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Political and Economic Explanations of Cross-National Differences in Government Basic Human Rights Performance and Effort

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Reinhard Heinisch

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THE STATUS OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNMENT BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND EFFORT

Volume I

By

Reinhard Heinisch

A DISSERTATION

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Department of Political Science

1994

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ABSTRACT

THE STATUS OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNMENT BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND EFFORT

By

Reinhard Heinisch

This is a cross-national comparative empirical analysis of the government human rights performance and human rights effort (performance in relation to the resources available to government) of some 127 countries (1 million or larger). In operationalizing basic human rights (BHR) centered around core security and subsistence rights and based on the theory of Henry Shue it addresses successfully major conceptual and methodological problems in the human rights and the comparative literature, the specifics of which as well as the evolution of human rights and its research are discussed extensively. In developing and subsequently applying five key indicators in each of the two dimensions of BHR (security rights and subsistence rights) this study not only demonstrates that the concept of basic human rights is a meaningful alternative to other more complex and conceptually questionable approaches, but it also yields, on a country by country basis, numerical evaluations of the government performance in securing elementary political and economic rights. To explain BHR-performance and effort, economic and political explanations are derived from the literature and subsequently subjected to bivariate and multivariate hypothesis testing (cross-tabulations,

correlations, analysis of variance, bivariate and multiple OLS regression analysis). The principle findings are that only three factors regime type (competitiveness and participation), level of economic development and equality of income account for most of the variation (80%) in cross-national BHR-performance, with minor effects also by moderate economic growth, foreign trade, British colonial heritage and length of national independence. Regime type, income equality and foreign trade also account for much of the variance in BHR-effort. Ranking countries by effort challenges conventional country human rights evaluations. Further analysis explores the effects of competitiveness and participation as well as the significance of an "evolutionary trajectory" towards the liberal regime. Lastly, recent data (1991) are contrasted with earlier ones to indicate performance changes over time. Overall the importance of the political explanations of human rights practices is affirmed such that the institutions of the liberal regime, specifically high levels of political competitiveness, are the best guarantors of good government human rights performance.

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support of my department, both in terms of financial means and other resources. This project has in part been funded by a generous fellowship be the Washington based Institute for the Study of World Politics. I would also like to acknowledge the contributions by Christine Perry, who has not only helped with library research and data-entry, but whose excellent command of English has made much of this dissertation more readable. Lastly, I would like to thank my parents for their moral support and all of my friends for their patience and for sticking with me during the more stressful and frustrating periods of the past few years.

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INTRODUCTION

Scholars of human rights are in the fortunate position of not having to elaborate greatly on the relevance of their research issue to popular well-being. It has also been impressive to observe how much the interest in human rights research has increased in recent years. For the first time a growing number of empirically-oriented political analysts are turning to a field traditionally dominated by political activists, legal scholars and political philosophers. Regardless, the consensus concerning the importance of human rights has not yet translated into a common understanding of the nature and extent of human rights. Furthermore, there are as yet no generally accepted empirical frameworks to effectively operationalize, measure and explain the human rights performance of governments. Four major problems have plagued comparative international human rights research in the past: (a) the normative conflict between different conceptions of human rights which produces different rights preferences and undesirable rights tradeoffs, (b) the question of whether human rights are universal and cross-cultural or relative and context-bound, (c) the issue of reducing a complex set of rights in order to make them manageable for research purposes, and (d) the importance of adequately comparing countries with different resources and governments with different capacities. In my dissertation I shall introduce an approach to comparative human rights research that is designed to address all the above problems. At the core of this approach are two novel concepts, which I call basic human rights and human rights effort. In the

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following I shall briefly elaborate on the aforementioned problems and sketch how these concepts and this research project can successfully address those issues.

What has been termed 'human rights tradeoffs' (c.f Donnelly/Forsythe 1989: 305-328) arises out of an existing or perceived tension between different human rights conceptions which are rooted ultimately in two important, but distinct normative goals of enlightened humanity -- autonomy and equality. Problems are often resolved by choosing to protect and enforce either certain political or certain economic rights at the expense of others. Such choices seem especially unavoidable when limited resources place severe strains on government policies. Researchers frequently rate such choices more or less favorably, depending on the researchers' own normative preferences (c.f. Wiarda/Kline 1979, Wiarda 1982, McClean et al. 1978, Schwab 1979, Pollis/Schwab 1979, Howard/Donnelly 1983 and 1986, Donnelly 1984, Owen 1988, Louis 1989).

Similar to the controversy over economic versus political rights, there has been an ongoing debate over the extent to which one standard of human rights analysis can apply to different cultures. Some, notably proponents of developing countries, have argued against the predominance of the Western conception of rights as claims against government by individuals. Instead, in accordance with their tradition they have focused more strongly on communal, ethnic and national rights. Others insisting that cultural context becomes all too often a pretext for grave human rights violations claim that "Human rights must be individual rights and must be universal, otherwise they do not protect real, concrete people against class-ruled people" (Howard 1986: 8).

In the past human rights have frequently eluded empirical analysis. Most rights violations were difficult to verify. Often, insufficient data were available especially for those

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countries in which most of the violations took place. In addition, there have been numerous problems with defining and operationalizing a concept as complex as human rights. Even after sorting through the normative issues, in which any conception of human rights is invariably embedded, researchers found themselves confronted with long catalogues of codified human rights (c.f. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights). The scope of human rights and the long list of indicators necessary has continued to be a major obstacle for empirical research. Scholars of human rights have therefore turned to alternative approaches. In some instances, analysts used proxy-measures such as indicators of democratic performance and competitiveness, while other studies have focused on basic human needs and general notions of human dignity and well-being. Such alternative approaches however, have led away from the research topic of human rights. Conceptions of democracy and human dignity are related to but, nevertheless, distinct from human rights in the sense of individual entitlement. As well, there is a clear difference between 'having a right' by holding a claim to it, and being able to enjoy the substance of a right by the 'grace' of some benevolent government.

Of the four major problems of cross-national human rights research listed above, the last one deals with the necessity of comparing fundamentally unequal units of analysis. Few would disagree that it is certainly important for the world community to share some absolute standard of human rights and to judge countries accordingly. Ideally, all governments would then be expected to live up to such standards. In the far more imperfect reality, however, it is not necessarily practical to compare Switzerland with Sierra Leone and come to the obvious conclusion that the human rights record of the latter is far worse. As the capacity of government of these two countries is vastly different, we would naturally expect a difference in general political, economic and social performance. There is no reason to assume that this

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would be any different with respect to human rights performance. This gives rise to the question of how we can give adequate consideration to a particular context of countries while neither excusing human rights violations in the name of economic imperatives, nor retreating to a completely relativist understanding of human rights.

In order to move beyond the above problems I operate with two novel concepts, which have, to my knowledge, never been empirically grounded before. The first is the concept of basic human rights (henceforth also: 'BHR'), initially introduced by Henry Shue (1987). The other is that of human rights effort.

Basic human rights establish minimal standards of decent political and social governmental practice by reducing a complex catalogue of different international political and social rights to a few essential rights clustered around individual survival and security. Along with Henry Shue, I argue that basic human rights have three fundamental characteristics that set them apart from conventional conceptions of human rights, making them especially applicable for the purposes of this research project. These are that: (a) their provision is the prerequisite for any higher-order human rights, whether these be political, social or cultural, meaning that basic rights do not then rest upon a particular cultural conception of human rights, (b) since none of the basic rights can be sacrificed without threatening human security and subsistence, they do not allow for rights tradeoffs, and (c) since they represent only minimal demands upon governments, they are more easily affordable, even for lesser developed countries. I also agree with Henry Shue's theory that basic human rights constitute fundamental claims to government by humans regardless of gender, race or class, in that basic human rights are universal. Incidently, by distinguishing between basic rights and higher-order rights neither Henry Shue nor I argue that the latter are less desirable or unimportant. The

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issue is, rather, that before being concerned about more complex human rights, one must analyze the conditions under which and the extent to which governments secure basic rights.

In contrast to most traditional approaches to human rights, which conceptualize the issue-area in terms of two competing concepts -- political and economic rights -- I view basic human rights as two dimensions of essentially the same concept. One can imagine this very much like a plane being spanned by these dimensions, on which nations take up respective positions based on their performance in both security and subsistence rights. Subsequently, nations can be classified and analyzed in terms of their economic wealth, political history and regime type to help explain BHR-performance.

The other major concept underlying this research is human rights effort. Thus far, the literature has mainly focused on human rights performance by comparing countries by an absolute set of standards. In contrast to 'performance', human rights effort seeks to assess a government's record on human rights by taking into account both the means and resources available to that government. Assuming that wealthier countries are far better equipped to guarantee certain human rights, this study means to put human rights performance into perspective by controlling for level of development and economic prosperity. The concept of 'effort' is conceived of here not as a substitute but, rather, as a supplement to human rights performance. Therefore, analysis of 'effort' may help us discover which part of the poor human rights performance of a poor country X is due to its lacking capacity and which part is due to lack of will or commitment to human rights. In short, the concept of 'effort' works in two ways; on one hand it is sensitive to the constrained economic situation of poorer countries and on the other hand it does not relieve these governments of their commitment to human rights to the extent that they are capable of securing them. Human rights effort will

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enable researchers to incorporate the special economic conditions of a country without retreating to a relativist position, which would claim that different contexts require a different set of human rights priorities. In this dissertation then, I shall furthermore make the case that conventional methods of quantifying human rights have been strongly biased against economically less developed countries. Without much differentiation the poorest of the poor nations are frequently jointly grouped into the bottom category of international human rights ranking indices (c.f. Strouse and Claude 1976; Arthur Banks 1979; Gastil 1984;). Using the novel concept of human rights effort, I will illustrate that such rankings are highly problematic.

Assessing and comparing human rights performance is only one side of the coin. In the past, researchers have too often been content to accept economic explanations of poor human rights performance, without giving adequate consideration to political and historical factors. In contrast, I shall place great emphasis on political explanations by paying close attention to the role of regime-type as potentially the most important political explanation of human rights conditions. In examining the regime conditions most favorable to human rights I hope to make a contribution not only to the issue-area of human rights, but also to the literature on regimes.

In short, the objective of this dissertation is (a) to assess cross-national basic human rights performance and effort for as many countries as possible, and (b) to provide explanations thereof. Accomplishing this task, will require the following operations:

* First, to define and operationalize a set or index of human rights that is both universal and truly basic in the sense conceptualized by Henry Shue (1987).

* Secondly, to measure the performance and effort of governments with respect to such rights.

* Thirdly, to provide some explanation for differing human rights performances and effort

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across countries. In doing so I shall mainly rely upon a wide variety of contemporary literature on comparative politics and human rights.

A further point needs to be addressed here, namely that human rights research is always vulnerable to the criticism of advertently or inadvertently fusing normative and positive questions, which is seen as a threat to the scientific rigor of the analysis (c.f. Hudson 1969, Is/Ought Question). Without any false pretense, I would like to stress the normative dimension underlying my research, the goal of which is to clearly identify those governments that either have good BHR-performance, or that make a strong effort to secure basic human rights. My 'normative bias' also includes the belief that individuals will need both economic security and physical protection to realize a decent human life. In other words, while human rights research as an undertaking can never be value-free, its operationalization, can, nevertheless, follow a methodological process of inter-subjective empirical testing and validation.

As stated earlier, I believe that it is important to retain a universalist perspective on human rights as far as core rights are concerned, which remains, nevertheless, sensitive to different cultural, economic and social realities and traditions. In order to understand the controversy surrounding different conceptions of human rights we need first trace the evolution of contemporary human rights.

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THE LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENT -- AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Establishing limits on the legitimate range of state action is one of the primary functions of human rights. The present notion of human rights, including the somewhat fuzzy boundaries of the concept, is the product of a long historical process, each epoch adding to and transforming the conceptual conglomerate that we have come to call human rights.

Natural Law and the Universality of Rights

It is widely believed that the concept of human rights emerged from the notion of natural law (Maritain 1947:64-8, Messner 1965:278, 326; Cranston 1973:7; Palumbo 1982:9, 22). The origin of the idea that nature assures a particular dignity for all human beings is much older, however, and dates back to Greek Stoicism, and Roman law and was then developed more fully over the course of early Christianity (c.f. Forsythe 1991:1-26). The main contribution of early Christianity to contemporary human rights lies in the idea of universality. Early on Christian dogma specifically affirmed the all-encompassing character of natural law which was founded on the universal genius of God. When we today take medieval Christian notions of natural law as our point of departure for the discussion of contemporary human rights, it is important to remember that originally natural law had a meaning quite different

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Aquinas, whose theory of natural law is perhaps the best known of all classical theories, natural law is prior and above merely human ordinances. "The participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica: question 91, article 2). For Aquinas natural law exists at the intersection of the divine and human realms. Since humans are able to grasp only a small portion of the divine reason (c.f. Aquinas, Summa Theologica : parts 1a, 2ae; question 19; article 10; objection 1), however, natural law is restricted to general precepts. Therefore, it must be supplemented by what Aquinas calls 'human laws' -- roughly the laws of political life and practice which are particular specifications of the general precepts of natural law. In contrast to the modern understanding of rights as 'entitlement under the law', Aquinas' 'right' is "the good at which justice aims" (Donnelly 1985:48), and law is the written expression thereof. Rights and law are simply two different ways of looking at the same thing. In other words, it would be wrong or at least anachronistic, to infer from the medieval understanding of natural law that somehow natural rights are derived from natural law. Accordingly, it is equally wrong to consider natural rights a prescriptive set of entitlement grounded in an underlying framework called natural law as this would be a modern interpretation.

Rights Versus Duties.

Natural law is a part of eternal law and does not provide the foundation for individual claims in cases of abuse. In Aquinas' understanding, natural law in itself does not give rise to rights but merely states what is right. Natural law entails certain obligations or duties for everyone including the ruler. However, if a tyrant fails to fulfill his obligations, natural law itself does not provide sufficient grounds for political action against the ruler. In other words,

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from the violation of natural law do not automatically follow particular rights prescribing a particular course of action. This does not mean, however, that overthrowing the tyrant would be inconsistent with natural law; these are simply two separate issues. In Aquinas' conception such an act of rebellion would, at the most, pertain to the realm of 'human law' resting on human contingencies rather than natural law. To put it differently, natural law in the original sense has no means of redress. This is clearly a far-cry from contemporary conceptions of rights to self-determination, political participation or equal protection under the law. These rights are considered natural and universally valid. The underlying conception of natural right is a very different one from that of Aquinas. In the former case these rights belong to men qua men, and their violations warrant remedial action by the people. Such rights simply do not exist for Aquinas (c.f. Donnelly 1985:49-50).

If, indeed, modern conceptions of human rights and medieval natural law diverge so much why is the latter often taken to be the starting point for the evolution of the former? There are mainly two reasons. For one, natural law in the medieval Christian context is one of the first comprehensive legal frameworks which places restrictions of power on the ruler. Neither the reign of a ruler nor his law must contradict natural law, as he rules only by the grace of God, that is qua divine law. This stands in marked contrast to many other cultures in which rulers themselves were considered divine and the ultimate source of all law. Secondly, the idea of an all-encompassing universality, which was the most fundamental characteristic of classical natural law, has survived in the universal validity of modern human rights laws.

An analysis of medieval natural law is relevant for the modern human rights debate also for a third reason. There are some important parallels between pre-modern Western

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natural law conceptions and most present non-Western conceptions of human rights. In Christian medieval natural law as well as in Islamic, Asian and African cultures human rights are conceptualized almost entirely as a system of duties. Similar to Aquinas' recognition that a full human life and human dignity require certain duties, non-Western cultures often evolved elaborate systems of duties that in many instances provide the substance of life, justice, speech, religion, work, health, education, and so forth. Nevertheless, stating what is right and establishing a set of duties for the state or the ruler is not the same as having a right, or claim, in the modern Western sense. The difference may be subtle, but is nevertheless important. In the case of rights, which constitute individual entitlement, the individual is the source of the right and therefore, (at least theoretically) has the option of legal recourse if rights are not guaranteed. By contrast, in a system of duties the individual does not have automatic legal recourse if governments fail to fulfill their obligations. In the system of medieval natural law, for example, rulers had duties vis-a-vis their subjects, the neglect thereof, however, was not a violation against the population affected, but rather against the natural order of things and ultimately against God. In addition, not only do individuals not have the means of legal redress, but rulers may unilaterally free themselves from such obligations against certain subjects, if, for instance, these subjects seem particularly disloyal or if extraordinary circumstances call for it. In short, the issue here is neither a question of whether notions of human dignity exist in other cultures, nor whether the substance of human rights can be provided in other systems of human dignity but rather whether human rights claimable by an individual are a distinctly modern and Western concept, which were as alien to medieval natural law theory as they are to today's non-Western cultures. Ultimately, the most important difference between modern human rights and other (ancient or contemporary)

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conceptions of human dignity concerns the fundamental distinction of whether people are the source of rights, as in Western understanding, or merely the beneficiaries of the substance of rights.

The distinction between rights and duties is a very important aspect in the course of this project. Accordingly, basic human rights are conceptualized as basic claims, that is, as individual entitlement, and not as basic governmental duties. I shall argue that only the modern Western concept of 'claim-rights' can fully guarantee the political, social and economic security of individuals.

Individualism and Human Rights

In the late middle ages and Renaissance, the traditional medieval natural law doctrine that no state could engage in violations of natural law began to shift towards the assertion of individual rights on the basis of natural law. This transformation is evidenced in such important documents as the Magna Carta in 1215, the English Bill of Rights in 1689 and the American Declaration of Independence in 1776 (Weston 1984: 264-267).

The shift from God as the source of law to the individual was a very gradual process. In the work of John Locke is found one of the first affirmations of the individual as being at the "center.... of the moral world" (Strauss, 1953:248); however, Locke hesitates to part completely with the medieval world of ideas writing that "God is the source of natural law, which is a law of reason not of individual interests, and natural law obliges both in the state of nature and in society" (in: Donnelly 1985: 69). In contrast to the medieval natural law doctrine, however, Locke shifts the focus of natural law to (human) society. He argues that "everybody is bound to preserve himself..[but] the first and fundamental natural Law...is the preservation of Society" (Locke 1967: para.7). Natural law, while retaining its claim to universal validity is conceived as a feature of human society. In fact, some (c.f. Donnelly 1985: 71) argue that through his use of 'property', Locke transforms natural rights, which he derives from natural law, in an interesting way leading to a uniquely Western concept of rights. While the term 'property' has several meanings in Locke, in one sense it becomes synonymous with 'having a right'. For example, Locke writes that "every man has a Property in his own Person... [T]his no body has rights to but himself" (Locke 1967: para. 30). In other words, people have the right or title to themselves. Obviously, then, the individual becomes

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the source of the most fundamental (human) right, that of the right to life or survival. Government, according to Locke, is obliged to preserve the property of its citizens. The literature remains divided over the question whether by this Locke means possessions alone, or whether he includes life, liberty or rights in general (c.f. Donnelly 1985: 72; Macpherson 1963: 263-4).

Nevertheless, Locke's theory is essentially individualistic and opens up a new dimension in the conceptualization of human dignity and corresponding rights. In the new natural law doctrine the individual is endowed with certain inalienable rights that are never renounced, even when people enter into a contractual relationship with a ruler or a government (Weston 1984: 264-267). Maurice Cranston (1979), for instance, presents a modern interpretation of this natural law conception arguing that the need for human rights arises out of a human's vulnerability due to lack of any kind of natural protection. In other words, physical and economic human survival is seen as depending very much upon one's protection by the community. According to Cranston, such elementary natural human rights are not a carte blanche relieving the individual of self-mastery and self-responsibility, but rather entail a basic guarantee to physical security and subsistence. I shall return to this point later when I discuss the theoretical foundation of basic rights. Cranston's argument bears important parallels to the concept of basic human rights. Like Cranston's position, the concept of basic human rights not only entails universal validity, but is also based on a naturally arising need to security and subsistence, the substance of which must be secured by the community, respectively by government in a more complex modern society.

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Liberty and Human Rights

Whereas Locke helped bring individualism and especially liberty into focus, the idea of 'liberty', became the primary vehicle of the development of human rights in the West. The concern with liberty as the foundation of a framework of rights is most forcefully expressed in John Stuart Mill's "Essay on Liberty" (1859: 87) in which he writes:

> No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it."(Mill 1859: 87)

Mill proposes an entire catalogue of rights to guarantee the kind of individual liberty he so cherishes, including the "freedom of consciousness and religion,.... the liberty of thought and feeling...., absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects..., the liberty of tastes and pursuits..., the freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm...., (ibid.).

The Western concern with liberty not only shaped the understanding of human rights, but became the engine of revolutions and generated entire constitutional frameworks, whose legal concerns far exceed the issue of human rights. The Western 'obsession' with liberty, however, would prove problematic for human rights in the long run. Liberty in the West meant always also the liberty to pursue profit and property, the acquisition, defense and protection of which would ultimately be possible only by denying human rights to those that stood in the way of one's rights to accumulate property. Strangely enough, the concern with liberty, therefore, had two rather opposite consequences. On one hand liberalism meant the affirmation of a universal humanity in the sense that humans are born free and equal, while on the other, classical liberalism opened the door to a differentiated framework of citizen

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rights which categorized 'equal and free humans' by property qualifications, gender, class and nationality.

Important manifestations of the liberal conception of human rights includes the following documents; the English Bill of Rights (1689), the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the American Constitution (1789) and the American Bill of Rights (the first ten Amendments 1791), and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789). All of these catalogues of rights had the same intention to curb the powers of the Crown/government by trying to preserve the "natural and inalienable rights of man" as expressed in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. Rights such as 'due process', 'freedom of assembly', 'freedom of thought and expression', 'equality before the law', 'protection of property rights' and many other civil and political rights and freedoms are today an integral part of the constitutional inventory of every civilized society. The conventional wisdom of liberal thinking was based on the assumption that if people were left alone by government to pursue their own business, all individuals would prosper. In short, a catalogue of liberal rights would automatically take care of economic and social problems. Adam Smith put this way: "the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to society" (Smith, in Stepan: 8). The neglect of the social and economic dimension by classical liberalism, aggravated by the adverse effects of the industrial revolution and imperialism, would eventually lead to social and economic rights, the most formidable challenge of liberal conception of human rights. Individual liberty, however flawed, remains the hallmark of the Western human rights tradition; in this the Western perspective is unique and different from all other former and present conceptions of rights and human dignity. While the ideas of

universality, moral decency and personal well-being/happiness are also present in other cultures, the concept of individual autonomy is the chief western contribution to modern human rights.

It is important to emphasize that the classical liberal human rights tradition has two rather unequal present day intellectual offsprings, which are often confused. Firstly, there is the so called modern liberal approach which is characterized by the promotion of political rights to equal concern and respect, the gist of which was eloquently summarized by Richard Dworkin (1977: 272-73):

> Governments must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who are capable of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived. Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect. It must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that some citizen are entitled to more because they are worthy of more concern. If must not constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception of the good life....is nobler or superior to another's.

The other heir to the liberal human rights tradition developed the idea of individual liberty or autonomy much further, advocating the pursuit of individual self-interest, or selfish interest as some might say, as the most fundamental right of all. By advocating a system of free market relations for all human affairs the libertarian tradition favors a minimal state with only very limited capacity (c.f. Nozick 1974). In opposition to the modern liberal approach, libertarians would regard the emphasis on equality and concern/respect as unwelcome. According to Bentham, "nothing ought to be done or attempted by government" (Jeremy Bentham in Stepan: 8). In other words, government's concern, whether equal or particular, is always seen as a negative intervention and distortion of the natural ambitions of people and the (market) mechanism established between them. While I return to this point later, it should be emphasized here that the libertarian concept of unlimited individual accumulation is

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fundamentally incompatible with the concept of basic human rights (c.f. Howard/Donnelly 1986: 806-7). Most rights, especially economic and social rights, depend on capable and committed state institutions for their enforcement. Libertarians conceive civil liberties narrowly, as rights to public noninterference in the private lives. The minimalist, however, explicitly protects property rights while rejecting economic and social rights. "(Classical) Liberalism's dual pursuit of autonomy and equality is replaced in minimalism by a single-minded pursuit of autonomy understood largely as the social guarantee of the broadest possible sphere of private action" (Howard/Donnelly 1986: 807).

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Human Rights and Legal Guarantism

Bold declarations and a lengthy catalogue of human rights amount to little more than 'barking' without the ability to 'bite' on occasions. By this I am referring to ability of individuals to claim their right, either through government enforcement or through legal proceedings. Even John Locke's theoretical 'natural rights' formulations were probably of "secondary importance compared to the crafting of standards of liberty by English jurists" (Claude 1976: 19). Parallel to the sometimes esoteric writings of Hobbes, Locke and others, generations of British jurists had been engaged in a bitter struggle with the Crown and in doing so had generated new (human rights) laws. Acquiring economic resources, members of the English middle class sought a marginal share of the power and protection through some measure of legal recognition in the form of declarations of rights and privileges. With the spread of early capitalism and the simultaneous decline of the institutions of agrarian feudalism, the need to somehow redefine the status of the individual was made unavoidable, principally on account of critical changes affecting the individual in the distribution of material goods. The assertion of property rights was the linchpin "which joined the individual's new economic role with his citizenship role as a public individual" (Claude 1976: 16). Changes in the relationship between the nobility and the commercially successful, propertied (but usually unlanded and untitled) middle class, the 'third estate', were sweeping through much of post-feudal Europe; nowhere, however, was this development more revolutionary than in England. There an informal alliance existed between a relatively independent Parliament, that could count on the financial support of the middle class, and a class of jurists and judges. Especially, the latter was the key in developing the civil liberties

that later found their way into the constitutions of most Western countries. The role of "jurists [was] pivotal in aiding Parliament to resolve the .... problem of human rights development: that of the legal status of the individual" (Claude 1976: 17). Key judges, for instance, aided doctrinal development sympathetic to civil liberties and sided with Parliament in its opposition to royal prerogatives (c.f. Claude 1976: 15-21; see also: Marshall 1981). These ascriptive rights were grounded not in philosophical abstractions but in a "process of slowly broadening out from precedent to precedent" (Claude 1976: 17). The courts were finally rewarded with a document guaranteeing judicial independence (Act of Settlement of 1701).

In opposition to the preference of the foreign king (James I) and some members of the bar for the abstractions and logic of Roman civil law, a movement led by Sir Edward Coke sprung up that sought to revive and affirm the old English law tradition (c.f. Claude 1976: 20). A new influential commentary on the Magna Carta by Coke (1628) proved especially important. The activities of Coke and his followers in relying on the Magna Carta led to the abolition of special tribunals, the due process laws and the Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and 1679. From 1689 the Crown was held to the Bill of Rights and freedom of the press was assured by permitting the old Licensing Act to lapse in 1695. These rights were justified not so much by resorting to 'natural rights' but by reference to "the ancient [English] customs of the realm" (Claude 1976: 18). In fact, it was Thomas Jefferson who had written from Paris to James Madison in 1787 expressing his conviction that "....a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth" (in: Ford 1899: 4, 477). His concern was understandable considering that the American Constitution, drawn up in Philadelphia in the same year, made few references to individual freedoms. This problem had arisen from the

fact that whereas English law and with it the English Bill of Rights had remained in force under the First Continental Congress (1774), the new Constitution of 1787 had created a new situation (Claude 1976: 20). The problem was eventually amended by passing the federal Bill of Rights, which was largely based on the Virginia Declaration of Rights written by planter-lawyer George Mason. Jefferson's concern for guaranteed individual rights was also understandable from another perspective, as he was a witness to the frequent human rights abuses in pre-revolutionary France, where in the absence of any guarantees of citizen's rights, the king could imprison enemies without restriction by the notorious sealed lettres de cachet (Claude 1976: 21).

The issue of legal guarantism is of special importance to the concept of basic human rights, which is centered around the concrete applicability thereof. I shall design the measures for basic human rights so that the extent to which governments secure such rights can be assessed. Rather than deriving a very broad hypothetical catalogue of rights without adequate legal, political and economic guarantees, the concept applied in this research project will focus on the ability of government to secure rights (e.g. freedom from capital punishment, rights to minimal eduction, rights to adequate nutrition and safe water etc.,); the realization of which requires both political will and economic resources. Governments will, therefore, be rated based on their ability to deliver.

Challenges to Universality (I) -- The Western Critics of the Natural Law Doctrine

The evolution of human rights was by no means a linear development and today's conception of human rights is shaped as much by the evolution of liberal Western natural rights philosophy as it is shaped by the challenges and opposition to that notion. Since the types of human rights enshrined in the various constitutions and bills of rights, which had been adopted by many Western nations in the age of constitutionalism, were intimately associated with liberalism, the decline of liberal thought and the challenges to liberal ideology necessarily led to challenges of the Western liberal idea of human rights. Criticism of the Western concept of human rights was not confined to the political left and to non-Western philosophies, but included challenges from within the Western liberal tradition itself.

The Utilitarian Perspective.

Within the Western tradition some thinkers, most notably Hume, Burke and Bentham, (c.f. Cranston 1979: 18) argued strongly against grounding human rights in natural law for their lack of empirical verifiability. Others, such as Savigny and Mill (c.f. Mill 1859; 1862), suggested that human rights could only be based upon utility and/or were necessarily bounded by cultural relativism.

Utilitarianism was, in fact, considered an alternative to human rights. Given the great variety of utilitarian perspectives on this issue the following represents only a small but significant selection. According to Bentham "that which is useful is right: a right is that which grows out of the greatest application of the happiness principle" (Bentham 1834:136-7). Bentham, as well as other utilitarians, claim that rights are subservient to utility. This,

however, amounts to a repudiation of rights as we know them today. If applied, the notion of the subservience of rights to utility would be especially crippling to the idea of human rights. Donnelly, for instance, tries to refute utilitarian claims by pointing to a scenario in which everyone in a society intensely enjoys torturing members of a fringe political group, so that the calculations of pains and pleasure establish beyond all doubt that such torture would maximize utility (Donnelly 1985: 52). According to Donnelly such a determination would only increase the importance of rights to freedom of expression and personal liberty. Utilitarian considerations seem particularly damaging to the idea of basic human rights, since such calculations would inevitably lead to the kinds of rights tradeoffs that the concept of basic human rights tries to avoid. Not only could utilitarian calculations be used to determine which types of human rights would help maximize utility at the expense of other rights, but with respect to economic and social rights, marginalized groups would find it particularly difficult to convince the majority of the utility to provide certain costly services to the under-class. As Donnelly puts it "....The subservience of utility to rights is the whole point of the special normative force of rights as trumps; subservient to utility, 'rights' are no longer rights" (Donnelly 1985: 52).

Challenges to Universality (II) -- The Critique by Cultural Relativists

The other great challenge to universalism comes from cultural relativists. The criticism here is twofold; (a) human rights like all products of human society are bounded by time, location and context; therefore, to speak of universal human rights was naturally considered a problem on grounds of principle, (b) in addition, if the Western human rights conception had become the dominant global approach then this could obviously not be a consequence of universal validity, but rather the result of Western hegemony imposing its cultural standards on other cultures. Unlike the utilitarian challenge, the issue of universalism versus relativism is still a very topical debate and is likely to continue for some time into the future (c.f. Hill 1992: 1-22). The recent World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 1993 found it necessary, for instance, to affirm on several occasions the "universality, indivisibility and the inter-dependence of all human rights" (UN: Vienna Declaration 1993). This statement by the conference organizers had by no means been assured, as there had been loud calls for a much more relativist and context oriented interpretation of human rights by many of the non-Western member countries. Numerous arguments have been made against the Western human rights standards, which have been dubbed by some critics 'human rights ideology' (for a more thorough discussion of relativism versus universalism see; Alston 1987; Bozeman 1971; Claude 1989; Donnelly 1985; Donnelly 1989; Forsythe 1985; Franck 1982; Howard 1985; Howard/Donnelly 1986; Marenin 1980; Milne 1986; Pollis/Schwab 1979; Renteln 1990; Schirmer 1988; Siegel 1985).

The Critique of Individual Autonomy

One of the chief objections against the Western understanding of human rights raised by cultural relativists is the individualistic nature of Western human rights. Communitarian societies view rights for which the source is exclusively the individual as potentially destructive to the community. In societies centered around group or communitarian rights the basic social unit is not the individual, and essential human dignity is defined as excelling in fulfillment of one's obligation to one's group. Similarly, the question of autonomy and freedom is interpreted differently. In contrast to the Western concept of individual autonomy, other cultures frequently claim to understand the concept of freedom and accompanying moral rights, in terms of freedom from colonization and exploitation. This also includes the right to development as well as the protection of traditional customs, culture and religion (c.f. Nickel 1987: 4-12). Other criticisms of Western human rights include the following aspects; for one, liberal rights presuppose the organization of society into states and place the individual in opposition to the state (with the assumption the individual is paramount) (c.f. Donnelly 1989: 67). Secondly, it is argued that the economic and social dimension of human existence is largely ignored. In another instance, Islamic countries have complained bitterly against granting people the right to change their religion. Another case of dispute is the attempt to enforce Western-style child labor laws upon Third World societies. A further issue concerns the practice of female circumcision of which Alison Renteln in her recent work International Human Rights concludes "The fact that many women in the society perpetuate the custom is one which must be squarely faced... . The presumption of universality cannot alter the reality that the practice is accepted as moral by members of the culture" (Renteln 1990: 58).

Pollis and Schwab (c.f. 1979; 1982) are among the most vocal critics of the

international pervasiveness of the Western human rights. In their review of the international human rights documents such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Pollis and Schwab find "abundantly clear" evidence that the Western concept of political liberty and democracy is the overriding philosophy in those documents (Pollis/Schwab 1979: 5). As Pollis and Schwab write,

> the primacy of political rights is clear....[the rights in the UDHR] are an indication of a culturally centered priority that gives more weight to certain types of rights [political and civil rights] than others (Pollis/Schwab 1979: 9).

Pollis and Schwab conclude that the current universalist approach to human rights is a culturally-bound "Western construct with limited applicability" (1979: 5).

Modern Conceptions of Relativism.

There is, however, a different relativist position, which is more moderate and tries to narrow the gap between relativism and universalism. Under this revised relativist rights conception Renteln (1990) proposes an approach based on three types of moral challenges to established international human rights standards. First, an act/practice can be contrary to the norms of the society in which it occurs. Secondly, an act/practice can violate both internal and universal standards. Thirdly, an act/practice can be in accordance with internal norms but violates the critic's standards. The problem of universality arises only in the last of the three cases for the other two there are established moral standards by which to judge human rights practices. In the third case a thorough cross-cultural analysis may help resolve the critics' qualm. With this argument Renteln tries to refute claims that a relativist' conception would have to accept all behaviors as equally valid. Renteln argues that such unresolved cross-cultural issues may be dealt with by extensive comparative empirical research to uncover

cross-cultural universals. Rights and standards should then, according to Renteln, be considered universal if shared by a majority of cultures. For Renteln, relativism provides insights into the inner cultural logic of the society under study but "in no way precludes the possibility of cross-cultural universals discovered through empirical research... . It seems that all cultures have mechanisms which are intended to limit violence and to prevent needless killing" (Renteln 1990: 62, 133).

Third World Perspectives.

The most important criticism of Western human rights comes from representatives of other cultures, most notably African, Islamic and Latin American critics. Josiah A. M. Cobbah (1987), in comparing the Western ideas of Locke and Hobbes with the African philosophy of existence writes that "the evolution of liberalism undermined the validity of all groups that held an intermediate position between the individual and the State" (Cobbah 1987: 315). Cobbah maintains that the African lifestyle features cohesiveness and the importance of kinship with the extended family, rather than the Western nuclear family, as the chief unit of relationship. He writes that "as a people Africans emphasize groupness, sameness and commonality" (Cobbah 1987: 320). In his analysis Cobbah points to the writings of Niara Sudarkasa who found that African society was ordered around four rules of kinship: "respect, restraint, responsibility and reciprocity" (Cobbah 1987: 323). He further argues that close to 80% of Africans live in a traditional setting of rurality including a communal lifestyle with all its responsibilities and entitlement. Obinna Okere, for instance, points to the African Charter of Human Rights, which, according to Okere, combines Western values with African philosophy and concern for economic development within the context of group solidarity

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(Okere 1984: 147).

In the Islamic tradition the investigation of human rights is often a study of the scriptural values as basis for human rights values (c.f. Maqbul Ilahi Malik 1981: 56-67). Malik, one of the most eminent Islamic human rights scholars, finds evidence for a philosophic conformity to Western standards within Islam. According to Malik, this includes even controversial issues such as religious toleration as well as most civil, political and economic rights. He concedes, however, that despite the scriptural emphasis on government rule through the shura (consultation), this (very democratic) idea was never adopted in practice (Malik 1981: 59). James Piscatori, another proponent of the islamic human rights tradition, asserts that Islam "set definite limits to the cycle of murder and revenge that traditionally exposed the individual to the perils of blood feuds" (Piscatori 1980: 141). He admits, however, that the Western conception affording all individuals inviolable freedoms as an inherent consequence of their being, is "largely alien to Islam" (Piscatori 1980: 142). Similar to pre-modern Christian natural law conceptions (c.f. especially Donnelly, 1985, on Islam and medieval natural law: 49-50), the Islamic concept of right is also more applicable to the divine rather than the human realm (Piscatori 1980: 142). It should be immediately apparent that the positions of Malik and Piscatori are somewhat in contradiction with each other; however, both emphasize that in Islam the relationship between the individual and the state as well as the emphasis on community are different from the Western ideal. The state in Islam has a clear mandate to interpret the will of God and to protect the believers from wrongdoing. In other words, the state, according to Malik, combines political and religious functions to ensure the good of the community (Malik 1981: 59). Individual needs are clearly subordinate.

In The State and Society Alfred Stepan (1978) identifies Latin American political philosophy as an organic-statist tradition. This tradition, also termed corporatism, has its origins in Western thought. In this conception, according to Stepan, the emphasis on rational, individual self-interest is replaced by the premise that the preferred form of the human political life is being a member of a community. Stepan argues that the "central normative theme is that man's nature can only be fulfilled within a community" (Stepan 1978: 32). Stepan traces origins of this development back to Aristotelian thought, Roman law, medieval natural law and especially contemporary Catholic social philosophy. In the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum Leo XIII identifies the state with specific moral ends (Stepan 1978: 32). If the state is to act effectively to restore equality and a sense of well-being to society, then it must be interventionist and strong -- in some instances even a benevolent developmentalist dictatorship.

> The concept of the common good, with the moral obligations it imposes on the state to achieve the general welfare, leaves open the possibility that the state can formulate and impose on its own initiative major changes in the established order so as to create a more just society. (Stepan 1978: 33).

Stepan's position is echoed by Neale Ronning (1979) and Patricia Ruffin (1982), who both point to political manifestations of this idea in the form of the "caretaker" dictorships of a either a conservative or left-wing nature. Ruffin argues that socialism in Latin America has incorporated the "communal base of traditional Latin American societies" (Ruffin 1982: 120).

Defending the Liberal Position.

In all three cultural spheres discussed above political thought and corresponding conceptions of human rights differ substantially from Western liberal-pluralism. The main

difference generally concerns the role of the individual and their position vis-a-vis the state. The shared philosophical approach in most non-Western societies is change (development) through the state and the subordination of the individual to the community. The issue of context-bound versus cross-cultural rights standards is of particular importance to this research project, given its wide scope and its large sample size.

The concept of basic human rights employed in this study is undoubtedly broader than the Western-liberal focus on civil and political rights. It is, however, strongly rooted in the Western tradition (as are most international human rights documents) of individual autonomy and universal validity. How then are we to confront the relativist challenge?

I believe that Howard and Donnelly have addressed this question very forcefully. Rhoda Howard's study of human rights in Commonwealth Africa is perhaps the most extensive analysis of the social factors that influence the human rights debate in Africa (c.f. Howard 1986). In the countries surveyed she argues that, despite great regional variation, the "specious ideology of the communal and inherently democratic nature of African society" (Howard 1986: 8) is an all-too-convenient excuse for abrogating individual civil liberties. Howard sees a high potential for abuse in a political framework that does not offer Western-style guarantees of political participation. The "allegedly consensual nature of pre-colonial African society" is often used to justify one-party states or the elimination of formal elections (Howard 1986: 8). The African Charter 'Human and Peoples Rights' is indeterminate and refers to sovereign states rather than individual cultural grouping (Howard 1986: 6). Howard asserts that in the African as well as in any other cultural setting "human rights must be individual rights and must be universal, otherwise they do not protect concrete people against class-ruled peoples" (Howard 1986: 8). She contends, especially with reference to Pollis and

Schwab, that proponents of cultural relativism all too often characterize all of the non-Western world vaguely as 'traditional' and communal without adequate differentiation. Ironically, the relativist core-values of tolerance and (democratic) respect for other cultural positions are themselves Western liberal values. Earlier in this chapter I pointed to Donnelly's distinction between definitions of rights and dignity (c.f. Donnelly 1989: 67). While other cultures may have high standards of human dignity and provide the substance of several important human rights, Donnelly (1989) makes a good case that a system of duties is ultimately never as effective as a system of claimable rights rooted in one's existence as a human being.

Further Challenges to Individual Autonomy -- The Marxist Critique and the Importance of Positive Rights

The Western liberal emphasis on individual autonomy was the aspect most criticized by cultural relativists and proponents of group rights. While the thrust of the Marxist critique is similar the reasoning is somewhat different. In a Marxist understanding individual freedom in a society stratified by class is primarily seen as the license of the propertied class to unlimited acquisition at the expense of the working class. Marx, for instance, commented scathingly on the kind of human rights specified in the various bills of rights accompanying 18th century constitutionalism, labeling them 'bourgeois' or 'citizen rights' ("droits du citoyen" Marx CW 1975: 162) rather then human rights ("droits de l'homme"); that is rights in the interest of a particular privileged class, denied to the masses (c.f. Kamenka 1978: 5; Nickel 1987: 1-12).

The Historical Roots of the Marxist Critique.

Marx's most extensive discussion of the rights of man is in "On the Jewish Question" in which he writes:

> [T]he so called rights of man...are nothing but....the rights of egotistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community (Marx CW 1975:III, 162). None of the so called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egotistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society, that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, and separated from the community (Marx CW 1975:III, 164).

In summarizing his argument in The Holy Family, Marx and Engels particularly emphasize the necessary connection between bourgeois society and human rights ideas.

In their own words ..

> The recognition of the rights of man by the modern state has no other meaning than the recognition of slavery by the state of antiquity did. In other words, just as the ancient state had slavery as its natural basis, the modern state has as its natural basis civil society and the man of civil society...the modern state has recognized.. [the slave of labor for gain and... men's selfish needs]... in the universal rights of men (c.f. Marx CW 1975:IV 113).

Donnelly writes that "[t]here can be no doubt that Marx saw the rights of man, like capitalism to which they were linked, as having played a positive, if limited, historical role that was coming to an end; i.e. human rights were seen by Marx as obsolescent and to be transcended in socialism" (c.f. Donnelly 1985: 74). It remains, however, somewhat unclear whether Marx intended to supplement or supplant bourgeois (natural) rights in socialism. Marx, for instance, distinguished the application of rights in the early post-revolutionary (Socialist) phase, in which the remnants of bourgeoisie society (unequal individuals) still exist, from the later (Communist) phase with a much greater emphasis on equal rights and equal standards -- "From each according to his ability to each according to his needs" (Marx SW 1968: 325; see also Weil 1973: 9-23). For the most part, for Marx rights are essentially instruments for carrying out adversary relation between competing and essentially atomistic individuals.

The state, against which Western liberal rights are directed, is viewed by Marx somewhat differently. In its bourgeois variant, the state in a capitalist society is as much a part of the superstructure and serves capitalist class interests as is the legal system including all rights specified therein. Marx, therefore, rejects the antagonistic relationship between rights and capitalist state. By contrast, in the post-revolutionary phase, especially during the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', the state is seen as the agent of societal change, respectively, as the advocate of the exploited class. Subsequently, the state becomes an irrelevant issue, as, according to Marx, the state will atrophy once classes are eliminated. Therefore, proletarian

socialist revolutions by eliminating the state, would remove the need for human rights, which would then become a superfluous anachronism (c.f. Donnelly 1985: 76).

Soviet Orthodoxy.

Soviet theory seems to depart from Marx's analysis as it focuses on the relationship between rights and duties (c.f. Chernenko 1981, Medvedev 1981) -- an idea that is not expressed as such by Marx. The preamble of the 1977 Constitution stated that the USSR "is a society of genuine democracy, whose political system ensures...the combination of real citizen's rights and liberties with their duties and responsibilities to society (Donnelly 1985: 77). Article 59 stated that "the exercise of rights and liberties is inseparable from then performance by citizens of their duties (c.f. in Donnelly 1985: 77). Similar examples of this relationship were reflected in statements by leading Soviet legal theorists such as ... " the linkage of rights and duties [is] the special quality of socialist law" (Sawczuk 1979: 89), ..." the most important feature of the Soviet citizen's legal status is the organic unity between their rights and their obligations" (Chkhidvadze 1980: 18). Soviet doctrine derived rights from duties and made their enjoyment contingent upon the performance of social duties. This becomes clear in the following example. The Soviet constitution (Article 40) guaranteed the rights to labor and choice of occupation, type of employment and work. Article 60, however, limited this right dramatically by demanding that "conscientious labour in one's chosen field of socially useful activity [emphasis added] and the observance of labor discipline are the duty of,...., every able-bodied USSR citizen".

The point here is not that the Soviet Union focused on a different set of rights in connection with a different understanding of democracy based on economic and social rights

but that the social was preferred to the individual (c.f. Klenner 1980). In contrast to the group rights conceptions discussed earlier in the section on relative rights, the concept of 'social' had a different meaning in the Soviet context, for the socialist state was itself taken to be the 'social', which was the group or community worth protecting. In this totalitarian conception of the state, violations against the socialist state were therefore violations against Socialist society as such.

From a Western perspective it is, therefore, important to distinguish between having a right and enjoying the substance of a right. In the Soviet case we would argue that contingent upon the compliance with duties the individual may have enjoyed the substance of certain economic and social rights; however, this is different from having a right (c.f. Hakim 1955: 3-6) The 'rights' mentioned in the Soviet constitutions had, according to Western understanding, more the character of privileges, which could, depending on the situation, be granted or revoked by the state. Since the state stood collectively for the socialist society at large to which the individual is subordinate, the individual had no means of recourse against the state (c.f. Donnelly 1985: 75-80). The state and not the individual was the source of rights.

The Dualism of Positive and Negative Rights.

The subordination of the individual to the state as the embodiment of society at large is a concept rejected throughout the West. In fact, the very idea of human rights as claims against and freedoms from the state is based on the exactly opposite understanding of the relationship between state and individuals. Accordingly, this aspect of the Marxist tradition has had little relevance for the evolution of Western human rights. In a different aspect,

however, Marxist thought was, indeed, of much greater influence. By the mid 19th century progressive liberals, labor advocates and social revolutionaries were convinced that civil liberties and political rights alone would neither alleviate the plight the working poor in the sprawling industrial centers of Europe and North America nor halt the growing social inequality of society in general. The situation called for measures -- welfare programs accompanied by social and economic rights -- designed especially for those who were unable to partake in the classical liberal vision of individual prosperity. This meant, however, that by targeting the needy these new rights were particularistic and represented a departure from the previous understanding of human rights. In the U.S., a new brand of (welfare) liberals argued that equality of opportunity and life chances were what liberalism really was all about. In Europe a growing movement of democratic Marxism made similar demands. The pressure from the street was successful in forcing directly and indirectly the governments of Germany and Britain to enact welfare legislation as early as the 1880s. Eventually, when social democrats governed much of Europe these rights were established and further expanded throughout the continent (c.f. Howard/Donnelly APSR 1987:924-27). Today they form an integral part of the Social Charter of the European Community (Haeusermann 1992: 47-74). In both the American model of New-Deal welfare-liberalism and European social democracy the state, the nemesis of classical liberalism, suddenly became the advocate of change and the ally of the underprivileged against a conservative status quo and powerful corporate interests. With expansion of social and economic rights the traditional liberal value of individual liberty was gradually supplemented with and to some extent replaced by the value of equality. The question of the role of the state as well as the duality of liberty and equality has since then characterized the contradictory nature of contemporary human rights.

Human rights have since been conceptualized as negative and positive rights depending upon what obligations they impose on the state. Political and civil rights the cornerstones of liberal Western human rights, are commonly counted among the so called negative rights, since they prevent the state from interfering in the actions of an individual (Forsythe 1981: 13-14). Positive rights, by contrast, entail that governments do something for their citizens. These rights include all fundamental social and economic rights and usually emphasize the government's duty to provide adequate housing, health care and education. It should become immediately clear that there is a tension between both sets of rights (c.f Forsythe 1981: 13-14). While negative or restraining rights seek to limit or reduce the role of the state, positive rights will naturally require a greater role of government. The establishment and steady expansion of positive rights have remained an important agenda for the political left, which continues rely upon an active government (c.f. Kamenka 1978: 5). In the twentieth century the emphasis on positive rights was naturally very strong in all Marxist societies[1] and in many developing countries. It will hardly surprise anybody that the notion of 'social equality' and government activism on behalf of the poor and underprivileged has been a popular idea in Africa and in much of the rest of the Third World (c.f. Nyerere: 1961). Modern day formulations of strong positive rights can be found, for instance, in the various basic need approaches and minimum threshold theories (c.f. Scott 1976; McClean et al. 1978; Pollis and Schwab 1979; Eide Asbjorn 1978, 1989: 35-51). Among the Western-industrialized nations the Scandinavian countries, most notably Sweden, have traditionally placed great importance on securing economic and social rights for their citizens (Forsythe 1978: 58-82).

Modern International Human Rights

When speaking of rights today, we usually refer to just and lawful entitlement (c.f. Kamenka 1978: 9-10; Cranston 1979: 21). In other words, a right "enables a holder to make certain claims on others, who are morally obliged to respect her or him" (Chan 1984: 364). A human right constitutes a moral and legitimate right based on moral claims against the state. Human rights pertain to all people at all times (Cranston 1979: 21). This definition is crucial, as it sets human rights apart from other rights. In contrast to other rights, human rights are inherited with humanity itself and are neither contingent upon merit nor upon professional, legal or other qualifications. The definition of human rights reflects a dual emphasis when it speaks of moral and legitimate claims. It is legitimate in the sense that human rights are recognized by the international community and legally guaranteed by many governments. In this human rights form part of the positive (codified) law of many nations. Human rights, however, also constitute moral claims, which go beyond domestic law and exist even when not recognized and not guaranteed by government. This moral claim implies a right to one's physical integrity, liberty as a person, security and sustenance regardless of gender, ethnicity or class.

In the previous section I indicated that modern human rights are the product of a long historical evolution. Originating in the universalism of Christian natural law, human rights have been transformed through classical liberalism's emphasis on individual liberty as well as through the ideas of the great anti-liberal social reform movements of the 19th and 20th century. Despite numerous assaults on the universality of human rights the idea survived and received international recognition after the experience of the Nazi-Holocaust and the slaughter

of WWII; the idea manifested itself in numerous international documents such as the European Convention of Human Rights (1953), the Convention and Charter of the Organization of American States (1969, entered into force 1978), the Arab League's Permanent Commission of Human Rights (1968), and the recently adopted African Charter on Human Rights (1987). It found its foremost expression, however, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Furthermore, it was embodied in international law by two international covenants of the UN General Assembly in 1966. Together with the UDHR the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic and Social Rights form the International Bill of Rights, which today provides a universally acknowledged basis by which to judge governments (c.f. Forsythe 1981).

The formulation of the UDHR and its subsequent two covenants (in contrast to a declaration, covenants are legally binding) was an attempt to reconcile the duality of positive and negative rights as well as to incorporate the values of autonomy and equality. While the UDHR and especially its subsequent covenants are sufficiently broad to reflect communitarian, ethnic and national concerns to some extent, the UDHR remains a document in the liberal human rights tradition. Virtually all rights that are set forth in the document affirm the existence of rights that are held by people as individuals. Article 3 of the Declaration affirms the right to "liberty" (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)). Other rights specified in the document are the right to recognition as a person (Art.6), the presumption of innocence until proved guilty (Art.11), the right to a nationality (Art.15), the right to marry and found a family (Art.16), the right to own property (Art.17), the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Art.18), the freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19), and the freedom of peaceable assembly and

association (Art.20). The article concerning marriage and family affirms that "the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and state." As Pollis and Schwab (1982: 9) write, "...of the thirty articles only three, one of them dealing with property rights, can be considered as dealing with economic rights." In order to address the imbalance, in 1966 the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights was adopted. Article 1.1 states that "all peoples have the right of self-determination...and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Furthermore, all peoples may "..., freely dispose of their natural resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation.... In no case may a people be deprived of its means of subsistence" (Art.1.2). Article 6 demands "steady economic, social and cultural development and full and productive employment..", and Article 7 calls for "fair wages, equal remuneration,...a decent living, safe and healthy working conditions,..,rest, leisure,..., reasonable limitations of working hours and periodic holidays with pay as well as remuneration for public holidays". Other articles state that everyone has a fundamental right to join trade unions (Art.8), a right to be free from hunger (Art.11), a right to highest attainable standards of physical and mental health (Art.12), a right to primary and secondary education (Art.12) as well as similar rights to economic and social protection and well-being.

Being as all-encompassing and inclusive as possible the UDHR and its covenants have not resolved the contradictions and potential tradeoffs between the different rights conceptions embodied therein (c.f. Nickel 1987: 4-12; Howard/Donnelly 1986: 809-811; Klenner 1984). Western theorists, therefore, often see the two covenants as containing two different types of rights with "civil and political rights being the 'essential' rights which are easy for the state

to guarantee negatively" (Chatterjie 1986: 230). The rights in the Economic and Social Covenant are seen as "vaguer or lesser rights demanding positive action.." (Chatterjie 1986: 230). By the same token, developing countries have frequently pointed out that international human rights documents do not sufficiently address their particular needs and concerns. Many African, Asian or Islamic countries state that while their values and cultural priorities may not run counter to those stated in the UN Bill of Rights, they are nevertheless not adequately addressed. These countries had simply arrived too late to effectively influence the drafting process. They are now, however, involved in their interpretation and implementation with the consequent "difference of emphasis and priority" (Chatterjie 1986: 231).

The international community of nations was slow to endorse the two covenants. The Covenants were adopted by the General Assembly in 1966, but entered into force only in 1976 when a sufficient number of states had ratified them. Only twenty-eight states have become party to the so called Optional Protocol, which enables the UN Human Rights Committee to consider communications from private individuals who allege that they were victims of violation by a state party to the Protocol of any of the rights set forth in the Covenants (c.f. Chatterjie 1986: 231).

It is also understood that the International Bill of Rights is not yet recognized everywhere nor is it fully enacted within international law in terms of providing internationally accepted means of redress, adjudication and enforcement. States accused of human rights violations frequently maintain that these issues are an internal matter and international investigations would infringe upon their national sovereignty, a concept which is one of the most widely recognized legal principles in international law. Article 2.1 of the UDHR states, for instance, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the UN

to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...". However, the UDHR and its two Covenants are an attempt to provide internationally acceptable human rights standards setting forth "norms that exist within all enlightened moralities" (Nickel 1987:4).

The lingering inter-state disagreement on human rights issues was to be the issue at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993, prior to which the Preparatory Committee issued the following press release; "Even though... disagreement still exists, we [the drafting committee] had a positive consensus on key issues such as the protection from torture and the protection of women, the disabled minorities and the world's indigenous people" (Press Backgrounder, World Conference: 2 1993). The final document of the conference, after much agonizing debate, sometimes at the brink of breakdown, was able to present a document which reiterated a universalist conception of indivisible, interdependent and inalienable human rights by stating:

> Recognizing and affirming that all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person, and that the human person is the central subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms... (Press Backgrounder, World Conference: 2 1993).

The Vienna Declaration, addressing especially the rights of women, children, disabled people and minorities, reiterates the most fundamental economic and social rights and it calls for the increase of resources to monitor national human rights performance (e.g. by the Human Rights Center) (c.f Vienna Declaration 1993). For the first time the United Nations expressly recognized the importance of international, regional and sub-regional non-governmental human rights organizations; some 1400 NGOs were present at the conference (NGO-Press Release, Vienna 1993). And yet, many concerned observers of the conference could not help notice the deep normative disagreements among UN member states which had dominated

much of the committee work and discussions, and which also found their way into the final document. A joint response by the NGO's stated the following concerns:

> [T]he refusal to commit themselves to universal ratification and the lifting of reservations by an agreed time....the weakening of universality through reference to historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, and national particularities....the insistence that the primary responsibility for standard setting lies with states....the insistence that the state alone decides the nature of national institutions such as human rights commissions.... (NGO-Press Release, Vienna 1993).

In their final analysis on the current state of human rights as expressed in the Vienna Declaration, the position statement by the NGOs comes to the conclusion that "the Declaration remains a flawed document. It uses weak and vague language and fails to commit governments individually or jointly to concrete measures for the protection and promotion of human rights" (NGO-Press Release, Vienna 1993).

Endnotes

1. As explained earlier, in defining right as a privilege or an exchange for duty towards the state the Soviet-Communist understanding differs from the Western conceptualization markedly.

ASSESSING HUMAN RIGHTS -- NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS

In its effort to be as comprehensive as possible the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its Covenants still reflect the tension between autonomy and equality -- the different normative goals of human rights. In the past many Western countries, especially the US, hesitated to assign as much importance to the Covenant on Social and Economic Rights as to civil and political rights. Socialist countries and many Third World nations, by contrast, have been rather reluctant to endorse civil and political rights (c.f. Sinha 1978: 144; Zvogbo 1979: 95; Medvedev and Kulikov 1981; Chernenko 1981; Forsythe 1981: 58-82; Chatterjie 1986; Renteln 1990: 51-54). The situation is even further complicated by persisting challenges to the universal nature of human rights by cultural relativists, respectively through those, who call for a relaxation of 'absolutist human rights standards'. A recent indicator of this normative debate was the angry reaction of many Third World countries to the publication of the Humana Index of Civil and Political rights as a part of the 1991 UNDP report on the state of human development in the world (c.f. "UN Freedom Index Angers Third World", New York Times 6/23/1991).

Clashing views on the nature and substance of human rights have subsequently been carried over into scholarly research leaving a partially divided research community. Advocates of Third World countries frequently maintain that in an ideal world all human rights are worth protecting, but point out that "poor nations cannot afford the luxury of political and civil

rights" (c.f. Dasgupta 1990: 4), which suggests that human rights and development may not be complementary but rather "competing concerns" (c.f. Donnelly's review of related articles in World Politics 1984 :255). Indeed, with respect to civil and political rights the performance of most non-Western countries has been singularly poor. Critics of such studies, however, charge that it is hardly surprising that when a relatively complex set of political and civil rights is used as a baseline for comparison, it is difficult for poor countries to meet these standards. Thus, while Western countries may take the moral high ground in securing most human rights, we have gained little understanding as to how well poorer countries cope with the demand for basic human rights despite their limited resources. As a result, they encourage a more relativist and culture-bound interpretation of human rights clustered around the specific needs of less-developed traditional societies (c.f. Marshall 1964, Wiarda 1978, McClean et al. 1978, Schwab 1979, Pollis/Schwab 1979, Howard/Donnelly 1983 and 1986, Donnelly 1984, Owens 1987, Louis 1989). Others again point out that while it may be tempting to side with the relativist viewpoint, the latter position seems all too often to justify human rights violations in the name of economic, social or cultural imperatives (c.f. "Relativism Revisited" in Renteln 1990: 63-87).

Empirical Comparative Human Rights Research

In the 1960s those social scientists studying comparative politics were primarily concerned with the problem of political stability (Huntington 1968; Gurr 1970). Concern for human rights was largely confined to somewhat cursory investigations by scholars interested in the social preconditions for representative democracy (Kornhauser 1959; Lipset 1959; 1981). Only in the 1970s and 1980s did human rights emerge as a topic of serious research interests; a process that went hand in hand with expanded attempts to monitor the status of international human rights. Chiefly responsible for this development were international monitoring organizations such as Amnesty International and the annual Freedom House survey. In addition, the United States Department of State was required by Congress to prepare a yearly report on the status of international human rights. The sudden availability of standardized data and regular reports opened up a new avenue for the comparative study of human rights abuse. The abuse of human rights has been used as an independent variable by authors to explain political protest (c.f. Gurr 1970) and as a factor influencing American foreign policy expenditures (c.f. Schloutz 1981; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Pasquarello 1986). As McNitt (1988) puts it "when used as an independent variable there is a strong tendency to reduce measurement of the abuse of human rights to a single indicator variable. Although methodologically defensible this practice runs the risk of oversimplifying a complex variable" (:90). When human rights abuse is treated as a dependent variable, it has been analyzed as a consequence of the economic system (Strouse and Claude 1976), socio-economic factors (Nixon 1960), military government (Henderson 1982) and dependently (Chomsky and Herman 1979). McNitt (1988) argues that such

explanations have been one-dimensional and few "attempts have been made to study the abuse of human rights as a multifaceted phenomenon" (:90). "The current tendency is to either use a simplified general measure of abuse or to look at one aspect of abuse" (McNitt 1988: 90).

The Difficulty of Defining the Relevant Concepts.

When divergent human rights policies are observed in different countries, analysts usually turn to 'ideological commitment' or 'types of government' for explanations, contrasting democratic support for human rights violations with authoritarian regimes of the left or the right. There is validity to this analysis, but "divergent human rights policies may be observed even when these variables are held relatively constant" (Johnson 1988: 41). For one, the seemingly simple task of demonstrating that democratic regimes are more responsive to human rights concerns proved to be of greater difficulty than the unsuspecting researchers had initially thought. Instead they sometimes found themselves trapped in the circularity of their argument (c.f. Howard and Donnelly 1986). The concept of what constitutes a democracy eluded easy quantification. When it was defined by virtue of the constitutional rights guaranteed under a democratic constitution and researchers set out to measure the extent to which these rights were protected only to discover that they had been moving in a circle as the dependent and independent variables were not sufficiently distinct. If, by contrast, the researchers attempted their investigation through backward induction by identifying human rights abuses in countries irrespective of prior definitions of regime, another problem emerged. In this configuration it was largely impossible to distinguish between 'having a right' and 'enjoying the substance of a right' (c.f. Strouse and Claude 1976). In other words, in many cases even non-democratic regimes provide the substance of rights without guaranteeing the

rights themselves (c.f. my earlier discussion of the difference between having a right and enjoying the substance thereof).

The problem of establishing a connection between regime and human rights can be demonstrated by comparing India and the United States, arguably the two largest democracies in the world (c.f. Johnson 1988: 41). For a long time India and the US took rather a opposite stance on the major UN Human Rights Covenants; India supports a New International Economic order as a human rights policy, the United States objects to it; the US condemns the denial of political and civil rights in Marxist states, India is silent. In the domestic realm there are similarities of openness in political debate, freedom of political participation and protection of judicial due process "but there is also an elaborate structure of preferential treatment for disadvantaged minorities while, in the United States, arguments over equality threaten even modest affirmative action programs" (Johnson 1988: 41). According to Johnson these differences cannot be accounted for by different forms of government, but only by considering the wider socio-economic and cultural context within which human rights policies are adopted and implemented. Such contexts, however, may vary considerably across nations and are even harder to conceptualize than notions of regime type. Thus, the over-riding question posed by some has been whether or not "there is any comparable notion, or what has been called the homomorphic equivalent" (Renteln 1988: 7). Researchers that undertake cross-national human rights research obviously believe in the possibility of operating with comparable equivalents, and would therefore dismiss Renteln's doubts. However, one would nevertheless have to acknowledge that one of the most serious problems with existing studies of human rights is "the lack of conceptual clarity" (McNitt 1988: 91).

Normative and Empirical Judgements in Human Rights Research.

The quantitative analysis of human rights requires making normative as well as empirical judgements. In terms of normative judgements, researchers must determine what constitutes abuses of human rights. In Western empirical human rights research, developed industrialized countries usually feature prominently at the top of human rights rank-lists while poorer countries, regardless of social, political and economic differences between them, are jointly listed at the lower end of such scales. Thus, critics such as McNitt (1988) charge that Western research clustered around liberal human rights has been plagued by a number of problems, not the least of which has been its strong bias in favor of liberal industrialized democracies (c.f. McNitt 1988). The main areas of normative disagreement involve: (a) the conflict between economic and political rights, and (b) the question of context-bound (relative versus universal) human rights.

In addition to the normative dimension, problems may arise from the empirical approach chosen. Empirical judgements are made whenever researchers decide how to measure human rights abuse. In some cases the concepts are not defined adequately (e.g. see McNitt's discussion of "respect for human rights" as defined in Strouse and Claude 1976 or in Henderson 1982), while in others researchers borrow existing scales from earlier works (Strouse and Claude 1976 from Gastil 1973) without giving adequate consideration to the fact that scales are often derived from a particular "ideological position" (McNitt 1988: 91).

As well, early cross-national human rights studies encountered the problems of relatively few comprehensive data sources and reliable measures. Kenneth Bollen (1986: 567-591) stresses that in addition to the problem of verifying and quantifying human rights abuse, the major difficulty in defining proper human rights measures lies in the danger of

confounding different, but related concepts and their corresponding indicators (for an extensive treatment of this subject, see Alex Inkeles On Measuring Democracy 1991). Indices of political democracy and/or political stability have frequently been used as proxy measures for human rights -- a practice that poses severe validity problems (see here McNitt's (1988) discussion of the use of 'popular sovereignty' and 'electoral choice' as proxy measures (:91)).

Selected Examples of Comparative Human Rights Research.

An example of the difficulty in assessing human rights performance is the annual Freedom House survey by Raymond Gastil (1973, 1978, 1984, 1987, 1993). It is discussed here not merely because it is a classic among human rights studies, breaking new ground in this field of research, but also because it embodies many of the problems and shortcomings that plague cross-national human rights research. At one point Gastil's measures were so controversial that the Human Rights Quarterly in 1986 dedicated a special edition to this subject (it also needs to be pointed out that the Freedom House Survey has recently made changes in response to the criticism of having a pro-Western bias).

Traditionally, the Freedom House index has focused predominantly on civil liberties, political rights, and the status of freedom, as well as what Gastil calls, 'associated trends'. For Gastil, civil rights are conceptualized as the rights of individuals and groups vis-a-vis the government including the 'right to privacy' and 'the right to form organizations'. From this premise he then develops a seven-point index ranging from the highest to the lowest levels based on these and similar indicators. As his measure for political rights[1] (c.f. Gastil 1986: 26) is quite similar, he is able to rank each country according to its civil and political rights performance. Gastil's measure for freedom differs somewhat by classifying countries as

"free", "partly free" and "not free" based on the seven-point ratings.

Gastil's survey has had considerable impact on the human rights scholarship both as a data source and as an example of how to operationalize an issue as complex as human rights. His work, however, has been vulnerable to several criticisms. By excluding data on positive human rights such as health, education and social security (indicators of a worldwide scope of that nature were available) he (especially in his earlier editions) succumbs to equating human rights strictly with the values and principles of the liberal Western democracy. Not surprisingly, it is these countries that feature most prominently among the freest and highest ranked. Yet, even if one is willing to accept Gastil's measure, some of the definitions he uses to score countries seem somewhat questionable. If we consider, for example, the following definitions for measuring country performance in terms of political rights on a 1 to 7 scale:

> In political rights, states rated (1) have a fully competitive [?] electoral process, and those elected clearly rule .... Relatively free states may receive a (2) because, ..., there are factors that cause us to lower our rating, [such as] economic inequality, illiteracy or intimidating violence, ... Below this level, political ratings of (3) through (5) represent successively less effective [?] implementations of democratic processes.... (Gastil 1986: 29).

We may ask whether the 'factors' Gastil mentions are really on the same level (e.g. illiteracy and intimidating violence) and should, therefore, be conceptualized as having an equal impact. In addition, we may question what is being measured here -- human rights or rather democratic performance and competence (c.f. Gastil 1986: 29, 35). Even by Gastil's own criteria, it is surprising to find countries like Switzerland or Japan among the top ranking in the mid-1980's. While the former still had restrictions with respect to universal suffrage and secret ballot[2], the latter had not had a change in government since the end of WWII[3], which is actually one of the Gastil measures for democratic competitiveness. Furthermore,

according to Gastil, Nicaragua under Somoza is ranked as more free and more democratic than at any time during Sandinista rule. Obviously, the classification of several countries is rather problematic. In particular, with regard to Western democracies he chose to ignore structural impediments that effectively reduce the chance of oppositional groups becoming elected. We ought to examine, for example, West-Germany's Radikalenerlass; a policy by which Communists and alleged leftist radicals were kept out of the Bundestag as well as being banned from government employment, schools and in some cases universities. In Japan and the US there have been allegations that the system of campaign financing effectively creates a structural impediment for financially less-endowed candidates and groups, which, as a result, find themselves shut out from the electoral process.

While Gastil is widely credited for making one of the first comprehensive efforts to assess human rights on a world-wide scale, critics, such as Wiseberg and Scoble (1981), charge that the Freedom House survey and follow-up studies (e.g. Strouse and Claude 1976; Arthur Banks 1979) are so partisan and culture-bound that it would be "intellectually and politically dangerous to rely upon [them] "(167-8). It needs to be emphasized that in more recent editions of the Freedom House survey (especially 1993), the information provided has been amended by including data and a description of the socioeconomic conditions in the countries surveyed. The country reports have also become considerably more detailed and seem overall more balanced in the way their political and economic background is presented.

Despite the controversial nature of the earlier Gastil data, his research has, nevertheless, proved influential for a number of important human rights studies, such as the research pursued by James C. Strouse and Richard P. Claude. They propose a synthesis of two different research strategies, combining longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses

(Strouse/Claude 1976: 51-66). Following Gastil in their conceptualization of human rights, Strouse and Claude distinguish between three types of human rights: 'civil rights', 'political rights', and 'freedom rights'. In their effort to explain human rights performance, Strouse and Claude rely on a set of classical assumptions about the relationship between development and democracy as put forth by Lipset, Deutsch and others, namely that:

> the greater the level of political stability as well as of social development and economic development per capita, the more civil and political rights are expressed and made available, but the more rapid the rate of economic development, the less civil liberties and political rights are expressed and made available (Strouse/Claude 1976: 54).

The subsequent empirical analysis seems to support their test-hypothesis, as Strouse and Claude find considerable association between this type of human rights conception and economic development. Their approach, however, is not free from criticism. For one, in relying on Gastil's human rights definitions their research is plagued by the same problems described earlier with respect to the Freedom House survey. In addition, their study shows measurement problems in terms of the temporal spread of the data. In order to measure social and economic performance, political stability, as well as rate of development, they rely on the Hudson-Taylor World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, whose data goes back to the mid-1960s, whereas the Freedom House human rights data by Gastil are of a more recent vintage (1975). In addition to having a difference of almost 10 years between the independent and the dependent variables a more fundamental question arises as to whether this kind of research could be used to legitimize human rights violations in the name of economic development. McNitt charges that in analyzing human rights abuse as a consequence of economic circumstances Strouse and Claude use a "simplified general measure of abuse" (McNitt 1988: 90).

A different sort of approach is pursued by Jorge Dominguez, who compares

government human rights performance across four defined issue areas: infant mortality, slavery, torture, and number of political prisoners (Dominguez 1979).[4] In measuring human rights performance by the occurrence of clearly defined violations, rather than by listing an index of positive rights, Dominguez avoids the arbitrariness and definitional vagueness of Gastil or Strouse and Claude. In relying on country profiles as provided by Amnesty International and similar organizations, Dominguez is able to clearly identify human rights violators and can rank them according to the frequency and severity of the violation. While Dominguez's approach has its virtues, a study like this is descriptive rather than explanatory. In short, we are not provided with answers as to why, for instance, torture is an 'administrative practice' in countries such as Argentina and Equatorial Guinea, but 'occasional, selective and time limited' in India, Venezuela, the United Kingdom and Spain.

Generally speaking, most comparative human rights studies have either been area-specific (e.g. "Report in Twenty-Two Nations" by Americas Watch, Helsinki Watch and Lawyers Committee for IHR, 1983) or issue-specific (e.g. Dominguez 1979; Amnesty International Report on Death Penalty 1989; Amnesty International Torture in the 1980s 1984). By comparison, human rights sources of world wide scale are very limited and include along with the UNDP Human Development Report, the Gastil data, the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Amnesty International's (AI) annual reports and Charles Humana's World Human Rights Guide (1983, 1985, 1992). While the State Department reports are very detailed, they also reflect a Western-liberal bias similar to the Freedom House survey. AI data and records have been widely used by researchers (e.g. McNitt 1988; Spalding 1988; Cingranelli 1992), although the organization is sometimes charged with a leftist bias and accused of paying too little attention "to political rights and

less drastic limitations on freedom of expression" (McNitt 1988: 97). Humana's human rights index includes a long list of civil and political rights for over 100 countries, but does not account for social and economic rights.

Tradeoffs and Eclecticism in Human Rights Research.

In terms of providing an assessment and explanation of the differing human rights performances of governments, comparative cross-national human rights studies often reflect the current state of confusion. Which rights should take priority? Which tradeoffs are acceptable? Which regimes, political systems and structures violate, which ones protect human rights? It often seems that for each set of rights one could conceive of an equally convincing counter-argument in favor of a different set of rights; an example of which is the dispute between Rhoda Howard and Paul Streeten. While the latter claims that economic rights in response to basic needs are more important than civil and political rights, Howard emphasizes the usefulness of civil and political rights for economic development and redistribution of wealth (c.f. Paul Streeten 1980: 107-111 vs. Rhoda E. Howard 1983).

Compilations of extensive data-sets on various types of human rights have helped foster an eclecticism that seems to characterize today's empirical approach to human rights. In short, out of an array of human rights conceptualizations one might give selective preference to a particular set of human rights and corresponding data. This way one's normative position can find empirical support. An example of such a broadly, all-inclusive human rights data-set ranging from individual freedom and political rights to social, economic and communitarian rights is the annual UNDP Human Development Report. Here the problem has been that its all-encompassing understanding of human rights does not resolve the tension

between political and economic rights present within such a sweeping conceptualization. In other words, while certain countries are likely to score better in guaranteeing some rights, different countries perform better in securing other rights. In this case we have neither a means of distinguishing core rights from higher order human rights, nor of comparing countries on a level playing field. Furthermore, such an approach may even encourage human rights tradeoffs allowing some governments to argue that the normative conflict between different human rights can only be resolved by sacrificing some rights for the sake of others.

Given the shortcomings evident in both the all-encompassing (UNDP) as well as in normatively selective (Gastil) conceptualizations, it would be especially important for new research to return to a universal notion of human rights that is, nevertheless, sensitive to different normative traditions. While I am committed to the Western tradition of human rights in the sense that rights constitute universal and fundamental claims of individuals against government, I also believe that one cannot ignore the numerous challenges to the Western human rights tradition. It is therefore important for any framework of human rights to expand its scope to include social and economic rights. In short, human rights measures should be balanced by reflecting the tradition of both economic and political rights. Simultaneously, research should also avoid an all too lengthy catalogue of rights to prevent tradeoffs and eclecticism. For research to be both comprehensive and succinct it will have to distinguish 'core' or essential rights from higher-order human rights. Forsythe and Wiseberg for instance, argue that "[o]ne way to avoid the problems caused by global measures of human rights is to concentrate on a small subset of core rights.."

A focus on the protection of core rights, which are less difficult to attain even for countries with fewer resources would address a further problem of past human rights research;

namely the traditionally poor performance of non-Western countries in most human rights studies. Instead of operating with a relativist concept to solve this problem by judging LDCs according to a variable human rights standard, the universal application of more basic and therefore more attainable core rights, would be mindful of the particular needs of underdeveloped nations without sacrificing general human rights principles. Countries could then be compared along less stringent but, nevertheless, absolutely essential human rights. In addition, the social-economic context can be factored into the evaluation by accounting for economic prosperity when assessing the human rights performance. A full discussion of this approach will be presented in the subsequent chapter.

The task for new human rights research is, therefore, to derive a set of core human rights that (a) overcomes the need for tradeoffs between rights, (b) includes elements from different human rights traditions, (c) imposes minimal standards of human rights practice that can be met by all countries, including less-developed countries, and (d) is manageable for research purposes.

Endnotes

1.Defined as the right of people to express directly or through the election of representatives how they want government to be legislated and administered.

2. At the time when these data were compiled some Swiss Cantons were denying women the right to vote. In addition, local political decisions are frequently held in the form of open voting in public assemblies without secret ballot. For a critical observer this practice does not conform to Western standards of free and fair election.

3. The LDP has enjoyed a substantial parliamentary majority in every post-war election.

4. Torture is defined as "systematic and deliberate infliction of acute pain.." It is subsequently classified along the following range: 'mere brutality (occasional, selective, time limited) administrational practice, adjunct to massacres'. In a cross-tabulation these categories are related to whether the political system responds by showing 'some concern', by 'permitting some discussion' or by 'repressing discussion'. The issue area 'Political Prisoners' lists countries according to the total number of political prisoners as well as in terms of the rate of political prisoners (number of political prisoners per 100,000 population). As far as 'Slavery' and 'Infant Mortality' are concerned, Dominguez gives a brief general discussion with several selected examples, but does not provide tables or a listing of violators (c.f. Dominguez 1979: 87-102).

OPERATIONALIZATION AND MEASUREMENT

In this chapter I shall explain, define and operationalize the two principal concepts employed in this study -- basic human rights and human rights effort; each of which was designed to address a problem in the previous human rights literature. I shall, furthermore, propose a novel approach to assessing human rights performance across nations. Lastly, I am going to suggest a number of explanations of human rights performance, which will subsequently be tested.

Basic Human Rights -- What Are They?

The task is to define and conceptualize a set of human rights that is truly basic in the sense that (a) they are essential for human survival and cannot be renounced, and (b) the provision of all other rights requires the prior guarantee of these basic rights. Therefore, instead of dividing human rights vertically into parallel hierarchies of political and economic rights, I intend to split the issue area along a horizontal axis into basic political and economic as well as higher-order political and economic rights. This division does not suggest that higher-order rights are unimportant or dispensable. Rather, it is a recognition of the political and socioeconomic realities with which many countries have to cope. Under ideal

circumstances one would naturally hold countries to highest human rights standards possible; In this far more imperfect world, however, rational and pragmatic individuals will have to admit that it is highly unrealistic to expect nations, even if they are willing, to fully guarantee all rights specified in the UDHR and the two covenants. Basic human rights, however, entail minimal standards below which no human being should be allowed to fall and they are more easily attainable even by countries with fewer resources. Therefore it would be a reasonable start to implement basic rights (which, as I shall argue, guarantee physical protection and subsistence) to all people and by which we can judge governments accordingly.

While basic human rights are not grounded specifically in a particular political or cultural tradition they are consistent with the conception of natural law advanced by Cranston (1979). She argues that the most essential right of a human is the right to survival. Humans are naturally vulnerable; in contrast to most other species they have no form of natural protection.

> This vulnerability gives a special urgency to his desire to avoid such fates [getting murdered].It is sometimes suggested further that this vulnerability is what makes man a social animal. For his own preservation, a man must live peaceably with his neighbors, and this means he must live under some form of rule (Cranston 1979: 22).

By using a weapon the weakest of us can kill the strongest of us. Humans are social creatures and depend on each other for securing their livelihood. Survival and subsistence cannot be accomplished by an individual in isolation; rather a person must rely upon the community for physical and economic protection (c.f. my earlier discussion of natural law and basic rights). That humans require social and economic essentials has been recognized by others and a fairly lengthy literature on basic (human) needs has developed (c.f. Scott 1976; McClean/Raveles/Tucker 1978: 64-85; Asbjorn[1] 1989: 35-51). This includes among other

works especially Eide Asbjorn's (1987, 89) writings on establishing a moral and legal framework around a minimum threshold of what constitutes a decent human life. Similarly, Dasgupta's (1990) efforts to "assess the performance of governments in the field of positive rights on the basis of the access that citizens have to basic needs" (:21) needs to be mentioned here, as it deserves credit for pointing into the direction of a basic rights framework. Aside from these few examples, however, this issue has rarely been approached from the perspective of rights as individual entitlement.

The concept of 'basic human rights' employed here is modelled after Henry Shue (1987), who proposes a set of core rights centered around the right to security and subsistence. In addition to grounding basic rights in natural law (c.f Cranston 1979) Shue introduces an additional justification for basic rights, making an analytical argument by stressing that for the enjoyment of certain rights we require the guarantee of certain other, more basic rights without which the former rights could not be enjoyed.

> Basic rights,.... are everybody's minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity. They are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept....When a right is genuinely basic, any attempt to enjoy any other right would quite literally be self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath itself. Therefore, if a right is basic, other non-basic rights may be sacrificed, if necessary, in order to secure the basic right. But the protection of a basic right may not be sacrificed in order to secure the enjoyment of a non-basic right.. It may not be sacrificed because it cannot be sacrificed successfully. If the right is indeed basic, then, no right for which it might be sacrificed can actually be enjoyed in the absence of the basic right. The sacrifice would have proven self-defeating. (Shue 1987: 19).

In other words, in order to enjoy a higher order right Y whether economic or political in substance, we need to be socially provided with a basic right X. The relationship between basic rights and higher order rights is irreversible. Thus, if the goal of a basic right is to enable an individual to exercise any higher order human right, it would indeed be universal as neither individual rights nor group rights, neither political nor economic rights

are exercisable without the prior provision of basic rights. Therefore, even a communitarian society that subjects the rights of the individual to the rights of the community must provide basic rights for an individual to survive and subsist in order for this person to serve the community. The right to vote is meaningless in a society in which people face mass starvation; the right to subsistence, in return, is irrelevant if people are arbitrarily subjected to violence by the government or other agents. In rendering Shue's formalized representation of basic rights I do not want to leave the impression that he conceives of human rights solely in an instrumental fashion. This approach, however, not only helps to gain conceptual clarity, but also establishes criteria by which to judge rights as basic.

Basic rights set minimal standards for government policy. Therefore, basic political rights do not automatically entail all civil and political rights normally found in advanced democracies. However, governments are required to guarantee at least physical protection for their citizens, including security guarantees not only against the state, but also vis-a-vis third parties. Thus, the right to personal security is also violated if people become victims of political violence, extrajudicial killings and disappearances by individuals or groups not linked to the government. Similarly, basic economic and political rights do not automatically constitute claims for complex medical procedures and measures to prolong life at any cost. Conversely, ensuring mere survival does not suffice either. Basic rights call for a minimal quality of life. Shue's understanding of 'having basic rights' entails, therefore, having the 'means to basic rights'. He argues that no meaningful distinction can be made between so called 'means' and actual 'rights', as both compare in the form and the extent to which they can be provided.

The Substance of Basic Rights.

Thus far I have described the form and character of basic rights, the next step must be to examine and specify their substance. Shue distinguishes three basic rights - security, subsistence and liberty. The need for the basic right to security does not require much justification as "no one can fully enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society, if somebody can credibly threaten him or her with murder, rape, beating etc., when he or she tried to enjoy the alleged right" (Shue 1987: 21). In other words, a right to full physical security belongs among the basic rights, not so much because the enjoyment of it "would be more satisfying to someone who was also enjoying a full range of other rights, but because its absence would leave available extremely effective means for others, including the government, to interfere with or prevent the actual exercise of any other rights that were supposedly protected" (Shue 1987: 21).

Shue devotes more room to the discussion of basic economic and social rights, since subsistence rights have caused much greater controversy in the literature. Such rights have been described as a threat to human self-mastery and an invitation to hampering personal freedom, stifling private initiative as well as creating dependency-relationships between citizens and government. In awareness of such criticism Shue defines subsistence as the right to minimal economic security "which can also be shown to be as well justified for treatment as a basic right as physical security" (Shue 1987: 23). He provides us with the following definition:

> By minimal economic security, or subsistence, I mean unpolluted air, unpolluted water, adequate food, adequate clothing, adequate shelter, and minimal preventive public health care.....A right to subsistence would not mean, at one extreme, that every baby born with a need for open-heart surgery has a right to have it, but it also would not count as adequate food a diet that produces a life expectancy of 35 years of fever-laden, parasite-ridden listlessness. By subsistence I shall always mean a right to at least subsistence" (Shue 1987:23)

The connection between political and economic security is straightforward, as the provision of either of the two rights would be meaningless without the provision of the other. The right to free speech or equal treatment before the law is useless, if one does not live to enjoy it. Equally, political freedoms are rendered useless if the daily struggle for mere physical survival leaves no room for other activities. Thus, the right to subsistence qualifies as a core or basic right, simply because without their provision any other human right could not be enjoyed.

The only aspect in which this study departs from Shue's conceptualization of basic rights concerns his notion of "some liberty" and "effective participation" (Shue 1987: 65-87). While we will find it hard to disagree with Shue that some minimum amount of liberty is an essential part of human dignity, it is considerably more difficult to define as a concept how much freedom some liberty requires. Not only is this concept difficult to conceptualize according to Shue's own criteria of basic versus higher-order rights, there is the question of whether "liberty" indeed constitutes a separate realm. In short, is the "enjoyment of some liberty" (Shue 1987: 74) not already implied in basic security and subsistence rights? Even totalitarian societies allow their citizens to have 'some' liberty. Under the Nazi-regimes most Germans were allowed to move about or travel. They were free to pursue careers of their choice, to practice their religion or to marry and divorce if they so desired. Even in the Soviet Union people enjoyed a limited amount of freedom over their own lives -- within limits they were able to choose their profession, determine their leisure time or even travel. They could even decide whether or not join the ruling political party. One could argue, therefore, that freedom within limits is very much compatible with 'some' liberty. Critics may counter by arguing that both Germans and Soviet citizens were forbidden from organizing a political

opposition. History also teaches us that in Nazi Germany Jews, gypsies and acknowledged homosexuals were the victims of state terrorism and did, therefore, certainly not have the same rights and freedoms as other Germans. Critics may also assert that in the Soviet Union labor camps and draconian punishment were the frequent consequence of asserting one's already limited freedom. In short, whenever people were judged by a totalitarian regime to be a threat to or a convenient scapegoat for society, respectively whenever people tried to organize a political opposition they were beaten up, arrested, deported, institutionalized and often killed. These are, however, all violations of basic security rights and as such are already covered by the conditions that define the basic right to physical protection, personal integrity and security. Similarly, if people are not allowed to determine their own economic well-being, if they are forced into labor camps, if they have to exist under slave-like conditions, then these are all grave violations of elementary political and economic rights. It seems, therefore, impossible to separate (some) liberty from the realm of security and subsistence rights. Judged by the criteria of 'some liberty' many totalitarian societies would pass, while judging these countries in terms of security and subsistence rights cases such as a Nazi-Germany would fail miserably.

Let us, for instance, briefly consider the case of freedom of settlement, movement and travel. In many third world countries this freedom is more an economic than a political question. Travelling, whether abroad or domestically requires some financial resources. In some cases such as in Central America travelling abroad is restricted by the requirements of foreign governments[2]. In other cases governments will try to restrict or control the migration to cities in order to contain the sprawling urban slums. The very cause of such migration is usually the inability of people in the countryside to subsist. In both cases the restrictions of

freedom are the consequence of either economic or political causes. The right to subsistence implies certain minimal freedoms to make decisions affecting one's economic well-being. The right to subsistence defines a space to operate by which people can find and secure venues and means of economic survival. Once again it seems impossible to separate the sphere of liberty from that of basic security and subsistence rights and to treat it as a separate variable.

By the same token the "right to effective participation" (Shue 1987: 71-78) is clearly a more complex political right -- undoubtedly a very important one -- that it seems to exceed Shue's own criteria of basic rights. For people to become effective political participants, further conditions have to be met. Individuals need to enjoy protection against government harassment, which is a basic security right. As well, people must have means and ways of articulating themselves, something which requires both basic subsistence and security rights. Some minimal education will be required, which is an important basic subsistence right. By contrast, people preoccupied with physical survival will find it difficult to participate effectively. As with 'some liberty' the issue here is not whether effective participation is important to human dignity, but whether it is truly basic according to Shue's own criteria. In short, we must question whether participation depends on the existence of other more basic rights, while considering that elements of liberty and participation are already entailed in basic subsistence and security rights. Shue argues that only "effective participation" will provide for the enjoyment of a right to security and of a right to subsistence (c.f. Shue 1987: 70). A skeptic could respond that, for one, history shows that effective participation and even full fledged democracy, for that matter, do not always ensure such a provision, particularly with respect to minorities. Secondly, the argument seems circular. If Shue's claim is true then a measure for subsistence and security rights would automatically yield a measure for effective

participation. Therefore, it seems futile to separate 'effective participation' or other forms of 'some liberty' from subsistence and security rights.

Corresponding to the basic right to subsistence and security Shue conceives of a set of government duties. These correlative duties comprise: (a) duties to avoid depriving, (b) to protect the deprived and (c) duties to aid the deprived (Shue 1987: 34-64). If government is to fulfil these duties corrective government action has to go beyond the mere protection from violation but must entail retribution or correction for violation.[3]

Shue introduces another important point in his discussion of basic human rights when he rejects the sharp dichotomy between so called 'positive' and 'negative' human rights (c.f. Shue 1987: 35-40). Shue suggests that traditionally negative human rights basically entail 'doing nothing on the part of the state', while positive human rights are defined as 'doing something', implying that doing nothing is cheaper and easier than doing something. He then goes on to demonstrate that this sharp dichotomy does not hold up. He argues, for instance, that the implementation of certain positive rights such as legal measures concerning the economy may be quite inexpensive, while some negative human rights such as state protection from persecution and other human rights violations may require an expensive state security apparatus. He concludes that this dichotomy cannot, therefore, be an excuse for differing human rights performances in economically less developed countries. I would agree with Henry Shue that the distinction between both sets of rights is not as pronounced as it is often claimed to be. Especially, on the level of basic rights both political and economic rights are so intertwined and mutually dependent that it seems, indeed, meaningless to pit one conception of rights against another.

In contrast to Shue, however, I would maintain that positive and negative rights

constitute equal but, nevertheless, distinct dimensions, which not only entail differing degrees of government action, but which affect non-state actors differently. This point requires further explanation. Generally speaking, human rights can involve two or three parties: (a) the right's source and beneficiary, the individual, (b) the right's guarantor, usually the state, and (c) sometimes a third party, which like the state may also be a potential violator. Negative rights are centered around the relationship between beneficiary and state, whereby the state itself avoids violation and/or extends protection against third parties through deterrence. In the latter case the state forces 'inaction' from the third party. Positive rights, by contrast, involve forcing third parties to change their operative behavior against their own best interest, such as forcing a company to act in accordance with certain labor, health and safety laws, or implementing a highly redistributive taxation policy to finance social and economic programs. Thus, the cost of negative and positive rights need not only be measured in terms of budgetary allocations, as Shue seems to suggest, but also in terms of the political and social cost of rights-implementation, as well as in the length of time of implementation. It is certainly true that guaranteeing certain security rights and civil liberties can be very costly, and yet: (a) states may perceive these costs as less expensive, for example, than starting a literacy campaign and (b) subsistence programs may face extensive resistance from third parties. Such resistance may take the form of lobbying, filibustering, forming cross-national alliances, bribery and the like, to delay the passage of such bills. Consequently, 'positive human rights' may then be more costly and complex than granting security rights. This point will become immediately clear when we consider the recent political changes in Eastern Europe. While new constitutions were drawn up rather swiftly, guaranteeing civil and political rights and liberties, it proved a far more arduous task to address the social and economic


issues. The latter, for instance, involve guaranteeing basic economic protection and some measure of equality in the face of dramatic economic reforms. I believe that history has shown that establishing 'positive rights' is an infinitely more cumbersome and complex undertaking. Therefore, I would, indeed, expect that countries with lesser resources will find this task particularly difficult.

In concluding my discussion of Henry Shue's conceptualization of basic rights it should be pointed out that his analysis is much more extensive[4] and that this brief rendition can hardly do justice to his work. For space considerations, however, Shue's argument cannot be rendered in its entirety here.

The Dimensions of Basic Human Rights.

Traditionally, the duality of economic and political rights has been a conceptual problem, for whenever we operate with competing concepts of human rights, we contribute to a situation in which certain rights are pitted against each other. As a result we often end up with undesirable tradeoffs. I tend to view political and economic rights as two dimensions of essentially the same concept, like two sides of a coin. Figure 1 demonstrates this more clearly. In terms of their basic human rights performance nations may take up any position on a plane spanned by both dimensions of basic human rights. We may then evaluate countries relative to each other according to their respective position. In any two dimensional schema four ideal-types are possible: (a) a nation may secure both security and subsistence rights, (b), (c) a nation may excel along one of the two dimensions, or (d) a nation may not guarantee any basic right at all.

Figure 1 Dimensions of Basic Human Rights



While few nations will match any of these extreme positions, most will probably converge on an area near these ideal-types. Subsequently, we may analyze the nation's rating on both human rights dimensions in terms of their economic wealth, their political history and regime-type to discern patterns, which help explain their BHR-performance.

Only through this conceptualization can we avoid thinking about human rights in terms of parallel hierarchies of political and civil rights on one side and social and economic rights on the other. I also argue that basic human rights are universal in character, because (a) they extend to all people and (b) they are not dependent on a particular cultural or political tradition.

Measures and Indicators of Basic Human Rights.

Based upon Shue's account the following operational definition may be given:

When a right is, indeed, basic then no right for which it might be sacrificed can actually be enjoyed in the absence of the basic right. In other words to enjoy any higher order human right Y, whether political, economic, cultural, social, etc., a basic security and/or subsistence right X has to have been secured. A basic right extends to all people all times, regardless of gender, class and ethnicity (c.f. Shue 1987: 23).

It is perhaps most meaningful to approach the operationalization of basic human rights by dividing the concept into its two dimensions -- basic subsistence and security rights. Each dimension can then be further disaggregated into a limited number of components or categories. The dual emphasis on both dimensions of human rights yields a wide scope of analysis, despite a comparatively small number of indicators. Keeping the number of indicators small is pertinent in making this concept manageable for research purposes. In addition, treating basic rights as two related but, nevertheless, distinct dimensions allows us to measure country performance separately for each dimension, which will help in analyzing performance differences across both dimensions. Further requirements entail that proxy-measures are to be avoided and that the indicators directly reflect individual security and socio-economic well-being. This contrasts with other research, which uses indirect measures, such as indicators of democratic openness and competitiveness, to make inferences about human rights. By the same token, the measures employed here have to remain in keeping with Henry Shue's notion of basic rights and with the operational definition stated above.

General measures for subsistence rights can be readily developed by drawing upon Shue's own suggested indicators and definitions (Shue 1987, 40), which include all of the following listed below. Since we assume that each indicator represents a fundamental, indivisible and essential right, there can be no rank order or hierarchy between them.

Therefore, I shall treat them as coequal.[5]

Indicators of subsistence rights:
(*) adequate nutrition
(*) access to safe water
(*) adequate housing conditions
(*) minimal health care standards
(*) minimal education

In the section below, I shall discuss a number of specific indicators and data sources that will be used in this dissertation to measure country performance in each of the above categories. The selection of such indicators is always problematic, as the inclusion of some indicators usually means leaving out others. In fact, R. L. Sivard (1987), upon whose work some of the measures are based, provides a critical appraisal of several of the indices and measures she has constructed. Given the importance of indicator selection I shall provide an extensive discussion of each in the appendix to this dissertation. In doing so I shall not only point to some of the virtues and tradeoffs that come with these choices, but shall also discuss some alternative measures including my rationale for deciding against them.

(1) 'Adequate nutrition' can be measured by following FAO recommendations on calories and protein intake by capita. The latter represents the average daily food supply available at retail level after allowance for animal feed, seed, storage and marketing losses, and waste. The indicator is based on recent FAO estimates of intake required to maintain moderate activity, taking account of age, sex structure of population, climate, etc. Data are provided through R.L. Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (1987). While the main drawback of this measure lies in its aggregate nature through which some information is lost, there is regrettably no better global measure of nutrition available.

(2) 'Adequate access to safe water' is defined as the percentage of households with adequate access to safe water and usually measured in the way: For developed countries the indicators

reflect the percentage of dwellings with piped water. For developing countries the standard of adequacy means treated or uncontaminated water, such as in urban areas the availability of a public well not more than 200 meters from a house; in rural areas it means that the source of water is close enough not to require a disproportionate part of the day to fetch it. Statistical data are compiled by the World Health Organization and the UN housing survey.

(3) The measure for 'adequate housing conditions' follows a suggestion made by the UN housing survey to utilize its data concerning the average number of persons per room.

(4) There are several indicators available to assess basic health care standards. In weighing the strengths and weaknesses of a number of measures I decided in favor of national infant mortality rate as best suited for the purposes of this study (see appendix for details). Infant mortality rate is defined as the death rates of infants under 1 year of age per 1000 live births (c.f. Sivard 1987: 45).

(5) 'Minimal education' seems best captured by the adult literacy rate, reflecting basic reading and writing skills; data on which are widely available and reported in the annual UNDP Human Development Report, Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures, by the annual United Nations statistical survey, the World Bank and a variety of other sources.

With respect to security rights we are not as fortunate as to be able to use Henry Shue's own suggestions, since he does not specify particular indicators. It is, however, possible to derive a set of indicators from Shue's general conceptualization of security rights that remains consistent with the operational definition stated above. A violation of each of the following rights threatens a human's right to physical security and integrity as a person:

Indicators of security rights
(*) the freedom from torture
(*) the freedom from slavery, serfdom, forced and child labor
(*) the freedom from police detention without charge

(*) the freedom from police searches of home without warrant,
(*) freedom from capital punishment[6] and extra-judicial killings[7]

While the above indicators are consistent with Henry Shue's conceptualization, each is actually taken from a data-set compiled by Charles Humana (1985). In his World Human Rights Guide Humana provides a comprehensive index of civil and political rights on a worldwide scale. Humana's method of assessment is based on a relatively simple 50 item checklist of political rights and civil liberties. Humana's indicators are based on Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as those parts of International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights that deal with individual security and personal safety (see endnote[8] for the specific cases and articles that apply). His technique of scoring countries on a four point scale ranging from '3' (a particular right is most fully guaranteed) to '0' (a right is not guaranteed at all) is straight-forward and plausible. In addition, his indicators are basic and descriptive, rather than valuative or dependent upon a particular ideological conception of human rights. Amnesty International Country Reports and US State Department Reports, however, may provide a valuable resource to up-date and supplement Humana.

Countries are then scored separately for each basic rights dimension. For security rights Humana's own scoring technique may be readily adopted, in which each of the five indicators is scored based on Humana's (1985) four-point scale using values from zero to three. Added together an index of security rights performance can be constructed, yielding a summery measure of security rights performance for each nation. I shall proceed similarly with respect to subsistence rights, where the construction of an additive index is somewhat more cumbersome, as there are several data sources with unequal units of measurement.

While this problem is discussed more fully later in this dissertation, it should be emphasized here that I rely primarily upon interval-level data for each of the categories. Lastly, by combining the scores for both security and subsistence rights an overall index of basic human rights performance can be created (c.f. index construction below in Chapter: "Basic Human Rights: How Do Nations Perform; The Construction of Indices").

The Concept of BHR-Effort

Operating with the concept of basic human rights enables us to assess the overall country performance with respect to important core rights. Furthermore, I want to emphasize the importance of sharing some absolute standard of human rights as well as judging governments accordingly. Therefore, the concept of human rights effort should not be misunderstood as a concession to a relativist notion of human rights. Ultimately, all humans require some minimal standard and some bottom line of dignified life beneath which no one should be allowed to sink. Assessing the BHR-performance of nations will demonstrate how successful governments are in securing such minimal requirements.

From an analytical perspective it is equally important, however, to distinguish whether governments fail in their task because they are simply too poor or because they are not sufficiently committed to basic human rights. The concept of human rights effort is intended to address this point. Evaluating governments not only in terms of performance, but also by their intentions and commitments should have important policy implications for Western nations seeking to strengthen their ties with developing countries. It would be prudent policy for the West to selectively target financial aid to those countries whose human rights performance is hampered mainly by a lack of resources rather than by a lack of good-will. The concept of 'effort' is an analytical supplement to the concept of 'performance' in the sense that poor performers can be further classified according to varying levels of effort.

Faced with numerous economic imperatives that leave little room to maneuver, poor countries often have few policy choices. In some cases they are confronted with foreign pressure to pursue economic policies designed to liberalize the economy and to improve investment conditions. Structural adjustment programs and austerity measures may trigger strikes or hunger revolts to which governments then react with repression. In other instances, disproportionate economic growth may lead to severe hardships for certain parts of the population. Assuming that the governments of wealthier countries are far better equipped to address the diverse needs of their people, Bonn or Tokyo can either avoid altogether or financially 'sweeten' the hard political choices that confront the governments of poor countries. Given the importance of the socio-economic context, it would indeed be unrealistic to expect a less developed nation to simply follow a human rights policy modelled after Switzerland or Sweden. By contrast, however, if two countries of a comparable level of development show dramatic differences in their human rights conditions, one may, indeed, expect the under-achiever to bring its own human rights policy in line with the better performing nation. Thus, only on a level playing field can some countries become models for others to follow. This logic also extends to those wealthy nations that are not performing as well as their resources would lead us to expect.

There is another way of conceptualizing human rights effort, which points to a different, but equally valid justification thereof. For one, economic conditions in many countries are only going to improve very slowly, if at all. Accordingly, we can either wait for economic conditions to improve, and for the time being remain content with grouping all poor BHR-performers at the low end of human rights rank-lists, or we can introduce an additional criteria by which to evaluate poorer countries. Identifying those countries that make the best

use of their limited resources should be an important priority, in order to develop a model for a comparable nation. In addition, economic difficulties often serve as a convenient excuse to justify a poor record on human rights. While this argument may apply to measuring performance, it is futile in light of 'effort', as we may at least expect governments to secure basic rights to the extent they are capable of. A definition of human rights effort is provided below:

Definition: Basic human rights effort is defined as the attempt of a government to protect the individual's right to economic subsistence and physical security in relation to the means and resources available to that government.

Measuring Human Rights Effort.

A measure of effort has to meet several criteria. It is first of all based on the assumption that there is a correlation between human rights performance and economic development. Secondly, we require a measure that is globally applicable and which functions very much like a control variable, accounting for the effect of economic development. We would ideally prefer an interval-level measure, which precludes operating with rank-lists, classification schemes, typologies and the like. Lastly, in the interest of parsimony it is important to keep the measure simple and straightforward. In keeping with these requirements I propose, therefore, to divide the human rights performance scores for each country by its gross national product per capita. The GNP per capita is one of the most widely used measures of economic development in study of comparative development and seems perfectly suited for the task at hand. The concept of effort may be expressed more formally:

$$E_i = P_i/\ln(GNPcap_i)$$

In the above expression (E) represents BHR-effort of a country 'i', and (P), which stands for the BHR-performance of that country, is divided by the natural logarithm[9] of that country's per capita GNP.

Once we have established a rank-list of countries based upon effort, it will be interesting do draw comparisons to established human rights rank-lists such as the Gastil data, the Humana index or the UNDP human development index. In the following section we shall take a first look at the concept of effort by ranking countries on basic human rights as well as on their GNP per capita. Subsequently, we shall assess the rank deviations between the country rank on human rights performance and on wealth to compile a new rank-list, which is intended to challenge established human rights indices that tend to emphasize the performance of wealthy nations by simultaneously neglecting the effort of less developed countries.

Ranking Countries by Performance and Wealth -- Challenging Conventional Wisdom

While the concept of human rights effort will be explored more fully in the second part of this dissertation the following section will take a first look at human rights performance relative to economic wealth by calling attention to the distinction between "performance" and "effort". The comparison of country rankings on human rights performance and on wealth is intended to demonstrate effectively the need to operate with a concept such as effort (a) whenever we seek to account for the commitment and the will of political leaders in terms of guaranteeing human rights and (b) whenever we mean to properly compare adequately nations of unequal economic background. It is also meant to show that rankings based on effort, that is performance relative to wealth, may be an intuitively more sensible way of evaluating the relative status of nations. One of the stated goals of this study is, therefore, to challenge existing human rights rank-lists that usually feature wealthy nations near the top, while many poorer countries, which often desperately try to cope with scarce resources, are lumped together near the low end of human rights scales. Assuming an intimate connection between GNP per capita and basic human rights performance -- a relationship which is a major focus of analysis later in this study -- one is prompted to revaluate existing human rights rankings that are based solely on performance.

In order to construct such a list all countries were ranked according to their security rights and subsistence rights performance as well as according to their GNP per capita. In a further step the rank deviations between the rank on either basic rights category and the rank on GNP per capita were calculated. All things being equal we would expect a country's basic human rights ranking to match roughly that country's ranking on GNP per capita. If

the ranking on one or both basic human rights exceeded that on GNP per capita "considerably", we may conclude that country demonstrated a performance better than expected. Conversely, if a nation's position on one or both basic rights categories was "considerably" out-ranked by its place on wealth, this would point to a performance worse than expected. If all rankings matched we may say that the country exhibits basic human rights performance as expected or as average.

How do we define "considerably"? While the selection of a cut-off point is not entirely free from a certain arbitrariness, I propose to use 0.25 standard deviation above and below the mean (rank deviation) as "expected or average effort". I shall also mark an area 0.5 standard deviations above and below the mean as a second less stringent criterion. We might view countries within this wider section around the mean as falling somewhere between "average" and "considerable" effort.

I need to emphasize that we have to be careful how to interpret the findings. For a nation to exhibit "expected" or "average" effort does not necessarily imply the country has acceptable or good human rights practices. "Expected" or "average effort" in one country can indicate good human rights performance, while "average effort" in another may reflect rather poor performance. "Expected effort" here concerns solely the performance we would expect given the means available to government, that is given the GNP per capita. In a wealthy society even an average effort may result in better overall performance, than a great effort in a society with few resources available. The findings here can tell us, however, which nations make more of an effort than expected, which ones are simply average and which other ones do not even live up to the level of effort they are theoretically capable of.

Furthermore, countries with relatively high per capita GNPs will find it increasingly difficult to exceed that high rank, especially with respect to rights as basic as the ones we are concerned with here. Therefore, these are relative measures and should only be understood in the sense that in judging a country's performance one will also have to consider its economic prosperity.

Table 1.1 presents an alphabetic listing of all nation including their rank on security rights, subsistence rights and GNP per capita. Table 1.1, furthermore, lists the rank deviations between GNP per capita and each of the two basic human rights dimensions. The last column in Table 1.1 indicates the rank deviation between per capita GNP and a country's combined rank on both basic human rights categories.

The first country listed is Afghanistan. It occupies the rank 117 on security rights, 114 on subsistence rights and 98 in terms of GNP per capita. Accordingly, its rank deviation for security rights is -19, for subsistence rights -16, resulting in a total rank deviation of -35 between Afghanistan's rank on wealth and basic human rights. A brief look at Table 1.1 also reveals that in most cases the countries' ranks on security rights and subsistence rights differed considerably from each other.

Security Rights Effort: What Countries Perform Best Relative to GNP per Capita?

Since this procedure is somewhat imprecise by collapsing interval data onto a rank-order scale we have to allow for some variation among rank deviations and must not jump to conclusions if the deviations are minor. Therefore, as stated above, I shall consider an area of 0.25 standard deviations (area marked by single line) above and blow the mean (4.7 -- bold-face print) as tolerable and treat them as showing an "average effort" , that is a security

rights performance roughly matches the nations ranking on wealth. Furthermore, there is a second, wider, area (+/-0.5 standard deviations around mean -- defined by double line) marking countries that fall between average and considerable effort.

Sorting by security rights effort we find that Papua New Guinea closely followed by a number of African countries including Gambia and Senegal were at the top of the list with the largest positive rank deviation (c.f. Table 1.2). In other words, relative to their low level of development all these countries showed a strong effort, that is a better security rights performance than expected given their low positions on GNP per capita. While Bangladesh and India were the highest ranking Asian countries, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia and Costa Rica were their Latin American equivalents. Among industrialized countries Portugal, Greece and New Zealand had the most significant positive rank deviations.

From Ireland to the Philippines some 28 countries, including most Western industrialized countries, formed the middle range of the rank-list. The United States, by contrast, dropped by 23 ranks when we compare security rights performance with GNP per capita and is placed even below the low threshold of 0.5 standard deviations below the mean. The countries with a very poor security rights effort were East European and Middle Eastern nations (Libya, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Albania, Rumania, Saudi Arabia). A number of countries notorious for human rights violations placed at the very bottom of the list; South Africa and the former Soviet Union. For Cambodia, Mongolia and Vietnam no meaningful data were available, but we can surmise that the governments in question probably had a good reason not to divulge the relevant information. The rankings of these countries do not come as a surprise and strike us intuitively plausible, which, in my view, lends additional support to this approach.

On average the countries in the sample (n=124) improved their ranking on security rights performance by 5 ranks relative to their respective GNP per capita. In short, most countries performed roughly as expected. Nevertheless, the distribution of rank deviations stretches across a considerable range (-94 to +68 deviations in rank). The most frequently recorded deviation was +7.

[Table 1.2 -- about here]

Subsistence Rights Effort: What Countries Performed Best Relative to GNP per Capita?

Here we are interested to what extend countries are able to provide adequate housing, food, safe water, minimal education and basic health care, given their level of economic development. Once again countries were ranked according to their subsistence rights performance and their GNP per capita. Then the rank deviations were assessed for each nation. Finally, the rank deviations were listed in the order of magnitude (Table 1.3) to demonstrate which nations showed significant positive (+0.25 Stdv.) and which exhibited significant negative (-0.25 Stdv.) changes in rank. Among those nations with the greatest subsistence rights effort were countries such as Sri Lanka, Kenya, Tanzania, Costa Rica, Mauritius, while Mozambique, South Yemen, Haiti, Iran, Angola, Kuwait and Libya performed poorly by comparison. Nations ranked around the mean are again printed in bold type-face.

Once again, most Western nations were placed in the middle of the distribution of rank deviations. In fact, the only Western country whose rank on subsistence right was significantly below its rank on GNP per capita was the United States (-14) (c.f. Table 1.3).

Overall the country rankings on subsistence rights matched much more closely their ranks on GNP per capita compared with the previous findings for security rights. On average countries improved their position only by 3 ranks. This trend was also underscored by the comparatively lesser spread of rank deviations (Stdv 16.9). While the maximum positive and negative rank deviations on security rights were -94 and +68, the rank deviations for subsistence rights spanned a more narrow range (-40 to +40). I interpret this finding that security rights performance is considerably more independent of GNP per capita than subsistence rights performance.

[Table 1.3 -- about here]

Combined Basic Human Rights Effort: What Countries Performed Best Overall Relative to GNP per Capita?

While it may be interesting to explore differences between subsistence and security rights performance, we ultimately want to screen out those countries which made the greatest BHR-effort, respectively, which performed best relative to economic wealth. In adding the rank deviations for subsistence and security rights a number of Sub-Saharan African countries including Madagascar, Kenya and Mauritius came to be placed at the top (Table 1.4). This is surprising as Africa usually does not feature prominently on human rights rank lists. In fact, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Nepal, India and Bangladesh were the only non-African cases among the top 15. Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom were the only West European countries to improve their BHR-rank.

[Table 1.4 -- about here]

Except for the US all other industrialized democracies were grouped within 0.5 standard deviations of the mean or better. It should be pointed out, though, that the US and also to some extend of Switzerland were somewhat disadvantaged by being endowed with a very high per capita GNP. This raises human rights performance standards to levels, which may be unrealistic to exceed. One could, therefore, claim that this method of evaluation is implicitly biased against economic powerhouses -- as opposed to conventional assessment mechanisms which are often unfairly stacked against developing countries. However, both objections can hardly justify the fact that in terms of effort the United States, with a combined rank deviation of -37, finds itself placed between Afghanistan and Bulgaria. In both basic human rights dimensions the US finishes considerably below all other industrialized nations. In terms of "performance" the United States ranks somewhat better by placing 26th on security rights and 17th on subsistence rights.

The purpose of presenting this revised rank-list was to call into question existing human rights indices and to demonstrate the difference between the concepts of "performance" and "effort". In the Gastil Freedom House Survey (1984) the country rankings by political rights differ considerably from the above rankings by security effort. The Gastil index, too, ranks the Gambia and Papua New Guinea, two of the countries with the greatest security rights effort, relatively high (score of 3 on a 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest) range -- Gastil 1984:20). Nevertheless, they are outranked by some 30 countries containing all Western nations, which include also the U.S. The last one, incidently, obtained the highest possible score (1) in the Freedom House index compared with one of the lowest on the above effort index. In the

Freedom House index South Africa and Sudan two nations with very low rankings on security rights effort here, are grouped by Gastil in the middle ranges (score: 5) on political rights, considerably ahead of countries like Nicaragua or Tanzania. Of the top 31 countries according to Gastil (all a score of 1) only three, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Portugal are featured among the top 31 countries on security rights effort.[10] Likewise, of the 12 nations ranking lowest on security rights effort, only seven are included among the least politically free in the Gastil survey. Rankings on effort and human rights performance as conceptualized by Freedom House diverge even further, when we use combined BHR effort as basis for comparison. Of the 20 nations with the greatest overall BHR-effort based on rank deviations, only one, Costa Rica, is among Gastil's top 30 countries. The differences between the Freedom House survey and the effort-index remain virtually the same for the subsequent edition of Gastil's Freedom in the World 1986-87.

The shifts in rank order are no less dramatic when we turn to another well-established human rights ranking index, the UNDP Human Development Report (1991), whose data are based more or less on the same time frame (mid to late 1980s). In the UNDP human development index the leading countries are once again all Western industrialized nations, Costa Rica (ranked high both by the Gastil index (1) and the effort index (8)), for instance, appears only on the 40th rank, considerably after the USSR and most other east European countries, which are all ranked lower in both this study and in the Freedom House index (c.f. UNDP 1991:119). It is important to note that all three rank-lists deviate from each other, as they all measure, of course, somewhat different concepts. In both the Freedom House and the UNDP, which is even more strongly based on economic wealth, the Western industrialized countries easily outperform the rest of the world. By contrast, in the BHR-effort index

adjusted for GNP per capita, many, but by far not all, less developed countries do much better, switching places with most of the wealthy countries.

Admittedly, there are a number of arguments that could be made against this approach; for one, it makes it almost impossible for nations with a high GNP per capita and an already good human rights performance to improve on themselves, especially, since basic rights are very limited in scope and leave at a certain level little room for improvement. Sweden, for instance, would find it difficult to rank any higher than is already does. Secondly, in adding together rank-deviations the sample size and the sample selection become a factor in determining a nations's revised rank. Thirdly, determining the range of acceptable rank deviations is a somewhat arbitrary process. Lastly, by collapsing interval level data onto a rank-order scale valuable information is lost. Therefore, the concept of human rights effort, that is measuring performance by taking into account a nation's prosperity, will ultimately have to take a different approach. I believe, however, that using rank-deviations relative to GNP per capita serves as an important point of departure for the discussion of the concept of human rights effort, to which I shall return later in the analytical part of this dissertation.

Table 1.1 Country Rankings on GNP/capita and on Human Rights Performance (Security Rights, Subsistence Rights) as well as their Rank Deviations relative to the Rank on GNP/capita

Country	RkSecRi	RkSubRi	RkGnpCap	SecEff	SubEff	BHREff
Afghanistan	117	114	98	-19.00	-16.00	-35.00
Albania	117	.	53	-64.00	.	.
Algeria	40	75	36	-4.00	-39.00	-43.00
Angola	107	100	71	-36.00	-29.00	-65.00
Argentina	18	46	38	20.00	-8.00	12.00
Australia	10	9	7	-3.00	-2.00	-5.00
Austria	1	18	15	14.00	-3.00	11.00
Bangladesh	73	114	123	50.00	9.00	59.00
Belgium	10	14	16	6.00	2.00	8.00
Benin	49	108	106	57.00	-2.00	55.00
Bolivia	42	76	87	45.00	11.00	56.00
Botswana	31	57	70	39.00	13.00	52.00
Brazil	42	54	51	9.00	-3.00	6.00
Bulgaria	73	24	29	-44.00	5.00	-39.00
Burkina Faso	54	110	118	64.00	8.00	72.00
Burma/Myanmar	117	79	123	6.00	44.00	50.00
Burundi	73	101	114	41.00	13.00	54.00
Cambodia	117	94	.	.	.	.
Cameroon	42	72	75	33.00	3.00	36.00
Canada	10	8	5	-5.00	-3.00	-8.00
Cent.Afr.Rep	117	104	107	-10.00	3.00	-7.00
Chad	107	113	122	15.00	9.00	24.00
Chile	73	35	52	-21.00	17.00	-4.00
China	86	.	102	16.00	.	.
Colombia	86	33	57	-29.00	24.00	-5.00
Congo	34	78	64	30.00	-14.00	16.00
Costa Rica	23	29	60	37.00	31.00	68.00
Cuba	86	27	48	-38.00	21.00	-17.00
Czchoslova.	73	23	27	-46.00	4.00	-42.00
Denmark	1	7	8	7.00	1.00	8.00
Dom.Rep.	23	59	69	46.00	10.00	56.00
Ecuador	26	63	63	37.00	.00	37.00
Egypt	49	92	78	29.00	-14.00	15.00
El Salvador	86	80	79	-7.00	-1.00	-8.00
Ethiopia	117	118	125	8.00	7.00	15.00
Finland	1	4	10	9.00	6.00	15.00
France	10	9	13	3.00	4.00	7.00
E.Germany	73	19	19	-54.00	.00	-54.00
W.Germany	1	13	8	7.00	-5.00	2.00
Gambia	34	103	101	67.00	-2.00	65.00
Ghana	62	82	99	37.00	17.00	54.00
Greece	1	25	32	31.00	7.00	38.00
Guatemala	86	66	61	-25.00	-5.00	-30.00
Guinea	86	116	100	14.00	-16.00	-2.00
Haiti	86	98	72	-14.00	-26.00	-40.00
Honduras	62	68	81	19.00	13.00	32.00
Hong Kong	18	11	26	8.00	15.00	23.00
Hungary	34	28	41	7.00	13.00	20.00
India	62	91	107	45.00	16.00	61.00
Indonesia	73	65	87	14.00	22.00	36.00
Iran	86	76	50	-36.00	-26.00	-62.00
Iraq	86	64	49	-37.00	-15.00	-52.00
Irish Rep.	18	16	30	12.00	14.00	26.00
Israel	23	22	28	5.00	6.00	11.00
Italy	31	20	25	-6.00	5.00	-1.00
Ivory Coast	42	89	84	42.00	-5.00	37.00
Jamaica	40	31	56	16.00	25.00	41.00
Japan	26	2	11	-15.00	9.00	-6.00
Jordan	42	55	55	13.00	.00	13.00
Kenya	62	60	102	40.00	42.00	82.00
Korea N.	107	44	65	-42.00	21.00	-21.00
Korea S.	49	45	40	-9.00	-5.00	-14.00
Kuwait	42	39	1	-41.00	-38.00	-79.00

Table 1.1 (con't)

Laos	86	96	113	27.00	17.00	44.00
Lesotho	54	83	89	35.00	6.00	41.00
Libya	62	58	18	-44.00	-40.00	-84.00
Liberia	107	93	90	-17.00	-3.00	-20.00
Madagascar	54	71	107	53.00	36.00	89.00
Malawi	86	87	117	31.00	30.00	61.00
Malaysia	62	48	46	-16.00	-2.00	-18.00
Mali	107	119	119	12.00	.00	12.00
Mauritania	117	.	92	-25.00	.	.
Mauritius	18	38	66	48.00	28.00	76.00
Mexico	73	47	43	-30.00	-4.00	-34.00
Mongolia	.	.	67	.	.	.
Morocco	54	84	82	28.00	-2.00	26.00
Mozambique	86	117	93	7.00	-24.00	-17.00
Nepal	73	98	118	45.00	20.00	65.00
Netherlands	1	5	14	13.00	9.00	22.00
New Zealand	1	21	20	19.00	-1.00	18.00
Nicaragua	49	61	73	24.00	12.00	36.00
Niger	73	105	116	43.00	11.00	54.00
Nigeria	62	97	77	15.00	-20.00	-5.00
Norway	1	6	4	3.00	-2.00	1.00
Oman	54	.	24	-30.00	.	.
Pakistan	107	106	94	-13.00	-12.00	-25.00
Panama	31	41	44	13.00	3.00	16.00
Pap.N.Guinea	18	.	79	61.00	.	.
Paraguay	73	53	59	-14.00	6.00	-8.00
Peru	54	70	68	14.00	-2.00	12.00
Philippines	86	56	83	-3.00	27.00	24.00
Poland	73	30	42	-31.00	12.00	-19.00
Portugal	10	32	47	37.00	15.00	52.00
Rumania	107	37	33	-74.00	-4.00	-78.00
Rwanda	54	85	105	51.00	20.00	71.00
Saudi Arabia	73	26	12	-61.00	-14.00	-75.00
Senegal	34	95	94	60.00	-1.00	59.00
Sierra Leone	34	112	102	68.00	-10.00	58.00
Singapore	42	40	21	-21.00	-19.00	-40.00
Somalia	107	109	107	.00	-2.00	-2.00
South Africa	117	.	37	-80.00	.	.
Spain	26	12	31	5.00	19.00	24.00
Sri Lanka	62	51	96	34.00	45.00	79.00
Sudan	117	102	96	-21.00	-6.00	-27.00
Sweden	1	1	6	5.00	5.00	10.00
Switzerland	10	3	2	-8.00	-1.00	-9.00
Syria	86	50	54	-32.00	4.00	-28.00
Taiwan	54	.	35	-19.00	.	.
Tanzania	86	73	115	29.00	42.00	71.00
Thailand	62	52	73	11.00	21.00	32.00
Togo	86	88	111	25.00	23.00	48.00
Trinidad	34	34	22	-12.00	-12.00	-24.00
Tunisia	49	74	58	9.00	-16.00	-7.00
Turkey	86	69	61	-25.00	-8.00	-33.00
Uganda	107	90	112	5.00	22.00	27.00
USSR	117	36	23	-94.00	-13.00	-107.00
UK	10	14	17	7.00	3.00	10.00
USA	26	17	3	-23.00	-14.00	-37.00
Uruguay	10	43	45	35.00	2.00	37.00
Venezuela	26	49	34	8.00	-15.00	-7.00
Vietnam	86	62	.	.	.	.
S.Yemen	86	111	85	-1.00	-26.00	-27.00
N.Yemen	86	106	85	-1.00	-21.00	-22.00
Yugoslavia	62	42	39	-23.00	-3.00	-26.00
Zaire	107	86	119	12.00	33.00	45.00
Zambia	62	81	90	28.00	9.00	37.00
Zimbabwe	86	67	76	-10.00	9.00	-1.00

(RkSecRi=Rank on Security Right, RkSubRi=Rank on Subsistence Right, RkGnpCap= Rank on GNP/c, SecEff= Security Effort (rank deviation), SubEff= Subsistence Effort (rank diviation), BHREff=Basic Human Rights Effort

Table 1.2 Country Ranking by Security Effort (= magnitude of rank deviation between rank on security rights performance and rank on GNP/c)

Country Name	SEC-EFF
Sierra Leone	68.00
Gambia	67.00
Burkina Faso	64.00
Pap.N.Guinea	61.00
Senegal	60.00
Benin	57.00
Madagascar	53.00
Rwanda	51.00
Bangladesh	50.00
Mauritius	48.00
Dom.Rep.	46.00
Bolivia	45.00
India	45.00
Nepal	45.00
Niger	43.00
Ivory Coast	42.00
Burundi	41.00
Kenya	40.00
Botswana	39.00
Costa Rica	37.00
Ecuador	37.00
Ghana	37.00
Portugal	37.00
Lesotho	35.00
Uruguay	35.00
Sri Lanka	34.00
Cameroon	33.00
Greece	31.00
Malawi	31.00
Congo	30.00
Egypt	29.00
Tanzania	29.00
Morocco	28.00
Zambia	28.00
Laos	27.00
Togo	25.00
Nicaragua	24.00
Argentina	20.00
Honduras	19.00
New Zealand	19.00
China	16.00
Jamaica	16.00
Chad	15.00
Nigeria	15.00
Austria	14.00
Guinea	14.00
Indonesia	14.00
Peru	14.00
Jordan	13.00
Netherlands	13.00
Panama	13.00
Irish Rep.	12.00
Mali	12.00
Zaire	12.00
Thailand	11.00
Brazil	9.00
Finland	9.00
Tunisia	9.00
Ethiopia	8.00
Hong Kong	8.00
Venezuela	8.00
Denmark	7.00
Germany	7.00
Hungary	7.00

Country Name	SEC-EFF
Mozambique	7.00
UK	7.00
Belgium	6.00
Burma/Myanmar	6.00
Israel	5.00
Spain	5.00
Sweden	**5.00**
Uganda	**5.00**
France	**3.00**
Norway	**3.00**
Somalia	.00
S.Yemen	-1.00
N.Yemen	-1.00
Australia	-3.00
Philippines	-3.00
Algeria	-4.00
Canada	-5.00
Italy	-6.00
El Salvador	-7.00
Switzerland	-8.00
Korea S.	-9.00
Cent.Afr.Rep	-10.00
Zimbabwe	-10.00
Trinidad	-12.00
Pakistan	-13.00
Haiti	-14.00
Paraguay	-14.00
Japan	-15.00
Malaysia	-16.00
Liberia	-17.00
Afghanistan	-19.00
Taiwan	-19.00
Chile	-21.00
Singapore	-21.00
Sudan	-21.00
USA	-23.00
Yugoslavia	-23.00
Guatemala	-25.00
Mauritania	-25.00
Turkey	-25.00
Colombia	-29.00
Mexico	-30.00
Oman	-30.00
Poland	-31.00
Syria	-32.00
Angola	-36.00
Iran	-36.00
Iraq	-37.00
Cuba	-38.00
Kuwait	-41.00
Korea N.	-42.00
Bulgaria	-44.00
Libya	-44.00
Czchoslova.	-46.00
E.Germany	-54.00
Saudi Arabia	-61.00
Albania	-64.00
Rumania	-74.00
South Africa	-80.00
USSR	-94.00
Cambodia	.
Vietnam	.

Table 1.3 Country Ranking by Subsistence Effort (= magnitude of rank deviation between rank on subsistence rights performance and rank on GNP/c)

Country Name	SUB-EFF
Sri Lanka	45.00
Burma/Myanmar	44.00
Kenya	42.00
Tanzania	42.00
Madagascar	36.00
Zaire	33.00
Costa Rica	31.00
Malawi	30.00
Mauritius	28.00
Philippines	27.00
Jamaica	25.00
Colombia	24.00
Togo	23.00
Indonesia	22.00
Uganda	22.00
Thailand	21.00
Cuba	21.00
Korea N.	21.00
Rwanda	20.00
Nepal	20.00
Spain	19.00
Ghana	17.00
Laos	17.00
Chile	17.00
India	16.00
Portugal	15.00
Hong Kong	15.00
Irish Rep.	14.00
Burundi	13.00
Botswana	13.00
Honduras	13.00
Hungary	13.00
Nicaragua	12.00
Poland	12.00
Bolivia	11.00
Niger	11.00
Dom.Rep.	10.00
Bangladesh	9.00
Zambia	9.00
Chad	9.00
Netherlands	9.00
Zimbabwe	9.00
Japan	9.00
Burkina Faso	8.00
Greece	7.00
Ethiopia	7.00
Lesotho	6.00
Finland	6.00
Israel	6.00
Paraguay	6.00
Sweden	5.00
Italy	5.00
Bulgaria	5.00
France	**4.00**
Syria	**4.00**
Czchoslova.	**4.00**
Cameroon	**3.00**
Panama	**3.00**
UK	**3.00**
Cent.Afr.Rep	**3.00**
Uruguay	2.00
Belgium	2.00
Denmark	1.00
Ecuador	.00

Country Name	SUB-EFF
Jordan	.00
Mali	.00
E.Germany	.00
Senegal	-1.00
New Zealand	-1.00
El Salvador	-1.00
Switzerland	-1.00
Gambia	-2.00
Benin	-2.00
Morocco	-2.00
Peru	-2.00
Norway	-2.00
Somalia	-2.00
Australia	-2.00
Malaysia	-2.00
Austria	-3.00
Brazil	-3.00
Canada	-3.00
Liberia	-3.00
Yugoslavia	-3.00
Mexico	-4.00
Rumania	-4.00
Ivory Coast	-5.00
W.Germany	-5.00
Korea S.	-5.00
Guatemala	-5.00
Sudan	-6.00
Argentina	-8.00
Turkey	-8.00
Sierra Leone	-10.00
Trinidad	-12.00
Pakistan	-12.00
USSR	-13.00
Congo	-14.00
Egypt	-14.00
USA	-14.00
Saudi Arabia	-14.00
Venezuela	-15.00
Iraq	-15.00
Guinea	-16.00
Tunisia	-16.00
Afghanistan	-16.00
Singapore	-19.00
Nigeria	-20.00
N.Yemen	-21.00
Mozambique	-24.00
S.Yemen	-26.00
Haiti	-26.00
Iran	-26.00
Angola	-29.00
Kuwait	-38.00
Algeria	-39.00
Libya	-40.00
Pap.N.Guinea	.
China	.
Taiwan	.
Mauritania	.
Oman	.
Albania	.
South Africa	.
Cambodia	.
Mongolia	.
Vietnam	.

Table 1.4 Country Ranking by Basic Human Rights Effort (= combined magnitude of rank deviations on security and subsistence rights performance)

Country Name	BHR-EFF
Madagascar	89.00
Kenya	82.00
Sri Lanka	79.00
Mauritius	76.00
Burkina Faso	72.00
Tanzania	71.00
Rwanda	71.00
Costa Rica	68.00
Nepal	65.00
Gambia	65.00
Malawi	61.00
India	61.00
Bangladesh	59.00
Senegal	59.00
Sierra Leone	58.00
Bolivia	56.00
Dom.Rep.	56.00
Benin	55.00
Ghana	54.00
Burundi	54.00
Niger	54.00
Portugal	52.00
Botswana	52.00
Burma/Myanmar	50.00
Togo	48.00
Zaire	45.00
Laos	44.00
Jamaica	41.00
Lesotho	41.00
Greece	38.00
Zambia	37.00
Uruguay	37.00
Ecuador	37.00
Ivory Coast	37.00
Indonesia	36.00
Nicaragua	36.00
Cameroon	36.00
Thailand	32.00
Honduras	32.00
Uganda	27.00
Irish Rep.	26.00
Morocco	26.00
Philippines	24.00
Spain	24.00
Chad	24.00
Hong Kong	23.00
Netherlands	22.00
Hungary	20.00
New Zealand	18.00
Panama	16.00
Congo	16.00
Ethiopia	15.00
Finland	15.00
Egypt	15.00
Jordan	13.00
Mali	12.00
Peru	12.00
Argentina	12.00
Israel	11.00
Austria	11.00
Sweden	**10.00**
UK	**10.00**
Belgium	**8.00**
Denmark	**8.00**

Country Name	BHR-EFF
France	7.00
Brazil	6.00
W.Germany	2.00
Norway	1.00
Zimbabwe	-1.00
Italy	-1.00
Somalia	-2.00
Guinea	-2.00
Chile	-4.00
Colombia	-5.00
Australia	-5.00
Nigeria	-5.00
Japan	-6.00
Cent.Afr.Rep	-7.00
Venezuela	-7.00
Tunisia	-7.00
Paraguay	-8.00
El Salvador	-8.00
Canada	-8.00
Switzerland	-9.00
Korea S.	-14.00
Cuba	-17.00
Mozambique	-17.00
Malaysia	-18.00
Poland	-19.00
Liberia	-20.00
Korea N.	-21.00
N.Yemen	-22.00
Trinidad	-24.00
Pakistan	-25.00
Yugoslavia	-26.00
Sudan	-27.00
S.Yemen	-27.00
Syria	-28.00
Guatemala	-30.00
Turkey	-33.00
Mexico	-34.00
Afghanistan	-35.00
USA	-37.00
Bulgaria	-39.00
Singapore	-40.00
Haiti	-40.00
Czchoslova.	-42.00
Algeria	-43.00
Iraq	-52.00
E.Germany	-54.00
Iran	-62.00
Angola	-65.00
Saudi Arabia	-75.00
Rumania	-78.00
Kuwait	-79.00
Libya	-84.00
USSR	-107.00
Pap.N.Guinea	.
China	.
Taiwan	.
Mauritania	.
Oman	.
Albania	.
South Africa	.
Cambodia	.
Mongolia	.
Vietnam	.

Endnotes

1. Asbjorn focuses not only on economic subsistence but her "minimum threshold" approach also incorporates environmental and freedom rights.

2. It has common practice in some Latin American countries that in order to cross the border visitors from neighboring countries were required to carry a not unsubstantial US dollar, barring effectively thousands of poor people from travelling abroad.

3. Shue conceptualizes government human rights behavior along the following three levels; a) no action towards rights violation, b) some action (protection against violation) and c) considerable action (retribution for violation). In order to ensure basic rights governments have to adopt 'considerable action'. According to Shue these action-guidelines may be helpful indicators for analyzing state behavior with respect to human rights.

4. In one instance he proposes a three-level measure for extent by looking at a human right as a) a basis for a justified demand, b) as actual enjoyment of the substance and c) as socially guaranteed against standard threats. Consequently, a particular human right may exist solely as a claim-right, or it may be implemented only as legal arrangement, or finally it may be guaranteed to the extent that it is generally encouraged and becomes custom. In this context Shue introduces his notion of 'standard threats'-- for a more detailed discussion of standard threats see: Shue, Basic Rights, p.29-34 which (analogous to Jorge Dominguez's issue-area analysis of human rights) cuts through the fuzziness of this issue by identifying a list of concrete threats to basic rights with which a system has to deal. To use a positivist metaphor here, rather than 'verifying' the existence of a human right, it may be easier to falsify the existence of a concrete 'standard threat'. This notion of standard threats leads Shue to introduce another measure for 'extent of human rights performance', this time with respect to government performance. In order to combat standard threats there is a set of 'correlative duties'.

5. Any differences between these indicators are undesired and may be due to a difference in quality between the data and data sources. Obtaining accurate social and economic data which cover the entire globe and which are taken from approximately the same time period are quite a challenge to say the least.

6. The inclusion of capital punishment warrants a brief explanation here. In my judgement the death penalty and the right to physical security and survival are inherently incompatible, regardless of existing moral or legal standards.It should also be pointed out, however, that the

measure for capital punishment represents a scale varying from 0 to 3. It allows us, therefore, to distinguish between judicial systems in which the effects of the death penalty are mitigated by the rule of law as well as by an extensive appellate process and those systems in which governments execute prisoners that have no or only an insufficient means of legal recourse.

7. From the perspective of an individual, whose life is threatened it makes no difference, whether murder is carried out upon government orders, by renegade authorities or by death squads that operate with the tacit approval of at least parts of the governing elite. El Salvador, Argentina, Chile or the murder of Polish priest Popieluszco through security forces are classic examples of how "disappearances" and "assassination" through hit squads served to intimidate opposition groups and help fulfill the oppressive policies of government. This point is further underscored by the fact that both items freedom from capital punishment and extrajudicial killings are included in same article of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (Art.6: 1,6). I am not suggesting that governments are at fault if they fail to protect each and every single individual from political violence as it can occur in any society. However, it there appears to be a pattern of politically motivated assassinations of people known for their opposition to government, the blame for this would have to be squarely placed on the government and should for the purposes of this analysis be treated as either a grave failure or as complicity of government. We have to remember that this research is not about uncovering the subtle differences in repressive strategies but takes the individual and his/her physical integrity as guaranteed by government as its point of departure.

8. Freedom form Torture corresponds to Humana item (question) 9 which is based on UDHR Article 5. Freedom from slavery, bondage, forced and child labor corresponds to Humana item 7 and is based on Article 10(3) ICESCR. Freedom from detention without warrant corresponds to Humana item 13, which is based on Article 9(1) ICCPR. Freedom from police searches of home without a warrant corresponds to Humana item 34 and is based on Article 17(1) ICCPR. Freedom from Capital Punishment and extrajudicial killings corresponds to Humana items 8 and 11 and is based on Article 6(1,6) ICCPR.

9. Given that the statistical procedures employed here assume linearity the natural logarithm is usually taken to account for the curvilinear nature of the relationship when operating with exponentially increasing variables such as GNP per capita.

10. Barbados, Belize, Kiribati and Tuvalu, which Gastil also includes among the tope ranked nations on political rights are not included in the BHR-survey here.

EXPLAINING BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

In addition to assessing basic human rights conditions, the major objective of this research project is to explain cross-national differences with respect to both basic human rights performance and effort. Explanations of human rights performance in the literature fall roughly into three major categories (a) individual-level explanations, (b) economic explanations and (c) political explanations. These dimensions are not neatly delimitated. Grouping the literature into these three categories is only one way of conceptualizing a rather diverse literature, other frameworks have been suggested (c.f. Mitchell/McCormick 1992).

Individual-level explanations, often the research subject of historians and psychologists, are ill-suited to empirical generalization. These focus mainly on the impact of individual national leaders such as Idi Amin, Stalin or Hitler (e.g. Bullock 1991). While political factors are undoubtedly bound up with the role such dominant figures play, explanations of their policies are mainly rooted in historical contingencies or the leaders' individual socialization and psychological motivations. I shall, therefore, limit my analysis to factors that can in the widest sense be considered economic and political. The goal is to derive from the literature a set of hypotheses and re-test them in light of bhr-performance and effort.

Economic Explanations of Basic Human Rights Performance

There is a wealth of literature dating back to the classical modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s suggesting a connection between a government's effort to keep the social peace and factors such as economic wealth, unbalanced economic growth and social mobilization. In some conceptualizations (Lerner 1958, Pye 1963 and Deutsch 1964; Huntington 1968; Jackman 1973; Henderson 1991) the role of the economic context is viewed as dynamic in the sense that changes in the economy, specifically the rate of economic growth, are linked to changes in democratic stability. In other works (c.f. Lipset 1959, 1981; Cutright 1968; Jackman 1973; Strouse and Claude 1976, Mitchell/McCormick 1988; Pourgerami 1991; Cingranelli 1992, etc.) the concept is more static by focusing on the level of economic development as the main independent variable. In more recent research the direction of causality between economic and democratic performance has been reversed, by identifying political explanations, specifically the role of the (strong) state for economic development (c.f. Huntington 1968; Stepan 1978; Evans 1979; Kohli 1986, Migdal 1988, etc.).

In the following section I shall review much of this literature and illuminate in more detail the importance of economic factors in explaining human rights practices. Generally speaking, economic explanations have been advanced along two levels; the (international) system-level and the (domestic) state-societal level.

System-Level Explanations.

System level explanations have traditionally looked 'outward' by explaining domestic policy mainly as a consequence of events in the international system. In short, system-level

explanations link international capitalist development to political authoritarianism in third world countries (c.f. Becker 1991). Chomsky and Herman (1979), for instance, have argued that efforts by advanced capitalist countries to create favorable investment conditions have led to repressive activities by governments against unions, social movements or civil society in general. Marxist critics such as Robert Cox (1987) or neo-realists like Robert Gilpin (1987) advance a similar argument. Cox (1987: 279-308), argues that structural changes ("the disintegration of the Neoliberal historic bloc") in the capitalist world economy led to a deterioration of the social and economic conditions of the working class in both industrialized and developing countries. Among these negative effects Cox (1987: 364-47) cites the "expansion of low-wage precarious employment", the "exemption of enterprises from labor and social security regulations", "poor working conditions and low wages [for illegal immigrants], "the reduction of welfare benefits" and the state's use of its "political and repressive resources" for the transformation of third world agriculture. Robert Gilpin makes a similar argument when he warns that "[t]he structural changes [in the world economy after American hegemony] have produced what a Marxist would call 'contradictions' in the international political economy (363)... resulting in the impact of external forces on domestic well-being (116)". Among the consequences of domestic adjustment Gilpin foresees a "dramatic decline in economic welfare" (385) especially for Western Europe and North America.

Other authors have focused exclusively on the effects of the international political economy on developing countries. An entire 'school' -- the dependency approach -- has tried to explain third world underdevelopment and authoritarianism as a direct result of core-peripheral economic relations (c.f. Frank 1969; Sunkel 1973), as a consequence of the 'logic'

of the capitalist world system (c.f. Wallerstein 1974). While dependencistas do not constitute a monolithic block, as there is substantial disagreement among them, they have all, in one form or another, focused on the reproduction of poverty and oppression in dependent societies. In earlier dependency theory, the state in a dependent society is seen primarily as the accomplice of international capitalism using whatever means necessary to secure the integration into an international division of labor (c.f. Frank 1969: 9; Dos Santos 1970: 235). "[T]o achieve this [the promotion of capitalism], relatively stable forms of labor control have been established and state bureaucracies and public enterprises have been expanded" (Cardoso 1973: 55). In the more sophisticated accounts put forth by later dependency models the view of the state changed in the sense that state agency could bring about some measure of dependent development. In any event, the breakdowns of democracy in Latin America and the establishment of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s were explained as a result of the impact of international economic demands on domestic politics (c.f. O'Donnell 1973, 1978; Collier 1979). Complementary to O'Donnell's analysis, a model of dependent development was formulated by Cardoso (1973; see also Cardoso/Faletto 1979) and expanded upon by Evans (1979). There the modern face of capitalist imperialism appears in the guise of transnational corporations -- "the organizational embodiment of international capital" (Evans 1979: 34) -- as the driving force behind a new form of economic imperialism and domestic repression. Others such as Edward Muller (1985) argue that the hypothesis of democratic breakdown as a result of depended development is misguided. Democratic breakdowns can be better explained by "preemptive authoritarian transformations in the interest of maintaining stable pro-American...government", by " aid-dependency" of third world regimes on the United States (Muller 1985: 445). In any event, all of the above system-

level approaches share the implicit or explicit assumption that the effect of the international system on domestic political and economic human rights is negative.

There is a considerable literature beginning with the early modernization theorists which makes the exact opposite assumption; that is the modernization of traditional societies, which eventually leads to pluralist market economic prosperity and democratic government, requires the insertion into the world market. Only the exposure to Western ways of political and economic behavior through economic, cultural, political and communication links may trigger a process by which traditional societies can successfully modernize (c.f. Apter 1965). In light of recent political changes following the exhaustion and failure of authoritarian rule in many countries, this perspective has received new attention. While transitions to democracy do not have mono-causal explanations, studies of regime change in Southern Europe and Latin America point to external and internal economic factors which play an important role in that process (Balyora 1987; Wiarda/Wiarda 1989; Williams 1984; O'Donnell 1986; Wiarda 1990). Transitions to democracy require the growth of civil society as well as a measure of political and economic pluralism (c.f. Levine 1988: 377-394). An emerging urban middle-class, which wants to see its economic power matched by political clout, is seen as the bearer of this development. This in turn seems to be facilitated by foreign investment and close economic ties to other liberal democracies. A frequently cited example is the rapid development of South East Asia in which the formula of export-led growth has resulted not only in greater overall prosperity but also in political liberalization (c.f. Robinson 1991). In addition, in the CNN-world of instant information, governments, wanting to attract foreign business and often depending on the support of the domestic middle-class, will likely show greater restraint in dealing with the political opposition. In sum, there is evidence suggesting that greater world

market integration may have a beneficial effect on both economic and political rights.

Both the dependency and the modernization hypotheses have actually been tested with respect to human rights. Carelton (1989) conducted a time series analysis of 22 Latin American countries examining the relationship between degree of dependence on raw material exports and human rights practices. He found a modest relationship supporting the dependency explanation of human rights violations. Wolpin (1986), by contrast, found little independent confirmation for dependency's central claim that the degree of a poor country's integration into the global market has a negative effect on that country's human rights record. The findings, however, were not substantial enough to draw the opposite conclusion and support the modernization hypothesis. Similarly, Kowalewski (1989) found no relationship between foreign dependence and workers repression by MNCs for Asia. Rothgeb (1989) actually found that the level of direct foreign investment in a developing country had a liberalizing effect. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) examined two indicators of dependency (trade with capitalist nations and extent of direct foreign investment) and human rights practices. They found that more dependent states were somewhat more likely to violate the human rights of their citizens. The results were, however, very weak and support neither of the above approaches.

Nevertheless, I shall retest this hypothesis by using the Mitchell/McCormick configuration[1] with two important modifications: instead of a complex measure of political democracy I shall focus on basic human rights, and in addition, regional differences largely ignored by Mitchell/McCormick will be an important part of this analysis, allowing me to examine factors such as exports, imports, private foreign investment and official foreign transfers as separate variables. For one, it is reasonable to assume that in regions or parts of

regions with great strategic importance to the West, trade, foreign investment and other forms of economic support may have flowed regardless of the authoritarian nature of governments. Regions also vary in terms of economic development, cultural and value orientation, level of institutional development and a number other factors, which may affect the way foreign trade and investment impacts on the government policy towards human rights.

Economic Explanations at the Domestic Level.

Explanations that focus primarily on internal economic factors of human rights performance have centered on a variety of issues. The most famous one is undoubtedly the 'Lipset-hypothesis' linking the level of economic development to democratic stability (Lipset 1959a; 1959b; 1981). Implicitly, economic performance has, therefore, been thought of as also being associated with greater government respect for political rights and civil liberties. He writes:

> it seems clear that the factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education are so closely interrelated as to form one common factor. And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of democracy (Lipset 1959b).

While Lipset seems -- in Robert Jackman's words (1973: 611) -- to "regard democracy as a linear positive function of economic growth" others (Cutright 1968; Jackman 1973) have argued in favor of a curvilinear relationship between economic and democratic performance. In any event, Jackman's findings reveal only marginal difference between the linear and the curvilinear model, supporting the overall claim that there is, indeed, a strong relationship (Jackman 1973; see especially also: Pourgerami 1991). Strouse and Claude (1976) have tested the Lipset-hypothesis specifically with respect to human rights (as defined by the Freedom House Index). Among the different measures of economic development used by Strouse and

Claude (1976: 56, Table 1) GNP per capita proved to be the strongest predictor of political and civil rights. Arat (1988) in a study on the relationship between democracy and economic development comes to a similar conclusion, in the sense that modernization and democracy share common explanatory factors rooted in culture and personality, in which the direction of causality points from economics to politics. Arat cautions us, however, that this hypothesis is only confirmed only by her cross-national data, but not her longitudinal data (:34). Furthermore, her model of democratic instability as a result of lacking economic development explains only 17% of the variance and visual examination of the scatterplot (Figure 2:33) reveals actually a (inverse u-shaped) curvilinear relationship between democratic stability and economic development. In a recent study Dasgupta (1990), for instance, finds that "political and civil liberties are positively and significantly correlated with per capita income and its growth, with improvement in infant survival rates and with increases in life expectancy" (:28).

Lipset's argument was centered on the assumption that democracy required a literate community, good communications and enough "prosperity so that the energy of the citizens was not wholly consumed by the effort needed to survive" (Cingranelli 1992: 2). Other theorists have taken this relationship further and noted that "socioeconomic development fundamentally changes the way individuals and groups relate to the political process" (Cingranelli 1992: 2). Development creates greater economic security, may reduce economic inequality, and may mitigate feelings of relative deprivation and injustice among the lower classes, thus, reducing the likelihood of extremist politics (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1990: 18). A wealthy society also tends to have a larger middle class, which has been associated in democratic theory with moderation and tolerance (Dahl 1971: 81). In yet another argument linking poverty to government oppression, Cingranelli and Wright (1985) found evidence that

due process laws are violated in the poorest countries because of an inadequate criminal justice system with poorly trained and ill-equipped lawyers, judges and police officers.

Other research in this area includes a series of studies edited by David Forsythe (1989), which focuses especially on economic and social rights. In addition, economic development as predictor of human rights performance has, in one form or another, been incorporated by Mitchell and McCormick (1988), Spalding (1988: 173-89), Pritchard 1989, Henderson (1991) and the UNDP Human Development Report (1991, 1992). Economic well-being and economic growth have also been two critical variables employed in a recent pooled time series analysis by Poe and Tate (1994) in testing explanations of violations of personal integrity and democracy.

Given the overwhelming evidence for the critical role of economic standing in explaining human rights performance I shall retest this hypothesis in light of basic human rights. Since GNP per capita was the strongest predictor of all the measures of economic development employed by Strouse and Claude (1976), Mitchell and McCormick (1988) as well as Spalding (1988), it seems an ideal choice for the purposes of this study -- both as an explanatory and a control variable.

While Lipset (1959a) had argued that stable democracy is related to economic development, he also believed that rapid industrialization "introducing sharp discontinuities between the pre-industrial and industrial situation" (:59) would lead to greater political extremism and, thus, instability. This realization eventually spawned an entire research tradition that concerned itself with the consequences of rapid economic change, especially with respect to political stability and democratic performance (c.f. Lerner 1958; Pye 1963, 1966; Huntington 1968). Karl Deutsch (1961, 1964), for instance, specifically warned against

the impact of social mobilization upon "the performance of political systems and upon the stability and capabilities of government" (1961: 207). He concluded that rapidly modernizing societies are more prone to political instability than either traditional or highly developed and fully mobilized societies. In short, from the perspective of human rights the implications of rapid socioeconomic change are entirely negative -- at least as long as society is in flux. During periods of social mobilization and economic transformation social and political tensions are exacerbated. Rapid growth is always unbalanced leading to greater socioeconomic and political disequilibria in a population. Hence, the disadvantaged strata are more likely to vent their frustration, which may in turn provoke a government crackdown. Similarly, government oppression may be a result of the inability on the part of the state to cope with economic change. Institutions can be overwhelmed beyond capacity and lag behind in their own development (c.f. Huntington 1968).

Strouse and Claude (1979) tested the impact of the rate of economic growth by adopting Gastil's measures of human rights (civil and political rights, freedom, associated trends). Their findings are more or less inconclusive, as the correlation coefficients are extremely low and most of the indicators turn out to be statistically insignificant (1979: 56). Henderson (1991), by contrast, did find that rapid growth was associated with oppression; this was the case, however, only in conjunction with distribution of wealth. I shall re-examine the relationship between rate of economic growth and human rights, both with respect to BHR-performance and effort.

The final economic hypothesis examined here concerns the distribution of wealth in society. Cingranelli summarizes the reason underlying this relationship as follows: "Societies where income, political power, and status are distributed equitably among different ethnic,

religious, and racial groups will also tend to have less oppressive governments" (Cingranelli 1992 :3). The logical underpinning of the assumption that greater equality will result in greater stability and less popular frustration and, therefore, less government oppression will hardly come as a surprise and yet, relatively little comparative research has been done, especially from a human rights standpoint. Jackman (1974) successfully demonstrated that socioeconomic equality and democracy are positively correlated. The proposition that distribution of income mattered was further supported by Henderson (1991), who found that the more unequal societies were the more likely they were to experience government repression. Dasgupta (1990) and Midlarsky (1992) have focused on similar explanations. Midlarsky, for instance, who operates with the Gini coefficient, finds modest support for his hypothesis that (early) democracy and a long tradition of good political and civil rights practices depend in part on a history of equitable land distribution. Given recent evidence that the distribution of wealth may be an important predictor of human rights I shall test this hypothesis in the context of basic rights, by using both the Gini coefficient and income ratios as indicators.

Summary of Economic Hypotheses for BHR-Performance.

Based on a very broad and complex literature the following hypotheses can be distilled. My goal is to limit myself to key-propositions in each of the major research traditions discussed above. At this stage of the conceptualization of basic human rights, it is more important to isolate a small number of economic and political factors which may help explain BHR-practices. A more refined analysis will have to be reserved for future research.

(E.H1) The higher the level of economic development the better the overall government performance in securing basic human rights.

(E.H2) The greater the inequality of wealth, the worse the government performance in securing basic human rights.

(E.H3) The greater a country's integration into the world market, the better the overall government performance in securing basic human rights.

(E.H4) The faster the rate of economic growth, the worse the government performance in securing basic human rights.

Political Explanations of Basic Human Rights Performance

Earlier I argued that in the past human rights researchers have frequently been too content with economic explanations of the attainment of human rights. Interestingly, despite working from rather different ideological positions the modernization tradition and dependency theory in its various manifestations have both anchored their explanation for political outcomes directly or indirectly in economics. Even when the protection of human rights was seen as a result of democratic practices, the underlying factors were often taken to be economic (e.g. Nixon 1960; Strouse and Claude 1976; Chomsky and Herman 1979; Henderson 1982) blurring in effect an important conceptual distinction between socioeconomic and political causes of human rights performance. While one side essentially argues that democracy requires a certain level of development and, since good things go together, economic development and market liberalization would eventually lead to democratization, the other position holds that state action is largely determined by a capitalist world system, or more generally, by a given economic base. In either perspective politics is taken to be an extension of economics that manifest themselves in the behavior of a rational homo economicus, in the laws of the market or in logic of a particular economic system.

But what about politics, per se? For instance, in 1968 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Social Welfare, and Level of Socioeconomic Development came to the conclusion that "(s)ome human rights, of course, are independent of socioeconomic considerations.."(c.f. in Strouse/Claude 1976:53) pointing, therefore, to important political factors. I believe that David Goldsworthy's (1988) Thinking Politically about Development is equally applicable to the field of human rights research, when he writes that "to presume

an objectively rational homo economicus is to retreat into apoliticism" (:510). Political considerations lead directly to questions about power and political will. Goldsworthy concludes that in development matters outcomes are in large measure shaped by the ways in which political power is deployed and employed, which is in turn bound up in the interests and values of the power-holders (:511-12). There is every reason to assume that the selective application of government repression as well as the economic deprivation of certain groups in society is indicative of existing power arrangements, respectively of a highly unequal distribution of power in society. As political scientists, we should place, therefore, our emphasis more firmly on the examination of the effects of political institutions, processes and choices, and be wary of too much economic determinism.

Only recently have political considerations received more attention in human rights research as evidenced by numerous case studies (Veenhoven et al., Case Studies 1976; Amnesty International 1984,85,86) or by the works of Cingranelli (1992), Howard and Donnelly (1986), Mitchell and McCormick (1988; 1992), Poe and Tate (1994), King (1994), Booth and Richard (1994), Davenport (1994) and others. Regime type and political culture have emerged as the two most important "political variables" in explaining human rights practices. Mitchell and McCormick (1988) conclude, therefore, that "(w)hile poverty, levels of development, and dependence represent the principle economic conditions that may be associated with human rights violations, political culture and regime type seem to be the principle political conditions. The dominant attitudes and beliefs of a society are considered to be of great importance in the choice of methods of political control and the relative propensity of governments to violate human rights (:479-480)". Mitchell and McCormick suggest that the concept of political culture can be further disaggregated. While a part of the

prevailing political culture is undoubtedly shaped by the exiting regime type, another can be "derived from the colonial experience" as well as from "the newness of the state" (:480).

The Impact of Regime-Type on Human Rights.

Let us first turn to the examination of regime type. In Dahl (1971) regime is defined as a system of public contestation. In other works the term regime is conceptualized more broadly and taken to refer to the particular set of procedures and structural arrangements (rules and institutions) that govern a country (c.f. Remmer 1986). From the perspective of human rights research it is important to understand that regimes vary in their responsiveness to societal challenges, pressures and demands. While some regimes are more capable of either absorbing such pressure or accommodating societal demands, others are unable to adjust and resort to political and economic measures of regulatory control (c.f. Davenport 1994). It is, furthermore, assumed that the degree and type of regulatory response to challenges is largely determined by the institutions and rules that make up a regime. Therefore, such a regulatory response may vary within and across regime-types.

On the most basic conceptual level we distinguish democratic and authoritarian regimes. While the former are characterized by the "free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule" (Linz 1975:183), authoritarian regimes commonly arise "to control mass participation and to prevent the political expression of social cleavages" (Collier 1978:63). It is generally thought, therefore, that democratic regimes are more accommodating to societal input (Huntington/Dominguez 1975:33-66; Dahl 1975: 115-161) than authoritarian

regimes (c.f. Linz 1975: 187-371). The term "authoritarian regime" itself, however, is not unproblematic. Sometimes the term authoritarian is used to refer collectively to all non-democratic regimes (Linz 1974), in other instances (c.f. Kirkpatrick 1979) authoritarian regimes are distinguished from totalitarian systems characterized by the presence of a "totalist ideology" (:187) reenforced at all levels of public institutions and society. Authoritarian regimes can be briefly defined as follows:

> [P]olitical systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones (Linz 1975: 264).

While the differences between democratic and authoritarian regimes seem clear. Linz admits that the conceptual boundaries between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are "more diffuse" (:264). Linz stresses the notion of "limited" pluralism as opposed to the unlimited pluralism of competitive democratic systems on one hand and the absence of pluralism in totalizing systems on the other. Nevertheless, the authoritarian regime type includes, in Linz's framework, different variants of single-party, corporatist bureaucratic-technocratic and military bureaucratic regimes, all of which differ from one another with respect to inclusiveness, political mobilization and the use of ideology (e.g. some form of nationalism or developmentalism) (c.f. Collier 1978). Others (Howard/Donnelly 1986) have found it more useful, therefore, to distinguish authoritarian regimes in terms of their normative preferences (e.g. communitarianism, traditional values, socialism) by classifying them according to their ideological commitments such as communist, traditional, corporatist and developmentalist.

Human rights researchers (c.f. Wolpin 1986) have sometimes relied on Gastil's regime definitions which include the main distinction between military and civilian and further

identifiers such as "capitalist", "capitalist-statist" or "communist" (Gastil 1981 cited in Wolpin 1986). Area specialists, confronting a bewildering variety of regime sub-types, have introduced further classifications, such as distinguishing broadly between corporatist and non-corporatist or neo-patrimonial regimes, of which there are again several types (personal dictatorship, military oligarchy, and plebiscitary and competitive one-party systems) (c.f. Bratton/van de Walle 1993).

For our purposes here, this detailed a level of analysis will not be necessary. Important, however, is the recognition that to secure the monopoly of power for a particular political elite, either for its own sake or to realize some collective political ideological agenda, authoritarian regimes always forcibly curtail individual freedoms. In short, repression is not simply a matter of bad policy choices, but a part of the institutional inventory of authoritarian regimes. Its institutions, designed to maintain the monopoly of power, are as much a part of the authoritarian regime, as are its rules and procedures, which usually include in one form or another torture, arbitrary detention, house searches without a warrant and extra-judicial killings as a regular praxis. By their very nature, authoritarian regimes resort to varying degrees of political repression. Some argue, however, that certain types of authoritarian regimes -- for example, communist regimes -- at least secure the substance of economic and social rights (e.g. see Howard/Donnelly's (1986) discussion of the point 1986).

From an institutional perspective authoritarian regimes share the following institutional characteristics; "....they restrict or suppress competitive political participation,..., their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite,..., once chosen they exercise power with few institutional constraints,....., most modern autocracies also exercise a high degree of directiveness over social and economic activity...." (Inkeles 1991:

81).

Democratic regimes, by contrast, are distinguished by three important principles, which include (a) the "presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders" (Inkeles 1991: 79), (b) "the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive" (ibid.). Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and balances, freedom of the press, and so on are "means to or specific manifestations of, these three principles" (ibid.). Consequently, democratic regimes have commonly been viewed by human rights researchers as the best guarantor for political and civil rights and freedoms. Cingranelli summarizes this point as follows:

> The logic behind the linkage between democracy and the human rights practices of governments is straightforward. If all citizens have an equal opportunity to participate in government and are represented in the policy making process whether or not they support winning candidates for leadership positions, then all citizens are empowered politically. They would be expected to use this power to ensure that their human rights were protected and promoted. Similarly, democratization should lead to improvements in human rights practices. (Cingranelli 1992: 1).

While this assertion seems highly plausible, we shall see in the course of this discussion here that the issue of regime type and its impact on human rights is really much more complicated. For one, democracy itself constitutes a relatively broad category of regime type. Secondly, the conceptualization and operationalization of an entire regime typology to test the above hypothesis, is not as straightforward as it appears in Cingranelli's definition -- below we shall review some of the difficulties encountered by researchers when testing this relationship. Thirdly, even democracies do not have an immaculate human rights record. Numerous cases of human rights abuse in democratic regimes have been documented; for

even in democratic system not all citizens enjoy truly equal access. Democratic governments, too, fail protect minorities from human rights violations, as the United States' own troubled history of race relations has shown. In less developed countries, where much of the population is rural, uninvolved, and, perhaps even alienated from government the promise of equal access under democratic conditions is even more questionable. In fact, one could make the opposite claim by arguing that in an unequal society those who do have access may use the system to their advantage at the expense of those who are shut out. Hence, existing inequalities may be further exacerbated. Most of the arguments in support of the linkage between democratic regimes and good human rights practices focus on Western-style liberal rights and rarely deal with economic and social rights (c.f. my earlier discussion of political versus economic rights as a subject of intense debate among human rights scholars). Furthermore, political competition, as part of a democratic reform process, in an already poor and fractured society may lead to further destabilization resulting in government repression, or as in Nigeria, military rule.

In short, the question of how democracy impacts human rights poses a considerable challenge both with respect to conceptualizing and empirically testing this relationship. Likewise, we need a conceptual framework of regime type that allows us to assess the relationship between all kinds of regime, type including different democratic and authoritarian regimes, and both dimensions of basic human rights.

The Difficulty of Conceptualizing Regime Type.

In some cases " developing countries, like El Salvador, have adopted democratic forms to please Western benefactors" (Cingranelli 1992: 1). Distinguishing between the form and the substance of democracy has proved to be the major challenge to comparative human rights research. If we define a regime as democratic based on formal criteria such as constitutional arrangements and the like, daily life under such a regime may in actuality be quite different and it would, therefore, be difficult to distinguish a real democracy from a formal one. However, if we use substantive criteria for our evaluation, such as the protection of certain political rights and civil liberties we engage in a tautological exercise arguing essentially that regimes that have good human rights practices indicate democracies, only to arrive at the conclusion that democracies have good human rights practices (c.f. Dahl 1971: Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990). Despite the conceptual problems indicating that democracies may not be the only type of regime providing the substance of human rights, a wealth of literature has sought to empirically ground the relationship between democracy and human rights (c.f. Strouse and Claude 1976; Kirkpatrick 1979; Forsythe 1981; Howard/Donnelly 1986; Mitchell 1987; Cingranelli 1992), some of which will be discussed further below.

There has been a different set of claims made about the relationship between democracy and human rights, especially with respect to economic and social well-being. Lenski (1966), Cutright (1967a,b), Howard/Donnelly (1986) and others have argued that the growth of political democracy reduces social inequality. According to Lenski (1966: 318), democratic countries have three basic characteristics which lead them to be more egalitarian: universal suffrage, organized political opposition and the possibility for collective action on the part of the disadvantaged elements. All three factors are seen as having a positive effect

on the distributive system. Jackman (1974) tested this hypothesis with a cross-section of 60 Western and Third-World countries and found that the "bivariate effects" of democracy on social equality are "quite spurious, once level of economic development is taken into account" (Jackman 1974: 29). Yet, based on the values and ideals of liberal democracy, Howard and Donnelly (1986) make strong claims to the contrary. ...[the] principal of equal concern and respect [embodied in liberalism] does imply a floor of basic economic welfare" (Howard and Donnelly 1986: 805).

In addition to investigating the link between democracy and human rights, we would probably not want to limit our analysis to comparing simply democracies with non-democracies. In short, it is not particularly exciting to confirm that those democracies, clearly identifiable as such, do have a better record on human rights; more importantly we might want to analyze performance differences among regimes other than Western-style democracies.

A number of human rights studies have tried to differentiate different types of regime. However, each of these studies have encountered problems which make them ill-suited for the purposes of this dissertation. Linz (1975) and Kirkpatrick (1979), for instance, used a classification schema, distinguishing democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian systems. In relying on the researchers' own assessment upon whether a particular system falls into one of three categories, this procedure is highly vulnerable to the scholars' own normative preferences. In addition, it is doubtful that the entire universe of nations could be classified without leaving out many border-line cases. Lastly, even if we could agree on precise criteria of assigning cases to each of the three categories, we are at best left with only a three-point ordinal level regime-type variable. In a later study David Forsythe (1982: 193) conceptualized

regimes along legal and structural characteristics, suggesting a matrix combining political and economic regime performance criteria. Forsythe[2] distinguishes competitive, semicompetitive, noncompetitive and totalitarian political systems and relates these performance characteristics to four types of economic systems: industrialized-mixed economy, developing-mixed economy, industrialized-command economy and developing-command economy. While Forsythe's approach allows for much more differentiation than Kirkpatrick's, it suffers from similar problems. For one, it too relies heavily on the researcher's ability to classify all countries, leaving ample room for mis-assignments and ambiguous classifications. Secondly, given the number of possible combinations in the regime-type matrix, Forsythe's system of measurement is highly complex and not very manageable for a large-scale empirical analysis.

I have already hinted at a further obstacle researchers encounter when trying to operationalize regime type; the problem of the circularity of the argument. In short, the independent and dependent variable are not sufficiently distinct from one other. Howard and Donnelly's (1986) research is a prime example. At first they define different types of regime based on the normative-philosophical tradition and the governmental practice of regimes (the regimes are classified as: liberal, minimal, traditional, communist, corporatist and developmental). In a further step they classify countries according to these definitions and find that democracies perform best in terms of providing human rights. All other forms of regimes either guarantee only some rights or none at all, depending on their underlying philosophical preferences. Howard and Donnelly's very persuasive argument about why certain regimes are, by their very self-understanding, better equipped to guarantee particular rights, cannot hide the fact that their argument is circular. If democracy is defined by the presence of rights 'X', 'Y', 'Z', then a country observed as respecting rights 'X', 'Y', 'Z' is classified as a

democracy. A subsequent empirical test of whether democracies respect the rights 'X', 'Y', 'Z' completes the circle and leads to the obvious conclusion, that democracies uphold the rights 'X', 'Y', 'Z'.

Other research featuring regime type as an explanation for human rights practices includes Mitchell (1987), Pritchard (1988), Spalding (1988), Cingranelli (1992) Poe and Tate (1994) all of which encountered one or several of the problems described above. Poe and Tate (1994) use the Vanhanen index of democracy (c.f. Vanhanen 1990) and two other regime related variables called "leftist government" and "military control" to explain violations of personal integrity. While the Vanhanen measure is statistically significant, the other two are not. Poe and Tate's approach, however, suffers from the problem that when they translate their model into regional settings their measures become -- with a few exceptions -- statistically insignificant, as they lose much of the variance. Mitchell (1987), Spalding (1988) and Cingranelli (1992) base their measure of democracy on the Gastil indicators, which is itself a rights-based measure and as such vulnerable to the charge of circularity. In addition, there are other problems with the Gastil measure (see my earlier discussion of the Gastil indicators). Pritchard (1988) operates with a variable called "constitutional acknowledgement", which makes it difficult to distinguish between the form and substance of democracy. I have already mentioned that the Soviet constitution 'acknowledged' several important human rights, which, nevertheless, did not prevent thousands of people from disappearing in labor camps and the like. In fact, Pritchard's (1988: 145) own analysis shows that the relationship between 'constitutional acknowledgement' and 'enjoyment of rights' is weak and negative. Given the difficulties encountered by comparative researchers trying to test the relationship between regime type and human rights practices, I believe we need to take a new and different route.

In the following section I shall outline an alternative approach to regime type, which I believe avoids many of the problems that has plagued this research agenda.

An Alternative Approach to Regime-Type.

In order to operationalize the concept of regime-type I intend to pursue a different path. The regime-type measure best-suited for the purposes of this research project will be based on the following criteria. For one, we require indicators that are not rights-based to ensure that dependent and independent variables are sufficiently separate. Secondly, in designing such indicators we would not want to depend on the researcher's ability to properly classify countries unambiguously. Thirdly, the measures should be based on substantive rather than formal criteria of regime. Fourth, the measures should allow for sufficient differentiation without being too complex to be practical. Lastly, we would ideally desire interval-level rather than ordinal or nominal-level measures.

In accordance with most previous research on this subject my approach is based on the assumption that a particular type of regime, by virtue of its institutions, rules and values, will show a better performance and make a greater effort in terms of guaranteeing basic human rights than another type of regime. As Henderson (1991: 23) puts it "it is thought here that the more democratic the government, the more responsive it will be and, hence, the less likely the government will choose repression as a means of rule".

For the regime type conceptualization employed here I found it useful to return to a classic work on regime-type literature. In his seminal piece Polyarchy Robert Dahl (1971) defines two theoretical dimensions of democratization. He argued that regimes vary along the dimensions of public contestation and electoral participation/inclusiveness. Depending on a

country's position along either dimension it can be classified as closed hegemony, competitive oligarchy, inclusive hegemony or polyarchy. Karen Remmer (1986) develops Dahl's regime type model further operationalizing its key variables by applying them to the Latin American context. Remmer's classification scheme also spans two dimensions along competitiveness and inclusiveness. Depending on how participatory and competitive a nation's political system is, countries are classified as exclusionary authoritarian (not/little competitive; not/little inclusionary), exclusionary democratic (competitive; not/little inclusionary), inclusionary democratic (competitive; inclusionary) or inclusionary authoritarian (not/little competitive; inclusionary). According to Remmer, the concept of an "ideal" inclusionary democracy corresponds, therefore, to Dahl's notion of polyarchy. In her research Remmer specifically addressed the kinds of problems that have plagued the regime-typologies developed by O'Donnell, Stepan, Ozlak and others (Remmer 1986: 68). She writes; "in the case of O'Donnell's work, conceptual complexity has produced a great deal of unproductive debate over whether a given case, such as Mexico, is or is not 'really' bureaucratic-authoritarian....the second major weakness of typologies such as those of Ozlak, Stepan, and O'Donnell is that they virtually ignore the democratic end of the continuum" (Remmer 1986: 68-69). This is similar to the difficulties encountered by the regime-oriented human rights research.

Remmer's approach allows for considerable differentiation of regimes along "two different theoretical dimensions" (Remmer 1986: 69). One is the 'liberal' element which refers to the possibility of forming opposition, competition and contestation. The other is concerned with participation and political inclusion. In rating countries according to competitiveness and participation we would expect that only a few countries will come close to the four theoretical "ideal-types", while many will place somewhere in between. Remmer's conceptualization does

not call for precise categories, but looks instead at the relative proximity of the case to each other as well as the four ideal-types; in that the measure is interval-level and stretches along a continuum. In addition, any nation of any level of development, from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy, can be easily incorporated. Furthermore, Remmer's approach is based on substantive rather than formal measures of democracy. Instead of focusing, for instance, on constitutional acknowledgement of electoral participation, Remmer's measure of 'equal access' is based on the recorded electoral turnout of the population (not eligible voters). While public records contain flaws and electoral participation figures may be over-reported in some cases, this method is, nevertheless, superior to using constitutional claims or lengthy debates among area specialists to gage the extent of access to political decision making in particular countries.

Another attractive feature of the Remmer/Dahl model lies in its two-dimensional approach, which incidently is similar to the conceptualization of basic human rights performance introduced in a previous chapter. Both dependent and independent variables vary each along two different continua allowing us to investigate which types of basic rights (subsistence and/or security rights) are more or less readily guaranteed by what type of (competitive/non-competitive and/or inclusionary/exclusionary) regime. I believe it would be an important contribution to both the human rights and the regime-type literature if certain levels of participation and competitiveness could be clearly linked to certain basic human rights practices.

Based on the literature on democracy and human rights surveyed above, and based on some of Remmer's own findings, we can actually hypothesize about what to expect. If democracies, as claimed by Howard/Donnelly (1986) and others, do a much better job in

securing human rights than any other regime, we would expect the most competitive and most participatory regimes to deliver the best BHR-performance, respectively making the greatest effort. By contrast, nations which are neither participatory nor competitive should do relatively worse. Regimes with no or little electoral contestation, but with claims to having popular support, such as one-party regimes with large electoral turnouts, would attempt to make a great number of people happy by providing at least economic essentials without jeopardizing the party's hold on power, as in the case of the former Soviet Union. As a one-party dictatorship it would score '0' on contestation; yet, millions of Soviet citizens routinely turned out to cast their votes in periodic elections. Even if official turnout statistics may be overblown, a substantial part of the electorate participated. We would therefore expect such a regime-type to perform poorly on basic political rights, but considerably better in terms of guaranteeing some measure of economic and social security. In the reversed scenario, which Remmer (1986: 69-76) defines as exclusionary democracy, we would expect the opposite to happen. Contestation may be intense, but limited to a relatively exclusive strata of the population. That is, political rights and civil liberties may be provided to some segments in society, while others in the population, mostly those who would pose a threat the ruling elites, are disenfranchised and alienated. Under conditions of exclusionary democracy social cleavages are exacerbated and we would, therefore, expect these regimes to perform poorly in terms of basic economic and social rights.

Lastly, the Dahl/Remmer model is very manageable for research purposes as its operationalization is straightforward. The participatory dimension can be assessed by measuring the electoral turnout as percentage of the population for each country (c.f. Remmer 1986: 73). Competitiveness/contestation can be measured by assessing party dominance. This

can be accomplished by counting the number of parties in the legislature (e.g. one-, two-, three-, multi-party systems), or by assessing for each country the electoral margin of the strongest party in the legislature in percent -- in a one party state it would be 100%. I shall rely upon the second measure, since the former would require us to somehow account for party strength or to impose a meaningful limit on how many parties we would consider for our competitiveness score[3].

Other Political Explanations -- Colonial Heritage, Length of Independence, Stated Human Rights Commitment.

Besides regime type, researchers have examined the impact of political culture and have identified colonial experience as an important explanation for human rights violations. Evidence in the literature suggests that the type of colonial legacy, specifically the British- versus the non-British colonial experience may be of particular relevance (c.f. Wiarda/Kline 1979; Huntington 1984; Mitchell/McCormick 1988; Diamond et al. 1988; Arat 1991; Collier/Collier 1991, Poe/Tate 1994). The general argument is that British colonial heritage, or "British Cultural Influence" (Poe/Tate 1994:9) entails fewer authoritarian roots for governmental repression than any other form of colonial experience.

British colonial rule, for instance, is commonly thought to be strongly associated with the postcolonial development of democracy. The British legacy may be a relatively greater respect for human rights. By contrast, other colonial experiences (Spanish, for instance) are generally assumed to have introduced a greater degree of hierarchy and authoritarianism. The legacy here may well involve higher levels of human rights violations (Mitchell/McCormick 1988:480).

An explanation related to colonial and cultural heritage states that the length of a country's political independence (newness of the state) is also likely to make a difference in

explaining human rights performance (Mitchell/McCormick 1988; Jackman 1993). This position is based on the assumption that after the initial turmoil following independence governments need time to regain stability and to develop structures to provide security and subsistence for their population. If the above assumptions are true we would expect formerly British colonies to have a measurably better track-record on BHR-performance and BHR-effort. Similarly, we would expect longer periods of independence to correlate positively with basic human rights practices.

Lastly, it may be interesting to query whether a nation's stated commitment to human rights does make a difference in that country's human rights performance and effort. In contrast to Pritchard's (1988) approach of using 'constitutional acknowledgement' I shall rely upon major international human rights documents as indicators, such as the various UN covenants on human rights. In short, the question is whether or not being a party to such a human rights accord is correlated with better human rights practices and greater effort. The rationale for this research question had grown out of a number of interviews with different NGO representatives at the 1993 Vienna world conference on human rights. Some had a very pessimistic view of United Nations human rights efforts, essentially maintaining that nothing good could would come out of such conferences and subsequent accords. Countries were seen by many human rights activists as rather uncaring towards human rights, occasionally staging such big events to get good press. Other NGO representatives, by contrast, attached considerable value to United Nations' human rights effort. The different viewpoints can be summarized as follows: one could argue that many countries enter into such agreements for reasons of maintaining a positive image, that human rights agreements have no 'political teeth' to force countries to actually change their policies, that successive governments do not

feel bound by agreements made by previous ones, and finally, that changing circumstances may call for a reversal of human rights policy, no matter what agreement was signed. Alternatively, one could point out that countries do not commit themselves lightly, as indicated by the long period it took many nations to become a party to these covenants. Signing such accords increases the awareness of human rights on both the international and the domestic level. Governments may, therefore, feel increased pressure to abide by their own commitment. Lastly, international and domestic human rights monitoring groups may have greater leverage to persuade governments to stick to what they had agreed upon.

Summary of Political Hypotheses for BHR-Performance/Effort.

Based on my discussion of theoretical arguments concerning 'political' explanations of human rights practices and based on the specific proposition that "the type of regime is likely to significantly affect basic human rights performance/efforts" a set of testable hypotheses can be derived. An additional discussion of the measures and statistical testing procedures employed is provided in the second part of this dissertation, in which I report on my findings based on an comparative analysis of some 127 countries.

(P.H1.) The more competitive and participatory political regimes are, the better the overall performance of governments in securing basic human rights. Specifically, inclusionary democracies are expected to perform best.

(P.H2.) The higher the level of political participation the better the government performance in guaranteeing basic economic and social rights.

(P.H3.) The higher the level of competition the better the government performance in guaranteeing basic political and civil rights.

(P.H4.) Formerly British colonies are more likely to perform better and to make a greater effort in securing basic human rights.

(P.H5.) The longer the period of political independence the more likely government will

perform better and make greater effort in terms of securing basic human rights.

(P.H6.) The stated commitments of governments to act in accordance with the United Nations human rights covenants is likely to make a difference in basic human rights performance/effort. Specifically, parties to both covenants are likely to perform best.

I shall attach special importance to testing hypotheses H2, H3 and H6 as they have to my knowledge never been tested before and by exploring the effects of competition and participation on human rights performance I hope to make an original contribution to the human rights literature. This concludes what I consider the theoretical part of this dissertation. In the second part, termed "data analysis" I shall present the empirical tests of the above hypotheses and report on the findings.

Endnotes

1. Mitchell and McCormick' use a developing country's total volume of trade with and investment by OECD countries as a measure of 'world market integration/foreign dependence'. This is discussed more fully later in this dissertation (c.f. Data Analysis - Economic Explanation/Foreign Dependence).

2. Forsythe's measures is based on a conceptualization by Ernst Haas suggesting that it is most meaningful to characterize states both politically and economically - 'competitive' is defined as 'fully democratic', 'semicompetitive' as 'partly democratic', 'non-competitive' as 'simple authoritarian' and 'totalitarian' as 'unlimited authoritarian'. Similarly, 'mixed-industrialized' is defined as 'advanced with some private enterprise', 'mixed-developing' as 'not advanced with some private enterprise', 'command-industrialized' as 'advanced with almost no private enterprise' and lastly 'command developing' as 'not advanced with almost no private enterprise'.

3. Otherwise we would argue that a 15-party legislature were several times more 'democratic' than a four-party legislature.

DESCRIBING THE SAMPLE

The Sample of 1984/85

This research project comprises some 127 cases including all independent, internationally recognized countries with a population of one million or larger in 1985.[1] Countries that at the time period relevant to this analysis were involved in a civil war (Lebanon) or occupied by military forces (e.g. East Timor, Tibet, the Baltic States) of another country were excluded from the analysis.[2] For a small number of countries (e.g. Mongolia, North Korea etc.) no or only incomplete information on human rights was available. A decision was made to undertake the cross-national analysis at two distinct points in time. The first cross-section is taken from the mid-1980s before many of the recent political changes in the world had taken place. In the last chapter of this dissertation I shall present a second analysis with basic human rights data from the early 1990s which will focus on changes in human rights performance and effort over time. I chose the first cutoff point of 1984/85 in order to strike a balance between the availability of data and the opportunity to keep this research as current as possible.

While countries were entered alphabetically into the data-set, they were also coded by income category, type of economy and geographic region; the following areas were distinguished: Europe (excluding the former Warsaw Pact countries, Albania and Yugoslavia),

Eastern Europe/Soviet Block (including the USSR, Albania and Yugoslavia), North America, Central America and the Caribbean, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Northern Africa, Middle East (excluding Northern Africa), Central and South East Asia, Eastern Asia and 'Oceania. In terms of income category and type of economy standard World Bank and OECD classifications[3] were used. This coding system allows for the extensive analysis of any regional, political, economic or cultural combination of countries.

Before the sample could be analyzed a major hurdle had to be overcome. For the majority of countries the data on basic security rights were taken from the 1986 Humana World Human Rights Guide[4]. As this data set covers only some 70 countries, information on the remaining cases had to come from different data sources, which include the US State Department Country Reports (1986, 87), Amnesty International Country Reports (1985, 86) as well as the Humana World Human Rights Guide (Summary Assessment -- 1986). Whenever data for the same set of variables are taken from different sources there are legitimate validity concerns. I felt that the threats to both external and internal validity could be minimized by approaching case evaluations in the following way; for one, the types of security rights relevant to this study are truly basic, such as capital punishment, extrajudicial killings, torture and slavery. Violations of such rights involve acts which are as such relatively easy to identify and require less interpretation than, for instance, the right to free and fair elections. Secondly, Humana's own criteria of evaluating rights violations were applied throughout. Therefore, I distinguished whether such violations were reported as (a) institutional and systematic, (b) frequent but more random and/or localized, (c) exceptional and infrequent, or (d) non-existent at all. Thirdly, while Humana discusses only some 70 countries in detail, he does provide summary information, about more basic rights violations

for some two dozen additional countries. Consequently, each evaluation was based on more than one source and whenever possible on Humana's own summary assessment.[5] Fourth, a t-test was used to compare two samples of the same randomly selected countries. In one sample the cases were assessed according to Humana's individual country analysis, in the other countries were evaluated by using the Humana summary assessment combined with Amnesty and US Government data. A comparison of sample showed no significant differences between the two samples. Lastly, I felt strongly that the advantage of having as complete and comprehensive a sample of the world community as possible would outweigh the methodological risks involved here. It is time that cross-national human rights research not confine itself simply to those nation-states that are neatly accessible based on the easy availability of data.

Basic Human Rights: How Do Nations Perform?

In this first step the objective was to assess the overall basic human rights performance of all countries for the mid-1980s. In this context there are a number of important research questions to be explored. For one, I asked whether the mean human rights performance differed significantly across regions. Secondly, we would want to know whether the average performance of a nation differed across basic human rights. Thirdly, if certain basic rights are guaranteed more readily than others, can one distinguish a trend or pattern, and what may this tell us about the nature of these rights? Fourth, it was important to compare the two basic human rights dimensions with each other both in terms of group means and the spread of the distribution. Descriptive statistics provided answers to most of these questions, the results of which are reported below and summarized in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.

Lastly, summary indices were constructed to gain a sense of the overall country performance for each of the two rights dimensions as well as for basic human rights as a whole. These indices were not only instrumental in compiling a rank-list of all cases in the sample, but will also be used throughout the analysis as summary performance indicators of subsistence rights, security rights and basic human rights

The Construction of Basic Rights Indices

The two most important criteria of index construction are to demonstrate that the items in the index hang together and that the index is consistently applicable to all cases in the data-set. In addition, the indices should be intuitively plausible and as simple as possible, that is with relatively little mathematical transformation of raw data. In the case of security rights

a simple five-item additive index was chosen. Each item corresponds to one of the five basic security rights and is treated as coequal. To obtain a security rights index rating for a country (i), that country's individual scores on freedom from torture (T), slavery (SL), detention (D), unlawful searches (S) and capital punishment (C) are added together. The scores range from 0 (a particular right is not guaranteed at all) to 3 (a right is most fully guaranteed). The individual country rating is taken from the Humana (1986) World Human Rights Guide (a detailed discussion on Humana's approach and technique of scoring was provided in Chapter 3 on the operationalization and measurement of basic human rights).

Index of Security Rights (range = 0-15):

$$SECRIGHT_i = T_i + SL_i + D_i + S_i + C_i$$

The construction of an equivalent subsistence rights index is somewhat more difficult as two of the five items in the index have different units of measure and are pointed in the opposite direction (both Chapter 3 and the Appendix discuss the indicators in detail and list the data sources). Three of subsistence rights (calorie intake (C), adequate water (W) and literacy (L)), whose scores are all recorded in percentages, can be readily added together, yielding a sum of three of the five indicators. As higher housing averages are less desirable from the human rights standpoint the score on housing (H) is subtracted from the above sum. To do so the housing scores need to be numerically transformed[6] to make them approximately equivalent in magnitude. Lastly, following the subtraction of the housing score the remaining sum is divided by infant mortality (IM) rate, which is recorded in number of live births. Higher infant mortality rates indicate lower subsistence rights performance,

therefore, dividing by infant mortality rate yields higher subsistence rights scores if the denominator is small (low infant mortality) and lower subsistence rights scores if the denominator is large.

Index of Subsistence Rights (range = 0-88):

$$SUBRIGHT_i = [(C_i + W_i + L_i) - H_i)]/IM_i$$

To test the reliability of both indices a Cronbach's Alpha probability test was applied, the results of which are reported below.

Index of Basic Human Rights (range = 0-200):

$$BHR_i = (SECRIGHT_i*100)/SEC\text{-}HI + (SUBRIGHT_i*100)/SUB\text{-}HI$$

Based on the two indices for security and subsistence rights a combined index of basic human rights (BHR-Index) can be constructed. It is important to create the index in such a way that both dimensions are treated as coequal. To achieve this both the security and subsistence rights scores are first converted to percentages of the highest possible score in each dimension. Thus, to calculate country "i's" BHR-rating, its score on security rights ($SECRIGHT_i$) is put in relation to the highest rating possible (SEC-HI) (as in the above formula). Similarly "i's" subsistence rights score ($SUBRIGHT_i$) is multiplied by 100 and divided by the highest score achievable on subsistence rights (SUB-HI). In two subsistence categories (infant mortality and number of persons per room)[7] no absolute best standard can be meaningfully established, therefore, in these two cases the "best" achievable score entered

into the above index represents the best score obtained by the nation with the best subsistence rights performance in the sample. Lastly, the percentage scores on security and subsistence rights are added together yielding an overall BHR-score. Table 2.4 lists all nations and yields the country scores according to all three indices.

Report of Findings: Basic Security Rights -- Freedom from Torture.

In only 21 (16.5%) out of 126was countries the freedom from torture fully guaranteed. In almost 35% of all nations in the sample torture occurred on a regular and frequent basis. In fact, the value '0' ('the freedom from torture is not guaranteed at all') was the modal score in this category. In a further 36 countries (28.3%) torture was, although not institutionalized widely practiced. Not surprisingly, the mean value of 1.183 (out of range from 0 to 3) was very low.

Torture is a firm part of the institutional inventory of many authoritarian regimes. Consequently, former Communist countries were rated very low, achieving mostly a score of '0'. The situation was equally bleak in much of Africa, the Middle East, South East Asia and Central America. Humana lists the following countries as particularly critical cases:

Africa: Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, Mali, Mauritania, South Africa, Somalia and Sudan.

Asia: Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, Laos and the Philippines.

Latin America: El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Mexico.

[Table 2.1 -- about here]

Some democracies showed much better ratings on torture, but also there the situation was far from perfect. In India, for instance, the use of torture was a frequent means to intimidate government opponents and to extract information. Among Western nations the US received a score of only '2' on the Humana index based on reports of local cases of police brutality. The United Kingdom fared similarly because of documented incidents of torture by British security forces in Northern Ireland. Israel, Spain, Italy, Costa Rica and Japan were further examples of democratic regimes which, according to Humana, failed to qualify as entirely free from torture.

Freedom from Slavery.

It was this category in which most countries had their best human rights performance. It is important to remember that 'freedom from slavery' also includes excessive child labor practices and forced labor. In about two thirds of all countries freedom from slavery was either fully or mostly guaranteed. Only 16 countries received a score of '0'. This category also had the highest mean value (1.76) of any security right. This finding suggests that freedom from slavery differs from other security rights in some respect. To enslave people means to deny them their full humanity based on the alleged inferiority of the enslaved population vis-a-vis their masters -- religious, economic or cultural notions may serve as rationalization thereof. However, since many developing countries during colonial rule were themselves victims of such notions, classic forms of slavery seem to be relegated to a few countries. Humana mentioned Mauritania, Sudan and South Africa as modern examples of effective master-slave relations. Former Communist countries, by contrast, obtained low scores on freedom from slavery because of their practice of forced labor and of detaining

people in labor camps. Several other third world countries, such as Pakistan, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic or Colombia were rated as poor (score of '0') because of wide-spread practices of child labor.

Freedom from Detention Without Charge.

Detention is an often used government means of dealing with political challenges. In over half of all countries detention without charge or warrant was a part of the institutional set up. In another 23% of all cases freedom from detention was mostly not guaranteed. Whenever people are detained without proper charge, they are not only held indefinitely behind bars, but they are also more easily subject to all forms of abuse by the authorities. In many instances, detainees simply disappear without family members or friends even knowing whether the person is still alive. In this the detention of a few serves as a primary means to intimidate entire groups of people such as neighborhoods, clans and fellow activists. The mean value for this category was even less than '1' (range: 0-3) indicating that for the sample as a whole the freedom from detention without charge is violated profoundly throughout the world. It is certainly no coincidence that countries with a poor record on torture also performed badly on detention. This is further evidenced by the fact that among the correlations between all basic human rights the relationship between torture and detention appears to be the strongest ($r=.832$/ $p<.001$ -- c.f. Table 2.3 further below). We can interpret this as finding in the sense that detention provides both the occasion and opportunity for torture. An interesting difference between the two variables, however, seems to consist in the greater polarization of the detention scores. In other words, in the category torture we can

see more often scores of '1' and '2' indicating a greater proportion of local or occasional cases of abuse, in part due probably to overly zealous, frustrated and/or ill-trained security forces, which may not necessarily have been acting on direct government orders. Detention, by contrast, was more dichotomized juxtaposing scores of '0' and '3', suggesting that governments either fully guarantee this right or make its abuse a regular practice. It appears, therefore, that cases of detention without charge are almost never local aberrations but always practiced with at least tacit government approval. The statistical comparison of the relative differences between performance scores for different types of human rights may serve as an important indicator of the quality of the criminal justice apparatus (see, for instance, Cingranelli and Wright's (1985) discussion of human rights and the criminal justice system).

Freedom from Seizures and Searches of Homes Without Warrant.

In more than 50% of all cases this profound violation of people's privacy occurred on a regular and frequent basis. In 45 countries the freedom from searches of homes without warrant was -- according to Humana's classification -- not guaranteed at all; accordingly the modal score in this category was also '0'. Overall, the findings for seizures and searches match closely those on 'detention without charge'. As indicated by the strength of the correlations with this variable governments that torture ($r=.771/p<.001$) and detain people without charge ($r=819/p<.001$) care equally little about the sanctity and privacy of one's home (c.f. Table 2.3 further below).

There was small number of countries such as Peru, Paraguay, South Korea or the Philippines where the findings indicate that the freedom from seizures and searches is slightly better protected than the freedom from detention. This may, however, not necessarily reflect

greater government respect for this basic right, but may have more to do with the logistics of conducting house searches. People can be detained by simply picking them up off the street after a demonstration or at their place of work. Searching someone's home requires security forces to enter neighborhoods and communities frequently hostile to the government. Therefore, such operations can hardly be kept a secret and may, in addition, incite further unrest; both of which are undesirable from a government's perspective.

Freedom from Capital Punishment and Extra-Judicial Killings.

In this category the sample performance was by far the worst. The right to one's life, surely the most elementary of human rights, was not protected at all in 80 countries. In only 17.5% of all cases governments fully guaranteed the sanctity of life. The category mean of '0.8' was the lowest of any of the security rights. Compared to other basic rights, freedom from capital punishment and extra-judicial killings was ignored fairly evenly throughout the world, so that it became almost impossible to pinpoint a particular region, culture or even political system outside Western Europe, which stood out in one way or another. In some countries, such as El Salvador, governments may not put people to death through their criminal justice system, but failed to protect them adequately from death squads and other forms of extra-judicial killings. Among Western industrialized countries both Japan and the United States were rated '0' by Humana. Especially in the US the death penalty has made a strong comeback backed up by considerable popular support. In addition, there is concern about the execution of minors and of mentally disturbed offenders. Western Europe was the only part of the world where citizens could fully enjoy this right. Among developing countries only in Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and Uruguay

governments fully guaranteed the freedom from capital punishment. As expected, this right was most strongly correlated with freedom from detention (r=.741/p<.0001) and freedom from torture (r=.755/p<.0001).

Summary-Index of Security Rights Performance.

Among the five indicators which together measure security rights performance both freedom from slavery and capital punishment differ from the others. In either case the reported violations were not necessarily a reflection of mere government repression, but were in part also due to the cultural, economic and political context -- for example, Mauritania and its remnants of a slave society, Child labor in Bangladesh, or capital punishment in the Southern and Western United States.

Based on the above scores an additive summary index was constructed. A Cronbach's Alpha probability test (Alpha= .919/n=126/items=5) underscores the extremely high reliability of the index of security rights. The scores for the nations in the sample range from '0' to '15'. Such index scores are, of course, only meaningful relative to other country scores or in the context of statistical measures such as group means or standard deviation. Only nine countries, all of which were Western industrialized democracies, achieved the maximum score, while over 61% of all countries obtained a rating below the mean of '6'. Ten nations received a score of '0' on all security rights categories indicating that none of the basic security rights/freedoms was protected at all in any of these countries. This illustrious list included the following; Afghanistan, Albania, Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mauritania, South Africa, and Sudan.

Subsistence Rights -- Adequate Nutrition/Required Calorie Intake.

Adequate nutrition was the first of the subsistence rights analyzed here. In our sample barely 65% of the countries were able to feed their populations properly according to the FAO as reported in Sivard World Military and Social Expenditures (1987). In close to 16% of all cases the daily food rations were less than 90% of what would be required. Nevertheless, 82 countries seemed to provide a sufficient amount (100%) of nutrition for their people. The mean value for all nations in the sample was an average calorie intake of 96%.[8]

Among the nations least capable of supplying enough food we find a number of African countries including Chad (68%), Ghana (73%), Mali (76%) and Mozambique (71%). It is also important to remember that the statistics reported for each nation represent national averages, so that for certain groups of people (e.g. children) or for individual provinces the food situation may, indeed, be much more precarious. Sudan, for instance, reports a national average calorie intake per person of 84%. It can be assumed, however, that the actual food shortage is much worse in the South. In Asia, Bangladesh fared the worst with 84% per capita calorie intake, while Haiti (82%) ranked last in the Western hemisphere.

[Table 2.2 -- about here]

Access to Safe Water.

Access to safe water is instrumental to a life in human dignity. In many parts of the world people's health is in jeopardy as families are exposed to unsanitary conditions because of insufficient or polluted water. In other cases, people -- especially women -- spend an

inordinate amount of time fetching water from far-away wells. In the sample here about half of all countries stated that more than 30% of their respective populations do not have access to safe water. In some instances (10%), nations reported that only a tenth of the population or less had access to safe water. Only thirteen countries in all claimed to provide safe water to virtually all their citizens. The overall mean value for access to safe water is 63%.

It is important to remember that the safe water measure employed by the United Nations is based on somewhat different criteria for industrialized and developing countries. For developed nations the percentages listed reflect people's access to piped water, while the criteria for LDCs is less stringent. There, access to safe water assumes a source of drinking water within 15 minutes of walking distance. Therefore, one has to be cautious when making direct comparisons between countries such as Finland (79%) or Czechoslovakia (74%) with Chile (85%) or Brazil (75%). Ethiopia with barely 6% of its population having access to safe water is by far the worst performer in this category, closely followed by Mozambique (9%), Mali (14%) and Nepal (16%).

Access to Adequate Housing/Number of Persons per Room.

As stated earlier this particular indicator presents a number of problems both conceptually and with respect to the time frame and consistency of the data available. For several Sub-Saharan African countries regional averages have to substitute for actual country reports. We also have to remember that the measure used here represents a national average meaning that in the poorer areas of the country the number of people per room may be considerably higher. There were, however, a number of reasons which, I think, justify the use of this measure. For one is relatively widely available. Other more common housing

measures such as 'number of housing units built', 'public expenditure on housing' or 'number of people per dwelling' say more about economics than about the living conditions of individuals. Most importantly, however, the indicator used here seems to come very close to Henry Shue's concept of the basic right to adequate shelter, as it relates housing directly to the individual's need for space and minimal comfort. Nevertheless, the findings reported here should be considered with this caveat in mind.

While cultural standards, room size and house size may vary, it is also obvious that overcrowded living conditions not only infringe on people's privacy affecting individual well-being, but are also indicative of an overall housing shortage. Whether we look at a one-room shack in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or at a typical living situation in one of Moscow's high-rise apartment buildings, in either case we often find three generations of a family living in very cramped conditions. In over 81% of all countries more than one person inhabit the same room. For about 53% of all cases in the sample more than two persons per room were reported. Egypt, El Salvador and Tunisia even indicated housing averages of three and more persons per room. In most Western countries the reported averages were less than '1'-- the exceptions are Finland (1.0), New Zealand (1.4), Portugal (1.4) and Japan (1.1). The mean value for this category was '1.8' (on a range from '0.4' to '3.3' persons per room).

Access to Basic Health Care/Infant Mortality Rate.

This measure has sometimes been controversial, as it represents national averages, whereas the actual figures for certain population groups may be considerably higher. A good example is the significant difference in infant mortality rates between African-American and Whites in the US. In comparison to other health care measures, however, such as 'average

life expectancy', this indicator tends to be biased somewhat in favor of the poorer strata of the population, overemphasizing negative trends if there are problem groups in a society -- an effect which is very much desired for the purposes of a human rights study.

Infant mortality rates vary greatly across nations. While less than 10% of all countries had mortality rates of less than 10 infants (under the first year of age per 1000 live births), more than 33 cases reported death rates of over '100'. The mean value for infant mortality rate was relatively high at almost '70', especially considering that the West has come to accept a standard of less than '10'. In comparison to other subsistence rights, the performance differences between nations were much more pronounced in this category (standard deviation of 52.3). This is particularly troubling, as infant mortality rates are commonly not only indicative of problems in the national health care and health prevention systems, but reflect also on the social and economic conditions in general. Among Western nations Austria and the US had the highest rates (11), while Japan, Finland and Sweden showed the best performance (6). Among the lowest ranking countries we find Afghanistan (182), Burkina Faso (160), Ethiopia (168), Gambia (180), Malawi (161), Mali (174), Sierra Leone (198) and Somalia (153).

Access to Basic Education/Literacy Rate.

Adult literacy rate (1985) was used to gauge minimal educational standards such as basic reading and writing skills among the adult population. While few countries claimed to have an entirely literate population -- something difficult to achieve given reports of considerable functional illiteracy even in advanced industrialized nations, at least 32.3% of all cases reported national averages in the 90% range. Nevertheless, in 26% of all countries

less than half of the population was literate. A mean literacy rate of 69% leaves, therefore, considerable room for improvement. The following countries had the lowest overall percentages: Afghanistan (24%), Bangladesh (33%), Burkina Faso (13%) Ethiopia (15%), Gambia (25%) Guinea (28%), Mali (14%), Mauritania (14%), Morocco (33%), Niger (14%), Pakistan (30%), Somalia (12%), S.Yemen (14%).

Also some of the relatively wealthy Middle Eastern countries had surprisingly low averages, although there governments would certainly have the capacity to remedy the situation: Saudi Arabia (34%), Oman (50%), Iran (51%) Iraq (58%), Algeria (55%). By contrast, a number of developing countries achieved impressive results, almost equal to that of most Western countries -- these include: Cuba (96%), Panama (88%), Paraguay (88%), Nicaragua (88%), Jamaica (94%), Mexico (88%), Singapore (86%), Taiwan (90%), Thailand (91%), Trinidad and Tobago (96%), Uruguay (97%), Venezuela (87%).

Summary-Index of Subsistence Rights Performance.

While it is difficult to compare directly the country performance on different subsistence rights, it appears that the situation was most critical with respect to adequate food and infant mortality. It also seems that poorer countries find it easier to improve certain subsistence rights, such as literacy -- e.g. Nicaragua between 1979 and 1984, while other rights, such as better housing, may require substantial economic and political resources. In fact, it was 'access to adequate housing' which has shown on average the least amount of change over time since tracking started in the early 1960s (c.f. Global Report on Human Settlement, United Nations, Habitat 1987). In addition to economic and political factors, the cultural background of nations cannot be ignored in explaining poor performance, such as the low literacy rates for many Middle Eastern countries. A gender sensitive analysis of this finding would probably illuminate a widespread cultural bias against educated women.

Correlations among basic subsistence rights varied substantially. While, for example,

infant mortality, adult literacy and access to safe water were all very highly correlated each other adequate nutrition and adequate housing showed less co-variation, not only with each other but also with the remaining basic subsistence rights (c.f. Table 2.3).

Analogous to the index of security rights performance, a similar index was constructed summarizing subsistence rights scores. To test the reliability of this indicator a Cronbach's Alpha probability test was applied. The probability estimate for the index of subsistence rights yields a coefficient for Alpha of .739 (n=126/items=5) indicating the high reliability of this measure. The mean for this index is '15.96' on a range from '0' to a maximum score of '88'. Some 69% of all cases fell below the mean, which suggests that, all things being equal, in two out of three countries subsistence rights practices are less than half of what is taken for granted in nations with a high level of respect for civil and political rights. Only some 5% of all countries lay within one standard deviation (22) from the maximum score indicating a good subsistence rights performance. By contrast, more than half of all countries (58.8%) did not even exceed a combined subsistence rights score of at least a tenth of that of Sweden, the best performer in the sample .

Finally, in comparing the two dimensions of basic human rights with each other we can see that overall the correlation between security rights and subsistence rights was substantial (c.f. Table 2.3). A correlation coefficient of '.7' ($p<.001$/n=118) indicates that for the most part countries who are lacking in one basic rights dimensions are also poor performers in the other. Governments that torture and execute people show generally equally little regard for the social and economic condition of people. There are, however, some notable exception to this rule. In some instances countries had a poor record in one basic rights dimension and a good record in the other. Papua New Guinea was a case in point; in

terms of security rights its scores were not much different from most Western countries, while its subsistence rights performance was more typical of that of a low income economy. By contrast, many of the former Communist countries were able to secure most basic social and economic rights, while performing dismally on security rights.

[Table 2.3 -- about here]

Best And Worst Performers -- BHR-Performance Index.

Table 2.4 lists all nations (n=119) based on their overall basic human rights performance by combining the scores for subsistence and security rights. The distribution ranges from 0.5 to 200. Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Switzerland emerge as the best overall performers in the sample while Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan and the USSR ended up as the worst performers (for a number of countries such as South Africa and Mongolia there were insufficient data to calculate the overall index). Among industrialized countries the US, Italy, Spain and Portugal were lagging significantly behind all other industrialized countries. The smaller countries of Northern Europe did exceptionally well. These are followed closely by most of the larger industrialized nations such as Germany, France or Japan. Except for the crown colony of Hong Kong, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Mauritius are the only developing countries with a BHR-performance score larger than 100. Hungary was the best performing East European country, followed closely by a number of Latin American countries. Most disheartening, however, is the fact that some 78% of all nations failed to achieve even the relatively low group mean of 59.14 (range: .05 to 200). In fact, some 40% of this sample obtained BHR-scores of more than one standard deviation

below the mean. A number of African countries (Sudan, Central African Republic, Afghanistan, Ethiopia) ranked at the low end of BHR-performance index. Tables 2.5 through 2.7 ranks the countries by their performance on security rights, subsitence rights and combined basic human rights.

The last tabulation in this section (Table 2.8) features countries in terms of a BHR-typology. Earlier I argued that the dimensions of security rights and subsistence rights can be conceptualized as spanning a plane, which allows for four BHR-type clusters. Nations may score high in both dimensions (high BHR-performance), nations may give preference to one human rights dimensions (security rights preference or subsistence rights preference), lastly nations may perform poorly in either dimension (low-BHR-performance)

[Table 2.4 -- about here]

[Table 2.5 -- about here]

[Table 2.6 -- about here]

[Table 2.7 -- about here]

[Table 2.8 -- about here]

Table 2.1 Basic Security Rights Performance -- Summary of Statistical Performance Indicators for all Countries

Rights --------- Stats.	Torture	Slavery	De-tention	Searches and Seizures	Capital Punish-ment	Security Rights Perf. (a)
Mean	1.18	1.76	.99	1.27	.80	6
Mode	0	2	0	0	0	2
Range	0 - 3	0 - 3	0 - 3	0 - 3	0 - 3	0 - 15
Stdv.	1.09	.94	1.20	1.15	1.18	4.85
n	126	126	126	126	126	126

(a) Index of Security Rights: $SECRIGHT_i = T_i + S_i + D_i + S_i + C_i$

Table 2.2 Basic Subsistence Rights Performance -- Summary of Statistical Performance Indicators for all Countries

Rights --------- Stats.	Calorie Intake %	Safe Water %	Adequate Housing (a)	Infant Mortality (b)	adult literacy %	Sub-sistence Rights (c) Perf.
Mean	96.056	63.016	1.848	69.961	69.047	20.941
Mode	100	100	2.2	10	99	2.8
Range	68 - 100	6 - 100	.4 - 3.3	6 - 198	12 - 100	1.2-99.5
Stdv.	6.908	29.170	.660	52.300	27.023	25.181
n	126	123	123	127	127	119

(a) number of persons per room (b) number of deaths per 1000 live births
(c) Index of Subsistence Rights: $SUBRIGHT_i = [(C_i + W_i + L_i) - H_i)]/IM_i$

Table 2.3 How Strongly Are Basic Human Rights Correlated with Each Other? Correlation Coefficients (**) for All Basic Human Rights

	tor.	slav.	det.	sear.	cap.pun.
torture					
slavery	.609				
detention	.832	.832			
searches	.771	.571	.819		
capital pun.	.741	.521	.755	.666	
calorie intake	.300	.300	.314	.273	.245
water(-)	.548	.530	.571	.520	.452
housing(-)	.286	.281	.338	.257	.330
infant mort.(-)	.472	.500	.523	.436	.439
literacy	.453	.448	.501	.464	.432

	cal.	wat.	hous.	inf.
torture				
slavery				
detention				
searches				
capital pun.				
calorie intake				
water	.588			
housing	-.254	-.341		
infant mort.	-.635	-.814	.430	
literacy	.611	.716	-.441	-.892

(-) indicates a negative relationship between this rights and all others rights listed in that row.
(**) for all correlation coefficients $p<.001$
n = 118

Table 2.4 Summary of Basic Human Rights Performance by Country by Order of Magnitude

Country	BHR-Perf.	SecRight Perf.	SubRight Perf.
Sweden	200.00	15.00	88.00
Finland	186.74	15.00	76.33
Switzerland	180.35	14.00	76.57
Netherlands	176.70	15.00	67.50
Norway	175.00	15.00	66.00
Denmark	173.58	15.00	64.75
Japan	165.00	11.00	80.67
Canada	161.26	14.00	59.78
W.Germany	161.14	15.00	53.80
Australia	159.49	14.00	58.22
France	159.49	14.00	58.22
UK	154.47	14.00	53.80
Belgium	153.33	14.00	52.80
Austria	152.48	15.00	46.18
Hong Kong	148.68	13.00	54.57
Irish Rep.	143.71	13.00	50.20
New Zealand	143.18	15.00	38.00
Spain	134.95	11.00	54.22
Greece	132.12	15.00	28.27
USA	128.91	11.00	48.91
Portugal	116.19	14.00	20.11
Israel	115.39	12.00	31.14
Italy	114.20	10.00	41.83
Uruguay	107.54	14.00	12.50
Costa Rica	105.12	12.00	22.11
Mauritius	104.32	13.00	15.54
Argentina	99.57	13.00	11.35
Hungary	87.87	9.00	24.53
Venezuela	85.00	11.00	10.26
Dom.Rep.	84.45	12.00	3.92
Trinidad	81.69	9.00	19.09
Panama	81.21	10.00	12.80
Ecuador	77.23	11.00	3.43
Jamaica	76.54	8.00	20.42
Botswana	71.32	10.00	4.09
E.Germany	68.35	3.00	42.55
Kuwait	63.09	7.00	14.45
Singapore	62.69	7.00	14.10
Congo	62.19	9.00	1.93
Senegal	60.99	9.00	.87
Gambia	60.68	9.00	.60
Sierra Leone	60.26	9.00	.23
Algeria	55.82	8.00	2.19
Czchoslova.	54.55	3.00	30.40
Bulgaria	54.23	3.00	30.13
Brazil	53.45	7.00	5.97
Korea S.	53.41	6.00	11.80
Jordan	53.06	7.00	5.62
Saudi Arabia	50.00	3.00	26.40
Cameroon	49.34	7.00	2.35
Bolivia	49.15	7.00	2.18
Ivory Coast	47.95	7.00	1.13
Nicaragua	44.23	6.00	3.72
Poland	43.44	3.00	20.63
Cuba	42.74	2.00	25.87
Tunisia	42.53	6.00	2.23
Chile	41.59	3.00	19.00
Egypt	41.10	6.00	.96
Yugoslavia	40.98	4.00	12.60
Benin	40.39	6.00	.34
Malaysia	39.37	4.00	11.18
Peru	36.39	5.00	2.69
Madagascar	36.11	5.00	2.44
Colombia	35.94	2.00	19.89
Sri Lanka	35.68	4.00	7.93
Lesotho	35.11	5.00	1.56
Morocco	35.08	5.00	1.54
Rwanda	35.06	5.00	1.52
Thailand	34.53	4.00	6.92
Burkina Faso	33.63	5.00	.26
Mexico	32.73	3.00	11.20
Libya	31.19	4.00	3.98
Kenya	31.10	4.00	3.90
Honduras	29.82	4.00	2.78
Zambia	28.62	4.00	1.72
Ghana	28.56	4.00	1.67
India	27.78	4.00	.98
Nigeria	27.64	4.00	.85
Paraguay	27.13	3.00	6.27
Rumania	26.82	1.00	17.74
Indonesia	23.45	3.00	3.03
Syria	22.38	2.00	7.96
Nepal	20.90	3.00	.80
Burundi	20.80	3.00	.71
Niger	20.60	3.00	.53
USSR	20.45	.00	18.00
Korea N.	20.30	1.00	12.00
Bangldesh	20.21	3.00	.18
Philippines	19.59	2.00	5.51
Vietnam	17.46	2.00	3.63
Iraq	16.85	2.00	3.09
Guatemala	16.64	2.00	2.91
Zimbabwe	16.57	2.00	2.85
Turkey	16.41	2.00	2.71
Tanzania	15.93	2.00	2.29
Iran	15.81	2.00	2.18
El Salvador	15.30	2.00	1.73
Malawi	14.69	2.00	1.19
Togo	14.65	2.00	1.16
Laos	14.31	2.00	.86
Haiti	14.24	2.00	.80
N.Yemen	13.87	2.00	.48
S.Yemen	13.62	2.00	.25
Guinea	13.53	2.00	.17
Mozambique	13.50	2.00	.14
Zaire	8.19	1.00	1.34
Uganda	7.93	1.00	1.11
Liberia	7.75	1.00	.95
Angola	7.53	1.00	.76
Pakistan	7.22	1.00	.48
Somalia	7.02	1.00	.31
Chad	6.89	1.00	.20
Mali	6.63	1.00	-.03
Burma/Myrnma	2.12	.00	1.87
Cambodia	1.04	.00	.91
Sudan	.76	.00	.67
Cent.Afr.Rep	.64	.00	.56
Afghanistan	.20	.00	.18
Ethiopia	.05	.00	.05

Table 2.5 Country Rank List by Security Rights Performance

Country	SecRight	Country	SecRight
Austria	15.00	Libya	4.00
Denmark	15.00	Malaysia	4.00
Finland	15.00	Nigeria	4.00
W.Germany	15.00	Sri Lanka	4.00
Greece	15.00	Thailand	4.00
Netherlands	15.00	Yugoslavia	4.00
New Zealand	15.00	Zambia	4.00
Norway	15.00	Bangladesh	3.00
Sweden	15.00	Bulgaria	3.00
Australia	14.00	Burundi	3.00
Belgium	14.00	Chile	3.00
Canada	14.00	Czchoslova.	3.00
France	14.00	E.Germany	3.00
Portugal	14.00	Indonesia	3.00
Switzerland	14.00	Mexico	3.00
UK	14.00	Nepal	3.00
Uruguay	14.00	Niger	3.00
Argentina	13.00	Paraguay	3.00
Hong Kong	13.00	Poland	3.00
Irish Rep.	13.00	Saudi Arabia	3.00
Mauritius	13.00	China	2.00
Pap.N.Guinea	13.00	Colombia	2.00
Costa Rica	12.00	Cuba	2.00
Dom.Rep.	12.00	El Salvador	2.00
Israel	12.00	Guatemala	2.00
Ecuador	11.00	Guinea	2.00
Japan	11.00	Haiti	2.00
Spain	11.00	Iran	2.00
USA	11.00	Iraq	2.00
Venezuela	11.00	Laos	2.00
Botswana	10.00	Malawi	2.00
Italy	10.00	Mozambique	2.00
Panama	10.00	Philippines	2.00
Congo	9.00	Syria	2.00
Gambia	9.00	Tanzania	2.00
Hungary	9.00	Togo	2.00
Senegal	9.00	Turkey	2.00
Sierra Leone	9.00	Vietnam	2.00
Trinidad	9.00	S.Yemen	2.00
Algeria	8.00	N.Yemen	2.00
Jamaica	8.00	Zimbabwe	2.00
Bolivia	7.00	Angola	1.00
Brazil	7.00	Chad	1.00
Cameroon	7.00	Korea N.	1.00
Ivory Coast	7.00	Liberia	1.00
Jordan	7.00	Mali	1.00
Kuwait	7.00	Pakistan	1.00
Singapore	7.00	Rumania	1.00
Benin	6.00	Somalia	1.00
Egypt	6.00	Uganda	1.00
Korea S.	6.00	Zaire	1.00
Nicaragua	6.00	Afghanistan	.00
Tunisia	6.00	Albania	.00
Burkina Faso	5.00	Burma/Myanmar	.00
Lesotho	5.00	Cambodia	.00
Madagascar	5.00	Cent.Afr.Rep	.00
Morocco	5.00	Ethiopia	.00
Oman	5.00	Mauritania	.00
Peru	5.00	South Africa	.00
Rwanda	5.00	Sudan	.00
Taiwan	5.00	USSR	.00
Ghana	4.00	Mongolia	.
Honduras	4.00		
India	4.00		
Kenya	4.00		

Table 2.6 Country Rank List by Subsistence Rights Performance

Country	SubRight	Country	SubRight
Sweden	88.00	Guatemala	2.91
Japan	80.67	Zimbabwe	2.85
Switzerland	76.57	Honduras	2.78
Finland	76.33	Turkey	2.71
Netherlands	67.50	Peru	2.69
Norway	66.00	Madagascar	2.44
Denmark	64.75	Cameroon	2.35
Canada	59.78	Tanzania	2.29
Australia	58.22	Tunisia	2.23
France	58.22	Algeria	2.19
Hong Kong	54.57	Bolivia	2.18
Spain	54.22	Iran	2.18
W.Germany	53.80	Congo	1.93
UK	53.80	Burma/Myanmar	1.87
Belgium	52.80	El Salvador	1.73
Irish Rep.	50.20	Zambia	1.72
USA	48.91	Ghana	1.67
Austria	46.18	Lesotho	1.56
E.Germany	42.55	Morocco	1.54
Italy	41.83	Rwanda	1.52
New Zealand	38.00	Zaire	1.34
Israel	31.14	Malawi	1.19
Czchoslova.	30.40	Togo	1.16
Bulgaria	30.13	Ivory Coast	1.13
Greece	28.27	Uganda	1.11
Saudi Arabia	26.40	India	.98
Cuba	25.87	Egypt	.96
Hungary	24.53	Liberia	.95
Costa Rica	22.11	Cambodia	.91
Poland	20.63	Senegal	.87
Jamaica	20.42	Laos	.86
Portugal	20.11	Nigeria	.85
Colombia	19.89	Nepal	.80
Trinidad	19.09	Haiti	.80
Chile	19.00	Angola	.76
USSR	18.00	Burundi	.71
Rumania	17.74	Sudan	.67
Mauritius	15.54	Gambia	.60
Kuwait	14.45	Cent.Afr.Rep	.56
Singapore	14.10	Niger	.53
Panama	12.80	Pakistan	.48
Yugoslavia	12.60	N.Yemen	.48
Uruguay	12.50	Benin	.34
Korea N.	12.00	Somalia	.31
Korea S.	11.80	Burkina Faso	.26
Argentina	11.35	S.Yemen	.25
Mexico	11.20	Sierra Leone	.23
Malaysia	11.18	Chad	.20
Venezuela	10.26	Bangladesh	.18
Syria	7.96	Afghanistan	.18
Sri Lanka	7.93	Guinea	.17
Thailand	6.92	Mozambique	.14
Paraguay	6.27	Ethiopia	.05
Brazil	5.97	Mali	-.03
Jordan	5.62	Pap.N.Guinea	.
Philippines	5.51	Oman	.
Botswana	4.09	Taiwan	.
Libya	3.98	China	.
Dom.Rep.	3.92	Albania	.
Kenya	3.90	Mauritania	.
Nicaragua	3.72	South Africa	.
Vietnam	3.63	Mongolia	.
Ecuador	3.43		
Iraq	3.09		
Indonesia	3.03		

Table 2.7 Country Rank List by Combined Basic Human Rights Performance

Country	BHR-Perf	Country	BHR-Perf
Sweden	200.00	Lesotho	35.11
Finland	186.74	Morocco	35.08
Switzerland	180.35	Rwanda	35.06
Netherlands	176.70	Thailand	34.53
Norway	175.00	Burkina Faso	33.63
Denmark	173.58	Mexico	32.73
Japan	165.00	Libya	31.19
Canada	161.26	Kenya	31.10
W.Germany	161.14	Honduras	29.82
Australia	159.49	Zambia	28.62
France	159.49	Ghana	28.56
UK	154.47	India	27.78
Belgium	153.33	Nigeria	27.64
Austria	152.48	Paraguay	27.13
Hong Kong	148.68	Rumania	26.82
Irish Rep.	143.71	Indonesia	23.45
New Zealand	143.18	Syria	22.38
Spain	134.95	Nepal	20.90
Greece	132.12	Burundi	20.80
USA	128.91	Niger	20.60
Portugal	116.19	USSR	20.45
Israel	115.39	Korea N.	20.30
Italy	114.20	Bangldesh	20.21
Uruguay	107.54	Philippines	19.59
Costa Rica	105.12	Vietnam	17.46
Mauritius	104.32	Iraq	16.85
Argentina	99.57	Guatemala	16.64
Hungary	87.87	Zimbabwe	16.57
Venezuela	85.00	Turkey	16.41
Dom.Rep.	84.45	Tanzania	15.93
Trinidad	81.69	Iran	15.81
Panama	81.21	El Salvador	15.30
Ecuador	77.23	Malawi	14.69
Jamaica	76.54	Togo	14.65
Botswana	71.32	Laos	14.31
E.Germany	68.35	Haiti	14.24
Kuwait	63.09	N.Yemen	13.87
Singapore	62.69	S.Yemen	13.62
Congo	62.19	Guinea	13.53
Senegal	60.99	Mozambique	13.50
Gambia	60.68	Zaire	8.19
Sierra Leone	60.26	Uganda	7.93
Algeria	55.82	Liberia	7.75
Czchoslova.	54.55	Angola	7.53
Bulgaria	54.23	Pakistan	7.22
Brazil	53.45	Somalia	7.02
Korea S.	53.41	Chad	6.89
Jordan	53.06	Mali	6.63
Saudi Arabia	50.00	Burma/Myrnma	2.12
Cameroon	49.34	Cambodia	1.04
Bolivia	49.15	Sudan	.76
Ivory Coast	47.95	Cent.Afr.Rep	.64
Nicaragua	44.23	Afghanistan	.20
Poland	43.44	Ethiopia	.05
Cuba	42.74	Albania	.
Tunisia	42.53	China	.
Chile	41.59	Mauritania	.
Egypt	41.10	Mongolia	.
Yugoslavia	40.98	Oman	.
Benin	40.39	Pap.N.Guinea	.
Malaysia	39.37	South Africa	.
Peru	36.39	Taiwan	.
Madagascar	36.11		
Colombia	35.94	Number of cases listed =	127
Sri Lanka	35.68		

Table 2.8 The Dimensions of Human Rights -- Country Classifications by Four Regime Type Clusters; High BHR Perfromance, Security Rights Preference, Subsistence Rights Preference, Low BHR Perfromance

High-BHR	LOW-BHR	N.Yemen
		Yugoslavia
Australia	Afghanistan	Zaire
Austria	Angola	Zambia
Belgium	Bangladesh	Zimbabwe
Canada	Benin	
Costa Rica	Burkina Faso	
Denmark	Burma/Myanmar	Missing Cases
Finland	Burundi	Albania
France	Cambodia	China
W.Germany	Cent.Afr.Rep	Mauritania
Greece	Chad	Mongolia
Hong Kong	Chile	Oman
Hungary	Colombia	Pap.N.Guinea
Irish Rep.	Egypt	South Africa
Israel	El Salvador	Taiwan
Italy	Ethiopia	
Japan	Ghana	
Netherlands	Guatemala	
New Zealand	Guinea	
Norway	Haiti	
Spain	Honduras	
Sweden	India	
Switzerland	Indonesia	
UK	Iran	
USA	Iraq	
	Kenya	
	Korea N.	
Secright-Preference	Korea S.	
	Laos	
	Lesotho	
Algeria	Libya	
Argentina	Liberia	
Bolivia	Madagascar	
Botswana	Malawi	
Brazil	Malaysia	
Cameroon	Mali	
Congo	Mexico	
Dom.Rep.	Morocco	
Ecuador	Mozambique	
Gambia	Nepal	
Ivory Coast	Nicaragua	
Jamaica	Niger	
Jordan	Nigeria	
Kuwait	Pakistan	
Mauritius	Paraguay	
Panama	Peru	
Portugal	Philippines	
Senegal	Poland	
Sierra Leone	Rumania	
Singapore	Rwanda	
Trinidad	Somalia	
Uruguay	Sri Lanka	
Venezuela	Sudan	
	Syria	
	Tanzania	
Subright-Preference	Thailand	
	Togo	
	Tunisia	
Bulgaria	Turkey	
Cuba	Uganda	
Czchoslova.	USSR	
E.Germany	Vietnam	
Saudi Arabia	S.Yemen	

Performance by Region

Performance standards vary widely across regions. As we have seen above, many of the industrialized countries were among the best performers. Therefore, we would also expect to find the highest performance averages for basic human rights in Western Europe and North America[9]. In every single category of security rights the averages of the North Atlantic community came close to the maximum possible scores indicating that all rights/freedoms were mostly or fully guaranteed. On a range from '0' to '3' the group means for industrialized countries were highest for 'freedom from slavery' (2.7) and lowest for 'freedom from torture'(2.5) and 'freedom from capital punishment (2.5). Especially the latter reflected differences along legal and cultural norms -- mainly between the US and the rest of the group. The somewhat lower scores on torture are a result of reported police brutality in some Western countries.

In terms of subsistence rights the West outperformed all other regions by a considerable margin. On average we find in this group the highest literacy rates (97.5%), most access to safe (piped) water (95.4%), the best housing conditions (.8 persons per room) and the lowest infant mortality rate (9.8 fatalities per 1000 live births). In addition, the West along with Eastern Europe was the only region of the world that could insure an adequate food supply for their populations.

[Table 3.1 -- about here]

Eastern Europe by contrast offered a contradictory image. While its performance on

subsistence rights was quite good by global standards, it exhibited the worst performance of any region in terms of guaranteeing basic security rights. In the categories 'freedom from torture', 'freedom from slavery and forced labor', 'freedom from detention and searches without warrant' the group means for Eastern Europe were on average half of those of most third world countries. Ironically, while otherwise higher per capita GNPs seemed to insure better human rights conditions -- as we shall see later on in this study, it appeared to have an opposite effect in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. There, the greater resources available to a government enabled it to exert much tighter control and repression than would be possible in many developing countries, where state-power sometimes barely extends much beyond the capital city.

In terms of basic human rights performance Africa has substantial room for improvement. While the overall averages in every single rights category were disappointingly poor, it needs to be pointed out that individual country performances differed considerably from each other. Especially in terms of security rights countries such as Botswana, Cameroon, Mauritius or Gambia, whose ratings were comparable to Western standards, were a far-cry from cases such as the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Sudan, Zaire or Somalia. When we compare Sub-Saharan Africa and Northern Africa there were some interesting differences in the sense that 'freedom from torture' and 'capital punishment' were less respected in the North, while the average scores on 'freedom from slavery' and 'freedom from detention and searches without warrant' were lower in the South. In all subsistence rights categories the wealthier North slightly outperformed the South. Particularly in terms of 'adult literacy', 'safe water' and 'adequate nutrition' Africa, and especially Sub-Saharan Africa, had the poorest showing of any region in the world; if we consider, for example, an average infant

morality rate of '120', or a mean score on calorie intake of 90.8%.

On a range from '0' to '15' Asia's average security rights performance (score: 4.71) was only slightly better than that of Africa (4.54). However, Asian countries also showed a great deal of regional variation. While the countries of Southern and Eastern Asia (3.66) obtained the poorest ratings in categories such as 'torture', and 'slavery/forced labor' of any region outside Eastern Europe, the various Arab and Gulf states (4.18) had the lowest average scores on 'detention', 'searches without warrant' and 'capital punishment of any developing area. The low averages for both Asian sub-groups were all the more remarkable as they include a number of prosperous and/or in the case of India, Bangladesh and Japan democratic or relatively democratic countries. Not surprisingly, Asia has the highest standard deviation of any region (4.27).

In terms of subsistence rights the overall performance of Asia (score: 13.16/range 0-88) was considerably better than that of Africa (1.67) and only slightly below that of Latin America (14.97). An analysis of the individual subsistence rights categories broken down by sub-region offered a puzzling picture, which may perhaps be best explained by differences in terms of culture and regime type. The Arab and Gulf countries performed well in some subsistence rights categories, which should hardly be surprising given the substantial oil induced wealth in the region. There, on average 73% of the population had access to safe water and 98% were provided with adequate food, compared to averages of 58% access to safe water and 96% access to adequate food for the rest of Asia. In terms of literacy rate and infant mortality the situation was reversed. In the Middle East average literacy rates were low (57% compared to 70% for the rest of Asia), which may reflect traditional religious and social values, especially towards women. Saudi Arabia with a literacy rate of only 34% was

a case in point, as it could certainly afford to educate its population. The relatively high infant mortality rates were indicative of the considerable socio-economic disparities in this region. While Saudi Arabia (10 deaths per 1000 live births) or Kuwait (22) approached Western levels on infant mortality rates, South Yemen (134), North Yemen (143),and Iran (112) did poorly even by third world standards.

Latin America outperformed any other region outside Western Europe and North America in terms of security rights. The scores for individual basic security rights ranged from '1.0' on capital punishment to '1.7' on slavery on our '0' to '3' scale. In other words, while violations of security rights were still widespread, the general situation was notably better than in either Asia or Africa. The scores for Latin America deviated from other regions in the world in an important aspect. While in Europe, Asia and Africa BHR-performance differed significantly across regions, in Latin American BHR-performance varied considerably within regions, so that neighboring countries often presented very different images -- for instance, Haiti and its Caribbean neighbor, the Dominican Republic, then El Salvador and nearby Costa Rica in Central America, or Chile and Ecuador in the Southern Cone.

In terms of adequate food (97%), housing (1.8 persons per room) and literacy rates (82%) Latin American countries performed reasonably well by global standards. With respect to access to safe water (65.8%) and infant mortality rate (50 deaths/1000 live births) the scores were substantially lower compared to the other three indicators, something which attests to the considerable social and ethnic inequalities in most Latin American countries.

[Table 3.2 -- about here]

Conclusion.

Two principal findings emerge out of the descriptive analysis. First, we need to recognize the connection between economic conditions and human rights performance. Both basic political and economic rights are more frequently violated in those parts of the world plagued by widespread poverty and a lack of government resources. Even at the level of basic rights most non-industrialized countries found themselves overwhelmed by the task of securing the means to individual security and subsistence to all people in their society. Curiously, the second finding here puts the above observation into perspective, as low economic standing cannot fully account for BHR-performance differences in each dimension within as well as across regions. Cases such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and a number of other ones far outperform other often equally underdeveloped countries in one or both dimensions of basic human rights. In other instances, nations with considerable economic capacity, such as Eastern Europe or many Middle-Eastern states, perform worse than many of the poorer countries in the sample. Accordingly, economic factors can be only one (undoubtedly a very important) aspect in explaining human rights performance. In addition to exploring the human rights differences of countries with similar economic backgrounds, it is equally important to disaggregate the concept of 'economic conditions'. Rather than treating the economy as some vaguely defined residual category, we would want to find out what aspects of the national or international economy are strongly associated with human rights performance; is it the level of development, the distribution of wealth or the extent to which countries are involved in the world market? The following chapter is intended to explore these questions and to provide answers.

Table 3.1 Summary of Security Rights (Means, Stdv) By World Regions

Type of Right ------- Region	STAT	Torture range: (0-3)	Slavery range: (0-3)	Detention range: (0-3)	Searches range: (0-3)	Capital Punishment range: (0-3)	Sec-Right Perf. range: (0-15)
Sub-Saharan Africa	**M**	**.80**	**1.41**	**.44**	**.80**	**.41**	**3.88**
	S	.88	.90	.77	.95	.77	3.36
	n	36	36	36	36	36	36
North Africa	**M**	**.83**	**1.66**	**.66**	**1.33**	**.33**	**4.83**
	S	.75	1.03	.51	.81	.51	2.7
	n	6	6	6	6	6	6
AFRICA TOTAL	**M**	**.81**	**1.4**	**.47**	**.88**	**.40**	**4.02**
	S	.86	.91	.74	.94	.73	3.26
	n	42	42	42	42	42	42
Middle East	**M**	**.81**	**2.00**	**.63**	**.63**	**.09**	**4.18**
	S	.98	.63	1.02	1.02	.30	3.28
	n	11	11	11	11	11	11
South and East Asia	**M**	**.77**	**1.58**	**.51**	**.90**	**.12**	**3.90**
	S	.84	.99	.96	1.01	.42	3.33
	n	31	31	31	31	31	31
ASIA TOTAL	**M**	**.97**	**1.65**	**.71**	**1.02**	**.34**	**4.71**
	S	1.04	.99	1.15	1.09	.34	4.27
	n	35	35	35	35	35	29
CARIBBEAN **LATIN AMERICA**	**M**	**1.18**	**1.77**	**1.22**	**1.5**	**1.04**	**6.72**
	S	1.05	.52	1.15	1.01	1.21	4.17
	n	22	22	22	22	22	22
EASTERN EUROPE **SOVIET UNION**	**M**	**.77**	**1.44**	**.33**	**.33**	**0.00**	**2.88**
	S	.66	1.01	.70	.70	0.00	2.71
	n	8	8	8	8	8	8
WEST. EUROPE **NORTH AMERICA**	**M**	**2.66**	**2.83**	**2.77**	**2.83**	**2.72**	**13.83**
	S	.59	.38	.54	.38	.75	1.58
	n	18	18	18	18	18	18

(M) Mean, (S) Standard Deviation, (n) Sample size

Table 3.2 Summary of Subsistence Rights (Means, Stdv) By World Regions

Type of Right / Region	STAT	Housing (a)	Calorie Intake (%)	Adult Literacy (%)	Safe Water (%)	Infant Mortality (b)	Sub-Right Perf. (c)	Total BHR-Perf. (d)
Sub-Saharan Africa	**M**	**2.14**	**90.86**	**.45**	**35.94**	**120.38**	**1.62**	**29.9**
	S	.22	9.16	22.37	21.34	37.49	3.66	23.91
	n	36	36	36	36	36	34	34
North Africa	**M**	**2.65**	**97.50**	**47.33**	**73.33**	**95.16**	**1.92**	**34.41**
	S	.53	6.12	13.95	16.53	15.53	1.18	18.5
	n	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
AFRICA TOTAL	**M**	**2.21**	**91.81**	**45.71**	**24.56**	**116.78**	**1.67**	**30.06**
	S	.33	9.04	21.24	41.55	36.18	2.49	.23
	n	42	42	42	40	42	40	40
Middle East	**M**	**2.05**	**98.80**	**57.18**	**73.20**	**75.18**	**9.42**	**38.04**
	S	.66	2.57	21.88	20.74	48.34	11.07	33.02
	n	11	11	11	11	11	11	10
South and East Asia	**M**	**2.22**	**96.57**	**70.04**	**59.045**	**71.143**	**11.87**	**37.57**
	S	.46	5.51	.24.25	30.61	3.36	21.29	45.23
	n	19	21	21	21	21	18	18
ASIA TOTAL	**M**	**2.09**	**97.40**	**67.38**	**63.76**	**69.27**	**13.16**	**45.06**
	S	.58	4.67	24.17	29.34	49.05	19.76	48.62
	n	35	35	35	35	35	35	31
CARIBBEAN LATIN AMERICA	**M**	**1.85**	**97.18**	**82.50**	**65.86**	**50.40**	**10.04**	**56.25**
	S	.511	.53	15.13	19.26	30.73	7.88	30.20
	n	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
EASTERN EUROPE SOVIET UNION	**M**	**1.18**	**100**	**94.77**	**83.11**	**22.22**	**24.57**	**49.58**
	S	.21	.00	7.90	12.18	9.12	9.53	21.85
	n	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
WEST. EUROPE NORTH AMERICA	**M**	**.81**	**100**	**97.50**	**95.77**	**9.83**	**55.96**	**155.81**
	S	.27	.00	3.95	8.73	2.97	16.5	24.12
	n	18	18	18	18	18	18	18

(M) Mean,
(S) Standard Deviation,
(n) Sample Size
(a) number of persons per room
(b) number of deaths per 1000 live births
(c) Subsistence Rights Rerfromance (range: 1.2 - 99.5)
(d) Basic Human Rights Performance (range: 0.05 - 200)

Endnotes

1. The inclusion of Hong Kong takes exception to this for good reason; in all major existing Human Rights publications and surveys Hong Kong is listed as a separate entity. In its form of government and administration it has a considerable measure of independence from the United Kingdom. In area studies Hong Kong is more frequently labeled as one of the newly industrialized Asian Tigers along with Taiwan and South Korea, than simply as a British colony. Its cultural, economic, social and political system is sufficiently unique to warrant a distinct treatment.

2. While the sample does not include Lebanon, it does comprise countries such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru and others, which were at that point confronted with a significant amount of civil strife and armed rebellion. The chief goal of this research is to ascertain the government's handling of human rights, even under situations of duress and pressure, therefore it was important to include countries with turbulent domestic politics as long as there was an internationally recognized and functioning government able to exercise control in most of its territory. Despite the nominal existence of a Lebanese government these conditions do not apply to the Lebanon during the days of civil war, foreign occupation and militia rule.

3. (a) Income Category: Industrial market economies, East European non-market economies, high income oil exporters, upper middle income oil exporter, lower middle income oil-exporter, lower middle income country lower income country (c.f. World Bank, World Development Report 1986 (Oxford University Press 1986).
(b) Type of Economy: Industrialized nations (OECD), nations with command economy (COMECON), less developed countries (LDCs), country or area not specified (c.f. Direction of Trade Statistics, (OECD 1986).

4. Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide 1986.

5. These are country evaluations for which Human does not have sufficient information on all of his human rights categories, he nevertheless, has sufficient data on the general state of human rights including the kind of basic human rights in which I am interested.

6. Each of the housing scores is multiplied by '50' to make the scores mathematically comparable to the percentages used for the others items in the index. This transformation is not intended to weigh the scores but is designed solely to create a numerical equivalent to the other components in the index.

7. Infant mortality rates tend to converge against 0, for biological and medical reasons it remains unachievable no matter how much in the way of resources is utilized. It is equally unreasonable, however, the take any number between 0 and 4 (the currently lowest rate) as an absolute target value.

Likewise, housing averages tend to approximate 0 the more personal space is available. A value of 0 (persons per room), however, is obviously meaningless, an value of 0.3 by comparison, signals more individual space than for example 0.8. In addition, the room size and lay-out also contribute to personal comfort. It is impossible, therefore, to determine an absolute lowest value.

8. For obvious reasons countries providing more than what is required in terms of nutritional needs were still scored as '100'.

9. In order to simplify reporting the US and Canada were grouped with Western Europe.

ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE

"Good things go together" (Max Weber)

Economic Wealth and Basic Human Rights

Level of economic development, as conceptualized originally by Lipset (1959, 1981) has featured prominently as a predictor of democratic performance in the literature. In a somewhat modified version, Lipset's proposition was the first hypothesis being testing here:


(E.H1) "The higher the level of economic development the better the overall government performance in securing basic human rights."

In this study I use two measures for 'level of economic development', one of which is 'GNP per capita' (source: Sivard, 1987) the other 'Income Type' as defined by the World Bank (source: World Development Report 1986). In order to test the above proposition two separate analyses were performed. In the first one I used a bivariate regression, by regressing each of the two dimensions of basic human rights performance (security rights and subsistence rights) on 'GNP per capita'. In the second analysis I employ a series of t-tests.

The results of the bivariate regression are presented in Figure 2 and Table 4.1. A visual examination of the regression plot in Figure 2 and the itemized bivariate regression coefficients listed in Table 4.1 confirm that 'GNP per capita' turned out to be an excellent predictor of basic human rights performance. In every single rights category there was a

substantial and highly significant correlation between a nation's level of economic development and basic human rights. With regression coefficients ranging from .45 to .69 ($p<.0001$) GNP per capita explains between half and two thirds of the variation of four of the subsistence rights (c.f. Table 4.1). Only with respect to housing -- the variable with least variation -- the relationship was naturally less pronounced. In terms of basic security rights the r^2-coefficients for the individual categories were somewhat lower ranging from .36 to .21 ($p<.0001$). Nevertheless, level of economic development explains nearly 40% of the variation in security rights performance ($r^2=.38/p<.0001/n=124$).

Figure 2 Regression Plot of BHR on GNP per Capita[1]



[Table 4.1 -- about here]

The relationship between GNP per capita and BHR-performance can be demonstrated also in a cross-tabulation table. All nations in the sample were grouped into three categories according BHR-performance and level of economic development. To keep Table 4.2 simple the categories were labeled 'low', 'medium' and 'high'. The criteria for assigning cases was each country's score relative to the respective group means on GNP per capita and BHR-performance. Cases that were more than half a standard deviation above or below the mean were classified as 'high' or 'low', respectively. Cases falling within half a standard deviation around the mean were labeled 'medium'. Of all countries classified as having a low BHR-performance, some 75% also have low per capita GNPs (c.f. Table 4.2). Conversely, some 64% of nations with a high BHR-performance placed in the high GNP per capita range. More importantly, none of the countries with a low economic performance managed to obtain a high BHR-score. Medium BHR-performers were drawn mainly from the low (44.2%) and medium (41.9%) GNP per capita ranges. The relationship between human rights and economic development further underscored by the two statistical measures of association employed here (Gamma=.759, Kendall's Tau-b= .551/sign. of table $p<.0001$).

[Table 4.2 -- Table about here]

If security rights and subsistence rights are analyzed separately the difference in the

effect of GNP per capita on the two BHR-dimensions became once again apparent. For security rights the correlation was much weaker (Kendall's Tau-b=.388/p<.0001) than for subsistence rights (Kendall's Tau-b=.818/p<.0001). A casewise analysis showed that nations with low levels of economic development were more likely to have a very poor record on subsistence rights (80%) than on security rights (60%). Conversely, nine out of ten countries with a high score on subsistence rights were nations with high per capita GNPs. This finding stands in a sharp contrast to security rights performance. There only 50% of the countries with high scores were drawn from the wealthiest economies.

The results summarized in Table 4.1 were based on a bivariate regression. Using a regression analysis, however, leads to problems similar to those encountered by other researchers whose indices were derived from Gastil's conceptualization of political rights and civil liberties (e.g. Strouse/Claude 1979: Cingranelli 1992). In short, the indicators employed were ultimately based on classifications and, therefore, ordinal-level, which in turn affected regression results -- although the 'ordinal' effects were somewhat mitigated by the spread of the index (range: 0-15), which also allows for true intervals. Therefore, I decided to re-test the above hypothesis by using a t-test, a statistical technique better suited to ordinal-level analysis. In doing so I decided to operate with a different measure for 'economic development' by using World Bank classifications of countries according to their income type (World Development Report 1986). Subsequently, I created two distinct sub-samples, one consisting of industrialized nations, the other made up of developing countries. In the interest of keeping the two samples as dichotomous as possible to examine performance differences between Western industrialized and less developed countries I omitted all former East European non-market economies and high income oil produces (they will be analyzed further

below). The t-test essentially compares the sample means by calculating the Student's t and tests the significance of the difference between the group means. In short, if income type had little or no impact we would expect no significant difference between the two group means for different security rights.

The results of the t-test analysis are reported in Table 4.3, which indicates that the performance differences for each security right are considerable. The findings here confirm essentially the above regression results underscoring the importance of economic development for basic political rights and civil liberties.

[Table 4.3 -- about here]

The differences from the bivariate regression, which included the former Communist countries, are minor. Previously, 'freedom from capital punishment' seemed least associated with level of development (compare Table 4.3 with Table 4.1). In the t-test analysis, however, the relationship between the death penalty and national wealth was somewhat more pronounced. The situation was exactly reversed with respect to 'freedom from torture'. While for 'freedom from detention' the group means between industrialized and developing countries were relatively farthest apart, they were relatively close together for 'freedom from slavery'.

Level of Economic Development -- A Perfect Predictor?

Are we to conclude from the above analyses, as have other researchers (see my earlier account of economic explanations of human rights), that level of economic development is

a nearly perfect predictor of human rights? In short, are we content with confirming a modified 'Lipset hypothesis' and attribute the remaining unexplained variation to the contingencies of a complex reality, or does economic development tell us only part of the story?

A closer item by item analysis of both Table 4.1 and Table 4.3 reveals that the impact of economic development is uneven, both within and across the dimensions of basic human rights. While GNP per capita explains some two thirds of the variation in subsistence rights, it can barely account for 40 per cent of the variation in security rights performance. This difference cannot be fully explained by the difference in the nature of the data (partially ordinal-level for security rights). Theory would lead us to expect that subsistence rights are, indeed, much more strongly affected by a country's wealth. I pointed earlier to an important conceptual distinction between security and subsistence rights. The latter belong to the realm of positive rights requiring an expansion of the role of government in the sense that it has to allocate precious resources to establish minimal education, to improve basic health care, to provide housing and the like. Security rights are commonly counted among 'negative' or 'restraining rights' limiting the role of government. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that security rights performance depends to a much greater extent than subsistence rights on factors rooted in a nation's cultural and political context. The death penalty, the variable with the weakest correlation in Table 4.1, is a case in point. A number of countries with medium to high per capita GNPs, such as the nations of Eastern Europe, the US or Japan, do not guarantee the freedom from the death penalty. Theoretically more challenging, however, is the finding that the impact of GNP per capita varies not only across but also within each BHR-dimensions.

Disaggregating Wealth and Basic Human Rights Performance.

While GNP per capita has proved to be a good predictor of human rights performance, it is, nevertheless, not a perfect one leaving considerable unexplained variation. This lack of fit is not only indicative of other, especially non-economic, factors which need to be followed up here, but we can also assume that different types of countries are affected differently by this variable. In other words, it is helpful to disaggregate the relationship between wealth and human rights in order to explore this further. Breaking this relationship down by region is not recommended, however, as world regions conform almost uniformly to particular levels of development, which eliminates most of the variation in both dependent and independent variable resulting in low coefficients of correlation and determination. Therefore, once again the standard World Bank (World Development Report 1986) classification of countries according to income type becomes useful, which distinguishes industrial market economies, East European non-market economies, high income oil exporters, upper middle income oil exporters, lower income countries, and lower income countries.

[Table 4.4 -- about here]

Table 4.4 provides an overview of the relationship between basic security rights and different income types. As expected, the wealthiest countries (100%) and most of the poorest nations (70%) are at opposite ends in terms of guaranteeing security rights. We may conclude that level of economic development is a fine predictor of security rights performance for cases positioned at the low or high end of the GNP per capita range. For the income types between the two polar opposites the reliance on level of economic development as a predictor of BHR-

performance is somewhat more problematic, as two income categories indicate a trend reversal; East European non-market economies and high income oil producers. Despite their higher levels of economic development these nations performed poorly in guaranteeing basic political rights. Upper middle income countries split nearly evenly into the three levels of security rights performance. In addition, almost 20% of lower middle income countries were still capable of guaranteeing all or most security rights. Even some 40% of lower income countries managed to obtain medium scores on security rights performance. In short, GNP per capita becomes increasingly less relevant a factor in explaining security right performance for nations that are neither extremely wealthy nor excessively poor (c.f. Table 4.4).

Based on the earlier bivariate regression analysis I concluded that the relationship between GNP per capita and basic subsistence rights is much more straightforward. This becomes evident also in Table 4.5, which again classifies countries according to income types and relates these to subsistence rights performance. All Western industrialized countries excelled in guaranteeing subsistence rights, while a large majority (74%) of upper middle income countries do not exceed medium performance in the same category. East European countries -- quite as their ideological claims may lead us to expect -- did notably better in terms of subsistence rights than in security rights. However, even in this rights dimension they were hardly a match for Western countries. By contrast, the Communist countries scored at best equal to many lower middle income and lower income countries.

It remains particularly revealing, however, that not a single lower income nation exceeded a the lowest levels of subsistence rights performance. In short, for reasons which will require further analysis it seems at this point that there was not a single low income economy that could serve as a model for the adequate provision of subsistence rights, at least

not when we judge countries by absolute performance standards without taking into account their socioeconomic conditions. It appears, therefore, that even securing the bare essentials of adequate food, shelter, water, housing, education and health care was far beyond the capacity of these countries, no matter how it was nationally allocated, rationed and no matter how the political system was structured. It should be emphasized also that most lower middle income countries (80%) and even many upper middle income countries (21%) found themselves in a similar situation.

[Table 4.5 -- about here]

Conclusion.

We may conclude from this first analysis that economic development is not only a goal in itself but instrumental for the enhancement of basic certain human rights. We may even argue that a certain level of prosperity is a necessary condition for guaranteeing basic economic and social rights. There is no evidence, however, that GNP per capita is a sufficient condition for good human rights practices. We can, furthermore, infer that the level of economic development will have to be considered in the continuing analysis as important control variables in the context of other explanatory variables. Lastly, this finding also strengthens the argument that human rights analysis will need to operate with concepts such as 'effort' that are designed to account for economic prosperity and measure countries according to the "will" of their political leaders as opposed to the "capacity" of their economies.

Table 4.1 Itomized Basic Human Rights by GNP per Capita

	GNP per Capita[c]		
Rights	correlation coefficient (r)	regression coefficient (r^2)	n
torture	.558	.312	124
slavery	.604	.365	124
detention	.585	.342	124
searches	.490	.241	124
cap.pun.	.463	.215	124
inf. mort.	.803(-)[d]	.646	125
housing	.675(-)	.455	121
calorie	.532	.283	124
literacy	.728	.531	125
water	.831	.691	121
secright[a]	.617	.381	124
subright[b]	.804	.647	117

(a) Security rights performance, (b) Subsistance rights perfromance
(c) Due to the curvilinear nature of the distribution
the natural logarithm of GNP per Capita was used
(d) denotes a negative relationship; Source (GNP/c): Sivard (1987)
World Military and Social Expenditures

Table 4.2 Basic Human Rights by GNP per Capita

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		GNP per Capita			
		Low	**Medium**	**High**	**Row Total**
Basic Human Rights	**Low**	36 75.0 65.5 30	8 16.7 22.2 6.7	4 8.3 14.3 3.4	48 40.3
	Medium	19 44.2 34.5 16.0	18 41.9 50.0 15.1	6 14.0 21.4 5.0	43 36.1
	High		10 35.7 27.8 8.4	18 64.3 64.3 15.1	28 23.5
	Column Total	55 46.2	36 30.3	28 23.5	119 100

Kendall's Tau-b=.551/Gamma=.759/p<.0001; Source (GNP/c): Sivard (1987)

Table 4.3 Performance Differences between Developing and Industrialized Countries -- Results of a T-Test Analysis:

Rights to, Freedoms from	Income Type (a)	Sample Mean	Pooled Variance Estimate
Torture	IC	2.63	t-value=7.41 n=113 2-tail. p<.0001
	LDC	.92	
Slavery	IC	2.89	t-value=6.82 n=113 2-tail. p<.0001
	LDC	1.55	
Detention	IC	2.78	t-value=8.79 n=113 2-tail. p<.0001
	LDC	.69	
Searches & Seizures	IC	2.84	t-value=7.46 n=113 2-tail. p<.0001
	LDC	1.05	
Capital Punishment	IC	2.52	t-value=8.18 n=113 2-tail. p<.0001
	LDC	.55	
Security Rights	IC	13.68	t-value=9.61 n=113 2-tail. p<.0001
	LDC	4.78	
Subsistence Rights	IC	59.77	t-value=21.5 n=108 2-tail. p<.0001
	LDC	6.17	

(a) IC = industrialized countries,
LDC = developing countries

Table 4.4 Basic Security Rights by Income Type

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Western Industrial Nations	East Europ. Non-market Economies	High Income Oil Producers	Upper Middle Income Nations	Lower Middle Income Nations	Lower Income Nations	Row Total
Basic Security Rights	Low		7 13 63.6 5.6	1 1.9 100.0 .8	5 9.3 23.8 4.0	16 29.6 42.1 12.7	25 46.3 69.4 19.8	54 42.9
	Medium		3 9.1 27.3 2.4		7 21.2 33.3 5.6	15 45.5 39.5 11.9	8 24.2 22.2 6.3	33 26.2
	High	19 48.7 100 15.1	1 2.6 9.1 .8		9 23.1 42.9 7.1	7 17.9 18.4 5.6	3 7.7 8.3 2.4	39 31
	Col. Tot.	19 15.1	11 8.7	1 .8	21 16.7	38 30.2	36 28.6	126 100

Source (Income Type): World Development Report (1986)

Table 4.5 Basic Subsistence Rights by Income Type

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		West. Industrial Nations	Europ. Non-market Economies	High Income Oil Producers	Upper Middle Income Nations	Lower Middle Income Nations	Lower Income Nations	Row Total
Basic Subsistence Rights	Low		1 1.4 11.1 .8		4 5.7 21.1 3.4	30 42.9 83.3 25.2	35 50.0 100.0 29.4	70 58.8
	Medium		7 25.0 77.8 5.9	1 3.6 100.0 .8	14 50.0 73.7 11.8	6 21.4 16.7 5.0		28 23.5
	High	19 90.5 100.0 16.0	1 4.8 11.1 .8		1 4.8 5.3 .8			21 17.6
	Col. Tot.	19 16.0	9 7.6	1 .8	19 16.0	36 30.0	35 29.4	119 100

Source: Income Type World Development Report (1986)

The Distribution of Wealth and Basic Human Rights

In the theoretical part of this dissertation I discussed another potentially important economic factor in explaining BHR-performance -- the distribution of wealth in society. Cingranelli (1992) summarized the reason underlying this relationship as follows: "Societies where income, political power, and status are distributed equitably among different ethnic, religious, and racial groups will tend to have less oppressive government" (:3). It has been suggested, therefore, that an unequal distribution of wealth has a twofold impact on the state of human rights. For one, a lack of equality may lead to political violence as marginalized segments of the population vent their frustration. Governments, in turn, often resort to repression to restore political stability. Secondly, an unequal distribution of wealth tends to exacerbate social cleavages resulting in severe economic deprivation on the part of the neglected and disadvantaged groups in the population, which is expected to substantially undercut people's subsistence rights. In drawing on the works of Jackman (1974), Henderson (1991) and Cingranelli (1992) the following hypothesis was derived:

(E.H2) "The greater the inequality of wealth, the worse the government performance in securing basic human rights."

In order to test this hypothesis two measures were employed here. The first one is the Gini coefficient, which shows how close a given distribution of income is to absolute equality or inequality.[2] As the coefficient approaches zero, the distribution of income approaches absolute equality. Conversely, as the coefficient approaches one, the distribution of income approaches inequality.[3] The other indicator used here measures the distribution of income by dividing the share of the population in the bottom 20% income bracket by the

percentage of people in top 20% income category. Thus, the larger the resulting coefficient the greater is the gap between income brackets and the more unequal is, therefore, the distribution of income in that society. The reason for using these two similar but, nevertheless, distinct measures lies in the lack of available data to cover all countries in the sample. For some countries data were only available for one of the two variables, in other instances each measure would cover different countries. To minimize the risk of skewed results due to a sampling bias both measures were employed in each step of the analysis.

We have seen that variables may affect both dimensions of basic human rights quite differently, therefore, it seems useful to analyze security and subsistence rights separately. For a crosstabulation analysis the Gini coefficients were divided into four categories labeled 'low', 'lower medium', 'upper medium' and 'high'.[4] Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the findings for both human rights dimensions.

The results of the crosstabulation analysis support the hypothesis that greater income equality is associated with higher levels of human rights performance. Among countries with poor security rights performance, only some 8% had high levels of income equality. By contrast, almost 50% of the countries with high security rights standards were drawn from the low Gini category. Overall the strength of association is moderate but statistically highly significant (Gamma=-.512, Kendall's Tau-b=-.360/table sign. $p<.0001$). I interpret these findings that, all things being equal, in nations with comparatively little inequality governments see less of a need to resort to torture, detention, illegal searches and other repressive means to ensure the social peace. By contrast, it is intuitively highly plausible that repression is far more likely to occur in countries in which a wealthy elite desperately seeks to preserve an highly unequal economic system (c.f Remmer (1986) on exclusionary practices).

The impact of the distribution of wealth appears to be much more pronounced with respect to basic subsistence rights. Here none of the countries with upper medium or high Gini coefficients was represented in the top performance category. The strength of the relationship was also reflected in the respective coefficients of determination (Gamma=-.757, Kendall's Tau-b=-.504/table sign. p<.0001). This finding is important, as it seems to confirm the hypothesis that economic inequality results in economic deprivation and undercuts directly people's subsistence rights.

[Table 5.1 -- about here]

[Table 5.2 -- about here]

In order to minimize the risk of sampling bias, as Gini coefficients were available for only 103 of the 127 nations in the sample, I decided to test the above hypothesis by using a second measure designed to capture income equality. This variable reflects the ratio between the bottom 20% and the top 20% income brackets of a given population. The findings matched those of the earlier analysis based on the Gini coefficient confirming the relationship between income equality and security rights performance (Gamma=-.611, Kendall's Tau-b=-.377/both p<.0001) as well as between income equality and subsistence rights (Gamma=-.672, Kendall's Tau-b=.501/both p<.0001).

Using a bivariate measure for determining the relationship between the distribution

of wealth and BHR-performance may be misleading. Earlier we have seen the strong correlation between level of economic development and human rights. Therefore, one could argue that the observed relationship between the distribution of resources and human rights is actually spurious, as the change in both variables could be caused by changes in GNP per capita. I retested, therefore, the effect of income equality on basic human rights performance, this time, however, controlling for GNP per capita. For this purpose GNP per capita was divided along its standard deviation into three categories (low, medium, high).[5]

The findings reveal that there was, indeed, some interaction effect by GNP per capita on the relationship between income equality and security rights performance. For very poor countries (per capita GNPs of less than $1000) the distribution of wealth did not appear to have much of an effect at all. For medium and high GNP per capita nations, however, the association between income distribution and security rights performance held up; for instance, the statistics of association between the Gini coefficient and security rights were moderately strong for medium level economies (Gamma=-.580, Kendall's Tau-b=-.396/p<.053) and very strong for nations with per capita GNPs of more than $5000 (Gamma=-.807, Kendall's Tau-b=-.516/p<.005). The slightly lower significance levels reflect the small number of cases, as the previous sample was split three-ways when controlling for level of economic development.

In turning to subsistence rights the findings here are somewhat surprising. The relationship between income equality and subsistence rights performance was hardly affected at all by per capita GNP and the association remains strong despite the presence of the control variable.

We may draw the following conclusions; First, the distribution of wealth does appear to have an independent positive effect on both BHR-dimensions. Secondly, in terms of

security rights the impact of income distribution is especially pronounced for nations with higher levels of development, while for countries with per capita GNPs of less than $1000 the Gini coefficient makes little difference on whether governments guarantee basic security rights. Third, the relationship between distribution of wealth and basic subsistence rights remains robust even when we control for level of economic development.

How Does Income Equality Affect Basic Human Rights?

In order to answer the question of how basic human rights are impacted by the distribution of income we need to determine if rights are affected uniformly, or whether there was a notable variation within and between the BHR-dimensions. A correlations analysis presented in Table 5.3 provides some answers.

Generally we notice only a very modest variation across both basic human rights dimensions. In terms of security rights the correlations appeared to be strongest for 'freedom from detention' ($r=-.474/p<.001$) and 'freedom from capital punishment' ($r=-.406/p<.001$), while slightly weaker for 'freedom from slavery' ($r=-.315/p<.001$), 'freedom from searches and seizures without a warrant' ($r=-.372/p<.001$) and 'freedom from torture' ($r=-.381/p<.381$). Among the subsistence rights only 'adequate calorie intake' did not appear to be related to income equality. All other variables showed similar levels of association, of which 'adequate housing' seemed to form the strongest ($r=-.402/p<.001$) and 'safe water' the relatively weakest correlation ($r=-.367/p<.001$).

[Table 5.3 -- about here]

In fact, it is the evenness, with which all rights were affected, that is astonishing.

Contrary to GNP per capita which had shown considerable variation both across and within the BHR-dimensions, income equality had a relatively uniform impact on all basic rights, with the exception of 'adequate calorie intake'. This last finding seems at first surprising, although one could argue there was generally little variation to be explained given a statistical mean for 'adequate nutrition' of 96% calorie intake. Lack of variation alone, however, does not suffice as an explanation of a low value for 'r', since GNP per capita, for instance, was highly correlated with 'adequate nutrition'. We also have to consider that nutrition represents an aggregate measure (average nutrition) in which some information is lost. Only a closer casewise analysis showed that, indeed, of the 33 countries that did not provide sufficient nutrition, only slightly more than half (57%) have Gini coefficients higher than average. In other words, regardless of the distribution of income the proportion of nations either failing or succeeding in providing an adequate calorie supply is roughly equal. A further reason may be that the nutrition measure represents the average daily food supply masking the variance.[6] Those countries that, despite a highly unequal distribution of wealth, manage to meet the nutritional needs of their populations include many comparatively wealthy Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Turkey and Tunisia. Despite considerable economic inequality these countries are rich enough to provide enough food overall.

Let us turn now to the more important result of the above analysis; the uniform impact of the Gini coefficient on subsistence rights. It has been argued that income inequality affects human rights performance mainly for two reasons (c.f. Arat 1991). For one, great social cleavages, which leave a considerable part of the population marginalized and discontent, are more likely to lead to political instability. This in turn can result in greater government repression. Secondly, in a highly unequal society the ruling elites tend to be largely

disinterested in the needs of the majority of the (mostly poor) population and are, therefore, unwilling to ameliorate the latter's socioeconomic deprivation. While these arguments may explain the overall impact of income inequality, they do not necessarily make a case for why rights are affected so uniformly. I would argue that the evenness of the impact can be attributed to the fact that in highly unequal economies entire groups of people are equally shut out from the resources that an otherwise even relatively wealthy society, may have to offer. While 'per capita Income' or 'GNP per capita' as measures of average individual wealth tend to reflect access to those goods in society, which are more or less costly to obtain (e.g. housing, health care, safe water, education -- c.f. Table 2.1), a marginalized segment of the population can find itself uniformly deprived from the means to subsistence, even in a country with medium and higher overall per capita GNPs. We could, therefore, conceive of 'income equality' as acting more like a "switch" uniformly denying access to minimal education, health care, safe water and adequate housing. In many countries, however, there appears to be enough food to go round (if it were evenly distributed) so that even the marginalized segments of a population can obtain an adequate or nearly adequate calorie supply.

In very poor nations there seems to be little regard for security rights no matter what the distribution of resources. In somewhat wealthier countries, however, income distribution becomes a more important factor, as the disadvantaged strata of the population seems less capable of drawing upon the existing resources and falls more easily victim to security rights violations. Without access to resources and with little political clout economically deprived groups are less able to obtain either legal representation or the support of potentially powerful organization such as unions or political parties. In addition, marginalized people are less capable of arousing international attention and of enlisting foreign support groups such as

Amnesty International. Therefore, such a population is more often the target of political persecution by being the victims of torture, "disappearances" , as well as unlawful searches and detentions.

Lastly, it was important to determine how much of the variation in security and subsistence rights can actually be explained by income distribution. In doing so it became first necessary to control for GNP per capita. Table 5.4 shows the results of a regression analysis by regressing security rights and subsistence rights on the Gini coefficient.[7]

[Table 5.4 -- about here]

While it is immediately evident that income distribution is able to explain only a relatively small portion of the variation in either basic rights dimensions, the amount is, nevertheless, clearly quantifiable and highly statistically significant. Despite controlling for the interaction effects of GNP per capita income distribution accounts for almost a third of the variation in subsistence rights (r^2=.301/p<.0001). The coefficient of determination for security rights is slightly lower (r^2=.228/p<.0001).[8]

Conclusion.

While income distribution is only one out of several factors which influence basic human rights performance, it is, nevertheless an important one. The results here clearly indicate a substantial association between income inequality and a poor performance in either dimension of basic human rights. In terms of security rights income distribution plays an even larger role in nations with higher levels of GNP per capita. In extremely poor countries, by

contrast, there was virtually no correlation between the Gini coefficient and security rights, suggesting that regardless of how wealth is allocated, governments are generally unable or unwilling to guarantee elementary security rights. In a closer analysis of the evenness with which income distribution affected human rights performance we may conclude that income distribution functions much like a gatekeeper or "switch" that, when turned "off", shuts out fairly evenly entire segments of a population (even in relatively wealthy countries) from accessing the goods and services available in that society. As these goods and services are generally less available in very poor societies, income distribution is also less of an explanatory factor for those countries.

Table 5.1 Security Rights by Income Equality/Gini Coefficient

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Gini Coefficient (a) Row	Row to Medium	Medium to High	High	Row Tot.
Basic Security Rights	Low	4 8.2 20.0 3.9	17 34.7 58.6 16.5	17 34.7 58.6 16.5	11 22.4 64.7 10.7	49 47.6
	Medium	2 8.0 10.0 1.9	8 32.0 21.6 7.8	10 40.0 34.5 9.7	5 20.0 29.4 4.9	25 24.3
	High	14 48.3 70.0 13.6	12 41.4 32.4 11.7	2 6.9 6.9 1.9	1 3.4 5.9 1.0	29 28.2
	Col. Tot.	20 19.4	37 35.9	29 28.2	17 16.5	103 100

(a) "+-" more than one stdv. (17.6) from the mean (29.18)= high, low, within +/- one stdv. of the mean = medium to high, low to medium. Source (Gini): UNDP Human Development Report 1991

Table 5.2 Subsistence Rights by Income Equality/Gini Coefficient

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Gini Coefficient (a) Low	Low to Medium	Medium to High	High	Row Tot.
Basic Subsistence Rights	Low	4 6.5 20.0 4.0	19 30.6 55.9 19.2	24 38.7 82.8 24.2	15 24.2 93.8 15.2	62 62.6
	Medium	5 23.8 25.0 5.1	10 47.6 29.4 10.1	5 23.8 17.2 5.1	1 4.8 6.3 1.0	21 21.2
	High	11 68.8 55.0 11.1	5 31.3 14.7 5.1			16 16.2
	Col. Tot.	20 20.2	34 34.3	29 29.3	16 16.2	99 100

(a) "+-" more than one stdv. (17.6) from the mean (29.18)=high, low, within +/- one stdv. of the mean = medium to high, low to medium

Table 5.3 The Effect of Income Equality on Individual Basic Human Rights

	Gini Coefficient
Correlations:	
Security Rights	
torture	-.381**
slavery	-.315**
detention	-.474**
searches	-.372**
capital pun.	-.406**
Subsistence Rights	
calorie intake	-.136
water	-.367**
housing	.402**
infant mort.	.369**
literacy	-.381**

Note: (**) denotes 1-tailed significance of p<.001
N = 99

Table 5.4: Bivariate Regression: Basic Human Rights Regressed on Gini Coeficient (controlled for GNP per Capita)

	Income Equality		
	r^2	r	p<
Security Rights	.228	-.47	.0001
Subsistence Rights	.301	-.54	.0001

Foreign Economic Dependency and Basic Human Rights

'Foreign economic dependence' is potentially one of the most interesting economic explanations of human rights performance. For one, its importance stems from the possible political implications associated with this research question. Secondly, it is at the center of a conflict in the literature which offers diametrically opposite accounts of the effects of 'foreign economic dependence' on human rights conditions. For the reasons explained earlier in this dissertation the following question is at issue here: Does a nation's increased world market involvement/dependence lead to a decrease or an increase in human rights performance?

According to an argument put forth mainly by dependency theorists, an increased dependence upon the capitalist core economies will lead to deteriorating human rights conditions, especially as far as economic and social rights are concerned. Dependencistas see the cause of human rights abuse rooted mainly in underdevelopment as a result of structural constraints in the capitalist world economy. In a related argument dependency theorists claim that foreign investors are attracted to an underdeveloped economy not only by the low wages and cheap resources, but also by a low degree of unionization, as well as an unpolitical and, therefore, unorganized work force. To ensure these "assets" the governments of dependent countries are likely to use repressive means. According to a very different logic, put forth mainly by modernization theorists and many economists (c.f. Sen 1883, Bardhan 1993, Przeworski 1993, Huber/Rueschemeyer/Stephens 1993, Hirschman 1994, Tideman 1994), developing countries with strong economic links to Western democracies will ultimately show an improvement in human rights performance. The rationale here is twofold: for one

international trade is seen as mutually beneficial enhancing the overall level of wealth even in less developed societies and thus alleviating economic deprivation. Secondly, economic liberalization as a consequence of international trade and foreign investment is viewed as a catalyst for political liberalization resulting in lower levels of government repression. The arguments advanced by dependency theorists are obviously incompatible with the viewpoint favored by modernization theorists. The hypothesis tested here can be stated as follows:

(E.H3) "The greater a country's integration into the world market, the better the overall government performance in securing basic human rights."

There are any number of ways to conceptualize "foreign economic dependence".[9] In my approach I am following Mitchell and McCormick (1988: 491), who focus on the impact of "capitalist involvement" on human rights violations. The measure for capitalist involvement used by Mitchell and McCormick consists of two components: 'foreign trade', with and 'foreign investment' by, OECD countries. Trade itself is the summary of exports and imports, which were recorded here as separate variables to analyze differences between the two. Foreign investment combines the private sector net investment (PSNI) by the OECD with the total other official flows (TOOF) from the OECD. It is important to note that Mitchell and McCormick look at investment and trade relations between LDCs and OECD countries in terms of absolute volumes. That is neither a nation's size nor level of economic development is taken into account. Although this does not seem very intuitive Mitchell and McCormick follow the argument of Firebaugh/Gibbs (1985) and Uslaner (1976) that capitalist involvement demands an absolute and not a relative measure thereof. "Irrespective of the size of a country's GNP it is assumed that two plants or factories will be twice as likely to prompt effort to unionize as would one plant, and twice as likely to prompt government counter

measures as well."

While their argument is interesting it is not necessarily convincing. In light of the above argument one could counter by suggesting that in a country with over a hundred plants two unionized facilities are less likely to prompt government action than in a country in which the only two factories are unionized. In short, economic size relative to degree of unionization may, indeed, make a difference in government behavior. Therefore, in this analysis both foreign trade and foreign investment were operationalized once as absolutes values and then relative to the total GNP.

I felt is was most meaningful first to disaggregate the concepts involved and then to analyze the various relationships separately. Foreign dependence/capitalist involvement was, therefore, tested in its two different components; 'foreign trade' and 'foreign investment'. Likewise, human rights performance was analyzed separately for each of its two dimensions; security rights and subsistence rights. The variable 'foreign trade' is the sum (in US Dollars) of total exports to and imports from OECD countries (OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Resources 1988, Direction of Trade Statistics 1986).[10] In light of the hypothesis tested here we would, of course, expect both trade and foreign investment to be positively associated with either dimension of basic human rights.

A correlations analysis of foreign trade relations of some 94 LDCs with OECD economies yields somewhat disappointing results which indicate at best very modest support for the argument that trade has overall some beneficial effect on human rights. However, even this needs to be qualified, as some statistically significant covariation was found only between trade and subsistence rights ($r=.201/p<.05$), while basic security rights ($r=.0894$/not sign.) remained virtually unaffected. When we look at the relationship between subsistence rights

and foreign trade without accounting for size of economy of developing countries, we find a moderate to medium correlation (r=.459/p<.0001). Even in this configuration foreign trade explained very little in the variation of subsistence rights (r^2=.21/p<.0001). If the GNP of LDCs is factored into the relationship the correlation coefficient actually decreased somewhat (r=.361/p<.0001).

In terms of security rights foreign trade did not appear to have any effect at all (r=.2, r^2=.04/p<.05). It was this relationship that would have been one of the critical tests for either line of arguments. That is, if governments tighten repression as a result of increased trade the correlation coefficient should haven been negative and markedly higher. By contrast, if trade were to lead to a relaxation of government repression the value for 'r' should have been considerably higher.

We may conclude, therefore, that, if anything, basic economic and social rights were slightly better protected in countries that have a significant amount of trade with OECD economies. Among the basic subsistence rights this effect was most pronounced for 'infant mortality rate' (r=.521/p<.0001/n=97), 'adequate nutrition' (r=.415/p<.0001/n=97) and 'safe water' (r=.481/p<.0001/n=94), while it was somewhat less correlated with 'adult literacy rate' (r=.366/p<.001/n=97) and non existent for adequate housing (r=-.149/not sign./n=94).

An analysis of security rights showed that 'freedom from slavery' was the only category which showed some statistically significantly correlation with 'foreign trade' (r=.233, p<.05/n=96). All other correlations are either not significant or insubstantial and therefore not worth reporting.

In a further step I examined whether or not there were any significant regional differences in the relationship between trade and basic human rights. Once again security

rights remained steadfastly unaffected by trade. Subsistence rights showed some variation across regions. Due to the overall weak correlations and the extremely small number of cases (mostly less than 20) in each regional group, only one of the following relationships were statistically significant. While there was some extremely weak correlation between foreign tarde and subsistence rights for Latin America, the findings are inconclusive due to low levels of statistical significance (c.f. Central America: r=.218/not sign./n=12; South America: r=.179/not sign./n=10). There was virtually no relationship at all for Sub-Saharan Africa (r=.077/not sign./n=33. Northern Africa and Middle East, by contrast, showed the strongest correlation (r=.514/p<.05/n=14) followed closely by Asia (without the Middle East) (r=.443/p<.06/n=18). These finding do, of course, not allow us to draw any sweeping conclusions. They indicate, however, trade with the West and subsistence rights performance may be positively associated in both Asia and the Middle East.

All things being equal foreign trade had, if at all, a mildly positive effect on subsistence rights. While the correlations for Middle Eastern countries are both statistically significant and relatively strong, this finding is theoretically hardly exciting. It was to be expected that those Middle Eastern countries which have close economic ties with the West by providing a highly-priced commodity such as oil and which import a large amount of Western consumer goods are also able to ensure that their populations are reasonably well-fed and sheltered. A potentially interesting finding, albeit neither very strong nor quite statistically significant, is Asia. One might argue that, indeed, trade with Western countries may have begun to initiate a trend to gradually improve subsistence right performance.

In the second part of this analysis I turned to the other component of 'foreign economic dependence'-- foreign investment. This variable is a composite of the 'Total Other

Official Flows' and the 'Private Sector Net Investment'. Analogous to the concept of trade, foreign investment was once analyzed by using the absolute volume of net investment by OECD countries and a second time by factoring in the relative size of the developing economy. In neither configuration the results are worth reporting as the correlations were either not significant or insubstantial.

Lastly, foreign trade and foreign investment were combined to a new variable called 'foreign economic dependence'. A correlations analysis, thereof, shows a weak but statistically significant positive correlation between subsistence rights and foreign dependence ($r=.37/p<.003/n=63$). In terms of security rights there was virtually no relationship. However, the sign changed and the relationship suddenly pointed into a negative direction. While the low level of significance suggests that this may be purely coincidental I decided to investigate this further by analyzing this relationship by region. The only interesting finding was that for Sub-Saharan Africa there was an extremely weak but negative correlation (r=-.249/not sign./n=24) between security rights and foreign dependence. While not statistically significant (due also to a very small sample size) this was, nevertheless, the strongest correlation between security rights of any region and any of the independent variables employed here in this part of the analysis.

A crosstabulation table relating security rights (low, medium, high) and foreign trade (low, medium, high) further supports the above finding.[11] Table 6.1 is statistically significant and indicates that a majority of Sub-Saharan nations with medium and high volumes of trade with the OECD were in the lowest rights performance category (Kendall's Tau-b=-.366/p<.05/n=36). In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa advocates of increased trade with the West will not easily find support for their position, at least not for the time period

of the analysis here.

[Table 6.1 -- about here]

Conclusion.

While the results of this analysis were somewhat disappointing there are a number of possible explanations for the above findings. First, one could argue that there may be a conceptual problem in the sense that basic rights may, indeed, be too basic to be affected by trade relations or foreign investment, especially compared to factors such as 'GNP per capita' or 'income distribution'. In other words, in very poor countries or in nations with extreme economic inequality the (presumably small) volume of trade and investment is not going to affect the poor human rights conditions one way or another. In wealthier countries with more balanced wealth the overall human rights performance is usually better regardless of the amount of trade or investment.

As an alternative I would like to offer a different set of explanations. Form the vantage point of 1993 there is increasing evidence that developing countries are (although with some reluctance) beginning to embrace more liberal economic policies as well as an participate more vigorously in the world market. The concepts of self-reliance and autonomy have been, for the most part, replaced by the desire to attract foreign investment. Mexico's push for NAFTA may be a case in point. In many regions the liberalization of domestic markets has gone hand in hand with attempts to initiate a process of political opening. While this trend seems to have been particularly successful in Eastern Asia, with political reforms in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Cambodia, there have also been a number of recent

setbacks such as Nigeria, Nicaragua or Angola. The above analysis, however, was based on data from the early part of the 1980s. That was a time period, when the Cold War had flared up in intensity leading temporarily to a dramatic deterioration of superpower relations. As a result political loyalties and strategic interests rather than a developing nation's regard for human rights were chief criteria for why particular third world regimes received Western economic support. Since then aid patterns have shifted and now both the US and the European Community have tied economic aid to the state of human rights and democracy in recipient countries. In other words, given the overall political context of the late Cold War it was perhaps implausible to assume a correlation between human rights conditions and Western economic involvement with these countries. Carefully nurtured by Japan, however, some (East) Asian countries may have been somewhat of a forerunner anticipating the coming trend of economic liberalization and greater prosperity. This may explain the relatively highest correlations for Asia with respect to subsistence rights performance. With respect to a more definitive conclusion on whether or not foreign economic dependence affects human rights performance this question would have to be revisited with newer data.

Lastly, it should be pointed out, once again, that different regions in the world may not be affected uniformly by the extend of economic relations with the West. Cultural, geographic, economic and regime-related factors may produce different effects in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The experience of resource-poor city-states, such as Hong Kong or Singapore, with highly centralized and capable governments embedded in Confucian ideology may prove to be impossible to replicate in more rural, culturally more heterogenous societies which are stuck with weak civilian or authoritarian governments such as Central America. We noticed above that for Sub-Saharan countries security rights appeared to be negatively

correlated with 'foreign dependence', while other regions showed no correlation at all. In conclusion, there is a clear need to re-examine this issue both in terms of human rights effort and in light of more recent data taken from a later time period.

Table 6.1 For Sub-Saharan Africa; Basic Security Rights by Foreign Trade Relations with Western Economies

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Volume of Trade (Exports and Imports) with OECD Countries in %			
		Low	**Medium**	**High**	**Row Total**
Basic Security Rights	**Low**		22 95.7 66.7 61.1	1 4.3 100 2.8	23 63.9
	Medium	1 9.1 50.0 2.8	10 90.9 30.3 27.8		11 30.6
	High	1 50.0 50.0 2.8	1 50.0 3.0 2.8		2 5.6
	Colum total	2 5.6	33 91.7	1 2.8	36 100

Source: OECD Geographical Distribution of Fiancial Resources (1988), Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (1986)

Economic Growth and Human Rights Performance

Rapid economic growth has been one of classic explanations for unstable democracy, higher levels political extremism and government repression. A number of researchers (Lerner 1958; Pye 1963, 1966; Deutsch 1961, 1966; Huntington 1968) have hypothesized that rapid industrialization and increased levels of social mobilization are related to democratic performance, for which a number of underlying causes have been identified. Rapid growth tends to introduce sharp discontinuities between pre-industrial and industrial stage of a society. Furthermore, it thought of as exacerbating existing socioeconomic cleavages between different strata of the population. In some cases, institutions fail to adjust and are overwhelmed by the novelty and complexity of a rapidly changing economic environment. Lastly, people's lives tend to be transformed radically creating in the process new desires and new needs as well as frustration and alienation. In keeping with this research tradition I have tested the following hypotheses:

(E.H4) "The faster the rate of economic growth, the worse the government performance in securing basic human rights."

Two indicators were employed to reflect rate of economic growth; average annual rate of growth of GNP[12] (from 1965 to 1984) and average annual rate of growth of GDP[13] (1973 to 1984). An initial bivariate correlations analysis between rate of GNP as well as rate of GDP with the various human rights indices already foreshadows disappointing results indicating that the findings here are likely to remain inconclusive. Table 7.1 clearly shows that there is only one statistically significant, albeit very weak, correlation pointing to a mild positive association between subsistence rights performance and rate of GNP growth.

Unfortunately -- for those arguing that accelerated growth would lead to more repression -- all signs in the below correlation matrix are positive.

[Table 7.1 -- about here]

It would be premature, however, to dismiss the rate of economic growth as a potential predictor of human rights practices. The main problem here is not so much that the underlying theory may be misguided, but rather that there has been extremely little growth in much of the third world for the time-frame of the analysis, a period marked by two economic recessions, the beginning of the debt crisis, staggering rates of inflation and a soaring US dollar. The growth rates of the sample of LDC's analyzed here average only an annual rate of GNP of 2.2%. Much of the classical research on the effects of economic growth stems from a period prior to the mid-1970s. Most current studies on economic development in Eastern Asia, for instance, are of a more recent date. Furthermore, the argument that excessive growth rates produces instability does not automatically imply that the opposite is true and that zero-growth were to enhance democratic performance. Growth rates of around zero are reflective of economic problems, which are likely to contribute to poverty and put further strains on already scarce resources. It is plausible, therefore, to expect 'normal/medium' economic growth to be positively associated with subsistence rights performance. By contrast, nations with annual growth rates in excess of 8% or 10%, such as China in recent years, may, indeed, experience the aforementioned negative effects associated with of rapid economic change, such as instability or repression. However, there were too few cases in the sample with GNP rates in excess of 7% to derive any general conclusions.

In order to test my assumption that in the interest of better subsistence rights performance 'normal/medium' economic growth is preferable to 'no/little' growth I decided to apply a t-test to this question. The sample was split at the mean (2.2) into two groups, whose respective group averages on subsistence rights performance were compared in terms of whether difference between them was statistically significant. Both sub-samples were fairly even in size. The group with 'normal/above average' growth rates (GNP rate: >2.2%, n=44) averaged a subsistence rights score twice as high as the group with 'no/little' growth (GNP rate: <2.2%, n=43). The t-values for the one-tailed and two-tailed probability test were both statistically significant ($p<.01$) confirming that the difference in subsistence rights performance between the two groups was not accidental. Regrettably, there were too few cases to determine whether the positive association between economic growth and basic human rights reversed itself at very high rates of economic growth.

Conclusion.

With the data available here it is impossible to refute or confirm the above hypothesis. It appears, however, that, by enhancing overall wealth, some economic growth is positively associated at least with basic economic rights. While this finding does certainly not lend any support to our initial test-hypothesis, it may not necessarily be in contradiction to it, as the original assumption about the negative impact of rapid growth rates presupposes fairly high levels thereof. In defense of the above hypothesis one may point to some recent evidence from countries like Brazil, China, South Korea or Taiwan that experienced government repression at least during the early stages of their economic transformation.

Table 7.1 Correlations Analysis: Economic Growth and Basic Human Rights Performance in Developing Countries

	BHR	Security Rights	Subsistence Rights
Rate of GNP	.22	.14	.30*
Rate of GDP	.11	.10	.10

(*) p<.01, n=92
Source: IBRD (1986) World Development Report

Combined Effects of Economic Variables

Thus far, I have focused exclusively on bivariate relationships between a number of different economic factors and basic human rights performance. It is safe to assume that in reality the effects of the independent variables examined here are more complex, so that the presence of several factors identified as having an independent effect on human rights performance may in combination have an additional impact on the dependent variable. In this section I shall examine the combined or interactive effects of the two economic variables that were shown to have the strongest relationship with basic human rights performance -- GNP per capita and equality of income. The two-way ANOVA is a standard statistical technique to test simultaneously for significant differences between all means from two independent variables, including their combined effects. ANOVAs are particularly useful when the dependent variable is an interval measure and the predicting variables are interval but non-linear in their effects (c.f. Iversen/Norpoth 1976). In short, we can examine the impact of each independent variable separately as well as the effects of a combination of the variables. The ANOVA output summarized in Table 7.2 includes the following standard items of information; the source of the variation, the sum of squares and the mean square, the F-ratios as well as the degrees of freedom associated with each effect. The category marked 'residual' represent the variance that remains within cells after cases have been partitioned by GNP/c and Gini categories. This variance may be thought of as 'unexplained'. As this row does not contain any information about an association, it does not have an F-ratio. The row beginning with 'GNP/c' represents the association between basic human rights performance and GNP per capita. The F-statistic compares all sample means. If the sample means are significantly

different from each other for different levels of 'treatment' (levels of GNP per capita, Gini coefficient), we may conclude that the difference is due to effect of the treatment variable and not a consequence of sampling error. For GNP/c the F ratio[14] is 53.3, which indicates that when we control for the effects of income equality (Gini) the differences between GNP per capita categories are much greater than within the GNP per capita categories (c.f. Table 7.2). The significance of F is .000, which shows that a difference this size would occur fewer than one time out of 1000 by random sampling error. Likewise, the differences between the means for the Gini categories are significant (F_{Gini}= 6.13/p<.000); hence, more income equality will produce a significant improvement in basic human rights performance. While this essentially confirms the earlier findings, the ANOVA yields also the interaction effects of both independent variables (c.f. Table 7.2). The $F_{GNP/c(x)Gini}$ ratio is 5.58 (p<.000), which indicates that the two-way effects of GNP per capita and Gini are significant. We may conclude, therefore, that specific combinations of levels of development and income equality produce means that represent interactive effects on BHR-performance. In short, the impact of level of economic development on basic human rights performance depends in part on how wealth is distributed and vice-versa. As the effect of level of economic development is so much stronger, both income inequality and combine effects play a subordinate role, which may be interpreted as follows. Even an equitable distribution of income may not result in better human rights practices at certain levels of per capita GNP. We saw earlier in the bivariate analysis that income equality tends to become a more significant factor in countries with higher per Capita GNPs, while below roughly $ 1000 GNP per capita GNP its impact is virtually nil. We may, furthermore, infer from the ANOVA results that the combined effects of both economic variables is roughly as large as the independent effect of income equality.

[Table 7.2 -- about here]

I also examined possible combined effects of both GNP per capita and income equality for each of the two dimensions of basic human rights separately. In the interest of keeping this section as short as possible I shall report only the F ratios and give a brief interpretation thereof. With respect to security rights the F-ratios for GNP per capita (11.04/p<.000), income equality (3.06/p<.000) and combined effects (2.6/p<.033) are all significant, which replicates essentially the trend observed earlier for basic human rights as a whole (c.f. Table 7.2). As the combined effects for the summary index of security rights seem rather weak, we may suspect that not all of the individual security rights are subject to interactive effects. In breaking down the security rights index into its separate components and run an ANOVA for each of security rights we find that interactive effects are present for all security rights except for 'freedom from slavery'.

With respect to the summary measure of subsistence rights both independent variables have separate and combined effects ($F_{GNP/c}$=71.06/p<.000; F_{Gini}=8.3/p<.000; $F_{GNP/c(x)Gini}$=6.6/p<.000) -- c.f. Table 7.2. Broken down by individual subsistence rights, two-way effects are present only for 'infant mortality', 'housing' and 'adult literacy'. 'Calorie intake' seems to be impacted only by level of economic development as both F_{Gini} and $F_{GNP/c(x)Gini}$ are not statistically significant.

Conclusion.

The analysis of both the bivariate relationships and the combined effects suggest that among the economic variables examined here, level of economic development and distribution of income emerge as the two most important factors for basic human rights performance. Overall economic factors play a greater role with respect to subsistence rights, as they are somewhat less associated with security rights. In addition to their independent effects, these two economic variables have some interaction effects on most of the individual security and subsistence rights. If we were to develop an economic profile of countries in which most or all basic human rights are frequently abused, three 'ideal types' emerge. The first one would be characterized by very low levels of development. In that case poverty is so pervasive that income distribution has no or only a marginal effect on human rights performance. In the second type underdevelopment and a relatively unequal distribution of income produce independent and combined effects on human rights performance. In the third variant income distribution becomes a more important explanatory factor, as in that type medium to high per capita GNPs are matched with a high degree of income inequality. The higher the level of economic development, the more important income equality appears to be. This finding may prove significant for the subsequent analysis. Thus far, we have treated income distribution purely as an economic variable, as if the process of how wealth and resources are allocated in society were somehow detached from the political realm. Income equality may in effect be a powerful indicator for underlying political factors rooted in the institutional, legal and cultural arrangements of a particular society. The second part of this analysis is, therefore, devoted to exploring the political context of basic human rights performance.

Table 7.2 ANOVA-Analysis; Independent and Combined Effects of Level of Economic Development and Income Equality on Basic Human Rights

Basic Human Rights by GNP/c and Gini					
Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sign. of F
Main Effects	175012.16	5	35002.43	43.76	.000
GNP/c	85361.45	2	42680.72	53.36	.000
GINI	14727.25	3	4909.08	6.13	.001
2-way Effects	26800.15	6	4466.69	5.58	.000
GNP/c GINI	26800.15	6	4466.69	5.58	.000
Explained	201812.32	11	55.03	22.93	.000
Residual	69583.62	87	799.81	n.a.	n.a.
Total	271395.94	98	13.45	n.a.	n.a.

Security Rights by GNP/c and Gini					
Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sign. of F
Main Effects	1148.28	8	143.53	13.87	.000
GNP/c	571.54	5	114.30	11.04	.000
GINI	95.01	3	31.67	3.06	.033
2-way Effects	354.35	13	27.25	2.63	.000
GNP/c GINI	354.35	13	27.25	2.63	.000
Explained	1502.63	21	71.55	6.91	.000
Residual	838.14	81	10.34	n.a.	n.a.
Total	2340.77	102	22.94	n.a.	n.a.

Subsistence Rights GNP/c and Gini					
Source of Variation	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sign. of F
Main Effects	37062.84	8	4632.85	77.20	.000
GNP/c	21322.41	5	4264.48	71.06	.000
GINI	1511.63	3	503.87	8.39	.000
2-way Effects	5192.41	13	399.41	6.65	.000
GNP/c GINI	5192.41	13	399.41	6.65	.000
Explained	42255.25	21	2012.15	33.53	.000
Residual	4620.75	77	60.01	n.a.	n.a.
Total	46876.08	98	478.32	n.a.	n.a.

Endnotes

1. The log of GNP/c was used.

2. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between 45° line and the Lorenz curve and the area of the entire triangle.

3. Using an "income" as a measure seems least susceptible to concerns about the causal circularity between the concepts of wealth and subsistence rights. The causal connection follows a clear direction in which income commonly precedes access to food, shelter, water and medical care. Only in one component in the five item index (minimal education) a two-way relationship is conceivable.

4. The criterium for assigning cases to each of the four categories was as follows; the area within one standard deviation below and above the statistical mean defined the ranges for lower medium and upper medium gini coefficients. The extremes outside the medium ranges denoted either the low or the high values for Gini.

5. Gnp per Capita was divided into three categories (low, medium, high), whereby 'low' denotes a range from $110 to $1044, 'medium' denotes a range from $1045 to $5098, and 'high' denotes a range $5098 to $16720). The medium range defines an area within half a standard deviation from the mean of the distribution. Lower and higher values outside the medium range fall into the various categories 'low' and 'high'. This procedure was chosen because first of all it does not rely upon the researcher to arbitrarily set category boundaries but allows for a mathematical process to assign the cases. Secondly, it limits the range of cases to only three groups. Thirdly, there is a meaningful number of cases in each of the three categories to produce useful results. Forth, the boundaries of roughly $1000 and $5000 are also conceptually very useful.

6. Income inequality can be expected to explain the variance much more than the average.

7. The natural logarithm of GNP per Capita and Gini coefficients was used for this analysis.

8. In interpreting regression results based on the index of security rights performance one has to be somewhat cautious in drawing definitive conclusions; while the composite index consists of interval level data, it components are ordinal, which are ill-suited for regression analysis.

9. Mitchell/McCormicks (1988) analysis includes only developing countries.

10. In 1985 the OECD consisted of the following member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland. France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States.

11. Both variables were categorized along their respective standard deviations. 'Medium' defines a range within half a standard deviation from the mean, values outside this interval were labelled 'low' and 'high'.

12. Rate of GNP (average annual growth, 1965 to 1984) was based on the World Bank (1986) World Development Report: 181

13. Rate of GDP (annual average growth, 1973-84) was based on the World Bank (1986) World Development Report, Table 2: 183.

14. The F ratio is the mean of the differences on bhr-performance between GNP/c categories squared divided by the mean within-cells of the differences on bhr-performance squared. To reject the null-hypothesis that the effects observed are random and not due to the treatment applied, the F statistic has to be positive and significantly different from one. In addition, the obtained values for F (by dividing the mean square between-cells by the mean square within-cells) have to be compared to some critical value of F on the F-table for the given degrees of freedom. In dividing F(obtained) by F(critical) we obtain an F-ratio, which, if significant, allows us to reject the null-hypothesis. We may then conclude that the difference between means are not due to sampling error but are a result of the treatment or independent variable.

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THE STATUS OF BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS OF CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN GOVERNMENT BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND EFFORT

Volume II

By

Reinhard Heinisch

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1994

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POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS -- REGIME TYPE

"Multiparty democracy is part of a foreign ideology peddled by some unpatriotic people with borrowed brains"[1] (Daniel arap Moi - President of Kenya)

The Influence of Regime Type on Human Rights Performance

In the theoretical part of this dissertation I discussed extensively the relationship between human rights and regime type, which is generally considered to be the most important "political" variable in explaining human rights performance (Mitchell/McCormick 1987). Let me briefly review the principal arguments here. Regimes, broadly defined as the "rules and structural arrangements that govern a country" (Remmer 1986), vary in their regulatory control and responsiveness to societal pressures and demands depending on procedural and institutional characteristics as well as underlying ideological preferences (c.f. Strouse and Claude 1976; Kirkpatrick 1979; Forsythe 1981; Howard/Donnelly 1986; Mitchell 1987; Cingranelli 1992; Davenport 1994). Generally, we distinguish between democratic and different types of authoritarian regimes (see my earlier analysis). It is commonly thought that authoritarian regimes by their very nature forcibly prevent the public expression of societal cleavages. In authoritarian regimes repression and deprivation is not simply a consequence of bad policy choices, but rather system-immanent and manifest in the institutional inventory and procedural practice, both of which are designed to monopolize most or all executive,

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judicial and legislative powers in the hand of a political elite (c.f. Linz 1975; Collier 1978; Inkeles 1991). The institutions of the authoritarian regime include an extensive security apparatus along with a penal system designed as a deterrent, as well as in many cases extra-governmental mass organization and other instruments of social control. Its rules and procedures include government violence as regular practice against all manifestations of dissent, often in the form of arbitrary detention, torture, forced labor and legal as well as extrajudicial killings. The goal of the authoritarian state may serve a certain ideological, political or economic imperative, or respectively it may simply aim at securing the monopoly of power for a particular elite.

It has been pointed out, however, that authoritarian regimes come in a considerable variety and may therefore differ in their BHR-performance depending on their institutional and normative underpinning. Specifically, communist regimes and other communitarian regime types are sometimes thought of as being more capable of providing for the basic social and economic needs of the population in poor countries (Howard/Donnelly 1986) than democratic regimes which are not only more fractionalized, but occasionally limit political competition to the well-to-do strata of the population (c.f. Remmer 1986). Especially during the early phases of rapid economic development, authoritarian regimes are often considered to provide for greater social and political stability, the absence of which is equally detrimental to human rights (c.f. Huntington 1968; Howard/Donnelly 1986). In short, while we expect authoritarian regimes to vary widely in the human rights performance, in some cases perhaps even outperforming formally democratic societies, it is evident that we would assume most authoritarian regimes will fall far short of performing acceptably in securing basic human rights.

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In democratic regimes, by contrast, all citizens have theoretically an equal opportunity to participate in government and are, therefore, represented in the policy making process. Since all citizens are empowered politically "they would be expected to use this power to ensure that their rights were protected and promoted" (Cingranelli 1992: 1). Democratic governments are, therefore, less likely to use repressive means of regulatory control and are better equipped to cope with societal demands. The presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens express effective political preferences, a system of checks and balances, the guarantee of civil liberties, the rule of law, freedom of the press and other manifestations of the pluralist democratic regime would lead us to expect a strong connection between human rights practices and human rights performance. Nevertheless, not all democratic regimes are equal and we shall, therefore, also expect differences in human rights performance across democratic regimes. There are numerous cases of human and minority rights abuse also in democratic countries. In other instances democracies may be more formal than substantive in character, respectively political competition may exclude vast segments of the population.

Furthermore, the relationship between regime type has been rather difficult to test empirically. The challenge has been to conceptualize a measure of regime type which is sufficiently independent from measures of human rights. Furthermore, a number of substantive concerns have added to the measurement problems. It seemed especially difficult to define regime type categories broadly enough to fit a universe of nations without being either too trivial or too cumbersome for empirical research.

A crude dichotomous distinction between democratic and non-democratic regimes is not a very powerful analytical framework (Remmer 1986; Huntington 1991). A number of

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borderline cases would probably end up being assigned to the wrong category. In addition, we would find it difficult to determine what aspect of a democratic regime does have the strongest impact on human rights performance. Lastly, if we draw the conceptual boundaries of democracy too narrow, we end up with the theoretically hardly exciting prospect that some 30 Western Democracies have superior human rights practices, while the rest of the world would be jointly labeled as 'poor' performers -- despite the fact that even among that group performance would differ considerably. In the context of third world countries, regime classifications have posed a particular challenge. Many of the reference frameworks used by area specialists, such as bureaucratic-authoritarianism, clientelism, corporatism or African-style one-party regimes, are often too context-bound to be valid across regions. In other instances, a globally applicable but highly complex battery of regime type criteria, such as Forsythe's regime matrix (1982: 193) is very cumbersome for research purposes.

For reasons explained in more detail in the theoretical part of this dissertation the regime type conceptualization of Dahl (1971) and Remmer (1986) avoids all the aforementioned problems. In defining regimes along the two dimensions of participation (inclusiveness) and political contestation (competitiveness), this approach not only covers the two fundamental aspects of democratization (the possibility of opposition and participation), but it also yields measures that are sufficiently distinct from measures of basic human rights. Furthermore, because this regime type variable is continuous it avoids all problems associated with classifying cases according to dichotomous categories and will work across the world's regimes without the problem of context bound classification.

Conceptually, competitiveness represents the 'liberal' element in regimes referring to the possibility of having an opposition and political contestation. Competition creates the

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opportunity for opposition groups to make certain claims against government and to present themselves and their political agenda as an alternative to the government. Political competition also provides the means to hold the government accountable. In addition, competitions creates space to critique government for lacking performance. In competitive regimes all political groupings have a vested self-interest in guaranteeing especially security rights, since the outcome of competitive political processes is unpredictable. Repressive policies can backfire in competitive regimes, since, once out of power, the oppressors could quickly find themselves to be the oppressed. The protection and possible expansion of these rights is, therefore, pertinent to the interests of those participating in a competitive political process. Likewise, as political fortunes may change quickly in competitive regimes, all sides benefit also if certain economic and social rights are guaranteed, thus, covering all relevant political groupings and their respective clientele.

The other dimension, according to Remmer (1986), is concerned with participation and political inclusion. As people participate they will seek to advance their own interest, at the core of which are the rights to personal security and economic subsistence. The more people participate the broader and more effectively will these rights be enforced. Only in a participatory political system can the diverse needs of a population be adequately addressed. While competitiveness helps create and expand the political institutions which guarantee human rights enforcement, participation ensures that a broad range of political and economic rights are covered.

The general proposition being tested here is that a particular type of regime, by virtue of its institutions, rules and values, will show a better performance and make a greater effort in terms of guaranteeing basic human rights than another regime. As suggested by

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Howard/Donnelly (1986), Henderson (1991), Cingranelli (1992) and others we would expect that the more democratic the government, the more responsive it will be and, therefore, the less likely the government will choose repression as well as deprivation as a means of rule. The test hypotheses based on the general proposition that "the type of regime is likely to affect significantly the basic human rights performance of governments" can be state as follows:

(P.H1) The more competitive and participatory political regimes are, the better the overall performance of governments in securing basic human rights. Specifically, inclusionary democracies (highly participatory and competitive regimes) are expected to perform best.

(P.H2.) The higher the level of political participation the better the government performance in guaranteeing basic economic and social rights.

(P.H3.) The higher the level of competition the better the government performance in guaranteeing basic political and civil rights.

In Remmer's approach, regimes vary along two separate dimensions, which, if dichotomized, result in roughly four regime type clusters, each of which is expected to relate differently to the two dimensions of basic human rights. The regimes which are least participatory and least competitive are likely to perform worst in either BHR dimension. Participatory and competitive regimes that approximate "real" democracy, and which Dahl termed 'Polyarchies', are thought of as performing best overall.

Regimes dominated by one political party, but which claim popular support and involve a substantial part of the public (inclusionary authoritarian), are expected to score better in securing basic economic and social rights, while being politically repressive. It is thought here that these governments in their pursuit of particular ideological goals try to appeal to a significant part of the population, while being hostile to political challenges by

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Under regime conditions in which parties are competitive, but in which a substantial part of the population is shut out from the political process, we would expect greater concern for political rights of the ruling minority, while simultaneously subsistence rights are undercut by socioeconomic cleavages. Remmer termed this type 'exclusionary democratic'. As a disadvantaged segment of the population is prevented from accessing their political rights, the government sees little incentive in ameliorating the living conditions of the politically powerless.

In keeping with Remmer's choice of indicators I shall use voter turnout as percentage of the total population as the measure of 'participation' (source: Vanhanen (1990) The Process of Democratization). The Vanhanen data, recording the voter turnout from almost all nations, has the tremendous advantage that it is current, covers virtually all countries in this project, and reports turnout as a percentage of the total population, rather than of eligible voters (c.f. Taylor/Jodice 1983[2]).

Political competitiveness can be operationalized by accounting for relative party strength such as, for example, by counting the number of political parties in the legislature. I decided against this indicator for a number of reasons. For one, we would have to develop categories, such as 'one', 'two' and 'many', otherwise we would be arguing that political systems with 10 or more parties, such as Israel or Italy, are several time more democratic than Britain or the US. Secondly, we would need to account for party strength. While, for example, Japan has several different parties represented in the legislature, only one has been dominant since 1955. Lastly, we would need to factor in the voting system, which can vary from single member district to split ballot, proportional representation and combinations thereof. In

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Britain, for instance, Prime Minister Thatcher was able to hold an absolute majority of seats with barely more than 40% of the popular vote. All these problems can be solved by taking the legislative margin (percentage of seats of the largest party in the lower house) as indicator (source: Der Fischer Weltalmanach (1986)). In a one-party system, for example, the value for legislative margin is 100. In short, the lower the legislative margin the more competitive the political system. Likewise, participation increases with rising voter turnouts. Hence, by dividing "voter turnout" (VT) by the "legislative margin" (LM), we obtain an interval-level summary measure for regime type (RM), which has the desired properties. The more participatory (higher turnout) and competitive (lower legislative margin) the regime, the higher the index-score and vice versa.

Regime Type Index:

$R_i = VT_i / LM_i$

Tables 8.1 through 8.3 list how the nations in this sample scored in terms of political competitiveness, political participation and according to the regime type index combining the previous two dimensions.

[Table 8.1 -- about here]

[Table 8.2 -- about here]

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
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[Table 8.3 -- about here]

Report of Statistical Findings.

Figure 3 Regression Plot of Basic Human Rights with Regime Type



114 cases plotted. Regression statistics of BHR on REGTYP:
Correlation .78878 R Squared .62218 S.E.of Est 32.80904
Sig. .0000 Intercept(S.E.) 10.07236 (4.76505)
Slope(S.E.) 83.13242(6.12138)

A bivariate correlation analysis between regime type and all three BHR-indices finds a substantial association between regime conditions and human rights practices. Correlating regime type (R) with the summary measure of basic human rights (BHR) yields a correlation coefficient of (r=.788/p<.000/n=114). In a bivariate regression by simultaneously controlling for GNP per capita, presented in Figure 3 above, regime type accounts for more than half of the variation in BHR-performance (r^2=.622/p<.000/n=114). The relationship is clearly weaker but remains moderately strong and statistically significant, when we look at a sample of

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developing countries (r^2=.247/r=.495/p.<001/n=74). Good human rights performance continues to be significantly correlated with more participatory and more competitive regimes.

When analyzing the impact of our regime type variable on each of the two dimensions of human rights separately we notice that its effect on security and subsistence rights performance is about equal. While "regime type" can account for about some 51% of the variation in security rights performance (r^2=.512/r=.715/p<.000/n=120), it can explain about 55% of the variation in subsistence rights (r^2=.559/r=.748/p<.000/n=114).

By breaking down regime type into its two components, competitiveness and participation, each showed a markedly different relationship with human rights performance. While overall, participation appeared to be less associated with either dimension of human rights than competitiveness, it was, as hypothesized, relatively more strongly correlated with subsistence rights performance (r^2.236/r=.486/p<.000/n=114) than with security rights performance (r^2.208/r=.456/p<.000/n=120). By comparison, more competitive regimes were clearly more likely to guarantee security rights (r^2.463/r=.680/p<.000/n=126) than subsistence rights (r^2.356/r=.597/p<.000/n=119). Also this finding is in keeping with our hypothesis that more competitive regimes, even when exclusionary, are more likely to guarantee security rights.

The relationship between each of the human rights dimensions and the two regime dimensions are presented in more detail in two crosstabulation tables. Table 8.4 shows the impact of political contestation on security rights. The indicator 'legislative margin' was divided at the mean resulting in the categories labeled 'low' and 'high'. As in previous tables the variable 'security rights' was split three-ways into 'low' 'medium' and 'high'[3]. Some 83.5% of the nations with medium to high levels of political competitiveness ended up in the

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worst performance category of security rights. The figures were almost exactly reversed for nations with low levels of party dominance (low legislative margins), of which some 85% showed a high security rights performance. In fact, some 93% of the countries, whose political competitiveness was classified as 'low', achieved only low to medium scores on security rights performance, while more than two thirds of countries with above average competitiveness guaranteed all or most security rights. Both measures of association were statistically highly significant and yielded large coefficients (Kendall's Tau-b=-.530/ p<.000/n=126)[4]. In short, the findings here provide strong empirical support for our hypothesis that competitive regimes are more likely to guarantee security rights, for it is precisely the uncertainty of the outcome of political competition that requires all participants to secure the rights underlying the competitive process.

[Table 8.4 -- about here]

[Table 8.5 -- about here]

Table 8.5 indicates quite dramatically that higher levels of participation are strongly associated with better subsistence rights performance (Kendall's Tau-b=.447/p<.007/n=126). Nations in which more than 36.02% (sample mean for voter turnout[5]) of the <u>entire population</u> participates in national parliamentary election were roughly 19 times as likely to guarantee

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a high level of subsistence rights, than countries with a low voter turnout. By comparison, two out of three countries with a medium to low voter turnout were grouped in the low subsistence rights category. The findings indicate, therefore, that in participatory regimes basic economic and social are more likely to be secured, since there the policy priorities are more likely to be reflective of the concerns of people outside the political elites.

Dimensions of Human Rights and Regime Type

Both regime type and basic human rights can be conceptualized as having two separate dimensions, each with distinct properties. We have already seen some evidence that the dimension of political competitiveness has overall a greater impact on both types of basic human rights than the participatory dimension. This may suggest, in accordance with some of the literature reviewed earlier (c.f. Howard/Donnelly 1986; Arat 1991), that the more important component "driving" the relationship between regime type and BHR-performance is its "liberal" element, that is political competitiveness. In this segment we shall explore this assumption more closely and focus extensively also on the separate effects of each regime type dimensions on both security rights and subsistence rights. Specifically, we shall concern ourselves here with the relationship between the participatory dimension and government performance in securing subsistence rights.

It should be remembered here that the second political hypothesis being tested states that there is a significant positive association between political participation and subsistence rights performance. It is also important to point out, once more, that this hypothesis was based important claims in parts of the literature (see my earlier discussion) concerning the achievements of "developmental" dictatorships, one-party states and communist governments

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in providing for the basic social and economic needs of their population. This position holds, furthermore, that extremely poor countries are better off with inclusionary authoritarian regimes that provide at least the social and economic basics than with exclusionary democracies, which restrict competition to a range of political interests beyond the poorer strata of the population. To test this assumption we would, first, require convincing evidence that the participatory dimension is significantly more strongly correlated with subsistence rights than is political competitiveness. Secondly, we would need to establish that inclusionary authoritarian regimes considerably outperform exclusionary democracies with respect to subsistence rights.

To test the third political hypothesis that higher levels of political competition are associated with better government performance in guaranteeing basic political and civil rights, we need to establish that competitiveness is more strongly correlated with security rights performance than is participation. Partially, this was already demonstrated in the preceding section.

Table 8.6 provides a comprehensive assessment of the cross-dimensional relationships between regime type and human rights. All things being equal, both correlation and regression coefficients are higher for the relationship between human rights and competitiveness (rows 1, 2) than for human rights and political participation (rows 5,6). All of the aforementioned relationships are statistically significant at the .001 level.

The findings change somewhat when we focus on a sub-sample of developing countries only (c.f. Table 8.6 -- rows 3,4,7,8). Naturally, we expect our coefficients to be much smaller since we not only lose a considerable portion of the variation in human rights performance (as most of the cases are clustered around lower performance levels) and to a

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lesser extent in turnout and legislative margin, but other factors, notably economic components (c.f. GNP/c) become, at this level, more important predictors of BHR-performance meaning that regime type can account for a proportionally lesser amount of the variation. The latter affects especially the regression coefficient (note that later in this dissertation a multi-variable regression model will analyze the effects of political and economic variables on BHR-performance). For developing countries the relationship between competitiveness and security rights performance remains robust yielding a moderately strong and highly significant correlations coefficient ($r=.440/p<.001$ -- Table 8.6). In turn, the relationship between participation and security rights performance is notably weaker ($r=.278/p<.05$).

The most interesting finding presented in Table 8.6 is, however, that for developing countries there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between political competitiveness and subsistence rights, while there is at least a moderate and statistically significant association between participation and both BHR-dimensions. This does by itself not make a strong case for inclusionary authoritarian regimes, since we have, thus far, only focused on the two dimensions separately and not yet on combinations thereof, but the findings do suggest that with lower levels of development the participatory component becomes more important. Therefore, in terms of securing subsistence rights in less developed countries the inclusionary dimension appears to be somewhat more important than political competitiveness.

[Table 8.6 -- about here]

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In order to proceed with this analysis we first need to construct a regime-type variable that corresponds to the four possible combinations of participation and competitiveness. By dichotomizing participation and competitiveness along their means, a four-cluster regime type variable[6] was created, in which each cluster (category) corresponded to a possible combination of participation and competitiveness. In drawing on the definitions applied by Remmer (1986), the four clusters were labelled: (a) exclusionary authoritarian (n=40), which define regimes of little or no political competitiveness combined with a highly restricted access to participation, (b) inclusionary authoritarian (n=31), meaning that in spite of none or few political choices, more than 36% of the population (sample mean for voter turn out) participates in elections, (c) exclusionary democratic regimes (n=19) which combine higher levels of political competition with limited political access for the voting public, and (d) inclusionary democratic regimes (n=32), which represent participatory and competitive political systems.

[Table 8.7 -- about here]

Table 8.7 compares each of the four regime clusters in terms of security rights performance. As expected exclusionary authoritarian and inclusionary democratic regimes show diametrically opposite results. While most of the former (95%) scored either low or medium on security rights, some 87.5% of participatory and competitive regimes indicated good security rights practices. While this does not come as a surprise, we are more interested in the mixed regime types. In comparing inclusionary authoritarian regimes and exclusionary democratic regimes in terms security rights performance, it becomes immediately evident that

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the former is considerably more repressive (35.8% have low security rights perf.) than the latter (11.3%). Conversely, almost twice as many exclusionary democracies (13.2%) placed in the high security rights category than did inclusionary authoritarian regimes (7.9%). The largest percentage of exclusionary democracies (42.1%) placed in the medium performance range. In short, while this regime type is clearly less repressive than either of the two authoritarian types, their security rights practices were considerably worse than fully competitive and participatory democracies. Both coefficients of determination are moderately high and statistically highly significant (Kendall's Tau-b=.520; Gamma=.670/p<.000/n=121).

[Table 8.8 -- about here]

Table 8.8 compares the above regime clusters according to subsistence rights. Once again exclusionary authoritarian and inclusionary democratic regimes form polar opposites. While 58.1% of inclusionary and competitive regimes score high on providing basic economic rights, 77.8% of exclusionary and non-competitive political systems fail to secure even the most basic subsistence rights. Among the mixed types inclusionary authoritarian regimes performed somewhat better in guaranteeing basic economic rights rather than security rights. In fact, overall, a smaller proportion of inclusionary authoritarian (69%) regimes placed in the low subsistence category, than did exclusionary democracies (84.2%). Inclusionary authoritarian regimes were also more likely (27.6%) to achieve a medium subsistence rights performance when compared with exclusionary democracies (10.5%). Given that of all regime types exclusionary democracies have the largest percentage in the lowest subsistence performance category we may conclude that the exclusionary democratic regimes perform

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poorly with respect to securing basic subsistance rights and are frequently outperformed by inclusionary authoritarian regimes. The measures of association support the trend observed in Table 8.8 (Kendall's Tau-b=.470; Gamma=.662/p<.000/n=115).

The case for authoritarian regimes as better providers for the basic economic and social needs of their populations remains weak, however. Authoritarian regimes with no or little popular participation tend to exhibit utter disregard for any kind of human rights. Inclusionary authoritarian regimes may edge out exclusionary democracies to some extent in terms of subsistence rights performance, but the difference is often marginal and usually outweighed by the dramatically higher levels of political repression. In fact, if we look only at those nations with low subsistence rights performance the inclusionary authoritarian variant was the second most frequent regime type (29.9%) in this category -- c.f. Table 8.8.

From the perspective of basic human rights a clear order of preference emerges. Overall both exclusionary and inclusionary authoritarian regimes log a dismal performance in either BHR-dimension, although the latter one does clearly better in securing subsistence rights and even outperforms, in that particular category, exclusionary democracies. Increased levels of voter participation does significantly affect the subsistence rights performance of regimes in developing countries and can, therefore, not be discounted. Supporters of inclusionary authoritarian rule will undoubtedly take comfort in this finding. It should be remembered, though, that given the disregard of most authoritarian regimes for basic human rights in general, and for security rights in particular, the claims of advocates of one-party regimes, and of authoritarian rule in the name of basic needs and national development, do not find much support here. For one inclusionary authoritarian regimes are only marginally better on subsistence rights performance than exclusionary democracies (c.f. also Arat 1991).

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Even those economic benefits, however, often come at the expense of high levels of repression, suggesting an undesirable tradeoff. I would, therefore, still argue that ceteris paribus among the mixed types greater political competitiveness is usually always preferable to greater participation.

[Table 8.9 -- about here]

In Table 8.9 both BHR-dimensions are broken down by individual rights to compare the average performance of regime type clusters with respect to individual indicators. We notice that inclusionary authoritarian regimes had more incidents of torture, forced labor and searches and seizures without warrant than any other regime type. Capital punishment, extra-judicial killings and detention without warrant were most frequent in exclusionary dictatorships.

Except for calorie intake, inclusionary authoritarian regimes slightly outperformed their exclusionary variant in all subsistence rights. The difference is most pronounced with respect to basic literacy skills and infant mortality. Exclusionary democracies did notably better in all security rights, but even there the overall performance was much closer to either authoritarian type than to fully open and competitive regimes. Especially with regard to access to basic housing and adult literacy exclusionary democracies performed poorly, when compared with inclusionary dictatorships. By contrast, inclusionary democracies were really in class of their own, as they averaged far higher group means in virtually every rights category. In fact, the group of nations classified as open and competitive averaged scores of above '2' meaning that each security right is either 'mostly' or 'fully' guaranteed. Infant

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mortality rates in that regime category were at almost half of what they were in exclusionary regimes. In terms of safe water and housing performance averages were considerably better than in any other regime type.

Finally, analogous to the regime typology, the two dimensions of basic human rights can equally be combined to four clusters by conceptualizing particular combinations of security rights performance and subsistence rights performance (see my earlier discussion and findings of the dimensions of basic human rights). Dichotomizing each BHR-dimensions along its mean yields four possible combinations; (a) low BHR-performance type (below average in both BHR-dimensions), (b) subsistence rights preference (above average in subsistence rights, below in security rights performance), (c) security rights preference (above average in security rights performance, below in subsistence rights performance) and (d) high BHR-performance type (above average in both BHR-dimensions).

In Table 8.10 the four BHR-type clusters were paired with the four regime type clusters, confirming that most (80.6%) exclusionary authoritarian nations were in the low-BHR type category, while 67.7% inclusionary democracies were grouped among the high-BHR type. Another 19.4% indicated a security rights preference, but below average scores on subsistence rights. As expected neither variant of democratic regime type ended up in the category marked "subsistence rights preference". While the BHR-type cluster "security rights preference" drew fairly evenly from all four regime type categories, exclusionary democracies had the relatively greatest proportion of cases in this particular category (31.6%), confirming once again the strong connection between either type of democracy and security rights.

Lastly, it should be pointed out in light of some of the more unusual results (c.f. Table 8.10 -- cell in row 3, column 1 and cell in row 1, column 4) that Table 8.10 reflects broad

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trends rather than exactly delimited dimensional boundaries. By dichotomizing security and subsistence rights performance along their respective means (which are relatively low given the range of the distribution) it was fairly easy for a nation (even five exclusionary authoritarians governments managed combined security rights score of "6" out of 15) to make the cut. In the interest of consistency throughout this project and in light of differentiating especially among medium performance developing countries, I thought it more important to continue to use the statistical mean rather than a more challenging cut-off as a threshold between BHR-clusters.

[Table 8.10 -- about here]

Conclusion.

It appears that the findings clearly support the three principal political hypotheses tested here as well as the general proposition that regime type makes a considerable difference in human rights performance. As expected, the more competitive and the more participatory political regimes are the greater the regard for the political and economic rights of their citizens. In any competitive political regime security rights and to a lesser extent subsistence rights have to be guaranteed precisely because of the open and unpredictable nature of the political outcome of the competitive process. Competition creates the opportunity to make claims against government, it provides the means to hold government accountable and lastly, competition establishes space for the critique of government non-performance. In this, political competitiveness also contributes to the expansion of basic social and economic rights. If

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competitive regimes are also highly participatory both security and especially subsistence rights receive an even greater priority. Through broad participation the political and especially the economic concerns of social segments outside the elites are more readily addressed, resulting in a better subsistence rights performance.

At the opposite end of the regime type spectrum, people's personal security and economic subsistence are least secured in regimes characterized by low or no political contestation and by no or little voter participation. Among the mixed regime types nations with higher levels of "competitiveness" , even in combination with lower levels of participation, were found to have overall a better human rights performance, than countries with more participation, but with fewer political choices. However, especially in the context of less developed countries participation has, as predicted, a significant independent effect on subsistence rights practices and to a lesser extend also on security rights performance. Generally, however it is political contestation which accounts for most of the variation in performance in either dimension of human rights.

The fact that it is the 'liberal' component of the two dimensions of regime type -- the right to opposition and dissent --, which accounts for most of the increase in BHR-performance, lends support to Howard and Donnelly (1986) powerful argument that the liberal regime is likely to outperform all other regime types. Howard and Donnelly carefully distinguished their notion of liberal regime from classical liberalism and the concept of the minimal state. Their argument was based on the understanding that the value system underlying the liberal regime, which gives equal concern to all its citizen, is unique, because only it alone takes the individual as the source of all rights. Howard and Donnelly (1986) argue that by constructing a regime type around the protection of claimable rights, the liberal

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Howard and Donnelly's claims are clearly confirmed here by the fact that inclusionary democracies performed markedly better than any other type. The significance of findings here lies not so much in the fact that liberal democracies averaged higher BHR-scores along a continuum, but that these scores are so dramatically higher indicating both a quantitative and qualitative difference.

In contrast to Howard and Donnelly's notion of regime type, however, this approach offers an independent conceptualization of regime, arguably the most important political explanation of human rights. In defining regime along two distinct dimensions this approach was not only able to explore the strengths and weaknesses of non-liberal regime types, but also to provide empirical grounding for three important theoretical claims; (a) competitive and participatory regimes are the best guarantors for basic rights. (b) political participation is strongly associated with security rights performance and (c) higher levels of participation are correlated with better subsistence rights performance, especially in less developed countries. Lastly, it needs to be emphasized that this approach represents an important political alternative to the usual economic explanations of human rights performance. Given the central importance of regime type as a predictor of BHR-performance, it will feature as an important part of a series of multi-variate OLS models to be introduced in the following sections.

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Country --
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Italy
Belgium
Netherland
Ecuador
Thailand
Denmark
Portugal
Spain
Israel
Norway
W.Germany
Sweden
Bolivia
Peru
Japan
Brazil
Australia
Austria
Pap.N.Guine
Irish Rep.
Angola
Canada
Dom.Rep.
Korea S.
Honduras
Colombia
Costa Rica
Greece
Zimbabwe
Venezuela
France
New Zealand
Panama
Argentina
El Salvador
UK
USA
Turkey
Philippines
Nicaragua
Uruguay
Indonesia
Paraguay
India
Morocco
Trinidad
Mauritius
Bangladesh
Gambia
Saudi Arabi
South Afric
Botswana
Malaysia
Mexico
Nepal
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Egypt
Sierra Leon
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria

Table 8.1 Listing of Countries by Competitiveness defined as Magnitude of Legislative Margin (Mean 79.63/Stdv. 24.57/n=127)
[Source: Fischer Weltalmanach, 1986]

Country -- Margin in %		Country -- Margin in %	
Switzerland	25.5	Benin	100.0
Finland	26.0	Bulgaria	100.0
Italy	28.0	Burkina Faso	100.0
Belgium	28.7	Burma/Myrnma	100.0
Netherlands	30.0	Burundi	100.0
Ecuador	33.3	Cambodia	100.0
Thailand	33.4	Cameroon	100.0
Denmark	33.7	Cent.Afr.Rep	100.0
Portugal	34.0	Chad	100.0
Spain	39.0	Chile	100.0
Israel	42.0	China	100.0
Norway	42.5	Congo	100.0
W.Germany	43.8	Cuba	100.0
Sweden	44.0	Czchoslova.	100.0
Bolivia	45.0	Ethiopia	100.0
Peru	45.7	E.Germany	100.0
Japan	45.8	Ghana	100.0
Brazil	48.0	Guatemala	100.0
Australia	49.0	Guinea	100.0
Austria	49.0	Haiti	100.0
Pap.N.Guinea	49.0	Hong Kong	100.0
Irish Rep.	50.0	Hungary	100.0
Angola	50.7	Iran	100.0
Canada	52.0	Iraq	100.0
Dom.Rep.	52.5	Ivory Coast	100.0
Korea S.	53.6	Jamaica	100.0
Honduras	54.3	Jordan	100.0
Colombia	55.0	Kenya	100.0
Costa Rica	57.0	Korea N.	100.0
Greece	57.0	Kuwait	100.0
Zimbabwe	57.0	Laos	100.0
Venezuela	57.7	Lesotho	100.0
France	58.0	Libya	100.0
New Zealand	58.9	Liberia	100.0
Panama	59.0	Madagascar	100.0
Argentina	60.0	Malawi	100.0
El Salvador	60.0	Mali	100.0
UK	60.0	Mauritania	100.0
USA	61.0	Mongolia	100.0
Turkey	62.2	Mozambique	100.0
Philippines	63.0	Niger	100.0
Nicaragua	63.5	Nigeria	100.0
Uruguay	64.0	Oman	100.0
Indonesia	64.4	Pakistan	100.0
Paraguay	66.6	Poland	100.0
India	68.8	Rumania	100.0
Morocco	70.2	Rwanda	100.0
Trinidad	72.0	Senegal	100.0
Mauritius	74.0	Singapore	100.0
Bangladesh	75.0	Somalia	100.0
Gambia	77.0	Sudan	100.0
Saudi Arabia	82.0	Syria	100.0
South Africa	82.0	Tanzania	100.0
Botswana	85.0	Togo	100.0
Malaysia	85.7	Tunisia	100.0
Mexico	85.7	Uganda	100.0
Nepal	85.7	USSR	100.0
Sri Lanka	86.0	Vietnam	100.0
Taiwan	87.0	S.Yemen	100.0
Egypt	87.2	N.Yemen	100.0
Sierra Leone	97.0	Yugoslavia	100.0
Afghanistan	100.0	Zaire	100.0
Albania	100.0	Zambia	100.0
Algeria	100.0		

Table 8.2
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[Sources:

Country
W.Germany
Bulgaria
Czechoslova
Guinea
Rumania
USSR
Sweden
Denmark
Italy
Greece
Austria
Syria
E.Germany
Uruguay
Hungary
Norway
Finland
Belgium
New Zealan
Yugoslavia
Albania
Rwanda
Netherland
Australia
Togo
Portugal
Poland
Spain
UK
Congo
France
Zaire
Korea S.
Argentina
Israel
Canada
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Irish Rep
Korea N.
Mongolia
Japan
Mauritius
Trinidad
Vietnam
Algeria
Burma Myr
Costa Ric
Mali
Madagasca
Burkina F
Venezuela
Liberia
Somalia
Cameroon
USA
Pap.N.Gu
Sri Lanka
Burundi
Turkey
Ivory Co
Philippi
Honduras
Zimbabwe

Table 8.2 Listing of Countries by Participation defined as Voter Turnout in Percent of Total Population (Mean 36.02/Stdv. 21.71/n=121)
[Sources: Vanhanen 1990 -- Fischer Weltalmanach 1986]

Country -- V.Turnout %	
W.Germany	74.6
Bulgaria	74.2
Czchoslova.	70.1
Guinea	69.1
Rumania	68.3
USSR	66.9
Sweden	66.7
Denmark	65.8
Italy	65.2
Greece	64.1
Austria	63.9
Syria	63.5
E.Germany	63.4
Uruguay	63.1
Hungary	63.1
Norway	62.6
Finland	61.2
Belgium	61.2
New Zealand	59.7
Yugoslavia	59.0
Albania	58.5
Rwanda	58.4
Netherlands	57.5
Australia	57.1
Togo	56.4
Portugal	55.5
Poland	55.1
Spain	54.8
UK	54.4
Congo	54.0
France	51.3
Zaire	50.5
Korea S.	50.0
Argentina	49.9
Israel	49.8
Canada	49.4
Indonesia	49.1
Irish Rep.	48.5
Korea N.	48.5
Mongolia	47.9
Japan	47.6
Mauritius	46.8
Trinidad	46.2
Vietnam	46.0
Algeria	45.4
Burma/Myrnma	45.0
Costa Rica	42.7
Mali	42.6
Madagascar	42.3
Burkina Faso	41.1
Venezuela	40.1
Liberia	40.0
Somalia	40.0
Cameroon	39.3
USA	39.1
Pap.N.Guinea	38.3
Sri Lanka	37.8
Burundi	37.5
Turkey	36.6
Ivory Coast	36.5
Philippines	36.2
Honduras	35.3
Zimbabwe	34.9

Country -- V.Turnout %	
Nicaragua	34.7
Singapore	34.6
Jamaica	34.5
Sudan	33.0
Peru	32.8
Brazil	32.4
Iran	32.2
Dom.Rep.	31.9
India	31.9
Uganda	31.9
S.Yemen	31.0
Mexico	30.7
Nepal	30.3
Switzerland	30.1
El Salvador	29.4
Paraguay	29.4
Panama	28.9
Malaysia	28.7
Cent.Afr.Rep	27.5
Ecuador	26.7
Bolivia	26.2
Gambia	26.2
Bangladesh	25.9
Colombia	24.2
Zambia	24.0
Thailand	23.8
Tanzania	23.0
Egypt	22.4
Botswana	21.7
Nigeria	21.6
Morocco	20.8
Guatemala	20.8
Pakistan	20.0
Kenya	17.7
Senegal	17.2
Ghana	16.1
South Africa	4.7
Kuwait	2.8
Cuba	.1
Angola	.0
Saudi Arabia	.0
Afghanistan	.0
Benin	.0
Chad	.0
Chile	.0
China	.0
Ethiopia	.0
Haiti	.0
Iraq	.0
Libya	.0
Malawi	.0
Mauritania	.0
Mozambique	.0
Niger	.0
Oman	.0
Tunisia	.0
N.Yemen	.0

Table 8.3
Margin) (Me
1986)

Country	Re
Finland	
Italy	
Belgium	
Denmark	
Netherlands	
W.Germany	
Portugal	
Sweden	
Norway	
Spain	
Austria	
Israel	
Switzerland	
Australia	
Greece	
Japan	
New Zealand	
Uruguay	
Irish Rep.	
Canada	
Korea S.	
UK	
France	
Argentina	
Ecuador	
Pap.N.Guin	
Indonesia	
Costa Rica	
Bulgaria	
Peru	
Thailand	
Czechoslova	
Venezuela	
Guinea	
Rumania	
Brazil	
USSR	
Honduras	
Trinidad	
USA	
Syria	
E.Germany	
Mauritius	
Hungary	
Zimbabwe	
Dom.Rep.	
Yugoslavi	
Turkey	
Albania	
Rwanda	
Bolivia	
Philippi	
Togo	
Poland	
Nicaragu	
Congo	
Zaire	
El Salva	
Panama	
Korea N.	
Mongolia	
India	
Vietnam	

Table 8.3 Listing of Countries by Regime Type Index (Voter Turnout/Legislative Margin) (Mean=.57/Stdv.=.50/n=121) [Sources: Vanhanen 1990 -- Fischer Weltalmanach 1986]

Country	Regime Type Index
Finland	2.35
Italy	2.33
Belgium	2.13
Denmark	1.95
Netherlands	1.92
W.Germany	1.70
Portugal	1.63
Sweden	1.52
Norway	1.47
Spain	1.41
Austria	1.30
Israel	1.19
Switzerland	1.18
Australia	1.17
Greece	1.12
Japan	1.04
New Zealand	1.01
Uruguay	.99
Irish Rep.	.97
Canada	.95
Korea S.	.93
UK	.91
France	.88
Argentina	.83
Ecuador	.80
Pap.N.Guinea	.78
Indonesia	.76
Costa Rica	.75
Bulgaria	.74
Peru	.72
Thailand	.71
Czchoslova.	.70
Venezuela	.69
Guinea	.69
Rumania	.68
Brazil	.68
USSR	.67
Honduras	.65
Trinidad	.64
USA	.64
Syria	.64
E.Germany	.63
Mauritius	.63
Hungary	.63
Zimbabwe	.61
Dom.Rep.	.61
Yugoslavia	.59
Turkey	.59
Albania	.59
Rwanda	.58
Bolivia	.58
Philippines	.57
Togo	.56
Poland	.55
Nicaragua	.55
Congo	.54
Zaire	.51
El Salvador	.49
Panama	.49
Korea N.	.49
Mongolia	.48
India	.46
Vietnam	.46
Algeria	.45
Burma/Myrnma	.45
Paraguay	.44
Colombia	.44
Sri Lanka	.44
Mali	.43
Madagascar	.42
Burkina Faso	.41
Liberia	.40
Somalia	.40
Cameroon	.39
Burundi	.38
Ivory Coast	.37
Mexico	.36
Nepal	.35
Singapore	.35
Bangladesh	.35
Jamaica	.35
Gambia	.34
Malaysia	.33
Sudan	.33
Iran	.32
Uganda	.32
S.Yemen	.31
Morocco	.30
Cent.Afr.Rep	.28
Egypt	.26
Botswana	.26
Zambia	.24
Tanzania	.23
Nigeria	.22
Guatemala	.21
Pakistan	.20
Kenya	.18
Senegal	.17
Ghana	.16
South Africa	.06
Kuwait	.03
Cuba	.00
Afghanistan	.00
Angola	.00
Benin	.00
Chad	.00
Chile	.00
China	.00
Ethiopia	.00
Haiti	.00
Iraq	.00
Libya	.00
Malawi	.00
Mauritania	.00
Mozambique	.00
Niger	.00
Oman	.00
Saudi Arabia	.00
Tunisia	.00
N.Yemen	.00

Table 8.4 Security Rights by Political Competitiveness

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Political Competitiveness (Legislative Margin %)		
		High Comp.	Low Comp.	Row Total
Basic Security Rights	Low	9 16.7 17.6 7.1	45 83.5 60.6 35.7	54 42.9
	Me-dium	9 27.3 17.6 7.1	24 72.7 32.0 19.0	33 26.2
	High	33 84.6 64.7 26.2	6 15.4 8.0 4.8	39 31.0
	Col. Tot.	51 40.5	75 59.5	126 100.0

Kendall's Tau-b= -.530/ p<.000. "Legislative Margin" is defined as the percentage of seats on the largest party in the in the main legislative body. Source: Fischer Weltalmanach 1986

Table 8.5 Subsistence Rights by Political Participation

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Participation (Voter Turnout % Tot. Pop.)		
		Low VT	High VT	Row Total
Basic Sub-sistence Rights	Low	44 66.7 80.0 38.6	22 33.3 37.3 19.3	66 57.9
	Me-dium	8 34.8 22.9 9.9	18 64.3 30.5 18.5	28 24.6
	High	1 5.0 1.8 .9	19 95.0 32.2 16.7	20 17.5
	Col. Tot.	55 48.2	59 51.8	114 100.0

Kendall's Tau-b= .447/ p<.000. "Voter Turnout" is defined as the percentage of voters participating in the last national election for the main legislative body prior to 1985 (respectively the most resent data available prior to 1985). Source: Vanhanen 1990.

Table 8.6 Bivariate Correlations and Regressions Analysis of Regime Type and Basic Human Rights Dimensions

	Regime Type Dimensions		
	Competitiveness (Leg. Margin %)		
Basic Human Rights Dimensions	correlation coefficient (r)	regression coefficient (r^2)	n
SecRight[a]	-.680[c]***	.463***	126
SubRight[b]	-.597***	.356***	119
SecRight/LDCs[d]	-.440***	.193***	90
SubRight/LDCs[d]	-.160	.025	87
	Participation (V.Turnout %)		
SecRight	.456***	.208***	120
SubRight	.486***	.236***	114
SecRight/LDCs	.278**	.077**	85
SubRight/LDCs	.272*	.074*	83

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05
(a) Security rights performance, (b) Subsistence rights performance
(c) denotes (as hypothesized) an inverse relationships,
since larger legislative margins imply lower levels of competitiveness;
(d) denotes the sample of developing countries (LDCs) only.
Sources: V.Turnout (Vanhanen 1990), Leg. Margin (Fischer Weltalmanach 1986)

Table 8.7




Table 8.8




Table 8.7 Security Rights by Regime Type Cluster

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Regime Type				
		exclu-sionary authori-tarian	inclu-sonary authori-tarian	exclu-sionary demo-cratic	inclu-sionary demo-cratic	Row Total
Basic Secu-rity Rights	Low	25 47.2 62.5 20.7	19 35.8 63.3 15.7	6 11.3 31.6 5.0	3 5.7 9.4 2.5	53 43.8
	Me-dium	13 43.3 32.5 10.7	8 26.7 26.7 6.6	8 26.7 42.1 6.6	1 3.3 3.1 0.8	30 24.8
	High	2 5.3 5.0 1.7	3 7.9 10.0 2.5	5 13.2 26.3 4.1	28 73.7 87.5 23.1	38 31.4
	Col. Tot.	40 33.1	30 24.8	19 15.7	32 26.4	121 100.0

Kendall's Tau-b= .488/ p<.000

Table 8.8 Subsistence Rights by Regime Type Cluster

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Regime Type				
		exclu-sionary authori-tarian	inclu-sonary authori-tarian	exclu-sionary demo-cratic	inclu-sionary demo-cratic	Row Total
Basic Sub-sistence Rights	Low	28 41.8 77.8 24.3	20 29.9 69.0 17.4	16 23.9 84.2 13.9	3 4.5 9.7 2.6	67 58.3
	Me-dium	8 28.6 22.2 7.0	8 28.6 27.6 7.0	2 7.1 10.5 1.7	10 35.7 32.3 8.7	28 24.3
	High		1 5.0 3.4 .9	1 5.0 5.3 .9	18 90.0 58.1 15.7	20 17.4
	Col. Tot.	36 31.3	29 25.2	19 16.5	31 27.0	115 100.0

Kendall's Tau-b= .470/p<.000.

Table 8.9 Grou

Basic Human Rights
Torture[a]
Slavery[a]
Detention
Searches [a]
Cap.Pun.[a]
Calorie I
Safe Wate
Housing[b]
Inf.Mort
Literacy

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Table 8.9 Group Means of BHR-Categories by Regime Type

Basic Human Rights	Regime Type			
	Exclusionary Authoritarian (M) n=40	Inclusionary Authoritarian (M) n=31	Exclusionary Democratic (M) n=19	Inclusionary Democratic (M) n=32
Torture[a]	.84	.77	1.23	2.20
Slavery[a]	1 .73	1.31	1.82	2.50
Detention[a]	.36	.40	1.05	2.42
Searches[a]	.78	.50	1.58	2.61
Cap.Pun.[a]	.15	.31	.76	2.19
Calorie In.[%]	95.15	94.82	97.58	99.15
Safe Water[%]	58.66	72.64	6462.72	84.19
Housing[b]	2.30	1.70	1.71	1.23
Inf.Mort.[c]	85.78	56.94	71.17	29.34
Literacy[%]	58.42	77.58	69.21	90.34

(m) group mean; (a) range of scores from 1 to 3; (b) number of people per room; (c) number of deaths by 1000 live births

Table 8.10 Su

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Table 8.10 Subsistence Rights by Regime Type Cluster

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Regime Type				
Basic Human Rights Type	exclu-sionary authori-tarian	inclu-sonary authori-tarian	exclu-sionary demo-cratic	inclu-sionary demo-cratic	Row Total
Low BHR Perf.	29 44.6 80.6 25.2	20 30.8 69.0 17.4	12 18.5 63.2 10.4	4 6.2 12.9 3.5	65 56.5
Subright Prefer-ence	2 40.0 5.6 1.7	3 60.0 10.3 2.6			5 4.3
Secright Prefer-ence	5 22.7 13.9 4.3	5 22.7 17.2 4.3	6 27.3 31.6 5.2	6 27.3 19.4 5.2	22 19.4
High BHR Perf.		1 4.3 3.4 .9	1 4.3 5.3 .9	21 91.3 67.7 18.3	23 20.0
Col.Tot.	36 31.3	29 25.2	19 16.5	31 27.0	115 100.0

Kendall's Tau-b= .527/p<.000.

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Multivariate Models of Basic Human Rights Performance

Before turning to other political and regime related explanations that deal specifically with a subset of nations and their colonial experience, I shall introduce here a series of multivariate models designed to explain much of the variation in government human rights performance across nations. All models are based on the analyses of economic and political factors discussed thus far and will be estimated through ordinary least squares regression. The first model, dubbed "General Model", is intended to explain overall basic human rights performance. Two further models will each deal with one of the two dimensions of human rights. The last model to be introduced, loosely called "LDC-Model" will specifically focus on the BHR-performance in less developed countries.

Since the procedure to estimate these models is OLS a few words to explain the technique are in order. The analysis takes the following standard algebraic formula (c.f. Pindyck/Rubinfeld 1981; Kmenta 1986: 392) with γ indicating the dependent (endogenous) variable:

$$\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + \beta_3\chi_{i3} .... + \beta_k\chi_{ik} + e$$

Where γ is the dependent variable at that point in time,

α is the intercept,

β_1, β_2, $\beta 3_3$,...,β_k are empirically determined weights,

χ_{i1}, χ_{i2}, χ_{i3},...χ_{ik} are the independent variables,

and e is the error term.

If the equation explains significantly the variation, then, it is reasonable to conclude that there is an interaction between the dependent and the independent variables.

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In the interest of keeping the technical discussion short and to allow for a good visual comparison of the models all important findings are presented in one comprehensive tabulation. Table 8.11 summarizes the results of all five models, each column featuring a different model. Each cell in the table's top row presents the model name as well as its principle independent variables. The table's columns feature the following items for each model which require some explanation;

[Table 8.11 -- about here]

"DV" stands for the "dependent variable" γ to be explained in each of the four models. "R" (multiple R) represents the correlations between dependent variable and the entire set of independent variables. "R2", the coefficient of determination, (multiple R-squared) is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable associated with variance in the independent variables. This proportion is a good indicator of the explanatory power of the regression model. "Adj.R2" stands for adjusted R^2, which essentially restates the R^2 corrected or adjusted for the number of cases (a small number of cases relative to the number of variables in the multiple regression can bias upward the estimate of R^2). "F"[7] and significance of F represent the F-value and its statistical significance, a test statistic designed to determine if the joint effects of all the independent variables on the dependent variable is significantly different from zero.

"B" represents the partial slope or regression coefficient indicating the average change in the dependent variable (γ) associated with a unit change in the independent variable (χ_{ik}) when the other independent variables are held constant. "Beta" indicates the values of the

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standardized regression coefficient. It represents the effect that a standard deviation difference in the independent variable would have on the dependent variable in standard deviations (the standardized scores of the dependent variable). The T statistic is a measure of the distance of Beta from zero in a probability distribution. The "Sig.T" is the probability that such a deviation from zero would be due to sampling error. Lastly, "Const." represents the intercept α indicating geometrically where the value of γ is zero, that is where the regression surface crosses the Y-axis when all other independent variables equal zero.

In all of the below models the following additional tests were applied; an F-test was undertaken to test for serial autocorrelation of the error term. A correlations matrix helped determine, if strong correlations among independent variables were present hinting at possible multicollinearity. The goodness of fit was also visually confirmed by plotting the obtained residuals with the predicted residuals.

The General Model of BHR-Performance.

Model Specification (Table 8.11):

$\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + \beta_3\chi_{i3} + e$

Where γ is the dependent variable at that point in time,

α is the intercept,

β_1, β_2, $\beta 3_3$ are empirically determined weights,

χ_{i1} (Regime Type) χ_{i2} (GNP/c) χ_{i3} (Income Equality) are the independent variables,

and e is the error term.

This first model is dubbed "general" as it applies to the entire sample of nations and includes the three most important explanatory variables we have encountered in this project -

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- regime type, level of economic development (logged GNP/c) and income equality (Gini-coefficient). In using an OLS-regression to estimate the model we find that these three variables are able to account for almost 80% of the variance in basic human rights performance. This high a coefficient is surprising and not frequent in cross-national comparative studies of this kind. The model is statistically highly significant ($p<.00001$). Likewise, the parameter coefficients for each of three independent variables are statistically significant, with income distribution having the lowest t-value (3.11) of the three. Given that all three independent variables are rather abstract indices and that GNP per capita was converted to its natural logarithm, it is perhaps best to compare the effects of the three variables by looking at the standardized regression coefficients. Regime type and GNP per capita seem to have a roughly equal impact on BHR-performance, although the former appears marginally stronger. The effect of income equality is clearly less pronounced (about four times weaker). Overall, we may conclude that all other factors being equal this model cannot only explain most of the observed cross-national variation in basic human rights practices, but it also underscores the importance of regime type as the single most important variable in this project.

A Model of Subsistence Rights Performance.

Model Specification (c.f. Table 8.11):

$$\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + \beta_3\chi_{i3} + \beta_4\chi_{i4} + e$$

Where γ is the dependent variable at that point in time,

α is the intercept,

β_1, β_2, $\beta 3_3$, $\beta 4_4$ are empirically determined weights,

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χ_{i1} (Regime Type) χ_{i2} (GNP/c) χ_{i3} (Income Equality) χ_{i4} (Trade) are the independent variables,

and e is the error term.

The above equation defines a model of subsistence rights performance. For the most part its specification is similar to the "General Model", except that this one includes a fourth variable "Trade", which represents the sum of exports and imports divided by the country's GNP (to adjust for country size)[8]. Earlier in my discussion of the bivariate relationship between trade and human rights practices I concluded that while there was no significant association between trade and security rights performance, there appeared to be a moderate to medium correlation with subsistence rights (r=.459/p<.0001). Hence, it seemed an important component that should not be ignored here, especially since trade is frequently taken to be a measure of a nations economic liberalization as well as its openness to the world (c.f. Mitchell/McCormick 1988).

Also this model is statistically highly significant (p<.0001). The R^2 value (.84) is even higher than that of the General Model. Except trade all parameter coefficients are statistically significant. In contrast to the general model, per capita GNP turned out to be the most important independent variable with respect to subsistence rights (beta =.52), followed by regime type (beta=.40) and by a wide margin by income distribution (Gini Coefficient) (beta=-.09)[9]. While trade (beta.=.08) did not appear to be statistically significant the model in this specification was able to explain more of the variance in subsistence rights performance than any other one tested here. Once again level of economic development, regime type and income equality were the most important underlying factors in explaining why governments secure basic economic and social rights.

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A Model of Security Rights Performance.

Model Specification (c.f. Table 8.11):

$\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + \beta_3\chi_{i3} + e$

Where γ is the dependent variable at that point in time,

α is the intercept,

β_1, β_2, $\beta 3_3$, $\beta 4_4$ are empirically determined weights,

χ_{i1} (Regime Type) χ_{i2} (GNP/c) χ_{i3} (Income Equality) are the independent variables, and e is the error term.

When the General Model is applied to security rights performance, it once again yields a high goodness of fit. In the above specification regime type, GNP per capita and income equality can account for almost 60% of the variation in security rights performance across nations. In comparison to the previous model regime type is the best predictor of security rights practices, followed by per Capita GNP. The latter, however, is considerably less a factor in this model than in any of the previous ones. While, all other variables held constant, a one point increase in the regime type index, would yield a five point increase in security rights performance (range 0-15), the impact of per capita GNP is only about half as effective. Income equality appears to have a somewhat greater impact on security rights than on subsistence rights, but is by far the least effective variable here.

The LDC-Model of Basic Human Rights Performance.

Model Specification (c.f. Table 8.11):

$\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + \beta_3\chi_{i3} + \beta_4\chi_{i4} + e$

Where γ is the dependent variable at that point in time,

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α is the intercept,

β_1, β_2, $\beta 3_3$, $\beta 4_4$ are empirically determined weights,

χ_{i1} (Regime Type) χ_{i2} (GNP/c) χ_{i3} (Income Equality[10]) χ_{i4} (Trade) are the independent variables,

and e is the error term.

The last model to be introduced here focuses on a sub-sample of lower middle and low income nations in the data-set. In its specification it is the same as the above subsistence rights model and includes four independent variables. The rationale for their inclusion is the same as explained above. Given that we are now dealing with a relatively homogenous group of nations that share many important characteristics we lose a considerable portion of the variation in both our dependent and independent variables. As a result the goodness of fit measures will be smaller than in the previous models. Yet, the findings indicate that this model can explain about 50% of the variance in γ and is statistically highly significant. The most interesting single finding concerning the individual parameter coefficients, all of which are statistically significant, is the importance of the trade variable, which appears to have a considerable impact (more than income equality) on BHR-performance, but in an inverse direction. This suggests that for this sub-sample of 59 lower middle to low income nations (n=59) an increase by one standard deviation in the amount of trade BHR-performance declines by about one third of a standard deviation[11]. Income equality is also an important factor in this model (c.f. Table 8.11). In fact, it seems to play a somewhat more significant role for this sub-sample of nations than for the general sample. Conceptually, the 'distribution of wealth' is positioned at the intersection between economics and politics. In accounting directly for the distribution of resources in a given society this measure makes explicit

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economic claims. Implicitly, however, it also reflects on the political mechanisms that determine the societal allocation of resources. These mechanisms are to some extent, but not exclusively, rooted in different regime arrangements. Inclusive types, as we have seen earlier, tend to be more egalitarian. More importantly, however, there are other factors embedded in the political culture, in established practices and customs, in the socioeconomic context and in existing traditions that also affect the allocation of wealth. In my opinion any comprehensive political model of human rights performance would have to give sufficient consideration to the distribution of resources, respectively to the allocation of wealth in society.

Also in this model regime type emerges clearly as the most important factor. A one point increase in the regime type index (range 0 to 2.35) by expanding either participation or competitiveness leads to a 59 point jump in the BHR-performance index (range: 0 to 200).

Summary and Conclusion.

All models introduced here can account for a substantial part of the variation in the dependent variable (between 50% and 84%) and are all statistically highly significant. Regime type and level of economic development (GNP per capita) emerge as the best overall predictors of human rights practices. The single most important factor in explaining government performance in securing human rights is undoubtedly regime type, which routinely had the largest parameter coefficients except for the Subsistence Rights Model. Income equality varies considerably in its effect depending on the type and specification of human rights performance to be explained. While hardly a factor in explaining subsistence rights, income equality proved most significant with respect to BHR-performance in most

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middle to lower income developing countries (LDC-Model). Likewise, trade turned out to a very important variable in explaining human rights performance in the LDC-Model. We may conclude, therefore, that, all other factors being equal, human rights are generally most likely guaranteed under the following conditions. Good human rights practices require a highly participatory and competitive political regime, a high level of development and a relatively equitable distribution of wealth. For less developed countries the same set of factors applies, however, foreign trade may become more important (the effect of the latter being negative, however). From the perspective of human rights an order of preference emerges, which points first to regime type as principal precondition for good human rights practices. This is cause for optimism not only because regime type can make up somewhat for threats to BHR-performance due to lower levels of economic wealth, but also because regime conditions are less immutable than economic conditions. Therefore, change in favor of greater competitiveness and participation seems more achievable, especially when strategically supported by Western economic aid and foreign policy, than dramatic increases in GNP per capita.

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Table 8.11 A Comparison of Multivariate OLS-Regression Models of Human Rights Performance

OLS-Models G.o.Fit Statistics & Parameter Coeff.	Gen. Model BHR RegTyp Gnp/c Gini n=96	Subsis-tence Rights SubR. RegTyp Gnp/c Gini Trade n=96	Security Rights SecR. RegTyp Gnp/c Gini n=99	LDC-Model BHR RegTyp Gnp/c Trade In.Dis.* n=59
DV	BHR	SubR	SecR	BHR
R	.893	.917	.772	.732
R2	.799	.841	.596	.536
Adj.R2	.792	.834	.583	.491
F	121.99	121.16	46.84	11.882
Sig.F	.000	.000	.000	.000
RegTyp B	52.06	17.48	5.07	59.30
SE B	5.96	2.20	.76	12.88
Beta	.50	.40	.52	.52
T	8.73	7.93	6.62	4.60
Sig.T	.00	.00	.00	.00
GNP/c B	.0058	.0020	3.29E-04	.0088
SE B	7.23E-04	3.19E-04	9.37E-05	.0023
Beta	.45	.52	.27	.44
T	8.08	8.83	3.50	3.74
Sig.T	.00	.00	.00	.00
In.Dis. B	- .35	- .11	- .03	.84
SE B	.15	.05	.02	.38
Beta	- .12	- .09	- .11	.23
T	- 2.30	- 2.30	- 1.5	2.16
Sig.T	.02	.02	.11	.03
Trade B	n.a.	7.81E-05	n.a.	-.010
SE B		5.16E-05		.004
Beta		.08		- .31
T		1.51		-2.57
Sig.T		.13		.00
Const. B	21.94	- 1.08	3.34	.95
SE B	7.04	2.60	.90	8.46
T	3.11	- .41	3.68	.11
Sig. T	.00	.67	.00	.91

Abbreviations: DV=Dependent Variable; R=Correlation Coefficient; R2=Regression Coefficient; Adj.R2=Adjusted R-Square; F-Statistic; Sig.F=Significance of Model; RegTyp=Regime Type; GNP/c=ln(GNP per Capita); In.Dis=Income Distribution (Gini, (*)Top 20% vs. Bottom 20%); Trade=ln((Exports+Imports)/GNP); Const.=Constant; B=Parameter Coefficient; SE B=Standard Error of Parameter Coefficient; Beta=Standardized Parameter Coefficient; T=T-values; Sig.T=Significance of T (statistical significance of Parameter Coefficient); BHR=Basic Human Rights Performance; SubR=Subsistence Rights Performance; SecR=Security Rights Performance; LDC=Less Developed Countries

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Endnotes

1. The World Today, July 1992: 116-119

2. Originally I had intended to use Charles L. Taylor and David Jodice (1983) World Hand book of Political and Social Indicators as my source, but decided against it as their analysis is somewhat dated and included only some 80 countries. In addition the data seem somewhat inflated in comparison with other sources.

3. 'Low' and 'high' define values of more than half a standard deviation below or above the mean, while the values in between are considered to be 'medium'.

4. The sign for Kendall's Tau-b is negative since the indicator used is legislative margin, that is the larger the margin of a dominant party, the lower the level of competitiveness.

5. Turnout was divided in two categories (low, high) at the mean.

6. Each of the two regime measures was split at the mean and subsequently combined into four categories.

7. $F= (R^2/k)/[(1-R^2)/(n-k-1)]$; test statistic with k degrees of freedom in the numerator and n-k-1 in the denominator.

8. Subsequently the variable Trade is logged before it is entered into the equation.

9. The sign here is negative, because larger Gini-coefficients indicate greater inequality. Thus, human rights performance and the Gini curve are inversely correlated.

10. Here another measure for income equality was used (ratio between the bottom 20% and top 20% income brackets), since Gini coefficients were not available for all LDCs in the data set.

11. The standardized coefficient is used here since the Trade variable was logged and it is somewhat difficult, therefore, to describe the effect in dollar values.

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POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS -- THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The Colonial Legacy and Human Rights

Empirical research sometimes tends to de-emphasize historical context as a relevant factor in explaining political phenomena. In this dissertation I have thus far focused on economic and political causes that share roughly a common time horizon with the dependent variable basic human rights. Establishing a connection between these factors and government behavior provides us with causal 'snapshots' at a distinct point in time, a process analogous to discovering the motive in a murder mystery. While finding the immediate motive for a crime may solve the murder, knowing the socialization and upbringing of the perpetrator may help us understand the motive. Decision making is always shaped by past experiences and a given context that constrains the range of choices (c.f. North 1990, Putnam 1988). For many nations the single most significant collective experience lies in its colonial heritage. This insight does not only apply to recently liberated nations in Africa and Asia, but holds true for countries whose present power and influence seems to far outshine the colonial experience of a distant past, something readily evident at the annual 4th of July celebrations in the United States. This incidently also points to the complex nature of the effects of colonial legacy. While imperialist nations leave their cultural, political and economic imprint on their respective colonies -- the US is an English speaking country, the legal system is modelled

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after English case law and likewise the moral, political and economic principles of the United States are ultimately rooted in a liberal tradition of philosophy and politics --, nations are also affected by their struggle against colonial domination and by the process of how national liberalization occurred -- Americans are fiercely proud of their successful revolution, their quest for freedom and their tradition of independence. It is doubtful that American self-understanding would be quite the same today, had their cause not been successful in 1776 and some point to Canada as a contrasting case. In short, while the colonial legacy is undoubtedly important in a nation's history its impact on state behavior and contemporary politics is complex and difficult to assess.

While a number of researchers have sought to explain democratic stability and implicitly or explicitly human rights performance by using some conceptualization of colonial legacy, there has not yet emerged a clear consensus on the long-term consequences of the colonial experience (c.f. Wiarda/Kline 1979; Huntington 1984; Mitchell/McCormick 1988; Diamond et al. 1988, 1989; Arat 1991; Collier/Collier 1991). Diamond (in Diamond et al.1988) summarizes this point as follows; "The colonial experience [in Africa] was far from uniform, and it is important to assess how variations in colonial rule may have contributed to variations in democratic performance and prospects in Africa" (:6). Jean-Francois Bayart (1986 :109) in his analysis of civil society in Africa reminds us that "[t]he concepts of democracy and of human rights are the products of Western history [derived from]....the idea of the individual, which pre-colonial societies did not share, and which were introduced into Africa in the wake of colonial rule". Both in Latin America and Africa colonialism led to profound transformations of the original civilizations. In Africa European powers carved up the map of Africa "without regard for the integrity of existing cultural groups and state

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systems" (Diamond et al. 1988 :6). With many ethnic groups split and others lumped together in artificially established boundaries post-colonial countries found themselves in ethnically fragmented societies, a fragile nationhood and alien political structures. In Latin America the experience was different, but, nevertheless, equally pervasive. There, much of the indigenous population was either killed or died in the process of European conquest. The colonial legacy resulted not only in a new ethnic mix of indigenous people, European colonizers and imported slaves, but left the continent with "severely polarized class divisions...that would impact on social and political life well into the future" (Diamond et al. 1989 :3). While colonialism usually pitted European colonizers against non-European indigenous societies, in some cases those colonized were themselves European settlers, and in other cases the colonial masters shaping an indigenous society were themselves non-Europeans (c.f. Waltz' (1989) discussion of the impact of Turkish and French rule in Tunisia).

Some scholars have maintained that British rule entailed fewer authoritarian roots than other forms of colonialism and may have set countries on an evolutionary trajectory towards more liberal societies and towards more democratic regimes with greater respect for human rights (Weiner 1987). The idea was that British colonialism was more co-optive and better prepared the natives for self-rule through democratic institutions. The British created a national elite "who (was) educated in the British liberal tradition and whose members were later recruited into the civil service system" (Arat 1991 :60-1). Zimbabwe, Botswana and especially India have become frequently cited examples for the British legacy. Others challenge this position by arguing that these cases are exceptions, rather than the rule. Zimbabwe may constitute a special case, because of its long white rule and the relative short period since independence (Diamond et al 1988 :217-57). Botswana's society was hardly

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penetrated by British rule (Diamond et al 1988 :168-216) and India's example is sharply contrasted by the troubled history of neighboring Pakistan, also a former British colony. Gann and Duignan (1967 :331) point out that in the African context "even the more liberal systems such as those developed by the British in West Africa had allowed only limited popular participation in government, and this itself was confined to a small elite". Diamond, Linz and Lipset assert likewise that also in British colonies it was not until shortly before independence that Africans began to be prepared to take over legislative, executive and bureaucratic functions and this "preparation was often very superficial" (1988 :7). Nevertheless a number of researchers have put the hypothesis to the test that British rule is correlated with more regard for human rights. In this context it is also important to distinguish between 'liberal' and 'democratic' in the sense that while some former British colones such as Nigeria may have authoritarian governments, their societies, influenced by a more liberal tradition, may have developed institutions independent from government, such as a more vigilant press or a relatively independent judiciary, which help mitigate the repressive nature of government rule.

Mitchell and McCormick (1988) test whether the British colonial legacy is positively associated "with greater respect for human rights" (:480). The findings seem to confirm their hypothesis as former British colonies are significantly less likely to take political prisoners and to use torture than former Spanish, Dutch, French, Belgian, Portuguese or Italian colonies (c.f. Mitchell/McCormick 1988, Table 4: 494). Arat (1991) by contrast comes to a rather different conclusion. In her data-set of 128 countries she analyzes 42 that have experienced British rule and finds that almost half of theses cases appear at the undemocratic end of the spectrum. She writes "[i]n fact, the average score of democraticness for the countries that

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experienced British rule is 73.8, approximating the overall average of 73 for the study" (:61), which is only slightly higher than that of Spanish colonies. In short, neither the type nor the length of British rule seemed to make any significant difference in determining the success of the post-colonial democratic systems. In his view the more important factor in this context is how independence was gained (:63). While Arat was not measuring human rights performance directly, democratic stability is a closely enough related concept to warrant suspicion about the 'beneficial' influence of British colonial rule on contemporary human rights performance. Nevertheless, the fact remains that by 1985 all those countries that had gained their independence in this century and that had sustained (an albeit imperfect) democracy for a significant period of time shared a British colonial heritage. On the other side of the ledger we encounter numerous nations that despite the same British legacy have headed straight for authoritarian rule, a fragile nationhood and/or ethnic violence.

For the purposes of this study I shall, therefore, examine the question of whether the type of colonial heritage is significantly correlated with basic human rights performance, specifically whether the British colonial legacy is linked to greater government respect for human rights.

The impact of the colonial legacy may be affected by an additional factor, the length of independence, which some students of political democracy consider important for the political culture of a nation (Huntington 1984; Mitchell/McCormick 1988; Jackman 1993). It is argued that many colonies that had gained independence before the turn of this century seem to have fared better than relatively recently decolonized countries. Examples are all the European settler colonies, many Latin American cases such as Costa Rica, Brazil following its abertura or Uruguay after its 1983 reforms. The rationale for this argument has been that

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institution building requires time. Independence often presents itself as traumatic period, during which different ethnic and political groups struggle for power and influence. As stability is regained over time and as institutional structures have developed into their own governments may see less the need to use repressive force to maintain control.

The hypotheses tested here can therefore be stated as follows:

(P.H4.) "Formerly British Colonies are more likely to perform better in securing basic human rights".

(P.H5.) "The longer the period of political independence the more likely government will perform better in securing basic human rights".

While the main objective is here to explore the British colonial legacy with respect to contemporary human rights performance, the analysis itself is designed to be considerably boarder contrasting not only different colonial systems, but also controlling for the presence of intervening variables such as length of independence, region, level of development and national wealth.

Report of Findings.

The analysis includes some 91 countries[1], of which 31 (34.1%) were former British colonies, some 18 (19.8%) were French ruled, 16 (17.5%) were governed by Spain, 3 (3.2%) were under Portuguese rule, 3 (3.3%) had gained their independence from Belgium, 7 (7.7%) had belonged to the Ottoman Empire and some 13 (14.3%) were assigned to the category 'other'[2] indicating that this group includes nations that were formerly governed by a country other than those listed above, but does not include countries that had continuously enjoyed political independence. It typically includes countries that, while having gained political

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independence from foreign rule, were never actually colonies in the classic sense, such as Finland, which gained independence from Russia, or Norway, which broke away from Sweden.

The findings here are for the most part based on crosstabulations as well as bivariate correlation analyses. The results from the bivariate analysis form the foundation for a multivariate institutional OLS-model of basic rights performance, which will be introduced at the end of this chapter. Analogous to the procedure used throughout this study, all table categories (unless otherwise specified) were constructed by using (0.5) standard deviations to define three (low, medium, high) intervals.

In a first step we would want to assess the overall impact of different colonial legacies on BHR-performance. The results of this direct comparison are recorded in Table 9.1.1. Except for the category marked 'other', which, for the aforementioned reason, is not entirely representative of colonial experience, the group of former British colonies had the largest proportion of countries (22.6%) in the high BHR-performance category[3] (c.f. Table 9.1.1). This was a better than the performance of formerly French (0%), Spanish (13.3%), Portuguese (0%), Belgian (0%) or Turkish (0%) ruled countries.

[Table 9.1.1 -- about here]

In comparing the former colonial systems in terms of poor BHR-performance, Spanish colonies (25%) had the relatively lowest proportion of countries in this category. They were followed by British (45.2%), French (50%) Portuguese (66.7%), Turkish (57%) and Belgian (66.7%) colonies ('other'= 46.2%) (c.f. Table 9.1.1). In short, in a direct comparison of

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different colonial legacies formerly British colonies seemed to do relatively well, outperforming all except the former Spanish colonies, whose group averages on BHR-performance undoubtedly benefitted from recent reforms in countries such as Argentina, Uruguay and Nicaragua.

The results turn somewhat less favorable for the British case if we look only at developing countries, after eliminating all European settler colonies from the sample (n=79). In this configuration only 4% of former British colonies end up in the top BHR-category, compared with 18.7% for former Spanish colonies. None of the other colonial types find themselves represented in the top BHR-category.

Table 9.1.2 finds also that a relatively large proportion of former British colonies are grouped among the low BHR-performers. Following former Portuguese (75%), Belgian (66.7%) and the Ottoman-ruled (66.7%) nations, the group with British heritage had the third highest proportion (56%) of countries in the low-BHR-category. Former French colonies (50%) were somewhat less frequent and formerly Spanish colonies (25%) were considerably less frequent in this category.

[Table 9.1.2 -- about here]

This set of findings, however, may not necessarily contradict the claims made earlier about a linkage between greater respect for certain human rights and the British heritage. The argument in favor of the British case is centered around the notion that the British tradition entails fewer authoritarian roots. In short, these claims concern primarily the realm of civil and political rights, something which, if true, would have to be reflected here in the measure

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of security rights, since the above category of BHR-performance is based on measures of both subsistence and security rights performance.

To test whether former British colonies outperform countries with other colonial legacies in terms of at least guaranteeing security rights, Table 9.1.3 compares the percentages of seven different colonial types for each security rights category. In the interest of presenting these findings in a clear and concise manner the results for the full sample and the sample of LDCs were consolidated into one table. Furthermore, since the relevant information is contained in the column percentages, indicating the proportion of cases of each colonial legacy in each of the three security rights categories, Table 9.1.3 lists only the column percentages. Each cell of Table 9.1.3 includes the column percentage for the sample at large (n=94) as well as in brackets the percentages for the sample of developing countries only [n=80].

The findings suggest, indeed, that of the six different national colonial legacies identified in Table 9.1.3 the British colonial type has comparatively the best performance. Some 34% [20%] of former British colonies achieved a high score in security rights performance, compared with 28% [28%] of Spanish, 10% [10%] French, 0% [0%], Portuguese, Belgian and Turkish. Conversely, the British colonial type has the relatively smallest proportion of nations (34.4%) [40%] in the low security rights category. This compares very favorably with the other types; French 53% [53%] Spain 45% [45%] Portuguese 67% [67%], Belgium 67% [67%] Turkish 75% [75%]. Considering recent reforms in Latin America as well as the fact that most of the former Spanish colonies had gained their independence in the last century, pointing to length of independence as a possible intervening variable, the British colonial heritage appears to have the best overall track record on security

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[Table 9.1.3 -- about here]

In order to examine the British colonial legacy and its impact on security rights practices more closely, the sample of former colonies was divided into groups, contrasting the British with non-British experience. The latter category includes nations of French, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian and Turkish colonial background. By correlating security rights performance with the now dichotomized variable of colonial-heritage (British versus Non-British), we obtain a simple two by two crosstabulation table (Table 9.2). As suspected, we find that former British colonies have a markedly higher proportion of countries in the top security rights category (34.4%) compared to all non-British colonies combined (14.3%). The strength of the association is moderate and statistically significant (Kendall's Tau-b=.232; Gamma=.402/p<.023).

[Table 9.2 -- about here]

The strongest evidence in support of a relationship between the British heritage and current basic human rights practices emerges when we focus exclusively on security rights and consider only those countries that have gained independence in this century (Kendall's Tau-b=.274; Gamma=.477/T-values=2.28/n=58). Among some 58 nations, which have won independence since WWI, the percentage of former British colonies in the top bracket of security rights performance (26.9%) is more than four times higher than that of non-British

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colonies (6.3%). Conversely, there are proportionally fewer past British colonies (38.5%) among the ranks of those nations with a poor security rights records, than there are of other colonial legacies (62.5%). Given the correlation between security rights performance and the British colonial legacy, it may be interesting to explore which types of basic rights are more readily guaranteed in former British colonies.

If we compare British versus non-British forms of colonial legacy for individual basic human rights the British type comes out ahead in every single category except freedom from capital punishment (Table 9.3). Most importantly, the differences are especially striking for three of the security rights. In the categories freedom from torture and detention the group averages of former British colonies are almost twice as high as that of other forms of colonial experience. I interpret this finding as further evidence that, all things being equal, liberalism may be more fully developed in former British colonies, so that government authorities are less likely to resort to torture, detention and illegal house searches. Such a liberal legacy can be enshrined in existing legal principles as well as in established rules of government conduct or may simply be the result of an independent judiciary or a free press monitoring state action. The argument in favor of a 'liberal legacy' is further strengthened by the fact that the group differences for all other BHR-categories are considerably less pronounced.

[Table 9.3 -- about here]

It appears, therefore, that a case can be made for a positive association between the British colonial experience and the protection of basic political and civil rights. The relationship is strongest for nations that have gained their independence in this century. The

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type of basic rights (freedom from torture, detention and unlawful searches) that is more fully guaranteed in former British colonies point especially to a lasting liberal legacy in these countries. Notwithstanding, having British colonial roots is not a sufficient condition for governments to guarantee from violating human rights, as many former British colonies are also found at the low end of human rights performance. Furthermore, economic deprivation is almost as common in countries with British colonial experience as in others. Summing up, the British legacy can play a role in explaining at least some aspects of human rights performance, but many other factors -- some of which will be explored in the following section -- impact the relationship between colonial experience and human rights performance.

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Table 9.1.1: Basic Human Rights by Colonial Heritage

		Type of Colonial Legacy							
	Ct R % C % T % (a)	Bri- tish	Fre- nch	Spa- nish	Por- tug- uese	Bel- gian	Tur- kish	Oth-er (b)	Row Tot.
BHR	low	14 34.1 45.2 15.4	9 22 50 9.9	4 9.8 25 4.4	2 4.9 66.7 2.2	2 4.9 66.7 2.2	4 9.8 57.1 4.4	6 14.6 46.2 6.6	41 45.1
	med	10 27.8 32.2 11	9 25 50 9.9	9 25 56 9.9	1 2.8 33.3 1.1	1 2.8 33.3 1.1	3 8.3 42.9 3.3	3 8.3 23.1 3.3	36 39.6
	hi	7 50 22.6 7.7		3 21.4 18.5 3.3				4 28.6 30.8 4.4	14 15.4
	Col Tot	31 34.1	18 19.8	16 17.5	3 3.2	3 3.3	7 7.7	13 14.3	91 100

(a) Count, Row Percentages, Column Percentages, Total Percentages
(b) Other includes countries gaining independence from: Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Haiti, China, Italy, Sweden, Brazil Source: J. Wright (1991) Universal Almanach. New York: Anderson & McMeel
Fischer (1986) Fischer Welt Almanach. Frankfurt Germ.: Fischer
Arthur S. Banks (1985) Political Handbook of the World. Binghamton: CSA Publications

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Table 9.1.2: Basic Human Rights by Colonial Heritage -- For Developing Countries

		Type of Colonial Legacy							
	Ct R % C % T % (a)	Britis h	Fre- nch	Spa- nish	Por- tug- uese	Bel- gian	Tur- kish	Oth-er (b)	Row Tot.
BHR	low	14 35.0 56.0 17.7	9 22.5 50 11.4	4 10.8 25.0 5.1	2 5.0 66.6 2.5	2 5.0 66.7 2.5	4 10.0 66.7 5.1	5 12.5 62.5 6.3	40 50.6
	med	10 28.6 40.2 12.7	9 25.7 50 11.4	9 25.0 56.2 11.4	1 2.9 33.3 1.3	1 2.8 33.3 1.3	2 5.7 33.3 2.5	3 8.6 37.5 3.8	35 44.3
	hi	1 25.0 4.0 1.3		4 50.0 18.7 3.7					4 5.1
	Col Tot	25 31.6	18 22.8	16 20.0	3 3.8	3 3.8	6 7.6	8 10.1	79 100

(a) Count, Row Percentages, Column Percentages, Total Percentages
(b) Other includes countries gaining independence from: Netherlands, Russia, Haiti, China, Italy, Sweden, Brazil Sources: J. Wright (1991) Universal Almanach. New York: Anderson & McMeel
Fischer (1986) Fischer Welt Almanach. Frankfurt Germ.: Fischer
Arthur S. Banks (1985) Political Handbook of the World. Binghamton: CSA Publications

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Table 9.1.3 Security Rights Performance by Colonial Heritage; For the Entire Sample (N=94) and for Developing Countries [N=80, listed in Brackets] (percentages are rounded)

	Type of Colonial Legacy								
	C % [C%] (a)	Bri-tish	Fre-nch	Spa-nish	Por-tug-uese	Bel-gian	Tur-kish	Oth-er (b)	n [n]
Sec-Right	low	34% [40%]	53% [53%]	45% [45%]	67% [67%]	67% [67%]	75% [83%]	39% [63%]	43 [41]
	med	32% [40%]	37% [37%]	27% [27%]	33% [33%]	33% [33%]	25% [17%]	15% [12%]	27 [25]
	hi	34% [20%]	0% [10%]	28% [28%]				46% [25%]	24 [14]
	n [n]	32 [25]	19 [18]	16 [16]	3 [3]	3 [3]	8 [6]	13 [8]	94 [80]

(a) Column Percentages -- percentages listen in brackets are for LDCs only.
(b) Other includes countries gaining independence from: Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Haiti, China, Italy, Sweden, Brazil

Table 9.2 Security Rights by British/Non-British Colonial Heritage

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct[a]		Colonial Heritage		
		Bri-tish	Non-Brit.(b)	Row Total
Basic Security Rights	Low	11 28.9 34.4 13.6	27 71.1 55.1 33.3	38 46.9
	Me-dium	10 40 31.3 12.3	15 60 30.6 18.5	25 30.9
	High	11 61.1 34.4 13.6	7 38.9 14.3 8.6	18 22.2
	Col Tot	32 39.5	49 60.5	81 100.0

(a) Count, Row Percentages, Column Percentages, Total Percentages
(b) French, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgian, Turkish.

Statistic: Kendall's Tau-b= .232; Gamma=.402/
T-values= 2.244
Significance of Table p <.023

Table 9.3 Group Averages on Individual Basic Human Rights by Colonial Heritage (British versus Non-British)

	Colonial Heritage					
	British (a)			Non-British (b)		
Rights	Group Mean	Stdv	n	Group Mean	Stdv	n
Torture (c)	1.31	1.09	32	.77	.89	49
Slavery (c)	1.68	1.03	32	1.53	.81	49
Detention(c)	1.09	1.27	32	.59	.81	49
Searches (c)	1.25	1.13	32	.93	.96	49
Cap.Pun. (c)	.59	1.01	32	.61	.97	49
Inf.Mort.(d)	80.03	56.9	32	87.89	87.89	49
Housing (e)	2.02	.62	32	2.04	.54	48
Calorie (%)	95.75	6.88	32	93.73	8.30	49
Literacy (%)	65.68	26.7	32	59.71	25.28	49
Water (%)	60.16	30.0	31	52.08	25.95	48
Secright(f)	5.93	4.85	32	4.44	3.62	49
Subright(g)	13.35	20.08	31	5.34	7.35	47

(a) Includes: Anglo-European Settler Colonies
(b) Includes: French, Spanish, Portugal, Belgian, Turkish Colonial Legacies
(c) Range: 0-3
(d) Number of deaths per 1000 live births
(e) Number of persons by room
(f) Security Rights Performance (range: 0-15)
(g) Subsistence Rights Performance (range: 1.2-99.5)

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Colonial Legacy -- A Co-Factor in Human Rights Performance?

The findings do not allow us to make a strong case for the British colonial heritage in the sense that by virtue of its more co-optive system former British colonies were automatically set on a trajectory to a political system in which government guaranteed certain basic rights. The evidence, however, is too strong to dismiss colonial heritage as a potential explanation of human rights performance entirely. It appears likely, therefore, that colonial legacy can be a useful explanatory concept in conjunction with other factors. We have seen in the previous section that in combination with length of independence the relationship between colonial experience and security rights performance tends to vary depending on the date of independence. It is plausible that a number of other factors such as national wealth, ethnic stratification and different cultural and/or social variables are likely to affect the relationship between human rights and colonial legacy. To test this assumption BHR-performance was correlated with colonial heritage (British versus non-British) by simultaneously controlling for GNP per capita.

The strength of the relationship between the colonial legacy and BHR-performance varied considerably depending on the level of per capita GNP, which was, for the purposes of this analysis, divided along 0.5 standard deviations into three (low, medium, high) categories[4]. For extremely poor nations (roughly less then $ 1000 GNP/c) the type of colonial legacy seemed to have no influence at all on BHR-performance (Kendall's Tau-b=-.022; Gamma=-.047/ not sign./n=52). In fact, non-British colonies did actually slightly better by placing a marginally greater proportion of nations in the medium BHR-performance category (35.5% vs. 33.3%). None of the countries in the low GNP per capita group achieved a high

score in terms of human rights performance. For the group of nations with medium per capita GNPs (roughly $ 1000 to 5000) the relationship between colonial legacy and BHR-performance was markedly higher (Kendall's Tau-b=.281; Gamma=.680/ not sign./n=25). The somewhat lower levels of significance can in part be attributed to the small number of cases in this sub-sample. Almost 62% of former British colonies score a high BHR-performance rating, compared with 50% of non-British colonies. The relationship between colonial experience and BHR-performance is strongest for countries above the $ 5000 GNP per capita mark (Kendall's Tau-b=.477; Gamma=.806/ p<.06/n=14). Of this sub-sample proportionally almost twice as many former British colonies (83.3%) are represented in the high BHR-performance category than there are former non-British colonies (37.5%).

While this study here is not equipped to make elaborate cross-cultural comparisons to determine whether a particular type of colonial legacy in combination with certain cultural, ethnic or social characteristics can produce variations in human rights performance, we can nevertheless explore regional differences. The colonial experience in Africa and Asia varied not only in terms of different colonial systems, but also in length and depth. Despite such variation Diamond reminds us, however, that...

> all of the colonial empires had set an example of authoritarian government.....To this model of authoritarian power and privilege must be added the colonial precedent of state violence and repression...the intolerant and antidemocratic character of postindependence politics must be traced, in part, to the repressiveness and lack of democratic penetration during colonial and settler rule" (Diamond et al. 1988 :7).

An analysis of the BHR-performance of some 33 Sub-Saharan African countries based on their colonial background did not indicate a superior performance of former British colonies (Table 9.4). Adding North African and Middle Eastern Countries to this sub-sample did not change the relationships observed in Table 9.4.

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[Table 9.4 -- about here]

A sub-sample of 38 Sub-Saharan and Northern African nations, however, confirms earlier observations that past British colonies have on average a better track record in security rights performance (Table 9.5). A considerably smaller percentage of previously British colonies were among the poor performers and proportionally more than twice as many ended up in the top category, when compared with former French, Portuguese, Belgian, Spanish or Turkish colonies.

[Table 9.5 -- about here]

[Table 9.6 -- about here]

In the Asian context the differences between various colonial legacies were considerably more pronounced. In a sample of 12 South and East Asian countries former British colonies outperform their non-British counterparts by a wide margin (Table 9.6).

In examining security rights alone the positive association between the British legacy compared with others increases in strength and is statistically significant despite the small number of cases (Kendall's Tau-b:.516/t-value 2.44/n=13) (c.f. Table 9.7).

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[Table 9.7 -- about here]

While overall the British colonial legacy has a better track record on security rights performance, we have also seen that the impact of the British heritage is not a uniform one, as a number of former British colonies are grouped at the opposite end of the human rights performance spectrum. For one, a number of other political, cultural and economic factors, some of which I have considered here, have affected both the countries' institutional evolution and their current human rights practices. Secondly, the British colonial system itself had a considerably varied impact on its former colonies. Goldsworthy, in a comprehensive study on British decolonization (1971), noted that both the British policy towards its colonies and the preparation for independence differed depending on the size and legal status of the territory (colony, protectorate (or both), trust territory, protected state, and condominium) as well as on the strategic, economic and demographic importance of the colony. Some were important strategically such as Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Singapore and Bermuda, others had substantial areas of white settlement (notably Kenya and Zimbabwe) and again others were economically crucial including Malaya (rubber), India (market), Uganda (cotton), the Gold Coast (Cocoa) or British Guiana (sugar). Depending on any of these factors colonies also differed in the level of political and economic penetration as well as in the length of British rule. In order to make a more definitive evaluation of the significance of the British colonial legacy on human rights practices these additional factors would need to be explored.

The colonial experience in Latin America differed from that of Africa or Asia in the sense that there the colonial experience was more alike and some of the variables affecting liberation and post-colonial evolution were "more or less constant across cases" (Diamond et

al 1989 :1). Most countries gained their independence from European colonial rule before the 20th century, share a common cultural heritage and a long tradition of Iberic colonization. In contrast to the decolonization of Asia and Africa "independence [in Latin America] was not gained by native elites outside the colonial administration who transferred power to nationalist leaders and returned to the metropolis, but by a Creole, culturally Spanish or (at the most) Mestizo elite against the officials sent by the crown to rule and administer the Indies. The indigenous population played no role in the struggle for independence, except, perhaps, in Mexico" (Diamond et al 1989 :3). Many students of Latin American politics attribute to Iberic colonial rule "an authoritarian legacy, since the metropolis ruled the colonies through centralized, bureaucratic state structure as part of a patrimonial monarchical state pursuing mercantilistic policies" (:2). The independence process through military force generated a whole new type of leadership -- the caudillos -- military strongmen creating and shaping the new nation. Wiarda in his discussion of Spanish rule in the Dominican Republic insists, for instance, that "the political culture inherited from Spain, has been absolutist, elitists, hierarchical, corporatist and authoritarian" (in: Diamond et al. :8) so that the enduring cultural legacy in former Spanish colonies is destined to shape and constrain the possibilities for democratic development.

Despite these important parallels the colonial legacies were not entirely uniform. Where mineral were resources plentiful and indigenous populations large, such as in Mexico or Peru, or in places where slaves were imported, colonial rule was especially harsh and exploitative (c.f Diamond et al. :3). This in turn resulted in severely polarized class divisions which would impact political life well into the future. Regions of lesser interest to the Spanish, such as Costa Rica, remained more isolated and largely bypassed by hacienda

agriculture. In nations such as Peru the effects of colonial rule were compounded by bitter ethnic cleavages. Other economies, such as Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, were less able rely on an indigenous labor supply than other Latin American countries, as a result the colonial history there implied the heavy influx of foreign immigrants.

In order to compare the overall human rights practices of former colonies in Latin America with that of past colonies in other parts of the world, regions were rated in terms of their average BHR and security rights scores. Latin American countries were proportionally much less likely to be represented in the bottom category of BHR-performance, than any other regions (Table 9.8). By the same token a larger proportion (15%) of former colonies in Latin America and the Caribbean were rated high performers, which compared very favorably with all other regional groupings, of which only Asia and Oceania had somewhat comparable results (33% with and 8% without Australia and New Zealand --c.f. Table 9.8).

In evaluating the performance of Latin American countries in this sample the relatively good performance may surprise at first, however, one should consider the following points. First, both the overall basic human rights and security rights performance in Latin America is not anywhere near the standards taken for granted in developed countries (c.f. Tables 3.1 & 3.2). Secondly, In contrast to other regions the nations of Latin America have enjoyed considerably longer periods of independence, much of that time was characterized by internal violence, excessive government repression and political turmoil. The data here, however do not reflect much of this troubled history, and are more indicative of recent reforms (such as the end of Somozismo in Nicaragua, or the changes in Uruguay and Brazil). Lastly, some parts of Latin America also benefit from their relatively greater prosperity when compared with many former colonies in Asia and Africa.

[Table 9.8 -- about here]

Table 9.8 also indicates that Latin America not only boasts the relatively largest proportion of nations in the top performance categories, but with respect to security rights it places nearly equal proportions in each of the three (low 40%. medium 30%, high 30%) categories measuring country performance in this dimension. This suggests that with nearly equal percentages in the low and high category, Latin American countries are more polarized in security rights performance, compared with other regions that are almost all represented only in the bottom and medium performance category. One of the advantages that Latin American countries have enjoyed in comparison with other regions is that many of them possess some of the institutional inventory to secure human rights, such as different political parties, a well-developed judicial system, a parliament and regular elections. All too often, however, the political will is missing and existing formally democratic institutions are little more than window dressing. In the case of real reforms such a in Uruguay or Argentina the human rights conditions may improve more rapidly as existing institutional structures can be quickly adapted, while in other world regions reform-minded regimes often have to first embark on a lengthy process of institution building.

Another important question concerns how former British colonies in the region compare to their Iberic neighbors in terms of the security rights performance (c.f. Table 9.9). Due to the small number of former British colonies in the region, the results do not allow us draw any sweeping conclusions, the findings are, nevertheless, consistent with our earlier results and give additional support to the general proposition that in terms of security rights former British colonies tend to outperform other colonial types.

[Table 9.9 -- about here]

Accounts of the failure of democracy in former Spanish colonies usually contrast the Latin American experience with that of North America (c.f. Diamond et al 1989 :4). Judged by the performance of their northern neighbors, the newly independent countries of Central- and South America fall, of course, far short. They had to contend with a repressive political culture, ethnic fragmentation, institutional discontinuity and civic strife in the wake of the collapse of the metropolis (Spain in 1812). The extractive nature of Spanish colonialism and the sharp social divisions added to an evolutionary trajectory, which, in terms of democratic performance, including government respect for human rights, was very different from the English legacy to the north. This, however, never implied that the Iberic colonial experience in Latin America would compare unfavorably with that in other parts of the globe and, indeed, in terms of BHR-performance many Latin American countries seem to be curiously positioned between the former Anglo-European settler colonies and some of the more recently decolonized countries in Africa and Asia. In contrast to the latter group, most former Iberic colonies have enjoyed over 150 years of independence and even a longer period of nationhood (although by no means consolidated statehood). In addition to the role of the Catholic Church as a pervasive force of social mediation and cultural integration there has been a substantial institutional continuity (systemic corporatist elements, republican and presidential tradition) in most Latin American countries. These are all factors absent in most African and several Asian countries, which still wrestle with questions of national self-identity as well as ethnic and religious diversity. Lastly, in explaining the BHR-performance of Latin American countries one will also have to consider the substantially greater wealth of Latin America ($

1,900 GNP/

($ 477).

1,900 GNP/c in 1984) compared, for example with South Asia ($ 268) or Sub-Saharan Africa ($ 477).

Table 9.4 Sub-Saharan Africa: BHR-Performance by Colonial Heritage (n=33)

	n=(17)	n=(16)
Low BHR-Perf.:	British (60.1%);	non-British (61.1%)
Medium BHR-Perf.:	British (33.3%);	non-British (38.9%)
High BHR-Perf.:	British (6.7%);	non-British (0%)
Pct. Total:	British (100%);	non-British (100%)
Kendall's Tau-b:.036/T-value .21		

(*) Percentages refer to the total number of cases in each of the two categories of colonial heritage.

Table 9.5 Africa: Security Rights_Performance by Colonial Heritage (n=38)

	n=(18)	n=(20)
Low SecRight-Perf.:	British (44.4%);	non-British (55.6%)
Medium SecRight-Perf.:	British (33.3%);	non-British (40%)
High SecRight-Perf.:	British (22.2%);	non-British (10%)
Pct. Total:	British (100%);	non-British (100%)
Kendall's Tau-b:.100/t-value .641		

(*) Percentages refer to the total number of cases in each of the two categories of colonial heritage.

Table 9.6 South/East Asia: BHR-Performance by Colonial Heritage (n=13)

	n=(7)	n=(6)
Low BHR-Perf.:	British (57.1%);	non-British (100%)
Medium BHR-Perf.:	British (28.6%);	non-British (0%)
High BHR-Perf.:	British (14.3%);	non-British (0%)
Pct. Total:	British (100%);	non-British (100%)

Kendall's Tau-b:.490/T-value 2.28

Percentages refer to the total number of cases in each of the two categories of colonial heritage.

Table 9.7 South/East Asia: Security Rights Performance by Colonial Heritage (n=13)

	n=(7)	n=(6)
Low SecRight-Perf.:	British (42.9%);	non-British (100%)
Medium SecRight-Perf.:	British (42.9%);	non-British (0%)
High SecRight-Perf.:	British (14.3%);	non-British (0%)
Pct. Total:	British (100%);	non-British (100%)

Kendall's Tau-b:.593/T-value 2.44

Percentages refer to the total number of cases in each of the two categories of colonial heritage.

Table 9.8 Basic Human Rights and Security Rights Performance of Former Colonies By Regions (The percentages for security rights performance are listed in parentheses).

	Regions of Former Colonies [a]			
BHR (Sec-Right)	Latin-America Caribbean n=20	Africa[b] n=36	Middle East[c] n=6	Asia Oceania[d] n=10
Low %	25(40)	52.8(47.4)	66.7(66.7)	67.1(58.3)
Med. %	60(30)	44.4(38.8)	33.3(33.3)	25.8(33.3)
High %	15(30)	2.8(15.8)	0(0)	7.1(8.3)

(a) Includes countries of former British, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Turkish rule
(b) Includes Sub-Saharan and Northern African countries
(c) Without Northern Africa
(d) Without Australia and New Zealand (including these two nations would result in the following distribution (n=12): BHR (Security Rights) Performance: low = 58.3%; medium = 16.7%; high = 25.5%

Table 9.9 Latin-America/Caribbean: Security Rights Performance by Colonial Heritage (n=20)

	n=(2)	n=(18)
Low SecRight-Perf.:	British (0%) ;	non-British (44.4%)
Medium SecRight-Perf.:	British (50%);	non-British (27.8%)
High SecRight-Perf.:	British (50%);	non-British (27.8%)
Pct. Total:	British (100%);	non-British (100%)

Kendall's Tau-b:.232/Gamma=.615/T-values 1.231

Percentages refer to the total number of cases in <u>each</u> of the two categories of colonial heritage.

Newness of the State/Length of Independence

When analyzing the impact of the British colonial legacy on BHR-performance, length of independence featured as an important intervening variable. The relationship was strongest for those of developing countries that had gained independence since WWI. Since this procedure eliminated also the wealthy Anglo-European settler colonies form the sample it also removed a number of variables that could have otherwise accounted for the 'strong British showing' (wealth, European settler colony, ethnic make-up etc.) leaving length of time itself as an important factor. In addition, the overall performance of Latin-American and Caribbean countries, most of which had gained their independence in the last century may provide an additional clue that 'history', respectively 'time' itself may, indeed, be a relevant variable in explaining human rights performance. Over time societies consolidate, institutions grow into their own and often social, cultural and religious cleavages become less pronounced with successive generations. One-party states and authoritarian regimes often deemed indispensable in the centrifugal turmoil following the decades after independence may exhaust themselves eventually and may seem more and more irrelevant as people have learned to live with the realities of their new societies (c.f. Bratton 1994; Jackman 1991, Mitchell/McCormick 1987).

In following an idea by Mitchell/McCormick (1988) I correlated BHR-performance with years since independence in order to establish whether length of time played a significant role in the post-colonial experience. In a sample of 95 nations 43 LDCs (and 1 OECD nation) gained their independence after WWII, 12 LDC's (and 1 OECD nation) between the world wars and 26 LDCs (and 7 OECD nations) prior to that. Interestingly, the countries that won independence since WWII are proportionally the poorest (56.6% are classified as low income

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economy and only 6.5% are classified as upper middle income by the World Bank), while those with a long record of independence are the richest (only 8.6% are classified as lower income, while 22.9% are considered upper middle income.).

Correlating length of independence with our index of BHR-performance reveals a moderately high and statistically highly significant correlation coefficient ($r=.426/p<.001$). The relationship is markedly weaker when we control for industrialized countries, but even in a sample of only developing countries longer periods of independence are significantly associated with better BHR-performance ($r=.290/p<.01$).

Tables 9.10 and 9.11 provide an overview of how the two basic human rights dimensions are related to length of independence. In order to reduce a long list of other potentially intervening factors the sample analyzed in the above tables consists of LDCs only. Both tables record that longer periods of independence tend to be associated with a better performance in each of the human rights dimensions. The relationship is especially pronounced with respect to security rights.

[Table 9.10 -- about here]

[Table 9.11 -- about here]

It seems, furthermore, that, if time is to be a factor, the relevant period spans several generations, rather than a few decades, as evidenced by the performance differences between

the three time categories. In fact, if we analyze a sub-sample of developing countries and focus solely on a time frame of less than 50 years since independence (n=43) the countries with less than 25 years of independence actually outperform those between 25 and 50 years of national independence considerably in terms of guaranteeing basic human rights (c.f. Table 9.12) -- this short-term trend reveres itself, however, if we push the time frame of analysis past the 50 year mark.

[Table 9.12 -- about here]

While there are many other factors to consider that may explain this unexpected variation in security rights performance over the first few decades, one possible answer may lie in the process of regime consolidation in various countries. In some cases, immediately following independence different societal and political forces emerge. Perhaps once united in the struggle against colonial rule, revolutionary coalitions fall apart and confront each other, so that it is more difficult for any one group to monopolize governmental power. Being fearful of a still powerful opposition even a more dominant political group may initially shy away from using the entire repressive inventory of the state. Over time, however. as the dominate regime consolidates its power, is it able to apply a greater level of repressions. Overall it appears, nevertheless, that the level of repression peaks at some point within 50 years following independence and decreases (albeit painfully) slowly with each additional decade of independence. Elsewhere in this study I suggest that all things being equal some additional 10 years of independence add about one and a half points to the BHR-score (c.f Table 10.1).

As indicated earlier in this study, it is far more useful to conceive of the concept of colonial experience as a combination of factors, which have had both independent and joined effects on the evolutionary trajectory of nations. It would, therefore, be an oversimplification to look at colonial legacy and length of independence as isolated causal phenomena, each with clearly quantifiable measures of influence. Instead, it is more likely that these variables acted in conjunction with each other and probably a host of other factors to produce a variety of outcomes. These combined effects can be effectively demonstrated, for instance, by comparing the relationship between length of independence and human rights performance for different colonial legacies.

In order to undertake such a comparison a sample of developing countries was split into two groups based on whether the colonial heritage was British or non-British. The difference in BHR-performance was quite dramatic. For the British type there was a negative, respectively no association between length of independence and BHR-performance (Kendall's Tau-b=-.093/Gamma=-.189/T-value-.509/n=25). The relationship observed in the group of non-British colonies was quite different reflecting in part, undoubtedly, the Iberic legacy. There 56% of the nations with medium BHR-performance and 100% of countries with high BHR-performance were drawn from the pool of cases, whose independence dates back to the last century. By contrast, nations with a poor BHR-record were twice as likely to have gained independence after WWII than prior (Kendall's Tau-b=.256/Gamma=.440/T-value=2.12/n=54).

Conclusion.

In this chapter two principal aspect of the colonial heritage were examined -- colonial legacy, specifically the British versus the non-British type, and length of independence. The

concept of colonial heritage is undoubtedly more complex than this study was able to analyze. The findings here should, therefore, be viewed more as exploratory and suggestive, rather than finite conclusions.

For one, a multitude of factors is likely to impact the evolutionary trajectory of nations, out of which the colonial experience is only one -- undoubtedly an important -- element. Secondly, a more complete analysis of colonial legacy would also have to include measures for level of cultural and economic penetration by the former colonial power, length of colonial rule as well as a systematic analysis of how independence was brought about. Thirdly, the complex evolution of countries conditioned by the multi-faceted nature of the colonial heritage is also bound up with other historical, political and economic factors, which makes it difficult to determine to what extend current human rights practices are attributable to colonial legacy and to what extend to other causes.

There are, however, several important trends that can be supported empirically. It is save to say that of all countries that had gained independence in this century former British colonies performed notably better in terms of guaranteeing basic human rights than any other type. Among developing countries the British colonial legacy seems be more strongly correlated with security rights than with subsistence, something which is quite consistent with theoretical claims concerning the more liberal and democratic nature of British colonial roots. The impact of the colonial legacy is affected by a variety of other factors, most notably national wealth, length of independence and regional differences. The impact of the British colonial heritage on BHR-performance was strongest for nations with high per Capita GNPs and weakest with nations of less than $ 1000 GNP per capita. Conversely, while former British colonies showed the best BHR-performance of all countries that have gained

independence in this century, length of independence itself did not seem to have impact on the BHR-performance of former British colonies.

Over long periods of time length of independence is mildly associated with greater respect for human rights. For the first two or three decades immediately after independence, however, this relationship may actually reverse itself in some cases. There are also a number of interesting regional differences. Former Iberic colonies in Latin America generally benefitted -- with a few exceptions -- from greater overall prosperity and longer periods of independence. In addition, the existence of a more homogenous culture, a well-defined institutional inventory and in contrast to other regions a more consolidated nationhood, seemed to important advantages of the Iberic legacy. Latin American countries, however, are also more polarized with respect to their security rights performance with almost equally large shares of countries in the two opposite categories of the performance spectrum.

The impact of the British colonial legacy was notably weaker in Africa than in Asia. In Latin America and the Caribbean there are too few cases of former British colonies to draw any definitive conclusions, although also there the two cases recorded performed above the regional average. Among nations whose independence does not predate WWI former British colonies clearly outperform all other colonial types. Length of independence itself, however, was found to have least of an impact on the BHR-performance of former British colonies. As the British policy towards its colonies differed, also the British legacy is not a uniform and a substantial number of nation under former British rule have ended up with poor human rights practices. In short, while the British experience may be one factor in explaining good human rights, and especially security rights performance, it is not a sufficient condition to prevent a poor track record in human rights.

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While the colonial legacy and length of independence may be not as important as other explanatory variables in this study, in conjunction with regime type they could form the core of an institutional model of human right performance in former colonies, in the sense that the evolutionary trajectory of political development in these countries was strongly conditioned by these factors.

Table 9.10 Security Rights by Length of Independence for LDCs

	Length of Independence				
	Ct R % C % T % (a)	After WWII	After WWI	Before WWI	Row Tot.
Sec-Right Perf.	low	40 61.5 88.9 44	9 13.8 75 9.9	16 24.6 47.1 17.6	65 71.4
	med	5 27.8 11.1 5.5	2 11.1 16.7 2.2	11 61.1 32.4 12.1	18 19.8
	hi		1 12.5 8.3 1.1	7 87.5 20.6 7.7	8 8.8
	Col Tot	45 49.5	12 13.1	34 37.4	91 100

(a) Count, Row Percentages, Column Percentages, Total Percentages
Source: J. Wright (1991) Universal Almanach. New York: Anderson & McMeel

Table 9.11: Subsistence Rights by Length of Independence for LDCs

		Length of Independence			
	Ct R % C % T % (a)	After WWII	After WWI	Before WWI	Row Tot.
Sub-Right Perf.	low	39 60.9 92.9 49	9 14.1 81.8 11.4	16 25 61.5 20.3	64 81
	med	3 20 7.1 3.8	2 13.3 18.2 2.5	10 66.7 38.5 12.7	15 19
	Col Tot	42 53.2	11 13.9	26 32.9	79 100

(a) Count, Row Percentages, Column Percentages, Total Percentages
(Kendall's Tau-b=.339/Gamma=.678/T-value=3.03/Table: p<.005)

Table 9.12 Security Rights Performance of Nations by Length of Independence For the last 50 Years (n=43)

	n = 28	n = 15
Low SecRight-Perf.:	0-24 yrs (48.3%);	25-50 yrs (60%)
Medium SecRight-Perf.:	0-24 yrs (31%) ;	25-50 yrs (40%)
High SecRight-Perf.:	0-24 yrs (20.7%);	25-50 yrs (0%)
Number of cases:	0-24 yrs (100%) ;	25-50 yrs (100%)

The percentages listed refer to <u>each</u> time category separately.

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An Institutional Model of Explaining Human Rights Performance

At its core regime type has two important components, one being political competition the other political participation, both of which are reflective of the institutions, rules and underlying normative preferences of different regimes. In order to construct an institutional model of human rights performance we want to return to regime type as our point of departure. We begin our investigation of a historical trajectory along the development of institutions that define the liberal political regime by examining the following issues. First we want to assess in more detail the importance of the "liberal" component (competitiveness) on human rights. Then we shall look at the impact of the more "liberal" British colonial heritage in conjunction with length of independence as part of a multiple regression model to be introduced below.

An OLS-regression was used to analyze the impact of each of the two regime type components on basic human rights, respectively to determine the amount of variation explained by each regime dimension in relation to the other. To do so we specify the following three equations:

(c.f. Table 10.1):

(1) BHR-Performance = $\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_i + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + e$

(2) Security Rights Performance = $\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + e$

(3) Subsistence Rights Performance = $\gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + e$

Where γ is the dependent variable at that point in time,

α is the intercept, β_1, β_2 are empirically determined weights,

χ_{i1} (legislative margin %) χ_{i2} (voter turnout %) are independent variables,

and e is the error term.

Table 10.1 summarizes the findings of three OLS-regression equations, in which BHR-performance, security rights performance and subsistence rights performance were dependent variables, each in a different equation, while legislative margin (competitiveness) and voter turnout (participation) were the independent variables in all three equation. The findings confirm our earlier conclusion that competitiveness is the more important component. With respect to BHR-performance and security rights performance the parameter coefficients for legislative margin are about twice as high as participation. In terms of subsistence rights performance, the former is still by about 10% higher. In short, all things being equal a one percent decline in legislative margin adds about 1.3 points to the BHR-index score (range: 0 to 200), 0.12 points to the security rights index (range: 0 to 15) and about 0.01 points to subsistence rights performance (range: 0 to 88). By comparison, a one percent increase in voter turnout boosts the BHR-index by about 0.8 points, security rights performance by about half a point and subsistence rights by a little over a tenth of point (.013).

[Table 10.1 -- about here]

Elsewhere in this dissertation I have argued that all too frequently economic factors are advanced in order to explain human rights performance. In the following I shall introduce an alternative model explaining human rights performance centered around regime-type. In the course of analyzing the bivariate relationships between human rights performance and various economic and political factors evidence has suggested that a multivariate approach may reflect much more accurately the complex interactive relationships between the variables

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examined here. I propose two multivariate regime type models, one is a more narrow institutional model, the other is an expanded model. Both are designed to account for cross-national variations in BHR-performance of former colonies. The first model is dubbed an institutional model, as it explains human rights performance as a result of a particular institutional evolution. It is narrow in the sense that if focuses solely on the political variables examined here without taking into account some of the economic factors analyzed in the earlier part of this dissertation. The institutional model posits that three different political components, regime type, colonial legacy and length of independence, are instrumental in creating conditions that determine the extent to which governments secure human rights. Bivariate evidence has shown that more participatory and more competitive regimes were likely to perform better in securing basic human rights. In addition, the British colonial legacy tended to lead to the creation of more liberal and open societies evidenced in the existence of institutions separate from government, such as a relatively free press and/or an independent judicial system, as exemplified in Nigeria or India. In the face of such institutions even the actions of authoritarian governments tend to be somewhat mitigated -- something which is quite consistent with the findings of the earlier bivariate analysis. It is important to remember that 'more liberal' does not automatically imply more democratic. Few people would consider Nigeria's history of constitutional upheavals and military rule as resembling anything like a democracy, and yet it boast a more vigilant press and an a more independent judicial system than many other countries in the region.

Lastly, length of independence was found to be associated with better BHR-practices hinting that over longer time periods repressive regimes may either exhaust themselves and disappear, or respectively, consolidate themselves to the extend that increased political

stability results in a decrease of repression (as for example Chile in the 1990s).

The "expanded political model" incorporates the same independent variables as the institutional model but adds volume of foreign trade as a measure of openness and liberal economics. Findings presented earlier in this study has resulted in conflicting accounts suggesting that trade may have a positive or negative impact on human rights depending on the region and the type of countries analyzed. In the earlier LDC-Model, which focused specifically on some 59 lower middle and low income countries, trade appeared to have a negative effect. This was also corroborated by earlier bivariate, albeit statistically not significant findings, that in extremely poor countries foreign trade had no or a negative impact on human (especially security) rights. There is other bivariate evidence, however, that in the sample at large trade tends to be positively associated especially with subsistence rights performance. Since the trade has featured in this an other research (Mitchell/McCormick 1987) as a measure for world market integration implying "liberal" economics institutions and policies, it seems a fitting inclusion in an expanded regime type model centered around the "liberal regime".

Institutional Model.

An OLS-analysis of the institutional model indicates that it can account for some 59% of the variation in BHR-performance (c.f. Tables 10.2). Furthermore, its goodness of fit was confirmed by a visual examination of a residual plot (plot of residuals with predicted residuals) and highly significant F-statistics ($p<.0001$). Concerns that the independent variables are considerably correlated with each other are not warranted. A correlation matrix prior to the regression analysis does not indicate multi-collinearity. All independent variables -- regime

type, British colonial legacy, length of independence -- were statistically significant.

As expected, in Tables 10.2 the most important predictor of human rights performance was regime type (electoral turnout by legislative margin -- c.f. section on regime type) suggesting that the higher the voter turnout and the lower party dominance the better the performance in both human rights dimensions. British colonial legacy was coded as a dummy variable (1 British legacy; 0 non-British legacy) and since the coefficient is positive it confirms our earlier findings that former British colonies were more likely to have a better human rights performance. In fact, the data indicate that all thing being equal a British colony had on average a BHR-performance score that was by about 16 points higher on the BHR-index (0 to 200), than if the heritage was non-British. Nevertheless, British heritage turned out to be the least significant of the three variables in the model. The coefficient for length of independence, by contrast, proved more important but is effective only over very long periods of time. Its parameter value of (.126) suggests, all things being equal, that for roughly every additional 10 years of independence the BHR-score would increase only by a value of '1.26'.

[Table 10.2 -- about here]

The institutional model provides an alternative explanation of basic human rights performance that departs from other, strictly economic, approaches centered on national wealth or level of development by embracing a political-institutional framework. The model is robust, statistically significant and has a high goodness of fit by explaining almost two thirds of the variance in basic human rights performance of former colonies. In addition, the

coefficients for each of the independent variables -- regime type, British colonial heritage and length of independence -- are statistically significant.

The Expanded Model.

The expanded model is based upon the institutional model but adds a measure for trade[5] (source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1986). It is important to remember that this is not a general model of human rights performance, but applies specifically to the group of nations that share one main characteristic by all having once been colonies, excluding most West and East European as well as several Asian countries.

The expanded model has somewhat more explanatory power than the institutional model as it can account for about 64% of the variation in BHR-performance and is statistically highly significant ($p<.00001$). Except "British colonial legacy" all parameter coefficients were statistically significant, with regime type being the most important and the length of independence and trade roughly having an equal impact. The relationship between trade and BHR-performance is incidently positive. While "British colonial legacy" came close to being statistically significant ($p <.079$), it remained clearly the weakest explanatory variable in this model.

[Table 10.3 -- about here]

Conclusion.

This chapter has shown that it is possible to develop alternative political explanations of human rights performance, which contrasts other approaches that are implicitly or explicitly based on economic contingencies. In doing so I am neither suggesting that economic factors are unimportant, nor that they should be neglected, but I do argue that a considerable portion of the variation in cross-national human rights performance can be explained in terms of political variables, conceptualized largely independent of economic effects. Such political explanations include most importantly political competitiveness and participation, but can be supplemented also by measures for colonial legacy and length of independence, depending on the sample of nations analyzed. While regime type was found to have a most profound effect on all aspects of BHR-performance, with participatory and competitive regimes accounting for most of the high BHR-performance, length of independence and colonial experience were found to be lesser but, nevertheless, significant factors. British colonial legacy seemed in many countries to be associated with a more liberal tradition reflected in a better record on BHR-performance (on average 11-16 BHR-index points higher), the analysis of length of independence suggested, furthermore, that BHR-performance improved (albeit very slowly) with longer periods of independence.

Given the complex nature of the concept of colonial experience, which was shown earlier to be affected also by regional and economic factors (GNP/c), it is most meaningful to apply these variables either in conjunction with each other (by using one as a control variable for the other), or respectively in the context of multivariate models, two of which I have introduced here.

I interpret the excellent goodness of fit of both models, especially the importance of

competitiveness and the British colonial legacy, as evidence for a historical trajectory towards the establishment of political institutions, which more readily secure human rights. It can be argued that a certain (most likely British) colonial experience facilitated the evolution of a liberal tradition, which is taken to be a prerequisite for institutions such as a free press, an independent judiciary, free and fair elections and all the other institutional inventory associated with good human rights performance. Furthermore, successful countries in such a historical trajectory have by now reached a considerable length of independence during which they have stabilized themselves, their institutions have more fully developed and initial "political scores" have been settled. By invoking the notion of a historical trajectory I am not suggesting that this is an automatic or teleological process. In fact, it is probably contingent also upon a variety of other factors, some of which have been examined and successfully identified in the course of this project. In the best case scenario, however, the liberal historical trajectory led to the creation of inclusionary democracies, in which high levels of participation and competitiveness insure a good record on human rights.

Table 10.1 A Comparison of the Relative Impact of political Competitiveness (Leg. Margin) versus Participation (Voter Turnout) on BHR-, Security Rights, and Subsistence Rights Performance

Regime Type Models	----- BHR ----- Leg. Margin Voter Turnout n=114	----- SecR ----- Leg. Margin Voter Turnout n=114	----- SubR ----- Leg. Margin Voter Turnout n=114
G.o.Fit Statistics & Parameter Coeff.			
DV	BHR	SecR	SubR
R	.770	.739	.662
R2	.593	.546	.438
Adj.R2	.585	.538	.428
F	80.894	70.416	43.366
Sig.F	.000	.000	.000
Leg. Margin B	-1.300	- .121	- .013
SE B	.135	.012	.002
Beta	- .611	- .615	- .438
T	-9.587	- 9.337	-5.850
Sig.T	.000	.000	.000
Voter Turnout B	.782	.057	.013
SE B	.135	.014	.002
Beta	.312	.254	.376
T	4.897	3.868	5.024
Sig.T	.000	.000	.000
Const. B	132.107	13.502	2.147
SE B	14.019	1.329	.239
T	9.423	10.154	8.971
Sig. T	.000	.000	.000

Abbreviations: DV=Dependent Variable; R=Correlation Coefficient; R2=Regression Coefficient; Adj.R2=Adjusted R-Square; F-Statistic; Sig.F=Significance of Model; Leg. Margines defines the percentage of seats in % of the dominant party in the main legislative body; Voter Turnout reflects the % of voters of the total population in national elections. Const.=Constant; B=Parameter Coefficient; SE B=Standard Error of Parameter Coefficient; Beta=Standardized Parameter Coefficient; T=T-values; Sig.T=Significance of T (statistical significance of Parameter Coefficient); BHR=Basic Human Rights Performance; SubR=Subsistence Rights Performance; SecR=Security Rights Performance; LDC=Less Developed Countries

Table 10:2 OLS-Institutional Model -- Basic Human Rights Performance

Multiple Regression Analysis:

Dependent variable: BHR-performance
Independent variables: regime type, British colonial legacy, length of independence (yrs)

Multiple R	.780
R^2	.609
Adjusted R^2	.594
F	28.072
Sig.F	.000

Dependent Variables	B	SE B	Beta	T-value	sig. T
Regime Type	72.478	8.070	.659	8.981	.000
Brit.Col.	16.239	6.582	.175	2.467	.015
Length/Indep.	.126	.037	.252	3.356	.001
Constant	-1.158	5.705		-.203	.839

Table 10:3 OLS-Expanded Model -- Basic Human Rights Performance

Multiple Regression Analysis:

Dependent variable: BHR-performance
Independent variables: regime type, British colonial legacy, length of independence (yrs), trade

Multiple R	.800
R^2	.640
Adjusted R^2	.623
F	36.126
Sig.F	.000

Dependent Variables	B	SE B	Beta	T-value	sig. T
Regime Type	68.296	7.939	.621	8.602	.000
Brit.Col.	11.672	6.574	.125	1.776	.079
Length/Indep.	.100	.037	.200	2.671	.009
Trade	4.7E-04	1.75-04	.195	2.674	.009
Constant	2.528	5.672		.446	.657

(note: trade was adjusted for GNP and logged)

Stated Human Rights Commitment

The preceding chapters have sought to provide different explanations of human rights performance, the remainder of this dissertation will introduce a new concept, that of human rights effort by putting performance in relation to capacity. At this juncture between the concepts of performance and effort I want to return to a question posed at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, which concerns the relationship between a government's actual policy on human rights and its publicly stated commitments about it. Conceptually, the notion of stated human rights commitment provides a bridge between the two operational frameworks of BHR-performance and BHR-effort. On one hand a government's stated commitment is measured against its actual "performance", on the other a stated commitment can also be thought of as professed effort, which is related to the same type of values, intentions, and the political will that is assumed to be the conceptual underpinning for "effort".

Let me briefly repeat my earlier observations of why I think this is an important question. NGO representatives at the 1992 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna were debating the effectiveness of human rights agreements. Some took the position that becoming a party to UNDHR and its two Covenants was mostly a token act undertaken by governments largely for image reasons, which did not really affect their actual human rights policy. Others argued that signing human rights agreements was an expression of a government's stated commitment to human rights, which ultimately resulted in improved human rights practices. In short, the research question is straight-forward and asks, whether or not there is a statistically significant correlation between a government's stated commitment

to human rights by being a party to the two UN human rights covenants, and the performance of that government in terms of actually securing basic political and economic rights. If, as expected, there exists such a relationship we might further examine whether there are any important differences across regions or groups of countries.

While the connection between government behavior and professed commitment may be easy to ascertain, its interpretation is substantially more complicated, for it is somewhat difficult to infer a meaningful causal linkage between the two variables. While behavior may be a consequence of intentions, both intentions and behavior are themselves only the last two links along a causal chain of variables that are conceptually more meaningful to uncover than the intentions immediately preceding the act. In a participatory and inclusive regime, for instance, popular pressure may compel a government both to sign a human rights agreement and to act upon it; to argue then that signing the human rights document "caused" the government to show greater respect from human rights is problematic, as the relationship is in part spurious. In short, it is theoretically more valuable and insightful to be able to link human rights to general underlying socioeconomic and political conditions, such as regime type, the distribution of wealth, the level of development or the colonial heritage than to attribute BHR-performance simply to the government's stated views on human rights, for both the government's actions and intentions could be the product of the same underlying factors.

However, the relationship between performance and stated commitment may also have a true causal connection in the sense that once a government commits itself publicly to human rights, its behavior changes. This may happen for anyone of the following reasons; for one, the government's policy can now be monitored more effectively by domestic and international human rights organizations, as there exists an agreed upon catalog of criteria by which to

judge a government's performance. Secondly, making a public commitment may draw international attention to the human rights situation in a country, as a result of which a government concerned for its international prestige would improve its policy, even if the true intentions had been otherwise. Thirdly, a government's pledge to respect certain rights may bring about a number of incentives in the form of international trade, economic aid, foreign investments, increased tourism, MFN-status and other benefits which would induce a government to continue to improve its new human rights policy. Fourth, expanded human rights monitoring due to a government commitment to human rights would also make it more difficult for local police and security forces to engage in human rights abuse, as such behavior can be reported to superior authorities. Fifth, a government signalling its willingness to commit itself to human rights is more likely to receive international help to retrain and educate its security forces in light of the new policy.

Summing up, we expect ceteris paribus governments that make a public commitment to human rights will perform better than those that do not. Furthermore, its is reasonable to assume that becoming a party to the UNDHR and its covenants is not only a mere reflection of government policy but may, to some limited extent, also "cause" government to improve its performance for the reasons mentioned above.

Hypothesis Testing and Findings.

The following hypothesis is being tested here:

"The stated commitments of governments to act in accordance with the United Nations human rights covenants is likely to be positively associated with basic human rights performance".

Based on David Forsythe 's assessment of which countries had become a party to one of both UN covenants by 1984 (c.f. David Forsythe (1983) Human Rights and World Politics, Table 3: 68-73, Fischer Weltalmanach 1986) each nation in the data set was classified according to whether it had (a) not signed any covenant at all, (b) signed only the civil/political covenant, (c) signed only the socioeconomic covenant, (d) signed both covenants or (e) any other human rights accord, but not any of the two covenants. BHR-performance was once again divided along 0.5 standard deviations into three categories marked low, medium and high. As evident in Table 11.1 the overwhelming majority of countries (76) had signed both covenants, while only 27 had not become a party to any UN-human rights agreement. Some 12 nations had signed human rights accords other than the two covenants. All nations, however, that signed the civil/political covenants had also (by the time of this assessment) signed the socioeconomic covenant. By contrast two nations had signed only the latter without becoming a party to the former. The group of nations that had not signed any international human rights agreement performed poorly, as almost 52% of it placed in the low-performance category. By contrast only some 7.4% of the same group achieved a high BHR-performance rating. Having signed both covenants, however, was far from being a strong indicator of good BHR-performance, as this group of countries split nearly three-ways (L=31.6%, M=36.8%, H=31.6%) into the three levels of performance, in which the medium category actually takes the lion share with 36.8%. Nations that have either signed only the socioeconomic covenant (L=100%) or human rights agreements other than the two covenants have by far the worst track record (L=66.7%, M=33.3%, H=0% -- c.f. Table 11.1).

[Table 11.1 -- about here]

In short these findings do not suggest that being a party to the two covenants or to any other human rights agreement has much effect on human rights performance. While this may seem disappointing from the perspective of advocates of UN human rights efforts, our assessment of this relationship may change as we control for level of development. In order to simplify the procedure and to test for significant differences between the country categories the variable was dichotomized such that one category was made up of nations having signed both UN covenants, while the other was coded to include countries having signed none or only agreements other than the two covenants. Subsequently, the nations were analyzed again in terms of low, medium and high BHR-performance, this time, however, by controlling for level of economic development (low, medium, high GNP/c -- Tables 11.2.1 through 11.2.3). Indeed, per capita GNP has a strong intervening effect. For nations with low levels of development (approximately less than $ 1000 GNP/c) there is no significant difference in BHR-performance between nations having signed both covenants and those that have not or signed other agreements (Kendall's Tau-b=.095/T-value=.679/n=49).

[Table 11.2.1 -- about here]

[Table 11.2.2 -- about here]

[Table 11.2.3 -- about here]

For nations in the medium GNP per capita range the difference in BHR-performance between both groups of countries was marked (Kendall's Tau-b=-.239/T-value=-1.401/n=31 -- c.f. Table 11.2.2), but opposite to what was predicted by our hypothesis. Although this finding is not statistically significant and may be purely coincidental, it comes, nevertheless, as quite a surprise that parties to the two covenant find themselves outperformed by those nations that had chosen to abstain. Only for nations with per capita GNPs above around $ 5000 the relationship between signing both UN covenants and good BHR-performance was positive and statistically significant (Kendall's Tau-b=.377/sign. of table: Chi-Square=.004/n=25 -- c.f. Table 11.2.3).

In a further step regime type was introduced as a second control variable. In short, the relationship between the dichotomized "covenant variable" (whether or not a nation had signed the two covenants) and BHR-performance was examined for each of the four regime type categories; exclusionary authoritarian, inclusionary authoritarian, exclusionary democratic and inclusionary democratic. There was no significant difference between nations in their BHR-performance regardless of their status with respect to the two UN-covenants. In fact, except for exclusionary democracies the performance of nations in all other regime categories was slightly better for those that had not signed the two covenants than those that had signed (c.f. Table 11.4).

Conclusion.

We are therefore left with the startling conclusion that being a party to the two major UN covenants has virtually no effect on performance. While less participatory and less competitive regimes had a uniformly bad track record on human rights, inclusionary democracies did exceedingly well no matter what their position was with regards to the UN covenants. The same was true for nations along different levels of development. Poorer nations tended to do badly and wealthier ones noticeably better irrespective of their stated commitment. Only in the group with high GNPs per capita nations that had become a party to both covenants clearly outperformed those that had not. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the evidence does not support the assertion that a government's stated commitment to human rights in the form of being a party to the two UN covenants has any significant effect on that government's BHR-performance. In fact, the findings here can be interpreted as further evidence for the importance of underlying factors such as economic development and regime type.

Table 11.1 Basic Human Rights Performance by Stated Human Rights Commitment:

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Signed no UN Covenant	Signed Socio-econ. Covenant	Signed both UN Covenants	Signed other HR-Document	Row Total
Basic Human Rights Performance	Low	14 29.2 51.9 12	2 4.2 100.0 1.7	24 50.0 31.6 20.5	8 16.7 66.7 6.8	48 41.0
	Medium	11 25.6 40.7 9.4		28 65.1 36.8 23.9	4 9.3 33.3 3.4	43 36.8
	High	2 7.7 7.4 1.7		24 92.3 31.6 20.5		26 22.2
	Col. Tot.	27 23.1	2 1.7	76 65.0	12 10.3	117 100

Table 11.2.1 Low GNP/c Countries (GNP/c < $ 1030): Basic Human Rights by Stated Commitment (Signing the two UN Covenants), Controlled for GNP/c

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Signed No or Other HR Covenants	Signed Both UN Covenants	Row Total
Basic Human Rights	Low	16 51.6 69.5 32.6	15 48.4 75.7 30.6	31 63.3
	medium	7 38.9 30.4 14.3	11 61.1 42.3 22.4	18 36.7
	High			
	Col. Tot.	23 47.0	26 53.0	49 100

Chi-Square=1.61/sign.=.446,
Kendall's Tau-b=.095/T-value=.679/n=49

Table 11.2.2 Medium GNP/c Countries ($ 1030 >GNP/c< $ 5060): Basic Human Rights by Stated Commitment (Signing the two UN Covenants), Controlled for GNP/c

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Signed No or Other HR Covenants	Signed Both UN Covenants	Row Total
Basic Human Rights	Low		6 100.3 21.4 19.4	6 19.4
	medium	3 50.0 100.0 12.0	14 93.3 50.0 45.2	15 48.4
	High		8 80.0 28.6 25.8	10 32.3
	Col. Tot.	3 9.7	28 90.3	31 100

Chi-Square=2.017/sign.=.364,
Kendall's Tau-b=-.239, T-value=-1.401

Table 11.2.3 High GNP/c Countries (GNP/c > $ 5060): Basic Human Rights by Stated Commitment (Signing the two UN Covenants), Controlled for GNP/c

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Signed No or Other HR Covenants	Signed Both UN Covenants	Row Total
Basic Human Rights	Low		3 100.3 13.6 12.0	3 12.0
	medium	3 50.0 100.0 12.0	3 50.0 13.6 12.0	6 24.0
	High		16 100.0 72.7 64.0	16 64.0
	Col. Tot.	3 12.0	22 88.0	25 100

Chi-Square=10.79/sign.=.004,
Kendall's Tau-b=.377, T-value=1.87

Table 11.3 Inclusionary Democracies: Basic Human Rights by Stated Commitment (Signing the two UN Covenants), Controlled for Regime Type.

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Signed No or Other HR Covenants	Signed Both UN Covenants	Row Total
Basic Human Rights	Low		1 100.0 3.7 3.4	1 3.4
	medium		3 100.0 11.1 10.3	3 10.30
	High	2 8.0 100.0 6.9	23 92.0 85.2 79.3	25 86.2
	Col. Tot.	2 6.9	27 93.1	29 100

Chi-Square=.343 Sig. 0.842
Kendall's Tau-b=-.107, T-value=-1.27

Endnotes

1. It is important to remember that the data-set includes only countries with a population of one million or larger. In addition, countries with no available data on basic human rights were also dropped form the analysis.

2. Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Haiti, China, Italy, Sweden, Brazil.

3. As previously BHR were divided into low medium and high by using an area within +/- 0.5 standard deviations to define the medium range.

4. As previously +/-0.5 standard deviations from the mean was used to construct a three (low, medium, high) level GNP/c variable.

5. Trade (exports + imports) was divided by GNP to adjust for the size of the economy. Subsequently it was logged before entering into the equation.

HUMAN RIGHTS EFFORT

Human Rights Effort -- Putting Performance into Perspective

This chapter will introduce the novel concept of human rights effort, which is intended to allow us to take a new and somewhat different look at human rights research. In focusing primarily on human rights performance -- undoubtedly the ultimate concern of all interested in this field -- human rights researchers make the implicit assumption that all nations have a theoretically equal chance to perform as well as any other nation in securing human rights. Ranking countries by performance makes only sense, if we consider the units of analysis more or less equal and therefore comparable. Paradoxically, most of us are equally convinced that a nation faced with the socioeconomic and political constraints of the average African country is utterly incapable of pursuing a human rights policy modelled after Sweden or Norway. Given the dramatically lower government capacity in a poor nations we would generally expect poorer government performance, something which has been recognized in other comparative studies by routinely ranking LDCs and industrialized countries in separate indices. In short, there is no reason to assume that human rights takes exception to the correlation between capacity and performance, something which was also conclusively born out by this study. As this fact has, of course, not gone unnoticed, some researchers have tried to analyze essentially unequal units of analysis by calling for a contextual and, thus, relativist

understanding of human rights in the sense that poorer countries face different needs and priorities and should be judged, therefore, by a different rights standard. I elaborated on this more extensively in the theoretical part of this dissertation.

Others (such as this author in the previous chapters) have retained a universal perspective on human rights, but sought to explain performance differences by pointing to structural constraints, such as level of development, distribution of income, foreign trade, rate of growth, colonial experience, regime type and others. While the identification of such constraints is valuable, since it also points to possible corrective mechanisms, it is also limiting by placing all its emphasis on factors, such as level of development, that can be changed, if at all, only very slowly and over long periods of time. In addition, the conceptual centrality of economic resources to human rights research reduces the political dimension of human rights to an extension of economic conditions.

The concept of effort presents an innovative approach, as it seeks to account, at least in part, for the impact of the varying amounts of resources available to governments across nations. Conceptually, it is useful to distinguish between performance, which is a reflection of the government's effectiveness in securing rights and delivering policy, from the effort to do so. Performance and effort, however, are not entirely separate from one another, but rather closely related in the sense that government performance requires in addition to resources also a certain amount of effort, which I take to represent all that which is necessary to achieve policy objectives, excluding the required resources. Countries in which governments make more human rights effort the performance is likely to be better and vice versa.

Performance is rooted both in the economic and political capacity of governments. In drawing primarily on Weber, Pye and Huntington, Robert Jackman pointed out in a recent

work (1992) that the political capacity of governments, respectively its effectiveness is based on a number of factors, such as the nature and organization of its power, its perceived legitimacy, the degree of institutionalization, the longevity of institutions and a number of other components. It seems, however, that first and foremost governments are able to deliver when there is something to deliver. As the governments of countries such as Mexico or Nigeria became painfully aware, that, once their oil-induced wealth began drying up in the 1980s, their performance began to declined. It became less and less possible to deliver social programs, respectively to provide jobs and other needed services. Thus, while we assume that good performance requires some effort, it is equally true that in times of abundant resources even an inefficient, unjust and uncommitted government can perform acceptably as there are simply enough resources to go round. Effort by contrast is conceived of being more independent from the availability of resources.

Effort requires primarily political will, leadership and commitment to a policy objective. Migdal in his much noted Strong Societies and Weak States (1988) describes quite convincingly the difference in policy outcomes depending on the personal style and leadership of national leaders and policy makers. Likewise, Bullock (1991) analyzes the (negative) impact of certain national leaders on the human rights condition in different societies. Effort requires, furthermore, political skill to outmaneuver the opposition, to form critical alliances as well as to build a consensus and to gain a majority backing for policy objectives. Effort, however, will also depend on the training and expertise of government officials as well as on the organizational arrangements of government institution. Efficient organizations with better trained officials can process fewer resources more effectively and make up for economic shortcomings.

"Effort" is conceptually more independent of resources than "performance". The emphasis on 'more' suggests that resources can, of cause, also impact "effort" itself in a number of ways. In conditions of great economic constraint or social conflict more political will, skill and commitment will be needed to achieve policy goals than under different circumstances. Resources also allow governments to provide for better training of their officials and to increase the efficiency of their institutions. Nevertheless, by accounting for the level of development I hope to put BHR-performance into perspective and to establish a more sensibly based notion of evaluating and ranking countries according to their human rights practices.

For the purposes of this analysis here BHR-effort is defined as the attempt of government to protect the individual's right to economic subsistence and physical security in relation to the means and resources available to that government. Furthermore, operating with the concept of effort offers the advantage to take economic wealth into consideration without having to retreat to relativism by excusing mediocre human rights performance in the name of poverty. In fact, the opposite is the case, since we can now demand from governments to live up to the performance levels they are capable of given their resources. In applying this elastic measure of human rights, some governments will find it much more difficult to justify their poor performance by pointing to their low level of development when confronted with the better performance of equally poor nations. In terms of effort, each nation has, indeed, a much better chance to be rated as highly as any other nation.

Measuring Effort

As described in more detail earlier in the theory-part of this dissertation a general measure of rights effort can be obtained by dividing rights performance by the logged GNP per capita, which represents a widely accepted global measure for national wealth. For the purposes of this analysis I decided to divide the scores of security rights performance and of subsistence rights performance each by GNP per capita resulting in a measure of security rights effort and subsistence rights effort. To obtain a summary measure of BHR-effort both were combined such that a country's score on security rights effort ($SECRIGHT_i/GNPcap_i$) and on subsistence rights effort ($SUBRIGHT_i/GNPcap_i$) was converted to percentages and than divided by the top effort score (=100%) (SECEFF-HI, SUBEFF-HI) achieved by any country on in each human rights dimension.

Index of Human Rights Effort:

$$BHR\text{-}Eff_i = ([SECRIGHT_i / GNPcap_i] * 100) / SECEFF\text{-}HI + ([SUBRIGHT_i / GNPcap_i] * 100) / SUBEFF\text{-}HI$$

Human Rights Effort -- How Do Nations Rank?

Security Effort.

Applying the above procedure to each nation in the sample yields frequency distributions for security rights effort, subsistence rights effort and (combined) BHR-effort. The scores for security rights effort range from '0' to '1.9' with a mean of '.802' and a standard deviation of '.568'. While global indices of this nature are somewhat artificial, they are meaningful in comparison to each other -- a breakdown is provided in Table 12.1. Some 57.3% of nations fall below the mean suggesting that their performance relative to their per capita GNP was less than average. Only about 34% of nations exhibited a high level of security rights effort (more than half a standard deviation above the mean) -- c.f. Table 12.1.

[Table 12.1. -- about here]

In ranking countries by security rights effort (Table 12.2) we find that compared to rankings based solely on performance less developed countries do much better. In fact Papua New Guinea, Mauritius, Portugal and Uruguay obtained the highest effort scores followed by many other less developed nations including the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Sierra Leone, Ecuador and the Gambia among the top 20 nations in the sample. In contrast in my earlier approach to account for effort based on rank deviations between performance and GNP/c (c.f. Tables 1.1 through 1.4) this procedure here is far less biased against developed countries, as evidenced by the presence of New Zealand, Sweden, West Germany, Norway, Finland and the United Kingdom among the leading 20 nations in terms of effort (c.f. Table

12.2). Once again the United States ranks somewhat low (37) after Venezuela, Panama and Senegal, however, before Italy (38). Other industrialized countries whose security rights effort do not place them among the top 30 include Spain and Japan. Lesotho, Singapore, South Korea and Morocco are grouped around the distribution mean. At the very end of the spectrum are Afghanistan, Albania, Myanmar, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mauritania, South Africa, Sudan and the USSR, all of which have a security effort score of '0.0' (c.f. Table 12.2).

[Table 12.2 -- about here]

Chad, Mali, Zaire, Uganda, Somalia, Angola, Liberia, North Korea and Romania are also among the 20 nations with least security rights effort. A number of Middle Eastern states also fall considerably below the sample average, this group includes wealthy Saudi Arabia (rank 92), South and North Yemen (93 and 94), Turkey (100), Syria (102), Iran (103) and Iraq (104). Cuba (105), Colombia (101), Guatemala (99), El Salvador (96) and Haiti (98) were the lowest ranking countries in the Western hemisphere. Except for Hungary (36) all former Communist countries of Eastern Europe showed little security rights effort (more than half a standard deviation below the mean (c.f. Table 12.2).

Subsistence Effort.

Analogous to security rights a frequency distribution was also calculated for subsistence rights. It defines a range from '-.01' to'9.38' with a mean value of '1.89' and a standard deviation of '2.38' (c.f. Table 12.1). Slightly more than half (52.1%) of the sample

fell below an area of half a standard deviation around the mean qualifying them as exhibiting poor effort. By comparisons only about 23% of the nations were placed in the top category of subsistence rights effort. In fact, some two thirds (67.5%) of the countries did not even achieve the distribution mean of '1.89' (c.f. Table 12.1).

When ranking the countries according to their subsistence effort scores (c.f. Table 12.3) we are surprised to find that despite accounting for GNP per capita a number of wealthy industrialized countries (Sweden, Japan, Finland, Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and others) lead the rank-list of countries. The United States (rank 17), Austria (18) and Italy (19) are towards the low end of this grouping. East European countries did noticeably better in terms of subsistence rights effort than in the other BHR-dimension by immediately trailing the group of industrialized countries. Cuba (26), Costa Rica (28) and Jamaica (30) emerge as the top ranking developing countries. Not far behind is Mauritius (35) as the leading African nation. Trinidad, the USSR, North Korea, Panama and Uruguay are grouped around the distribution mean. Once again Middle Eastern nations did not do as well as their relative wealth may lead us to expect, Saudi Arabia ranked 29th between Costa Rica and Jamaica, Kuwait even only 45th. Turkey, Iraq, Iran and both Yemens placed in the bottom tier in terms of subsistence rights performance. Mali (the only nation with a negative score), Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Chad showed the least effort in this BHR-dimension. Haiti was the lowest ranking nation of the Western hemisphere (c.f. Table 12.3).

[Table 12.3 -- about here]

Basic Human Rights Effort.

In combining the scores for both types of basic rights we obtain an overall score for BHR-effort (c.f. Table 12.4). Its range spans from '.11' to '180.76' with a mean of '61.56' and a standard deviation of '47.19'. In using 0.5 standard deviations around the mean as the assignment rule we find that some 38.5% of nations exhibited low levels of BHR-effort, while only about a quarter (24.8%) were grouped in the top category. Ranking countries by the magnitude of their combined effort scores reveals that Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and a number of other Western democracies emerged as the nations showing the greatest overall BHR-effort (c.f. Table 12.4). The phalanx of highly ranked industrialized countries was broken by a number of developing countries such as Costa Rica (rank 21) and Mauritius (22), both of which outranked the US (23), Israel (25) and Italy (26). Many African (e.g. The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Botswana, Congo) and Latin American (e.g. Uruguay, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama) countries outranked the wealthier East European and Middle Eastern Nations, with the notable exception of Hungary. East Germany, Bolivia and the Ivory Coast are ranked about around the distribution mean. A group of African and Islamic Countries form the low end of the distribution. It includes Ethiopia as the nation with the lowest score, preceded by Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Myanmar, Angola, Pakistan and Somalia. Haiti is by far the lowest ranking nation in the Western hemisphere, while the USSR and Rumania have the same dubious distinction for Europe (c.f. Table 12.4). Finally, Table 12.5 summarizes in alphabetical order each nations effort ratings broken by human rights dimension.

[Table 12.4 -- about here]

[Table 12.5. -- about here]

How Do We Interpret These Findings?

The value of this approach lies in my judgement in its intuitive strength. In short, the findings are highly plausible and turn out roughly as one might except. In accounting for the wealth of a nation country rankings shift more dramatically for security rights than for subsistence rights, when we compare performance with effort. We may conclude, therefore, that relative to their wealth a number of developing countries show security rights effort comparable or better than most industrialized nations. Papua New Guinea for instance jumps from the 18th rank on security rights performance to the first in terms of security rights effort. Mauritius, Costa Rica or the Gambia show similar improvements -- incidently, all these nations are ranked below all Western Nations in both Gastil (1985, 87) and the UNDP World Development Report (1991). By the same token Switzerland or Austria drop considerably, others such as the US retain their relatively low rank. In many cases rank deviations are less dramatic but nevertheless important. Zimbabwe and Tanzania, for example, place by a about 10 ranks higher on effort that on security rights performance. The reverse is the case for some middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, whose rank on security rights effort is considerably lower (about 10 ranks) than on security rights performance. Particularly, striking is the rank change for the countries of Eastern Europe. East Germany or Czechoslovakia, for example, place on effort more than 30 ranks below their already low rank on performance.

There are a number of important conclusions, which appear at first contradictory and

difficult to interpret. For one, resources (GNP/c) affect both "performance" and "effort" somewhat differently in each BHR-dimension. Given that rankings change more dramatically with respect to security rights than with respect to subsistence rights, when we account for per capita GNP, we may conclude that for security rights "performance" is strongly affected by lacking resources. It also means, however, that for security rights "effort" is less crippled by GNP per capita given that several poor countries manage to outrank or equal much wealthier countries. The situation is almost reversed with respect to subsistence rights; there, effort rankings are much more closely patterned after the rankings on performance suggesting that accounting for the GNP per capita has less of an impact on how countries are rated against each other. This implies that with respect to basic economic and social rights "effort" itself is much more dependent on available resources than the effort to secure basic political and civil rights. I shall return to this point further below and provide some possible explanations for this difference between BHR-dimensions.

Nevertheless, rankings change when we account for the GNP per capita. Some shifts in rank are particularly interesting but become apparent only after closer inspection. In terms of subsistence rights performance Spain and West Germany were ranked closely together as 11th and 12th. When we account for GNP per capita Spain, as expected, improves its position to eight, while West Germany drops to 16. Despite relatively minor rank changes the two nations are now eight ranks apart. Similar shifts can be observed throughout the distribution, which in sum account for a greater reversal in rank order than is immediately apparent. Consider, for instance, that while Canada and Denmark are ranked 7th and 8th on performance, their ranks change to 6th and 10th on effort. While many poorer nations (North Korea, Sri Lanka, Kenya, India, Indonesia, Tanzania, Madagascar and others) improve their

standing somewhat when we consider effort, Middle Eastern nations tend to show negative rank deviations. Iraq declined by five ranks, Egypt by 12, Turkey by three, Kuwait dropped by six ranks and Saudi Arabia by five, the last is incidently surpassed by Cuba when we account for GNP per capita. The two countries in Central America most notorious for human rights violations Guatemala and El Salvador are the only ones in the region that rate worse on efforts than on performance. More important than comparing country ranks may be to compare actual effort scores. The United States, for instance, was, despite its 17th rank, more than a standard deviation away from Sweden, the top-ranked country, while for example Hungary, Cuba, Jamaica, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia all lay within one standard deviation of the subsistence rights effort exhibited by Washington.

The overall picture that emerges is quite consistent with our expectations. Sweden led the list of nations in terms of subsistence rights effort, it also topped all other nations in terms of performance. Given that Sweden is commonly known for its modern and efficient government institutions as well as the often professed welfare concerns and care for its people we would have certainly expected that Sweden's good performance is not simply a function of its high GNP per capita but also of an extraordinary effort and commitment. It is, therefore, quite plausible to find Sweden, Finland and several -- but not all -- European Nations as well as Japan ranking as high as they do -- despite their extraordinary high per capita GNPs. Others including the United States (Sub-eff.score: 5.07), West Germany (5.77), Belgium (5.83) or Austria (5.06) have substantially lower ratings than Sweden (9.38), Japan (8.70) and Finland (8.22). Likewise, several of the Communist countries including developing countries like Cuba and North Korea rated better on subsistence rights effort than on performance, something that is also consistent with what one would expect of Socialist type governments,

that are traditionally characterized by a strong state and a certain commitment to social equality and basic economic security.

The findings here indicate that many, but not all lesser developed countries improved their position on effort relative to that on performance, which effectively allows for a better differentiation between nations of similar levels of development. Overall, however, the ranking of nations based on their subsistence rights effort matched their ranking on subsistence rights performance much more closely, than was the relationship between security rights effort and security rights performance. This suggests to me that with respect to subsistence rights, "effort" is nearly as dependent upon resources as is "performance". All things being equal, in most nations the effort made to secure adequate nutrition, basic health care and education as well as adequate housing and safe water is more closely tied to national wealth then is the effort to secure basic political rights and freedoms. We may, furthermore, infer that a lack of resources renders most governments not only ineffective but also incapable and unwilling to address the elementary social problems.

The causes for the difference in effort between the two BHR-dimensions are probably numerous. For one, social and economic improvements require considerably greater resources than changing the government's policy on torture. To allocate such resources (to the extent that they are at all available) requires a much more substantial commitment on the part of the government to follow through with its policy, given the explosive nature of redistributive policies especially in poor but unequal societies. The interest of a dominant social and political class or of a particular clan and tribe is frequently bound up with the policies pursued by government. Extracting financial resources, redistributing land, instituting affirmative action and job programs, increasing tax-progression, expanding educational efforts, legalizing

squatter-settlements, enforcing labor and safety rules and similar policies often not only run counter to the interest of those in power, but require a strong government with a capable institutional framework as well as a skilled and motivated bureaucracy -- all of which necessitates a certain level of resources. Lastly, even when governments are in principle committed to such a social agenda, corresponding policies are often shunned for fear that they stifle development and deter foreign investors. These may be the principal reasons why we see less effort with respect to subsistence rights than in terms of security rights; something which in incidently very consistent with the conventional wisdom concerning the difference between so called negative and positive human rights, as I have elaborated on more extensively earlier in this dissertation (c.f. McClean 1978, Kamenka 1978 Pollis 1979, Forsythe 1981 :13-14). In short, negative rights entailing a "do-nothing approach by government" are more easily pursued as they require less effort, than "do-something approaches" which require more effort, not least of which, because it involves in many instances not only two parties, that is the government and the right's-subject, but also third party, whose resources, rights or actions are affected by the expansion of positive rights.

Explaining Human Rights Effort

Before analyzing what may be potential explanations of BHR-effort, it is useful to take a look at how nations compare on effort when broken down by income type, a summary of which is presented in Table 12.6. The row listing high levels of BHR-effort includes all industrialized market economies, followed by 31.6% of upper middle income countries, 11.1% of East European non-market economies and some 8.3% of lower middle income economies. The medium effort category drew the largest percentages from all income types except for Western market economies and lower income countries. While the former all placed in the top bracket, the majority of lower income countries were found to show little effort, nevertheless, some 30.3% of the poorest countries were classified as making at least a medium BHR-effort. Overall 24.9% of all nations in the sample rated high, two thirds of which were industrial market economies. By contrast, some 38.5% placed at the opposite end of the effort spectrum by placing in the bottom category, slightly more than half of which were lower income economies (c.f. Table 12.6). While income differences not only affect performance but are also a highly correlated with BHR-effort (Kendall's Tau-b= .603/T-value: 6.585/n=112[1]), it is, nevertheless, encouraging to see that some 52.2% of all developing countries manage to make medium or great effort. This certainly suggests a very real possibility for the remaining 48% of the sample to overcome their current difficulties and likewise move at least beyond the bottom tier of BHR-effort.

[Table 12.6 -- about here]

In trying to explain BHR-effort it seems plausible to turn to some of the same explanatory variables that have been used earlier to account for performance, since essentially the same theoretical arguments apply to both. Let us, therefore, review these arguments in light of the above findings and the earlier theoretical assumptions about BHR-effort. Conceptually effort and performance are different in the sense that the latter incorporates the former. While performance is a measure of government's overall effectiveness in securing human rights, the concept of effort is conceived of as a combination of factors such as government commitment, political will and skill, as well as a or more less efficient organization of government institutions to deal with the social, economic and political problems at hand.

I also stated above that resources may affect both performance and effort differently depending on the dimension of basic human rights concerned. The availability of resources can improve BHR-performance in two ways; first greater overall wealth eliminates many causes of popular discontent, which routinely sets off government repression, and secondly it allows governments to deliver overall more goods and services. Likewise, economic wealth can also impact BHR-effort in the sense that principally, more resources eliminate the root cause for many societal problems to which governments respond with repression. Furthermore, institutions can be organized more efficiently, the state's social control strengthened as well as the recruitment and training of bureaucrats and public officials improved, if sufficient resources are available. However, retaining the centrality of "resources" to explain effort would undermine the logic of the entire project here, which was to explain human rights practices largely irrespective of the resources available. I shall, therefore, propose an alternative explanatory framework that explains a considerable portion of the variation in

human rights effort.

We may start our examination by asking ourselves what kind of government we would expect to make the greatest effort. Presumably, our first choice would be a type of regime that approximates the liberal democratic ideal of giving "equal concern and respect" (Howard and Donnelly 1986: 805) to all its citizens. This assumption may be generalized by hypothesizing that regime type is an important explanation, specifically, that the more participatory and competitive a regime is the more BHR-effort it will make, mainly because any effort undertaken by such a regime is more likely to be geared towards all segments of society (c.f. Cingranelli 1992: 1).

Secondly, the more unequal wealth is distributed in a society, the less, it seems, that those in power would commit themselves to the security and welfare of those deprived of power, status and material goods (Cingranelli 1992: 3). In a highly unequal society there are not only no incentives for those in power to make an effort to change the status quo, but to do so would in fact run counter to the interest of those governing. It stands to reason, therefore, to expect the distribution of wealth to be negatively correlated with BHR-effort.

Thirdly, if we are persuaded by the arguments of either recent democratization theory or neo-classical economics (c.f. Sen 1883, Bardhan 1993, Przeworski 1993, Huber/Rueschemeyer/Stephens 1993, Hirschman 1994, Tideman 1994) we would also expect those governments to show greater BHR-effort that encourage pluralism and are politically more open to the outside world, as measured by their amount of international trade and foreign investment. Not only do these countries seem to be relatively more affluent with perhaps internationally more experienced and better trained government bureaucrats as well as more capable institutions, but in the interest of foreign investment and good trade relations

with the West these governments are more likely to cultivate a positive international image. Furthermore, in open and accessible countries governments can be more easily monitored. Lastly, these societies may more easily adopt the values, political practices and conventions of their trading partners. Therefore, we would expect the amount of foreign trade and investment to be positively associated with BHR-effort.

A General Model of BHR-Effort -- Report of Findings

The operationalization and application of the independent variables was the same as with respect to BHR-performance (see the chapters on "Economic Explanations of Human Rights" and "Political Explanations of Human Right"). As above, regime type is measured by a composite variable reflecting the ratio between voter turnout and the percentage of seats for the dominant party (legislative margin). The Gini coefficient is used again as a measure of income inequality. The international openness and accessibility of a nation is measures by two variables foreign trade (volume of imports and exports) and foreign investments (Private Sector Net investment and Total Other Official Flows) -- (c.f. section on "Foreign Economic Dependency and Basic Human Rights). To account for the size of a nation's economy both foreign trade and investment were divided by the nations total GNP.

The results of a bivariate correlations analysis are summarized and presented in Table 12.7, which indicates that except for foreign investment all independent variables co-vary with BHR-effort significantly and in the direction predicted. Most noticeable are the moderately high correlations coefficients for competitiveness (legislative margin), foreign trade and inequality.

[Table 12.7 -- about here]

Encouraged by the correlations analysis all of the above variables (except foreign investment) were incorporated in a general model of BHR-effort which was subsequently estimated by an OLS-regression with the following equation;

$$\text{BHR-Effort} = \gamma = \alpha + \beta_1\chi_{i1} + \beta_2\chi_{i2} + \beta_3\chi_{i3}$$

Where γ is the dependent variable at that point in time,

α is the intercept,

β_1, β_2, $\beta 3_3$ are empirically determined weights,

χ_{i1} = regime type = [voter turnout/legislative margin]),

χ_{i2} = income equality (Gini coefficient),

χ_{i3} = trade = [ln ((exports+imports)/GNP)]

are the independent variables, and e is the error term.

The results presented in Table 12.8 indicate that the model explains some two thirds of the variation in BHR-effort and is statistically highly significant ($p< .00001$). Except for income equality (which is almost significant at $p<.057$) all independent variables are statistically significant and vary in the hypothesized direction. Both regime type and foreign trade turned out to be the best predictors in the model. The goodness of fit of the model is further underscored by a subsequent analysis of residuals. A visual inspection of a histogram of standardized residuals as well as normal probability plot of standardized observed and expected residuals (c.f. Figure 5) does not indicate a problem with outliers. Furthermore, there is no evidence for problematic levels of multicollinearity given that the highest correlation between two independent variables is nearly less than half the R^2.

[Table 12.8 -- about here]

Conclusion.

We may draw the following conclusions concerning human rights effort. While it is impossible to ignore the fact that economic wealth also affects how nations are rated in terms of human rights effort, accounting for their GNP per capita seems, nevertheless, a much more sensibly based notion of evaluating differing human rights practices across nations. Especially, with respect to security rights country rankings change considerably and of all nations a relatively poor developing country, Papua New Guinea, emerges as the one with the greatest effort. By comparisons, a number of industrialized countries and wealthy middle Eastern nations show comparatively little effort. Simultaneously, this approach does not unfairly penalize wealthy countries simply because of their high per capita GNP. We would, of cause, expect countries like Sweden or Norway to make, indeed, a considerable effort in both human rights dimensions. By contrast, the governments of countries like the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, South Africa, Mali, Sudan or Somalia are generally known for the disregard for human rights, no matter what the resources. New, however, was the fact that many countries like Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya. Sri Lanka, or even Cuba or Madagascar exhibited a level of BHR-effort that exceeded their economic performance. In turn, Iraq, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Guatemala, El Salvador and others rank even lower on effort that on performance.

We also noted, however, that subsistence rights effort the sample distribution followed much more closely how countries were rated in terms of performance. I conclude from this

that wealth affects both "effort" and "performance" differently in each of the two dimensions of Basic Human Rights. As mentioned above these differences are consistent with commonly accepted differences between so called positive and negative rights. Nevertheless, it is impossible to completely separate the question of resources and government capacity from effort in the sense of distilling a pure measure of political will or commitment. Effort by putting performance in relation to resources is a useful approximation however. A general OLS-model of BHR-effort demonstrated that governments make the most effort in countries with a competitive and inclusionary political regime, especially when accompanied by a relatively equitable distribution of income. In addition, governments in countries more integrated into the world market, as indicated by higher levels of foreign trade, tend to make significantly more human rights effort than governments in more closed countries.

Table 12.1 Distribution Statistics of Effort Indices

Statistic	Security Effort	Subsistence Effort	BHR-Effort
Range	.00 to 1.98	-.01 to 9.38	.11 to 180.76
Mean	.80	1.89	61.56
Stdv.	.56	2.38	47.19

Table 12.2 Country Rankings By Security Rights Effort

Country	Sec-Eff	Country	Sec-Eff
Pap.N.Guinea	1.98	Bangladesh	.62
Mauritius	1.86	Honduras	.61
Portugal	1.85	Nigeria	.61
Uruguay	1.84	Thailand	.59
Greece	1.82	Nepal	.59
Dom.Rep.	1.74	Niger	.57
Costa Rica	1.69	Oman	.57
Argentina	1.69	Burundi	.56
New Zealand	1.68	Malaysia	.53
Austria	1.64	Yugoslavia	.52
Netherlands	1.64	Indonesia	.48
Finland	1.62	Libya	.44
Denmark	1.61	Paraguay	.42
W.Germany	1.61	Chile	.40
Sweden	1.60	Mexico	.39
Norway	1.57	Poland	.39
Sierra Leone	1.57	Malawi	.39
Ecuador	1.56	Tanzania	.37
Gambia	1.56	Laos	.37
UK	1.55	Togo	.36
Belgium	1.55	Bulgaria	.35
Irish Rep.	1.53	China	.35
France	1.52	Guinea	.34
Senegal	1.52	Czchoslova.	.34
Australia	1.49	E.Germany	.33
Hong Kong	1.49	Mozambique	.33
Canada	1.47	Saudi Arabia	.32
Botswana	1.46	S.Yemen	.32
Switzerland	1.44	N.Yemen	.32
Israel	1.41	Philippines	.31
Venezuela	1.35	El Salvador	.30
Panama	1.32	Zimbabwe	.30
Spain	1.31	Haiti	.29
Congo	1.28	Guatemala	.28
Japan	1.19	Turkey	.28
Hungary	1.18	Colombia	.28
USA	1.14	Syria	.27
Italy	1.14	Iran	.27
Bolivia	1.11	Iraq	.27
Ivory Coast	1.09	Cuba	.26
Jamaica	1.09	Chad	.20
Benin	1.07	Mali	.20
Cameroon	1.05	Zaire	.20
Algeria	1.03	Uganda	.18
Trinidad	1.01	Somalia	.18
Burkina Faso	.99	Pakistan	.17
Jordan	.95	Liberia	.16
Brazil	.94	Angola	.15
Egypt	.91	Korea N.	.14
Madagascar	.90	Rumania	.12
Nicaragua	.89	Afghanistan	.00
Rwanda	.89	Albania	.00
Tunisia	.84	Burma/Myanmar	.00
Lesotho	.80	Cent.Afr.Rep	.00
Singapore	.79	Ethiopia	.00
Korea S.	.78	Mauritania	.00
Morocco	.77	South Africa	.00
Peru	.72	Sudan	.00
Kuwait	.72	USSR	.00
India	.72		
Kenya	.70		
Ghana	.68		
Sri Lanka	.68		
Zambia	.65		
Taiwan	.62		

Table 12.3 Country Ranking By Subsistence Rights Effort

Country	Sub-Eff
Sweden	9.38
Japan	8.70
Finland	8.22
Switzerland	7.89
Netherlands	7.37
Denmark	6.95
Norway	6.92
Spain	6.46
France	6.34
Canada	6.30
Hong Kong	6.23
Australia	6.21
UK	5.94
Irish Rep.	5.90
Belgium	5.83
W.Germany	5.77
USA	5.07
Austria	5.06
Italy	4.77
E.Germany	4.73
New Zealand	4.24
Israel	3.65
Bulgaria	3.54
Czchoslova.	3.48
Greece	3.43
Cuba	3.42
Hungary	3.21
Costa Rica	3.12
Saudi Arabia	2.85
Jamaica	2.78
Colombia	2.75
Poland	2.70
Portugal	2.65
Chile	2.55
Mauritius	2.22
Rumania	2.17
Trinidad	2.15
USSR	2.03
Korea N.	1.71
Panama	1.69
Uruguay	1.65
Yugoslavia	1.65
Singapore	1.59
Korea S.	1.54
Kuwait	1.49
Malaysia	1.47
Argentina	1.47
Mexico	1.47
Sri Lanka	1.35
Venezuela	1.26
Syria	1.08
Thailand	1.02
Paraguay	.88
Philippines	.85
Brazil	.80
Jordan	.76
Kenya	.68
Botswana	.60
Dom.Rep.	.57
Nicaragua	.55
Ecuador	.49
Indonesia	.48
Madagascar	.44
Libya	.44
Zimbabwe	.43
Tanzania	.43
Honduras	.42
Guatemala	.41
Iraq	.41
Peru	.39
Turkey	.38
Burma/Myanmar	.38
Cameroon	.35
Bolivia	.35
Tunisia	.31
Iran	.29
Ghana	.28
Algeria	.28
Zambia	.28
Congo	.27
Zaire	.27
Rwanda	.27
El Salvador	.26
Lesotho	.25
Morocco	.24
Malawi	.23
Togo	.21
Uganda	.20
India	.18
Ivory Coast	.18
Laos	.16
Nepal	.16
Liberia	.16
Egypt	.15
Senegal	.15
Burundi	.13
Nigeria	.13
Haiti	.12
Sudan	.11
Angola	.11
Gambia	.10
Cent.Afr.Rep	.10
Niger	.10
Pakistan	.08
N.Yemen	.08
Benin	.06
Somalia	.06
Burkina Faso	.05
Sierra Leone	.04
S.Yemen	.04
Chad	.04
Bangladesh	.04
Afghanistan	.03
Guinea	.03
Mozambique	.02
Ethiopia	.01
Mali	-.01

Table 12.4 Country Ranking By BHR-Effort

Country	BHR-Eff
Sweden	180.76
Finland	169.25
Netherlands	161.25
Switzerland	157.04
Denmark	155.39
Norway	153.13
Japan	152.68
France	144.54
W.Germany	142.87
Australia	141.69
Canada	141.60
Hong Kong	141.48
UK	141.41
Belgium	140.16
Irish Rep.	140.02
Austria	137.05
Spain	134.98
New Zealand	129.87
Greece	128.59
Portugal	121.47
Costa Rica	118.86
Mauritius	117.56
USA	111.70
Uruguay	110.70
Israel	109.98
Italy	108.48
Argentina	100.86
Dom.Rep.	94.19
Hungary	93.60
Jamaica	84.64
Panama	84.51
Ecuador	84.02
Venezuela	81.75
Botswana	79.90
Gambia	79.78
Sierra Leone	79.67
Senegal	78.08
Trinidad	74.15
Congo	67.50
E.Germany	67.33
Bolivia	59.89
Ivory Coast	57.00
Singapore	56.68
Cameroon	56.64
Jordan	56.19
Korea S.	56.02
Brazil	56.00
Bulgaria	55.47
Algeria	54.88
Benin	54.78
Czchoslova.	54.40
Kuwait	52.20
Nicaragua	50.72
Burkina Faso	50.31
Madagascar	50.10
Cuba	49.88
Sri Lanka	48.69
Poland	48.56
Rwanda	47.68
Egypt	47.62
Chile	47.60
Saudi Arabia	46.75
Tunisia	45.72
Yugoslavia	43.91

Country	BHR-Eff
Colombia	43.26
Lesotho	42.91
Kenya	42.47
Malaysia	42.32
Morocco	41.32
Thailand	40.81
Peru	40.71
India	38.21
Ghana	37.52
Zambia	35.81
Mexico	35.55
Honduras	35.36
Nigeria	32.02
Nepal	31.53
Bangladesh	31.53
Paraguay	30.66
Niger	29.94
Burundi	29.49
Rumania	29.29
Indonesia	29.22
Libya	27.01
Korea N.	25.37
Syria	25.15
Philippines	24.61
Tanzania	23.45
Malawi	21.90
USSR	21.64
Togo	20.53
Laos	20.29
Zimbabwe	19.81
Guatemala	18.71
Turkey	18.41
El Salvador	18.19
Iraq	17.83
Guinea	17.73
Mozambique	16.96
N.Yemen	16.81
Iran	16.61
S.Yemen	16.44
Haiti	16.05
Zaire	13.11
Uganda	11.46
Chad	10.71
Mali	10.15
Liberia	9.86
Somalia	9.68
Pakistan	9.37
Angola	8.57
Burma/Myanmar	4.09
Sudan	1.22
Cent.Afr.Rep	1.07
Afghanistan	.32
Ethiopia	.11

Table 12.5 Alphabetic Listing of Country Scores on Security Rights- (Sec-Eff), Subsistence Rights- (Sub-Eff), and Basic Human Rights Effort (BHR-Eff)

Country	Sec-Eff	Sub-Eff	BHR-Eff
Afghanistan	.00	.03	.32
Albania	.00	.	.
Algeria	1.03	.28	54.88
Angola	.15	.11	8.57
Argentina	1.69	1.47	100.86
Australia	1.49	6.21	141.69
Austria	1.64	5.06	137.05
Bangladesh	.62	.04	31.53
Belgium	1.55	5.83	140.16
Benin	1.07	.06	54.78
Bolivia	1.11	.35	59.89
Botswana	1.46	.60	79.90
Brazil	.94	.80	56.00
Bulgaria	.35	3.54	55.47
Burkina Faso	.99	.05	50.31
Burma/Myanmar	.00	.38	4.09
Burundi	.56	.13	29.49
Cambodia	.	.	.
Cameroon	1.05	.35	56.64
Canada	1.47	6.30	141.60
Cent.Afr.Rep	.00	.10	1.07
Chad	.20	.04	10.71
Chile	.40	2.55	47.60
China	.35	.	.
Colombia	.28	2.75	43.26
Congo	1.28	.27	67.50
Costa Rica	1.69	3.12	118.86
Cuba	.26	3.42	49.88
Czchoslova.	.34	3.48	54.40
Denmark	1.61	6.95	155.39
Dom.Rep.	1.74	.57	94.19
Ecuador	1.56	.49	84.02
Egypt	.91	.15	47.62
El Salvador	.30	.26	18.19
Ethiopia	.00	.01	.11
Finland	1.62	8.22	169.25
France	1.52	6.34	144.54
E.Germany	.33	4.73	67.33
W.Germany	1.61	5.77	142.87
Gambia	1.56	.10	79.78
Ghana	.68	.28	37.52
Greece	1.82	3.43	128.59
Guatemala	.28	.41	18.71
Guinea	.34	.03	17.73
Haiti	.29	.12	16.05
Honduras	.61	.42	35.36
Hong Kong	1.49	6.23	141.48
Hungary	1.18	3.21	93.60
India	.72	.18	38.21
Indonesia	.48	.48	29.22
Iran	.27	.29	16.61
Iraq	.27	.41	17.83
Irish Rep.	1.53	5.90	140.02
Israel	1.41	3.65	109.98
Italy	1.14	4.77	108.48
Ivory Coast	1.09	.18	57.00
Jamaica	1.09	2.78	84.64
Japan	1.19	8.70	152.68
Jordan	.95	.76	56.19
Kenya	.70	.68	42.47
Korea N.	.14	1.71	25.37
Korea S.	.78	1.54	56.02
Kuwait	.72	1.49	52.20
Laos	.37	.16	20.29
Lesotho	.80	.25	42.91
Libya	.44	.44	27.01
Liberia	.16	.16	9.86
Madagascar	.90	.44	50.10
Malawi	.39	.23	21.90
Malaysia	.53	1.47	42.32
Mali	.20	-.01	10.15
Mauritania	.00	.	.
Mauritius	1.86	2.22	117.56
Mexico	.39	1.47	35.55
Mongolia	.	.	.
Morocco	.77	.24	41.32
Mozambique	.33	.02	16.96
Nepal	.59	.16	31.53
Netherlands	1.64	7.37	161.25
New Zealand	1.68	4.24	129.87
Nicaragua	.89	.55	50.72
Niger	.57	.10	29.94
Nigeria	.61	.13	32.02
Norway	1.57	6.92	153.13
Oman	.57	.	.
Pakistan	.17	.08	9.37
Panama	1.32	1.69	84.51
Pap.N.Guinea	1.98	.	.
Paraguay	.42	.88	30.66
Peru	.72	.39	40.71
Philippines	.31	.85	24.61
Poland	.39	2.70	48.56
Portugal	1.85	2.65	121.47
Rumania	.12	2.17	29.29
Rwanda	.89	.27	47.68
Saudi Arabia	.32	2.85	46.75
Senegal	1.52	.15	78.08
Sierra Leone	1.57	.04	79.67
Singapore	.79	1.59	56.68
Somalia	.18	.06	9.68
South Africa	.00	.	.
Spain	1.31	6.46	134.98
Sri Lanka	.68	1.35	48.69
Sudan	.00	.11	1.22
Sweden	1.60	9.38	180.76
Switzerland	1.44	7.89	157.04
Syria	.27	1.08	25.15
Taiwan	.62	.	.
Tanzania	.37	.43	23.45
Thailand	.59	1.02	40.81
Togo	.36	.21	20.53
Trinidad	1.01	2.15	74.15
Tunisia	.84	.31	45.72
Turkey	.28	.38	18.41
Uganda	.18	.20	11.46
USSR	.00	2.03	21.64
UK	1.55	5.94	141.41
USA	1.14	5.07	111.70
Uruguay	1.84	1.65	110.70
Venezuela	1.35	1.26	81.75
Vietnam	.	.	.
S.Yemen	.32	.04	16.44
N.Yemen	.32	.08	16.81
Yugoslavia	.52	1.65	43.91
Zaire	.20	.27	13.11
Zambia	.65	.28	35.81
Zimbabwe	.30	.43	19.81

Table 12.6 Basic Human Rights Effort by Income Type

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		Western Industrial Nations	East Europ. Non-market Economies	High Income Oil Producers	Upper Middle Income Nations	Lower Middle Income Nations	Lower Income Nations	Row Total
Basic Security Rights	Low		3 6.7 33.3 2.6		3 6.7 15.8 2.6	16 35.9 44.4 13.7	23 51.1 69.7 19.7	45 38.5
	Medium		5 11.6 55.6 4.3	1 2.3 100 .9	10 23.3 52.6 8.5	17 39.5 47.2 14.5	10 23.3 30.3 8.5	43 36.8
	High	19 65.5 100 16.2	1 3.4 11.1 .9		6 20.7 31.6 5.1	3 10.3 8.3 2.6		29 24.8
	Col. Tot.	19 16.2	9 7.7	1 .9	19 16.2	36 30.8	33 28.2	117 100

Table 12.7 Bivariate Correlations between BHR-Effort and Political and Economic Factors

Bivariate Correlations (**) p<.0001, (*) p<.05	
Indep. Variables	BHR-Effort
V.Turnout[a]	.514 **
Leg.Margin[b]	-.701 **
Reg.Type[c]	.774 **
Gini	-.443 **
Trade/GNP[d]	.400 **
Invest./GNP[d]	.207 p<.06

(a) voter turn out in % (VT)
(b) % of seats of dominant party (LM)
(c) regime type RT=VT/LM
(d) GNP logged due to its curvelinear nature

Table 12:8 OLS-General Model of Basic Human Effort


Multiple Regression Analysis:

Dependent variable: BHR-Effort
Independent variables: Regime Type, Income Equality (Gini) Foreign Trade

Multiple R	.812
R^2	.660
Adjusted R^2	.649
F	59.756
Sig.F	.000

Dependent Variables	B	SE B	Beta	T-value	sig. T
Regime Type	58.477	6.547	.631	8.981	.000
Gini	-.352	0.182	-.133	-1.927	.057
Trade	4.18E-04	1.36E-04	.209	3.076	.002
Constant	33.477	8.107		4.129	.000

Figure 5 Normal Probability Plot of Observed and Expected Residuals



Endnotes

1. The Tau-b statistic refers to a somewhat reconfigured income type variable testing the hypothesis that economic type (1=OECD, 2=COMECON, 3=LDCs)is positively associated with BHR-effort (low, medium, high).

BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS -- CHANGES OVER TIME

The Sample of Nations in 1992

Since the mid-1980s when the data for these 127 nations were collected the world has changed a great deal. From the perspective of human rights advocates there have been advances and setbacks[1]. Two images, indelibly imprinted in our minds and particularly symbolic of these transformations stand out. In the spring of 1989 CNN flashed TV-images around the word depicting armored columns of the Chinese people's army advancing on Tiananmen square where droves of pro-democracy students had camped out for some time, huddled around the "Goddess of Democracy", a plaster-cast replica of the Statue of Liberty. The action by these students posed the most formidable challenges to authoritarian rule in China to date and the students' quest for more democracy could only be broken through the harshest means of repression. Yet, even in the face of the crushing power of the state human spirit remained defiant when a young man stepped in front of an T-72 tank blocking effectively its way. The same year we were treated also to TV-images of a different sort, when overjoyed Germans dancing, cheering and flag-waving had climbed on top of the Berlin Wall, which, quite literally, was crumbling quickly under the onslaught of souvenir hungry crowds trying to carve out chunks of this notorious symbol of state repression.

While Tiananmen Square may be as symbolic of the setbacks, as the fall of the Berlin

wall was of the recent advances, numerous other equally memorable events have left their mark on recent political history. Who would have expected a decade ago to see the formerly imprisoned dissidents and opposition leaders Havel, Walesa and Mandela become the presidents of their countries? The past ten years were, indeed, not good ones for autocratic leaders. In some instances they went quietly, such as Jaruselski in Poland or Pinochet in Chile, in other cases the dictators fell by force -- President Marcos was removed by people's power, Mengistu was swept away by anti-government forces, and Ceauscescu died at the hands of a firing squad. Furthermore, we witnessed the undoing of an empire and a superpower which literally dissolved itself by bureaucratic fiat. Change did not only come about in the domestic arena, but all over the world borders were redrawn and new countries appeared. While Namibia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Moldova, Belarus, the Ukraine, the Baltic and Caucasian States as well as Soviet Central Asia became independent countries and while Slovakia divorced from the Czech Republic and a fledgling Palestinian state is beginning to take shape, both Yemens and both Germanies merged into one.

Likewise there have been the setbacks; the bloodstained market square of Sarajevo, the shelling of Dubrovnik, Vukovar, Gorazde, Tuzla and Mostar. Armed conflict, ethnic and otherwise, is abound from Croatia and Bosnia to Karabach in Azerbaijan, from Moldova and Ingushetia-Chechnia to Sukhumi in Georgia and from Aden in South-Yemen to the Tadjik-Afghan border. In these and other regions repression seems nowadays more severe and the human tragedies more acute than before the days of the New World Order. In both Haiti and Iraq brutal dictatorships have prevailed despite international efforts to the contrary. In Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Myanmar authoritarian governments have survived the political changes in the rest of the world relatively unscathed. In both Liberia and Somalia foreign

intervention could not bring about a stable and peaceful government. Like Biaffra in the late 1960s Bosnia, Sudan, Somalia and Rwanda have become generational markers for atrocities and human suffering unprecedented since World War II.

What do all these developments mean for the state of basic human rights in he world? On one hand there have been fundamental political reforms in much of the world, ranging from Eastern Europe to East Asia, Africa and Latin America. Between the Elbe River and the Baltic Sea, in South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan as well as in Benin, Zambia and even Uganda, likewise in Nicaragua, Brazil, El Salvador, Chile and many other countries there have political reforms in favor of more democracy, pluralism and liberal economics. In fact, this development seemed so pervasive that a leading American intellectual (Fukuyama 1989) already proclaimed the end of history because all relevant players in the world had converged on some form of liberal democracy. On the other hand, both economic change coupled with widespread political instability has brought unknown suffering to people in regions that had been considered stable, safe and moderately prosperous only a few years ago.

In this chapter we shall revisit the sample of nations and see how the state of basic political and economic rights has been affected by these changes. In 1992 Humana published his latest World Human Rights Guide to date, which will serve as the chief source for assessing basic political rights and freedoms. Fortunately, this work by Humana is much more comprehensive than any of his former and includes most of the nations (120 out of 126) in our sample, which made it less necessary this time to turn to other supplementary sources. For those few cases for which Humana does not have sufficient data I relied again on the State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (1992) as well as Amnesty International Country Reports (1992). Cases were once again evaluated by using the same

criteria and tests as described earlier for the mid-1980s sample. To ascertain basic economic and social rights data were collected from a variety of sources including the UNDP-Report (1992), United Nations Statistical Year Book (1992), United Nations Economic Commission - - Report on Africa (1989, 90, 91, 92) (c.f. see the Appendix for a detailed reference of indicators and data sources). The data are taken from the period 1990/91, respectively they are most recent ones available prior to 1991[2].

In the interest of continuity and comparability it was important to keep the two samples as similar as possible, nevertheless, the same sample selection rules apply here as well. Thus, this selection includes all independent nations states (including Hong Kong) with a population of one million or larger, which were at that time neither involved in an armed conflict and/or a civil war, nor occupied by enemy forces. In addition, the inclusion rules required a functioning government that, unlike for example Lebanon in the 1980s, was capable of executing its policy and enforcing its power in all or most of the country. This disqualifies Liberia which, in 1991 was heavily embroiled in internal conflict and continues to be occupied by "peace-making" military forces from neighboring countries. In addition, Somalia was dropped from the sample since no proper governmental structures could be identified. Instead, the country was dominated by marauding factions of different warlords and militias. By 1992 both the Socialist South Yemen and the Islamic North Yemen had merged into one nation. While this union is unravelling fast in 1994, they are nevertheless treated in the 1991 data as one country. In addition, the Soviet Union was dropped from the sample. While it technically still existed in 1991 its rapid disintegration made it not only impossible to gauge the existing human rights practices, but in light of its dissolution any findings would have only the character of momentary impressions largely irrelevant for long term

conclusions. Neither Russia, nor any of the other successor states had yet been constituted as independent countries in 1991 and are, therefore, also not included in the sample. While the sample lists a still unified Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia represents a rump-state consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. Due to the warfare in Croatia and Slovenia in 1991 both were not included in the sample. Lastly, the German reunification also meant that East Germany is no longer in the sample.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that revisiting the sample in the early 1990s is solely intended to provide a comparison over time and will, therefore, remain primarily descriptive in its analysis. Future research, however, will take these new data as the basis for a further analytical exploration of the research questions raised in this project.

Changes in Basic Human Rights Performance -- A Comparison

Security Rights.

Table 13.1 provides a comprehensive summary of security rights performance of both the 1984/85 and the 1991 sample broken down by world region and individual rights. Scanning the bottom row of Table 13.1, which features distribution means and standard deviations for both samples for the world as whole, we can see that security rights performance has overall somewhat improved. While in the 1980s the average index score for security rights was around 6 on a range from 0 to 15, it is 7.26 for the later sample, which represents an increase of about 8.5%. We should remember that based on Humana's own assessment each basic security rights category was scored along a range from 0 to 3, in which a score of 0 meant that a right/freedom was not guaranteed at all, 1 indicated it was mostly not guaranteed, 2 reflected that it was mostly guaranteed and 3 meant that this rights/freedom was fully guaranteed.

Improvements were achieved in every single security rights category, except, interestingly, in the category freedom from torture, in which the average dropped lightly (from 1.18 to 1.17 -- c.f. Table 13.1). The most significant gains occurred with respect to freedom from detention without warrant (from .99 to 1.41) and freedom capital punishment (from .80 to 1.12). Less substantial were the improvements in the categories freedom from slavery (from 1.76 to 1.94), which includes also forced labor and excessive child labor practices, as well as freedom from searches without warrant (from 1.27 to 1.61).

[Table 13.1 -- about here]

How are we to explain the deviant case of freedom from torture? Already in the earlier sample we noticed a curious polarization of the scores on 'detention' and 'searches', which indicated that governments either did not guarantee these rights at all and willfully detained people and searched their premisses, or abstained from doing so completely. The ratings for torture, by contrast, were much more evenly distributed across the range from 0 to 3. I hypothesized, therefore, that detentions and searches happen almost in all cases upon official authorization and are more likely to be a part of a coherent policy. Torture, however, tends to be on one hand a regular practice in some regimes, and on the other localized and occasional as a result of poorly trained and overly zealous security forces. It seems, therefore, that while governments overall seem have shifted more towards respecting elementary human rights norms, increased political instability and rising crime rates in many places has resulted in greater police brutality on a local or regional level. This is incidently also Humana's explanation for why even several Western countries did not receive perfect scores in this category (Table 13.1).

The region with the most impressive improvement in security rights performance was, as expected, Eastern Europe, which leapt from a mere 2.88 (the lowest average for any world region) to an impressive 11.33, which is almost as high as the average for Western Europe and North America (11.83). Given a range from 0 to 15 this meant an overall improvement in performance by over 55%. Both Hungary and Czechoslovakia as well as a small number of Scandinavian and West European countries among the top 10 performers, all with a maximum score of 15 (c.f. Table 13.3 further below). Prior to 1989 capital punishment was pervasive (group average of 0) in the former Communist bloc, now the group rating is 2 out of a possible 3 (c.f. Table 13.1). The respect for privacy rights (detention and searches

without warrant) has gone up more than sevenfold. Forced labor, a common practice in East European labor camps, was largely abolished boosting almost doubling the rating from 1.44 to 2.66. Lastly, even on freedom from torture the scores have almost tripled.

The West (North America and Western Europe) managed to improve it already high ratings somewhat, except for the category freedom from torture, in which Humana points to increasingly frequent cases of police brutality in Austria, Greece, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the U.K. and the U.S. (c.f. Table 13.1).

Substantial gains in security rights performance occurred also in Sub-Saharan Africa, which outperformed as a region both the Middle Eastern and North African nations as well as South and Eastern Asia. It increased its, admittedly, dismally low score of 3.88 to 5.32. While this indicates that basic rights are still frequently abused by governments, the Sub-Saharan group average of the 1991 sample is nevertheless by more than two thirds higher than that for the mid-1980 sample (c.f. Table 13.1). Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe were the only two global regions in which torture and police brutality was less frequent in 1991 than in the mid-1980s.

In other regions of the globe the gains were less substantial. Least change occurred in the Middle East, where the group average was not only the lowest in the sample but virtually the same as in the mid-1980s (4.62 vs. 4.41). The countries of South and East Asia, while having passed by 1991 the Middle Eastern nations, still register the second worst performance of any regional grouping. It should be pointed out, however, that the high standard deviation shows considerable intra-regional differences for this particular group, suggesting that performance varies widely from country to country.

Overall we may conclude that the state of basic political and economic rights has

clearly improved across nations both in terms of higher average scores and mostly smaller standard deviations implying that on average nations deviate less from these higher group means.

Subsistence Rights.

In terms of basic economic and social rights the changes over time were more incremental. Table 13.2 records a marked drop in infant mortality rates from 69.69 to 59.69 infant deaths per 1000 live births. Progress has been made in the recent decade in virtually all categories, yet only the West and Eastern Europe can claim to be the only regions in the world capable of supplying adequate nutrition. Except for Sub-Saharan Africa where calorie intake actually slightly fell (from 90.86 to 90.19%), all other regions are well within the upper 90s in terms of percentage of calorie intake. Positive inroads were also made in terms of providing safe water, so that some two thirds of the world population have access to a nearby well or piped water. Not only are the averages higher in most subsistence rights categories but also fewer nations deviate from these means pointing to a steady increase in government concern for these rights in most parts of the world. In South and East Asia the areas with the greatest economic growth in some categories progress has been enormous. There infant mortality dropped by some 13% and access to safe water went up from some 58% to 65%. The enormous spread of performance scores in this region also suggests that some countries have come lot further than others. As a region South and East Asia moved further ahead of Latin America and the Caribbean. Sharp increased in performance occurred also in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, the latter had the single largest increase in performance relative to previous levels. This, however, cannot hide the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa as well as

much of North Africa and the Middle East remain problem regions, in which vast segments of the population are deprived of adequate nutrition, safe water, proper shelter as well as basic health care and education. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the only region in which infant death rates average more than 100 deaths per 1000 live births. In the Middle East, there have been at least significant improvements in terms of infant mortality (declined from 82.23 to 50.5) as well as adult literacy (increased from 53.7 to 61.31) (c.f. Table 13.2).

[Table 13.2 -- about here]

Both the West and Eastern Europe have overall further improved on their already high levels of economic and social rights performance. Nevertheless, infant mortality rates took a turn for the worse in Eastern Europe, reflective undoubtedly of the severe economic and social problems plaguing the region in this period of transition.

On conclusion, the overall improvement in both subsistence and security rights performance in almost all regions is cause for optimism, which is mitigated, however, by the fact that grave disparities persist, so that the less developed regions in the world average performance levels that many times below Western standards. In terms of combined basic human rights roughly three clusters emerge along difference levels of performance. In the lowest tier, with ratings about four times below that of the highest level, we find Sub-Saharan (37.56), North African and Middle Eastern (38.72) as well as South and East Asian nations (45.47). Of this group Sub-Saharan Africa made by far the strongest gains (old rating: 29.29). One the second tier there are the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean (61.70). Here we have to remind ourselves however that performance tends to vary widely across the region

(stdv.: 24.95). East European nations (114.11) and the Atlantic community (157.48) form the third cluster with a performance about twice as high as the next lower tier.

Table 13.1 Summary of Security Rights Performance in 1991 (Means, Stdv) By World Regions [numbers in brackets refer to the 1984-sample, intended as comparison]

Type of Right / Region	STAT	Torture range: (0-3)	Slavery range: (0-3)	Detention range: (0-3)	Searches range: (0-3)	Capital Punishment range: (0-3)	Sec-Right Perf. range: (0-15)
Sub-Saharan Africa	**M**	**.88 [.80]**	**1.76 [1.41]**	**1.00 [.44]**	**1.32 [.80]**	**.35 [.41]**	**5.32 [3.88]**
	S	.80 [.88]	.55 [.90]	.98 [.77]	.94 [.95]	.81 [.77]	2.64 [3.36]
	n	34	34	34	34	34	34
Middle East & North Africa	**M**	**.81 [.82]**	**1.87 [1.88]**	**.68 [.64]**	**.87 [.88]**	**.37 [.17]**	**4.62 [4.41]**
	S	.75 [.88]	.88 [.78]	.79 [.86]	.80 [.99]	.71 [.39]	2.77 [3.02]
	n	16	16	16	16	16	16
South & East Asia (*)	**M**	**.76 [.76]**	**1.52 [1.33]**	**.76 [.42]**	**1.19 [1.00]**	**.46 [.14]**	**4.66 [3.66]**
	S	.76 [.83]	.92 [1.06]	.88 [.92]	.92 [1.00]	.92 [.47]	3.21 [3.36]
	n	21	21	21	21	21	21
Eastern Europe	**M**	**2.00 [.77]**	**2.66 [1.44]**	**2.50 [.33]**	**2.14 [.33]**	**2.00 [0.00]**	**11.33 [2.88]**
	S	.89 [.66]	.81 [1.01]	.83 [.70]	1.06 [.70]	1.26 [0.00]	4.41 [2.71]
	n	6	6	6	6	6	6
West. Europe **North America**	**M**	**2.50 [2.66]**	**2.77 [2.83]**	**2.88 [2.77]**	**2.88 [2.83]**	**2.77 [2.72]**	**13.83 [13.2]**
	S	.51 [.59]	.42 [.38]	.32 [.54]	.32 [.03]	.54 [.75]	1.200 [2.92]
	n	18	18	18	18	18	18
Caribbean **Latin America**	**M**	**.90 [1.18]**	**1.68 [1.77]**	**1.54 [1.22]**	**1.63 [1.50]**	**1.81 [1.04]**	**7.59 [6.72]**
	S	.81 [1.05]	.64 [.52]	.91 [1.15]	1.00 [1.01]	1.33 [1.21]	3.26 [4.17]
	n	22	22	22	22	22	22
World Total	**M**	**1.17 [1.18]**	**1.94 [1.76]**	**1.41 [.99]**	**1.61 [1.27]**	**1.12 [.80]**	**7.26 [6.00]**
	S	.98 [1.09]	.81 [.94]	1.14 [1.20]	1.06 [1.15]	1.32 [1.18]	4.37 [4.85]
	n	120	120	120	121	120	120

(M) Mean, (S) Standard Deviation, (n) Sample size
(*) does not include Oceania, for which the means are as follows (n=3):
T=1.66; Sl=2.66; D=2.66; Se=2.66; C=2.00; SR=11.66

Table 13.2 Summary of Subsistence Rights/BHR/Performance in 1991 (Means, Stdv) By World Regions [numbers in brackets refer to the 1984-sample, intended as comparison]

Type of Right ------- Region	STAT	Calorie Intake (%)	Safe Water (%)	Housing (a)	Infant Mortality (b)	Adult Literacy (%)	Sub-Right Perf. (c)	Total BHR-Perf. (d)
Sub-Saharan Africa	**M**	**90.19 [90.86]**	**44.84 [35.94]**	**2.14 [2.14]**	**106.02 [120.3]**	**50.73 [45.44]**	**2.06 [1.62]**	**37.56 [29.29]**
	S	9.21 [9.16]	19.16 [21.34]	.22 [.22]	34.66 [37.49]	20.60 [22.37]	3.06 [2.66]	19.45 [23.91]
	n	36	36	34	36	34	33	33
North Africa & Middle East	**M**	**98.37 [98.31]**	**76.25 [73.25]**	**2.21 [2.26]**	**50.50 [82.23]**	**61.31 [53.70]**	**8.11 [6.61]**	**38.72 [36.68]**
	S	5.31 [4.11]	22.61 [18.69]	.70 [.67]	28.27 [40.41]	17.21 [19.58]	12.48 [9.38]	26.90 [27.78]
	n	16	16	16	16	16	16	16
South & East Asia (*)	**M**	**97.45 [96.40]**	**65.00 [58.14]**	**2.24 [2.22]**	**61.04 [70.59]**	**70.85 [70.68]**	**14.64 [11.45]**	**45.57 [37.57]**
	S	4.49 [5.43]	26.07 [30.13]	.56 [.44]	48.44 [50.21]	25.82 [23.85]	24.77 [20.77]	41.63 [45.23]
	n	22	22	20	21	21	20	20
Caribbean & Latin America	**M**	**98.22 [97.18]**	**69.77 [65.86]**	**1.91 [1.85]**	**45.40 [50.40]**	**84.54 [82.50]**	**11.40 [10.04]**	**61.70 [56.25]**
	S	4.40 [5.34]	18.90 [19.26]	.52 [.51]	25.75 [30.73]	12.25 [15.13]	10.13 [7.88]	24.95 [30.20]
	n	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Eastern Europe	**M**	**100.00 [100.0]**	**81.66 [83.11]**	**1.10 [1.18]**	**26.83 [22.22]**	**95.00 [94.77]**	**28.21 [24.57]**	**114.11 [49.58]**
	S	0.00 [0.00]	11.07 [12.18]	.20 [.21]	24.18 [9.11]	5.40 [7.90]	9.36 [9.53]	19.40 [21.85]
	n	6	6	6	6	6	5	5
Western Europe & North America	**M**	**100.00 [100.0]**	**97.50 [95.77]**	**.83 [.81]**	**7.77 [9.83]**	**97.61 [97.5]**	**67.09 [55.96]**	**157.48 [155.8]**
	S	0.00 [0.00]	3.79 [8.73]	.40 [.27]	1.26 [2.97]	3.51 [3.95]	13.67 [16.53]	19.36 [24.12]
	n	18	18	18	18	18	16	16
World Total	**M**	**96.21 [96.05]**	**67.86 [63.01]**	**1.85 [1.84]**	**59.96 [69.96]**	**71.92 [69.04]**	**19.11 [15.96]**	**67.67 [59.14]**
	S	7.00 [6.90]	26.11 [29.17]	.70 [.66]	46.31 [52.30]	24.74 [27.02]	26.21 [22.00]	51.34 [53.13]
	n	119	119	117	120	120	116	116

(M) Mean,
(S) Standard Deviation,
(n) Sample Size
(a) number of persons per room
(b) number of deaths per 1000 live births
(c) Subsistence Rights Performance (range: 1.2 - 99.5)
(d) Basic Human Rights Performance (range: 0.05 - 200)
(*) does not include Oceania, for which the findings are as follows (n=3):
C=99%, W=77%, H=.6 (n=2), IM=24.33(inf's/1000LB's), L=83.33%,
SR=63.31 (n=2), BHR=158.26 (n=2)

Ranking Countries by Performance

Ranking countries by performance we notice some interesting changes between the two samples. In terms of security rights (Table 13.3) Czechoslovakia and Hungary outrank all but eight Western countries. The U.S. ranks 19th along with Rumania, Spain, Uruguay, Poland Hong Kong, Italy, Benin, Costa Rica and Ecuador. The last three are incidently the highest ranked developing countries. Three countries still recorded score of 0 in each security rights category and can be considered the nations with the worst security rights practices. These are Burma, Iraq and Sudan. Afghanistan, China, Haiti, North Korea and Angola were "close seconds". Among African countries Zimbabwe, Mali, Niger and Zambia made marked improvements. Chad, Vietnam, Laos, Congo, Ethiopia Madagascar and a few others have, while still ranking towards the low end of the spectrum, at least improved somewhat and moved away from around the last rank.

[Table 13.3 -- about here]

When we factor in subsistence rights wealthier countries outrank poorer ones and not surprisingly the nations with the highest per capita GNPs Sweden, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland are ranked among the best BHR-performers. Finland, the U.K. and Ireland also have impressive scores despite their slightly lower per capita GNPs. Czechoslovakia is the highest ranking non-Western country edging out the U.S. Aside from Hong Kong Costa Rica is the leading developing country followed by Uruguay, Panama, Trinidad and Mauritius. Singapore ranked between Panama and Trinidad is the best

performing "Asian Tiger". Botswana, the Gambia and Ivory Coast are the leading African countries followed at some distance by Zimbabwe and Senegal. The Sudan has the worst BHR-score of any nation, Burma, Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, are not much better. China, Turkey and India are ranked also comparatively low, India's performance is surprisingly bad in both BHR-dimensions.

Performance By Levels of Development.

In two crosstabulation tables (Tables 14.1 and 14.2) nations were grouped by their level of BHR-performance and their GNP per capita. The categories were marked 'low', 'medium' and 'high'. The rule of assignment was 0.5 standard deviations from the respective means. In brackets both tables also feature the equivalent figures for the 1984/85 sample. While both Table 14.1 and 14.2 confirm once again that wealthier the countries perform better in guaranteeing basic security rights (Kendall's Tau-b.493/p<.0000./n=120) and subsistence rights (Kendall's Tau-b.770/p<.000/n=116), it appears that at least in terms of subsistence rights a greater proportion of countries is now grouped in the high performance categories (22.4% vs. 17.6%). Conversely, there are by a about 4% fewer nations in the low-subsistence rights category. Overall, however, the relationship between subsistence rights performance and GNP per Capita has virtually stayed the same and a familiar trend emerges. There, only some 15.4% of the nations with medium per capita GNPs manage to place in the top category, while 77.8% of countries in the category indicating low subsistence rights performance are drawn from the poorest nations. By contrast some 91.7% of the nations with high per capita GNPs were also in the highest subsistence rights category. This finding underscores once

again the importance of wealth for securing even the most fundamental conditions of decent human living.

With respect to security rights the new findings compare actually unfavorably with the mid-1980s sample in the sense that in the early 1990s a greater proportion of nations (45.8%) placed in the bottom security rights category than in the previous sample (42.9). Overall, the findings are here are rather similar to the earlier results and two important conclusions emerge. First, while the performance in both dimensions has improved somewhat in absolute terms, it has not relative to per Capita GNP, in fact to some extent it has deteriorated (c.f. Tables 14.1 and 14.2). Secondly, in terms of subsistence rights the markedly higher coefficient for statistical association (Kendall's Tau-b=.493 versus (1984/85)=.356/both $p<.000$) suggests that level of economic development is now considerably more associated with security rights practices than it was a decade ago.

[Table 14.1 -- about here]

[Table 14.2 -- about here]

Table 13.3 Security Rights Performance by Country in Order of Magnitude (1990 Sample)

Country Name	SecRight Perf.	Country Name	SecRight Perf
Czechoslov	15.00	Rep. Yemen	6.00
Denmark	15.00	Zambia	6.00
Finland	15.00	Burkina Faso	5.00
Germany	15.00	Chad	5.00
Hungary	15.00	Colombia	5.00
Irish Rep.	15.00	Congo	5.00
Netherlands	15.00	Kuwait	5.00
New Zealand	15.00	Lesotho	5.00
Norway	15.00	Madagascar	5.00
Sweden	15.00	Malaysia	5.00
Australia	14.00	Mexico	5.00
Austria	14.00	Mozambique	5.00
Belgium	14.00	Oman	5.00
France	14.00	South Africa	5.00
Switzerland	14.00	Tunisia	5.00
U.K.	14.00	Bangladesh	4.00
Canada	13.00	Brazil	4.00
Portugal	13.00	Cameroon	4.00
Benin	12.00	Egypt	4.00
Costa Rica	12.00	El Salvador	4.00
Ecuador	12.00	Ethiopia	4.00
Greece	12.00	Guinea	4.00
Hong Kong	12.00	Kenya	4.00
Italy	12.00	Laos	4.00
Poland	12.00	Libya	4.00
Rumania	12.00	Malawi	4.00
Spain	12.00	Pakistan	4.00
U.S.A.	12.00	Peru	4.00
Uruguay	12.00	Taiwan	4.00
Argentina	11.00	Togo	4.00
Bulgaria	11.00	Vietnam	4.00
Panama	11.00	Albania	3.00
Botswana	10.00	Burundi	3.00
Dom. Rep.	10.00	Cambodia	3.00
Gambia	10.00	Cuba	3.00
Israel	10.00	Ghana	3.00
Ivory Coast	10.00	India	3.00
Japan	10.00	Indonesia	3.00
Mauritius	10.00	Mauritania	3.00
Paraguay	10.00	Nigeria	3.00
Chile	9.00	Rwanda	3.00
Nepal	9.00	Saudi Arabia	3.00
Nicaragua	9.00	Tanzania	3.00
Trinidad	9.00	Uganda	3.00
Venezuela	9.00	Zaire	3.00
Honduras	8.00	Centr.Africa	2.00
Iran	8.00	Sri Lanka	2.00
Philippines	8.00	Syria	2.00
Senegal	8.00	Turkey	2.00
Singapore	8.00	Afghanistan	1.00
Zimbabwe	8.00	Angola	1.00
Algeria	7.00	China	1.00
Bolivia	7.00	Haiti	1.00
Jordan	7.00	Korea N.	1.00
Mali	7.00	Burma/Myanmar	.00
Niger	7.00	Iraq	.00
Sierra Leone	7.00	Sudan	.00
Guatemala	6.00	Liberia	.
Jamaica	6.00	Mongolia	.
Korea S.	6.00	Somalia	.
Morocco	6.00	Russia	.
Papua N.Guinea	6.00	S.Yemen	.
Thailand	6.00	Yugoslavia	.

Table 13.4 Basic Human Rights Performance by Country in Order of Magnitude (1990 Sample)

Country Name	BHR Perf	Country Name	BHR Perf
Sweden	187.22	Colombia	42.56
Finland	180.74	Zambia	42.41
Germany	174.76	Morocco	42.36
Netherlands	174.76	Rep. Yemen	40.68
U.K.	168.10	Mexico	39.80
Switzerland	167.82	Oman	38.48
Japan	166.67	Tunisia	36.49
Denmark	165.42	Congo	36.43
France	165.04	Lesotho	35.71
Norway	163.96	Madagascar	34.74
Canada	162.82	Burkina Faso	34.21
Irish Rep.	161.04	Brazil	34.03
New Zealand	159.23	Chad	33.72
Belgium	157.54	Mozambique	33.52
Australia	157.29	Vietnam	31.59
Austria	152.67	Libya	30.96
Italy	141.04	Peru	29.63
Czechoslov	140.33	Cameroon	29.26
U.S.A.	138.15	Egypt	28.96
Hong Kong	133.64	Kenya	28.87
Hungary	128.33	Togo	28.79
Greece	127.28	El Salvador	28.38
Spain	124.02	Malawi	27.69
Portugal	122.39	Laos	27.63
Israel	117.25	Bangladesh	27.59
Poland	106.59	Ethiopia	27.30
Costa Rica	102.70	Guinea	27.14
Bulgaria	100.69	Pakistan	26.70
Uruguay	95.56	Saudi Arabia	24.82
Rumania	94.63	Sri Lanka	24.03
Panama	89.43	Indonesia	23.56
Singapore	88.11	Syria	23.11
Trinidad	86.85	Tanzania	22.56
Argentina	85.38	Ghana	22.31
Mauritius	84.44	Zaire	22.17
Ecuador	84.18	Korea N.	21.98
Benin	81.33	India	21.59
Chile	80.62	Mauritania	21.44
Paraguay	71.65	Nigeria	21.43
Venezuela	71.62	Rwanda	21.38
Dom. Rep.	71.32	Burundi	21.20
Botswana	70.25	Cambodia	21.06
Gambia	67.99	Uganda	20.79
Ivory Coast	67.94	Turkey	17.68
Nicaragua	64.34	China	15.55
Jamaica	62.50	Centr.Africa	13.86
Nepal	60.74	Haiti	8.10
Philippines	60.57	Angola	7.14
Iran	59.38	Afghanistan	7.12
Cuba	58.56	Iraq	4.23
Honduras	57.10	Burma/Myanmar	2.20
Zimbabwe	56.91	Sudan	.04
Senegal	54.86	Papua N.Guinea	.
Jordan	54.64	South Africa	.
Thailand	53.39	Taiwan	.
Korea S.	53.09	Albania	.
Kuwait	51.30	Liberia	.
Bolivia	49.28	Mongolia	.
Algeria	49.18	Somalia	.
Niger	47.41	Russia	.
Mali	47.27	S.Yemen	.
Sierra Leone	47.08	Yugoslavia	.
Malaysia	44.65		
Guatemala	43.82	Number of cases listed =	126

Table 14.1 1991-Sample -- Security Rights by GNP per Capita [shows 1985 figures for comparison]

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		GNP per Capita			
		Low	**Medium**	**High**	**Row Total**
Security Rights	**Low**	36 [32] 65.5 [59.3] 65.5 [55.2] 30 [25.4]	17 [16] 30.9 [29.6] 41.5 [41] 14.2 [12.7]	2 [6] 3.6 [11.1] 8.3 [20.7] 1.7 [4.48]	55 [54] 45.8 [42.9]
	Medium	14 [20] 56.0 [60.6] 25.5 [34.5] 11.7 [15.9]	10 [9] 40.0 [27.3] 24.4 [23.1] 8.3 [7.1]	1 [4] 4.0 [12.1] 4.2 [13.8] .8 [3.2]	25 [33] 20.8 [26.3]
	High	5 [6] 12.5 [15.4] 9.1 [10.3] 4.2 [4.8]	14 [14] 35.0 [35.9] 34.1 [35.9] 11.7 [11.1]	21 [19] 52.5 [48.7] 87.5 [65.5] 17.5 [15.1]	40 [39] 33.3 [31.0]
	Column total	55 [58] 45.8 [46.0]	41 [39] 34.2 [31]	24 [29] 20.0 [23]	120 [126] 100

Table: Chi-Square 46.99/p<.000, Statistic:Kendall's Tau-b =.493[.356]/p<.0000

Table 14.2 1991-Sample -- Subsistence Rights by GNP per Capita [shows 1985 figures for comparison]

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct		GNP per Capita			
		Low	**Medium**	**High**	**Row Total**
Sub-sistence Rights	**Low**	49 [55] 77.8 [78.6] 92.5 [100] 42.2 [46.2]	13 [12] 20.6 [17.1] 33.3 [33.3] 11.2 [10.1]	1 [3] 1.6 [4.3] 4.2 [10.7] .9 [2.5]	63 [70] 54.3 [58.8]
	Medium	4 [0] 14.8 [0] 7.5 [0] 3.4 [0]	22 [22] 81.5 [78.6] 56.4 [61.1] 19.0 [18.5]	1 [6] 3.7 [21.4] 4.2 [21.4] .9 [5]	27 [28] 23.3 [23.5]
	High	[0]	4 [2] 15.4 [9.5] 10.3 [5.6] 3.4 [1.7]	22 [19] 84.6 [90.5] 91.7 [67.9] 19.0 [16.0]	26 [21] 22.4 [17.6]
	Column total	53 [55] 45.7[46.2]	39 [36] 33.6[30.3]	24 [28] 20.7 [23.5]	116 [119] 100

Table: Chi-Square 122.06/p<.000, Statistic: Kendall's Tau-b =.770[.700]/p<.0000

Basic Human Rights Effort -- Changes Over Time

Indices of security rights efforts and subsistence rights efforts are constructed for this sample as outlined in the last chapter. In a first step nations are ranked according to their effort to guarantee basic security rights (c.f. Table 15.1). The resulting rank-list reveals quite a dramatic reversal in country rankings in comparison to both the security rights "performance" of this sample and to "effort" as observed in the previous sample. Dividing the country scores on security rights performance by their logged GNP per capita redraws country rankings substantially so that the highest ranking Western countries, Ireland and New Zealand are ranked 7th and 10th. The top ten nations are led by Benin, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Ecuador and include also Nepal, the Gambia and Costa Rica. West European countries are spread from 13th rank (Netherlands) to 45th (Italy). The U.S. ranks 47th and Japan even 57th when their security rights performance is adjusted for their per capita GNP, both of which are outranked by Mali, Zimbabwe, Niger and Senegal. Noticeable also are the relatively low rankings of the emerging economies of East Asia such as Singapore, Thailand, China, which all rank lower then 60th place. As previously, Saudi Arabia and Oman are found towards the low end of the effort spectrum. The rank-list is rounded out by Iraq, Burma and Sudan, all of which have a score of 0, closely preceded by North Korea and Angola (c.f. 15.1).

[Table 15.1 -- about here]

In comparison to the rank-list on "performance" the rankings based on effort caused some countries to dramatically improve their position, these include like Benin (by 17 ranks),

the Gambia (by 27 ranks), Nepal (by 36 ranks), Nicaragua (by 20 ranks) or Costa Rica (by 7 ranks). Others like Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ireland, Zimbabwe, the Philippines or Senegal stay roughly the same. Many nations, however, drop substantially. These include industrialized countries like Germany (by 16 ranks), Sweden (by 20 ranks), Austria (by 17 ranks), Switzerland (by 32 ranks) and the U.S.(by 29 ranks). A number of emerging economies and developing countries are also among those that score considerably worse on effort than on performance, which include Hong Kong, El Salvador, Cuba or Albania (c.f. 15.1).

In comparison to the mid-1980s sample (see previous chapter) we notice some interesting changes. Papua New Guinea, formerly the top-ranked country dropped by more then 60 ranks. Similarly, Austria, Congo, the Dominican Republic, India, Japan, Mauritius, Sierra Leone and several others show a lower ranking on security effort than they did in the mid 1980s. Most East European countries as well as a number of African and Latin American countries, including Benin, Ecuador, the Gambia, Uruguay, Zimbabwe exhibit considerably more effort than approximately decade earlier.

In terms of subsistence efforts country rankings match those on performance much more closely (Table 15.2). Changes over time have also been relatively minor. Japan and Sweden switched places for first rank. While the U.K. has substantially boosted its ranking, Hong Kong's positions has declined relative to others. Most of these changes are, however, due to shifts and unequal growth rates in GNP. While the U.S. has retained roughly its position over time (1984: 17th rank, 1991: 18th rank) it is one of the few industrialized countries that has not increased its overall score (c.f. Table 15.2 with Table 12.2).

[Table 15.2 -- about here]

When security and subsistence efforts are combined countries can be ranked by their overall human rights effort (c.f. Table 15.3). Compared with the earlier sample the distribution is remarkably stable over time. There are, however, some interesting deviations. While the order of the top three countries Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands remains the same, their scores drop off slightly (c.f. Table 15.3 with Table 12.3). Ireland, a unified Germany, New Zealand and the U.K. improve their ranks and scores somewhat, while the effort scores for Denmark, Switzerland and Norway have not kept up with their rising per Capita GNPs. A number of countries, like the U.S. has retained its position, but improved its score slightly. Noticeable is also the dramatic improvement in effort among many East European countries boosting the position of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria. Costa Rica and Benin are the highest ranking developing countries, displacing Mauritius, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic all of which had significant drops in rank and score. Of the 10 nations whose governments make least effort Sudan (last rank), Burma/Myanmar, Iraq Angola and Central Africa are the same in both samples. Due to war and political chaos both Liberia and Somalia, two of the previously worst nations in the sample, are no longer included. New among the "bottom 10" are China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Haiti. Pakistan, Ethiopia, Chad and Mali have increased their position somewhat, both in rank and score.

[Table 15.3 -- about here]

Differences in cross-national human rights effort can also be demonstrated by breaking them down by world regions. Table 15.4 presents an overview of security rights performance

(low, medium, high[3]) in eight regional groupings (Western Europe and North America, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, Central and Southern Asia, Eastern Asia as well as Oceania). Overall an equal percentage (38.7%) of nations make either great (high) or little (low) effort. About 37% of the nations in the high effort category are drawn from the Atlantic community, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa(!) (21.7%), Latin America (19.6%) and Eastern Europe (10.9%). Sub-Saharan Africa, however, contributes an even larger share of countries (34.8%) to the low effort category, followed by the Middle East and Northern Africa (21.7%), Eastern Asia (17.4%) and Latin America (15.2%). In a direct comparisons of the regions with each other 94.4% of the countries from Western Europe and North America show a high level of security rights effort, followed by Eastern Europe (83.3%), Oceania (66.7%), Latin America 40.9%, Sub-Saharan Africa 29.4%, Central and Southern Asia (16.7%), Eastern Asia (14.3) and Northern Africa and the Middle East (0%). Conversely, Central and South Asia (66.75%), the Magreb countries and the Middle East (62.5%) as well as Eastern Asia (57.1%) have the relatively largest proportion of countries in the low effort category (c.f. 15.4).

[Table 15.4 -- about here]

As expected, the situation is very different with respect to subsistence effort. Table 15.5 indicates that both the West (including Australia and New Zealand) and Eastern Europe place all their nations in the category defining a high level of effort. All other regions fall far short, only 18.2% of Latin American and Caribbean nations, 15.4% of East Asian countries, 6.3% of Middle Eastern nations, 6.3% of Sub-Saharan African states and none of the Central and

South Asian countries are able to make a similarly great effort. By comparisons the countries of Asia and of the Middle East exhibit by far the worst subsistence effort of any region.

[Table 15.5 -- about here]

Conclusion.

The findings here have confirmed the expectation that human rights performance and effort have overall increased. Surprising was, however, that fact that most of this increase came about in a rather unlikely region such as Sub-Saharan Africa, which is all the more remarkable in light of some of the recent catastrophic news from the region. The much complimented and admired countries of Eastern Asia, whose economies have gone through staggering growth rates in the past decade, have not yet matched their economic performance with that on basic human rights. This is all the more regrettable since the resources available would certainly warrant an improvement both in performance and effort. Another region with a marked turn for better was Central and Eastern Europe. In many respects their performance is now equal to that of Western and Southern Europe. While the significant improvement of human rights does not come as a surprise in light of the recent political reforms, from the perspective of an observer from before 1989 also this development seems hardly conceivable.

It was to be expected that the dimension of security rights is much more susceptible to the kind of political changes that have occurred in recent history. Accordingly, improvements have been more spectacular with respect to security rights, than with subsistence rights, where improvements are painfully slow in coming. Basic economic and

social rights, on the other hand, are much more closely tied to the economic realities present in many countries. As a result improvements in this dimension are only very slow in coming. This linkage between wealth and performance has also resulted in a "greater volatility" of security effort rankings over time, whose order has been substantially redrawn since 1984. Something which stands in a marked contrast to subsistence efforts, the ratings of which have proved more stable over the past decade.

In conclusion, cautious optimism is warranted, since progress has been made in two of the most unlikely regions, the poor and troublesome countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and the nations that lay once behind the iron curtain. Our optimism is dampened, however, by the fact that in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, in the Middle East and in much of Asia many of the basic human rights are still largely ignored by governments, because these governments are either unwilling or incapable of ensuring the means for individual security and subsistence.

Table 15.1 Security Rights Effort by Country in Order of Magnitude (1990 Sample)

Country Name	SecRight Eff	Country Name	SecRight Eff
Benin	2.02	Singapore	.84
Czechoslov	1.92	Ethiopia	.84
Hungary	1.90	Jamaica	.83
Ecuador	1.74	Thailand	.82
Nepal	1.73	Lesotho	.79
Gambia	1.70	Laos	.74
Rumania	1.66	Bangladesh	.74
Irish Rep.	1.61	Malawi	.74
Poland	1.60	Congo	.71
Costa Rica	1.60	Colombia	.70
New Zealand	1.59	Kenya	.69
Ivory Coast	1.53	Korea S.	.69
Netherlands	1.52	Tunisia	.68
Uruguay	1.51	Pakistan	.67
Portugal	1.50	Togo	.66
Germany	1.49	Guinea	.65
Denmark	1.49	Tanzania	.65
Finland	1.49	Malaysia	.64
Norway	1.49	South Africa	.64
Sweden	1.48	Mexico	.62
Nicaragua	1.47	Egypt	.62
Bulgaria	1.46	Cameroon	.59
Dom. Rep.	1.46	Uganda	.58
U.K.	1.44	Peru	.57
Australia	1.44	Oman	.57
Panama	1.44	El Salvador	.57
Belgium	1.42	Cambodia	.57
Austria	1.41	Burundi	.56
France	1.41	Zaire	.56
Paraguay	1.40	Taiwan	.54
Argentina	1.39	Rwanda	.54
Greece	1.37	India	.52
Switzerland	1.34	Kuwait	.52
Canada	1.31	Nigeria	.51
Sierra Leone	1.31	Brazil	.50
Mauritius	1.28	Ghana	.50
Botswana	1.28	Mauritania	.48
Spain	1.27	Indonesia	.47
Hong Kong	1.26	Libya	.47
Honduras	1.26	Albania	.45
Mali	1.24	Cuba	.41
Zimbabwe	1.24	Centr.Africa	.34
Niger	1.23	Saudi Arabia	.33
Senegal	1.22	Sri Lanka	.32
Italy	1.22	Syria	.28
Philippines	1.21	Turkey	.27
U.S.A.	1.20	Afghanistan	.18
Chile	1.17	China	.17
Mozambique	1.14	Haiti	.17
Venezuela	1.14	Angola	.16
Trinidad	1.10	Korea N.	.14
Bolivia	1.08	Iraq	.00
Israel	1.07	Burma/Myanmar	.00
Iran	1.04	Sudan	.00
Jordan	1.01	Vietnam	.
Zambia	.99	Liberia	.
Japan	.98	Mongolia	.
Rep. Yemen	.96	Somalia	.
Madagascar	.94	Russia	.
Chad	.94	S.Yemen	.
Algeria	.92	Yugoslavia	.
Papua N.Guinea	.89		
Burkina Faso	.88	Number of cases listed =	126
Guatemala	.88		
Morocco	.86		

Table 15.2 Subsistence Rights Effort by Country in Order of Magnitude (1990 Sample)

Country Name	SubRight Eff	Country Name	SubRight Eff
Japan	10.08	Zimbabwe	.57
Sweden	8.85	Saudi Arabia	.55
Finland	8.23	Libya	.51
U.K.	7.91	Botswana	.47
Canada	7.89	Congo	.45
Netherlands	7.81	Tunisia	.44
Germany	7.63	Peru	.44
France	7.43	Burma/Myanmar	.43
Switzerland	7.35	Bolivia	.41
Australia	6.75	Zaire	.41
Irish Rep.	6.74	Zambia	.41
Belgium	6.70	Ghana	.40
Denmark	6.68	Cameroon	.40
Norway	6.51	Kenya	.39
New Zealand	6.46	Lesotho	.38
Italy	6.39	Egypt	.37
Austria	6.16	Togo	.36
U.S.A.	5.97	Morocco	.35
Hong Kong	5.80	Algeria	.34
Greece	5.55	India	.28
Israel	5.54	Madagascar	.27
Cuba	5.40	Rwanda	.25
Czechoslov	5.31	El Salvador	.25
Spain	4.80	Nigeria	.25
Portugal	4.23	Haiti	.25
Bulgaria	3.74	Senegal	.24
Singapore	3.74	Mauritania	.24
Hungary	3.68	Gambia	.23
Poland	3.65	Burundi	.23
Trinidad	3.36	Benin	.23
Jamaica	3.20	Cambodia	.21
Costa Rica	3.10	Ivory Coast	.20
Chile	2.76	Malawi	.19
Mauritius	2.35	Laos	.18
Korea N.	2.28	Bangladesh	.18
Panama	2.16	Burkina Faso	.16
Rumania	2.08	Uganda	.16
Uruguay	2.01	Nepal	.15
Kuwait	1.91	Ethiopia	.13
Thailand	1.87	Niger	.13
Sri Lanka	1.77	Rep. Yemen	.11
Argentina	1.56	Mali	.11
China	1.54	Centr.Africa	.09
Korea S.	1.54	Afghanistan	.09
Venezuela	1.51	Sierra Leone	.08
Malaysia	1.49	Guinea	.08
Syria	1.42	Angola	.08
Colombia	1.33	Chad	.07
Jordan	1.18	Mozambique	.04
Philippines	1.13	Pakistan	.01
Brazil	.95	Sudan	.01
Mexico	.83	Papua N.Guinea	.
Iran	.81	South Africa	.
Nicaragua	.73	Taiwan	.
Paraguay	.72	Albania	.
Dom. Rep.	.70	Vietnam	.
Ecuador	.62	Liberia	.
Honduras	.61	Mongolia	.
Oman	.61	Somalia	.
Turkey	.60	Russia	.
Iraq	.58	S.Yemen	.
Guatemala	.57	Yugoslavia	.
Indonesia	.57		
Tanzania	.57	Number of cases listed =	126

Table 15.3 BHR-Effort by Country in Order of Magnitude (1990 Sample)

Country Name	BHR Eff	Country Name	BHR Eff
Sweden	161.10	Madagascar	48.97
Finland	155.28	Rep. Yemen	48.61
Netherlands	152.94	Colombia	47.86
U.K.	149.84	Chad	47.02
Germany	149.44	Malaysia	46.34
Japan	148.50	Morocco	46.29
Czechoslov	147.70	Burkina Faso	45.23
Irish Rep.	146.52	Kuwait	44.45
France	143.55	Lesotho	42.71
Canada	143.09	Ethiopia	42.70
New Zealand	142.93	Congo	39.76
Denmark	139.95	Mexico	39.11
Switzerland	139.38	Laos	38.54
Norway	138.17	Bangladesh	38.46
Australia	138.07	Malawi	38.34
Belgium	136.84	Tunisia	38.25
Austria	131.00	Tanzania	37.91
Hungary	130.43	Kenya	37.83
Italy	123.80	Togo	36.51
Greece	122.93	Egypt	34.53
Hong Kong	120.05	Oman	34.41
U.S.A.	118.59	Brazil	34.19
Portugal	116.02	Sri Lanka	33.49
Poland	115.52	Cameroon	33.28
Spain	110.61	Pakistan	33.11
Costa Rica	109.74	Guinea	33.08
Bulgaria	109.54	Peru	32.72
Israel	107.68	Zaire	31.63
Rumania	102.70	El Salvador	30.85
Benin	102.28	Uganda	30.48
Uruguay	94.67	Cambodia	30.07
Panama	92.47	Burundi	30.07
Ecuador	92.17	Korea N.	29.81
Trinidad	87.64	Rwanda	29.04
Nepal	87.26	Indonesia	28.82
Mauritius	86.85	Ghana	28.72
Gambia	86.40	India	28.41
Chile	85.42	Libya	28.19
Argentina	84.13	Syria	28.16
Nicaragua	79.89	Nigeria	27.97
Dom. Rep.	79.25	Mauritania	26.17
Singapore	78.51	China	23.69
Ivory Coast	77.71	Saudi Arabia	22.05
Paraguay	76.38	Turkey	19.15
Cuba	73.75	Centr.Africa	17.49
Jamaica	72.82	Haiti	10.85
Venezuela	71.29	Afghanistan	9.88
Philippines	71.27	Angola	8.45
Honduras	68.28	Iraq	5.76
Botswana	67.84	Burma/Myanmar	4.24
Zimbabwe	66.77	Sudan	.06
Sierra Leone	65.60	Papua N.Guinea	.
Senegal	62.97	South Africa	.
Mali	62.59	Taiwan	.
Niger	62.09	Albania	.
Jordan	61.51	Vietnam	.
Iran	59.58	Liberia	.
Thailand	58.93	Mongolia	.
Bolivia	57.62	Somalia	.
Mozambique	56.93	Russia	.
Zambia	53.24	S.Yemen	.
Korea S.	49.19	Yugoslavia	.
Guatemala	49.15		
Algeria	49.03	Number of cases listed =	126

Table 15.4 1991 Sample -- Security Rights Effort by Region

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Low Effort	Medium Effort	High Effort	Row Tot.
Europe & North America		1 5.6 3.7 .8	17 94.4 37.0 14.3	18 15.1
Eastern Europe	1 16.7 2.2 .8		5 83.3 10.9 4.2	6 5.0
Latin America	7 31.8 15.2 5.9	6 27.3 22.2 5.0	9 40.9 19.6 7.6	22 18.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	16 47.1 34.8 13.4	8 23.5 29.6 6.7	10 29.4 21.7 8.4	34 28.6
North Africa & Middle East	10 62.5 21.7 8.4	6 37.5 22.2 5.0		16 13.4
Central & South Asia	4 66.7 8.7 3.4	1 16.7 3.7 .8	1 16.7 2.2 .8	6 5.0
Eastern Asia	8 57.1 17.4 6.7	4 28.6 14.8 3.4	2 14.3 4.3 1.7	14 11.8
Ocenania		1 33.3 3.7 .8	2 66.7 4.3 1.7	3 2.5
Column Tot.	46 38.7	27 22.7	46 38.7	119 100.0

Table 15.5 1991 Sample -- Basic Human Rights Effort by Region

Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Low Effort	Medium Effort	High Effort	Row Tot.
Europe & North America			18 100.0 54.5 15.7	18 15.7
Eastern Europe			5 100.0 15.2 4.3	5 4.3
Latin America	6 27.3 12.2 5.2	12 54.5 36.4 10.4	4 18.2 12.1 3.5	22 19.1
Sub-Saharan Africa	20 60.6 40.8 17.4	12 36.4 36.4 10.4	1 3.0 3.0 .9	33 28.7
North Africa & Middle East	11 68.8 22.4 9.6	4 25.0 12.1 3.5	1 6.3 3.0 .9	16 13.9
Central & South Asia	5 83.3 10.4 4.3	1 16.7 3.0 .9		6 5.2
Eastern Asia	7 53.8 14.3 6.1	4 30.8 12.1 3.5	2 15.4 6.1 1.7	13 11.3
Ocenania			2 100.0 6.1 1.7	2 1.7
Column Tot.	49 42.6	33 28.7	33 28.7	115 100.0

Endnotes

1. To borrow a metaphor used by Bratton (1993) to describe the recent political changes in Africa.

2. Housing presents once again somewhat of a problem, since also the "new" housing data listed in the UNDP 1992 and the U.N. Statistical Yearbook were essentially were gathered from 1980-85, but became available only recently. In those cases where housing averages have changed between the earlier and the later sample, figures have been re-estimated, respectively new information has allowed to update old estimates, by discarding even older data. Given the natural inertia in a sector as vast as the housing conditions of a nation, we would, of course, not expect dramatic changes over the period of few years.

3. Using 0.5 standard deviations from the mean as the assignment rule.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

Basic Human Rights -- What Lessons Can be Drawn?

This project had three main objectives; first to provide empirical grounding for Henry Shue's theoretical work by operationalizing his concept of basic human rights. The second objective was to assess the state of basic human rights in as many countries as possible, including devising a rank list of countries. The third task called for the development of a comprehensive explanatory framework of basic human rights including the testing of a number of important hypotheses derived from the human rights and comparative literature.

Furthermore, there were two additional objectives that are critically linked to the main tasks outlined above. For one, as a political scientist I regarded it important to pursue especially political explanations of human rights practices, which meant the development and operationalization of a regime type measure, derived from Dahl's work on in Latin America, as an important alternative to the economic explanations frequently used in comparative human rights research. This included also the development of an institutional model loosely dubbed "liberal institutional trajectory" to account for BHR-performance in nations that were former colonies. The other objective called for a novel approach to rate the countries' human rights practices by simultaneously accounting for their wealth. I have referred to this concept as "human rights effort", which resulted, at least with respect to security rights, in a startling

new rank order of countries challenging established notion of cross-national human rights practices. In addition to merely assessing the human rights effort made by government, is was equally important to identify possible explanations thereof.

In operationalizing basic human rights, by making this concept manageable for comparative research, in developing a practicable measure for regime type in conjunction with human rights as well as in devising and exploring the concepts of human rights performance and effort this author hopes to have broken new ground and to have genuinely contributed to the field of cross-national human rights research.

The First Objective.

Let us briefly review here why these objectives are important. In drawing upon Henry Shue's notion of basic human rights several critical and largely unresolved questions in the human rights literature can be addressed simultaneously. For one the human rights community has been historically divided over which type of human rights ought to be given priority consideration in cases when countries were faced with pressing social and economic needs as well as with extremely limited resources. Some have argued that in areas where basic needs are not being met, so called "positive rights", that is social and economic rights are of primary importance, even at the expense of curbing some or all civil and political rights and freedoms. Others have maintained that while human rights concern primarily civil and political rights that must never be sacrificed, a government's proper economic and social policy, on the other hand, is a political matter and as such subject to different interpretations. This position also holds that by ensuring personal and political freedom, public participation as well as political and economic pluralism, liberal regimes tend to correct economic imbalances, promoting,

therefore, the economic betterment all segments of society. Critics counter, however, that "negative rights" may restrain government action to a point where the state becomes unable or unwilling to address emerging social imbalances exacerbating in effect the plight of large segments of the population in underdeveloped countries. Researches have frequently sided with one of these two arguments and devised measuring instruments, data-sets and rank-lists that were crafted to correspond to one of these positions, respectively to their underlying ideological frameworks. In other cases, where research tended to reflect both negative and positive rights, it was often not made clear how nations are to deal with the tradeoffs and choices involved, since obviously not all the requirements of either set of rights could be met simultaneously.

The concept of basic human rights offers an ingenious solution to the question of positive versus negative rights and the tradeoffs entailed therein by distinguishing elementary or foundational from higher order rights. In doing so it recognizes the reality that not all societies are equipped to guarantee all rights and all freedoms all of the time. It also allows for the possibility that societies choose their own human rights approach depending on the existing economic, social or political contingencies. However, the concept of basic rights entails also that a set of basic political and economic rights are absolutely and equally essential for a decent and dignified human life. In other words, these are rights that can never be sacrificed, since their denial threatens personal and physical security as well as economic subsistence. Since it is meaningless to trade security for subsistence, no tradeoff between basic rights is acceptable. In addition, any human rights framework of greater complexity would inevitably first have to secure these basic rights, which include the freedom from torture, the freedom from detention and house searches without a warrant, safety from capital punishment

and extrajudicial killings, the freedom from slavery or any other form of compulsory labor. These also include the right to adequate nutrition as well as safe and sanitary water, the rights to adequate shelter as well as minimal health care and education.

Henry Shue's concept of basic rights is important in another respect. In developing the notion of subsistence rights Shue conceptualizes much of what others consider a social and economic agenda largely left to the ideological preferences of policy makers as a right, that is a justified moral claim by an individual against government. In so doing economic rights became co-equal in stature to political and freedom rights. In this Shue is drawing on non-liberal/Western traditions by emphasizing social and economic equality by simultaneously remaining committed to the Western understanding of rights as individual claims. A concept that is far more powerful and departs, as I discussed extensively earlier, in many important ways from other (non-Western) moral systems that treat this issue merely as a form of duty for a charitable and benevolent government.

Applying the concept of basic human rights helps us address a further contentious issue in field of human rights, which has divided and confounded researchers, activists and philosophers alike. That is the question whether human rights ought to be thought of as universally valid at all times and in all places applying to everybody regardless of culture, creed, gender, age, class or status. Or do we take human rights to be something that is as context-bound as all other human affairs, contingent upon cultural and moral beliefs relative to historical experience and political practice. Shue's concept of basic human rights sidesteps the problems by using the same reasoning that successfully resolved the question of positive versus negative rights. In appealing to the fundamental importance to everybody's right to a life with at least personal safety, physical integrity and minimal economic security the concept

of basic rights implies that it can be in nobody's interest to see members of one's community die or suffer needlessly, no matter which cultural frame of reference is used. Even a strictly communitarian society, which expects of individuals to excel in fulfilling their roles towards the community, would want their members live and function in order perform their obligations. In short, while Shue's concept is sufficiently inclusionary to be sensitive to the concerns of non-Western human rights traditions, it is, nevertheless, clearly centered around the individual and affirms the universal validity of basic rights.

This is not to say that the concept of basic human rights is the only rights conception that claims universal validity, in fact the UNDHR and its two covenants are the two most important international documents affirming the universal validity of human rights. Because of their complex nature and because of the political circumstances of their drafting the UNDHR cannot be easily applied to empirical research. This points to another strength of Shue's concept of basic rights in the sense that it is highly manageable for research purposes.

The Second Objective.

Assessing the state of basic human rights was the second objective, the importance of which lies not only in providing an accurate accounting of performance differences across nations, but to demonstrate the usefulness and validity of this concept for cross-national research. This involved developing a series of measures and to locate data-sources that not only corresponded as closely as possible to Shue's theoretical framework, but that were not plagued by some of the problems of earlier comparative human rights research. For one, politically controversial data sources as well as proxy-measures reflecting concepts other then human right such as levels of democracy or political stability had to be avoided. Specifically,

indicators and data had to be centered around the individual and his or her political, social or economic situation. For example, rather than assessing adequate housing by some global measure of public housing expenditures, it was important to get a sense of individual comfort by measuring the number of persons per room. Furthermore, it was important to work with data that were plausible, interval level, widely available, direct and easy to handle as well as without extensive prior interpretation and manipulation at the source. I believe that the Humana's World Human Rights Guide (1983, 86, 92), the UNDP Development Report (1991, 92) as well as Sivard's (1987) World Military and Social Expenditures, supplemented by the U.N. Statistical Yearbook (1986-92), Habitat Global Report on Human Settlement(1987), Amnesty International sources and State Department Country Reports (1985-92) were the most helpful sources in this process.

The Third Objective.

The third objective called for explanations of basic human rights performance and effort by focusing specifically on regime type as an important political explanation of human rights. Here it was essential both to establish some continuity to the current comparative literature by testing several critical hypotheses, and to break new ground by operationalizing a regime type measure that is itself not rights-based and avoids, therefore, the circularity that had for instance been a problem in Howard and Donnelly's (1986) work along the same lines. Two tasks were especially important; one was to determine the extent to which economic factors affect both the levels of performance and effort. The other was to develop alternative political explanations, by suggesting that, generally, human rights are at least as much contingent on political as on economic factors.

The effort to provide explanations of human rights performance culminated in a series of OLS-regression models which were able to explain between 60% and 80% of cross-national differences in human rights performance. In all models political competitiveness and participation, level of economic development as well as equality of income proved by far the best predictors of human rights performance. Later in the dissertation I also introduced a multivariate institutional model, centered around regime type, British colonial legacy and length of independence, that was able to account for much of the variation in BHR-performance of all former colonies in the sample. Likewise, it was a considerable challenge to model BHR-effort, without drawing on GNP per capita, to demonstrate the importance of factors other than the amount resources available to government. The so called "alternative model" of BHR-effort could still explain almost two thirds of the variation in BHR-Effort.

Both the bivariate and the multivariate analysis point to (only!) three central factors that, overall, affect most significantly whether governments secure basic political and economic rights; these are the presence of an inclusionary and competitive regime, an advanced level of development and a rather equitable distribution of wealth. In fact, the first two seem so fundamentally important that some combination of the two is virtually a necessary condition for good human rights performance.

What Lessons May We Derive?

The relevance of this analysis is twofold. For one, if political factors are found to play a greater role in basic human rights practices than hitherto thought, this would be a cause for optimism since political change may come about more rapidly than economic progress. Likewise, governments would find it more difficult to justify human rights violations in the

name of economic imperatives. Secondly, given that Western governments are interested in expanding political and economic relations with regimes that show an improvement in human rights performance, respectively that make the most effort, the findings here may provide a useful basis for such policy decisions.

Let us now reconsider the findings of this analysis. How can they be interpreted? Generally speaking, most findings have turned out as predicted, some, however, have been rather unexpected and surprising. It came certainly, as no surprise that both the level of development and the distribution of income are highly correlated with existing human rights practices. It was surprising, however, to find that when governments publicly endorsed the UNDHR and its covenants, there was generally no relationship between the words and actions of government. Quite unexpected also were the differences between nations both with respect to performance and effort which resulted in country rankings, often quite different from conventional human rights rank-lists, especially when we adjusted human rights performance for GNP pert capita.

Foreign economic relations and especially trade has been somewhat of an enigma here. For the mid-1980s nations, still mired in the depth of the Cold War, foreign investment had none and trade only "little" effect on human rights practices overall. The term "little" requires some clarification, for there was some noticeable positive correlation between foreign trade and subsistence rights, and to the extent that economic rights were part of the overall BHR-index, this relationship also carried over into the joint BHR-index. Conversely, however, there was some evidence that foreign trade was negatively correlated with security rights performance in very poor countries, part of which can probably be explained in terms the international political and economic alliance of the late Cold War period.

Some results have helped confirm established hypotheses, while others have broken some new ground. While, for example, the effects of level of development and that of income distribution on human rights practices were largely corroborated, the strong impact of participation and competitiveness on basic human rights had in this configuration not been previously established. Furthermore, the beneficial role of 'moderate to normal economic growth' had also not been recognized as such in conjunction with human rights performance and effort.

Some findings have given us cause for optimism while others point to the near impossibility of improving even basic human rights. While human rights practices have dramatically improved in places where this would have been unthinkable just a few years ago and while, at least with regards to security rights, even poor countries have proved to be capable of good performance there have also been setbacks. In many places, notably Asia and Africa poverty is such an overwhelming and pervasive phenomenon that both human rights effort and performance are severely crippled by the compounding effect of a lack of resources, and an extremely uneven distribution of wealth, a weak and instable government as well as social and ethnic tension.

Some, however, may find comfort in the position that the recent political changes in the world seem to have reduced the "political" causes of human rights violations as many governments seem to have moved through a process of democratic reform, leaving a lack of development as the single major remaining obstacle to good human rights performance. From the perspective of the findings here such a somewhat optimistic conclusion would have to be tempered by adding that both the medium and high income nations of the Middle East as well as South and Eastern Asia, an area with the highest economic growth rates in the recent

decade, boasted some of the worst BHR-performers. Likewise, in Latin America human rights practices have overall not improved much from their (admittedly already somewhat higher) levels in the 1980s. By contrast, the most impressive gains have occurred in regions, notably in Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa that have experienced little in the way of economic betterment.

What overall lessons may we derive, therefore, from these findings? For one, a certain level of economic development is undoubtedly a necessary condition for good human rights performance, both with respect to economic and political rights. The relationship between human rights and economic wealth, however, is not a linear one but rather shaped something like a logit curve, that is flat at both ends and rather steep in the middle. On one hand, in countries with very low per capita GNPs even substantial increases in wealth such as even doubling the GNP per capita may add very little to improve human rights performance, especially in terms of subsistence rights. Similarly, countries at the high end of the GNP per capita spectrum show relatively few performance differences. While the difference in wealth between Portugal or Switzerland is enormous their difference in BHR-performance is not. On the other hand it seems that medium income nations have the greatest potential for improving their human rights record. While a certain level of GNP per capita is a necessary condition for good BHR-performance, the former is certainly not a sufficient one. The regime arrangements, the distribution of resources aided by the presence of gradual economic growth has proven to be an essential factor as well. In low and medium income countries such as Papua New Guinea, Benin, the Gambia, Mauritius or Costa Rica the type of regime combined with these factors to some extent make up for lacking resources.

Regime type has proved to be the single most important variable in explaining why

governments secure basic human rights. The results here demonstrate conclusively that human rights performance is not merely an extension or automatic outgrowth of improved economic performance, but depend considerably on the willingness and responsiveness of government to do so. Accordingly, the most inclusionary and competitive regimes fare best in securing basic political and economic rights. It is, therefore, no coincidence that these are also the countries with a relatively equitable distribution of resources. By contrast governments that care little for popular input are equally inconsiderate of the people's welfare. A direct comparison of the two principal "political" factors analyzed here, participation and competitiveness, has shown that the latter is considerably more important.

Inclusionary regimes tend to take steps to secure basic subsistence rights, however, their attempts to secure their political monopoly not only undercuts these efforts, but results also in generally high levels of political repression. Exclusionary regimes, which favor political competition only within a relatively limited political spectrum, are also far from being guarantors of good human rights practices. However, since even limited political competition requires greater government responsiveness to a broader cross-section of the population and since these regimes have typically some in-built mechanisms of government accountability their human rights records is not only much better than that of inclusionary authoritarian regimes, but exclusionary regimes have also a far greater potential of improving their BHR-performance as it is always easier to expand political competition than to start from scratch. In several Latin American countries such as Nicaragua or El Salvador we recently witnessed such an expansion process when a large part of the previously excluded political opposition spectrum was brought into the regular political framework. Such a process is far more difficult to envision, for instance, in a country like Cuba in which the government,

undoubtedly committed to enhancing the social well-being of its population, is unwilling to relinquish its monopoly of political power. As a result not only is the Cuban government widely regarded as very repressive, but it finds itself in a position in which its unyielding political stance now threatens to undermine all the social and economic gains the Cuban leadership used to pride itself on.

The findings here also suggest that ceteris paribus former colonies benefitted from something that was loosely described here as a liberal institutional trajectory. That is nations that were former British colonies or that have enjoyed a considerable length of independence, allowing for sufficiently long period of time for political institutions to mature and for post-independence conflicts to "heal", seem to exhibit better human rights practices than others. In conjunction with regime type this model can account for almost two thirds of the variation in BHR-performance for the 1980s sample.

Lastly, the analysis of what has been defined here as human rights effort has yielded two important results. For one, adjusting BHR-performance for the resources available to governments has shown that human rights practices can vary greatly for nations with similarly high or low levels of wealth. Especially in terms of securing basic political rights and freedoms, government effort can make all the difference. On the other hand, the evidence has been far less convincing with respect to subsistence rights effort.

Future research in this area can principally take three directions. For one, new data gathered on a contemporary sample of nations allow us to retest some of the hypotheses put forth in this project. It would be important to see if the relationships remain robust over time, or whether the post-Cold War world requires new explanations. Secondly, the assumed curvilinear relationship between wealth and human rights performance can itself be modelled,

perhaps through a probit or logit analysis, such that critical thresholds can be identified at which minor increases in levels of development can lead to proportionally greater improvements in human rights performance. Thirdly, a more sophisticated measure of effort may be capable of distilling an even "purer" theory thereof, which would allow for a more thorough analysis of human rights effort of nations.

In conclusion, the most important result, in my judgement, is the fact that human rights remain an eminently "political" phenomenon. While we may agree with those that argue "good things go together" and that economic growth is likely to lead to better human rights practices, this development is neither automatic nor irreversible. Much of the respect for human rights exhibited by governments is rooted in the philosophical commitment and in the political will of government leaders as well as in the institutions that make up the political regime. International support for economic development must be complemented by specific and well-targeted international efforts to support the expansion of political, social and economic rights. Relying simply on the "invisible hand" of market and the power of rising per capita GNPs to bolster magically the government performance in securing human rights is not only not warranted, but may also prove-counter productive in the long run.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Measures of Subsistence Rights

Charles Humana surveyed 107 countries in questionnaire form based on the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The questionnaire is divided into different sections (i.e. freedom/rights, state power, maximum punishments in penal codes for various offenses, compulsory documents for citizens). In each section there is a variety of specified rights or freedoms ranging from 'freedom of movement', to 'inter-racial marriages', 'secret trails', 'censorship', 'artistic freedom', 'practice of homosexuality', 'purchase and drinking of alcohol', 'abortion' and 'divorce'. Each right or freedom receives a simple score ranging from 0 to 3 (most severe to most free). Finally, the scores are added up and the country is ranked on a scale from one to hundred. As the laws and customs vary from country to country Humana provides a brief comment on each of his indicators for each country. Potential drawbacks are that Humana has to rely greatly on (his evaluation of) government reports and that, for lack of information, 32 countries could only be assessed in a summary form.

Index of Security Rights: $SECRIGHT_i = T_i + SL_i + D_i + S_i + C_i$

T = Freedom from torture, SL = Freedom from Slavery, D = Freedom from Detention, S = Freedom from Unlawful Searches, C = Freedom from Capital Punishment.

Freedom from Torture corresponds to Humana item (question 9) which is based on

the UDHR Article 5. Freedom from slavery, bondage, forced and child labor corresponds to Humana item 7 and is based on Article 10(3) ICESCR. Freedom from detention without warrant corresponds to Humana item 13, which is based on Article 9(1) ICCPR. Freedom from police searches of home without a warrant corresponds to Humana item 34 and is based on Article 17(1) ICCPR. Freedom from Capital Punishment and extrajudicial killings corresponds to Humana items 8 and 11 and is based on Article 6(1,6) ICCPR. For further details refer to: Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide, (1986, 1992).

Technical Note

Nutrition: Adequate nutrition is one of five requirements for basic subsistence rights. Therefore, countries exceeding the adequate amount of 100% of daily recommended calory intake were, nevertheless, recorded as 100%. Otherwise, the index would have been unfairly skewed in favor of countries with fatty or high-calory diets (i.e. a country with twice the adequate amount of recommended nutrition would have scored higher in terms of basic subsistence rights than a country providing simply an adequate amount).

Measures of Subsistence Rights

Index of Subsistence Rights: $SUBRIGHT_i = [(C_i + W_i + L_i) - H_i)]/IM_i$

C = Calory Intake (%), W = Adequate Water (%), L = Literacy (%), H = Number of Persons per Room (Housing), IM = Infant Mortality Rate (number of deaths per 1000 live births). As higher housing averages are less desirable from the human rights standpoint the score on housing (H) is subtracted from the above sum of calory intake, adequate water and literacy. To do so the housing scores need to be numerically transformed to make them approximately

equivalent in magnitude. Lastly, following the subtraction of the housing score the remaining sum is divided by infant mortality (IM) rate, which is recorded in number of live births. Higher infant mortality rates indicate lower subsistence rights performance, therefore, dividing by mortality rate yields higher subsistence rights scores if the denominator is small (low infant mortality) and lower subsistence rights scores if the denominator is large.

Why these indicators and what would have been alternatives?

R.L. Sivard in World Military and Social Expenditures (Washington, D.C. World Priorities, 1987) comments on several of the most widely used health indicators such as public health expenditures by governments, number of physicians, hospital beds etc. as well as life expectancy and infant mortality. While all indicators are useful, those linked with government expenditure are clearly the most problematic, as they may be biased depending on the various national public accounting systems. In addition, they neither reflect the distribution and allocation of such means, nor account for varying insurance costs. For example, due to high insurance costs and wage-levels the US per capita expenditures on health care are among the highest of the industrialized countries and yet the U.S. has one of worst records of infant mortality rates within the OECD. Equally problematic are indicators reflecting the number of fully qualified physicians, health facilities etc. as these data do not always reflect the concentration of personnel and institutions in certain areas. In addition, the standard of what counts as fully qualified may vary from country to country.

Although average life expectancy seems very suitable for this study, it tends to be over-estimated. This bias results from averaging in the life spans of also the very affluent segments in societies (for further discussion see Ruth Leger Sivard 1987, 45, see also World

Tables 1989-90 (Worldbank, New York, 1990)

Infant mortality rates are the death rates of infants under 1 year of age per 1000 live births. From a basic human rights perspective the advantage of this indicator is that, contrary to life expectancy, it tends to be biased towards people with lower incomes. There is, however, a reporting bias for developing countries with not fully effective registration systems (c.f. Sivard 1987, 45), see also World Economic Survey (United Nations, New York, 1988).

Calories and protein per capita represent the average daily food supply available at the retail level after allowance for animal feed, seed, storage and marketing losses, and waste. Here it should be pointed out that in the past storage loss estimates were significantly over-estimated. More recently, this problem seems to have been corrected (c.f. Robert Chambers, Rural Development (Longman; New York 1983) 13-28. The indicator is based on FAO estimates of 1980 of intake required to maintain moderate activity, taking account of age, sex structure of population, climate and income variations. There is a caveat, however, as these data represent dietary energy supplies as national averages for 1980-82, and may, thus, conceal regional variations.

(Sivard 1987, 45).

As indicated in the paper the data on safe water employ two slightly different definitions and are also based on two different sources to give world wide coverage. The information in most cases comes from the housing surveys of the WHO, UN; for Latin America it is from the PAHO. Varying definitions and sources always raise methodological problems. In the interest of retaining a comprehensive measure for safe water these problems seem acceptable. This includes an obvious bias, namely that the measure for developed countries reflects 'piped water', something which may actually exceed the concept of basic

right (c.f. Compendium of Social Statistics and Indicators 1988 (United Nations, New York, 1988, see also United Nations - Housing and Building Statistics For Europe (United Nations, Geneva, 1975), United Nations Statistical Yearbook For Latin America (Cepal, New York, 1988).

Following the United Nations Housing Survey, (1991, 45) I shall employ 'average number of persons per room' as a measure of adequate housing conditions. Obviously this measure does not fully capture the concept of adequate living conditions. The quality of living does not alone depend on the density per room alone, but also on the room size and other factors. Two persons sharing a small room may be less comfortable than 4 people in a rather large room. There are also cultural differences with respect to housing size, but I believe that in conjunction with 'access to clean water' this indicator is the most useful one available in order to reflect housing conditions as a basic human right (c.f. Compendium of Social Statistics and Indicators 1988 (United Nations, New York, 1988).

Technical Note

Index of basic subsistence rights: the objective here was to construct a straightforward index that is both similar to the Humana Index (used to assess security rights) and yet retains as much information of the raw data as possible. Since three out of five indicators are measured in percentages and a fourth can be easily converted a additive/subtractive approach was chosen. Since infant mortality is recorded in whole numbers with sometimes only small differences between countries, the sum of all other indicators was finally divided by infant mortality to reflect even these small differences. In order to reduce somewhat the influence of the housing variable, the sum of 'calory intake' 'adequate water' and 'adult literacy rate'

was multiplied by two before 'adequate housing' was subtracted. The rationale for this was twofold; for one, the housing date are to some extent the relatively least reliable of all the subsistence measures, therefore they should not carry and undue weight by being a denominator. Housing measures differ with respect to accuracy and the time of survey. For some countries they are not available at all. In addition, they also do not reflect cultural differences or the availability of open space (c.f. US with Japan or Hong Kong).

Summary of Original Variables in the Data-Set and Sources:
(capitals denote the code used in the analysis)
(for full bibliographic reference see "Bibliography")

(1) Case Number
(2) Country Name
(3) Country Acronym
(4) Country Code
(5) TORture (Humana, World Human Rights Guide, 1985)
(6) SLAVery (as above)
(7) DETention, Freedom from (as above)
(8) SEARechs, Freedom from unreasonable (as above)
(9) CAPital punishment and EXtrajudicial Killings, Freedom from (as above)
(10) CAL (Sivard World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987-88)
(11) WATer, Access to safe (UN Housing Survey, UN Demographic Yrbk)
(12) HOUSing, adequate (Sivard, as above)
(13) MORTality Rate, Infant.. (as above)
(14) LITeracy Rate, Adult.. (as above)
(15) GNPCAP, ('84) (World Tables IBRD 1991, :3)
(16) GNPRATE, ('65-'84) World Development Report (IBRD '86,:181))
(17) GNP, (absolute in US$, for '84) (OECD: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows 1986)
(18) GDPRATE, (average annual growth '73-'84) Table 2 World Development Report IBRD '86
(19) INCOMDIS, (distribution of income, '84-'87 bottom 20%:: top 20%) UNDP Human Development Report 1991, p.122 (3rd world) & p.186 (industrialized countries) (c.f. also World Development Report)
(20) ECONTYP, Type of Economy (Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1986)
(21) LINDEP, Length of Independence ('84) Universal Almanac 1991, and Political Almanac 1986
(22) COLSYS, Colonial System (as above)
(23) REGime Type - participation = voter turnout in % of total population (Vanhanen 1990)

competitiveness = % of seats of dominant party in legislature (Fischer Weltalmanach 1986)
(24) UNCOV, signed UN HR Covenant (Fischer Weltalmanach 1986, Forsythe 1981)
(25) TOOF (Total Other Official Flows, Net, 1984) investment from OECD (OECD: Geographic Distribution of Financial Resources, 1988)
(26) PSIN (Private Sector Net Investment) Private investment from OECD (Sources: same as 23)
(27) EXP, Exports from OECD countries, 1984, Direction of Trade Stat. Yearbook, 1986.
(28) IMP, Imports from OECD countries, 1984, (Source same as 25).
(29) INCOMTYP, Income type as defined by World Bank (IBRD World Tables 1991)
(30) GINI coefficient (measure of income inequality) Source: UNDP Human Development Report 1991.

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