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
The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit As
A Strategy of Rural Transformation

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Almaz Zewde

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**THE CHILALO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT UNIT
AS A STRATEGY OF RURAL TRANSFORMATION**

By

ALMAZ ZEWDE

AN ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In Partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT**THE CHILALO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT UNIT
AS A STRATEGY OF RURAL TRANSFORMATION**

By

Almaz Zewde

An integrated rural development project-the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in South-central Ethiopia is investigated in the Social Learning framework to ascertain consistent convergence or divergence between stated project goals and actual programs. The research issue is why underdevelopment persisted in spite of over two decades of intensive development intervention.

The research method is documentary analysis. Evaluation reports, budget and plan documents, survey reports on different aspects of the project, program blue-prints and other documents spanning twenty two years of project operation provide the primary data of the research.

The research findings strongly indicate that CADU's large-scale, bureaucratically organized, capital, expert, and high-technology intensive approach did not incorporate the local people, communities, and institutions into dynamic

Almaz Zewde

interactive processes of their own development. As a result, it faced problems in creating a development environment in which the local people and their socioeconomic and political institutions and CADU could engage in mutually reinforcing effort for rural development and poverty alleviation.

The lesson of CADU is the need to avoid reliance on bureaucratic project structures to "deliver" development. Development agencies must rely on local potentials and emergent institutions as vehicles of development. They must only inject measured amounts of external capital, appropriate technology, managerial, and other competence-building programs directly into local institutions and communities to initiate sustainable development form within.

DEDICATION

To my beloved children, Makda, Haeran, and Yonas, whose youthful love for knowledge and people have been unchallenged by hardships and uncertainties. Their selfless dedication to family under trying circumstances, and their loving encouragement have been my sources of joy and inspiration, hope and energy throughout.

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Representative to India did not stand in the way of his professorial duties respecting my work. He read all the documents I sent to him on the plane, in the car, or at night to offer his insightful guidance with unexpected punctuality.

Professor Chris Vanderpool not only made me feel welcome to my Department of Sociology from the first day of our encounter, but also inspired a new intellectual enthusiasm in sociological theory. As a member of my Dissertation Committee, he spent time helping me chart out meaningful lines of enquiry.

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documents. Without their contribution, filling the gaps that emerged in the systematic collection of documents would have been difficult.

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ACRONYMS

ARDU	Arsi Rural Development Unit
AID	Agency for International Development
BARDU	Bale Arsi Rural Development Unit
CADU	Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit
CIF	Cost, Freight and Insurance
EPID	Extension Project Implementation Department (Ministry of Agriculture)
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization (United Nations)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MPP	Minimum Package Project
IRD	Integrated Rural Development
SEAD	South Eastern Agricultural Development Zone
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority (Agency).

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Introduction

A series of photographs taken by Bengt Nekby which appeared in his 1971 book entitled CADU An Ethiopian Experiment in Developing Peasant Farming, and another series taken in 1987 in the same area (Alemneh Dejene, 1987) appeared, to this investigator, to portray very similar profiles of rural deprivation and underdeveloped agricultural practice. The area, where these pictures were taken twenty six years apart, was one in which the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), a world renown integrated rural development project, had operated for close to 21 years. Despite contradictory assessments of CADU programs in Ethiopia during the 1970s, there was an expectation that it had major positive development impacts on the region's ways and standard of life.

Through their rapid accumulation of wealth from the CADU region, commercial farmers operating out of Addis Ababa and other major towns like Nazareth (100 km. southeast of Addis Ababa), had reinforced this expectation of CADU-generated rural prosperity and progress. This had overshadowed the critique of members of the intelligentsia associated with CADU and the Ministry of Agriculture (Henock, 1972, 1973, Betru, 1975) who presented the unintended, and often negative, consequences of CADU programs to subsistence farmers in its region. Swedish development assistance to Ethiopia in general and CADU in particular were popularly

hailed as altruistic in motive and dedicated to the uplifting of disadvantaged groups. It was puzzling how any one could have been hurt through such aid.

With the new opportunities provided by graduate studies at Michigan State University, I undertook a number of preliminary investigations on studies of CADU to get a more comprehensive grasp of what happened. Most of the empirical studies, in one way or the other, identified land reform and peasant cultural practices as major constraints impeding development. In actual fact, rural development suffered from a multiplicity of factors, many generated by public policy choices. This was further exacerbated by the control of agricultural production and marketing and the collectivization drives of the post 1974 "Marxist" government.

The international development literature (Galal, 1974, De Janvry, 1984) on the other hand indicates that land reform, while essential, is not a sufficient condition for development. As for peasant cultural practices, Schultz (1964) had convincingly analyzed the efficiency and rationality of peasant practices as survival strategies. Schultz's insights into peasant rationality and responsiveness to innovations with potentials for improvement of farm life was compelling. It became evident to this investigator that the effectiveness of CADU's development intervention must be more comprehensively studied to build a more holistic understanding of its development achievements and shortcomings. The study of the nature and source of the

variety of constraints it faced was seen as equally important. Perhaps the epistemological foundations of development design contributed to CADU's success or failure as much as anything else.

A decision was, therefore, made to study CADU's development assumptions and theses and their translation into program intervention. This decision in no way minimized the importance of land reform and the role of the political economy setting in development. These critical factors were expected to be figured into program design. As far as research data allow, therefore, land tenure and sociopolitical factors would be incorporated into the study of CADU strategies and programs.

The study of CADU cannot be viewed in isolation from the state-of-the-art knowledge of development theories and practices that informed its orientation and planning strategies. It was felt that CADU must have drawn on development theories and perspectives current during the 1950s and 1960s. For this reason, a brief survey of the evolution of development thinking and theory formulation was deemed essential.

Development theories are reviewed at two levels. First, the general intellectual or theoretical formulation of economic and social development and the shifts in these over time is relevant. Secondly, the practical interpretation and utilization of these theories in development work at the planning and field levels is important. These concerns are addressed in the first chapter of this study. CADU serves as

the case in point relating to the influence of development theories and empirical experiences on practice.

Overview of the Study

This study is divided into 7 chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the evolution of development theories generally and CADU's derivation of theoretical and practical framework specifically. The chapter particularly explores the intellectual roots of the dominant development paradigms of the 1950s and 1960s. It also shows how the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) attempted to improve on some of the more conventional approaches by drawing on the development experiments in countries whose development problems were thought to be relevant to the Ethiopian case. CADU's definition of development and its planned strategy for achieving it are also offered. Finally research questions that will guide this study are posed.

Chapter 2 provides a review of the different studies that have been done on CADU to date. It is on the basis of this review that the rationale and purpose of the present study are established. Chapter 3 provides brief historical, physical, and sociopolitical descriptions of the national and regional development contexts of CADU. In Chapter 4 the theoretical framework of the study is outlined. The eclectic definition of development adopted in this study is operationalized. This definition is then interfaced with the selected theoretical framework or paradigm of the study- the emergent Social Learning Paradigm. It is argued that the definition of development and the theoretical paradigm

adopted in this study provide better opportunities for the study of the sociology of CADU-engineered development. Chapter 5 outlines the methodology of the research and Chapter 6 is devoted to the presentation and analysis of data. Data presentation and analysis is periodized to cover the ideologically divergent pre and post 1974/75 eras.

This long chapter is divided into two major parts dealing with CADU's development assumptions, strategies and programs during two ideologically divergent periods. The first part concerns CADU's conceptual and programatic approaches during the days of the old order spanning 1966-1974. Feudal land relations obtain as the dominant political economy feature of CADU's region at this time. The second part examines issues similar to those of the first part for the period spanning 1975-1989. This period follows the popular upheavals of 1974 which turned the old system of land relations and the status quo in general upside-down. As during the pre 1974 period, government intervention in development became increasingly prominent during the post-1974 era. Government pursued its own goal, often labeling it as "the collective goal". Yet all signs were that the goals of government did not necessarily overlap with that of the people. The convergence and divergence between public and private goals are examined in major sections of the two parts of chapter 6.

CADU's impact on Chilalo region's economic and social life and the generation of appropriate indigenous technologies as a change variable forming part of the content

of development programs are also examined in chapter 6. Some sub- sections of the two major sections of this chapter also strive to deal with CADU's internal structure and its implications for rural development. CADU's relations with different strata of national and regional elites, the population of the development region in general, and with women, and youth in particular, are briefly evaluated to give a broad view of the sociological dynamics which linked CADU and the people of the development region.

In chapter 7 a conclusion of the study based on the findings analyzed in chapter 6 is provided. The conclusion largely takes the form of answers to the stated research questions. Some theoretical reflections are offered to add to the logic and validity of the conclusions. Recommendations on alternative future designs of rural development strategies that are more consistent with local sociological realities and resource possibilities are finally offered. The suggested alternative development strategies argue in favor of avoiding large-scale project bureaucracies as development intermediaries. It is suggested that indigenous informal and formal institutional structures and innovations should provide the legitimate framework for modelling development intervention. Local resources could be augmented and institutional and human capital building in the rural setting effectively managed through the mobilization of indigenous structures.

In general, this approach offers greater possibilities for more successful and enduring transformation of rural

life. International and bilateral development assistance must experiment with this strategy for improved results.

The problems of operating under a political economy environment hostile to individual liberty, achievement, and local initiative is briefly explored. It is recognized that Ethiopia's centralized and autocratic structure diminishes opportunities for equitable and complementary mobilization of internal energies and resources and donor material and manpower assistance for rural transformation by the people for the people. Minimal measures, by donors, to redress the negative effects of excessive government intrusion in civil society is recommended.

The social learning metaphor of development is shown to have more innovative and relevant attributes that can help planners to draw the local people, their resources and institutions to the center stage of development planning and implementation. This is because it allows the installation of dynamic strategies that help interweave the local socio-cultural systems and the intervening development authority into a mutually instructive and reinforcing whole.

It is further suggested that in the future, donor assistance should be fine-tuned and directed at two distinct levels: 1) at the national or macro policy level where normative and structural changes favoring the people's political, social and economic rights are pressed on the government. At the macro level, research, and activities such as the building of national and regional physical and institutional infrastructures, education and health services

can also be supported. 2) at the local level, effort must focus on enabling and empowering the people in knowledge building as well as acquiring competencies technically, socially and politically. The criteria and acid test of development effectiveness need to be the extent to which the ordinary rural people are enabled to articulate their legitimate aspirations and development needs, become cognizant of their resource possibilities and limitations and participate in their development accordingly. In this process, people can be enabled to acquire essential knowledge and skills critical to the building of relevant institutions and development strategies thereby becoming effective utilizers of donor assistance.

It is recognized that experts can play a vital role in realizing development results at both macro and micro levels. Expert analysis of problems along with the people, diplomacy, political dialogue, and pressure by donor agencies and countries can play critical roles in fostering government attitudes favoring the liberalization of the sociopolitical environment. This in turn can create conditions conducive to the free unfolding of popular development energies and potentials. Challenging the will of national governments to facilitate, nurture, and encourage development, therefore, needs to be included in the package of problem analysis and design of development intervention.

Of course, any development intervention, however well studied and empirically based, will inevitably encounter more constraints and problems during application than originally

assumed. This is owing to the complexities of the social, economic and power interests and dynamics within the development organization, the community and the nation. To keep the development project on track and to inform it about all the relevant dynamics within its local development network, a research and evaluation methodology that brings together the people, government and project sponsors is suggested. The research methodology is called Participatory Action Research (Dickinson, 1988, 55-59, Susman and Everland, 1978). This research methodology is a research innovation that makes the process of investigation and evaluation genuinely educational to the people, the officials involved and the development experts. It is also oriented to the application of research findings to the immediate solution of real problems.

Finally, it is suggested that such research and evaluation be undertaken by randomly selected outside entities and not the government or development experts and authorities themselves. It is sociologically imperative that organizational tendencies towards self-maintenance and justification supersede the primacy of the task for which it was established. This imperative is cited as one of the major reasons that renders organizational self-evaluation complacent. The full implementation of the findings of such research and evaluation, it is stressed, must be made unconditionally binding on all involved if development is to be realized.

Chapter I

The Research Problem

Economic development and the interrelated social changes that accompany it have been the subject of fascination and competing theoretical and practical interpretations for a long time. The physiocrats led by the physician Francois Quensay, classical scholars like Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and more recent thinkers like Max Weber, and many others, have led divergent schools of thought on development. What is the source of economic development and the process that nurtures its continued progress? Various answers have been offered, a few variations of which still provide the intellectual framework for conventional analyses of social and economic reality.

Development Theory and Practice in General

The Physiocrats of France had earlier concluded that the source of all economic wealth and the engine that keeps it growing was agriculture (Heilbroner, 1980, p. 47). Agriculture alone had the capacity to produce society's vital subsistence and surplus commodities in the form of foodstuffs and fiber. Other sectors of the economy were perceived as activities merely altering the form of agricultural products without adding new wealth. The logical extension of this argument could be that since large segments of society are involved in non-agricultural economic activities, it follows

that people in the non-agricultural sectors are motivated to create goods and services that could be exchanged for food or money with which to purchase it. This line of argument could have still given agriculture the pivotal place of an economic engine that turns all other sectors of the economy.

Adam Smith had broader and more holistic ideas on the matter. His Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776 (1976, xix) provided a new theoretical framework for analyzing economic phenomena. His intellectual legacy is richly enshrined in modern neoclassical economic thought. His theoretical model essentially saw the economic system and the attendant social structure as based on two basic elements- the division of labor and the market. These two elements work in symmetrical harmony in Smith's model. People see different opportunities for self-betterment or possibilities for fulfillment of self-interest provided by the marketplace and creatively seek out their economic niche. By specializing in one or the other aspects of the economic network mediated by the free market, people seek to enhance their self-interest by catering to the needs of others. The economic system, in this model, serves to positively coordinate the division of labor and symbiotic relationships in society.

The market, as a powerful and inexorable social force, also links two fundamental social categories to which all people must necessarily belong, the consumer and the producer. The market mediates between these two categories of people through the system of pricing. Different groups

produce different items demanded by consumers. "Effectual demand" is seen as based on price levels. If the price of goods is too high, many people cannot afford it and so refrain from buying or consuming it. To stay in business, the producer must set prices that encourage people to consider the good within their list of preferences and habitual consumption. This creates the constant drive for innovation in ways of efficient production that keeps prices down.

Adam Smith saw the division of labor as the essential vehicle for the acceleration of efficiency and diversification of production. He observed that,

...this great increase of the quantity of work which, in consequence of the division of labor, the same number of people are capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first, the increase of dexterity in every particular workman, secondly, to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another, and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor (1976, chapter I p. 11).

He reminds us, however, that the division of labor

...is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary though very slow and gradual, consequences of a certain propensity in human nature....the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. (1976, chap. II p. 17)

Adam Smith thus recognized that the division of labor and all the innovations it gives rise to are gradual and based on prior experience on the job.

The ideas propounded by classical social thinkers following the intellectual tradition of Adam Smith saw the growth of society as being all embracing. In their model, society as a whole moved forward towards overall self-betterment. This forward movement is propelled by mutually beneficial propensities of producing, selling and buying. It is this economic logic and tendency that precipitates change and growth which is not limited to economic life but becomes inclusive of all aspects of social, cultural and technical life leading to what we now call "development" or qualitatively betterment of human life.

David Ricardo was to challenge this assumption of peaceful harmony of interests and tendencies that benefitted all sectors of society and served as its engine of development. Ricardo (1969, 1926) saw the economic system as having differential effects on different groups in society. He recognized the effect of disparities in property ownership on the distribution of benefits generated within the economic system and constrain the way the economy works. He argued that not all the beneficiaries of economic development actively participated and contributed to it. In fact, the least contributing classes such as landlords skimmed off the profits earned by the diligence of entrepreneurs and laborers as rent on their property;

All classes, therefore, except the landlords, will be injured by the increase in the price of corn. The dealings between the landlord and the public are not like dealings in trade, whereby both the seller and buyer may equally be said to gain, but the loss is

wholly on one side and the gain wholly on the other... (1969, p. 225).

Ricardo examined the price and tax systems as well as different types of rents on land, mines, etc. and the institutional systems legitimizing production and ownership relations to arrive at the conclusion that society is characterized by many asymmetrical tendencies and critical imbalances in its social and economic process.

Ricardo was also the first to formulate the labor theory of value. His argument was that profit or surplus is the residual product after labor has been paid its due. To Ricardo, the less time spent on producing a good, the less the labor cost and so the lower its price. Still, Ricardo saw conflict and struggle for a share of the economic pie as likely to tear society apart since the manner of its appropriation was not based on universally accepted formulas of fairness and worth of labor.

Marx later aimed to refute Ricardo's labor theory of surplus, arguing that surplus is the value of unpaid and unfairly expropriated labor, and not the value of other factors of production after labor has been paid its share (1967, Vol.1, chap. VII-IX). Unlike Smith and Ricardo who assumed that labor is paid its share of contribution to the production process through wages, Marx argued that labor is always paid only a portion of its value. A greater part of the value produced by labor is retained by the capitalist, thus adding continuously to his stock of capital (1967, Vol. I, Chap. XXIV). Based on this logic, he formulated a theory of social structure in which two dominant classes (workers

and capitalists) form a unity of opposites. This unity is fraught with conflict and tension which will only be resolved with the disappearance of the two classes in the classless society that will emerge through the final resolution of the contradiction and conflict between labor and capital (Marx, 1967).

The legacies of Marx's intellectual tradition are too well known to merit further analysis here. It is sufficient to note that while much of Marx's substantive analysis of the economic process is compelling, his deterministic approach to social and economic phenomena, leave many analytical gaps. His construction of pure categories and systems are unattainable in real life. Social and economic systems are dynamic and their pace and direction subject to intractable social, moral, and other human forces. Marx's simplistic and deterministic predictions have contributed to the emergence of systems of tyranny, in the name of ultimate achievement of social and economic justice. Zealous, perhaps even devious, disciples of his doctrine conveniently turned and twisted his basic theses to fit their private purposes under the guise of pioneering humanity's classless society at a highly advance technological stage. The communist systems constructed around the world since the Russian Revolution of 1917 have been in turmoil and collapse during the latter months of 1989 under the pressure of their own colossal economic and social failures. Perhaps this will end Marx's vision of a communist society born out of a violent resolution of the bitter conflict between workers and property owners.

Max Weber's theoretical system elucidates the complexity of the social and economic process and its ultimate structure (1978, 371-398). From family based production and consumption, societies evolve disparate social and economic systems even under identical development conditions (377).

Differences in the evolution of social and economic organizations arise from the value emphasis of societies. Those that stressed piety and restrained human economic behavior curbed the intrinsic human tendencies of acquisitiveness and controlled its full manifestation. This, according to Weber, happened in ancient Chinese culture (377). But in cultures that developed in parts of Western Europe, more individualistic economic behavior was sanctioned (376-377). Weber later links this cultural tendency with Western capitalistic development and its distinctive emphasis on individual achievement orientation in the secular as well as religious realms (1959).

Individualism by itself is not assumed to have provided all the necessary conditions for capitalist successes. Other related progress such as the rise of rational bureaucratic organization of life and business played key roles also. In his preface to Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1959), Talcot Parsons summarizes some of Weber's seminal ideas on social and economic development,

...he, like others emphasized profit making enterprises, but he was careful to point out that it was not orientation to profit alone which was the crucial criterion, but such orientation in the context of careful, systematic, rational planning and discipline which connected profit-making with

bureaucratic organization of the economy... (xv)

Other thinkers have similarly developed variants of explanations of the process of change and development. The economic historian W.W. Rostow deserves special mention here. He developed his famous (if controversial) stages theory of economic growth in his 1953 and 1960 treatise entitled The Process of Economic Growth. He defines his work as :

...an effort to introduce into the formal economic analysis variables which incorporate the human response to the challenges and material opportunities offered by the economic environment. These variables are designed to constitute a link between the domain of the conventional economists on the one hand, and the sociologist, anthropologist psychologist and historian on the other (1960, 11).

The conventional economic analysis he is addressing here refers particularly to Alfred Marshall's theoretical system of economic analysis. Marshall treats the economic process as a self-propelling process whose dynamics lies on supply and demand and prices of outputs and factor inputs. He also introduced the concept of "equilibrium" into economic analysis. This notion assumed that, for analytical purposes, the factors affecting production could be seen as static over a given time (Marshall, 1972). Rostow finds this assumption of asset and socio-political fixity over any recognizable period "intolerable" (1953, 2).

Rostow sees the limits of Marshall's and other neoclassical economic models in explaining the true dynamics of economic change and growth. He sees the process not as a mere interaction of production factors and product prices, but as one that is contingent on the social, cultural, and

political economy environment. These variables can interact to impel or impede development.

Rostow's analytical elements bear striking similarity to those analyzed by Adam Smith. Like Adam Smith, Rostow's model puts into perspective the social, institutional and cultural elements of the economic process. These are seen to constitute a number of propensities that are assumed to predispose individuals and communities toward economic growth tendencies. These propensities include;

a) the propensity to develop fundamental science (physical and

social),

b) the propensity to apply science to economic ends,

c) the propensity to seek material advance,

d) the propensity to accept innovations, and

e) the propensity to consume (1960, 11)

The character of these propensities is determined by or is a reflection of the society's value system and level of cultural development as well as the social and political institutions it is capable of creating and sustaining (p.12-13). Rostow asserts that the analysis of changes in these propensities is essential since inherent propensities within a culture determine the pace and character of social, cultural, institutional, and economic transformation that may be realized. Such an understanding requires no less than a "general dynamic theory of social change" (p.13).

Rostow's propensities are differently manifested at different stages of society's development. The stages of

development he identifies are, 1) the traditional, 2) the stage of preconditions for take off, 3) the take off, 4) the drive to maturity, and 5) the age of mass consumption (1977).

Starting with the traditional stage where capital accumulation and technology are very low, societies are assumed to progress in a linear direction, accumulating more wealth to invest and to promote innovation of technology that helps break production barriers. Finally, societies come to a steady "developed" state where the population enjoys the bliss of high production and consumption.

There is a lot of value in Rostow's insights. But the general assumption that development, whose complexities will be highlighted in the eclectic definition of the concept which will be offered later in this study, is the exclusive consequence of internal social and cultural dynamics makes Rostow's analysis too limited in the explanation of development in the present world context. In a world where there has been intricate power and political interrelationships and interdependence within and between societies, it serves little purpose to limit the analysis of such a complex process as development only to local socio-cultural dynamics.

Besides this shortcoming, the general Western bias of Rostow's theory, specifically, and the works of many others that follow this intellectual tradition generally, has rendered them vulnerable to attacks as Eurocentric (Dickinson, 1988 p.26) interpretation of development phenomena. Among other things, this type of analysis

neglects the many advantages and opportunities in trade and other forms of resource transfers from the Third World that Western countries have enjoyed and continue to enjoy in their progress (Wallerstein, 1986, Rodney, 1982, Amin, 1976, Gunder Frank, 1974, 1979). Be this as it may, the central analyses provided by thinkers like Rostow and Adam Smith have provided the premise of the general development model popularly known as "modernization" which really is a unilinear evolutionary social Darwinism.

The modernization paradigm of development which defines development as growth in GNP and per capita income, assumed preeminence as a formal development model after World War II when former colonies of European powers started to gain their independence. It arose out of the challenge of meeting the development aspirations and fervor of these new states in a manner that gave credence to Western ideology and interests. Theoretical systems and practical methods of development intervention, were put together in a short time to facilitate economic reconstruction (R. R. Rostow, 1984, Meiers, 1984, Bauer, 1984, Rogers, E. 1962, introduction).

The modernization model of development was simplistically translated into a strategy of mere transfer of capital and technology to create modern production systems with national governments of Third World countries as the main agents of development. The history of the past 30-40 years of development work in the Third World shows the consistent application of this strategy. Modernizing the industrial sector in the Third World was assumed to generate

a chain reaction throughout all other sectors, thereby benefitting all the people over the long term (Steven and Jabara, 1988, 121-122). But, as the experience of development failures during this period (Organization of African Unity, 1986, Meiers and Seers, 1984) has proved, the process of economic growth and associated social change have remained illusive.

The theoretical and conceptual shortcomings of the model have been looked at from different angles. Many of the basic assumptions and tenets of modernization have been proven to be inconsistent with the development experiences of the Third World. Jacobs (1971), Galal (1974), and others have shown that in many Third World countries, technological and economic development are not natural and spontaneous reactions or social structural adjustment to available innovations, resources, and market opportunities. Rather, they are carefully screened and engineered sets of behaviors encouraged by the image makers of each country. These image makers are the social and political elite, with stakes in the maintenance of the established order.

Jacobs reached this conclusion after studying the patterns of development in Thai society. He discovered that diffusion of new ideas and technological innovations can take place without making significant economic, socio-political, and institutional changes. He observed that in a wide range of people's activities in Thailand, discrepancies existed between basic Thai values and manifest behavior. New behaviors were practiced without any fundamental change in

the value and institutional structure of society (p. 276). He attributed this to the careful filtering of innovations by the elite decision-makers in such a way that the innovations promoted will not lead to undermining of key assumptions of the existing social order (p. 315ff).

In such societies, individuals are not allowed or encouraged to innovate and exercise their creativity because the consequences of their actions to the social system may be considered suspect by the powers of the land. The intrinsic value of the technology or innovation itself is not encouraged. The point here is that forces within civil society are not free to follow the logic of functional interdependence. Nor is the existence of indigenous potential for innovation a sufficient condition for development. Democratic political institutions, and a carefully managed laissez faire environment are necessary preconditions for unleashing a community's potential. When the sociopolitical system is restrictive of the expression of full human potential, human initiative and creativity are stunted. Durkheim (1933), for instance, theoretically explains how small traditional societies with tight normative control over individual behavior expression preclude emergence of innovative behaviors. In contradiction to this, more open and anonymous social environments offered by large-scale social organizations like cities, foster individual creativity and self-expression. Therefore, more efficient and rational adaptation to a changing social, physical and technological environments require substantial degrees of

freedom for individuals and groups to experiment, experience and innovate appropriate responses. Western industrialization, which followed Europe's cultural renaissance was, in part, propelled by the prevalence of such a precondition.

Galal (1974) also studied the development approaches of nine Arab countries with different land tenure and political-economy systems. He concluded that with or without land reform and coming from different resource bases, the rural sector of all the countries studied remained underdeveloped, with declining food self-sufficiency (108). Yet all of these countries were investing at much higher rates than Europe ever did during the past century when record rates of industrialization took place. He locates the major obstacles in the weak development will of national governments that maintain very controlling social structures detrimental to progress but of paramount importance to the maintenance of power and indulgence by the elite.

Many scholars (Dube, 1988, Chambers, 1983, George, 1986, Cernea, 1985, Goulet, 1976, Jaycox, 1988, Eicher, 1988, De Janvry, 1988, Schmid, 1987, Dickinson, 1988, Hall and Midgley, 1988, Oakley and Marsden, 1984, Johnson, 1988) call attention to the role of non-economic factors in shaping economic development processes. The need for extending the analytical parameters of economic and social development to include factors like institutions, the law, technological and human capital etc. traditionally not considered within the

framework of economic development analysis, is now considered evident.

The most complete theoretical model that has emerged in recent decades is perhaps the Social Learning paradigm. Scholars writing in the tradition of this emergent paradigm are contributing to the search for a revised model and strategy for holistic development, especially rural development. The logic and theoretical bases of the Social Learning Paradigm are firmly founded in time tested educational theories of learning and sociological and social psychological theories of socialization. At the close of this chapter, a fuller description of the Social Learning Paradigm and its intellectual roots will be provided. Before we close this discussion of general conceptual and theoretical problems of development, a brief discussion of one of the most vigorous challenges to the "modernization" theory, which has put it on the defensive, must be presented. This is the Dependency perspective on development and underdevelopment

Dependency- The Development of Underdevelopment

This school of thought addresses only the sources of underdevelopment of the Third World. Though there are a number of shades of dependency analysis, its dominant feature is that it locates the main problems of Third World development in the same processes that fuel the continued development of the First World. There is assumed to be a zero-sum relationship between the two worlds as they deal with each other in trade and other resource transfer

arrangements. In all economic transactions between the First and Third worlds, resource and surplus transfer favors the former since it is in a position to dictate price for Third World commodities, as well as conditions of interest and returns on First World investments in the Third World.

Raul Prebisch (1984) and other Latin American scholars, (Kahl, 1988, Chilcots, 1984), other scholars outside of the Latin American Region (Andre Gunder Frank, 1971, 1972 Galtung, 1970, Amin 1976) contributed to the various shades of this neo-marxist perspective. As already stated earlier, the general conclusion of this school of thought essentially views both development and underdevelopment as resulting from the same economic processes in which Western and Third World countries participate. It argues that the underdevelopment of the Third World is inherent in the nature of its relation with the global economic system dominated by the Western economies. The economic relations of this global system has the power to impel or impede development. Some scholars in this school of thought point out that

In effect, unequal exchange is simply a part of the world-wide process of appropriation of surplus. Surplus value that producers create passes through a series of persons and firms...This chain of the transfer of surplus value ...traverses national boundaries and when it does, the state operations intervene to tilt the sharing... towards core states (Wallerstein 1986, 292).

Because the system is based on the protection of the interests of industrialized countries at the expense of poor

ones, development becomes a zero-sum game in which rich and poor countries get locked in.

Such resource transfers deprive the poor economies of any opportunity to accumulate wealth that can be invested and reinvested to promote their economic progress. Thus the cycle of poverty and underdevelopment is maintained by the very process that fuels the continued growth of the industrialized economies. Other scholars (Reynolds, 1983) have countered this argument by historically documenting the economic benefits that some underdeveloped countries have in fact realized from their association with the industrialized ones through trade and other international arrangements.

Regardless of the merits and demerits of the dependency perspective, it or other perspectives on development competing with the modernization paradigm have not offered strong practical and methodological alternatives for designing rural development in the Third World. This has resulted in the unchallenged continuation of the modernist models of development in spite of all evidence of its limitations in helping bring about balanced and broad-based development. It is in reaction to this situation that a growing number of development scholars have turned to the task of re-examining the concept of development and the discovery of new and more appropriate approaches to it.

CADU and The Practice of Development

Historically, the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) arose out of the genuine concern and good will of the

Swedish government to help Ethiopia improve the life of its rural people. Since the late 1950s, the Swedish Government was involved in many valuable development projects such as the Elementary School Building Unit (ESBU) which provided matching funds for local initiatives in school building. The program became a catalyst for massive school construction and operation in many parts of Ethiopia. The Ethio-Swedish Pediatric Clinic, Ethio-Swedish College of Building Technology which later became the Building College Under Haile Selassie I University and Addis Ababa University respectively, were all model successes in development cooperation.

Swedish interest in Ethiopian agriculture emerged in the early 1960s. The background and history of this interest and the creation of CADU as a result is given in the history and background section of the data analysis chapter of this study. Here, we will merely take a brief look at the research problem arising from its implementation as a rural development strategy and program.

The designers of CADU were very much aware of the problems inherent in designing rural development programs. The Swedish experience in agricultural development in Africa, no doubt enriched their perceptions on the problem. It is also clear that they were well informed about the general paradigmatic problems in the design and implementation of rural development. At the beginning of their project formulation they recorded that,

The lack of unified, empirically verified and practically applicable development theory is of course most disturbing in the planning on a rural development project....Due to the striking success of the above programmes it seems nevertheless desirable to try to draw some conclusions for the organization and introductory activities of a possible rural development programme in Ethiopia.
(SIDA, 1966, Part I. 123)

The programs referred to here were the Comila Community Development Program and the Regional Development in Israel.

The conclusions drawn from studying these programs were that the project (CADU) must: 1) be very flexible at all times so as to be able to change course and respond to the signals given by continuous evaluation and feedback on project activities, 2) serve as an experimental program designed to "find" methods for rural development in Ethiopia, 3) that a thorough survey of the resource base of the potential project region precede project design, 4) have financial and administrative autonomy, 5) be planned and operated within the framework of the national development plan, 6) be able to coordinate the activities of government development programs in the region to ensure unity of purpose and enhanced development impact, 7) be aimed at multi-faceted development embracing agricultural practices by the peasant, marketing and rural credit, the development of local crafts, rural industries, management skills of the local people, self-administration etc. through the direct participation by the relevant groups of the population of the project region (123-124).

The building of rural human capital in all spheres was stressed as the epic purpose of the project. T.W. Schultz's

famous work (1964) on the transformation of traditional agriculture was cited as the single most important source of theoretical inspiration for the project. Schultz had set a new trend in rural development. He had argued that, contrary to popular assumptions about the conservative and backward peasantry being obstacle to its own development, the peasantry is rational, does respond to market signals, and strives to improve personal well-being when possibilities allow. Schultz stressed the need to enhance peasant know-how and knowledge as well as making appropriate and affordable technology available to them as key to solving problems of poverty.

CADU was thus founded on an eclectic development model that was informed by the state-of-the-art thinking in rural development. A careful study of Israeli regional development and Comila's (Pakistan) rural development strategies informed the design of CADU since both countries were assumed to share shades of development problems with Ethiopia. CADU's declared goal, which is fully cited in the background section of the analysis chapter (Chapter 6), was to mobilize the rural people and their institutions towards self-development. There was a strong initial commitment to the genuine participation of the people in the articulation or definition of their problems and in searching and learning of viable methods for solving them. CADU would be an instrument or catalyst in this capacity building and enabling process.

CADU's stated goals presented amazing similarity to the development formulation of the Social Learning paradigm,

though a unified theory of Social Learning was not articulated at the time of the Project's design. Even its definition of development closely corresponds with that of the Social Learning Paradigm. Yet, after more than 21 years of project work, visible changes in the socioeconomic status of the average farm household appears unachieved. It is this reality which justifies this study and makes it worthwhile to investigate the extent to which the original project development perceptions were consistently followed and consciously implemented throughout the life of the project. What could the factors be that impeded the envisaged rural transformation?

A review of the Literature on CADU reveals that it has remained at the center of development controversy since its early days. Studies covered in the literature review (Chapter 2), suggest that the project has so far been investigated either from a modernist perspective or from a single issue and single disciplinary perspective. It has not yet been studied from an eclectic or holistic and interdisciplinary perspective. A study in the tradition of the emergent Social Learning Paradigm, that allows an interdisciplinary and multidimensional investigation of project operations and local institutional responses is needed.

Before proceeding to specify the research questions, we should broadly define the terms growth, participation, development and transformation. These concepts are extensively used in this study.

The words development and participation will be formally operationalized in the methodology chapter. But their generic usage throughout this document minimally imply the following: development means continued improvement in the whole range of economic, social, technical, educational and technological conditions. It suggests qualitative as well as quantitative changes in rural life transcending relatively temporary external interventions. Transformation is used interchangeably with development. Growth, on the other hand, is a mere increase in production regardless of who benefits from it and how it is achieved. Participation is used to describe the fullness of popular involvement transcending arbitrary and ad hoc role playing of people in limited aspects of development programs. It implies a learning and experiencing process through which people grow out of their established and relatively stable practice into one that is sustainably dynamic. In the longer term perspective, it also implies taking part in increasingly specialized and diversified roles as opposed to the traditional roles of self-sufficiency and subsistence.

Objectives of the Study

The lively debate over the efficiency of bureaucratically organized, large-scale, integrated rural development (IRD) projects like CADU still continues (Holmberg, 1989, Cohen, 1987). Some development specialists argue that IRD ought to be continued for a longer period yet before any satisfactory conclusions about it can be drawn. CADU is often used as a general success case that warrants

continuation of IRD programs organized through massive donor and international assistance and credit. At worst, it is suggested, CADU's outcomes make any conclusion about IRD programs ambiguous.

The purpose of this study is to contribute to the closure of the controversy surrounding large-scale and bureaucratically managed integrated rural development projects. It hopes to achieve this by investigating the empirical adequacy of CADU's definition of development seen from the perspective of the emergent Social Learning Paradigm, and the correspondence of CADU's development philosophy and planning with its practice. It seeks to highlight the consistencies and inconsistencies between CADU's goals and actual programs, between CADU and government objectives, and between local people's and CADU's objectives. The convergence and divergence between the goals and practices of CADU and those of the different strata of local institutions and social groups will be studied to shed light on CADU's inherent capacity to create enduring change and transformation in its region. It is hoped that the multidimensional analyses of the logical consistency of CADU's defined aims, its structural and operational priorities, and resource allocation patterns, as well as its operational linkages with the local institutional systems and the rural people, will reveal the structural and operational opportunities or impediments that conditioned project outcomes. The structural, operational, institutional, and social factors inherent in the project are considered

critical elements in project success or failure in transforming the rural setting. This is because CADU was otherwise well endowed with technology, expertise, natural resources and financial capital with which to do the job.

More specifically, this study seeks to examine project impact on peasant and rural life from the stand point of development criteria including participation, reciprocal learning, innovations in rural technology, rural institution building, and material improvements in rural life. All of these variables are central to the Social Learning Paradigm which serves as the basic framework of analysis.

Research Questions

The following research questions will guide this study;

1. How did CADU define development?
2. Who participated in the formulation of this definition?
3. What program strategies did CADU adopt to translate this definition in program terms?
4. Were the definition of development and program strategies mutually consistent? Did CADU's initial objectives continue to guide project activity through the life of the project?
5. What role did local institutions and people play in the design of development objectives and programs?
6. What were CADU's significant development outcomes or achievements?
7. What lessons can we draw from CADU's 21 years of experiments in rural development in Ethiopia?

These questions may not be investigated in the literal order they have been presented. Nor will the format of the research be organized around providing verbatim answers to each question. Analysis will be organized around elucidating the answer to each of these questions.

Chapter II

Literature Review on CADU

Bengt Nekby, the first Swedish Director of CADU, was perhaps the first one to write about CADU. His book CADU an Ethiopian Experiment in Developing Peasant Farming, was published in 1971. By this time, controversy had already broken out over CADU's development strategies and the negative impact of some components of CADU program on peasant farming and peasant welfare.

Nekby begins by describing how the World Bank, USAID, FAO and SIDA had convergent views on how best to hasten rural economic productivity in Ethiopia. This convergent view emphasized the application of a comprehensive rural development package in selected areas with high agricultural potential. CADU reflected this concept, as well as SIDA's concerted efforts to synthesize the best lessons of such renown rural development efforts like Comila in Pakistan and Regional Planning in Israel.

Apparently, Ethiopian planners gave cold reception to the idea in the beginning. Indeed, the planners' reluctance to the idea of concentrating development efforts in high potential regions was evident even in the Third Five Year Plan. But, as Nekby informs, the planners gradually adopted the idea as good.

Given the general backwardness of the Arsi province in general and its Chilalo Awraja in particular, and given the potential to transform it into a prosperous agricultural region, the enthusiasm of experts in designing CADU's strategy as they did is understandable. The experts did recognize that there was no sure and tested method for bringing about rural development and they were eager to test out their version of the possible.

Nekby narrates how the earliest project activity focused on the collection and purchase of milk from farmers who did not derive the necessary economic benefit from their product before the advent of CADU. Reasonable prices were offered for the farmers' milk, and the amount of marketed milk started to grow significantly. Thus marketing of products that were essentially part of a subsistence economic organization was introduced. Other services and activities followed. But all did not go well by way of introducing the desired economic trends and activities to the peasantry.

Nekby gives us useful insights into how unexpected situations forced CADU to extend some of its services to richer farmers which resulted in aggravating the economic disparity between rich and poor farmers. For example, he notes that experts overestimated fertilizer consumption and imported far more than poor farmers could buy. The excess had to be disposed of by selling to rich farmers. This set a precedent that was difficult to break, and CADU was castigated for having enhanced commercial farming at the expense of the peasantry, especially as poor farmers and

tenants started to be evicted by richer and commercial farmers.

In general, Nekby's work is one of general description of the project region, its socioeconomic and political environment and the program strategies that seemed appropriate to the general situation and how these strategies were applied in CADU. It applied little theoretical framework to evaluate whether the Project and the way it was designed had intrinsic attributes that would make it effective in transforming rural society. One of the greatest values of this work is its documentation of the conditions of rural life in photographs that can serve useful baseline situations against which present and future changes in rural ways of life in the region can be compared.

John M, Cohen has produced a number of works on CADU individually and in cooperation with others. His first work, The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit as a Program Intermediary For Foreign Assistance in Ethiopia (1972) aimed to identify the merits and constraints of the project in terms of inducing development. In this manuscript, Cohen suggests that the strategies and development programs of CADU were adequate. But the project's effectiveness is seen as troubled by the land tenure system in particular and government administrative constraints in general. The author saw the package, top-down approach as potentially useful for developing peasant agriculture.

Cohen, in collaboration with Norman T. Uphoff (1977) authored an extensive work on rural development in which

CADU was used as a prototype in developing concepts and measures for rural development and participation . This work was titled Rural Development Participation: Concepts and Measures for Project Design, Implementation and Evaluation. Its analysis appears to rely heavily on Cohen's knowledge of CADU rather than detailed documentation of data. This work indicates that local participation in decision-making in CADU was virtually absent at all levels. It is implicitly asserted that large bureaucratic development organizations could be effective instruments of socioeconomic development if only they paid attention to a few details such as participation.

The notion of participation in this context is used to indicate the democratic nature of decision making rather than the more fundamental involvement of all strata of society in acquiring new outlooks, innovating appropriate institutions, and learning relevant skills to be effective in their participation in development and the on-going process of transformation of rural ways of life and production.

Cohen's other significant works include The Effects of Green Revolution Strategies on Tenants and Small scale land owners in the Chilalo Region of Ethiopia (1975), Rural Change in Ethiopia, The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (1974) and Integrated Rural Development, The Ethiopian Experience and the Debate (1987).

The first two are journal articles focused on single issues in development. The first paper discusses the negative effects of peasant and tenant eviction resulting

from the introduction of Green Revolution technology in the Chilalo region by CADU. The second looks at some additional changes presumed to be stimulated by CADU's impact. Neither is a comprehensive study of the internal and external processes that condition CADU's performance and its impact on the development of the region.

The last mentioned work is a major one. It relies on an extensive selection of CADU/ARDU/SEAD documents for its data. But both the selection and interpretation of data seem bent on proving a single point: that CADU has in fact been an effective instrument of development, even though its senior experts showed resistance to the participation of the people in project affairs (p. 113), and in spite of government policies such as resistance to land reform, centralized administration, price control of agricultural products, collectivization etc. which are inimical to rural transformation. It is argued that CADU would have been more effective as a strategy and as an organization for rural development had the policy environment been more favorable. The conclusion offered suggests that CADU has proved that bureaucratically organized integrated rural development projects should be continued since they have the potential to transform rural society as demonstrated by CADU. This is a thesis that will be challenged by the findings and analysis of the present research.

Other scholars and writers have also provided different insights into CADU. Betru Gebregziabher's (1975) study on Integrated Development in Rural Ethiopia: An Evaluative Study

of the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit, looks at basic ambiguities in the conceptual framework of CADU. The author also refers to the disharmony between CADU and different elements of rural society and bureaucracy, each attacking CADU for different reasons. As a former executive of CADU, Betru observes that the small grain merchants, resented CADU's intrusion into the rural grain market, the rural bureaucrats saw it as a competitor for the people's respect and time, the clergy saw it as spreading secular values inimical to their dogma, and other elements of rural society had their own complaints. The author expresses the need for a systematic and comprehensive study of CADU as an approach to rural development to inform the future design of rural development and CADU's present operational effectiveness. He suggests that a coherent study of CADU organized around a clearly stated development framework and a set of indicators of effectiveness be undertaken for this purpose.

Michael Stahl's Ethiopia: Political Contradictions in Agricultural Development (1974) also provides some treatment of CADU in his dissertation study of agricultural development programs in Ethiopia. He concludes that except for the political constraints and tenancy problems, CADU would have successfully transformed its subsistence agrarian environment into a modern and prosperous one.

Stahl calls his study somewhat journalistic. He does not use any theoretical or development framework to look into the activities and program assumptions of CADU. His observations are well intended but the lack of the kind of

rigorous inquiry that make perspectives on development explicit weakens the value of his work in terms of its contribution to the development literature. The task of isolating the empirical dynamics that are internal and external to the project and the precise ways in which each affects the effectiveness of the project is totally absent.

Derrick Brinkerhoff's dissertation, Participation and Rural Development Project Effectiveness: An Organizational Analysis of Four Cases (1980) includes CADU as one of the four cases of rural development under study. The investigator uses a selected set of management parameters to look at what each project did by way of its management style. The thesis is that a project which adopts a more inclusive participatory approach to the role players in the project is likely to succeed than one which does not. From some secondary information on CADU's organizational style, it is concluded that CADU did not have the participatory management style that the other comparable development organizations had. But the notion of participation and what it is supposed to achieve or who exactly should do what in the participatory framework for development to occur is not sociologically spelled out.

Seleshi Sisay's dissertation research (1979), Development Aid to Rural Ethiopia, 1954-1977, The Political Economy of Swedish Rural Development Assistance, devotes chapters 5 and 7 to CADU. The study stresses the problems of bypassing the national development objectives by CADU's concentration on a high potential agricultural region. The

national objective is understood as one intent on broad agrarian development- a position which is questionable given the pervasive ambivalence and lack of specificity on objectives and strategies of development in Ethiopian planning circles at that point in Ethiopia's development history. The study does not rely on investigating the documented activities of CADU in an extensive way.

Based on his argument that there was no alignment between CADU objectives and strategies and those of national development authorities, the author suggests that future foreign assistance focus on macro rather than micro projects. At the Macro level, donors are advised to suggest to national authorities on the essential preconditions of equity-oriented development programs for the entire nation, and also support such programs on a national scale. The character and nature of such programs is not made explicit. The author also seems to believe that expatriate experts have all the necessary insights and knowledge about how to bring about development and how to make this development equitable and beneficial to all the people. This of course is an assumption of a rather tall order. The intricacies of development are too many and at times unique to given situations to be mastered by any group of experts apriori.

Aregay Waktola (1975) also completed a dissertation on the Diffusion and Adoption of Package of Agricultural Innovations in Chilalo. Although there is some marginal handling of political and bureaucratic problems in a period of escalating political turmoil following the 1974

revolution, the investigator applies a standard diffusion of innovation model. The focus is the identification of correlations between socioeconomic characteristic of peasants and the rate of adoption of innovations propagated by CADU diffusion agents. This is indeed very far from looking at the entire range of CADU's assumptions, organization of activities, and development strategies. In fact Aregay's investigation is grounded in the modernist assumption that development could be brought about through the work of bureaucratically organized projects like CADU. His study is preoccupied with the discovery of whether or not CADU is accomplishing its development mission through diffusing innovations to farmers. Roger Everett's model of diffusion of innovations and its correlation with socioeconomic status (SES) of farmers and other farmer attributes, as well as factors such as the frequency of farmer contact with extension agents etc. is built into a framework and strategy of Aregay's study of development.

In another dissertation study entitled An Economic Evaluation of Agricultural Package Programs in Ethiopia, Tesfaye Tecle (1973) includes CADU as one case of a Minimum Package Project (MPP) that had a national character. The minimum package in agricultural development consisted of the diffusion of improved seeds and fertilizer through extension workers using government and project credit facilities that allowed farmers to purchase these farm inputs. The MPP is a CADU generated strategy. The important research concern here appears to be identifying the factors influencing technology

adoption behavior and estimating costs and benefits of different technologies.

The research questions are typically economic. The furthest that the investigation goes into looking at the development processes is the investigation of program techniques used to influence farmer productivity and whether or not these were immediately effective.

The general conclusion of the study is that CADU's experience has been instrumental in the design of MPP as a national strategy and that both CADU and the MPP deriving from it are generally beneficial production enhancing strategies.

In a study of 17 African development projects, Uma Lele (1975) provides a very brief analysis of CADU. The purpose is to shade light on ways of making project design more popular-participation oriented (6). A very brief sketch of CADU's project logic and lines of success is provided. This, along with brief analyses of 16 other African development projects is used to draw aggregate conclusions about future African projects.

Projects like CADU oriented toward service delivery to individual farmers are seen to offer little or no possibilities for mass participation. This, coupled with the paucity of trained manpower, is seen as indicating the need for delegation of development responsibility to rural masses. The logical policy shift for the World Bank is, therefore, to be shaped by this reality. However, the meaning of the concept of participation and why and how it works or what the

institutional mechanisms for the delegation of development responsibility to rural masses are, remain unclear and unspecified.

Sisay Asefa (1980) also conducted a dissertation study on the economics of household farm production in the Chilalo region. The main line of inquiry follows a simulation programming technique using different resource allocation options for household production. The important conclusions include that in Chilalo, land is not a limiting resource and that considerable gap exists between actual and optimal farm plans in Chilalo and by extension in Ethiopia. The investigator recommends a number of policy liberalization and changes in agricultural marketing and other overall sociopolitical institutions.

Green (1974) also completed a study similar to that of Sisay's. But he uses very sparse Chilalo data to conduct comparative simulation analysis of farm productivity and efficiency of four Ethiopian agricultural systems. The author uses farm budgeting and economic trend analysis techniques to arrive at comparative rates of return on investment in the four agricultural systems included in the study. Green's study is much more specialized in its scope than even Sisay's and eschews any preoccupation with broader development issues.

Other minor works on CADU also exist. But they are fragmented studies on specific programs carried out by CADU. M.B Karim's (1985/86) article, "Rural Development Projects-Comila, Puebla, and Chilalo: A Comparative Perspective"

offers little data and only minor theoretical analysis to establish that some bureaucratically organized projects function better than others in rural development. CADU is not given a high mark.

E. Brangang's (1980/81) work, "Breeding Activities of the Ethio-Swedish Integrated Rural Development Project" deals with CADU's animal breeding and husbandry activities. The first part of this short article discusses the planning and goals of the breeding program which was to improve dairy production and livestock farming as a more commercially oriented enterprises. The second part deals with the results of crossbreeding experiments and how dairy production in particular was enhance by it. This study is technical and does not deal with broader and fundamental development issues.

The same is the case with L. E Richter's (1979) article, Integrated Rural Development: Training for Effective Implementation. It examines CADU's manpower development programs. Project-related manpower requirement is identified and training undertaken at the project site, making training relevant and timely for project needs. This is held as exemplary for a purposeful training innovation.

The literature review on CADU suggests that all available works on it are single-issue oriented or use established diffusion of innovation models with modernist assumptions about delivering development from the outside or from top down through bureaucratically-organized projects. An analysis of CADU's rich documented experiences and

development perspectives from a holistic and interdisciplinary point of view, with emphasis on sociological variables and processes is very much needed to make CADU's experiences more instructive to future development efforts. The present research aspires to fill this need.

Chapter III

The Development Context

In this chapter, a brief socio-historical and environmental information on the nation (Ethiopia), Arsi province and the project site (Awraja) are offered in order to provide the general context in which CADU is located.

The Nation

Brief History.

Any serious discussion on Ethiopia inevitably begins with its ancient history. The most striking features of the country's 3,000 year history are, perhaps, its perpetual struggle to maintain some form of independence, its ethnic and religious diversity, and the successive expansion and contraction of its borders depending on the strength of the central government in maintaining influence and law and order over enlarged territories.

The exact origins and span of history of Ethiopia and its civilization are still subjects of lively research (Kaplan et al 1971, 33). Scholars generally note that the Ethiopian state and people had prospered and built advanced civilization at a very early stage of world history. Although the exact identity of the country and people referred to in many classic writings may be in question, some writers cite that Herodotus, a Greek scholar of the 5th

century B.C. wrote about Ethiopia. The Greek poet Homer referred the Ethiopians as a "blameless race" around 800 B.C (Dostert, 1980, 3). That Herodotus and Homer wrote on various features of Ethiopia is cited by other scholars also (Kaplan et al 1971, 33). In the Christian Bible, the first book of Kings and the second book of Chronicles, the relationship between the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon is mentioned. From this relationship is supposed to have come Menelik I who became the Emperor of Ethiopia. This had given the basis of hereditary legitimacy for long lines of kings and queens who ruled Ethiopia over centuries (Buxton, 1970, 14-15).

The remarkable aspect of this thousands of years of history is the demographic and environmental imprints it left on modern day Ethiopia. According to some scholars, (Kaplan et al 1971, 33), the first kingdom was that of Cush or Meroe. This Kingdom was a strong "contender with Egypt for control of the upper Nile. Its kings ruled Egypt from 751-656 B.C and dominated an area reaching from the "Mediterranean south through what is now the Republic of Sudan...Ethiopia and perhaps even Uganda" (33).

Other historians support Kaplan's position. Jones and Monroe (1955, 1-25) cite ancient and authoritative sources to portray the geographical grandeur, organizational sophistication, and the flourishing of the arts of the ancient Ethiopian empire.

The historical landscape that these historians portray makes clear that, contrary to some simplistic assumptions

that the current borders of Ethiopia were expanded during the 19th century, the Ethiopian frontier even during as early as the 13th and 15th centuries A.D. extended beyond the borders of the current Ethiopian southeastern province of Bale to Adel on the Gulf of Aden (Jones and Monroe, 1955, 55, 85) and beyond the province of Kaffa to the south (Jesman, 1963, p. 91, Abir, 1968.)

The expansion and contraction of frontiers seems to have depended on the military and administrative strengths of the central government. When many internal conflicts prevailed, the country tended to lose control over areas farther away from the center. This was then aggravated by external wars of conquest and pressures of new immigrants into the region.

A military expert impressed with this phenomenon wrote "In 3000 years of history there have been something like 800 peace treaties signed and less than 250 of them observed..." (Austin H.H. 1938, p. 372). Rubenson (1972) provides a very instructive history of this perennial struggle for national survival.

Since the reign of Emperor Teodros (about 1831-1868), the country has been aspiring to attain stability in every sense and to modernize itself. This aspiration continues to be illusive owing to problems of leadership and external aggression by bordering states.

The 35 years following World War II marked a period of reasonable stability. This allowed reasonable progress in infrastructural development, including subsidized health care, all levels of education offered free of charge to the

limited number of people who were able to have access to it, national road and air transport systems, wire and wireless communication systems, industries, agricultural development, research and development, etc. However, the rate of progress in these areas could not keep pace with a sudden rise of popular expectation beginning with the early 1960s. More importantly, structural and systemic adjustments and transformations were resilient to the people's expressed need for a liberalized system in which all could play a part and contribute to national and individual development. The result was repeated coup attempts and attempts on the personal life of Emperor Haile Selassie, finally culminating in his deposition and death following the 1974 popular revolt.

Physical Characteristics

Location and Area.

Ethiopia lies within the tropics extending from 3 to 18 degrees north of the equator (Mesfin, 1972, 1). It borders the Red Sea on the East, Sudan on the west, Somalia and Djibuti to the south east and Kenya to the south (see map on next page). The country is very mountainous with a total surface area of about 1,220,000 sq. km. or 470,000 square miles (Buxton, 1970, 17). Comparatively speaking, this means an area in excess of the combined areas of France, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal (Buxton, 1970,17).

Climate

Ethiopia's climate is not shaped by its latitudinal location. Rather, it is determined by the altitude of any given region. Ethiopians typically speak of three seasons--winter or rainy season (Keremt) Spring or season of small rains (Belg) and Summer (Bega). These seasons correspond to the amount of precipitation received rather than definite climatic variations. The season known as Bega (dry season) stretches from November to February. During these months, night-time temperatures can approach freezing. But the days are typically dry, sunny, and warm. Keremt, the season of heavy rains, lies between mid or late June and September. Belg, lasts from February to May. The coming of the small rains typical of this season provides for a second rain-fed crop. It also provides for the growth of grazing grass for cattle.

In recent history, the rains due in this season have declined and become generally unpredictable in many parts of the country. This accounts, in some part, for the reduction of per capita food production.

Ethiopia's range of variation in altitude and irrigation possibilities in some areas provide it with a unique opportunity to grow all types of cereals, vegetables, fruits, and other food items. The country can provide its population with adequate food supply all year round, even under current agroclimatic conditions, if appropriate resource allocation and socioeconomic policies were in place.

AFRIC.

Ethiopia

*Map of Ethiopia*

The country's natural vegetation has been largely destroyed by unwise lumbering practices, population pressure, and, more recently, persistent civil war in most parts of the country. Based on a 1961 report, SIDA experts estimated that 72,000 square km or 7.5% of the country remained woodland with about 40,000 square km of it forming dense forest. But, this forest area has been reduced by an estimated 1,000 square km. per year since then (SIDA , 1966, p. 41). This has reduced forest resources in Ethiopia to dangerously low levels.

On the more optimistic side, the country's potential for fast reforestation is very high. Already, modest international programs such as Food for Work, some government reforestation programs and programs of Non-Governmental Organization have shown very promising results in restoring the vegetation in some denuded parts of the country.

The People

It is believed that Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, in general, have been the home of Hamitic people since the earliest dawn of history. David Buxton (1970) Kaplan et al (1971, 33-35) assert this perspective on the area's demographic history. Basing his studies on the discovery of prehistoric rock paintings, engravings and other archaeological artifacts discovered in Eritrea and Tigray in the north and Harrar in the east, as well as the southern most regions of Ethiopia, Buxton suggests that the Hamitic people were the exclusive possessors of most of north and east Africa long before the arrival of other African ethnic

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groups (23). Buxton states that the influence of latter immigrants from southern Arabia imposed Semitic language and culture on the indigenous Hamitic ones. The present day Amharic and Tigregna, and a few other smaller language groups have been the outcome of this blend between Hamitic and Semitic languages (23-37). Agawu, Gurage, Sidama, Burji-Geleb and others in the south and southwest of the country are a few of such smaller language groups. The speakers of these languages had formed parts of the modern Ethiopian state since the time of Zarayacob in 1434-68 (Kaplan et al, 1971, 37) and Serse Dengel around 1563-97 (Jones, and Monroe, 1955, 91). Serse Dengel is said to have converted the population of Kaffa to Christianity.

The Oromos (sometimes also called the Galla in many writings including Buxton) also belong to the Hamitic group. They came into Ethiopia in the sixteenth century (Buxton, 1970, 28-30). It is popularly known that a large migration of Oromos took place in the sixteenth century perhaps because of a population explosion among this group. As dramatic population increases occurred, the Oromos outgrew the small area they occupied somewhere between the southeastern tip of Bale (an Ethiopian Province) and the southeastern corner of present day Somalia. According to Buxton, they originally occupied the Somali area "south of the Gulf of Aden" (1970, 28). Jesman, (1963, 54-62) also agrees with this. All scholars locate the original home of the Oromos around this area.

Buxton and other historians attribute the sudden inflow of the Oromo into the Ethiopian hinterland, stretching from the plateau areas of Harrar to the plain regions of Shoa, Wellega and parts of the escarpment regions of Wollo and even Gondar and other northern regions, to the weakened military state of the Ethiopian empire. The Empire was weakened due to years of war against the invading forces of Gragne Mohammed- a Moslem leader bent on converting the whole country to Islam. This war, though ultimately won, had depleted the population, which meant that the country was only sparsely populated and virtually ruined (Buxton, 1970 29-32). Referring to the vigorous and massive Oromo migration into Ethiopia, Buxton writes,

as a result of this wholesale immigration and in spite of the ferocious resistance of various Ethiopian Monarchs, (sic) the Galla came to occupy a great part of the plateau as far north as Wallega, Shoa and the regions of Harrar (1970, 28).

The present day existence of Gurage (Hametic-semetic language speakers) in southern Shoa and Sidamo provinces as well as other pockets of non-Oromo populations throughout regions occupied partly by Oromos, are seen as indications of how far spread the original populations were (29).

According to Buxton and many other scholars, the Oromos displayed a tendency to mix easily with the Amhara and other indigenous groups. They gave up their nomadic ways of life and became sedentary, intermingling with the latter at all levels. Indeed, Levine (1974) provides historically convincing data and analysis in support of his thesis that

the Oromos, in time, became the cement that glued the scattered Ethiopian society into a continuous whole for centuries.

As they migrated in all directions, the Oromos are believed to have left their original homeland near the Gulf of Aden, vacant. The Somalis, who now occupy the eastern most corner of the Horn of Africa extending into the Indian Ocean, are believed to have arrived and occupied the area "in comparatively recent times" following the foot steps of Oromo migration into different parts of Ethiopia (Buxton, 1970, p.29).

Demographic Profile

At the present time, Ethiopia has a population of about 48 million (World Almanac, 1989). In the mid-1960s, the population was estimated at about 24-25 million (Third Five Year Plan, p. 26, Kaplan. 1971, vii). The population profile shows the following general age distribution according to a sample survey covering 12 of the 14 traditional administrative regions or states of Ethiopia:

Age range	per cent
0-4	20%
5-9	18.6%
10-14	11.8%
15-19	8.1%
20-24	5.1%
25-29	6.0%
30-34	5.8%
35 & over	24.6%

Source: Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture, Planning and Programming Department, General Agricultural survey, Preliminary Report 1983/84 (1976 E.C) Vol. 1 Addis Ababa, 1984, Table 2. p 22-25.

It can be seen that the population is quite young. 50.4% falls under the age of 15, and 69.6% under the age of 30. Ethiopia has one of the highest population growth rates in the world. According to a World Bank report, it will reach 3.1% during the 1990s (1984, 68, 25, and 82).

The Economy

90% of the population is engaged in agriculture. Most of the agricultural population is engaged in small scale subsistence farming.

The Ethiopian economy remains preponderantly agricultural even today. Pastoralism and other forms of animal husbandry rank next to subsistence farming. The change in these economic sectors has been relatively insignificant in terms of productive improvements and improvements in the style of life they offer to those engaged in the sectors.

According to some latest figures, the country has about 84 million hectares of arable land. Of this, only 6-7 million hectares, or 7-8%, is currently under cultivation (Ethiopian Ministry of Information, 1988, p.13). 95% of the cultivated land falls under small-holder peasant farming. This sector produces 94% of all cereals and 98% of the coffee which is the country's main export (p.13). The small holder sector has, however been subjected to untold harassment during the past 16 years by a government bent on collectivizing agriculture.

In the late 1960s, when CADU initiated its project activities, the country's overall economy showed a GDP growth from Eth.\$ 3,575 mil. to 4,779 mil. (Third Five Year Plan, p.

43). Basing its estimates on Central Statistical Office figures, the SIDA team of experts also estimated total GDP growth from Eth.\$ 2290.2 mil. in 1961 to Eth.\$ 2452.7 mil in 1963. (SIDA, 1966, part I, p.2, table 1). Most of this growth was accounted for by the fledgling industrial sector.

The SIDA report makes clear that whereas in 1963 the agricultural sector accounted for only 1.3% of the GDP, the Third Five Year Plan aimed to raise its GDP share to 2.9% during the following five years. Again, until 1963, the rate of GDP growth was only 3.5%. This was expected to increase to 6% during the Third Five Year Plan. Most of this growth was expected to occur in the modern light industry sector which employed a very small fraction of the population (Third Five Year Plan, p. 26-27).

The need to stimulate the agriculture sector and to move it out of subsistence into more commercial orientation was clearly urgent. But as we will see in the background section of Chapter 6, very little or no support was given by government to subsistence agriculture to help it achieve this transition. In concrete terms, only 3% of the total agricultural budget was allotted to the support of subsistence agriculture (Third Five Year Plan, 26-27).

The sluggish performance of subsistence agriculture contrasted sharply with its importance in generating a very high percentage of the country's export. 90% of the country's export was derived from agriculture (SIDA 1966, Part I, 3).

Administrative, Social, and political Structure
Administrative Structure

Administratively, the country was divided into 14 provinces/states. These provinces were divided into 99 Awrajas (sub provinces) which were subdivided into 440 Woredas (equivalent of counties) and 1,300 Mikitl Woredas (sub counties) (Kaplan, 1970, p. vii-x).

These administrative divisions were vertically linked to form a monolithic political center headed by the Emperor. The Emperor appointed all governors of provinces and Awrajas, just as he did cabinet ministers. The provincial governors appointed county governors and other functionaries in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior and in consultation with the Awraja officials. Everything that was done, therefore, ultimately rested with the Emperor. During the post 1974 era, this pattern generally persists, but with emperor now replaced by a dictator.

In addition to his cabinet ministers, the Emperor had the unique office of the Minister of Pen. As Kaplan (1970, 272-274) observed, cabinet ministers actually had little autonomy and power. Through his Ministry of Pen, the Emperor retained all administrative and political powers.

The pursuit of unlimited powers on the part of the Emperor was in part a confirmation and, at the same time, a contradiction of ancient traditions. In ancient Ethiopia, power was decentralized to provincial kings. Ancient kings (1270-1632) had powers over local matters, although they declared loyalty and obedience to the Emperor (Ministry of Information, 1968, 11-12). This stands in clear

contradiction to a monolithic Empire State. But there is another sense in which this becomes a confirmation of another era of ancient Ethiopia. In 1434-1468, Emperor Zara Yaqob is known to have taken the centralization of power a step further. He centralized taxation and rights to land appropriation into the hands of the Emperor (12). With the supreme power to grant or dispossess owners of land, the Emperor was able to "collect taxes, regulate the social hierarchy and secure soldiers for his army" (12).

This arrangement was loosened at some points in subsequent history. But Emperor Haile Selassie revived the stringent centralization of power. Actually, the process had started during the reign of his predecessor, Emperor Menelik II. The tradition of centralized state power continues to serve as a convenient vehicle for the imposition of total state intrusion into the lives of people and untold levels of unencumbered tyranny by a government that toppled Haile Selassie in 1974 and labeled itself Marxist.

Constitutional Development

Although all power was centralized and vested in one center, the Emperor, state structures that followed the modern constitutional rule were also in place beginning with the early 20th century (Ministry of Information, 1968). Emperor Haile Selassie issued the first Constitution in the country's history in 1931. He did so by combining the old customary laws with the constitutional provisions of modern, Western states (Ministry of Information, 1968).

In earlier periods, following the collapse of the Axum Empire around the 4th century A.D, the rule of the emperors and kings and the obligation of citizens were regulated by unwritten but commonly understood laws. Typically, emperors marched from one part of the country to another to ensure loyalty of local kings to the center and the rule of common law in their empire. But from around the 15th century, a more permanent capital was built, first around Debre Berhan by Emperor Zara Yacob (7). The Fetha Negast-Law of Kings-was developed as the first written document that set out laws and regulations governing the entire spectrum of Ethiopian life in the late middle ages (7).

The 1931 constitution and its revised 1955 version added not only new legal elements but also "superstructures to the historic foundations laid in the centuries that had passed" (4). One dimension of this superstructure was the centralization of every aspect of power in one hand.

The Ethiopian constitution provided for four permanent bodies. The Crown Council, the Council of Ministers, the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies (Kaplan, 1970, 276). Since the 1950s, members of the Chamber of Deputies were elected by the people. All of the other posts were filled by appointment of the Emperor.

Traditional Social Structure and Status System

In traditional Ethiopia, the social structure and status system were determined by varied and complex patterns of land ownership. The subject is further complicated by the fact that ownership of land does not often coincide with right to

the produce of land. Mesfin Woldemariam (1972) has attempted to clarify the intricate connection between the two. His major categories of ownership and right to produce can be looked at as follows: 1) right to land, 2) right to the produce of land (and labor) (83-89).

Right to land pertains to forms of individual ownership. Mesfin identifies three forms of such ownership: a) atseme rist or land ownership through lineage however untraceable, b) rist or ownership through occupation of unclaimed or vacant land, and c) siso which is a somewhat ambiguous ownership right suggestive of an arrangement whereby the owner had retained one third of the wild or forest land he cleared for cultivation. Under such a system, two thirds of the cleared land is assumed given over to government or local chief as price of the third that the individual retains. In all of these cases, the individual has full right to the land but not always to the control and free appropriation of the produce of land.

In historical perspective, right to the produce of land was very complex and often confused with land ownership patterns. In reality there may or may not be correspondence between the notions of land ownership and ownership of ones produce on it. In the traditional and non-monetized economy, the state had to devise mechanisms for extracting surplus to support the state apparatus without necessarily dispossessing the peasant of land. Hence, during most of Ethiopia's history, there existed stringent mechanisms for the alienation of all forms of agricultural produce and labor

from the peasant to support large, non-working classes such as the nobility, military, and the clergy.

In general, right to the produce of and had two levels, according to Mesfin. The first level pertains to right over ones own fruit of labor from the land regardless of land right or ownership status. A person may not have ownership right to the land he cultivates, but can have full right to produce thereof. This system is known as maderia. Essentially it guarantees right to land use. Such rights were usually accorded to lower ranking government functionaries who serve the state in official capacities part of the year and cultivates the other part. Free use of land was granted in lieu of salary. Right to maderia land theoretically terminated when the individual's service was no longer needed or on his discharge from duty for any other reason. Land which reverts to government ownership in this way was supposed to be reassigned.

The second variety of right to the produce of land focused on expropriation of produce and labor from peasants. Its mechanisms relied on assigning a certain number of landed peasants to materially support military and civilian chiefs as well as whole military contingents. The assigned entities had full right of extracting surplus and peasant labor for official purposes as well as private comfort. This right of peasant exploitation was granted in lieu of wage payment to government functionaries. The size of peasantry assigned to a person or group depended on the military or civilian rank of the individual or group.

Two sub-categories appear here too. The first sub-category of surplus-labor extraction by assigned officials, had gult or rist gult status. This sub-category allowed the cultivator to retain ownership title to the land while sharing his labor and surplus. It represented a case where government transferred its taxation rights to individual lords or public officials.

The second type was called sirit. This involved government appropriation of whole peasant cultivated regions to military officials with a large army. The military officials levied tax and extracted peasant labor for different personal and official duties. Technically, this arrangement should only last for the duration of service of the individual official. But over time, it settled into an amorphous and ambiguous indirect system of taxation in which the lords levied heavy taxes from farmers and shared part of it with government. The land owning status of the peasant became vague and highly contested in this system.

In recent decades, additional land acquisition criteria evolved. These include, direct purchase from government or individuals and land grant by the Emperor. In many cases, those who acquired land were not themselves cultivators. These new owners also relied on tenant labor to benefit from the land. The Ethiopian agricultural landscape, therefore remained replete with acrimonious owner-cultivator relationships which only ended with the radical changes and agrarian reform which followed 1974.

Even as the economy increasingly monetized, making the old land based-social relations irrelevant for state functions, the old exploitative land relations generally continued under different guises. The new exploiters no longer justified their claim to surplus and social status on service to government, but on their persistent claim to privilege because they were descendants of past lords. The established social and status structure labored to discover new myths and forms of justification though these found no acceptance or legitimation in the evolving Ethiopian society.

Even as the circle of educated elite representing different strata of society expanded, the myth of hereditary status by those who controlled large numbers of peasantry and huge tracts of land persisted. The land-owning and independent peasantry was regarded with disdain and the tenant class was virtually a statusless strata with no social, economic, or political power. It was this condition which kindled enduring resentment and rejection of a social order which was inimical to individual freedom and dignity and certainly lagging far behind the enlightened human perspectives of the twentieth century.

The Regional Context of the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU)

Physical and Climatic Context.

Arsi province or administrative region, is located in the south central part of Ethiopia (see map on next page). Its total area is 24,000 square kilometers (Alemneh Dejene, 1987, 14). Consistent with the national ecological

characteristics, the province falls within three distinct climatic zones consisting of dega (highland), woina dega (medium altitude) and kwala (low altitude). As described in the national context, climatic variations correspond to the altitude of a given place in the Arsi region as well.

Most of the climatic regions of Arsi are conducive to cereal and oil seed cultivation. The region is a well known surplus producer in wheat, barley, and oil seeds. Cattle raising and cultivation of maize and sorghum are also important economic activities.

Population

When the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) was initiated in September 1967, the population of Arsi was estimated at 360,000 of which 45% was below the age of 15 and 92% were illiterate (Lexander, 1968, 3-4). According to some estimates, this population has grown to 1.7 million by 1987 (Alemneh Dejene, 1987, 14). A study done by Lexander (1968, 4) reveals that the cereal farming population was typically Christian (74%). This is interesting since recent estimates (Dejene, 1987, 16) suggest that 61% of the population is Moslem and 39% Christian.

There are other demographic changes in Arsi in addition to the growth of population which is perhaps caused by massive in-migration. According to government estimates, literacy rate has grown from 8% in the mid 1970's to 33% by 1984. Of the twelve provinces included in the sample survey on which the estimate is based, only Wollega province is

significantly higher at 39% literacy rate (Ministry of Agriculture, 1984, vol, 1, 26, table 3).



Economy: traditional farming

Most farmers in Arsi practice mixed farming and animal husbandry. Oxen serve as traction animals while cows produce oxen and dairy products for home consumption and cash sales to supplement the farm income. So important is the cattle component of farming that the average household cattle holding is 8.5 cattle and only 16% of households in some regions of the province report having no cattle (Lexander, 1968, 3-4).

Arsi being one of the most fertile regions of Ethiopia, the diffusion of green revolution technologies was already under way by the early 1960s, long before CADU project was initiated (Lexander, 1968, 4). The government had seed multiplication and marketing station in Kulumsa district (Lexander, 1968, 4, SIDA Report, 1966, Part I, 18). The Station was later taken over by CADU.

The Kulumsa seed multiplication station distributed high yield seed varieties to over 2909 farmers by 1965/66 (SIDA, 1966, part I, 19). Lexander (1968, 4) noted that the region was clearly influenced by the seed multiplication and distribution center.

A 1984 survey showed that the average income for Arsi was Eth.\$ 376. This compares with average incomes for Harrarge (306), Gondar (455), and Gamo Gofa (421) and a national average income of 435 (Ministry of Agriculture 1984, summary table, p. 117). This is surprising when considered against



Map of Chilalo Awraja

the fact that for the same year, Arsi marketed 13.5% of all marketed crops, 9.9% of the total marketed sheep and goats, and 7.8% of all marketed cattle (109). It is surprising because Arsi, whose population is estimated at 1.5 mil. in this same document, compared to the combined estimated population of 30 million of the 12 provinces included in the sample, should have generated so much wealth for distribution through the national market. On the other hand, its own per capita income remained comparatively low.

Administration, Formal, and Informal Social Structures

Administration

Arsi province had three Awrajas, all of them administered from a centralized power center as discussed earlier. SIDA experts studying the region had noted that:

the government represents a form of leadership which is of highly marked authoritarian type. Through the governors, orders and information are communicated to the people. The people look at these as just the representatives of the government and do not count them as members of their own local community (SIDA, 1966, Part I, 138).

The Provincial governor was an appointed representative of the Emperor. At the same time, the governor was also functionally responsible to the Minister of the Interior who held a cabinet portfolio. The Awraja governor was also appointed by the Emperor but often on the recommendation and approval of the provincial governor and the Minister of the Interior. The structural and administrative hierarchy stretched down to the Woreda (county) level following this logic of centralized power.

The task of development work at any of these hierarchical levels was made complex by the idiosyncratic behavior of governors. Often, the Provincial governor would bypass the Awraja governor and intrude in Woreda or lower levels affairs (Betru, 1975, 33). This undoubtedly created frictions and mutual undermining of bureaucratic functions between and among of administrative bureaucrats making development work hard.

Development work was further frustrated by a proliferation of bureaucratic networks representing each technical ministry. The Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education, etc. all had their provincial and awraja offices. These generally worked autonomously of each other which means that there existed no coordination of activities. In addition the provincial governor had the right of intervention in each technical case and at all levels (33), however uninformed he may be in any given technical area. This often meant dealing with very complicated and hard-to-handle situations for many technical and development operators. It was this realization that motivated designers of CADU to set it up, as a totally autonomous project freely working and coordinating with all branches of technical ministries in the Chilalo Awraja, without bureaucratic interference from administrative offices.

Formal and Informal Social Structure

Chilalo Awraja/region is one of three awrajas that constitute the province/state of Arsi. Its social structure derived its form and content from the region's social,

economic, political, conditions, and land ownership patterns. We can think of two social structural systems defining the position and function of a person. One is the formal or bureaucratic social structure discussed above. The second is the informal social structure that derives its legitimacy from ones social, economic, and cultural position within the local community. The size of land ownership formed the backbone of social standing within the informal social structure. However, as in most parts of Ethiopia, informal traditional social structures or institutions had other criteria by which people were ranked. Often those who were respected and trusted formed the core leadership. These people played a great role in the day-to-day life of the people. Traditional leaders were recognized as wise elders with integrity and humanity. People turned to them to settle their disputes and otherwise find counsel on the many complexities of life in a feudal state (SIDA, 1966, Part I, 138-141). A profile of Chilalo social structure is given below.

Sociologically, as already stated earlier, the two categories of social structure (formal and informal) existed side by side. Generally, these seem to interface in very limited ways, existing as separate systems. Those in the formal structure were generally considered outsiders to the community and were only accorded formal deference compatible with their office (SIDA, 1966, 133-141, Lexander, 1968).

The informal sociological structures manifested a number of laterally and vertically differentiating factors.

Laterally, Christians and Moslems constituted two of the major population categories. Within each group, vertically stratified communities existed representing differentiated levels of wealth and land ownership, social prestige, and occupational grouping or affiliation. In this scheme of stratification, the tenant and the artisan fell at the bottom of the social ladder.

Prior to 1974, the tenant owned nothing except his labor. In a rural society that measured personal worth by size of land owned, the tenant had no way to assert his personal and social worth. The artisan was degraded because, traditionally, society's reliance on his products was matched by its contradictory disdain for his art and vocation.

The merchant class drawing from both Moslem and Christian communities, and dealing in grain primarily, was very important owing to their economic clout (Betru, 1975, 35-36). Religion formed the other critical institution. It played a determinant role in shaping the world outlook and ways of life of the people (35). Religious leaders may or may not be part of the community depending on their humility and the nature of their relationship with the people. However, unlike the bureaucrats, religious leaders and institutions were revered and accepted by the people, regardless of the structural distance between them.

It should be evident that structural and role arrangements in Chilalo had an official dimension which did not have culturally meaningful relation with local structures, except as an entity representing central power.

That the local or informal social structures and the formal ones generally behaved as distinct entities with strained relations is recorded by many observers (Nekby, 1971, SIDA, 1966, 137-140, Lexander, 1968). A critical question arises as to how development would be possible under conditions of such evident contradiction and strained relation between the people and local government that should theoretically serve them and help guide them in development.

It seems that the modernization process in Ethiopia was rooted in assumptions of embarrassing backwardness and irrelevance of traditional society more than we realized. The condescending attitude of modern, bureaucratic elites towards local people can only be understood as manifesting the inherent tension between a modern structure that considers itself superior to the traditional one. Peasants in turn resented the modern elite. Lexander (1968) records the resentment peasants felt towards the political and bureaucratic elites in Chilalo. It was this latent resentment that erupted into open hostility during the popular uprising of 1974. Should CADU have attempted to deal with this problem rather than avoiding it by placing itself above and outside of it? How effective can its own programs be when it must deal with a social system that is not in peace and functional harmony with itself? One of the greatest challenges for CADU will undoubtedly be mobilizing the rural setting for development under this condition.

Earlier, we mentioned that tenancy was an important factor in forcing people to the margins of society. Chilalo

region, perhaps, had one of the highest rates of tenancy in the country. Cohen (1972, 7-8) estimates the land ownership and usage pattern to be as follows:

	Northern Chilalo	Southern Chilalo
Land owners	53%	40%
tenants	29%	49%
relatives' land	17%	21%

Most likely, those who reported cultivating relatives' land were also tenants trying to escape that stigma. This means that in parts of Chilalo, tenancy rates reached 70%.

Actually, later studies put Chilalo's tenancy rate as high as 71% and that of Arsi province as a whole at 67% (ARDU 1980, Publication No. 18, 24).

The other element of Chilalo's social structure, usually ignored by most observers of the region, constitutes the different artisan groups. A 1969 survey by a junior CADU staff (Progress Report No.1, 57) puts the number and composition of artisans as follows:

Blacksmiths	26
Carpenters	31
Tanners and Saddle makers	<u>14</u>
Total	71

Traditionally, this artisan group produced most of the farm implements and household goods used in the region (Progress Report No.1). But the skill and product of artisans declined in importance as more imported goods found their way into the region, primarily after the introduction of CADU programs. Coupled with the low social status usually accorded this group, the decline in its economic condition no doubt further devastated it.

Clearly, the social structural pattern of Chilalo presented a complex picture. We have seen that the formal bureaucratic structure was alienated from the people. It is likely conflict of interests between and within different social structures was common place. The challenge to any outside intervention to modify and change the system and to spearhead economic and social development is how to design programs that can transcend these obstacles. Project design of the most creative type is likely to be challenged by this structural environment whether it affirms or negates Pareto optimal development assumptions. Obviously, development should include the groups most disenfranchised by the existing system if it is to be worthy of that label. But how are such groups to be reached if the system makes them "invisible" or powerless ? This will clearly be one of the primary factors that can be expected to color CADU's general development performance.

Be this as it may, it may be useful to take a glimpse at some of the traditional social institutions evolved by the people to deal with different the many concerns of every day life. Typically, these institutions were transcended class, ethnic and religious lines. The remarkable thing about them was and still is, that all people participate in them and enjoy the sense of belongingness they offer to people within a set geographic ares. More than anything else, the following traditional institutions are demarcated by spatial proximity.

The Social Structure and Traditional Social Institutions

Prevalence of informal traditional institutions like ekub, idir, debo, and others is well documented by Lexander's narrative field report (1968) and SIDA (1966, Part I, 139-140). Ekub helps its members to raise capital for individual business or personal use. Members contribute a set amount of money weekly or monthly and an individual member collects the whole sum according to randomly assigned turns. No interest and service charge is usually paid and the treasurer, chairman, and other officers are elected volunteers. Idir is a form of social insurance against family or personal emergency. It is also run by a team of trusted volunteers. People contribute very modest amounts each month and are guaranteed not only a standard cash payment in case of death or accident, but also enjoy the personal presence, emotional and social support of members during a calamity. Similarly, debo ensures labor contribution by invited members of a community at critical times of labor shortage. Such labor pooling may be called upon during critical agricultural seasons, or when the construction of a new house or barn is undertaken.

Various other informal social structures also existed in addition to these. The golmassas (organization of youth), and shemagles (council of elders) were important traditional institutions designed to serve additional community needs. Golmassas were youth organizations with diverse and often unspecified functions. This organization is known to have been coopted by the local government to reinforce its

security functions (SIDA, 1966, Part I, 139-140). Shemagles focused on settling of disputes, and generally harmonizing rural life to the benefit of all.

Chapter IV

The Theoretical Framework of the study and Definition of Development

The Social Learning Theory or Paradigm will be used as the general theoretical framework for analysis in this study. The Social Learning Paradigm can be appropriately considered as an interdisciplinary synthesis drawing on convergent ideas in sociology, education, psychology, social-psychology, and economics. This paradigm has been in emergence since the early 1970s, though its intellectual roots are traceable to classical theories especially in sociology and education. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to trace the theoretical connection of this interdisciplinary paradigm to different disciplinary social science traditions. Its linkages with more recent efforts in the evolution of development theory and methods of practice will also be examined to establish its value as a useful guide to designing rural development.

The Social Learning Paradigm views socioeconomic change or development as a process of continuous learning and experimenting. As such, it is no different from other learning and learning-by-doing principles which form part and

parcel of every person's life-long engagement. Learning to cope with ever changing conditions through social interaction is characteristic of community life as it is of individual life.

The Sociological Roots of the Social Learning Paradigm

Emile Durkheim is, undoubtedly, one of the first social thinkers to appreciate the role of learning, experiencing, reflecting, and adapting to the social and physical environment as uniquely human attributes. These are the attributes that account for much of the continuous change process that has characterizes human societies since the beginning of organized social life. However small or large, the change may be, all societies change over time. No society can be said to be static over any length of time.

Durkheim looked at what limited anthropological data was available at his time and organized other empirical data to explicate his concept of "social facts" and "public morals" (1933, 1977). Both of these notions closely corresponds to our modern day notion of "norms" and "normative standards" and shared values that help individuals and groups to organize their social behavior in relation to each other. These normative standards are transmittable, over time and generations, through different symbolic, verbal, and other modes of communication.

The extent and nature of human contacts that underlie this process of value transmission is affected by population density and its spatial dispersion. The smaller and more tightly organized the group, the greater the face to face

interaction and, therefore, the control and influence each person and group of persons have on others. The reverse is true with large and complex social structures held together by the technical dependence of one specialized group on another for survival and task accomplishment. Durkheim suggests that the qualitative difference between expected conformity and tight control over members by, traditional communities, as opposed to the relatively loose and permissive organization of rationally organized modern ones is at the heart of the difference between the rates of change exhibited by the two types.

Population and spatial growths expose people to different sets of circumstances requiring changing modes of adaptation to the social as well as the physical world at a more rapid rate. (Pickering, 1979, p. 5-6, Durkheim, 1933, 147-229). To Durkheim, moral facts constitute a social reality from which people learn and to which they turn to get the meaning of a given case or thing. The ability to organize patterns of predictable and understandable social behavior is contingent on moral facts which become shared values. In the extreme form of Durkheim's notion of the social nature of most of human action and behavior, he asserts that even the notion of God is a socially derived notion. He argues that our acceptance of the concept of divinity is a collectivist solution to the many unknown problems of human and social life (Pickering, 1979, 34-36).

Durkheim's pioneering work in the sociology of knowledge (1952) also shows how intrinsic knowledge generation is the

result of the struggle for survival and continuity of communities through solving problems. He laboriously elaborates how this knowledge is transmitted among members and generations. Durkheim recognized the iterative nature of learning among and between groups and individuals. His mechanical communities based on tradition and uniformity of approaches to solving problems of life tend to be autocratic, curbing individual autonomy, and requiring behavior uniformity that excludes significant individual freedom of thought and action. On the other hand, the organic communities based on diversity and division of labor, on larger scale organization and anonymity of individuals, encourage conformity to the seminal expectation of the system while allowing large margins of individual creativity and freedom of action. This allows the individual to exercise creativity and to contribute richly to the store of society's knowledge and skill in dealing with the environment (1933, 200-350).

In other writings, Durkheim makes the point that each era develops a set of norms and social structures made essential by its circumstances;

The reason for the moral system of the Romans lay in Roman society, just as our own society has its reasons in the nature of contemporary European societies. To allow the postulate....that morality has continued to become more and more rational with the passing of time....one would...have to reduce morality to no more than a system of abstract notions—to a kind of geometry. But this would, I believe, constitute a serious misunderstanding of moral reality which consists not in a system of concepts that might be constructed by a sui generis logic, but in a system of

forces- surely not physical ones- but mental, moral forces, forces which derive all their power from action, representations and from states of conscience. (Pickering, 1979, 65).

These statements correspond very closely to some of the most enlightened propositions of the Social Learning approach to understanding and guiding socioeconomic development. The concept of development in the Social Learning tradition will be operationalized in the following pages. In short, the sociological propositions examined above point to a central thesis that human actions leading to development must be seen as part of a continuous experiential exploration and learning by doing and doing while learning, or even accidentally stumbling on ideas and techniques in the social process.

Talcott Parsons and other structuralists may have reduced the potential of Durkheim's contribution and intellectual heritage from continuing to develop further. In the elaboration of the functional underpinnings of systems of social action, Parsons essentially built Durkheim's theoretical schemes into rigid structural formulae that obscure the dynamic interactions and the give and take in the social structural process (Gunder Frank, 1970, 44ff).

At the present time sociology generally skirts rigorous theoretical and empirical exploration of the phenomena of socioeconomic transformation, whether this is brought about by deliberate intervention or by series of changes that are internally and externally inspired without any ones planned action (Gunder Frank, 1970, Hall and Midgley, 1988.) Hall and Midgley, in particular attribute sociology's practical disengagement from development issues to the discipline's

unsettled disputes over the value-free or value-laden nature of sociological knowledge (11-18) or the basic versus applied character of sociological research. This long standing debate has led to an equally extended debate on whether the field should seek to apply its knowledge base to influence and modify social realities and policies (12).

Some even argue that sociology's quest for objective knowledge will be impeded by the deliberate production of policy-relevant research. Others counter this argument by insisting that sociological inquiry is, in any event, rooted " ...in values and preconceptions and that attempts to attain ethical neutrality are futile" (12). It is such unresolved issues that have kept sociology from actively contributing to the critical area of development.

A 1989 social science citation index and social science data base search on literature development since 1983 on the social learning paradigm for rural development showed approximately 40 entries. Practically all of these were observed to fall outside of sociology. It is evident, in fact, that the most significant theoretical and empirical explorations in the social learning tradition are currently in education, public administration, and related fields.

Again, ERIC (education data base) search for the period 1983-89 generated 452 titles in the area of social learning. Of these, 48 titles or about 10% , dealt with rural development including integrated rural development. While the heavy engagement of the field of education in rural development matters may look surprising at first sight, it

can be well understood and appreciated when placed in the context of aspects of the early educational and philosophical writings in the United States. A brief reference to this will be made below in the discussion on the interdisciplinary nature of the Social Learning Paradigm.

The Development of the Social Learning Framework as an Interdisciplinary Paradigm.

The intellectual seeds of the social learning paradigm as an alternative development framework to the current modernization paradigm (which primarily relies on the transfer of technology, capital and managerial skills from rich to poor nations, through an elaborate national and international bureaucratic system) became already evident around the 1960s (Lipset, 1967, Poper 1959). But, it was at the beginning of the 1970s that the paradigm assumed the status of a theoretical synthesis combining the valid elements within diverse development perspectives. Dunn, (1971), Kolb, (1984, especially p. 109), Korten, (1984), Goldstein, (1981), Gordon, W. and Marks, S, (1981), Rotter, (1982) are among the most prominent development scholars vigorously promoting the emergent Social Learning Paradigm.

Among scholars contributing to the emergence of the Social Learning Paradigm as a tenable development framework, Edgar Dunn (1971) can be considered as the first and benchmark contributor. He systematically explored and formulated its theoretical system in a manner that is logically clear, consistent, convincing, and useful for development modelling. Coming from the intellectual tradition of economics, Dunn

surveyed the origins and rationale of mechanistic and biological evolutionary metaphors in the social sciences, including the applied area of development. He laid out the theme of his book as follows

Evolution, biological and social, is a learning process. Phylogenesis is a learning process that has bred animal learning and human learning leading to social learning. Social Learning incorporates many characteristics of its antecedent learning processes but exhibits many unique characteristics of its own. Some of these are evident. Others will require the advance of social science to uncover. Many of the most critical human problems and social problems of our day are developmental problems that can be successfully approached through the medium of some understanding of this learning process. However, the conventional metaphors and methods of economics and of the other social sciences are deterministic models that cannot be stretched to accommodate adequately the reality of social development. (v-vii).

Dunn acknowledged that the roots of the Social Learning Paradigm are to be found primarily in biological and sociological principles. Biology makes significant conceptual contribution because the self-preservation instincts that generate impulses aimed at survival through adaptation is its key concepts borrowed by social science disciplines. These impulses are widely recognized as contributing to the conditioning of human and social behavior in a given environment. Sociological concepts make significant contribution because fundamental human self-actualization takes place in the context of social systems whose role and normative structures restrain, facilitate and give meaning to human behavior and action.

The practical and theoretical validity of the social learning paradigm arises from the fact that it recognizes the essence of individual and systemic survival as contingent on adaptability. Dunn looks at it in this way;

Over the long run, survival is served best by a highly developed learning capacity. At the human level social learning is an essential component of the absolute goal of life, (1971, 178)...Growth motives, must be among the target values of the individual that social systems ought to be instrumental in serving. It must also follow that social systems that are instrumental in serving these growth motives...are also serving the most fundamental and absolute requirements of the evolutionary system (181).

Dunn views socioeconomic development as a cumulative evolutionary process that builds on the lessons of each practical experience. Collective survival is a function of social systems' capacity to learn from and adapt to changing environments. However small or large, change is an inherent characteristic of the human individual and the social system. He offers the following hypothesis here,

...social systems that support the learning or developmental motives of their human constituents may, in the long run, be the only ones that will support social development consistent with social survival and consistent with the development exercise of the psychic potential of the mass of human individuals (181).

This perspective is strikingly consistent with the philosophy of education advocated by early American educators, philosophers, and leaders. It is inconsistent with standard neoclassical economic perspectives which is a credit to Dunn's extremely creative and imaginative mind.

Thomas Jefferson was, perhaps among the earliest of thinkers who propagated this perspective. He viewed practical, non-formal as well as formal education as the foundation, not only of an innovative society bent on continued improvement of the quality of its life, but also as the very pillar of an enduring democracy (1943, 1048-1115). To Jefferson, science, liberty, and literacy were reciprocally and inextricably interdependent (Lee, 1967, 17). Democratic involvement in social and political affairs should never be taken from the people because they are not educated enough to exercise it, but they should be enabled to do so through education and learning while doing;

I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education (Lee, 1967, 17).

The prominent educator John Dewey had similar ideas to those of Jefferson. But as a professional educator-philosopher, he had the methodological tools to focus the idea of learning and teaching in a practicable way. Dewey saw the historical roots of learning in the social process itself, pretty much as Durkheim did. People have learned from each other and have built on each others' knowledge and skills since the beginning of time. He called this the indirect education (1951, 9-11) which appears to be very close to what we here call social learning. To Dewey

The social environment consists of all the activities of fellow beings that are bound up in the carrying on of the activities of any

one of its members. It is truly educative in its effect in the degree in which an individual shares or participates in some conjoint activity (26).

Involvement and full participation are the key variables to the process of learning and improving oneself in performing a given task. Formal or organized schooling offers learning opportunities, generally in theoretical terms. Its functions are essential because the range and scope of accumulated knowledge grows so large and specialized fast that hands-on learning through practical application and participation is not always feasible. But the learning principle in formal and informal settings remains more or less the same.

Learning must be purposive and must fill a social as well as an individual need, both of which can be complementary rather than contradictory. This notion is consistent with sociological assumptions about social roles, interaction, communication, behavior modification and change resulting from these.

It does not appear essential to elaborate the individual contributions of every scholar writing in the tradition of Social Learning. It is significant to note, however, that they all see socioeconomic development as that activity which individuals, groups, and communities evolve in a variety of ways, using available material means and knowledge they are able to access or create. Development, then, must be appropriately anchored in the community and accepted as a phenomenon which is intrinsically intertwined with the outlook, competency, and resource base of the community. Understood in this way, development becomes the manifestation

of what people want, learn, and are able to do with whatever resources are available to them.

Scholars of development in the social learning framework appropriately view it as a learning process sustained by the individual, group, and community backed by resource availability to experiment with what is learned. To Kolb (1984) This process of social learning combines two established psychological principles: the principles of reinforcement and cognition. His model of the dialectical linkages involved in the cycle of learning indicates several stages. First people see and do something, then they try to harmonize or integrate it into their existing pool of knowledge, and finally internalize it after they assimilate the newly learned concept, skill or knowledge fully into their life and activity patterns. Kolb's learning model is shown in figure 1 below. This process continues with each new set of learning experience, making it continuous over time at ever higher levels of cognition.

Definition of Development and Its Implications for Development Strategies: A Social Learning Perspective

Korten (1984), Friedman (1984), Akoff (1984) have launched efforts to formulate some practical development methodologies consistent with the Social Learning theoretical paradigm for Third World development. Korten sees development as a drive for self-reliance. To him, the logic of this self-reliance is

...the logic of place, people and resources bound into a locally, self-sustaining human ecological system...local self-reliance as a development strategy involves giving first

priority to the creation of conditions that enable the people of an area better to meet their own needs using local resources under local control (1984, 307)

He emphasizes the central role of self-reliance through pragmatic development based on local resource possibilities and human capital. In this vein, Korten (299-309) presents a cogent argument for the need of Third World countries to decentralize and democratize access to decision making and allocation of resources such as land as essential development preconditions. He also discusses the need for the creation of enabling and self-help settings through the organization of small, indigenous institutions and resource control by the people themselves.

Akoff makes his own contribution to it when he defines development as:

...a capacity defined by what they (people) can do with whatever they have to improve their quality of life and of others. Therefore, development is a possession of a desire for improvement and the ability to bring it about (1984, 195).

Akoff's definition clearly focuses on subjective variables in development. It stresses the need for closing the hiatus between the people's potential and their awareness of it.

Friedman's conception of the development process starts with people's theory of reality, its connection with social values and political strategies all three of which interact to condition the nature of the fourth and determinant dimension which is social action. Other definitions examined

similarly focus on one or two variables that are perceived as essential ingredients of development. A more holistic and interdisciplinary definition that incorporates the insights of contributors like those mentioned above needs to be formulated to reflect the wide range of issues and variables implied by the term development or transformation.




Figure 1 Kolb's Experiential Learning Theory of Growth and Development

Definition of Development in This Study

In addition to the definitions of Akoff, Friedman, and Korten, development has been variously defined by different scholars. These definitions reflect the ideological biases

or paradigmatic preferences of their authors (Hall and Midgley 1988, 13-14). In this study, the concept of development is eclectically defined to incorporate Korten's and Akoff's definitions of development and additional socioeconomic, political, sociological, cultural, human capital, institutional, resource, and technological elements of change consistent with the stipulations of the Social Learning paradigm.

Specifically, development is defined as a dual, iterative learning, experiential, and action processes aimed at mobilizing and coordinating local resources and those made available by the government or donors in an evolving, goal-oriented manner. This goal-oriented coordination of energies and resources is based on a prospect of free and voluntary participation of the people in which development authorities assist them individually and collectively, to; a) achieve pragmatic insight into development problems and the human and resources potential available for dealing with them, b) design pragmatic and feasible strategies and program approaches to tackle the problems using essential technical and resource inputs from government and donor agencies, c) create institutional infrastructures that will be responsive and capable for dealing with the challenges of transforming the socioeconomic and physical environment, in a sustainable manner, d) create possibilities whereby the people can learn and continue to learn relevant technical, and managerial skills that will help them innovate and sustain incremental growth and improvement in social and economic conditions,

over time, and e) minimize the bureaucratic and institutional strangle-hold on the peoples' creativity and their desire for self-actualization, and f) democratize the people's access to local and national, regional and international resources for socioeconomic improvement of rural life and institutions without undermining the responsibilities of the central government to demarcate those resources that may be vital for the creation of collective goods and services designed to benefit all its citizens.

The main body of this definition rests on the special attention it gives to both the internal and external opportunities as well as barriers and constraints on development. Reference to the internal constraints make evident the urgent and fundamental need for developing the rural institutions and the human capital itself, technically, educationally, and politically and in other respects. The rural community must acquire changed world outlooks and new technical and resource inputs, if possible, to match its new and enlightened world outlooks and its inevitable aspiration for improved rural life consistent with acquired world views.

Reference to external constraints and opportunities point to the need for the removal of political, bureaucratic, and power barriers that exclude the people's discretionary exercise of rights and responsibilities in all aspects of life and prospects for change and transformation. It also relates to the need for developing partnership between the local people and the external authority so that the latter becomes a facilitator of development through its command over

external technical and resource inputs. Additionally, it makes us aware of the need for external organizations to support the peoples' own effort for self-development without creating sustained dependency on it.

Failing to forge such a partnership has a number of important implications; 1) the development authority will continue to plan in the abstract using theoretical models that may have little relevance to local conditions. 2) The development authority may also exacerbate further the tendency to create barriers against the expression of local perspectives and initiation of indigenous development. Alienating the people in this way creates dependence on external resources and leadership and continued pursuit of unattainable development goals. 3) Lastly, not involving the people in every aspect of development planning and prioritizing needs and programs, may mean failing to benefit from the rich reservoir of local wisdom, aspiration, and resourcefulness to accelerate development.

The learning and growth process that is intrinsic to the definition of development given above, may be graphically presented as in figure 2 below.

The Y axis represents changes in local problem solving capacity like innovativeness, technological and institutional transformations, empowerment of the people (educationally, economically, socially, politically). The axis generally represents the aggregate effect of variables taken as indicators of improvement in the standard of community well being expected to result from development intervention. The




Fig. 2. A model of the development process in the social learning mode of representation, adopted from Kolb, 1984, Axinn, 1978, Friedman, 1984.

Notations;

CE= concrete experience

AE= active experimentation

OR= observation reflection

AC= abstract conceptualization

X axis represents the intervention variables or programs introduced into the community. If we, therefore, treat all the aggregate development programs as independent variables and the qualitative changes in the community's ability to solve its development problems, as dependent variables, we would see an iterative growth pattern as shown in figure 2.

Various cycles of social learning and development starting with observation and understanding, integration, and internalization, of the learned behavior, resulting from the interaction between local people and the development or intervening agency to produce aggregate up ward change are indicated. The total development trend is indicated by the slope of the two lines that resemble a regression curve (1-5...). The cycle begins with concrete experience with new things, observing its cause and effect relationships, reflecting on these, abstractly conceptualizing the process, and preparing to make active experimental use of it. After completion of such a process, most of the relevant skills made available to people are likely to become part of the peoples' everyday tools for coping with problems. Theoretically, the process would continue to ever higher levels of learning achievement and even assume self-regenerating qualities as long as the opportunity for continued learning exists. A learning curve and increase in the community's knowledge base is clearly implied.

This process of learning and growth is contingent on the prevalence of a participatory learning process engendering dynamic interaction, communication and two way learning

between the local community and its development benefactors. Such participation is fundamentally different from the common and unspecified usage of the term in the dominant development literature. In the latter the usage of the concept of participation, denotes anything in which the people play a part, whether this is a temporary event, mandatory contributions of labour, paid or unpaid, contributions of material and money towards programs, or coerced involvement in rural cooperatives etc. In other words, in the popular development literature, evident distinction is generally not made between ad hoc community participation in program activities, and theoretically grounded, sustained participation aimed at educating and being educated. Participation popularly defined has nothing to do with peoples' intellectual and practical growth in facing up to the challenges of development tasks and their control over their destiny. Typically this type of participation is ephemeral and lasts only for the duration of the coercive or obliging mechanisms which stimulate it. This is evidenced by several projects in Ethiopia that turned to white elephants as soon as project sponsorship was withdrawn (Harris, 1987, 256) .

The Social Learning model of self-transformation through well rounded participation and learning assumes a two way channel of communication between local people and the development agency. Both the agency and the people are seen as growing and changing through mutually beneficial learning encounters. As it works with the people, the agency learns

of the people's priority needs, the local resource and skill deficits for addressing them and the survival strategies of the rural people. It then helps the people to design programs aimed at effectively addressing the deficits and enhancing their tested survival strategies. In this process, the people acquire new perspectives and skills from the new challenges and opportunities presented by their encounter with development agents who bring some material and much technological resources and fresh perspectives on local problems.

Axinn (1978), Friedman (1984) represent this process by models that describe the interaction between the community and development agency and the learning cycle that links theory and practice respectively. Axinn, uses an iterative communication and interaction model to explicate the mutuality of influence between the intervening agency and the local community. Friedman, on the other hand, offers a model that describes social learning as a planning approach in which practical action could be joined to theory within a single matrix involving the four intersecting dimensions mentioned earlier (1984, 189-191). David Korten (1984, 176-188), on the other hand, describes the growth in program learning effectiveness of the intervening organization itself. Drawing on the empirical experience of a pilot Indian Dairy Development Program, a Rural Advancement Committee in Bangladesh, and a community-based Family Planning Service in Thailand, Korten describes how local groups composed of the rural poor were mobilized by

development authorities as effective agents of their own development.

These experiences indicate that program planning emerging through development experts' hand-on experience with the people and their perspectives on problems may look time consuming and expensive at first, but have values that far surpass the blue-print approach to development planning in its longer term durability. Korten's model consists of three rather distinct stages of learning that represent the experts' relative effectiveness on the job. The first stage is one for learning to be effective within the constraints of the local social environment. In the second stage, the expert learns to be more efficient and learns to screen the relevant from irrelevant and the productive action from the unproductive. In the third stage, the experts elaborate the development structure and install the necessary manpower and operational norms to expand the development effort.

The critical feature of this approach is that the development structure evolves from a stage by stage learning and data gathering on local conditions. In the first two stages, the agents went into the communities with no structured or preconceived ideas of their own. They lived among the people, learned from them, and, analyzed with the people the possibilities for confronting the problems of underdevelopment in the respective areas. This led to the design and formulation of development strategies and programs most suited to the needs of the people as they experienced them.

Because people were helped to acquire conceptual and practical skills in tackling problems while experts developed pragmatic synthesis of indigenous initiatives and external expertise and resources, the stage for realistic programs were set. Even if unforeseen problems constrain the progress of development as envisaged in this model, results are likely to be more lasting and tangible than would otherwise be the case.

Axinn's, Friedman's, and Korten's models help complete the interaction process within and between the two parties in rural development—the people and the intervening organization. All three are presented in figures 3, 4, and 5 below.

Within the context of organization-people partnership, a whole range of political, social, and economic constraints internal and external to both entities may continue to engage the participants in development. The development organization may be subject to irrelevant criteria and standards of practice by sponsors. At the




Figure 3 Axinn's Model of Iterative Reciprocity

same time, its own organizational structure may experience stress and distraction owing to internal conflicts and competition among and between employees. The people may continue to suffer the prescription and proscription imposed on them by local and national authorities. In addition, economic, social, and other conflicts and competitions within the community may undermine its unity of goal and commitment. All of these may distort and complicate the course of concerted efforts. But even if progress is slow and frustrating, each direct experience and knowledge of the multitudes of obstacles in development is likely to enrich rather than deprive the two major partners in development--the people and the intervening or technical assistance authority.

In Axinn's doctrine of "iterative reciprocity" as a strategy of development, the external development system and the local or recipient system forms a complementary unity. The interaction between the two parts of the whole guide each other's perceptions of development and form the legitimate basis for constructing feasible programs suited for dealing with local problems (1978, 59-62).

Axinn's longer term perspective on the likely results of such partnership between the two systems is interesting.

Over time, the iteration continuously modifies the nature of both systems and of the interaction between them. Reciprocity in value suggests continuous growth in benefits to each participant and continuous reduction in the cost. To the extent that the two systems can build enduring linkages between themselves, iterative reciprocity may be more

appropriate in the future than international development assistance for and on behalf of either system (61)




Figure. 4 Friedman's Model of Learning and Social Action

Viewed in these ways, long-term changes in communities rely on the local people and institutions learning, participating and mobilizing their resources in equal partnership with development authorities right from the beginning. In fact, Axinn would argue that local initiatives and resources are more critical to development than is often assumed by large scale assistance.

Many scholars have contributed to the elaboration of theoretical and empirical grounds for justifying development as not merely economic but largely a sociological, sociocultural, political, and social- psychological phenomenon. This suggests the centrality of learning and participation by local people to any development success (Cernea, 1985, George, 1986, Korten, 1984, Dunn, 1971, Goldstein, 1981).

Convergence of Social Learning with Other Development Perspectives

It might be instructive to mention that the field of economics itself is being increasingly challenged to incorporate into its models the human, institutional, sociocultural and political dimension of economic phenomena (Schmid, 1987, Earl, 1983, Etzioni, 1988, Frantz, 1988, Thurow, 1984, Johnson, 1988, Eicher, 1988).

This seems to suggest the growing relevance of the Social Learning paradigm and its adherence to a holistic model of analysis and practice of development.

Extending the analytical framework of the economic process further, some scholars specify a range of factors that determine its pace and nature and generally act as its engine of progress (Johnson, 1986, 129, 219-245). These factors could be grouped into roughly five categories: institutions (market, social and political), capital, technology, human capital and resource endowment. The absence of one or more of these will hamper or retard the pace of progress. But none of the factors are perhaps as singularly important or has greater power to obstruct progress than institutional barriers. For this reason, models that incorporate the analysis of development opportunities and constraints in terms of the five categories mentioned above go even further than the Social Learning paradigm in explicating the dynamics of development.

Many Third World countries especially, in Africa, block their own development through rigid institutional controls (Bauer, 1984). And yet, analysis of development problems




Figure. 5 Korten's Program Learning Curve
(Korten and Klauss, 1984, p. 183)

rarely includes the study of state mechanisms as barriers to development. Even the Social Learning Paradigm skirts the negative role of government policies and institutions in people's pursuit of self and collective improvement. By focusing on the mutual learning benefits of people and organizations directly interacting to bring about change, it overlooks or implicitly adopts optimistic assumptions about Third World governments. As Galal (1974) and others have empirically demonstrated, in many developing countries, it is the governments themselves that construct the biggest development obstacles which render even record rates of investment worthless in terms of concrete results.

Using the Social Learning Paradigm in this Study

It is appropriate that an inquiry into the role of CADU as a strategy of rural transformation, should use the Social Learning paradigm as its framework of analysis. As documented earlier, this framework presents opportunities to investigate the operational pattern of the development organization itself as well as the dynamics of its development relations with local communities and institutions. Within this framework, it is feasible to study the organizational and sociological dynamics of CADU in its contextual setting to the extent that data allow.

The method, analytical framework, and general character of the research are justified both by the nature of the data source and the academic interest of interpreting broad empirical data in terms of an organizing principle that gives development praxis theoretical meaning. Warriner's (1980)

incisive observations on the nature and level of specificity of sociological research has also influenced the design of the research. Warriner has this to say about studies of this nature:

"Research" may be thought of in narrow scientific terms indicated by the precision of techniques and data manipulation, or it may be defined by the broader criteria of systematic observation and analysis. Organizational scholars have done much research that is sophisticated in design and in analytical methods...But in many cases, the precision of the analysis is little justified by the sophistication of the theory or the relevance of the questions asked. I am convinced that we have many critical problems for which simple observations...and analysis are appropriate (1980. x).

Warriner's academic analysis on the character of problem-oriented studies and Korten's (1984, 176-188) practical views on the futility of abstracted models and theories for solution of real and empirical problems, highlight the need for a conceptually feasible and methodologically practicable paradigm. The analytical and practical logic of the Social Learning approach to development as opposed to the conventional top-down abstracted development planning, has made it a preferred paradigm for this study. This preference and choice of paradigm has in turn influenced the choice of data and style of its organization and presentation. The paradigmatic synthesis represented by figure 2 presented earlier in this chapter will form the essential skeleton around which the body of data and analysis organized.

Korten's cogent argument on the essential benefits of Social learning and the disadvantages of abstract expert planning is worth presenting here:

Its clear cut order, allocation of funds for precisely stated outcomes, reliance on 'hard' data and expert judgement....make project justification easy in budget presentation. It is a programming approach quite appropriate tophysical infrastructure projects-where the task and outcome are defined, environment stable.... In rural development, the objectives are ...multiple, ill-defined and subject to negotiated change; task requirements are unclear; environments are constantly changing. Although knowledge is severely limited, the blue-print approach calls for behaving as if it were nearly perfect. Where there is need to build institutional capacity, for sustained action on unfamiliar development problems, it assumes that development actions are terminal and that hastily assembled temporary organizations will suffice. Where the need is for a close integration of knowledge-building, decision-making and action-taking roles, it sharply differentiates the functions and even the institutional locations of the researcher the planner and the administrator (1984, 182).

This statement highlights the complexities of the social world and the limitations of existing development knowledge on which to base planned intervention. Inquiry into the epistemology of development must include all that could contribute to the explication of the development process. This suggests that new operational partnerships need to be forged between the practitioner, the policy maker and the researcher, who investigates their combined effect on the development context, and the people. It is only through such broad based inquiry into the total dynamic engendered by and linked to the practice of "development" that the cryptic phenomena hindering or enhancing progress can be identified.

The need for identifying the forces that impede or impel development is critical for effective development practice. For if all the resources and human energies appropriated by national, international, non-governmental, and bilateral agencies were mobilized with the genuine requirements of each problem case, the world would not have needed to be home for so many hundreds of millions of starving and destitute souls, most of whom have the potential to be viable and contributing members of their respective societies.

It is worth noting that the debate on the appropriate design and strategy for rural development is far from being conclusive. In fact, it should be clear, from the discussions earlier, of different shades of theoretical perspectives on economic and social development, that there exist a number of competing theories and assumptions about development. All of them contribute to explicating some dimension of development or other. None of them can yet serve as a complete theory. The closest we have to a holistic and multidisciplinary framework providing a more holistic view of development is the still emerging Social Learning framework.

Paradigmatic Change and Resistance

The visible and well-documented failures of development projects fashioned after one theoretical model or the other within the range of modernization paradigm (which generally accepts top-down delivery of expertise, technology, and capital driven programs, as a core strategy of development) has given impetus to the search for new development

approaches and paradigms. But the replacement of one model by another for serious trial purposes will not be easy and straight forward. Dube (1988, p.48-49) sees the resilience of the "development establishment" as the major constraint and obstacle to trying out alternative and viable practical innovations in the field. He sees genuine efforts to introduce paradigmatic changes being shortchanged by meaningless "mini-terminological revolutions" which merely replace conventional development labels like "economic development" with "social development" while the old practices endure.

Thomas Kuhn (1970) studied similar problems of change in paradigms even in the natural sciences. He traces the sources of inertia that resist the replacement of old and established ideas and practices by new and demonstrably superior ones, to the systemic and personal commitment that the established paradigms enjoy within the discipline or organization. A whole network of disciplinary perspectives and methodologies develop around a prevailing paradigm or set of theories. Highly regarded people commit their scholarly prestige and careers on them. Thus the defense, promotion, and preservation of the authority of these theories and paradigms becomes part of the career structure itself. When these theories are challenged by new and competing ones, the enormous weight of the system of belief, personal and institutional interests, become wittingly and unwittingly defensive. It takes the system time and persistent pressure to adjust and to find justifications for the needed shift so

that the discipline could advance. But building the necessary pressure and theoretical challenge on established institutions and practices is very hard and even risky for those involved. Kuhn asserts, however, that over time this is realized as new and innovative ideas persist and crowd out the old.

The problem with such a process of change in the development field is that its main element-the people- are voiceless in the development drama. Their representation has typically assumed intellectual and academic advocacy by groups far removed from the people on the one hand and policy makers such as governments and international development organizations on the other. The advocates of the people are typically intellectuals and academicians only theoretically connected with the people and generally detached from policy makers.

In addition, the advocacy groups themselves are diverse. They represent varying theoretical and competing orientations and interests. Though well meaning, they may not only be too removed from the problems of the people, but may also view their work as an enterprise of intellectual art and creativity befitting an academic institution. This may make their theoretical contribution less focused on solving problems of poverty and ignorance.

Organizational theories and empirical investigations generally point to dynamic tendencies towards greater elaboration of organizational structure to secure greater welfare to diverse role occupants within it. Often this is

at the expense of the pursuit of performance efficiency oriented to the achievement of the organization's stated goals (Livingstone, 1986, Hall, 1977, Frost et al, 1978, Robert and Porter, 1983).

As an organization grows more complex, it even becomes difficult to ensure its conformity to the original purpose for which it was set up. The problem is related to a number of factors. Max Weber (Gerth and Mills, 1958, 203-244) recognized that bureaucracies tend to work to sustain themselves, through means other than the fulfillment of the objectives set for them. A system of values and interests, real or perceived, develops independent of the goals for which the bureaucratic organization was set up. One is "seldom able to accomplish...anything that displeases his bureaucracy" (203). This realization should remind us of the need for constant feedback and external evaluation of any development organization to ensure the consistency of its programs and activities with its set or approved goals.

Chapter V

Methodology of the Research

General Methodological Considerations

The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) underwent a number of changes since its inception in 1966. The changes related to the expansion of its geographical scope from one region of Arsi province to cover the whole of the Province. This expansion was part of the original plan. The plan was based on the assumption that an appropriate and effective methodology of rural transformation would be discovered during the first phase of project operation. The potential for a discovery of the intended model for rural transformation remained illusive. But the socio-political upheavals that started in 1974 overshadowed the conditionality of the expansion program. Physical expansion was effected in 1976 without due assessment of its rationale or cost effectiveness of programs.

The new sociopolitical environment affected the very logic of CADU as a rural development authority in a number of other ways as well. From an autonomous organization, it turned into an organization whose facilities and assets were turned into instruments of implementation of government

policy. Only on paper were some of the central objectives of CADU retained. For most of the latter 1970s and all of the 80s, it was more or less turned into just another government (socialist) bureaucracy with generous funding from Sweden. The research methodology must allow probing into this periodic shift of project goals and function.

Nature of Data to be Used

This research is based on analysis of the contents of documents by and concerning the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) and its expanded version, the Arsi Rural Development Unit (ARDU). ARDU was still later expanded into a regional project, South Eastern Agricultural Development Zone, SEAD. At this stage, the project seems to have generally abandoned its original rural development orientation altogether to focus on matters of abstract, regional development planning. This phase does not seem to have generated much documentation, though a few scattered publications have been located.

Sources of Data and Steps In Their Identification

The primary source of data consists of diverse project documentation published by the project itself on and by its various technical departments. Documents used include evaluation of the work of these departments by its Planning and Evaluation Section, and the annual and semi-annual reports. Reports, studies, and evaluations by other people and groups have also been used. A number of research steps and procedures were followed in identifying representative materials for this research:

1. The first step was to compile a list of all project documents issued by CADU, which became ARDU and SEAD. This was a fairly straight forward task since each document published by the project management provided an updated list of all documents issued by the project up to that time. So the latest document of ARDU issued in 1985 was used to provide this listing of documents. This document is entitled Report on Surveys and Experiments carried out in 1981/82, Crop and Pasture Section. Compiled in December 1985, it formed the last of the 33 documents issued by ARDU. After 1985, the project was shortly known as the Bale Arsi Rural Development Unit, BARDU, which quickly became SEAD.

Documentation under these two later stages was very sparse. The character of the project had also changed significantly as it became a regional planning and agricultural development center of the government.

The first two phases of the CADU Project, spanning 1967-1975 had generated 112 written documents and 13 minor research undertakings. The later consists of documentation of casual observations related mainly to local agronomic and animal husbandry practices, environmental factors and manifest social practices of the local people. Of the 112 documents, 10 were pre-implementation. The first of two major volumes in this category provided a fully detailed justification for the project with an extensive discussion of the development environment nationally and regionally. The second volume pertained to the physical development of project headquarters; office and staff residence buildings,

staff recreation facilities, roads, and other infrastructures that preceded full project operation. Both of these critical documents were available in MSU Library.

Other pre-project or pre-implementation documents provided analysis of field observations and data on social, economic, and resources conditions in the development region. Most of these materials were included in the analysis section of project justification, but a number of these were also available as separate documents in MSU Library.

Of the remaining 101 project documents issued during the implementation period of CADU, 64 were available at the main library of Michigan State University. Five additional documents were made available from the private collection of an Ethiopian colleague at MSU and through correspondence with sources in Addis Ababa. Two more were secured through interlibrary loan.

In 1976, the Project was renamed ARDU as it expanded its geographical coverage from one region of the province of Arsi to the whole province. During the ARDU phase, 1976- 1985, 33 project documents were generated. Of these, the MSU Library collection had 15 and additional 4 were acquired from a private collector and again correspondence with sources in Addis Ababa.

2. Extensive correspondence was carried out with individual scholars and the Swedish International Development Authority, SIDA in Sweden. These yielded only a few sources on the closing stages of the project in 1989 at which time SIDA completely withdrew its support.

3. The possibility of securing a grant to facilitate the material search at SIDA headquarters in Sweden and particularly to gain access to a complementary sources in Sweden on official Swedish debate on the project did not materialize. Materials on Swedish policy debate on the project, known to have taken place periodically, were not available elsewhere. For the same reason, efforts to balance out the analysis through data that was to be gathered through interview questionnaires with former executives and senior experts of CADU could not materialize. The whereabouts of almost all of the Swedish and Ethiopian senior executives of the project was identified through extensive international correspondence. But lack of funds prevented this aspect of data collection.

Not only SIDA, but also the Ford Foundation, and the Social Science Research Council were approached. But grant policies had shifted to only support for field research in Africa itself rather than documentary studies elsewhere and no grant offer came through, except a small provision for the purchase of a computer.

4. In the absence of research funds, the prepared questionnaires were sent to 17 former senior executives of CADU. Only two were returned, and of the two only one was carefully completed. The idea of supplementing documentary data with interview material was given up.

5. From Addis Ababa, only a few CADU/ARDU documents not available at MSU and other US libraries could be had. For the most part, materials expected to exist in particular

places could not be located. Frequent reorganization in Ethiopia during the years following 1974, and a possible devaluation of documentation may have caused them to be dislocated. But an extensive collection of all the legislations of the last 15 years pertaining to rural land reform, the organization of peasant associations, taxation etc. were acquired through the assistance of colleagues and family.

6. SIDA officials sent some of the most recent works on CADU/ARDU, although they could not provide original documents of and on the project requested by the researcher.

7. An extensive database, citation index, and dissertation abstracts search yielded all the documents included in the literature review section of this research. Many of these works were acquired through the microfilm service of the MSU and University of Michigan Libraries and through inter-library loan.

8. On the basis of careful examination of the contents of materials acquired, under standardized reporting formats like annual and semi-annual reporting expectations, surveys, budget and program documents, evaluation reports etc., it is concluded that the acquired materials are fully representative of CADU/ARDU activities over time, and across its operational and philosophical land escape.

The materials collected represent more than 68% of the documents generated by CADU and 58% of that generated by ARDU. Scanty materials could be collected on the SEAD phase

of the project following its further regional expansion in 1985. From a 1986 SEAD volume titled "Agricultural Survey in Dodole Woreda, Genale Awraja, Bale, the Situation Today and Proposals for the Agricultural Extension Service by Per Olov Florell (SEAD, 1987), it appears that CADU's tradition of systematic recording and evaluation had apparently ceased to serve as a norm at this stage.

9. The documents available for both CADU/ARDU cover the range of the project's activities for the period of 1967-1985. The documents cover the project's programs in agricultural and veterinary research, marketing and credit, demonstration and diffusion of technological innovations, engineering and natural resources survey and planning, research on appropriate farm implements, budget and program planning, evaluation of operational programs, and an extensive range of social surveys ranging from coffee and water consumption to health conditions, nutrition, housing, census, and social networks.

10. A volume which was to serve as the Monitoring and Evaluation guide for CADU developed by J. Holmberg (1972) and a similar effort for ARDU by Negussie W. Michael (1984) were consulted to decide on how best to organize the project documents on CADU/ARDU. This was important because program categories stressed by the evaluation criteria and standards may have guided CADU/ARDU program designs. Getting good representation of these programs could provide the essential material needs for the investigation of specific development programs relevant to answering the research questions.

On examining the evaluation guidelines, it was found that Holmberg had recommended the strategy of evaluating CADU at two levels: a) the program level and b) the project level. As it turned out, the two levels often coincided in virtually all evaluations. This was perhaps partly because CADU's staff focused on evaluating such things as the volume and quality of agricultural research, development of market structures and purchase of farm outputs, and the distribution of credit and inputs as primary indicators of both program and project success or failure. Other relatively complex and rigorous sets of criteria that Holmberg's recommendations required were not followed. So the document selection was based on the type of documents rather than on the level of evaluation or reporting.

Selecting and Categorizing the Data

11. Selecting only a sample of documents to provide the essential material for analysis was abandoned in favor of using all the materials available. This is because a careful examination of the documents revealed that, much needed materials often were found under titles in which logical expectation would not assume their inclusion. For instance, a progress report on the innovations and experiments of the Implement Design and Engineering Section includes a whole survey on the status of local technical skill, what is happening to locally produced farm tools, the economic life of their producers, and comprehensive recommendations for the future. A decision, therefore, was made to use all available documents at two levels: 1) as primary sources of data and

materials for the study 2) as general reference documents to inform analytical insight into the materials being handled as primary data source. The classification of documents under these two statuses depends on the extent of direct use made of their content as primary data.

Since this research seeks to investigate CADU's development philosophy, its program design and strategy and how these related to the incremental transformation of rural society, the role that the people and the educational and communication techniques used to reach them were assigned importance. The general framework of the research being the Social Learning Paradigm, most of the data selected centered around those activities that impacted the lives of the people and the people's role in it. Also those programs and activities which had real or potential implications for the training, education and participation of the people in shaping development and their role in it were given importance.

For this reason most of the technical documents dealing strictly with agronomic and veterinary research, resources surveys and engineering plans all served as general reference material to inform general knowledge about the project. But they were not made part of the documentary data directly included in the analysis chapter.

Although project documents from the beginning of program implementation showed CADU's very technical orientation, its stated original aim was to bring about social transformation as characterized in this study. The pre-implementation

report prepared by the SIDA project preparation team (1966, Report No. 1), shows articulation of problems that correspond closely with the perspectives of social learning adopted in this study. As will be demonstrated in this study, the program orientation of CADU was far from being consistent with its stated aims and the practical methods implied by the nature of development problem and our framework of analysis.

The author sees this discrepancy between stated aims and objectives and actual program design and implementation as a case probably indicating the difficulty encountered by experts in fitting development aims and objectives and actual programs in a consistent way owing to: a) the specialization of experts in specific scientific disciplines like agricultural research, marketing, animal husbandry etc. only to the detriment of holistic perspectives b) lack of expert awareness of the multidimensionality of development and its requirement for creative joint experimentation through joint project-people participation, c) the fact that those who formulated the original project visions may not have been the ones who designed the development programs. This implies that an institution which houses diverse expertise and experts cannot assume single minded dedication to a singular goal. Many people are likely to revise the original project vision to fit their preferences and expertise.

Additionally, holistic development modeling that successfully incorporates the dimensions of social, political, administrative, institutional, human, technological, resource and capital constraints and

opportunities of development requires a deeper understanding of the etiology of development than was readily available at the time CADU was initiated. As SIDA experts pointed out, there was no reliable and readily available formula for rural development that worked (SIDA, 1966, 116-120). Nor could there be a formula for development relevant for all situations and contexts even today. Given the diversity of problems and interests within a community, each case and its requirements must be studied using the social learning assumptions and theoretical perspectives. It is difficult to offer macro theoretical specifications valid for all development cases and at all times.

Limitations of this Research

In light of CADU's initial transformative goals and the empirical evidence that suggest the absence of the intended transformation after 21 years, the concern is to identify why this occurred. The research agenda is, therefore, dictated by the need to build broad descriptive and analytical understanding of the absence or presence of social and economic dynamics set in motion by CADU. Theory building at macro, middle range, or micro level is not the goal. However, though theory building is not the purpose, the data and analysis could well be used to generate useful theories and hypothesis on development problems in the context of a comparative study and in the tradition of Grounded Theory (Glazer and Strauss, 1967, Shields, 1976).

Bailey (1987, 291-315) and Babie (1986, 266-295) provide convincing grounds for using and treating documentary data as

if they were survey or field observation data. The ultimate outcome depends on the research objective which, in the present context, is limited to the purpose stated above.

The second limitation arises from the absence of rigorous document sampling methods. No systematic random sampling was used, owing largely to the reporting inconsistencies, and nature of reporting emphasis in each document. This necessitated judicious selection of material based on detailed preliminary assessment of the contents of each document rather than randomly selecting documents based on some sampling criteria in advance. The problem of data reporting under titles where they would not be logically expected, was one of the reasons for avoiding randomization by chronology, subject heading of reports or some other sampling criteria.

Chapter VI.

Data Analysis

Part I

CADU, Its Origins, Goals, and Development

Strategies: 1967-1974

Introduction

The study of CADU's programs of rural development and its achievements will be approached from four perspectives. The first perspective is that of CADU itself. The second is that of the Ethiopian government. The third is that of the people for whom the development programs were intended. The people are a very heterogeneous group who may have divergent perspectives on CADU depending on their experience with it. Ultimately, however, it is how much the life of the majority within CADU's region changed for the better and how enduring change was effected that constitute the essence of project success or failure. The fourth perspective is that of the investigator. It is relative to the insight gained through the research process and the theoretical logic of the Social Learning framework. The personal experience of years of development-related career in Ethiopia and some observation's

of the CADU project will also contribute to the investigator's perspectives.

This chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part presents the background and history of CADU, its perspectives on Ethiopian agricultural life and its development approaches during the first two project phases spanning 1967-1974. Consistent with the operative theoretical framework, the role, development perception, participation and learning involving the government, CADU and the people will also be examined as extensively as data allow.

The second part presents CADU's development goals and strategies covering the period 1975-1989. The analytical patterns and development issues pursued in the first part will be replicated, as far as possible, in the second part. The aim is to investigate change or persistence in CADU's program philosophy, assumptions, and strategies given the experiences of the first two phases and radical changes in the political and social system distinguishing the development environment from that of CADU's first phases (1967-1974).

The Emergence of the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU): Swedish Agricultural Development Assistance

Historical Background.

In 1964, the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) established a working group to study ways and means of increasing Swedish development assistance to Ethiopia (SIDA,

1966, Appendix 1, 5). According to Nekby, (1971, 7) the Swedish government was disappointed with its agricultural development aid to Algeria and Tunisia. These two countries were the only hosts to Swedish-assisted agricultural programs in Africa at the time but the assistance was not working well. Another African country was being considered for a new development experiment.

The working group studied the Ethiopian development situation and needs with special emphasis on the agricultural sector. It concluded that the paucity of development means (technology, capital, managerial capacity agricultural research institutions etc.), and the underdeveloped status of all the national development infrastructures, make it essential for Swedish development aid to take the form of an autonomous integrated (comprehensive) regional development. This approach would concentrate development efforts in a specific region to attack many constraints simultaneously (SIDA 1966, appendix 1, Aide-Memoire p. 5).

Integrated rural development was specifically defined in terms of the delivery of a development package largely consisting of agricultural inputs such as green revolution inputs and technologies for major food crops of the development region. Financial credit would also be included to facilitate input acquisition by farmers. Extension services would diffuse the green revolution technologies tested by CADU and its marketing services would provide farmers fair prices and outlets for their produce. CADU's Agricultural and technological research was to aim at

developing locally adapted high-yield seed varieties and improved livestock as well as farm implements for diffusion in its development region.

Other related services such as rural road building, to facilitate the outflow of agricultural surplus to regional and national markets and the inflow of green revolution inputs into the region was considered a critical component of development effort. Road building program would be undertaken in the region by the Imperial Highway Authority on priority basis (SIDA, 1966, 396). Similarly, education, health, and other social services considered essential support activities for CADU success would be undertaken by the government on priority basis. CADU would recommend their planning and execution but would not be directly involved itself (SIDA 1966, appendix 3, 4, CADU Preliminary Final Report, 1967-70, 11).

The idea of applying the integrated development package to a specific region for maximum impact emerged from the realization of the Swedish working group that neither Ethiopia nor Sweden had sufficient resources to launch such a comprehensive program nationally. A choice had to be made as to which regions should receive development assistance. The choice of regions with high economic potential where development investments could yield quick results seemed logical.

In August 1965, another team of high-powered Swedish experts consisting of Professor L. Hjelm, A. Hanson, and E. Aberg of the Agricultural College (Uppsala), Dr. K.E. Knusson

of the University of Gothenburg, and Dr. B Nekby, head of the Planning Division of SIDA, visited Ethiopia. They met with the then Minister of Agriculture Dejazmatch. Girmachew Tekle Hawariat in an effort to obtain first hand information on the state of agricultural development and agricultural institutions in Ethiopia. Their visit was partly motivated by the need to verify the validity of the integrated regional development concepts recommended by the experts that preceded them.

The group left well informed about the weakness of the emerging agricultural research facilities, the scarcity of veterinary services, severe shortage of extension workers, lack of agricultural credit, and other related constraints on agricultural development. The group also apparently discussed, with Ethiopian authorities, the serious development limitations likely to be imposed by feudal land relations (SIDA 1966, Appendix 1, p. 3,5,). In spite of this apprehension about the development effects of the land tenure system, the group seems to have left Addis Ababa with a firm belief that integrated rural development in a selected region, was the answer to the massive agricultural development problems (SIDA 1966, Appendix 1, 5-7).

In November 1965, the Swedish Ambassador to Ethiopia advised the Ministry of Agriculture of the Ethiopian government of the need to set up an integrated regional development in a selected region. The Government accepted the suggestion. The Swedish side offered a skeletal outline that was to characterize the integrated regional development

project that would later be known as CADU (Appendix 1, 6-8).

The outline included: 1. The project should be autonomous taking full charge of "economic development" within the framework of the national development plan,

2. The agricultural research unit of the proposed project would be closely linked with the network of agricultural research stations being planned under the Institute of Agricultural Research of the Ethiopian government.

3. This Swedish Integrated Regional Development project would also cooperate with IBRD/FAO Mission, which was expected to come to Ethiopia to select several regions in which agricultural credit programs would be initiated. The Swedish party proposed that the choice of IBRD/FAO credit region be coordinated with its selection of development region.

4. Criteria for the choice of project region should include:

- good agricultural potential but in need of improved agricultural technology
- an area with a large homogeneous agroclimatic region where uniform agricultural technology could be applied
- land tenure conditions which should have a) large proportions of land owning peasants, b) large tracts of government owned land available for future use, c) stable households farming the same land over time, and d) existence of extensive farming that could be gradually converted into intensive farming.

5. The local administration should be ready to give full support to the development project, and the local population should be receptive to development efforts and ideas.

6. The government should provide increased support to different service activities in the region, giving the region priority in the expansion of education, health services, road construction, etc.

7. If possible, there should exist an already operational Swedish supported "field activity." This could be a mission, school, clinic or any other program which could help CADU to understand local receptiveness to development intervention.

A Swedish team of experts was to prepare a detailed project document that would outline all the essential features of an integrated regional development project that would satisfy the above conditions.

The Swedish Project Preparation Team and Its Composition

The project preparation team was to be headed by an economist who would develop a blueprint for a regional development project (SIDA, 1966, Report No. 1, Appendix 1, 8-10). A sociologist team member would survey the structure and functions of the different social institutions of rural society in the region. The sociological study would also include the land tenure system, economic incentives that could impel or impede rapid agricultural development, and other relevant characteristics of the rural social fabric.

Lexander's field observation completed in 1968 represented the participation of a sociologist on the planning team. Other agricultural specialists were also included to study problems and their solutions from the perspective of their respective specialities.

The Project Preparation Team is Launched

On March 15, 1966, the Swedish Embassy in Addis Ababa submitted its written proposal on the official commissioning of a project preparation team to implement the tasks outlined above (SIDA 1966, Appendix 1, 22). On the same day, the Ethiopian government endorsed the Swedish proposal (Appendix 1, 3-4). Subsequent to this, a number of letters and Aide-Memoires were exchanged as work on project design progressed.

The Project preparation team started its work in March, 1966. The completed project report on the establishment of CADU was submitted to the Ethiopian government by the Development Assistance Attache of the Swedish Embassy, Mr. Bengt Nekby.

From a letter of the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture dated 14 July 1966 addressed to the Swedish Ambassador in Addis Ababa, it is evident that the Ethiopian party was alerted to important measures being recommended by the project preparation as conditions for project success. These conditions pertained to traditional administrative structures in the project region and the project's links with the Ethiopian government (SIDA 1966, Appendix 2). Land reform, administrative reform, and proportionally large resource inputs by the Ethiopian government were viewed as essential for the success of the project. It is not clear, however, if the Ethiopian side studied the implication of all of these requirements carefully and appreciated the consequences of non-compliance with the anticipated policy measures. The government's response was quick and affirmative indicating a

sense of urgency. The country was supposed to be entering a serious economic crisis in the very near future (SIDA 1966, Appendix 3, 1). Holmberg states that, indeed, the Ethiopian government pushed for the implementation of CADU long before it examined in detail the nature and specific requirements and consequences implied by the implementation of the project (1971, 23).

In September 1967, CADU was launched as an autonomous regional development project, largely funded by Sweden and staffed by Swedish experts at different levels with a substantial contribution in cash and in kind by the Ethiopian government. We can thus summarize the background of CADU as follows: 1) The idea of CADU as an autonomous, integrated rural development project was the brain child of SIDA experts who studied the problems of Ethiopian agriculture and comprised the Project Preparation Team. Although Ethiopian planners accepted it, the concept was shrouded in ambivalence and ambiguity. 2) While Ethiopian officials were consistently consulted at each stage of project formulation, they apparently did not participate in the process actively and fully. Rather, they endorsed the recommendations of the Swedish experts, some times on the same day or within a few days of the Swedish proposals as evidenced by the texts of the appendices to the 1966 SIDA Report. This, most likely blurred their full grasp of the project's longer term socio-political implications. 3) The integrated rural development strategy not only involved external funding, but also the concentrated expenditure of Ethiopian government resources

both as matching funds and for the creation of service and physical infrastructures considered essential for the project's success. 4) The criteria for the selection of the project site emphasized economic potential rather than the alleviation of rural poverty and underdevelopment.

CADU: Definition of Development Problems and the Design of Solutions, 1967-1974

CADU's perception of Ethiopia's development problems generally and Chilalo region's particularly, was based on analysis of massive statistical data and discussion with a few public officials. In this section, the database and data interpretation on which CADU was envisioned will be offered. Then the experts' definition and understanding of development problems and the processes by which these problems were to be overcome will be discussed. The design of CADU's development strategy and its implementation along with some of the outstanding results and consequences of program implementation will be documented and analyzed.

SIDA experts who in 1966 carried out an exhaustive pre-project analysis on the development situation in Ethiopia, observed that the country was not only food self-sufficient, but also exported agricultural surplus,

The country is virtually self-sufficient in agricultural produce...The nation is almost exclusively dependent on agricultural produce incl.(sic) animal produce for foreign exchange. (SIDA 1966, Report I, Part I, 3).

In the mid 1960s, the country was exporting agricultural products to the magnitude indicated by table 1 below, though the level of agricultural development was low. The

industrial sector was growing rapidly in spite of many constraints. Although manufacturing accounted for only 2.5% of GDP, this sector was growing

Table 1 Agricultural Export by Commodities.

exports	Eth. Birr ('millions)	% of total export
coffee	158.8	60.5
cereals and pulses	13.6	5.2
oil seeds	30.6	11.5
chat (stimulant)	5.1	1.9
fruits and vegetables	6.3	2.4
hides and skins	21.9	8.3
Live animals and meat	8.4	3.2
other	<u>18.3</u>	<u>7</u>
Total	262.5	100.00

Source: SIDA, 1966, Report No. 1 Part I, 3.

in importance and expanding at about 17% per annum. By the end of the 1960s, the percentage share of GDP of manufacturing was expected to double to 5%. The SIDA team saw this process as likely to stimulate increasing rural-urban labor migration in search of industrial work, thereby reducing the food supply to the non -agricultural population (3). Hence agricultural production needed boosting right away.

While about 90% of the population (estimated at 21 million at the time) was engaged in agriculture (12), agricultural practices and technology were at low stages of development. Peasant agriculture was seen as stagnant and non innovative. Unless agriculture was made more productive to keep pace with the fast growing population and industrial sector, the country would soon face grave difficulties (181-

86, Appendix 3, 1-2). The population was estimated to grow to 26 million by 1971 (12).

The SIDA team of experts was also concerned that unless food production was expanded rapidly, a) famine could set in and become a regular occurrence, b) the standard of living which lags far behind other African countries could not be improved and c) foreign exchange earnings cannot grow as required by the economy. (44). Because of this, the Ethiopian government and USAID had planned to redirect development resources from infrastructure development to agriculture beginning in 1966 (44).

While the need to "modernize" the agricultural sector and to make it more efficient and productive was seen as urgent, it was felt, both by SIDA and USAID, that Ethiopia lacked institutional efficiency to support a modern agricultural economy (Appendix 3, 2). This convinced the experts that the most effective way of helping Ethiopian agriculture to meet the challenges it faced was setting up an integrated regional agricultural development project which could be autonomously, flexibly, and efficiently run by a cadre of expatriate and national experts. The argument that agricultural development needed to concentrate scarce resources in high potential regions for quick and efficient returns to investment and effort gave this trend of reasoning greater impetus.

The proposed autonomous regional development project in theory, was to have the following advantages:

a) circumventing the institutional inefficiency of the Ethiopian bureaucracy, b) enhancing the limited supply of

Ethiopian expertise by using expatriate personnel as a stop-gap measure, c) concentrating all of the donor country's development contribution and a substantial amount of national resources to a geographically specific area for maximum development impact, d) organizing and extending the narrow and fragmented market system, e) using donor country expertise, capital, and advanced technology to stimulate long-term development while producing much needed quick economic results, and f) ensuring built-in budget and program flexibility so as to make the project sensitive and responsive to local situations as they unfold.

The problem of development was, therefore, defined as the need for producing agricultural surplus. The strategy for meeting it was thought to be quick injection of agricultural productivity using imported technology, capital, and manpower applied to a high potential region.

As we saw earlier, Chilalo was selected as the project site, on the bases of a set of selection criteria. Now, the critical issue became how to model the proposed autonomous integrated regional development. Here we start to see the link between problem definition and justifications for the design of CADU become ambiguous. Initially, the problems were largely seen as low agricultural productivity only. But as the articulation of programs starts, experts become concerned with the totality of rural development. Ultimately, rural development and not production enhancement emerge as the dominant goal of the project. The planning experts observed that,

rural development is...hampered by the absence of a general method for integrating the economic conclusions of agricultural planning with the many factors affecting rural life. The main difficulty arises from the fact that agricultural planning, both at the national and the farm level, is mainly economic, whereas (sic) rural development is influenced by a wide spectrum of non-economic factors. Agriculture is not only a means of livelihood-it is a way of life... (SIDA 1966. Report I Part I, 116).

To gain more insight into the linkage between agricultural production and rural change, the experts undertook an extensive study of rural development programs and experiences in different developing countries. Comila of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Israel's regional development plans and programs were specially interesting, since the problems they were addressing seemed similar to Ethiopia's and therefore, their experiences relevant for its design of rural development.

Based on careful study and analyses of the experiences of these two projects, the experts developed a model of development that they perceived to be a workable and eclectic synthesis of the positive lessons derived from the projects they studied (111a-120). This synthesis came in the unique form of CADU.

CADU was unique in a number of ways. First, unlike the Israeli regional planning and development approach which built development programs around the concept of regional comparative advantage, CADU aspired to achieve development through the region's total resource mobilization and to drive towards multi-faceted regional development (Aide-Memoire,

Appendix 1, 5-10). As one professor who had first hand insights into Comila observed, CADU experts also seem to have either misread or put the Comila experiment on its head in the design of cooperatives and rural credit programs and generally, the task of involving the rural people. For instance, in Comila, cooperative formation is known to have preceded credit services. This means that sociocultural mobilization and indigenous social structural arrangements were put in place before economic intervention occurred.

CADU set for itself the comprehensive task of bringing about social and economic development to an entire region. Initially, all development tasks would be accomplished through considerable infusion of foreign capital, expertise, technology, and decision-making from outside of the region. In time, it was assured, the local population will take over its own development.

We should, at this stage, consider in greater detail CADU's specific development goals and concrete methodologies and program support to the region by which it hoped to bring about regional development.

CADU: Initial Goals and Development Premises

CADU's initial development goals and premises were stated as follows:

- 1) to improve the ability of the local population to participate in and be responsible for the local administration and development efforts and thereby improve the economic and social condition in the area,

2) to create possibilities for an expansion of the program to other regions (SIDA, 1966, Report No. 1 Part II, 189). The second goal implied a much broader role for the project than the development of the project area. Besides its tasks in the targeted project area, CADU was to serve as an experimental effort in which methods for effective rural development applicable elsewhere were to be generated (SIDA 1966 Report I. Letter of Submittal, part II, 189).

While CADU's definition of development problems centered on the need for enhancing agricultural production for domestic consumption and export, its goals and envisaged development processes were stated entirely in social developmental terms which were strikingly consistent with the development definition in the Social Learning Tradition.

CADU stated its goals as follows:

With respect to the first target, it must be underlined that the project not only aims at an increased production (sic). This could probably be achieved most easily through large scale farming and big industrial ventures often under foreign management. The more important aspect of this project is, however, to develop the ability of the local people to deal with their own problems and to competently lead the progress of their society... the local population as individual entrepreneurs, as members of economic organizations and as being responsible for the local administration must be informed about the possibilities within the region and be one of the parts in the establishment of targets.... (189-190).

The project document, however, stated that the initial stage of regional planning and program implementation cannot benefit from broad popular participation because there were

no economic organizations and the local self-administration order ...It will be impossible to obtain the local opinion on the targets for the regional plan. (190)

The first phase of the project was therefore planned and implemented strictly by experts alone. This set a serious precedent as to how future activities were to be structured. It was a caveat of events and trends to follow.

CADU's Program Strategies Defined: Operationalization of Development

The project's general development goals were to be achieved through an eleven point program strategy summarized here:

1. CADU's coordination and stream lining of the activities and programs of all government ministries and agencies in the region.
2. Establishment of a planning unit that continuously surveys the region's natural and manpower resources to be deployed in the development effort.
3. Establishment of an applied research unit to test modern seed varieties and their fertilizer responsiveness in different agroecological zones of the region.
4. Study the structure and network of traditional institutions. Discover ways for inducing them to serve economic ends.
5. Construction of expanded regional road networks by the Imperial Highway Authority. CADU may assist in planning and construction of some rural roads.

6. Preparation of draft legislation on land reform in the region and facilitate its legal adoption by the Ethiopian government.
7. Conducting research in animal breeding and husbandry to improve the region's livestock.
8. Creating individual and commercial enterprises that will help create rural jobs and material incentives for farmers to enhance their surplus production.
9. Preparation of seminars and promotional materials to publicize CADU and its goals to the population of the region.
10. Undertaking staff training for the replication of the Project elsewhere in the country.
11. Increasing local revenue generation which would enable the local population to assume increasing responsibility for financing the project. Alternatively, revenues generated in the region could be collected by the government and invested in other regions so that some of the benefits of development to the region could be transferred to other rural areas.

(SIDA 1966, part II, 191-192)

These program strategies stand at striking variance with CADU's two seminal goals: enabling the people to participate in the project and demonstrating how they could take responsibility for their development project. Replicating the methods for attaining these goals in other regions. The strategies outlined negate the possibility of both occurring. A closer investigation of CADU's structural and operational characteristics is in order to determine how goals and program strategies converged or continued to diverge.

CADU'S Organizational Structure

The Swedish government (specifically SIDA) was to work through a National Rural Development Board that was to be set up to overlook the work of CADU. The executive director of CADU was to have the role of coordinating the activities of different technical ministries and relating to the governor of Arsi in matters of project interest. He was also to command an elaborate project bureaucracy that would deal with different technical operations (see figure 6 below).




Figure 6 CADU's Organizational Structure
(SIDA, 1966, 196)

Each technical and operational unit in turn had its own internal structure well laid out, in figures, charts and detailed job descriptions to facilitate efficient work and its supervision by the unit head (Report no. I, part II, 194-322). Figure 7 represents the organizational detail worked out for each major program or department.




Figure 7 Organizational Chart of Extension Services
(CADU, 1966, 244)

CADU's organizational charts depict a conspicuous absence of people's active participation except as recipient of services.

**Content of Development Programs: Support
for Peasant Agriculture, Phases I & II, 1967-1974**

Earlier discussions attempted to establish the definitional consistency of development in the social learning paradigm and CADU. Both stress the learning and participation of the people, at whom development is directed, as the primary goal and vehicle for tenable development process. Both also emphasize that the learning process is a two-way street in which the people learn from development agents and the latter learn from the people. Learning is, therefore, seen as an iterative process in the context of which both parties grow in their outlooks and acquire pragmatic insights into development problems. Development of methodologies and practical skills emerge just from such a process. An open and dynamic educational and communication strategy which facilitates iterative learning and continuous growth in skills and insights is clearly implied. In CADU, this process is not evident and the design of programs is a caveat for alienating people-project relations. Tables 2 and 3 below indicate patterns of resource allocation and level of project benefits reaching the people. Both are indicative of the nature of the people's participation. The degree of alienation between architects of development and the popular masses at whom it was directed is evident.

Table 2 Summary of CADU's Budget (1967-70)

Expenditure (Eth. \$)		Years		
		1967/68	1968/69	1969/70
1. Staff				
high level staff(Eth)	11	14	14	
middle level staff(Eth.)	24	36.5	42	
High level (Swed.)	22.5	25	25	
Middle level (Swed.)	13.5	19.5	19	
2. Land invest. (Eth. Contr.)	142,800	4,000	4,000	
3. buildings	3,324,480	1,441,190		
4. equipment	1,628,875	631,550	81,400	
Total	5,096,155	2,076,740	85,400	
5. Net operating cost	<u>843,500</u>	<u>688,100</u>	<u>565,500</u>	
6. Total investment and operating cost	5,939,655	2,764,840	650,900	

source: Table 74 SIDA 1966, Report no. 1 part II p. 3

This budget allocation shows that development was seen as a series of investments in buildings, equipment, and expert services rather than a process to be initiated for people, by people and sustained through their enlightened initiatives supported by external resources and expertise. Over the first three years expenditures in excess of seven million Ethiopian dollars is made on just the establishment of project facilities and personnel services. It might be of interest to contrast this magnitude and character of

Table 3. Estimated benefits to (peasant) farmers 1968/1969

improved seeds	1000 ha. x 1 quintal x Eth\$ 20	= 20,000
fertilizer	20 ha.. x 7 quintals x 20	= 2,800
plowing (tractor ser.)	550 ha. x 20	= 11,000
milk sales	23,040 lit. x .20	= 4,600
Total benefits		39,400

Compiled from information in Tentative CADU Program 1970-75, p.5-7)

expenditure with actual program expenditures benefitting the peasant as shown in table 3 above.

It is clear that the meaning and strategy of development are at great variance with the stated goals. In what follows, additional categories of data on CADU's planning strategies, programs, and results will be presented. During the first phase of project operation (1967-1970), CADU experts moved into the project area with ready made plans for what needed to be done. The building of a very elaborate headquarters with staff residential and recreational, agricultural extension and demonstration, credit, marketing facilities, and facilities for research in plant and livestock breeding were the major programs.

We noted CADU's elaborate and hierarchical structure in figure 6 and the linkage between the organization's different departments and the local people in figure 7. Figure 7 shows the organizational flow of extension, community education, and other development programs that link the project and the people. Note that, except for the demonstration farm at the district level, all other technical innovations are diffused to the peasant through the model farmer. This means that even agricultural extension workers do not have direct contact with the peasant farmer. The extension worker instructs the model farmers on the use of green revolution technologies and other modern farm practices. The model farmer is expected to impart the knowledge he has acquired and the results he has achieved from its application to farmers within an area delimited as his "extension domain". One model farmer assumed responsibility for 80-100 farmers

scattered over wide areas. The model farmers were to serve as "innovation islands."

Selection of Model Farmers

The selection of model farmers was done by farmers themselves (SIDA, 1966, Report I, Part II, 250-251). It was stipulated that selection would be from among traditional leaders with authority-the Balabat- (landed dignitary) or shemagles (elders) who are accepted, trusted and respected by the community. CADU's program plan stated that the "model farmers will be used as a kind of extension agents in the way that they will hand over their new experiences to their fellow farmers" (251). In addition to regular extension exposure, these model farmers were to be intensively trained through short courses that were given continuously one day a week- or at least one day every two weeks. They were to be paid allowances for the days of training (253).

CADU's demonstration farms were generally located on model farmers lands so that the results could be seen by all other farmers within the domain of the model farmer. But examination of demonstration reports (Results of Demonstrations 1968, CADU Publication No. 24, Results of Demonstrations, Report 19769/70 CADU Publication No. 48) shows that a quarter of the demonstration work was also done on commercial farms with significant wealth and power. It is not sure whether these farmers would take the time or have interest to volunteer their expertise and effort for the betterment of the peasant farmer, especially the tenant.

In the 1970-75 CADU program and budget, (CADU Publication No. 26), the role of wealthy commercial farmers as preferred extension targets is stressed owing to their receptiveness to CADU innovations (19).

The Implications of CADU's Structure for Project Learning and Feedback.

CADU's indirect system of contact with the peasantry and its complex structure diminished the opportunity for experts to have first hand knowledge and information on what was happening to peasant farmers and farming as a consequence of project intervention. Most of all, the possibility to help the peasantry acquire new organizational insights and world views that serve as new guide posts for social and economic action was missed. Our analytical model places special emphasis on the value of direct communication and learning contacts between the intervening and local systems at individual as well as institutional levels. These are seen as essential conditions for change and development. As we saw in figure 7, the district center and demonstration farms were at the center of the relationship between CADU and the peasantry. Most of the high and middle level experts working in the headquarters do not seem to have frequent face to face contact with farmers.

Credit distribution was also handled by this unit. Credit would be given to land owners with production plans approved by CADU and to groups of model farmers who were organized into cooperatives (SIDA report I, part II, 392-396). It was made explicit that credit acquisition, which

was the key to the utilization of CADU generated innovations, were, at least initially, restricted to larger, land-owning farmers and model farmers' cooperatives.

By using the criteria of land ownership, approved production plans, and model farmer cooperatives, development programs excluded the more than 50% of the farmers who were tenants or farming relatives' lands. The pattern of initial credit distribution was as follows:

Table 4 Distribution of Credit by Category of Farmers (1968).

Farmer Category	Farm credits	Total credit (Eth.\$)
Tenants	16	610
landowners		
01-10 ha.	81	2,717
11-20	36	2,924
21-40	21	3,703
Above 40	18	5,148
Unknown	<u>17</u>	<u>780</u>
Total	189	15,697

Source: Henock Kifle, An Analysis of the CADU Credit Program 1968/69-1970/71, CADU Publication No. 66, p. 6, Table 2.

It is significant that although about 50% of the region's farmers were tenants, only 8% received credit in 1968 and that this happened in spite of policies excluding them from credit participation altogether. Though CADU credit programs, which took the form of advancing agricultural inputs, favored land-owning and relatively larger farmers, the target population was generally not carefully selected for any of the project programs. Holmberg (1972, CADU publication No. 81, 10) suggests, that the entire population of the project region was loosely defined as the target of development.

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This ambiguity in specifying target populations was in itself problematic in the absence of clearly delimited program boundaries designed to address the diverse needs and problems of different strata of rural society. Diverse interest groups with varied resource bases and access to power and influence were made to compete for the same resource. As will be shown by later data, the consequences of this was that poorer farmers were pushed out not only from CADU programs, but also from the region altogether.

It is also interesting that even within the peasant category, those with least hectarage participated least in CADU credit as shown in Table 5:

Table 5 Tenant Participation in CADU Credit and input Utilization by farm Size (1970).

Tenant Farm size	<u>tenant creditors.</u>	Usage of Credit	
		<u>Seed</u>	<u>Fertiliz.</u>
2 ha.	120	107	120
2-4 ha.	662	547	661
4-6 "	466	393	466
+6 "	160	137	160
Unknown	<u>132</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>132</u>
Total	1,540	1,292	1,539

source; Henock, 1971 Table 12, p. 20.

It is instructive that there should be credit distribution discrepancies favoring bigger land tillers even among tenants. It is evident that credit is relatively evenly distributed. However, tenants cultivating more than 4-6 hectares enjoyed some margin of advantages over those with less hectarage. CADU's efforts to attain economy of scale in credit distribution seems to have negatively selected against

the poor to some extent, thereby exacerbating the structural disadvantages weighing heavily against the tenant and poor farming classes.

CADU and Chilalo's Non-agricultural Innovations: The Role of Local Artisans in Rural Development

Of all CADU activities, its implements research and production unit endeavored to keep its grassroots orientation over a longer time, consistent with the Project's original commitment of transforming rural society from within. This Unit started operation in 1968. Its first progress report (CADU, 1969, Publication No. 32) clearly states its goals. These goals included; a) testing farm equipment and implement prototypes imported from other countries and making such prototypes itself, b) production of a limited series of tested prototypes for experimental trials and c) training of local artisans and craftsmen in tool designing and encouraging them to produce the improved and tested prototypes on commercial basis.

For this purpose, local artisans (blacksmiths, leather and wood workers) initially were used as temporary employees in CADU's Implement Workshops. These temporary employees were to be theoretically and practically trained and encouraged to return to their homes to continue the production of essential farm and household items of improved quality and functionality (Progress Report I, 1969, 57). The plan appeared serious about local capacity building in implement manufacturing. Whether this will consistently continue over CADU's operational life span is a matter for

further investigation which will be provided below in our investigation of phase two of the project covering 1970-1974.

CADU's Development and Program Strategies: Phase II of The Project 1970-1974; Continuous conceptual Drift

A large number of CADU's Budget and Plan documents, annual reports, and field studies, was carefully examined to determine the structure and content of development programs and who the main actors were during the second phase of the project. We already have reviewed the budget allocations and programs for the first three years of operation (see Table 2). In the budget and program proposed for 1970-75 new concepts appear that modify the very nature and foundation of CADU's development perspective and goals.

Before going into the details of these conceptual developments, it may be useful to mention that the first three years of CADU's development activities were scheduled for evaluation by external evaluators. The 1970-75 program and budget were formulated in March 1969, a number of months before the publication of the external evaluators' report which was to provide objective feedback on the first three years of work. For this reason the 1970-75 program and budget proposal was based on subjective indicators used by project staff to estimate the validity of the project and future program needs (Tentative CADU Programme 1970-75, Addis Ababa, CADU publication No. 26, 5). These subjective indicators were: 1) positive cooperation with Ethiopian authorities as indicated by the fulfillment of the government's cash commitment to the project even during times

of great financial difficulty (p. 5, 2) the interest of the people in the project region in CADU's supply of clean and improved seeds, fertilizer, and farm machinery services which surpassed CADU's expectations (5). Discouraging delays in land reform which, if implemented, would, in any event, be limited to standardizing tenancy practices, was not seen as sufficiently serious to negatively affect CADU's program progress.

In the new budget and plan, the administration of large numbers of small credits to poor farmers was considered cost ineffective and earlier decision to limit small loans to model farmers' cooperatives, unless the loan applicant was a landowner with CADU approved production plans (SIDA, 1966, Report No. I, part II, 394) were still in operation. However, by March 1969 when the new program and budget for 1970-75 was being compiled, cooperative formation on any significant scale had not begun. The decision against small credit administration, therefor, continued to effectively select against small farmers.

The introductory statement of the Phase II of the plan and program document notes that the project could not have shown significant benefits in such a short time. The benefits to farmers in 1967/68 consisted only of project purchases of surplus grain and the purchase of milk which was not regularly marketed before the advent of CADU. A total of 480 quintals of cereals (1 quintal=100 Kg..) was bought by CADU's marketing service at a price of

Eth\$ 1.50/quintal higher than the market price to redress exploitative pricing by grain merchants. The total benefit to farmers from two years of project operation has already been summarized in Table 3 earlier.

The goal of the 1970-1975 Tentative budget and program already demonstrates a shift in project orientation. The initial project goal of popular participation and partnership in rural transformation and agricultural development as the ultimate project objective were replaced by economic precepts and objectives (1-5) which are more amicable to rational input-output planning. The new and economistic program and budget orientation was emphatically introduced as a necessary mechanism to produce agricultural surplus and to supply industry with the necessary raw materials. Each budget category and program sub-heading was preceded by an introductory phrase that read: "main goal: economic development".

This budget and program document starts out by summarizing the goals of CADU that were set down for the first phase of project operation 1967-1970: 1) economic development, 2) establishment of methods for agricultural development, 3) expansion and improvement of Ethiopian staff for agricultural development, and 4) increased awareness and participation of the local population in the economic development process (12). It was stated that these goals be maintained for the 1970-75 period:

but emphasizing that the achievement of economic development should be the ultimate

goal with which the others should not be allowed to interfere (12).

The hierarchy of objectives and the depth of commitment to the achievement of fundamental change in rural conditions of life through the people's own active participation was devalued. Learning and teaching, goal and program formulation consistent with peoples' needs, and possibilities receded into the back alley of project operation. There was no evident preoccupation with the need to help the people build institution and indigenous capacities to face the challenge of effectively dealing with development tasks as

Table 6 Summary of Expenditures by year, 1970-75
(Eth. \$)

expenses	Budget Years				
	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75
expatriate staff HL	1,012,500	999,000	702,000	634,500	694,000
Expatriate staff ML	378,000	210,000	126,000	126,000	126,000
Ethiopian staff HL	319,200	352,800	386,400	386,400	386,400
Ethiopian staff ML	230,400	345,600	464,400	550,800	615,600
invest. in building	780,000	401,500	264,000	112,500	111,000
equipment	522,630	556,140	360,640	284,180	175,340
operating cost	1,136,500	1,219,000	1,337,600	1,265,400	1,201,700
special cost	<u>490,000</u>	<u>482,000</u>	<u>450,000</u>	<u>434,000</u>	<u>434,000</u>
total	4,869,230	4,566,040	4,091,040	3,793,780	3,644,040

Source: Tentative CADU Programme 1970-76 Addis Ababa, March 1969. p. 143.

(HL=high level, ML= middle level)

was originally planned. A summary of the budget allocation which mirrors the new program priorities and contents for 1970-75 is given in Table 6 above.

This budget summarizes the detailed allocations of project resources. Staff salaries take the biggest chunk. Infrastructure development, junior staff training, research, credit, and marketing, extension work (mainly focused on the diffusion of CADU generated innovations and green revolution inputs) form other aspects of allocation emphasis.

The internal organization of CADU was somewhat modified to facilitate the vigorous pursuit of the economic development goals. Figure 8 gives the organizational picture as modified for the period under plan.

The new organizational chart shows that all social services, institutional and infrastructural development are placed outside of the CADU package of programs. Other agencies of government were expected to assume full responsibility in these areas as CADU focuses its efforts in economic growth.

The process of economic growth is assumed to stimulate social transformation. The process by which this is assumed to result is shown in Figure 9. This flow chart traces the processesual interlinkages between economic and social transformation. Its message is that social development is the spontaneous result of economic growth. The only indicator of development success was to be purely economic in




Figure 8 Revised Organizational Chart of CADU

Source: Tentative CADU Program 1970-75, CADU
Publication No. 26, p.13, Fig. 1.

nature and specified by benefit-cost ratios:

The only measure if the project has succeeded or not and if thus a new and improved method of agricultural development has been established will be the achievement of reasonable cost benefit ratio. An internal rate of return ...of 15% should be regarded as acceptable (CADU Publication 26, 19)

Though the role of CADU in social and economic transformation is confusing, its intentions regarding it are not. The 1970-75 budget and program analysis reversed, for instance, earlier decisions regarding small farmer credit participation and gave them preferential access to tractor




Figure 9 Economic Growth, Increased awareness, and Participation.

Source: CADU Publication No. 26, p. 18, Fig. 6.

services and credit. This was argued on the ground that richer farmers could access these services through the private market more easily than poor farmers (19). This was a way of redressing structural constraints on small farmers which had remained a social developmental issue.

The shift from initial social development objectives to economic ones could be accounted for in a number of ways. The most important perhaps were the difficulties in conceptualizing just how social development takes place and how intervention could enhance it. The second, and perhaps more important in this case, may have been the absence of the

predicted economic achievements which may have increased the urgency for decisive emphasis on purely economic ends. It needs to be recalled that CADU had a time frame of 12 years in which to accomplish development in its project region and derive credible methods to be replicated for the development of other regions. This time frame called for a three phase program terminating in 12 years:

- 1) program initiation and experimentation 3 years
- 2) expansion within the region 3 years
- 3) expansion to whole of Arsi and phasing out of aid 6 years

(SIDA, 1966, Part II, 193)

But development experience was fraught with many conceptual and practical problems and by 1970/71, it was evident that the project could not achieve the predicted development results. Up to 1971, the total project benefits to the local people had remained

Table 7 Project Costs and Benefits by Year
(Eth.\$ '000)

Cost & Benefit	Year			
	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71
Estimated benefits	28	466	1,661	4,194
Costs	2,880	7,313	3,660	5,626
Difference	-2,852	-6,847	-1,999	-1,432

Source: CADU Annual Report 1970/71, Publication No. 65, 7-8

insignificant compared to costs in time, expertise and money which undoubtedly forced urgent changes in declared strategy. Table 7 shows the comparison between costs and benefits in estimated Ethiopian dollar values.

With the advent of a revolutionary change in 1974 and as CADU's program drifted further away from its initially stated

objectives, the management of CADU became predominantly Ethiopian. Budget and program strategies designed for 1970-75 had to be revised in keeping with the new radical "socialist" ideology. While commending CADU's research efforts, the new national professional cadres were euphoric about social transformation and saw CADU's extension approaches centered on the model farmer concept limiting for participation and transformation of ordinary farmers (CADU Publication No. 88). New organizational and service delivery structures were designed. In the process, project administration became even more elaborate in its bureaucracy (Fig. 10).

The new organizational structure and program required a substantial budget increase from both Ethiopian and Swedish sources as shown in table 8.

Social development, and greater participation of ordinary farmers in project activities and benefits were vigorously asserted by the revised program and budget. However, consistent with previous trends, the annual report for 1974/75 issued in 1977 shows that the so called social transformation programs had degenerated into ad hoc home economic programs from the very beginning (CADU Annual Report 1974/75, ARDU Publication No. 6). The report also indicated the prevalence of internal conflicts and strifes between different professional groups within CADU which negatively affected its activities.

The new program and budget also appeared much more structured and less flexible. Each department's and

Table 8 Comparison between Tentative CADU Program
for 1970-75 and the Revised 1974/75 Annual Budget
Proposal (in Eth.\$ '000)

	Ethiopian gov.	Swedish gov.	Differenc.
Tentative Program	2,397.0	2,882.8	
1974/75 Proposal	2,397.0	3,504.8	662.0

*Source: CADU Work Program and Budget 1974/75 CADU
Publication No. 88. p. ix*

section's "production" or performance targets were established in advance- pretty much like the production quota that is typical of the socialist organization of life that was creeping into Ethiopia at the time. This trend and its development implications will be addressed later in the section dealing with CADU's operation during the period of 1975-85.

Evaluation and Feed Back in CADU (1967-1974)

From the beginning CADU had a permanent system of self-evaluation and feed back built into its operational structure. Each operational unit would evaluate its performance and the constraints that encumbered progress. These would be evaluated by the Planning and Evaluation section to provide the basis for the next cycle of planning. Generally, the evaluation reports from each of the technical departments reflected the intensity of research and organizational experimentation that was going on. In aggregate, all the reports reflected the efficiency and dedication with which the research and experimentation work was carried out.




Figure 10 CADU's Revolutionary Administrative Chart
 Source: Plan for 1976-80, ARDU Publication No. 1, 28)

Technical reports on demonstrations and trials dominated much of the reporting. Demonstrations and trials were part of the agricultural experiments that tested fertilizer responsiveness of different crop varieties and improved seeds under different agroecological conditions. These reports lacked social dimensions which would help gauge the social and structural dynamics of the region under development intervention.

The first major evaluation report that placed the project in its socioeconomic context came in 1970. A team of external evaluators which included Prof. Rene Dumont, members of the Ethiopian government, and SIDA was invited to assess CADU's performance between 1967-1970.

Though this evaluation document was not available in its entirety to this investigator, the summary of its recommendations was extensively cited in CADU's Preliminary Final Report for the period 1967-70 (12-13).

The evaluators made it clear that CADU's package or comprehensive approach in the sense of providing a mix of agricultural technologies, along with credit facilities for their acquisition, and extension services was commended by the evaluators. However, the evaluators had made a number of seminal observations on the limitations of CADU's development strategies. They urged it to pay special attention to the involvement of the people in their own socioeconomic development.

Specifically, the evaluators' major observations were; 1) unless the project finds a way to involve the local population more actively, there was still a risk of failure, 2) CADU was overly conscious of quality and scientific standards resulting in many of its activities being far beyond the capacity of the local population to attain and 3) that no significant development could occur without land reform to give each tenant farmer the authority and resources needed to participate in development. Other observations were also made that reinforce these three main points.

While CADU expressed agreement with the suggestions of the evaluation team, it continued to reinforce program approaches that emphasized the very strategies that the evaluators questioned and which were questioned in its own initial premises of 1967. In general, CADU took the evaluators' general stamp of approval of the package approach to strengthen the content of the package and the scientific research that backed it, rather than the recommended methods for making the project developmentally (development as defined in this study) more, effective and relevant to the learning and growth process of the local population.

CADU's Impact on Local Socioeconomic Dynamics and Technological Innovativeness

At higher levels of technology, CADU introduced a number of innovations that were new to both the region and the country. It is believed that it operated the only plant breeding station at the time (Tentative CADU Program 1970-75, 52). CADU's introduction of large-scale use of green

revolution technologies, marketing and other economic interventions undoubtedly resulted in impressive production increases in the region. But these gains were limited to farms that could use its services and suggested technologies. It was also the first organization to have a seed multiplication center attached to its plant breeding experiment programs, so that its new crop technologies could be put into production immediately (Cohen 1987, 52). Indeed, the efficiency with which the research, training, and production enhancement were operated had received world renown (Brangang, 1980/81, Nekby, 1971, Cohen, 1975, 1987). Although it cannot be established with certainty, CADU scientists and trainees undoubtedly impacted positively on agricultural research in Ethiopia. But this study is about CADU as a strategy for rural transformation. This forces us to focus more on the development processes, both socioeconomic and technological, that CADU's programs were instrumental in setting into motion in its development region. Here, the record appears less optimistic.

CADU and Chilalo's Economic and Social Dynamics, 1967-74

We should recall that CADU's plan for the first phase of operation (1967-70) supported disbursing credit in the form of improved seeds and fertilizer to land owning farmers and cooperatives of model farmers. Theoretically, tenants and small farmers were excluded on account of the cost of managing a large number of small credits (SIDA, 1966, Report No. 1. part II, 394). Poor farmers were to be included in the cooperative arrangement at some later date. In practice,

however, poor farmers participated in CADU credit programs from the beginning. A study conducted in 1970 (Henock, 1971) also showed that even before the organization of cooperatives was started, peasants and other categories of poor farmers benefited from CADU credit, indicating that stated policies tended to be replaced by flexible and pragmatic choices in the course of project operation.

Tables 4 and 5 presented earlier showed credit participation by different categories of land owners and tenants. It was shown that credit distribution systematically favored larger farmers and that even among tenants, those with substantial farms fared better than those with smaller holdings. The main point is that however small the credit may have been, tenants and small farmers did participate regardless of stated policies.

By 1970, CADU had even implemented a policy to exclude, from its credit program, farmers cultivating more than 25 hectares (Henock, 1971, 29) because the distribution of easy credit had attracted large numbers of influential farmers into the region and into CADU's programs. The growth and success of this group often meant evicting poor and tenant farmers. The increasing commercialization of agriculture in the Chilalo region had dire consequences for tenants and other subsistence farmers. They could not compete with large-scale commercial farmers using subsidized fuel to run their mechanized farms. Nor could they compete for farm land since those with affluent means pushed them out one way or the other.

Two studies that focused on the eviction problem were conducted by Henock Kifle in 1972 and Michael Beyene in 1973. Henock found that the rapid modernization of farming and the rush of speculating commercial farmers into the region was forcing different categories of poor farmers out of the region, totally dislocating heretofore stable rural families. The eviction rate is given in table 9 below.

Henock's research discovered that of the 617 tenants evicted, 538 had moved out of the project area altogether. The total rate of eviction due to CADU-stimulated development programs was estimated to be about four tenants and farmers per 40 hectares (21). This rate of eviction is alarming if we take into account the total volume of affected population.

The average family size in the Chilalo region was 6.2 in 1981 (Investigation on impact, CADU Publication No. 18). If an assumption of family size of 5 is adopted for the early 70s, it would mean that a total of about 17-18 persons per 40 hectares were being evicted. How can there be rural development and transformation when so many rural people are being chased out of the region? This is actually the question that the investigator of the above cited study asked.

Though the serious problem of rural social turmoil engendered by CADU was never a preoccupation of program evaluation, CADU did attempt to respond to the social impact of its economic programs. This was clearly reflected in its evaluation and planning document of 1971 (CADU Publication No. 66). First, in a 1970 policy revision, terms favoring

Table 9. Peasant Farmers and Tenants Evicted
from Different Districts of the Project Region,
1969-1970

District	Evicted tenants mechanized Farm. own contract		Tenants leav. voluntar.	Dis- agreemen.	New tenan	Total
N Asela	24	16	8	4	15	67
Gonde	22	82	1	2	7	144
Etaya	66	57	8	-	23	154
Huruta	95	39	24	17	22	197
Lola	<u>13</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>65</u>
total	240	225	48	25	79	617

Source; Henock, K. Investigation on Mechanized Farming and Its Effects... March 1972. Table 1.5, 20

small farmer and tenant participation in CADU credit and tractor services, was conducted (Michael Beyene, 1973, CADU Publication No. 92). The 1970 internal policy barred the participation, in CADU credit services, of landowners cultivating more than 25 has. and tenants cultivating more than 40 has. (Michael Beyene, 1973, 3). This was very important for the survival of the remaining tenants and poor peasants. An earlier study had revealed that at least 51% of poor farmers were indebted to traditional informal money lenders who charged up to 70% in interest alone (Minor Research Task No. 3 cited in Michael Beyene, 1973, 2).

Tenants and poor peasants who owed such credits and government taxes were unable to compete with the more richly endowed ones enjoying new advantages to purchase modern technologies and investment in farm improvements at subsidized rates. This could partially explain the large exodus of poor farmers out of the project region besides the forced eviction.

Table 10 Credit Distribution by Farmer Status.
1971/72-72/73

Category	No.	As % of total	amount of credit (Eth.\$)
Tenant	5,486	38.6	547,625
Landowners			
1-10 has.	8,208	58.5	812,441
11-20 "	388	2.5	63,980
21-40 "	<u>82</u>	<u>.4</u>	<u>18,931</u>
Total	14,164	100.	1,442,977

Source: Michael Beyene, An Analysis of CADU Credit Programme 1971/72-1972/73. CADU publication No. 92, Table 1 p. 6.

In 1973, a follow-up study (CADU Publication No. 92) to the CADU's policy shift aiming the credit program in favor of the poorer farmers showed that this policy had produced very visible results. The credit distribution pattern showed a significant increase of participation by tenants and poor land owners as indicated in table 10.

There was a definite shift of emphasis in the allocation of CADU's credit services to favor the poorer farmers. But tremendous damage had already occurred respecting the welfare of the poor and tenant farmer. The enormous energy and vigor of the expanding mechanized farming with the strength of a significant accumulation of capital and the technology that this made available was already set in motion. From here on it was only a matter of time before it swallowed the subsistence family farms with or without CADU's assistance to this sector. This trend was exacerbated by the greed of land owners who wanted to farm or contract out their farm to more profitable commercial farming.

It needs to be parenthetically noted that CADU was not solely to blame or take credit for the rapid mechanization of farming in Ethiopia. During the mid 1960s and early 1970s, a vigorous drive for farm mechanization was occurring in many parts of Ethiopia. Actually, the entire Arsi Province, in one region of which CADU was located, accounted for only 6.5% of the total number of tractors registered for duty-free imported fuel in 1970 (Tecle, 1973, 175). The point is that economic growth in the agriculture sector was occurring quite independent of CADU's intervention. Normal processes of capital accumulation and diffusion of innovation between global and local systems was helping new production ideas and technologies to spread among the more enlightened and affluent populations. The lag was in the peasant sector which was closed off from external information and aid to evaluate its possibilities and participate in the national growth process. In other words, the development challenge was to assist the distribution of development effects to rural communities through their institutional and individual participation in training and education, technology diffusion and general competency building. The data indicates that CADU did not score significant achievement in these sectors. On the other hand, significant portions of the rural population suffered from the unintended effects of CADU intervention.

On the production and economic growth side, CADU scored significant progress, though this still represented relatively low aggregate benefits relative to costs as shown

earlier in table 7. Tables 11 and 12 provide summaries of average incomes estimated for individual farmer categories.

We see overall increases in both aggregate and per capita benefits between 1968-1969 but declining during 1970. This phenomenon is not explained in the study, but probably is a consequence of rising fertilizer costs and declining market prices for agricultural outputs owing to increased supply not matched by demand, both of which were under extensive discussion in Ethiopian planning circles at the time. Discussions pertaining to fertilizer prices in

Table 11 Aggregate Annual Average Benefits by
Category of Farmers (Eth. \$)

Farmers' Category	Average Aggregate Benefits		
	1968	1969	1970
Tenants	2,825	34,639	361,666
Land Owners			
1-10 has.	12,217	177,507	592,209
11-20 has.	15,941	137,973	285,073
21-40 has.	24,239	80,674	142,018
over 40 has.	25,740	169,784	531,052
unknown	<u>1,755</u>	<u>30,877</u>	<u>156,868</u>
Total	82,817	631,455	1,590,939

Constructed from Henock Kifle, An Analysis of the CADU Credit Program 1968/69-1970/71...CADU Publication No. 66, p. 39 Table 22.

particular were lively within CADU also as will be discussed later in this study.

The income increase accruing to tenants between 1968-69 (increase from 183 in 1968 to 258 in 1969) is deceptive in that, depending on tenancy contracts, the landlord claimed one third to one half of the gains (Henock, 1971, CADU

Table 12 Average Per Capita Income by Category of
Farmers and Year (Eth. \$)

Farmers' Category	Per Capita Income by Year		
	1968	1969	1970
Tenants	183	258	235
Land Owners			
1-10 has.	154	405	311
11-20 has.	443	958	646
21-40 has.	1,154	1,222	793
Over 40 has.	1,430	3,144	983
Unknown	103	965	241

Source: Henock Kifle, 1971, CADU Publication No. 66, Table 11.

Publication No. 66, 41). Henock concluded that land distribution problems and tenancy relations "make impossible" equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth (41).

As part of the investigation of the socioeconomic turmoil in CADU's region, it would have been interesting to study how much of the new wealth being generated in the region actually remained there to improve the lives of the people and the condition of rural communities. Unfortunately, there is no available data on this issue. However, we know from popular history that many of the most successful commercial farmers of the region, built their own lives and invested their fortunes not in the project region, but in more fashionable, cosmopolitan centers of the country like Addis Ababa, Nazareth etc. Again, the question arises: How can a region develop and be transformed if much of the wealth generated there flees to other regions for private enjoyment?

Progress in Indigenous Technological Innovations 1970-85

Another indicator of progressive change in rural communities is the attainment by local artisans and semi-skilled craftsmen of new and improved technological competencies to enhance the quality of their tradeable goods and their steady supply. CADU's initial intent was to stimulate indigenous technological innovations. This was restated in the main thrust of the First Progress report noted earlier. Research on indigenous technological innovations continued for a time but soon started to change its character.

Progress Report II (CADU, 1970, Publication No. 52, 46-60) described not only the results of implement design and testing, but also the results of a survey on the situation of craftsmanship and the availability of craftsmen in the project region. The survey found that there were 71 craftsmen making different supplies for farm household and farming activities. Of these 71 craftsmen, 26 were blacksmiths, and 31 were carpenters. The rest were tanners, saddle makers and members of other small trades.

The study also found that only 14 of the 71 craftsmen were literate. It was further revealed that blacksmiths in particular worked in close cooperation with poor farmers notwithstanding the general cultural discrimination against and isolation of craftsmen. Poor farmers and other rural people often volunteered their labour to help the blacksmith accomplish certain tasks vital to the farming community.

All of the tools used by blacksmiths in the production of farm and household implements were produced by themselves. This would indicate the existence of potential not only to manufacture household and farm tools, but also to design and create the hardware used in manufacturing these tools. Carpenters used some tools designed and produced by blacksmiths, further indicating the existence of this possibility to extend indigenous rural technology production to the manufacture of tools used by producers as well as consumers. This is a key economic element in creating interdependence between different craft producers and the rural economy generally. Primitive as they may have been, the production of workshop equipment by the blacksmith offered possibilities for converting them into improved tool manufacturing shops, thereby contributing to the creation of non-farm rural employment and enhancement of rural technological capacity.

The survey also found that the raw materials used by craftsmen, including blacksmiths, were locally available. Blacksmiths used junk iron that traders and customers collected and brought to them for sale or barter with ready made tools. Every piece of iron tool was recycled a number of times through this process. It was also found that imported hand tools used by a significant sector of the farming community increasingly competed with the locally produced tools so that the blacksmiths in particular reported being underemployed during much of the year. The sales and production picture was reported as shown in Table 13:

Other data on production cost, sales price, income of artisans, and their views on the market situation revealed a serious disincentive for improving the various trades and the quality of local products that were so vital to the improved standard of living and productivity of the rural community at large.

The study concluded that while traditional craftsmanship had no earlier opportunities to develop further, it was exposed to international competition in which better quality goods from developed countries commanded much of the present market. Traditional craftsmanship was being squeezed out of existence instead of being helped to grow and develop (59).

Table 13 Production and Sales of Local Tools

Production and sales	Category of Craftsmen blacksmith		carpenters		saddle makers and others	
	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
Sell all produced	13	8	5	9	13	1
Employed full capacity	5	21	-	31	3	10
Willing to make new materials	22	4	29	2	13	1
Willing cooperate with other artisans	23	3	30	1	13	1
Willing be employed in workshop	23	3	31	-	13	1

Source: *Progress Report II. Table 48, 58.*

The study appropriately recommended three measures to help local craftsmanship overcome this double bind; a) training of local artisans in the making and maintenance of improved tools and implements, b) supplying the local artisans with tools and raw materials that can help improve

the quality of their products, and c) recruitment of local artisans to staff small scale industries that must be developed in the project region.

The authors of the report insightfully point to the historical evolution of small scale industries (which formed the basis for larger scale industrialization) from small craft workshops, like those traditionally serving the Chilalo region, all over the developed world. They saw the need to facilitate a parallel development in the project region through CADU's help (60).

In December 1969, the first training program for artisans was organized within CADU's Implements Research Section. Six carpenters were the first to receive training in the use of improved tools and the making of wheelbarrows. These trainees were to go back to their villages and start production of wheelbarrows. They did, and 50 of their wheelbarrows were purchased by CADU and distributed to model farmers for trial use. In May of 1970, a model workshop was established in the Sagure area of the project region at a modest cost of about Eth.\$1,300.

In addition, different artisans trained by CADU were hired on daily wages to produce some of the implements developed and/or tested by the Implements Research Section. The plan was to eventually sell the workshop to the artisans so that they could run it themselves on commercial basis.

The whole effort was carefully planned to inject innovative capacity into the local community and to offer the innovators minimum but essential technical support to launch

improved enterprises closely integrated with the region's production and consumption needs. As these needs grow and change, so would the skills and products of the artisans that must satisfy them.

CADU's implements research efforts could also benefit from this networking between local producers and consumers. Research could be guided by the level of development and production of these workshops which reflect the changing needs and demands. Thus, theoretically at least, the stage seemed well set for an interlinked and mutually reinforcing indigenous technology development process within the rural community.

By 1971, Progress Report III of the Implements Research Section (CADU, 1971 Publication No. 79) stated that the effort to foster rural craftsmanship on a commercial basis was failing as the wheelbarrow production at Sagure was showing (p. 26). The wheelbarrows being manufactured could not be sold. Its sales price of about Eth.\$50 apparently was too high. The Sagure project was, therefore failing and it was recognized that perhaps wheelbarrow production could not be efficiently undertaken at the workshop level. Perhaps larger scale production in which economy of scale could reduce production cost was required.

Interestingly, this report made no further mention of plans to explore alternative levels of workshop organization or the further training of more artisans and the reorganization of local production. Such experimentation would have been justified in view of the minimal cost of the

Sagure experiment. Beyond reporting the Sagure failure, this third report totally abandoned the impressive plans laid out in the second progress report for the expansion and development of local crafts.

Progress Report No. IV in 1974 (CADU Publication No. 96) clearly indicated that implements design, research or trial, and production were now restricted to the Implements Research Unit of CADU's Agricultural Engineering Section. However, the report introduced training of artisans as a new venture with no reference to the impressive earlier beginnings. It introduced the program with a note:

The limit in skill and the lack of variety in products makes many of the present artisans incompetent to exist as craftsmen as the demand for quality and different types of items rises in the near future. To improve the situation, different alternative approaches can be considered, including:-

- a) upgrading the skill of existing artisans
- b) encouraging educated and skilled manpower to settle in rural areas
- c) importing goods produced in developed towns.

It was decided to be in line with CADU's general aims and goals to concentrate on alternative (a) (27).

Accordingly, it was planned to train 40 artisans. But, unlike the first time such a program was attempted, artisans appeared unenthusiased with the training scheme. Only 28 could be recruited for training "due to lack of interested participants" (28). At the end of the training, it was recommended that the two-week training offered to these artisans be extended to include mobile, on-the-job follow up of training. It was also recommended that tools and

equipment, totaling in value about Eth.\$50, and essential raw materials be supplied as starter to each trainee who graduated.

By the time Progress Report V (ARDU Publication No. 14) came out in March 1980, we once again lose total track of any program to help local production of rural tools and implements. It appears that all efforts to help rural crafts development as a vital sector of the rural economic and social transformation was totally abandoned once again.

A careful examination of CADU's program and budget documents reveals that the idea of promoting skills and trade development of the local population through the interlinking of CADU's technical department with mechanisms for local participation, such as the training of artisans, was advocated by lower ranking employees. But their suggestions, though potentially very beneficial and not costly, never enlisted serious attention of senior experts as a viable approach. The lower staff proposals appear most relevant to the local need for farm implements and for creating local supply systems, thereby interlinking different sectors of the rural economy and promoting local inventiveness.

It is striking that CADU's own implement research could not produce implements on sustained basis and adapted for wider farm use. The effort remained at the trial and experimental stages. Why then, were higher level experts not receptive to the suggestions of junior staff within CADU to experiment with means for enhancing local production in quality and quantity? Could it be that only high-technology

and prestigious staff and programs enjoyed priority, irrespective of their immediate relevancy to the uplifting of rural life and peasant production? The answer is a matter of interpretation of the data so far presented.

The revised 1974-75 Budget and Program abolished the concept of implement research and supplanted it with "implement service" (CADU Work Program and Budget, 1974/75, Publication No. 88, 65, 213). Under this system, the staff of implement research and related services was reduced to one middle level Ethiopian staff, and one university student assigned on practicum. The impact of this measure on any prospects for the promotion of rural crafts and technology is self-evident to require any further assertion.

**CADU and National Development Planning, 1967-1974:
Shifting Definition of Problems and Government
Development Goals**

Our analytical model of Social Learning, and CADU's initial development objectives call for iterative and mutually effective interaction as the essential tool for the realization of lasting development trends. Lasting development means locally sustainable, ie. capable of being continued with or without external assistance over time . In what follows, the nature of CADU's interaction with various Ethiopian institutions and the convergence and divergence in their development goals, views, and strategies will be examined. This is because the symmetry between the goals and strategies of the people, the government, and local institutions form part of our paradigmatic concern.

The late 1960's marked a significant strategic shift from industrialization to peasant agriculture as a viable basis for national socioeconomic transformation. The Third Five Year Plan was already in the process of formulation as the CADU Project was being planned and launched. Though limited to a high potential agricultural region, CADU itself was supposed to promote the development of peasant agriculture. There was, therefore, a significant convergence between the development aims and perceptions of CADU and national development planning in many respects. But for both CADU and the government, the involvement of local people and their institutions remained an aside of limited significance.

The Third Five Year Plan (1968), like CADU, stressed the need for land reform, expanding agricultural research, extension work among farmers, and strengthening rural credit markets as well as organizing rural grain and commodity markets. This was seen as key to providing the essential, mutually reinforcing, and stimulating link between farm and non-farm producers. The Plan also emphasized that extensive institutional reforms must be put in place if agrarian development is to occur (188-189), as did CADU. Above all, the Plan recognized that rural development

...problems are numerous and complex and not so much a question of providing the necessary capital or other inputs as of designing policies, specific measures and administrative means which can ...help the peasant farmers (193).

As it was already ascertained, CADU's initial development goals also reflected a broader concern than mere increases in production.

The Third Five Year Plan reflects the tremendous insights Ethiopian planners had gained from their 10 years of experience with central planning. The limits of modernizing and developing the economy and society generally through the expansion of the industrial sector was recognized. The experience of the Second Five Year Plan was that import substitution strategies focused on the development of manufacturing of consumer goods as a key development strategy had failed because the market for the goods produced was so limited. With the peasantry accounting for more than 90 per cent the total population, but living at bare subsistence level, it could not provide the necessary market for manufactures, nor supply surplus raw materials required by the industry sector.

The Third Five Year Plan aimed to redress the ineffectiveness of the previous development strategy. Employment generation and agrarian development became the central themes of development planning during the Third Five Year Plan preparation. It was recognized, however, that the agricultural sector was entangled in a web of problems and constraints including land tenure, farmer illiteracy, paucity of rural technology, and credit and conservative administrative and bureaucratic stranglehold. Rhetorically, the Third Plan sought to address these problems.

Land reform was the major theme of the Plan. Agricultural research aimed at different agroclimatic zones, and cereals were seen as critical and urgent. It also advocated expansion of the agricultural extension system to disseminate agricultural innovations to farmers at the fastest possible rate. Reformed administrative approaches responsive to the diverse challenges of development were extensively discussed as a primary prerequisite of national development. Measures to bring about such reforms were recommended (188-89).

With the exception of land reform, which remained a sensitive issue, the Ministry of Agriculture and major agricultural research centers had already initiated many efforts that addressed the technological dimensions of development as stipulated in the Plan. The Ministry of Agriculture had created different departments to deal with research on improved seed varieties, animal husbandry, crop production and forestry. Other departments covering other dimensions of agricultural and rural development were also created, and their activities were picking up momentum at the field level as the assessment of SIDA reports (1966) indicated.

In addition, there was also the Institute of Agricultural Research of Haile Selassie I University and the Bako Agricultural Experiment stations dealing with agricultural research for different ecological zones. Manpower training, limited as it may have been, was also undertaken by different faculties of the Haile Selassie I University and other

colleges at diploma and degree levels. Young scientists and senior staff in different fields were sent to different European and American universities in particular for advanced training.

The Bako agricultural experiment station was a joint project of the governments of Ethiopia and the Federal Republic of Germany. Its division of labor within the agricultural research network was focused on agronomics of wetter and warmer regions of Ethiopia located between altitudes of 15,000-17,000 meters above sea level (SIDA, 1966, 28).

Virtually all of the research activities undertaken by different organizations had international aid components. FAO, IBRD, and different American universities were active in them to varying degrees. In spite of this, agricultural research was still in its infancy.

The extension system through which research outcomes could be disseminated to farmers was also in a very rudimentary stage of development. Only 10 of the 14 provinces had extension programs. Between them these 10 provinces had only 95 posts for extension workers, and 99 actually employed to serve in the field. (SIDA, 1966, 17-46). The extension service was very sparse indeed when we consider that presumably, much depended on them in the planned modernization of some 4 million farm households (Third Five Year Plan, 1968, 190).

**Divergence and Convergence in the Definition
of Development within the Ethiopian government: Impact
on Program Design**

The Third Five Year Plan contains divergent, even contradictory, views on rural development and its problems. At the level of analysis, there was a clear disparity between the views of planning experts who saw development problems in terms of the complex interaction between backward land ownership, administrative structures, lack of capital, technology, and human capital and that of the imperial circles who defined development problems as intrinsic to the backward and unenterprising nature of the peasantry and its inability to accumulate the necessary capital for investment in farm improvements. This was very evident in the Emperor's inaugural address launching the Third Five Year Plan:

Several factors impede efforts at drastically changing traditional farming practices in the space of a generation. Shortage of capital is one such factor. Rigid traditional outlooks and customs are another (9).

It is appropriate here to define the two power blocs that typically permeated Ethiopian political and socioeconomic life at all levels. The first bloc may be labeled the technocratic block and the second the bureaucratic one. In this context, technocrats were those professionals who were typically university-educated and whose operational doctrines at the work place supported a system of government and administration on rational, technical, and scientific grounds. They advocated rational resource allocation appropriate to the rapid advancement of society into the 20th century. The bureaucrats, on the other

hand, were typically schooled in the traditional religious education and the art of governance in the rigid, autocratic sense. Their doctrine centered on routine administration based on inflexible adherence to bureaucratic rules set for them, and the maintenance of the traditional status quo even under changing conditions. They opposed any change that, they perceived, placed the established system in uncertainty. The conflicting definition of the nature and source of rural underdevelopment emanating from the two sources can be accounted for by their divergent world views.

In contradiction to their stated doctrines on the sources of rural underdevelopment, the Emperor, and by extension, the conservative elements recognized the impressive indigenous development potential displayed by the people in the absence of traditional bureaucratic and land tenure constraints. This implied that their attribution of underdevelopment to peasant characteristics was at best a conscious self-delusion:

On the other hand, the resounding success recently registered by the vast agricultural enterprises being run by a few people at Setit Humera has given a vivid testimony to what our people can achieve through diligence and hard work (9).

A brief excursus may be in order here to explain what this Setit Humera success was. Setit Humera is a region in the Province of Gondar bordering the Republic of the Sudan. It is a flat virgin plain that by the early 1960's was still unclaimed as individual property. Many ordinary Ethiopians who lacked possibilities to compete for the limited urban

employment opportunities started settling and farming there. The most successful crops consisted of oil seeds that were in big demand on the national as well as the international (especially European) market.

Within a few years, these private farmers could attract a large influx of farm labor and save enough capital to expand their farms. Soon farm mechanization had to be introduced to substitute for increasingly scarce labor. The rate of mechanization was considered one of the fastest in the country.

Setit Humera and similar settlements in the Awash River basin of central Ethiopia had significant heuristic value for people-initiated agricultural and agroindustrial development. Similar pockets of development emerged spontaneously in several parts of the country and agricultural life started to become a new and fashionable career trend for many educated young people. People started to open new agricultural frontiers further away from centers of feudal land control and government bureaucracy.

By referring to Setit Humera, therefore, the Emperor actually contradicted his own thesis that traditional practices and lack of peasant enterprise were the main causes of agricultural underdevelopment. Perhaps the struggle of ideologies and divergent definitions of development adopted by the two power blocks within the government accounted for the discrepancy between the planners' perceptive problem analysis and the lopsided program strategy of the Third Plan. In the end, only programs that were not inimical to the

development-underdevelopment assumptions of the bureaucrats who controlled political power and allocation of resources prevailed.

Even when government support was not extended, significant development could occur when land tenure and bureaucratic constraints were eased. In a very real sense, Setit Humera was a clear experiment in what could be achieved by the people, without any cost to the government, when possibilities for free experimentation, individual initiative and creativity exist. Even technical ideas did not have to be delivered through expensive government extension systems. Farmers picked up information and technical ideas freely diffused by word of mouth or through commercial and other mediums for the informal spread of knowledge and information.

It can, therefore, be concluded from the above analysis, that the national development thinking was ambiguous and ambivalent on many issues relating to rural development generally and the development of peasant agriculture specifically. As already mentioned, part of this problem arose from the conceptual and ideological contradictions between the different national power blocs.

Adopting the Strategy of Integrated Rural Development in Selected High Potential Regions

The initial inclination of the Third Five Year Development Plan has already been characterized as favoring gradual transformation of peasant agriculture on a national scale. But it may be worth reinforcing a few points respecting this. The plan had explicitly stated that:

"Only if the mass of peasant farmers improve their productivity can sustained surplus production occur" (27). The plan had further called for the joint commitment and participation of government and the entire people in the task of development (30-31). In its eight-point agenda, which included achievement of efficient government administrative coordination and resource allocation, involvement of the security and military forces in concrete development contributions, and encouragement and promotion of self-help projects (147), the Plan made no reference to integrated or package development projects for selected high potential regions. In fact, it specifically pointed to the potential danger of focusing on resource-endowed regions:

If regional development of Ethiopia...were to be limited to only a few better endowed areas, the process would bypass the majority of Ethiopian farmers now engaged in small-scale, largely subsistence production...Furthermore, the major regional development projects will tend to benefit from existing metropolitan centers where processing activities will continue to be concentrated. In the long term, rapid economic growth cannot be sustained unless the productivity and per income...of(sic) the great mass of the Ethiopian people are significantly increased (Planning Commission, 1968, 365).

Only towards the end of the planning document do we note that such an approach was being accepted and implemented on a ten year experimental basis through CADU, with substantial external assistance (371).

Why was integrated rural development of selected high potential adopted as a development strategy in a limited sense? Bengt Nekby shades some light on this question:

Other assistance agencies, particularly the World Bank (IBRD) and the USAID also advised Ethiopia to give a higher priority to the agricultural sector and recommended the package approach, concentrating on the more promising regions. This idea was also supported by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The Ethiopian Government had not taken any decision on these proposals, but there was a considerable interest in advancing them further (1971, 9).

For the probable reasons of internal struggle between the different national power blocs already referred to earlier, the Third Five Year Plan also attenuated its development strategy through its own resource allocation schedule. This schedule supported preferential fiscal and credit treatment of commercial farming which weakened the competitiveness of peasant agriculture. But this ambivalent and ambiguous prioritization of development activities negated the need for balanced resource allocation favoring peasant agriculture. Table 14 below summarizes the imbalance in resource allocation between commercial and peasant agricultural sectors.

It is clear from this budget allocation that peasant farming received very little government support. There could be no transformation of the peasantry when even the participation of the peasant in the growth and improvement of agriculture was not a priority.

Table 14 Annual Capital and Recurrent Expenditure
projections
for different Agricultural Sector, (million Eth.\$)

Productive Activities (Agriculture)	274	% 59. 2
Commercial farms	209	
multipurpose coops.	30	
peasant farms	35	
Marketing organization	11	2.5
Services and Research	30	6.5
Water resources survey	28	6.00
Forestry and fisheries	<u>18</u>	<u>3.9</u>
Total capital expenditure	361	78.00
Recurring expenses	<u>102</u>	<u>22.00</u>
Total	463.00	100.00

Source; Third Five Year Plan p. 204.

**The Development Goals of the Ethiopian Government;
1967-1974.**

The national development euphoria of the 1950s and 1960s seems to have been guided by somewhat simplistic and optimistic assumptions about the process of economic and social. The general mood was that development is something that could be delivered or denied by government and its state apparatus alone. Through its monopoly of power and control over resources like land, the government depicted itself as the culprit for underdevelopment and the benefactor of what little development did occur. Even after the first coup attempt of 1961 which sought to change the imperial system to a more democratic system of constitutional rule, the government of Emperor Haile Selassie proclaimed itself as the sole pillar of "constructive change" (Ministry of Information, 1968, 26-27). There was, of course, some truth

to this in historical perspective, but the currency of this assertion was at odds with the emerging social reality. Since his rise to power as Negus (king) in 1928 and Emperor in 1930 (Ministry of Information 1968, 27), Haile Selassie I did open the country to foreign contacts, build more schools, hospitals, roads, and other communication infrastructure, all of which were changing Ethiopian society.

Under Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia became the first African country to adopt five year central planning to guide its development (Taddesse K.M 1983, 14). The First Five Year Plan covered the period 1955-1959 (Third Five Year Plan, 1968, 74). This Plan emphasized building of infrastructure. Schools, colleges, technical and vocational training centers, air and ground transport, health services, telecommunication, and other infrastructures were extensively developed at this time. Not only was the emphasis of the first Plan on infrastructural development, it also emphasized high quality in everything that was done. Schools, at all levels, and colleges were set up on the highest possible standards comparable to European (especially British) and American institutions.

Road construction focused on show-case asphalted highways connecting a few economically strategic areas. The airline system was modeled after one of the most efficient and prestigious airlines in the world at the time-the Trans World Airlines- which initiated and trained the Ethiopian Airlines for its present exemplary performance on international scale. Banking, telecommunications, and all other public

undertakings were of the highest quality and efficiency, but publicly owned. This development, however, remained limited to a few fields and benefitted only limited segments of society. It failed to tackle the more massive issues of broad-based rural development in which the people could participate.

Emperor Haile Selassie's credible efforts needed the input of a wider range of visionary and idealist members of the growing intelligentsia. It needed to expand and share the scope of responsibility for development and to transfer some of it to the people. The need for a clear division of labor between the people and government were becoming evident. But the regime remained closed and inimical to any idea of power and responsibility sharing. It increasingly alienated the very groups that could have served it and society well. These groups consisted of university students, young professionals educated abroad and at national institutions of higher learning, teachers and enlightened members of the traditional social strata, as well as the peasantry itself. At the same time, the old regime failed to generate any significant wealth and employment that could allow meaningful participation of significant segments of society to sustain its claim to power and legitimacy. The rift between traditional authority and the new aspirations of a young and restless generation continued to widen and deepen to end only with the collapse of the system during the popular upheaval of 1974.

The contradictions and strains in the relationship between the old and the new were amply reflected in the Third Five Year Plan. Where it could voice dissent, the Plan dwelt on the numerous areas in which the existing system must change in the interest of progress (Third Five Year Plan, 147-149, 153-154). It also challenged high quality and high prestige projects spotting the national landscape, arguing for the need to pursue equitable development through less expensive and lower quality services and infrastructures:

...the building of costly premature roads will be avoided. Effort will be given...to a network of modestly designed secondary, feeder and service- to traffic roads. Particular attention will thus be given to a comprehensive and integrated highway and road networks serving the entire country and its various productive regions (275).

The TFYP had similar views on education, health services, and other sectors.

The Second Five Year Plan had built on the limited achievements of the first and emphasized the creation and expansion of manufacturing (Third Five Year Plan, 19). Most of the capital investment was in this area. Manufacturing output grew by 16% per year even during the early part of the second plan period (Third Five Year Plan, 217).

Though the major focus was on industrial development, (development of light industries in particular), the Second Five Year Plan also stressed the need for improving government policy, building new institutional capacities, such as research and training in areas of direct relevance to rural development (Third Five Year Plan, 181-218). But most

of these recommendations were not met by the end of the plan period. Among other things, the question of land tenure and the tenant question were consistently avoided.

Decentralization of some administrative institutions was also seen as crucial to the task of aligning local administration to the goals of development and sensitive to the needs of people. But this required increasing popular accountability of appointed officials which would have contradicted the Emperor's claim to divine rights of rule and the absolute power of the traditional elite over the people. For all these and other reasons, decentralized administration remained a hope rather than reality.

The second Five Year Plan's emphasis on manufacturing, mining, and electric power generation was constrained by the inability of local purchasing power to stimulate it and generate financial support for its expansion. It was partly for this reason that the emphasis of the Third Five Year Plan shifted to agriculture which provided employment and livelihood for more than 90% of the population (Third Five Year Plan p. 19, 190). Across the board improvements were envisioned for this sector. It was clearly stated that agriculture held the key to the country's development both as a source of surplus and the market for domestic industrial products. In practice, peasant agriculture continued to be neglected as the Third Plan followed the same trend as the previous two and focused on sectors other than peasant agriculture. The strategic adoption of selective regional development was justified on the grounds that;

Modernization of peasant subsistence agriculture in all areas of the country simultaneously is hardly feasible. It would merely mean dilution of effort and of limited resources. But no time should be lost in making a start in strategically selected areas in which good results can soon be seen (193).

The Chilalo region of Arsi province, Wolamo in Sidamo province and the southern live stock region of Borena were the sites first selected for this strategy of selective regional development.

What was the goal of rural or agricultural development that focused on commercial farming and peasant farming in only selected high potential regions? A comprehensive answer to this question may be difficult to find given the complexities, ambiguities and ambivalence that surrounds the choice of these strategies. But some explicit points can be derived from the different planning analyses and justifications given for the adoption of these development strategies.

With respect to commercial farming, the Third Five Year Plan (TFYP) stated that "Ethiopia needs...to expand agricultural exports...to pay for the growing volume of imports demanded by a growing economy" (181). The economy-wide transformation that was to be developed through careful crafting of interdependence between the agricultural, manufacturing and trade sectors seems compromised for the short-term aim of surplus production of marketable goods (181-182). This was justified on the ground that:

The need for a structural transformation does not exclude the possibility for taking measures that will lead to greater

agricultural output in the short run. But in the long term, the fundamental forces which will propel the subsistence farmer away from his traditional ways of life, will have to come from the fact that while the other sectors provide him with attractive possible alternatives ...(182).

It can, therefore, be concluded that the short term objective of development planners in promoting commercial farming and integrated development in selected regions was motivated by the need to generate agricultural surplus for export and domestic markets. The need for export commodities was technically and ethically justified on the ground that the growing national economy needed imported technology and production inputs. Commercial farming was, therefore, allocated 76% of the agricultural budget, peasant farming 13% and the remaining budget was shared between all other agricultural services (204). More importantly, in the short run, development was defined as agricultural growth.

Program content of Government Support for Agricultural Development

Broadly, five types of support for the agricultural sector are evident in the planning document: 1) capital loans to commercial farming, 2) government operation of state farms and large-scale ranches, 3) development of agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation, marketing, and different types of rural cooperatives, 4) capital loans for purchase of farm inputs, technology, and credit, and 5) research and extension (Third Five Year Plan p. 204-205).

It is safe to assume that who ever wished to invest in farm improvement had access to credit facilities. Inevitably, it is the wealthier farmers who aspire to improve

their operations having met their basic needs. The poor peasant is usually engaged in the struggle for survival and is not likely to consider the risk of investment in farm improvements that may or may not produce subsistence, let alone profit or improved security owing to the natural variabilities and risks in agriculture.

Therefore, the small amount (13%) earmarked by government for improvement of peasant agriculture was intended to boost peasant production by able farmers and not to promote the participation of poor farmers who constituted the vast majority, in self-improvement and national socioeconomic transformation. The type and composition of support programs were consistent with the TFYP's short run policy objectives of boosting agricultural production. The objective of a more broadly based rural transformation was not on the agenda.

The Role and Participation of the People in Development

From the discussion so far, two contradictory tendencies seem evident in the perception and practice of development by national planning technocrats. Planning rhetoric supported the notion of development through broad participation of the people. In practice, development strategy and programs focused on limited participation which selected against the mass of the peasantry. In all circumstances, there was no sign of planning input involving the people or their felt needs, suggesting that the role of the people was largely seen as one of conforming to technocratic development edicts. Given the international development thinking that

was similarly oriented, can it be surprising that Ethiopian technocrats compromised their vision of development as one that could be alternatively attained through the work of emancipated and competent technocrats alone?

Lord Bauer (1984, 28) summarizes the fundamental assumptions behind expert and capital driven development strategies,

General backwardness, economic unresponsiveness, and lack of enterprise are...universal within the less developed world. Therefore, if significant economic advance is to be achieved, governments have an indispensable as well as a comprehensive role in carrying through the critical and large-scale changes necessary to break down the formidable obstacles to growth, and to initiate and sustain the growth process.

Decades of observation and study of development programs in the Third World guided by such an assumption have convinced him that this premise has been erroneous if not dangerous for development;

...comprehensive central planning was certainly not necessary for economic advance; it was much more likely to retard it. It did not augment resources, but only diverted them from other public and private uses. It reinforced the authoritarian tradition prevailing in many LDCs (42)

Bauer is also critical of international development aid itself:

It was not indispensable for the progress of poor countries...it often served to underwrite and prolong extremely damaging policies commonly pursued in the name of comprehensive planning (42).

While there is significant empirical evidence supporting Bauer's statement, it is debatable whether the experience is generalizable to all cases and types of development aid.

By the end of the Third Five Year Plan, Ethiopian planners were still oriented toward central planning but had indeed learned significant lessons about the limitations of their strategy. Some form of development was taking place in the country, but virtually all of it was outside the realm of their planning. Within the stringent constraints of the Ethiopian socio-political, financial and technological environment, a number of private and spontaneous indigenous development initiatives beyond the purely individual and entrepreneurial ones discussed earlier were emerging. Many of these initiatives were regionally organized, and started by groups interested in promoting regional self-development. Informal and indigenous self-help institutions started to mushroom. Hailu Abatena, (1988) provides insightful typologies and analysis of the functions of different self-help and development associations that were emerging around the country.

Many of these indigenous groups and associations undertook development initiatives and ambitious programs such as the building of regional road infrastructure and the development of transport systems, water supply systems, and numerous other projects focused on serving the common good. These initiatives were later to inspire the strategic analysis and national development planning attitudes, at

least in rhetoric, to follow rather than lead the people in development (Planning Commission Office, 1973).

It must be noted that the manifest strategies and programs of the Third Five Year Plan actually represented a considerable moderation of the stringent economic criteria for prioritizing development programs and regions recommended by a panel of national experts. Before the actual formulation of the Third Plan was launched, a national task force was established to study ways and means in which different regions of the country could participate in national development. In 1967, this task force produced a multi-volume work titled Regional Aspects of National Planning in Ethiopia (Taddesse K.M., 1983). The work compiled and analyzed massive demographic data, distribution of natural resources, geographical barriers and advantages to various types of development undertakings in different regions etc.

The task force had made a general recommendation that economic criteria alone serve as the pre-eminent consideration for initiating regional development plans (Taddesse K.M., 1983, 16). But the TFYP did not accept this recommendation in its totality. In fact, it is not clear how much planning was influenced by this recommendation. On the whole, planning rhetoric continued to favor broad-based and equitable development favoring as wide a coverage of the country as possible though practice diverged from this rhetoric considerably.

The Plan reiterated that development must have two objectives. The first objective must be the maximization of economic growth and productivity. The second objective should be the redressing of gross distributional disparities in economic development (TFYP, 364). It was argued that in the case of Ethiopia's underdeveloped economy, these two objectives could be contradictory, unless conscious measures were in place to ensure regional equity.

Historically, regional disparities in Ethiopia arising from different agricultural resource endowments were always evident. These disparities were minimal when only traditional labor and natural factor endowments played important roles. In a fundamentally agricultural nation, this had meant that regions with good soil, irrigable land, and rivers to water the fields had fared better than others lacking in these assets. But when improved technologies, capital and other inputs were also biased towards those same advantaged regions, disparities would widen.

The conclusion of the Third Plan had only a few phantoms of development to edify it. Already established programs such as road construction and expansion of the educational infrastructure continued. CADU and several similar projects (Wolamo Sodo Agricultural Development, and different live stock projects in the south) were established. But these remained expensive, generally externally driven projects with little impact on the fundamental logic and level of indigenous production.

The Strategy Outline for the Fourth Five Year Plan

(1974/75-1978/79) (Planning Commission Office, 1973) generally characterized the CADU type package programs, (in fact CADU was named) as having generated useful but limited innovations primarily in improved seed production and extension services. The Strategy Outline was clearly unimpressed with its other aspects. CADU's approach was viewed as too expensive for replication in other regions (Planning Commission Office, 1973, III, 1). The Fourth Five Year Plan, it was argued, should abandon CADU's approach to development and rely on the burgeoning grassroots-initiated development efforts and other indigenous and religious organizations whose involvement in development were picking momentum (I, 3, I, 10-15, III, 1-4, IV, 3).

New designs of labor-intensive rural public works and settlement programs were also seen as crucial for promoting equitable development. The new development goal would be the achievement of twin development objectives-the growth of total output and the equitable regional distribution of this growth and its benefits (II, 1-3). It was unequivocally stated that in Ethiopia's case, the two objectives were totally compatible and did not compete with each other (II,1). This approach was also compatible with the opportunities and advantage provided by the popularly based development movements or institution formation for government development intervention.

Once more, planning rhetoric was incisive and well informed by empirical trends. If previous inconsistencies

between analytical insights and actual program measures serve as caveat, however, the ultimate success of the Fourth Plan may have been no different from the first three plans. But there appeared greater resolve to shift from bureaucratic reliance for resource allocation and guiding development to working with and through indigenous institutions. This was a remarkable innovation not evident in the Third Five Year Plan. Yet, this may not refute all stipulations that the ultimate program design of the Fourth Five Year Plan may have, in practice, degenerated into a bureaucratic exercise of abstract logic. This can never be resolved since the Fourth Five Year Plan barely left the drawing board when the 1974 civil unrest culminated in the overthrow of the old government and scrapped the planning efforts.

CADU and Local Participation at Different Levels

Participation in project activities by the Ethiopian side must be categorized into different sectors. In this section, a brief description and discussions of project participation by different elements of government bureaucracy and local administration, women, youth and rural society in general will be presented.

Participation by Different Government Offices and Officials

In the background section of this study, we noted that CADU was the brainchild of Swedish experts with intense interest to assist and participate in Ethiopia's development. Project documents show that efforts were made to keep the Ethiopian side abreast with project developments from the

beginning. To every request and proposal, the reaction of the Ethiopian side was a hurried compliance and endorsement rather than careful scrutiny and interested participation.

By design, CADU was set up as a totally autonomous project with very limited links with relevant government ministries and organizations. Throughout CADU's operation during 1967-1974, a precipitous gap existed between the Project and national as well as local government institutions. Cohen (1987) relates the tension, contradiction, conflict, and competition that plagued CADU's relations with the Ministry of Agriculture, (151), with the Ministry of Community Development and Social Affairs (116-118), and other government organizations (116-117). Betru Gebregziabher (1975) discusses similar problems at the local as well as central government levels.

The idea of making CADU operationally autonomous emerged largely from a felt need to protect it from layers and layers of inefficient and corrupt government bureaucracies that stretched from the national to the local level. But while autonomy provided the freedom of efficient resource and financial allocation, program flexibility and program execution within the project, it insulated project activities from making development and transformative impact on official institutions. Yet, if any lasting development is to occur, these institutions, among other things, needed to change, modernize, become more efficient and serve the needs of local development.

The local bureaucrats, clergy, merchants, courts, and traditional leaders who were alienated from CADU's development programs felt threatened by CADU and they struck back by spreading false rumors, obstructing project programs, and being outright hostile to CADU (Gebregziabher 1975, 34-35). CADU's annual reports also reflect this tension between itself and different power strata in the Chilalo region (CADU Annual Report 1969/70, Publication No. 51, 2-3, Annual Report 1970/71 Publication No. 65, 5-6, Report for the period 8.7.70-15.11.70 Publication No. 54, vi). Not all the people were affectionate towards CADU either. Those negatively affected in one way or another naturally resented it.

The Interministerial Committee set up to work with CADU met rather regularly. By November 1969, five meetings were held between CADU executives and ministerial representatives (CADU Annual Report 1969/70, Publication No. 51, 2). The Committee reviewed CADU's proposed Programs and apparently ensured timely contribution of Ethiopian counterpart funds to the Project. Otherwise, a significant level of apathy towards Project activity on the part of the Committee is evident.

All initiatives seem to be taken by CADU and these initiatives implied decisive actions on land reform, rules for tenant-landlord relationships and other issues. There was evidently very little action on these from the government side. It seems that from time to time, such inaction drove the Swedish sponsors of CADU (SIDA) to extreme frustration that put their participation in the project at risk.

Government inaction and apathy towards land reform and other measures deemed essential by the Swedish party during the whole period of 1967-70, for example, prompted SIDA to call for curtailment of the 1970/71 program to a half year operation with the implication that if nothing changed during that time, the project could be suspended. The project staff had to work hard to adjust the one year program to a half-year operation with all the uncertainty that accompanies such decisions (CADU Annual Report 1969/70, Publication No. 51, 4).

From the different data on the role of the local bureaucracy and government institutions in general, one gets the impression that CADU operated as an isolated island with selective and limited interaction with the peasantry, and a rather limited contact with technocratic circles. Its relation with the local power system was rocky and generally hostile as already documented above.

Participation of Rural Women

Token programs for women were included, in CADU's operations from the project's earliest days. Project activities for the incorporation of women into rural development remained rather insignificant throughout the life of CADU/ARDU. (Hanna, 1975, Alopaeus-Stahl, 1989). We will take a brief look at the nature and content of these programs and their impact on Women's role in development.

In 1968 a modest program for training of rural women was initiated (Hanna 1975, CADU Publication No. 107, 10). A small group of women was organized in each of the six districts in the project area. The purpose was to include

women in rural development efforts and to enhance their and their family's adjustment to a more modern way of life, assumed to result quickly and spontaneously from CADU's program intervention (Hanna, 1975, 9). But the meaning and practical application of programs to achieve this very broad goal remained confused and obscure throughout most of CADU's history. The program of guiding women to adjust to a new way of life in a modernized economy was in fact a very irrelevant program concept in view of the fact that the economic status of the peasant community never changed significantly.

In 1968, the women's program was staffed by only one Ethiopian and one Swede. To make do with this and other constraints, these two women devised program strategies whereby they would train a few women from relatively urbanized areas of the project region. These women were then to act as volunteers to instruct the more rural women in different aspects of family and home management as well as personal and environmental hygiene. It turned out that even this well intended but limited program brought with it unforeseen problems.

The training received by the more urbanized women only enhanced their superiority complex over rural women owing to their perceived sophistication and emancipation. The urbanized women started to manifest condescending attitudes towards the rural women thereby alienating, offending, and driving them away from the program (10-11).

Even without this human problem, the women's program assumed no importance and commanded no resources that would

make it commensurate with any meaningful goals. Essentially, women's programs, which started out on very weak footing, quickly further degenerated into traditional home economic classes that emphasized the care and making of clothes for the family, child care, and vegetable gardening (11-13). Without minimizing the importance of all of these activities to family life, such measures could not lead to the economic, social, and cultural emancipation of women and their meaningful participation in rural development and its benefits. It is only such a participation that would give them independent status and an identity that would make them count in the socioeconomic and cultural fabric of rural society.

The women's program in general lacked a coherent and consistent set of practical and well-designed means for achieving the enabling goals that were needed. Here is what a researcher evaluating the women's program during 1968-70 had to say:

It appears as though the staff neither had specific operational goals nor were they clear on the means for the achievement of their goals. The Unit's operation...appears to be generally haphazard.
(Hanna, 1975, 18).

This observation is substantiated by reports on the subject in CADU's Annual Reports for various years. Rhetorically, some vague but lofty statements would be made. These would then be contradicted by feeble and ill directed programs. The gap between broad statement of goals and actual practice appears ubiquitous in field programs. In

this connection, the Annual Report for 1968/69 (CADU Publication No. 34, 98) states that,

overwhelming support should be given to the women in rural areas in order to support and supplement the agricultural extension program.

But it gives no concrete solution to this problem. Rather it repeats the broad steps that must be taken in the future without specific assessment of past program successes and failures and reflection on how to better structure these programs.

As already recognized above, budget and staff allocations never reflected CADU's rhetoric with regards to women's programs. The report for the period 8.7.70-15.11.70, (Publication No. 54), the semi-annual report for 1968/69 (Publication No. 23) and other documents reflect the marginal status for the women's programs and the state of confusion that characterize it at each stage of project programming and each effort to restructure it.

A study on the subject already referred to earlier (Hanna, 1975) concluded that,

With each stage of its (Home Economics Unit handling the women's program), development, there resulted goal formations and reorganization of methodology...However, the proper outlook of regarding Home Economics within the context of the Social Development aims of CADU was not achieved because the operational goals for Social Development were not formulated until recently (Part IV, 81).

The revolution of 1974 set in before a meaningful reorganization and reorientation of the women's program could be realized.

Participation of Youth

Arsi Province was perhaps unique in the official perception of the role of youth in rural society. A 1966-67 study (Lexander 1968) found that the different government administrative units in the region relied on traditional youth groups referred to as "Golmassas" for purposes of law enforcement and other functions. The regional administration facilitated, even ordered, the organization of Golmassas to help ensure local security and public safety. The region apparently had banditry problems resulting from Somali insurgency and instigation. The Golmassas not only helped to control roving bandits and petty criminals in communities, but also gathered information on "anti- social" elements, real or perceived, budding in the community (20). This included scouting villages for any information about any stranger entering their district.

CADU also organized youth groups. But unlike the traditional organization and participation of youth in rural life, which had specific roles and objectives, CADU's youth programs lacked specificity of goals and consistent and coherent program strategies. Throughout most of CADU's earlier period, youth programs were ad hoc and often limited to recreational programs.

The first significant and large-scale involvement of youth in local affairs was achieved during the 1974 drive to mobilize all youth for massive reorganization of rural and urban society. In the Chilalo region, 98 youth groups with a membership of 2,592 were organized (CADU Annual Report 1973-

74, 1976, ARDU Publication No. 5, 32). Later reports also mention organizations with little information on their specific development functions (ARDU Annual Report 1978/79, Publication No. 15, 10, Annual report 1979/80, publication No. 17, 1, 14). Generally the organization and mobilization of youth had socialist ideological agitation and revolutionary tasks rather than development participation beginning with the 1974 revolution.

Participation of the Rural Population in general

The preceding analysis of various programs indicates a distinctive direction in the people's participation in project activities. The people were generally marginal to what was being done, except for the farmers who participated passively by adopting CADU generated or recommended agricultural innovations and practices.

The above analysis also suggests which programs always carried the heaviest weight in CADU's range of priorities. Clearly high level scientific research in animal and plant breeding and fertilizer testing on crops and animal fodder enjoyed high priority. Marketing and extension followed. Participation and learning by the people scored very low. Participation in particular was very limited. This is manifest, among others, in the strategy of mass meetings conducted for the purpose of acquainting the population with CADU's aims and achievements, its credit program, model lease programs between tenants and landlords, women's' extension programs and other project matters (CADU Annual Report 1969/70, Publication 51). If CADU's relationship with

various sectors of rural society was significant, mass meetings to cultivate familiarity with its programs would have been unnecessary.

In the report cited above, it is clearly stated that many hostilities were expressed by different groups present at the mass meeting towards CADU's different programs. The local bureaucrats who had become part-time farmers were hostile to CADU because of the restraint CADU placed on their access to credit and other project facilities. Local merchant groups were hostile because of CADU's intervention in local markets; the clergy, other local leaders and administrators were hostile because they felt that CADU's influence was eroding their authority among the peasant farmers, and so on.

In general, active learning and teaching contacts between CADU and the people were very limited. While much effort and resource was expended to help the farming community improve its techniques of production and income, ways were not discovered for involvement on an enduring and active basis in the prioritizing of needs, planning, devising relevant and needed programs etc.

Early in its operation CADU evidently gave up its goal of transforming rural society through teaching and enabling programs. Perhaps this was due to the absence of well-formulated program strategies of social development that it could adopt or institute. Technical programs of research, experimentation, and demonstration as well as market development were familiar to the experts so that they could implement those with vigor and enthusiasm. Yet, it would

have been the sociocultural and institutional mobilization and renovation resulting from popular involvement and participation in all levels of project activities, that would have revealed the intricate web of constraints holding back development. Such a discovery would have been vital to the understanding of the equally intricate possibilities that may have existed within the community and society at large for undoing these constraints and for installing enduring development tendencies.

The pattern of the project's taking all initiatives and commanding all activities was so firmly established that even programs that could be clearly amenable to community participation and management, like the construction of earthen dams, (Carl-Gosta & Wenner, 1973, CADU Publication No. 91) were planned and executed by experts with the participation of the local people solely as hired labor. Apparently, the project attracted so much interest that the local people came to talk to the laborers for extended periods during the day, stepping on the carefully stacked soil and stone structures and making them slide out of place inadvertently. The situation so annoyed the expert that the people were ordered not to come and disturb the project.

If teaching and working with the people had been valued, this situation would clearly be viewed as presenting golden opportunities to involve and educate the local people on the benefits of such simple structures and their techniques. In fact, experts could have even benefitted much from the experiences of local (traditional) water conservation

practices and why the idea of earth dams were not thought of in the area. In near by areas like Shenkora region of Shoa Province known to this researcher, local communities traditionally constructed and maintained community water reservoirs that supplied designated areas with water year round. Each user was required to volunteer labor and services needed to clean, maintain, and guard the water supply. The traditional institutional controls and management of the water conservation and distribution system were built into the local social structure so that people knew what the requirements for the continued sharing of water were and complied. In this connection, one asks the question, how would the expert-constructed earthen dams be maintained over the years once the aid experts are gone? Who assumes the responsibility for them?

Without minimizing the influence of CADU in popularizing modern agricultural inputs and practices in the project region, one is forced to ask whether this goal, as a major project preoccupation, warranted so much of investment in time and resources. Farmers did and could pick up much technical information through informal channels. The farmers of Chilalo region across educational and economic status lines have been known to be receptive to ideas that would improve their farming and standard of living by CADU's Preliminary report for 1967-1970, Aregay Waktola, (1975), Paulos Abraham (1989). Aregay found a very weak relationship (a correlation coefficient of less than $R = .56$) between

farmers' socioeconomic status and adoption of agricultural innovations (180-164).

Before we close this section, one more event that typified project attitudes towards people's participation and development initiatives may be mentioned. A number of communities had actually initiated self-help road construction projects. Perhaps they were inspired by CADU's road construction programs. It is reported that though CADU endeavored to respond to their call for some technical assistance, there were a number of problems that stood in the way of full CADU cooperation with such initiatives. First, CADU could not accommodate most of the requests because it had not yet formulated detailed policy, priority, and schedule for implementation of self-help projects. Secondly, CADU's operational structure needed to adjust itself to this new demand to work with communities and their priority projects. Thirdly, CADU's road construction services were too busy with its own "complex and vital" penetration roads. Other reasons were provided for not being partners in community initiated projects such as roads. (CADU Annual report 1973/74, Dec. 1976 ARDU Publication No. 5, 33-35)

CADU executives and experts, both national and expatriate, clearly missed golden opportunities to encourage and support local commitment to regional development which would have reduced financial and other burdens of development on the project and provided continuity. More importantly, they failed to adequately encourage the natural process of

genuine development which originated with the people and their felt needs.

The reasons for this can be many and complex requiring highly specified, theoretical and disciplinary analysis. Among these, the typical behavior of bureaucratic organizations is paramount. We know that organizations respond to their own internal logic and perceived benefits, and the status, roles, and interests of its members rather than the objective goals set for it and the interest of the broader community which it is supposed to serve. Organizations respond to their internal interest rather than the interest of entities and goals that caused their creation in the first place. This is evident everywhere.

Clearly, the indication is that no meaningful development can occur through the delegation of development tasks to bureaucratic machineries. As we defined it, development results from subjective human and social action on the physical environment to derive improved well-being for individuals and communities. This takes many complex and gradually evolving systems which makes development a phenomenon that can only be engineered by the people in ways that can not be accurately predicted and understood in advance. Each social and cultural environment typically evolves unique ways for dealing with problems consistent with its experiences, values, and the inner logic of its society. No one can achieve this for it. Only the particular society or community can.

This is why a social learning metaphor of development becomes compelling. External assistance has a tremendous role to play in enabling societies and communities to materially, culturally and technologically deal with their problems. But aid must be perceived as an enabling instrument. Any other perception of aid is not likely to leave any lasting development behind it. Adopting an enabling role for external assistance may require a significant departure from the conventional top-down project structure eschewing close interaction with and accountability to local people and institutions. We will return to this issue in our concluding chapter.

Part II

CADU and The Post 1974 Period: Revisioning The Rural Development Agenda, 1975-1985

Brief Background

1974 marks the end of the old feudal order in Ethiopia. By late 1974, the deepening crises imposed on the old order by the new aspirations of Ethiopian society had caused an irreversible rupture of the imperial system. The rural land ownership issue was one of the factors that had plagued the old order's attempt to patch up its ineptitudes and continue.

The first attempted coup back in 1961 had the land tenure question as one of the centers of popular grievances it set out to redress. The failure of that coup intensified rather than weaken the growing consciousness of the fundamental injustices and imbalances in the society. This was particularly the case in the social and economic position of peasants who farmed the land and landlords who extracted most of the benefits of peasant effort. University students and the intelligentsia generally became increasingly resentful of the system and alienated themselves from its core values and assumptions of the unquestioned authority of the monarch and the sanctity of the established conservative traditions.

The personal charisma and his earlier modernizing influences placed the Emperor himself in a reverent position with the people. He could have, therefore, gained more popularity from reforms much sought by the growing "educated classes". But, he remained ambivalent to popular sentiment and pushed increasing numbers of people into opposing him. As he grew older, he seemed increasingly alienated from the very class of people who could have been his strongest source of new legitimacy. He was increasingly and more tightly encircled by traditional and opportunistic groups who felt threatened by any loosening and democratizing of the system even as the vocal and increasingly militant students and young intelligentsia started to escalate their theses from reform to radical and ideological revolution that would root out the old system once and for all.

It is not our purpose here to give a full account of the historical sources of the 1974 popular unrest which developed into a revolution. We only need to recognize the general context preceding the advent and to understand the socio-political and structural system it gave rise to. By late 1974, social upheavals in the form of student riots, demonstrations, over, among other things, the hidden famine in the northern provinces escalated. Labor strikes, by industries, transportation workers, and taxi cab owners (responding to very modest increases in the price of imported petroleum) exacerbated by persistent demonstrations brought the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie to total and unexpected chaos.

The cabinet resigned shortly after and an obscure group of junior military officers started to maneuver and manipulate the situation and to make bold political postures. By September 1975, the aging Emperor (over age 85) was deposed. The military group acted as king-maker and watchdog for a time, installing two civilian prime ministers, each for short periods of time, in succession. One of the Prime ministers was jailed and later executed along with Haile Selassie's entire cabinet and some of his family. The military took power with no apologies but with a promise to hand over power to civilian rule in the shortest possible time.

The twists and turns of history and of political intrigue, often deceptive and equally often cruel and uncompromising, landed the country in the hands of, perhaps

enthusiastic, but certainly markedly unenlightened dictatorship which elaborated legitimizing marxist-leninist slogans to cover itself against all legitimate opposition and moral challenge. The full story of what followed cannot be told short of several volumes. The important note here is that all the political maneuvers centered around claims of selfless devotion to the restructuring of the old oppressive system which had alienated and embittered almost the entire country. The promises of a new order that would nurture the best attributes in Ethiopian society, liberate the mind, and society's institutional systems for rapid development of the country, were high in government rhetoric and propaganda but demonstrably empty of sincerity and content.

CADU and the New Development Environment: New Definition of Development, 1975-1985

Tenant and landlord relation had been perceived as the single major obstacle to CADU's success in transforming its rural setting through the application of production enhancing techniques (Stahl, 1975, Cohen, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1987). With the new land reform acts of the new government, development problems were assumed manageable through massive organization of peasant labor and resources. Development was, therefore, redefined in terms of the need to organize agriculture on larger scales. Small scale peasant farming was considered inefficient and backward even under autonomous land holdings.

Accordingly, CADU was transformed into its third phase and became ARDU (Arsi Rural Development Unit) in 1976 (Plan

and Budget for 1976-80 ARDU Publication No. 1). The project now became province wide rather than being restricted to one region of the province. Its main task became the organization of the peasantry into farmer cooperatives and collectives, the execution of other socialist edicts, and the distribution of what agricultural inputs and credit existed to and through these peasant organizations.

ARDU's work plan started with evaluation and critique of CADU's performance. The first project plan issued by ARDU reflected on the successes and shortcomings of CADU's first seven years of development effort. It recognized that the project's greatest success was in agricultural research. High yield seed varieties were successfully developed, cattle were successfully cross-bred for milk and beef production, pasture grass varieties with high forage yield were developed. The productivity of the project region was significantly increased through the application of these technological innovations and imported green revolution inputs.

ARDU's new plan contrasted these achievements in economic growth with CADU's low achievement of broad-based development. It stated that CADU could not achieve rural transformation as successfully as it achieved technical innovations primarily because a very large segment of the rural population consisted of poor peasants and tenants who were not able to participate in CADU's development benefits. These groups would now be enabled to participate fully as

organized members of peasant associations and cooperatives (1-9).

ARDU's Program Strategies

While ARDU's primary program contents (diffusion of green revolution technology inputs backed by road and other infrastructure building) remained the same as CADU's, its strategies were, nevertheless, declared to be differently constructed. If there was any strategic difference between the two phases of the project, it was only in the delivery of farm technology innovations to organized peasant associations and cooperatives by ARDU extension agents rather than the former use of model farmers to disseminate innovations to individual farmers. ARDU declared that this would facilitate the delivery of the whole development package directly to "...the broad masses at the lowest...cost and in the shortest possible time" (ARDU Publication No. 1, 14). ARDU would also promote a "self-reliant cooperative community instead of being limited to only increasing individual economic...productivity (14). It was suggested that the Project's unit of development will be producer cooperatives and peasant associations. The government was vigorously pursuing ways and means of controlling and appropriating peasant production. ARDU's strategy made its development objective similar to and compatible with that of the government's strategy and objectives. Both were fundamentally against individual economic and social choice.

Once again, a development metaphor of large-scale, mechanical organization of production as the engine that

would propel agrarian society towards "modernity" and efficient productivity, missed the essence and nature of socioeconomic development. The new system consciously denied that development is a human and social-structural phenomenon emerging from individual and collective learning and free human will supported by institutional and social environments rooted in freely shared goals and values. Development was instead understood as an ideologically engineered process impelled by coercive force and perennial threat of state violence against people.

It must be mentioned that the staff of the project was virtually totally Ethiopian since shortly after 1974. If any expatriates were present, they were certainly far removed from policy and program design.

Program Implementation and Emergent Problems

The annual report for 1975-76 (ARDU Publication No. 7) records a phenomenal scale of organization of farmers into peasant associations. Some 582 peasant associations were organized. The numerical increase in the participation of peasants in CADU development programs like credit and acquisition of improved seeds and fertilizer purchase was also impressive as shown in table 15.

The report pointed out that these achievements were realized in the face of violent conflicts that had erupted between project staff in April-May of 1976. There was vigorous ideological struggle going on between various groups and for a time it looked as though the

Table 15. Volume of Credit, Improved Seeds and Fertilizer Distributed through Farmer Cooperatives by Year

Year	No. of Credits	Improved seed(use)	Fertilizer (used)
1974/75	48,000	20,000 qts.	12.000 qts.
1975/76	57,000	70,000 "	59,700 "

Source; ARDU annual report for 1975-76. p.2

very continuation of the project was in serious question (4). It was also revealed that persistent efforts at harmonizing the various interest and ideological camps prevailed so that major project activities could be continued.

While the mechanical aspects of the project executed by professional staff (ie. diffusion of green revolution technologies, organization of peasant associations, purchase of farm surplus, etc.) were conducted with reasonable success, no comparable achievement could be realized in any of the programs labeled as "social development." The reason given was the "lack of well defined goals and activities as regards social development" (37). This ought to have made it clear that the process of development was far beyond the reach of the structured project intervention through which ARDU purported to bring it about.

Subsequent reports confirm the consistent subsiding of the project into a bureaucracy-centered operation driven by professional bureaucrats and technology routinely applied on local communities from top down. Any element of people's participation was generally limited to coerced compliance to

official policies of mass organization and alienation of peasant labor at command of political authorities. Thus, most farmers wished autonomy but joined peasant associations and cooperatives because this was a legal requirement for survival. A 1985 survey revealed many striking incidents that demonstrate the wide rift between peasant wishes and what was happening to please government policies and programs. Table 16 shows that as the region was being aggregated into coercive peasant organizations, the peasants retained their personal preference for autonomy and individual farm holding.

Table 16. Farmer Preference for Autonomy
or Joining Peasant Cooperatives

Preference	Number of Farmers	% of total
Prefer small holder status within PAs	112	75
May eventually like to join peasant coops.	<u>38</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	150	100

Source: Alemneh Dejene, Smallholder perceptions of Rural Development and Emerging Institutions in Arsi Region Since the Ethiopian Revolution. Table 106, p. 167. Development Discussion Paper 192, March 1985. Harvard Institute for International Development.

By 1985, most of the farmers were organized into cooperatives in spite of their wish to remain autonomous farmers. Further analysis of the survey data by the above

cited researcher indicates that of the 38 peasants in table 16 who said that they would eventually like to join cooperatives, 6 or 15 % said that their preference was due to their lack of plow oxen. By joining cooperatives, they hoped to have access to the oxen of other members who owned them. 9, or 24% would join to benefit from government assistance and the rest had some minor utilitarian reasons, all related to government control of land and other production resources made available only through cooperative (Table 108 , 170).

The same study found that, contrary to the planning deliberation of involving the farmers in their development creatively and actively, ARDU's working contact with them was not all that different from that of CADU (51).

The Participation of the farmers is clearly intentionally limited to being organizationally manipulated and moved around at government will. The 1978/79 annual report (ARDU Publication No. 15) makes this very clear. The highlights of the report focus on the organization of service cooperatives and peasant associations with farm implement production coming next in importance. A total of 1,120 peasant associations and 144 service cooperatives were organized (10). Credit, fertilizer and improved seeds distribution had levelled at the 1975/76 level. It is noteworthy that ARDU had all but abandoned serious work with the development of rural crafts and the rural artisans. By 1976, it seems to be urged into reluctantly adopting the new concept of rural skills centers which was developed by an

interministerial committee beginning in 1975 (Ministry of Education, 1979, 4).

The rural skills center idea was innovated by the Adult Education Department of the Ministry of Education. Its design and articulation of goals took shape through an interministerial technical committee on which this author had the honor of being a participant for a number of years. The idea of the rural skills centers was to offer an effective but inexpensive medium for the infusion of all kinds of technological, social, cultural and organizational etc. training into rural communities. The centers would be inexpensively built by the rural population from local materials with the technical assistance from relevant government departments. They would be fitted out with all essential facilities for men, women, and children who would stay there for a given time during appropriate months of the year when the rural people could take time off from farm activities to benefit from skills training and education to enhance their over-all competency and quality of life. Different technical agencies of government would use the skills center facilities at different times and for different audiences.

By design, the skills centers were a very versatile and economical network of appropriate set ups that could be used to reach the rural people for all kinds of informal educational, developmental, health and vocational instructions. The most important feature of the skills center concept was that people participated directly in its

creation and services. Their introduction into the ARDU region where innovative rural development ideas were supposed to originate is in itself very telling of the extent of ARDU's development success.

The 1978/79 ARDU report makes marginal mention of the fact that four such skills centers were added in the project region and that not only artisans, but also farmers representatives were being given three months of technical training there. Unfortunately, no detailed information on the contents of training and participation is provided in the document.

The annual reports for 1980/81, 1981/82 and 1982/83 show a number of common features; 1) their focus was on the mass organization of farmers, particularly into producers' cooperatives. By 1982/83, there was a vigorous drive to move these cooperatives to collectivized farms. Table 17 shows the rapidity of change in this direction;

Table 17 Levels of Farm Organization by Year

Year	stages of organization				
	1st stage (melba)	2nd.st. (Walba)	Members.	Hectares	Tractors
1979/80	48	1	2,221	6,558	-
1990/81	37	48	3,870	9,994	8
1981/82	89	49	12,669	47,305	13
1982/83	92	76	13,480	46,204	19

Source; ARDU annual report 1982/83- publication No. 26, 17.

Those in the second stage of cooperative formation (Walba), are only one stage away from the final collectivization process (Waland).

2) By this time, ARDU's technical competency , ie research and technology generation capacity was reported to have declined. The organization was suffering from high staff turn over and emphasis had shifted from production to political organization of rural life. The 1982/83 report in particular emphasized this point.

3) In many instances, skills training centers seem to bustle with activities. For once, these rural institutions seem to be involved in the production and distribution of farm and household tools and implements. The activities and successes in this area appear almost visibly exaggerated in their magnitude. For example the 1980/81 report (ARDU publication No. 19) puts the total value of goods made in and by the skills centers at (Birr) Eth.\$ 53,233, 64. But in the 1981/82 report, a more realistic figure of Eth.\$84,616 is given.

4) Contradictions between project rhetoric and blue-print and practical action seem to deepen in many dimensions of development programs. On the one hand, small and more appropriate scales of technology and skills were being imparted and inculcated through skills centers. On the other hand farm mechanization and large-scale organization of agriculture and rural life were being vigorously pursued by heavily funded programs staffed by powerful project professionals who also seem to serve as party functionaries.

This drive towards mechanization made farming dependent on imported fuel and high technology, the marginal costs of which are very likely to outweigh marginal economic benefits. There can be no question on this. As far back as 1972/73, it was realized, by Swedish authorities of CADU, that the downward fluctuations in the price for agricultural products, coupled with the ever increasing price of imported agricultural technology and inputs had posed threatening possibilities for the total collapse of the CADU engineered, green revolution dependent development systems. It was stated that

Erratic fluctuations in grain prices as has been witnessed in the last two years coupled with rising costs of imported inputs such as fertilizer, are bound to have multiple negative impacts not only limited to short-term undertakings such as CADU but also on the whole effort of initiating sustained development in the rural areas of Ethiopia" (CADU annual Reports 1971/72 & 1972/73, publication No. 77, IV).

Concrete price figures suggesting the international price trends for fertilizer may serve to make the point clear. In 1968, the cost of phosphates was Eth.\$ 28/quintal. By 1971, this price had soared to Eth.\$ 38 and by 1973, to Eth.\$ 53 (Cohen 1987, 97). It became economically impossible for even the average farmer (leave alone the poor farmer) to use fertilizer. A decision was then made to subsidize it at the Eth.\$ 44 level (Cohen, 1987, 97). But then, the price of fertilizer continued to soar. In 1974 the CIF price of DAP at Addis Ababa city, from where it was distributed throughout the country, was Eth\$ 160/quintal and Urea Eth\$ 75/quintal.

The Extension Project Implementation Department (EPID) of the Ministry of Agriculture, concluded that the Ethiopian government alone could not afford to subsidize these inputs any more (EPID, 1974, Publication No. 21, 62). This report also noted that International financial organizations like the World Bank were using fertilizer price levels of Eth.\$ 42/quintal in their appraisal of agricultural development projects in Ethiopia. This would suggest that the estimated benefits of fertilizer application which were offered by international lending agencies was unrealistically higher than the farmer could actually realize. Fertilizer prices and the escalating subsidy problem became the major preoccupation of the Minimum Package Program (MPP) that was created within the Ministry of Agriculture to expand some of CADU's production-enhancing activities, namely, the application of fertilizer and improved seeds, to as wide a region of Ethiopia as possible (EPID, 1974, Publication No. 21).

Surprisingly, the 1982/83 report included the introduction of a new Training and Visit System (TVS). The system, as it is well known, is among the latest of the World Bank supported innovations designed to stimulate farmer productivity. Its focus is on the delivery of appropriate and adaptive research findings in a manner sensitive to farmers' real needs and educational level. Again the image one gets of the project ARDU and its position in the rural community is contradictory. On the one hand, its reports suggest that, apart from the drive for collectivization and

villagization, other wide ranging participatory possibilities have been opened to relate the rural people with the project. On the other hand, we note the introduction of new approaches to working with the farmers, suggesting that the existing systems have not succeeded.

**Non-Agricultural Technology Generation and Diffusion:
A Second Look at The Role of Local Artisans and
Craftsmen**

As we saw under 3 above, rural skills centers were portrayed as active in the production of farm and household implements beginning in 1980/81. A total of 10 skills centers were operational. This time it seems to be farmers themselves who were trained for different technical tasks (ARDU Annual Report 1980/81, Publication No. 19, 8). The trained farmers received ready-made materials which they assembled in the skills centers. The income generated by farmers working in these centers was given as follows:

Income Generating Activity	Income in Eth.\$
Wood articles assem.	3,679,265
Metal articles	950,505
Repair of wooden cart.	126,515
Repair of miscellaneous items	<u>567,079</u>
Total	5,323,364

Source: ARDU Publication No. 19, 8.

The income figures above look somewhat unconvincing in that the values reported do not correspond to any commonsense estimate of the production capacity of meagerly equipped rural skills training centers operated through the labor of farmers who come for short periods of training. The 1982/83

Annual Report (ARDU Publication No. 26) reinforces this skepticism. It made it clear that farmers did not do the bulk of production. Implement production was carried out largely by ARDU's Industry Promotion Section itself (45). The production activities of this section included supplying skills centers with Eth.\$ 9,778 worth of ready-to-assemble materials.

The important thing to note is not the value of the goods produced, but the shift of emphasis towards the development of rural skill and technical competence through a wide range of training programs for farmers. But the fervor indicated in this respect in the 1980/81 report seems to have quickly degenerated into a workshop production activity by ARDU itself. The 1982/83 report makes it clear that the range of activities envisaged for the skills centers for that year remained largely unaccomplished. Subsequent reports made only scanty mention of rural skills training and production at all. Once again, we see a clear case where participatory development intentions and rhetoric in practice soon degenerate into reinforcing the direct production and bureaucratic activities of the development organization-ARDU-itself.

Participation of Women and Youth

Except their involvement in ideological organizations, neither women nor youth had any significant role in ARDU programs beyond the accounts already given earlier in this study during the period of 1975-1985.

ARDU After 1985

By 1985, ARDU became BARDU (Bale Arsi Rural Development Unit) for a short while and then was renamed SEAD (South Eastern Agricultural Development Zone). In its latest status, the project appeared to have been transformed into a regional planning bureaucracy of the government. Swedish patience with endowing ARDU/SEAD programs with continued financial and moral support, primarily aimed at influencing government policy in rational and humanistic ways, seems to be fatigued (Stahl, 1989). Judging from the writings of Stahl, Swedish experts and influential personalities who defended the project against many skepticisms in Swedish circles, had tried hard to convince skeptics of the virtues of continued persuasion of the government to adopt policies more favorable to the development of the people through continued presence in ARDU. In time this was to change, as the Swedes realized that

Ethiopian governments from Haile Selassie to this day, have waged war in the north and elsewhere in the country and have been noted for a singular disrespect for basic human rights. The instruments of repression of the state have been brutal and efficient. In its economic policies Ethiopia is today just about the only country (possibly next to North Korea) still practicing the concepts of the supremacy of the state planning over market forces that were so in vogue in the 1970s. Since the early 1970s SIDA had been debating these policies with the Ethiopian authorities, particularly as they were being applied in agriculture and in Arsi region. ...Resources provided by Sweden were being used in support of policies that Swedes did not believe in... SIDA decided in early 1986 to phase out its support ... (Holmberg, 1989, 24-25).

Low agricultural prices were necessary to feed the huge army and unproductive bureaucracy and growing urban population at the expense of a tightly controlled peasantry that was seen as nothing more than a production machinery. Villagization served this end very well. As one Swedish authority negotiating the issue of the peasantry and its autonomy observed,

A peasantry which is settled in nucleated villages is 'captured' and amenable to political manipulating. Control of grain marketing...is central to the leadership's economic considerations. The townspeople, the bureaucracy, and the military apparatus must be supplied with foodstuffs.... (Stahl, 1989, 14-15).

SIDA finally withdrew its financial support for ARDU/SEAD in 1989.

In ARDU/SEAD as in CADU development rhetoric and practice remained contradictory and at great variance with each other. In part, this seems to be facilitated by the absence of well formulated and broadly accepted theories and methodologies of development convincingly dealing with the intractable nature of development. Such a body of theory and methodology would at least help to emphasize the inability of marxist, modernist, or other simplistic forms of assumed knowledge and methodology of development to identify the critical interfaces between systems of human, institutional, and social action and the prospects of development. This would in turn help to challenge planners and bureaucrats to be conservative on their application of haphazard and uninformed approaches to development.

It is reasonable to assume that the presence of a viable and holistic theory and methodology of development such as the one being articulated by the social learning paradigm, would force a second look on authorities after decades of failure to attain development by any model applied for the purpose. In the case of CADU/ARDU, there was little of methodological reflection even after years of top-down, technology, and capital driven planning that failed to achieve transformative results. Appropriate attention was paid to negative government policies by critiques. The focus on negative government policies is relevant. But it fails to recognize the organizational and learning dimensions which have been absent from CADU/ARDU and this too is a major constraint in itself. If the project or another designed after it were to continue, this problem would have needed to be addressed even after the demise of a marxist agricultural policy.

Sufficient development conditions can only be met when the missing link in development practice, the people, are integrated into program formulae as partners and equal participants in decision making regarding the "what", "how", "who" and "why" of development design. These issues were not raised anywhere in ARDU documents.

The other side of the problem was the way development practitioners and authorities defined development. As we saw, elites, bureaucrats, and professionals defined development and development tasks in ways that reflected their professional and political outlooks, interests, biases,

and ideologies, rather than the true development requirements of the people. This impaired active pursuit of workable alternative solutions to problems and led to circular thought patterns and activities that resulted in programs focusing on "more of the same." The involvement of the people and consultation with them on what they perceive to be the problem in achieving rural development would have revealed all of the philosophical and methodological issues we have been so far elaborating. The people know what would work for them, and why it would work and the problem of how to design an effective development approach would find a solution.

Program Strategies of ARDU: A Summary

It may now be useful to put ARDU's development strategies in a logical and chronological summary. The economic, social, and organizational practices carried out in the project region in the name of development find their roots in the elaboration and logic of the revised Plan and Budget document covering the period 1976-1980.

1. The Plan and Budget for 1976-1980 (ARDU Publication No.1) outlined in detail the two major components of ARDU's comprehensive package program of development- a) the social and b) the economic components.

The social component focused on bringing peasants (farmers), youth, women, and occupational groups in its fold (32-58). Peasants were to be organized first into peasant associations which would be further reorganized into service and production cooperatives around the principle of "collective action for self-reliance". A total of 14-17

peasant associations serving 3,000-3,500 members with each association having about 200 peasant farmers within it were to be organized during the first year. The logic of this seems to be the empty theoretical assumption that peasants have no aspirations and insights of their own, and ways of resisting the violation of their identity and interests, and that they could be manipulated and shaped as desired by ideologues and bureaucrats.

2. The youth of Arsi province would be formed into associations that would be instruments of socialist indoctrination. Indoctrination would aim at raising political and civic consciousness and cooperative and communal mental set and discipline that makes unquestioning and selfless compliance of the peasantry with government edicts possible.

3. Women's associations would be organized to facilitate their involvement in political and "functional" education and to "draw rural women into the main current of the development process" (37). Again development is ambiguously defined to mean what the authorities define it; in this case, it meant political mobilization.

4. specialized associations of artisans or craftsmen, dairy farmers, poultry farmers and seed growers etc. would also be organized to help the socialist process.

5. All of the above will be embraced by a villagization program. The program of villagization would bring together scattered rural households. Formal and informal rural educational systems supported by the findings of on-going

social surveys , will aim at evaluating the present and charting the course of the future.

These programs had little to do with the real interests, needs, and aspiration of the people. On the contrary, they negated every grain of known human aspiration. As such, they could not enlist willingness of the people to exercise their best ingenuity and energy to bring about development. In fact, the programs of ARDU had little to do with development and everything to do with the exercise of power over the people. Government bureaucrats and party functionaries made all the decision and all the rules by which even the game of subsistence was to be played.

The Role and Participation of the People.

The declared policy of involving the people in the development process, was interpreted by ARDU in a way that was purely ideological. The people's role was treated as one of passively accepting predetermined doctrines and programs and playing no significant part in determining rural development objectives. Development, most importantly, rural development, was defined and its strategies determined by political fiat. Generally both development and its strategy were perceived as spontaneous process which could be charted out and decreed by those in power.

Participation of Women: An Experimental Case

A number of revealing points about the development potential of women and the real obstacles to its realization appeared in latter documents of ARDU. These are worth looking at in some detail.

Late in ARDU's history, a very interesting experiment was undertaken. Based on a SIDA survey of needs in one area of the development region, a rural water project entirely managed by women through SIDA budget appropriation outside the regular ARDU allocation, was initiated in 1986. Women became surveyors, accountants, supervisors and producers of machine spare parts and soon the program expanded to cover a few more areas. Simple farm implement production, the design and construction of fuel-efficient stoves etc. were successfully planned and implemented by the women at insignificant financial cost. Their social and economic image improved dramatically because they now earned their living and made a big difference in the life style of the rural community through their labor and ingenuity (Alopaeus-Stahl, 1989, 22).

Alopaeus-Stahl reports that when the time came to replicate this successful experiment with women's participation in development in more extended areas of the project region, insurmountable bureaucratic barriers were constructed by ARDU functionaries. They blocked all women's programs and in their stead labeled existing and new programs having little development relevance, as "women's programs" because Swedish assistance made the participation of women in development as an important financing criteria. That successful experiment for unfolding women's potentials thus remained only an experimental proof of what could be and how it could be done. Party and government bureaucrats saw to it

that it would not assume any meaningful program form or continuity.

Participation of Youth

Participation of youth remained limited to ideological organization and indoctrination as stipulated by the Program and Budget document for 1976-80 (ARDU Publication No. 1)

ARDU's Development Impact

Inevitably, it is the outcome of programs that determine their value since pragmatic choices of means otherwise considered unacceptable are sometimes justified by the adequacy and appeal of their ends. For development programs, appealing ends must pertain to changes in the quality of human life. A few substantive statistics may underscore ARDU's achievements in this regard.

A 1981 survey in the project region (ARDU 1981, Publication No. 18) revealed the peoples' general state of well-being. Per capita income was Eth. \$ 239 (58), and the region's literacy rate stood at 11.86%. Housing conditions reflect unsatisfactory conditions:

1 room residence	84.82%
2 room "	13.64%
3 room "	1.54%

Source: ARDU Publication No. 18, 19

A Ministry of Agriculture survey (1984) provides some valid comparisons between the project region, Arsi, and other regions of Ethiopia:

Indicators	Region	% of Population
Literacy	Arsi	33
	Wellega	39
	Gojam	30
Life span (population 60 years or over)	Arsi	6
	Bale	7.5
	Illubabor	13.8
	Wollow	10.0

Source: Ministry of Agriculture (1984), Table, 2, 25

The same study indicated that a lower proportion of farmers in the ARDU region own and invest in farm implements as compared to other regions (Table 36, 124-128). The overall development picture gives little comfort in what has been achieved after more than two decades of heavy investment in manpower, technology and other material resources. This perhaps explains the striking similarity between pictorial representations of life in the project region in 1971 and 1987 which stimulated this longitudinal documentary study.

Government Definition of Development: The Goal and Strategy of the Post-1974 Government: Its Role, Participation and Influence on CADU/ARDU

Though important data on the sociopolitical and economic objectives of the post 1974 government have been incorporated implicitly and explicitly in the analysis of CADU/ARDU to this point, it is important to reiterate a few and add more

specific data to understand the development environment more fully. This will in addition help conform to the general format of the study, thereby maintaining the analytical balance of the two major parts of this chapter.

Defining Development and Its Main Constraints: A Government Perspective

As an early manifestation of the new government's promises for a just social and economic order, proclamation No. 31 of April 1975, nationalized all rural lands. This Proclamation replaced private ownership of land by public ownership. Article 5 of Chapter 2 of this Proclamation prohibited any form of transaction in land since no individual owns land but is given usufructuary rights with stringent limits on how much farm land each person or family is to be allocated. It stated that,

No person may sale, exchange, succession, mortgage, antichresis, lease or otherwise transfer his holdings to another; provided that upon the death of the holder the wife or husband or minor children of the deceased or where these are not present, any child of the deceased who has attained majority, shall have the right to use the land.

Subsequent to the passage of this proclamation, students in grade 11 and above, including all college and university students, numbering in tens of thousands, were sent to the rural country side to organize peasant associations who would be in charge of apportioning land among farmers, and in essence, serve as front-line functionaries for the government. Under peasant association stewardship, rural land was made available to all of those who would till it. But the true nature of land ownership became ambiguous. To

this day, the question of who really owns land- the government or peasant associations? remains an unanswered question.

Article 6 of proclamation No. 31 states that,

Until lands are distributed pursuant to chapter 3 of this proclamation, any tenant or hired laborer shall have possessory right over the land he tills; provided a resident landowner who has leased out all his lands shall have the right to equally share the land with his tenants...

Chapter 3 of this proclamation establishes peasant associations as its implementing instrument. A peasant association comprised of heads of farm households residing within a Chicka- an area of about 800 hectares, or 20 gashas in local units of land measurement.

According to Proclamation No. 31, the key functions of peasant associations were:

1. equitable distribution of land among resident farmers and new settlers coming into the area
2. implement other land use directives coming from the government from time to time
3. settle disputes among farmers
4. undertake villagization programs

Peasant associations were and still are vertically integrated from the local to the national level, following the bureaucratic hierarchy of the state apparatus. A sequence of proclamations (proclamation No. 71 of 1975, and proclamation No. 130 of 1977) provided additional mandates to peasant associations. Proclamation 71 reinforced the provisions of proclamation No. 31 of 1975 and clarified the far reaching mandate of these associations. Proclamation No.

130 provided for the creation of the All -Ethiopia Peasant Association (AEPA) and strengthened the regional organizations. Proclamation 130 of 1977 left no doubt that peasant associations were arms of the government that stretched deep into the rural community and household allowing it to intrude at any level of rural life, not to nurture and improve it, but to sap its energy and resources to strengthen the totalitarian control over its existence and activities.

In Part III of proclamation 130, the objective of PAs were specified. Among the 9 objectives detailed, the primacy ones are article 1, on political alliance with the working class, article 4, on increasing agricultural production through cooperatives and struggling to free the economy from imperialist dependency, and article 6, to coordinate peasant associations defense squads and to prepare them for "revolutionary operations".

Only article 19 of Part III makes any reference to helping the peasant attain self-reliance. No reference is made to the priority, or even need to improve the quality of rural life. In a country as poor and as underdeveloped as Ethiopia, it is preposterous that peasant association proclamations should be oblivious to the plights of rural life and pretend that the peasantry has attained economic and social positions which it should vigilantly defend against unnamed and unknown enemies. Perhaps the peasantry was being asked to defend the irrational and illegitimate power of a government, that assumed position without popular mandate, in

exchange for the right to use land without sharecropping with feudal landlords.

In 1978, Proclamation 152 to amend Rural Land use Fee and Agricultural Activities income tax was passed. Among other things, this proclamation put in place coercive measures to force farmers to join producers cooperatives (first stage of collectivization). Article 2, section 2 mandated that farmers who do not join such cooperatives would pay double the fees that members would pay. Agricultural income tax was to be paid in addition. According to article 5, tax assessment and collection is the mandate of the tax office. The farmers' estimate of income would not count. The tax office could impose any arbitrary income level and assess taxes accordingly.

The stage for a system of surplus extraction that would exploit the farmer bare, was set. And this is in addition to the low prices set by government for agricultural produce and numerous other indirect taxes (Cohen 1987, 169). The devastating economic and human consequences of this and other policy measures have been amply documented in and outside of Ethiopia (World Bank Report, 1984, Cohen 1987, Institute of Agricultural Research, Research Report No. 5, 1989).

Simultaneous with peasant farming structured under peasant association as above, the government organized state farms on a massive scale. These were to supplement food production, supposedly, in an efficient manner. Many of the large private farms of the pre-1974 era were incorporated into the system of state farms and new farm lands were opened

up by state farms enterprises. The preamble to proclamation No. 142 of 1978 establishing the State Farms Development Authority states the reasons for setting up such an authority. The first reason given was the growing food shortage, "...arising from the failure of peasant associations to produce...on a scale commensurate with ...demand..." The second reason given was the need to have the state play "its vanguard role in opening up vast development avenues..." The third reason was that the government believed that self-reliance in food production could be achieved only when agriculture is "exploited ...on a large scale by the state on a modern basis".

In this legislation, the conviction of the government that the only efficient method for food production is large scale commercial farming becomes unequivocally clear. This, of course is contrary to the empirical evidence of South East Asia which suggests that small scale agriculture can be a very efficient approach to agricultural production, not to mention its critical role in maintaining a high level of rural employment.

Thus, the agriculture sector was organized into three categories: peasant agriculture, cooperative agriculture and state farms.

Careful examination of all government planning and legal documents concerned with agricultural development, including the Ten Year Perspective Plan (1985), the report of the Secretary General of the Communist Party- Mengistu Haile Mariam- to the 9th. plenum of the Party (1989), and the

proclamations cited above, show that the government's goal in the agricultural sector was strictly aimed at increasing production. The Government had structured agriculture into three distinct categories; state farms, cooperatives (and collectives), and peasant farming, all aimed at government control of production, and enhancement of production by any means. The cooperative movement was intended to lead to rapid collectivization, thereby facilitating farm mechanization and government control of the process of agricultural production. The state farms system applied large scale mechanization, improved seeds, fertilizers and all other modern agricultural technologies. It was managed through a huge labyrinth of bureaucracy stretching from the national to the farm level. The other category which is the residual peasant agriculture, large in sizes of land it occupies, and the number of farmers it employs, receives no support from the government. In fact it is targeted for active discouragement through exploitative and harassing government policy. In what follows, effort will be made to sort through government development strategies and the role envisaged for each of the three agricultural categories.

Government Program Strategies.

The Ten Year Perspective Plan covering 1985-1994 contains extensive sections on government vision for rural or agricultural development. This vision sees the government as the central actor in all matters pertaining to the management of rural life and productivity. Accordingly, the agricultural sector or rural society as a whole is to be

mechanically organized into huge collective units that will respond to all forms of government signal and command. The Ten Year Plan projects the organization of 4,124,116 farm households into 15, 344 cooperatives by 1986 (Table 3.5, 65). This is a very rapid rate of aggregation that was to be achieved through massive disruptions of organized rural life and ruthless dismantling of traditional villages and homesteads.

By 1986, this cooperative sector was planned to contribute about 49.8% of the country's agricultural output. Very high importance and priority is also attached to state farms. State farms were expected to increase their share of production from 2.9% of total national agricultural output in previous years to 6.8% by 1986. But this modest rate of production increase will come at a disproportionately high cost to the economy. The budget allocation of the Plan makes this explicit.

Of the total of about 7.78 billion Birr (Ethiopian dollar) allocated for the agricultural sector during the first five years of the plan period, the state farms take up by far the highest single chunk. Table 10.2., 168 of the Perspective Plan gives the following budget breakdown;

state farms	4.7 billion
intermediate farm development	66,930 mill.
settlements	47,003 "

Other agricultural activities like research, agricultural education, tea and forest development, fisheries and live stock share the remaining portion of the planned budget.

In addition to denying necessary technical and credit support to peasant farming, and the forced cooperative formation that were vigorously pursued by the government, farmers in particular became the main targets of the villagization program. This program forcibly herded hundreds of thousands of farm households into ill-planned government village plots. Farm households were forced to tear down their established homes and gardens and to construct new houses on government designated lots (Hunger Notes 1990, Vol. XV No. 5, 5). The human tragedy of this program has enraged international conscience and, for a time it was the most hostility-invoking issue against Ethiopia's tyrannical government in international circles. Arsi province, where the project CADU/ARDU was located, was one of the first regions targeted for villagization (Cohen 1987, 192-193), perhaps because it had the organizational machinery of CADU/ARDU to help out with the program. In the first sweep of villagization which stretched from December 1985 to March 1986, about one million of Arsi's total population of close to 1,662,223 million were forced into new villages (Cohen, 1987, 192-193).

In general, government designs of agricultural production enhancement schemes, have not produced the results desired and intended by the government. This is made clear in the different official pronouncements of the Ethiopian government. In his report to the 9th. Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Ethiopia in Nov. 1988, Mengistu Haile Mariam- the Party's General Secretary-

recounted numerous "disappointments" in the performance of the agricultural sector (25-52). Cooperatives and peasants did not produce anything of what was expected of them. In spite of the 1.7 billion Birr invested in government-run agriculture

...the growth in agriculture has consistently declined from 1984/85 to 1988 at an annual rate of .4 per cent. It is indeed alarming that agricultural production is consistently declining from year to year...while the rate of population growth has reached three per cent. (41).

Previous to this, a World Bank report (1984, 68 table 2, 85, table 25) had warned of this exact scenario.

The report goes on to stress that the decline in production can neither be blamed on natural disasters nor shortage of agricultural inputs. The weather has generally been favorable in many of the high-potential grain producing regions where government had given special attention. In these regions, more than 1.7 million quintals (one quintal=100 kilo grams) of fertilizer, and 120,000 quintals of high yield seeds were distributed to farmers' cooperatives (30-31). But these inputs and good weather have not produced good harvests (44). What has gone wrong with the performance of the agricultural sector?

The Chairman asserts that his strategy of state farms, organization of producer cooperatives, collectivization and villagization are the only sure ways for increasing agricultural efficiency and productivity (45-48). The problems of this sector, according to him, arise from the fact that the transformation of peasant agriculture into

collectivized farming has been too slow (48). He goes on to insist that the Rural Land Proclamation of 1975 gives the farmer only the right to use the land and not to own it which makes it commendably consistent with his collectivization drive (48-49).

Convergence and Divergence in ARDU and Government Perspectives on Development

Despite SIDA's urging to the contrary, ARDU goals and objectives became identical to those of Government. Both defined rural development in terms of increasing surplus production for the market and both subscribed to the strategy of cooperative formation and collectivization as well as villagization as feasible approaches to rural progress. The people were treated as objects on whom both ARDU and government acted rather than autonomous entities who should contribute to policies and programs affecting them and who should exercise their self-interests and initiatives to better their lives.

ARDU vigorously implemented prescriptive government programs, of organizing the peasantry into peasant associations and cooperatives. It intensified government edict on villagization and the indoctrination of the entire population as a priority concern misnomered as "development". In short, government and ARDU objectives and strategies were identical. Both were inimical to any prospects for social and economic development and the transformation of rural Ethiopia. It was, no doubt, such a realization that

motivated the withdrawal of Swedish assistance to the project.

Chapter VII

Conclusions, Observations, and Recommendations

In this chapter, the seminal conclusions relevant to the findings of this study will be summarized. This will be followed by a discussion of the implications of the findings and conclusions for the theory and practice of development in Ethiopia generally. Sociology's potential role in empirically and theoretical explicating the process of development or rural transformation in general will be briefly discussed. The Chapter will conclude with some recommendations on changing the future design of rural development in Ethiopia.

I . Conclusions

a) This study applied a Social Learning model and definition of development to the analysis of CADU/ARDU/SEAD as a strategy of rural transformation. The findings suggest that while development rhetoric stayed close to the notion of enabling people to participate in each step in the design and implementation of development, consistent with social learning expectations and CADU's initial definition of development, program strategies consistently negated it across time, ideological environments, and the nationality of development practitioners. Whether the expert staff was Ethiopian or expatriate, its operational behavior was similarly bureaucratic and attentive to the prescriptions of its senior members. The barriers to direct communication

between CADU and the people and community participation in matters of its development strengthened over time. CADU's success indicators also remained quite distant from estimating broadly based social and economic gains by the peasantry and the rural community.

During the first phase of the project, success was measured largely in terms of research results in animal and plant breeding and testing of fertilizer responses of various crop varieties. Production increases resulting from the application of agricultural research was also an important success indicator regardless of who benefited and lost from these increases. The involvement of the people in the context of development resulting in the improvement of their social, economic, skills, educational, health, organizational, and general well-being were omitted as indicators of changing trends within the rural community.

While not of short-term observed benefit to the peasantry, CADU's research and technology diffusion experiences would have had longer-term benefits if they were fully sustainable by the national professional cadres and local resources. It was clear that this scientific and technological capacity drastically declined when the project's expatriate staff was removed, indicating the ephemeral nature of the project's scientific impact on the local and national development context owing to the inability of its host environment to sustain it. It similarly appears that CADU's initial aloofness respecting Ethiopian national and regional social and institutional strata, together with

its emphasis on highly technical rather than socioeconomic processes diminished its impact and relevance to rural transformation during its operational life time.

b) By failing to be a fully interactive and integrated part of the rural community, it generally remained immune to the felt needs and emerging problems of the rural community, interpreting its needs and development requirements to be identical with experts' definitions of these. The points under (a) and (b) above provide blanket conclusions. More concrete conclusions of the study on different aspects of CADU could perhaps be best summarized through brief answers to the research questions posed at the beginning of the study.

1. Regarding CADU's definition of development, our findings show that initially, it was stated in terms and using parameters consistent with those of the Social Learning Paradigm and its more eclectic extension adopted in this study. The conceptual focus was on achieving development through the inculcation of new and enduring perspectives on development problems and local potentials for dealing with it supported by external resource, technology, and manpower. The installation of a development strategy aimed at building new rural individual and institutional capacities to cope with the challenges of agricultural development and rural transformation was at the center of justification for designing the project.

In practice, this comprehensive definition of development degenerated into simple economic growth notions

beginning with the first year of project operation. This negation of intended means and ends persisted throughout the project's life, with perspectives which vacillated between social learning type objectives in rhetoric and simple production enhancement programs in practice.

The first significant conceptual shift in definition of development and its goals occurred in 1970 with the design of the second phase programs and budget covering 1970-1975. Subsequently, project rhetoric stressed "social development" as spontaneously resulting from economic development. Project strategy justifiably emphasized "economic development" as the goal of CADU. Programs focused on the diffusion of yield enhancing technologies introduced by CADU to who ever can and wants to use them. The result was beyond just neglect of the diverse needs and competitive positions of different social and economic strata in the Chilalo region. It directly negatively impacted the rural equilibrium attained by the tenant and poor peasant as well as the rural artisan and craftsman.

A significant proportion of these strata lost out in the bid for economic survival. In an environment that exposed them to new competition with those whose efficiency and scale of production exceeded theirs by many times, owing to their technological and capital advantage, poor farmers, tenants, and rural craft and implement producers lost the economic bid. One can argue that where a significant proportion of the rural population was dislocated even from its meager but

stable economic survival, underdevelopment rather than rural transformation results.

2. With regard to the question pertaining to the participants in the definition and design of development, it was shown that SIDA experts were responsible for defining and designing development in the Chilalo region. The people of the project region played no role in this respect. Ethiopian experts and authorities, while fully informed, did not make much input to CADU's design initially or in subsequent years. They accepted Swedish expert proposals as potentially important development experiments with evident ambivalence. By 1973, they were retreating from CADU's development concepts and strategies as they perceived that the cost implications made it non-feasible for the Ethiopian situation.

3. What program strategies did CADU design to implement its definition of development? The main program strategies can be characterized as expert, technology, and capital driven interventions delivered from top-down. The most significant features of this strategy were that not only did local initiatives and institutions not participate at decision, policy, or program design levels, but it was also heavily dependent on imported agricultural inputs and technologies. The erratic international market fluctuation of these imported inputs, especially the escalating price of fertilizers, made even the economic growth strategy, on which CADU was operationally based, vulnerable and unsustainable. As early as 1972, the dependence of fertilizer supply on heavy government subsidies was making its use a charge rather

than a benefit to the economy. Agricultural development based on expensive imported technologies requiring such high rates of government subsidy clearly lead to underdeveloping rather than developing the local economy since the financial outflow resulting from their use far outweighs the net benefits they yield. This was recognized by Swedish CADU experts and others as far back as 1972. But the bureaucratic momentum already in place relied on imported technology use and it kept on rolling despite real cost problems recognized by CADU itself.

This seems to suggest that once a system of development is set up outside the control and accountability of the local population, it will continue regardless of the intolerable level of performance deviation from the expectations and promised results that caused its establishment. Some CADU experts even concluded that the solution to this problem is extending external support indefinitely rather than refining the project to innovate locally sustainable strategies. This suggestion is tantamount to arguing for nurturing of permanent dependence on aid rather than achieving types and variations of development strategies that could be locally sustained without continued foreign assistance beyond a specified period. This suggestion is unreasonable for many reasons and cannot be accepted.

4. The answer to the question of whether the definition of development and program strategies were mutually consistent is given under 1-3 above.

5. What were the highlights of development achievement?

Output increases especially during the first two years of project operation were the most impressive achievements. However, the cost benefit relations of these achievements over time leave much question. Data showed that aggregate benefits fell far behind aggregate costs for the project as a whole. In addition, the distribution of benefits was such that it did not seem to have much impact on the improvement of life or socioeconomic transformation as defined in this study and CADU initially.

On the other hand the human and social costs of the project were not negligible. Tenants and poor peasants were massively evicted and their stable ways of life dislocated as a consequence of CADU-stimulated commercial farming. The introduction of commercial farming (which enjoyed import-subsidies on tractors, fuel, and other benefits) in the absence of social structural constraints to control appreciation in land values, protect the small and vulnerable farmers, and eliminate tenancy, generated chaotic social turmoil where development and stability were intended.

6. The sixth research question pertains to the lessons that should be drawn from CADU's experiences. This is a vast theoretical as well as an empirical question and needs to be addressed at both levels. At both the theoretical and empirical levels, the lessons that can be drawn are broad and far reaching and may not be exhaustively apprehended here. However, several striking features are very evident and instructive for empirical and theoretical understanding of

the processes of development initiated by CADU and their implications for future programs that may be fashioned after it.

At the empirical level, a) CADU's experience confirms the argument that development needs to be perceived as a complex learning process in which economic action follows a series of conceptualization and adaptation processes in the social, psychological, and technical dimensions of individual and institutional life. Mere imitation of isolated actions such as using fertilizer to enhance crop yield, do not constitute development.

b) CADU's experience demonstrates that development cannot be achieved through the vicarious definition of needs and program designs bureaucratically and delivered from top-down. Any semblance of development can only be achieved through the learning and participation of the people at all levels. After all development is not just a change in the method and scale of production but also a beneficial change in social, economic, and cultural relationships between and among various components of society. Development also implies the achievement of higher levels intellectual, aspirational, organizational, technological, and cultural competencies emerging from a changed human and community perspective. This cannot be achieved by mere change of the scale of production in one or several sectors of the economy.

The entire range of social, economic, cultural relationships and structures must change gradually if each of these sectors is to stimulate the other towards higher levels

of achievements. For example, in the case of CADU, as the region became more productive, even the farmers involved in this suffered, for the price of farm products on the local market fell. Price declines resulted from the inability of the non-agricultural economic sectors to provide the demand. The country being over 90% subsistence agriculture, and the bulk of the non-agricultural population being employed at subsistence wages, efficient agricultural production could not alleviate either the problems of the farm producer or the consumer over any length of time.

Clearly, the solution to this problem lies in helping the regional and national societies in mobilizing themselves holistically in such a way that sectoral interdependence and complementarity is achieved. Thus, the trader that distributes goods, the service entrepreneur who rushes to provide evident service needs, the artisan who improves and expands his trade in response to demands, the credit organizations that supply needed capital, different private and government training programs and institutions that address the needs of all of the above, need to be in place if a balanced and sustainable development is to be achieved. Clearly, this can only be achieved through the active mobilization of all these sectors and their resources to play their roles.

In this process of self-mobilization of communities, patterns of interactive relationships emerge across social and economic institutions in ways that cannot be predicted in advance. This side effect of the development process is

sometimes the key factor that gives regional and national development patterns their innovative and distinctive character. Thus development cannot be designed, parcelled out, stimulated, and monitored from a single center like CADU. It must be diffused and distributed throughout the system and encouraged to unfold local potentials in all directions. The development institution like CADU can play key roles in providing the knowledge base, technical and financial support as the emerging system of development in different sectors of society demand them. Technical assistance and external resource inputs must be seen as catalysts that stimulate popular effort, participation, and local resources and not to supplant them.

c) We also learned from CADU that whether planning experts are national or expatriate, their development perspectives, methodologies, and behavior appear to be similar. In all cases, development is seen as something planners could do for and on behalf of the people, and as such apply wrong metaphors to fashion programs. These metaphors generally simplify the development process into some kind of predictable motion that can be engineered from the top. In addition, the business of development becomes a vocation to the role occupants within the development organization. These role players attend to their career perceptions and professional interests more than the interests of the people to whom they generally relate indirectly. Perhaps inadvertently, professional and group interests and goals become defined as development interests and goals thereby

removing the practitioners further away from apprehending the requirements of development as they originally intended and as the people need it. Additionally, the original visions of development may be lost as those who visualized it are replaced by new professionals who may not share the same zeal and goal, but may be guided by their professional and scientific training alone. All of this speaks for moving away from the practice of externally designed and delivered programs and in favor of locally initiated and sustained ones even though the latter may look very modest and unimpressive at first.

In theoretical terms, the lessons of CADU point towards the limits of single discipline perspectives on rural development. Disciplines like economics or agronomy are likely to see development in terms of installing certain scientific or quantifiable indicators of "development" and straightforward methods for achieving such a "development". Hence, large-scale production enterprises may be installed at great costs and GNP and per capita income figures enhanced without at all affecting local conditions of backwardness and poverty significantly. While GNP and per capita income are important indicators of economic advancement and development, their utility is limited in terms of measuring the spread of development. As we demonstrated and argued, genuine development is only attained when the people concerned attain the capacity to handle and sustain it, and when they are enabled to share equitably in its benefits. This means that the local social, institutional, educational, cultural,

political, ecological, resource and other intervening factors impinging on the development environment must be brought into the measurement of progress.

It also means that each development case is unique, perhaps requiring unique understanding and assessment of the state of local conditions. This kind of relevant understanding is contingent on working closely with and understanding the people, the limits and possibilities of their institutions, their ways of life and methods of coping with it, as well as their priorities. Knowing and understanding the social, cultural, and physical environment also requires close analysis and interpretation of all dimensions of local reality. When this is cut short by linear, abstracted, and theoretical planning, development programs run the risk of becoming anomalous grafts of esoteric ideas on traditional systems least able to host and incorporate them.

The most significant point emerging from this is the implication that development needs to be visualized in interdisciplinary terms and that the education of those practicing it needs to be reformulated to incorporate interdisciplinary perspectives. Technical experts dealing with development must recognize that the social whole-the society or institutions they set out to deal with- is very complex and dynamic whose responses to intervention cannot be effectively predicted in advance. In this respect, the discipline of Sociology has a key and fundamental role to play. The institutional and structural focus of its

theoretical and analytical tools, allows it to study the unity of the social system and its processes, as well as the harmony and conflict engendered by movements in different elements of this system.

Sociological perspectives typically examine the iterative interplay among parts of the structural whole. This includes institutions like the economy, law, technology (innovation), social institutions, the arts, etc. as these interact functionally, normatively, and adaptively to progressively influence and be influenced by individual and collective behavior. Though its unit of analysis is the social structure or institution, sociology's theory of socialization, for instance, is nothing less than a theory of life-long individual and group learning and adaptation to changing situations and expectations. At the core of the continuous role differentiation and integration of individuals as well as institutions and communities is this process of iterative learning, influencing and being influenced by the social and physical environment.

Sociology's rich and still emerging theoretical paradigms for the study of social structures, socialization processes, evolution in normative and role structures, the evolution of science and technology and its diffusion, give the discipline a holistic perspective on the dynamics of the social, cultural, and economic world. This disciplinary competence and versatility is dormant at present. But if the discipline's intellectual revival in the study of change and development occurs, sociology's contribution to theoretical

and methodological work in development will and can play a very critical role.

As we observed in the theoretical chapter of this study, Sociology has regrettably attenuated its potential role in the formulation and continued improvement of development theory and practice. This situation has resulted from its internal disciplinary debate over academic values, over whether sociology should seek normative and applied knowledge as opposed to a positive one. One would see no real contradiction between disciplinary efforts to explore new frontiers of knowledge as well as the pursuit of objective theoretical understanding of reality and the practical application of these to the solution of human and social problems. There is much that even the current state of sociological knowledge can contribute to development thinking and design. This must be richly tapped into in constructing interdisciplinary approaches to development.

Sociological insights into specific development issues are necessary but not sufficient bases for designing rural development programs. Economic techniques of cost-benefit analysis, resource development and enhancement, manpower development, and the development of management techniques, and methodologies for organizing and planning rural programs, adult education techniques etc. must form the core knowledge base for a new, holistic approach to development.

Such a holistic approach must also be founded on the inviolable role of the local population and the government as partners to any intervening organization intending to promote

development. Of course government must not be assumed to function with the sole interest of the people. It is not uncommon to find Third World governments that actively undermine the potential of their people for development. The people themselves, therefore, must play their role as the agents of their own transformation. Governments too must participate to fine tune their institutions to serve the people. They must be brought to understand that there are no long term alternatives to peaceful transition except to facilitate and serve the peoples' effort and aspiration for democratic and participatory self-development.

Whenever external development agencies enter the scene, they must do so as the third party in development, working with the government and the people to enrich the iterative learning process by all three parties. The methodological balance for a well rounded development will be achieved only when the three parties are incorporated into the program formula. The local grounding of development effort through this kind of cooperative relationship between people, government, and assistance organization also creates a pragmatic environment for the selective adaptation and application of relevant technologies, and prudent and purposeful use of international assistance.

Ultimately this argument may have a number of implications for how development and development assistance is organized in the future. The conventional bureaucratic organization of development practice in which what should be the ethical goals of development become secondary to the

interests, preferences, and professional biases favoring purely economic means and ends, for instance, may be proven to be theoretically and practically inconsistent with the requirements of development. Typically, bureaucratically organized delivery of development programs tend to emphasize the elegance of the programs' operational logic and academic quality regardless of their contribution to actual problem solving. The primary development needs and goals of the masses of the poor, the "outsiders" who remain voiceless and powerless in this system of development practice, actually get lost in the process.

Peer judgements of academic quality of program designing can have status implications for professionals. Professionals have the urge to demonstrate the level of their technical competence. And this is expected of them. But it may not be what a given rural development task requires. One can argue, in fact, that the less advanced planning and the more listening to the people is adopted, the higher the chances for affecting rural development positively.

II. Observations and Recommendations on Future Development Cooperation in Ethiopia.

Land tenure systems and institutions of government in the Third World are typically held as the culprits for the lack of development despite many decades of international and bilateral assistance. There have been scores of studies on land reform measures and their relations to development. While, agrarian reform sets a necessary condition for development, it has been amply demonstrated that development

has failed to occur after land reform promulgation. Gallal's study cited in this research is one case in point.

This particular study attempted to establish some of the program and design characteristics of CADU as a strategy of development intervention that may have played a role in how development unfolded or failed to do so. It is fair to say that the study did document features of CADU's program design that were not up to the task of rural development holistically defined. These features persisted in feudal as well as radical land reform environments leading to similar absence of significant development.

Like any field of intellectual endeavor, social scientists, including economists, innovate paradigms and methods aimed at dealing with development problems. But, over time, these may prove ineffective for the intended task. This shortcoming should be modified so that better theoretical and methodological tools could be redesigned. This redesigning requirement must not be understood to mean that previously attempted methods were unproductive wastes of money and time. In fact such attempts, CADU in this case, can be considered to have fulfilled a vital experiential need. The fact that limitations in methodology, assumption and strategy appear in hindsight cannot make the effort to create them invalid. It is thanks to these efforts that new exploration of more viable methods can be productively pursued. CADU has certainly informed much of the thinking and debate in development which is hopefully heading towards where it should- being centered around the people and

communities that are in need of development and whose duty it is to do something about it.

The experiences emerging from CADU force on us the realization that our efforts to encapsulate a whole historical process of development, as observed in industrialized countries, into neatly packaged program shortcuts, fall far short of understanding the social, institutional and historical forces and processes that mutated in different ways to create them. We are now obliged to go back to the planning board and attempt to redesign methods by which we can only assist the emergence of similar process, and not try to create artificial imitations of them unsuccessfully.

Development assistance can play a vital role in transforming rural life and initiating the process of development. But it can do this only to the extent that its programs are guided by iterative learning assumptions linking it with local people, their institutions and governmental systems in need of change. The justifications for this have been made very evident by this study and by other informed theoretical and empirical analyses on development. Greenwood (1980), for instance, provides a seminal analysis on two critical dimensions of development intervention: a) the role of the government and its network of sociopolitical structures as these relate to household and individual roles and behavior and b) the communities targeted for development.

Communities are typically heterogeneous with respect to a number of characteristics and this has implications for the

design of programs. We will take a brief look at the role of the government and communities in development.

Until recently, development cooperation in general emphasized the need to overcome traditional attitudes and practices of rural people as key to enhancing economic efficiency. The next order of importance has been the drive for technological and capital infusion to propel traditional societies towards production efficiency and "modernity". From a development view point, this is touching on the less important of the range of development constraints. More important are the institutional and political restraints on human and social action that hinder necessary resource allocation and pursuit of legitimate human interests and aspirations.

Greenwood (1980) draws on long standing sociological concepts relating to the nature of social structures to analyze development problems. Sociologically, the nation state can be viewed as any large-scale social structure. By definition, the social structure with its arrangement of roles, norms, and status systems, serves as a powerful instrument that influences and even shapes attitudes and behavior patterns of groups, communities and individuals (Landis, 1983, 64-68). Understanding this reality, Greenwood states that in developmental terms

...we are beginning to view the nation-state as complexly integrated system of national institutions, markets, socio-geographic areas, and local communities in which all the parts are locked into continuous interaction with

each other. These interactions affect the structure of all level of society (2).

This is very different from conventional development assumptions which generally skirt the direct role of the state in impeding or impelling local development, instead focusing on single issues like diffusion of new technology, infusion of capital and/or integration of fragmented and ineffective local markets as key factors in rural development. Planners in the latter tradition view the state as little more than a large scale aggregation of isolated and self-contained communities (Greenwood, 1980, 2). Such neglect of the role and impact of the state structure on local development is believed to have contributed to the repeated failure of community development programs in the past (3).

It is feasible to conceptualize the role of development assistance as the catalyst that can help create new perceptions about macro development barriers and constraints holistically while at the same time dealing with concrete development issues at the local or micro level. The catalytic role of external assistance can, therefore, be viewed at two levels as discussed below.

Development Assistance and the government:

International development assistance must not shy away from confronting the political, structural, power, and resource allocation prerogatives of governments and their surrogates which impede development. Liberalization measures to open the system for democratic participation by civil society and building equity in social, economic and political

life must be made absolute prerequisites and part and parcel of development assistance and cooperation. The people themselves must participate in defining these equity and democratic issues.

To date, any serious concern with the behavior of the state has been limited to World Bank and IMF strategies of structural adjustment, which are often charged with, paradoxically, hurting more than helping Third World development (Dell, 1984). Unless government restructures its institutions and patterns of power and resource allocation in society, and unless it nurtures philosophical values favorable to the maximum fulfillment of individuals and communities, investments and efforts in rural and community development will continue to be wasteful and irrelevant.

Development Assistance, The Community, and Macro Development Concerns

Micro development concerns can be seen at two levels: 1) the community and its heterogeneous and often hierarchically organized sub-parts, 2) the individual household and its members.

For development purposes, the community needs to be operationally defined. It can be defined as a continuing group of people occupying an identifiable geographical territory, sharing natural and economic resources, and relating to each other and to those outside of its geographical boundary in a relatively organized and interdependent manner.

Continuity and interdependence are the key concepts that should help to establish the identity of the community and its component parts as permanent stakeholders in local development. Within these identifying characteristics of the community, its strengths and weakness, its homogeneity or heterogeneity, its conflicting and harmonizing attributes, and its development potential could be studied and utilized in the design of the development process.

The general tendency in rural development planning has been to assume that rural communities are homogeneous entities that are faced with identical problems. This leads to a further assumption that the community as a whole could uniformly benefit from a singular development program, like the distribution of credit. The analysis and program approaches of CADU largely adopted this assumption. Its efforts to study other international development efforts only helped it to redress perceived inadequacies in the design of top-down, uniform interventions.

Heterogeneity rather than homogeneity in access to resources, agricultural practices, family and individual needs, goals, and objectives characterize rural communities. These form part of the driving force in the production effort (Greenwood, 1980, 11-27). Such heterogeneity leads to conflict of interests and competition for different kinds of opportunities. Development programs set one more stage for competition unless their programs are knowledgeably and flexibly designed to address the interest of competing groups

so that those who are already in weak competitive positions are not undermined by the more privileged.

Secondly, the individual household and the members within it are also important elements in development. In the final analysis, it is individuals and households with their individual goals, interests, and objectives that can invest, create, apply their labor, and experiment to change the existing social and economic conditions for their betterment and the betterment of their community.

It therefore becomes essential to take into account the needs, interests, and objectives of households and even of individual household members in the development process. Each household and individual should be drawn into active participation and pursuit of enlightened self-interest. Enlightened self-interest is understood to mean the exercise of individual initiative and pursuit of interest within the over all context of social responsibility and the common good. The aborted participation of rural women in CADU's region in constructing and managing a rural water supply system could be seen as a case of enlightened self-interest.

In Ethiopia, women hold the key to improving the family's economy through their contribution to family farming activities, trade and food processing. Yet, they are typically excluded from participation in most cases of planned rural development (Johnston and Clark, 1982, 104-105), as they were in CADU. Development assistance must focus on ensuring their full participation.

The role of youth in rural development also remained unexplored in CADU as in many other similar projects. Conceivably, youth could make significant inputs in skill, labor, and creativity to the development process and should, therefore, be figured prominently in the design of rural development.

International and bilateral development assistance would serve efficient development ends if strategies for self-mobilization by all members of the rural community were adopted through the active participation of rural populations and institution in the articulation of the "what, how, when, and for whom and by whom" of development. A radically changed concept of design and management of development is required. A whole new methodology and ethical standard need to be worked out to directly link the assistant expert and the local people in a real way.

Project Evaluation and Feed Back

Evaluation is a key instrument for keeping a program on target and fine tuning its effectiveness. The experiences of CADU show that self-evaluation by development projects or authorities yields little result in diagnosing operational problems and correcting them. There is something like a self-justifying tendency in self-evaluation that gives a hopeful coloring to evaluations even when the project is missing its purposes and targets. It appears most useful to have external evaluation on a regular basis. External evaluators must consist of independent professionals selected by the people, the government and the external assistance

agency, for their knowledge of the relevant issues, for their integrity and ingenuity. Evaluation by such a group representing the different role players in development is consistent with the general tenets of Participatory Action Research.

Participatory Action Research is a method being articulated through the merging of two methodologically similar but ideologically divergent approaches to research. One of these is Action research and the other Participatory research. Action research is designed to merge the researcher's quest for knowledge with the utilitarian needs of agencies and decision makers for data and knowledge on which to base policy and programs (Fals-Borda, 1984, Susman and Evered, 1978). This approach is consistent with the general tenets of the modernization paradigm in which the modernizers and the units to be modernized pose as givers and receivers, as the knowledgeable and informed versus the naive and uninformed in need of development and enlightenment through top-down actions of modernizers.

While methodologically similar to action research, participatory research brings an added element to the research equation. It includes the participation of ordinary people in the research process and justifies their inclusion both as a tool for informing and enlightening the disenfranchised on their condition and making them an iterative part of the knowledge generating process (Dickinson, 1988, 54). It is a dependable method for

generating credible knowledge about the dynamics of the community.

The emergence of participatory action research seems to be rooted in and influenced by populist philosophers like Freire (1984) and Fals-Borda (1984). Both of these scholars approach development principles and concepts from unconventional and populist perspectives. The philosophical and methodological frameworks of these scholars correspond to that of the Social Learning framework in the sense that both advocate the full participation of the people as key to socioeconomic transformation and democratization of the development process.

It is evident that participatory action research helps to unify the generation and utilization of knowledge involving the researcher, the development authority, and the people into a single process. The knowledge base derived in this way is critical to educating civil and development authorities and the people on priority development needs, values, and ways of dealing with them. It has been repeatedly argued that self-reliant development tendencies creating a dynamic, indigenous inertia for development can arise only through such a process as demonstrated by our learning curve (Figure 2). Once such a process is in place, development assistance, can phase itself out having played a lasting catalytic role without creating a permanent dependence as was argued in the case of CADU: "In the Ethiopian environment a case can be made to continue a project of this type indefinitely" (Holmberg, 1989).

It needs to be mentioned that the participatory action research approach is not likely to be readily embraced by evaluators and development authorities. Both of these groups are traditionally oriented to the exercise of their expertise and prerogatives as their exclusive domain which no ordinary person outside of their discipline could participate in (Benveniste, 1977). For the development authority, there is also the fear that its existence and legitimacy may be jeopardized if outsiders intrude into its operations. Such skepticisms are unjustified. Both groups need to view evaluation and research in a new light.

Evaluators must themselves accept that knowledge of people's situation and their values can only be adequately acquired through allowing them to express the things they consider important, and not just from responses to survey questions reflecting the evaluators' subjective judgement of what is relevant and important. Evaluators must also impress on the development authority that it is in its best interest to understand exactly how others perceive it and its impact. The development authority must be helped to see itself as being a part of a complex social field made up of all kinds of institutions and conflicting interests that must be brought together around a commonly defined goal, through difficult social experiments. It must also see that its ultimate validity needs to be secured by its ability to help shape gradually the conflicting and competing social and institutional elements into complementary parts mutually enhancing each other's progress (Susman, 1976, 72-87).

The emerging philosophical orientation of the international development community seems to favor the approaches outlined above. Jaycox (1988) speaking on behalf of the World Bank has stated

The good old days when we could ride our favorite hobby horses or pursue single-mindedly certain hot issues are over ... Individual issues are, of course, important...But we must be careful not to become overly preoccupied with any one single problem ... Our fundamental goal should be to get African countries back on a sustainable growth path, thus reducing their dependence...

Similarly, the Executive Director of UNICEF (Grant, 1988) also makes a convincing case for turning the current crises in the Third World into new opportunities for global development. He emphasizes the education, communication and participation of the ordinary people, facilitated in part by modern communication technologies, as key to future development successes. Smuckler, Berg, and Gordon (1988) put forth a proposal for a less bureaucratic, restructured development approaches favoring more dynamic and participatory roles for the United States international development cooperation (28-39). The renaming and restructuring of the United States Agency for International Development (AID) to bring it closer to the real needs of the people of the Third World is suggested.

Envisaging a New Direction for Ethiopia's Rural Development

Ethiopia's complex and massive development problems span the whole range of environmental, human capital, institutional, political, technological, and financial

constraints. Only an indigenous process of massive transformation incorporating the people and mobilizing their innovative energy and resources can bring about improvements in the prevailing, sad human conditions. This mobilization must be based on the understanding and appreciation for the people's normative choices and priority needs. In this process, the government and its institutions can play critical roles only to the extent that the government abides by the needs and wishes of the people. When government actions derive their legitimacy from serving the people's needs, both the people and institutions of government will benefit immensely from the injection of external assistance in the form of relevant expertise, capital, and technology.

The design of institutional reforms best suited to the needs of the people is a legitimate domain for social science. Social science applied in these cases, however, must be informed by local adaptive wisdom and timeless experience embedded in the peoples' manifest strategies of survival. In this sense, the logic and methodology of the Social Learning Paradigm expounded in this study present a promising line of approach to Ethiopia's development challenges.

The current command and top-down planning strategy needs to be turned on its head. Whether they act as organized groups, or private entrepreneurs, the people must take command of their development and appropriate available resources for this purpose. Both the government and

development agencies must enlighten and support this process and not seek to supplant it.

This process of indigenous transformation needs to start with a clear division of labor between the people, the development agency, where it exists, and the government. The division of labor must necessarily reflect the central role of the people in determining the direction and content of development. The role of government and development agency must include supplementing this with informed insight and expanded visions of development to guide the people and communities to include environmental and equity considerations and to assist them in the mastery of new educational, technological, and such other relevant competencies. Equally important, the capital and technology stock available to the people may need urgent supplementation. Here is where development assistance becomes critical. Development assistance can also play a key role in the upgrading and manufacture of appropriate and affordable rural technology locally.

It has been typical for some regions in Ethiopia to denude and deforest the land in the interest of immediate production. Rural development must include the development of rural consciousness in the need for environmental protection and conservation. This needs to be viewed against the immediate economic benefits for which the peasant aspires. Once environmental consciousness is achieved and innovatively made part of the people's short and long term economic interests, environmental maintenance can have no

better custodian than the individual rural household and community.

As part of its division of labor in national reconstruction, the government must, in addition to its primary role of maintaining national security and law and order, focus on the development of education, communication, financial and institutional development, and the study and implementation of public choices and programs that advance the common good of the nation. Regional equity and equality of opportunities for all citizens under a democratic order must additionally be a macro policy domain.

Public sector research and technology development should be a priority government concern as well. The diffusion of nationally innovated or selected technologies should be organized through market systems such as those modeled by Ruttan (1978). Technology selecting or innovating public institutions can be made to respond to private user demand through regular market institutions.

Institutional Foundations for Indigenous Development Mobilization

The array of indigenous institutions in Ethiopia that can form the foundation for local development participation and mobilization is very large and cannot be exhaustively treated here. A brief discussion of some of the more popular ones will be given to illustrate the endless possibilities that exist for interfacing external development intervention and local social and institutional participation.

Diverse communities in Ethiopia have already demonstrated the enormous energy and creativity they can bring to bear on development as recognized by the Strategy Outline for the Fourth Five Year Plan (Planning Commission, 1973).

Traditional social institutions like idir (trans-ethnic, trans-religious and trans-class mutual aid society) debo (cooperative labor sharing organization) mahber (religious and secular organization catering to the social, economic, and religious needs of people) and the more recently innovated and formal Rural Skills Training Centers (Ministry of Education, 1979) and numerous varieties of voluntary regional development associations can be used as local systems through which external assistance can be channeled. However, the mobilization of these traditional, indigenous, and formal organizations should not act as a barrier to the vigorous individual and entrepreneurial drive for self-betterment. It should rather nurture, support and encourage it while balancing it with programs and agendas for development cooperation within and between communities.

Many of the above mentioned indigenous institutions had scored compelling local and regional development achievements to merit the recognition of pre-1974 planners. The Strategy Outline (Planning Commission, 1973) had designed the major rural economic and infrastructural development plans of the Fourth Five Year Plan around concepts of channeling government resources and technical assistance through them.

Details of the institutional categories and the variety of development and mutual-assistance functions that different

indigenous institutions performed have started to be studied by Ethiopian social scientists (Hailu Aba Tena, 1988). Such studies should be expanded and encouraged to provide the starting point for theoretically and empirically specifying the role and participation of indigenous institutions in national development.

The need for realizing that development problems are more than the mere absence of physical, capital, and technological capacities to generate goods has been stressed throughout this study. Our model of analysis has demonstrated the infinite complexity of development beginning with the human agent. The role and impact of his/her external environment in determining what can be individually and collectively achieved has legitimized the preference of the Social Learning Model as a legitimate tool for designing holistic and indigenous development. The social learning model suggests that the study of local institutional environments and the methods for using them for development access into the community must receive new priority.

In this study, any analysis of the global environment of which each locality is a part has been eschewed. The focus has been on how best development intervention at the local level could be redesigned theoretically and methodologically so that the full range of local possibilities could be unleashed to set in motion an indigenous development chain reaction. It has been argued that redesigning development must revolve around involving the masses of people in their development. This demands a redefinition of the development

problematic and process itself to recognize the immense complexity that inhere in it. Inadequate and reductionist definitions of problems inevitably lead to inadequate design of solutions.

It is the logic on which a society, a community, or a development intervention is organized to nurture development from within that will ultimately manage to harness local development potential and bring about substantive changes in people's lives. Success in this respect cannot be demonstrated through achievements in GNP or per capita income growth alone. Success must be demonstrated through the equitable spread of material well-being and the spread of unquantifiable attributes manifest in the intuitively evident developments in the levels of democracy, moral, social, educational, and aesthetic qualities of life attained.

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