individuals and a veritable racial caste of manual laborers (Lawler, 1978: 47).

But soon psychological hereditarians would have doubts.

Robert M. Yerkes: The Testing of Army Draftees

The hereditarian argument continued to advance and new instruments were devised that could be used to test everyone: enter Robert M. Yerkes. In 1917 the Eugenics Research Association had elected Yerkes as chairman to their Committee on Inheritance of Mental Traits. But America's entry into World War I gave Yerkes a chance to do research on a much grander scale. Robert M. Yerkes, a Harvard professor, convinced the Army to allow him to initiate a vast testing

program of Army draftees in 1917-1918. Together with Lewis Terman, Henry Goddard, and "... all the major hereditarians of American psychometrics ...", Yerkes devised the Army Alpha test, which was given to literate draftees, and the Army Beta, which was given to illiterates and those who failed the Army Alpha (Gould, 1981: 194). Those who "failed" the Beta test were given a version of Binet's IQ test. The tests were used to select officers who were in short supply during World War I. With a ranking between A to E, usually scoring below a C meant that one could not be considered for officers' training. Beyond using the tests to select for officers' training, the tests went largely ignored by the Army. In the Army, one proved himself under the direction of a drill instructor who had little use for usurping "... smart-assed young psychologists who arrived without invitation ..." (Gould, 1981: 194).

Now a Colonel in the United States Army, Yerkes and his colleagues administered these tests to nearly two million draftees. The results, published by the National Academy of Sciences in 1921, with Yerkes as the editor, showed that intelligence correlated with national origins, now offering substantial data to apply an hereditarian interpretation. Here was the rank order, beginning with the highest scores: England, Holland, Denmark, Scotland, Germany, Sweden, Canada, Belgium, White Draft, Norway, Austria, Ireland, Turkey, Greece, All Other Foreign Countries, Russia, Italy, and Poland (Kamin, 1976: 377). At the very bottom were blacks.

E.G. Boring, who was working for Yerkes, selected one hundred and sixty thousand cases as a sample to make some conclusions. The fist shock was that the average age of white Americans stood at thirteen.

> [That figure] became a rallying point for eugenists who predicted doom and lamented our declining intelligence, caused by the unconstrained breeding of the poor and feeble-minded, the spread of Negro blood through miscegenation, and the swamping of an intelligent native stock by the immigrating dregs of southern and eastern Europe (Gould, 1981: 196).

The tests were then correlated with national origins. Russians had a mental age of 11.34, Italians 11.01, Poles 10.74, and blacks 10.41.

Thus not only was America in danger from an enemy from without but from an enemy from within, for that was the immediate conclusion of the Eugenics Research Association and they heavily lobbied Congress for legislation to protect the imminent downfall of American civilization (Kamin, 1976: 378). The House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the United States Congress appointed the secretary of the Eugenics Research Association to provide expert opinion to Congress as they wrote the upcoming legislation in 1921. In 1923 the Eugenics Research Association, following the norm of reciprocity, elected the chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Albert Johnson, as chairman of their organization. Yerkes's tests lent support to the hereditarians' vision of what America should be and what it would become if Yerkes's conclusions went unheeded.

The social significance of Yerkes's research went far

beyond his development of an instrument to select candidates for officers' training school. With this new instrument "... a technology had been developed for testing all pupils. Tests could now rank and stream everyone; the era of mass testing had begun" (Gould, 1981: 195).

In concluding this section, I have shown that the proponents of hereditarianism undertook research for fifty years, from Galton to Yerkes, to develop an instrument, an intelligence test, which would prove the case for the biological interpretation of intelligence and therefore, prove beyond doubt that classes, races, and people from different countries are biologically determined in intelligence. And, most important from the hereditarian viewpoint, there was nothing society could do to improve intelligence but a great deal that it could do to save America from those who would sap the strength of the state. In conclusion of the development of psychological hereditarianism:

> American psychologists perverted Binet's intention and invented the hereditarian theory of IQ. They reified Binet's scores, and took them as measures of an entity called intelligence. They assumed that intelligence was largely inherited, and developed a series of specious arguments confusing cultural differences with innate properties. They believed that inherited IQ scores marked people and groups for an inevitable station in life. And they assumed that average differences between groups were largely the products of heredity, despite manifest and profound variation in quality of life (Gould, 1981: 157).

But the cultural interpretation of intelligence would arise as persistent anomalies would multiply.

Anomalies and Crisis

Thomas Kuhn has stated that "... the value placed upon a new phenomenon and thus upon its discoverer varies with our estimate of the extent to which the phenomenon violated... expectations" (Kuhn, 1970: 56). Anomalies are a normal part of any scientific research project. They always appear in scientific research for a theory does not explain everything. Thus when they first arise one can pay attention to them and consider them a matter for future research. But anomalies do not mean that one has to abandon one's theory or assumptions. Only when an anomaly persists might it give one an indication that there may be something wrong with one's theory. There came to be anomalies that violated expectations and that could not be explained away, no matter how hard the mental testers tried. These anomalies centered on environmental and cultural influences in test results. But at first the results of the tests were as expected if one adhered to the biological interpretation of intelligence. If one believes that Nordics are superior in intelligence to eastern and southern Europeans, and one gives tests to both groups and the Nordics score higher, then that can support a hereditarian theory of intelligence. But that same data can also support a cultural interpretation of intelligence. A cultural interpretation of intelligence is the new phenomenon that emerged through persistent anomalies. As cultural anthropology arose and made the argument for the separation of biology from culture, a cultural

interpretation of intelligence finally gained hegemony. But at first the IQ controversy was a fiercely contested debate, for each position suggested different social policies. Indeed when the psychological hereditarians were in ascendency, their theory provided scientific validation to the national origins quota legislation of 1924. But within a decade, displaying intellectual honesty, most of the psychological hereditarians changed their theory to the cultural interpretation of intelligence. A few adhered to the biological interpretation of intelligence, notably E.L. Thorndike who later had Arthur Jensen as a loyal follower.

After his Army days, Yerkes had become a member of the National Research Council, which had a Division of Anthropology and Psychology, and in that division a Committee on Scientific Problems of Human Migration. Their first research project went to Dr. Carl C. Brigham, an assistant professor of psychology at Princeton. He is one whom all students have had to confront, for he later became the secretary of the College Entrance Examination Board and developed the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).

Brigham "... wrote one of the most bizarre of the studies of mental tests as applied to race" (Gossett, 1969: 374). His work, A Study of American Intelligence (1923) was a reanalysis of the Army data focusing on countries of origin and length of time residing in the United States. With a biological hypothesis of intelligence, the data confirmed that interpretation, so that no matter what the critics of

his theory said, Nordics ended up as superior in intelligence. The environment and culture were always argued as negligible. The results showed that recent immigrants did not do as well as those who had been here for some time. Those who were here twenty years did better than those who were here fifteen; those who were here fifteen years did better than those who were here ten; and those who were here ten years did better than those who were here five.

These results were as expected if one began with an hereditarian assumption of intelligence. "These facts did not lead him to conclude that perhaps environment might be a considerable factor; instead, he interpreted the figures as conclusive proof that the innate quality of the more recent immigrants was lower and was steadily declining" (Gossett, 1969: 375). Immigrants were coming from increasingly inferior countries. But even when Brigham discovered that when the country of origin was the same, the scores for recent arrivals were lower than for those who had been in America for some time. Brigham now concluded that within a single country of origin there was a conspiracy to send lower and lower biologically unfit immigrants to America. "The decline in intelligence is due to two factors, the change in the races migrating to this country, and to the additional factor of the sending of lower and lower representatives of each race" (Brigham quoted in Gould, 1981: 230). And when critics from the environmentalist side pointed out to Brigham that northern blacks did better than southern blacks or

that northern blacks did better than southern whites from some states, again Brigham could explain this within a biological interpretation of intelligence. "The superiority of the northern Negroes over southern Negroes was to be explained on the basis of their greater admixture of white blood and the fact that better opportunities in the North prompted the more intelligent Negroes of the south to migrate there" (Gossett, 1969: 376).

Brigham also encountered the research result that there were differences in scores among Nordics from English and non-English countries, clearly an environmental influence. As a scientist trying to understand the data, Brigham did acknowledge this, since he would not condemn any Nordic as inferior (Gould, 1981: 228-229).

There emerged a crisis of interpretation among those who were psychological hereditarians; first and foremost, they were sensitive to mounting criticism, especially from cultural anthropologists who were arguing for the separation of culture from biology and therefore a cultural interpretation of intelligence. There had been early suspicions of hereditarian assumptions all along. Even the Army had been suspect. "As friction and doubt mounted, the secretary of war polled commanding officers of all camps to ask their opinion of Yerkes's tests. He received one hundred replies, nearly all negative" (Gould, 1981: 202). Thus even early on Yerkes's "... work proceeded under a cloud of suspicion" (Gould, 1981: 202). Now in the middle and late 1920s the

controversy was at its height.

Terman also began to notice anomalies. There were differences in test results between rural and urban test takers, clearly an anomaly since one would not expect rural people to be biologically different. Rural people scored lower despite the fact that eastern and southern immigrants were locating in the city. Rural people come from a different environment, a different social world, and that environmental/cultural realization was beginning to undermine psychological hereditarianism. It was the Nordics who had settled the countryside, yet their test scores were lower (Gould, 1981: 192).

Terman also found the anomaly that bright people were in low paying jobs, a violation of his expectation that those who are in low paying jobs were there because of biological inferiority (Gould, 1981: 187). Another anomaly Terman found was the "... poor correlation of 0.4 between social status and IQ ...", another violation of the expectation that the upper class are the brightest. In yet another study Terman found low scores among those in orphanages, but this did not lead him to conclude that the environment, the educational or cultural conditions of the orphanage itself, may have some contributing effect; rather, he concluded that those who were in orphanages came from the lower class and that the lower class was biologically inferior. As Gould reports, this was all guesswork, for "Terman offers no direct evidence about the lives of his twenty children

beyond the fact of their institutional placement" (Gould, 1981: 190).

In another study Terman found another anomaly: hoboes did better than "... motormen, salesgirls, firemen, and policemen" (Gould, 1981: 182-183). Terman then rearranged the data to support his hereditarian interpretation.

> Terman suppressed this embarrassment by ordering his table in a curious way. The hobo mean was distressingly high, but hobos also varied more than any other group, and included a substantial number of rather low scores. So Terman arranged his list by the scores of the lowest 25 percent in each group, and sunk his hobos into the cellar (Gould, 1981: 183).

What was occurring was the type of finagling with statistics that is done to try to make sense out of the data in light of one's (in this case) hereditarian assumptions.

Yerkes encountered other anomalies. Yerkes had argued, along with Terman, that intelligence is normally distributed, i.e., that it represents a normal bell-shaped curve. This was the expectation for the Army test results but these expectations, too, were violated. As Gould reports "... Yerkes wormed his way out of the difficulty ..." (Gould, 1981: 213). There were multiple modes which should have suggested inhomogeneity. However, since the test results violated the perspective, Yerkes changed the statistics to conform to hereditarian assumptions. "The multiple modes should have guided Yerkes to a suspicion that his tests were not measuring a single entity called intelligence. Instead, his statisticians found a way to redistribute zero scores in a manner favorable to hereditarian assumptions" (Gould,

1981: 214).

Yerkes not only found innumerable anomalies, but also his test results yielded data which might have enlightened him to environmental influences on scores. For example, in all versions of the test "Yerkes found strong correlations between average score and infestation with hookworm ..." (Gould, 1981: 217). "These results might have led to the obvious admission that state of health, particularly in diseases related to poverty, has some effect upon the scores" (Gould, 1981: 218). However, Yerkes's creativity devised a way to interpret these correlations. "Low native ability may induce such conditions of living as to result in hookworm infection" (Yerkes quoted in Gould, 1981: 218). It was our biology that led us to live in run down and infested hovels.

Another expectation of psychological hereditarianism was that high test scores would be achieved by those in high occupational positions. After all, Yerkes argued, in a just world those who are smart rise to the top. But this expectation was also violated: Yerkes "... found no pattern" (Gould, 1981: 218).

Yet another anomalous test finding was ignored by Yerkes. There was a strong correlation between education and test results, suggesting that environment is the independent variable rather than innate biological superiority in high test scores. "Yet Yerkes did not conclude that more schooling leads to increasing scores per se; instead, he

argued that men with more innate intelligence spend more time in school" (Gould, 1981: 218). In terms of differences between blacks and whites on test results, Yerkes found the differences correlated to education. From a cultural interpretation of intelligence, this suggested that whites did better because they had not been denied education as blacks had been. But Yerkes saw different reasons. As Gould describes Yerkes's reasoning: the "... failure of blacks to attend school ... must reflect a disinclination based on low innate intelligence. Not a word about segregation (then officially sanctioned, if not mandated), poor conditions in black schools, or economic necessities for working among the impoverished" (Gould, 1981: 219).

Yerkes and his colleagues stuck hard and fast to their innate intelligence theory, even in the face of all damaging evidence. Even when there were now numerous and persistent anomalies, political conditions and social power kept their ideas dominant. Immigration policy, sterilization, and later using IQ scores to justify the educational policy of tracking school children in the United States would be guided by the conclusions of the mental testers.

The anomalies multiplied. As we have noted, both Yerkes and Brigham found that eastern Europeans scored lower than northern Europeans. But Yerkes reasoned that recent immigrants' lack of familiarity with English did not distort the test results. Why? Because they were given Beta, "... a pictorial test that supposedly measured innate ability

independent of literacy and language" (Gould, 1981: 220). The problem, of course, as Franz Boas and others saw, was that pictures are not independent of culture.

Every stratagem was used to quell the environmental thesis, all the more exigent since an environmental or cultural interpretation of intelligence suggested that what was needed was social reconstruction.

> The army mental tests could have provided an impetus for social reform, since they documented that environmental disadvantages were robbing from millions of people an opportunity to develop their intellectual skills. Again and again, the data pointed to strong correlations between test scores and environment. Again and again, those who wrote and administered the tests invented tortuous, ad hoc explanations to preserve their hereditarian prejudices (Gould, 1981: 74).

But as I shall point out, Terman, Yerkes, and Brigham changed their theoretical assumptions, suggesting that they were sensitive to the rising cultural interpretation of intelligence.

Toward the Cultural Interpretation Of Intelligence

Between 1916 and 1937, geneticists, sociologists, and anthropologists had published work that led social scientists to rethink the conceptualization of human nature. Contributing to this reconceptualization were the psychological hereditarians themselves, who began to promulgate their own uneasiness about their research. Yerkes and Brigham both had made statements in 1921 that the tests were administered under circumstances that were less than desirable.

> This lack of a uniform process of segregation is certainly unfortunate. On account of the variable

> facilities for examining and the variable quality of the groups examined however, it appeared entirely impossible to establish a standard uniform for all camps (Yerkes quoted in Gould, 1981: 202).
>
> The method of selecting men for Beta varied from camp to camp, and sometimes from week to week in the same camp. There was no established criterion of literacy, and no uniform method of selecting illiterates (Brigham quoted in Gould, 1981: 203).

With the mounting debate, Brigham had by 1930 changed his mind. In a 1930 article, "Intelligence Tests of Immigrant groups," published in the Psychological Review, Brigham discredited his own work.

> As this method was used by the writer in his earlier analysis of the Army tests as applied to samples of the foreign-born in the draft, that study with its entire superstructure of racial differences collapses completely. Comparative studies of various national and racial groups may not be made with existing tests. One of the most pretentious of these comparative racial studies--the author's own--was without foundation (Brigham quoted in Klineberg, 1966: 186).

Terman's beliefs were also greatly affected by the contemporary debate. In 1937 Terman published a vastly different conceptualization of intelligence than the one of 1916, for in the 1920s and early 1930s hereditarianism, both its biological and psychological arguments, had been thoroughly challenged.

> Terman's book on the Stanford-Binet revision of 1937 was so different from the original volume of 1916 that common authorship seems at first improbable. But then times had changed and intellectual fashions of jingoism and eugenics had been swamped in the morass of a Great Depression. Not a word beyond a few statements of caution do we hear about heredity. All potential reasons for differences between groups are framed in environmental terms. Terman presents his old curves for average differences in IQ between social classes, but he warns us that mean differences are too small to provide any predictive information for individuals (Gould, 1981: 191-192).

Terman had discredited his earlier statements. Simply put, he recanted. Terman's recantation is to his credit, for it shows that he was not intentionally trying to deceive (Mannheim's definition of ideology). The debate had revolved on the persistent problem of interpreting IQ scores that differed among social classes, national origins, and race. The question centered on how to unconfound biological and environmental/cultural factors in the scores so that the relative importance of each and the nature of their interaction could be assessed. That is why Franz Boas work was so important, for he showed that culture was indeed separate from biology and could offer explanations of behavior, including the difference between IQ scores among social classes, national origins, and race.

Gould's work on psychological hereditarians suggests that there were three assumptions that were basic to their thesis which later came to be seen as fallacies. The first was reductionism: intelligence was biologically determined, thereby culture and environment were ignored. The second was reification: measures that were artifacts of statistical manipulation, intelligence or IQ, were treated as real, as existing inside the heads of people. It was presumed that measuring intelligence yields a rank order of all classes, races, and nationalities. The third was inevitability: intelligence was an inevitable consequence of biological inheritance. Intelligence is innate, unimprovable. These three assumptions comprise the major beliefs of

psychological hereditarians, and they were largely rejected by those who were sensitive to the work of cultural anthropologists and comparative ethnologists and the new geneticists. Cultural anthropology had separated culture from biology, and giving a cultural interpretation to intelligence, and genetics had proven the plasticity of heredity to the environment.

Psychologists now increasingly favored the cultural interpretation of intelligence. The cultural interpretation was gaining all types of support by those citing evidence for its adoption. E.B. Reuter's study in 1927 The American Race Problem clearly showed that differences in IQ test scores where based on education and access to educational opportunities (Kruger, 1975: 388). T.R. Garth's research finding in 1935, published in the Psychological Bulletin, that American Indians who had been given foster homes in white environments had IQ scores of 102, well above scores reported for American Indians. Garth tested those brothers and sisters of foster children who had stayed on the reservation. Their scores were 87.5, which provided data for an interpretation that cultural advantages, or at least familiarity with a white, Anglo-Saxon culture, could lead to improvement in scores. The psychologist Otto Klineberg, who had been a student of Franz Boas at Columbia, in 1935 published his book Negro Intelligence and Selective Migration, which showed that as black children moved north their IQ scores improved. The studies also provided evidence against

the argument that only the most intelligent blacks moved north, the hereditarian deus ex machina for higher IQ scores among northern blacks. Now there was the case for improvement in scores within groups the longer they lived in New York, which was clearly contrary to any notion of innate and unalterable biological determination of intelligence. These are just a few of the typical arguments in the tumultuous debate.

Sociology Becomes Autonomous

Joining the Boasians and the new geneticists in this three-pronged attack on hereditarianism were a few sociologists of the 1910s, 1920s, and the early 1930s, primarily the symbolic interactionists. But it would not be before the mid-1930s that sociology was to have its marriage with biology annulled. Thomas Hunt Morgan had argued in 1924 that "[m]an differed from the animals in that he had a social inheritance; he lived in a cultural world of ideas and symbolic language that shaped his behavior" (Cravens, 1978: 172). This is what James Mark Baldwin was saying as well. "[Baldwin] concluded that since biological heredity could not be invoked to explain human development, the concept of "social heredity" or "culture" was necessary" (Curti, 1980: 283). Sociologists realized the need to "... purge sociology of all natural science determinants, analogies, metaphors, and levels of explanation, if they wanted their discipline to become autonomous in modern American university culture" (Cravens, 1978: 121).

A new way of interpreting behavior and social reality was emerging with this new group of sociologists, of whom Cooley, Thomas, and Mead were highly significant. In fact, according to the Hinkles, the notion that the individuals could determine their own life became one of the strongest tenets in American sociology.

> Perhaps the outstandingly persistent feature of American sociology is its voluntaristic nominalism. This term describes the assumption that the structure of all social groups is the consequence of the aggregate of its separate, component individuals and that social phenomena ultimately derive from the motivations of these knowing, feeling, and willing individuals (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: v).

As Donald G. MacRae argues, sociologists were beginning to explain the social by the social.

> Racial explanation disappears from serious sociology with the great generation of the early twentieth century: Pareto, Durkheim, Hobhouse and Max Weber made the issue of race irrelevant by the introduction of new canons of analysis and by their attempt to explain the social by the social... (MacRae, 1960: 84).

However, I need to caution that it really was not before the mid and late thirties that sociology in the United States really divorced itself from racial explanation.

As I pointed out at length in Chapter II, sociology was interwoven with social reform, reform that offered solutions that were directed to policies of changing institutions, providing education and socialization so that assimilation could proceed with less social conflict, not breeding a better race. Not only would sociology have to leave biology and natural science behind, but also, psychology. "Cooley made the first decisive break from psychology's metaphors

and determinants in Social Organization (1909). He argued that the social group, not the individual, was sociology's true point of departure" (Cravens, 1978: 144).

Some sociologists, including the symbolic interactionists, broke away from the reductionist claims of biology and psychology and thereby did much to challenge scientific racism, racist interpretations of intelligence tests, and instinct theory. The Chicago school sociologists began "... arguing that social phenomena has social causes" (Cravens, 1978: 250). Concepts such as social disorganization advanced by Robert E. Park and W.I. Thomas and others at Chicago as they began the study of urban life, especially urban immigrant culture, enlightened the discipline of sociology and informed the public that human behavior was largely socially and culturally motivated, not simply biologically driven and predestined (Cravens, 1978: 150). As Merle Curti concurs, "[t]he innovating, empirical investigations of the Chicago urban sociologists drew attention to the sudden exposure of rural peoples to complex, unfamiliar city surroundings, an exposure that explained much of the deviant behavior of immigrants that hereditarians laid at the door of innate "racial" differences" (Curti, 1980: 289). "Throughout the 1920s and 1930s sociologists published many such studies, which, in their totality, affirmed the importance of the cultural level of human existence and which also implied that level of human existence to be the domain of the social sciences" (Cravens, 1978: 181). The

sociologists at Chicago who accomplished this were largely working under the perspective of symbolic interactionism, which had culminated in the works of Mead, which is why the development of that perspective is so important in the reconceptualization of the nature of human nature and social behavior. Mead himself had given the title of social behaviorism to his perspective, specifically to counter the reductionist perspective of behaviorism coined by J.B. Watson.

Publications by Ellsworth Faris in 1921 and 1922 and Luther L. Bernard in 1924 led to "... the debacle of the doctrine of instincts" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 22). L. L. Bernard's book Instincts: A Study in Social Psychology in 1924 set out to counter the earlier social psychology and sociology of William McDougall and Edward A. Ross, whose "... books were essentially biologically oriented, attributing human civilization to the nature and quality of inherent human tendencies" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 29). As the Hinkles report on Bernard's efforts:

> After examining 2000 books by 1700 authors, Bernard enumerated 15,789 separate instincts subsumed under 6,131 types and concluded that the instinct concept had become too inconsistent, uncritical, and inaccurate for scientific use. Furthermore, he demonstrated how a theory of personality development can be established without reference to so-called instincts, many of which are not inherited but the consequence of social environmental forces. These learned behavior forms should be called habits, Bernard suggested, and those which are not learned he termed reflexes. By careful use of these concepts it is possible to investigate the process whereby the environment modifies the biologically given nature of man into human personalities (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 29).

J.B. Watson also helped to discredit instinct theory. In 1917 Watson advanced his major critique which argued that "... virtually all adult human behavior patterns were the result of environment and training rather than biopsychological inheritance.... Heredity provided little more than the ability or the potential to learn ..." (Watson quoted in Cravens, 1978: 210). Cooley, Thomas, and Mead were to accept Watson's critique of instinct theory, but they also rejected Watson's argument of limiting statements about human beings to overt behavior.

"With the collapse of instinct theory, the interactionist social psychology propounded by Charles H. Cooley, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and William I. Thomas gained ascendancy" (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 30). Within sociology the argument against biological determinism and for a new conceptualization of human nature and personality was, as the Hinkles argue, primarily the contribution of the early interactionists.

> According to the social interactionists, biological factors such as the instincts do not play a determining role in the formation and growth of personality. The child is born neither human nor social; at birth he is simply an animal organism belonging to a particular biological species. Ordinarily he is born into a small, face-to-face social group--the family--where he experiences social interaction with parents, siblings, and others, and acquires language, behavior patterns, and familiarity with and acceptance of the values and goals of his society. Along with this indoctrination into the culture of his group, he develops a notion of himself as a self, or ego, which makes him all the more human and social because he now responds directly to the expectations of others and to the internalized moral codes of the group. The child thus becomes self-conscious and plays social roles in accordance with the expectations of others in order to attain their respect and

> acceptance. As the individual matures he modifies and adjusts his personality developed in childhood by extending the attitudes and values acquired in primary groups to other social situations (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 30).

And the Hinkles support the inclusion of William James and James Mark Baldwin as contributors to this interactionist social psychology (Hinkle and Hinkle, 1954: 30). Thus, it is the interactionists who helped to play a role in discrediting biological determinism, instinct theory, and behaviorist psychology and advanced a sociological conception of human nature and personality, their contribution to the development of sociology.

In William James's concepts of habit, free-will, indeterminism, plasticity, and self, we see the beginnings of that new conceptualization of personality and human nature. He held that the self could change, that education, habits, and socialization were important. And such a theory provided a basis from which the sociological and social psychological challenge emerged. Hofstadter emphasizes the importance of such concepts to the pragmatists, some of whom were symbolic interactionists.

> The pragmatists' most vital contribution to the general background of social thought was to encourage a belief in the effectiveness of ideas and the possibility of novelties--a position necessary to any philosophically consistent theory of social reform. As Spencer had stood for determinism and the control of man by the environment, the pragmatists stood for freedom and control of the environment by man (Hofstadter, 1969: 125).

Social reconstruction could only be accomplished if human beings could determine their environment, otherwise public and private intervention made no sense. Human beings

are primarily actors in determining their life: "... James' objection to Spencer arose partly because James was in search of a philosophy that could acknowledge active human effort in the bettering of life" (Hofstadter, 1969: 129). These new thoughts in sociology were occurring in the broader context of the professionalization of sociology, for sociology had just come of age.

Increasingly, "... American social scientists regarded the new hereditarian doctrines as a threat to the future of social science in America and to the prospects for a decent society" (Cravens, 1978: 86). Thus, many sociologists who had been hereditarians were to change their minds in the mid-1930s. Typical was Howard W. Odum, who in 1910 had published an argument that blacks were inferior; he now recanted to the academic community in 1936 in an article, "The Errors of Sociology," published in volume XV of Social Forces. He later expanded upon this theme in the same year and published a thoroughly social and cultural interpretation of human behavior in Southern Regions of the United States. Odum and his North Carolina sociological colleague, Guy B. Johnson, made important contributions to the Commission of Interracial Cooperation, which was an Atlanta-based philanthropic organization dedicated to easing racial tensions (Kruger, 1975: 392). Black sociologists were making strong contributions to the discrediting of any hereditarian interpretation of behavior. W.E.B. Du Bois, Franklin Frazier, and Charles S. Johnson were among the most well-known.

Johnson's 1934 study Shadow of the Plantation showed how poverty and crowded housing lead to a whole host of cultural disadvantages. In 1937 John Dollard published a widely influential book to sociologists, Class and Caste in a Southern Town. Dollard clearly showed the enormity of exploitation and brutality to blacks and how it was continued because of the economic advantages to whites. By 1941 Wilber J. Cash's study, The Mind of the South, made headway in destroying the myths of southern history. And in 1944 the most famous of all studies, Gunner Myrdal's An American Dilemma, showed the cultural, social, and economic disadvantages under which blacks struggled for equality. Ralph Bunche, Otto Klineberg, Melville Herskovits, Howard Odum and Guy Johnson, all contributed. In 1950 UNESCO's "Statement on Race" clearly argued against innate inferiority, group differences in mental abilities, and racial interpretations of behavior. Thus, hereditarian principles were discredited by a three-pronged attack, one from anthropology, one from the new genetics, and one from symbolic interactionists, and later, sociologists after the mid-thirties.

Interdependence between biological and cultural evolution was now emphasized in the study of human populations. By 1947 a pre-eminent geneticist, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and a pre-eminent anthropologist, M.F. Ashley Montague, were able to co-author an article advancing an interdependent relationship between nature and nurture, that human beings were a product of both biological and cultural evolution.

But social science had won an extremely important concession. The natural scientists now conceded that "... it was man's particular cultural traits--the specific domain of the social sciences--that had the most to do with his behavior as a member of a culture" (Cravens, 1978: xii).

Of course, the debate has never really gone away since the social context for the debate still remains: poverty, social inequality, and racism. Articles by Arthur Jensen in 1969, an educational psychologist at the University of California at Berkeley, and Richard Herrnstein in 1971, a professor of psychology at Harvard University, were to be expected. Richard Herrnstein has in fact argued that there are, and will increasingly be, hereditary social classes. The biological, physiological, and now sex-hormonal basis of cognative abilities and differences is still an academic debate, though, in the last thirty-five years, it has centered on differences between men and women. Arguments about a biological, physiological, or sex-hormonal difference between men and women, especially in intellectual ability, aggression, and visual-spatial ability to explain gender inequality still results in educational and job assignment discrimination. Not one to give up easily in the search for innate differences in abilities, Lewis Terman made a comeback and sparked a new debate in the field of genetic psychology on the sex differences between the behavior of women and men. In the new sex-hormonal research, hereditary explanations for behavior are extrapolated from animals,

primarily rats, to people. These arguments continue the attempt, by more subtle arguments than those of the earlier scientific racists, to justify a racist and sexist America. But the dominant interpretation was now the cultural interpretation of behavior, an interpretation that emerged as America's social context changed to one of a corporate capitalist state supporting liberal reform.

Social Context and Social Theory

A sociology of knowledge explanation appears compelling to help us understand the development of the psychological hereditarian thesis and its rejection by its major inventors. The social context of immigration, urbanization, industrialization, the modern graduate research university, and World War I, along with Terman's own political commitments to eugenics, had provided a social setting and research opportunities that influenced Terman (and others) to adopt a biological interpretation of intelligence. Though, of course, the contemporary social context did not cause Terman (and others) to think that way, for clearly others thought differently.

The changing social context and intellectual developments lent support to new views. America had experimented with thirty years of social reconstruction that had provided cultural receptivity to the notion that assimilation could be achieved if immigrants were educated and socialized so that they had access to the opportunity structure. The Progressives had provided strong arguments that through

education there could be an equality of opportunity. Thus, even though the progressives supported immigration restriction, they began to view the immigrant already here in a new light.

> Progressives made up the dominant element in the settlement houses that were undertaking the first systematic "Americanization" work, and the Americanization they advocated was no one-way street. The immigrant was not only to learn, settlement workers emphasized; he was to teach. While assimilating, he was to preserve the parts of his heritage which did not conflict with adjustment to the United States and he was to enrich American culture by bringing to it desirable ideas or customs from his old-country background (Goldman, 1955: 60-61).

The social context in which the theory of hereditarianism was embedded and nurtured was changing. America had committed itself to seeking social order through the corporate liberal state. Corporate America's social reconstruction of capitalism would broaden in the years of the New Deal. A corporate America inculcated the belief that equality of opportunity was obtainable through education, that if one were to pull one's self up by the bootstraps, along with state and philanthropic programs to help, then social mobility was achievable for those who were economically disadvantaged but nevertheless motivated, hard-working, and persevering. Everyone was to be given a fair chance to compete, in which some would succeed and others fail; but, it was not to be a social order in which social position was frozen (except, of course, for black Americans). Thus the changing social context of corporate liberalism in the Progressive Era was an attempt in which Americans "... could be given back their birthright of

opportunity by moderate, practical moves". Corporate capitalism's social and economic reforms represented "[t]he restoration of opportunity by giving stronger powers to more democratized governments, a businesslike restoration with no disreputable caterwauling..." (Goldman, 1955: 64-65). A socially mobile corporate America dedicated to an equality of opportunity was highly incompatible with the assumptions of innate inferiority and predetermined social position.

By the time sociologists were changing their views in the mid-thirties, the move to restore an equality of opportunity in which everyone would have a chance to compete had gone one step further, so that now even those who failed in the competitive order would have security and social insurance against destitution. The capstone to that philosophy was the Social Security Act of 1935. By the mid-thirties there had emerged a far greater emphasis on egalitarianism. A program of eugenics was out of step with the times. A program of social insurance and social security to help those who, through no fault of their own, had lost everything in a corporate economy that was nevertheless highly competitive among the vast world of job seekers, gained sufficient support to become the law of the land. Even members of the upper-class had lost everything and were committing suicide. People obviously could not always be in control of their economic future. The Great Depression had brought that point home with a vengeance.

The recognition that the normal operation of corporate

capitalism could leave farm families homeless, entire communities unemployed and destitute, and the equity in stocks and bonds evaporated, signaled a new response to human suffering. It meant the end of legitimately viewing oneself as superior based on one's social position or others as inferior because of poverty, a view that was inconsistent to the themes of the eugenics movement. It meant that failure, when so many capitalists themselves were failing, could no longer be laid at the foot of the victim. To some extent, fortunate and unfortunate circumstances were both seen as accidents of history. Depression itself was seen by some economists as the working out of contradictions inherent in capitalism.

With the clear recognition of the instability of capitalism and the instability in one's present social position, scholars began to make a more systemic analysis of social problems. One consequence was the undermining of the upper-class patrician belief that they were superior people. With the unmasking of that myth, the old hereditarian assumptions were relegated to the dustbin of history (as Marx was fond of saying of ideas no longer tenable). To the upper-class who had believed in their superiority and in eugenics, this new egalitarianism was galling. In fact, Eric Goldman argues that it was this attack on innate superiority that had angered the upper-class more than the sweeping social reforms of the New Deal. Quoting an unnamed contemporary of the time:

> The real source of the venom is that Rooseveltism challenged their feeling that they were superior people, occupying by right a privileged position in the world. I am convinced that a lot of them would even have backed many of his economic measures if they had been permitted to believe the laws represented the fulfillment of their responsibility as 'superior people.' They were not permitted that belief. Instead, as the New Deal went on, it chipped away more and more at their sense of superiority. By the second term, it was pressing hard on a vital spot and the conservatives were screaming (Goldman, 1955: 289).

With a solid attack on innate superiority, limited support for equality of opportunity, coupled with social security and social insurance legislation, the social context had changed enough that hereditarian ideas were out of date. And intellectually, genetics had undermined the scientific validation of hereditarianism. There was nowhere to turn, neither to the academic community for scientific validation of innate inferiority nor to the New Deal administration for social policies to protect America from the "dangerous classes."; notions of biological superiority (at least in terms of intelligence between groups) were unmasked. The conservatives could scream all they wanted.

I devote the next two chapters to the development of the reconceptualization of human nature and behavior advanced by symbolic interactionists. The development of their conceptualization is to be seen in light of the social context of corporate capitalism and the Progressive Era that I earlier reviewed and the debate with the hereditarian thesis that I have just covered. The symbolic interactionists were challenging the notion of invariant behavior put forward by the instinct theorists; instead, they argued for the

indeterminacy of behavior. They were arguing that between a stimulus and response human beings define the situation and make adjustive responses. The ability of human beings to do so was the place of intelligence in the adaptive capacity of the species. They were also emphasizing the social basis of human nature and behavior. Their major contribution to sociology, which emerged directly from this debate, was the development of a perspective on socialization. They developed a set of concepts to explain how individuals are socialized into their society and the processes by which individuals develop a self and mind. Those processes were seen as emergent ones, ones that solely develop within groups.

In the following review of their concepts I limit the analysis to solely those that challenged biological determinism and contributed to symbolic interactionism. I ignore major shifts within their thinking. For example, Cooley and Thomas both adhered to instinct theory early on but later changed their minds. Dissertations and books have been written on these scholars. To review the complete work of each of these scholars is not the object of analysis, nor could it be within a single dissertation.

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THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: CORPORATE CAPITALISM, PROGRESSIVE POLITICS, AND THE NATURE/NURTURE DEBATE

Volume II

By

Gil Musolf

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

1989

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CHAPTER V

THE CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM: THE CONCEPTS OF JAMES, BALDWIN, COOLEY, DEWEY, AND THOMAS

We will now explore the key concepts of William James, James Mark Baldwin, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, W.I. Thomas, and in a later chapter, George Herbert Mead. I mean by key concepts exclusively those that contributed to the development of symbolic interactionism, that is, all of these thinkers have many key concepts, only a few of which are relevant here.

William James

As Don Martindale has stated in his analysis of the history of symbolic interactionism:

> It is convenient to trace symbolic interactionism to the work of William James. His brilliant Principles of Psychology opened up new possibilities for re-examining the relations of individual and society. Although James had taken over and accepted the instinct theory current in his day, there were other aspects of his thought which tended to modify it, including his brilliant examination of habit (Martindale, 1960: 339-340).

James's influence on symbolic interactionism was largely through his concepts of self, habit, plasticity, and the notion that an idea separates stimulus-response activity.

James was part of the movement of functional psychology. This movement had come out of the psychology of capacity or individual differences. In America the leader was

J. McKeen Cattell who had been "... a student in Wundt's laboratory, [and] who had also worked with Francis Galton ..." (Curti, 1980: 202). Cattell's coworkers were some of those we have already discussed: H.H. Goddard, Lewis Terman, and E.L. Thorndike, among others. Their main work was on how to measure individual differences. But functionalism was an outgrowth of this emphasis on individual differences. The concern of functionalism became how the individual adjusts to his or her environment.

> Based on biological evolutionary theory, functionalism regarded mental activities, conscious and unconscious alike, as a continuing, dynamic adjustment on the part of the organism to the demands of life. With the assumption that the needs of the organism were met by sense perception, mental images, emotions, and thinking, functionalists tried to find at what stage in human development the need for each became sufficiently pressing to account for the appearance of a partial process or function. Functionalism thus emphasized motor activity in the ongoing search for adjustment to changing situations... (Curti, 1980: 202-203).

How individuals <u>adjusts</u> to their environment, not how they are determined by it, that was the question that was at the heart of early symbolic interactionist theory. The symbolic interactionists' interpretation of social changes transforming America after the Civil War led them to conceptualizations that concerned the question of how an individual can adjust to the overwhelming shock of rapid social change.

James's concern with how an individual makes a decision was to form the basis, for example, of Cooley's notion of sympathetic introspection, of Dewey's deliberation, of Mead's taking the role of others, and of Thomas' definition

of the situation. James argued against the simplistic associationist pain-pleasure psychology of decision-making and advanced instead an argument "... in which conflicting choices were resolved in any one of five ways" (Curti, 1980: 204).

In presenting his ideas on how the individual acts in The Principles of Psychology published in 1890, James criticized the "reflex-arc" concept whose adherents argued that behavior was basically a nerve response and that any behavior can be traced to an earlier nerve response. James felt that human consciousness was eliminated in such a theory that reduced mental phenomena to electrical impulses. Between any stimulus-response there is an idea.

> James contended that the stimulus-response process was saved from being entirely automatic by the function of a 'thought or idea' in the brain which could, in choosing which muscles to activate, keep outgoing impulses from following a predetermined path. This was even more the case since interest and attention influenced the response of the brain to the stimuli by suppressing or recognizing the immediate or delayed response of a given behavioral act (Curti, 1980: 205).

The notion that interest and attention would affect response anticipates Mead's concepts of selective attention, selective environment, and meaning. James had provided the beginning of a non-mechanistic, non-reductionistic conceptualization of human behavior.

The social basis of minded activity, another hallmark of symbolic interactionist theory, had its basis in James's notion that an idea separates any stimulus-response in the behavior of human beings. Ideas were the instruments that

were to guide human beings in adapting to his environment.

> ... [A]n idea was not an abstraction but rather a self-conscious, animated part of a functional process of adaptation. Put still differently, mind was to be regarded not as the sum of sensations, feelings, and conations, not as an atomistic melange, but as a dynamic, organic, purposeful, and above all selective process engaging the whole being (Curti, 1980: 206).

Without a doubt, this basic tenet of early interactionism provided the theoretical basis for transcending determinism.

The Self

James's concept of the self laid the foundation for succeeding symbolic interactionist theory on the self. James developed a fecund theory of the self that included the notions of the self as subject and object, as knower and known, and as both I and Me. Let us begin with his notion of the three constituent Mes.

The three constituent Mes are the material me, the social me, and the spiritual me (James, 1968: 41). James's argument was that the material me consisted of our body and clothes, our immediate family, our home and accumulated property. James insisted that the self is distended and personally connected with the possessions we accumulate. In making this distinction, James expanded the conceptualization of the self from an innate, psychological one, to a historically emergent, sociological one.

But the material me was also bound up with James's theory of instincts. James's concept of the material me was that an "instinctive impulse drives us to collect property; and the collections thus made become, with different degrees

of intimacy, parts of our empirical selves" (James, 1968: 42). In the latter half of the argument James has articulated one of the most brilliant insights into an understanding of the complexity of the self in a possession-oriented society. Certainly no adult who has experienced or known others who have experienced the personal loss of a loved one, friend, or sentimental and valued property would discredit the argument. As James states: "There are few men who would not feel personally annihilated if a life-long construction of their hands or brains ... were suddenly swept away" (James, 1968: 42). This profound understanding goes a long way to explain the desolation, despondency, dejection, or general depression others experience when overwhelmed by personal loss, the emotions that are normally associated with bereavement.

> ... [A]lthough it is true that a part of our depression at the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go without certain goods that we expected the possessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there remains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness ... (James, 1968: 42).

The above experience is certainly a psychological phenomenon, but I believe the argument that would compel most social psychologists today is that it has a sociological element as well. Socialization to accumulate private property and the inculcation that a person of worth is a person of wealth is, I believe, a powerful explanation of why depressive states overcome and overwhelm us when we suffer a loss of property. We feel we are nothing when we suffer

loss of property because we have been indoctrinated to feel and believe that we are only something, somebody, a fairly important somebody (a big deal) if we possess wealth and/or power. An importunate ego to achieve, accomplish, succeed, and dominate is the result of enculturation to a materialistic, possession-oriented social order. But, of course, the loss of others is more universal and psychological; grief is universal in all cultures and societies.

James's conceptualization of the material me reflects the beginnings of the shift away from a purely psychological and biological image of human beings to a social one; the nature of the self is constituted as much by its social inheritance as it is by its biological and psychological inheritance. I do not want to stretch my inferences too far here, for James was still trapped within the instinct theory.

James's theory of the self becomes even less psychological and biological, and more sociological in his conceptualization of the social me. The social me is the desire to receive recognition from those we encounter, to make an impression. This, of course, anticipated Goffman's impression management theory. Also, it was James who developed the multiple social self concept: "... a man has as <u>many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him</u> and carry an image of him in their mind" (James, 1970: 374). James limited this concept to include only those who are significant or meaningful to us:

> ... we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups. Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his "tough" young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club-companions, to our customers as to the laborers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends. From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command (James, 1970: 374).

James here anticipated Goffman's concept of audience segregation, as well as the general sociological concept of social roles. It also anticipated much of the work of Simmel; and, most important, it anticipated the concept of the generalized other of George Herbert Mead. Again, what I am inferring is that implicit within James's work is the beginnings of a shift away from biology and psychology to a more social conception of human beings, human nature and behavior; the "embryonic" development of these concepts that the Hinkles argued were evident in James.

The above quotation certainly makes plain that human behavior is influenced by those around one, that others are in a sense social control, and that one must take others into account when acting, that one must be able to assess social meaning. The fact that human beings must do these things makes their behavior variable, calculated, reflective, and conscious, and thoroughly social, certainly not instinctual or biologically determined. Human beings have a

mind with which to think and adapt; their behavior is not a reflex action.

The spiritual me is our self at our most conscious reflection, or better, during our most conscious activity. "The more active-feeling states of consciousness are thus the more central portions of the spiritual Me" (James, 1968: 43). James thus constructed a pragmatic self, a self associated with activity, which, Cooley further developed.

These three components of the me reflect James's trend away from conceiving individuals as solely biological and psychological beings, to social beings, as ones affected by the society in which they are socialized.

James's concept of the I is also similar to the one later expanded upon by Mead. It is an active I, the knower, the thinker, the conscious agent of our actions. "It is that which at any given moment is conscious, whereas the Me is only one of the things which it is conscious of" (James, 1968: 46). An active I is one capable of change, and this notion also moves us away from conceiving the self in static, biological terms.

The Social Basis of Self-Esteem

James also associated a self-feeling with the self which may, like Cooley's looking-glass self, be one of pride or mortification. Whether we have pride or mortification depends on a pragmatic criterion: success in the world: "... the normal provocative of self-feeling is one's actual success or failure, and the good or bad actual position one

holds in the world" (James, 1968: 43). In fact, James adopted a formula for self-esteem:

$$\text{Self-Esteem} = \frac{\text{Success}}{\text{Pretensions}}$$

"Such a fraction may be increased as well by diminishing the denominator as by increasing the numerator" (James, 1968: 45). The notion that self-esteem is largely based on a dynamic relationship between aspirations and achievement is still a basic tenet of psychology to this very day. In the relationship between aspirations (which are inculcated through a normative order that emphasizes achievement) and achievement, James began the understanding of the social construction of the self and self-esteem. We measure our worthiness by our success and status in the world. Even though those measures may be personal ones, society still will measure us with its own standards of success and status; therefore, our own concept of worthiness is bound to be influenced by the norms of society. Self-esteem cannot but have a social basis.

With such a socially grounded theory it is easy to find in James's concept of self and the social basis of self-esteem many insights still applicable to and utilized by social psychologists and sociologists today. As one example, Robert Merton's notion of crime causation has similarities to James's notion of the social basis of self-esteem. Robert Merton argued that criminals had the same aspirations as everyone else but that because they did not

have the means to achieve those ends, criminals resorted to contranormative means to achieve normative ends. A low self-esteem based on not achieving aspirations set by societal standards provided the motivation to crime.

Habit

According to James, because human beings are creatures of habit we must concentrate our explanatory analysis on the individual rather than social forces (Martindale, 1960: 340). We must study the behavior of individuals and explain that behavior in terms of the individuals themselves, not through any determinant social forces.

But James's theory of habit is also a theory of social order and social control. Certain people--classes--have predisposed habits. Thus, habits function to maintain social order.

> Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor (James, 1948: 143).

And for social control:

> It alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the deckhand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in its darkness, and nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the months of snow; it protects us from invasion by the natives of the desert and the frozen zone. It dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice, and to make the best of a pursuit that disagrees, because there is no other for which we are fitted, and it is too late to begin again. It keeps different social strata from mixing (James, 1948: 143).

Habit is what brings the oppressed to tread within

certain wretched occupations? Habit is what keeps the social strata from mixing? Habit is what saves the children of fortune from the envious uprising of the poor? James is here contributing to the shift away from biology toward a psychological understanding of human behavior. James has not developed a sociological understanding, however. And his approach here reveals his reliance on a biologically influenced psychology which was dominant at the times. Habits for James came from instincts. Today a sociologist might state it as differential power--social, economic, and political as the causative factor in occupational stratification; power as the force that prevents the social strata from mixing, and keeps the children of fortune (by every form of class segregation, or, if necessary, more drastic means) from the envious uprisings of the poor. However, placing James in his social context, this psychological theory of conduct marked a real advance in the social sciences. James's reconceptualization of human behavior from the solely biological to the psychological contributed to the contemporary revolution in the social sciences.

Look at what James has accomplished here in terms of describing a mechanism of social behavior. Although James conceived of habit as an individual phenomenon, and although it is linked to his notion of instincts, what he has described, implicitly, is the power of the normative order in regulating everyday behavior. He advanced the social sciences by recognizing that behavior is more than what is

biological, that it is profoundly psychological as well, that there are internal forces other than the biological that regulate and constrain human behavior. Merle Curti has underscored the psychological and sociological implications of James's concept of habit. "Yet at the same time habit could open the door to possible changes of conduct and social relations. ... [H]is theory enabled James to stress the binding character of habits while opening the way to the possibility of developing new ones by the exercise of attention, choice, will, and persistent repetition" (Curti, 1980: 207).

Although he had not clearly recognized this himself, James had begun to show to the social scientists of the early twentieth century how social order and social control are achieved through human beings' internalization of the normative order; that is, what is sociologically implicit in the concept of habit. We are socialized to class-influenced social niches, the poor to be deckhands and miners, the rich to run the corporations. James's psychological concept of habit was a stepping stone in the shift from a biological to a psychological to a social conceptualization of human beings.

The concept of habit balances the writings of other pragmatists, James included, who emphasized the fluidity and sky-is-the-limit possibility of human aspirations. Habit balances the concept of plasticity.

Plasticity

Plasticity means "... the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits" (James, 1948: 135). What it means to human beings to possess plasticity is that they have some control over their lives; they are not merely passive--though they do possess a structure weak enough to yield--but active, volitional, able to respond. People cannot be determined totally by their environment or heredity.

James formulated his concept of plasticity in response to the biological and geographical determinism of Herbert Spencer (Petras, 1975: 7). The social order is not seen as oppressive, but the mechanism through which the creativity of human beings could be expressed (Petras, 1975: 7). Human beings are creative and the social order or social system cannot socialize us completely; we react to what we are confronted by. It is essentially the same debate that has been continued by Dennis Wrong (1961). Wrong, however, is arguing against functionalism, which, Wrong says, holds an oversocialized view of the person and an overintegrated view of society from a biological/Freudian view, which posits instincts as the source of nonconformity. Thus, we discern in James's concept of plasticity part of the Horatio Alger culture of laissez-faire capitalism. The individual, no matter how oppressive the environment, is not determined but

able to rise above social forces. Again, this underscores the theme of voluntaristic nominalism that the Hinkles argued was the predominant theme of early sociology.

H.S. Thayer has provided insight into the social sources of James's complementary concepts; James, who travelled in Europe, was wedded to two cultures.

> One part is the indigenous, evolving community begun in a wilderness, become colonized, and most of whose organization and mores were (and in very complex ways continue to be) determined by conditions of survival and, in due course, conditions of prosperity on the cleared land or seaport. The other part is the whole imported, variegated, intellectual, moral, and religious European tradition ... (Thayer, 1973: 232).

Influenced by two cultures, James's concepts of habit and plasticity reflected this social diversity.

But there is no doubt that his concept of instincts was in contradiction to many of his other concepts that emphasized free will. Merle Curti explains James's position: "William James was both an effective champion of the New Psychology and a trenchant critic. His ambivalent and contradictory positions did not greatly trouble him. He preferred to leave paradoxes dangling rather than to resolve them in misleading oversimplifications" (Curti, 1980: 203).

James Mark Baldwin

Vahan D. Sewny has called James Mark Baldwin "... the father of American social psychology" (Sewny, 1968: i). Baldwin continued, in a much stronger way, arguments to develop a perspective on human nature away from conceiving behavior in solely biological and psychological terms toward

conceiving behavior in sociological terms. According to Don Martindale, through Baldwin's works, the person became recognized as a fully social being. "It is perhaps not unfair to say that for the first time the study of the social person has come into its own as a recognized branch of sociology" (Martindale, 1960: 317). Baldwin's basic tenet in social psychology was "... that the individual could not be described as an entity without reference to a larger grouping, society, which was the creator of the individual and therefore the reality from which the individual drew his identity" (Noble, 1967: 79). David Noble attributes to Baldwin a very strong place in the transition away from an "historical individualism" which had dominated the discussions on human nature. "From now on, American social philosophy would be solidly based on the assumptions that man is only a product of his society, and that society in turn can only be understood in terms of its place in the ever-changing process of history" (Noble, 1967: 79).

Baldwin attacked Herbert Spencer's biological determinism as much for its scientific inadequacy as for its political agenda. Baldwin felt that if Spencer's conception of human nature were taken as true, then it would make futile "... all attempts to remake man and society" (Noble, 1967: 80). Human beings were social animals and, for Baldwin, "... human nature must be related to an environment of constant change and growth" (Noble, 1967: 83).

The themes of pragmatism--progress, change, and

adaptation--are evident in Baldwin as well. Like W.I. Thomas' major concept of the definition of the situation, Baldwin saw human beings as having manipulative and instrumental powers. A person must be able to define the situation and make, in Mead's words, an adjustive response or a plan-of-action. A person, through action, had free-will, as opposed to the earlier writings of Spencer, which emphasized biological determinism. "If man was always in the process of adjusting to novel situations, then intelligence was an instrument which facilitated his survival in his evolving world, it was the instrument of his freedom to create the world he needed for the present moment" (Noble, 1967: 83). Like W.I. Thomas' ideal creative person, for Baldwin, "... the highest attribute of man was not conformity but creative freedom" (Noble, 1967: 96). And thus, unlike Spencer's social philosophy that argued that one must not tamper with society, Baldwin's social psychology invited human beings to change the world. "Man was a free intellect using his reason as an instrument to fulfill his wishes. But man was exercising his freedom to approach a sacred goal, that of a perfectly integrated social community...." (Noble, 1967: 96). Baldwin used both the concepts of plasticity, much as did William James, and the concept of novelty, much as did George Herbert Mead later, to articulate his views that human nature allowed human beings the possibility to shape and manipulate the world, rather than be controlled by it, a classic theme of pragmatism.

Habit and Accommodation

In Mental Development in The Child and the Race (1894), Baldwin advanced James's concept of habit to make it more social psychological; James's concept was psychological and also tied to his instinct theory.

> What is the least that we can say about an organism's development? Everybody admits that two things must be said: first, it develops by getting habits formed; and second, it develops by new adaptations which involve the breaking up or modification of habits--these latter being called accommodations (Baldwin, 1968: 452).

The individual acts according to habits, but not ones that are innate or based on instincts; rather, the individual develops through habits that are socially learned. This comes to light clearly in Baldwin's concept of accommodation. "Accommodation is the principle by which an organism comes to adapt itself to more complex conditions of stimulation by performing more complex functions" (Baldwin, 1968: 45).

Basically, accommodation to Baldwin was a process of social learning. "Learning to act is just accommodation, nothing more nor less. Speech, tracery, handwriting, piano-playing, all motor acquisitions, are what accommodation is, i.e. adaptations to more complex conditions" (Baldwin, 1968: 455). We become who we are, develop habits, through a process of social learning.

Baldwin's study of the mental development of the child and its ability to develop through habit and accommodation, helped to establish a field that became known as genetic

psychology. Nelson N. Foote believes that Baldwin has described the relationship between play and cognitive development better than any other genetic psychologist, then or now. "No one has quite as well described as has James Mark Baldwin--the father of genetic psychology--the dialectic of personal growth in all its intricacy and cumulative onwardness ..." (Foote, 1970: 325). Baldwin's argument that children develop cognitively through play informed Mead's play-game theory of self-development. It also greatly informed the work of Jean Piaget. As Foote suggests, we recognize in play the ability of the child to affirm him/herself, to be creative, volitional, manipulative, to be an actor and not just a reactor, all general themes of pragmatism. "If a person is permitted freedom to play and is stimulated by a loving audience, he moves on not merely from one requisite developmental task to another, but toward self-chosen goals which are not requisite but are autonomously affirmed" (Foote, 1970: 325).

Clearly we are moving toward a sociological conception of human behavior. As Vahan D. Sewny has stated, "The importance of Mental Development lies mainly in the fact that it represents a pioneer effort to present a picture of the social nature of the self and the manner of its growth" (Sewny, 1968: ii).

Suggestion, Imitation And the Social Person

Continuing with coming to grips with how the person devel oped, Baldwin advanced the concepts of imitation and suggestion. Imitation is a concept that is similar to Mead's taking the role of the other. We develop selves by incorporating others into our selves, imaginatively. "My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense of myself. Both ego and alter are thus essentially social; each is a socius, and each is an imitative creation" (Baldwin, 1968: 321). Imitation is the creative part of self development, but society also has a socializing role.

> The growth of human personality has been found to be pre-eminently a matter of social suggestion. The material from which the child draws is found in the store of accomplished activities, forms, patterns, organizations, etc., which society already possesses. These serve as ready stimulating agencies, loadstones so to speak, to his dawning energies, to draw him ever on in his career of growth into the safe, sound useful network of personal acquisitions and social relationships which the slow progress of the race has set in permanent form. All this he owes, at any rate in the first instance, to society. His business is to be teachable (Baldwin, 1973: 66).

Don Martindale has analyzed these two concepts of Baldwin: "... the two processes of suggestion and imitation sum up the plastic relations between individual and environment. Suggestion is the process of being acted on and imitation the response to suggestion" (Martindale, 1960: 315). This conceptualization of self development, a dialectical relationship between the individual and the environment, would later inform the concepts of the I and Me by George Herbert

Mead. Through imitation and suggestion, the self is constantly changing, constantly being socialized; again, major themes of symbolic interactionism, themes which challenge biology as destiny.

> We never outgrow imitation, nor our social obligation to it. Our sense of self is constantly growing richer and fuller as we understand others better,--as we get into social co-operation with them,--and our understanding of them is in turn enriched by the additions which our own private experience makes to the lessons we learn from them (Baldwin, 1968: 324).

The credit to be given Baldwin in the shift to social science is made by Don Martindale. Because of Baldwin's concepts of imitation and suggestion the personality is no longer seen as a biological determinant. The personality is an emergent in its dialectical relationship with society.

> By locating these processes centrally to psychological development, emphasis is shifted away from all forms of hereditary determination ... of mental life; various psychological activities such as adaptation, consciousness, emotional expression, attitude formation, memory, recognition, imagination, and thought are seen as special emergents. Individual development consists in forming habits and adapting and modifying them (Martindale, 1960: 315).

Merle Curti also comments on Baldwin's realization of the self as a social product. "What man is or can become depends upon his social relations with others. Social suggestion accounted for much in the development of self-consciousness and personality" (Curti, 1980: 239). Baldwin advanced the argument that human beings emerge through their interaction with society; they are thus thoroughly social beings, and only social beings because of society.

In the following quotation we recognize a description

of personality development that emphasizes socialization, that individuals develop their personality by their intimate social bonds with others, not by something that is innate, biological, or predetermined.

> We have to say, therefore, that the child is born to be a member of society, in the same sense, precisely, that he is born with eyes and ears to see and hear the movements and sounds of the world, and with touch to feel the things of space; and, as I hope to show later in detail, all views of the man as a total creature, a creation, must recognize him not as a single body to act, or to abstain from acting, upon others similarly shut up in similar bodies; but as a soul partly in his own body, partly in the bodies of others, to all intents and purposes, so intimate is this social bond--a service for which he pays in kind, since we see in his body, considered simply as a physical organism, preparation for the reception of the soul-life, the suggestions of mind and spirit, of those others (Baldwin, 1968: 144-145).

One only becomes a person through one's interaction with society: "For the infant is an embryo person, a social unit in the process of forming ..." (Baldwin, 1968: 148). It takes time to develop, to emerge as a social being, for one is not a social being at birth: "For the social life is a late attainment ..." (Baldwin, 1968: 148).

This development of self begins in childhood and goes through epoches, anticipating the play and game stages of Mead. In The Story of the Mind, (1910) Baldwin outlined the developmental process of becoming a social person.

> First, the epoch of the rudimentary sense processes, the pleasure and pain process, and simple motor adaptation, called for convenience the "affective epoch": second, the epoch of presentation, memory, imitation, defensive action, instinct, which passes by gradations into, third, the epoch of complex presentation, complex motor coordination, of conquest, of offensive action, and rudimentary volition. These, the second and third together, I should characterize, on the side of consciousness, as the "epoch of objective reference": and,

> finally, the epoch of thought, reflection, self-assertion, social organization, union of forces, cooperation; the "epoch of subjective reference," which in human history merges into the "social and ethical epoch" (Baldwin, 1910: 16).

The strong argument of human development, especially the importance of human consciousness, thought, reflection, self-assertion, and social organization clearly marks a difference from the biological conception of human behavior. The emphasis that the last epoch in childhood development is the social and ethical epoch, that individuals learn to behave in a social environment is crucial to a developmental and social view of human nature and social behavior.

Making a profound change in the conceptualization of the self, from solely a biological and psychological construct to a social one, we clearly recognize Baldwin's contribution to the perspective of symbolic interactionism. We are thoroughly social beings because we can only develop selves through imitation and interaction with others. "... I have become what I am in part through my sympathy with you and imitation of you" (Baldwin, 1968: 325). It is this notion of sympathy with others that Charles Cooley would later expand upon in his concept of sympathetic introspection.

And whatever society is, that is bound to influence the type of person we become, for any society will circumscribe the type of people we can imitate and interact with. The interactionist tenet that there is an indissoluble connection between self and society is made by Baldwin. Society

constitutes human beings, and human beings, through the actions of self and mind, constitute society. Here Baldwin anticipates Mead's scheme on the development of becoming human through taking the role of the generalized other. Though it is somewhat vague, we are developed, constituted, or "realized" by incorporating from society a "copy" and then acting back on society.

> The self is realized by taking in "copies" from the world, and the world is enabled to set higher copies only through the constant reactions of the individual self upon it. Morally I am as much a part of society as physically I am a part of the world's fauna; and as my body gets its best explanation from the point of view of its place in a zoological scale, so morally I occupy a place in the social order; and an important factor in the understanding of me is the understanding of it (Baldwin, 1968: 467).

Social Heredity

In Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development (1897), Baldwin made even stronger arguments on the social nature of human beings and the social nature of human nature than he had in 1894 in Mental Development in The Child and Race. He developed the concept of social heredity.

> It is hereditary in that the child cannot escape it. It is as inexorably his as the color of his eyes and the shape of his nose. He is born into a system of social relationships just as he is born into a certain quality of air. As he grows in body by breathing the one, so he grows in mind by absorbing the other. The influence is as real and as tangible; and the only reason that it is variable in its results upon different individuals is that each individual has his physical heredity besides, and the outcome is always the outcome of the two factors,--natural temperament and social heredity (Baldwin, 1973: 60-61).

Through the concept of social heredity Baldwin views

behavior as having a biological and social basis. But he goes on to challenge the notion of instincts in people.

> The influence of social heredity is, in a large sense, inversely as the amount and definiteness of natural heredity. By this is meant that the more a person or an animal is destined to learn in his lifetime, the less fully equipped with instincts and special organic adaptations must he be at birth (Baldwin, 1973: 61).

With Baldwin's deemphasis on instincts and his emphasis on learning, we see how much he advanced a social view of human nature since William James. Baldwin did not, however, abandon biology; he clearly believed that the human being was a result of both "causes". Baldwin felt that the current debate was emphasizing one or the other to the detriment of an alternative view: "... <u>that most of the man's equipment is due to both causes working together</u> ..." (Baldwin, 1973: 68). With this insight, Baldwin became the first major social psychologist of the twentieth century to articulate the dialectical relationship between biology and society, a view that is predominant today.

<u>Charles Horton Cooley</u>

Charles Cooley is largely remembered for three major concepts: the looking-glass self, primary groups, and sympathetic introspection. Throughout his work there is the theme of anti-determinism. "From the German social idealist Albert Eberhard Friedrich Schäffe he took the idea that society could be free from deterministic control by an external environment while it was at the same time the formative setting for human nature" (Curti, 1980: 240). Cooley

also greatly advanced the relationship between the individual and society; namely, that they are inseparable.

Sympathetic Introspection

Sympathetic introspection is a methodological tool or, better, mental manipulation by which one imaginatively puts oneself in an individual's place or frame of reference in order to better comprehend the meaning of an individual's behavior. This is how we obtain an understanding about others. It is at once both subjective and idealistic. Cooley's epistemological idealism holds that all knowledge is ultimately mental, a work of the imagination, a construct that the mind is generally developing as a system (Hinkle: 1967, 8).

Remember that one of the assumptions of pragmatism is that reality is shaped by the knower. Reality can only be reality-as-known by the individual perceiver. Thus, Cooley is formulating his concepts within the philosophical domain assumptions of pragmatism. What we know of others originates from how able we are to imaginatively 'sink into' another's frame of reference, understand his/her definition of the situation, and thus try to comprehend him/her. The result is social knowledge or sympathetic introspection.

> [It is] ... developed from contact with the minds of other men, through communication, which sets going a process of thought and sentiment similar to theirs and enables us to understand them by sharing their states of mind. This I call personal or social knowledge. It might also be described as sympathetic, or, in its more active forms, as dramatic, since it is apt to consist of a visualization of behavior accompanied by imagination of corresponding mental processes (Cooley, 1967: 69).

Sympathetic introspection provides us with the inner experience we need for socialization. It is by sympathetic introspection that we come to know others and thereby develop a self.

> Every response we make is a step in our education, teaching us to act, to think, and to feel a little more humanly. Our brain and nerve complexes develop in the sense of our social surroundings. And at the same time our consciousness takes account of this inward experience and proceeds to ascribe it to other people in similar conditions. Thus by a single process we increase our understanding of persons, of society, and of ourselves (Cooley, 1967: 71).

We come to know men through sympathetic introspection and we also can plan how to act, how to adjust to any particular situation. Our behavior is social because we must take others into account before we act.

> What you know about a man consists, in part, of flashes of vision as to what he would do in particular situations, how he would look, speak and move; it is by such flashes that you judge whether he is brave or a coward, hasty or deliberate, honest or false, kind or cruel, and so on (Cooley, 1967: 72).

Adapting to our environment, a theme that came out of functional psychology and was prominently used in the works of William James, is underscored by Cooley. Again, adjustment to the environment rather than being determined by it is the symbolic interactionist major tenet.

In arguing that we can only know others if we incorporate a sympathetic understanding, remember that Cooley is also attacking Watsonian behaviorism. Watson had made great strides in challenging the hereditarian argument of an innate human nature. Watson also argued in favor of

limiting statements about human beings to overt activity, to behavior. Cooley's response is that we must study people differently than we study animals. "We know animals mostly as a peculiarly lively kind of thing. On the other hand, although our knowledge of people is likewise behavioristic, it has no penetration, no distinctively human insight, unless it is sympathetic also" (Cooley, 1967: 72). Studies of acts alone cannot give us a complete or at least thorough understanding of human nature and social behavior.

> The social man is something more than the sum of standardized acts, no matter how many or how well chosen. You can grasp him only by the understanding and synthetic power of your own mental complex, without which any knowledge you may gain from behavior tests must remain superficial and unintelligent (Cooley, 1967: 73).

In fact because of Cooley's distaste of these behavior tests which were then used to characterize people <u>in toto</u>, he criticized the use of intelligence tests.

> Is it not a somewhat equivocal use of terms when we talk of measuring intelligence or personality? What we measure is the performance of standardized operations. To pass from these to the organic whole of intelligence or personality is always a difficult and fallible work of the constructive imagination (Cooley, 1967: 73).

Social theory that ignored human consciousness would lead to solely superficial analysis; therefore, "... sympathetic introspection, or the understanding of another's consciousness by the aid of your own..." could provide a deeper though subjective understanding of the other (Cooley, 1967: 76).

Cooley was quite aware that this sort of knowledge was less precise, verifiable, and cumulative. But to Cooley the

question was: What does behavior mean? And the only way to get at the meaning of human behavior was through the study of covert action, of consciousness, of how people defined the situation. The way to social knowledge is through sympathetic introspection. "The human material is peculiar not only in its enormous abundance and variety, but in requiring, to deal with it, a radically different theoretical and technical equipment" (Cooley, 1967: 83). For Cooley "... the imaginations which people have of one another are the solid facts of society and to observe these must be the chief aim of sociology ... (Cooley quoted in Jandy: 1942, 109).

In this concept we discern the move to a social conception of mind, a move that was completed with Mead. Cooley's shift is definitely away from solely an innate, predetermined biological or psychological conception of mind.

The Looking-Glass Self

The significance of the ideas we have of others as the basic social fact logically leads to Cooley's concept of the self: the self we construct is based on our imaginations of how others perceive us. A looking-glass self is the process by which we develop a self, a self-concept, and self-esteem. The often quoted definition of the looking-glass self involves: "The imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of the judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification" (Cooley, 1970: 380). The second tenet is the more

important, for that is how our self-concept is formed, i.e., by how we think others, especially meaningful or significant others, view us. It is also an extension of James's notion of the social basis of self-esteem.

> The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling (Cooley, 1970: 380).

In attaching importance to our concern with the opinions of others, Cooley also realized that these not be present or personally known others, but simply imagined others. Thus, it is to Cooley's insight that the origins of an imaginary reference group concept belong.

> These [significant others] are not necessarily living persons; any one that is at all real, that is imaginable, to us, becomes a possible occasion of social self-feeling; and idealizing and aspiring persons live largely in the imagined presence of masters and heroes to whom they refer their own life for comment and improvement (Cooley, 1968: 140).

The core of the self-concept is thus a feeling. Unlike the primary group whose core feeling is a "we" feeling, the attendant feeling of the self is one of appropriation, aggression, or exclusion. "The distinctive thing in the idea for which the pronouns of the first person are names is apparently a characteristic kind of feeling which may be called the my-feeling or sense of appropriation" (Cooley, 1968: 87).

The self-feeling develops synchronously with the

expansion of our control over objects.

> It appears to be associated chiefly with ideas of the exercise of power, of being a cause, ideas that emphasize the antithesis between the mind and the rest of the world. The first definite thoughts that a child associates with self-feeling are probably those of his earliest endeavors to control visible objects--his limbs, his playthings, his bottle, and the like. Then he attempts to control the actions of the persons about him, and so his circle of power and self-feeling widens without interruption to the most complex objects of mature ambition (Cooley, 1968: 88).

The self-feeling is thus associated with accomplishment, with achieving, with purposeful activity. This notion is very similar to James's notion that self-esteem is the relationship between aspirations and achievement. Cooley has thus constructed a pragmatic self-feeling. In fact, "[t]o lose the sense of a separate, productive, resisting self, would be to melt and merge and cease to be" (Cooley, 1968: 141).

We also see the move away from our emotions as solely psychologically and biologically based on instincts; our emotions are socially constituted as well.

> We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one.... We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind. A man will boast to one person of an action--say some sharp transaction in trade--which he would be ashamed to own to another (Cooley, 1972: 231-232).

Cooley articulated two other ideas on the self still dominant in symbolic interactionism: (1) the self as multiple self, and (2) the self as a seasoned actor. The former is attributable to the influence of James.

The young performer soon learns to be different things

> to different people, showing that he begins to apprehend personality and to foresee its operation. If the mother or nurse is more tender then just she will almost certainly be "worked" by systematic weeping. It is a matter of common observation that children often behave worse with their mother than with other and less sympathetic people (Cooley, 1968: 382).

The second is that we all are actors, anticipating Goffman's dramaturgy. Cooley in referring to his daughter, states:

> At about fifteen months old she had become 'a perfect little actress,' seeming to live largely in imaginations of her effect upon other people. She constantly and obviously laid traps for attention, and looked abashed or wept at any signs of disapproval or indifference. At times it would seem as if she could not get over these repulses, but would cry long in a grieved way, refusing to be comforted. If she hit upon any little trick that made people laugh she would be sure to repeat it, laughing loudly and affectedly in imitation. She had quite a repertory of these small performances, which she would display to a sympathetic audience, or even try upon strangers (Cooley, 1968: 382).

Cooley quite obviously knew that people try to impress one another and control the definition of our selves that emerges through our competency or incompetency in social interaction. We must be constantly on-guard, for even if we know that our image is positive in the eyes of others such a state of affairs can dramatically change. Cooley's metaphor is apt:

> Perhaps we do something, quite naturally, that we find the social order is set against, or perhaps it is the ordinary course of our life that is not so well regarded as we supposed. At any rate, we find with a chill or terror that the world is cold and strange, and that our self-esteem, self-confidence, and hope, being chiefly founded upon opinions attributed to others, go down in the crash. ... As social beings we live with our eyes upon our reflection, but have no assurance of the tranquility of the waters in which we see it (Cooley, 1968: 141).

Cooley's concept of self was not primitive, but one so rich that it is still the center of symbolic interactionism. Many of his insights have been elaborated on, especially by Erving Goffman and his notion of the dramatizing self, the self as impression manager. But the point to remember is that Cooley's concept of the self exemplifies the perspective shift occurring at this time, the shift from conceiving behavior and personality in solely biological and psychological terms, to sociological ones as well.

The Individual and Society

Cooley argued that "... society and individuals are inseparable phases of a common whole, so that wherever we find an individual fact we may look for a social fact to go with it" (Cooley, 1972: 160). The relationship between the individual and society is one of organic dependence.

> That is, we see that the individual is not separable from the human whole, but a living member of it, deriving his life from the whole through social and hereditary transmission as truly as if men were literally one body. He cannot cut himself off; the strands of heredity and education are woven into all his being. And, on the other hand, the social whole is in some degree dependent upon each individual, because each contributes something to the common life that no one else can contribute. Thus, we have, in a broad sense of the word, an "organism" or living whole made up of differentiated members, each of which has a special function (Cooley, 1967: 153).

Neither society nor the individual can exist without the other in this organic relationship. "The organic view stresses both the unity of the whole and the peculiar value of the individual, explaining each by the other. A well-developed individual can exist only in and through a

well-developed whole, and vice versa" (Cooley, 1967: 153).

Cooley is making strong arguments here against the hereditarian view, for individuals are social products. In fact, Cooley asks and then answers this question, and in doing so presents his view of the relationship between heredity and environment.

> Is the individual a product of society? Yes, in the sense that everything human about him has a history in the social past. If we consider the two sources from which he draws his life, heredity and communication, we see that what he gets through the germ-plasm has a social history in that it had to adapt itself to past society in order to survive: the traits we are born with are such as have undergone a social test in the lives of our ancestors. And what he gets from communication--language, education, and the like--comes directly from society. Even physical influences, like food and climate, rarely reach us except as modified and adapted by social conditions (Cooley, 1967: 155).

Even if one were to live as a hermit one would carry society within the mind.

> If you go off alone into the wilderness you take with you a mind formed in society, and you continue social intercourse in your memory and imagination, or by the aid of your books. This, and this alone, keeps humanity alive within you, as just so far as you lose the power of intercourse your mind decays (Cooley, 1967: 155).

Implicit here is the concept Mead would develop of the generalized other and of the influence communication has on the emergence of the mind. The group and, a fortiori, the society is thus vital and necessary in social development.

The Primary Group and Human Nature

It was highly probable that Cooley would develop one of the most explanatory and accepted concepts in sociology, the primary group. Early in his career Cooley published a

monograph, Genius, Fame and the Comparison of Races, "... making a brilliant attack on the particularistic and dogmatic hereditary views of genius which Francis Galton championed" (Jandy, 1942: 91). Thomas Carlyle had also formulated the Great Man theory of leadership with the publication of Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History (Jandy, 1942: 91). This aristocratic view of history, genius, and leadership was sure to be invidious to a person from a family that had achieved national prominence from such humble beginnings. Charles' father, Thomas McIntyre Cooley, was the eighth child in a family of fifteen, but even though financial resources prohibited him an education, his ambition, industriousness, and psychic drive led him to become the country's leading constitutional lawyer (Jandy, 1942: 10). For Charles Cooley, the notion that one had to accept one's position in life rather than strive for upward mobility was not only elitist and vulgar, but viewed individuals deterministically, as though the influence of biology and heredity were destiny. Charles Cooley could see from the upward mobility of his father that primary group socialization, i.e., socialization within the family, was significant in developing one's self and mind, one's values and ambitions.

Thus, to Charles Cooley, the most important and necessary of all groups is the primary group.

> Primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity, and also in the sense that they do not change in the same degree as more elaborate relations,

> but form a comparatively permanent source out of which the latter are ever springing (Cooley, 1972: 158).

Out of the primary group emerges human nature.

> ... [T]he view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a group-nature or primary phase of society, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind. It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us--though that enters into it--and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation (Cooley, 1972: 159-160).

Don Martindale has summarized the five characteristics of Cooley's concept of primary groups: (1) face-to-face association, (2) unspecified nature of associations, (3) relative permanence, (4) a small number of persons involved, and (5) relative intimacy of participants (Martindale, 1960: 345).

The primary group's cardinal function is the socialization process through which children develop their human nature. "Here Cooley broke unplowed ground in specifically explaining human nature in terms of the human organization that developed only in the experience of the individual in primary groups" (Curti, 1980: 241).

Adults are also socialized and continually resocialized by the primary groups they encounter. For Cooley human nature was not a biological given but was the result of

socialization. Sentiments of all sorts are potentialities within the individual; however, for Cooley, the sentiment of sympathy was fundamental.

> By human nature, I suppose, we may understand those sentiments and impulses that are human in being superior to those of lower animals, and also in the sense that they belong to mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time. It means, particularly, sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong (Cooley, 1972: 158).

It is through primary groups that the sentiments--though some are more emphasized and nurtured than others, depending upon whom the primary group is composed of--are brought to fruition, i.e., develop to produce human nature. What a human being is to become does not then depend so much on native human capacity but on the type of society he/she is born into, the type of prevailing social organization.

Two necessary requirements to develop sentiments into human nature--the process of socialization--according to Cooley were: (1) the ability to empathize, and (2) the ability to symbolize. These are distinctly human capacities, thus allowing human beings to develop in a way qualitatively different from that of animals.

Cooley's notion that one could not become a human being or develop human nature had received academic support from such cases as the savage DE 'Averyron, or that of Anna or Isabelle. They have come to be known as social isolates or feral children. The first case is of a French boy who was found "wild" in the woods but brought under the care of

Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard--the founder of special education. The boy was named Victor. He was successfully though only partially socialized by Itard. Victor learned to write but never to speak. Part of what was human nature had decayed in isolation (Elkin and Handel, 1978: 22-31). Anna was a girl who had been locked up in a room with only occasional contact with other humans beings since infancy. She was found when six years old but died five years later without recovering a basic human nature. Isabelle was another girl who was also found at six but through an intensive program did develop or recover her human nature. Isabelle, however, had contact with her mother, though her mother was a deaf-mute (Elkin and Handel, 1978: 22-31). Social deprivation and personality development are now specialties within psychology and psychiatry. Such cases and Cooley's perspective underscore how strong was his argument that human beings are social, requiring the company of others.

Primary Groups and Identity Formation

Primary group interaction, especially during stressful times such as bereavement, is necessary for survival. In a person's basic need for social support and social interaction, we see how powerful Cooley's arguments were at challenging the notion that there was solely an innate biological or psychological component to human nature. Solidarity formation is also a function of the primary group, e.g., primary group definitions of self and group in the social construction of identity can contravene negative

definitions, that is, what I perceive society thinks of me and my group. However, such an identity may not be able to block or prevent negative sanctions from that society on the self or the primary group. For example, a minority family that defined their identity as possessing the same rights as any other members of the society might come into conflict with racists who do not define the minority's status as equal to theirs.

> The self-respecting man values others' judgments and occupies his mind with them a great deal, but he keeps his head, he discriminates and selects, considers all suggestions with a view to his character, and will not submit to influences not in the line of his development (Cooley, 1968: 139).

By using the example of minority groups we can illustrate how the primary group sustains solidarity and a positive identity. In-group peers, because they are usually people one interacts with, can offer social support to a minority suffering from negative societal evaluations. Significant others also function as a social shield to attacks on one's self-concept. People live in social worlds; thus, minorities can be intellectually inoculated from a "sick" environment. What evaluations minorities selectively attend to about themselves depends on the meaning they assign (credibility) to the evaluators. Cooley is thus illustrating the profound social nature of human beings, that the self and identity is formed in primary groups.

W.I. Thomas pointed out that a primary group is analogous to the family: they perform the same function in terms of maintaining social cohesion even if social

disorganization is ongoing.

> The interest by which members of a primary group are moved to keep the group together in spite of disorganizing external influences is the same general interest which underlies family life, that is, the desire for response, manifesting itself in unreflective social solidarity (Thomas, 1966: 71).

The primary group, Thomas argued, is a cultural universal. From the most preliterate to the most advanced industrial society, it is "... the most important form of social life for the immense majority of mankind" (Thomas, 1966: 57).

Cooley's concept of the primary group is a truly universal and enduring concept. All societies have primary groups in order to socialize their members. His definition of self-feeling as appropriation, aggression, or the exercise of control and power in dominating one's environment, that the self is also a multiple self for the specific purpose of successfully manipulating ("working") people, underscore Cooley's recognition of a shift away from biology and psychology to sociology. His concepts also emphasize the theme of voluntaristic nominalism. Cooley's concepts made him a major force in the development of a new perspective, in the shift in the explanation of human behavior from biology and psychology, to sociology as well.

John Dewey

Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct, published in 1922 has a very revealing subtitle: An Introduction to Social Psychology. It is in this work that Dewey's contribution to a reconceptualization of human nature and his contribution to

social psychology, specifically symbolic interactionism, was most thoroughly made.

Right from the very beginning, Dewey's argument about human nature is tied to his notions of liberal social reform. Dewey presents a dialectical view of human nature, that it is neither determined by the "instincts," which had been a very popular contemporary theory, nor was it determined solely by culture, a position of reaction to hereditarianism that came to be known as cultural determinism. Dewey, like all symbolic interactionists, was on the side of interaction between the biological and the cultural.

> We can recognize that all conduct is interaction between elements of human nature and the environment, natural and social. Then we shall see that progress proceeds in two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of interaction which maintains an environment in which human desire and choice count for something. There are in truth forces in man as well as without him (Dewey, 1957: 11).

Dewey's belief that we are influenced by the environment means that we should construct the type of environment in which "human desire and choice count for something."

For Dewey, a belief in how human nature emerges is tied in to a social policy for providing the proper environment in which human nature can properly develop. As Dewey stated, "... the issue shifts from within personality to an engineering issue ..." (Dewey, 1957: 11). J.D.Y. Peel's argument that liberals use engineering metaphors is confirmed here. When human nature is solely determined by what is within, the organic analogy of Spencer becomes appealing. But when human nature emerges from an interaction between

the biological and cultural, then we can change the cultural; we can resort to social engineering.

Habit

Given the importance of the concept of habit to William James and James Mark Baldwin, it is not surprising that Dewey would begin his contribution to social psychology with advancing the conceptualization of habits.

> The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions, these express a way of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts (Dewey, 1957: 40-41).

Habits are our ways of acting in social situations.

The way we act in a social situation (our habit) is a function "... requiring cooperation of organism and environment" (Dewey, 1957: 17).

> They are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces. They are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the out-door world (Dewey, 1957: 19).

The social basis of habits has been extended from James Mark Baldwin. Remember, earlier, I only inferred the social basis of habits in William James's conceptualization. Dewey's conceptualization is a guide as to how far human behavior had come to be seen as a product of the environment as well as a product of the organism, that the two were inseparable in any discussions of human behavior. Human behavior is now seen as social behavior. "It is not an

ethical 'ought' that conduct should be social. It is social, whether good or bad" (Dewey, 1957: 19).

Again we notice how Dewey blended teleological goals with his views on human nature. "To change the working character or will of another we have to alter objective conditions which enter into his habits" (Dewey, 1957: 22). One cannot just advocate that people change; for, Dewey not only rejected biological determinism (which meant that people could not change) but also "... a belief in metaphysical free-will" (which meant that people were free in their choice of behavior) (Dewey, 1957: 20). Rather, a social behaviorist approach meant "... that there are many recognitions of the part played by social factors in generating personal traits. ... [W]e change character from worse to better only by changing conditions.... We cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic" (Dewey, 1957: 22). Rejecting both biological determinism and metaphysical free-will, a social view of human nature made great strides with Dewey's argument.

Character

We develop many habits. In fact, the habits that we acquire make up our character. "Character is the interpenetration of habits" (Dewey, 1957: 37). The interpenetration of habits is what gives our behavior a certain unity, a certain cohesiveness that constitutes our character. "If each habit existed in an insulated compartment and operated without affecting or being affected by others, character would

not exist. That is, conduct would lack unity being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reactions to separated situations" (Dewey, 1957: 37). If our habits are highly integrated then we will have a strong character. "A weak, unstable, vacillating character is one in which different habits alternate with one another rather than embody one another" (Dewey, 1957: 37).

The dialectical notion that things interact is a recurring theme in Dewey. Out of the "... mutual modification of habits by one another..." character is formed (Dewey, 1957: 38). "... Character is the name given to the working interaction of habits ..." (Dewey, 1957: 39). And to have a good character, proper education and socialization are vital. The building of a good character requires "... the work of intelligence in observing consequences and in revising and readjusting habits, [for] even the best of good habits, can never be forgone" (Dewey, 1957: 49). Socialization and education lead to "... intelligently controlled habit" (Dewey, 1957: 28). Thus, besides changing social conditions to change behavior, Dewey also strongly believed in education and socialization to change mankind.

Custom

Dewey's concept of custom is closely associated with the anthropological concept of culture. For Dewey, "... customs or widespread uniformities of habit, exist because individuals face the same situation and react in like fashion. But to larger extent, customs persist because

individuals form their personal habits under conditions set by prior customs" (Dewey, 1957: 55). Uniformities of habit exist among people because they share a common environment. Those habits that are built up out of intelligently responding to that environment create a culture or for Dewey, a set of customs. Culture or customs persist because we are socialized to them; they are there before we are born and they will exist after we are gone. In order for human beings to become social, to become members of their community, they must incorporate the customs of the group. "The activities of the group are already there, and some assimilation of his own acts to their pattern is a prerequisite of a share therein, and hence in having any part in what is going on" (Dewey, 1957: 55).

The relationship between the individual and society or for Dewey, the individual and customs, is a dynamic one. It changes through interaction. Individuals are changed as they interact with others, and the customs of others is changed in the process of encountering the individual.

> ... [T]hose established and more or less deeply grooved systems of interaction which we call social groups, big and small, modify the activities of individuals who perforce are caught-up within them [and at the same time] ... the activities of component individuals remake and redirect previously established customs ... (Dewey, 1957: 57).

Customs then are merely "... settled systems of interaction among individuals" (Dewey, 1957: 56). And it is by understanding customs, these settled, though dynamic systems of interaction, that we understand human groups. That is to

say, for Dewey, to understand the human group meant that sociology was much more important than psychology. The shift from psychology to sociology in presenting a conceptualization of human nature and behavior was greatly advanced by Dewey's notion that psychology was not as important as other disciplines.

> The conditions which determine the nature and extent of the particular grouping in question are matters of supreme import. But they are not as such subject-matter of psychology, but of the history of politics, law, religion, economics, invention, the technology of communication and intercourse (Dewey, 1957: 59).

It was through the study of the human group, the social group and its customs, that we could come to understand human nature and behavior. And that field of study is sociology and anthropology, not psychology.

Customs shape the individual. But that does not mean for Dewey, or for any interactionist, that human beings are determined by customs. People always have a choice and that choice increases with the complexity of modern society.

> ... [B]ecause of present mobility and interminglings of customs, an individual is now offered an enormous range of custom-patterns, and can exercise personal ingenuity in selecting and rearranging their elements. In short, he can, if he will intelligently adapt customs to conditions, and thereby remake them (Dewey, 1957: 70).

The individual for Dewey is similar to Thomas' notion of the creative person. One is able to define the situation and respond with intelligent action. Custom supplies the storehouse from which to choose behavior. But behavior can be novel because people can always combine customs in unique ways.

This does not mean that the individual can act any way that he/she wants to, at least not without consequences. "Customs in any case constitute moral standards" (Dewey, 1957: 70). And a "[b]reach of custom or habit is the source of sympathetic resentment, while overt approbation goes out to fidelity to custom maintained ..." (Dewey, 1957: 71).

Custom and institutions are built up through social interaction. Dewey is very close to Mead's position on this, not to be unexpected. Dewey used the custom of language to make his argument.

> Men did not intend language; they did not have social objects in view when they began to talk, nor did they have grammatical and phonetic principles before them by which to regulate their efforts at communication. These things come after the fact and because of it. Language grew out of unintelligent babblings, instinctive motions called gestures, and the pressure of circumstance (Dewey, 1957: 74).

"What is said of the institution of language holds good of every institution. Family life, property, legal forms, churches and schools, academies of art and science ..." (Dewey, 1957: 74).

Dewey also recognized that within any society there was a plurality of customs, a notion that would probably be under the heading of subcultures in today's sociological terminology. In fact, Dewey even had a class analysis of customs. "For segregated classes develop their own customs, which is to say their own working morals" (Dewey, 1957: 76). This class diversity of customs leads to cultural conflict. "Today such a conflict occurs between propertied classes and those who depend upon daily wage; between men and women;

between old and young. Each appeals to its own standard of right, and each thinks the other the creature of personal desire, whim or obstinacy" (Dewey, 1957: 77). Dewey is able to recognize that the conflict of customs is a manifestation of the class struggle. The conflict over customs is "... a social clash, an irreconciled conflict of moral standards and purposes, the most serious form of class warfare" (Dewey, 1957: 76).

Impulse

Dewey brought forth the concept of impulse to replace the concept of instincts. Instincts were not the source of social behavior and Dewey criticized his contemporary psychologists for the error (Dewey, 1957: 85-90). An impulse is somewhat similar to Mead's notion of the I in that it is through the I that novel behavior emerges. "Impulses are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality" (Dewey, 1957: 88). Because of impulses there is a plasticity to personality and society. "... [H]abit is plastic to the transforming touch of impulse" (Dewey, 1957: 97). Through impulses society reconstitutes itself to meet new situations and thereby remains viable and dynamic (Dewey, 1957: 99).

Motive

We begin to notice how strongly Dewey moves beyond psychology and into the realm of social psychology and

sociology with his concept of motive. "The whole concept of motives is in truth extra-psychological. It is an outcome of the attempt of men to influence human action, first that of others, then of a man to influence his own behavior" (Dewey, 1957: 112). There are social expectations placed on behavior, the totality of these expectations is what sociologists call the normative order. It means that behavior is social. By imputing motives to others we engage in social and self-control. The behavior that we engage in is a social product, influenced by our socialization to a normative order.

> A motive is then that element in the total complex of man's activity which, if it can be sufficiently stimulated, will result in an act having specified consequences. And part of the process of intensifying (or reducing) certain elements in the total activity and thus regulating actual consequence is to impute these elements to a person as his actuating motives (Dewey, 1957: 113).

The type of person we are, the type of human behavior we exhibit is due to the fact "... that social institutions and expectations shape and crystallize impulses into dominant habits" (Dewey, 1957: 115). It is by imputing motives to others (and ourselves) that we let others (and ourselves) know what the expectations are, and consequently, what is appropriate and what is deviant behavior. We give positive sanctions to behavior we approve of and negative sanctions to behavior we disapprove of, this influences us to act in certain ways, it makes behavior social. A "... quality of action when noted and encouraged becomes a reinforcing stimulus of that factor which will induce similar acts in the

future. An element in an act viewed as a tendency to produce such and such consequences is a motive" (Dewey, 1957: 113).

Deliberation and Meaning

Just because we are influenced by social expectations, by the motives people attribute to our actions, does not mean we are socially determined. We are subject to social control, but the individual always acts based on deliberation and the meaning of events. Dewey's reasoning is very close to Mead's notion of minded activity and Thomas' concept of the definition of the situation. "As he looks, he sees definite things which are not just things at large but which are related to his course of action" (Dewey, 1957: 172). As a person attempts to complete his/her course of action, he/she goes through a process of deliberation. "... [D]eliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action. It starts from the blocking of efficient overt action ..." (Dewey, 1957: 179). Through this process of deliberation, a person does not act in a stimulus-response pattern as do lower animals, a person has choice, self-determination. "Choice is made as soon as some habit, or some combination of elements of habits and impulse, finds a way fully open. Then energy is released. The mind is made up, composed, unified" (Dewey, 1957: 181). Neither human nature nor social expectations determines (absolutely) human behavior. Through deliberation human beings can respond to the environment

selectively. They can use their mind to select competing plans-of-action, and dramatically rehearse these plans-of-action so that they can anticipate the consequences to any one chosen course. This ability to conceptualize the world, to discriminate among competing courses of action gives human beings control over their environment rather than the environment having control over human beings.

Another reason that a person is not determined by social expectations is that one attaches meaning to social objects and acts or responds to situations based on the meaning they have for one. Because a person sees definite things, not just things at large, there is a phenomenal or symbolic character to the world. What one object means to one person may mean something entirely different to someone else. Thus to believe that one can know how someone might respond to a social situation, what sort of behavior they may engage in, is futile without knowing the meaning objects and events have for someone.

> ... [T]he meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a matured social medium. In the case of a tiger or eagle, anger may be identified with a serviceable life-activity, with attack and defense. With a human being it is as meaningless as a gust of wind on a mudpuddle apart from a direction given it by the presence of other persons, apart from the responses they make to it (Dewey, 1957: 86).

Through deliberation and meaning human beings in a large sense determine their world, they selectively attend to social objects. Human beings create their own world by attaching meaning to social objects and events which makes

social interaction largely symbolic and purposive. Deliberation and meaning are instrumental in guiding human beings to respond to their environment creatively, neither determined by organic predispositions nor social expectations. This emphasis on symbolic conduct is why this school of thought is known as symbolic interactionism.

Human beings' creativity in responding to their environment leads them to construct unique habits. Habits found instrumental in guiding purposive social interaction become customs. The diversity of customs constructed through responding to an environment leads to a unique way of life, a culture that distinguishes one people from another. A patterned way of life, a social order, has emerged through the process of deliberation and meaning. The social order, society, is thus a social product built up through social interaction. The social order is never a "natural order," a product of inevitable human nature. Therefore, no social order, slavery, feudalism, or capitalism can be justified as an inevitable manifestation of human nature. Deliberation and meaning make all social orders and cultures dynamic, ever-evolving.

Dewey has offered sociological and anthropological evidence which has challenged reified conceptualizations of human nature, such as hereditarianism. Debates on the nature of humanity and human nature underwent philosophical reconstruction in the work of Dewey. A social view of human nature was to gain hegemony within philosophy and social

science.

Human Nature and Political Philosophy

Dewey makes the argument that one's view of human nature leads one to a political philosophy. I would agree with this. Dewey challenges the views of human nature of both the conservative and the revolutionary. Instead, Dewey presents a view of human nature which leads to social reconstruction.

The conservative argument (hereditarianism) is in error because its assumptions of human beings are no longer valid; they are based on a misinformed history and anthropology which has led to an out-of-date psychology of instincts. The immutability of human nature argument leads one to the political philosophy of laissez-faire, exactly the position Spencer came to from his views on human nature.

> Wary, experienced men of the world have always been skeptical of schemes of unlimited improvement. They tend to regard plans for social change with an eye of suspicion. They find in them evidence of the proneness of youth to illusion, or of incapacity on the part of those who have grown old to learn anything from experience. This type of conservative has thought to find in the doctrine of native instincts a scientific support for asserting the practical unalterability of human nature. Circumstances may change, but human nature remains from age to age the same. Heredity is more potent than environment, and human heredity is untouched by human intent. Effort for a serious alteration of human institutions is utopian. As things have been so they will be. The more they change the more they remain the same (Dewey, 1957: 101-102; emphasis G.M.).

We see how strongly the views of Dewey were an attempt to challenge hereditarianism and the psychology of instincts, how strongly the nature/nurture debate formed the backdrop

not only for his view of human nature but also helped shape his view of social reconstruction.

The revolutionary argument is in error due to uncritical assumptions about habits, customs, and culture. The revolutionary believes that the cake of custom quickly crumbles.

> ... [T]he short-cut revolutionist fails to realize the full force of the things about which he talks most, namely institutions as embodied habits. Any one with knowledge of the stability and force of habit will hesitate to propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping social changes. A social revolution may effect abrupt and deep alterations in external customs, in legal and political institutions. But the habits that are behind these institutions and that have, willy-nilly, been shaped by objective conditions, the habits of thought and feeling, are not so easily modified (Dewey, 1957: 102-103).

According to Dewey, the revolutionary errs in the opposite direction of the conservative. He believes in "... the idea of the complete malleability of a human nature which originally is wholly empty and passive ... the ground of proclaiming the infinite perfectibility of mankind" (Dewey, 1957: 101). The idea that one can quickly change human nature by revolutionary changes in social institutions is to ignore the profound conditioning effect of socialization and education.

In fact, it is through the profound conditioning effect of socialization and education that Dewey finds a third way. Dewey's concept of human nature was: "Native human nature supplies the raw materials, but custom furnishes the machinery and the designs" (Dewey, 1957: 104). Improving human nature requires improving the machinery and the designs of

custom, which, for Dewey, were socialization and education. The gradual change of human nature by changing habits through socialization and education must begin before habits are ossified; therefore, it begins with the young.

> [T]he cold fact of the situation is that the chief means of continuous, graded, economical improvement and social rectification lies in utilizing the opportunities of educating the young to modify prevailing types of thought and desire. The young are not as yet as subject to the full impact of established customs. Their life of impulsive activity is vivid, flexible, experimenting, curious (Dewey, 1957: 120).

Dewey fully realized that education and the school system would have to be altered, for they were institutions that served the prevailing powers, nothing more than institutions of indoctrination. Since its inception "... schooling has been largely utilized as a convenient tool of the existing nationalistic and economic regimes" (Dewey, 1957: 120). But schooling is the answer to a progressively better society.

> ... [W]ith the dawn of the idea of progressive betterment and an interest in new uses of impulses, there has grown up some consciousness of the extent to which a future new society of changed purposes and desires may be created by a deliberate humane treatment of the impulses of youth. This is the meaning of education; for a truly humane education consists in an intelligent direction of native activities in the light of the possibilities and necessities of the social situation (Dewey, 1957: 92).

Whole social science specialties have emerged with the realization of how precious childhood socialization is, e.g., developmental psychology, personality development, child psychology, the work of Piaget in particular.

Since we could change our society by changing the youth

of our society, society was ours for the remaking. What we made of it must be attributable to human design, not to human nature. For example, Dewey points out that forms of oppression are usually justified by attributing a social institution to human nature. Thus, Aristotle justifies slavery and captains of industry justify capitalism as expressions of inevitable human nature. But these are mere examples of a particular way to socialize and educate people. Neither slavery nor capitalism is inevitable. There are many ways to become human and to construct society, this is the lesson of history and anthropology. "We thus miss the fact of history and also its lesson; the diversity of institutional forms and customs which the same human nature may produce and employ" (Dewey, 1957: 105).

Human beings construct society and society constructs human beings. If we are to have a progressively better society, then we need a critique of culture which leads to social reconstruction, to an altering of social institutions, though not necessarily a revolution. We must socialize the young to socially more progressive values and thereby reconstitute and evolve our culture, and at the very same time we must alter the institutions of society that perpetuate values and human behavior that are no longer socially responsible, broadly defined. The profound transformation that the concept of socialization has had in social science thought and in American social policy is to be credited, in part, to Dewey and the other symbolic

interactionists.

The Self

If human beings construct society and that society constructs human beings, then not only are there a variety of historical and cultural expressions of being human, but also that the human being is not determined to be anything in particular. The self has a variety of manifestations and is constantly in the process of becoming. What expressions of the self are evoked or stunted depend on the dialectical relationship between the prevailing culture and the creativity of the individual.

> There is no one ready-made self behind activities. There are complex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impulses which gradually come to terms with one another, and assume a certain consistency of configuration, even though only by means of a distribution of inconsistencies which keeps them in water-tight compartments, giving them separate turns or tricks in action (Dewey, 1957: 130).

Because the self has so many potential expressions we must come to "... the recognition that selfhood ... is in [the] process of making ..." (Dewey, 1957: 130).

W.I. Thomas

Nicholas St. John Green, an influential member of the Metaphysical Club, out of which much of pragmatic thinking developed, persuaded the group that Alexander Bain's definition of belief was highly relevant to an understanding of behavior (Wells, 1971: 25). Bain's definition of belief was "that upon which a man is prepared to act" (Wells, 1971: 25). As C.S. Pierce notes: "From this definition,

pragmatism is scarce more than a corollary ..." (Pierce quoted in Mills, 1964: 84). If one believes that an entity or an idea is such and such, one will act toward that object in a way consistent with one's belief. If we believe there is a fire in our building then that will motivate us to act in a particular way; hopefully, to sound an alarm, and then, evacuate. Belief serves the function of motivating us to act; belief becomes that upon which we are prepared to act. As C.S. Pierce was to state "... as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be false or true ..." (Pierce quoted in Wells, 1971: 27).

The Definition of the Situation

We have located a powerful influence on one of symbolic interactionists' most coveted concepts, called the "definition of the situation" or the "Thomas Axiom." The way we define a situation leads to a particular plan-of-action just as belief about a situation or object becomes that upon which we are prepared to act. Whether the belief is true or not and whether the way we define our situations correspond to the true state of affairs is inconsequential for motivating action, since true or false beliefs or definitions of the situation both lead to action. "To speak of a 'true belief' is simply redundant, for both terms have the same meaning" (Wells, 1971: 27). However, although the truth or falsity of a belief is inconsequential in motivating action, it is not inconsequential for the action itself. Action which leads to failure or as Dewey phrased it "fails to

clear up confusion, uncertainty, and evil" deviates from the norms of practicality and success.

W.I. Thomas introduced the definition of the situation by showing how belief can motivate action with tragic consequences.

> A paranoid person, at present in one of the New York institutions, has killed several persons who had the unfortunate habit of talking to themselves on the street. From the movement of their lips he imagined they were calling him vile names, and he behaved as if this were true. If men define their situations as real, they are real in their consequences. The total situation will always contain more or less subjective factors, and the behavior reactions can be studied only in connection with the whole context, that is, the situation as it exists in verifiable, objective terms, and as it seemed to exist in terms of the interested person (Thomas, 1966: 301).

Between any stimulus-response, the individual defines the stimulus, i.e., interprets the stimulus and responds according to and consistent with his/her definition. His/her definition does not have to correspond with reality, for situations defined as real are real in their consequences.

The implication is that to understand behavior in a meaningful sense, one must understand how individuals define situations. One must understand the interpretation, the meaning an individual gives to situations and objects in order to understand why one behaved toward a certain object as one did, or why one acted as one did in some specific situation. Understanding others' definitions of the situation allows us to understand the subjective meaning of their action. In the American idiom this is phrased: "Oh, yes, I

see where you're coming from." The world becomes what we define it to be. But social structure and social organization are also important. To understand the subjective meaning of an individual's act--to understand why he/she defines reality in a particular way that leads to particular behavior, is also to try to uncover the social sources of interpretation/perception, i.e., the social influences that lead to defining a situation a particular way. Thomas does not emphasize the social determinants of one's definition of the situation. Rather, his emphasis is that because one can define situations one is not totally determined by the social structure or existential surround. Defining the situation allows one to break out of the conventional wisdom of the age and respond with novelty to the world.

Definitions, as we have seen, are not without their consequences. If one defines a situation in a way unshared by members of a group which leads to contra-normative action that is significantly deviant, one might have what Thomas Szasz identified as a "problem in living." In fact, one could say that it is through a contra-normative definition of the situation that one encounters a problem in living as well as a problem with social control personnel. Thomas Szasz's definition of a problem in living is analogous, I think, to Thomas' definition of the situation: "... what people now call mental illnesses are, for the most part, <u>communications</u> expressing unacceptable ideas, often framed in an unusual idiom" (Szasz, 1970: 19). As Thomas'

explanation of deviance goes:

> As long as the definitions of situations remain constant and common, we may anticipate orderly behavior reactions. When rival definitions arise ... we may anticipate social disorganization and personal demoralization. There are always constitutional inferiors and divergent personalities in any society who do not adjust, but the mass of delinquency, crime, and emotional instability is the result of conflicting definitions (Thomas, 1966: 166).

Through the above concept we see Thomas reacting to the determinism of the day, and the concept of a definition of the situation is still widely used to explain human behavior in a way that rejects determinism, both biological and psychological, and puts behavior in the context of the meaning it has to an individual, which is socially constructed.

Philistine, Bohemian And the Creative Person

Thomas also constructed a typology of how people define the situation in response to the prevailing norms of the culture. A constant conflict between the individual wanting to maximize new experiences and the society demanding a maximum of stability create three types of individuals. The Philistine: his/her response is to adhere to the norms like an automaton; he/she values security over new experience and individuality. The Bohemian: he/she exists in something like a constant state of anomie, escaping from normative behavior through a tendency to revolt or because no norms were inculcated with any suation. The creative person: the two others were extremes, but the creative person is the symbolic interactions' dream of a person: one confronted by

social or cultural determinants but able to transcend them through redefining the situation, through creative, rational action; one who does not overrespond to the norms (the Philistine) or underrespond to the norms (the Bohemian) but interprets the norms and chooses an appropriate plan-of-action. The ideal, creative person, is one that reflects the primary theme of these early sociologists, voluntaristic nominalism.

Thomas' concepts of the definition of the situation is a universal and enduring one. It is a defining characteristic of human beings at all times. But his application of it, especially in his typology of how people can define situations, is highly rooted in the social circumstances of his day. Thomas stressed a person's ability to manipulate the environment, and in doing so he helped create the emerging perspective of symbolic interactionism in which one is not determined by biology or environment. The creative person represents a balance between those who would see human beings as determined by either internal or external forces. As Don Martindale comments on the work of W.I. Thomas: "At every critical point Thomas' affinities are with the pragmatists and symbolic interactionists" (Martindale, 1960: 349). This is certainly seen in the concept of the creative person, one exemplifying the theme of voluntaristic nominalism.

Culture as Social Disorganization

W.I. Thomas also greatly incorporated the concept of culture into his work, primarily by showing how old world traits were dysfunctional to immigrants coming to America. In the works of The Polish Peasant (1918-1920) with Florian Znaniecki, Old World Traits Transplanted (1921), and The Unadjusted Girl (1923), Thomas spent much of his life's work "... tracing the dependence of individuals on social life and culture and of culture and social life on the individual" (Martindale, 1960: 348). In these works Thomas developed the primary techniques of research of symbolic interactionism, the life history, the case history, ethnography, and what is now called by interactionists, participant observation.

The city, though primarily its seedy side, was the laboratory for Thomas' new type of empirical research. One was to explore the various social worlds of the incoming immigrants. This focus on the social worlds of the immigrant was also responsible for the later development of the concept of subculture in sociology as well as the ecology school of deviance that was developed under the direction of Robert Park. Direct observation redirected attention on the subject of the deviant act. "The religious and philanthropic temper that animated speculations about evolution, organicism, racial differences, and adjustment was replaced by deliberate attempts to investigate the meanings of the world from the subject's viewpoint" (Davis, 1980: 57).

Social disorganization was defined by Thomas as the absence of social control, that is, "... a decrease of the influence of existing social rules of behavior upon individual members of the group" (Thomas, 1966: 4). Social disorganization is a concept that referred to institutions "... and only secondarily to men" (Thomas, 1966: 5). The theme emphasized by Thomas is that one may live in an area of social disorganization but not necessarily suffer any individual disorganization, or conversely one may be individually disorganized but live in an area of social organization. One phenomenon is not coextensive with the other (Thomas, 1966: 5).

Thomas was a person that was influenced by both the good and the bad aspects of early twentieth century culture. We see this in some of his writings on immigrants, for he echoes much of the fear of the mental testers. For Thomas the immigrants did not have inferior biologies or an inferior intelligence but an inferior culture. He, too, thought that immigrants would breed too fast for American democracy.

> ... [I]f we should receive, say, a million Congo blacks and a million Chinese coolies annually, and if they should propagate faster than the white Americans, it is certain that our educational system would break down; we could not impart even the "three R's." We should then be in a state of chaos unless we abandoned the idea of democracy and secured efficiency by reverting to the "ordering and forbidding" type of state. This is the general significance of immigration to our problem of democracy (Thomas, 1966: 198).

We have to help the immigrant adjust properly for: "If visitors are disorderly, unsanitary, or ignorant, the group which incorporates them, even temporarily, will not escape

the bad effects of this" (Thomas, 1966: 197-198). Immigrants need not do better on intelligence tests but rather learn American values. "They cannot be intelligent citizens unless they "get the hang" of American ways of thinking as well as of doing" (Thomas, 1966: 198). Thomas was not so fearful of polluting the gene pool as he was the culture pool. "... [W]e have on our hands this problem we are importing large numbers of aliens, representing various types, in the main below our cultural level" (Thomas, 1966: 197)). Therefore: "We must make the immigrants a working part in our system of life, ideal and political, as well as economic, or lose the character of our culture. Self-preservation makes this necessary ..." (Thomas, 1966: 198).

Thomas' work on the influence of culture on human beings' lives greatly advanced the perspective of sociology, and was significant in challenging biological determinism and behaviorist psychology in the 1920s. His work with Florian Znaniecki was regarded for a long time as <u>the</u> exemplar in the field of sociology.

In this chapter I have introduced the major contributions that these thinkers made to a reconceptualization of human nature and behavior. This dissertation also showed that the concepts of human nature that were developed were consistent with a liberal agenda.

We now turn to the person who did more than anyone else to develop a sociological conception of human nature and behavior and thereby challenge biological determinism and

behaviorist psychology, contributing to the hegemony of the sociological perspective that George Stocking argued was evident on questions of human nature and behavior by the middle of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER VI

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE HEGEMONY OF A NEW PERSPECTIVE: THE MAJOR CONCEPTS OF GEORGE HERBERT MEAD

It is now time to direct our attention to the concepts of G.H. Mead, the person who, above all, has influenced the perspective in sociology coined by Herbert Blumer in 1937, as symbolic interaction.

Any order of discussion is arbitrary, but the one employed here is of an increasing complexity in concepts. I start with the simplest for clarity and hope that because of this that, as one advances, the foregoing comprehension will allow the discussion to remain clear and simple even though the ideas and concepts become more complex.

Gesture

The concept of the gesture is probably as simple a starting place as any. Mead's thinking on gestures was influenced by Wilhelm Wundt, who: "... isolated a very valuable conception of the gesture as that which becomes later a symbol, but which is to be found in its earlier stages as a part of a social act" (Mead, 1972: 154). The earlier stage of the social act, the gesture, is a simple stimulus-response. Here the gestures have no meaning; there is no conscious attempt to guide or control one's action or

the response of others. Simply put, the gesture is an instinctive action.

> "... [W]e have a situation in which certain parts of the act become a stimulus to the other form to adjust itself to those responses; and that adjustment in turn becomes a stimulus to the first form to change his own act and start a different one. The term "gesture" may be identified with these beginnings of social acts which are stimuli for the response of other forms (Mead, 1972: 155).

Gesture here is the simplest form of the social act. The initiation of the gesture serves as the stimulus to a recipient who makes an adjustive response. Gestures do not carry ideas with them. They do however, carry or are initiated by emotional attitudes. "Anger expresses itself in attack; fear expresses itself in flight" (Mead, 1972: 157). Attacks and flight are gestures, instinctively so. However, "We cannot say the animal means it in the sense that he has a reflective determination to attack" (Mead, 1972: 155).

Perhaps the best way to understand the simple gesture is that it is not preconceived. When one has an idea behind one's gesture, one has made a conscious determination to act in a particular way. This would be a significant gesture. Mead explained the contradistinction between the two.

> ... [T]he observer sees that the attitude of the dog means attack, but he does not say that it means a conscious determination to attack on the part of the dog. However, should somebody shake his fist in your face you assume that he has not only a hostile attitude but that he has some idea behind it (Mead, 1972: 157).

Another clarification is that for gestures the stimulus and response are different (Zeitlin, 1973: 222). The

stimulus of attack initiates the response of flight. The meanings are not shared. The dog does not put itself in the place of the cat; the stimulus is not a shared understanding in the sense that it means the same to the initiator as it does to the respondent. It is at this level that animal action is circumscribed. Gesture-action on this level is what Mead referred to as the unconscious or non-significant conversation of gestures (Mead, 1972: 158). To transcend to the human level of action involves a qualitatively different cognitive manipulation: symbolization.

Significant Gestures

Mead had set out to establish that Watsonian behaviorism was misguided in that it approached the study of the behavior of animals and people with the same methodological assumptions. It was through the concept of significant gestures that Mead's distinction between the behavior of animals and that of people emerged. Human beings gesture in a qualitatively different way than do animals: "... gesture means idea ... behind it and it arouses that idea in the other individual ..." (Mead, 1972: 157). The initiation of action arouses an idea that is similar both within himself/herself and that of the respondent.

> In the case of the dogfight we have a gesture which calls out appropriate response; in the present case (someone shaking his fist in your face) we have a symbol which answers to a meaning in the experience of the first individual and which also calls out that meaning in the second individual (Mead, 1972: 157).

Symbolization and significant gesturing are exclusively

human; language is a developmental consequence, and language is an exclusive communication process of interaction among human beings.

Mead successfully began to refute Watson's simplistic and reductionistic notion of human behavior. A qualitative difference in human interaction should surely require a qualitatively different or at least more sophisticated methodology. Zeitlin states the importance of this qualitative difference.

> Although the most intelligent animals learn to behave appropriately and even to cooperate, the stimulus-gesture of one can never evoke the identical response-gesture in another. So long as this is true, they do not have significant symbols or language. There is no way of getting from the animal condition, in which stimulus and response differ, to the human condition, in which stimulus and response can be identical. The latter requires that mediation of that exclusively human capacity for creating and transmitting symbols, meanings, ideas, and content (Zeitlin, 1973: 222).

Significant gestures then are shared symbols, i.e., their meaning is culturally shared. Experience is shared through significant gestures: the process of human communication is established when one has the ability to initiate gestures which are significant, i.e., elicit an identical response in the initiator and the person to whom the gesture was directed. "Where the gesture reaches that situation it has become what we call "language." It is now a significant symbol, and it signifies a certain meaning" (Mead, 1971: 157). Gesture-action at this level was called by Mead a conscious or <u>significant conversation of gestures</u> (Mead, 1972: 158).

The function of the significant gesture is that it allows a great diversity in social behavior. Human behavior is infinitely more complex, conscious, directed, and purposive than that of animal behavior. It is through language (or symbolization generally) that complex forms of behavior and development are realizable. Again we can discern that with this concept Mead has challenged instinct theory and biological determinism, behavior in terms of significant gestures is thoroughly social.

Vocal Gesture

It is through the concept of the vocal gesture that Mead elaborated his notion of meaning emerging through a shared response to a stimulus.

> The particular importance of the vocal gesture is that it affects the individual who makes it just as much as it affects the individual to whom it is directed. We hear what we say ... (Mead, 1972: 36).
>
> The gesture that affects another, when it is a vocal gesture, is one which may have the tendency to influence the speaker as it influences others. The common expression of this is that a man knows what he is saying when the meaning of what he is saying comes to him as really as it goes to another (Mead, 1972: 37).

Vocal gestures are those gestures where the stimulus of one's speech is identical to self and others. We respond to our own speech as others do; its meaning is the same for us as it is for others.

The vocal gesture is thus that form of interaction that is most fundamental to the development of the self. The function of the vocal gesture allows us to take the role of the other--a concept to be explored momentarily.

> ... [T]he vocal gesture is the medium for one's becoming a self, or evolving and becoming aware of oneself as a self. The vocal gesture is the particularly apt and functional medium for using and developing the capacity to respond to one's own stimulus as others would and do respond (Thayer, 1968: 247).

The vocal gesture assumes--as do all significant gestures--that the response will be identical even though there are a number of potential respondents.

Taking the Role or the Attitude Of the Other

The process through which gestures "... arouse in an individual making them the same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed ..." (Mead, 1972: 158-159), is the process of taking the role or attitude of the other. To gesture with significance we have to take the attitude of the person(s) to whom we are addressing our gestures. The taking of the other's attitude allows gestures to become significant: we understand the meaning of our gestures, and of the gestures of others by imaginatively placing ourselves in the position and/or attitude of the other. A common consciousness of meaning emerges: "... the individual's consciousness of the content and flow of meaning involved depends on his thus taking the attitude of the other toward his own gestures" (Mead, 1972: 159). Consciousness of our gestures, of the meaning embodied in or symbolized by them makes them significant, and surely distinguishes the gesture-action of an animal from the significant gesture-action of an individual. As

succinctly explained:

> Significant gesture is always self-conscious because significance depends on the individual making the gesture becoming self-aware of the content of his gesture through taking the place of the other individual to whom the gesture is addressed (Natanson, 1973: 8).

Both addresser and addressee must take the attitude of the other (Natanson, 1973: 8), thus communication and experience become shared.

Through taking the role of the other we are able to plan our action/behavior by taking into consideration others' possible responses to our action, since by knowing their attitude we may anticipate their responses and act accordingly. Thus, reciprocally taking each others' attitudes influences each of our acts/behavior reciprocally.

Thus, for Mead, one important function of taking the attitude of the other is that of social control. If we know another's attitude, then what he/she expects of us will certainly influence how we act. Social control becomes self control. And since our behavior is influenced by taking the role of others, we transcend any notion whatsoever of a biologically determined behavior or that of psychologically determined instincts: behavior becomes situational, calculating, volitional, and problematic; we must assess the meaning of others' significant gestures and respond with significant gestures of our own. And how we respond depends a great deal on how we define the situation. This is how the concepts of these interactionists come together in establishing a hegonomic view of human nature and behavior.

Social Objects

Objects are human creations. Objects exist independently of us, and only become objects for us when we experience them. We experience and give meaning to objects by acting toward them. No object has intrinsic meaning; the meaning of an object is designated by our response to it. Objects are different entities for different individuals. A can of coke to one individual is a pleasurable drink; to another individual it is a poison that rots the teeth. The meaning of an object is different to people even though objects exist in nature independent of our experience of them. It is only by experiencing objects that they become real to us.

Mead is not solipsistic, for he does not deny the existence in nature of objects independent of our experience; rather, he is a reality constructionist in his notion that objects are different entities for different individuals.

> Nature--the external world--is objectively there, in opposition to our experience of it or in opposition to the individual himself. Although external objects are there, independent of the experiencing individual, nevertheless they possess certain characteristics by virtue of their relations to his experiencing or to his mind, which they would not possess otherwise or apart from those relations. These characteristics are their meaning for him.... The distinction between physical objects or physical reality and the mental or self-conscious experience of those objects or that reality --the distinction between external and internal experience--lies in the fact that the latter is concerned with or constituted by meanings. Experienced objects have definite meanings for the individuals thinking about them (Mead, 1972: 193).

We orient our action toward objects on the basis of the

meaning the objects have for us, and that meaning is an emergent through the process of social interaction.

The group one interacts with or is a member of or serves as a referent for is a determinant of social meaning. The interaction say, between the parent and a child of an upper-class family regarding the object, college education, and the interaction between the parents and a child from a family not nearly as economically advantaged, are likely to be different in terms of the definitions placed upon the object, college education. The definitions attached to, thus, the emergent meaning of a college education, is likely to be favorable in one family, and perhaps unfavorable in the other.

Objects are emergents through the process of symbolization--a process not achievable by animals. Again Mead is refuting the inadequacies of Watsonian behaviorism; he is showing how behavior is social, purposeful, and creative, rather than biologically determined. The animal world is determined, but humans, since they can create objects, can create their own world. Language or communication allows us to define objects and to respond to them.

> The social process, as involving communication, is in a sense responsible for the appearance of new objects in the field of experience of the individual organisms implicated in that process (Mead, 1972: 164).

And:

> Language does not simply symbolize a situation or object which is already there in advance; it makes possible the existence or the appearance of that situation or object, for it is part of the mechanism whereby that situation or object is created (Mead, 1972: 165).

To summarize:

(1) The meaning of any object is designated by how one responds to it.

(2) One responds to an object on the basis of the expectations that one holds about the object.

(3) Expectations about objects are socially constructed through symbolic interaction. They are social emergents.

(4) If the expectations about the objects are satisfied, one will continue to respond to the object in a probabilistic manner; if expectations sour, response becomes problematic. Note the pragmatic influence: if it works to your satisfaction, continue.

(5) Personal change (attitudinal and behavioral) occurs when we reconstitute the meaning of objects and thereby respond to them de novo.

A person who responds to coke by drinking can after can has (1) a favorable image/meaning of the object, (2) perhaps based on the expectation that coke is a refreshing drink that satisfies one's thirst, (3) constructed by, say, how one's friends talk about and use it, and the influence of the mass media, (4) and every time the person drinks a coke he/she enjoys, it thereby having one's expectations reaffirmed, (5) though a trip to the dentist, who berates the person for being so careless with an irreplaceable possession as well as inflicting pain and the insult of a $1,000 dentist bill, may lead the person to reconstitute the meaning of coke with the expectation that, if one continued to drink it, all one's teeth would rot, thereby changing the person's attitude and behavior vis-a-vis the object, coke. This illustrates how social objects are emergent and subject to redefinition.

Our world is thus of our own making, since we construct objects to which we respond. Berkeley's proposition: "To be is to be perceived," fits well with Mead's notion of objects. Objects have different shades of meaning to different individuals, thereby engendering different responses to objects.

Meaning

Obviously, from the above discussion, the concept of meaning is closely tied to our understanding of objects. Meaning functions as a predisposition to act in a certain way toward gestures or objects. These predispositions are social constructs. They emerge in interaction with others. Meaning is a process of internalizing how others define objects or situations, but is not a passive process. Meaning is the response we make to a gesture or object or situation, not a mere stimulus-response, but a stimulus-interpretation-response. "The response of one organism to the gesture of another in any given social act is the meaning of that gesture ..." (Mead, 1972: 165).

Meaning, for Mead, emerges within the process of the social act. As Mead often stated: "... meaning involves [a] threefold relation among phases of the social act as the context in which it arises and develops ..." (Mead, 1972: 164). Piecing together this process explained by Mead we find (Mead, 1972: 164-167):

(1) The first phase is the gesture, the initial process of the social act. Symbolization is here a prerequisite, a necessary condition.

(2) The second phase is the "Response on the part of the second organism to the gesture of the first is the interpretation--and brings out the meaning--of that gesture, as indicating the resultant of the social act which it initiates ..." (Mead, 1972: 167).

(3) The third phase is the completion of a given act by the initiator of the gesture.

Meaning, of course, is something that changes as the individual changes his/her response to an object. For example, marriage or a college education may not be responded to favorably--a negative meaning--but through one's experiences, emotions, and interaction with others, a new meaning may emerge in regard to obtaining a college education or getting married. The individual is thus not a static creature but a changeable one, one capable of personal change. Again we see how Mead's concepts were the culmination in the shift from viewing behavior biologically to viewing behavior socially. Because meanings are shared, there is cooperative behavior, shared expectations, and normative patterns of interaction; in short, social order. Because meanings can change there is both personal and social change. And because there are shades of meaning demonstrated by various responses to gestures, there is individuality, cultural, and subcultural variation. Thus behavior is probabilistic rather than determined.

Selective Attention

As we have discussed above, objects and meanings are social emergents. The world is not one of social force or restraint overpowering the individual. Rather, people are

able to select out those stimuli that are relevant to them (say, because of their needs). People select the stimuli to which they respond. We are the creators of our own worlds. Again the theme of voluntaristic nominalism is everywhere relevant in Mead's work.

> Our whole intelligent process seems to lie in the attention which is selective of certain types of stimuli. Other stimuli which are bombarding the system are in some fashion shunted off. We give our attention to one particular thing (Mead, 1972: 138).

> Here we have the organism as acting and determining its environment. It is not simply a set of passive senses played upon by the stimuli that come from without. The organism goes out and determines what it is going to respond to and organizes that world (Mead, 1972: 139).

This strong anti-deterministic stance must be seen in its contemporary setting, for Mead still had to win the battle against the biological determinists. Today a sociologist might say: In what sense does someone from the ghetto go out and organize their world? Mead's position is understandable when we remember that he was arguing for a reconceptualization of human nature and behavior, away from a vulgar and pernicious determinism that said that people were biologically trapped.

Through selective perception, reality is a social construction. Stimuli are present--objective--but how we perceive/experience those entities or stimuli is idiosyncratic. Experience is subjective; and that subjectivity characterizes us as individuals. "The particular color or odor that any one of us experiences is a private affair. It differs from the experiences of other individuals, and yet

there is a common object to which it refers" (Mead, 1972: 146). It is as though every object is a holograph toward which we all have a different angle of vision. Again Mead is polemically using the concept of selective attention as ammunition against the Watsonian behaviorists. Human beings are qualitatively different because they can select out the stimuli to which they will respond, animals cannot.

This whole process or activity is a rational one: it is rationality itself. To select out those stimuli to which we respond (freedom of choice is assumed in daily interaction) and to indicate stimuli to others through significant gestures is rational conduct. "That is what you are doing when you act in a rational fashion; you are indicating to yourself what the stimuli are that will call out a complex response ..." (Mead, 1972: 172). Action is intelligent action. We are able to choose what to do when confronted by problematic situations. We engage in reflective, introspective, decision-making processes, we do not act in a whimsical or capricious manner. We are able to mentally design alternative scenarios to stimuli, i.e., to imagine, by taking the role of the other, how our responses will be met, i.e., evaluated by others, and what possible consequences our action may have. Our action is purposive, and purpose is in the mind of the actor. Human beings are teleological. All this is preliminary covert activity.

> Human intelligence ... deliberately selects one from among the several alternative responses which are possible in the given problematic environmental situation .... [A]nd thus it makes possible the

> exercise of intelligent or reflective choice in the acceptance of that one among these possible alternative responses which is to be carried into overt effect (Mead, 1972: 176).

As opposed to social control resulting from internal/biological constraints human beings have instead the power of self-control over social facts, i.e., things independent of our will which we cannot blink away. Again we see how non-biological and thoroughly social our behavior is, Mead's contribution to the development of the sociological perspective, of unconfounding biology from sociology.

Selective Environment

It is through the activity of selective attention that we create a selective environment. Environmental relativity emerges. Since each individual selects his/her own stimuli, the corollary deduction is that the environment becomes relative vis-a-vis the individual: "... the particular phase of reality that is there for us is picked out for us by our response" (Mead, 1972: 190), "... in this sense the environment of the individual is relative to the individual" (Mead, 1972: 191).

But Mead is not solipsistic, for remember that Mead argued that the world is objectively there, but that we experience that world cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally as subjective. In fact, Mead criticized Cooley's Human Nature and Social Order as solipsistic, of denying the existence of society (Mead, 1972: 244). In defining what social psychology is--as opposed to

reductionistic Watsonian behaviorism, Mead states: "For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part of the whole; and the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the parts" (Mead, 1972: 121). Society as prior to the individual is an important point without which Mead's theory would lose a great amount of sociological significance.

The Self

The self is George Herbert Mead's paramount concept. The self develops through the individual taking the role of others toward himself/herself. The mechanism whereby an individual takes the role or attitude of the other toward himself/herself is language. The self is both subject and object. The ability to be an object to one's self (self-objectification) is an emergent of the capacity to take on the role or attitude of others. We are self-conscious when we treat our selves as an object, when we scrutinize our selves from the vantage point of another. We are able to evaluate our own behavior, to laud our selves or to blame our selves as others would do; indeed, we do so from the standpoint of another or the generalized other. By taking the role of others we have internalized the norms and attitudes of primary, significant, and generalized others. It is this process of normative internalization that develops our selves, that makes us moral beings, that distinguishes us as members of the community in the fullest sense, since the community is now within us. Without

internalizing the norms of the community, we are in a very real sense, a pariah.

The self is a developmental activity that is in contradistinction to "the physiological organism proper." "The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there at birth but arises in the process of social experience and activity ..." (Mead, 1972: 199). Mead simply meant that the body is different from the self.

> The body can be there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion without there being a self involved in the experience. The self has the characteristic that it is an object to itself, and that characteristic distinguishes it from other objects and from the body (Mead, 1972: 200).

Our selves are only operative at certain times, at times when we are objects to ourselves.

The concept that a body does not necessarily possess a self is to differentiate human beings from animals. "The intelligence of the lower forms of animal life, like a great deal of human intelligence, does not involve a self" (Mead, 1972: 199). As in many of Mead's concepts, the self is to be viewed in relation to his debate with Watson; Mead demonstrated, quite successfully, that the self is a generative process differentiating human beings from animals on the phylogenetic continuum. Being able to be an object to our self we become reflexive: "This characteristics is represented in the word 'self' which is a reflexive, and indicates that which can be both subject and object" (Mead, 1972: 201).

The mechanism of reflexivity, of making an object of

our selves (self-objectification) is by taking the role of either significant others or the generalized other. We thus experience our selves indirectly through the eyes of others.

> The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only insofar as he first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or are in his experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved (Mead, 1972: 202-203).

The substance of this mechanism of role-taking is language and communication for "... it provides a form of behavior in which the organism or the individual may become an object to himself" (Mead, 1972: 203). "I know of no other form of behavior than the linguistic in which the individual is an object to himself ..." (Mead, 1972: 206).

Another person does not have to be present for us to slip into his/her place, to take his/her role toward our self. Having this conversation with ourselves is thinking. "The very process of thinking is, of course, simply an inner conversation that goes on, but it is a conversation of gestures which in its completion implies the expression of that which one thinks to an audience" (Mead, 1972: 206).

A crucial note is that not all of our self is present in any one situation. The self that is presented is in a sense a situational self (multiple personality in Mead's words), one that is a function of the ongoing interaction.

> What determines the amount of the self that gets into communication is the social experience itself. We carry on a whole series of different relationships to different people. We are one thing to one man and another thing to another. There are parts of the self which exist only for the self in relationship to itself. There are all sorts of different selves answering to all sorts of different social reactions (Mead, 1972: 207).

What Mead was referring to here, he calls a multiple personality. The debate over whether Mead considered the self unitary or multiple is perhaps engendered here. Mead goes on to say that: "Normally, within the sort of community as a whole to which we belong, there is a unified self, but that can be broken up" (Mead, 1972: 207). We also see here how much Mead's work was influenced by William James.

The multiple personality helps us to function in a world when we encounter different groups or different reactions to our behavior. We present a self that is appropriate for the group or possible reaction we may encounter: "... there can be different selves, and it is dependent upon the set of social reaction that is involved as to which self we are going to be" (Mead, 1972: 207-208). When this happens we are not expressing our <u>complete selves</u>. Mead was trying to distinguish between fragmentary selves and complete selves. There are a number of elementary selves that are particular to particular situations or interactions (what I have called a situational self) and the complete self that is a composite of all of the elementary selves.

The unity and structure of the complete self reflects

> the unity and structure of the social process as a whole; and each of the elementary selves of which it is composed reflects the unity and structure of one of the various aspects of that process in which the individual is implicated. In other words, the various elementary selves which constitute, or are organized into, a complete self are the various aspects of the structure of that complete self answering to the various aspects of the structure of the social process as a whole; the structure of the complete self is thus a reflection of the complete social process (Mead, 1972: 208).

The self is unitary, but elementary selves respond to particular social experiences or processes the individual encounters. This is a normal occurrence.

But there is also an abnormal self that is presented, that is, a self-dissociation, or personality breakup.

> The phenomenon of dissociation of personality is caused by a breaking up of the complete, unitary self into the component selves of which it is composed, and which respectively correspond to different aspects of the social process in which the person is involved ... (Mead, 1970: 209).

With the conceptualization of multiple selves, multiple personalities, and our ability to use one or another at will, depending on what the social situation calls for, we notice how successfully Mead has challenged biological determinism and why he stands at the pinnacle in early American sociology as responsible for the development of a sociological conception of human nature and behavior, of personality development and socialization.

The Emergence of the Self

Edwin M. Lemert has pointed out that the metaphors of play and game may have unintended, "reductionistic" implications. They may deny the very determining nature of

human reaction that Mead wished to convey (Lemert, 1979: 428). However, we must attribute to play and game the meaning that Mead gave to them, which was wholly anti-reductionistic. Drawing on Baldwin's earlier work in genetic psychology, Mead located the emergence of the self in two stages: play and game. Play is the rudimentary stage of role-taking. "Play in this sense ... is play at something" (Mead, 1972: 214). One plays at being the various roles that children encounter: father, mother, fireman, policeman, nurse, doctor and the like. The child has no unified self as yet. The role-taking is not of another toward one's self but merely, "The child says something in one character and responds in another character" (Mead, 1972: 215). Role-taking is not sophisticated or advanced beyond that of a fragmentary taking of another's role toward oneself.

In the game stage one "must be ready to take the attitude of everyone else involved in the game and that these roles must have a definite relationship to each other" (Mead, 1972: 215). The individual is now able to engage in abstraction so as to consider the attitudes of others simultaneously. Only insofar as one is able to accomplish this will one be able to develop a complete self. The development of a complete self is coterminous with the ability to take the role of the generalized other. If the individual does not take the role of the generalized other toward his/her behavior, he/she will not be a moral being,

will not develop a conscience, will not have internalized the norms of the community. A very important function that is a result of role-taking will be vitiated; the loss of social control through self-control. "It is in the form of the generalized other that the social process influences the behavior of the individuals involved in it and carrying it on, that is, that the community exercises control over the conduct of its individual members" (Mead, 1972: 219).

The individual thus develops conduct norms, has a guide to his/her behavior, and is able to achieve self control since the mechanism of self-control is the internalized norms of the community. Without this role-taking ability, the individual may develop in deviant ways.

An important theme in Mead, especially for the sociology of knowledge, is in the effect of the group on the structure of the self. Our selves are inescapably structured by the social groups we are part of, in fact, as we have already shown, one cannot develop a self until one has internalized the norms and expectations of the group, of the generalized other.

> The individual possesses a self only in relation to the selves of the other members of his social group; and the structure of his self expresses or reflects the general behavior pattern of this social group to which he belongs, just as does the structure of the self of every other individual belonging to this social group (Mead, 1972: 227-228).

Mead was not casting human beings in a deterministic mold, for even though the self emerges with the internalization of the community, the individual is always above and

beyond the community in the sense that he/she selects stimuli/objects, defines the situation, considers alternative plans-of-action, and can act upon the world rather than passively respond to it. One does not respond to norms in the structural-functional image of humans. The individual confronted by any problematic situation is able to use various referents, but how he/she uses them in any unique combination will produce a novel social act. Novelty is always possible or present because one takes the role of various reference groups or significant others in formulating a plan-of-action. The individual is both determined and determiner, both conformist and radical (in the non-political sense), thus society remains stable though ever in a state of flux. How is this accomplished? Mead argued that this is possible because there are two processes or activity phases of the self: the I and Me.

The I and Me

Perhaps as simple as statement as any explaining the I and the Me: "the I is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the Me is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes" (Mead, 1972: 230). The Me is society in microcosm, it is the self developed through role-taking. The function of the Me is goal-direction, conformity, and stability. The Me functions to organize the individual's response to be compatible but not identical with community expectations. The response is not determined but a probabilistic expectation. The

"response of the I is something that is more or less uncertain" (Mead, 1972: 231). There is an indeterminacy of the self through the I. The function of the I is novelty, spontaneity, and creativity. "The I gives the sense of freedom, of initiative" (Mead, 1972: 232). But the I is only caught sight of as an historical figure, for the second we think of the I we are in the phase of activity that is the Me. There is a dialectical phase of activity between the Me and I. The self is a dialectical process whereby the I (thesis) calls out the Me (antithesis) and the resulting social act after we ruminate over several plans-of-action is novelty (synthesis). Personal change (attitudinal and behavioral) is thus an inescapable characteristic of the dialectical process of the self; again, soundly refuting biological determinism.

Social control is also a function of the Me, but this does not robotize us to respond to norms methodically, or as marionettes pulled to and fro by the norms of the community. The response of the I "... raises us above the institutionalized individual" (Mead, 1972: 239). The institutionalized individual is the image of human beings the structural-functionalists adhere to. We identify our selves with the response of the I, for it is our unique responses that differentiate us from every one else.

Mind

Mead rejected Wundt's concept of mind as the antecedent condition and prerequisite for the social process of

experience. Rather, the social process of experience was prior "... to the existence of mind and explain[s] the origin of minds in terms of interaction among individuals within that process ..." (Mead, 1972: 162). "Mind arises through communication by a conversation of gestures in a social process or context of experience--not communication through mind" (Mead, 1972: 162).

Language plays the most crucial role in the development of the mind. Significant symbols such as the vocal gesture are necessary human manipulations (cognitive prerequisites) for the development of the mind. Only as we develop communication and language through the ages of evolution does the possibility of a mind exist. Mind emerges through and out of symbolic interaction. "Out of language emerges the field of mind" (Mead, 1972: 195). When we are able to indicate to ourselves and to others through the vocal gesture --language--what our response to objects will be, it is then that we have developed language, a necessary stage on a phylogenetic continuum for the development of mind. "Language is the means whereby individuals can indicate to one another what their responses to objects will be, and hence what the meaning of objects are ..." (Mead, 1972: 184). Mind emerges as competence in the manipulation of significant symbols emerges. "Mentality is that relationship of the organism to the situation which is mediated by sets of symbols" (Mead, 1972: 187). "Mentality ... comes in when the organism is able to point out meanings to others

and to himself. This is the point at which mind appears, or if you like, emerges" (Mead, 1972: 194).

Mind is the ability and process of the human to select a response to an object or stimulus. The mind has the ability to select our stimuli and plan complete acts before we ever physically initiate those acts. The formation of the mind requires a physiologically necessary condition, a complex and advanced brain. But the brain and the mind are not identical. The brain has an empirical referent, the mind is a process, an activity. Thus, there is a free-will or voluntaristic component to human behavior. Rationality of human actions is embedded in choosing one's course of action. Thus, the mind's function is to provide human beings with a superior adaptive capacity in confronting one's environment through the process of internally controlling one's response to stimuli by selecting an appropriate plan-of-action.

> There is an organization of the various parts of the nervous system that are going to be responsible for acts, an organization which represents not only that which is immediately taking place, but also the later stages that are to take place. If one approaches a distant object, he approaches it with reference to what he is going to do when he arrives there. If one is approaching a hammer, he is muscularly all ready to seize the handle of the hammer. <u>The later stages of the act are present in the early stages</u>--not simply in the sense that they are ready to go off but in the sense that <u>they serve to control the process itself</u>. They determine how we are going to approach the object, and the steps in our early manipulation of it (Mead quoted in Troyer, 1946: 198-199).

The mind allows us to have an internal organization of the act before we physically initiate the act. Mead named this

ability to respond to an object in a certain pre-planned way our attitude (Troyer, 1946: 199).

The mental attributes of human beings thus require a methodology appropriate to study them. This is why Mead so vehemently and rightly opposed any reductionistic methodology such as Watsonian behaviorism. Human life is qualitatively different: "... it involves and presupposes an ever ongoing social life-process; and ... the unity of its component acts--is irreducible, and in particular cannot be adequately analyzed simply into a number of discrete nerve elements" (Mead quoted in Troyer, 1946: 200).

The mind is essentially social, an important theme for the sociology of knowledge. "... [I]t is essentially a social phenomenon; even its biological functions are primarily social" (Mead, 1972: 195). Mind emerging only through social interaction is a significant insight into the origins of mental production. Mead thus has a more grounded social theory of mind than any other social psychologist. The mind is thoroughly socially constituted, a social emergent coterminous with and dependent on linguistic communication.

Mead's social theory of mind illustrates how the group is paramount in the construction of self and mind. One is inescapably of the group, though through reflexivity, novelty, and adjustive response one transcends the group. The objects of the environment give us freedom, for they do not wholly determine our world, but rather through selective

attention to objects based on our attitude that organizes what we respond to, we create our own world; we (in some slight sense) cast aside the world of the group to create the world of the mind.

Mead not only had a dialectical view of the self, but also of the mind as well. The social theory of mind is an attempt to bridge the determinism/free will arguments by arguing that both were aspects of being human.

The Challenging of Behavioristic Psychology

From the opening pages of Mind, Self, and Society, it is manifest that Mead was reacting to the behaviorism of J.B. Watson. What Mead argued as inadequate was Watson's reductionistic conception of both behavior and mind. Watson (like his contemporary disciple, B.F. Skinner) reduced the study of behavior to only that which is observable; to say anything else is unscientific. With regard to mind, activities such as introspection and consciousness are untenable, mere speculation and metaphysics. Mead would agree that, as entities, mind, consciousness, and introspection do not exist: Mead did not reify his concepts. Mead, however, argued that mind and consciousness do exist as activities. Mead viewed behaviorists as circumscribing action--as though there were no qualitative difference between animals and human beings. Behaviorists studied animals and generalized their hypotheses to human beings.

> Historically, behaviorism entered psychology through the door of animal psychology. There it was found to be impossible to use what is termed introspection. One

> cannot appeal to the animal's introspection, but must study the animal in terms of external conduct (Mead, 1972: 116).

Since introspection and consciousness are unobservable in animals, "... it was possible to carry it [the behaviorist view] over to the human animal" (Mead, 1972: 116). According to Mead, Watson's view was that what does not exist in the animal cannot exist in the human being. "John B. Watson's attitude was that of the Queen in Alice in Wonderland--off with their heads--there were no such things" (Mead, 1972: 117).

The meaning of an individual's act was irrelevant to Watson--the overt behavior alone was studied. But for Mead that inner experience or meaning can be reached through speech or language.

> There is a field within the act itself which is not external, but which belongs to the act, and there are characteristics of that inner organic conduct which do reveal themselves in our own attitudes, especially those connected with speech (Mead, 1972: 120).

Mead's social behaviorism, his social psychology, was thus anti-reductionistic when juxtaposed against the behaviorism of Watson. Mead began with Watsonian premises, but expanded them to include a more adequate and sophisticated image of human interaction. People are qualitatively different than animals and thus cannot be studied like animals. Mentalism was not the pejorative for Mead that is was for Watson or that it is today for B. F. Skinner.

> Social psychology is behavioristic in the sense of starting off with observable activity--the dynamic, ongoing social process and the social acts which are its component elements--to be studied and analyzed

> scientifically. But it is not behavioristic in the sense of ignoring the inner experience of the individual--the inner phase of that process or activity (Mead, 1972: 121-122).

The problem with Watsonian behaviorism was stated by Mead as one of methodology. Behaviorists tend to be animal psychologists, and then, when impelled to say something about human beings, rather than elaborate their methodology, in procrustean fashion, they reduce the individual to gloss over methodological inadequacies. Mind and consciousness do not fit the animal psychologists' assumptions or methodology; thus, they are explained away as nonexistent in human beings.

> Watson apparently assumes that to deny the existence of mind or consciousness as psychical stuff, the substance or entity is to deny its existence altogether and that a naturalistic or behavioristic account of it as such is out of the question. But, on the contrary, we may deny its existence as a psychical entity without denying its existence in some other sense at all ... (Mead, 1972: 124).

This other sense is that they exist as activity even though they are nonexistent as psychical stuff.

We see how thoroughly Mead contributed to the perspective shift away from psychology to sociology with his challenging of behavioristic psychology and his advocacy for a different methodology when studying human beings, one that is not the same as that used in studying animals.

This is not to say that Mead totally ignored biology, but rather contributed to a view of the interaction between the two. "While these types of conduct can be clearly distinguished from each other in human behavior, they are

not on separate planes, but play back and forth into each other, and constitute, under most conditions, an experience which appears to be cut by no lines of cleavage" (Mead quoted in Baldwin, 1988: 953). But certainly those sociologists who read Mead took from him the views that challenged biological determinism and contributed to the hegemony of the sociological view of human nature and behavior, so much so that one critic has charged that later sociologists went too far.

> In their reaction against Watson's extreme position, sociologists took a position that was also extreme, refusing to acknowledge the importance of habits and the biological components of behavior. Conscious and reflective action became the center of attention, while habit and biology were denied important theoretical status (Baldwin, 1988: 952).

Society

Society is a series of organic institutions which are functionally interrelated and interdependent. Society is constituted by a multitude of institutions that are built up out of social interaction. And what is an institution? "The institution represents a common response on the part of all members of the community to a particular situation" (Mead, 1971: 249). That is, we all share generalized ideas on how to respond to everyday situations, and usually we respond in the normative way. A large number of people living in proximity and sharing common attitudes about public behavior, with individual variations, constitutes society. These institutions make us think and act in predictable ways. We become discriminable from other

groups. We are distinguished by our institutions: by how we as a society respond to the situations of everyday life. Other groups, communities, and societies evolved with different institutions, different ways to respond to the situations of everyday life, thereby contributing to different ways to be human, different cultures.

We internalize these institutions through socialization. A shared education, media, and life experiences socialize us to respond to situations in a distinct way, contributing to the development of a unique culture and society. "Thus, the institutions of society are organized forms of group or social activity--forms so organized that the individual members of society can act adequately and socially by taking the attitudes of others toward these activities" (Mead, 1972: 250).

Society is prior to the individual and the individual can only become human if adequately socialized to society's institutions. We become human through the process of internalizing the ways to respond to situations from the institutions that socialize us, that is how selves and minds develop. "... [W]ithout social institutions of some sort, without the organized social attitudes and activities by which social institutions are constituted, there could be no fully mature individual selves or personalities at all ..." (Mead, 1972: 250). This, of course, means that we are determined, to some extent, by the institutions to which we are socialized. Such social institutions as our family,

church, school, and jobs socialize us, which means we incorporate or internalize their attitude of how to respond to the situations we encounter. Consequently our behavior, in part, reflects our socialization.

Mead went on to argue that we are never totally determined by the institutions that have socialized us. For example, the child is certainly socialized to the way his/her parents what him/her to respond (to behave) in certain situations, but what child is totally conformist? The "generation gap" and "teenage rebellion" are legendary instances of the self asserting its individuality. Certainly if we all conformed to the institutions to which we have been socialized, deviance of any sort would be eliminated. That, however, is obviously not the case. Social interaction is rife with everyday conflict. We rebel, to some extent, against all agents of socialization: parents, school, church, government, jobs, and husbands and wives. Conformity others may expect but individuals asserting themselves is normal in everyday life. Obviously, a dialectic between the institutions that have socialized us and our desire to express our individuality is the way we resolve everyday interactional conflicts. This is basically the dialectic of behavior that Mead conceptualized as that between the I and Me of the self. Such realities as social power are, of course, always operative and need to be taken into account. The positive sanctions (or at least avoiding negative sanctions) that come by responding (behaving) to

situations as we have been socialized are certainly inducements to conform, but we define and assess the situation and then act individually with selves and minds.

Mead's argument that we are neither determined by biology nor social forces, underscores his commitment to the theme of voluntaristic nominalism. We make our own history even if not under circumstances chosen by ourselves. In a pluralistic society socialization is general and diversified. Most social institutions--organized attitudes on how to act--allow for leniency, idiosyncrasy, and diversity. Tolerance, novelty, and change are themselves norms.

For Mead, the purpose of education is to broaden our social horizons, to educate us against ethnocentrism and nationalism and in favor of cultural relativism and internationalism.

> We all belong to small cliques, and we may remain simply inside of them. The "organized other" present in ourselves is then a community of a narrow diameter. We are struggling now to get a certain amount of international-mindedness. We are realizing ourselves as members of a larger community (Mead, 1972: 253).

As Durkheim recognized the more tolerance and diversity we allowed, the more our society was open to social change. It is through education that we can foster the growth of a universal society by internalizing the generalized others of different cultures.

> The universe of discourse within which people can express themselves makes possible the bringing-together of those organized attitudes which represent the life of these different communities into such relationship that they can lead to a higher organization. The very universality of the processes which belong to human society ... opens the door to a universal society

(Mead, 1972: 258-259).

This universal society is to be a generalized other that all members of the world share. Everyone will be socialized to common institutions and thereby think and act in a universal way. Society will lose its conflictual nature, because, as we will shortly discover, Mead's notion of conflict was one that arises because of different attitudes about how to act in social situations.

> The human social ideal--the ideal or ultimate goal of human social progress--is the attainment of a universal human society in which all human individuals would possess a perfected social intelligence, such that all social meanings would each be similarly reflected in their respective individual consciousness--such that the meanings of any one individual's acts or gestures (as realized by him and expressed in the structure of his self, through his ability to take the social attitudes of other individuals toward himself and toward their common social ends or purposes) would be the same whatever for any other individual who responded to them (Mead, 1972: 270-271).

Cosmopolitan insight and tolerance were goals of Mead.

All of this socialization of the individual both to intra-society and inter-society normative structures does not mean that Mead had any concept of the individual as oversocialized or as a determined creature doomed to be synonymous with his social context. Social institutions leave room for and even promote individual freedom.

> [Social institutions] ... are not necessarily subversive of individuality in the individual members; and they do not necessarily represent or uphold narrow definitions of certain fixed and specific patterns of acting which in any given circumstances should characterize the behavior of all intelligent and socially responsible individuals .... On the contrary, they need to define the social, or socially responsible, patterns of individual conduct in only a very broad and general sense, affording plenty of scope for originality,

> flexibility, and variety of such conduct ... (Mead, 1972: 251).

Thus, the relationship between the individual and society is dynamic and dialectical. Mead does not theorize that the individual is totally determined or determiner. His notion of the interplay between social forces and human subjectivity is similar to Marx's. Human sociality for Mead meant the human beings can reconstruct society in new ways even though their selves and minds were constituted by that very society. Society sets the social context for interaction. However, we are not determined, through praxis we can overcome, reconstitute, revolutionize. The weight of the individual on society can also be felt.

> Human society, we have insisted, does not merely stamp the pattern of its organized social behavior upon any one of its individual members, so that this pattern becomes likewise the pattern of the individual's self; it also, at the same time, gives him a mind, as the means or ability of consciously conversing with himself in terms of the social attitudes which constitute the structure of his self and which embody the pattern of human society's organized behavior as reflected in that structure. And his mind enables him in turn to stamp the pattern of his further developing self (further developing through his mental activity) upon the structure or organization of human society ... (Mead, 1972: 251).

Mead did not mention the concepts of praxis and revolution; he was more concerned with bringing about self-change; nor did his concepts articulate the potential efficacy of human subjectivity and intention in the collective sense, as did Marx's. For Mead, social change is in large part self-change.

Social change is primarily a reconstituting of ways to

think and act when faced with problematic situations. It is the minded behavior of acquiring a new consciousness about the problems one faces in everyday life. By selecting a combination from the infinite number of existing attitudes on how to act, one can constitute a new and unique way to act when faced with the inescapable problematic situations of everyday life. Mead underscored that the purpose of minded activity is to act in new ways to problems in living. But his approach was to stress individual rather than collective action. The following quotation makes plain Mead's dialectical relationship between self and society and that to change the self is to change society, underscoring the liberal, gradualist approach to institutional reform that I discussed in Chapter III.

> Thus the relation between social reconstruction and self or personality reconstruction by the individual members of any organized human society entails self or personality reconstruction in some degree or other by each of these individuals.... In both types of reconstruction the same fundamental material or organized social relations among human individuals is involved, and is simply treated in different ways, or from different angles or points of view, in the two cases respectively; or in short, social reconstruction and self or personality reconstruction are the two sides of a single process--the process of human social evolution (Mead quoted in Shalin, 1988: 941).

Collective action is absent because Mead's concept of conflict in society was limited. Mead primarily viewed conflict as individual and interpersonal rather than social (Mead, 1972: 268). The individual could think of a solution to the oppressive conditions he/she might find himself/herself in.

> Mind, as constructive or reflective or problem-solving thinking, is the socially acquired means or mechanisms or apparatus whereby the human individual solves the various problems of environmental adjustment which arise to confront him in the course of his experience and which prevent his conduct from proceeding harmoniously on its way until they have thus been dealt with (Mead, 1972: 268-269).

The more problems the self encounters the more opportunity the mind has to develop. Thinking about problems and problem solving for Mead is social in that one takes others' attitudes into account and reconstructs them so as to act appropriately to solve a problem in living; but Mead's analysis was focused on individual action, on solving problems by oneself. Problems in living are largely personal and overcome by creative thinking, not collective action. This underscores the progressive rejection of violence and the threat to democracy and civil liberties that they argued might come about through revolutionary action. The power of the ruling class in inhibiting social change was not a major concern in Mead's view of society and social change.

Mead assumed that we will rationally, through intellectual tolerance and critical thinking, come to know others' institutions, their generalized beliefs, practices, and behavior; and that through communication we will mutually undergo institutional osmosis. We will recognize the rationality of incorporating a cosmopolitan perspective. Self change and a universal generalized other adapted from the community of nations will lead to the universal society and the end of conflict (Mead, 1972: 269-270). But what is

rational to one group or society is not rational to others, especially since the movement to universalism that Mead saw happening implies equality in economics, politics, and distributions of justice. A universal society will not come about while those issues remain unsolved.

Mead recognized these irreconcilable conflicts; they were ones perpetuated by an inability of the parties to take the role of the other.

> Examples of social situations of this general type are those involving interactions or relations between capital and labor, that is, those in which some of the individuals are acting in their socially functional capacity as members of the capitalistic class, which is one economic aspect of modern human social organization; whereas the other individuals are acting in their socially functional capacity as members of the laboring class, which is another (and in social interests directly opposed) economic aspect of that social organization (Mead, 1972: 277).

But Mead failed to see how these overwhelming class struggles will retard the progression toward a universal society. He noticed such irreconcilabilities but failed to explore them more fully, in which case, if he did, he might have realized the somewhat limited view of social change that he advanced.

Mead identified communication competence as the social mechanism that will allow us to transform the social situation so that all will be able to take the role of others. Unless communication competence becomes achievable, the ideal society is just a whim.

> The ideal of human society cannot exist as long as it is impossible for individuals to enter into the attitudes of those whom they are affecting in the performance of their own peculiar functions (Mead, 1972: 282).

Thus: "As democracy now exists, there is not this development of communication so that individuals can put themselves into the attitudes of those whom they affect" (Mead, 1972: 282). Communication competence must be democratized through the democracy of education. Unless we have a democracy of education allowing all access to the cultures of the world, we will have no political democracy.

In conclusion of this section on Mead, I think I have shown how powerful Mead's ideas were in challenging biological determinism and behavioristic psychology and reconceptualizing human nature and behavior into a sociological perspective. The theme of voluntaristic nominalism is so strong in Mead that he generally equated self-change with social change. The individual had a never-ending capacity to change and thereby to change society. Provided the institutional safeguards were in place, the individual was able to achieve his full potential. Biology was not destiny, and human nature was profoundly social, for the self could only emerge as it took on the role of significant others and the generalized other. These views are still dominant today and form the basis of what is called microsociology, a foundation of sociology in general.
We thus see how thoroughly Mead and the others responded to the dogmatic claims of the biological determinists, and how their conceptualizations formed the nurture part of the nature/nurture debate. In the process of reconceptualizing human nature and behavior, the early interactionists made

unique and profound contributions to the perspective of socialization and the discipline of sociology. They were at the very center of a transformation in social thought that constituted a perspective in social science's, and eventually the American public's, image of human beings, social behavior, and the nature of inequality. America would not go the route of Germany. The New Deal would be undertaken. A long-delayed and not-yet-completed civil rights for minorities would emerge as an issue, an issue that was not defined in terms of biological inferiority (except for a few), but in terms of institutional racism, structures of domination, equality of opportunity, voting rights, and affirmative action.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has shown how social theory and social policy were "enveloped and nurtured" in the social changes that began transforming America after the Civil War. It has also shown that these social changes were variously interpreted, leading to the conceptualizations of Social Darwinists, hereditarians, and symbolic interactionists. I have shown that the interpretation of human nature and behavior changed from a perspective that was biologically dominant to one that relied on social and cultural interpretations. I have also shown the nature of the relationship between these changing conceptualizations and a changing social context.

This chapter will briefly review the dissertation's thesis that symbolic interactionism developed directly out of the nature/nurture debate and was influenced by the social context of the times and the political commitments of the interactionists. I will briefly review the social context, the interpretation of that social context in the work of the hereditarians and symbolic interactionists, and the political commitment of hereditarians to eugenics and the political commitment of the early interactionists to social reform, primarily through education and socialization. I

will also discuss some major themes related to the sociology of knowledge that were advanced in the introduction. I will conclude the chapter by suggesting some research questions that arose from the work done so far.

The Social Context of Conceptualization: The Hereditarians

As this dissertation has shown, the emergence of Social Darwinism and later hereditarianism in American science and popular culture provides one example of the relationship between knowledge and its social context. Hereditarianism arose along with industrialization, immigration, urbanization, and the new graduate universities that provided the opportunity for experimental research in biology and psychology. The social problems of poverty, crime, alcoholism, mental illness, slums, juvenile delinquency, and disease that accompanied the above social changes influenced the hereditarians' interpretation; they viewed social problems as a result of the inferiority of human beings, specifically racial and class inferiority. Hereditarianism attributed differences in human behavior and social position to the relative biological superiority or inferiority among groups and individuals. The hereditarian perspective did not take into account social structure and culture. Hereditarians saw no relationship between the plight of people and economic oppression, and the disadvantages of inadequate institutions of socialization and education, and the problems associated with cultural and social disorganization that

accompanies immigration and rapid industrialization and urbanization.

The social changes of industrialization, immigration, and urbanization and their concomitant social problems of poverty, crime, prostitution, alcoholism, and mental illness led some to conceptualize inequality as an inherent problem of human nature, that certain groups were inherently superior and inferior. Inequality, power, privilege, and prestige were, according to the hereditarian psychologists and biologists, justified because some groups were more worthy than others, more fit to rule. Some groups were not fit to rule nor even fit for democratic governments. With the rise of biological and psychological hereditarianism it appeared as though the public had at long last its "scientific" evidence to back up earlier, popular works on innate inferiority, such as those by Dugdale. According to the hereditarians' interpretation of social inequality, those on top were there because of innate biological and psychological endowment. Those suffering from poverty were innately inferior, must be feared, and above all, must be controlled, segregated or, if they were southern and eastern Europeans, restricted from entering the nation. In the most drastic cases, some members of the "dangerous and dependent" classes would have to be involuntarily sterilized.

The persistence of hereditarianism in the face of damaging evidence--anomalies that might have prompted the hereditarians to question their assumptions--leads us to

view the rise of hereditarianism as rooted in something more than strictly internal developments within science. I reviewed how those who believed in eugenics seized the findings of the unit-character biologists as scientific validation for their own social policy aims. Also, many who were biologists, psychologists, and sociologists were hereditarians. Whether in academic journals, the popular press, or pronouncements from the White House, a concern with the lowering of American intelligence and perhaps the downfall of American civilization became an American nightmare and obsession. Xenophobia led to a eugenics movement that successfully enacted legislation to restrict southern and eastern European from entering the United States. The leaders of the eugenics movement, many of whom were from upper-class western and northern European backgrounds, also feared those who were huddled in the tenement slums: the poor, socially disorganized, and victims of social problems. Suggestions of ways to socially control, restrict them from entering the United States or in the most drastic cases, involuntarily sterilize the dangerous and dependent classes, were very much on the minds of a number of white, middle-class Americans. This was one reason that the hereditarian perspective could flourish even in light of the anomalies that these researchers found in their own investigations. The social context enveloped and nurtured the hereditarian perspective and thereby delayed the ascendency of a new perspective.

This dissertation also reviewed the intellectual

history of hereditarianism. That history began with the evolutionary science of Lamarck and Darwin. Lamarck advanced the idea of spontaneous generation and, most importantly, the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The notion of the inheritance of acquired characteristics was later applied by other social thinkers to people.

Evolutionary science received its greatest advance when Darwin published The Origins of the Species in 1859, advancing the ideas of natural selection and genetic variety, as well as the argument that each species will generally tend to increase beyond the available food supply thus leading to adaptation and speciation. Some members of every species will have advantageous hereditary characteristics that will lead to the survival of offspring. Others not having such "adaptive genes" will be eliminated. Heredity became a crucial concept in understanding the animal world and species' survival.

Evolution became an accepted notion in natural science. Religious opposition was strong at first, but eventually all but the most fundamental denominations accepted evolution. Herbert Spencer applied this evolutionary science to society, creating the organic analogy. Spencer saw societies as evolving from the simple to the complex, and argued that population pressure was the prime mover not only in animal evolution but also in the evolution of human societies. Population grows beyond the capacity of the food supply to sustain life, so animals and people must adapt.

People that are intelligent and societies that are capable of social or technological inventions survive; people and societies not capable of adaptation die off. Society becomes more complex through this process. The survival of the fittest thereby benefits society. Competition for available resources eliminates weaker classes, races, or societies, and thereby improves the quality of the species of human beings. Consequently, any political interference with this "natural" process was considered to be dangerous, for it artificially allowed the unfit to survive. Also, social intervention was unsound because one could never know how by changing one aspect of society one might inadvertently affect another aspect of society. The argument that one should not interfere in order to help out those who cannot compete was the origins of Social Darwinism. One must distinguish between the social evolutionary theory of social change, which many sociologists accepted, from Social Darwinism, which was based on the social evolutionary theory of social change, and which most sociologists did not accept. Sociologists such as William Graham Sumner and Franklin H. Giddings used the social theory of Social Darwinism to rail against state interventionism. Social Darwinism drew from studies such as Dugdale's <u>The Jukes</u>, which had hereditarian assumptions.

Social Darwinism had early opponents in the American Social Science Association. They emphasized the importance of the environment in affecting human behavior. They

believed that by improving the environment one could improve the life-chances of human beings. All types of programs, such as the public health movement and the movement for public parks, were to improve the environment and consequently improve the lives of human beings. Sociologists such as Ward emphasized the importance of education and culture over heredity. Yet the proponents of this movement were still Lamarckians, believing in the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The biggest decline of Social Darwinism was attributable to the rise of corporate capitalism, which undermined the need for any ideology to justify laissez-faire capitalism.

With the decline of laissez-faire capitalism the decline of Social Darwinism was not far behind; but, biological evolutionary theory did not decline. While the organic analogies between biology and society were gone, a new perspective, hereditarianism, emerged through the work of experimental biologists and psychologists. Both biological and psychological hereditarianism were defined by three major assumptions: 1) reductionism, whereby human behavior is traceable back to our biology 2) reification in the measuring of intelligence, and 3) inevitability: intelligence, behavior, and social rank are innate and unalterable characteristics of one's heredity. The social order was seen as a natural consequence of differential intelligence based on unalterable heredity.

Biological hereditarians argued that they could

separate heredity from environment in their experiments. Convinced that nature and nurture were separate variables, biological hereditarians argued that it was nature rather than nurture that was the determining factor in evolution and behavior. This dissertation reviewed the rise of biological hereditarianism in the work of August Weismann, Gregor Mendel, Hugo De Vries, and Charles B. Davenport. The notion that heredity determines the quality of a human being and that eastern and southern Europeans and minorities were biologically inferior led to the rise of the eugenics movement.

This dissertation traced the eugenics movement back to the work of Francis Galton who advocated a program of "race betterment." Galton tried to prove scientifically that the white race and the upper class were superior in intelligence to other races and classes of people. The eugenics movement in the United States was a political response to conclusions that had been advanced by the unit-character biologists. Its primary aim was immigration restriction and sterilization laws. A numerous list of prominent Americans who promoted eugenics, including university professors and presidents, was reviewed as was the rise of the eugenics movement in popular culture. The eugenists succeeded in persuading legislators to enact compulsory sterilization laws in thirty state legislatures, and members of Congress to enact the federal immigration restriction legislation of 1924. But the assumptions of the eugenists soon came under attack.

Cultural evolution declined with the work of Franz

Boas. There was no one culture that was evolving so that one could make distinctions of superiority. Boas opposed the concept of a hierarchical arrangement of cultures that was supposedly a manifestation of progressive historical development, charging that such an argument was misleading since western European culture was placed on top and other cultures were considered primitive by comparison. Franz Boas also argued that such an hierarchical arrangement of cultures helped to legitimate imperialism. Boas advanced the concepts of cultural relativity, cultural plurality, and ethnocentrism as a response to cultural evolution.

Boas and his students also advanced the arguments for the separation of culture from biology. Social and cultural analysis was confounded with Lamarckian biology. A new level of analysis was reached when Boas and his students Kroeber and Lowie unconfounded biology and culture and stressed the interaction between heredity and environment and the notion that heredity is plastic to the environment. The separation of culture from biology also was a significant challenge to the eugenics movement.

The most thorough undermining of biological hereditarianism and eugenics was the development of the new genetics, which pointed out the plasticity of heredity to the environment. The older unit-character biology was thoroughly undermined. Thomas Hunt Morgan and his fruit-fly experiments showed decisively that heredity and environment "constantly interacted in the development of individuals and

species." These new geneticists did not share their earlier colleagues' enthusiasm for eugenics. The new geneticists were far more interested in the betterment of agricultural commodities. A new theory of evolution, the synthetic theory of evolution, ascended to intellectual dominance in the 1920s and 1930s. Reification, reductionism, and inevitability were eliminated in this new model of evolution which emphasized the interaction between heredity and environment. But hereditarianism was not yet dead.

Psychological hereditarianism, which had the development of the intelligence test as its main aim, was also rooted in the social context of industrialization, the new immigration from eastern and southern Europe, and urbanization. Even before the intelligence test came to the United States, Francis Galton had worked on developing such a test. This dissertation reviewed the development of the intelligence test in the works of Alfred Binet, H.H. Goddard, Lewis Terman, and Robert M. Yerkes. The intelligence test became standardized and the common measure for tracking and segregating students. I pointed out that Alfred Binet was not a hereditarian but that his intelligence test was given a hereditarian interpretation in the United States.

The Social Context of Conceptualization: The Interactionists

The emergence of symbolic interactionism provides another example of the relationship between knowledge and its social context. As we have seen, the symbolic

interactionist perspective was rooted in the same social changes transforming America after the Civil War that fostered the growth of hereditarianism. But the political commitment of symbolic interactionists was different than those of hereditarians, and those political commitments enveloped and nurtured this perspective. The interactionists did not conceptualize human nature or inequality the way that the Social Darwinists or later the hereditarians did. Opposing the hereditarian argument of a solely biological basis for human behavior, the interactionists developed the concepts that argued for the social basis of human nature and behavior.

Since the social context of early symbolic interactionism was also rooted in industrialization, immigration, and urbanization, the same concomitant social problems of poverty, crime, delinquency, alcoholism, mental illness, slums, and disease enveloped and nurtured the perspective. This provides strong support that social circumstances provide the context but do not determine conceptualizations; thus, the determinist argument in the relationship between social context and knowledge is challenged by this dissertation's research. Between social context and conceptualization is human consciousness, a person's ability to interpret the times and come to his/her own conclusions.

Part of the social context of interactionism was the reorganization of graduate education. After the Civil War America began the transition from a rural agricultural

economy to an urban industrial economy, which altered the occupational and educational structure of the United States. To respond to a growing corporate economy and its need for engineers, scientists, and professionals of all sorts, graduate education expanded in the United States. This increased need for professionals in a new urban industrial economy led to an emphasis on upward mobility through education. It created the rise of the middle-class and the culture of professionalism. Business and government, grown centralized and complex, began courting the special and esoteric knowledge of professionals.

This dissertation reviewed Bledstein's argument that an educated middle-class provided an excellent social context for the conceptualization of a creative, determining human nature. The middle-class professionals required creativity, flexibility, and drive to meet their goals of upward mobility through careerism. The belief that one could improve one's life and status through education became a hallmark of American culture. It did violence to the argument that one is condemned to one's lot in life, that one cannot transcend unfavorable social circumstances. Higher education and the culture of professionalism provided a social context for ideas that challenged the belief in innate inferiority.

The concepts of symbolic interactionism examined in this dissertation all advance the power of the self, arguing that the self can overcome most obstacles in its path. In the work of William James, competent selves were assumed to

be able to thrive in a fluid class structure, failures were seen as individual. The understanding that social problems are interconnected and that to solve any one necessitates a transformation of the major institutions of society was not part of James's theory. James's interpretation is in some measure due to the fact that his theory was enveloped and nurtured primarily during the social context of laissez-faire capitalism which extolled the virtues of rugged individualism. People were expected to solve their own problems in William James's time. Immediate and extended families were viewed as the only legitimate recourse.

Mead and Dewey developed their conceptualizations as the social context of laissez-faire capitalism was ending and the social context of corporate capitalism was solidifying. Social institutions had become so powerful in affecting the life of business and people that even capitalists had recognized the need for regulation and control. The recognition of how powerful the social environment could be in affecting one's life caught the attention of the emerging field of social science. Symbolic interactionist conceptualizations were rooted in this recognition of a changed social context.

With this changed social context a new interpretation of individualism was to emerge in which the social structure and culture came to be viewed as important social constraints affecting a person's life. A new view of human nature emerged as early interactionists provided insights

into the social nature of human beings and the social basis of behavior. Yet the question for the interactionists was how could one remain an individual, how could one transcend social, cultural, and biological determinism?

> The question ... was how to arrive at a 'new individualism.' This was the question of working out the ways in which persons might engage in intelligent and imaginative occupations with a sense of purpose and value in a social order becoming increasingly organized, collectivistic, and economically deterministic. The older ideals of rugged individualism or Jamesian pluralism, of spontaneity and freedom of action were inadequate to the changed social and technological scene (Thayer, 1973: 239).

Dewey's conceptualizations, based on his interpretation of the rapid social changes transforming America, made great advances in understanding the power of social expectations, of habits, custom, and culture. Dewey's conceptualization provided the new individualism which recognized the power of collectivistic forces in American life.

> ... Dewey would have characterized James as a spokesman for the 'old individualism' of an eighteenth century laissez-faire, atomistic, pre-industrial social philosophy. James' hatred of bigness, of large organizations, and his prizing of individual action in a 'plastic' and 'growing world' is suited to conditions ... [of laissez-faire capitalism] (Thayer, 1973: 238).

Nevertheless, in the works of Dewey, Mead, and the early interactionists generally, the individual has great powers and determinism is diminished.

Since Mead and Dewey started with the individual social act, this lead to a model of individual problem solving. An individual with a problem, if he had a developed self and could take the role of various others, could formulate an appropriate plan-of-action, an individual solution. Or in

Dewey's conceptualization, similar to taking the role of others, one engaged in dramatic rehearsals through deliberation. Thus, this conceptualization modified the influence of internal and external constraints on human behavior, a necessary step in order to reconceptualize human nature from biological reductionism to a perspective that emphasized the social and the cultural. Both biological and social determinism had been conceptually modified. The power of the social environment was recognized but human beings had the ability to adapt to it.

The social context of America combined with the particular interpretation that symbolic interactionists gave to that context, led to a perspective that was anti-deterministic and pro-individualistic. It represented the development of a sociological social psychology. It took into account environment and culture. The human being's ability to think (a mind with the function of intelligent action and adaptation to the environment) meant that the stimulus-response model of behavior was not applicable to human behavior. The individual either through deliberation or taking the role of others or defining the situation was able to set forth his/her own plan-of-action, to make unique adjustments to culture and environment, to place a check on his/her emotions, to be more determining than determined. Symbolic interactionists were able to provide an alternate interpretation of the social changes affecting America that led them to a reconceptualization of human nature, to a

reaffirmation of the power of the individual, to a rejection of determinism either through organic impulses or social expectations.

Symbolic interactionism was also enveloped and nurtured by the rise of corporate capitalism and the accompanying political culture of the Progressive Movement. This dissertation traced the influence on symbolic interactionism in particular, and sociology in general, of a moral and reformist response to the social problems that accompanied the social changes transforming America. The early sociologists, including the early symbolic interactionists, were from a rural and religious background. They had a moral concern for the individual and the harmful effect the environment, particularly inferior institutions of education and socialization, was having on people. The moral response of sociologists, which was part of the larger Progressive Movement, was a reaction to the excesses of laissez-faire capitalism, to the overwhelming power of the business trusts and the conspicuous consumption of the captains of industry. It was supported by small farmers, the labor movement, and the old middle-class. The Progressive Movement was an attempt to recapture the American dream for the average person. It was a movement for political reform and the federal regulation of the economy and corporations.

This dissertation reviewed the political precursors to the Progressive Movement in Populism, the Salvation Army, the social gospel movement, muckrakers, and reform-minded

organizations. I argued that with the rise of corporate capitalism the Progressive Movement led to a changed political context in which the role of government was expanded. It was to be a professionally administered government. New agencies (such as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Food and Drug Administration) combined with new laws (such as the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Underwood-Simmons Tariff) gave new hope to labor and ushered in a culture of social justice based on reforming the excesses of capitalism. Theodore Roosevelt attempted to give labor a "square deal," for example, by his mediation in the anthracite coal strike of 1902. Later under Wilsonian liberalism the Clayton Act gave minimum protection to union labor, the La Follette Seamen's Act of 1915 laid the precedent for minimum wages, the Keating-Owen Act of 1915 forbade interstate commerce of commodities that used child labor, and the Adamson Act of 1916 set the precedent for an eight hour day. Large government, the bureaucratic solution in Wiebe's terms, attempted to solve the social disorder and social problems that accompanied industrialization, immigration, and urbanization.

The idea that the government should regulate the economy rather than defaulting to a policy of laissez-faire, found a home in a large segment of the American population and became a permanent part of our political heritage. But it was the enlightened corporate capitalists themselves who recognized the need for regulative reform in order to

eliminate the internecine cutthroat competition among large concerns. Government intervention to alleviate the negative effects of the market became a defining characteristic of liberalism. The Progressive Movement was a recognition that the economy of the small town and rural life was behind us and that we needed to apply the best and brightest minds to administer the social problems of the city and industrial life. Only the government was large enough and had the financial and human resources to handle the job. Because of corporate America's dominance in the reform movement, this period represented the triumph of conservatism (Kolko, 1967). It certainly represented a period of the triumph of capitalism that accepted and advocated reform.

The Progressive Movement provided an alternative interpretation of the social changes transforming American society. Utopian standards of criticism dwindled: piecemeal reform replaced visionary notions of social justice (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1974: 451). A social change policy that would not overthrow capitalism necessitated segregated problems based on a theory of human nature that could change as the social institutions of capitalism changed. Thus we discern how the symbolic interactionist concepts that grew out of the nature/nurture debate were also enveloped and nurtured in a political culture that grew out of the Progressive Movement. Indeed, as this dissertation pointed out, Dewey and Mead were leaders of the Progressive Movement in Chicago. Thus, the symbolic interactionist

interpretation was rooted in a political desire for gradual change to meet the ongoing needs of a dynamic capitalism.

Thus, this dissertation has shown a close relationship between political context and theory. Symbolic interactionism was compatible with capitalism and a particular political doctrine, namely, liberalism. Liberalism assumed the gradual perfection of the system, granting that only certain evil parts had as yet to be reformed. Time and effort would be the panacea. One must become in Mead's own word an "opportunist" and apply the scientific method to changes that will work. Mead argued that "... socialist utopias have been recognized as impotent to lead to better conditions, and opportunists have succeeded ..." (Mead quoted in Schwendinger and Schwendinger: 1974, 453). He also asserted that "... every attempt to direct thought by a fixed idea of the world of the future must be, not only a failure, but also pernicious" (Mead quoted in Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1974: 455). Since we cannot know the future, we must concentrate our judgements and policies on the world that is, not on the world that ought to be. This was consistent with a pragmatic approach to social problems--reforming institutions and providing education to the young.

Reformism was also well-suited to the American dilemma of the widening power of economic forces and the dwindling promise of American democracy. Conflicts between capital and labor would need to be resolved through an experimental method--reforms of various sorts--that did not question the

economic foundation of capitalism (Thayer 1973: 241).

We should notice then that perspectives on human nature are rooted in a political culture. The Schwendingers also support this argument, arguing that Mead's conceptualizations were rooted in the political culture of reform. As the Schwendingers point out, those reforms such as the juvenile court system or the enactment of compulsory universal education laws, have not lived up to their expectations. "Mead's discussion represented a very early attempt to justify ameliorative models of social intervention on the basis of a pragmatic phenomenology of a scientific act" (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1974: 456). But the Schwendingers' criticism fails to place Mead and the other symbolic interactionists within their social context; for, symbolic interactionism represented a radical departure from viewing behavior in solely biological or psychological terms, so radical in fact that we can define this reconceptualization of human nature and behavior as the beginning of the study of the social basis of human nature and behavior, as a perspective that made more contributions to socialization theory than any other. Unconfounding social and cultural analysis from biology was a social science triumph and the early interactionists contributed to that triumph.

If we examine the symbolic interactionists' major concept, the self, we notice that James, Baldwin, Cooley, Dewey, Thomas, and Mead all conceptualized the self as multiple, that the self has as many elements as situations to

which it must respond. The self must adjust to various situations, and in doing so it must be creative. A rapidly changing social order in a pluralistic society required a multiple self. A multiple self underscored the changeability of the self, and lent support to the notion that one could change society by changing the self through education and socialization. A multiple self was consistent with the liberal image of human nature.

We not only notice this close relationship between social context and social thought in the concept of the self but also in concern over the child. As Wiebe argued, a central theme of Progressivism was the concern for the child. Campaigns for improving the health, education, and welfare of children were commonplace. Dewey and Mead were both leaders in this movement at Hull House in Chicago. The attention that they paid to childhood socialization and the development of the self were rooted, in part, in this concern for the child.

The social context of America was (and is) complex and contradictory, from which competing images of human nature were drawn. This does not mean that the social context of corporate capitalism determined the individual sociologist's or hereditarian's thought. From the social changes transforming America, alternative interpretations of those social changes and alternative social policies were developed. Those social changes led many to a biological interpretation of human nature and behavior and a conservative social

policy. It led others to a social and cultural interpretation of human nature and behavior and Progressive social policy. The Progressive Movement thus enveloped and nurtured the new image of human nature, but mainly, that new image emerged out of the nature/nurture debate as symbolic interactionists developed a new perspective on human nature and behavior, and made a significant contribution to the surging social science disciplines in America.

The interactionists revolt against formalism also contributed to their conceptualization. The fictions of a logical, legal, and economic person were challenged by the anti-formalists. They turned their studies to the economic aspects of American society, and to formulating liberal, bureaucratic solutions to the problem of social disorder. The revolt against formalism emphasized economic interpretations, cultural analysis, historical methods, and a respect for the social sciences. Dewey felt that philosophy could be used to analyze social problems to help in the real world. One of Dewey's most anti-formalistic arguments was the distinction between formal and real freedom, which corresponded to the distinction between political and economic democracy.

Dewey's and Mead's interpretations arose out of the new social sciences which led to their debate with biological determinism or hereditarianism. Psychological hereditarianism erupted into controversy and crisis when persistent anomalies would not go away. When many of these

psychologists themselves controlled for differences in education, geographical location, and income, the differences in IQ scores among groups diminished. Just being reared in America, socialized to American culture, and learning the English language, made great difference in scores. The longer eastern and southern European immigrants were in America, the higher their IQ scores, meaning that nurture was responsible for differences in IQ scores. Franz Boas and his students' work in separating culture from biology also led to the cultural interpretation of intelligence. Symbolic interactionism provided a socially grounded view of self and mind. The social and cultural basis of human nature and behavior gained intellectual ascendency.

By the mid and late 1930s sociology had gone through its period of professionalization simultaneous with the changing social context in America that was increasingly moving toward egalitarianism, equality of opportunity, and even social security and social insurance legislation. In developing a social basis for human behavior, sociology carved itself a discipline. This dissertation reviewed the increasing sociological conceptualization of human nature and behavior as it examined the rise of the early symbolic interactionist perspective in the works of William James, James Mark Baldwin, Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, W.I. Thomas, and George Herbert Mead.

With the culmination of early symbolic interactionism in the work of George Herbert Mead, a sociologically

grounded social psychology had been developed. The social basis of human nature and behavior, of emergent selves and minds, and human beings' determining characteristics had been outlined. Also, by showing how human beings develop a self and mind, a new conceptualization of individualism developed, whereby it was argued that behavior was affected but not determined by social forces.

The perspective of socialization, of how we become human, is today taken for granted. But the socialization perspective was a highly political and contentious answer to the prevailing hereditarian, determinant, and instinct reasoning that had hegemony in the early decades of the twentieth century. The socialization perspective outlined how all people become human in the same way, that there was a universal human nature, and that, because of this, all people could become citizens and participate in democracy.

The socialization perspective emerged from the symbolic interactionists' interpretation of the social processes transforming America--industrialization, urbanization, and immigration. They saw the need for new and better institutions of socialization and education, whereby newly arrived immigrants could (and must) become full participants in the culture and politics of the United States. The interactionists' interpretation (along with the social thought of many reformers) led to a view of human nature with social policy consequences that made American society more egalitarian and democratic. We became a society that would increasingly be

dedicated to social intervention to improve the conditions of those less fortunate. The hegemony of this perspective was realized in the social policies of the New Deal. This is not to say that a bureaucratic solution of social intervention has succeeded, but it has made our society vastly different from one that might have been, if the hereditarian interpretation of human nature and its social policies had continued unchallenged.

The commitment to social and governmental intervention was a redefinition of classical liberalism that had prevailed from John Locke forward. Freedom from oppressive feudal institutions and freedom from general constraint (for example, religious and economic constraint) had defined liberalism up to the end of laissez-faire capitalism in the United States. Liberalism signified freedom from the tyranny of government. But now liberalism--progressivism--was defined in terms of governmental intervention into the affairs of people in order to benefit them by increasing their opportunity for equality and by preventing their abuse by economic forces beyond their ability to confront even-handedly, such as the modern corporation. But in enhancing people's opportunity to achieve upward mobility and equality through government intervention, an insidious power of government to intervene obtrusively in one's life also occurred. Thus, as I briefly mentioned in Chapter III, in order to save the child, the government (its social workers) could now take the child away from the corrupting urban

tenement dwelling (and the parents) without due process of law. Due process of law was regarded as unnecessary, since it was argued that the intervention was on behalf of the child, thereby making unnecessary the need for due process of law. The dangers inherent in this form of liberalism were not the subject of this study, though such studies have been, and are still to be, written.

A New View of the Indeterminacy Argument

One contribution of this dissertation is a new way of understanding the indeterminacy argument of the symbolic interactionist perspective. A number of critics (Coser, 1976; Huber, 1973; Lichtman, 1970; Reynolds and Reynolds, 1973; and Shaskolsky, 1970 to name just a few) have argued that the symbolic interactionist indeterminacy argument is due to the pragmatists' failure to account for social structure, social organization, and social power. However, Dewey and Mead never ignored social domination, their Progressive politics and social praxis accepted them as fundamental aspects of social organization. The social, political, and theoretical origins of early interactionists' position on indeterminacy have been misconstrued. It is as though interactionists and critics alike believed that it referred to a rejection of social structure, social power, and social organization, when instead, the indeterminacy argument, while partly based on their notion that social structure is not totally determining, was also part of their challenge to biological determinism, through which they reconceptualized

the nature of human nature and formulated a perspective of social behavior opposed to the prevailing perspective of biological behavior, instinct theory, and the psychological reductionism of IQ testing. Based on a sociology of knowledge study of its social, political, and intellectual origins, this dissertation presents an alternative account of the symbolic interactionist indeterminacy argument from the way it has traditionally been interpreted in sociology by interactionists and critics alike.

The Relationship between Social Context And Knowledge

In general, then, the social changes sweeping American society shaped the framework within which Social Darwinists, hereditarians, pragmatists, and symbolic interactionists developed their unique interpretations of those social changes. And, dialectically, the ideas of Social Darwinism, hereditarianism, pragmatism, and symbolic interactionism also helped to shape the social policies and institutions of American society. "There seems little doubt that the nature/nurture controversy played an important role in the history of modern American culture and science, and in the continuing impact of evolutionary ideas and evolutionary science in our nation's history" (Cravens, 1978: 270). Both the perspectives of hereditarianism and symbolic interactionism present us with excellent examples of how ideas have social consequences.

The social theory of a Galton, Spencer, or Sumner was

rooted in a social context of laissez-faire capitalism. Later, hereditarianism was rooted in the changing social context of corporate capitalism, the modern research university, and their political commitments to the eugenics movement. The eugenists' political agenda, as we have seen, was to legislate immigration restriction, sterilization, and both positive and negative eugenics. For the eugenists, hereditarianism provided a scientific justification for restrictionist immigration and involuntary sterilization as well as a perspective that viewed inequality as the result of an inferior biology. It was both consistent with and supportive of a system of power, privilege, and oppression. The symbolic interactionist theory incorporated a social policy of reform. Their political agenda was suffrage, juvenile court systems, education, and social work. Their theory celebrated the continued perfectibility of human beings made possible by what they regarded as human beings' basic human nature, their desire to create, manipulate, and excel. Human beings would be able to realize their potentiality if the harsher aspects of capitalism could be reformed, if people were provided with an education to guide their creativity and their manipulation of the environment. The symbolic interactionists believed that a reformed capitalism was the system best suited to giving human beings the freedom to express their will and creativity.

This dissertation has shown that the symbolic interactionists' interpretation of social and political events led

them to a unique conceptualization of human nature and social problems. It has also shown that the symbolic interactionists advanced a perspective of human nature that was consistent with their own liberal agenda. The major interactionists were leaders in the Progressive Movement in America, and that political culture enveloped and nurtured their own interpretations of contemporary events.

In this dissertation I have outlined a number of social changes transforming America after the Civil War which were given unique interpretations that led to conflicting conceptualizations of human nature, social inequality, and evolution. I have shown how the biological image of human nature was challenged as new conceptualizations emerged based on the rise of sociology and anthropology, the new genetics, and the rise of a Progressive Movement. The changing social context led to an increasing recognition of the power of the environment and culture in American lives. The political culture in the United States came to favor liberalism, egalitarianism, and social security and social insurance legislation. The symbolic interactionists developed their concepts directly out of the nature/nurture debate. Their conceptualization were enveloped and nurtured by the more egalitarian aspects of American culture and institutions.

Human Consciousness and Conceptualization

This dissertation has outlined the intellectual history of the changes in the conceptualizations of human nature and political philosophy. We noticed the conceptual changes

that were undergone as we moved from James to Baldwin to Cooley to Dewey to Thomas and to Mead. We have seen how the conceptualization of human nature changed from a solely reductionistic biological image of human nature to a view of human nature that takes into account both biological and social inheritance. In conjunction with reviewing this changed view of human nature, we have reviewed how political philosophy and social policy changed from a laissez-faire position to one of liberalism. We outlined the intellectual history of this conceptualization process as we highlighted the move from biology to psychology to sociology. This dissertation has shown that both the hereditarian and the symbolic interactionist response arose out of the social context of American society though opposing political commitments that influenced their conceptualization process in the nature/nurture debate. Hereditarianism was rooted in the political culture of the eugenics movement while symbolic interactionism was rooted in the political culture of the Progressive Movement. Their vastly different conceptualizations were influenced by unique interpretations of the social context and from their roots in different aspects of a contradictory political culture. In following the rise of these two opposing perspectives (hereditarianism and symbolic interactionism), this dissertation has clearly shown how social and political context provides the backdrop but that the human being, through his or her own interpretation of events, develops particular conceptualizations. The

social and political context does not determine the conceptualizations of human beings, for as this dissertation has demonstrated, there are different ways to conceptualize social objects and events. This dissertation reviewed the contributions that individual thinkers have made in interpreting the social circumstances of their day.

Knowledge and Human Nature are Dialectical

This dissertation's theoretical orientation was that knowledge is dialectical. In both the hereditarian and symbolic interactionist arguments, the dialectical relationship of knowledge is evident. Hereditarian and symbolic interactionist views were contextually rooted in industrialization, immigration, and urbanization; but, these views also affected contemporary social circumstances, i.e., ideas not only have a social base, but, in addition, ideas have social consequences. Dialectically, both influence each other. In the hereditarian case, ideas influenced social circumstances with tragic consequences. For example, this dissertation pointed out that the hereditarian idea of human nature led to both the notion that the criminal was abnormal and that there was a criminal "instinct." Both ideas were later discredited, but they led criminologists to study convicted criminals and then make conclusions about criminals in general. The concept of the criminal as abnormal misguided the criminal justice system. The ideas of unit-character biology influenced the notion that immigrants were inferior and later psychological hereditarianism led to the notion

that immigrants had lower intelligence, based on an intelligence test. Both of these led to the eugenics movement and to the passage of the immigration restriction legislation of 1924 and to sterilization laws. Similarly, the idea that one could measure the intelligence of anyone with an intelligence test normed on white, middle-class children, led to many immigrants and minorities, particularly blacks, being mistakenly relegated to special education classes. The ideas of the progressives and symbolic interactionists helped to bring about social reform, though those ideas were also supported by the most enlightened members of the capitalist class.

The emergence of hereditarianism and symbolic interactionism through a particular interpretation of the social changes transforming America, and the effects of those ideas on the social institutions of American society, supports this dissertation's theoretical orientation that knowledge is dialectical. Social context provided a backdrop for interpretation and conceptualization. Those interpretations and conceptualizations led to social policies that changed American institutions.

Another theoretical orientation of this dissertation was that the separation of social wholes in reasoning is reductionistic. I have provided two arguments to support this. First, the relationship between knowledge and social context is dialectical. We just reviewed that argument above. The second argument to support anti-reductionistic

reasoning is through the dialectical conceptualization of human nature. Before the rise of the new genetics, the nature/nurture controversy fell victim to the same dualist and reductionist fallacy as those who argue that ideas are solely socially or economically produced, or that ideas are primary. Geneticists and environmentalists tried to separate social wholes and then to project one as primary, as an independent variable, the other as secondary or dependent. But this is not the case in either knowledge construction or in the case in the nature of human nature. The reconceptualization of human nature was based on the notion that heredity and environment interact. This recognition has led to a dialectical model of human nature.

> Why do biological determinists use the concepts of nature and nurture as separate causes when developmental genetics long ago showed them to be inseparable? [The new] ... dialectical explanation contrasts with ... dualistic modes of explanation that separate the world into different types of phenomena--culture and biology, mind and body,--which are to be explained in different and non-overlapping ways. [However], ... according to the dialectical view, the properties of parts and wholes codetermine each other. The properties of individual human beings do not exist in isolation but arise as a consequence of social life, yet the nature of social life is a consequence of our being human and not, say, plants. [The new view of evolution] ... abolishes the antitheses of reductionism and dualism, of nature/nurture or of heredity/environment ... (Lewontin et al., 1984: 11-12).

The symbolic interactionists further developed an interactive view of human nature by showing how thoroughly social a human being is, that self and mind, the essence of being human, can only develop in society through socialization. "... [T]he nature/nurture controversy [that] was

alive in the 1920s and 1930s, of scientists with different points of view offering conflicting interpretations of the same data" faded away by the 1940s. (Cravens, 1978: 270).

The significance of the triumph of a view that focused on the interaction between heredity and environment was that "... American scientists had discovered that an either/or question ... was too difficult and perhaps profitless to discuss further" (Cravens, 1978: 265).

In conclusion then, besides defending my thesis that symbolic interactionism emerged directly out of the nature/nurture debate and was influenced by social context and political commitments, my research has lent support to the theoretical orientation of the dissertation. The dissertation outlined a dialectical relationship between knowledge and its social and political context. It showed that human consciousness always makes a difference, that the human being can be enveloped and nurtured in a social and political context but that he/she is able to reflect upon the circumstances of the times and come to his/her own conclusions. (This does not mean that those conclusions will be correct.) Through the advantage of hindsight and later research (such as a sociology of knowledge study), we can better understand why social theorists developed their thoughts in one way and not another. Hopefully, this dissertation has helped us to better understand the intellectual history of a small part of early North American social theory.

Questions for Further Research

As this dissertation has noted, in attempting to justify class stratification and laissez-faire capitalism, Social Darwinists tragically misunderstood and misapplied Darwin's work. The "fittest" concept had nothing to do with being the strongest or most brutal; rather, "... to Darwin it meant merely the best adapted to existing conditions" (Hofstadter, 1969: 199). And rather than survival through competition, "... in nature group cohesion and solidarity ..." was the key to species survival (Hofstadter, 1969: 202). Thus, in exploring the conceptualization process by those who interpreted Darwin in the 1880s and beyond, Hofstadter makes an important point about the political nature of ideas: "In determining whether such ideas are accepted, truth and logic are less important criteria than suitability to the intellectual needs and preconceptions of social interests" (Hofstadter, 1969: 204).

Hofstadter and Cravens in their summaries of this period have both made statements worthy of further research. They have both argued that what guides the acceptance or rejection of ideas has a great deal to do with the social interests of society or with a certain segment of that society, such as the ruling class. This dissertation has shown that the hereditarians explained away anomalies, that their conceptualizations remained creditable to a public even in the face of damaging criticism that was persistent. Thus, in this dissertation, I have not only outlined the

social context that provided the backdrop to conceptualization, but I have raised a serious question for further research; namely, how do the social interests of a society help support ideas that may be inaccurate? One may want to limit society to the ruling class and ask: How does the social interests of the ruling class help support ideas that may be inaccurate? The concept of social interests would have to be precisely defined. Another question for further research is: How do the social policy interests of scientists affect their conceptualizations? Do scientists allow their political beliefs to affect their analysis of the nature of human nature? The question of the influence of social interests of society in general or the ruling class in particular upon the acceptance or rejection of social or scientific thought was not part of this dissertation's research agenda. As I pointed out in my introduction, a sociology of knowledge can lead to further research, such as a political critique. To tackle the above research, the concept of ideology would have to be defined.

Two more issues for further research are suggested here; one, to study precisely how the natural sciences and the hereditarian image of human nature shaped social policy and American institutions; and two, how the new conceptualization of human nature and the concept of culture helped shape social policy and American institutions since the 1930s. Further research might show that the rise of the Welfare state and of the dominance of liberalism during the

Roosevelt years were influenced by the rise of social science. Cravens argues that our everyday lives are now shaped, in part, by the conceptualization of human nature and the concept of culture that emerged during the 1920s and 1930s.

> ... [T]he question of the influence of evolution and of the science of man probably resolves itself not into the number of American citizens who accept these ideas freely but to the extent to which these ideas are and have been embedded in the basic social institutions and social roles of our modern corporate social order, and to the extent these institutions and roles perpetuate the formulae and prescriptions of this science of man and influence the patterns of existence experienced by so many millions of Americans (Cravens, 1978: 273).

Another question to explore is what changes have occurred in symbolic interactionist theory since 1937? Has the theory changed as symbolic interactionists have interpreted contemporary events? Has symbolic interactionism developed a new theory of human nature in response to a changed social and political context since 1934?

Yet another issue for further research would be to take the particular interpretation that symbolic interactionists gave their contemporary social context and explore criticisms of this mode of thought. Did the interactionists strive to challenge determinist thought to such an extent that they gave less recognition to social constraints such as power, class, race, and gender?

There is much work still to be done on the intellectual history of symbolic interactionism. I have already begun a second study to trace the social context of second generation symbolic interactionists as well as exploring the

major conceptual developments of this period. In a 1988 paper presented at the Midwest Sociological Society I explored specific criticisms of symbolic interactionism, pointing out that concepts such as class, race, gender, social power, social organization, and social structure were lacking from contemporary interactionism up to about 1975. In a 1989 paper for the North Central Sociological Association I argued that since 1975 most of the past deficiencies of symbolic interactionism have been remedied in the work of those subscribing to the negotiated order perspective, a subset of symbolic interactionism.

Another area for research is: In what sense is hereditarian thought still persisting in the academic community? If hereditarian thought is still extant, what elements in our social context and political commitments are enveloping and nurturing its continuance? There is still a debate on sex differences and social behavior, for example, especially on work that is being done in sex-hormonal research. What social policy implications has this research had? The continuing research brought on by the nature/nurture debate is still exploring ways to try to unconfound biology, the normative expectations embedded in social roles, and culture so that the influence of each and the character of their interaction on human behavior can be assessed. There are plenty of opportunities here for research from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

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